SENECA'S DE BENEFICIIS

BOOK ONE

A COMMENTARY
SENeca's De Beneficiis

Book One

A Commentary

On Chapters One to Ten

By

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to provide a commentary on part of Seneca's lengthy treatise on benefits. An attempt is made to provide an understanding of the meaning of the text. This involves, at times, consideration of the continuity of thought, of textual problems and lacunae (although by no means all difficulties of that order have been discussed). The statements which Seneca makes in his other philosophical works, whether in agreement or contradictory, are adduced for purposes of elucidation. It is apparent that some of the expressions and statements which seem innocuous in their context are sometimes coloured by their appearing elsewhere in doctrines of considerable complexity. Some of the works of Cicero, another valuable source of Roman philosophy, particularly Stoicism, are introduced for purposes of comparison. The ethical works of Aristotle likewise prove to be a valuable source of comparative statements. In general the background provided illustrates that Seneca did not provide the reader with much original thought but that he presented his material with the skill of an effective instructor.
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PREFACE

The De Beneficiis of Seneca, a treatise in seven books, on the theme of giving and receiving benefits, and returning gratitude, was written during the last decade of Seneca's life. An unkind reference to the Emperor Claudius in the last chapter of the first book has led to the conclusion that it was written after the Emperor's death (54 A.D.). Another reference in one of Seneca's epistles (Em., 81.3) to books previously written about benefits seems to put an upper limit on the date (approximately 62 A.D.). But it is not clear whether Seneca is referring to all seven books, or a smaller number. It has been thought that the work was published in stages, since Seneca himself seems to regard the last three books as appendices of sorts. Such a theory would allow the last book, which contains a discussion of tyrants (Ben., 7.19), to have been published after Seneca's falling out with Nero. But this must remain speculation, and we must be content with approximate dates (for bibliography see J. Wight Duff and A. M. Duff, A Literary History of Rome in the Silver Age, 3rd ed., London: Ernest Benn, 1964, p. 176).

The work on benefits, along with that on clemency, proved popular subsequently, and more citations from these treatises survive from the period of the early Middle Ages than from the other treatises. Excerpts found their way into florilegia and into contemporary expositions of courtly ethics (see Klaus-Dieter Nothdurft, Studien zum vi
In more recent times the De Beneficiis has not fared so well. True, editions have not been lacking. One could mention that of M. N. Bouillet, L. Annaei Senecae Pars Prima Sive Opera Philosophica, vol. 2, Paris, 1827, which includes brief comments by the editor in which he has included the opinions of such previous scholars as Lipsius and Gronovius. Editions appeared in Germany: that of Fickert in 1843, of Fr. Haase in 1884-86. In 1876 M. C. Gertz brought out his edition. C. Hosius edited the Teubner text, first in 1900, then the second edition in 1914. In English a translation by Aubrey Stewart was published in the Bohn's Classical Library series (London, 1887), and some time later found a companion in the Loeb translation by J. W. Basore (London, 1935). The French are served by the edition and translation of F. Préchac, two volumes in the Budé series of texts. This text has served as the one upon which the commentary of this dissertation is based, and when a reading differing from Préchac's is preferred, the reader will be notified. The only philosophical work of Seneca available in the Oxford Classical Text series is his collection of letters, the Epistulæ Morales.

Although there is, then, no dearth of texts and translations, there has not yet been a commentary on the whole of the De Beneficiis or part of it. Only one recent article, not generally accessible, since it is written in Polish, has attempted to present Seneca's
doctrine of benefits (L. Malunowicz, "Koncepcja Beneficium u Seneki Młodszego", Eos,8 [1963], 171-181). What may in part be responsible for the lack of attention paid to the De Beneficiis may be the negative evaluations which one still reads. J. W. Basore in the introduction to his Loeb edition (p.vii) characterizes it as "discursive and repetitious". The general handbooks on Roman literature are no more charitable. M. Schanz-C. Hosius (Geschichte der römischen Literatur, Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, vol.8, pt.2, Munich 1959, [repr., 4 ed., 1935] p.697) remarks that the work dissolves into unfruitful subtlety and comments on the lack of good structure. J. W. Duff (cited p.vi) regards the De Beneficiis as all but "incapable of analysis". He finds "a dearth of method" and points to the presence of "repetitions and anticipations". John Ferguson (Moral Values in the Ancient World, London, 1958, p.201) who considers the work from an ethical perspective describes it as a "long and frankly tedious document" which contains "arid philosophy", and states "we happily do not need to delay over the details of the treatise". In fact he finds only one passage which is worthy of consideration (Ben.,4.2-7). Some remarks are made by most of these critics which attribute some value to the work, but the predominant attitude is negative.

A brief explanation of the format of the thesis is in order. This preface will be followed by a summary of the De Beneficiis. Within the commentary itself the chapter divisions correspond to the chapters of the first book. In each chapter will be found, first, an
outline of the content of the chapter, then a section of text with a paraphrase, and, where necessary, a more general discussion of the problems within the section. This is followed by a restatement of a segment of text with the commentary on it. Since a commentary often assembles comment from different, sometimes unrelated perspectives, an attempt has been made to provide separation by means of asterisks. These can not in every case indicate gaps of equal proportions between the perspectives. Likewise an attempt has been made to avoid excessive use of them, so that within paragraphs marked by asterisks the continuity of perspective can not always be maintained on the same level.
BOOK 1.

The first of the fifteen chapters of this book points to the need for proper knowledge about giving and receiving, and does so by analyzing causes for ingratitude, especially those on the part of the donor. He receives positive advice in the form of advice to follow the example of the gods and to disregard returns which benefits might bring. The succeeding chapter cautions against the excesses of large-scale giving as well as that of stinginess, which is exemplified by a bookkeeper's attitude towards generosity. Persistence in giving is urged. The third and fourth chapters contain an allegorical interpretation of the Graces, whose Greek name is the equivalent of the Latin word for benefits. These chapters contain as well Seneca's negative reaction against such an allegorical approach. In the fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters a carefully worked out definition of a benefit is presented. First a distinction is made between the material manifestation of a benefit and the benefit itself. The latter is defined as a benevolent action which is determined by and dependent upon the state of mind of the benefactor. Subsequently the consequences are traced of what would be the case, if the definition were not true. These consequences manifestly do not describe what we know by experience to be true. In the eighth, ninth, and tenth chapters, examples are given...
of how the attitude of the donor affects the quality of the gift, and influences the reaction of the recipient. An ever widening impact on society and morality becomes apparent. Seneca then discusses the validity of the concept of decline. At the conclusion of this discussion, he asserts that basic to all vices is the one of ingratitude, towards which he urges different attitudes for the donor and for the recipient. He reasserts a point made earlier, that care must be taken in the selection of recipients. Moreover, not every recipient is deserving of the same assistance. At this point, the end of the tenth chapter, our commentary ceases. The eleventh and twelfth chapters contain a classification of benefits, dividing them into necessary, useful, and pleasant ones. Other factors, such as time, place, and persons involved may have an influence on a gift. The thirteenth chapter contains an anecdote concerning Alexander the Great, who serves as an example of incorrect receiving. The fourteenth and fifteenth chapters provide further instruction in how to give. Seneca urges that the recipient be made to think he has been especially chosen as recipient, even if he has not. He stresses that giving be done with judgment, which, he states, must not be interpreted as a stricture on generosity.

BOOK 2.

Since the commentary proper does not extend to this nor to the following books, the chapter by chapter summary, as in the case of the
first book, will be abandoned in favour of a thematic treatment.

Seneca continues his instruction of how one should give (chapters 1-17), emphasizing the disposition (voluntas) of the donor, and the time of giving. Consideration is given to such matters as open or secret benefaction, harmful or shameful benefits, and other aspects to be evaluated.

The remainder of the book (chapters 18-35) is devoted to receiving, and Seneca treats the topics of how, and from whom to receive, before turning to the faults of the recipient which cause ingratitude, and to an explanation of the Stoic paradox, that to receive a benefit gladly is to have returned it.

BOOK 3.

Treatment of the topic of ingratitude is resumed (chapters 1-17). Seneca first explores the role memory plays in that vice, then whether it ought to be subject to the courts and legal punishment. The answer is negative.

Two related topics occupy the rest of the book. First is discussed whether a slave can give a benefit to his master (chapters 18-28); secondly, whether a child can give his parent a greater benefit than he received from him (chapters 29-37). Both questions are answered in the affirmative.
BOOK 4.

This book contains a treatment of the theoretical topics, whether or not giving benefits (chapters 1-15) and returning gratitude (chapters 16-25) are desirable per se. The positive answer accorded to the first question could lead to limitless giving, but as this is neither virtuous nor practical, Seneca puts aside a large part of the book (chapters 26-39) for consideration of limitations, restricting the giving of benefits to ingrates, yet arguing against a too restrictive attitude in those cases when it is not known whether or not the recipient is ungrateful. An escape-clause is provided for a benefit promised, since actually giving it is made conditional upon the fact that nothing has happened to change the situation. The positive answer to the second question has implications disposed of more easily (chapter 40); limitation is allowable in the returning of a benefit, but not in the feeling of gratitude.

BOOK 5.

The fifth book contains explorations of the following questions: (a) Is it shameful (turpe) to be defeated in the matter of benefits? (chapters 2-6). This variation on the theme of rivalry in giving is answered negatively on the basis of the distinction between the physical manifestation of a benefit and the frame of mind behind it. In case of the former, there is no shame in being outdone; in case of the latter, it is not possible to be outdone.
(b) The next question discussed (chapters 7-12) is the Stoic debate as to whether a man can give a benefit to himself. The answer in this case is negative, since giving, by definition, requires someone else as object.

(c) Now follows discussion of an argument which attempts to turn Stoic doctrine against itself (chapters 13-17). The charges, that a man called bad in Stoic terms can not be ungrateful, since he can not receive a benefit proper, is answered by the argument that he can still receive something like benefits (beneficiis similia), and to be amiss in gratitude even with respect to these quasi-benefits is nevertheless true ingratitude, on the grounds that such a person is found wanting in his intention, the criterion for evaluation in such matters. In fact, so far is it from the truth that no-one is an ingrate, that rather the converse holds, that everyone is ungrateful.

(d) The next question (chapters 18-19) is concerned with the extent of a benefit. Is a benefit to a son also one to his father and so on (personarum series)? Is a benefit infinite? The answer to this sorites is to restrict the benefit to the person for whom it was intended, while not denying that advantages derived from it may accrue to other persons.

(e) Next follows a brief discussion (chapter 20.1-5) of whether it is possible to give a benefit to an unwilling recipient. It is concluded that the attitude of the recipient is immaterial, but that a donor must intend a benefit specifically for the recipient.
(f) The last topic of the book (chapters 20.6-25) is the problem of reclaiming a benefit. Although not generally approved, it is allowed under certain conditions and if done in the right way, as described by Seneca.

BOOK 6.

(a) The sixth book commences with a fuller investigation (chapters 2-6.6) of the claim made earlier that a benefit is eternal. The question raised is whether a benefit can be taken away. It is denied that the giving of a benefit, an event, can be undone, but its effect can be invalidated by a subsequent injury.

(b) Next, the state of mind of the donor and its effect upon the benefit are scrutinized (chapters 6.7-11). If the donor gave unwillingly, is the gift a benefit? Likewise, if he gave unknowingly? It is determined that a donor must give both willingly and knowingly.

(c) A further question (chapters 12-24) with regard to the state of mind of the donor is whether he is owed anything for a benefaction done either completely for his own sake, or partly for his own sake and partly for that of the recipient. In the first case nothing is owed; in the second case some gratitude should be forthcoming. Various cases are considered, and the principle emerges that the indebtedness depends on the extent in which the benefit was personally intended for the recipient. This is then applied by an imaginary interlocutor to the sun and the moon. Are we indebted to them? Are we to be indebted also to the gods whose nature compels us to do good to us? Is freedom
to refuse to give a benefit a prerequisite for there being a benefit? The intention to benefit mortals was present at the beginning of the world, and therefore obligation must be felt to the deities.

(d) The final question (chapters 25-43) concerns itself with the morality of excessive gratitude. Prayers for calamities to fall on someone's head in order to provide an opportunity for repayment are seen as a refusal to be under obligation. Besides, it is possible to return favours even to the fortunate, e.g. by telling the truth, or giving advice; they do not first have to suffer.

BOOK 7.

After preliminary remarks about the nature of the remaining questions, and the nature of useful knowledge, the final book commences with:

(a) A probe into how one can give to the wise man or to a friend (chapters 7-12), since all things already belong to the wise man and friends have all things in common. The answer is provided through the introduction of different notions of ownership. One may, for example, distinguish between legally owning a thing and actually using it. At any rate, it is possible to give to the wise man and to a friend.

(b) A brief chapter (chapter 13, in which the text appears to be defective) follows, which states that a benefit itself can neither be decreased or increased, but its physical manifestation is subject to such changes.
(c) Seneca now returns to the question whether the will (voluntas) to return is sufficient as a return (chapters 14-16.4). Has someone who has done everything to return a benefit, in fact returned? The problem is solved with reference to an altruistic attitude; the donor of the original benefit is to regard such an attempt as a return, but the recipient is still to consider himself under obligation.

(d) A further question is raised with reference to returning (chapters 16.5-25). Ought one to return to a man who was wise when he gave, but has since become bad? The solution is found in a double definition of a benefit, a strict one, which limits a benefit to being given and received by wise men, and a more relaxed one, which deals with a benefit of the ordinary kind (vulgare, plebeium). The latter must be returned, although it can be flung rather than given back. In addition, it makes a difference whether the vices of the person under consideration in this question are private ones or whether they, like a tyrant’s, have repercussions on society. It matters too whether what is returned will have a disastrous impact upon society. Yet the problem of the moral status of the recipient of the return is secondary in importance to the obligation to return. Seneca concludes with a reminder of the altruistic principle that the donor should forget he has given, but the recipient remember that he has received, and with an explanation of hyperbolic statements such as this principle.

(e) The final topic of the work, treated with appropriate rhetorical embellishment, is how ingrates are to be endured. A somewhat ironic xvii
conclusion to a work intended to combat ingratitude!
CHAPTER ONE

In his opening chapter Seneca points out that, in spite of a multiplicity of vices, there are two between which it is difficult to differentiate, lack of knowledge of giving and of receiving. For the one entails the other; improper giving of benefits results in their being improperly owed. Seneca hastens to add that the vice is also the most common one. Several reasons are adduced for this state of affairs, foremost of which is the failure of the giver to make a sufficiently careful selection of his recipients. Other causes may be a repudiation of a benefit, or an attempt to win one back. The pleading of bankruptcy is also a cause, albeit an illegitimate one. But the donor too is at fault, because of his unpredictable and inconsistent attitude. He may be destroying gratitude even while he gives, through ways such as facial expressions, ruses to stall requests made of him, or giving in any manner but willingly. Such behaviour does not create gratitude, for there is correlation between the manner in which a benefit is given and the spirit in which it is owed. Therefore all possible care must be exercised in giving, for negative aspects are especially remembered by the recipient.

The fact that the vice of ingratitude is so common ought, for several reasons, not to be a deterrent to giving. (a) The donors themselves are responsible for increasing the number of ingrates.
(b) The immortal gods, who, unstinting in their favours, help even those who are hostile to them, ought to serve as models in giving; a commercial attitude, on the other hand, is truly deserving of ingratitude. (c) To some extent the models are already being imitated; this is notably true in domestic relations such as those with wives and children. Persistence is evident too after political or natural disasters. It ought then to be likewise in the giving of benefits, and, if it is not, the logical inference is that the motivation behind the original gift was the expectation of a return, which is a justifiable cause for ingratitude. (d) Nature (the Stoics' paradigm par excellence) also supplies examples of gifts given to those unworthy of them. It is virtuous then not to seek the rewards of benefits, but benefiting itself. The risks involved enhance the value of benefiting; a good man obtains his reward in the giving of benefits which are not guaranteed to produce a return. This is so true that, even if there were no possibility of finding a grateful man, giving would still be advocated, to avoid being the direct cause of ingratitude.

1.1.1. Inter multos ac varios errores temere inconsulteque viventium nihil propemodum, vir optime Liberalis, discerni haec duo dixerim, quod benificia nec dare scimus nec accipere. Sequitur enim, ut male conlocata male debantur, de quibus non redditis sero querimur; ists enim perierunt, cum darentur. 1.1.2 (a) Nec mirum est inter plurima maximaque vitia nullum esse frequentius quam ingrati animi. Id evenire ex causis pluribus video.

Seneca points out to Aebutius Liberalis, to whom the de Beneficiis is dedicated, that among the many different vices of men who live
rashly and unwisely, two seem closely interrelated, ignorance about
giving and ignorance about receiving. For it follows that gifts that
have been badly placed (by the donor) are badly owed (by the recipient).
Complaints about the lack of a return in such cases come too late,
since these gifts were lost while they were being given. It is not then
surprising that the vice of ingratitude is the most frequent among the
many great vices. According to Seneca several reasons contribute to this.

The main problems in this section are presented by a textual
difficulty of some significance and the philosophical vocabulary
introduced by Seneca.

For the textual problem and suggested solutions see F. Préchac's
app. crit. ad loc. In addition to suggestions cited there, note also
A. J. Kronenberg, "Ad Libros de Beneficiis et de Clementia", CQ, I
(1907), 284. He thinks that vehementius, the word for the comparison
implied in quam, which is preserved after dixerim in some MSS, has
dropped out, since it resembles (inconsulteq)ue viventium. Kronenberg
provides parallels (without adequate references, however); vehementer
errasse and vehementius malum.

This suggestion, to insert a comparative, is also made by others
(e.g. indignius in the Loeb translation), and may represent an attempt
to find in the first sentence an indication that Seneca considers the
vice under discussion especially reprehensible. Such an attempt may be
unnecessary, because the point is made a few lines below that the vice
is the most common one.

Kronenberg has a further comment on the continuity of the
passage which has more merit. Reacting to a previous judgment that
sequitur must refer to words no longer in the text, he maintains it points to a connection within the sentence instead of one with the previous sentence. This internal connection is not precisely described, but one may surmise it would be: bad placement of benefits entails bad debts.

W. Richter, Die Lücken in Senecas Briefen und De Beneficiis I, pp.13-14, states that quam with a comparative satisfies the grammar of the passage but not the logic. This he bases on the belief that error can not be equated with nec dare scimus nec accipere, since error means wrong action or false opinion, and is therefore something: error never means not knowing at all, although not knowing can be the cause of error. Some sort of transition between error and nescire is therefore necessary. Richter suggests accordingly that a lacuna occurred after quod which was substantial, several pages in fact, comprising the whole introduction to the book. The sentence beneficia . . . accipere could then form the conclusion to the missing introduction. Richter's belief about the meaning of error will receive further comment below; it must here be pointed out that Richter may, on this matter, have been influenced by his assumption that the first book of the de Beneficiis was as long as the others, causing him to rely heavily on lacunae to make up the difference in length with these other books. His arguments are therefore not compelling.

W. H. Alexander, Seneca's De Beneficiis Libri VII, p.6, follows J. Buck, Senecae de Beneficiis et de Clementia in der Ueberlieferung, p.42, in positing no lacuna. He states: "Certainly as compared with a
great many of the mistakes made by people living recklessly and unreflectively, failure to know how to bestow a benefit or how to receive it is nihil propemodum, a gaucherie rather than an error, regarded mostly with an amused eye by the world in general." This interpretation suggests so wide a gap between ignorance of giving and receiving (a mere gaucherie) and error that the question arises why Seneca would apparently slight his theme in this way. Arguments against the interpretation of Alexander may be based on (a) the generally pessimistic tone of the first chapter, (b) the importance of the theme of benefits to Seneca who regards it as the chief bond of human society (res quae maxime humanam societatem adligat, Ben.,1.4.2), (c) the fact that Seneca places the vice of ingratitude, which is related to the ignorance of giving and receiving, among the most numerous and greatest of vices (Ben.,1.1.2).

Préchac's emendation might be defended by pointing to the paleographical similarity between discerni and dixerim; he himself cites a parallel for haec duo (EM.,76.19).

We now turn to the philosophically coloured vocabulary and will discuss errores out of the sequence in which it appears in the text, before multos ac varios, because it is a term of central significance.

Errores is an epistemological term (SVF.,1.16.27 = Cic., Acad., 1.42) which means wrong opinion and is often associated with words denoting thought such as existimare, putare, credere, aestimare (e.g. Ben.,4.38.1; Ben.,6.43.1; EM.,76.32; EM.,103.2; EM.,94.68). W. Richter, Die Lücken in Senecas Briefen und in de Beneficiis, p.13, n.19, claims that error also means wrong action. But of those texts adduced to
substantiate this meaning, one (EM.,87.15) contains no reference to error, and in the other three, Clem.,1.7.1; Ira,2.16.1 (wrongly cited as from Clem.); EM.,81.17, it can be interpreted as wrong opinion. Even where it appears with words for emotions (EM.,113.30; Ben.,7.26.5) Stoic doctrine would allow an intellectualist connotation to come to the fore.

A. E. Wilhelm-Hooijberg, Peccatum, Sin and Guilt in Ancient Rome, pp.13-14, differentiates errare from peccare in Sen., BV.,7.1 and Ira,3.25.2. In the first instance she states that errare seems to mean "to err, to make mistakes" and peccare "to be wrong, to be at fault"; in the second she finds "Peccare has a stronger significance than error", which has "an excusing sense; one can not help committing an error, one is not responsible for that", and adds that in the text peccare is placed with prudentissimi quite deliberately since the combination imprudens peccare exists while imprudens errare would be redundant. She also remarks that "Errare has a more limited sense than peccare. Peccare may be due to different causes . . . errare only to one: the failing of the mind." This last statement ought perhaps to have reminded her that rationality (ratio recta) was most important to the Stoics and that error therefore is anything but excusing.

Incorrect knowledge leads to incorrect action; Error . . . est causa peccandi (EM.,94.21). This sequence is also found in our text where incorrect knowledge of giving and receiving results in benefits badly placed and badly owed. To eliminate the wrongdoing one must therefore eliminate errores. But the method to be followed to achieve this goal proved to be controversial within the Stoa (see EM.,94&95). Some, including Aristo of Chios, thought that the paraenetic part
of philosophy (concerned with praecpta, exhortations or advice directed to specific situations) was unable to eradicate errores, and useless while the mind was still confused by them (EM.,94.21; EM.,94.5), and that the doctrinal part (concerned with decreta, general rules or dogmas) could correct them (EM.,94.7&8). Seneca, who maintains that praecpta are useful as auxiliary weapons against errores (EM.,94.21) and that they are necessary even after the removal of vices, because then the learning process of what is to be done, and how, still continues (EM.,94.23), adopts a compromise which is also evident in the de Beneficiis, in which general rule is mixed with specific advice.

Error, as incorrect opinion, is related to the statement of our text nec dare scimus nec accipere. With that assertion we must return to the contention of Richter, one basic to his assumption of a very large lacuna in the text (see p. 4 ), that error and nescire can not be identical. That the ignorance of the text is not a complete absence of any knowledge, as Richter supposes, we may learn from that part of the important letter on the subject of benefits (EM.,81), in which Seneca writes about the Stoic paradox that only the wise man knows how to give a benefit and return a favour: Sapiens omnia examinabit secum, quantum acceperit, a quo, quare, quando, ubi, quemadmodum. Itaque negamus quemquam scire gratiam referre nisi sapientem, non magis quam beneficium dare quisquam scit nisi sapiens- ... Nemo referre gratiam scit nisi sapiens. Stultus quoque, utcumque scit et quemadmodum potest, referat; ... (EM.,81.10-14). It is here apparent that the
fool has a limited knowledge which is still, strictly speaking, ignorance; nescire then does not mean knowing absolutely nothing but may well represent partial knowledge which results in such incorrect action as misplacing or improperly owing a benefit.

Knowledge as such was of paramount importance to the Stoics. With the aid of the catalogue of aspects of returning a favour provided by EM.,81.10 we can now begin to understand of what the knowledge of giving and receiving must consist, and likewise in what respects it can be deficient. The total number of aspects (numeri) mentioned by Seneca of giving and receiving is eight; (1) who, (2) what, (3) how much, (4) to whom -giving, from whom -receiving-, (5) where, (6) when, (7) how, (8) why (for the references see G. Bühring, Untersuchungen zur Anwendung, Bedeutung und Vorgeschichte der stoischen "numeri officii", p.297).

We also know that these different aspects (numeri) must be compared, because a different time or place or cause can make the same gift appear larger or smaller (EM.,81.14). This flexibility makes the task of knowing about giving and receiving a difficult one, for it would be easy to be wrong about one or more of the aspects.

With the assistance of the notion of the numeri, which are also considered to be constituent parts (G. Bühring, p.62) of an act or of virtue, we may now interpret the adjectives modifying errores, multis ac varios. Similarity between them and the description of vices (see p.10)suggests that there may be many different kinds of vices, i.e. that there is a qualitative difference between them. Introduction of the concept of the numeri now allows differences also to be seen in quan-
tative terms. When all the aspects have been correctly evaluated, as only a sage can do, the action performed on the basis of it is complete or full; when an error has crept in, the action is morally not perfect or complete. There may, of course, be differences in the degree of incompleteness, but incomplete can only be incomplete. This notion underlies the famous Stoic paradox, held by the Stoic school, with the exception of Heracleides of Tarsus and Athenodorus (SVF.,3.258.14 = D.L.,7.121), that all sins (ἀμαρτήματα) are equal (Ἰσα) but not alike (ἕως SVF.,3.141.30 = Stob. Ecl.,2.7, p.106); some sins transgress more aspects than others (... alia peccata plures, alia pauciores quasi numeros officii praeterirent, SVF.,1.55.35 = Cic. Fin.,4.56). Yet he who commits a greater sin and he who commits a lesser one are equally not acting correctly (ὁ πλεῖον καὶ ὁ ἔλαττον ἀμαρτάνων, SVF.,3.141.29 = D.L.,7.120). The question of what punishment was to be meted out for wrongdoing was settled by the Stoics with reference to the number of aspects of an act which were not properly fulfilled (see the discussion J. M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy, p.82).

multos ac varios:

Cf. Hor. Sat.,2.3.49 (the "Stoic" satire), ille sinistrorum, hic dextrorum abit, unus utrique / error, sed variis illudit partibus.

* Cf. also Seneca's expressions conveying variations in the degree (quantity) of sin: magis peccat, Ben.,1.2.7, sine quo vix ullum magnum facinus adcrevit, Ben.,1.10.4; minus peccares, Ben.,6.23.3.
* Note the similar but fuller description of vices: Non debes admirari si tantas invenis vitiorum proprietates: varia sunt, innumerae, habent facies, conprendi eorum genera non possunt (EM.,122.17; cf. Verg. G.1.506, tot multas scelerum facies). Even a single vice may have many different manifestations: Multa sunt genera ingratorum, ut furum, ut homicidarum, quorum una culpa est, ceterum in partibus varietas magna, (Ben.,3.1.3).

**temere inconsulteque viventium:**

Those here described are obviously not following the Stoic dictum to live according to nature (secundum naturam vivere), i.e. to live wisely, and can only be the so-called fools (stulti, mali). Although the fools form but one class as opposed to the wise (sapientes), they may on a secondary level be subdivided into three classes of those who are proceeding towards wisdom (proficientes, EM.,75.8) and, presumably, one class of those who are not making any progress whatsoever. Differences between the three groups of proficientes are based on the degree (gradus) of progress they have made towards wisdom (EM.,76.9-15). Every fool possesses every vice, although not every vice is equally prominent in every fool, so that some may be present in a latent stage only (Ben.,4.27.2; Ben.,5.26.2; cf. EM.,42.3). The fool then is inept in the matter of benefits: Εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀχărιστον, οὕτω πρὸς ἀνταπόδοσιν ἀρίττος οἰκείως ἔχοντα οὕτω πρὸς μετάδοσιν διὰ τὸ μήτε κολωνὶς τι πολεμὸν μήτε φιλικῶς μήτε ἀμελετήτως (SVF.,3.169.39 = Stob. Ecl.,2.103).
A. Bourgery, *Sénèque Prosateur*, p.132, n.3, lists the pleonastic use of synonymous adverbs as a feature of popular language found in Seneca. We may well have an instance here; both words indicate a lack of the proper use of reason (*ratio*). Cicero uses them in combination to characterize erroneous doctrines (*ND.*, 1.16.43).

No special relationship needs to be postulated at this point between the adverbs and a particular form of benefits such as rash giving (*largitio*), so as to exclude its opposite, meanness (*avaritia*). Both faults must be included in error and both (and others as well) result from hasty assent to impressions which are not wellfounded. The terms used in the last sentence provide a link with Stoic theory of knowledge, and it is not surprising that *temeritas* occurs in discussions about epistemology (*Cic.Acad.*, 1.11.42; cf. *D.L.*, 7.46&48, where recklessness in assertions is seen to have practical consequences, in that it leads those with untrained perceptions into disorder and erratic behaviour, i.e. epistemological rashness can have ethical consequences. See also G. Watson, *The Stoic Theory of Knowledge*, p.53).

In respect to benefits negligence and rashness are vices which seem much like virtues: *Imitatur negligentia facilitatem, temeritas fortitudinem* (*EM.*, 120.8).

*Liberalis:*

Aebutius Liberalis; cf. *Ben.*, 3.1.1; *Ben.*, 4.1.1; *Ben.*, 5.1.3; *Ben.*, 6.1.1 (in this book his role as participant in a discussion makes him more prominent); *Ben.*, 7.1.1. He may be the centurion mentioned on
an inscription (CIL.,3, Suppl.,9973), and may be a citizen of Lugdunum (EM.,91). He may not have been a Stoic, for the interlocutor who speaks of your school (Ben.,6.5.5) is identified a few lines later as Liberalis.

* It may be that Seneca introduces him somewhat tongue-in-cheek; the Stoics had a reputation for being interested in etymology, cf.

... Stoicos, qui studiose exquirunt, unde verba sint ducta ... (Cic.Off.,1.7.23); ... beneficentia, quam ... liberalitatem appellari licet (Cic.Off.,1.7.20).

**benificia:**

Note the spelling; no correction was included in the list of errata published by F. Préchac, "Mélanges", RHPh, 1 (1933), 173-175.

* The term is more fully defined in Ben.,1.5 & 1.6, where Seneca distinguishes between a benefit and the material of a benefit. The latter is popularly called a benefit, and, since the distinction has not yet been made, it is probable that Seneca uses the term in this sense here.

**scimus:**

Since in the matter of giving distinctions between right and wrong are subtle, Seneca recommends that knowledge (the topic of the epistle) be obtained by paying close attention and formulating distinc-
tions (EM.,120.9).

male conlocata male debeantur:

The incorrect placement of benefits leads to their being incorrectly owed in return. Seneca does not here specify whether incorrect placement entails conferral on the wrong recipients (but conlocare can mean giving to proper recipients, EM.,19.12) or conferral in the wrong spirit, but he probably means both, since both are causes of ingratitude (Ben.,1.1.2; Ben.,1.1.8).

* Cf. Benefacta male locata male facta arbitror (Cic. Off.,2.18.62, quoting a line of the poet Ennius); Cicero subsequently relates the action of placing benefits to the selection of suitable recipients.

redditis:

A return is defined as the return of one thing for another; it is the return, not of the same thing, but of the same value (Ben.,6.4.2). It is also to return what you owe, to the one to whom it belongs, when he wants it (Ben.,7.19.2). The word reddere does not have the noble connotations which referre has, for the former is used of people who returned after being asked, or who returned unwillingly, or who returned under any circumstances, or through the agency of another, the latter is used of a voluntary return (EM.,81.9).
Sero querimur:

Seneca repeats his points, that the complaint of a lost benefit is an indication of a benefit not well bestowed (Ben., 7.29.1), and that the loss took place at the very time of giving, but may be revealed at a later date (Ben., 7.30.1).

* The adverb sero conveys an apologia for the De Beneficiis, for it implies that it is fitting that we should learn about giving and receiving now rather than complain afterwards. Complaints, at any rate, may not change the situation (cf. BV., 6.3).

* Pointing out that the theme of his work is a matter of concern is a rhetorical technique used by Seneca to elicit the reader's interest. He employs it as well in his epistle on benefits (FM., 81), in which quereris is the very first word (cf. BV., 1.1, where a universal complaint is again Seneca's point of departure).

* This is not the place for Seneca, who must woo the reader in the proem, to tell the reader he ought not complain, but he does so subsequently. In Ben., 2.28.2-4 Seneca states that complaining does not make one worthy of greater gifts, but unworthy of those already given, and advances the typical Stoic position that each must bear his lot. No benefit is so perfect (plenum) that malice can not criticize it or so small that a kind interpretation can not enlarge it. If you look at benefits from their dark side (a deteriorare parte) you will never lack reason to complain. At the conclusion of the De Beneficiis Seneca likewise casts doubt on whether complaints are justifiable, when he
writes that the complainer may himself possess the vice of which he complains, ingratitude (cf. [Ben.],7.27.3, ingratitude is so common that even he who complains of it, does not escape it). It is unfair for the complainer to be angry at a universal fault; he must pardon in order to be pardoned. By being patient with the ingrate he will make him better, by upbraiding him worse ([Ben.],7.28.3); (for the Stoic position on complaining cf. [Ira],1.14.1-2; [Ira],2.10.1-8; [Ira],3.26.3-5).

* The reasons for complaints, Aristotle indicates, are differences in the relationships of individuals, when one party is more active than another in love, benefits, or service ([MM.],1210a25 f.). Such complaints also arise, and do so more frequently, if there is a lack of clarity about the nature of the relationship, and the two parties pretend that what is in fact a utilitarian friendship, is a moral one, based on trust ([EE.],1242b33 f.). Great frequency of complaint is also found in relationships based purely on utility ([EN.],1165b5 f.).

perierunt:

Cf. [Ben.],1.2.1; [Ben.],7.29 & 30 for the theme of loss. A thoughtless gift (inconsulata donatio) is the worst kind of loss ([Ben.],4.10.3).

inter plurima maximaque vitia nullum esse frequentius quam ingrati animi:

Cf. [Ben.],3.1.1, even the ingrates complain about ingratitude, since the vice which displeases all, clings to all; [Ben.],5.17.3, it is
not possible that all men complain, unless all men give reason to complain; Ben., 5.15.2, the complaint of ingratitude is a general one, and not the mutterings of the Stoics only; EM., 81.1. Similarly the topic at hand receives rhetorical emphasis in Ira., 1.2.1.

* Note the increase in emphasis over multos ac varios in the superlative degree of the adjectives; it may be that the mention of complaint led Seneca to give voice to the words often heard in complaints. But the vice was also considered serious from a philosophical perspective; cf. Ben., 4.18.1, where Seneca states in a context filled with philosophical commonplaces that nothing equals this vice in dissociating and ripping apart the human race.

* With Seneca's attempt to state the relevance of his theme compare also Cicero's opening of the de Officiis (Off., 1.2.4) where he writes that no part of life, private or public, is free from duty (officium).

 ingrati animi:

The fault of the ingrate is an internal one, one of attitude or motivation. Four kinds of ingrates are given in Ben., 3.1.3.

 ex causis pluribus:

Seneca has reason to list causes for ingratitude again, and comparison with the later material yields interesting conclusions.
In *Ben.*, 2.26.1 three main causes of ingratitude are given and discussed; they are pride (*nimius sui suspectus*), greed (*aviditas*) and envy (*invidia*). They are without exception faults within the character of the ingrates. A faulty memory (*Ben.*, 3.2.1-3.5.2) is also the responsibility of the ingrate (see in addition *Ira*, 3.30.2; *Ira*, 3.31.1).

In the first chapter, however, Seneca has the brunt of the blame bear down upon the donor, who must first select the proper recipients and then give in the proper spirit. This cause of ingratitude external to the ingrate, the donor, is also mentioned at *Ben.*, 2.17.5.

1.1.2(b) *Prima illa est, quod non eligimus dignos, quibus tribuamus.*

Sed nomina facturi diligenter in patrimonium et vitam debitoris inquirimus, semina in solum effetum et sterile non spargimus: beneficia sine ullo dilectu magis proicimus quam damus.

1.1.3 *Nec facile dixerim, utrum turpius sit infitiari an repetere beneficium; id enim genus huius crediti est, ex quo tantum recipiendum sit, quantum ultero refertur; decoquere vero foedissum ob hoc ipsum, quia non opus est ad liberandam fidem facultatibus sed animo; reddit enim beneficium, qui debet.*

Seneca states that the first cause of ingratitude is the donor's negligence in the selection of worthy recipients. Of other causes, denying a benefit or seeking it back, it is difficult to say which is worse; for a benefit is a loan of a special sort from which one must only recover what is freely given back; to plead bankruptcy is most disgraceful for the reason that no goods are necessary to fulfil one's commitment but the wish to do so; for, paradoxically, he
is returning a benefit, who truly feels himself obliged for it.

Of the several causes of ingratitude Seneca promises to give, only the first is specifically stated to be such a cause; we must guess how far Seneca wanted his list to extend. It could go as far as \textit{Ben.},1.3.1; in that case likely causes for ingratitude are (1) to deny a benefit (which could include pleading bankruptcy), (2) to seek to have it returned, (3) to adopt an improper attitude towards recipients, (4) to be intimidated from giving benefits by the large number of ingrates, (5) to adopt a commercial attitude towards benefits. The majority of these are faults of the giver; we know that Seneca also treats of the fault of the recipient because he passes, in \textit{Ben.}, 1.1.4, from the fault of self-confessed ingrates to that of the donor (nobis), and it is likely that \textit{decoquere}, which just precedes this statement, refers to the recipient, since the term is used of individuals who plead insolvency when faced with the obligation of a return. \textit{Infitiari} could also apply to the recipient, but this case is less certain (see the commentary). We may be assured, however, that Seneca could have added to the faults of the recipients at this point; he could have discussed in some detail, as he does in \textit{Ira.},3.20.2, their suspicion which sometimes leads them to give the name injuries to modest benefits, which are the most frequent and the bitterest causes of anger, since people become angry at their dearest friends, on the grounds that they gave them less than they thought, less than they gave to others, etc.(cf. \textit{Ben.},1.14.1; \textit{Ben.},2.28.1).
Most interesting in this section is Seneca's use of comparisons (for Seneca's views on the use of metaphors see EM.,59.6 where he allows them as aids for our weakness; cf. Ben.,4.12.1: see also D. Steyns, Étude sur les métaphores et les comparaisons dans les œuvres en prose de Sénèque le philosophe; F. Husner, Leib und Seele in der Sprache Senecas; W. Trillitzsch, Senecas Beweisführung, pp.36-45, 113-124). Of the two comparisons, one from the world of finance, the other from agriculture, the latter is of considerable antiquity (see W. K. C. Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy, Vol.3, p.168-169, for comparisons between the care of men and that of plants in Protagoras, Antiphon and the Hippocratic Law). The metaphor is particularly appropriate of benefits, and is used by Cicero (Off., 1.15.48), who in the repayment of benefits urges imitation of fertile fields which produce more than they receive. Seneca uses it in the opening of his epistle on benefits (EM.,81), when, urging continued giving in spite of ingratitude, he writes that even after a bad crop one ought to sow; often whatever had been lost because of the continual barrenness of poor soil, the abundance of one year has restored. But the metaphor is more than a mere topos; the Romans respected agriculture and A. Bourgery, Sénèque Prosateur, p.292 reminds us that Seneca was no exception, since he claimed to be a diligent viticulturist (QN.,3.7.1).

Even within the context of benefits, the comparison can be used in a variety of ways, depending on the point Seneca wants to stress. In our text, the farmer, in his care in the selection of the proper soil, is held up as a model to be followed; in Ben.,4.9.2,
where an interlocutor refers to this comparison between giving benefits and ploughing and sowing, in order to counter Seneca’s argument that we should confer benefits as do the gods, i.e. without expectation of repayment, this adversary of Seneca uses the comparison as basis for his own claim that, as sowing is not done for its own sake, so the giving of benefits is not. This Seneca counters (Ben., 4.14.3) stating: Nemo ad agrum colendum ex aequo et bono venit nec ad ullam rem, cuius extra ipsam fructus est. He then points out that giving benefits is very different. In Ben., 2.11.4 he uses the comparison of the sower to point out that more than the giving of benefits is required; sowing is not enough, cultivation is also necessary.

The financial comparison is also common in the De Beneficiis, and serves continually as a contrast with the giving of benefits (see the commentary on Ben., 1.2.3). It is introduced by nomina facturi and continued in genus huius crediti.

The two comparisons picturing discriminate selection contrast with the statements, about the absence of selection in benefits, found before and after it; a contrasting "frame" encloses two "pictures". Proicimus at the end of the frame may be influenced by the picture of the sower; conversely, the beginning of the frame, eligimus dignos, has probably suggested in patrimonium et vitam debitoris inquirimus (see W. Trillitzsch, Senecas Beweisführung, p.114, who notices the close interweaving of picture and generalization and the effect of a picture continued over a longer passage in EM., 59; cf. A. Bourgery, Seneque Prosateur, p.114, who points out Seneca’s tendency not only to quote a poet, but also to let the context of the quote have an
impact on the thought or expression of his context; cf. EM.,65 on the
subject of efficient cause and material cause (materia), in which
Seneca applies those two concepts to his writing that epistle, when he
states he is struggling with difficult subject matter (materia).

Prima:

The word indicates priority in chronological sequence (cf.
Natura prius est, ut quis debeat, deinde ut gratiam referat, Ben.,5.8.
1), a priority which need not per se signify greater importance (Ben.,
3.30.2; Ben.,3.34); but the emphasis put on the donor throughout most
of the first chapter allows perhaps some stress to be put on the
importance of this cause. Translate "first and foremost". The improper
selection of recipients is the only cause so designated numerically.

non eligimus dignos:

The related problem of the selection of friends was much dis-
cussed in antiquity; there too care was urged (Arist.EN.,1156b31 f.)
and carelessness led to bad consequences (Cic.Lael.,17.62, where
Scipio's remark that people know how many sheep and goats they have,
but not how many friends, is comparable to Seneca's reference to agri-
culture; cf. Lael.,21.79). Differences arose over whether trial
(iudicare) should precede friendship (credere) or whether the riskier
alternative of forming the friendship before the trial should be adopted
(Lael.,17.62; Lael.,22.85; see W. Brinckmann, Der Begriff der Freundschaft
in Senecas Briefen, p.23, n.7. Seneca too expresses concern about the selection of worthy friends (EM.,7.8; EM.,38.2; EM.,47.15; I. Hadot, Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung, p.171, n.42.

* With respect to benefits Cicero also advises judgment and care in the selection of suitable recipients (Off.,2.18.62). The worthiness (dignitas) of the recipient must be considered, in which Cicero includes the character (mores) of the recipient, his attitude towards the donor, his sense of fellowship and relationship with the donor, and the services he has done previously in the interest of the donor (Off.,1.14.45). Cicero goes on to say that no-one should be neglected who possesses any trace of virtue; at the same time an individual is to be favoured, i.e. given benefits, in proportion to the virtue with which he is endowed. A more charitable attitude is advocated when Cicero writes (Off.,2.18.62) that liberality ought to be more favourable to the unfortunate, unless they deserve their misfortune. Seneca would disagree with Cicero to some extent, especially on the criterion of service previously rendered in the interest of the donor. Cicero portrays the mutual exchange of services which was part of Roman society (e.g. in the patronus-clients relationship), while Seneca puts more emphasis on the giving of benefits as virtuous and good, without consideration of the consequences (Ben.,1.1.12). While putting less emphasis on the return of a benefit from the point of view of the giver, Seneca stresses this obligation for the receiver.

* See also Ben.,1.10.5.
nomina facturi:

The expression means to record someone's name in a ledger with reference to a loan given him; hence to grant him a loan (A. Berger, Enc. Dict. Rom. Law, s.v.).

*Cf. Ben.,7.29.2; Ben.,5.22.1; Cic.Off.,3.14.59; VB.,24.1, where in a discussion about giving, it is again contrasted with spargere.

spargimus:

The term is an important one; when used of benefits, it means giving, even handing, something to someone, without having the intention of giving expressly to him (Ben.,6.18.2). This constitutes failure to know one of the aspects (numeri) of a benefit, that of the recipient (cui), which is more important than that of the object received (EM.,19.12). With its synonyms proicere and largiri, it is characteristic of a haphazard approach (incidere rebus) indicative of the absence of reason (ratio, EM.,37.4) which depends on the numeri (Ben.4.10.2).

proicimus:

This word echoes the reference to indiscriminate giving in spargere, and is contrasted with damus, which must here imply consideration of the recipient. The phrase therefore ought not to be used as
evidence for Seneca's theory that a benefit "should always be forthcoming", as is done by P. T. Photiades, "A Profile of Seneca", Orpheus, 9 (1962), 55.

* Since the verb implies giving without considering the recipient, it is appropriate for the kind of return made to a bad man, the relationship with whom is best terminated, as distinct from the return (reddere) made to a good man (Ben.,7.17.2).

* Proicere is characteristic of the man whom Seneca (humorously) calls angry with his money rather than liberal; he is the prodigal man, who differs from the liberal man in that the latter knows how to give, the former does not know how to save (EM.,120.8).

* The same principle of careful placement, employing similar language, can also be applied elsewhere: ... ista dicendi celeritas nec in sua potestate est nec satis decora philosophiae, quae ponere debet verba, non proicere, et pedetemptim procedere (EM.,40.7).

* Cf. VB.,23.5.

turpius:

Like foedissimum (below), the term connotes moral opprobrium. To the Stoics it was an important concept which is descriptive of the state of mind and actions of the fool. Seneca counts the knowledge that malum (bad, evil) is turpe (base) and that bonum (good) is honestum (honourable, virtuous) as a rule or law of life which should govern all actions (Ben.,7.2.2).
**infinitari:**

*Infinitari* is often found with words for benefits or debts (in general see *TLL*, vol.7.1450). To deny a benefit can have a variety of meanings: it can apply to either the donor or the recipient (cf. the similar use of *ἀναθεσθαι* in *Hom.Od.*, 4.651, where it applies to the donor's refusal to give a gift requested by the recipient, and *Od.*, 18.287, where it refers to the recipient's refusal to accept a gift). For the donor to refuse a benefit can be (a) to refuse to bestow a gift outright (cf. *Ira*, 3.28.4, where Seneca states that there is a considerable difference between not giving and taking away), (b) to refuse to give a gift which has been promised (see Lewis & Short, s.v.; *Flor.*, 1.17.2[Budé]). For the recipient to refuse a benefit can mean (c) to refuse to accept a gift (an attitude Arist. *EN.*, 1120a8 f. damns with faint praise, and one which Seneca regards as stemming from a refusal to be under obligation, *Ben.*, 6.25.1), (d) to deny he has received a gift either explicitly or by dissimulation (cf. Quint.*Decl.*, 333 [p.313.3 in C. Ritter's Teubner edition]), (e) to acknowledge receipt of a gift but to refuse to make a return.

Although the situations described in (a) and (b) occur in the *De Beneficiis* (in *Ben.*, 2.14.1 and *Ben.*, 2.4.1-2 respectively), *infinitari* and its cognates are not used there. These are restricted to descriptions of the behaviour of recipients as follows: (c) occurs in *Ben.*, 6.23.8 (cf. *Ben.*, 5.6.6), (d) in *Ben.*, 6.27.3 (cf. *Ben.*, 3.1.3), (e) in *Ben.*, 7.26.2; *Ben.*, 3.17.4; *Ben.*, 4.10.1, where denial is regarded as
justified, if a return would be harmful to the recipient (cf. Ben., 5.22.1). A secretive return can also be considered as a denial of this kind (Ben., 2.23.2). A few instances must remain inconclusive: Ben., 2.35.3 where the antonym of infitatio beneficiorum, exhortatio beneficiorum appears; Ben., 3.13.1 and Ben., 6.35.5.

The instance in our text may simply describe a refusal to pay back; petere and infitiari are used of opponents in a legal or quasi-legal sense (Varr. LL., 5.180; Quint. Inst., 7.2.27; see also repetitio in a legal sense Ben., 3.14.3). This would require that each of the infinitives be understood to have a different person as its subject, a grammatical anomaly not impossible in Seneca, since he is not averse either to omitting pronoun subjects of infinitives even when they differ from the subjects of the main verb (see B. L. Charney, "Ellipsis of the pronoun in Seneca", CP, XXXIX (1944), p. 109). The two parties, like those in a legal dispute, are almost equally wrong; this is so, precisely because they are engaged in a dispute, since repayment of benefits must only be made willingly (ultro). If it is subjected to legal action, the benefits can no longer be considered benefits (Ben., 3.7.1). The question of whether benefits ought to have anything to do with the courts, discussed at length Ben., 3.6-17, receives a decidedly negative answer.

repetere:

The reclamation of benefits Seneca generally treats as if it were base; ... qui dat beneficia, deos imitatur, qui repetit,
feneratores (Ben.,3.15.4); ... eo loco sit donatio, unde repeti non debeat, reddi possit (VB.,24.2, where Seneca differentiates between giving to regain and giving not to waste). However, his admonitions never to seek back are not to be taken at face value, as Seneca himself admits in a discussion on the methodology of his ethical teaching. Hyperbole is used to reach the truth by way of falsehood, and never hopes for realization of all it dares to state, but it asserts the incredible to arrive at the credible. So, claims Seneca, when we say a benefit ought not to be reclaimed, we do not dismiss reclamation altogether, for often the bad have need of harsh exaction, the good of warning (Ben.,7.23.1-3). The conditions under which requests for repayment may be proper are such extenuating circumstances as when the safety of the donor's children, wife, country, or liberty are at stake (Ben.,5.20.7; cf. the classification of benefits in Ben.,1.11). In some cases reminding the recipient he has received a benefit may even be considered a second benefit (Ben.,5.22.2; cf. Ben.,7.25; see Ben., 5.22.2-25.6 for the manner in which reclamation ought to be carried out).

**genus huius crediti:**

Translate: "for this is characteristic of this type of loan, that from it only so much is to be recovered as ...."

* Seneca is somewhat uneasy about the comparison of a benefit with a loan; he makes clear that he is employing a figure of speech: Cum creditum dicimus, imagine et translatione utimur .... cum dico creditum,
intellegitur tamquam creditum (Ben., 4.12.1). In addition to a benefit being voluntary, it is distinguishable from a loan in that it can not be repaid (insolubile, Ben., 4.12.1).

* Cf. Ben., 2.18.5; Ben., 2.21.2; Ben., 2.34.1; Ben., 4.39.2.

* What is freely returned, in the case of such a loan, can include both a material object and gratitude or consist solely of gratitude.

ex quo tantum recipiendum sit, quantum ulter referetur:

Referre est ulter quod debeat adferre (EM., 81.9); referre est ad eum a quo accipias rem ferre. Haec vox significat voluntarium relationem: qui rectulit, ipse se appellavit (EM., 81.10).

* The essential voluntary aspect of a return is not possible in the contentious atmosphere of denying and reclaiming a benefit, which for that reason carry a moral stigma.

decoquere:

"To plead insolvency, bankruptcy." There was usually shame (infamia) attached to it (for references see J. A. Crook, "A Study in Decoction", Latomus, XXVI (1967), p. 370), but some preferred it as a way to avoid paying debts (cf. quaerens quomodo dequoquat, Ben., 3.17.4) and it was open to manipulation, i.e. it was possible, when faced with creditors who demanded payment in full, to give away your property and then claim inability to pay (J. A. Crook, p. 372, who refers to App.
Apol., 75).

*Cf. EM., 36.5, where Seneca writes that it is less shameful (turpe) to plead bankruptcy with a creditor than with expectation of goodness, for a merchant needs a prosperous voyage to pay back borrowed money, a farmer the fertility of the land and good weather, but a friend can pay what he owes with his will alone.

* To plead insolvency is one way of denying a benefit. It is to acknowledge having received it but to refuse to pay back (see (e) under infitiari). Apart from it being contentious, and therefore reprehensible, it is wrong because it completely misunderstands the nature of repayment of a benefit, which can consist solely of gratitude. Since there is no need for a material object, bankruptcy need not even enter the picture.

liberandam fidem:

"To stand by one's commitment; to keep one's word"; the expression is synonymous with fidem praestare (which occurs in Ben., 4.36.3; Ben., 7.16.3).

* The ancients thought it was necessary to keep one's word under all circumstances (Ben., 7.16.3); but it is not, if the situation for the donor changes after he has made a promise (Ben., 4.35.2, ... quidquid mutatur, libertatem facit de integro consulendi et me fide liberat.)
facultatibus sed animo:

On the distinction between material goods and the state of mind of the agent of an action see Ben., 1.5.2 f.

Reddit enim beneficium, qui debet:

Translate: "Owing a benefit, is returning one"; this means that the recognition that a benefit is owed, is a form of gratitude, which in turn is a kind of repayment.

* Seneca is restating the meaning of a previous clause in the form of a paradox, a trope much favoured by the Stoics, which is, Seneca states, an unusual way of presenting doctrines which are not unusual (Ben., 2.35.2). This particular paradox receives further elucidation in Ben., 2.31 f., where it is apparent from the context that debere of the paradox is identical with libenter accipere (Ben., 2.35.1), benigne accipere (Ben., 2.35.5), bono animo accipere (Ben., 2.35.3); these are, in turn, equivalent with gratiam referre (Ben., 2.35.3).

* Cicero expresses approval (Off., 2.20.69) of a similar paradox which he quotes: pecuniam qui habeat, non redidisse, qui reddiderit, non habere, gratiam autem, et qui rettulerit, habere et, qui habeat, rettulisse.

* Another similar paradox of Cicero (Planc., 68) is criticized by Antonius Julianus - a rhetorician who taught Aulus Gellius - for being inaccurate. In the comparison of a debt (debitio) of money and one of gratitude Cícero had stated: Nam qui pecuniam dissoluit, statim non
habet id, quod reddidit, qui autem debet, in eo quod habet, retinet alienum: gratiam autem et qui debet habet, et qui habet, in eo quod habet, refert.

Julianus objects to the substitution of habet for debet in the case of gratitude since a debt of gratitude, not a possession of gratitude, (habitio) was compared with money. Reinserting the word debet would yield et qui debet, in eo ipso, quod debet, refert. On this Julianus aptly comments: sed absurdum et nimirum coactus foret, si nondum reddidam gratiam eo ipso reddidam diceret, quia debetur (Gell.NA.,1.4).

1.1.4 Sed cum sit in ipsis crimen, qui ne confessione quidem grati sunt, in nobis quoque est. Multos experimur ingratos, plures facimus, quia alias graves exprobatores exactoresque sumus, alias leves et quos paulo post muneris sui paeniteat, alias quereli et minima momenta calumniantes. Gratiam omnem corrumpimus non tantum postquam dedimus beneficia, sed dum damus.

1.1.5 Quid nostrum contentus fuit aut leviter rogari aut semel? quid non, cum aliquid a se peti suspicatus est, frontem adduxit, voltum avertit, occupationes simulavit, longis sermonibus et de industria non invenientibus exitum occasionem petendi abstulit et variis artibus necessitates properantes elusit.

1.1.6 In angusto vero comprensus aut distulit, id est timide negavit, aut promisit, sed difficulter, sed subductis superciliis, sed malignis et vix exeuntibus verbis?

1.1.7 Nemo autem libenter debet, quod non acceptit, sed expressit. Gratus adversus eum esse quiquam potest, qui beneficium aut superbe abiecit aut iratus inpegit aut fatigatus, ut molestia careret, dedit? Errat, si quis sperat responsurum sibi, quem dilatone lassavit, expectatione torsit.

Although the ingrates, who by their own admission are ungrateful, are at fault, the donors must also shoulder blame, for they add to the number of ingrates by their inconsistent and unfriendly behaviour, which is exhibited in a variety of ways, all reprehensible. Two elements are stressed in the explanation of the fault of the donor,
which Seneca in *Ben.*, 2.5.4 entitles *tempus* and *voluntas*, the latter consisting of the direct emotional reaction of the donor to a request, or the spirit or manner in which he gives, the former a more discreet form of communication externalizing this reaction in ruses designed to thwart the person making the request and so to stall either the request or the donation.

Since there is a certain amount of repetition in the treatment accorded these points, it is as well to focus on the ways in which Seneca achieves variety. This is found in the alternation of donor and recipient as subject of the sentence (e.g. *Nemo*; *si quis*, *Ben.* 1.1.7), and in the changes in the time perspective; in *Ben.*, 1.1.4 there is mention of the spoiling of gratitude after the donation has been made (*postquam dedimus*), and the time during which it is made (*dum damus*). This latter perspective is then explored under two headings, (a) the possibility that a gift is being asked (*suspicatus*) and (b) certainty that it is asked (*in angusto vero comprensus*). Since the first of these deals with a situation prior to the actual donation, it, in effect, represents the future. We thus have evidence that Seneca used the well-known rhetorical device of structuring according to past, present and future (*Quint. Inst.*, 7.21; *Inst.* 5.10.71; cf. *Em.*, 124.17; *Bv.*, 10.2; *Ben.*, 3.4.2). Rhetorical skill is illustrated too in the length of the sentence in *Ben.*, 1.1.5 & 6 which echoes his point *longis sermonibus et de industria non inventibus*.

The spirit of the donor is apparent in *frontem adduxit*, *vultum avertit*, when it is suspected that a request is being made; in *difficulter*, *subductis superciliis*, *malignis et vix exeuntibus verbis*
when the request is granted; **superbe, iratus fatigatus**, when the donation takes place (continued by **neglegenter** and **contumeliose** in Ben. 1.1.8). Correspondingly the temporal element is stressed in **occupationes simulavit, longis sermonibus ... elusit, distulit, dilatione, expectatione** (so also **tarde** in Ben.,1.1.8).

See the discussion on how a benefit is to be given (Ben., 2.1-18) for elaborations on some of the points Seneca makes here.

**confessione:**

The word was perhaps suggested by **infitiari** (above), with which it appears as its antonym (TLL., vol.7, 1450.3). Here, of course, it is negative and therefore a synonym.

**Multos experimur ingratos, plures facimus:**

A distinction is clearly drawn between ingrates, for the cause of whose condition donors must assume personal responsibility, and ingrates who were already ungrateful. The latter group is, most likely, comprised of individuals who have a natural propensity for that vice (Ira,2.31.5; Ben.,4.26.2-4.27.4).

* Other ways, not stated in the first chapter, in which donors make greater the number of ingrates include (a) deliberately favouring ingratitude because it seems to enhance the magnitude of the benefits when gratitude for them can not be returned (Ben.,2.17.5), and (b)
taking ingrates to court, a process by which their already vast number becomes widely known and so deprives the vice of its shame, thereby, in turn, increasing the number still more (Ben., 3.16.4).

exprobatores exactoresque:


* A Bourgery, Sénèque Prosateur, p.288, lists exprobrator as a rare word, but points out it is found in Sen. Contr., 21. For cognates see Ben., 2.11.6; Ben., 2.10.4; Ben., 5.22.2; Ben., 7.22.2; Ben., 7.28.3.

* The concept is related to that of admonition (Ben., 2.10.4; Ben., 2.11.6), but it connotes a harshness which is destructive, for it makes the individual to whom the reproach is directed not better, but worse (Ben., 7.28.3); it induces hatred in him, whereas warning (admonitio) produces mere resentment (Ben., 2.11.6). One must not reproach a friend harshly, but as gently as possible (Ben., 5.22.2).

* Aristotle expresses the opinion that we wish to be friends with those who do not reproach our shortcomings or our benefits (Rhet., 1381b1), but Cicero states that warning and reproach must be endured in friendship in order that its usefulness and loyalty may last, although he is aware of the difficulties of this policy (Lael., 24.8869). A case can be made for reproach provided one resorts to it as to surgery, if no other cures are available. We may seem (but not be) angry; and the harshness of our reproach must demonstrably be in the interest of the object of that reproach (Off., 1.38.136).
* **Exactor** is a metaphor (A. Bourgery, Sénéque Prosateur, p.245) and is listed in TLL (s.v.) as a non-technical term, which denotes two types of officials, one functioning as *custodes* of *opera publica* (already in Cic. Dom.,51) who also supervised the construction of public buildings, while the other raised money (cf. Caes. BCiv.,3.32.4) and, as extraordinary officials until Diocletian, performed a function analogous to that of the πράκτωρ σιτικῶν, who collected overdue taxes (RE.,6.1540 f.). This last meaning seems most suitable to the context of our text. Like the *exprobrator*, the *exactor* practises an excessively harsh form of admonition (Ben.,7.23.3) and he is the reason why Seneca states that one should not seek to recover a benefit, although he means that it may occasionally be done (Ben.,7.24.2; cf. Ira,3.3.3; Cic. Off.,2.18.64, in exigendo non acerbum).

**leves:**

In spite of the contrast with *graves*, **leves** is probably not to be taken with *exprobratores exactoresque*; because in each of the other two cases **alias** is followed by two ideas which complement each other, it is likely that **leves** should balance *quos paulo post muneris sui paeniteat*, and also refer to a fickle giver.

* Such fickle givers reproach themselves, wishing that they had lost their gift, rather than that they had given it to whom they did (Ben.,4.10.3).

* Cf. Nep. Att.,15, for the contrast **levis** - **liberalis**.
rogari:

Asking for something may provide difficulties for the person making the request; the words "I ask" are torture (Ben., 2.1.3), or troublesome and are to be said with downcast face (Ben., 2.2.1). In fact, a man who asks does not obtain his request free of charge, but by his having to ask pays a price of sorts (Ben., 2.1.4). It is apparent then that the donor, far from having the request repeated, must endeavour to anticipate and forestall it (Ben., 2.1.3; cf. Cic., Lael., 18.65&66).

frontem adduxit:

For a description of the correct appearance of a donor see Ben., 2.13.2.

* The benefits themselves may have tristem frontem et asperam (Ben., 5.20.2; cf. Ben., 6.24.2); they can under these circumstances still be motivated by a kindly disposition.

* New interest in the emotions was displayed in the Hellenistic age; sculpture tended towards the realistic and the dramatic. Character-delineation, such as in the sketches of Theophrastus or in the comedy of the period, reveals keen psychological insight, as does the physiognomy of the period. The Physiognomica attributed to Aristotle gives an indication of the methodologies used in antiquity, one of which was to determine a person's character from such obvious characteristics
as his facial expression, a method which had certain pitfalls inherent in it, since similar expressions could be indicative of different dispositions (Arist. [Phgn.], 805a f.).

Within the Stoa Posidonius had a special interest in the subject of characterization, outlining the virtues and the vices and giving their distinguishing marks (EM., 95.65; see also L. Edelstein, "The philosophical system of Posidonius", AJP, LVII (1936), pp. 307-308.)

Seneca recognizes that one's physical appearance can communicate; non opus est te dicere; volitus tuus loquitur (Ben., 6.12.1). The face, of course, occupies a prominent position in such non-verbal ways of communication (cf. Ira, 3.19.2, where the face of Gaius Caesar comes as the climax of a list of instruments of torture; Cic. Off., 1.19.102; Prop., 1.10.23, ingrata fronte; Ben., 6.4.6; Ben., 2.2.2 ... induit sibi animi sui vultum; Ira, 3.13.2 where Seneca urges angry people to relax their exterior in order to have their interior conform to it). The effects of the emotions on one's physical state are frequently described by Seneca (e.g. Ira, 1.1.3-7; Ira, 3.4.1-3).

occasionem petendi abstulit:

Préchac refers to Mart.,2.44; a money lender refuses a request in anticipation of it being made.

varius artibus necessitates properantes elusit:

Cf. Theophr. Char.,1, in which the dissembler avoids borrowers by claiming that he is poor. He pretends not to have heard and seen what he has heard and seen, and conveniently forgets what he has previously agreed to.

distulit:

Préchac points to Mart.,6.20 and 7.43, in which postponement in giving is castigated; a negative reply to a request would be preferable (the same point is made in Ben.,2.5.1 and Ben.,3.8.4). Delay is appropriate if motivated by consideration of the recipient, e.g. his shyness (Ben.,2.1.3).

negavit:

Seneca elsewhere makes much of the distinction between sins of commission (e.g. eripere, auferre) and those of omission (e.g. non dare, negare) and implies that one should not be angry at the latter, which offend more than they damage (Ira,3.28.4); this distinction does
promisit:

A verbal promise could, if the word spondeo were used, constitute a legal contract, stipulatio, which may have been one of the oldest Roman contracts, since it occurs in the XII Tables. This type of contract was upheld by legal actions which did not allow consideration of mitigating circumstances (actiones stricti iuris), and so placed restrictions on transactions, which do not harmonize with Seneca's emphasis on freedom, or willingness in benefits; a stipulatio Seneca regards as a sign of weakness and mistrust (Ben., 3.1.15; on stipulatio see B. Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law, p.159, p.193 f., F. Schulz, Classical Roman Law, p.473, and J. A. Crook, Law and Life of Rome, pp.207-208). Since the donor in our text is so reluctant to give, it is likely he would avoid such a contract as the stipulatio, by answering the question spondesne with promitto.

vix exeuntibus verbis:

Perhaps translated as "inaudible words"; perhaps "slow words" (on which see EM., 40.3); possibly "words choked with anger" (cf. iratus, Ben., 1.1.7).

* Contrast with longis sermonibus ... non invententibus exitum.
Nemo autem libenter debet, quod non acceptit, sed expressit:

Seneca does not here comment on the justification of the lack of gratitude of the recipient: he does state that this behaviour is to be expected. The recipient is usually regarded as inferior to the donor, but not so by the third century Cynic philosopher Teles, who writes:

εγὼ δὲ λαμβάνω εὐθαρσῶς παρὰ σοῦ, οὐχ ὑποκείτων οὔδὲ ἀγεννυζον οὔδὲ μεμφιμοιρῶν

(Stob.,3.38.9).

The sage will purposely forget the injuries he has received in benefits and will not give words or faces a negative interpretation, but will mitigate whatever happens, by giving it a kind interpretation (EM.,81.3; cf. Ira,3.34.1).

expressit:

This contrasts with acceptit which connotes passivity. In the case of expressit the recipient has expended all the effort (hence the donor is said to be in angusto vero comprensum) and has only himself to thank.

superbe:

Pride is one of the works contrary to nature (SVF.,3.102.35 = Stob.,2.93.4); hence the sage is ἄνυβριστος (SVF.,3.152.29 = Stob., 2.110.16).
* For discussions of Stoic doctrines about the emotions see
A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, pp.175-178; J. Rist, Stoic
Philosophy, pp.22-36; M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa, pp.89-92 and 141-152.

Iratus:

For a full treatment of anger consult Seneca's de Ira. Certain
of the marks of anger correspond with the behaviour which causes ingratitude; tristis frons, parum explanatus vocibus sermo praeruptus (Ira, 1.1.364). Anger achieves the destruction of social relations and so
undoes the work of benefits (Ira,1.5.263).

Fatigatus:

Unlike the emotions in superbe and iratus, that in fatigatus
is not an active negative feeling, but even the absence of such an
active feeling is not sufficient for the proper giving of benefits;
an active positive feeling (εὑρίσκεια) must be present.

* Fatigatus is perhaps ironical in its context; in the previous
sentence it is the recipient who expends his effort, in the following
one he is the object of lassavit.

1.1.8 Eodem animo beneficium debetur, quo datur, et ideo non est negle-
genter dandum: sibi enim quisque debet, quod a nesciente accepit; ne
tarde quidem, quia cum omni in officio magni aestimetur dantis voluntas,
qui tarde fecit diu noluit; utique non contumeliose: nam cum ita natura
comparatorum sit, ut altius injuriae quam merita descendant et illa cito
defluant, has tenax memoria custodiat, quid expectat, qui offendit, dum
obligat? Satis adversus illum gratus est, si quis beneficio eius ignoscit.
A benefit is stated to be owed in the same spirit in which it was given and must, therefore, not be given lightly. If the donor is so negligent as to be unaware of the fact that he has conferred a benefit, no obligation is due to him. Tardiness in giving is regarded as an indication that the donor was, for a long time, unwilling to give. Under no circumstances ought one to give insolently, for who does so, creates displeasure at the same time as he creates an obligation. It is natural in this case for the injuries to outweigh the benefits, which, unlike those injuries, are soon forgotten. The man, then, who gives in this manner is shown sufficient gratitude if his benefit is forgiven him.

While Seneca continues the same subject, the causes of ingratitude found in the behaviour of the donor, he varies the tone by turning from describing behaviour to dispensing advice, albeit in negative terms. Rhetoric is here too in evidence, as each of the three negative injunctions is followed by a clause containing a reason for the injunction, each of which is, in turn, longer than the preceding one.

Eodem animo beneficium debetur, quo datur, et ideo non est neglegenter dandum:

The fact that a benefit is owed in the same spirit as it was given is stated as a general rule. It is not always valid, as in the case of those naturally ungrateful (multos ... ingratos, Ben.,1.1.4). Moreover, it can not truly represent the ideal motivation (ideo) for correct giving, since it is to some extent self-serving.

* Cf. Eo animo quidque debetur, quo datur, nec quantum sit, sed a qualı profectum voluntate, perpenditur (EM.,81.6).

* Neglegenter dare is not to choose carefully one's recipients
but to give haphazardly and impulsively and without deliberation (VB., 24.1). Benefits so given are inferior (Cic. Off., 1.15.49).

Negligence is the antonym of willingness (FM., 81.25). Cicero distinguishes negligentia from temeritas, as being at fault unintentionally rather than knowingly (Off., 2.19.68). Such a distinction was also maintained in Roman law (for references see A. E. Wilhelm-Hooijberg, Peccatum, Sin and Guilt in Ancient Rome, pp. 33-34, on conscious and unconscious peccare. Among synonyms for unconscious sinning she gives imprudens, insciens, ignorans; for conscious sinning voluntate, prudens, sponte). See also Ira, 2.28.5 for such states of mind which qualify an act such as self-interest, compulsion, ignorance, wilfulness. Some of these play an important part in some of the questions discussed in the De Beneficiis (e.g. Ben., 2.19.2; Ben., 3.12.3; Ben., 5.7 f; Ben., 5.12 f.).

sibi enim quisque debet, quod a nesciente accepit:

Seneca means to say that the recipient is not indebted to the donor, if the latter was not aware he was bestowing the benefit upon that particular recipient; later Seneca will have occasion to argue that it is impossible to give oneself a benefit and be grateful to oneself (Ben., 5.7.1-5.11.6).

ne tarde quidem, quia cum omni in officio magni aestimetur dantis voluntas, qui tarde fecit diu noluit:

Cf. tarde velle nolentis est (Ben., 2.5.4); it may be more of
a service to refuse quickly than to give slowly (Ben.,4.8.4);
no act which is not voluntary can be virtuous (EM.,66.16).

* Officium, a service performed for someone who has some right to it, is probably used deliberately because the dilatory attitude of the donor has made it less than a benefit, which is always in all aspects morally correct (Ben.,1.6.2).

* The concept of will (voluntas) is of critical importance in Seneca's theory of benefits (see Ben.,1.5.5 f.). In the context of our text it is associated with action; its opposite, noluit, with inaction.

natura:

It has long been recognized that the Stoics used the concept of nature in two senses, one referring to universal nature which has an axiological sense, another referring to the nature of an individual, which has a psychological sense (see E. Holler, Seneca und die Seelenteilungslehre und Affectspychologie der Mittleren Stoa, p.14-15; M. Pohlenz, Antikes Führertum, p.12; I. G. Kidd, "The Relation of Stoic Intermediates to the Summun Bonum, with Reference to Change in the Stoa", CQ, N.S. I (1955), p.194). One can therefore speak of the natural vice of an individual (Ira, 2.10.6-7; Ben.,3.14.4); in fact it is the Stoics' task to overcome the nature of man (BV.,14.2). Yet Seneca can also claim that anger is not natural, i.e. it is contrary to nature (in the axiological sense; Ira, 1.6.5). In our text therefore it can be natural, in the case of certain individuals, for the
injuries to outweigh the kindnesses; at the same time it is possible for such a state of affairs not to be recommended, since the good man will regard the benefits as more important than the injuries (EM., 81.6 & 8 & 17).

**injuriae:**

These are the opposites of benefits (Ben., 4.15.1); as a legal term they described initially physical violence, but developed to include other assaults upon one's dignitas (J. A. Crook, Law and Life of Rome, p. 250). They are distinguished from benefits, not by results but by intention, since the important question is not what a dart hit, but at what it was aimed (Ben., 6.8.3; on the dart comparison see Antipater's distinction between ἔλος and σχονος discussed in M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa, p. 188-9 and A. Long, "Carneades and the Stoic Telos", Phronesis, 12 (1967), 59-90). Different rules govern the repaying of benefits and injuries. For it is not honourable to repay injuries with injuries, although benefits are repaid by benefits; in this it is shameful to be outdone, in that to outdo (Ira, 2.32.1; cf. Ben., 6.5.1-2).

altius ... descendant:

Forgetting benefits and remembering injuries is characteristic of the ingrates (EM., 81.23, where we may also have an interpretation of how the nature of our text functions, when Seneca states that the ingrate mentally expands and increases the injuries).
tenax memoria:

The concept of memory is important to Seneca's theory of benefits (cf. Cic. Acad., 2.7.22, for another statement of its importance). In a tradition traceable to Demosthenes' De Corona 269, it is regarded as the instrument which can suppress one set of facts, those which serve one's own interest, in favour of another set, those which serve another's interest. It thus serves as an important tool in the furthering of an altruistic attitude, a clear statement of which is found in Ben., 2.10.4, that for the two parties involved in a benefit the law (lex beneficii) is, that one ought to forget immediately that he has given a benefit, the other never ought to forget that he has received it (the rigor of this principle is modified in Ben., 7.22). The memory is not always correctly used however; forgetting benefits received is characteristic of the most ungrateful of the four types of ingrates (Ben., 3.1.3, where memoria is discussed at some length; cf. EM., 81.24-25 for the differing ways in which evil men and the wise remember). A cause of such a lapse of memory is novorum cupiditas (Ben., 3.3.2; cf. cupiditas accipiendorum, EM., 81.28). The concept of memoria is relevant too in the question of whether it is right to remind someone of a benefit (Ben., 5.22 f.; see the commentary on repetere, Ben., 1.1.3).

* Cf. Ben., 7.28.2 where, instead of being tenacious, the memory (of benefits) is described as a fragile vessel (imprimis vas fragile).
ignoscit:

A pardon for a benefit is a surprising, if not paradoxical, reward for a benefit, but it is prepared for by the previous sentence.

* The sentence indicates that a benefit is not always owed in the same spirit in which it was given, a general rule stated by Seneca at the beginning of this section.

1.1.9 Non est autem, quod tardiores faciat ad bene merendum turba ingratorum. Nam primum, ut dixi, nos illam augmentem; deinde ne deos quidem immortales ab hac tam effusa nec cessante benignitate sacrilegi neglegentesque eorum deterrent: utuntur natura sua et cuncta interque illa ipsos munera suorum malos interpretes iuvant. Nos sequamur duces, quantum humana inbecillitas patitur; demus beneficia, non feneremus. Dignus est decipi, qui de recipiendo cogitavit, cum daret. 1.1.10 At male cesserit. Et liberi et coniuges spem fefellerunt, tamen et educamus et ducimus, adeoque adversum experimenta pertinentes sumus, ut bella victi et naufragi maria repetamus. Quanto magis permanere in dandis beneficiis decent! quae si quis non dat, quia non recept, dedit, ut recipere, bonamque ingratorum facit causam, quibus turpe est non reddere, si licet. 1.1.11 Quam multi indigni luce sunt! tamen dies oritur. Quam multi, quod nati sunt, queruntur! tamen natura subolem novam gignit ipsosque, qui non fuisse mallent, esse patitur.

There is no reason why the great number of ingrates should make donors more hesitant to give. In the first place, donors are responsible for increasing that number; in the second place, the gods are not deterred from exercising their generous and never-ending kindness by those who ignore them or by the sacrilegious: they are true to their nature and extend their aid to all, including those whose explanation of their gifts is incorrect. Let us follow the example of the gods, in so far as human frailty allows; let us give our benefits, not merely
lend them. He, who turns his thoughts to remuneration, even while he gives, deserves to be cheated. Apprehensions about the (financial) consequences of the advice proffered are countered by analogies from domestic and public life, where, in fact, the advice of persistence after disappointments is already followed. How much more appropriate it is in the giving of benefits, where it represents the only alternative to giving for a return, which gives recipients just cause to be ungrateful, although normally it is morally reprehensible not to return. Nature gives her gifts of day-light and life to those who are unworthy or unwilling recipients.

In this section Seneca continues giving advice, but no longer in terms of the negation of undesirable qualities (e.g. non est neglegenter dandum); he sounds a more positive note by urging imitation of the gods. To support his position he draws upon analogies which cover a wide scope. This becomes apparent when we consider that these analogies reflect the areas of life represented by comedy, history and philosophy (children and spouses, battles, and nature respectively).

The exhortation to imitate the gods is central to this section of the text and requires discussion prior to the commentary. It has been remarked that those parts of the De Beneficiis which consist of an apologia on behalf of the gods may well reflect Seneca's own interest in the divine (M. Sonntag, L. Annaei Senecae de Beneficiis Libri Explanantur, p.8, who, pointing out that Seneca joined theology to ethics rather than to physics, thereby gives the impression that the connection between the gods and the giving of benefits is a novel
one). The association between the gods and benefits, however, is one of long standing. The role the gods play in the De Beneficiis as example of an attitude which goes beyond the demands of legal rights is akin to the ancient function of religion to protect strangers who in Greece were beyond the protection of legal rights (on this function see H. Lloyd-Jones, The Justice of Zeus, p.166, n.21). The gods were hailed as givers of good things (Hom. Od., 8.325; Hes. Theog.,46; Arist. EN.,1162a5) and the Stoa did not demur, but acknowledged that the gods were benefactors (ευεργετικός καὶ φιλανθρώπος, SVF.,2.323.35 = Plut. Stoic. repugn.,c.38, p.1051e; cf. SVF.,3.249.14 & 18 = Plut. Stoic. repugn.,c.38; Cic. ND.,2.64).

That in benefaction man could most closely approach god was oft stated (e.g. Cic.Lig.,38; see H. Bolkestein, Een geval van sociaal-ethisch syncretisme,p.19; H. Bolkestein, Wohltätigkeit und Armenpflege, p.434 & 173, where he refers to the extensive collection of texts in L. Sternbach, "De gnomologio vaticano inedito", WS,9 (1887), p.199 ff.). In the Hellenistic world the concept of philanthropia, originally used of the feelings the gods had for men, came to be used of the feeling of man (i.e. ruler) for men, and so imitation, of a sort, of the gods was occurring (see J. Ferguson, Moral Values in the Ancient World, p.104, for references).

But the gods are connected with the subject of benefits in still another way; they are the recipients of piety (εὔσεβεία), which is classed as part of the same virtue which governs benefits, justice (see Arist. VV.,1250 b 22; SVF.,3.64.24 = Stob.,2.60.23). It is not surprising then that the gods should play a prominent role in the
de Beneficiis (occurrences at 2.1; 2.29-30; 4.3-9; 4.19; 4.25; 4.31-32; 5.17; 6.23; 7.4; 7.7; 7.15; 7.31). With the money-lenders they form the poles of a contrast between right and wrong giving (Ben.,3.15.4; Ben.,4.3.3) and mention of them and of money-lending in our text leads naturally into more extensive treatment of the commercial attitude towards giving (Ben.,1.2.3; see also Arist. EE.,1243b12, for a contrast between the benevolent attitude of a god and the commercial attitude of the seller and the lender).

The exact relationship between man and the gods with special reference to the possibility of imitating the gods successfully is not fixed. As in Aristotle there are contradictory statements regarding the analogy between god and man (cf. EE.,1244b8 and MM.,1212b34), so in Seneca there are differing statements. We read that god is far superior to man (QN.,1.pr.) and that reason is perfect in God and perfectible in man (EM.,92.27). Yet for man there is the possibility of change; he can leave the class of dumb animals and approach god (EM.,124.21 & 23), and can achieve this through philosophy (EM.,48.11). In fact man can even take precedence over god in that man can rise above the enduring of evil, while god is not in the position to do so (Prov.,6.6; cf. EM.,53.12).

In the de Beneficiis the traditional view that man is second to the gods is maintained (Ben.,2.29.2; Ben.,7.2.2). It is difficult, however, to reconcile Seneca's simplistic concept of a god who is a beneficent father swayed by prayer, with the more sophisticated Stoic doctrine of fate, pantheism and materialistic monism (see W. J. Richards, Gebed by Seneca die Sto'lsyn, pp.174-182).
Nam primum, ut dixi, nos illam augemus:

The statement was previously made in Ben., 1.1.4.

* The implication of the argument is that, since donors increased the numbers, they can also decrease it.

ne deos quidem immortalis:

The gods of mythology were accepted by the Stoics as allegorizations of various forms of nature (Cic. ND., 2.23.60). It was the Stoics' duty to worship them under the name bestowed on them by custom (Cic., ND., 2.28.71; cf. Ben., 4.7; EM., 95.47).

* The element of surprise contained in "not even the immortal gods are deterred" may acknowledge that the assertion runs counter to a common conception of deity as vengeful and punishing, if a contract with it were broken (cf. Ben., 3.17, where the ingrate is haunted by fear of the gods; Ben., 4.19.1).

ab hac tam effusa nec cessante benignitate:

Hac need not refer to something already mentioned, but could mean "that which is present, that which is experienced even now, in spite of sacrilege".

* The reading of MS N, necessitate in place of nec cessante benignitate, is possible, although perhaps a bit forced, for "generous necessity", i.e. generosity to which the gods are obliged, because as Seneca
goes on to say, they are true to their own nature. Seneca points out (Ben., 6.23) that the gods can not change their minds because it does not please them to depart from the right course; hence this inability is not a sign of weakness.

* Unceasing kindness is appropriate for gods who are immortal. Seneca often uses traditional expressions about the gods; at other times he expresses the more typical Stoic view that the gods are confounded at the end of the world except for Juppiter, who retires into himself and gives himself over to his own thought (EM., 9.16; cf. Ben. 6.22, for a similar description of the cataclysm attending the final conflagration of the world).

* See also Cic. ND., 2.29.73 f. for the providential nature of the gods. The divine attribute of benefaction was not unanimously accepted in antiquity; Seneca treats the Epicurean objection non dat deus beneficia in Ben., 4.4.1 f. The difficulty raised by the fact that god lets the sun shine for the wicked, i.e. indiscriminate giving (Ben., 4.26.1) is answered in Ben., 4.28.1 f. On another question, whether divine care extends to individuals (affirmatively answered Cic. ND., 2.65.164), Seneca is more hesitant (interdum incuriosi singulorum, EM., 95.50; cf. Prov., 3.1, where he states the gods care more for mankind than for individual men).

sacrilegi neglegentesque eorum:

Two distinct categories of individuals, each with a distinct affront to the gods are mentioned; the first is the man who attempts to injure the gods (Ben., 7.7.3), the second, perhaps the atheist, or
the Epicurean, who does not thank the gods for benefits received.  
* The fact that the sacrilegious went unpunished was used as an argument against divine providence (Cic. ND., 2.33.81).

\[ \text{utuntur natura sua:} \]

\[ \text{Cf. EM., 95.49, Quae causa est dis bene faciendi? natura.} \]
\[ \text{Errat si quis illos putat nocere nolle: non possunt.} \]

* \[ \text{Sua is reminiscent of Panaetius' individualistic interpretation of the Stoic dictum secundum naturam vivere (cf. Cic. Off., 1.31.110, sic enim est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus, ea tamen conservata propriam nostram sequamur, ...).} \]

\[ \text{cuncta interquie illa ipsos munerum suorum malos interpretes iuvent:} \]

For \[ \text{cuncta cf. prodesse omnibus (used of the gods, Cic. ND., 2.25.64).} \]

* \[ \text{Interpretes is used by Cicero (ND., 2.4.12) of those who interpret the will of the gods by studying the entrails of animals; in our text it includes the sacrilegious and those who neglect god, both of whom respond incorrectly to the gifts of the gods. Also included could be those who dispute with the gods about a gift, saying that they did not give it with the recipients specifically in mind (Ben., 6.23.7), and those who complain about the gifts of the gods, after} \]
turning them into their opposites (QN.,5.18.13). But Seneca may also have so-called philosophers in mind, whom he calls iniqui divinorum munera aestimatores (Ben.,2.29.1). The argument there makes it clear Seneca is referring to Epicureans, who deprived the gods of the ability to give, and claimed, therefore, that they received no divine benefits (Ben.,4.19.2 & 3).

Hos sequamur duces:

This is a common injunction (cf. the Platonic δικων φιλότητα Θεία Pl. Tht.,176b) and is attributed to Zeno (SVF.,1.46-9; cf. VB.,15.5, where it is called a vetus praeceptum). In Ben.,4.25.1 it is linked to the Stoic dictum secundum rerum naturam vivere (Ben.,4.25.1). It is usually interpreted as a command to use reason (ratio) but can, secondarily, refer to reason employed in such specific activities as beneficence, or clemency (Clem.,1.7.1).

Humana imbecillitas:

See the introductory note to this section for the relationship between god and man, and the possibility of successful imitation.

demus beneficia, non feneremus:

The rejection of the commercial treatment of benefits was old, occurring in Aristotle (EN.,1167b29; cf. Cic. Lael.,9.31); and it must
have been common, since Terence has a play on the word, *faeneratum istuc beneficium tibi pulchre dices* (Phorm.,493).

* See further Ben., 1.2.3.

**Dignus est decipi:**

A. Bourgery, *Sénèque Prosateur*, p.358, points out Seneca's usage of *dignus* with the infinitive (not a classical prose construction).

**At male cesserit:**

This curt phrase is puzzling. It could refer to the grammatical subject of the previous sentence, and mean that it will be a bad thing if he shall have ceased giving, the point being that deception is inevitable, but giving should nonetheless continue. It could also be translated: "Suppose that it turned out badly" (concessive subjunctive of the verb used impersonally; cf. Hor. *Sat.*, 2.1.31; Const. *Sap.*, 2.18.4), the reference being to the sentence in which Seneca advocates giving benefits rather than lending them. Seneca then anticipates the objection to this advice (*occupatio*), and counters it by pointing to other areas where failure is met with persistence.

* Cf. Ben., 4.39.2, *si foro cesserit*, which means "if he goes bankrupt". There is a slight possibility of a play on *cesserit* in our text.
liberi et coniuges:

See Ben., 3.11.1 f., where the situation of a donor of benefits is seen as not at all parallel to the position of a parent.

experimenta:

The wise man counts every injury useful, for through them he tests himself (experimentum sui capit), and tries his virtue (Ira, 1.9.3). See also EM., 66.5 & 37 f. on virtue displayed in adverse circumstances. Whether or not this was preferable to virtue displayed in favorable circumstances was a controversial point within the Stoa (EM., 67.5; cf. EM., 66.49–53).

naufragi maria repetamus:

Seneca uses the same example at the beginning of his epistle on benefits to advocate persistence in giving (EM., 81.2); but himself Seneca describes as a far from persistent sailor (EM., 53.2–5). F. Husner, Leib und Seele in der Sprache Senecas, p. 66, n. 3, points out that ship-similes, especially those with the motif of shipwreck, were very common in Hellenistic times.

* The sentence referring to domestic and other parallels for persistence is interposed between the theological/philosophical arguments and by pointing to what has already been achieved adds a
more positive note than the philosophical arguments which contain
pessimistic touches (humana imbécillitas, indigni luce).

indigni luce sunt! tamen dies oritur.

Cf. the metaphorical use of the same image; the greatest gift
which we have from nature is the fact that virtue allows its light
into the minds of all, - even those who do not follow virtue see it
(Ben.,4.17.4).

multi, quod nati sunt, queruntur!

Cf. Illud, quod natus sum, per se intuere, quale sit:
animadvertis exiguum et incertum et boni malique communem materiam,
sine dubio primum ad omnia gradum, sed non ideo maiorem omnibus, quia
primus est (Ben.,3.30.2; see also Ben.,3.30.4, where the value of life
as a gift is minimized). Although life was classified as one of the
indifferents (EM.,82.10), the Stoics were not so disdainful of it as
to despise it utterly; suicide should be attempted only in special
circumstances (EM.,24.24) and mere dissatisfaction is not among them
(IA.,2.15).

natura subolem novam gignit:

On the gifts of nature see Ben.,2.29; Ben.,4.28.11; Ben.,6.23.5 f.
The point made about nature is the same as that made about the immortal gods, but whereas that was made on the level of allegorization, this is basic Stoic theology (cf. Ben.,5.8.2, where Seneca asserts the identity of god and nature in answer to an Epicurean objection that benefits are received from nature not from god).

1.1.12 Hoc et magni et boni proprium est, non fructum beneficiorum sequi, sed ipsa et post malos quoque bonum quaerere. Quid magnifici erat multis prodesse, si nemo deciperet? nunc est virtus dare beneficia non utique reditura, quorum a viro egregio statim fructus perceptus est.

1.1.13 Adeo quidem ista res fugare nos et pigriores ad rem pulcherrimam facere non debet, ut, si spes mihi praecidatur gratum hominem reperiendi, malum non recipere beneficiam quam non dare, quia, qui non dat, vitium ingrati antecedit. Dicam, quod sentio: qui beneficium non reddit, magis peccat; qui non dat, citius.

It is characteristic of a great and noble soul not to pursue the rewards of benefits but the benefits themselves, and after experiences with base men also to seek the good man. There would be nothing high-minded in providing services to many, if no-one were cheated. As it is, it is a virtue to give benefits which will not come back under any conditions, - benefits whose fruit is tasted at once by the good man. Indeed so true is it that concern about rewards ought not to frighten donors nor increase their aversion for a most beautiful act, that, even if all hope of finding a good man were taken away, not receiving a benefit would be preferable to not giving one, on the grounds that the vice of the one who does not give precedes the vice of the ingrate. What it means is this: he who does not
return a benefit, sins more gravely, - he who does not give, sooner.

The content of this section is similar to parts of the fourth book in which the question is discussed whether giving benefits and being grateful are to be sought after for their own sake or not. Despite the positive answers, there are also statements which seem to urge minimizing the risk involved in giving, notably by the careful selection of recipients (Ben.,4.11). These positions are never completely harmonized (see also the commentary on Ben.,1.10.5). It will suffice here to observe the emphasis Seneca puts on the risk in giving; one must give with loss and danger to oneself (Ben.,4.12.2). Risk, in fact, is the most splendid element of a benefit (Ben.,3.7.1), and is such an integral part, that if it is absent, a benefit is not truly a benefit (Ben.,5.11.3). Risk furthermore involves no fault (culpa) on the part of the giver, if he is cheated by the recipient (Ben.,4.34.2).

magni animi:

The Stoic virtue of magnitudo animi (μεγαλοψυχία), which is part of the virtue of courage (άρετή), is concerned primarily with being superior to and despising external goods and the injuries they cause (SVF.,3.64.37 = Stob.2.60.22; SVF.,3.65.10 = DL.,7.92; Clem.,1.5.5; Cic. Off.,1.18.61). This rerum externarum despicientia, as Cicero terms it, strives to do difficult, laborious, and dangerous tasks (Cic. Off.,1.20.66) and can be related to beneficence and

**bonum quaerere:**

The context favours the translation "to seek a good man"; the words could mean to seek the good (cf. Summum bonum extrinsecus instrumenta non quaerit, EM., 9.15).

**nunc est virtus dare beneficia non utique reditura:**

To do well (εὐεργετῶν) is included under actions performed correctly (κατορθώματα; SVF., 3.136.20 = Stob., 2.96.21), which are therefore virtuous (for the technical aspects, see the commentary on Ben., 1.6.2, beneficium utique bonum est).

* Utique means "under all conditions" (cf. Ben., 1.6.2; Ben., 7.16.3); non utique, frequent only in post-Augustan writers (Lewis & Short, s.v.), means, therefore, "not under any circumstances".

**a vire egregio statim fructus perceptus est:**

The reward is in the act itself; cf. Ut enim benefici liberalesque sumus, non ut exigamus gratiam (neque enim beneficium faeneramur, sed natura propensi ad liberalitatem sumus), sic amicitiam non spe mercedis adducti, sed quod omnis eius fructus in ipso amore inest, expetendam putamus (Cic. Lael., 9.31). This state-
ment of Cicero is criticized by a sophistic rhetorician, who protests the fact that Cicero seeks confirmation regarding the motivation of friendship from the example of beneficent and generous people, since the motivation of beneficence is itself still a moot point; in most cases this motivation is the desire for a return of gratitude, - very rarely do benevolence and generosity please for their own sake (Gell. NA.,17.5.2 f.; Gellius, in turn, criticizes the rhetorician).

* In Ben.,2.33 Seneca mentions a triple fruit: one is the consciousness of a benefit, another is the glory of it, the third is one of utility, i.e. gratitude, pecuniary compensation etc.

* As with good deeds, so with evil ones, the reward, i.e. punishment, lies primarily in the crime itself (Ira,3.26.2; cf. EM., 87.25; EM.,97.14).

**qui non dat, vitium ingrati antecedit:**

Although Seneca only mentions the chronological priority of the donors' fault, implicit in his criticism is also the suggestion that the donor provides, if not the efficient, the antecedent cause for the ingrate's vice.

**qui beneficium non reddit, magis peccat; qui non dat citius.**

Seneca is fond of employing such a rhetorical **sententia** to close a paragraph; cf. **prope est enim, ut libenter damnet, qui cito;**
prope est, ut inique puniat, qui nimis (Clem., 1.1.14).

* Cf. EM., 81.4, Plus nocuit, sed prius profuit; itaque habeatur et temporis ratio.
CHAPTER TWO

When to a crowd benefits to scatter, you decide,
Many must be lost, so that one may abide.

In the first line of the verse, two elements deserve censure, for (a) benefits are not be be poured out upon a crowd, and (b) prodigality of anything, least of all of benefits, is not honourable. If from the giving of benefits we take away the element of discernment, the benefits cease to be benefits and randomly acquire some other name. The second line of the verse is quite extraordinary, since it eases the loss of many benefits with one benefit which has been well placed. As a matter of fact, it may be more valid, and more appropriate for the magnanimity of the benefactor, that we urge him to bestow benefits, even if he will not give a single one a good placement. For it is not true that many benefits must be lost; not a one of them is wasted, since he who loses one, has been keeping a count of them. The bookkeeping of benefits is straightforward: one only pays out; if a benefit is going to bring any return, it is counted as gain, but if it is not, no loss occurs. The benefit was given for no other reason than that a benefit be given. In the case of benefits no-one will make an entry into a debt-book, nor will a greedy demander dun for the day of payment. The good man never gives the benefits he has bestowed any thought, unless he is reminded by the recipient returning a favour; else he turns into some kind of
creditor. It is base usury to enter a benefit in the books as an expense. Whatever has happened to previous benefits, persist in bestowing benefits on others; it is preferable that they lie dormant with the ungrateful, whom shame, opportunity, or someone's example will be able to turn grateful. Above all, don't cease, complete your task and perform the duty of a good man. Help one with goods, another with protection, another with political influence, another with advice, still another with salutary precepts. Even wild beasts sense their obligations, nor is any animal so wild, that care does not soothe it and transform it to love this attention. Their trainers handle the jaws of lions with impunity, and provisions lay such an obligation on fierce elephants that they become slavishly compliant; to such a degree does the persistence of constant benefits overwhelm even creatures which are not capable of understanding and evaluating benefits. Is someone ungrateful over against one benefit? He will not be so over against a second; did he forget two? By a third he will be led to remember the ones he has forgotten.

1.2.1 Beneficia in vulgus cum largiri institueris, Perdenda sunt multa, ut semel ponas bene. In priore versu utrumque reprehendas; nam nec in vulgum effundenda sunt, et nullius rei, minime beneficiorum, honesta largitio est; quibus si detraxeris iudicium, desinunt esse beneficia, in alijt quodlibet incident nomen. 1.2.2 Sequens sensus mirificus est, qui uno bene posito beneficio multorum amissorum damna solatur. Vide, oro te, ne hoc et verius sit et magnitudini bene facientis aptius, ut illum hortemur ad danda, etiam si nullum bene positurus est. Illut enim falsum est "perdenda sunt multa"; nullum perit, quia, qui perdit, computaverat.
According to a comic poet, when a decision is taken to scatter benefits to the crowd, many must be lost, in order to place well even one. But two things are wrong with this assertion: in the first place, it is wrong to give to a crowd; secondly, hand-outs, especially those of benefits, are immoral. For, if you take away from benefits the element of consideration, benefits cease to be such; they may be called by any other name. That part of the poet's lines which speaks of compensation for the loss of many benefits by one well-placed is good, but does not go far enough, since it is more in keeping with a benefactor's magnanimity that he be encouraged to give, even if no benefit is well-placed. When the poet speaks of the necessity of losing many benefits, he is certainly wrong, because it betrays a bookkeeper's attitude to benefits.

Within this section Seneca touches upon two defects in giving which correspond to the two Aristotelian deviations from the mean, those of excess and deficiency, found in the profligacy associated with the word largitio (see the commentary below), and the meanness of the commercial attitude towards benefits. If by largitio Seneca means some form of public donatives or largesses, we may have, instead of the excess of liberality, a substitute in the excess of munificence, discussion of which follows that of liberality in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, and which differs from it only in this respect that it is concerned with larger amounts of money (EN., 1122a22). It includes such items as public games (EN., 1122b22). The end result of this substitution is that the respective polarities of the defects
seem even further apart.

It is appropriate to recall some of Aristotle's pronouncements on the subject under discussion. Aristotle has a much fuller treatment than Seneca of prodigality (ἀμοιβᾶ) and meanness (ἀνελευθερία; EN., 1119b28 f.). Individuals in each class he subdivides into various kinds; the prodigal man is either given over to unregulated spending, or - more interesting because of Seneca's subsequent reference to bookkeeping - he can not stand the annoyance of calculation (τὴν ἀπὸ λογισμοῦ λύπην, EE., 1232a18). The truly liberal man, on the other hand, will not neglect his property, and he will not give to whoever happens along, in order that he may be able to give to the proper persons and at the right time and place (EN., 1120b3). As a result of his vice, the prodigal man lacks even necessities, whereas the liberal man gives what he has left over (EE., 1232a10). One type of illiberal man does not give (ὁ εἰδωλος), another with a great deal of effort gives small sums (κιμβίξ), yet another is so devoted to gain as to accept it from every source (αισχροκερδής; EE., 1232a13; WW., 1251b4; cf. EN., 1121b21 f. for a slightly different grouping). The last type is for our purposes especially interesting, since included in a list of those who exhibit such love of gain is a group recognizable also in Seneca's discussion, usurers who lend small amounts for large profits (τοις τοῖς κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῷ EN., 1121b34). Also relevant for our text, especially Ben., 1.2.3, is that Aristotle states of the illiberal man that he cheats by false reckoning (παραλογίστης, EE., 1232a14).
E. Albertini, *La Composition dans les Ouvrages Philosophiques de Sénèque*, p.271, remarks that the commentary on the verses of a comic poet, which according to him extends as far as *Ben.*,1.3.1, follows upon the first chapter without any link. We may note, however, that the progression of the argument is, if not as explicit as it could be, not without its logic. Two main topics of the beginning of the second chapter, *largitio* and *feneratio*, are associated with the topic of imitation of the gods. The beneficence of the gods is sometimes falsely regarded as indiscriminate giving to large numbers (*largitio*; see *Ben.*,4.26.1 and *Ben.*,4.28.1 f.), and the kind of virtuous giving recommended at the conclusion of the first chapter can likewise be so regarded (*Ben.*,4.9.2 f.), so that a rejection of *largitio* in the second chapter is not out of order. In addition, the beneficence of the gods is not only traditionally contrasted with the practices of commerce but this contrast has already appeared in *Ben.*,1.1.9; the subject *feneratio* is therefore reintroduced quite naturally.

*Beneficia in vulgus cum largiri institueris,*
*Ferdenda sunt multa, ut semel ponas bene:*

The lines are listed in O. Ribbeck, *Scenicae Romanorum Poesis Fragmenta*, vol. 2, 3rd ed., p.149, as those of an anonymous comic poet. The vocabulary does not point to an early date; this would concur with the judgment of A. Bourgery, *Sénèque Prosateur*, p.23-4, that Seneca
did not possess a good knowledge of Latin literature prior to the Ciceronian period.

**In priore versu utrumque reprehendas:**

The two items worthy of censure in the first line of the verse are bestowing benefits on crowds (*in vulgus*) and the kind of bestowing done (*largiri*), although there is a common element to both, lack of proper consideration of the recipient.

**In vulgum:**

Seneca changes the gender from the one used in the verse.

* The word *vulgus* may carry an accessory idea of contempt (Lewis and Short, II.8); Seneca often expresses disdain for the crowd (see A. L. Motto, *Seneca Sourcebook*, p.56-57, for references). It is not so much the contempt of the Roman privileged and powerful, as the Stoic belief that the sage was a rare phenomenon, and perforce, most people fools. At times Seneca urges fleeing the crowd and its influence (e.g. *EM.*,7); at other times he stresses that tranquillity is not dependent on place or circumstances, but on one's state of mind (e.g. *EM.*,55.8; *EM.*,56.3 f.). It may be the crowd's inability to distinguish false from true goods, which include benefits (*EM.*, 81.27-31; *EM.*,118.7-8; *EM.*,74.6-9), which makes it wrong to give to it. However, giving to the crowd presents an even greater danger to the donor, that of giving negligently (see *neglegenter*, *Ben.*,1.1.8)
by failing to take seriously the choosing of recipients. It is not enough to give to humanity instead of to a human (Ben., 4.29.3), and a gift bestowed upon anyone, not per se, but qua member of a group, does not make this recipient a debtor (Ben., 6.19.5).

nullius rei ... honesta largitio est:

The adjective honesta, a Stoic technical term, denotes moral perfection or virtue; honestum is the perfect good, by contact with which other things also become good, as, when military service or the administration of justice are performed well, they become good (EM., 118.10 & 11). According to Seneca's statement at this point in our text largitio can apparently not under any circumstances become good (but cf. Ben., 1.14.2 where a proper largitio is described).

* What largitio might mean is evident from Cic. Off., 2.15.52 ff. He states that there are two kinds of beneficence and generosity, one of personal service, the other of money. The latter is termed largitio. Since it is said to deplete the very source of generosity, Cicero must have substantial sums in mind. The example which follows, a donative given by Alexander the Great to the Macedonians to buy their good-will, and called corruption by his father Phillip, illustrates the additional meaning which largitio sometimes has, bribery (cf. Cic. Off., 2.6.21). Cicero does not want to dispense with largitio altogether; it must be moderated, although many spend their patrimony by unchecked spending (inconsulti largiendo). His readers are urged by Cicero to remember the much-quoted proverb that largesses have no

Cicero resumes with a discussion of the prodigal man (prodigus), but, since he identifies him with the largitor (Cat., 4.5.10), his remarks continue to be relevant to our theme. The prodigal men pour their money on banquets, public distributions of meat, gladiatorial exhibitions, and the magnificence of public games and hunting spectacles. Cicero expresses surprise at Theophrastus' approval of such expenditure and himself approves of Aristotle's criticism of it. But political realism forces Cicero to concede that a largitio, if wrong, may at times be necessary and useful (*Off.*, 2.17.58 & 60; see also J. Hellegouarc'h, *Le Vocabulaire Latin des Relations et des Partis Politiques sous la République*, pp. 219-221: he states that largitio is used of the act of the man who spreads his fortune far and wide, that his gifts are selfish and given, in the political sense, to gain political debtors, gratiae. He adds that the meaning of largitio is normally pejorative).

* *Largitio*, then, means the kind of limitless giving which lacks moderation, and which Seneca would prohibit (*Ben.*, 1.15.3). One instance when it is proper occurs when, in spite of the fact that the recipient is not the only one to receive the gift, he is made to feel that he is the only one (*Ben.*, 1.14.2).

* *quibus si dextraxeris iudicium, desinunt esse beneficia, in aliat quodlibet nomen.*

To have been given with judgment is the best part of a benefit
(Ben., 1.15.6). Since giving with judgment is opposed to haphazard and impetuous giving (Ben., 1.15.1) it is nothing other than reason (ratio) which consists of the proper consideration of the numeri (see p. 8; another synonym is sensus communis, Ben., 1.12.3). Since such judgment is normally not fully carried out in a largitio, it is not surprising that giving in this manner is not virtuous.

* A change in moral status can entail a change of name; ... sciant omnia praeter virtutem mutare nomen, modo mala fieri, modo bona (EM., 95.35; EM., 114.24; cf. VB., 11.3; Ira, 1.9.3; but some things, morally immutable, such as virtue, or the divine, can have several names, corresponding to different functions, Ben., 4.8.1 ff.; cf. Const. Sap. 3.1, where Stoic paradoxes are said to make common statements mutatis rerum nominibus). In the case of beneficium, the prefix, which has moral connotations (see Ben., 1.6.2), is not applicable to largitio, and, because it is such an integral part of the noun, and can not simply be dropped, requires a complete change of name (but cf. Arist. EN., 1120a28, he who gives to whom he ought not, or gives, not for the sake of virtue, but for some other reason, will not be called liberal but something else).

* Two possible translations, one with incidere, the other with incidere, suggest themselves. The first of these would be "they will inscribe their name under any other heading; they will come as a different entry". This translation anticipates the references to accounting found in Ben., 1.2.3. The meaning of nomen is extended to "credit rating" (EM., 119.1), "account", or "entry in that account",
"debtor" or "debt" (Ben., 5.22.1; Ben., 7.29.2; see also A. Palmer's commentary on Hor. Sat., 2.1.16; G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, "Greek and Roman Accounting", Studies in the History of Accounting p. 46-7). In a pun Seneca may be expressing that the subtraction of reason from benefits reduces the benefit to a commercial loan, so that a different entry must be made for it, or, it becomes a different entry. This reading is not impossible; incidere with accusative is not uncommon (Plin. Pan., 1.7.16; Liv., 3.57; Cic. Phil., 1.10.26; one drawback is that these refer to incisions in bronze); moreover incidere with nomen is frequent (e.g. Cic. ad Fam., 13.36.1). The personification of beneficia is startling, but poetic devices are part and parcel of Silver Latin prose.

The second translation would be "they fall into, or under, any other name". This version is preferable, since a parallel is found in Ben., 4.13.2, where in ingrati nomen incidet means "he will be called ungrateful". Such falling into a name, or category, is appropriate of the fool and his actions, since his stumbling into mistakes is described with the same verb (Ira, 3.24.4; cf. EM., 37.4 & 5).

* Seneca showed great interest in precision of speech (see Ch. Smiley, "Seneca and the Stoic theory of literary Style", Univ. of Wisconsin Studies in Lang. and Lit. III (1919), p. 59, who refers to EM., 81.9; EM., 102.15; EM., 102.17; EM., 110.3; Ira, 1.4.1; QN., 2.12.1, where Seneca makes distinctions between near synonyms). Seneca may have been interested in nomenclature because of Stoic doctrine which
posited a close relationship between things and the words which denote them (on this, see A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, p.131 ff.).

* Nomen receives further attention in the section on the Graces (Ben.,1.3.6-10).

sensus:

For the post-Augustan meaning, "sentence", cf. Quint. Inst., 9.4.61; Inst.,7.10.16.

mirificus:

After expressing approval of the second line of the verse, Seneca immediately qualifies it by his intention to introduce something even more valid. This leads him to reject part of what he previously terms mirificus as falsum. By rejecting the second sentence of the verse, which in itself goes beyond the contractual notion of giving for a return, Seneca takes up an even more extreme position, although he does so cautiously (Vide oro te ne ...). The second part of the second line of the verse is corrected first (etiam si nullum bene positurus est), but with the compensation consisting of one well-placed benefit removed, a comment on perdenda becomes necessary (see the commentary on nullum perit below).
**solatur:**

This word indicates that receiving no return for benefits is still felt as a loss, a regret which is present in the verse itself (perdenda) and is shared by those who complain about such a loss (Ben., 1.1.1).

**bene facientis:**

This denotes the man who gives a beneficium; he must be distinguished from aliquid boni faciens, who performs a good deed (= officium), which falls short of being a benefit, for some such reason as that it was done under compulsion (Ben., 6.7.2) or for the sake of the doer, at least not for the sake of the recipient (Ben., 6.19.1).

**illum hortemur ad danda:**

With the gerundive understand beneficia.

* Illum probably refers to the person indicated by bene facientis, although normally hortatio would be reserved for those who have not yet reached the stage of giving benefits.*
nullum perit:

A real benefit is eternal, and, although it can be nullified by having it cancelled out by an injury (Ben., 6.4.1), it can not be taken away (Ben., 1.5.3; Ben., 6.2.1 f.; Ben., 7.29.1 f.), because as the verbal root in beneficium indicates, it is something which was done; such events can not be undone, in the sense that one can not bring it about that they never happened (the material or concrete expression of the benefit can change however). A benefit which is incorrectly given, as in the case of our text, for example, with a book-keeper's attitude, can be thought to be a benefit, but is not a true one, so that one can not accurately speak of the loss of a benefit. If one uses a popular way of speaking, one could say that such a benefit perishes when it is given (Ben., 1.1.1; cf. Ben., 4.39.2, ... beneficium et totum perit et statim).

* The correct attitude regarding loss is displayed by the example of the fourth century philosopher Stilbon, in reply to the question put to him by Demetrius Poliorcetes after the capture of his country, whether he had lost anything. He said that he had lost nothing, he had all his goods with him, meaning that he considered nothing which could be taken away, a good (EM., 9.19).

Computaverat:

Computatio, qualified by the adjective sordida, is allied to
self-interest, and leads to excluding certain people from being potential recipients, such as those who are about to leave the country permanently or the incurably ill, and it can cause the donor, if he is himself ill, to cease giving altogether, whereas, it is, in fact, desirable per se to give to a stranger passing through, or an unknown ship-wrecked person (Ben., 4.11.2 & 3); computare is base, since virtue does not attract by means of gain nor repel by means of loss (Ben., 4.1.2); the man who computes, instead of gives, makes his benefit mercenary (Ben., 6.14.3; cf. Ben., 7.10.4). It would appear that in the context of benefits computatio has a derogatory connotation.

* See further Ben., 1.3.2.

1.2.3 Beneficiorum simplex ratio est: tantum erogatur; si reddet aliquid, lucrum est, si non reddet, damnum non est. Ego illut dedi, ut darem. Nemo beneficia in calendario scribit nec avarus exactor ad horam et diem appellant. Numquam illa vir bonus cogitat nisi admonitus a reddente; alioqui in formam credendi transit. Turpis feneratio est beneficium expensum ferre.

The balance-sheets for benefits are straight-forward; one has only expenditures, but, if the benefits are not going to bring any return, no losses occur, and if they are, this is not considered a return, but pure profit. The benefit was given totally for its own sake. When it comes to benefits, the practices of having to make payments by the due date, dunning, or threatening law-suits, do not apply. The good man does not think of the benefits he has given,
unless he is reminded by the recipient who is returning a favour; else he would be some kind of money-lender. To write off a benefit as an expense is base usury.

In this section Seneca clearly and unequivocally expresses an anti-commercial attitude. A. R. Hands (Charities and Social Aid in Greece and Rome, p.29-30) points out that this attitude arose out of criticism of the Homeric depiction of giving, at a time when economic development and usage of coins had brought about a loss of understanding of reciprocity in giving. Unfortunately he does not spell out precisely how this occurs. He does state that the concept of giving for a return was not completely abandoned (see the note on Ben., 1.10.5).

At times statements which express an anti-commercial attitude are linked with expressions of disdain for certain professions, notably those associated with trade. This may reflect the preservation of an aristocratic bias. Certainly in Rome it is significant that commerce was not indulged in by the upper class (see Cic. Off., 1.42.150 where the professions of tax-collectors, usurers, hired labour with the exception of artists, merchants on a small scale, workmen, are held to be despicable; H. Bolkestein, Wohltätigkeit und Armenpflege, pp.332-337 provides references to Plato and Aristotle; for Latin references for contempt of business see D. C. Earl, The Political Thought of Sallust, p.27, n.5; for disdain for money-lenders, J. A. Crook, Law and Life of Rome, p.211; A. Bonhöffer, "Die Ansichten der Stoiker Über den Erwerb", an appendix in Die Ethik
Epictetus, p.233 f. has a complex discussion on Stoic views on wages and profit. We may note that in Ben., 6.12.2 Cleanthes is said to claim that there is a great difference between a benefit and business. References in the de Beneficiis are frequent; in certain cases a commercial attitude to benefits is appropriate, as, when an impure donor saves one’s life, one can regard it as a loan from a money-lender, Ben., 2.21.2; usually stress is laid on the fact that a benefit is far removed from a loan or merchandise, Ben., 2.34.1; Ben., 3.7.1; Ben., 3.14.4; Ben., 3.15; Ben., 4.13.3; Ben., 5.19.3; Ben., 5.20.6; Ben., 5.21.2; Ben., 6.4.4; Ben., 7.14.5.

Seneca in our text casts aspersions on keeping accurate records of benefits. Perhaps this is too a vestige of aristocratic disdain of precision in tabulation, which became possible when goods or services could be given monetary equivalents. Such meticulous keeping of accounts goes counter to the spirit of generosity; Aristotle calls such a finical attitude (ἀκριβολογία) niggardly (EN., 1122b8). Likewise Cicero is critical of ... nīmis exīgue et exilīter ad calculos vocare amicitiam, ut par sit ratio acceptorum et datorum, and remarks that friendship does not keep a close check on whether it pays out more than it takes in (Cic. Lael., 16.58; but cf. Off., 1.18.59).

\textit{Beneficiorum simplex ratio est:}

It would be tempting to think that Seneca is proposing the elimination of one of the two pages so familiar to us, debit and credit.
But the Romans did not have the double-entry system of bookkeeping, and records were kept in narrative form (G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, "Greek and Roman Accounting", *Studies in the History of Accounting*, p.74). Moreover, the text does not support such an interpretation either, since Seneca still has equivalents of each of our debits and credits in *erogatur* and *lucrum*. What Seneca means is that, with the elimination of returns as returns (they are now profit), and of losses, accounts are simplified. The fact that the double-entry system was not used does not, of course, mean that no entries of expenditures and receipts could be made, so that one still reads of *expensorum acceptorumque rationes*. Seneca states that god (whose example is to be followed) does compare receipts and payments before bestowing benefits (*Ben.*,4.32.4). So the sage will give as one who remembers that one must give account both of one's receipts and one expenditures (*VB.*,23.5). The fool does not keep his accounts correctly, as he values what he has given at a lot, what he has received at a little (*Ira*,3.31.3; cf. *comparatione beneficii et iniuriae*, *EM.*, 81.15; *EM.*,81.18; *Ben.*,6.4.1; *Ben.*,6.4.5). When Seneca asks whether a man, who has first given a benefit, then committed an injury, ought to be rewarded for each action separately, *ac veluti duobus nominibus separatim respondere*, or to take the two together, the reference in *nominibus* is probably to separate entries in one account. We come close to the concept of double entry in *EM.*,81.6, but are not dealing with a ledger, but an abacus of sorts: *Vir bonus utrosque*
calculos sic ponit ut se ipse circumscribat: beneficio adicit, iniuriae demit.

* Ratio is an account (cf. EM., 1.4), as is nomen, but, while the latter can also be an entry in an account, ratio can not (G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, "Greek and Roman Accounting", p. 47). That Seneca was well familiar with the procedures of accounting, B. M. Allen has pointed out ("The Vocabulary of Accounting in Seneca", CJ, LXI (1966), pp. 347-349).

* The adjective simplex contrasts with the complexity suggested by the prefix of computaverat, separated from it by but one word.

* For a purely verbal contrast with simplex ratio cf. Cic. Off., 2.15.22, ... deinceps de beneficentia ac de liberalitate dicendum est, cuius est ratio duplex. nam aut opera benigne fit indigentibus aut pecunia.

erogatur:

Originally a technical term from public law, meaning to disburse money from the public coffers with public approval (by a rogatio), erogare was extended beyond this to refer to other expenditures (Lewis and Short, s.v.).

Ego illut dedi, ut darem:

This tautology makes sense, once it is remembered that it is
the negation of the statement of giving for a return, do ut des.
Cf. Ben.,4.14.1, ... qui beneficium ut recuperet dedit, non dedit.

Nemo beneficia in calendario scribit:

Seneca does not describe the real situation, but the ideal one.

* The calendarium is the only account-book for which the Romans used a special name. The book was "a man's record of outstanding debts, the name being derived from the fact that the date at which the debt became due would be specified in the record"

* In Ben.,7.10.3 & 4 Seneca writes that interest, the account book and usury (fenus et calendarium et usura) are nothing but the names sought for human desire which exceeds the bounds of nature. In EM.,14.18 the calendarium is symbolic of the man who suffers anxiety because of his devotion to wealth. In EM.,87.7 it represents apparent wealth which is meaningless because it is borrowed from fortune. In all these instances the word has negative connotations.

Numquam illa vir bonus cogitat nisi admonitus a reddente:

Cf. Ira,3.36.4, admoneri bonus gaudet, pessimus quisque rectorem asperrime patitur.
* The behaviour of the good man contrasts with that of the
exactor, mentioned just prior in the text; but he need not be the
sage, for Seneca distinguishes two kinds of wise men, one, which,
like the phoenix, arises once every five hundred years, is the sage,
the other is one of a second grade (huius secundae notae, EM.,42.3).

Alioqui in formam credendi transit:

For in formam cf. Tac. Ann.,14.31, ... quando in formam
provinciae cesserant; for transire in cf. Ben.,6.16.1; EM.,18.11;
EM.,114.24.

* C. Hosius' second Teubner edition (1914) reads alioqui in
formam crediti transeunt, following the reading transeunt found in some
MSS, and assuming the subject of that verb is the object in the pre­
vious main clause, illa, i.e. benefits. It is not clear from the
apparatus criticus of either Hosius or Préchac whether N, the MS
from which all others are derived, has a singular or plural verb;
J. Buck, Seneca De Beneficiis und De Clementia in der Ueberlieferung,
p.44, leaves the impression that N reads transit. If this is correct,
we may assume that vir bonus is the subject of transit; Préchac,
however, translates his transit as if it were plural. The assumption
that vir bonus is the subject requires that the metamorphosis of
which the sentence speaks be into a creditor, not a credit. The most
suitable form would then be credentis. This is paleographically not
impossible, for N, according to the apparatus in Hosius, reads crededi,
which could be produced when the n and t of credentis coalesced to form d, and the final s dropped out.

* That the good man can not undergo such a transformation is stated in Ben., 6.21.2, and discussed in Ben., 4.34.3 and Ben., 7.16.5 ff.

Turpis feneratio est beneficium expensum ferre:

Expensum ferre is "to enter into the accounts as a sum paid out"; to do this with benefits is immoral (EM., 87.5).

* Roman morality expressed an aversion for money-lending; Cato even went so far as to equate money-lending with murdering (Cic. Off., 2.25.88; see also the introductory note to this section).

1.2.4 Qualiscumque priorum eventus est, persevera in alios conferre; melius apud ingratos iacebunt, quos aut pudor aut occasio aut imitatio aliquando gratos poterit efficere. Ne cessaveris, opus tuum perage et partes boni viri exequere. Alium re, alium fide, alium gratia, alium consilio, alium praeceptis salubribus adiuva.

1.2.5 Officia etiam ferae sentiunt, nec ullum tam inmansuetum animal est, quod non cura mitiget et in amorem sui vertat. Leonum ora a magistris impune tractantur, elephantorum feritatem usque in servile obsequium demeretur cibus; adeo etiam quae extra intellectum atque aestimationem beneficii posita sunt, adsiduitas tamen meriti pertinacis evincit. Ingratus est adversus unum beneficium? adversus alterum non erit; duorum oblitus est? tertio etiam in eorum, quae exciderunt, memoriam reducetur.

Regardless of the outcome of previously given benefits, persist in bestowing them on others; this is the best course, since something may still turn the ungrateful grateful. Continue to perform the duties of a good man and provide assistance in various ways. Even animals
respond favourably to persistent kindness; so the ingrate must be overwhelmed by continued benefits which will eventually prod his memory.

Quantum priorum eventus est, persevera in alios conferre.

With priorum understand beneficiorum.

* Conferre, "contribute", gains emphasis by contrast with expensum ferre, at the conclusion of the previous sentence. The prefix con provides a suggestion of mutuality which is deceiving, the point being that one should continue to give benefits, even if past experiences have proved this to be unproductive of return.

melius apud ingratos iacebunt:

Supply beneficia as subject; translate iacebunt as "they shall lie neglected, unused". Their not being used consists in the fact that no return is forthcoming; still, they possess the potential of being used, which is not the case if they are not bestowed, and something may bring about their proper use. Hence Seneca writes melius; for if they do not perish with another man, they will perish with oneself (Em., 81.1).
quos aut pudor aut occasio aut imitatio gratos
poterit facere.

Cf. Ben.,3.2.2. Denique ad reddendam gratiam et virtute opus
est et tempore et facultate et adspirante fortuna.

* Regarding pudor cf. Ben.,1.3.1, Non audebit ... oculos tollere.

* Occasio is defined by Cicero (Inv.,1.27.40) as that part of
time which has within it an opportunity suitable for acting or for
not acting.

* Someone who has not returned a benefit through lack of
opportunity or means is not at fault; Non est per me mora, si aut
occasio mihi deest aut facultas (Ben.,4.40.3).

* Imitatio is a concept of fundamental importance to Seneca's
concept of the paranetic function of philosophy; Instruenda est enim
vita exemplis inlustribus (EM.,83.13).

opus tuum perage et partes boni viri exequere:

The first clause has a double meaning. It can simply be trans-
slated as "complete your task". But agere can mean "act" or "perform"
(partes agere, Ter. Phorm.,835); in that case opus could refer to a
play and mean with perage "act out the play - or role - to its
finish" (Cic. Sen.,18.64, fabulam peregisse; Sen.,19.70, ... peragenda
fabula est ... in a comparison between the sage and an actor). Like-
wise the second clause has a double meaning; "perform the duties of a
good man" or "play the role of a good man", the first being an extension of the second (Lewis & Short, s.v. pars). In each clause one interpretation is based on the metaphor that life is a stage (it occurs with some frequency in Seneca; Ben., 2.17.2; EM., 77.20; EM., 80.7; ad Marc., 10.1; see A. Oltramare, Les Origines de la Diatribe Romaine, p. 276, n. 1, for other references; E. R. Curtius, European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, p. 138 f.; M. Kokolakis, The Dramatic Simile of Life, who notes [p. 23] that Bion the Cynic used the comparison "to express his moral theory", and cites instances in the Stoics Aristo of Chios and Chrysippus, and in Cicero inter al.). Panaetius had employed the metaphor of the stage in his theory of the person (Off., 1.30.107 ff. & 115 ff.), explaining that each individual consists of at least four masks (persona), or roles, one for human nature shared with others, one for one's individual nature, another imposed by experience and circumstance, still another dependent on one's own choice (e.g. profession; see M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa, Vol. 1, p. 201; M. Pohlenz, Antikes Führertum, p. 68). Of these the first is the source from which one finds one's duties, and this role is therefore similar to the one to which Seneca refers in our text. Aristo of Chios had pointed out that the wise man must imitate the good actor (DL., 7.160). But the emphasis put by Seneca on the completion of the role (perage, exequer) seems more likely an adaptation of the popular sentiment found in the third century B.C. writer of diatribes Teles, who writes that just as the good actor must play well the beginning,
middle and conclusion of a play, so the good man must live his life well at its beginning, middle, and end (O. Hense, Teletis Reliquiae p.16.4).

* With this common comparison, Seneca is not, of course, advocating playacting at being a good man, i.e. hypocrisy, and so leaving himself open to the criticism voiced by Cicero (Off.,1.13.41) that of all injustice none is more heinous than that committed by those who deceive expressly in order to appear to be good men.

Alium re, alium fide, alium gratia, alium consilio, alium praeeptis salubribus adiuva.

The list which Seneca presents is one of various types of services which can be given. Cf., with Précnac, Ter. Heaut.,86, aut consolando aut consilio aut re iuvero; cf. also Nero's words to Seneca, ... ratione consilio praeeptis pueritiam, dein iuventam meam fovisti (Tac. Ann.,14.55). Diogenes Laertius attributes a similar schema to Plato, who, he states, divided benefaction (εὐεργεσία) into assistance provided through goods, bodies, knowledge, or words (χρήματαν, σώματαν, ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις, τοῖς λόγοις). These he explains, in sequence, as consisting of helping someone in need financially, of coming to the rescue of those being beaten, of training, healing or teaching something good, and of speaking on someone's behalf in the courts (D.L.,3.95 & 96). H. Bolkestein remarks (Wohltätigkeit und Armenpflege, p.145-6) that material help is placed in a position of
prominence because it is the most frequent form of assistance, a form which Aristotle also has most often in mind, although the Cynics and the Stoics had a different evaluation. With the Platonic schema found in Diogenes Laertius may be compared one devised by the one-time pupil of Theophrastus, and later follower of the Cynic Crates, Metrocles, who had a simplified version, dividing things into those which can be bought by money and those which can be acquired with time and through care and devotion. Such divisions then were not uncommon, and similarities with our text are immediately apparent (see also Ben., 1.10.5 and the classification of benefits, Ben., 1.11 & 12). But Seneca's list includes terms which do not only correspond to inherited categories but also derive their significance from the Roman socio-political context in which they frequently appear. Here they are not devoid of theoretical significance, as is clear from the lengthy treatment Cicero accords them in the de Officiis. Cicero distinguishes between beneficence and generosity which consists in service and that which consists in money (cf. χρηματικά). The latter is easier, especially for the rich man, but the former is more illustrious and worthier of a noble and honorable man (Off., 2.15.52). After noting ways in which personal service is preferable to giving money, and following a discussion of the proper ways in which to give money, Cicero returns to the subject of personal service (Off., 2.19.65), which he divides into in iure cavere, consilio iuvare, and hoc scientiae genere prodesse. Legal assistance is stated to be pleasing to many and suitable for binding people to oneself by means of benefits. Eloquence is next
discussed (cf. λόγοι). Its decline has still left the opportunity to provide service through exercising political influence (= gratia), by making recommendations to judges, or magistrates, or by looking after someone's interest, by arranging for others to advise or defend that person. This discussion of Cicero is very helpful for understanding Seneca's list. It suggests that Seneca with re (= pecunia) commences with the lowest kind of help, and that some of the other items may have political connotations. This is true of fide. D. C. Earl, The Moral and Political Tradition of Rome, p.8, has rightly noted that this and other such names for key concepts of Roman political life are untranslatable. He approximates this concept, which he terms "the paramount Roman virtue" (p.83), to "good faith" and the obligation to fulfil promises (p.33). It might lead an individual to neglect his own affairs in favour of those of a friend (D. C. Earl, The Political Thought of Sallust, p.100). It was not only the corner-stone of the patronus-cliens relationship, but also the quality which ensured the stability of amicitia between equals" (op. cit., p.11). In this connection Earl cites Cicero's statement that fides is the foundation of justice (Fundamentum autem est iustitiae fides, id est dictorum conventorumque constantia et veritas, Cic. Off., 1.7.23). This statement may sound like a metaphysical one, but the concept of fides was important for the realities of Roman political life. When a patronus, for example, extends fides to a cliens, this means he gives a promise to protect, especially in terms of a juridical defence; fides hence has the derived meanings of "protection, help"
(Lewis & Short, s.v. II.B.2). For this reason Basore's Loeb translation for fides, "credit" is probably too restricted in scope (for the various meanings of fides, see J. Hellegouarc'h, Le Vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques, p.23 ff., p.275-6).

Gratia in the political sense is expressed essentially through casting votes and so means political influence (see J. Hellegouarc'h, p.204 & p.237). Hellegouarc'h (p.171) distinguishes two forms of assistance in Roman political relationships adiuvare consilio, which is also included in Seneca's list, and refers to verbal or moral support, and adiuvare opibus, in which he includes defensio salutis, which is a defense in the courts, and defensio dignitatis, which consists of maintenance of the political status of a friend or a party. It is possible to relate the defensio salutis to fides ... adiuva, and the other defensio to gratia ... adiuva.

* In Ben.,6.29.1 fidele consilium is regarded as a means for a poor man to express gratitude to a rich man (cf. Ben.,6.33.1), but in Ben.,4.29.1 it is not regarded as a beneficium. The explanation for this is that it there appears in a list of minimal social obligations, protected by the Bouzygian imprecations (ἀρετή Σουζύγιος, on which see H. Bolkestein, Wohltätigkeit und Armenpflege, p.69-71; M. Pohlenz, Antikes Fuhrertum, p.37; they are also referred to B. Snell, The Discovery of the Mind, p.168). In our text the nature of the list links it more closely to Roman political theory and practice where it was regarded, with prudentia and sapientia, as an aspect of political virtue which could help others (Hellegouarc'h, p.254). These two terms
with which it appears provide a transition analogous to the one
Seneca makes from consilium to praecepta, for the latter pair have
also to do with wisdom and philosophy (consilium is promised by philo-
sophy to the human race, EM.,48.7; on praecepta see EM.,94 & 95).
Precepts are probably not very different from advice (cf. EM.,94.19
& 20); the tone may be somewhat more peremptory since precepts are a
form of warning (EM.,94, passim, but especially 25 & 37). The noun
praepectis also receives emphasis from the adjective salubribus
(cf. EM.,8.1; EM.,94.26). The imagery of health is pervasive in
Seneca, since the philosopher is considered to be the doctor of the
soul (cf. D. Steyns, Les Métaphores et les Comparaisons dans les
Oeuvres en Prose de Sénèque le Philosophe, p.51-70). See also the
note on sanare, Ben.,1.4.6.

officia etiam ferae sentiunt:

Préchac, "Le dernier ouvrage de Sénèque", CRAI, (1914), p.114,
noted a harsh transition and assumed that Seneca had inserted the
animal comparison just prior to his death without having time to com-
pletely integrate it, or else that it represents marginal comments by
Seneca which became part of the text in a posthumous edition.
E. Albertini, La Composition dans les Ouvrages Philosophiques de
Sénèque, p.182, counters this by stating that the animal comparison
fits well into the flow of ideas. Both are, in a sense, correct, for
the introduction of the comparison is abrupt, and not until its con-
clusion does the relevance of the point, which is admittedly there, become clear (cf. *ne cessaveris, adsiduitas*).

* *Officia* are duties or right actions, which are not perfect or complete, because they are not performed by the sage. The word can be applied to animals and plants: "Ετι δὲ καθήκον γεωτιν εἶναι ὁ πράξειν εὐλογίαν [τῇ] ἰσχεὶ ἀπολογισμὸν, οἷον τὸ ἀκδλοῦθαν ἐν τω, ἀπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ ζώα διατείνει: ὃρασθαί γὰρ κἀπι τοῦτων καθηκοντα (DL.,7.107).

* More emphasis is gained by the initial contrast between man and *ferae* than if Seneca had started with *animalia* (which could also be ambiguous, since it, meaning living creature, can include men and gods, EM.,113.17). The examples of animals are presented to encourage responding to benefits, since, if animals are capable of replying to continued kindnesses, man, who is superior, should also be capable.

* It is appropriate at this point to remark on the use of animals as examples. Examples can be of two kinds, those to be avoided and those to be imitated (Ira,3.22.1). Seneca claims that it is wrong to hold up as an example for man those creatures which have impulses instead of reason, and advocates imitating the universe (nature) and god (Ira,2.16.1 & 2). Likewise in Ben.,2.29.3, where men's ingratitude caused by jealousy of animals is described, Seneca states that comparison with animals should not be made (cf. Ben.,7.8.3, a noble human such as Demetrius the Cynic may serve as an example and reproach). The major difference, then, between man and beast is that man has the gift of rationality, which figures prominently in the god-man-animal schema
(EM., 76.9 & 10; cf. EM., 113.17; EM., 121.3; EM., 124, passim; Cic. Off., 1.16.50; Cic. ND., 2.34; the distinction between man and animal was strictly maintained by Panaetius, see F. Steinmetz, Die Freundschaftslehre des Panaitios, p. 18). When it comes to benefits, animals can be of service (see officium above), but can not give a benefit: ...

prodest enim et animal et lapis et herba, nec tamen beneficium dant, quod numquam datur nisi a volente (Ben., 5.19.6; cf. Nam qui beneficium mihi daturus est, debet non tantum prodesse, sed velle. Ideo nec mutis animalibus quicquam debetur: et quam multos e periculo velocitas equi rapuit! Ben., 6.7.3). We humans give benefits to animals because they will be useful to us or provide us with food. But this is giving to receive. Therefore we do not give animals real benefits either (Ben., 4.14.2). Yet Seneca is not averse to employing animals for purposes of comparison (e.g. Ben., 3.30.4; Ben., 3.31.4; EM., 87.18; see F. Husner, Leib und Seele in der Sprache Senecas, pp. 92-103), and sometimes holds them up as worthy of imitation (bees, EM., 84.5; cf. EM., 66.26). Such comparisons are frequent in popular philosophy (diastribe, satire) and can be used, as stated previously, in various ways, for example, by causing a man to feel shame (e.g. formica, Hor. Sat., 1.1.38; cf. ... pudebit cum animalibus permutasse mores, Ira, 2.31.6) or by encouraging him, as in our text. A. O. Lovejoy and G. Boas, Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity, p. 389, cite Xenophon's Memorabilia 1.4.2 as containing "the earliest extended discussion of the possible superiority of animals", but it is the influence of the Cynics, who "championed the superiority of the beasts, the doctrine of
animalitarianism in its most outspoken form" (L. Edelstein, *The Idea of Progress in Classical Antiquity*, p.62), who used animal behaviour as a standard of what is natural and therefore right for man to do (cf. DL., 6.22). This development popularized such comparisons that, in spite of a conflict with Stoic doctrine, Seneca uses them for rhetorical purposes.

* Sentient is appropriate of animals, who are irrational creatures, but still possess feeling (Cic. *ND.*, 2.12.34; *ND*, 2.47.122). In fact the senses are more active in animals than in humans (EM., 74, 16).

\[
\text{nec ullum tam inmansuetum animal est, quod non cura mitiget et in amorem sui vertat:}
\]

This sentence, with the examples that follow, is a common-place. Often the ox and the horse are included in the lists of illustrations, but not necessarily so (cf. Prop., 2.3.47; Tib., 1.4.14, on which see K. F. Smith's commentary for a good discussion; Ov. *AA.*, 1.471-2; Ov. *Trist.*, 4.6.1-8, where the sequence ox, horse, Punic lion and elephant is found, and on which see the commentary of Th. De Jonge, who gives an additional reference to *Poet. Lat. Min.*, [ed. Baehrens], v.328.269 ff. in which the lion and the Caspian tiger appear). Similarly Seneca states that by a benefit even wild animals grow tame and cites as examples elephants who submit their necks to the yoke, and bulls who allow boys and women to jump on their backs, snakes who crawl harmlessly over cups and garments, and bears and lions whose
whose expressions are placid when their trainers are in their cages, and wild beasts who fawn upon their master (Ira, 2.31.6). Wild animals grow tame through living with us, and no animal, even if fierce, retains its violence, if it has for some time shared its accommodation with man; all its ferocity is blunted, and, in the tranquil surroundings, is forgotten little by little (Ira, 3.8.3). At other times Seneca expresses less certainty on this point; tigers and lions never lay aside their ferocity, but they sometimes restrain it, and, when you least expect it, their savageness, which had been soothed, is provoked (EM., 85.8; cf. EM., 42.4).

* A. Bourgery, Sénèque Prosateur, p. 308, is of the opinion that sui is the equivalent of curantis; a lapse of Seneca's memory has been caused in the heat of the argument. He cites a sufficient number of grammatical anacolutha in Seneca's works to lend credence to the possibility. It is however possible to take sui to refer to cura, the possible subject of mitiget; the animals become dependent on the attention paid to them, not on the person paying this attention (a somewhat cynical view).

* Cf. Verg. Cir., 135 f. where Amor is said to tame lions and tigers.

Leonum ora a magistris inpune tractantur:

Seneca uses the same animal in different ways, with different attitudes. A wild lion may be portrayed sympathetically since it
displays spirit, whereas a tame and decorated lion is unnatural, and therefore symbolic of the fool, who does not live according to nature (EM.,41.6).

* Cf. EM.,85.41, where the wise man, one skilled in taming evils, is compared to the trainers who are not content merely to tame wild beasts, but also live with them; they put their hands in the mouths of lions, and kiss tigers.

* elephantorum ferocitatem usque in servile obsequium demeretur cibus:

Elephants had a reputation for being fierce not only because they were so in their natural state, but also because they were employed as instruments of war (cf. Plb.85.2-7, and Walbank’s commentary ad loc; Lucr. DRN.,5.1302 f. & 1338 f.).

* The obedience of elephants is proverbial (cf. EM.,81.41, where a tiny Ethiopian puts funambulist elephants through their paces; Gummere, in the Loeb edition, refers also to Suet. Galba,6; Suet. Nero, 11; Plin. NH.,8.2). Seneca is not, of course, proposing such servility for humans, rather, that a change in their attitude can also be brought about.

* For the elephants’ natural use of food, as contrasted with man’s, cf. EM.,60.2.

quae extra intellectum atque aestimationem beneficii posita sunt:

See p. 93, for the exclusion of animals from benefits.

The function of evaluation is assigned to the theoretical division of moral philosophy (EM.,89.14), and animals are therefore not able to perform it.

Ingratus est adversus unum beneficium? Adversus alterum non erit; duorum oblitus est? Tertio ...

Although Seneca is enumerating benefits, he is not guilty of computatio (Ben.,1.2.3). But he proposes no set limit and the question tacitly raised here, and openly in Ben.,5.19.9 (in a slightly different context), is where should one draw the line. The logical puzzle, or paradox, of how many are enough is that termed the sorites (Latin acervus), of which Seneca states: sorites enim ille inexplicabilis subit, cui difficile est modum imponere, quia paulatim subrepit et non desinit serpere (Ben.,5.19.9). This puzzle was among those, such as that of the liar and that of the horned man (EM.,45.8 & 10), inherited by the Stoics from the Megarian School of philosophy (Ueberweg-Praechter, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, p.157; W. and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic, pp.113-4). It occurs in Hor. Ep., 2.1.47; D.L.,7.82. Cicero informs us that Chrysippus dealt with the problem (Cic. Acad.,2.19.93; cf. Pers. Sat.,6.80).
in ... memoriam reducetur:

See the note on memoria, Ben.,1.1.8. The figure of speech anticipates that of memoriam suam fugiens, Ben.,1.3.1.
CHAPTER THREE

The man who believes he has lost benefits, will lose them; but he who persists in giving benefits will eventually force gratitude to appear. Benefits must be so heaped upon the ingrate, that there is no escape for him. A definition of benefits is promised, but first will follow a digression, consisting of an allegorical account of the Graces. Various aspects are discussed: what each Grace stands for, why the Graces form a circle, why they are joyful young maidens, why they are dressed as they are. Seneca is less positive about the value of the allegorization of other aspects, such as the individual names carried by the Graces; they have been subject to change, and seem the arbitrary creation of the poets. In fact, their dress and their association with Mercury also fall into this category. The Stoic patriarch Chrysippus, who has a keen mind, is criticized for over indulging allegory. He attempts, inter al., to explain the name of the mother of the Graces in relation to what the daughters represent. But names are fictitious products of the poets, who are guided, as they compose, by concerns other than one about the truth.

1.3.1 Is perdet beneficia, qui cito se perdidisse credit; at qui instat et onerat priora sequentibus, etiam ex duro et inmemori pectore gratiam extundit. Non audebit adversus multa oculos adtollere; quocumque se convertit memoriam suam fugiens, ibi te videat: beneficiis illum tuis cinge.
That man will lose a benefit who believes in no time that he has lost one; but the man who presses on, heaping benefits on benefits, shapes gratitude even out of a hard and ungrateful heart. The ingrate will not dare raise his eyes in the face of so many benefits; wherever he turns, as he flees his memory, there let him see you: encircle him with your benefits.

In this section Seneca forges a link between his last point, persistent giving, and the allegorical interpretation of the Graces. He achieves this primarily through a word-play on the pivotal expression gratiam extundere, which, in the context of what precedes, means "wring out gratitude", and, in the context of what follows "sculpt a Grace". The language of this section suggests the plastic arts, especially in such verbs as instare, onerare, extundere, which, with their over-tones of aggression, conjure up an image of a craftsman (artifex) struggling with a particularly intractable piece of marble (duro; the image of the artifex and his materia, a frequent one in Greek philosophy, is compared to the giving of a benefit in Ben.,2.33.2).

In addition the verbs of aggression (add cingere), which describe the benefactor, contrast with those describing the cringing passivity of the ingrate (non audebit, quocumque se convertit, fugiens, videat), so unlike the joyful dancing of the Graces.

The language of one phrase in this transitional section recalls that of the Theseus-Ariadne story of Catullus (Cat.,64). But, although
the verbal reminiscences are slight, thematic similarities and contrasts between Seneca and Catullus, as well as the fact that both treat the allegorization of a work of art, call for a comparison. It is impossible to claim that the verbal reminiscences are deliberate; Catullus is never mentioned by Seneca, although the former's neoteric friend Calvus is quoted (EM.,94.26). But Catullus' work had not disappeared; it was known to Pliny the Elder, Quintilian and Martial (see C. J. Fordyce, Catullus, p.xxiv). What makes a discussion of Catullus appropriate in any case, are the remarks Seneca makes about the poets' attempts to reform society (see the commentary on Ben., 1.4.5-6). Catullus was interested in the concepts of obligations and societal relations. Such words as bene velle, pium, ingrata, fecisse benigne (Cat.,73), officio (Cat.,75), benefacta, fidem, foedere (Cat., 76), words also relevant for a theory of benefits, are integrated into Catullus' description of the love relationship between himself and Lesbia (on this see R. Reitzenstein, Zur Sprache der Lateinischen Erotik, p.15 ff. & p.26 ff.). This concern of Catullus with fides and broken promises also found expression in the love-story of Theseus and Ariadne (see M. Putnam, "The Art of Catullus 64", HSCPh, 65 (1961), p.168 for emphasis on these ethical aspects). One of the main motifs in the story of Theseus and Ariadne, as well as that of Theseus and his father Aegeus, is that of memoria, which we have already seen, in Ben.,1.1.8, as central to Seneca's theory of benefits (on memory in Cat., see Putnam, op.cit., p.185, K. Quinn, "Docte Catulle", Critical
Essays on Roman Literature, Elegy and Lyric, ed. J. P. Sullivan, p.56; D. F. S. Thomson, "Aspects of unity in Catullus 64", CJ, 57 [1961], pp.54-55). A further parallel between Catullus and Seneca is that both are describing not merely a myth, but a representation of myth in art. Catullus is describing a coverlet of some complexity; on it the Theseus-Ariadne story is embroidered, but it is not described as a static scene, but as a dynamic story slowly unfolding, within which the embroidered Ariadne can yet be described as a statue, saxe ut effigies (Cat.,64.61). Seneca may not have been considering a particular representation of the Graces, but, if Chrysippus is his source, a statue or painting may well loom large in the background (cf. Chrysippus' allegorical explanation of a painting of Justitia, Gell. NA.,14.4); Seneca does refer to a painting of the Graces (Ben., 1.3.7). Another point in common between the neoteric poet and the court philosopher is that the art object is treated from the point of view of its ethical implications. In his epyllion Catullus is a moralist (there will be no agreement on this point, but this interpretation is asserted by K. Quinn, op.cit., p.55; K. Quinn, Catullus, An Interpretation, p.263; M. Putnam, op.cit., p.197). Seneca treats the Graces from the same perspective, although his attitude is, of course, negative.

A further and incidental link between the Theseus-Ariadne myth and the Graces is found in the fact that Theseus is reported to have left Ariadne for someone called Aegle, a name also given to one of the
Graces (Ben., 1.3.6). This story was current in the first century A.D., since Plutarch (+A.D. 50-120) reports it (Thes., 20). It is repeated by Athenaeus (Deipnosophistae, 13.557a) who writes that Hesiod states Theseus also married Hippe and Aegle, for whom he also transgressed his oaths to Ariadne, as Cercops reports. In Plutarch Aegle is called Πανοξινήδος, and although we find no elaboration of this, and no hint she is a deity, Zeus, the father also of the Graces (Ben., 1.3.9), comes to mind, for he is the all-seer (Aesch. Eum., 1045; Soph. OC., 1085). We note further that in Hesiod (Th., 945 ff.) the two lines describing the marriage of Hephaestus to Aglaea (see Prechac's app. crit. on Ben., 1.3.6, for variants of the name) are followed immediately by two describing that of Dionysus to Ariadne. The two females are once again in a sense juxtaposed, if Ariadne, like the Graces, has a connection with vegetation (see T. B. L. Webster, "The Myth of Ariadne from Homer to Catullus", Greece and Rome, 13 (1966), p.24). Did an existing connection between Ariadne and Aegle trigger recollection in Seneca of Catullus' epyllion? The question must remain unanswered here, but the language of Ben., 1.3.1 suggests the possibility.

* Is perdet beneficia, qui cito se perdidisse credit:

On perdere see Ben., 1.2.2, nullum perit ... computaverat.

Here the subject of undue preoccupation with benefits given is
approached from a different, a psychological angle; loss can be the result of its anticipation. It may be caused by a subjective feeling, or state of mind.

ex duro et inmemori pectore gratiam extundit:

Apart from the direct meaning "to force, i.e. squeeze gratitude out of a hard and ungrateful heart", there is another, equally important, "to sculpt a Grace" out of a scarcely malleable substance.

TLL. s.v. gives a gloss on extundere: ἐκχῶπτω ἀπὸ λίθου, ἐλώυω ἐπὶ σιδήρου ἡ ἀληθὸς ὀλης. Likewise Virgil (Aen.,8.665) uses the verb of Vulcan as he works on Aeneas' shield (there is a touch of irony here, Vulcan is Hephaestus, husband of the Grace Aglaea).

* If the principle eodem animo beneficium debetur, quo datur (Ben.,1.1.8) is applied, the benefit was given reluctantly in the first place. But we have seen (p.42) that in spite of its formulation as a general rule, it must not be considered so. Both passages aim to promote continued giving of benefits, and Seneca merely varies his approach.

* With ex duro et inmemori pectore cf. Cat.,64.123 inmemori pectore (for the theme of memory, in the poem see also 11.58; 135; 208; 231; 248); cf. Cat.,60.3 mente dura, and with duro cf. also ferox Theseus (Cat.,64.73 & 247). Theseus, as an archetype of the ingrate, who accepted Ariadne's help in conquering the Minotaur only to abandon
her, also attempts to flee his commitments, i.e. his memory (cf. Cat., 64.58-9, *immemor at iuvenis fugiens pellit vada remis, / irrita ventosæ linguens promissa procellae*). Ariadne, was, of course, not in the position to follow Seneca's advice and persist in benefits. Her last words *sed quali solam Theseus me mente reliquit, / tali mente, deae, funestet seqve suosque* (Cat., 64.200-1) contain a wishful echo of the sentiment in *eodem animo beneficium debetur, quo datur* (Ben., 1.1.8).

\[
\text{Non audebit adversus multa oculos addolere}
\]

Cf. *pudor* (Ben., 1.2.4). The shame felt by the ingrate is expressed in a nice psychological touch, the inability to look someone in the eye. Similarly Orestes (Eur. *Orest.*, 460 f.) claims that shame (αἰδώς) prevents him from direct eye to eye contact, and Phaedra, who turns aside her eyes for shame, expresses a desire to be veiled (Eur. *Hipp.*, 244 f.; see W. S. Barrett's instructive commentary *ad loc.*). To this we may add the aetiological story given by Pausanias (3.20) in which he tells of a veiled Penelope to explain the statue of the goddess Ἀιδώς. On Roman imperial coinage *Pudicitia* was depicted veiled or half-veiled (on the personification of obstructions as deities see H. Bolkestein, *Wohltätigkeit und Armenpflege*, p.288; Cic. *ND.*, 2.23.61 and A. S. Pease *ad loc.*). Seneca's detail is therefore not purely psychological, but is also suggestive of the plastic arts. Such an amalgam of art and ethics anticipates the digression on the Graces.
quocumque se convertit memoriam suam fugiens,
ibi te videat:

The ingrate is pictured as trapped between past and present benefits; the situation in Seneca's image calls for the application of the lesson given in the animal examples (lion and elephant, Ben., 1.2.5). The image of perpetual entrapment is a visual one and reminiscent of the plastic arts (cf. the description of the prize-cup, Theocr. Id., 1 and Keat's "Ode on a Grecian Urn").

beneficiis illum tuis cinge:

The sequence of the words illustrates the meaning: illum is surrounded by beneficiis and its adjective. Cingere picks up both the image of taming animals (Ben., 1.2.5), i.e. "surround him with the net of your benefits", and that of sculpture, i.e. "drape or clothe him in your benefits".

* It does not suit Seneca's purpose, as he concludes this successful transitional passage, to consider the implications of a sentiment he expresses elsewhere (EM., 19.11), that there are those of whom it is the case that the more they owe, the more they hate.

Seneca discusses allegorical interpretations of the Graces, and so places himself within the tradition of the old Stoa; but not squarely, since he is apologetic about doing so. The tradition of allegorizing myths extends to well before the origin of the Stoa, and
one of the tools, employed especially by Zeno and his followers, etymology, is employed already in Homer (see L. P. Rank, *Etymologistie en Verwandte Verschijnselen bij Homerus*; one of the possible etymologies deriving δῖος [fem. δία] from δία, Od.,8.82, discussed in Rank, p.43, is also used by Zeno, DL.,7.147, and Chrysippus, SVF., 2.312.22-3). Some of the other names from the pre-classical period associated with the phenomena of allegory and etymology include Pherecydes of Samos (DL.,1.119) and Anaxagoras, who is reported to have believed Homer treated the subjects of virtue and justice, and who was followed by his pupil Metrodorus of Lampsacus, who treated Homer's physical doctrines (DL.,2.11). Theagenes of Rhegium defended Homeric mythology, claiming that the battles of the gods represented the conflict between the elements, and also that the gods represented faculties (διάδοσις) of the psyche (e.g. Hermes = logos, DK.,8.3); both of these types of allegorization, cosmological and ethical, were subsequently used by the Stoa (see J. Pépin, *Mythe et Allégorie*, p.98-99, n.16 for some controversial aspects). With the development in philosophical thinking, allegory received new strength, and the Sophists (e.g. Prodicus) may be mentioned, as well as the Cynics (e.g. Antisthenes, who was denied the status of allegorist by J. Tate, "Plato and Allegorical Interpretation", *CQ.*,24( 1930), p.4, followed by J. C. Joosen and J. H. Waszink, *RAC*, s.v. Allegorese, but still accorded it by J. Pépin, *op.cit.*, p.105). Plato's attitude to allegory did nothing to advance its cause. Although he did not deny that the myths of the poets could have an underlying meaning, the
right interpretation of a myth is not accessible by any certain way. Hence "to waste time in ingenious guesses at the meaning of myths or other passages where the poets do not speak plainly, is unworthy of the serious philosopher" (J. Tate "Plato and Allegorical Interpretation", CQ., 23 (1929) p.154; cf. J. Pépin, op.cit., pp.112-121; Seneca's attitude is similar to Plato's). The works of Aristotle contain some allegorical interpretations (for references see J. Pépin, op.cit., pp.121-124). Of the Hellenistic schools the Epicureans did not espouse allegory (an exception is Lucretius, e.g. the explanations of Sisyphus' punishment in Hades, DRN., 3.995; for Epicurean criticism of allegory see Cic. ND., 1.16.42-43). It was around the Stoa that allegory found especially fertile ground. As stated, etymology (for which see also Plat. Crat.) was an important tool. Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus, the first three heads of the school all practised it (see Cic. ND., 1.14.36 ff.; ND., 2.24.62 ff.; ND., 3.24.62 ff.; SVF., 1.43 & 63; SVF., 123-124 & 312-320; M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa, vol.1, p.97, vol.2,p.55). Chrysippus used allegory in his Περὶ θεῶν (SVF., 2.315.2 ff.) and in his Περὶ χάριτων, in which he said that the Graces were "our beginnings and the repayments of benefits (τὰς ἴμετε[ρ]ας καταφάς κα[ί] τὰς ἀνταπ[ὸ]δόσεις τῶν εὔς[ργ]εσιῶν), SVF., 2.316.36). We also know that Chrysippus could use an artistic representation as the point of departure for an allegorical explanation (the ιμάγος of Justice, Gell. NA., 14.4). Cleanthes wrote a work Περὶ χάριτος (DL., 7.175) but to what extent allegory played a role in it we do not know. The grammarians of the Hellenistic period became embroiled in a controversy over the
validity of the allegorical method with Crates of Mallos, and Pergamum, accepting it, whereas Aristarchus, and Alexandria, were opposed. Later within the Stoa some resistance set in. Panaetius divided religion into three parts, a mythical, civil (political), and a philosophical part (cf. August. Civ.D., 6.5) and did not ascribe much value to the first mentioned (for an evaluation of recent views of this matter, see J. Rist, Stoic Philosophy, pp.178-9); furthermore, A. Schmekel has pointed out, on the basis of Athenaeus' Deipnosophistae 14.634 d, that Panaetius favoured Aristarchus' method of explaining the poets over that of Crates (Die Philosophie der Mittleren Stoa, p.207, n.5). As to Hecato, a pupil of Panaetius, whom Seneca cites (Ben., 1.3.9), opinions are divided. R. Hirzel, Untersuchungen zur Ciceros philosophischen Schriften, vol.2, p.609, believes that Hecato was partial to allegory, on the ground that he was more partial to Chrysippus than was his master who was more under the influence of Plato (vol.1, p.220). M. Sonntag (L. Annaei Senecae de Beneficiis Libri Explanantur, p.12) thinks Hecato did not believe in allegorical interpretations, but merely used them for decorative purposes. The evidence is not sufficiently clear for a decisive answer.

Our fullest early examples of allegory date from the first century A.D., and are, therefore, roughly contemporary with Seneca. The allegories ascribed to a Heraclitus (for doubts about his name and date see the Budé edition of F. Buffière, p.viii f.) are written to defend Homer rather than for their own sake, and are placed within the
tradition of ethical explanations. Since he does not discuss the Graces fully (in §43 he allegorizes Charis, Hephaestus' wife, as companion to the architect of the world), no more need be said about him at this point. The other writer, Cornutus, was closely associated with Seneca's nephew, Lucan, whom he taught. He taught the Stoic satirist Persius as well, who is said to have left his library (see p.151) to him. Cornutus did not look askance at ethical allegory, but put greater stress on physical, cosmological explanations than Heraclitus. Since Cornutus deals extensively with the Graces it will be profitable to remark in the commentary on the differences between him and Seneca (for accounts of the history of allegorical thinking see the following: K. Müller, RE., Suppl. vol.4, s.v. Allegorische Dichtererklärung; J. Tate, "The beginnings of Greek Allegory", CR., 41 (1927) 214-215; J. Tate, "Cornutus and the poets", CQ., 23 (1929), 41-45; J. Tate, "Plato and Allegorical Interpretation", CQ., 23 (1929) 142-154, 24 (1930), 1-10; J. Tate, "On the history of Allegorism", CQ., 28 (1934), 105-114. More recent treatments may be found in the Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum: see the articles on Allegorese by J. Joosen and J. H. Waszink [vol.1, 1950] and Etymologie by I. Opelt, and Exegese by H. Schreckenberg [vol.6, 1966]. See also the fuller studies of F. Buffière, Les Mythes d'Homère et la Pensée Grecque [1956], and J. Pépin, Mythe et Algéorie [1958], which contains a bibliography of general treatments of the topic [p.92,n.45]. The question of Seneca's position vis-a-vis allegorism is discussed by G. Mazzoli, Seneca e la Poesia, who accepts that Seneca was an allegorizer
(p.112); he is criticized for this position by J. Dingel in his review in *Gnomon* 46 (1974) 212-214. Dingel will undoubtedly explore the question in his forthcoming *Habilitationschrift* titled *Seneca und die Dichtung*.

The Graces are introduced by Seneca because of the etymological connection with the theme of gratitude (*gratiam extundit*, *Ben.*, 1.3.1). The Greek equivalent is even more appropriate since it also translates *beneficium* as well as *gratia*, and appears in the titles of works dealing with benefits (e.g. Chrysippus Περὶ χαρᾶς τῶν). In fact, H. Gomoll (*Der Stoische Philosoph Hekaton*, p.76) believes that Seneca's impatience with Chrysippus (see *Ben.*, 1.3.8) is based on the fact that he himself could not establish a relationship between Gratiae and beneficia in the same close way this was possible in the Greek. His frustration, however, probably has other causes, such as a Platonic attitude towards allegory, inherited by way of Panaetius, and his own critical stand over against useless knowledge (see p.151).

At any rate, the name of the Graces in Greek lends itself easily to allegorical explanation. Commenting, in a discussion about Justice, on the importance for the state of some form of reciprocity in the exchange of services, Aristotle remarks (*EN.*, 1133a3) this importance is the reason why people build a temple to the Graces in a conspicuous place, so that there may be a giving in return. Aristotle then picks up on the double meaning of Charis (gratitude, benefit), stating that there is an obligation to benefit in return, as well as to take the initiative in benefiting. Whether Aristotle's pupil
Theophrastus, who also wrote a work titled Περὶ χάριτος (DL., 5.48), made use of the Graces must be left to conjecture, but it is not unlikely. Epicurus too is reported to have written a work Περὶ δόμων καὶ χάριτος (DL., 10.28; E. Wind, *Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance*, p.34-35, takes seriously the claim of Carneades that Chrysippus was the literary parasite of Epicurus [DL., 10.26], and conjectures that Epicurus influenced Chrysippus. If the fact that Plutarch's reference to the work of Epicurus [Mor., 778c] is followed by a brief discussion of the Graces, is significant, it may well be that Epicurus too allegorized the Graces. Strabo (9.2.40) connects the founding of the cult of the Graces at Orchomenos by Eteocles with giving and receiving benefits. Diodorus Siculus (5.73.3) adds aesthetic considerations to ethical ones, since he assigns the Graces, as their particular province, beautifying the body, initiating benefits and rewarding benefactors, in return, with gratitude (for other allegorical interpretations of the Graces see the commentary).

Seneca's declaration of the irrelevance of an allegorical approach to the Graces loses its echo with the passage of time. In the fourth century A.D. Servius adds to the detail in Seneca (Serv. In Virg. Aen., I.720). He states that the reason why one Grace is painted from the back, while the two others return the look of the viewer, is that gratia, a benefit, ought to return twofold (this idea was much copied, e.g. by the fifth and sixth century mythographer Fulgentius, by Boccaccio in the Renaissance period, by Spenser, et al.; for details see E. Wind, *op. cit.*, p.28, n.5).
Wind points out (p.30) that Seneca envisions three actions, giving, receiving, and returning, while Servius has two in mind. Servius has the Graces arranged, while Seneca envisions a circle. Another difference is that Seneca's Graces are dressed; Servius' are not. But, although the latter's depiction persisted, Seneca's explanation was very influential, and the two, according to Wind (p.52), were harmonized, with, as a result, one Grace seen in profile (cf. Corregio's famous "Three Graces", fig.16 in Wind; J. Seznec, The Survival of the Pagan Gods, p.208, traces a disintegration of the old motif in the Middle Ages when relative positions in the group no longer seem important; two Graces may have their back turned to the viewer, for example; for other famous depictions of the Graces see H. Hünger, Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie, s.v. Chariten). There was change too in what the Graces represented; as attendants of Venus they became Chastity, Beauty, and Love, or Beauty, Love and Pleasure, etc. (see Wind, pp.36-52; they also became Faith, Hope, and Charity, D. C. Allen, Mysteriously Meant, p.172).

The Graces have a long history in mythology and cult, and as well in iconography (for details consult the articles on Chariten in RE, and in W. Roscher, Lexikon der Griechischen und Römischen Mythologie; not available was E. Schwarzenberg, Die Grazien, Bonn, 1966; J. Pépin, Mythe et Allégorie, unfortunately contains no discussion of the Graces). Their names (Ben.,1.3.6) identify them with nature, and they may originally have been chthonic deities with fertility associations.
Early depictions show them with the attributes of flowers, fruits, or branches. These early representations show them staidly dressed.

Later reliefs show them facing front, the middle one holding hands with the outside ones, as they dance to the left. In sculpture they were also depicted around a bowl or pillar. In the Hellenistic period, perhaps under the influence of paintings, the Graces adopted their now so familiar representation (e.g. the famous Pompeian fresco) in which three nude Graces appear to form a circle; but notice that the position of their feet still places them linearly, with the middle one turning her back upon the other two facing the viewer. The two external ones face outward and the middle one to her right. The outside arms of the external Graces hold an attribute; their inside arms embrace the middle Grace, who, in turn, embraces with her left arm the sister positioned on that side, and extends her other arm, with an attribute, to her right.

In conclusion, one further fact is worthy of note. Socrates, the philosopher, was reported to have sculpted a relief of the Graces (Paus.,1.22.8; Schol.Aristoph.Nub.,773). Perhaps this influenced Chrysippus to pay particular attention to the Graces.

1.3.2 Quorum quae vis quaeve proprietas sit, dicam, si prius illa, quae ad rem non pertinent, transilire mihi permiseris, quare tres Gratiae et quare sorores sint, et quare manibus inplexis, et quare ridentes et iuvenes et virgines solutaque ac perlucida veste.

1.3.3 Alii quidem videri volunt unam esse, quae det beneficium, alteram, quae accipiat, tertiam, quae reddat; alii tria beneficiorum esse genera promerentium, reddentium, simul accipientium reddentiumque.

1.3.4 Sed utrumlibet ex istis judica verum: quid ista nos scientia iuvat? Quid ille consentis manibus in se redeuntium chorus? Ob hoc,
quia ordo beneficii per manus transeuntis nihil minus ad dantem revertitur et totius speciem perdit, si usquam interruptus est, pulcherrimus, si cohaeret interim et vices servat. In eo est aliqua tamen maioris dignatio sicut promerentium.

1.3.5 Vultus hilaris sunt, qualis solent esse, qui dant vel accipiunt beneficiam; iuvenes, quia non debet beneficiorum memoria senescere; virgines, quia incorrupta sunt et sincera et omnibus sancta; in quibus nihil esse alligati decet nee adstricti: solutis itaque tunicis utuntur; perlucidis autem, quia beneficia conspici volunt.

Seneca promises a definition and classification, after skimming over some material he considers irrelevant. This consists of an allegorical explanation of such matters as the number of the Graces, why they are sisters, why their hands are intertwined, why they are smiling and young and maidens dressed in a free-flowing and sheer garment. He gives alternate explanations of the number of Graces, disclaiming any importance for the question which is the correct one. As to the fact that they represent a dance-group of maidens holding hands, which turns back upon itself, this is explained by the sequence of benefit's passing from hand to hand; it returns to the donor. The beauty of the whole is lost, if the chain is broken, whereas this sequence is most magnificent, if it stays intact and the rotation remains in force. Yet there is in this circle esteem for the elder, just as in the case of benefactors. Their faces are happy, just as are those who give or receive benefits; they are young, because the memory of benefits ought not to grow old; maidens, because benefits are untainted, pure and sacred to all. In them there ought to be nothing restricted; and therefore the Graces wear free-flowing garments. These
are sheer, moreover, because benefits want to be seen.

**Quorum quae vis quaeve proprietas sit:**

The reference in *quorum* is to benefits.

*Vis* means "force", i.e. significance, meaning or definition; cf. Ben., 2.34.5; Ben., 3.8.3; EM., 95.66 (see also H. Lausberg, *Handbuch der Literarischen Rhetorik*, 108).

*Proprietas* may form a hendiadys with *vis*, but *-ve*, in a sentence which is not negative, usually means "leaving the choice free between two things or among several" (Lewis & Short, s.v.) suggesting that *vis* and *proprietas* need not be identical. In *proprietas* Seneca may be referring to the classes of benefits outlined in Ben., 1.11.1 ff. Admittedly a preferable reading in that case would be *quaque proprietates*. This is paleographically not impossible; the confusion in the MSS over *sit* or *sed* (see Préchac's *app.crit.*) may have been caused by disruption in the final syllable of *proprietates*, and *quaque* easily yields *quaee* (*quaee* in Préchac's orthography) with the omission of *g*. For *proprietates* meaning "kinds" cf. *Non debes admirari si tantas invenis vitiorum proprietates: varia sunt, innumerables habent facies, comprehendt eorum genera non possunt* (EM., 122.17; cf. TA., 2.7). Such a procedure of first defining what benefits have in common (*vis*) and then giving differences (*proprietates*) is not unusual (see M. Fuhrmann, *Das systematische Lehrbuch*, pp.139-40; cf. H. Lausberg, *Handbuch der*
Literarischen Rhetorik, § 111; a definition can give the universum or proceed per partes, Quint. Inst., 5.10.54).

si prius illa, quae ad rem non pertinent, transilire mihi permiseris:

Seneca requests permission to skip across, i.e. touch lightly upon material which is not strictly relevant. The form into which the request is cast, a condition, is, of course, merely a rhetorical device, which adds to the apologetic tone in which the digression is presented; it must not be taken at face value.

* H. Fowler, Pan. et Hecaton. Fragm., p. 26, argues that Seneca would not have started his pillaging of Hecato (on whom see Ben., 1.3.9) with material he considered irrelevant, and that Seneca must, therefore, have been using Hecato before the section on the Grace. But transilire must not be used to anchor what precedes the section on the Graces into Hecato's work. Rather than saying "I am going to skim over what Hecato has to say about the Graces", Seneca may be stating "I shall hurry my treatment of the Graces". Certainly within the framework of the whole De Beneficiis the digression is not large, so that the statement made about the disproportionate place assigned to the Graces by Chrysippus (Ben., 1.3.8) does not apply to Seneca (cf. also Ben., 1.5.1, transcurram). Hecato has not yet been introduced, and reading him back from Ben., 1.3.9 into an earlier section of the text, as Fowler does, complicates an otherwise clear statement.
Transilire (skip, skim, dance) is apt in the context of the Graces, and may have been written tongue-in-cheek (on the association of the Graces with dancing see RE.,3.2163.24-52, and the note on chorus, Ben.,1.3.4). Galen, who adopts an attitude towards Chrysippus' allegorizing and etymologizing similar to that of Seneca, likewise expresses the intention to hasten over material more extensively dealt with by Chrysippus (ὅτα ταχέων παρέρχεσθαι τὰ περιττῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ χρυσίσκου γεγραμμένα; Opera Omnia, ed. C. Kühn, vol.5, p.358-9).

Seneca acknowledges the irrelevance of the digression also at its conclusion (quemadmodum supervacua transcurram, Ben.,1.5.1), and casts doubt on the value of such allegorical exercises throughout the digression itself (Ben.,1.3.6; Ben.,1.3.7; Ben.,1.3.8; Ben.,1.4.1; Ben.,1.4.6).

The question may be raised why Seneca bothers to include a digression containing material which he does not consider essential. One reason is that it allows him to criticize the allegorical interpretation, and to disallow the claim of poetry (Ben.,1.4.6) to improve society. Another reason is that Seneca in general does not avoid being intrigued by, and devoting time to, the kinds of knowledge which he, in more cynical moments, declares useless (Ben.,7.1). Such matters in fact may provide relaxation for those who have already acquired the basics (EM.,65.15; cf. EM.,58.25; Ben.,6.1). Dialectic, discussions of such technical subjects as the corporality of virtue (EM.,106), and exhaustive explorations of certain questions about benefiting (in
the last books of the *De Beneficiis* find their way into Seneca's works. Moreover the digression on the Graces gives rhetorical advantages, which also the proem of Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura* offers (cf. the simile of the medicine given in a honey-rimmed cup, EM., 1.936). The diversion, in the ecphrasis, from the grim picture of ingratitude which has so far been on display allows relaxation, making the reader more receptive for the all important definition of benefits which follows the mythological excursion. The ecphrasis in this way marks a transition from a more negative to a more positive part, and from protreptic remarks to instruction proper. In addition Seneca's digression can be regarded as a negative and somewhat belated sort of invocation (the Graces are associated with the Muses as a source of inspiration in Pind. P., 9.3; cf. Plat. _Leg._, 3.682A).

* The digression can be divided into three parts. The first consists of a discussion of those aspects which Seneca allows to be somewhat relevant (for someone else; _Ben._, 1.3.2 - _Ben._, 1.3.5), and which can be subdivided into a preliminary list of characteristics of the Graces, followed by an allegorical explanation of the items in the list. The second is a discussion (_Ben._, 1.3.6 - _Ben._, 1.3.7) of elements which to Seneca have no relevance (true names, and association with other deities). The third (_Ben._, 1.3.8 - _Ben._, 1.4.6) consists of criticism of Chrysippus' treatment of benefits, with further discussion of some of the elements of the second class. After corrections have been made by placement of the theme of benefits in the proper practical and social context, Seneca rejects poetry as inadequate to the task
of improving society.

quare tres Gratiae et quare sorores sint:

The order in which details about the Graces appear in Cornutus (ND.,15), who first discusses their parentage, then their dress, their facial expression (leading to an etymological explanation of their names), their shape, their individual names, their parentage again, the fact that one was married to Hephaestus, and, finally, their association with Hermes, does not correspond with the order as observable in Seneca. A reason may be the difference in value in Seneca between the allegorical explanation of details apparent in an artistic representation of the Graces, and those which are not so apparent, such as genealogy and etymology. It does not appear likely that either of the two authors used the other as a source. This will also be borne out by differences in the details of their allegorical explanations (for which see the commentary below). It must be pointed out, however, that like Seneca (EM.,88.5 f.), and unlike the usual Stoic position (for which see A. S. Pease on Cic. ND.,1.15.41), Cornutus did not believe Homer to be a philosopher. Moreover, he criticized Homer and Hesiod especially for transferring names and adding to genealogies (J. Tate, "Cornutus and the Poets", CQ.,23 (1929), p.41).

* Seneca promises an explanation of why there are three Graces; instead he gives one of what these three might represent. He ignores
the problem of the number of the Graces. Homer does not give a fixed number, but speaks either of one Charis or an unspecified number in the plural (Od., 18.194; Il. 14.267). Further difficulties lie in the fact that in some locations two Graces were worshipped instead of three (e.g. Auxo and Hegemone in Athens, Kleta and Phaenna in Sparta, Paus. 9.35). This variation in number led H. Usener (Dreiheit, pp. 321-323) to regard the lower number as an earlier one, from which a development to a trinity took place. Cornutus is aware of the tradition that there were two Graces. His two differing explanations of the number three are preceded by an explanation of the number two, one representing the original donors (προκατάρχειν), the other those who are making a return (ἀμετέρεσθαι). It must be added that some have believed that since Cornutus seems to echo Chrysippus' explanation of the Graces as initiators and returners of benefits (τὰς ἡμετέρας καὶ τὰς ἀνταργόσεις τῶν ἐυργενῶν, SVF., 2.316.36) Chrysippus also postulated two Graces (see F. Osann's edition of Cornutus, p. 272).

* Seneca does not include the promised exposition of why the Graces are sisters with the explanations of the other points in Ben., 1.3.3-5, although it may be hinted at in the comparison of their ages; it is discussed, however, in Ben., 1.3.9, where it is listed with information not transcribed by Hecato, but by Chrysippus. If Hecato, who was Seneca's source for part of the digression, did not comment on this point, why did Seneca include it in his initial list? To answer
this question with another; did Seneca already have Chrysippus on
the Graces in mind at this particular point?

Alii quidem videri volunt unam esse, quae det
beneficium, alteram, quae accipiat, tertiam, quae reddat;
alii tria beneficiorum esse gener a promerentium,
reddentium, simul accipientium reddentiumque.

K. Busche, "Zu Senecas Büchern de beneficiis und de clementia",
RHM, 72 (1917), p. 465, considering videri awkward, wishes to replace
it with dividere (he compares distinguant, Ben., 3.18.2); the suggestion
has merit.

* Promerenti is synonymous with beneficium dare. Merenti means
"to earn something", a return, for example, and so "to be deserving
of it"; hence it means "to perform a service, or give a benefit".

Meritum appears as a synonym for beneficium (J. Hellegouarc'h, Le
Vocabulaire Latin des Relations et des Partis Politiques, p. 169).

* Seneca presents two alternate explanations of what each of the
three Graces represents. The first is the simpler one; one Grace
gives, another accepts, and a third returns. The second is more com-
plex in two ways. In the first place, each Grace is said to represent
a class of benefactors, and, in the second place, there is at the very
end a figure which represents two functions at once, accepting and
returning, a figure which seems strangely out of sequence, since a
more logical progression would be promerentium, accipientium reddentium-
que, reddentium, since then accepting would take place prior to passing
on. Reddentiumque in that case would have to mean tradentiumque (as it can, see Lewis & Short, s.v. reddo, II, 1). As distinct from that, reddentium would refer to giving the benefit back to the original Grace, so that it has travelled full circle. It may be possible, however, to explain the text as it stands. Seneca could have ended up with the sequence he has, if, instead of using a logical analysis, he had in mind some such representation as the Pompeian Graces. These are positioned in such a way that they seem to form a triangle.

\[\text{(1)} \quad \text{.} \quad \text{.} \quad \text{(2)} \quad \text{.} \quad \text{(3)} \quad \text{.} \quad \text{(4)}\]

\[(1) = \text{promerens} \quad (2) = \text{reddens} \quad (3) = \text{accipiens et reddens} \quad (4) = \text{viewer}\]

If we assume that the viewer (4) standing in front of the Graces lists them not from left to right as seen from his vantage point, but in clockwise fashion as seen from above (1) (2) (3) (see the illustration), the Grace with the double function, while "in the middle", according to a left to right listing, is enumerated last. Another explanation can be derived from Cornutus who also has two explanations of the number three. The first account has the third Grace represent the original donor after he has received a return, since it is good that
he be charitable again so the process will not stop (ἔπειτ' καλῶς ἔχει τὸν τετευχότα ἀμοιβής ἐστάμαι πάλιν χαριστικῶς, ἵνα ἀκαταπαύστως τούτο γίνηται, Corn. ND.,15). Cornutus then relates that this is the reason why the Graces appear in a chorus. The second of Cornutus' explanations equates the first Grace with the benefactor, the second one with the person who receives the benefit and who also watches for the right moment to make a return, and the third Grace with this same person as he in fact makes the return at the proper moment. Problems have of course arisen because there are two persons, but three acts (giving, receiving, and returning) involved in the exchange of benefits. The most interesting figure in Cornutus' last explanation is the middle one, who receives, and is involved in, the return to the extent of its preparation, but not its execution. Was the function of such a figure misunderstood by Seneca and reduced to accipiens et reddens? A final alternate explanation for the lack of clarity in Seneca's sequence, and at this point perhaps an attractive one, is that Seneca deliberately confounds the reader; it would bolster his thesis that an allegory worked out in such detail is useless knowledge (cf. BV.,13). In relation to the more important point that a benefit returns whence it came by a circular motion the difference in the particular function of each Grace is not important; quid ista nos scientia iuvat?
consertis manibus in se redeuntium chorus:

Although the earlier reference manibus inplexis (Ben., 1.3.2) did not make clear whether Seneca visualized a linear or a circular group of Graces, since the linear groups are also depicted as holding hands, the question is now answered. Cf. Servius (in Verg. Aen., 1.720): ideo connexae quia insolubiles esse gratias decet. Servius cites in this connection Hor. Od., 3.21.22; ... segnesque nodum solvere Gratiae. Cornutus pays no attention to the hands of the Graces.

* In the context the word chorus has an ironic reverberation. Its cognate χορηγία is, like beneficia in the popular sense, synonymous with wealth (Arist. EN., 1178a24), and the necessity of such χορηγία for one's being virtuous was disputed in the Stoa according to Diogenes (DL., 7.128).

* The Graces are often depicted as dancing (Eur. Phoen., 788, χοροποιοί; Corn. ND., 15, χορήγας; Pind. O., 14.19-21).

ordo beneficīi per manus transeuntis ad dantem revertitur et totius speciem perdit, si usquam interruptus est, pulcherrimus, si cohaeret interim et vices servat:

The description of the Graces represents an ethical cycle and completeness which is also found in a description of the unity of the virtues; ... comitatus virtutum consortarum et inter se cohaerentium (EM., 90.3). Such a cycle of benefits per manus, involving more than one person, is an essential part of benefiting: intra unum hominem non
est vicissitudo (Ben., 5.11.1; cf. Ben., 5.8.5-6).

* A more idealistic (altruistic) interpretation of the cycle (magna pars eius [beneficii] in se reedit, EM., 81.19) is given in the epistle on benefits. There it is stated that benefiting another benefits oneself, not in the sense that the other will give similar help, nor in the sense that a good example returns in a circle to the one who gave it (quod bonum exemplum circuitu ad facientem revertitur), but in the sense that the reward for all virtues lies in themselves.

* The proper exchange of benefits, as depicted by the cycle, will constitute obedience to the Stoic command to follow Nature, since the cycle of benefits imitates the cycle of Nature. The terminology used to describe the operations of the cycle (si cohaeret interim et vices servat) and the aesthetic appreciation given to it (totius speciem, pulcherrimus) suggest descriptions of nature, which is ultimately stable and eternal, but goes through set changes (EM., 58.24; EM., 88.15; EM., 93.9; Ben., 6.22). The changes (vices) may appear as death if one takes the near view; not so, if one takes the far view (EM., 71.13). Then a unity will be seen beyond successive changes; contrariis rerum aeternitas constat (EM., 107.8). S. Rubin states (Die Ethik Senecas, p.11) that the aesthetic appreciation of the harmony of the world is unique in Seneca, since the Stoa looked at the world from a utilitarian point of view. Such is not the case.

Panaetius stated that man is the only animal which can appreciate the beauty, charm and harmony of things seen, and, by analogy, of thoughts and deeds (M. Van Straaten, Panaetii Rhodii Fragmenta, fr.98, = Cic.
Off., 1.4.14; see further R. Phillipson, "Das Sittlichschöne bei Panaitios", Philol., 85 (1930), pp. 382-3; A. D. Nock, "Posidonius", JRS, 49 (1959) p. 15, raises the suggestion that also "Posidonius did perhaps communicate to others a sense of the wonders of nature").

* With totius speciem ... pulcherrimus, si cohaeret cf. Cic. ND., 2.34.87, an argument for the divine creation of the world with similar terminology used of the parts of the universe: ... ad speciem pulchriorum ... cohaerere. Cf. Cic. ND., 2.38.98 ff. Although Stoic physics as such have no place in the description of the circle of the Graces, the term cohaeret is reminiscent of the Stoic doctrine that pneuma holds the universe together (SVF., 2.147.27), and suggests that the circle of the Graces forms a self-sufficient cosmos.

In eo est aliqua tamen maioris dignatio sicut promerentium:

Maioris literally the "older" of the Graces. But Seneca does not even mention the version in which there are only two Graces (see p. 121); he must mean "oldest" (see maximam natu, Ben., 1.3.6; cf. Ben., 1.3.9, where the ages of the Graces, relative to those of the Hours, are regarded as unimportant). E. Wölfflin, Ausgewählte Schriften, p. 178-79, points out that the confusion, which sometimes exists in the use of the comparative and superlative degrees of Latin adjectives and adverbs, is more acute in the case of those words which have irregular formations in these degrees; this would apply to and explain maioris.
* The allegorical explanation of our text is not included in the list of Ben.,1.3.2; the idea is perhaps to be regarded as a complement to the concept of the circle. *Tamen* points to a contrast between the equality, so far assumed to pertain within the circle, and the greater stature of the oldest Grace (this idea was given artistic shape by the sixteenth century painter Correggio in his celebrated "Three Graces", on which see E. Wind, *Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance*, p.33; Wind thinks the idea, that the giving Grace was more important, Stoic; but see below).

* The oldest Grace represents those making the original benefaction. That the more prominent position should be given to the donor was a commonplace. Pericles notes in the Funeral Oration (Thuc., 2.40.4) that we gain friends not by receiving kindness, but by doing it; he who does the kindness is the stronger friend, whereas the recipient is more indifferent, because he knows that when he repays, he is not really giving a benefit, but repaying a debt. Aristotle frequently touches the theme. It is more virtuous to benefit than to be benefited (*EN.*,1120a ff.). To this Aristotle adds that the former is a mark of superiority, the latter of inferiority (*τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δὲ ὑπερεχομένου, *EN.*,1124b10; cf. *EN.*,1159a27). The same position as is advanced by Pericles is discussed at some length in a section in which, inter al. the benefactor's love for the recipient is compared to an artist's affection for his handiwork (*EN.*,1167b17 - 1168a28). Epicurus echoes Aristotle's sentiments, declaring that it is not only nobler but
also more pleasant to give benefits than to receive (Plut. Mor.,
778C). In Seneca a special responsibility is put upon the giver of
benefits. While the recipient can express his gratitude through his
voluntas alone, the donor can not impose an obligation that way. He
must actually give something (Ben., 6.10.2; but cf. Ben., 6.43.1, owing
is more laborious). Seneca also contains an echo of Aristotle's
artist-handiwork analogy; the donor is very pleased to see the recipient
because the benefits, which he himself has given, please him (Ben.,
4.15.3). The relative position of those engaged in exchanging benefits
is most fully discussed in Ben., 5.2.1 - 5.6.7.

Vultus hilaris sunt, qualis solent esse, qui dant vel
acciipient beneficia:

The detail of the joyful faces may derive from the etymological
connection between χάρις and χαρά. Cf. Corn. ND., 15, Ἰλαρῶς δ’
εὐεργετεῖν δέοντος καὶ Ἰλάρος ποιούσών τούς εὐεργετουμένους τῶν
χαρῶν, πρῶτον μὲν κοινῶς ἀπὸ τῆς χαρᾶς πᾶσι χάριτες ἀνομασμέναι
eἰσι. Note that in Cornutus the joy is also experienced by both parties
(cf. qui dant vel accipient); hence the emphasis on tribuens gaudium
capiensque in the definition of a benefit (Ben., 1.6.1).

* Cf. VB., 4.4, where the happy, i.e. good man, is said to be
attended by hilaritas continuo et laetitia alta atque ex alto veniens,
ut qui suis gaudeat nec maiora domesticis cupiat.

* With quales solent esse contrast the pessimistic tone of Ben.,
1.1.2.
In the allegorical explanation under discussion the Graces represent the persons involved in the giving and receiving of benefits; by the end of the section a change has occurred in which the benefits themselves are explained (quia beneficia conspici volunt).

juvenes, quia non debet beneficiorum memoria senescere:

In Homer (Il., 14.267) Hera promises to Hypnos as wife one of the younger Graces (χαρίτων με'αυ όπλοτερόων). This adjective puzzled commentators, with some scholiasts assuming there must also have been a group of older Graces (see p. 154). An explanation similar to the one in our text is found in Eustathius (Schol. Il., 984.25 on Il., 14.276); the Graces (χαρίτες) must always be young so as not to forget a benefit (χαρίτες), but by means of memory and by deeds and by exchanges in return to rejuvenate benefits and make them return. For this reason, Eustathius continues, artists picture them turned to one another. An additional explanation of "younger" is given; the adjective distinguishes them from the Graiai. Others had a more cynical view; Lethe (Forgetfulness) was named mother of Charis because a benefit (χαρίς) is soon forgotten (Schol. Il., 14.276, ed. H. Erbse; a direct reversal of this psychology makes Mnemosyne [Memory] mother of the Muses, Heraclit. All., ed. F. Buffière, § 55).

* With the idealistic non debet memoria senescere contrast the realistic evanescens memoria which necessitates choosing lasting gifts.
virgines, quia incorrupta sunt et sincera et omnibus sancta:

The moral and religious approval here accorded to the Graces Seneca picks up tongue-in-cheek when he mentions that Homer promised one of the Graces in marriage, ut scias non esse illas virgines vestalis (Ben., 1.3.7). But it would be characteristic of acumen nimis tenue (Ben., 1.4.2) to apply this loss of chastity to the allegory of our text.

in quibus nihil esse alligati decet nec adstricti: solutis itaque tunicis utuntur; perlucidis autem, quia beneficia conspici volunt.

Cf. Corn. ND., 15. It is there stated that some make Hera the mother of the Graces because they are the noblest born of the gods, and that according to another interpretation (πρὸς ἀλλὰν ἔμφασιν) they are introduced nude. Some tension was apparently perceived by Cornutus between the lofty status of the Graces and the manner of their dress. This may be related to the moralistic attitude evident in the denouncements - during the early empire - of diaphanous dress, especially Coan silk (e.g. Hor. Sat., 1.2.101, where Coan silk revealing the quasi-nudity of the prostitute is contrasted with the dress of the
matrona, which covers all; Seneca is also critical of vestis nihil celatura ... in qua non dico nullum corpori auxilium, sed nullum pudori, EM., 90.20; cf. Ben., 7.9.5, Video sericas vestes, si vestes vocandae sunt, in quibus nihil est, quo defendi aut corpus aut denique pudor possit, quibus sumptis parum liquido nudam se non esse iurabit). Cornutus continues with an allegorical explanation of their nudity. It signifies that those who have no possessions can perform many a useful service and that it is not necessary to be rich to be a benefactor. Some think, Cornutus states, that by means of the nudity the necessity of having a free and unimpeded attitude to giving benefits comes to mind (το εὐλύτως καὶ ἀνεμποδίστως δεῖν ἔχειν; εὐλύτως perhaps seen as related to generosity, ἐλευθερία). Yet another explanation is offered by Servius (in Aen. 1.720): ideo autem nudae sunt, quod gratiae sine fuco esse debent. Pausanias (9.35) states that the Graces were represented nude in his day, but that he does not know who is responsible for the innovation. The first literary references to their nudity occur in Euphorion and Callimachus (R. Pfeiffer, Callimachus, vol. 1, pp. 14 & 317). Seneca's image of Graces with loose diaphanous garments presents a type midway between the later nude groups and the staidly dressed earlier groups (Horace knew differing types; solutis / Gratiae zonis, Hor. Od., 1.30.5: Gratia / nudis iuncta sororibus, Hor. Od., 3.19.17). Part of Seneca's allegory (nihil esse alligatī decet nec adstrictī) is akin to the second of the explanations of Cornutus; the explanation of perlucidis is new (see the note on
Pasithea, Ben.,1.3.7).

* With nihil ... adstricti compare the notion of benefits as a bond, and the fact that giving must be bound, i.e. restrained (Ben.,1.4.2).

* With beneficia conspici volunt compare Ben.,2.9-10, where it is pointed out that all philosophers teach that some benefits are to be given in the open (palam), others not (secreto), so that in some cases the recipient will not even know who gave the benefit.

1.3.6 Sit aliquis usque eo Graecis emancipatus, ut haec dicat necessaria; nemo tamen erit, qui etiam illut ad rem iudicet pertinere, quae nomina illis Hesiodus inposuerit. Aglaien maximam natu appellavit, medium Euphrosynen, tertiam Thaliam. Horum nominum interpretationem, prout cuique visum est, deflectit et ad rationem aliquam conatur perducere, cum Hesiodus puellis suis, quod voluit, nomen inposuerit.

1.3.7 Itaque Homerus uni mutavit, Pasithean appellavit et in matrimonium promisit, ut scias non esse illas virgines vestalis. Inveniam alium poetam, aput quem praecingantur et spissis aut Phryxianis prodeant. Ergo et Mercurius una stat, non quia beneficia ratio commendat vel oratio, sed quia pictori ita visum est.

There may be someone so given over to the Greeks that he would declare the aforementioned allegories as necessary. Nevertheless, there will be no-one who will claim relevance for the names which Hesiod gave the Graces. The oldest he called Aglaie, the middle one Euphrosyne, and the third Thalia. As Hesiod imposed on his maidens the names he wanted, just so everyone changes the meaning of the names as he sees fit, and tries to end up with some reasonable explanation. And so Homer changed the name of one, called her Pasithea, and
promised her in marriage, so that you know the Graces are not vestal virgins. We shall find another poet who does not depict them with free-flowing garments, but with thick and woollen garments. Also, Mercury is depicted with them, not because reason and rhetoric recommend benefits, but because it so pleased a painter.

Sit aliquis usque eo Graecis emancipatus, ut haec dicat necessaria:

Disdain for the Greeks who were regarded as somewhat effete, as given to luxury, hence as desiring, in this instance, more than what is strictly necessary, was a commonplace (on anti-Greek sentiment see Juv. Sat., 3.60 ff.; W. Kroll, Studien zum Verständnis der Römischen Literatur, pp.1-23). This disdain must have been all the more keenly felt around the time Seneca was writing the De Beneficiis, after 54 A.D. when Claudius died (see Ben., 1.15.5). His successor Nero's excessive espousal of Greek culture, its athletic and musical competitions and the theatre were well known, but anathema to the Roman nobility (Tac. Ann., 14.14 & 15 & 20; Suet. Nero., 12 & 20-25; see also B. H. Warmington, Nero: Reality and Legend, pp.108-127, and p.174 for bibliographical material; M. Grant, Emperor in Revolt, Nero, pp.83-107). In philosophy the Greeks were given to excessive subtlety, and sophistry, which however Seneca on his own admission can not avoid; Libet enim, Lucili, virorum oprime, ridere ineptias Graecas, quas nondum, quamvis mirer, excussi (EM., 82.8, Seneca there disputes the
usefulness of syllogisms in behaviour-modification; this sentiment is paralleled by the doubts he expresses about allegory and poetry in bringing a cure for the soul Ben., 1.4.5 & 6; cf. Cic. Off., 1.6.19, where it is said error can result from too much study of matters obscure, difficult and not necessary). Ironically the distinction necessaria / supervacua was, if not Greek, much used by the Cynics; Diogenes used it (EM., 90.14) and so did the teacher of Seneca, Demetrius the Cynic, whose distinction between necessary and superfluous knowledge is recounted in Ben., 7.1.3 ff. Seneca applies the distinction with considerable frequency (EM., 113.26; BV., 13.8, both also of useful and useless knowledge; ad Helv., 11.4; EM., 110.11 & 12; EM., 119.2, all in a cynic context).

* The distinction which Seneca draws between the material of doubtful value and that which has no relevance corresponds to a distinction between allegory (ὑπόνοια) of those aspects of the Graces which are visually, and therefore more obviously apparent, and the more recondite matters such as true names (vera nomina, Ben., 1.3.9 which is literally etymology) and genealogy.

* Emancipatus means the reverse of what the English "emancipated" suggests; rather than being "freed" it is "to have left the formal possession of one master into that of another", and so "to be sold or surrendered to the Greeks", (see Lewis & Short, s.v.), an ironical touch, since many of the slaves in Rome were Greek.
nomina illis Hesiodus imposuerit:

Seneca here states that Hesiod imposed the names on the Graces, and in *Ben.*, 1.3.7 that Homer changed the name of one of them; the problem of the chronological priority of Homer and Hesiod is raised. Several interpretations suggest themselves. It may be that the fact that Hesiod is mentioned first is not significant; in *Ben.*, 7.8.2 the order of appearance in a list certainly can not be important, since Seneca lists, in that sequence, Socrates, Chrysippus and Zeno. It is also possible that Seneca's source regarded the names, which Hesiod had given, as significant for purposes of allegory, and that Seneca himself adduced Homer to prove the contrary, that the process of naming is arbitrary. This would then account for the fact that Homer makes his appearance in the argument at a later stage than Hesiod, and would have no implications for the relative dates of the poets. Still another possibility is that Seneca regarded Homer as earlier than Hesiod, but mentioned Hesiod first, because in him the traditional names are first found; mutavit then would mean, not "changed subsequently", but "imposed a name differing from what later became traditional". This suggestion is not attractive, since it requires reading much into the text. A further possibility is that Seneca has cast the authors not into the chronological framework of their lives, but into that of their work; Hesiod is mentioned first, because he wrote about an earlier period in his *Theogony* than did Homer in his *Iliad* and
Odyssey. It is natural, therefore, that the time when they first came into being should be regarded as the time when they first received their names, and hence be listed first. The possibilities so far mentioned share the assumption that Homer lived before Hesiod, as is still suggested in some of the current classical handbooks (e.g., P. Harvey, The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature). However, the question of priority is and was by no means settled. M. L. West suggests, in his commentary on the Theogony (pp. 46-7), that the Theogony may be older than the Iliad and Odyssey in their present form, and that "until the latter part of the fourth century B.C. Hesiod's priority was widely accepted". This view had already been held in the late fifth century (West, p. 40, cites Hippias, DK., 86B6; Aristophanes, Ran., 1032-5; Plato, Apol., 41A. Also mentioned are Hellanicus, Damastus and Pherecydes in Procl. Chrestomatheia, 19; Georgias, DK., 82B25; Plato, Rep., 363A, 377D, 612B). When West states that in later antiquity the order Hesiod-Homer was reversed because of the propaganda of the Homeridae, he leaves the erroneous impression that the question was settled. A. Stückenberger, Senecas 88. Brief, pp. 106-7, states that, according to the Chronicon Parium (IG., 12.5.444; see OCD, s.v. Marmor Parium for bibliography) which has an entry for 264/3 B.C., Hesiod was older. Aulus Gellius (NA., 3.11.1-7) is instructive; he writes that Philochorus and Xenophanes thought Homer older, whereas Accius and Ephorus, the historian, thought him younger. Accius is criticized for the arguments he used to support his claim. In any case, the issue of the priority of the poets was still very much a moot point in Rome at
the end of the Republic; Gellius further mentions Marcus Varro as being uncertain about which was older, but calculating that they were contemporaries, as Gellius himself accepted (NA.,17.21.3). By Seneca's slightly older contemporary Velleius Paterculus (Vell.,1.7.1) Hesiod is said to be one hundred and twenty years younger than Homer. In fact around the end of the second century A.D. Sextus Empiricus still speaks of the problem as though it has not yet been solved (Math.,1.204). One may have, therefore, considerable sympathy for his near contemporary Pausanias, when he writes: Περὶ δὲ Ἡσιόδου τε ἡλικίας καὶ Ομήρου πολυπραγμονήσαντι ἐς τὸ ἀκριβέστατον οὐ μοὶ γράφειν ἴδε ὑπ᾽ ὑμῖν, ἔπισταμένῳ τὸ φιλαδελφίαν ἄλλων τε καὶ οὕχ ἡκιστα δόσι κατ᾽ ἐμὲ ἐπὶ ποιήσει τῶν ἐπών καθεστήκεσαν.

As to the Stoics' view on the matter of priority, we have no certainty. Cicero's summary (ND.,1.15.41; see A. S. Pease, ad loc.) of Chrysippus Περὶ Θεῶν is not helpful in regard to the latter's opinion, since the order Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod, Homer is different in Philodemus' summary of the same work, namely Orpheus, Musaeus, Homer, Hesiod (SVF.,2.316.18, where, incidentally, Euripides is added to the list). Galen several times mentions Chrysippus as using Homer and Hesiod (Omnia Opera, ed. C. Kuhn, pp.300,309,310,314), but without stating expressly that Chrysippus believed either one or the other prior. As we can not be certain of Chrysippus, so no certainty is possible in the case of Seneca. He lists Homer before Hesiod (EM., 27.6), but, in an epistle in which he indicates the futility of investi-
gations of such questions as (inter al.) which is Homer's birthplace, and how many are the years between Orpheus and Homer (EM., 88.37 & 39), remarks the following: Hoc quidem me quaerere, uter maior aetate fuerit, Homerus an Hesiodus, non magis ad rem pertinet quam scire, cum minor Hecuba fuerit quam Helena, quare tam male tulerit aetatem (EM. 88.6).

nomina ... inposuerit:

The expression is stronger than Herodotus' τὰς ἐπωνυμίας δύντες (2.53, where twice he lists Hesiod before Homer), and carries the suggestion of the artificiality of the names.

Aglaien maximam natu appellavit:

For the names of the Graces see also Hes. Th., 909, Pin. OI., 14.19 f., and Corn. ND., 15. Other names of local Graces are mentioned in Paus. 9.35. There we are also told that Hermesianax, a Hellenistic poet, made Peitho a Grace (Corn. ND., 15 calls the Graces well-shapen διὰ τὸ ευεξίδειαν καὶ πιθανότητα χαρίζεσθαι).

* Aglaia appears to be connected in Plut. Mor., 778D with Ἀγαλλω (glorify), but properly it means "splendour, beauty, brightness".

* Called here the oldest of the Graces, Aglaia is termed the youngest by Hesiod (Th. 945–6): Ἀγλαιήν δ' Ἡφαιστος ἀγαλλώτως ἀμφίγυνείς ὀπλοτάτην χαρίτων θαλερὴν πολήσατ' ἀκολείν. M. L. West,
commenting *ad loc.*, takes ὀπλοτάτην literally; Escher (*RE.*, s.v. Charites) considers the adjective honorific, and asserts it has nothing to do with her age. He compares Hom. II., 14.267 where the same adjective is used in the plural of the Graces (τῶν ὀπλοτέρων χαρίτων).

**Euphrosynen:**

"Merriment; cheer". She is listed third after Thalia by Cornutus (ND., 15); Seneca preserves Hesiod's order (Th., 909).

**Thaliam:**

"The blooming one". Her name she shares with a Muse (see Ben., 1.3.10; for associations of Thalia with poetry see Hor. Od., 4.6.25; Ovid. AA., 1.264; Virg. Ecl., 6.2). But as in iconography the Graces and the Muses are not always easily distinguishable, so with respect to literature they do not always seem distinct. For the Graces also provide inspiration (Pin. N., 9.129); they may, in fact, constitute with the Muses a mixed choir (Eur. Herc. Fur., 673). So too we find Aglaia associated with song (Virg. Catal., 9.20).

*Horum nominum interpretationem, prout cuique visum est, deflectit et ad rationem aliquam conatur perducere.*
Etymology was a tool much used by Stoic allegorists (see p.108). For examples see Cic. ND.,2.25.64 ff. Seneca's attitude is decidedly cynical (but see Ben.,4.8, where Seneca himself indulges in the practice).

Itaque Homerus uni mutavit, Pasithean appellavit:

Seneca does not specify which of the original Graces had her name changed, nor does Homer provide any help in that respect. A scholium on Il.,14.275 (ed. H. Erbse, vol.3, p.629) remarks simply that Homer does not know the names of the Graces in Hesiod.

et in matrimonium promisit:

Pasithea is used by Hera as a bribe to gain the assistance of Hypnos, Sleep, in putting Zeus to sleep, so that Hera herself can influence the tide of battle at Troy (Il.,14.267).

* The same name occurs in Hesiod (Th.,246) of a Nereid; in Homer she is the only Grace specifically named. The allegorists interpreted her name as meaning that benefits are to be gazed upon and should not escape our notice (Eustath. in Il.Schol.,984.29), or that they should be seen everywhere and not be hidden but shine the whole day (H. Erbse, ed. Schol. Il.,14.275, vol.3, p.630). In that respect some scholiasts were puzzled by the fact that this Grace should be
betrothed to Sleep, which is tantamount to betrothal to forgetfulness (cf. Cat., 63.43 where Pasithea is consort of Somnus).

* In Hom. II., 18.382 we read that a Grace is already married; she can therefore not be the one whom Seneca has in mind, apart from the fact that for her no name is given by Homer. Her union with Hephaestus is allegorically explained by Cornutus (ND., 15) as stemming from the fact that artistic works are considered gracious (Hephaestus was the divine smith and craftsman).

\textit{ut scias non esse illas virgines vestalis:}

The clause is usually translated as a purpose clause (Préchac in the Budé text, Basore in the Loeb, and A. Stewart's translation of 1887). This would mean that Seneca tongue-in-cheek is claiming to give Homer's motivation for the betrothal. Alternately, the clause could be a result clause. In either case Seneca casts a glance backwards at Ben., 1.3.5 and his explanation of \textit{virgines} as \textit{beneficia incorrupta} ... \textit{et omnibus sancta}.

* The reference to \textit{matrimonium} may have suggested to Seneca the marriage of one of the Graces to Hephaestus, the fire-god. From there it would be easy to make a mental journey to other maidens who tended a fire, the Vestal virgins, who were required to remain chaste under pain of being buried alive. Because Seneca is probably writing tongue-in-cheek, the anachronism enhances rather than mars the comparison. A
further contrast between the Graces and the Vestals is seen in the depictions of each common in Seneca's time; the Graces formed nude, or semi-nude groups of joyful young maidens, whereas the Vestals were carved fully dressed and posing somewhat stiffly (some of the latter are still to be seen in the Roman Forum; for an illustration see M. Grant, The Roman Forum, p.65). Thinking of the Vestals in their formal dress may well have led Seneca to comment on the heavier clothing which the Graces sometimes wore, as he does in the next sentence.

Inveniam alium poetam, aput quem praecingantur et spissis aut Phryxianis prodeant:

Which poet Seneca means is not certain. His reference in the next sentence to a painter indicates that Seneca may not be thinking of a specific representation of the Graces, but in general of types of representations or descriptions (cf. gratiam extundit, Ben.,1.3.1).

* With spissis understand vestibus (surely not omitted because of the preceding vestalis!). Descriptions of Graces dressed in such attire are based on depictions of the pre-hellenistic period.

* Phryxianis, "of excellent wool", contains a reference to Phrixus who fled to Colchis on a ram with a golden fleece, which was later retrieved by Jason and the Argonauts.
Ergo et Mercurius una stat, non quia beneficia ratio commendat vel oratio, sed quia pictor ilia visum est.

Seneca here criticizes the allegorical explanation of what he considers an arbitrary association of Mercury with the Graces, but in Ben.,4.8.1 he is quite content to give an allegorical account of why god is called *inter al.* Mercury, ... *quia ratio penes illum est numerusque et ordo et scientia.* Perhaps his rejection of the association of Mercury with the Grace stems from his recent disavowal that the giving of benefits constituted a business venture (Ben.,1.2.3); Mercury was patron of business (cf. the Latin *merx*) and of thievery. He could not be a sufficiently serious representative of *ratio* and *oratio,* both of which are important in Stoic doctrine as a fundamental bond for the human race (see Cic. Off.,1.16.50; Ben.,4.18; cf. Cic. Off.,1.27.94, where the wise use of *ratio* and *oratio* is contrasted with being mistaken and being deceived, - i.e. being victims of the more sinister aspects of Mercury). For other Stoic disapproval of Mercury see Horace's "Stoic" satire, in which Damasippus, who had acquired the nickname *Mercuriale* for his skill as a trader in *objets d'art,* renounced this way of life upon his conversion to Stoicism (Hor. Sat.,2.3.25). In the same satire Mercury is seen as the purveyor of booty (Hor. Sat.,2.3.68). The involvement of Mercury, i.e. Hermes, with thievery is old; it already occurs in one of the Homeric hymns in his honour, in the delightful tale of his cunning theft, on the day of his birth, of the cattle of his brother Apollo (H. Hom.,4.17 ff.).
Mercury's connection with the Graces may lie in the fact that like them he was associated with fertility (cf. his representation as a herm). His pastoral function, prominent especially in Arcadia, is frequently brought out (H. Hom., 4.2; cf. Hes. Th., 444). But his connection with benefaction is still closer; he is called ἐρυθοῦνις, "the ready helper, benefactor" (Hom. Il., 24.360 & 677), and he is also known as δῶτος ἐδωρόν, "the giver of goods" (Hom. Od., 8.335; H. Hom., 18.12). A further relationship between Mercury and the Graces lies in their having a common enemy, Lethe (Forgetfulness; see memoria, Ben., 1.3.5; on Hermes' battle with Forgetfulness see Heraclit. All., 55, ed. F. Buffiere). Moreover both the Graces and Mercury have an association with Peitho (Persuasion, who is sometimes classified as a Grace [see p.139]; Mercury, i.e. speech, is in need of Peitho, i.e. persuasion, Heraclit. All., 59). With the Graces Mercury attends Aphrodite (Corn. ND., 24). Cornutus explains the fact that Mercury is the leader of the Graces on the ground that one must give rationally (ἐν λογίαστιν), not randomly, but to worthy recipients (Corn. ND., 16; Ben., 1.1.2; Ben., 1.15.1). This explanation makes Mercury represent a desirable quality in giving (the Graces). Plutarch reverses this, making the Graces a desirable quality of what Mercury represents; speech especially demands graciousness and friendliness (Mor., 44E).

Another reason why Seneca rejects the allegorical explanation of the connection between Mercury and the Graces may be the fact that, while he allows some value to explanations of obvious features (see p.135), he refuses it to explanations of more recondite matters. Such
a matter would be the etymological connection between Mercurius and ratio and oratio. In Greek the matter is simpler; Hermes is allegorically interpreted as related to ἐρμηνεύς and its cognates with the meanings "messenger, interpreter, someone who explains" so that Hermes' concern with λόγος, which in Latin yields both ratio and oratio, is natural (cf. Plat. Crat., 407E6 f., where Hermes is also called wily, deceptive in speech, and oratorical; Heraclit. All., 72). Cornutus takes a different approach. He states Hermes is named ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐρμηνευτλογομένου ("to have planned to speak", which includes the essence of both ratio and oratio), or ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐρμηνεύμα ("defense"; Corn. ND., 16). So facile a connection between Mercury and oratio and ratio (on the latter see also SVF., 2.316.25) is not present in Latin. Varro did make a valiant attempt to reflect this connection, (August. de Civ. D., 7.14), deriving Mercurius from medius currens, which is descriptive of language, the medium of communication between men.

1.3.8 Chrysippus quoque, penes quem suptile illut acumen est et in imam penettrans veritatem, qui rei agendae causa loquitur et verbis non ultra, quam ad intellectum satis est, utitur, totum librum suum his ineptiis replet, ita ut de ipso beneficio et commercio dandi, accipiendi, reddendi beneficii paucia admodum dicat; nec his fabulas, sed haec fabulis inserit.

1.3.9 Nam praeter ista, quae Hecaton transscribit, tres Chrysippus Gratias ait Iovis et Eurynomes filias esse, aeitae autem minores quam Horas, sed meliuscula facie et ideo Veneri datas comites. Matris quoque nomen ad rem iudicat pertinere: Eurynomen enim dictam, quia late patentis matrimonii sit beneficia dividere; tamquam matri post filias soleat nomen inponi aut poetae vera nomina reddant.

1.3.10 Quemadmodum nomenclatori memoriae loco audacia est et cuicumque nomen non potest reddere imponit, ita poetae non putant ad rem pertinere verum dicere, sed aut necessitate coacti aut decore corrupti
Chrysippus, a man with a keen wit which cuts straight to the marrow of truth, a man who does not waste words, but uses just enough words to make possible comprehension of what he says, also filled his whole book with such allegorical trivia, with the result that he says but little about benefits and how to handle them; he does not engraft such myths upon his treatment of benefits, but rather vice versa. For, in addition to those items which Hecato has copied from him, Chrysippus says that the three Graces are the daughters of Juppiter and Eurynome, that they are younger than the Hours, and somewhat prettier, and therefore are the companions of Venus. He also thinks the name of the mother is relevant: for she is called Eurynome because it is characteristic of an extensive estate to apportion benefits; as if a mother would be named after her daughters, or, as if poets would give true names. Just as his boldness serves a nomenclator, when his memory fails him, and, when he cannot recall someone's name, he invents one, so poets do not think it important to tell the truth, but, either compelled by necessity, or enticed by standards of taste, they command someone to bear the name which is most effective in their verse. They don't consider it a fraud, if they introduce a "pseudonym"; for the next poet bids the Graces bear the names he has chosen. So that you may know this is true, take the case of Thalia, a very à propos example,
who is in Hesiod a Grace, but in Homer a Muse.

Chrysippus quoque ... totum librum suum his ineptis replet:

Chrysippus was the third head of the Stoic school and died, aged seventy-three, in the hundred and forty-third Olympiad (208-204 B.C.; DL.,7.184). A prolific writer he has more than seven hundred works credited to him, and was renowned for his ability in dialectic (DL.,7.180), a subject to which he devoted many titles (DL.,7.189 ff.). In reputation he surpassed his predecessor, Cleanthes, for "without Chrysippus there would have been no Stoa" (DL.,7.183; see further A. S. Pease on Cic. ND.,1.15.39, and J. B. Gould, The Philosophy of Chrysippus, pp.7-14).

* "The Stoic rhetoricians considered brevitas as one of the cardinal virtues of style (σωφρονιστικοῦ), closely related to clarity" (A. D. Leeman, Orationis Ratio, p.39). With Seneca’s commendation of Chrysippus for his brevity compare Fronto’s evaluation: Num contentus est docere, rem ostendere, definire, explorare? non est contentus: verum auget in quantum potest, exaggerat, praemunit, iterat, differt, recurrit, interrogat, describit, dividit, personas fingt ... (SVF., 2.11.20-23; on the basis of this text Ch. Smiley, "Seneca and the Stoic Theory of Literary Style", Univ. of Wisconsin Stud. in Lang. and Lit., III [1919], p.57, points to an affinity in the styles of Chrysippus and Seneca. Is this perhaps why Seneca approves Chrysippus' style?). Not
all considered Chrysippus style *ad intellectum satis*; he had a reputation for obscurity (*SVF.*, 2.10.12; *SVF.*, 2.11.30; Epict. *Ench.*, 49). There is further evidence for both evaluations, that he was terse, and, that he was expansive. Perhaps a reconciliation of the two positions is offered by Galen (*Omnia Opera*, ed. C. Kühn, vol. 5, p. 312) who praises a maxim of Chrysippus as terse, if somewhat obscure, then adds that in his books as a whole Chrysippus did not imitate brevity. There is then a contrast in Chrysippus' works between the style used in individual sentences and the impression given by the whole.

* Although Seneca praises Chrysippus' intellectual abilities, and the brevity of his style (for Seneca's fondness of such a style cf. *EM.*, 59.5), he also offers criticism, albeit muted in comparison with that of *Ben.*, 1.4.1. Seneca does not approve of the proportion of Chrysippus' work devoted to allegory. R. Hirzel (*Untersuchungen zur Ciceros philosophischen Schriften*, vol. 1, p. 224, n. 1) remarks that allegorization of myth lost its favoured position within the Stoa, perhaps as a result of the criticism of Carneades. He regards such later allegorizers as Cornutus as grammarians and not as philosophers. For an explanation of Seneca's attitude, one should rather point perhaps to the influence which Plato had on *Panaetius* (see p. 108), and also to Seneca's fondness for the Cynical distinction between useful and useless, as applied to knowledge (see p. 135; ironically Seneca was himself accused by an imaginary interlocutor of introducing *acutae*
ineptiae, Ben., 6.5.3). The evidence Seneca adduces for his claim that the wrong proportions have been observed is scanty, consisting of a mere four additional facts about the Graces (genealogy, age, beauty, association with Venus) of which only the first is elaborated. Is Seneca's criticism typical of him? He mentions Chrysippus fifteen times and the references are predominantly complimentary, as J. Gould (The Philosophy of Chrysippus, p.11) has pointed out. But Gould does not lend sufficient weight to the criticisms voiced here and in Ben., 1.4.1, failing to relate them to remarks against dialectic, or useless knowledge in general, where Chrysippus is not named, but what he stood for is rejected. Unlike the Epicureans, moreover, the Stoics did not feel obliged to pour upon their founding fathers unreserved adulation; Posidonius was quite critical of Chrysippus (J. Gould, The Philosophy of Chrysippus, p.10). Seneca himself states of these leaders that he regards them as non domini nostri, sed duces (EM., 33.11; see also EM., 33.7-9).

* The totum librum referred to is presumably the Περὶ χαρίτων, which appears to have been considered by Philodemus (SVF., 2.316.35) a theological work. For this reason Von Arnim placed some fragments from Seneca's De Beneficiis under the heading of Chrysippus' physical doctrines (Stoic natural philosophy includes theology), and others under ethics (SVF., 2.316.38 ff. and SVF., 3.182.13 ff). Von Arnim was criticized for this by E. Bickel (Diatribe in Senecae Philosophi Fragmenta; I, p.355-6, n.2, and he is followed by H. Gomoll, Der Stoische Philosoph Hekaton, p.74) who considered Chrysippus' work an
ethical work. It is true that the ethical topic of benefits was treated under the title \( \Pi \epsilon \rho \iota \chi \alpha \rho \iota \tau \omicron \nu \) (Stob. Ecl., vol.2, p.45, 1.6). It is also true that Seneca expected more ethical material. But this does not substantiate the theory, as Bickel contends, that Chrysippus intended to treat the topic as an ethical one. What can be said is that Von Arnim's ambivalent attitude at least echoes the criticism which Seneca makes, and therefore a certain ambivalence may have been inherent in the work itself. It is generally believed that Seneca consulted Chrysippus directly (Hirzel, Untersuchungen zur Ciceros philosophischen Schriften, p.609; Fowler, Panaetii et Hecatonis Librorum Fragmenta, p.24; E. Bickel, Diatribe in Senecae Philosophi Fragmenta; I, p.355) but the possibility has been raised that a mythographical book such as that of Cornutus was consulted (Sonntag, L. Annaei Senecae De Beneficiis Libri Explanantur, p.12). Even if the claim in the Vita Persi "that Persius' Library contained nothing but seven hundred volumes of Chrysippus seems grotesque" (W. Clausen, A. Persi Flacci Saturarum Liber, p.xxvi), some of Chrysippus' works must have survived long enough for Galen to criticize in depth and with many specific examples Chrysippus' method of quoting the poets at length to support his arguments (Galen, "Hippocr. et Platon. Plac.", passim, in Omnia Opera, ed. C. Kühn, vol.5). There is therefore no reason to believe that Seneca did not have direct access to Chrysippus' works. Furthermore, totum librum suggests that Seneca knew the whole work.
The MSS have nothing between beneficio and dandi, and something should be supplied. Most suggestions so far proposed ratione, officio, commercio (see Préchac's crit.) are plausible. Add W. H. Alexander's vinclo (Seneca's De Beneficiis Libri VII, p.6), an attractive emendation in that it anticipates the imagery of a benefit as a bond (Ben., 1.4.2). One could further add doctrina, scientia (cf. EM., 81.13), or perhaps praecptis.

Hecaton:

Seneca's source for at least part of the allegorical interpretation of the Graces, Hecato is mentioned also in Ben., 2.18.2; Ben., 2.21.4; Ben., 3.18.1; Ben., 6.37.1. Not much is known of this representative of the so-called middle Stoa (see A. Schmekel, Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa, p.290-296). Cicero states (Off., 3.15.63) that he was a pupil of Panaetius and like him a Rhodian. Of his works, titles and fragments survive. Diogenes twice mentions a work titled Χρεῖα (DL., 6.32; DL., 7.26). Other titles are On the goods, On the virtues, On the emotions, On the Paradoxes, On the Goal (DL., 7, passim). Von Arnim (RE., vol.7, pt.2.2797 and H. Fowler (Panaetii et Hecatonis Librorum Fragmenta, p.28) believe that a work of his entitled On Duty, which was used as a source for the casuistic treat-
ment of the third book of Cicero's *De Officiis*, also was the source employed by Seneca for his *De Beneficiis*; H. Gomoll, *(Der Stoische Philosoph Hekaton*, p. 72) believes Seneca used a treatise of Hecato titled \( \text{Περὶ χαρῆς} \).

tres Chrysippus Gratias ait Iovis et Eurynomes filias esse:

The genealogy of the Graces varies. Eurynome is first named in Hesiod (Th.,907); Zeus alone is named *(Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta*, ed. E. Lobel & D. Page, fr.53). Eurynome is replaced by Aurydome, Eurymedousa, Euanthe (Corn. ND.,15: each has her own allegorical explanation). Many other parentages are found as well (cf. R. Pfeiffer, *Callimachus*, vol.1, p.13, n.). G. Hanfman *(OCD., s.v. Charites)* incorrectly states that, although the mothers vary, the Graces are always the daughters of Zeus; they were regarded as children of Aigle and the Sun by Antimachus *(Paus.,9.35; for other fathers see *RE.*,3.2150 f.).

aetate autem minores quam Horas:

The Hours were the Greek goddesses of the seasons. Their names in Attica, Thallo, Karpo *(Paus.,9.35)*, associate them with fertility, a function they share with the Graces; both groups moreover play a subordinate role in the panoply of deities. In Hesiod (Th.,902) their
names are Eunomia, Dike, and Eirene, which are obviously socio-political personifications, and may represent a later stage of development than that of the nature deities. In Hesiod the Graces are daughters of Eurynome who succeeds the mother of the Hours, Themis, as wife of Zeus; hence they are younger. The emphasis on their age may also have gained emphasis from Homer's puzzling epithet ὄπλοτερὰς (II.,14.267; some scholiasts thought there were two groups of Graces, an older and a younger one, perhaps with different mothers, Hera and Eurynome, Schol. II.,14.267, ed. H. Erbse; others provided an allegorical explanation, - the Graces were called younger because benefits ought to be recent, so that not one will be forgotten, Eustath. Schol.II.,984.25).

sed meliuscula facie et ideo Veneri datas comites:

The Hours might assert a claim to the position of attendants of Aphrodite on the basis of birth-right, but the younger Graces qualify because of another criterion, beauty (cf. Aphrodite's apple in the judgment of Paris; the Graces too are sometimes depicted with an apple).

* Association of the Graces with Venus (Aphrodite) was early (cf. Hom. Od.,8.364; h.Hom.,5.61) and was a natural development of their mutual association with fertility (Hor. Od.,1.4).
Eurynomen enim dicitam, quia late patentis matrimonii sit beneficia dividere:

Eurynome is explained as from εὐρύς (wide) and νέμω (divide, distribute; Soph. Αϊ. 1371 has χάριν as object of the verb νέμειν). Cf. H. Flach, ed., Schol. Hes. Th. 907: Εὐρυνόμηῃ. διὶ αἱ τοῦ Διὸς ὠρεῖαι ἀνὰ πᾶσαν εἰς τὴν οἰκουμένην (the gifts of God are spread throughout the whole inhabited world); T. Gaisford, ed., Etymologicon Magnum 396.31 f.: Ἡ δὲ ἡ τῶν χαρίτων μήτηρ· παρὰ τὸ εὐρέως καὶ μεγάλως νέμειν αὐτὴν καὶ διόδυναι· διὰ τὸ τούτο γὰρ καὶ θυγατέρα Ὀκεανοῦ καὶ μητέρα χαρίτων φασίν. Cornutus (ND. 15) explains the name as based on the fact that those who distribute large portions (οἱ μεγάλους κλήρους νεμόμενοι) are, or ought to be, more generous.

Seneca's explanation differs from that of Cornutus in that the former focuses on the possession, matrimonii, the latter on the possessors.

Moreover Seneca's version attributes the concept of extension, εὐρύς, not to beneficia, but rather to matrimonium, whereas Cornutus applies it to his equivalent of beneficia (μεγάλους κλήρους).

* Matrimonium, normally "marriage", is only here used as the equivalent of patrimonium, because Eurynome is the mother of the Graces; no other such usages are found in TLL., or A. Berger. Encycl. Dict. Law.

* Late patentis is common; cf. Cic. Off., 2.19.66, beneficia et patrocinia late patent; Off., 1.16.51; Off., 1.26.92; Off., 2.15.54.
tamquam matri post filias soleat nomen inponi:

Seneca uses ridicule to undermine Chrysippus allegorization. However, Chrysippus need not have meant that because the daughters represented benefits the mother was called Eurynome, as Seneca implies; the reverse could be true, i.e. because the mother had such a name or nature, she bore daughters like herself. Hesiod, at any rate, whom Chrysippus seems to be following, names the mother before he mentions the daughters.

aut poetae vera nomina reddant:

Seneca's belittling of etymology runs counter to the tradition of the early Stoa (see p.108). On the battle waged between poetry and philosophy for the right to proclaim the truth see F. M. Cornford, Principium Sapientiae, chapters 7-9.

* In Ben.,1.4.5 & 6 Seneca disputes the poets' right to moralize in verse and so improve society. Such poetry might include satire (see the commentary on Ben.,1.4.6). If this is the case, Seneca's statement that the poets do not give true names may have a further point; satirists by and large avoided using the real names of contemporary individuals, but hid them behind such pseudonyms as mythological or historical prototypes (for Horace and names: \ldots do nomen quodlibet illi, Hor. Sat.,1.2.126; see also N. Rudd, "The Names
in Horace's Satires", CQ., NS 10 [1960], 161-78). Seneca may here be expressing a veiled criticism of poets such as the satirists.

Quemadmodum nomenclatori memoria loco audacia est ...
ita poetae non putant ad rem pertinere verum dicere:

Seneca uses a comparison from contemporary life to explain the methods of the ancient poets. The analogy, however, is not a strict one, for, whereas the nomenclator invents names on the spot, the poet often has time to think of circumlocutions.

* The nomenclator is mentioned again in Ben., 6.33.3. It was the task of this slave to remind or inform his master of the names of persons the latter was to meet. Seneca's description calls to mind the practice of the salutatio in which clientes paid a morning call on their patroni (cf. Sen. TA., 12.6; BV., 14.3; EM., 19.11; EM., 19.11; EM., 47.8). Sometimes written lists were used to aid the memory (Ben., 6.33.4), or several nomenclatores might be employed (Plin. Ep., 2.14.6). If all else failed, a name might be made up (... nomenclator, qui nomina non reddit sed imponit ..., EM., 27.5).

* Seneca's nephew, the poet Lucan, would agree that poets do not necessarily tell the truth, but reserves an epithet for those who would require this of the poet: Invidus, annoso qui famam derogat sevo, / qui vates ad vera vocat (Phars., 9.360-1, at the introduction of his recounting of the mythological tale concerning the golden apples of the Garden of Hesperides).
See also C. O. Brink, Horace on Poetry: Ars Poetica, pp. 91-2
for a useful note on licentia poetica.

\[\textit{aut necessitate coacti aut decore corrupti id quemque vocari iubent, quod belle facit ad versum:}\]

The exigencies imposed by metrical patterns necessitated circumlocutions, or different names. For the former see Horace
(Sat., 1.5.37): \textit{Mamurrarum ... urbe = Formiae}; Hor. Sat., 1.5.87, ...
\textit{oppidulo quod versu dicere non est}. Cf. also Quint. Inst., 10.1.29
on changes suggested by metre, and Inst., 8.6.17: ... poetis, qui et omnia ad voluptatem referunt et plurima vertere etiam ipsa metri necessitate coguntur.

* Seneca's younger contemporary, the Stoic satirist Persius,
inveighs against the literary taste of the day, and criticizes decor
for its lack of vigour (Sat., 1.92-106).

* For other Senecan statements on this theme see EM., 59.5 & 6
where Seneca compliments his correspondent Lucilius for not following
the practice of others who digress, allured by the charm (decore) of
some pleasing word (the description of Lucilius' terse style is
reminiscent of that of Chrysippus: \textit{pressa sunt omnia et rei aptata;}
\textit{loqueris quantum vis et plus significas quam loqueris}). See also
EM., 75.2 & 5; \textit{Non delectant verba nostra sed prosint}, and EM., 114
(on Seneca's theory of style see A. D. Leeman, \textit{Orationis Ratio}
pp. 264 ff.).
Nec illis fraudi est, si aliud quid in censum detulerunt:

Seneca employs a Roman legal metaphor to prepare for Thalia's reclassification from a Grace to a Muse. The metaphor is that of making a declaration before a censor. Such a declaration was regarded as an oath, and false witnesses and perjurers (fraus) were subject to punishment (see T. Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht 2.1.373 & 2.1.380). Names, ages and property were required, on the basis of which citizens were distributed into five classes. The idea of the census may have been suggested by nomenclator (above). Officials with a similar title performed duties during a census, the nomenclatores a censibus (CIL.,6.8937-40; cf. CIL.,6.1986, nomenclator censorius).

proximus enim poeta suum illas ferre nomen iubet:

The example which Seneca gives does not have Thalia change her name but her classification; what she changes therefore is, in Stoic terms (SVF.,3.213.27-31; SVF.,2.45.1 & 2), not her nomen proprium (ὀνόμα) but her nomen appellativum (προσηγορία; cf. R. Schmidt, Stoicorum Grammatica, pp.37 & 43).

ece Thalia, de qua cum maxime agitur, aput Hesiodum Charis est, aput Homerum Musa:

A. Bourgery, Sénèque Prosateur, pp.391-2, comments that Seneca
uses cum maxime to indicate more particularly that the action expressed in the verb is in the process of taking place, and that it is almost the equivalent of nunc maxime. Translate de qua ... agitur as "who is a case in point"; Thalia has been mentioned in Ben.,1.3.6, but has received no special consideration above that accorded the other Graces.

* As a Grace Thalia occurs in Hes. Th.,909 (but in Th.,245 she is included, with Pasithea, in a list of Nereids; so Hom. Il.,18.39 has her in a comparable list of Nereids). Hesiod himself used the name Thalia for one of the Muses (Th.,77), but as Homer does not, Seneca is in error.
CHAPTER FOUR

In order to avoid coming under our own criticism, we shall abandon discussion of material which is so far removed from the topic, that there is not even a tenuous link. But defend me, if someone reproaches me for having put Chrysippus back in the ranks, - a great man he was, but nevertheless a Greek, whose intellectual acuity is too keen, and becomes blunt and counter-productive. Moreover, when it appears to accomplish something, it merely pricks and does not pierce. What indeed is the use of such acuity in the topic under discussion? We must speak about benefits and must put in order a matter which constitutes a powerful bond of human society. Life must be regulated, so that thoughtless ease in giving does not become acceptable under the guise of generosity, and so that, when this care is exercised, it does not - while restraining - restrict generosity, which ought to be neither excessive nor deficient. People must be taught to give, receive, and return freely, and to put before them a great contest not only to equal but to out-do in returning gifts and gratitude those to whom they are obligated, since the man obliged to be grateful never catches up, if he has not surpassed. The donors must be taught not to enter anything in account books; the recipients to be under greater obligation. To this most virtuous struggle of vanquishing benefits with benefits Chrysippus urges us, by saying that, because the Graces are the daughters of Jupiter, we must fear that insufficiently grateful
deportment is sacrilege, and an affront to maidens so beautiful. Teach me, rather, how to become more beneficent and grateful to my benefactors, and how the spirits of those who impose obligations, and of those upon whom they are imposed, may rival each other so that the donors become forgetful, and the debtors remember very well. Let trivia be left to the poets, whose task it is to delight the ear, and to weave a pleasant tale. But they wish to provide psychotherapy, to preserve trustworthiness in human relations, and to impress upon our minds the memory of our obligations. Then let them speak seriously, and act vigourously, or do you think, perhaps that a most destructive disaster, the erasure of obligations, can be prevented by means of trifling, incredible prattle and tales that an old woman might believe in?

1.4.1 Sed ne faciam, quod reprehendo, omnia ista, quae ita extra rem sunt, ut nec circa rem quidem sint, relinquam. Tu modo nos tuere, si quis mihi obiciet, quod Chrysippum in ordinem coegerim, magnum mehercules virum, sed tamen Graecum, cuius acumen nimis tenue retunditur et in se saepe replicatur; etiam cum agere aliquid videtur, pungit, non perforat.
1.4.2(a) Hic vero quod acumen est?

Seneca promises to leave aside the discussions on allegory which are not germane to the topic, and while seeking to be excused for his criticism of Chrysippus continues that very criticism. The edge of Chrysippus' wit is so finely honed that it is easily blunted and unable to be incisive; it merely scratches the surface.
In the fifth chapter Seneca states his intention to abandon criticism of Chrysippean allegory, and to initiate discussion of the subject matter proper. The sociological importance of the theme is stated, and the principle of moderation seen as imperative. The object of the lesson is the development of the free (liberal) exchange of benefits, which is advanced by means of an attitude, which is, paradoxically, agonistic yet altruistic. Seneca turns to Chrysippus once more, this time to reject the latter's reason for the development of an agonistic attitude (fear of sacrilege based on allegory). Proper instruction is to take the place of allegory. The chapter is concluded with literary criticism which denies to poetry a therapeutic role in human society.

*Sed ne faciam, quod reprehendo, omnia ista, quae ita extra rem sunt, ut nec circa rem quidem sint, relinquam:

Seneca clearly marks the allegory of the Graces as a digression, but does not leave the subject even now; the definition of a benefit, promised in _Ben._,1.3.2 does not start until _Ben._,1.5.1 (cf. _BV._,13.8; _Cat._,64.116). A more humourous example of the tension between theory and practice, showing Seneca's awareness of it, is found in _EM._,58.37: _Sed in longum exeo; est praeterea materia quae ducere diem possit: et quomodo finem inponere vitae poterit qui epistulae non potest._

* Extra rem ... circa rem involves a play on words; circa rem is one of the divisions into which _loci_, commonplace proofs, may be
divided. Loci circa rem, by and large, have to do with proofs by
analogy, such as similarity and dissimilarity. Included amongst those
a simile is fabula, so that the terminology circa rem is related to
the discussion of the types of exemplum (Ben.,1.4.5). This termino-
logy, moreover, has been claimed as Stoic (R. Volkmann, Die Rhetorik
der Griechen und Römer p.207, cf. p.228; H. Lausberg, Handbuch der
Literarischen Rhetorik, p.206). Seneca, then, is saying that all these
matters (omnia ista) are so far off topic that they are not even analo-
gous; circa is the restatement of extra, but with an additional element
of hyperbole. Seneca shows a fondness for such statements indicating
relative relationship (cf. Ben.,5.1.2, ... conexa sunt, non cohaerentia).
Those which contain prepositions lend themselves to his pointed style
(EM.,74.17, of the so-called goods, apud nos, sed ... extra nos: EM.,
75.9; regarding individuals who have almost attained to wisdom, tamen
etiam quod prope est extra est; EM.,117.18, regarding overly subtle
problems, omnia ista circa sapientiam, non in ipsa sunt; Prov.,6.6,
Hoc est quo deum antecedatis; ille extra patientiam malorum est, vos
supra patientiam.

Tu modo nos tuere, si quis mihi obiciet, quod Chrysippum
in ordinem coegerim, magnum mehercules virum, sed tamen
Graecum:

Seneca's fear of criticism is not deeply felt; he frequently
asserts his claim to independent judgment (e.g. EM.,33.4 & 9; cf. VB.,
3.2, where Seneca claims to follow only nature, not the Stoic school).

* In ordinem coegerim suggests (in comparison with ordinanda res, Ben., 1.4.2) that Chrysippus had been "out of line", i.e. guilty of some excess (cf. acumen nimis tenue).

* Magnum is used metaphorically, but is aptly followed by a reference to Hercules, who was also "nevertheless Greek".

* Chrysippus came from Soli or Tarsus in Cilicia (DL., 7.179) but from Seneca's point of view he was nevertheless Greek; hence subject to anti-Greek sentiment (see the note on Graecis emancipatus, Ben., 1.3.6). For other anti-Greek sentiments in Seneca see BV., 12.2; BV., 13.2; EM., 40.11; EM., 82.8 & 9; EM., 113.1, one of which indicates that Zeno is not exempt from criticism either (T. J. Haarnhoff in The Stranger at the Gate, which treats the theme of xenophobia, does not deal with such Senecan passages, but only points out that Seneca was "thoroughly Roman", p. 281). Such statements of Seneca reflect a difference of approach to knowledge which the Romans claimed existed between them and the Greeks; their self-image as men of action persisted here as well (cf. W. Kroll, Studien zum Verständnis der Römischen Literatur, p. 2). Knowledge for Seneca must be related to action (EM., 82.8 & 9); useless knowledge is not conducive to moral improvement (EM., 109.17-18; EM., 45.5-13); hence the statement of our text. It need not indicate a "temporarily hellenophobe de Sénèque" (A. Bourgery, Sénèque Prosateur, p. 76), supposedly based on the incompatibility of Greek and Spanish character (Bourgery, op. cit., p. 28; Bourgery even explains Seneca's silence about Phaedrus on the ground that the latter
was not sufficiently Latin). A. Bodson's characterization of Seneca's attitude as "un virulent anti-intellectualisme" is not correct either (La Morale Sociale des Derniers Stoïciens, p. 26). Note that by the end of Ben., 1.4 Seneca is no longer criticizing the Greeks, but, more generally, the poets.

* The word *acumen* meaning "point" (as of a weapon) introduces a military metaphor, which, since the Romans surpassed the Greeks in the art of warfare, tacitly but ironically underlines the point Seneca is making. The metaphor may have been suggested by *ordinem*, which can be a military term. The criticism Seneca makes is that Chrysippus' intellect is sharp but not virile, massive, or substantial enough to accomplish anything. The point of the weapon is sharp but feeble, is easily blunted, and, lacking hardness, has a certain flexibility which allows it to bend back upon itself. Therefore it pricks, rather than penetrates. Seneca sometimes expresses an anti-dialectical tendency in similar terms (e.g. EM., 82.24, *Acuta sunt ista quae dicis: nihil est acutius arista; quaedam inutilia et inefficacia ipsa subtilitas reddit*; the military metaphor is explicit in EM., 117.25, where subtleties are called *lusoria arma*). Compare also Cicero's *minutis interrogatiunculis quasi punctis quod proposuit efficit* (of Cato, Cic. Pared., pr. 2; cf. Cic. Fin., 4.7, of the Stoics, *pungunt enim quasi aculeis, interrogatiunculis angustis*). This anti-dialectical tendency was probably inherited from Panaetius (M. Van Straaten, Panaetii Rhodii Fragmenta, fr. 55) but was certainly strengthened in Seneca by the advice of his teacher.
Fabianus whom he quotes: contra affectus impetu, non suptilitate pugnandum, nec minutis vulneribus sed incursu avertendum aciem; non probam cavillationem, nam contundi debere, non vellicari (BV.,10.1; cf. BV.,13.9).

Hic vero quod acumen est:

"What subtlety is there in this subject?"; i.e. what is the need of such subtlety in the topic under discussion?

1.4.2(b) De beneficiis dicendum est et ordinanda res, quae maxime humana societatem adligat; danda lex uitaæ, ne sub specie benignitatis inconsulta facilitas placeat, ne liberalitatem, quam nec deesse oportet nec superfluere, haec ipsa observatio restringat, dum temperat; 1.4.3 docendi sunt libenter dare, libenter accipere, libenter reddere et magnum ipsis certamen proponere, eos, quibus obligati sunt, re animoque non tantum aequare sed vincere, quia, qui referre gratiam debet, numquam consequitur, nisi praecessit; hi docendi sunt nihil inputare, illi plus debere.

1.4.4 Ad hanc honestissimam contentionem beneficiis beneficia vincendi sic nos adhortatur Chrysippus, ut dicat verendumesse, ne, quia Charites Iouis filiae sunt, parum se grate gerere sacrilegium sit et tam bellis puellis fiat iniuria.

The topic to be treated is benefits, and some rules and regulations must be imposed upon this matter which is a fundamental bond for human society; neither excessive nor insufficient giving of benefits is desirable. Man must be taught to freely engage in exchanges of benefits and to rival one another in doing so. Chrysippus, admittedly, urges us to such a rivalry, but he does so in a strange manner; he warns against ingratitude on the ground that it is sacrilege, inasmuch as the Graces
are the daughters of Jupiter, and that it is an insult to these beautiful maidens.

De beneficiis dicendum est et ordinanda res, quae maxime humanam societatem adligat:

Note the sense of urgency which is captured by the repeated use of gerunds and gerundives (continued in Ben., 1.4.3 & 4).

* Whether ordinanda res means more than that rules must be given is doubtful. Certainly a logical exposition will not be forthcoming in the De Beneficiis. Moreover a pun may be intended here: as he had forced Chrysippus in ordinem (Ben., 1.4.2), so the subject-matter is to be treated.

* The last clause of our text has implicit in it the concept of cosmopolitanism, an important one in Hellenistic philosophy (on the subject see H. C. Baldry, The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought; references to early statements anticipating the concept in H. Bolkestein, Wohltätigkeit und Armenpflege, pp. 88, 123, 125). In the early Stoa the possession of rationality is generally regarded as the tie binding mankind (Baldry, op. cit., p. 152); our text is not at variance, — rationality is merely channeled into the specific activity of benefitting. Cicero also lays stress on benefits: magna etiam illa communitas est, quae conficitur ex beneficiis ultero et citro datis acceptis, quae et mutua et grata dum sunt, inter quos ea sunt, firma devincientur societate (Cic. Off., 1.17.56). Conversely, personal gain at the expense
of others is disruptive of society, and is so in the same way as that in which the sickness of part of the body can cause the whole body to weaken and die (Cic. Off., 3.5.21-22). The implications of this simile are present in Ben., 4.18, where, after ratio and societas are mentioned as the two divine gifts which enable man to rule the world, the consequences of the removal of societas are considered. Such a removal, caused in this instance not by personal gain but by ingratitude, destroys the unity of mankind by which life is sustained.

* With adligat compare Ben., 6.41.2, ... beneficium commune vinculum est et inter se duos alligat; Ben., 5.11.5, Beneficium ... dare socialis res est, aliquem conciliat, aliquem obligat. From a basic bond between two individuals, interlinking can be extended to include all of society. The bond of society can also work negatively for certain individuals, - in the case of the ingrate, for example, who is regarded as a common enemy (Cic. Off., 2.18.63; cf. Ben., 7.19.8).

* When Seneca portrays benefits as obligations and bonds, he does not have in mind the bondage of the old Roman law of debts, known as nexum (on which see R. M. Ogilvie, A Commentary on Livy, Books 1-5, p.296-8).

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{danda lex vitae, ne sub specie benignitatis inconsulta} \\
\text{facilitas placeat, ne liberalitatem, quam nec deesse oportet} \\
\text{nec superfluere, haec ipsa observatio restringat, dum temperat:}
\end{align*}
\]

The Stoics believed that law was given by god (SVF., 3.78.16).
However, although Seneca writes in universal terms (*danda lex vitae*), the gerundive indicates that the giving must still take place, a task Seneca expects to perform; the expression, therefore, means much the same as *de beneficiis dicendum est*.

*Lex means "ruling principle". E. C. Clarke (History of Roman Private Law, Part II, Jurisprudence, vol.1, p.303, n.15) gives three different etymological possibilities for *lex* (a) it is connected with *ligare*, as that which binds, (b) that which is laid down (from the same root as the English "law", (c) that which is read or declared. The last receives the support of Clark, following Cicero (*Leg.*,1.6.19). The context of our passage (adligat, restringat) indicates Seneca may have the first possibility in mind. However the Stoic identification of *lex* and *ratio* (*SVF.*,3.78. *passim*; cf. λόγος in Heraclitus) must not be discounted; *ratio* performs a similar controlling or restricting function (cf. *modus*, *Ben.*,1.15.3). *Lex vitae* is a common expression (e.g. Cic. *Tusc.*,2.4.11; *Tusc.*,4.29.62; Sen. *EM.*,108.6). For an example of *lex beneficii* see *Ben.*,2.10.4, where it refers to the altruistic principle that the donor should forget a given benefit, the recipient remember; but such a *lex* can not be part of a legal code (*Beneficium nulli legi subiectum est*, me arbitro utitur, *Ben.*,6.6.1). The term, then, need not invalidate A. Bodson's opinion that it is no longer in terms of law but in terms of affection that the social morality of the later Stoics expressed itself (*La morale sociale des derniers Stoïciens*, p.62). C. O. Brink (Horace on Poetry: Ars Poetica, p.211-12) notes that in Latin metaphors derived from *lex* come close
to "procedure" in meaning.

* Although lex vitæ (genitive) is common, vitæ could be dative, "regulation must be imposed upon life". Lex would then stand in relation to vita, as does causa (ratio) to materia (active and passive principle), in which the former shapes the latter (EM., 65.2).

* Benignitas is a synonym of liberalitas (Cic. Off., 1.7.20; cf. Ben., 1.1.9; Ben., 1.15.2). In juxtaposition with lex it may retain some of its legal colouring; in legal documents the term came to be used of decisions not taken according to the strict rules of law but according to moral considerations (A. Berger, Encycl. Dict. Rom. Law, s.v.).

* What Seneca advocates in nec deesse ... nec superfluere is the peripatetic doctrine of the mean. Aristotle had defined liberality as a mean (περὶ χρήματα μεσότης, EN., 1119b22). It is a mean between stinginess and prodigality in acquiring and parting with possessions (Arist. EE., 1231b37). The liberal man gives what he has over, but the prodigal man even lacks necessities (presumably because he has squandered everything; EE., 1232a9). Nevertheless prodigality is closer to true liberality than stinginess is (MM., 1186b23). The mean itself is to be achieved through the proper observation of the aspects (numeri) of an act of giving (EN., 119a28). J. Rist's remark (Stoic Philosophy, p. 19), that "Naturally enough, the Stoics will have nothing to do with virtue defined as a mean of any kind", must be modified to accommodate the doctrine of liberality. It is true that mediocritas is denied in
certain areas, such as diseases, also by Seneca (see EM.,116 for arguments against the peripatetic doctrine of metriopathy; T. P. Hardeman, *The Philosophy of Lucius Annaeus Seneca*, p.277). The adoption of the doctrine of mediocritas has long been pointed out (e.g. E. Bickel, *Die Schrift des Martinus von Bracara Formula Vitae Honestae*, RhM,60 (1905), p.549, where reference is made to Zeller and Schmekel; H. Gomoll, *Der Stoische Philosoph Hekaton*, p.61). Cic. *Off.*, 1.25.89 is generally regarded as evidence for Panaetius' adoption of the doctrine of the mean. In Cicero several passages anticipate the sentiments of Seneca; cf. *quam ob rem nec ita claudenda res est familiaris, ut eam benignitas aperi-ye non possit, nec ita reseranda, ut pateat omnibus; modus adhibeatur isque referatur ad facultates* (*Off.*, 2.15.55); in a discussion of largitio, ... mediocritatis regula optima est (*Off.*,2.17.59; cf. *Off.*,2.17.60; *Off.*,2.18.64). Cicero states that generosity must not be harmful, must not exceed one's means, and must be in proportion to the worthiness of the recipient (*Off.*,1.14.42 ff.). In his elaboration of the second point Cicero notes that excessive giving harms one's own relatives, encourages theft to replenish depleting stores, and leads to ostentatious display. Seneca does not in our text introduce any consequences of either excess or deficiency, but he is not unaware of them. He recognizes the dangers of giving to unworthy recipients and the difficulty of giving to a worthy recipient after the supply has been exhausted (*VB.*,24.3). This last point puts the transaction of giving a benefit within the framework of a larger social context (possible future recipients) than that of the donor and recipient
of the moment, a point which H. Fowler, in a comparison of Cic. Off., 1.14.42 and Sen. Ben., 2.15.3, denies Seneca ("The Sources of Seneca de Beneficiis", TAPhA, 17 [1886], p.30). Seneca allows moderatio in other areas as well, in clemency, for example, where it stands between indiscriminate and restricted mercy (Clem., 1.2.2, where Seneca advocates that, if one must err in so difficult a matter, it be on the side of leniency). Compare also Ben., 2.16.2, ... sit ubique virtus modus, aeque peccat, quod excedit, quam quod deficit; TA., 9.6, vitiosum est ubique, quod nimium est.  

* observatio is "precept, rule", a post-Augustan meaning (Lewis and Short, s.v.).

* Temperat has a good sense in its context, but it appears as an accusation in an argument against peripatetic metriopathy: Non his [peripatetic arguments] tollunt affectus sed temperant (EM., 85.4).

docendi sunt libenter dare ... et ipsis magnum certamen proponere ... quia, qui referre gratiam debet, numquam consequitur, nisi praecessit:

The plural in docendi, grammatically harsh, is probably derived from the idea of plurality in humanam societatem. The gerund clearly brings out the didactic function of the De Beneficiis, and the paraenetic function does not remain far behind (magnum ipsis certamen proponere is grammatically dependent on docendi sunt, but see Ben., 1.4.4, Ad hanc ... contentionem ... nos adhortatur Chrysippus). Both
functions, praeceptio and exhortatio are among the divisions of the paraenetic part of philosophy (EM., 94.48-9; see also I. Hadot, Seneca und die Griechisch-Römische Tradition der Seelenleitung, p.8).

* The old heroic concept of certamen gloriae is placed in a different ethical setting (see also the note on aliqua tamen maioris dignatio, Ben., 1.3.4). See Ben., 2.17.3 f. and Ben., 2.25.3 for illustrations of Chrysippus' views of the agonistic nature of giving and repaying benefits; in the former instance an exchange of benefits is compared to a game of ball; in the latter the man who wants to be grateful is compared to a racer straining behind the barrier. See also Ben., 5.2 ff. where the question whether it is shameful to be conquered in rerum honestarum certamine is discussed at some length. This question is a natural one in view of the oft maintained superiority of the donor. Compare Cicero's use of the phrase honesta certatio (Lael., 9.32), which is developed in a friendship based on equality of affection. In our context certamen can be regarded as a return to the military metaphor used of Chrysippus (Ben., 1.4.1), since it is reinforced by vincere, consequitur, praecessit, contentionem. But note the contrast between the sham fight (Ben., 1.4.1) and the real struggle (Ben., 1.4.3).

* The concept of rivalry in the context of benefits can be traced to Democritus, χάριτις δέχεσθαι χρεών προσκοπεύμενον κρέσσονας αὐτῶν ἀμοιβάς ἀποδοῦναι (DK., 68B92, cited by H. Bolkestein, Wohltätigkeit und Armenpflege, p.168, who points out that this seemingly utilitarian
principle of reciprocity in repaying may yet have an idealistic motivation. The agonistic attitude came to be formally embedded in documents: "the acceptance resolutions of social clubs and political assemblies alike follow almost a set formula in stating the various honours which the donor is to receive in return for his gift, a fact which makes possible the almost certain restoration of quite fragmentary inscriptions. The formula runs to the effect that in recognizing the generosity of the donor the recipients have conferred upon him honours which are not less, but rather more, than the equivalent of his gift" (A. R. Hands, Charities and Social Aids in Greece and Rome, p.50).

* Obligati is related to adligat and lex (Ben.,1.4.2); to be under obligation links one to human society. "The verb obligare is old in juristic use, e.g. Varro (LL.,7.105) quoting Mucius: quae per aes et libram fiant ut obligentur ..., but it is not confined to 'obligations'. Plautus uses it of pledge (Truc.,2.1.4: aedes obligatae sunt ob amoris praedium), as indeed the classical lawyers still do (e.g. D., 20.4.21). The noun obligatio is rare before Gaius; Cicero uses it, e.g. ad Brut.,1.18.3, but without any definite legal implication" (H. F. Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to Roman Law, p.284, n.1). The word is used in ius civile (ibid.; C. Schulz, Classical Roman Law, p.456). Seneca puts it in the context of ius gentium; it can also be used of moral obligations (A. Berger, Encycl. Dict. Rom. Law, s.v.). Whether Seneca in our text uses contemporary legal terms is less certain than that he anticipated, perhaps influenced, adoption of such terms as
legal ones (the question of the extent of the influence of Stoic philosophy on Roman law is a vexed one, see I. M. Cormack and B. I. Brown, "Stoic Philosophy and the Roman Law", BIDR, 44 (1936-7), 451-458). Compare also the following texts: "obligatio is a legal tie (vinculum) by which we are forcibly bound (adstringimur) to pay a certain thing (alicuius solvendae rei) according to the laws of our nation" (Just. Inst.,3.13.pr); "The substance of an obligatio consists in binding (obstringere) another person to give us (dare) something, to do (facere) or to perform (praestare) something" (Dig.,44.7.4; both text quoted in A. Berger, Encycl. Dict. Rom. Law, s.v. obligatio). The vocabulary is reminiscent of the De Beneficiis (beneficium = commune vinculum, Ben.,6.4.2; restringat, Ben.,1.4.2; cf. Ben.,1.3.5 the vocabulary used to describe the dress of the Graces). It will have been noticed that the definition of obligatio employs the passive voice, whereas that of the Digest the active. These indicate the perspectives of the person bound and of the binder respectively, and differ as duties of obligation from rights of obligation (E. C. Clark, Roman Private Law, Part II, Jurisprudence, vol.2, p.654 f.). Hence the obligatio is "not merely a tie between the two" (Clark, op.cit.,p.655).

* Numquam consequitur, nisi praecessit is cast in the form of a paradox.

**hi docendi sunt nihil inputare, illi plus debere:**

**Hi** must refer to the donors (cf. Ben.,1.2.2, computaverat);
for the content compare, alter statim oblivisci debet dati, alter accepti numquam (Ben., 2.10.4). The contrast between hi and illi forms the climax of the theme of Ben., 1.4.3, the initial statement of which is found in the form of infinitives modified by the same adverb libenter. In order for donors and recipients to act in the same way (libenter) they must not equal but surpass each other. Attention has been drawn away from sameness to differentiation. The element of contrast is further emphasized by nihil and plus. Seneca then returns to the similarity of the actions, when he refers to them as contentionem beneficiis beneficia vincendi.

* Hic does not in Latin necessarily refer to the nearer antecedent on the page, but may serve as well to indicate the noun with which the speaker is most closely connected (Seneca had identified with the donors in Ben., 1.1.4).

Ad hanc honestissimam contentionem ... sic nos adhortatur Chrysippus, ut dicat verendum esse, ne, quia Chariten Jovis filiae sunt, parum se grate gerere sacrilegium sit et tam bellis puellis fiat injuria:

The Graces are also called the daughters of Jupiter in Ben., 1.3.9. It is not clear whether Chrysippus considered their divine status as the ground for sacrilege, or whether it was more particularly their relationship to Jupiter. Chrysippus must have liberally dispensed the accusation of sacrilege if he took seriously the syllogism attributed to him (DL., 7.186), stating that he who divulges the mysteries to
the uninitiated is guilty of impiety; the hierophant reveals the
mysteries; therefore the hierophant is guilty of impiety.

* To regard the beauty of the Graces a reason not to be ungrate-
ful is characteristic of the romantic charm one might expect of an
Ovid, not of Chrysippus, who had a reputation for being coarse in his
allegorical explanations (DL., 7.187).

1.4.5 Tu me aliquid eorum doce, per quae beneficentior gratiorque
adversus bene merentes fiam, per quae obligantium obligatorumque
animi certent, ut, qui praestiterunt, obliscantur, pertinax sit
memoria debentium, istae vero ineptiae poetis relinquantur, quibus
aures oblectare propositum est et dulcem fabulam nectere.
1.4.6 At ingenia sanare et fidem in rebus humanis retinere, memoriam
officiorum incidere animis volunt: serio loquantur et magnis uiribus
agent, nisi forte existimas levii ac fabuloso sermone et anilibus
argumentis prohiberi posse rem perniciosissimam, beneficiorum novas
tabulas.

Rather than indulge in allegory, one should learn how to be more
beneficial and more grateful, how to rival others in gratitude, while
adopting an altruistic attitude (donors should forget the benefits they
have given; recipients remember them all the more). Leave allegory to
the poets; it is their task to please the ear and to fabricate a
pleasing tale. Their intentions are serious; they want to moralize.
Let them speak seriously and forcefully, for anything less, such as
fanciful tales, can not prevent the erasure of obligations.

Tu me aliquid eorum doce, per quae beneficentior
gratiorque adversus bene merentes fiam ...:
Is the apostrophe a desperate plea to Chrysippus? Or is the person addressed the same as tu of Ben.,1.4.1, presumably Aebutius Liberalis (on whom see Ben.,1.1.1); in both cases Seneca intends to change the subject. The inversion of the teacher-pupil relationship seemingly implied in Seneca's statement accords with the status of proficiens which he attributes to himself in EM.,68.9: Erras, qui hinc aliquid auxili speras: non medicus sed aeger hic habitat. Moreover Liberalis is knowledgeable about benefits (Ben.,5.1.3). Alternatively we may have a parody, an invocation for inspiration, which, in the context, as Seneca is about to reject the Muses (poetry), is ironic.

* Precisely what is meant by aliquid eorum doce is difficult to determine. Several possibilities arise: (1) something is better than nothing (which is roughly what Chrysippus had to offer), (2) Seneca anticipates his point of saturation will be reached before he has learned all, (3) Seneca does not want all, (4) Aebutius does not have all. In contrast with ineptiae (below) aliquid may have a positive connotation, favouring the first suggestion.

* The content of the lesson Seneca expresses a desire to learn is a restatement of Ben.,1.4.3, rivalry (certent) expressed in the form of an altruistic attitude ( ... ut, qui praestiterunt, obliviscantur, pertinax sit memoria debentium).
Istae vero ineptiae poetis relinquantur, quibus aures oblectare propositum est et dulcem fabulam nectere:

Of the three rhetorical goals docere, delectare, movere (Quint., 12.10.59) Seneca disallows the poets the first. Moreover istae ineptiae is derogatory (in + aptus) implying a violation of a standard of decorum (on which see M. Pohlenz, "Τὸ Πρέξιον, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Griechischen Geistes", in Kleine Schriften, pp. 100-171; see p. 107, n. 2 on the Latin terms). The concept of decorum can include a number of peristaseis (Theophrastus followed by D. H. Lys., op. cit., p. 108-9), but the violation in this instance seems largely to be restricted to the inappropriateness of style to subject matter (see Ben., 1.4.6, where serio and magnis viribus is contrasted with levi which is made to bear the brunt of Seneca's criticism), and thus corresponds to what Pohlenz (op. cit., p. 109) regards as the narrower Stoic concept (πρέξιον ἐστι λέξις ὁλκεία τῷ πράγματι, SVF., 3.214.18.

The word λέξις means style but is expanded to include rhythm and melody, Pohlenz, loc. cit.). Seneca, however, uses ineptias poetarum (VB., 26.6) where it clearly applies not to style but to content, i.e. mythology, which represents Jupiter as an adulterer, cruel to other gods, parricide inter al. (cf. BV., 16.5, ... poetarum furor fabulis humanos errores alentium). The criterion of truth may be the decisive factor in VB., 26.6, as it had been in Ben., 1.3.10 (poetae non putant ad rem pertinere verum dicere), and it must not be ruled out in our text (see also the note on fabula below; on Stoic attitudes to poetry in
general see Ph. De Lacy, "Stoic Views of Poetry", AJPh, 69 (1948), 241-271). Compare Catullus' ineptiarum and nugas (14bl;1.4), which are generally interpreted as not including the longer poems. Seneca may well be referring to such longer poems, since ineptiae anticipates fabulum (on which below). Catullus 64, for example, could be said to be attempting to fulfil the three intentions of Ben.,1.4.6; the conclusion of the poem, if interpreted as moralizing, may represent an attempt to cure ingenia, and the concepts of fides and memoria are most germane to the poem. The exact reference in istae ineptiae is not certain; Seneca may mean mythology or such allegorical interpretation as that of Chrysippus, which precedes (Ben.,1.4.4); the latter, if favoured for reasons of proximity, could mean that allegory belongs as much in the realm of poetry (fiction) as the myth it purports to explain.

Himself a poet Seneca is here critical of poets. Is Seneca here adopting a disdainful rhetorical stance? Can his statement here contribute to a debate about the validity of such interpretations of his tragedies as claim they present Stoic doctrines (e.g. B. Marthi, "Seneca's Tragedies-a New Interpretation", TAPhA, 76 [1945], 216-45).

Opinions about Seneca's attitude towards myth are not unanimous (G. Mazzoli, Seneca e la poesia, accepts the thesis that Seneca's tragedies are philosophical poetry, but is criticized for it by Joachim Dingel in his review of Mazzoli's work [Gnomon,46 (1974), p.212]; Seneca's attitude to poetry has been much discussed; for references see W. Trillitzsch, Senecas Beweisführung, p.23 f., p.83 f.: a useful English synopsis of Seneca's attitude is provided by W. S. Maguinness, "Seneca and the
Poets", Hermathena, 88 [1956] pp.81-89). What can be said is that poetry was acceptable to the Stoics as a didactic device with a special impact on beginners (EM.,108.9; I. Hadot, Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung, pp.189-90). The artes liberales as a whole are, in fact, regarded as propaedeutic (EM.,88). Poetry may serve as a useful antidote to anger: Lectio illum carminum obleniat et historia fabulis detineat (Ira, 3.9.1). Poetry can attack the emotions directly, or point out a wrong example (cf. EM.,94.27). The more positive task of inculcating a correct conception must be done in more rational terms. Seneca's attitude can perhaps be explained by the fact that he does not consider himself a neophyte but wants to learn (me ... doce) at a more serious level. Seneca's attitude portrays the prejudices of the moralist, accepting poetry when it supports his moral stand, attacking it when poetry detracts from ethics (ad Marc.,19.4, the poets' conception of the Underworld is criticized; EM.,115.12 the poets' praise of wealth is said to fan the flames of our desires; EM.,108.11, is more positive; EM.,8.8, states poets and philosophers often say the same thing). We need not assume that Seneca has specific poets in mind in the criticism of our text although Catullus and Horace would be likely candidates (see the commentary on Ben.,1.4.6; for contemporary criticism of the poets see Pers. Sat.,1). Our text can bring no certainty as to the relations of Seneca with such Stoic poets as Persius and Lucan. From Valerius Probus' life of Persius we learn that the latter was not impressed by Seneca: sero
cognovit et Senecam, sed non ut caperetur eius ingenio (W. V. Clausen, ed., A. Persi Flacci Saturarum Liber, p.38), whereas Lucan admired Persius, claiming that the latter's were real poems, his own but trifles (loc. cit.).

* The antecedent of quibus is probably not ineptiae but poetis; the personification of ineptiae with dulcem fabulam nectere would be awkward.

* The pleasure provided through the ear (aures oblectare) is viewed ambiguously by the Stoics; such pleasure is τέρψις, or, if it arises from deceit, κήλης (SVF., 3.97.44; SVF., 3.98.1). Now τέρψις can be an acceptable emotion to the Stoics, being one of the kinds of ευπάθεια (SVF., 3.105.36; on this see Ph. De Lacy, "Stoic Views of Poetry", AJP, 69 (1948), p.250, who notes that since "proper pleasure ... is defined in terms of what is rational and beneficial, ... pleasure is not the ultimate aim of poetry" but instead "the means to exert a beneficial influence on the disposition of the auditor"). The doctrine of euphonia, moreover, which Philodemus (Περὶ Ποημάτων, V, col.18.14, in M. Pohlenz, Τὸ Πρὸς Πολιτικὸς, p.124, n.3) first ascribes to the Hellenistic χριτικοί (on whom see Pohlenz, op. cit., p.127) "who placed the criterion of good poetry in the ear and considered further analysis impossible" (Ph. De Lacy, op. cit., p.252-3), had its impact on Stoic thinking, notably on Aristo of Chios, who emphasized a trained ear, so allowing an irrational criterion (Pohlenz, op. cit., p.124 f.; De Lacy, op. cit., p.253; neither scholar refers to EM., 94, where, in regard to the conflict between praecepta and decreta, Aristo is said
to minimize the impact of the former [EM., 94.2, quae non descendat in pectus], although precepts can be in the form of poetry [EM., 94.27, carmini intexta]. It is Seneca who defends their immediate impact [EM., 94.28, affectus ipsos tangunt]). Crates was another Stoic to be influenced by the doctrine of euphonia, but attempts to explain it in terms of Stoic epistemology and dialectic (Pohlenz, op.cit., p.127; De Lacy, op.cit., p.253). Seneca himself belittles the pleasures of the ear. He states (EM., 75.6) that a sick man does not seek an eloquent physician, although he will count it a boon to have an effective doctor who is eloquent. He continues: Quid aures meas scabis? quid oblectas? aliud agitur: urendus, secundus, abstinendus sum. Moral purpose, here expressed in a medical metaphor, takes precedence over stylistic matters. By introducing aures in our text as object of oblectare Seneca makes the exercise seem superficial in contrast with ingenia sanare (on the application to poetry of the three-fold task of the orator, docere, movere, delectare, see C. O. Brink, Horace on Poetry, Ars Poetica, p.352).

* Regarding dulcem C. O. Brink (op.cit., p.355) is helpful:

"Ar. Poet., 24, 1460 all ff. describes τὸ θαυμαστὸν, the realm of ἀλογον, as ἡσύ. In Hellenistic terminology marvellous and irrational happenings were assigned to μυθος, "tale", in its new, non-Aristotelian, significance. And τὸ ἡσύ followed ...". It is well to keep in mind this connection between ἡσύ and the fabulous. Aristotle was still hesitant to recognize ἡσύ as a separate characteristic of style (he
subsumes it under ςαφήνεια, Rhet.,1414a19); according to Quintilian (Inst.,4.2.63) Théodectes first posited it as an independent characteristic. Aristotle does say of ἡδύ that it comes through sight, or, more significantly for our text, through hearing (cf. aures oblectare).

* In Latin the metaphor fabulam nectere is not common (see, however, E. Fantham, Comparative Studies in Republican Latin Imagery, p.159,n.22, where fabulas intexere is mentioned [Cic. Or.,52]). In Greek it occurs in Homer (Od.,13.295, μυθούς πλοχοὺς). Sappho had called Eros μυθόπλοκος, weaving tales (E. Lobel & D. Page, Poetarum Lesborum Fragmenta, 'fr.188); Pindar had used the metaphor of weaving poetry (O.,6.86; N.,7.77). Aristotle had again used μυθού with πλέκειν, albeit with a different sense, i.e. to construct a plot (Poet.,1456a9; cf. Poet.,1452a12,1452b32 where the perfect participle is used for a complex plot). The phrase fabulam nectere can be contrasted with humanam societatem adligat (Ben.,1.4.2) in respect to their objects; this contrast may be enhanced by the fact that a cognate noun nexum had historical and legal implications (R. M. Ogilvie, A Commentary on Livy, Books 1-5, pp.296-299). Since the metaphor of weaving is also used of weaving the "web of deceitful invention" (E. Fantham, op.cit., p.106) and fabula is invention, the contrast has some point.

* Fabula has a plethora of meanings; those from the OLD which might apply are: fictitious story or report, story told for entertainment or instruction or a fable, legend or myth, and, less likely, play or drama. If we regard fabulam as anticipating fabuloso (Ben.,1.4.6),
emphasis is laid on the mythical and the fictitious. This draws attention to the use of the term in the much discussed distinctions between historia, argumentum and fabula (some modern discussions in R. Reitzenstein, Hellenistische Wundererzählungen, p.90 ff.; K. Barwick, "Die Gliederung der Narratio in der rhetorischen Theorie und ihre Bedeutung für die Geschichte des antiken Romans", Hermes, 63 (1928) pp.261-287; F. W. Walbank, "History and Tragedy", Historia, 9 (1960), pp.225-8; Ph. De Lacy, "Stoic Views of Poetry", AJPh, 69 (1948), pp.267-8; C. O. Brink, Horace on Poetry, the Ars Poetica, pp.354-5). These three are intended to denote truth content, historia (ἵστορια) being true, argumentum (πλάσμα) false but like the truth; fabula (μύθος) false and not like the truth. Examples of fabulae are tragedies, of argumenta comedies and mimes (Auct. Her.,1.13; Cic. Inv., 1.27). It is not inevitable that Seneca used the terms with that significance (argumentis occurs in Ben.,1.4.6); it is remarkable, however, that two out of three occur juxtaposed and shortly after Ben.,1.3.10 where the question of truth is discussed. C. O. Brink commenting on the appearance of the division in Hor. AP.,338-42 remarks that it appears there "in close connection with Neoptolemus' triad prodesse - delectare - prodesse et delectare. This connection constitutes not indeed a certainty but a balance of probability in favour of Hellenistic rather than Roman provenance for the Horatian tradition". It need not be pointed out that in Seneca's text these concepts (obluctare; sanare = prodesse) enter into the discussion.
Seneca uses *fabula* with a different sense elsewhere. It applies to a historical incident involving Julius Caesar (Ben., 5.24. 2; cf. Ben., 7.21 where it is used of the anecdote of the Pythagorean and the cobbler; EM., 77.10). But it is the *fabula* of the poets which is especially reprehensible; cf. BV., 16.5, *poetarum furor fabulis humanos errores alentium*.

At *ingenia sanare et fidem in rebus humanis retinere, memoriam officiorum incidere animis volunt*:

The subject of the verb volunt is not specified. The context, however, points to *poetae* (quibus referring to poetae is the nearest preceding pronoun), and the commentary will indicate that there are poets (e.g. Horace and Catullus) who have a moralizing purpose.

Seneca uses medical metaphors frequently (see also salubribus, Ben., 1.2.4). The metaphor is of considerable antiquity (I. Hadot, Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung, pp. 13-16). Aristotle too uses a medical example as a paradigm of ethical behaviour (EN., 1137a9 f.), and the Stoics followed suit (Cicero complains that too much attention is paid by the Stoics, notably by Chrysippus, to comparing diseases of the soul to diseases of the body, Tusc., 4.10.23). Closer in time to Seneca his teacher Q. Sextius elicits the remark from A. Leeman (Orationis Ratio, p. 261), "His ideas about moral purification had a very concrete foundation in medical concepts and ideas about man's relation to nature". The metaphor of healing is
also found in the satirists (e.g. Hor. Ep., 1.1.102). The concept of insania is especially in the foreground in Horace's "Stoic" Satire (Sat., 2.3). Damasippus desires ingenia sanare: "... huc proprius me, dum doceo insanire omnis, vos ordine adite./ danda est elebori multo pars maxima avaris / ... (Sat., 2.3.80-82). Horace sees himself as sanus (Sat., 2.3.302; cf. Sat., 1.4.129, ex hoc ego sanus ab illis, / perniciem quaecumque ferunt, note the juxtaposition of sanare and perniciosissimam in Ben., 1.4.6). Persius as well is fond of medical metaphors, notably so in the third satire "where the 'sickness' of mankind constitutes the basic metaphor" (W. S. Anderson in W. S. Merwin, tr., The Satires of Persius, p. 39; Anderson comments on the medical metaphor, pp. 39-40). Anderson points out that Persius uses the practice of Roman physicians of cleaning the ears with vinegar in a metaphor describing the satirist's task (Sat., 1.107; cf. Sat., 5.86, ... Stoicus hic aurem mordaci lotus aceto ...; Sat., 5.63, cultor [= Cornutus] enim iuvenum purgatas inseris aures / fruge Cleanthea; cf. Hor. Ep., 1.1.7, where Horace describes his own ear as purgatam). It is apparent that this metaphor was appropriated by both philosophers and satirists. When we bring it in juxtaposition with Seneca's quibus [= poetis] aures oblectare propositum est et dulcem fabulum nectere, we notice the medical metaphor ingenia sanare has become related to aures oblectare. They are opposites; it is philosophy's task to scrape the ears and so bring a cure, - it is poetry's task to soothe them. The metaphor ingenia sanare gains point in the literary context of our
text through irony; the madness of poets is a common-place (see Hor. Sat., 2.3.306 and A. Palmer's commentary ad loc.).

* Ingenia curare occurs also in Ira, 1.6.3, where it is regarded as the task of the guardian of the laws and the ruler of the state. The context there is of some relevance to our text, since an expanded version of the physician's methodology occurs in a discussion of the social implications of anger. In Ira, 1.5.3, the statement is made: Beneficiis enim humana vita constat et concordia, nec terrore sed mutuo amore in foedus auxiliumque commune constringitur. And the question is asked whether this statement does not preclude castigatio. The answer is that it does not, providing correction is sine ira, cum ratione. So the door is opened for the medical metaphor. The physician, who attempts to correct, will adapt the remedy to the disease. If gentle measures bring no result, drastic ones are legitimate. No cure seems harsh if its result is beneficial. What an animus sanus is Seneca states in EM., 72.7: si se ipse contentus est, si confidit sibi, si scit omnia vota mortalium, omnia beneficia quae dantur petunturque, nullum in beata vita habere momentum (other instances of medical imagery EM., 8.2; EM., 22.1; EM., 64.8; EM., 75.7 & 10-11; EM., 78.5; EM., 94.17; EM., 120.4, where it is used as an example of analogy; Const. Sap., where a sapiens stands in relation to all men, as a physician towards the insane).

* With fidem in rebus humanis retinere compare Hor. Ep., 1.18.69, percontatorem fugito, nam garrulus idem est, nec retinent patulae
commissa fideliter aures. Horace also sets himself the task of preserving fides.

* Incedere occurs with the dative meaning "occur to one's mind" (Liv., 1.57.6; cf. exciderunt used of memory, Ben., 1.2.5). However memoriam ... incidere animis meaning remember is not paralleled. Incidere, "engrave", gives better sense. The poets are compared to (a) sculptors (cf. gratiam extundit, Ben., 1.3.1), (b) surgeons (suggested by sanare above). The word occurs also in Hor. Sat., 2.3, in an anecdote told by Damasippus who relates that the heirs of a certain Staberius had to engrave the sum of his estate on his tomb (Hor. Sat., 2.3.84 & 89). This inscription of Staberius, a slave to greed, forms a direct contrast with the one Seneca describes. Incidere is, therefore, more a propos than the reading of N, ingerere, which Basore in the Loeb edition, translates as "engrave", but might mean "keep mentioning" (Ben., 7.22.2; cf. Ben., 1.12.1).

serio loquantur et magnis viribus agant, nisi forte existimas levi ac fabuloso sermone et anilibus argumentis prohiberi posse rem perniciosissimam, beneficiorum novas tabulas:

Contrast serio with levi (below) and ineptiae above. See Hor. AP., 320 where pondus, "contrary to Callimachean and neoteric poetics, is a recommended quality" (C. O. Brink, Horace on Poetry, Ars Poetica, pp. 345-6). Although style may be linked to genre (cf. Hor. Sat., 1.4.45; Sat., 1.10.11; AP., 73 f. and Brink, op. cit., ad loc.) we can not be
certain Seneca is advocating or rejecting genres in our text; however, the possibility must remain open.

* Agant may be contrasted with loquantur in terms of the traditional polarity words-deeds; it may, however, mean no more than "discuss, reason, argue" (OLD., s.v.). Vires in the plural generally means physical strength, but it was used in the post-Augustan period of power of eloquence (Quint. Inst., 5.1.2; Inst., 8.3.87). Hence magnis viribus agant need form no real contrast with serio loquantur, but can likewise refer to style.

* For fabuloso sermone see the note on fabula (above). Sermone perhaps suggests Horatian satire (Hor. Sat., 1.4.41, sermoni propriora; the term is applied to comedy, Sat., 1.4.47). Moreover, Horace on occasion states that in his satires he writes fabulas (Sat., 1.1.70; Sat., 1.1.97; Sat., 2.5.61; cf. Quint. Inst., 5.11.20, where this practice of Horace is looked at askance). Is Seneca refusing satire its role as social remedy? See also the discussion of sermo in Cicero (Off., 1.37.132-135), where the definition is much broader: ... sermo in circulis, disputationibus, congressionibus familiarium versetur, sequatur etiam convivía. There sermo is not denied magna vis. Moreover a mixture of styles is encouraged: ac videat in primis, quibus de rebus loquatur, si serwis, severitatem adhibeat, si iocosis, leporem (Off., 1.37.134).

In our text Seneca seems to reject any σπουδαίογλωσσον (cf. Horace's ridentem dicere verum, Sat., 1.1.24) of which "the later Cynics and the Stoic philosophers are the best representatives "(G. C. Fiske, "The
Plain Style in the Scipionic Circle", Univ. of Wisconsin, Stud. in Lang. and Lit., 3 [1919], p. 85).

* Anilibus means "such as old women believe in". It occurs with fabellas to introduce the fable of the town and country mouse (Hor. Sat., 2.6.77; with fabullis, Quint. Inst., 1.8.19).

* The abolition of debts and benefits is called destructive, perniciosissimam, since it would lead to the abolition of human life: beneficiis enim humana vita constat et concordia ... (Ira, 1.5.3).

* The reference in novas tabulas is to the abolition of debt; new account books (cf. Const. Sap., 6.7) constitute what is in our idiom "a clean slate" (Cic. Phil., 6.4.11; ad Att., 5.21.13; ad Att., 14.21.4). Cicero considers tabulae novae a form of theft, and laxity in the enforcement of the laws of debt a threat to the state (Off., 1.23.84). Seneca may be punning in our text: tabula also means writing tablet, such as the poets might use. The poets by writing lightly (levi; there may be a play on this word as well, i.e. referring to style, and to the mechanics of writing, i.e. pressing the stylus lightly) can not prevent the writing tablets from being blank (novas); one must press more heavily (magnis viribus), in order to incidere.
CHAPTER FIVE

Just as it is necessary to scurry over the (previous) irrelevant material, so it is necessary to state that we must first of all learn what it is we owe, when we have received a benefit. For one says that he is indebted for money acquired as a gift, another for a consulship, another for a priesthood, yet another for a province. However, these are but the outward signs of benefits, not the benefits themselves. A benefit can not be touched by the hand; benefaction is done by the soul. There is a great difference between the material (substance, matter) of a benefit and the benefit itself; and so, neither silver nor gold, nor any of those things which are believed to be the most valuable, is a benefit; the benefit consists of the mentality of the donor. The ignorant, however, only take notice of what meets the eye, what is passed from hand to hand, and what is possessed, but not of what is valuable in the giving of benefits. What we hold in our hands, what we see and are very fond of, is ephemeral, and can be taken from us by accident or chance; a benefit, however, lasts after the substance through which it was given has perished; for it is a perfect deed which no power can cause to be undone. When a friend, who has been ransomed from pirates, is captured by another enemy and incarcerated, not the benefit itself, but the use of the benefit has been taken away. Sickness, or some other mishap, may take
from a father his children saved from a shipwreck or a fire; yet the benefit which was given through them remains without them. All things which falsely carry the name of benefit are, in fact, the instruments through the use of which a friendly disposition expresses itself. There are analogous cases for the outward appearance of a thing being in one place, the thing itself in another. When a general bestows various awards, he gives something which has per se relatively little value. None of the awards is an honour, but symbolizes honour. Likewise what meets the eye is not the benefit, but the trace and token of a benefit.

1.5.1 Sed quemadmodum supervacua transcurram, ita exponam necesse est hoc primum nobis esse discendum, quid accepto beneficio debeamus. Debere enim se ait alius pecuniam, quam accepit, alius consulatum, alius sacerdotium, alius provinciam.

1.5.2(a) Ista autem sunt meritorum signa, non merita. Non potest beneficium manu tangi: res animo geritur. Multum interest inter materiam beneficii et beneficium; itaque nec aurum nec argentum nec quicquam eorum, quae pro maximis accipiuntur, beneficium est, sed ipsa tribuentis voluntas.

Seneca states that he must now teach the definition of a benefit and commences by listing items which are commonly regarded as benefits for which one feels indebted. These, Seneca states, are just the outward signs of benefits, not the benefits themselves. Benefits can not be touched by the hand; benefaction is internal, a function of the psyche. There is then a great difference between the outward manifestation or substance of a benefit, and the benefit
itself, which, contrary to popular opinion, is the disposition of the donor of the benefit.

This chapter introduces the definition of a benefit which continues into Ben., 1.6 and Ben., 1.7. Considerable care has been taken by Seneca in the unfolding of the definition and its subsequent restatements, as will appear shortly; Albertini's negative general evaluation of Seneca's enchaînement des éléments, as leaving a confused impression, cannot be applied in the case of chapters five, six, and seven, which Albertini left out of his discussion (he does attribute methodical composition to chapters eleven and twelve of the first book, E. Albertini, La composition dans les ouvrages philosophiques de Sénèque, p. 271). It is true that there is a certain amount of restatement and that there are lists of examples. However, since they appear in the form of a well-known rhetorical device, termed the priamel, they are far from objectionable, but indeed at once illuminating and pleasing. Moreover, Seneca does provide variety in examples and approach; Ben., 1.5 is mainly negative, first demonstrating what a benefit is not, then, by contrast, what it is. The positive side is more obviously brought to the fore in Ben., 1.6, where the psychological aspect of a benefit is further explored. In Ben., 1.7 the consequences of an incorrect view of a benefit are developed, and material from the previous chapters is integrated and interpreted.

Since the priamel is of some significance, it is as well to discuss it, first generally, then as it appears in our text. Works which are essential for a consideration of the priamel are W. K.
Krühling's *Die Priamel (Beispielreihung) als Stilmittel in der griechisch-römischen Dichtung*, and U. Schmid's *Die Priamel der Werte im Griechischen von Homer bis Paulus*. The former has collected examples and classified them; the latter has analyzed in greater detail one of the classifications, the priamel of value (*Priamel der Werte*). Neither discusses the Senecan passage, where the priamel is important, since it is the means by which the definition is presented; a summary of the views of both, however, will facilitate the understanding of Seneca's text. The priamel (from *praemulum*) is a literary figure which consists of a series of examples, and the purpose of it is to give emphasis, by setting something against a broader background, or by showing the validity of a *sententia* by means of a row of examples; the priamel should illuminate, clarify, make graphic, point to something especially impressive, and create tension (Krühling, *op.cit.*, p.73). Some series of examples contain a gnome which may be placed at the beginning, at the end, or be suppressed i.e. be understood from the examples, but not expressed (Krühling, *op.cit.*, pp.12-13). The series may be negative. It may ascend to the example of greatest importance or descend from it (Krühling, *op.cit.*, p.13).

Schmid narrowed his scope to consideration of the priamel of value, and altered Krühling's definition (p.x) by including within it the ultimate value (*Höchstwert*) to which the values of the examples (*Beispielwerten*) are compared. Schmidt does not include the explanatory exposition which often is appended to the antithesis of values.
Schmid has found four types of priamel of value, of which the first, as found, for example, in Tyrtaios (Anth. Lyr. Graec. ed. E. Diehl, vol.1, fr.9) and Xenophanes (DK., 21B2), shows the greatest similarity with our text. Its most important characteristic is that it is dipolar, i.e. that it contrasts the values of the author with those of others, so creating tension, and giving evidence of the polemical paraenetic concern of the author (U. Schmid, op.cit., pp.32-33). Its function is not merely to stress the highest value formally, but to make a claim for its universal validity, to make it universally binding. The priamel is the locus of an antithesis between the author's values and the values of his times, but is also the place for an attempt to bring about a change in the latter values (Umwertung).

In addition a number of secondary formal characteristics may be present. The series of examples may be preceded by negatives (if the value-determining statement [wertende Aussage] comes at the beginning), or the examples may be presented in climactic order. There should also be present a statement in which the true values are assigned (wertende Aussage), and the matter endowed with the highest value (Höchstwert) must be introduced. In addition there may be found a πάντα-motif, an element which may conclude a list of examples by subsuming any further possibilities, as well as a δόξα-motif (sometimes related to the πάντα-motif) which also attributes value, since value and fame were identical to the Greeks (U. Schmid, op.cit., p.6).
Although the subsequent exposition is not formally part of the priamel, it is closely related to it, serving as an explanation which is warranted because of the abrupt presentation of the suggested change of values. In both Tyrtaios and Xenophanes Schmid has found the exposition to consist of a short negative resume of the priamel, a presentation on the basis of which the ultimate value has been founded, and the ultimate value itself, which in both cases represented a shift from private virtue to a socio-political one (κοινόν ἀγαθόν).

It is now possible to analyze Ben.,1.5 in the light of the preceding considerations about the nature of the priamel. We note that the first priamel to come to our attention is a dipolar one; there are clearly two points of view introduced. The erroneous one is represented by alius which is repeated three times, giving in all four variations of the current erroneous opinion. However, opposed to this we do not find an expected sed ego. Rather we must deduce from the opening sentence, where the first person is used, that it is Seneca's opinion which will follow; the ultimate value itself is impersonally represented. Reasons for this are (a) that Seneca can not claim to be presenting as ultimate value one which he has himself discovered, as the juxtaposition of the personal pronoun and the ultimate value might suggest, (b) that, as in the case of Schmid's fourth type of priamel which is formulated completely impersonally (op.cit.,p.103), the universal validity of the value introduced is stressed by this impersonal formulation. Since the list of examples, pecuniæm, consulatum, sacerdotium, provinciam, is not
preceded by a value-attributing statement, the examples themselves are not preceded by negatives. They may however be listed in a climactic order (see the commentary). The value-attributing statement, introduced by an adversative autem, follows, with the negation of value (non merita) following the proper designation of the false values as meritorum signa. This procedure allows an essential link to be preserved between the false and the true values; the false can not be dispensed with altogether, since they are to serve the true as materia. Instead of the expected presentation of the ultimate value, however, we next find two statements which explain the value-attributing statement. The conclusion of the first of these (res animo geritur) foreshadows as a quasi ultimate value the ultimate value voluntas, but the equation beneficium est voluntas is not yet made outright, animo being in an oblique case. This somewhat more cautious procedure lessens to some extent the dramatic possibilities of the device. It is, however, in harmony with the care taken throughout the definition. The quasi-ultimate value can be regarded as the conclusion of the first priamel. The next priamel, one impersonally formulated but personalized by the context, starts with a gnome: multum interest inter materiam beneficii et beneficium. It is in fact a restatement of part of the quasi ultimate value (non potest beneficium manu tangi), which, because of its negative implication, serves as value attributing statement. The example series, negative in this case, is concluded by nec quicquam eorum, an obvious example of the
πάντας-motif. Quae pro maximis accipientur relates to this the δόξα-motif. It is followed by the ultimate value tribuentis voluntas.

So far we have considered two series of examples, one explaining the other (Xenophanes follows a similar procedure; Schmid, p.21, considers this unusual). Both are traditional in that external values, commonly held to be ultimate, are contrasted with an internal (moral) one (see Schmid, op. cit., p.138).

To these examples of the priamel others are appended. But a careful transition takes place; we no longer find ourselves in the street and on the market-square, as it were, but in the philosopher's lecture-hall. The next priamels are concerned with epistemology and conclude with Stoic doctrine (recte factum). The dipolar element is present, as it had been at the beginning of the chapter. But there is a difference; alii are now defined as imperiti, which at once brings the priamel within the parameters of Stoicism (imperiti = stulti), and functions as a value-attributing statement (but only implicitly so). The three examples refer to the senses of sight and touch and to feeling of possessing (feeling because possession brings with it insatiable craving for more, EM.,16.8, EM.,119.9; ad Helv.,11.1-4). Both the senses and emotions are, of course, suspect sources of knowledge. An explicit value-attributing statement is found in cum contra, and the ultimate value in illud, quod in re carum atque pretiosum. Again the priamel is explained by another, which makes clear that the value of a benefit is its eternal duration. Two of the examples from the previous
priamel are repeated (oculis incurrit in aspicimus; traditur in tenemus) but possidetur is replaced by cupiditas. Imperiti is replaced by the first person plural. This is an unexpected feature in a priamel since it seems to suggest that the author shares in the erroneous common opinion, but in the case of Seneca it is explicable by the fact that he often presents himself as someone not yet wise (e.g. EM.,45.4), and so establishes identification with his audience.
The adjective caduca is the value-attributing statement which is set over against durat, the ultimate value. It is followed by an explanation in Stoic terms. The priamel has here lost such embellishments as the πάντα-motif.

The next set of examples serves to illustrate the distinction drawn between the temporal and the lasting qualities. The illustrations of this priamel are taken - like those at the beginning of the chapter - from common experience. The ultimate value, manet etiam sine illis, quod in illis datum est, is similar to the preceding one. This priamel has functioned, therefore, to bring down the essence of the prior one from its philosophical and conceptual heights to the plains of practicality.

The concluding section of the chapter contains a simile which is taken from Roman political experience. Since it contains a series of examples, it may be regarded as analogous to the preceding priamel, and as balancing the first one of the chapter which also reflects the Roman scene. The following sequence of priamels is observable in the chapter, and betrays its careful construction: Roman, general, theore-
tical, general, Roman.

By using the stylistic device of the priamel Seneca places himself in a long tradition, and thereby makes the change in values he advocates more acceptable. Seneca's series of examples are among those in which possessions are contrasted with other values (see W. Kröhlung, *op. cit.*, pp.35-36 for a list); an interesting partial parallel is provided by the poet Bacchylides, who opposes to cattle, gold, and purple tapestries, other values amongst which is ὂυμος εὔμενης, similar to Seneca's benevolentia (Kröhlung, *op. cit.*, p.36 = Bacch. ed. B. Snell, fr.21; cf. Hor. Od.,2.18.1 where gold is put over against fides, inter al.). The rejection of gold and political power is found in Archilochus and Anacreon (Anth., *Lyr. Graec.* ed. E. Diehl, vol.3, fr.22; on Anacreon see Kröhlung, *op. cit.*, p.44). Both themes, possession and political power, appear in Seneca's priamel, as indeed they had done in that of Horace (Od.,1.1), who regards them as typically Roman (avaritia and ambitio, Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p.67) as the theme of victory at sport is typically Greek. It must further be pointed out that both Tyrtaios and Xenophanes propose, instead of an individualistic value, a common one (κοινὸν ἔσθελον; see Schmidt, *op. cit.*, pp.5 & 20-21; Cato does likewise in a priamel which will be mentioned below; cf. Kröhlung, *op. cit.*, p.47). Again a remarkable parallel is evident with Seneca's overall aim, the abandonment of excessive self-interest in favour of greater social awareness (cf. Ben., 7.16.2, *In omni quaestione propositum sit nobis bonum publicum*).
Important too for our discussion is the oldest priamel in Latin (Kröhl, op.cit.,p.46) found in the proem to Cato's Agricul-
tura; in it the occupations of trader and money-lender are unfavour-
ably compared with that of the farmer. Cato's harsh attitude, based
on the ancient Roman Law of the XII tables (see P. Thielscher, Des
Marcus Cato Belehrung über die Landwirtschaft, p.175), is comparable
to Seneca's rejection of the commercial world (Ben.,1.2.1), and to his
proposal to adopt, in respect to benefits, the attitude of a farmer to
his fields, i.e. continued cultivation after the initial sowing of the
seed. This similarity, plus the fact that Seneca has made such exten-
sive use of the priamel in Ben.,1.5.1, leads to postulating the question
whether, in fact, that part of the text which precedes the definition
can not be regarded as a more extensive priamel in which different
definitions of a benefit are rejected, i.e. the commercial evaluation
(Ben.,1.2) and the allegorical explanation (Ben.,1.3; mythological
examples are common in the example series, Schmid, op.cit.,p.3),
before the ultimate value voluntas is presented in the definition.

It is clear, at any rate, that Seneca in chapter five uses
examples which are at once contemporary and traditional (for another
use of the priamel in a philosophical context cf. Cic. Lael.,6.22;
Lael.,14.49; 23.86, where amicitia is contrasted with divitiae and
honores).
Sed quemadmodum supervacua transcurram, ita exponam necesse est hoc primum nobis esse discendum, quid accepto beneficio debeamus:

Seneca renews his promise to leave the irrelevant (see the note on necessaria, Ben.,1.3.6). But unlike a similar commitment in Ben.,1.4.1 which refers strictly to the allegorization of the Graces, the present text must include the content of chapter four.

*The definition of a benefit is given from the perspective of a recipient, as is evident in quid accepto beneficio debeamus; hence debere, accepit, accipiantur in the following sentence. It is initially surprising that at this critical point such a perspective is taken, for in Ben.,1.1.2 the faults in giving and receiving are attributed primarily to the giver. It would, moreover, be just as important for the latter to know the definition, since he must know what he gives (cf. Ben.,1.6.1). The discussion proper of the receiver does not start until Ben.,2.18.1. M. Sonntag (L. Annaei Senecae De Beneficiis Libri Explanantur, p.12) takes the formulation as evidence that Hecato gave at the beginning of his work a definition of gratia also, in the sense of returning. Perhaps the formulation can be better explained with reference to the altruistic principle which states that the donor must forget what he has given, but the recipient remember what he has received (Ben.,7.22.1). This is, admittedly, more idealistic than the emphasis on the donor in Ben.,1.1.2, but such idealism is not out
of place in the definition.

* With transcurram (subjunctive with necesse est) cf. transilire (Ben.,1.3.2); "treat fleetingly".

Debere enim se ait alius pecuniam, quam accepit, alius consulatum, alius sacerdotium, alius provinciam:

The indicative in quam accepit is not part of the oratio obliqua; the clause contains an addition by the author which is perhaps intended to distinguish the money received as a gift, i.e. taken into one's own possession (accipere is the complementary act of dare, cf. Ben.,2.18.1), from money borrowed. Debere in the context does not mean that a consulate, priesthood or a province must be returned; debere here is "to be indebted for" (OLD., s.v. debere, 5). What is owed is an equivalent value (cf. the distinction between two types of loans; commodatum, which requires the return of the very item borrowed, and mutuum, which requires the return of an equivalent: see J. A. Crook, Law and Life of Rome, p.210).

* The examples are derived from Roman public life (see TLL., s.v. beneficium, c). Included under the name beneficium were dispensations from military duties, (RE.,3.271) or grants of citizenship or land (Th. Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht, vol.2, p.868; Gromatici Veteres, ed. C. Lachmann, p.40Q). Such benefits were exceptions to the rule, or if rules, those of limited application, sometimes requiring special
authorization and protected by law (RF.,3.272).

* See EM.,118.2 & 3 for Seneca's disparaging remarks about the role which some of our examples (e.g. money, consulships) play in Cicero's correspondence about elections. On the role of money in judicial bribery, see EM.,115.10. Our present context need not be so negative; emperors donated sums of money to impoverished senators so they could meet property qualifications (Tac. Ann.,1.75; Ann.,2.37). The context does, however, favour taking pecuniam in a political sense.

* The consulship could be given indirectly during Republican times; quis consulatum fiducia Caesaris, quis Pompei, quis arcae petat (EM.,118.2), or somewhat more directly during the imperial period through commendatio and nominatio (Tac. Hist.,1.77; cf. Tac. Ann.,1.14.6; e.g. legionary legates could be rewarded for loyalty to the dynasty by means of the consulate: see R. Syme, Tacitus, p.33). Cf. Cic. Lael., 73, where Cicero, considering how much to give to friends, remarks that you can not give everyone a consulship.

* The next example, that of a sacerdotium, appears elsewhere in Seneca in a list of pairs of compared gifts in which the first of the pairs is regarded as of less significance than the second (Ira,3.31.2): its position makes the office of consul ordinarius less valuable than a sacerdotium. It is not difficult to extend the pattern to Seneca's four examples and regard the whole series as arranged in climactic order, as is normal for a priamel.

* Sacerdotium is the generic term for priesthood. In imperial
times priesthoods could be awarded by the emperor (cf. Pliny's petition to the emperor Trajan for one, Plin. Ep., 10.13). Earlier, in the third century B.C., some priests were elected by comitia sacerdotum (Liv., 25.5.2; Liv., 39.45.8; Liv., 27.8.1; G. W. Botsford, Roman Assemblies, p. 120). By a lex de sacerdotii of Cn. Domitius, tribune of the people in 103 B.C., all members (not only heads) of important colleges were voted on by comitia sacerdotum (Botsford, op. cit., p. 391). In 44 B.C. the pontifical college regained the right to elect their own head (Botsford, op. cit., p. 458). In imperial times choice of priests was made by the Senate, but in it the imperial commendatio played a significant role (RE., 1A. 1642; see Furneaux' commentary on Tac. Ann., 3.19; see also Th. Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht, vol. 2). 1054 f. on three ways in which the emperor could influence appointments to priesthoods - in addition to the one mentioned above, he may have made his influence felt in those priesthoods which had the right of co-optation through his right as a member to nominate, and he may have used his office as Pontifex Maximus).

* Imperial provinces were under the direct control of the emperor, who could bestow them upon whom he pleased. In the senatorial provinces control was more indirect; by means of influence over who was elected to and advanced in office, the emperor could keep an eye on which candidates were available.
Ista autem sunt meritorum signa, non merita:

Cf. Cic. Inv., 1.30.48: *signum est quod sub sensum aliquem cadit et quod ex ipso profectum videtur ...*; "a sign is something which is perceived by one of the senses, and which indicates something which seems to follow from the sign" (i.e. by way of the sign, or starting from the sign, we arrive at a deeper reality). Cicero continues that a sign may precede, be simultaneous with, or follow what it signifies, and gives the examples blood, flight, paleness, and dust. The term is also used in Stoic logic (= σημεῖον); signs are divided into (a) commemorative, as when smoke signals fire, a scar, a wound, (b) indicative, pointing to something not observable, as, for example, motions of the body which signal a soul (Sext. Emp. Math., 8.143-155, on which see B. Mates, Stoic Logic, pp.13-14). The use of the term *signum* in our text corresponds to (b).

* In EM., 118.11 Seneca states of some of the goods, which are here terms *meritorum signa*, that they (*militia, legatio, iurisdiction*) are morally indifferent (*neque bona neque mala*) but can become good, if performed virtuously.

Non potest beneficium manu tangi: res animo geritur:

One could possibly infer from the above statement that a benefit is not corporeal, but such an inference would be incorrect. Stoic
materialism recognized only four incorporeals (void, place, time, and lekton, SVF., 2.117.20; see G. Watson, The Stoic Theory of Knowledge, p.38 ff.), and virtue is not included. Seneca rather points out that a benefit is intangible for all practical purposes, because it is psychological, internal. The truth of the matter is that a benefit is corporeal. For it is termed recte factum (Ben., 1.5.3) and is hence a virtuous act. Since virtue is corporeal (EM., 106; cf. EM., 113.20 where every virtue is also stated to be a living thing) a benefit must likewise be so. Seneca is therefore not speaking strictly when he states the following in a passage - similar to our text - in which he distinguishes beneficium as actio from res (Ben., 6.2.1): ... ita aliud est beneficium ipsum, aliud, quod ad unumquemque nostrum beneficio pervenit. Illud incorporale est, inritum non fit; materia vero eius huc et iluc iactatur et dominum mutat.

* In the clause res animo geritur the case of animo is probably ablative of means, although the ablative of place must not be ruled out altogether as a possibility; translate "the giving of a benefit is accomplished by the soul". Construing animo as an ablative of means may be supported (a) by Ben., 1.6.2, where animus is given a determining and creative role in establishing a benefit, and (b) by parallelism with manu in Ben., 1.5.2; the same case for manu and animo strengthens the antithesis between them. The noun res does not signify a benefit (thing) but the giving of a benefit (actio; see Ben., 1.6.1; Ben., 6.2.1). Seneca subsequently distinguishes a benefit from a thing (res), but may
be using the noun here (a) because *beneficium* has not yet been defined as *actio*, (b) for idiomatic reasons; cf. *res gestae* (from *gerere*) which does refer to events or exploits, (c) because of the attraction exercised by the series of contrasts in the context between the material and the psychological.

*Multum interest inter materiam beneficii et beneficium; itaque nec aurum nec argentum nec quicquam eorum, quae pro maximis accipiuntur, beneficium est, sed ipsa tribuentis voluntas:*

Within the Stoic ethical framework *materia* is *per se* of neutral value, and becomes good or bad through the use to which it is put, whereas a benefit always has positive value as a *recte factum*. Likewise the *materia* is capable of increase, whereas the benefit is not ( ... *beneficium maius esse non potest, ea, per quae beneficium datur, possunt esse maiora et plura*, *Ben.*, 7.13). The contrast between external and internal in evidence in our text permeates Seneca's thought (e.g. *EM.*, 72.5; *EM.*, 82.4 & 5; *EM.*, 80.10; *EM.*, 93.7; *Prov*. 6.2-5; see also P. Thévenaz, "L'intérieurité chez Sénèque", in *Festschrift M. Niedermann*, pp. 184-194).

*Seneca supplies what is commonly held to be valuable (gold, silver) as examples of *materia*. Seneca's diatribe against gold and silver in the denunciation of *avaritia* (*Ben.*, 7.10) is typical of his cynical attitude (cf. *EM.*, 90.10; *EM.*, 92.31; *EM.*, 94.56 & 57 & 59; *EM.*, 95.73; *EM.*, 110.14-18, where Seneca reports the doctrines of his teacher,
the Stoic Attalus; EM.,115.9-11; Prov.,6.3 where god states he has surrounded certain people with false goods - Auro illos et argento et e bore adornavi, intus nihil boni est). For a more positive attitude see Ben.,4.6.1, where gold and silver are considered benefits given by god.

* In sed ipsa tribuentis voluntas (cf. Ben.1.6.1) the perspective has shifted from that of the recipient (debeamus, Ben.,1.5.1) to that of the donor. The question of the sufficiency of voluntas in returning, and of its relationship to rea is discussed in Ben.,7.14-16.4.

Seneca there claims to offer his own solution in which he counsels different attitudes for the debtor and the one to whom the debt is owed; but both are based on the same notion - that of altruism.

* Cf. Arist. EN.,1120b8 f., οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πλήθει τῶν διδομένων τὸ ἐλευθερίου, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ τῶν διδόντος ἔξει, αὐτή δὲ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ὄντως. οὖθεν ὅτι κωλύει ἐλευθεριώτερον εἶναι τὸν τὰ ἐλάττων διδόντα, ἐναν ἀπ’ ἐλαττών διδότων.

* Linguistic consuetudo (e.g. the popular definition of a benefit as gold or silver) and voluntas (intention, meaning) represent two principles on which law can be interpreted (H. Lausberg, Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik, §115).

* Cf. EM.,92.11, where Seneca states that the so-called goods are not goods, but that the action performed in choosing these very so-called goods may be good.
1.5.2(b) Imperiti autem id, quod oculis incurrit et quod traditur
possideturque, solum notant, cum contra illud, quod in re carum atque
pretiosum.

1.5.3 Haec, quae tenemus, quae aspicimus, in quibus cupiditas nostra
haeret, caduca sunt, auferre nobis et fortuna et iniuria potest;
beneficium etiam amisso eo, per quod datum est, durat; est enim recte
factum, quod inritum nulla vis efficit.

1.5.4 Amicum a piratis redemi, hunc alius hostis excepit et in
carcerem condidit: non beneficium, sed usum beneficii mei sustulit.
Ex naufragio alicui raptos vel ex incendio liberos reddidi, hos vel
morbus vel aliqua fortuita iniuria eripuit: manet etiam sine illis,
quod in illis datum est.

The ignorant take note only of the external dimensions of a
benefit, and not of what is valuable in benefactions. These external
dimensions are perishable, but even when they have disappeared, the
benefit itself lasts, because it is a virtuous act which can not be
undone. An individual may lose the use of a benefit, as when someone
ransomed is again deprived of his freedom, but not the benefit itself.
Likewise the benefit of the gift of life outlasts the life-span of
those whose life has been saved.

* For Stoic evaluation of the senses cf. EM.,74.16; Summum bonum
in animo contineamus: obsolescit si ab optima nostrī parte ad pessimam
transīt et transfertur ad sensus, qui agiliores sunt animalibus mutis.
Non est summa felicitatis nostrae in carne ponenda: bona illa sunt
vera, solida ac sempiterna, quae cadere non possunt, ne decrescere
quidem ac minui (this text should also be compared with Ben., 1.5.3).

Possession (possideturque) is closely linked to cupiditas
(EM., 16.8, EM., 119.9; ad Helv., 11.1-4), and in fact is replaced by that
concept in the next priamel (Ben., 1.5.3).

Seneca's criticism is that the physical aspect of goods and
the emotional dimension of possessing alone are noticed (solum notant);
he does not state that they should not be noticed at all.

Cum contra without a verb has seemed too abrupt for some (see
Préchac's app. crit.), but Préchac's reading suffices. The elliptical
style underscores the contrast found within the priamel between the
values of the examples and the ultimate value (see Schmid, op. cit.,
pp. 49-50, for a similar contrast, which he terms an oὐξ-ἄλλα contrast,
in a certain type of priamel).

Res in the phrase in re carum probably has the same significance
as in res animo geritur (Ben., 1.5.2); hence neither Préchac's la chose donnée
nor Basore's "really" is adequate (but in re does mean "really" in Liv.,
10.8.11 according to Lewis and Short, s.v.).
Haec, quae tenemus, quae aspicimus, in quibus cupiditas nostra haeret, caduca sunt, auferre nobis et fortuna et iniuria potest; beneficium etiam amissae oeo, per quod datum est durat; est enim recte factum, quod inritum nulla vis efficit:

The materia beneficii is carefully pictured more clearly; he makes it more concrete (aurum, argentum), visualizes it in relation to human beings, but impersonally (oculis incurrit), and finally personally (aspicimus). This process finds its ultimate conclusion when possideturque is replaced by cupiditas nostra.

* Caduca is a term which occurs in Seneca not infrequently (see A. Pittet, Vocabulaire Philosophique de Sénèque, p.147). Seneca touches upon the theme of the perishability of earthly goods and of change and stability, in terms used also of the relationship of body and soul (cf. corpore caduco, Cic., ND.,1.35.98). Cf. Cic. Lael., 6.20, where the popular values in a priamel (divitiae, valetudo, potentia, honores, voluptates) are described as caduca et incerta, and linked to fortune (posita ... in fortunae tementitate).

* With the statement that a benefit lasts cf. Arist. EN.,1168a15 f. regarding a benefit, τῷ μεν οὖν πεποιηκτὲν μένει τὸ ἔργον (τῷ καλὸν γὰρ πολυχρόνιον), τῷ δὲ παθόντι τὸ χρησμὸν παροίχεται. Aristotle continues with the statement that the memory of virtuous things is pleasant, that of useful things is not, or less so. There are differences with our text, but the durability of virtue, and the perishability of what is useful is the same (cf. Ben.,1.5.4, non
beneficium, sed usum beneficii mei sustulit). The tribuentis voluntas does not necessarily last; the giver may feel different the next day. However the fact of his having felt beneficent does last (cf. EM., 98.11, Habere eripitur, habuisse numquam - possession may be taken away, having possessed never; EM., 99.4, nostrum est quod praeterit tempus nec quicquam est loco tutiore quam quod fuit - the past belongs to us, nor is anything in a safer place than what was). In Ben., 1.12.1 Seneca adopts a more practical attitude, when he advises to choose lasting gifts so that they may long prod the memory of the recipient; in spite of the apparently contradictory attitude towards materia beneficii both passages, our text and Ben., 1.12.1, reveal a yearning for something lasting. A few other passages bear upon our text: Seneca presents as Stoic doctrine the view that a good perishes in one way alone, if it changes into something bad. This nature does not allow, because every virtue and every work of virtue remains incorrupt (EM., 74.23). The wise delights, not in receiving a benefit, but in having received it; this joy is immortal and continual (EM., 81.24). See also Ben., 6.2-7, where the question whether a benefit can be taken away is discussed at some length: Potest eripi domus et pecunia et mancipium et quidquid est, in quo haesit beneficii nomen; ipsum vero stabile et inmotum est; nulla vis efficiet, ne hic dederit, ne ille acceperit (Ben., 6.2.3).

* Recte factum is a Stoic technical term (= κατάδρωμα, Cic. Fin., 4.15 = SVF., 3.5.28). Strictly speaking a recte factum differed from
an officium (καθηκόν) by being perfect or complete (καθηκόν τελειώθεν, SVF., 3.136.9). G. Bühring has demonstrated that this completeness consists in the proper observance of all the aspects (numeri) of the act (Untersuchungen zur Anwendung, Bedeutung und Vorgeschichte der stoischen "numeri officii", pp. 50-135). Such an act can only be performed by the Stoic sage, and is clearly placed out of reach of the fool, a point Seneca makes in his letter on benefits EM., 81.10-14. Consequently a true benefit would be almost as much a rarity as the sage is. Yet Seneca normally speaks as if anyone may bestow a benefit (e.g. EM., 81.7; EM., 81.15; EM., 81.26). The same man may commit an injury (and is therefore not a sage) and bestow benefits, so that the question is discussed in EM., 81 whether the injuries and benefits cancel each other. In addition the De Beneficiis is based on the premise that society—not just the sages—can become more closely bound through benefits. A solution to the problem of the accessibility of a benefit to the fool is suggested in Ben., 5.13 ff., where Seneca acknowledges that only the good man (sage) can give or receive true benefits, but the bad man (fool) can give something like benefits (beneficiis similia; tamquam beneficia). Of the three classes of goods, those of the mind, those of the body, and those of fortune, only the first is barred to him; he can engage in exchanges of goods of the other classes. These are called benefits, although Seneca admits that this use of the word is incorrect. What is more to the point is that even with these quasi-benefits one can be truly ungrate-
ful, not merely quasi-ungrateful, on the ground that both donor and recipient call them benefits. It is the assumptions on which they act, as well as the intentions they have, which count. As he concludes his argument Seneca even states that the definition of a true benefit is not an urgent matter, and that it is necessary to act on the basis of what seems to be the truth (cf. Cic. Off., 1.15.46; Cic. Lael., 5.18).

* In EM., 81.15 ff. Seneca is not as definite as in quod inritum nulla vis efficit of our text. There Seneca states that the good man will tend to (proclivior: inclinabit; verget) to count benefits more than injuries, but the implication is that a benefit can to some extent be nullified by an injury. The theoretical Stoic position that virtue can neither be increased nor decreased is often maintained by Seneca (for references see A. L. Motto, Seneca Sourcebook, p.223, nr.49).

Amicum a piratis redemi, hunc alius hostis exceptit et in carcerem condidit: non beneficium, sed usum beneficii mei sustulit:

The act of buying back a friend from pirates need not per se be a benefit (cf. Ben., 1.6.1, non quid fiat); one could perform it from selfish motives. It is here not qualified except through the context. The example falls into the first of the three classes of benefits necessaria, utilia, iocunda (Ben., 1.11.3). Redemption of prisoners was regarded as a benefit to the state (Demosthenes, 8.70, cited by H. Bolkestein, Wohltätigkeit und Armenpflege, p.97; see p.98,
Moreover it was a prevalent phenomenon, especially during Hellenistic times; "it was quite a common occurrence at this time for charitable souls, who saw respectable citizens of some friendly community exposed for sale on their slave market, to come up and pay their ransom, or help them in some other way," (Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World, vol.1, p.202; see vol.3, p.1365, n.26, for bibliography). The situation presented by ransoming lent itself to casuistic treatment (for ransoming and a conflict of obligations see Arist. EN.,1164b35).

Cicero states that the redemption of the captives of pirates is characteristic of the truly generous man, as opposed to the prodigal man (Off.,2.16.56), and he too cites the deed as being useful to the state (Off.,2.18.63).

* The distinction between usus beneficii and beneficium seems similar to that of materia beneficii and beneficium; it is not quite. In the phrase usus beneficii Seneca must mean usus beneficii materiae, since a benefit proper remains forever and can be used, i.e. enjoyed, as long. Seneca chooses a looser, more natural, way of expression (cf. Ben.,6.2.3, non numquam usu beneficii longiore prohibemur, beneficium quidem ipsum non ereditur). A similar distinction to the one in our text is drawn in EM.,74.23, where the loss of friends or children is not regarded as the death of these friends or children but of their bodies.
Ex naufragio alicui raptos vel ex incendio liberos reddidi, hos vel morbus vel aliqua fortuita iniuria eripuit: manet etiam sine illis, quod in illis datum est.

Although Seneca's aunt Helvia, to whom he was close, personally suffered shipwreck (ad Helv.,19.4 & 7), he is probably using no more than a commonplace (cf. EM.,74.4; "Der Schiffbruch ist in der Stoa zum Hauptbeispiel einer Bewährungsprobe geworden", A. Stückelberger, Senecas Brief, p.111). Compare Hecato's use of the example of shipwreck in a casuistic context (Cic. Off.,3.89.90).

* The fire is likewise a commonplace (cf. Multi inveniuntur qui ignem inferunt urbis, EM.,94.61). If the Liberalis to whom the De Beneficiis is addressed can be identified with the Liberalis of EM., 91, he would have noted incendium with some poignancy whenever he read it after the summer of 64 A.D., at which time, Seneca reports, he was quite distressed by the burning of his native city, Lyon.

* Losing one's children can be regarded as a test (Prov.,5.5), and the wise man is not afflicted by the loss of children and friends (EM.,74.22). But in the De Beneficiis saving the life of someone's children is in the third class of necessary benefits, those of which it is worse to be deprived than of life (Ben.,1.11.4). If, however, the child's life was saved for the child's sake, the father is not put under obligation by this benefit to the child, although he may enjoy it (Ben.,5.19.7-8).
1.5.5. Omnia itaque, quae falsum beneficii nomen usurpant, ministeria sunt, per quae se voluntas amica explicant. Hoc in aliis quoque rebus evenit, ut aliubi sit species rei, aliubi ipsa res.

1.5.6 Inperator aliquem torquibus, murali et civica donat: quid habet per se corona pretiosum? quid praetexta? quid fasces? quid tribunal et currus? Nihil horum honor est, sed honoris insigne. Sic non est beneficium id, quod sub oculos venit, sed beneficii vestigium et nota.

The so-called benefits furnish the benevolent disposition with the means to express itself. Concepts like honour also are expressed through tokens which are not of themselves valuable. So too what is popularly called a benefit is but an indication of the true benefit.

Omnia itaque, quae falsum beneficii nomen usurpant, ministeria sunt, per quae se voluntas amica explicant:

With falsum nomen compare Ben.,1.3.6 where the expression is used of the Graces. In Ben.,5.13 the so-called goods are termed beneficiis similia and tamquam beneficia. They are here assigned some positive value as ministeria.

* The last clause provides the first hint that a true benefit is an actio (Ben.,1.6.1). Préchac compares Ben.,7.13.

Hoc in aliis quoque rebus evenit, ut aliubi sit species rei, aliubi ipsa res.

The precise significance of the phrase in aliis quoque rebus
may not at first be certain. As sic below substantiates, Seneca argues by analogy, one of the ways in which the Stoics believed conceptual knowledge was acquired (EM.,120.5 ff.; cf. Cic. Fin.,3.40; DL.,7.52; Sext. Emp. Math.,3.40; on the latter see G. Watson, The Stoic Theory of Knowledge, p.25; M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa vol.1, p.58, vol.2, p.34). The method was also popular among rhetoricians (W. Trillitsch, Senecas Beweisführung, p.14). Two arguments can be adduced against regarding the following examples as analogous ones; (a) they are of the same order as the political rewards in Ben.,1.5.1, (b) the general proposition which precedes states omnia, which would subsume the political rewards of Ben.,1.5.6, rather than relate to them as analogous. The difficulty disappears, however, once it is pointed out the political rewards are not compared; the comparison is between beneficium and honor (Ben.,1.5.6). Aliis rebus must refer not to the military and political rewards, but to such concepts as honor, which functions not only in the military and political spheres but also in religion (Ben.,1.6.3).

Inperator aliquem torquibus, murali et civica donat: quid habet per se corona pretiosum? quid praetexta? quid fasces? quid tribunal et currus?

Torques were necklaces which were originally regarded as foreign insignia, but were later also sent by the senate (Liv.,43.5.8). They could be given as tokens of victory, votive offerings, or special rewards (e.g. Suet. Aug.,43.2; see RE.,6A.1803 f.). They could likewise
be granted as rewards for bravery, to individuals or to military units, alae or cohortes (RE., 5.1528). This latter use is more appropriate for our text.

* With murali understand corona (on the subject of the many and various crowns see Gell. NA., 5.6.1-27). The corona muralis, gold and bedecked with turrets, was a high award bestowed on the first soldier to scale the walls (Liv., 23.18; Polyb. 6.39.5; Suet. Aug., 25.3).

* The corona civica was awarded for saving the life of a fellow-citizen in war (Augustus won one, Mon. Anc.). It was made of oak-leaves, because, according to Gellius, acorns had provided man with the earliest food. For Seneca's praise of this crown see Clem., 1.26.5. This crown, being made of leaves, is less costly than the gold corona muralis, but in both cases the honor is what is most valuable; hence Seneca's question quid habet per se corona pretiosum (even the honor could be diminished, - M. Fulvius Nobilior, consul in 189 B.C., gave crowns too freely, for building a rampart, for example, or for digging a well, Gell. NA., 5.6.26).

* The praetexta was the purple-bordered robe worn by free-born boys until the age when they donned the toga virilis, and by curule magistrates, also those outside Rome in the municipia and coloniae. Ex-curule magistrates were buried in the garment (Liv., 34.7.2). Some priests too had the right to wear it (cf. Liv., 27.8.8; Liv., 33.42.1). In the context Seneca is probably referring to magistrates.

* The fasces could also be given as an award; lictors, carrying
fasces laureati, accompanied a general celebrating a triumph. The laurels were deposited on the lap of the statue of the Capitoline Jupiter (ad Helv., 10.8).

* The tribunal was a platform supporting the seat of a praetor or presiding magistrate (Liv., 23.32.4); it was used also by generals in camp when addressing troops. The currus may be the triumphal chariot.

Nihil horum honor est, sed honoris insigne:

To some of Seneca's readers a touch of irony might have been present. The distinctions of a rank could be held without the rank itself being attained (see Furneaux' note on insignia praeturae, Tac. Ann., 11.4.5; included could be the right to wear the toga praetexta).
A benefit is a benevolent action which gives pleasure and receives it through giving, and is inclined towards and of its own accord ready for what it accomplishes. Accordingly, the event that takes place, or the object that is given are not important, but what is, is the attitude with which the benefaction takes place, inasmuch as a benefit does not consist of the event or gift, but of the very disposition of the one giving the gift or performing the event. Moreover you may understand that there is a great difference between them from the fact that a benefit is good under all circumstances; the event, however, (or the gift) is neither good nor evil. It is the disposition which elevates the insignificant, which distinguishes the paltry, and disparages what is considered great and valuable; the things after which we strive are neutral in nature, being neither good nor evil. What matters is the direction into which the guide, by whom form is given to things, steers them. That very thing which is counted out or passed from hand to hand is not a benefit, just as honor paid to the gods does not lie in the victims, however splendid and resplendent with gold they are, but in the upright and pious attitude of the worshippers. Accordingly good men are devout even with simple offerings of grain and gruel; evil men, on the contray, do not avoid being impious, however much they have stained the altars with blood.
1.6.1 Quid est ergo beneficium? Benivola actio tribuens gaudium capiensque tribuendo in id, quod facit prona et sponte sua parata. Itaque non, quid fiat aut quid detur, refert, sed qua mente, quia beneficium non in eo, quod fit aut datur, consistit, sed in ipso dantis aut facientis animo.

A benefit is said to consist of an action which gives mutual pleasure to the parties involved in the exchange of the benefit. It is above all an action which is free from compulsion, i.e. spontaneous. For that reason it is not important what act is done for someone, or what object is given him, but it is important what spirit attended it, because the benefit does not lie in the event or the gift, but in the disposition of the donor who gave the help or the gift.

After the preliminary distinction between the materia beneficii commonly called beneficium and the true benefit as internal has been presented through a series of contrasts, the true benefit now receives full attention. Whereas - because of the context - a true benefit was, with the exception of Ben.,1.5.5, presented as something static, emphasis is now placed on its dynamic aspects. The definition is followed by attempts to convey its validity. They consist of (a) a deduction (itaque) of the negative consequences (non refert) set within a contrast (quid, mente), the whole of which is repeated for emphasis in a causal relationship, (b) proof, not for the definition, but for the contrast (inter ista discrimum); hence only indirectly for the definition. The definition is made up of a restatement of the beneficium in terms of the Stoic system of values, asserted somewhat
dogmatically, (c) an explanation of the Stoic system of values in terms of the dynamic role of the soul. Note that the Stoic section in the centre of the chapter has a parallel in the Stoic doctrine in the centre of the preceding chapter (Ben., 1.5.3, recte factum),
(d) an analogy (sicut) involving honor which is doubly effective for its having appeared in Ben., 1.5.6.

Benivola actio tribuens gaudium capiensque tribuendo
in id, quod facit prona et sponte sua parata:

The definition is not Seneca's own (Ben., 6.2.1, Quidam negant posse; non enim res est, sed actio, as response to the question whether a benefit can be taken away; cf. Ben., 2.34.1, Sic beneficium est et actio, ut diximus, benefica et ipsum, quod datur per illam actionem, ut pecunia, ut domus, ut praetexta; unum utrique nomen est, vis quidem ac potestas longe alia). The reason why the name benefit is used for both res and actio is the fact that there are many things without names, which we do not call by their own, but by borrowed names (Ben., 2.34.2; cf. EM., 58.1, on verborum ... paupertas, immo egestas; EM., 59.1, distinguishes between significatio publica and significatio Stoica). As an actio a benefit comes under the third part of moral philosophy (de actionibus; the first is inspectio which assigns proper values, the second de impetu, EM., 89.14-15). But it is dependent on the other parts of philosophy as well, since an action must be carried out at the right time, place, and in the right manner (numerî, EM., 89.15).
The dynamic characteristic of actio is reinforced by the verbal elements which follow (tribuens, capiens, tribuendo, facit).

* Benevola repeats the noun of ipsa tribuentis voluntas (Ben., 1.5.2) in adjectival form, and may represent the second of the three parts of moral philosophy. The function of the prefix bene- is analogous to that in beneficium (cf. recte factum, Ben., 1.5.3), and occurs also in benevolentia (Ben., 3.22.1; Ben., 7.13; EM., 81.25; other instances listed in A. Pittet, Vocabulaire Philosophique de Seneque, s.v.). Bene- translates the Greek ἐὖ, which occurs in related expressions ἐὖ πολεῖν, ἐὖ ἔροῦν, ἐὖ ἀρκαν, ἐὔεργετεῖν (see H. Bolkestein, Wohltätigkeit und Armenpflege, p. 95). More closely related to benevola-benevolentia is Aristotle's ἐὖνολα, which he places within the context of discussions on friendship (EN., 1155b31). Goodwill if reciprocated and recognized, and if given time and intimacy becomes friendship (EN., 1156b26); it is possible to be beneficent to someone who has not been seen, or who is not known (EN., 1166b31). It is not friendship, rather the beginning of friendship (ἀρχὴ φιλίας), or inactive friendship (ἀρχὴν φιλίαν, EE., 1241a; cf. [Arist.] MM., 1212al; EN., 1166b30 f.). Benevolence lacks the intensity and desire of friendship; it may arise suddenly (ἐκ προσπαθοῦ) as for competitors in a contest (EN., 1166b33 f.; see also Cic. Lael., 5.19; Lael., 6.20 & 22; Lael., 7.23; Lael., 9.29 & 30, for the importance of benevolentia in friendship). In benefits benevolentia can be a positive force, for when a benefit is cancelled by an injury, a certain amount of benevolence remains (EM., 81.25; cf. EM., 81.26 humanitas inclinat in melius).
In *tribuens gaudium capiens* we have two actions, normally used of exchanging gifts, which instead have, as their object *gaudium* (it may reflect a Greek play on words, χαρίς and χαρά), a new element, not mentioned in the discussion of *materia beneficii* (Ben., 1.5). A single action is thus shown to have a double effect, and can therefore be a social bond (see Ben., 1.4.2). Compare the Stoic definition of εὐχαριστία (SVF., 3.67.12): ἐπιστήμη τοῦ τίσι καὶ πάτε παρεκτέον χάριν καὶ πῶς καὶ ταρά τόυν ληπτέον. Note the difference in emphasis achieved by the substitution in Seneca of *actio* for ἐπιστήμη. Seneca makes *tribuens* and *capiens* refer to the same act (by means of tribuendo); this is not evident in the Greek text. Regarding rejoicing, Seneca states that the wise man enjoys having given a benefit more than the recipient having received it (magis ... gaudet, EM., 81.10), but paying back ought to involve greater joy for the recipient than receiving (EM., 81.17). *Gaudium*, which contrasts with the complaints described in Ben., 1.1, is more extensively defined by Seneca in EM., 23.3-6, where it is stated to be a res severa, something solid and deep, not identical with a face devoid of frowns, nor with laughter. Strictly speaking *gaudium* is attainable only by the wise man, for it is the elation of a spirit trusting in its own goods and truth; although such a thing as a consulship is often regarded as a source of *gaudium*, it is often the beginning of future unhappiness, — real *gaudium* does not cease and does not change into its opposite (EM., 59.2; note that *gaudium* shares with *beneficium* a common incorrect usage of the term, and the fact that both are essentially immutable). *Gaudium* can be acquired in a short
span of time, and can be obtained by the anticipation of a future task such as dying for one's country (EM.,76.28). It is listed with peace and the safety of one's country as goods of the first rank, as opposed to those of the second which are situated in adverse circumstances, such as enduring torture (EM.,66.5). Yet these goods are, paradoxically, equal (EM.,66.12), at least as far as their status as virtue is concerned (EM.,66.14). What is required of virtue (significantly for text) is that it is spontaneous (voluntarium, velit, libens faciat, EM.,66.16 & 17). In fact, if something restricts its freedom the best element of it is lost, sibi placere. Gaudium, a eupathic emotion is contrasted with voluptas, a vice (EM.,59; cf. SVF.,3.105.16 f. where χαρά is contrasted with ἔοικος; Cic. Tusc.,4.6.13, distinguishes gaudium from laetitia gestiens vel nimia). Virtue alone gives joy which is eternal and secure (EM.,27.3). Gaudium and voluptas can also be contrasted in the following way: Malis una voluptas est et haec brevis, dum accipient beneficia, ex quibus sapienti longum gaudium manet ac perenne (EM.,81.24; cf. Cat.,76.1, siqua recordant benefacta priora voluptas / est homini ...). In the fourth book of the De Beneficiis Seneca does use voluptas of the Stoic giving of benefits and contrasts it with the Epicurean voluptas (Ben.,4.13.1-2; cf. Ben.,4.2). Various terms are used to describe the critical function pleasure has in the context of mutual sharing of friendship (gaudeo, delectabit, iucunda). Aristotle had also stated that the good man delights (χαρά) in virtuous deeds (EN.,1170a8; cf. EN.,1167a31 ff.). The liberal man
will give correctly, the right amount, to the right person, at the right time, and will do so with pleasure or without pain (ἡδέως ἦ ἀλυπως, EN.,1120a26; cf. EN.,1120b30, where ἡδέως appears as one of the numeri of giving. On the topic see R. P. Hayes, "The Theory of Pleasure of the Old Stoa", AJPh,83 (1962), 412-9; he is criticized by J. Rist, Stoic Philosophy, p.37 ff.

* In id should perhaps be illud as object of tribuendo; this is paleographically possible. However, in the text as it stands in complements paratus. Seneca used in with many verbs regularly construed with ad (A. Bourgery, Sénèque Prosateur, pp.389-90; cf. VB.,8.3, in utrumque paratus; Ira, 2.20.1, proclives in iram). The sentence may be translated, "a benevolent action which gives joy and by so doing receives it, inclined as it is toward, and ready of its own accord for, its task".

* Prona et sua sponte parata means inclined by reason of one's disposition, not compelled by external forces. On Seneca's insistence on freedom of the will as a necessary prerequisite for accepting a benefit see Ben.,2.18.6-8. A virtuous deed must be voluntary (EM., 66.16; cf. Cic. Off.,1.9.28, ... hoc ipsum ita iustum est, quad recte fit, si est voluntarium; amicitia must also be voluntary, Cic. Lael., 8.26; Arist. EE.,1234b35; in Roman law this voluntary aspect, sponte, based on friendship, became the distinguishing mark of negotiorum gestio, the management of another's affairs in his interest, but without his authorization, e.g. in his absence, H. H. Seiler, Der Tatbestand der Negotiorum Gestio im Römischen Recht, p.39). Seneca uses other
terms as well: ... *libens id tribuam percipiens ex munere meo
gaudium ... (Ben., 4.29.3); *liberalitas is so called, not because
it is owed to free men (*liberis), but because it issues from a free
mind (*libero animo; VB., 24.3). M. Pohlenz, ("Philosophie und
Erlebnis in Senecas Dialogen, NGA philolog.histor.klasse, (1941), nr.6,
p.114) is of the opinion that Seneca is translating a word like
προαιρετική. One might further suggest as a possibility ἐξωστίας
which is defined by Aristotle (EE., 1225a37 f.) in terms of knowledge
of the aspects (*numerii) of a given situation (see G. Bühring,
Anwendung der Stoischen Numeri Officii, p.218). *Sua sponte may also
refer to the sudden appearance of a benevolent attitude (Arist. EN.,
1166b33 f.).

*Itaque non, quid fiat aut quid detur, refert, sed qua mente,
quia beneficium non in eo, quod fit aut datur, consistit,
sed in ipso dantis aut facientis animo:

With our text compare EM., 95.40, ... *non in facto laus est
sed in eo quemadmodum fiat.

*Quid fiat is analogous (in dynamic terms) to materia beneficii;
it is not quite identical to quid detur, the former being an event,
the second an object. In Ben., 1.5.4 an event (*amicum ... redemi) had
seemingly been considered a beneficium, here the actio without qualifi-
cation is found to be deficient.

*The separation which this sentence posits is that of two of
the numeri, quid and quis (who, in this case, is the donor, but cf.
EM., 19.12, 'Quid ergo? beneficia non parant amicitias?' Parant, si
accepturos licuit eligere, si conlocata, non sparsa sunt. Itaque dum
incipis esse mentis tuae, interim hoc consilio sapientium utere, ut
magis ad rem existimes pertinere quis quam quid acceperit). Quid
is frequently separated from and subordinated to other aspects (see
G. Bühring, op.cit., p.190, who cites Pl. Phdr., 268a ff., Arist.,
EN., 1137a9 ff., [Arist.] MM., 1199a3 f., Sen., EM., 22.1, EM., 64.8,
Epict., 3.21.20 f.; cf. Arist. Poet., 146a5). The numerus "qua mente"
(= quemadmodum), referring to the manner in which something is done or
given as determined by the mental attitude of the giver, includes such
topics as nolens, volens, sciens, nesciens, sua causa an et sua causa
(Ben., 6.7 ff.). Such factors determine the value of the benefit and
the return to be made (cf. Ira, 3.12.2, ... nemo animum facientis,
sed ipsum aestimat factum. Atqui ille intuendus est, voluerit an
inciderit, coactus sit an deceptus, odium secutus sit an praemium, sibi
morem gesserit an manum alteri commodaverit). Seneca sums up a similar
yet different list of distinctions with the comment, quod est incredi-
 bile, saepe de facto bene existimamus, de faciente male (Ira, 3.28.5).
Aristotle makes the evaluation of a gift dependent on the intention
(προαρχησιν) of the benefactor. This is especially true in the case
of the noblest of the three kinds of friendship, friendship of virtue.
The gift then is given for the sake of the recipient; no complaints
arise, but a return must be made on the basis of the benefactor's
intention (EN., 1164b3 f.). The question, however, admits of more
complex considerations. When one of two parties in a friendship claims it is one form of friendship, the other another, arbitration must be sought (EE., 1243b3). Another question is whether the magnitude of the benefit is to be determined by the utility to recipient (τῇ τοῦ παράνυτος ὄφελεία) or by the beneficence of the doer (τῇ τοῦ δράσαντος εὐεργεσίᾳ; EN., 1163a9 f.). The recipients underrate its value, and the donors overrate (ibid.; cf. EE., 1243a15 f.). The problem is solved by allowing the utility to the recipient to be the criterion in friendships of utility; the intention (προαίρεσις) of the doer in friendships of virtue. Since the conception of a benefit in our text is closer to the latter (beneficium = recte factum), it is not surprising that Seneca should present its criterion. Compare with our text also Cic. Inv., 2.38.112, Beneficia ex sua vi, ex tempore, ex animo eius qui fecit, ex casu considerantur. Each of these categories is explained, the one for animus being, ... si non sui commodi causa, si eo consilio fecit omnia, ut hoc conficere posset. (Cicero does not mention here the utility to the recipient, but replaces it with ex sua vi, the intrinsic value of the service, as Aristotle had done EE., 1243a15). See also the definition of χάρις (Arist. Rhet., 1385a17), where mens (πῶς ... ἔχοντες) is positively presented as an altruistic attitude, as well as negatively, in which case the benefit is negated (αὕτων ἐνεκα, Rhet., 1385b1). We gain a further glimpse of what Aristotle might mean by qua mente in WV., 1250b32, where the liberal man is defined as being attended by pliability and ductility of character,
philanthropy, and being pitying, affectionate, hospitable, and devoted to honour.

1.6.2. Magnum autem esse inter ista discrimen vel ex hoc intellegas licet, quod beneficium utique bonum est, id autem, quod fit aut datur, nec bonum nec malum est. Animus est, qui parva extollit, sordida inlustrat, magna et in pretio habita dehonestat; ipsa, quae adpetuntur, neutram naturam habent, nec boni nec mali: refert, quo illa rector inpellat, a quo forma rebus datur.

Moreover you may understand that there is great difference between the gift and the disposition of the donor from the fact that a benefit is under all circumstances good, but event or gift are neither good nor bad. It is the spirit which can give value to what is small, and deflate what is considered valuable; the things themselves have a neutral nature, being neither good nor bad. It is important to what end the person, who, as it were, shapes or creates them, uses them.

Seneca continues with contrast between external and internal. At times Seneca allows a grande discrimen to exist between differentia (EM., 82.15), although with respect to virtue they are alike. These remarks necessitate an explication of the Stoic value system as found in Seneca. A gathering together of Seneca's remarks will be useful in understanding certain aspects of the definition, such as the contrasts internal-external and eternal-temporal.

A beneficium, an act qualified as morally correct, is declared a bonum, i.e. a manifestation of virtue, whereas an act per se, or an
object given, have no moral value of their own, but depend for it, as the next sentence of our text illustrates, on the animus of the agent. Seneca expresses the fact that the object or act receives its moral colouring from the agent in the traditional metaphors of rector and artifex. That such moral qualification is of paramount importance is shown repeatedly in the Epistulae Morales. Two examples will suffice. Vivere is not bonum, but bene vivere (EM.,70.4). Likewise patientia can be distinguished from fortiter pati, which is a virtue (EM.,67.6; cf. EM.,71.21; EM.,85.22; EM.,93). Comment is necessary on the terminology employed by Seneca. Bonum can be used of moral virtue. It is then identical with honestum (ἐὐλογία), for which virtus is also used. Strictly speaking only honestum is bonum (EM.,71.5; EM.,76.19; EM.,76.21; EM.,85.17). At times this sense of the word bonum is indicated through modification by the adjective summum (EM.,31.8; EM.,74.16) or primum (EM.,66.6). In addition to this significance, referring essentially to an internal dimension, that of virtue, bonum can also be used of the external aspect, the manifestation of virtue, or its materia, as will appear in the texts cited below. This use of the word bonum can in some instances be differentiated from bonum which is summum bonum by its appearing in the plural form bona (goods; e.g. EM.,118.11). The text just cited also reveals that those things which may manifest virtue need not do so necessarily. They are in fact neque bona neque mala (EM.,118.11), which will be shown to be the indifferentia.

Some confusion seems to be present in Seneca's appellation.
At times the *indifferentia* are acknowledged as *bona* (EM., 118.11), at other times this status seems to be denied them, and they are known as so-called goods (EM., 74.14), or goods popularly thought to be so (EM., 74.17). There is at the basis of this apparent conflict no real contradiction. The *indifferentia* are not *bona per se* (one reason being that they are not possessed by the gods, EM., 76.25), but can be *bona* in a certain context. If they are regarded as *bona per se*, they are falsely named (EM., 110.8). They share a name with the true goods, but not their essence (EM., 74.16). Those *bona* which are truly good in their context are therefore named appropriately (EM., 76.16).

In addition to these negative and positive applications of the term *bona* to those things which are or are potentially manifestations of virtue (i.e. *externa*); there is a positive application which must be differentiated from that referred to above. The examples of EM., 118.11 are such that they would popularly be regarded as goods (*militia*, *legatio*, *jurisdictio*), while at the same time they could be real goods. Distinct from these is a good which the public does not recognize as a good, but the Stoic does; they are the goods in *materia infelici expressa*, *tamquam tormentorum patientia* (EM., 66.5).

To the classification of the goods we shall return; at present it will be well to stress once more that from one point of view these goods are *indifferentia* (on the possible Cynic origin of the concept and its use see G. Bühring's lengthy note, *Anwendung der stoischen 'Numeri Officii'*, p.151). For the *indifferentia* Seneca uses a number
of synonymous expressions, apart from the Greek term ἀδόξαστον which occurs in EM.,82.10. We find neutram naturam habent (Ben.,1.6.2); dubia (EM.,118.11); media (EM.,117.9; EM.,109.12); res qualibet (somewhat doubtful, EM.,87.17); materia (EM.,66.15; ad Marc.,19.5; EM.,71.22).

The classification adumbrated above is found in EM.,66.5. Although bona are agreed to be paria, there is still a triple condicio. In the first class are placed those goods which are generally found to be so, examples are gaudium, pax, salus patriae, victoria, boni liberi (EM.,66.5 & 36). The second class contains those which are manifest in adverse circumstances, such as enduring torture, disease, fire, thirst, or exile. The third is comprised of insignificant goods, at least goods which are no more according to nature than against nature, and may be for that reason regarded as media (EM.,66.36; media probably in a different sense than intermediate as indifferentia). The epistle is replete with important distinctions. Although sumnum bonum is immutable, and the first and second class of goods are equal (EM.,66.12), differences in circumstances do exist (... inter illa in quibus virtus utraque ostenditur, EM.,66.14, = materia, EM.,66.14). In EM.,66.9 & 19 & 29 the first class is described by the following words, optanda, petam, optabilia, and the second by aversanda, vitabo, mirabilia (they correspond to the Greek προηγμένα and ἀποπροηγμένα). The latter class is against nature, or rather the materia in which the good exists is against nature (EM.,66.39). Goods in this class will be sought if it is necessary (EM.,66.5) or taken if the situation presents
them (EM.,71.17).

A great difference among the media is also acknowledged in EM.,82.15. Some, such as death, have the appearance of evil (mali speciem), although they are not evils. The first and second classes are also differentiated by the terms commoda, producta (EM.,74.17; commodum is further defined as that which has more usefulness than trouble, EM.,87.36) and incommoda (EM.,66.17; EM.,67.4; EM.,71.5; EM.,72.5).

The relationship between the two classes Seneca does not dispose of easily; the sixty-seventh epistle is devoted to the question whether the goods of the second class are in fact optabilia. As in the conclusion of the previous letter, where Seneca appears to speak personally (EM.,66.49 f.), his attitude towards them is not unfavourable; he cites Demetrius his friend and Attalus his teacher as being contemptuous of a tranquil life (EM.,67.14 f.) and does not dissociate himself from them. Elsewhere Seneca recognizes that there is evil in this class, namely the danger of mental breakdown (EM.,71.26). Again no serious conflict is apparent and the main outlines of the system have not been obscured.

The kind of examples given of indifferentia can now be understood. While most are commoda (EM.,117.9, pecunia, forma, nobilitas; EM.,109.12, gratia, incolumitas, alia in usus vitae cara aut necessaria; EM.,118.10, militia legatio, iurisdictio; EM.,82.4, divitiae, virea, formae, honores, regnum), some are incommoda (EM.,82.4, morbus, dolor,
paupertas, exilium, mors). The difference between divitiae from the first class and paupertas from the second is that the former offers a more fruitful area for the display of virtue (maiorem virtuti ... materiam, VB.,21.4; ... in divitiis et temperantia et liberalitas et diligentia et dispositio et magnificentia campum habeat patentem, VB.,22.1).

Now that the relationship between the externals has been delineated, honestum, the internal aspect will be reintroduced. In order to understand the effect which virtus has on the externals, one of its characteristics, namely that of immutability, must be pointed out, and contrasted with the changeability potentially present in the externals. Virtue is described as plena, complete (EM.,71.16). For that reason it will not grow; it can not be shortened, stretched (EM.,71.19), bent (EM.,71.20), be made larger or smaller (EM.,66.7), although it may adapt itself and change its qualities in accordance with the material in which it manifests itself (EM.,66.7).

Change, however, is possible for the other goods; ... omnia praeter virtutem mutare nomen, modo mala fieri, modo bona (EM.,95.35). Such change depends on a change in the circumstances, since the aspects (numeri), determine the moral content; Eadem aut turpia aut honesta: refert quare aut quemadmodum fiant (EM.,95.43). Other numeri could be substituted for motive and manner, e.g. purpose, or indirect object; Eadem res, si gulae datur, turpis est, si honori, reprensionem effugit (EM.,95.41). The change comes about when virtus, the sine qua non for all other goods (EM.,76.16) is applied; Haec [militia, legatio, iuris-
dictio] cum honeste administrata sunt, bona esse incipient et ex dubio in bonum transeunt (EM.,118.11). Seneca continues by stating that this goodness is derivative, issuing from honestum; what is good could have been an evil (cf. EM.,71.5, Hoc ligueat, nihil esse bonum nisi honestum: et omnia incommoda suo iure bona vocabuntur quae modo virtus honesta- verit; EM.,71.21 Bona ista aut mala non efficit materia sed virtus; EM.,82.12, Omnia ista per se non sunt honesta nec gloriosa, sed quidquid ex illis virtus adiit tractavitque honestum et gloriosum facit: illa in medio posita sunt. Interest utrum malitia illis an virtus manum admoverit ...). The contrast virtus-materia aptly describes the relationship between virtue and the indifferentia. It is significant that the term materia in this sense first appears in the epistles at the beginning of EM.,66 which immediately follows the important epistle dealing with the two Stoic causes, - the efficient and the material cause. The content of EM.,65 has a definite bearing on the doctrine of the goods. Both H. Cancik (Untersuchungen zu Senecas Epistulæ Morales, p.148) and G. Maurach (Der Bau von Senecas Epistulæ Morales, p.137) remark on the relationship of the letters. However Cancik sees only a formal relationship; both epistles contain theoretical themes and related arguments. Maurach remarks (p.138) on a similarity in content. The introduction of EM.,66 contains an illustration of the theme of EM.,65, the superiority of the spirit over bodies, in the person of Seneca's friend Claranus whose courageous spirit rises superior to his ailing body. The theme is also present in the epistle itself. The primum bonum is an animus (EM.,66.6). We may then expect that the
content of EM.,65 will have some bearing on EM.,66, and on Ben.,1.6.2.

The two main causes causa (EM.,65.2; cf. ratio faciens, EM.,
65.12; efficiens causa, EM.,65.14; deus, EM.,65.12) and materia (EM.,
65.2) are comparable to an artifex and the bronze from which he makes
a statue (EM.,65.3 f.) or god, i.e creative reason, fashioning the
universe (EM.,65.19; EM.,65.23). It is apparent that the relationship
between virtus and the indifferentia is similar (see also EM.,76.16,
where bona which issued from and were accomplished by virtue are said
to be its works, opera). With respect to Ben.,1.6.2 it is interesting
to note that the images of artifex / formator and of rector are also pre-
sent in the epistle (EM.,65.19; EM.,65.23). Moreover the agent in
Ben.,1.6.2, animus, is stated to be analogous to deus (Quem in hoc
mundo locum deus obtinet, hunc in homine animus ... EM.,65.24); we note
that its role in EM.,66.6, ... non ex opinione sed ex natura pretia
rebus inponens ..., is akin to its role in Ben.,1.6.2.

One additional problem may be introduced at this time. EM.,
117.9 states that all things are mala or bona or indifferentia. The
suggestion contained in that statement is that things in this world
are classifiable into this tripartite division. However, the tripartite
division, we can now argue, represents a conflation of two states:
potentiality and actuality. Before things are in this world, in a
concrete situation, or in a context, they are indifferent, because
potentially they are either good or bad (quod bonum est malum esse
potuit, EM.,118.11; Id autem medium atque indifferentis vocamus quod tam
malo contingere bono possit ..., EM.,117.9). In actuality such an indifferent becomes malum or bonum. The relationships can be depicted by the following diagram:

Potentiality | Actuality
---|---
| bonum - virtue (all the numeri) \(\text{EM.71.17}\) { quis 
| \(\text{EM.71.17}\) 
| quid 
| \(\text{EM.71.17}\) 
| cui 
| etc. 
| liberalis \((\text{EM.},120.8)\)
\(\text{indifferens} \)
\(\text{momen mutare} \)
\(\text{malum} - \text{absence of virtus} \) \(\text{not all}\)
\(\text{the numeri}\) 
\(\text{prodigus}\)

Essential for actualization are the two major causes recognized by the Stoics causa (ratio efficiens, deus) and materia. Some of the other factors, to which Seneca denies the status of causa, which are nevertheless prerequisite to actualization, are such aspects (numeri) as time, place, and motion (EM.,65.11).

The metaphors used by Seneca to illustrate the change brought upon materia by virtue are noteworthy: (a) temperature (EM.,82.14), an object is per se neither hot nor cold, i.e. a furnace will heat it, water will cool it, (b) light (EM.,82.14), the same room can be light during the day, dark at night, (c) dye (EM.,66.8), whatever the highest good touches it transforms into something like itself and dyes (cf. DK.,22B67). In these examples changes are not structural or material, but rather of another dimension (i.e. it is not the quid,
but the other numeri which determine the moral status, for example cui in EM., 117.9). The basic point is also made in EM., 87.15 ff.; that which can come into the possession of a shameful man is not a good. The pimp and the trainer of gladiators have riches. Therefore wealth is not a good. But a further, and somewhat paradoxical statement is also made, ... qualia quisque habet, talis est.

J. Rist does not discuss the Senecan passages in his helpful treatment of the Stoic doctrine of the goods (Stoic Philosophy, pp. 97-111), but comes to the following conclusion (p. 107), which may also terminate the present discussion:

We have reached the point at which we can say that for orthodox Stoicism every actual thing will in particular circumstances be either preferred or rejected, and every particular act will be either appropriate or inappropriate. Apparently the Stoics held that some types of action, such as pursuing virtue, are always appropriate, but in the case of the rest, though many other acts may be normally appropriate, their appropriateness cannot be assumed on every individual occasion; rather each individual occasion must be taken on its merits.

A further footnote is allowed. If Rist's conclusion is correct, then that of H. Cancik (Untersuchungen zu Senecas Epistulae Morales, pp. 123-4) can not be. She believes that nihil gloriosum esse nisi circa indifferentia (EM., 82.10) in which the indifferents are declared explicitly as the proper field of activity for morality, represents Seneca's own opinion, and that Seneca’s thesis, that an indifferent becomes in each case a good or evil according to the dis-
position of the agent, seems a significant change in Stoic doctrine. Instead it may well be orthodox Stoicism.

Magnum autem esse inter ista discrimen vel ex hoc intellegas licet, quod beneficium utique bonum est, id autem, quod fit aut datur, nec bonum nec malum est:

The major difference between a beneficium and its materia is that the former is a good, the latter per se indifferent (i.e. without the qualification of a context), so that it can become either a good or an evil. A beneficium is, as its prefix shows, always morally qualified. This point is reemphasized by utique (cf. Ben., 1.1.12), "under all circumstances" (see also the references to a beneficium as recte factum, Ben., 1.5.3, and virtus, Ben., 1.1.12). Therefore G. Bühring (Anwendung der stoischen Numeri Officii, p.279) is incorrect in stating that Seneca no longer views a beneficium as κατόρθωμα with the old Stoa, but as καθήκοντο (he bases this on Ben., 4.12.3 where Seneca states, ... viri officium est inter alia et beneficium dare; officium, however, cannot here have its technical meaning of καθήκοντο, since it is used earlier in the same sentence of the cycles of the universe and the sun which are divine, Quomodo mundi officium est circumagere rerum ordinem, quomodo solis loca mutare ...).
Animus est, qui parva·extollit, sordida inlustrat, magna et in pretio habita dehonestat; ipsa, quae adpetuntur, neutram naturam habent, nec boni nec mali: refert, quo illa rector impellat, a quo forma rebua datur:

Definitions of the soul are not lacking in Seneca. It is, in brief, the divine element in man (EM.,41. passim), part of the creative fire, not a separate but an integral part of us (EM.,113.5). Its task is idealistically set forth in EM.,66.6 at some length: it gazes upon the truth, knowledgeable in what is to be avoided and what is to be sought. It imposes values upon things not according to opinion but according to nature; it inserts itself into the whole world and contemplates all that takes place there. It remains great and vigorous, and does not submit itself to good or bad fortune - talis animus virtus est (EM.,66.6). But Seneca's views about the soul, as well as its relation to the body are shrouded by ambivalent statements. EM.,92.1 has been regarded as evidence for dualism in psychology, In hoc principale est aliquid inrationale, est et rationale (cf. EM.,71.27). The irrational part is divisible into two parts, one placed in the emotions, the other devoted to pleasure (i.e. spirited and appetitive parts; EM.,92.8). S. Rubín (Die Ethik Senecas, ch.4) points to Ira, 1.8.3 as evidence for an earlier monistic position (sed affectus et ratio in melius peiusque mutatio animi est). A. D. Nock ("Posidonius", JRS.,49 (1959) p.11) denies that the doctrine of EM., 92.10 in which the soul is contrasted with useless and dissolving flesh, suitable only for the reception of food, is strictly dualistic,
postulating that the remark may originally have occurred in a homiletical context, or one of controversy against hedonistic views. Be that as it may; it is possible to note in Seneca—leaving aside the question of the parts of the soul—that disparaging remarks are made about the body in relation to the soul (see Fr. Husner, *Leib und Seele in der Sprache Senecas*, Philologus, Suppl.17, for categories of metaphors used to describe the body-soul relationship). Some have seen Platonic influence on Seneca in this respect (for references see T. P. Hardeman, *The Philosophy of Lucius Annaeus Seneca*, p.36 who states that Mommsen found Platonic influence negligible, while others came upon more Platonism than Stoicism). In the controversy the following texts are significant: *Non potest artifex mutare materiam* (Prov., 5.9). This text which limits the creativity of the divine, active element is fundamental to Seneca's deviation from orthodox Stoicism in his more pessimistic conception of morality and humanity (according to E. Spring, "The Problem of Evil in Seneca" CW,16 (1922), 51-53; cf. A. A. Long, "The Stoic Concept of Evil", PQ,18 [1968], 329-43, who unfortunately does not discuss these texts). A similar limitation is found in *Em*,58.27 in which the admission is made that god could not make certain things immortal because materia prevented it. Whether by the analogy macrocosm-microcosm (cf. *Em*,65.24) these limitations can be carried over to the task performed by the *animus* in *Ben.*,1.6.2 is not clear from the text, but they can be considered in terms of the question of the sufficiency of *voluntas* in benefits,
when materia seems either to obstruct the workings of voluntas, or be absent altogether (e.g. Ben., 7.14 ff.; Ben., 2.31. ff.). On the whole the important creative role assigned to the animus is in accord with the status of priority it receives vis-a-vis the body (apart from Husner's work cited above, see also S. Rubín, Die Ethik Senecas, p. 71; T. P. Hardeman, The Philosophy of Lucius Annaeus Seneca, p. 205 ff.; A. Bodson, La Morale sociale des derniers Stoïciens, p. 30 ff.).

* With parva extollit ... dehonestat compare stylistically, Haec [pudicitia] pauperem commendat, divitem extollit, deformem redimit, exornat pulchram (Hier. adv. Jov., 319c, believed by E. Bickel, Diatribe in Senecae Philosophi Fragmenta, p. 394, to be derived from Seneca's lost De Matrimonio).

* The idea of popular attribution of value, explicit in the word habita must also be applied to parva, sordida, magna, for the reason that these adjectives are not neutral as objects per se are, and because the adjectives do not reflect the true value of the objects.

* Pretium is attributed to goods of the body, whereas dignitas is denied them (EM., 71.33; cf. EM., 81.28, Abstrahunt a recto divitiæ, honores, potentia et cetera quae opinione nostra cara sunt, pretio suo vilia). However the distinction is not maintained consistently; Seneca also uses pretium of the virtues (EM., 81.19).

* Adpetuntur is a technical term (appetitio = ὑπηρέτης) indicating the first in the progression appetitio, officium, virtus (SVF., 3.32. 17 f.; cf. I. Hadot, Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der
Seelenleitung, p.73). It is used in relation to those indifferentia which are the first according to nature (SVF.,3.43.38), and indicates a natural inclination – as distinct from choice – which is also found in children (as manifest in the instinct for survival, see EM.,121 passim). Adpetere must not be confused with expetere (αὐτετονεῖ) which appears frequently in the fourth book of the De Beneficiis (e.g. Ben.,4.1.1, where the question is raised whether giving a benefit and bestowing gratitude are per se res expetendae). Expetere is used of the attempt to do everything to achieve the ultimum (τέλος), i.e. virtuous activity, whereas seligere is aimed at the propositum (σχοινος), the external object of the virtuous activity. The analogy of archery was used to clarify the distinctions; the σχοινος was the target, and the τέλος the attempt to hit the target (see A. A. Long, "Carneades and the Stoic Telos, Phronesis, 12 [1967], 59-90, see especially p.78 f., n.19).

* Note that datur is not in the subjunctive mood, and therefore not governed by referre; "it matters to where the controller, by whom shape is given to things, directs them".

* The two metaphors of artifex and rector reflect the functions, customarily associated with the divine, of creating and subsequently governing or maintaining the creation. The term rector may have been all the more attractive to the Stoics because of its assonance with such terms as recta ratio and recte factum. Rector in the context could be a conflation of the senses ruler and helmsman (= gubernator); these meanings are sufficiently close to be associated on occasion (e.g.
Cic. Tim., 46, regerent et gubernarent). Impellat can also be used of ships (Lewis & Short, s.v.). With our text compare On., 7.24.2, where animus is described as ille rector dominusque nostrō (cf. Ben., 7.25.5, where animus is rector and dux; EM., 114.23, rex noster est animus; Clem., 1.3.5 draws the analogy between the ruler (rex) and his people and the soul and the body). Compare also EM., 65.23, nempe universa ex materia et ex deo constant. Deus ista temperat quae circumfusa rectorem sequuntur et ducem. The text continues to draw an analogy between the function of god in the world and the soul in man. The image of the divine ruler is common enough, but it may be significant that Posidonius was especially interested in Plato's Timaeus where the image is prominent (A. D. Nock, "Posidonius", JRS, 49 (1959), p.10; Cicero later translated the Timaeus; see A. E. Taylor's instructive on the metaphor τὸ ἑαυτὸν διαμορφωμένῳ, Pl. Tim., 42e in his commentary ad loc.).

* Although the Stoics recognized only two causes, the active and passive principles (EM., 65.2), they admitted the importance of other aspects (EM., 65.11); in our text all four of Aristotle's causes are present, although the final cause is most prominent (quo = final cause; illa, rebus = material cause; forma = formal cause; rector = efficient cause).

1.6.3 Non est beneficium ipsum, quod numeratur aut traditur, sicut ne in victimis quidem, licet opimae sint auroque praefulgeant, deorum est honor, sed recta ac pia voluntate venerantium. Itaque boni etiam farre ac fictilla religiosi sunt; mali rursus non effugient inpietatem, quamvis aras sanguine multo cruentaverint.
A benefit does not consist in what is counted out or passed from hand to hand. There is a parallel for this in the reverence paid to the gods; it does not lie in sleek and gilded sacrificial victims but in the upright and pious attitude of the worshippers. A consequence of this is that the upright can pay the proper respects to the gods with offerings of simple fare; the evil can not avoid being irreverent, even if they have sacrificed a hecatomb.

Non est beneficium ipsum, quod numeratur aut traditur, sicut ne in victimis quidem, licet opimae sint auroque praefulgeant, deorum est honor, sed recta ac pia voluntate venerantium:

Numeratur means either "possessed" (Lewis & Short, s.v., IIa: a significance which is rare), balancing traditur, or "counted", indicating quantity contrasting with quality in recte ac pia voluntate.

* In sicut analogy is introduced, as it had been at the conclusion of the previous chapter (honor, Ben., 1.5.6). This time the comparison is not with politics but with Roman religion. Roman religion in general and sacrifices in particular were ritualistic, but Seneca, as in his rejection of commerce (Ben., 1.2), rejects formalism, and stresses the inward attitude by means of a series of contrasts (opulence-poverty, public-private, bloody-bloodless, and the basis a contrast between boni and mali).

* Victimae refers to bovine sacrificial animals; other sacrificial animals were hostiae (Daremberg-Saglio, Dictionnaire des
Antiquités Grecques et Romaines, vol. 4, pt.2, p.974) but the distinction was not kept strictly (Cic. Leg.,2.8; Cic. ad Att.,1.13).

* Opimae is a technical term, describing the excellence of the sacrificial victims, already found in the hymn of the Arval Brothers. Strict rules governed the choice of victims as to age, sex, and colour (cf. Cic. Leg.,2.12; Plin. HN.,8.206; Varr. RR.,2.4.16). Animals were to be unblemished; bovines not to have carried the yoke (Macr. S., 3.5.5). Public examination (probatio) was carried out to ascertain whether animals measured up to standard (Cic. Agr.,2.93). The victim's head was decorated with infula, vitta, or serta; horns of oxen were gilded, as were goat's horns for special festivities (Liv.,25.12.13; Verg. Aen.,5.366; Verg. G.,1.217; Plin. HN.,33.39; Ov. Met.,7.161). For Seneca's attitude see EM.,67.12; the concept of virtue is not worshipped with frankincense or garlands but with perspiration and blood.

* In deorum est honor the genitive is objective. See EM.,95. 47 f. for precepts governing worship of the gods. Seneca regards them as insignificant in comparison to true knowledge of the gods, which consists of recognition of their natural beneficence. Worship of the gods comprises belief in their existence, acknowledgement and imitation of their example (EM.,95.50). The same concept, honor, is used, as stated, in the analogy in Ben.,1.5.6, in a military-political context. These analogies reflect the static and dynamic aspects in their respective sections; static - honoris insigne (Ben.,1.5.6), dynamic - honor [in] voluntate. Ben.,1.5.6 does not answer the question what honor is; Ben.,1.5.3 can do so, after a benefit has been more fully
defined in dynamic terms.

* A. Bourgery (Sénèque Prosateur, p.407) points to the curious omission of the preposition in with recta ac pia voluntate; Hosius in his first Teubner edition left out this preposition, but restored it in the second (O. Rossbach in his review of Hosius' second edition, BPhW, 35 (1915) p.679). N. Gilbert ("The Concept of Will in Early Latin Philosophy", JHPh, 1 (1963), p.26, n.20) states that in the equation of a sacrifice with recta ac pia voluntas "very likely Seneca is following the thought of Plato in Book IV of the Laws (716D)". For an older parallel compare the sacrifices of Cain and Abel (Genesis 9). Compare also Lact. Inst., 6.25.3 (quoting Seneca), deum ... non immolationibus et sanguine multo colendum ... sed mente pura, bono honestoque proposito; ... in suo cuique consecrandus est pectore. Compare also Ben., 2.31.1, every virtue (pietas is also listed) is complete within itself, even if it has not stretched out a hand (i.e. voluntas is sufficient). (See also W. J. Richards, Gebed by Seneca, die Stoïsyn, p.118, n.116, who cites D. Loenen, Eusebeia en de Cardinale Deugden, p.47, for Greek examples of the view that a small offering can be indicative of pietas, and acceptable to the gods).

Itaque boni etiam farre ac fictilla religiosi sunt; mali rursus non effugient inpietatem, quamvis aras sanguine mutlo cruentaverint:

Far was a grain which was roasted and made into bread (RE., 3A. 1609). Presented on a wooden dish, it was associated with the simple
cult of the country, and was the usual offerings for the Lares and Vesta. It was also used in mola salsa (coarsely ground grain mixed with salt) in the ceremony of immolatio by which the victim was consecrated to the divinity (Fest. Teubner ed., W. M. Lindsay, ed. 1913, p.97, Immolare est mola, id est farre molito et sale, hostiam persper-sam sacrare). Seneca does not insist on poor fare as a mark of moral virtue (turpe est beatam vitam in auro et argento reponere, aeque turpe in aqua et polenta, EM.,110.18). It is not certain whether Seneca in our text intends the same primitivistic overtones as found in Ov. Fast.,1.338 and Fast.,2.519. In the first of these passages animal sacrifice is seen as a punishment resulting from the crime of destroying grain; in the second grain is clearly associated with the ancients.

* Our text reads fictilla. As Préchac ad loc., points out the c in MS. N has been erased and fitilla is found in other MSS. The latter, dubbed a neologism by A. Bourgery (Sénèque Prosateur, p.274) also occurs in Plin. HN.,18.8.19 84 and in Arn.,2.58; Arn.,7.230. It is a gruel used at sacrifices (Lewis & Short, s.v.). An alternate reading would be fictili; this would suit the context as an indication of poverty and simplicity (cf. Juv.,3.168, of the rich, fictilibus cenare pudet).

* By associating animal sacrifices with the mali Seneca may not only be indicating that the externals do not make pietas, but may also be expressing disdain for animal sacrifices. The verb cruentare can mean "pollute with blood - guiltiness" (OLD., s.v.); it is also used
in a negative context in Ben., 6.3.2, of fleets in quest of riches
staining the sea with blood. Following the Pythagorean teaching of
his mentor Sotion and the example of Sextius, Seneca himself abstained
from meat for a year when a young man. Sextius' reasons for abstinence
may have some bearing on our passage: **Hic homini satis alimentorum
citra sanguinem esse credebat et crudelitatis consuetudinem fieri
ubi in voluptatem esset adducta laceratio. Adiciebat contrahendam
citam esse luxuriae ...** (EM., 108.18). Theophrastus had likewise
disapproved of animal sacrifices (and, in fact, of haruspicum;
a reading of the fragments of his Περὶ εὔσεβείας is instructive back-
ground for Seneca's text, - see the recent edition of W. Pütscher).
Theophrastus may have influenced Posidonius (A. D. Nock, "Posidonius",
JRS., 49 [1959], p.6). In our text Seneca does allow offering as an
expression of piety; it should not be used as a method to obtain
divine favour, for the gods are beneficent for the sake of being so
(Ben., 4.25.1).
CHAPTER SEVEN

If benefits consisted of their external aspects, not of the very will to do good, they would increase in size in proportion to the gifts we receive. This, however, is not true; sometimes a greater obligation is imposed upon us by someone who gives little, but in a generous way, who "with his heart equalled the riches of kings", who bestowed a trifle, but did so freely, who has forgotten his own poverty, while he considers mine, who had not only the will to help, but a strong desire to do so, who thought that he was receiving a benefit, when he was giving it, who gave as though he would not receive a return, who received as if he had not given, who not only seized an opportunity (when it arose), but (actively) looked for it. On the other hand, benefits which are forced from the donor or fall out of his possession, receive no thanks, however magnificent they appear - a point already stated - and a benefit which is given with a willing hand is much more pleasing than one given by a full hand. It is a small item he bestowed on me, but it could not have been bigger; however, in the other case the gift is substantial, but the donor hesitated, but he postponed, but, when he gave it, he groaned, but he gave proudly, but he made public that he had given and did not have the wish to please the recipient; he gave to his own ambition, not to me.
1.7.1 Si beneficia in rebus, non in ipsa bene faciendi voluntate consistenter, eo maiora essent, quo maiora sunt, quae accipimus. Id autem falsum est; non numquam enim magis nos obligat, qui dedit parva magnifice, qui "regum aequavit opes animo", qui exiguum tribuit sed libenter, qui paupertatis suae est obilitus, dum meam respicit, qui non voluntatem tantum iuvandi habuit sed cupiditatem, qui accipere se putavit beneficium, cum dare t, qui dedit tamquam numquam recepturus, recepit tamquam non dedisset, qui occasionem, qua prodesset, et occupavit et quaesit.

1.7.2 Contra ingrata sunt, ut dixi, licet re ac specie magna videantur, quae danti aut extorquentur aut excidunt, multaque gratius venit, quod facili quam quod plena manu datur.

1.7.3 Exiguum est, quod in me contulit, sed amplius non potuit; at hic quod dedit, magnum est, sed dubitavit, sed distulit, sed, cum daret, gemuit, sed superbe dedit, sed circumtulit et placere non ei, cui praestabat, voluit; ambitioni dedit, non mihi.

This chapter consists of a hypothesis which is then denied on the basis of experience, the denial being expressed in the form of a priamel. The method of not attacking the premises, but the conclusion, a method favoured by the Megarians (see E. Brehier, The History of Philosophy, the Greek and Roman Age, tr. W. Baskin, p.4), is one of the undemonstrated arguments used by the Stoa (see the commentary). The grounds for the denial consist of a contrast of positive and negative examples, repeated in that order. From the perspective of length of treatment, the repetition is chiastic (positive-elaborate, negative-brief, positive-brief, negative-elaborate). The chapter allows for a reworking of the content of Ben., 1.5 (contrast external-internal) as well as Ben., 1.6 (dynamic aspect), especially in relation to the theme of giving (i.e. not receiving). Thus the definition is seen in operation. By verbal reminiscences
(in Ben., 1.7.3) the concluding section is linked to the discussion of the causes of ingratitude in Ben., 1.1 (e.g. distulit; superbe).

\[
\text{Si beneficia in rebus, non in ipsa bene faciendi voluntate consistenter, eo maiora essent, quo maiora sunt, quae accipimus.}
\]

The argument is that of the second of five types of undemonstrated arguments - i.e. arguments which required no demonstration because of their immediately apparent validity - which were accepted by Chrysippus (B. Mates, *Stoic Logic*, p. 69). Mates provides (p. 70) the following definition: "a type 2 undemonstrated argument is that which, from a conditional and the contradictory of its consequent, infers the contradictory of the antecedent as a conclusion" (see also J. B. Gould, *The Philosophy of Chrysippus*, p. 82).

\* With \text{eo maiora essent} ... \text{Id autem falsum est} compare Ben., 1.15.1 for an apparent contradiction: \text{quo plura maiorque fuerint [beneficia], plus adferent laudis}. In the latter case uses \text{beneficia} in a different sense. See also Ben., 7.13: \text{... beneficium maius esse non potest; ea, per quae beneficium datur, possunt esse maiora et plura.}

\[
\text{regum aequavit opes animo:}
\]

The thought contained in this quote from Vergil's Georgics
may have suggested the anecdote of Aeschines and Socrates (Ben.,1.8.1).

Seneca frequently quotes Vergil, but he adapts the quote to fit his context; the subject of Vergil's verb, the Corycian senex, could not be the subject of Seneca's paraphrase qui dedit parva magnifice, since he does not give anything to anyone. In fact the original sentence illustrates the contentment of the farmer with his own produce, a self-sufficiency not at issue in Seneca's text. This example of Senecan use of Vergil illustrates the general evaluations of W. S. Maguinness, "Seneca and the poets", Hermathena, 88 (1956), 81-98. He points out "Seneca's frequent practice of quoting from memory and with no recollection of the poet's context" (p.89).

Passages "may have some unexpected interpretation, or some extension of reference, usually in a philosophical direction" (p.94; for bibliography on the subject of Seneca's use of Vergil see W. Trillitzsch, Senecas Beweisführung, p.28,n.4, and G. Mazzoli, Seneca e la Poesia, p.215, n.1).

paupertatis suae est oblitus, dum meam respicit:

This is a clear instance of the application of the altruistic principle (on which see the commentary on Ben.,1.10.5).
Cupiditas is presumably a more intense state of mind than voluntas, a distinction perhaps akin to that between ἡθλω and σόλωσι (the former is to be willing in a more passive sense, implying consent rather than desire, Liddell & Scott, s.v. ἡθλω).

From a strict Stoic point of view cupiditas, a strong emotion, violates the doctrine of eupatheia, and constitutes a pathos, an excessive emotion, which ought normally to be eliminated. Seneca would tolerate such excess when directed to a proper end.

These are further illustrations of altruisms. They are expressed in terms of distortions of the customary relationships in giving and receiving. One individual reverses the customary meanings of accipere and dare; he believes he receives when he gives. The other two each negate one of the terms giving and receiving; the first gave as if he would never receive a return, the second receives as if he had not given.

If the two main verbs have as object the same opportunity, we
have a pointless hysteron-proteron. Préchac's translation attempts to put matters in the proper chronological perspective: ... par le bonheur avec lequel on a saisi, après l'avoir cherchée, l'occasion. d'être utile. A. Stewart reverses the order of the verbs in his translation, as does Basore in the Loeb translation. A different approach is possible. This turns on a contrast between two states of mind, one of which is more passive in outlook than the other, a contrast similar to the one between voluntas and cupiditas. The individual is said then not only to seize an opportunity when it arises, - a more passive attitude, since it implies waiting - but also actively goes out looking for one. The opportunity is not then the same opportunity, but "an opportunity". This interpretation preserves a climactic order.

Contra ingrata sunt, ... quae danti aut extorquentur aut excidunt:

Ingrata is here used in a passive sense, "receiving no thanks" (see Lewis & Short, s.v.). Gratitude must be felt by the recipient, but rather than speaking of his ingratus animus Seneca has transferred the adjective to the benefits themselves, so taking some measure of emphasis away from the recipient, and, since we have learned that the value of a gift is determined by the voluntas of the donor, putting it on the latter. This is consistent with the attention paid to him in Ben.,1.7.1 in the many qui clauses. The main point under discussion
is bene faciendi voluntas (Ben.,1.7.1), a theme which follows naturally upon the definition of Ben.,1.6. W. L. Friedrich ("Die Abfassungszeit von Senecas Werk Über die Wohltaten", BPhW, 47 [1914], 1502) is therefore correct in pointing out that C. Haeberlin ("Quaestiones criticæ in L. Annaei Senecæ de beneficiis libris", RhM, N.F. 45 (1890), p.44) was in error in considering that the gratitude of the recipient is the main issue.

multaque gratius venit:

Multaque is corrected to multoque by F. Prechac, "Mélanges", RHPh, 1 (1933), p.173; the correction is erroneously referred to p.4, 1.7 of his text, rather than to p.14, 1.7.

at hic quod dedit, magnum est, sed dubitavit:

The contrast between the frame of mind of the donor and the value of the gift per se, is a further development of the same contrast in the previous section. The faults of hesitation, postponement, complaint, pride, publicity and disregard of the recipient correspond to causes of ingratitude as they were given in Ben.,1.1.6-7, and Ben., 1.2.1 (largitio).
ambitioni dedit, non mihi:

Cf. Ben., 1.1.8, sibi enim quisque debet, quod a nesciente accepit. To be a benefit the gift must be part of a social, i.e. inter-personal act. The word ambitio occurs in Ben., 6.19.1, where the context is instructive: having been transported free of charge across a river, Plato considered this a favour, until he perceived that others were accorded the same honour. In order to establish a debt, therefore, not only must something be given to an individual, but expressly to him (tamquam proprium beneficium). If that element of consideration is lacking the deed may still be a good deed in some sense (aliquid boni facit), but it is no benefit. It was done out of self-interest, at least not out of the interest of the recipient, and the actual recipient may be the state, the neighbourhood or his own ambition, and for this the donor expects some other reward than that which he can obtain from individuals (Ben., 6.19).

* Ambitio is, in the strict sense, the search for gratia, political influence, and is appropriate especially of a candidate wanting to secure public office. But its meaning was extended to include the search for honour and popularity, so that the ultimate aim is to have oneself well regarded (J. Hellegouarc'h, Le Vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous La République, p.209). This extended sense is the one most applicable in our text.
CHAPTER EIGHT

When people were giving many gifts to Socrates, each according to his means, Aeschines, a poor pupil said: "I do not find anything, which is worthy of you, to give to you, and I think that I am a pauper but only in this way. And so I give to you my only possession, my very self. I ask you to be satisfied with this gift, whatever value it has, and to consider that although others gave you much, they kept more for themselves". Socrates replied to him: Why isn't the gift you have given me a considerable one, if it is not, perhaps, that your self-esteem is low. I shall cherish your gift in such a way, that I shall return you to yourself a better person than I received you". With this gift Aeschines outdid not only the magnanimity of Alcibiades, which in the case of Alcibiades was equal to his wealth, but also all the munificence of the wealthy youths.

1.8.1 Socrati, cum multa pro suis quisque facultatibus offerrent, Aeschines, pauper auditor: "Nihil" inquit "dignum te, quod dare tibi possim, invenio et hoc uno modo pauperem esse me sentio. Itaque done dono tibi, quod unum habeo, me ipsum. Hoc munus rogo, qualecumque est, boni consulas cogitesque alios, cum multum tibi darent, plus sibi reliquisse".
1.8.2 Cui Socrates: "Quidni tu" inquit "magnum munus mihi dederis, nisi forte te parvo aestimas? Habebo itaque curae, ut te meliorem tibi reddam, quam accepi". Vicit Aechines hoc munere Alcibiadis parem divitiis animum et omnem iuvenum opulentorum munificentiam.

The anecdote introduces an example of the manner in which the\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nThe bene facientis voluntas influences, in fact determines, the gift. The
story is also told by Diogenes: Αἰσχίνου δὲ εἰπόντος, "πένης εἰμὶ καὶ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδὲν ἔχω, οὐδὲν δὲ σοι ἐμαυτῶν," "οὐ δόν," εἶπεν, "οὐκ αἰσθάνη τὰ μεγίστα μοι ὀλίγους;" (DL.,2.34). Comparison will show that Seneca's treatment is fuller, and that many of the extra details are significant for the theory of benefits. There is, for example, the comparison of Aeschines with others who are giving in proportion to their means, i.e. are making a donation which is normally acceptable. This comparison is of some importance, as Aeschines himself refers to it, and it is again stated at the conclusion of the chapter. There is also the evaluation of the worthiness of the gift for the recipient (cf. Ben.,2.15.3). Seneca, therefore, capitalizes on the significance of the anecdote for his theme.

Socrati, cum multa pro suis quisque facultatibus offerrent, Aeschines, pauper auditor:

After Epicurus, Socrates is the philosopher most often referred to in Seneca's extant philosophical works (approximately fifty times; in the De Beneficiis see 3.32.3; 5.4.3; 5.6.2; 7.8.2; 7.24). His special importance was that he had recalled all of philosophy to ethics (EM.,71.7), and he is for that reason contrasted with other philosophers who engage in what is called ludum litterarium (EM.,71.6). Anecdotes about this patriarchal figure in the ranks of philosophers were common, and circulated in such works at Hecato's χρεῖαι (which Diogenes
Laertius also knew; DL., 6.4; DL., 7.32).

* The suggestion is raised in offerent that perhaps Socrates is the recipient of fees (cf. Plat. R., 337D where Socrates is asked for a sum of money in case he learns something; when he states he does not have it, his friends offer to pay on his behalf). Although his adversaries, the sophists, received remuneration for their services, Socrates himself did not (see M. L. Clarke, Higher Education in the Ancient World, p. 58; in the Roman empire some philosophers wanted considerable fees, p. 86). Some of Socrates' followers did not adopt their master's example, e.g. Aeschines (DL., 2.62) and Aristippus who was one of the first pupils of Socrates to charge a fee and to send money to his teacher (DL., 2.65), a point which was raised by the rhetorician Isocrates in his conflict with philosophers (on this see W. Jaeger, Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture, tr. G. Highet, vol. 3, p. 57 & p. 304, n. 48a). Chrysippus was not averse to the idea of remuneration for the wise man (SVF., 3.174.20). Seneca, however, makes a harsher comment, stating that no study, which results in money-making (ad aea exit), can be part of philosophy (EM., 88.1).

* With pro suis ... facultatibus cf. Ben., 1.1.3 ... non opus est ad liberandam fidem facultatibus sed animo. In our text the propriety of the gifts to Socrates seems to be indicated, since each gives according to his means. In consequence, Aeschines' animus or attitude towards the other givers, especially evident in alias, cum multum tibi darent, plus sibi reliquisse, appears self-serving and arrogant,
diminishing, to some extent, the success of this illustration (cf. Chrysippus' high opinion of himself as a teacher: there was no-one better, else he would be studying with him, DL.,7.182).

* Aeschines was a follower of Socrates, and was present at the latter's trial and death (Pl. Ap.,33c; Pl. Phd.,59B). One of the most respected followers of Socrates (DL.,2.47) he wrote Socratic dialogues which were of interest to the Stoic Panaetius, who passed judgment on their authenticity (DL.,2.64). Aeschines' poverty became proverbial so that some of the anecdotes on this topic must be regarded with some suspicion. It was poverty that drove him to stay a time at Dionysius' court in Sicily (DL.,2.61). He reportedly tried to reduce his debt by turning to perfume making (τέχνη μυρευκία; Athenaeus states [Deipnosophistae, 13.611e] that Lysias made this claim in a work Πρὸς Ἀισχίζουν τὸν Σωκρατικὸν Χρέως). Socrates is said moreover to have advised Aeschines, as a solution for the problem of his poverty, - to borrow from himself by reducing his rations.

* The term auditor is normal for pupil (cf. Mnesarchus who is called an auditor of Panaetius, Cic. de Orat.1.45).

"Nihil" inquit "dignum te, quod dare possim, invenio et hoc uno modo pauperem esse sentio":

Aeschines refers in nihil ... dignum te to materia beneficii, not to beneficium. This reflects a prior pre-occupation with the
external aspect. It is only when possibilities of finding a gift in the normal sense have been exhausted that Aeschines lights upon a true benefit. While Aeschines' first attempt to find a gift is incorrect, when he does find a true benefit, he errs in underestimating himself (see Socrates' reply to him), and in being at the same time, paradoxically, somewhat arrogant in his comparison of himself with others who keep more than they give.

Habebo itaque curae, ut te meliorem tibi reddam, quam accepi:

Aeschines thinks about the gift in numerical terms. He wants to give a gift, and he himself is the only gift he has. The excellence of such a gift he does not recognize since he deprecates its quality (qualecumque; cf. Cat.,1.9). Socrates, on the other hand, provides assurance of its quality (in his initial rhetorical question) and, more important, promises improvement of this quality.

Vicit Aechines [sic] hoc munere Alcibiadis parem divitiis animum et omnem juvenum opulentorum munificentiam:

Seneca turns from the superior gift promised by Socrates to a comparative evaluation of the gifts of Aeschines and others. It may be stated that Socrates' promised gift is less self-serving than that of Alcibiades, which is marred by the remarks he makes about the others. A hierarchy of excellence would thus have Socrates at the top, followed
by Aeschines, who is in turn followed by Alcibiades.

* On the theme of conquering in benefits see the notes on *certamen*, Ben., 1.4.3. The point of the comparison between Aeschines and Alcibiades is not their gifts as such but rather the spirit in which they were given; in the case of Alcibiades his heart matched his riches, but in the case of Aeschines his heart outstripped his wealth in magnitude (cf. *EM.*, 66.22, Agedum pone ex alia parte virum bonum divitiis abundanter, ex altera nihil habentem, sed in se omnia; uterque aequae vir bonus erit, etiam si fortuna dispari utetur).

* Alcibiades was a famed Athenian statesman and general. Brought up by Pericles, he became a close friend of Socrates, whose comrade-in-arms he was at Potideia (Pl. *Symp.*, 219e; *Symp.*, 219e; *Symp.*, 221a; Plut. *Alc.*, 7.2 & 3). He was well known for his wealth and his generosity (Plut. *Alc.*, 16.3; Nep. *Alc.*, 1); hence Seneca speaks of the former being matched by the latter.


* Since the munificence of the young men is linked to the proverbial generosity of Alcibiades to Socrates, both being outdone by the gift of Aeschines, we may assume that the young men are the same individuals mentioned, in the first sentence of the chapter, as
bestowing gifts to Socrates. If this is so, the word munificence provides some difficulty. Although Socrates' father, a stone-mason, probably was not poor, Socrates, who did not practise his father's craft long, was by no means wealthy (see W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol.3, p.379). Socrates' poverty is due mainly to the fact that, unlike the Sophists, he charged no fees, but he himself gave not economic, but rather an ethical explanation (... 'αλλ' ἐν πενθῷ μυρίῳ εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν, Pl. Ap., 9.23b).

Socrates claimed he could afford a fine of one mina (one sixtieth of a talent, or a hundred drachmas), although his friends volunteered to be sureties for thirty minae (Pl. Ap., 28.38b). In Xen. Oec., 2.3 Socrates evaluated all his possessions at five minae. Other tales attributing to him a larger sum, such as seventy or eighty minae which he had inherited, still conclude by making him a pauper, since he is said to have lost them through lending them out (Demetrius of Phaleron, cited in Plut. Arist., 1; cf. Lib. Decl., 1.17, ed. R. Foerster, vol.5, p.23).

The evidence agrees that Socrates was poor, so that if he did accept the munificence of the youths (but see the anecdote of Ael. VH., 9.29 quoted above), we may be sure that, what he had done with a prize for valour awarded him at Potideia, he did also with these gifts; he had passed the prize to someone else (DL., 2.23).
CHAPTER NINE

Do you see how the spirit finds the material with which to be generous even in the midst of poverty? Aeschines' statement can be paraphrased as follows: "You have accomplished nothing, Fortune, with your wish that I be poor; I shall, in spite of that, still provide this man with a worthy gift, and because I am unable to give from your store, I shall give from mine." There is no reason why you should think he thought himself cheap; he set his value at what he was, in fact, worth. The wily youth found a way in which to give Socrates to himself. It profits to know, not how sizable is each of the gifts, but what sort of person gave them.

A shrewd master, for example, offered easy access to some who had immoderate desires, and gave verbal encouragement to their shameless hopes, although he was not about to give substantive help; but worse off than (the Horatian character) Opimius is the man who had a rough tongue and an unfriendly demeanor when he displayed his fortune, and so induced the appearance of envy. For people hate a person doing certain things, although they would do the same, if they could.

They sported with the wives of others not secretly but openly and gave up their own to other men. Boorish, and barbarous and a partner detested by the ladies, is the man who forbade his wife to solicit in her sedan-chair and, as the observers gain access, to be on
public view.

If someone has become prominent by having no mistress, and does not pay a stipend to another's wife, he is called insignificant by the ladies, and given to a base lust, as well as a lover of servant-girls. Hence adultery has become the most established form of betrothal, and in marriage one acts as a widower or a bachelor: no-one takes a wife without taking her away from someone else.

Now people vie to strew about their ill-gotten gains, and once they are scattered they vie to collect them again with a belated and fierce avarice. They have no scruples. They despise the poverty of another; their own they fear (more) than any other evil. They disturb the peace with the injuries they cause; they oppress those who are weaker with violence and fear, for the provinces are pillaged, and, once the bidding on both sides has ceased, a venal magistracy is awarded to another, not surprisingly, since it is common law that you can sell what you have bought.

1.9.1 Vides, quomodo animus inveniat liberalitatis materiam etiam inter angustias? Videtur mihi dixisse: "Nihil egisti, fortuna, quod me pauperem esse voluisti; expediam dignum nihil minus huic viro munus, et quia de tuo non possum, de meo dabo". Neque est, quod existimes illum vilem sibi fuisset: pretium se sui fecit. Ingeniosus adulescens invenit, quemadmodum Socraten sibi daret. Non quanta quaeque sint, sed a quasi profecta, scire proficit.

1.9.2 En dominus callidus non difficilem aditum praebuit inmodica cupientibus spesque inprobas nihil re adiuturum verbis fovit; at peior Opimio, si lingua asper, voltu gravis cum invidia fortunam suam explicuit. Colunt enim detestanturque felicem et, si potuerint, eadem facturi odere facientem.
The spirit can be generous even if it is poor; Aeschines appears to have thumbed his nose at Fortune. He knew what his true value was, and managed to find a way to have Socrates given to him. The size of gifts is not important, what is important is the kind of person giving them. A clever man, for example, gives easy access to those whose desires know no limits, and gives them verbal support but no real help. Worse off than Opimius is the man who gives but does so in an unpleasant manner. He arouses envy, for people worship and detest a rich man and, given the opportunity, will do the same things for which they hate him.

In this section the subject matter of the previous chapter, the anecdote of Aeschines and Socrates, is continued. Seneca paraphrases the import of Aeschines' previous statement, gives an interpretation of Aeschines' behaviour, and arrives at the general conclusion that not the size of the gift but the spirit of the giver is important. This conclusion is subsequently illustrated (Ben.,1.9.2 ff.). The comparative peior (Ben.,1.9.2) reminds the reader that Ben.,1.8.2 had also contained comparisons (meliorem, vicit). Moreover, it has been noted that the gifts in the anecdote could be listed in order of diminishing value as those of Socrates, Aeschines, and Alcibiades. The new comparative, peior, suggests that this descending scale is continued. Section 1.9.2 is linked to the previous one in that it illustrates the statement sed a qualit profecta scire proficit, and also by the fact that of the contrasted pair (in Ben.,1.9.2) consisting of the man who gives
verbal assistance but no substantive help, and the man who does give material assistance but does so unkindly, the former (callidus) is similar to Aeschines (ingeniosus adulescens). Both show, as the adjectives indicate, mental acumen, and to each nihil re adiuturus verbis fovit is applicable. From the Greek and quasi-historical examples there is a progression to satirical and general ones (Ben., 1.9.2) then to examples drawn from the contemporary marital, social and political experience of the Romans (Ben., 1.9.3-5). The list of examples seems to have a chronological dimension, although Seneca does not refer to it explicitly. There is a chronological sweep from the time of Socrates through the Hellenistic period (Ben., 1.9.2) when interest in stock psychological types was high (Comedy, Theophrastus' Characters), to the Roman period (Ben., 1.9.3-5). In addition there is evident a shift from attention on the individual (in the Socrates-Aeschines anecdote, although attention is not paid exclusively to individuals, - pro suis quisque facultatibus, alios, iuvenum) to society. The repercussions of vice within society are seen to expand with ever-widening impact. Incorrect giving on the part of the man classified as worse than Opimius calls forth envy, a mixture of admiration and envy, in others. The bonds of the family are seen to break down, and vice spreads still further until the provinces are involved. The final phrase ius gentium suggests the crisis has reached world-wide proportions. It is also apparent that initial incorrect giving has resulted ultimately in taking (Ben., 1.9.5), and that on a world-wide scale.
We may conclude that chapters eight and nine are closely linked, and that, in spite of lacunae (on which see the commentary), which hamper comprehension of the train of thought, the general movement of the consequences of incorrect giving can be discerned. This movement appears as one of decline and degeneration which in time is manifest in ever larger segments of society and in expanding geographical areas. Chapters eight and nine therefore exemplify the doctrine of decline as it is enunciated in Ben.,1.10.1. With this chapter also a link is then firmly established. Chapters eight and nine, therefore, do form a digression, as Seneca states in Ben.,1.10.1, but not because they are unrelated to his main theme, but rather because he devotes more time to them than intended, carried away as he is by his moralistic attitude towards contemporary vice. The digression becomes a digression slowly, and it is fruitless to search for a specific point in the text for a change of subject.

Vides, quomodo animus inveniat liberalitatis materiam etiam inter angustias:

The creative resourcefulness of the spirit is illustrated (cf. Ben.,1.6.2).

* On liberalitas see H. Bolkestein, Wohltätigkeit und Armenpflege, p.144, "Nach griechischer Auffassung sind tatsächlich Freigebigkeit und Wohltätigkeit identische Begriffe". Bolkestein points out that the word ἐλευθεριότης is not prominent in Plato; where it does occur
(Pl. R., 402c), it is not restricted to money (an exception being Pl. Th., 144D, where such a connection is explicitly stated). Aristotle discusses the word EN., 1119b19 ff. Cicero states that liberalitas is a synonym for beneficiencia, as is benignitas (Cic. Off., 1.7.20).

Nihil egisti, fortuna, quod me pauperem esse voluisti:

One could attempt to argue that from a Stoic point of view an apostrophe to Fortuna gives the concept (or the deity) too much recognition, since the Stoic concept of divine providence eliminates that of fickle fortune. But Aeschines is no Stoic. Furthermore Fortuna (Tyche) was a concept to be reckoned with, especially during Hellenistic times, when the vicissitudes of fortune, from which the Stoa aimed to provide insulation, was felt so keenly (see the discussion of Tyche in F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius, vol. 1, pp. 21-26. Tyche can even be similar to the concept of fate or providence, and has compared with the Stoic notion of πρόνοια [p. 21]; cf. P. G. Walsh, Livy his Historical Aims and Methods, p. 55 f.). In our text fortuna is the antonym of divine benefaction, whose presence is best explained by rhetorical reasons; the device of an apostrophe to Fortuna is not an infrequent one (E. Norden, Antike Kunstprosa, vol. 1, p. 277). Seneca was not averse to treating the commonplace of the power of fortune with rhetorical amplification (ad Marc., 10.5-6; ad Polyb.,
2.2; E. Albertini, *La composition dans les ouvrages philosophiques de Sénèque*, p.223). T. Hardeman (*The Philosophy of L. Annaeus Seneca*, p.148) is of the opinion that for Seneca fortune is a power to be feared, yet identical with god (on the basis of *Ben.*, 4.8.2, where *natura*, *fatum*, *fortuna* are all said to be names of god using his power in various ways). Once the notion of providence is accepted, the concept of *fortuna* must be seen in relation to it; it refers to what may seem capricious to an individual, but in fact is not. It is doubtful, however, whether Seneca attempted to harmonize in this way and so create a consistent theology. God was recognized as the giver par excellence, and Fortuna is not. It is much more ambivalent; *magnam vim esse in fortuna in utramque partem, vel secundas ad res vel adversas, quis ignorat* (*Cic. Off.*, 2.6.19; on εὐτυχία see [Arist] MM., 1206b30. In Seneca *fortuna* appears with the polarities of internal and external possessions (on which see P. Thévenaz, "L'intérieurité chez Sénèque", in *Festschrift M. Niedermann*, pp.184-194), and is identified with the latter. The nature of man's relationship to fortune is clearly expressed in the military metaphor attributed by Seneca to Posidonius (*EM.*, 113.28): *non est quod umquam fortunae armis putes esse te tutum: tuis pugna. Contra ipsam fortuna non armat; itaque contra hostes instructi, contra ipsam inermes sunt*. The gifts of fortune may include honours, riches, and political influence (i.e. the things popularly called benefits), which are perishable and are to be contrasted with the true eternal boons bestowed by virtue (*EM.*, 74, *passim*). The Stoic aims to be *supra fortunam* (*Const. Sap.*, 1.1). One should use the
gifts of fortune, not be enslaved to them (VB., 3.3). To achieve this, one must spurn fortune: \textit{nihil mihi tecum, fortuna; non facio mei tibi copiam} (EM., 118.4). How does one come under the spell of fortune? 

... \textit{qui alia bona judicat in fortunae venit potestatem, alieni arbitrii fit: qui omne bonum honesto circumscripsit intra se felix est} (EM., 74.1). The external goods are often opposed to the self and the possession contained in it (VB., 8.3; VB., 15.3), and, consequently so is fortune (TA., 9.2). Since god is internal, we may, therefore, distinguish him in some sense from Fortuna (cf. EM., 110.2).

\begin{quote}
\textit{expediam dignum nihilo minus huic viro munus, et quia de tuo non possum, de meo dabo:}
\end{quote}

\textit{Tuo and meo are colloquial; cf. Ben., 1.11.1, meo contentus sum.}

It is characteristic of a wise man to consider nothing his own but himself (Const. Sap., 6.3). Cf. EM., 75.18, where possessing great power over oneself is part of absolute liberty, and to become one's own is an immeasurable good. Cf. Cic. Lael., 2.7, ... \textit{hanc esse in te sapientiam existimant, ut omnia tua in te posita esse ducas humanisque casus virtute inferiores putas.}

* The interpretation placed by Seneca on Aeschines' words, indicates that the latter gave himself because (\textit{quia}) he had nothing else. If Seneca's evaluation, that he considered himself more valuable than other goods, is correct, Aeschines can be faulted for first wishing to give what is second best; if he first attempted to offer the more
valuable (i.e. other goods), Seneca's interpretation, pretium se sui facit, is incorrect.

* Pretium se sui facit means "he established his value at his true worth".

Ingeniosus adulescens invent, quemadmodum Socraten sibi daret:


* The object and the indirect object in Socraten sibi daret (how he might acquire Socrates, i.e. win his approval) are the reverse of those in dono tibi ... me ipsum (Ben., l. 8.1); Aeschines' purpose in giving is here seen as acquisitive and illustrative of the principle do ut des against which Seneca usually militates. Ingeniosus hence is "wily", implying almost a misuse of ratio.

Non quanta quaeque sint, sed a quali profecta, scire proficit:

This sentence contains a troublesome lacuna. The major MS, N, reads a quali proficiendom callidum (for the readings of other MSS see J. Buck, Seneca De Beneficiis und De Clementia in der Uberlieferung, p. 47). Préchac expanded this into the text as found above. C. Hosius in his edition has a quali profecta prospiciendum taking profecta from N3, a later hand which corrected N, and derives prospiciendum from the
reading of two other MSS. M. C. Gertz in his edition of 1876 has proficiantur animo respeciendum. J. Buck writes qualia instead of quali, seeking to balance quanta. He thinks the final a was superscribed, and then erroneously put before quali. Proficiendum he regards as a corruption of providendum. How large is the lacuna? W. Richter (Die Lücken in Senecas Briefen und De Beneficiis I, p.14) thinks that it is of considerable proportions, containing, perhaps, a theoretical discussion of a new theme found in Ben.,1.9.2, and other examples to illustrate this. Both discussions and examples may have been preceded, thinks Richter, by Roman examples to balance the Greek one. It must be remembered however that Buck is intent on making the first book as long as possible (see p.4), and, while there is some disruption in the continuity of thought, the overall pattern of decline is clearly visible. C. Haeberlin ("Questiones criticæ in L. Annaei Seneca de beneficiis Libros", RhM., N.F. 45 [1890], p.43) regards the chapter as the most corrupt of the whole work, notably because of the later lacuna between Ben.,1.9.2 and Ben.,1.9.3. The lacuna under discussion provides no real difficulty; Haeberlin agrees with Gertz' ending of Ben.,1.9.1, and assumes with him that the beginning of the next sentence has disappeared. Callidus was prefaced, he thinks, by something like bene audit homo dives, si (a rich man has a good reputation, if ...). We have, then, a long lacuna postulated (Buck), as well as a short one (Haeberlin). W. Friedrich ("Die Abfassungszeit von Senecas Werk Über die Wohltaten", BPhW,47 (1914), 1502) agrees with the reading of Hosius
but sees the sentence as the point of departure for the discussion of Ben., 1.9.2, and would remove it from its paragraph, and attach it to the next. W. H. Alexander (Lucius Annaeus Seneca De Beneficiis Libri VII, p. 7) argues there is no need for profecta and that prospiciendum represents the original reading.

* Another reading is here proposed which does not require the hypothesis of a lacuna. It is paleographically possible to arrive at the corrupt reading proficiendom (N) from profecta refert, especially if lack of space, as in N, where the word occurs at the bottom of the page (so indicated in Préchac's text), provides pressure to alter the relative size of the last letters. The changes required by this reading are not radical: e → i, t → i, a → e, r → n, ef → d, e → o, rt → m, (the MS is in precarolingian miniscules, with letters at times close together, at times the opposite; ligatures occur - l, r, t with e, i -, but are not used consistently; the letter m is sometimes abbreviated as s: J. Buck, op. cit., p. 6). This reading preserves the continuity of thought, emphasizing the importance of the character of the donor; it is linked to ingeniosus, which proceeds it, and callidus, which follows.

* Another possibility is that refert stood at the beginning of the sentence and preceded non quanta; it could have been left out through confusion with the last word of the previous sentence, daret, which contains some of the same letters. The final verb could be proficiant or proficiscantur; refert non quanta quaeque sint, sed a quali proficiant.
* Cf. EM., 81.6, *Po animo quidque debetur quo datur, nec quantum
sit sed a qual i profectum voluntate perpenditur.*

En dominus callidus non difficilem aditum praebuit
inmodica cupientibus spesque inprobas nihil re adiuturus
verbis fovit:

W. Friedrich ("Die Abfassungszeit von Senecas Werk Uber die
Wohltaten", BPhW, 47 (1914) 1502) is of the opinion that Ben., 1.9.2
represents Seneca's purely personal thought, and, in spite of the
general formulation in which the examples are cast, postulates that
callidus is Nero's henchman and successor Otho, that *immodica cupientes*
are the senators of Rome, and that the man, who is serious of counte-
nance and harsh of tongue, is a philosopher, perhaps Seneca himself,
whose fortune incited envy. Friedrich's attempts to see historical
events masked by generalities continues into the next chapter. Such
attempts, however, can not be definitive: Seneca was himself accorded
shrewdness, *argutia* (Gell. NA., 12.2.1) and enjoyed a reputation for
affability, *comitas honesta, ingenium amoenum* (Tac. Ann., 13.2.2), making
him as likely a candidate for *callidus* as Otho, i.e. this identification
is as difficult to substantiate.

* Callidus need not be pejorative in every instance, but it can
carry the derogatory overtones of *astutia* (which, incidentally, can
serve the cause of ingratitude [Cic. Mur., 8] and presumably that of
incorrect giving). Cicero expounds *calliditas* on several occasions.
Quoting Plato (Off.,1.19.63), he differentiates it from wisdom, as knowledge which is not combined with justice. In Off.,3.13.57 he calls callidus the man who would choose expediency over moral rectitude in commerce by drawing subtle distinctions between tacere and celare (this caveat emptor philosophy is that of the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon whose stand was attacked by his pupil Antipater). The catalogue of adjectives, which Cicero ascribes to such men, casts light on the implications of calliditas: hoc autem celandi genus quale sit et cuius hominis, quis non videt? certe non aperti, non simplicis, non ingenui, non jasti, non viri boni, versuti potius, obscuri, astuti, fallaci, malitiosi, callidi, veteratoris, vafri (M. Pohlenz, "Cicero de officiis III, NG philolog.-hist.klasse, N.F.1 (1934), Nr.1, p.38, aptly calls Diogenes' position one of egoistische "Klugheit"). Cicero is also instructive elsewhere. He calls calliditas a perverse imitation of prudentia (Off.,3.32.113), and of those who admire persons possessing calliditas he states that they mistake cunning for wisdom (Off.,2.3.10). He further relates that wisdom without justice can not inspire confidence, but that the cleverer and shrewder a man is (versutor et callidior), the more he is detested and mistrusted (invisior et suspectior). This last statement significantly occurs in the context of a discussion of how benevolentia and fides are to be secured. We have seen thus that in a Roman philosophical work reflecting doctrines of the so-called Middle Stoa calliditas does not have a favourable connotation. Is this true also of Seneca? The concept of calliditas is
described as prudentia overstepping its bounds in a work believed to be derived from Seneca's lost De Officiis (in the fifth chapter of Martin of Bracara's Formula Vitae Honestae, for the relationship of which to Seneca's work see E. Bickel, "Die Schrift des Martinus von Bracara Formula Vitae Honestae", RhM,60 (1905), 505-551; cf. H. Gomoll, Der Stoische Philosoph Hekaton, 25 f.). But more direct evidence is available. Seneca states that subdola ... calliditas does not fit souls engaged in great endeavours (EM.,49.12), and that calliditas can make an insignificant crime worthy of greater punishment than a serious crime which was committed by mistake and without cruelty (Ira, 1.19.6; cf. EM.,90.11 f. where shrewdness, sagacitas, which can lead to vice, is distinguished from ratio recta).

It is apparent that callidus has unfavourable connotations, that it intimates a self-serving attitude and that it favours expediency. Furthermore, it may call for a negative reaction in others (e.g. Off., 2.3.10). These factors must be kept in mind for an understanding of the position of callidus in our text. In some respect the man so termed is comparable to the acquisitive ingeniosus adulescens whose wiles were also to some extent self-serving, but who still had fortunate results. The callidus is worse off in that he is dealing with people with immoderate desires, perhaps people who are envious. The results in this case are not spelled out, but one may surmise that, if good, they are only temporarily so, because verbal approval will not long satisfy inmodica cupientes. And if verbis fovit means promisit, but
without a realization of the promise, the long term prospects for the callidus do not appear favourable either. The callidus, then, is in a less enviable position than the ingeniosus adulescens; a decline is apparent. But worse off still is man who is next discussed. * If profecta refert is read (Ben.,1.9.1), En dominus will not be necessary in the text.

at peior Opimio, si lingua asper, voltu gravis cum invidia fortunam suam explicuit:

Opimio is Prechac's reading (his app. crit. does not contain the MS readings, but Hosius reads opinio). One may further suggest inopi, "worse than a poor man", i.e. he may as well be poor, for then he would not be the object of envy. Opimio, however, is more attractive. Opimius appears in Hor. Sat., 2.3.142 f., in a satire which is replete with Stoic teaching, and which contains an attack on four vices (ambitio, avaritia, luxuria, superstition, three of which are discussed in Ben.,2.26-28, as causes of ingratitude). In the attack on what is termed the worst of these vices (Hor. Sat.,2.3.82), avaritia, Opimius appears as an example of an avarus. He is described as a pauper because of his lifestyle, although he is surrounded by heaps of gold. He too is object of invidia, since, when he falls ill, his heir runs rejoicing around the coffers. He too shows he is lingua asper (Hor. Sat.,2.3.156). His situation may be preferable to that of the man Seneca introduces in his comparison, because Opimius has at least one friend,
the medicus fidelis, who acts in his interest, and uses display (cf. explicuit) of Opimius' wealth for the owner's benefit, to cause him to rally. The medicus thus buffers Opimius from the full impact of the consequences of invidia. Such assistance is absent in the case of Seneca's individual. In comparison with a good man (the good ruler, Clem.,1.13.4) both callidus and peior are amiss; this good man will combine the positive qualities of both: ... felix abunde sibi visus, si fortunam suam publicarit, sermone adfabilis, aditus accessuque facilis, vultu, qui maxime populos demeretur, amabilis ...

Préchac notes that Seneca quotes from Horace's satires on other occasions (EM.,86.13 = Sat.,1.2.27; EM.,119.13 = Sat.,1.2.114-116; EM.,120.20 = Sat.,1.3.11-17).

* Does fortunam suam explicuit mean that the fortune was merely put on display, i.e. not in fact given? See OLD.,s.v. expedio,3b, "settle (a debt)"; s.v. expedio, 6, "supply, provide" (TLL.,s.v., makes the verb the equivalent of persolvere, which is used of a debt). The individual performing the action is a reluctant giver and to the extent that he desires to retain the gift displays avaritia. In the case of both the callidus and the peior there is an inconsistency between the act performed and the manner in which it is done. The first is verbally supportive, but unhelpful substantively; the second vice versa (this yields a chiastic arrangement).

* Invidia has been the subject of controversy and semasiological study (see E. Wistrand, "Invidia", Franos,44 (1946), 355-369; criticized
by I. Odelstierna, Invidia, Invidiosus, and Invidiam Facere; neither
discuss our text. Its basic meanings are (a) envy, grudge (b)
indignation, ill-will. The essence of the problem is who is experienc­ing the feeling and what is the nature of that feeling. Wistrand
considers the pregnant use of the word to have taken its departure from
the arousal of indignation against someone among others (a situation
involving three parties), and to have included conduct which leads to
that arousal. Included too are actions which can have a direct effect
upon one's opponent. For our text this last possibility seems most
likely, since there are but two parties present. Two interpretations
of our text remain. In the first place the phrase cum invidia may
represent the feeling of indignation experienced by the man compared to
Opimius (such a reference to one's own feeling seems to stem from the
rhetorical use of the term; see Odelstierna, pp.31, 71, and 92, "... a
very prominent meaning of invidia: the offended party's own feeling of
ill-will against an encroachment"). As such the phrase is the final
member of a triad reflecting the irascibility of the man as shown in
his tongue, face and feeling. This indignation on his part would con­
trast with the affability of the callidus. In the second place invidia
could represent the feelings of envy induced in the audience when con­
fronted by the man's fortune and manner. As to a choice between the
two interpretations, much will depend on what one views enim as purport­
ing to explain. It may provide reasons why the man is peior Opimio,
since his inconsis—
tency, giving but doing so angrily, produces inconsistency, admiration and hatred, in others. If, on the other hand, *enim* is explicative of *invidia*, that word must refer to the feelings induced in the audience. The mixed feelings portrayed in *colunt ... detestanturque* are perhaps those found in *edax et inimica semper alienis processibus invidia* (ad Polyb., 9.4), which likewise combines a wish to acquire with elements of hostility. *Invidia* in our text is, therefore, most probably the description of the feelings of the audience, a situation which would harmonize much better with the overall schema of degeneration on an ever-widening scale. The *peior Opimio* has violated the precept on how to avoid *invidia* (*Invidiam effugies si te non ingesseris oculis, si bona tua non iactaveris, si scieris in sinu gaudere, EM., 105.3*). As a result he fosters in others the need to possess; *invidia* can turn into *avaritia* (on their relationship see N. Rudd, *The Satires of Horace*, p. 14, where they are stated to be "as inseparable as concave and convex", "both converge towards the larger concept of πλεονεξία"; cf. *Ira*, 3.8.2, *avaritia in proximos virus suum transtulit*). Moreover, gratitude and envy are mutually exclusive (*Ben.*, 3.3.3). Envy is therefore closely allied to ingratitude (it is, in fact, its most ferocious cause, *Ben.*, 2.28.1), and ingratitude is disruptive of society at its very roots (*Ben.*, 4.18). One can see how one vice begets another, and more and more people become involved. The context of the statement cited from *Ben.*, 3.3.3 shows how this theme of decline may form a link between *Ben.*, 1.9.2 and *Ben.*, 1.9.3 (envy is characteristic of the
complainer; we regard what we have at home of no account, and look not to what we have but what we seek; we are possessed by novorum cupiditas and aliorum admiratio). It is evident that the characteristics of envy are very prominent in the marital relationships described in Ben., 1.9.3; complaints (rusticus), discontent with what is at home (in sella prostare), and novorum cupiditas are the order of the day. The content of Ben., 1.9.3 is therefore not as foreign to that of Ben., 1.9.2 as has sometimes been stated (see p.291).

* Arist. Rhet., 1362a states that it is generally the goods derived from fortune (άτο τύχης, cf. fortunam) which are the objects of envy.

* Cf. SVF., 3.99.38 ff. ... φθόνον δὲ λύπην ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίωσ ἀγαθῶς, ζηλούν δὲ λύπην ἐπὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ παρείναι, δὲν αὐτὸς ἐπιθυμεῖ, ζηλοτυπίαν δὲ λύπην ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ παρείναι, ὥστ' αὐτὸς ἔχει ...

* With invidia's power to disrupt society, compare that of pecuniae cupiditas to break up a friendship (Cic. Lael., 10.34; this may be derived from Theophrastus, see R. Stark, Die Freundschaftslehre des Panaitios, pp.63,64). On the role of the vices avaritia, ambitio, luxuria in the degeneration of the Roman world in Sallust's view see D. C. Earl, The Political Thought of Sallust, pp.13-15, 112. The chronological sequence in which Sallust postulated they appeared is not apparent in our text.
Colunt enim detestanturque felicem et, si potuerint, eadem facturi odere facientem:

The subject of the verb is not stated explicitly, but it must be something like "people" (German man; French on); they are those who feel invidia. The mixture of feelings they experience reflects, and may be caused by, the inconsistencies of callidus and peior who both do one thing and say another. For a similar mixture cf. VB.,2.4, Quam magnus mirantium tam invidentium populus est.

* Felix is colloquial for having a high rating in the census (W. Friedrich, "Zur Abfassungszeit von Senecas Werk uber die Wohltaten", BPhW,44 [1914], 1407; cf. EM.,104.39). Felicitas elicits invidia (ad Polyb.,2.2; cf. EM.,87.13, riches are not the efficient cause of vices such as invidia, but the antecedent cause). Excessive prosperity leads to greed and unchecked desires which ever increase a magnis ad maiorum (Clem.,1.1.7).

* Seneca was himself accused of subita felicitas by his adversary Suillius in 58 AD (Tac. Ann.,13.42.8), a charge to which Seneca refers when pleading with Nero for the opportunity to retire (Tac. Ann.,14.53.2).

* Préchac (in his note on p.18) thinks felicem odere eadem facturi constitutes the transition from Ben.,1.9.2 to Ben.,1.9.3, from the quality of certain benefactors to the general corruption of the human heart. Indeed a transition to vices active on a larger social
scale is present, but Ben., 1.9.3, does not provide illustrations of the sentence quoted by Préchac, but rather of a further stage in the development of degeneration. Instead of hating the doer of deeds they themselves are about to do, they have already done deeds which they allow their partners to indulge in as well. Jealousy has been replaced by permissiveness, but avarice continues unabated.

1.9.3 Coniugibus alienis ne clam quidem sed aperte ludibrio habitis suas aliis permisere. Rusticus, inhumanus ac mali moris et inter matronas abominanda condicio est, si quis coniugem suam in sella prostare vetuit et vulgo admissis inspectoribus vehi perspicuam undique. 1.9.4 Si quis nulla se amica fecit insignem nec alienae uxori annuum praestat, hunc matronae humilem et sordidae libidinis et ancillariolum vocant. Inde certissimum sponsaliorum genus est adulterium et in consensu viduitas caelibatusque: nemo uxorem duxit, nisi qui abduxit. 1.9.5 Iam rapta spargere, sparsa sera et acri avaritia recolligere certant, nihil pensi habere, paupertatem alienam contemnere, suam quam ullum aliud vereri malum, pacem iniuriis perturbare, inbecilliores vi ac metu premere. Nam provincias spoliari et numarium tribunal audita utrimque licitatione alteri addici non mirum, quoniam, quae emeris, vendere gentium ius est.

Permissiveness is the rule within marriage, and whoever refuses to indulge in it is considered not fashionable but rude. If someone does not keep a mistress, he is suspected of some perversion. One gets into marriage by way of adultery, and once married one lives as though single. Ill-gotten gains are distributed, then greedily gathered again; scruples have disappeared; another's poverty is oppressed, one's own feared; the weak are oppressed, for the provinces are plundered. And it is not surprising that magistracies are up for sale, for it is the
law of nations that what you buy you sell.

For the second time in chapter nine, a lacuna must be discussed. C. Haeberlin (Questiones criticæ in L. Anae Senecæ de beneficiis libros, RhM, N.F.45 [1890] pp.46-47) attempts to fill out the text by including an enjoiner to give to selected individuals and to those who possess judgment. He would include here too a discussion about ingrates. Such a discussion is mentioned at the beginning of the third book (Ben.,3.1.2), and is not to be found elsewhere in the first two books. To this he would add the observation that ingratitude brings about the vice of our age, and to that, in turn, the castigation of vices extant in our text. All of this requires a substantial lacuna (ironically W. Richter [Die Lücken in Senecas Briefen und de Beneficiis I, p.14], who has seen lacunae of very large proportions in Ben.,1.1.1 and Ben.,1.9.1, does not think there is a substantial one at this point in the text). Haeberlin finds an indication of such an extensive lacuna in Ben.,1.10.1, longius. The term, however, means "longer than intended", and what that was we do not know. Haeberlin considers the material of Ben.,1.9.3 ff. a digression from the theme. It is, however, replete with words which are definitely related to the theme of giving and receiving (permisere, prostare, abduxit, rapta spargere, spoliare to name a few). Moreover Haeberlin himself shows the relevance of the description of vice and the disruption of society when he refers back to Ben.,1.4 where benefits were seen to be a cohesive element in society.

Sonntag (L. Annaei Senecæ de Beneficiis Libri Explanantur,
p.15) considers that the lacuna contained a discussion of the question to whom we should give. He bases this on the hypothesis that the presence of a similar discussion about the topic from whom we ought to receive (Ben.,2.18) creates the need for it. F. Préchac ("La date du de Beneficiis, CRAI, [1914], p.115, n.1), explains the harshness of the transition on the basis of his theory that it was the De Beneficiis which Seneca was revising prior to his death, and that some additions were made at this time which were not fully integrated. He regards Ben.,1.9.3-10 as the misplaced complement to the discussion concerning marital relations at Ben.,3.16, an explanation he does not mention in his edition of the De Beneficiis. E. Albertini (La composition dans les ouvrages philosophiques de Sénèque, p.182) takes issue with Préchac's theory, follows Sonntag in positing a discussion on the topic to whom we should give (p.80), and does so for the same reasons as Sonntag (p.158). Against the inclusion here of such a discussion we may raise the following points. It would disrupt the flow of the decline and would detract attention from the animus dantis. More important Seneca has already given an indication of the importance of choosing a recipient (Ben.,1.1.2), will do so again shortly (Ben.,1.10.5), and has still in store a description of the character of the recipient (Ben.,4.11.1). Moreover, in the corresponding discussion on the question from whom we ought to receive, Seneca states that this requires a more careful selection than that of a recipient. The greater difficulties involved here would seem to warrant some attention; this should not
lead, however, to the conclusion that Seneca must have paid equal attention to the question of the selection of the recipient. What is more, Seneca does not in Ben.,2.18.3 f. give an example of or instruction concerning how to choose someone to whom to owe. Instead, he discusses a possible complication, that of the absence of the right to refuse a gift, as in the case of a tyrant's gift. In the end we are left as much in the dark about specifics of the process by which selection takes place. There is then no great need for a corresponding treatment between Ben.,1.9.2 and Ben.,1.9.3, especially one which, as Albertini would have it (p.158), would make up one-fourth of the book.

The text of Ben.,1.9.3-5 illustrates the ever-widening repercussions of avaritia (cf. EM.,90.3, ... societatem avaritia distraxit; EM.,90.36, ... avaritia atque luxuria dissociavere mortales). The essential characteristic of avaritia is its lack of control and moderation, and the fact that any concession to it but fans its flames (Ben.,2.27). In addition felicitas can lead to luxuria (EM.,119.9) and this vice grows with time (EM.,90.19). It may manifest itself in immoral dress (Ben.,7.9.5), as is also suggested in our text (vehic perspicuum undique). Selfishness is traced in social relations, first within the context of the family, then of what seems to be the patron-client relationship (spargere), and lastly at the political level. In somewhat greater detail the structure of the remainder of Ben.,1.9 is as follows. At the first of these levels there is an effective series
of contrasts, between singular and plural (husbands, *si quis; si quis*, singles), and between actual situations or general rules on the one hand, and hypothetical ones or exceptions to the rules on the other. The four polarities are arranged in chiastic order. At the second level we find a contrast between *spargere* and *recoligere*, which gains point through the confusion of the two. At the political level two charges are made, disturbing the peace and pressing those who are weaker, illustrated with examples, namely the pillaging of the provinces and the venality of the tribunal.

The theme of Ben.,1.9.3 is not far removed from that of benefits (cf. Hor. *Sat.*,1.2, a satire on sexual vices also touches on the theme of giving: e.g. 1.5, *benignus ... prodigus*; 1.6, *inopi dare*; 1.7, *praeclaram ingrata stringat malus ingluvie rem*). An attack on contemporary morals lends itself to satirical presentation, and for that reason involves the commentator in such problems as evaluating whether a specific individual is referred to (W. Friedrich, "Zur Abfassungszeit von Senecas Werk Über die Wohltaten", *BPhW*, 48 (1914) 1534, thinks Seneca is writing about the Roman senators and the *amici* of the emperor). Since explicit identification is studiously avoided, and since a general theory of decline is referred to in Ben.,1.10.1, it seems likely that Seneca is not being personal in a covert manner (we may be reminded at this point that Seneca himself was exiled for supposedly having committed adultery with Julia, daughter of Germanicus, and that other vices mentioned in the text, disregarding another's
poverty and plundering the provinces, were also imputed to him [Tac. Ann., 13.42]). Ch. Favez ("Le pessimisme de Sénèque", REL, 25 [1947] p.159) regards the attack on contemporary morals as more than rhetoric and relates it to Seneca's personal pessimistic way of life. He also regards Seneca's opinion about women as generally negative and severe, with the notable exception of those individual women who influenced him. In general women are characterized by lack of self-control and wisdom, although theoretically they are capable of achieving them (Ch. Favez, "Les opinions de Sénèque sur la femme, REL, 16 [1938], 335-345).

Augustus' attempts to save morality and marriage by means of legislation (e.g. Lex Julia de adulteriis coercendis, 18 B.C.) did not achieve its goals. Although Seneca at times expresses himself in the manner of the Cynics, his view of marriage, as it emerges from our text, does not show the cynic hesitation about marriage (for which see D. R. Dudley, A History of Cynicism, p.51; J. Rist, Stoic Philosophy, p.56) nor does he share Zeno's view that women are to be held in common (see J. Rist, op. cit., p.65 for points of controversy). Seneca's Stoic contemporary Musonius Rufus likewise has a favorable view of marriage (A. van Geytenbeek, Musonius Rufus and Greek Distrîbe, pp.51-77). Seneca himself wrote a work De Matrimonio of which only traces survive in the Adversus Jovinianum of St. Jerome (it may owe something to Theophrastus' work on the same topic, see E. Bickel, Diatribe in Senecae Philosophi Fragmenta). Seneca did not believe the
self-sufficiency of the wise man was irreconcilable with marriage and the raising of children (EM., 9.17). His devotion to his wife Paulina is obvious in EM., 104 (E. Elorduy, Die Sozialphilosophie der Stoa, p. 172, regards it a Missachtung der stoischen Sittenlehre, on the ground that the Stoic loves because it is his duty to love, and because he cares not about the fidelity of the beloved). Moreover, his censorship of relations with a paelx (EM., 95.26) goes beyond the requirements of Roman tradition. Cato's cautious approval of relations with prostitutes (Hor. Sat., 1.2.31) can be contrasted with Seneca's advice (Ben., 2.14.2) not to give someone money who, one knows, will spend it on an illicit relationship.

Coniugibus alienis ne clam quidem sed aperte ludibrio habitis suas aliis permisere:

The adjective alienis underscores the fact that the vice of greed (cf. inmodica cupientibus, Ben., 1.9.2) has turned from unspecified objects to more personal ones.

* Clam and aperte represent aspects of an ethical act; for their application to the giving of benefits see Ben., 2.9. Cf. Hor. Od., 3.6.25–32, where attention is drawn to the openly flagrant behaviour of a young woman at a party non sine conscio ... marito (see RE., 15. 1021 for instances of women who practised prostitution with the consent of their husbands).
* Note that permisere represents a further stage of decline than eadem facturi odere facientem.

**Rusticus, inhumanus ac mali moris et inter matronas abominanda condicio est:**

The term *matronas* is used ironically; it is applicable to free-born married Roman women (hence it connotes respectability). They were entitled to wear distinctive clothing, to appear without which was a punishable offense under Tiberius (*RE*, 14.2305). *Meretrices* were forbidden to wear their clothes or hairstyle. Seneca's point is that moral similarity has blurred outward distinctions (for the taboo against adultery with a *matrona* see Hor. *Sat.*, 1.2.54; *matronam nullam tango*).

* Condicio means "partner" (according to J. Mayor, "Corruption of the Text of Seneca", *JPhil*, 30 [1914], p.209).

**si quis coniugem suam in sella prostare vetuit et vulgo admissis inspectoribus vehi perspicuam undique:**

The *sella* is perhaps the *sella gestatoria*. Cf. *at tu / cum tibi vestiti facies scorti placet, haeres / et dubitas alta Chionem deducere sella* (Juv. 3.134). Such modes of transportation were obviously used for a variety of purposes; Suet. *Ner.*, 28, alleges Nero committed incest with Agrippina in a litter. In Seneca the *sella* can as well
connote idleness (*iners negotium*, BV.,12.6 & 7), or be symbolic of the empty trappings of a woman's power (*Const.*Sap.,14.1). In the context "cella", a room in a brothel (cf. Juv.,6.121), would not be an inappropriate reading.

* With *perspicuam* cf. Petr.,55, *aequum est induere nuptam ventum textilem, / palam prostare nudam in nebula linea*. Such a manner of dress was a favorite target of the moralist (e.g. *Hor.* Sat., 1.2.83-5; *Ben.*,7.9.10).

* K. Barwick, *Martial und die Zeitgenössische Rhetorik*, p.26, points out how this sentence and the preceding one was used by Martial as he crafted 12.58: *Ancillariolum tua te vocat uxor, et ipsa / lecticariola est: estis, Alauda, pares.*

* H. Lehmann ("L. Annaeus Seneca und seine philosophischen Schriften", Philologus,8 [1853], p.324) compares with our text Poppaea's pronouncement - about Nero's attachment to the slave-girl Acte - that he derived from the liaison nothing *nisi abiectum et sordidum* (Tac. Ann.,13.46). He concludes that the date of writing of Seneca's passage may be 58 A.D., the year of Poppaea's ascendancy. W. Friedrich ("Die Abfassungszeit von Senecas Werk Über die Wohltaten", BPhW,48 [1914], 1534) likewise has her in mind throughout the discussion on adultery, noting that while she was still married to Crispinus she
committed adultery with Otho, later to be her husband, and, for a short
time, emperor. Subsequent to her marriage to Otho, the latter seemed
to foster a relationship between her and Nero. While it is true that
Seneca remarks that adultery is now (nunc, Ben.,1.10.2) more common
than other vices, and that it is practised by illustrious and noble
women (Ben.,3.16.2), our text need not be taken to refer specifically
to Nero and Poppaea, since adultery was not uncommon among the senatorial
class during the latter years of the republic nor at the imperial
court subsequently. If degeneration is described within a chronologi-
cal framework which starts with Socrates, nunc need not be taken as
strictly as the interpretations of Lehmann and Friedrich suggest.
Moreover ancillariolus in Seneca's sentence can hardly refer to Nero,
since the individual so termed resists the trend to immorality;
Nero was hardly such a paragon of virtue.

* Nulla se amica fecit insignem indicates that not having a
liaison was in itself a mark of distinction, emphasizing that having
one had become the common rule. With insignem contrast humilem; it is
telling of the moral standards that abuse is heaped not on vice itself,
but on its occurrence with the wrong social classes.

* Ancillariolus occurs elsewhere only in Mart.,12.58.

*Inde certissimum sponsaliorum genus est adulterium et in
consensu viduitas caelibatusque:

Sponsalia means "engagement" (Gel. NA.,4.4; Varr. LL.,6.69-72;
Ulp., Dig., 23.1.2). It consisted of commitments on either side, made by the prospective husband or his pater familias, and, usually, the pater familias of the girl (C. Schultz, Classical Roman Law, p.109). Originally a breach could be the cause of legal action, but in classical times the arrangement was not enforceable (H. Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to Roman Law, p.242). Hence a freedom pertains akin to that which Seneca advocates for benefits when he recommends (Ben., 3.7 f.) that ingratitude not be subject to legal arbitration.

* In consensus is difficult. F. Préchac translates "veuvage et célibat sont la règle générale"; likewise A. Stewart "widowhood and celibacy are commonly practised"; J. Basore has "the bachelor is in accord with the widower". The word consensus, however, can have a closer connection with marriage. "Nuptias non concubitus sed consensus facit. ... it reveals in the form of a maxim ... the humanistic principle which governs the whole classical law of marriage" (C. Schulz, Classical Roman Law, p.110). Seneca's sentence could then contain two paradoxical situations: adultery is the equivalent of engagement and marriage (in the new sense) allows retention of the single status.

* Caelibatus is a neologism (A. Bourgery, Sénèque Prosateur, p.264).

nemo uxorém duxit, nisi qui abduxit:

W. Friedrich ("Die Abfassungszeit von Senecas Werk Über die
"Wohltaten", BPhW, 48 [1914], 1503) notes that the perfect tense here indicates an oft repeated action; it is perhaps better explained as a gnomic perfect. The sentence contains a play on ducere, with substitution of an abductio for the normal deductio (procession in which the bride was led away).

* Cf. Infrunita et antiqua est, quae nesciat matrimonium vocari unum adulterium (Ben.,3.17.3).


* Tacitus describes the progression of Otho's relation with Poppaea Sabine as follows: nec mora quin adulterio matrimonium iungetur (Tac. Ann.,13.45; see Ann.,11.26 for a description of the wedding ceremony of G. Silius and Messalina while she was still married to the emperor Claudius).

Iam rapta spargere, sparsa sera et acri avaritia recolligere certant:

The cycle here described is distortion of the circular movement in benefits symbolized by the chorus of Graces (Ben.,1.3.4). The rivalry present likewise is a travesty of the certamen of Ben., 1.4.1; at its basis is not an altruistic attitude, but a selfish one expressed in the contempt for another man's poverty, and the fear for one's own.
With sense of our text compare ... luxuria pecuniam turpiter perdens quam turpius reparet (QN.,1. pr.6).

On Avaritia, - see the lengthy apostrophe addressed to her in Ben.,7.10.1 ff.

inbecilliores vi ac metu premere:

Cf. Cicero's injunction (Off.,2.24.85) that the poorer classes not be oppressed in the courts because of their insignificance. To this Cicero adds the converse that invidia should not stand in the way of the rich either in maintaining or recovering what is theirs. Both subjects are treated under the heading of aequitas (cf. Seneca's ironic ius gentium) and are hence related to the theme of benefits which is also part of the virtue of justice.

provincias spoliari:

To take something from someone else is destructive of human society (Cic. Off.,3.5.21) and against natura, i.e ius gentium (Cic. Off.,3.5.23).

Compare the charge against Seneca (Tac. Ann.,13.42; ... Italiam et provincias immenso faenore hauriri) and the parallel charges against the accuser of Seneca by his supporters (Tac. Ann.,13.42).
Seneca's adversary Suillius was reportedly active in bribery in the courts, and Tacitus comments: *nec quicquam publicae mercis tam venale fuit quam advocatorum perfidia* (Tac. Ann., 11.5.2).

* Both customs, plundering provinces and buying justice, are of long-standing so that there is little justification for claiming identification with particular circumstances at Seneca's time.

J. A. Crook, *Law and Life of Rome*, p. 29, points out that *ius gentium* does not mean international law; "What it does refer to is those legal habits which were accepted by the Roman law as applying to and being used by all the people they met, whether Roman citizens or not". H. F. Jolowicz (*Historical Introduction to Roman Law*, p. 103) draws attention to a distinction between the practical sense and the theoretical sense of *ius gentium*. The latter he considers derived from Aristotle's natural law (ϕυσικόν as opposed to νομικόν, *EN.*, 1134b18) which was also termed common law (κοινόν) a concept which influenced the Stoics (see also M. Kaser, *Das Altrömische Ius*, p. 87). Cicero identifies this natural law with *ius gentium* (*Off.*, 3.5.23; cf. *Off.*, 3.17.69). The philosophical sense possible for the phrase
adds irony to the commercial meaning present in this instance (RE., 10.1.1219.8, ius gentium = formlose Kauf, Verkehrsrecht, i.e. without payment of sale price, or surety, no goods are given over; cf. TLL., 6.2.1861.35; cf. Ben., 3.14.3, Aequissima vox est et ius gentium prae se ferens: "Redde, quod debes"; haec turpissima est in beneficio: "Redde!").
Seneca signals the conclusion of what has turned out to be a digression, and indicates that a postscript (itaque sic finiamus) is necessary to avoid possible misunderstanding of the chronological sequence found in the decline traced in the previous chapters. This sequence, which was attended by an increase of vice, culminated in a picture of the contemporary world as an especially reprehensible one. Seneca comments on this by remarking that the concept of a moral decline is one which is held universally, but that there is a constancy to vice despite fluctuations within fixed limits. A rhetorical elaboration of the variety of vices which succeed each other then follows. Their flux is ironically described in terms of the Epicurean theory of atomic flux, perhaps thereby providing a tacit comment on Epicurean ethics. Seneca next states that ingratitude is basic to all these vices (cf. the rhetorical opening remarks of the first book). Towards the vice of ingratitude Seneca recommends a double standard; the person in danger of committing it is to regard it as the greatest evil, and ought therefore to avoid it, but once it has been committed, presumably by another, this person ought to forgive it, as the least of crimes. Note that there are two differences between the aspects (numeri) of each situation,
one of time, i.e. before and after the act of ingratitude, and another of persona, or role, with respect to the act of ingratitude, i.e. as perpetrator of the act (active role) or the recipient of the act (passive role). It is especially this latter difference which is, by making the value of the act relative to the persona, an important element in the altruistic attitude which permeates Seneca's doctrine of benefits.

The implications of an altruistic attitude are subsequently raised in a discussion of what are in essence limitations to be applied to such an attitude. Constituents to be taken into consideration, such as risk involved in giving and its correlative, the worthiness of the recipient, are then discussed.

1.10.1 Sed longius nos inpetus evehit provocante materia; itaque sic finiamus, ne in nostro saeculo culpa subsidat. Hoc maiores nostri questi sunt, hoc nos querimur, hoc posteri nostri querentur, eversos mores, regnare nequittiam, in deterius res humanas et omne nefas labi; at ista eodem stant loco stabuntque paulum duntaxat ultra aut citra mota, ut fluctus, quos aestus accedens longius extulit, recedens interiore litorum vestigio tenuit.

Seneca states he has gone too far (in his recriminations), and wishes to conclude with an attempt to avoid leaving the impression that the present generation must bear the brunt of the censure, by stating that the complaint of declining morals is voiced in every age. On the whole morals are constant, changes being relatively small and within fixed limits, like the patterns of motion of the sea.

A significant theme, the direction taken by the course of
events of this world, is raised here, and we will treat it at some
length, first commenting on the theme of moral constancy and then
on the question of decline and progress.

The position taken by Seneca, the assumption of a morality
basically constant between progress and decline, need not represent
moral mediocrity intermediate between good and bad. It is com­
parable to the Stoic manner of considering fools: in spite of
differences between the statuses of the vices of the fool, whether
actual or potential (see Ben.,4.26-27), every fool may in some sense
be said to possess them all (Ben.,5.12.1). Likewise all ages can be
equated, in that morally they are actually or potentially alike.

To posit the constancy of morality does not mean that the
chronological perspective, with the increasing consequences of the
misuse of benefits discerned in the so-called digression, has no
validity, because vice is transferable and the process of transfer
requires time (cf. EM.,94.54, Nemo errat uni sibi, sed dementia
spargit in proximos accipitque invicem. Et ideo in singulis vitia
populorum sunt, quia illa populus dedit), and because more recent
examples can be more notable, hence, in this case more effective in
playing a part in the cure suggested for misuse of benefits (cf. EM.,
83.13, Instruenda est enim vita exemplis inlustribus. Non semper
confugiamus ad vetera.).

Seneca's emphasis on constancy is, according to R. Höffssler,
Tacitus und das Historische Bewusstsein, p.203, an example of an
attitude commonly developed by the moralist who, with his own criteria
(i.e. ones different from that of the historian), has done historical research. Hüssler differentiates a quasimedical, diagnostic concept of stability from the more ethically accentuated one of Seneca, which is also that of the Roman historians. This concept of stability was not that adopted by the Stoics, who instead had one which looked back with great admiration at a Golden Age. Following Plato, Posidonius linked technological progress to moral decline (see K. T. Reckford, "Some appearances of the Golden Age", CJ, 54 (1958), pp. 79-87; on Posidonius see also T. Cole, *Democritus and the sources of Greek Anthropology*, passim; on the theme of the Golden Age, B. Gatz, *Weltalter, goldene Zeit und sinnverwandte Vorstellungen*).

The concept of a moral decline may also have been more immediately familiar to Seneca from his father, Seneca Rhetor, who considered that the world was in a state of decline, and saw a direct link between this and a low regard for memory (*Contr. I, praefatio*, 2-4; the son also makes much of memory as a factor in giving - see the note on memoria, *Ben.*, 1.1.8).

There has been no agreement about Seneca's ideas concerning the direction of the course of human affairs, with this exception - that the doctrine of constancy of *Ben.*, 1.10.1 is not considered the typical view of Seneca. J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, p. 15, held that Seneca believed "in the theory of degeneration and the hopeless corruption of the [human] race", whereas L. Edelstein, *The Idea of Progress in Classical Antiquity*, expresses disagreement with Bury (p. 173, n. 85) and believes that Seneca "gives a clearer and more
comprehensive picture of what the ancients meant by progress than does any other author" (p.169) and that Seneca sees "advance in knowledge as the clue to the march of the human race" (p.175). This antithesis of views is one inherited from the nineteenth century, as Edelstein points out in his opening chapter. It has recently received further impetus from E. R. Dodds' (The Ancient Concept of Progress and Other Essays on Greek Literature and Belief) who has reacted against Edelstein's view, while acknowledging that certain of Seneca's statements about the future point in the direction of indefinite progress and are the most confident pronouncements on the subject (p.23). Dodds does recognize that the enthusiasm is limited to the pure sciences, excluding by and large the applied sciences and the liberal arts, so that in Seneca we see the tension between belief in scientific or technological progress and belief in moral regress (p.24).

It will not be possible within the scope of this work to treat exhaustively all the evidence provided by Seneca's works. Discussion will therefore be restricted to (a) a statement of several factors which must be considered, (b) a brief review of some of the evidence and (c) a more detailed treatment of those texts which Edelstein thinks indicate Seneca's belief in progress.

(a) When one considers Seneca's view of progress, one must take into account several factors such as a distinction between progress for society and progress for the individual, a distinction between the possibility of progress (basic for the author of the De Beneficiis) and actual progress to date, and the distinction, already introduced
above, between moral and scientific progress.

Seneca's attitude towards society is complex, if negative. He may advise escape from the crowd and withdrawal into the self ('EM., 7.8; cf. 'EM., 8; 'EM., 14; 'EM., 19), or to be in its midst and not be influenced by it ('EM., 56; 'EM., 87), depending on whether one has acquired self-sufficiency, or the degree of moral progress one has made. Yet he is well aware of the importance of the social virtues such as beneficence, which especially binds human society ('Ben., 1.4.2). However, although the reform of a society may be Seneca's ultimate goal, his philosophical works address themselves to individuals, and so it is in the De Beneficiis, where progress through relationships between individuals is stressed, but not so the means of improvement which apply uniformly to society as a whole (e.g. legislation). In addition, the kind of study Seneca recommends, which is the field where progress of some kind may be made, the study of the universe or metaphysical verities, such as being, is an escape for the individual from the weariness of life ('EM., 58.26; 'EM., 65.17), and a way of improvement ('EM., 58.26; 'EM., 65.16). In short the emphasis is on improvement for the individual.

The matter of the distinction between actual and possible progress can be most easily disposed of by reference to the many pessimistic expressions regarding the state of affairs in the world (for references see Ch. Favez, "Le pessimisme de Sénèque", REL, 25 (1947), 158-163) with which may be contrasted the supposition of the possibility of progress inherent in Seneca's paraenetic efforts.
An insufficiently clear distinction between moral and other kinds of progress has led to erroneous conclusions, notably on the part of L. Edelstein.

(b) A most important document relevant to the theme of progress or decline is EM.,90 in which Seneca is heavily indebted to Posidonius but also differs from him (on EM.,90 see S. Blankert, Seneca ep. 90 over natuur en cultuur en Posidonius als zijn bron, Diss. Amsterdam, 1941 - not available to me; T. Cole Democritus and the Sources of Greek Anthropology, passim.); cf. EM.,95.29-34, where a moral decline is traced; BV.,12 states that a great quantity of unbelievable vices has come to light in this age which is more degenerate; Ben.,5.15-17 and Ben.,7.27 paint a most pessimistic picture of contemporary life; EM.,97, EM.,122.5 do likewise; Ira, 10.2-4 states that for humanity sin is inevitable (cf. Ira,3.26.4; Ira,27.3). Passages cited by S. Rubin, Die Ethik Senecas, p.44, n.3, as counteracting the pessimistic tone, namely Polyb.,12.13.3; EM., 37.4; EM.,49.11; EM.,92.27; Ira,1.17.2-3, do not describe the world as it is, but contain either a wish for a better situation, or a description of the benefits accruing to those who follow reason (ratio).

In summation, Seneca may be said to have a very pessimistic view of the world as it exists. Redemption in the form of the happy life is attainable, but it is limited to a few, the sages, and can be acquired only after a long struggle. This Seneca himself has not, he thinks, completed successfully (EM.,45.4).
We now turn to consider more closely Seneca's most optimistic remarks as discussed by Edelstein, op.cit., since they carry the burden of his argument.

(i) Firstly QN.7.25.4-5 which Edelstein translates (p.169), "The time will come when our successors will wonder how we could have been ignorant of things so obvious." Edelstein comments on this (p.169) "that what is still wanting will gradually be provided by those who live in later ages", implying that everything will become known. The context, however, is not as optimistic; the statement appears in an apology for contemporary ignorance regarding comets and it is introduced for the purpose of inducing a less harsh attitude on the part of his contemporaries towards their ignorance, rather than as a firm prediction about the future. We might add that just prior to the translated text Seneca has stated that we concede the existence of many things about the nature of which we are ignorant, as for example the soul. No-one, he continues, can tell what or where it is, although various answers have been given. The soul's lack of knowledge about itself is then correlated to the lack of knowledge about other matters. Why be surprised about ignorance of comets, if the soul is still searching for itself? Now Seneca does not at all suggest that the nature of the soul will be completely known. It cannot be assumed, then, that all that is still wanting will become known; at best it must be restricted to those matters which future generations will have discovered since the present time.
(ii) The second text, *QN.*,7.30.5 is translated by Edelstein (p.170), "Many things unknown to us will be understood by men of future centuries, many are reserved for ages yet to come, when our memory shall have perished. It is a petty world in which there is no question worth asking for every generation". Edelstein remarks that Seneca is confident that there will be no end to such progress. Again it will be instructive to look at the context. Seneca's text appears in a section which follows the discussion on comets, *QN.*,7.28.3. Seneca concludes his remarks on comets with the statement that the gods, who have knowledge of the truth, know whether his remarks are true. We, he continues, are allowed only to examine and to proceed in the dark by means of conjecture, neither with the assurance of finding nor without the hope of doing so. This is far from pride in progress made so far, and equally far from self assurance that it will continue. Shortly thereafter (*QN.*,30.3-4) Seneca writes that many bodies are never seen by human eyes. God, who himself escapes our eyes, has not made all things for man, only a small part. This surely contains no bright prospects for the future? The chapter which follows the text translated above, contains a list of vices, with graphic examples, which are destroying contemporary society, and these vices are said to be increasing (*in processu ... sunt, QN.*,7.31.1). Seneca follows this with the remark "You are surprised that wisdom has not completed all its task!" and retorts himself that vice has not yet completely extended itself. It is for vice that we toil; it is vice we serve. No-one judges wisdom worthy except in passing; people study only when
there is nothing else to do. In conclusion Seneca complains that investigations of the ancients are so far from being completed, that many things which had been found have been forgotten. Seneca is scarcely brimming with enthusiasm; the statement translated is but a feeble ray of hope for the future. Its function is akin to that of the consolatio, attempting to make a desperate situation more endurable.

(iii) With Edelstein we now return to QU.,7.25.4 for our third text, "A single life time, though it were wholly devoted to the heavens, is not enough for the investigation of problems of such complexity ... it must therefore require long successive ages to unfold all." Once more the statement is not as optimistic as it would at first sight appear. For Edelstein has left out of his quotation Seneca's remark that we do not divide our brief time equally between study and vice; this is the reason why long successive generations are required. Seneca's statement is in fact a recrimination against his age. Moreover, Edelstein gives a mistaken impression when he translates "to unfold all"; the text reads ista and refers to problems of great complexity, (tantorum quae nunc latent), a statement not so all-embracing.

(iv) Edelstein admits (p.170) that the three texts we have considered concern only natural phenomena, but he extends the concept, remarking that Seneca "is careful to observe that the law is valid not only for natural science but for everything". His remark is based on QU.,6.5.3 which he translates "Nothing is completed at its very beginning. This is true not only of the matter with which we are dealing, the greatest and most involved of all (i.e. natural philosophy), where even though
much may be accomplished, every succeeding generation will still find something to do." The context of Seneca's remarks is a discussion of the cause of earthquakes for which various suggestions, each to be followed up by Seneca, have been made. What Seneca next points out is important: credit must be given to those who formulated the first theories: it required courage to move aside the shadows of the nature of things and not be content with its external appearance, to look inside, and to descend into the secrets of the gods. He who hoped that a find could be made contributed most to the find's taking place. And so the ancients must be listened to with indulgence (cum excusatione).

Then follows our text. When in it Seneca turns to the specific matter at hand (hac ... re) he may be referring to the cause of earthquakes and not, as Edelstein interprets, natural philosophy. There have emerged now several factors which must be taken into consideration: 1) the possible restriction in the text to a specific theory, 2) the focus of the passage being directed to the past and its purpose being to elicit the reader's sympathy for the older theories, 3) the emphasis on the point that it is the proper attitude, hope of success, which has in the past yielded the greatest results. Together these points make progressivism unlikely. The moral attitude is then translated in our text into terms which apply to the future, and must, therefore, not be taken as a prediction about future events, but rather as a protreptic remark, the purpose of which is to spur on in the present, i.e. to induce hope to be felt now for success to be experienced in the future. Seneca, in effect, urges not only greater charity towards the
past generations but also that the present generations should adopt the same courageous attitude in the face of the possibility of never having complete knowledge (the imperfectibility of knowledge being the reverse side of the coin from that of infinite progress). As such it could even be regarded, not as a statement of hope, but rather as a statement of the necessity of faith. That such an ethical aim is not far from Seneca's mind, even in a scientific work, is proven inter al. by the fact that after the discussion on earthquakes Seneca turns once more to confirmatio animorum, QN.,6.32.2. It is also doubtful whether the sentence, in omni alio negotio longe a perfecto fuere principia (QN.,6.5.3) can be made to yield a law of general progress. Seneca appears to be seeking corroborating evidence in the experience of every-day life for the assertion he has made that the ancients must be listened to because of their courageous attitude; we all know things are different at their beginning from what they turn out to be when complete. Hesiod would have said as much about the beginning of the world. Rather than moving to a higher level and enunciating an abstract or metaphysical doctrine of progress Seneca in our text has made an appeal to the lower level of experience.

(v) Edelstein considers Seneca's independent stand in relation to other Stoics (see EM.,33.11) as indicative of his progressive attitude. Seneca there writes that the ancients are not our masters but our guides. The truth is open to all; it has not yet been usurped. Much of it has been left for generations to come. Edelstein comments (p.171) "progress in understanding, then, depends on reasoned freedom
from authority as well as a reasoned acceptance of it". The remark is interesting in that it reveals Edelstein's concept of progress as qualified by being limited to understanding. To be sure, Seneca, as a Stoic, lays great stress on reason, but he does not regard all understanding, or all accumulation of knowledge *per se*, as desirable. It is precisely on this point that he refuses to follow the founders of the Stoa, who showed a preoccupation with wrong kinds of knowledge, e.g. logic and dialectic, which are not effective in bringing about right action.

(vi) Edelstein also quotes FM.,64.7-8, in which Seneca states that no-one born after thousands of centuries will be deprived of contributing something (i.e. knowledge) in addition. It ought to be noted, however, that progress is not *inevitable* here, for there is a great difference between having an opportunity to add, and in fact doing so. In the second place, Seneca considers the possibility that all things have been discovered by the ancients and that what remains is only the application and learned classification of these discoveries. Ancient cures, as it were, must be adapted to contemporary situations.

(vii) A further point Edelstein makes (p.172) is that "Seneca remains undaunted by the evils which in his opinion do accompany the ascent of civilization... The value of progress is not diminished by human shortcomings, however, any more than is that of all other goods that god has given the human race." No direct textual evidence is provided for these assertions; on the other hand many references can be given to instances where Seneca despairs of what man does (see p.311).
It is true, as Edelstein maintains (p.173), that Seneca views dispassionately the final destruction of the world by fire (QN.,3.27.1), but that could be explained on the ground that, like the death of an individual, it is no evil, but one of the indifferentia (see note on Ben.,1.6.2). But as of now, vices still seem to be on the increase.

Edelstein's general evaluation that for Seneca "the history of civilization is the history of enlightenment" (p.175), is misleading. His methodology of taking isolated statements from their contexts is in part responsible. The danger inherent in it is clear, for it would allow the statement vincuntur enim meliora peioribus (QN.,6.28.2, a statement about pure air being changed into noxious vapours) to be taken as a statement of general decline.

It is not easy to give a summary of Seneca's views on progress and decline in a sentence or so. Much depends on the perspective from which Seneca speaks, whether synoptic, or subjective and individualistic. This difference of perspective is similar to that introduced by Lucr. DRN.,2.315 f. where he points out that motions of a flock of sheep, grazing and playing on a hill, are not perceptible when the observer is some distance away. Generally speaking Seneca's position is akin to the Platonic view that technological progress is accompanied by moral decline. Seneca's own opinions, carefully distinguished from those of Posidonius in EM.,90, reveal that he has, on the one hand, admiration for an earlier age which lacked such contemporary vices as greed and killing (EM.,90.37-41), which also lacked technology (artes),
an incentive to vice (EM.,90.7-8), and which, moreover, lacked tools, inventions not made by wise men (EM.,90.10). Yet this admiration must, on the other hand, be tempered by the facts that (Stoic) philosophy was absent in that period (EM.,90.35), that then there were no wise men (EM.,90.44), and that the virtues, which can only be secured by learning and training, were unknown (EM.,90.46). Now, on the one hand, avarice and luxury have torn society apart, and have themselves increased and helped other vices (EM.,90.3; EM.,90.19; EM.,90.36; EM.,90.38), but, on the other, the possibility to become a sage is open, even if it is in fact limited to a few. For this reason Seneca exhorts men to improve, and since each must achieve such improvement for himself, Seneca often speaks from the perspective of an individual, where progress, if present at all, is not without relapses, so that change seems to be the order of the day. This subjective view can be balanced, and is in Ben.,1.10.1, by the doctrine of constancy, but even there his ethical purpose, to give encouragement and hope for improvement, is not far behind (see p.333).

Generally speaking, however, the doctrine of constancy, with its synoptic view, is less suited to Seneca's purpose than the opinions he proclaims in EM.,90.

Sed longius nos inpetus evehit provocante materia:

W. L. Friedrich, "Die Abfassungszeit von Senecas Werk Über die Wohltaten, BPhW 47 (1914), p.1502 claims that the preceding digression
is an intentional one, and that in Ben., 1.10.1 Seneca provides a blatant excuse (blosse Entschuldigung). But the digression need not be one in the sense of material not germane to the context and linked to it only by a tenuous connection; rather, Seneca may simply have gone beyond the length he anticipated devoting to the decline (longius). In this case provocante does not mean "calling aside from the original subject", but "leading on further than was intended"; cf. EM., 59.4, ... non effert te oratio nec longius quam destinasti trahit.

* The formula redirecting the reader to another point must be standard, cf. Sen. Rhet. Suas., 1.7, "longius me fabellarum dulcedo produxit; itaque ad propositum revertar.

**sic:**

This word can refer either to what precedes or what follows (Lewis and Short, s.v.). If the former, Seneca may be referring to gentium ius and, by punning on that expression, proclaiming corruption to be a universal law; hence no special blame is to be attached to the Romans. If the latter, sic refers to the concept of moral constancy (ista eodem stant loco) which makes the contemporary generation no more culpable than any previous or future ones. Special blame is thus taken away by sharing it with others, i.e. by making it either geographically universal (the first instance) or chronologically so (the second instance).
eversos mores, regnare nequitiam, in deterius res humanas et omne nefas labi:

Note the emphasis on the past (eversos), the present (regnare), and the future (in deterius ... labi) which is provided through the anticipation of the conclusion of the process connoted by the progressive present tense.

omne nefas:

The phrase can be construed as governed by the same preposition which governs deterius, i.e. in must be supplied (cf. Tac. Ann.,14.51, where the preposition per is not repeated: civitati grande desiderium eius [Burri] mansit per memoriam virtutis et successorum alterius segnem innocentiam, alterius flagrantissima flagitia). Alternatively it could be the subject accusative of the infinitive labi, which could then be translated, "the human situation, with every kind of wrong which presently attends it, is heading for a situation yet worse". The latter interpretation, which ascribes every wrong to the present age, is perhaps rhetorically more emphatic; but the former reading is preferable, since it more closely echoes the still prevalent complaint that deterioration of the present situation will lead to acceptance of every vice.

ista eodem stant loco:

For a similar emphasis on the concept of stability see Thuc.,
1.22.4; Thuc.,3.82.2, which Dodds (The Ancient Concept of Progress, p.12) states do not refer to cyclical cosmic cycles but rather to "the permanence of the irrational and unteachable elements in human nature".

* Within its context our text need be regarded as no more than a convenient means of disposing of the notion of continual decline in such a way as to provide the possibility for improvement, which is in fact urged for the individual at Ben.,1.10.4. Such a rhetorical technique of first emphasizing the extent of the vice under discussion as a preliminary to a subsequent remedy is not unknown to moralists and sermonizers.

* Ista, being neuter, may have as its antecedents mores, nequitiam, and res humanas, and may therefore designate human morality, imperfections included. The fact that this is said to stay relatively in the same place means that imperfections will always remain, and that from a synoptic point of view, they will remain at the same level, i.e. have the same grasp on mankind, barring, of course, variations of a minor kind. Seneca's ethical purpose, to take away despair caused by a continuing decline, leads him to add stabunt; in the future the situation will not be worse. We have no evidence that the omission of a past tense in the sequence stant ... stabuntque is to be taken as an indication that Seneca is here postulating a theory that there was a decline in the past, but that it has now been arrested, and will not be resumed.

* The steadfastness mentioned in our text is usually attributed
to the wise (see Sen. Const.Sap., passim.), whereas inconstancy is characteristic of vice and the fool (cf. Ben.,1.10.3); hence stant may be used ironically, as may also be evident from the metaphor used subsequently to characterize vice, fluctus.

* The absence of the preposition in is normal with loco (see Allen and Greenough's New Latin Grammar, p.272, 429).

fluctus:

This image is common in Seneca as a description of vice or the fool, e.g. EM.,120.20, maximum indicium est malae mentis fluctuatio et inter simulationem virtutum amoremque vitiorum adsidua iactatio. Cf. EM.,72,27 & 28; EM.,4.5 & 7; EM.,8.3; BV.,2.2; BV.,2.4; BV.,7.10; BV.,14.1; BV.,18.1; VB.,27.3; VB.,28.1.

* Aristotle, who likewise believed in the immutability of the good and the changeability of the bad (EE.,1239b), and in the possibility to fail in all sorts of ways, but to succeed only in one (EN.,1106b29), also formulates this concept in terms of the metaphor of the tide, for he states that the opinions of good men are stable and do not fluctuate like the tide (καὶ οὐ μεταρρέει ὡς ἐν τοῖς τετράοις, EN.,1167b6). On Aristotle's word for tide Liddell and Scott comment that it is used especially of the strait between Euboia and Boiotia, where in antiquity a change in the current was believed to occur seven times daily; generally tides do not occur in the Mediterranean. The notion of tides could have been reinforced by Posidonius, who, according to W. Capelle (RE., Supplement 7.213), went to Cadiz to study the tides.
Cf. Helv.,20.2, for knowledge of the tides listed as part of the study of the nature of the universe (although in Ben.,7.1.5 it is not considered possible or profitable knowledge); Prov.,1.4, for a good explanation of the interplay of the phenomena of successive waves and tides.

Without stating so explicitly, Seneca has different fluctus represent different vices; the fact that we change our vices Seneca considers the worst of ills (Ot. Sap.,1.2).

Translate, "... waves, which the sea, as it comes in, pushes quite a distance inland, and, as it recedes, keeps on the lower limit of the shore."

1.10.2 Nunc in adulteria magis quam in alia peccabitur, abrumpetque frenos pudicitia; nunc conviviorum vigebit furor et foedissimum patrimoniorum exitium, culina; nunc cultus corporum nimius et formae cura prae se ferens animi deformitatem: nunc in petulantiam et audaciam erumpet male dispensata libertas; nunc in crudelitatem privatam ac puplicam ibitur bellorumque civilium insaniam, qua omne sanctum ac sacram profanetur; habebitur aliquando ebrietati honor, et plurimum meri cepisse virtus erit.

Different vices are prominent at different times; such vices as adultery, gluttony, excessive attention paid to the body, brazenness, cruelty and civil war, drunkenness all take their turn.

The waves of vice may not be as random as they appear; a pattern is discernible, climaxing in the madness of civil war with the sacrilege entailed by it, and concluded by the apparently anti-climactic vice of drunkenness.

The first two, adulteria and convivium (i.e. culina) are
destructive of the household (domus); the first needs no comment in this respect, while the second is called patrimoniorum exitium. The following two, cultus corporum nimius and libertas betray an excessive concern with - or too high an opinion of - oneself, the consequences of which are apparent not only within the confines of the domus but also outside of it. We note a further link, one between the last of the first pair and the first of the next pair, since both may be subsumed under the heading luxuria (cf. EM.,114.11 for the link, ... conviviorum luxuria ... [et] vestium aegrae civitatis indicia sunt ...). In EM.,114.8-9 Seneca applies a chronological sequence to the order in which they appear as consequences of luxury, and lists cultus corporum as arising prior to cena; some variation in sequence must have been possible. Both elements of the second grouping are mutually related in that both reflect a mental aberration; libertas, which results in petulantia and audacia, obviously so; whereas cultus corporum nimius is explicitly said to be indicative of animi deformitas. There is however also a progression within this group; see the analogous comparison between ira and luxuria (Ira,3.5.5), in which the former is stated to be worse, since the latter enjoys its own pleasure, but the former the grief of another. The next pair of vices, crudelitas, as manifest especially in civil war, and the vice which flows from civil war, sacrilegium, operate within an even wider social sphere and affront more than human sensibilities.

* On the apparent anticlimax, see the note on ebrietati below.

* For a similar climactic sequence where unchecked wrongs cul-
minate in civil war, see Cic. Off., 2.8.28.

* Lists of vices, such as that provided here by Seneca, are not uncommon (see BV., 2 for another), and may have a preventative effect; to place continually before oneself all the vices of anger and to assign them their correct value may lead to their being prevented (Ira, 3.5.3), although overexposure may make a vice less shameful, and in fact increase it (Ben., 3.16).

* The vices represent both historical problems (see the commentary below and notes on Ben., 1.9.2) and rhetorical commonplaces (cf. Quint. Inst., 2.4.22-3, where in a definition of commonplaces as denouncements, which attack vices [in ipsa vitia] without attacking specific individuals [citra personas], Quintilian lists as two of his three examples adulterum and petulantem).

**Adulteria:**

Adultery was regarded as a serious vice. Aristotle (EN., 1107a17) states that some things are always wrong, such as adultery, there being no possibility of a right woman, a right time, or a right way. The Romans too regarded it as a serious offense: see Marcus Cato's speech quoted in part by Aulus Gellius (NA., 10.23); Augustus' Lex Julia of 17 B.C. enacted stringent measures against it (in general see A. E. Wilhelm-Hooijberg, Peccatum, Sin and Guilt in Ancient Rome, pp. 19-27).

* The works of the historians and biographers of the early empire are replete with examples. Seneca himself comments extensively
on the case of Clodius' adultery with Julius Caesar's wife (EM.,97),
and on the pervasiveness of the practise which had reached such
proportions that adultery was employed to bribe jurors sitting on
Clodius' case (note Seneca's sententia on this matter, EM.,97.7,
Quaerebatur, an post adulterium aliquis posset tutus esse; apparuit
sine adulterio tutum esse non posse). Seneca also inveighs against
Julia, daughter of Augustus (Ben.,6.32) and against contemporary
customs with regard to adultery (Ben.,3.16).

culina:

Culinary excesses were also restricted; see Favonius' speech,
quoted in Aulus Gellius (NA.,15.8), in which he militates against
luxury and gluttony, and for the Lex Licinia Sumptuaria (dated in the
OCD. between 143 and 102 B.C.). These excesses were grist for the
mill of the moralist and satirist e.g. Persius Sat.,1.67 & 68,
sive in mores, in luxum, in prandia regum / dicere, res grandes nostra
dat Musa poetae. See also Petronius' Cena Trimalchionis. Seneca
comments on this vice, EM.,78.23-24; EM.,110.12; EM.,114-26; EM.,122
passim; especially Helv.,10.2 f.; for a recommended, if meagre fare
see EM.,18.10-11.

cultus corporum nimius:

As the text stands it could apply equally to male or female.
Indeed the garments of the latter are thoroughly censured (Ben., 7.9.5) as too revealing. But Seneca reserves stronger censure for males who not merely adopt women's dress and cosmetics but even surpass them in their use (QN., 7.31.2), a practice which has surprisingly spread to even the military, QN., 1.17.10). Seneca labels such behaviour as contra naturam vivere (EM., 122.7), which is therefore contrary to Stoic doctrine.

* The vice is related to that of attempting to retain one's youth artificially (EM., 122.7). Such pursuits of beauty are in vain, since nature has endowed even dumb animals with characteristics which in this respect surpass those of men (EM., 124.22).

bellorumque civilium insaniam:

See the lengthy digression on this theme, Ben., 5.15.4 ff.

ebrietati:

The appearance of this vice at the conclusion of the list seems to us anticlimactic. To the Romans it need not have been so, at least to the same degree, for a variety of reasons. In the first place by ancient Roman moral standards it was considered a most serious offense. Marcus Cato (in Aulus Gellius NA., 10.23) mentions it more than once in juxtaposition with adultery, reporting that women were punished by a judge no less if they had drunk wine than if they had
committed adultery. He notes further that the practice of abstinence from wine, known by the archaic word temetum, was attributed to the early Romans. In the second place, the possible neglect of this abstinence was tested by a kiss. Stoic philosophers considered the vice most reprehensible. While Seneca may disagree with Zeno about the method to be applied in a cure for alcoholism, rejecting syllogism in favour of rhetoric (EM., 83.17, ... aperte accusare ebrietatem et vitia eius exponere), both concur that the affliction is a grave one. Seneca labels it voluntary insanity (EM., 83.18) and states that it kindles and uncovers all kinds of vices, included in the listing of which are those of the petulantia and crudelitas, which also appear in our text. Ebrietas, then, exposes whatever vices are not included in our list, and is not purely a lonely anti-climactic addition.

* In addition, the reference to intoxication performs a useful function in its context by providing continuity with the next section, in that it suggests staggering and instability, the theme of the next section, and is also linked, at least popularly so, with the hedonistic Epicureans alluded to in that section.

1.10.3 Non expectant uno loco vitia, sed mobilia et inter se dissidentia tumultuantur, pellunt in vicem fuganturque; ceterum idem semper de nobis pronuntiare deebimus, malos esse nos, malos fuisse, invitus adiciam, et futuros esse.

Vices do not remain in the same place, but jostling each other (like atoms) they supplant one another. To us, however, the
same label is always applicable; we have been, are and shall, alas, be bad.

Ironically the vices are described in terms of the bouncing atoms of Epicurean physics. That this is intentional is all the more probable because Ben.,1.10.2 contains references to the kinds of hedonistic pleasures for which the Epicureans had a reputation (cf. Ben.,4.31.4 for a popular picture of Epicureans). In one sentence Seneca relates the Epicureans' physical system to their ethics; both stand condemned when judged by the criteria of the concept of constantia sapientis. Doubly ironical is the fact that the bad (mali) are like atoms in a further way, namely, in their essential immutability, despite their perpetual motion.

\[
\text{mobilia et inter se dissidentia tumultuantur,}
\text{pellunt in vicem fuganturque:}
\]

Reminiscences of the vocabulary of Lucretius or concepts comparable to his are found here, rather than quoted lines or part lines; mobilia, cf. Lucr., DRN.,2.161, mobilitate; inter se dissidentia tumultuantur, cf. DRN.,2.85, nam (cum) cita saepe / obvia conflixere, fit ut diversa repente / dissiliant, DRN.,2.119, certantia, DRN.,2.122, iactari, DRN.,2.956, tumultus; pellunt in vicem fuganturque, cf. DRN.,2.98, ... / partim intervallis magnis confulta resultant, / pars etiam brevibus spatiis vexantur ab ictu, DRN.,3.394, et quam in his intervallis tuiditantia possint / concursare coire et dissultare vicissim, DRN.,2.275, pellat, DRN.,1.1047,
tempusque fugai.

* For another example of Epicurean terminology used to describe vices see EM.,122.17, Simplex recti cura est, multiplex pravi, et quantumvis novas declinationes capit.

* Lucretius is quoted by Seneca EM.,95.11, EM.,106.8; EM.,110.6; Tranq.,2.14.

* On Seneca and Epicureans see the bibliography cited in W. Trillitzsch, Senecas Beweisführung, p.27.

malo:

Note the plural; the pessimistic attitude expressed here is limited to mankind in general, and has no bearing on the Stoic doctrine of progress (προοξωση) which applies to individuals (see the significant change to the singular tu in Ben.,1.10.4). Such possibility for individual progress does not alleviate Seneca's general pessimism: EM.,97.10. Omne tempus Clodios, non omne Catones feret.

1.10.4.(a) Erunt homicidae, tyranni, fures, adulteri, raptores, sacrilegi, prodictores; infra omnia ista ingratus est, nisi quod omnia ista ab ingrato sunt, sine quo vix ullum magnum facinus adcrevit.

Criminals such as murderers, tyrants, thieves, adulterers there will always be; below all these is the ingrate, who may even be the source of the others, for without him scarcely any crime has grown great.
infra:

There is a play on this word; initially it means "below, beneath in rank, honor, or esteem" (Lewis & Short, s.v., II.B.), but a reinterpretation is called for when the reader reaches the word _ab_, suggesting the ingrate is a source, so that _infra_ may then, in hindsight, mean "fundamental to" or "at the basis of".

* The point Seneca makes is crucial because it demonstrates that, by linking ingratitude to other vices as it does, the so-called digression is in fact germane to the theme of the work.

* Ingratitude may be regarded as an internal catalyst for vices (sine quo ... adcrevit), as intoxication (see Ben., 1.10.2 above) is an external one.

* On the universality of ingratitude see also Ben., 1.1.1; Ben., 5.17.3.

1.10.4. (b) Hoc tu cave tamquam maximum crimen ne admittas, ignosce tamquam levissimo, si admissum est. Haec est enim injuriae summa: beneficium perdisti. Salvum est enim tibi, quod est optimum: dedisti.

Seneca counsels Aebutius Liberalis, to whom the De Beneficiis is dedicated, and the reader, not to commit the offense of ingratitude on the grounds that it is a serious one, but when it has been committed against oneself, to forgive it on the grounds that it is of little consequence, for in that case the loss is limited to the object given and does not extend to the virtuous act which has been committed.
The first sentence is a clear formulation of a relativistic principle, with an altruistic basis, analyzable in terms of the aspects (numeri) of an ethical act (on which see p. 8); the same act can be regarded as maximum or levissum according to whether the person to whom it is related is the agent or the recipient of the ingratitude. The difference in attitude advised here corresponds to a similarly altruistic principle commonly suggested for benefactor and recipient. It states that the recipient ought to remember a gift, but that the benefactor should forget it, Dem., De Cor., 269; J. M. Edmonds, The Fragments of Attic Comedy, III, 749; Cic. Lael., 20.71. Seneca comments on this principle, stating that it is a hyperbole intended to combat the excessively reproachful memory of the giver (Ben., 7. 22-23). See also Ben., 2.177. Aristotle is aware that the reverse of the principle is often the case; the donor remembers, the recipient forgets (EN., 1124b13; EN., 1167b28 f.; EN., 1168a17).

\textit{tu:}

Note the change to the singular, now that Seneca offers advice.

\textit{beneficium perdidisti:}

Seneca uses \textit{beneficium} in the popular sense; strictly speaking a benefit cannot be lost, cf. Ben., 1.2.2; Ben., 1.5.3; Ben., 1.7.29-30.
Salvum est enim:

D. R. Shackleton Bailey, "Emendations of Seneca", CQ, 20 (1970), p. 361, proposes to replace enim with autem as a simpler solution to the problem of the "logic" in beneficium perdidisti than that of Gertz (for whom no further reference is provided), ...

summa: beneficis materiam, non ipsum beneficium ... The text is clear as it stands, however, if we understand enim as explaining summa, which could here mean "sum total", i.e. the injury is limited only to the extent that the benefit, in the loose sense of the term, is lost, the reason being that the most precious element, the virtuous act, cannot be lost.

1.10.5.(a) Quem ad modum autem curandum est, ut in eos potissimum beneficia conferamus, qui grate responsuri erunt, ita quaedam, etiam si male de illis sperabitur, faciemus tribuemusque, non solum si iudicabimus ingratos fore, sed si sciemus fuisse.

Seneca states that just as care must be taken that benefits are bestowed especially on those who will respond with gratitude, so we will bestow some, even if we are apprehensive about them, and we will do so, not only if we anticipate that the recipients will be ungrateful, but also if we know for a fact that they have already been ungrateful.

Seneca does not spell out in what way care must be taken in the selection of potentially grateful recipients. Presumably this is
not necessary since the question was subsumed in another— that of determining whether some one was worthy (dignus) to receive a benefit, and to this question Seneca does pay attention (as will appear below). Neither does Seneca indicate whether grate responsuri entails repayment in kind, or whether the feeling of gratitude is sufficient repayment. We may note, however, that since Seneca here counsels careful selection as the general rule and deliberate exposure to risk as the exception (without specifying the desirable frequency of such exceptions), he appears less idealistic than at Ben.,1.2.3, where loss is simply not counted.

With this point we have arrived at a fundamental question concerning giving in antiquity, the nature and extent of altruistic notions, briefly touched upon in the comments on Ben.,1.10.4.(b).

Two secondary sources most useful, both in their collations of evidence, and in their comments, are H. Bolkestein, Wolhütigkeit und Armenpflege im vorchristlichen Altertum, and A. R. Hands, Charities and Social Aid in Greece and Rome.

Bolkestein states (p.169) that a few moralists expressly rejected the principle of exchange of services, citing Democritus, "Χαριστικὸς οὐχ ὃ βλέπων πρὸς τὴν ἀμοιβὴν, ἀλλ' ὁ τὰ δρᾶν προηγημένος" (= DK.,68B96). We may add references from Aristotle who states it is good to be a benefactor (EN.,1171b16) but not good to be eager to be helped, and therefore urges one to be slow to receive (EN.,1171b24; cf. Arist. Rh.,1366b17; Rh.,1367a; it is especially applicable to friends, Arist. Rh.,1361b; EN.,1167a22 [contrast EN.,1167b13]; a selfish
attitude differentiates the tyrant from the more altruistic king, EN.,1160b2). Seneca is indebted to Aristotle (noticed by Hands, p.30). But although in antiquity it was stated that we should do more for our friends than for ourselves (e.g. Cic., Lael.,57), concern for another is often linked with concern for the self (alterius ac sui cura, EM.,90.41; cf. EM.,60.4): such idealistic statements as that of Aristotle, that a benefit is conferred upon the needy not in return for something (δεομένῳ μὴ ἀντὶ τινὸς, Arist. Rh.,1385al8), and such idealistic positions as that of Stoic doctrine, that one should disregard the consequences of an act, and only consider whether it is virtuous or not (see Ben.,4, passim), with the result that a good man will do the virtuous task, even if it involves toil, loss or danger (laboriosum, damnosum, periculosum, EM.,76.18), are often balanced by more practical considerations. In Ben.,4.28.6 Seneca states that he will not give anything over the disposal of which he has jurisdiction to someone whom he knows to be ungrateful. In Ben.,2.15.1 he places limits on altruism, arguing that (a) since the essence of friendship is to make a friend equal to oneself, one ought, when giving to a friend, to act in the interest of both self and friend, (b) one ought to give to the one in need, but not so as to become needy oneself, (Dabo egenti, sed ut ipse non egeam), (c) one ought to help someone about to perish, but not so as to perish oneself, unless a great person or matter is at stake - here one ought to take into account the character of the recipient and compare it with that of the donor. Greater generosity is displayed in Ben., 4.12-13, where Seneca states that a benefit ought not to be given for
the sake of utility but often (nota bene) with loss and danger, and that the Stoics regard it a pleasure to give even troublesome benefits, provided they alleviate the troubles of others; even dangerous benefits, provided they extricate others from danger; expensive benefits, provided they mitigate the dire circumstances of others; the upshot being that a benefit considers the interest of the recipient, not that of the donor, else it would be given to the self.

On the problem of whether a good man will give a benefit to an ingrate, knowing him to be so, see also the special treatment accorded the question at Ben., 4.26. The answer turns on the point that there are in fact two classes of ingrates, those who are so by virtue of the fact that all men, with exception of the sage, possess all vices, even if only latently, and those who are so in a special way (proprie, Ben., 4.27.4) and have a special tendency towards it (natura propensus, Ben., 4.26.2). The first will be accorded benefits but not the second. In fact, whoever chooses ingrates, in order to give benefits that will perish, has the reputation of being the worst of benefactors (Ben., 4.27.5).

At this point the aptness of the following quotation from Hands (p. 30) will be apparent:

... there remains [in the critique of the Homeric do ut des ethic] basic to the discussion [of giving and receiving] the assumption that the gifts, benefits or favours in question are to be conferred upon
somebody who can make a return, so that a return
even though it may no longer be decently asked for,
is confidently expected. The discussion then never
reaches the obvious conclusion, namely that the
surest way to avoid any suggestion of giving with a
view to return is to confer one's gift on someone
who is incapable of giving in return.

1.10.5(b) Tamquam si filios alicui restituere potero magno periculo liberatos sine ullo meo, non dubitabo. Dignum etiam ipendio sanguinis mei tuebor et in partem discriminis veniam; indignum si eripere latronibus potero clamore sublato, salutarem vocem homini non pigebit emittere.

Seneca states that he will not hesitate to provide the benefit of restoring to someone his sons, freeing them from a great danger, without becoming himself exposed to it. He will protect a worthy individual with the loss of his own blood and share his danger, and if he is able to save an unworthy one from the hands of robbers by shouting, it will not trouble him to raise a saving cry.

In this section a scale of values is set forth, according to which a certain service will be rendered. This requires an evaluation of the components (numerî) of the situation in terms of the magnitude of the danger to which the donor is exposed, correlated with the worthiness of the recipient (cf. Ben.,2.15-17 where much emphasis is laid on a comparison of the donor and recipient;

Aestimanda est eius persona, cui damus ... Utriusque itaque personam confer ... Ben.,2.15.3. The worthiness of a person must also be considered; habetur personarum ac dignitatum portio, Ben.2.16.2).
Three recipients are considered (aliquis, dignus, indignus) but, in spite of the fact that each of the three is associated with a different stock example of a benefit, the third may be a duplicate of the first, since in both there is no danger to the donor.

The three examples of a benefit may be analyzed in terms of the classification of benefits presented in Ben.,1.11: the first belongs to a subclass (the third) of necessary benefits i.e. those without which we are unwilling to live (Ben.,1.11.4); the other two form sub-class I of the same type of benefits, necessary benefits, without which we cannot live (Ben.,1.11.3, cf. Ben.,5.18-19 on whether saving the life of a son represents a benefit to the son or to the father).

The concept of dignitas was one especially well-known to the Romans since it permeated their socio-political structure, where it stood for the value and prestige acquired through public office or the office itself and could be inherited from one's ancestors (D. C. Earl, Sallust's Political Thought, pp.53-55). In financial relationships it was important in that it - in addition to goods - could be offered as security (J. A. Crook, Law and Life of Rome, p.243). Such external connotations are not always devoid of moral and ethical implications with respect to obligations (officia) and political friendship (amicitia), (J. Hellegouarc'h, Le Vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la République, p.389). But Seneca directs his method of selection, censorship and evaluation of persons (censura et personarum aestimatio, Ben.,4.28.5) to ferret
out a dignitas which represents internal values; Ad animum tendit aestimatio mea, Ben., 4.10.5. He will select the man who is grateful, not the man who is likely to make a return; he will pass by the rich, if he is unworthy, and will give to the poor, if he is good (Ben., 4.10.5); he will select a man with integrity, sincerity, mindfulness, gratefulness, one who does not greedily cling to his own possessions, one who is benevolent (Ben., 4.11.1). He will give to those who are good or those whom he is able to make good, choosing (with a great deal of wisdom), as he does so, the most worthy (VB., 25.5). Some we ought to judge satisfactory if they try, if they dare, and if they want (Ben., 2.17.4). The social status of the recipients matters not, for these individuals can be rich (although a poor man will be preferred to a troublesome rich man, Ben., 4.3.1), slaves, free, free-born or freed, freed by law or freed among friends; ubique homo est ubi beneficìi locus est (VB., 24.3; cf. Cic. Off., 2.20.69 f.).

However, the wise man never bestows generosity on the wicked and unworthy and never exhausts his supply, so that a deficiency might not thwart his generosity towards future worthy recipients (VB., 24.3). Indeed, no true benefit can be said to have been given if a gift is bestowed on someone base (Ben., 4.9.3); so that we may conclude that the value of the gift is not strictly intrinsic, but affected by the persona of the recipient, as much as that of the donor (for which see Ben., 1.6.1). This Seneca states in so many words when he writes (EM., 19.12) that it is more important who receives something, than what it
is he receives.

Seneca tackles the inevitable question that too much concern with the worthiness of the recipient might be indicative of self-interest, just as a farmer might select ground most appropriate to sowing for his own advantage, by stating that although a virtuous act (such as giving a benefit) may be desirable for its own sake, yet it consists in actuality of precisely such unavoidable questions as what, when, and how to give, making also the question to whom to give a necessary one (Ben., 4.9.3).

In spite of the necessity to give benefits to worthy recipients, there are certain conditions under which one might give to the unworthy (indigni). One could, for example, give to the unworthy to honour others, as one might confer political office on the unworthy scion of noble ancestors (Ben., 4.30, strictly speaking the gift to the scion would not be a benefit to him, but to the ancestors; see the line of reasoning in Ben., 5.19.8). Likewise, if one does not know whether someone is unworthy, i.e. is an ingrate or not, it is better not to wait for certainty, but to act on the basis of probability, and so to give (Ben., 4.33). If one subsequently finds that one's assumptions about a man's worthiness were wrong, one will deny the benefit, and even have cause for anger (Ben., 4.35.3).

We have noted that Seneca places no restrictions on an individual's worthiness according to social status or kinship. Such restrictions, ultimately derived from the Peripatetics, do make an appearance in Stoic texts, and it might be well to cite a few examples.
In a lengthy discussion of the problem to whom one should limit one's generosity, found in the first book of Cicero's *De Officiis*, derived from Panaetius, there is introduced as a determining factor the notion of degrees of relationship (gradus societatis hominum, Cic., *Off.*, 1.17.53); these are basic humanity, nation, city, relatives, who can further be sub-divided in terms of priority, the conjugal being the strongest, followed by the parental-filial one, then the extended family (domus), next brothers, lastly cousins, first and second. But the strongest bond is friendship which arises from justice and generosity in the case of compatible people. Patriation too forms a strong bond. When a final comparison of the various relationships is made (*Off.*, 1.17.58) Cicero concludes that the first obligation is towards one's country and parents, then towards one's children and one's whole household, next one's relatives. However only certain types of benefits are owed them (necessaria praesidia vitae, *Off.*, 1.17.58; cf. the classification in *Ben.*, 1.11); others, such as advice, encouragement, consolation and sometimes reproof, flourish most strongly in friendship. Hecato's order of priorities in relationships, children, relatives, friends and especially the state (*Off.*, 3.15.63) is not as full, but helps establish that such lists were used by the Stoics.

Seneca's emphasis on the internal aspect of benefits leads him, when he does consider the possible impact of social relationships on the giving of a benefit, to regard them as of minimal or no significance. Therefore slaves can give benefits to masters (*Ben.*, 3.18-28)
and sons can give their parents greater benefits than they received from them (Ben., 3.29-38; cf. Ben., 5.18-19, especially 19.1 where an imaginary interlocutor [not Seneca] differentiates between the status of a son and that of a slave, in that the former can receive a benefit in his own right, but not the slave since he is chattel [mancipii res]. H. Bolkestein, Wohltätigkeit und Armenpflege, p. 464 states there was a difference in the practise of law with respect to citizens or slaves; in general a slave could not be the object of beneficence. In Rome there was a more sympathetic attitude towards slaves and children; A. R. Hands, Charities and Social Aid in Greece and Rome, pp. 6-87).

Seneca's stress upon the internal aspects may also have been responsible for the emphasis he gives to the concept of amicitia, already noted in Cicero (Off., 1.17.58). Friends would seem prima facie to be worthy recipients, but the link between the concept of a philosophical and internalized amicitia, which Seneca favours over the political sense of the term (Ben., 6.34.5; cf. EM., 3.1), and beneficentia is closer still. The giving of benefits can be productive of friendship, if it is possible to select recipients (EM., 19.12; cf. EM., 81.12; cf. Arist., Rh., 1381b35, who also recognizes that χαρία produces φιλία, but in addition lays stress on the time required for this process). As the giving of benefits produces friendship, so persistence in giving can preserve friendship (Ben., 7.31.1). Both beneficence and friendship spring from the same impulse, benevolentia (cf. Cic. Lael., 6.20). The two subjects then are inextricably intertwined.
(see also J. Ferguson [Moral Values in the ancient world, p.60, n.1] for references to Isaeus, Demosthenes, Aeschines and Isocrates; see W. Brinckmann [Der Begriff der Freundschaft in Senecas Briefen, p.141] regarding the place of benefits in friendship).

The implications of friendship, like those of beneficence, extend beyond those of the contractual notions of commerce; obligation is felt towards a doctor and a teacher apart from remuneration for services, precisely because these people change into a friend (Ben., 6.16.5). One's creditor for money is to be distinguished from one's creditor for a benefit, for the latter is not simply paid off once and for all, but the bond of friendship between those involved in the giving of a benefit remains (Ben., 2.18.5). A gift from someone who is base may be accepted but does not rate as a benefit, rather as a loan, just as one can not be that base man's friend, but must regard him as a creditor (Ben., 2.21.2). Finally, in the area of benefits one has obligations to one's friends, which include reminding him of a benefit he has received, in order to prevent him from being ungrateful (Ben., 5.22.2; cf. Ben., 7.25.1).

In view of the close relationship between the two themes, it is not surprising that questions concerning both are similar, and of these, some have a bearing on the problem of the worthiness of the recipient or the friend. Such questions are whom to select, how to select, how many to select, and the level at which a relationship can exist (see Aristotle's statements on friendships, Books eight and nine of the Nicomachean Ethics; Cicero Laelius).
inpendio sanguinis:

Cf. *Ben.*, 4.1.2. Virtue may demand one's blood.

There is no substantial difference in meaning between construing the phrase as an ablative with *dignum*, or as an ablative of means.

dignum:

The sentiment of giving to the good is traceable back to Theognis 1161, referred to by A. R. Hands, *Charities and Social Aid*, p. 74.

* See also *Ben.*, 1.1.2.

in partem discriminis:

An example would be Pylades claiming to be Orestes to save him; cited by *Cic.*, *Lael.*, 7.24.
ABBREVIATIONS

The reader is advised to consult the Oxford Classical Dictionary (2nd ed. 1970) for abbreviations of ancient authors and works, and of some modern abbreviations as well. These are supplemented by abbreviations found in Lewis and Short, A Latin Dictionary (1962, repr. 1879) and in Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (1968, repr. 9th ed. 1940). For abbreviations of journals and periodicals consult L'Année Philologique.

For the sake of convenience some of the most frequently occurring abbreviations are listed below.

Seneca's philosophical works:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ben.,</td>
<td>De Beneficiis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BV.,</td>
<td>De Brevitate Vitae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clem.,</td>
<td>De Clementia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Const. Sap.,</td>
<td>De Constantia Sapientis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM.,</td>
<td>Epistulae Morales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ad Helv.,</td>
<td>De Consolatione ad Helviam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ira,</td>
<td>De Ira</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ad Marc.,</td>
<td>De Consolatione ad Marciam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ot.,</td>
<td>De Otio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ad Polyb.,</td>
<td>De Consolatione ad Polybium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prov.,</td>
<td>De Providentia</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Some of the most frequently occurring abbreviations to Aristotle's works are:

- **EE.**, = *Ethica Eudemia*
- **EN.**, = *Ethica Nichomachea*
- **MM.**, = *Magna Moralia* (authorship uncertain)
- **Poet.**, = *Poetica*
- **Phgn.**, = *Physiognomonica* (authorship uncertain)
- **Rhet.**, or **Rh.**, = *Rhetorica*

Cicero's works most often cited include:

- **Acad.**, = *Academicae Quaestiones*
- **Fin.**, = *De Finibus*
- **Lael.**, = *Laelius De Amicitia*
- **ND.**, = *De Natura Deorum*
- **Off.**, = *De Officiis*
- **Parad.**, = *Paradoxa Stoicorum*
- **Tusc.**, = *Tusculanae Disputationes*

Other frequently occurring abbreviations:

- **Corn. ND.**, = *Cornutus De Natura Deorum*
- **DL.**, = *Diogenes Laertius*
- **Gell. NA.**, = *Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OCD.</td>
<td>Oxford Classical Dictionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLD.</td>
<td>Oxford Latin Dictionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAC.</td>
<td>Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RE.</td>
<td>Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stob.</td>
<td>Stobaeus, eds. C. Wachsmuth and O. Hense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(references to the last two works consist of volume, page and line numbers).
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