THE PRIMACY OF FREEDOM IN ROUSSEAU'S FIRST DISCOURSE
THE PRIMACY OF FREEDOM
IN
ROUSSEAU'S DISCOURS SUR LES SCIENCES ET LES ARTS
AS RELATED TO
THE CONTRAT SOCIAL AND THE EMILE

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ABSTRACT

The emphasis in the thesis is on demonstrating the absolute primacy of freedom (autonomy) in Rousseau's thought. The intention of the thesis is to suggest some of the problematic 'irreconcilables' inherent in any attempt to construct a political theory within the constraint of the primacy of freedom. This emphasis and intention is attempted through analysis of the concluding paragraphs of the Discours sur les Sciences et les Arts in relation to the Contrat Social and the Emile.

The actual thesis of the thesis is formulated to reflect the primacy of freedom in Rousseau's thought and is stated as follows: The concluding paragraphs of Rousseau's first Discourse delineate a paradigm within the context of which Rousseau will later formulate his political projection, the Contrat Social, and his educational projection, the Emile. The terms 'paradigm' and 'projection' are used advisedly within the context of their centrality to modern thought. While recognizing that Rousseau did not use these terms in their evolved sense, the conceptual framework out of which they developed may be found in Rousseau's thought, particularly within the concluding paragraphs of the first Discourse.
Part I of the dissertation explores the paradigm outlined in the concluding paragraphs of the first Discourse. Specifically, Chapter I explores Rousseau's concept of freedom in relation to nature as manifest in the state of nature and human nature. Freedom is related to independence (vis-a-vis other men) and free-agency (vis-a-vis nature) and these two components form the basis for a typology of freedom that will be used throughout the thesis: natural freedom, misused freedom, and radical freedom. Chapter II examines Rousseau's historical perspective and his account in the first Discourse of the devolution of natural freedom into misused freedom (exercise of negative free-agency and loss of independence). Chapter III discusses Rousseau's concept of 'art' in order to further elucidate his concept of freedom and to reconcile Rousseau's praise of science in the concluding paragraphs with his attack on the arts and sciences earlier in the Discourse. Chapter IV contrasts the 'art of thinking', which Rousseau condemns, with the great science of Bacon, Newton and Descartes. Rousseau's designation of these men as the 'precepteurs du Genre-humain', his description of the nature of their thought, and his demand that they be bound only by their own hopes, all demonstrate the extent to which Rousseau understood the relationship between freedom and projection that was to characterize modern thought. Chapter V identifies three types of virtue in Rousseau's thought (all of which are contrasted with the 'art of manners' attacked in
the first Discourse): innocent virtue emanating from the primary goodness of man, political virtue based on the horizon of patriotism and religion, and autonomous virtue which is a type of self-legislation. Innocent virtue is simulated in Emile by the tutor and political virtue is established in the citizens by the legislator, whereas autonomous virtue characterizes those who are capable of exercising radical freedom.

In Part II, Chapter VI summarizes the paradigm outlined in Part I to serve as the basis for analyzing Rousseau's political and educational projections. Chapter VII explores the relationship between the legislator, who is identified as a 'precepteur du Genre-humain', that is, as one capable of exercising radical freedom, and the citizens of the general will state. This relationship is seen as a manifestation of the distinction Rousseau makes at the conclusion of the first Discourse between 'deux grands Peuples; que l'on savoit bien dire, et l'autre, bien faire'. Chapter VIII parallels Chapter VII, by viewing the Emile as Rousseau's own projection within the context of the paradigm found in the first Discourse, particularly in the assignation of the tutor as a 'precepteur du Genre-humain' and in his relationship to Emile. Throughout my analysis, the emphasis is on demonstrating the primacy of freedom in all areas of Rousseau's thought: freedom for Rousseau is both the highest philosophic principle and the
fundamental fact of human existence; it is the primacy of freedom that characterizes man's original condition, his fundamental desire and fundamental right; it is freedom that is the root and end of the just society.

In this emphasis on the primacy of freedom in Rousseau's thought, the thesis makes a significant contribution to Rousseauan scholarship by providing a new perspective on the overall unity and consistency of Rousseau's thought, while, in a broader context, using Rousseau as the medium for exploring those irreconcilables which have become endemic to modernity's attempts to think together the exaltation of freedom (autonomy) as the highest good with the exigencies of political order.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my gratitude for the helpful encouragement of Professor Robert Agger who served as supervisor during the early, unsure stages of the thesis, and to Professor Roman March, who carefully proofread and provided useful suggestions in the final stages. Professor Howard Aster deserves particular thanks for helping me keep some critical perspective on what I was doing, but I am especially grateful to him for always being available and willing to give help and direction. Finally, I am deeply indebted to Professor George Grant who taught me to read political philosophy. His wisdom and kindness has guided and encouraged me throughout.

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INTRODUCTION

Jean Jacques Rousseau, in his *Discours sur les sciences et les arts*, sought to expose the naiveté of the Enlightenment's intention. Unlike his contemporaries, Rousseau recognized that the classical antagonism between knowledge and virtue had continuing relevance for any attempt to formulate a political or educational theory. At the conclusion of the first *Discourse*, Rousseau reformulates that antagonism and proposes to resolve it in a way that clearly adumbrates the thought of Kant and especially Nietzsche, and catapults Rousseau into a position of prominence in the history of political thought unrivalled by any of his contemporaries. The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the relevance of the concluding paragraphs of the first *Discourse* (see Appendix, pages 235-6 below) for understanding Rousseau's political and educational theories; and also, the paramount significance of these paragraphs in establishing Rousseau in the vanguard of modernity.
Insight into these paragraphs, whose meaning and significance had eluded me even after many readings of the first Discourse, came after I began reading Kant. I mention this not as a deliberate methodological procedure, but simply as an autobiographical fact relevant to the development of this thesis. This thesis is not a Kantian interpretation of Rousseau for the very good reason that my knowledge of Kant is inadequate; and, understanding Rousseau's thought in itself is a necessary and sufficiently challenging task. Kant however, served as a type of impetus or entry point into Rousseau, particularly in the parallel Kant drew between Rousseau's thought and that of Newton. The following observation by Kant is especially germane to the intent of this thesis.

Newton was the first to discern order and regularity in combination with great simplicity, where before him men had encountered disorder and unrelated diversity. Since Newton the comets follow geometric orbits. Rousseau was the first to discover beneath the varying forms human nature assumes, the deeply concealed essence of man and the hidden law in accordance with which Providence is justified by his observations.

Kant recognized that Newton's thought, as outlined in his *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica*, was central, not only in the development of natural science, but also for establishing the nature of all modern thought. Newton's first principle, his 'Law of Motion', exemplified, to use Heidigger's phrase, a new "manner of asking about the thing". The revolutionary significance does not merely lie in the Law itself, but in the way in which it was formulated. Heidigger describes this formulation as a type of 'mathematical projection', which he defines as follows:

The mathematical is, as mente concipere, a project (Entwurf) of thingness (Dingheit) which, as it were, skips over the things. The project first opens a domain (Spielraum) where things — i.e. facts show themselves.

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There is some evidence of this type of projection in Rousseau's writings, particularly in his investigations into the state of nature and natural man. Rousseau himself seemed aware of the parallel with Newton's thought. However, our thesis is not directly concerned with the epistemological basis of Rousseau's thought within this context, although we will suggest in Chapters I and II that Rousseau's conception of the state of nature and natural man is in some senses determined by the nature of the 'projection'.

More central to the intention of our thesis is the primacy of freedom in the formulation of 'mathematical projections'. Heidigger brilliantly outlines the relationship between freedom and the mathematical projection that underlies the structure of modern thought:

In the essence of the mathematical, as the project we delineated, lies a will to a new formation and self-grounding of the form of knowledge as such. The detachment from revelation as the first source for truth and the rejection of tradition as the authoritative means of knowledge — all these rejections are only negative consequences of the mathematical project. He who dared to project the mathematical project put himself as the projector of this project upon a base which is first projected only in the project. There is not only a liberation in the mathematical project, but also a new experience and formation of freedom itself, i.e., a binding

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6 The first Law of Motion, or principle of inertia, has of course had great significance in itself, situated at the apex of what is today known as 'classical physics'.

7 Heidigger, What is a Thing?, p. 92.
with obligations which are self-imposed. In the mathematical project develops an obligation to principles demanded by the mathematical itself. According to this inner drive, a liberation to a new freedom, the mathematical strives out of itself to establish its own essence as the ground of itself and thus of all knowledge.

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This type of freedom has become central in modern thought and is adumbrated in Rousseau's writings, particularly in the concluding paragraphs of the first Discourse. Inquiry into the nature of freedom in relation to mathematical projection, having taxed the brilliance of Immanuel Kant and Martin Heidigger, is beyond the scope of this thesis.

The foregoing has been included primarily for its significance in the initial conceptualization of the thesis. We will, however, identify aspects of this type of projection and this concept of liberation in Rousseau's thought. Specifically, the Social Contract and the Emile will be seen as 'projections' within the context of the paradigm outlined at the conclusion of the first Discourse. Of particular concern will be the primacy of freedom both in choosing the

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See, for example, J.-J. Rousseau, Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalite, Oeuvres Complètes, ed. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1959-1969), III, 123,127, 133, etc. Hereafter referred to as the second Discourse. The Pléiade edition has been used throughout and hereafter all references from Rousseau will give the appropriate volume number from the Pléiade edition.
'preceptors of the human race' and in determining the nature and source of their thought. In the Conclusion, we will return to this passage from Heidigger having demonstrated in the thesis the extent to which Rousseau's thought represents a "will to a new formation and self-grounding of the form of knowledge as such".

9 Heidigger, What is a Thing?, p. 97, emphasis added. The term 'modernity' will be used in this dissertation within the context of this excerpt from Heidigger; that is, 'modernity' refers to that "specific will to a new formation and self-grounding of the form of knowledge . . . a liberation to a new freedom, the mathematical striving out of itself to establish its own essence as the ground of itself and thus of all knowledge". Manifestations of this 'will to a new formation' are outlined on pages 26-7 below.

10 As is the supplementary question of the role of 'mathematics' in the history of modernity. Morris Kline's work in this area is a good introduction to the enormous scope of this question. However, Kline's historical approach to the mathematical is as beyond our competence as is Heidigger's philosophical inquiry. Although the relationship between freedom and mathematical projection, and the role of the mathematical in the history of modernity are significant in the initial conceptualization and the ultimate intention of our thesis, we are not able to speak directly on the nature of the mathematical. See M. Kline, Mathematics in Western Culture (New York, 1965), especially Chapters XVI-XVIII and XXI-XXII; also note Kline's Mathematical Thought from Ancient to Modern Times (New York, 1972).
Contained in the concluding paragraphs of Rousseau's first Discourse are a series of ideas and concepts which together form the framework for the political and educational theories outlined in Rousseau's further writings. In this dissertation, these concluding paragraphs will be examined with particular reference to Rousseau's political projection, the Social Contract, and his educational projection, the Emile.

Specifically, the thesis of this dissertation may be stated as follows:

The concluding paragraphs of Rousseau's first Discourse delineate a paradigm within the context of which Rousseau will later formulate his political projection, the Social Contract, and his educational projection, the Emile.

The terms 'paradigm' and 'projection' are used advisedly within the context of their centrality to modern thought. The term 'projection' has its etymological roots in the Latin prefix pro meaning 'forward' and the verb iacere meaning to 'throw out'. As suggested earlier, projection, by aligning reason with will, is a critical and determining factor in the conception of modern thought, particularly as formulated in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. This role of projection in the Kantian 'manner of asking about the thing' is reflected in popular usage where projection has come to mean 'plan or scheme', which literally in a historical perspective translates as 'to throw out into the future (forward)'. For Rousseau, who saw history as fundamental, yet basically random and hitherto subject only to accident or chance and the exercise of misused freedom, political and educational theories would have to be projective. His own Emile and Social Contract may be
In these concluding paragraphs, Rousseau designates the **who** ("ces Precepteurs du Genre-humain"), **how** (through the conjunction of 'la vertu, la science et l'autorité') and **why** ("Il n'a point fallu de maîtres") that will underlie any future ordering of the world for the "felicité du Genre-humain". Rousseau argues that those few men capable of

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"Continued

seen as 'projections' both in the popular sense as schemes or plans thrown out into the future whereby chance can be overcome and the course of history can be ordered, but also in coupling reason with will in forming the projection itself.

The term 'paradigm' basically means 'model, example or pattern'. Etymologically it is composed of the prefix *para* meaning 'outside of, beside, or beyond' and the Latin verb *dicere* 'to say or to appoint'. In combining these ideas and connotations of 'model', 'example' and 'speaking or appointing what is beyond', etc., the term 'paradigm' most closely approximates a view of the whole which uses hypotheses and conjectures in speaking about the past in determining what is natural, and projections about how the future should be ordered. When will becomes a determining factor in the 'manner of asking about the thing', the structure of knowledge becomes paradigmatic. The terms 'projection' and 'paradigm' give the scope necessary for any world-view in which freedom (autonomy) is primary, as it is in Rousseau's thought. Although Rousseau did not use these terms in their evolved sense, it will be argued that the conceptual framework out of which these terms evolved may be found in Rousseau's thought especially within the concluding paragraphs of the first Discourse. W. W. Skeat, *An Etymological Dictionary of the English Language* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1916), pp. 168, 428, 478; *The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology*, ed. C. T. Onions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), pp. 649, 714.
autonomous reason be bound only by their own hopes and be
given access to princely power in order to teach those in
authority how to enlighten the people ("d'engager les hommes
à bien faire") and rescue them from their present vile,
corrupt and unhappy state. This in effect is the paradigm,
within Rousseau's paradigmatic view of the future, which
will form the context of his educational and political pro-
jections in the Emile and the Social Contract. It is within
the context of this paradigm that the implications of Emile's
educational process and the formation of the general will
state can be understood. As such, the thesis of this disser-
tation would indicate that the concluding paragraphs of the
first Discourse are crucial for understanding the nature
and implications of the Emile and the Social Contract.

More importantly, the absolute primacy of Rousseau's
concept of freedom defined in terms of autonomy, that is,
independence and free-agency (see pages 124-5 below) is
demonstrated. The terms 'paradigm' and 'projection' them-
selves evolved out of a world-view in which freedom predom-
inates (see pages 7-8, n. 11 above). As will be argued in
Chapters III to V, it is freedom that is the criterion whereby

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Jean Jacques Rousseau, Discours sur les Sciences
et les Arts, III, 28-30. (Hereafter referred to as the
first Discourse.) See Appendix on pages 235-6 below.
the 'preceptors' are designated; it is on the basis of freedom that 'virtue, science and authority' are both defined and combined; and finally, those political and educational projections (of which the Social Contract and the Emile, it will be argued in Part II, are examples) whereby the future will be ordered for the felicity of mankind, are in their very conception characterized by freedom. It was through his concept of freedom that Rousseau bridged the gap that was of such concern to his predecessors, Machiavelli and Hobbes, the gap between the 'is' and the 'ought'. In the language of modernity, Rousseau sought to reconcile political reality and the ideal by defining both in terms of his concept of freedom. Freedom as autonomy is for Rousseau both the highest philosophical principle, as well as the fundamental fact characterizing human history.

The thesis will be explicated in the following way: The concluding paragraphs of the first Discourse will be examined within the context of that discourse itself, the Correspondances relating to it, and the second Discourse.  

The second Discourse is not specifically dealt with in the thesis. This does not reflect on the significance of this Discourse, but on the need to limit the scope of the dissertation. Many of its insights, however, have been used in the development of the thesis.
The explication of the concluding paragraphs and delineation of the paradigm contained therein, constitutes Part I (Chapter I-V) of the dissertation. Part II (Chapters VI-VIII) will provide a summary of the thesis explicated in Part I that will serve as the basis for analysis of Rousseau's political and educational projections, the Social Contract and the Emile.

Having thus outlined the thesis and how it will be explicated, it is necessary to turn to the question of originality and significance. The development of a thesis on Rousseau that is both original and a contribution to knowledge is an elusive task, since the complexity and centrality

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As such, this method of explication affirms the basic unity of Rousseau's thought and the interrelationship of the first Discourse with his major political and educational writings. See pages 16-19 below.

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The centrality of Rousseau's thought belies its complexity. His obvious rhetorical skill and the immediacy of much of his thought, made him the centre, whether as source or target, of the numerous political and philosophical trends and movements of his time. The complexity of his thought provided fodder for almost any group to appropriate or vilify. Hasty and prejudiced reading focused on fragmented and often contradictory aspects of Rousseau's thought and it is these that had historical impact and significance. For many years, the political use of Rousseau's writings impeded any reasonable attempt to understand the complexity of his thought.
of his thought has stimulated such a vast outpouring of secondary literature. The history of this Rousseauan analysis is a subject in its own right. Extensive analysis of the

innumerable interpretations of Rousseau's thought in order to determine an unexplored area or 'new' thesis will undoubtedly predestine such an enterprise to failure. Our primary focus in developing the thesis of this dissertation was to listen and attend to what Rousseau was saying in an attempt to understand his thought. The originality of the resultant thesis was confirmed only through a post factum examination of the secondary literature.

This is not to say that I embarked on a thesis on Rousseau unread and totally free of the secondary literature. Leo Strauss' *Natural Right and History* and Roger Masters' *The Political Philosophy of Rousseau* were particularly illuminating in my initial reading of Rousseau and the influence of their tradition of political thought has clearly lingered throughout the formulation of the thesis. Even though I attempted to put a certain distance between myself and the secondary literature in order to focus specifically on Rousseau, in retrospect, I recognize that most of my interpretations of the specifics of Rousseau's thought concur with those of Masters (hopefully a sign of correctness rather than lack of originality), and more importantly, that Strauss' *Natural Right and History* clearly underlies the general context and intent of the thesis. My indebtedness to Professor Strauss will be discussed in the latter part of the Introduction (pages 22ff.).

I draw attention to two other works that were examined post factum, but which do parallel in some senses my interpretation of Rousseau.

Judith Shklar, in her *Men and Citizens*, identifies men in authority and discusses their role in Rousseau's thought. We found Shklar's psychological approach and her analysis of *La Nouvelle Heloise* helpful in confirming much of our own interpretation of the role of the legislator and tutor in Rousseau's thought. Her examination of Wolmar was of particular interest, especially her comment that he was "... better and kinder than God. God gave men a freedom which they are too weak to use well and left them to suffer ... The miracle of the true man of authority
In terms of textual analysis, the thesis demonstrates that the concluding paragraphs form a significant climax to the Discourse, a climax that is consistent, but goes much further than the historical analysis that comprises the rest of the Discourse. In a sense, there is a type of dialectic

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is that he subjugates the will of his pupils so that they may develop enough inner strength to throw off the yoke of personal servitude". (J. Shklar, Men and Citizens Cambridge, 1969, p. 28) Unlike Shklar however, we would not term this a "liberating form of authority". Moreover, although Shklar examines the role of the legislator, tutor and especially Wolmar in great detail, she does not inquire into the nature and qualifications of these authority figures beyond describing them as charismatic, god-like, etc. More importantly, Shklar does not include Rousseau's comments on Bacon, Newton, and Descartes in her examination of authority figures and hence overlooks the significance of the concluding paragraphs of the first Discourse.

In terms of our emphasis on the primacy of freedom in Rousseau's thought, there is some similarity to Cassirer's interpretation, which also notes the centrality of freedom in Rousseau's thought; however, Cassirer applies a Kantian-like rationalist concept of freedom to Rousseau. Whereas we define Rousseau's concept of freedom in terms of autonomy as manifest in independence and free-agency, Cassirer places freedom within the context of an unconditional universal law, whose revelation, although not transcendent, is purely immanent. (Cassirer, The Question of Jean Jacques Rousseau, pp. 96-7; 49, 59, etc.) We can only say that we did not find that "... hymn to the law and to its unconditional universal validity" which Cassirer claims runs through all of Rousseau's political writings. Although we recognize that there is some foreshadowing of Kant's 'ethical liberty' in Rousseau's thought, we would argue that Cassirer carries Kant's concept of the ethical will too deeply into Rousseau's thought. In effect, we will argue that Rousseau's concept of the general will uses a process of generalization that is technically similar but philosophically radically different from Kantian universalization. Cassirer in fact acknowledges that Rousseau had a great deal of difficulty in
process implicit in the first *Discourse* that we have identified as the natural, historic, and projective perspectives comprising Rousseau's paradigmatic view of the whole.

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distinguishing the *volonté générale* from the *volonté de tous* (p. 63). Although we agree that there is a difference between these, it is not a difference that can be reconciled by the positing of a universally valid ethical will. The *volonté générale* is more than the quantitative tally of individual votes, but it is not the universal and unconditionally valid law of Kant. (See pages 141-46 below.) Despite this most fundamental disagreement, there are many points of agreement between our interpretation and that of Cassirer. Cassirer's writing on sensibility and Romanticism in Rousseau's thought provides a dimension that is lacking in our own interpretation and which we found most helpful.

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We use the term dialectic process here only within the context of Rousseau's paradigm, referring to the juxtaposing of the natural and historical perspectives and the synthesizing function of the projective. The use of the term is not meant to imply a philosophy of history as in Hegel and Marx's use of the term. In fact, we will argue that Rousseau did not have a doctrine of necessary or meaningful historical process. See pages 33, 232 below.
It will be argued in the course of the dissertation that the concluding paragraphs intimate the next stage (projective) in this dialectic process to which may be attributed the seemingly paradoxical relationship of these paragraphs to the rest of the Discourse. Without careful analysis of these paragraphs, therefore, it is impossible to understand the scope of Rousseau's thought in the first Discourse. Rousseau's famous account of the vision that precipitated his response to the Dijon Academy's question indicates that Rousseau's major works form an interrelated totality and not a developmental sequence.

Tout ce que j'ai pu retenir de ces foules de grandes vérités, qui, dans un quart d'heure, m'illuminèrent sous cet arbre, a été bien faiblement épars dans les trois principaux de mes écrits, savoir ce premiers discours, celui sur l'inégalité, et le traite de l'éducation.

It would appear that Rousseau's vision of the whole was essentially formulated prior to writing the first Discourse, although the totality and implications of that vision were not fully explicated in any single writing. The first Discourse must not be interpreted, therefore, as a preliminary stage in the development of Rousseau's thought, but as a major

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work based on and including elements drawn from a fairly comprehensive view of the whole. Clearly the scope of the first Discourse extends beyond the immediate question of the Dijon Academy concerning the effects of the Enlightenment on morality, that is, the relationship between the restoration of the arts and sciences and the purification of morals. Rousseau formulates the question from within a view of the whole that is essentially complete. In the concluding paragraphs, Rousseau gives his ultimate answer, a qualified affirmative to the question he had seemed to refute through his laborious investigation into nature and history in the rest of the Discourse. This seeming paradox can only be understood in terms of the comprehensiveness of the vision/paradigm underlying the first Discourse.

20 The developmental approach to Rousseau's thought is often used to account for seeming inconsistencies. Vaughan, for example, interprets Rousseau's writings as a growth process or development from individualism to collectivism; see C. E. Vaughan, ed. The Political Writings of J.-J. Rousseau (Oxford, 1962), pp. 80-1, etc. See also, J.-J. Rousseau, Discours sur les Sciences et les Arts, ed. C. R. Havens (London, 1946); H. Benda, "Rousseau's Early Discourses (I) and (II)", Political Science (Wellington, New Zealand), V (1953), 13-20, (1954), 17-28.
Within the context of Rousseauan scholarship, this thesis argues that some understanding of the concluding paragraphs is necessary in order to understand the relationship of the first Discourse to Rousseau's further writings, particularly the Social Contract and the Emile. By interpreting the concluding paragraphs of the first Discourse as a basis for understanding Rousseau's educational and political theories, this thesis will illustrate the interrelationship and consistency of Rousseau's writings, without eliminating the paradoxical elements so vital to the comprehensive and paradigmatic nature of his thought. In affirming the necessary interrelationship between the two Discourses, the Social Contract and the Emile, this dissertation is consistent with those efforts, dating from Lanson's article at the turn of the century, which attempt to reconcile seeming inconsistencies and prove the essential unity and coherence of Rousseau's thought. Unlike many of these efforts, no recourse has been made in this dissertation to biographical insight or analysis in the attempt to delineate the core of Rousseau's thought. Although our thesis indicates that Rousseau's major political and educational writings can be

understood and integrated within themselves, this does not deny the importance of Rousseau's autobiographical writings, nor does it denigrate those analyses that seek to integrate the totality of his work.

While the essential unity and consistency of Rousseau's writings is recognized, there are paradoxical elements in his thought that must be explored rather than unproductively resolved. Many of these paradoxes reflect the

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22 This thesis is an attempt to explicate Rousseau's political and educational theory within the context of the first Discourse. Although biographical insight may be critical for understanding other aspects of Rousseau's thought, such as, for example, his contribution to Romanticism, we believe Rousseau's political thought can be usefully examined in itself. Although we argue that analysis of the first Discourse in relation to the Emile and the Social Contract is important for understanding Rousseau's role in the development of modern thought, we recognize that this does not reflect the totality of Rousseau's thought nor the full scope of his significance.

23 The variety and complexity of Rousseau's work make this an incredibly difficult task. Cassirer makes a brilliant attempt in his essay The Question of Jean Jacques Rousseau. Starobinski makes the most notable attempt to integrate Rousseau's personality with his thought in J. J. Rousseau le transparence et l'obstacle. See also, J. Shklar, "Rousseau's Images of Authority", American Political Science Review, LVIII (1964), 919-32. Of course, psychological and biographical analyses have also been used to demonstrate Rousseau's mental imbalance, moral irresponsibility, psychosis, etc., which in turn is used to account for the seeming contradictions in his writings. J. Maritain, for example, concludes that Rousseau was psychotic and that this was the essence of his life and work. Maritain does not dismiss Rousseau on that basis, but sees Rousseau's psychosis as endemic of his times. Of Rousseau and Nietzsche, he writes "both of them
scope and complexity of Rousseau's understanding of the human condition. It has been noted that these 'truth-giving tensions' suggest a dialectical view of the whole. However, in our analysis we have come up against some very fundamental inconsistencies that seem ultimately to be contradictory rather than paradoxical. We refer specifically to those inconsistencies that relate, not to the paradoxical nature of the whole or the complexities of the human condition, but to the means Rousseau prescribes to implement his 'ideals' or projections. Of course, some of Rousseau's most vehement critics have focused their attack on this

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were victims, because they lived them to the end, of principles of madness which they took from their age. (And they returned them to their age with interest)". J. Maritain, Three Reformers: Luther, Descartes, Rousseau (New York, 1929), p. 111.

24 Stephen Salkever has given an excellent account of the various attempts to deal with the paradoxical nature of Rousseau's thought. He argues that Rousseau's paradoxes must not be seen as dilemmas calling for resolution, but rather as an essential element of Rousseau's philosophical style "... because they reflect Rousseau's conviction that no single answer can be given to the question of what constitutes human happiness or the best human life". (S. G. Salkever, "Interpreting Rousseau's Paradoxes", Eighteenth Century Studies, XI (Winter 1977-8), 204-226.

25 It will be argued in the thesis that it was through the exercise of man's freedom (free-agency) in history that many of these paradoxes were introduced.

26 M. Einaudi, The Early Rousseau, p. 16.
aspect of his work. Although most of these critiques suffer from superficial interpretations and a failure to recognize the paradoxical nature of Rousseau's thought, there is no doubt that Rousseau's proposals for implementation of his 'ideal', his attempted reconciliation of the 'ought' with the 'is' within the context of his political and educational theories, are problematic. This does not reflect on the adequacy of Rousseau's thought, but on the immensity and ultimate impossibility of his task. The reconciliation of the 'ought' with the 'is' was central to modern political theory and Rousseau sought to formulate that reconciliation in terms of his concept of freedom. It was in terms of freedom that he constructed his paradigm of 'what is' and his projections of what 'ought to be'. We will argue that the singular designation of freedom defined as autonomy is inadequate as a foundation for constructing

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28 This is discussed further below. See pages 31-33.
a political and educational theory. Whereas the highest good in traditional political theory was related to the hierarchy of lesser goods by an essential harmony, the exaltation of freedom (autonomy) as the highest good has an exclusive, disjunctive quality that manifests itself in any attempt to formulate a political theory. It is within this context that some inconsistencies and their implications, particularly the subordination of equality to freedom, are examined.

Finally, it is necessary in determining the significance and originality of the thesis to locate it within some tradition of political thought. This thesis has been written within the context of a tradition of political philosophy that is most clearly manifest and brilliantly argued in the work of Leo Strauss. Although I have not deliberately studied nor am I thoroughly familiar with all of the Straussian literature, it is within the general milieu of that tradition that I have read Rousseau.

Leo Strauss has defined philosophy, the quest for wisdom, as the attempt to replace opinions about the whole by knowledge of the whole. Political philosophy, as a branch of philosophy, is more focused and immediate, but also more
complex. It must focus the quest for truth within the context of the exigencies and realities of political life. Of course, the possibility of such a quest has been denied in the name of the 'fact-value' distinction whereby modern science has neatly divided up the whole. Indeed, the modern university seeks to institutionalize this distinction in the organization of its departments. Despite the popularity and pervasive-ness of the fact-value distinction, political philosophy has not been alone in attacking and undermining the premises on which it is based.

More difficult is historicism which has questioned the existence of the type of truth sought by political philosophy and has denied its relevance in determining the best type of political order. There are, of course, a number of forms of historicism; some, although pervasive, need not be taken seriously; however, it is in radical historicism that political philosophy faces its most serious challenge. It is to this that all of Strauss' thought is ultimately directed and it is for his difficult and careful thought in this most complex controversy that those concerned with political philosophy are most deeply indebted.


30 Careful reading of Kant, for example, would totally eradicate this distinction.
The popular attacks made on political philosophy in the name of 'science' and 'history' are not dealt with in this thesis. Nevertheless, the controversy between political philosophy and historicism underlies the orientation and intent of this thesis. In affirming the need and relevance of political philosophy as a quest for truth and knowledge, a primary mandate must be close attention and careful reading of primary sources in order to gain some entry into the thought of those who in the past have sought to understand the whole. Political philosophy in this sense must not be confused with antiquarianism. Rather, George Grant has described the purpose of such an entry into the past as "... a search for good which can be appropriated to the present". It is within this context that I have read Rousseau, with the awareness nevertheless, that Rousseau's thought is particularly salient and significant in the development of historicism.

31 Radical historicism "refuses to regard the historical process as fundamentally progressive, or more generally stated as reasonable. [It] rejects the question of the good society . . . because of the essentially historical character of society and of human thought". Even "permanent characteristics of humanity" when recognized by radical historians are denied relevance in distinguishing between good and evil. L. Strauss, "What is Political Philosophy?", in Political Philosophy, ed. H. Gildin (New York, 1975), p. 23.

Close, careful reading of Rousseau will indicate that he understood clearly the fundamental 'transvaluation' that was developing in all areas of thought in the seventeenth century. This transvaluation was rooted in a spirit of inquiry that infiltrated all areas of thought, and Rousseau's designation of Descartes, Newton and Bacon as 'preceptors of the human race' evidences his awareness of that fact. Rousseau perhaps more than any other philosopher until Nietzsche, understood the extent to which the spirit of the modern enterprise stood in contradistinction to the principles of classical thought. Rousseau chose to participate in the modern enterprise, fully conscious of the tremendous theoretical implications and practical consequences that entailed, especially for political thought. Rousseau's participation in the modern enterprise is not always recognized, probably because he cloaked his insight with much irony and spent much thought in attempting to mitigate some of the radical implications of that enterprise. Although these efforts are closely scrutinized and criticized in this thesis, we recognize that it is these efforts that make Rousseau in some way a greater political thinker than his two immediate predecessors Hobbes and Machiavelli.
It is not our purpose in this thesis to use Rousseau as the medium for elaborating a version of the ancients versus the moderns controversy. However, it is necessary in assessing the significance of Rousseau to recognize those elements in his thought which adumbrate this controversy. Some of those elements discussed in the thesis include Rousseau's view of man as a malleable, historical being, fundamentally characterized by freedom; reason conceived as man's historically developing ability to calculate means for his self-preservation; nature viewed as representing a type of referent for good, but whose relevance has been undermined by the exigencies of time and circumstance; society defined as a historical phenomenon, necessitated by the demands of scarcity on self-preservation, but ultimately incompatible with the fundamental independence and solitude that defines man's natural state; the introduction of generalization as a source for justice and law (general will); and finally, a concept of science combining creative, projective reason with autonomy to overcome chance and re-order history to restore the felicity of mankind. These concepts will be

33 Although Rousseau understood and embraced modernity, he returned to aspects of classical thought by his concern with virtue, citizenship, etc. in contrast to the bourgeois concerns of Hobbes and especially Locke.
discussed within the context of Rousseau's writings and are mentioned here only to indicate the extent to which Rousseau's thought is fundamental in the development of modern thought.

The fundamental contention of this thesis is the absolute primacy of freedom in all areas of Rousseau's thought: freedom, defined as autonomy, is exalted as the highest good. The concepts alluded to above are defined and interrelated in terms of Rousseau's concept of freedom; the dialectic nature of Rousseau's paradigm is based on the preeminence of freedom; and finally, the very nature and role of political philosophy undergoes a fundamental transition through the nexus of freedom. It is in this emphasis on freedom as autonomy that this thesis differs somewhat in focus from Strauss's interpretation of Rousseau.

Although I acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor Strauss for clarifying the nature of political philosophy and for locating Rousseau within the context of the history of political thought, I have not set out to do a Straussian interpretation of Rousseau. I have sought to interpret Rousseau on the basis of an understanding derived from my own reading and attention to what Rousseau is saying. The

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resultant differences between my interpretation of Rousseau and that of Strauss, although perhaps salutary for establishing the 'originality' of the thesis, undoubtedly indicates the need for future further investigation on my part.

Strauss' "The Three Waves of Modernity", which traces the history of political thought from Machiavelli to Nietzsche, stands, in its succinctness and brilliance, in marked contrast to most contemporary histories of philosophy which invariably achieve far less at much greater length. It is with trepidation therefore, that I offer the following argument.

In "The Three Waves of Modernity" and his famous "What is Political Philosophy?", Strauss argues that the desire for self-preservation is the fundamental fact of human existence in Rousseau's thought. Strauss writes that, for Rousseau, "... the desire determining man in the state of nature, the desire for self-preservation, is the root of the just society and determines its end. This

35 My intention in presenting this argument is not to criticize Professor Strauss' interpretation of Rousseau, because, in effect, I am here only using Strauss' comments on Rousseau in his two essays "The Three Waves of Modernity" and "What is Political Philosophy?". The purpose of these two essays is to determine the nature of political philosophy and its relationship to modernity, and it would be unfair to Professor Strauss to consider his comments on Rousseau in this context as definitive and complete. I am here only attempting to justify my interpretation of Rousseau and his place in the history of philosophy in terms of the primacy of freedom as autonomy.
fundamental desire . . . is at the same time the fundamental right . . . " Although in the second Discourse, it was clearly the need for self-preservation that induced men to enter society (see pages 44, 67 below), we would argue that, for Rousseau, it is freedom and not self-preservation that is fundamental in both the state of nature and the just society. The desire for self-preservation is, of course, always in some sense fundamental; however, it is the form of freedom that characterized man in the state of nature that is at the root of the just society and determines its end (see pages 133ff. below). According to Rousseau's paradigm, man entered into society carrying with him his natural independence which is ultimately inalienable and which must serve, according to Rousseau's political theory, as the basis for legitimacy in society. Moreover, we would argue, there seems to be evidence that Rousseau thought freedom, and not self-preservation as Strauss argues, to be the 'fundamental desire' and 'fundamental right' of man.

36 Strauss, "Political Philosophy", p. 54.

37 This is a primary point on which Rousseau's thought may be distinguished from Hobbes'.
In "The Three Waves of Modernity", Strauss acknowledges that self-preservation may not be the fundamental fact, but that the goodness of mere existence would have to precede the desire for self-preservation. In other words, that self-preservation is a derivative of the goodness of existence, that man ought to go back beyond self-preservation to the root -- "the feeling of the sweetness of mere existence". We would argue, however, that for Rousseau, freedom underlies that 'sweetness of existence'. Strauss himself, in Natural Right and History, describes the 'sweetness of existence' in Rousseau's thought as "... god-like self-sufficiency ... he finds consolation only in himself by being fully himself and by belonging fully to himself". The 'sweetness of existence' is actually found only by those few whom Rousseau feels are still able to retreat back into nature; that is, the natural freedom of Rousseau's 'solitary dreamer'. Just as

38 See pages 134-41 below. Strauss himself argues, in Natural Right and History, that "According to Rousseau . . . freedom is a higher good than life". L. Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1953), p. 278.

39 Strauss, "The Three Waves of Modernity", in Gildin, p. 93.

40 Strauss, Natural Right, p. 292. Rousseau describes this condition as follows: "De rien d'exterieur a soi, de rien sinon de soi-meme et de sa propre existence, tant que cet etat dure on se suffit a soi-meme comme Dieu". Reveries d'un Promeneur Solitaire, I, 1046.
the desire for self-preservation is based on the 'sweetness of existence', so that 'sweetness of existence' is rooted in the fundamental natural freedom of man, his natural self-sufficiency and independence. In this thesis, we will attempt to demonstrate that, in Rousseau's thought, it is the primacy of freedom that characterizes man's original condition, his fundamental desire and fundamental right, as well as the root and end of the just society.

This is important because it is through the primacy of freedom (autonomy) that Rousseau seeks the reconciliation of the is and the ought. According to Strauss, Rousseau attempts the reconciliation between the is and the ought, the actual and the ideal, through the medium of the general will. He argues that, "Rousseau's concept of the general will which as such cannot err — which by merely being is what it ought to be — showed how the gulf between the is and the ought can be overcome". Certainly the general will is a means for actualizing the ideal; however, actualization of the ideal is only one aspect of Rousseau's attempt to reconcile the is and the ought. It will be argued in

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41 Rousseau's concept of the general will will be discussed in Chapter VII on the Social Contract. See pages 141-46 below.

42 Strauss, "Three Waves", p. 91.
the thesis that Rousseau attempted this reconciliation of the actual with the ideal by making freedom both the highest philosophical principle as well as the fundamental fact characterizing all aspects of human history. In the language of our stated thesis, Rousseau's concept of freedom underlies both his paradigm of 'what is' and his projection of what 'ought to be'. The reconciliation of the is and the ought, the actual and the ideal, so crucial for modern political theory, can be effected in two ways: by providing a mechanism for the actualization of the ideal and by establishing the ought without reference to a good that transcends human reality. We would argue that Rousseau was more successful at the latter. The general will mechanism, for example, achieves the reconciliation of the is and the ought much more effectively through the elimination of transcendence than through its potential for actualization. In effect, Strauss acknowledges that a theory of historical process would have to be posited to complete the reconciliation of the is and the ought through the general will. Strauss describes the link between the actualization of the general will and a doctrine of historical process as follows: "... the rational or just society, the society characterized by the existence of a general will known to be the general will, that is, the ideal, is necessarily actualized by the historical process without man's intending to actualize it". Strauss admits that the linking of
this process was left to Rousseau's successors, Kant and Hegel. However, we would argue that the role of the legislator and the educational process outlined in the *Social Contract* are much more important for actualizing the general will than is a doctrine of historical process. In effect, despite these attempts to ensure the practicability of the general will, Rousseau remained pessimistic about actualization, and I would argue, there is little evidence that he sought refuge in a doctrine of historical process to mitigate that pessimism.

The lack of a doctrine of historical process is significant in assessing Rousseau's place in the development of modern political thought. Strauss argues that Nietzsche was the first to recognize the impossibility of a philosophy of history. The insight that all principles of thought and action are historical cannot be attenuated by the baseless hope that the historical sequence of these principles is progressive or that the historical process has an intrinsic meaning, an intrinsic directedness.

Rousseau seemed to understand that too, although he did not

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44 This is argued in Chapter VII on the *Social Contract*, see pages 149, 152-3 below.

focus on and develop that insight to the extent that Nietzsche did. In effect, he sought to mitigate the implications of that insight through his concept of nature (see pages 233-4 below).

This brings us to our final point, which is, I believe, the most significant contribution of our interpretation and relates specifically to the intention of this thesis. By making freedom both the highest philosophic principle and the fundamental fact of human existence, Rousseau's vision of the whole was necessarily historical. Strauss argues that in Rousseau's thought nature "... is merely man's past, which cannot give any guidance for man's possible future; the only guidance regarding the future, regarding what man ought to do or aspire to, is supplied by reason. Reason replaces nature". My contention is however, that reason itself is transformed within this historical perspective. It is an historical phenomenon which is preceded by freedom. Not only must reason provide guidance for the future, it is instrumental in ordering the future, in overcoming chance. Strauss speaks of


47 This transformation is examined in Chapter IV below.
Nietzsche's teaching that

... all human life and human thought ultimately rests on horizon-forming creations which are not susceptible of rational legitimation. The creators are great individuals. The solitary creator ... gives a new law unto himself and subjects himself to all its rigour.

This teaching was based on Nietzsche's insight into the implications of a historical view of the whole and the impossibility of a philosophy of history. We would argue that there are elements of this type of thought in Rousseau, particularly in the final paragraphs of the first Discourse. Clearly Rousseau does not go as far as Nietzsche; Rousseau did not espouse the radical historicism underlying Nietzsche's thought, although Rousseau was the first to delineate a completely historical view of the whole; Rousseau did not see the total abyss, the emptiness of Nietzsche's

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48 Strauss, "Political Philosophy", p. 56. It is interesting to note the last sentence of this passage quoted in full, that is, Strauss writes: "The solitary creator who gives a new law unto himself and who subjects himself to all its rigors takes the place of Rousseau's solitary dreamer". We would argue that Rousseau himself realized that, in terms of his political theories, the 'solitary dreamer' would be replaced by the 'solitary creator'.


50 See pages 24 n. 31.
Rousseau affirmed the basic goodness of nature, but he also saw that nature had been limited and ultimately transcended by history; Rousseau saw man as compassionate, not cruel, and so, argued that great individuals could create and project ideals for the felicity of mankind, and not just for themselves. Nietzsche used his insight to teach the transvaluation of values, whereas Rousseau sought to create horizons to re-establish virtue. Nevertheless, adumbrations of Nietzsche's "creative call to creativity" may be found in Rousseau's thought. In the concluding paragraphs of the first Discourse, great individuals are called to overcome chance through creative, horizon-forming projections.

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We will argue that Rousseau did retreat into Romanticism in refuge from his perception and experience of history (see pages 233-234 below).

Strauss, "Political Philosophy", p. 56.

Compare the passage quoted earlier from Heidigger describing the basis for knowledge--"a specific will to a new formation and self-grounding of the form of knowledge as such". See pages 4-5 above.
It is this type of projection that underlies the nature of political theory within the context of a historical view of the whole. We will argue that Rousseau's historical view of the whole is related to the primacy of freedom in his thought. Rousseau understood the true nature and implications of that relationship between freedom and history more clearly than anyone up until Nietzsche. It is in terms of the primacy of freedom and its impact on the nature of history in Rousseau's thought that his description of the whole may be seen as paradigmatic and his prescription for the future as projective.

54

A. Levine argues that "Rousseau's political philosophy in the final analysis, will be seen to lack foundations. It might not be inappropriate at this point once again to hazard the suggestion that a central motivation of Kant's investigations in moral philosophy was to remedy this lack". A. Levine, The Politics of Autonomy: A Kantian Reading of Rousseau's Social Contract (Amherst, 1976), p. 55. In effect, Rousseau understood that such foundations are ultimately not possible. Nietzsche concurs when he calls Kant 'the delayer'. See pages 231-32 below.
I

FREEDOM AND NATURE

It is Rousseau's concept of freedom that forms the focal point of his perception of the whole, including his paradigm for the future ordering of the world through educational and political projections to restore the felicity of mankind. It is impossible to understand Rousseau's thought without first dealing with this concept of freedom. By the same token, Rousseau's concept of freedom is central to the thesis of this dissertation. This first chapter is used to begin exploration of this concept of freedom.

This is done through a discussion of nature as manifest in Rousseau's concepts of (i) the state of nature and (ii) human nature. It will be shown that Rousseau's notion of freedom is integrally related to both of these manifestations, even though conceptually nature does in some sense form a counterpoise to Rousseau's understanding of freedom.

The dissertation is structured around three manifestations of freedom that may be identified in Rousseau's thought. These we will term natural, misused and radical freedom. These terms will be defined and distinguished on the basis

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1 Nature represents a type of heteronomy; freedom, it will be argued, is synonymous with autonomy.
of two components of autonomy — independence and free-agency. Independence is investigated in terms of its roots in the state of nature, and free-agency is examined as the fundamental quality underlying Rousseau's concept of human nature. The purpose of this first chapter, therefore, is to introduce these two components of autonomy, independence and free-agency, as they relate to Rousseau's concept of the state of nature and human nature respectively. In this way, Rousseau's concept of freedom is explicated through examination via his concept of nature, thus demonstrating the centrality and pre-eminence Rousseau gives to the notion of freedom even vis-à-vis his concern for nature and that which is natural.

1. The State of Nature

Contained in the following few lines taken from the first Discourse is Rousseau's account of the state of nature, an account that will be expanded and elaborated on, but not altered, in the second Discourse.

Havens argues that these references to the state of nature "ne sont encore que quelques lueurs qui font entrevoir le développement entre le premier et le second Discours, de ce que Rousseau appellera son 'système' sur la bonté de la nature". (J.-J. Rousseau, Discours sur les Sciences et les Arts, ed. G. R. Havens (London, 1946), p. 181 n. 63.) We would argue that the basic principles of Rousseau's state of nature 'system' are already formulated and contained in this passage quoted from the first Discourse. This view seems to cohere more closely with the passage from the letter to M. de Malesherbes quoted above (page 16) than does Havens' developmental view of Rousseau's thought on nature. See also pages 17-20 above.
On ne peut réfléchir sur les moeurs, qu'on ne se plaise à se rappeler l'image de la simplicité des premiers temps. C'est un beau rivage, paré des seules mains de la nature, vers lequel on tourne incessamment les yeux, et dont on se sent éloigner à regret.

3

All essential aspects of Rousseau's formulation of the state of nature are contained in this passage.

The state of nature is 'un beau rivage, paré des seules mains de la nature'. There all things function in accordance with nature. There all creatures, including man, live in direct obedience to the commands of nature. As Rousseau will describe in the second Discourse, man acted in accordance with his natural instincts of amour de soi and pitié, and could be distinguished from other creatures not by his actions, but only by the consciousness that he could disobey the commands of nature. This he did not choose to do in the state of nature. If we define history as a manifestation of the exercise of human freedom (see Chapter II below), then, in this sense, there is no history in the state of nature. Men's actions are governed by nature.

3

III, 22.

4.

The interpretation of 'premiers temps' as the state of nature is substantiated by G. Havens' comment on this passage as "un des rares indices de l'admiration de Rousseau pour l'état de nature ... dans le premier Discours". (Havens, Discours, p.228 n. 228)

5

Second Discourse, III, 140, 53f, etc.
In later writings, Rousseau will refer to nature as always operating according to fixed and invariable principles, a concept of nature putting him closer to modern natural science than to the ancient teleological conception. In the state of nature everything operates according to fixed and invariable principles — hence the simplicity of earliest times. In contrast to this stands history, a manifestation of human freedom, which has brought complexity, confusion and ultimately chaos with it. However this will be discussed below (pages 58, 65, etc.).

This state of nature, adorned by the hands of nature alone, is beautiful (beau), and indeed, throughout Rousseau's writings nature remains synonymous with that which is beautiful and desirable. Man living in accordance with the voice of nature partakes of this beauty.

In contrast to the "lovely shore adorned by the hands of nature alone", stands history, depicted by Rousseau as the realm in which vice predominates. In effect, the paragraph which this passage under consideration opens, delineates a

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7 See pages 51ff. below; also, the Emile, IV, 443, 466, 454ff., 578, 591, etc.


9 Ibid.
a chronology or sequence from the goodness of the state of nature to the degradation of vice and evil in history.

This state of nature has been left behind. Hence-forth, all of human thought and activity take place in a different realm, namely history. All of Rousseau's writings, with the exception of part of the second Discourse, take place in the realm of history.

The use of the term 'éloigner' gives the sense of a gradual drifting away, consistent with the 'shore' imagery.

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10 See Chapter II below; see also, second Discourse, III, 141-3; "Lettre à Grimm", III, p. 69; etc.

11 It is absolutely essential to understand this. Innumerable paradoxes, contradictions and insolvabilities ostensibly found in Rousseau are rooted in a failure to understand this dialectical and paradigmatic aspect of his thought.

12 This imagery of the state of nature as a shore is paralleled most significantly in Rousseau's further writings. Taking the 'lovely shore regretfully left behind' as the state of nature, we may extend the analogy further by presuming that the 'sea' by which one moves from that shore to be history. As evidence, note the marvellous analogy of the sea as history in Rousseau's comparison of mankind with the statue of Glaucus:

et comment l'homme viendra-t-il à bout de se voir tel que l'a formé la Nature, à travers tous les changemens que la succession des tems et des choses a dû produire dans sa constitution originelle, et de démêler ce qu'il tient de son propre fond d'avec ce que les circonstances et ses progrés ont ajouté ou changé à son Etat primitif? semblable à la statue de Glaucus que le tems, la mer et les orages avoient tellement défigurée, qu'elle ressemblait moins à un Dieu qu'a une Bête féroce, l'ame humaine altérée au sein de la société . . .

(Second Discourse, III, 122)
As evident from the further context of this paragraph, there is a gradual degeneration process by which men drift further and further away from that shore. The second Discourse clearly outlines stages in the progression of vice in terms of the proportional distance from the state of nature. The numerous accounts of the degeneration of cities in the first Discourse, represent this process as well. The Rome, for example, founded by shepherds and farmers, though not the state of nature, was a closer approximation of that state in history than was the Rome of Ovid, Catullus and Martial. In this sense, Rousseau uses the state of nature as a measuring stick of history (see pages 45ff. below).

The phrase 'se sent éloigner à regret' seems to have a passive connotation. The impression is not that man has deliberately and freely willed to leave the shore of nature. In effect, the account of this event found in the second Discourse, makes it clear that man did not in himself choose to leave the state of nature. It was through accident, ("du concours fortuit de plusieurs causes étrangeres qui pouvoient ne jamais naître") leading to scarcity that man was forced to

12 continued

Extending the analogy yet further, we may note the significance of islands, both in Emile's education and in Rousseau's own life. The key book in Emile's education is Robinson Crusoe. Note also Rousseau's retreat to the island of Saint Pierre in his Confessions, I, 636ff. Do islands represent the closest approximation possible of the shore of nature? Are islands a respite, or a haven, from the ravages and uncertain demands of the sea, that is, history? See also Les Reveries du Promeneur Solitaire, I, 1046-7.
leave that state.

The fact that man left the state of nature, not through a deliberate exercise of his freedom, nor through reason's curiosity and the desire to expand knowledge, but rather under the compulsion of accidentally caused scarcity, has vital implications, both for insight into Rousseau's autobiographical reflections, and for any judgements that may be made of his educational and political projections. As man's departure from the state of nature was without design, the result of various accidental causes that need not have arisen, so the development of history in the second Discourse is without design. This is the fundamental reality that underlies Rousseau's paradigm. As such, he does not, as will later thinkers, devise a philosophy of history to mitigate the implications of this view. This phrase 'se sent éloigner à regret' underlies all of his thought, and any assessment that is made of that thought must seriously take this into account.

13 First Discourse, III, 10.

14 Second Discourse, III, 162. See also, Contrat Social III, 360.

15 On this point, Rousseau differs significantly from the account Kant will later give of man's origins in Conjectural Beginnings of Human History, an essay closely paralleling the second Discourse. Kantian interpretations often overlook this aspect of Rousseau's account and argue that for Rousseau leaving the state of nature was a deliberate step in man's development as a free and rational being. Such an interpretation of Rousseau is not only inaccurate but is incompatible with Rousseau's historical view of the whole.
The implications of the phrase 'vers lequel on tourne incessament les yeux' are difficult to evaluate. It was noted earlier (page 43), that the shore of nature appears to serve in some senses as a measuring stick for history. In what sense can the state of nature serve as a referent for life in the realm of history? Does the state of nature serve as a standard for what is true and good, or is it a type of paradigm of what is desirable? In effect, both descriptions are true. The state of nature does serve as a standard or norm, especially within Rousseau's political theory; however, we will argue that the actual epistemological status of the state of nature is that of a paradigm or projection of what is desirable.

The central question that must be asked is, why is man solitary in the state of nature? There seems little immediately apparent apart from Rousseau's assertion that it is so. However, some answer to this question may emerge in considering the implications of this assertion. Rousseau makes it clear

16 As in the Kantian account.

17 Cassirer describes the state of nature in these terms; that is, "as a standard or norm according to which he can show what in the present state of society is truth and what is illusion, what is morally obligatory law and what is mere convention and caprice". (E. Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. F. C. A. Koeller and J. P. Pettegrove, (Boston, 1964), p. 271) In Chapter VII on the Social Contract, we will examine in what sense man's condition in the state of nature serves as a standard from which "morally obligatory law" can be derived.
that man's natural state is always that of solitude. However, only in the state of nature is that solitude possible, because only in the state of nature is man truly independent of other men. To be independent, to not need other men, lies at the core of Rousseau's concept of freedom. In aligning freedom with the solitary condition of man through independence, Rousseau connects freedom with autonomy, a connection that has become central in all areas of modern thought. Only in the state of nature is man truly solitary, truly independent of other men, and thus only in the state of nature is natural freedom qua autonomy possible. Although the state of nature has been left behind, and natural freedom is no longer possible, the conceptualization of freedom as autonomy is established.

To return to the question of why man is solitary in the state of nature, we may take Rousseau's injunction at the beginning of the second Discourse very seriously:

Que mes Lecteurs ne s'imagent donc pas que j'ose me flatter d'avoir vu ce qui me paroit si difficile à voir. J'ai commencé quelques raisonnemens; J'ai hazarde quelques conjectures, moins dans l'espoir de resoudre la question que dans l'intention de l'éclaircir et de la reduire à son veritable état ... Car ce n'est pas une légère entreprise de démêler ce qu'il y a d'originaire et d'artificiel dans la Nature actuelle de l'homme, et de bien connoître un État qui n'existe plus, qui n'a peut-être point existé, qui probablement n'existera jamais, et dont

18 Second Discourse, III, 140, 150.

il est pourtant nécessaire d'avoir des notions justes pour bien juger de notre état présent.

21

Les recherches politiques et morales auxquelles donne lieu l'importante question que j'examine, sont donc utiles de toutes manières, et l'histoire hypothétique des gouvernemens, est pour l'homme une leçon instructive à tous égards.

22

Commençons donc par écarter tous les faits, car ils ne touchent point à la question. In ne faut pas prendre les recherches, dans lesquelles on peut entrer sur ce sujet, pour des vérités historiques, mais seulement pour des raisonnements hypothétiques et conditionnels; plus propre à éclaircir la nature des choses qu'à montrer la véritable origine, et semblables à ceux que font tous les jours nos physiciens sur la formation du monde.

23

The state of nature is conjectural history--hypothetical and conditional reasonings--purposely constructed to lay the foundations for Rousseau's political theory. As such it may be argued that the primary hypothesis that man was solitary in the state of nature, was based on Rousseau's overriding concern for the freedom (conceived as autonomy) of man. Or, more specifically, that Rousseau deliberately

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20 As stated above, natural, misused and radical freedom are defined and distinguished in terms of two components of autonomy — independence and free-agency. Natural freedom will be defined below to include free-agency (pages 55-6).

21 Second Discourse, III, 123.

22 Second Discourse, III, 127.

23 Second Discourse, III, 133.
constructed the state of nature as a solitary state in order to ensure the exaltation of freedom as the highest good. As such, the state of nature is not a 'given', an a priori referent for the good; but rather, is a constructed referent, a paradigm designating what is desirable. In this sense, Rousseau is examining "les faits par le Droit".

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24 Even though Rousseau's state of nature is in effect a type of paradigm or projection, he does assign the state of nature both an historical and legal status, that is, the state of nature represents man's original condition from which Rousseau derives man's fundamental and inalienable right within society (see Chapter VII below).

25 Leo Strauss argues that Rousseau retained the state of nature concept in order to ensure individual independence. In Natural Right and History he argues:

He retained the notion of the state of nature because the state of nature guaranteed the individual radical independence. He retained the notion of the state of nature because he was concerned with such a natural standard as favoured in the highest possible degree the independence of the individual.

The notion that the good life consists in the return on the level of humanity to the state of nature, that is, to a state which completely lacks all human traits, necessarily leads to the consequence that the individual claims such an ultimate freedom from society as lacks any human content. But this fundamental defect in the state of nature as the goal of human aspiration was in Rousseau's eyes its perfect justification: the very indefiniteness of the state of nature as a goal of human aspiration made that state the ideal vehicle for freedom.

(Chicago, 1953), pp.

Strauss argues that Rousseau retained the notion of the state of nature because of its indefiniteness or lack of content which facilitated the exercise of individual freedom.

26 Second Discourse, III, 182.
One must not take too facile a view of Rousseau's concept of conjectural history. Rousseau clearly states that conjectural history is meant to reflect "la Nature des choses". Therefore, to argue that Rousseau deliberately constructed the state of nature as a solitary state in order to ensure the exaltation of freedom, is not to deny that the state of nature reflects Rousseau's perception of the 'nature of things'. At the heart of Rousseau's understanding of the whole lies his concept of freedom as autonomy. It is autonomous freedom that is the ultimate reality characterizing his perception of the whole, and it is also through the exercise of autonomous freedom that that perception or paradigm is formulated (see page 7 n.11 above). As such, Rousseau's conjecture that the state of nature was a solitary state reflects this understanding of the true 'nature of things'.

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27 Second Discourse, III, 133.

28 Masters' translation, Discourses, p. 103.

29 This will be expanded at the end of the chapter.
2. The Nature of Man (Human Nature)

Although it may be reasonable to argue that the state of nature is based on conjectural history (see pages 47ff. above), it is inadequate to relegate all references to nature in Rousseau to the realm of hypothetical projection. Rousseau acknowledges that there is a force "beyond our control" which acts both within man and upon things. Accordingly, much of his writing is concerned with trying to determine the original nature of man.

The nature of man is revealed in the difficulty encountered in trying to discover it. Consider the following statement which opens the first Part of the first Discourse:

C'est un grand et beau spectacle de voir l'homme sortir en quelque maniere du neant par ses propres efforts; dissiper par les lumieres de sa raison, les tenebres dans lesquelles la nature l'avoit enveloppe; s'elever au-dessus de soi-meme; s'elancer par l'esprit jusques dans les regions celestes; parcourir a pas de Geant ainsi que le Soleil, la vaste etendue de l'Univers; et, ce qui est encore plus grand et plus difficile, rentrer en soi pour y etudier l'homme et connoitre sa nature, ses devoirs et sa fin.


31 Havens notes that Rousseau was not alone in this concern. He indicates the importance for Rousseau of Alexander Pope's Essay on Man (1733-34); Voltaire's Discours envers sur l'homme (1738-39); Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1600); and Condillac's Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines (1746). See Havens, Discours, p. 178 n. 50.

32 First Discourse, III, 6.
Why is it more difficult for man to study himself and know his nature, than to encompass the vastness of the universe? The answer to this question revolves around the relationship between human freedom and the nature of man in the following way.

Rousseau accepted Newton's account of motion in nature, insofar as he refers to nature as being subject to fixed laws. Nature, if understood to be governed by fixed and invariable principles (see pages 41 above and 63-4 below), can be thoroughly studied and ultimately known with a high degree of certainty. This new concept of nature seemed to avoid the complexities of the then prevailing teleological view. Consistent with this, Rousseau always equates nature with simplicity. This concept of nature as subject to fixed and invariable laws made the task of traversing the vastness of the universe seem feasible.

This concept of nature emerging in the seventeenth century had significant impact on the nature of science and the proliferation of technology. Strauss clearly delineates this process in his "Three Waves of Modernity":

The rejection of final causes ... destroyed the theoretical basis of classical political philosophy. The new natural science differs from the various forms of the older one not only because of its new understanding of nature, but also and especially because of its new understanding of science: knowledge is no longer understood as fundamentally receptive; the initiative in understanding is with man, not with the cosmic order; man calls nature before the tribunal of his reason; he "puts nature to the question" (Bacon); knowing is a kind of making; human understanding prescribes nature its laws; man's power is infinitely greater than was hitherto believed; not only can man transform corrupt human matter into incorrupt
It is to this simplicity of nature, this being governed by fixed and invariable principles, to which the study of man is contrasted. But why is it more difficult to study man's nature? Is not human nature also governed by fixed and invariable principles? The answer to these questions lies in Rousseau's phrase that man must "rentrer en soi". In order to study man and know his nature, it is necessary to discern the changes and developments that the "succession des temps et des choses", that is, history, have produced in human nature and separate these from the original constitution of the human soul. It is necessary to 'come back to himself' and this is precisely the task Rousseau sets himself in the second Discourse. Rousseau asks:

33 continued
human matter, or conquer chance — all truth and meaning originate in man; they are not inherent in a cosmic order which exists independently of man's activity ... The purpose of science is reinterpreted: propter potentiam, for the relief of man's estate, for the conquest of nature, for the maximum control, the systematic control of the natural conditions of human life.
(L. Strauss, "Three Waves", pp. 87-88.

34 First Discourse, III, 6.

35 Within this context the term 'soul' denoting an eternal type of essence is no longer applicable. See page 64 n:4 below.

et comment l'homme viendra-t-il à bout de se voir tel que l'a formé la Nature, à travers tous les changements que la succession des temps et des choses a dû produire dans sa constitution originelle, et de démolir ce qu'il tient de son propre fond d'avec ce que les circonstances et ses progrès ont ajouté ou changé à son État primitif? semblable à la statue de Glaucus que le temps, la mer et les orages avaient tellement défigurée, qu'elle ressemblait moins à un Dieu qu'à une Bête féroce, l'âme humaine altérée au sein de la société par mille causes sans cesse renaissantes, par l'acquisition d'une multitude de connaissances et d'erreurs, par les changements arrivés à la constitution des Corps, et par le choc continu des passions, à dire, changé d'apparence au point d'être presque méconnaissable; et l'on n'y retrouve plus, au lieu d'être agissant toujours par des Principes certains et invariables, au lieu de cette Céleste et majestueuse simplicité dont son Auteur l'avait empreinte, que le difforme contraste de la passion qui croit raisonner et de l'entendement en délire.

Man himself is an historical being, whose original constitution has been altered by the sequence of time and things. As such, inquiry into the nature of man cannot be based on a social 'science' adept at discovering the laws that govern human nature. Inquiry into the nature of man, as with the state of nature, must be based on a reconstruction of the sequence of time and things, that is a type of conjectural history. In sum, therefore, it is easier to traverse the vastness of the universe than to study man's nature, because it is easier to study natural rather than historical phenomena. However, this raises a serious problem.

37 Note also Rousseau's attempts to 'rentrer en soi' in his autobiographical writings.

38 Second Discourse, III, 122.
If it is argued that man is an historical being, whose original constitution can be changed by the sequence of time and things, then it is necessary to re-examine the whole notion of human nature. Again, as with the notion of the state of nature, it is necessary to ask what meaning or role the concept of human nature has in the realm of history.

The absolute focal point of Rousseau's thought lies in his understanding of what man is, and this is laid out in a few pages of the second Discourse.

Tout animal a des idées puis qu'il a des sens, il combine même ses idées jusqu'à un certain point, et l'homme ne diffère à cet égard de la Bête que du plus au moins: Quelques Philosophes ont même avancé qu'il y a plus de différence de tel homme à tel homme que de tel homme à telle bête; Ce n'est donc pas tant l'entendement qui fait parmi les animaux la distinction spécifique de l'homme que sa qualité d'agent libre. La Nature commande à tout animal, et la Bête obéit. L'homme éprouve la même impression, mais il se reconnaît libre d'acquiescer, ou de resister; et c'est surtout dans la conscience de cette liberté que se montre la spiritualité de son âme.

39 Science, in accordance with the seventeenth century's concept of nature, became concerned with determining the laws that seemed to govern nature.

40 Second Discourse, III, 141.
In this passage, Rousseau makes it thus very clear that the essence of man is freedom. The very definition of his humanness involves that quality of 'free-agency' which distinguishes him from the beasts. For, although nature lays her commands on all animals, the beast obeys automatically, whereas man realizes he is free to acquiesce or resist. To define freedom as the ability to resist or disobey the voice of nature is to identify freedom again with autonomy. This is the other aspect of freedom as autonomy referred to earlier on page 47 n.20. Freedom as autonomy is exemplified, therefore, both in man's natural independence of other men and in his ability to acquiesce or resist the voice of nature.

It is now possible to define natural freedom. In this dissertation, natural freedom will refer to the original solitary condition of man living in total independence of other men and in complete harmony with nature, with only a consciousness of his ability to acquiesce or resist its commands. Later it will be argued that neither total

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42 See also Emile, IV, 582, 586, 587, 603, 818, etc.

43 Many interpreters of Rousseau see freedom as dormant or as only a potentiality in the state of nature. (See for example, J. W. Chapman, Rousseau — Totalitarian or Liberal? (New York, 1968), pp. 5ff.; R. Grimsley, The Philosophy of Rousseau (London, 1973), p. 36; etc.) This type of interpretation usually makes freedom contingent on morality. Such a view does not take into account the full implications of Rousseau's definition of freedom in terms of autonomy nor its primacy.
independence nor complete harmony with nature is possible in history. Nevertheless, natural freedom remains as a referent for what is desirable and serves as the antithesis of the misused freedom that, according to Rousseau, characterizes history.

A great deal of emphasis has been placed in various analyses of Rousseau on the instincts of *amour de soi* and *pitié*. And clearly, these instincts lie at the very centre of human nature as Rousseau conceived it. However, it cannot be forgotten that man's quality of free-agency enables him to resist the voice of nature (in this case, instincts). As such, freedom precedes nature within man.

Following the passage quoted on page 54 above, is Rousseau's acknowledgement that to distinguish man from the beasts in terms of freedom may be open to dispute. Hence he proposes that the clearly evident human faculty of self-perfection (*perfectabilité*) be considered the grounds for distinguishing man from the beasts. *Perfectabilité* is the "faculté qui, à l'aide des circonstances, développe successivement toutes les autres". Examined closely, Rousseau's

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45 Second *Discourse*, III, 126.

46 This will be discussed more fully below. See Chapters II, V, and especially, VIII.
concept of perfection is historical rather than teleological. In effect, to interpret Rousseau's concept of perfectabilité in terms of the traditional concept of 'perfection', that is, as an attainment or fulfillment of one’s end or telos, is totally inconsistent with Rousseau's own discussion of perfectabilité in which he dwells almost exclusively on the negative manifestation of this faculty. It is a faculty reflecting man's malleability rather than the "fulfillment of his authentic nature". If the notion of self-perfection is examined, it is evident that Rousseau's concept of perfectabilité is none other than the historical manifestation of free-agency. Man's capacity for self-perfection is a corollary of his essential freedom and is of necessity a two-edged sword in that not only does it enable man to transcend...

47 Second Discourse, III, 141ff.

48 Second Discourse, III, 142.

49 In La Nouvelle Heloïse, for example, Rousseau speaks of the need for infinite perfection, that is, in contrast to the eternal and circular nature of teleological perfection. (II, 689-693) See also M. Foss, The Idea of Perfection (University of Nebraska, 1946).

50 Grimsley, Philosophy of Rousseau, pp. 31-33 and also pp. 123, 159, etc.
himself, but it equally affords the possibility that man falls lower than the beasts. And indeed, this latter possibility seems manifest in Rousseau's interpretation of history. In the following chapter, the relationship between free-agency and perfectabilité will be examined as manifest in the misused freedom and degeneration that has characterized history.

In summary, Rousseau's conceptualization of freedom as autonomy is based on independence as the original condition of man and free-agency as the fundamental quality underlying human nature. It is in his examination of nature that Rousseau finds independence exemplified in man's solitary condition in the state of nature and free-agency evidenced by

It is interesting to speculate why Rousseau introduces this notion of perfectabilité, and moreover, why he does not explicitly relate this notion to his concept of freedom. Masters and Strauss argue that Rousseau introduced the notion of perfectabilité to avoid the metaphysical objections the materialists would raise against his concept of free-agency. Perfectabilité is an observable phenomenon and is therefore subject to scientific proof. (See R. D. Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau (Princeton, 1968), pp. 69-72; Strauss, Natural Right, pp. 65-66.) If perfectabilité is seen as the historical manifestation of free-agency, this would be especially true. Perhaps it may further be suggested that it is difficult to acknowledge that that freedom which is the source of the only truly spiritual acts of the human soul (Second Discourse, III, 141), is also the source of the unhappiness and misery of mankind and the chaos and misfortune characterizing history. Rousseau argues that evil and the misery of mankind is a small price to pay for god-like freedom (see pages 69-70 below). Those who would exalt freedom as the highest good, may, nevertheless, hesitate to admit that such freedom allows the possibility of radical evil as inexorably as radical good. See for example, I. Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. T. M. Greene, H. H. Hudson (New York, 1960).
man's consciousness of his ability to acquiesce and resist the commands of nature. In this sense, it would appear that Rousseau's conceptualization of freedom as autonomy derives from his examination of these two manifestations of nature, and further, that the exaltation of this type of freedom is justified through this derivation.

In what sense however, can nature represent a 'given' in Rousseau's thought? Rousseau's conceptualization of freedom as autonomy precedes the formulation of his view of the state of nature. He acknowledges that his description of this state is an examination of "les faits par le Droit", 'le Droit' being freedom. In effect, the actual conceptualization of the state of nature may be seen as an exercise of autonomous freedom. The construction of the state of nature through conjectural history may be seen as an example of how Rousseau uses autonomous freedom in speaking about or designating that which is beyond. Although Rousseau sees nature in some senses as a given and uses it as a referent for what is desirable, it is freedom as autonomy that is primary in his perception of the whole, and it is history seen as the exercise of various forms of autonomous freedom (whether misused or radical) that lies at the heart of that perception. Accordingly, in his view of human nature, Rousseau sees free-agency as the fundamental quality distinguishing man from the beasts. By its definition, free-agency

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Para-dicere, see pages 7-8 n.11 above.
precedes all other qualities and elements in human nature and enables man to move beyond and also against all manifestations of nature. Man has himself become a historical rather than a natural phenomenon. In Chapter II it will be argued that man as an historical phenomenon has, through the exercise of autonomous freedom (misused), moved in history beyond that which is 'given' in nature. The primacy of

53 This is a crucial point that must be recognized in order to understand the true relationship between nature, history and freedom in Rousseau's thought. Those who fail to recognize this often interpret Rousseau via a progressive and developmental, yet teleological concept of nature. (See for example, Wright, Meaning of Rousseau, pp. 9, 21-22, 25, 27, 32, etc.; Grimsley, Philosophy of Rousseau, pp. 31, 43, 45, 159, etc.) These interpretations conceive of nature as dynamic, yet embodying all the various possibilities that will lead to man's fulfillment in the future. Freedom is confined to choosing (rather than creating) among the various possibilities intrinsic in nature. We would argue that nature in Rousseau's thought is a primordial ideal whose potential for guiding man has been severely limited by the exercise of man's essential freedom.
freedom makes Rousseau's vision of the whole, including that which is 'given' in nature, necessarily historical. 54

For an opposite view note Grimsley's observation that:

'Nature' can not have a merely historical meaning, because history represents little more than the decline and fall of human existence from innocence into enslavement and corruption; the historical process can be judged only by a principle which transcends it and yet gives it meaning. Although nature is thus a critical principle which enables us to see how present existence is at variance with human nature in its deepest sense, it also represents an ontological and metaphysical principle of more positive significance.

'Nature' thus has a broad metaphysical significance as the universal order, and a more limited and less clearly defined meaning as human nature in its potential perfection.

(Philosophy of Rousseau, pp.

Grimsley continually refers to man's need to realize the authentic possibilities of true nature in relation to the universal order. Such an interpretation of Rousseau's thought (and in this Grimsley is not alone) very accurately reflects the 'public' or practical account Rousseau would have us believe. Rousseau does use nature as a referent in his political and educational theories, yet it functions, to use a Kantian phrase out of context, as a postulate for practical thought, because ultimately it is freedom and not nature that lies at the heart of Rousseau's vision of the whole.
II

HISTORY, NATURE AND FREEDOM

Free-agency does not only have ramifications for man himself, whether as individual or species. The ability to acquiesce or resist the commands of nature is not limited to the sphere of human nature alone. As Rousseau indicates in his discussion of the faculty of *perfectabilité*, man is free to resist or move against not only human, but all manifestations of nature.

Il seroit triste pour nous d'être forcés de convenir, que cette faculté distinctive, et presque illimitée, est la source de tous les malheurs de l'homme; que c'est elle qui le tire, à force de tems, de cette condition originaire, dans laquelle il couleroit des jours tranquilles, et innocens; que c'est elle, qui faisant éclore avec les siècles ses lumières et ses erreurs, ses vices et ses vertus, le rend à la longue le tiran de lui-même, et de la Nature.

That which makes man a historical phenomena is also that which gives his actions historical significance.

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1 Second Discourse, III, 142.
There is an useful distinction that can be made in Rousseau between the realm of nature and that of history.

Whereas action and motion in the realm of nature occur according to fixed and invariable laws, action and change in history are a manifestation either of chance or freedom, whether **misused** or **radical**. The free-agency that is, according to Rousseau, fundamental in man, is defined as man's ability to acquiesce or resist the commands of nature. It is in the consciousness of this freedom that the spirituality of man's soul is demonstrated.

L'homme . . . se reconnaît libre d'acquiescer, ou de resister; et c'est surtout dans la conscience de cette liberté que se montre la spiritualité de son ame: car la Physique explique en quelque manière le mecanisme des sens et la formation des idées; mais dans la puissance de vouloir ou plutot de choisir, et dans le sentiment de cette puissance on ne trouve que des actes purement spirituels, dont on n'explique rien par les Loix de la Mécanique.

Again this definition of spirituality is rooted in the distinction between nature and history. The power of willing and of choosing and the sentiment associated with this power (awareness of the ability to acquiesce or resist the commands of nature) cannot be explained in terms of any laws of mechanics as can, according to Rousseau, reason and the formation

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2 Second Discourse, III, 142.
of ideas. Freedom as the power to will and choose, cannot be bound (explained in terms of any laws or fixed principles. As such, Rousseau's critical association of freedom with pure spirituality adheres in the complete absence of that heteronomy which characterizes all natural phenomena. The identification of freedom with autonomy is made in terms of the pure spirituality of the power to will and choose; that is, a power which is not subject to fixed laws and invariable principles. This thinking together of freedom and autonomy with pure spirituality is crucial to Rousseau's thought, and it is the exercise of this autonomous freedom of which history is a manifestation.

3 Second Discourse, III, 144ff.; Emile, IV, 344, 370, 417, 430, 443, 481-6, 551-6, 568, 570, 610, etc.

4 Grimsley argues that in Rousseau's view, the existence of freedom is inseparable from the existence of the soul. Since freedom cannot be explained in physical terms, he argues, its existence presupposes the presence of an immaterial principle in human nature. (Grimsley, Philosophy of Rousseau, p. 78.) The term 'soul' as traditionally conceived referred to man's fundamental essence. By defining man's essence in terms of freedom, Rousseau has indeed achieved the association of the soul with freedom, but in so doing has deprived the term of any content. It is interesting to note that within the context of 'liberalism' (the exaltation of freedom as the highest good, see page 170 below), the 'soul' has been replaced by the 'self'. This distinction between the soul and the self is reflected in etymological analyses of the word 'âme'. Robert distinguishes between "Metaph. Principe qui anime v. Animer, animisme, esprit, force . . . Principe spirituel de l'homme v. Esprit, spiritualité" and "La personne, l'être, l'individualité, le moi". (P. Robert, Dictionnaire alphabétique et analogique de la langue française (Paris: Société du Nouveau Littré, 1960), I, 127-9).
Although history is the realm in which man can exercise his autonomous freedom (the realm of purely spiritual actions), Rousseau confronts us with the strange paradox that man, having left the state of nature and entered the realm of history, has become subject to vice, degeneration and misery, and indeed, has lost for the most part his natural freedom. In effect, Rousseau describes history in terms of the development of vice and as a process of enslavement. At the most general level, we may reiterate the point that autonomous freedom by definition must allow for the possibility of radical evil (see page 58 above). However, such is not a sufficient answer, especially for political theory. Rousseau's prescriptions, his political and educational projections, signify his struggle to deal with this paradox.

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Similarly, the Grand Larousse distinguishes between "L'Âme, principe de vie considéré généralement comme immatérial et immortel" and "L'Âme, principe de la vie intérieure, c'est-à-dire mentale et affective". (Grand Larousse de la langue française (Paris: Librairie Larousse, 1971), I, 144-5.) It is interesting to note further that the latter sense of the term, that is, "la personne, l'être, l'individualité, etc., is not found in Huguet's Dictionnaire de la langue française du 16e siècle, (Paris: Librairie Ancienne Edouard Champion, 1925), p. 188.

5 Or, in Kantian terms, that which is noumenal.

6 First Discourse, III, 17; Second Discourse, III, 141-2; "Lettre à Grimm", III, 69; etc.
The paradoxical relationship between history as a manifestation of man's autonomous freedom (his spirituality) and history as the process of vice and enslavement reflects the complex relationship between nature and history. In leaving the state of nature, man lost the complete independence entailed in natural freedom. Never again would man live in true independence of his fellow-men. Man in the realm of history cannot regain that solitary condition necessary for his natural state. It is a shore that has been left behind, that can only be at best simulated under exceptional circumstances. Man, having lost the means to his natural solitary condition, must live of necessity in society, and society always represents for Rousseau bonds or chains. Again the relationship between society and enslavement may be explained in terms of autonomy. In the state of nature, man could live alone because he could provide for his own needs. Although dependent on nature to

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In effect, Rousseau's main writings may be classified in terms of these 'chains': the first Discourse describes how the arts and sciences "étendent des guirlandes de fleurs sur les chains de fer" (III, 7); the second Discourse outlines how these chains were forged; the Social Contract attempts to demonstrate how these chains can be made legitimate (III, 351); and, Emile is taught to accept these chains retaining only the consciousness of freedom (IV, 436).
provide for his needs, he was independent of other men. Natural freedom was possible because he did not need other men to live. When through scarcity this was no longer feasible, men were forced to work and live together. Society represents for Rousseau a means to deal with the interdependence forced on man neither by nature, nor by choice, but by necessity (through accident). In this sense, society is not a natural but a historical development necessitated by scarcity-induced interdependence.

It is when men are no longer able to live according to their nature, that is, alone, and when they grow dependent on one another, that vice seems to arise. Free-agency does not remain as in the state of nature, a consciousness of the freedom to acquiesce or resist the commands of nature. This aspect of autonomy is actualized. Men begin to exercise their freedom against nature. Indeed, it would appear that the more dependent men become on each other, the more they assert their free-agency against nature. Man seems to compensate for loss of autonomy in one area (independence of other men) by assertion of autonomy in another (over nature). As man moved from his solitary condition in the state of nature into the interdependence of society, his natural freedom degenerated into misused freedom. Misused freedom combines man's increasing dependence on other men with negative free-agency, the exercise of the ability to resist nature.
Assertion of man's autonomy against nature has many ramifications. However, the most significant implications have been within man himself. Nature within man, that is, his primal instincts of amour de soi and pitié, have been resisted and perverted. In Chapter VIII, for example, it will be shown how amour de soi devolves into amour-propre in society. The primal goodness of man has been thwarted by the misuse of man's free-agency, his ability to resist the demands of his nature within his own self.

In Chapter I, freedom was associated with autonomy in terms of man's natural independence vis-à-vis other men and his free-agency vis-à-vis nature. In the state of nature, that autonomous freedom was manifested in man's solitary and independent state and the consciousness of his ability to acquiesce or resist the commands of nature (natural freedom). As man moved from the state of nature into society, he lost the means to that solitary and independent existence and grew increasingly more dependent on other men. This increasing dependence seemed to correlate with an increasing assertion of man's ability to resist the commands of nature. Autonomous freedom manifesting itself as natural freedom in the state of nature, devolved into misused freedom in society (history). Man's primal goodness, characterized by amour de
de soi and pitié degenerated into pride, competitiveness, greed and other vices attributable to amour-propre. Although the mere consciousness of free-agency is sufficient for freedom in the state of nature, it is through the exercise of that free-agency that man enters the realm of history. For the most part, men have misused that free-agency, and Rousseau sees history as basically a chaotic interplay of passions and vices contrary to man's primary instincts. According to Rousseau, history has been a process of degeneration and corruption taking man further and further from original condition in the state of nature. This is reflected in the devolution of natural freedom into misused freedom. Years of misused freedom has left man a tyrant over himself and nature.

Nevertheless, despite what may appear to be the witness of history to the contrary, Rousseau still sees autonomous freedom as man's exaltation. Autonomous freedom is not judged in terms of its implications for the human condition, nor as a means for preceiving the good, nor even for achieving what is desirable. Autonomous freedom, especially as manifested in free-agency, is exalted in itself.
Man's ability to will and choose in the complete absence of any form of heteronomy is, for Rousseau, a very unique power that distinguishes man from the beasts, makes him higher than the angels, and likens him to God. The misery and corruption that has accompanied the exercise of free-agency through the centuries is unfortunate, but insignificant, in exchange for this unique capacity. Unlike nature, the ability to will and choose is ultimately unknowable and hence, unpredictable, and this is the source of its spirituality.

In terms of practical purposes beyond the pure spirituality of the power to will and choose, autonomous freedom apart from chance, is the only source of historical change in the world. Although change has hitherto been largely negative, the result of misused freedom, Rousseau argues that meaningful, that is, useful change can be wrought through the exercise of autonomous freedom. In the following chapters,

8 Emile, IV, 244-256, etc.

9 It may be noted that this acceptance of human misery and suffering as a necessary evil was not mitigated by a philosophy of history. Unlike his successors, Hegel and Marx, and to a lesser extent, Kant, Rousseau did not see human misery vindicated within the context of a purposive, progressive view of historical development. For Rousseau, the misery that is concomitant with free-agency is justified not because it is a purposive part of the overall development of the species ("une peste Salutaire"), but through the desire-ability of free-agency. (Second Discourse, III, 207n.IX)
radical freedom as the third manifestation of autonomous freedom will be examined as a source for meaningful change. Radical freedom may be seen as a type of synthesis of natural freedom and its antithesis, misused freedom.
III

AUTONOMOUS FREEDOM AND THE ARTS AND SCIENCES

It is common, both in modern thought and in terms of interpreting Rousseau's thought, to contrast that which is made by art with that which is natural. Although the distinction between art and nature underlies all of Rousseau's writings, especially the first Discourse, it will be argued below that to fully grasp what Rousseau is saying in the first Discourse, it is necessary to consider art in conjunction with autonomous freedom. It is only by considering art in terms of autonomous freedom that Rousseau's crucial distinctions between the arts and sciences and great

1 It is interesting to note, within the context of Rousseau's influence, the pejorative connotation terms such as 'artifice' began to acquire towards the end of the seventeenth century. Up until the seventeenth century, 'artifice' referred to "art consommé, habileté" (Robert, I, 258) or "manière de faire ou d'agir pleine d'habileté", or "toute façon d'agir, de travailler, de procéder" (Grand Larousse, I, 261). The "sens péjoratif moderne" refers to "art employé à abuser quelqu'un, à déguiser la nature ou la vérité" (Robert) or "manièr e d'agir qui tend à déguiser la vérité, à masquer la nature" (Grand Larousse). See also F. Godefroy, Dictionnaire de l'ancienne langue française du IX au XV siècle (Liechtmannstein: Kraus Reprint, 1969), I, 414; E. Huguet, Dictionnaire du seizième siècle, I, 324-5.
Science and true virtue will be understood. First, however, let us examine the relationship between art and nature.

Both in origin and development, art is for Rousseau an exclusively historical phenomenon. This we may conclude for the following reasons. First, whenever Rousseau speaks of the origin and development of a phenomenon, it may be assumed that he is referring to an historical phenomenon. Historical phenomena are subject to change over time. Furthermore, in his description of their origin and development, Rousseau identifies the arts with vice. Because whatever is natural is good, according to Rousseau, we may assume that phenomena born of vice are not of nature. Finally, in his description of the state of nature in the second Discourse, Rousseau makes it clear that man in nature practised no arts. As a parallel and necessary concomitant to the development of society, the arts are a necessary, but not a natural development.

Natural phenomena, by definition, do not need to be evaluated. However, this is not the case with historical phenomena and it is necessary to designate values or standards whereby these phenomena can be judged. It has already been

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2 First Discourse, III, 17.

3 Second Discourse, III, 153.
suggested that the state of nature serves in some senses as a type of standard in Rousseau's thought whereby historical phenomena and events may be judged. Accordingly, historical phenomena may be judged in terms of the extent to which they reflect natural phenomena. Although there are arts that spring from necessity and in a certain way assist nature ("et le genre humain periroient si l'art ne venoit au secours de la nature"), or at least are in harmony with nature, many arts are rooted in the misuse of freedom. They reflect negative free-agency, the misuse of man's ability to resist the commands of nature. These may be seen as the artificial arts.

As has been pointed out, Rousseau sees history in terms of the devolution of natural freedom into misused freedom, with the increasing negative exercise of free-agency correlating with the loss of independence. This correlation between negative free-agency and the loss of independence is evident in all historical phenomena including the arts where artificiality is connected with the degree of dependence required.

4 Social Contract, III, 360.

5 Wright distinguishes between art that perfects nature and art that perverts nature. (Meaning of Rousseau, p. 9.)
Accordingly, Rousseau uses independence, the other aspect of autonomous freedom, as the criterion whereby all historical phenomena, including the arts may be judged. The other criterion Rousseau uses to judge historical phenomena is utility. Historical phenomena generally spring from need, and utility is directly responsive to need. Society and the whole expanse of historical phenomena it entails, involves a certain degree of interdependence that is justified or necessitated in the interests of utility. The role of utility in judging historical phenomena is discussed in Chapter VIII on the *Emile*. Given the dual criteria of independence and utility whereby historical phenomena are judged, it is clear that the highest art is that which embodies the maximum utility with the minimum of dependence on other men, namely agriculture. Throughout the first *Discourse*, Rousseau uses the dual criteria of utility and the independent aspect of autonomous freedom to judge among the arts.

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6 First *Discourse*, III, 10-14; *Emile*, IV, 415n.1, 428, 446, 454, 456, 458, 628, etc.

7 In addition to the first *Discourse*, the *Emile* contains a comprehensive assessment of the various arts based on this dual criteria of utility and autonomous freedom (independence):

Il y a une estime publique attachée aux différents arts en raison inverse de leur utilité réelle. Cette estime se mesure directement sur leur inutilité même et cela doit être. Les arts les plus utiles sont ceux qui gagnent le moins.
However, more significant than this assessment of the various arts in terms of one another, is Rousseau's use of the criterion of autonomous freedom to distinguish art from great Science and true virtue. It is this distinction that is fundamental in the first Discourse and lies at the heart of Rousseau's political and educational projections.

Careful reading of the first Discourse will indicate that Rousseau uses the traditional conception of the term 'art'. Art is a method or procedure of making, doing, or acting, according to certain rules, for a particular end. This conception of art comes very close to the Greek concept of techne. Although there is clearly a distinction

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7 continued
Il y a un ordre non moins naturel et plus judicieux encore: par lequel on considère les arts selon les rapports de nécessité qui les lient, mettant au premier rang les plus indépendans, et au dernier ceux qui dépendent d'un plus grand nombre d'autres. Cet ordre qui fournit d'importantes considérations sur celui de la société générale est semblable au précédent et soumis au même renversement dans l'estime des hommes... l'art dont l'usage est le plus général et le plus indispensable est incontestablement celui qui mérite le plus d'estime, et que celui à qui moins d'autres arts sont nécessaires la mérite encore par dessus les plus subordonnés, parce qu'il est plus libre et plus près de l'indépendance. Voila les véritables règles de l'appréciation des arts et de l'industrie... Le premier et le plus respectable de tous les arts est l'agriculture. (Emile, IV, 456f and 459f., emphasis added)
between 'art' (a making or producing requiring the work
of human beings) and 'nature' (that which proceeds directly
or is produced from within itself), this is not the primary
distinction in the first Discourse. In other words, the
emphasis is not on the fact that art is a poiesis (pro-
duction) requiring the intervention of human beings. The
primary emphasis in Rousseau's thought is that art is a
method or procedure of making or doing.

What is crucial here is that, both in the acquisi-
tion and practice of an art, a certain degree of inter-
dependence is involved. As pointed out on page 73
above, man in the state of nature did not have art for two
reasons. Man in the state of nature did not need to produce or
make, because all his needs were satisfied by a bountiful nature.
Moreover, if hypothetically man did make or produce some-
thing, it would not be according to some method or procedure

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The fascinating yet complicating factor here is
that, although Rousseau uses the traditional conception of
'art', the basis for the modern notion of 'art' as pertaining
to creativity in the plastic arts as opposed to imitation
and representation, is also found in Rousseau. (See page 79n.
13 below; Chapter IV below; first Discourse, III, 21, etc.)
As with many other terms, 'art' in its modern connection
with creativity stands as a complete inversion of the tra-
ditional sense of art as craft.

9

George Grant has defined art (techne) as a leading
forth (poiesis) of something which requires the work of human
beings. See G. R. Grant, "Knowing and Making", Paper pre-
sent to Royal Society Symposium, June 2-3, 1974, p. 4.
according to certain rules, but rather spontaneously. In other words, in the state of nature, man did not need nor could he acquire art.

In the acquisition and practice of an art, a certain degree of dependence is involved that is incompatible with the independent aspect of natural freedom. Nevertheless, man has of necessity left the state of nature and must live in society which requires art, and as such, it is vain to condemn art for the loss of natural independence. In what sense then, is Rousseau attacking art in the name of freedom? Noting that natural freedom, although lost in history remains the criterion whereby historical phénoména are judged, let us examine more closely Rousseau's attack on art in the first Discourse.

Rousseau argues in the first Discourse that all aspects of human activity, not just making and producing, but also thinking and acting (insofar as these are separable in modern thought) are based on art. All aspects of human activity are governed by methods or procedures of doing, that is, by art. Rousseau accepts the fact that in history, making and producing governed by art is a necessity.

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10 That is, the method or procedure would be self-given, rather than taught or acquired. Such an art may perhaps be classified as a natural art.

11 Emile, for example, will be taught an art. (IV, 148ff.)
What he attacks, however, is the relegation of all aspects of human activity to art, that is, all aspects of human life are governed by methods and procedures acquired through society. Of particular concern is the subjection of thought and action to art. Science, Rousseau laments, has become the 'art of thinking', and morality, the 'art of manners'.

Both in the acquisition and practise of an art, a certain degree of interdependence (heteronomy) is involved, and accordingly, it is on the basis of autonomy that Rousseau distinguishes art from great science and true morality. It is on the basis of autonomy that Rousseau, in the concluding pages of the first Discourse, distinguishes science

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12 First Discourse, III, 5. This is for the most part the type of 'science' that Rousseau is referring to when he uses the term the 'arts and sciences'. Similarly, although of less significance, the Letters are referred to as the 'art of writing'. For this reason, the 'arts, sciences and letters' are all subsumed in this chapter within the term 'art'.

13 It must be noted that Rousseau also uses the criterion of autonomy to distinguish among what we more usually call 'art' today, that is, the plastic or fine arts. Although art in this sense is not our concern here, it is extremely interesting to consider that the transition or development of the term 'art' from the traditional sense of craft to the modern sense of creativity is involved here. The relationship of autonomy to creativity will be examined in relation to science below, however, the same reasoning is applicable to Rousseau's concept of painting, sculpting, etc. (First Discourse, III, 21ff.)
as the art of thinking from the great science of Descartes, Newton, and Bacon. On the same basis, the art of manners practiced and perfected in the Parisian society Rousseau abhorred is contrasted with true virtue. In the following chapters, the distinction between the art of thinking and great science, and the distinction between the art of manners and true virtue will be examined.

In the concluding paragraphs of the first Discourse under study, Rousseau refers to the progress in "des sciences et des arts" that has led to man's misery and corruption, but he also speaks of "des Sciences et des Arts" that will be studied by the "Precepteurs du Genre-humain" of whom Descartes, Bacon and Newton are examples (see Appendix). In Chapter IV, the great 'Sciences' will be contrasted to 'des sciences et des arts'. However, what are the 'Arts' that these preceptors will study? These would appear to be the art of education and the art of politics. Further in the paragraphs, Rousseau refers to "l'art de conduire les Peuples" and "celui de les éclairir". (III, 29) Rousseau proposes that the learned of the first rank teach these 'Arts' in princely courts. In Chapters VII and VIII we will examine how Rousseau himself would teach these 'Arts'.
IV

THE ART OF THINKING VS. GREAT SCIENCE

In the concluding paragraphs of the first Discourse, Rousseau makes his attack on the "vain" sciences in terms reminiscent of Plato's attack on sham philosophers. Plato's argument in The Republic in favour of a division of labour based on one's nature seems echoed here. They both warn against the clothmaker as geometer, and the tinker as thinker.

Que penserons-nous de ces Compilateurs d'ouvrages qui ont indiscrettement brisé la porte des Sciences et introduit dans leur Sanctuaire une populace indigne d'en approcher; tandis qu'il serait à souhaiter que tous ceux qui ne pouvoient avancer loin dans la carrière des Lettres, eussent été rebâttés dès l'entrée, et se fussent jetés dans des Arts utiles à la société. Tel qui sera toute sa vie un mauvais versificateur, un Géomètre subalterne, serait peut-être devenu un grand fabricateur d'étoffes.

The argument here seems based on utility. Let the unworthy learner take up an art useful to society, and indeed, the

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2 Plato, Republic, pp. 713, 728-32.

3 First Discourse, III, 29.
thrust of Rousseau's attack on the Enlightenment up to this point has been based on the waste of resources, the uselessness of most learning. However, as the paragraph continues, a different reason emerges; one that will clearly distinguish Rousseau from Socratic thought.

In Socratic thought, a test of morality was laid at the door of learning. In the Laws, for example, the three interlocutors specifically state that they may discuss philosophy because of their virtue and age. Rousseau also advocates a test for those who might be tempted to learn. However, the test is a test of strength. Rousseau asks:

que penserons-nous de cette foule d'Auteurs élémentaires qui ont écarté du Temple des Muses les difficultés qui défendaient son abord, et que la nature y avait répandues comme une épreuve des forces de ceux qui seroient tentés de savoir?

4 First Discourse, III, 12, 15, 17-19, etc.


6 Although Rousseau advocates a test of strength for those who might pursue learning, he was also of course, concerned with the implications learning might have on morality. L. Strauss, in his essay "On the Intention of Rousseau", outlines the similarity between Rousseau and Plato on this point. This will be discussed in Chapter V, see especially pages 107 below. (L. Strauss, "On the Intention of Rousseau", in Hobbes and Rousseau, ed. M. Cranston, R. S. Peters (New York, 1972), pp. 254-90.)
and later, of the preceptors of the human race, he writes:

C'est par les premiers obstacles qu'ils ont appris à faire des efforts, et qu'ils se sont exercés à franchir l'espace immense qu'ils ont parcouru. S'il faut permettre à quelques hommes de se livrer à l'étude des Sciences et des Arts, ce n'est qu'à ceux qui se sentiront la force de marcher seuls sur leurs traces, et de les devancer.

What then is the test of strength? Rousseau will later write, "Le seul qui fait sa volonté est celui qui n'a pas besoin pour la faire de mettre les bras d'un autre au bout des siens: d'où il suit que le premier de tous les biens n'est pas l'autorité mais la liberté". At the end of the first Discourse, Rousseau also associates strength with freedom.

Il n'a point fallu de maîtres à ceux que la nature destinait à faire des disciples. Les Verulams, les Descartes, et les Newtons, ces Precepteurs du Genre-humain n'en ont point eu eux-mêmes, et quels guides les eussent conduits jusqu'où leur vaste génie les a portés? Des Maîtres ordinaires n'auront pu que retrécir leur entendement en le resserrant dans l'étroite capacité du leur... Mais si l'on veut que rien ne soit au-dessus de leur génie, il faut que rien ne soit au-dessus de leurs espérances. Voilà l'unique encouragement dont ils ont besoin.

7 First Discourse, III, 28.

8 First Discourse, III, 29.
This is one of the most significant passages in Rousseau's work. The reason it is usually ignored and passed over perhaps attests to its significance. The thinking in this passage is clearly part of the ideology of modern science and incorporates our understanding of genius. These genii are capable of exercising radical freedom and it is in this that they are distinguished from those who merely practice the art of thinking. Radical freedom, manifesting independence and free-agency in their ultimate form, is the third type of autonomous freedom. The concept of radical freedom centres on the complete absence of any form of heteronomy.

9 In the Emile, Rousseau, discussing the differences between men and women and the types of knowledge appropriate to each, argues that "quant aux connoissances physiques c'est à celui des deux qui est le plus agissant, le plus allant, qui voit le plus d'objets, c'est à celui qui a le plus de force et qui l'exerce davantage à juger des rapports des êtres sensibles et des loix de la nature". Note the emphasis on vigour and strength as qualities necessary for pursuing the physical sciences. One wonders whether the aged interlocutors of the Laws would, like the female sex, be disqualified by Rousseau's test of strength. (Emile, IV, 737)

10 Emile, IV, 309. Note also Rousseau's comment that "l'homme est foible quand il est dépendant". (Second Discourse, III, 153)

11 First Discourse, III, 29.
First, the significance of Rousseau's attack on art in the name of independence is evident. Great thinkers, as opposed to those who practice the art of thinking, cannot be taught. The art of thinking made possible by textbooks, stands in contrast to the thought of men such as Descartes, Newton, and Bacon, who, according to Rousseau, have had no teachers, no rules nor procedures, nor techniques of thinking. They are those who are capable of thinking alone. Great thinkers, therefore, cannot be taught. Theirs is not an art, a technique or method of thinking governed by rules acquired in society, but is a thinking (and making) in freedom, that is, alone, in independence of other men. In contrast to the art of thinking, great science involves the exercise of autonomous freedom in the sense that it is not acquired or learned, nor does it require other men.

12 See, for example, S. Toulmin, Foresight and Understanding (New York, 1961); H. Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science: 1300-1800 (New York, 1965); T. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, 1962); etc.

13 See, for example, S. Toulmin, Foresight, p. 109.

14 See G. Grant, "Knowing and Making".
As such, great thinking takes place in a context reflecting the solitary and independent condition of man in the state of nature. However, the independence of the great thinkers is of a higher order than that of natural man. There are but few men who are capable of such independence in the midst of society.

The lack of heteronomy in radical freedom is reflected not only in the independent context in which the act of thinking takes place but also in the very nature of that thought. In order for thought to be free of heteronomy, it must be characterized by free-agency. Accordingly, reason cannot be seen as a natural phenomenon. The traditional conceptualization of reason as an innate faculty leading man to understand or perceive or discover 'what is' is inadequate. Similarly, man is not distinguished from the beasts by reason.

Rousseau's account of reason as outlined in the second Discourse and the Emile, makes it clear that reason is an historical development, and not a natural phenomenon. Unlike natural freedom, reason was only a potentiality in the state of nature, that developed through the exigencies of time and circumstances, that is, through history.

15 Second Discourse, III, 141.

16 Second Discourse, III, 143ff.; Emile, IV, 90, 122, 165, 218-9, 230, etc.
Like other historical phenomena, reason, in its origins and development, is based on the necessities imposed by time and circumstances on man's fundamental instinct for self-preservation. In much of the conjectural history outlined in the second Discourse for example, reason appears to be man's historically developing ability to calculate means for his self-preservation.

More importantly, reason was also used in history as an instrument of man's free-agency, his ability to acquiesce or resist the commands of nature. Few men, however, are capable of thinking alone and this seems to correlate with the fact that reason was used, for the most part, for the purposes of misused freedom. Much of the philosophy, sciences, and learning attacked in the first Discourse is a manifestation of reason used in the service of misused freedom.

The autonomy necessary for great thinking is impossible for most men, for their reason is bound by many

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17 Rousseau writes:

Il me seroit aisé . . . de faire voir, que chez toutes les Nations du monde, les progrès de l'Esprit se sont précisément proportionnés aux besoins, que les Peuples avaient reçus de la Nature, ou auxquels les circonstances les avaient assujetis, et par consequent aux passions, qui les portaient à pourvoir à ces besoins. (Second Discourse, III, 143)

See also, second Discourse, III, 152, 165-6, etc.
forms of heteronomy. Dependence on other men subjects reason to pride, opinion, competitiveness, and other vices, making autonomous thought impossible. Moreover, reason is bound by the vast assortment of false passions that arise through the negative exercise of free-agency.

Autonomous reason necessary for great thinking is possible only for those capable of exercising radical freedom. Like man in the state of nature, great thinkers accept the guidance of nature. However, the guidance of nature is insufficient after centuries of misused freedom, hence making the exercise of free-agency necessary. In order to understand the connection between free-agency and autonomous reason, it is necessary to examine the relationship between radical freedom and nature.

Rousseau refers to Bacon, Descartes and Newton as "ceux que la nature destinoit à faire des disciples". These men and all those whom Rousseau would consider to be

18 The legislator in the Social Contract, for example, must be free of passions:

Pour découvrir les meilleures regles de société qui conviennent aux Nations, il faudroit une intelligence supérieure, qui vit toutes les passions des hommes et qui n'en éprouvât aucune. (Social Contract, III, 381)

19 First Discourse, III, 29.
great thinkers are 'disciples' of nature only in the sense that they study nature.

It was stated earlier that Rousseau shared Newton's concept of nature governed by fixed and invariable principles. Such a mechanistic nature, governed by fixed laws, could be thoroughly studied, categorized and known with a high degree of certainty (predictability). Leaving aside the fascinating, but complex, question of to what extent the laws of nature are in effect a manifestation of man's freedom, it is important to note the consequences of this view of nature. Knowledge of the laws that govern nature would ultimately enable man to control and manipulate natural phenomena. The control and manipulation of natural phenomena is necessary because, although nature remains as a guide for what is desirable, many of the ills and problems confronting man in society are beyond its scope. Nature has not

20 It is relevant for the intention, but beyond the scope of this paper, to investigate to what extent this concept of nature is based on the exaltation of freedom. See M. Heidigger, What is a Thing?; also, Emile, IV, 235, etc.; "Observations", III, 41.

21 It is interesting that Rousseau chose Bacon to stand with Descartes and Newton as among the preceptors of the human race. Although Bacon did not perceive the nature of 'mathematical projection' in Descartes' and Newton's 'manner of asking about the thing' (see pages 2-6 above), he did understand very clearly the way in which nature could be put to the question by modern science.
ceased to represent what is desirable; however, the sequence of time and circumstances, dominated by fate and misused freedom, has so altered the original constitution of 'what is' and has given rise to a whole series of new (historical) phenomena, that nature as a force to restore the felicity of mankind has been transcended. Although nature remains as a standard for what is desirable, even a retreat for the few, it is only through the exercise of radical freedom that purposive historical change is possible. Chapter VIII in Part II below examines how and for what purpose natural phenomena are studied and used in the *Emile*.

The manipulation and control of natural phenomena represents a qualitative change in the nature of free-agency. Whereas with natural freedom free-agency referred to man's consciousness of his ability to resist or acquiesce to the commands of nature, and misused freedom entailed the exercise of man's ability to resist nature, free-agency in radical freedom was transcended.

21

Rousseau notes:

> Quand on observe la constitution naturelle des choses, l'homme semble évidemment destiné à être la plus heureuse des créatures; quand on raisonne d'après l'état actuel, l'espèce humaine paraît de toutes la plus à plaindre. Il y a donc fort grande apparence que la plupart de ses maux sont son ouvrage, et l'on dirait qu'il a plus fait pour rendre sa condition mauvaise que la nature n'a pu faire pour la rendre bonne. (Fragments Politiques, III, 477-8)

freedom implies the ability of some men to transcend and assume nature's role as a source of guidance for men. Nature, as a purposive guiding force, is impotent in the face of historical change. Neither nature, nor the domination of men misusing their free-agency, can effect the changes necessary to restructure history to restore the felicity of mankind. This task must, according to Rousseau, be entrusted to those few who are capable of exercising radical freedom in thought and action.

It was stated earlier that great thinking requires autonomous reason. A significant component of autonomous reason is imagination. In effect, imagination itself is a manifestation of human freedom. Rousseau himself says of imagination that it is that "qui étend pour nous la mesure des possibles soit en bien soit en mal". As such, imagination, like man's faculty for self-perfection, of which it is an integral part, is a two-edged sword. Within the context of misused freedom, imagination is the source of an infinite variety of corrupt passions and desires. On

22 *Emile*, IV, 304.

23 La source de toutes les passion est la sensibilité, l'imagination détermine leur pente . . . Ce sont les erreurs de l'imagination qui transforment en vices les passions de tous les êtres bornés. (*Emile*, IV, 500-1)

See also, *Emile*, IV, 304-5, 662, etc.
the other hand, those capable of autonomous reason exercise their imagination in a creative way. To create is to make new. By definition, creation is an historical act. Unlike art however, which is a making according to procedure or methods for a certain end, creation is an unbound poiesis. This concept of autonomous reason as active, constructive and creative imagination in Rousseau's thought adumbrates the very complex relationship that exists between knowing and making, thought and action in the modern world. The nature of this relationship is implicit in the concept of projection. It is through active and creative imagination that great thinkers are able to formulate political and educational projections for the re-structuring of history.

24 This interpretation of the role assigned the preceptors of the human race differs radically from that proposed by Strauss. Strauss interprets Rousseau's praise of Bacon, Newton, and Descartes in terms of their emulation of classical philosophy, combining learning with virtue. We would argue that Rousseau praises these men because of their independence and ability to exercise free-agency. Their virtue is concomitant with their freedom, but it is not virtue which qualifies them to function as 'preceptors of the human race'. Strauss recognizes that only a few privileged souls are privy to scientific pursuits and although he sees the solitary nature of this pursuit ("a god-like self-sufficiency"), he does not see the primacy of autonomy in designating those who can 'speak well'. He does recognize man's ability to become master over his fate and to overcome chance, but he does not limit this ability to those few who are capable of radical freedom. ("Man, the product of blind fate, eventually becomes the seeing master of his fate. Reason's creativity and mastership over the blind forces of nature is a product of those blind forces." Strauss, Natural Right and History, p. 273)
At the beginning of this chapter, the connection between strength and freedom was noted. Bacon, Newton and Descartes are praised because obstacles did not deter them, but rather inspired them to greater exertion. Those who would study the sciences and arts must have the strength to walk alone in the footsteps of these great men and surpass them (see Appendix). The emphasis in these concluding paragraphs of the first Discourse is on the scope of great thought. Great thinkers have the strength necessary to traverse immense spaces ('l'espace immense') and to move beyond ('devancer') all obstacles, boundaries and limitations. This strength however, must be matched by social and political power. Those capable of exercising radical freedom must not be bound by any social constraints. Society must not limit in any way the vast scope of their genius ("si l'on veut que rien ne soit au-dessus de leur genie, il faut que rien ne soit au-dessus de leurs esperances"). This applies not only

24 continued

We would argue that, according to Rousseau, the overcoming of chance and the restructuring of history are possible only through the exercise of radical freedom by those few who have no masters.

25

In his appointment of these three as the great preceptors of the human race, Rousseau closely reflects the attitudes of his contemporaries of the Enlightenment. According to Mlle. M. Reichenburg, this is the only place where Rousseau mentions Bacon, and it was primarily through Diderot that Rousseau developed such an admiration for Bacon.
to their thought, but to their actions as well. In Chapter V, it will be argued that these preceptors of the human race have moved beyond both innocent and political virtue. Their actions are governed by autonomous virtue that is self-given and totally lacking in heteronomy. For these men, both science and virtue are defined in terms of autonomy.

Rousseau argues further that science and virtue must be combined with authority and that these 'savans du premier ordre' must be given status and authority to match the capacity of their intellect. Welcoming the preceptors of the human race into 'princely courts' will ensure that they occupy themselves with great and useful thoughts, and that they will be given authority to implement the projections they formulate. Rousseau suggests that this may be accomplished by allowing these preceptors to teach those in authority the arts of leading and especially of enlightening the people. In Part II where Rousseau's own political and

25 continued
M. Reichenburg, Essai sur les lectures de Rousseau (Philadelphia, 1932), p. 140. There is much evidence that Rousseau studied Descartes carefully and shared his contemporaries' assessment of Descartes as the founder of modern philosophy. It would appear that Rousseau came into contact with Newton's thought through Voltaire, and again shared in the enthusiasm over Newton's new account of nature. See Havens, Discours, pp. 246-7n. 291, 292, 293.
and educational projections are examined, the role of author-
ity and power in the relationship between 'la vertu and la
science' will be explored.

26 In one of his correspondences following the first
Discourse, Rousseau argues:

Si des intelligences célestes cultivoient les sciences,
il n'en résulteroit que du bien; j'en dis autant des
grands hommes, qui sont faits pour guider les autres. ("Dernière Réponse", III, 72)

Havens in his commentary on the first Discourse notes:

le 10 Septembre 1755, dans sa replique à la lettre du
30 aout que Voltaire lui envoya au sujet du Discours
sur l'inégalité, le Genevois dit: "Convenez-en, mon-
sieur, s'il est bon que les Grands genies instruisent
les hommes, il faut que le vulgaire reçoive leurs in-
structions; si chacun se mêle d'en donner, qui les
voudra recevoir? 'Les boiteux' dit Montaigne, 'sont
mal propres aux exercices du corps; et aux exercices
de l'esprit les ames boiteuses'. Mais en ce siècle
savant, on ne voit que boiteux vouloir apprendre à
marcher aux autres". (Havens, Discours, p. 247n.29)
Morality is for Rousseau an historical phenomenon. The explication of events found in the conjectural history outlined in the second Discourse, for example, is suggestive of a genealogy of morality. The Fragments Politiques include a chapter subtitled 'Histoire des Moeurs' which ends with a table of contents for "un projet d'Histoire des moeurs". Moreover, the first Discourse can only be understood within the context of a developmental view of morality. Chapter V, therefore, is divided into three sections, (1) innocent virtue, (2) political virtue and (3) autonomous virtue, to reflect Rousseau's developmental view of morality within the context of the three forms of autonomous freedom outlined in the preceding chapters.

1 First Discourse, III, 22.
2 See also Havens, Discours, p. 229n230.
3 Fragments, III, 554-560.
1. Innocent Virtue

The first Discourse seems to begin and end with a concept of morality which we have termed 'innocent virtue'. Specifically, in the opening paragraph of the Discourse, Rousseau writes that in the discussion of the relationship between the arts and sciences and morality, he will take the side of "un honnête homme qui ne sait rien, et qui ne s'en estime pas moins". Similarly, the closing paragraph of the Discourse opens with the famous line "O vertu! Science sublime des ames simples ... Tes principes ne sont-ils pas gravés dans tous les coeurs?". It is clear from these passages and from others in the Discourse, that Rousseau has some conceptualization of virtue that is associated with honesty and simplicity.

The reason we have termed this as 'innocent virtue' is that this virtue seems related to some innate or primary goodness in man. In accordance with this association of

4 First Discourse, III, 5, emphasis added.

5 First Discourse, III, 30, emphasis added.

6 Note for example the phrase "les hommes innocens et vertueux". (III, 22)
virtue with man's original or true self, virtue becomes synonymous with honesty and integrity. In other words, honesty and integrity are not simply manifestations of virtue, but are the conditions or source for this type of virtue. Similarly, because this type of virtue is related to that which is natural to man, it is associated with simplicity (see pages 51-2 above).

Clearly, when reference is made to the primary or innate goodness of man, the concept of nature is involved. And indeed, Rousseau states "On ne peut réfléchir sur les moeurs, qu'on ne se plaise à se rappeler l'image de la simplicité des premiers temps". Earliest (premiers) times (as opposed to primitive times) refers to the state of nature. We must assume, therefore, that the state of nature has some bearing on morality. However, it must be noted that morality is only relevant for man in relation to other men. Morality, a historical phenomenon correlating with the development of society, is not possible for solitary man in the state of nature. Nevertheless, Rousseau makes it clear

7 First Discourse, III, 22.

8 It may be argued that natural man is sub-human because he is pre-moral in the state of nature. We would argue, however, that man is human in the state of nature because he is free, and it is freedom and not virtue that defines man's essence in Rousseau's thought.
in the second Discourse that man in the state of nature is
good, and it is evident from passages in the first Discourse,
especially the concluding paragraphs, that man is by nature
good. However, that "shore adorned by the hands of nature
alone" in which man was good, has been permanently lost
among man living in the realm of history. In what sense
then is the natural goodness of man the source for innocent
virtue?

To answer this the distinction between virtue and
goodness is relevant. Rousseau associates virtue with free-
dom, as will later liberal philosophers. Freedom (autonomy)
precedes virtue. Rousseau makes it clear that man in the
state of nature lived entirely in direct obedience to the

9 First Discourse, III, 30; see also "Dernière Réponse", III, 80n*.

10 Masters, Discourses, p. 54.

11 See pages 42-44 above and second Discourse, III, 162.

12 It may be argued that goodness is distinguished
from virtue in terms of one's relationship to other men.
In other words, solitary man may be good, but only social
man can be virtuous. Morality or virtue is relevant only
for man living in society. Nevertheless, the distinction
between goodness and virtue is made in terms of freedom and
not in terms of man's relationship with other men. The develop-
ment of morality coincided with the evolution of society,
because society, by engendering dependence resulting in
greed, amour-propre, etc., encouraged man to exercise his free-
agency, rather than automatically acquiescing to nature's voice.
commands of nature. Although such a man is good, he is neither moral nor virtuous, for his goodness is heteronomous.

Ne dans le fond d'un bois il eut vécu plus heureux et plus libre; mais n'ayant rien à combattre pour suivre ses penchants il eut été bon sans mérite, il n'eut point été vertueux, et maintenant il sait l'être malgré ses passions.

Ce passage de l'état de nature à l'état civil produit dans l'homme un changement très remarquable, en substituant dans sa conduite la justice à l'instinct, et donnant à ses actions la moralité qui leur manquait auparavant.

Whereas goodness characterized those who lived in direct obedience to the voice of nature, virtue requires a certain degree of autonomy.

In considering the relationship of autonomy to nature in the question of morality, it is necessary to discern what constitutes heteronomy. Man in the state of nature, apart from his natural freedom, also possessed two basic natural instincts, namely self-preservation and compassion (see pages 56, 68-69 above and 187 below), although by definition freedom precedes these two instincts. Even though autonomous freedom is the highest good in Rousseau, nature's influence through

13 Emile, IV, 858.


15 One component of freedom, free-agency, is the ability to go against the voice of nature, in this case, instinct.
these two instincts of self-preservation and compassion is never denigrated and remains fundamental in the development of morality.

L'amour des hommes dérivé de l'amour de soi est le principe de la justice humaine.

16

L'Amour de soi-même est un sentiment naturel qui porte tout animal à veiller à sa propre conservation et qui, dirigé dans l'homme par la raison et modifié par la pitié, produit l'humanité et la vertu.

17

Certainly man, in the consciousness of his freedom, can over rule and resist these instincts, as he in fact has done in society. However, this is a misuse of freedom. These original instincts remain central to Rousseau's thinking, especially in the development of morality. Whereas for Kant, for example, morality is based on an autonomy that involves emancipation from the heteronomy of nature, Rousseau retains the original instincts to serve as the foundations of morality.

16 *Emile, IV, 523*; see also, 491-2, 503ff.; pages 68-9, above and 187-8 below.

17 Second Discourse, III, 219nXV; see also 154ff. especially, for example, Rousseau's comment that "de cette seule qualité [pitié] découlent toutes les vertus sociales".

18 Hence, man has lost his sensitivity to his fellow man's suffering and his amour de soi has degenerated into amour-propre. See pages 187ff below.
Hence, although autonomy, the free will, is the primary 20 condition for morality in Rousseau as in Kant, it is crucial to note that throughout his writings, Rousseau considered 'nature' to be an important component in the development of morality.

Goodness, therefore, derives from direct obedience to the commands of nature, while innocent virtue involves following the voice of nature, in full consciousness of one's ability to do otherwise. The question is, of course, in how far is innocent virtue possible, given that man has in history exercised his free-agency in disobedience to the voice of nature and has perverted his natural instincts (see pages 185-186 below and Chapter II above)? One must recall Rousseau's comparison of the original constitution of man to the statue of Glaucus, altered and changed beyond recognition by the sequence of time and circumstances (see page 53 above). Can man, living in society, retain that goodness and those natural instincts which form the basis for innocent virtue? It would appear that innocent virtue, emanating from the primary goodness of man, is not a practical

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19 These original instincts may be developed through education (Emile) and through the institution of the general will (Social Contract) to produce the moral man. See Chapters VIII and VII below.

20 Autonomy as the primary condition for morality will be further discussed in section (3) below.
option for men living in society given the stress Rousseau lays on the effects of history (society) on man's nature. Further, the very difficult aim of the Emile is to design an education which will form a man capable of innocent virtue, that is, one whose virtue is the residue, or emanates directly from his fundamental nature. The exceptional circumstances necessary for Emile's education would indicate that the 'simplicity of the earliest times', on which innocent virtue is based, has indeed been permanently lost.

On the other hand, it is clear that innocent virtue remains central to the first Discourse as the standard by which the 'appearance of right' must be judged. Innocent virtue characterized by honesty, integrity, and simplicity forms a perfect counterpoise to the art of respectability, the veil of polite manners, that constituted the morality of Parisian society.

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21 At the beginning of the Emile, Rousseau describes the effects of misused freedom:

Il ne veut rien tel que l'a fait la nature, pas même l'homme; . . . Les préjugés, l'autorité, la nécessité, l'exemple, toutes les institutions sociales dans les- quelles nous nous trouvons sumergés, étrofferoient en lui la nature. (Emile, IV, 245)

22 The implications of this attempt will be explored in Chapter VIII below.
Natural freedom, as earlier defined, refers to man living in solitary independence of other men and in harmony with nature, with a consciousness of his ability to disobey. Innocent virtue correlates with this concept of natural freedom, not only in the harmonious relationship with nature, but also in terms of independence. Innocent virtue is that "Science sublime des ames simples" which requires neither preparation nor instruction, is not based on opinion and is fundamental in all men. As such, innocent virtue also conforms to the independent aspect of natural freedom.

Rousseau's scathing attack on Parisian society focused on the extent to which morality had become an art. He argues that "Avant que l'Art eut façonné nos manières et appris à nos passions à parler un langage apprêté, nos moeurs étoient rustiques, mais naturelles". Morality was not freely chosen in response to the impulse's of one's heart, but rather was an acquired art. As such, morality was reduced to a method or procedure of acting according to certain rules for a prescribed end (see pages 77-80 above). That end was and could not be other than the appearance of 'right'. That society which had perverted the natural instincts which served as the basis for innocent virtue, attempted to simulate

23 First Discourse, III, 8.
virtue by art. A great deal of the first Discourse is concerned with the contrast between innocent virtue, that which emanates from man's natural freedom in harmony with his basic instincts, and this simulation of virtue by art, which Rousseau claims is ultimately nothing more than the art of deception.

However, Rousseau is concerned with more than the contrast between innocent virtue and the art of manners. If innocent virtue is no longer a practical alternative in society, and if virtue cannot be simulated by art, what option for morality is left, given the state of society? It is this question which Rousseau, as a political theorist, must confront.

2. Political Virtue

Political virtue characterized by strength and vigour, temperance and valour, stands in contrast to the idle opulence, urbanity and ornamentation that accompany the perfection of the arts and sciences. Much of what Rousseau says

24 Many analyses of Rousseau do not move beyond this concept of 'innocent virtue'. Havens, for example, criticizes Rousseau for exalting innocent-innate virtue and forgetting the profound effects of his Genevan childhood. (Havens, Discours, pp. 249-50n306) Such a view does not take into account Rousseau's developmental view of morality that encompasses other types of morality as will be discussed below.
concerning the relationship between the development of the arts and sciences and the deterioration of morality focuses on a conception of 'political virtue'. Whereas Rousseau used the concept of 'innocent virtue' mainly as a counterpoise to the art of manners in the first Discourse, his concept of 'political virtue' incorporates the much broader problem of the relationship between knowledge and virtue. In effect, the debilitation of political virtue in the various societies he examines is interpreted by Rousseau as historical manifestations of the classical antagonism between philosophy and virtue.

When Rousseau states "On a vu la vertu s'enfuir à mesure que leur lumiere [arts and sciences] s'élévoit sur notre horizon", he is referring to political virtue. The implications of this statement, when thought in conjunction with Nietzsche's subsequent account of 'horizon-based' virtue, are indeed profound. Whereas innocent virtue had its basis on the 'shore adorned by the hands of nature alone', the 'horizon' of political virtue was based on patriotism

25 First Discourse, III, 10.

and religion. Leo Strauss in his essay "On the Intention of Rousseau", deals with this concept of political virtue and interprets the first Discourse as an attempt by Rousseau to re-establish, in the face of the Enlightenment, the classical antagonism between philosophy and virtue. And indeed, on this very practical issue there is a great deal of similarity between Rousseau and Socrates.

It was stated earlier that Rousseau, as political theorist, had to confront the fact that innocent virtue was no longer a practical alternative for the majority of men in society, and that virtue could not be simulated by art. As such, Rousseau turns to the concept of political virtue and seeks to protect it not only from the ravages of misused freedom, but also, and especially in the first Discourse, from the effects of the Enlightenment.

Why must political virtue be protected from knowledge? Rousseau attacks the men of the Enlightenment for the following reason:

Mais ces vains et futilen déclamateurs vont de tous côtés, armés de leurs funestes paradoxes; sapant les fondemens de la foi, et anéantissant la vertu. Ils sourient dédaigneusement à ces vieux mots de Patrie et de Religion, et consacrent leurs talens et leur Philosophie à détruire et avilir tout ce qu'il y a de sacré parmi les hommes. Non qu'au fond ils haissent ni la vertu ni nos dogmes; c'est de l'opinion publique qu'ils sont ennemis.

28

In this denunciation of vain learning, Rousseau reveals the antagonism between knowledge and virtue. Political virtue is based on faith. If the foundations of faith are undermined, virtue is annihilated. The foundations of faith are based on fatherland (patriotism) and religion. Rousseau makes clear that these things, although held sacred among men, are dogmas and matters of public opinion. The whole thrust of the Social Contract and its institutions verifies this interpretation of the passage. It will be argued in Chapter VII below that the task of the legislator and the devising of a civil religion are geared to the re-establishment of these foundations of faith which underlie political virtue.

28 First Discourse, III, 19, emphasis added.

29 Économie Politique, III, 255.

30 Social Contract, III, 383-4, 394; second Discourse, III, 185-6; etc.
In sum, Rousseau sees political virtue as based on a 'horizon' of faith in patriotism and religion.

As Nietzsche worked out years later, moral 'horizons' have more to do with history than with things eternal. Rousseau seems to have realized this. Unlike innocent virtue which is in part based on what is natural and is in some senses a 'given', political virtue is a historical phenomenon. Political virtue characterized by courage, valour, self-sacrifice, etc., is suited to the social and political circumstances in which man in society finds himself. In the second Discourse, Rousseau observes how the origin or genesis of political virtue may be found in the exigencies of political order and peace. Moreover, political virtue of the type practised by Sparta and so praised by Rousseau, transcends the natural instinct of self-preservation. Rousseau clearly lauds the zealots who, without the elaborate rationale outlined in the Social Contract for self-sacrifice in the general will state, placed fatherland before the natural instinct of self-preservation.

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31 See page 106 n.26 above. George Grant clearly sums up Nietzsche's teaching on this when he writes: "The historical sense teaches us that horizons are not discoveries about the nature of things; they express the values which our tortured instincts will to create". Time as History (Toronto: CBC Massey Lectures, 1969), p. 29.
As stated earlier, Rousseau sees the debilitation of political virtue as a manifestation of the tension between the quest for knowledge (science) and virtue. It is necessary to point out that it is inadequate to argue that this antagonism existed only between vain philosophy and virtue, that it was only sham or useless philosophy which was dangerous to morality. Such an interpretation does not sufficiently take into account Rousseau's understanding of political virtue as a 'horizon', nor his view of philosophy. Neither is this adequate to explain what he says about philosophers whom he clearly admires and praises elsewhere. Why are science and political virtue incompatible? Strauss expresses it clearly when he writes: "We may express the thesis of the [first] Discours as follows: since the element of society is opinion, science, being the attempt to replace opinion by knowledge, essentially endangers society because it dissolves opinion". As stated above, political


33 "Dernière Réponse", III, 82.

34 First Discourse, III, 18-19, 27.

virtue, the virtue necessary for society, is also based on 'dogma' and 'public opinion'. Hence, political virtue is susceptible and vulnerable to the quest for science. It is clear why Rousseau was so opposed to the attempts of the Enlightenment. In contrast to his friends, the Encyclopaedists, Rousseau did not believe morality would come with mass enlightenment of the type they envisaged. Indeed, he argues the opposite: such enlightenment will annihilate political virtue on a mass scale.

In sum, therefore, whereas innocent virtue is based on the natural goodness of man, political virtue has its source in the exigencies of social and hence political life. Political virtue is a 'horizon'. This 'horizon' of patriotism and religion is a matter of opinion and belief. As such, it is endangered by any quest for knowledge. For this reason, those few who Rousseau would have pursue science, must be animated by virtue, in much the same way as only those who are virtuous may discuss the best city in Plato's Laws. It is necessary, however, to examine the virtue of the preceptors of the human race more carefully.

36 "Observations", III, 42.

37 There are, of course, other reasons why the development of the arts and sciences led to the decline in political virtue. Science, for example, requires access to an idle and leisurely life style as opposed to the vigourous activity characterizing political virtue.
3. Autonomous Virtue

If innocent virtue, as a direct manifestation of the natural goodness of man, is no longer possible due to the ravages of time and circumstances which have altered the basic instincts of self-preservation and compassion, and if political virtue is shown by science to be a 'horizon' based on opinion and dogma, of what type is the virtue of great thinkers, such as Bacon, Newton, and Descartes? There is no reason to assume that the innate goodness of these men is more fully preserved than among other men. Further, these men cannot be held by faith in patriotism and religion which, according to Rousseau, they must recognize to be opinion and dogma. What is the nature of virtue which must be combined with science and authority in these men? What type of virtue is reconcilable with the pursuit of science as outlined in Chapter IV above?

It will be recalled that Rousseau has a dual criteria for judging historical phenomena, that is, utility and independence (see page 75 above). It may be said that political

37 continued

The spirit of science is geared towards universalism or cosmopolitanism and denies the allegiances of particularisms, that is, patriotism. Often it is pride that compels men to further learning, etc. However, these reasons need not be elaborated here, for they are not crucial to our purposes and are clearly outlined in the first Discourse.
virtue has its chief merit in utility. It is a useful means of ensuring stability in the political order. It was stated in Chapter III, that radical freedom is the criterion that distinguishes ordinary science from great science. Similarly, it is autonomous freedom that constitutes the basis for the virtue of the preceptors. It was already stated that a certain degree of freedom is necessary to distinguish mere goodness from virtue (pages 99-102 above). The only type of virtue possible for great thinkers such as Bacon, Newton and Descartes, is autonomous virtue, that is, virtue that is not bound in any way by heteronomy. Autonomous virtue in this sense comes very close to Kant's concept of self-legislation. The great thinkers who in their thinking are bound only by their own hopes, in morality are bound only by those laws they give themselves.

In Kant, however, autonomous virtue is bound, in a sense, by reason's ability to universalize, that is, the categorical imperative. Although generalization as a means of judging one's actions is theoretically important in Rousseau's


39 Strauss describes self-legislation as the substitution of freedom for virtue, or the view that it is not virtue which makes man free, but freedom which makes man virtuous. (Strauss, Natural Right and History, p. 280)
attempt to re-establish political virtue in the general will state, there is little evidence that he bound autonomous virtue in this way.

In Part II Chapter VIII, we will argue that the virtue that the tutor would develop in Emile is closer to innocent virtue than autonomous virtue. Yet what is the nature of virtue in the tutor who devises an educational scheme whereby innocent virtue is simulated, or of the legislator in the Social Contract who would re-establish the basis for political virtue? It is significant that both the subjects of the 'general will' state and Emile himself, will be among those who know how to act well (bien faire). Both political virtue and innocent virtue produce people who are capable of 'bien faire'. The virtue of those who 'speak well', the preceptors of the human race, such as the legislator, the tutor, Bacon, Descartes, Newton, etc. is of a

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Rousseau concludes the first Discourse with an exhortation:

tâchons de mettre entre eux et nous cette distinction glorieuse qu'on remarquoit jadis entre deux grands Peuples; que l'un savoit bien dire, et l'autre, bien faire.
(III, 30)

It is important to determine what Rousseau means by this conclusion. In using the term 'bien dire', which in seventeenth century usage meant "Art de parler, de s'exprimer avec correction et élégance" (Grand Larousse, I, 430), Rousseau may only be claiming that good deeds are better than fine words.
different order. This type of virtue we have called autonomous virtue. In effect, there is little that can be said of a type of virtue that is characterized by radical freedom. Whereas innocent virtue was characterized by honesty, simplicity and goodness, and political virtue by valour, self-sacrifice, temperance, etc., autonomous virtue by definition has no content. In Chapter IV, it was implied that any other

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In effect, the term 'bien dire' is most commonly used in pejorative contrast to 'bien faire'. However, more is implied and it is necessary to determine who Rousseau is referring to in making this distinction. The two ancient peoples are presumably the Athenians and the Spartans. From the context of the preceding two paragraphs it is clear that 'bien faire' refers to 'les hommes vulgaires' or 'lesames simples' whose virtue is comparable to the much praised Spartans. Those capable of 'bien dire', however, are 'ces hommes célèbres' who must 'instruire les Peuples de leurs devoirs', earlier referred to as the preceptors of the human race, etc. In view of the earlier description of these men and the momentous task assigned them, it is difficult to think that they, together with those 'grands Peuples', the Athenians, are merely capable of 'bien dire' in Rousseau's estimation. We would argue that on one level, intended for 'les hommes vulgaires', Rousseau indeed seeks to restore this ancient distinction in praise of those who are capable of 'bien faire'. On another level, that distinction is in fact restored, whether deliberately or not, within Rousseau's political and educational theories, where this distinction underlies the relationship between the legislator and the citizens of the Social Contract and between the tutor and Emile (see Chapters VII and VIII below).

Within this context, the translation of 'bien faire' is important. We have used the Masters' translation of 'act well' and the Cole translation 'act aright'. As such, the term 'faire' is interpreted as an intransitive verb with an adverb 'de manière'; hence, "Bien, mal faire: agir avec a-propos ou maladroitement" (Grand Larousse, III, 1867). This translation of 'bien faire' as 'act aright' (as opposed to the transitive verb 'do*), is consistent with our analysis of the relationship between the legislator and the citizens, or the tutor and Emile.
type of virtue would constitute a type of heteronomy that would limit the scope of great thinking. This is implicit in Rousseau's argument that the learned of the first rank must be given authority and power (and will be examined further in Part II).

It may be said that those who know how to 'act well' will have only a consciousness of freedom, but will not exercise radical freedom in the sense of those 'learned of the first rank'. For the sake of virtue, freedom is necessary insofar as men must do only what they choose to do. The nature of political and innocent virtue is that men will want or will to do that which is 'right'. This is ensured by love of fatherland, belief in religion, enlightenment of the will in the general will state, the careful nurture of natural instincts, etc. In other words, those who 'act well' may choose, but will only choose that which is 'right'. This we have called the consciousness of freedom, and it is this that characterizes those who act well and are animated by political or innocent virtue.

40 continued

The term 'act aright' more aptly describes the behaviour of those in whom "l'habitude de bien faire" has been developed. See also, Robert, I, 470-1; II, 1890-8; Huguet, I, 572.
However, if the basis for political virtue has been destroyed by the development of the arts and sciences, and if the natural goodness necessary for innocent virtue has been perverted and altered by the developments of history, how will virtue as the basis for right action be restored? Clearly the restoration of political and innocent virtue cannot come from these types of virtue in themselves. They will be re-established only by those who know how to 'speak well', through the combination of science, authority and autonomous virtue. According to Rousseau's paradigm at the conclusion of the first Discourse, it is only in the actual exercise of radical freedom (in conjunction with authority) that the basis for political or innocent virtue can be re-established.

41 Levine speaks of Rousseau's "moral individualism according to which the self, in the final analysis, is the ultimate constituent of the moral world order". A. Levine, The Politics of Autonomy: A Kantian Reading of Rousseau's Social Contract (Amherst, 1976), p. 196. This is true whether one examines natural, political, or autonomous virtue. Natural virtue, it will be argued in Chapter VIII, evolves fundamentally out of man's basic amour de soi. Political virtue will be ultimately manifested in the bearers of the general will for whom in effect there is no law beyond the law they give themselves, that is, the general will. Autonomous virtue is the ultimate form of moral individualism which Kant will later explore.

42 See Chapters VII and VIII below.
VI

SUMMARY OF PART I AND INTRODUCTION TO PART II

In this chapter the five foregoing chapters are summarized to serve as a basis for Chapters VII and VIII in accordance with our thesis that "the concluding paragraphs of Rousseau's first Discourse delineate a paradigm within the context of which Rousseau will later formulate his political projection, the Social Contract, and his educational projection, the Emile". In formulating this thesis, and especially in using the terms 'paradigm' and 'projection' to interpret Rousseau's writings, we recognize the centrality of freedom as autonomy in Rousseau's view of the whole (see page 7n.11 above). Throughout Part I this centrality of freedom as autonomy was emphasized. Specifically, in Chapters I and II it was shown how the fundamental perspectives of 'nature' and 'history' were based on Rousseau's concept of freedom, and in Chapters III, IV and V, freedom was used to explicate Rousseau's understanding of the 'arts', 'science', and 'morality'. For this reason a typology for freedom will be used to summarize Part I in preparation for Part II.
Freedom is always identified with autonomy in Rousseau's thought. This primary association of freedom with autonomy may be seen in man's relationship to other men and in his relationship to nature; specifically, in his independence vis-à-vis other men and in his free-agency, consciousness of his ability to disobey or obey the voice of nature.

There are of course other typologies. The most common also identifies three forms of freedom in Rousseau's thought, usually, natural freedom, civil liberty and moral liberty. Let us examine this typology as outlined by E. H. Wright, since his interpretation of Rousseau is popular and representative.

1) Wright begins with natural freedom which he sees as simple independence hemmed in by the laws of nature. This he judges to be a 'pitiable state': "For brute freedom to do as we please is only bondage to our pleasure, and extremes meet when the freedom of the savage to glut appetite turns out to be slavery to appetite". It must be emphasized that freedom in the state of nature is not the freedom to 'glut appetite'. Rather natural freedom is characterized by man's independence and harmonious relationship with nature, with only a consciousness of his free-agency. It is only when man enters society and loses his natural independence that amour-propre develops together with innumerable passions and appetites which enslave man.

2) Wright then argues "We rise next into civil liberty. It is that security in rights that constitutes liberty. What we have lost is therefore the precarious freedom to do as we please, and what we have gained is the assured freedom to do what all consider right". Rousseau does refer to civil liberty as the "security in rights" ("la propriété de tout ce qu'il possède" Social Contract, III, 364); however, such liberty is gained at great cost, namely, the sacrifice of natural freedom. Rousseau deems this a precious and fundamental freedom, not a 'precarious one' to do 'as we please'. Within the context of Rousseau's use of the term civil liberty, Wright's assertion that 'what we have gained is the assured freedom to do what all consider right' is totally incompatible with the whole thrust of Rousseau's critique of society. The civil liberty man gains in entering society consists in basic rights protection.
Independence and free-agency are the two elements that form the basis for the construction of a typology of freedom.

In Part I, three manifestations of freedom were identified: (i) natural freedom, (ii) misused freedom and (iii) radical freedom. Corresponding to these there are three perspectives that together form the basis for Rousseau's paradigm: (i) nature, (ii) history, and (iii) projection.

Wright continued:

(3) Wright continues: "Perfect obedience to our civil duty will bring us finally to know that highest form of freedom which is moral liberty . . . until our desire is one with reason. Full submission to the law of reason means entire mastery of self, and the kingship over self is the final freedom". By defining moral freedom as 'full submission to the law of reason', Wright underestimates the centrality of freedom in Rousseau's thought. Man's essence consists in freedom, not reason. Freedom precedes both reason and virtue.

Apart from these inaccuracies, Wright's typology is not particularly useful. It appears to be based on a single passage in the Social Contract (III, 364-5) and does not take into account the broader context of Rousseau's writings. Wright does not examine the nature of freedom and so, the relationship between the various forms of freedom is unclear. In arguing that freedom is the fundamental essence of man in Rousseau's thought, we have delineated a typology based on the two components of freedom as autonomy, namely, independence and free-agency, and have traced these two components through the various manifestations of freedom. By avoiding the chronological and progressive natural—civil—moral freedom interpretation, we have demonstrated the continued relevance of natural freedom as a standard for comparison. Further, we have argued that misused freedom is a significant manifestation of free-agency demonstrating the primacy of freedom as autonomy in Rousseau's thought. (E. H. Wright, Meaning of Rousseau, pp. 27-8; see also, A. Levine, Politics of Autonomy, pp. 57ff.)
In Chapter I it was argued that the state of nature in Rousseau's thought represents a type of ideal, a constructed referent whereby historical phenomena may be judged. It is the solitary nature of man's existence in the state of nature that distinguishes it from all other conditions of men and is the source of its idealization. According to Rousseau, man's natural state is that of solitude and only in the state of nature is man sufficiently independent of other men to make solitude possible. It is only in the state of nature that natural freedom is actually feasible, for natural freedom entails complete independence, not needing other men. Although this is only possible in the state of nature, it remains at the heart of Rousseau's concept of freedom. In aligning natural freedom with the solitary condition of man through independence, Rousseau connects freedom with autonomy, a connection that remains central throughout his writings.

Freedom as autonomy is also exemplified in man's relationship to nature. Rousseau argues that it is man's quality of 'free-agency' that distinguishes him from the animals. Man is able to resist and ignore nature unlike the animals who obey automatically. In the state of nature
man obeyed nature, living according to his natural instincts. His obedience was distinct from that of the animals however, in that he was free to obey or resist. Obedience to nature was not automatic, but a matter of choice, "un acte de liberté". Man is not required to exercise his ability to resist nature to be free. Natural freedom requires only the consciousness of one's ability to resist nature. Hence, natural freedom embodies autonomy both in man's independence of other men and in his free-agency, the consciousness of his ability to obey or ignore nature.

In Chapter II it was argued that the natural freedom which characterized man in the state of nature has degenerated in history into what we have termed misused freedom. Through history ("la succession des tems et des choses", and specifically, "le concours fortuit de plusieurs causes étrangères") man became increasingly dependent on other men and lost that solitary condition that distinguished the state of nature from all other conditions. In the two Discourses, Rousseau traces the increased dependence of men on each other and the

\[\text{Second Discourse, III, 141.}\]
\[\text{Second Discourse, III, 122.}\]
\[\text{Second Discourse, III, 162; see pages 43-4 above.}\]
devolution of man from a being characterized by natural freedom to his enslavement through social interdependence. Man seemed to compensate for this loss of autonomy in one area (independence of other men) by assertion of autonomy in another (over nature). The loss of one aspect of natural freedom led to a misuse of the other. Man's primary instincts of amour de soi and pitié degenerated into amour-propre. The attendant multiplication of unnatural lusts and desires within man led to the misuse and distortion of the order of nature around him. In sum, misused freedom combines man's increasing dependence on other men with negative free-agency, the exercise of his ability to resist nature.

Radical freedom may be seen as a type of natural freedom available for some men living in society. Radical freedom combines both aspects of natural freedom, independence and free-agency, within the constraints of social circumstances and the changes wrought by centuries of misused freedom.

Radical freedom is not bound in any way by heteronomy. It is best described by Rousseau's phrase 'they have no masters', which encompasses autonomy both vis-à-vis other men and vis-à-vis nature. Unlike most men whose thoughts and actions are bound by 'art' (see Chapter III above), those

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5 First Discourse, III, 29.
few capable of radical freedom exemplify the solitary and independent condition embodied in natural freedom. In terms of man's relationship to nature, Rousseau indicates that the "sequence of time and circumstances" has so altered the original constitution of what is ("the nature of things") and has given rise to a whole series of new (historical) phenomena, that history has degenerated beyond nature's scope (see pages 89-90 above). Nature can no longer be looked to as a force to restore the felicity of mankind. In this sense, radical freedom must move beyond nature; those capable must exercise their free-agency to order history to restore the felicity that was lost together with natural freedom.

In sum, natural, misused and radical freedom may be distinguished in terms of these two aspects of autonomy, namely, independence of other men and free-agency, as follows:

Natural freedom refers to the original solitary condition of man living in total independence of other men and in harmony with nature, with only a consciousness of his ability to acquiesce or resist.

Misused freedom refers to the loss of man's independence vis-à-vis other men coupled with the exercise of his autonomy over nature, that is, the misuse of his free-agency.

6 Second Discourse, III, 162.
Radical freedom refers to the ability of some great men to think and act alone, without 'art' or any other form of heteronomy, and to their ability to exercise free-agency to restore the felicity of mankind.

It was pointed out earlier that there are different historical perspectives which correspond with these three manifestations of freedom. These are (i) nature, (ii) history, and (iii) projection. These three perspectives together form the framework for Rousseau's paradigm, the 'model or example whereby he speaks or appoints what is outside of, beside or beyond' (see page 7 n.11 above). The centrality of Rousseau's concept of freedom as autonomy is incorporated into his paradigm via each of these perspectives.

In formulating his 'nature' perspective, Rousseau uses both careful observation and conjecture. The critical role played by careful observation in determining the 'nature of things' is most clearly demonstrated in the *Emile*. In Rousseau's educational projection, both teacher and student are urged to study and observe nature, not only that it may be fully utilized, but also to serve as an example or model to judge other (historical) phenomena. This will be further examined in Chapter VIII.
In Chapter I, it was pointed out that much of Rousseau's description of nature, particularly as manifest in his concept of natural man in the state of nature, was based on conjectural history. Misused freedom and 'the sequence of time and circumstances' had so altered the original nature of man and things that it was only through the reconstruction of history through hypothesis and conjecture that much of Rousseau's 'nature' perspective could be formulated. Rousseau's assertion that man's original condition in the state of nature was that of solitude and independence is a hypothesis to expedite his formulation of educational and political projections in terms of freedom. Similarly, his argument that man could be distinguished from the beasts by his consciousness of his ability to obey or disobey nature is also a hypothesis. These two primary hypotheses concerning natural man in the state of nature are combined in Rousseau's concept of natural freedom. Although these things are hypotheses and are based on conjecture, Rousseau argued that they reflect the 'nature of things'.

For Rousseau, these and other hypotheses and conjectures concerning the original constitution of men and things are not merely of antiquarian or anthropological interest.
Underlying this reconstruction of history is Rousseau's hypothesis that man is distinguished from the beasts by his perfectabilité. In Chapter I it was noted that this perfectabilité may be seen as the historical manifestation of human freedom, specifically, free-agency. Perfectabilité is a corollary of man's essential freedom, that not only enables man to transcend himself, but equally allows him to fall lower than the beasts. History, according to Rousseau, mainly consists of this latter aspect of perfectabilité.

'History' in Rousseau's paradigm may be seen as a process of degeneration, a moving away from the 'nature' perspective. Despite man's potential for unlimited progress, history for the most part has been characterized by the misuse of freedom, the antithesis of natural freedom. Man in history has lost the means to his natural solitary condition and must live of necessity in society. Society is predicated on a certain degree of interdependence and in terms of Rousseau's exaltation of natural freedom, society always represents a form of bondage and enslavement. Man seems to compensate for loss of autonomy in one area (independence of other men) by assertion of autonomy in another (over nature). In history, man has misused freedom to assert his autonomy against nature and has thus become a tyrant over himself and over
nature. Within Rousseau's paradigm, therefore, the 'history' perspective traces a process or movement away from the 'model or example' which Rousseau argues represents the 'nature of things', that is, the 'nature' perspective. Rousseau addresses himself to the antithetical relationship between these two perspectives in terms of radical freedom which is the basis for what we have termed his 'projection' perspective.

It was argued in Chapters IV and V that to restore the felicity of mankind, to approximate to some extent the natural freedom man enjoyed in the state of nature, even after the ravages of misused freedom, it is necessary to combine authority with great science (thinking alone) and autonomous virtue, both characterized by radical freedom. Thinking according to method or procedure, that is, the 'art of thinking' cannot make/create that which is necessary to move beyond history as "le difforme contraste de la passion qui croit raisonner et de l'entendement en délire" of misused freedom.

8 Second Discourse, III, 142.

9 Second Discourse, III, 122.
It is through the exercise of radical freedom that the 'preceptors of the human race' can develop 'models whereby they can speak or appoint what is beyond'. The term 'projection' most closely approximates the relationship between thought and action in Rousseau's work, particularly in the concluding paragraphs of the first Discourse, that places him at the forefront of modern political theory. Although Rousseau's paradigmatic view of the whole cannot be understood without the perspectives we have termed 'nature' and 'history', we are ultimately most concerned in this dissertation with this 'projection' perspective. Accordingly, Chapters VII and VIII will examine the Social Contract and the Emile as 'projections', as 'models or examples whereby Rousseau speaks (appoints) what is beyond'.
ROUSSEAU'S POLITICAL PROJECTION: THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

The centrality of Rousseau's concept of freedom as autonomy will be reflected in the structure of this chapter. Examination of the Social Contract will be based on the three aspects of freedom — natural, misused, and radical freedom — that underlie the paradigm developed in Part I as summarized in Chapter VI.

In the preface to the Emile, Rousseau states:

En toute espece de projet, il y a deux choses à considérer: premierement, la bonté absolue du projet; en second lieu, la facilite de l'exécution.

Under the rubric of natural freedom we will examine 'la bonté absolue du projet', or specifically, how the independent and solitary condition of man in the state of nature serves as the basis for Rousseau's general will state.

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1 Emile, IV, 243.

2 It may be argued that the term 'general will state' is inappropriate since the state as an "apparatus of external co-ordination and control" (Levine, Politics of Autonomy, p. 200) becomes superflous when the general will truly operates within a community. Recent Marxist-oriented interpretations examining Rousseau's pioneering of a concept of community may be tempted to also see in Rousseau the 'withering away of the state'.
In the *Social Contract*, Rousseau must also take into account 'la facilité de l'exécution' of his political projection. He must deal with "les hommes tels qu'ils sont". Within the context of misused freedom, we will examine men 'such as they are' — ill-equipped for citizenship, lacking in political virtue, and hence, unsuited for life in the general will state. Under the heading of radical freedom, we will examine how men 'such as they are' may be fitted for life in the general will state and how Rousseau seeks to restore the felicity of mankind through his political projection.

**Natural Freedom**

It was stated earlier that freedom is both the highest philosophic principle and the fundamental fact of human existence in Rousseau's thought (see page 28 above). This is perhaps nowhere as clearly demonstrated as in the *Social Contract*. In the *Social Contract*, Rousseau seeks to establish the basis for the legitimization of the state in a new way that justifies his claim to be the founder of political

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2 continued

See L. Colletti, *From Rousseau to Lenin*, trans. J. Merrington, J. White (London, 1972), pp. 184-7. It is doubtful if Rousseau foresaw the dissolution of the state ('apparat of external co-ordination' etc.) through the proper functioning of the general will in a community. Certainly within the context of the *Social Contract*, the institution and initial operation of the general will clearly takes place within the structure of a state.
right(s). It will be argued below that Rousseau's understanding of law, legitimization, the general will, citizenship, and above all, his concept of political right(s), on which these are all based, are rooted in his concept of freedom as autonomy.

It was argued in Part I that although the conditions necessary for natural freedom had been lost through history, it nevertheless remains as the fundamental basis for Rousseau's concept of freedom and hence, his concept of who man is and what he can be (see pages 55ff. above). It is natural freedom based on the description of man's original condition as one of solitude that idealizes autonomy (independence of other men). It is Rousseau's very difficult task in the Social Contract to reconcile the exigencies of political order necessitating interdependence with his exaltation of

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3 The context of this phrase is as follows: "Je veux chercher si dans l'ordre civil il peut y avoir quelque règle d'administration légitime et sûre, en prenant les hommes tels qu'ils sont, et les loix telles qu'elles peuvent être" (III, 351). There is some confusion whether this phrase refers to men such as they were (original or natural man) or men such as they have become (historical man). However, within the context of the opening lines quoted above, and Rousseau concern with practicability, it would seem clear that 'tel qu'ils sont' refers to historical man.

man as a free --independent, autonomous--being. This he does by making the independence aspect of natural freedom the crucial factor in the determination of the legitimacy of the political order. It is in this way that Rousseau demonstrates "la bonté absolue" of his projection, or specifically, that "le projet soit admissible et practicable en lui-même, que ce qu'il a de bon soit dans la nature de la chose". In the following pages we will examine Rousseau's concept of political right(s), the general will and citizenship in order to see how this reconciliation of freedom with the political order is accomplished.

Political Right(s)

It would be an exceedingly difficult task to fully explicate what Rousseau means by 'right' or 'rights'. It is our purpose here only to indicate the relationship between Rousseau's concept of 'right(s)' and his notion of freedom, and so it is only in a very partial and limited way that 'right(s)' will be examined.


6 Emile, IV, 243.
The Social Contract is alternatively named Principes du Droit Politique and there are but few pages in the Social Contract in which the word 'droit' or 'droits' does not appear. Yet, Rousseau's use of the word 'droit(s)' seems ambiguous and there would appear to be two meanings or two ways in which this core word is used. More precisely, Rousseau's thought reflects some transition in the meaning of the word 'droit politique'. The word 'droit' or 'droit politique' was traditionally based upon or at least related to some concept of natural right. 'Political right' in this sense may be seen as a standard, which traditionally implied a type of 'given'. Rousseau often uses the word 'droit' in this way. In his charge that Grotius establishes "le droit par le fait", Rousseau is clearly using the word 'droit' in the sense of a type of standard. Similarly, in his statement that, "Je tâcherai d'allier toujours dans cette recherche ce que le droit permet avec ce que l'intérêt prescrit", the word 'droit' is used in this sense as well.

In terms of Rousseau's own political theory, 'droit' as a type of standard is primarily associated with nature and is used to represent the 'nature of things' by which history

7 Social Contract, III, 353.
8 Social Contract, III, 351.
and facts, and specifically, the political order can be judged. However, it was argued in Chapter I that nature, especially as manifest in the state of nature, was a constructed referent, based on conjectural reasoning — ultimately an 'ideal' rather than a 'given' in the strict sense of the word.

It is our contention that freedom transcends any possible 'given' standard or referent in Rousseau's thought, and in effect, when he uses the term 'droit' in the sense of a standard within the context of his own political theory, he is really referring to freedom. Freedom is basically the only relevant 'natural right' in Rousseau's thought.

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9 **Social Contract**, III, 357.

10 We recognize that the distinction between an 'ideal' and a 'given' standard reflects a fundamental difference between modern and traditional political thought. Involved here are two senses of the term 'nature'. Nature in the metaphysical sense of an essence, involving a teleological type of order that is ordained by the Author of Being underlies the traditional concept of political right as a 'given'. In modern thought (Spinoza, Hobbes), nature conceived as an original primitive state, or that which existed before historical development due to intelligence or will, began to replace the traditional concept of nature in the development of political right. Rousseau in effect attempts to combine these two senses through his concept of freedom. In so doing, he avoids the materialist sense of the latter, but also strips the former of any content.
Freedom is the 'natural right' on which his 'principes du droit politique', whereby he criticizes existing regimes and develops his own political projections, is based.

Rousseau argues that "ces mots esclavage, et, droit sont contradictoires; ils s'excluent mutuellement", thus indicating the very close connection between freedom and right. In both Chapter IV of Book I and Chapter I of Book II in the Social Contract, the inalienability of freedom is argued. Freedom is inalienable because it is of the very essence of man. Freedom lies at the very core of human nature. As men enter society, they each retain this freedom.

11 Strauss argues that Rousseau showed that man in the beginning lacked all human traits and that therefore it was impossible to find right in nature as Hobbes tried to claim. He then goes on to argue that man's humanity is the product of historical process. This is true if one takes humanity to imply reason or morality. (Hence the argument that man in the state of nature is sub-human because he is pre-moral; see page 98n.8 above.) However, we have argued that Rousseau defined humaness fundamentally in terms of man's freedom. It is in terms of the 'independence' component of that freedom that he presents the natural right on which all political right must be based. Strauss comes to this conclusion from a different direction when he says that "there is no natural law . . . which antedates the human will". (Natural Right and History, p. 280.)

12 Social Contract, III, 358.

13 Social Contract, III, 355-8, 368-9; Emile, IV, 833.
as an inalienable property, that is, as their natural right. In Rousseau's thought, natural right is no longer an anterior or external standard or referent whereby man may order his life, but becomes internalized and individualized as a fundamental and inalienable property which belongs to every man in the definition of his humaness. It is at this point that the transition in the meaning of the word 'droit' emerges.

From this inalienable property or natural right flows a whole series of political rights. These are designed to protect each man's independence insofar as possible in civil society. Rousseau incorporates this concept of political rights, mutually agreed to and developed to protect the independence of each man, into his 'principes du droit politique'.

14

Derathé argues that the idea that liberty was transferable or alienable prevailed among natural right thinkers before Rousseau:

tout droit est susceptible d'être transféré à autrui par un pacte. L'idée d'un droit inaliénable leur est complètement étrangère. Tout transfert de droit leur paraît légitime, pourvu qu'il se fasse par le moyen d'une convention, c'est-à-dire avec le consentement des intéressés.

[Rousseau] nie que ce qui est vrai de la propriété des choses puisse s'appliquer aussi à la liberté des personnes... Le droit de propriété n'apparaît qu'au sein de la société civile et doit son origine à des conventions humaines. Au contraire, la liberté est un droit naturel de l'homme, et il est de l'essence d'un tel droit d'être inaliénable.

'Droits' thus refers to protective mechanisms whereby individuals mutually ensure through the equal distribution of power a certain degree of independence within society. 'Right(s)' are established by convention, are negotiable and if necessary, forfeitable, except for freedom (independence) itself, which is inalienable, being a type of 'natural right' in the traditional sense of a 'given'.

The difference between 'natural right' as a type of 'given' standard (or ideal) and 'political rights' as protective mechanisms mutually agreed to in a society, is demonstrated in Rousseau's discussion of the social order as the basis for all other 'rights'. He writes: "Mais l'ordre social est un droit sacré, qui sert de base à tous les autres. Cependant ce droit ne vient point de la nature; il est donc fondé sur des conventions". Even though Rousseau argues that the social order is a 'sacred right', and the basis

15. Clearly it is only in society that 'rights' can be enforced. Of course, it is only in society that 'rights' are necessary.


17. The role of civil religion and 'divine' authority in the establishment of the state is reflected in the peculiar use of the word 'sacred' here. "Il ne faut pas de tout ceci conclure avec Warburton que la politique et la religion aient parmi nous un objet commun, mais que dans l'origine des nations l'une sert d'instrument à l'autre." (Social Contract, III, 384; see pages 160-1 below.)
of all other rights, it is not a 'natural right' or 'given'. It does not come from nature and must be founded on convention.

Rousseau makes it clear that 'rights' in this sense must be created and mutually agreed upon. This is the basis for political right within the context of the general will state where the inalienable 'natural right' of each man to freedom is transformed into the absolute sovereignty of the general will to ensure the protection of each man's 'political rights'.

Within the context of both concepts, of natural right or political rights, the centrality of Rousseau's concept of natural freedom idealizing man's independence of other men is evident. "Natural right' in the sense of a 'given' associated with that which reflects the 'nature of things' refers

18 Levine argues that "Within the contractarian tradition it was habitual to confound two quite distinct questions: the historical problem of the origin of the state, and the normative-moral problem of the foundation in right of the state (and so, of political authority and obligation)". (Levine, Politics of Autonomy, p. 6) In effect, however, these two questions are closely related in Rousseau's thought. For Rousseau, the problem of the origin of the state was very much related to the basis for right in the state. Having demonstrated the historical rather than natural origin of the state, there is no 'normative-moral' context for determining the foundation of right in the state apart from man's original condition in the state of nature.

19 Social Contract, III, 351-2; Emile, IV, 836.
directly to man's natural autonomy and independence of other men. "Political rights" as imperatives mutually agreed to, established and enforced by convention, are designed to protect and ensure a certain degree of this autonomy for each individual living in society.

The General Will

The reconciliation of the exigencies of the political order with the exaltation of man's freedom is ingeniously accomplished through the device of the general will. That which qualifies the general will as the legitimate absolute Sovereign in a state is its ability to ensure the independence of each citizen. Because the general will mechanism can ensure the natural freedom, that is, the independence of each man, it is used as the criterion for judging the legitimacy of all states.

The general will is determined through a process of generalization that adumbrates Kant's concept of universalization. Kant's categorical imperative ("Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.") is reflected in the manner in which the general will is determined.

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20 Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p. 39.
Pourquoi la volonté générale est elle toujours droite, et pourquoi tous veulent-ils constamment le bonheur de chacun d'eux, si ce n'est parce qu'il n'y a personne qui ne s'approprie ce mot chacun, et qui ne songe à lui-même en votant pour tous?

21

However, it is necessary to distinguish between Kantian universalization and generalization in Rousseau's thought, if the nature and function of the general will is to be understood. In Kant, man's developing ability to universalize correctly establishes the basis for morality through self-legislation. Through universalization, specific principles or maxims would be perceived by all rational men. For Rousseau, generalization is a means for determining the laws reflecting the general will. These laws are not universal maxims for moral action, but are relevant only within the context of the particularities of the specific nation (or community) within which a general will operates.

21 Social Contract, III, 373.

22 It is interesting to note that Kant ultimately envisions the founding of the universal and homogeneous state. (I. Kant, "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View", "Perpetual Peace", trans. L. W. Beck, in On History, ed. L. W. Beck (Indianapolis, 1963), pp. 11-26, 85-135.) Note in contrast Rousseau's emphasis on national particularities in devising a political system. Rousseau makes the following observation on the task of devising a form of government:
who see the general will in terms of a "metaphysical entity" or even a "Platonic ideal" misperceive the nature of the general will. The general will does not have a single, universally valid content, but reflects the common interest of members of a specific nation. Rousseau argues, for example, that what may be the general will for one association will be an external and particular will for another.

La volonté de ces sociétés particulières a toujours deux relations; pour les membres de l'association, c'est une volonté générale; pour la grande société, c'est une volonté particulière, qui très-souvent se trouve droite au premier égard, et vicieuse au second.

Mais quand il se fait des brigues, des associations partielles aux dépends de la grande, la volonté de chacune de ces associations devient générale par rapport à ses membres, et particulière par rapport à l'État.

The principles or content of the general will is applicable and just only within the context of the particular nation in which it functions. This is evidenced by Rousseau's almost total preoccupation in the Social Contract with moulding the bearers of the general will as opposed to explicating the

22 continued

Si l'on ne connoit à fond la Nation pour laquelle on travaille, l'ouvrage qu'on fera pour elle, quelque excellent qu'il puisse être en lui-même, pécherá toujours par l'application, et bien plus encore lorsqu'il s'agira d'une nation déjà toute instituée, dont les gouts, les moeurs, les préjugés et les vices sont trop enracinés pour pouvoir être aisément étouffés par les semences nouvelles.

(J.-J. Rousseau, Considérations sur le gouvernement de pologne et sur sa réformation projetée, III, 953; see also, Social Contract, III, 393.)
content of the general will. The citizens of the general will are prepared, not through the development of reason and their ability to universalize correctly, but by ensuring that they recognize and choose the common good. In his discourse on Political Economy, Rousseau clearly outlines the relationship between patriotism and the general will.

Ce n'est pas assez de dire aux citoyens, soyez bons; il faut leur apprendre à l'être; ... l'amour de la patrie est le plus efficace; car comme je l'ai déjà dit, tout homme est vertueux quand sa volonté particulière est conforme en tout à la volonté générale, et nous voulons volontiers ce que veulent les gens que nous aimons.

Il semble que le sentiment de l'humanité s'évapore et s'affoiblisse en s'étendant sur toute la terre ... il est bon que l'humanité concentrée entre les concitoyens, prenne en eux une nouvelle force par l'habitude de se voir, et par l'intérêt commun qui les réunit.

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25 Political Economy, III, 246.

26 Social Contract, III, 371, and also, 374.

27 C. Hall is very misled in this, arguing that the role of the legislator is to provide content for the general will. Rousseau (Toronto, 1973), p. 112.

28 Political Economy, III, 254; see also, 247, 262, etc.
The general will is based on affection and common interest and not reason in the Kantian sense.

The general will does not, therefore, embody a set of political principles, or laws good in themselves and universally applicable. The general will is crucial for Rousseau's political theory, not because of its content, but because of the relationship it establishes between men. The general will is basically a method of establishing sovereignty that ensures the fundamental independence of each citizen.

Les engagemens qui nous lient au corps social ne sont obligatoires que parce qu'ils sont mutuels, et leur nature est telle qu'en les remplissant on ne peut travailler pour autrui sans travailler aussi pour soi.

Les particuliers ne s'étant soumis qu'au souverain et l'autorité souveraine n'étant autre chose que la volonté générale, nous verrons comment chaque homme obéissant au souverain n'obeît qu'à lui-même, et comment on est plus libre dans le pacte social que dans l'état de nature.

Jouvenal notes that this view of the general will differs from the 'logical' or 'theological' concept of Fontenelle, Malebranche, Hobbes and Diderot. B. de Jouvenal, "Essai sur la Politique de Rousseau", in J.-J. Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, ed. B. de Jouvenal (Geneva, 1947), pp. 105-20. Rousseau rejected the idea of a single general will "as the dictate of right reason for the entire species ... Rousseau's general will is the 'common sensibility' of fellow citizens". S. Ellenburg, Rousseau's Political Philosophy (Ithaca, 1976), pp. 102-3n52.

Social Contract, III, 373.

Emile, IV, 841.
... car telle est la condition qui donnant chaque Citoyen à la Patrie le garantit de toute dépendance personnelle; condition qui fait l'artifice et le jeu de la machine politique, et qui seule rend légitimes les engagemens civils, lesquels sans cela seroient absurdes, tyranniquest, et sujets aux plus énormes abus.

32

Note that civil obligations, civil obedience and legitimacy all centre on the general will mechanism's ability to ensure the independence of each of its citizens. Rousseau's oft-praised defence of equality in the *Social Contract* is really only a component of the general will mechanism which ensures mutuality so necessary for the preservation of autonomy.

Si l'on recherche en quoi consiste précisément le plus grand bien de tous, qui doit être la fin de tout système de législation, on trouvera qu'il se réduit à ces deux objets principaux, la liberté, et l'égalité. La liberté, parce que toute dépendance particuliére est autant de force ôtée au corps de l'Etat; l'égalité, parce que la liberté ne peut subsister sans elle.

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The general will can best be seen as a mechanism whereby all the demands of political order can be reconciled with the primacy of freedom. The general will is primarily a method of establishing sovereignty whereby the natural independence of each man can be retained into citizenship. In this sense, the concept of the general will clearly reflects the primacy of freedom in Rousseau's political thought.

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33 *Social Contract*, III, 391
The Citizen

The protection of political rights and the proper functioning of the general will requires men who are truly 'citizens'. In his concept of citizenship, Rousseau must again reconcile the demands of the political order with the primacy of natural freedom (man's independence vis-à-vis other men).

Rousseau recognized that it is not possible for men to enjoy the 'rights of citizenship' without also fulfilling certain duties as subjects. Moreover, the general will can only operate in a state where men are willing to give the general will precedence over their individual, particular wills. How are these demands of citizenship (duties as subjects, the preference given to the general over the private will, etc.) reconciled with the exaltation of independence and autonomy? Rousseau writes:

\[ \ldots \text{que l'essence du corps politique est dans l'accord de l'obéissance et de la liberté, et que ces mots de sujet et de souverain sont des corrélations identiques dont l'idée se réunit sous le seul mot de Citoyen.} \]

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Obedience and liberty, subject and sovereign are merged through the mechanism of the general will whereby all equally submit to the laws they prescribe to themselves. Nonetheless, the

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demands of citizenship are great requiring the sacrifice of
one's natural freedom for the sake of conventional liberty.
Indeed, some may not consider the sacrifice worthwhile.

Although the transformation of natural freedom into conven­
tional liberty is ingeniously achieved through the mechanism
of the general will, in actual practice the general will pre­
supposes the existence of 'citizens', that is, those who are
willing to give the general will precedence over their private
wills, etc. Thus "il faudroit que l'effet put devenir la
cause, que l'esprit social qui doit être l'ouvrage de l'in­
stitution présidât à l'institution même, et que les hommes
fussent avant les loix ce qu'ils doivent devenir par elles".

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35 Rousseau makes the following distinction between
natural and conventional freedom: "il faut bien distinguer la
liberté naturelle qui n'a pour bornes que les forces de l'in­
dividu, de la liberté civile qui est limitée par la volonté
générale, et la possession qui n'est que l'effet de la force
ou le droit du premier occupant, de la propriété qui ne peut
être fondée que sur un titre positif". (Social Contract, III,
364-5)

The transformation of men into 'citizens' is a difficult and in most cases impossible task. For a man to live in the general will state, he must come to prefer the common good to his own private good, to choose the general will over his individual particular will, and to give the public precedence over his private aims. Even though Rousseau clearly outlines how, through the mechanism of the general will, each man will remain as free as before and each man will obey only himself, etc., he recognizes that more than simply appealing to man's rational self-interest is necessary.

Or le Souverain n'étant formé que des particuliers qui le composent n'a ni ne peut avoir d'intérêt contraire au leur . . . Le Souverain, par cela seul qu'il est, est toujours tout ce qu'il doit être.

Mais il n'en est pas ainsi des sujets envers le Souverain, auquel malgré l'intérêt commun, rien ne répondroit de leurs engagements s'il ne trouvait des moyens de s'assurer de leur fidélite. 39

It is not just necessary that men recognize their common interest, they must come to love it. The common interest on which the general will is based must eventually merge with, or replace, each man's private will. Rousseau notes: "Mieux 37


38 This is discussed on pages 152-3 below.

l'Etat est constitué, plus les affaires publique l'emportent sur les privées dans l'esprit des Citoyens". In order for the general will to operate its citizens must be animated by political virtue. The remainder of this chapter explores how Rousseau proposes to instill political virtue in men such that his political projection may be feasible.

In the above section, we have attempted to demonstrate, by examining Rousseau's concepts of political right(s), the general will, and citizenship, how he reconciles the exigencies of political life with the primacy of independence in his concept of natural freedom. Beyond this reconciliation, however, any projection formulated to restore the felicity of mankind must also take into account practicability, 'la facilité de l'exécution'. It is for the sake of the implementation of one's projections that Rousseau recommends that "the learned of the first rank" be welcomed into princely courts, that virtue and science be combined with authority. Rousseau himself never attained that status; he did nevertheless concern himself with the feasibility of his projection. Although Rousseau himself never was a legislator, he did devote much of the Social Contract to outlining how a legislator could make men into citizens capable of functioning in the general will state.

40 This is why the general will must be based on affection rather than reason; see page 145 n.29 above.
Misused Freedom

It is from the natural perspective of Rousseau's paradigm that we discover the original condition of man—a solitary creature choosing to live in harmony with nature, that is, a being characterized by natural freedom. It is within the historical perspective that we learn what man has become—a being whose total dependence on other men is coupled with a rebellious disobedience of the voice of nature, that is, a product of centuries of misused freedom. Rousseau accounts for the discrepancy between man as he truly is and men such as they have become in terms of misused freedom.

It must be noted that Rousseau's definition of 'citizenship' as discussed above only seeks to reconcile the exigencies of political order with the exaltation of independence, or in other words, the difference between the citizens in the general will state and man characterized by natural

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41 Social Contract, III, 429.

42 First Discourse, III, 29-30.
freedom. This does not take into account, however, the difference between man characterized by natural freedom and men 'such as they are' after centuries of misused freedom.

In actual fact, bridging the gap between the citizen in the general will state and man characterized by natural freedom is an exceedingly difficult task. Taking men 'such as they are' and turning them into citizens is an impossible one. Although the Social Contract is the most universal in scope of Rousseau's projections, he acknowledges that the vast majority of mankind has, through the misuse of freedom, been left incapable of citizenship in the general will state. They have moved not only beyond nature, but beyond the scope of Rousseau's creative imagination (projection) as well.

Looking back through recorded history, Rousseau can find but few peoples who would have been capable of citizenship in his general will state. Only people such as the Spartans and the early Romans, whom Rousseau contrasts continually in the first Discourse with contemporary man, would qualify for citizenship. These ancient peoples were

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43 Social Contract, III, 390-1. Rousseau suggests that only the Corsicans are still capable of legislating through the general will.
animated by political virtue characterized by self-sacrifice and temperance, vigour and valour. Without such virtues, the general will state, on which Rousseau's political projection is based, is impossible.

Specifically, what is required of a citizen in the general will state is that he must be able to generalize correctly and he must come to will the common good (general will) over his own private good (particular will). The former requirement is a problem relating to the public as a whole, while the latter is a problem relating specifically to the individual. The people (public) always, according to Rousseau, wills the good (general will), but it does not always see it.

Il s'ensuit de ce qui précède que la volonté générale est toujours droite et tend toujours à l'utilité publique; mais il ne s'ensuit pas que les délibérations du peuple aient toujours la même rectitude. On veut toujours son bien, mais on ne le voit pas toujours.

44 In praise of the Romans, for example, Rousseau writes: "Quelle difficulté n'imagineroit-on pas d'assembler fréquemment le peuple immense de cette capitale et de ses environs? Cependant il se passoit peu de semaines que le peuple romain ne fut assemblé, et même plusieurs fois. Non seulement il exerceroit les droits de la souveraineté, mais une partie de ceux du Gouvernement". (Social Contract, III, 425)

45 Social Contract, III, 371; see also pages 458-9.
On the other hand, the individual may see the good (general will) and still reject it.

De lui-même le peuple veut toujours le bien, mais de lui-même il ne le voit pas toujours. La volonté générale est toujours droite, mais le jugement qui la guide n'est pas toujours éclairé. Il faut lui faire voir les objets tels qu'ils sont, quelquefois tels qu'ils doivent lui paraître, lui montrer le bon chemin qu'elle cherche, la garantir de la séduction des volontés particulières, rapprocher à ses yeux les lieux et les tems, balancer l'attrait des avantages présents et sensibles, par le danger des maux éloignés et cachés. Les particuliers voient le bien qu'ils rejettent; le public veut le bien qu'il ne voit pas. Tous ont également besoin de guides: Il faut obliger les uns à conformer leurs volontés à leur raison; il faut apprendre à l'autre à connaître ce qu'il veut. Alors des lumieres publiques résulte l'union de l'entendement et de la volonté dans le corps social, de-là l'exact concours des parties, et enfin la plus grande force du tout. Voilà d'où naît la nécessité d'un Législateur.

Before examining how this is done or by what means the legislator is able to do this, it must again be pointed out that Rousseau considers most men beyond the scope of his political projection. Men such as they are have become incapable of political virtue and no amount of effort by Rousseau and his legislator will suffice to make them into citizens. Therefore, in speaking of how the legislator will prepare men for citizenship in the general will state, Rousseau is mainly concerned with bridging the gap between man characterized by natural freedom and man as citizen.

46 Social Contract, III, 380, emphasis added.

is not really dealing with men 'such as they are' after centuries of misused freedom.

In the Emile, Rousseau makes the following observation:

J'observe que dans les siècles modernes les hommes n'ont plus de prise les uns sur les autres que par la force et par l'intérêt, au lieu que les anciens agissoient beaucoup plus par la persuasion, par les affections de l'âme. 48

Rousseau, having demonstrated that 'force' is incompatible with man's natural right to freedom and having realized that rational self-interest is insufficient incentive for men to fulfill civil obligations, returned to the methods of the ancients to form the citizens for the general will state (see pages 221-222 below). In order that men may become citizens it is necessary to establish political virtue.

In Chapter V it was argued that political virtue, according to Rousseau, was a moral 'horizon' that developed out of the exigencies of social and political necessities. Political virtue was seen as an historical, rather than natural phenomenon, that was founded on faith, specifically

48 Emile, IV, 645.
49 Social Contract, III, 354-8 (Book I: Chapters III and IV).
religion and love of fatherland. These Rousseau saw as matters of public opinion and dogma (see pages 108-9 above). This view of political virtue is exemplified in the methods of the legislator in the Social Contract.

Je parle des moeurs, des coutumes, et sur-tout de l'opinion; partie inconnue à nos politiques, mais de laquelle dépend le succès de toutes les autres: partie dont le grand Légitimateur s'occupe en secret, tandis qu'il paraît se borner à des règlements particuliers qui ne sont que le centre de la voûte, dont les moeurs, plus lentes à naitre, forment enfin l'inébranlable clef.

Radical Freedom

It is through the conjunction of virtue and science with authority that a projection can be formulated to restore the felicity of mankind. In Chapters IV and V above, it was outlined how the autonomous virtue and great science necessary for projection were based on the exercise of radical freedom characterized by independence vis-à-vis other men and free-agency vis-à-vis nature. Those who are capable of exercising radical freedom in thought and action are among the few who know how to 'speak well' (bien dire), the 'preceptors of the human race' who formulate projections.

50 Social Contract, III, 394.

51 First Discourse, III, 29-30.
Rousseau in writing the *Social Contract* clearly identifies himself among the few 'preceptors of the human race'. As mentioned above, Rousseau did not possess the authority necessary for implementing his projection. It is through the legislator that Rousseau must hypothesize what he would do if he did.

In Chapter IV, it was argued that because reason, science and knowledge, and even man himself are subject to change in history, and because man and his circumstances, whether for good or ill, have moved beyond the voice of nature, it is only those who can exercise autonomous reason who can make things new, and history can only be ordered by that which is new. It is those few 'learned of the first rank' who are capable of autonomous reason who will, through the exercise of creative imagination, formulate educational and political projections for the ordering of history. The legislator in the *Social Contract* is readily identified as one who must be capable of autonomous reason and the exercise of creative imagination. Rousseau makes the following arguments:

Pierre [Peter the Great] avait le génie imitatif; il n'avait pas le vrai génie, celui qui crée et fait tout de rien.  

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52 *Social Contract*, III, 351; *Fragments Politiques*, III, 474.
Pour découvrir les meilleures règles de société qui conviennent aux Nations, il faudrait une intelligence supérieure, qui vit toutes les passions des hommes et qui n'en éprouvât aucune, qui n'eut aucun rapport avec notre nature et qui la connût à fond, dont le bonheur fût indépendant de nous et qui pourtant voulut bien s'occuper de notre; enfin qui, dans le progrès des temps se ménageant une gloire éloignée, put travailler dans un siècle et jouir dans un autre. Il faudroit des Dieux pour donner des loix aux hommes.

Le même raisonnement que faisait Caligula quant au fait, Platon le faisait quant au droit pour définir l'homme civil ou royal qu'il cherche dans son livre du règne; mais s'il est vrai qu'un grand Prince est un homme rare, que sera-ce d'un grand Législateur? Le premier n'a qu'à suivre le modèle que l'autre doit proposer. Celui-ci est le mécanicien qui invente la machine, celui-là n'est que l'ouvrier qui la monte et la fait marcher.

What is clear here is that the legislator must be distinguished from a mere prince, that is, one who has power. At best a prince may practice the art of governing which he has learnt from a legislator (by welcoming the 'learned of the first rank' into his courts). In effect though, according to Rousseau, princes usually govern by force. In contrast, the legislator will convince men to act well of their own

53 *Fragments Politiques*, III, 475; see also pages 52-61.

54 *Social Contract*, III, 386, emphasis added.

55 *Social Contract*, III, 381, emphasis added. See also pages 382, 384.
free will ("engager les hommes à bien faire de leur bon gré") and not by force. But the question remains, how will the legislator convince men to act well (bien faire) within a political context? How will he make them citizens?

It was noted earlier that that with which the legislator concerned himself in secret was manners and morals. Rousseau argues that these form the cornerstone of the state. Morality is a type of law that is not prescribed through reason or force, but must be graven on the hearts of the citizens through habit. In the state, morality is a matter of custom, and above all, public opinion. In an earlier discussion, a parallel was drawn between Nietzsche's concept of 'horizon-based' morality and the relationship between political virtue and public opinion in Rousseau's thought (see pages 106ff. above). Careful reading of the penultimate chapter of the Social Contract (Book IV: Chapter VII - "De la Censure") will further evidence this parallel.

Il est inutile de distinguer les moeurs d'une nation des objets de son estime; car tout cela tient au même principe et se confond nécessairement. Chez tous les peuples du monde, ce n'est point la nature mais l'opinion qui décide du choix de leurs plaisirs. Redressez les opinions des hommes et leurs moeurs s'épureront d'elles mêmes. On aime toujours ce qui est beau ou ce qu'on trouve tel, mais c'est sur ce jugement qu'on se trompe; c'est donc ce jugement qu'il s'agit de régler. Qui juge des moeurs juge de l'honneur, et qui juge de l'honneur prend sa loi de l'opinion.

56  First Discourse, III, 30; see also Fragments Politiques, III, 495.
Rousseau in this passage makes a clear connection between morality and that which is esteemed or valued, and between that which is valued and public opinion. Leaving aside the historical and philosophical significance of this view of morality, the political implications of this view are clear. The legislator must redirect public opinion, that is, "Redressez l'opinions des hommes et leurs moeurs s'epureront d'elles memes". The redirecting of public opinion to develop political virtue is best accomplished through patriotism and civil religion. The relationship between patriotism and political virtue was discussed earlier (see pages 144-5, 56 above). In the concluding chapter of the Social Contract, Rousseau argues that a civil religion must be formulated in order to develop political virtue.

57 Social Contract, III, 458; see also page 393.

58 Of course, Rousseau often describes the relationship between morality and those things which men value. In the famous passage in the first Discourse, he claims: "Les anciens Politiques parloient sans cesse de moeurs et de vertue; les nôtres ne parlent que de commerce et d'argent". (III, 19) This passage however, concerns the effects of such 'values' on morality, whereas the passage quoted from the Social Contract seems to imply that the source of morality (at least, political virtue) is based on what men value.

Il y a donc une profession de foi purement civile dont il appartient au Souverain de fixer les articles, non pas précisément comme dogmes de Religion, mais comme sentiments de sociabilité, sans lesquels il est impossible d'être bon Citoyen ni sujet fidèle. Sans pouvoir obliger personne à les croire, il peut bannir de l'État quiconque ne les croit pas; il peut le bannir, non comme impie, mais comme insociable, comme incapable d'aider sincèrement les lois, la justice, et d'immoler au besoin sa vie à son devoir.

In a similar passage in the *Emile*, Rousseau argues that the dogmas that constitute a civil religion are useful "d'enseigner à la jeunesse et de persuader à tous les citoyens".

Having thus engendered men with 'sentiments de sociabilité' through civil religion and patriotism, it is necessary to return to Rousseau's definition of man as being above all characterized by independence. Rousseau maintained throughout his writings that man is by nature a solitary autonomous being and that natural right could be identified with each man's fundamental independence. In order to make men into citizens, is it necessary to change human nature? Rousseau would seem to affirm this.

60 Social Contract, III, 468.

61 *Emile*, IV, 729; see also, pages 629, 636 and Social Contract, III, 383.
L'homme naturel est tout pour lui: il est l'unité numérique, l'entier absolu qui n'a de rapport qu'à lui-même ou à son semblable. L'homme civil n'est qu'une unité fractionnaire qui tient au dénominateur, et dont la valeur est dans son rapport avec l'entier, qui est le corps social. Les bonnes institutions sociales sont celles qui savent le mieux dé-naturer l'homme, lui ôter son existence absolue pour lui en donner une relative, et transporter le moi dans l'unité commune.

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Within this context it is appropriate to examine briefly what the training of men for citizenship in Rousseau's beloved Sparta entailed. When Rousseau urges us at the conclusion of the first Discourse to retain "cette distinction glorieuse qu'on remarquait jadis entre deux grands Peuples; que l'un savoit bien dire, et l'autre, bien faire", he is referring in part to the Athenians and Spartans (see page 112n.40 above). The Spartans are held in great esteem because they knew how to 'act well'; they, above all other men, exemplified political virtue. But how did the Spartans become such exemplary citizens? Like the citizens of Rousseau's general will state, the Spartans had a legislator, Lycurgus, of whom Rousseau writes:

Quand on veut renvoyer au pays des chimères, on nomme l'institution de Platon. Si Lycugue n'eut mis la sienne que par écrit, je la trouverois bien plus chimérique. Platon n'a fait qu'épurer le coeur de l'homme; Lycurgue l'a dénaturé.

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62 Emile, IV, 249.
There is no doubt that inasmuch as Rousseau admired Sparta, he emulated the methods and art of Lycurgus.

The legislator who sets up such social institutions must be capable of changing human nature.

Just as fate and centuries of misused freedom have altered human nature by making men dependent and perverting amour de soi into amour-propre, so Rousseau presuming on man's malleability, prescribes the transformation of man's original nature to conform to the demands of citizenship. The transformation is radical — from an individual 'parfait et solitaire' to a citizen 'qui n'est rien, ne peut rien, que par tous les autres'.
Of course, in changing men into citizens, in making them totally dependent on each other, Rousseau would claim that he is trying to preserve man's autonomy and independence as much as possible within a social and political context. In our earlier discussion, we tried to show how Rousseau has defined political right(s), the general will and citizenship, in terms of the pre-eminence of freedom. In giving oneself totally over to the general will, each man is assured of independence vis-à-vis his fellow-citizens. In effect, the general will transforms dependence on men into dependence on things, that is, laws. Dependence on things, that is, law, does not constitute heteronomy in Rousseau's thought.

Il y a deux sortes de dépendance. Celle des choses qui est de la nature; celle des hommes qui est de la société. La dépendance des choses n'ayant aucune moralité ne nuit point à la liberté et n'engendre point de vices. La dépendance des hommes étant désordonnée les engendre tous, et c'est par elle que le maître et l'esclave se dépravent mutuellement. S'il y a quelque moyen de remédier à ce mal dans la société c'est de substituer la loi à l'homme, et d'armer les volontés générales d'une force réelle supérieure à l'action de toute volonté particulière. Si les loix

64 Emile, IV, 250.

65 Social Contract, III, 381.
In this passage, Rousseau very ingeniously outlines how, theoretically, man's natural independence can be simulated within a political context. Elsewhere, by defining natural right in terms of man's natural independence and through the mutuality of the general will, Rousseau has further demonstrated how theoretically 'la dépendance des hommes' can be eliminated. However, in the process of acquiring 'sentiments de sociabilité' and learning to will the general will, men have become dependent, not just on the laws, but on the legislator. The primacy of freedom (independence) so ingeniously maintained in Rousseau's political theory, is seriously compromised by the art (of the legislator) required for its implementation. Both the methods and the product of the legislator's art seem inconsistent with the exaltation of freedom in Rousseau's political projection. This inconsistency will be explored further in Chapter VIII and in the Conclusion;

66 Emile, IV, 311.
however, in concluding this chapter the notion of authority will be examined as illustrative of this inconsistency.

In his discussion of authority in Book I of the Social Contract, Rousseau clearly argues that no man has natural authority over other men. Natural right declares the fundamental independence of each man. Legitimate authority can only be established by convention. Rousseau rejects the traditional sense of authority as 'given', that is, having an external referent or 'author'. Instead, authority is given by the people and is subject to constant supervision by the people. All other authority, according to Rousseau, is merely power. This is fundamental to Rousseau's thought in establishing the legitimacy of any political order, and yet, on another level, he recommends that the legislator use a form of authority that is neither natural nor established by convention. The political use of 'divine authority', for example, for persuading and constraining men is clearly advocated by Rousseau.

Cette raison sublime qui s'élève au dessus de la portée des hommes vulgaires est celle dont le législateur met les décisions dans la bouche des immortels, pour entraîner par l'autorité divine ceux que ne pourroit ébranler la prudence humaine.


Divine authority is invoked, not because it is true, but because it is useful. Such authority being 'given' neither in the traditional sense by the Author of being, nor in Rousseau's sense, by the people, cannot be distinguished from power. Rousseau justifies the use of this type of 'authority' because it is exercised in secret. The freedom of the citizen is not compromised because he is not aware of the legislator's role. This is a recurrent and significant theme in Rousseau's political and educational projections. The art of the legislator which in actuality seriously circumscribes the freedom of the citizen does not constitute heteronomy by virtue of the citizen's ignorance. It may be argued that the general will state as instituted by the art of the legislator through the political use of divine authority, civil religion, patriotism, etc., preserves only the forms and language (ideology) of freedom and that it is only the semblance of freedom that its citizens enjoy.

The art of the legislator is necessary despite the ingenuity of the general will mechanism in preserving each man's natural right to independence, because man is not by nature rational. 'Les hommes vulgaires' neither recognize

69 social contract, III, 383.
nor are compelled by the rational self-interest underlying submission to the general will. The logic and ingenuity of Rousseau's political theory cannot in itself compel men to become citizens. Rational persuasion being ineffective and force illegitimate, the art of the legislator is necessary to transform men into citizens. The legislator 's'occupe en secret' with the manners and morals of the people. The people are persuaded and constrained by opinion, affection, custom, and faith, all leading to '[l'] habitude de bien faire'. Paradoxically, the primacy of freedom requires the legislator to regulate not the actions, but the will itself. Freedom demands that men 'obéissant avec liberté'. In accordance with his natural right to independence, each man is ultimately only obligated to obey those laws he gives to himself. The general will is legitimate because it ensures that law is self-given. In other words, the legislator cannot publically constrain or regulate the actions of the citizens. Obligation and legitimacy in the political order are rooted in the individual will. For this reason, the legislator must address himself to regulating the will — to ensure that each citizen wills that which is

70 Fragments Politique, III, 494.
conducive to public order (the general will). Each citizen must be free to choose; however, the art of the legislator ensures that he will choose only that which is right. The autonomy of the will is preserved, according to Rousseau, because it is regulated in secret (see pages 156, 199-201 below).

From the time of its publication, Rousseau's Social Contract has inspired innumerable attacks denouncing the totalitarian and authoritarian implications of his political thought. Many of these attacks come from within the tradition of his own thought, that is, liberals who object to illiberal aspects of his political theory. It is not our purpose here to criticize Rousseau in the name of liberalism. Rather, we would argue that Rousseau thought out the implications of liberalism more fully than have his epo-goni. The totalitarian and authoritarian aspects of Rousseau's thought derive not from inadequacies in his political theory, but from the principle on which it is based. What Strauss has called the "undefined and undefinable" freedom

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71 Rousseau has been attacked for: subordinating the individual to the state (H. Taine, The Ancient Regime; C. E. Vaughan, Political Writings); using authoritarian means to achieve liberal ends (J. W. Chapman, Rousseau: Totalitarian or Liberal?, L. G. Crocker, Rousseau's Social Contract); the potential for popular despotism (B. Constant, "Principles of Politics" in Readings from Liberal Writers; Is. Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty); totalitarian nature of Rousseau's concept of unanimity (K. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies; J. S. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy
that lies at the heart of all of Rousseau's thought, becomes inadequate and pernicious when used within the context of the political order. The totalitarian and authoritarian potential of Rousseau's thought derives from the exclusive, disjunctive nature of freedom defined as autonomy. Natural right, law, legitimacy, justice, morality, and authority are all defined in terms of the primacy of freedom, and thus emasculated, are ultimately unable to constrain the exercise of freedom in the political sphere. Whereas traditionally these formed the context within which political power was exercised, this function is severely limited by the exaltation of freedom as the highest good. Of course, on one level of Rousseau's thought, these concepts are used to form the context for the exercise of political power; however, their function is mainly ideological, having ultimately no constraining influence over the exercise of power by those who practice and those who teach the art of politics

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E. Roesch, The Totalitarian Threat), etc. For an excellent synopsis and excerpts from the various critiques of Rousseau's political thought, see G. H. Dodge, J.-J. Rousseau: Authoritarian Libertarian? (Toronto, 1971). For a historical perspective on these types of critiques of Rousseau's thought, see R. Derathé, "Introduction: Du Contrat Social", in Oeuvres Complètes, III, cxiii-cxiv.

72 We define 'liberalism' in the broadest sense here as the exaltation of freedom as the highest good.
in the name of freedom. Those who practice the art of politics are not subject to constraint because they exercise political power in secret. Those who teach the art of politics by definition themselves have 'no masters'. They formulate political projections through the exercise of radical freedom which cannot be bound or limited by any form of heteronomy. These preceptors of the human race are characterized by complete autonomy, and although their task is no less than the complete transformation of human nature, regulation of the human will, and the re-direction of human history, they are bound only by their own will. It is in this that the potential for totalitarianism and authoritarianism may be found.
ROUSSEAU'S EDUCATIONAL PROJECTION: THE EMILE

Within the context of the paradigm outlined in Part I, the Emile may be seen as an educational projection ("projet"), a scheme or plan thrown out into the ("les reveries d'un visionnaire") to restore the felicity of mankind ("Ce sont celles . . . qui font le bonheur ou le malheur du genre humain"). Rousseau described the Emile as a "work which was the best, as well as the most important". Although it concerns the private education of a single child, in a certain sense the scope of the Emile extends much beyond that of the Social Contract involving man in relation to nature, to other men, and to the state. For these reasons, the Emile was used in the formulation and develop-

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1 Emile, IV, 243.
2 Emile, IV, 242.
3 Emile, IV, 242.
5 Emile, IV, 833.

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ment of the thesis of this dissertation as a source of verification for interpretation of the first Discourse and the Social Contract. This is evidenced by the extensive references to the Emile throughout Parts I and II. In this final chapter, the Emile will be examined as Rousseau's educational projection outlining the methods, principles and goals involved in 'l'art de former les hommes'.

6 Emile, IV, 241. The meaning of the term 'former' is important in this context. The verb 'former' can mean 'Donner l'existence et la forme' in reference to a Creator or Nature (Grand Larousse, III, 2025; Robert, III, 109). In a figurative sense, the term can be used to mean 'Faconner un être en developpant ses aptitudes, en exerçant son esprit, son caractère' (Robert, III, 110), or 'Eduquer quelqu'un selon certaines principes, développer ses aptitudes physiques ou intellectuelles, tel ou tel aspect de sa personnalité' (Larousse; III, 2028). In view of the malleability of man in Rousseau's thought and the creative role of the legislator or tutor in developing 'l'habitude de bien faire' in citizens and pupils, Foxley's translation of 'former' by 'training' is inadequate and somewhat misleading. The term 'develop' may be more appropriate, although it does not convey the creative aspect of the tutor's role. It will be shown that the tutor's role includes more than 'developpant Emile's aptitudes'. At times, the tutor must take on Nature (or the Creator's) role and actually give 'la forme' itself to Emile's development.
Natural Freedom

A central perspective in Rousseau's paradigm is his observation that history is characterized by the misuse of freedom. We have argued throughout the dissertation that misused freedom involves the ever-increasing dependence of men on each other (the loss of man's natural independence vis-à-vis other men) coupled with a misguided assertion of his autonomy over nature (the negative exercise of free-agency). The Emile can be interpreted as a reaction to these trends, with independence and the guidance of nature serving as the cornerstones of Emile's education. It is natural freedom, referring to the 'original solitary condition of man living in total independence of other men and in harmony with nature, with only a consciousness of his ability to acquiesce or resist nature' (see pages 124, 121-22 above), that lies at the heart of Rousseau's educational projection. In the Emile, Rousseau 'throws out into the future' a plan or scheme whereby these aspects of natural freedom may be preserved (simulated) insofar as possible in a society characterized by misused freedom.

7 Emile, IV, 309, 471, 666.
As already many times noted, freedom conceived as autonomy (independence) underlies all of Rousseau's thought and so it is not surprising that this autonomy is the ultimate goal that is exalted in Emile's education. Accordingly, Emile's first book is Robinson Crusoe, "le plus heureux traité d'éducation naturelle". Shipwrecked on a deserted island, Crusoe's solitary state best exemplifies the autonomy and independence that is to be Emile's ideal. It is this tale which will provide the setting for the first exercise of Emile's imagination and for a time he will be obsessed in work and play with solitary life on a desert island. It is within the context of this island that Emile will learn "les vrai rapports des choses", and will learn to judge all things as they should be judged. Ultimately, of course, Emile must leave his island and his independence will be modified by necessity, utility, social duty, his love for Sophie, etc. Nevertheless, the whole thrust of Emile's education is towards nurturing independence and

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8 Emile, IV, 454.
9 Emile, IV, 455.
10 Emile, IV, 469. 488, 536.
it is man in this independent, solitary condition as exemplified in Robinson Crusoe that remains as a standard whereby all other conditions of men are to be judged.

In accordance with the other aspect of natural freedom, Emile's education is formulated to be in harmony with nature. In contrast to the educational procedures of his day, Rousseau encourages teachers above all to observe nature and seek nature's guidance in educating the young. Emile will be of nature's making, "l'homme de la nature". As has already been pointed out, it would be a difficult and lengthy task to determine precisely what Rousseau means by 'nature'. This task is beyond the scope and intention of this dissertation; however, the following distinctions are useful and seem clear from a close reading of the Emile.

First of all, the word 'nature' is used to describe the relationship between things, that which Emile studies exclusively during the first half of his education. In teaching Emile to study 'nature', great emphasis is placed on observation and the proper development and use of one's senses. According to Rousseau, all that enters the human mind does so by means of the senses and the development of reason is based on sense-experience. Hence, in order that

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11 Emile, IV, 549.

12 Emile, IV, 481-88.
Emile learn to reason properly and not be misled by opinion and prejudice, it is necessary that he be taught to observe and use his senses accurately. ("Dans les premières opérations de l'esprit que les sens soient toujours ses guides."\textsuperscript{14})

It may be noted that this total reliance on one's own sense experience for the development of judgement and reason follows directly from the pre-eminence given independence and autonomy in Rousseau's thought. Emile, for example, cannot be taught, for he does not accept authority. All he knows must ostensibly come through discovery via his senses.

It is through 'nature' as the relationship between men and things, that Emile learns to accept physical necessity. Despite the exaltation of freedom as the highest good, the acceptance of necessity is not a problem for Rousseau. This is because that which is exalted is man's independence or autonomy vis-à-vis other men. Dependence on things is acceptable and according to nature (see pages 164-5 above).

\textsuperscript{13} Emile, IV, 370, 417, 481, 550, 551, 553, 568, etc.; Fragments Politiques, III, 554.

\textsuperscript{14} Emile, IV, 430.

\textsuperscript{15} Emile, IV, 316, 421, 444, 486, 558, 610, 635, etc.
Emile's acceptance of the law of necessity in relation to things is an important preparatory lesson for the law of utility unavoidable in his relationship with other men; and later, for the duties and obligations his role as citizen will require.

The word 'nature' is also used to describe "le developement interne de nos facultés et de nos organes". To a certain extent, the growth and development of the organs and faculties is an area "beyond our control". It is an area of physical necessity that must be taken into account and incorporated into any educational program that seeks to be in harmony with nature. Included in this use of the term 'nature' are instinct, conscience and passion. These Rousseau calls 'sentimens naturels', innate feelings that

16 The independence necessary for full development of the senses is later coupled with the free-agency that is central in the development of judgement. Rousseau argues that the distinct faculty of the free and intelligent being is to be able to given meaning to the word 'is':

Ensuite je réfléchis sur les objets de mes sensations, et trouvant en moi la faculté de les comparer, je me sens doté d'une force active que je ne savois pas avoir auparavant. 

Appercevoir, c'est sentir; comparer, c'est juger: juger et sentir ne sont pas la même chose. Par la sensation, les objets s'offrent à moi séparés, isolés, tels qu'ils sont dans la nature; par la comparaison, je les remue, je les transporte, pour ainsi dire, je les pose l'un sur l'autre pour prononcer sur leur différence ou sur leur similitude, et généralement sur tous leurs rapports. Selon moi la faculté distinctive de l'être actif ou intelligent est de pouvoir donner un sens à ce mot est. (Emile, IV, 571)
precede historical phenomena such as reason, morality, and society. Instincts may be described as innate impulses. Man's basic instincts are those of pitié and amour de soi which serve as the basis for morality. Conscience is the 'divine instinct', 'affections primitive' engraved in each man's heart that can infallibly discern good from evil and can guide reason towards notions of justice and kindness. Passions are basically desires. The original passion is self-love and only those passions which lead to self-preservation and freedom are natural. It is these innate feelings, that is, instinct, conscience, and passion, which

17 Emile, IV, 429, 781, 820, 836, 855-6, etc.

18 Emile, IV, 247.

19 Emile, IV, 247.

20 Emile, IV, 600.

21 See pages 100-1 above. Chapman makes an interesting distinction between 'social interest' arising out of pitié -- the "social sentiment of natural man", and 'social spirit' developed through habit and association and the extension of amour de soi to others through associating the idea of one's own good with theirs. He argues that social interest characterizes Emile who is a humanitarian, whereas social spirit characterizes the citizens of the Social Contract who are patriots. (Chapman, Rousseau, pp. 55-8)
make men, though by nature solitary, nevertheless capable of becoming sociable. Presumably these 'sentimens naturels' in themselves should make men capable of living harmoniously in society. However, as pointed out in Chapter II, freedom as manifest in man's ability to acquiesce or resist the voice of nature allows man to ignore nature's guidance. Over the years, man has misused this freedom to such an extent that these innate impulses, these primary feelings are almost effaced (see pages 187-90 below). In educating Emile for manhood and citizenship, the tutor will carefully observe the development of these 'sentimens naturel'. Just as Emile will study 'nature' around him as manifest in the relationship between things, the tutor studies 'nature' within Emile. In the section on radical freedom below, we will examine more closely how and for what 'use' the tutor does this.

22 Emile, IV, 600. Rousseau adds: "elle est a l'ame ce que l'instinct est au corps". (IV, 595, 598)

23 Emile, IV, 522-3.

24 Emile, IV, 322, 490.

25 Emile, IV, 600; Second Discourse, III, 126.
Natural freedom characterized by independence vis-à-vis other men and harmony with nature (with only a consciousness of free-agency) may be seen as the standard or ideal which forms the foundation of Rousseau's educational project. As indicated, independence is the criterion or standard by which decisions are made and things are judged, even though Emile's independence is ultimately severely modified and limited by the exigencies of social and political life. Further, the tutor takes great pains to ensure that, insofar as possible, Emile's education proceeds in harmony with nature. Young Emile will study nature as manifest in the world around him in order to see the true relationship between men and things, and in so doing, learns to accept physical necessity. The tutor will observe nature within Emile, the growth and development of his organs and faculties, and in particular, his 'sentiments naturels' in order that he may educate Emile in harmony with these innate tendencies and feelings.
Apart from outlining his ideas on education, Rousseau uses the *Emile* to criticize and analyze the failings of the society around him. Rousseau sees society as basically making men ever-increasingly and unnecessarily dependent on each other and leading them away from the guidance of nature. Misused freedom is characterized by the loss of autonomy together with the exercise of misguided, negative free-agency, and the *Emile* points out innumerable examples of this phenomenon. Before examining the relationship between the tutor and Emile, it is important to see how society dominated by misused freedom makes Emile's education based on natural freedom exceedingly difficult. If Emile could stay on his imaginary desert island, this would be unnecessary. But Emile is not a savage trained to live in the woods, but rather is to be a 'natural' man suited for life in society. The tutor's task lies in reconciling an education based on natural freedom with a society dominated by misused freedom.

26 *Emile*, IV, 483, 551.
Rousseau acknowledges that any society is predicated on a certain degree of interdependence. However, such interdependence must be governed by utility. These are lessons that Emile must learn. The law of necessity that he learns from nature prepares him for acceptance of the demands of utility necessitated by society. In Chapter III, in the discussion of 'art', it was argued that the criteria by which historical phenomena such as art were judged were independence and utility (see pages 73-75 above). For this reason, for example, Emile will learn carpentry which requires a minimum of dependence, but has a maximum utility or usefulness. Similarly, as Emile comes into contact with society, it is utility that is the basis for judging his relations with other men.

Even though the need for interdependence in society is recognized, as is physical necessity in nature, it is only interdependence for the sake of utility that is acceptable for Emile. Rousseau attacks the misguided prejudices that exalt interdependence for reasons other than utility.

27 Emile, IV, 456ff.
28 Emile, IV, 446, 456, 458, 473, 492, 539, 670, 728, etc.
This is most clearly illustrated in choosing among the arts. Whereas Emile will respect those arts which couple minimum interdependence with maximum utility, society exalts those arts which produce a minimum of utility with a maximum of interdependence. These types of arts relate to the production of luxury which, of course, is neither useful nor necessary, and therefore is outside of Emile's world. As such, much of what is honoured and valued in Parisian society falls outside of Emile's world, for he has learned to accept and desire only that which is useful. Apart from luxury which is the antithesis of utility and yet generates tremendous interdependence, Rousseau also attacks, for the same reason, manners, theatre, authority, textbooks, philosophy, etc. Until Emile's judgement is formed such that he cannot be corrupted by these things, he must be protected from them. Only at such time as he has learned to value independence and utility, and is able to judge his relations with men accordingly, will he be exposed to those things which are esteemed and coveted in a society dominated by misused freedom.

29 Emile, IV, 457.
Apart from making men unnecessarily dependent, Rousseau also argued that society stifled the direction and development of nature within man. The opening lines of the *Emile* sum up the effects of misused freedom: "Tout est bien, sortant des mains de l'auteur des choses: tout dégénéré entre les mains de l'homme". Rousseau then outlines how man confounds and distorts every manifestation of nature concluding that: "Il ne veut rien tel que l'a fait la nature, pas même l'homme". Rousseau acknowledges however, that society has evolved in such a way that man cannot exist as nature would have him be. Man in society is a historical phenomenon who through "les préjugés, l'autorité, la nécessité, l'exemple, toutes les institutions sociales", etc., has moved beyond nature's scope. The guidance of nature must, therefore, be supplemented by education -- 'the art of training men'. The tutor and all those who would train men do not merely guard and nurture nature within the child, but also carefully observe and study it in order that nature can be used to assist in the formulation and implementation

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31 *Emile*, IV, 246.
32 *Emile*, IV, 246.
33 Rousseau notes: "Nous travaillons de concert avec la nature, et tandis qu'elle forme l'homme physique nous tâchons de former l'homme moral". (*Emile*, IV, 636)
of those areas and facets of education that are beyond the scope of nature. The *Emile* is an education 'according to nature' in the sense that nature is observed to discover 'who man is', but also because nature is used to assist in training men to be what is necessary in the context of society. In the following section it will be argued that this observation of nature is a tool necessary for the manipulation involved in training men. First however, it is important to examine why an education beyond nature is necessary; why it is not sufficient or possible to allow nature in itself to guide and direct the development of the child.

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34 *Emile*, IV, 246-7.

35 The argument that Emile's education is simply based on nature is common, but inadequate. Grimsley, for example, argues:

An education based on nature rather than on human will has the great advantage of linking up the growth of the individual with the most fundamental aspects of the human condition . . . seeing the progressive unfolding of his character as part of a larger process and as a means of ultimately allowing him to take his place in 'the order of things' and the 'chain of being' created by nature. (Grimsley, *Philosophy of Rousseau*, p. 308)

Leaving aside the question of where Grimsley finds such an ontological view of nature in Rousseau, this interpretation of the *Emile* may be called the 'negative education theory'; that is, the tutor's job is only to allow nature to develop unimpeded in Emile. (See also, Wright, *Meaning of Rousseau*, Chapter II: "The Natural Education".)
Again there are countless examples in the *Emile* of how society has perverted and confounded nature within man. However, we will examine only those three very important manifestations of nature within man mentioned above, specifically, instinct, conscience, and passion. These three manifestations of nature within man are clearly interrelated. Nevertheless, instincts (innate impulses) and passions (basic desires) may be distinguished from conscience; instincts and passions are corruptible, whereas conscience, it may be argued, is not. This is an important distinction to consider in examining the effects of society on man's "sentiments naturels." Man's basic instincts are those of *amour de soi* and *pitié*. A crucial distinction in Rousseau's thought is that which he makes between *amour de soi* and *amour-propre*. *Amour-propre* is an historical phenomenon that occurs only in society. Rousseau recounts how Emile's natural instinct of *amour de soi* is transformed into *amour-propre* through feelings of comparison and competition aroused in his first encounter with his equals. From this corruption

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36 *Emile*, IV, 493, 523; Second *Discourse*, III, 219n.xv.
of the basic instinct of *amour de soi* there arise innumerable unnatural and perverted desires, that is, passions. Rousseau argues that our natural passions are those leading to self-preservation and freedom and are characterized by gentleness and kindness. As such, they are in harmony with the basic instincts of *amour de soi* and *pitié*. When society changes man's basic *amour de soi* into *amour-propre*, these natural passions are replaced by a whole host of new desires. In this process, man exercises his free-agency in a negative way ("la nature ne nous les donne pas, nous nous les approprions à son préjudice"). This corruption of the passions has serious implications for the preservation of man's natural independence. Rousseau explains as follows:

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37 Although *amour de soi* and *pitié* are man's fundamental instincts, man also has further instincts or innate impulses which are capable of corruption. Rousseau advises teachers: "Défiez-vous de l'instinct sitôt que vous ne vous y bornez plus; il est bon tant qu'il agit seul, il est suspect dès qu'il se mêle aux institutions des hommes". *Emile*, IV, 663.

38 *Emile*, IV, 523.

39 *Emile*, IV, 490, 493.

40 Rousseau adds: "[C]'est alors que l'homme se trouve hors de la nature et se met en contradiction avec soi". (*Emile*, IV, 491)
L'amour de soi, qui ne regarde qu'à nous, est content quand nos vrais besoins sont satisfaits; mais l'amour-propre, qui se compare, n'est jamais content et ne saurait l'être, parce que ce sentiment, en nous préférant aux autres, exige aussi que les autres nous préfèrent à eux, ce qui est impossible. Voila comment les passions douces et affectueuses naissent de l'amour de soi, et comment les passions haineuses et irascibles naissent de l'amour-propre. Ainsi ce qui rend l'homme essentiellement bon est d'avoir peu de besoins et de peu se comparer aux autres; ce qui le rend essentiellement méchant est d'avoir beaucoup de besoins et de tenir beaucoup à l'opinion.

The distinction between amour de soi and amour-propre which includes within this context the distinction between good and evil, is ultimately a question of independence, with man's corruption being clearly linked with increasing dependence on other men. Each new passion or desire spawned by amour-propre, itself a product of man's dependence, poses a further threat to man's independence. Enslavement to passions is the most common form of bondage in society. Even those passions which Rousseau calls 'pure' are capable of enslaving man. Emile's passion for Sophie is an example of this. Strength and freedom for man in society consists in a balance between his passions and his ability

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41 Emile, IV, 493, emphasis added.
42 Emile, IV, 493, 816, 819, 857.
43 Emile, IV, 776, 790, 799, 801, 819, etc. The primacy of independence in Rousseau's thought makes the question of 'love' incredibly problematic. See, for example, Emile, IV, 493.
to satiate them. Rousseau argues, "L'homme vraiment libre ne veut que ce qu'il peut et fait ce qu'il lui plaît". The great difficulty with corrupt passions is that they are limited only by the extent of one's imagination. Rousseau argues that *amour-propre* makes us desire that others prefer us to themselves which is impossible, and therefore, gives rise to passions that are incapable of satisfaction.

Conscience, the 'divine instinct' containing the basic principles of justice and virtue, may be ignored, buried or disobeyed, but is ultimately beyond corruption. Of these principles of justice and virtue, Rousseau writes: "Je les trouve au fond de mon coeur écrites par la nature en caractères inéfacoables". As such, the euphemism 'the voice of nature' is most apt to describe this manifestation or nature. Of conscience Rousseau says, "c'est qu'il nous parle la langue de la nature que tout nous a fait oublier".

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44 *Emile*, IV, 309.

45 Rousseau explains: "Ce sont les erreurs de l'imagination qui transforment en vices les passions de tous les être bornés". *Emile*, IV, 501; see also, 305, 491, 662.

46 *Emile*, IV, 493.
There is a basic contradiction between the demands of corrupt passions and the demands of conscience. Hence, the transformation of the basic instinct of self-love (amour de soi) and vanity (amour-propre), leading to innumerable corrupt desires and passions, makes men insensitive and unwilling to obey the voice of nature within, that is, conscience.

Through all this, it is crucial to note that the corruptibility of instinct and passion, and the fact that conscience, though not corruptible, is nevertheless only a 'voice' that can be ignored, are ultimately necessary for the preservation of man's autonomy. If instinct or passion were incorruptible, or if conscience was more than a voice, nature would constitute a degree of heteronomy inconsistent with the exaltation of freedom as the highest good.

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Of conscience, Rousseau says:

La conscience est la voix de l'âme, les passions sont la voix du corps. Est-il étonnant que souvent ces deux langages se contredisent, et alors lequel faut-il écouter? Trop souvent la raison nous trompe; nous n'avons que trop acquis le droit de la récuser; mais la conscience ne trompe jamais, elle est le vrai guide de l'homme.
(Emile, IV, 594-5)

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Emile, IV, 594, 857.

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Emile, IV, 601, 603.
Although conscience is the 'divine instinct', it is man's 50 freedom to choose to obey or resist his conscience that exalts him above even the angels.

Si l'homme est actif et libre, il agit de lui-même; tout ce qu'il fait librement n'entre point dans le système ordonné de la providence, et ne peut lui être imputé. Elle ne veut point le mal que fait l'homme en abusant de la liberté qu'elle lui donne, mais elle ne l'empêche pas de le faire; soit que de la part d'un être si faible ce mal soit nul à ses yeux; soit qu'elle ne pût l'empêcher sans gêner sa liberté, et faire un mal plus grand en dégradant sa nature. Elle l'a fait libre afin qu'il fit non le mal, mais le bien par choix ... La supreme jouissance est dans le contentement de soi-même; c'est pour mériter ce contentement que nous sommes placés sur la terre et doués de la liberté, que nous sommes tentés par les passions et retenus par la conscience. Que pou-voit de plus en nôtre faveur la puissance divine elle-mêmes? Pouvoit-elle mettre de la contradiction dans nôtre nature et donner le prix d'avoir bien fait à qui n'eut pas le pouvoir de mal faire? Quoi, pour empêcher l'homme d'être méchant fallait-il le borner à l'instinct et le faire bête? Non, Dieu de mon ame, je ne te reprocherai jamais de l'avoir faite à ton image afin que je puisse être libre, bon et heureux comme toi!

Hence, although man has become increasingly dependent on other men in society, and although he has confounded and perverted all manifestations of nature around and within him, this abuse of his powers (free-agency) nevertheless has merit. Misused freedom demonstrates in a negative way the ultimate freedom of man which still remains the highest good in Rousseau's thought. In the next section, we will examine how autonomy in the form of radical freedom is used in a 'positive' way to reconcile natural freedom with the effects of misused freedom.
Radical Freedom

The 'sequence of time and circumstances' has altered the original constitution of what is and has given rise to a whole series of new (historical) phenomena, such that nature as a force to restore the felicity of mankind has been transcended; although nature remains as a guide, it is only through radical freedom that history can be re-ordered. For this reason, an education based solely on the direction and guidance of nature is insufficient and inadequate preparation for life in society. Education must encompass whole areas (historical phenomena) that are beyond the scope of nature. Together with politics, education is among the 'great arts' that will be taught by the 'preceptors of the human race'. In formulating and teaching the 'art de former les hommes', the tutor may by identified as one who is animated by radical freedom, capable of creating projections, that is, schemes or plans

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50 *Emile*, IV, 256.

51 *Emile*, IV, 587.

52 See page 124 above; see also, *Emile*, IV, 818.

53 First Discourse, III, 30; *Emile*, IV, 247, 362.
whereby the felicity of mankind may be restored. The tutor, like the legislator in the Social Contract, is not practising an art that he has learned, but is among those who teach, having themselves had no masters. In the Emile, Rousseau is using the tutor to teach and demonstrate the 'art de former les hommes'.

In Chapter III, 'art' was defined as "a method or procedure of making, doing or acting, according to certain rules, for a particular end" (see page 76 above). What are the methods and procedures, the rules and principles, that will be used to train Emile, and more importantly, what is the 'particular end' of that training?

The first rule or principle the tutor prescribes for those who would practice the 'art de former les hommes' is the careful observation of nature. In the section on natural freedom above, it was shown how nature was to be

Rousseau notes that: "On n'a besoin d'élever c[e]ue les hommes vulgaires; leur education doit seule servir d'exemple à celle de leurs semblables. Les autres s'élevent malgré qu'on en ait". (Emile, IV, 266) See also pages 537, 670, 746, and page 201 n. 70 below.
used both to teach the acceptance of physical necessity and to develop Emile's reason and judgement. It was also argued that nature as the 'growth and development of the organs and faculties' is an area 'beyond our control' that must be incorporated into any educational programme. However, it was indicated that this careful observation is not just to ensure that nature is allowed to guide and develop unimpeded within Emile, but that such observation and study is also to be used in the control and manipulation of the child in those areas of his education for which nature in itself is inadequate. In other words, the careful observation and study of nature provides a useful tool for training men. Rousseau observes that, "Chaque esprit a sa forme propre, selon laquelle il a besoin d'être gouverné, et il importe au succès des soins qu'on prend, qu'il soit gouverné par cette forme et non par une autre". In Chapter IV, it was pointed out that a mechanistic view of nature was evolving in the seventeenth century that would replace the teleological concept of Aristotle (see pages 89ff. above). Newton's view of nature as being governed by fixed laws that could be thoroughly studied, categorized and 'known' with a high degree of certainty (predictability) is reflected

55 Emile. IV, 324.
In Rousseau's thought. It was suggested in Chapter IV that this view of nature facilitated the control and manipulation of natural phenomena. Insofar as man may be seen as a being governed by certain laws, this relationship between the observation of nature and its control and manipulation underlies much of the *Emile*. At this point it may be recalled that it was earlier argued that man is fundamentally an historical being in whom freedom (free-agency) predominates over nature. This, however, is not an obstacle in the relationship between knowledge of human nature and its manipulation in the *Emile*, for Emile's free-agency is rigourously controlled from infancy onwards (see pages 200-1 below).

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*Emile*, IV, 443, 466, 573-9, 591, etc.

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Rousseau advises:

Toutes ces pratiques semblent difficiles parce qu'on ne s'en avise pas, mais dans le fond elles ne doivent point l'être. On est en droit de vous supposer les lumières nécessaires pour exercer le métier que vous avez choisi; on doit présumer que vous connoissez la marche naturelle du coeur humain, que vous savez étudier l'homme et l'individu, que vous savez d'avance à quoi se pliera la volonté de votre élève à l'occasion de tous les objets intéressans pour son âge que vous ferez passer sous ses yeux. Or avoir les instrumens et bien savoir leur usage, n'est-ce pas être maître de l'opération? (*Emile*, IV, 364; see also, 520, 582)
The second rule the tutor prescribes is that Emile must be protected from the influences of society. In the above section on misused freedom, it was indicated that Rousseau saw society as dominated by ambitions and desires totally contrary to those to be pursued in educating Emile. Although it is clear that a certain degree of isolation may be necessary in raising children according to principles contrary to those valued by society, the manipulation and control of Emile's environment goes far beyond mere protection. Emile's desert island is not totally imaginary. The tutor asks, "Mais où placerons-nous cet enfant pour l'élever comme un être insensible, comme un automate? Le tiendrons-nous dans le globe de la lune, dans une isle déserte?" Emile's isolation must be achieved through the careful control of his surroundings and environment and the manipulation of all his encounters with the outside world. Emile's surroundings are carefully prepared such that he may see only those things which are fit for his sight. Having taught Emile to accept necessity, the tutor cloaks the manipulation of Emile's environment in the guise of necessity.

58. *Émile*, IV, 325.
Il ne faut point se mêler d'élever un enfant quand on ne sait pas le conduire où l'on veut par les seules lois du possible et de l'impossible. La sphère de l'un et de l'autre lui étant également inconnue, on l'étend, on la resserre autour de lui comme on veut. On l'enchaîne, on le pousse, on le retient avec le seul lien de la nécessité sans qu'il en murmure.

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Moreover, he will be raised in a village so that his contacts with other people can be controlled. Rousseau warns: "Vous ne serez point maître de l'enfant si vous ne l'êtes de tout ce qui l'entoure". Hence, Emile's mortification at the fair has been prearranged with the juggler. Emile competes in races with other children unaware that the tutor has fixed the races. The manipulation and control of Emile's surroundings and contacts with other people is not confined to the early stages of his education. The tutor remains master of Emile's environment even throughout his courtship with Sophie, who herself has been handpicked long in advance by the tutor.

59 Emile, IV, 321, emphasis added.

60 Emile, IV, 497, 501, 540, 801, etc.

61 Emile, IV, 438.

62 Emile, IV, 394-6.
The careful observation of nature and the control of Emile's surroundings are both used to ensure the fulfillment of the third rule necessary in the 'art de former les hommes' — the establishment of the authority and control of the tutor over his pupil. Paradoxically, the methods used to establish this authority are ostensibly based on the affirmation of natural freedom. This is most clearly demonstrated on pages 362 to 364 of the Emile, where Rousseau contrasts his education methods with other established practices in terms of the difference between a savage and a peasant. Tutors who practice the established methods of education produce pupils comparable to peasants dull creatures of habit, automatons in whom obedience has replaced reason. By contrast, those who practice the art of developing men according to the methods prescribed by Rousseau, will produce pupils in whom strength and reason have developed together to produce the self-reliance possessed by savages. The difference, according to Rousseau, is that the former pupil is controlled by precepts and is aware of the master-pupil relationship, whereas the latter always thinks he himself is master. In effect, however, Emile's tutor

63 "Ce rapport des noms, cette rencontre qu'il croit fortuite . . ." Emile, IV, 778; se also, 691, 763, 765, 776, 801, 803, etc.
holds greater control and authority over Emile than that
normally held by tutors over their pupils. Rousseau pre-
scribes using the language and forms of freedom to ensure
the total mastery of the tutor over his pupil.

Prenez une route opposée avec votre élève; qu'il croye tou-
jours être le maître et que ce soit toujours vous qui le
soyez. Il n'y a point d'assujettissement si parfait que
celui qui garde l'apparence de la liberté; on captive ainsi
la volonté même. Le pauvre enfant qui ne sait rien, qui
ne peut rien, qui ne connoit rien, n'est-il pas à votre
merci? Ne disposez-vous pas par rapport à lui de tout ce
qui l'environne? N'êtes-vous pas le maître de l'affecter
comme il vous plait? Ses travaux, ses jeux, ses plaisirs,
ses peines, tout n'est-il pas dans vos mains sans qu'il
le sache? Sans doute, il ne doit faire que ce qu'il veut;
mais il ne doit vouloir que ce que vous ne l'ayez prévu,
il ne doit pas ouvrir la bouche que vous ne sachiez ce
qu'il va dire.

Hence, it is through "la liberté bien réglée" that the
tutor controls and leads Emile such that even when Emile
is free to choose he will only choose that which the tutor

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The tutor asks:

Quoi! faut-il abdiquer mon autorité lorsqu'elle m'est
le plus nécessaire? ... Jusqu'ici vous n'en obteniez
rien que par force ou par ruse; l'autorité, la loi du
devoir lui étoient inconnues; il falloit le contraindre
ou le tromper pour vous faire obéir. Mais voyez de
combien de nouvelles chaines vous avez environné son
coeur.

(Emile, IV, 639; see also, 643, 651, 653, 823, etc.)
wills. With the will thus regulated, it is necessary to examine the nature of freedom that is available for Emile. As with the citizens of the Social Contract, it is actually only the form of freedom that is preserved. Although freedom is the fundamental principle that forms the basis for Rousseau's political and educational projections, Emile and the citizens of the Social Contract are left with what may be called the ideology of freedom. Towards the end of the Emile, Emile proclaims: "Il me semble que pour se rendre libre on n'a rien à faire; il suffit de ne pas vouloir cesser de l'être". He does not realize that under Rousseau's tutelage, it was only the desire for freedom that was ever available to him anyway.

The tutor explains:

Il m'a fallu quinze ans de soins pour me ménager cette prise. Je ne l'élevois pas alors, je le préparois pour être élevé; il l'est maintenant assés pour être docile; il reconoit la voix de l'amitié et il sait obéir à la raison. Je lui laisse, il est vrai, l'apparence de l'indépendance, mais jamais il ne me fut mieux assujeti, car il l'est parce qu'il veut l'être. Tant que je n'ai pu me rendre maître de sa volonté je le suis demeuré de sa persone; je ne le quittois pas d'un pas. Maintenant je le laisse quelquefois à lui-même parce que je le gouverne toujours. (Emile, IV, 661).

Emile, IV, 362.

Emile, IV, 321.
The crucial question that must be asked is, for what end or purpose are men educated? What is the 'particular end' that Rousseau is trying to achieve through 'l'art de former les hommes'? It was argued earlier that Rousseau formulated his educational projection in terms of the attributes of natural freedom, namely, independence of other men and living in harmony with nature, in full consciousness of one's ability to obey or disobey. Although the tutor succeeded to a certain extent in incorporating these attributes into Emile's education process, it cannot be forgotten that the language of natural freedom was used to establish the tutor's absolute control over Emile. In this sense, natural freedom must be seen more as a method than as the end of Rousseau's art of training men. The 'particular end' of Rousseau's art is to enable men to 'act well' (bien faire).

The relationship between the tutor and Emile, as a manifestation of the relationship between those who know how to 'speak well' (bien dire) and those who know how to 'act well' (bien faire), closely parallels the relationship between the legislator and the citizens of the general

68 Emile, IV, 765.

69 Emile, IV, 856.
will state. Rousseau uses education and politics for the purpose of training men to 'act well'. Although inexorably linked with happiness ('felicity of mankind'), learning to 'act well' only allows a semblance of freedom, and it is after all freedom that is exalted as the highest good in Rousseau's thought. Although dependence on others is seen as the greatest of evils, the authority and control exercised by those who know how to 'speak well' in order to train men to 'act well' surely implies an extremely dependent relationship. The implications of that dependency are not mitigated by the fact that this authority and control is exercised in secret. Rather, the fact that Emile and the citizens of the general will state are unaware or not conscious of the ways in which they are being manipulated and formed makes their dependence on the tutor and the legislator that much more complete. Although Rousseau's projections may be useful in restoring the felicity of mankind, the methods, principles and ends advocated in these.

In the following passage, Rousseau makes clear that this distinction may be made between the tutor and Emile:

Mais toi, bon Emile, à qui rien n'impose ces douloureux sacrifices, toi qui n'as pas pris le triste emploi de dire la vérité aux hommes, va vivre au milieu d'eux, cultive leur amitié dans un doux commerce, sois leur bien-faiteur, leur modèle, ton exemple leur servira plus que tous nos livres, et le bien qu'ils te verront faire les touchera plus que tous nos vains discours. (Emile, IV, 858-9)
projections seem inconsistent with that which he deems to be the highest good, namely, freedom as autonomy.

Again however, the purpose of our thesis is not to criticize Rousseau in the name of liberalism. The fact that the methods, principles and ends of this projections may be inconsistent with freedom is not in itself the subject of our concern. Rather, we would argue that this inconsistency is illustrative of a more fundamental problem with Rousseau's thought, namely, the definition of freedom in terms of autonomy and its exaltation as the highest good. The consequences and implications of this exaltation have been the primary concern of this thesis and will be the subject of its conclusion.

71 Emile, IV, 359, 815.

72 At the conclusion of the Emile, Emile, now married to Sophie and expecting a child, begs the tutor: "Conseillez-nous, gouvernez-nous, nous serons dociles: tant que je vivrai j'aurai besoin de vous. J'en ai plus besoin que jamais, maintenant que mes fonctions d'homme commencent". (Emile, IV, 868)
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we will re-state our thesis and summarize how it has been explicated (pages 205-215). We will then outline some of the problematic areas in Rousseau's thought (pages 216-234).

Our thesis has been that: "The concluding paragraphs of Rousseau's first Discourse delineate a paradigm within the context of which Rousseau will later formulate his political projection, the Social Contract, and his educational projection, the Emile". Our intention in formulating and arguing this thesis has been to demonstrate the primacy of freedom as autonomy in Rousseau's thought.

Exploration of this concept of freedom began with a discussion of nature as manifest in Rousseau's notions of the state of nature and human nature (Chapter I). Although most interpretations of the first Discourse are based on a juxtaposing of nature with the artificialities of society, there is a further historical dimension that in a certain way transcends nature. Our examination of
Rousseau's notions of the state of nature and human nature indicated that these manifestations of nature, both in their definition and actual conceptualization, are clearly preceded by Rousseau's concept of freedom. Moreover, from a historical perspective, nature as a guiding force has been thwarted and ultimately transcended by the exercise of human freedom in history.

According to our interpretation, the first Discourse may be divided as follows: In the discussion of morality and the arts and sciences in the main body of the Discourse, Rousseau describes the many manifestations of the misuse of freedom leading man away from that which is natural, whereas the concluding paragraphs outline a paradigm whereby freedom, 'properly' used, will enable some men to make educational and political projections which, if combined with authority, will restore the felicity of mankind. Both of these aspects of freedom, the misuse of freedom and the exercise of what we describe as radical freedom, take place in the context of what we termed 'history'. Although the concept of nature is crucial to the analysis of these aspects of freedom, they clearly do not take place in any way in the state of nature, nor within the jurisdiction of nature.
Following from this, we identified three aspects of freedom which form the context of Rousseau's thought: namely, i) natural freedom (the context in which natural freedom is possible is more fully elucidated in the second Discourse, but nevertheless, underlies much of the first Discourse as well), ii) misused freedom (through which men in history moved against the voice of nature precipitating the malaise and misery described in the first Discourse), and iii) radical freedom (by which certain men exercise freedom to restore the felicity of mankind in the attempt to simulate a type of nature in history). These three aspects of freedom form the basis for understanding the concluding paragraphs of the first Discourse, both in relation to that Discourse itself and in relation to the Social Contract and the Emile.

In our discussion of 'art' (Chapter III), we were concerned to analyze the nature of Rousseau's attack on the arts and sciences in the first Discourse, and to relate this to his concluding paragraphs. Basically we argued that Rousseau saw that both thinking and action had become dominated by art. Art was defined as a "method or procedure of making, doing or acting, according to certain rules, for a particular end". Art as a historical phenomenon, requiring a certain degree of interdependence for its acquisition
and practice, is contrasted with Rousseau's concept of freedom as autonomy. Our purpose in examining Rousseau's concept of art was threefold: 1) Rousseau's attack on the artificialities of civilization was placed in the context of historical versus natural phenomena. 2) The concluding paragraphs of the first Discourse can only be reconciled with Rousseau's earlier attack on the arts and sciences in terms of the contrast between art and freedom. 3) In the concluding paragraphs of the first Discourse, Rousseau speaks of those who will cultivate, that is, teach, not merely practise or learn, the great Arts and Sciences. One of those great Arts is the art of education, the other is politics. The concept of art as analyzed in Chapter IV, becomes central in understanding Rousseau's treatise on the art of politics and his treatise on the art of education.

In the paradigm outlined in the concluding paragraphs, Rousseau points out that science and virtue will be combined with authority. We examined Rousseau's notions of science and virtue in terms of the relationship between art and freedom.
Rousseau claims that most science has been reduced to the 'art of thinking'. In the concluding paragraphs of the first Discourse, this type of science is contrasted with the great science of Bacon, Descartes and Newton, the 'preceptors of the human race'. This great science was seen as a manifestation of radical freedom as opposed to art. Within this context, reason must be freed of all heteronomy and must be characterized by autonomy both in its independence and in its free-agency. The concept of autonomous reason as active, constructive and creative imagination in Rousseau's thought, adumbrates the very complex relationship that exists between knowing and making, thought and action in the modern world. The nature of this relationship is implicit in the concept of projection. It is in this that the relationship between knowledge and freedom discussed by Heidigger as referred to in the Introduction (pages 4ff above) may be seen in Rousseau's thought.

In our discussion of morality, three types of virtue were identified: innocent virtue, political virtue, and autonomous virtue. Each of these was contrasted with a morality that is reduced to the art of manners described in the first Discourse. More importantly, each of these
three aspects of morality were seen to relate to a different perspective in Rousseau's view of the whole. Innocent virtue relates to the primary or innate goodness of man and the exercise of natural freedom. This aspect of morality as emphasized at the conclusion of the first Discourse in the line "O vertu! Science sublime des ames simples", is especially germane to the nature of Emile's education. This notion of innocent virtue was related to political and autonomous virtue and was contrasted to the art of manners within the context of the thesis of the dissertation. Political virtue was seen as an historical phenomenon that nevertheless evokes the problem of the classical antagonism between virtue and philosophy. According to Rousseau, political virtue is a 'horizon' based on patriotism and religion, both of which he relegated to the area of opinion and dogma. Both political virtue, as a historical phenomenon, and innocent virtue as a type of natural phenomenon, are aspects of morality on the basis of which people 'act aright'.
The virtue that is combined with science and authority in Rousseau's paradigm is characterized by radical freedom. This type of virtue we have termed autonomous virtue. Such virtue cannot be bound by any form of heteronomy and seems close to Kantian self-legislation. It was noted, however, that the universal and unconditional law that in a sense bound Kant's ethical will, is lacking in Rousseau's description of the virtue of great thinkers. This type of virtue we have termed autonomous virtue. It is through the exercise of autonomous virtue in combination with great science and authority, that the 'preceptors of the human race' can re-establish the basis for political virtue through political projections of which the Social Contract is an example, and can simulate a type of natural virtue in history through educational projections of which the Emile is an example. In sum, these three aspects of morality are fundamental to the distinction Rousseau makes in his paradigm between those who can speak and those who can act aright. This relationship was central to our examination of the Emile and the Social Contract.
In Chapter VI, we summarized the foregoing five chapters to serve as a basis for Chapters VII and VIII in accordance with our thesis that the "concluding paragraphs of Rousseau's first Discourse delineate a paradigm within the context of which Rousseau will later formulate his political projection, the Social Contract, and his educational projection, the Emile". Chapter VI outlined the paradigm contained in the concluding paragraphs thus providing a framework whereby Rousseau's own projections could be examined. In summarizing Part I, Chapter VI was organized around the three aspects of freedom which we termed natural, misused and radical freedom. These were distinguished in terms of independence and free-agency as follows:

Natural freedom refers to the original solitary condition of man living in total independence of other men and in harmony with nature, with only a consciousness of his ability to acquiesce or resist.

Misused freedom refers to the loss of man's independence vis-à-vis other men coupled with the exercise of his autonomy over nature, that is, the misuse of his free-agency.

Radical freedom refers to the ability of some great men to think and act alone, without 'art' or any other form of heteronomy, and to their ability to exercise free-agency to restore the felicity of mankind (see pages 122-3 above).
Corresponding to these three forms of freedom, three perspectives were identified which together form the basis for Rousseau's paradigm: nature, history and projection. Ultimately, it is the projection aspect of Rousseau's paradigm that is of greatest interest in this dissertation. Accordingly, the concluding chapters focused specifically on Rousseau's own political and educational projections in the *Social Contract* and the *Emile*.

Our analysis of the *Social Contract* was structured around the three aspects of freedom that underlie the paradigm developed in Part I as summarized in Chapter VI. Aspects of the general will state, including Rousseau's redefinition of political right(s), the general will, and citizenship, were examined in relation to the idealization of natural freedom. The way in which men 'such as they are' after centuries of misused freedom must be fitted for life in the general will state was assessed. It was seen that this process necessitates the distinction Rousseau makes between those who know how to speak and those who know how to act aright, with the legislator clearly designated as one of the 'preceptors of the human race'. This distinction and designation is based on Rousseau's concept of radical freedom, not only in the unbound, creative and constructive exercise of autonomous reason in formulating a political projection.
but also is implicit in the authority and power Rousseau assigns the legislator to implement that projection. In Chapter VII we focused on those elements of the Social Contract which parallel aspects of the paradigm found in the concluding paragraphs of the first Discourse. Included was the solitary independence and autonomy of the legislator, the clear assignation of the legislator as a 'preceptor of the human race', the relationship between the legislator and the citizens of the general will state, the appropriation of power and authority by the legislator, the distinction between teaching and practicing the art of politics, and finally, the projective nature of the Social Contract itself, including its ultimate goal, the restoration, insofar as possible, of 'la felicité du Genre humain'. Of particular concern was the primacy of freedom conceived as autonomy as it relates to these issues in particular and to the nature of political thought in general.

In our examination of Rousseau's educational projection, we focused on the relationship between the tutor and Emile within the context of the distinction Rousseau makes at the conclusion of the first Discourse between those who can 'speak' and those who can 'act aright'. Again, our analysis was directly structured around the three aspects of freedom underlying the paradigm described in Chapter VII.
As an educational projection to restore the felicity of mankind, the *Emile* is in its very conception a manifestation of the exercise of radical freedom. Rousseau outlines how the tutor will teach Emile to 'act aright' through the restoration of a type of innocent virtue and the simulation of natural freedom within the confines of a society corrupted by the misuse of freedom. Our intention in this chapter was not to provide a comprehensive and definitive account of the *Emile*, but rather to further elucidate the concluding paragraphs of the first *Discourse* and to demonstrate the significance of this *Discourse* in understanding his subsequent writings. In addition, by viewing the *Emile* as Rousseau's own projection within the context of the paradigm found in the first *Discourse*, a new and hopefully useful perspective for interpretation of the *Emile* is suggested. Again, of particular concern is the primacy of freedom in relating man to things/nature, to other men/society, and to the good.

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To conclude we return to our observation in the Introduction that there are some fundamental problems in Rousseau's thought. It was noted that these problematic areas reflect not on the adequacy of his thought, but the impossibility of his task. The construction of a political and educational theory based on the exaltation of freedom, defined as autonomy, as the highest good is exceedingly difficult. The reconciliation of this freedom with the exercise of authority and power necessary to meet the demands of social and political order is ultimately impossible.

It is within the natural perspective of Rousseau's paradigm that the definition of freedom as autonomy is established. Through the conjectural reconstruction of history and the careful observation of the 'nature of things', Rousseau determined that man's fundamental nature and original condition were both primarily characterized by freedom — that is, by free-agency and independence respectively.
We have shown that, according to Rousseau, man is distinguished from the beasts, not by reason, nor by his basic instincts of self-preservation and compassion, but by the consciousness of his ability to acquiesce or resist nature. The consciousness of this ability is identified with the purely spiritual action of the human soul in its power to will and choose. This power or ability we have termed 'free-agency'. According to Rousseau's account, free-agency when exercised has tended to obviate and pervert man's natural instincts and passions. Perfectabilité, as a corollary of this free-agency, has tended to manifest itself in the almost total perversion of even the most fundamental instincts, self-preservation and compassion. Free-agency by definition denies any essence beyond itself. Man is an historical phenomenon who, for the purposes of political and educational projections, may be seen as a totally malleable being. The problem of determining man's nature, whether pure (original man), preserved (Emile), or perverted ('men such as they are'), is relevant only as a technique useful in 'l'art de former les hommes'. In Rousseau's thought, this 'art' is not limited or bound by any 'given' understanding of what man is fitted for, thus eliminating a traditional constraint on those who teach and practice this art.
In addition, Rousseau described man's original condition as one of solitude. From this he concluded that man's fundamental desire is that of independence. Moreover, because all types of association are unnatural, each man brings with him his natural right to independence. By making the natural condition of man to be one of solitude, and by declaring independence to be the fundamental desire and right of each man, Rousseau directs political thought away from the traditional question of the best city or polis to a pre-occupation with legitimacy. The polis is no longer recognized as a natural phenomenon in harmony with man's essence, but is aptly described in terms of a political machine ("la machine politique") geared to reconciling the rights of the individual with the demands of societal and political order. Rousseau views the relationship between the citizen and state in terms of a numerator-denominator analogy that is descriptive of neither the harmonious and natural interdependencies characterizing a polis, nor the diverse interrelationships of a community. It has been argued that Rousseau pioneered the concept of community through his notion of the general will. However, the

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1 Social Contract, III, 364.

2 See pages 131-32 n.2 above.
general will is primarily a mechanism which seeks to reconcile individual right with political order. The community it establishes is a community that is contractual and based on negative mutuality (of identical rights protection), rather than the integration of particularities within a consensus of what is good. Rousseau argues that the key to the workings of the political machine is the protection of each citizen from personal dependency. It is difficult to see the potential for community within this context. The primacy of independence severely limits the nature of all human associations and interdependencies in Rousseau's thought, constraining them within the confines of rational self-interest. It is not only political, but all types of human relationships that are locked within the tension between this type of self-serving utility and independence. Emile is taught, for example, to process all his relationships through a calculation of utility and the preservation of independence. Even the family unit, the most fundamental of human associations, dissolves in the assertion of independence as soon as there is no further need for association.

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Examined from a historical perspective, man's natural right to independence, according to Rousseau, has been almost universally usurped by illegitimate political regimes, master-slave relationships, enslavement to opinion, prejudice, and manners, the proliferation of luxury-induced dependence, etc. This loss of independence has been matched by the negative exercise of free-agency which has totally perverted man's basic instincts of self-preservation and compassion, and has given rise to innumerable unnatural passions and desires that complete his enslavement. Clearly rejecting any idea of necessary historical progress, Rousseau notes that man's perfectabilité (free-agency) has left him a tyrant over himself and nature.

Construction of a political theory within this context becomes difficult. To summarize: legitimacy and natural right demand that each man's fundamental independence be preserved; yet, a mechanism such as the general will can depend neither on reason (man's ability to recognize his own self-interest achieved through obedience to the general will) nor on man's basic instincts of self-preservation and compassion for implementation; having recourse to neither force, nor reason, nor nature, Rousseau turns politics into 'l'art de former les hommes', with the concept of perfectabilité retaining significance only as malleability.
In Chapters VII and VIII, some of the methods and techniques Rousseau recommends for use in training men were outlined. These included the manipulation of public opinion through the political use of civil religion and patriotism in the *Social Contract* and the careful control of the pupil's environment through deception and manipulation in the *Emile*. These techniques and others offensive to liberal sensibilities have been adequately catalogued elsewhere (see pages 169-70n.71 above), and are not in themselves as significant as their intended effect. It may be pointed out that many of these methods do not originate with Rousseau, and some even parallel for example, those recommended by Plato in the *Republic*. There are critical differences however. Plato's 'art de former les hommes' is constrained within the context of a good that transcends the human will, and, as Rousseau himself notes, Plato sought only to purify man's heart, not change it.

As already noted, one central constraint on 'l'art de former les hommes' in traditional thought was the concept of human nature, that is, the idea that man has an essence, a soul of eternal substance, that clearly indicates what man is fitted for. By defining man's essence in terms of his free-agency, Rousseau eliminates the traditional notion of essence, transforming it into its antithesis: eternal
essence becomes infinite malleability. Moreover, by defining independence as the natural condition of man and by declaring all societies as unnatural phenomena, Rousseau suggests a clear dichotomy between man and citizen. It is in terms of man's malleability that this dichotomy is resolved. The legislator and those who exercise authority must be capable of changing human nature.

It may be argued that the authority of the legislator is constrained by the traditions and customs of the nation for whom he is formulating and implementing a political projection. It was noted in Chapter VII, that Rousseau emphasized the need to take into account national characteristics in making any political projection. However, national characteristics and particularities are not a restraint on the exercise of authority, but only on its efficacy. National traditions and mores must be studied and taken into account if the legislator is to effectively train men. Tradition and national particularities are only a restraint on authority in the sense that the degeneration of man is--an impediment or obstacle to the malleability of men.
'L'art de former les hommes' involves not simply the development and 'leading forth' of man's aptitudes and character, but includes creating and forming in a more fundamental sense. It is not necessary to elaborate the sinister potential that historical hindsight has proven is inherent in this process. Rather, the products ('ceux qui savoient bien faire') of Rousseau's own 'art de former les hommes', the citizens of the general will state and Emile, are sufficiently illustrative of the inadequacy of this process.

First, it is interesting to note the end this art seeks to achieve. According to Rousseau, the preceptors must formulate political and educational projections in order to restore 'le bonheur du Genre-humain'. The only reward the 'learned men of the first rank' require as recompense for their public service is the happiness of the people. Happiness derives not from fulfillment (in traditional thought, of man's essence), or enlightenment, but rather, in Rousseau's thought, is ultimately a matter of opinion, that is, the attainment of what is valued, the elimination of the gap between one's strength and one's desires. However, opinion, what is valued and desired, are all social phenomena that are subject to manipulation.
By controlling what is valued (and therefore desired) through opinion, the legislator or tutor, can bring man's aspirations within the sphere of what is possible, and also what is necessary for political order; and, at the same time, restore happiness. This type of eudaemonism is certainly a low vision of what man is fitted for, and is, especially when defined in these terms, one that is devoid of any constraints on the exercise of authority for its achievement.

More important for assessing the product of Rousseau's 'art de former les hommes' is the actual process involved in that art. Having defined man's humanness and spirituality in terms of free-agency, Rousseau must leave man free to will and choose. Accordingly, authority must be exercised in secret. The emphasis in Rousseau's 'art de former les hommes' is not on purifying the heart, neither is it on enlightenment through reason, nor even the restoration of man's original nature; but rather it is concerned with the transformation of the will. Man must be free to choose, but he must be made, in secret, to choose only that which is 'right'. We would argue that this process of developing/training men to act aright retains only the language
and form of freedom. Clearly the quality of free-agency and independence allotted the subjects of the general will state or Emile is very different from that exercised by the preceptors of the human race. The autonomy of those who can speak well is distinguished from that of those who know how to act well by more than degree. That free-agency which is demonstrative of the spirituality of man's soul through the pure power of willing and choosing is mocked by the concept of a controlled and transformed will. The independence of those who have no masters, who are bound only by their own hopes, is very different from the institutionalized independence allotted those over whom they exercise authority (in secret).

Clearly it is impossible that all men exercise the radical freedom that Rousseau makes the perogative of a few. However, if one constructs a political theory in which the highest good is defined in terms of independence and free-agency, surely equality demands that all men, at least theoretically, be given reasonable access to that good. To deny the majority of men the possibility of some meaningful appropriation of the highest good is a pernicious abrogation of equality. In a sense, this sacrifice of equality reflects
the difficulty of Rousseau's task. On the other hand, it also demonstrates the absolutely unassailable primacy of freedom in Rousseau's thought. We argued earlier that equality was important in Rousseau's thought only as a necessary condition for freedom within the context of the general will state (see pages 146ff. above). The following passage from the Social Contract suggests to me the extent to which Rousseau was willing to subordinate equality to freedom.

Quoi! la liberté ne se maintient qu'à l'appui de la servitude? Peut-être. Les deux excès se touchent. Tout ce qui n'est point dans la nature a ses inconvénients, et la société civile plus que tout le reste. Il y a de telles positions malheureuses où l'on ne peut conserver sa liberté qu'aux dépends de celle d'autrui, et où le Citoyen ne peut être parfaitement libre que l'esclave ne soit extrêmement esclave. Telle étoit la position de Sparte. Pour vous, peuples modernes, vous n'avez point d'esclaves, mais vous l'êtes; vous payez leur liberté de la vôtre. Vous avez beau vanter cette préférence; j'y trouve plus de lâcheté que d'humanité.

For those who share Rousseau's exaltation of freedom as the highest good, this sacrifice of equality to freedom must raise some serious questions.

As traditionally conceived, education and politics are predicated at some point on authority in the relationship between those who are able to 'speak well' and those they would teach or govern. In this respect, Rousseau's projections are no exception, although under his ideology of freedom, authority and obedience are stricken from the vocabulary. In effect, within Rousseau's view of the whole there is no justification for authority apart from necessity. For this reason, it is exercised in secret. In this way, the citizens of the general will state, or Emile, can be trained to 'act aright' while still retaining the consciousness of freedom. Within traditional political philosophy, authority was recognized as an integral component of the city or polis that was subject to certain constraints and limitations deriving from the source of that authority. The authority of the legislator and tutor is not 'given' in any sense (neither by the people nor by the Author of being), and must be exercised in secret because it has no context. The governed have no recourse because they are unaware of the authority exercised over them. The problem, in sum, with Rousseau's 'art de former les hommes' is the lack of any type of referent. Politics and education are
not formulated to reflect the good, but rather are projections created through the exercise of radical freedom.

In Rousseau's thought, the preceptors of the human race are designated as such on the basis of their ability to exercise radical freedom in thought and action. That freedom which describes man's fundamental essence and his original condition, and is designated as his natural right, reappears both as the criterion whereby the preceptors are chosen and as the source and context of their thought. All point to the primacy of the will. Those capable of exercising radical freedom are subject only to their own will. Their independence and free-agency are absolute, unlike the simulated version provided for those over whom they exercise authority.

It is useful at this point to recall the passage from Heidigger quoted in the Introduction.

In the essence of the mathematical, as the project we delineated, lies a specific will to a new formation and self-grounding of the form of knowledge as such. The detachment from revelation as the first source for truth and the rejection of tradition as the authoritative means of knowledge—all these rejections are only negative consequences of the mathematical project. He who dared to project the mathematical project put himself as the projector of this project upon a base which is first projected only in the project. There is not only a liberation in the mathematical
project, but also a new experience and formation of freedom itself, i.e., a binding with obligations which are self-imposed. In the mathematical project develops an obligation to principles demanded by the mathematical itself. According to this inner drive, a liberation to a new freedom, the mathematical strives out of itself to establish its own essence as the ground of itself and thus of all knowledge.

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Within the context of the paradigm laid out in the concluding paragraphs of the first Discourse as interpreted earlier, no other form of knowledge is possible. The autonomous preceptors are bound neither by revelation nor tradition. In rejecting the relevance of the only referent he recognizes (nature), and in the exaltation of freedom, knowledge in Rousseau's thought becomes none other than a 'will to a new formation and self-grounding of the form of knowledge as such'. What is clear is that this concept of knowledge, when applied to political thought, radically transforms the nature of political philosophy. Political philosophy as the quest for truth is replaced by a form of knowledge that is preceded by the primacy of freedom. By making freedom as autonomy both the highest philosophic principle and the fundamental fact of human existence, Rousseau's vision of the whole is necessarily historical. Because there

5 Heidigger, What is a Thing?, p. 97; see pages above.
is no recognition of a transcendent good beyond the human will, political thought becomes projection.

The passage from Heidigger is most clear in this context, outlining the very complex relationship between freedom and knowledge in modern thought. However, this passage was also cited because, as an interpretation of Kantian thought specifically, it contains an element that is not found in Rousseau.

From a pre-Kantian perspective, the revolutionary significance of Kant's concept of the 'mathematical' relates to the effects/implications of the projection of thingness on the way in which things show themselves. From a post-Kantian, Nietzschean perspective, projection or the will is still bound in a sense, in Kant, by a type of ontology in the relationship between the thing itself and the concept of thingness. In the concept of the mathematical there is implied a relationship between projection and intuition. The nature of this relationship lies at the very core of Kant's thought.

6 The role of projection is being particularly emphasized by current philosophers of science such as Kuhn. Kuhn is clearly, if unwittingly, an heir of Kant's insight into the nature of projection. Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions; see pages 84-5 n. 12 above.
The ontological aspect of the mathematical that in a sense binds projection is more easily seen in its application to moral law. Kant's belief that every rational man, through the process of universalization, would discern identical moral laws contains a certain ontology that is absent in Rousseau's concept of morality. Rousseau's concept of generalization, although adumbrating Kantian universalization, was not used as a method of determining universally valid laws; neither was it primarily the product of reason. Rousseau used the process of generalization to determine laws which are valid only within the particular context of the political order in which those laws were determined. It was not the primary source of morality as it was in Kant's moral doctrine.

Rousseau and Kant's successor, Nietzsche, recognized that, if freedom of the will is exalted as the highest good, only a radical historicism is possible and all forms of ontologies, particularly those relating to morality, are only 'delaying' tactics. It is within this context that Nietzsche accuses Kant of being a "veil-maker", or one of the "great-

We have argued that Rousseau's vision of the whole is ultimately historical, approaching the radical historicism of Nietzsche (although only through a process of elimination). The only source of guidance that Rousseau recognizes beyond that of the human will is that of nature. As Kant had sought to modify his vision by the form and structure of reason, "a conceptualized form, in fact, of Dionysian wisdom", so Rousseau sought to modify his concept of history by 'nature'. In effect however, nature is severely limited by freedom in Rousseau's thought: both nature within man and man's natural condition are defined in terms of freedom (free-agency and independence); history as a manifestation of human freedom (misused and radical) has made nature as a source of guidance largely irrelevant; and finally, the conceptualization of nature as the original condition of man and things, is itself a projection, a manifestation of the will to a new formation of knowledge.

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Within this context and at this point in concluding, it is appropriate to acknowledge that the account of nature given in this dissertation as here summarized, though accurate, is incomplete. We have not dealt with the most famous and influential, though mythical, aspect of his thought, namely, Romanticism. Nietzsche calls Rousseau: "this first modern man, idealist and canaille in one person . . . this abortion, who planted his tent on the threshold of modernity, and also wanted a 'return to nature'". Nietzsche accuses Rousseau, as he does Kant, of dishonesty, of retreating from their vision. Rousseau's retreat into Romanticism is particularly odious to Nietzsche, for it is a myth that cultivates weakness. Nietzsche's typically astute observation that modern man is both an idealist and canaille may indicate why Rousseau could entice countless numbers into the lull and illusion of Romanticism. For Rousseau himself, his autobiographical writings show that Romanticism was a conscious retreat and personal refuge from his perception and experience of history. In a sense, Rousseau's retreat into Romanticism reflects the impossibility of his self-appointed task.

of reconciling the primacy of freedom with the demands of social and political order. Clearly, Rousseau's influence as the father of Romanticism far outreaches his impact as a preceptor of the human race.

In Rousseau's behalf, his retreat into Romanticism seems preferable to Kant's conceptual ontology, and especially Nietzsche's madness-inducing abyss. Fortunately for those who seek a good beyond that of the human will, there are other options.
Mais si le progrès des sciences et des arts n'a rien ajouté à notre véritable félicité; s'il a corrompu nos moeurs, et si la corruption des moeurs a porte atteinte à la pureté du gout, que penserons-nous de cette foule d'auteurs elementaires qui ont écarté du Temple des Muses les difficultes qui défendoient son abord, et que la Nature y avoit repandues comme une epreuve des forces de ceux qui seroient tentés de savoir? Que penserons-nous de ces Compilateurs d'ouvrages qui ont indiscrettement brisé la porte des Sciences et introduit dans leur Sanctuaire une populace indigne d'en approcher; tandis qu'il seroit à souhaiter que tous ceux qui ne pouvoient avancer loin dans la carrière des Lettres, eussent été rebutés dès l'entrée, et se fussent jetés dans des Arts utiles à la société. Tel qui sera toute sa vie un mauvais versificateur, un Geometre subalterne, seroit peut-être devenu un grand fabricateur d'étoffes. Il n'a point fallu de maîtres à ceux que la nature destinent à faire des disciples. Les Verulams, les Descartes et les Newtons, ces Precepteurs du Genre-humain n'en ont point eu eux-mêmes, et quels guides les eussent conduits jusqu' où leur vaste genie les a portés? Des Maîtres ordinaires n'auraient pu que retrécir leur entendement en le resserrant dans l'étroite capacité du leur: C'est par les premiers obstacles qu'ils ont appris à faire des efforts, et qu'ils se sont exercés à franchir l'espace immense qu'ils ont parcouru. S'il faut permettre à quelques hommes de se livrer à l'étude des Sciences et des Arts, ce n'est qu'à ceux qui se sentiront la force de marcher seuls sur leurs traces, et de les devancer: C'est à ce petit nombre qu'il appartient d'élever des monumens à la gloire de l'esprit humain. Mais si l'on veut que rien ne soit au-dessus de leur genie, il faut que rien ne soit au-dessus de leurs esperances. Voilà l'unique encouragement dont ils ont besoin. L'amé se proportionne insensiblement aux objets qui l'occupent, et ce sont les grandes occasions qui font les grands hommes. Le Prince de l'Eloquence fut Consul de Rome, et le plus grand, peut-être, des Philosophes, Chancelier d'Angleterre. Croit-on que si l'un n'eut occupé
qu'une chaire dans quelque Université, et que l'autre n'eut obtenu qu'une modique pension d'Académie; croit-on, dis-je, que leurs ouvrages ne se sentiroient pas de leur état? Que les Rois ne dédaignent donc pas d'admettre dans leurs conseils les gens les plus capables de les bien conseiller: qu'ils renoncent à ce vieux préjugé inventé par l'orgueil des Grands, que l'art de conduire les Peuples est plus difficile que celui de les éclairer: comme s'il étoit plus aisé d'engager les hommes à bien faire de leur bon gré, que de les y contraindre par la force. Que les savans du premier ordre trouvent dans leurs cours d'honorables aziles. Qu'ils y obtiennent la seule récompense digne d'eux; celle de contribuer par leur crédit au bonheur des Peuples à qui ils auront enseigné la sagesse. C'est alors seulement qu'on verra ce que peuvent la vertu, la science et l'autorité animées d'une noble émulation et travaillant de concert à la felicité du Genre-humain. Mais tant que la puissance sera seule d'une côté; les lumières et la sagesse seules d'un autre; les savans penseront rarement de grandes choses, les Princes en feront plus rarement de belles, et les Peuples continueront d'être vils, corrompus et malheureux.

Pour nous, hommes vulgaires, à qui le Ciel n'a point départy de si grands talens et qu'il ne destine pas à tant de gloire, restons dans notre obscurité. Ne courons point après une réputation qui nous échapperoit, et qui, dans l'état présent des choses, nous rendroît jamais ce qu'elle nous auroit coûté, quand nous aurions tous les titres pour l'obtenir. À quoi bon chercher notre bonheur dans l'opinion d'autrui si nous pouvons le trouver en nous-mêmes? Laissons à d'autres le soin d'instruire les Peuples de leurs devoirs, et bornons-nous à bien remplir les notres, nous n'avons pas besoin d'en savoir davantage.

O vertu! Science sublime des âmes simples, faut-il donc tant de peines et d'appareil pour te connaître? Tes principes ne sont-ils pas gravés dans tous les coeurs, et ne suffit-il pas pour apprendre tes Lois de rentrer en soi-même et d'écouter la voix de sa conscience dans le silence des passions? Voila la véritable Philosophie, sachons nous en contenter; et sans envier la gloire de ces hommes célèbres qui s'immortalisent dans la République des Lettres, tâchons de mettre entre eux et nous cette distinction glorieuse qu'on remarquoit jadis entre deux grands Peuples; que l'un savoit bien dire, et l'autre, bien faire.

(First Discourse, III, 29-30)
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