ECUMENISM IN CANADIAN PRESBYTERIANISM

REGIONALISM, NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL GOSPEL SUPPORT IN THE ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT OF CANADIAN PRESBYTERIANISM

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS:

The thesis is a critical examination of the social and cultural factors operative in the ecumenical movement of Canadian Presbyterianism that led to the formation of the United Church of Canada in 1925. Canadian ecumenicity is examined in the light of contemporary international research in the sociology of ecumenism. The thesis employs both historical materials and statistical records to discover the salient variables influencing support and opposition to church union.

It is the central contention of the thesis that support and opposition to church union were motivated by a complex of variables relating to regionalism, nationalism and the social gospel movement. The issues that divided the Presbyterian Church in the ecumenical controversy were the same issues that divided English speaking Canada. It is our contention that the creation of a national united church was seen as a vehicle for the systematic redemption of Canadian society, that it was an attempt to dramatically reform and redefine confederation. It is our final contention that the vision of a new society or the hope

of attaining a comparable ideal is an essential component for the accomplishment of an extensive inter-denominational church merger in an industrialized nation.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BLI	Bureau of Literature and Information
CLU	Co-operation and Local Union
PNL	Presbyterian Nonconcurrent Literature
UCA	United Church Archives
UCC	United Church of Canada

INTRODUCTION

The twentieth century has seen the rapid development of the ecumenical phenomenon from a relatively esoteric concern of a few individual churchmen to a pervasive international movement of thought and action that affects all religious groups. One country that has enjoyed particular ecumenical success is Canada. The various inter-denominational unions have developed at an earlier period here than in other countries. In 1884 Canadian Methodists resolved their differences to form a national union; comparable organizations of united Methodists did not develop in Australia until 1904, in Mexico until 1930, in England until 1931 and in the United States until 1939. It should be noted that the Canadian Methodist union was the culmination of a long process of 8 separate unions involving 16 distinct groups.[1] A similar series of unions led to the formation of the Presbyterian Church of Canada in 1875, a process of consolidation that began with the merger of a Burgher and anti-Burgher group in the second decade of the 19th century. Unification of Presbyterians did not occur until 1910 in Australia and not until 1929 in Scotland. American Presbyterians still remain divided into two camps, despite decades of negotiations

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[1] K. H. Cousland, "A Brief History of the Church Union Movement in Canada", in T. B. Kilpatrick, Our Common Faith (Toronto: Ryerson, 1928), p. 11. Other sources for this section are Rouse and Neill, A History of the Ecumenical Movement, 1517-1948 (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1954), pp. 496-505; J. J. Moi, Religion in Australia (Melbourne: Nelson, 1971), pp. 129-132; J. R. Fleming, The Story of Church Union in Scotland (London: James Clarke, 1929); S. M. Cavert, The American Churches in the Ecumenical Movement, 1900-1968 (New York: Association, 1970).

and conversations. Canadian Congregationalists became a single body in 1906, slightly after the Australian union of 1903 but well in advance of the American Congregational union of 1925.

Ecumenism in Canada has also been much broader in scope. The first large inter-denominational union in the world took place in Canada in 1925. (The United Church of North India which was formed in 1924 consolidated the mission activities of eleven separate church organizations but these mission boards were not autonomous bodies.) Since the Canadian union in 1925 there have been other trans-confessional ecumenical victories in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Thailand, Guatemala, Rhodesia, and South India. In addition there have been intra-denominational Protestant unions in France and Japan and two unions in the United States involving small Protestant groups. In contrast to these church unions of non-industrialized nations of the Third World and the other unions involving small minorities of more developed countries, stands the Canadian union that created the largest Protestant denomination in this industrialized nation, a church now comprising over 20% of the population. The unification of Methodists, Congregationalists and two-thirds of the Presbyterians in Canada in 1925 serves as an outstanding example of ecumenical triumph.

The history of the 1925 union is not controversial. The initial ecumenical overtures were made by the Anglican Synod in 1885. The Methodists in 1886 and the Presbyterians in 1888 gave the church union movement additional support with regular meetings of interested parties

in the period from 1893 to 1901. The Anglicans left the negotiations as did the Baptists who had expressed a brief interest in church union. In 1904 a joint committee representing Methodists, Presbyterians and Congregationalists recommended organic union of the churches. The history of the union movement itself can be conveniently divided into four segments: 1904-1910 preparation of the Basis of Union, the theological document upon which the union was founded; 1910-1917 formal commitment to union by Methodists and Congregationalists with internal conflict among Presbyterians; 1917-1921 a period of moratorium on the union debate; 1921-1925 legal battles to secure legislative approval of union and the Presbyterian schism. The culmination of the union movement was the formation of the United Church of Canada in 1925, involving all Methodists and Congregationalists and approximately two-thirds of the Presbyterians.

This thesis will not be concerned with recounting the chronology of the movement; there are a number of good histories readily available which itemize the critical events that led to union.[2] There are also a number of works which concentrate on the doctrinal implications of ecumenism with particular reference to the 1925 union. The best of these is E. L. Morrow's Church Union in Canada.[3] Since it is our

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[2] The leaders of the uniting churches, (George Pidgeon, S. D. Chown, W. T. Gunn, E. H. Oliver, etc.), have published their accounts of the union and there is little controversy surrounding the sequence of events. There are also a host of other books on the history of the 1925 union; references are given in the bibliography. Particularly noteworthy is J. W. Grant, The Canadian Experience of Church Union (London: Lutterworth, 1967).

[3] E. L. Morrow, Church Union in Canada (Toronto: Thomas Allen, 1923).

contention that theology was only a peripheral factor in the formation of the United Church, little theological discussion will be found in this thesis.

Our central concern in this study is to uncover the social and cultural factors that influenced Canadian ecumenism. Individual decisions to support or oppose the union were based on a wide variety of reasons some of which were flippant and arbitrary.[4] We are not concerned with the peculiarities of individual actions but with the patterns that lay behind them. The task of discovering these patterns is impeded by a phenomenon that obscured the union debates.

> From the very first the situation was complicated by the fact that the real differences of social attitude and temper could not very well be discussed in the open without offense, and thus the arguments set forth in public did not represent the issue as it existed in the minds of large numbers of people. Any transcript of the records, therefore, will fail to reveal some of the main elements in the actual discussion.[5]

Our task is to make manifest these hidden "differences of social attitude and temper".

There is only one published text which attempts to analyze the sociological factors in the formation of the United Church, the seminal work of C. E. Silcox.[6] Silcox's massive tome was a significant contribution when it was published in 1933 because of its concern with the

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[4] For an anecdotal account of some of these flippant reasons see J. K. Galbraith, The Scotch (Toronto: MacMillan, 1964), pp. 100ff.

[5] E. Thomas, "Church Union in Canada", American Journal of Theology, July 1919, p. 260.

[6] C. E. Silcox, Church Union in Canada (New York: Institute for Social and Religious Research, 1933). W. E. Mann, "The Canadian Church

(continued)

latent social factors underlying unionist/nonconcurrent rhetoric, and because it assembled data from widely separated geographical areas and presented this material in a coherent form. But there is in Silcox's work no theory of Canadian ecumenism. He merely assembled data and offered a variegated list of explanations for support and opposition to church union. There was no attempt to weigh the importance of these explanations nor to show how the key themes related to each other and to Canadian society. The absence of a theory of ecumenism in Silcox indicates that his work requires substantial revision. In addition it should be noted that since the time when Silcox wrote, sociology has developed much more sophisticated techniques to measure and evaluate and since 1933 more data has become available, not only about the 1925 Canadian union, but also about international ecumenicity. Silcox had to travel across the country to find scattered pieces of information because the courts had not determined the final ownership of Presbyterian records. After World War II the collection of church records, personal correspondence, newspaper reports, etc., increased dramatically and is now centrally located at the United Church Archives--Silcox had no access to much of this material. Since 1933 there has

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6 (continued)
Union", in Ehrenstrom and Muelder, Institutionalism and Church Unity (New York: Association, 1963), pp. 171-194 relies heavily on Silcox, as does Edwin File, "A Sociological Analysis of Church Union in Canada: Non-Theological Factors in Interdenominational Church Union up to 1925" (PhD dissertation, Boston University, 1961). File's work has most of the shortcomings of Silcox's account with few of its virtues. File's study is largely descriptive; his analysis is very poor. He wishes to show that the UCC "approaches" the ecclesia type of Milton Yinger and suggests that the UCC may be a new national denomination. There is virtually no use of materials that were not available to Silcox.

been considerable research in the sociology of ecumenism internationally, research that can provide new insights and corroborating evidence for an analysis of the Canadian movement. This material was also not available to Silcox.

This thesis will attempt to re-examine the social and cultural factors operative in the 1925 Canadian union in the light of materials and methods that have become available since the publication of Silcox's text. Our analysis will focus on the ecumenical debate within the Presbyterian Church of Canada since the only significant dissent to the union came from within Presbyterianism. Although we shall make occasional reference to Methodists and Congregationalists our primary interest is with the unionists and nonconcurrents of Canadian Presbyterianism.

Two further limitations of this thesis should be noted. The first relates to statistical techniques. This thesis attempts to integrate historical materials with the analysis of quantifiable data. Certain tests of statistical significance[7] have been employed to minimize the influence of chance. The statistical analysis in this thesis is relatively primitive; there has been for example no attempt to rigorously control the influence of intervening variables in every case. The

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[7] The primary tests of statistical significance used were chi-square, Spearman's coefficient of rank order correlation, and Oppenheim's Nomographs; see H. M. Blalock, Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960) and A. N. Oppenheim, Questionnaire Design and Attitude Measurement (New York: Basic Books, 1966). It should be noted that Spearman should be employed with caution when $n \leq 10$; see Blalock, op. cit., p. 318. Unless otherwise noted the confidence level used in this thesis is $p < .05$.

justification for the use of a relatively primitive methodology is based on an appreciation of the crudeness of the data. The reliability of church records varies enormously, reflecting the competence and enthusiasm of individual session clerks. To use sophisticated techniques with crude data would create an illusion of scientific exactitude that would be misleading.

The second major limitation relates to the very brief discussion in this thesis of enormously complex issues. The critical forces in the church union controversy were closely connected with issues that have been the subjects of exhaustive debate in Canada. In this thesis there has been no attempt to definitively discuss these important issues; we are solely concerned with the relationship of these central questions to Canadian ecumenism. Our delineation of the critical issues in Canadian social history has been severely limited of necessity. We have attempted to direct the reader to other sources for a more extensive discussion of such matters as nationalism, regionalism, and so forth, as they arise.

The first chapter of the thesis opens with a discussion of the relative insignificance of theological questions to the church union debate, followed by a review of the critical variables that have influenced ecumenism in Canada and in other countries. This survey leads to the establishment of three central sociological theories of ecumenism. In chapter II the theory that ecumenism is a response to the declining importance of religion is examined through a comparative empirical

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analysis of the institutional strength of unionist and nonconcurrent Presbyterian charges. The third chapter examines the theory that ecumenism is an attempt to rationalize ecclesiastical competition in imitation of organizational changes in the Canadian business community and the larger society. This leads to a discussion in the fourth and fifth chapters of the social goals of the Presbyterian Church and the relevance of the social gospel movement to Canadian ecumenism. The sixth and seventh chapters are devoted to a discussion of the influence of nationalism and regionalism on the church union movement.

The concluding chapter returns to the theoretical framework developed in the initial chapter and summarizes the contribution of this thesis to an understanding of the Canadian church union movement of 1925 and the contribution to the wider study of international ecumenism. It is the central contention of this thesis that support and opposition to church union was motivated by a complex of variables relating to regionalism, nationalism and the social gospel movement. The issues that divided the Presbyterian Church in the church union controversy were the same issues that divided English speaking Canada. It is our contention that the creation of a national united church was seen as a vehicle for the systematic redemption of Canadian society, that it was an attempt to dramatically reform and redefine confederation. It is our final contention that the vision of a new society or the hope of attaining a comparable ideal is an essential component for the

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[8] The term nonconcurrent refers to those Presbyterians who refused to concur with the decision of the majority of the members and of the general assembly of the Presbyterian Church to enter into church union with the Methodist and Congregational Churches.

accomplishment of an extensive inter-denominational church merger in an industrialized nation.

CHAPTER I

THE SOCIOLOGY OF ECUMENISM

The avowed motivation for ecumenism most frequently articulated by supporters of the Canadian union of 1925 was based on the prayer of Jesus for His church in John 17:21 (KJV): "That they all may be one; as thou Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us; that the world may believe that thou has sent me". The unionists argued that the divisions of the Christian church were tragic wounds in Christ's body, wounds that could be healed through the removal of denominational distinctiveness. The church union movement was described by its advocates as being the concrete application of sound Biblical theology to ecclesiastical organization.

Similarly the opponents of union in the Presbyterian Church couched their defense of denominationalism in theological and Biblical language. They rejected the unionist exegesis of John 17:21 as an argument for organic union; in their view the New Testament supports only the "spiritual unity" of Christendom. The nonconcurrents argued that the united church would be a creedal monstrosity. The theology of the Basis of Union was said to be faulty, making too many concessions to Congregational liberalism, omitting central articles in the Presbyterian Confession of Faith and abandoning the theological core of the Presbyterian tradition. The union was allegedly the ideal of those who wished to "eliminate the embarrassment of doctrine" and make the church "a non-sectarian institution similar to the Canadian

Club or the Rotarians".[1] The opponents of union pictured themselves as ardent defenders of theological truth in a secular age.

The manifest concern with the theological merits of ecumenism conceals the more serious social and cultural divisions that polarized the unionists and their opponents. Although many religious leaders would agree with W. L. Sperry's contention that "all our religious differences, whether of faith or conduct, derive from varying doctrines of God",[2] there is a growing awareness that the non-theological factors in the ecumenical controversy are of pre-eminent importance. A survey of the articles contained in the Ecumenical Review and its predecessor Christendom, together with an analysis of the bulletins published by the Faith and Order movement of the World Council of Churches, reveals an increasing concern with the prominence of social variables in ecclesiastical disputes. Despite the bulk of these articles very little material is contained in them other than a listing of the social and cultural elements which retard church unity with an exhortation to all Christians to manifest greater tolerance.[3] For

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[1] George F. Macdonnell quoted in E. L. Morrow, Church Union in Canada (Toronto: Thomas Allen, 1923), p. 136.

[2] W. L. Sperry, "The Non-Theological Factors in the Making and Unmaking of Church Union", Faith and Order Bulletin, #84, (New York: Harper, 1937). Similarly R. P. Barnes, "The Ecumenical Movement", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Nov. 1960, pp. 133-45, argues that "the ecumenical movement is essentially an expression of conviction, a matter of faith derived from biblical and theological authority".

[3] See e.g. H. P. van Dusen, "Church Union: Recent Progress and Present Obstacles", Christendom, 1943, pp. 87-96; D. Jenkins, "The Ecumenical Movement and its Non-Theological Factors", Ecumenical Review, July 1951, pp. 339-346; C. H. Dodd, G. R. Cragg and J. Ellul, Social

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religious leaders social considerations constitute the residual category which explains why ecumenical negotiations fail even when doctrinal, devotional and ecclesiastical structures are not impediments to merger. For a more extensive analysis of the importance of social as contrasted with theological variables, we must turn to sociologists.

The typical attitude of sociologists toward ecumenical theology is revealed in an incisive American study of the rejection of union with the Northern and United Presbyterian Churches by the Southern Presbyterian group. The authors of this study contrasted the manifest factors in the ecumenical debate, discovered through a content analysis of anti-union literature, with the latent factors as revealed through an ecological study of county voting patterns. In the literature of the debate a complex of themes related to doctrine and church policy were of primary importance with the subject of race relations receiving only cursory mention. But an ecological analysis of the vote on union showed that counties which had a high proportion of Presbyterian delegates voting against union were counties in which prosegregation sentiment was strong. The discrepancy between the manifest and latent arguments against union led the authors

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3 (continued)
and Cultural Factors in Church Divisions (New York: World Council of Churches, 1952); W. E. Garrison, "Social and Cultural Factors in our Divisions", Ecumenical Review, Oct. 1952, pp. 43-51; J. Hromadka, "Social and Cultural Factors in our Divisions", Ecumenical Review, Oct. 1952, pp. 52-58; R. C. Kennedy, "Why Churches Do Not Unite", Christian Century, July 16,1952, pp. 825-7; C. C. Morrison, "The Nature of Protestant Disunity", Christian Century, Mar. 9, 1960, pp. 281-4; J. K. Hadden, "A Protestant Paradox--Divided They Merge", Trans-Action, July/Aug., 1967, pp. 63-69.

of the study to conclude that theological defenses of denominationalism were used to legitimate an emotional position on race relations.[4] This view of theological debate "as an ex post facto ideological legitimation of a process of co-operation with appreciably more mundane roots"[5] is shared by all sociologists of ecumenism surveyed in this chapter.

The theological debates surrounding the Canadian union of 1925 bear out the sociologists' contention that theology has little to do with the real issues of ecumenism. The merger of the dogmas of the three churches was accomplished with relative ease; the negotiations that produced the Basis of Union were not permeated by doctrinal controversy. The clash of Arminianism and Calvinism was soft-pedalled in the creedal formulation; in S. D. Chown's words "the denominations . . . were prepared to accept both principles as pragmatical entities without courting any abstract debate upon a theme so difficult".[6] That the two principles were fundamentally contradictory

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[4] S. M. Dornbush and R. D. Irle, "The Failure of Presbyterian Union", American Journal of Sociology, Jan. 1959, pp. 352-355. The authors used an index of pro-segregation sentiment based on the proportion of Negroes and the proportion of rural voters in the population of each county. These measures were found to be accurate indicators of pro-segregation in other studies.

[5] Peter Berger, "A Market Model for the Analysis of Ecumenicity", Social Research, 1963, pp. 77-93. The few sociological studies of religious schism also suggest that theology is a minor variable; see R. W. Doherty, The Hicksite Separation, (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers, 1967); R. W. Doherty, "The Social Bases for the Presbyterian Schism of 1837-8: The Philadelphia Case", Journal of Social History, 1968, pp. 69-79; Vrga and Fahey, "The Relationship of Religious Practice and Beliefs to Schism", Sociological Analysis, 1970, pp. 46-55; Vrga and Fahey, "Status Loss as a Source of Ethno-Religious Factionalism" and "Political Ideology and Religious Factionalism", Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1971, pp. 101-113; R. D. Christy, "Hidden Factors in Religious Conflict: A Sociological Analysis", M. A. thesis, University of Waterloo, 1969.

[6] S. D. Chown, The Story of Church Union in Canada (Toronto: (continued)

and that the Basis of Union was a theological mosaic that failed to synthesize the three doctrinal traditions of Presbyterianism, Methodism and Congregationalism, did not disturb many churchgoers. In fact many unionist clergymen confessed that they had never read the Basis or had forgotten its contents.[7]

Although nonconcurrents stressed the significance of theological inadequacies in the Basis, the doctrinal argument did not emerge until opposition to church union had become firmly entrenched. When the Basis was first issued, Ephraim Scott, who was to become a vociferous critic of the creedlessness of the united church movement, was effusive in his praise. The excellence of the Basis said Scott, "must impress every thoughtful reader. It is full, simple and Scriptural. There are few Presbyterians who can find any substantial difference between it and the Shorter Catechism or the Confession of Faith".[8] D. J. Fraser, who also became a critic of

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6 (continued)
Ryerson, 1930), p. 66. Cf. J. W. Grant, The Canadian Experience of Church Union (London: Lutterworth, 1967), pp. 36-37; C. E. Silcox, Church Union in Canada (New York: Institute of Social and Religious Research, 1933), pp. 198ff. The essential theological differences between Presbyterians and Methodists related to whether one is saved solely through divine grace (Calvinism) or whether one could through one's own action facilitate the salvation that ultimately flows from divine grace (Arminianism). Theological differences among the denominations also were related to matters of authority and individual freedom.

7 See E. L. Morrow, op. cit., pp. 118ff. In a study of attitudes toward ecumenism in the United States, H. Paul Douglass found that only 7% of all Protestants surveyed and only 8% of all Protestant clergy regarded the absence of a creed or statement of common doctrine a serious impediment to church union: see Douglass, Church Unity Movements in the United States (New York: Institute of Social and Religious Research, 1934), p. 75.

8 Scott's remarks were cited by R. E. Welsh in a letter to the Montreal Witness and Canadian Homestead, Jan. 5, 1924.

the theological lapses in the Basis, awarded equally complimentary accolades to the document when it first emerged.[9]

The schism of Canadian Presbyterianism in the church union controversy did not follow the lines of the major theological divisions of the day, the fundamentalist/modernist dispute. Although opponents of union liked to describe themselves as the defenders of the Presbyterian theological tradition, and even though fundamentalists appear to have been more prevalent in the nonconcurrent camp than among unionists, many of the leaders of the anti-union movement, especially in the Presbyterian Church Association, were modernists.[10] There were no specific doctrines that divided unionists and nonconcurrents nor was there a strong correlation between support or opposition to church union and theological fundamentalism.

In later chapters we shall show that the social gospel movement was a highly significant variable in the church union controversy. At this point we shall merely note that the social gospel issue was not directly related to theological doctrines by its supporters. The division within Presbyterianism over the social gospel concerned the relationship between the church and the world; it was a question as

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[9] D. J. Fraser, "Church Union Movements in Canada", Harvard Theological Review, 1915. Cf. editorial in the St. Thomas Times-Journal, Oct. 17, 1923.

[10] The more prominent anti-union Modernists were T. Crawford Brown, Thomas Eakin, D. J. Fraser and Stuart Parker. See the editorial in the Witness Nov. 27, 1924, the letter by Douglas Reid to the Toronto Globe Nov. 25, 1924, and the anonymous letter to the Globe Nov. 28, 1924.

to the extent to which religious belief should be actualized in social action. Although theological liberalism was more popular than commitment to traditional theological principles among social gospellers, there were social activists who were conservative in regard to the maintenance of doctrine.[11]

Theological and scriptural arguments were introduced as rationales for support or opposition to church union. There was little difference in the content of the theological beliefs of the two parties. In general the opponents of union were more likely than unionists to regard theology, regardless of content, as being more important. The theological implications of church union and the unionists' de-emphasis of the particularities of Presbyterian belief were subjects debated more often by opponents than by supporters of union. But the issues which divided Presbyterians in the schism of 1925 were only peripherally related to theological questions. The significant variables that split the church were social and cultural.

A. A Survey of Variables

If social and cultural factors are more important than theological differences in disputes over church union, we should examine the international body of sociological literature on ecumenism in order to determine the critical variables affecting ecumenism.

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[11] See Richard Allen, The Social Passion (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1971), p. 252.

After discovering the variables that have a significant influence on other church union movements, we shall attempt to determine the influence of each variable on the Canadian union of 1925.

(i) Social Class

H. R. Niebuhr in the Social Sources of Denominationalism argued that the divisions within American Christianity were largely maintained by the existence of differences of social class.[12] The congregations of Protestant denominations in North America tend to be relatively homogeneous in regard to social status. Different economic groups hold different values sacred and expect their religious institutions to respond to the emotional needs of particular socio-economic groups. Because religious affiliation reinforces the social status of church goers, a sharply delineated class structure is an impediment to ecclesiastical consolidation. Churchgoers of the lower stratum of society are reluctant to merge with middle or upper class churches because of a fear that they would be patronized by the upper group. Similarly middle and upper class church members fear that union with a lower class church would identify the former with the behaviour patterns of the latter, thereby weakening the superior position of the middle and upper groups.

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[12] H. R. Niebuhr, The Social Sources of Denominationalism (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1929). Similarly the economic divisions of Methodist groups in Great Britain hampered attempts to unify Methodism; see Robert Currie, Methodism Divided (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), pp. 205-213.

The increasing American interest in ecumenism has been attributed by some sociologists to an alleged decline in class tension. Peter Berger, Robert Lee and Milton Yinger argue that sectarian groups that were founded on economic protest have lost their reason for maintaining their denominational identity because of upward social mobility. As sectarian groups become more middle class they gravitate toward the mainstream denominations.[13] Social mobility can affect ecumenism in other ways. Gus Tubeville, for example, in an analysis of union negotiations among Methodists in a small rural community in South Carolina, found that opposition to religious merger was spearheaded by an emerging group of wealthy citizens who sought to displace the established families that had supported ecumenism.[14]

Social class was a central variable in the 1925 Canadian union. Anglicans refused to participate in the union because they did not want to share the lower class identity of the Methodists. Similarly in the union vote Presbyterians, who occupied a higher stratum of society, opposed union to a far greater extent than Methodists. The differences in social class between Methodists and

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13 Peter Berger, op. cit., p. 91; Robert Lee, The Social Sources of Church Unity (New York: Abingdon, 1960), pp. 25ff; Milton Yinger, The Scientific Study of Religion (New York: MacMillan, 1970), p. 248.

14 Gus Tubeville, "Religious Schism in the Methodist Church: A Sociological Analysis of the Pine Grove Case", Rural Sociology, March 1949, pp. 29-39.

Presbyterians has been suggested by many observers[15] as an explanatory variable for understanding the higher level of opposition to union among Presbyterians. But none of these observers presents evidence to substantiate the claim that Presbyterians in general were socially superior to Methodists, nor do these observers attempt to substantiate the logical consequence of their argument: that Presbyterians who opposed union were of a higher social class than those Presbyterians who supported union.

The evidence for ascribing high social class to Presbyterians is based on historical data and contemporary sociological research. Historically Presbyterians were much more likely than Methodists to occupy positions of social, economic and political power in Canada,[16]

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[15] See S. D. Chown, op. cit., p. 82; E. F. File, "A Sociological Analysis of Church Union in Canada: Non-Theological Factors in Interdenominational Church Union Up to 1925" (PhD dissertation, Boston University, 1961), p. 120; J. W. Grant, George Pidgeon (Toronto: Ryerson, 1962), p. 82; W. E. Mann, "The Canadian Church Union", in N. Ehrenstrom and W. G. Muelder, eds., Institutionalism and Church Unity (New York: Association, 1963), p. 182; Silcox, op. cit., p. 199. Unfortunately none of the above devote much attention to the influence of class on ecumenism.

[16] See S. D. Clark, Church and Sect in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1948); H. H. Walsh, The Christian Church in Canada (Toronto: Ryerson, 1956); D. J. Wilson, The Church Grows in Canada (Toronto: Ryerson, 1966); etc. W. H. Magney, "The Methodist Church and the National Gospel 1884-1914", United Church Archives Bulletin, XX (1968), pp. 3, 29-30, notes that wealthy Methodists at the turn of the century were more likely to be among the nouveau riche. Presbyterian wealth had a longer historical pedigree.

and there is considerable evidence to show that this supremacy over the Methodists continued in 1925,[17] even though Methodists were beginning to challenge the established groups with some hope of success. J. D. Allingham, in an ecological analysis of 1951 census data, showed that Presbyterians and United Churchmen were both upper middle class churches but that Presbyterians were clearly superior in regard to education and occupational status.[18] John Porter has shown that Presbyterians are superior to United Church members in regard to representation in the economic elites of Canada.[19] The historical and contemporary statistical evidence is sufficiently compelling to substantiate the claim that Presbyterians in general were of higher social class than Methodists.

It is more difficult to demonstrate the consequence of the class argument, that is, to show that Presbyterians who opposed union were of a higher social class than Presbyterian ecumenists. There is no hard data to substantiate the hypothesis but there is at least one letter to the Toronto Globe which suggests that class

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[17] See e.g. the article by Robert Hornie which analyzes census reports to show Presbyterian social superiority in the Presbyterian May 15, 1913, pp. 618-9. Cf. Presbyterian and Westminster Jan. 15, 1920, p. 63; Witness Mar. 31, 1921; Aug. 31, 1921; Nov. 17, 1921; etc. Jack Pickersgill is quoted by Peter Newman, The Distemper of Our Times (Winnipeg: Greywood, 1968) p. 215 as saying that all members of John Bracken's Manitoba cabinet in 1922 were Presbyterian. Hugh MacLennan makes a number of interesting remarks about the dominance of Presbyterians in the financial life of Montreal in Two Solitudes (Toronto: Collins, 1945) and Return of the Sphinx (New York: Scribner's, 1967).

[18] J. D. Allingham, "Religious Affiliation and Social Class in Ontario", (M.A. thesis, McMaster University, 1963), tables 7, 8, and 11 on pp. 27-30.

[19] John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic (Toronto: University of (continued)

differences among Presbyterians hindered church union.[20] In addition there is the clear evidence that the superior social class of Presbyterians in general was a significant factor in opposition. Finally there is the central importance of the social gospel movement; since the united church would attempt to reduce the social and economic power of Canadian elites it is probable that opponents of union would be overrepresented in these elites.[21]

(ii) Regionalism

Within the United States support for ecumenism is distributed unequally geographically. H. P. Douglass, H. R. Niebuhr, Robert Lee and Milton Yinger all have noted that opposition to church union is concentrated in particular areas of the United States, especially in the South.[22] Morris Taggert, in a study of attitudes toward ecumenism of members of the Evangelical Covenant Church of America,

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19 (continued)
Toronto, 1965), pp. 91-103, 287-90, 348-9; John Porter, "The Economic Elite in Canada", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 1957, pp. 377-394.

20 Letter by J. B. Skene, Toronto Globe Mar. 8, 1923. Skene wanted to dispel the numerous allegations that nonconcurrents were the party of privilege for whom opposition to union was motivated by self-interest.

21 It is also possible that Presbyterians who opposed the democratizing potential of the social gospel unionists were merely more insecure in their positions. Thus Presbyterian opposition would be based not on class differences but on psychological variables.

22 Douglass, Church Unity, p. 117; Niebuhr, op. cit.; Yinger, op. cit., p. 248; Lee, op. cit., p. 195.

found that opposition to union was significantly stronger in the western states.[23] Regionalism retards ecumenism in two ways: geographical isolation hinders contact with denominations in other parts of the country and the life styles and attitudes, (especially toward race relations), of various parts of the country are so different as to impede national mergers. Yoshio Fukuyama argues that increased geographical mobility weakens denominational ties and thus supports the growth of ecumenical sentiment.[24]

In the Canadian union of 1925 regionalism was a highly significant variable with strongest Presbyterian support for union in the Western provinces and lowest support in central Canada, especially Ontario. In table I-1 the unequal geographical support for union is depicted.

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[23] Morris Taggert, "Ecumenical Attitudes in the Evangelical Covenant Church of America", Review of Religious Research, 1967, pp. 36-44. Taggert's survey included 24,838 respondents (40% of the entire church); the regionalism variable was significant at the level $p < .001$.

[24] Yoshio Fukuyama, "The Theological Implications of Mobility", in J. R. Nelson, ed., Christian Unity in the United States (St. Louis: Bethany, 1958), pp. 197-205.

TABLE I-1 REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ECUMENICAL SUPPORT IN PERCENTAGES

	Our Survey	Silcox's Survey
Ontario	46	61
Quebec	63	75
Maritimes	69	79
Alberta	78	93
British Columbia	79	93
Saskatchewan	92	97
Manitoba	93	97
All Canada	66	83
	(n=1577)	(n=4512)

The first column of the table contains data for charges only, (details of the methodology of our survey can be found in chapter II). The second column of the table contains the data collected by C. E. Silcox in 1933;[25] this column reports the vote of all congregations including Canadian charges, non-Canadian charges, and domestic and foreign missions. Silcox's study shows a much higher level of support for church union than does our survey. But we have greater confidence in our data because only the charge is a viable financial unit. Mission stations, especially in the sparsely populated West, had little choice in the union vote; they lacked the financial independence to oppose union. It should be noted that our figures report a 34% level of Presbyterian opposition compared to only 17% in Silcox's study. The 34% level of our survey corresponds much more closely with the official vote and is much closer to the final settlement that divided the

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[25] Column 2 was computed from Table XIV in Silcox, op. cit., p. 282. Silcox includes non-Canadian charges e.g. in the British West Indies that were under Canadian jurisdiction.

property of the Presbyterian Church. But despite the union bias of Silcox's study there are no differences in the regional pattern of voting between our study and that of Silcox. In both studies the regional variable is of central importance.[26]

(iii) Ethnicity

Ethnic differences help maintain denominational pluralism insofar as religious organizations reflect the ethnic background of their members. Churches tend to support the values of life styles of particular ethnic groups. Thus each wave of immigration brings a new church into being; ethnic churches are separated not only by country of origin but by period of migration. In the United States ethnic differences are of decreasing importance as all ethnic groups become assimilated into the American way of life. Once ethnic differences decline the reason for distinct ethnic churches disappears and church union is a viable possibility.

In the Canadian union of 1925 there is abundant historical evidence pointing to the centrality of the ethnic variable. In addition there are two statistically significant relationships between ethnicity and ecumenism: there is a positive correlation between regions which supported church union and those regions which had a high proportion of non Anglo-Saxon immigrants; there is a relationship between country of origin and clerical support for ecumenism.

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[26] In our study the regional variable is significant at the level of $p<.001$, chi square=87.4141, df=6.

The 1921 census reports the distribution of immigrants in each Canadian province. We were able to compute from this data the proportion of immigrants to the base population of each region, expressing the result as a percentage. These percentages could then be rank ordered providing a way of establishing the relationship between ecumenism and ethnicity. In table I-2 the ecumenical rank of each region is correlated with the rank order of post 1900 non Anglo-Saxon immigrants in each region. There is a positive correlation that is statistically significant at the .05 level.[27] Repetition of the procedure relating regional economic rank with pre-1900 non Anglo-Saxon immigrants and with Anglo-Saxon immigration before and after 1900 revealed no further correlations. The positive correlation between church union support and the proportion of post 1900 non Anglo-Saxon immigrants in each region suggests that extensive contact with new Canadians weakened the ethnic identity of those Presbyterians living in areas where non Anglo-Saxons were plentiful. The weakening of ethnic identity facilitated church union support.

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[27] Data in the table was computed from Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1921), volume II, table 61, pp. 374-391. The significance test is Spearman's Co-efficient of Rank Order Correlation; see H. M. Blalock, Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 317-9. Statistical significance can be established with complete confidence only when 10 cases are used.

TABLE II-2 CORRELATION OF ECUMENISM RANK WITH THE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION OF POST 1900 NON ANGLO-SAXON IMMIGRANTS IN EACH REGION

	Ecumenism Rank	Pop. of Region in 1921	Number of non Anglo-Saxon Immigrants	% of Immigrants in Pop.	Immigration Rank
Man.	1	610,118	87,047	14.26	4
Sask.	2	757,510	178,861	23.61	2
B.C.	3	524,582	79,178	15.09	3
Alta.	4	588,454	157,948	26.84	1
Mar.	5	1,000,328	20,838	2.08	6
Que.	6	2,361,199	80,467	3.40	5
Ont.	7	2,933,662	33,927	1.15	7

r_s=.7572 Z=1.8551 $p<.05$

In order to discover the relationship between country of origin and clerical ecumenial support, the obituaries of clergy active in the Presbyterian Church in 1925 were examined. The Presbyterian Church continuing after 1925 very carefully recorded the birthplace of its clergy in the obituaries published in the annual reports from the general assembly; we were able to determine the country of origin for almost all nonconcurrent ministers. The United Church Yearbook published only the dates of birth, death and entry into the ministry; consequently our sources for the birthplaces of unionist clergy are the eulogies published in the New Outlook and United Church Observer. These obituaries reported place of birth in less than 30% of the cases. We suspect however that place of birth would more likely be reported if it was non-Canadian. Our data for unionists should if anything overreport non-Canadian births; hence we submit the data on birth and union support in table I-3 with confidence.

TABLE I-3 BIRTHPLACE OF UNIONIST AND NONCONCURRENT CLERGY

	Unionist Clergy	Nonconcurrent Clergy
Canada	313	248
Scotland	66	117
Ireland	17	47
England	31	45
Other	13	14
Total	440	498

TABLE I-4 ECUMENICAL SUPPORT AND IMMIGRANT STATUS, IN PERCENTAGES

	Native Canadian	Immigrants to Canada
Unionist	71	29
Nonconcurrent	53	47

Chi-square=22.8455 df=1 $p<.001$

Table I-3 reveals that many more nonconcurrents than unionist clergy were born in Scotland, Ireland and England. By collapsing the categories into a simple 2 x 2 table we discover that 71% of all unionist clergy were native born Canadians, compared to only 53% of clerical opponents of union. Similarly in table I-4 only 29% of unionists were immigrants to Canada in contrast to almost half of all ecumenical negativists. The discovery of a statistically significant relationship between ecumenical support and the country of origin of ministers shows that a strong ethnic identity supports ecumenical negativism.

(iv) Sex and Age

Sex and age are significant factors affecting religious behaviour. Consequently we would expect these variables to be related to support and opposition to church union.

H. Paul Douglass in a study of the attitudes of 10,000 laymen toward ecumenism found a slight tendency for women to give greater support to the existing denominational pattern.[28] Similarly Taggert discovered that women were less likely to favour the membership of their denomination in the World Council of Churches.[29] But R. J. Flynn found a slight tendency in the opposite direction with women giving greater support to all forms of church consolidation.[30] D. J. Pletsch found that sex was irrelevant to ecumenism.[31] The literature on sex and ecumenism is inconclusive.

In regard to age and ecumenicity, Pletsch and Taggert found that young people were more likely to support church union.[32]

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28 H. P. Douglass, Church Unity, pp. 120-121.

29 Taggert, op. cit.

30 R. J. Flynn, "Church Involvement, Church Goals and Community Structural Differentiation: Social Influences on Attitudes Toward Church Consolidation" (M.A. thesis: Carleton University, 1970), p. 105. Flynn distributed a self-administered questionnaire to United Church members on Easter Sunday. His sample of 596 represented a return rate of 32%, indicating that his respondents were self-selected with females over-represented.

31 D. J. Pletsch, "Ecumenism in Two Protestant Churches in Ontario" (M.Sc. thesis: Guelph University, 1966), p. 49. Pletsch interviewed a random sample of 83 members of the UCC and Evangelical United Brethren, 58% of whom were male.

32 Pletsch, op. cit., p. 46; Taggert, op. cit., pp. 37-8.

But the large study done by Douglass in 1934, in which young people were overrepresented, revealed exactly the opposite result with young people supporting denominational pluralism to a greater extent than their parents.[33] Similarly J. J. Mol, in an analysis of two Australian Gallop Polls, discovered that teenagers were less inclined to support ecumenism than adults.[34] But in Mol's own survey of Australian religious behaviour he found that age had no effect on attitudes toward ecumenism, a finding that was confirmed by Flynn.[35]

There is no data available with which to discover the influence of age and sex variables on the Canadian union of 1925. The only evidence that we have is for age differences in the vote on church union taken by the Methodist Church in 1912. In this vote church members under 18 years of age supported union to a slightly greater extent (only 2%) than Methodists over 18.[36] Despite the absence of data for our study, the inconclusiveness of other research findings leads us to conclude that age and sex variables had only minimal impact on the Canadian ecumenical movement.

(v) Ecclesiastical Status

Ecumenism also may be related to a complex of variables that

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[33] Douglass, Church Unity, pp. 120, 424. The age bias of Douglass' survey is noted on p. 520.

[34] J. J. Mol, Religion in Australia (Melbourne: Nelson, 1971), pp. 131-2.

[35] J. J. Mol, "The Merger Attempts of the Australian Churches", Ecumenical Review Jan. 1969, p. 25; Flynn, op. cit., p. 105.

[36] Church union was supported by 86% of Methodists over 18 and by 88% of Methodists under 18. This result was computed from data

(continued)

define an individual's status in the church. Of paramount importance is the very sharp difference between clergy and laity in regard to church union support. Opposition to ecumenism is invariably much stronger at the grass roots level than among church leaders.[37]

It is clear that in the Presbyterian vote on union, taken in late 1924 and early 1925, a higher percentage of clergy than laity entered the United Church, even though there is some doubt as to the size of the difference in voting behaviour. The official record of the 1925 Presbyterian ballot shows that 57% of the laity voted to enter the UCC. In our empirical study, which omits the membership of mission fields and non-Canadian charges, a similar figure was obtained.[38] Our study also shows that church union was supported by 79% of the clergy. But E. F. File, on the basis of an official

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36 (continued)
published in the Presbyterian July 25, 1912, p. 79 and Acts 1922, Minutes p. 38.

37 Douglass, Church Unity, p. 432; Timothy Miller, "Whither Unity? A Case Study", Christian Century, 1970, pp. 891-3; W. G. Muelder, "Institutional Factors Affecting Unity or Disunity", Ecumenical Review Jan. 1956, pp. 113-126; Bryan Wilson, Religion in Secular Society (London: C. A. Watts, 1966).

R. C. Kaill, "Ecumenism, Clergy Influence and Liberalism: An Investigation into the Sources of Lay Support for Church Union", Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, Aug. 1971, p. 161 argues that the clergy of the UCC and Anglican Church of Canada are not enthusiastic supporters of church union. We challenge the validity of Kaill's conclusions in this regard; see footnote 75.

38 Silcox, op. cit., p. 281 argues that many Presbyterians entered union by default, especially in the west where voting was by show of hands. He argues that lay support for the UCC was actually much higher than is indicated by the official record. The revisions that Silcox suggests would raise the level of lay support to 70%. Silcox's argument is hardly convincing and reflects his obvious bias toward ecumenism.

document from the Joint Committee on Union of the 3 churches, reports that only 76% of the clergy supported union.[39] Regardless of the actual size of the clerical vote it clearly surpassed the lay vote by a considerable margin.

H. Paul Douglass found that ordinary members supported union in the United States to a lesser extent than church officers: church officers and elders supported ecumenism almost as enthusiastically as the clergy.[40] The relevance of Douglass' finding is explored in table I-5 which analyses the votes taken on union in the

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[39] File, op. cit., p. 201 claims to derive his statistics from the Analysis of Votes on Church Union issued by the Bureau of Literature and Information of the Joint Committee on Union. But the document of this name (which can be found in UCA, Bureau of Literature and Information, Box 7, file #128) makes no reference to the vote of clergy. We were unable to find any official document that reports the level of clerical support for ecumenism. Silcox, op. cit., also has no information on this issue. Assuming that File's data is derived from a document of the same name which is no longer available, the differences between our findings and those of File should be explained. Our clerical study omits faculty members, ministers without charge and foreign missionaries (284 in total) most of whom would likely vote in favour of union. But our study is based on 1923 statistics: it does not include ministers who joined the Presbyterian church before the union vote was taken. Since the opponents of union began a recruiting drive in the old country immediately before the vote was taken, additions to the clerical role in 1924 and 1925 (404 in total) would increase the nonconcurrent vote. Since the second factor is greater than the first our study under-reports clerical opposition to union.

J. R. Robertson, "The United Church of Canada", in E. A. Davis, ed., Commemorative Review of United Churches in B.C. (Vancouver: Joseph Lee, 1925), p. 223 presents data to show that only 18% of the Presbyterian clergy refused to enter the UCC. Robertson does not identify the source of his information.

[40] Douglass, Church Unity, p. 432.

Presbyterian and Methodist churches in 1912 and 1915.[41]

TABLE I-5 ECUMENICAL SUPPORT OF ELDERS, MEMBERS AND ADHERENTS IN THE METHODIST AND PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES, 1912 AND 1915

	Methodist Ballot 1912		Presbyterian Ballot 1912		Presbyterian Ballot 1915	
	Number	% Unionist	Number	% Unionist	Number	% Unionist
Elders	27,344	86	8,720	72	10,888	65
Members	195,831	86	155,053	69	176,477	60
Adherents	49,349	85	51,349	72	56,946	65

From Douglass' study we would expect that on each ballot elders would be the greatest supporters of church union, followed by members and adherents. But in both Presbyterian votes elders and adherents were equal in their support with the communicant members lagging behind. The differences among elders, members and adherents in the Presbyterian votes are minor and in the Methodist vote nonexistent. Although we have no data on the voting pattern of Presbyterian elders, members and adherents in 1925 it is unlikely that significant differences existed.

In regard to other measures of religious participation, R. J. Flynn found only weak correlation among four dimensions of religious involvement and attitudes toward ecumenism. Flynn's study provides slight support for the hypothesis that favourable attitudes toward church consolidation vary directly with public

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[41] Sources for this table are Silcox, op. cit., p. 173 and the Presbyterian July 25, 1912, p. 79. L. W. Parker, "Some Lessons from the Church Union in Canada", Homiletic Review, Aug., 1925, pp. 89-91 claims that adherents opposed union to a greater extent than members. Parker offers no data to substantiate his claim.

ritual involvement and inversely with intellectual and private ritual involvement.[42] Pletsch found that church attendance was unrelated to attitudes toward ecumenism, although infrequent church attendance was associated with increased neutrality on union questions.[43] Similarly Mol found that frequency of church attendance and private devotionalism had little effect on attitudes toward church mergers.[44] Although we have no data for the Canadian union of 1925 that would enable us to relate church going and other indices of religious involvement to ecumenism, we are confident that these variables are not important because of the findings of Flynn, Pletsch and Mol.

(vi) Rural/Urban Differences

Previous research indicates that urban/rural differences influence attitudes toward ecumenism. In a secondary analysis of American ecumenical studies, Douglass and Brunner in 1935 concluded that support for church union is strongest in rural areas.[45] Similarly Peter MacRae in a study of two Anglican churches in New Brunswick in 1969 found the ecumenical sentiment to be slightly stronger in the

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42 Flynn, op. cit., p. 105.

43 Pletsch, op. cit., pp. 65, 78.

44 Mol, Australia, pp. 133ff.

45 H. Paul Douglass and Edmund Brunner, The Protestant Church as a Social Institution (New York: Institute of Social and Religious Research, 1935), pp. 274ff.

rural church than in the urban parish.[46] A national survey of the Anglican Church of Canada in 1966 found that support for church union was strongest in small communities, (population 10,000 to 25,000),[47] and weakest in rural communities. Stewart Crysdale in a national study of the UCC made a similar discovery with ecumenical support greatest in the suburbs and lowest in rural areas.[48] Flynn found that the ecumenical sentiment was slightly stronger in highly differentiated communities.[49] Previous research indicates that the urban/rural dichotomy is an important variable but its influence on ecumenism is ambiguous.

In the Canadian union of 1925 the level of ecumenical support was evenly distributed between urban and rural areas for all of Canada: 57% of the total membership of churches in rural areas and in cities with a population of over 5,000[50] entered the UCC. But

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[46] Peter MacRae, "The Anglican Church and the Ecumenical Movement in New Brunswick", (M.A. thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1969). MacRae found that members of the rural church were more likely than urban Anglicans to attend non-Anglican services (pp. 189, 206) and to attend ecumenical events (pp. 193, 209). MacRae also found that support for Anglican-United union was equal in both areas but a higher proportion of members of the rural church opposed the merger (pp. 248, 276).

[47] Anglican Church of Canada, Report of a Survey Among Laymen (Toronto: Anglican Church, 1966).

[48] S. Crysdale, The Changing Church in Canada (Toronto: UCC, 1965), pp. 74-75.

[49] Flynn, op. cit., pp. 140ff. Cf. Taggert, op. cit.

[50] The source for distinguishing urban from rural areas was the 1921 Census, Vol. I, pp. 756-767.

when regionalism is controlled differences in union support between urban and rural areas are discovered. In table I-6 ecumenism is stronger in rural areas with the exception of the Maritimes and Manitoba. Urban areas were more likely to oppose church union because the churches of the city were less isolated and had greater financial stability; consequently they had less need of a large centralized ecclesiastical organization. In addition city churches tended to be older; churches which had established themselves over a long period of time were less likely to renounce their denominational commitment and enter the UCC.[51]

The two exceptions in which rural areas supported church union to a lesser degree than urban areas also can be explained. In the case of Manitoba, urban areas were the centres of social gospel strength; since the social gospel was a critical variable increasing support for ecumenism, the higher union support in Manitoba's urban centres is understandable. In the case of the Maritimes its rural areas were experiencing a severe drain of

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[51] 48% of the charges of east and central Canada that were established before 1885 entered the UCC in 1925 compared to 61% of charges established after 1885.

Synod	Churches Established before 1885		Churches Established after 1885	
	Number	% UCC	Number	% UCC
Maritimes	136	68	233	68
Mont/Ott	113	60	196	64
To/King	159	36	317	59
Ham/Lon	169	35	236	48
Total	577	48	982	61

$x^2=6.3844$, df=3, $p<.10$ Table computed from data in Acts 1885.

TABLE I-6 ECUMENICAL SUPPORT IN TOWNS OVER 5,000 POPULATION AND RURAL AREAS, IN PERCENTAGES

	Urban Union Support	Rural Union Support
Maritimes	77	13
Quebec	51	61
Ontario	46	58
Manitoba	98	87
Saskatchewan	89	90
Alberta	60	79
British Columbia	72	89

Ch-square=52.5904 df=6 $p < .001$

population together with a continuously depressed economy and the shift of national focus from the east coast to Canada's centre contributed to the strong conservative tradition in the Maritime provinces. Resistance to change and the desire to maintain ancient patterns of behaviour was strongest in rural areas. Opposition to church union was for rural residents in the Maritimes an attempt to maintain tradition through the re-affirmation of denominational commitment.

B. Sociological Theories of Ecumenism

Having reviewed the variables which have been cited by sociologists as relevant to the study of ecumenism and having noted which variables are of particular importance to the Canadian union of 1925, we shall now examine the major theories of ecumenism in order to discover the most useful model to explain Canadian ecumenicity.

The various studies of ecumenism by sociologists can be

divided into three separate schools of thought. Each school is relatively independent of the others although there is considerable similarity among them.[52] The American school consists of those sociologists who argue that the growing unity of ecclesiastical organizations is the replication of the growing unity of all sectors of American life. Members of the British school claim that ecumenism is a response to the declining influence of religion in society. The Psychological school consists of those who argue that the most significant variables affecting ecumenism relate to personality traits.

(i) American School

Robert Lee in the Social Sources of Church Unity argues that the increasing ecumenical concern of American Protestantism is a byproduct of the growing cultural unity within the United States. Lee argues that the social variables that divided the churches in the past, (regionalism, ethnicity, racial and class divisions), have lost their potency. Together with the decline of divisive social factors there has been an increase in the power of forces that unite the nation and the churches. Specifically the development of mass communications, the strengthening of common values and life styles

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[52] The use of the terms British and American is somewhat arbitrary. However, the major exponents of the growing unity of society theory are American while the exponents of the religious decline theory are British. In addition the relative strength of religious organizations in the two countries corresponds to the emphasis of their theories.

and the maintenance of common cultural symbols has weakened denominational distinctiveness and facilitated the growth of ecclesiastical co-operation.[53]

Of particular importance in Lee's analysis is the organizational revolution. Lee claims that the majority of Americans now belong to at least one social group at the local level that has ties with a national organization. Membership in these secular groups, (such as labour unions, professional societies, the Rotary Club, etc.), which are national in scope makes membership in national churches easier. Lee also claims that all types of American organizations share common characteristics which makes switching from one organization to another relatively simple. The growing bureaucratization of American society leads in Lee's analysis to the ecumenical growth of large scale bureaucratic churches.[54] Lee's account of ecumenicity accepts the reality of the differentiation process while arguing that each segment of American pluralism is growing more similar to other segments of American society.

Peter Berger makes a similar case for ecumenism emerging from the growing unity of American society. Berger claims that America is moving toward a common middle class life style. The churches therefore are competing for members from a group which is

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53 Robert Lee, op. cit., pp. 24-74.

54 Ibid., pp. 63-67.

highly mobile and consumer oriented. In order to successfully appeal to this group the churches' product has become uniform; the standardized product of each church is distinguishable only by the marginal differentiation of denominational packaging. Berger argues that the laissez-faire attitude toward the ecclesiastical market had proved to be impractical because of the accelerated costs of church construction programs. The bureaucracies of each church lead the denominations into an ecumenism of rational planning with the merger of small churches into large economically viable units with the geographic allotment of the ecclesiastical market. Berger claims that "ecumenicity in the American situation functions to rationalize competition".[55] The growth of church mergers is the "well-known process of cartelization, facilitated in the ecclesiastical case by the absence of a Sherman Act".[56] Berger concludes that opposition to ecumenism is strongest in fundamentalist sectarian organizations that are marginal to the middle class way of life. Through upward mobility these fundamentalist groups will enter the middle class and join the ecumenical movement.

There is considerable evidence to suggest that the American theory of ecumenism is applicable to the Canadian union of 1925. S. D. Clark and W. E. Mann in particular have argued that the United

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[55] Peter Berger, "A Market Model for the Analysis of Ecumenicity", Social Research, 1963, p. 85.

[56] Ibid., p. 86.

Church was a response to the growing uniformity in Canadian life. In chapter III the relevance of the American theory will be examined with greater care.

(ii) British School

Bryan Wilson, a major representative of the British school, argues that ecumenism is a response to the dwindling importance of religion in society. The major impetus for church union in Wilson's account comes from the clergy for whom ecumenism is a new faith that replaces traditional ideas about God that have been weakened by demythologization. The growing weakness of the church, both in decline of numbers and deterioration of religious commitment, impells the clergy to bolster their status in a larger ecclesiastical framework.[57] The growing professionalization of the clerical class, together with their awareness that they share common problems, leads to the aggressive support of ecumenism. Although churches have begun to imitate the merger pattern of society as a whole they do so

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[57] Clerical mobility has been suggested by others as a factor supporting ecumenism. Moberg, op. cit., p. 253 notes that as early as 1926, 28.5% of all new ministers to the General Council of the Presbyterian Church USA came from other denominations. Cf. Douglass and Brunner, op. cit., p. 258; Jenkins, op. cit.; Lee, op. cit., p. 89. Ecumenism may also be related to increased denominational switching and increasing intermarriage among the laity; see Lee, op. cit., pp. 83-98; Heer, "The Trend of Interfaith Marriages in Canada", American Sociological Review, Apr. 1962, pp. 245-250; Stark and Glock, American Piety (Berkeley: University of California, 1968), pp. 183-203; Mol, Australia, p. 233; S. A. Mueller, "Dimensions of Interdenominational Mobility in the United States", Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, X (1971), pp. 76-84.

out of weakness not strength.[58] Each church merger is designed to increase clerical authority and depreciate the Protestant emphasis on the priesthood of all believers as all churches move toward centralized episcopal organizations in which elaborate liturgy has new prominence.[59] Wilson argues that opposition to ecumenism is confined to the laity and concludes that the only effective impediment to increased ecumenicity is organizational strength.

Robert Currie, in an analysis of Methodist unions in the United Kingdom, presents a similar explanation for the social causes of ecumenism stating that "ecumenicalism in an advanced industrial state is a function of the decline of religion".[60] Currie argues that union proposals emerge from declining memberships, the liberalization of theology, the loosening of church structures and the weakening of the stern Methodist ethic. In the face of adversity younger members of the laity and church leaders hope that the allure of a larger ecclesiastical organization will halt membership losses; lateral growth through amalgamation replaces frontal growth.[61] Currie claims that the history of Methodist unions shows that this hope is without foundation: church union only increases religious decline.

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58 Wilson, op. cit., pp. 151ff.

59 Ibid., pp. 181-205.

60 Currie, op. cit., p. 109.

61 Ibid., pp. 111-140.

He concludes that the continuance of this vicious circle reveals the ineptitude of religious leaders in Britain. Currie has little hope that the cycle will be broken; "the strength of the ecumenical imperative can be seen in the inability of denominational leadership to devise alternatives to already discredited policies that abolish crumbling convictions and leave little in their place".[62]

Support for the suggestion that ecumenism is a product of the institutional weakness of modern Protestant churches is not confined to British sociologists. Douglass and Brunner claim that "churches federate, in the main, only under great pressure of adverse circumstance".[63] Moberg argues that the American mergers of the 1930's were "ecumenicalism by default"[64] because the motivating factors for union were declining membership and external threats to religious organizations. Demerath and Hammond claim that church members at the local level approve church mergers because they fear their congregation cannot survive alone.[65] In Canada Stewart Crysdale found support for the projected Anglican-United merger strongest in the St. Lawrence Valley region where both churches are small minorities.[66] Similarly

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62 Ibid., p. 316.

63 Douglass and Brunner, op. cit., p. 281.

64 Moberg, op. cit., p. 259.

65 J. Demmerath and P. Hammond, Religion in Social Context (New York: Random, 1969), p. 221. Milton Yinger, op. cit., p. 250 presents a different view arguing that church union is a movement of the prosperous.

66 S. Crysdale, op. cit., p. 74. Pickering and Jackson, "A Brief Sociological Examination of Local United and Anglican Churches", Canadian Journal of Theology, 1968, pp. 249-261 conclude that despite the close similarities between the two churches in their survey, these churches would likely not be involved in a merger because of their success.

R. J. Flynn found that "the more the respondent felt that his local congregation had insufficient members and financial resources to pay for the building and support the minister, the more favourable he was toward consolidation".[67] Finally H. H. Hiller claims that ecumenicity is a function of diminished denominational cohesion.[68]

The British school could derive considerable support for its contention that ecumenism is a response to religious decline from the Canadian union of 1925. In chapter II we shall examine the relationship between ecumenism and the strength of individual charges. An analysis of yearbook statistics for Presbyterian churches will provide the basis for determining the applicability of the British theory of ecumenism.

(iii) Psychological School

The psychological motivation of clergy has often been discussed in ecumenical literature, usually in the context of opposition to merger. The fear of entrenched bureaucracies that their status will be relativized in a larger church is said to be a significant factor in ecumenical negativism.[69] But the clergy give greater support to ecumenism than any other group. Far from fearing status loss, church leaders are aware of the increased vocational opportunities in a unified church which requires an organizational structure larger and

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67 Flynn, op. cit., p. 105. Kaill, op. cit., found on the other hand that pessimism over the church's future had no effect on attitudes toward ecumenism.

68 H. H. Hiller, "Communality as a Dimension of Ecumenical Negativism", Review of Religious Research, 1971, pp. 111-114. Lee, op. cit., pp. 208-214 also suggests that ecumenical negativism is related to institutional strength.

69 Kennedy, op. cit.; Muelder, op. cit.

more complex than the combined bureaucracies of the component churches.

More germane to our discussion are the observations of numerous ecumenists that denominational loyalty obstructs union.[70] The motive element is loyalty to ecclesiastical structures as such, and the desire to maintain organizational identity that appears in the literature as 'settled temperament' or 'grass roots opposition'. Entering into the 'tribal loyalty' is denominational pride, the belief in the social-spiritual superiority of one's own group over the other groups in projected unions.

There is considerable unease on the part of some members that their own denomination may be swallowed up in a merger with other churches.[71] Involved with this unease is the general anxiety of the unknown and the fear that participants will be forced to conform to a different authority, that the idiosyncracies of their pattern of religious expression will be curtailed and the legitimacy of their life styles challenged. This motif had little influence in the Canadian union of 1925: few concessions were made to the smallest church, yet virtually all Congregationalists entered union. Similarly significant dissent existed only among Presbyterians even though the Presbyterian and Methodist churches were of relatively equal size.

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[70] A. T. Boisen, "Divided Protestantism in a Midwest County: A Study in the Natural History of Organized Religion", Journal of Religion, Oct. 1940, pp. 359-381; E. T. Clark, op. cit.; Dodd, Ellul and Craig, op. cit.

[71] J. L. Allen, "Methodist Union in the United States", in Ehrenstrom and Muelder, op. cit., pp. 275-299.

It has been suggested that attitudes toward church mergers are related to specific personality types. J. J. Mol in his Australian survey found that those respondents who opposed church consolidation were more likely to have their closest friends in the local church than supporters of ecumenism. Ecumenical negativists also stressed that it is more important for a child to learn obedience than thinking for oneself. Mol suggests that opposition to church union may be concentrated among authoritarian or closed-minded personalities, individuals who derive security from intolerance.[73] Mol's findings confirm the discovery of Douglass and Brunner of a strong correlation between religious prejudice and opposition to ecumenism.[74] Mol's thesis also is strengthened by the research of R. C. Kaill, who in a study of the attitudes toward ecumenism of adherents to the United-Anglican merger in Canada, discovered that those who believed most in freedom of expression gave greatest support to church union.[75]

The critical problem of the psychological theories of ecumenism is that they fail to explain denominational differences in response to church union proposals. Although we would expect to find some

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[73] Mol, "Australian Churches". See T. W. Adorno, et. al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper, 1950); Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960); Bernard Spilka and James Reynolds, "Religion and Prejudice: A Factor Analytic Study", Review of Religious Research, 1965, pp. 163-168.

[74] Douglass and Brunner, op. cit., p. 331; cf. Douglass, Church Unity, p. 116.

[75] Kaill, op. cit. Kaill found that the respondents' perception

(continued)

correlation between personality traits and the structure of religious organizations there is no reason to suppose that the proportion of authoritarian personalities is any higher or that religious bigotry is any more frequent in one denomination than another. This is especially true in mainstream churches in which denominational affiliation usually is established by birth not conversion. Yet it is clear that some denominations resist union overtures to a greater extent than others.

It should also be noted that the statistical relationships established by Mol, and to a lesser degree those of Kaill,[76] were based on a survey of attitudes toward union in general. The vote on union in these surveys did not demand a commitment from respondents; the ecumenical issue was largely a hypothetical problem. We suspect that in a situation in which the personal implications of the response to the union question are minimal, the direction of the

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75 (continued)
of clerical attitudes had an even greater effect on attitudes toward merger than belief in freedom of expression. This close correlation of attitudes between clergy and laity is contradicted by other findings. For example Stewart Crysdale, op. cit., found a sharp division between attitudes of clergy and laity on a diverse range of topics. Similarly in all countries support for ecumenism is far stronger among clergy than laity. Kaill's study established the attitudes of clergy toward ecumenism as perceived by the laity, not as stated by the clergy. It is highly probable that lay respondents projected their own attitudes toward church union into the minds of their clergymen.

76 Kaill's study, published in 1971, was taken at a time when the Anglican and United churches were seriously negotiating. But Kaill's respondents were not asked to vote on a specific union in which the concrete outlines of the new church were clear, nor did the vote have any consequences for the respondents. Despite the timeliness of his study it was still an examination of attitudes toward unification as a theoretical possibility.

response will be largely determined by personality traits. In a divisive situation, like the Canadian union of 1925, in which the ballot on union had profound consequences for the respondents, we contend that authoritarian and other psychological predispositions will be only one of many variables influencing the decisions of the voters.

In the Canadian union of 1925 religious bigotry was by no means the exclusive prerogative of either unionists or nonconcurrents. In a later chapter we shall show that antipathy toward Methodist behaviour patterns was a significant factor in Presbyterian opposition to union. But it should also be noted that many Presbyterians supported church union in order to consolidate Protestant power in the battle with Rome. S. D. Chown was widely cited as the author of the perfidious argument that "there is urgent need of a strong Protestant church to fight the Pope".[77] Enlightened unionists of course rejected the argument for union from religious prejudice.[78] But at times

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[77] See for example Evening News (New Glasgow, N.S.) Dec. 2, 1922; Hamilton Herald Mar. 9, 1923; letter by J. J. Bethune, Witness Dec. 28, 1922, and the letter by W. C. Clark, Witness Mar. 8, 1923.

Catholics opposed the unification of Protestantism: see Catholic Register (Toronto) Jan. 15 and Jan. 22, 1925. Cf. news reports of the union debate in the provincial and federal legislatures in Halifax Herald Apr. 30, 1924; Toronto Star May 17 and May 24, 1924; Toronto Telegram May 22, 1924; etc.

[78] See e.g. the report of the union committee of the presbytery of Montreal, Witness Mar. 15, 1923.

Presbyterians of both camps contended for the support of bigots within the church: unionist Orangemen claimed that the purpose of the united church should be to attack the evils of Catholicism, while nonconcurrent Orangemen claimed that church union was a Catholic plot to destroy Canadian Presbyterianism.[79]

Just as there were authoritarian churchmen on both sides of the union controversy, civil libertarians can be discovered in both camps. Although the unionists in general were more open-minded than nonconcurrents, opposition to union was for many Presbyterians an affirmation of individual freedom. The social gospel ideology of the union movement was interpreted by some nonconcurrents as providing religious legitimation for the unwarranted intervention of the state into the lives of individuals. Related to this fear was the belief that the majority of Presbyterians who supported ecumenism were trying to coerce the minority of nonconcurrents into abandoning their heritage. As we shall see in a later chapter the latent forces within ecumenical negativism were more powerful than the manifest declaration of the defense of individual liberty. But it is also clear that open-minded civil libertarianism was not confined to church union supporters.

This brief analysis suggests that the contribution of the Psychological school to an explanatory model applicable to the

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[79] See letters by "Orangeman" in the Toronto Telegram Dec. 15 and Dec. 18, 1924.

Canadian union of 1925 is minimal. There is no doubt that the decision for or against union was significantly influenced in many cases by psychological variables. But there is no evidence to suggest that the personality traits of authoritarianism on the one hand and open-mindedness on the other influenced the union vote in a single direction. Both bigotry and civil libertarianism reinforced the decision on union, regardless of what that decision was.

C. Summary

In our initial chapter we have attempted to accomplish a number of purposes. First we tried to show that theological questions had only peripheral influence on support and opposition to church union, despite the prevalence of theological and scriptural language in the controversy. Secondly we tried to carefully review the international body of sociological literature on the subject of ecumenicity selecting the critical variables that have been found to be important in other studies. From this review we determined that class, regionalism, ethnicity, and clerical/lay differences had a significant influence on the Canadian union of 1925. In later chapters we shall return to these variables in a more detailed analysis of their influence.

We also attempted in this chapter to identify the prevailing sociological theories of ecumenism and briefly explore their capacity to explain Canadian ecumenicity. We discovered that the

Psychological school was of little value for this purpose. The American and British theories appeared to have greater utility and merited further discussion. In chapter II we will examine at greater length the relevance of the contention of the British school that ecumenicity is a response to religious decline. In chapter III we shall explore the American theory that ecumenism emerges from the growing unity of society.

CHAPTER II

AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES

There is considerable evidence to suggest that the British theory of ecumenism, that church union is a function of religious decline, is applicable to the Canadian union of 1925. In the two decades preceeding union the Methodist Church's representation in the Canadian population declined from 17.2% in 1901 to 13.2% in 1921; the Congregational Church representation dwindled to 0.3%. In the same period the Presbyterian Church maintained its representation in the population and even showed a slight increase in 1921.[1] Since only the Presbyterian Church dissented significantly against the union, the census data provide comfort to the supporters of the British theory.

C. E. Silcox seems to support the British theory. He argues that in 1911 the Methodists in Newfoundland resisted union proposals because there were few Presbyterians and Congregationalists in the colony to provide competition for Methodism.[2] He also notes that the Congregationalists, who were moving toward organizational extinction in Canada, were the most ardent unionists.[3] Silcox also argues

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[1] Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1941), vol. I, p. 290.

[2] C. E. Silcox, Church Union in Canada (New York: Institute for Social and Religious Research, 1933), p. 168.

[3] Ibid., p. 46.

that opposition within the Presbyterian Church came from the wealthiest and strongest charges: approximately 62% of all the churches which supported ecumenism required financial assistance from the ecclesiastical head office to pay their minister and maintain their buildings, while only 32% of nonconcurrent churches required similar aid.[4] Comparable remarks relating unionist support to institutional weakness and opposition to union with organizational strength have been made by J. W. Grant, C. C. Morrison, W. E. Mann and S. D. Clark.[5]

The applicability of the British theory to the Canadian union of 1925 can be explored empirically through an examination of Presbyterian church records. If the British theory is a viable theoretical model we would expect to find a relationship between the institutional strength of a church and its response to ecumenism. In general we would expect to find that:

1) churches which supported ecumenism had a disproportionate share of the total membership of the Presbyterian population;

2) churches which supported ecumenism had greater growth potential than churches which opposed church union;

3) Nonconcurrent churches had greater financial strength than unionist churches.

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[4] Ibid., pp. 282-3.

[5] J. W. Grant, The Canadian Experience of Church Union (London: Lutterworth, 1967), p. 50; C. C. Morrison, "The Non-Concurring Presbyterians", Christian Century, May 3, 1928, pp. 568-571. W. E. Mann, (continued)

A. Research Design

The study will employ the most complete and up to date Presbyterian data available before the union event, that is the statistical records of the Presbyterian churches published in the 1924 yearbook.[6] The basic unit of analysis in this study is the pastoral charge because it is the primary administrative and financial unit of the church; membership and financial records are reported by the Presbyterian Church in terms of charges rather than by congregation. Data for non-Canadian charges, (including Newfoundland), and for domestic and foreign mission stations have been omitted from

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5 (continued)
"The Canadian Church Union", in Ehrenstom and Muelder, eds., Institutionalism and Church Unity (New York: Association, 1963), pp. 183ff attributes church union support to the inability of the churches in a divided state to meet the needs of a frontier society. S. D. Clark, Church and Sect in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1948), pp. 431-2 argues that the union was accomplished in a period of religious decline in Canada, religious decline being in Clark's terms a function of prosperity. But Clark presents no evidence, other than the union, for the contention that the period between 1920 and 1930 was a spiritual wilderness.

At the time of union it was frequently suggested that the Methodist Church supported union to entice Presbyterians into paying their debts. S. D. Chown, The Story of Church Union in Canada (Toronto: Ryerson, 1930), pp. 109-110 repudiates these rumours by presenting statistical material to show that the Methodist Church was not only solvent but was in some ways financially more secure than the Presbyterian Church.

6 Acts, 1924, Appendix, pp. 275-471.

this study. The remaining sample consists of 1577 charges, (80% of the total number of Presbyterian charges), which includes 374,951 church members, (over 95% of the total membership of the Presbyterian Church of Canada).

Each charge within the sample was identified as voting either for or against church union. The source for identification was the official record of the vote published in the 1925 yearbook.[7] There were a few charges which experienced a voting split among their congregations. Since the study required that all charges be identified as either unionist or nonconcurrent, split charges were given the identity of the majority party. In general split charges tended to be identified as nonconcurrent even though the unionist preaching stations constituted a sizable minority in some cases. This procedure led to a slight bias in the study to overestimate the extent of Presbyterian dissent; since the number of split charges was very small the bias was minimal.

Once individual charges were identified the totals for each category listed in the statistical and financial reports were compiled, separating the data of unionists from the data of nonconcurrents. The totals for each synod and for all of Canada were converted into percentages to make comparisons possible.[8] Oppenheim's Nomographs

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[7] Acts, 1925, Appendix, pp. 17-36.

[8] A. N. Oppenheim, Questionnaire Design and Attitude Measurement (New York: Basic Books, 1966), pp. 287-8.

were used to test the statistical significance of differences between percentages.

B. Findings

The basic strength of a church lies in its members. If a church has a large and growing congregation it is relatively immune to outside threats and financial instability. The yearbook statistics provide four separate measures that can be used to test the membership strength of Presbyterian churches.

The most important category for this aspect of institutional strength is the total number of members listed on church rolls. Of almost equal significance is the number of families in the church; mainline Protestant denominations, unlike sectarian and cultic groups, base their appeal on family centred religious life. The singles category is less important, indicating the number of unmarried church contributors. The pastoral care category signifies the number of potential members in the area served by each charge; it includes semi-adherents who may infrequently contribute to the church even though they are not listed on the church roll, as well as nominal Presbyterians who do not participate in church life. We expect that on each measure nonconcurrent churches will have a disproportionate share of the membership resources of the Presbyterian Church.

TABLE II-1 MEMBERSHIP RESOURCES OF UNIONIST AND NONCONCURRENT PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES FOR ALL CANADA, IN PERCENTAGES

	Nonconcurrent Churches	Unionist Churches	Raw Data Totals
Number of charges	34	66	1,577
Singles	36	64	37,612
Pastoral Care	37	63	684,885
Families	38*	62*	192,935
Total members	43**	57**	357,685

*significant difference $p.<.05$
**significant difference $p.<.001$

Table II-1 expresses the membership resources of Presbyterians in 1924. There is no relationship between the less important singles and pastoral care categories and support for church union. Significant differences exist between unionists and nonconcurrents in regard to the family and total enrolment sections. As expected, churches with a disproportionate share of the total membership resources of the Presbyterian church tended to be opposed to church consolidation.

The relationship discovered between membership resources and church union requires further examination. Table II-2 compares the percentage of nonconcurrents in each synod to the membership resources of each synod; in other words synod is introduced as a control variable. None of the differences in Table II-2 are statistically significant. (The table omits data for unionists and examines only nonconcurrent totals.)

TABLE II-2 MEMBERSHIP RESOURCES OF NONCONCURRENT PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES IN PERCENTAGES, CONTROLLING FOR SYNOD

	Number of Charges	Singles	Pastoral Care	Families	Total Membership
Maritimes	31	28	30	31	32
Montreal/Ottawa	38	42	48	41	42
Toronto/Kingston	52	51	48	53	54
Hamilton/London	61	60	63	61	64
Manitoba	7	6	7	7	8
Saskatchewan	8	7	10	10	10
Alberta	22	29	28	26	32
British Columbia	21	16	21	18	23

no significant differences

There is a tendency for nonconcurrent churches to have greater membership strength than unionist churches but the differences are not very large. An alternate method of evaluating membership strength produces similar results. In table II-3 the average number of members per charge has been calculated for unionist and nonconcurrent churches in each synod. In every case the average unionist charge is smaller than the average nonconcurrent charge although the differences are not always great. Similar breakdowns of the totals for other indicators of membership strength produced no consistent pattern.

TABLE II-3 AVERAGE NUMBER OF MEMBERS PER CHARGE FOR UNIONISTS AND NONCONCURRENTS IN EACH SYNOD

	Average number of members in nonconcurrent charges	Average number of members in unionist charges
Maritimes	220	206
Montreal/Ottawa	287	220
Toronto/Kingston	332	307
Hamilton/London	323	223
Manitoba	186	162
Saskatchewan	154	115
Alberta	196	113
British Columbia	197	176

Chi-square=874.6596 df=8 $p<.001$

Another critical factor in evaluating the institutional strength of a church is its growth potential. The Presbyterian yearbook provides four measures of the capacity of a church to expand and maintain its membership strength. The number of baptisms, the size of the Sunday School class and the total number of Sunday School teachers reveal the future growth patterns of the church. An even clearer indication of growth potential is the number of new communicants enrolled by a church either through individual profession of faith or through transfers from other churches.

In table II-4 it is clear that baptisms and Sunday school activity bear no relationship to church union in Canada as a whole, but as we anticipated churches which favour union have a disproportionately lower percentage of new communicants than churches which oppose religious consolidation.

TABLE II-4 GROWTH POTENTIAL OF UNIONIST AND NONCONCURRENT PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES FOR ALL CANADA, IN PERCENTAGES

	Nonconcurrent Churches	Unionist Churches	Raw Data Totals
Number of charges	34	66	1,577
Baptisms	36	64	18,380
Sunday Scholars	36	64	267,378
Sunday Teachers	37	63	29,788
New Communicants	39*	61*	31,611

*significant difference $p < .05$

When synod is introduced as a control, no new relationships between church union and growth potential appear. In addition the

relationship between new communicants and ecumenical negativism is no longer visible. Table II-5 shows that the various indicators of growth potential are only weakly related to support and opposition to church union.

TABLE II-5 GROWTH POTENTIAL OF NONCONCURRENT PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES IN PERCENTAGES, CONTROLLING FOR SYNOD

	Number of Charges	Baptisms	Sunday Scholars	Sunday Teachers	New Communicants
Maritimes	31	29	30	30	31
Montreal/Ottawa	38	41	41	40	40
Toronto/Kingston	52	54	53	53	51
Hamilton/London	61	61	62	61	61
Manitoba	7	8	8	8	7
Saskatchewan	8	11	9	8	10
Alberta	22	27	28	28	25
British Columbia	21	19	22	21	21

no significant differences

The critical test of the institutional strength of a church is the financial viability of each charge. Even a church with a small declining membership can survive if it is able to pay its minister and maintain its buildings. Table II-6 examines the financial resources of the two Presbyterian groups of this study. The size of ministerial stipend reflects the ability of a church to hold its minister and attract an able replacement upon his departure. The amount a church spends on missions and the size of a church's contributions to centrally administered schemes represents the surplus funds remaining after the church has provided for its own needs.

Contributions to the Women's Missionary Society (W.M.S.) represent funds raised for both internal church maintenance and external benevolences. The Rented House (R.H.) category indicates the financial weakness of a charge that is unable to build a manse for its minister. The Congregational Expenditures category refers to the total funds required to maintain local religious institutions. The most important indicator of financial strength is the total revenue of the church.

TABLE II-6 FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF UNIONIST AND NONCONCURRENT PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES FOR ALL CANADA, IN PERCENTAGES

	Nonconcurrent Churches	Unionist Churches	Raw Data Totals
Number of charges	34	66	1,577
Congregational Exp.	38*	62*	$6,473,219
Stipend	37	63	$2,697,574
Total Revenue	37	63	$8,852,160
Missions	40*	60*	$2,105,466
Schemes	47*	53*	$1,191,701
W.M.S.	42**	58**	$ 433,575
Rented House	20**	80**	113

*significant difference $p < .01$
**significant difference $p < .001$

From table II-6 it can be seen that the size of ministerial stipend is irrelevant to church union. Similarly the total revenue of the church is unrelated to support and opposition to ecumenism. There are small but statistically significant differences among the other financial indicators with weaker churches supporting union

to a greater extent than stronger churches. When synod was introduced as a control variable, in table II-7 no additional relationships were discovered between financial resources and ecumenicity.

TABLE II-7 FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF NONCONCURRENT PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES IN PERCENTAGES, CONTROLLING FOR SYNOD

	Number of Charges	Cong. Expend.	Stipend	Missions	Schemes	WMS	Total Revenue	R.H.
Mar.	31	27	29	27	24	31	27	*
Mont/Ott	38	44	41	40	39	40	43	*
To/King	52	53	53	49	49	54	50	*
Ham/Lon	61	61	62	61	62	63	60	*
Man.	7	10	9	6	5	8	7	*
Sask.	8	8	8	8	7	11	8	*
Alta.	22	32	28	33	39	34	31	*
B.C.	21	22	25	22	19	24	23	*

*too few cases for reliable percentaging

No significant differences

Our discovery of only minor differences between the financial resources of unionist and nonconcurrent churches is challenged by Silcox's claim, noted earlier, that self-sustaining charges opposed church union to a much greater extent than augmented charges. The relationship discovered by Silcox may be the result of an intervening variable; we suspect that the relationship between self-sustaining charges and ecumenical negativism will be weak when synod is controlled.

The raw data that Silcox used to compile his totals were not available to us; we were unable to identify which charges were

self-sustaining and which were augmented. Although we could not control for synod directly we do have synod totals[9] which enable us to calculate the percentage of self-sustaining charges in each synod. The synod proportion of self-sustaining charges can be rank ordered and correlated with the synod ecumenicity rank. Table II-8 shows that there is no significant correlation. The relationship between self-sustaining charges and ecumenical negativism discovered by Silcox is no longer visible when the intervening variable is controlled.

TABLE II-8 CORRELATION OF NONCONCURRENT RANK WITH THE RANK ORDER OF THE PROPORTION OF SELF-SUSTAINING CHARGES IN EACH SYNOD

	Total Number of Charges	% Self-Sustaining	Self-Sustaining Rank	Nonconcurrent Rank
Maritimes	229	62	6	4
Mont/Ott	193	68	5	3
To/King	318	74	3	2
Ham/Lon	235	83	2	1
Manitoba	159	89	1	8
Sask.	192	72	4	7
Alta.	114	39	8	5
B.C.	100	42	7	6

r_s= .1429 Z= .3780 No significant correlation.

These findings suggest that the relationship between ecumenism and institutional strength is very weak. The differences between

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[9] The figures in table II-8 are based on the summary totals for all synods in Acts, 1924, Appendix, p. 471. They include foreign charges but omit student fields and missions.

unionists and ecumenists are very small. In addition table II-8 suggests that financial strength may have no influence on favouring or disfavouring union. It is possible that the small differences that we discovered may be the product of the inadequacies of our method. In order to check against this possibility we have adopted an alternate method to test our predictions. If the relationship discovered earlier between institutional weakness and ecumenical support reappears with the alternate method we shall have greater confidence in our findings.

Tables II-9 through II-13 are concerned with financial statistics. We calculated the average expenditures per charge in each synod for all the financial categories listed on page 60. The average expenditures per charge in each synod were rank ordered. This expenditure rank was then correlated with the rank order of ecumenical negativism.

With the exception of ministerial stipend[10] we found that there was a statistically significant correlation between the rank orders of financial expenditures and the rank order of ecumenical negativism. In tables II-9 through II-13 we found a positive

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[10] There was little variation in the average stipend paid to ministers: the average stipends ranged from a high of $1951 in the synod of Toronto/Kingston to a low of $1394 in Alberta. There was no significant correlation between the rank order of stipend expenditures and the rank order of ecumenical negativism (r_s=.4762; Z=1.2599).

relationship between financial strength and opposition to church union. The alternate method confirmed our earlier findings.

TABLE II-9 CORRELATION OF NONCONCURRENT RANK WITH THE RANK ORDER OF AVERAGE EXPENDITURES PER CHARGE IN EACH SYNOD

	Average Expenditure per Charge	Expenditure Rank	Nonconcurrent Rank
Maritimes	$4,555	6	4
Montreal/Ottawa	$6,533	3	3
Toronto/Kingston	$7,380	1	2
Hamilton/London	$6,670	2	1
Manitoba	$4,978	4	8
Saskatchewan	$4,041	7	7
Alberta	$3,680	8	5
British Columbia	$4,733	5	6

r_s=.6905 Z=1.8269 $p<.035$

TABLE II-10 CORRELATION OF NONCONCURRENT RANK WITH THE RANK ORDER OF AVERAGE MISSION EXPENDITURES PER CHARGE IN EACH SYNOD

	Average Mission Expenditures per Charge	Mission Expenditure Rank	Nonconcurrent Rank
Maritimes	$1,165	4	4
Montreal/Ottawa	$1,983	1	3
Toronto/Kingston	$1,833	2	2
Hamilton/London	$1,765	3	1
Manitoba	$1,011	5	8
Saskatchewan	$ 599	7	7
Alberta	$ 553	8	5
British Columbia	$ 835	6	6

r_s=.7381 Z=1.9529 $p<.026$

TABLE II-11 CORRELATION OF NONCONCURRENT RANK WITH THE RANK ORDER OF AVERAGE CONGREGATIONAL EXPENDITURES PER CHARGE IN EACH SYNOD

	Average Congregational Expenditures per Charge	Congregational Expenditure Rank	Nonconcurrent Rank
Maritimes	$3,296	5	4
Montreal/Ottawa	$4,555	2	3
Toronto/Kingston	$5,457	1	2
Hamilton/London	$4,539	3	1
Manitoba	$3,747	4	8
Saskatchewan	$3,094	7	7
Alberta	$2,977	8	5
British Columbia	$3,797	6	6

r_s=.6905 Z=1.8269 p<.035

TABLE II-12 CORRELATION OF NONCONCURRENT RANK WITH THE RANK ORDER OF AVERAGE WMS EXPENDITURES PER CHARGE IN EACH SYNOD

	Average WMS Expenditures per Charge	WMS Expenditure Rank	Nonconcurrent Rank
Maritimes	$283	4	4
Montreal/Ottawa	$336	3	3
Toronto/Kingston	$361	2	2
Hamilton/London	$393	1	1
Manitoba	$233	5	8
Saskatchewan	$130	8	7
Alberta	$111	7	5
British Columbia	$181	6	6

r_s=.9048 Z=2.3939 p<.009

TABLE II-13 CORRELATION OF NONCONCURRENT RANK WITH THE RANK ORDER OF AVERAGE EXPENDITURES PER CHARGE FOR SCHEMES IN EACH SYNOD

	Average Expenditures for Schemes per Charge	Schemes Expenditure Rank	Nonconcurrent Rank
Maritimes	$ 636	4	4
Montreal/Ottawa	$1,031	3	3
Toronto/Kingston	$1,104	1	2
Hamilton/London	$1,064	2	1
Manitoba	$ 512	5	8
Saskatchewan	$ 323	7	7
Alberta	$ 293	8	5
British Columbia	$ 508	6	6

r_s=.8096 Z=2.1420 p<.016

The meaning of the financial statistics for church union becomes much clearer when we examine the relationship between ecumenism and the average financial contributions of each member. Nonconcurrent churches were stronger than unionist churches both in terms of size of membership and in terms of the total church budget. When we relate size of membership to total financial expenditures we find that members of the larger churches were able to make lower individual contributions than members of the smaller churches.

TABLE II-14 CORRELATION OF NONCONCURRENT RANK WITH THE RANK ORDER OF FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS PER MEMBER IN EACH SYNOD

	Average Contribution per Member	Member Expenditure Rank	Nonconcurrent Rank
Maritimes	$21.69	7	4
Montreal/Ottawa	$26.56	4	3
Toronto/Kingston	$24.52	6	2
Hamilton/London	$21.54	8	1
Manitoba	$30.35	2	8
Saskatchewan	$34.25	1	7
Alberta	$28.09	3	5
British Columbia	$26.29	5	6

$r_s = -.8333$ $Z = -2.2047$ $p < .014$

In table II-14 the average contributions per member in each synod were calculated, rank ordered, and correlated with the rank order of ecumenical negativism. This table shows that there is a negative relationship between the size of individual contributions to the church and opposition to church union. In other words members of unionist churches made greater financial sacrifices to maintain their local religious institutions than did members of nonconcurrent churches. It should be noted that members of churches in the wealthier regions who presumably were able to contribute more to the church tended to give less than Presbyterians in the poorer regions of Canada. It is probable that supporters of church union were under greater financial strain than opponents of church union.

C. Discussion

The empirical findings of this study of Presbyterian churches leads us to partially accept the British theory of ecumenism. Churches which supported ecumenism had a disproportionate share of the total membership of the Presbyterian population. Nonconcurrent churches had a slightly greater growth potential than unionist churches. Churches opposed to church union had greater financial resources than churches which supported church union. Although the differences between unionist and nonconcurrent charges were in every case relatively small, the differences were in the direction predicted by the British theorists; churches which had relatively greater institutional strength were more likely to oppose ecumenism than weaker churches. It is also likely that the burden of maintaining local religious institutions weighed more heavily on the shoulders of unionists than nonconcurrents.

A pristine methodologist could certainly challenge the findings of this study. We used simple statistical techniques and attempted to control chiefly for a single intervening variable. It is possible that our method has concealed the interaction of compensating variables, some of which promote ecumenism and others which retard church consolidation. It is also possible that new relationships might be discovered if alternate variables, for example the urban/rural variable, were controlled.

We have not attempted a more sophisticated research design for a variety of reasons. Firstly the cost of such a study would have been prohibitive; there is no evidence to suggest that more sophisticated techniques would produce findings sufficiently significant to justify the additional expenditure of energy and research funds. Secondly it would be unwise to apply sophisticated statistical techniques to what is essentially very crude data. The reliability of the reports from each charge vary tremendously with the competence and enthusiasm of session clerks. Historical data is much less amenable to sociological exactitude than the controlled context of questionnaires and interview schedules. Finally it should be noted that our findings suggest that the influence of uncontrolled variables is likely to be minor.

It should be noted that we have not examined the British theory of ecumenicity in its entirety. We focussed only on the organizational aspects of the theory; we examined only the contention that church union is related to institutional weakness as revealed in membership and financial statistics. But the British theorists also argue that weakness involves more than organizational failings; it includes the crucial questions of the degree of commitment of members to the church, the status of religion in society, and the saliency of religious belief for individual action. We have no way of answering directly the latter questions. But there is no evidence

to suggest that the power and influence of the Protestant denominations were declining in Canada in the early 20th century; every indication, from over-flowing churches to swelling fiscal resources to religious intervention in the affairs of the state, suggests the opposite conclusion. Finally it should be noted that although the commitment of unionists to the Presbyterian Church had a different focus and wider boundaries than the commitment of non-concurrent Presbyterians, there is no reason to believe that unionist religious commitment was any weaker.

Despite these methodological caveats we are confident that our empirical findings warrant partial acceptance of the British school of ecumenical theory. We are convinced that the relative strength of each charge had a significant influence on support of opposition to church union. But the small size of the differences in the statistical records of unionist and nonconcurrent churches shows that the organizational strength variable, although present, is relatively minor. To fully understand the forces that led to the creation of the United Church of Canada we must examine the role of other variables.

CHAPTER III

THE RATIONALIZATION OF COMPETITION

Having deprecated the value of the British and Psychological theories of ecumenism as explanatory models we must consider the relevance of the American school for an analysis of the Canadian union of 1925. The theory that church unity emerged from the growing unity of society as a whole has many Canadian supporters.

S. D. Clark argues that "the union of the Methodist, Presbyterian and Congregational churches in 1925 was a reflection of the growing dominance of secular values associated with Politics and Big Business".[1] The motivation for ecumenism in Clark's account is the desire by church leaders to eliminate waste and consolidate services.[2] W. E. Mann presents a similar case arguing that the merger movements in the industrial world prompted church leaders to explore the economic advantages of church union.[3] The position of Mann and Clark receives support from G. M. Morrison in a related argument.[4] Similarly E. H. Oliver and others claim that church union was the natural consequence of the application of sound bureaucratic techniques to the problems of waste of church resources and the

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1 S. D. Clark, Church and Sect in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1948), pp. 431-432.

2 S. D. Clark, The Developing Canadian Community (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1968), p. 122.

3 W. E. Mann, "The Canadian Church Union", in Ehrenstrom and Muelder, eds., Institutionalism and Church Unity (New York: Association, 1963), pp. 185ff.

4 G. M. Morrison, "The United Church of Canada--Ecumenical or (continued)

duplication of religious services in the Canadian frontier.[5]

The American theory of ecumenism as articulated in the Canadian context has three critical elements connected in an evolutionary framework: 1) the existence of a pattern of early denominational competition; 2) the development of rational consolidation in the secular world; 3) the growth of co-operative activity among the churches that culminates in the ecumenical movement. In this chapter we shall examine with care each element of the evolutionary schema in order to show that the American theory of ecumenicity, after substantial revisions, is highly relevant to an analysis of the Canadian union.

A. The Pattern of Early Competition

The early development of religious organizations was

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4 (continued)
or Economical Necessity?" (B.D. thesis: University of Toronto, 1956) presents the argument for union from economic necessity but concludes that economic considerations were ultimately secondary to the "ecumenical spirit" (p. 113).

5 E. H. Oliver, The Winning of the Frontier (Toronto: UCC, 1930), p. 249. Cf. C. E. Silcox, Church Union in Canada (New York: Institute for Social and Religious Research, 1933), pp. 7-72; E. M. House, "Century Plant in Canada", Christian Century, May 16, 1945, pp. 601-602; E. File, "A Sociological Analysis of Church Union in Canada: Non-Theological Factors in Interdenominational Church Union Up to 1925" (Ph.D. thesis: Boston University, 1961), pp. 91-102; W. E. Mann, op. cit.

Similar arguments in reference to duplication of services were introduced at the time of the Methodist union of 1884; see J. W. Caldwell, "The Unification of Methodism in Canada, 1865-1884", United Church Archives Bulletin, XIX (1967), pp. 10f, and W. H. Magney, "The Methodist Church and the National Gospel 1884-1914", United Church Archives Bulletin, XX (1968), p. 14.

characterized by fierce denominational competition, interspersed with infrequent isolated acts of co-operation. The first missionaries were more intent on carving out spheres of denominational influence than in Christianizing a pagan land. The denominational unions of Methodists, Congregationalists, Baptists, and Presbyterians in the late 19th century were preceeded by an abrasive inter-denominational rivalry.[6] At one point eight distinct Presbyterian factions contested for the allegiance of Canadians. The various Methodist groups also competed ferociously, particularly in Upper Canada in the 1830's.[7]

The major issue dividing the denominations in the early period centred around the Clergy Reserves. The Constitutional Act

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[6] Between 1850 and 1860 the following Presbyterian organizations were in Canada: 1) the Synod of the Presbyterian Church of Canada in connection with the Church of Scotland (formed in 1831); 2) the Synod of the (Free) Presbyterian Church of Canada (formed in 1844), 3) the Synod of the United Presbyterian Church of Canada in connection with the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland (formed 1834), 4) the Synod of the Presbyterian Church of Nova Scotia (formed 1817), 5) the Synod of the Free Church of Nova Scotia (formed 1844), 6) the Synod of the Church of Scotland in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island (formed 1854), 7) the Synod of New Brunswick in connection with the Church of Scotland (formed 1833), 8) the Synod of the (Free) Presbyterian Church of New Brunswick. All these groups were in fierce competition; for example in British Columbia a variety of Presbyterian groups sought to establish missions. See W. Gregg, A Short History of the Presbyterian Church in Canada (Toronto: Wm. Briggs, 1892), p. 175.

[7] J. W. Caldwell, op. cit., p. 8.

set aside one-seventh of all future land grants for the use of the Protestant clergy. By the 1840's these lands began to provide a large revenue, and became the focus of religious and political antagonism.[8] The Anglicans argued that the term Protestant referred only to the Church of England. Presbyterians claimed an equal share in the Reserves on the grounds that they represented the established church in Scotland, as the Anglicans represented the established church in England. Methodists and others, (including various Free churches), stated that no religion in Canada should have establishment status. The controversy raged on even after 1854 when John A. Macdonald enacted legislation to divide the revenues from the sale of the Clergy Reserves among the Canadian churches.[9]

Intra-denominational rivalry was sustained by the education issue, another area of church/state relations that increased religious competition. In 1807 government aid was extended to schools that were largely run by Anglicans. The quality of these schools was dramatically improved by Strachan who heavily Anglicized the educational facilities of English Canada. Early colleges were jointly supported by the Anglican hierarchy and the colonial government.

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[8] H. H. Walsh, The Christian Church in Canada (Toronto: Ryerson, 1956), pp. 135ff.

[9] See W. H. Elgee, The Social Teachings of the Canadian Churches (Toronto: Ryerson, 1964); J. S. Moir, Church and State in Canada West (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1959); H. H. Walsh, op. cit.

Subscription to the 39 Articles was a prerequisite at King's College.[10] Non-Anglicans were forced to go to the United States or form their own schools, a situation that exacerbated religious tension.[11] Even after the creation of a non-denominational university at Toronto in 1849, education continued to be a source of denominational conflict.

In the early period theological and devotional differences among Protestant groups were subjects of heated debate in which tolerance of the religious practices of others symbolized lack of zeal rather than magnanimity. During the competitive era it was not unusual for one denomination to refuse to allow another to use its buildings.[12] An even more sordid case of denominational rivalry was reported in New Brunswick in 1846: an Anglican priest refused to bury the child of Anglican parents because the child had been baptized by a Presbyterian when no Anglican clergy were available.[13]

There were scattered acts of co-operation when no alternative was possible. The scarcity of clergy in Cape Breton Island in the

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[10] Elgee, op. cit., pp. 50-56.

[11] Note for example: "Shut out from King's College . . . by the bigoted exclusiveness of its Episcopal governors, the Presbyterians were compelled to establish an academy of their own for the higher education of their members", in R. G. Balfour, Presbyterianism in the Colonies (Edinborough: MacNiven and Wallace, 1900), p. 15.

[12] Elgee, op. cit., p. 125. A similar situation developed in the United States; see for example S. M. Cavert, The American Churches in the Ecumenical Movement, 1900-1968, (New York: Association, 1970), p. 23.

[13] Elgee, op. cit., p. 119.

late 18th century necessitated the baptism of Protestant children by Catholic priests.[14] Similarly Protestant groups occasionally used Catholic facilities prior to the erection of their own churches, and in at least one case, when an Anglican church was destroyed by fire.[15] In the frontier areas local co-operation in regard to Sunday school education, sharing church buildings, and attendance at all religious services regardless of denomination, were relatively common.[16]

The most extensive co-operation in early Canadian religious history involved the Presbyterians and Congregationalists of Nova Scotia. In 1769 they submitted a joint petition to England for the relief of Halifax ministers, and ordained a clergyman in a presbytery meeting which consisted of two ministers from each denomination. The Congregationalists felt free to call a Presbyterian minister, and vice versa. This Nova Scotia pattern was purely a local phenomenon that originated in the common New England background of the settlers. The later Scottish immigration to the Maritimes virtually ended the co-operative activity.[17] With these exceptions the posture of the

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[14] C. W. Dunn, Highland Settler (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1953), p. 93.

[15] W. S. Reid, The Church of Scotland in Lower Canada (Toronto: Presbyterian Pub., 1936), pp. 96-100.

[16] Hugh McKellar, Presbyterian Pioneer Missionaries (Toronto: Murray, 1924) recounts numerous anecdotes of this nature.

[17] J. F. Mackinnon, Settlement and Churches in Nova Scotia (Halifax: Walker Press, 1930), pp. 89-91.

denominations was an aggressive one.

In the late 19th century competition was keenest among Presbyterians, Methodists and Anglicans. Letters to the editor of the Presbyterian in the 1860's show that the prime motive for the union of the Scottish churches was to prevent rural adherents from falling into the clutches of the Methodists and urban members from lapsing into Anglicanism.[18] This conflict continued into the late century. The arrival of an Episcopal bishop to Prince Albert in 1880 elicited an aggressive response from the Presbyterian missionary in the area.[19] Similarly the Methodist itinerant in a new Alberta settlement in 1891 responded to the arrival of James Buchanan, a Presbyterian clergyman, into his area with the words "as a Presbyterian minister you are not needed here . . . There are no Presbyterians near, and you can only poach, as this is a Methodist settlement".[20]

James Robertson, the Presbyterian Superintendent of Home Missions from 1881 to his death in 1902, strongly supported competition in all areas[21] with the full approval of the General

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[18] J. A. Johnston, "Factors in the Formation of the Presbyterian Church in Canada, 1875" (Ph.D. thesis: McGill University, 1955), p. 64.

[19] Acts 1881, Appendix, p. xiii.

[20] McKellar, op. cit., p. 245.

[21] J. W. Grant, George Pidgeon (Toronto: Ryerson, 1962), p. 64; Silcox, op. cit., p. 116.

Assembly. The Assembly acceded to the request from Algoma presbytery in New Ontario for a full time Presbyterian minister to compete more effectively with the local Methodist cleric; in Algoma the Presbyterian cause had been weakened by the lack of continuity in services that resulted from having only a summer student and winter catechist minister to the mission field.[22] The Assembly also adopted in 1901 a resolution to ordain all students serving in missions who had completed one year of divinity school because "in many promising fields our cause has been put to serious disadvantage"[23] through the inability of students to perform marriages. It was hoped that the strong Methodist advances in Ontario would be retarded if Presbyterian students were permitted to offer a full range of religious functions. As a result of such tactics, the Presbyterian Home Mission Board was able to boast at the turn of the century that the Presbyterian Church had twice as many mission fields as the Methodists.[24]

With the rapid expansion of population in the Western provinces the inadequacies of the competitive approach to missions became apparent. The immensity of the task of bringing religious services to a rapidly growing isolated population taxed the resources of the churches. The critical shortage of clergy in the

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22 Acts, 1899, Appendix p. 9.

23 Acts, 1901, Minutes p. 72.

24 Acts, 1904, Appendix pp. 2-5. Similar claims, for example, that the Presbyterians had been the first and most active Protestant group in Quebec (Acts, 1902, Appendix p. 10) are frequent in this period.

West[25] and the enormous expenditures required to erect new churches and manses caused the denominations to re-assess their earlier policies. James Robertson, who vehemently opposed co-operation with the Methodists, attempted to meet the problem by regrouping Presbyterian missions into more compact units that required little financial support from the central church,[26] and by vigorously campaigning in England, Scotland and Ireland to attract Presbyterian ministers to Canada.[27] These conservative mechanisms were not sufficient to solve the problem, for they failed to deal with the waste and duplication issue. The existence of three competing denominations in a small village[28] constituted a severe drain on resources that was very difficult to justify.

B. The Influence of Business Techniques on the Churches

The belief that denominational rivalry could no longer be justified was a product of the growing penetration of the values

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[25] Acts, 1899, Appendix #1, p. xxv reports a surplus of students in the West, yet only two years later a critical shortage of student missionaries was noted (Acts, 1898, Appendix, p. 21). Similar shortages were reported in the Maritimes (Acts, 1904, Appendix, p. 274; etc.) and in the rest of Canada.

[26] Acts, 1899, Appendix, p. 15. Acts, 1906, Appendix, p. 35 describes how a group of missions in Westminster, B.C. were regrouped to produce an augmented charge.

[27] Acts, 1901, Minutes, p. 17.

[28] A situation described as typical in Acts, 1900, Appendix, p. 4.

of efficiency and rational planning into every segment of Canadian society. The benefits of efficient bureaucratic techniques and the rationalization of competition were most keenly felt in the business world. Whereas before 1900 there had been only 2 major industrial consolidations, in the period from 1908 to 1912 there were 58 mergers involving 275 firms.[29] After the introduction of anti-trust legislation in 1910, Canadian manufacturers sought to continue to delimit spheres of influence, regulate trade patterns and eliminate the excessive competition that drained profits, through formal and informal Trade Associations.

Organizational consolidation was not limited to industrial corporations. In 1923 unsuccessful and semi-bankrupt rail lines were amalgamated to form the Canadian National Railway.[30] Similarly Canadian banks sought to increase their strength by reducing their numbers; the 41 banks in Canada in 1886 had dwindled to 22 by 1914.[31] This trend toward organizational consolidation and rational bureaucratic planning in all fields was not accidental; the nature of the Canadian economy, according to Harold Innes, virtually dictates a persistent trend toward unity.[32]

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[29] G. M. Morrison, op. cit., p. 61. Cf. Mann, op. cit., pp. 185-6.

[30] G. M. Morrison, op. cit., p. 58.

[31] Edgar McInnis, Canada: A Political and Social History (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), pp. 453-454.

[32] H. A. Innes and A. F. M. Plumptree, The Canadian Economy and Its Problems (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1934), p. 21.

Although the reading lists circulated by the Life and Work Committee to concerned Presbyterians gave prominence to anti-trust literature, church leaders were well aware of the power of rational bureaucratic techniques to strengthen an organization and effect its goals.[33] H. M. Pearson, an elder at College Street Presbyterian Church in Toronto, claimed that the effective operation of a large inner city church required an organizational pattern similar to that of a modern office.[34] The Rev. C. A. Myers, associate secretary of the Sunday School division of the Young People's Society, argued that the growth of business life showed how the unity and co-operation exemplified by large industrial concerns was conducive to the successful fulfillment of any organization's functions.[35] There was some opposition to the intrusion of secular values into religious structures. For example H. F. Gadsby, a prominent layman, was sharply critical of the invasion of business practices into the Presbyterian Church.[36] But opposition to rational planning per se was rarely heard. Virtually every Presbyterian would agree that "there is no teaching

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33 Acts, 1910, Appendix, pp. 294-298.

34 Record, June, 1919, p. 177.

35 Record, Oct., 1915, pp. 445-446.

36 Letter by H. F. Gadsby to Saturday Night, Nov. 4, 1916.

in the New Testament which can be construed as a mandate to waste, either the Lord's men or the Lord's money".[37] The acceptance of rational planning and the techniques of business had profound consequences for the church, eventually leading to a shift from denominational competition to denominational co-operation.

C. The Growth of Co-operation

A committee to study the practical issues of co-operation among the denominations was proposed by Presbyterians in 1899 and began to operate in 1902.[38] Nowhere was the need for rational planning and the consequences of unregulated competition more evident than in the waste and duplication of the mission field.[39] The Presbyterian committee met with comparable bodies of Methodists and Congregationalists to end overlapping in home missions through the twin principles of non-intrusion and readjustment of fields.[40] Co-operation was not formally recognized by the denominations until the Matheson case in New Ontario in 1909: this was a signed agreement to end overlapping that required the Methodists to withdraw from Rosseau and the Presbyterians from Orville.[41]

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[37] E. L. Morrow, Church Union in Canada (Toronto: Thomas Allen, 1923), p. 62.

[38] Acts, 1899, Appendix, p. 23; Acts, 1902, Appendix, p. 8.

[39] S. D. Chown, The Story of Church Union in Canada (Toronto: Ryerson, 1930), p. 16; Silcox, op. cit., pp. 70-72; letter by W. J. Clark to Record Jan., 1915, p. 10; etc.

[40] Acts, 1903, Appendix, pp. 8-9.

[41] Acts, 1918, Appendix, p. 27. The Presbyterian Board for co-operation in home missions was not formally instituted until 1908, and the Methodist in 1910. Joint sessions at the highest level took place first in 1911.

Co-operation took a variety of forms, the basic and most effective one being the agreement of the churches not to establish a new preaching station within six miles of a mission already established by one of the denominations. If two or more denominations were competing in a sparsely populated area, the district was assigned to only one church with the others withdrawing. The rules to end overlapping specified four criteria for the assignment of a district: the denomination of the first area mission, the denomination having the most members in the field, the relative financial contributions of members and the desires of the majority population of the district.[42] Regions of new settlement previously without religious services were arbitrarily assigned to one denomination according to provincial agreements. This procedure was most successful in Alberta, which in 1911 was divided into blocks of 20 townships each, with district responsibility alternating between Methodists and Presbyterians.[43] Since settlements followed the railway, rail lines became denominational boundaries, with the Presbyterians accepting responsibility for CPR settlements and Methodists controlling CNR districts.[44]

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[42] Acts, 1917, Appendix, p. 239.

[43] Letter of J. G. Shearer to Sherbrooke Record (United Church Archives, Co-operation and Local Union, Box #1, File 16), no date.

[44] S. D. Chown, op. cit., pp. 53-55; Acts, 1912, Appendix, p. 20; C. C. Morrison, "Church Union in Canada", Christian Century, Apr. 26, 1928, pp. 538-541.

The results of the agreements to end waste and duplication were considerable in the West and in New Ontario, (that is, central Ontario north of Barrie). By 1920 in New Ontario 194 Methodist, Presbyterian and Congregational charges with 582 preaching stations, had been reduced to 113 pastoral charges comprising 339 stations.[45] In a single year of readjustment the Presbyterian outreach in New Ontario required 41 fewer men making a budget reduction of $26,000 possible.[46] Results in the Western provinces were equally dramatic. British Columbia reported the virtual end of overlapping in 1909.[47] The three home mission districts of Saskatchewan had very little overlapping by 1913,[48] and during World War I only seven out of 287 Presbyterian missions in southern Saskatchewan competed with Methodist fields.[49] The plans to eliminate duplication of services were so complete that in 1923 the Winnipeg Evening Tribune was able to report that overlapping had been eliminated in mission fields in the West and New Ontario.[50]

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45 Acts, 1921, Appendix, p. 29. Cf. Acts, 1919, Appendix, pp. 22-23.

46 Acts, 1923, Appendix, p. 26. The process of consolidation was facilitated by other factors unrelated to church planning, for example improved roads in Ontario reduced the number of missions simply because members could travel greater distances to attend church (Acts, 1909, Appendix, p. 10).

47 Acts, 1909, Appendix, p. 21; Acts, 1918, Appendix, p. 40.

48 Acts, 1913, Appendix, pp. 32-37.

49 Record, April, 1918, pp. 99-100.

50 Winnipeg Evening Tribune, Jan. 13, 1923. In 1919 the General Assembly reported that "you will not find any overlapping in aid-receiving congregations . . . from Toronto to Winnipeg" (Acts, 1917, Appendix, pp. 22-23).

Co-operation to reduce the drain on resources was not confined to the rural areas of new settlement. Missions to non Anglo-Saxon immigrants became co-operative ventures when the flow of immigrants became too heavy for fragmented denominational efforts. Since the techniques used to evangelize Eastern Europeans were common to all,[51] the churches were able to pool their resources without organizational or ideological conflict. Responsibility for the evangelization of immigrants was shared by the churches, with each denomination ministering to a particular ethnic group.[53] In 1920 the three churches combined to produce a Ukrainian hymn book[53] and the Methodists and Presbyterians jointly published the Canadian Ranok, a Ukrainian language newspaper.[54] The Protestant churches also respected the principle of non-intrusion in regard to foreign mission fields; the problem of Christianizing the pagan world was said to be so great that no denomination could afford to duplicate the work of others.[55]

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[51] McKellar, op. cit., p. 214; Record, May, 1919, p. 143.

[52] The ethnic groups assigned to each denomination varied across the country; for examples see Acts, 1911, Appendix, p. 7 and Acts, 1914, Appendix, pp. 356-360.

[53] Manitoba Free Press, Dec. 11, 1920.

[54] Acts, 1920, Appendix p. 20. Other co-operative activities are noted in Acts, 1914, Appendix pp. 356-60; Acts, 1919, Appendix pp. 5-6; Acts, 1921, Appendix p. 35.

[55] The Presbyterian Church of Canada accepted the responsibility for Trinidad, British Guiana, New Hebrides, North Formosa, central India, north Honan, north Korea, and south China. The practice of dividing the foreign mission field among the denominations was not confined to the Canadian churches; Acts, 1898, Appendix p. 19 notes that the American Presbyterians were responsible for the Klondike area of Alaska.

By the time of Canada's entry into the European war competition in higher educational facilities of the Protestant churches had virtually ended, even though each denomination maintained separate university seminaries. The Anglican, Methodist and Congregational theological colleges in Montreal, Winnipeg and Edmonton shared facilities and faculty. Responsibility for religious knowledge courses for undergraduates was shared at most secular universities.[56]

The attempts to eliminate overlapping in mission charges were not completely successful. Despite the co-operative gains in areas of new settlement in the West and New Ontario fierce competition in older Canada continued unabated. By 1919 the process of co-operation was slowing down, partly because the great success in the West had eliminated the need for further readjustment of fields, but also because the Eastern areas vigorously resisted attempts to consolidate inefficient charges.[57] In 1923 George Pidgeon reported that little progress had been made in the East since the war; in old Ontario 39 charges, each with less than thirty families received funds from the augmentation board.[58] Presbyterian leaders became convinced that the only way to completely eliminate duplication of services was through

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[56] Acts, 1914, Appendix pp. 388-9; Acts, 1918, Minutes pp. 75-6; Acts, 1924, Minutes p. 67; Silcox, op. cit., p. 100 suggests that a major factor leading to ecumenical sentiment among the clergy was the sharing of facilities of the three seminaries at the University of Toronto.

[57] Acts, 1914, Appendix, p. 355; Acts, 1918, Appendix, p. 9; Acts, 1919, Appendix, p. 5.

[58] Toronto Daily Star, Nov. 27, 1923. There were of course some

(continued)

organic church union.[59]

The highest expression of local co-operation took the form of community church unions initiated in anticipation of the national union of the three churches. In these churches the binding influence that held the members together was not denominational loyalty but commitment to the same geographical community. The church was a focus for all social activities, serving to overcome the problems of isolation in a sparsely populated area. These churches began as missions of the parent churches but gradually attained a degree of autonomy. They strenuously supported organic union.

The parent churches were initially hostile to the community church movement. In the time of James Robertson, missionaries sent out by the Board of Home Missions attempted to impose upon local non-denominational churches a Presbyterian identity.[60] The Board of

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58 (continued)
successes in the East. The presbytery of Quebec, for example, reported an end to overlapping in 1907 (Acts, 1907, Appendix, p. 24). There were also failures in the West: in parts of Alberta some Presbyterians boycotted church services when their area was assigned to the Methodists (Acts, 1912, Appendix, p. 20).

59 Toronto Globe, Jan. 7, 1912; Globe, Apr. 7, 1914 and many others. Those opposed to church union saw that the ecumenical argument based on the elimination of waste was critical to the unionist cause and argued that there was no need for union because overlapping had been almost completely eliminated. See Ephraim Scott's editorial in the Presbyterian Record, Oct., 1915, p. 439.

60 Acts, 1898, Appendix, p. 19.

Sabbath Schools was against community unions and union Sunday schools because they believed Presbyterian church schools to be so much better.[61] The Board also noted that reports from union schools were very difficult to obtain unless the local superintendent was a Presbyterian; this was a serious concern because 50% of the children in these schools were Presbyterian.[62] The Methodists also discouraged community unions. S. D. Chown in a letter to T. Albert Moore, then General Secretary of the Methodist Church, argued that community churches "should come into play only in cases where the co-operative movement seems unworkable".[63]

The parent denominations objected to community unions because of their isolation from the national churches. They had no court of appeal to settle disputes and had continual difficulties obtaining proper ministerial services: by remaining outside the structure of the parent bodies the community unions were without regulatory agencies.[64] The presbytery clerk in Edmonton pinpointed the ultimate head office objection:

> My contact with union churches leads me to believe that they are drifting towards being community centers, in which the social side of life is emphasized, and there are no vital principles of religious conviction for which they stand.[65]

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61 Acts, 1899, Appendix p. 21.

62 Acts, 1904, Appendix, p. 274.

63 Letter of S. D. Chown, May 12, 1913, quoted in Morrow, op. cit., p. 80.

64 Record, March, 1918, pp. 68-69.

65 Quoted by Morrow, op. cit., p. 104.

The attempts of the parent churches to discourage local unions met with resistance. The Western churches had demonstrated their independent spirit as early as 1892 when one of the Presbyterian missions in Alberta cut off its contributions to the central church in retaliation against a General Assembly resolution to cut the budget of the Home Missions Board.[66] In 1912 the community churches banded together to form a General Council of Local Churches[67] in order to present their views more effectively to the parent denominations. They also obtained representation in 1921 on the Joint Committee on Church Union formed by the three merging churches.[68] Their best defense against the assertion of denominational control was to keep the church union issue on the agenda of General Assembly meetings.[69]

The rapid growth of community churches forced the parent denominations to respond more positively to the movement. The new strategy became: "if it could not be checked, it must be guided".[70]

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66 McKellar, op. cit., p. 146.

67 The council met twice in 1912; the minutes of these meetings have unfortunately been lost; see J. M. Buck, "The Community Church and Church Union" (M.Th. thesis: McGill University, 1961), pp. 45-53.

68 Record of the Proceedings of the Joint Committee on Church Union, Oct. 21, 1921.

69 Acts, 1917, Appendix, p. 11; Acts, 1921, Appendix, pp. 542-543; Dawson and Young, Pioneering in the Prairies (Toronto: MacMillan, 1940), pp. 237-239.

70 E. H. Oliver, His Dominion of Canada (Toronto: UCC, 1932), p. 140.

In 1916 the General Assembly gave its approval to local unions and established committees in each presbytery to effect these unions which would be ecumenical in scope but formally affiliated with one of the parent denominations.[71] In 1922 the parent churches supported the principle of local unions affiliating with two or more denominations and accepted community churches formed without reference to any denomination or to the Basis of Union.[72]

Since the first vote on union in 1912 the Presbyterian Church had been delaying its decision in the hopes of dissipating Eastern opposition. By temporizing the church faced the danger of schism through Western secession. Colin Young, the district superintendent of Presbyterian missions in Saskatchewan reported that union charges in his province had been kept close to the parent bodies, but by 1918 they were beginning to grow restless at the lack of ecumenical progress at the national level.[73] A survey of church conditions in Canada by a joint Methodist/Presbyterian commission reported that "unless something is done, the union churches may organize into a separate denomination", and break away from the parent bodies.[74]

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71 Acts, 1916, Minutes, p. 57; Record, March, 1918, p. 69.

72 Buck, op. cit., p. 48. The double and triple affiliation plan was adopted by the provincial committee on co-operation in Saskatchewan and Manitoba (ibid., p. 57).

73 Acts, 1918, Appendix, p. 31.

74 Acts, 1914, Appendix, p. 367; Acts, 1915, Appendix, p. 295. Cf. J. W. Grant, Pidgeon, pp. 66, 78-79; Presbyterian Apr. 2, 1914, p. 419; letters to the secular press like that of M. MacGuillivray Kingston-Standard, Feb. 7, 1923.

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74 Acts, 1914, Appendix, p. 367; Acts, 1915, Appendix, p. 295. Cf. J. W. Grant, Pidgeon, pp. 66, 78-79; Presbyterian Apr. 2, 1914, p. 419; letters to the secular press like that of M. MacGuillivray Kingston-Standard, Feb. 7, 1923.

There is considerable confusion concerning the number of local unions in the period immediately before the consummation of union in 1925. The number of purely community churches, completely independent of the present denominations was very small but the number of affiliated unions and co-operating churches which would likely join a new united denomination was vast. J. T. McNeill in the Presbyterian Church in Canada estimates that there were 1015 union churches in 1923; Silcox claims that there were 1244 in the same year; the Winnipeg Evening Tribune and Manitoba Free Press both reported 3000 union congregations in 1923.[75] Regardless of the precise number of union churches involved, it is clear that a very large section of the Protestant church was concerned. It is also clear that these churches were unevenly distributed regionally; 81% of the union churches in table III-1 are in the Western provinces.

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[75] J. T. McNeill, Presbyterian Church in Canada (Toronto: Presbyterian Church, 1925), p. 243; Silcox, op. cit., p. 227; Manitoba Free Press, Mar. 22, 1923; Winnipeg Evening Tribune, Jan. 13, 1923. The confusion persists at the local level: the Free Press Evening Bulletin, Feb. 9, 1924 reported 92 union churches in Manitoba, yet the Sydney Post, Feb. 21, 1924 reported 156 union churches in the same province. It is probable that some of the confusion arose from comparing charges with congregations.

TABLE III-1 AMALGAMATION OF CHURCHES UP TO 1923[76]

Synods	Affiliated Churches	Independent Union	Co-operating and Delimiting Territory	Total
Maritimes	6	2	22	30
Montreal/Ottawa	28	1	--	29
Toronto/Kingston	2	-	168	170
Manitoba	69	15	64	148
Saskatchewan	51	30	350	431
Alberta	16	3	278	297
British Columbia	4	3	132	139
	176	54	1014	1244

A disproportionate number of the union churches in the Synod of Toronto and Kingston were in the four northern presbyteries of New Ontario, where only 10 of 42 charges, were purely Presbyterian.[77] The table above gives no information from the Synod of Hamilton and London. Since the 1921 summary of union charges also omits this synod[78] it is likely that union charges in old Ontario were virtually non-existent. The fear of losing the union charges of the West and New Ontario impelled the three denominations toward union because if these congregations formed a new denomination the old denomination would be

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76 Silcox, op. cit., p. 227.

77 Acts, 1921, Appendix, p. 29; Acts, 1923, Appendix, p. 26. The presbyteries of New Ontario were North Bay, Timiskaming, Sudbury and Algoma. E. H. Oliver, His Dominion, p. 217 states that only 84 Presbyterian charges in the synod of Toronto and Kingston were co-operative.

78 Record of Proceedings of the Joint Committee on Church Union, Oct. 21, 1921, p. 9.

cut off from the regions of greatest population growth.[79]

D. Ecumenicity and the Rationalization of Competition

The increasing importance of efficiency and rational planning in Canadian society as a whole, and especially in the business community, was the major force behind the shift within the churches from competition to co-operation. Church union was a logical consequence of the co-operative movement. The economic benefits of ecumenism were continually stressed by unionists.

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[79] It has been suggested that church union was a response to the demands of the Western frontier environment. E. H. Oliver is the most extreme proponent of this view. "The needs of the Frontier inspired the vision and raised the issue of Church Union. It was the Frontier that led the way, when the Churches hesitated . . . It was the Frontier that continued the pressure for Church Union when difficulties of sentiment and prejudice asserted themselves in more populous communities . . . Church Union is a gift of the Frontier." (Oliver, Winning of the Frontier, p. 81)

The debate concerning the relevance of the Turner frontier thesis is far too extensive to enter here: see M. S. Cross, ed., The Frontier Thesis and the Canadas: The Debate on the Impact of the Canadian Environment (Toronto: Copp-Clark, 1970) and G. F. Stanley, "Western Canada and the Frontier Thesis", Canadian Historical Society Report of the Annual Meeting, 1940, pp. 105-118. We doubt that the Turner thesis has wide applicability to the Canadian scene. In particular we think it is highly unlikely that ecumenism would emerge from the frontier; the writings of S. D. Clark and W. E. Mann demonstrate that frontier conditions promote sectarianism, not church union. A similar point is made by J. W. Grant, The Canadian Experience of Church Union (London: Lutterworth, 1967), p. 22.

> Union will strengthen the Church. For instead of anemic and feeble charges; each dependent more or less on outside support and each a constant drain on mission funds, you will have one self-sustaining church, with a well-paid minister performing a man's job.[80]

Church union would complete the consolidation process, eliminate waste and duplication in missions, and remove the fear of secession of community unions.

Opponents of union did not challenge the legitimacy of saving money. Their attack focussed on whether the economic argument alone was sufficient to justify the dismantling of traditional denominational structures. Nonconcurrents claimed that church unionists were only nominal Presbyterians who cared more about money than about religious faith. Much as the opponents of union appreciated thrift, they remained convinced that "to make religion cheaper will not make it better".[81]

The historical evolution from church competition to co-operation and the debate within Presbyterianism over the value of business techniques support the claim of the American theorists that church union emerges from unitive patterns in society as a whole.

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80 Toronto minister quoted by E. L. Morrow, op. cit., p. 62. Cf. S. W. Dyde, "Church Union in Canada from a Presbyterian Standpoint", Journal of Religion, March, 1922, pp. 147-158; W. H. Smith, "The United Church of Canada in Coming Days", in E. A. Davis, ed., Commemorative Review of United Churches in B.C. (Vancouver: Joseph Lee, 1925), pp. 204ff; articles by D. M. Reid, Presbyterian Mar. 16, 1911, pp. 330-331; letters by Rev. G. A. Sutherland and H. R. Read to Witness Apr. 17, 1917 and May 5, 1917; series of letters to Presbyterian July, August and Sept., 1913; etc.

81 G. F. Macdonnell, St. Andrew's Church Message (UCA, Presbyterian Nonconcurrent Literature, Box 2, File 78), Feb., 1923. Cf. letter by Rev. F. D. Roxburgh in Morrow, op. cit., p. 103 and T. Eakin, p. 100; Record Jan. 1918, p. 10; etc.

But the utility of the American theoretical model is limited by its failure to explain why some Presbyterians were unwilling to accept economic considerations as sufficient justification for the creation of a national united church.

It is possible that this lacuna in the American theory can be filled by integrating the chief insight of the British theory into the American schema. We would thus expect that those Presbyterians living in areas in which Presbyterianism was in a relatively inferior position vis a vis the other denominations, especially Methodism, would accept the rationalization of religious competition to a greater extent than Presbyterians living in areas in which their denomination was relatively dominant. This expectation can be tested empirically.

In table III-2, 1921 census data[82] have been used to calculate the percentage of Presbyterians in each region. These percentages have been rank ordered to demonstrate that there is no significant correlation between church union support and the relative strength of Presbyterians in each region. Similarly in table III-3, there is no relationship between church union support and the ratio of Presbyterians to Methodists in each region.

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[82] Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1921), Vol. I, pp. 568-570.

TABLE III-2 RANK ORDER CORRELATION OF CHURCH UNION SUPPORT WITH THE PROPORTION OF PRESBYTERIANS IN EACH REGION

	Ecumenicity Rank	Proportion of Presbyterians	
		Percentage	Rank
Manitoba	1	22.6	2
Saskatchewan	2	21.4	3
Alberta	3	20.5	4
British Columbia	4	23.4	1
Maritimes	5	18.0	6
Quebec	6	7.0	7
Ontario	7	20.9	5

r_s=.6786 Z=1.5269 No significant correlation

TABLE III-3 RANK ORDER CORRELATION OF ECUMENICAL SUPPORT WITH THE RATIO OF PRESBYTERIANS TO METHODISTS IN EACH REGION

	Ecumenicity Rank	Ratio of Presbyterians to Methodists	
		Ratio	Rank
Manitoba	1	1.94	1
Saskatchewan	2	1.60	5
Alberta	3	1.34	6
British Columbia	4	1.86	2
Maritimes	5	1.68	4
Quebec	6	1.76	3
Ontario	7	.89	7

r_s=.4286 Z=1.0500 No significant correlation

It is also possible that the failure to respond to the economic argument may be related to the success or failure of the consolidation process.[83] This suggestion may be tested with data from Saskatchewan.

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[83] There were 205 Presbyterian charges in Saskatchewan in 1925; table III-4 omits 13 of these charges because they were not located near rail lines.

We noted earlier that new charges were assigned to each denomination with reference to rail lines: CPR charges were Presbyterian; CNR charges were Methodist. Thus Presbyterian charges located on CNR lines were those which resisted the consolidation process. We would expect Presbyterian CNR charges to resist church union to a greater extent than Presbyterian CPR charges. Table III-4 shows that this is not the case; the relative success or failure of attempts to rationalize competition had no effect on support for ecumenicity, even though the drive to end duplication of religious services continued to be an expressed motive of unionists up until 1925.

TABLE III-4 PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PRESBYTERIAN ECUMENICAL SUPPORT IN TERMS OF LOCATION ON RAIL LINES IN SASKATCHEWAN

	Unionist	Nonconcurrent	Number
CPR	92	8	129
CNR	90	10	63

Chi-square=.1737 Not significant

The contribution of the American school to a theory of Canadian ecumenism should not be underestimated. The church union of 1925 was to a significant degree the product of pressures within society as a whole to eliminate the waste of religious resources inherent within the competitive pattern. But the American school is unable to explain why only a part of the Presbyterian Church responded to the allure of economic savings. It is our contention that the key to solving this question lies in an examination of the purposes for which the

church's consolidated resources would be utilized. In the ensuing chapters we shall attempt to discover what the goals of Canadian Presbyterianism were, and to show how these goals were closely related to the ecumenical movement.

CHAPTER IV

THE SOCIAL GOSPEL MOVEMENT IN THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN CANADA

The pressure to consolidate religious resources was founded not merely on thrift but upon a desire to accomplish specific goals. In the early 20th century the goals of Canadian Presbyterianism were redefined and elaborated under the influence of the social gospel movement. The development of new religious functions strained the resources of the church and required the elimination of waste and duplication of services. The church union movement was the chief mechanism whereby inefficient expenditures could be redirected toward meeting the new tasks that the church had accepted. It is our contention that many Presbyterians opposed church union because they were opposed to the redefinition of the church's functions and to the kind of society that the social gospellers were trying to create. In this chapter we shall attempt to show that there was an active social gospel movement in Canadian Presbyterianism[1] that was

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[1] Previous research has stressed the Methodist support for social gospel while minimizing the Presbyterian contribution (chiefly because of the Calvinist emphasis on faith rather than works). See for example Richard Allen, The Social Passion: Religion and Social Reform in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1971); Stewart Crysdale, The Industrial Struggle and Protestant Ethic in Canada (Toronto: Ryerson, 1961); J. W. Grant, George Pidgeon (Toronto: Ryerson, 1961), pp. 29-31; M. W. Royce, "The Contribution of the Methodist Church to Social Welfare in Canada" (M.A. thesis: University of Toronto, 1940), (continued)

oriented toward making very concrete changes in Canadian society. In chapter V we shall continue the discussion of the social gospel's influence on ecumenism by delineating the depth of opposition to social reform within Presbyterianism and the relevance of the social gospel debate to the church union question.[2]

The Canadian social gospel was largely an indigenous religious movement even though it was substantially influenced by American thinkers after the publication of J. S. Woodsworth's My Neighbour in 1911.[3]

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1 (continued)
W. H. Magney, "The Methodist Church and the National Gospel 1884-1914", United Church Archives Bulletin xx (1968), pp. 3-95.

E. A. Christie, "The Presbyterian Churchin Canada and its Official Attitude Toward Public Affairs and Social Problems, 1875-1925" (M.A. thesis: University of Toronto, 1955) describes social gospel support in the general assembly but fails to perceive the lay hostility toward social reform revealed in certain Presbyterian periodicals, notably the Record.

2 Richard Allen, op. cit., pp. 248-256 recognizes the close link between social gospellers and ecumenists but denies that the social gospel issue was a significant factor in the church union movement. Others have argued that social service was relevant to church union insofar as it fostered co-operation among the denominations, but do not suggest that the social gospel was more than a peripheral factor in ecumenism. See for example Edwin File, "A Sociological Analysis of Church Union in Canada: Non-Theological Factors in Interdenominational Church Union Up to 1925" (Ph.D. thesis: Boston University, 1961); W. E. Mann, "The Canadian Church Union", in Ehrenstrom and Muelder, (ed.), Institutionalism and Church Unity (New York: Association, 1963), pp. 171-194; C. E. Silcox, Church Union in Canada (New York: Institute for Social and Religious Research, 1933), pp. 90-100.

J. W. Grant, The Canadian Experience of Church Union (London: Lutterworth, 1967), p. 95 suggests that there was a strong link between ecumenism and the social gospel; regrettably, he does not elaborate.

3 J. S. Woodsworth, My Neighbour (Toronto: Methodist Church, 1911) is full of references to American social theologians, especially (continued)

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As in the United States the social gospel received its greatest support from the middle classes and the university educated clergy. Even though its appeal was couched in terms that would put the working man at ease, the social gospel made as little progress with the impoverished workers as with members of the entrenched elites. Historically the social gospel began in the late 19th century and received its full flowering immediately before the first world war. Post-war disillusionment destroyed much of the optimism of the earlier movement, but active support continued until about 1926 with the failure of Prohibition and the co-opting by the State of many social gospel platforms.

Strongest support for the social gospel was found in the Methodist Church which issued on a regular basis petitions to government to remedy social ills, and which provided a ready supply of field workers to effect change in the social sphere. The Congregationalists

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3 (continued)
Washington Gladden and Walter Rauschenbush. E. A. Christie, op. cit., p. 303 argues that the Canadian social gospel was unaffected by American and Scottish social developments. Richard Allen, op. cit., p. 9 adopts the opposite position, suggesting that the lateness of the Canadian movement demonstrates American influence. Against Allen's argument is the evidence of an active, if uncoordinated, social concern in Canadian churches before the widespread publicity of Rauschenbush's texts. Stewart Crysdale, op. cit., p. 22 defends the independence of the Canadian movement but his account fails to fully acknowledge the early 19th American reformers discussed by C. H. Hopkins, The Rise of the Social Gospel in American Protestantism 1865-1915 (New Haven: Yale University, 1940). It is probable that the American and Canadian church leaders reacted independently to social problems caused by similar forces and that the influence of American thinkers on the Canadian movement came only after the latter had become well established.

4 P. A. Carter, The Decline and Revival of the Social Gospel 1920-1940 (Ithica: Cornell University, 1954), pp. 14-16.

also became sympathetic to the social gospel, especially in regard to the labor issue, in the early 1900's. The Anglican communion [particularly the official Anglican newspaper the Canadian Churchman] maintained a more aloof position on social matters. Pronouncements from Anglican leaders tended to be rather vague, noble in scope but unspecific in content.[5] The Baptists generally remained silent on social questions, maintaining a firm theological emphasis on the transcendence of God. The Salvation Army, although very active in agencies dealing with urban problems, kept its program at the level of personal evangelism, eschewing political appeals.

The Presbyterian Church as a whole adopted a rather ambivalent attitude toward the social gospel which concealed the sharp controversy within the church. Although the Calvinist doctrine of election and emphasis upon individualism militated against social gospel support, the Presbyterian church was the first to establish, in 1907, a Committee on Temperance and Moral Reform[6] to articulate the church's attitude toward prohibition, labor and politics. The Rev. J. G. Shearer, a prominent Presbyterian social gospel supporter, became the first full-time head of the Social Service Council,[7] the most active

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[5] Crysdale, op. cit., pp. 102-116.

[6] Acts, 1907, Minutes, p. 56.

[7] Acts, 1918, Minutes, p. 96.

non-denominational social agency in Canada, and one that was formed on Presbyterian initiative.[8] But against this pattern of social gospel support there was a large group of Presbyterians who opted for a more conservative understanding of the church's role in the world.[9]

With the possible exception of William Irvine, the Presbyterian social gospellers never espoused a position as radical as that of the most extreme Methodists. Salem Bland, in the New Christianity published in 1920 articulated the most radical Methodist view. He held that the history of the last 200 years shows an increasing realization of the relevance of Christianity for social equality.

> Democracy is nothing but the social expression of the fundamental Christian doctrine of the worth of the human soul . . . Christianity can never be content until it has achieved a democracy of religion, of culture, of politics, and of industry. The inherent dignity of every human soul must be recognized in every sphere of life. Heirs of God, joint-heirs with Christ--how is it possible to reconcile such august titles with servitude or subjection? A share in the control of church, community, industry is the

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[8] George Pidgeon, in an interview with E. A. Christie, stated that the forerunner of the Social Service Council, (the Moral and Social Reform Council of Canada), was created in 1908 as a result of Presbyterian overtures to other bodies (E. A. Christie, op. cit., p. 13).

[9] The strong support of Canadian Methodists for the social gospel and ambivalent position of Canadian Presbyterians finds parallels in American religious history. Although the major thrust for social reform was provided by the Methodist Episcopal Church, the first official church agency for social action was the Department of Church and Labor of the Board of Home Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, headed by Rev. Charles Stelzle. Stelzle, who was very prominent in the early social gospel, was eventually forced from

(continued)

> Divine right of every normal man and woman.[10]

For Bland Christianity meant a socialism infused with a deeper conception of spiritual brotherhood. The Christian ideal of equality was said to demand that the church wage war against dehumanizing competition and the profit motive. The abolition of capital was said to be the logical consequence of Christianity with public ownership of industry the final goal.

> To discredit and attack the principle of public ownership is to discredit and attack Christianity. It would seem to be the special sin against the Holy Ghost of our age. He who doubts the practicability of public ownership is really doubting human nature and Christianity and God.[11]

Bland argued that historically Protestantism developed to meet the religious needs of the middle class. The class conscious workers were allegedly alienated from the church which had utterly failed to support the labor movement. This new Christianity would appear when the labor movement recognized its Christian foundation and broadened its base to include all productive individuals. The great Christianity

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9 (continued)
this post by conservatives in 1913 (Hopkins, op. cit., pp. 280-291). The southern branch of American Presbyterianism consistently adopted a conservative attitude toward the social gospel and adopted a very anti-labor stance. The major Presbyterian papers opposed the steel strike of 1919 even though the report of the Interchurch World Movement eventually vindicated the strikers' position. The attitude of conservative Presbyterians toward labor strife is clearly expressed by an editorial in the United Presbyterian in Jan. 31/29, which solemnly intoned: "Laziness, booze, improvidence, the habit prodigality, a persistent blindness to the truth of the parable of the seven fat years followed by the seven lean years, have very much to do with the fact that 86% of America's population is poor" - cited by R. M. Miller, American Protestantism and Social Issues, 1919-1939 (Chapell Hill: University of North Carolina, 1958), p. 231.

10 Salem Bland, The New Christianity (Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1920), pp. 29-30.

11 Ibid., p. 49.

of the future would strengthen the labor movement with the best elements of Protestantism, Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy.[12]

Equally radical views were espoused by J. S. Woodsworth, who like Salem Bland, eventually left the Methodist church. Woodsworth decried the excessive individualism of contemporary Methodism and called for a tightly organized unified church to combat the power of Big Business.

> The power of organization has developed into the mightiest social force of modern times. The capitalist-employer class has carried organization far beyond the bounds of the individual factory, and now not only industry but business of all kinds--commerce in general--is being organized. On every hand we have great companies, extensive combines, consolidated trusts, giant mergers and all-powerful monopolies.[13]

Woodsworth's major concern was the urban slum. He sharply criticized the practice of Protestant churches abandoning the down-town core, migrating with their congregations to the suburbs. The cure for urban problems lay in comprehensive city planning led by church leaders and responsible municipal governments. Only through active participation in city affairs could the church overcome the alienation of the workers and immigrants from religion.

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[12] Ibid., pp. 136-167.

[13] J. S. Woodsworth, op. cit., p. 78. The best biography of Woodsworth is Kenneth McNaught's Prophet in Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1959).

The radical posture of the Methodist extremists was never accepted by the leading Presbyterian social gospellers. Prominent spokesmen for the Presbyterian movement like J. G. Shearer, George Pidgeon, T. R. Robinson, and others, promulgated a much more moderate position, infusing the drive for secular reform with Christian concern. They believed in

> The Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man; the Kingdom of God, and . . . in universal righteousness and social justice through the evangel of Christ. The saving of not only men but man, not only of the individual but society. The universal call to social service unto sacrifice for the Christianizing of all life--economic, social and political. The highest good of all people as the ideal and test of social legislation and institution.[14]

The Presbyterian social gospellers never neglected the importance of personal evangelism in their appeals, the necessity for balance between social and individual salvation was always acknowledged.[15] What distinguished the social gospel Presbyterians from their colleagues was their emphasis upon the primacy of collective redemption, the need to redeem the environment as the first priority and their consequent involvement in secular activities.

In the following sections of this chapter we shall outline the major projects of the Presbyterian reformers in order to delineate the

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[14] Acts, 1918, Appendix, pp. 13-4.

[15] See for example editorials in the Presbyterian, Jan. 19, 1913, p. 37; the Presbyterian and Westminister, Jan. 30, 1919, p. 99, and Mar. 27, 1919, p. 291; Presbyterian Witness (Toronto), Aug. 10, 1922; etc.

goals of the official church. Although each element of the social gospel platform will be isolated, it should be noted that support for one element implied support for all. The fundamental principles of the social gospel provide the cohesive force that binds together the variegated motifs of social action.

A. Prohibition

The drive for the prohibition of all intoxicating liquors was the greatest of all the social gospel projects, but during the 18th and early 19th centuries there was no aggressive temperance sentiment in the Protestant churches, even among the clergy. Alcohol was consumed in grossly excessive quantities in early Canadian history, partly because transportation costs made it economically practical for farmers to convert their grain into alcohol, but also because of the widespread belief in the medicinal benefits of intoxicating beverages and ignorance of their disruptive effects.[16] Although the first temperance society was formed in Nova Scotia in the 1820's as an offshoot of American temperance work,[17] religious support was slight. The Rev. William Proudfoot, a prominent Presbyterian evangelist

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[16] William H. Elgee, The Social Teachings of the Canadian Churches (Toronto: Ryerson, 1964), pp. 136ff. The history of the prohibition movement in Canada can be found in Allen, op. cit., pp. 264-283; E. H. Oliver, The Liquor Trade in the Prairie Provinces (Toronto: Presbyterian Church, 1923); R. E. Spence, Prohibition in Canada (Toronto: Ontario Branch of the Dominion Alliance, 1919), and others. None unfortunately is comprehensive.

[17] Spence, op. cit., pp. 40ff.

in the early period, refused to join such a society on the grounds that it would dishonour the church.[18] Open hostility toward temperance was expressed by many ministers; the remarks of the Presbyterian minister of Oakville, the Rev. Robert Murray, expressed in 1839, were not untypical:

> Since God created man upon the face of the earth there never was a more downright absurdity imposed upon and supported by an enlightened and civilized people, than that of absolute abstinence from all intoxicating liquors.[19]

But by mid-century support for temperance was growing, especially in Methodist circles.

Prohibition enthusiasm flourished throughout the 19th century and resulted in a dramatic victory for temperance devotees in the dominion plebiscite of 1898. This was a Pyrrhic victory however for it revealed substantial hostility toward prohibition in the province of Quebec. Since no national government could hope to rule without a minimum of support from Quebec, the reformers turned to provincial referendums to accomplish their goals. The high point of the crusade came in 1918 when prohibition was effectively instituted in seven of the nine provinces.[20] But temperance fervor waned after 1922 with the loss of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta. The final test came

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18 Elgee, op. cit., p. 149.

19 Ibid., p. 152.

20 Acts 1918, Appendix, p. 12.

when Premier Ferguson placed the Ontario government on record as opposed to prohibition and in favour of government regulated liquor sales.[21] He was decisively elected in 1926 and 1929. After 1927 only Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island remained teetotal; although the prohibition forces continued to push for local option laws in rural municipalities the temperance movement was effectively finished as a major political force.

Support for temperance legislation was sustained by scientific reports, especially in the United States, that debunked the medical benefits attributed to alcohol. These medical findings led the major insurance companies to reduce the life insurance premiums of abstainers, providing financial incentives for individuals to renounce drink but also providing undeniable evidence linking alcohol to a shortened life span.[22]

North American industry also supported temperance. The increasing speed and danger of industrial machinery required sober labourers, not only for the physical safety of the workers, but also because assembly line production could not tolerate absenteeism. The American railway companies in particular refused to employ anyone who drank at all. Corporations were frequently active in passing out bulletins of the Anti-Saloon League and the Dominion Alliance.

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[21] New Outlook Oct. 27, 1926, p. 12; Oct. 23, 1929, p. 1065.

[22] Presbyterian Witness Jan. 30, 1915; Presbyterian and Westminster May 8, 1919, p. 459.

(These bulletins were also prominent in the schools, this being the major contribution of the Women's Christian Temperance Union in both Canada and the United States.) The representatives of industry believed that with prohibition the lower classes and immigrants would be kept under control, and the money that once went to buy alcohol would be spent on consumer goods. Above all business firms supported prohibition because a sober work force meant higher productivity. During the war patriotic citizens applauded the efforts of business to eliminate drink because alcohol retarded munitions production,[23] and because grain that should have been used to produce bread was wasted in alcohol production.[24]

Prohibition also had the support of most labor leaders, even though few union members were ready to take the pledge. Unions discovered that with Prohibition workers took greater interest in union activities; when the workers could no longer drown their sorrows they turned to purposeful action to remedy their problems.[25] In addition violence during industrial strikes was less likely if neither side had access to intoxicants. Labor union support of prohibition

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[23] Witness Nov. 18, 1916; June 8, 1918.

[24] Witness May 5, 1917; Presbyterian and Westminster Oct. 16, 1919, p. 392.

[25] Allen, op. cit., p. 267.

was cited by social gospellers as further proof of the justice of their cause.[26]

Within the Protestant churches prohibition was not strictly a social gospel issue; the Baptists for example, who certainly did not approve of the social gospel, supported temperance legislation. Within the Presbyterian Church prohibition received as much support from conservatives as from the most ardent social reformers. But the attitudes of the conservatives and reformers toward prohibition can be clearly distinguished.

1) The conservatives directed their attention to the reformation of the individual drinker, calling upon him to sign the pledge to renounce liquor.[27] By way of contrast the social gospellers concentrated their efforts on eliminating the conditions that led men to drink.[28] The social gospellers regarded alcohol addiction as the symptom of poverty while the conservatives saw drunkedness as the cause of suffering; in the homilectic short stories of the latter, economic success was the natural consequence of the decision to lead

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[26] See for example J. G. Shearer's contention that labor unions were the chief allies of the church in the war on drink Record Oct., 1915, p. 460; etc.

[27] The July 15, 1915 editorial in the Record, p. 323 is typical of the individual call.

[28] The Methodists were the first to stress the role of the environment with regard to drunkedness. As early as 1889 the Christian Guardian noted that intemperance was directly related to long hours in the factory and harsh working conditions; see Christian Guardian Nov. 27, 1889, cited by Royce, op. cit., p. 165.

a sober life.

2) The social gospellers, at least in the early period, regarded the drinker as a victim, whereas the conservatives pictured him as a sinner. In the popular evangelistic tracts of the conservatives the chief protagonist fell into the drink habit because of a previously established moral defect. But the social gospel exponents claimed that the worker or urban immigrant was driven to drink by forces beyond his control--his deprived economic existence and the evil machinations of the saloon keeper. After prohibition legislation came into force social gospellers moved closer to the conservative position, depicting the drinker more as a law breaker and less as a victim.

3) The conservatives saw the prohibition campaign as a single issue crusade; once the tyranny of alcohol was removed from the lower classes, social strife would cease. The social gospellers on the other hand believed prohibition to be a central platform of a much broader campaign. They attempted to link the war against drink to the attack on Big Business, political corruption, social vice, and to equitable relations between capital and labour. The attack on the liquor cartel was part of the attack on the monopolistic practices of Big Business. The association of bootleggers with race track activity was part of the crusade against gambling.[29] The deleterious influence

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[29] Witness, Nov. 7, 1924.

of the liquor companies on police and elected officials supported the social gospel drive for an end to bribery and malfeasance in political life. The social gospellers supported the American discovery of a link between alcohol and social disorders, notably crime, venereal disease, family breakup and prostitution.[30]

B. The Church and Big Business

The social gospel critique of Big Business took a variety of forms, the major plane of attack being the inequity of capital-labour relations, the subject of our next section. In this section we are concerned with the social gospel criticism of Big Business in terms of consumerism and the public responsibility of corporations, which were combined in a general attack on the wealthy.

The Presbyterian social gospellers never approached the muck-raking intensity of their American counterparts, but they did draw attention to the prevalence of misleading advertising and expensive promotional schemes which deceived the consumer.[31] They attacked the price inflation resulting from excessive profits reaped by middlemen.[32]

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[30] J. H. Timberlake, Prohibition and the Progressive Movement 1900-1920 (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1963), pp. 58-59.

[31] Presbyterian and Westminster Mar. 1, 1917, pp. 270-272.

[32] Witness Apr. 21, 1917.

They strongly supported anti-combine legislation, claiming that "there has been a conspiracy to rob the people by extortionate prices".[33]

The lack of patriotism of certain corporations during the war fueled the critique of business ethics. There were reliable reports that old horses had been sold to the army at inflated prices,[34] and that the troops overseas were provided with shoddy footware that fell apart in the mud of France.[35] Social reformers noted that the excess profits tax had failed to curb the greed of the large manufacturers.[36] The appalling spectre of capitalists benefitting from the sufferings of war led some church leaders to call for a conscription of wealth as well as of men.

> While many of those possessing resources have responded most liberally in giving energy and money for worthy purposes, it is generally accepted as true that the slackers among the well-to-do are so numerous as to have brought down the merited condemnation of a well-known judge to the effect that such indifference and unresponsiveness is making for the conscription of wealth--the very thing the upper crowd fear.[37]

After the war the complaints about excessive war profits continued with the call for a graduated income tax and increased corporation taxes to pay the war debt; many reformers believed that the increase in general

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[33] Witness May 24, 1923; Mar. 22, 1923.

[34] Witness Aug. 7, 1915.

[35] Witness Feb. 27, 1915; Apr. 17, 1915.

[36] Witness June 2, 1917; Aug. 4, 1917.

[37] Presbyterian and Westminster Feb. 1, 1917, p. 148; cf. Mar. 24, 1917, p. 592.

taxes imposed in the austerity budget of 1920 would have been unnecessary if the profits of industry had been fairly taxed.[38]

The social gospellers also opposed land speculation. As early as 1915 the British Columbia Ministerial Association noted that unsettled land around the major urban centres was controlled by large landholders who wanted such high prices for their property that immigrants and laborers had to settle elsewhere, retarding the province's economic growth.[39] The social gospellers decried the municipal tax system that allowed absentee capitalists holding vacant land to earn enormous profits through the efforts of small property owners who built up settlements around the larger holdings. The unearned increment on land became a major issue of contention,[40]

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38 Presbyterian and Westminster Aug. 2, 1917, p. 111; May 27, 1920, p. 522. Canada's participation in the war effort had profound consequences for every aspect of society. The effect of the war on Canadian life is a subject too broad to enter into here, but some brief comments regarding the war and the goals of Canadian Presbyterianism should be made. 1) The war focussed the energies of the church, creating an aura of crisis that spurred church leaders to attack those interest groups which profited from the struggle. 2) The conscription crisis split French and English Canada arousing social gospel fears that national unity would be lost. 3) The highest casualties in trench warfare were among the young officer class, the source of future leaders in the church and society. 4) The horror of war broke the idealism of many church-goers, challenging the belief in the inherent goodness of man and the possibility of creating a righteous society.

39 Witness June 12, 1915.

40 Acts 1915, Appendix, pp. 352-358; Presbyterian and Westminster Apr. 5, 1917, pp. 414-416; June 28, 1917, p. 744; July 5, 1917, pp. 18-19; John MacDougall, Rural Life in Canada (Toronto: Westminster, 1913), p. 87.

although few Presbyterians supported Woodsworth's claim that all land within city limits should belong to the people as a whole.[41]

The variegated attacks on land speculation and corporate indifference to Canada's needs crystallized in the minds of some social gospellers into a concentrated attack on wealth and the capitalist system. In an article in the Presbyterian and Westminster the Rev. W. R. Wood of Winnipeg drew attention to the conspiracy of wealth:

> Nothing is clearer than that, in our transportation system, in our land system, in our political party system, in our judicial and legal machinery and in some of our common business methods, there are being worked out with diabolical heartlessness plans, the sole object of which is to grasp 'as much as the traffic will bear' of the earnings of the common man in order to swell the fortunes of those who are already immoderately rich.[42]

The social gospellers called upon the church to be critical of the way in which wealth was acquired; the church must not be subservient to the whims of its wealthy donors because "most very large fortunes are made, in part at least, in ways which are not ethically defensible".[43]

C. The Church and Labor

Support for labor was an integral part of social gospel reform. Although the Methodists eventually[45] assumed the most prominent

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41 Woodsworth, op. cit., p. 193.

42 Presbyterian and Westminster, May 24, 1917, pp. 597-8.

43 Presbyterian June 19, 1913, p. 794.

44 Sermon by Rev. A. R. Gordon, Presbyterian and Westminster Apr. 5, 1917, pp. 282-3.

45 The Methodists were at first opposed to union agitation (continued)

place in the religious defense of labor organizations, the Presbyterian could point to early and consistent support of their church for the workers.

Presbyterian reformers preferred arbitration boards composed of representatives of capital and labour as a mechanism to settle industrial disputes rather than strikes and lockouts.[46] But they supported the "inherent right of men to combine together for mutual protection"[47] even if union organization led to strike action.[48] The Presbyterian reformers believed that the responsibility for strikes did not rest with the workers but with the capitalist system.

> The blame must not be put upon the shoulders of the working man. He makes mistakes. He commits excesses. But the blame at bottom, rests upon others, and not upon him. God never intended the man to be lost in the enterprise or in the tool he is using.[49]

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45 (continued)
because "cheapness of skilled labour is essential to the well-being of society" (Christian Guardian Apr. 2, 1879, cited by Royce, op. cit., p. 205). The Guardian also declared (July 3, 1878) that "Employers must be allowed to judge what wages they can afford to pay. In compelling the employers to pay rates of wages which will bring them to certain bankruptcy, workers are greedily killing the goose that lays the golden egg." (cited by Royce, op. cit., p. 204). The Methodists were at first terrified of the social disruption resulting from the introduction of the strike weapon (S. D. Clark, op. cit., p. 395). Methodists expressed sympathy for the plight of the workers in the Printers Strike of 1872 while remaining extremely hostile toward the union that called the strike; see Guardian Nov. 27, 1872 cited by Crysdale, op. cit., p. 18. Cf. W. H. Magney "The Methodist Church and the National Gospel 1884-1914", United Church Archives Bulletin, XX (1968), pp. 9-10, 26-28.

46 Canadian Presbyterian May 23, 1879, cited by Christie, op. cit., p. 460. Cf. Westminster Oct., 1896, p. 198; Record Dec., 1903.

47 Presbyterian Aug. 31, 1905, p. 260; cf. Presbyterian Nov. 16, 1911, p. 548.

48 Canadian Presbyterian 1882, cited by Royce, op. cit., p. 70.

49 Presbyterian Mar. 21, 1912, pp. 355-6.

Social gospel pressure for the cause of labor manifested itself in specific proposals to Canadian legislatures. The Presbyterian reformers idealized co-operation between capital and labor but believed that this co-operation could only develop when labor had the power to negotiate with capital as an equal.[50] This equality could only come from legislation that would redress the bias against labor in economic disputes. The reformers supported legislation that would protect union workers from arbitrary dismissal, that would permit the right to strike, that would limit long hours in the factory, that would institute a minimum wage and improve working conditions in all industry.[51] All industrial matters were the concern of the church.

> We recognize that questions of wages and hours of labor and a healthy and safe atmosphere in which to labour are matters not only of economics, but of morals and religion--matters in which our Master is interested, and therefore in which the church must be interested.[52]

The subject of unemployment was also a major concern of the reformers. In addition to establishing welfare agencies for the alleviation of the sufferings of economic dislocation, the church petitioned the government

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50 Presbyterian and Westminster Jan. 23, 1919, pp. 75-6; Mar. 13, 1919, pp. 243-4.

51 Witness Jan. 24, 1914; Westminster Mar., 1909, pp. 196-202; etc. especially Acts 1905ff. The social gospellers did not hesitate to condemn the federal government when it acted ignobly; see for example the editorial in the Witness July 10, 1924, regarding the postal strike.

52 Acts, 1914, Appendix, p. 321.

to institute industrial councils, public works programs, an unemployment insurance scheme and encouraged the intervention of government mediators into industrial disputes.[53] The social gospellers proudly claimed the labor movement as its firmest ally in the crusade against social immorality.

> The labor union has been the Church's best ally . . . there is not a reform in which the Church is interested in which she is not fighting the battle of the working man.[54]

Social gospel support of labor was severely tested by four critical events in labor history; the war, the Winnipeg general strike of 1919, the Printers Strike of 1921, and the Nova Scotia labor strife 1922-25.

1) The Great War of 1914-18 taxed the full resources of the Canadian economy and demanded sacrifices of all Canadians. Conservative elements within Presbyterianism, especially the Presbyterian Witness of Halifax, detected a failure on the part of organized labor to respond to the national crisis with selfless enthusiasm. The acute housing shortage in Halifax was blamed on the excessive wage demands of construction workers; union leaders were accused of calling unnecessary strikes that limited war production; labor forces refused to tolerate harsh working conditions for the good of the nation; etc.[55] But the

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53 Acts 1914, Appendix, p. 322; Acts 1915, Appendix, pp. 358-9; Acts 1922, Minutes, p. 110; Witness Dec., 1923; etc.

54 Presbyterian July 4, 1907, p. 4; cf. the address by D. C. MacGregor on Labor Sunday, reported in the Presbyterian Aug. 27, 1914, p. 174.

55 Witness July 20, 1918; Sept., 1918; Oct. 19, 1918.

social gospel forces in the church continued to lobby for industrial reform. The general assembly agreed in 1917 and in 1918 that

> organized labor is not to be charged with selfishness or lack of patriotism simply because in war time it contends earnestly for normal standards.[56]

> it is essential alike to prosperity and to good morals that there be during war no lowering of the standard of life in industry or agriculture whether in the form of Sunday labor or of lengthened hours or lowered wages.[57]

The Presbyterian reformers refused to allow wartime expediency to impede progress in industrial reform.

2) The Winnipeg General Strike in 1919 confronted the social gospel supporters with the spectre of Bolshevik extremism. With the exception of the Christian Guardian, which in Crysdale's words, "never flinched in sympathy for working men in spite of the almost universal hostility of the public press",[58] the Protestant papers accepted the government's claim that an armed insurrection had been narrowly defeated in Winnipeg. The Presbyterian Witness of Halifax was especially harsh in its condemnation of the workers.[59] The general assembly meeting in Hamilton at the height of the controversy declared that "the rights of

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[56] Acts 1917, Appendix, p. 29.

[57] Acts 1918, Minutes, p. 29. The Presbyterian Church strongly opposed Sunday newspapers during the war. Government offices could easily serve as distribution agencies for war news that broke on Sunday, therefore depriving newspaper workers of their Sabbath rest was unnecessary. Acts 1915, Appendix, p. 335. Railways were particularly guilty of unnecessary Sunday work.

[58] Crysdale, op. cit., 1961, p. 76. The Methodist Conference was split over the strike issue. Allen, op. cit., pp. 116-20. S. D. Chown, the great Methodist reformer, condemned the Winnipeg Strike (McNaught, op. cit., p. 118).

[59] Witness May 24, 1919 referred to the "smouldering fires of

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the entire community are imperilled by general sympathetic combinations, whether of Capital or workers".[60] The Presbyterian and Westminster, usually very sympathetic toward the labor movement, sharply attacked the strikers.[61]

But the social gospel fervor reasserted itself once the initial shock of potential anarchism had dissipated. J. G. Shearer was the first Presbyterian social gospeller to assert that the government discovery of Soviet style revolution in the strike was evil nonsense.[62] The Presbyterian and Westminster published a letter sharply critical of the arrest of the strikers and the attempts to deport four aliens not connected with the strike.[63] Support for the strikers grew in the latter journal which supported the verdict of not guilty in the February trial of one striker; the journal also applauded the Winnipeg parade in support of the jailed strikers and expressed sympathy for the plight of the incarcerated Methodist labor spokesman William Ivens.[64] Despite

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59 (continued)
revolution"; cf. May 31 and June 7, 1919. The Record ignored the controversy.

60 Acts 1919, Minutes, pp. 82-3.

61 Presbyterian and Westminster May 22 to July 24, 1919.

62 Allen, op. cit., p. 111. Allen's discussion of the role of the Protestant churches in the Winnipeg strike (chapter 6) is excellent.

63 Presbyterian and Westminster July 24, 1919, p. 91.

64 Ibid., Jan. 8, 1920, p. 51; Feb. 26, 1920, p. 227; May 6, 1920, p. 476; May 13, 1920, p. 473.

the cries of Bolshevik revolution, the social gospel moderates in the Presbyterian church retained their commitment to the ideals of the labor movement.[65]

3) In 1922 the printers who set the type for church newspapers went on strike. The dilemma for the pro-labor elements of Protestantism was acute. The Presbyterian Witness, (a conservative journal which had just merged with the liberal Presbyterian and Westminster in Toronto), opposed the strike. It was argued that since other unions had accepted wage cuts as a natural consequence of the decline in the cost of living since the war, the printers demand for a salary increase was blatant greed.[66] But the social gospellers refused to condemn the closed shop of the Typographers Union or to criticize their wage demands. The general assembly's reply to the strikers, shrewdly drafted by the Rev. C. W. Gordon (Ralph Connor), deplored the strike but supported the workers. It was an adroit compromise that rejected the pressure from conservatives in affirming the church's pro-labor stance.[67]

4) Bitter labor strife in Nova Scotia from 1922-1925 provided the social gospellers with another opportunity to face the problem of Communist inspired labor turmoil. The Presbyterians had opposed the

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[65] The effect of the strike on Methodism was more dramatic with the divorce of the radical social gospel from the church (Allen, op. cit., p. 119).

[66] Witness Aug. 4, 1921; Aug. 18, 1921. These anti-labor articles were preceeded by a series of pro-labor articles from Apr. 7 to May 5, 1921 that depicted industrial strife as the product of economic insecurity. Cf. Record Aug. 22, 1922, p. 229.

[67] Acts 1922, Minutes, pp. 111-123. This position was reaffirmed in 1923, Acts, Minutes, p. 123. A conservative ammendment to the motion by Ephraim Scott was defeated; for the Scott motion see Record Oct., 1919, p. 295.

growth in Canada of the International Workers of the World and other Bolshevik organizations. The social gospel elements within the church were critical of the violence and class hatred of the Red unions arguing that the solution to industrial strife was a classless society in which labor is equal with capital. In attempting to separate Christian socialism from Bolshevism, the social gospellers had asserted that the real problem was not the presence of Communists in unions but the unequal distribution of wealth in Canadian society.[68] These noble sentiments were put to the test in a series of debilitating strikes in which there were allegations of Communist influence in the mining and steel industries of Cape Breton. Although the Presbyterian press was at times critical of the labor unions in Nova Scotia, especially with regard to strike violence and compulsory unionization, the social gospellers supported the strikers and rejected the allegations of Bolshevik involvement made by the industries involved in the disputes.[69]

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[68] Presbyterian and Westminster July 25, 1918, pp. 75-6; July 16, 1913, pp. 55-6; Jan. 22, 1920, p. 81.

[69] The Witness contained many articles critical to the workers and discovered Red influence in the strikes (Mar. 30, 1922; June 14, 1922; July 19, 1923). But the Witness also published in Sept. 28, 1922, a letter by the Rev. A. M. MacLeod presenting the workers case, and in Sept. 20, 1923, supported the steelworkers demands for better working conditions. In Apr. 2, 1925 the Witness firmly attacked the British Empire Corporation of Nova Scotia, and in Apr. 30, 1925, applauded an inter-denominational committee established to provide food and financial support for striking coal miners. For an account of the Cape Breton disputes see H. A. Logan, Trade Unions in Canada (Toronto: MacMillan, 1948), pp. 199ff; C. Lipton, The Trade Union Movement in Canada (Montreal: Canadian Social Publications, 1966), pp. 245ff; Martin Robin, Radical Politics and Canadian Labour (Kingston: Queen's University, 1968).

The decisive social gospel support for the labor movement during these four crises shows that the church did not fear social disruption. For the prophetic element within the Presbyterian church, social disorder was a healthy sign that the oppressed were rallying against the forces of corruption within society.

> That there is unrest among the working people is neither to be wondered at nor regretted. It is a sign of intelligent ambition. It must continue until full justice is done . . .[70]

In the midst of the Winnipeg strike the Board of Home Missions and Social Service of the general assembly issued a dramatic report that threw the church's support behind those who wished to reform the social order

> unrest is a belated protest against injustices that have been tolerated in our social system--the alienation of our natural resources, the tying up of land for the unearned increment in value, profiteering especially during the war, the public indifference toward the conditions in which many of our people live and toward the wrongs they suffer.[71]

This affirmation of the social benefit of social strife was closely linked to religious support for the main platforms of the labor movement. The official body of the Presbyterian Church warned capital to respect the rights of the workers and pledged the church to the creation of an industrial system in which both capital and labor existed for public service.

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70 Acts 1915, Appendix, p. 359.

71 Acts 1919, Minutes, p. 81.

This enthusiastic social gospel support for the labor movement is remarkable in the face of evidence that organized labor in North America was relatively hostile toward religion. In 1931 an editorial in Christian Century drew attention to this phenomenon in the United States:

> To the best of my knowledge the church has not betrayed labor but labor has betrayed both churches and ministers where such ministers and such men have taken the side of labor. It has stood off and scoffed while ministers have sacrificed position and personal welfare in behalf of an organization that does not support their budgets nor fill their church pews.[72]

There is considerable evidence to suggest that Canadian workers were also disenchanted with religion. J. S. Woodsworth suggested that workers were alienated from religion because of the middle class character of the Protestant churches.[73] M. V. Royce observed that church going Methodists were on the side of the Citizens Committees in the Winnipeg Strike.[74] Labour spokesman Frank Urey argued in a series of articles in the Westminster that union members were not concerned with the church's efforts on their behalf.[75] The general assembly of the Presbyterian Church observed in 1914 that religious adherence and church membership were becoming mutually exclusive affiliations.[76] The assembly deplored the uneasy relations between

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[72] Miller, op. cit., p. 286.

[73] Woodsworth, op. cit., pp. 155-174.

[74] Royce, op. cit., p. 236.

[75] Westminster Mar., 1909, pp. 196-202; Jan., 1910, pp. 28-32.

[76] Acts 1914, Appendix, pp. 44-5; cf. Presbyterian and Westminster June 5, 1919, p. 353.

church and labor, claiming that

> in numerous instances there is manifest hostility to Christian institutions--no loud protest, but a quiet covert suspicion that the Christian world has no deep interest in the welfare of the great masses that are in constant struggle for a mere existence.[77]

The alienation of labor from religious institutions was probably the major reason why Presbyterian social gospellers were not active in the Labor Church movement. Although the Presbyterian reformers called for a democratic church to speak to the workers, only the Presbyterian and Westminster supported the idea of separate labor churches.[78] The independent movement of Labor Churches was never a major force in Canadian religion, comprising at its height in 1921 only 660 official members, mostly in Winnipeg.[79] The Presbyterian social gospellers feared the movement because of its espousal of class warfare and the apparent absence of specifically religious concerns within Labor Churches. They supported the contention of S. D. Chown and other moderate Methodist social gospellers that

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77 Acts 1911, Appendix, p. 46. Crysdale, op. cit., 1961, pp. 16ff argues that the alienation of the workers from religion, although present in Canada, was not as extensive as in the United States or the United Kingdom because of the brief period between the settlement of the frontier and the beginning of industrialization.

78 A report from Winnipeg in the Presbyterian and Westminster Sept. 9, 1920, p. 281, declared that "the Labor Church stands for the application of the Christian principles of Brotherhood to our industrial relationships. We hope that this may be but the beginning of a closer co-operation between the Labor leaders and the clergymen". Cf. Aug. 21, 1919, pp. 171-2.

79 Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Census of Canada (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1921) I, pp. 756-67, Table 39. See Allen's account of the Labor Church movement, op. cit., pp. 159-174.

> the history of the labor churches thus far in Canada is a demonstration that the purpose of many who support them is to use the word "Church" as a cloak under which the teachings of revolutionary socialism may be made to reach a larger number of people, and particularly people who are interested to some extent in Christian principles, but are alienated from their former connections by the opinion that the Church is not doing all she might do to solve social problems.[80]

By 1927 the Labor Churches had vanished, their members dispersed into the radical labor movement.

But despite their failure to support independent labour churches, the Presbyterian social gospellers continued in their defense of the aims of organized labour. The progressive element of the church was committed to uplifting the oppressed, even if the oppressed preferred to seek their own solutions to social and industrial problems. For the social gospellers all men were responsible for the alleviation of the sufferings of the few. This noble sentiment was articulated as early as 1911 in a declaration of the general assembly of the church's attitude toward social questions, and remained a fundamental conviction of the reformers.

> We realize that poverty is due to vice, indolence or imprudence; but on the other hand, we hold that much is preventable disease, uncompensated accidents, lack of proper education, unemployment, insufficient wages, and other conditions for which society is responsible, and which society ought to remove . . . when through old age, accident, sickness or any other incapacity, the family or individual is unable to become self-supporting, society should make adequate provision for them.[81]

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[80] Address to the Toronto Conference, June, 1920, cited by Allen, op. cit., p. 172.

[81] Acts 1911, Appendix, pp. 274-5.

Toward this goal the social gospellers pressured for internal reform to make the Presbyterian Church more appealing to the downtrodden; they called upon industry to acknowledge its responsibility to the workers, and above all, they petitioned the state to chastize the social oppressors and equalize the powers of capital and labor.

D. Political Reform

The social gospel platform required vigorous intervention into the political sphere. The dramatic changes required to re-make Canada into a Christian nation necessitated the co-operation of the State. The moderate social gospellers never fielded candidates of their own but encouraged reform minded clergy to speak from the pulpit and in the public press on political questions.[82] The political activities of the social gospel movement took three forms: a) the application of pressure for specific proposals regarding labor, prohibition, social injustice, etc., b) attempts to improve the level of honesty among government officials, and c) fundamental reforms in the political system.

The social gospel supporters gave extensive publicity to political scandals. The purpose was not to discredit the political process but to make corruption unprofitable for politicians. In 1915 the Witness reported in comprehensive detail a scandal in the Roblin

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[82] Westminster June, 1896, p. 6; Presbyterian June 30, 1910, pp. 810-2; July 23, 1914, pp. 57-8; July 30, 1914, pp. 75-6.

government of Manitoba; the case centred around exhorbitant construction contracts which were awarded to friends of the party with the understanding that campaign contributions would be forthcoming. The Manitoba scandal was typical of political malfeasance with the suborning of key witnesses at the government inquiry, missing and altered documents, and the like.[83] During the war the reformers publicized munitions contracts that were overly generous to certain companies that were closely connected to the parties in power.[84] Election irregularities were of critical concern to the social gospel supporters. They published reports of corrupt practices during the Prohibition Referendum of 1924: in Toronto alone 70,000 names were illegally added to the voters' list.[85] Although the level of political scandal does not appear to be any higher in this period of Canadian history than in any other, the extreme zeal of religious reformers in exposing these episodes reveals a continuous concern with political affairs.

Presbyterian reformers were distressed by the recurring reports of bribery of public officials. The liquor trade and supporters of race track gambling were most frequently accused of corrupting government officials. What disturbed the social gospellers was not only

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83 Witness June 19, 1915; July 10, 1915ff.

84 Presbyterian Apr. 6, 1916, p. 319 is typical.

85 Witness Nov. 13, 1924. For a report of earlier election irregularities see Acts 1905, Appendix, p. 242; Acts 1912, Appendix, p. 316; Acts 1914, Appendix, pp. 322-8.

the lack of integrity exhibited by venal politicians, but also the undue influence wealth could exert upon affairs of the State. This theme was the basis of the Presbyterian's editorial in reference to a Quebec scandal

> bribery is a vice with which Canadian politicians are only too familiar . . . Hence arises the chief danger which threatens the present social order, the preponderating influence of selfish and unscrupulous money interests in choosing our legislators and framing our laws.[86]

The reformers were sophisticated in their attacks; they publicized not only the cases of blatant bribery but also the more subtle forms, like the case of the government official who after leaving office appeared as a spokesman for the industry he had been supposed to regulate.[87]

The prevalence of bribery motivated social gospellers to push for fundamental reforms of the political system, in this case for the elimination of patronage in the civil service.[88] The spoils system by which the political victors awarded government posts to their supporters without regard to ability, (or to the wishes of the previous incumbents), created numerous abuses. The economic insecurity of government appointments encouraged office holders to favour those

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[86] Presbyterian Feb. 12, 1914, p. 195; cf. Acts 1912, Appendix, pp. 316-8; Presbyterian Mar. 2, 1916, p. 199; Presbyterian and Westminster Mar. 8, 1917, p. 283; Witness Feb. 17, 1921.

[87] Presbyterian and Westminster May 13, 1920, p. 484.

[88] Witness Mar. 24, 1917; June 23, 1917; Acts 1918, Minutes, p. 29.

corporations which contributed to party coffers. The frequent changes in key positions also meant that inexperienced officials were often duped by shrewd contractors. When the patronage system was abolished in 1918, partly as a result of social gospel pressure, the general assembly declared

> it is not possible to overestimate the increase and economy which will result from this action to present and future generations of Canadians.[89]

The reformers vigorously resisted any attempts to re-introduce the political patronage or replace the merit system of the civil service.[90]

The second fundamental political change that the social gospellers supported was reform of the Senate. The Senate had on three separate occasions vetoed legislation central to the social gospel platform; legislation regarding race track gambling, the age of consent for girls, and measures to protect the chastity of young females in the city, were passed by the House of Commons but defeated in the Senate.[91] The social gospellers argued that Canada should be ruled by representatives of the electorate, not political appointees.

The third fundamental political change desired by the reformers

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89 Acts 1918, Appendix, p. 13.

90 Witness May 19, 1921; Mar. 8, 1923; Jan. 3, 1924.

91 Presbyterian and Westminster Sept. 6, 1917, p. 229; Acts 1918, Minutes, p. 30; Witness July 5, 1923; Aug. 7, 1924; Apr. 23, 1925.

was the enfranchisement of women.[92] The major impetus for this reform was a commitment to Christian equality, a theme that was most actively put forth by the Presbyterian in its support of women's rights, including equality in marriage.[93] Social gospellers also believed that if women were given the vote the legislation of other social gospel reforms, notably prohibition, would be assured. This conviction was partly a vestigal remnant of the Victorian notion of female purity and partly an empirical observation of the reformist character of certain female organizations like the Women's Christian Temperance Union.

Of central importance to the social gospel critique and use of the political process is the mechanism by which the reformers hoped to see their policies implemented by the State. Presbyterian social gospellers did not field political candidates and were never associated with any one political party, (although the mutual sympathy of the social gospel and Progressive movements is clear). The reformers believed that their movement transcended the traditional political process; they saw little difference among the political parties and argued that the key to Christianizing Canada lay with a militant public opinion. With the up-lifting of moral fervor among the electorate would come political officials with integrity.

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92 Presbyterian Apr. 28, 1910, p. 516; Jan. 2, 1913, p. 5; May 15, 1913, p. 613; Jan. 27, 1916, p. 78; Presbyterian and Westminster Mar. 8, 1917, pp. 279-80; Acts 1918, Appendix, p. 12.

93 e.g. Presbyterian Apr. 20, 1911, p. 483.

> The blame for the dishonesty in public life must lie not so much upon those who are in public life, as upon the state of public opinion, which is behind them.[94]

> The ardour for electoral reform which burns in the breasts of a Parliamentary Opposition is usually quenched when the party obtains power. Little will be done to heal the sore of Canadian political life until a strong and healthy public opinion asserts itself.[95]

For this reason the Presbyterian general assembly urged voters to "hold their party affiliations lightly, in the interests of the State".[96]

E. The Sabbath

The Presbyterian Church has been the denomination most active in the defense of the Sabbath, from the mid 19th century to the present day. The enforcement of Sabbath laws and membership in the Lord's Day Alliance were major concerns of civic minded Presbyterians. But as with Prohibition, conservatives and social gospellers approached the issue in different ways. The two key conservative arguments in support of Sunday purity, tradition and divine obligation,[97] were rarely employed by the reformers.

The central argument for the social gospellers in support of Sabbath legislation was the motif of Christian equality which was

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94 Acts 1912, Appendix, pp. 317-8.

95 Presbyterian Apr. 15, 1915, p. 390.

96 Acts 1915, Minutes, p. 54.

97 e.g. Witness Feb. 10, 1917; Aug. 4, 1917; Dec. 29, 1917.

closely linked to pro-labour sentiment in the church. The reformers argued that the Lord Day's Act ensured that all men, laborers as well as wealthy capitalists, could have one day's rest in seven.[98] Scientific proofs were introduced to demonstrate the necessity of weekly rest for health,[99] and evidence was presented to show that industrial production increased with the shorter week.[100] The social gospellers linked Sabbath support to their critique of Big Business; opposition to the Lord's Day Act was identified with the shallow greed of corporate oppression.

> It is the inordinate desire to increase the dividend that induces certain corporations and industrial and commercial enterprises to overlook every religious and humanitarian consideration, and wherever possible to rob the workingman of his right to one day's rest in seven, and of his opportunity for Lord's Day worship.[101]

The social gospellers were opposed to Sunday movies and sports but not because of a Puritanical prejudice against frivolity. Their argument was that Sabbath entertainment involved commercial enterprises with employees who were thereby deprived of their Sunday rest.[102]

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98 Acts 1907, Appendix, p. 253; Presbyterian May 8, 1911, p. 612; Oct. 19, 1911, p. 428. The first reference to Sabbath legislation as protection for the working man is an article in the Canadian Presbyterian, Mar. 26, 1880, p. 328. The first Lord's Day Act was introduced by the Presbyterian minister John Charleton in 1884 (Christie, op. cit., pp. 239-43).

99 Witness June 9, 1917; May 25, 1918.

100 Presbyterian Apr. 13, 1911, pp. 461-2.

101 Acts 1914, Appendix, p. 301; cf. Acts 1920, Minutes, p. 25.

102 Acts 1922, Minutes, p. 109; cf. Presbyterian and Westminster May 6, 1920, p. 46.

The Presbyterian reformers emphasized the secular character of the Lord's Day legislation. The Rev. T. A. Moore argued against the Seventh Day Adventists who claimed that the Sabbath law vindicated their principles. He argued that the law was a civil rather than a religious matter.[103] The following interpretation of the Lord's Day Alliance policy published by the Witness in 1923, reveals that for the social gospellers the Christian element of the Sabbath law lay not in the setting aside of one day for religious worship but in ensuring that all men have an equal right to weekly rest.

> The Alliance has nothing to do with the way in which men spend their Sabbath so long as they do not interfere with the rights of others to a quiet day of rest. As a matter of fact, thousands who through the agency of the Alliance have been released for one day in the week from grinding toil choose to spend a portion of this day in the established ways of worship; but there is nothing in the Lord's Day Act to compel any one to go to Church. He is free to go or to remain at home but he must not do anything to rob his neighbour of the privilege which he enjoys. Most laboring men understand this and among the most ardent supporters of the Lord's Day Alliance are the labor unions of Canada.[104]

F. Race Track Gambling

Both reform and conservative elements of the Presbyterian Church were unalterably opposed to gambling in all its forms. But the social gospellers doggedly pursued one particular form of gambling--horse race betting--to the virtual exclusion of all other forms.

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[103] Presbyterian Mar. 3, 1910, p. 276; cf. Feb. 24, 1910, p. 228; July 4, 1912, pp. 3-4.

[104] Witness Sept. 27, 1923.

Although the conservatives also disapproved of the race track and could be critical of that institution,[105] they never caught the special qualities of the race track cited by the reformers; for the social gospellers the race track was a symbol of social elitism and a centre for ancillary immorality of all types.

The race track, despite intense pressure from the churches, allegedly continued to exist because of the privileged status of its supporters. Horse race fans were largely drawn from the social and political elites. Because of the high status of their customers, race track owners were able to gain exemption from gambling laws, thereby ensuring a privileged status for what was seen to be an illicit enterprise.

> The real and intolerable scandal is that public gambling is permitted in connection with a sport which is patronized by a wealthy and fashionable clique, while in every other form gambling is prohibited under heavy penalties.[106]

For the social gospellers the race tracks were not only gambling centres but were symbols of the social inequality inherent in Canadian society.

The race tracks supported a wide range of immoral activities. They were linked to financial fraud, prostitution, bootlegging and stock market speculation.[107] But in the eyes of the reformers the most serious ancillary activity of the race track was the corruption

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105 Record May, 1915, pp. 204-5.

106 Presbyterian and Westminster May 1, 1919, p. 422; cf. Feb. 15, 1917, p. 188; May 17, 1917, pp. 567-8; Acts 1911, Appendix, p. 256; Witness Mar. 15, 1923; etc.

107 Witness Nov. 7, 1924; Presbyterian Oct. 12, 1905, p. 451.

of government officials. Race tracks were enormously profitable; between 1910 and 1917 the Jockey Club earned for its shareholders $710,000, a return on capital investment of 100% per year.[108] In order to protect this profit race track officials had been known to bribe or illicitly pressure elected officials to prevent the passage of gambling legislation; the same owners were allegedly able to dupe the Senate into exercising its veto powers in this area.[109] It was this combination of the sin of gambling with social elitism, political corruption and other forms of social sin that led the reformers to protest against the race tracks so aggressively.

G. Social Vice in the City

Most of the social gospel efforts to redeem the urban slum have been discussed above. There were other concerns, however, notably the attempts to curb prostitution. The reformers opposed the unspoken practice of permitting prostitution to flourish provided it was confined to a specific "red light" district of the city.[110] They campaigned vigorously through the National Committee for the Suppression of White Slave Traffic[111] to eliminate the oldest profession,

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108 Witness June 16, 1921.

109 Witness July 5, 1923.

110 Presbyterian Mar. 10, 1910, pp. 291-2.

111 Acts 1913, Appendix, p. 294; cf. Acts 1909, Minutes, pp. 69-71.

because it was a major source of the corruption of young females and chief cause of venereal disease.[112] Toward this end the social gospellers established redemption centres to save fallen women; they pressured police forces to enforce existing vice legislation, and they petitioned the federal government to limit the immigration of single girls.[113] The Presbyterian chaplains at immigration centres tried to ensure that new Canadians did not succumb to this social evil; the YWCA performed a similar function for country girls newly arrived to the city.

The social gospellers were also active in curbing the drug traffic, especially of opium in Montreal and Vancouver. The reformers established centres for the rehabilitation of drug addicts and pressured the government to stop the influx of drugs into the country.[114] Presbyterians were also active in fighting urban crime of all types, and penal reform.[115]

One of the mechanisms to fight crime approved by both reformers and conservatives was censorship. The social gospellers believed that

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[112] Acts 1918, Minutes, p. 29; Acts 1921, Minutes, pp. 97-8.

[113] Acts 1910, Minutes, p. 63; Acts 1911, Minutes, p. 86.

[114] Acts 1924, Minutes, p. 27; Acts 1911, Appendix, pp. 263-5; Witness Aug. 14, 1924; cf. J. G. Shearer in the Record Jan., 1923, p. 30; Nov., 1923, p. 331.

[115] e.g. Shearer in the Record Feb., 1925, p. 41; Witness Feb. 4, 1925; Presbyterian July 14, 1910, p. 33; July 21, 1910, p. 51.

the glorification of crime in the mass media fostered the growth of young deviants; they argued that movies, literature and the theatre could be moral forces if only they were purged of sex and violence.[116] Presbyterians attempted to censor classics like Balzac and Maupassant as well as popular literature. There was even an attempt to Bowdlerize the Bible; the reform minded editor of the Witness approved the controversial Prohibition Bible, a translation of the New Testament that ommitted all references to wine and drinking.[117] The censorship campaign became at times ludicrous; an angry letter-writer in the Presbyterian found a social gospel lecture on the evils of obscenity obscene.[118] [119]

Presbyterian social gospellers were committed to making extensive changes in the structure of Canadian society, changes that would have wide-ranging implications for all Canadians. The social gospellers were ardent supporters of church union because they believed that only a united church would have the concentrated resources to reform society. They were convinced that "in order to exert their most potent influence, the Churches must work together".[120]

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116 Presbyterian Apr. 28, 1910, pp. 515-6; Oct. 6, 1910, p. 354; May 11, 1911, p. 579; Feb. 12, 1914, p. 196; Acts 1910, Minutes, pp. 45-7; Witness Feb. 17, 1921; Record Mar., 1924, p. 74.

117 Acts 1911, Appendix, pp. 262-3.

118 Witness Apr. 23, 1925.

119 Letter by "Protester", Presbyterian, Dec. 17, 1914, p. 576.

120 Report by Alfred Gandier Acts 1920, Minutes, p. 25.

The social gospellers had experienced the dramatic effect on government when the churches had acted as a cohesive unit to eliminate the liquor trade in the West.

> For 15 years the separate denominations battled apart against the bar and the government at them, then the force united and organized a powerful machine that forgot denominational lines and that machine wiped out the existing government and the bar.[121]

The social gospellers believed that they should formally unite with reformers from other churches in order to work more efficiently and with greater hope of success toward the redemption of Canadian society.

But there was in the Presbyterian Church of Canada a minority of concerned laymen who were totally opposed to the reform of Canadian society along the lines established by the social gospellers, and to the use of religious institutions to effect social change. In the following chapter we shall examine the conservative opposition to the social gospel movement of Canadian Presbyterianism in order to show that opposition to the social gospel led to opposition to church union.

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121 Ralph Connor, St. Thomas Times-Journal Dec. 22, 1924.

CHAPTER V

THE SOCIAL GOSPEL AND CHURCH UNION

(A) Social Conservatism and Ecumenical Negativism

Our discussion of the vigorous social gospel movement in Canadian Presbyterianism has minimized until now the conservative opposition to social Christianity. But acceptance of social gospel ideals was by no means universal. The progressive resolutions of the general assembly were often ignored in practice and the aggressive participation of social gospel clergy in the secular realm was frequently thwarted by a recalcitrant laity.[1]

Hostility toward the social gospel was strongest amongst anti-unionists. In this section we shall attempt to outline Presbyterian opposition to the social gospel, selecting our material from non-concurrent sources. These sources are: the Presbyterian Record which opposed union;[2] books published by ministers who eventually fought to maintain a distinct Presbyterian Church; articles, addresses, letters and sermons by nonconcurrents reported in the public press, and to a lesser extent, the Presbyterian Witness of Halifax which before 1920 remained neutral on the church union question.

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[1] A similar phenomenon occurred in the United States. Many resolutions of national church councils were passed in the spirit of harmony with the tacit understanding that they would not be acted upon; e.g. the Rock River Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church in 1932 unanimously adopted a socialistic report yet 86% of the delegates voted for Hoover. See R. M. Miller, American Protestantism and Social Issues 1919-1939 (Chapell Hill: University of North Carolina, 1958), pp. 113-4.

[2] The Record, as an official publication of the Presbyterian (continued)

Opponents of church union argued that the social gospel movement was emphatically denied by Biblical exegesis.[3] They stressed the eternal validity of scriptural proclamations, claiming that the attempt to recast traditional teachings into a set of clichés that would appeal to men of the present age[4] would dilute the Christian message. The social gospellers were attacked because they made Christianity too easy, as if one could be religious simply by articulating social concerns in theological language. For conservatives the social gospellers were impatient and unfaithful in their implicit denial that God's grace alone was sufficient to resolve all human problems.

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2 (continued)
church, always claimed a neutral stance on the union question. But there is no doubt that its editor, Ephraim Scott, vehemently opposed union and sought at every general assembly to fight the movement. The Record attempted to balance pro and anti union articles and letters in each issue, maintaining editorial neutrality. But this balancing of articles meant that the Record was the only Presbyterian periodical to give equal status to the nonconcurrents; the other journals were pro-union and published nonconcurrent critiques infrequently. The other journals argued that the Record was opposed to union despite its alleged neutrality (see Presbyterian May 30, 1912, p. 666; Sept. 12, 1912, p. 271; Witness July 28, 1910, pp. 75-6). The moderator of the general assembly claimed in 1910 that the Record distorted the assembly's pro-union resolutions, a charge that Scott hotly denied (Witness Sept. 22, 1910, pp. 296-7; Oct. 6, 1910, p. 359).

3 Record Jan., 1923, p. 27.

4 Record Jan., 1915, p. 28.

The conservatives claimed that Christianity was most relevant to the world when it refused to be like the world. The conservative emphasis was upon a radical transcendence that relativized human preoccupations. They argued that the Kingdom of God is not of this world,[5] that it is an invisible realm that cannot be actualized within finite existence. Although in practice the conservatives gave greater support to the status quo than did social gospellers, the theological commitment of conservatives was to a more radical prophecy that stressed the enormous gulf between the society of men and the Kingdom of Heaven. This gulf could be overcome only by God; man's attempts to redeem human society were doomed to failure. This conviction led to the conservative espousal of two anti-social gospel motifs: individualism, and the radical separation of sacred and secular realms.

The conservative emphasis upon individualism explicitly rejected the social gospel attempts to save men by saving society. The Record argued that the social gospel movement had reversed the true situation; in reality human society would be redeemed only when individuals in society were saved by God.

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[5] Robert Campbell, The Relations of the Christian Churches (Toronto: William Briggs, 1913), pp. 77-8 is typical. Cf. Stuart Parker, "How Shall I Vote on Church Union" (UCA, PNL, Box 2, File 62) Toronto, 1925.

> This term [the Social Gospel] is often heard in these times. The way it is used seems to imply that there is a gospel to be given to a community or society as a whole. This is spoken of as the means of solving all social, business and political problems.
>
> But we see nothing of such a gospel in the Bible. It presents only a gospel for the individual. This Gospel is God's message to man, and God deals with the individual . . . When individuals are what they ought to be, the community or the nation will be what it ought to be, and it will not be so otherwise.[6]

Although the Record contained some articles, chiefly by J. G. Shearer, in support of the social gospel, the journal maintained a negative attitude toward "Christian secularism",[7] advocating a return to personal evangelism as opposed to social service.[8] The conservatives argued that failure and human suffering were the consequences of personal defects rather than the result of any particular social environment.[9] For conservatives the social gospel drive to reform society was a foolish attempt to redeem man by external or mechanical means without dealing with the fundamental problem of individual sin.[10]

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6 Record Jan., 1923, p. 27 quoting the United Presbyterian. The Record is full of references to conservative American periodicals, especially the one just named, which opposed with equal fervor the social gospel and ecumenism.

7 James Dunney in the Record May, 1922, p. 155; cf. Feb., 1925, p. 42, and Frank Baird's sermon preached at Knox Presbyterian Church, "Our Inheritance" (UCA, PNL, Box 1, File 1).

8 e.g. Record Dec., 1922, p. 376; Sept., 1920, p. 457; etc.

9 Article by R. M. Glassford, Record Feb., 1916, p. 65.

10 Sermon by Rev. M. Hay, Record June, 1915, p. 253; cf. article by Rev. W. H. Andrews, Record Oct., 1916, p. 448; Campbell, op. cit., p. 80; etc. The stress upon individual rather than collective redemption was the majority position of Canadian Presbyterianism before 1906. The Life and Work report of the general assembly before 1900

(continued)

Of equal importance to individualism in the conservative position was an emphasis upon the separation of religion from secular affairs. The editor of the Halifax Witness decried the clerical practice of preaching on social and political matters;[11] the Record agreed wholeheartedly arguing that even in wartime clergy should confine their remarks to eternal questions and eliminate those sermons which would be more appropriate in the public press.[12] The social gospel attempts to depict Jesus as an exemplary revolutionary leader were sharply rejected by conservatives who argued that Jesus was indifferent to the social and economic conditions of the time;[13] those who interpreted the prophetic witness of Christ in any other manner were merely interpolating their own political views into the scriptural record. For conservatives the social environment was irrelevant to the religious quest because "Jesus did not come to fix up a world for men to live in, but to fix up men to live in the world."[14]

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10 (continued)
emphasized the need for individual integrity in social life rather than a call for social reform (Acts 1897, Appendix, pp. 256ff; 1898, Appendix, pp. 280-1; 1899, Appendix pp. 261ff). Social questions were included in the Life and Work section from 1900 to 1902, excluded in 1903 and 1904, and given peripheral mention in 1905 (Appendix, pp. 240-2). In 1906 the assembly moved toward a social gospel position, de-emphasizing individualism in a call for a "pure and righteous nation" (Appendix, p. 304).

11 Witness Mar. 13, 1915.

12 Record Oct., 1916, p. 434.

13 Campbell, op. cit., pp. 18-9.

14 Record, Oct., 1918, p. 292.

The pastoral counsel of the Minister's Page in the Record repudiated the favorite social gospel role of the minister as mediator in social unrest; the best that the clergy could do would be to infuse their congregations with the Christian spirit, the content of which was unspecified.

> it is not the work of the ministry as such, nor of the Church as a Church, to adjust property relations, either by inheritance, or between Capital and Labour, or in any way . . . All social and moral reform, all attempted adjustment of man to his fellow man, which is not founded upon adjustment with God, will be of little value.[15]

The guiding motif that emerged from a conservative separation of sacred and secular affairs was the principle of non-intrusion of the church into the secular realm. The conservatives argued that the best aid they could give the downtrodden was not advice on the strategy of social reform but helping the downtrodden realize that their condition was a result of personal moral failings. If only the oppressed would make a decision for Christ their sufferings would be over.[16] The conservatives took a narrow view of the church's

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[15] Record Sept., 1917, p. 263; Witness Mar. 10, 1921.

[16] There were basically two attitudes in the conservative camp in regard to the cause of human suffering. One segment, the majority, held the Deuteronomic position that personal success was a consequence of spiritual purity; this theme was especially strong in prohibition literature and popular evangelism. More subtle conservatives believed that external circumstances were simply irrelevant to the inner state of the soul; the existence of the pious sufferer was simply beyond the understanding of men.

function arguing that agencies for social amelioration were the concern of the state, or in the case of workers the labor unions, not the church.

> The first and supreme work of the Church is not to secure better social conditions . . . it is not a better adjustment of the relations between capital and labour . . . it is not to secure from Parliament humane and righteous laws, but to lead men and women to receive Christ . . . There are already societies and organizations in plenty for these other objects. There are over 30 organizations for charitable and benevolent work alone, in one of our Canadian cities. The Church does not need to add herself to the number, but to work for and pray for better men and women in all of them.[17]

From this principle of non-intrusion came opposition to social gospel participation in political affairs. Unlike the social gospellers, conservative ministers refused to speak on political questions from the pulpit.[18] Political activity on the part of the church was regarded by conservatives as an infringement upon the right of the state. Ephraim Scott for example argued that the church had a lofty mission to instill personal integrity in its members, thereby creating loyal citizens, but any attempt by the church to influence public opinion through its size and strength would be to usurp the powers of the State.[19]

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17 Record Feb., 1925, p. 36; cf. Campbell, op. cit., pp. 272-4.

18 Address by Rev. George Duncan, "Report of a Meeting Held in Montreal West Presbyterian Church, May 25, 1923" (UCA, PNL, Box 1, File 27); cf. Record Jan., 1923, p. 27.

19 Ephraim Scott, "Letters to an Inquirer" (UCA, PNL, Box 2, File 80), 1917, p. 20.

Thus when conservative Presbyterians supported social gospel policies in moral questions they adopted a different approach, arguing in favour of an individual boycott of the immoral activity rather than pressing for government abolition of the practice.[20]

By remaining silent or indifferent to the great social issues of the day the conservatives in practice legitimated the status quo; their avowed neutrality revealed implicit support of the establishment. Presbyterian conservatives, when they spoke of industrial strife at all, tended to be more critical of the labour movement than social gospel supporters. The Record warned in 1903 of unscrupulous union leaders who were motivated solely by greed.[21] The Halifax Witness in an article on the shorter working day instituted in Britain suggested that labour unions were never satisfied with the gains they obtained and that union men should realize that there are limits to what employers could give.[22] In a similar vein the editor of the Witness declared his neutrality in industrial disputes

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[20] See for example the conservative attitude toward racetrack gambling: "There ought to be moral stamina enough in every Christian man and woman to boycott these meets unless they are freed from organized gambling . . ." R. G. MacBeth, Our Task in Canada (Toronto: Westminster, 1912), p. 132.

[21] Record Dec., 1903, p. 536.

[22] Witness Feb. 22, 1919.

but observed that workers should acknowledge that capitalists must earn a good profit on their investments because of the risks they take.[23] Nonconcurrents occasionally included in their speeches slanderous remarks regarding the labour movement; Stuart Parker for example, in an address against church union included a gratuitous reference to employee violence during a particular labour dispute.[24] The opponents of church union attempted to link the drive for a new church to the One Big Union movement, a labor organization that was inaccurately blamed for the Winnipeg General Strike and which was allegedly controlled by Soviet agitators.[25] The conservatives acknowledged to a lesser degree than social gospellers the problems of the industrial worker and argued that these difficulties could be remedied by a benevolent corporation.[26]

If conservative Presbyterians were critical of the labor movement they were much less so of the wealthy. Contrast the following remark by the nonconcurrent spokesman R. G. MacBeth to the

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[23] Witness Jan. 25, 1919.

[24] Stuart Parker, "Address in Deer Park Church, Jan. 10, 1924" (UCA, PNL, Box 2, File 61).

[25] E. Scott, Ottawa Citizen Jan. 13, 1924; D. Wright, Halifax Chronicle Jan. 26, 1923.

[26] e.g. MacBeth, op. cit., 1912, p. 133: the industrial concerns should look after their workers--MacBeth does not call for government or church intervention into labor problems.

social gospel critiques of class oppression:

> There is nothing necessarily criminal in being well-to-do. Poverty is a crime if it is due to sloth or vicious living or deliberate failure to avail one's self of the surroundings into which God has thrust us . . . Blessed is he who works amongst the poor, but blessed is he also who works faithfully and fearlessly amongst the rich.[27]

The conservatives thus gave greater emphasis to the functions of religious institutions as legitimaters of the existing order. Canadian religion has rarely been genuinely prophetic; even the most ardent social gospeller supported the war effort, seeing no conflict between duty to God and duty to country,[28] and was quite capable of remarks to the effect that "Jesus was a true patriot".[29] As we shall see below the social gospellers also emphasized the capacity of religion to unify the country. But Presbyterian conservatives stressed the social control functions of religion to a greater extent than social gospellers. This motif was by no means foreign to social gospel supporters but they never stated the issue as baldly as the editor of the Record who said that "Ministers and missionaries have

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[27] MacBeth, op. cit., 1912, p. 40.

[28] Principal Dyde spoke for all but the most extreme Presbyterian social gospellers when he stated that "there is no conflict of duties between fearing God and honouring the king, between obeying God and serving one's country . . . We must take as a Church our full part in this war" (Presbyterian Mar. 9, 1916, pp. 227-8). Methodist social gospellers were less comfortable with the war but most gave church support to military exploits; a notable exception was J. S. Woodsworth (McNaught, Prophet in Politics, Toronto: University of Toronto, 1959, p. 67). Presbyterian social gospellers did not become involved in the anti-war movement until after 1926 (Allen, The Social Passion, Toronto: University of Toronto, 1971, p. 313).

[29] R. A. Falconer, Presbyterian Apr. 13, 1916, pp. 345-7.

done more than any other single factor to make and keep Canada a land where life and property are safe."[30] Conservatives stressed the close co-operation of the church with the police forces of the land, especially in unsettled districts where one missionary was said to be worth ten policemen.[31] The outstanding feature of the church according to conservative spokesmen is that religion is the foe of anarchy and the foundation of law and order.

> If there is no God there is no authority to stand as a basis for government and hence the Church which keeps vivid the sense of God in the world stands for justice and order in the State.[32]

Although nonconcurrents were hostile toward the social gospel movement the critique of social Christianity was presented explicitly as an argument against church union only infrequently. W. D. Tait, in a brief polemic against the unionists, rejected the social gospel claim that church union would solve social problems. Tait argued that the causes of human suffering are individual rather than collective.[33] A similar position was presented by the Rev. D. McLeod who rejected the unionist claim that a united church oriented to the social gospel would be able to redeem society.

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30 Record Jan., 1918, p. 3; cf. July, 1916, p. 317; Dec., 1922, p. 358; Oct., 1922, pp. 394-5.

31 MacBeth, op. cit., 1912, p. 11. This co-operation at times became collusion; Allen, op. cit., pp. 170ff reports that one official in the Methodist conference acted as an informer for the RCMP investigations of Communism in the Labor Church movement.

32 MacBeth, op. cit., 1912, p. 11.

33 W. D. Tait, "Church Union and Social Service", The Need of the Presbyterian Church, published by a Group of Presbyterians, n.d., p. 8 (UCA, PNL, Box 1, File 38); also published in the Presbyterian

(continued)

> The cause of these social evils is our corrupt human nature. Union will not change or modify that. These evils are and will be always present in the world.[34]

A wartime anti-union pamphlet rejected the social gospel argument for union on the feeble grounds that future social needs could not be predicted.[35]

Even though hostility toward the social gospel was rarely articulated as a central argument against union, the latent influence of the motif is clear. The whole controversy concerning the "religio-political machine of Dr. Chown" involved nonconcurrent distrust of the political goals of social gospellers. Despite S. D. Chown's denial that he had ever used the term,[36] the expression became a rallying cry for nonconcurrents who feared that a united Protestantism would be sufficiently powerful to crush all opposition to the reforms of the social gospellers. A casual remark attributed to Principal Gandier, "the United Church is to be the beginning of a National Protestant Church for Canada and no government would dare to resist the demands of such a Church,"[37] increased the fears of Presbyterian

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33 (continued)
Standard, Toronto, July, 1923. Tait's article is a weak response that evades the issues raised by D. C. MacGregor's article on social service in the unionist pamphlet, The Need of Church Union.

34 Rev. D. McLeod, "The Present Duty to Preserve the Presbyterian Church", July, 1915 (UCA, PNL, Box 1, File 45).

35 The Message, Toronto, March, 1917, p. 4 (UCA, PNL, Box 1, File 49).

36 S. D. Chown, The Story of Church Union in Canada, Ryerson, Toronto, 1930, p. 105 states that he did on one occasion refer to the "religio-political realm" (Christian Guardian, June 28, 1922) but never to a "machine". Chown's remark was often quoted by nonconcurrents, e.g. Saturday Night, Toronto, Sept. 29, 1923; Mail and Empire, Toronto, Dec. 17, 1924; Presbyterian Standard, Toronto, Oct., 1923, pp. 6-8.

37 quoted by W. G. Brown in a letter to the Mail and Empire May
(continued)

conservatives that drastic social and political changes would follow church union.

The preponderance of social gospellers in the unionist ranks confronted social conservatives in a number of ways: as a threat to the accepted social structure; as an intrusion of religious institutions into the realm of the state, as a challenge to the Canadian business community, and as a threat to individual liberty.

In the first place, conservatives were disturbed by the social gospel attempts to weaken the class structure, to democratize the capitalist system, and to increase the numbers and social power of non-British immigrants. A united church would give the reformers the social and political clout to effect their goals, thereby disrupting the lives of those who were relatively content with the old system.

Closely related to this fear of the democratizing tendencies of the social gospel was the threat to upper class Presbyterians posed by the potential unification with the Methodists. Status conscious Presbyterians feared that their social position would be undermined if their religious institutions were consolidated with lower class Methodism. The class issue was rarely introduced as an argument against union but was nonetheless an extremely potent factor. (See the discussion in chapter I.) C. C. Morrison recounts with shock and horror a conversation with a prominent Presbyterian judge in which the class argument against union is articulated with utmost

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37 (continued)
28, 1924. C. W. Gordon was quoted as saying "I would like to see the legislature that would dare to refuse the request of the united church", Halifax Herald, Mar. 26, 1924.

clarity.

> The Presbyterians, he said coolly, are "better people" than the Methodists . . . The Presbyterian church is really a "select group". It is the "aristocracy of Canada". We will not abandon our "social position". "Our children's children will be proud of their fathers" for standing "staunch". "When our grandsons or great grandsons go east to college and are asked their religious affiliation" they will reply with "pride in their ancestors" who preserved for them "the aristocracy of the Presbyterian clan" which assures them a distinctly "superior" social classification.[38]

This fear of status loss was heightened by the social gospel identification of liberal Presbyterians and Methodists with the masses, the workers and the downtrodden of Canada. Presbyterian nonconcurrents feared that their prestige, especially vis a vis the Anglicans, would be irreparably damaged by church union.

The second fear of the conservatives was that a united church could become an institution of such strength as to co-opt the prerogatives of the state. We noted earlier how social conservatives attempted to maintain a sharp distinction between sacred and secular affairs. The conservatives feared that a united Protestantism would have too much power in relation to the state, operating as an autonomous realm like the Catholic church. The editor of the Evening Telegram in Toronto was not alone in his suggestion that church union was Protestant ultramontanism that threatened the very foundation of confederation.

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38 C. C. Morrison, "The Non-Concurring Presbyterians", Christian Century, May 3, 1928, p. 571.

> The authorities of the church are invading the secular power of the legislature. The principle of the Alexander-Chown-Gandier manifesto would be recognized as a danger to be resisted to the death if such a menace to the sovereignty of a free state was signed by the dignitaries of the Roman Catholic hierarchy.[39]

The conservatives feared that the state would become a mere adjunct to an all-powerful religious institution.

The third great fear of conservatives related to the aggressive attacks by unionists on the business community. Many nonconcurrent Presbyterians were disturbed by the detailed proposals for the secular world made by social gospel clergymen--subjects in which church leaders were said to be lamentably uninformed and inexperienced.[40] Church union would increase the power and audience of reform spokesmen, raising the threat of significant changes in business behaviour through legislative action, a prospect that had no appeal for the Presbyterian business community.

The fourth fear of social conservatives concerned the threat to individual liberty posed by a united Protestantism. The social gospel movement was distinguishable by its desire to deal with immorality in a collective context; there was no doubt that the united

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[39] Telegram, Toronto, Apr. 17, 1924; cf. letter by Rev. Hilts, Dec. 19, 1924, and by Rev. D. T. Shields, Jan. 19, 1925; Montreal Standard Apr. 19, 1924; Record Oct., 1920, pp. 294-5; Nov., 1920, p. 327.

[40] Letter from a "distinguished" Presbyterian layman quoted by Morrison, "Non-Concurring", p. 571.

church would attempt to persecute and prosecute sinners. In the words of one nonconcurrent layman, "They were overeager to dictate personal conduct and habit".[41] Social conservatives believed that the social gospel definition of sin was uncomfortably broad and unspecific. "Wets" who did not support the prohibitory emphasis of social gospel temperance opposed the church union movement because the first act of the united body would be to implement stringent controls on alcohol consumption.[42] Conservatives feared that prohibition was only the first of many laws to restrict the rights of individuals, laws which would curtail activity judged immoral solely by United Churchman. Conservatives were haunted by a vision of a small coterie of church leaders continually inventing new crimes and resurrecting old ideals.

> Why do these men wish to create a new political bloc? Why would they weld a weapon to hold over the government's head while they write objectionable clauses into laws? We are in sight of getting rid of one political bloc--the Progressives--why create another?[43]

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41 Ibid., emphasis in the original.

42 The opposition of wets to church union is reported in the Telegram Apr. 28, 1924; the Albertan, Calgary, Apr. 22, 1924; Saturday Night June 13, 1925; the Christian Guardian stated that "it is very significant that every well-known defender of the liquor traffic, as far as we know, stood opposed to church union". Cf. E. Thomas, "Church Union in Canada", American Journal of Theology, July, 1919, p. 260.

43 Montreal Standard Apr. 12, 1924; cf. Saturday Night July 4, 1925.

In our discussion we have attempted to show that for a significant number of Presbyterian conservatives church union was a force to be feared and opposed. Ecumenical negativism was a logical consequence of opposition to the social changes promoted by the social gospel movement.

B. The Social Gospel Variable

Both unionists and nonconcurrents equated ecumenism with the social gospel movement. For unionists ecumenism was an essential step toward the attainment of social reform in Canada; for nonconcurrents ecumenism was a force to be opposed because it would increase social disruption and social change. There is considerable empirical evidence that shows the influence of the social gospel variable on church union; in every case where the social gospel was strong, ecumenical support was equally strong.

The social gospel movement received greater support from the clergy than the laity, and was strongest in the seminaries. Leaders of the Presbyterian Church encouraged the development of social awareness in the theological colleges: the general assembly resolved in 1911 to ensure that the ideals of social reform were included in the curriculum,[44] and guest speakers to the colleges often selected social gospel themes in their lectures to the students.[45] The training

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[44] Acts 1911, Appendix, p. 276.

[45] e.g. the speech of J. W. MacMillan at the opening of Manitoba College, Presbyterian Nov. 18, 1915, pp. 489-91; R. S. McDonald's lecture to Saskatoon graduates, Presbyterian and Westminster May 10, 1917, pp. 547-8.

centres for future clergymen were the major centres of social gospel fervor in Canada.

The first piece of evidence suggesting support for the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between ecumenism and the social gospel is the voting behaviour of Presbyterian clergy who held lecture positions in the theological colleges. In all of Canada only two faculty members, D. J. Fraser and Thomas Eakin, both of Montreal, opposed church union.[46] The official spokesmen of the social gospel oriented educational system thus supported union almost unanimously.

The second piece of evidence is the vote of former moderators of the Presbyterian church. Of the 16 ex-moderators living in 1923 only one opposed the projected union.[47] These moderators were strong social gospel supporters who guided the general assembly to adopt progressive resolutions. The meetings of the general assembly consistently supported the social gospel movement, advocating policies more radical than even those supported by the most liberal Presbyterian journals. The moderators who guided the assembly, because they were elected by it, epitomized the social gospel sentiment of the official church; their near unanimous support of church union indicates the importance of the social gospel variable.

The third piece of evidence relevant to our hypothesis is the response of foreign missionaries to the union controversy. Workers

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[46] N. G. Smith, Short History of the Presbyterian Church in Canada (Toronto: Presbyterian Church, 1965), p. 96.

[47] Letter by R. B. Cochrane Witness Jan. 25, 1923.

in foreign fields were committed to the social gospel platform. They campaigned not only against heathenism but against social immorality; they laboured to improve the status of women, eliminate the caste system, abolish infanticide and curtail the international opium trade.[48] The explicit social gospel commitment of foreign mission workers was articulated as early as 1915, in this case by the Rev. T. Fraser:

> In all non-Christian countries it is the work of the missionaries not merely to bring a message of salvation for the individual soul, but to uplift the individual's whole social environment.[49]

In the crisis of 1925 workers in the mission fields voted overwhelmingly in favour of union; 314 of 337 missionaries entered the united church.[50] Since 94% of these workers entered the union our contention that the social gospel motivated unionists is supported.

The fourth and strongest piece of evidence supporting the hypothesis is the recorded vote of ministers. In chapter I we showed that church union support was stronger among the clergy, the major source of social gospel fervor, than among the laity.[51] Table V-1 compares

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48 See e.g. Record July, 1915, pp. 300-304; Dec., 1920, p. 370; Jan. 1921, p. 20; Aug., 1921, pp. 252ff; Nov., 1921, p. 340; Oct., 1922, pp. 310f; July, 1924, p. 205; Feb., 1925, p. 58. Most foreign missionaries were theological conservatives and social liberals: there was no relationship between liberalism on the theological and social levels.

49 Article by Rev. T. Fraser, Record July, 1915, p. 300. It should be noted that the outspoken social gospeller Alfred Gandier directed the Presbyterian foreign mission service for many years.

50 Witness May 14, 1925; Acts 1925, Minutes, p. 86.

51 See chapter I, pp. 30-31 especially footnotes 38 and 39. The data in table V-1 is drawn from the empirical study of Presbyterian churches described in chapter II.

the vote of clergy and laity on the union question. For all of Canada clergy are over-represented in the unionist ranks with 79% in favour of union while the laity are under-represented in the same category with only 57% supporting union. The probability of these results occurring through chance is less than one in a thousand. When synod is controlled the relationship established between clergy and church union support remains.

TABLE V-1 CLERICAL AND LAY SUPPORT FOR UNION, IN PERCENTAGES, CONTROLLING FOR SYNOD

	Charges	Laity	Clergy
Maritimes	69	68	87*
Montreal/Ottawa	62	58	75*
Toronto/Kingston	48	46	72**
Hamilton/London	39	39	69**
Manitoba	93	92	90
Saskatchewan	92	90	90
Alberta	78	68	79
British Columbia	79	77	83
All Canada	66	57	79**

*significant difference $p<.05$
**significant difference $p<.001$

The voting behaviour of clergy, theological faculty, former moderators and missionaries demonstrates that there is a positive relationship between church union and social gospel support.

Even though we have demonstrated a correlation between the social gospel movement and church union it is possible that the social gospel is a dependent rather than an independent variable. There is some

evidence to suggest that social gospel was stronger in some regions than in others. Richard Allen in the Social Passion argues that the major centre for social Christianity was Wesley College (Methodist) in Winnipeg,[52] and that Winnipeg had the bulk of Labor Churches.[53] M. V. Royce states that the social gospel was much stronger in the West than in the Maritimes, although she presents no evidence to substantiate her claims.[54] Stewart Crysdale presents a similar argument for the absence of social gospel sentiment in the Atlantic provinces.[55] The annual reports from the Maritime synods reveal a more conservative social policy than the reports from the Western synods.[56] Since regionalism was found to be a major independent variable it is possible that the social gospel correlation with union merely reflects the geographic distribution of social gospel support in Canada.

In order to test the relationship between the two variables an analysis was made of reports from synod and session published in the Presbyterian Witness from July 1921 to June 1925. The number of social gospel oriented reports was determined for each province, allowing us to assign a social gospel rank to each province. Spearman's

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[52] Allen, op. cit., p. 10.

[53] Ibid., p. 172.

[54] M. V. Royce, "The Contribution of the Methodist Church to Social Welfare in Canada" (M.A. thesis, University of Toronto, 1940), p. 106.

[55] Crysdale, op. cit., 1961, p. 83.

[56] Synod reports published by the Witness show that in 2 years there was no discussion of social questions at all in the Maritimes Synod (Oct. 25, 1923; Oct. 23, 1924).

co-efficient of rank correlation was used to discover the degree of relationship between the variables. Table V-2 shows a slender but not significant relationship between provincial union support and provincial social gospel support.

TABLE V-2 CORRELATION OF ECUMENICITY RANK WITH SOCIAL GOSPEL RANK, BY PROVINCE

	Ecumenicity Rank	Social Gospel Rank	Number of Entries
Saskatchewan	1	3	40
Manitoba	2	1	68
Alberta	3	5	23
British Columbia	4	4	33
Maritimes	5	6	18
Quebec	6	7	9
Ontario	7	2	65

r_s=.3571 Z=.1457 No Significant Correlation.

In chapter IV we noted that prohibition was supported by both conservative and progressive Presbyterians with equal fervor but with clearly distinguishable attitudes. Since prohibition is an ambiguous indicator of social gospel sentiment it is possible that the inclusion of prohibition entries in our social gospel index may be misleading. In table V-3 the social gospel rank assigned to each province has been revised by eliminating prohibition from the index. The revised table demonstrates once again that there is no correlation between regional support for ecumenism and social gospel strength within each province.

TABLE V-3 CORRELATION OF ECUMENICITY RANK WITH REVISED SOCIAL GOSPEL RANK, BY PROVINCE

	Ecumenicity Rank	Revised Social Gospel Rank
Saskatchewan	1	4
Manitoba	2	6
Alberta	3	5
British Columbia	4	1
Maritimes	5	6
Quebec	6	7
Ontario	7	3

$r_s=0$ Z=0 No Correlation

In the period prior to union the social gospel was an integral part of official church policy. It is possible that synod and provincial bodies were reluctant to openly oppose the movement; conservatives in large gatherings may have felt that it was advisable to at least pay lip service to the social gospel rather than alienate the clerical elite.[57] In order to test this possibility a rank order of provincial social gospel support was constructed using only reports from individual presbyteries, the smallest units consistently reported in the Witness. Table V-4 employs this local social gospel index to demonstrate that the correlation between provincial social gospel support and regional approval of ecumenism is slight and not statistically significant.

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[57] The militant social gospeller the Rev. T. R. Robinson complained that despite the lofty resolutions of the official church he rarely heard social gospel themes articulated at the local level (Witness Dec. 22, 1921).

TABLE V-4 CORRELATION OF ECUMENICITY RANK WITH LOCAL SOCIAL GOSPEL RANK, BY PROVINCE

	Ecumenicity Rank	Local Social Gospel Rank
Saskatchewan	1	3
Manitoba	2	2
Alberta	3	5
British Columbia	4	4
Maritimes	5	6
Quebec	6	7
Ontario	7	1

r_s=.8214 Z=.3353 No Significant Correlation

We can conclude from tables V-2, 3 and 4 that the social gospel influence on ecumenism is not dependent upon regional distribution; regionalism and social gospel support are separate independent variables.

C. Social Reform and Church Union

Support and opposition to social gospel reform was inseparably related to favouring and disfavouring ecumenism. The schism within Canadian Presbyterianism over the church union question followed the divisions within Canadian society as a whole. The controversy surrounding the questions of Prohibition, capital-labour relations, political reform and social amelioration was not confined to the Presbyterian Church but was the subject of exhaustive debate in the secular press, in the seats of government and in the homes and offices of the nation. The vote on church union demanded a decision that

involved not only ecclesiastical boundaries but also the future course of Canadian society.

The church union vote revealed that Presbyterians were divided in their attitudes toward the social and political changes envisaged by the social gospellers. The union vote also revealed the controversy within Presbyterianism concerning the relationship between the church and society. Supporters of church union were more likely to advocate direct and extensive participation of religious institutions in the secular realm. They were also more likely to support those reform movements in which the benefits and responsibilities of the nation were shared equally by all Canadians. By way of contrast opponents of church union tended to advocate a relative separation of sacred and secular realms such that the influence of religious life on social behaviour was indirect. In addition opponents of union were more likely to be concerned with maintaining existing social patterns and with the gradual development of Canadian society without significant deviation from the past.

The church union controversy revealed the disagreement within the Presbyterian Church over the kind of society that Canada should become. But the church union movement was also a major weapon in the arsenal of one of the contending parties in the dispute. Presbyterian reformers were acutely aware of conservative strength in their own church and in Canadian society as a whole. By joining forces with the

socially concerned Methodists, Presbyterian social gospellers hoped to forge a national church of such size and strength that conservative opposition to reform would be futile. The united church would be the foundation of a democratic nation operating on Christian principles.

CHAPTER VI

THE LOCUS OF PATRIOTISM

The concern of social gospel oriented church unionists with the kind of society Canada was to become was closely linked with the resurgence of a strong nationalist movement in Canada and in the Presbyterian church. There was a conscious campaign to establish an independent stance vis a vis Britain. Presbyterian nationalists never repudiated the imperial connection; they acknowledged the profound debt of the new nation toward the mother country. But they believed that Canada's destiny was to build upon her British heritage a new and virile nation that would synthesize the best of the new and old worlds. The twentieth century belonged to Canada, provided she could assert her autonomy.

The Presbyterian Church in Canada was intensely patrictic. All elements of the church, social gospellers and unionists as well as social conservatives and nonconcurrents believed that Christianity and patriotism were inseparable. But there was a critical difference between unionists and nonconcurrents in regard to the locus of their patriotism. Unionists were loyal to the vision of an independent, multi-ethnic Canada, the senior dominion of the empire. Nonconcurrents were loyal to the ideal of British North America, whose policies

and goals were determined by the needs of the British empire. For nonconcurrents an independent Canada meant the severance of the tie to Scotland. It is our contention that the conflict between nationalist and imperialist factions in Canada decisively influenced the church union controversy.

At the turn of the century Canadians weighed the merits of a variety of alternatives for the future of their nation. Although there were as many alternatives as there were Canadians, the possibilities could be narrowed to four. Of these the completely autonomous nation of French intellectuals had little appeal in English Canada. The remaining possibilities were: (i) Canada could continue its present relationship with Great Britain (conservative imperialism); (ii) she could move out of the empire, drawing closer to the United States (continentalism); (iii) she could seek autonomy through increased influence in imperial affairs (progressive imperialism). Only the first and third of these alternatives were viable options for Presbyterians.

A. Continentalism

The desire to change Canada's relationship to Britain emerged shortly after Confederation in the Canada First movement. This was a disparate group of thinkers who responded to the crisis of declining British interest in North America at a time of American expansionism by advocating the emergence of an independent Canada which had

outgrown its colonial status.[1] The movement was short-lived; by 1875[2] it had split into two factions consisting of continentalists and progressive imperialists.

The continentalists argued that Canada had matured beyond dependence on Britain and that her destiny lay in a closer relationship with the United States. They claimed that Britain was more concerned with maintaining good relations with the Americans than with securing Canadian objectives; they pointed to the Oregon, Maine and Alaska boundary disputes and to the negotiation of fishing treaties as evidence of British indifference. The continentalists believed that the imperial connection would destroy Canadian industry, making Canada a producer of raw materials and consumer of British manufacturing.[3] Goldwin Smith, the continentalist most pessimistic about Canada's future argued that the forces of geography, ethnicity, and the assimilating power of North American culture would eventually result in the absorption of Canada into the United States.[4] By 1900 few continentalists shared Smith's pessimism. In the first decades of the 20th century the major issue of continentalism was reciprocity,

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1 The primary sources for this discussion are Carl Berger, The Sense of Power (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1970), and the collection of documents edited by Berger, Imperialism and Nationalism 1884-1914: A Conflict in Canadian Thought (Toronto: Copp-Clark, 1969).

2 W. S. Wallace, The Growth of Canadian National Feeling (Toronto: MacMillan, 1927), p. 59.

3 See e.g. Adam Shortt, "A Blighted Bucolic Future for Canada as the Granary of the Empire", in Berger (ed.), Power pp. 79-81.

4 Goldwin Smith, Canada and the Canada Question, introduction by Carl Berger, (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1971).

free trade between Canada and the United States.

The Presbyterian attitude toward the United States was ambivalent; there was a distaste for many elements of American life together with a desire for closer ties between the United States and the empire. Presbyterians never definitively articulated their critique of American society but certain themes reappeared in religious journals. They were concerned with the high divorce rates in the United States, racial violence, political corruption, excessive materialism and American lawlessness.[5] Presbyterians also attacked the American refusal to accept the principle of arbitration in international disputes.[6] The theme of American indifference to international responsibility was the basis for Presbyterian attacks on American isolationism and tolerance of Irish agitators after World War I.[7][8]

Presbyterians promoted closer ties between the United States and Britain, especially before and after America's entry into the war.[9] The goal for Presbyterians was not to improve Canadian-American relations but to bring the two great English-speaking powers of Europe and North America together. Presbyterians advocated for Canada a

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[5] These same themes are cited by Berger in his delineation of anti-American imperialism, in Power, pp. 155-65. For Presbyterian examples see Presbyterian Feb. 17, 1910, p. 197; June 1, 1911, pp. 677-8; Witness Aug. 26, 1910; Oct. 12, 1912; Mar. 6, 1915; Apr. 28, 1921; Westminster Aug., 1910, pp. 151-4.

[6] Witness Aug. 26, 1911; Aug. 17, 1912; etc.

[7] See e.g. Witness July 17, 1920; Aug. 7, 1920; Mar. 17, 1921.

[8] Witness Jan. 10, 1920; Apr. 28, 1921; etc.

[9] Witness June 25, 1910; Oct. 20, 1919; Oct. 23, 1920. Note the attack on the anti-British bias of Hearst publications in the United States Witness Feb. 21, 1920.

mediating role[10] between the two larger nations, to create a military and political alliance that would safeguard peace in the world.

Reciprocity was a decisive issue that polarized Canadian opinion on the question of Canada's relationship to her northern neighbour. The reduction of trade barriers between Canada and the United States was an integral policy of continentalism. Presbyterian periodicals approached the issue with utmost caution; none supported reciprocity. Of all the Presbyterian journals, the Presbyterian was the most open to continentalism even though its sympathy was lukewarm.[11] The Presbyterian in the spring of 1910 supported lower tariffs between Canada and the United States,[12] but in the fall the same journal noted that Canada was not eager for reciprocity, and argued that Canadian industry needed some tariff protection.[13] A long editorial in the Presbyterian waffled on the reciprocity issue refusing to make a commitment for or against.[14] But when the election that defeated reciprocity was over, the journal expressed pleasure at the decision of the electorate.[15] The other journals did not discuss reciprocity at any length except to join with the Presbyterian in emphasizing

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[10] Westminster Aug., 1910, p. 100; Witness Nov. 20, 1920.

[11] e.g. the Presbyterian June 16, 1910, p. 739 eulogized Goldwin Smith as a great Canadian but made it clear that the journal opposed annexation of Canada by the United States.

[12] Presbyterian Feb. 24, 1910, pp. 228-9; Mar. 24, 1910, p. 357.

[13] Presbyterian Oct. 6, 1910, p. 357; Nov. 10, 1910, p. 517.

[14] Presbyterian Feb. 23, 1911, p. 228.

[15] Presbyterian Sept. 28, 1911, p. 324.

that reciprocity should be interpreted by Presbyterians as an economic rather than cultural issue; the journals stressed that reciprocal trade should not be confused with cultural or political annexation.[16]

The lack of support for reciprocity in the journals should not be understood to mean that all Presbyterians opposed the Liberal policy. Clearly the Presbyterian farmers in the West supported the reduction of tariffs because agricultural machinery would become cheaper. It is equally clear that Presbyterian industrialists in Quebec and Ontario enthusiastically opposed reciprocity. What the journals reveal is that for Presbyterians reciprocity was a question of trade not national destiny, and thus it was not an issue of direct concern to the church. Presbyterians who were content with the existing economic situation supported conservative imperialism. Presbyterians who wished to change the existing relation to Britain were led by men like G. M. Grant[17] to support a nationalistic form of imperial connection. Continentalism was simply not a viable alternative for Presbyterians.

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[16] Presbyterian Feb. 23, 1911, p. 229; Witness Feb. 18, 1911; Westminster Apr., 1911, p. 263. The Record ignored the issue. The Witness Mar. 18, 1911 opposed reciprocity unless Britain was given similar trade concessions.

The refusal of the journals to discuss the reciprocity issue at length can be explained partly by the partisan nature of the debate. Presbyterian spokesmen were reluctant to identify the church with any one political party; since the main issue in the 1911 federal election was the Liberal government's support for reciprocity the church chose to remain relatively silent.

[17] In Grant reform minded Presbyterians saw the three virtues of social concern, ecumenical fervor and nationalism.

B. Progressive Imperialism

Supporters of progressive imperialism were firmly nationalistic; they sought to loosen the ties with Britain, not to isolate Canada from her British heritage, but to strengthen the indigenous identity. They believed that there was ultimately no conflict between independence and loyalty to Britain while emphasizing that at this period of her development Canada should assert her distinctive qualities.

> A Canadian's first allegiance is due to his own nation and not to the Empire of which that nation forms a part . . . it is upon Canadian loyalty, Canadian allegiance, Canadian patriotism that we must begin to build if we are to promote a strong and united national life throughout the Dominion.[18]

In their eyes a strong Canada would make for a stronger empire because the distinctive contribution of an autonomous Canada would be to provide an example for the younger dominions of a virtuous nation founded on civil liberties and Christianity.[19]

The ideal for Canada would be a staunch nationalism combined with a "sane" imperialism.[20] This "sane" imperialism was sharply contrasted to the spurious imperialism attacked by Principal John McKay of Manitoba College:

> There is a kind of spurious Imperialism abroad in the land which looks with condescending pity on everything Canadian and bows the knee to all the outward geegaws of British civilization.[21]

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18 Presbyterian and Westminster Nov. 13, 1919, p. 443.

19 Presbyterian Dec. 12, 1912, p. 669.

20 Presbyterian and Westminster July 19, 1917, p. 59.

21 Witness Nov. 24, 1921.

These nationalists stressed that one should not confuse loyalty to the empire with loyalty to the mother country.[22] Progressive imperialists depicted the British empire as a co-operative federation, a commonwealth of nations relatively equal in status, in which Britain was the leading but not dominating country. They argued that to be loyal to this "sane" imperialism was to support Canadian autonomy and to strengthen Canada's independent voice in imperial affairs.

> Our country has . . . a practical partnership with the other parts of the Empire and is sharing in a power and importance which the wildest imaginings of a United Empire Loyalist of a century ago could never have approached. This very fact makes it incumbent on us to develop our nationhood in order that our land may take a place of increasing influence in the Empire.[23]

Progressive imperialists gave greater emphasis to the virtue of Canadianism rather than to concentrated attacks upon British tradition. But the anti-democratic character of British society did receive a moderate amount of criticism, especially in the Presbyterian which noted

> how much there is in the social organization of the Mother Country that is repugnant to Canadian feeling. Caste and privilege and all the feudal vestiges that have persisted through the centuries and that are so hard to excise are alien to the democracy of Canada.[24]

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[22] Presbyterian Aug. 17, 1916, p. 147; cf. Presbyterian and Westminster Feb. 27, 1919, p. 19.

[23] Presbyterian May 14, 1914, p. 612.

[24] Presbyterian June 29, 1911, pp. 803-4; cf. Mar. 24, 1910, p. 356.

The editor of the Presbyterian strongly opposed the appointment of Prince Alexander as Governor-General of Canada on the grounds that the selection criteria for such an important position should be intelligence and general ability rather than royal lineage.[25] The contest between Britain and Germany to build the largest dreadnought fleet also aroused controversy. Progressive imperialists contributed to the naval campaign reluctantly, arguing that Canada's navy should not be used for Britain's own aggrandizement--"to uphold an arrogant and offensive parade of British supremacy"[26] --but for the defense of the empire. They advocated a ship building program in which all nations would co-operate to regulate naval traffic, thereby alleviating world tensions and ending Britain's paternalistic control of the seas. The naval debate became at times acrimonious with bitter attacks on British pretensions.

> The money which Canada is asked to contribute to the strengthening of the British navy is to be thrown into a bottomless pit . . . Britain made herself mistress of the seas . . . But the time is past for Britain to act as naval policeman for the world . . . The time has come when, in the interests of freedom and safety and fair play for all, the nations must get together and constitute a common, moderate naval force to police the seven seas . . . such an arrangement would be hard to accomplish; doubtless it would be humbling to British pride: but it is the only direction in which there is hope.[27]

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[25] Presbyterian May 14, 1914, p. 610.

[26] Presbyterian Jan. 20, 1910, p. 67.

[27] Presbyterian Dec. 12, 1912, p. 669.

This stress upon the equality of nations acting in co-operation was the keynote of the nationalists' interpretation of the war effort. Canada did not participate in the war as a colony defending the motherland from the Kaiser but as an independent nation fighting for the cause of democracy in the world.[28]

Unionist literature was much more nationalistic than non-concurrent literature. The unionists supported a number of specific proposals to increase Canadian independence. As early as 1870 supporters of church union (in this case supporters of the unification of Presbyterianism) criticized the control of Canadian legal matters by England's Privy Council, proposing in its stead an indigenous court for final appeals.[29] The prominent union spokesman C. W. Gordon argued in 1896 that Canada should develop her own home mission program rather than rely on overseas contributions.[30] The Presbyterian and Westminster, a unionist periodical, supported the Canadian claim for separate status in the League of Nations rather than entering as a part of the British empire.[31] The journal also

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[28] Presbyterian Nov. 12, 1914, pp. 438-9. The nationalists stressed the contribution of Canadian soldiers to the war effort; see e.g. Presbyterian and Westminster Apr. 11, 1918, p. 343.

[29] Canadian Presbyterian May 7, 1880, p. 440, cited by E. A. Christie, "The Presbyterian Church in Canada and Its Official Attitude Toward Public Affairs and Social Problems" (M.A. thesis, University of Toronto, 1955), p. 91.

[30] Acts 1896, Appendix #1, p. xxxv.

[31] Presbyterian and Westminster Feb. 12, 1920, p. 187.

campaigned for the obliteration of titles conferred by the king on Canadians[32] and for the right of Canada to amend her own constitution.[33] The Toronto Witness supported progressive imperialist desires to have foreign treaties that involved Canadian interests negotiated by Canadian rather than English representatives.[34]

Progressive imperialists supported church union because the movement would create a national church capable of providing the cohesion to sustain the country. They were acutely conscious of the political, economic, ethnic and geographic differences that divided Canada.

> Canada is in need of binders . . . in the life of our Dominion there is a need for unifying forces to counteract and overcome the malevolent forces making for disruption . . . We see the disruptive tendency in our social organization. Instead of working in unison for the good of one another and of all we split into classes and parties which pull in opposite directions when they ought to be pulling together . . . cracks are perceptible in the walls of our national edifice.[35]

The progressive imperialists believed that religious loyalties were stronger than other affiliations; they argued that commitment to a national church would be able to overcome the divisive loyalties to secular associations.

Immediately before union the theme of church union as a

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[32] Presbyterian and Westminster May 29, 1919, p. 519.

[33] Presbyterian and Westminster Mar. 25, 1920, p. 312.

[34] Witness July 12, 1923; cf. Presbyterian Mar. 31, 1910, p. 389.

[35] Witness Jan. 13, 1921; cf. Nov. 3, 1921; May 10, 1923; article by D. L. Ritchie in the Montreal Gazette Mar. 5, 1923.

centripetal force in the nation took on added importance as it became clear that ecumenical support was stronger in the West than in the East. The discovery of sectional differences in religious affairs encouraged Presbyterian nationalists to press even harder for church union, arguing that Eastern ecumenical support was essential to avoid national disunity. The editor of the Witness declared that East and West must keep pace in ecumenical fervor because it was

> inconceivable that the Church which has hitherto been the greatest bond of union between East and West should become a divisive force in our national life.[36]

When a Presbyterian schism became inevitable nationalistic imperialists attacked the Continuing Presbyterian Church because it would not be represented in every province but would be merely a regional denomination cut off from the mainstream of Canadian life.[37]

C. Conservative Imperialism

Presbyterian opponents of union were also imperialists. But their imperialism was of a fundamentally different character than the imperialism of the unionists. Nonconcurrents wanted to maintain the existing relationship with Great Britain in order to keep the link

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[36] Witness Jan. 10, 1924; cf. Jan. 18, 1923.

[37] See e.g. letter by J. L. Mulligan, London Advertiser Jan. 22, 1925; Charlottetown Patriot Jan. 27, 1925; Halifax Herald Jan. 23, 1925.

with the old country intact. Unlike the unionists they did not want Canada to mature within the empire, taking her appointed place as the senior dominion. Opponents of union were relatively content with the colonial status that Canada enjoyed.

Opponents of union rejected the suggestion that there were distinctive Canadian qualities worthy of development. The tradition that nonconcurrents sought to maintain was not native to the North American continent; loyalty to tradition meant keeping alive the spark of old country routines and values in the new world. It was fundamentally an ethnic identity. In one of the very few articles written by socially prominent nonconcurrent laymen, T. B. McQuesten of Hamilton articulated his opposition to union in terms of ethnic heritage. He ridiculed the suggestion of Pidgeon and others that a national church would be desirable for Presbyterians.

> Is it not a very dangerous thing to do anything to cut ourselves off from the traditions of our own race . . . Have we any traditions of our own, or are those of any alien race finer or more wholesome? You can blatter about Canadianism, but you will not produce a race of finer qualities than the race from which you sprang. Your sole concern should be to maintain it as pure and undefiled as our conditions will permit.[38]

McQuesten argued that the unionist demand for an indigenous church was pointless; Presbyterians already had an indigenous church in the old country. Canadian Presbyterians were not, in his words, "so alien to the stock from which we sprang" as to seek a racially mongrelized identity.

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[38] Witness Apr. 12, 1923.

Nonconcurrents regarded the very idea of Canadian initiative in the ecumenical realm as highly presumptuous. If church union was desirable it should originate in Scotland and then spread to Canada.[39] Previous Canadian unions which amalgamated the various streams of Presbyterianism were acceptable to nonconcurrents because the participants in these ventures

> realized the ideal of a whole people, the Scots and the Scots-Irish, in the outlying parts of the Empire, constituting a solid homogenous, well-rounded Christian church, with a history all its own.[40]

The projected union of 1925 would be senseless racial mingling, doomed to failure because Methodism and Congregationalism had never been successful in Scotland.

Much of Presbyterian opposition to union was based on feelings of cultural superiority. Presbyterianism was said to be the religion of Canada's best; it was Scottish brains and Highland temper that infused the Canadian wilderness with civilized traditions.[41] The exuberance of Methodist revivalism was an offence to Scottish sobriety.[42]

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39 Campbell, The Relations of the Christian Churches (Toronto: William Briggs, 1913), p. 245. Cf. letter by E. Young, Toronto Globe, Feb. 7, 1925.

40 Robert Campbell, Union or Co-operation--Which? (Montreal: Foster-Brown, n.d.), p. 11.

41 James Galoska, "Organic Union: Boon or Conspiracy", (UCA, PNL, Box 1, File 37), 1924, p. 9. Cf. letter by W. E. Maclellan, Witness Jan. 17, 1914.

42 Letter by A. F. Angus, Colonist (Victoria, B.C.) Apr. 5, 1924. Cf. Toronto Telegram May 2, 1924; letter by "Jumbo" Montreal Gazette Mar. 28, 1923; Morrow, Church Union in Canada (New York:

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Even the Methodist clergyman, "an ignoramus knowing nothing of Greek or Church History",[43] reflected the cultural inferiority of the other partners in the projected union.

The importance of ethnic ties for nonconcurrents is demonstrated by the astonishing number of letters by ecumenical negativists that contain Scottish poetry and longing references to the Scottish soil. Reverential quotations (in dialect) of the literary greats of the old country were presented, especially by laymen, as definitive arguments against union.[44] Many of these letters and articles contained further references to Scottish controversies that had little relevance to the Canadian situation. Two of these controversies, the Wee Free Case and the Settlement Committee dispute, warrant further discussion because of the frequency with which nonconcurrents referred to them.

In Scotland the Free Church and United Presbyterian Church merged in 1900. A small minority, consisting of 24 ministers and 100 congregations remained outside the union. These Wee Frees contended that only they were the true spiritual successors of the Free Church and launched legal proceedings to obtain possession of

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42 (continued)
Institute of Social and Religious Research, 1923, p. 199; C. C. Morrison, "The Non-Concurring Presbyterians", Christian Century, May 7, 1923, pp. 568-571; Judge J. D. Swanson, "Forward Looking" in E. A. Davis, ed., Commemorative Review of the United Churches of B.C. (Vancouver: Joseph Lee, 1925), pp. 217-221.

43 Banks Nelson, "Address to the Women's League, Knox Church, Toronto, Apr. 9, 1923" (UCA, PNL, Box 1, File 52), p. 3. This type of snobbery led some neutral Presbyterians to support union; witness for example the anonymous letter writer to the Almonte Courier Dec. 5, 1924, and the letter by O. Dow to Montreal Gazette Mar. 10, 1917.

44 See e.g. letters in the Mail and Empire Mar. 20, 1924; Examiner Nov. 26, 1924; Montreal Gazette Apr. 14, 1923; Halifax Chronicle Dec. 30, 1924; etc.

all Free Church property. Their initial suit failed but in 1904 the appeal to the House of Lords granted their claim that the Wee Frees were the spiritual and monetary heirs of the Free Church heritage. The tiny minority was completely unable to administer its property and the majority of Frees who entered the union were in dire straits. An act of the Imperial Parliament in 1905 resolved the crisis and awarded the church property to congregations on the basis of need. Canadian Presbyterians opposed to union cited the Wee Free case time and again,[45] arguing that in Canada the true spiritual heirs of the Presbyterian Church were not a tiny minority incapable of administering property and that consequently entry into union would mean that all Presbyterian church property would remain with the nonconcurrents. The Canadian debate was fuelled by prominent nonconcurrent spokesmen like John MacKay who were in Scotland during the Wee Free affair.[46] The debate itself was rather onesided; despite the nonconcurrent preoccupation with the Wee Free case of Scotland, unionists rarely commented upon the issue except to note its irrelevance to the Canadian situation.

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[45] See for example letters in Toronto Telegram Jan. 8, 1925; Toronto Globe Apr. 13, 1925; etc. See also speeches and articles by nonconcurrents, for example, M. Blakely, "A Breach of Faith in Church Union Proceedings" (UCA, PNL, Box 1, File 2), Oct. 16, 1922; Robert Campbell, "Church Union" (UCA, PNL, Box 1, File 7a), Montreal, July 10, 1910; F. Chrysler, "Address at Stewarton Presbyterian Church Association" (UCA, PNL, Box 1, File 16), Ottawa, 1923; Presbyterian Church Association, "The Wee Free Story" (UCA, PNL, Box 2, File 93); T. Wardlaw Taylor, "Church Union and Church Law" (UCA, PNL, Box 2, File 90).

[46] George Pidgeon, The United Church of Canada, Ryerson, Toronto, 1950, p. 19.

Opponents of union virtually ignored a Canadian legal dispute very similar to the Scottish case. After the 1875 union, Presbyterian dissenters tried to gain control of the assets of the Kirk churches in Canada, arguing that the unionists were seceeders. The Privy Council ruled that the enabling legislation passed by the provinces was ultra vires, but the Dominion bill of 1882 ended the controversy and rejected the property claims of dissenters.[47] The Wee Free debate and its irrelevance to the Canadian situation revealed that nonconcurrents were concerned with Scottish rather than Canadian precedents.

A second issue that received inordinate attention by nonconcurrents was the question of the settlement committee. This issue involved the difference in authority structure between the two major churches: the Methodists had a hierarchical organization whereas Presbyterians decentralized power. In the Scottish tradition local congregations had the right to call and dismiss their own ministers, a practice unlike the Methodist policy of a stationary committee that supervised clerical employment. The settlement committee of the united church would follow Methodist lines, with the important proviso that each charge would have control of its minister. Nonconcurrents saw the settlement committee as another attempt to "coerce congregations";[48] they ignored the clause that

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[47] Letter by M. Macgillivray, Witness Mar. 22, 1923.

[48] See e.g. the special issue of the Message (UCA, PNL, Box 1, File 34) Toronto, April, 1917, devoted to this question. The settlement committee dispute was often entangled with the legalistic

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protected congregational liberty. The opponents of union fought an issue that had little to do with the church in Canada. In a nation of vast distances and sparse population the Scottish system of right of call was simply unworkable. In the West and New Ontario the Presbyterian church had already instituted a mechanism to fill vacant charges with unemployed ministers.[49] The failure of nonconcurrents to acknowledge the exigencies of the Canadian situation indicates an overweening preoccupation with Scottish rather than Canadian church history.

These Scottish controversies and the prevalence of ethnic references in nonconcurrent literature reveal that opposition to union was based on adherence to a Scottish identity. Many Scots were never assimilated into the Canadian tradition; in the words of John Dow,

> to a degree more than their leaders realized, there were Presbyterian families who had lived two generations in Canada but who still remained Scots or Irish in their

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48 (continued)
argument that the Presbyterian Church was not a corporation, that the votes in assembly were not representative of the people, etc.

49 Editorial in the Witness Aug. 23, 1923; cf. letter by A. C. Reeves who voted against union twice but acknowledged the need for a committee mechanism to deal with clerical unemployment Presbyterian Apr. 20, 1916, p. 379.

The problem of bringing together vacant charges with unemployed ministers was a persistent one in Canada. Even during the war when there was a drastic shortage of clergy throughout the nation there were unemployed ministers; (see Presbyterian Dec. 9, 1915, pp. 557-558). Supporters of church union argued that the peculiarities of the Canadian environment demanded a Presbyterian settlement committee, although they continually stressed that such a committee would become active only when a charge had failed to secure a minister through its own efforts. See C. C. Morrison, "Is Canada's Church Union a Success?", Christian Century, May 10, 1928, pp. 602-605 and

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loyalties.[50]

This resistance to union on the basis of ethnic ties led unionists to exort Presbyterians to "not plant the heather in our Canadian hills",[51] leaving Scottish concerns in Scotland.

Since assimilation into a new cultural environment is a lengthy process that is not always successful in the first generation of immigration, it can be assumed that ethnic loyalties were stronger among immigrants than among native born Canadians. Since loyalty to the old country was a significant factor in opposition to church union we would expect new Canadians to be more opposed to union than the native born. There is historical evidence to support this hypothesis: the Presbyterian unions of the 19th century were hampered by clergy who had recently come to Canada.[52] There are

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49 (continued)
E. Thomas, "Canada's Union--After One Year", Christian Century June 3, 1926, pp. 711-714.

50 John Dow, Alfred Gandier, United Church, Toronto, 1951, p. 105. The Witness contained occasional reference to charges that held Gaelic services for special events, for example Boularderie in Sydney presbytery (Sept. 22, 1921) and St. Paul's Hamilton (Nov. 30, 1922): both these charges opposed union in 1925.

J. R. Fleming, History of the Church in Scotland (Edinborough: T. T. Clark, 1933), pp. 136-137, makes the interesting observation that many of the motifs of the emigrant Scot were anachronistic; Fleming notes "the persistence among Scots and their descendents abroad of strongly accentuated convictions that have become almost obsolete in the home country".

51 Letter by A. Graham, Presbyterian May 4, 1916, pp. 429-30; cf. letters to Mail and Empire Mar. 20, 1924; Toronto Star Apr. 9, 1924. The union of 1865 was partly motivated by a desire to "make our Presbyterianism not a Scotch exotic, but an element in Canadian society--an institution of the land" (Presbyterian, 1865, p. 213, cited by Johnston, op. cit., p. 65).

52 J. A. Johnston, "Factors in the Formation of the Presbyterian Church in Canada 1875", (Ph.D. dissertation, McGill University, 1955), p. 38.

also the numerous references made by participants in the 1925 union crisis to the opposition of immigrants to ecumenism.[53]

Our analysis of the clerical vote on union in chapter I confirms that ethnic identity was a significant factor in Presbyterian opposition to church union. In chapter I, section (iii) we found that many more nonconcurrent than unionist clergy were born in Scotland, Ireland and England. Only 29% of the unionist clergy were immigrants to Canada, compared to almost half of all the ministers who opposed union. The predominance of the native born in the ranks of clerical advocates of church union supports the contention that a weakened ethnic identity facilitated the growth of ecumenism and conversely that a strong ethnic identity was a major impediment to church union. We also discovered in chapter I that regions which had a high proportion of non Anglo-Saxon immigrants in the population were more likely to support church union because extensive contact with new Canadians of different ethnic backgrounds weakened the Scotch-Irish identity of Presbyterians living in these areas.

Ethnic identity was critically related to the conflict between conservative and progressive imperialists. Presbyterian conservative

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[53] The opposition of the Scots has been documented above. Irish immigrants were also opposed to union according to letters in the Globe Jan. 12, 1925, and Montreal Star Apr. 7, 1923. Banks Nelson was the outstanding Irish ecumenical negativist who travelled from coast to coast in 1925 to stiffen Irish opposition to union. The issue of new Canadian opposition was exhaustively discussed in Saturday Night Dec. 15, 1923.

imperialists saw the maintenance of Canada's link with the empire as an essential step in keeping the Scottish heritage alive. Progressive imperialists in the Presbyterian Church were much less concerned with maintaining the purity of Scottish tradition in Canada, partly because their ethnic identity was weaker than that of conservative imperialists.

D. Immigration and the Threat of Union

The disagreement between unionists and nonconcurrents in regard to the future course of Canadian development was closely linked to a disagreement in regard to the attitude Canada should adopt toward immigration. Immigration was a crucial factor in determining whether the nation would follow the course advocated by progressive imperialists or the course advocated by conservative imperialists.

The first quarter of the 20th century saw not only a dramatic increase in the number of immigrants to Canada but a shift in the country of origin of new Canadians. Up to 1880 the majority of immigrants came from preferred countries, chiefly the British Isles. But in the latter part of the 19th century the industries of the United Kingdom could no longer spare the loss of their population. The effect upon Canada was a shift in the ethnic heritage of newcomers; by 1903 70% of all immigrants were from

Austria-Hungary, Italy, Poland and Russia.[54] This shift was partly a product of change in old country opportunities and partly the consequence of new immigration policies of the Canadian government. It was a time of group settlements in the West and aggressive attempts by the federal department of immigration to populate the country.

Certain elements in the Presbyterian church were disturbed by this massive influx of newcomers, many of whom came from countries overtly hostile to British traditions. Conservative imperialists believed that immigration was too rapid,[55] and argued that the new areas of the West should be left open until filled with the natural increase of native born Canadians.[56] The Halifax Witness in an editorial celebrating the 50th anniversary of confederation did not object to the sudden jump in population but to the disruption in cultural patterns that would ensue from large scale non Anglo-Saxon immigration.

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[54] Norman MacDonald, Canada: Immigration and Colonization (Aberdeen: Aberdeen Press, 1966), pp. 146-147.

[55] Westminster July, 1912, pp. 149-52. In the first decade immigrants represented 23% of the total Canadian population; in the peak period of American immigration, newcomers represented only 10% of the population of the United States. See W. G. Smith, A Study in Canadian Immigration (Toronto: Ryerson, 1928), p. 61.

[56] Robert Campbell, Union or Co-operation--Which?, pp. 28-29.

> Would it not be infinitely more satisfactory had the increase [in population] been purely natural, from our own good British Canadian stock, or through immigration from the Homelands? . . . Is Canada to be kept British in blood as well as in institutions or is she to be converted into a land of cosmopolitan mongrelism?[57]

The preference for British Isles immigrants was based on a desire to maintain the existing ethnic distribution (and not incidentally to reduce the proportion of French speaking Canadians). But there were other reasons for preferring United Kingdom newcomers to others. Partly it was Canada's imperial responsibility to redistribute the population of the empire; if there was a surplus population in the old country that surplus should go to Canada to work for the empire rather than be lost to some other nation.[58] Partly it was the belief that British Isles immigrants were more easily assimilated with less socially disruptive consequences.

Conservative imperialists were acutely aware of the social problems of immigration. With the exception of English speaking newcomers, immigrants had very high illiteracy rates.[59] Crime rates were very much higher for new Canadians: the proportion of

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57 Witness June 30, 1917. Cf. the overture from the synod of Hamilton/London that immigration be limited to English speaking people Acts 1919, Appendix, p. 296.

58 Letter by T. Sedgwick, Presbyterian Aug. 19, 1915, pp. 170-171. This was the old country view of the function of emigration; see for example S. C. Johnson, Emigration from the United Kingdom to North America (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1961), p. 328, and the report of the British government study on emigration reported in the Witness Jan. 6, 1921.

59 Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canadian People, pp. 170-175.

foreigners in penetentiaries was four times that of the native born. The crime rate of British Isles immigrants, although slightly higher than that of the native born, was much below the rate of non-British newcomers.[60] Other indices, such as infant mortality, showed the desirability of imperial migrants.[61] United Kingdom emigrants also had lower rates of rejection at ports of entry and lower deportation rates than other ethnic groups,[62] indicating superior physical and moral health. The disruptive effect of non-British immigrants was particularly acute in political affairs; in many areas, especially the West, new Canadians held the balance of political power. Their ignorance of the English language and British political traditions made them susceptible to political manipulation that could decisively alter the outcome of elections.[63] Consequently conservative imperialists argued that the level of immigration should decrease and that entry be granted chiefly to United Kingdom immigrants.

Supporters of liberal immigration laws were as much aware of the problems of newcomers as conservatives.[64] But the progressive imperialists believed that the social problems of non-imperial immigrants could be overcome if foreigners were assimilated into

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60 Ibid., pp. 198-9.

61 Ibid., pp. 218-20.

62 W. G. Smith, op. cit., pp. 128-32.

63 Westminster Feb., 1916, pp. 129-132; Presbyterian Jan. 20, 1910, p. 68; etc.

64 See e.g. J. G. Shearer in the Record May, 1924, pp. 169-71;

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Canadian society. Supporters of liberal immigration believed that a variety of ethnic heritages was desirable for Canada because the new traditions would relativize French/English differences which constituted the major impediment to a united Canada.[65] They claimed foreigners could become patriotic, citing as an example the loyalty of thousands of non-British immigrants to the empire during the war.[66] Supporters of the liberal immigration policy accepted the necessity of certain restrictions on newcomers but argued that Canada should accept people from all races (except Asians) not just imperial stock.[67]

Presbyterian proponents of liberal immigration laws stated that the key to assimilating foreigners was the substitution of racial loyalties with religious ones.[68] This motif was manifest during the first massive influx of immigrants in 1900.

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64 (continued)
J. S. Woodsworth, Strangers Within Our Gates (Toronto: Methodist Church, 1909). However the Presbyterian Sept. 21, 1912, pp. 316-7 argued that immigrants were no more likely than native born Canadians to commit crime--a claim that is not supported by penal statistics.

65 Presbyterian and Westminster Jan. 18, 1917, p. 72.

66 Presbyterian and Westminster Feb. 22, 1917, p. 216.

67 Presbyterian and Westminster May 8, 1919, p. 451. Even the supporters of the most open immigration policies opposed Oriental immigration because of the failure of Orientals to assimilate. See e.g. Presbyterian Jan. 1, 1914, p. 4 for a typical argument. Methodist liberals held a similar view of the worth of Orientals; see e.g. Woodsworth, op. cit., 1909, pp. 275-8.

68 Presbyterian and Westminster Mar. 18, 1920, p. 294.

> Many of these foreign people come from lands where the sentiment is distinctly anti-British . . . There is no way of welding them so quickly and thoroughly into our national life as by winning them to an intelligent religious life, and no agent so valuable to the Empire as the missionary and the minister.[69]

The Presbyterian Church sent chaplains to immigration stations and established the Department of the Stranger to minister to the religious needs of new Canadians. The supporters of liberal immigration policies allied themselves with the social gospel supporters to attempt to overcome immigrant disruption through the integration of newcomers into Canadian society.[70]

The need to assimilate immigrants was a significant argument for church union. Unionists claimed that the scope of immigrant problems and the sheer numbers of new Canadians required a large and united church.[71] In addition there was evidence that existing programs had not been successful in eliminating immigrant alienation from religion.[72] The immigrant problem had always been approached in a co-operative way with Presbyterian and Methodists

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69 Record Apr., 1900, p. 98; cf. Dec., 1898, p. 358. The Presbyterian Church sent forth its missionaries to foreigners in North-west Canada "in the interests of patriotism as well as religion" Acts 1900, Appendix, p. 10.

70 Presbyterian Mar. 16, 1911, pp. 324-5; Mar. 26, 1914, pp. 387-8; July 16, 1914, pp. 27-8; etc.

71 See e.g. letter by W. C. Murray Presbyterian Feb. 3, 1916, pp. 106-7; Acts 1919, Appendix, p. 8, 274; etc.

72 The hostility of immigrants toward religion is noted in a number of places; see for example Acts 1912, Appendix, p. 332; 1913, Appendix, p. 61; 1914, Appendix, pp. 44-45, 360, 389.

combining to provide joint missions for newcomers or by assigning responsibility for the evangelization of particular ethnic groups to particular churches. Church union was thus a logical extension of existing immigrant facilities, a necessary extension given the increasing number of immigrants. In addition the organic union was to be a national church that would combine religious affiliation with nationalism, thereby facilitating the assimilation process.

The multi-ethnic immigration policies of unionists were a major factor in ecumenical negativism. Nonconcurrents rejected the argument for union which was based on the need to assimilate immigrants. In a variation of the assimilation thesis, Stuart Parker argued that church union should be opposed because of the need to integrate Anglo-Saxon immigrants into Canadian society. Since denominational distinction was the pattern in the old country it should be retained in Canada to give newcomers a point of entry into North American life. Parker's statement reveals the non-concurrent concern with mono-ethnic migration:

> We need our Churches as a bond of Empire, to provide for our Anglo-Saxon immigrants a religious context identical with that from which they came, that they may feel they are come to no strange land, but are still among their own folk.[73]

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[73] S. C. Parker, "How Shall I Vote on Church Union?" (UCA, PNL, Box 2, File 62), Toronto, 1925.

A more common nonconcurrent position was to argue that the assimilation of immigrants was not the church's function; it lay beyond the abilities and desires of the church and was more properly the function of the state. Non Anglo-Saxon immigrants were not even Protestants, so the argument went, and hence of no concern to the Presbyterian Church.

> To offer alien immigrants the Gospel as opportunity occurs will be our duty; but to charge ourselves with responsibility for making good Protestants of them . . . the distaste of sober thought forbid.[74]

E. F. File, in a series of interviews with ministers who voted against church union, noted that many nonconcurrent ministers were either covertly hostile or paternalistic toward new Canadians. One nonconcurrent clergyman in File's study said that his church ushered Ukrainians into the gallery for Sunday services.[75] The nonconcurrents were immune to church union as a response to the need to assimilate new Canadians.

The identification of multi-ethnic immigration policies with ecumenism meant that church union was a positive threat to conservative imperialists who wanted Canada to reflect the ethnic makeup of the old country. The consummation of church union would bring even

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74 Robert Campbell, Union or Co-operation--Which?, p. 30; cf. letter by H. Ray, Presbyterian, Jan. 19, 1913, p. 794.

75 E. F. File, "A Sociological Analysis of Church Union in Canada", Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University, 1961, p. 153. Regrettably File does not speculate about the implications of his interviews for an understanding of church union in Canada.

more non Anglo-Saxon newcomers to Canada and increase the social disruption of ethnic pluralism. In addition the possibility of a political alliance of immigrants with progressives of every stripe was an ever present reality. At another level the church union movement threatened the continuation of the imperial connection; the unionist ideal of a national church unifying east and west would weaken dependence on the empire. Church union thus was a force to be feared and opposed by those Presbyterians for whom the locus of patriotism and identity lay outside Canada's borders.[76]

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76 The terms progressive imperialism and conservative imperialism used in this chapter were carefully selected to emphasize that what the various Presbyterian groups had in common was imperialism, not nationalism. Berger, et. al., would argue that imperialism in the first decades of the twentieth century was nationalistic, a position that ignores the weighty evidence of a non-nationalistic imperialism in Canadian Presbyterianism.

CHAPTER VII

REGIONAL DISPARITY AND CHURCH UNION

The pressures toward national unity in Canada have been tempered by competing regional identities since the inception of nationhood. The vision of Presbyterian nationalists of a united and relatively autonomous Canada was threatened by the centrifugal power of regional loyalties. The nationalists tried to redirect the forces of regional protest by espousing the goals of Western protesters. The social gospel orientation of the unionists with its stress on equality of opportunity for all Canadians easily absorbed the indignant attacks of Westerners that denounced regional economic disparities and the alleged inequities of confederation.

Few subjects in Canadian political history have received the exhaustive attention that has been lavished on the question of regional disparity. It is not our intention to do more than skim the surface of this debate. We shall make no attempt to give a complete account of the controversy and will make every attempt to limit our discussion to brief remarks on only a few of the major issues. Our concern is solely to show that a significant number of Canadians believed that they were the objects of regional discrimination and that the church union movement was seen by these

Canadians as an effective mechanism to redress geographic inequities.

It is not our purpose to adjudicate regional disputes. The justice or injustice of the confederation system and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of Western complaints are questions peripheral to our concerns. Although we shall on occasion make reference to dispassionate accounts of the regional issues we are concerned chiefly with delineating only one side of the argument.

A. The Burden of Confederation

The fathers of confederation intended the British North America Act to establish the dominance of the federal government over the provinces. In the formative years following the founding of the nation the federal government frequently exercised its power to overrule provincial legislation when provincial policies contradicted national programs. The central government was able to alter the financial arrangements of confederation and it was able to give to new provinces more seats in the federal legislature than the population of these new areas deserved. Although the Privy Council expanded the powers of provincial governments, the dominion government remained the dominant force in the Canadian system.

The dominance of the federal authority aroused resentment in certain areas of the country and the federal system became the focus for a wide variety of complaints. The Western provinces, and

to a lesser degree the Maritimes, argued that federal policies favored central Canada to the detriment of other regions. Westerners associated federal authority with Eastern oppression and called for a new arrangement of rights and responsibilities within the dominion.

The first objection of Westerners was related to the federal control of settlement policies which allegedly subordinated the needs of the Western area to the wishes of Eastern manufacturers. Clifford Sifton, one of the architects of Western expansion, was quoted as saying in 1903 that the function of the dominion policy was

> to build up a consuming and producing population in our vast western country for the purpose of giving legitimate occupation, without excessive duties, on a legitimate business basis, to the mechanics and artisans in Eastern Canada.[1]

Westerners argued that the emphasis upon Eastern needs had a number of deleterious consequences for the West. They claimed, for example, that areas that were unsuitable for settlement because of the threat of drought, nonetheless received settlers because the speed of settlement precluded adequate land surveys.[2]

The Dominion Lands policy was sharply criticized by Westerners who argued that the extensive land grants to the railroads and

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[1] Submission by the Province of Alberta to the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Edmonton: King's Printer, 1938), p. 46. Cf. B. Y. Card, The Canadian Prairie Provinces, 1870-1950 (Toronto: J. M. Dent, 1960), p. 5.

[2] Alta. Submission, p. 52. The short grass area of southern

(continued)

Hudson's Bay Company, together with the lots set aside for educational institutions, produced a low population density in the prairies.[3] The control of vast acreage by the CPR particularly incensed the farmers who argued that the CPR unjustly withheld its land from settlers hoping that its lots would increase in value to be sold to land speculators for a higher price at a later date. The effect of the Dominion Lands policy allegedly hampered the orderly development of the prairies.[4]

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2 (continued)
Alberta was destroyed by homesteading (Ibid., p. 57). J. B. Hedges, Building the Canadian West (New York: MacMillan, 1939), pp. 401ff. attributes the problem of drought in Alberta and Saskatchewan to a combination of the failure of dry farming and human greed on the part of farmers who attempted to increase their holdings during the war time period of peak prices. In either case the federal government was in no way culpable. Chester Martin notes that the attempts by the federal government to withhold arid land from farming were sharply challenged by local settlers before the droughts ensued; see A. S. Morton and Chester Martin, History of Prairie Settlement and "Dominion Lands" Policy (Toronto: MacMillan, 1938), pp. 526ff.

3 Ibid., p. 49; Submission by the Province of Manitoba to the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Winnipeg: King's Printer, 1937), part iv, pp. 15-8.

4 Martin argues that most of the land alienated by the federal government, railways and schools was sold to small farmers at reasonable prices at an early date. Martin claims that the Dominion Lands policy fostered the development of prosperous farms. See Martin, op. cit., pp. 495-507. Hedges, op. cit., defends the policies of the federal government and the CPR arguing that the CPR was especially vigilant in keeping land speculators out of the West. Hedges states that the distinctive characteristic of the CPR colonization policy was "the extraordinary effort made to guarantee the actual occupation and the successful cultivation of the land, as opposed to a primary preoccupation with the sale of land, with the hope and trust that settlement and development would follow". (p. 402).

The control of prairie natural resources by the dominion was also the focus of considerable resentment. Westerners argued that the federal grants to compensate for the loss of their resources were puny in comparison to the value of assets lost.[5] The Maritime provinces made a similar protest against the dominion land policy, arguing that the Maritimes received neither new land (unlike Ontario and Quebec) nor federal grants (unlike the prairies), when Canada expanded into the North-West.[6] The control of lands and settlement policies by the federal government was cited as a source of hardship by residents of both Western and Maritime regions of Canada.

Dominion trade policies were also said to discriminate against Outer Canada. The National Policy of protective tariffs for domestic manufacturers first instituted in 1878 encouraged the growth of east-west trade and the development of central Canada's industry. The Western provinces and those Maritime regions which were largely agricultural were forced to buy manufactured articles in a protected market and sell their goods in an open international

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5 Submission by the Province of Saskatchewan to the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Saskatoon: King's Printer, 1937), pp. 259-72. The prairie provinces noted that British Columbia and Prince Edward Island which entered confederation after Manitoba received control of their public lands in 1871 whereas the three prairie provinces did not gain sovereignty over their own resources until 1928. Cf. W. L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1950), p. 8; John Nelson, The Canadian Provinces: Their Problems and Policies (Toronto: Musson, 1924), pp. 42-3.

6 Nelson, op. cit., pp. 85-9; Submission by the Province of Prince Edward Island to the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Charlottetown: King's Printer, 1938), p. 10.

market.[7] The discouragement of north-south trade by the tariffs contributed to the costs of transporting manufactured articles which were passed on to the consumer;[8] the increased prices of manufactured goods alone were said to add $100 per year to the costs of a prairie farm.[9] In addition the federal tariff indirectly reduced the sales of Canada's primary industries to other countries. Since each country attempted to balance exports with imports the discouragement of imports into Canada by the tariff reduced the number of Canadian exports accepted by other countries.[10] Westerners also argued that in periods of economic depression tariffs were increased, returning Central Canada to prosperity at the expense of the rest of the country.[11] In addition it was alleged that the benefits of the tariff were not actually distributed to all manufacturing areas; the secondary industries of Nova Scotia and British Columbia were not protected to the same extent as the industries of central

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[7] Alta. Submission, pp. 178-94; Submission by the Province of Nova Scotia to the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Halifax: King's Printer, 1938), pp. 93-8; etc.

[8] Sask. Submission, p. 205.

[9] Man. Submission, part iv, p. 22.

[10] Alta. Submission, p. 186.

[11] Sask. Submission, p. 228.

Canada.[12] The trade policies of the federal government were said to create prosperity in Ontario and Quebec while promoting economic stagnation in the Western provinces and Maritimes.

Another area of serious concern for Outer Canada (that is the West and Maritimes) was the high level of provincial public debt. All provinces shared the same problem to some degree: the financial responsibilities of the provinces were increasing even though the sources of provincial revenue remained relatively constant. The highly lucrative field of personal income tax was wrested from the provinces during the war.[13] The major revenue producing mechanisms were all controlled by the federal government. Although the dominion government had absorbed all provincial debts incurred before confederation and had maintained a regular system of regional financial grants, provincial budgets produced large deficits. These deficits were swollen in periods of economic

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[12] Norman Rogers, A Submission on Dominion-Provincial Relations and the Fiscal Disabilities of Nova Scotia Within Canadian Confederation (Halifax: King's Printer, 1934), p. 106. Ontario defended the national tariff policy by arguing that tariffs brought prosperity to all of Canada's regions. Ontario claimed that regional economic disparities were redressed by federal grants largely funded by the taxes of Ontario residents. See the Submission by the Province of Ontario to the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Toronto: King's Printer, 1938), pp. 18-22, 78-84.

[13] Province of British Columbia, British Columbia in the Canadian Confederation (Vancouver: King's Printer, 1938), pp. 351-352.

recession because provincial expenditures for welfare increased as revenues from semi-luxury consumption taxes declined.[14] The interest payments on the public debt became a major provincial expenditure.

The problem of public debt was much more acute in Outer Canada than in Ontario and Quebec. In 1913 for example the per capita public debt of each Western province was six times the per capita rate for the rest of Canada.[15] The major causes of the high public debt were low population density and rapid unplanned settlement of the West: two factors which were attributed to policies of the federal government. Western protesters argued that the Eastern desire to fill the West with settlers required enormous capital expenditures for highways, schools and provincially owned telephone systems. The low population base of the West, which was allegedly caused by the federal lands policy, meant that these provincial expenditures could be funded only by deficit spending.[16] The same services were provided in Central Canada without extensive deficit spending at a lower per capita cost over

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[14] Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1939), Book I, p. 131.

[15] Ibid., p. 83.

[16] W. A. Mackintosh, Economic Problems of the Prairie Provinces (Toronto: MacMillan, 1935), pp. 52-86; cf. Sask. Submission, pp. 273-284; Man. Submission, part vii, pp. 38-42, part viii, pp. 85-9.

a much longer period of time. In addition Western provinces received no tax revenue from the major Canadian corporations because the head offices of these firms inevitably were located in Toronto or Montreal.[17] Provincial public debt was further swollen by the grants given by the Western provinces to branch lines competing with the CPR.[18] Westerners held the federal government ultimately responsible for these added costs on the grounds that the federal government permitted the CPR to operate in a manner that aroused such resentment in the West that provincial legislatures believed that the development of competing transportation systems was absolutely essential.

The role of federal dominance in the increase of private debt in Outer Canada was less direct than the influence of dominion policies on public debt. But the high levels of private debt in the Western provinces were attributed to federal policies. The Dominion Lands policy set aside numerous lots in the West for various purposes. Westerners complained that the competition for the remaining land drove prices upward. In particular farmers who

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17 Man. Submission, part vii, p. 40; Rogers, op. cit., p. 185.

18 Alta. Submission, pp. 78-81, Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 40.

purchased land through mortgages at peak prices had great difficulty making interest payments during the recession of 1921-1924. Private debts were also increased by the cost added to agricultural machinery by the national tariffs.

Westerners were sharply critical of the policies of major Canadian banks. Westerners believed that since these financial institutions were centred in Toronto and Montreal they discriminated against Westerners. Mortgage rates and interest on consumer loans were much higher in the West than in Ontario. When the interest rate on Ontario mortgages was 7 to 7-1/2%, prairie farmers paid 8 to 9%. Short term credit was equally expensive; even though the maximum lending rate in Canada was set at 7% in 1922, many Westerners were charged 9 and 10%.[19] Eastern banks were more likely to extend credit to the large grain companies than to private farmers. The banks' reluctance to lend money to farmers meant that Westerners had to sell their crops immediately after harvest rather than wait for a better price.[20] Although the higher interest rates charged to Western farmers probably arose because the farmers were poor credit risks, Westerners claimed that the discriminatory high interest

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[19] Mackintosh, op. cit., pp. 259-73; Alta. Submission, pp. 116-26; Man. Submission, part viii, pp. 23-4.

[20] Lipset, Agrarian Socialism (Berkeley: University of California, 1967), p. 50.

rates were a product of the monopoly situation of Eastern banks. This monopoly of Eastern banks, together with the existence of interlocking directorships of the banks with the major Eastern corporations[21] convinced Westerners that there was a conspiracy among the major institutions of Central Canada to discriminate against the West, a conspiracy made possible by the collusion of the federal government. Westerners argued that if confederation was to give every region a fair deal the federal government should force the banks to be more responsive to Western needs.

Settlement of the West was made possible by the dominion's sponsorship of the national railway. The federal government's acceptance of the CPR's monopoly and the apparently discriminatory character of freight charges were continual sources of Outer Canada resentment. Not only did Western farmers have to pay shipping costs to get their products to market but the rates they were charged were much higher than freight rates for Central Canada.[22] In addition transportation costs of manufactured goods were passed on to the consumer but freight charges on farming goods were absorbed by the producer.[23] The absence of competition from water routes and alternate rail lines kept Western freight charges

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[21] McNaught, Prophet in Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1959), p. 192.

[22] Alta. Submission, pp. 141-177; Sask. Submission, pp. 205-223. For a more sympathetic treatment of CPR freight charges see Hedges, op. cit., and H. A. Innis, History of the Canadian Pacific Railway (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1923), especially pp. 182-196.

[23] Sask. Submission, p. 205.

high.[24] Westerners argued that freight rates were based on what the traffic would bear, claiming that the CPR rate structure was highly discriminatory.[25] Attempts by the federal government to mollify Westerners by reducing freight charges were only partially successful. Even when the Crow's Nest Pass Agreement reduced rail charges some Westerners charged that most of the profit from the reduction was absorbed by the shipping combines on the Great Lakes and was not passed down to the farmer.[26]

Western farmers also protested the unfair distribution of rail cars in periods of peak production. In 1911 for example there was a drastic shortage of railway cars to transport the bumper wheat crop to market; farmers complained that the cars that were available were used for other purposes in Eastern Canada.[27] Westerners also argued that the CPR discriminated against farmers by sending rail cars to the elevators operated by the major grain trading companies rather than to individual farmers. The grain elevators of these companies paid a lower price per bushel than the farmers could obtain at the rail terminals after paying the freight charges

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[24] R. McQueen, "Economic Aspects of Federalism: A Prairie View", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Aug., 1935, pp. 352-367.

[25] The province of B.C., B.C. in Confederation, pp. 293-302, presented statistical evidence to show that the average freight charged on goods entering that province was 2-1/2 times the average freight charged on goods leaving B.C. These freight charges were passed directly to the B.C. consumer.

[26] Nelson, op. cit., p. 29.

[27] P. F. Sharp, The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada (New York: Octagon, 1971), pp. 28-9.

themselves but the farmers could not obtain the rail cars.[28]

Westerners identified the CPR with Eastern discrimination against the West and with the alleged desire of the federal government to promoted Central Canada prosperity at the expense of the rest of the country. This led Westerners to question the equity of confederation. The Maritime provinces also protested freight rates that were higher on the east coast than in Central Canada.[29] The manufacturing areas of Nova Scotia launched an additional protest; Maritime industries could not pass freight charges onto the consumers of Central Canada because of the competition from Ontario industry.[30] The problems of the Maritimes were attributed to the alleged inequities of the dominion tariff policy as well as to the federal support of the railway interests.

From our discussion it is clear that a significant number of Canadians believed that confederation had unequal economic consequences for the provinces. The major benefits of federal policies were said to be received by Ontario and Quebec. The Maritimes believed that they were penalized most heavily by dominion policies and these areas protested with appropriate fury.

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[28] Lipset, op. cit., pp. 40-50. The farmers' protests in this regard were probably unreasonable. To send cars to individual farmers would have increased costs dramatically because individual farmers did not have adequate loading facilities and did not deal in complete car loads.

[29] Submission by the Province of New Brunswick to the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Fredericton: King's Printer, 1938), pp. 55-9; N. S. Submission, pp. 100-5.

[30] Rogers, op. cit., p. 110.

B. Unionist Sympathy for Western Protest

The protest of Outer Canada against the allegedly preferred status of Central Canada in confederation was sympathetically reported and echoed by supporters of church union. The Toronto Witness supported the petition of the Western provinces to gain control of their natural resources from the federal government.[31] The Presbyterian was sharply critical of speculation in Western land that was said to be encouraged by the dominion lands policy.[32] The problems of rural isolation in the West were treated with great sympathy by unionists.[33] Supporters of church union agreed with those Westerners who believed that the national tariff discriminated against Outer Canada.[34] The failure of the CPR to provide rail cars when required by Western farmers[35] and the increase in freight charges under the War Measures Act in 1918[36] also aroused unionist sympathy. In addition unionists supported the farmers' complaints about credit discrimination; the Presbyterian indignantly reported

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[31] Witness, Dec. 30, 1920; Jan. 24, 1924.

[32] Presbyterian May 30, 1912, p. 675; Oct. 10, 1912, pp. 396-8; Nov. 21, 1916, p. 588; Presbyterian and Westminster June 28, 1917, pp. 744-5; cf. McDougall, Rural Life in Canada (Toronto: Westminster, 1913), p. 87; J. S. Woodsworth, My Neighbour (Toronto: Methodist Church, 1911), p. 193; etc.

[33] E. H. Oliver article in Witness June 9, 1921; McDougall, op. cit.; etc.

[34] Presbyterian and Westminster July 5, 1917, p. 19; Oct. 25, 1917, pp. 395-6; Oct. 14, 1920, p. 409; Witness June 9, 1921.

[35] Presbyterian Feb. 8, 1912, p. 665; Presbyterian and Westminster Jan. 11, 1917, p. 52; Oct. 14, 1920, p. 419; Witness Dec. 23, 1920.

[36] Presbyterian and Westminster Feb. 21, 1918, p. 170; Aug. 1, 1918, p. 99.

the case of a farmer who was unable to get a $4000 loan despite bills of lading for wheat valued at $20,000.[37]

Not only did the unionists support Westerners in specific areas of discontent, but they called for a general acceptance of regional equality. The Western farmer, according to church union advocates, demanded no special privilege but simply asked for the same rights extended to the businessmen of central Canada.[38] The unionists looked forward to the day when the West would no longer be subordinated to the East but would be an equal partner in confederation.

> We are told that much resentment has been aroused in the older east by the prominence given to the West . . . This newer Canada can no longer be overlooked . . . these provinces will be in a position to resist in the future the efforts which they feel have been put forth in the past to exploit them for the benefit of the east.[39]

Unionists deplored the hostility expressed by some Easterners toward Western aspirations and to the drain on church resources by Western missions.[40] Banks Nelson, an outspoken Irish nonconcurrent was particularly prone to hostile remarks, referring to the West as a "spoilt child", and as a "breeding ground of sectarianism".

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37 Presbyterian Apr. 8, 1915, p. 370; cf. June 6, 1912, pp. 717-8. Unionists also supported the Western desire for producer and consumer co-ops to eliminate the middleman.

38 Presbyterian and Westminster June 28, 1917, pp. 18-9.

39 Article by Angus A. Graham Presbyterian and Westminster Sept. 27, 1917, p. 304.

40 Presbyterian July 6, 1916, p. 11.

Nelson spoke for many Eastern nonconcurrents when he stated that he did not care what the West wanted.[41] Unionists argued that hostility toward the West and opposition to church union were synonymous; they agreed with S. D. Chown's remark that the failure to pursue union would ally the Christian church with Eastern corporations and the federal government to deny the development of an indigenous Western movement.[42]

C. Regional Disparity and Ecumenism

The relationship between church union support and regional protests against the alleged inequities of confederation was modified by the level of prosperity in each province in the period immediately prior to the union vote. From 1921 to 1924 Canada experienced a depression. But some provinces were able to withstand the economic downturn to a greater degree than others.

Although the net value of production declined and the unemployment rate of union members increased, Ontario and Quebec were relatively prosperous during the post-war depression. Of the two provinces Ontario had the stronger economy, increasing its share of Canada's mining, building and manufacturing production.[43] British Columbia was the most prosperous region in this period. The

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[41] See e.g. the letter by Oliver, Hamilton Herald Jan. 16, 1923; letter by J. W. Woods, Globe, Jan. 27, 1923.

[42] Presbyterian Mar. 23, 1916, pp. 273-4; cf. Feb. 24, 1916, pp. 183-4; Mar. 2, 1916, pp. 207-8.

[43] Mackintosh, The Economic Background of Dominion-Provincial Relations (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1939), p. 49; Commission Report, table 37, p. 123.

development of new mining techniques, the world-wide demand for lumber products and the opening of the Panama Canal fuelled British Columbia's boom. After 1920 capital investment grew in the west coast province by 33% and in a period when net production declined in Canada, B.C. production increased 26%. The per capita income of the region exceeded that of Ontario and Quebec.[44] The prosperity of these three provinces testified to the strength of their diversified economies.

The immediate post-war boom of industry in the Maritimes, supported by the rebuilding of Halifax and investments in inventories, collapsed in 1920. The Maritimes' share of Canadian manufacturing continued to decline as the bulk of Canada's population shifted westward.[45] Expanded competition resulting from the end of the war and Scandinavian technological advances reduced dried cod prices by 50%. The Maritime fishing industry was further depressed by the end of trade concessions with the United States and by the decline of the economy of the West Indies, the Maritimes' best customers.[46] The population exodus that began as the Maritime economy began to decline continued.

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[44] Commission Report, pp. 122-7.

[45] In 1900 Nova Scotia had manufacturing capacity equal to Ontario. This parity position had disappeared with the opening of the West which gave Ontario a strong geographical advantage (Rogers, op. cit., p. 51).

[46] Mackintosh, op. cit., 1939, p. 38; Commission Report, pp. 117-20.

The prairie provinces which had enjoyed an expanding economy before 1920 entered a period of acute depression that continued until the end of 1924. The major cause of the collapse of the prairie economy was the drastic decline in the price of farm products in international markets. Wheat prices fell by 60%; the price of pork declined 50%; the cattle industry also deteriorated, partly because of the increase in American tariffs. At the same time the costs of farmers continued to increase. Table VII-1 reports the percentage increase in the costs of farming from 1920 to 1923. Even though crop yields remained high, with the notable exception of the 1921 season, the cost-price squeeze drained the resources of farmers. The high level of fixed costs in prairie farming accentuated the crisis; as gross income dwindled, net income plummeted. In 1923 the farmers' purchasing power was only 20% of the pre-war level.[47] Marketing problems increased economic pressures in the prairies. Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta experienced a drastic decline in prosperity in the period before the union vote.

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[47] Sharp, op. cit., p. 130.

TABLE VII-1 INCREASED COSTS OF PRAIRIE FARMERS, 1920 to 1923[48]

	1920	1923
farm implements	100	198
hardware	100	160
building materials	100	175
freight rates	100	190
interest rates	100	225

Provinces that enjoyed relative prosperity during the post-war depression supported church union to a lesser degree than provinces which experienced the full force of the national economic decline. The relationship between regional protest against confederation and regional support for church union was modified by the strength of the provincial economy. Highest support for union was found in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta where both forces pushed toward union; these regions experienced economic depression and were highly critical of the alleged inequities of confederation. At the other extreme was the very low level of union support in Ontario and Quebec where both forces pulled the regions away from union; Ontario and Quebec enjoyed relative prosperity and were far less critical of federal-provincial arrangements.

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[48] This table was compiled from data collected by Mackintosh, op. cit., 1939, p. 39.

Church union support was relatively high in British Columbia because of the protest of that province against the tariff policies of the federal government, the freight rates of the CPR and other federal activities, particularly the income tax system. British Columbia claimed that its barter position vis a vis Central Canada had been declining since before the war.[49] But B.C. enjoyed considerable prosperity in the early 1920's. The combination of regional protest with prosperity left B.C. with relatively strong support for the church union movement but this support was substantially below that of Manitoba and Saskatchewan. The Maritimes, which experienced a lengthy depression, gave less support to church union because its regional protest movement was significantly less active than the Western movement. Within the Maritimes Nova Scotia supported ecumenism to a greater extent than either Prince Edward Island or New Brunswick[50] because regional protest against the alleged inequities of confederation was higher in Nova Scotia than in the other Maritime provinces.

The relationship between church union, regional protest, and provincial economic status is summarized below. In each case regional protest and economic depression led to church union support.

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[49] See B.C. Submission and B.C. in Confederation, especially pp. 273-289.

[50] The levels of church union support were Nova Scotia 71%, New Brunswick 67%, Prince Edward Island 61%.



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D. Religious and Political Alternatives for Protest

The protest of Outer Canadians, and especially the indignant cries from the West, could not be adequately expressed within the two party system. The major political parties were conglomerates composed of a variety of interest groups. No major party could hope to govern without support from a variety of regions and economic groups; consequently no major party could allow itself to become the spokesman for the protests and goals of a single region. Consequently, Westerners believed that both the Liberal and Conservative parties were dominated by Eastern interests.

The domination of the parties by Easterners was said by Westerners to be based partly on population and the unequal distribution of seats in the federal legislature, but mostly Eastern dominance was said to be the consequence of economic power. Although the West was rapidly increasing in population the bulk of the nation resided in central Canada, rendering the West a minority political force.

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51 See Appendix B: The Alberta Case for a discussion of the peculiarities of the Alberta situation.

In addition the periodic redistribution of electoral districts never kept pace with demographic changes. The caucus of both parties was therefore said to be dominated by Easterners. The cabinet, which in the Canadian political system is the major federal institution for the protection of regional interests, was also allegedly dominated by Easterners. The dogma of cabinet solidarity prevented Western ministers from publicly protesting the Eastern influenced policies that emerged from the cabinet.

Westerners argued that the basic source of Eastern domination of the parties was based on the East's ability to finance election campaigns. Since the wealth of the East was said to be founded on the unequal distribution of the benefits of confederation, Eastern interests allegedly tried to maintain control of the federal parties. The following selection from the writings of William Irvine, a former Presbyterian minister and articulate spokesman for Western interests, explains how the major parties "became tools of the wealthy".

> partyism became an investment for big interests in Canada, dividends being paid in the shape of legislation and privileges to those in a position financially and morally to make the investment. Business interests no longer content themselves with financing one of the parties--they donate freely to the campaigns of both, and so make doubly sure of purchasing government influence, no matter which party happens to be elected. Thus our government machinery has grown to be the most farcial of institutions being used by the wealthy as a means of attaining financial advancement, and applied to the masses for the purpose of dividing them foolishly against themselves, dividing them in fact to such an extent as to render them politically helpless.[52]

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[52] William Irvine, The Farmers in Politics (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1920), p. 57. Cf. Morton, op. cit., pp. 9, 16; Sharp, op. cit., p. 123; etc.

The dominance of the major parties by wealthy Eastern interest allegedly frustrated the attempts of Outer Canadians to improve their position and led Westerners to support alternate political movements.[53]

Support of the major parties was weakened by other factors, not the least of which was the absence of a lengthy political tradition in Alberta and Saskatchewan. Charges of widespread corruption were levelled against the provincial branches of the major political parties. Scandals in the Alberta and Manitoba governments,[54] together with evidence of war profiteering in the federal government tarnished the moral image of the major parties. The breakdown of major party support was also hastened to a lesser degree by the influx of the Non-Partisan League from the United States in 1915-16. The conscription issue in 1917 severely weakened both major parties, especially the Liberal caucus, by splitting the country along linguistic lines. Westerners who supported conscription were alienated from the parties when Borden reneged on his promise to exempt farmers' sons from military service. These

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53 C. B. MacPherson, Democracy in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1962), pp. 9-10, in his analysis of the "quasi-colonial" status of the prairie region argues that Westerners gained political victories only when Western goals coincided with the interest of Easterners.

54 See the articles by Long and Quo (pp. 1-26) and Peterson (pp. 69-115) in Martin Robin (ed.), Canadian Provincial Politics (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1972). Cf. Morton, op. cit., pp. 36-7; Sharp, op. cit., pp. 115ff.; etc.

other factors increased Western distrust of the major parties and strengthened Western support for religious and political alternatives to the two-party system.

There were numerous similarities between radical politics and agrarian reform on the one hand, and church union and social gospel support on the other. The Albertan political radical Henry Wise Wood was heavily influenced by the social gospel movement; he argued that agrarian reform would lead to social regeneration[55] and claimed that "the Wheat Pool was as much a religious institution as the Church".[56] Many of the prominent third party leaders, e.g. J. S. Woodsworth, William Irvine, and Salem Bland, were former clergymen active in the social gospel. Many of the early leaders of the Grain Growers' Association were Protestant clergy.[57] Both the farmers' movements and the labor parties shared with the social gospellers a hostility toward the industrial powers,[58] and many of the planks of the platform of the social gospel were part of the third party political protest. The most successful radical political party, the CCF, can be seen as the political expression of the social ideals of liberal Protestantism.[59]

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55 Rolph, op. cit., p. 63.

56 Morton, op. cit., p. 29.

57 Sharp, op. cit., p. 61.

58 Ibid., p. 44. Cf. Doris French, Faith, Sweat and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1962), pp. 396-397.

59 Lipset, op. cit., pp. 134-8, 185-6; Leo Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1964); etc.

Although both the political and religious alternatives to the two party system enjoyed the support of Westerners, radical politics experienced a relative decline in 1925 as the church union movement reached its triumph. The advantages of the religious movement as a vehicle for regional protest were essentially twofold.

1) The religious movement remained aloof from the nitty gritty of political life, never fielding candidates for office and concentrating the energy of the movement on specific issues of particular relevance. But the political protest movement, including the United Farmers of Alberta after 1921, became enmeshed in the debilitating routine of political life. The concepts of group government, referendums, the right of a constituency to recall its elected representative, and the ideals of delegate democracy, fared poorly in the realm of practical politics.[60] The radical parties were highly susceptible to party schisms (e.g. the Ginger Group) and the uncontrolled independence of its members. Radical representatives elected to the federal government were often absorbed into the old party system or in the case of Woodsworth and Irvine, remained in noble, powerless, isolation. The difficulty involved in creating a non-party political alternative was reflected in the decline of the national Progressive Party in 1925 and 1926. As an alternative to

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60 See e.g. the struggle between cabinet control and delegate autonomy in Alberta discussed in MacPherson, op. cit., pp. 64-84.

politics the social gospel oriented church union movement offered the power of enlightened public opinion which could direct the political system to act with moral integrity. The reforms of the political system and the support for legislation that would equalize opportunity for all Canadians were merely a prelude to the goals that would be accomplished when liberal Protestants were united. By remaining aloof from direct political activity the religious movement was able to articulate regional protest, apply pressure to the political system for reform, and escape the diffusion of energy and the other problems resulting from participation in government.

2) Both the agrarian protest movement and the labor radicals opposed the two-party system and shared common sympathies. But the agrarians and labor radicals were never able to effect a long lasting coalition[61] to attain the goals they had in common. The social gospellers supported the ideals of both farmers and workers and tried to overcome the mutual antagonisms between the two groups (workers vs. independent producers) that were especially apparent after the Winnipeg Strike. The emphasis within the church union movement on

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[61] Martin Robin, Radical Politics and Canadian Labour, (Kingston: Queen's University, 1968), pp. 208-52. Robin claims that the only lasting labor-farmer alliance in Canada was formed in Alberta by Social Credit (p. 272). The basic problem was a fundamental difference in self-conception of the two groups but the tariff support of certain Ontario labor leaders further hampered co-operation between workers and farmers.

co-operation of all groups held the promise of uniting the agrarian and labor movements to fight the power of Eastern corporations. The church union movement had greater potential for success in uniting these two groups because it promised to shift the focus of identity from occupational categories to a religious category.

The enthusiastic support of church unionists for the protests of Outer Canadians against the alleged inequities of confederation was an integral part of Canadian ecumenism. The often uncritical acceptance by unionists of the claims of Westerners was based chiefly on the social gospel desire to equalize opportunity for all Canadians. But unionists were also motivated to support regional protest movements by the belief that the West represented Canada's future. In the first decades of the 20th century there was unbounded optimism about the growing importance of Western agriculture to Canada's economy and keen anticipation of a shift of the nation's population from the East to the West. For many unionists support for Western protest was founded on the desire to participate fully in Canada's future.

The support given by unionists to regional protesters was part

of an ambitious attempt to fundamentally restructure Canadian society. The changes anticipated by church unionists were so extensive as to constitute both figuratively and literally a re-definition of confederation. In the literal sense the unionists' aspirations for a renewed Canada involved constitutional changes in regard to dominion-provincial relations, in regard to political structures and in regard to Canada's relationship to the empire. In the figurative sense the unionists' goals involved a shift in the highest cultural values upon which the nation was founded, implying a re-alignment of social priorities, a dramatic increase in the influence of religious institutions on social and political behaviour, and the development of an indigenous rather than imported national identity.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

In the preceeding chapters we have tried to show that the schism of the Presbyterian Church revealed the central variables involved in the church union question. In this concluding chapter we shall return to the theoretical framework developed in chapter I with a twofold purpose: firstly to summarize our findings and integrate the central variables of our study into a coherent schema, and secondly to show in what ways the present study of the Canadian union of 1925 contributes to an understanding of ecumenism in general.

A. The Canadian Case

All the variables[1] in the following review of factors influencing the Canadian church union movement are closely interrelated. But for the purposes of analysis we have attempted to isolate the influence of each even though no single item acted separately. Each variable in the review has been placed in one of three categories depending upon its explanatory value. The relative importance of each of the three categories can be expressed in

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[1] By limiting our study to an examination of unionists and nonconcurrents in the Presbyterian Church we have omitted certain factors relevant to the wider study of ecumenism. Our decision to limit the (continued)

percentage terms: marginal factors account for 10% of the explanation, secondary factors for 30% and central factors for 60%. These numerical expressions are not to be taken literally; they merely express the relative importance of each category of variables to our attempt to explain Canadian ecumenism.[2]

(i) Marginal Factors

In our study we found that support for particular doctrines of theological belief was unrelated to support and opposition to church union. But we also discovered that there was a greater tendency among nonconcurrents than among unionists to regard theological questions as important. The theological implications of church union and the relationship between theological tradition and ecclesiastical innovation were subjects debated more often by opponents than by supporters of union. In addition there was a greater tendency for unionists to admit new ideas into theology and

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1 (continued)
study was based on the awareness that the only significant dissent to the union existed among Presbyterians, and we remain convinced that the factors promoting union in the Presbyterian Church were also operative in Methodism and Congregationalism. But there is one additional factor peculiar to Presbyterianism that should be noted. The organizational structure of the Presbyterian Church helped promote and sustain dissent. Local churches in the Presbyterian system had a high degree of autonomy, unlike the more disciplined Methodist polity. In addition local Presbyterian charges had regularized contact with other charges at the synod and presbytery levels; these contacts enabled dissidents to reinforce their convictions and to form alliances to defy the national church. These alliances of dissenting groups were formed less easily in the more decentralized Congregational system.

Our review of the critical variables affecting support and opposition to the Canadian union of 1925 will not reexamine those variables judged irrelevant in chapter I. In the first chapter we found that the sex and age of individuals, the distinction between elders, members and adherents and a variety of variables relating to religious participation, had no bearing on the church union question.

2 Two strong caveats should be attached to these numerical
(continued)

to attempt to distill the Christian tradition into a succinct set of universal principles. In contrast nonconcurrents were more concerned with maintaining existing dogmas and codifying traditional beliefs.

We found that the decision on ecumenism was frequently coloured by variables relating to the individual. Particular psychological types were not confined to either camp; we discovered that both bigotry and civil libertarianism reinforced the decision on union, regardless of what that decision was. But there was a slight tendency for authoritarian or close-minded personality types to be over-represented among nonconcurrents with a comparable over-representation of open-minded personality types among unionists. Opponents of union were more likely to seek clear definitions of structures, resisting ambiguity and change.

In our study we found that older Presbyterian congregations were less likely to support union than more recent churches. The established churches were more immune to the economic and social pressures of ecumenism; they were relatively autonomous institutions

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2 (continued)
expressions of importance. Firstly, although the sum of the percentages is 100 we do not claim that our explanation is definitive and admit that other factors could have influenced individual decisions to support and oppose church union. Secondly, numerical equivalents suggest a precision which is simply not present here. The weighting of variables was based on a careful evaluation of both quantifiable and non-quantifiable data. Although the ascription of importance to each category of factors was by no means done in an arbitrary fashion, the procedure lacks the exactitude of a controlled experiment.

which felt no compelling need to expand their borders. Younger churches were less secure, more open to change. Mission churches in particular were dependent upon denominational headquarters for sustenance, and hence were much more likely to seek new opportunities in an expanded church structure. Younger churches, because their boundaries had not been clearly established, were able to renounce local ties and give allegiance to the larger denominational framework that would develop from ecclesiastical consolidation.

Theology, psychological variables and congregational age had a significant influence on support and opposition to church union. But these factors were relatively peripheral accounting for only small differences between unionists and nonconcurrents.

(ii) Secondary Factors

In our study we found that support for ecumenism was influenced by the rural/urban variable. In general rural areas tended to give greater support to church union than urban areas. The churches of the city were less isolated and had greater financial stability than rural churches; consequently they had less need of a large centralized ecclesiastical organization. In addition urban churches tended to be older and more established. In certain areas the relationship between church union and the rural/urban variable was reversed, indicating that this factor interacted very closely with regional variables.

The relative strength of individual charges had a significant influence on support or opposition to church union. Churches which ~~supported~~ ecumenism had a disproportionate share of the total membership of the Presbyterian population; they had greater growth potential, and they had greater financial resources than unionist churches. In general churches which were relatively weaker in institutional strength tended to support church union to a greater extent than stronger churches.

We also found in our study that church unionists were more likely to advocate the use of business techniques in church management. Specifically, unionists argued that religious consolidation would produce economic savings that could be used to accomplish certain goals. Unionists argued that the existing pattern of denominational competition should be rationalized. Nonconcurrents tended to oppose the application of business principles to religious institutions and deprecated the need for financial savings. Opponents of church union also opposed the goals toward which the economic savings would be allocated.

These secondary factors had an important influence on the church union question. It is unlikely that these factors in themselves could have precipitated the formation of new ecclesiastical structures. The influence of these variables was most acute when acting in conjunction with the central factors discussed below.

(iii) Central Factors

The most important motivating force in the union controversy was a complex of variables relating to regionalism, nationalism and the social gospel. The fundamental differences between opponents and supporters of ecumenism were closely related to differences of attitude in regard to these factors.

The social gospel movement received far greater support from unionists than from nonconcurrents. The social gospellers were more open to change in religious life and were consequently more amenable to revising denominational patterns. The social gospellers were also more likely to subordinate religious belief to religious action; the de-emphasis of belief reduced theological obstacles to ecclesiastical consolidation. The unionists were more likely to share the social gospel concern for direct and extensive participation of religious institutions in the secular realm. They were also more likely to support reform movements in which the benefits and responsibilities of the nation were shared equally by all Canadians. By way of contrast nonconcurrents tended to advocate a relatively sharp separation of sacred and secular realms. In addition opponents of union were more likely to be concerned with maintaining existing social patterns and with the gradual development of Canadian society without significant deviation from the past. The association of church unionists with the social gospel movement sharpened opposition to ecumenism among social conservatives. They feared that a national

united church would attempt to co-opt the legitimate prerogatives of the state, that such a church might threaten the orderly conduct of business affairs, and that the united church might pose a threat to individual liberty, persecuting and prosecuting activities judged immoral by a small coterie of church leaders.

The social gospel movement was stronger among the clergy than the laity. Consequently ministers supported church union to a greater extent than laymen. The ecumenical movement received its greatest strength from those who were committed to the social gospel, specifically from clergy, theological faculty members, former moderators of the church, and missionaries.

The commitment of social gospellers to the reform and democratization of Canadian society meant that the church union movement would have important consequences for the relations between capital and labour and for social stratification. In our study we found little direct information about class differences between unionists and nonconcurrents but we found considerable indirect evidence to suggest that nonconcurrents tended to enjoy higher social status. We found clear indications that opponents of union were more concerned than unionists with maintaining the existing arrangement of classes. For those Presbyterians who were content with the existing stratification the commitment of social gospel unionists to class reform was threatening. In addition opponents of union feared that the association of liberal Protestantism with the masses, the

workers and downtrodden of Canada would weaken the prestige of Presbyterians vis a vis other groups.

We found that support for church union was distributed very unevenly across Canada with the highest support for ecumenism in the Western provinces and lowest in central Canada. The strong influence of regionalism on church union was related closely to the social gospel variable. There was in the West and to a lesser degree in the Maritimes a sizable group of Canadians who attributed their social, economic and political problems to the alleged inequities of the confederation system. For these regional protesters the church union movement, with its social gospel emphasis on equality of opportunity for all Canadians, was seen as an effective mechanism for the amelioration of regional disparity. The unionists' support of Western demands was for many residents of central Canada sufficient grounds for opposing the ecumenical movement.

The subject of nationalism also had a profound influence on the church union movement. Unionists and nonconcurrents differed sharply in regard to the question of Canada's place in the world. Supporters of church union tended to be more critical than nonconcurrents of the political and social happenings in the old country. Although ecumenists never repudiated the imperial connection they believed that Canada's destiny was to build upon her British heritage a new and virile nation that would synthesize the best of the new and old worlds.

Unionists believed that Canada should mature as the senior dominion to take a more independent stance vis a vis Britain. Opponents of church union tended to be strong supporters of the imperial tie. They believed that Canada should maintain the ideal of British North America, orienting her policies and goals toward the greater good of the empire. Nonconcurrents on the other hand believed that it was more important to keep the traditions of the old country alive in Canada than to establish an independent nation. Ecumenical negativists described the ideal relationship between Canada and Britain not in terms of a commonwealth of relatively equal nations but in terms of the familial symbol of mother and son.

Supporters of church union were deeply concerned with the problem of national unity. They were acutely conscious of the political, economic, ethnic and geographic differences that divided the nation; they believed that commitment to a national united church would overcome the divisive loyalties to secular association. By way of contrast nonconcurrents were relatively disinterested in the unity question. On the one hand they did not regard national integration as a legitimate function of the church. On the other hand they feared that a united Canada would be less dependent upon the empire; the link with the old country would be weakened critically by a cohesive national identity.

Opposition to church union and opposition to nationalism

were strengthened by a persistent Scottish identity among Presbyterians. This ethnic identity was strongest among those Canadians who were born overseas and among those who lived in regions where contacts with non Anglo-Saxon immigrants were relatively infrequent. A weakened ethnic identity facilitated the growth of ecumenism while a strong Scotch-Irish identity was a major impediment to church union. The relationship between ethnic identity and attitudes toward ecumenism was based on the tendency of churches to reflect the ethnicity of their members; the Presbyterian Church reinforced Scottishness in a way that the united church would not. Ethnic identity was also related to the question of nationalism. Those who wanted to maintain their ethnic heritage were opposed to the establishment of a more independent nation and argued that Canada should keep its link with the empire intact.

The church union controversy was also influenced by different attitudes toward immigration into Canada. Supporters of church union believed that Canada should pursue a vigorous multi-ethnic immigration program because the entry of a variety of ethnic groups would increase Canadian autonomy and moderate the French/English conflict. Unionists believed that a national united church would be able to assimilate newcomers into Canadian society. Opponents of church union disagreed, arguing that the enormous social problems that accompanied immigration were not the responsibility of the church.

Nonconcurrents believed that immigration should be sharply curtailed or at least limited to Anglo-Saxon newcomers. Unionists argued for a cultural pluralism in which the variegated ethnic groups would share equally in Canada's resources. The emphasis of opponents of church union was on a mono-ethnic Canada with a culture derived from the British Isles; nonconcurrents would place new Canadians in a position subordinate to the native born and to those of British stock.

This complex of variables related to regionalism, nationalism and the social gospel was at the heart of the church union controversy. The split between unionists and nonconcurrents in the Presbyterian Church reflected the divisions within English speaking Canada. In each case the controversy was based on competing visions of the nation's destiny. The attitudes of unionists toward regionalism, nationalism and the social gospel reveal that the ecumenical movement was part of an ambitious program to dramatically reform Canadian society, reforms so extensive that one could say that the goal was a fundamental redefinition of confederation.

The accent of the ecumenical movement was on change in both the religious and social institutions of the nation. Supporters of church union subscribed to the ideal of evolutionary progress. They believed that change was both inevitable and desirable. Although particular manifestations of social change could have deleterious

consequences and even though dysfunctional regressions could interrupt the evolutionary cycle, they were firmly convinced that historical development involved the progressive manifestation of the divine will. It was man's Christian responsibility to support change and thereby ensure the actualization of the Kingdom of God on earth, in so far as it was possible to implement the sacred realm in the secular world.

The changes envisaged by church unionists were oriented toward the creation in Canada of a pristine nation founded on Christian principles. The unionists had very specific proposals in mind to effect changes in the social structure, in industry, in dominion-provincial relations, in foreign policy, and in all other aspects of Canadian society. The key motifs of the new society were Christian democracy and equality of opportunity for all Canadians. There was to be a re-alignment of powers in Canada such that the dispossessed and disenfranchized of every economic, geographic and ethnic group would share equally[3] in the benefits and responsibilities of the nation. The united church would exert its moral authority and intervene in the secular realm to ensure that justice and equality prevailed. The dramatic social and political changes advocated by the unionists were the end product of the conviction that a Christian environment is essential to individual salvation.

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[3] The social gospellers in the church union movement enthusiastically argued that a fundamental tenet of Christianity was social equality, which usually meant equality of opportunity. Some unionists held the

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For those Protestants caught up in the vision of a new Canada the culmination of church union was an essential step toward the goal of a Christian society. They were intensely aware of the opposition within Protestantism and within Canada to the reform movement; they believed that a national united church would be able to overcome conservative opposition.

Supporters of church union believed that ecumenism was a valuable mechanism for the accomplishment of this goal for a variety of reasons, the most important being that the movement could draw support from disparate sections of society. Canadians outside the centres of power were divided among themselves by denominational, occupational, economic, ethnic and regional loyalties. Support for church union cut across these barriers, shifting the focus of identity away from divisive loyalties toward a unitive identity centred around religious adherence. Instead of competing among themselves the powerless could consolidate their forces to successfully challenge the established elites and institutions of society. In addition the overt agreement of the unestablished groups to the principle of social equality could provide the necessary aura of trust that makes co-operative effort possible.

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3 (continued)
utopian belief that equal opportunities would lead inevitably to a classless society and to the literal equality of all men. But the majority of unionists believed that differences among men would persist even with equal opportunity. For the majority of unionists the goal was a general reduction of the tensions among classes, a weakening of the social hierarchy, and an equitable allotment of the benefits of society on the basis of individual achievement.

The specific means by which unionists hoped to achieve the new society was the power of public opinion co-ordinated and enlightened by the UCC. They believed that an informed and organized populace could apply irrestible social pressure to the political, economic and social arbiters to ensure that all Canadians shared equally in the national dream. This confidence in the power of public opinion was derived partly from the belief that political states were becoming more and more democratic as history progressed. Of greater importance was the conviction that religious institutions were the dominant moral authorities for the Canadian people. The formation of a new ecclesiastical organization provided the mechanism to displace emotional commitment from existing religious traditions thereby reducing the commitment of its members to those social institutions previously supported by the superceded denominations. This release of commitment would make attachment to new social forms possible; these new social forms could then be legitimated by the new church.

Although the UCC has managed to grow successfully with the population increase and to obtain new members through ecumenical ventures (notably the acquisition of the Evangelical United Brethren in the late 1960's), the social goals of the church have been frustrated. Despite the influence of the UCC on the development of social welfare in Canada, most of the specific ideals of the social gospel were never implemented: prohibition was rejected; political reforms were not

attained; labour and capital found their own ways of resolving industrial disputes; class conflicts continued and no fundamental restructuring of confederation took place.

This failure of the UCC[4] to attain social reform was partly a product of organizational pressures. In the years immediately after union the church was concerned with the consolidation of its own institution. The surplus of clergy and loss of ecclesiastical buildings in key areas, (especially the loss of Knox College in Toronto), forced the church to devote its resources to the erection of new structures: in a curious irony the construction boom after union required capital expenditures exceeding those of the years preceding union. But the major source of the failure of social reform is grounded in the factors that created the UCC in 1925.

The consolidation of liberal Protestantism was attained through the sacrifice of theological concerns. The unionists were unconcerned with theological nuance, combining with relative ease the Calvinism of the Presbyterian tradition with the Arminianism of Methodism. The commitment demanded by the United Church was to social action not theological belief, hence the accusation that the UCC was a "creedless" church. The UCC's espousal of social and cultural integrative functions was made possible by the renunciation of personal integrative functions. Thus the United Church was unable to meet the needs of its members when the locus of concern shifted from

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[4] For the Presbyterian Church continuing after 1925 the schism was an unmitigated disaster. Despite the generous property settlement and the optimistic claim that Presbyterianism had been purified of its

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questions of national destiny to questions of personal survival during the depression. Massive unemployment, social strife and middle class despair during the 1930's did not lead to a renewed commitment to social gospel principles but to a re-awakening of individualistic evangelical religion. The rise of sectarianism and the return of UCC members to a conservative theological stance during the depression revealed the fundamental inability of the social gospel ideology of the UCC to provide support and consolation for its members.

Because the cohesion of the UCC was focused around secular rather than sacred concerns it lost its influence in the social realm. The United Church was a conglomerate of various groups united for the purpose of social reform. Consequently it was not able to exact from its members the commitment required to implement church norms. The radical changes in Canadian society advocated in the ideology of the movement could be attained only through an equally radical commitment of its members to a higher ideal. The vision of a just nation was not sufficiently powerful to hold the allegiance of UCC members beyond the period of initial enthusiasm. In the crucial questions of Canada's future the United Church simply was not able to marshall the support of its members. Consequently it was ignored.

Finally it should be noted that the failure of the UCC to effect social reform was prophesied in the schism of Presbyterianism. If the UCC had been able to enlist the support of those nonconcurrent

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4 (continued)
irreligious element, the continuing Presbyterian Church entered a period of decline that has continued to the present day. The nonconcurrents lost the overwhelming majority of clergy to the UCC; the shortage of
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Presbyterians who wielded power within Canadian society it might have been possible to implement major segments of the social gospel. But if the Presbyterian economic and political elites could not be convinced of the merit of the new church's vision how could upper class Anglicans be influenced? The UCC's expectation that the established social groups would open up the corridors of power to newcomers even after the liberal Presbyterians' co-religionists had refused was surely unrealistic.

Even if the hopes of the unionists for social reform exceeded the accomplishments of the UCC it is clear to us that the central motivating power in the ecumenical movement was the combination of factors related to the vision of a new Canada. The significant variables in the Canadian union of 1925 are listed briefly below by way of summary.

	Unionist Position	Nonconcurrent Position
Marginal Factors		
1. Theology	de-emphasized	important
2. Individual Variables	tendency toward open-mindedness	tendency toward authoritarianism
3. Congregational Age	younger	older

4 (continued)
church leaders was a continual source of hardship. The geographic distribution of nonconcurrents and minority status in the schism meant that many Presbyterians in areas of low population density were left without a local religious organization. The failure to attract new members to the denomination has created an unusual age profile in the church with the elderly over-represented and the younger under-represented. The decline in the proportion of Presbyterians in the population recorded in each census is likely to continue.

	Unionist Position	Nonconcurrent Position
Secondary Factors		
4. Rural/urban Differences	generally rural	generally urban
5. Institutional Strength	weaker	stronger
6. Attitudes toward Rationalizing Religious Competition	in favour	opposed
Central Factors		
7. Social Gospel	supporters; expansion of functions of religious institutions	opponents; retention of existing religious functions
8. Clergy/laity	clergy	laity
9. Social Class	relatively lower; class less important	relatively higher; class more important
10. Regionalism	outer Canada	central Canada
11. Attitudes toward Confederation	regional protest	no regional protest
12. Attitudes toward Nationalism	progressive imperialism	conservative imperialism
13. Ethnicity	weak ethnic identity	strong ethnic identity
14. Attitudes toward Immigration	extensive; multi-ethnic	limited; Anglo-Saxons

B. Generalizations from the Canadian Case

Many generalizations about ecumenism as an international movement can be made on the basis of our study of the Canadian union of 1925. Among the most important of these generalizations is that our

study confirms the findings of others. Every church union has unique features, the product of the interaction of particular variables with local conditions. But there are certain features common to church union movements per se, and the variables which were found to be significant in other church mergers were salient in the Canadian case. (See especially chapter I.) It should be noted that nationalism, a central factor in the Canadian movement, has been associated closely with ecumenical support in other nations, particularly in Africa and India. In addition the social reform motif that played such an important role in the Canadian union has been a major force in American ecumenism.

Secondly, the review of variables in the early part of this chapter enables us to generalize about the relationship between ecumenism and boundaries. Canadian ecumenists were more likely than ecumenical negativists to reject the need for clearly delineated borders and were more likely to accept broad, abstract, and ambiguous definitions of the breadth of social institutions, particularly the church. The unionists wanted to expand the functions of religious institutions, extending the boundaries of the church to include all aspects of social life. They were more open to the future and more in favour of change. Opponents of church union demanded narrow, concrete and discrete boundaries. They were more particularistic than universalistic in regard to ethnicity, social class, regionalism,

immigration and other factors. They were concerned with maintaining stability and conserving tradition, particularly in regard to theology. In the Canadian union we found that individuals who could live with weak or fluid boundaries in other aspects of social life were less committed to existing ecclesiastical structures and were more willing to transfer their loyalties to larger religious institutions. In contrast opponents of church union tended to be threatened by ambiguity and change, and feared that the renunciation of denominational patterns would lead to rootlessness. We suspect that the differences in boundary definitions between unionists and opponents of union in the Canadian case are typical for ecumenical movements throughout the world.

Thirdly, from this Canadian study generalizations can be made about the relationships among the three principal sociological theories of ecumenism. In the first chapter we noted that there were three relatively distinct theories: the American school which consisted of those sociologists who argued that the growing unity of ecclesiastical organizations was an imitation of the growing unity of all sectors of American society, the British school which claimed that ecumenism was a response to the declining influence of religious institutions, and the Psychological school which consisted of those who argued that the most significant variables affecting ecumenism related to personality traits. From our Canadian study we can conclude

that the differences among the schools are based chiefly on differences of emphasis. The American school tends to focus on the church as a social institution reflecting changes within society as a whole, particularly with regard to the organizational revolution. The British school tends to focus on the cultural aspects of religious institutions with the ecumenical movement depicted as the churches' response to changing cultural values, specifically to a perceived decline in the importance of religious life to society. The Psychological school tends to focus on the individual using concepts derived from Psychology to interpret ecumenism. In addition to these differences in emphasis we can note that much of the discrepancy between the American and British theories can be explained by the different relationship between religion and society in each nation. The value of each theory to the interpretation of a particular church union movement will be a function of the extent to which the socio-religious environment in which the union movement develops resembles either British or American society.

Our final generalization about ecumenism in the world relates to the uniqueness of the 1925 Canadian union. Despite the characteristics shared with other church unions the Canadian union remains distinctive in the breadth and depth of its religious consolidation. The merger of the Presbyterian, Methodist and Congregationalist

churches in Canada was one of the very few inter-denominational unions ever to occur. It was also the only trans-confessional union in the industrialized world that embraced a major segment of a nation's population. The overwhelming failure of inter-denominational union proposals in other parts of the world suggests that the central factors in the Canadian union may be essential to the consummation of inter-denominational church union. In 1925 the unionists were motivated by a powerful vision of a new society; the painful decision to abandon the comfort of existing denominations was made possible by the hope of attaining a higher ideal. We strongly suspect that in the absence of hope in a comparable ideal inter-denominational proposals will collapse in failure.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V

A HISTORICAL PRECEDENT

The social gospel controversy which raged within Presbyterianism prior to the union of 1925 was present in the church 50 years earlier. In 1875 four separate branches of the Presbyterian church in Canada united. The Free and Secessionist churches (hereafter called the Free Presbyterians) differed considerably from the Church of Scotland (hereafter called the Kirk), the former adopting what could be described as a proto-social gospel stance relative to the latter. Free Presbyterians advocated Sabbath legislation as early as 1850 and were identified as early temperance enthusiasts, urging the Ontario government in 1875 to enact prohibition. The Kirk continued to ignore both issues right up until 1875. In addition the Free church vigorously opposed the special educational concessions granted to Anglican and Presbyterian communities, while the Kirk fought to retain its privileged position. Finally it should be noted that the Free church was active in the anti-slavery campaign in Ontario during the 1840's and 1850's, whereas the Kirk regarded the underground railway as a non-religious issue.[1]

In the 1875 crisis a number of Kirk churches refused to enter

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[1] J. A. Johnston, "Factors in the Formation of the Presbyterian Church in Canada in 1875", (Ph.D. thesis, McGill, 1955), pp. 69-74.

the union,[2] although all of these dissenters eventually trickled into the Presbyterian Church of Canada. Since there was a clear distinction between the Kirk and Free churches in regard to the proto-social gospel movement it is possible that these two groups of churches differed slightly in their response to the union controversy of 1925. We were able to trace 481 of these 1875 churches still surviving in 1925. Table A-1 shows that even after 50 years the differences in attitude toward social Christianity influenced church union. Although the differences discovered are not statistically significant, the table shows that for all of Canada and in every province the socially concerned Free churches supported union to a greater extent than the conservative Kirk sessions.

TABLE A-1 1875 PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES ENTERING UNION IN 1925, IN PERCENTAGES

	Kirk Churches	Free Churches
Maritimes	64	67
Quebec	48	61
Ontario	33	41
All Canada	45	50

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[2] Opposition in 1875 was confined to the presbytery of Pictou (13 churches) and some isolated congregations in central Canada (12 churches). See J. T. McNeill, The Presbyterian Church in Canada 1875-1925 (Toronto: Presbyterian Church, 1925), pp. 29-32.

TABLE A-2 VOTING BEHAVIOUR OF 1875 PRESBYTERIAN CHURCHES IN THE 1925 UNION[3]

	Kirk Churches		Free Churches		Total	
	pro-union	anti-union	pro-union	anti-union	pro	anti
Maritimes	21	12	68	31	89	43
Quebec	10	11	14	9	24	20
Ontario	19	37	102	147	121	184
All Canada	50	60	184	187	234	247

By breaking the summary table down into four separate tables the relationship between 1875 identity and 1925 voting behaviour could be tested in each province. The chi squares were Ontario: .7342, Maritimes: .0918, Quebec: 1.0090, All Canada: .5815. None of these is significant for a confidence level of $p < .05$.

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[3] Sources for table A-2 are: Acts and Proceedings of the Canada Presbyterian Church, Toronto, 1875; Minutes of the Adjourned Meeting of the Synod of the Presbyterian Church of the Lower Provinces of British North America, Halifax, 1874; The Monthly Record of the Church of Scotland in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Adjoining Provinces, Halifax, June, 1874; Acts and Proceedings of the Synod of the Presbyterian Church of Canada in Connection with the Church of Scotland, Kingston, 1875.

Y. M. Lee, "A Historical Study of Presbyterianism in its Relation to the United Church of Canada", (M.Th. thesis, Victoria, 1961), pp. 133-4 suggests that the Kirk and Free elements of Canadian Presbyterianism influenced the 1925 union but he gives no indication of which element supported union or why. E. A. McDougall, "The Presbyterian Church in Western Lower Canada 1815-1842", (Ph.D. thesis, McGill, 1969) also suggests that earlier Presbyterian controversies influenced the 1925 union. His claim that "the forming of the United Church of Canada . . . was a triumph for the principles of New School American Presbyterianism of the 1830's" (p. 283) grossly overestimates the influence of this tiny group.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VII

THE ALBERTA CASE

The province of Alberta deviated slightly from the regional pattern of church union support. Like the other prairie provinces Alberta experienced both high regional protest and economic depression. But the level of union support in Alberta was only 78%, well above the national average, but substantially below the 92% support of Saskatchewan. This finding is surprising because Alberta was so similar to Saskatchewan in regard to history, geography, economy, social structure, etc. There were several factors operative in Alberta that tended to reduce church union support below the level of the other prairie provinces. None of these factors is in itself sufficient but in combination they do help to explain why ecumenical support was lower in Alberta than anticipated.

1) Both Manitoba and Saskatchewan looked to the city of Winnipeg for religious, cultural and intellectual leadership. Winnipeg in 1921 was the third largest city in Canada and the only major urban centre in these two provinces. Alberta was farther away from Winnipeg geographically and the influence of Winnipeg was relativized by the presence of Calgary and Edmonton, the eighth and tenth largest cities in the nation.[1] Since social gospel support was much stronger in

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[1] In 1921 the population of Winnipeg was 179,087 compared to 63,305 for Calgary and 58,821 for Edmonton. Census, Vol. I, pp. 756ff.

Winnipeg than in either Calgary or Edmonton, and since support for church union was associated with support for the social gospel, we would expect church union support to be correspondingly lower in Alberta than in the other prairie provinces.

2) Alberta had a higher proportion of American immigrants than the other provinces. Table A-3 shows that 37% of all Albertan immigrants came from the United States compared to only 29% in Saskatchewan. Since the ecumenical movement was less extensive in the United States, and since American ecumenism emphasized federation rather than organic union, we would expect the relatively high level of American immigration into Alberta to reduce church union support in Alberta below the level of the other prairie provinces.

TABLE A-3 LEVELS OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION IN THE PRAIRIES[2]

Province	Number of U.S. Immigrants	Total Number of Immigrants	Percentage of Americans
Alberta	99,879	273,364	37
Saskatchewan	87,617	299,677	29
Manitoba	21,644	222,372	10

3) Alberta differed from the other prairie provinces in regard to political activity. The leader of Alberta's agrarian protest movement, Henry Wise Wood, convinced Alberta's farmers that

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[2] 1921 Census, Vol. II, pp. 374-87.

they should consolidate themselves into a cohesive class movement. On the basis of his experience in American protest movements, Wood believed that admitting non-farmers into the United Farmers of Alberta would weaken the movement. He counselled against co-operation with the major parties and with other interest groups. In contrast the agrarian movements of Manitoba and Saskatchewan advocated co-operation with other groups in order to attain their goals; T. A. Crerar, Manitoba's chief spokesman, was even prepared to co-operate with the federal Liberal party.[3] Since the desire to co-operate is a fundamental tenet of ecumenism, the adoption of non co-operation as a political strategem weakened church union support in Alberta.

It is our contention that support for third party political movements and support for church union were closely related but separate ways of expressing regional protest. In the federal elections from 1921 to 1926 Alberta gave more support to political protest movements than did Saskatchewan. This finding is depicted in table A-4 which expresses in percentages the levels of third party support in the two provinces.[4]

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[3] W. K. Rolph, Henry Wise Wood of Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1950), pp. 63, 80, 103ff; C. B. MacPherson, Democracy in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1962), p. 60; Sharp, op. cit., pp. 96-7, 140-6.

[4] The table is computed from the data reported by D. O. Carrington, Canadian Party Platforms, 1867-1968 (Toronto: Copp-Clark, 1968), pp. 79, 94, 103. The percentages in the table refer to the number of seats won by alternate party candidates, not to the popular vote.

TABLE A-4 LEVELS OF POLITICAL PROTEST IN ALBERTA AND SASKATCHEWAN, 1921-1926, IN PERCENTAGES

Province	1921	1925	1926
Alberta	100	41	80
Saskatchewan	93	22	24

Alberta's emphasis on a political solution to the problems of regional disparity contrasts with Saskatchewan's emphasis on a religious solution.[5]

These geographic, demographic and political factors lowered church union support in Alberta below the level of the other prairie provinces. None of these factors in itself is sufficient to explain the differences between Alberta and Saskatchewan but in concert their influence was significant.

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[5] Another political difference between Alberta and Saskatchewan relates to the response of these provinces to the great depression of the 1930's. Alberta elected a right wing movement, Social Credit, while Saskatchewan supported the leftist CCF. Seymour Lipset, Agrarian Socialism (Berkeley: University of California, 1967), p. 125 argues that this difference in political support is not a striking contrast. In both provinces the party in power at the beginning of the depression was rejected by the electorate. In Saskatchewan the Liberals held power and were replaced by the left wing agrarian CCF. In Alberta the UFA, an agrarian protest party was in power and was replaced by Social Credit, a new protest movement. Lipset's analysis suggests that the left/right differences between the two provinces in the 1930's has no bearing on the church union question.

Regionalism was a central factor in the schism of Presbyterianism. But regionalism had a pervasive effect on all Canadians. Why was there no split in the Methodist Church? Why did Ontario Methodists accept church union when it was clear that union would strengthen western dissent?

A definitive explanation for the absence of regional differences in Methodism would require an extended analysis of Methodist documents, a task far beyond the scope of this thesis. However, two brief remarks can be made as a tentative explanation.

1) Canadian Methodism enjoyed greater church discipline than did Presbyterianism. The Presbyterian Church gave enormous power to individual presbyteries and synods. Dissidents were given opportunities to meet as a group to reinforce their convictions, to create a parallel organization to oppose the assembly's policy on church union. No such organizational opportunities to sustain dissent existed for Methodists.

2) The Presbyterian Church tolerated the anti-unionist activities of Ephraim Scott, the editor of the official journal of the church, the Record, throughout the period of the union controversy. The Record gave opponents of union a forum to air their criticisms and seek converts to their views. Such a forum did not exist in the Methodist Church.

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The United Church Archives, housed in Victoria College at the University of Toronto, is the official repository for documents relating to the United Church of Canada and for pre-1925 archival materials of the Methodist, Presbyterian and Congregational Churches. In addition to its own holdings, Victoria College has acquired microfilm copies of relevant documents stored in other Canadian centres.

The materials contained in the United Church Archives, especially the Church Union Collection, are essential to Canadian ecumenical research. Of particular importance to this study were the extensive collection of clippings from major Canadian newspapers, the collection of sermons, speeches and pamphlets by Presbyterian opponents of church union, (catalogued as the Presbyterian Non-concurrent Literature section), and the collection of articles and pamphlets by supporters of church union published by the Bureau of Literature and Information. In addition the present study also examined many documents in the Presbyterian Church of Canada section that were available only at the United Church Archives.

The present study also relied heavily upon the following official documents of the Presbyterian Church:

Acts and Proceedings of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of Canada 1875-1972

Acts and Proceedings of the Canada Presbyterian Church Toronto, 1875

Acts and Proceedings of the Synod of the Presbyterian Church of Canada in Connection with the Church of Scotland Kingston, 1875

Minutes of the Adjourned Meeting of the Synod of the Presbyterian Church of the Lower Provinces of British North America Halifax, 1874

Monthly Record of the Church of Scotland in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Adjoining Provinces Halifax, 1874

The United Church Yearbooks 1925-1972 were consulted less extensively.

Church newspapers were also important for the research of this work. The following Presbyterian journals were used extensively:

The Message

Presbyterian

Presbyterian Record

Presbyterian Standard

Presbyterian and Westminster

Presbyterian Witness

St. Andrew's Presbyterian Church Magazine

Westminster

The New Outlook and United Church Observer, both United Church journals, were also consulted.

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