LOGIC IN THE HUSSERLIAN CONTEXT

By

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A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements
for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

McMaster University
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TITLE: Logic in the Husserlian Context

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NUMBER OF PAGES: xvi, 432
ABSTRACT

The theme of logic runs through all of Husserl's writings, from his earliest Philosophy of Arithmetic, to his final Experience and Judgment. Husserl has even characterized phenomenology as a transcendental logic. I examine Husserl's notion of logic, and it turns out to be an interesting vehicle for bringing together two diverse aspects of Husserl's phenomenology which by many critics are thought to be incompatible with each other, namely the purely formal aspect of phenomenology, and the aspect of phenomenology which deals with life. I show how Husserl develops a transcendental logic by going through the tradition of formal logic. He argues that traditional formal logic is not a pure logic, but is one which presupposes the world. Husserl goes beyond this and develops a logic which is pure, one based on the pure transcendental ego in which no world is presupposed. This introduces a "subjective" factor into logic. I show that no logical psychologism is implied. At the same time I show that this pure ego is the centre of life, and that it can do justice to the speculative demands contained in the concept of life. This is done in three ways: by demonstrating that i) the notion of pure transcendental ego is compatible with and can do justice to the life related concepts contained in Freudian psychology, ii) the notion of pure transcendental ego can account of other selves, also a notion found in the concept of life, and iii) Husserl's essentialist approach is compatible with a
teleological-historical approach, the latter introducing a factual element. Finally I show that Husserl's transcendental logic, with its notion of the constituting subject, is compatible with the logic of Frege.
I wish to express my gratitude to my supervisor Dr. Jakob Amstutz for having had faith in this project from the start, and for having helped me actualize it. It would not have been possible for me to sustain my efforts without his good will and encouragement as well as his understanding and sound advice. I owe him thanks not only for being an exemplary supervisor, reading and commenting on my work promptly, but for much more. Since the bulk of this dissertation was written over a period of years when I was no longer registered at McMaster University, and so, except for a year of teaching, was not in an academic setting, my supervisor was my "philosophical lifeline". It is my good fortune that he is a master of creating philosophical atmosphere, making the philosophical and literary tradition come to life in our discussions, for our dialogues sustained me. For all of this I thank him, especially since he was officially under no obligation to work with me these past years.

I am grateful to my second reader, Dr. Jeff Mitscherling, for taking on the duties of second reader on very short notice, and for giving this work his full attention while so many other projects were making demands on his time. He offered not only many interesting philosophical ideas, but innumerable suggestions for improving the style and grammar of this work. I was impressed by the care he showed and thank him for that.
I am grateful to my third reader, Dr. Constantine Georgiadis, for kindly agreeing to become third reader, when my initial third reader fell ill.

Thanks go also to Dr. David Hitchcock for reading and commenting on my Frege-Husserl chapter.

There are others, too many too enumerate, without whose backing I would not have been able to complete the dissertation. But of these I must mention a few. I owe my parents a great deal. I have been fortunate in that they have encouraged my work and helped me in innumerable ways, and I thank them for this. My brother too has lent me his help thereby making my load a little lighter. I wish to thank my friend, Marea Carey, for her unyielding support and for cheering me on. To Danuta Kamocki-Allaby I am indebted especially for her kind support and excellent suggestions prior to the defense, and for her presence during the defense.

Finally, as a token of my gratitude, I dedicate the dissertation to Dr. Peter Barsony, from whom I first learned the power of the phenomenological method.
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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE TEXT

In this work, when either quoting from a text or referring to a text, I will use sigla. Where applicable, reference to the English translation is given first in parenthesis followed by reference to the original text in square brackets. I mainly use B. Gibson's translation of Ideas, but in the few instances in which I use F. Kersten's translation of this text I cite the letter "I" for Ideas and follow this with the letters "FK". Below follows a listing of the sigla in alphabetical order. This is followed by another listing of the sigla arranged according to author.

The sigla in alphabetical order:

A  Carnap, R. The Logical Structure of the World.
AN  Freud, S. "A Note on the Unconscious in Psychoanalysis."
ASTP  Duhem, P. The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory.
BN  Sartre, J. P. Being and Nothingness.
BT  Nietzsche, F. The Birth of Tragedy.
C  Husserl, E. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology.
CD  Freud, Sigmund. Civilization and its Discontents.
CHF  Cairns, D. Conversations with Husserl and Fink.
CI  Ricoeur, P. The Conflict of Interpretations.
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LP  Ayer, A. Logical Positivism.

LSL Carnap, R. The Logical Syntax of Language.

M  Camus, A. The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays.

MBF Tugendhat, E. "The Meaning of 'Bedeutung' in Frege."

MR  Barral, Mary. Merleau-Ponty: the Role of the Body-Subject in Interpersonal Relations.

MT Von Kleist, Heinrich. "Uber das Marionettentheater".

MUS Amstutz, J. "Der Mensch und das Sein."

N  Freud, S. "On Narcissism: An Introduction."

NAS Langsdorf, L. "The Noema: An Analysis of its Structure."


PE Zaner, R. The Problem of Embodiment.

PH Gadamer, H-G. Philosophical Hermeneutics.

PhP Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology of Perception.

PL Husserl, E. Paris Lectures.

PM Spiegelberg, H. The Phenomenological Movement.

PN Nietzsche, F. "The Spirit of Modernity."

PTP Mohanty, J. N. The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy.
PWG Geatch, P. and Max Black. Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege.

RM Rickman, H. W. Dilthey: Selected Writings.

RPL Rosenberg, J. and C. Travis. Readings in the Philosophy of Language.

S Merleau-Ponty, M. Signs.

SA Trilling, L. Sincerity and Authenticity.

SB Merleau-Ponty, M. Structure of Behaviour.

SHL Bachelard, S. A Study of Husserl's "Formal and Transcendental Logic".

SO Angelelli, I. Studies on Gottlob Frege and Traditional Philosophy.

SW Petrement, S. Simone Weil: A Life.

TIHP Levinas, E. The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology.


VM Fichte, G. The Vocation of Man.

WA Ross, W. The World of Aristotle.

Z Nietzsche, F. "Thus Spoke Zarathustra."
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CWA Horowitz, Joseph. Conversations with Arrau.


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Veatch, Henry. Intentional Logic.

Von Kleist, Heinrich. "Uber das Marionetten Theatre".

According to Husserl phenomenology is the science of the human soul (C 257, 264-265). The essence of the soul, he maintains, is knowing (CM 156-157 [182-183]). Hence he also describes phenomenology variously as the science of rationality (C 338), and as transcendental logic, the science of science (FTL 13 [11], 231 [205]). Characterized in these ways phenomenology comes under attack from many schools of thought. For instance, today it is popular to maintain that one can speak of a philosophy that seeks to reveal a rationality common to all human beings only at the expense of the individual and that such a philosophy can at heart only be totalitarian. According to the dictates of Husserl's phenomenology this belief is not only false, but dangerous, for it promotes the very state-of-affairs that it denounces—totalitarianism. After all, if humans do not have an inherent, essential, rationality which can be mutually recognized, what compelling reason can be advanced for a liberal society? At best one might advance prudence as a reason, but that is surely the emptiest of reasons.

As well, the claim that phenomenology is transcendental logic, science of the soul, is generally repugnant to the logician and existentialist-humanist philosopher alike. To the former the claim sounds like a reversion to psychologism, the reduction of formal, logical, objects and laws to psychological (empirical) facts and laws. To the latter the claim merely reinforces the suspicion that

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phenomenology is a theoretical science, closed to Being and divorced from life. After all, questions of life and existence are questions of fact, and logic does not deal with matters of fact, but with matters of form only. That Husserl was a mathematician as well as a philosopher is taken as an indication that his phenomenological method is not unlike that of a pure mathematician—a disinterested method which abstracts from the "rough" elements of experience and considers only the unchanging, abstract forms of objects of experience. It is thought that Husserl views the world as a mathematical manifold and phenomenology as the geometry of the soul which will reveal this manifold. Even certain phenomenologists will not be happy with the characterization of phenomenology as logic, for they think that phenomenology thereby loses its humanist-existentialist properties. Such phenomenologists ignore the link between logic and phenomenology, even though Husserl developed the concept of "intentionality" out of the debate between psychologism and anti-psychologism and even though logic is the leitmotiv in his work. But ignoring the role of logic in phenomenology does not make the relation of phenomenology to life any stronger or clearer; it merely has the undesirable effect of taking away some of the rigor of phenomenology.

If Husserl talks about the universal it is not at the expense of the individual or of life. For him the universal and the individual are as inseparable as melody and rhythm. To stress one at the expense of the other is in his view to belie human nature, which in turn is to court alienation. It is this separation of the universal, the rational, from the particular, from life, which lies at the root of the
crisis Husserl speaks of in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and the *Crisis*. In these two works Husserl describes the crisis that European man finds himself in as concerning "questions of the meaning or meaninglessness of the whole of this human existence" (C 6). According to Husserl, European man cannot see his place in a purposeful whole:

...men live entirely in a world that has become unintelligible, in which they ask in vain for the wherefore, the sense, which was once so doubtless and accepted by the understanding, as well as by the will. (FTL 5 [5])

According to Husserl, then, this crisis is at its most fundamental level a crisis of value. European man experiences a loss of belief in those values previously determined by the view he held of man's nature, namely, the view of man as part of a purposeful or meaningful whole, a view which gave meaning to his life.

Although the crisis Husserl describes is one felt on a mass or global scale, and is the result of certain historical developments—e.g., the rise of technology with its disregard for value—and is precipitated by certain sociopolitical events which make one aware of the problematic nature of existence, such as the outbreak of World War I, the crisis is not by its essence a social phenomenon bound by particular historical or sociopolitical events, but is much more pervasive than that. It is one related to the very constitution of man. Unlike much of their surrounding world humans are not merely subject to natural and mechanical laws. Man is not one event in a host of other events, but is also a witness, an onlooker, and is conscious of being such. This allows him to distance himself from events, which, in turn, allows him to take his destiny in his own hands and to shape
himself. But this freedom to self-determination brings with it a sense of responsibility--it brings with it the question, how should I shape my life?

In the final analysis they [these ultimate questions of value] concern man as a free, self-determining being in his behaviour toward the human and extrahuman surrounding world and free in regard to his capacities for rationally shaping himself and his surrounding world. (C 6)

It is because essence and fact have been separated that the question, "how shall I shape my life?", is left without an answer, for it rules out appeal to any essence one may have. It must be understood that the problem is not merely one of having to choose between given values, but is one of establishing what, if any, the criteria of genuine value are. It is not that there are no values or standards of conduct to choose from, but, rather, there seems to be no satisfying reason for choosing one set of standards over the other. One may, of course, as mentioned previously, adhere to a set of rules or standards because it is prudent to do so or because they meet the necessities of daily life, but these are not satisfying reasons for choosing a set of standards. What one seems to need is a justification beyond the facticity of one's particular life, that is, in terms of the whole beyond oneself and of which one forms a part. Hence the question of the criteria of value forces one to examine one's total existence. If the question is allowed to come to full consciousness--and frequently it is not--it can be nothing less than radical. For value itself, its ground and its meaning, is brought into question. The question, if it is truly a question, is experienced as an upheaval, as a loss of value, for in questioning the ground of value we suspend our belief in specific
values. That is, questioning, if genuine, is by definition the very opposite of believing. Our confidence in specific values is shaken, for what we thought was absolute is now put into question. This has such an overwhelming effect on man because man feels he cannot live without (absolute) value grounded in or backed by reason. He feels he cannot live without his life having meaning.

Generally one considers it the task of religion to address the question of man's place within a purposeful whole, as for example the Christian might think of God as the designer of the purposeful whole, and one may think that the loss of belief in values Husserl is speaking of is a loss of belief in religion. But this is not what Husserl means. The crisis is not of religion--at least not directly. The point at which man can no longer merely blindly believe in religion has already passed in the spiritual unfolding of European man according to Husserl, viz., in the Renaissance. The crisis Husserl speaks of occurs in a state of spiritual development in which man has long since come to believe on the basis of reason. In fact, the crisis of value is a crisis of reason itself. It occurs at a point in time at which man has come to identify reason with science, that is, with science as it developed from its inception with Galileo and Newton, with science as a mathematization of nature (C 23). Man turns to science to seek answers to these ultimate questions, but science does not address the question of man's place in a purposeful whole--of the meaning of man's life. The loss of belief in values Husserl speaks of is the loss of belief in science or reason as a means to answering such questions.

This belief that science leads to wisdom - to an actually rational self-cognition and cognition of the
world and God, and, by means of such cognition, to a life somehow to be shaped closer to perfection, a life truly worth living, a life of "happiness", contentment, well-being, or the like - this great belief, once the substitute for religious belief, has (at least in wide circles) lost its force. (FTL 5 [5])

Since man, as Husserl describes, believes on the basis of reason, and since science (reason) does not address these ultimate questions, indeed considers these questions to fall outside its range of meaning, they remain unanswered. Man has, then, no way of dealing with those questions which in a sense are the most pressing to him. Reason is now seen by man in a limited capacity since it does not seem to deal with ultimate questions. Reason is identified with science understood as a discipline concerned with the objective quantifiable aspect of nature and is thought not to deal with questions of the meaning of existence and life, which by their very nature tend to be subjective and non-quantifiable.

Because it seems to man that he cannot live without value, the question of the criteria of genuine value begs for some standard or norm of value. But where should one turn to seek the ground of value? Husserl's answer, as I mentioned, is: to Science. The question must be answered scientifically. Transcendental phenomenology is to reestablish human values by grounding the sciences in their unity (FTL 7 [7]). But how strange this claim seems since according to Husserl the rise of science itself was in part responsible for the value-reason split, and since according to him science does not deal with such questions. Husserl explains that seeking to rediscover human value by rediscovering the sense of science seems wrong, because science had nothing to say to humanity about humanity in its time of alienation or
loss of value. It seems that science itself is, at least in part, responsible for man's alienation, because it is concerned with either pure theory for its own sake, that is, with theory that does not reflect back on man's existence as a whole, or with useful results. The question of human value appears to have no place in science. While we would no doubt not want to do without the useful results of science, these do not in and of themselves tell us how to shape our lives. In other words, the paradigm of science is a narrowly construed pragmatics, one not sufficient as a guide to action. In that sense, science does nothing to help us and the rise of science can be seen as tantamount to the loss of value. At the turn of the century artists especially lamented the rise of science and gave expression to this in their works. Hence the philosophical enterprise of discovering the sense of science as a means of spiritual "salvation" was held under suspicion (C 137) as it seemed to entail exactly what it sought to remedy.

This way of looking at it makes it appear as if, once again, a new, purely theoretical interest, a new "science" with a new vocational technique, is to be established, carried on either as an intellectualistic game with very ideal pretensions or as a higher intellectual technique in the service of the positive sciences, useful for them, while they themselves, in turn, have their only real value in their usefulness for life. (C 136)

And:

Is it not the case that what we have presented here is something rather inappropriate to our time. an attempt to rescue the honor of rationalism, of "enlightenment", of an intellectualism which loses itself in theories alienated from the world, with its necessary evil consequences of a superficial lust for erudition and an intellectual snobbism? Does this not mean that we are being led again into the fateful error
of believing that science makes man wise, that it is destined to create a genuine and contented humanity that is master of its fate? Who would still take such notions seriously today? (C 289-290)

If this philosophical enterprise was held suspect in Husserl's time, how much more so today, for today science has drifted even further from its true sense--consider the moral dilemmas it presents us with--and the philosophic critique of scientific rationalism has proliferated. How can science which poses a threat to humanity's survival and which poses grave ethical problems be said intrinsically to have questions of value at its centre? How can it be said that we should turn to science for guidance in matters of value, including moral value, when science itself seems to be the source of so many moral dilemmas? Yet this is what Husserl seems to maintain when he advocates the ideal of philosophy as rigorous science. How can we explain this? It is not the case that science in his day was closer to man; it is not the case that it was a source of humanity and culture in his time whereas it is not in ours, for we have said above that Husserl maintains that the crisis of value is also a crisis of reason, of science. According to Husserl the science of his day, although high in practical value, has nothing to say to humanity about humanity (C 6). Yet he maintained that this was not so because of the intrinsic make-up of science, but because science had strayed from its true sense (C 7). When he says that we should turn to science for moral guidance, he does not mean that we should turn to any de facto, that is, existing, science, but he means, rather, that we must rethink science in order to find once again its true sense (CM 9 [50]), a sense which is, according to Husserl, the path to our humanity, to self-responsibility and even to God.
The present condition of European sciences necessitates radical investigations of sense. At bottom these sciences have lost their great belief in themselves, in their absolute significance. The modern man of today, unlike the "modern" man of the Enlightenment, does not behold in science, and in the new culture formed by means of science, the self-Objectification of human reason or the universal activity mankind has devised for itself in order / to make possible a truly satisfying life, an individual and social life of practical reason. (FTL 5 [4-5])

And:

Now, however critical and skeptical our attitude toward scientific culture as it has developed historically, we cannot simply abandon it, with no more reason than that we lack an ultimate understanding of it and are unable to manage it by virtue of such an understanding - because, in other words, we are unable to explicate its sense rationally, to determine the true range of its sense, the range within which we can self-responsibly justify the sense of our culture and, with our continued labor, make this sense actual. If we are not satisfied by the joy of creating a theoretical technique, of contriving theories with which one can do so much that is useful and win the admiration of the world - if we cannot separate genuine humanity and living with radical self-responsibility, and therefore cannot separate scientific self-responsibility from the whole of the complex of responsibilities belonging to human life as such - then we must place ourselves above this whole life and all this cultural tradition and, by radical sense-investigations, seek for ourselves singly and in common the ultimate possibilities and necessities, on the basis of which we can take our position toward actualities in judging, valuing, and acting. (FTL 5-6 [5])

These excerpts from Formal and Transcendental Logic illustrate what an exalted status Husserl accords to genuine science. They illustrate also that according to Husserl the true range of the sense of science is "the range within which we can self-responsibly justify the sense of our culture, and with our continued labour, make this sense actual". Genuine science and genuine humanity are, then, for Husserl one and the same. It is clear that science in our time, as in Husserl's time, has
lost its true sense. It is because science has lost its true sense, according to Husserl, that man is in crisis. Throughout all of his writings Husserl urges us to seek anew this sense.

But what is the true sense of science and how do we go about rediscovering it? To have a sense of science, that means to have a theory of science. According to Husserl, a theory of science can be found in Plato's thought. In Plato logic (dialectic) is concerned with the theory of science. Logic is the discipline the task of which it is to seek the sense of science and to guide its development in light of this sense. Hence, if Husserl is correct, it is to logic that we must turn to seek a sense of culture and humanity. How odd this sounds to the contemporary ear, for logic is not viewed today in that capacity. But then, according to Husserl, logic too has strayed from its true sense and no longer seeks the sense of science. Speaking about logic Husserl says the following:

Logic itself, however, has strayed utterly away from its own sense and inalienable task in recent times. (FTL 3 [3])

And:

For this situation, as we have said, logic itself shares the blame - because, as may be added here, instead of keeping its eye unfalteringly on its historical vocation and developing as the pure and universal theory of science, logic itself became a special science. Its own final sense demanded that, reflectively, it make that final sense a theme for radical considerations and master the essentially differentiated strata of problems in the theory of science that predelineate the hierarchy of logical disciplines, in which alone the idea of a theory of a science - and science itself - can become actualized. But logic did not satisfy this, its own essential sense. (FTL 4-5 [4])
In other words, the crisis of science is at heart a crisis of logic, for if science has strayed from its ideal it is because logic has failed to make explicit this ideal and has failed to guide the development of science accordingly. Instead, logic has itself become a special science. Contemporary (traditional, objective) logic is not logic in its true sense: theory of science. What is needed is a discipline that will examine traditional de facto logic to reestablish its sense or idea. That discipline is phenomenology. Phenomenology works out the Idea of logic contained in de facto logic, but from which the latter has strayed. This constitutes a radicalization of traditional logic. In working out the Idea of logic, phenomenology attempts to bring out the true, that is, full sense of logic and thus reestablish the sense of science. All of Husserl's phenomenology in effect is an attempt to rediscover the genuine sense of science as a means of reestablishing human value.

The fact that Husserl speaks of science drifting or straying from its true sense, a sense which includes, according to Husserl, questions of value, suggests that he believes there to have been a time at which science was closer to its true sense than it is now. Indeed, according to Husserl, science at its inception with Plato was close to its true sense and included a concern with value. In fact, science as we know it today, that is, a critical attitude of seeking legitimation for facts and theories by norms, was born with Plato out of questions of human value. To be more specific, science developed with Plato as a response to the claim made by certain Sophists that we cannot have moral knowledge and that there are no rational standards or norms.
according to which man should shape his life. Certain Sophists, of course, deny the possibility of any knowledge, for taking natural science of their time to be the paradigm of true knowledge or rationality and seeing that natural science did not yield knowledge, they become skeptics. But it is especially their consequent denial of moral knowledge that is of concern to Plato. Since, according to the Sophists, there are no universal rational norms according to which one should shape one's life, they advocate that one should exercise concealed tyranny: self-development according to self-interest. This position is morally unpalatable to Plato. Plato responds to the Sophists by trying to show that knowledge or science in general is possible, which entails that moral knowledge is possible. He attempts to show the possibility of science as such by working out the Idea of science.

Plato's logic arose from the reaction against the universal denial of science by sophistic skepticism. If / skepticism denied the essential possibility of any such thing as "philosophy", as science, then Plato had to weigh, and establish by criticism, precisely the essential possibility of such a thing. If all science was called into question, then naturally no fact, science, could be presupposed. Thus Plato was set on the path of the pure idea. Not gathered from the de facto sciences but formative of pure norms, his dialectic of pure ideas - as we say, his logic or his theory of science - was called on to make genuine science possible now for the first time, to guide its practice. (FTL 1-2 [1-2])

The idea of science that Plato establishes is that of a deductive system in which the ultimate premises are self-evident first principles (cf., e.g., Rep. 533c). In other words, "a science worthy of the name must justify each of its steps" (SHL xxxiii). As it stands, of course,
this Idea(1) of science does not relate to questions of value and self-responsibility. To relate it to value it is necessary to relate it to Plato's metaphysics, to his theory about the nature of true (ultimate) Being. The way it stands, however, the ideal seems to be unconnected to any metaphysical system. Hence Bachelard can write that "one can characterize science in this way without presupposing any particular theory of science" (SHL xxxiii). But in Plato's doctrine this ideal is interpreted in a metaphysical manner, that is, in terms of his theory of ideas, which essentially links the ideal of science to value in the following manner. According to Plato science yields knowledge of true Being. Now, in Plato's view only the ideas have true being. These ideas are hierarchically ordered with, at their apex, as the highest idea, the idea of the Good. The Good is the direct cause of both the being of the ideas, of true being, and any kind of knowledge of the latter. Hence, only the Good can be an ultimate first principle, and the ideal of science really reads: a deductive system in which the ultimate first principles are descriptions of the Good. Since all science, then, in this view starts and ends with the Good, science is at once concerned with value. Only a science which has as its domain the ideas and ultimately the Good is genuine science, according to Plato. That science is dialectic, philosophy itself.\(^5\)

At its inception, then, science was essentially linked with value. Husserl considers this a weak link, however, because of its metaphysical, that is, speculative, nature. Let it be noted here, to avoid confusion, that Husserl uses the term "metaphysics" in two senses. On the one hand, he means by metaphysical claims those that
concern true Being, genuine value, genuine knowledge, and so forth, claims that are based on descriptive analyses. On the other hand, he uses the term in a pejorative sense to refer to claims which are but speculative portrayals of those ultimate dimensions of the world and experience, in other words to refer to speculation as opposed to description. Although Plato's link between science and value is a weak one in Husserl's view because of its speculative nature, still he considers Plato to be on the right path. It will be shown later (chapter six, especially page 348) how Husserl aims to reveal the inextricable link between the ideal of science and concerns of value without invoking a metaphysics. Hence, Husserl does not merely want to repeat Plato, but wishes to reinterpret him. The thing to note, however, is that science, or dialectic, has as its concern questions of value for Plato. Fundamentally it was a radical enterprise of self-responsibility—it was philosophy itself. In Plato science is not alienating because it is at once knowledge of self in terms of the whole of existence—it is knowledge of one's place in the world. Actions in Plato's philosophy are based on this knowledge of the whole, this whole which is "held together" by the Good. To know how one ought to act one needs to contemplate the totality, which in turn allows one to discover true value.

While in Plato value and science belonged together in so far as science was the search for and grasp of the idea of the good, beautiful and true, gradually in the history of thought this link became weakened. In Plato's thought, theory of science and science were aspects of one discipline. Theory of science revealed the ideal of
science which, in turn, served to guide the development of science. This assured the link between value and science because the theory of science revealed that science aimed at true Being which ultimately related to the Good. But in Aristotle theory of science (logic) splits off as a separate discipline. This split is the beginning of the weakening of the science-value link. As I explain in what follows, even though, after having been repressed in the Middle Ages, the Platonic ideal of science resurges in the Renaissance, the ideal undergoes a change in meaning due to the development of natural science. This development of natural science was itself made possible through a change in world view. In the new world view episteme came to mean knowledge of the physical world as it is in itself, as opposed to how it appears to man. I explain also how this deepened the split between human value and science (pp. 299 ff.). Philosophy being concerned with value and meaning is left behind, while science with its practical results forges ahead. It is to this crisis in philosophy that Descartes responds. He tries to reunite value and science, philosophy and science, but inadvertently deepens the rift between these. Indeed, with Descartes Plato's ideal of science undergoes a modification which changes the face of philosophy, a modification which, as I shall explain below (pp. 13 ff.), which ultimately leads rationality to suffer the fate of rejection mentioned above (p. 6); that is, it leads to the loss of belief in reason as a means to answering questions of human value. While Descartes, like Plato, is advancing a rationality, his ideal of science differs significantly from Plato's in that he uses the Galilean model of science, according
to which science is not intricately linked with value. Yet Descartes does not seem to realize this, for in his mind the ideal of science is somehow linked with value. Indeed, Descartes' primary concern is with value, his interest in science being subordinate to the latter. It is ultimately Descartes' main aim to unite value and science, for although he shares the Galilean view of knowledge, he does not share the scientific view that all being and therefore all knowledge is on par, is of equal value. He believes that the highest type of knowledge is ethics, and that all other knowledge makes way for ethical knowledge. Descartes writes:

"Thus, all philosophy is like a tree, whose roots are metaphysics, the trunk physics and the branches which grow out of this trunk are all the other sciences, which are reduced to three principle ones, namely, medicine, mechanics and ethics, by which I understand the highest and most perfect science which, as it presupposes a complete knowledge of the other sciences, is the last degree of wisdom.

But as it is not from the roots or the trunks of trees that the fruits are picked, but only from the extremities of their branches, so the principle usefulness of philosophy depends on those of its parts which we can learn only last of all. (D 183-184)"

According to Descartes knowledge of self, which leads to knowledge of God, is the highest type of knowledge. As in Plato's philosophy, there is a highest good in Descartes' philosophy. Whereas for Plato the Good was the ultimate cause of all Being, in Descartes' philosophy God is the ultimate cause of all Being (B 162) and God is the highest Good (B 227). This self-knowledge will lead in Descartes' view to the betterment of mankind. Achieving self-knowledge means for Descartes coming to know one's place in the world. Only such knowledge can lead man to correct action (B 206,207; 152; 222). Ultimately,
then, it is self-knowledge which is the highest type of knowledge, according to Descartes, and this is why he bases science on knowledge of the ego.

Descartes' aim, then, was twofold, namely, to ground science in the ego and to show that all knowledge of the ego--self-knowledge, in other words--is the highest type of knowledge. To prove the latter it was necessary for him to prove the existence of God, for self-knowledge in his view is the highest knowledge precisely because it is at once knowledge of God. But Descartes is unsuccessful in proving either that knowledge is grounded in the ego or that self-knowledge is the highest type of knowledge. If all knowledge were grounded in the ego, then knowledge, including knowledge of the external world, should flow from the ego. But Descartes can make the leap from knowledge of the ego's existence to knowledge of the world's existence only by invoking the veracity of God. Even then it is a matter of inferring knowledge of the world from knowledge of the existence of the ego. Hence, in proving that the ego is the ground of all knowledge, Descartes already appeals to the method (inference being part of the scientific method) which he was to ground. As well, if the cognitive link between the ego and the world is tenuous, the claim that self-knowledge is the highest type of knowledge becomes dubious, for self-knowledge was supposed to reveal one's place in the world as well as how one was to act in the world. In short, self-knowledge was supposed to be a type of knowledge of the world. But while Descartes forges the ego-world link via God, his proofs of God's existence presuppose belief in God. Hence Husserl writes that "unnoticed prejudice directed his [Descartes'] meditations
so that, viewed as a whole, they lack the power to convince even his contemporaries" (FTL 7 [6]). Hence, Descartes was unsuccessful at uniting philosophy and science, in uniting value and science. But more than that he inadvertently deepened the rift between them. This is so, as I explain in what follows, because Descartes, in accepting the Galilean model of science, inadvertently views the ego through this model. Mind or ego as seen by science is a part of the world, something to be studied in-itself. Value, on the other hand, is typically human, and to appreciate it one must understand it as human, i.e., not as something in-itself outside of human experience. According to Husserl science is grounded in the ego, but not the ego that is viewed through the model of objectivistic science. As well, he maintains that the ground or proof of the value of self-knowledge lies in the structure of mind itself, but this structure cannot be appreciated through the model of Galilean/Newtonian science.

That science could proceed without answering the questions of philosophy was taken as an indication that these disciplines were two distinct fields of study, and so philosophy and science go their separate ways. The Platonic and Cartesian ideal of philosophy as universal science falls. Science no longer concerns itself with metaphysical questions, that is, with ultimate questions of genuine being, genuine knowledge, genuine value and so forth, but is led on only by its useful results. Husserl explains that in turning away from metaphysical questions science turns away from questions of reason, for problems of genuine knowledge, genuine value and so forth, are problems of the rational criteria for the identification of genuine knowledge,
value, etc. That is, metaphysical questions are questions of the legitimization of knowledge claims, of claims concerning being and values, and asking for *legitimation* is an act of reason. To neglect these questions is to turn away from the demands of reason.

It [positivistic science] has dropped all the questions which had been considered under the now narrower, now broader concepts of metaphysics, including all questions vaguely termed "ultimate and highest." Examined closely, these and all the excluded questions have their inseparable unity in the fact that they contain, whether expressly or as implied in their meaning, the problems of *reason* - reason in all its particular forms. Reason is the explicit theme in the disciplines concerning knowledge (i.e., of true and genuine, rational knowledge), of true and genuine valuation (genuine values as values of reason), of ethical action (truly good acting, acting from practical reason); here reason is a title for "absolute," "eternal," "supertemporal," "unconditionally" valid ideas and ideals....All these "metaphysical" questions, taken broadly - commonly called specifically philosophical questions - surpass the world understood as the universe of mere facts. They surpass it precisely as being questions with the idea of reason in mind. (C 9)

With Plato reason or science pertains both to mind and world. When science splits off from philosophy, a division of labour results. Science comes to study the world independently of mind; it no longer considers questions of mind to be intricately connected with its domain. Questions of mind are not only considered irrelevant to the progress of science, but are seen to impede the latter's progress. But science, in excluding questions of mind from its domain, excludes questions of reason as well, for reason is an aspect of mind. Philosophy comes to think of itself as the discipline dealing with mind. Indeed, when one considers the disconnectedness of the sciences and the humanities at our universities, one can in effect view the
philosophy-science split as the mind-matter or mind-body split on an institutional level. But science can ignore questions of reason only as long as it engages in self-deception. Science can ignore questions of reason and mind only as long as it focuses on its results and turns a blind eye to questions about its own nature—as long as it fails to become self-reflective—as long as it fails to take itself as object of study. And science feels justified to focus on only its results since these have become the exclusive measure of its success. Philosophy, however, due to its lack of success, becomes a problem for itself (C 11) and so becomes all the more self-reflective. It becomes critical philosophy. Were science to examine itself it would see that science is inextricably bound to reason in terms of its origin (it is a product of human reason), in terms of its structure (science is a system of judgments ordered according to certain ultimate unifying principles and theories, ordered according to reason, in other words), and in terms of what it does.

In ignoring questions of reason, science becomes "fact minded" and strays from the ideal it had at its inception with Plato. This is why Husserl says that science did not always leave out questions of value and that "the positivistic concept of science in our time is, historically speaking, a residual concept" (C 9). No longer concerning itself with self-responsibility, no longer relating its results to human value, science becomes alienated and alienating. Its results are not acknowledged to be human products, yet it takes its results to be capable of yielding a total world view. Hence, there is no room for any model of man other than that given by the results of modern
science. Science may not be interested in questions of mind or reason as part of its procedure, but it has implicitly judged the nature of mind by determining that it is to be studied by the method of natural science, i.e., by the method whereby one studies any real object in the world. But this is to falsify human nature, for as mentioned previously humans are not like other objects in that they are observers and have a certain amount of freedom.

With science's increasing power philosophers have to take a new stand not only towards science, but towards their own discipline as well. They have to reassess both their role and that of science. What is of interest to us here is that these new stands reflect specific theories of rationality. The positions that develop are many and varied and their respective views concerning the relation of philosophy to science are often far from univocal. Nevertheless certain dominant trends emerge. (Again, even within the dominant trends one finds that the positions are never univocal, but only tending in a direction.) Some—for example, Neurath—align themselves with science and come to view philosophy as a handmaiden to the sciences. In this view philosophy is not seen as a distinct discipline but as subordinate to science. While philosophy initially determines the language of science, viz., physicalistic language, once it has done this its task is completed, according to Neurath. Essentially philosophy becomes obsolete for Neurath. He writes the following:

All the representatives of the Circle are in agreement that "philosophy" does not exist as a discipline, alongside of science, with propositions of its own: the body of scientific propositions exhausts the sum of all meaningful statements. (LP 282)
The physicalistic language, unified language, is the Alpha and Omega of all science. There is no "phenomenal language" behind the "physical language", no "methodological solipsism" behind some other possible position, no "philosophy", no "theory of knowledge"...there is only Unified Science, with its laws and predictions. (LP 293)

But the objection to the expression, "philosophizing", is not merely a terminological one; the "clarification of the meaning of concepts" cannot be separated from the "scientific method", to which it belongs. The two are inextricably intertwined. (LP 283)

Others, such as Carnap, see philosophy as logic of science, not subordinate to science with obsolescence as its fate, as Neurath would have it, but as a discipline alongside science responsible for distinguishing scientific claims from non-scientific (metaphysical/speculative) claims. In The Logical Syntax of Language Carnap writes the following:

Apart from the question of the individual sciences, only the questions of the logical analysis of science, of its sentences, terms, concepts, theories, etc., are left as genuine scientific questions. We shall call this complex of questions the logic of science...

According to this view, then, once philosophy is purified of all unscientific elements, only the logic of science remains. In the majority of philosophical investigations, however, a sharp division into scientific and unscientific elements is quite impossible. For this reason we prefer to say: the logic of science takes the place of the inextricable tangle of problems which is known as philosophy....(LSL 279)

It must be understood, however, that when Carnap says that philosophy is the logic of science, he uses the term "science" not in the way in which Plato or Husserl do, as intimately connected with self-
understanding, but as science understood as positivist science, science which studies facts independently of their relation to mind. Although the arbitrational role that Carnap assigns to philosophy places it above science, still its domain is the domain of positivist science. Hence Carnap's theory of reason aligns itself with the world view of the scientist, which leaves out all concern with questions of mind as part of the procedure of science. Reason, then, is understood as the study of deductive systems independent of mind—as the study of formal logic—and is not seen as relating to self-understanding as it was with Plato. Nor is it thought that it should. That philosophy does not deal with questions of human value is not seen as a lack.

Still others, notably the existentialists, turn away from science, if not against it. But although the existentialists turn away from science, they have something in common with scientists: like the scientists the existentialists reject rationality, considering it to be of limited value to man. They, like the scientists, turn away from the Platonic ideal of the unity of mind and world in ratio. The reason for this is the following. The existentialists see that man is alienated and that this is in part the fault of science with its disregard for the question of what man is. They see more clearly than the scientists, that the latter, in talking about their exalted "facts", are actually engaging in a rationality of sorts. These facts do not present the world, but are absolutizations of one way of encountering the world. Writes Camus:

I realize that if through science I can seize phenomena and enumerate them, I cannot for all that apprehend the world. (M 20)
Now, rationality means various things, but whatever else it may mean, it also means being part of a whole. It is this part of what rationality means, according to the existentialist, which puts it at odds with the concept of life, the concept that the existentialist champions. What does not form part of an ordered whole is a-rational, is a "fact". According to the existentialist, one's life (livedness, lived moment) is a "fact". Since everything starts with the fact of one's life, with the fact of this lived moment, one's life is itself unconditioned—that is, cannot be placed in any context, since context is something which follows upon the fact of one's being alive. To say that one's life cannot be placed into an ordered whole is to say that the fact of one's life is a bare fact. It may, then, be the only genuine fact there is. A fact which is part of an ordered whole is no longer a fact. So science does not present us with facts, for its facts are always part of an ordered whole. No rationality can therefore deal with the fact of man's existence, according to the existentialist. Mind meets the world in existence, and this meeting is not, contra Plato, rational, but is a-rational. It is not ratio that binds mind and world, as Plato would have it, but the absurd.

The absurd depends as much on man as on the world. For the moment it is all that links them together. It binds them one to the other as only hatred can weld creatures together. (M 21)

Mind desires rationality, that is, a unifying world view of which it would be a part, but all such views start and end with the brute fact of one's existence, according to the existentialist, and so one shall never have a purely rational world view. Life, while inviting desire
for the rational, at the same time resists this desire. So, in the existentialist's view, rationality is of limited use for self-understanding, for it cannot tell us about life. In this view rationality falsifies life and is contrasted with notions of "play", "dance" and "creativity" which are thought to do more justice to the structure of life (see chapter five). These approaches have become suspicious of rationality and deny that it can yield self-understanding, that is, that it has anything to do with life as it is lived. They see the scientist as a rationalist trying to contain life in the confines of reason.

But, as Husserl maintains, if rationality has failed scientist and philosopher alike it is because rationality has not yet been properly understood. Phenomenology wants to reestablish the value of rationality, for it believes, in accord with the ancient Greek ideal, that only it can yield self-understanding, self-responsibility and value (C 290). According to phenomenology both the objectivist and the existentialist views dichotomize reason and life, each view emphasizing a different term of the dichotomy. Phenomenology, considering this a mistake, wants to establish a new rationality, one which falls midway, as it were, between these two approaches by bringing out its true sense as universal science (FTL 6 [6]). When Husserl urges that we return to the true sense of science, that we reestablish philosophy as a universal science, it sounds as if he wants to reestablish Platonism. But it cannot be stressed enough that for Husserl, when he says that science has strayed from its true sense, it is not a matter merely of returning to the origin, of returning to and regaining Plato's idea of
philosophy/science. It is a question, rather, of returning to the ancient motive to philosophize, the motive to seek the idea of philosophy/science, and in light of the historical development that philosophy and science have undergone, to reinterpret and thus develop a new sense of that original idea. Hence Husserl says:

Rather - as the reestablishment of philosophy with a new universal task and at the same time with the sense of a renaissance of ancient philosophy - it is at once a repetition and a universal transformation of meaning. [my emphasis] (C 14)

The aim is to establish a new rationality and not to repeat the rationalist tradition. The aim is to go beyond that tradition by bringing to light and working out the idea of rationality implicit in the tradition but which the tradition itself did not work out. It is picking up on something the tradition "skipped" as it were. As I show in what follows, in Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl establishes a new rationality by working out the idea of logic implied in de facto logic. Again, while this sounds like Platonism, for it seems to express Plato's theory of participation--the theory of the relation between fact and idea, according to which the idea is what we seek to know and come to know through its imperfect realization in the fact--Husserl's theory is distinct from Plato's. After all, the new theory of rationality that Husserl is trying to put forth is one which unites life with reason, fact with idea, while on many readings of Plato fact and idea are separate. While both Plato and Husserl maintain that the idea is first and foremost latent, this has essentially a different meaning for the two. According to Plato, prior to its incarnation the soul exists in the realm of Ideas and so knows the ideas [Phaedrus 249
B,C]. At birth, however, they are forgotten by the soul—they become latent, subject to recall in later life [Phaedrus 250 A,C,D; Meno 81C]. Hence, "latent" here means "forgotten" for Plato. In the Crisis Husserl too speaks of "the latent life of depth" (C 120). But he sometimes uses the term "unconscious" to describe the latency of ideas (e.g., C 237, EJ 279). Now, unconscious material can be material which was once known and which is now forgotten, but it can also be material which was never known, where by "known" is meant subject to explicit awareness. One can for example, perceive and/or draw inferences unconsciously (EI 216), where what is perceived and/or inferred is new material. In other words, unconscious material can be active material which has never been known, i.e., which has never been brought to explicit awareness. This is the sense in which the ideas are latent or unconscious for Husserl. Contrary to Plato, for whom Ideas are known prior to life, for Husserl ideas are lived before they are known, as I explain in chapter six. In my view it would be illegitimate according to Husserl to speak, even metaphorically, of a "point" divorced from incarnate life at which the ideas are known.

Although for Husserl unconscious ideas are not known and never have been known, that is not to deny that for Husserl unconscious Ideas can become known. In the Crisis, for example, Husserl speaks of a "dimension of the living spirit that had to remain hidden" but which "can be made accessible to scientific understanding through a method of disclosure appropriate to it..."(C 118-119). It is just to deny that this becoming aware of ideas is a matter of recalling something one had prior knowledge of. The difference between Plato and Husserl on this
point—even if it is only a difference in emphasis—reflects a difference in their notion of objectivity. When Plato says that the soul lives in the realm of ideas prior to incarnation [Meno 81C] he is suggesting that this realm exists independently of incarnate life. If one thinks that something is objective only if it has existential independence of subjectivity, then maintaining the Realm of Ideas to exist independently of incarnate life is a way of ensuring the objective status of the Ideas. Husserl, however, maintains that objectivity does not demand independence of the lived, incarnate, dimension. I shall explain later (pp. 238 ff.) how his method reflects this belief. To say that the idea is first and foremost lived, as Husserl does, is to say that it is lived "in" someone. The ideas, unconscious at first, but which one tries to bring to explicit awareness, are "someone's". In other words, Husserl emphasizes one's lived link with the ideas. In so doing he stresses a personal, subjective, dimension. Yet despite this personal dimension the Ideas are nevertheless objective according to Husserl.

The phrases "unconscious" and "life" used by Husserl to refer to ideas reflects the potency and dynamism that the latent ideas have in Husserl's view. To say that the unconscious idea is lived is to say that it exerts a force on behaviour, on one's doing or action, whether practical or theoretical in nature. The unconscious or latent ideas for Husserl seem to guide one's actions. He described the "region" of ideas, the transcendental realm, as follows:

...spiritual functions which exercise their accomplishments in all experiencing and thinking, indeed in each and every preoccupation of the human
world-life, functions through which the world of experience, as the constant horizon of existing things, values, practical plans, works, etc., has meaning and validity for us....(C 119)

He refers to the Idea of "the universally, apodictically grounded and grounding science" as "the driving force of life for the highest stage of mankind" (my emphasis) (C 338).

Our actions are in part unconsciously guided by ideas. This includes actions of a theoretical nature, such as the development of logic or science. As with most unconscious material one cannot become acquainted with the idea directly, but one must discern the idea from results or actions that were motivated by it. This is why in Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl seeks to come to know the idea of logic through an analysis of the tradition of logic deposited in the history of thought. Hence, Husserl's method consists of a "teleological consideration of history" (C 73). History, according to Husserl, is the result of a doing implicitly guided by an idea (FTL 10 [9]). But the method of reading history as a text to be deciphered for its motivating Idea is that of hermeneutics. In Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl, I argue, is engaging in a hermeneutics. This will be discussed in chapter five, where I also consider professor Carr's claim that the hermeneutic method is not only foreign to Husserl's philosophy, but is contrary to his method of "essential seeing". Carr's claim, a claim shared by many Husserl scholars, is crucial because it transposes Husserl into a Platonist, thereby precluding a proper grasp of Husserl's notion of rationality.

Basically, then, Husserl wants to reintroduce the "subjective" in science (logic)--he wants to humanize science. The starting point
of this process is a crisis. This crisis is part of the telos of man, according to Husserl, a telos which he describes as

...that of humanity which seeks to exist, and is only possible, through philosophical reason, moving endlessly from latent to manifest reason and forever seeking its own norms through this, its truth and genuine human nature....(C 15)

The telos, then, is that of grounding all human value in reason. We can only ground human value in reason if we assume a genuine, that is, a radical, questioning, stance toward value, i.e., reason is by "definition" the opposite of dogma. Such a radical questioning stance is experienced as an upheaval, as was explained previously. It is important to note that those philosophers who have attempted to ground science on the ego's rationality experienced the questioning as a crisis. Consider, for example, the words of Fichte:

I cannot remain in this state of indecision; on the solution of this question [of whether man is free or determined] depends my whole peace and dignity. And it is impossible for me to reach a decision. I have absolutely no ground for making a decision in favor of one opinion or the other.

This is an intolerable state of uncertainty and irresolution. Through the best and most courageous resolution of my life, I have been reduced to this! What power can deliver me from it? What power can deliver me from myself?

Chagrin and anguish stung me to the heart. I cursed the returning day which called me back to an existence whose truth and significance were now involved in doubt. I awoke in the night from unquiet dreams. I sought anxiously for a ray of light that might lead me out of these mazes of uncertainty. I sought, but became only more deeply entangled in the labyrinth. (VM 34-35)

Husserl too speaks of going through the hell of radical skepticism (C 77). This crisis is in effect none other than the crisis Socrates deliberately attempted to induce in his interlocutors. It is the state
of suddenly doubting what one previously took for granted—the state of feeling one's ignorance or lostness. For Socrates, as for Husserl, this crisis, this suffering, is a necessary step on the way to genuine knowledge. It is only through a feeling of ignorance, through a painful feeling of lostness, that one is motivated to seek truth, indeed that one is open to knowledge at all. This is perhaps what Buber means when he writes:

...despair...is the highest of God's messengers; it trains us into spirits that can create and decide. (DL 133-134 [68])

It is the crisis which motivates us to reexamine our own telos. This, in effect, is what Husserl does in _Formal and Transcendental Logic_. For although man has strayed from his telos, it is nevertheless adumbrated in the history of thought. As I explained, according to Husserl, man came closest to his telos with Plato's philosophy in that dialectic—once science and theory of science—was not theory from up high but part of one's intersubjective life. But the telos is not fully realized with Plato. Aristotle recognizes the difficulty with Plato's science. While Plato's science was intended to reveal the basis of all Being, of all life, according to Aristotle Plato's science could not adequately account for life—it could not deal with movement and change, the essence of what is living. Husserl maintains that in attempting to overcome this problem, in effect, in attempting to come closer to the telos, Aristotle paradoxically strays further away from it. But there is, according to Husserl, contained in Aristotle's logic, in his theory of science, an implicit idea which, if followed through and developed, brings us once again closer to our telos. This
is the idea of pure science, not determined by any facts or any particular being, but which is open to all Being. This pure logic is not developed by Aristotle. I shall show in what follows how Husserl works out a pure logic according to the Idea, theory of science, and achieves a universal mathesis consisting of a pure ontology, and how he develops this yet further into a pure theory of multiplicities: a theory of possible forms of theories and its correlate, the concept of a possible province of cognition that would be governed by a theory having such a form. It is explained how even such a logic as this (which I shall show to have parallels with the logic of Carnap and Frege) still presupposes a world, albeit a possible world, and hence is not a pure logic. To achieve a truly pure logic one needs to go deeper, to the pure transcendental ego where no world is presupposed, and show how logic is founded on the self-evidence of the pure transcendental ego. (I argue that such transcendental themes are also found in Frege's work.) Husserl argues that unless one introduces "subjective" considerations into logic, as opposed to the purely "objective" considerations found in traditional logic, logic will not understand itself, which in turn is alienating for man's self-understanding.

Of course in what follows I have to deal with such problems as the threat of psychologism. I shall show how the transcendental ego differs from the empirical ego in order to avoid psychologism. As well, I shall explain how the notion of the pure transcendental ego as knowing is not an ideal construction, but one which can do justice to the speculative demands contained in the concept of life. It will be
demonstrated how Husserl's notion of the pure transcendental ego can accommodate the phenomena of death, the unconscious, the body, desire, sexuality and other selves. In effect, then, Husserl's characterization of phenomenology as an a priori apodictic science of essences is reconciled with his characterization of phenomenology as a concrete science of the life-world, and, correlatively, Husserl's claim that the phenomenological method involves intuitions a priori essences is reconciled with his claim that it involves the teleological-historical (hermeneutic) approach.

For Husserl, understanding the self, the nature of the soul, is important, then, because it prescribes a type of behaviour (implying an ethics) in line with the ancient Ideal of self-responsibility via self-knowledge. But his concept of knowing (rationality/science) is one deeper than that of empirical science (rationality). I shall argue that for Husserl knowing is not an activity opposed to or divorced from feelings and emotions, value, spontaneity and creativity, the latter being characterizations that are usually attributed to the artistic mode. I attempt to show that phenomenology, to use de Muralt's phrase, "possesses an aesthetic structure". Husserl's Science (phenomenology) shares elements of Nietzsche's new Science (new rationality), a science in touch with life and open to Being, a Science in which science and art merge. Because Husserl's notion of knowing (Science) is open to and in touch with Being, knowing for him is an activity which heightens the sense of Being and increases Being, leading to ecstasy.

A few words about the approach I shall take in this work. My reading of phenomenology has been strongly influenced by the writings
of Andre de Muralt and Suzanne Bachelard. According to de Muralt, Husserl was guided by an implicit idea of phenomenology, and all of Husserl's writings constitute so many factual expressions of this idea. In this work I attempt to bring to light certain aspects of the idea of phenomenology through an analysis of its adumbrations in Husserl's writings. I shall, in other words, engage in a phenomenology of phenomenology. Applying the phenomenological approach to Husserl's work, then, means that I will treat his work as continuous--I consider all of Husserl's works to be adumbrations of the implicit idea of phenomenology, the latter being a unity in a multiplicity. This approach, to quote de Muralt, involves suspending "the historical facticity of Husserl's intellectual life and, following the deepest intention of Husserlian method, work[ing] on the pure meaning of the doctrine" (DeM 6).

It is this approach of attempting to bring to light the idea of phenomenology which led me to focus on the theme of logic. That is, this approach involves looking for a unifying principle, a guiding idea or leitmotiv. That leitmotiv, it should be apparent from the introduction, is logic. The theme of logic is one that runs throughout the breadth of Husserl's philosophic career, from the early Philosophy of Arithmetic to his final Experience and Judgment. Even after Ideas, for example, which is generally thought to contain the heart of the phenomenological doctrine and which is not a work dealing explicitly with logic, Husserl returns to an explicit treatment of the notion of logic in his Formal and Transcendental Logic. An examination of the
notion of Logic in Husserl's writings will bring out aspects of the idea of phenomenology which generally remain latent.
FOOTNOTES--INTRODUCTION

1. See for example C. Perelman's The New Rhetoric And The Humanities chapter four (NRH 62-71). Husserl's phenomenology would fall into what Perelman calls a monism. But phenomenology is a monism which, if properly understood, is at once a pluralism. That is, a genuine pluralism is a position open to various standpoints. This openness to various standpoints requires a transcendental ego.

One requires, however, if I am able to speak of alternate conceptual schemes, that I must be able to translate the others into my own; or mine into someone else's. This requirement has nothing to do with the primacy of the English language or, for that matter, of any other language. What it requires is that the languages must be mutually translatable. But when I assert this, I am not taking the "internal" standpoint, but rather the "external" standpoint of a transcendental ego, for whom any language is as good as any other, before whose gaze all possible worlds are spread out and none is more his own than any other. The transcendental ego's is no standpoint: all possible standpoints are arranged before its gaze. The transcendental ego has no "home" language. (PTP xxviii)

And:

But to be able to survey all possible points of view, conceptual frameworks, languages objectively--as making sense to each other, therefore as commensurable (and mutually translatable), one needs to take up a stance, which is none other than that of a transcendental ego. (PTP xxviii)

2. Husserl writes in the Crisis that the "crisis" of European culture was due to "the apparent failure of rationalism" (my emphasis) (C 299), and that "the reason for the failure of a rational culture...lies not in the essence of rationalism itself but solely in its being rendered superficial..." (C 299). We can take Husserl to consider Naziism, which is an instance of totalitarianism, to be a manifestation of the European crisis. Husserl describes that the crisis of Europe has only two escapes, one of which is "the downfall of Europe in its estrangement from its own rational sense of life, its fall into hostility toward spirit and into barbarity", the other being "the rebirth of Europe from the spirit of philosophy through a heroism of
reason..." (C 299). The former of these two escapes characterizes Naziism aptly.

3. And I do not think it is a powerful enough motive to build a just society. Perhaps to some, though, it is the only acceptable reason.

4. This is how Plato portrays the Sophists. There are more sympathetic portrayals of the Sophists. Indeed, there is truth to what the Sophists say, but I will return to this later (page 239, footnote 18). For now, it is sufficient to characterize them in this way to show what Plato was reacting against.

5. While Plato agrees with the Sophists that natural science of the time did not yield knowledge, this is so, according to him, because it was not genuine science or rationality at all. Natural science did not meet the ideal of science on two counts: (i) it was not in touch with real Being—it did not have as its domain the Ideas, but phenomena—and (ii) its ultimate premises were not first principles, but were claims concerning phenomena.

6. Such speculative accounts may or may not be true, that is founded on insight, but they can only be verified, in Husserl's view, through descriptive analysis.

7. On page 348 the link is pointed out, but this entire work is, in a sense, concerned with working out this link in a non-metaphysical manner.

8. In other words, Husserl thinks value can be an object of knowledge in the strict sense.

9. This claim is true at least on one reading of Descartes. There is a second way to read him, according to Husserl, to which this critique would not apply.

10. I deal with Fink's cautionary essay in the Crisis regarding the unconscious (C pp. 385 ff.) in chapter four.


12. This is touched upon on pp. 264 ff.
CHAPTER ONE
The Idea Of Logic Contained In The History Of Thought And The Projection Of This Idea To Its "Limit".

In this work I am going to show how logic and life are unified in phenomenology's concept of rationality. This means that it must be demonstrated in what sense phenomenology is a logic, and that in turn means showing how it at once relates to traditional logic and yet goes beyond that logic. I shall start out, then, by examining "logic".

Logicians generally argue that formal logic is a pure science, by which they mean that it is a science which has nothing to do with factual matters. They maintain that formal logic is a science that is neither based on nor refers to factual matters. Hence, the realm of logic is considered to have nothing to do with "experience" or the "world", since these are both factual realms. The objects of formal logic are said by some to be ideal objects, such as propositions, functions, classes, etc., or signs and expressions standing for these, such as sentences standing for propositions, predicates standing for properties, etc.; by others they are said to be meaningless symbols manipulated according to given formal rules. The claims of logic, which concern formal relations between these objects, are said to be necessary, i.e., the denial of any such claim constitutes a self-contradiction: it is inconceivable. The relations of matters of fact, however, are said to be contingent--the denial of a factual claim is
not inconceivable. Consequently, logical truths are distinguished from factual truths in that the former are necessary truths while the latter are contingent truths; or, as it is also expressed, logical truths are analytic, as opposed to truths about the world, which are synthetic. Hence, examining the relation between logic and the world, between logic and experience, is frowned upon by the formal logician, since there is assumed to be no connection. The belief that the realm of logic is radically distinct from matters of fact is a longstanding one in the history of thought. That this belief is a longstanding one, and one that is taken for granted, is brought out poignantly by Hume, whose radical skepticism subjected all knowledge of matters of fact to a great upheaval, but which did not touch logic precisely because he assumed the truths of logic to be necessary truths, quite distinct from truths of fact. Kant, in turn, inherits this belief from Hume. Writes Husserl:

How does it happen that he [Kant] regards a formal logic, with its apriority, as self-sufficiently grounded? How is it comprehensible that he never thought of asking transcendental questions about the sphere of formal logic, taken as a sphere in and for itself?

That can be understood as a consequence of the above-mentioned dependence on Hume implicit in Kant's reaction against him. Hume directed his criticism to experience and the experienced world, but accepted the unassailableness of the relation of ideas (which Kant conceived as the analytic Apriori). Kant did the same with his counter-problem: He did not make his analytic Apriori a problem. (FTL 260 [230])

It must be underscored that Husserl agrees that if logic is really a pure science, then its truths, logical truths, should have nothing to do with the world, with matters of fact. That is, the criteria of its
"truths" should not be derived from or based on facts. However, he insists that assuming or claiming purity and turning one's eye away from the world does not in fact produce purity. Husserl maintains that, paradoxically, because the logicians have not analyzed the connection between logic and the world, between logic and experience, logic has not achieved its purity. The logicians have not seen that their logic implicitly presupposes a world, that it is what Husserl calls a positivistic science (FTL 13 [12]), a science which harbours meaning constituted by the subject, but which is not recognized by the subject as doing so. It is Husserl's aim to develop a logic which is truly pure by means of the phenomenological method. It must be understood that this does not mean that he rejects traditional formal logic. Contra Ricoeur (CI 247-248), the phenomenological attitude and the objective attitude, an attitude in which meaning is not traced to its source, have not been placed in opposition. Rather, Husserl thinks that traditional logic does not achieve true scientific status, hence he aims "to provide an honorable status for the traditional locutions [of formal logic] by new insights" (FTL 330 [289]). To gain purity in logic one must, according to Husserl, go through the world, as I shall show. My first concern, in this and the following chapter, shall be to show in what way traditional logic presupposes the world. In this chapter I identify the idea of logic present in the history of thought according to Husserl, and I show how he works it out to its limit. He does this by examining what notions are implicit in the idea of logic, examining these for further implications, and in light of these notions developing logic. He takes the demands contained in the concept of
traditional formal logic seriously, especially the demand that logic be pure, and is even more extreme in adhering to them than most of the proponents of traditional logic. By thus developing logic he reaches a point which strains the notions of traditional logic. Specifically, Husserl shows that the demand for purity is not met by traditional logic. As I shall show in the next chapter, when logic is worked out according to its idea, it can be seen to presuppose the world and experience. This brings in a "subjective" factor into Husserl's logic. I shall attempt to show that when properly interpreted this subject is not the psychological subject but the pure transcendental ego, which, although pure, can nevertheless do justice to the speculative demands contained in the concept of life.

Since, according to Husserl, the reference to the world is implicit in the meaning of logic, he attempts to make the meaning of logic explicit, thereby exposing its hidden presuppositions. In Formal and Transcendental Logic he tries to determine the idea (meaning) of logic by considering the de facto science of logic, logic in its historical development. Understanding the idea of x (the whole) by means of the factual development of x (the part) is a teleological-historical, or hermeneutic, task. Husserl uses the teleological-historical approach because in his view the science of logic is a categorial object (object of the understanding) (FTL 41 [36]) sedimented in the history of thought, one that continues to develop in time, its "end point" being an ideal point at infinity. Evidence for claims concerning the nature of this object, then, are the facts of the history of thought. Hence Husserl must appeal to de facto logic, the
science of logic as he finds it deposited in the history of thought. What is the idea of logic revealed in the history of thought?

In accord with the general opinion on the matter, Husserl maintains that formal logic as a distinct discipline was established by Aristotle as the science of the assertive predicative judgment, as Apophansis. Aristotle did not use the term "logic" for this science but called it "analytics" (HFL 44). In fact Aristotle's Analytics formed only part of a science much broader in scope than what we today consider to be formal logic. Whereas we consider formal logic to deal with the formal properties of judgments only, this broader discipline, expounded by Aristotle in the Organon, also considers non-formal properties of judgments, viz., rules of judgment as employed in everyday dialogue and public debating contests (rhetoric), what we would today perhaps call informal logic. But from the standpoint of present day formal logic, the Prior and Posterior Analytics "contain Aristotle's most mature thought about logic" (KK 4). What motivated Aristotle to establish Analytics? What function was this science to serve—what need did Aristotle feel that led him to found logic as a distinct discipline?

We know that Aristotle's philosophy was generally based, at least in part, on a critique of certain aspects of Plato's theory of Ideas. Unlike Plato, Aristotle did not believe that the ultimate reality was a distinct realm of ideas. Again, it would seem impossible that the substance and that of which it is the substance should exist apart; how, therefore, could the Ideas, being substances of things, exist apart? (Metaphysics 991b)
Aristotle is especially perturbed by the theory of forms because it can account neither for the phenomena of growth and change, nor for the supposed interaction between the Ideas and sensible particulars.

Above all one might discuss the question what the Forms contribute to sensible things, either to those that are eternal or to those that come into being and cease to be. For they cause neither movement nor change in them. (Metaphysics 991a 10)

Aristotle's concern with movement and change of course arises from his concern with the study of nature, biology being one of his main interests. Indeed, Aristotle maintains that with the Platonic theory's inability to account for movement "the whole study of nature has been annihilated" (Metaphysics 992b 5), and he goes so far as to say that "of the ways in which we prove that the forms exist, none is convincing " (Metaphysics 900b 10).

In light of the reservations Aristotle felt for Plato's Theory of Ideas, it is not surprising that he did not accept Plato's method of dialectic as a method which would yield truth, since dialectic presupposed the Theory of Ideas as much as it served to prove that theory. As a scientific method which was to yield truth, dialectic was a failure in Aristotle's eyes, because dialectic did not neutrally seek to find out what ultimate reality or truth is, but presupposed that the ideas were ultimate reality. For Aristotle demonstration, not dialectic, is the method of science, and demonstration proceeds by means of the syllogism.

By demonstration I mean a syllogism productive of scientific knowledge, a syllogism, that is, the grasp
of which is eo ipso such knowledge. (Analytica Posteriori 71b 2'15-20)

Study of the syllogism forms a major part of Aristotle's Analytics. Aristotle's logic, then, was motivated by a concern with science. But I wish to make a stronger claim. The motivating idea behind Aristotle's science of logic is a theory of science. As soon as one has a science or wants to develop a science one has implicit a theory of science. This is so because in order to develop a science one must have a working idea of the object domain of that science, a working idea of a method for revealing the objects of that object domain, for achieving truth, in other words, and a working idea of "truth". These ideas all form part of a theory of science, i.e., a theory of science is concerned with questions of object domain, methods of revealing this domain and its objects, questions of truth, and so forth. Aristotle's logic was motivated by an implicit theory of science and cannot be understood in isolation from such a theory. As such, Aristotle's logic implicitly is a theory of science.  

It seems that what Aristotle objects to in Plato's method of dialectic is the latter's failure to respect Being (for Plato could not account for the marks of Being: growth and change) and the inability of the dialectic method to reveal Being. In short, in Aristotle's view dialectic is not a scientific method, since it is prejudiced as to the nature of Being. A truly scientific method concerned with revealing Being should not be prejudiced about the nature of Being, but should be neutral with respect to Being, i.e., should be open to its nature. A neutral method would not be dependent on any particular being, but receptive to all Being. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that
Aristotle wanted, though did not achieve, a method that was neutral, and that syllogistic demonstration was to be that method. That Aristotle wanted a neutral method is indicated, for example, by the neutrality of the technical expressions employed in his logic and by the use of letters to stand for cores of judgments. Indeed, it seems that it was precisely this desire to achieve neutrality and establish a method free from presuppositions about the "matter" it was to judge that led Aristotle to found logic. I cite Stigen in support of this view:

If scientific discourse and argumentation itself were introduced by Aristotle as a new factor to be treated in relative independence of things and thoughts, it is natural that he should be the founder of logic, and the first to formulate detailed requirements of scientific arguments and principles, as well as of dialectic proofs and sophistical fallacies. (SAT 123)

That Aristotle was concerned with neutrality of method is noted by Bochenski:

What emerges from the text is the complete neutrality of the technical expressions "term", "premiss", "syllogism" relative to any philosophical interpretation. For the premiss consists of terms, the syllogism of premisses, and the premisses are logoi, which can equally mean utterances or thoughts or objective contents, so that the way is open to a formalist, psychological, or objectivist interpretation. All these interpretations are permissible in regard to Aristotelian logic; the purely logical system excludes none of them. Guided by his original intuition the founder of formal logic so chose his terminology as to rise above the clash of interpretations to the level of pure logic. (HFL 45)

Husserl notes that in the study of the syllogism, the tool of science, Aristotle uses letters to stand for the cores of judgments, suggesting a desire for purity and neutrality.
In the materially determinate statements taken as examples, Aristotle substituted algebraic letters for the words (terms) indicating the material: that which is spoken about in the statements, that which determines judgments as judgments relating to divers material provinces or single matters. (FTL 48 [42-43])

And:

With this taking of the materially filled cores as indeterminate optional affairs - lingually, as indeterminate terms, S, p, and the like - the exemplificative determinate judgment becomes converted into the universal and pure form-idea: the pure concept of any judgment whatever that has, as the case may be, the determinate judgment-form "S is p", the form "If S is p, the Q is r", or the like. (FTL 49 [43])

Although Aristotle aimed for purity in logic he did not achieve it, according to Husserl. This is so because although in the Metaphysics Aristotle poses the question of the nature of Being (as opposed to Plato's assuming, in Aristotle's eyes, the nature of ultimate reality), he, no less than Plato, is prejudiced as to the nature of Being. Aristotle reveals his predilection for natural science when he maintains that Being qua Being is primary substance, the concrete individual. The individual for Aristotle is an entity in the world. This leads Husserl to say that,

...Aristotle had a universal ontology of realities only; and this was what he accepted as "first philosophy". (FTL 80 [70])

Although in a certain way Aristotle's logic seemed to have purity in that, as Bochenski observes, logoi or premisses (judgments) could "mean utterances or thoughts or objective contents, so that the way was open to a formalist, psychological or objectivist interpretation", nevertheless the judgment, whether construed as utterance, thought or
objective content, always reflects the structure of reality according to Aristotle, and reality is living nature for Aristotle.

Aristotle relates his analytics to the real world and, in so doing, has not yet excluded from his analytics the categories of reality. (FTL 49 [43])

Hence Husserl writes that Aristotle's formal logic "did not attain the full purity and breadth prescribed by its essence." (FTL 48 [42])

Aristotle thinks that logic is grounded on being, the individual, and that logic reflects language, which in turn reflects reality. He treats logic as if it were the pure method which reveals Being. But in fact he has not grounded logic and so fails to understand its nature. This is so because he has not freed his logic from being, has not allowed it to reveal its intrinsic nature, its purity. That is, logic was wedded to the concern for truth, and this concern kept the domain of pure logic from view. Because the judgment was understood in terms of primary substance or individual being, Aristotle did not focus on the judgment in-itself, the judgment qua judgment. Only once one has a sense of the proposition in-itself can one develop a purely formal logic, for in order to appreciate the purely formal dimension of the proposition one must be able to exorcize all material considerations. The Stoics, for example, whose notion of *lekta* (FTL 82 [72]) comes close to that of proposition in-itself, developed a logic of propositions which was a logic more formalized than Aristotle's logic. Although their logic developed from that of Aristotle (HFL 108), "the Stoics understood formal treatment in a formalistic way, and laid the foundations for an exact syntax and semantics" (HFL 109). They were led to this because they studied
propositions and the relations between propositions more for their own sake and not, as in Aristotle's case, for revealing the nature of reality. Whereas Stoic logic developed out of a concern for dialogue, or "everyday argumentative encounters" (HFL 113), Aristotelian logic developed out of a concern for looking for the nature (essence) of reality. Stoic logic was purer because dialogue concerns propositions par excellence.

Aristotle always remained at heart a pupil of Plato's, looking for essences, and accordingly asking himself the question: "Does A belong to B?" But the Megarians start from the pre-Platonic question: "How can the statement p be refuted?" (HFL 113)

It is only when the domain of the pure judgment, of pure logic, is revealed that logic can become a true science, for only then can one see its object and its nature--only then can one ground the science, making it a true science. Husserl explains, for example, how the concern for truth masks the different levels within logic:

Here it is a matter of a shifting of concepts and an equivocation that went on in the logicians' thinking, not for accidental but for essential reasons and that necessarily remained hidden, because they themselves pertained to the unity in respect of theme that characterizes the logicians' "straightforward" thinking, as directed to the critical evaluation of judgments according to the norm of truth. More precisely, they necessarily remained hidden because inquiry about the formal conditions for possibly true judgments necessarily proceeded on the systematic levels that we distinguished as theory of the forms of judgments, consequence theory, and theory of truth. (FTL 178 [158])

There is a paradox here. The concern for truth which leads to purity in logic, also stands in the way of achieving that purity. Although pure apophansis stems from the motive of the theory of
science, in achieving purity in apophansis we must put this motive aside. Since science is concerned with truth, and the study of the judgment in its purity leaves all consideration of truth behind, there is a move away from apophansis as a theory of science. Yet precisely this move is necessary to unite logic with its original motive, to work out logic as a theory of science. So, if in the aim for purity we have "left things behind", we know logic must return to things if it is going to become one with its motivational force, theory of science, for the latter is concerned with adequation to things.

Unless this motive is kept in mind, the result will be a pure logic removed from the world, involving and dealing with a very narrow domain, a seemingly impotent field of study. That is, if this idea of purity contained in Aristotle's logic is followed through, and made the proper object of logic, it will be seen to lead to a very narrow, limited, domain. Its object will be the broadest concept of judgment, the judgment qua judgment, the judgment qua possibility (conceived in its purity). Hence, the logic implied in Aristotle's analytics is a very narrow field of study. Up until Husserl's time it had not been developed. Suzanne Bachelard suggests that it was in part because of the narrowness implied in its development that the logicians were kept from developing logic in its purity.

In our opinion, one can go so far as to say that it is a fear of recognizing its own limits that has, for so long a time, kept formal logic from absolutely assuming its formal character. (SHL 25)

But this narrow field will turn out not to be an end point, but an impetus for the further development of logic. Narrowness may seem to
connote impotence, but the narrowness implied in Aristotle's logic is a narrowness that points beyond itself. It points beyond itself precisely because of its narrowness, its apparent limits, for it is the desire to go beyond the felt restriction that leads one to reexamine what motivated the quest for purity, formalness, which itself led the discipline into its narrow domain. In that broader motive lies a way beyond the limitations one has been led to. Aristotle wanted a pure method which was open to Being, but one can achieve such a method only within a theory of science, a theory concerning the question of what science or knowledge is, what Being is, and so forth. In other words, logic is a theory of science. Once logic is seen explicitly as theory of science it is seen that logic must go beyond its apparent limits. Writes Bachelard:

In fact the "limits" of formal logic are not restrictions that would give rise to a sense of impotence; they are rather determining factors which on the one hand enable us to carry out the formal program and on the other hand force us to see that there can be other logical tasks. "[F]ormal logic cannot be the whole of logic: the full and - in a new and richer sense - formal theory of science." (SHL 25)

It is noteworthy that at the point in Formal and Transcendental Logic at which Husserl begins to work out the pure logic implied in Aristotle's analytics but not developed by the latter, it seems that Husserl goes over to the approach of his philosophy of essence and no longer appeals to the history of logic. But this must not be taken as an indication that in Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl does not take the teleological-historical approach. Rather, if Husserl does not appeal to the history of logic at this point, it is because the pure
logic Husserl envisioned had not yet been developed. And indeed, logic itself had made little progress beyond Aristotelian logic. That is, although a conception of a purely formal logic is commonplace in contemporary thought, at the time at which Husserl was writing the notion had not yet been developed. While the concept of a purely formal logic was alien neither to the Stoics, nor to Duns Scotus, the insight did not prevail, as Husserl points out (FTL 49 [43]; 82 [72]).

It is now generally held that the notion of a purely formal logic was developed by Frege and took hold only after Frege, his work at first not receiving acceptance. But Frege was a contemporary of Husserl, and the two developed the notion simultaneously though essentially independently. Although there was an exchange of ideas between the two, Husserl's logic is sufficiently distinct from that of Frege to indicate independence of thought. Moreover, Frege seems to have misunderstood what Husserl was doing (SO 97) and was critical of him. Indeed, what is particularly noteworthy is the way in which Husserl develops a purely formal logic, viz., by using the phenomenological method. Frege objected to this method, claiming that the method only psychologized logic in the Philosophy of Arithmetic. The phenomenological method is still not generally accepted in formal logic for the same reason. But according to Husserl it is indispensable to developing a purely formal logic as a true science, for only this method will allow a radical grounding or legitimation of logic. Legitimation, according to Husserl, relates to the individual's experience. By "relating to experience" here is not meant a relating of objective concepts to one's experience, but an act of experiencing,
of living through, of "giving birth" to the concepts in the act of experiencing. When the tradition generally offers legitimations of logical concepts, it tends to do so with further reference to objective concepts, albeit of a higher level. Such an endeavour no doubt has its place. But according to Husserl this can never be "complete" legitimation. According to Husserl the grounds for these notions are located in one's experience, so "proof" for a given notion is achieved by isolating and focusing on that experience which gives rise to the notion in question. Presupposed is that its giving rise was motivated by a reason. Hence, one's actual cognitive doing, the recreating of the originary experience, becomes one's legitimation. That is, of course, not the same as the original cognitive act; it is not mere repetition (FTL 177 [157]) because one is now aware that one is legitimating. This is, in effect, rebirth of the concepts in a living doing.

They all have the character of investigations fundamental to the uncovering and criticism of the original logical method; and indeed we can characterize them all likewise as explorations of the method by which the "fundamental concepts" of analytics are produced originaliter, in that evidence which assures us of their respective essences as identical and safeguarded against all shiftings. (FTL 180 [160])

Hence Husserl calls such legitimation clarification "from the most original sources" (FTL 71 [63]). On a larger scale this original recreating is the method of philosophy itself, according to Husserl, as I shall have occasion to discuss later (page 238). The tradition generally, however, has based its proof only on "static" objective
concepts for fear of psychologism, for fear of confusing act and content of act.

If the general confusion was reduced to the extent that (overcoming the psychologistic confounding of them) one distinguished judging from the judgment itself (the ideal formation, the stated proposition), it then was even less possible to set a senseful problem concerning the subjective as long as the peculiar essence of all intentionality, as constitutive performance, was not understood and therefore judicative intentionality in particular was not understood as the constitutive performance in the case of the ideal judgment-formations - and, still more particularly, the intentionality of evidential judging was not understood as the constitutive performance in the case of the ideal truth-formations. (FTL 206 [183])

The type of evidence Husserl offers in legitimating notions, then, is in a certain way subjective. But "in a certain way" only, for Husserl's point will be that not all appeals to the subjective entail psychologism. This is where the distinction between an objective formal logic and a transcendental logic lies. In Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl proceeds according to this insight. In the first half of the first chapter of part one, for example, he introduces distinctions for which he produces evidence in the form of appeal to experience as discussed in the second half of that chapter. This method of proving by doing Husserl already uses in his Philosophy of Arithmetic, where it is criticized by Frege. Frege claims that it leads to psychologism. (H-J 61,62)

In present day texts on formal logic it is commonplace to consider propositions in their purely formal dimensions. It is generally accepted that there are such "entities" as propositions and that logic deals with propositions in their purity on at least three
levels, viz., syntax, semantics and truth. Legitimation of speaking of propositions and their various levels does not, on the whole, form a part of the texts on formal logic.\textsuperscript{15} At most the proposition is identified by contrast to the sentence, e.g., by pointing out how different sentences can express the same proposition. Legitimation in any deeper sense must find expression outside the texts on logic and is left to "philosophical logic". One expects that introductory texts on formal logic reflect what formal logic is in the eyes of contemporary philosophy, its function, its importance and so forth. So one gets the sense that legitimation does not form part of formal logic per se, that logic can be "mastered" and "practised" by the student without legitimation of its basic concepts, and that legitimation is of interest and concern to the "professional philosopher" only. For Husserl this is unthinkable. Formal logic is of too great an importance to be left to the professional philosopher. It is of fundamental importance to every person. Husserl, then, would maintain that for those who study formal logic legitimation must accompany introduction of the notions of logic.

I have argued, above, that according to Husserl logic in its historical sense is the theory of science, and that this sense is implicit in Aristotle's work. According to the notion of theory of science logic should be a pure discipline. But this idea of a pure logic, of a pure theory of science, was not developed by Aristotle. Let us next see how Husserl works out the notion of pure logic contained in Aristotle's logic by means of the phenomenological method. This will give a feel for the type of "legitimation" involved in
phenomenology. Husserl proceeds by introducing three levels of logic, viz., morphology, consequence logic and the logic of truth, in sections 12-15 of *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and subsequently grounds these by appeal to the evidence of "subjective" experience. I shall present this evidence and work towards the three distinctions of logic. After that it will be shown how Husserl follows the idea of pure logic, or theory of science, to its limit.

We are all familiar with the phenomenon of being presented with a vague judgment which one subsequently makes distinct. It does not matter whether the vagueness is due to an unclarity in the utterance (FTL 56 [50]), as, for instance, when the words are mumbled, or, if there is clear articulation, due to an unclarity in the content, in the meaning of the words. Nor does it matter whether it is a judgment performed by oneself—something vague can come to mind (FTL 56 [50]), for example—or by another (FTL 69 [61]). When one makes a vague judgment distinct, one "has" something before one. One knows this is what is meant. One suddenly or finally "sees" it. The criterion of distinctness is being able to perform the judgment, being able to bring the meant to mind (FTL 56 [50]). The distinct judgment is an explicit judgment. It is "an explicit performance belonging to judicative spontaneity" (FTL 56 [49]). By explicit performance is meant, among other things, "explicit subject-positing, of a positing thereupon as predicate, of a passing on relating to another object, which is posited separately, or of any like process" (FTL 56 [49]). As Husserl writes:

If the "vaguely", "confusedly", judging process of meaning something that comes to mind is followed by such a process of explicit judging, then we say, on the
basis of the synthesis of fulfilling identification that comes about: The confused meaning or opinion "becomes distinct"; now, for the first time, something is "properly judged"; and the judgment, which previously was meant only expectantly now is properly and itself given. (FTL 56 [49-50])

So the distinct judgment is a performance, a doing. In so far as we make vague judgments distinct many times a day without giving it a thought, the "movement" from vague judgment to distinct judgment is "automatic". But one can also make this movement thematic. Implied in making the confused judgment distinct is the fact that the meant is evidence of something, namely, of the judgment in its vague, most basic, form. It is implied that it is this (same) vague judgment that I've made distinct. The distinct judgment and the vague judgment, are the same judgment.

Although in distinct judging one aims for the judgment itself, the ideal objectivity, one does not yet have the explicit notion of judgment in-itself, of judgment as object. I can make the act of bringing the vague judgment to distinction thematic thereby making explicit the fact that in doing so I believed that the distinct judgment and the vague judgment are one and the same. Only then do I realize that there is something which remained the same, which I aimed at, an objectivity itself, in other words. When we look at it, our cognitive action of rendering a vague judgment distinct is seen to imply a proposition-in-itself, P. In effect evidence for the judgment in-itself is a performance. This is why Husserl says that although the explicit judgment is evidence of an ideal objectivity, and although "This evidence is an original emerging of the judgment as it is in-itself", it is "not yet an evidentially experiencing (act of) seizing
upon and regarding it thematically" (FTL 60 [53]) and that it is only when "what has become constituted in this evidence, in this polythetic action [becomes] graspable 'monothetically' in one grasping ray", that "the polythetic formation becomes an object." (FTL 60 [53]). It is, then, only after making the act of rendering a vague judgment distinct as an object of thematic consideration that one gets a sense of the judgment as object. Thematizing this act leads one to realize that one is aiming for an object, the meant judgment, which is thought to remain the same from the vague to the distinct judgment. The meant, the distinct judgment, is evidence of the vague judgment. The vague judgment is a judgment too, since it is that which one worked on, but one not given in evidence. This type of evidence, evidence of distinctness, is, in turn, different from evidence of clarity, the evidence for the distinct judgment being true or false (FTL 69 [61]).

With the transition, with the making distinct to oneself of what one / truly meant in the vague judging process of meaning...with this transition the distinct judgment becomes given as an evident mere explication of the true sense or meaning. There comes to pass a coincidence of identity belonging to an originally peculiar type, which indicates a fundamental type of "evidence". This evidence, like any other (and "experience" in the widest conceivable sense), has its degrees of perfection and its idea - here indeed an ideal limit of perfection, at which the synthetic coincidence would in fact be absolutely perfect. (FTL 69 [60-61])

The distinct judgment is evidence of the vague judgment, and this type of evidence differs in nature from the evidence for the distinct judgment being true. For example, "My brother John is in the navy" is a distinct judgment, but also a false judgment. It is because the distinct judgment gives one the judgment "in-itself" and because it
does not have to be true that Husserl says that the judgment itself does not have a claim to truth included in its essence, even though this is what we are naturally led to believe.

It cannot even be said that, in the strict sense of the word, a claim to truth is included in the proper essences of judgments; and consequently it is incorrect to account this claim-concept part of the judgment-concept from the start. (FTL 196 [174])

And:

...[the] predicate truth, or...falsity...is not a constituent mark of any judgment as a judgement. (FTL 197 [175])

But not all vague judgments can be brought to distinction, whatever the nature of bringing to distinction will turn out to be. In part, making distinct means relating a claim or its parts to other claims in a unity (FTL 64 [57]). "No triangle has three sides" cannot be made distinct, that is, cannot be performed as a judgment. It cannot be "grasped" or "pictured". But does that mean it is not a judgment? On purely formal grounds there is no justification for saying that only a judgment that can be brought to distinction deserves to be called a judgment. The distinct judgment is evidence for the vague judgment. But if there is no evidence for a given judgment, and I cannot render it distinct, then nonetheless it is still a judgment. The claim "No triangle has three sides" has the form P and not-P. The only criterion for ruling such a claim out as a judgment is that of possible truth or adequation. That is, there is no way in which this judgment can be brought to adequation. But that is not strictly speaking a formal consideration. Hence Husserl says that while the theme or the interest of pure apophantics is the genus,
distinct judgment, i.e., "possible forms of true judgments" (FTL 53 [46]), its province is the judgment in its broadest sense, the vague judgment, the judgment itself irrespective of any "ties" to reality or truth (FTL 70 [62]). That is, pure apophantics has as its "field" the judgment qua judgment, the judgment irrespective of any ties to reality, irrespective of any concern with truth. But apophantics will be interested in a subsection of judgments, namely in those whose forms could yield truth. This interest stems from logic's guiding idea, theory of science, which is concerned with truth. The vague judgment leads to an appreciation of the judgment qua judgment, the judgment in its purity, and pure apophansis from the standpoint of its province asks what formal conditions need to be met for a judgment to be a judgment at all, in the broadest sense of the term. This leads to a categorization of different judgments according to their forms and the relation between these forms.

The possibility of subsuming all judgments under pure concepts of configuration or form immediately suggested the thought of a descriptive classification of judgments, exclusively from the formal point of view: regardless, that is, of all other distinctions and lines of inquiry, like those concerning truth or non-contradiction. (FTL 49 [43])

Thus one distinguishes with respect to form simple and composite judgments (FTL 49 [43]). Among simple judgments one distinguishes singular, particular and universal judgments (FTL 50 [44]). Among composite, or complex judgments one differentiates the disjunctive, the conjunctive and the causal judgment (FTL 50 [44]). Such a descriptive classification of judgments, if done consistently, would lead to a
grammar of pure logic (morphology), and this Husserl considers the first level of formal logic:

Systematically consistent and clean execution of such a description would have permitted the sharp isolation of a peculiar discipline, first defined in the *Logische Untersuchungen* and characterized there as theory of the pure forms of significations (or grammar of pure logic). This theory of pure forms of judgments is the intrinsically first discipline of formal logic, implanted as a germ in the old analytics but not yet developed. (FTL 50 [44])

This discipline of morphology, as Husserl calls it, involves more than a static description of how forms of judgments are generated from more fundamental forms. This, again, is done for both simple and complex judgments. In the case of simple judgments of apophansis, predicative judgment certainties, the primitive form is S is p, where p designates a determination and S its substrate. Higher forms can be generated from this form by an operation of reiteration. S is p by reiteration yields Sp is q, which yields by reiteration Spq is r and so forth ad infinitum.

This moreover, should be emphasized expressly: Every operative fashioning of one form out of others has its law; and this law, in the case of operations proper, is of such a nature that the generated form can itself be submitted to a repetition of the same operation. Every law of operation thus bears within itself a law of reiteration. (FTL 52 [46])

Hence the fundamental forms, says Husserl, are not side by side but are graded one above the other. The concept of operation introduced here is of great importance and more will be said about it in what follows. According to Husserl, Aristotle did not recognize this process of generation of complex forms from more simple ones. Concerning morphology, Husserl writes:
If we have become attentive of the point of view of "operation"...we shall/naturally choose the concept of operation as a guide in our investigation of forms; we shall have to conduct this research in such a way that it leads to an exhibition of the fundamental operations and their laws, and to the ideal construction of an infinity of possible forms, according to these laws. (FTL 52 [46])

Even S is p is achieved by an operation (FTL 52 [46]), namely, by that of "determining a determinable substrate." In the case of simple propositions, then, we look at the internal structure and see how forms are generated from more basic forms. In the case of complex propositions, the component propositions are treated as unanalyzed totalities and the complex propositions are examined for connections between propositions to discover fundamental forms of connection and how reiteration of these leads to a generation of more complex propositions. Hence such formation forms as the conjunctive and hypothetical Husserl calls fundamental forms, "since they indicate fundamental kinds of 'operations' that we can undertake with any two judgment forms" (FTL 51, 52 [45]).

It may seem a bit puzzling that Husserl bothers with the internal structure of the proposition, since the internal structure of the apophantic judgment, S is p, is something he inherits from Aristotle, who thought it to reflect reality. Husserl says that Aristotle does not yet have the pure form of judgment, for he "relates his analytics to the real world and, in so doing, has not yet excluded from his analytics the categories of reality" (FTL 49 [43]). However, Husserl deals with this structure because he does not think that it is faulty, just Aristotle's interpretation of it. Frege too questions Aristotle's interpretation, but while Frege, in order to
indicate that he is rejecting Aristotle's subject-predicate distinction, uses different terms, namely, object-concept, Husserl retains the terminology but reinterprets the terms.

The second level of pure apophantics is consequence logic, the logic of noncontradiction. This level spells out the possible forms of true judgments, separate or in combination. It is still a purely formal level, for truth is not made thematic (FTL 54 [47], 55 [48]).

In such inquiry one is not yet concerned with the truth of judgments, but is concerned merely with whether the judgment-members included in a whole judgment, no matter how simple or how complex it may be, are "compatible" with one another or contradict one another and thereby make the whole judgment itself a contradictory judgment, one that cannot be made "properly". (FTL 54 [47])

The fundamental question of this level of logic is:

When, and in what relations, are any judgments as judgments, and so far as mere form is concerned - possible within the unity of one judgment? (FTL 64 [57])

The third level of logic occurs when we make truth, adequation of the judgment to affairs themselves, our theme (FTL 65 [57]). While the first two levels ruled out nonsense and formal countersense respectively it did not rule out material countersense or any other untruth (FTL 65 [57]). But, as Husserl says, one thinks of the judgment from the start as a vehicle for truth, as under the motive of cognitive striving. That seems to be its function.

Now the judgments are thought of from the very beginning, not as mere judgments, but as judgments pervaded by a dominant cognitional striving, as meanings that have to become fulfilled, that are not objects by themselves, like the data arising from mere distinctness, but passages to the "truths" themselves that are to be attained. (FTL 65 [58])
On this third level of logic one focuses on cognition, on the states of affairs that are judged—in short, on the "object" of the judgment. One realizes that any contradiction in the judgment rules out the possibility of adequation.

Truth and falsity are predicates that can belong only to a judgment that is distinct or can be made distinct, one that can be performed actually and properly. (FTL 66 [58])

Of course, in this realm we do not take a stand concerning the actual truth or falsity of the judgment. What we gain here is that our perspective is altered, "New thematic interests emerge (SHL 19). Instead of focusing on mere judgments we now focus on cognition.

By attaining the formal logic of truth I do not know more - I am in another way. Hence I know better. I know that, beyond the questions to which the second discipline of logic is limited, there are other questions to be raised by another discipline. (SHL 19)

From the perspective of truth logic the judgment is seen in terms of its original motive, that of cognitive striving, of coming to know the object. And it is precisely science that aims to know the object. But if the judgment is a way of knowing the object, then knowing the object is part of the judgment's essence, in which case a theory of judgment (logic) should include a theory about the objects judgments aim at and the relation between judgments and their respective objects, albeit from a formal perspective. In short, formal logic seen from the view of its motivating idea should consist of a formal ontology, that is, a formal theory of the object, as well as formal apophantics, that is, a formal theory of the judgment. Husserl explains that what a formal ontology is and how it relates to formal
logic could not be grasped until pure mathematics, algebra, had been developed. Only then could mathematics be seen to be dealing not with number and quantity per se but with relations between any object whatever, e.g., relation of whole to part, identity, equality, unity, totality, property, etc. To see pure mathematics as a formal ontology it had to be unified (SHL 32). For example, while the determining concept in the theory of cardinal number is that of unit and in set theory that of element, each is "any object whatever".

However, once pure mathematics is seen as formal ontology the relation between it and formal apophantics may not be immediately clear. At first one may be at a loss as to how to unite the two disciplines into one formal logic, for apophantic analytics and formal ontological analytics seem to be two distinct sciences, having different provinces, viz., judgment-forms and forms of objects, respectively. Upon analysis, however, their relation will be seen to be a close one. Judgments are about objects: they predicate properties or relative determinations of them. As well, all forms of objects, all the derivative formations of "anything whatever", make their appearance in the judgment and hence in formal apophantics itself. Formal apophantics and formal ontology both deal with the same type of objects, viz., senses, i.e., ideal objects "produced" by subjective acts. As well, one can calculate with both pure syntax and pure mathematics.

Indeed, when looked at in this way formal ontology and formal apophantics seem indistinguishable as sciences! And Husserl presents us with the following paradox: if we focus on formal apophantics as
the science (theory) of science, then, since the aim of science is (knowledge of) the object, the domain of formal apophantics, strictly speaking, is formal ontology. Formal apophantics would become formal ontology. If, on the other hand, we focus on the fact that the objects formal ontology considers are categorial objects and that categorial objects are always constituted in judgments on syntax, and, if we considered that even though the judgment aims at an object, that object is what it is only in the judgment, that judgments aim to determine an object province only given in the judgment, then formal ontology becomes formal apophantics. On a static level there is, in Husserl's view, no resolution to the problem. Resolution of the problem requires, as I show next, phenomenological considerations of the aim, or concern, of science. It requires a phenomenological approach because aim involves a subjective doing, and phenomenology, unlike traditional logic, can bring in "subjective" considerations.

Science embraces a critical attitude, that is, it wants to have evidence for its judgments. It is an attitude in which it is known that both the judgment and the evidence for the judgment may be wrong. Hence in the critical attitude the judgment is treated as supposed--as needing verification. The critical attitude, in short, treats the judgment as a meaning or sense. Nevertheless science per se does not thematize meanings or sense as such; logic does. Science aims to verify its judgments; it aims at the true judgment. It turns to logic to provide it with norms to help it do so (SHL 71), for science consists of judgments in a certain relation to each other, that is, judgments organized according to theories. Hence formal apophantics,
working at the service of science, focuses on judgments qua judgments, with the implicit goal of verifying these. Hence the apophantic focus is at the service of the aim of science. The apophantic focus is an intermediary one. The end focus is knowledge of the object.

And here lies the difference between pure mathematics and formal apophantics. Formal apophantics was always part of a broader concern; more specifically, it was part of a broader concern with truth. Pure mathematics never had that concern. For this reason Husserl maintains that whereas mathematics can become a mere game, logic, in its true sense, because of its relation to truth, cannot. But pure mathematics can be seen as formal ontology only if it is inserted into the broader concern with the possible forms that objects which are could take. In other words, formal apophantics and formal ontology are not reducible to each other but are both moments of science, of the endeavour to attain knowledge of the object. Here we have the reemergence of Leibniz's mathesis universalis. Hence, if logic, an enlarged logic, mathesis universalis, is the theory of science, it will envelop both formal apophantics and formal ontology.

But one can carry the idea of a pure science further. Science does not consist of an arbitrary combination of judgments. Rather the judgments of science are unified. In the case of pure, abstract sciences, such as pure geometry, this unity is determined by certain principles or laws. All the judgments of such a science can be derived from basic axioms, and the objects of abstract sciences are defined by these lawful operations. In such a science truth is analytic consequence from apriori principles. Hence in abstract sciences such
as pure geometry—or, as Husserl calls them, nomological sciences—axioms determine both the province and the theory form. This is why Husserl, when he speaks of the theory of multiplicities, means both the province and the theory of a nomological science. "Multiplicity is not a mere 'set' [ensemble] of objects but rather a set determined specifically by the fact that it is subject to a form of nomological theory" (SHL 47). Hence a formal theory of science is also concerned with a theory of possible forms of theories, and with its correlate, "the concept of any possible province of cognition that would be governed by a theory having such a form" (FTL 91 [97]), something the mathematician calls a multiplicity [Manigfältigkeit]. While the earlier level of logic dealt with pure forms of significational functions that can occur within science (judgment forms, forms of the latter's elements, argument forms, proof-forms, and correlative, on the objective side, any object whatever, any set and set relationships whatever, any combinations, ordered sets, quantities, etc.), now judgment systems in their entirety become the theme, systems which make up the unity of a possible deductive system. Any nomological science can be reduced to a theory form through formalization. The theory of multiplicities then appears as the highest level of logical analysis, and the problem of mathesis universalis is the problem of a full, entire logical analysis.

In taking the idea of science to a theory of multiplicities Husserl has taken the idea of a pure science (analytically formal science) to its limit. But here the limit betrays a lack. I said that it is our concern with truth, with science, that allows us to unite
formal apophantics and formal ontology in one mathesis universalis. From the perspective of a theory of science, formal apophantics and formal ontology are correlates of one science, viz., logic (theory of science). But although mathesis universalis is motivated by a concern for science, mathesis universalis cannot finally be the theory of science, for it cannot account for concrete science; in other words, it cannot talk about the world. The mathesis universalis is a theory of nomological science. But in fact we distinguish between concrete and nomological sciences. The unity of concrete sciences, unlike that of nomological sciences, is not determined by axioms or laws, but by the object, and there can be no question of deriving all the judgments of a concrete science. Truth is not analytic consequence from apriori principles but adequation to the thing (DeM 72). But Husserl urges that this distinction between nomological and concrete science is not an analytic distinction, and so is not one that one can make from the standpoint of pure analytics alone.

Thus logic, as analytics, is not equipped with any ready-made distinction among sciences, like the usual distinctions between concrete (descriptive) and abstract ("explanatory") sciences or any other distinction that may be proposed. By its own resources it can attain only the cognition that, conceived with formal universality, an open plurality, or "multiplicity", of objects is formally conceivable as having this particular determination: that it is a definite mathematical multiplicity and that, correlatively, the propositions conceived with formal universality as jointly holding good for it have a constructional (deductive) system-form. (FTL 103 [91])

While mathesis universalis is motivated by a concern with science, science which deals with true Being, it finally cannot be a total theory of science, logic in the true sense of the word, for it cannot
talk about the world. But, paradoxically, as Husserl shows, even this pure analytic logic, this mathesis universalis, which cannot speak about the world, still presupposes the world. This shall be explained in the next chapter. To Husserl this means that a deeper scientific attitude exists than that of analytics. That deeper science is transcendental phenomenology.
FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER ONE

1. "...The whole of formal consequence-logic, the logic of analytic necessities, can be seen from the point of view of non-contradiction." (FTL 331 [290])

2. For Kant, who introduced the terms "analytic" and "synthetic", "analytic" was not synonymous with "a priori" or "necessary", for synthetic claims could also be a priori or necessary; e.g., "every event has a cause". Hence, Kant maintained a distinction between analytic and synthetic claims on the one hand, and necessary and contingent claims on the other. However, in present day logic, the two distinctions tend to be collapsed, and it is generally assumed that "analytic propositions are necessary and...all non-analytic propositions are contingent" (ITL 161).

3. It has not achieved scientific status because it has not analyzed certain of its basic concepts to their source. For Husserl the ideal of science is one in which none of its concepts is taken for granted.

4. Some authors, such as Carr, deny that Husserl employs the hermeneutic approach in Formal and Transcendental Logic, maintaining that Husserl's phenomenology, being a philosophy of essences, is incompatible with hermeneutics. I discuss this in detail in chapter five.

5. Husserl begins his analysis of the term "logos" by looking at the role it plays in Plato's thought. But according to Husserl, for Plato logic as theory of science was not a discipline distinct from the act of philosophizing.

6. According to Kneale and Kneale, "The word 'logic' did not acquire its modern sense until some 500 years later, when it was used by Alexander of Aphrodisias, but the scope of the study later called logic was determined by the contents of the Organon" (KK 23).

7. One might argue that this is a naive reading of Plato's Theory of Ideas. Nevertheless Aristotle's critique of the Theory of Ideas is based on this interpretation of the theory.

8. This gives rise to an unavoidable ambiguity in the use of the word "logic". Logic is at once a science and a theory of science. So "logic" could refer to the broader "motive", i.e., theory of science, or to the narrower products of this motive, such as, apophantics, the formal study of the judgment, and formal ontology, and so forth.
9. Categories 5, 10-15; 3, 10. While from the Husserlian perspective Aristotle is correct in making primary substance the individual, he is wrong in not having "purified" the notion of individual. Further, while Husserl considers him correct in having made "life" his concern, he considers Aristotle to have failed in purifying that notion.

10. Categories 5, 3a, 35.

11. Bochenski writes, "And generally speaking they everywhere show traces of the same spirit as Aristotle's, only in a much sharper form, that spirit being the spirit of formalized logic" (HFL 108).

12. There are, as it were, two histories of thought. The history of individual thinkers and that which is emphasized over time, which becomes the "tradition".

13. Not that complete legitimation is in fact possible, but if it were, this would not be the way to achieve it.

14. That is, they ignore a "subjective" doing. I am speaking of a trend only. At times objective notions in the tradition may be explained by appeal to a subjective doing, but it is not recognized as such.

15. I am speaking in general terms and as such there may be counterexamples to my claim. But I am speaking of a tendency, and, as such, I think the claim is true.

16. That is, the true aim of logic or apophantics is the method of science, a method which reveals truth, so its interest is the conditions of truth, i.e., the distinct judgment as a condition of possible truth.


18. Examples of nonsense and countersense are, respectively, "King and or because" and "This circle is a square".

In this chapter I shall show how traditional logic presupposes the world, and how, in order to develop a pure logic, it is necessary to develop a transcendental logic, a logic based on the pure transcendental ego. In doing so I bring out the nature of intentionality. To aid me I shall contrast Husserl's notion of intentionality with that of Brentano. The reference to Brentano, then, serves as a heuristic device. In fact, one of the things I aim to show in this chapter is that in Husserl's view Brentano's notion of intentionality is lacking in that it views intentionality in static terms, whereas according to Husserl, it must be understood in dynamic terms. What this means and its significance I shall make clear in the course of this chapter.

We have worked out logic according to the idea of purity under the guiding idea of theory of science. We end up with a logic which shares elements of contemporary logic--specifically with that of Frege and Carnap. Despite the fact that this logic has been worked out according to the idea of purity, it presupposes the world, and, indeed, experience, the latter implying a subjective element. That is, when we analyze a certain type of nonsense we see that the judgment is governed by material conditions. The judgment sense is dependent on a certain
material lawfulness. Specifically the judgment cores must be related materially. This cannot be foreseen as long as we remain in the formal perspective without relating formal apophantics to its guiding idea, theory of science. Hence, while within the perspective of a formal apophantics we come upon the apriori idea of cores containing no syntactical structures, in a formal apophantics such a syntax-free cores are of no particular interest. They are of interest when it is viewed from the standpoint of a theory of science. This standpoint must never be forgotten since it motivated the development of pure apophantics to begin with. From that standpoint the syntax-free cores are of particular interest, for they represent the individuals about which the judgments "speak", i.e., they represent the individuals in the world. These individuals in the world are prior to the judgment and the judgment refers to them. In other words, logic in a way is determined by the world and relates to it--formal laws are regulated by empirical lawfulness. This sounds decidedly un-formal logical and un-phenomenological. I shall show this not to be so, however. The world does not destroy the purity of logic for Husserl. It indicates to him, rather, that the judgment is not the deepest level of either logic or phenomenology. The deepest level of both logic and phenomenology in his view is experience. According to Husserl experience, contra Hume, is intentional, it has a logic. The lawfulness of experience is the lawfulness of a deeper logic, namely, the lawfulness of the transcendental subject, the intentionality of the pure transcendental ego. While for Brentano intentionality is an act of mind independent of experience--it is neutral or pure matter--this is not so for
Husserl. For Husserl experience, the genetically primary and therefore deeper act of mind, is intentionality. According to Husserl the essence of intentionality is not a neutral act divorced from experience, is not presentation, as Brentano calls it, but objectification. Objectification occurs even in experience. The essence of the transcendental ego is objectification, and the formal structure of the judgment reflects this essence of the transcendental ego. As I shall explain below, objectification is a dynamic act of bringing something to evidence. There are many levels of objectification, all genetically related, the higher ones reflecting increased actualization. Let me first explain in more detail the difference between Brentano's and Husserl's notions of intentionality by examining their respective treatments of the judgment.

Logic deals with judgment senses, albeit under the notion of theory of science. But the phrase "judgment sense" can be taken in two ways.

Thus the concept of sense has, in the judgment sphere, an essentially double sense. ...(FTL 217 [193])

On the one hand, "sense of judgment" refers to the judgment as a whole. Understood in this way the judgments, "It is possible that the tree is in bloom", "It is certain that the tree is in bloom" and "It is not true that the tree is in bloom" all have different senses. On the other hand, "sense of judgment" can also refer, not to the total judgment, but to part of the judgment, viz., to the part Husserl calls the "matter" or "content" of the judgment. By the "matter" of a judgment Husserl means that part of the judgment devoid of belief
(thetic) character. The matter of an act determines the object of consciousness and what it grasps it as. "It is the act's matter that makes its object count as this object and no other", writes Husserl (LU 589). The belief character of a judgment Husserl calls the judgment's "quality". The quality of an act is the manner in which an object is posited, the manner in which it is thought to exist, e.g., in memory, in perception, in phantasy, and so forth. If one understands the judgment sense to be the matter of an act, the above judgments would be considered to have the same sense, viz. "the tree is in bloom", since the modal operators and the negation, being belief characters, would not form part of the sense of the judgments. The judgments would, however, have different qualities (certainty, possibility and negation) associated with them.

As the sense of a statement, one can understand--

Firstly, the corresponding judgment. But, if the person who makes the statement goes on from the simple certainty, "S is p", to the / uncertain presuming, the considering probable, the doubting, the affirmation or the denying rejection, or the assumption, of the same "S is p", there stands out--

Secondly, as the judgment-sense, the "judgment-content" as something common, which remains identical throughout the changes in the mode of being (certainty, possibility, questionability, "actuality", nullity) and on the subjective side, the changes in the mode of doxic positing. This identical What in the judgment—throughout the changing modifications of the primitive mode, doxic certainty — ,this that, in the particular case, "is", or is possible, probable, questionable, and so forth, the Logische Untersuchungen apprehended as a non-selfsufficient moment in the judgment-modalities. (FTL 216-217 [192-193])

The distinction "matter-quality" that Husserl applies to judgments is one he borrows from Brentano, who uses the distinction to
bring out the nature of intentionality, which, according to Brentano, distinguishes a phenomenon as a mental phenomenon. According to Brentano, intentionality, being related to an object, is the essence of mind, and intentionality in turn is made possible by "mere presentation", the content or matter of an act.

...each intentional experience is either a presentation [i.e., a mere presentation] or based upon an underlying presentation. (LU 598)

Since Brentano considers mere presentation to be the essence of mind, he applies the matter-quality distinction to every act of consciousness and its products (to imagination, perception, recollection, to name a few) and not merely to judging. Although here I shall apply the distinction to judgments and evaluate it in terms of judgment theory, since I, with Husserl, view the judgment as an example of intentionality in general (FTL 263), it will also be for me a means of evaluating the distinction as a characterization of the essence of mind, or intentionality, in general.

According to Husserl, Brentano means by "mere presentation", or matter of an act, that part of an act devoid of belief character.

...among cases of 'mere presentation' we must include, following Brentano, all cases of mere imagination, where the apparent object has neither being nor non-being asserted of it...as well as all cases where an expression, e.g., a statement, is well understood without prompting us either to belief or disbelief. It is mainly by contrast with such a 'belief-character', whose addition perfects judgement, that the notion of mere presentation can be elucidated. (LU 599)

Writes Levinas:

According to Husserl, by [re]presentation Brentano means the act which Husserl later calls a "neutralized act", whose nature consists in presenting a mere image
of an object in which the object appears independently of any claim to exist or not exist. Any Humean character of "belief" is missing. The image floats before us without our deciding about its existence or non-existence. (TIHP 58)

Applying this distinction to judgments, then, we get two notions of judgment sense: in the first notion of judgment sense the unity of matter and quality of the judgment is taken to be the sense of the judgment; in the second notion of judgment sense only the matter is taken to be the sense of the judgment.

That the distinction between the two notions of judgment sense is a legitimate distinction, that is to say, that it is not spurious, can be seen from the fact that it is not immediately clear which notion of judgment sense we are referring to when we say logic deals with the judgment sense. Indeed, a case could be made for either notion of judgment sense. The judgment senses with which logic deals are meanings. Hence, on the one hand it seems intuitively correct to understand by judgment sense the total judgment, that is, matter plus quality, since the expression of quality—in our examples the modal operators and the negation—seem to form part of the meaning of the judgment. On the other hand, since logic, the science of judgments, is traditionally held to exclude subjective factors from its domain, it seems that we should take sense of judgment to refer only to the matter of the judgment, for belief characters are generally considered to be the subjective factors. There seems to be, then, a narrow way to understand "judgment sense", namely as the matter of the judgment, as well as a broader way, namely as the matter plus quality of the judgment. And there are other grounds for maintaining that there are
two senses of judgment sense. The two notions of judgment sense stand in a specific relation to each other: the broader notion is dependent on the narrower. More specifically, the unitary effectibility of the judgment content is a condition for the effectibility of the total judgment itself.

The unitary effectibility of the judgment-content is prior to, and a condition for, the effectibility of the judgment itself. Or: the ideal "existence" of the judgment-content is a presupposition for, and enters into, the ideal "existence" of the judgment (in the widest sense, that of supposed categorial objectivity as supposed). (FTL 217 [193])

Furthermore, the narrower concept of judgment sense, the matter of the judgment, is restricted by specific conditions of meaningfulness. It is by examining these conditions that logic can be seen to relate to experience. I shall explain this next.

It is assumed in formal logic that every judgment which meets the rules of syntax and non-contradiction can be brought to adequation, that is, can be brought to evidence, and found to be either true or false. This is known as the law of excluded middle. This law is assumed to hold universally for all judgments. But Husserl shows this not to be the case. If the matter of the judgment fails to meet certain conditions of sense not specified by either the rules of syntax or the law of non-contradiction, the law of excluded middle will not apply to it. Examples of such judgments are "The king is cloudy" and "This colour plus one makes three" (FTL 216 [192]). These judgments meet the requirements of the rules of syntax. While the rules of syntax will rule out such a judgment as "King and or bald", it will not rule out the two sentences above, for they are syntactically
sound. Nor are these judgments ruled out by the law of non-contradiction, for their senselessness places them above the law of non-contradiction. For sentences like these the law of non-contradiction simply does not hold. Because they are senseless they cannot be made into distinct judgments and they cannot be brought to adequation. They are neither true nor false. As Husserl says, for such judgments the law of excluded middle does not hold because "the 'middle' is not excluded" (FTL 220 [196]). The rules of syntax and non-contradiction are rules that prevent the formation of nonsense (Unsinn) and countersense (Widersinn) respectively. Here, however, we are dealing with a third type of sense. What conditions restrict the sense of the judgment content, what determines the unity of the judgment content? This is not a question Brentano asked himself, for he was satisfied that matter was the mark of intentionality. But for Husserl, as will be explained shortly, presentation or matter is not the essence of intentionality but itself the result of a deeper intentionality. His reasons for differing from Brentano on this are varied, as I shall explain below (page 88).

By examining judgments that are beyond the law of excluded middle, Husserl comes to the conclusion that the condition of sense for the judgment content is related to the syntactical stuffs, that it is determined by the cores being materially related. For the judgment content to make sense, the cores must "have 'something to do with each other' materially" (FTL 219 [195]). In other words, the judgment presupposes a unified 'world' (EJ 39).
Prior to all judging, there is a universal experiential basis. It is always presupposed as a harmonious unity of possible experience. In this harmony, everything has "to do" materially with everything else. (FTL 218 [194])

And:

Thus, in respect of its content, every original judging and every judging that proceeds coherently, has coherence by virtue of the coherence of the matters in the synthetic unity of the experience, which is the basis on which the judging stands. (FTL 218 [194])

And:

Apriori the syntactical stuffs of each possible judgment and of each judgingly combinable judgment-complex have an intentional relatedness to the unity of a possible experience - correlative, to a unitarily experienceable materiality. (FTL 219 [195])

It is only if the cores are related materially that the law of excluded middle applies to a judgment, for only such a judgment can make sense--provided, of course, that it also adheres to the rules of syntax and non-contradiction--and it is only if a judgment makes sense that it can be matched against experience and thereby be brought to adequation or negation.

If the principles of logic were related to judgments universally, they would not be tenable, certainly not the law of excluded middle. For all judgments that are "senseless" in respect of content violate this law.

The principles, to make this evident first of all, hold good unconditionally for all judgments whose cores are congruous in respect of sense - that is: all judgments that fulfill the conditions for unitary sensefulness. For, in the case of these judgments, it is given a priori, by virtue of their genesis, that they relate to a unitary experiential basis. Precisely because of this, it is true of every such judgment, in relation to such a basis, either that it can be brought to adequation and, with the carrying out of the adequation, either the judgment explicates and apprehends categorically what is given in harmonious experience, or else that it leads to the negative of adequation: it predicates something that, according to
the sense, indeed belongs to this sphere of experience; but what it predicates conflicts with something experienced. (FTL 220 [196])

Judgments that fulfill the conditions for unitary sensefulness, then, presuppose a unified world. Logic, being the science of such judgments, thus presupposes a unified world as well. It will not do to deny that the law of excluded middle needs to hold for logic, for if logic is the method and theory of science and has been developed according to the idea of science, then the law of excluded middle must hold for it. After all, a system that contains judgments that are neither true nor false or are capable of being both true and false at one and the same time, is a system from which anything can be derived, as Popper has shown. In short, such a system is one that violates the very ideal of science and hence violates the very principles that govern the system. But given purely formal considerations the law of excluded middle does not without further ado hold. In other words, Husserl sees that logic is founded on a presupposition of which it is not aware. It presupposes the world. "All judgments, truths of science, of which this logic speaks, relate to this existing world" (FTL 224 [198]), writes Husserl. And that this world presupposed by logic is a possible world makes no difference. (FTL 224ff [199f]; EJ 39).

At first sight Husserl's claim that the condition of sense for the judgment content is related to syntactical stuffs, that it is determined by the cores being materially related, seems decidedly unformal-logical and indeed even un-phenomenological. According to this view the universal status of the laws of logic depend on material
conditions, on the core stuffs. This seemingly goes against traditional formal logic, for the latter maintains a sharp distinction between empirical and formal realms, considering formal logic to be concerned with form only. It considers logic to be a pure, not an empirical, science. Logic, to be pure, cannot be based on material factors. Hence traditional logic considers only syntactical forms (EJ 25). The claim sounds unphenomenological because it seems that sense or intentionality is made dependent upon material factors given to the ego, thus violating the principle of the ego as the founder of all sense. One might mistake this for a naive empiricism. In fact, it is highly likely that one will take this for a naive empiricism because "world" has the sense of being already "there" for us, of being given to us (EJ 30f). It seems as if Husserl is saying the "S" and "p" are linked in the judgment because they are linked in the world, the unity of the judgment being based on the unity of the world. It seems as if Husserl is saying that the given world "automatically" presents "S" and "p" as linked--that the unity of the world is the unity of the judgment, the latter merely reflecting the unity of the former. The judgment would then reflect a material, empirical, link; it would copy the link in the world. This would be contrary to the demands both of formal logic and phenomenology. And this is not what Husserl means, as I shall expound below. That the judgment has a dependency on material factors was seen by analyzing a type of nonsense. But the judgment's "dependency" on experience is also seen when "judgment" in its formal nature is viewed from the proper logical perspective, theory of
science. From the standpoint of theory of science the judgment will be seen to imply experience as its ground and as its aim, as I show next.

Formal logic deals with the formal aspects of judgments. It treats the components of judgments as empty cores, as indeterminate "mere anythings whatever" (FTL 202 [170]). These empty cores enter into, for example, such laws of logic as those which deal with the generation of judgments from more basic judgments. But Husserl points out that "we must note the relativity in which these laws leave the indeterminately universal cores" (FTL 202 [180]). For example, the "S" in the form "S is p" could be formally particularized equally well by "S which is a" as by "S which is in relation to Q", and by "S which is a and b", and so forth. In each of these, in turn, "S" could contain syntactical structures. The same applies to the predicate "p": it may contain syntactical structures (e.g., "p which is q"). I have already noted in chapter one how judgments relate hierarchically to each other. This hierarchical relation is one of judgments being generated from lower level judgments. "S which is p, is r" is generated from "S is p", for example. "P is q" is generated by nominalization of the predicate from "S is p", to give another example. Understood in this way, all sense formation has a logical history of sense genesis (FTL 207 [184]). When considering such a hierarchical ordering of judgments we are automatically led to the a priori idea of ultimate judgments containing ultimate cores, cores containing no syntactical structures.

But it can be seen a priori that any actual or possible judgment leads back to ultimate cores when we follow up its syntaxes; accordingly that it is a syntactical structure built ultimately, though perhaps far from
immediately, out of elementary cores, which no longer contain any syntaxes. (FTL 202-203 [180])

For mathesis universalis these non-syntactical cores are of no particular interest (FTL 203 [180]). They are merely implied by ultimate judgments. They are of no greater significance than the generated structures. However, when we step into the attitude of logic as theory of science—the true sense of logic, according to Husserl—these ultimate substrates take on great importance. In the attitude of logic as theory of science, we recall, logic, the theory of judgments, was not intended to deal with mere senses, but was intended to deal with judgment senses as a means to truth, with knowledge of existents. It is only when we are in the attitude of logic as theory of science led beyond the judgment sense that these ultimate cores take on significance (FTL 203 [180]). It is then that we realize that these ultimate cores refer to ultimate substrates, individual objects, which since the judgment is about them, are in their experienceable factual being prior to all judging.

The activity of the judgment is considered...as an activity which is at the service of the striving for knowledge. Knowledge of what? Speaking quite generally, knowledge of what-is, of the existent [das Seiende]. But, if the striving for knowledge is directed toward the existent, if it is the effort to formulate in a judgment what and how the existent is, then the existent must already have been given beforehand....the act of judgment requires something "underlying", about which it judges, an object-about-which....(EJ 19)

And:

To the reduction of judgments to ultimate judgments with an ultimate sense, there corresponds a reduction of truths: of the truths belonging to a higher level to those belonging on the lowest level, that is: to truths that relate directly to their
matters and material spheres, or (because the substrates play the leading role here) that relate directly to individual objects in their object-spheres - individual objects, objects that therefore contain within themselves no judgment-syntaxes and that, in their experienceable factual being, are prior to all judging. (FTL 204 [181])

Since these objects-about-which are prior to judging they contain no judgment syntaxes: "the individuum is the primal object required by pure logic, the absolute of (pure) logic back to which all logical variants refer" (I section 15). The object-about-which, formalized as "S", must, then, be an individual, for generality or plurality already involves syntactical formations which are the result of a more primitive logical act of taking several individuals together (EJ 26).

We saw the laws of logic held only for those judgments in which the cores were materially related. This shows that these individuals presupposed by the judgment are assumed to form part of a related whole or unity--part of a world. Hence Husserl writes:

That judgments (not judgment-senses) relate to objects signifies that, in the judgment itself, these objects are meant as substrates, as the objects about which something is stated; and reductive deliberation teaches, as an Apriori, that every conceivable judgment ultimately (and either definitely or indefinitely) has relation to individual objects (in an extremely broad sense, real objects), and therefore has relation to a real universe, a "world" or world-province, "for which it holds good." (FTL 204 [181])

In other words, when we consider truth logic we are led to individual objects in their object-sphere (FTL 204 [181]). Every conceivable judgment ultimately refers to objects in a universe and for logic these objects are first in themselves. That is, these objects are given to logic as existing beforehand. It must be noted that since judgments also aim at knowledge of the existent, of these object spheres which
are first in themselves, the existent which is the ground of the judgment is, paradoxically, also its telos (FTL 205 [182]). In other words, according to phenomenology the judgment is not the deepest level of either logic or phenomenology. According to Husserl a world is a world that is experienced by a subject. Hence, if intentional analysis follows the logical sense given in judgments, then, it will, working from higher to lower sense, be led back to experience. Husserl maintains, contra Hume, that experience itself is intentional, which for Husserl means it has a logic. This logic consists in the lawfulness of the transcendental subject, that is to say, the intentionality of the pure transcendental ego. "Every object expresses a rule structured within transcendental subjectivity" (PL 21 [22]), writes Husserl. This is why the material foundation of logic does not destroy the purity of logic for Husserl, for these material conditions are in turn grounded by a deeper (pure, transcendental) logic.

According to Husserl, then, we start with experience. The difference between Brentano's and Husserl's notion of intentionality can be immediately seen. For Brentano "experience" is a quality added on to an intentional act. This is not so for Husserl. For Husserl "experience" is not a quality added on to an intentional act, but is part and parcel of the intentional act. For Husserl experience is the genetically primary act of mind. It is intentional and is a precondition for the formation of the matter of the judgment; it is already something "within" what Brentano calls "matter". In other words, while for Brentano matter is neutral--it has no quality associated with it--according to Husserl matter by its essence is not
neutral but always has a quality associated with it. What Brentano considers to be "pure" matter is made neutral, according to Husserl, by an additional act of consciousness—the neutrality itself is a quality. What is more, from the above it follows that, according to Husserl, the original quality is that of experience (sense-experience), and all other qualities are modifications of the original quality:

...for objectivities of every sort, consciousness in the mode, giving themselves, precedes all other/modes of consciousness relating to them, all these other modes being genetically secondary...from these genetical points of view, the intrinsically first judgment-theory is the theory of evident judgments, and the intrinsically first thing in the theory of evident judgments (and therefore in judgment theory as a whole) is the genetical tracing of predicative evidences back to non-predicative evidence called experience. (FTL 209 [185-186])

And:

The primitive mode of the giving of something-itself is perception. (FTL 158 [141])

And:

In respect of its being, reality has precedence to every/irreality whatsoever, since all irrealties relate back essentially to an actual or possible reality. (FTL 168-169 [150-151])

And:

...most fundamentally, the experiential judgment - is nevertheless the original judgment. (FTL 211 [187])

Since all qualities are modifications of the original quality (perception), they bear the sense of the original quality within them, i.e., their quality is understood by reference to the original quality. Since the original judgment is the judgment of experience, all
subsequent judgments will have within them a reference back to the judgment of experience.

Not only does Husserl's analysis of the notion of "judgment" show that intentionality essentially involves quality and thus that Brentano's notion of intentionality does not hold up, but other considerations as well show Brentano's position to be untenable. One insurmountable difficulty Brentano's position entails is the following. If mere presentation or matter is neutral, how does one presentation differ from another; say, the presentation of pope from that of emperor, to use Husserl's example in the Logische Untersuchungen. One cannot say that they are distinguished on the basis of their content, for they were characterized as the same, i.e., as mere presentation on the basis of content. If one were to say that the two presentations are differentiated on the basis of content, then content can no longer be said to be the common denominator which makes them both mere presentations, thus leaving quality as the only possible common denominator (LU 602). Indeed, according to Husserl the intentional act is never without a quality. What Brentano has isolated as the content or pure matter of an act is not really pure matter--it is a combination of matter and quality. Mere presentation is a mode of positing the object in neutrality. The quality here is that of neutrality. Hence, Husserl can say that one mere presentation differs from another in content (e.g., "emperor" from "pope") because mere presentation for him is a combination of content and quality.

As well, Brentano's position entails the following problem. According to Brentano, presentation, the essence of intentionality, has
no quality associated with it. But if presentation marks intentionality par excellence, then quality, which is in principle distinct from matter, cannot come from intentionality. But on what basis, then, does certain matter become qualified as experience? In other words, what marks some presentation as experience must be something non-intentional. It must be something "beyond" consciousness, for intentionality is the essence of consciousness. In other words, it must be something like Hume's vivaciousness of impression, which gives rise to the datum belief. This is the position Brentano is inadvertently driven to. It is for this reason that Husserl says that Brentano to some extent, like Hume, presupposes a notion of belief understood as a datum on the tablet of consciousness.

Even Brentano's concept of judgment supposes such a datum [of passive belief on the tablet of consciousness]--at any rate, as his theory of internal consciousness shows, it is not an activity emanating from the ego-pole (my emphasis). (EJ 61)

The position entails that something, a datum, "enters into" or "strikes" consciousness which makes it "label" it as experience. But experience and common sense (Hume not withstanding) do not support this position, and consequently it is not tenable phenomenologically. First of all, the claim that experience involves something, an object, an experiential datum, alien to consciousness entering into consciousness is countersensical--it is patently absurd. Secondly, and this relates to the first point, the belief in experience is not, contra Hume, something which cannot be grounded. Let us discuss these two points in turn.
Consciousness is a seeing, an apprehending. But it is more than this. It is not just actual "seeing", but also the ability to see (PL 25 [25]): anything I can apprehend but is not yet in my "view", to speak metaphorically, is already related to consciousness, for the "I can" is a mode of consciousness. "Alien" to consciousness would then mean alien to being apprehended, for consciousness is also the ability to apprehend. Hence, if something were truly alien to consciousness it would not be graspable by consciousness, and we would not be able to talk about it (PL 32f [32f]). If I label something as alien it must be something for consciousness in order for me to label it "alien". And if it is something for consciousness it is not alien to consciousness. Hence Husserl writes:

As in everyday life, so too in science (unless, under the misguidance of "realistic" epistemology, it misinterprets its own doing) experience is the consciousness of being with matters themselves, of seizing upon and having them quite directly. But experience is not an opening through which a world, existing prior to all experience, shines into a room of consciousness; it is not a mere taking of something alien to consciousness into consciousness. For how could I make a rational statement to that effect, without seeing not only consciousness but also the something alien to consciousness - that is: experiencing the alien affair? And how could I objectivate such a state-of-affairs as at least a conceivable? Would that not be immersing myself intuitionally in such a countersensical experiencing of something alien to experience? (FTL 232-233 [206])

Objects may be outside of my attention, but not outside of consciousness. The phenomenon of, say, a "mere 'stimulus' which proceeds from an existent in the environing world, as, e.g., the barking of a dog which 'just breaks in on our ears'" (EJ 60), is already something within the stream of experience. The noise may be
"alien" to, i.e., beyond, my psycho-physical being, but it is not alien to consciousness. It is, rather, found within the stream of consciousness. If something is considered to be beyond or transcendent to me, the object receives this sense from my consciousness.

If what is experienced has the sense of "transcendent" being, then it is the experiencing that constitutes this sense, and does so either by itself or in the whole motivational nexus pertaining to it and helping to make up its intentionality. (FTL 233 [206])

Consciousness itself is what allows for experience, and if an object is transcendent to me or imperfectly given it is experience which tells me that this is so. In other words, experience itself is imbued with sense, a sense which I can consult and explicate:

The currently experienced (physical things, I myself, others, and so forth), the current More that could be experienced, the self-identity with which the experienced extends throughout manifold experiences, the pointing ahead of every sort of experience on the different levels of originality / to new possible experiences of the same (first of all, possible experiences of my own and, at a higher level, possible experiences belonging to others), to the style of progressive experience, and to what this would bring out as existing and being thus and so - each and all of these are included intentionally in the consciousness itself, as this actual and potential intentionality, whose structure I can at any time consult. (FTL 233-234 [206-207])

Hence, according to Husserl experience is not only the basis for any act of mere presentation, but experience is itself already intentional, and thus always accompanied by consciousness.

If their genuine sense is brought out, the intentionality of predicative judgments leads back ultimately to the intentionality of experience. (FTL 210 [187])
In Husserl's view, then, Brentano's "mere presentation" is not the deepest act of intentionality. Experience, which grounds mere presentation, itself has a sense which can be explicated in phenomenological evidence. Before we discuss what is involved in the intentionality of experience--our second point on page 89--let us remark here that Husserl is not so much rejecting Brentano's claim that the mark of intentionality is presentation as he is reinterpreting it. As Levinas writes, "Husserl thinks that he can still preserve Brentano's formulation in its entirety by considering another meaning of the term 'representation'" (TIHP 59). Presentation is the mark of intentionality if we take presentation to be an act of objectification (TIHP 61). In other words, according to Husserl the essence of intentionality is objectification, the having an object before the mind.

Each intentional experience is either an objectifying act or has its basis in such an act....If no act, or act-quality, not objectifying by nature, can acquire 'matter' except through an objectifying act that is inwoven with it in unity, objectifying acts have the unique function of first providing other acts with presented objects, to which they may refer in their novel ways. The reference to an object is, in general terms, constituted in an act's matter. (LU 648)

It is true that what Brentano calls "presentation" is an act of objectification, and as such there is nothing wrong with what Brentano says, according to Husserl, when the former claims that presentation is the essence of mind. But Brentano misunderstands the nature of presentation, and because of this is not able to tap the phenomenon and bring out its deepest dimensions. Husserl's point is that the objectification that occurs in presentation is not the most "primitive"
or basic level of objectification but is already a level of objectification quite high up, so to speak. Presentation, which is an act of predication, logically implies an earlier level of objectification, namely, nominalization, which is prepredicative and experiential. Nominalization is a single rayed act (LU 459) which makes something the subject for a judgment. On the lowest level, in the sphere of original passivity, nominalization is an act of "turning toward the object" (EJ 77), an act through which the object begins to stand out for consciousness (EJ 77). This presupposes a field of experience or a "horizon", as Husserl terms it, against which the object will stand out. The horizon is implied in nominalization and is part of intentionality. An examination of experience confirms the existence of the act of nominalization. I can scan the environment without anything standing out for me, without my focusing explicitly on any object. Even if some object catches my attention and there is nominalization a predicative judgment proper need not be formed. Only if I focus on the object explicitly will it become the subject of a predicative judgment and will there be true objectification (EJ 62).

It is crucial to see that presentation logically implies an earlier level of objectification, i.e., nominalization, in order to understand two things about the phenomenon of intentionality, two things which mark the difference between a correct and incorrect grasp of intentionality. When we see that presentation logically implies a lower level of objectification, that there is a relation between the predicative and pre-predicative levels respectively, we are drawn to examining this relation. Then we will discover that the relation is
not restricted to these levels, but that presentation also implies a higher act of objectification. We will discover that acts of objectification are never simple acts cut off from others, but are acts always implying further acts of objectification. This is the first important aspect of intentionality we come to appreciate: we get a glimpse of the fact that intentionality, consciousness' relation to the object, is not a static relation, but one of movement, that it is dynamic—intentionality is an interplay of levels of objectification.

Now, the relation between the levels of objectification is an essential one. The higher levels could not be without their relation to the lower, and hence, they always have a reference back to the lower levels. The lower levels enter into all higher levels of intentionality. And this leads us to the second important property of intentionality. Since the basic level is that of perceptual experience, i.e., experience of real being, all levels of intentionality refer back to sense experience and hence to sensual, real, being. Hence, not only is intentionality dynamic, it is related to real being.

It must be appreciated, however, that although experience is considered to be the basic level, intentionality is not to be identified with this level. Nor is intentionality to be identified with any of the higher levels. Intentionality is not any one level, but is the relation between levels. More specifically, it is the act of actualizing the potential of any level. For this reason a static analysis and correlatively a static concept of consciousness, of intentionality or of the transcendental ego, will not do, for such an
analysis will be piecemeal and hence unrepresentative of intentionality. The transcendental ego, the "organ" of intentionality, is not any one point or level; it is never "complete"; it isn't an object, but is a function (of actualizing). The difference between Brentano's and Husserl's notions of intentionality, then, is the following: (a) whereas Brentano has a static notion of intentionality, Husserl defines intentionality dynamically as a process of actualizing the objectivity contained potentially at lower levels, and (b) while intentionality is essentially related to experience or real being for Husserl, for Brentano it is not.

I said, then, that Husserl's claim that logic is dependent upon material factors, and thus upon experience, does not threaten the purity of either logic or phenomenology because for Husserl experience already bears an intentional, logical, structure. What this means can be made clear by discussing the nature of objectification, for an act is intentional if it is objectivating (FTL 262 [232]) and experience is intentional in that it is objectivating.

To objectify, is to bring an object before the mind. To have the object before the mind is to have evidence of the object--that is to say, to have it in its embodiment, as it itself, in its presence, in its being (PL 22 [22]). To have an object before the mind, to have evidence of the object and intentionality, these are all one and the same thing.

Category of objectivity and category of evidence are perfect correlates. (FTL 161 [144])

And:
The concept of any intentionality whatever - any life-process of consciousness of something or other - and the concept of evidence, the intentionality that is the giving or something-itself, are essentially correlative. (FTL 160 [143])

And:

Evidence, as has already become apparent to us by the above explanations, designates that performance on the part of intentionality which consists in the giving of something-itself (die intentionale Leistung der Selbst-gebung). More precisely, it is the universal pre-eminent form of "intentionality", of "consciousness of something", in which there is consciousness of the intended-to objective affair in the mode itself-seized-upon, itself-seen - correlatively, in the mode: being with itself in the manner peculiar to consciousness. We can also say that it is the primal consciousness: I am seizing upon "it itself" originaliter, as contrasted with seizing upon it in an image or as some other, intuitional or empty, fore-meaning. (FTL 157-158 [141])

And:

Thus it points to an essential fundamental trait of all intentional life. Any consciousness, without exception [my emphasis], either is itself already characterized as evidence (that is, as giving its object originaliter) or else has an essential tendency toward conversion into givings of its object originaliter - accordingly, toward syntheses of verification, which belong essentially in the domain of the "I can". (CM 58 [93])

We must before proceeding make clear two senses of "evidence", which, if not distinguished, may lead one to reject out of hand the claim that to have an object before the mind is to have evidence of that object, for while the claim is true for one sense of evidence, it is not true for the other. The distinction between the two senses of evidence, and corresponding to this, between the two senses of truth, is one Husserl explicitly makes (FTL 127f [113f]). Roughly speaking,
one can distinguish two senses of evidence and truth by saying that one
is naive and the other is critical (FTL 127 [113]).

The word evidence also takes on a double sense in connexion with these two concepts of truth: In
addition to signifying the original having of a true or
actual being itself, evidence signifies the property
belonging to the judgment - as a supposed categorial /
objectivity (an "opinion" or "meaning") - when it fits,
in original actuality [Aktualität], a corresponding
actuality [Wirklichkeit]. Thus evidence involves, in
the latter case, that original consciousness of
correctness which arises in the event of actual
adequation. That consciousness is itself evidence in
the first sense, with regard to the correctness; it is
a particular case under the broader concept of evidence
as the having of something itself. Then, in a
naturally amplified sense, a judgment is called
evident, also with reference to the potentiality of
bringing about its adequation. (FTL 128 [113-114])

Let us illustrate this with an example from perception, since it is the
easiest to deal with. When I see a glass standing in front of me on
the desk, and I pick it up, feeling the coolness of the glass, I have,
in my sensory impressions of the glass (vision, touch sound etc.),
evidence of the glass. This evidence is naive: I quite literally do
not give it a second thought. However, if after taking a sip from its
content I go about my work and later, wanting to take another sip, I
don't see the glass anywhere, I may begin to question whether perhaps I
hadn't had a glass there at all, and whether I was perhaps thinking of
yesterday. I take a scientific, critical attitude towards the evidence
I had of the glass. I form a judgment, the glass as supposed, as I
seek to determine whether there had been a glass on my desk. That is,
I do not live in the judgment directly, but instead treat the judgment
as a judgment, and one to be verified at that. When, after looking
about, I find the glass behind a pile of books I had absent-mindedly
stacked in front of it, I have renewed evidence of the glass, though this time the evidence is critical, not naive— it is explicit and an object of my explicit will or cogito. This critical attitude is the beginning of a properly scientific attitude. In the scientific attitude one's stance toward evidence is still more critical, where not only do we have explicit evidence, but we know that the evidence itself may be misleading.

The scientist, however, has long been apprised, not only that evidence has its degrees of clarity but also that it may be deceptive evidence. Consequently there exists for him the further distinction between supposed and genuine evidence. His judgments must be verified by genuine, by maximally perfect, evidence; and only as so verified shall they be admitted among the results of science as theory. This brings about a peculiar judging procedure on the scientist's part, a zigzag judging, so to speak: first making straight for the givenness of something itself, but then going back critically to the provisional results already obtained—whereupon his criticism must also be subjected to criticism, and for like reasons. (FTL 125 [111]).

Usually when we speak of evidence we mean the latter, critical, sense of evidence. But Husserl uses the term evidence for both cases. Evidence broadly speaking is "the having of something itself"; it is actuality as an itself given (FTL 127). This is evidence in the naive sense; one has evidence but one does not know that one has evidence. The narrower sense of evidence is that of evidence for the judgment. It occurs in the critical attitude when we have evidence of the judgment "fitting" actuality. The latter occurs in a critical attitude. That is, it involves focusing on the judgment qua judgment, the judgment as supposed. So when Husserl says that being related to an object, i.e., intentionality, is the having of evidence of the
object, he means evidence in the first sense, for many acts of consciousness are not critical, as in the second sense of evidence.

Here we are concerned with the first type of evidence, which we called naive, the evidence which presents the object itself. Although naive, this first type of evidence is a very complex phenomenon. Even the "first" level of experience is full of sense. This is so because perception or evidence of an object, whether the object is real or ideal, is never restricted to what is immediately given, to what is immediately before the mind. For any object we have the idea of the perfect givenness, the complete determination, of the object, which always remains unrealizable.

But as "idea" (in the Kantian sense), the complete givenness is nevertheless prescribed - as a connexion of endless processes of continuous appearing, absolutely fixed in its essential type, or, as the field for these processes, a continuum of appearances determined a priori, possessing different but determinate dimensions, governed by an established dispensation of essential order. (I 366 [297])

What is given of the object always points beyond itself to what is not-yet-given but which can become given. Hence, part of the sense of the object is an anticipation of the "filling out of the object". In other words, what evidence we have of the objects points to further evidence (EJ 331). Evidence is not an isolated phenomenon but is part of an intricate web of further evidences.

...the giving of something-itself is, like every other single intentional process, a function in the all-embracing / nexus of consciousness. The effect produced by a single intentional process, in particular its effect as the giving of something itself, its effect as evidence, is therefore not shut off singly. The single evidence, by its own intentionality, can implicitly "demand" further givings of the object
itself; it can "refer one" to them for a supplementation of its Objectivating effect. (FTL 159-160 [142-143])

And:

Thus a great task arises, the task of exploring all these modes of the evidence in which the objectivity intended to shows itself, now less and now more perfectly, of making understandable the extremely complicated performances, fitting together to make a synthetic harmony and always pointing ahead [my emphasis] to new ones. (FTL 161 [144])

How to achieve this further evidence is prescribed by the type of object one is confronted with. That is, the concrete object, whether real or ideal, is never merely an object in general, but is always an object of a certain type, i.e., perceptual, imaginary, memory, etc.

"The factual world of experience is experienced as a typified world" (EJ 331), writes Husserl. Being of a certain type it has predetermined properties—an internal horizon, a set of determinations which define the object's own nature and which prescribe the way in which that object can be brought to further evidence. Hence, although qua object all objects have certain universal properties of evidence in common (FTL 168)—their evidence is something which can be "seen" (FTL 153 [139]), something which is in principle repeatable (FTL 157 [140-141]), and something which can "become disclosed as deception" (FTL 156 [140])—different regions of objects nevertheless have different types of evidence (C 166; PL 24 [25]).

For though, in characterizing evidence as the giving (or, relative to the subject, the having) of an object itself, we were indicating a universality relating to all objectivities in the same manner, that does not mean that the structure of evidence is everywhere quite alike.

Category of objectivity and category of evidence are perfect correlates. To every fundamental
species of objectivities - as intentional unities maintainable throughout an intentional synthesis and, ultimately, as unities belonging to a possible "experience" - a fundamental species of "experience", of evidence, corresponds, and likewise a fundamental species of intentionally indicated evidential style in the possible enhancement of the perfection of the having of an objectivity itself. (FTL 161 [144])

And:

To every region and category of would be objects corresponds phenomenologically not only a basic kind of meaning or position, but also a basic kind of primordial dator-consciousness of such meaning, and, pertaining to it, a basic type of primordial self-evidence, essentially motivated through a primitive givenness that conforms to the basic divisions just referred to. (I 356-357 [288])

The type of the object, then, establishes an internal horizon of the object (EJ 36). Since the object is never given in isolation but is always given in context--it always has a background, for example--it is also endowed with an external horizon, a "field" of co-given objects with which it stands in relation (EJ 33). Hence, this "naive" evidence of the object involves further evidence, in the form of internal and external horizons of the object. This all forms part of the sense of "object"--each object comes in a web of cognitive expectations--of the sense of how to actualize its evidence. From the moment I experience an object it is part of this complex structure. Whether I choose to become aware of it or actualize it is an other question altogether, but the object is understood as something I can, at least potentially or in principle, bring to evidence. This means that "object" is understood in terms of a doing, for actualizing is a doing, a performance. This is why Husserl describes evidence as a performance.
...ascending level by level from sensuous experience, one can acquire an understanding of evidence as an effective performance [als Leistung]...(FTL 282 [249])

And:

...evidence as an effective performance [als Leistung]...like all other effective intentional performances, takes place as woven into systematically built performances and abilities. (FTL 283 [250])

Such doings or performances can, depending on whether the object is real or ideal, be an abstract set of cognitive performances or may involve actual physical acts of the body--kinesthesia--for physical objects are always given via the body.

For everything that exhibits itself in the life-world as a concrete thing obviously has a bodily character, even if it is not a mere body, as, for example, an animal or a cultural object, i.e., even if it has psychic or otherwise spiritual properties. If we pay attention now purely to the bodily aspect of the things, this obviously exhibits itself perceptively only in seeing, in touching, in hearing, etc., i.e., in visual, tactual, acoustical, and other such aspects. Obviously and inevitably participating in this is our living body, which is never absent from the perceptual field, and specifically its corresponding "organs of perception" (eyes, hands, ears, etc.). In consciousness they play a constant role here; specifically they function in seeing, hearing, etc., together with the ego's motility belonging to them, i.e., what is called kinesthesia. All kinesthesia, each being an "I move", "I do", [etc.] are bound together in a comprehensive unity - in which kinesthetic holding-still is [also] a mode of the "I do". (C 106)

And:

Thus sensibility, the ego's active functioning of the living body or the bodily organs, belongs in a fundamental, essential way to all experience of bodies. (C 106)

In the case of a real, perceptual object, something is evidence if it adheres to the sense of that object, that is, if from the standpoint of
the subject it fits in with an elaborate and complex set of kinesthetic acts: I can touch, see, smell, and so forth.

Evidence is part of a complex theme, in other words. Husserl urges that those who have traditionally understood evidence as a feeling, have not analyzed properly the concept of evidence. Husserl criticizes Hume, for example, for thinking that evidence was a feeling that resulted from a datum of vividness (FTL 157f [140f]). Evidence is not a static entity or an ungrounded feeling, be it of vividness or anything else. Rather, it is a part or moment of a theme, of sense. Hence, experience, the original giving of something itself, the original evidence, is thematic. We may not always make this theme explicit, or we may not develop it further, but even then we passively believe in this theme. Passively we believe that we have a certain kind of evidence corresponding to the type of object we have before us and that we can bring out further such evidence. Hence, sensory experience involves a passive belief, according to Husserl. Although this attitude is passive, it is still warranted to speak of belief, for it does involve taking a stand as is seen by the fact that we can be wrong. While, when having an object before the mind one always has some evidence of the object before one, and although one always thinks one can make actual further evidence of the object along these lines, still we do not always have the type of evidence we think we do. We may, for example, think we have sensory, that is perceptual, evidence while in fact we are hallucinating. The point is, however, that whether or not the object is a hallucination is not determined by a mere datum, but by a complex set of cognitive/kinesthetic performances.
A mere datum cannot ever really be evidence, for by itself it would not relate to anything, and evidence proper is evidence for or of something. The theory of the datum of vividness does not hold up under close scrutiny. A hallucination, for example, is not distinguished from reality by a vividness but by its inability to fit into a larger set of anticipations. Indeed, the hallucination may be as vivid as the perception of physical reality. If on having a fever I hallucinate that someone hands me a glass of water, I conclude that I had been hallucinating if I cannot drink the water, cannot feel relief of thirst, cannot feel the glass. As well, the dream, for example, is not differentiated from reality by its lack of vividness. When dreaming, the dream is my reality. It is distinguished from reality proper only when, upon waking, I can, say, no longer see the villain pursuing me, can no longer see the winding streets that I ran down, but can see my room with its familiar surroundings, and so forth. If something is evidence for sense perception it already forms part of the sense "perceptual object", otherwise it would not constitute evidence.

Hence, the original act of perception, of experience, involves belief (PL 23 [23]). The original belief is belief in being; it is a naive certainty. That belief is either confirmed or shattered on the basis of the ability to bring to evidence the object I have before me according to the type of object it is. Hence, we may be mistaken about our belief, or we may be certain or uncertain about it, as, for example, when we wonder whether "x" is an object of perception or a mirage, and so forth. For this reason Husserl writes:
This beginning, moreover, is the place systematically, starting from the judgment, to discover that certainty and modalities of certainty, suppositive intention and fulfilment, identical existent and identical sense, evident having of something itself, trueness of being (being "actual") and truth as correctness of sense - that none of these is a peculiarity exclusively within the predicational sphere, that, on the contrary, they all belong already to the intentionality of experience. (FTL 209-210 [186])

And:

...the so-called modalities of judgment, which constitute a central element of traditional formal logic, also have their origin and foundation in the occurrences of prepredicative experience. (EJ 91)

The prepredicative level of experience is, in other words, like the judgment, the predicative level, in two respects: (1) it too is objectivating, and (2) it too is thetic or positional, i.e., involves taking a stand -- the making of a decision or assertion. It is, in other words, syntactical in a certain way:

...even this founding experience has its style of syntactical performances, which, however, are still free from all the conceptual and grammatical formings that characterize the categorial as exemplified in the predicative judgment and the statement. (FTL 212 [188])

And:

...the syntactical as such... makes its appearance already in the pre-predicational sphere.... (FTL 212 [188] n. 2)

For this reason Husserl extends the notion of judgment to experience.

Thus one comes from the experiential judgment - more particularly, from the most immediate experiential judgment having the categorial form - to experience and to the motive for that broadening of the concept of the judgment already indicated by Hume's concept of belief. (FTL 210 [186])

And:
If experience itself is accounted as judgment in the broadest sense, then this theory of experience is to be characterized as itself the first and most fundamental judgment-theory. (FTL 211-212 [188])

Even sense experience, the basic level of intentionality, shares properties of the judgment. In other words, Husserl is trying to show that the predicative judgment displays properties of intentionality in general, that not only is the judgment an example of intentionality, but it is in a way paradigmatic of intentionality, and "the predicative judgment gains universal significance for psychic life" (FTL 263 [232]). More specifically, the link in the judgment between "S" and "p" expresses intentionality **par excellence**. The link expresses an ego act of **actualizing** an object, that is to say, of bringing it to evidence; it expresses an act of objectification, in other words. It does so more fully, that is, it is a more actualized state, than the objectification that occurs on the prepredicate level. This does not mean that the predicative level is somehow "more intentional" than the initial objectifying acts of the lower, prepredicate levels, or than the still lower level of time-synthesis of the stream of experience, for, as we have already remarked, intentionality properly speaking is not restricted to any one level, but is rather a relation **between** levels. This means, rather, that since the predicative level is a more explicit level, the workings of intentionality can be **seen**. In the predicative level we can see intentionality starting to work itself out, starting to actualize itself. By studying the predicative level we can gain a **sense** of the arché of intentionality and its telos, for we have noted that the predicative judgment implies on the one side earlier levels and on the other side later levels.
But to understand how the earlier levels imply the later predicative levels, how the pre-objective flow of experience implies the prepredicative objectivities and the predicative objectivities without the lower levels being "given up" or becoming replaced, as they would be if we were describing, not a logical, but a psychological, temporal genesis, that is, in order to understand how we can speak of a more actualized level which does not entail the giving up of the lower levels, we need to introduce a distinction Husserl makes between the ego and its attention. Without this distinction Husserl could not execute his phenomenology. Without it one could not do a genetic logical analysis. This distinction to which Husserl, in my opinion, does not devote quite enough attention, is one of the most important distinctions for Husserl's phenomenology. That is, Husserl is forever urging that what he is speaking of when he speaks of potential consciousness becoming actualized or of sense implying further sense, is not a psychological, temporal genesis, but a logical, genetic, one. Phenomenology is, for Husserl, genetic analysis in a logical sense. Without this distinction between the ego and its attention it is impossible to account for, and indeed impossible to do, genetic analysis. According to Suzanne Bachelard, genetic analysis "is a new type of investigation characteristic of Husserlian phenomenology" which gives "to Husserl's thought its horizon of originality" (SHL 136). Hence she writes that the importance of genetic analysis "cannot be overemphasized" (SHL 136). It follows that the distinction between the ego and attention is fundamental. Indeed, Husserl does say that the function of attention "signifies a special dimension of correlative
modifications noetic and noematic, of which systematic study on essential lines is one of the fundamental tasks of general phenomenology" (I 249 [192]). According to temporal analysis earlier levels are taken up in later ones, of which they become a real part. The lower level must always occur first and then the second level occurs, at which point the first level is taken up into the second, leaving only the second level. According to genetic analysis, while the lower levels are taken up into higher ones, and are needed for them, they are not in any way given up; the lower levels do not become real parts of the higher levels, but remain temporally synchronous with the higher levels. Genetic analysis requires components to be distinct while allowing them to be temporally synchronous; it requires earlier levels to remain themselves while being taken up into higher levels.

In Experience and Judgment Husserl characterizes attention in the following manner:

In general, attention is a tendency of the ego toward an intentional object, toward a unity which "appears" continually in the change of the modes of its givenness and which belongs to the essential structure of a specific act of the ego (an ego-act in the pregnant sense of the word); it is a tending-toward realization. (EJ 80)

In Ideas he characterizes attention as "a quite general structure of consciousness sui generis" (I 246 [189]), and he speaks of it metaphorically as "'a mental glance' or 'glancing ray' of the pure ego, of its turning toward and away" (I 246 [189]). Attention is the property of a "'wakeful' Ego" (I 107 [63]) that actualizes intentional experiences.
If an intentional experience is actual, carried out, that is, after the manner of the cogito, the subject 'directs' itself within it towards the intentional object. (I 109 [65])

Attention belongs to the cogito, which is only "part" of the Ego, and is never absent from the Ego. As with most of Husserl's distinctions, this is one which is made for the purpose of analysis. The distinction is not a "real" one: Ego and its attention, while distinct, are always related.

To the cogito itself belongs an immanent "glancing-towards" the object, a directness which from another side springs forth from the "Ego", which can therefore never be absent. (I 109 [65])

And:

The shaft of attention is not separate from the Ego....(I 249 [192])

The attention, the "ray of light" (I 248 [191]), or the ability to focus, is sui generis—it is always there and belongs to the ego. It is a "tendency...[which] emanates from the ego" (EJ 82). Hence Husserl calls it a "personal ray" (I 249 [192]). The ray of light can be directed freely at will, at anything in the stream of experience. The Ego lives in and through this ray. The ray always occurs in conjunction with other acts and so belongs to every ego-act in the pregnant sense of the word, e.g., perception, memory, willing, etc. Indeed, since the ray makes an object stand out, the ray forms part of the essence of the ego. That is, the ray is the means whereby the ego objectifies, and objectification is the very essence of intentionality, the very essence of the ego. There is an

...essential connexion between attention and intentionality--this fundamental fact that attention
generally is noting else than a fundamental kind of intentional modification...(I 250 [192] n. 4)

It is attention that makes the ego subject to genetic analysis, for by means of attention it is possible to make a break and to objectify while yet staying within a unity. Attention makes it possible to execute something new within the stream of experience. Attention allows components to be distinct, while allowing them to be temporally synchronous. The focusing of the ray is temporal, but what happens next, the "looking" and its results, although occurring in time, do not come after the stream of experience (the lowest level, genetically), but merge with it: "the beam is also a phase of experience" (I 247 [190]). While the higher levels take up the objectification of the stream, its results also become part of the stream. The ray itself, of course, remains free to move through the various levels. The lower levels are ever-present realities for the ego and are in fact its field of potentiality. Hence, the ego's attention makes possible a diversity within a unity. That is, it allows both higher and lower levels to be co-present within one stream of experience. The stream of experience is ever present, and the ego's attention can act on that stream; it can modify it, create out of it, retain its creations as part of the stream, and free itself for further acts (I 249 [192]).

By means of the phenomenon of attention it becomes possible to explain in what way the predicative judgment is a "higher", more actualized state of intentionality and, what is more, how it is nonetheless not more truly intentionality than the lower levels. The lowest level of experience, "prior to" the direction of attention, is
the constitution of the stream of experience. This is a temporal constitution.

Thus, the sensuous data, on which we can always turn our regard as toward the abstract stratum of concrete things are themselves also already the product of a constitutive synthesis, which, as the lowest level, presupposes the operations of the synthesis in internal time-consciousness. These operations as belonging to the lowest level, necessarily link all others. (EJ 73)

Genetically the next level is one in which the ego turns its glance, its attention, toward some object within the stream of experience, setting it apart from the rest of the stream. This is receptive experience, and, as we indicated, it is implied by the judgment. The judgment points back to the pre-predicative basis, "S". According to Husserl, while "S" is pre-predicative, it is still the result of an activity of the ego, for "S" is made to stand out from its surroundings—it is, after all, subject of predication. According to Husserl, "S" is the result of an act of the ego turning-toward something within the stream of experience and may include contemplation of the object's properties. On the level of receptive experience, then, the ego is already active. This act of turning toward of the ego, not the act of predication, Husserl considers the lowest, most basic, act of objectification. Contra Brentano, predication is not the lowest act of intentionality, and hence, according to Husserl intentionality must be characterized differently than the way in which Brentano characterizes it. In other words, the "start" of the judgment (the beginning of the striving for knowledge) is not automatically given within experience, but is the result of a specific act of the ego.
Although the ego is productive on this level, "it is not yet a field of objectivities in the true sense of the term" (EJ 72). This is so because "an object is the product of an objectifying operation of the ego and in the significant sense, of an operation of predicative judgment" (EJ 72). What Husserl means here is that an object is that to which we can return. Now, while in receptive experience we are faced with objectivities and it is possible to recall them, still they have not become our deliberate abiding possessions (EJ 197) and so are not truly objects for us. The forming of the predicative judgment 'S is p' is the result of a further act of the ego set in motion by attention. That is, attention is an interest-producing activity:

...with this tendency [of attention] is awakened an interest in the object of perception as existent. (EJ 82)

This interest sets into motion an activity, a striving, to bring the object to givenness:

...in this firm orientation on the object, in the continuity of the experience of the object, there is an intention which goes beyond the given and its momentary mode of givenness and tends toward a progressive plus ultra. It is not only a progressive having-consciousness of but a striving toward a new consciousness in the form of an interest in the enrichment of the "self" of the object which is forthcoming eo ipso with the prolongation of the apprehension. Thus the tendency of the turning-toward continues as a tendency toward complete fulfillment. (EJ 82)

And:

As has already been said in a general way, here also it is true that the inception of an act of turning toward, of paying attention to what exists, puts into play an activity with a tendency, a striving. It is a striving toward realization, a doing which includes different forms of discontinuance and completion. (EJ 82)
Attention is a motive for looking, a motive for acting:

The tendency is thus actualized in a manifold "doing" of the ego. Its aim is to convert the appearance (figuration) which the ego has of the external object into other and again other "appearances of the same object". (EJ 83)

The interest sets into motion not only a striving to bring the object to givenness, but, and this is what truly characterizes predicative objectivity from its prepredicative base, the will to "have" this object in its givenness once and for all. Judgments result from an act of will, the will of cognitive striving, the will to have knowledge of the object once and for all:

In genuine cognitive interest...the ego wishes to know the object, to pin it down once and for all...the goal of the will is the apprehension of the object in the identity of its determinations, the fixing of the result of contemplative perception "once and for all". (EJ 198)

And:

...what is here important above all - this production of categorial objectivities in cognitive action is not the final goal of this action....The goal of this activity is not the production of objects but a production of the knowledge of a self-given object, therefore the possession of this object in itself as that which is permanently identifiable anew. (EJ 200)

This involves an "active" and abiding assent to the validity of the categorial object.

This gives it the character...of an acquisition which still continues to be valid, which we still hold in our will....I, the present ego...am in accord with the past act of will...I, the present ego, presently willing. (EJ 202)

Active turning toward thus differs from receptive experience, which may also involve a turning toward, in that the former involves an act of
will and results in the constitution of true objectivities--objects as an abiding possession. The act of turning toward that occurs in receptive experience, on the other hand, while an act of interest, is not yet an act of will, but is, rather, part of normal perception.

We have also spoken of an interest which may be awakened along with a turning-toward an object. It now appears that this interest still has nothing to do with a specific act of will. It is not an interest which engenders anything on the order of plans and voluntary activities. It is merely a moment of the striving which belongs to the essence of normal perception. (EJ 85)

Husserl nevertheless calls the lower act an act of interest because of the accompanying feeling of satisfaction that marks the actualization of the striving (EJ 85-86). This act of striving can become a true act of will, a will to knowledge, with deliberate positing of goals, etc.

Although intentionality may be the same throughout consciousness, it too has its levels of actualization. Each lower level is the potential of a higher level--true intentionality being a point at infinity. Hence Husserl writes that:

The interest in perception, which gives receptive experience, is only the forestage of the interest in cognition in the proper sense....(EJ I97-198)

The difference between interest in cognition and interest in perception is that the former's activity involves the use of will and as a consequence gives rise to the new type of objectivity, viz., categorial objectivity. Indeed, only interest in cognition gives rise to objectivity in the true sense of the term. Hence, although it is possible to recall an objectivity of receptive experience, what occurs on the next higher level is not a matter of mere memory:
Such reproductions are then more than a mere memory of an earlier intuition. We return to what is reproduced as to an acquisition, actively produced in an act of will orientated toward this acquisition. As such, it is intentionally characterized. It is reproduced otherwise than in mere memory: a modification of the will is present, as with every acquisition. (EJ 201-202)

Hence, the claim that the link between the cores in the judgment are conditioned by material factors, that they must have something to do with each other materially, that they reflect a unified, coherent, world, can be understood phenomenologically. The material factor, the unified world, is itself intentional in nature— it is itself constituted by the transcendental ego. Although both the judgment and what it presupposes, namely a unified world, are intentional objects, with the formation of the judgment we nevertheless have the creation of a new type of objectivity. This is so because intentionality involves levels of objectification. The higher levels of intentional constitution produce a new type of objectivity. Specifically, in the judgment categorial objects are created. This is truly a product of an act of mind qua mind. That is to say, categorial objects are objects of the understanding. They are formed in a judgment in which the subject is determined by an adjective. In the categorial object, cognition is deposited so that it becomes an abiding possession.

Thus it is a matter here of objectifying achievements of a new kind, not merely of an activity attached to the pregiven and receptively apprehended objectivities; rather, in predicative knowledge and its deposit in the predicative judgment new kinds of objectivities are constituted, which can then themselves be apprehended again and be made thematic as logical structures, i.e., as what we call categorial objectivities, since they arise from the kategorien, the act of declarative
judgment, or also (since judgment is certainly an activity of the understanding) objectivities of the understanding. Thus the work of cognition, this higher, stage of activity, must, in contrast to receptivity, be characterized as a creative spontaneity, itself already productive of objects. (EJ 198-199)

Because the categorial judgment refers to the world, it is almost natural to think that categorial objectivities belong to the order of the world and are, as it were, "ready-made". In fact, however, the judgment creates a new type of objectivity. When a categorial mistake is committed it is not a matter of the judgment not "mapping" onto the world. We are not dealing here with a straightforward mapping relation at all. According to Husserl, the judgment which yields knowledge of the world is not a straightforward reflection of the concrete world it presupposes, the world as experienced. The judgment transforms the base, as it were. While the judgment is about the concrete world and refers to it, the judgment is not the same type of objectivity as the world it is about. The world the judgment presents is not of the same "order" as the world it is based on. The latter is a prepredicative, and to some extent, pre-objective, "object"; the former a predicative, categorial, object. Hence, in Husserl's view while the unity or link of the judgment relates to and in a way reflects the unity of the world it presupposes, the link or unity of the judgment is nevertheless of a different type than the unity of the concrete world.

I said, then, that this unity reflects the nature of intentionality, the nature of mind qua mind. It follows that according to Husserl the study of the judgment is at once a study of mind, of intentionality. Hence, the study of the judgment should include far
more than what formal logicians have included under it (FTL 263 [233]). First of all, such a study needs to look at experience for a sense of the judgment itself. That is, since the first judgment is the experiential judgment, i.e., all judgments ultimately point to a prepredicative level of experience, and since this sense enters into the sense of all judgments, the theory of the judgment needs a theory of experience (FTL 264 [233-234]). In other words, if we want to understand what a judgment is, we need to look at the sense of judgment, and according to Husserl, since every judgment that is not a judgment of experience refers back to such a judgment, we cannot grasp the sense of judgment without involving ourselves in the notion of experience. Secondly, since the judgment, understood properly as relating to experience, is paradigmatic of all conscious life, of all intentionality, the study of the judgment could have a far greater significance than traditional logic attributes to it. But this brings in a subjective factor, and the formal logician sees this as a threat of psychologism, whereby logical laws are reduced to empirical, de facto, laws.

It remains to be shown what is involved in the threat of psychologism, and also that this position of Husserl is not a psychologism. That is, it must be demonstrated that it is not a matter of describing what the psyche as a matter of fact does, but rather, a matter of describing necessary laws. I do that in chapter four. As well, it must be shown that it is possible to maintain that the laws of logic are necessary, without falling into a kind of Kantian idealism in which the ego imposes a necessity on experience, or a type
of Berkeleian idealism in which the ego "contains" all reality whatsoever. After all, it was stated that the ego constitutes even the stream of experience, and that moving from one level of intentionality to another involves making explicit what was contained in an earlier level of the ego. In chapter three I shall explain how Husserl's position avoids these two types of idealism.
FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER TWO

1. This reminds one of Fichte according to whom the absolute Ego posits the non-ego.

2. Whether we use judging, dreaming, imagining or perceiving, to name a few, to study the nature of mind qua mind (Husserl's aim) makes no difference, for all these acts are acts of mind and as such will display the essence of mind. However, later (pp. 92 ff.; 106 ff.) it will be shown that using the judgment as example is rather fortuitous because it is in fact the mode of intentionality. Had we studied intentionality by examining, say, dreaming, we would have been led back to the judgment, for the judgment (understood in its proper, phenomenological, sense) is found within all mental acts, according to Husserl. Husserl writes:

This teleological structure of intentional life, as a universally Objectivating life, is indicated by the fact that object and judgment (in the widest sense) belong together, and by the universality with which we can freely submit any already-given object to our categorial actions. For that reason moreover (and this is another index of that same teleology), the predicative judgment gains universal significance for psychic life. (FTL 263-263 [232]

(See also TIHP pp. 62ff) I shall consider this in more detail later (pp. 195 ff.) when I attempt to show the link between life and the judgment. The study of the judgment as a means of studying the mind qua mind is fortuitous too in that it has been studied formally and mind qua mind must be studied formally (FTL 212), since its properties are not tied to any particular content per se, yet are revealed in all its contents.

3. According to Husserl the judgment always has a modality (belief character), but this need not be explicitly stated. Modalities are ego-decisions for Husserl (EJ 271).

4. Even if he had asked himself this question he could not possibly have given the same answer as Husserl.

5. Intentional analysis aims precisely at an analysis of such a history of sense genesis (FTL 207ff [184ff]). This is why phenomenological analysis is sometimes compared to archeology, since the former, like the latter, involves a type of unearthing. The sense
genesis that phenomenology aims at is, of course, a logical genesis, not a psychological one.

6. Intentionality, turning toward something and making that something the explicit object of attention, is an act that can be reiterated. Reiteration is part of the essence of objectification.

7. We get only a glimpse here. Later (pp. 106 ff.) I shall discuss this in more detail.

8. That being related to an object is a striving conforms to Husserl's claim that the transcendent object is truly transcendent, i.e., transcendence expresses itself as a striving instead of a having once and for all. "Where the dator intuition is of a transcending character, the objective factor cannot come to be adequately given; what can alone be given here is the idea of such a factor", writes Husserl (I 367 [298]).

9. Husserl says the same in FTL 285 [251] and FTL 234 [207].

10. Though he cautions against understanding this in the Humean way. Belief is not based on the mere force of a datum, but is based on thematic or structural considerations. An hallucination may, for example, be as forceful as a sense perception but will nevertheless not be confused with reality because it will not fit into the broader structure of our sense experience.

11. "Part" is to be understood here as "aspect" and is not to be taken in a reified sense.

12. That is, the lower levels constitute the field to which the ego can direct its attention and on which it can exert its acts of objectification to achieve ever higher levels of objectivity.

13. Cf. Carnap: "objects on higher levels are not constructed by mere summation....The object state, for example, has to be constructed in this constructional system out of psychological processes, but it should by no means be thought of as a sum of psychological processes" (A 9).
We have seen that if the laws of logic are to hold universally for judgments, certain material conditions must be met in the judgment. Specifically the cores of the judgment must be related materially. As well, I have explained that according to Husserl this relation of the cores is one of implication (p implied by S), and that forming a judgment is an act of making the implicit explicit; it is an act of bringing the object or state-of-affairs to evidence. Having an object in evidence is having it really before one. I have argued that intentionality itself is either the having of an object in evidence or the bringing of an object to evidence, and that the different object regions have different types of evidence. I claimed in the last chapter that the "rule" for achieving this evidence is dictated by the idea of the type of object in question. But it is important to understand the very special way in which Husserl means this. That is, this sounds like a typical rationalist/idealist position according to which the idea precedes and/or has priority over the real. Indeed, to put it simplistically, it sounds as if Husserl were saying that the idea prescribes how to make the object real, since having the object in evidence is having it really before one, and how to achieve evidence is dictated by the idea of the object. But it is fundamental to see how Husserl differs here from the rationalist/idealist tradition in
general, and especially how he differs from one of its representatives, viz., Kant. It seems as if Husserl were saying that forming a judgment involves nominalizing a sense-datum (the given) as \( S \), applying to this the idea of object (an \( x \) with predicates) to get the judgment \( S \) is \( p \). This sounds like the Kantian claim that pure concepts on coming in contact with sense-impressions give rise to judgments about the world. In *The Critique of Pure Reason* Kant writes the following:

...pure concepts...have their source in the understanding alone, independently of sensibility....

(CPR [B144])

And:

We shall therefore follow up the pure concepts to their first seeds and dispositions in the human understanding, in which they lie prepared, till at last, on the occasion of experience, they are developed, and by the same understanding are exhibited in their purity, freed from the empirical conditions attaching to them. (CPR 103 [B91])

Kant's theory is one according to which the concept precedes reality. In general Husserlian phenomenology may be confused with Kantianism because each is known as transcendental philosophy, "a philosophy which, in opposition to prescientific and scientific objectivism, goes back to knowing subjectivity as the primal locus of all objective formations of sense and ontic validities, undertakes to understand the existing world as a structure of sense and validity, and in this way seeks to set in motion a new type of philosophy" (C99). In other words, a transcendental philosophy is one which attempts to overcome all objectivism, both prescientific and scientific. Objectivism may be briefly characterized as the failure to recognize sense or ontic validity as being the result of a constitutive act of the ego; it
occurs when we mistake a sense or ontic validity constituted by the ego for something given to the ego. Simply stated: objectivism occurs when we mistake something "emanating from" the ego for something "foreign to" the ego. Objectivism is considered undesirable because it lessens the ego's power and its self-responsibility. Hence the aim is to overcome it. In its extreme form objectivism results in the claim that objects (in its broadest sense, the world) as described by science have absolute being and are the ground of all being (C 68), including the being of the ego.² Both Kant and Husserl attempt to overcome objectivism and so both have a transcendental philosophy.

But confounding Husserl's transcendentalism with that of Kant would be a mistake. In Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl stresses that although Kant's theories "are implicitly theories of intentional constitution" and are for him "a source of profound stimulations" (FTL 258 [228]), still, Kant, unlike Husserl, did not achieve a pure transcendental phenomenology. Indeed, Husserl describes the character of Kant's advancement of a system of transcendental philosophy as being "halfway" (FTL 258 [228]) and claims that Kant is "far from accomplishing a truly radical grounding of philosophy..."(C 99). In other words, Husserl overcomes objectivism in a way that Kant does not. In this chapter I shall show how Husserl differs from the idealist/rationalist tradition in general and from Kant in particular. Specifically I shall show that while even Kant still retains traces of objectivism in his philosophy, Husserl is able to overcome all objectivism in a pure transcendental phenomenology thanks to a "genuinely radical meaning of the opposition between objectivism and
transcendentalism" (C 100). I shall show that he is able to achieve such a radical purity only by taking into account life. To show how Husserl differs from Kant I will have to consider those of Kant's predecessors that influenced the latter most directly, viz., Descartes, Hume and, to a lesser extent, Locke. My aim must be understood: it is to see what Husserl understood the effect of these philosophers to be on the history of thought, rather than attempting to understand what these philosophers "really meant".\textsuperscript{3} That is to say, there are always different ways of understanding a philosopher. Husserl himself repeatedly points out that Descartes, Hume and Kant, for instance, all had a greater depth of insight than is usually recognized, at times even by the respective philosophers themselves. But the way these philosophers have tended to influence the history of thought is usually not by their more profound thoughts. If Husserl discusses their less profound thoughts, even while being aware of the more meaningful aspects of their thinking, he does so because that is how he thinks they most significantly influenced philosophy. Indeed, Husserl's aim here must be understood as well. It is not to prove that these philosophers were somehow "wrong". His aim is, rather, to contrast his philosophy to theirs solely for the purpose of clarifying the phenomenological doctrine. Hence I frequently shall be citing Husserl's description of what these philosophers maintained rather than citing the philosophers themselves. Even if one might at times take issue with his description, that will not interfere with our achieving our aim: clarifying the nature of phenomenology.
According to Husserl, Descartes, Hume and Kant, in maintaining the ego to be the founder of all sense, all stand on the threshold of phenomenology. (For reasons to be discussed later in this chapter, of the three he considers Hume to have come closest to phenomenology.) Yet all fail to enter the region of phenomenology, and, what is more, what prevents them from doing so is in all three cases the same: their concept of the ego. That the latter concept is the linchpin in transcendental philosophy should come as no surprise. After all, transcendental philosophy aims to ground all knowledge in the pure ego, in that level of the ego where nothing is taken for granted. According to transcendental philosophy genuine science is built on that pure basis. Naturally, if the pure basis is not reached, if the synthesis of science occurs too soon, the demand of transcendentalism has not been met and a true (pure) transcendental philosophy cannot be established. In the case of Descartes, Hume and Kant, the ego they consider to be the pure ego, the ground of all sense, is not the pure ego at all, but is an ego constituted by the pure ego; it in fact contains levels of meaning constituted by the pure ego. Their failure to recognize this means that they do not overcome objectivism, for they consider certain meaning and its correlative concepts to be given to the ego, while in fact they are constituted by the ego. (In all three cases, as I shall show, part of this meaning is the meaning of rationality with its various concepts and notions, including the pure categories.) They work with these concepts without saying how they come about in the ego; they leave these concepts ungrounded. Hence they do not have the radicalism demanded by transcendentalism. That is
they do not meet the demand for a presuppositionless basis; they have not taken their analysis to the source of meaning. In part the inability of these philosophers to achieve a sense of pure ego is due to the then prevalent view of the ego as "place" where thoughts occur, analogous to space being a place where events occur. According to this view, internal experience is analogous to external experience. Husserl terms the tendency to parallel "internal" and "external" experience, to treat psychic problems as having the same sense as problems concerning physical nature and to treat them by the same method (FTL 210 [187]), the naturalistic and sensualistic view of the ego (FTL 255 [226]).

The way leading to the whole inquiry concerning origins, an inquiry that must be taken collaterally, as belonging to pure psychology and transcendental philosophy...that way remained for centuries untrod. This was an entirely understandable consequence of naturalistic and sensualistic aberration on the part of all modern psychology based on internal experience. This aberration not only drove the transcendental philosophy of English empiricism into that well known development which made it end in countersensical fictionalism; it also arrested the transcendental philosophy of Kant's Copernican revolution short of full effectuation, so that the Kantian philosophy could never force its way through to the point where the ultimately necessary aims and methods can be adopted. (FTL 255 [225-226])

Hence what differentiates phenomenology from the philosophies of Descartes, Hume and Kant is its view of the ego. This it will be shown, is related to the earlier philosophers' maintaining a reality-idea split, which in the case of the rationalist/idealist tradition--Descartes and Kant of the three we are considering, Hume strictly speaking being an empiricist--takes the form of the claim that the idea precedes reality.
According to Husserl Descartes was the first to approach phenomenology in his attempt to prove the ego in its rationality to be the founder, the absolute ground, of all sense, of all knowledge, and, on the basis of this, to establish philosophy as a universal science. By a radical skeptical epoche Descartes wants to find the absolute, indubitable, ground of all knowledge, "a foundation of immediate and apodictic knowledge whose self-evidence excludes all conceivable doubt" (C 75), and on the basis of this by self-evident steps build up a genuine science. Husserl points out, however, that what is new in Descartes that makes him the first to approach phenomenology is not the fact that he instituted an epoche, for this is something the ancient skeptics (starting with Protagoras and Gorgias, according to Husserl) (C 76) and St. Augustine\(^5\) had achieved as well, but it is, rather, "the original Cartesian motif: that of pressing forward through the hell of an unsurpassable, quasi-skeptical epoche toward the gates of the heaven of an absolutely rational philosophy, and of constructing the latter systematically" (C 77). That is, while the skepticism of the ancients was a negative skepticism, "oriented negativistically toward the practical and ethical (political)", as Husserl phrases it, Descartes' skepticism is positive in nature, for it aims to give rise to truth. As well, and indeed, consequently, Descartes' skepticism is more radical than that of the ancients. While the ancient skeptics deny episteme, that is, scientific knowledge of what is in-itself, according to Husserl, "the 'Cartesian epoche' encompasses not only that validity of all previous sciences...but even the validity of the pre- and extrascientific life-world, i.e., the world of sense-experience
constantly pregiven as taken for granted unquestioningly and all the life of thought which is nourished by it - the unscientific and finally even the scientific" (C 76). Hence Husserl says that "the 'Cartesian epoche' has in truth an hitherto unheard of radicalism" (C 76). To illustrate this point with an example: while the ancient skeptics may have applied the epoche to the world as an object of knowledge, doubting that knowledge of the absolute nature of the world as it is in-itself was possible, Descartes doubts the world as an object of sense-experience; he doubts the world as an object of everyday experience. The key point is, then, that Descartes approaches phenomenology in his attempt to prove the ego to be the founder of all sense by applying a radical epoche not just to scientific knowledge, but to the life-world, and in attempting to establish a universal science on the basis of this. But I also said that according to Husserl Descartes was nevertheless unable to penetrate into the realm of phenomenology and that this inability was due to his view of the ego. This view is a result of his failure, despite all his good intentions, to adhere to his own demand for radicalism in executing the epoche. Let me explain this point next.

Descartes' radical epoche leads finally past the life-world, past the world of everyday experience, to one certitude upon which all knowledge will be erected; namely, the ego of the ego-cogito. Writes Husserl:

...for Descartes...I, the ego performing the epoche, am the only thing that is absolutely indubitable, that excludes in principle every possibility of doubt.(C 78)
Contra Ricoeur (CI 227), the certainty of the ego's being does not foreclose the question of the nature of the ego's being, even for Descartes. Husserl points out that Descartes does ask himself "what kind of an ego it is, whether the ego is the human being, the sensibly intuited human being of everyday life" (C 79). Descartes answers that it is not the living body, for it, like all sensible objects, is "ruled out" by the epoche. But according to Husserl Descartes' answer is motivated by his acceptance of the Galilean belief that reality given by the senses is misleading and covers up an in-itself, a purely physical reality, which is mathematical and the subject matter of pure thought. That is, Descartes treats the physical body like any other object of the physical, sensible, world, namely as a pure physical object. Hence, the ego Descartes is left with after applying the epoche to the body "is the residuum of a previous abstraction of the pure physical body" (C 80). Husserl objects to this for three overlapping reasons:

(i) Conceiving the ego as the residuum of an abstraction from the pure physical body is to give a prejudiced view of the ego's nature; that is, it is to characterize it strictly in terms of the physical order, albeit negatively, and not at all in terms of its own nature, whatever that turns out to be, i.e., the ego that is the residuum of such an abstraction "according to this abstraction, at least apparently, is a complement of this body" (C 80). Indeed, according to Husserl, there are various "ways of being an ego, and none of its ways can be severed from the others" (C 108) without distorting the nature of the ego, for "throughout all their transformations they form a unity" (C 108). One
of the ways of being an ego is through the "bodily I" [die leibliche Ichkeit], which is the I of the living body and so to describe the ego strictly as residuum of an abstraction of the body is to deny the living physical aspect of the ego's nature, and ultimately to falsify the ego's essence.

(ii) It is a mistake to treat the physical body like any other object given by the senses, as a pure physical object, for the body has a "unique ontic meaning", according to Husserl, in that unlike pure physical objects, the body is perceived as living by me.

In a quite unique way the living body is constantly in the perceptual field quite immediately, with a completely unique ontic meaning, precisely the meaning indicated by the word "organ" (here used in its most primitive sense), [namely, as] that through which I exist in a completely unique way and quite immediately as the ego of affection and actions, [as that] in which I hold sway quite immediately, kinesthetically - articulated into particular organs through which I hold sway, or potentially hold sway, in particular kinestheses corresponding to them. (C 107)

The body is never experienced as just pure body, but always as subject-object, according to Husserl:

...I...find my animate organism as uniquely singled out - namely as the only one...that is not just a body but precisely an animate organism...the only Object "in" which I "rule and govern" immediately....(CM 97 [128])

(iii) The ego achieved through Descartes' abstraction is not a pure apodictic ego. While Descartes has correctly isolated the "centre" of apodicticity, the ego cogito, he fails to understand its nature. This is in part due to the fact that Descartes answers too quickly his question as to the nature of the ego-cogito, according to Husserl (C 82), for Descartes' answer is coloured by a Weltanschauung that should
have been included in the epoche. The ego Descartes is left with is one that has an idea of the external world according to the Galilean model, which has an idea of God, which has an idea of others and of culture and which has an idea of itself vis-à-vis all of the aforementioned. In short, Descartes has left the psychological self intact. But according to Husserl, the existence of the world, God, others, culture and so forth, is not all that should have been subjected to doubt, but also the very meaning of these, what they are for the Ego and how they come about in the ego. Hence, according to Husserl, the ego got through Descartes' abstraction is not one to which doubt no longer applies--it is one to which one can still apply the epoche. This is what Husserl means when he writes the following:

Is not the epoche related to the totality of what is pregiven to me (who am philosophizing) and thus related to the whole world, including all human beings, and these not only in respect to their bodies? Is it not thus related to me as a whole man as I am valid for myself in my natural possession of the world [Welthabe]? (C 79)

By "whole man" Husserl means here the psycho-physical self, and by "as I am valid for myself in my natural possession of the world" Husserl means my Weltanschauung, for a Weltanschauung is a way of possessing the world. What Husserl is saying here, then, is that the epoche should be applied not only to the physical aspect of the self, viz., the body as object, but to the psychological self as well, of which my Weltanschauung, that is, my conception of the world and, since I am a being in this world, my conception of my ego as a being in this world, forms a part. It follows that according to Husserl the Galilean world view that Descartes adopts should also have been bracketed by the
epoche, for this forms part of the Weltanschauung of the ego, one which in the long run prejudices the ego's self-understanding.

Is Descartes here not dominated in advance by the Galilean certainty of a universal and absolutely pure world of physical bodies, with the distinction between the merely sensibly experienced and the mathematical, which is a matter of pure thinking? Does he not already take it for granted that sensibility points to a realm of what is in-itself, but that it can deceive us; and that there must be a rational way of resolving this [deception] and of knowing what is in-itself with mathematical rationality? But is all this not at once bracketed with the epoche, indeed even as a possibility? It is obvious that Descartes, in spite of the radicalism of the presuppositionlessness he demands, has, in advance, a goal in relation to which the breakthrough to this "ego" is supposed to be the means. He does not see that, by being convinced of the possibility of the goal and of this means, he has already left this radicalism behind. It is not achieved by merely deciding on the epoche, on the radical, withholding of [judgment on] all that is pregiven, on all prior validities of what is in the world; the epoche must seriously be and remain in effect. The ego is not a residuum of the world but is that which is absolutely apodictically posited; and this is made possible only through the epoche, only through the "bracketing" of the total world-validity; and it is the only positing thus made possible. (C 79)

Descartes does not ask what the world is for the ego or how its sense comes about, for the Galilean world view through which he views the ego is one in which the ego is cut off from the world. This is because of the way in which the body is conceived on this model. That is, the Galilean world view is implicitly a theory about the essence of the body, and, in Husserl's opinion, a false one. No provision is made for the special nature of the body as "door" to the world, or as a means whereby I have access to the world. It is of course true that the Galilean world view acknowledges that the body reveals the world through the senses, but this forms no part of the view's understanding
of the essence of the body. The body is understood as any other physical thing; it too is given by the senses and its essence is its mathematical properties. This has a direct bearing on the view of the ego, for it means that in the Galilean model the ego is considered as something which is the "opposite" of a pure physical thing, while in fact the ego is the idea of the pure physical thing, as I shall explain below. Hence, Husserl maintains that the act of "abstracting" the ego from the body is itself motivated by the Weltanschauung of the Galilean model of the natural scientist, by "the psychologist's way of looking at things, on the natural ground of the world as pregiven and taken for granted" (C 80). The world is presented through the body, but because Descartes has abstracted the ego from the body, this means that on this model the world is not given directly to the ego, for unless the ego and body are in some way inseparably "one", the ego has no immediate access to the world. Hence Descartes' need to invoke God's benevolence as a guarantee of the ego's knowledge of the world. In other words, if the ego is seen as radically distinct from the body, as in the Galilean world view, the world will be considered to be completely independent of the ego. The bond that exists between the ego and the world, viz., that of the ego as constitutor of the world, according to the phenomenologist is denied in this view.

Yet according to this model the world is believed to be that which is "there" beforehand, the ground of all being, an in-itself. Hence, the ego which is "in" the body must also on this view find its ground in the world--it too must be part of the natural order, even though it was held to be radically distinct from the purely physical.
The reasoning is fallacious, yet Descartes' philosophy exhibits such thinking, for, while the ego is considered by him to be radically distinct from the world, still he maintains that the ego is to be studied by psychology, a science of the natural order.

In general terms, then, the consequence of not applying the epoche to the psychological ego is the absurd position in which what is supposed to ground the objective sciences, the ego, is itself subject to the objective science of psychology, for the ego which is the ground of Descartes' science is the psychological ego.

That Descartes, however, persists in pure objectivism in spite of its subjective grounding was possible only through the fact that the mens, which at first stood by itself in the epoche and functioned as the absolute ground of knowledge, grounding the objective sciences (or, universally speaking, philosophy), appeared at the same time to be grounded along with everything else as a legitimate subject matter within the sciences, i.e., in psychology. Descartes does not make clear to himself that the ego, his ego deprived of its worldly character through the epoche, in whose functioning cogitationes the world has all the ontic meaning it can ever have for him, cannot possibly turn up as subject matter in the world, since everything that is of the world derives its meaning precisely from these functions—including, then, one's own psychic being, the ego in the usual sense. (C 81-82)

In other words, what we have here is an assumption about the nature of the ego. It is assumed that the ego is a "place" where thoughts and ideas occur, and that these thoughts and ideas are events which take place in time. Hence the study of the ego is understood as the study of psychological facts. This is a theory about the self not subjected to the epoche, a failure which leads to a substitution of the psychological ego for the pure ego.
Another belief concerning the ego's nature not subjected to the epoche is the belief in the ego's inherent rationality. That Descartes maintains the ego to be essentially rational follows from his intention to establish a universal science on the ego; that is, from his intention to develop a science using only the resources of the ego itself. Indeed, since science proceeds by reason, Descartes could only ground science on the ego if he assumed the thinking of the ego fundamentally and essentially to proceed according to the dictates of reason; if, in other words, he considered the ego to be essentially rational. But this assumption is not questioned by Descartes. More specifically, Descartes uses, but does not question, the notion of judgment, and the laws and procedures of logic, including deduction. Had he questioned the assumption of the ego's rationality as does Husserl, he would have seen the need to ground rationality and would have been led to the pure ego. It is for this reason that Husserl maintains that although Descartes was on the path to phenomenology, it is his failure to adhere to his own demand for radicalism that prevents him from gaining access to the pure ego, and thereby from entering the realm of phenomenology (CM 25 [64]).

...in the foundation-laying reflections of the Meditations - those in which the epoche and its ego are introduced - a break in consistency occurs when his ego is identified with the pure soul [i.e., ego as residuum of an abstraction from the pure physical body]. (C 80)

And:

For Descartes, the Meditations work themselves out in the portentous form of a substitution of one's own psychic ego for the [absolute] ego, of psychological immanence for egological immanence, of the evidence of psychic, "inner", or "self-
According to Husserl, it was Descartes' "haste to ground objectivism and the exact sciences as affording metaphysical, absolute knowledge" which prevented him from setting himself "the task of systematically investigating the pure ego - consistently remaining within the epoche - with regard to what acts, what capacities, belong to it and what it brings about, as intentional accomplishment, through these acts and capacities" (C 82).

Paradoxically, Descartes' philosophy gives rise to two branches of philosophy commonly considered to be diametrically opposed to each other, viz., rationalism and empiricism. Both the rationalism and empiricism that follow Descartes take over the transcendental theme of returning to the ego as the ground of knowledge. Both also take over the worst in Descartes, viz., Descartes' misunderstanding of the nature of the apodictic ego, of the ego as residuum of an abstraction from the body. In short they take over Descartes' mind-body split. However, the empiricists and rationalists are distinguished by this: while the latter believe in the possibility of knowledge of a transcendent in-itself, the former eventually come to deny such possibility and adopt a skepticism similar to that of the ancient skeptics.

It is ironic that Descartes by his original insight did not want to split ego and object (object in its broadest sense being "world"), for he was implicitly guided by a notion of intentionality: by the idea that every cogitatio has its cogitatum (C 82) i.e., that the ego always implies an object, hence that there can be no radical
ego-object split. But since the concept of intentionality is not made explicit it cannot properly guide him nor can he investigate it. Had he made this notion explicit, he would have been led to the question of rationality, for in its broadest sense intentionality involves problems of reason and understanding (C 82): intentionality, the ego's being related to its object, is an act of believing and has its modes of confirming, disconfirming, of truth and of falsehood. In short, Descartes would have been led to question the nature of rationality, and that in virtue of which the ego is rational at all, viz., evidence. Had Descartes made explicit his concept of intentionality he would have been led to the true nature of the ego, not as residuum of an abstraction from the pure physical body, but as the ground of rationality.

Any notion of intentionality which Descartes may have had implicit in his philosophy is lost with Locke (C 82). Locke takes over Descartes' view of the soul as residing in the body, as residuum of an abstraction from the body. The motive of a return to the ego as ground of all knowledge remains, but with one difference: whereas in Descartes' theory the ego could know the reality which transcended it (the world in-itself, substance), in Locke's theory the transcendent, the in-itself, substance, can never be known by the ego. All that we know, according to Locke, is what is given internally in the soul. That which is transcendent to the soul is a "je ne sais quoi". This theme is carried further in Berkeley, according to whom it is not only not possible to know a reality, an in-itself transcendent to the ego, but there is no such thing. In his view, the transcendent reality, the
"je ne sais quoi" found in Locke's theory, is but a philosophical invention (C 82). It is Hume who carries this line of thought to its extreme. For Hume not only is "substance" a philosophical invention, but so are all objective categories, (e.g., cause and effect, substantial self), pre-scientific as well as scientific. This leads Hume to reject the possibility of knowledge of matters of fact—it leads him to reject the possibility of science, in other words, for the latter is given through objective categories. This position, in which the possibility of empirical knowledge is denied, is of interest to us here because it is at once a theory of the nature of the ego. Let me briefly outline the way in which he arrives at his position.

According to Hume knowledge is marked by a type of certitude found in judgments of logic and mathematics. Such judgments express relations between ideas; they express necessary connections between ideas. Hence, in Hume's view, knowledge is given in judgments expressing necessary relations between ideas. In so called knowledge of the world such necessary relations are presumably expressed in judgments of cause and effect. The objective category of cause and effect is thought to express a necessary connection: we assume the effect must follow upon the cause. But Hume asks: what evidence do we have for the necessary nature of this connection, for the link between cause and effect? Using his "copy-principle" as criterion of evidence, Hume is unable to find any evidence for the "necessity" of this link. He maintains that experience is fundamentally a series of sense-impressions, and that what we term knowledge of fact is a connection of representations derived from these sense-impressions. But the
connections between these representations are made on the force of what is usually the case, not on what must be the case. Hence, they are in no way necessary connections. Belief in the necessary nature of the link between cause and effect is groundless. Since judgments of cause and effect express no necessary relations, they express no certitude, and, consequently, do not constitute knowledge claims, according to Hume. Hume does not end his "attack" on empirical knowledge there. Once again with the aid of his copy-principle he shows that all objective categories (such as substance, substantial self), and not merely the category of cause and effect, are groundless. Hence, Hume maintains that knowledge of the world is not possible, and he falls "into the countersense of a 'philosophy of as-if' " (FTL 257 [227]). Science or knowledge is not possible since it deals with only fictional concepts; hence it presents us with an "as-if reality".

Now, the important thing to note concerning Hume's philosophy, in Husserl's opinion, is that Hume's final position, however unphenomenological it sounds, is a consequence of his taking very seriously the transcendental impulse to see the ego as founder of all sense. According to Husserl:

He [Hume] was the first to treat seriously the Cartesian focusing purely on what lies inside: in that he began by freeing the soul radically from everything that gives it the significance of a reality in the world! and then presupposed the soul purely as a field of "perceptions" ("impressions" and "ideas"), such as it is qua datum of a suitably purified internal experience. (FTL 256 [227])

But what is even more surprising, in light of the fact that Hume, unlike Descartes, had no concept of intentionality, and that he is
generally acknowledged to be a proponent of sense-data empiricism, a position Husserl battled all his life, is that in Husserl's estimation Hume carries the transcendental motive of a return to the ego further than anyone prior to him, including Descartes and even Kant (C 262). Hume's transcendental move is more radical than Descartes', in other words. This is so not merely because he, unlike Descartes, frees the ego from all objective categories, but also because he was the first to make the problem of transcendental philosophy concrete.

Hume's greatness (a greatness still unrecognized in this, its most important aspect) lies in the fact that, despite all that, he was the first to grasp the universal concrete problem of transcendental philosophy. In the concreteness [my emphasis] of purely egological internality, as he saw, everything Objective becomes intended to (and, in favourable cases, perceived), thanks to a subjective genesis. Hume was the first to see the necessity of investigating the Objective itself as a product of its genesis from that concreteness [my emphasis], in order to make the legitimate being-sense of everything that exists for us intelligible through its ultimate origins. Stated more precisely: the real world and the categories of reality, which are its fundamental forms, became for him a problem in a new fashion [my emphasis]. (FTL 256 [226-227])

In making the problem of transcendental philosophy concrete, Hume enables the problem of transcendental philosophy to reach a new depth; he is able to see, more clearly than Descartes, what questions transcendentalism must answer and along which lines it must do so. In this way Hume points the way to a correct understanding of the transcendental ego. Let me explain in what way Hume goes beyond Descartes in executing the transcendental motive, and more specifically what is meant by making the problem concrete.
It is undeniable that in a certain sense Hume has a more phenomenological attitude than Descartes, in that he is fundamentally guided, albeit implicitly and somewhat inconsistently, by a notion of intentionality. That is, Descartes is able to see beyond the "parts", ego-God-world, to the unity they imply: he sees that the ego implies a sense of objectivity and of God. The ego implies a sense of objectivity because the ego in order to be must be self-aware, and it can be self-aware only by contrast to something which resists it, viz., an object, which in its broadest sense is the world. In the ego's self-awareness God is given, for God is given in apodictic truth, and self-awareness is the apodictic truth of one's own being. But as I mentioned earlier, Descartes' insight is a sweeping intuition in need of anchoring, for at times, indeed at the most crucial moment when he is about to answer the question of the nature of the apodictic ego, he loses sight of his intuition. This causes his writings to be a curious blend of depth and superficiality. Descartes should have asked what this fact that the ego and object are given at once, this intentionality, says about the nature of the ego. I have already suggested that this would have led him to question "rationality" and "evidence", which in turn would have revealed the true nature of the apodictic, that is, transcendental, ego. Instead Descartes lets his insight into intentionality slip, and, assuming a gulf between the ego and the world, needs to appeal to the benevolence of God in order to bridge this gulf. Without God's benevolence the ego could not know the world (D 149). In short, "evidence" for the object is not immediately given to the ego, but meditately through God. In maintaining this
Descartes has strayed from the transcendental demand that all knowledge ultimately be grounded directly in the ego. He has strayed from the transcendental demand that the ego be the ground of evidence. One should not have to appeal to the benevolence of God for knowledge of the object if one is truly going to ground knowledge in the ego. One should appeal to reason. At most the appeal to God's benevolence is an intermediate step which itself will be explained by reason and so should not form part of the final expression of how the ego can have knowledge of the object. But the appeal to benevolence itself betrays a dependency on revelation. That is, while Descartes proves God's perfection by appeal to reason, that perfection implies benevolence does not immediately follow. It is, rather, something known from revelation, the acceptance of which itself requires faith. Hume, however, adheres to the transcendental demand to the end, for he asks what concrete evidence the ego has for the object. That is, he asks what proof the living ego here and now in direct experience has for the object.

But idealism was always too quick with its theories and for the most part could not free itself from hidden objectivistic presuppositions; or else, as speculative idealism, it passed over the task of interrogating, concretely and analytically, actual subjectivity, i.e., subjectivity as having the actual phenomenal world in intuitive validity - which, properly understood, is nothing other than carrying out the phenomenological reduction and putting transcendental phenomenology into action. (C 337)

Hume does not consider that which is not directly given to the ego to be evidence. Revelation is not evidence in his view, for it requires faith. In other words, Hume, pushing the transcendental demand to its
extreme, can legitimately ask what evidence there is for revelation, for faith in God. **Everything** is to be grounded in the ego. This is so for Husserl as well; he too maintains that God is something constituted by the ego, that "God" finds its sense in the ego, and he points out that this is in no way to commit a blasphemy. Hume, then, is truer to the transcendental motive. It is his **question** of what concrete evidence the ego has for the object that can set us on the path to working out explicitly the nature of the transcendental ego. It is just that his **answer** is disappointing. Using his copy-principle as criterion for evidence he is unable to find any sense-impression corresponding to such objective concepts as "object", and he concludes that objective concepts are groundless; that they are without evidence altogether; that they are fictions. That is, on seeing that the ego has no external evidence for these ideas but is the source of these ideas, instead of looking for the evidence or ground of these ideas "in" the ego, something which would have led him to intentionality and phenomenology, he concludes that these ideas are completely without evidence, that they are groundless. I explained above how this leads to the absurd position of a "philosophy of as-if" (FTL 257 [227]). But it is precisely this absurdity which motivates us to go beyond Hume. In other words, Hume's philosophy will lead us closer to phenomenology in both a direct, positive, way, and an indirect, negative, way. On the positive side he leads us to phenomenology to the extent that he pushes the transcendental move to its extreme in asking for the ego's concrete evidence for objective categories. On the negative side he leads us to phenomenology in that his philosophy leads to an absurd
position which will force us to reexamine the concrete facts at that point where his philosophy gives way to absurdity and to seek another answer to Hume's question of the ground of the objective categories.

And this is precisely what Kant does. Following Hume's "transcendental turn", Kant in effect asks what evidence the ego has for the legitimacy of the objective categories. I say Kant "in effect" asks this because actually he asks how we can know that judgments of fact are knowledge--how we can in principle be assured of their truth. But this is tantamount to asking for the legitimacy of objective categories since judgments of fact are composed of the latter. The legitimacy of judgments of fact, then, depends on the legitimacy of the objective categories. The question of the legitimacy of the objective categories and judgments of fact is essentially the question of how we know that these objective categories and judgments of fact "match" something in experience, how we know that they represent reality. When Hume says that judgments concerning the world are fictions he means that they do not "match" experience, that there are no sense impressions corresponding to the objective categories. There is for Hume, then, a judgment-experience split. And this is the problem that Kant addresses when he addresses the problem of objective categories, and, what is the same thing, the problem of the epistemic status of judgments of fact.

Hume had made him [Kant] sensitive to the fact that between the pure truths of reason and metaphysical objectivity there remained a gulf of incomprehensibility, namely, as to how precisely these truths of reason could really guarantee the knowledge of things. (C 93)
But for Kant the fact that evidence for the objective categories cannot be found in experience is not an indication that these categories are fictions. Kant attempts to show that evidence for them cannot be found in experience because they allow for the very possibility of experience. "The categories", writes Kant, "are the conditions of the possibility of experience, and are therefore valid a priori for all objects of experience" (CPR 171 [B 161]). Experience already "makes use of" the categories, as it were.

Kant now undertakes, in fact, to show, through a regressive procedure, that if common experience is really to be experience of objects of nature, objects which can really be knowable with objective truth, i.e., scientifically, in respect to their being and nonbeing, their being-such and being-other-wise [So-und Andersbeschaffensein], then the intuitively appearing world must already be a construct of the faculties of "pure intuition" and "pure reason", the same faculties that express themselves in explicit thinking in mathematics and logic. (C 94)

While judgments of fact were fictions for Hume, since they did not "match" what was given in experience, for Kant judgments of fact already express the ego's relation to the world, since the objective categories of which they are composed make experience possible. Any judgment about the world (which is experience of the world, in Kant's view) comes about, according to Kant, when sense-impressions (which by themselves are not knowledge, but are uninformed) and pure concepts (which, without sense-impressions are empty) "meet", as it were. Writes Kant: "the categories are not in themselves knowledge, but are merely forms of thought for the making of knowledge from given intuitions..." (CPR 253 [B 288]). The categories themselves, according
to Kant, "come from" the ego. Let me briefly outline the argument whereby he claims that the categories "stem from" the ego.

According to Kant, the categories stem from the understanding:

...the understanding alone [is] their [the a priori concepts'] birth place....(CPR 103 [B 90]).

The understanding, in turn, is made possible by the original unity of apperception. That is, the very function of the understanding, combination or synthesis, presupposes unity. Hence the original unity of apperception is ultimately what makes the categories possible. Kant makes it quite clear that the original unity of apperception which allows for the understanding is not to be confused with the category of unity, for the latter stems from the understanding.

This unity, which precedes a priori all concepts of combination, is not the category of unity; for all categories are grounded in logical functions of judgment, and in these functions combination, and therefore unity of given concepts is already thought. Thus the category already presupposes combination. We must therefore look yet higher for this unity (as qualitative), namely in that which itself contains the ground of the unity of diverse concepts in judgment, and therefore of the possibility of the understanding, even as regards its logical employment. (CPR 152 [B 131])

This unity of apperception is, rather, the "unity of consciousness", the pure original unchangeable consciousness" or "transcendental apperception" (CPR 136 [A 107]). It is the "a priori ground of all concepts" (CPR 136 [A 107]). This unity finds expression in the representation "I think", a representation which must be able to accompany every intuition or thought, according to Kant (CPR 153 [B 132]). For Kant, then, as for Hume, the categories have their source in the ego. But while these are ungrounded and hence fictitious for
Hume, for Kant they find their ground in the ego. Kant will show by his "recessive method" (C 114) how the categories are grounded, thereby showing their legitimacy. By thus demonstrating their legitimacy he shows how knowledge is possible. But here Kant runs into difficulties, partly because he has inherited from Hume some concepts that will not allow him to work out the problem of the grounding of the objective categories. First of all, Kant accepts the Humean notion of knowledge as certainty, the type of certainty exhibited in mathematics and logic. This will force Kant to find a non-empirical source of knowledge of the world, for only the non-empirical is capable of giving the type of certitude that Hume and Kant think marks knowledge. Since judgments about the world are formed by means of objective categories this means the source of the objective categories must be pure.

...since they [the categories] are a priori concepts, and therefore independent of experience, the ascription to them of an empirical origin would be a sort of generatio aequivoca. (CPR 174 [B 167])

Hence the ego that is the source of the categories cannot be the empirical ego but must be the pure, transcendental, ego. Indeed, this is why Kant stresses that the original synthetic unity of apperception is a thought, not an intuition.

...in the synthetic unity of apperception I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am. This representation is a thought, not an intuition. (CPR 168 [B 157])

Indeed, if the original synthetic unity of apperception were not a thought but an intuition, it would not be free from empirical influence, and this would in turn mean that the categories to which it
gives rise were not pure, that is, were not free from empirical factors. In that case knowledge would not have certitude, which would mean that Kant could not refute Hume's claim concerning empirical knowledge. For this reason Kant must hold that this original unity is free from all impressions of the senses, i.e.,

This is the concept or, if the term be preferred, the judgment 'I think'. As is easily seen this is the vehicle of all concepts... But it can have no special designation, because it serves only to introduce all our thought, as belonging to consciousness. Meanwhile, however, free it be of empirical admixture (impressions of the senses)....(CPR 329 [B 399-400])

And again:

For, it must be observed that when I call the proposition, 'I think', an empirical proposition, I do not mean to say thereby, that the 'I' in this proposition is an empirical representation. On the contrary, it is purely intellectual, because belonging to thought in general. (CPR 378 [B 423])

Hence, although Kant realizes that the proposition "I think" is an empirical proposition--I can only think "I think" once I have as a matter of fact thought, i.e., "I think" is something I can find out only empirically--he holds that the "I" is not in any way empirical. It follows that he holds it to be pure thought. Indeed, Kant does not want to ground the objective categories in the natural soul, for if he were to do so he would end up with a Humean type of skepticism. That is, if the "I" were the natural soul it would be in space and time, and its structure and function would be determined according to the forms of space and time. In that case evidence for the categories would be within space and time. This was Hume's standard of evidence and it meant that that which grounds the categories was something "in" space
and time. Hume found nothing in experience to correspond to the objective categories. Hence, to successfully show how the categories originate in the pure transcendental ego Kant will have to show the difference between the transcendental and empirical ego. But he will have difficulty doing this, for according to him we can have no knowledge of the pure transcendental ego, i.e., all knowledge involves the combination of intuition and categories. For Kant the nature of the transcendental ego remains beyond description since in view of its purity it cannot be made intuitively clear: it cannot be revealed by the self-evidence of inner perception for according to the Kantian doctrine of inner sense - everything that can be exhibited in the self-evidence of inner experience has already been formed by a transcendental function, that of temporalization (C 114). And there is another concept that Kant takes over from Hume which prevents him from achieving a proper understanding of the pure ego, namely his notion of inner-perception, as I mentioned earlier. Kant views self-evident inner perception as self-perception of the naturalized soul (C 115). Kant cannot concretely distinguish, and hence cannot clearly distinguish, transcendental subjectivity from the "soul which is made part of nature and conceived of as a component of the psycho-physical human being within the time of nature, within space-time" (C 115). Hence he cannot make intuitively clear how objective categories are grounded in the transcendental ego, for if he shows it by appeal to inner-perception he is inadvertently grounding them in the objective soul. This is why he cannot effect a true transcendental philosophy; to do so he would have to show how the objective categories are
grounded in the transcendental ego, but this he cannot do because he cannot free himself from the popular view of the ego. Hence, while Kant has gone beyond Hume and has come a step closer to transcendental philosophy in maintaining that the objective categories are not fictions but are required for the very possibility of experience, still, Husserl's complaint against him is that these objective categories remain, as in the case of Hume's philosophy, groundless. The categories of science are "in" mind, but what grounds them, from where do we "get" them?

There is some complaint about the obscurities of the Kantian philosophy, about the incompatibility of the evidences of his regressive method, his transcendental-subjective "faculties", "functions", "formations", about the difficulty of understanding what transcendental subjectivity actually is, how its function, its accomplishment, comes about, how this is to make all objective science understandable. And in fact Kant does get involved in his own sort of mythical talk, whose literal meaning points to something subjective, but a mode of the subjective which we are in principle unable to make intuitive to ourselves, whether through factual examples or through genuine analogy. (C 114)

Husserl's complaint against Kant is that his conception of the "I think" makes it completely incomprehensible and powerless. Presumably the "I think" which accompanies all thought and intuition precedes all thought and intuition, the empirical merely being the "condition of application" of thinking "I think" (CPR 378 [B 423]). But what does it refer to, and what makes it ever present? How does it come to attach itself to all thought and intuition? Now, although Kant says that the "I" of the "I think" cannot be an object of knowledge, he does on the one hand term the "I think" a thought, to distinguish it from
intuition, to stress purity. But it is a thought which "can have no special designation, because it serves only to introduce all our thought..." (CPR 329 [B 399-400]). In that case it is a thought which in itself has neither reference nor sense. But how then is it to serve as unifying agent? That is, how, by what motive, will it ever "attach" itself to all intuition and thought? Let us stress that the difficulty rests not with saying that the "I" of the "I think" has no special designation--this is what Husserl maintains as well--but with maintaining that and, further, that it is a purely intellectual "entity", for then it has no inherent link with intuition and thought--it has nothing to "anchor" it to the empirical. According to Husserl the "I" of the "I think" must immediately be related to the sensible. Indeed, if the "I" were a thought, since the "I think" precedes all intuition and thought, it would precede itself; it would make itself possible. Such a "system" could never "get off the ground". The "I think" must be immediately given and secured. For Husserl the "I" is pure, but not without significance, as we shall see.

Kant maintains that the "I" makes experience possible. But Kant is working with a very special concept of experience. By experience Kant means objective thinking, knowledge. "Experience", writes Kant, "is an empirical knowledge..." (CPR 208 [B 218]). Hence, for Kant experience already involves objective categories. Indeed, Kant's "problem" is the possibility of science, i.e., it is "the problem of rational natural science which primarily guides and determines Kant's thinking..." (C 97). But according to Husserl our scientific way of knowing the world is an act of mind "higher up" than
our general experience of the world and is certainly very specialized. Not all experience, in Husserl's opinion, is scientific knowledge. Indeed science itself presupposes a world in which we live, a world thought to be there beforehand. Without this presupposition, science makes no sense and could not advance.

It belongs to what is taken for granted, prior to all scientific thought and all philosophical questioning, that the world is - always is in advance - and that every correction of an opinion, whether an experiential or other opinion, presupposes the already existing world, namely, as a horizon of what in the given case is indubitably valid as existing; and presupposes within this horizon something familiar and doubtlessly certain with which that which is perhaps canceled out as invalid came into conflict. Objective science, too, asks questions only on the ground of this world's existing in advance through prescientific life. Like all praxis, objective science presupposes the being of this world, but it sets itself the task of transposing knowledge which is imperfect and prescientific in respect of scope and constancy into perfect knowledge - in accord with an idea of a correlative which is, to be sure, infinitely distant, i.e., of a world which in itself is fixed and determined and of truths which are idealiter scientific ("truths-in-themselves") and which predicatively interpret this world. To realize this in a systematic process, in stages of perfection, through a method which makes possible a constant advance; this is the task. (C 110-111)

Kant "skips over" this life-world--it is not something he puts to question--and does not consider it in his theory. Kant asks how we can know the world, but by "world" he means the world given by science, a world which presupposes the world of everyday life. Hence Kant's questioning does not take place on the most basic level, and hence his philosophy cannot become a true transcendental philosophy. Kant has the transcendental ego constituting objective (scientific) thought directly--that is, by bypassing life. The transcendental ego Kant
takes to be the pure ego harbours meaning of which Kant is not aware. It harbours meaning of the transcendental ego as living. Kant has, then, purified the ego too readily—and this is not genuine purification. Purifying the transcendental ego means getting at a presuppositionless basis. But one cannot without further ado declare that a certain level of the ego is to be presuppositionless. Meaning must be faced to purify the ego. The pure transcendental ego is the ground of meaning, so meaning must be the guide to the pure transcendental ego; one must, as it were, strip successive layers of meaning. None can be skipped. Since the transcendental ego that Kant considers to be pure implicitly harbours a sense of life, purification must go through the sense of life. This is where Husserl's philosophy differs from Kant's. While "from the start in the Kantian manner of posing questions, the everyday surrounding world of life is presupposed [my emphasis] as existing..." (C 104), Husserl's transcendental philosophy examines this presupposition and the meaning it harbours. Husserl's philosophy is explicitly concerned with the notion of "life", in other words. Indeed, according to Husserl a true transcendental philosophy, then, must take into account "life".

It is the motif of inquiring back into the ultimate source of all the formations of knowledge, the motif of the knower's reflecting upon himself and his knowing life [my emphasis] in which all the scientific structures that are valid for him occur purposefully, are stored up as acquisitions, and have become and continue to become freely available. Working itself out radically, it is the motif of a universal philosophy which is grounded purely in that source and thus ultimately grounded. This source bears the title I-myself, with all my actual and possible knowing life [my emphasis] and, ultimately, my concrete life [my emphasis] in general. The whole transcendental set of
problems circles around the relation of this, my "I" - the "ego" - to what it is at first taken for granted to be - my soul - and, again, around the relation of this ego and my conscious life [my emphasis] to the world of which I am conscious and whose true being I know through my own cognitive structures. (C 97-98)

It is very difficult to express in precise and direct terms Husserl's objection against the way in which Kant conceives of the transcendental ego, because Kant does not directly characterize the transcendental ego. He does not directly characterize the transcendental ego because he maintains that we cannot really have knowledge of it. However, as I shall explain, we indirectly get a sense of how Kant conceives of the transcendental ego from some of his general philosophical presuppositions, notably the following:

(1) Knowledge is marked by certainty, the type of certainty exhibited in judgments of logic (a presupposition he shares with Hume).

(2) Everything in our experience has already been subjected to the objective categories--experience is knowledge, in other words.

(3) We have two representations of ourselves: "'I', as thinking, am an object of inner sense, and am called 'soul', and "that which is an object of outer sense is called 'body'" (CPR 329 [B 400]).

As well, Kant does in a general way describe some aspects of the transcendental ego:

(a) The transcendental ego is the source of the pure categories and hence is the ground of knowledge. In light of (1) above, the transcendental ego is the source of that type of certainty exhibited in judgments of logic, and hence,
(b) The transcendental ego must in some way be like logical objects; it must be pure, "thought-like" and "intellectual" (CPR 378 [B423]; 168 [B 157]; 169 [B 158]; 247 [B 278]).

(c) The transcendental ego is not experienced (CPR 246 [B 277]).

(d) The transcendental ego is the ground of all meaning. This principle expresses Kant's transcendental motive of overcoming all objectivism.

From the above general philosophical principles and characterizations of the transcendental ego, it is clear that how Kant conceives of the transcendental ego is determined by how he conceives of knowledge, certainty and purity. For Kant, as for Hume, the paradigm of this is formal logic. The transcendental ego for Kant is like a logical object (he calls it a judgment CPR 329 [B 399]). Now here we run into a conflict. His way of conceiving of the transcendental ego is determined by his conception of logic. Hence, unless he has a purified concept of logic he will not have a purified concept of the transcendental ego. As long as his concept of logic remains objectivistic, that is, as long as it implicitly harbours meaning constituted by the transcendental ego, his concept of the transcendental ego remains objectivistic. But Kant does not realize that his logic is not a purified logic, that it is objectivistic, that it has a meaning constituted by the transcendental ego. Hence while Kant realizes he "wants" a logic purified by the transcendental motive, he is not working with such a purified logic. Husserl writes:

According to the words, beginning with the definition and throughout the exposition, Kant's logic is presented as a science directed to the subjective - a
science of thinking, which is nevertheless distinguished, as apriori, from the empirical psychology of thinking. But actually, according to its sense, Kant's purely formal logic concerns the ideal formations produced by thinking [my emphasis]. And, concerning them, Kant fails to ask properly transcendental questions of the possibility of cognition. (FTL 260 [230])

And:

As for Kant himself: clearly as he recognized (in the nuclear components of the Aristotelian tradition) the apriori character of logic, its purity from everything pertaining to empirical psychology, and the wrongness of including logic in a theory of experience, he still did not grasp the peculiar sense in which logic is ideal. Otherwise that sense would surely have given him the motive for asking transcendental questions. (FTL 261 [231])

In other words, Kant did not appreciate the extent of the objective nature of logic (FTL 261 [231]), and so did not ask of it transcendental questions (FTL 258-259 [228-229]). According to Husserl, it was an anti-Platonism that prevented Kant from appreciating the objectivity of the ideal objects of logic (FTL 258-259 [228-229]); IK 55), which in turn prevented him from asking transcendental questions concerning logic:

But that [the failure to ask transcendental questions about logic] was because no one ventured, or had the courage to venture, to take the ideality of the formations with which logic is concerned as the characteristic of a separate, self-contained, "world" of ideal objects and, in so doing, to come face to face with the painful question of how subjectivity can in itself bring forth, purely from sources appertaining to its own spontaneity, formations that can be rightly accounted as ideal objects in an ideal "world". (FTL 260-261 [230])

And:

...the definite aim [of purifying logic] could not be attached to the obscure need for logical inquiries directed somehow to the subjective until after that the
ideal Objectivity of such formations had been sharply brought out and firmly acknowledged. For only then was one faced with the intelligibility of how ideal objectivities that originate purely in our own subjective activities of judgment and cognition, that are there originaliter in our field of consciousness purely as formations produced by our own spontaneity, acquire the being-sense of "objects", existing in themselves over against the adventitiousness of the acts and the subjects. (FTL 263-264 [233])

In Husserl's view, then, the transcendental set of problems that Kant applies to judgments of science should have been applied to judgments of logic as well (FTL 264 [233-234]).

Accordingly the transcendental problem that Objective logic (taken no matter how broadly or narrowly) must raise concerning its field of ideal objectivities takes a position parallel to the transcendental problem of the sciences of realities....(FTL 264 [233-234])

And this is what Husserl means by saying that "Kant's Copernican revolution [falls] short of full effectuation..." (FTL 255 [226]); he means that Kant failed to extend the Copernican revolution that he effected in natural science to the realm of logic. Hence, Kant's description of the transcendental ego is based, however implicitly, on a model of an objectivistic logic, and this will not allow him to overcome objectivism. If a transcendental philosophy wants to arrive at the ego without presuppositions it cannot use a model containing presuppositions for its descriptive purposes. The transcendental ego of Kant's philosophy is still an objective ego, for it is conceived on the model of a logic that is something formed by thinking, a "had" meaning. According to Husserl objectivism can only be overcome in life, the start of all meaning.

I mentioned above that in Kant's system the transcendental ego is rendered powerless. If the transcendental ego can neither be known
nor experienced, as Kant maintains (CPR 246 [B277]), then in what sense is it there for us at all? In what way does it exert its influence? But we see that it is Kant's conception of experience that "forces" him to say that the "I" is not experienced. That is, since experience is knowledge for Kant, if he were to say that the "I" of the transcendental unity of apperception is experienced that would mean that it is known. And this would destroy the thrust of his philosophy—it would undermine his "answer" to Hume. If the "I" were known this would mean that it was known before we knew the external world, for the transcendental unity of apperception precedes knowledge of the external world and is its a priori ground or condition. Self-knowledge would then be a condition of knowledge of the world. It would mean that self-knowledge is immediate, while knowledge of the external world, being known only via the former, is mediate. It would mean that we know the self as it is in-itself, for there is nothing between its being and our knowledge of it, but that we would not have knowledge of the object in-itself, for it would always be known mediate via knowledge of the self. But this would imply that there is a "gap" between self-knowledge and knowledge of the world, a gap in need of bridging. This occurs in Descartes' system where self-knowledge is superior to knowledge of the external world, in which the gap is bridged by deducing knowledge of the external world from knowledge of the self. That gap allows for skepticism to creep in, for there is always the possibility of bridging it in a false way— one thinks here of Hume's claim that the objective categories do not apply to the world. Hence for Kant it is important to prove that knowledge
of the world and of the self are given at once, and are of the same status. And indeed in his Refutation of Idealism Kant makes it clear that he does not maintain that the ego is better known than the external world. The same way that we do not have knowledge of objects as they are in themselves, Kant says that we do not have knowledge of self as it is in-itself, i.e., "in the synthetic unity of apperception I am conscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am" (CPR 168 [B 157]). This is why he denies that the "I" is experienced. But this is because Kant is working with a limited concept of experience. Experience and knowledge are the same for Kant, as they are both subject to the objective categories. But according to Husserl there is a level of experience that has not yet been subjected to the objective categories and which is in fact the ground of the latter. The "I" is such an experience, an experience which is pre-objective, and is not knowledge. According to Husserl the "I" refers to an ever present experience. More specifically, it is the living body. Husserl writes that "our living body...is never absent from the perceptual field..." (C 106). Such a position is unthinkable for Kant, for according to him "body" refers to that which is an object of outer sense (CPR 329 [B 400]). But here Kant makes the same mistake that Descartes does. "Body" does not refer to only that which is an object of outer sense, nor mind exclusively to inner sense. "Body" as immediately sensed is subject, not object; "body" is sensing. The body is not given only through outer sense, as when one observes one's hands or hears one's voice for example, but body is also sensed immediately as subject or as "inner" as, for example, when I inhale, blink my eyes,
swallow, when I feel hungry etc. One could not call this sensing an intuition in Kant's sense of the word, for intuition for Kant is of an object, and the above refers not to the sensing of an object, but refers to sensing itself, i.e., to myself as sensing. This "I", then, is not an impression free from empirical admixture; it is an impression of the senses. The "I" refers to a condition, not to an object, viz., the condition of immediate always present feeling or sensation of "inner". Not only is this condition always present, that is, not only is it always "there", but it defines for us our temporal present. This "I" is not an empty thought; it refers to something. Nor is it a pure thought a priori in the mind, but is born within experience; it is made up of and comes from one's experience. All experience is experience of this abiding body; every act of cognition will reflect this position or condition. According to Husserl, "we are concretely in the field of perception, etc., and in the field of consciousness [my emphasis], however broadly conceived, through our living body..." (C 108). This is why Husserl differs radically from Kant. The transcendental ego is not a pure thought for Husserl, but is lived. There can be no question of sense-impressions coming into contact with pure concepts of the transcendental ego. Nor will Husserl say that the transcendental ego "contains" the idea, as I shall explain later in greater detail. The transcendental ego is the pure idea in Husserl's view. But if the transcendental ego is the pure idea, it is also reality. All reality is for the transcendental ego--is relative to the transcendental ego, according to Husserl. The transcendental ego allows for reality. Hence in Husserl's view the transcendental ego is that in which reality
Hence in Husserl's view the transcendental ego is that in which reality and idea are one. While in the philosophies of both Hume and of Kant there was some form of idea-reality split--it will be recalled that there was a judgment-reality split in Hume's philosophy, and a category-sense-impression split in Kant's philosophy--in Husserl's philosophy there is no idea-reality split in any form whatsoever (EJ 330). The idea (the eidetic idea, not the concept) of the object makes for the reality of the object and vice versa. By real object we mean an object we can touch, hear, see, etc. This project of "can do" requires or involves the idea. In turn the idea is of the real object.

Now, the transcendental ego is both arche and telos. Its telos is that of perfect self-awareness. This it could not achieve without the object, for the transcendental ego in itself is "transparent". It follows that the transcendental ego could not be without the idea (and hence reality) of the object. The fact of our living then becomes ground of the transcendental ego. Hence Husserl's claim that phenomenology is description. While Kant has to ground the categories in an ego devoid of experience, for Husserl they are grounded in terms of the life of the transcendental ego; they are grounded in the being and structure of the transcendental ego which is life (life here is not to be confused with Kant's notion of experience). Life, not experience, becomes the ultimate basis of the legitimation of the categories. Saying that for Husserl the transcendental ego is life, in no way denies the "immortality" of the ego. What it does deny, however, is that death can be viewed as the antithesis to life. But this I shall explain in the next chapter.
FOOTNOTES—CHAPTER THREE

1. This is not a position in which all truths are reduced to necessary truths, for it is not the case that one knows everything implicitly from the start. That is, it is not the case that the given in its totality is implicitly known. Rather, what is given contains something implicit which we can make explicit by looking at that which confronts us in the given. Thus the given qua given is not implicit for it truly has the sense "something new for me".

2. As a modern example of objectivism I might mention Nicolai Hartmann's "Gesetz des Gegenstandes der Erkenntnis":

Von hier aus kann man nun...das Gesetz des Gegenstandes der Erkenntnis so formulieren: Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis geht in seinem Gegenstandsein nicht auf, seine Seinsweise ist eine übergegenständliche. Oder auch: er ist, was er ist, unabhängig von seinem Gegenstandsein, er ist es an sich. Darin eben unterscheidet er sich vom Gegenstand des Denkens, des Urteils, der Meinung, der Phantasie. (KS 19)

3. Such an approach would necessitate our becoming involved in so many intricacies of the respective philosophies that it would require an in depth, independent study of each. Obviously that is beyond the scope of the present study. It might be pointed out that according to Husserl all philosophers really aim at the same thought, so strictly speaking Kant "really meant" to achieve phenomenology; that is, according to Husserl all philosophy aims to become phenomenology. But Husserl maintains also that even his own phenomenology is not yet true phenomenology but is striving to become genuine phenomenology. It is interesting to note that Simone Weil as well thinks that all philosophy aims to express the same thought:

One generally sees only conjectures in philosophy. What produces this opinion are the contradictions between the systems and within the system. It is generally believed that each philosophy has a system that contradicts all others. Now, quite far from this being the case, there exists a philosophical tradition that is truly as ancient as humanity and that, one must hope, will last as long as humanity will; from this tradition, as from a common source, are inspired, it is true not all those who call themselves philosophers but several among them, so that their thought is nearly the same. Plato is no doubt the most perfect
representative of this tradition; the Bhagavad-Gita is inspired by the same tradition; and one can easily find Egyptian and Chinese texts that can be named alongside these. In Europe in modern times one must cite Descartes and Kant; among the recent thinkers, Langneau and Alain in France and Husserl in Germany. This philosophic tradition is what we call philosophy. Far from being able to reproach it for its differences, it is one, eternal, and not susceptible to progress. The sole renewal of which it is capable is that of expression, when a man expresses himself to those around him in terms that are related to the conditions of the epoch, the civilization, and the environment in which he lives. It is desirable that such a transformation take place from age to age, and this is the only reason that makes it worth the trouble to write on this subject after Plato wrote...." (SW 406)

4. Spiegelberg, in his Glossary of Phenomenological Terms, "defines" the different levels of constitution in the following manner:

**Constitution, phenomenological:** the act by which an object is built up in consciousness; also what is so constituted 71, 99, 130-131, 706-708

- **active and passive** 130-131
- **transcendental:** constitution originating in transcendental consciousness 130-131

See also **Urkonstitution** (PM 741)

And:

**Urkonstitution**, primal constitution (Husserl): the prime level of constitution, i.e., the constitution of inner time 131 (PM 755)

5. While a radical skepticism is found in Augustine's philosophy, unlike Husserl, St. Augustine does not build his philosophy on that skepticism.

6. Husserl's use of the term "apparently" can be explained as follows. The body as physical object is constituted by the ego through the lived body. The ego is not identical to the physical body it has constituted, and hence in a certain way is an abstraction from the pure physical body. But this claim can be safely made only if it is understood that the ego in the living body constituted the physical body in the first place, and this Descartes does not see.

7. cf. Martin Buber: "So they build their ark or have it built, and they name the ark Weltanschauung, and seal up with pitch not only its cracks but also its windows. But outside are the waters of the living world" (DL 90).
8. The phenomenologist is able to avoid this position because the sense of the world is constituted by the ego according to phenomenology. Hence the ego always has its bond with the world—the ego is always "at" the world.

9. Writes Husserl, "evidence is...related to the whole life of consciousness. Thanks to evidence, the life of consciousness has an all-pervasive teleological structure, a pointedness toward 'reason' and even a pervasive tendency toward it..." (FTL 160 [143]).

10. Although Hume is dealing with various objective categories such as "cause and effect", what is basically at issue is the notion of "object". That is, Hume's claim that there is no necessary connection between cause and effect is basically an expression of his belief that objects do not have essences. Indeed, if objects had essences, the latter would determine the necessity of connections between objects, analogous to the way in which the meanings of ideas determine the necessity of the connection between ideas. In short: if objects had essences their interaction would be essential. Hence the fact that at certain times my argument is framed in terms of "cause and effect", while at other times it is framed in terms of the notion of "object", is not to be taken for a discontinuity in my line of thought. I am addressing fundamentally the same issue.

11. That is, he did not think any of the objective categories, categories used to describe reality, pertained to the ego.

12. Kant follows Hume's transcendental turn, but on the other hand he does not endorse Hume's scepticism (C 97); so, in that sense he does not quite follow Hume's transcendental turn.

13. Very minimally, that which is combined must lie within one and the same understanding.

14. According to Iso Kern, Kant inherited a number of false beliefs of his time (IK 55).

15. This will be explained in chapters four and five.

16. Compare Carnap's words: "the object and the concept are one and the same" (LSW 10).

17. Compare the words of Fichte:

Sensible objects, therefore, exist for you only in consequence of a particular determination of your external senses: you know of them only as a result of your knowledge of this determination of your sight, touch, etc. Your assertion, 'these objects are external to me', depends upon this other - 'I see, hear, feel, and so forth..." (VM 36)
CHAPTER FOUR
The Pure Transcendental Ego, Ground Of Logic And Of Life: Where Psychology And Phenomenology Meet.

In chapter two it was argued that the form of the judgment (S is p) reflects the nature of the transcendental ego, namely, the act of objectification. It was said that objectification is an act of bringing the object to evidence and that the "rule" for doing so is the idea of the object (x with predicates). I also said that this sounds like a form of Kantian idealism: it seems as if Husserl were saying that the judgment involves nominalizing a sense datum (the given 'S'), applying the idea of the object (x with predicates) to this object to get the judgment "S is p". In chapter three I explained how Husserl's position differs from Kant's. While for Kant the transcendental ego somehow "has" the categories, which on coming in contact with sense impressions give rise to experience, for Husserl there is no transcendental ego-sense-impression split, no category-sense-impression split. To have a sense-impression is to experience. For Husserl the transcendental ego is the idea of the object and is also the centre of experience and indeed the centre of life. Logic, then, the study of the judgment, is the study of the transcendental ego, and since the transcendental ego is the centre of experience, logic involves a theory of experience. Judgment, experience and transcendental ego, are all interwoven.

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This is why the theory of the judgment in Husserl's view requires a theory of experience, and indeed a theory of life, since it is always a living subject who experiences. Not only do judgments intentionally refer back to experience, but the reference to experience forms part of the sense of judgment. In other words: to ground logic, the science of judgments, a theory of experience is necessary. Most logicians shun this position for to them it implies a dependency of the judgment on experience, which in turn introduces a subjective factor in logic, for as stated above, it is always a subject who experiences; and that in turn spells the threat of psychologism, the doctrine that denies the objective status of logical laws and objects by reducing them to subjective, psychological, acts. In such a view everything psychic is a real event (an event in space and time), and is to be studied by psychology, an empirical science. Logical psychologism maintains that the laws of logic reflect the way the mind, the human psyche, as a matter of fact works; hence, it reduces logical laws to empirical laws. Describing logical psychologism Husserl writes:

...the Data for logic are real occurrences belonging to the sphere of psychology; and, as such, according to the usual view, they would be unambiguously determined within the universal causal nexus/of the real world and explainable by causal laws.

But this latter point may be left out of consideration. Our main concern here is the equating the formations produced by judging (and then, naturally, of all similar formations produced by rational acts of any other sort) with phenomena appearing in internal experience. This equating is based on their making their appearance "internally", in the act-consciousness itself. Thus concepts, judgments, arguments, proofs, theories, would be psychic occurrences; and logic would be, as John Stuart Mill said it is, a "part, or branch, of psychology." This highly plausible conception is logical psychologism. (FTL 154 [137-138])
Understood this way, logical psychologism is an empiricism, as opposed to rationalism/idealism, which maintains that mind contributes something a priori to experience and knowledge. But here a paradox confronts us. As we discuss below, Husserl charges Kant with psychologism. But Kant's philosophy is generally said to be an idealism. Furthermore, Hume, who believes in the a priori status of logical laws—he unquestioningly takes these to be paradigmatic of knowledge—and who generally is thought to be an empiricist, Husserl labels as an idealist (FTL 166 [148])! But this paradox is resolved once one sees that logical psychologism is but a facet of a broader notion of psychologism.

The extraordinary broadening and, at the same time, radicalizing of the refutation of logical psychologism, which we have effected in the foregoing investigation, have brought us an extreme generalization of the idea of psychologism, in a quite definite— but not the only—sense. Psychologism in this sense is to be distinguished by the circumstance that some species or other of possibly evident objectivities (or even all species, as in the case of Hume's philosophy) are psychologized, because, as is obvious, they are constituted in the manner peculiar to consciousness—that is to say: their being-sense is built up, in and for subjectivity, by experience or other modes of consciousness that combine with experience. That they are "psychologized" signifies that their objective sense, their sense as a species of objects having a peculiar essence, is denied in favor of the subjective mental occurrences, the Data in immanent or psychological temporality...the expression psychologism is more appropriate to any interpretation that converts objectivities into something psychological in the proper sense; and the pregnant sense of psychologism should be defined accordingly. (FTL 169 [151])

Logical psychologism, which rejects logical idealities, is but an aspect of a more generalized psychologism which rejects all idealities.
Whereas logical psychologism rejects a restricted region of Platonic ideas, the broader psychologism rejects an extended region of Platonic ideas, as it were (FTL 166 [148])². That is, the notion of real objects, as Hume realized, also involves idealities, e.g., the idea of identity over time and the idea of substance (FTL 166 [148]). Something is objective, i.e., transcendent to me if it has its own abiding being (identity and substance). If one rejects ideal logical objectivities, that is, if one reduces them to subjective acts, then, if one were consistent, one would reject, i.e., reduce to subjective acts, idealities involved in perception of real objects. Hume rejects the latter type of idealities because there are no sense data corresponding to these ideas, and for Hume the sense datum is the criterion of reality. He considers these ideas fictions. That is why Husserl says that Hume denies the objective status of objects of perception. For Hume real objects make their appearance in mind and are reduced to data of mind—their objective, transcendent status is denied, for he considers the ideas which allow for that status to be fictions. But while Hume reduces idealities involved in perception of real objects to subjective acts, he does not so reduce logical idealities. Logical psychologism is an empiricism—but a psychologism that rejects the idealities of real objects leads to an idealism because the ideal aspects of real experience give real objects their objectivity and hence their reality. That is, acknowledging a real object involves the employment of ideas, such as that of extension, the general idea of object (an x with predicates), and so forth. Hence, strictly speaking, if one were consistent one would reject all
idealities if one rejected any, or make all idealities problematic if one makes any problematic. But if these philosophers are inconsistent it is due to their failure to see that logical and ontological concepts are perfect correlates (see chapter two).

In any case, logicians are generally not sympathetic to psychologism because logic is considered by them to deal not with empirical, but with universal, a priori, laws and objects. When Husserl, as early as the Philosophy of Arithmetic, wanted to ground arithmetic and logic by reference to subjective acts, i.e., by reference to experience, Frege criticized Husserl for propounding a psychologism. But even at that time Husserl denied that he was advancing a psychologism. Husserl's point was and remained that explaining the logical by reference to subjective acts does not automatically imply psychologism. Whether or not psychologism is implied depends on how one conceives of the nature of the subjective act. We need to make clear, then, how Husserl's phenomenology, while advocating a return to a subjective doing in grounding logic, is not a psychologism. In a sense to some extent this has already been done in the preceding chapter, but the issue is so multi-sided that one must examine and deal with various aspects of the issue if one wishes to deal with the issue at all.

Showing that while the laws of logic are generated by mind they are in some way necessary, that is, as Kant does when he shows that the categories are necessary for experience/knowledge to be possible at all, will not in itself overcome psychologism, even though it does tend to lend to logical laws some necessity. Saying that the logical laws
are necessary for experience/knowledge to be possible does not make them truly a priori, for they could still have been generated by the empirical psyche. The laws will not be a priori unless that from which they are generated is truly a priori. That is, since something a priori cannot come from something empirical, that from which the laws are generated must be a priori through and through; there can be no factual/empirical "residue". To show that logical laws are generated from "mind", and are truly a priori, one needs to show that mind is truly a priori. Logical laws must be grounded in a structure which in no way is the empirical psyche. This means that mind, that from which logical laws are generated, must be necessary not in terms of something extrinsic to it--experience/knowledge in Kant's system can be said to be extrinsic to logical laws because the categories are prior to experience--but in terms of its own being. Mind must be absolutely a priori; its being must be necessary. Husserl, claiming that he has overcome psychologism, "accuses" Kant of failing to do so, and it remains for us to determine in this and the next chapter how Husserl differs from Kant on this issue--how, although Husserl maintains that logic needs a theory of experience, he is not propounding a psychologism. This will involve two overlapping aspects: (i) showing how certain phenomena associated with the concept of life which seem to threaten the necessary and absolute status of the transcendental ego in fact are compatible with the absolute, pure, status of the latter, and (ii) showing in what way mind is necessary in terms of its own being without destroying facticity.
I have, then, differentiated phenomenology from previous philosophies and specifically from realism and idealism by the fact that phenomenology acknowledges both ideal and real objectivities as well as their essential interrelatedness. According to Husserl the ideal and real, or eidos and fact, respectively, mutually imply one another. On this Husserl differs from the realists and from such idealists as Kant, in that the former deny objectivity of the ideal while Kant maintains the eidos to be "separate" from the fact. The essential relation of the eidos and fact is a core point of phenomenology. I have already suggested that this relation corresponds to the transcendental ego. The transcendental ego is the idea and the fact of the object, according to Husserl. But "object" is given via the body, via kinesthesis, the "states" whereby I hold sway in the body (C 107). Without kinesthesis one would not have, according to Husserl, a concept of object. As Dorion Cairns writes:

Husserl proceeded to develop his idea of kinaesthesis. The constitution of an object in perception depends not only on a certain Verlauf (course, flow) of sensational-hyletic data, but also upon a certain correlation with a certain type of kinaesthesis. Kinaesthesis differs from Empfindung (sensation) by having an intimate relation to subjective potentiality. The "I can" works directly on or with kinaesthesis, and brings about sensational and hence objective changes only indirectly. The identity of an object depends on a certain relation to the "ich kann" (I can). I asked Husserl whether, if, were it impossible for the body to have a reflex perception to itself (one hand touch the other, the eye see the hand, etc.) there would then be the possibility of the constitution of a world, or of a body. If, e.g., our only sense organ was an eye, would we have any sort of world? He answered no. (CHF 3-4)

Indeed, fact and eidos are one in the living body, and it is the living body that is the transcendental ego in Husserl's view. I have said
that Husserl differs in this respect from Kant. For Husserl, unlike Kant, the transcendental ego is *lived*; the transcendental ego is the lived-body (subject-object) for Husserl:

"Life" is also, and no less, the transcendally reduced subjectivity that is the source of all objectifications. Husserl calls 'life' that which he emphasizes as his own achievement in his critique of the objectivist naivete of all previous philosophy. It consists, in his eyes, in having revealed the unreality of the customary epistemological controversy between idealism and realism and, instead, in having thematized the inner relation between subjectivity and objectivity. This is the reason for his phrase 'productive life'. "The radical contemplation of the world is the systematic and pure interior contemplation of the subjectivity, which expresses itself in the "exterior". It is as with the unity of a living organism, which we can certainly examine and analyse from the outside, but can understand only if we go back to its hidden roots...". Thus also the intelligibility of the subject's attitude to the world does not reside in conscious experiences and their intentionality, but in the anonymous 'productions' of life. The metaphor of the organism that Husserl employs here is more than a metaphor. As he expressly states, he wants to be taken literally. (TM 200)

But this poses several problems. If logic is grounded in the transcendental ego, the "subjective-relative' a priori of the life world" (C 140-141), then logic is grounded in the lived-body, since the transcendental ego is the lived-body. But the body is the seat of desires, and as Freud tells us, thought closely related to the body is not subject to the laws of non-contradiction, and is not subject to objective time. An observation of our dreams confirms this. In other words, thought closely related to the body is not subject to the structure of objective thought. Does this mean that the "universal prelogical a priori through which everything logical, the total edifice of objective theory in all its methodological forms, demonstrates its
legitimate sense and from which, then, all logic itself must receive its norms" (C 141) is itself essentially illogical, perhaps even determined by desire? Furthermore, I have said that according to Husserl the transcendental ego is absolute, a priori (C 28), and that the transcendental ego must be absolutely a priori if psychologism is to be overcome. But I have also said that the transcendental ego is the lived-body. The body perishes; it is subject to death. Does this violate the claim regarding the absolute a priori status of the transcendental ego, which as absolutely a priori, and non-factual, cannot perish? But neither can Husserl maintain, as a large segment of the philosophical tradition does, that the absolute subjective a priori is an eternal soul that leaves the body at death, for as discussed previously in Husserl's view the eidos always implies the fact and so cannot exist independently of the fact. How then are we to conceive of the absolute subjective a priori, the absolute transcendental ego? Its relation to the factual seems on the one hand to threaten its truly a priori status, yet without the factual relation it becomes something mythical. These are pressing questions for transcendental phenomenology. If phenomenology is to be legitimate then it must both tell us something and be true to the phenomena. There is yet another phenomenon that challenges the claim that the transcendental ego is absolute Being, viz., the phenomenon of experiencing another human being. If the transcendental ego is absolute Being, then how can there be "room" for other selves, since these would presumably all be absolute Beings? The problems of life and death, of the body, and of other selves are, then, not merely peripheral problems for
phenomenology, but core problems. They severely put to test the claim that the transcendental ego is pure, absolute, Being. A successful treatment of these problems by phenomenology will determine its viability. Ricoeur has said, for example, that the problem of other selves is the "touchstone for the success or failure not only of phenomenology but also of the implicit philosophy of phenomenology" (HAP 195). More specifically, the claim that the transcendental ego is pure yet the centre of life needs to be explained if psychologism is to be avoided in Husserl's phenomenology.

What I am really asking here is how to conceive of the absolute transcendental ego. Husserl warns us that here the conceptual difficulties are the greatest, for we are asking for the most radical ground of being-sense. Speaking about delving into the absolute, transcendental, realm, Husserl writes:

Nevertheless, these are the slightest difficulties compared to those which have their ground in the essence of the new dimension [the truly transcendental] and its relation to the old familiar field of life. Nowhere else is the distance so great from unclearly arising needs to goal-determined plans, from vague questionings to first working problems - through which actual working science first begins. Nowhere else is it so frequent that the explorer is met by logical ghosts emerging out of the dark, formed in the old familiar and effective conceptual patterns, as paradoxical antinomies, logical absurdities. Thus nowhere is the temptation so great to slide into logical aporetics and disputation, priding oneself on one's scientific discipline, while the actual substratum of the work, the phenomena themselves, is forever lost from view. (C 120)

At this juncture nothing is so crucial as clear vision, the only means of remaining true to the phenomena:
...how great the temptation is, here, to misunderstand oneself and how much—indeed, ultimately, the actual success of a transcendental philosophy—depends upon self-reflective clarity carried to its limits. (C 153)

The first thing to realize is that although the lived-body is the transcendental ego, it is not the absolute transcendental ego. The lived-body is what Husserl calls the concrete transcendental ego, and it is a "fact" related to an eidos. The individual's stream of experience or life is but a factual instance of the eidos transcendental ego, and it is in fact constituted by the latter. The eidos transcendental ego is the absolute transcendental ego.

After the significant formulation of the idea of a transcendental phenomenology according to the eidetic method, when we return to the task of discovering the problems of phenomenology, we naturally confine ourselves thenceforth within the limits of a purely eidetic phenomenology, in which the de facto transcendental ego [my emphasis] and particular data given in transcendental experience of the ego have the significance merely of examples of pure possibilities [my emphasis]. (CM 73 [107])

And:

The eidos itself is a beheld or beholdable universal, one that is pure, "unconditioned"—that is to say: according to its own intuitional sense, a universal not conditioned by any fact....each singly selected type is thus elevated from its milieu within the empirically factual transcendental ego [my emphasis] into the pure eidetic sphere....In other words: With each eidetically pure type we find ourselves, not indeed inside the de facto ego, but inside an eidos ego; and constitution of one actually pure possibility among others carries with it implicitly, as its outer horizon, a purely possible ego, a pure possibility-variant of my de facto ego. We could have started out by imagining this ego to be freely varied, and could set the problem of exploring eidetically the explicit constitution of any transcendental ego whatever....Therefore, if we think of a phenomenology developed as an intuitively apriori science purely according to the eidetic method, all its eidetic researches are nothing else but uncoverings of the /
all-embracing eidos, transcendental ego as such, which comprises all pure possibility-variants of my de facto ego and this ego itself qua possibility. Eidetic phenomenology, accordingly, explores the universal Apriori without which neither I nor any transcendental Ego whatever is "imaginable".... (CM 71-72 [105-106])

And:

How can we make it more concretely understandable that the reduction of mankind to the phenomenon of "mankind", which is included as part of the reduction of the world, makes it possible to recognize mankind as a self-objectification of the transcendental subjectivity which is always functioning ultimately and is thus "absolute"? (C 153)

In other words, the concrete transcendental ego, the living human being which is an instance of the essence "mankind", is a self-objectification of the eidos transcendental ego (C 186). It is only the eidos which is absolute. But this notion of the eidos being absolute is very difficult to conceptualize. That is, I explained earlier how for Husserl the eidos always implies the fact. This holds in the case of the eidos transcendental ego also: the eidos transcendental ego implies the factual transcendental ego. It would be more accurate to say, then, that the absolute transcendental ego is a relation of the eidos transcendental ego and the factual transcendental ego. In other words, the pure transcendental ego in a sense "contains" the concrete transcendental ego and the empirical psyche "within" it. What is fundamentally at issue in grasping the relation of the pure transcendental ego to the concrete transcendental ego and the empirical ego is Husserl's understanding of how pure subjectivity relates to objective elements, for the concrete transcendental ego and the empirical ego are self-objectifications of the pure transcendental ego
Gadamer describes the special way in which Husserl understands this relation of subjectivity to its objective elements, and it accords with the description I give above.

What Husserl means, however, is that we cannot conceive subjectivity as an antithesis to objectivity, because this concept of subjectivity would itself be conceived in objective terms. Instead, his transcendental phenomenology seeks to be 'correlational research'. But this means that the relation between subjectivity and objectivity is the primary thing, and the poles into which it forms itself are contained within it, just as what is alive contains all its expressions of life in the unity of its organic being [my emphasis]. (TM 220)

But this relation between the transcendental and factual or empirical is difficult to conceptualize. One of the most common tendencies is to conceive of the transcendental as being the "true" realm, as being real being, and to conceive of the empirical as the "false" realm. But this would be wrong. As Merleau-Ponty cautions:

The relationship between the natural and the transcendental attitudes are not simple, are not side by side or sequential, like the false or the apparent or the true. (S 164-165)

The reduction which yields the transcendental was meant to understand objectivity (C 189); it was not meant to downgrade as fake objectivity or objective thought.

Objective truth belongs exclusively within the attitude of natural human world-life. In the reorientation of the epoche nothing is lost, none of the interests and ends of world-life, and thus also none of the ends of knowledge. But for all these things their essential subjective correlates are exhibited, and thus the full and true ontic meaning of objective being, and thus of all objective truth, is set forth. (C 176)

The transcendental and the empirical are essentially related for Husserl. They cannot be reduced to each other. If the
transcendental were the "true" and the factual the "false", Husserl would be advancing an idealism. But recall, he criticized Kant for "splitting" the transcendental, i.e., the a priori, and the factual.

...we must not treat the transcendental Ego as the true subject and the empirical self as its shadow or wake. If that were their relationship to each other, we could withdraw into the constituting agency....(PhP 426)

The pure transcendental ego implies the factual transcendental ego. But the pure transcendental ego is also implied by the factual transcendental ego. The transcendental ego, the pure eidos transcendental ego, is the ground of the concrete transcendental ego. Indeed, if the concrete transcendental ego really is "Human subjectivity also possesses being-value" writes Gadamer (TM 216)--then it must be thinkable, for everything that is has an identity over time. But that means it must have an eidos, for the eidos is that which allows an object to be thought, to have identity over time (EJ 341). That means that the concrete transcendental ego is a fact vis a vis an eidos. We must note that there are three "divisions" or "stratifications" of the ego. In addition to the pure transcendental ego and the concrete transcendental ego, which is factual with respect to the eidos, there is the concrete factual psyche with its corresponding eidos. That is, the concrete transcendental ego, the lived-body, has necessarily correlated with it factual, objective psycho-physical phenomena, such as phenomena of desire, repression, alienation, and so forth, which are usually studied by empirical psychology.

To the concrete transcendental ego there corresponds then the human Ego, concretely as the psyche taken
purely in itself and [as it is] for itself, with the psychic polarization: I as pole of my habitualities, the properties comprised in my character. Instead of my eidetic transcendental phenomenology we then have an eidetic pure psychology, relating to the eidos psyche, whose eidetic horizon, to be sure, remains unexamined. If, however, it did become examined, the way to overcome this positivity would become open—that is, the way leading over into absolute phenomenology, the phenomenology of the transcendental ego, who indeed no longer has a horizon that could lead beyond the sphere of his transcendental being and thus relativize him. (CM 73 [107])

All these are essentially interrelated, and must be understood relationally. They imply each other. This means that the lived-body, the concrete transcendental ego with its concrete psyche, must be a function of the pure transcendental ego.

The universal Apriori pertaining to a transcendental ego as such is an eidetic form, which contains an infinity of forms, an infinity of apriori types of actualities and potentialities of life, along with the objects constitutable in a life as objects actually existing. (CM 74 [108])

Life must be understood in relation to the pure transcendental ego. Hence, the concrete psychological phenomena must be shown to be understandable in terms of the pure transcendental ego and vice versa. In other words: to get at the pure transcendental ego we cannot merely posit an empty pure transcendental ego, but we must go through the lived-body with its objective correlates. This is not something Kant did—he "skipped" the life world—but only in this way does one avoid positing the transcendental ego as a mythical entity (C 153), for the lived phenomena are evidence for the transcendental ego. Because the concrete objective phenomena correlated with the lived body are to be evidence of the absolute transcendental ego, Husserl says that
**psychology** is the decisive field (C 203, 208) for transcendental phenomenology.

Psychology is constantly involved in this great process of development, involved, as we have seen, in different ways; indeed, psychology is the truly decisive field [n.: i.e., decisive for the struggle between subjectivism and objectivism]. For by beginning as objective science and then becoming transcendental, it bridges the gap. (C 208)

So, even if we can see that the concrete transcendental ego implies the pure transcendental ego, still we must show how the latter is the ground of the former. This means that phenomenology must be able to discuss the pure transcendental ego's relation to the concrete transcendental ego, of which the factual or empirical psyche is a "component". It must be able to explain how the pure transcendental ego involves the concrete transcendental ego, including life and death, if it is truly to deal with psychologism. I shall deal with these issues in the remainder of the chapter.

The absolute transcendental ego *is* a correlation between the eidos transcendental ego and the fact of the transcendental ego, the lived-body. In other words: the body as fact is not radically separate from the pure transcendental ego, but is necessarily "part" of its being. I will say more about this relation of the pure transcendental ego and lived-body and between psychology and pure transcendental phenomenology in the next pages, but I must show now how the pure transcendental ego's essential relatedness to the lived-body does not threaten its absolute status, despite the fact that the body is subject to death. If the pure transcendental ego is a correlation between the factual and eidetic transcendental ego, then the factual
transcendental ego, the lived-body, forms a part or an aspect of the pure transcendental ego. But the factual transcendental ego is not only life; it is also death. Death too is an aspect of the concrete transcendental ego. That is, life, whatever else it involves, involves movement, growth and decay, all of which could not occur without death. Death, as it were "makes room for" life. In that sense life implies death, feeding off death, and at the same time overcoming it. I think this is what Freud means when he says life aims at death (GS 160). Not only does death not destroy the being of the pure transcendental ego, but it "ensures" its being, for death allows for the facticity of the concrete transcendental ego which forms part of the pure transcendental ego. The position I wish to express is quite similar to that of Buber in Daniel:

My existence was no rolling ball that I could think of as stopping somewhere or preferably being thrown further. It was the bed in which two streams, coming from opposite directions, flowed to and in and over each other....What I knew was the stream coursing downward alone, but what I was comprehended the upward one...coming-to-be and passing-away, these two did not alternate with each other like building up and breaking down; they lay side by side in endless embrace, and each of my moments was their bed. It was foolish to limit death to any particular moments of ceasing to be or of transformation; it was an ever-present might and the mother of being. Life engendered being, death received and bore it; life scattered its fullness, death preserved what it wished to retain. (DL 130-131 [66])

This means that death, being part of the factual transcendental ego, is something for the pure transcendental ego and is included in the epoche (C 188). It must be appreciated, however, that in maintaining death to be something for the transcendental ego, Husserl
is not in any way denying the reality of death. Death is a reality for the pure transcendental ego, and by including "death" in the epoche Husserl means only that its meaning must be phenomenologically clarified. Nor does he maintain that at death "I" become, or withdraw into, the pure transcendental ego, the immortal soul. We can never withdraw into the pure transcendental ego. In other words, he does not maintain that death brings the onset of our real being and that life, being only apparent or false being, is inferior to death. Such a position would tend to preach abstinence in life and encourage a turning away from life, for it would see death as superior to life. But this is not Husserl's position. Husserl's position is, rather, in accord with that of Nietzsche when the latter criticizes philosophies that preach superiority of death with their concomitant denial of life (Z I, 21). At death we do not withdraw into the pure transcendental ego according to Husserl's position. Death is not superior to life. But neither is it inferior. Life and death are on a par, as it were. Death is as much a part of our Being as life. Hence we must embrace both fully. That is not to say that Husserl denies immortality. Indeed not: "the spirit alone is immortal" writes Husserl (C 299). Rather, it is to say that he denies immortality in the "conventional" sense. Saying that death is part of the absolute transcendental ego's Being is to affirm immortality. But since death is not superior to life in Husserl's view, it brings no automatic guarantee of something, a promised heaven, beyond life. This position is again similar to Buber's in Daniel:
Life engendered being, death received and bore it; life scattered its fullness, death preserved what it wished to retain. And this certitude was not unholy; it was, indeed, no feeling of being secure in any certainty [my emphasis] but the unarmed trust in the infinite. (DL 131 [66])

And:

Is what we call death, therefore, perhaps the way? To think that is senseless; what life did not accomplish, death too will not produce. (DL 131 [67])

In other words, belief in immortality cannot take away from our responsibility here in life. We must still do something, and what we do will make a difference (C 17, 338). One recalls the words of Fichte:

You are here, not for idle contemplation of yourself, or for brooding over devout sensations - no, you are here for action; your action, and your action alone, determines your worth. (VM 84)

In this sense Husserl is also in agreement with Heidegger. Amstutz writes that according to Heidegger, "Der Mensch ist vom Sein mit gewaltigen Aufgaben betraut..." (MSU 8). But the question is, what must we do?

As they [life and death] work in me - through me - I listen, I am aware, I ask: what is the command? (DL 132 [67])

The answer: embrace our full being.

...what follows this is the ultimate self-understanding of man as being responsible for his own human being: his self-understanding as being called to a life of apodicticity, not only in abstractly practicing apodictic science in the usual sense but [as being mankind] which realizes its whole concrete being [my emphasis] in apodictic freedom by becoming apodictic mankind in the whole active [my emphasis] life of its reason – through which it is human; as I said, mankind understanding itself as rational, understanding that is rational in seeking to be rational; that this signifies an infinity of living [my emphasis] and striving
towards reason...that reason allows for no differentiation into "theoretical," "practical," "aesthetic" or whatever; that human being is teleological being and an ought-to-be, and that this teleology holds sway in each and every activity and project of an ego [my emphasis]... (C 340-341)

Husserl's concept of immortality is one that demands that we live and die to the fullest. In this respect Husserl's dictum is that of Nietzsche. Once again there is also a similarity with Buber's position:

You cannot know it [the unity that bears life and death] otherwise than when you take upon yourself the tension of life and death and live through the life and death of the world as your life and death. (DL 144 [76])

Our responsibility is to live and die to the fullest. But to do that we must know what we are, for humans have the freedom to shape themselves, to actualize their potential nature (C 340f). In the words of Buber:

Now I know for certain, destroying and shaping, they create my being, make out of what I actually am an essential being...the unity that this creating commands and leads, that which bears life and death in right and left hand, that holy sea I want to know. I do not wish to grasp what is outside me, but I long to behold what I am. (DL 132 [67])

And:

Once they still appeared to me as boundaries, succeeding each other in service or play, these two satisfied me by their duality...it has now become otherwise. Since these two are no longer boundaries but are in each other, since they are no longer over me but rule in me, an alternating movement no longer satisfies me; they drove me to penetrate behind them into the infinite that bears them both. (DL 132 [67])

We must see what we are if we are to actively fulfill the dictate of our being, if we are to be true to our nature and fulfill our potential.
Hence it is important to know what we, in our subjectivity, are. In this respect Husserl's philosophy is similar to that of Heidegger. Amstutz writes that according to Heidegger,

Für uns Menschen geht es vor dem Sein selber, dem "Abgrund", dem Grund aller Gründe, vor Gott einzig darum, "ob wir und wie wir, die Sätze dieses Spiels hörend [Gottes "Lautenspiel"], mitspielen und uns in das Spiel fügen" (S. 188). (MSU 6)

I shall show in the chapter on intersubjectivity that our essence, again as in the case of Heidegger, involves an ethical dimension—the task is an ethical one. In his article describing the philosophy of Heidegger, Amstutz writes:

Darin nun, dass das Sein den Menschen beauftragt liegt verborgen eine vollständige Ethik. (MSU 6)

It is important, then, to know what we in our subjectivity are. And this brings us to the question of the relation of the pure transcendental ego and life, for although I have argued that death does not threaten the pure transcendental ego's being, still we need to grasp the relation between the transcendental ego and life. Husserl, following Brentano, maintains that our essence is intentionality. It is that which differentiates psychic phenomena, which are generally taken to constitute our subjectivity, from material phenomena. But we must understand the depth of intentionality for it to be the significant concept it was meant to be, and we can do so only if we appreciate its relatedness to life. A correct grasp of self, of subjectivity qua subjectivity, of pure subjectivity, means grasping intentionality vis-à-vis life. According to Husserl, if we fail to see intentionality as a concept related to life we fall into an idealism or
psychologism of the Kantian sort. But the concept of life has proved to be notoriously troublesome for philosophies which sought to describe pure subjectivity. This is so because life involves the body and body is not usually considered to be part of pure subjectivity. That is, pure subjectivity is generally thought to be mind (soul/spirit) or thought, which, although "in" the body, is nevertheless distinct from the latter. The body is material; mind immaterial. It seems as if the biological/physical has its own motivation, structure, laws, etc., and thought its own. Life is biological, psycho-physical; it is growth, desire, sexuality and decay. It seems to have a wellspring distinct from that of thought. The body is studied by empirical sciences, which are generally held to be subject to a methodology distinct from that used to study pure subjectivity. There is a conceptual tension here that is of great significance. On the one hand intuition tells us that life is that which is truly subjective, for life can only be seen from "within"--it is the subjective par excellence.

What is alive can never really be known by the objective consciousness, by the effort of understanding which seeks to penetrate the law of appearances. What is alive is not such that a person could ever grasp it from outside, in its living quality. The only way of grasping life is, rather, to become inwardly aware of it. (TM 223-224)

But on the other hand, life, as I said, involves the body, which is usually not considered as pure subjectivity. Indeed, philosophies of subjectivity, philosophies of mind, have not generally been able to meet the speculative demands contained in the concept of life. We may recall, for example, Aristotle's critique of Plato's theory of Ideas (see pp. 43 ff. above). In Plato, pure subjectivity, the soul, is like
the Ideas. Yet the theory of Ideas could not, according to Aristotle, deal with the phenomena of life, with, specifically, the phenomena of movement, growth and decay. The Ideas are static and eternal, whereas life is dynamic.

But the same critique cannot be levelled against Husserl. In Husserl's system life already involves the Idea, the eidos. That is why, according to Husserl, any objective science concerned with life can lead to pure transcendental phenomenology. Any study of life by any of the empirical sciences, whether biology, ecology, psychology or physiology, can reveal the eidos by the essential fact-eidos relation. Hence, any such empirical science can become a pure phenomenology, if it is led to the source of this relation: pure subjectivity. But of all the empirical sciences psychology, which also includes as its subject matter bodily phenomena such as the unconscious, desire, sexuality, etc., is most likely to lead to pure subjectivity, for it already "makes the psychic, the specifically subjective...its chief theme" (FTL 38 [33-34]). Husserl maintains, as I mentioned before, that psychology is the decisive field for overcoming the subject-object dichotomy in pure subjectivity. The nature of the relation between intentionality and life can be clearly brought out by examining this relation between psychology and pure transcendental phenomenology.

According to Husserl, true psychology is pure transcendental phenomenology. Let us note carefully the claim here. True psychology, which studies the body in its psychosomatic aspects (desire, sexuality, etc.) is pure phenomenology. It should not surprise us that we must go through an "empirical" discipline in order to see the pure
transcendental ego, for the pure transcendental ego, being transparent, cannot be seen directly but must be seen through its objects.

Yet not withstanding these peculiar complications with all "its" experiences, the experiencing Ego is still nothing that might be taken for itself and made into an object of inquiry on its own account. Apart from its "ways of being related" or "ways of behaving," it is completely empty of essential components, it has no content that could be unravelled, it is in and for itself indescribable: pure Ego and nothing further. (I 214 [160])

But the claim that Husserl is making here is stronger, viz., that pure psychology is pure transcendental phenomenology, and that claim may come as a surprise. Indeed, let us reflect on the full implications of this assertion. It means that pure psychology is also pure transcendental logic, since pure phenomenology is pure transcendental logic.

The surprising result of our investigation can also, it seems, be expressed as follows: a pure psychology as positive science, a psychology which would investigate universally the human beings living in the world as real facts in the world, similarly to other positive sciences (both sciences of nature and humanistic disciplines), does not exist. There is only a transcendental psychology, which is identical with transcendental philosophy. (C 257)

And:

Thus pure psychology itself is identical with transcendental philosophy as the science of transcendental subjectivity. This is unassailable. (C 258)

And:

...thus pure psychology is and can be nothing other than what was sought earlier from the philosophical point of view as absolutely grounded philosophy, which can fulfill itself only as phenomenological transcendental philosophy. (C 259)
But this only proves that the transcendental ego in Husserl's view is not divorced from the concrete, from life, that it is not merely an empty (formal) structure "von oben her". In fact, it is because the Cartesian way into phenomenology posits a pure, as if empty, transcendental ego that Husserl dislikes the Cartesian way into phenomenology. (Although I show in the next chapter, on pp. 229 ff., that, contra Carr, in certain respects the Cartesian way is indispensable to phenomenology.)

...the "Cartesian Way"...has a great shortcoming: while it leads to the transcendental ego in one leap, as it were, it brings this ego into view as apparently empty of content, since there can be no preparatory explication; so one is at a loss, at first, to know what has been gained by it, much less how, starting with this, a completely new sort of fundamental science, decisive for psychology, has been attained. (C 155)

If the transcendental ego is not understood via its correlate, the concrete, then its significance will not be understood; the concept of the transcendental ego will be uninformative, and the whole enterprise of phenomenology will have lost its purpose, its raison d'être. Hence Husserl would disagree with Ricoeur when the latter maintains that "the reflecting philosopher cannot go beyond abstract or negative statements" and that the propositions the reflecting philosopher generates "are true, but lifeless" (CI 242). Transcendental phenomenology must in its purity be able to adequately handle the concrete, because it is a descriptive science, a science of what is. In Husserl's view it is correct to say, I think, that the pure transcendental ego must be understood through the concrete.
The empty generality of the epoche does not of itself clarify anything; it is only the gate of entry through which one must pass in order to be able to discover the new world of pure subjectivity. The actual discovery is a matter of concrete, extremely subtle and differentiated work. (C 257)

The transcendental ego runs through all of life and all mental accomplishments. It is that

which is taken for granted, which is presupposed by all thinking, all activity of life with all its ends and accomplishments....(C 113)

Hence, we can in principle infer the transcendental from any empirical, i.e., objective, science. Although Husserl frequently says that pure transcendental phenomenology is transcendental logic and he does derive pure phenomenology from traditional logic, which in its traditional embodiment is also an objective science, it must not be thought that this is the only way into phenomenology (FTL 7 [7]). In the Crisis he suggests how to enter phenomenology via psychology. Both have their pros and cons as an entrance way. On the other hand, it is "safer" to proceed via logic, in that logic deals with the universal and aims at a purity (formality) that phenomenology aims at as well. The path of logic shows more readily than the path of psychology that the transcendental ego is necessary for any meaning, for any science, and shows the essential connection between meaning and science and the life-world. The way of logic also reveals formal ontology, which in turn allows one to see the relation between the transcendental ego and all being. The reduction is in fact only truly radical via ontology, because it reveals transcendental subjectivity as the constituting source of all Being, both possible and actual. The shortcoming, however, is that since we are dealing with meaning (science) and
knowledge, the connection between the transcendental ego and our concrete selves, may not be clear, or may be missed altogether. To reveal that connection the path of psychology is more advantageous. Following that path shows the transcendental ego to be necessary for explaining concrete psychological phenomena. But the path of psychology, on the other hand, may fail to show the universality of the findings. It may not be apparent that the transcendental ego is necessary for any thought whatsoever; its enormous impact for mind in general may not be understood. That phenomenology studies mind qua mind, qua possibility, may not be clear, and if that is not clear, the impact for science (knowledge), for logic and for ethics will not be appreciated. This may be overlooked because the psychologist tends to focus on minds (psyches) in the world. While the psychologist necessarily must carry out the epoche (C 251-252), he or she may not carry the epoche to its extreme; that is, to the discovery of the pure transcendental ego.

Both a true psychology and phenomenology, then, end up, according to Husserl, with the pure, absolute, transcendental ego, the ground of all being-sense. If this is true, then we should be able to show this concretely: we should be able to take a psychology and show the theory of intentionality to be at its core. I shall next concretely work out the connection between psychology and phenomenology. At the same time I will thereby work out the relation of the transcendental ego to life.

But which psychology should we work with? I think Husserl would say any that is true to the "facts", to the phenomena:
If empiricism had done more honour to its name by being thus [i.e., by being empirical] it could never have missed the phenomenological reduction, its descriptions would never have led it to data and complexes of data, and the spiritual world, in its own specificity and infinite totality, would not have remained closed.11 (C 249)

In other words, to develop a true psychology, we must become astute observers of the human psyche. One must "learn to see" (C 248). One psychology that has developed out of a shrewd observation of human nature is Freudian psychology. This is an auspicious psychological doctrine to relate to pure transzendental phenomenology, for it deals with what is most problematic for a philosophy that considers consciousness to be the foundation of all being-sense, viz., desire rooted in biological life. Some philosophers, such as Paul Ricoeur, consider Freud's findings concerning the unconscious to contradict phenomenology's basic tenet regarding the absolute status of consciousness. Writes Ricoeur:

The contemporary philosopher meets Freud on the same ground as Nietzsche and Marx. All three rise before him as protagonists of suspicion who rip away masks and pose the novel problem of the lie of consciousness and consciousness as a lie. This problem cannot remain just one among many, for what all three generally and radically put into question is something that appears to any good phenomenologist as the field, foundation, and very origin of any meaning at all: consciousness itself. (CI 99)

And:

[Psychoanalytic theory] is an antiphenomenology which requires, not the reduction to consciousness, but the reduction of consciousness. (CI 237)

According to Ricoeur, then, not only is this psychology not phenomenology, it even contradicts it. According to Ricoeur, Freudian psychology challenges any philosophy of the cogito by maintaining that
"consciousness is not the principle, not the judge, not the measure of all things..." (CI 238). In taking psychoanalytic theory as our example for demonstrating that pure psychology is pure phenomenology, then, our challenge is a double one, for not only is the connection between psychology and phenomenology not clear, but it seems threatened.

I have said that Freudian psychology deals with desire rooted in biological life, and I have already explained that the concept of life has been notoriously problematic for a philosophy of the subject. But let us note how Freud conceives of life. Even as a non-purified science, Freudian psychology shows that life essentially involves ideas. Freud saw that every drive or instinct is essentially ideational, that human biological life is essentially significant. According to Freud, the two main instincts of life are Thanatos, the death instinct, and Eros, libido [EI 224]). From the following quotations it is clear that Freud considers these as being essentially ideational, and in fact he understands and "defines" life in terms of an opposition of ideas:

Starting from speculations on the beginning of life and from biological parallels, I drew the conclusion that, besides the instinct to preserve living substance and to join into ever larger units, there must exist another, contrary instinct seeking to dissolve those units and to bring them back to their primal, inorganic state. That is to say, as well as Eros there was an instinct of death. The phenomena of life could be explained from the concurrent or mutually opposing action of these two instincts. (CD 65)

And:

I may now add that civilization is a process in the service of Eros, whose purpose is to combine single
human individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and nations, into one great unity, the unity of mankind. Why this happens, we do not know; the work of Eros is precisely this. (CD 69)

Note how Freud describes Eros, life, which is bodily as a tendency to join living substance into ever larger units, and Thanatos as the opposite tendency. These forces are ideational, and life, Freud tells us here, can be explained from the concurrent or mutually opposing action of these instincts.

It follows that an individual's sexuality, being a manifestation of Eros, is essentially ideational. Indeed, in Freud's theory sexual behaviour is essentially meaningful. According to this psychological doctrine, the body is meaningful in its being, in its life. But according to Freud cognitive being, the ego, is at the service of life, for the ego is a manifold aspect of the id, and self-preservation, which is part of Eros, belongs to the ego as well. It follows that the ego too will essentially be related to the basic ideas and instincts that make up Eros and Thanatos.

...the ego is subject to the influence of the instincts, too, like the id, of which it is in fact only a specifically modified part. (EI 223)

And:

It [Eros or the sexual instincts] comprises not merely the uninhibited sexual instinct proper and the impulses of a sublimated or aim-inhibited nature derived from it, but also the self-preservative instinct, which must be assigned to the ego....(EI 224)

And:

It seems a plausible view that this neutral displaceable energy, which is probably active alike in the ego and in the id, proceeds from the narcissistic reservoir of libido, i.e., that it desexualized Eros. (The erotic instincts appear to be altogether more
plastic, more readily diverted and displaced than the destructive instincts.) From this we can easily go on to assume that this displaceable libido is employed in the service of the pleasure-principle to obviate accumulations and to facilitate discharge....If this displaceable energy is desexualized libido, it might also be described as sublimated energy; for it would still retain the main purpose of Eros - that of uniting and binding - in so far as it helped towards establishing that unity, or tendency to unity, which is particularly characteristic of the ego. If the intellectual processes in the wider sense are to be classed among these displacements, then the energy for the work of thought itself must be supplied from sublimated erotic sources....(EI 226-227)

Freud obviously considers the human organism, psyche and soma, as a meaningful whole, as a whole united in significance, for the components of mind (structure and content) are all related to the basic instincts of life, and the latter are ideational, i.e. significant, in their essence. Hence the body has something thought-like about it, or to use Merleau-Ponty's words, Freud shows that "in sexuality [there are]...relations and attitudes which had previously been held to reside in consciousness." (PhP 158). I cite Merleau-Ponty in support of my position:

Thus sexuality is not an autonomous cycle. It has internal links with the whole active and cognitive being, these three sectors of behaviour displaying one typical structure, and standing in a relationship to each other of reciprocal expression. Here we concur with the most lasting discoveries of psychoanalysis. Whatever the theoretical declarations of Freud may have been, psychoanalytical research is in fact led to an exploration of man, not in terms of his sexual substructure, but to a discovery in sexuality of relations and attitudes which had previously been held to reside in consciousness. Thus the significance of psychoanalysis is less to make psychology biological than to discover a dialectical process in functions thought of as 'purely bodily', and to reintegrate sexuality into the human being. It would be a mistake to imagine that even with Freud psychoanalysis rules out the description of psychological motives, and is
opposed to the phenomenological method: psychoanalysis has, on the contrary, albeit unwittingly, helped to develop it by declaring, as Freud puts it, that every human action 'has a meaning', and by making every effort to understand the event, short of relating it to mechanical circumstances. (PhP 157-158)

According to Merleau-Ponty, then, psychoanalytic theory, contra Ricoeur, not only does not contradict phenomenology, but "helped to develop it by declaring, as Freud puts it, that every human behaviour 'has meaning'" and by declaring that concrete lived-being is significant. According to this psychological doctrine, significance and life are one, and this unity is expressed in desire, in the desire to unify and to self-preserve. But this is to say that bodily being (life) is a seeing, for as Freud said, Eros is self-preservation and the tendency to unify oneself with others, and to do that, even to desire that, I must have some sense of self and other, however unthematic or nascent that sense. Without that minimum level of self-awareness "I" could not fulfil the structure of life--I could not live. In my bodily life I am an intending and a projecting of myself. The body in its living being is a seeing: a seeing of self and of others. "The thing expressed [my being, which is self assertion] does not exist apart from the expression [my bodily life]" (PhP 166). To see myself is to have evidence of myself and to anticipate further evidence, and my "first" evidence is my livedness, my living body. My body is the sign (of my being) for myself and for others, and it is the evidence (realization, actualization) of that sign (again, for myself and for others). In my act of life I am an incarnation of an idea, I am an actualization, I am a significance. I have meaning in my being:
If we therefore say that the body expresses existence at every moment, this is in the sense in which a word expresses a thought. Anterior to conventional means of expression, which reveal my thoughts to others only because already, for both myself and them, meanings are provided for each sign, and which in this sense do not give rise to genuine communication at all, we must, as we shall see, recognize a primary process of signification in which the thing expressed does not exist apart from the expression, and in which the signs themselves induce their significance externally. In this way the body expresses total existence, not because it is an external accompaniment to that existence, but because existence comes into its own in the body. This incarnate significance is the central phenomenon of which body and mind, sign and significance are abstract moments. (PhP 166)

My being is a seeing. But we have previously said that consciousness is a seeing. Hence being and consciousness have the same structure. Husserl's point is that although the body is not yet an explicit cogito, it still warrants being termed "intentional", for intentionality is not equivalent to the explicit cogito. Intentionality also includes the implicit cogito. On this point Husserl criticizes Descartes, for whom "cogito" was synonymous with explicit cogito. While Husserl retains Descartes' dictum, ego cogito, ergo sum, he reinterprets the meaning of "cogito" to take account of both the implicit and explicit cogito. While the latter is conceptual, the former, the lived-cogito, is pre-conceptual. The lived, implicit cogito, is, however, meaning-laden, for, while it is not conceptual, it is ideational, i.e., involves the eidos. But it must be understood the eidos is not the concept of explicit thought (EJ 318). Being the ground of the concept, the eidos is prior to the concept and is that to which the concept refers:

The eidos itself is a beheld or beholdable universal, one that is pure, "unconditioned"--that is to say:
according to its own intuitional sense, a universal not conditioned by any fact. It is prior to all "concepts", in the sense of verbal significations; indeed, as pure concepts, these must be made to fit the eidos. (CM 71 [105])

The eidos is conceptualized or thematized in the explicit cogito.

At first we have, lived-experience, which is the ground of the explicit cogito. By directing attention to this lived-experience, the cogito is made explicit and eventually judgments are formed. These judgments are hierarchically ordered, with eidetic judging as the highest form of judging (EJ 319). But even if the cogito has as its telos the eidetic judgment (EJ 319), it requires the "lowest" cogito as its ground, i.e., as its source of evidence. Hence consciousness must pass through the world in order to see the eidos, for seeing the eidos means going through the world; the eidos cannot be seen directly. The body is, in other words, an indispensable moment of intentionality. It is "part of" intentionality. But it must be kept in mind that when it is said that the body is a type of cogito, by cogito is not meant pure thought or spirit as in Hegel's system. It literally is bodily.

The return to existence, as to the setting in which the communication between body and mind can be understood, is not a return to Consciousness or Spirit, and existential psychoanalysis must not serve as a pretext for a revival of spiritualism. (PhP 160)

In other words, intentionality is quite literally the founding act in Husserl's view, and this is compatible with Freudian psychology. Intentionality grounds life—it is needed for life. Hence, in Husserl's philosophy of the subject the absolute status of intentionality or consciousness is not threatened by the phenomena which are the subject matter of psychoanalytic theory, such as the
phenomena of life, the body, desire. Furthermore the theoretical constructs which psychoanalytic theory uses to deal with these phenomena are compatible with phenomenology. Specifically, the theoretical constructs of topography, i.e., unconscious, preconscious, and conscious (henceforth abbreviated as Uncs, Pcs and Cs, respectively) and of forces or roles, i.e., id, ego and superego, isolated by Ricoeur (CI 240) as contradicting phenomenology, are, in my view, compatible with phenomenology. The former is thought to contradict phenomenology because consciousness is "displaced" from being omnipotent/omnipresent (fundamental/foundational) to being one of three "places" (CI 237-238,240) of the mind. I would agree with this claim if by "consciousness" was meant here the explicit cogito. The unconscious and preconscious deny the autonomy of the explicit cogito. But in Husserl's view intentionality (consciousness) is not restricted to the explicit cogito. The latter is merely a manifestation or an aspect of intentionality, of the cogito which is the foundation of all being-sense. The unconscious and preconscious do not deny the omnipotence of intentionality.

But Husserl's point is that mind is not what it had been traditionally thought to be. He takes pains to show that both Descartes and Kant identify mind or consciousness with the explicit cogito, with the wakeful ego. In the Freudian topography, as well, by "consciousness" is meant the wakeful ego. But when Husserl uses the term "consciousness", he means intentionality, the essence of mind, which includes the implicit cogito of which the wakeful ego is only an aspect. The topography of Uncs, Pcs and Cs is compatible with
intentionality if we take "consciousness" in this division to mean the wakeful ego, the explicit cogito. The wakeful ego is the result of attention directed at the stream of experience, the Uncs; that is, the stream of experience is unconscious with respect to the wakeful cogito. In other words, I am disagreeing with Ricoeur's claim that the tripartite division is one of place at all. According to Ricoeur, These "places" - unconscious, preconscious, and conscious - are in no way defined by descriptive, phenomenological properties but as systems, that is, as sets of representations and effects governed by specific laws which enter into mutual relationships which, in turn, are irreducible to any quality of consciousness, to any determination of the "lived". (CI 237)

And:

This preliminary abandonment is the prerequisite for the separation that exists between the field of all Freudian analyses and the descriptions of "lived" consciousness. (CI 237)

Freud's division, in my view, expresses a relation between attention and the stream of experience. I am supported by the text of Freud. From the quotation that follows it is clear that the distinction between Uncs and Pcs is described in subjective, lived, terms and has been made on the basis of subjective, lived experience, viz., on the basis of feelings of resistance and repulsion which accompany the attempt at bringing certain material of the unconscious to consciousness. The distinction Uncs-Pcs is not one of place:

...every mental act begins as an Uncs one, and it may either remain so or go on developing into consciousness, according as it meets with resistance or not. The distinction between preconscious and unconscious activity is not a primary one, but comes to be established after repulsion has sprung up. Only then the difference between preconscious ideas, which
can appear in consciousness and reappear at any moment, and unconscious ideas which cannot do so gains a theoretical as well as practical value. (AN 51)

In other words, all mental processes start out unconscious, according to Freud, as for Husserl. However, by directing attention to the unconscious the ideas may either become conscious, or, if met with resistance at the preconscious level, may remain unconscious. Hence the topography is not, contra Ricoeur, irreducible to any determination of the "lived".

The implicit cogito is, according to Husserl, a productive one, its mode of cognitive production being, not conceptual, but associative (EJ 321). Here too Husserl is in accord with Freud, for whom the most "primitive" mode of cognition is association (cf. the role of association in psychoanalytic theory and practice).

Neither does the tripartite structure id, ego, and superego contradict phenomenology. The absolute consciousness phenomenology speaks about is not the ego of this division, for the ego of this division is itself constituted by the intentionality of the absolute transcendental ego. The claim that the ego of this tripartite division is constituted is in accord with Freudian theory. Fancher writes:

In a totally immature system there would be no ego at all; there the incoming external stimulation would clash directly with the instinctual impulses of the id. It is out of just such clashes that the ego comes to be formed and to assume its role as mediator. (DF 204)

To fail to keep in mind Husserl's critique of Kant's and Descartes' conception of consciousness as the explicit cogito is to fail to appreciate the way in which Husserl overcomes psychologism. Husserl maintains that Kant does not overcome psychologism because he
has taken the structure of the explicit cogito to be the structure of
the transcendental ego. But that structure is not ultimate, for it
occurs within life. Hence, in confusing the explicit cogito for the
pure transcendental ego "life" is left outside of the phenomenon of the
transcendental ego for according to that misunderstanding the
transcendental ego occurs within life. That is, in that view the
transcendental ego itself will be grounded on the facticity of life and
will be a "fact" occurring in life, a fact left unexplained, and hence
mythical, as Husserl calls Kant's description of the transcendental
ego. Kant has not overcome the mind-body split. To overcome
psychologism the transcendental ego must be the ultimate ground, for
only then is any factual "residue" beyond the transcendental ego
overcome. The transcendental ego must be a necessary structure for my
being, for my being through and through (psyche and soma). For Husserl
intentionality is necessary for my life, and, as well, intentionality
involves life.

I have attempted to demonstrate, then, that a psychology which
seemed to be contradictory to phenomenology in that it deals with the
phenomena of life, phenomena which have generally been difficult to
deal with for a philosophy of the subject, is not only compatible with
phenomenology, but is phenomenology in that intentionality lies at its
core. This will be demonstrated again in the chapter on
intersubjectivity and worked out in more detail. In the next chapter
on the hermeneutic circle I will make clear the second point I said had
to be met if psychologism is to be successfully overcome. If the
transcendental ego is necessary, and if it is an implicit cogito, the
cogito proper being an explication of what was implicit in the transcendental ego, are we not dealing with a duplication in the explicit ego? Does this not mean all being-sense is necessary, thereby destroying facticity? That is, if the pure transcendental ego is absolute ground of all being-sense, if all being-sense is constituted by the pure transcendental ego, and if the explicit ego is nothing but an explication of that pure ego, do we not destroy facticity? Again, in effect I have already to some extent dealt with this objection in this chapter, but I shall deal with it again in the next chapter to make the concept of intentionality as clear as possible.
FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER FOUR

1. I am actually going to make a stronger claim. One can look at experience only by experiencing, so one can achieve a theory of experience only by an act of experience, by attending to the act of experience as one experiences. This will be explained on page 231.

2. Note the title of section 62 in Formal and Transcendental Logic: "The Ideality Of All Species Of Objectivities Over Against The Constituting Consciousness. The Positivistic Misinterpretation Of Nature Is A Type Of Psychologism" (FTL 165 [148]).

3. Mohanty (PTP 231) writes: "...the transcendental subjectivity that is revealed through the Kantian enquiry remains the formal principle that it is".

4. The dream, a primitive mode of thought closely related to the body, is filled with contradictions. For example, in a dream it is not unusual to find ourselves interacting with someone knowing all the while that that person is actually deceased. Nor is it unusual for one and the same person to be both young and old in the dream.


6. As I shall show (page 229 ) and as Descartes established, it is indubitable that I am.

7. In the following pages I use the term "part" for lack of a better term. In any case it is not to be understood in a reified sense, but is, rather, to be taken to mean "aspect".

8. I cannot cite a passage where Husserl says this in exactly these words. But this is the dictum contained in his writings. He says that our task is to become self-reflective. The transcendental ego is by its essence self-reflection, so the task is to self-actualize ourselves. But as I shall show in this and the next chapters the transcendental ego, reflection, involves life and death--to self-reflect is to live and die to the fullest. Hence, while I state here that according to Husserl we must live and die to the fullest, I attempt to bring this to evidence in this chapter and the following ones.

9. This is the reason why I interchange the terms "life" and "body".
10. Biemel interpolates "tied to pure experience". I would say that Husserl meant more observant of the phenomena, i.e., more empirical. The latter would lead to pure experience.

11. It is interesting to note that Noam Chomsky in effect expresses the same critique against empiricist thought, namely that it, rather than the rationalistic psychologies and philosophies of mind, suffers from dogmatism and apriorism because it fails to be truly empirical. Chomsky writes:

It is important to emphasize that seventeenth-century rationalism approaches the problem of learning—in particular, language learning—in a fundamentally nondogmatic fashion. It notes that knowledge arises on the basis of very scattered and inadequate data and that there are uniformities in what is learned that are in no way uniquely determined by the data itself....Consequently, these properties are attributed to the mind, as preconditions for experience. This is essentially the line of reasoning that would be taken, today, by a scientist interested in the structure of some device for which he has only input-output data. In contrast, empiricist speculation, particularly in its modern versions, has characteristically adopted certain apriori assumptions regarding the nature of learning (that it must be based on association or reinforcement, or on inductive procedures of an elementary sort—e.g., the taxanomic procedures of modern linguistics, etc.) and has not considered the necessity for checking these assumptions against the observed uniformities of "output"—against what is known or believed after "learning" has taken place. Hence the charge of apriorism or dogmatism often levelled against rationalistic psychology and philosophy of mind seems clearly to be misdirected. (CL 65)

12. A philosophy which considers consciousness, in whatever form (as cogito, as ego or as transcendental ego) to be the foundation of all being-sense Ricoeur calls a "philosophy of the subject" (a phrase I shall adopt in this work). In Ricoeur's words, a philosophy of the subject is one which "claim[s] that the subject's reflecting on himself or the positing of the subject by himself is an original, fundamental, and founding act" (CI 237).

13. Ricoeur maintains in effect the same position as I. "It is notable that, even when Freud speaks of instinct, it is always in and based on an expressive level, in and based on certain effects of meaning which lend themselves to deciphering and which can be treated like texts: oneric texts or symptomatic texts", writes Ricoeur (CI 263). It is not clear to me how Ricoeur in Conflict of Interpretations can maintain essentially the same position that I am expressing here.
and yet fail to read Freud in this fashion from the start. Ricoeur feels that one can read Freud like this only after taking the detour of semiotics—that what we need is a "rereading of psychoanalysis in the light of semiology..." (CI 263).

14. Later (pp. 197 ff.) I will make clear that I do not mean by "thought-like" the empirical ego, the concrete psyche, or the explicit ego as Descartes used the term.

15. Desire is not something alongside meaning. It is meaning. Contra Ricoeur I would say that libido is symbolic, not related to the symbolic (CI 264).

16. I have discussed in an earlier chapter the relation between seeing and evidence—that to see x is to have evidence of x (pp. 95 ff.).

17. We are reminded of Parmenides, fragm. 3 and 8:

I am arguing against Palmer, then, according to whom Husserl posited a realm of ideas above the flux of experience:

Husserl had observed the temporality of consciousness and furnished a phenomenological description of internal time consciousness, yet his eagerness for apodictic knowledge led him to translate this temporality back into the static and presentational terms of science—essentially to deny the temporality of being itself and assert a realm of ideas above the flux. (P 127)

I am maintaining that for Husserl ideas are lived and felt. I shall reinforce this claim in the next chapters.

19. After all, intentionality aims to describe the essence of mind and all three (Unconscious, Preconscious and Conscious) are phenomena of mind.

20. Although Freud changes the model (F 195-196) after the text cited here, still even in its earliest conception it is described dynamically.

21. The only thing that is irreducible is the division between the stream of experience and attention.
CHAPTER FIVE

Reconciliation Of Husserl's Characterization Of Phenomenology As A Philosophy Of Essences And As A Teleological-Historical Discipline: An Answer To A Hermeneutic Critique Of Phenomenology.

Phenomenology is subject to some very serious charges which must be answered if it is to remain viable. There is the claim that phenomenology as Husserl conceives of it cannot maintain itself because some of its basic concepts contain the seeds of its own destruction. Notably I am thinking of the charge that Husserl's concept of transcendental subjectivity as the absolute ground of being-sense contradicts his concept of transcendental ego as radical self-examination. It is claimed that the concept of transcendental ego as radical self-examination leads to an infinite regress which precludes the absolute status of the transcendental ego. That is, something absolute should be beyond question. But this question as to whether the essence of the transcendental ego is the absolute ground of being-sense or whether it is a self-questioning is the question of necessity versus facticity. The last chapter also ended with the question of facticity versus necessity. There it was asked: if the transcendental ego is absolute being, ground of all being-sense, and the cogito proper but an explication of what was implied in the transcendental ego, is facticity not "swallowed up" by the transcendental ego? Now we encounter the problem from the opposite angle: if the transcendental
ego is by its essence self-questioning, does this not imply that it is fundamentally factual and not necessary? It seems, then, that these two characterizations of the transcendental ego rule each other out. Yet Husserl describes the transcendental ego simultaneously as the absolute ground of meaning and being, and as radical self-examination. Both Suzanne Bachelard and David Carr pick up on this problem, though in different ways. As it is clear that the charge that Husserl's apparent contradictory ways of characterizing the transcendental ego undermine his phenomenology cannot be left untouched, this chapter is devoted to it. Let us first see what Carr exactly says, since his claims are potentially more devastating than those of Bachelard.

Carr maintains that the Crisis marks a turning point in Husserl's thought. According to Carr there are developments in the Crisis that not only undermine Husserl's earlier position, but which constitute a break with Husserl's prior philosophical position. Specifically, Carr maintains that in the Crisis Husserl suddenly adopts the teleological-historical approach and that the earlier "philosophy of essences" as expressed especially in the Cartesian Meditations is thereby undermined, albeit tacitly. According to the former the nature of x works itself out in its history according to an inherent teleology which is both its arche and its telos, and which we can attempt to determine through an examination of the history of x. The nature of x cannot be known at once, according to this view. Hence in this view the ego's nature is revealed only through an ongoing questioning of its nature--through radical self-examination, in other words. But what this means is that we would never know what the nature of the ego is,
for our findings would always be open to further question. According to the philosophy of essence, on the other hand, the ego has an essence that can be known a priori. According to both models, the ego has a necessary nature, but only according to the latter model can this nature be known with apodictic certainty. According to Carr Husserl, abandoned the Cartesian Meditations, and this would provide an answer as to why he did so. I cite Carr at length to give an accurate representation of his position.

The question of historical genesis is explicitly banned from phenomenology per se in Husserl's writings up through the Cartesian Meditations. Yet in the Crisis it suddenly makes its appearance as something the author obviously thinks is important. (C xxxv)

And:

A glance suffices to convince us...that by comparison to the other "introductions" available in English - the Ideas, Volume I, and the Cartesian Meditations - the Crisis is radically different in format. ...The earlier works mentioned above are both characterized explicitly by a "Cartesian" approach. In them, Husserl begins by inviting his readers to reflect upon the world and to see that a certain new attitude, embodied in certain methodological procedures, will enable us to answer the questions of philosophy, to solve or dissolve its problems. Here, by contrast, Husserl announces "a teleological-historical reflection upon the origins of our critical scientific and philosophical situation." (C xxiv)

And:

These two themes [of historical discussion and lifeworld] and their interconnection must be examined in order to assess the significance of the Crisis not merely as a document of its time but as a general statement of Husserl's phenomenology. Such an examination is all the more important in light of an opinion first expressed by Merleau-Ponty and since taken up by many of his followers, the view that these new dimensions of the Crisis introduce elements into phenomenology that strain to the breaking point,
whether he fully recognized it or not, Husserl's philosophical program and undermine the results of his earlier works. If this view is correct, it provides an answer to the question of why the German version of the Cartesian Meditations was abandoned and Husserl embarked on such an unusual approach at the end of his life. (C xxx-xxxi)

Carr adds in a footnote:

One possibility is that Husserl developed a new idea of philosophical "science" that was radically different from or even incompatible with the earlier one; another is that the investigations of the Crisis and other manuscripts of the period imply a denial of scientific philosophy even though Husserl did not recognize it or would not admit it to himself. (C xxxi, n. 21)

And:

In earlier works, discussions of other philosophers are not part of the introduction to phenomenology, strictly speaking, but form either a kind of "introduction to the introduction" or a series of asides. A constant strain throughout Husserl's career is his disdain for the tendency of some philosophers to conjure up a doctrine of their own simply by an ingenious dialectical combination of the doctrine of others. The true introduction to phenomenology--and thus to philosophy, for Husserl--is to be found precisely by turning away from the opinions of the philosophers and by turning toward "the things themselves" (Zu den Sachen selbst!). In the Crisis, by contrast, as stated in the Preface, the teleological-historical reflection serves "in its own right" as an introduction to phenomenology. (C xxx)

A little further Carr writes:

This historical discussion, as is generally agreed, is one of the truly new elements in Husserl's philosophy which make their appearance in the Crisis. (C xxx)

As well, Carr cites Merleau-Ponty in support of his position:

It was in his last period that Husserl himself became fully conscious of what the return to the phenomenon meant and tacitly broke with the philosophy of essences. (Phenomenologie de la perception, p. 61n; in C xxx, n. 20)
Clearly to Carr there is a tension between Husserl's philosophy of essences and the teleological-historical approach. The conflict that Carr believes to be present in Husserl's writings can be described in more detail as follows.

According to Husserl's philosophy of essence, phenomenology is the apodictic, a priori science of essences:

...pure or transcendental phenomenology will be established not as a science of facts, but as a science of essential Being (as "eidetic" Science); a science which aims exclusively at establishing "knowledge of essences" (Wesenerkenntnisse) and absolutely no "facts". (I 40 [4])

And:

...phenomenology is here to be established as a science of Essential Being - as an apriori, or, as we also say, eidetic science....(I 41 [5])

The essence "defines" what something is, it is the What of an Individuum (I 48 [5]) and can be seen by instituting a reduction (I 40 [4]). To be more exact, phenomenology is ultimately concerned with the essence of the pure transcendental ego (I 102 [59], 140 [94], 160 [113]). The latter is an immanent essence. To focus on immanent essences one must institute a series of reductions (I 103 [59-60]). The first reduction excludes matters of fact and exposes essences, both transcendent and immanent. The second reduction excludes transcendent essences\(^5\) and yields immanent essences only.\(^6\) Only the latter are strictly speaking indubitable and form the strict phenomenological region.

...phenomenology embraces as its own all "immanent essences," i.e., all those that become singularized exclusively in the individual events of a stream of consciousness, in fleeting single mental processes of
any kind. Now it is of fundamental importance to see that not all essences belong to that sphere, that just as in the case of individual objectivities the difference between immanental and transcendent objectivities obtains, so too it obtains in the case of corresponding essences. If we intend to develop phenomenology as a purely descriptive eidetic doctrine of the immanent consciousness-formations, the occurrences in the stream of mental processes which can be seized upon within the boundaries drawn by phenomenological exclusion, then no transcendent individuals and, therefore, none of the "transcendent essences" belonging within those boundaries are included. (I FK 137-138 [114])

And:

To phenomenology that proposes really to limit itself to the region of pure experience, no transcendent-eidetic regions and disciplines can contribute, in principle, any premises at all. Since, then, it is our purpose, in conformity with the standard already referred to above, to give to phenomenology precisely this purity of construction, and since issues of the greatest philosophical import depend on deliberately preserving this purity throughout, we expressly sanction an extension of the original reduction to all transcendent-eidetic domains and the ontologies which belong to them. (I 162 [114])

What is more, the essence can be seen without the consideration of facts, but can be seen by pure imagination (EJ 329).

The Eidos, the pure essence, can be exemplified intuitively in the data of experience, data of perception, memory, and so forth, but just as readily also in the mere data of fancy (Phantasie). Hence, with the aim of grasping an essence itself in its primordial form, we can set out from corresponding empirical intuitions, but we can also set out just as well from non-empirical intuitions, intuitions that do not apprehend sensory existence, intuitions rather "of a merely imaginative order." (I 50-51 [12])

And speaking of the method used in phenomenology Husserl writes:

There are reasons why, in phenomenology as in all eidetic sciences, representations, or, to speak more accurately, free fancies, assume a privileged position over against perceptions, and that even in phenomenology of perception itself....(I 182 [130-131])
According to the teleological-historical approach, however, we discern the nature of something, not from imagination, but the de facto development (the history) of that something. For example, one would discern the nature of the ego from an examination of its de facto, historical, development. Since something's de facto development is in principle infinite, in its development the ego may change radically, and with it our conception of its nature. But in what sense would the nature or "essence" of the ego then be absolute or apodictic, and indeed, in what sense would phenomenology, the science of the pure transcendental ego, then be an apodictic science? Contrary to the philosophy of essences, the nature or essence of something cannot be known a priori according to the teleological-historical approach, but can be "known" only a posteriori. Hence, according to Carr, when Husserl adopts the teleological-historical approach in the Crisis this means that Husserl does so at the expense of his philosophy of essence, thus creating a tension in his writings. Writes Carr:

Not only would a "philosophy of history" seem to find no justification in phenomenological terms; it might even directly contradict the results obtained by that method. (C xxxiv)

I think, however, that the tension is not there in Husserl's philosophy, at least not in the way Carr believes it to be. The tension does not reflect the incompatibility of the teleological-historical and essential approaches, but reflects, rather, the need to work out explicitly the interrelation of the two approaches. If Husserl adopts the teleological-historical approach it is not at the expense of his philosophy of essences. As I aim to show in this
chapter, to make these two approaches incompatible with one another is to deny the very possibility of phenomenology. As I will show below the teleological-historical approach without a philosophy of essences leads to a radical skepticism, and a philosophy of essences without a teleological-historical approach leads to dogmatism.

As we stated, phenomenology ultimately aims at the essence of the pure, absolute, transcendental ego. If phenomenology were identical with the teleological-historical approach as Carr conceives of the latter, phenomenology would infer the nature of the absolute transcendental ego from how the ego, in its individual and collective states as a matter of fact has developed—from the de facto ego only. But, as I said above, it would then be impossible to really know the nature of the transcendental ego because it is that which is developing. It would be in a state of flux and it would not be possible to speak of its essence, for an essence is unchanging. An analysis of how the ego or humanity as a matter of fact develops cannot yield an essence of the ego or of humanity. As André de Muralt says:

Now, what does the descriptive experience of man yield? Does it immediately reveal the essence of man to us as a necessary a priori? No, it does not; instead it gives only man's becoming or development, his flowing realization, his life or exercise of existence. This flowing reality cannot be defined by a concept delimiting an essence. (DeM 370)

In fact, with every act of questioning itself the ego's nature would be affected (P 52). How could phenomenology then ever maintain the transcendental ego to be that which questions itself, for even that claim concerning the ego would be open to question? Because its nature would not be fixed, it would be conceivable, for instance, that at some
point in time the ego changed from a self-questioning being to a
dogmatic, authoritarian being. As well, there would be the problem of
from where the ego gets its norms that enable it to engage in a self-
critique. One cannot say that the ego gets it from itself, for, being
part of the ego, such norms would then be open to critique. In such a
position we are led to an infinite regress. Saying that what is
involved is a spiral effect, where a higher level always criticizes a
lower level will not obviate the problem either, for every level
remains open to criticism, thus leaving the question of the norms
according to which the criticism takes place. Bachelard expresses this
clearly:

If one does not lose sight of the fact that phenomenology is set up on different levels, one can conceive of a new transcendental investigation which relates the norms of the first phenomenological subjectivity to a higher subjectivity; more specifically, one can conceive of a new transcendental investigation which performs a "criticism of those evidences that phenomenology at the first, and still naive, level carries on straightforwardly." But then one is presented with the danger of an endless regress. (SHL 221-222)

Yet if, as an absolute ground seems to demand, the norms are said to be beyond the transcendental ego they would be "objective" and we would fall prey to objectivism, the very antithesis to phenomenology, as Suzanne Bachelard explains:

How can the constituting subjectivity criticize itself without using norms, hence without referring to an "Objectivity" which dominates it and reduces its authority? (SHL 221)

Hence without some apodictic norms "in" the transcendental ego we fall prey to either a radical skepticism or an objectivism, both of which
destroy phenomenology. If one takes phenomenology to be the kind of teleological-historical approach that Carr takes it to be, then Bachelard's claim that phenomenology falls before the third man argument rings true. If, on the other hand, one takes phenomenology to be a philosophy of essence which, contrary to the teleological-hermeneutic approach, rules out appeal to facts, then phenomenology becomes a dogmatic doctrine, one which asserts principles or ideals irrespective of the facts, and this contradicts its claim to rationality. As we see from the quotation below rationalism is a form of relativism, according to Husserl. Phenomenology therefore must find its place somewhere between these two approaches. And indeed, this is what Husserl maintains:

It is high time that people got over being dazzled, particularly in philosophy and logic, by the ideal and regulative ideas and methods of the "exact" sciences - as though the In-itself of such sciences were actually a norm for objective being and for truth. Actually, they do not see the woods for the trees. Because of a splendid cognitive performance, though with only a very restricted teleological sense, they overlook infinitudes of life and its cognition, the infinitudes of relative and, only in its relativity, rational being, with its relative truths. But to rush ahead and to philosophize from on high about such matters is fundamentally wrong; it creates a wrong skeptical relativism and a no less wrong logical absolutism, mutual bugbears that knock each other down and come to life again like figures in a Punch and Judy show. (FTL 278 [245-246])

In other words, the teleological-historical and essential approaches must be compatible if phenomenology is going to work. I think there is evidence to show that a teleological-historical approach did not suddenly make its appearance in the Crisis but was there in Husserl's earlier works alongside his philosophy of essences. Consider, for
example, the following passages from *Formal and Transcendental Logic* in which Husserl explicitly describes the approach he will use in that work, and it will be seen that what he describes is a teleological-historical approach.

So much by way of a most general characterization of the aim and method of this essay. It is, accordingly, an intentional explication of the proper sense of formal logic. The explication begins with the theoretical formations that, in a survey, are furnished us by historical experience - in other words: with what makes up the traditional Objective content of formal logic - and puts them back into the living intention of logicians, from which they originated as sense-formations. (FTL 10 [9])

And:

Now, however, our only concern is to give an understanding of the essential character of historically existing logic, by means of an explication of the intentionality determining the sense of logic most originally. (FTL 46 [40])

Husserl is attempting to determine the meaning aimed at in the science of logic (the whole) by looking at de facto logic (the part). This is a teleological-historical approach, also known as a hermeneutic approach. Hermeneutics may be characterized as a model of understanding according to which the "object" to be understood is treated like a text to be interpreted (RM 10). It essentially involves a process of understanding the whole in terms of the parts and vice-versa. While the term was revived by Dilthey, who used it essentially to refer to a process of understanding socio-historical phenomena (R 5, 10) [i.e., hermeneutics was a crucial ingredient of the methodology of human studies (R 10)], the term has since evolved to refer to the process on understanding in general. As Palmer writes:
In *Wahrheit Und Methode*, Gadamer brings hermeneutics to a new level of comprehensiveness. Dilthey and Betti had both argued for a comprehensive general hermeneutics - for the Geisteswissenschaften. What about the natural sciences? Do they require a different understanding? The general conclusion has been that the interpretation of an historically transmitted text requires an act of historical understanding quite distinct from the understanding practiced by a natural scientist. Gadamer leaves this distinction behind, for he no longer conceives of hermeneutics as restricted either to a text or to the Geisteswissenschaften.

Understanding, says Gadamer, is always an historical, dialectical, linguistic event - in the sciences, in the humanities, in the kitchen. (P 214-215)

Not only does Husserl adopt an hermeneutical approach in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, but he considers there the difficulty such an approach may pose to his demand for radicalism, for an absolute (essential) science. He raises the question Carr cites Ricoeur as posing, viz., "How can a philosophy of the cogito, of the radical return to the ego as founder of all being, become capable of a philosophy of history?" (C xxxiv).

Thus we are presupposing the sciences, as well as logic itself, on the basis of the "experience" that gives them to us beforehand. Because of this, our procedure seems not to be at all radical, since the genuine sense of all sciences - or, equivalently, the essential possibility of their existence as genuine and not merely supposed sciences - is the very thing in question. And this applies in the case of logic itself, which is said to be the science of science, taken universally, and to bring out with its theories - or, as existing historically, to have ostensibly brought out - precisely that essential possibility. Nevertheless, whether sciences be genuine or spurious, we do have experience of them as cultural formations given to us beforehand and bearing within themselves their meaning, their "sense": since they are formations produced indeed by the practice of the scientists and generations of scientists who have been building them. As so produced, they have a final sense, toward which the scientists have been
continually aiming. Standing in, or entering, a community of empathy with the scientists, we can follow and understand - and carry on "sense-investigation".

(FTL 8-9 [8])

While this does not constitute a "solution" to the problem of the compatibility of a teleological-historical approach and a philosophy of essences, it does show Husserl to be aware of the problem and show him to consider the approaches to be compatible. And indeed there is a type of hermeneutics which incorporates elements of Husserl's philosophy of essence. Husserl's philosophy of essence is not in conflict with hermeneutics in general, but only with a specific type of hermeneutics. The tension Carr speaks of between essential philosophy and a teleological-historical approach, a tension between absolutism and relativism respectively, is parallel to the tension between two branches of hermeneutics, viz., that of Hirsch and Betti on the one hand, and that of Heidegger and Gadamer on the other. The debate between the two types of hermeneutics has been characterized by Palmer in his book on hermeneutics and I will be referring to it later in this chapter. I shall use this debate as a vehicle for explaining the relation between the essential and teleological-historical approaches in phenomenology. I will refer to Palmer's presentation of the debate because he focuses on and expresses very clearly the main points of contention between the two camps, at times more clearly than some members of either camp do. Although Palmer favours the approach of Gadamer and Heidegger, he presents the two sides with laudable fairness. Let me now briefly characterize this debate. Afterwards I shall explain in what way Husserl's phenomenology combines elements of the philosophy of essences and hermeneutics. When I have done that I
shall further my explanation by drawing on the debate between the two camps of hermeneutics in more detail, showing the danger inherent in a hermeneutics that denies elements of a philosophy of essence.

In simplified terms, according to the hermeneutics of Betti and Hirsch, any work to be interpreted has an objective meaning of its own, a meaning which we aim to discover through our interpretation. One may term such a meaning the essence of the work; hence the alignment of this branch of hermeneutics with the philosophy of essence. According to the other branch of hermeneutics, one stemming from Heidegger's thought, viz., the "philosophical hermeneutics" of Gadamer, the work has no "objective" meaning of its own but has only a significance or relevance to our present situation and it is the task of the interpreter to discover and express this relevance. According to Gadamer meaning and significance are one--the work has no meaning "in itself" outside of the relevance we give it in our act of interpretation, and there can be no objective criteria concerning the interpretation of a work (P 63). Since in the view of Betti and Hirsch the work has a meaning irrespective of any significance or relevance it might have for us, it is legitimate to talk of correct and incorrect interpretations of a work, and there are norms which aid us in interpreting. According to Betti and Hirsch those philosophers who deny that hermeneutics can or should provide norms for achieving a valid interpretation of a text and maintain instead that the task of hermeneutics is to find significance for us today fall prey to relativism, to a radical skepticism. Writes Palmer:
In essence, Hirsch argues that if it is held that the "meaning" of a passage (in the sense of the verbal meaning) can change, then there is no fixed norm for judging whether the passage is being interpreted correctly. Unless one recognizes the "glass slipper" of the original verbal meaning intended by the author, there is no way of separating Cinderella from the other girls. This recalls Betti's objection to Gadamer's hermeneutics: that Gadamer does not provide a stable normative principle by which the "correct" meaning of a passage can be validly determined. (P 61)

For Betti and Hirsch "Gadamer is lost in a standardless existential subjectivity" (P 58,61). Their critique of Gadamer's hermeneutics is the same as my critique of Carr. Indeed, those who consider the hermeneutical approach incompatible with a philosophy of essences do so because they consider the latter to be a process of describing objective, static, entities (the essences) "above the flux of experience" (P 127) and the former to be a radically "subjective" process, or, to use Palmer's phrase (one which he adopts from Ebeling [P 65]), a "word event".

Literary criticism is helped by oral interpretation to recall to itself its own inner intention when it takes (in a more conscious way) the definition of the "being" of a work of art not as static, conceptual thing, not an atemporal "essence" that has become a thing as word-expressed concept, but rather as a being that realizes its power of being as oral happening in time. The word must cease being word (i.e., visual and conceptual) and become "event"; the being of a literary work is a "word-event" that happens as oral performance. (P 18)

Paradoxically, when Palmer characterizes his concept of hermeneutics in terms of word-event he considers his concept of hermeneutics to be phenomenological, though he uses the term to refer to the philosophy of Heidegger and Gadamer (which he calls "hermeneutical phenomenology" [P 125]) rather than that of Husserl. Palmer considers the hermeneutics
of Hirsch and Betti, which is quite critical of Gadamer's position, to be in alignment with at least Husserl's early phenomenology, which he sees as compatible with realism.

[Hirsch] affirm[s] that the verbal meaning is something independent, changeless, and determinate which one can establish with objective certainty. Such a conception of verbal meaning rests on certain specifiable philosophical presuppositions, mainly realistic, or perhaps those of early Husserl of Logical Investigations, when Hirsch quotes to the effect that the same intentional object may be the focus of many different intentional acts. The object, in this latter case, remains the same, an independent idea or essence. (P 63)

In fact, I believe that Palmer's hermeneutics is not phenomenological in Husserl's sense of the term. To make it so he must incorporate exactly those elements in the hermeneutics of Betti and Hirsch which he finds objectionable. Betti's and Hirsch's hermeneutics are not incompatible with Husserl's philosophy of essence and, moreover, are more truly phenomenological in Husserl's sense of the term than the philosophy of Palmer. But, I shall argue, neither Betti and Hirsch nor Husserl are realists. I shall show as well that those who regard Husserl that way fail to understand how he overcomes psychologism and how he understands the subject-object relation. Let us now return to our task of explaining in what way Husserl's philosophy of essence is not incompatible with hermeneutics.

We return to Suzanne Bachelard's claim that phenomenology is subject to an infinite regress if it maintains that the transcendental ego is self-criticism. She believes that because of the infinite regress entailed in the concept of phenomenology as self-examination, Husserl cannot maintain that phenomenology reveals the essence of an
absolute transcendental ego (the essential approach), but is led to say that the understanding of the transcendental ego is in flux and that phenomenology reveals a dialectic between the transcendental ego and the forms in which it necessarily manifests itself.

The Husserlian conception of transcendental subjectivity in fact falls before the objection of the third man. Actually, Husserl is unable to maintain his conception of an absolute transcendental subjectivity...it does indeed seem that Husserl did not remain in the perspective of absolute transcendental subjectivism and that he was "unconsciously oriented toward a dialectic". For our part...we would say..."toward a dialectic of reason and the structural form." (SHL 222)

And:

...it is not precisely a question of a dialectic between subjectivity and its "objective" products, its "contents"; one should rather speak of a duality between subjectivity and the forms which in which it necessarily manifests itself. (SHL 223)

But, as Suzanne Bachelard observes (SHL 222), Husserl acknowledges the possible threat of an infinite regress but denies that phenomenology falls prey to it.

All transcendental-philosophical theory of knowledge, as "criticism of knowledge", leads back ultimately to criticism of transcendental-phenomenological knowledge (in the first place, criticism of transcendental experience); and, owing to the essential reflexive relation of phenomenology to itself, this criticism also demands a criticism. In this connexion, however, there exist no endless regresses that are infected with difficulties of any kind (to say nothing of absurdities), despite the evident possibility of reiterable transcendental reflections and criticisms. (CM 152 [178])

It is hard to believe that Husserl would merely deny that phenomenology is open to an infinite regress if he did not have grounds for doing so.
One may disagree with those grounds, but that is another matter. Let us see if we can unearth those grounds. It will turn out that these will allow us to combine the essential and hermeneutic approaches.

I said that the conflict between essential philosophy and a teleological-historical approach is one of apodicticity versus relativism. But note Husserl's words in the *Cartesian Meditations*:

> Meanwhile we have lost sight of the demand, so seriously made at the beginning - namely that an apodictic knowledge, as the only "genuinely scientific" knowledge, be achieved; but we have by no means dropped it. Only we preferred / to sketch in outline the tremendous wealth of problems belonging to the first stage of phenomenology - a stage which in its own manner is itself still infected with a certain naivete (the naivete of apodicticity) but contains the great and most characteristic accomplishment of phenomenology, as a refashioning of science on a higher level - instead of entering into the further and ultimate problems of phenomenology: those pertaining to its self-criticism, which aims at determining not only the range and limits but also the modes of apodicticity. (CM 151-152 [177-178])

Of particular interest to us is that Husserl is here putting the traditional notion of apodicticity into question. In the *Crisis* as well Husserl says that "apodicticity" is far from clear and needs to be reexamined:

> ...what this apodicticity could ultimately be which would be decisive for our existential being as philosophers, is at first unclear. (C 18)

The apodicticity that contradicts a teleological-historical approach is a narrowly (objectivistically) construed apodicticity in which facticity, relative truth, is considered the opposite of apodicticity, absolute truth. But Husserl writes:

> What if, even when we get down to the primitive phenomenological bases, problems of relative and
absolute truth are still with us, and, as problems of the highest dignity, problems of ideas and of the evidence of ideas? What if the relativity of truth and of evidence of truth, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the infinitely distant, ideal, absolute, truth beyond all relativity - what if each of these has its legitimacy and each demands the other? (FTL 278 [245])

Here Husserl is suggesting that phenomenology embraces both relativism and absolutism. If phenomenology is an a priori science it is not a dogmatic absolutism. It contains elements of relativism, but not of a skeptical relativism (see also the quotation from Formal and Transcendental Logic on page 216.) What is implied here is that hermeneutics, associated with relativism, and phenomenology, thought to be a form of absolutism, are compatible. To make this clear let us contrast Husserl's notion of apodicticity with that of Descartes, for the Cartesian type of apodicticity does contradict hermeneutics. If people think Husserlian phenomenology contradicts hermeneutics it is usually because they think the phenomenological notion of apodicticity is the same as that of Descartes.

Cartesian philosophy contradicts hermeneutics, in that according to the former knowledge is deduced from the cogito alone, that is, from a cogito which is isolated from facticity, hence ruling out using facts as a source of knowledge in the way hermeneutics makes use of facts. Husserl's apodictic philosophy, while grounded in the cogito is, however, not a deductive science and is receptive to "facts". Indeed, while both Husserl and Descartes base their apodictic philosophy on the cogito, for Husserl this has a different meaning than for Descartes. Husserl reinterprets the Cartesian philosophy by rethinking and grounding the apodicticity of the cogito, something
Descartes did not do. Let us briefly discuss how rethinking and grounding the cogito led Husserl to an apodictic science which is nevertheless not a deductive science, divorced from facts.

Although Descartes says that the ego-cogito is apodictic because it is a clear and distinct idea—that is, an idea, the denial of which constitutes an absurdity—he fails to investigate why this is so. In short: Descartes does not make scientific his concept of apodicticity. In Husserl's view Descartes' apodicticity is based on nothing more than a feeling:

...the subjective-psychic characteristic of clara et distincta perceptio (which is nothing other than what later theorists "describe" as the evidence-characteristic, as the evidence-feeling, the feeling of strict necessity)...(FTL 280 [247])

But phenomenology cannot be satisfied with this, for true rationality cannot be based on a feeling of "strict necessity". (I have already explained in a previous chapter how in Husserl's view evidence is not a blind feeling but is intelligible.) Phenomenology comes about by a rethinking of apodicticity.

The up-and-down of the historical movements—newly strengthened empiricist sensationalism and skepticism, newly strengthened rationalism in the older scientific style, German Idealism and the reaction against it—all this together characterizes the first epoche, that of the whole "modern period". The second period is the renewed beginning, as the reappropriation of the Cartesian discovery, the fundamental demand of apodicticity; and in this beginning, through the changed historical situation (to which all the fateful developments and philosophies of the first epoche belong), there arise forces of motivation, a radical thinking through of the genuine and imperishable sense of apodicticity (apodicticity as a fundamental problem), the exhibiting of the true method of an apodictically grounded and apodictically progressing philosophy; and included within this the discovery of
the radical contrast between what is usually called apodictic knowledge and what, in the transcendental understanding, outlines the primal ground and the primal method of all philosophy. It is precisely with this that there begins a philosophy with the deepest and most universal self-understanding of the philosophizing ego as bearer of absolute reason coming to itself...(C 340)

Phenomenology felt the need to rethink apodicticity of the ego because Descartes' apodicticity left his philosophy with deep problems. That is, while in Descartes' system the Ego's being is assured because the ego "somehow" has apodicticity, the being of objects other than the ego, of objects in general and the world in particular, poses a problem. To assure their being Descartes appeals to God's veracity. Husserl's point is that had Descartes looked at the nature of the ego's apodicticity he would have seen that there is no need to invoke anything beyond the ego to legitimate objects in general and the world in particular. Unlike for Descartes, for Husserl the apodictic ego-cogito is not something enclosed in itself, separated off from its objects.

...it is through this abstention that the gaze of the philosopher in truth first becomes fully free: above all, free of the strongest and most universal, and at the same time most hidden, internal bond, namely, of the pregivenness of the world. Given in and through this liberation is the discovery of the universal, absolutely self-enclosed [my emphasis] and absolutely self-sufficient correlation between the world itself and world-consciousness [my emphasis]. By the latter is meant the conscious life of the subjectivity which always has the world in its enduring acquisitions [my emphasis]...(C 151)

Also:

In this manner it becomes clear that the ego, taken concretely, has a universe of what is peculiarly his own, which can be uncovered by an original explication of his apodictic "ego sum" - an explication
that is itself apodictic or at least predelineative of an apodictic form. Within this "original sphere" (the sphere of original self-explication) we find also a "transcendent world", which accrues on the basis of the intentional phenomenon, "Objective world", by reduction to what is peculiarly the ego's own (in the positive sense, which is now preferred). (CM 104-105)

The cogito, which I am, is a relation to the object. Cogito is a seeing (I 75-76 [36]), a having of evidence of the object. The object is an indispensable aspect of the cogito, as Husserl captures in his tripartite expression ego cogito cogitatum. For Husserl if I am sure of the ego's being, I am sure of the being of an object. If I look at the cogito I see there are many modes of relating to an object. As Descartes saw, cogito can mean: "I perceive, I remember, I phantasize, judge, feel, desire, will" (I 104 [61]). Correlatively, there are many types of objects "in" the cogito: memory objects, judgments, phantasy objects, real objects, etc. All these modes of the cogito can be seen to refer back to experience of a real world as the primary mode (I 114 [130]), though this does not yet give us assurance of the being of the real world. The cogito can also take itself in its purity (cogito qua cogito) as object. While the former are transcendent objects, the latter is an immanent object. In short, the cogito is related essentially to many types of objects. This is why Husserl says that the cogito reflects, not a self-contained proposition, but a sphere.

Thus, during the universal epoche, the absolutely apodictic self-evidence "I am" is at my disposal. But within this self-evidence a great deal is comprised [my emphasis]. A more concrete version of the self-evident statement sum cogitans is: ego-cogito-cogitata qua cogitata. This takes in all cogitationes, individual ones as well as their flowing synthesis into the universal unity of one cogitatio in which, as cogitatum, the world and what I have variously attributed to it in thought had and still has ontic
validity for me...In the epoche, all these determinations, and the world itself, have been transformed into my ideae; they are inseparable components of my cogitationes, precisely as their cogitata. Thus here we would have, included under the title "ego", an absolutely apodictic sphere [my emphasis] of being rather than merely the one axiomatic proposition ego cogito or sum cogitans. (C 77-78)

In Husserl's view the "I am" at once expresses one's link with the object. The "I am" is the moment of plenitude which allows me to see being, that is, to have evidence of being. It is an openness to being. Since it is the moment that provides me with evidence, the "I am" is the moment I must consult if I want to know anything. I cannot go beyond it to ground my knowledge of the world by, say, appeal to the benevolence of God, for even the benevolence of God must be grounded in the I am. (If anything, the "I am" is already an expression of the benevolence of God.) Indeed, the apodicticity of the cogito must be grounded in the I am. And when we ground apodicticity in the ego-cogito, we see that appeal to God's benevolence is not necessary for assuring the being of transcendent objects in general and the world in particular, as I show next. In other words, the cogito's apodicticity, contra Descartes, is not a quality that cannot be analyzed.

Apodicticity is expressed in terms of evidence, and, as Descartes correctly saw, in terms of being, i.e., it is impossible to say cogito and to say I am not.

An apodictic evidence, however, is not merely certainty of the affairs or affair-complexes (states-of-affairs) evident in it; rather it discloses itself, to a critical reflection as having the signal peculiarity of being at the same time the absolute unimaginableness (inconceivability) of their non-being, and thus excluding in advance every doubt as "objectless", empty. (CM 15-16 [56])
Evidence of the being of $x$ is apodictic if the non-being of $x$ is in principle unimaginable. But the being of all transcendent objects, as Descartes noted, can be doubted, for, since their being is beyond me, I may be mistaken about them. Accordingly, Husserl, like Descartes, includes all transcendencies in the epoche ([I 137, 147]). True apodictic knowledge occurs only when evidence and the object are as close as can be, viz., when the act of evidence coincides with the object of evidence, as happens in self-reference, the performance of the cogito. If my cogito is directed at my pure cogito, that is, at the cogito in which all transcendencies are excluded, I can imagine the non-being of all objects except one, viz., my own act of thinking, for even in imagining that I am not, I am. The cogito is apodictic because whatever else it is aware of it is also always aware of itself and in self-awareness there is no "gap" between the object of evidence and the evidence. It is, in short, an immanent object. In the cogito I coincide with my evidence—in the cogito I am my own evidence.

Every immanent perception necessarily guarantees the existence (Existenz) of its object. If reflective apprehension is directed to my experience, I apprehend an absolute Self whose existence (Dasein) is, in principle, undeniable, that is, the insight that it does not exist is, in principle, impossible; it would be non-sense to maintain the possibility of an experience given in such a way not truly existing. The stream of experience which is mine, namely, the one who is thinking, may be to ever so great an extent uncomprehended, unknown in its past and future reaches, yet so soon as I glance towards the flowing life and into the real present it flows through, and in so doing grasp myself as the pure subject of this life (what that means will expressly concern us at a later stage), I say forthwith and because I must: I am, this life is, I live: cogito.

To every stream of experience, and to every Ego as such, there belongs, in principle, the possibility
of securing this self-evidence: each of us bears in himself the warrant of his absolute existence (Daseins) as a fundamental possibility. (I 130 [85])

And:

But my empathy and my consciousness in general is given in a primordial and absolute sense, not only essentially but existentially. This privileged position holds only for oneself and for the stream of experience to which the self is related; here only is there, and must there be, anything of the nature of immanent perception. (I 130 [85-86])

My proof for the indubitable cogito, the ground of the apodictic cogito, is a living doing—a seeing. Cogito is a seeing (I 75 [36]) and the only way to see that is by seeing, by directing the ray of attention to my act of seeing as I see.14

Only in seeing can I bring out what is truly present in a seeing; I must make a seeing explication of the proper essence of seeing. (FTL 159 [142])

I have already explained how this seeing is my Being.15 The living doing involves an act of reflection directed at the stream of experience. This act of reflection can itself become the object of yet a higher act of reflection. The phenomenological method proceeds entirely by such acts of reflection.

The study of the stream of consciousness takes place, on its own side, through various acts of reflexion of peculiar structure, which themselves, again, belong to the stream of experience, and in corresponding reflexions of a higher grade can be and indeed must be made into objects for phenomenological analyses. For it is through analyses of this kind that the foundations of a general phenomenology are laid, and the methodological insight so indispensable to its development is grounded. (I 200 [147])

The cogito, then, is indubitable because it has itself as immanent object. In the cogito seeing and being coincide. But this does not mean that the only objects "in" the immanent sphere are
immanent objects. "Cogito" essentially refers both to act and its object. The cogito as act is apodictic because it is the act which has itself as immanent object. When we use the word cogito to refer to the objects of that act, then transcendent objects are also indicated. But Husserl does not thereby reduce transcendence to immanence. Rather, he means that transcendence receives its sense from immanence. Transcendent objects are seen as transcendent by me due to immanence. Real objects, one type of transcendent objects, also get their sense from my being, from immanence. Hence, I am the living criterion of whether something is real--of whether the world is there. That I do not have perfect evidence of real objects and the world is neither a shortcoming or failing of real objects, nor does it bring into doubt my criteria of reality, for by their very nature transcendent objects are objects of which I cannot be certain--I can always be mistaken about their being. Transcendent objects are not apodictic. By their very essence they can be doubted (I 131 [86-87]). But the criterion of truth or error for these objects comes from my cogito. Hence there is no need to invoke God's benevolence to "prove" the existence of the world. All beings, immanent and transcendent, achieve their being-sense from my cogito. If anything is to be grounded, it must be so in the cogito.

And parenthetically here lies the ground of that principle that Husserl has insisted upon ever since the time of his Philosophy of Arithmetic, that principle to which Frege so strenuously objected considering it an expression of psychologism, that a "subjective" doing is the most radical way of grounding statements of science, that indeed
it is the only way to yield scientific statements since the ideal of science is precisely that of a radical grounding (FTL 279 [246]).

But while Husserl's program of grounding knowledge in the apodictic cogito sounds Cartesian, the difference between how the two philosophers understand this program is radical. For Descartes grounding science in the ego-cogito means deriving all knowledge from the cogito. This is in part because Descartes is a child of his times and understands "science", according to the model of the exact mathematical sciences, to mean deductive science. But Husserl does not accept that model of science as the only one:

It is naturally a ludicrous, though unfortunately common misunderstanding, to seek to attack transcendental phenomenology as "Cartesianism", as if its ego cogito were a premise or a set of premises from which the rest of knowledge (whereby one naively speaks only of objective knowledge) was to be deduced, absolutely "secured". The point is not to secure objectivity but to understand it. (C 189)

And:

It is only a misleading prejudice to suppose that the historical methods of the a priori sciences, which are exact ideal sciences throughout, must be accepted without question as the pattern for every new method of science, and especially for our new transcendental phenomenology - as though all eidetic sciences must show one type of method only, that of "exactness". Transcendental phenomenology as descriptive science of Essential Being belongs in fact to a main class of eidetic science wholly other than that to which the mathematical sciences belong. ([I] 193 [141])

Grounding objectivity does not mean for Husserl deriving it from the cogito. Objectivity is given. We need not derive it, but need to understand the meaning objectivity presupposes. As Simone Weil says:
...true philosophy does not build anything; its object is given to it—it is our thoughts; it only makes, as Plato says, an inventory of them...(SW 406)

To try to derive objectivity from the cogito, as Descartes does, is in effect to reduce objectivity to the cogito. But Husserl says that objectivity cannot be reduced to immanence. So too in the case of mathematical objects. Husserl did not want to reduce them to the cogito even in his Philosophy of Arithmetic, but wanted to see what meaning they presuppose.

But this may become clear if we recall once again the distinction between act of mind and content of mind. That this is a legitimate distinction can be seen at once by considering that the act of mind remains such throughout its differing contents, i.e., the former remains identical while the latter varies. Whether I am thinking about the tree in the garden, the significance of a poem or about how to dispose of the chair I no longer want, all these are instances of thinking. Phenomenology aims to describe the essence (structure) of this process or act of thinking (I 191 [139]) taken in its purity. While the process reveals itself in its contents (I 151 [104]), it is not to be confused with any of its contents. Hence, phenomenology does not describe a psychological event or state in objective space/time (I 215 [161]), in nature, because the latter are also constructs, "contents" of pure mind.

Were something still left over enabling us to grasp the experiences as "states" of a personal Ego, in and through whose changes self-identical personal properties were manifested, we could break up these apprehensions also, do away with the intentional forms which bring them into shape, and reduce them to pure experiences. Even psychical states point to the ordering conditions of absolute experiences in which
they are constituted and take on the intentional and in its way transcendent form "state of consciousness". (I 151-152 [105])

And:

All empirical unities, and therefore psychological experiences also, are indicators of absolute systems of experience, and show a quite distinctive essential formation, besides which still other formations are conceivable; all are in some sense transcendent, merely relative, contingent. (I 152 [105])

Phenomenology, then, distinguishes pure mental processes from their contents, and aims to describe the former in their purity. It must be observed, however, that when phenomenology looks at the pure mental process it sees that essentially associated with it is a pure subject.

Among the universal peculiarities pertaining to the transcendentally purified realm of mental processes the first place is due the relationship of each mental process to the "pure Ego". Each "cogito", each act in a distinctive sense, is characterized as an act of the Ego, it "proceeds from out of the Ego", it "lives" "actionally" in the act. (I FK 190 [159-160])

And:

But if I perform the phenomenological epoche-abstention, the whole world of the natural setting is suspended, and with it, "I, the man." The pure experience as act with its own proper essence then remains as residue. But I also see that the apprehension of the same as human experience, quite apart from the question of existence, introduces various features which do not need to be there, and that on the other side no disconnecting can remove the form of the cogito and cancel the "pure" subject of the act. The "being directed towards," "the being busied with," "adopting an attitude", "undergoing or suffering from" has this of necessity wrapped in its very essence, that it is just something "from the Ego," or in the reverse direction "to the Ego"; and this Ego is the pure Ego, and no reduction can get any grip on it. (I 214 [160])
Hence, strictly speaking phenomenology distinguishes between the pure subject, pure mental process, and its contents (I 214 [161]) and aims to be the eidetic science of the pure mental process.

Accordingly, there are always distinguished - in spite of the necessary relatedness to one another - the mental process itself and the pure Ego pertaining to the mental living. And, again: [there are always distinguished] the purely subjective moments of the mode of consciousness and, so to speak, the rest of the content of the mental process turned away from the Ego. As a consequence, there is a certain, extraordinary important two-sidedness in the essence of the sphere of mental processes, of which we can also say that in mental processes there is to be distinguished a subjectively oriented side and an objectively oriented side...(I FK 191 [161])

Phenomenology aims to uncover the universal structure of pure mental processes (CM 28 [67]); it attempts to determine the universal structure of acts of mind by examining the contents of mind, for the latter are indices pointing to pure absolute consciousness (I 152 [105]).

Thus we describe and, in so doing, determine by strict concepts the generic essence of perception taken universally or that of subordinate species, such as the perception of physical things and their determinations, the perception of animate beings, etc.; likewise the essence of memory taken universally, empathy taken universally, willing taken universally, etc. Prior these, however, are the highest universalities: the mental process taken universally, the cogitatio taken universally, which already make extensive essential descriptions possible. (I FK 168 [140])

In effect, then, phenomenology goes from particular content of mind to the universal which underlies all content and which allows that content to be. One recalls Nietzsche: "Read thine own life, and understand thence the hieroglyphs of the universal life" (N 340 [353]). But this only proves that phenomenology is not a deductive science, for the
relation of particular to universal is not one of implication. So, for example, when Husserl in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* shows that the notion of number presupposes the universal notion "any object whatsoever" (*Etwas*), he is not attempting to deduce the concept of number from consciousness, but is describing what is necessary for the concept of number to be at all.\(^{17}\)

This means, as we observe carefully, that in phenomenology the structure of the act of the cogito is apodictic, not its content per se. And this differentiates it from deductive science. On the deductive model of grounding science in the cogito, the content of the cogito is, in a higher act of cogito, derived from the cogito's content--each step in the derivation being apodictic. In the deductive model the cogito's content is apodictic. In Husserl's notion of grounding the act (of cogito) is apodictic, not the content of the cogito per se. Ricoeur asserts, for example, that "what is beyond all doubt is the act" (CI 262-263). Iso Kern states:

An apodiktischen Momenten scheinen am cogito übrig zu bleiben: seine Zeit-form, seine Existenz, seine intentionale Beziehung auf den Gegenstandspol und seine Beziehung auf den individuellen Ichpol, sowie dieser Ichpol selbst. Kein Inhalt, den die Phänomenologie als universale Erfahrungstheorie in sich aufnimmt, ist absolut gegeben. (IK 211)

And Husserl writes:

...no matter how absolute the apodictic evidence of the ego's existence may be for him, still it is not necessarily evidence for the existence of the manifold data of transcendental experience. (CM 28 [67])

And:

Rather there extends through all particular data of actual and possible self-experience - even though they
are not absolutely indubitable in respect of single
details - a universal apodictically experienceable
structure of the Ego....(CM 28 [67])

If it is difficult to see that what is apodictic is not the content of
the cogito but the structure of the act of the cogito, this is because
separating content from act is difficult due to the act by itself being
transparent and only being visible via the content.

But the pure Ego, which I am--i.e., I am both pure ego and
empirical ego (C 184,186)--lives in this stream. I am the stream of
pure consciousness that phenomenology describes in its pure
universality. In other words, the universals "used" in all
understanding and experience are the universals of my act of being.
These universals are what I seek to have evidence of and are part of my
act of evidence. In short: they are immanent objects that can be
known apodictically. The universals phenomenology seeks can be
grounded apodictically in the I am. Since I am the universals
phenomenology seeks to describe, phenomenology is self-analysis
(cogito). Apodicticity in phenomenology is achieved only in the act of
doing phenomenology, in the act of cogito, i.e., the universals are
grounded in the act of seeing. This is why Husserl thinks that
phenomenology when properly carried out is the surest of all sciences
and is the truest science. Hence Merleau-Ponty's claim that "there is
no apodictic self-evidence, the Formale und Tranzendentale Logik (p.
142) says in effect" (PhP xvi), is misleading. What Husserl means in
that section of Formal and Transcendental Logic is that there is no
principle we can appeal to that would reveal truth. Only an act of
Here Husserl's conception of philosophy is identical to that of Simone Weil:

The rigor and certitude of philosophical investigation are as great as they can be; the sciences are far from coming close to them. Should one conclude from this that philosophical reflections are infallible? Yes, it is infallible to the degree that it is actually carried out. (SW 406)

The universals phenomenology describes are not constituted by the explicit cogito but are the basis of the latter. They are what I am—are universal fact. For this reason Husserl calls phenomenology a descriptive eidetic science (I 184 [132]), a material (as opposed to formal) eidetic science (I 185 [133]) and a concrete eidetic science (I 189 [136]). The claim that the transcendental ego is self-criticism is not open to an infinite regress, then, because the claim is given in and based on the facticity of Being, and that is where the regress ends. The regress ends with the fact of my Being, for my Being reveals itself to me as self-examination. That is, it reveals itself as a stream of objects, both transcendent and immanent, and as involving a ray of attention which I can at will direct at the stream and its objects and which, because they are not totally given to me, I seek to bring to evidence. My Being reveals itself as a seeing of objects and as a seeing of self, for, if it is a seeing, its identity is self-seeing. I see that I am self-examination in the immediacy of my being. The norms used to criticize the self are not other than the transcendental ego, but are part of the transcendental ego, for the transcendental ego is self-criticism, which means it is at once ground, the striving to explicate the ground, and the norms. More
specifically, the stream of experience is the ground, striving to explicate the ground occurs by means of attention and will, and the norms are found in the structure of that being of the transcendental ego.

The claim that the transcendental ego is that which questions itself can be interpreted in two ways. It can mean either (1) that the transcendental ego questions itself, or (2) that the transcendental ego is a self-questioning. A diagram of the first and second interpretations respectively may make the difference clear:

On the first interpretation, if the norms for the questioning are found in the transcendental ego, then they too are subject to questioning, in which case we have an infinite regress and phenomenology fails. If the norms are found outside of the transcendental ego, then we have
objectivism and phenomenology falls too. On the second interpretation the norms are neither beyond the transcendental ego, nor subject to questioning, but are "part of" the transcendental ego and the grounds of the self questioning; that is, they are part of the self-questioning. On the first model the transcendental ego has an identity outside of the self-questioning. On the second model this is not so--the transcendental ego is self-questioning through and through. If the transcendental ego is essentially self-questioning, that means it has the norms, has a temporal aspect, has an a-temporal pure subject, has a stream of experience with objects which are transcendent to it and which it seeks to know, and is itself in part transcendent.

What Husserl says about objectivity, that our task is not to derive it because it is given, but to understand it, applies also to subjectivity. The possibility of subjectivity as self-examination does not need to be proven. That subjectivity is a process of self-examination is given in Being. We must describe and understand what is involved in this process. If the transcendental ego is self-examination, that implies that it has norms, that it is in part a temporal Being, that I have some evidence, i.e., direct contact with Being against which I assess claims, and so forth. And in questioning the latter claims I only "prove" them, for I would not, indeed, could not, question if I didn't have some evidence, if I did not have norms and so forth. Nor can questioning these norms ever invalidate the norms, for every act of questioning applies the norms--the norms are the ground of all questioning. Even if my goal to achieve apodictic knowledge of myself cannot be met, i.e., even if I am constantly open
to self-criticism, this does not deny the phenomenological claim that I have apodictic self-evidence, for I can only criticize myself if I have an apodictic ground, that is, some immediacy on which to do so. Even if I am always open to self-criticism that does not make me fall prey to radical skepticism, for the very process of continual self-criticism implies I have in principle something (my Being) given to me and that I have norms.

What this shows is that Husserl's "model" of the structure of the transcendental ego is different from Descartes' model; of the cogito. So, while the transcendental ego shares similar properties with Descartes' cogito, because these properties find themselves in a structure which is so different from that of Descartes, Husserl is able to overcome the difficulties and absurdities implicit in the Cartesian model of the ego. The difficulties and absurdities that Husserl overcomes, and with which I am dealing here, are the isolation of the ego from the world, the apodicticity of the cogito contradicting the historicity (facticity) of the ego, and the cogito as self-examination leading to an infinite regress. On the Cartesian model there are "things" radically beyond the cogito, namely the world, God and others. In such a model it is no contradiction to say that the transcendental ego could get its norms from beyond itself. On an Husserlian model, however, there is nothing beyond the transcendental ego, for the transcendental ego allows for Being and is openness to Being, i.e., the ego is not cut off from the world and others on Husserl's model, and so on Husserl's model it is a contradiction to say that the transcendental ego gets its norms beyond itself.
So not only is an infinite regress not implied in the transcendental ego as self-criticism, but the hermeneutic approach is indicated, for it implies that part of my being is historical. My Being (cogito) reveals that I do not know everything about myself, that while one aspect of "me" is apodictic and adequate, namely the act of cogito, another is not.

...the Ego is apodictically predelineated, for himself, as a concrete Ego existing with an individual content made up of subjective processes, abilities, and dispositions - horizontally predelineated as an experienceable object, accessible to a possible self-experience [my emphasis] that can be perfected, and perhaps enriched, without limit [my emphasis]. (CM 28-29[67])

My transcendental ego is apodictic and adequate, my empirical ego is not. As empirical ego I am an historical process, which indicates that I need a teleological-historical approach.

...adequacy and apodicticity of evidence need not go hand and hand. Perhaps this remark was made precisely with the case of transcendental self-experience in mind. In such experience the ego is accessible to himself originaliter. But at any particular time this experience offers only a core that is experienced "with strict adequacy", namely the ego's living present (which the grammatical sense of the sentence, ego cogito, expresses); while, beyond that, only an indeterminately general presumptive horizon extends, comprising what is strictly non-experienced but necessarily also meant. To it belongs not only the ego's past, most of which is completely obscure, but also his transcendental abilities and his habitual peculiarities at the time. (CM 22-23[62])

According to Husserl, the absolute transcendental ego is nothing other than a process of self-examination. But this means that I am an historical process, for self-knowledge is, according to the
claim that I am self-examination, something I work or strive towards over time.

This life, as personal life, is a constant becoming through a constant intentionality of development. What becomes, in this life, is the person himself. His being is forever becoming....(C 338)

Let us return to Carr's interpretation of hermeneutics and phenomenology, one which considers the philosophy of essences to be contrary to hermeneutics. As I stated, this is but one school of hermeneutics, and there is another school of hermeneutics which incorporates elements of the philosophy of essence. Let us see next what lies behind the debate between these two branches of hermeneutics. I shall subsequently bring out what I consider to be the undesirable moral consequences of the hermeneutics which denies any philosophy of essence. Let us remember throughout the discussion that follows, however, that although the debate between the two camps of hermeneutics is expressed in terms of "interpretation" and specifically in terms of "interpretation of a work of art", "interpretation" is to be understood as the model of all understanding. Since according to hermeneutics, as for phenomenology, we are acts of understanding, hermeneutics, while expressed in terms of a theory of interpretation of art, is a theory about the nature of our Being, of our ego.

The Gadamerian/Heideggerian school of hermeneutics, which considers essentialism to contradict its tenets, attempts to put forth a theory of interpretation which overcomes the subject-object dichotomy of traditional metaphysics. In Palmer's words:

It should be said at the outset that the subject-object model of interpretation is a realist
fiction. It is not derived from the experience of understanding but is a model constructed reflexively and projected back into the interpretive situation. (P 223)

And:

To ask meaningfully about what happens when one understands a literary work means transcending the prevailing definition of the interpretive situation in terms of the subject-object schema. (P 224)

And:

It is the service of Martin Heidegger in Being And Time to have opened up the ontological character of understanding in a way that moves radically beyond the older conception of it within the subject-object schema. (P 227)

One might object that surely overcoming the subject-object dichotomy of transcendental metaphysics was Husserl's concern as well. Although Palmer does cite Husserl as one of the first to attempt to overcome this dichotomy, he considers Heidegger the first to have done so successfully and sees Heidegger's attempts carried further by Gadamer (P 216), whom he considers to have added a Hegelian element to Heidegger's hermeneutics (P 215). According to Palmer, Husserl's attempt to ground all being-sense in transcendental subjectivity is a form of subjectism, which is but "the other side of" objectivism, and an aspect of the old metaphysics. By subjectism Palmer means any philosophy which takes the human subject, as consciousness, will, spirit etc., as its ultimate reference point, and which thus regards the world as "measured by man":

Subjectism is a broader term than subjectivity, for it means that the world is regarded as basically measured by man. In this the world has meaning only with respect to man, whose task it is to master the world. The consequences of subjectism are many. First, the sciences take preeminence, for they serve
man's will to master. Yet since in subjectism man recognizes no goal or meaning that is not grounded in his own rational certainty, he is locked in the circle of his own projected world. (P 144)

In other words, when Palmer wishes to overcome traditional metaphysics he quite literally does not wish to consider either the subject or the object as foundational. Hence he considers Husserl to have been unsuccessful at overcoming traditional metaphysics even though the latter criticizes objectivism, for he considers transcendental subjectivity as being foundational, and this, according to Palmer, is subjectism. Heidegger overcomes subjectism, maintains Palmer, by grounding being-sense in Being, in man's historical being-in-the-world. Heidegger starts not with subjectivity but with "the facticity (Faktizität) of the world" (P 227) and by grounding the understanding "in the act of the world, the facticity of the world..." (P 228).

Heidegger held that the facticity of being is a still more fundamental matter than human consciousness and human knowledge, while Husserl tended to regard even the facticity of being as a datum of consciousness. (P 125)

For these reasons Palmer considers Heidegger's phenomenology to be radically different from that of Husserl:

...Heidegger rethought the concept / of phenomenology itself, so that phenomenology and the phenomenological method take on a radically different character.

This difference is epitomized in the word "hermeneutic" itself. Husserl never used it in reference to his work, while Heidegger asserted in Being And Time that the authentic dimensions of a phenomenological method make it hermeneutical; his project in Being And Time was a "hermeneutic of Dasein." Heidegger's selection of the term "hermeneutic" - a word laden with associations, from its Greek roots to its modern use in philosophy and theology - suggests the antiscientific bias which forms a marked contrast to Husserl. The same strain is carried over into Hans-Georg Gadamer's "philosophical
hermeneutics", stamping the word itself with overtones of antiscientism. (P 125-126)

It is because Palmer wants to overcome objectivism that he denies the objective status of a work, whether that work is a work of art or the Ego; that is, he denies that it has "an essence" or ideal meaning. It is thought by him that an ideal meaning is an essence which is a being-in-itself, which in turn is objectivism. As I explained above, Palmer instead reduces a work of art to an act of significance. But, as I shall explain in the next pages, in reducing the work to significance and overstepping ideal meaning, Palmer falls into psychologism, his protestations to the contrary notwithstanding. This is one undesirable consequence of the theory. There are two reasons why Palmer fails to see this - the second perhaps the most telling for our purposes, giving rise to a more significant set of undesirable consequences. First of all, Palmer fails to see that he has fallen into psychologism because he is working with a definition of psychologism that is far too narrow, viz., he thinks psychologism is reducing (ideal) objects to feelings:

To consider the above elements of the interpretative problem is not, as some might think, to fall back into "psychologism". For the perspective within which the charge of "psychologism" and the attitude of antipsychologism (presupposed in the charge) have any meaning assumes at the outset the separation and isolation of the object and then looks pejoratively at the "subjective" reaction as in the intangible realm of "feelings". The discussion presented here, however, has not dealt with feelings but with the structure and dynamics of understanding, the conditions under which meaning can arise in the interaction of the reader with the text, the way in which all analysis presupposes an already shaped definition of the situation. Within the framework of such considerations the truth of George Gurwitch's observation is seen - that object and method can never be separated. Of course, this is a truth foreign to the realistic way of seeing things. (P 26)
It is clear from the above quotation that Palmer thinks that psychologism occurs when one reduces the object to feelings. Because he does not reduce the objects to feelings he thinks he has avoided psychologism. But the definition of psychologism, at least as Husserl uses it, is broader. Psychologism occurs when one reduces the object to any subjective event—not merely to feelings. It occurs when one reduces judgment to judging. In reducing the work to word-event Palmer reduces judgment to judging. Husserl always urged that while the two, judgment and judging, are essentially related, they are nevertheless distinct, and that to fail to keep these distinct is to propound either psychologism or objectivism.

We have already spoken of the difficulty of separating from psychological subjectivity the psychically produced formations making up the thematic domain of logic—the difficulty, that is, of regarding judgments (and likewise sets, cardinal numbers, and so forth) as anything other than psychic occurrences in the human beings who are doing the judging. (FTL 153 [137])

And:

...the general confusion was reduced to the extent that (overcoming the psychologistic confounding of them) one distinguished judging and the judgment itself (the ideal formation, the stated proposition)....(FTL 206u [183])

And:

We noted in the first place the extraordinarily widespread disposition of our time to interpret the eidetic psychologically. Even many who call themselves idealists have yielded to it; and, indeed, generally speaking, the influence of empiricist views on idealist thinkers has been a strong one. Those who take ideas or essences for "mental constructions", who with respect to the operations of consciousness through which "concepts" of colour and shape are acquired, drawn from intuited examples of things with colours and
shapes, confuse the consciousness of these essences, colour and shape resulting from momentary intuition, with these essences themselves, ascribe to the flow of consciousness a real part of it what is in principle transcendent to it. But that is on the one hand a corruption of psychology, for it affects the purity of the empirical consciousness; on the other hand (and that is what here concerns us), it is a corruption of phenomenology. (I 163-164 [116])

A further misconception that Palmer has is his belief that "the attitude of anti-psychologism...assumes...the separation and isolation of the object and then looks pejoratively at the 'subjective' as in the intangible realm of 'feeling'". While Husserl propounds an anti-psychologism, he does not look at the subjective as an "intangible realm of feelings". By "separation and isolation of the object" I take Palmer to mean separation and isolation of the object from the subject. But one thinks of Husserl propounding anti-psychologism and yet maintaining that while the object is distinct from the subjective process still it does not exist in isolation from the subject. While he urges that the logical object, i.e., the meant, the judgment, is not to be reduced to the act which gave rise to it, he nevertheless urges that the two, the meant and the act of meaning, are essentially related. Hence, in Husserl's view any objective theory of meaning, such as logic, requires correlational research into the subjective act which gives rise to meaning. Since this point is important I cite Husserl at length.

Logic...inquires in two opposite directions. Everywhere it is a matter of rational productions, in a double sense: on the one side, as productive activities and habitualities; on the other side, as results produced by activities and habitualities and afterwards persisting. (FTL 33 [29])
And:

These Objective affairs all have more than the fleeting factual existence of what comes and goes as a formation actually present in the thematic field. They also have the being-sense of abiding validity; nay, even that of Objective validity in the special sense, reaching beyond the subjectivity now actually cognizing and its acts. They remain identical affairs when repeated, are recognized again in the manner suitable to abiding existents; in documented form they have Objective factual existence; just like the other objectivities of the cultural world: Thus they can be found in an Objective duration by everyone, can be regeneratively understood in the same sense by everyone, are intersubjectively identifiable, are factually existent even when no one is thinking of them.

The opposite direction of logic's thematizing activity is subjective. It concerns the deeply hidden subjective forms in which theoretical "reason" brings about its productions. The first question here concerns reason in its present activity - in other words: that intentionality, as it flows on during its living execution, in which the aforesaid Objective formations have their "origin". (FTL 34 [30])

And:

The considerations just pursued give us access to an understanding of the proper task of judgment-theory, a discipline that, although much discussed, has remained rather fruitless, because it has lacked all understanding of the specific character of the investigations directed to the subjective that are necessary in the case of judgments, in the logical sense, and in the case of the fundamental concepts relating to these.

1. If the general confusion was reduced to the extent that (overcoming the psychologistic confounding of them) one distinguished judging and the judgment itself (the ideal formation, the stated proposition), it then was even less possible to set a senseful problem concerning the subjective as long as the peculiar essence of all intentionality, as a constitutive performance, was not understood and therefore judicative intentionality in particular was not understood as the constitutive performance in the case of ideal judgment-formations - and, still more particularly, the intentionality of evidential judging
was not understood as the constitutive performance in the case of ideal truth-formations. (FTL 206 [183])

Psychologism occurs when one reduces the object to subjective acts, irrespective of whether these acts are feelings or not.

Unless Palmer is willing to speak of the meaning of a work, as opposed to merely its significance, he falls into psychologism. But speaking of the meaning of a work of art does not, contra Palmer, imply "objectivism" or realism, for one can maintain, as Husserl does, that the meaning is constituted by the subject. Indeed, this is exactly the sense in which Betti and Hirsch speak of the meaning of a work. Contra Palmer they are not realists (P 60), but phenomenologists, for the realist maintains that the object exists independently of the subject, and both Betti and Hirsch insist that it is illegitimate to speak of the object without a subject, as Palmer himself says.

Betti by no means wishes to omit the subjective moment from interpretation, or even to deny that it is necessary in every humane interpretation. But he does wish to affirm that, whatever the subjective role in interpretation may be, the object remains object and an objectively valid interpretation of it can reasonably be striven for and accomplished. An object speaks, and it can be heard rightly or wrongly precisely because there is an objectively verifiable meaning in the object. If the object is not other than its observer, and if it does not, of itself, speak, why listen? (P 56)

And:

Thus, as Betti observes, to speak of an objectivity that does not involve the subjectivity of the interpreter is manifestly absurd. Yet the subjectivity of the interpreter must penetrate the foreignness and otherness of the object, or he succeeds only in projecting his own subjectivity on the object of interpretation. Thus it is fundamental and is the
first canon of all interpretation to affirm the essential autonomy of the object. (P 57)

Betti's position is one against psychologism. For Betti the object is objective, though vis à vis the subject. This is like Husserl's position.

But the other reason why Palmer thinks he has avoided psychologism is that he thinks he can avoid the subject-object distinction altogether. This is to be taken quite literally: Palmer is in effect trying to get rid of the subject in hermeneutics. He uses the example of Gadamer's writings on the phenomenon of "game" to describe the latter's hermeneutics as applied to art. "There are a number of significant elements in the phenomenon of 'game' which shed light on the way of being of the work of art" (P 171), writes Palmer. He adds that in the game "Gadamer had found a model which...can serve as a basis for substantiating the dialectical and ontological character of his own hermeneutics" (P 174). But what becomes clear is that on this model as Palmer seems to interpret it the subject becomes eradicated.

The object of Gadamer's discussion of the concept of game or play in relation to art is to free it from the traditional tendency to associate it with activity of the subject. (P 172)

And:

From the subjectivist point of view, the game is an activity of a subject, a free activity into which one wills to enter and which is used for his own pleasure. But when we ask what the game itself is, and how it comes to pass, when we take the game and not human subjectivity as our starting point, then it takes on a different aspect. A game is only a game as it comes to pass, yet while it is being played it is master. The fascination of the game casts a spell over us and draws us into it; it is truly the master over the player.
The game has its own special spirit. The player chooses which game he will give himself to, but once he chooses he enters a closed world in which the game comes to take place in and through the players. In a sense the game has its own momentum and pushes itself forward; it wills to be played out. (P 172)

And:

The "subject" of the experience of art, the thing that endures through time, is not the subjectivity of the one who experiences the work; it is the work itself. This is precisely the point at which the mode of being a game becomes important. The game too has its own nature independent of the consciousness of those who play it. (P 174)

The subject, it is to be noted, is being denied in all its forms—reason, freedom, love, spirit, will, etc.

How can thinking be defined in such a framework [i.e., the framework of subjectism]? Again, in presentational terms that go back to Plato. How can truth be conceived? In terms of correctness, certainty that the statement about something corresponds with the way the object is presented to us. This presentation cannot really be a self-disclosure of something, since it is caught up in the overpowering act of objectification by the subject. Therefore, says Heidegger, the great metaphysical systems become expressions of will, whether phrased in terms of reason (Kant), freedom (Fichte), love (Schelling), absolute spirit (Hegel), or will-to-power (Nietzsche).

The will to power that is grounded in subjectism knows no ultimate value, only the thirst for more power. In the present day this expresses itself in the frenzy for technological mastery. (P 145)

Hence Palmer wants to speak of an event which is subjectless, and so when he reduces the objective ideal meaning of a work to an event, he does not think he falls into psychologism because this event is not that of a subject. Now there is truth to what he says—but his claims need to be modified. As it stands, Palmer seems to be denying the subject altogether. It is one thing to say that the ultimate subject is not the psychological subject or to say that it is a pure
subject, as Husserl does, but it is quite another to say that there is no ultimate subject.

As the theory stands it has undesirable consequences, notably there are some serious moral consequences to denying the subject, namely, a diminishing of personal responsibility in favour of adherence to authority and tradition.

If there can be no presuppositionless understanding, if, in other words, what we call "reason" is a philosophical construction and no final court of appeal, then we must re-examine our relationship to our heritage. Tradition and authority need no longer be seen as the enemies of reason and rational freedom as they were in the Enlightenment and the Romantic period, and into our own day. Tradition furnishes the stream of conceptions within which we stand, and we must be prepared to distinguish between fruitful presuppositions and those that imprison and prevent us from thinking and seeing. In any event, there is no intrinsic opposition between the claims of reason and those of tradition; reason stands always within tradition. Tradition even supplies reason with the aspect of reality and history with which it will work. Ultimately, Gadamer asserts, the consequences of recognizing that there can be no presuppositionless understanding are that we reject the enlightenment interpretation of reason, and both authority and tradition win back a status they have not enjoyed since before the Enlightenment. (P 183)

While Palmer seems to be saying on the one hand that reason is to work hand in hand with authority and tradition--a claim which is not unacceptable to Husserl--on the other hand the sense of the passage seems to be that tradition and authority have the "upper hand", as it were, a claim which has dire consequences and which goes against what Husserl fought for. Husserl considered the individual's free reason to be the path to self-responsibility, which in turn he considered to be the key to man's salvation and even his immortality. In this sense,
Husserl was a proponent of the Enlightenment, albeit a new Enlightenment. That is, while he considered the objectivistic rationalism of the Enlightenment (C 192) to be a mistake (C 290), he believed in the Enlightenment's aim of achieving self-responsibility through reason. The New Enlightenment in Husserl's view would result from a reinterpretation of rationality, a reinterpretation which would lead to a more accurate and more fruitful concept of rationality. Husserl writes:

The rationalism of the Age of Enlightenment is now out of the question; we can no longer follow its great philosophers or any other philosophers of the past. But their intention, seen in its most general sense, must never die out in us. For, as I emphasize once again, true and genuine philosophy or science and true and genuine rationalism are one. Realizing this rationalism, rather than the rationalism of the Enlightenment, which is laden with hidden absurdity, remains our own task if we are not to let specialized science, science lowered to the status of art or techné or the fashionable degenerations of philosophy into irrationalistic busy-work be substituted for the inextinguishable idea of philosophy as the ultimately grounding and universal science. (C 197)

And:

I too am certain that the European crisis has its roots in a misguided rationalism. But we must not take this to mean that rationality as such is evil or that it is of only subordinate significance for mankind's existence as a whole. Rationality, in that high and genuine sense of which alone we are speaking, the primordial Greek sense which in the classical period of Greek philosophy had become an ideal, still requires to be sure, much clarification through self-reflection; but it is called in its mature form to guide [our] development. On the other hand we readily admit (and German Idealism preceded us long ago in this insight) that the stage of development of ratio represented by the rationalism of the Age of Enlightenment was a mistake, though certainly an understandable one. (C 290)
This is not to deny that for Husserl tradition and authority are important, but it is to say that tradition and authority are not foundational. Tradition and authority are always for a consciousness, and it is consciousness that must bring life to tradition and authority—that must inspire tradition and authority. That is to say, consciousness must inspire tradition and authority internally, i.e., must bring it to life for the self, for without consciousness' active (inspired) relation to tradition and authority the latter will be but dead entities incapable of evoking anything but blind responses. In principle, respect for authority and tradition are based on the structure of Being, on the "I am", as I shall discuss in the next chapter on other selves. It is consciousness which must supply the norms with which to evaluate actual tradition and authority, for by themselves the latter may be the bearers of evil—cf. Nazi Germany. This, again, is similar to Nietzsche's position on authority: the latter condemns a blind adherence to authority and tradition and praises an active, free adherence to tradition and authority, one which comes from a plenitude of one's Being, i.e., one which comes from, not a denial of self, but from an affirmation of self. Plenitude, which allows one to truly give to the other, comes from a celebration of self, which paradoxically, allows one to become truly unselfish.

For Husserl reason is lived. I have already discussed this and I shall have occasion to go over this again in the chapter on other selves. This indicates that Husserl is working with a sense of reason other than that of objectivistic reason. Hence, Husserl's notion of science is different than that of objectivistic science, for reason and
science are the same for Husserl. But, and this is one of the shortcomings of Palmer's book, Palmer has only one sense of science, viz., objectivistic science. There is no other type of science for Palmer. Science, for him, means technological mastery. Hence when Palmer says that a philosophy which takes the subject as ultimate reference point gives predominance to science, he means that subjectivism gives rise to technological mastery and a technological attitude, which serves man's will to master (see previous quotations). But it is incorrect to lump subjectivism and technological science together, for while Husserl bases his science in consciousness, his whole motive was to fight the attitude which made technological science the mode of grasping man. But it is possible that Palmer himself retains an element of objectivism in his philosophy. Recall that objectivism was said to occur when a phenomenon constituted by consciousness was not seen as such but as already formulated independently of consciousness (see pp. 122-123). Consider, for example, the following quotation:

How does the operation of language in understanding take into account the function of will and desire in man? Gadamer would probably reply first that his analysis in Wahrheit und Methode was of the event of understanding itself, not of the motivations for it or the personal effect surrounding it. (P 217)

Palmer's hermeneutics, in line with Heidegger's philosophy, is supposed to describe man's essential way of being-in-the-world, viz., understanding. But one wonders how essential a hermeneutics is that does not account for desire or will, both of which are fundamental aspects of our Being-in-the-world. One is led to suspect that this hermeneutics is not in touch with the deepest source of Being, but is
starting relatively "high up", that it is talking about understanding already cognitively advanced, and that a deeper act of understanding is needed to relate that higher understanding to desire and personal affect surrounding it. In fact, according to Husserl and Merleau-Ponty this is the case. It is not possible to understand the higher understanding without considering the motivations or personal affect surrounding it, and this requires a deeper understanding, a deeper logos (PhP 365). Nor can it be said that it is because Palmer is working with this deepest understanding that he does not account for desire, for the deepest logos should be able to talk about desire and can clarify itself only in relation to such considerations.

But it is revealing that Palmer himself is somewhat unsatisfied with the lack of discussion on personal affect as it relates to understanding, despite his vehement insistence that hermeneutics is not grounded in the subjective. The quotation above, in which Palmer suggests what answer Gadamer would give to the question concerning desire in understanding, goes on to say:

This may be so, but it would be very enlightening to know how Gadamer would answer this question. I believe that here again the dialectical character of Gadamer's hermeneutics as over against that of Heidegger would more adequately provide for the contribution made by the person doing the understanding [my emphasis] to the hermeneutical experience. This would valuably supplement and extend the final portion of the book dealing with the hermeneutical experience. (P217)

Indeed, man is in part desire and if Palmer's hermeneutics is to give us insight into man, is to give us self-understanding, then we need to be able to account for desire. This cannot be left out. I think Palmer is correct, however, in saying that Gadamer can in principle
handle the question concerning desire better than Heidegger can because of the Hegelian element Gadamer injects into his hermeneutics. That is, it allows him in principle to consider the subjective vis a vis the objective without falling into a reductionist position. Hegel saw clearly that the Subject-Object dialectic was irreducible. In this respect Husserl is close to Hegel, for the former too insists that phenomenology is correlational research, that subject and object occur together. Indeed, since the transcendental ego is a seeing of the object, it, like Hegel's Absolute Spirit, is to be considered neither as subject or object. That is, the transcendental ego in Husserl's philosophy is not to be seen as personal, but as Hyppolite suggests, as impersonal (PH 156). One may object that this is what Palmer wanted—to "ground" philosophy in the non-subjective—but the point is, Palmer tries to get that by ignoring or sidestepping the subject altogether (free will, love, spirit, desire, consciousness etc.), and Husserl would say that one can get to the non-subjective ground, the pure transcendental ego, only by going through the subject, for it is a relation of subject to object. The transcendental ego is not not-subject, nor is it subject. Hence Husserl says I am the transcendental ego and yet I am not the transcendental ego. In the moment of the "I am" I truly am transcendental ego, but that moment indicates to me as well that I am not yet, but that I must bring myself to evidence. As it were, the "I am" becomes the model and motivation for my cognitive life, for bringing to evidence. The "I am" at once expresses the wish to increase my own Being. Being itself then becomes the motive for
bringing to evidence, and with that is connected a morality, as I shall discuss in the following chapter on other selves.

This lack of subjective emphasis has an effect on ethics, as Palmer himself notes:

> It is difficult to resist asking what kind of ethics and doctrine of man are presupposed by Heidegger. Is man simply to live in a kind of responsive surrender to the call of being? And it would be of interest to put the same question to Gadamer. (P 217)

Indeed, if subjectivity is not considered fundamental but authority is, hermeneutics faces grave ethical problems, for, as Palmer himself admits, the individual will not be responsible.

> ...one notes the tendency in later Heidegger to describe understanding exclusively with a vocabulary of passive terms; understanding is no longer viewed as an act of man but as an event in man. There emerges a danger that man will be seen as a passive speck in the stream of language and tradition. (P 216)

Palmer cites the objection relevant against a Heideggerian hermeneutics raised by Jean-Marie Domenach:

> A convergent undertaking [in philosophy today] seeks to reverse the order of terms under which philosophy has lived up to the present, and to negate the autonomous activity of consciousness. I don't think, I am thought; I don't speak, I am spoken; I don't deal with something, I am dealt with. It is from language that everything comes and to language that everything returns. The System, which is seized in the midst of itself, is proclaimed the master of man....The System, a thinking that is cold, impersonal, erected at the expense of all subjectivity, individual or collective, negates at last the very possibility of a subject capable of expression and independent action. (P 216)

This is the same critique de Muralt has of the ontological aspect of Dufrenne's and Merleau-Ponty's theories:
Merleau-Ponty and Dufrenne represent the same philosophical position, one in ethics and the other in aesthetics. By insisting on the fact that human operation is essentially free, these writers come to suppress the freedom of man. Man thus becomes the bearer of a universal intentional teleology, just as scientists are bearers of the universal scientific knowledge interest which extends beyond each of them. This freedom is a curious freedom, one that hypostatizes human operation while preventing man from being truly responsible for it. I am not responsible for a work of which I am only the instrument. (DeM 367) 

Palmer goes on to say that:

It must be said at once that the disembodied objectivity of a pure system that leaves man out of account stands at once worlds apart from any phenomenological approach, which takes as its foundation the lifeworld. (P 216)

But Husserl, who is considered a subjectivist by Palmer and Heidegger, takes the life-world as foundational, and what else could the life-world be but subjective? In other words, one cannot have it both ways, viz., speak of a life-world and yet deny subjectivity, for after all, it is a subject who lives. What is really required is not a denial of subjectivity, but a reinterpretation of it. I have already adumbrated such a reinterpretation and I will substantiate it in the chapter on other selves. But now I wish to bring out some further shortcomings of Palmer's approach, and this will serve to make still more clear Husserlian phenomenology. To do so a distinction must be drawn between consciousness, self-consciousness and self-reflection. I said previously that consciousness, whatever else it is aware of, is also always aware of itself. Hence it might seem as if we could use all three phrases interchangeably. However, I reserve the term "self-reflection" for when consciousness explicitly makes itself the object
of its ray of attention. I do not use the term "self-consciousness" because that phrase has negative psychological overtones. By a self-conscious person is usually meant one who is more or less painfully aware of his or her empirical ego. It describes an undesirable psychological state because self-consciousness usually interferes with one's actions, especially with artistic acts. The first two "states", consciousness and self-reflection, however, are indispensable to the artistic act, to one's relation to a "work". Palmer, however, denies all three when he denies the role of subjectivity in the "work of art".

According to Palmer, the work of art does not involve objective meaning and involves neither the intention of the artist nor the will or consciousness of the interpreter, whose relation to the work is one of spontaneity, according to Palmer. Throughout his book Palmer uses music to illustrate how philosophical hermeneutics conceives of the "work". I think, however, that the example of music illustrates just the opposite that Palmer thinks it does. If Palmer were correct, then it would not be necessary to inquire after the composer in order to play a given piece--it would not be necessary to know whether one is playing Bach, Chopin or Beethoven, for example. However, if Palmer adopts Gadamer's way out of being left with no guidelines whatsoever for playing a given piece, he might say that we need to place the piece within the tradition in order to play it well. But frequently tradition alone will not tell us how to interpret a work, for certain composers introduced radically new elements into their works which were atypical vis-à-vis the tradition. One thinks of Beethoven. The tradition surrounding Beethoven will not itself tell one how to play
Beethoven, for Beethoven broke with tradition. While the music he wrote was formed by a dialectical relation to the tradition, it was not strictly speaking in keeping with tradition. That means that there is a level of meaning "beyond" the tradition (which can later become absorbed into the tradition), one which developed with the individual and which bears his or her stamp, his or her intention, or outlook.

As to Palmer's claim that the performer's relation to the work does not involve his will, consider the words of renowned pianist Claudio Arrau:

If the artist's gifts are exceptional, he will often show in his early years the qualities symbolized in the archetype of the Divine Child, which, as Jung describes it, "is a personification of vital forces quite outside the limited range of our conscious mind: of a wholeness which embraces the very depth of Nature. It represents the urge, the strongest, the most ineluctable urge in every being, namely the urge to realize itself. It is, as it were, an incarnation of the inability to do otherwise [Jung's italics], equipped with all the powers of nature and instinct, whereas the conscious mind is always getting caught up in its supposed ability to do otherwise." 24

This is the unconscious power of the child prodigy. But passing over from the divine innocence of unconscious security to the young manhood of conscious responsibility takes an act of supreme courage and heroism. For the young artist, it represents one of the most difficult periods of his life. He must pass through a great test.... First he must slay the terrible dragon (attain conscious understanding), then he must pass through the test of fire and water (with Sarastro, the force of conscious knowledge and commitment, as guide), and only then does he attain Pamina (his soul), and his heart's desire. In doing so, the dark terrible forces of the unconscious (Queen of the Night), which always seek to drag him down, sink into the deepest layers of his psyche from where he can then begin to draw his creative power, but this time mastered by his conscious mind. (CWA 241)
From Arrau's description we see the extent to which the self-reflective mind is involved in the creative process, and how both will and courage are involved in this self-reflective process. The role of self-reflection in shaping the artist is a lifelong process, according to Arrau:

This does not mean that from the age of fifty or so an artist begins to flag and accomplish less, just the contrary happens if everything in his psychic development has gone well. His energy is as enormous as ever. Only now, if, as Jung describes it, the full process of individuation has taken place, or is taking place - the process by which a man, through ever greater consciousness, effort, and wisdom finally attains his complete selfhood in harmony with the cosmos - does he do his best and most meaningful work. If this last task is achieved, it produces a new wave of creativity arising from still deeper sources than anything before. (CWA 243-244)

There is nothing in Palmer's description of the artist's relation to the work to suggest any form of personal struggle, any form of personal responsibility, of personal will. While it is true that the artist's relation to his or her work may involve a state in which the subject and object are one in the event (e.g., in certain performances) that is, a state in which among other things the artist is not self-conscious, a state which the pianist Glenn Gould describes as "ecstasy", this neither denies the consciousness of the artist nor the acts of will which led up to the achieving of that "state". In describing the artistic process it is not legitimate to sever the state of ecstasy from the process that led up to that "state", a process that involved not only consciousness but self-consciousness, i.e., reflection, reflection which took place over a long period of time. Observe the words of Gould:
The purpose of art is not the release of a momentary ejection of adrenalin but is, rather, the gradual, lifelong construction of a state of wonder and serenity. Through the ministrations of radio and the phonograph, we are rapidly and quite properly learning to appreciate the elements of aesthetic narcissism - and I use that word in its best sense - and are awakening to the challenge that each man contemplatively create his own identity. (GG 64)

Nor must it be thought that Arrau or Gould are exceptions, and that this is peculiar to musicians. One thinks of the very long reflective development that Rilke underwent, for example.

We know, on the other hand, how Husserl's concept of mind stresses responsibility (C 340), how he speaks of the "heroism of reason" (C 299). The process of conscious self-reflection that Arrau describes fits in with Husserl's phenomenology. According to Arrau's description, self-reflection, an act of objectification, is not only not antithetical to the "word-event", it is indispensable to achieving the highest artistic performance. Self-reflection or objectification helps the artistic act, which at its highest is inspired, alive and deeply felt, come about. This in effect is Kleist's position in The Marionette Theatre:

We see that as in the organic world reflection becomes ever darker and weaker, so grace in proportion comes more brilliantly to the fore. But in the same way as the intersection of two lines on one side of a point, finds itself suddenly on the other side after passing through infinity, or as the image in a concave mirror, after having disappeared into infinity, suddenly reappears right in front of us, so in a similar manner does grace reappear, after knowledge has, as it were, passed through something infinite. At the same time grace appears in its purest form in a human body which either has an infinite consciousness or none at all, i.e., in a marionette or a god.

We must then, I asked, eat again from the Tree of Knowledge in order to return again to a state of
innocence? Of course, he replied. Thus ends the last chapter of the world. (MT 141)

The act of objectification destroys or falsifies neither Being nor the artistic act. "...Phenomenology possesses an aesthetic structure...", writes de Muralt (DeM 368). Indeed, as de Muralt argues, without the notion of voluntary and reflected acts, the artistic act loses its value:

...without the freely voluntary and reflected act of the artist, it amounts to the same thing to say that the aesthetic creation is the necessary result of aesthetic exigency or that it is the product of chance. (DeM 372)

When Arrau talks of the unconscious power of the child prodigy undergoing lifelong reflection to increase the depth and beauty of his or her artistry, this is in line with Husserl's concept of how consciousness operates. For Husserl each level of thought is naive with respect to the next higher level, however rich (potentially or actually) the former is. This can be taken on the level of the individual or on the level of the history of thought. In terms of the latter, for example, Plato's thought is naive with respect to Aristotle's, even though Aristotle's thought involves a misunderstanding of Plato's thought and even though, in Husserl's opinion, Plato's thought contained a greater truth than that of Aristotle. This greater truth is his view that logic, or, to use Plato's term, "dialectic", is one with philosophy, and not, contra Aristotle, a specialized science. Hence, when Aristotle makes logic a special science (FTL 7 [7]), he loses the deeper truth contained in Plato's thought. Yet paradoxically, this misunderstanding in the long run deepens our understanding of logic, for reflection will turn to the
misunderstanding, and, correcting it, will gain an explicit and deepened understanding of logic. It will deepen our understanding because the explication will reveal meaning and connections which were previously only implicit. Hence Plato's thought is the ground, but in a condensed, implicit sense. The aim is to "return to" the original point, but in an enriched, reflective, way thereby transforming the origin. This holds for the artist no less than for the philosopher dealing with the history of thought. The aim is not mere repetition. And, parenthetically, this is how the phenomenological analysis of the notion of the constitution of number in the Philosophy of Arithmetic is to be understood: subjective constitution of the concept is not mere repetition of that concept's constitution.

...as the reestablishment of philosophy with a new universal task and at the same time with the sense of a renaissance of ancient philosophy - it is at once a repetition and a universal transformation [my emphasis] of meaning. (C 14)

Writes de Muralt:

If we want to apply the Husserlian theory of the teleology of history...we might say that the Husserlian idea intentionally removes the historical dross from Plat's original intention and represents the true Platonic idea. (DeM 42)

It sounds as if I am saying that according to Husserl we "have" an idea which guides us a priori and which shapes our behaviour, and that we should come to know this idea. It even sounds as if I am saying that an idea blindly drives our behaviour, as if the latter were predetermined by the former. It seems as if I am putting forth a theory about the nature of mind, in its individual and collective manifestations, which is speculative. But this is only seemingly so.
The spiritual telos of European humanity...lies in the infinite, is an infinite idea towards which, in concealment, the whole spiritual becoming aims, so to speak. As soon as it becomes consciously recognized in the development as telos, it necessarily also becomes practical as a goal of the will; and thereby a new, higher stage of development is introduced which is under the guidance of norms, normative ideas.

Now all this is not intended as a speculative interpretation of our historical development but as the expression of a vital presentiment which arises through unprejudiced reflection. (C 275)

What I am saying here is phenomenologically sound; the description is based on an analysis of the Being of the transcendental ego. Not only is the possibility of the historical movement of thought, both in its individual and collective manifestations, "contained" in the structure of the transcendental ego, but the motive to develop it is also given in the transcendental ego. The transcendental ego "contains" both the structure and the motive push for the development of thought, as I shall now proceed to explain.

In terms of its structure, I have already discussed how for Husserl consciousness can hierarchically relate to itself, each level of self-reflection being naive with respect to the next higher. In terms of motive, I have also discussed how for Husserl the structure of the transcendental ego embodies motive: the transcendental ego is so structured as to imply further action, for it is seeing, and seeing is an act which is incomplete--neither myself nor the object is given completely--but which at the same time "contains" the possibility and rules of further completion. We are the part driven towards the whole. Husserl would agree with Nietzsche when the latter, using musical dissonance as "the auditory analogue" of "the need to look yet go beyond the look" (BT 143 - K 140 [146]), says of man that he is an
incarnation of dissonance (BT 145 - K 143 [151]). Man is the need to hear and at the same time to go beyond the hearing. One recalls also Sartre here: "Man is the desire to be..." (BN 565). When I increase my seeing, i.e., when I reflect, I increase my Being, for Being is seeing. This also involves a physical element as I explained in chapter four. Seeing, from the beginning, is unified with Being and every act of seeing is incorporated into the primal stream of "Being-seeing" upon which I can reflect further. Reflecting, then, is a magnifying of Being, an increasing of the intensity or the being of Being, an increase of power. This achieves its greatest intensity when thought examines itself, i.e., when reflection makes the pure stream of experience its object. Again there is a similarity to the thought of Buber:

Yes, this is what it means to realize: to relate life experience to nothing else but itself. And here is the place where the power of the human spirit awakens and collects itself and becomes creative. (DL 69 [25])

Buber speaks of this relating of life experience to itself as an act which "creates reality" in and through it (DL 69 [25]).

Hence, Being, which quite literally includes the body, the felt, itself points the way to reflection. Being propels and feeds itself in thought. Reflection is a function of Being; it is Being asserting itself. Hence, reflection is self-assertion. Cupiditas, the tendency to self-assertion, is interwoven with our structure. On this level, then, the will is not a separate faculty, although it can later become the function of the explicit ego.
We do not have a willing and, next to it, a perceiving, but in itself what is perceived is characterized as being produced voluntarily. (EJ 201)

And:

...we can form a broader concept of interest [a part of willing], or of acts of interest. Among such acts are to be understood not only those in which I am turned thematically toward an object, perceiving it, perhaps, and then examining it thoroughly, but in general every act of turning toward of the ego, whether transitory, or continuous, every act of the ego's being-with (inter-esse). (EJ 86)

This first level, which is a type of will and structure, is felt, according to Husserl:

We have also spoken of an interest which may be awakened along with turning-toward an object. It now appears that this interest still has nothing to do with a specific act of will. It is not an interest which engenders anything in the order of plans and voluntary activities. It is merely a moment of the striving which belongs to the essence of normal perception. The reason we speak of interest here is that the feeling goes hand in hand with this striving, indeed a positive feeling, which, however, is not to be confused with pleasure taken in the object. (EJ 85)

This first level is the source. This source, the lived-body, the felt, which Husserl calls the transcendental, is Dionysian, to speak in Nietzschean terms, which express very well what is at stake here. The way the Dionysian is described in the literature is similar to how Husserl describes the transcendental. Dionysus is the universal (K 128), basic ground of the world (K 143 [151]), basis and origin of the word (K 129 [134]). The reflective level, which is thought proper, i.e., the concept, the word, is Apollonian (K 129). Apollo represents the individual: the cry to self-knowledge is Apollonian.

As a moral Deity Apollo demands self-control from his people and, in order to observe such self-control, a
knowledge of self. And so we find that the esthetic necessity of beauty is accompanied by the imperatives, "Know thyself,"...(BT 34--K 46 [36])

While these descriptions of Dionysus and Apollo are from Nietzsche's writings, Dodds (GI) describes the two in a similar fashion. According to Dodds, Apollo offers security through personal responsibility, while Dionysus offers liberation through self-abandonment (GI 76)--Dionysus "enables you for a short time to stop being yourself, and thereby sets you free" (GI 76). The Dionysian is the more powerful initially, because it is more immediate--it is felt. But if we hold off on a quick gratification of Dionysus, and instead reflect on Dionysus, we achieve a stronger, transformed, evolved Dionysus. What we achieve is an Apollonization of Dionysus, which in turn is absorbed by Dionysus, the lived stream. What I mean comes close to something Nietzsche writes in the Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music, where he describes the relation between the musical (Dionysian) and conceptual (Apollonian) elements of tragedy. I would like to apply this to life in general, to the relation between the Dionysian and Apollonian elements in life.

If our analysis has shown that the Apollonian element in tragedy has utterly triumphed over the Dionysian quintessence of music, bending the latter to its own purposes - which are to define the drama completely - still an important reservation must be made. At the point that matters most the Apollonian illusion has been broken through and destroyed. The drama which deploys before us, having all its movements and characters illuminated from within by the aid of music - as though we witnessed the coming and going of the shuttle as it weaves the tissue - this drama achieves a total effect quite beyond the scope of any Apollonian artifice. In the final effect of tragedy the Dionysian element triumphs once again: its closing sounds are such as were never heard in the Apollonian realm....Dionysos speaks the language of Apollo, but
Apollo, finally, the language of Dionysos; thereby the highest goal of tragedy and of art in general is reached. (BT 130-131--K 129-130 [135-136])

And:

When speaking of the peculiar effects of musical tragedy we laid stress on that Apollonian illusion which saves us from the direct identification with Dionysiac music and allows us to discharge our musical excitement on an interposed Apollonian medium. At the same time we observe how, by virtue of that discharge, the medium of drama was made visible and understandable from within to a degree that is outside the scope of Apollonian art per se. We were led to the conclusion that when Apollonian art is elevated by the spirit of music it reaches its maximum intensity; thus the fraternal union of Apollo and Dionysos may be said to represent the final consummation of both the Apollonian and Dionysiac tendencies. (BT 140-141--K 139 [145-146])

And:

Enchantment is the precondition of all dramatic art. In this enchantment the Dionysiac reveler sees himself as satyr, and as satyr, in turn, he sees the god. In his transformation he sees a new vision, which is the Apollonian completion of his state. And by the same token this new vision completes the dramatic act. (BT 56--K 64 [57-58])

It may be objected that because Nietzsche considers the Socratic spirit, rationalism, in other words, antagonistic to the Dionysian spirit and the destroyer of tragedy\(^3\) (BT 77--K 82 [79]), phenomenology, also being a rationalism, could not be harmonized with the Dionysian spirit. To this we retort that Nietzsche was not against all rationalism, for he believed in a "new rationalism", one which would be compatible with the Dionysian spirit, and in my view Husserlian phenomenology is such a new, reinterpreted rationalism. As well, his words in the Birth of Tragedy suggest that in Socrates are found the beginnings of such a new rationalism (BT 90--K93 [92]).
Furthermore, one might take issue with Nietzsche's characterization of Socrates, a characterization which is not always consistent, for at times Nietzsche has the highest of praise for Socrates. Specifically Nietzsche maintains that the three Socratic maxims, "virtue is knowledge", "all sins arise from ignorance" and "only the virtuous are happy" (BT 88--K 91 [90]) and his "scientific" attitude of maintaining that one can know nature (BT 94 K 97 [96]) and derive knowledge from a foundation by a logical deductive procedure, spell the death of tragedy (BT 88--K 91 [90]). But is this really Socrates? The maxims, yes. But the latter claims seem more Cartesian than Socratic. Indeed, Socrates insisted that he knew only one thing, viz., that he knew nothing. We are to take him quite seriously on this. Those who know that they do not know become seekers--they question. Nietzsche takes Socrates to be saying that he does not know yet but will know. But one can take Socrates to be saying that he cannot know, but can only ever seek to know. Hence, for Socrates, no less than for Lessing (BT 93--K 95 [95]), the search for truth has greater importance than truth itself. In other words, Socrates' seeing is also a non-seeing--he sees that he does not see.

In any case, the Apollonian dictum "know thyself" need not be considered as antithetical to tragedy. Surely the tragedy cited by Nietzsche himself, Oedipus, has as its theme precisely the need for and redeeming quality of self-knowledge, as Bruno Bettelheim observes:

What forms the essence of our humanity - and of the play - is not being victims of fate, but our struggle to discover the truth about ourselves. Jocasta, who clearly states that she does not wish to discover the truth, cannot face it when it is revealed, and she
perishes. Oedipus, who does face the truth, despite the immense dangers to himself of which he is at least dimly aware, survives. Oedipus suffers much, but at the end, at Colonus, he not only finds peace, but is called to the god and becomes transfigured.

What is most significant about Oedipus, the Oedipal situation, and the Oedipus complex is not only the tragic fate that we are all projected into deep conflicts by our infantile desires, but also the need to resolve these conflicts through the difficult struggles for, and the achievement of, self-discovery. (FMS 30)

As well, Socrates espouses a theory of openness to Dionysus in the Phaedrus, in the Ion and in Diotima's speech in the Symposium, where unbridled receptivity to Dionysus is referred to as "Divine Madness". This also suggests that Nietzsche's critique of Socrates in the Birth of Tragedy is not quite legitimate.

We have seen, then, that from the camp of philosophical hermeneutics comes the charge that Husserlian phenomenology, in speaking of the meaning of a text, and, correlatively, in speaking of grounding philosophy in consciousness, is still given to objectivism. But from semiology comes the opposite charge, that phenomenology ignores the objective (in meaning) and that it moves directly into the word-event. For philosophical hermeneutics the philosophy of the subject spells objectivism, while for semiology it spells the ignoring of the objective! Such divergent, indeed, opposing interpretations only show how poorly phenomenology is understood. I will next raise and discuss the challenges of semiology in order to explain, once more, how phenomenology finds itself in between objectivism and subjectivism. The semiological challenge according to Ricoeur is the following:

And yet, phenomenology has radicalized the question of language in such a way which excludes dialogue with modern linguistics and with semiologic
disciplines which are built on a linguistic model. The partial failure of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of language is instructive in this respect.

The "return to the speaking subject" which Merleau-Ponty foresaw and began, following the later Husserl, is conceived in such a way that it rushes past the objective science of signs and moves too quickly to speech. Why? Because, from the beginning the phenomenological attitude and the objective attitude have been placed in opposition....(CI 247-248)33

And:

The fact that the notion of language as an autonomous system is not taken into consideration weighs heavily on this phenomenology of speech. Its recourse to the process of "sedimentation" carries it back to the old psychological notion of habitus, of acquired powers, and the structural fact as such is missed. (CI 249)

In other words, according to Ricoeur, whereas in the view of semiology language has primacy over speech, system over process, structure over function, phenomenology maintains the reverse (CI 257).

According to Ricoeur phenomenology maintains that the subjective act has primacy over any objective system.

After presenting the challenge semiology poses for phenomenology, Ricoeur attempts to answer the challenge by reinterpreting the phenomenological reduction (CI 257) which he sees as the source of the problem. He wants to forego "the identification of reduction with the direct passage which, at once and in one step, would make the phenomenological attitude spring from the natural attitude and would snatch consciousness from being..."(CI 257). Such an approach to the reduction allows the semiological challenge to take hold because it makes it seem as if the transcendental ego is cut off from the world, from others and from language, and makes it seem as if the transcendental ego precedes these. The reduction that Ricoeur seems to
be describing here, and upon which he wishes to improve, is the Cartesian way into phenomenology which "leads to the transcendental ego in one leap" (C 155) and which Husserl himself criticized as having the drawback of making it seem as if the ego that the reduction yields is cut off from the world and others, of making it seem like an idealist ego (C 155). Instead Ricoeur intends to do the following:

I should like to explore another path to propose an interpretation of reduction which would more closely connect it to the theory of signification, whose central position in phenomenology we have acknowledged...we will look for the reduction among the necessary conditions of signifying relations of symbolic function as such. (CI 257)

But what is interesting is that the approach that Ricoeur describes here is precisely the approach Husserl takes in Formal And Transcendental Logic, the path of "passing from language to discourse" (CI 26). In Formal And Transcendental Logic Husserl starts out with the formal system of logic and language and proceeds to the subject in the life-world, the speaking subject. Formal And Transcendental is "a meditation which crosses the threshold separating the semiological from the semantic" (CI 261). In the latter work Husserl moves from the purely logical and grammatical to semantics and Being by means of the idea of the theory of science. What Ricoeur offers as a reinterpretation of the reduction is one of Husserl's own interpretations of the reduction--it is one of the ways into phenomenology.

We see in Husserl's treatment of logic those elements Ricoeur says are missing in Merleau-Ponty's treatment of language, elements native to semiology, which Ricoeur sees as part of a semiological
challenge to phenomenology (CI 251). Ricoeur says that two postulates of semiotics which pose a major challenge to phenomenology are (a) "the reduction of the substantial aspects of language - phonemic substance and semantic substance - to formal aspects" (CI 250), and (b) that "it is scientifically legitimate to describe language as being essentially an autonomous entity composed of internal dependencies, in a word, a structure" (CI 250). Ricoeur goes on to say:

In other words, the system of signs no longer has any outside, it has only an inside; the last postulate ['b' above], which can be termed the postulate of the closed system of signs, summarizes and commands all the others. It constitutes the major challenge for phenomenology. (CI 250-251)

But these postulates form part of Husserl's philosophy in Formal And Transcendental Logic. Husserl makes the distinction between the signified and the one who signifies, between the spoken and the speaker, and morphology is an "objective" science of the spoken. It has no outside, and it is formal. But Ricoeur is correct in saying that whereas in semiotics this objective formal structure is considered to be the total ground hence implying primacy of structure over process, in phenomenology it is a moment in, an aspect of, a transcendental logic. Furthermore, if we take the speaking subject to be an instance of the universal a priori transcendental ego, then for phenomenology, no less than for semiotics, "language is a system which precedes the speaking subject" (CI 251), i.e., "the knowledge of 'possibilities' must precede that of actualities (Wirklichkeiten)", writes Husserl [I 213 <159>]. In Husserl's phenomenology neither structure nor process has primacy. Both exist together from the start.
The transcendental ego constitutes pure grammar from the structure of its Being, from its function to bring objects to evidence, and the pure grammar is there as a potential to be constituted.

Although morphology and the other levels of apophantics constitute a formal system of signs, it must not be thought that it is a closed system of signs, in contrast to ordinary language, which can have an openness. The openness of ordinary language is exhibited, for example, in the metaphor of the poet. Transcendental logic, although formal, is ultimately linked with Being, and this link gives it an openness, which allows for the freedom of the metaphor. Morphology is part of a logos deeper than acquired language and underlies and upholds the latter, becoming incorporated in it and allowing it to develop. Ricoeur is correct when he writes that "[in phenomenology] one sees logical meaning lodged at the centre of gravity of linguistic activity..." (CI 246). Husserl's transcendental logic is more basic than acquired language because it is grounded in pre-predicative experience, which is a logic too. The infant has, in other words, a type of logic as well (cf. Piaget).

I have attempted to show, then, that Husserl's characterization of the pure transcendental ego as the absolute ground of all being-sense is compatible with his characterization of the pure transcendental ego as radical self-examination. Phenomenology embraces both an essential approach and a hermeneutic approach. It was demonstrated that a purely hermeneutic approach à la Palmer, which excludes a philosophy of essences, cannot do justice to the creative acts of the ego. In the next chapter I put to the test again the
description of phenomenology that I have advanced. I said that the notion of the pure transcendental ego as absolute ground of being-sense can do justice to the speculative demands contained in the concept of life. I attempted to work this out in chapter four by relating phenomenology to psychoanalytic theory. In the next chapter I examine if phenomenology can do justice to the phenomenon of intersubjectivity. In so doing I aim to deepen our understanding of the connection between desire, value and thought, between life and reason.
FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER FIVE

1. Unless I state otherwise, when I say "phenomenology" I mean Husserl's phenomenology.

2. The concept of transcendental ego as radical self-examination reflects the openness of phenomenology.

3. It is also the question of dogma versus openness.

4. Though at one point (C xlii) Carr suggests that the two approaches are compatible, still I do not think he seriously considers it and in any case he does not see the structural reason for their compatibility.

5. As examples of transcendent essences Husserl gives the following: "thing", "spatial shape", "movement", "colour of a thing", "man", "human feeling", "soul", "psychical experience" (experience in the psychological sense), "person", "quality of character" (I 161 [114]).

6. Husserl writes that it took him a long time to see this important point:

   At least for me the second stage was very difficult, even after the first. Today that cannot escape the attentive reader of the Logische Untersuchungen....The fact is that the beginner in phenomenology finds it difficult to acquire a reflective mastery of the different focussings of consciousness with their different correlates. (I FK 140-141 [117])

7. Again there is a similarity between Husserl's position and that of Buber. Writes Buber: "He knows no security yet is never unsure; for he possesses steadfastly that before which all security appears vain and empty: direction and meaning." (DL 92) Direction and meaning are the essential characteristics of intentionality.

8. This gives rise to the paradoxical hermeneutic circle.

9. It does not matter whether we are talking about "works" here. The "work" could also be the ego.

10. It will not do to say that Descartes explains the cogito's apodicticity by the notion of clear and distinct ideas, for Descartes himself felt the latter notion to be in need of grounding, and he
attempts to prove the status of clear and distinct ideas by appeal to the benevolence of God.

11. This is the reason why Iso Kern (IK 203-204) writes that Husserl does not lose the world in his reduction, unlike Descartes in his doubting.

12. See page 87.

13. What is meant by "immanent object" is explained on pp. 230 ff.

14. As Buber writes, "it is immediacy which alone makes it possible to live the realizing as real." (DL 78)

15. If it be objected that the cogito is only my mental being, and not my physical, I refer the reader to chapter four, in which it is discussed how the cogito involves the body.

16. The world is not a necessary object, but a factual object. It might not have been, but as a matter of fact it is. Cogito is a necessary Being. Husserl writes:

   Over against the positing of the world, which is a 'contingent' positing, there stands the positing of my pure Ego and Ego-life, which is a 'necessary', absolutely indubitable positing. Anything physical which is given 'in person' can be non-existent; no mental process which is given 'in person' can be non-existent. This is the eidetic law defining this necessity and that contingency. (I 131 [86])

   It is interesting to compare this to the words of Buber:

   To neither the joinings of human need between birth and the grave, however, nor to the fate of all life that is scattered abroad in the world, nor to all the counter play of the elements, nor even to the movement of the stars themselves, not to all these investigated and registered things may I grant the name of necessity, but only to the directed soul. (DL 57 [18])

17. On the difference between phenomenology and deductive science de Muralt writes the following:

   Geometry and phenomenology are both eidetic sciences; but the deductive method is a deduction of essences, while the phenomenological method is a direct intuition of essences. (DeM 76)

   And:
Factical science, tending towards its own ideal perfection, always remains in tendency toward its idea. Hence we have a necessarily dynamic point of view, that of realization of the idea by development, which contrasts with the static point of view of deduction. Even if the idea is analogous to an axiom, definition of science by its idea is not the definition of science's object but of its own development as science. This development is, to be sure, a "consequence" of the idea, since it is motivated a priori by it. But it is not deduced from its idea as the analytic consequences of a geometric axiom are deduced from the axiom. (DeM 73)

18. Parenthetically, one could take the Sophists to be saying something like this when they say there are no principles one can appeal to in the search for truth (cf. p. 12).

19. This point is articulated by Gadamer too when he says that every question implies or presupposes knowledge (TM 326).

20. See footnote 11 of this chapter.

21. Iso Kern writes the following:

Mit Recht wurde Husserl in manchen Kritiken vorgeworfen, dass er dem Eigensein der fremden Subjektivität in seiner phänomenologischen Philosophie nicht Rechnung zu tragen vermöge. Diese Kritik hat aber--so müssen wir wiederum vorausnehmend sagen--nur vom Gesichtspunkt des Catesianischen Weges ihr Recht, der den eigentlichen Sinn von Husserl's tranzendental-phänomenologischer Reduktion nicht erreicht. (IK 205)

22. This is brought out beautifully in Heinrich von Kleist's Über das Marionettentheater (MT 133-141).

23. I am referring to the extent to which his music expresses "raw" emotion, something not found previously. The tradition has no way of conveying to us the way in which his music is to be played--the peculiar blend of explosiveness and tender restraint. This is Beethoven's "stamp" on music and in part it reflects his personality.

24. By "conscious mind" is here meant what I term self-consciousness.

25. Again, compare the words of Buber:

Realization has nothing to promise. It says: If you wish to become mine, you must descend into the abyss. What is it if the choosing man hands himself over to the friendlier mistress [orientation] and only now and then, in the rare hours of self-recollection, casts a
melancholy glance at the other [realization]? (DL 96 [44])

And:

Security--thus you name the breath of your first life. But that was the security of the sleepwalker. Children are sleepwalkers in the world. They pass through all abysses unharmed, for they do not see them. The direction that guides their steps is dreamlike. It is granted them to realize without risk because they are unaware of the inner duality and therefore all things offer themselves to them undivided. Everything harmonizes with them like a roundelay, and the contradiction itself joins in the play...then comes the awakening. It can come late. There are men whose realizing power is so great that it outlasts childhood in its first form--the dreamlike simplicity. No matter: it happens that an abyss that one has countless times passed by suddenly looms at his feet. (DL 96 [43-44])

26. For my part, I would say that not all children "pass all abysses unharmed".

27. For Buber also the artistic act is one which is not only ordered but comprehended (DL 75 [30]). Writes Buber:

The primitive man and the child are still, the creative man newly master of reality. A moonbeam lies on the forehead of the former like the mirroring of a forgotten paradise, but the latter shines with a fire that it has stolen from heaven. (DL 71 [27])

28. This is explained and further textual reference is given on pp. 333 ff.

29. "Untergründe der Welt".

30. "Untergrund und die Geburtsstätte des Wortes".

31. By tragedy is meant: "concrete manifestation of Dionysian conditions, music made visible, an ecstatic dream world" (BT 89 K 92 [91]).

32. It must be stressed that what is meant by "madness" here is not psychosis. As Trilling argues:

...the doctrine that madness is health, that madness is liberation and authenticity, receives a happy welcome from a consequential part of the educated public....But who that has spoken, or tried to speak, with a
psychotic friend will consent to betray the masked pain of his bewilderment and solitude by making it a paradigm of liberation from the imprisoning falsehoods of an alienated social reality? (SA 171)

33. This is the way Ricoeur reads Merleau-Ponty. I do not read him that way. Merleau-Ponty has stated explicitly that the objective realm and transcendental realm are not opposed to each other. See page 342.

34. I would say that Ricoeur's interpretation of the reduction here is a reinterpretation of the way most philosophers understand the reduction, but not a reinterpretation of how Husserl understood the reduction, for Ricoeur's approach here, as I shall explain a little further on, is that of Husserl in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. And my "quarrel" with Ricoeur is not that I do not agree with his final stance, but that I think that that position is found in Husserl.

35. The other part of the semiological challenge comes from Freudianism, as I explained in an earlier chapter. I think Freud poses the only real challenge, for he presents a new phenomenon. Structuralism has only a new interpretation for an "old" phenomenon.
CHAPTER SIX

The Problem Of The Other: A Resolution Of Transcendental Solipsism.

In this chapter I address the "problem of other selves". Besides being an issue for philosophy in general, the problem of other selves has a special significance for phenomenology in particular, as I explain below. The challenge that the problem of the alter ego poses to philosophy in general is summarized lucidly by Merleau-Ponty:

How can an action or a human thought be grasped in the mode of the 'one', since by its very nature, it is a first person operation, inseparable from an I...[H]ow can the word 'I' be put into the plural, how can a general idea of the I be formed, how can I speak of an I other than my own, how can I know that there are other I's, how can consciousness which, by its nature, and as a self-knowledge, is in the mode of the I, be grasped in the mode of the Thou, and through this, in the world of the 'One'? (PhP 348)

The problem of other selves, then, may be characterized briefly as follows: how does the notion of "I", which denotes a private experience, namely that of being conscious, of being alive, something only given directly from within, get transformed into the general idea of "I"? That is, how can I come to have a notion of "other I" or "other self" given that I cannot, by definition, experience another "I"? Presumably Descartes gave rise to this problem when he said that mind and body are two distinct substances, the former, a mental substance, inhering in the latter, a material substance. Since consciousness in this view is construed as an interiority, the other remains actually inaccessible to me. One will presumably never
encounter another consciousness directly but will only be able to think another consciousness. I quote Merleau-Ponty again because he expresses the problem so lucidly:

...if it [the body] is that object which the biologist talks about, that conjunction of processes analyzed in the physiological treatises, that collection of organs shown in plates of books on anatomy, then my experience can be nothing but the dialogue between bare consciousness and the system of objective correlations which it conceives. The body of another, like my own, is not inhabited, but is an object standing before the consciousness which thinks about or constitutes it. Other men, and myself, seen as empirical beings, are merely pieces of mechanism worked by springs, but the true subject has no counterpart, for that consciousness which is hidden in so much flesh and blood is the least intelligible of occult qualities. (PhP 349)

According to this theory, original coexistence or intersubjective experience is denied: the other is identified by his or her body first as object and only subsequently as other person (consciousness/mind). Analogical reasoning, the process whereby I project my consciousness into the body of another, in virtue of the other's body being the analogue of mine, is traditionally invoked to explain the transition from seeing the other as object to the seeing the other as person. But, as Merleau-Ponty points out, reasoning by analogy presupposes what it aims to explain.

If it were really my "thought" that had to be placed in the other person, I would never put it there. No appearance could ever have the power to convince me that there is a cogito over there, or be able to motivate the transference, since my own cogito owes its whole power of conviction to the fact that I am myself. (S 170)

Husserl makes the same point in the Cartesian Meditations:

Therefore it is not as though the body over there, in my primordial sphere, remained separate from the
animate bodily organism of the other Ego, as if that body were something like a signal for its analogue (by virtue of an obviously inconceivable motivation)[my emphasis]. (CM 122 [151])

Indeed, there seems to be no way out of the solipsism that is entailed by this view of the ego.

The problem of other selves is of importance to philosophy on at least two counts. If one maintains that philosophy has implications for those actions which concern one's dealings with one's fellow human beings, then one must deal with philosophy's problem of the alter ego. It is hard to conceive how a discipline for which the existence of other selves constitutes not merely a difficulty, but, to use Merleau-Ponty's expression, an "outrage" (PhP 349), can be a form of social activity. Our values are based on our essential nature. If the relation to others is at the heart of our Being, that is, if our relation to others forms part of our essence, then a philosophy for which the alter ego is a problem, a philosophy which does not touch the heart of our Being, our essence, is a philosophy which is bankrupt in terms of value. Such a philosophy, to borrow Husserl's phrase, will have nothing to say to us. Hence, philosophy's problem of other selves is a problem of values. More narrowly, and secondarily, the problem of other selves is the acid test for phenomenology. According to Ricoeur:

...the constitution of the Other, which assures the passage to intersubjectivity, is the touchstone for the success or failure not only of phenomenology but also of the implicit philosophy of phenomenology.

All aspects of phenomenology, therefore converge upon the problem of the constitution of the Other. (HAP 195)

In what way the problem of other selves is the acid test of phenomenology I will spell out below.
Husserl's entire philosophy essentially constitutes a critique of objectivism, as I explained in chapter three. There I said that objectivism may be briefly characterized as the failure to recognize sense or ontic validity as being the result of a constitutive act of the ego; it occurs when we mistake a sense or ontic validity constituted by the ego for something given to the ego (see pp. 121 ff.). I explained also that objectivism is considered undesirable because it lessens the ego's power or responsibility. This means, again, that we bypass our deepest values. Hence the aim is to overcome objectivism. Phenomenology attempts to overcome objectivism by excluding all positing of being and by exposing the truly given, by exposing the genetic primary level of Being, the "point" at which, genetically speaking, the ego "commences" constitution (see pp. 125 ff.). To posit being is to engage in mere ontological prejudice. Husserl thought to overcome all ontological prejudice, to avoid all unwarranted constructions and false posittings, by bringing phenomena to expression (PH 131) through repeatedly instituting the transcendental reduction (see pp. 131, 135 ff. and p. 211). The repeated institution of the transcendental reduction ultimately leads to the life-world: "the doctrine of life-world is intended to make the transcendental reduction flawless" (PH 164) (see pp. 152 ff.). Understandably, then, the concept of life-world occupies a pivotal position in Husserl's framework, for it is the very antithesis of objectivism (TM 218). It marks, according to Husserl, the overcoming of all ontological prejudice: both idealism and realism, each a form of objectivism, are overcome in the concept of life-world (pp. 160 ff.).
But according to Gadamer, "there is one element in Husserl's thinking...that constantly threatens to burst his framework asunder" (TM 219). Gadamer wonders whether Husserl does "justice to the speculative demands contained in the concept of life" (TM 221), where specifically he questions whether Husserl can adequately account for the phenomenon of intersubjectivity and the understanding of the other "I":

The immanent data in reflectively examined consciousness do not include the 'Thou' in an immediate and primary way....Husserl tried, through the most painstaking investigations, to throw light on the analogy between the 'I' and the 'Thou'--which Dilthey interprets purely psychologically through the analogy of empathy by means of the intersubjectivity of the communal world. He was sufficiently rigorous not to limit in any way the epistemological priority of transcendental subjectivity. But his ontological prejudice is the same as Dilthey's. The other person is first apprehended as an object of perception which then, through empathy, becomes a 'Thou'. In Husserl this concept of empathy has no doubt a purely transcendental meaning, but is still oriented to the interiority of self-consciousness and fails to achieve the orientation towards the functional circle of life, which goes far beyond consciousness, to which, however, it claims to return. (TM 221)

Gadamer speaks of Husserl's theory of the alter ego being oriented to the interiority of a self-consciousness. This is so, according to Gadamer, because of Husserl's tenet that consciousness intentionally constitutes all being, according to which the transcendental ego constitutes the alter ego. The other becomes constituted "in" me and is derived from the originary constitution of the ego-cogito. This is to deny original intersubjective experience in that what is original is the ego-cogito, the interiority of consciousness, as Gadamer states. But the other too is accordingly an
interiority, a constituting transcendental ego. But how can I have access to such an interiority? How can it be given to me? How can I ever know any constituting activity other than my own transcendental ego to exist? This is precisely the problem of other selves, now encountered on a transcendental level. Hence, according to Gadamer, we re-encounter in Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity the very problem that he set out to solve in the Cartesian Meditations: Husserl's philosophy is caught up in a solipsism, albeit a transcendental solipsism. According to Gadamer, because Husserl maintains that we have no direct perception of the other's interiority, Husserl is led to suggest that the other is first seen as object, and only subsequently, through analogical reasoning, is his "interiority", his consciousness, inferred.

But why should this problem have such an extensive impact on Husserl's philosophy? That is, why should this problem "threaten to burst asunder Husserl's framework"? The insoluble dilemma of other minds has its origin in the ontological prejudice of Cartesianism. It is the ontological prejudice of Descartes, in which being is reified and seen as an existent thing (CI 228), that renders the problem of other selves insoluble. That is, Descartes, in taking the ego to be a mental substance inhering in a physical body, in taking the being of the ego to be an existent thing, in other words, makes the alter ego something we can only infer; something we never see but only think. This commits him, in other words, to solipsism. It is well known that Husserl's phenomenology has its origin in Descartes' philosophy even though Husserl claims to "correct" Cartesianism by radicalizing it (CM
1). But if Husserl, like Descartes, runs up against the problem of other selves, could it be because he has somehow inherited the very ontological prejudice of Descartes that he sought to overcome in phenomenology? If so, the whole enterprise of phenomenology may be rendered suspect, for phenomenology claims to overcome all ontological prejudice. It may, according to Gadamer, give support to Heidegger's criticism of Husserl's philosophical enterprise:

Is Heidegger not right when he sees an ontological prejudice operative in Husserl's foundational structure, a prejudice that finally affects the whole idea of a constitutive phenomenology? (PH 169)

But what is it that Husserl takes over from Descartes, and in what way does this contain a prejudice? Husserl takes from Descartes the ego-cogito. That is, Husserl, like Descartes, grounds his phenomenology on the "I know", knowledge being conceived as apodicticity. Husserl too places a heavy emphasis on apodicticity, i.e., he takes over Descartes' method of doubt to achieve apodictic knowledge. But Ricoeur has shown that the ego-cogito of Descartes is not an innocent, that is, unprejudiced assertion, but is one which reflects a specific metaphysics, based on an ontological prejudice.

According to Gadamer, Husserl unwittingly incorporates this metaphysics in his phenomenology. Ricoeur, speaking of Descartes, explains the nature of this ontological prejudice on which the ego-cogito is based. I quote at length:

...it belongs to an age of metaphysics for which truth is the truth of existents and as such constitutes the forgottenness of Being...The philosophical ground on which the cogito emerged is the ground of science in particular, but, more generally, it is the mode of understanding in which the existent (das Seiende) is
put at the disposal of an "explanatory representation". The first presupposition is that we raise the problem of science in terms of research (suchen), which implies the objectification of an existent and which places the existent before us (vor-Stellung). Thus calculating man perhaps becomes sure (sicher), gains certainty (Gewissheit), of the existent. It is the point where the problem of certitude and the problem of representation coincide that the cogito emerges. In the metaphysics of Descartes, the existent was defined for the first time as the objectivity of representation and truth as certainty of representation. With objectivity comes subjectivity, in the sense that this being certain of the object is the counter part of the positing of a subject. So we have both the positing of the subject and the proposition of the representation. This is the age of the world as view or picture (Bild). ... We understand now in what sense the cogito belongs to the metaphysical tradition. The subject-object relationship interpreted as Bild, as picture, as view, obliterates, dissimulates, the belonging of Dasein to Sein. It dissimulates the process of this ontological implication. (CI 228-229)

This represents a metaphysics of presence, the view according to which Being is construed as the presence of what is present, as opposed to presence by clearing (PH 170). The existent is understood, accordingly, in terms of objectivity of representation, and truth as the certainty of representation (cf. Hume and Kant: knowledge=truth=certainty). Truth, in other words, is seen as disclosedness, as opposed to being the interinvolvement of disclosure and concealment (PH 170). The truth of the ego is given by the absolute indubitability of the ego-cogito, the cogito being understood as representation. Because of the emphasis on apodicticity, on certainty of representation, the manner of existence of the ego was not put into question. For this reason Ricoeur writes that according to Heidegger "it is the absolute certainty of the cogito which has foreclosed the problem of the meaning of the being of this entity" (CI
227). Apodicticity, in other words, becomes mistaken for adequation, as Ricoeur points out.

All in all, this metaphysics is considered an "evil" because in construing Being as presence the question of Being is foreclosed. This bears certain moral consequences about which I will say a bit more later (p.350). Foreclosing the question of Being is ontological prejudice. Needless to say, if Husserl has taken over this metaphysics from Descartes, then his philosophy harbours and is built on an ontological prejudice. If this is so, the whole claim of a constitutive phenomenology is undercut, as phenomenology claimed precisely to be non-prejudiced ontologically. If "transcendental solipsism" reflects Husserl's inability to "solve" the problem of other selves, as Gadamer suggests, then we can appreciate the consequences: it suggests that Husserl shares Descartes' ontological prejudice. If it can, on the other hand, be shown that Husserl's philosophy is able to deal adequately with the problem of the alter ego, the claim that he shares Descartes' ontological prejudice cannot take hold here.

In the fifth chapter of the Cartesian Meditations Husserl himself raises the problem of transcendental solipsism.

When I, the meditating I, reduce myself to my absolute transcendental ego by phenomenological epoche do I not become solus ipse; and do I not remain that, as long as I carry on a consistent self-explication under the name phenomenology? Should not a phenomenology that proposed to solve the problems of Objective being, and to present itself actually as philosophy, be branded therefore as transcendental solipsism? (CM 89 [121])

And:

But what about other ego's, who surely are not a mere intending and intended in me, merely synthetic
unities of possible verification in me, but, according to their sense, precisely others? Have we not therefore done transcendental realism an injustice. (CM 89 [132])

And:

...can we avoid saying likewise: "The very question of the possibility of actually transcendent knowledge - above all, that of the possibility of my going outside my ego and reaching other egos (who, after all, as others, are not actually in me but only consciously intended in me) - this question cannot be asked purely phenomenologically"? Is it not self-understood from the very beginning that my field of transcendental knowledge does not reach beyond my sphere of transcendental experience and what is synthetically comprised therein? Is it not self-understood that all of that is included without residue in my own transcendental ego? (CM 90 [122])

I aim to show in this chapter how, contrary to general opinion, a careful reading of Husserl's work reveals that phenomenology has the means to overcome the problem of the alter ego. In doing so I will draw on the writings of Merleau-Ponty because, at least in phenomenological circles, he is generally credited with overcoming the problem of other selves by means of his theory of the lived-body, while on the whole it is not appreciated that this theory is already found in Husserl's writings. By the thesis of the lived-body, according to which consciousness is essentially embodied, Merleau-Ponty transposes the problem of the alter ego, for he denies the very mind-body split of objectivistic theories of consciousness which, as I explained, gave rise to the problem of other selves to begin with. I shall argue that while it is true that Merleau-Ponty wrote more extensively and explicitly on the problem of the alter ego than did Husserl, the conceptual means whereby he overcomes the problem, especially the notion of lived-body, are contained in Husserl's thought, as Merleau-
Ponty himself repeatedly indicates, especially in his "The Philosopher and his Shadow". In "The Philosopher and his Shadow", where he is concerned with explicating the relation of his own theory of the lived-body to Husserl's thought, Merleau-Ponty isolates two central notions of Husserl's phenomenology which form the foundation of his theory of the lived-body. These are:

(i) rejection of the notion of constituting consciousness, i.e., "Ideen II brings to light, a network of implications beneath the 'objective material thing' in which we no longer sense the pulsation of a constituting consciousness" (S 166). In Ideen II, the "source" of constitution, the pure transcendental ego is seen, not as constituting agency, but as an activity.

(ii) overturning of "our idea of the thing and the world", and a resulting "ontological rehabilitation of the sensible" (S 166-167). Here he means that the emphasis is shifted from the constituted, to the constituting. In other words, the emphasis is shifted from the thing, from being-in-itself, to pre-thetic, perceptual activity.

I will have to show next how these two themes are found in Husserl's phenomenology, and specifically how (ii) leads to (i)--that is, how overturning the idea of thing and world by means of the transcendental reduction leads us to the constituting activity of the pure ego and how this relates to the lived-body. I shall first discuss what leads Husserl to overturn the idea of thing and world.

I have said that the objective theory of consciousness, which underlies the problem of other selves, took root and blossomed with Descartes' theory of the ego-cogito. The philosophical ground on which
the cogito, as conceived by Descartes, emerged is the ground of science (CI 228). It is objectivistic science that leads to the bankruptcy of value. We must understand why this is so, for Husserl's overturning of thing and world comes about via a critique of 18th century science. His critique aims to restore Science to its true sense, which would unite it once again with value. Therefore let us see in what sense the ground on which the cogito emerged is that of science.

In the Aim and Structure of Physical Theory the physicist Pierre Duhem shows through an analysis of the history of science (ASTP 270) that science is implicitly guided by an idea which motivates it, and hence is necessary to it, but which, paradoxically, at the same time falsifies the nature of physical science. The idea is that science will yield absolute knowledge of true being, of reality as it is in-itself, that it will yield a consistent body of knowledge of reality-in-itself, a body of knowledge to which everyone would in principle assent. It is guided by the idea of cosmology, in other words. This idea is part of the idea of science first explicated by Plato in response to the claim made by certain Sophists that knowledge was not possible.

Plato's logic [i.e., theory or idea of science] arose from the reaction against the universal denial of science by sophistic skepticism. If skepticism denied the essential possibility of any such thing as "philosophy", as science, then Plato had to weigh, and establish by criticism, precisely the essential possibility of such a thing. If all science was called in question, then naturally no fact, science, could be presupposed. Thus Plato was set on the path of the pure idea. Not gathered from de facto sciences but formative of pure norms, his dialectic of pure ideas -
as we say, his logic or his theory of science - was called on to make genuine science possible now for the first time, to guide its practice. (FTL 1-2 [1-2])

According to Plato, Science, which yields knowledge of true Being, is a deductive system in which the ultimate premisses are self-evident first principles (cf., e.g., Rep. 533c). In other words, for Plato "a science worthy of the name must justify each of its steps" (SHL xxxiii). But as I have already mentioned (in chapter two) Plato's Idea of science was inextricably bound up with his cosmology or metaphysics. According to Plato science yields knowledge of true Being, but only the transcendent Ideas have true Being. The Ideas are hierarchically ordered with, at their apex, the Idea of the Good. The Good is the direct cause of both the being of the Ideas, of true Being, and of any knowledge of them. Hence, only the Good can be an ultimate first principle, and the Idea of science for Plato really reads: a deductive system in which the ultimate first principles are descriptions of the Good. Only a science which has as its domain the Ideas and ultimately the Good is genuine science, according to Plato. That science is dialectic, philosophy itself.

Plato's arguments for the possibility of knowledge leave intact the basic ancient Greek presupposition or view of the world as Cosmos, as an ordered, rational system and of mind as reflecting this order, a view in which to know the world is to know mind and vice versa. Dialectic, which aims to know the Ideas, the "really real", will at the same time yield knowledge of mind, for according to Plato the mind is capable of knowing the Ideas only because it is like the Ideas. Hence, science brings with it self-understanding, according to Plato, and is
the way to become a virtuous citizen. For Plato science is knowledge of self in terms of the whole of existence, knowledge of one's place in the world. Through understanding one's place in the Cosmos and one's relation to the Good, one comes to do good. To see the Good, is to do the Good, according to Plato. In other words, science for Plato was a radical enterprise of self-responsibility. Science, value, mind, self-knowledge, knowledge of the world, these are all related in Plato's system.

This Platonic ideal resurges in the Renaissance after having been repressed in the Middle Ages:

What does it [the Renaissance] hold to be essential to ancient man? After some hesitation, nothing less than the "philosophical" form of existence: freely giving oneself, one's whole life, its rule through pure reason or through philosophy. Theoretical philosophy is primary. A superior survey of the world must be launched, unfettered by myth and the whole tradition: universal knowledge, absolutely free from prejudice, of the world and man, ultimately recognizing in the world its inherent reason and teleology and its highest principle, God. Philosophy as theory frees not only the theorist but any philosophically educated person. And theoretical autonomy is followed by practical autonomy. According to the guiding ideal of the Renaissance, ancient man forms himself with insight through free reason. For this renewed "Platonism" this means not only that man should be changed ethically [but that] the whole human surrounding world, the political and social existence of mankind, must be fashioned anew through free reason, through insights of a universal philosophy. (C 8)

The Platonic ideal of philosophy as universal Science resurges. However, the ideal undergoes a change in meaning due to the development of natural science, which itself was made possible by a change in world view. The change is from seeing the world as a finite, hierarchically ordered whole to viewing the world as an infinite system (C 22) in
which all components are, or all being is, on a par. Hence, the ideal of universal science, science of true being, no longer means knowledge of a higher, transcendental, realm, but knowledge of the physical universe. Koyré, whose position is similar to Husserl's position on this in the Crisis, explains that this shift in world view brings with it a loss of concern with value in science.

This scientific and philosophical revolution...can be described roughly as bringing forth the destruction of the Cosmos, that is, the disappearance, from philosophically and scientifically valid concepts, of the conception of the world as a finite, closed, and hierarchically ordered whole (a whole in which hierarchy and structure of being, rising from the dark, heavy, and imperfect earth to the higher and higher perfection of the stars and heavenly spheres), and its replacement by an indefinite and even infinite universe which is bound together by the identity of its fundamental components and laws, and in which all these components are placed on the same level of being. This, in turn, implies the discarding by scientific thought of all considerations based upon value-concepts, such as perfection, harmony, meaning and aim, and finally the utter devalorization of being, the divorce of the world of value and the world of facts. (FCW 2)

With this change of world view, then, true knowledge, i.e., episteme, came to mean knowledge of the physical world as it is in-itself, as opposed to how the world appears to man. But as Husserl notes, subjective interpretations are essential to the empirically intuited world. These must be overcome in order to achieve a picture of the world as it is in-itself. By the time of the Renaissance the application of geometry to the earth and in astronomy had developed considerably. Since geometry aided "in bringing the sensible surrounding world to univocal determination" (C 29), it seemed as if geometry got at reality independent of subjective perspective, that is,
that it got at reality in-itself independently of subjectivity. Husserl describes the idea this led to:

Wherever such a methodology is developed, there we have also overcome the relativity of subjective interpretations which is, after all, essential to the empirically intuited world. For in this manner we attain an identical, nonrelative truth of which everyone who can understand and use this method can convince himself. Here, then, we recognize something that truly is... (C 29)

Geometry seemed to yield knowledge of true being, of being in-itself. This led Galileo to the idea of extending this method to all of nature and of describing its objective being as prescribed by the ideal of universal science.

Must not something similar be possible for the concrete world as such? If one is already firmly convinced, moreover, like Galileo, - thanks to the Renaissance's return to ancient philosophy - of the possibility of philosophy as episteme achieving an objective science of the world, and if it had just been revealed that pure mathematics, applied to nature, consummately fulfills the postulate of episteme in its sphere of shapes: did not this also have to suggest to Galileo the idea of a nature which is constructively determinable in the same manner in all its other aspects? (C 33)

In the 17th century, then, it seemed that the mathematical method of Euclidean Geometry, the paradigm of exact knowledge, could furnish empirical science with an exactness which it hitherto lacked, but for which it strove. With the application of the mathematical method to the physical sciences, physical objects achieve an exactness through participation in mathematical exactness. But, as de Muralt points out, this participation is limited, for "there is...one part of the material object which physical-mathematical science cannot consider: the sensible qualities of the object (colour, sound, odor etc.)" (DeM 240).
That is, mathematical exactness may be said to pertain to form only, whereas physical objects are given to us "in a sensory fulness...which in some way 'fills' the 'form' that is abstracted by mathematical science" (DeM 240). These sensible qualities, then, fall outside the "new" precise science. In this manner a distinction is drawn between the sensible thing and the physical thing, a distinction which later became known as secondary and primary qualities respectively. The latter was considered to be the true object of science, the transcendent, extra-mental being; the former, the subjective element through which transcendent being became known. The physical thing came to be regarded as the "efficient cause of the subjective data of perception". In other words, a causal bond is instituted between physical and sensible thing. This model leads to the view of the ego as a substance residing in the body, an ego that receives the subjective data of perception. On this view the ego is also amenable to scientific, that is, empirical study. The ego or consciousness is considered as a receptacle of sense data, and knowledge as the representation of the world, a world which is a determined, ordered whole, a rational systematic unity, a mathematical manifold.

...through Galileo's mathematization of nature, nature itself is idealized under the guidance of the new mathematics; nature itself becomes - to express it in a modern way - a mathematical manifold (Manigfaltigkeit).

While it left behind questions of value and meaning, on a practical level the new science was a success. It was this practical success which led to a severe break between philosophy and science, the latter leaving the former behind. While science forges forward, glorying in
useful results, philosophy is left behind in the chaos of its opposing systems of thought. To this philosophical chaos Descartes responds by attempting once again to unify philosophy and the special sciences in one universal science, first philosophy. But Descartes too uses the model of Galileo's natural science, the model of the world as a mathematical manifold and of science as knowledge of this mathematical whole. Descartes explicitly brings this model to philosophy, which creates for philosophy certain stubborn problems which will remain with it for a long time.

After Galileo had carried out, slightly earlier, the primal establishment of the new natural science, it was Descartes who conceived and at the same time set into systematic motion the new idea of universal philosophy: in the sense of mathematical, or better expressed, physicalistic, rationalism - philosophy as "universal mathematics". And immediately it had a powerful effect. (C 73)

Descartes takes for granted the Galilean model of knowledge.

Is Descartes not dominated in advance by the Galilean certainty of a universal and absolutely pure world of physical bodies, with the distinction between the merely sensibly experienceable and the mathematical, which is a matter of pure thinking? Does he not already take it for granted that sensibility points to a realm of what is in-itself, but that it can deceive us; and that there must be a rational way of resolving this (deception) and of knowing what is in-itself with mathematical rationality? (C 79)

Because Descartes accepts as universally valid the scientific model, he unwittingly treats mind as he does matter, that is, as something knowable by the mathematical method, as something to be studied by the method of natural science. For Descartes the ego too falls within the model of natural science.
That Descartes, however, persists in pure objectivism despite of its subjective grounding was possible only through the fact that the mens, which at first stood by itself in the époche and functioned as the absolute ground of knowledge, grounding the objective sciences (or, universally speaking, philosophy), appeared at the same time to be grounded along with everything else as a legitimate subject matter within the sciences, i.e., in psychology. (C 18)

In treating mind as something to be studied by empirical science, we are alienated from our essential nature; we are alienated from rationality and intersubjectivity with its attendant morality. So even if we were to treat intersubjectivity as an empirical fact—that is, if we observed that as a matter of fact humans interrelate, and were to make this intersubjectivity the object of an empirical psychology—we would not deal adequately with the phenomenon of intersubjectivity, for neither the phenomenon of intersubjectivity nor that of rationality and its consequences can be understood factually (objectivistically). This is so because the ground of intersubjectivity is our essential Being and empirical science gives us only facts—facts which could be otherwise. Our essential nature, intersubjectivity, carries with it, for example, a morality, the force of which cannot be grasped factually, for facts could always be otherwise and hence do not have the same motive power as that related to the essence of Being. Rationality cannot be understood factually either, for to do so is to fall into psychologism.

Of course, Descartes does not realize that he is treating mind like matter, for he explicitly insists that mind and matter are two distinct substances. To a certain extent, for Descartes too consciousness or the ego is considered as a receptacle of sense data,
and the cogito as the representation of the world. This model of the ego and cogito, which emerged on the ground of science is incorporated into Descartes' philosophy specifically, and empirical philosophy generally. Indeed, even non-empirical philosophy is influenced by it, for it tended to criticize the model. In the words of Merleau-Ponty:

...the empiricist philosopher considers the subject x in the act of perceiving and tries to describe what happens: there are sensations which are the subject's states or manners of being and, in virtue of this, genuine mental things. The perceiving subject is the place where these things occur, and the philosopher describes sensations and their substratum as one might describe the fauna of a distant land....(PhP 207)

What emerges is a schism between subject and object, between the for-itself and the in-itself respectively, to use Merleau-Ponty's expression. The physical thing "transcends the entire content of the thing as it is given to us in the experience of its bodily presence" (DeM 242). This model of consciousness opens itself to, broadly speaking, two theories of human behaviour, each dealing, as it were, with different sides of the same coin. On the one hand human behaviour is construed as blind reactions to stimuli; on the other, it is construed as the execution of intentions. The former constitutes an realist/empiricist thesis, the latter an intellectualist/idealist thesis. According to Merleau-Ponty, the latter thesis merely constitutes the reversal of the former:

Intellectualism certainly represents a step forward in coming to self-consciousness: that place outside the world at which the empiricist philosopher hints, and in which he tacitly takes up his position in order to describe the event of perception, now receives a name, and appears in the description. It is the
transcendental Ego. Through it every empiricist thesis is reversed: the state of consciousness becomes the consciousness of a state, passivity the positing of passivity, the world becomes the correlative of thought about the world and henceforth exists only for a constituting agent. And yet it remains true to say that intellectualism too provides itself with a ready-made world. For the constitution of the world, as conceived by it, is a mere requirement that to each terms of the empiricist description be added the indication 'consciousness of...'. The whole system of experience - world, own body and empirical self - are subordinated to a universal thinker charged with sustaining the relationships between the three terms. But, since he is not actually involved, these relations remain what they were in empiricism: causal relations spread out in the context of cosmic events. (PhP 208)

It is this absolute wedge between subject and object, between the for-itself and the in-itself, embodied in theories of human behaviour that Merleau-Ponty attacks. In the *Structure of Behaviour* he shows through a painstakingly detailed analysis of the results of experimental studies how such traditional theories of consciousness and the body fail to account adequately for behaviour. Even the "lowest level" of behaviour, reflexive behaviour, cannot be construed simply as a blind stimulus-response reaction, but is marked by a sense bestowing, while the "highest level" of behaviour, reflection, remains marked by an opaque element, something that remains hidden from us, something we do not know. Consistent and plausible interpretation of experimental data tells us that behaviour cannot be construed either as a thing or as an idea (SB 127), and shows that the distinction between the for-itself and the in-itself is therefore not absolute, but that behaviour forms a bridge between these (SB 126). Here Merleau-Ponty diverges markedly from the scientific conception of consciousness and denies the causal relation it postulates between subject and object. According to the
French philosopher, consciousness, the for-itself, is not absolutely distinct from its object, the in-itself—one is not anterior to the other—hence their relation cannot be that of causality.

In the Phenomenology of Perception, where Merleau-Ponty argues against traditional theories of human behaviour from a more phenomenological standpoint than in his earlier work, The Structure of Behaviour, he formulates in a general and abstract way the shortcoming on the intellectualist and empiricist theories of behaviour by saying that both fail to answer Meno's paradox (see the quotation below for a statement of this paradox). It is precisely this bifurcation of the in-itself and the for-itself that lies at the heart of Meno's paradox:

Whoever tries to limit the spiritual light to what is at present before the mind always runs up against the Socratic problem. "How will you set about looking for that thing, the nature of which is totally unknown to you? Which, among the things you do not know, is the one which you propose to look for? And if by chance you should stumble upon it, how will you know that it is indeed that thing, since you are in ignorance of it?" [my emphasis] (Meno 80D) A thought really transcended by its objects would find them proliferating in its path without ever being able to grasp their relationships to each other, or finding its way through to their truth....We must define thought in terms of that strange power which it possesses of being ahead of itself, of launching itself and being at home everywhere, in a word, in terms of its autonomy. Unless thought itself had put into things what it subsequently finds in them, it would have no hold upon things, would not think of them, and would be an 'illusion of thought'. (PhP 371)

In other words, cognitive activity is paradoxically characterized by a seeking of something it does not know—the lack of knowledge being that which instigates or motivates cognitive activity—and at the same time does know—how else would it know when to
terminate its activity? The former is an inconceivable state of affairs for intellectualism, while the latter is an inconceivable state of affairs for empiricism. The cogito is, then, at once similar to and distinct from its object. The nature of cognitive activity itself "seen from the inside" thus would suggest that the distinction between the in-itself and the for-itself is not absolute, but is something overcome in cognitive activity.

The solution to Meno's paradox is at once the solution to the problem of other selves, for as mentioned above it is precisely the distinction between the in-itself and for-itself which also renders the problem of the alter ego insoluble. The paradox is overcome and the problem of the alter ego is transposed, according to Merleau-Ponty, if consciousness is no longer considered to be a mental entity distinct from yet residing in the body. That is, the views that Merleau-Ponty criticizes treat and describe the body as pure object, as "a conjunction of physiological processes", as "a collection of organs shown in the plates of books in anatomy", and consciousness as pure subject. But is the body ever really given to or experienced by us as pure object? The body may be an object, but it is nonetheless a unique object. Indeed, looking at our experience, we do not know the body in the same way in which we know an external object: I know my body from the "outside" as object, but I know it from the "inside" too--it is lived. The body, in other words, is "an object in which there is no distance between it and the subject" (F 230). The body therefore is not an object in which consciousness resides, but is in its livedness embodied consciousness. For embodied consciousness
Merleau-Ponty reserves the term "lived-body". It is in the lived-body that the alternative of the in-itself and the for-itself is overcome (PhP 373), and this is because the lived-body is neither in-itself nor for-itself—is neither pure subject nor pure object—but is rather at once subject and object. Accordingly, consciousness is no longer considered as an absolute reflective ego-cogito, as a mental substance inhering in an objective body, but as essentially embodied. In other words, the mind-body dualism is overcome.

Meno's paradox arose because the for-itself and the in-itself had to be distinct yet somehow similar or "united": "a thought really transcended by its objects would find them proliferating in its path without ever being able to grasp their relationships to each other, or finding its way through to their truth" (PhP 371). A thought (the cogito, consciousness), then, cannot be really transcended by its objects, as traditional science holds in considering the cogito to be a mere representation of a world in-itself. What I said concerning the lived-body makes it clear that Merleau-Ponty is going beyond the representational view of the cogito: for Merleau-Ponty the cogito (knowledge) is not mere representation, but a livedness, an actuality. He stresses, then, the actual relatedness of consciousness to its object. That is, consciousness is not primarily an "I think"; the relatedness of consciousness to its object is not primarily theoretical or reflective. Indeed, it is fundamentally actual--consciousness is first of all an "I am" in the form of the lived-body. The first consciousness is thus perceptual consciousness. Hence for Merleau-Ponty a theory of the body is at once a theory of perception--
perception is our inherence in things (PhP 350-351). That is, the lived-body is the vehicle of being in the world--the world is known through the lived-body:

Every external perception is immediately synonymous with a certain perception of my body, just as every perception of my body is made explicit in the language of external perception. If, then, as we have seen to be the case, the body is...an expressive unity which we can learn to know only by actively taking it up, this structure will be passed on to the sensible world. The theory of the body image is, implicitly, a theory of perception. We have relearned to feel our body; we have found underneath the objective and detached knowledge of the body that other knowledge which we have in virtue of it always being with us and of the fact that we are our body. In the same way we shall need to reawaken our experience of the world as it appears to us in so far as we are in the world through our body, and in so far as we perceive the world with our body. But by thus remaking contact with the body and with the world, we shall also discover ourself, since, perceiving as we do with our body, the body is a natural self and as it were, the subject of perception. (PhP 206)

We do not, then, start with an in-itself (object) nor a for-itself (subject), but both are contemporaneous. In the lived-body we have a true dialectic between matter and spirit--the body is a bearer of a dialectic (MR 173).

It can be intuited in what way the notion of embodied consciousness is said to be the solution to the problem of the alter ego. Since consciousness is now considered to be essentially embodied, perceiving the other is no longer a problem.

I overcome the impossibility of conceiving another for-himself for me, because I witness another behaviour, another presence in the world...we can find others at the intentional origin of their visible behaviour. (PhP 432-433)
The other, because of the fact of his embodiment, is no longer an "occult quality". I have assurance of the other's existence; I no longer need to hypothesize his existence, because I can now directly perceive another consciousness in its embodiment. I am in actual touch with the other.

The above is Merleau-Ponty's way of dealing with the problem of the alter ego. Some have argued that the lived-body is a notion foreign to Husserl's phenomenology, that Husserl bases phenomenology on the pure transcendental ego which is distinct from the lived-body. For instance, Zaner maintains that Merleau-Ponty's philosophy breaks with Husserlian phenomenology. He maintains that Merleau-Ponty's mode of access to the unreflected, lived experience is unphenomenological and that he holds that the reflective method of phenomenology has no access to the pre-reflective level of experience:

It is, in fact, only if one maintains to begin with that reflection is not able to apprehend this experience that another mode of access to it seems necessary. (PE 139)

And:

The cards, however, are on the table: Merleau-Ponty simply rejects, without stating it, the Husserlian doctrine of epoche....(PE 142)

Others have argued that while the pure transcendental ego represents an idealist element, the notion of lived-body reflects a realist element. I shall argue in what follows that not only is the notion of lived-body found explicitly in Husserl's writings, but that one can only appreciate the import of this notion if one understands how it is derived from phenomenological "dicta". If one does not, one will be
hard pressed to distinguish the concept of lived-body from any monism that claims that mind and body are one substance. I shall show (pp. 319 ff.) that the pure transcendental ego is the basis of the lived-body and that this is what is implied by Merleau-Ponty's identification of the two phenomenological dicta from which he develops his thesis of the lived-body.

I discussed how science, in believing in being in-itself of the world, came to split subject and object and how this split grounds the objectivist, causal theory of human consciousness. According to Merleau-Ponty, Husserl demonstrates that this distinction is not absolute by showing there to be a layer of experience in which this distinction becomes problematic (§ 162). In the Crisis (part III A) Husserl explains that the world of science, which is the world of things in-themselves (blossen Sachen), is not the most basic mode of experience. This becomes apparent when we consider that science and the scientific attitude did not always exist in the history of thought, but emerged and evolved. They sprang up out of a more basic mode of experience, viz., that of everyday experience, that of the life-world or the natural attitude. For us the nature of the life-world is not immediately apparent, even though we live in the life-world in our natural attitude, because the world of science with its beliefs is superimposed on it. Even if we are not scientists immersed in the scientific attitude, the tenets of science have seeped into the life-world and we are imperceptibly influenced by these. Even in the life-world we find "the scholastic dominance of objective-scientific ways of thinking" (C 129). What is clear, however, is that the life-world,
unlike the world of science, is not a precise world. I have explained that in order to meet the ideal of a unified theory, of an exact science which glorified in universal assent, physical science had to be mathematicized: it represents the ideas it employs by numbers. The mathematization of physical science involves quantification: translation of concrete circumstances (facts) into numbers—into symbols. Quantification is abstraction or idealization (C 23; C 48), representation of reality by signs and symbols, and physical theory works on these symbols, these idealizations of reality, these approximations to reality, according to Husserl. It is interesting to note in passing that Duhem makes the same observation as does Husserl:

An experiment in physics is the precise observation of phenomena accompanied by an interpretation of these phenomena; this interpretation substitutes for the concrete data really gathered by observation abstract and symbolic representations which correspond to them by virtue of the theories admitted by the observer. (ASPT 147)

In other words, whereas the theoretical fact is precise or exact, the practical fact is not. When formulating a theoretical fact about a given object all irregularities of the object under study are ignored. To use an example given by Duhem, "the body studied [by physical science] is geometrically defined, its sides are true lines without thickness, its points are true points without dimension" (ASPT 133). The practical fact has none of this precision. Given an object in the life-world, "however sharp its edges, none is a geometrical intersection of two surfaces—these edges are more or less worn down or blunt" (ASPT 124). As Duhem points out, the scientist in his or her description of a practical fact by a theoretical fact acknowledges this
disparity between the precise and the imprecise, in attenuating his
description of the practical by the theoretical fact by the words
"approximate" or "nearly" (ASPT 134) as well as by the use of
corrections in experimentation. Only if it is understood that a
practical fact is not the same as a theoretical fact can the notion of
correction in experimentation make sense.

If an experiment in physics were merely the observation
of a fact, it would be absurd to bring in corrections,
for it would be ridiculous to tell an observer who had
looked attentively, carefully, and minutely: "What you
have seen is not what you should have seen; permit me
to make some calculations which will teach you what you
should have observed."

The logical role of corrections, on the other
hand, is very well understood when it is remembered
that a physical experiment is not simply the
observation of a group of facts but also the
translation of these facts into a symbolic language
with the aid of rules borrowed from physical theories.

(ASPT 156)

Duhem, like Husserl (C 49; C 51), also criticizes the failure of many
thinkers to keep the distinction between practical and theoretical fact
and to take the latter to be representative of the world in-itself.
Strictly speaking the life-world is there prior to science, prior to
the belief in a world in-itself, prior to belief that the world can be
considered independently from all subjectivity. That belief did not
evolve until the 17th century with Galileo. It is clear that the life-
world is one close to the subject, one in which subjectivity is not
ruled out, as in 17th century science. But this does not mean that the
life-world is primitive and magical like the early thought of the child
(cf. Piaget) or like the beliefs of a primitive people. The life-world
is not primitive in any pejorative sense of the term, for it remains
the ground of validation of science (C 126). Of course we do not mean to identify the life-world with primitive beliefs such as the belief that all objects are possessed by some spirit, for such belief systems are also superimposed on the life-world just as science is a belief system superimposed on the life-world. All world views presuppose the life-world. We wish to describe the life-world in its purity prior to any belief system. To do this we must describe the structure of experience of the life-world qua experience (C 139).

In opposition to all previously designed objective sciences, which are sciences on the ground of the world, this would be a science of the universal how of the pregivenness of the world, i.e., of what makes it a universal ground of any sort of objectivity. (C 146)

Phenomenology aims to describe "the world purely and exclusively as – and in respect to how – it has meaning and ontic validity..." (C 148).

While the life-world is intuitable within the natural attitude, as Merleau-Ponty argues (S 163-164), we are nevertheless oblivious to it because naturally the natural attitude involves a practical interest in the object, as de Muralt observes:

The subject in the natural attitude is interested in the Lebenswelt in a quite concrete way, in the sense that man tries to subjugate the world and dominate it. (DeM 250)

To jolt our interest away from the object as practical means, to jolt us into seeing the Lebenswelt qua Lebenswelt, Husserl institutes the epoche or transcendental reduction. What is required is a "total transformation of attitude, a completely unique, universal epoche" (C 148). The epoche is quite radical, for it is an epoche "in regard to
the totality of natural and normal life" (C 148). In the epoche, the being status of the world is suspended.

...we thus have an attitude above the universal conscious life (both individual-subjective and intersubjective) through which the world is "there" for those naively absorbed in ongoing life, as unquestioningly present, as the universe of what is there, as the field of all acquired and new established life interests. (C 150)]

The result of the epoche is not a world view or cosmology, for we focus not on the content, i.e., objects, of experience, but on the flow of experience itself. In this manner objects are considered not as objects in-themselves (as blossen Sachen, being in-itself), but as objects of experience, as noemata, as objects given in a flow of experience. The world then appears as noema, the object of a transcendental experience:

This is not a "view", an "interpretation" bestowed upon the world. Every view about... every opinion about "the" world, has its ground in the pregiven world. It is from this very ground that I have freed myself through the epoche; I stand above the world, which now has become for me, in a quite peculiar sense, a phenomenon. (C 152)

And from Merleau-Ponty:

In other words, reduced thought concerns Nature as the "ideal" meaning of the acts which constitute the natural attitude--Nature becomes once more the noema it has always been, Nature reintegrated to the consciousness which has always constituted it through and through. In the realm of "reductio" there is no longer anything but consciousness, its acts, and their intentional object. (S 162 )

Since science is based on the distinction between subject and object, Husserl exposes a dimension of human experience in which objectivistic science with its causal theories has no jurisdiction.
With the opening up of this dimension, the myth of science having total explanatory power is exploded. It reveals an aspect of human nature for which science cannot account—it brings to light the intentional nature of consciousness, for it results in placing emphasis on the constituting activity of consciousness, as opposed to the thing's, i.e., the constituted's, alleged causal relation to consciousness. In such a fashion, human nature, based on the essence of consciousness, is appropriated. According to de Muralt, Husserl was concerned with exposing this dimension of experience as early as his *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, and he attempted to do so throughout all his subsequent works, although changing his method of bringing to light this realm of experience (DeM 243).

Now how does this overturning of the idea of thing and world lead to the notion of a constituting activity in contradistinction to a notion of a constituting agency, and how does this notion lead to that of the lived-body (as Merleau-Ponty claims it does)? And, in what way is the notion of lived-body central to Husserl's phenomenology? I turn to these questions next.

As I explained in chapter four, it was precisely their failure to recognize and treat as problematic the life-world that prevented Kant's philosophy from being truly transcendental and prevented Descartes from explicitly reaping the deepest insights contained in his philosophy. Both Kant and Descartes reify the hypothesis of science, of a world in-itself. As I explained in that chapter, by "world" Kant means the world given by science, and he has the transcendental ego constituting objective thought *directly*, bypassing life. He does not
see that the world given by science presupposes the world of everyday life and that the transcendental ego constitutes the categories of scientific thought via the life-world. Since the transcendental ego that Kant takes to be the pure ego harbours meaning of which Kant is not aware, viz., that of the transcendental ego as living, his philosophy is not truly transcendental. The aim to establish a true transcendental philosophy leads Husserl to the lived-body in the following manner. There is a level of experience deeper than that of objective experience, a pre-objective level which grounds the latter, viz., that of lived experience. A true transcendental philosophy, aiming at the foundation of meaning, must start with this level of experience. In other words, it must take into account life. Kant does not admit a pre-objective level of experience of which we can have knowledge, for to him experience and knowledge are the same, and both are subject to the objective categories (see chapter four). Gadamer says that Husserl wants to be taken literally when he speaks of life. We live via the body. Hence, this level of pre-objective experience is the living-body, the experience of the "I". As I mentioned before, such a position is alien to both Kant and Descartes, who consider the body to be an object of outer sense (CPR 329).

In overturning the idea of thing and world we are led to a centre of constitution which, because pre-objective, cannot be understood in objective terms. Since they do not concede of experience outside of the objective categories, both Descartes' ego-cogito and Kant's transcendental ego are objectivistic notions, according Husserl. This is very clear in Descartes, for whom the ego is but a bit of the
world. It is a little less clear in, but nevertheless true of, Kant's philosophy, for, as I explained in chapter four, Kant cannot break out of an objective concept of the ego--the pure ego of Kant somehow "has" the categories--because he cannot work out, that is, bring to evidence, a non-objective concept of pure ego. According to Husserl any objective element of the ego needs to be traced back to its non-objective constituting source; that is to say, to the truly transcendental ego, the pure ego which constitutes the objective elements of the ego and the world.

It is for this reason, as I mentioned in chapter four, that the uncovering of the transcendental ego is not a novel contribution of phenomenology. Kant too realized that every cogito is the cogito of a transcendental ego. Where phenomenology goes beyond Kant, where it makes a novel contribution, is in taking its analysis a step further. Husserl sees that the ego Kant and Descartes take as foundational is still empirical; it is not only constituting but constituted. Husserl performs a reduction on that ego. In doing so Husserl overcomes the notion of transcendental ego as constituting agency and secures a sense of transcendental ego as constituting activity. This is the second notion Merleau-Ponty identifies as contributing to the notion of lived-body. It is only in the act of living that objectivity is overcome. For Husserl the transcendental ego is lived, and is not merely an empty thought.

The notion of the lived-body, then, is crucial to Husserl's phenomenology in that it is the means whereby phenomenology moves to
the truly transcendental realm. And there can be no mistake about this: the notion of lived-body is mentioned explicitly in the Crisis:

...the ego [is] functioning here in a peculiar sort of activity and habituality. In a quite unique way the living body is constantly in the perceptual field, with a completely unique ontic meaning, precisely the meaning indicated by the word "organ" (here used in its most primitive sense), [namely as] that through which I exist in a completely unique way and quite immediately as the ego of affection and actions, [as that] in which I hold sway, or potentially hold sway, in particular kinesthesia corresponding to them. (C 106-107)

And:

Thus, purely in terms of perception, physical body and living body [Körper und Leib] are essentially different; living body, that is, [understood] as the only one which is actually given [to me as such] in perception: my own living body. How the consciousness originates through which my living body nevertheless acquires an ontic validity of one physical body among others, and how, on the other hand, certain physical bodies in my perceptual field come to count as living bodies, living bodies of "alien" ego-subjects - these are now necessary questions. (C 107)

And:

[Being related] "through the living body" clearly does not mean merely [being related] "as a physical body"; rather, the expression refers to the kinesthetic, to functioning as an ego in this peculiar way, primarily through seeing, hearing, etc.; and of course other modes of the ego belong to this (for example, lifting, carrying, pushing, and the like).

But being an ego through the living body [die leibliche Ichlichkeit] is of course not the only way of being an ego, and none of its ways can be severed from the others. (C 108)

I have shown, then, how the overturning of "thing" and "world" leads to the notion of a constituting activity and how this leads to the lived-body. As well, I have attempted to show that the notion of lived-body is central to Husserl's phenomenology. But the lived-body is not quite
the pure transcendental ego. I show next that without appeal to the pure transcendental ego Merleau-Ponty cannot solve the problem of other selves and that he does have a sense of pure transcendental ego.

The notion of embodiment seemed to be the way to overcome the problem of the alter ego, in that it was now possible to see the other's consciousness. But is this really sufficient as a solution? Although the essence of consciousness is to be embodied, what I see or directly experience of the other is still "only" his objective body (body as object) and not the livedness of his embodied consciousness (body as subject). As the Crisis states:

Here my own living body alone, and never an alien living body, can be perceived as living; the latter is perceived only as a physical body. (C 107-108)

The livedness of the other's consciousness, even though embodied, cannot be directly experienced by me for two reasons. First of all, this livedness (life), being precisely non-objective, cannot be objectified, and hence precludes being seen "from the outside". "What is alive is not such that a person could ever grasp it from the outside, in its living quality", writes Gadamer (TM 224). And this is what Husserl maintains as well:

...neither the other Ego himself, nor his subjective processes or his appearances themselves, nor anything else belonging to his own essence, becomes given in our experience originally. If it were, if what belongs to the other's own essence were directly accessible, it would be merely a moment of my own essence, and ultimately he himself and I myself would be the same. (CM 109 [139])

In other words, and this is the second reason why I cannot experience the other's livedness directly, if I could experience the other's
livedness directly as livedness, I would no longer be experiencing an other, but I would be the other and hence "otherness" would fall away. Are we not at square one? How can I know that the other's body has a livedness if I cannot experience this livedness directly? It would seem as if we have not progressed one iota beyond our original problem. Are we not forced to appeal to reasoning by analogy in explaining how we ever gain awareness of the other qua other? Does Merleau-Ponty not beg the question, and is he not appealing to the traditional solution, viz., to the phenomenon of analogical reasoning, when, at the very point at which he proffers a solution to the problem of the alter ego, he writes:

If I experience this inhering of my consciousness in its body and its world, the perception of other people and the plurality of consciousnesses no longer present any difficulty. If, for myself who am reflecting on perception, the perceiving subject appears provided with a primordial setting in relation to the world, drawing in its train that bodily thing in the absence of which there would be no other things for it, then why should other bodies which I perceive not be similarly inhabited by consciousness? If my consciousness has a body, why should other bodies not "have" consciousness? (PhP 351)

This argument appears to be of the following form:

My body is inhabited by a consciousness.

There is another body like mine.

Therefore, it too must have a consciousness.

This is unmistakably analogical reasoning. It appears from the above passage that according to Merleau-Ponty we start with a particular
individual consciousness, viz., my consciousness, and reason from that to that of others; that is, "if my consciousness has associated with it a body and this is the only way I know my body and consciousness, then other bodies must have a consciousness".

It will turn out that the problem can only be resolved by appeal to the pure transcendental ego. In chapter four I explained that the lived-body is the concrete transcendental ego, and that we need to do still a further reduction to get at the pure transcendental ego. In other words, the notion of lived-body still has particular overtones--it is my lived-body, as is apparent from the fact that only I can suffer its death. To solve the problem of the alter ego we need more than the notion of embodied consciousness--we need a conceptual element which is truly universal. As long as we start with the particular, individual self and try to derive the universal, other selves from it, for example, through analogical reasoning, we remain committed to solipsism. Hence, although I have introduced the notion of lived-body, once again Meno's paradox rears its head. I must be at once the same as and distinct from the object of knowledge, which in this case is the alter ego. I can know "consciousness" or "livedness" (lived-body) only subjectively, i.e., through living it. In this sense consciousness or the self is particular, and in this sense we do and must start with the particular to have knowledge of consciousness. But as I explained above, this rules out the universality, "other selves", for it leaves us in the egocentric predicament (solipsism). However, to know other selves I must have a universal of self, of livedness, for without a universal I would not recognize others. Hence, for there to
be others, I must in my livedness at once be particular and universal. That is to say, if I were absolutely distinct from the other, and hence absolutely unique, it would not be possible to perceive another ego, "another myself", for being unique there could be no other "myself". At the same time, I must be in some manner distinct from the other, for otherwise there would not be an other ego.

The solution to Meno's paradox as it applies to the problem of the alter ego, then, is the solution to the question as to the very possibility of other selves. What form the solution will take is expressed by Merleau-Ponty in the following passage from the *Phenomenology of Perception*.

> My life must have a significance which I do not constitute; there must strictly speaking be an intersubjectivity; each one of us must be both anonymous in the sense of absolutely individual [my emphasis], and anonymous in the sense of absolutely general [my emphasis]. Our being in the world, is the concrete bearer of this double anonymity. (PhP 448)

From this passage we glean that the notion "I" (ego, self) must be at once (a) general and individual, or, phrased in term of Meno's paradox, must be at once universal and particular, and (b) anonymous, i.e., anonymous general and anonymous universal. I will discuss (a) first.

In chapter five I explained that the concrete transcendental ego needed the eidos transcendental ego in order to be at all. Every particular, in order to be, necessarily has a temporal dimension; this x which has been, for however short a while, and will be or can possibly be again at a future time. "Every individual object can be thought more than once" (EJ 335), writes Husserl. Merleau-Ponty agrees with Husserl on this point: "It is through time that being is
conceived" (PhP 430), he says. This temporal projection is the 17 object's universality. To be a particular, to be a fact, is at once to "participate" in an ideal or universal. According to Merleau-Ponty this is why Husserl insisted on the actual inseparability of fact and essence (S 173). The concrete transcendental ego, being in part particular, must also partake of an eidos:

...the transcendental ego is in a universal way the structure of the universal eidos "ego in general", the universal a priori without which no transcendental ego (neither I nor the other) would be conceivable. (PhP 347)

In other words, a particular transcendental ego would not be conceivable or possible if it did not partake of a universal; as I explained above a particular at once partakes of a universal. Hence to say that the notion "I", the notion of the transcendental ego, must be both particular and universal is no puzzle: it cannot be otherwise. This universal is the pure transcendental ego.

We have yet to account for (b) the anonymity of both the particular and general transcendental ego. The answer is that the very eidos of the transcendental ego is anonymity. Writes de Muralt:

In itself it [the transcendental ego] is simple, undivided, numerically identical, and empty of determinations. (DeM 328)

And in Ideas Husserl states:

Aside from its "modes of relation" or "modes of comportment", the [Ego] is completely empty of essence-components, has no explicable content, is undescrivable in and for itself: it is pure Ego and nothing more. (I FK 191 [161] BG 214)
Since it is empty of determinations it is anonymous. It has no determinations because it is not a thing or substance. In the words of Merleau-Ponty:

Subjectivity is neither thing nor substance but the extremity of both particular and universal. (S 153)

So, when Merleau-Ponty speaks in terms of the lived-body he has not rejected the eidos, the pure transcendental ego. It is perhaps not as clearly stated as in Husserl that one must do a reduction on the lived-body, but it is nevertheless clear that Merleau-Ponty has done this reduction. Hence, when Merleau-Ponty speaks of the "lived-body" he acknowledges the pure transcendental ego. The lived-body is not the pure transcendental ego but it is not not the pure transcendental ego, for it needs the pure transcendental ego for its being (PhP 347); hence the pure transcendental ego is "in" the lived-body. Merleau-Ponty has not abandoned Husserl's phenomenology on this point. Indeed, to radically split the pure transcendental ego and the lived-body would be a Platonism, and to identify them would be an empiricism, or an idealism.

I return now to our original problem to show why reasoning by analogy is not involved when in seeing the other's body I recognize him to be another ego. As I explained in chapter five, the perception of individuals (particulars) involves universals (types). To perceive an individual is to perceive it as a type, to place it under a universal, even if that universal has not been made explicit (EJ 332). This is a one step affair. We do not have an individual first and subsequently a universal. The individual or particular is via the universal. This
relation of particular and universal underlies and makes possible a
process Husserl terms association. According to Husserl it is this
process whereby I recognize another individual as belonging to the same
type. Association is a process that occurs passively, according to
Husserl (EJ section 16).

The fact that all objects are from the first
experienced as known according to their type has its
basis in the sedimentation of all apperceptions and in
their habitual continued action on the basis of
associative awakening. Association originally produces
the passive [my emphasis] synthesis of like with the
like, and this not only within a field of presence but
also through the entire stream of lived experience, its
immanent time, and everything which is constituted in
it. (EJ 321)

I must underscore, however, that the way in which Husserl uses the
term "association" is not the same way as the way in which behavioural
psychology uses the term when it refers to stimulus-response behaviour.
For the latter a stimulus is an external element which evokes a blind
(automatic) response; that is, a stimulus is not considered as imbued
with meaning by the subject. Husserl, on the other hand, insists that
association is an intentional act, an act of meaning on the subject's
behalf, albeit a passive one. It is made possible by a still deeper
intentionality, namely, time-synthesis. It is because everything in
the stream of experience is connected apriori by virtue of its relation
to the originary "now" that association can occur passively. Hence,
according to Husserl association is:

...that mode of passive synthesis founded on the lowest
synthesis of time-consciousness. (EJ 177)

And:
What in a purely static description appears to be likeness or similarity must therefore be considered in itself as being already the product of the one or the other kind of synthesis of coincidence, which we denote by the traditional term association, but with a change of sense. It is the phenomenon of associative genesis which dominates this sphere of passive pregivenness, established on the basis of synthesis of internal-time consciousness.

The term "association" denotes in this context a form belonging essentially to consciousness in general, a form of the regularity of immanent genesis. That association can become a general theme of phenomenological description and not merely one of objective psychology is due to the fact that the phenomenon of indication [Anzeige] is something which can be exhibited from the point of view of phenomenology. (This insight, worked out as early as the Logical Investigations, already constitutes there the nucleus of genetic phenomenology.) Every interpretation of association and its laws which make of it a kind of psychophysical natural law, attained by objective induction, must therefore be excluded here. (EJ 74-75)

As I said, association is passive. It is not an active logical process--it is not an inference, in other words. It has an immediacy to it that inference does not. It is this type of process that is involved in recognizing an alter ego, according to Husserl. From my own being I have a tacit sense of universal ego, on the basis of which I can associate to others. That is, however tacitly, the way in which I essentially conceive of myself is at once how I essentially conceive others to be. Since I never perceive my own body purely as object, I never perceive the other's body purely as object. Likewise, it is because I do not experience myself as pure subject that I am able to recognize an alter ego through the objectivity of his body, which by its essence has a livedness. Hence, when I perceive the other's body as object, it is not as pure object, but it is at once an object-subject, or lived-body. In short, perceiving an other qua other,
although involving my perceiving the other's objective body, does not involve analogical reasoning, but is a "one step affair". It is subsuming a particular under a universal. It is for this reason that Merleau-Ponty in the quotation below speaks of a "flash of meaning" making my incarnation substitutable with that of an other. Analogical reasoning, on the other hand, involves a sequential process of reasoning.

...the body proper is a premonition of the other person, the Einfühlung an echo of my incarnation, and...a flash of meaning makes them substitutable in the absolute presence of origins. (S 175)

It is no more difficult for me to recognize an other than it is for me to recognize a table. The former case, however, involves recognizing traits or properties that I know because I myself am those traits.

I would not recognize him (an other ego) if I were not a man myself....I say that there is a man there and not a mannequin, as I see that the table is there and not a perspective or appearance of a table....(S 170)

And:

...the body over there, which is nevertheless apprehended as an animate organism, must have derived this sense by an apperceptive transfer from my animate organism....(CM 110 [140])

It is only the nominalism of empiricism that must appeal to reasoning by analogy, as it starts with the individual totally distinct from the universal. It assumes an absolute wedge between the categories of the for oneself and for the other.

We must note, however, that in section 50 of Cartesian Meditations Husserl unfortunately uses the phrase "'analogizing' apprehension" (CM 111 [140]) to refer to the process whereby I
recognize an alter ego. It is unfortunate because this has led people
to believe that Husserl is explaining the process of recognizing an
other by analogical reasoning. But Husserl states explicitly that this
is not the case.

It is clear from the very beginning that only a
similarity connecting, within my primordial sphere,
that body over there with my body can serve as the
motivational basis for the "analogizing" apprehension
of that body as another animate organism./

There would be, accordingly, a certain
assimilative apprehension; but it by no means follows
that there would be an inference from analogy [my
emphasis]. Apperception is not an inference, not a
thinking act [my emphasis].20 (CM III [140-141])

He goes on to say that the type of apperception he is speaking of here
occurs "at a glance" (CM III [141]). In section 51 he narrows the
process of recognizing the other down to that of pairing.

...ego and alter ego are always and necessarily given
in an original "pairing". (CM II [142])

Husserl explains that pairing is a form of association and that this is
a universal property of the ego.

Pairing, occurrence in configuration as a pair
and then as a group, a plurality, is a universal
phenomenon of the transcendental sphere (and of the
parallel sphere of intentional psychology); and, we may
add forthwith, as far as a pairing is actually present,
so far extends that remarkable kind of primal
instituting of an analogizing apprehension - its
continuous primal institution in living actuality -
which we have already stressed as the first peculiarity
of experiencing someone else. Hence it is not
exclusively peculiar to this experience....Pairing is a
primal form of that passive synthesis which we
designate as "association", in contrast to passive
synthesis of "identification". (CM II [142])

We must note furthermore, however, that pairing is thought by Husserl
to occur immediately, despite the fact that he says the following:
...neither the other Ego himself, nor his subjective processes or his appearances themselves, nor anything else belonging to his own essence, becomes given in our experience originally. If it were, if what belongs to the other's own essence were directly accessible, it would be merely a moment of my own essence, and ultimately he himself and I myself would be the same. (CM 109 [139])

And:

A certain mediacy of intentionality must be present here, going out from the substratum, "primordial world", (which in any case is the incessantly underlying basis) and making present to consciousness a "there too", which nevertheless is not itself there and can never become an "itself-there". (CM 109 [139])

What Husserl means in the above quotations is that although I see immediately that it is another subject, I do not experience the other's subjectivity in its immediacy, for if I did I would be the other. Hence Husserl does not mean to deny the act of recognizing the other is immediate.

We see, then, that the problem of other selves occurs on the level of conceptual thought, on the level of identity of self, on the level of the empirical ego, in short. But according to Husserl (and Merleau-Ponty) there is a level which is deeper than the personal ego, that of the transcendental ego or lived-body. On this level the problem is resolved, as I explained. According to Husserl and Merleau-Ponty the transcendental ego constitutes the empirical ego. Phenomenology is here once again in agreement with psychoanalytic theory. The ego is not what is first in the developmental history of the individual, ego psychology tells us. According to Freud the ego develops out of its nucleus, the perceptual system (EI 214), via memory. Husserl too maintains that the ego develops via memory from
perceptual consciousness, which is the first consciousness according to Husserl (FTL 158 [141]). He maintains that through memories one's unique experiences are made into abiding possessions (cogitata), creating one's personality (CM 73 [107]; CM section 32; CM 67 [101]). Here again there is a similarity with Freudian theory. Hence these authors would agree with Dilthey's position according to which individuality cannot be taken to be primary. Gadamer writes:

Individuation now is not a fundamental idea that is rooted in phenomena. Rather, Dilthey insists that all 'psychological life' 'is subject to the force of circumstances'. There is no such thing as the fundamental power of individuality. It becomes what it is by asserting itself. (TM 200)

What is important to note is that the transcendental ego constitutes the empirical ego via the other through pairing. I cannot have a concept of self without having at the same time a concept of the other, for I am myself only in contrast with other selves.

...the Other [is]...phenomenologically a "modification" of myself (which for its part, gets this character of being "my" self by virtue of the contrastive pairing that necessarily takes place). (CM 115 [144])

And speaking of pairing in general, of which constitution of self and other is an instance, Husserl writes:

...there takes place in the paired data a mutual transfer of sense - that is to say: an apperception of each according to the sense of the other....(CM 113 [143])

In other words, I could never come to form a concept of self if I did not encounter an other qua other, if there were no awareness of other. This fact is incorporated in the Freudian theory of the structure of the psyche. According to Freud the ego cannot be except in relation to
an internal representation of the other, viz., the superego. To be more specific, Freud maintains that the ego is an energetic structure formed in relation to superego and id, and that the libido or strength of the ego cannot develop unless there is a superego, and indeed, one that is neither too strong nor too weak.  

As has been said repeatedly, the ego is formed to a great extent out of the identifications taking the place of the cathexes on the part of the id which have been abandoned; the earliest of these identifications always fulfil a special office in the ego and stand apart from the rest of the ego in the form of a superego....(EI 227)

And:

The development of the ego consists in a departure from the primary narcissism which results in a vigorous attempt to recover it. The departure is brought about by means of the displacement of the libido to an ego-ideal imposed from without, while gratification is derived from attainment of this ideal. (N 121)

From these quotations it is clear that Freud maintains that the ego is not ready-made, but is formed through formation of a superego. The superego forms through a process of identification and internalization. One identifies with the other and internalizes his values. The superego is the other internalized, in other words. The superego is necessary for the ego to actualize; it is the latter's ground of possibility (I shall return to this on page 349).

Hence, according to Husserl neither the concept of self nor that of other is first, where by "concept" is meant the "had" concept (EJ 318), the concept as object, as abiding possession of consciousness. The concept of other, and paradoxically that of self, develop out of a feeling of otherness. That is, association, Husserl
said, is not a thinking act (CM 111 [141]). It is rather an affective (feeling) act:

All prominences in a field, the articulation of the field according to likenesses and differences and the group-formation arising from it, the coming-to-prominence of particular members from a homogeneous background: all this is the product of associative syntheses of a manifold kind. But these are not simply passive occurrences in consciousness; rather, these syntheses of coincidence have their own affective power. We say, for example, of that which, in its nonsimilarity, stands out from a homogeneous background and comes to prominence that it "strikes" us, and this means that it displays an affective tendency toward the ego. (EJ 76)

Husserl speaks of the data in the sphere of association having a sensitive effect on the ego (EJ 77), of it forcing itself against the ego (EJ 77), of it obtruding on the ego (EJ 77). By calling this reaction of the ego an affective or feeling one Husserl does not mean to deny that it is without a structure or meaning, that it is without a rationality. He means to indicate, rather, that there are ways of experiencing, that there are modes of rationality, which are not objective, that are not subject to the objective ratio of science, but which allow the objective cogito to develop, where by "objective cogito" I mean the wakeful cogito, as I explained in chapter five.

We must, therefore, distinguish:
1. The tendency which precedes the cogito, the tendency as stimulus of the intentional background experience and its differing degrees of strength. The stronger this "affection", the stronger the tendency to give way to it, to bring about the apprehension. As already mentioned, this tendency has its two sides:
   a) The obtrusion on the ego, the attraction which the given exerts on the ego.
   b) From the side of the ego, the tendency to give way, the being-attracted, the being-affected, of the ego itself.
From these tendencies antecedent to the cogito can be distinguished:

2. The turning-toward as compliance with the tendency, in other words, the transformation of the character of the tendency of the intentional background experience in which the cogito becomes active. The ego is now turned toward the object; it has of itself a tendency directed toward the object. (EJ 78)

And:

The accomplishment of the turning-toward is what we call the being-awake of the ego. More precisely, it is necessary to distinguish being-awake as the factual accomplishment of an act from being-awake as potentiality, as the state of being able-to-accomplish an act, a state which constitutes the presupposition of the actual accomplishment of the act. To be awake is to direct one's regard to something. To be awakened means to submit to an effective affection. (EJ 79)

Initially there is only the continuous feeling of my living will or desire to unify and to "self"-preserve, in which thought lies only dormantly rooted and at whose service it will begin to work. This desire, as explained in chapter five, is Eros. It is warranted to speak of desire here, for Eros has a goal or aim as well as a push to achieve the goal. It is a feeling of living desire because at this point the will or desire is not yet an object for, an abiding possession of, the ego. But I underscore that desire is a structure. So when I speak of feeling or desire as the genetically first level of lived-experience I am not denying that structure is operative (see chapter five). I mean to say, rather, that structure can be experienced pre-thetically as well as thetically. Again we find a parallel with psychoanalytic thought.

...the body and its emotional equipment...constitute first sources of meaning; they provide the emotional - or in Werner's terms, 'physiognomic' character of reality. Thus they offer foundations for reason when
this comes forward as a positive force giving rise to new structures—structures that are based on purposeful action and objectifying knowledge. (FB 304)

Initially all I am is this living desire, so if something is to speak to me, if something is to make an impact on me, it will have to do so through my desires. It is through desire that thought is set into motion, that I come out of myself to become aware of a world beyond me, and come into myself, that is to say, become a reflective self, a self in the true sense of the word. The emergence of self is the emergence of reflective thought and vice versa. More specifically, it is through frustration of desire that I become aware of myself and concomitantly of others, for it is only if I am disturbed in my continuous path of being, of living desire, that thought is shocked into action by being thrown back on itself. If the living desire is disturbed, thought is motivated to do what it was destined to do, namely, to self-actualize. To pull itself out of its dormant state to become aware of itself and of the world beyond itself, making of both an object, all in the service of desire. This is in keeping with the terminology Husserl uses in Experience and Judgment where he speaks of the datum's forcing itself against the ego as a cause of the ego's turning-towards, of becoming wakeful or reflective. Thought thrown back on itself, reflective thought, is at the same time pulled out of itself and forced to go beyond itself. In descriptive psychological terms one might say that through lack of gratification I become aware of my limitations, I begin to define myself (fines = boundaries, limits) and am at the same time thrust on the path of seeking to restore the sense of continuity that has been disrupted, to restore my
strength. The latter necessitates thought to go into the world and to make of it an ally. This, once again, is in harmony with Freudian theory. According to Freud the ego develops out of the perceptual system and its running concern will be to know reality. He maintains that the ego is one's point of contact with reality, with the outside world.

...the ego is essentially the representative of the external world, of reality....(EI 222)

The ego can effectively make of the world an ally only if it makes its acquaintance with the world an abiding possession (cogitatum), to which it can return and which it can set in relation, and so forth.

Since the other, at least to begin with, is the agent that causes either the fulfillment or frustration of my desires, it is the other who occasions the awakening of reflective (objective) thought. And this is how thought on becoming reflective necessarily comes to understand itself, as something confronting and being confronted by an other (FTL 237-238 [210]). For thought cannot in the beginning understand itself as pure thought, but must understand itself in terms of its rootedness in desire. Thus when it comes to think of itself it does so in terms of the structure of desire, namely as something vis à vis the other. When thought thrown back on itself gives rise to the notion of self, it does not take itself merely as object, but always as object seen, actually or potentially, by the other. Hence, being object-seen-by-the-other is not merely an accidental property of self, but is an essential property of self, as well as of reflective thought.
(We might recall in this context Plato's notion of thought as inner dialogue.)

We can appreciate that the phenomenon of other selves is deeply intertwined with the whole of phenomenology. Phenomenology after all is a rationality and studies rationality, and we have seen that the rationality of the wakeful ego in its essential structure is intersubjective^22 through and through, from the "lowest level", at which experience of the other sets the wakeful ego in motion, to the highest level at which the cogito willfully has the other in view.

...phenomenology...finally understands itself as a reflective functional activity in transcendental intersubjectivity. ...(FTL 275 [243])

Now, the following objection may come to mind. The rationality of the wakeful ego is essentially intersubjective. Although phenomenology is a rationality and studies rationality, it is said to be a new rationality, the novelty coming from the transcendental perspective. But the transcendental is the non-wakeful ego; it is genetically prior to the objective rationality of science, the rationality of the wakeful ego. The transcendental is also pre-intersubjective, pre-subjective, solipsistic. If phenomenology's contribution is the opening up of this anonymous transcendental realm of pre-objective rationality and if it emphasizes and explores that level, thereby transforming rationality, is it not cut off from scientific rationality and intersubjectivity, in that these belong to the empirical realm? How can it then be maintained that intersubjectivity is essential to phenomenology?
Indeed, scholars like Zaner seem to think that speaking of an anonymous constituting realm rules out the individual, empirical, realm.

...how does it happen that this seeing, when reflectively apprehended, disclosed the sense that it is "my seeing"? How does "my" perception, and more importantly, "my" body, become "mine"? If the existence of the body-proper is truly anonymous, then, why is not my body experienced by me as yours? If perception is truly generalized, then how does it happen that every perception is nevertheless necessarily unique, individual?...I submit that Merleau-Ponty has not clearly recognized the problems involved in the phenomenon, "my body qua mine", but has rather begged the entire question with his conception of the body as "anonymous" and "generalized". (PE 220-221)

Zaner asks: "If perception is truly generalized, then how does it happen that every perception is nevertheless unique, individual?" The answer is: because the anonymous, transcendental realm, does not exist by itself. Phenomenology does not mean to oppose the transcendental to the empirical, and the rationality of the transcendental realm is not opposed to the rationality of the wakeful ego. I said in chapter five that phenomenology does not consider the transcendental, anonymous realm to be the true and the objective, personal, realm to be false. The intention is not to falsify or deny objective thought. Objective thought, or rationality, however, is forgetful of its origin, and in its forgetfulness it falsifies our understanding of experience and of ourselves if it considers itself to be the total ground or explanation of our experience. Reduction to the life-world is meant, not to deny objective thought, but to "assign to objective thought its place" and "endow it with its relative validity" (PhP 356). Phenomenology's point
is that the rationality of the wakeful cogito is not the only or deepest rationality. It maintains that to understand the rationality of science we need to understand how it relates to the deeper rationality. In fact, it is only a naive phenomenological reflection which leads to the transcendental realm and fails to see its relation to the empirical realm. That would constitute a static phenomenology. But Husserl urges that the first, of necessity, naive, phenomenological investigations need to be supplemented with a higher phenomenological reflection, a reflection which takes the first phenomenological reflection as its object. This higher reflection will reveal what we were doing on the lower level; it will reveal that we were led to the transcendental realm because we wanted to ground the empirical realm. Hence the higher order phenomenological investigation reveals the transcendental realm as related to the empirical, and it reveals the transcendental realm to be the realm required by the empirical. This is the genetic phenomenological approach. This point is lucidly expressed by Merleau-Ponty:

We have discovered, with the natural and social worlds, the truly transcendental, which is not the totality of constituting operations whereby a transparent world, free from obscurity and impenetrable solidity, is spread out before an impartial spectator, but that ambiguous life in which the forms of transcendence have their Ursprung, and which, through a fundamental contradiction, puts me in communication with them, and on this basis makes knowledge possible. It will perhaps be maintained that a philosophy cannot be centred round a contradiction, and that all our descriptions, since they ultimately defy thought, are quite meaningless. The objection would be valid if we were content to lay bare, under the term phenomenon or phenomenal field, a layer of prelogical of magical experiences. For in that case we should have to choose between believing the descriptions and abandoning
thought, or knowing what we are talking about and abandoning our descriptions. These descriptions need to provide us with an opportunity for defining a variety of comprehension and reflection altogether more radical than objective thought. To phenomenology understood as direct description needs to be added a phenomenology of phenomenology. We must return to the cogito, in search of a more fundamental Logos than that of objective thought, one which endows the latter with its relative validity, and at the same time assigns to it its place. (PhP 364-365)

It is not a matter of choosing realms. In fact, it is not possible to understand one realm without the other, according to phenomenology. If the first phenomenological reflections yield the transcendental realm, a further phenomenological reflection on that initial reflection, a reflection on method, i.e., a phenomenology of phenomenology, reveals what we were doing and how we were doing it—namely, grasping the objective rationality via the transcendental. Hence, while the first naive reflection yields a static transcendental realm, in phenomenology of phenomenology we are led to a genetic approach whereby we relate the transcendental to the empirical and in which relating the two realms becomes the task (see chapter three).

"...the task of a criticism of transcendental self-experience...would belong to a higher stage, since it would presuppose that, first of all, we had followed the harmonious course of transcendental experiencing as it functions in a certain naive manner, that we had made inquiries about its data and described them in respect of their universal properties. (CM 29 [67-68])

And:

"...the scientific efforts for which we found the collective name, transcendental phenomenology, must proceed in two stages. In the first stage the realm accessible to transcendental self-experience (a tremendous realm, as we soon discover) must be explored— and, at first, with simple devotion to the evidence inherent in the harmonious flow of such experience, while questions..."
pertaining to an ultimate criticism, intent on apodictic principles governing the range of evidence, are set aside. In this stage accordingly - a stage that is not yet philosophical in the full sense - we proceed like the natural scientist in his devotion to the evidence in which Nature is experienced, while for him, as an investigator of Nature, questions pertaining to a radical criticism of experience remain altogether outside the field of inquiry.

The second stage of phenomenological research would be precisely the criticism of transcendental experience and then the criticism of all transcendental cognition. (CM 29 [68])

And:

...we preferred to sketch in outline the tremendous wealth of problems belonging to the first stage of phenomenology - a stage which in its own manner is itself still infected with a certain naivete (the naivete of apodicticity) but contains the great and most characteristic accomplishment of phenomenology, as a refashioning of science on a higher level - instead of entering into the further and ultimate problems of phenomenology; those pertaining to its self-criticism....(CM 151 [177-178])

In that self-critical approach, which constitutes a phenomenology of phenomenology, it becomes clear that in order to make its concept of rationality phenomenological, phenomenology has to show how the other is constituted by the transcendental realm, because its deeper rationality is understood in terms of the ratio of the wakeful cogito, which is an intersubjective cogito. Hence, Husserl can say:

...reduction to the transcendental ego seems to entail a permanently solipsistic science; whereas the consequential elaboration of this science, in accordance with its own sense, leads over to a phenomenology of transcendental intersubjectivity and, by means of this, to a universal transcendental philosophy...transcendental solipsism is only a subordinate stage philosophically....(CM 30 [69])
The genetic phenomenological viewpoint relates the transcendental realm to the empirical realm. But it must be stressed, as I have said previously in chapter five, that the relation between the realms is not a simple one. Merleau-Ponty cautions:

The relationship between the natural and transcendental attitudes are not simple, are not side by side or sequential, like the false or the apparent or the true. (S 164)

The transcendental realm is that which is necessary for the being-sense of the empirical realm. In terms of the problem of other selves, then, the transcendental realm points to a fundamental basis without which objective notions of self and other would make no sense and would not be. The pre-objective and the objective are, in short, essentially interdependent:

Intercorporeality (the pre-objective level of experience/lived-body) culminates in (and is changed into) the advent of blosse Sachen (things in themselves) without our being able to say that one of the two orders is primary in relation to the other. The pre-objective order is not primary, since it is established (and to tell the truth fully begins to exist) only in being fulfilled in the founding of logical objectivity. Yet logical objectivity is not self-sufficient; it is limited to consecrating the labours of the pre-objective layer, existing only as the outcome of the "logos of the aesthetic world" and having value under its supervision. (S 173)

Nor must it be thought that the pre-objective is the cause or means and the objective the effect or end, for to do so would be once more to bifurcate them (S 173). Indeed, the pre-objective, i.e., the life-world or lived-body is rather the condition of possibility of the objective:

The body is nothing less than a thing's condition of possibility. When we go from body to the thing we go
neither from principle to consequence nor from means to end. We are present at a kind of propagation, encroachment, or enjambement which prefigures the passage from the solus ipse to the other person, from the "solipsist" thing to the intersubjective thing. (S 173)

As a condition of possibility of the empirical, the transcendental, the lived-body, is ever present, as I explained on pp. 178 ff. Moreover, as I explained there, this means the pure transcendental ego is ever present as the condition of possibility of the empirical ego and that it is not a matter of competition between the two. The correspondence of the earlier, transcendental levels to the later, objective levels is one of forgetfulness. The thing in-itself is constituted because inter-corporeality is "forgotten", and it can be forgotten because thought aims at the objective:

Logical objectivity derives from carnal intersubjectivity on the condition that it has been forgotten as carnal intersubjectivity, and it is carnal intersubjectivity itself which produces this forgetfulness by wending its way toward logical objectivity. Thus the forces of the constitutive field do not move in one direction only; they turn back upon themselves. Intercorporeality goes beyond itself and ends up unconscious of itself as intercorporeality; it displaces and changes the situation it set out from, and the spring of constitution can no more be found in its beginning than in its terminus. (S 173)

The transcendental reduction, of course, is intended precisely to bring to the fore this forgotten level of experience. Hence in speaking of the anonymous solipsist, i.e., transcendental ego with its corresponding realm, we are neither denying the empirical ego, the ego of objective thought which culminates in the personal ego in the sense of unique cogito, nor intersubjectivity. What is being denied is the
claim that we have this notion of the unique cogito to begin with. As Merleau-Ponty states:

Consciousness of oneself as unique individual (cogito), whose place can be taken by no one is not primary. (PhP 119)

It is the solipsist level that makes possible the phenomenon of intersubjectivity, that makes possible a shared, i.e., intersubjective world. But it must be understood that transcendental solipsism is not the solipsism of a cogito or ego enclosed in itself. Transcendental solipsism is a solipsism or solitude of ignorance:

True transcendental solipsism takes place only if the other person is not even conceivable, and this requires that there be no self to claim solitude either. We are truly alone only on the condition that we do not know we are; it is this very ignorance which is our solitude. The "layer" or "sphere" which is called solipsist is without ego and without ipse. The solitude from which we emerge to intersubjective life is not that of the monad. It is only the haze of an anonymous life that separates us from being; and the barrier between us and others is impalpable. If there is a break, it is not between me and the other person; it is between a primordial generality we are intermingled in and the precise system, myself--the others. What "precedes" intersubjective life cannot be numerically distinguished from it, precisely because at this level there is neither individuation nor numerical distinction. (S 174)

In the transcendental solipsism there is awareness neither of the ego nor of alter-ego.

The child does not live as an ego, but it lives as an us, in common bond with its whole environment. (FB 300)

The child proceeds from a state of "neutral indistinction between self and other". This is what Merleau-Ponty means when he asserts that "transcendental subjectivity is inter-subjectivity".
Initially, then, there is no reflective awareness of self and hence there is a state of mergedness, of intercorporeality, as opposed to a sharedness or intersubjectivity. The latter pertains to a state in which individuation has been achieved, i.e., which expresses a relation between individual subjectivities. As I said previously, the initial mode of relatedness to the world and to others is based on an ignorance of self. It is unreflectively lived; that is to say, it is emotional. Original empathy, the basic mode of relatedness, is emotional, and based on an ignorance of self, unlike adult empathy which occurs between individuals. The theory is once more in agreement with psychoanalytic psychology. In psychoanalytic theory it is held, for instance, that the emotional states, attitudes, etc., of the caregiver are communicated to the very young infant through manner of touch, voice, etc.

According to Remplein (1966, p.215) "it is beyond all doubt that the unconscious mind of the child responds to the parents' unconscious sets, attitudes and prejudices like a very sensitive seismograph. It responds to their peace and security, harmony and joy as well as to their irritability and anxiety, their quarrelling and temper." The concept of "contamination of feeling" (Gefühlsansteckung) used by Max Scheler (1948) can be applied here. Scheler points to the fact that the process of contamination occurs beyond knowledge and intentions of the ego. (FB 301)

What is suggested by the above, then, is that something occurs which is akin to Scheler's "contamination of feeling" (Gefühlsansteckung), which he says takes place beyond explicit knowledge or intention of the ego (NS chapter 1; 246). This is in accord with the way in which Freud describes the earliest type of interaction with others, the process of identification, which he says is "immediate" (EI 219) and occurs "prior
to object cathexis" (EI 219). No analogical reasoning takes place. Since one is not self-aware on this level, it is an unconscious mode of being. According to Freud, the ego to begin with is not conscious, but pre-conscious and even unconscious (EI 210-211).

I will not here describe in further detail the gradual process whereby one goes from an undifferentiated state to a state of individuality. What is important for our purposes is the realization that everything passes from livedness to awareness, from non-reflective mergedness to a reflective inter-subjectivity. Relatedness to the other is at first unreflectively lived, gradually becoming reflective until it culminates in the highest form of relatedness, that of linguistic dialogue.

In the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the other person and myself a common ground; my thought and his are interwoven into a single fabric, my words and those of my interlocutor are called forth by the state of the discussion, and they are inserted into a shared operation of which neither of us is the creator. We have here a dual being, where the other is for me no longer a mere bit of behaviour in my transcendental field, nor I in his; we are collaborators for each other in consummate reciprocity. Our perspectives merge into each other, and we co-exist through a common world. (PhP 354)

The highest form of relatedness to the other, then, occurs when there is awareness of one's ego and that of the other, and occurs in linguistic dialogue. Initially, I stated, there is no sense of distinctness. The very young child does not see phenomena as "private": there is a oneness, and everything is considered accessible to all, as it were. The boundary between self and other gradually emerges. In the beginning, as it emerges, there is a "dizzying
proximity to others". Self and other are confused, as is manifest in the phenomena of transitivity and syncretic sociability. These earlier, more fundamental levels of relating are, however, never lost, according to Merleau-Ponty. In a sense we always remain somewhat merged with others:

I borrow myself from others; I create others from my own thoughts. This is no failure to perceive others; it is the perception of others. (S 159)

In certain circumstances these earlier states re-emerge—in the phenomenon of love, and in certain pathological states, for example. Merleau-Ponty points out, further, that this process of going from an undifferentiated state to a state of individuality or segregation is one which is never completely finished (PhP 119).

What follows from the above is that transcendental phenomenology is essentially intersubjective. Even the pure transcendental ego as ground of rationality is the potential for the relation self-other. The pure transcendental ego too is understood vis-à-vis the other, intersubjectively. When I say the transcendental ego is self-questioning I am also saying that it bears the structure self-other for there are grounds and motives for questioning the self only if one does not quite coincide with oneself; that is, only if one is somehow also not-self, but other (object). Here we encounter again, as we did in chapter four, that life and the cogito have the same structure, namely, that of subject-object or self-other. The pure transcendental ego too has this structure. The pure transcendental ego, life and cogito all have the same structure and all are interconnected in phenomenology. The psyche is a correlation, and
this correlation is at once the structure of life and the structure of cognition, for both cognition and life have the form analogous to self-other. Cognition has this form because we know (cogito) when we have evidence, when we see, and seeing is being witness (self) to the world (other). Life has this form because life is always at some level self-assertion, which requires differentiation into self-other. In this sense, then, energy, libido or life, and cognitive structure or significance are intimately bound up with one another.

Here we see once more that the cogito is rooted in desire, for thought is quite literally motivated by prethetic experience, by desire, by Eros (self-preservation and unification). Thought was "born" out of desire and will always to a certain extent be determined by desire. All thought will have "in" it its connection to desire, however hidden that connection may become. And here is found the connection between science and value. Its rootedness in desire at once implicates thought in value, for our desires determine our values. Our "subjective affective states" are the immediate ground of our values. They validate or legitimate our choices. Knowledge is not a purely intellectual affair, but involves our subjective, affective states. Knowledge, according to phenomenology, is not representation, but investment.

I said that thought, on becoming reflective, takes itself as object seen by others, that it takes on the structure ego-superego, for superego is the idea of the other's view of the ego. Differentiation into ego and superego, then, is reflection. But from what I have said it follows that the psyche would not differentiate itself on an
abstract principle alone, but that thought has a motive for becoming or failing to become reflective--there is always something at stake. According to Freud the motive for internalizing the other, and hence the deeper motive for becoming reflective, is Eros, love of the other and fear of losing the other's love. "To the ego", writes Freud, "living means the same as being loved..." (EI 233). This is so because reflective thought, as mentioned previously, understands itself in terms of the other. It is welded to the other and needs the other for its being. Implicitly intuiting its indebtedness to the other, it will tend to love the other, though this may in fact prove difficult. Love of the other motivates the actualization of the differentiation of the psyche into ego and superego. Indeed, Freud claims that not only does living mean the same thing to the ego as being loved, but it means "being loved by the superego" (EI 233). This is the reason why a celebration of self, as Nietzsche speaks of it, is essentially unselfish: the self is always vis à vis the other, and a celebration of self occurs when ego meets ego ideal, when it meets the superego's standards. The latter, it will be recalled, are the values of the other internalized. In other words, the concept of the ego resting in itself--as in idealism or realism, both of which treat the ego as a self-sufficient homogeneous, ready-made unit--is not a concept of life or energy. Such an ego has no life for it does not reflect movement. What breathes life or energy into the ego is the superego, something to which the ego can aspire or strive, a differential, for energy is created by a differential. Literally the superego inspires (inspire: breath into) the ego. The ego has its greatest surge of energy and
indeed experiences its greatest sense of well-being when it achieves its ideal. It is a matter of life, potential significance, giving rise to significance, which in turn yields greater life. Cognition has the form of life and vice versa. Libido or life energy partakes of this cognitive form, for it is transformed so as to be freed or created by it. Once the psyche actualizes the self-other structure as ego-superego in a process which I said is at heart cognitive, the potential libido of the psyche is put at the disposal of the ego, which uses it for its work, as "energeia". There is no libido or life of the ego, hence no self-assertion, the principle of life, unless there is already significance.

There is ground for a morality here. Since, for the ego, being means being self-reflective, i.e., cogito ergo sum, and since this is made possible by the other, self and other are intimately connected. To hurt the other is then to hurt the self and vice versa.

I expressed concern at the outset of this chapter over the fact that philosophy's problem of other selves mocked the claim that philosophy is social in nature. Within phenomenology's framework the problem of the alter-ego is solved and the social nature of philosophy is once more brought out:

Philosophy is indeed, and always, a break with objectivism and a return from constructa to lived experience, from the world to ourselves. It is just that this indispensable and characteristic step no longer transports it into the rarefied atmosphere of introspection or into a realm numerically distinct from that of science. It no longer makes philosophy a rival of scientific knowledge, now that we have recognized that the "interior" it brings us back to is not a private life but an intersubjectivity that gradually connects us ever closer to the whole of
history...philosophy has a dimension of its own, the dimension of co-existence...as the milieu and perpetual event of universal praxis. (EW 80)

In pointing out how Merleau-Ponty's theory of other selves is in agreement with Husserl's phenomenology, I have lent support to the claim that Husserl does not share Descartes' ontological prejudice; that is, that Husserl is not committed to a metaphysics of presence. Let me briefly summarize the charges against Husserl and counter these. It was claimed that:

(i) For Husserl Being is construed as presence of what is present, as opposed to presence by clearing.

(ii) Because he, like Descartes, focused on the apodicticity of the ego, he failed to ask the question of the meaning of this being, and this was the result of his taking truth to be disclosure (apodicticity) as opposed to the interrelation of disclosure and concealment.

(iii) This metaphysics of presence shows up in his theory of the alter ego; he attempts to reduce the other to presence and that as a result he is committed to say that the other is seen first as object and subsequently as another ego.

I will discuss each of these in turn on the basis of what I have said in this chapter:

(i) I have tried to show that the transcendental is ever present as the condition of possibility of the presence of objective being. It makes the objective possible through forgetfulness of itself (S 173). The term "forgetfulness" may be a bit of a misnomer, however, in so far as we are not, to begin with, explicitly aware of the
transcendental realm and we can forget only that which we knew. The transcendental is lived and not reflectively had. It would be more accurate to speak of its absence from thetic consciousness. It is at any rate, clear that we have here not merely a metaphysics of presence. We have, rather, a presence due to absence or forgetfulness. For Husserl, as for Heidegger, "forgetfulness of Being is not forgetfulness of the world" (PH 171), but is its ground of possibility. Nor, since the transcendental is a condition of possibility of the objective, do we have a mere dialectic (as Gadamer suggests; PH 170)--absence is not a limit of being, but its condition of possibility.

(ii) Husserl criticizes Descartes for failing to question the nature of the ego's apodicticity. In questioning the nature of the apodicticity of the ego-cogito, Husserl comes to see that the ego-cogito is apodictic because the ego is given to itself non-objectively. That is, the cogito is act, not representation. Hence consciousness is never pure presence for Husserl. Because consciousness is activity, something of myself always escapes me. I am never given to myself in totality. The transcendental reduction is instituted to point to that of which we are forgetful, to point to that which we are: I am that of which I am forgetful, namely, the transcendental. Hence for Husserl, as for Heidegger, Dasein is closest to us--we are it--and yet is ontologically that which is farthest. However, it must be clearly kept in mind that the transcendental reduction can only point to the activity of consciousness, to its intentional life. reflection can never coincide with it (S 179; I 214 [160]).
(iii) Husserl does not reduce the other to presence—the other is never mere object for Husserl, according to Merleau-Ponty. For both Merleau-Ponty and Husserl the other is a negativity, a hollow, a constituting activity which I do not constitute. But this hollow or negativity is, according to Merleau-Ponty, indicated through what is present:

This is what animalia and men are: absolutely present beings who have a wake of the negative. A perceiving body that I see is also a certain absence that is hollowed out and tactfully dealt with behind that body by its behaviour. But absence is rooted in presence: it is through his body that the other person's soul is soul in my eyes. (S 172)

But according to Merleau-Ponty this paradoxical relation between presence and absence is characteristic of perception itself:

Thus there is a paradox of immanence and transcendence in perception. Immanence, because the perceived object cannot be foreign to him who perceives; transcendence, because it always contains something more than what is actually given. And these two elements of perception are not, properly speaking, contradictory...the appearance of "something", requires both this presence and absence. (EW 51)

I have been attempting to show, then, that although phenomenology is a pure, formal discipline, it can do justice to "life". What needs to be shown next is that the specifically phenomenological concepts in transcendental logic, such as that of a constituting subjectivity, are in fact compatible with traditional formal logic, for I said that phenomenology is a transcendental logic which developed by "going through" the tradition of formal logic. I shall deal with this concern in the next chapter. There I shall relate
Husserl's transcendental logic to the formal logic of Frege with the aim of demonstrating the connections between these two systems.
FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER SIX

1. Repeatedly instituting the reduction is in effect to ask at each successive stage what meaning "x" has for the ego. If we institute the first reduction we see that all meaning is constituted by the ego. Another way of saying this is that the first reduction yields the ego with its essences. But a second reduction applied to the results of the first reduction, that is, applied to the ego and its essences, separates transcendent and immanent essences. The second reduction reveals the immanent essences of the pure constituting activity of the ego. The ego of the first reduction, in short, is itself constituted by a deeper ego, the pure transcendental ego with its temporal synthesis. (see p. 318).

2. Objectivism is to be distinguished from objective thought. The concept of lifeworld marks the antithesis of objectivism, but not of objective thought.

3. Being, in the former view is understood exclusively in terms of the temporal present and subjectivity is considered as an absolute self-presence. In the latter view Being is understood not in terms of mere presence but in terms of what is not present, viz., past and future. The former grasps Being as what is "now", while the latter sees Being as a project into what is not yet, springing from a ground of which we are forgetful.

4. Merleau-Ponty means by "constituting consciousness" the notion of consciousness entertained in intellectualist theories, viz., the notion of consciousness as a constituting entity or agency, of consciousness as substrate, as interiority.

5. As Husserl urges, there is another stream in Descartes' thought which suggests a more phenomenological understanding of the ego-cogito.

6. One thinks of the different theoretical approaches to colour that Goethe and Newton had. Whereas Goethe's concern in his theory of colour is with the lived experience of colour, Newton's is with the quantification of colour.

7. That this is our essential nature according to Husserl I establish on pp. 331 ff. and 346 ff.

8. It should be clear from the quotation that Merleau-Ponty's criticism of the intellectualist thesis is not to be taken as a critique of Husserl's phenomenology. The theory Merleau-Ponty criticizes here is one in which the relations between world, own body, empirical self and
transcendental ego "remain what they were in empiricism: causal relations...".

9. In The Structure of Behaviour he deals with consciousness "seen from the outside", whereas in the Phenomenology of Perception, he deals with it from "the inside". In other words, in the former he is concerned with discussing the problem of consciousness from a scientific standpoint and in the latter from a phenomenological standpoint. He writes in the Phenomenology of Perception:

We have pointed out elsewhere that consciousness seen from outside cannot be pure for itself. (Structure du Comportment, pp. 168 and ff). We are beginning to see that the same applies to consciousness from the inside. (PhP 215)

10. If the intellectualist thesis were correct, there would remain no opaque element to experience; that is, if behaviour were the execution of the intentions of consciousness, consciousness would know everything ultimately, as it gave rise to these intentions.

11. Empiricism cannot see, according to Merleau-Ponty, that we need to know what we are looking for, and intellectualism cannot see that we need to be ignorant of what we are looking for (PhP 28).

12. These dicta are (i) overturning of the idea of thing and world (see pp. 315 ff.) and (ii) overcoming the notion of transcendental ego as constituting agency in favour of a notion of transcendental ego as constituting activity (see pp. 318 ff.).

13. Duhem argues that translation of a concrete fact into symbol is oftentimes not even a straightforward (one step) translation. Indeed, very often, because of the fact that physical theories become quite complex, in order to effect the translation of a practical fact, that is, in order to use a measuring instrument, an appeal to further, already established theories is required. Interpretation may be involved in the very use of a measuring device. Duhem writes, for example, that while "any man can...follow the motions of a spot of light on a transparent ruler, and see if it goes to the right or the left or stops at such and such a point", unless he knows the theory of electrodynamics, "he will not...be able to measure the resistance of the coil" (ASPT 145). In other words, experimentation in physics does not deal with concrete facts per se, but with theoretical facts, which at times cannot be translated back into concrete facts in one step, but which must be translated back by a chain of theoretical symbols, "by long and complicated theoretical intermediaries".

14. In chapter five (pp. 227 ff.) I explained how nothing is lost in the epoche, however.

15. It must be understood that I am not claiming a complete absence of causal relationship between the perceived and the percept. The causal
relation between the perceived and the percept is illustrated by the phenomenon of blindness, for example. What I am claiming is that the causal relation itself is parasitic upon the constituting activity of consciousness. This is not to invalidate causality anymore than saying that consciousness constitutes the world is to invalidate the world. In Mohanty's words: "intentionality characterizes the constituting order, real, natural causality the constituted" (PTP 73).

16. It is interesting to note that Schmidt makes the same point in his book, The Concept of Nature in Marx (CNM 25).

17. Compare the words of Carnap: "the object and its concept are one and the same. This identification does not amount to a reification [Substantialisierung] of the concept, but, on the contrary, is a 'functionalization' of the object." (L 10)

18. This is the problem of methexis, participation of the thing in the Idea that Plato struggled with.

19. It may seem like a contradiction that association is described as passive and as an act. Yet Husserl maintains that there are such things as passive acts. The contradiction disappears, I think, if we realize that passivity is here to be understood in terms of degrees, rather than in absolute terms. I quote Husserl:

   According to, there is not only a passivity prior to the activity, as passivity of the originally constitutive temporal flux, which is only preconstitutive, but also a passivity erected on this, a passivity which is truly objectivating, namely, one which thematizes or cothematizes objects; it is a passivity which belongs to the act, not as a base but as act, a kind of passivity in activity.

   This formulation shows that the distinction between passivity and activity is not inflexible, that it is not a matter here of terms which can be established definitively for all time, but only of means of description and contrast whose sense must in each case be recreated originally with reference to the concrete situation of the analysis--an observation which holds true for every description of intentional phenomena. (EJ 108)

20. By "thinking" Husserl means objective processes.

21. What is usually stressed concerning Freudian theory is how the superego can be a shackle to the ego. The superego can indeed rage against the ego to the point of crippling the ego. But it is important to realize that the ego is also dependent on the superego for its being, according to Freud.
22. This is not to be confused with the thesis that maintains that rationality is agreement. The latter is held, for instance, by Perelman in his *The New Rhetoric and the Humanities*.

23. "Contagion" would be a better translation of Gefühlsansteckung than "contamination".

24. This is why any investigation into cognition is always correlational research according to Husserl.

25. While in principle one would be without the other, one would not be self-conscious, one would have no concept of ego and so one would not be an ego, for as mentioned above, ego is created every time I conceive of ego. Hence, the mere fact that I am alive does not make me an ego, but only a potential, that is, unconscious ego. Psychology bears this out, for it observes cases, such as in autism, in which an ego does not develop. Lack of ego in autism is indicated by the lack of use of the term "I" for ego is such that if it were constituted or formed it would be cathected and thus enjoy a certain narcissism which would automatically lead it to self-assertion.

26. Though determining what constitutes "hurt" may not be a simple matter.

27. For this reason Merleau-Ponty denies that Husserl's theory of the other involves analogical reasoning.
CHAPTER SEVEN
Frege And Husserl: A Deepening Of The Standard Noema-Sinn Comparison By Means Of A Transcendental Perspective.

In this chapter I return to an explicit treatment of the theme of logic. Taking Frege as a representative of the tradition of formal logic, I shall show that there are points of contact between formal logic and Husserl's phenomenology. Specifically, I shall show that the transcendental perspective is not foreign to Frege's logic, nor is intentionality. While I am showing how transcendental logic and traditional logic are similar, I shall also demonstrate what I consider to be the difference between them. Naess, for example, noting the similarity between Carnap's universal scientific language and Husserl's mathesis universalis, asks what the difference between a Husserlian and Carnapean ideal of clarity and exactitude is (FMP 22). Indeed, Naess points out that Carnap not only saw points of contact between Husserl's phenomenology and his own aim for a rational reconstruction of the real world but, unlike Frege, never showed himself opposed to Husserl.

There are various reasons for drawing a comparison between phenomenology and the tradition of formal logic. First of all, it may deepen our grasp of the way in which phenomenology is logic, for, as I explained in chapter one, transcendental logic stands in relation to traditional formal logic. I explained that while transcendental logic
constitutes a critique of traditional logic, it is one which does not so much go against traditional logic as attempt to complete it by understanding its roots and origins (C 11, 14). Hence, while transcendental logic goes beyond the tradition, it is nevertheless best understood by going through the tradition (C 18). Phenomenology, in short, is not alien to the tradition, as Husserl is well aware. Writes de Muralt:

Husserl knows that he forms part of a closely interdependent human community. Hence he knows that he cannot completely disregard its efforts, its labors, even its theoretical results. This is an evident truth, which the philosopher of transcendental intersubjectivity, the philosopher who devotes himself to bringing to light the historical teleology of human reason and who acknowledges the history of human reason as the primary field of philosophical experience, would be unlikely to deny. (DeM 80)

Second of all, such a comparison is in line with Husserl's dictum that phenomenology be conducted by appeal to "die Sachen selbst". According to this dictum phenomenology should deal with facts, of which the history of thought which includes the philosophical tradition is one. That the individual philosopher forms part of a tradition is a fact his or her philosophizing must take into account. In a certain sense the raw data of phenomenology can only be the sedimented history of thought both in its individual and collective manifestations, for phenomenology attempts to bring out the ideal of philosophy through an examination of de facto philosophy. This does not mean that phenomenology would have to agree to all positions or even be sympathetic to all positions, but it does mean that it should
be able to give at least an account of what it finds objectionable in a theory with which it disagrees.\(^5\)

The third reason for drawing a comparison between the tradition and transcendental logic is that this will bring out notions in logic that otherwise would not surface, notions needed for logic to understand itself.

Finally, some reasons for advancing yet another comparison between Frege and Husserl. It is warranted, I think, because many of the ones now existing are fraught with difficulties and errors. The Frege-Husserl connection is popularly known in two ways, namely (i) in terms of Frege's "devastating" critique of Husserl's alleged psychologism in the Philosophy of Arithmetic, which purportedly caused Husserl to alter his views, and (ii) in terms of the similarity between Husserl's notion of Noema and Frege's notion of Sinn. I think, however, that neither claim is correct without fundamental qualifications. With respect to the first, although Frege may have thought that he was attacking Husserl's psychologism, it does not follow that Husserl was committed to psychologism in his Philosophy of Arithmetic. I have argued that Husserl was not propounding a psychologism in that work but that we find in there the rudiments of his transcendental philosophy. If anything, Frege's criticism did not cause Husserl so much to abandon his views of the Philosophy of Arithmetic as to make his position more precise and less vulnerable to misinterpretation. Furthermore, it has recently been argued by Mohanty (PTP Essay 1) that Husserl developed many of the views embodied in that early work independently of Frege's critique. With respect to the
second claim, the notions of noema and Sinn cannot be compared in the way in which they commonly have been, as more or less isolated from the fuller theories of Husserl and Frege respectively. These notions constitute only a very narrow segment of these philosophers' respective theories. In other words, what is being suggested here is not only that Husserl's notion of noema is truncated in these comparisons--due to the sometimes openly admitted ignoring of the transcendental reduction--but, and this is perhaps a bit surprising, that the same claim holds good for Frege's notion of Sinn as well. It too is pulled out of context. Once the fuller meaning of these notions is grasped, the connection between Frege and Husserl can be more accurately portrayed and drawn out in greater detail. To this task I devote the present chapter.

The person probably best known for making the comparison between Husserl and Frege is Dagfinn Føllesdal. A number of papers continuing this theme followed his 1969 article, making the comparison by now commonplace. The thesis that there are similarities between the theory of intentionality and that of intensionality is usually narrowed down, as stated above, to the claim that Husserl's notion of noema is similar to Frege's notion of Sinn. Authors who have made the Noema-Sinn comparison maintain, for example, that just as for Frege the Sinn is a way of being directed to an object, the noema is said by Husserl to be the way of being directed to an object. Hintikka, of example, writes:

...the only reasonable way of understanding Frege's statement in the last analysis is to interpret the sense of Sinn as the function which gives us the
reference, by means of which we as it were can find this reference....It is not so far from Husserl...for what Husserl was interested in was precisely those 'vehicles of directedness', the noemata, which enable us to intend or refer to objects. (I 133 [267])

The comparison is a fair one. Both Frege and Husserl maintain that Sinn is a way of relating to or being directed to an object. Frege maintains:

It is natural, now, to think of there being connected with a sign (name, combination of words, written mark), besides that which the sign designates, which may be called the meaning of the sign, also what I should like to call the sense of the sign, wherein the mode of presentation is contained. (PWGF 57)

Husserl writes:

Every noema has a "content", namely, its "meaning", and is related through it to "its" object. (I 133 [267])

However, while there is nothing wrong with comparing the noema and Sinn along this line, what I object to is the way in which this relating to or referring to an object is generally understood in the literature. It is understood as a "picking out" of an object, and this in turn is understood in terms of a linguistic model of referring. Føllesdal, for example, maintains that "noemata are like linguistic Sinne in most respects" (HNN 684). According to this model, the paradigm of reference is the relation of a name to that extra-linguistic entity it names, or as I shall call it, the name/bearer relation. As Bell writes:

...the reference of an expression is that extra-linguistic entity with which the expression has been correlated or which it picks out. (FTJ 42)

Usually the extra-linguistic entity 'picked out' by the name is taken to be an entity in the world. As Rosenberg and Travis write:
The question of reference is a specific instance of a general philosophical concern about the relation of words and the world--how is it possible to use language to talk about what is not language, the extra-linguistic world? Indeed, one historically important tradition hoped to find in an adequate theory of reference the full answer to the question of word-world relationships. On this account, the theory of reference was to constitute a theory of meaning as well. Sentences are combinations of words; they are made up of words. Each word stands for or names an object. The meaning of the word is the object for which it stands. Thus language achieves an extra-linguistic import. In one variant or another, something like this theory has been a viable force in philosophy from Plato to the present. (RPL 163)

Hintikka too speaks of reference in terms of "picking out" an object:

When one understands a singular term, one does not just know what it stands for, one also knows something about how its reference is picked out. (IOI 115)

But this is only one particular understanding of the theory of reference, and, as it stands, is an incomplete account of the phenomenon of reference. In the works of both Frege and Husserl there is to be found another notion of reference, one which is not based on the name-named paradigm. I shall argue in this chapter that it is in terms of this other model, and not the linguistic model, that the phenomena of Sinn and noema can best be understood.

The main objection I have against the linguistic model is that it is too static to do justice to either Frege's notion of Sinn or Husserl's notion of noema. The extra-linguistic object to which Sinn relates, for example, is considered to be already "there". The subject's relation to Sinn is also treated in a more or less static manner. Although it is admitted that the noema and Sinn are entities related to the subject--that they are subject dependent--the subjective aspect of the relation is not discussed at any length. It is taken for
granted that we somehow have the Sinn or noema and by means of this refer to the object. What is focused upon is the purely "objective" side of the meaning entity and its relation to the subject is not discussed. I have already explained how this is illegitimate according to Husserl (pp. 249 ff). For Husserl, there can be no hope of understanding the noema without understanding the nature of its relation to the "subjective" act—to the noesis. Writes Husserl:

...the Eidos of the noema points to the Eidos of the noetic consciousness; both belong eidetically together. (I 265 [206])

A little further he adds:

A parallelism between noesis and noema does indeed exist, but is such that the formations must be described on both sides, and in their essential correspondence to one another. (I 266 [207])

It can even be argued that Husserl draws so much attention to the noema only in order to reveal the constituting activity, the noetic activity, and, in the final analysis, to reveal specifically the pure noesis. The noetic acts are intricate, and Husserl speaks of their intricacy being "mirrored" in the noema. In effect, then, the whole point is to read the intricacies of the noema back into the noesis. But in most of the aforementioned papers the divisions Husserl makes within the full noema, while mentioned, are ignored or conflated. As a result, attention is not given to the noesis, whose activity these divisions "mirrored". It is to be understood that these papers cannot then be giving an adequate or even correct account of the nature of the noema. For although Husserl says that the noema, "despite its dependence [on the noesis], permits of being considered on its own
account" (I 265 [206]), he means that any account which focuses explicitly only on the noema must nevertheless reflect an understanding of the essential relation of the noema and the noesis. These papers do not reflect such an understanding. Indeed, it is not possible to grasp the noema without considering its noetic relation, because the intricacy of the noesis is quite literally taken up in the noema:

...intentionalities in the noesis and noema rest on one another in descending levels, or rather dovetail into one another in a peculiar way. (I 269 [210])

It is for this reason that Husserl cautions that, although he speaks of the structure of the noesis mirroring itself in the noema, this "mirroring" is not to be taken as a simple side-by-side relation:

These two doctrines of forms [of noeses and noemata] would not of course stand related to each other in any sense as images in a mirror, or as though they could pass over the one into the other through a mere change of signatures, e.g., through simply substituting for every noema N the "consciousness of N". (I 265 [206])

What are these divisions of the noema that are not adequately recognized in the papers referred to above? Husserl divides the noema into three moments: (i) a pure substrate of predicates, "the pure X in abstraction from all predicates" (I 337 [271]; (ii) a core or "characteristic nucleus" (I 338 [271])--also referred to by Husserl as "central 'nucleus' ", "the sheer 'objective meaning' " (I 246 [189]), "noematic Sinn", and "object simpliciter" (I 246 [189])-- which is the X filled out by predicates: "a fully dependable content is marked off in every noema...a definite system of predicates...[which] determine the 'content' of the object-nucleus of the noema" (I 336-37 [270]); and (iii) a quality, the mode of presentation of the object, e.g., the
object as seen, recalled, hallucinated, etc.: "an objective...has its ways of being given; its characters, its manifolds under which it is known in the complete noema" (I 250-51 [192]). All three moments together constitute the complete noema. Føllesdal in his article appreciates the distinctions "within" the noema and initially likens Sinn only to the central nucleus of the noema, to the sheer objective meaning, the noematic Sinn (HNN 682). However, about one third into the article he conflates the central nucleus, the noematic Sinn, with the complete noema. This is somewhat surprising in light of the fact that Føllesdal himself cautions us in his article about Husserl's inconsistent use of the term "Sinn", using it sometimes to mean the full noema, and at other times to mean the objective meaning (HNN 681-682). But Føllesdal conflates the two where Husserl does not do so. Føllesdal, for example, citing a passage in which Husserl is speaking about the noematic Sinn (HNN 684), generalizes Husserl's remarks about Sinn to the complete Noema. His justification for doing so is the following:

...since the other components of the noema are also "Sinn" components, the same presumably applies to them, and, thereby, to the whole noema. (HNN 684)

From the above it is clear that Føllesdal believes that in general what is said about the noematic Sinn can be said about the complete noema. He does the same once again a little further on in the article when he cites a section of Husserl's manuscript Noema und Sinn. In the section in question Husserl characterizes Sinn as having the possibility of remaining the same in perception, meaning and phantasy. It is clear that Husserl is talking about only part of the noema, viz., the sheer
objective meaning, the central nucleus. Føllesdal once again, however, concludes that Husserl's discussion concerning Sinn in this passage "presumably applies to all components of the noema" (HNN 685). Now Husserl may indeed sometimes use Sinn alternately to refer to the complete noema and part of the noema, and it is possible that Husserl does this because the whole noema and a part of the noema have something in common which the term "Sinn" applied to either attempts to express. But it does not follow that one can conflate the two in all cases, and certainly one should not do so where Husserl does not, as in the passages in question. If one does conflate the two terms, a reason for doing so, other than the one Føllesdal gives, should be advanced. Saying that the two notions have the same properties because they belong to the same complex is illegitimate.

Because of this conflation of the noematic core and complete noema, Føllesdal's comparison of Frege and Husserl on Sinn is not completely reliable. The articles on this topic which follow Føllesdal's paper incorporate much of the latter's position, including the confusion just discussed. A result of this is that the complete noema is underplayed, especially the quality, and the need to give a special account of it is not appreciated. Smith and McIntyre in their paper "Intentionality via Intensions", for example, write the following:

The noematic Sinn, because it prescribes the object of the act, is the most important component for Husserl's theory of intentionality. (IVI 545)

In failing to focus on the full noema in its own right, which would bring attention to its quality, the significance of the quality of the
noema is not appreciated. That this is so can be gleaned from Smith and McIntyre's comment in a footnote that "it should be noted...that without further modification...our present characterization of noemata is unable to account for evidential 'fulfillment' " (IVI 545), something, as I shall argue a bit later, the quality of the noema is precisely meant to reflect. The "further modification" that would be needed is an acknowledgement of the full noema with its quality. As I have argued, it is above all this notion of quality or character of the noema that captures Husserl's distinct notion of intentionality, that which differentiates it from Brentano's notion of intentionality, and reflects the special intentional relation of the subject to its object (see chapter two). Føllesdal realizes that Husserl's notion of intentionality differs from that of Brentano, and says that the difference is captured in the concept of "noema" (HNN 681). The claim is true but too general to be informative about the difference between Husserl's and Brentano's notions of intentionality. It is specifically in the notion of quality as inalienably belonging to the noema that we get a feel for the difference between Husserl's notion of intentionality and that of his master, as I explained in chapter two, a difference as Landgrebe argues (WDP) rooted in his Philosophy of Arithmetic though not realized by him there and misunderstood by Frege. Landgrebe underscores Husserl's very special notion of intentionality, and argues that although the claim that Husserl has a unique conception of intentionality is in some sense even commonplace, nevertheless it is deserving of renewed attention:
Das in der ganzen Entwicklung der Phänomenologie Husserls treibende Grundmotiv ist seine ihm spezifisch eigene Konzeption der Intentionalität. So sehr er selbst dies immer wieder betonte und so selbstverständlich das heute klingen mag, so sehr muss darauf hingewiesen werden, dass auch von seinen Schülern zumeist die Tragweite dieser Konzeption und die Konsequenzen, die sich aus ihr ergeben, verkannt wurden. (DWP 59)

The notion of quality touches on the nature of the subjective relation to the noematic Sinn, the relation of noesis to noematic core and to the object. I have argued that ignoring the quality of the noema gives one Brentano's concept of intentionality (see chapter two). In reducing the complete noema to Sinn in the sense of noematic core, as Föllesdall as well as Smith and McIntyre do, the complete noema is reduced to an objective entity, for Husserl describes the core as "the sheer 'objective meaning!'" (I 246 [189]). However, Husserl would not have agreed to understanding the complete noema as an objective entity per se, for phenomenology is everywhere concerned with uncovering the original hidden constitutive activity of subjectivity. So if "noema" characterizes Husserl's phenomenology, it does so because it bears the mark of and thereby reveals the activity of the constituting subject. When we focus our attention on the noema in the phenomenological reduction, we are supposed to see precisely this relation of objectivity, any objectivity, perceptual as well as the purely meant, to the constituting subjectivity. We are supposed to see the relation of constituted to constituting act (noesis), in other words. I find de Muralt in agreement with the claim that a proper phenomenological or transcendental understanding of the noema is one in which the complete noema is understood to imply the corresponding noesis:
The complete noema thus appears as in itself intentionally implying the corresponding noesis, the complete constituted as implying its constitution, the cogitatum as implying the cogito. The genuine sense of the noema necessarily requires this implication, without which the noema is not transcendentally understood. (DeM 284)

The trouble with Føllesdal's reading of Husserl, as Langsdorf (NAS 8) also argues, is his failing to perform the transcendental reduction. The same can be said of Smith and McIntyre, who, in their study on noemata, in fact openly admit to not being concerned with the reduction:

...the performance of the epoche--the use of the phenomenological method--will play no role in our present efforts. (IVI 543)

Smith and McIntyre in fact maintain that noemata can not only be adequately understood without invoking the reduction, but that the reduction can only be understood via an understanding of noemata. They assert:

The epoche, in fact, is an heuristic device whose purpose is to acquaint us with noemata. But the method is neither comprehensive nor effective without an understanding of the nature and role of the entities we are seeking by means of its use. (IVI 543)

The reduction gives us the meant qua meant--the Sinn of the noema. But if the reduction is not carried further, one is not engaging in a true transcendental philosophy. The reduction is continued to the point where it is seen that the meant qua meant is always the meant of a constituting subjectivity. And the reduction is to be carried still further: we are to apply it to the constituting subjectivity to achieve a view of the pure transcendental ego. This was explained in the previous chapters. Hence the claim made by Smith and McIntyre is
false. Neglecting the reduction prevents one from considering the complete noema, which leads to an objectivistic, and, from the transcendental phenomenological point of view, inadequate understanding of noemata, in which the connection to the noeses is neither seen nor understood. Yet most of the articles comparing Husserlian "noema" and Fregean "Sinn" fail to make the least mention of the noeses. The one exception is Jaako Hintikka, who does seem to appreciate the fact that the noemata are reached via the reduction. He writes:

...the importance of the 'phenomenological reduction' for the practice of phenomenology...seems to me best explicable in terms of the objective meaning entities, the noemata, which the reduction is calculated to uncover....(IOI 231)

Disappointingly he goes on to say, however:

It has been argued recently, and quite persuasively, that the very meaning of the phenomenological reduction can only be understood in terms of the semantical and ontological status of noemata, not vice versa. (IOI 231)

His reference here is to the Smith and McIntyre article we mentioned above, which cannot, in my judgment, be said to argue the case persuasively at all. In any case, Hintikka too ends up "concentrating on these meaning entities [the noemata] rather than on the technique allegedly needed to reach them " (IOI 231). Hintikka fails to see that the reduction shows the noema to be essentially linked to the noesis, that it shows the noema to point to an objectifying act which can be characterized.

I have said, then, that the noema for Husserl cannot be understood independently of a larger "cognitive" act. This is brought out by attention to the complete noema--specifically to its quality or
thetic character—and it is the latter which distinguishes Husserl's "intentionality" from that of Brentano. Already in the Philosophy of Arithmetic, in his endeavour to account for number, Husserl found Brentano's concept of intentionality to be too narrow for his purposes. It has been noted that although he tried to stay within Brentano's theoretical framework, Husserl, without being fully aware of it, had already gone substantially beyond his teacher's notion of intentionality (WOP 15). Husserl no longer conceived of the intentional act as undifferentiated, but as a very specific striving, a very specific operation. Writes Landgrebe:

In einer von Brentano abweichenden Weise ist also die Rede von Intentionalität wortlich genommen, ist sie gefasst als ein Intendieren, das von dem uneigentlichen zum eigentlichen Vorstellen hingehet, mit anderen Worten als ein Streben, das auf eine Leistung gerichtet ist, nämlich auf die Herstellung der eigentlichen Vorstellung. Der Unterschied zwischen eigentlichen und uneigentlichen Vorstellen war freilich Brentano geläufig und spielte in seinen Analysen eine grosse Rolle. Aber es blieb bei der Feststellung dieser verschiedenen Arten intentionaler auf ein Objekt, die er voneinander abhob, man könnte sagen, in einer rein statischen Weise, ohne dass er das Dynamische des Übergangs, des Intendierens von dem bloss symbolisch Indizierten zur erfüllenden Veranschaulichung, zur ursprünglich gegebenen Vorstellung beachtet hätte. (DWP 14-15)

That Brentano's notion of intentionality is too restrictive for Husserl's purposes in the Philosophy of Arithmetic is not surprising when we consider that the latter's account there of numbers involves appeal to the process of counting, a highly specific process that intentionality as undifferentiated act, as pure representation, cannot accommodate. And Suzanne Bachelard notes how frequently Husserl compares the "operation" of intentionality to that of counting (SHL
66). As I explained in chapter two this operation is one of bringing the object to givenness. Intentionality is not merely the "having" of an object. In Husserl's words, it "does not consist in just holding the object presently before one" (I 263 [205]), but it is the striving to bring the object to evidence, the striving to have it "originaliter". I have explained also that this act can be characterized in detail, according to the type of object consciousness relates to, and according to the region of being the object belongs to, for different regions have different types of evidence prescribed in advance (I 356-357 [288]); C 166; PL [25]). It was explained in chapter two also that evidence expresses a concern for truth, and that bringing the object to evidence is a striving for truth. The striving to bring the object to evidence is the essence of intentionality; but striving for evidence is striving for truth. In effect, then, striving for truth is the essence of intentionality. It is this concern with truth that is expressed in the noema's quality. The character expresses the manner in which the object is given to us, e.g., in perception, imagination, memory, and so forth. But we would not specify the manner of givenness if we were not concerned with truth. Indeed, the type of presentation indicates the type of evidence required to bring an object to adequation, and we arrive at a classification of the type through attempting to bring the object to adequation. I explained in chapter two (pp. 95 ff.) that at the basis of this theory is Husserl's belief in the primacy of perception, for the characters are arrived at in a sense negatively, as is any explicit sense of truth, i.e., one develops an explicit sense of truth only
after one's passive belief, that is, naive, non-questioning belief, in the truth of something has been frustrated, as I explained in chapter two (pp. 87 ff.). Through failing to bring the object to adequation by means of perceptual evidence, we get a sense of object not perceived, but wished, recalled, hallucinated, and so forth. As I argued in chapter two, for Husserl all characters are modifications of perception. The striving for truth, for bringing the object to adequation, is always present, though it remains implicit until one encounters an error, at which time a sense of truth is made explicit. Once error occurs the objects are qualified as real, fancied, dreamt, etc., all of which express a concern for truth. In addition, one becomes aware of nuances which further bear evidence of a concern for truth, e.g., probably seen, definitely dreamt, etc.

One recognizes further...that there is such a thing...as the consciousness of "fulfilment of the intention", of authorizing and strengthening with special reference to the thetic characters, just as there are also the corresponding opposed characters of the depriving of all authority and power. (I 369-370 [300-301])

As I said above, then, the striving for truth expresses itself in the quality of the noema. To discuss only the core of the noema is therefore to leave aside completely the notion of striving for truth, and this would be akin to Brentano's treatment of intentionality, not as a highly specified and specifiable act, but as an undifferentiated representation of object.

This in one way or another is, in effect, what the authors comparing intentionality and intensionality have done. They focus on the core of the noema only, thereby eradicating the difference between
Husserl's and Brentano's notions of intentionality. Yet Føllesdal, for instance, claims that the notion of noema differentiates Husserl's and Brentano's concepts of intentionality. While this is true, he sets out to understand the noema in such a way as to mask the difference between Brentano's and Husserl's notions of intentionality, i.e., as core versus complete noema. Because noema is understood as core, these authors cannot account for, and indeed do not see the importance for, the phenomenon, crucial to phenomenology, of the "filling out" of the noema, which is the process of bringing to evidence. I quote McIntyre and Smith commenting on the shortcomings of their interpretation of noema as Sinn:

There are important qualifications to this claim, dealing for the most part with the richness and evidential "fullness" of sensory intuition. But to allow for these here would be a needless complication [my emphasis] of our fundamental contention that noemata are intensions. It should be noted, however, that without further modification our present characterization of noemata is unable to account for evidential "fulfillment". (IVI 547, n. 10)

If, as they say, they cannot account for perceptual filling out without further modification of their account, there is reason to assume McIntyre and Smith cannot do so for any other type of filling out, e.g., the filling out of irreal objects, since the latter involves appeal to the more complex notion of adumbration of irreal objects. It is fair to say, then, that their understanding of intentionality as intensionality is one which, as it stands, is unable to deal with the process of filling out, of bringing to evidence or truth. What McIntyre and Smith in fact are doing--and we find a clear instance of this also in Føllesdal's paper--is working with a notion of object as
object already filled out. In Føllesdal's understanding of intentionality there is no striving left—we have, as it were, "arrived".

According to Føllesdal, Husserl considered his notion of noema to be a means of overcoming the problem of intentional inexistence. According to Føllesdal (HNN 680), the problem of intentional inexistence resulted from Brentano's thesis that "every mental phenomenon is characterized by the reference to a content, a direction upon an object", by what the Scholastics called "intentional inexistence of an object". Føllesdal points out that according to Brentano even in hallucinating or in imagining, say, a centaur, consciousness is directed to an object. The problem in Føllesdal's words is the following:

...whereas the view that the objects of acts are real leads to difficulties in the case of centaurs and hallucinations, the view that the objects are unreal, whatever that may mean, leads to difficulties in the case of many other acts, e.g., acts of normal perception: it seems that, on that view, what we see when we see a tree is not the real tree in front of us, but something else, which we would also have seen if we were hallucinating. (HNN 680)

According to Føllesdal Husserl overcomes this problem by denying that all acts have objects:

Husserl resolved this dilemma by holding that, although every act is directed, this does not mean that there always is some object toward which it is directed. According to Husserl, there is associated with each act a noema, in virtue of which the act is directed toward its object, if it has any [my emphasis]. (HNN 681)

Which acts of consciousness are not directed towards an object according to Føllesdal? He does not specify or characterize these
acts, but he does give an example, viz., the act of thinking of a centaur.

When we think of a centaur, our act of thinking has a noema, but it has no object; there exists no object of which we think. Because of its noema, however, even such an act is directed. To be directed simply is to have a noema. (HNN 681)

What characterizes such an act? The thought of a centaur is one which cannot be perceptually filled out. The cards are on the table. Føllesdal thinks that if an act of consciousness has a content which cannot be perceptually filled out, it has a noema according to Husserl, but not an object. Certain acts of recollection, then, would also have a noema but no object, such as my recollection of my dog Pedro, who is deceased. But how does the act of recollecting Pedro or of thinking of a centaur in its structure qua act of consciousness differ from my act of thinking of my actually existing, but absent, friend in Toronto? The former two acts cannot be perceptually filled out and the latter can, but that makes no difference to the nature of the acts qua acts of consciousness as they occur. It seems to me that Føllesdal is committed to saying that any content of thought which is not at the time at which it is thought given in immediate perceptual experience, which is not at the time of presentation perceptually filled out, has a noema but not an object. It seems that Føllesdal is committed to saying that, for Husserl, only if the object is what Husserl calls "perceptually filled out" is consciousness directed to an object.

Every [my emphasis] noema has a "content", namely its "meaning", and is related to its "object" [my emphasis]. (I 333 [267])
This is not surprising if we consider that, as I explained in chapter two, the essence of intentionality according to Husserl is objectification. In thinking of a centaur or any irreal object, consciousness is directed to an object.

...irreal objectivities...have the essential property of all experiences or evidences of whatever sort - that is to say: with the repetition of the subjective life-processes, with the sequence and synthesis of different experiences of the Same, they make evidently visible something that is indeed numerically identical (and not merely things that are quite alike), namely the object, which is thus an object experienced many times, or, as we may also say, one that "makes its appearance" many times (as a matter of ideal possibility, infinitely many times) in the domain of consciousness. (FTL 162-163 [145])

According to Husserl while some acts of consciousness are intentional and not directed to an object, in the broadest sense of the term--namely, those acts which he calls "primary intentionality", such as the original time synthesis--all other acts of consciousness are directed towards an object, including acts of imagination, hallucination, dreaming, and so forth. Husserl does not treat the intentionality of acts of dreaming, hallucinating, etc., any differently than that of acts of perceiving a real object. All acts are directed towards an object, though different types of acts have different types of evidence--in the former case the objects are not perceptually filled out, in the latter they are. It is false to say, then, that Husserl differs from Brentano in that the former claims that in the case of imaginary objects consciousness is not directed to an object. On this Husserl and Brentano agree.
Føllesdal's interpretation runs into an insoluble difficulty, one which results from his failure to do the reduction. If consciousness in both its empty and filled states has a noema, but only in its filled state a noema and an object, Føllesdal is compelled to find a bridge from the noema to an extra-noematic object. In other words, he has to account for how consciousness in its filled state gets from noema to object. The problem arises because Føllesdal has reified the noema. The result is what Veatch (IL 15) calls confusing a formal sign for an instrumental sign. Of an instrumental sign, Veatch writes that "instead of being something which immediately represents its object to a knowing power, [it] is rather something which has to be known in itself first; and then from this knowledge one has to make some sort of inference to the object of which the idea is presumably a copy or resemblance...". In Føllesdal's theory there is a noema-object split. But such a split is unthinkable for Husserl. The noema is precisely the subject-object link in Husserl's theory. This is what the reduction was meant to reveal: that the object is always the object of a consciousness. The noema is this link between subject and object. When Føllesdal says that the mark of intentionality is not being directed to an object, but having a noema, he has to account for the noema's relation to the object (when it has one), and he is thus, according to phenomenology, back at square one, for the noema was precisely to account for the link of consciousness to the object.

I am claiming, then, that the difference between empty and filled consciousness is not that in one case consciousness refers to an object while in the other it does not. In both empty and filled
consciousness there is reference to an object. The difference between empty and filled consciousness is, rather, that in the latter the object is filled out by the hyletic data, while in the former it is not. But does this position not run into the same difficulty Føllesdal's position runs into? Are the hyletic data not the extra-noematic elements to which a "bridge" must be spanned? The answer is no. In Husserl's theory only the telos, the object at infinity, which is the idea of the object completely filled out, is the whole; only the idea is concrete. All else, hyle, noesis, and noema comprise a moment of consciousness and cannot be taken as independent. In Husserl's theory no real break occurs between the components of consciousness, as I explained in chapter two (pp. 108 ff.). This applies to noesis, noema and hyle as well. There is no real break between the noema and hyle. It is not possible to stipulate where hyle ends and noema starts, for the hyle remains ever present in its original form even "after" the noema has been conceived by the noesis. The noema always has a "lower level", namely, the hyle, and always implies the hyle. Therefore no bridge need be spanned between noema and hyle, for noema implies the hyle.

What Føllesdal has inadvertently done is conflate the notions "object" and "real object". In imagining a centaur, consciousness is directed towards an object, only not a real object. But if for Husserl the mark or essence of intentionality is objectification, being directed towards an object, and if for Føllesdal consciousness is directed to an object only if there is a real object corresponding to the act of consciousness, then Føllesdal has inadvertently made
reality, existence of the real object, the mark or criterion of intentionality. For Føllesdal the relation of consciousness to its object is more static than it is for Husserl. While for Føllesdal the objectivity of the object is not constituted by consciousness, for Husserl the relation to the object is an act of objectification, of constituting the objectivity. For Føllesdal the object is extra-noematic. The relation to the object must then be a type of correspondence or a mapping on to the object. The being directed to or referring to an object, according to this view, is nothing but a kind of "picking out" of the object. That is, real objects, being spatio-temporal, are identifiable, individuated objects. They can be located and picked out. Taken in this way, referring is a kind of mapping out and constitutes a finite act; that is, the act of referring comes to an "end" when one has picked out the object referred to. It is akin to directing, say, someone to the water fountain--there is a point of arrival. It seems as if Føllesdal is saying that if an act of consciousness picks out an object in this way, then it can be said to be directed towards an object--otherwise it merely has a noema. According to Husserl, however, the object is identifiable only because of the noema. There can be no extra-noematic identifiable object, as all identity requires the noema, an X with predicates, identity being a unity with predicates. The notion of reference as a point of arrival at an object cannot constitute the essence of intentionality for it presupposes the noema, itself an intentional entity. For Husserl it is illegitimate to claim that consciousness is only directed to an object if the object of consciousness is a real object. According to Husserl
empty consciousness too is directed to an object. Empty consciousness is no less intentional than filled consciousness.

According to Husserl, then, in intentionality consciousness is always directed to an object. This being directed to the object is not a static relation to the object but a highly specific act of striving for truth--of striving to bring the object to evidence.

In the discussions of intentionality as intensionality no mention is made of a striving of the subject to constitute the object in evidence, the very distinguishing mark of Husserl's notion of intentionality. Does this omission completely invalidate the comparison between intentionality and intensionality? If so, that would impede the "rapprochement" between analytic philosophy and phenomenology, which, according to some philosophers, drew its legitimation from the similarity between noema and Sinn. As Solomon writes:

...the noema as a Sinn or meaning now falls into alignment with the various concepts of linguistic meaning that have been formulated and debated in the seventy years since Frege's pioneering efforts. And with this conceptual bridge between two initially different conceptions of meaning comes a bridge between two philosophical disciplines that seemed to be mutually incomprehensible and irreconcilable. (HEA 169)

I think, however, that a very close comparison between the philosophy of Frege and Husserl can be drawn if we take a more comprehensive look at Frege's thesis of sense and reference and gain an understanding of Frege's "Sinn" different from those accounts of Sinn which do not take into account the notion of striving of the subject for truth. In so doing it will be seen that a notion of the striving subject is not
alien to Frege's thesis of sense and reference but is fundamental to it. Indeed, a modified interpretation of Frege's notions of sense and reference is not uncalled for if we consider the words of Sluga:

While it is true that the doctrine of sense and reference and the issues it raises have been a major concern of recent analytic philosophy of language, it is important to keep in mind that Frege's interest in that doctrine differs from the current one in several respects. (GF 62)

Understanding Frege's interest in the doctrine is vital to a correct understanding of "sense" and "reference". So I shall next address the question of what Frege's interest in the doctrine was and how this differs from the import recent analytic philosophy of language has ascribed to it.

When the Fregean notions of sense and reference are discussed by philosophers, on the whole these notions are taken to comprise a thesis about sentence parts. That this is so can be seen in the fact that in the articles examined for this chapter, no mention is made of the reference of sentences, viz., truth-values. I explained that the model taken as paradigmatic of expressions having sense and reference is that of names (singular terms): sense is taken to be the meaning of an expression and the referent is taken to be "that extra-linguistic entity with which the expression has been correlated or which it picks out" (FTG 42). By taking "names" as the paradigm of sense and reference one gets a narrow, truncated, view of sense and reference. But Sluga is correct in pointing out that Frege's article on sense and reference does not fundamentally concern names, and in fact was not even motivated by a concern with the workings of ordinary language per
se, and hence is in this sense not even primarily a linguistic thesis (GF 158). The article is fundamentally and ultimately concerned with the reference of sentences, viz., truth-values: only about one third (PW 56-62) of the article is devoted to the reference of names, the remaining two thirds (PW 62-78) being devoted to the reference of sentences. The whole article on sense and reference was developed out of another article which dealt with Frege's concern for developing formalized language of pure thought modelled upon the language of arithmetic (PW 29). This needs to be included in any understanding of sense and reference.

It is true that Frege sometimes compares sentences to names. This is so because sentences are saturated entities according to Frege (PW 32), and he sometimes uses the term "name" to mean a complete or saturated entity as opposed to an incomplete or unsaturated entity, such as functional expressions (PW 57). In this sense sentences constitute names, as opposed to functional expressions, which do not. But he also uses the term "name" in its more popular sense to mean a sentence part, to mean a singular term. When used in that way equating sentences and names is a mistake, for in that case, although sentences and names are similar in that they are both saturated entities, they are not identical in nature according to Frege (GF 160). The referents of sentences and names are, for instance, of different logical types. What I shall argue next is that the reference of a name is dependent on the reference of a sentence and that the notion of the reference of a name can only be understood in context of the notion of the reference of sentence. I shall argue that the reason for this is twofold. First
of all, according to Frege, words, including names, have meaning only in a sentence, not in isolation (GA x). Secondly, according to Frege the movement of sense to reference everywhere comes about only due to truth (PW 63). I shall next explain these two points.

Frege states, then, that one cannot ask for the meaning of a word in isolation but only within the context of a sentence (GA x). But he says also that "that which the sign designates [i.e., the referent]...may be called the meaning of the sign" (PW 57). Hence one cannot ask for the referent of a word in isolation. But one cannot ask for the sense of a word in isolation either, for sense is the way to the referent, i.e., it is "the mode of presentation" (PW 57) of the object, of the referent, of the meant.

The meaning of a proper name is the object itself which we designate by using it; the idea which we have in that case is wholly subjective; in between lies the sense, which is indeed no longer subjective like the idea, but is yet not the object itself. The following analogy will perhaps clarify these relationships. Somebody observes the moon through a telescope. I compare the Moon itself to the meaning; it is the object of the observation, mediated by the real image projected by the object glass in the interior of the telescope [my emphasis], and by the retinal image of the observer. The former I compare to the sense [my emphasis], the latter is like the idea or experience. The optical image in the telescope is indeed one-sided and dependent upon the standpoint of the observation; but it is still objective, inasmuch as it can be used by several observers. At any rate it could be arranged for several to use it simultaneously. But each one would have his own retinal image. (PW 60)

From this passage it is clear that the sense is the way to the referent, for Frege speaks of the sense as a mediation to the observation, to that which is meant, the moon, the referent. The sense is a vehicle, a means to the referent. That is what sense is
essentially and so sense cannot be understood without this relation to the referent. Since the sense of a name includes knowledge of its referent, as it is in effect the means whereby the word is linked with its referent, one cannot ask for the sense of a word in isolation any more than one can ask for the meaning of a word in isolation.

The second reason given above for maintaining that the reference of a name cannot be understood without appeal to the notion of truth, viz., that the movement from sense to referent everywhere comes about only due to truth, is expressed in the following passage:

The fact that we concern ourselves at all about what is meant by a part of the sentence indicates that we generally recognize and expect a meaning for the sentence itself....But now why do we want every proper name to have not only a sense, but also a meaning [i.e., a reference]. Why is the thought not enough for us? Because, and to the extent that, we are concerned with its truth-value....It is the striving for truth [my emphasis] that drives us always [my emphasis] to advance from sense to the thing meant [i.e., to reference]. (PW 63)

From the above quotation it is clear that the notion of reference cannot be understood without the notion of truth, since the striving for truth is the motivating force of the act of referring, it makes the act of referring come about, as it were. Sluga, it is to be noted, points out that "in the Grundgesetze he [Frege] singles out the introduction of truth-values as the most significant achievement of the theory of reference" (GF 158). The striving for truth also drives us from sense to reference in the case of names, and the reference in the case of names must be understood in this light. But the striving for truth occurs via or in the sentence, which means we cannot understand the notion of the reference of the sentence in the case of names.
without appeal to an understanding of how the sentence works, without appeal to the notion of the reference of a sentence, for the referents of sentences are truth-values in Frege's theory. But if sense is essentially a vehicle to the referent, and if the seeking of the referent is motivated by a concern for truth, which in turn is achieved via the sentence, it follows that we cannot compare the noema to Sinn (sense) without considering the role "truth" plays in Frege's theory of sense and reference, that is, without considering the notion of the reference of a sentence. Yet the articles comparing intentionality and intensionality do not do so, do not so much as mention "truth". To discuss Sinn without putting it in the context of truth constitutes a false abstraction. In seeing Frege's "sense" and "reference" in terms of the reference of a sentence, in terms of referring to truth-values, a relation to Husserl's phenomenology can be more accurately established. Specifically, by introducing the notion of a "striving for truth" (PW 63) Frege has introduced a dynamic, "subjective" element into his intensionality, as we will discuss a little further on.

As I explained in the beginning of this chapter (pp. 363 ff.), the name/bearer relation is usually taken to be paradigmatic of the reference relation in general. I mentioned how usually, however tacitly, the bearer is held to be an object in the world. Considering what was just said concerning the reference of sentences, it can be appreciated that this model cannot be taken as paradigmatic of reference in Frege's theory. This is so because the reference of names in Frege's theory in effect is "defined" by means of the reference of sentences, and for Frege the referents of sentences, truth-values, are
not objects in the ordinary sense of the term, they are not entities with determinate qualities (an "X" with predicates); they are not objects spatio-temporally determined. A truth-value is a very peculiar sort of entity. From what I have said so far it seems that according to Frege the sense of a name, which gives the way to the referent, which allows us to "pick out" the object, fixes the criteria of identity for an object. That is, "picking out" an object occurs by the use of criteria. According to the name/bearer model, the object's identity is afforded by spatio-temporal predicates. The referent is then an object with specific identifiable properties. But with respect to the sentence, Frege writes the following:

...in the meaning [i.e., reference] of the sentence all that is specific is obliterated. (PW 65)

So in the case of the referents of sentences we are not talking of objects in the ordinary sense of the word--we are not talking of spatio-temporal objects. Writes Frege:

Truth is not a quality that answers to a particular sense-impression...being true is not a sensible, perceptible, property. (FLI 5)

If it were maintained that Frege construed the sentence-referent relation according to the model of name/bearer, it would mean that Frege subscribed to a correspondence theory of truth. But Frege does not adhere to a correspondence theory of truth:

It might be supposed from this that truth consists in a correspondence of a picture to what it depicts. Now a correspondence is a relation. But this goes against the use of the word 'true', which is not a relative term and contains no indication of anything else to which something is to correspond....(FLI 3)

And:
In any case, truth does not consist in correspondence of the sense with something else, for otherwise the question of truth would get reiterated to infinity. (FLI 4)

What I am arguing, then, is that for Frege the reference of names is subordinate to the reference of sentences. This is also how Tugendhat interprets Frege:

...the significance of the parts of sentences, and in particular of names, consists in their contribution to the truth-value of the sentences into which they may enter...In this case we should have to take the significance of sentences as primary. Instead of transferring the characteristics of the significance of names to that of sentences, we should reverse the order and try to define the significance of names by means of the concept with which the significance of sentences is defined. (MBF 180)

The reference of sentences is not to be construed on the model of linguistics described previously, in which the name "maps onto" or corresponds to an extra-linguistic entity. In the reference of sentences there is no mapping onto or corresponding to anything at all. "The cat is on the mat" is a categorial object, only formed in the judgment. To assert its truth or falsehood one does not map the sentence onto any object. There is by definition no such thing as an extra judgmental categorial object. One must judge, i.e., form the judgment, to affirm its truth or falsehood. One cannot say, for example, that one maps the judgment "the cat is on the mat" onto the state-of-affairs that the cat is on the mat, for the state-of-affairs is also a categorial object, formed in the judgment.

Dummett disagrees with Tugendhat's position (which is also mine), for he believes that it does away with the equation of the referent of a name with its bearer. The latter relation Dummett takes
to be the prototype of reference: "The equation of the referent of its name with its bearer is just what Tugendhat has thrown overboard" (DU 201). Dummett goes on to write:

...what constitutes our conceiving it [an object] as a part of external reality is that we take it as being the referent of an expression: and 'the referents of our words are what we talk about'. For Tugendhat, replacing the notion of reference by that of truth-value potential, all this is lost. (DU 202)

Dummett seems to think that in Tugendhat's position reference to the real world is forsaken in favour of reference to truth-values. But I think Dummett is mistaken. I think that Tugendhat neither denies the referent of a name to be an object, nor "replaces" the notion of the reference by that of truth-value potential. I shall briefly discuss each of these in turn.

That Tugendhat has no intention of denying that the referent of a name is an object should be clear from his following assertion:

...the significance is, in the case of names, the object referred to. (MBF 181)

In a footnote to this sentence he adds:

As has been pointed out to me by Mr. Dummett, it is not strictly correct to say that the truth-value potential is the object referred to. All we claim is that two names that refer to the same object have the same truth-value potential. Consequently, it would be preferable to say that the truth-value potential of a name is, rather than the object referred to, its reference to that object [my emphasis]. (MBF 181, n. 1.)

So Tugendhat plainly states that the referent of a name is an object. Indeed, what Tugendhat wants to do is put the reference of a name into perspective, not assimilate the reference of a name to that of a sentence. It is strict adherence to Frege's most important
dictum, that the unit of meaning is a sentence, that motivates Tugendhat's interpretation of reference, and leads him to claim a dependence of the reference of names on the reference of sentences. As Tugendhat writes:

Thus the fact that the interpretation of significance as truth-value potential is adequate while its interpretation as reference is inadequate sheds light on the nature of sentences and their composition: it can be taken as evidence for the claim that the primary semantic unit is the sentence and it can also be used to protect this claim from misunderstanding. The contention that the sentence is the primary unit of meaning does not exclude its divisibility into meaningful parts; it only claims that the significance, and consequently the sense, of words cannot be understood in isolation, but rather consists in their contribution to the significance or sense of sentences, respectively. (MBF 183)

Tugendhat's claim, that although a name can and sometimes does refer to an object, it can only do so via the sentence, accords with Sluga's interpretation that for Frege there can never be a bare association of a word and its object. In a passage already cited—in which Sluga denies that the name/bearer relationship could be paradigmatic of reference because that would assign to empirical objects a basic role which Frege had not given them—he adds that Frege "does not regard empirical objects as items of acquaintance that can be simply named or described" (GF 159). After all, Frege is not a Millsian—he does not have an associationistic theory of meaning. Needless to say, Dummett realizes this. But then the manner in which a word does refer to its object desperately needs to be spelled out and made viable (in a non-Millsian manner).
The only way to avoid a Millsianism is by saying that in the case of the perception of empirical objects a logical activity has already taken place. This is what Sluga argues Frege maintains:

He [Frege] does not regard empirical objects as items of acquaintance that can be simply named or described. 'Observation itself includes a logical activity' (F. 94). It has been one of Frege's assumptions against physiologically oriented psychologism that sensation never presents us with material objects. In the late essay 'The Thought' he argues that sensory impressions are necessary but not sufficient for seeing things. Something non-sensory must be added to the impressions and only with that addition do we gain access to the empirical world with its empirical objects. (GF 159)

This non-sensory element that must be added to impressions is a logical component. Saying, as Frege does, that observation itself includes a logical activity, is in effect saying that perception is intentional. But logical activity occurs in the judgment. Hence the object always occurs in the judgment. This is exactly what Husserl argues, as I explained in chapters one and two. The non-sensory element at work in the perception of objects is, in my estimation, what the reference of the sentence tries to capture. The object occurs in the judgment and the judgment is guided by and understood in terms of the ideal of the object, the object given in totality (see pp. 98 ff). The idea of the object given in totality is Truth. It is to this that the sentence refers. I can only affirm that "the cat is on the mat" is true if I have an idea of how the object is to be filled out. The truth, the referent of a sentence, comes about via the idea of the object given in its totality. Truth is an ideal, in other words. This point is expressed poignantly by Amstutz:
Wenn wir als Kinder die Voralpen sahen, schienen diese uns die Grenze unserer Welt zu sein. Doch als wir wandernd einst auf den Voralpengrat hinaufgekommen waren, sahen wir jenseits tiefer Täler die Hochalpen, und von den nördlichen Hochalpen erblickten wir später die südlichen, usw. Der Horizont ist unabschliessbar....Auch Jaspers hat als Wesen des Bewusstseins gesehen, dass es immerfort transzendierte, weiter und weiter schreitet.

Die Ausführungen Husserls zeigen nun, dass sein erkenntnistheoretischer Subjektivismus eine Neigung zur Zusammenhangstheorie der Wahrheit hat. "Eine Aussage ist wahr, wenn, und nur wenn sie Teil eines allumfassenden Zusammenhangs von Aussagen ist", so sagt diese Theorie. Und die subjektivistische Erkenntnistheorie mit ihrer Beobachtung von weiteren und weiteren Horizonten kann darum sehr leicht mit dieser Wahrheitstheorie einverstanden sein, sofern nur nie vergessen wird, dass "der allumfassende Zusammenhang von Aussagen" nie als Ganze und abschliessend erfasst werden kann. Um die Zusammenhangstheorie der Wahrheit diesem erkenntnistheoretischen Subjektivismus restlos annehmbar zu machen, mussten wir diese Wahrheitstheorie etwas anders formulieren; etwa so:

Eine Aussage ist wahr, wenn, und allein wenn sie Teil eines nach Allumfassung strebenden Zusammenhangs von Aussagen ist. (DEJ 7)

I said, then, that truth comes about via the idea of the object given in its totality. But as I explained in chapter two, saying that the idea of the object guides any individual judgment concerning an object sounds like idealism. Indeed, the divergence in the interpretations of the notions of reference can be traced back to a debate in Frege scholarship as to whether Frege was a realist or idealist. Dummett believes that Frege was a realist who "had for idealism not an iota of sympathy" (DU 684), and who in his writings was attempting to counteract and criticize the idealism prevalent in philosophical thought at the time, namely Hegelianism. According to Dummett "Frege's realism" played an important part "in bringing about the downfall of Hegelian idealism" (DU 683).
It is undoubtedly true that the overthrow of Hegelianism was a precondition of advance in philosophy, and, in so far as Frege's realistic philosophy played a part in that, that is also an ingredient in its historical importance. It is also true that Frege's realism would have been viewed by Frege himself as one of the essential features of his philosophical system, and that his work represents a classic statement...of a realistic theory of meaning.... (DU 683)

Sluga, on the other hand, refutes this and as well denies that Frege was either a realist or an anti-idealist. After a careful historical analysis Sluga concludes:

Frege's thought was conceived in opposition to...[a] form of scientific naturalism, and not to a dominant Hegelianism or idealism, as Dummett has claimed. in opposing themselves to scientific naturalism the philosophers of the late nineteenth century were often in sympathy with some doctrines of the idealists. That is why idealist and rationalist elements can be found in Frege's writings...And Frege was concerned neither with the formulation of an anti-idealistic philosophy nor with a defence of realism. (GF 14-15)

Sluga's position on Frege's ontological commitment is that the latter had a realism which was not antithetical to idealism:

If Frege's theory of objectivity can be interpreted in this Kantian sense, we can credit him with an understanding of the shortcomings of metaphysical realism or Platonism while holding on to the belief in the objectivity of logic and mathematics. There is a sense in which that position can be called a realism but its realism is not incompatible with idealism: it is itself a form of idealism. (GF 107)

I believe that it is Dummett's concern to prove Frege to be a naive realist, i.e., one who excludes an idealism, which leads him to take the name/bearer relation as the prototype of reference. As Sluga argues, "the claim that after 1891 the name/bearer relationship is the paradigm of Frege's semantics and that his theory of sense and reference is primarily meant as a theory of referring expressions has
the effect of assigning a basic role to empirical objects." He adds, in my estimation correctly, that "...it seems doubtful that such objects could ever have played an important role in Frege's thought" (GF 159). Indeed, the text of Frege accords with this:

Sense-perception indeed is often thought to be the most certain, even the sole, source of knowledge about everything that does not belong to the inner-world. But with what right?....Sense-impressions alone do not reveal the external world to us....Having visual impressions is certainly necessary for seeing things, but not sufficient. What must still be added is not anything sensible. And yet this is just what opens up the external world to us; for without this non-sensible something everyone would remain shut up in his inner world. (FLI 26-27)

In my estimation Dummett's belief that Frege is a realist leads him to see Tugendhat as eradicating any realistic strand in Frege. That is, Dummett has not worked out a notion of realism that does not exclude idealism; to him realism and idealism mutually exclude each other. He cannot conceive of the type of realism Sluga speaks of, a realism which "is itself a form of idealism". That Dummett has no articulated version of a viable idealism is clear from his writing the following:

...in Frege's day the kind of idealism that was everywhere prevalent in the philosophical schools was infected with a psychologism through and through: it was not until it had been decisively overthrown that it became possible to envisage a non-psychologistic version of idealism. Indeed it is not even yet certain that such a version is possible....[my emphasis] (DU 884)

So, when Dummett sees idealist trends in Tugendhat's interpretation of Frege, he cannot help but feel the threat of an idealism which excludes realism.
If we are to remain true to Frege's texts, we must keep in mind the dictum that the unit of meaning is the sentence, and work from whole to part and not vice versa. It is in this way that we must observe and articulate the interdependence of the reference of names and sentences. Tugendhat admirably captures this point:

Granted on the one hand that names and sentences form two different semantic categories and on the other hand that they have something in common, we must require of an adequate account of what they have in common that it should not obliterate their differences. This requirement is only met by the present account. Why is this so? Why is it that if we interpret the significance of sentences setting out from names, one cannot help assimilating sentences to names, whilst names are not assimilated to sentences when we interpret the significance of names setting out from sentences? The reason is that we have here an instance of a functional connection between part and whole. In any such instance, for example a tool, machine, or organism, the part can only be defined by its relation to the function of the whole and not vice versa. Since the relation of part to whole is functional, the reference to the whole in the definition of the part does not result in the assimilation of the properties of the part of the properties of the whole. On the other hand, any attempt to define the whole by means of its part is bound to result in a non-functional account of the whole which either assimilates its properties to the properties of the part or defines it as a mere conglomerate of its parts, or both. (MBF 183)

In the passage cited on page 387, Frege says that it is the striving for truth which takes us everywhere from sense to reference. In speaking of a striving for truth Frege has introduced a "subjective", purposive, element into the notions of sense and reference. That is, saying that we strive for truth implies that we aim for achieving truth, and this implies that we can discern when we do and do not "have" truth—that we know, at least in principle, when
something is true. In other words, striving implies some purposive activity.

The striving for truth is to be understood as an aiming to actualize a certain potential. In epistemological terms this would amount to the difference between knowing and not knowing a sentence to be true (PW 122). That is, while for Frege truth is objective, i.e., independent of human acts of judging and asserting, and hence is true or false whether we know it or not (LI 25), we cannot know a thought to be true or false "apart from making an act of judgment or assertion" (GF 115). Striving for truth is actualizing truth, which is a bringing to evidence, or, to use a Husserlian phrase, is a "filling out". In moving to the referent of the sentence (truth) via the sense of the sentence (the thought) one moves from a lower level to a higher level according to Frege, just as in Husserl's theory (see chapter two pp. 106 ff.). In the following passage Frege is saying that going from thought, the sense of the sentence, to truth, the referent of the sentence is an act of going from one level to a higher level:

...the relation of a thought to the True may not be compared with that of subject to predicate.

35] Subject and predicate (understood in the logical sense) are just elements of thought; they stand on the same level [my emphasis] for knowledge. By combining subject and predicate, one reaches only a thought, never passes from sense to meaning [reference], never from a thought to its truth-value. One moves at the same level but never advances from one level to the next [my emphasis]. A truth-value cannot be part of a thought, any more than, say, the Sun can, for it is not a sense but an object. (PW 64)

But how much of a part of Frege's theory is this notion of striving, this dynamic aspect? I think that the striving is embodied
in all notions of Frege's system. This striving for truth can be seen for instance in Frege's notion of function. Sluga writes that "the characterization of truth-value as Bedeutung (references) of sentences is inseparable from the characterization of concepts as functions" (GF 145). When discussing the notion of function, as I do next, it will be observed how well Frege's system is integrated--how intricately each concept is linked with others. Each concept in some way reflects the others, and it becomes impossible to discuss one without discussing the others. The notion of striving for truth runs throughout all of Frege's system.

Frege divides the sentence into saturated and unsaturated components, that is, into complete and incomplete components, respectively. In dividing a sentence into a saturated and unsaturated component Frege solves the problem as to how sentence parts are "held together". Incomplete, unsaturated, components Frege calls functions, borrowing the term from mathematics, though modifying it. A function is not an inert entity, according to Frege, but connects and correlates (GF 141). Specifically, as a mathematical function correlates numbers with numbers, so a functional expression in a sentence correlates objects with truth-values (GF 141). In effect the function has as its aim truth. As much as a "subjective" act of judging was implicated in the notions of sense and reference, as explained above, so too it is implicated in the notion of functions, as it is involved with a striving for truth as well. Indeed, this is to be expected, for functions correlate and connect to truth-values and presumably they do not do so on their own accord, i.e., they cannot correlate themselves.
Somehow, "somebody" must do the correlating. Indeed, in his earlier use of the term "function" Frege meant operation, which suggests an operator. But a treatment as to "who" does the correlating is lacking.

Dummett suggests that the notion of function cannot be introduced "without simultaneously introducing that of application of a function to an object" (DU 253), and he adds that some authors consider that "the notion of the application of a function to an object is—spurious and mythical" (DU 255). But while Dummett himself, I think correctly, does not consider this a spurious or mythical notion, he does not, to my mind, give a satisfactory account of this process of application. Hence, in some sense he does nothing to dispel its mythical nature. I think that he is not able to give a satisfactory account of application because to do so would require an appeal to a "subjective" process. Of course, to avoid falling into a psychologism, a satisfactory account would have to appeal to a transcendental subjectivity. But this is something which is repugnant to Dummett, for I think he would take an appeal to any subjective act, even a transcendental act, to be indicative of idealism, or of psychologism. Hence, we find him writing:

And how are we to explain the notion of 'application'? What curious property does an object have to render it capable of 'yielding' a number when 'applied to' [my emphasis] a number? We know that water will produce steam when poured on to fire: but obviously [my emphasis] we are not meant to think of the application of a function to a number as something that we do [my emphasis] to it, nor as its yielding a number as something that it does when brought into contact with an argument. (DU 251)
But this "we" that Dummett speaks of could be a transcendental subject. As I have attempted to explain throughout the present work, grounding logic in a transcendental subject does not imply psychologism or idealism. This is the point at which I believe Husserl's phenomenology could complement Frege's logic. While it is admirable that in his writings Frege attempts to overcome ways of looking at language and reality that have been around since Aristotle and that are deeply ingrained in the history of thought, nevertheless Frege's accounts seem at times to be in need of grounding or justification. A case in point is the notion of "function", as I just explained. I think that an appeal to transcendental subjectivity would help Frege in this respect. Of course, Frege does not appeal to a transcendental subjectivity per se. I say per se because he does have an implicit transcendentalism. As Angelelli writes: "Frege gives some hints of weak transcendental subjectivity" (SO 234). Frege did not appeal to transcendental subjectivity outright because he has trouble conceiving of a subjectivity which is not empirical—and Dummett is quite like him in this respect. According to Angelelli:

Frege usually characterizes subjective as that which is verschieden für verschiedene Menschen (BG, Vorwort, first page; SUB, pp. 29-31; GR, p. 37, etc.). This is precisely psychological subjectivity as opposed to transcendental subjectivity. Psychological subjectivity is also that strict sense of subjective....I think it is appropriate to call this the strong sense as well. It seems that Frege has understood "subjective" only in this way, leaving aside the minor exceptions we refer to in the present section. "Subjective" means for Frege psychological, personal sensations, personal feelings, and so on (cf. for instance GRL, p. 93). GED indicates that this was Frege's understanding of that term until the end of his life. (SO 245)
Other authors too have noted the necessity of a transcendental account in Frege's work specifically and in the analytic tradition generally. Bell, for example, writes the following:

...we have introduced what might be called a transcendental element into our account. Frege's approach, by contrast, was essentially mundane....In this general approach Frege has set the tone, the aims, and the methods in virtually all subsequent work in philosophical logic and semantics, at least in the English speaking world. Russell and the early Wittgenstein, and later Quine, Tarski, Carnap, Church, and Davidson, with only minor deviations, have trod the Fregean path. The major exception has been the author of the Philosophical Investigations (though one ought to mention here those, like Grice and Strawson, who have been strongly influenced by him). (FTJ 78-79)

And:

...he [Wittgenstein] showed that such an approach [a transcendental approach] must needs assume there is a community of language users whose linguistic activities are not cut off from other non-linguistic habits, customs, and activities. Language, Wittgenstein maintained, is not a formal calculus but a human tool whose construction and function become incomprehensible when it is divorced from the 'forms of life' in which it is used. It is indeed precisely in order to restore the notion of a language to the context in which it belongs, from which it has been removed by philosophers, and wherein only it can be adequately understood, that Wittgenstein introduces the notion of a 'language-game'. (FTJ 70)

Bell goes on to write that "Hintikka has recently complained that the 'transcendental point of view', which concentrates upon the human activities essentially involved in our obtaining whatever information we have, 'is notoriously absent from recent philosophizing' " (FTJ 79).

In the Frege-Husserl comparison, Frege's notion of Sinn is compared to Husserl's notion of noema. In these comparisons the notions of noema and Sinn are treated in a static manner. No mention
is made of the dynamic aspect of Sinn and noema, of a striving of the subject for truth. This falsifies the philosophies of both Frege and Husserl. Just as for Husserl the noema expresses a relation to subjectivity, albeit a transcendental subjectivity, so too Sinn must be understood in terms of a subjective activity. I tried to explain that Sinn is the way to the referent and that all reference must be understood via the reference of a sentence. Sinn, then, whether of names or sentences, must be understood in terms of the referents of sentences, truth-values. The referents of sentences reflect a striving for truth. The movement from Sinn to referent comes about through the striving for truth. Striving for truth is a subjective notion, i.e., it is a subject that strives for truth. This subjective notion is also found in Frege's seminal concept of function. Frege did not want to talk explicitly about a subjective factor in his philosophy for fear of psychologism. I suggested, however, that this is overcome by a transcendental subjectivity. Once it is seen that noema and Sinn are dynamic notions, a closer affinity between Husserl's work and that of Frege can be seen than when one does not view these notions as dynamic. It certainly gives rise to a comparison that is more palatable to the phenomenologist because it is one which does not ignore the reduction. The comparison also deepens the understanding of certain logical notions because it relates them to the subject, thereby grounding their significance.
FOOTNOTES--CHAPTER SEVEN

1. In light of the fact that much of present day logic is based on Frege's innovative ideas (e.g., quantification), that Frege's work is a cornerstone in present day symbolic logic and semantics, the choice of Frege as a representative of the tradition is a happy one.

2. It is to some extent undesirable to speak of the tradition of formal logic, since the tradition is a varied one. Still, since the tradition is composed of certain broad, unified themes, I feel justified in talking of "the tradition".

3. As I attempted to show in chapters one and two, the germ of the critique is in a sense to be found within the tradition--it is not a critique ab extra or von oben her. As I showed in chapters one and two, and shall show again below on pp. 399 ff., the critique is usually experienced as a sense of shortcoming within the tradition.

4. See chapter one. Of course the individual can see certain truths without appeal to the philosophical tradition, but such truths are ultimately clarified in relation to the tradition. It will then be seen that individual thinking aims at a telos which is also the communal telos of European man, to use Husserl's expression. In that sense phenomenology aims to bring out the ideal of philosophy through an examination of de facto philosophy (of the individual and of collective thought).

5. An unwillingness and inability to dialogue with other camps would seem to be symptomatic at least of a philosophically weak system and most likely of a philosophically deluded system, for in always warding off anything which might threaten its fabrications, it would in fact be excluding part of reality, viz., the reality of other schools of thought.


7. HNN.

8. Follesdal does not deny, however, that there are differences between these two notions.

9. Bell (FTJ 25) realizes this, however.

10. It is interesting to note that Jaakko Hintikka understands this point but then fails to capitalize on it and discusses the noema without relating it to the noesis.
11. This is how objectivism is overcome, after all.

12. Langsdorf in her paper on Føllesdal makes the same point.

13. In the Logical Investigations quality is still considered noetic, while in Ideas and later it is considered noematic but pointing to a noetic act.

14. Nor can Frege's concept of Sinn, as I shall show below (pp. 388 ff.)

15. This is tantamount to taking the complete noema to be the core of the noema (Sinn), for the core of the noema is the idea of the object given in adequation, which is the object filled out completely.

16. This aspect of the theory was not overtly stated or worked out by Frege because of his trouble with the notion of subjectivity. See below pp. 400 ff.

17. Articles which were the foundation of the Sinn-noema comparison.

18. Another phrase for his theory of reference.

19. This does not mean that the assertion "maps onto" the idea. The idea is a rule of procedure, not an image to be mapped onto.

20. A position which stressed "observational and experimental techniques" and which rejected "the deductive methods of the idealists", according to Sluga.

21. One could ask why it is not the other way around, i.e., is it not the name/bearer relation as the prototype of reference that leads Dummett to conclude that Frege is a realist. However, I think that taking the name/bearer as paradigmatic of reference is not supported by Frege's doctrine (see pp. 388 ff. below) and so must find its motivation elsewhere, such as in a desire to prove Frege to be a realist.

22. Non-psychologistic idealism is an idealism in which thoughts, etc., are not "in" the mind and are not merely empirical events.

23. I say that this purposive element is in sense too and not merely in reference because, as I read Frege, sense necessarily implies reference and hence shares in this striving for truth.

24. Examples of mathematical functions are: y=x + 2, x=2y + 5, etc. Examples of functions in language: the capital of _________, this tree is _________, _________ is green.
What I have attempted to argue in the present work is that Husserl's phenomenology embraces a theoretical stance, the ego-cogito-cogitatum, which is not divorced from life. I tried to show that the structure of the cogito is the structure of life, that the "ego-cogito, ergo sum" is an expression of life. To think of rationality as distinct or divorced from life is to rob both life and rationality of their significance, their power as well as their beauty. Cogito is not a static structure or utterance, but a project, a mode of Being which must be constantly revived and brought to ever new levels of actualization. Life without the active revival of rationality is but a dumb, superficial flow of events.

I have attempted to show the relation between rationality and life by starting with the characterization of phenomenology as logic. I have done so because logic is thought to be an abstract discipline divorced from life. I have shown how logic in Husserl's view presupposes life, and how this does not threaten the absolute, pure, status of logic. The point at which logic is related to life is the pure transcendental ego. I have tried to show that the concept of pure transcendental ego embraces concepts of life, such as that of the Other, the unconscious, the lived body, and so forth, and have attempted to demonstrate that here, in the notion of transcendental
ego, logic and psychology come together, and that phenomenology is both a logic and a pure psychology.

It is important to understand the nature of the transcendental ego in Husserl's view because it embraces an ethics, namely, one of self-responsibility through self-knowledge. This falls in line with the ancient Greek tradition. I have tried to show that this does not go against freedom, spontaneity, or creativity, but is in fact essential to them. In short, I have attempted to present the holistic concept of rationality that I think Husserl's writings embody. As well, I have tried to show that Frege was closer to Husserl's holistic concept of rationality than even some Frege scholars believe.
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