MANUAL WORKERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD SOCIAL CLASS
A STUDY OF MANUAL WORKERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD
SOCIAL CLASS IN FOUR ONTARIO COMMUNITIES

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ABSTRACT

A STUDY OF MANUAL WORKERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD SOCIAL CLASS IN FOUR ONTARIO COMMUNITIES

by Vincent Keddie

This study was concerned with the sources of variation in the attitudes of manual workers toward social class and related matters. A review of the literature suggested that, for workers to adopt a perspective that challenges the existing distribution of rewards and privileges in society, they have to be involved in a series of relationships, in work and in the wider community, that create barriers to the influence of the values of dominant groups in society. Evidence from studies in several societies suggests that involvement in predominantly working-class milieux, at work, in the community, and in kinship and friendship networks, leads to the worker adopting a perspective that is "deviant" from the dominant value system. Exposure to the influence of people from other classes, on the other hand, would weaken the barriers and increase the likelihood that the worker would adopt a perspective akin to that of groups higher in the social hierarchy.

This study involved the application of the perspective outlined above to differences in the attitudes of manual workers in four Ontario communities. A questionnaire survey was administered in the four communities, which were selected because, in terms of class structure,
they differed from each other in ways that were believed to be associated with differences in working-class attitudes. The indicators of class attitudes examined in this thesis are class identification, choice of models describing the bases of the stratification system, an index of militancy, and support for the New Democratic Party.

Residence in a predominantly working-class community was expected to influence the worker to adopt a "deviant" set of attitudes. But community differences in class identification and choice of class models among workers did not follow the expected pattern. Militancy and support for the NDP were found to be related to differences in the class compositions of the communities studied, but, over-all, community differences were not as large as evidence from studies in other societies would lead one to expect. It was argued that the extensive geographical mobility among workers, and the ethnic diversity in three of the communities, attenuated somewhat the effect that differences in community class structure were expected to have on workers' attitudes.

Elements in the work situation did, however, show a more substantial relationship with differences in workers' attitudes. Membership in a trade union was found to be the most consistently strong influence on the workers' adoption of "deviant" attitudes. White-collar kinship and friendship affiliations, on the other hand, particularly marriage to a woman who had, at one time or another, been employed in white-collar work, were found to be related to the worker adopting attitudes more similar to those held by people higher in the social hierarchy.

It was argued that the barriers to the influence of the dominant
culture are mutually reinforcing, so that removal of one weakens the power of the others. Geographical mobility among workers, combined with ethnic and religious diversity, were seen as weakening even the solidarity ties that might exist in a community predominantly working-class in social composition. And the large number of workers who were married to women with experience of non-manual work was seen as a further factor weakening the barriers to the influence of the dominant culture. It was argued that, even though the trade union appears to be the most effective barrier to the dominant culture, the absence of other strong barriers lessens the power the union has to provide a set of alternative definitions of social reality for workers.

It was concluded that the weakness of the barriers to the influence of the dominant culture may be suggested as one reason why Ontario workers do not provide the kind of support to the New Democratic Party that is provided to parties of the left by workers in other western societies.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The phenomenon of social class may be looked at from one of two major perspectives. On the one hand, the sociologist may attempt to delineate the system of social stratification of a society in terms of "objective" criteria he considers to be fundamental in the causation of stratification. To this end, he may focus attention on such factors as size of income, source of income, property, occupation, style of life, education, "relationship to the means of production", and so on (or a combination of these) as being the crucial factors leading to the differentiation of people along social class lines. Adoption of this approach leads to the description of "objective" categories such as Marx's "class in itself", Dahrendorf's "latent interest group", or Porter's "artificial statistical group". Although, for Marx and Dahrendorf, such "objective" categories may have the potential for developing into active conflict groups, for other writers such "objective" categories represent artificial constructs created by the researcher to facilitate the analysis of a particular social phenomenon.

In this sense, the term "class" refers to aggregates of individuals sharing a similar life situation; it by no means suggests that the members of a social class are conscious of this similarity of condition, or, even if they are so aware, that their social behaviour follows partly from such a realization.

The other major approach to social class follows from the above consideration, and leads to attention being focused on something like Marx's "class for itself". In this conception the term "social class" is reserved for those situations where individuals who share the same objective class situation are aware of their common class interests and act accordingly. For social classes to be more than mere social aggregates, for them to have some impact on the conduct of human activities, there have to exist feelings of class consciousness, some notion of class solidarity. Marx believed that, as capitalism developed, the proletariat would progress from being a "class in itself" to being a "class for itself", and that this process would end in a successful revolutionary challenge to the existing social order and the establishment of socialism. Although the organized working-

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2 It is possible to distinguish between "class awareness", where an individual knows that he is a member of a certain class but does not necessarily act on the basis of that knowledge, and the stronger term, "class consciousness", which implies some commitment to action. See J. Manis & B. Meltzer, "Attitudes of Textile Workers to Class Structure", American Journal of Sociology, 60 (1954), pp. 30-35.

3 I am not, of course, suggesting that the objective designation of class membership is unimportant for sociology. With the plethora of social phenomena that can be analyzed, at least partly, in terms of class, such a claim would be ridiculous. But members of a class cannot act together as a class unless some element of class consciousness is present.
class has become a significant force in modern societies, especially in the economic and political realms, this development has not led, in western societies, to the revolutionary transformation that Marx predicted. Analyses of this failure are numerous, as are the reasons suggested for it, but one possible reason is that the working-classes of western industrial societies never attained the degree of homogeneity and solidarity that Marx predicted.

If, following fairly standard practice, we define the working-class as being composed of those individuals (and their families) who perform manual (blue-collar) occupations, there is an impressive array of evidence indicating that there is a fair amount of dissensus within the working-class. A considerable proportion of the working-classes of western societies behave differently from the rest of their peers in many areas of life where social class is a fairly reliable predictor of attitudes and behaviour. This thesis is concerned with one such area of dissensus, that relating to manual workers' conceptions as to their positions in the class structure, their views as to the nature of the basic system of rewards and privileges in Canadian society, and their voting preferences and attitudes toward the political system.

The basic premise of this thesis is, therefore, that individuals

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5 This definition shall be defended in more detail in Chapter II.
who share a common class situation (in the sense of being manual workers) will not necessarily interpret the social world, particularly the system of social stratification, in the same terms. As Frank Parkin states:

Although there is a factual and material basis to class inequality, there is more than one way in which it can be interpreted. Facts alone do not provide meanings, and the way a person makes sense of his social world will be influenced by the nature of the meaning systems he draws upon.  

The problem, then, becomes one of specifying the conditions under which different "meaning systems" are engendered within the manual working-class. Before going into a discussion of the sources of variation in working-class attitudes toward social class and politics it is necessary to review some of the studies that have discovered evidence of such differences.

The first area of disagreement between workers is that of class identification. When asked to name the social class to which they belong, either in an open-ended question where no class titles are presented or in a pre-coded question where respondents are asked to pick one of the choices, a large number of manual workers identify themselves with the middle-class and not, as one might expect if there were total agreement among workers, with the working-class.  

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7It is, of course, assumed in this thesis that there is an objectively definable stratification system, and that manual workers are members of the working-class.
Centers, in a study in the United States in 1945, found that, in response to a pre-coded question, about twenty percent of the manual workers in his study labelled themselves as middle-class. Later studies in the United States, for example those by J.A. Kahl and J.A. Davis, N. Gross, J.L. Haer, and R.W. Hodge and D.J. Treiman, have all noted the propensity of many manual workers to claim middle-class status, although none give the actual percentage figures. Of these authors, only Centers, and Hodge and Treiman make any attempt to account for the lack of coincidence, in a large number of cases, between objective social class position and subjective class identification. Hodge and Treiman state:

Our data demonstrate that patterns of acquaintance and kinship between various status groups, as well as their residential heterogeneity, are no less important than the socioeconomic position of individuals in the formation of class identities.

Although they do not present data for manual workers separately, Hodge and Treiman show that, in their study, the status positions of friends, 

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8R. Centers, The Psychology of Social Classes, (New York: Russell & Russell, 1961), p. 87. Centers divided manual workers into skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled. The percentages of each group identifying as middle-class were 26%, 14%, and 18% respectively.


10Hodge & Treiman, op.cit., p. 547.
neighbours, and relatives are as important in the individual's assessment of his class position as his own objective socio-economic position.

In a recent Canadian study P.C. Pineo and J.C. Goyder have presented similar findings. 11 Looking at Protestants and Catholics separately, Pineo and Goyder found that as few as 33% of skilled Protestant workers claimed to be working-class (in response to a pre-coded question) and that even in the manual category with the highest level of working-class identification, Protestant unskilled workers, 38% claimed to be middle-class, while a further 5% claimed membership of either the upper middle or upper-class. 12 Among skilled workers, Protestants were more likely than Catholics to claim to be other than working-class (66% as against 53%), whereas the positions are reversed among the semi-skilled (47% and 56%) and unskilled workers (43% and 50%). Apart from religious differences Pineo and Goyder found, as Hodge and Treiman did in the U.S.A., that status contacts (in the form of "occupation of best friend") were almost as highly correlated with class identification as the multiple correlation of occupation, income, and education. Again, they do not present separate data for manual workers in this regard, hence it is impossible to assess

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12 Ibid., p. 191, Table 4.
the importance of the influence of non-manual affiliations on the class identifications of manual workers.

The studies mentioned above note the existence of differences in the class identifications of manual workers but, apart from the brief discussions by Hodge and Treiman and by Pineo and Goyder, do not treat these differences in any great detail. A number of British studies, however, have devoted more attention to such diversity in class identification among manual workers. Several studies in Britain have shown that the extent of middle-class identification among manual workers varies with the social class composition of the communities within which they reside. F.M. Martin found that workers living in Hertford, a small market town, were more likely to claim middle-class status than those residing in Greenwich, a suburb of London containing a large working-class population.\footnote{F.M. Martin, "Some Subjective Aspects of Social Stratification", in D.V. Glass (ed.), Social Mobility in Britain, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954), p. 56. Martin divides manual workers into two groups, but the percentages presented here were recalculated to give figures based on all manual workers in the study.} Thirty-one percent of the Hertford workers identified with the middle-class, as compared with twenty-three percent of the workers in Greenwich. The researches of the Institute of Community Studies provide further evidence of this relationship. In Dagenham, a large working-class borough on the eastern fringes of London, only thirteen percent of the working-class people interviewed said, in response to an open-ended question, that they were middle-class. In Woodford, a London borough containing a high percentage of
non-manual workers, fully thirty-four percent of people from manual worker families identified themselves with the middle-class.14

In discussing differences between workers in Woodford and those in the old, established working-class community of Bethnal Green (where they had also conducted a study), Willmott and Young suggest that working-class people in Bethnal Green can maintain a favourable self-image while not rejecting working-class culture and values.15 In fact any attempt to do so would be met by strong, negative sanctions from other people in this tightly-knit working-class milieu. In Bethnal Green, working-class identification comes easily, because of the weakness of middle-class influences in the community. Willmott and Young contrast this with the situation in Woodford:

But in general the Woodford working-class have to contend with middle-class views which are a much greater, more immediate challenge than they are in Bethnal Green. In face of the challenge, they divide, a part clinging rather unconvincingly to a version of the Bethnal Green code, a part accepting middle-class views and setting out to become middle-class themselves, in attitude, in house and furniture, and in politics.16


16 Willmott & Young, op.cit., pp. 131-132.
The evidence from British studies suggests, therefore, that one source of variation in class identification among manual workers is the extent to which the area they reside in is homogeneous or heterogeneous in social class composition.

Another factor centred upon by British sociologists is the work situation in which the worker finds himself. I.C. Cannon, for example, argues that the strength of the "occupational community" within which the worker is involved will influence his tendency to identify with the working-class. Cannon argues that, in the case of compositors in the London printing industry, certain characteristics of the work, including the need for communication and mutual assistance, create a feeling of community among the compositors, a sense of solidarity between the workers that extends beyond the "mere" performance of the job. The stronger the occupational community, Cannon suggests, the more the members of that community conform to a common set of attitudes. Thus he finds that, in the larger printing firms, where the occupational community is strongest, fewer workers claim middle-class status than in the smaller firms. This finding that plant size is related to the class identifications of workers has not been examined in any of the other studies consulted, but it will


18 Ibid., p. 181. 76% of the compositors in the largest plants identified as working-class, compared to 58% of the sample as a whole.
be seen in the discussion of political attitudes that many sociologists have found a relationship between plant size and left voting. Nordlinger, in his study of working-class Tories, has found that working-class identifiers are more likely to vote for left-wing parties (in this case, the British Labour Party) than are middle-class identifiers, and this finding would appear to suggest that the workers employed in large plants may also be more likely to identify as working-class.

One other element that Cannon sees as fostering the occupational community among compositors is the trade union branch. As the majority of compositors were trade union members no comparisons of the class identifications of union members and non-unionists were made. Surprisingly, given the influence of trade unions in British society, none of the other studies consulted deal with the influence of union membership on manual workers' class identifications. Centers, and Hodge and Treiman do discuss the role of union membership, but only in terms of their total samples and not relating specifically to differences among manual workers. It will be seen in the discussion


20 Centers, op. cit., p. 115, found that the tetrachoric correlation between class identification and union membership was .32. Hodge and Treiman, op.cit., pp. 542-545, found that a positive zero-order relationship between union membership and working-class identification disappeared once differences in income, occupation, and education were taken into account. Chapter IV of this thesis includes a discussion of the influence of union membership on manual workers' class identifications, and an attempt to assess whether the relationship is the result of the intervention of other factors.
of political attitudes that union members are more likely than non-members to vote for left-wing parties, and this may lead us to expect that union members will be more likely to claim working-class status than will non-unionists.

Thus far it has been shown that studies of the class identifications of manual workers have traced the sources of variation in such identifications to differences in the social composition of communities and to elements in the work situations of workers. W.G. Runciman, in his study of relative deprivation and social class attitudes, found that middle-class identification among manual workers and their wives was correlated with such factors as income, region of residence, and father's occupation.21 Higher income workers were found to adopt a middle-class self-rating in higher proportions than low income workers. Manual respondents whose fathers performed non-manual occupations were likewise more likely to identify as middle-class than were those whose fathers were also manual workers. And workers in the Midlands were more prone to middle-class identification than were workers in the South of England, and workers in the North were the least likely of all to claim middle-class status. Nordlinger also notes a relationship between income and middle-class identification,22 while Cotgrove and Vamplew found regional differences in


22 Nordlinger, op. cit., p. 172.
the class identifications of manual workers paralleling those found by Runciman. It is impossible, from the evidence presented by Runciman and by Cotgrove and Vamplew, to gauge to what degree regional variations in manual workers' class identifications are in reality due to differences in the social class compositions of the populations of these regions. The North of England, for example, is characterized by heavy industry and a large number of communities that are largely working-class in composition. Runciman recognizes this possibility and, in fact, only uses region as a variable because the data he was working with did not permit him to adopt a more precise classification.

A review of the literature on the class identifications of manual workers shows, therefore, that the inclination of manual workers to rate themselves as members of the working or middle-class varies with factors such as the class composition of their place of residence, elements of their work situation, class of origin, and income. To this writer's knowledge no single study has examined all these influences at one time, so there has been no attempt to evaluate the relative importance of each of these variables.

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24 Runciman, op.cit., p. 165.
(and others) in the formation of workers' class identifications. It shall be one of the tasks of this dissertation to undertake such an analysis of the class identifications of manual workers in several communities in Ontario.

Subjective class identification is only one aspect of the system of meanings with which people may interpret the system of rewards and privileges in their society. A person's class identification will inform us of where he or she places himself or herself in the stratification hierarchy but in itself does not tell much about the way the individual envisages this stratification system. Ralf Dahrendorf, in Class and Class Conflict In Industrial Society, reviews a number of studies involving working-class people's conceptions as to the nature of the system of social inequality in their societies.

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25 This statement does not apply if we are thinking of differences across the entire social spectrum. Hodge & Treiman, applying correlation analysis and multiple regression techniques, did attempt such an analysis on U.S. data. And, partly using evidence from the study that provides the data for this dissertation, J.C. Goyder conducted such an analysis on Canadian evidence. See "Subjective Social Class Identification and Objective Socio-Economic Status", (PhD dissertation, McMaster University, 1972).

Drawing on evidence from the U.S.A., Germany, Switzerland, and England, Dahrendorf distinguishes between hierarchical and dichotomous images of the class system. The hierarchical image views society as a continuum of levels or strata, whereas the dichotomous image sees society as being fundamentally characterized by a dichotomous class system. Dahrendorf suggests that the hierarchical image is basically an integrative model of social structure, recognizing that strains may occur in the social structure but denying the existence of fundamental social cleavages, whereas the dichotomous image is a model evoking ideas of "conflict, dissensus, and coercion". On the basis of the studies he examines, Dahrendorf argues that the dichotomous model of class is the image most often held by manual workers, whereas the hierarchical model is the predominant image of class structure among white-collar workers (and those above them in the occupational hierarchy).

Dahrendorf admits that there may be workers who view the class system in other than dichotomous terms, but he does not develop this insight into an analysis of the conditions under which alternative models of the class system are adopted by manual workers. Such an analysis is undertaken by David Lockwood in his essay "Sources of Variation in Working Class Images of Society". Lockwood argues

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27 Dahrendorf, op.cit., p. 284.

that the dichotomous image of class structure elaborated by Dahrendorf is but one of three possible models of the class structure that may be held by manual workers. In an analysis of previous (mainly British) studies Lockwood describes the content of these different class models and attempts to locate some of the factors which lead to variation in class imagery among workers. Variation in class imagery among manual workers, Lockwood suggests, can be traced in differences in the everyday experiences of manual workers. As he puts it:

For the most part men visualise the class structure of their society from the vantage point of their own particular milieux, and their perceptions of the larger society will vary according to their experiences of social inequality in the smaller societies in which they live out their daily lives.29

As working-class people do not all experience completely, or even predominantly, similar life situations it should come as no surprise that there are several possible images of the class structure that working-class people may adopt. Lockwood attempts to develop a typology of working-class images of society (or images of class structure, as I will refer to them),30 and discusses the social circumstances that promote their adoption.

29 Ibid., p. 249.

30 Use of the term "images of class structure" helps to avoid terminological confusion, for it is conceivable that there are images of society that have nothing to do with class. Lockwood and his coauthors in fact adopt this terminology in the third volume of the "Affluent Worker" series of books.
Variations in working-class images of the class structure are, Lockwood argues, to be explained primarily in terms of variations in the work situations and community settings within which workers are located. He develops three "ideal-types" of different kinds of workers, and suggests that each type of worker will have an image of the class system that will be distinct from the class imagery of the other two types. The three ideal-typical workers, and the class models held, are: the "traditional proletarian", who will adhere to a dichotomous power model; the "traditional deferential", who will view the stratification system in terms of a hierarchical status model; and, thirdly, the "privatized worker", who will view the class system from the perspective of a pecuniary model. It would be appropriate to analyze in some detail Lockwood's discussion of each type of worker and the class imagery associated with him.

The "Traditional Proletarian". The class imagery of the "traditional proletarian", in Lockwood's view, is dichotomous; the stratification system is seen primarily in terms of power, the world being divided into "Them", those who have power and authority over "Us". (This image of class is, of course, the same as that described by Dahrendorf). "Us" are neighbours and workmates, and people like "Us": "Them", in the evocative words of Richard Hoggart:

> Includes the policeman and those civil servants and local authority employees whom the working-class meet - teachers, the school attendance man, 'the Corporation', the local bench ... To the very poor, especially, they compose a shadowy but numerous and powerful group affecting their lives at almost every point .............................................
These may be to other classes servants, but to the working-classes they seem the agents of 'Them' and are mistrusted, even though they may be kindly and well disposed.31

In this image of the class structure 'Them' are obviously "superior" to "Us", in the sense that they have the power to influence the lives of working-class people, but they do not necessarily gain prestige among working-class people because of this fact.

What type of worker will adhere to such an image of the class structure? According to Lockwood:

The most highly developed forms of proletarian traditionalism seem to be associated with industries such as mining, docking, and ship building; in industries which tend to concentrate workers together in solidary communities and to isolate them from the influences of the wider society.32

Workers in these industries, Lockwood suggests, usually have a high degree of job involvement,33 and are involved in strong primary work

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32 Lockwood, op.cit., p. 250. One of the studies that Lockwood draws upon in developing his typology is C. Kerr & A. Siegel, 'The Interindustry propensity to strike: an International comparison', in A. Kornhauser, et al. (eds.), Industrial Conflict, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954). Kerr & Siegel found that the propensity of workers to strike is related to the relative isolation of the workers from the wider society.

33 R.K. Brown notes that, in the British steel industry, workers with the highest morale are the most likely to come into conflict with management, for they are the workers most concerned about management policy and the organization of work. See, "Participation, Conflict, and Change in Industry", Sociological Review, 13 (1965), pp. 273-29
groups. Factors such as these lead to feelings of solidarity and a sense of "occupational community", and the worker's involvement with workmates extends into his non-work life. The ideal-typical community is one characterized by occupational (hence, social) homogeneity, a stable population, and extensive kinship networks. The worker residing in such a community is involved in criss-crossing networks based on work, kinship, and leisure. It may be suggested that such an over-lapping of roles has the effect of increasing the loyalty of individuals to their community and their peers, and of enforcing a sense of solidarity among the workers.

Because of the predominantly working-class composition of the community, middle-class influences come predominantly from the outside. Of these "outsiders" Lockwood says:

Even though these outsiders are remote from the community, their power to influence it is well understood; and those within the community are more conscious of this power because it comes from the outside. Hence the dominant model of society held by the proletarian traditionalist is most likely to be a dichotomous or two-valued power model. Thinking in terms of two classes standing in a relationship of opposition is a natural consequence of being a member of a closely integrated industrial community with well-defined boundaries and a distinctive style of life.\(^{34}\)

Hence the "pure" power model of the class structure will, on Lockwood's reasoning, be found among "traditional proletarians"; those workers who, because they reside in relatively isolated, solidary working-class communities, are most acutely aware that they stand in a position of

\(^{34}\text{Lockwood, op.cit., p. 251.}\)
subordination vis a vis "Them".

The 'Traditional Deferential'. Whereas the "traditional proletarian" image of class structure is founded upon differences in power, the deferential model, in Lockwood's view, perceives the system of social stratification as being based upon differences in status and prestige. The "deferential worker" is a person ignored by Dahrendorf, but he excites a lot of interest among students of British society. As Lockwood points out, the deferential model, because people who think in prestige terms generally perceive a strata below them as well as above, is likely to be at least a trichotomous one. In addition to this, the "deferential" will not identify with those above him in the hierarchy, or aspire to rise up in the hierarchy, but will rather defer to the status claims of the "higher orders of society". He accepts his lowly status, and respects the rights and privileges of those above him, especially their right to make decisions that affect his interests. In Lockwood's words:

His recognition of authentic leadership is based on his belief in the intrinsic qualities of an ascriptive elite who exercise leadership paternalistically in the


36 This, it would seem, differentiates the deferential prestige model from a middle-class model, where there is more emphasis on the possibility of achieving a higher status.
pursuit of 'national' as opposed to 'sectional' or 'class' interests.\textsuperscript{37}

Because of this insistence on inheritance of leadership qualities it is possible, Lockwood goes on to say, that the "deferential" will think in terms of a fourfold societal division, distinguishing leaders with the proper ascriptive claims, leaders with bogus claims to legitimacy, \textsuperscript{38} "respectable" working-class people like himself, and "unrespectable" (i.e., non-deferential) working-class people.

The "ideal" location for the "traditional deferential" would be in rural areas and small towns, where the scale of industry is small. The typical work-role of such a worker would be one where the worker is in direct contact with his employer and/or other middle-class influentials, and where, at the same time, he has little chance to associate with many other workers. Unlike the communities of the "traditional proletarian", the communities within which this type of worker is found are socially heterogeneous. The community has an "interactional status system", social prestige being conferred on the basis of fairly detailed knowledge of the participants in the system; and there is a fairly general consensus as to the "rightness" of the social hierarchy within the community. Thus the "deferential worker's"

\textsuperscript{37}Lockwood, op.cit., p. 253.

\textsuperscript{38}Leaders of the British Labour Party, especially those from lowly origins, may fit into this category. So too might Conservative Party politicians who do not have the correct social pedigree. An example from a non-academic source may illustrate this. On a popular British television show (the model for "All in the Family") the working-class Tory "hero" has little respect for Edward Heath, the British (Tory) Prime Minister, describing him as a "Grammar school twit"!
social milieux is one characterized by paternalism from above, and normative acceptance of the existing distribution of rewards and privileges by those at the bottom of the social hierarchy.

The "Privatized Worker". The third working-class model of the class structure that Lockwood distinguishes is that held by the "privatized worker". In this image of class, possession of money and material goods are seen as the primary bases of social differentiation; power and status are not seen as having the same roles which they are assigned in the other class models. In the pecuniary model of stratification, Lockwood says:

Power is not understood as the power of one man over another, but rather as the power of a man to acquire things; as purchasing power. Status is not seen in terms of the association of status equals sharing a similar style of life. If status is thought of at all it is in terms of a standard of living, which all who have the means can readily acquire.  

The holder of a pecuniary image of the class structure sees society neither as a dichotomous structure based upon the distribution of power, nor as a finely graded hierarchical structure differentiated on the basis of status and prestige. Rather, Lockwood suggests, most people in society, in both manual and non-manual occupations, are conceived of as belonging to one very large income class, bordered on one side by the very poor, and on the other by the relatively few people who have so much wealth as to be outside this central

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39 Lockwood, op.cit., p. 260.
class. 40

The worker most likely to adhere to this image of class structure is, Lockwood suggests, the "privatized worker". He works in the modern, large factories and production plants utilizing mass production techniques, and, in Britain, resides in the newer types of council, or low cost private, estates; areas characterized by high levels of residential mobility and occupational heterogeneity, albeit of a blue-collar nature.

Drawing on findings from industrial sociology, 41 Lockwood argues that the work situation of the "privatized worker" is such that he derives little intrinsic satisfaction from his work or from the work groups of which he is part. Performing work that is generally repetitive, lacking any great deal of autonomy or opportunity for individual initiative, 42 and frequently prevented from any prolonged

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40In their study of "affluent workers" in Luton, Lockwood and his associates found that this model of the class structure was held by the majority of men in their sample. See J.H. Goldthorpe, D. Lockwood, et al., The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 145-156.


42Blauner, op.cit., exempts process workers from this fate, arguing that the technological organization of such work allows the worker great autonomy and increases his job satisfaction. Goldthorpe, Lockwood, et al., however, found little difference in attitudes between process workers and workers in other types of work in Luton. See The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968).
interaction with workmates by the constraints inherent in the technological organization of the workflow, the worker in this work setting very often adopts an instrumental orientation toward his job. Work is not seen as a source of intrinsic rewards, nor is much stress placed on relationships with workmates. The job, rather, is valued primarily as a source of income and security. The fact that many of the workers in these factories have moved their homes in search of higher incomes reinforces this instrumental orientation. The instrumental orientation toward work (or, rather, its emphasis to the detriment of intrinsic satisfactions) would seem unlikely to allow the development of strong normative attachments to working-class culture.

The lack of involvement in work is reinforced by the kind of life the "privatized worker" leads in the wider community. In his area of residence he will experience little in the way of strong ties of extended kinship or neighbourliness. Residential mobility means that the worker will have few ties in the neighbourhood, and lack of involvement with workmates indicates that the worker will not seek their company in his leisure time (even if they reside in the same area). The common adaptation to these circumstances, Lockwood suggests, is a retreat into the confines of the nuclear family, and relative isolation from other people in the neighbourhood. The social isolation within these communities prevents status within the estate being conferred on an interactional basis. The status system is "attributional"; people being judged by criteria that are readily observable. Hence status is based on conspicuous consumption, people judging their social
standing relative to others in terms of economic prosperity, rather than developing out of associational activities.

Lack of attachments to strong, solidary work groups, and lack of involvement in a vital working-class community, mean that the "privatized worker" will not develop that sense of class solidarity necessary to the fostering of an image of the stratification system as a class based dichotomy. Thus the "privatized worker" may very well be a trade unionist but he will see the union in instrumental terms and not as an expression of class solidarities. On the other hand, his role as an industrial worker, and his location in a community of wage-earners where people are judged on the basis of attributional criteria, will preclude him from envisioning the stratification system as a structure of status groups set apart from each other by differences in prestige and life-styles. The "privatized worker", therefore, is not becoming embourgeoisé, adopting the social perspectives of the middle-class. He is, rather, adopting a new interpretation of social reality, one that stems from the situation he finds himself in, a situation that is different from the situations of the "traditional proletarian" and the "traditional deferential" and that is also different from the life of the non-manual middle class.

The above discussion has presented what Lockwood considers to be the distinctive features of the three types of images of class which, he suggests, are held by different workers in Britain. Being ideal-type constructs, Lockwood's descriptions of the three types of workers, and their class models, are "extreme" examples developed to illustrate
in a clear manner the "pure" types of class model that workers adopt in "ideal" situations. Lockwood himself acknowledges that precise examples of the "traditional proletarian" and "traditional deferential" are increasingly difficult to find, particularly as processes of social change are leading both to changes in the structure of industry and to greater residential mobility, which will create changes in the communities within which these workers are located. Conversely, privatization and the pecuniary model of class structure are, in Britain at least, emergent phenomena, and it is unlikely that either this type of worker, or the model of class associated with him, will, as of yet, be found in great numbers. But it is still possible to suggest that the closer the actual social situation of a worker approximates either of the three outlined by Lockwood the more will his class imagery resemble one of the three class models depicted.

This may be illustrated by discussing some other works that have a bearing on this issue. Firstly, it has already been noted that the set of social conditions underlying the development of traditional proletarianism are becoming less of a common feature of British life. But because the traditional, single industry community may be declining this is not to say that all newer working-class communities approximate the kind outlined by Lockwood in his analysis of privatization. As Parkin says:

*Although this ideal-type construct ["traditional proletarianism". V.K.] is based largely on studies of communities of several generations standing, ... the comparatively newer working-class estates ... and the post-war towns may be included equally in the model, in so far as they appear to duplicate over time the same social patterns as those laid down in older*
communities. Again, although the common image of the traditional working-class community is one that envisages a fairly undifferentiated industrial base ... it is probably new more likely to be the case that working-class neighbourhoods will exhibit a more diversified occupational structure - particularly of course those in large urban centres of population, and the new towns. It is necessary to make this point to avoid slipping into the assumption that because the traditional, single-occupation community may be gradually disappearing, the homogeneous working-class community must be disappearing too.  

Dagenham, an outer suburb of London, for example, has a population that is ninety percent working-class. Although the Ford Motor Company is a very large employer, only twenty percent of the men in Dagenham work for that company. Forty percent of the men work outside the borough. Yet Willmott found that, in many ways, Dagenham resembles the more isolated, single industry community. Solidarity feelings were by no means absent in the town and, although many were not born in Dagenham, the newcomers hailed primarily from the East End of London and maintained relationships with other people with similar backgrounds. Although the people desired material goods, these were not sought after as a mark of status to enable the possessor to be "one up on his neighbours". "People on the estates seem to see their fellows not as adversaries but as allies in a general advance."

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44 Willmott, op.cit. Dagenham, in the early 1960's, had a population of approximately 90,000.
45 Ibid., p. 100.
Because this type of working-class community is more diversified than the smaller, single industry community, it may not exhibit the same intensity of solidarity feelings that typify the latter. But this is a far cry from suggesting that privatization is the typical mode of social existence of workers in such a community. Even if the workers are employed in industries conducive to privatization (given that the largest employer in Dagenham is engaged in automobile production it would, on the face of it, seem that many Dagenham workers do work in such an environment), it is still probable that their class imagery would not coincide with the pecuniary model because they are involved in a richer community environment than is the prototypical "privatized worker". The same kind of considerations would appear to militate against the adoption of a deferential prestige model by workers in such communities who happen to work in small plants, and are thus likely to come into contact with their employer and other middle class influentials. It may be that, in this kind of community, because of the possibility of a wider variety of work experiences, class imagery will not be as precise as that outlined by Lockwood. It might also be that workers adopt a hybrid model of the class structure.

It has been mentioned a number of times that one of the factors that Lockwood regards as influential in the development of a deferential image of class is employment in small firms, and consequent interaction with the employer. In her study of Banbury, Stacey argues that, in the small economic unit, there is close personal contact between "gaffer" and "man", and that this contact contributes to the worker's
acceptance of the justice of the existing system of inequality. Nordlinger, in his study of working-class Tories, disputes this argument. Dividing working-class Tories into "deferentials" and "pragmatists", Nordlinger finds that "deferentials" make up a smaller proportion of the Tory workers who reported that they had contacts with their employer than they do of the Tory workers who reported no such contact with their employer. As Ingham points out, Nordlinger may be correct in rejecting the simple hypothesis that personal contact has a direct impact on workers' attitudes. Ingham goes on to suggest that a more plausible explanation of deference among workers in small plants would be one that emphasizes an "interaction effect". Drawing on studies of voting, he suggests that high levels of left wing voting and attitudes are found among workers employed in large plants where there is a great deal of intra-class interaction, but little inter-class interaction. Citing Parkin's work (which will be referred to later in this chapter) Ingham argues that left wing attitudes are fostered in a situation of relative isolation from the dominant cultural values of society. The less the worker is "protected" from the influence of the dominant, primarily middle-class value system, the more will he accept his subordinate role. As Ingham points out:

46Stacey, op.cit., p. 28 and pp. 46-47.
47Nordlinger, op.cit., pp. 189-197.
It is possible that, in the small firm, a worker need not experience direct contact with his employer to be influenced by a system in which a large number or even a majority of workers experience such contact. 49

He provides some support for this contention by showing that, in a study he undertook, working-class Tories employed in small plants showed right wing ideological attitudes underlying their political preferences, whereas Tory voters in larger plants were largely instrumental in their support of the Conservative Party. Thus, it would seem, deference among workers in small plants is not a direct product of employer-employee interaction, but a consequence of the lack of barriers to the absorption of the dominant culture.

At this point one further question can be raised concerning the deferential model of class. Can it be assumed that the "traditional deferential", in Lockwood's terms, will be found in all western societies? In Gouldner's U.S. study of the gypsum plant at Oscar Center, although the conditions were, on the face of it, favourable, the "deferential" failed to appear. 50 The surface workers, although they were employed in a small plant where there was a great deal of supervisor-employee contact, and although most of them lived in the

49 Ibid., p. 237.

small, socially heterogeneous town of Oscar Center, were not deferential to authority. In fact they expected supervisors not to display signs of personal superiority, and, Gouldner found, the supervisors complied with this expectation.

In Australia, too, a major study failed to discern a deferential working-class image of class structure. In the discussion of Ingham's work it was noted that he stresses Parkin's argument that, in the absence of structural barriers of support, the worker will tend to adopt the values of the dominant institutional framework of his society. As many studies have indicated, part of the British political tradition is highly elitist, stressing the inherent superiority of the leadership qualities of an ascriptive elite. In Britain, therefore, working-class deference to the dominant cultural values would involve the types of attitudes specified by Lockwood. As Lipset points out, both the U.S.A. and Australia have value systems that are more equalitarian than the British, at least in the sense of emphasizing achievement values over qualities such as "birth" and "breeding". It is hardly to be expected that workers would touch their forelock when confronted with higher status people who expected no such behaviour.

What then, in these circumstances, takes the place of the tra-


itional deference described by Lockwood as the image of class structure appropriate to workers in a similar structural position? In the American case, I would suggest, workers in small plants (especially if they also reside in small, socially heterogenous communities) would be far more prone than their big city, big industry brothers to accept the Horatio Alger myth of equality of opportunity, and to espouse the "American Way of Life". It is, I think, fair to say that the Republican Party is more consistently in line with the ideas of elite groups than is the Democratic Party. In the light of this it is interesting to note that Oscar Center (the town studied by Gouldner) was eighty-five percent Republican.\(^{54}\) It would still be possible, with some justification, to refer to such attitudes as a deferential orientation, for they still involve the acceptance of the ideology of the dominant groups and institutions in society. Thus the content of deferential working-class imagery may be expected to vary between societies in line with the content of the dominant cultural values of these societies.

Lockwood's essay is but one of a series of publications arising from a major study that he and his associates conducted on the 'affluent

\(^{54}\)Gouldner, op.cit., p. 34. Several studies have shown that U.S. workers in large plants (especially assembly-line) soon lose their taste for the American Dream. See Chinoy, op.cit., and Guest, op.cit.
worker". In the last volume of the "affluent worker" series of books Goldthorpe, Lockwood, et al. discuss the images of class espoused by the "affluent workers" they studied in the British town of Luton. They found that the predominant model of the class structure espoused by the "affluent workers" was, in fact, a pecuniary one. The Luton workers were not, Goldthorpe, Lockwood, et al. argue, the products of a process of embourgeoisement for, although their attitudes can be distinguished from those of more traditional workers, they are also different from what would be regarded as typically middle-class attitudes. Thus the emphasis on the pecuniary model. The men in the Luton study were also under no great motivation to claim middle-class status, only fourteen percent doing so. The majority of them were union members and were also supporters of the British Labour Party.

55 The three books in the series, all authored by J.H. Goldthorpe, D. Lockwood, F. Bechhofer, and J. Platt, and all published by Cambridge University Press, are; The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour, (Cambridge, 1968), The Affluent Worker: Political Attitudes and Behaviour, (Cambridge, 1968), and The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure, (Cambridge, 1969). The study was designed to test the "embourgeoisement thesis" that workers, due to rising affluence, are becoming like the middle-class. To give this thesis the best possible chance of corroboration a particularly affluent and mobile group of workers were studied.

56 Goldthorpe, Lockwood, et al., The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure, pp. 145-156.

57 Ibid., p. 174. 67% of the workers identified as working-class, 8% claimed that they could equally well be described as either working or middle-class, while the remaining 11% gave no class identification.
Privatization, therefore, had not led the Luton workers into acceptance of middle-class norms. But, Goldthorpe, Lockwood, et al. argue, their commitment to the traditional organizations of the British working-class was based on calculative criteria of their self-interests. "Instrumental collectivism" is the term applied by Goldthorpe and his colleagues to this kind of attitude, and they contrast it to the "solidaristic collectivism" of the older form of proletarian traditionalism. The class imagery of the "affluent worker", in Lockwood's phrase, is based more on "commodity consciousness" than either class consciousness or status consciousness.

It is possible that there exists another working-class image of class that is not discussed by Lockwood. The images of class discussed so far have one thing in common; the worker is not necessarily led to claim middle-class status for himself. It has, however, been shown earlier in this chapter that a significant number of workers do in fact claim to be middle-class. In Runciman's study, about one-third of the manual worker respondents claimed to be middle-class. Only about one-quarter of these people, when asked to define the middle-class, did so by either mentioning the non-manual nature of middle-class occupations or by stressing a middle-class style of life. It would appear that only these two types of middle-class self-raters could be considered, in any meaningful sense, to be identifying themselves with persons

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58 Runciman, _op.cit._, p. 158.
actually occupying middle-class positions in the stratification system. One might expect this type of worker to adhere to a non-deferential prestige model of the class system.

Unlike the "traditional deferential", this type of worker would be likely to adopt the middle-class as both a comparative and a normative reference group. And his class model would be similar, if not identical, to a middle-class prestige model of the stratification system. As Bott points out, the middle-class image of the class structure places greater emphasis on achievement than does the deferential model: the individual can rise in the prestige hierarchy "by acquiring the education, occupation, sub-culture, and personal friendship of people in a superior class."\textsuperscript{59}

It is probable that the non-deferential prestige model would most likely be found among those people most marginal to the working-class. It has been noted that middle-class identification (though not all workers who so identify would necessarily adhere to this model) among workers is strongest where ties to the working-class are weakest. For example, workers residing in predominantly middle-class areas, workers who have middle-class contacts through kinship or friendship, and (possibly) workers employed in occupations at the fringes of the working-class would probably be among those most likely to adhere to such a model of the class structure. For this reason it would seem appropriate

to give the title the "marginal worker" to the manual worker who adheres to the non-deferential prestige model of the stratification system.

There are, then, several perspectives from which manual workers may view the system of inequality in their society. As in the case of subjective class identification, research has indicated that variation in the class imagery of working-class people can be traced to differences in the social networks within which workers find themselves. Differences in community, work situation, and experiences of social and geographical mobility all appear to play a part in the determination of the way the worker interprets the stratification system of his society. It is not suggested that this listing of class models is exhaustive, nor that conceptions of the class system in Britain will be exactly duplicated in other societies (although Dahrendorf's comparison of studies from four different societies suggests that they are not completely restricted to one society). But if similar types of worker exist in Canada then it is fair to assume that they will not all share the same conceptions, and, with the possible exception of the "traditional deferential", it is probable that the nearer workers in Canada approach the "prototypes" discussed then the nearer will their class imagery approach that described.

In addition to variations in class identification and class imagery, workers also vary in their political preferences and attitudes. In Britain, a country with a high incidence of class voting, about one-third of the working-class consistently votes for the Conservative
Party. In the United States, as Lipset shows, working-class people are much more likely to vote for the Democratic Party than for the Republican Party, but, again, a substantial number of workers vote contrary to their class. In Canada, as Alford shows, class voting is not so pronounced as it is in other western societies, and the votes of the working class are divided between the parties to a greater extent. However, as Alford also notes, support for Canada's social democratic party, the New Democrats, is class based, with votes for the N.D.P. coming disproportionately from the manual class.

McDonald, in her study of the 1968 federal election in Ontario, found that class membership was the most important factor affecting N.D.P. voting, whereas religious and ethnic affiliations were more important than class in explaining Liberal and Conservative voting.

The same kinds of factors examined earlier have also been found to be related to differences in working-class political preferences. Butler and Stokes, in their British study, find that one factor related to the tendency of manual workers to vote for the Conservative Party is the class composition of the constituency they reside in. They

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60 Parkin, "Working-class Conservatives", p. 278.
64 Butler & Stokes, *op.cit.*, pp. 144-150. Butler & Stokes cite evidence to show that a similar pattern has been found in U.S. studies.
first compare types of communities that differ greatly in their class composition; mining communities and seaside resort areas. In the mining areas almost ninety percent of the labour force were in manual occupations, as compared to fifty-six percent in the resort areas. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Labour gained a larger share of the vote in the mining areas. But even more than this, Butler and Stokes noted that working-class people themselves were more likely to vote Labour in the mining areas than in the resort areas. Thus over ninety percent of the manual workers in mining areas who supported one or other of the major parties supported the Labour Party, compared to approximately half of the manual workers in the resort areas. 65

In an analysis of poll data collected over the period from 1963 to 1966 Butler and Stokes find this pattern applies generally in British political behaviour. The larger the proportion of the population in a constituency that was in manual occupations the greater, they found, was the level of support for the Labour Party among manual workers. Likewise, the larger the proportion of middle-class people in the constituency the greater the level of support for the Conservative Party among middle-class people. Thus it appears that, as in the cases of class identification and images of class structure, the type of community the worker resides in will have an influence on his political predispositions.

65 Ibid., p. 145. The same holds for the middle-class. 36% of the middle-class people supported the Labour Party in the mining areas, compared to only 7½% in the resort areas.
A number of studies have also related differences in the work situations of manual workers to differences in political preferences. Trade union membership, for example, has often been cited as an influence leading workers to vote for the left-wing party in their societies. Thus evidence of a relationship between union membership and left-wing voting and attitudes among manual workers is presented by Lipset (for the U.S.A.), McDonald (for Canada), Butler and Strokes, Nordlinger, and Goldthorpe, Lockwood et al. (the last three studies referring to Britain). As Lipset points out, interaction between people who face common problems enhances their feeling that they share common interests, and increases the possibility that they will endorse collective action to solve those problems. He further suggests that, when informal contacts are reinforced by membership in formal organizations, political awareness is enhanced. And the trade union is the working-class organization, so it is to be expected that membership will influence the worker toward parties claiming to represent the interests of working-class people. Perry Anderson asks:

Why does union membership make so much difference to the political loyalty of industrial workers? Despite the lack of direct evidence on this point, it is possible to conjecture an answer. The Union introduces the worker into a new ideological and relational universe, however minimally. It creates its own loyalty (even if this may on occasion become very strained) and its own logic - a logic which

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leads to Labour allegiance. In a word, unionization changes the consciousness of workers, however imperfectly, and in doing so frees them from the elementary forms of mystification. 67

The trade union, by emphasizing collective action and the existence of conflicts of interest between workers and management, may help to engender a sense of solidarity among workers, and a sense of apartness from non-manual workers, both of which may contribute to left-wing voting.

The size of the plant in which the worker is employed has also been found to be related to left-wing attitudes. The larger the plant, it seems, the larger the proportion of workers supporting parties of the left. 68 The typical explanation is that the larger plants encourage worker interaction and foster the awareness of shared interests. In


Lipset’s words, "a large plant makes for a higher degree of intra-class communication and less personal contact with people on higher economic levels".\textsuperscript{69} It may be suggested that this is not so much an effect of plant size as such, but rather workers in large plants are more likely to vote for left-wing parties than are workers in smaller plants because they are also more likely to be members of trade unions. But Nordlinger and Ingham both report findings that suggest that plant size has an independent effect on political preferences and attitudes even after the fact of union differences is taken into account.\textsuperscript{70}

Affiliation with white-collar people has also been shown to be related to manual workers’ political preferences. Runciman found that manual workers whose fathers were in non-manual occupations were more likely to support the Conservative Party than were those workers whose fathers were also manual workers.\textsuperscript{71} Goldthorpe, Lockwood, et al. divided the workers in their study into three groups, on the basis of their white-collar affiliations. One group consisted of workers who were from white-collar origins, or whose wives were, and who also had experienced white-collar work themselves, or their wives had. The second group consisted of those workers who had experience of one, but not both, of

\begin{itemize}
\item Lipset, \textit{Political Man}, p. 252.
\item Nordlinger, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 204-209; and Ingham, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 249.
\item Runciman, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 175. 38\% of those whose fathers were in non-manual occupations supported the Conservatives, compared to 21\% of those whose fathers were in manual occupations.
\end{itemize}
the kinds of white-collar affiliation. And the third group comprised those workers with neither form of white-collar affiliation. Goldthorpe, Lockwood, et al. found that Conservative support was strongest among the workers with both forms of white-collar affiliation, and weakest among the workers with no such affiliations.\textsuperscript{72} Workers who are downwardly mobile, therefore, appear to be among those who adopt a political perspective that leads away from support of political parties that base their appeal on the premise that they are the party of the working-class.

The effects of socio-economic differences within the working-class upon political preferences are by no means clear. In the case of income, Lipset states that studies in Australia, Britain, France, Italy and the U.S.A. reported that higher income workers were less likely to vote for the party of the left than their poorer brethren, whereas in Germany and Sweden other studies found evidence that the higher income workers were the most likely to vote for the left-wing party.\textsuperscript{73} More recent studies, however, cast doubt on the finding that high income is associated with Tory voting among workers in Britain. Thus Runciman, Goldthorpe, Lockwood, et al., and McKenzie and Silver all report that income differences played no part in the explanation of

\textsuperscript{72}Goldthorpe, Lockwood, et al., The Affluent Worker: Political Attitudes and Behaviour, pp. 49-62.

\textsuperscript{73}Lipset, Political Man, pp. 252-254.
differences in voting among the workers in their surveys.\textsuperscript{74} Nordlinger, in fact, found that, among the workers in his study, income was positively associated with left-wing voting.\textsuperscript{75}

Lipset also cites evidence to suggest that differences in religious affiliation are associated with differences in political preferences among workers,\textsuperscript{76} but the degree of influence varies as between countries. In Canada, for example, Alford argues that differences in religious affiliation are more influential on party choice than class.\textsuperscript{77}

A review of the literature, therefore, indicates that similar factors may be invoked to explain differences among manual workers in class identification, class imagery, and political preferences. It has been noted that variations within the working-class along these dimensions are related to differences in the class composition of the communities within which workers live, to differences in the work situations that workers face, and to differences in workers' experiences of geographical and social mobility. Parkin's essay\textsuperscript{78} provides a theoretical framework that can be used to incorporate these disparate findings into a more parsimonious explanation. Accepting that large, complex societies such as our own display a variety of competing values,

\textsuperscript{74}Runciman, op.cit., pp. 171-172; Goldthorpe, Lockwood, et al., The Affluent Worker: Political Attitudes and Behaviour, pp. 38-41; McKenzie & Silver, op.cit., pp. 82-84.

\textsuperscript{75}Nordlinger, op.cit., pp. 169-170. He notes that Hamilton reports similar findings among French workers.

\textsuperscript{76}Lipset, Political Man, pp. 255-261.

\textsuperscript{77}Alford, op.cit., pp. 272-278.

\textsuperscript{78}Parkin, "Working-class Conservatives".
Parkin nevertheless asserts that there are dominant institutional orders in these societies, and that the values surrounding these institutions exercise a dominant influence. In western societies such as Britain the values associated with the dominant institutional orders are hostile to the values associated with socialism. Parkin points out that studies of the working-class Conservative have generally regarded him as a "deviant", that is, from the majority of his class peers who, in Britain, vote for the Labour Party. Parkin, in effect, reverses this position, arguing that:

Political deviance, examined from a national or societal level, is manifested not in working-class Conservatism, but rather in electoral support for Socialism on the part of members of any social stratum. Socialist voting in general can be regarded for analytic purposes, as a symbolic act of deviance from the dominant values of British capitalist society, whilst Conservative voting may be thought of as a symbolic reaffirmation of those values. To be rather more specific the following hypothesis is proposed: namely, that electoral support for Socialism will occur predominantly where individuals are involved in normative sub-systems which serve as 'barriers' to the dominant values of the society.79

Without the support of these normative sub-systems the worker will be far more likely to accept the values of the dominant political culture and, consequently, support the political party which is closest to those values (e.g. the British Conservative Party).

The normative sub-systems that Parkin focuses on as "barriers" to the dominant values of society are the traditional working-class comm-

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79 Ibid., p. 282 (Parkin's emphasis).
unity and the value system created by industrial workers in response to their experiences in the workplace. Both of these normative sub-systems embody collectivist values in opposition to the dominant values of a predominantly capitalist society. And these collectivist values derive out of the interactions and experiences of workers in their day-to-day lives. Remove the worker from either of these normative sub-systems and he is more likely to adopt the values of the dominant institutional framework. Remove him from both (which appears to be the lot of the "traditional deferential") and the likelihood is even stronger that he will accept the values of the status quo.

Parkin further suggests that the non-existence of these structural barriers to the permeation of dominant values within the working-class can account not only for overt political behaviour such as voting, but also for the value positions underlying such action:

Manual workers do not vote Conservative because they are deferential, or because they conceive themselves as middle class; rather they have a deferential and a middle class and a Conservative outlook when they are isolated from structural positions which provide an alternative normative system from that of the dominant institutional orders of society.  

Thus it is possible to conceive of class identification, class imagery, and political attitudes as a "package", and to argue that differences among workers in terms of their involvement in normative sub-systems which shield them from the blandishments of the dominant groups in society will be of crucial importance in determining the type of

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80 Ibid., p. 289 (Parkin's emphasis).
"package" of ideas the worker will carry with him. Parkin only deals with involvement in the two major normative sub-systems outlined above. It is also possible to incorporate the mobility experiences of workers into this argument. To the extent that a worker has white-collar affiliations, either through his own past history, through kinship, or through friendship, my hypothesis would be that his involvement in the working-class normative sub-systems would be attenuated. Even if a worker were a member of a solidary working-class community and were employed in circumstances favourable to working-class solidarity, his ties to the middle-class would act as cross-pressures on him and weaken the barriers that are in existence.

Community, work, and mobility appear, then, to be the crucial factors to be examined in any study of class and politics among workers.

The Problem

This thesis will attempt to examine the variations in attitudes toward the class system among manual workers in Ontario. Although there are numerous studies of worker's attitudes on class in other countries, little research has been undertaken in Canada, with the exception of political attitudes (research on political preferences, however, has not been conducted in terms of the framework outlined here).

The theoretical orientation of the study has been outlined in this Introduction, and involves examining variation in class attitudes in the light of a theory of ideological and political "deviance". Through examination of studies in this area it has been shown that
community work, and mobility are important explanatory variables in account-
ing for the differences among workers in their perceptions of the
class system. Parkin's essay provides the theoretical framework within
which to incorporate these findings. Looked at in terms of Parkin's
analysis, the ideal-typical worker could be placed on a continuum,
running from the "traditional proletarian", through the "privatized
worker", to the "traditional deferential" and then to the "marginal
worker". And this continuum would be related to the extent to which
manual workers are structurally isolated from the influence of the
dominant cultural values of society by strong working-class normative
sub-systems.

Taking note of Parkin's work, the major hypothesis that will be
tested in this thesis may be stated as follows: variation in class iden-
tification, class imagery, and political attitudes among workers will,
to a large extent, be related to the degree to which workers are
involved in sets of social relationships that isolate them from the
influence of the values of groups occupying dominant positions in the
social hierarchy. The greater this structural isolation the more
likely it is that workers will adhere to attitudes and values distinct
from the values of the groups higher in the stratification hierarchy.81

81Homans, in his attempt to develop a series of theoretical
propositions about social behaviour, asserts that equality between the
participants in a social relationship leads to increased interaction,
and that equality (in terms of performing similar roles) leads to the
participants sharing similar values. He also suggests that interaction
influences the participants to like one another (provided they are
"rewarded" in the relationship), and that interaction within one group
leads participants to express hostility to other groups that are seen
The "sets of social relationships" that this thesis will focus upon will be those related to the type of community the worker lives in, his work situation, and his contacts with the non-manual world, through his own occupational history, and through kinship and friendship. The more consistently the worker has been involved in a predominantly working-class environment the more I would expect him to adhere to attitudes that are distinguishable from those associated with people involved in non-manual pursuits.

It was decided that, in order to study variations in workers' attitudes on class and politics, four communities should be selected, each community having a social composition approximating that of one of the types of community cited in the discussion of images of class structure. By "controlling" for community in this manner it will be possible to examine the combined effects of community, work, and mobility on the class imagery of manual workers. Chapter II will outline the manner in which these four communities were chosen, will discuss aspects of the research procedure, and will present a summary discussion as threatening. (See G.C. Homans, Social Behaviour: Its Elementary Forms. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961, pp. 181-186, and 320-323).

If Homans is correct, if a person's interactions were almost totally confined to other working-class people then this would lead to increased solidarity among the participants and greater hostility toward outside groups. Homans' work, therefore, may contribute to an understanding of the social psychology underlying the argument that working-class normative sub-systems serve as barriers to the influence of the dominant culture.

Lipset uses a similar argument to that presented in this Introduction to account for the higher levels of political involvement of the more well to do classes. He suggests that they live in a "relatively homogeneous political environment", and hence face fewer cross-pressures that might pressure them from diverse political sources. See S.M. Lipset, Political Man, pp. 213-214.
of the characteristics of the workers in the four communities.

Chapter III will seek to establish that differences in attitudes toward class and politics exist between manual and non-manual workers. If there were no differences as such, much of what has been said in this Introduction would be irrelevant. The rest of that chapter will be devoted to a discussion of whether or not socio-economic differences, specifically income differences, can provide a sufficient explanation of variation in class attitudes among workers. It will be established that this is not the case.

The next part of the thesis, Chapter IV, will examine the class identifications of the workers in the study. An attempt will be made to study the influence of the kinds of variables discussed in this Introduction on the worker's class identification.

Chapter V will be devoted to a discussion of the class imagery of the workers who responded in this study. The first part of the chapter will examine the extent of traditional deference among the workers in the study, which is important because workers espousing a prestige model could be holding a deferential or an achievement version of such a model. The rest of the chapter will be devoted to the reasons for variation in the choices of class models made by workers.

Chapter VI will involve a discussion of other aspects of workers' attitudes toward social inequality. An attempt will be made to develop a score from answers to a number of questions, this score measuring the degree to which manual workers adopt a perspective that can be described as 'militant'.
The last part of this thesis, Chapter VII, will examine the political preferences of manual workers. Specifically it will deal with the sources of differences in support of the New Democratic Party. The chapter will also examine the question of whether workers in Ontario see politics in class terms or whether other forms of societal division are seen as the springs of political differences.
CHAPTER II
THE STUDY

This chapter describes the process of selection of the communities in which the study was conducted. Four communities were selected, each one approximating the occupational composition of the types of communities described in Chapter I. A brief description of the survey follows this section, including an outline of the weighting system used to compensate for bias in the response to the survey due to lower levels of response by people in certain socio-economic brackets. The next part of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of how, from all the responses to the survey, the group of respondents of interest to this study, working-class men, was selected. Finally, an outline of the characteristics of the working-class men in the four communities is presented.

Selection of the Four Communities

It has been suggested, in Chapter I, that the type of community a worker resides in will be an important factor in any analysis of working-class attitudes toward the class system. It was felt that it would be easier to focus on community in the initial selection of people to be studied, rather than, say, size of plant or union membership. There were two basic reasons for this decision. Firstly, as the next

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1See Appendix A for a more detailed discussion of the fieldwork.
section will show, the study was conducted as part of a larger survey in which other researchers were involved. The interests of the other parties were such that a fairly wide cross-section of the population of Ontario had to be included in the survey. Restriction of the study to manual workers in, for example, a number of plants of different sizes would be impossible in these circumstances. But it was possible to narrow the study to people living in four communities without conflicting with the interests of the other participants in the survey. The second reason for using community as a selection criterion was simply that it did not involve the problems of access to information on possible respondents that would be involved in approaching corporations for lists of their employees, or of finding a reliable way to sample workers who were not members of unions, even if it had been possible to gain access to union members. Thus the interests of other members of the research team, and the availability of information (in the form of City Directories) from which to draw samples, led to community being the initial criterion for the selection of the sample.

Following from the interest in community variation as a source of differences in workers' attitudes it was necessary, therefore, to select four communities in which to conduct the study. The communities had to be of such occupational compositions as to approximate the types of communities discussed in Chapter I. In order to approximate the milieux of the "traditional proletarian" one of the communities had to be predominantly working-class in occupational composition and to be organized around a single, dominant industry. For an approximation of the type of community that, in Britain at least, is regarded as the home of the "traditional deferential", another of the communities had to be fairly heterogeneous in occupational composition, and also contain a variety
of small industrial plants. A third community, in order to be similar to the type of community seen as containing the "privatized worker", had to be larger than the home of the "deferential", had to contain larger industrial plants, and, at the same time, it had to be less occupationally homogeneous than the milieux of the "traditional proletarian". Finally, the fourth community had to have a predominantly non-manual labour force so that it could simulate the surroundings that, it was suggested earlier, house the "marginal worker".

A complicating factor was introduced by the interest of other participants in the research to have a substantial group of French-speaking respondents in the sample.\(^2\) Ethnic differences could, therefore, present an additional factor to be taken into account in the analysis of the class attitudes of workers in Ontario. Ethnic homogeneity could be assumed in the British studies but it is not possible to do so in the context of Ontario. However much this fact may affect the comparability of findings between studies in Canada and Britain, the point still remains that the immediate issue is one of the class composition of these communities. It was, fortunately, possible to locate communities that met the needs of the other participants for French Canadian respondents while at the same time meeting the requirements of my interest in occupational composition.

To select the four communities the publications of the 1961 Census of Canada were utilised.\(^3\) The Census publications on the occupational

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\(^2\) The two study directors, F.E. Jones and P.C. Pineo, needed to test the questionnaire when translated into French. Another graduate student, J.C. Goyder, was interested in English Canadian/French Canadian differences in class identification.

\(^3\) At the time (1970/71) the 1961 Census statistics were the most up-to-date sources of information.
composition and industrial distribution of the labour force of communities in Ontario were studied in order to gain some idea as to differences along these dimensions. The four communities selected were Ottawa, Hamilton, Lindsay and Sudbury. Table II-1 shows the occupational composition of the male labour forces of the four communities, and compares them with urban Ontario as a whole.

Table II-1.--Percentage distribution of the male labour forces of the four communities, and urban Ontario, in major occupational divisions (1961 Census)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Division</th>
<th>Urban Ontario</th>
<th>Ottawa</th>
<th>Hamilton</th>
<th>Lindsay</th>
<th>Sudbury</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional &amp; technical</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service &amp; recreation</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport &amp; communications</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers &amp; farmworkers</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loggers &amp; related, fishermen, trappers &amp; huntsmen</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miners, quarrymen &amp; related</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen, production process &amp; related</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers not elsewhere specified</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation not stated</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100.0  100.1  99.9  99.9  99.9
(N = 1,320,994  71,086  108,642  2,839  22,515)

Index of dissimilarity 21.2  10.3  7.5  25.2

a City areas.
b Census metropolitan area.

4 In examining the census data for appropriate communities, I
Ottawa, as one would expect of the seat of the Federal government, is a city with a very large white-collar population. Under one-quarter of the male population in 1961 was engaged in manual work, whereas nearly forty-five percent were in managerial, professional and technical, or clerical occupations. Due to this substantial middle-class presence it appears that Ottawa would be the community in which to look for the "marginal worker". As the index of dissimilarity of 21.2 shows, the labour force of Ottawa differs substantially from the general labour force in urban Ontario, having disproportionately more men in white-collar and service occupations, and far less in manual, industrial work.  

Hamilton, as the dissimilarity index of 10.3 indicates, more
did not consider every community listed. Rather, I had some idea of
the kinds of communities, and examined a number of alternatives.

5. The reasons for restricting the survey to males will be
presented in the next section of this chapter.

6. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1961 Census of Canada, Volume 3, Part 1, (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1963), Bulletin 3.1-4, pp. 7-1 to 7-14 (Table 7), and 8-2 to 8-14 (Table 8), and Bulletin 3.1-6, pp. 11-25 to 11-35 (Table 11).

7. This percentage is based on the men classified as "miners, quarrymen, and related workers", "craftsmen, production process and related workers", and "Labourers n.e.s.". As will be seen later in this chapter, some ambiguity creeps in, due to there being, in some instances, manual and non-manual occupations in the same category. But for present purposes, the broad census classifications shall suffice.

8. The index of dissimilarity, developed by the Duncans, is a measure of the dissimilarity between two groups. Thus, in the case at hand, the index measures the dissimilarity in occupational composition between the communities and urban Ontario as a whole. The index of 21.2 for Ottawa means that 21.2% of the workers in Ottawa would have to change their occupations in order that Ottawa have an occupational structure similar to Ontario as a whole. See, O.D. Duncan & B. Duncan, "Residential Distribution and Occupational Stratification", American Journal of Sociology, 55:5 (1955), pp. 493-503.
closely resembles urban Ontario as a whole in occupational composition. With nearly fifty percent of its male labour force in manual occupations, it is a highly industrialized community, but nearly twenty-five percent were engaged in white-collar occupations. Thus, although Hamilton has a large working-class population, there is also a substantial middle-class in the city. This, it may be suggested, would contribute to the likelihood that workers in the city would not adopt a perspective akin to that of the "traditional proletarian".

Lindsay is the community closest in occupational composition to urban Ontario as a whole; the index of dissimilarity being only 7.5. Approximately forty-three percent of the employed men in Lindsay in 1961 were in manual occupations, while nearly thirty percent were in managerial, professional and technical, or clerical work. Thus Lindsay is a relatively heterogeneous community in class terms. It is also by far the smallest of the four communities, with a male labour force in 1961 of 2,839 men: Sudbury, the next largest town, had a labour force that is over eight times the size of Lindsay's. Lindsay, then, being a small, occupationally heterogeneous community, has certain of the attributes that, it was suggested in Chapter I, characterize the kind of community in Britain that houses the "traditional deferential".

Sudbury is the community that is most different from urban Ontario as a whole; the index of dissimilarity being 25.2. About sixty percent of the male labour force of Sudbury were employed as miners, quarrymen and related workers, craftsmen, production process and related workers, or as labourers. Only about eighteen percent were
employed as managers, professionals, or clerical workers. Sudbury, therefore, is very much a working-class town, with a smaller middle-class than is found in the other three communities.

In terms of occupational composition, therefore, the four communities selected differ considerably. Ottawa has only a small industrial working-class, but a very large middle-class. Both Hamilton and Lindsay have substantial proportions of their labour forces in manual occupations but are relatively heterogeneous, both having about one quarter of their employed men in white-collar occupations. But Hamilton is a much larger community than Lindsay. Sudbury is the most "working-class" of the four communities and, at least in terms of occupational composition, is closest to the type of community wherein one might expect to find the "traditional proletarian".

The occupational composition of the communities is not the only factor that has to be taken into account. The range of industrial activity and the size of the industrial plants are also important elements to be considered in the process of selecting appropriate communities in which to conduct a study such as this. Table II-2 shows the industrial distribution of the male labour forces of the four communities in 1961.
Table II-2.--Percentage distribution of the male labour forces of the four communities, in major industrial divisions (1961 Census)\(^9\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industrial Division</th>
<th>Ottawa</th>
<th>Hamilton</th>
<th>Lindsay</th>
<th>Sudbury</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forestry fishing, etc.</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines, quarries, wells, etc. (Total manufacturing)</td>
<td>(9.9)</td>
<td>(46.2)</td>
<td>(37.8)</td>
<td>(16.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary metals &amp; metal fabricating</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery, transportation equipment &amp; electrical products</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-metallic minerals, chemicals, petroleum, etc.</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food, beverages, &amp; tobacco</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber, leather, textiles &amp; clothing</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood, furniture, paper, &amp; printing</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous manufacturing</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport &amp; utilities</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, insurance, real estate, community, business &amp; personal service industries</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration &amp; defense</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified &amp; undefined</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 71,086)</td>
<td>108,642</td>
<td>2,839</td>
<td>22,515</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the table shows, only ten percent of the labour force in Ottawa is employed in manufacturing industries. Nearly forty percent

\(^9\)1961 Census of Canada, Volume 3, Part 2, Bulletin 3.2-2, pp. 2-1 to 2-12 (Table 2) and 3-2 to 3-12 (Table 3), and Bulletin 3.2- 4, pp. 6-25 to 6-31 (Table 6).
are employed in some branch of public administration and defense, which, in Ottawa, primarily means the Federal civil service. Examination of the industrial distribution of the Ottawa labour force reinforces the picture of that city as a middle-class community. Among the manufacturing industries, no one sector is a very large employer of labour. The largest manufacturing sector is that listed in Table II-2 as "wood, furniture, paper, and printing" but even here only 3.6% of the labour force is involved, and this amounts to about two thousand, six hundred men.

Hamilton, on the other hand, is a relatively heavily industrialized city, with just under half of the male labour force employed in manufacturing industry. The single largest sector is primary metal and metal fabricating, which employs approximately twenty percent of the Hamilton labour force. A large component of this sector is the basic steel industry, where there are two large corporations in Hamilton, the Steel Company of Canada and Dominion Foundries and Steel, which together employ about twenty-two thousand people. 10

Lindsay is not so heavily industrialized as Hamilton, but even here nearly forty percent of the town's male labour force are employed in manufacturing industries. No one type of manufacturing dominates this sector, the largest group being in the manufacture of non-metallic minerals, chemical, petroleum and related products. Even in this group of manufactures, though, only about eight percent of the male labour force (or about two hundred and thirty men) are involved.

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10 This figure, however, refers to white-collar and blue-collar employees, both male and female.
The extractive industry is the largest employer of labour in Sudbury. Over thirty-five percent of the male labour force are employed in the nickel mining industry. The manufacturing sector is much smaller, employing only about seventeen percent of the male labour force. And of the men employed in manufacturing, the majority are employed in the industries involved in the manufacture of primary metals and metal fabricating. Of the 11.4% of the male labour force employed in this sector nearly all (10.7% of the labour force) are employed in the nickel smelting industry. Thus nearly half of the male labour force of Sudbury is employed in one basic process, the mining and refining of nickel.

Not only, therefore, is Sudbury very much a "working-class town" but it is also a town dominated by one major industry. It would appear, therefore, that Sudbury satisfies fairly well the two criteria that have been laid down for the kind of community that, in Britain, "produces" the "traditional proletarian".

The size of the industrial plants in the four communities was also a factor taken into account in their selection. Table II-3 shows the proportion of the total number of plants constituted by plants of different sizes, and the proportion of the labour force they employ, in the four communities. The information is taken from Scott's Industrial Directory, 1968-69, hence the information is more up-to-date than that used so far.11 The total labour force figures will

not coincide with those given in Table II-1 and Table II-2, for they refer only to people employed in industrial concerns, but include manual workers and white-collar workers, both male and female. But even if the figures are not strictly comparable with those given earlier they still serve as a basis for comparison of the industrial characters of the four communities.

Table II-3.--Percentages of total number of firms and of total labour force in the four communities in different size brackets (no. of employees).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plant Size</th>
<th>Ottawa %</th>
<th>Hamilton %</th>
<th>Lindsay %</th>
<th>Sudbury %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Firms in size bracket</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 50 empls.</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>78.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 99</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>85.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>91.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 - 499</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>97.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>97.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>97.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 - 999</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>98.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>97.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 - 4999</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>99.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>98.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5000 - 9999</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>98.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000 &amp; over</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 244)</td>
<td>(N = 704)</td>
<td>(N = 37)</td>
<td>(N = 71)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% of labour force in size bracket

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ottawa %</th>
<th>Hamilton %</th>
<th>Lindsay %</th>
<th>Sudbury %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 50</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 99</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 - 499</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 - 999</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 - 4999</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5000 - 9999</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>78.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000 &amp; over</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 16,749)</td>
<td>(N = 78,838)</td>
<td>(N = 1,837)</td>
<td>(N = 22,438)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
About three-quarters of the industrial firms in all four communities employ under fifty people. However, the relative share that these firms have of the labour force varies as between the four towns. Approximately one-quarter of the Lindsay labour force is employed in such firms whereas, at the other extreme, only about four percent of the Sudbury labour force works for firms having less than fifty employees. No firm in Lindsay employs more than five hundred people, in fact over forty percent of the labour force work in plants of under one hundred employees. There are two relatively large firms in Ottawa that employ between one thousand and four thousand people, and they account for about twenty-three percent of the people in Ottawa who work for industrial concerns. But Ottawa does not contain any giant firms, and nearly sixty-five percent of the people working for industrial firms are in firms employing less than five hundred people.

The Hamilton industrial labour force is more diversified, in terms of the size of firms it is employed by. About forty-two percent work in firms employing less than five hundred people, but about eighteen percent work for the two firms employing between five thousand and ten thousand people, and another twenty-one percent work for the gigantic Steel Company of Canada which, according to Scott's Industrial Directory, employed nearly sixteen thousand people in 1968-69. But even this level of concentration appears small when compared to the fact that, in Sudbury, one company, International Nickel, employs nearly three-quarters of the industrial labour force of that city. When Falconbridge Nickel Mines Ltd. is brought into the picture, these two
companies employ over ninety percent of the people employed by industrial concerns in Sudbury.

By looking at the occupational and industrial distributions of the labour forces in the four communities, and by also examining the sizes of the industrial firms in the same communities, it was decided that the four communities were suitable places in which to conduct the study. Ottawa emerges as a city with a very large middle-class population, where industry takes second place to the civil service as a major employer of labour. The industry that does exist in Ottawa is rather diversified, and, although there is a fair degree of variability in the sizes of industrial plants in Ottawa, there are no very large plants in the city. It was felt that Ottawa would be an appropriate site for the study and that it displayed characteristics which would lead one to expect that the kind of worker described in Chapter I as the "marginal worker" might exist in such an environment.

At the opposite extreme is Sudbury, a community that is predominantly working-class in social composition. At the same time the community is dominated by a single industry, the extraction and refining of nickel ore, and, more than that, mostly by one very large employer, the International Nickel Company. In addition to this, the single largest occupational group in Sudbury are miners (the category, "craftsmen, production process and related workers" makes up a bigger proportion of the labour force but this is comprised of a large variety of manual occupations), and miners are generally focused upon as being "traditional
proletarians" par excellence.\textsuperscript{12} There is a history of militant trade unionism in Sudbury,\textsuperscript{13} and this fact, combined with the other considerations discussed above, suggested that Sudbury would be a suitable place to look for the "traditional proletarian".

Hamilton has a much more diversified industrial base than Sudbury, even though the basic steel industry is a large employer of labour. There are over seven hundred industrial firms in the area and, even if the steel industry is important, it does not dominate the community to the same extent as nickel production in Sudbury. There is a large working-class, but the middle-class still makes up a significant part of the population, so there is not the same degree of class homogeneity as exists in Sudbury. Factors such as this suggest that there would not be that strong sense of class solidarity which is deemed to exist in the single industry, solidary working-class community. The city is also highly differentiated along ethnic lines,\textsuperscript{14} and all these factors suggest that the attitudes of workers in this city may be closer to those of the "privatized worker". There is, for example, a strong trade union movement in the city,\textsuperscript{15} yet the political


\textsuperscript{14}See Table II-20 in the final section of this chapter.

\textsuperscript{15}With the exception of Dofasco, all the major plants are unionized.
party that is closely aligned to the unions, the N.D.P., has had rather a checkered history of success in Hamilton.

Lindsay is by far the smallest of the four communities, having a population (in 1965) of under twelve thousand. It is a socially heterogeneous community with a small scale, diversified industrial base. The class heterogeneity and small scale work environment of Lindsay suggest that this is the type of community wherein might dwell the "deferential worker".

Thus occupational and industrial characteristics were the criteria by which the four communities were selected as the sites for the study.

Response to the Survey

The survey on which this thesis is based was a mailed questionnaire type study. The questionnaires were sent out in two waves, the first wave going to Ottawa, Hamilton, and Sudbury in July, 1971, and the second wave going to Lindsay in March, 1972. The reasons for this time-lag between the two waves are outlined in Appendix A, which also provides details of the administration of the survey and a discussion of the response rates. The survey was restricted to men over the age of eighteen. The study was restricted to men for a number of reasons. The other study participants, interested in a replication of U.S. studies

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16 L.O.D.A. Facts, (Lake Ontario Regional Development Council, 1966). The total populations of the other communities, in 1961, were 268,206 in Ottawa, 395,189 in Hamilton, and 80,120 in Sudbury. (The Hamilton figure covers the metropolitan area, the others the city proper).
of occupational and social mobility, were only interested in the male labour force. From the point of view of this thesis, it was necessary to restrict the study to males because of the emphasis on work experiences as one of the crucial variables in the analysis. As many women who would have replied to the survey would have been housewives this would have added complications to the analysis, hence it was decided to restrict the study to males.

The over-all response rate to the questionnaire survey in the four communities was 32.9% (or one thousand, one hundred and seven completed questionnaires). The level of response, however, was not uniform between the four communities. The highest level of response came from Ottawa, where 39.2% of the men who received a questionnaire completed and returned it. Hamilton had the next highest response rate, 35.1%, followed by Lindsay with 29.5%, and the lowest level of response was from Sudbury, where 28.6% of those requested to complete a questionnaire did so. This is a disappointing response rate but is not unusually low in comparison with other questionnaire surveys. A more detailed discussion of the response to the survey, and of possible reasons for the level of response, is contained in Appendix A. In this

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17 The size of the entire sample, after deducting those cases where the questionnaire was returned undeliverable, was 3,369.

18 See D.C. Miller, Handbook of Research Design and Social Measurement, (New York: McKay, 1970), pp. 76-84. Miller points out that many questionnaire surveys receive response rates ranging from 10 to 25 percent. In that case, the four communities study seems to have been quite successful.
chapter the discussion will center on the problem of to what degree the sample obtained is representative of the populations of the communities studied.

To examine the question of to what extent the samples conform to, or depart from, the general populations from which they were drawn, certain characteristics of the respondents shall be compared with the distribution of the same characteristics among the populations of the communities studied. The information on the populations of the communities is taken from the 1961 Census of Canada. It cannot be expected that the comparisons will be strictly valid, because there is a ten year time-lag between the collection of the census information and the period during which the survey was administered. The communities are bound to have changed somewhat over this period but, unfortunately, details from the 1971 Census of Canada were not available at the time of writing and, therefore, the 1961 Census provides the most up-to-date population estimates.19

The time-lag inevitably leads to problems of comparison, as is clear, for example, in the case of education. The census records the highest grade of school attended by those males, over the age of five, who were not attending school at the time of the census. The study involves males who, as of 1971, were twenty years or over. Hence some of

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19 Communication with the Census Division of Statistics Canada revealed that similar statistics from the 1971 Census would not even begin to become available until after the summer of 1973.
the men in the sample, like a larger group in the general population, would still have been at school in 1961, and would not have been included in the census data. It is highly likely that this group received more formal education than men educated in earlier periods, and this would lead to the general level of education among the men sampled being higher than that among the males covered by the 1961 Census data.

Similar comparative problems could occur due to changes in the labour force. Lindsay, for example, welcomed several new industrial plants between 1961 and 1971, in particular a plant owned by Uniroyal. This has obviously led to changes in the occupational structure of the community, changes that would not be shown in the 1961 census data. It is probable that such changes would have a greater aggregate effect on the statistics for a small community such as Lindsay than those for larger communities such as the other three cities in the study. Migration, too, may have led to changes in the population profiles of the four communities in ways which will not be known until the publication of the 1971 census material. In lieu of any more recent statistics, however, the information contained in the publications of the 1961 Census of Canada appears to be the best yardstick with which to judge the representativeness of the sample.

A second possible source of discrepancy between the survey data and the census statistics lies in the fact that the census was based upon interviews (often of housewives), whereas the survey used the mailed questionnaire method. The census interviewers were able to probe respondents on questions that may not have been understood
properly, whereas the questionnaire had to rely on respondents understanding the question and answering it accurately. But, on the other hand, because the questionnaires were filled-in by the respondents to whom they referred, in contrast to the census situation where information on men was often provided by their wives, they may have elicited more accurate information in some respects. A wife, for example, may know that her husband is a steelworker, but she may not know that he is a second helper on a blast furnace.

Differences in the wording of questions may also prevent the strict comparability of the survey and census data. As will be seen in Appendix A, one of the reasons for this study was a pre-testing for a major study of occupational and social mobility in Canada. The question concerning the respondent's occupation, in addition to asking for the exact title of the occupation, also provided a set of incomplete and complete job titles in order to inform the respondent of the degree of exactness required. This question was assumed to be more accurate than that used in the census, and may make the two sets of data difficult to compare precisely. However, no controlled check on the supposed greater accuracy of the study question was made. Another such

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20 With inexperienced interviewers, though, such probing may lead to problems of interviewer bias.

21 This type of problem may have contributed to the underrepresentation of miners in the Sudbury sample. Men whose wives describe them as miners may provide more accurate job titles, leading to them being coded under a different category of the Census occupation classification scheme.

22 See question 1:19-24, Appendix C.

23 Some corroboration of this came from the greater ease of coding occupations when this question was used, compared to an earlier pilot study where the simpler Census question was used.
difference occurs with the question concerning educational attainment, with the survey question asking for the number of years the respondent had spent in full-time education. The census, on the other hand, presents data on the highest grade attended. This difference would tend to inflate the general level of education in the samples, due to the probability of people repeating grades. At the top of the educational scale, the census only records "university degree", whereas years of schooling may include graduate work. Thus the higher mean level of education of the samples may be partly attributable to these differences.

Coding error and unclear responses leading to coding difficulties could also be factors leading to discrepancies. All coding, and key-punching onto I.B.M. cards, was double checked, but some errors may have passed without discovery. With the problem of unclear responses such a "mechanical" procedure was not possible. With the education question, for example, a number of respondents answered with such statements as "public school", "high school", etc. In such cases the coders had to make informed guesses as to the number of years represented by such statements. "High school", for example, could mean that the respondent had completed high school, or that he had attended for as little as one year. If the coders assumed that the respondent had completed high school, did this mean that he had attended to grade 12 or to grade 13? Problems such as this, and the solutions adopted, may have inflated the educational levels of the samples as against the

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24See question 1:76-77, Appendix C.
census which, it will be remembered, simply asked for the highest grade attended.

Coding error due to ambiguity of responses was also a problem with the occupation question. In a variety of cases the census provides two codes for the same occupation, depending on whether the person is self-employed and employs other people (where he would be coded as "owners and managers n.e.s.") or whether he is employed by someone else or self-employed without paid help (where he would be assigned another code). There was no question in the study questionnaire concerning the employment of other people. In cases of doubt it was extremely difficult to make a decision, and some men may have been assigned the wrong code, possibly increasing the numbers of owners and managers in the samples.

The survey data refers to males over the age of twenty, whereas the census data is not always restricted to this segment of the male population, and this may sometimes lead to discrepancies. The method of drawing the sample also seems likely to have been a factor leading to discrepancies between the census and the samples. As Appendix A notes, approximately five percent of the questionnaires that were mailed out in the four communities were returned by the Post

25 The samples were, with the exception of Lindsay, drawn from City Directories, which list all persons over the age of 18. We did not, in fact, receive any replies from men under 20, and this is due, primarily, to the time-lag between the collection of information for these sources, and the administration of the survey. Hence men in their eighteenth year when the information was collected would have been older by the time the survey was conducted.
Office as being undeliverable. Owing to the information in city directories and Assessment rolls (the latter provided the sampling frame for Lindsay, the former for the other three communities) not being completely up-to-date at the time of the survey, a number of people had moved from the addresses given, and were untraceable. If the people who had moved were representative of the population as a whole this would present no difficulties. If, on the other hand, the people who were mobile were a distinct group, sharing attributes in ways dissimilar to the wider population, then this would lead to discrepancies between the samples and the census data, in that men of this type would be underrepresented in the study.

There is also the possibility that some groups of the men sampled saw the study as more relevant than others. Thus young adult males are under-represented in the completed data set. This may be due partly to the greater likelihood of such men being more mobile, and moving away from their parents' homes. There is also the possibility that, as many of the questions related to work experiences, some of the young men may have passed the questionnaires to their fathers who, they may have felt, were more qualified to complete them. At the other end of the age continuum, retired men may have felt that they were too old to be bothered with such things, or that the questionnaire was not relevant to their situation. Some indication of such feelings was provided by responses to the follow-up campaigns and by comments to such effect among the blank questionnaires that were returned.

The preceding pages should illustrate that there are other
possible sources of discrepancy between the samples and the population parameters besides those that can be traced to sampling error and non-response bias. But this is not to deny that the relatively low response rate presents a problem as to the representativeness of the samples from the four communities. Random sampling fluctuation can lead to a sample not conforming exactly with the population parameters, but there is only a certain range of fluctuation that can be assumed to be the result of chance. If a sample varies from the population parameters by more than we would expect by chance, then it has to be concluded that the sample is biased. With the data available, there is no way to estimate the separate influences of the various sources of bias; for example, non-response bias and bias introduced because of lack of strict comparability between the sample data and the census statistics cannot be separated out. Hence the discussion of differences between the samples and the census data will be couched in terms of total bias, even though some of this bias will be attributable to problems of comparability.

Checks on the degree of fit between samples and census data were made on seven variables, for each community. These variables were; place of birth, period of immigration of the foreign born, age,

26 It will be seen that measures of occupation and education show the greatest discrepancy with the census data. In view of what has been said about these two questions it appears likely that they, more than any of the other measures cited, are subject to problems of comparability. The samples may not, in fact, be as unrepresentative as these two measures, taken on their own, might suggest.
occupation, education, religious affiliation, and ethnic background. Chi-square values were computed by comparing the survey results with the results expected on the basis of the census check data. The .05 level of probability shall be the criterion of whether differences between the actual and expected responses are regarded as being the result merely of sampling fluctuation. At the .05 level of probability, at any given degree of freedom, a chi-square value of more than that given in a chi-square table would occur by chance only five times in a hundred. With twenty-eight checks of this nature one of the checks could yield a significant chi-square value and still be the result of chance.

Out of a total of twenty-eight checks with the census data, only eight yielded chi-square values low enough to comply with the hypothesis of random sampling fluctuations. It would be appropriate to present these comparisons in tabular form. Table II-4 compares the actual places of birth of the men in the samples with the numbers expected on the basis of the 1961 Census.

In the case of Ottawa the proportions of men from different birth-places do not vary significantly from the census check data. But in the other three places the samples do differ from the population parameters to a statistically significant extent. In the Hamilton case, this is attributable primarily to the under-representation of men from the U.S.S.R., Germany, and Poland, and over-representation of men born in other foreign countries besides Britain and Italy. But the difference only just reaches significance at the .05 level, and the three major groups, those born in Canada, Britain, and Italy, are represented in
numbers very close to those expected on the basis of the census data.

Table II-4.--Actual and expected birthplaces of men in the samples.27

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of birth</th>
<th>Ottawa Actual</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>Hamilton Actual</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>Lindsay Actual</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>Sudbury Actual</th>
<th>Expected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>260.3</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>188.3</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>210.5</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>222.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.,</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\begin{array}{lrrrr}
\chi^2 = 5.95 & \chi^2 = 11.59 & \chi^2 = 15.34 & \chi^2 = 30.02 \\
(4 df) & (4 df) & (2 df) & (4 df) \\
p > .20 & p < .05 & p < .001 & p < .001
\end{array}
\]

aToo few cases for separate cells, so included in "Other".

In both Lindsay and Sudbury, somewhat surprisingly, native-born Canadians completed the questionnaire in numbers less than expected. British-born men returned completed questionnaires in numbers greater than expected. In Sudbury these are the main sources of discrepancy, whereas in Lindsay there is also the fact that other nationalities responded in numbers double that of their expected frequency. The influx of several new industrial plants into Lindsay since 1961 may have led to an influx of non-Canadian, non-British-born men into the community.

27 The census data is contained in 1961 Census of Canada, Volume 1, Part 2, Bulletin 1.2-7, pp. 52-5 to 52-16 (Table 52).
Turning to Table II-5, which shows the period of immigration of the foreign born into Canada, only in Ottawa does the sample satisfy the criterion of correspondence with the check data. But there is only a moderate bias in the other three communities. In Hamilton there is an under-representation of men who immigrated to Canada prior to 1930, men immigrating between 1931 and 1955 are over-represented, and there are slightly fewer men who immigrated after 1955 than would be expected on the basis of census data. In Lindsay there is under-representation of the men who immigrated before 1921, and between 1931 and 1950, whereas all the other groups are over-represented. In Sudbury, the skew is attributable to the over-representation of the men who immigrated between 1931 and 1955, and the under-representation of post-1955 immigrants.

Table II-5.--Actual and expected periods of immigration of the foreign-born respondents to the survey.28

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period of Immigration</th>
<th>Ottawa Actual</th>
<th>Ottawa Expected</th>
<th>Hamilton Actual</th>
<th>Hamilton Expected</th>
<th>Lindsay Actual</th>
<th>Lindsay Expected</th>
<th>Sudbury Actual</th>
<th>Sudbury Expected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 1921</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-55</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-61</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\chi^2 = \begin{array}{cccc}
7.56 & 9.82 & 9.75 & 10.68 \\
(4df) & (4df) & (4df) & (4df)
\end{array}
\]

\[
p < .10 & p < .05 & p < .05 & p < .05
\]

28 The census data is contained in 1961 Census of Canada, Volume 1, Part 2, Bulletin 1.2-8, pp. 60-3 to 60-8 (Table 60).
The general under-representation of men who immigrated prior to 1921 is to be expected, bearing in mind that this group includes the oldest men in the population and, hence, the group likely to have suffered the greatest mortality in the period between the census and the survey. The other discrepancies are not so easily explained, except that it is possible that the post-1955 immigrants include men whose native tongue is neither English nor French, and who would have had the least time to become proficient in either language used in the questionnaire. This, however, does not appear totally convincing once it is noted that this group is over-represented in the Lindsay sample. What can be noted is that there is no common pattern to the departures from the expectations based on the census check data.

As Table II-6 shows, the age distribution of the samples deviate significantly from the distributions expected from the census check data. Table II-6.--Actual and expected age distribution of the samples.29

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Ottawa Actual</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>Hamilton Actual</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>Lindsay Actual</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>Sudbury Actual</th>
<th>Expected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 - 24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 - 29</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 34</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 - 39</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 - 44</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 - 49</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 54</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 - 59</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 - 64</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 &amp; over</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = \frac{72.66}{(9\text{df})} \quad \chi^2 = \frac{40.87}{(9\text{df})} \quad \chi^2 = \frac{35.21}{(9\text{df})} \quad \chi^2 = \frac{28.88}{(9\text{df})} \]

\[ p < .001 \quad p < .001 \quad p < .001 \quad p < .001 \]

29 The census data is contained in 1961 Census of Canada, Volume 1, Part 2, Bulletin 1.2-2, pp. 25-5 to 23-14 (Table 23).
In all communities, men in the twenty to twenty-four age bracket are fewer than expected, greatly so in three of the communities and, to a lesser extent, in Sudbury also. Men over the age of sixty-five are under-represented in all communities except Sudbury. The age groups that are most over-represented are not common in all communities but, broadly speaking, the age groups between thirty and sixty-four responded more to the survey than either the young or the retired. In this case, somewhat paradoxically, the magnitude of the skew in the sample is inversely related to the size of the response rate, with Sudbury having the smallest skew, and Ottawa the largest.

The occupational compositions of the four samples, as is clear from Table II-7, are significantly out of line with the census check data. In all four communities, owners and managers, and professional and technical workers replied in numbers far in excess of their representation in the population. Given the expectation that people of high socio-economic status would be more likely to respond to social surveys, some over-preponderance of people in such occupations is likely; but the magnitude of the disproportionate response comes as something of a surprise. Excepting the case of Sudbury, where the over-representation is primarily compensated for by the under-representation of miners, labourers, and transport and communications workers, the under-represented occupations are primarily those that occupy the middle ranges of the occupational hierarchy. In Ottawa the greatest under-representation is of clerical and service workers, with a slighter loss of sales workers, transport and communications workers, and farmers. In Hamilton,
service, transport and communications, and farmers are the most under-represented groups, and in Lindsay it is the clerical and transport and communications workers.

Table II-7.--Actual and expected occupational compositions of the samples.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational group</th>
<th>Ottawa Actual</th>
<th>Hamilton Actual</th>
<th>Lindsay Actual</th>
<th>Sudbury Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expected</td>
<td>Expected</td>
<td>Expected</td>
<td>Expected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional &amp; technical</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service, etc.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport &amp; communications</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers, etc.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miners, etc.</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen, production process, etc.</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>114.4</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers nes</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 81.81 \quad \chi^2 = 46.12 \quad \chi^2 = 58.18 \quad \chi^2 = 128.36 \]

\( (9df) \quad (9df) \quad (9df) \quad (10df) \)

\( p < .001 \quad p < .001 \quad p < .001 \quad p < .001 \)

\( ^a \text{Too few cases for separate category; included with "craftsmen" etc.} \)

A notable fact about the occupational composition of the four samples, and something that has advantageous consequences for this thesis, is that there is, with the exception of Sudbury, no substantial under-

\[ ^{30} \text{See note 6 for the source of the census data.} \]
representation of manual workers in the samples. This is not to say that there was a hundred percent response rate among manual workers, but that, given the response rate, the skews in the samples occur mainly between categories in the non-manual sections of the occupational hierarchy. "Labourers not elsewhere specified" tend to be under-represented in all samples, but this may be a function of the changed occupation question, more manual workers possibly being coded as "craftsmen, production process and related workers". If these two categories are combined, along with miners in Sudbury, only in the case of Sudbury is there a significant departure from the census check data.

As Table II-8 indicates, all samples show large discrepancies with the check data when the educational attainments of respondents to the survey are examined. Generally speaking, men who received eight years of formal education or less are under-represented in the

---

31 Comparison of the men who were miners (in the case of Sudbury), craftsmen, production process or related workers, or labourers n.e.s., with the proportions expected on the basis of the census data, yielded Z values of -1.30 for the Ottawa sample, -1.40 for Hamilton, -1.80 for Lindsay, and -6.36 for Sudbury. Only the Sudbury value indicates a significant difference at the .05 level, and is primarily attributable to the small number of miners in the sample, 35 against an expected 68.

Corresponding Z values for the proportions of owners and managers, and professional and technical workers are 8.07 for Ottawa, 5.65 for Hamilton, 5.92 for Lindsay, and 8.73 for the Sudbury sample. All of these values are statistically significant.
Table II-8.--Actual and expected levels of educational attainment of men in the samples.32

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of Education</th>
<th>Ottawa Actual</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>Hamilton Actual</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>Lindsay Actual</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>Sudbury Actual</th>
<th>Expected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>113.3</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>118.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 - 10</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 12</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 - 15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 &amp; over</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>310</td>
<td>310.4</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>279.1</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>255.2</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>282.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² = 80.25 (7df) χ² = 82.87 (7df) χ² = 132.12 (7df) χ² = 209.70 (7df)
p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001

With the three exceptions of the men in Ottawa who received nine to ten years of schooling, and those in Lindsay and Sudbury who attended school for thirteen years (and, in these cases, the differences are slight), all communities have an over-representation of men who attended school for more than eight years. This is particularly true of men who completed fourteen or more years of education. In other words, the samples from all four communities are distorted in favour of the

32 The census data is contained in 1961 Census of Canada, Volume 1, Part 2, Bulletin 1.2-10, pp. 75-5 to 75-16 (Table 75).

33 This is not completely true as regards the men who had no formal education. This, however, may be the result of a coding problem for, if a person did not complete this question, he was coded zero, the same code as for those who actually reported no education.
more educated segments of the male population.

Religious affiliation, as Table II-9 shows, is the only check of the degree of fit between the survey data and the population parameters where, in all four communities, the observed differences do not reach a statistically significant level. There is a slight over-representation of Protestants in all samples, but not enough to suggest that this is more than the result of random sampling fluctuation.

Table II-9.--Actual and expected religious affiliations of men in the samples.34

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Ottawa Actual</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>Hamilton Actual</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>Lindsay Actual</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>Sudbury Actual</th>
<th>Expected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>130.8</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>154.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Church</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Protestant</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>276</strong></td>
<td><strong>276.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>254</strong></td>
<td><strong>253.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>216</strong></td>
<td><strong>215.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>253</strong></td>
<td><strong>252.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2$</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>5.89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4df)</td>
<td>p &gt; .70</td>
<td>p &gt; .05</td>
<td>p &gt; .70</td>
<td>p &gt; .20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the last of the checks, that of ethnic background, Table II-10 shows that both Ottawa and Hamilton exhibit sufficient degrees of fit with the census data to support the hypothesis of random sampling.

34 The census data is contained in 1961 Census of Canada, Volume 1, Part 2, Bulletin 1.2-6, pp. 45-5 to 45-16 (Table 45).
fluctuation. In Ottawa, men of French ethnicity are slightly under-represented, but not enough to indicate that this is more than the result of chance. Again, in Hamilton, men of British ancestry are slightly over-represented, but this does not reach a statistically significant level.

Table II-10.--Actual and expected ethnic origins of men in the samples.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Ottawa Actual</th>
<th>Ottawa Expected</th>
<th>Hamilton Actual</th>
<th>Hamilton Expected</th>
<th>Lindsay Actual</th>
<th>Lindsay Expected</th>
<th>Sudbury Actual</th>
<th>Sudbury Expected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>168.9</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>159.9</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>201.4</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>94.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>93.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other &amp; not stated</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>84.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>310</td>
<td>310.4</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>279.0</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>234.9</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>283.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 4.76$  
$p > .50$

$\chi^2 = 3.18$  
$p > .50$

$\chi^2 = 69.33$  
$p < .001$

$\chi^2 = 37.58$  
$p < .001$

In the case of Sudbury, the skew is primarily attributable to an over-representation of men of British ancestry, and a commensurate under-representation of French Canadians. In Lindsay, both British and French ethnicities are under-represented, whereas those of German ancestry and, particularly, those in the "other and not stated" category appear in greater numbers than their proportions of the male population would warrant. In all communities, there was a substantial number

35 The census data is contained in 1961 Census of Canada, Volume 1, Part 2, Bulletin 1.2-5, pp. 38-5 to 38-16 (Table 38).
of no answers, ranging from just under 5% in Ottawa to approximately 11% in Lindsay. As the census does not separate the "other" and "not stated" categories, it was impossible to remove the no answers from the calculations. And, at least in the cases of Ottawa and Lindsay, the no answers contribute substantially to the magnitude of the skews (even though, in the Ottawa case, the skew is not statistically significant).

In an examination of the degree of fit between the samples and the census check data, therefore, in twenty out of twenty-eight cases the chi-square values yielded from a comparison of the actual and expected distribution of attributes among the samples were larger than would be the case if differences were due only to random sampling fluctuations. More of the checks were successful in the cases of Ottawa and Hamilton than in Lindsay or Sudbury, and this would appear to be consistent with the higher response rates from the former.

The magnitude of the discrepancies between the samples and the population parameters forces the conclusion that the samples cannot be regarded as representative of the populations from which they were drawn. Two considerations, however, suggest that the data collected are sufficient for the purposes of this thesis. Firstly, this thesis is concerned primarily with the attitudes of manual workers toward the Canadian stratification system. As has been noted, only in the case of Sudbury is the skew in the occupational compositions of the samples

36 In numerical terms, the no answers were 15 in Ottawa, 15 in Hamilton, 20 in Sudbury, and 27 in Lindsay.
attributable to the actual number of manual workers being under the number expected on the basis of the census data. The fact of the low response rate still remains, but it can be said that this has not, in three out of the four cases, resulted in manual workers responding at a rate that deviates greatly from the general response to the questionnaire survey. The second consideration concerns the fact that the primary emphasis of this study is comparative - to seek to analyse differences and similarities in the attitudes of men who share a similar class situation, but who differ in their particular work environment, community situations, and exposure to non-manual life styles. Even if it cannot be established that the men in the samples are typical of the men in the communities studied, it is still true that they are resident in different types of communities, and perform their jobs in a variety of work situations. Hence any differences that we find in the attitudes of these men, particularly when the influence of other variables is controlled for, would be indicative that such differences do exist between the total adult, male populations of these communities.

It is possible to compare some of the results of this study with those of a study that obtained a better response rate in order to gauge, somewhat, what effect the low response rate has on the validity of the findings. Pineo and Porter, in the course of their study of occupational prestige in Canada, asked the class identifications of their respondents in a manner identical to that used in this study. 37

37The wording of the question in both studies was, "If you had to pick one, which of the following five social classes would you say you were in - upper class, upper-middle class, middle class, working class, or lower class?" The question used in the present study, however, added two further responses - "don't know" and "there is no such thing". The data on the Pineo/Porter study is taken from J.C. Goyder, "Subjective Class Identification and Objective Socio-Economic Status", (Ph.D. dissertation, McMaster University, 1972), pp. 42-43.
Goyder, in his study of class identification in Canada, compared the zero-order correlations of class identification with a number of socio-economic attributes from the Pineo/Porter data with those from the study on which this thesis is based. As the data that Goyder worked with did not include the Lindsay sample, but did contain data from questionnaires administered in Hull, Quebec, these correlations were re-calculated on the data that is the basis of this study, namely the replies of men residing in Ottawa, Hamilton, Lindsay, and Sudbury.

### Table II-11.--Zero order correlations of class identification with socio-economic attributes for male respondents in the Pineo/Porter study and the four communities study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Pineo/Porter Study</th>
<th>Four communities Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of respondent</td>
<td>.37 (N=298)</td>
<td>.45 (N=969)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of respondent</td>
<td>.35 (N=300)</td>
<td>.42 (N=958)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income of family</td>
<td>.37 (N=296)</td>
<td>.44a (N=950)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of respondent's father</td>
<td>.10 (N=199)</td>
<td>.23 (N=880)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of respondent's wife</td>
<td>.29 (N=182)</td>
<td>.29 (N=500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of respondent's best friend</td>
<td>.38 (N=233)</td>
<td>.37b (N=566)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aRespondent's income only.
bAs many replies indicated wife as best friend, only the replies of respondents whose best friends were males are included.

38See Appendix A for reasons for excluding Hull.
Table II-11 shows that the correlations of class identification with a number of socio-economic attributes found in the two studies are fairly similar. The correlations with occupation of respondent's wife and occupation of respondent's best friend are practically identical in the two studies. The correlations with occupation of respondent, education of respondent, and income are higher in the four communities study. This may, however, be due to differences in the coding of these attributes in the two studies, and the correlations in the four communities study may be slightly higher because of the fact that, on these attributes, more categories were used. Also, the income correlations are not strictly comparable, as Pineo/Porter figures are of family income, whereas the four communities study figures are based solely on the income of the respondent. But even then, the differences are not large, and there is sufficient congruence between these correlations to suggest that the results are fairly similar. The only case where there is a substantial difference between the two studies is in the case of the correlations of class identification with the occupation of

39 In the Pineo/Porter study, as analyzed by Goyder, education was coded into 4 years of elementary or less, 5 years of elementary or more, 1 or 2 years of high school, 3 years of high school, 4 or 5 years of high school, vocational or technical school, some university, university degree, post-graduate degree or professional school. In the four communities study, on the other hand, education is coded by number of years. Income, in the Pineo/Porter study, is coded in $2000 intervals, whereas, in the four communities study, it is coded as under $2000, then $1000 intervals to $15000, and then in $2000 intervals to $20,000 or over. Occupation, in Pineo/Porter, is coded into 9 socio-economic categories, whereas in the four communities study it is coded by the three digit Blishen index. For details of the Pineo/Porter coding, see Goyder, op.cit., p. 32, note 8.
the respondent's father. Again, part of this difference may be due to the greater accuracy of measuring occupation in the four communities study.

The Pineo/Porter study obtained completed interviews with nearly two-thirds of the people sampled, a response rate about twice that achieved in the four communities study. As Goyder points out, if people who responded to the mailed questionnaire study held views on social class that differed from the rest of the Canadian population then it is probable that comparisons such as those made here would show such differences. The fact that such differences do not emerge from the comparison of the correlates of class identification offers some reassurance that the low response rate to the questionnaire survey has not led to a group of respondents to the survey who are so idiosyncratic in their attitudes as to be completely different from other men in their communities.

Even though it seems that the low response rate does not appear to have led to complete unreliability of the survey, it is possible, also, to improve the representativeness of the sample by weighting it, adjusting the sample by increasing the representation of people who display characteristics under-represented in the sample and, at the same time, decreasing the representation of types of people who appear too frequently in the sample. By making such adjustments to

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40Goyder, op.cit., pp. 44-45.

a sample, it is to be hoped that the range of attitudes displayed by respondents to the survey (and their distributions) would be closer to the distribution of such attitudes in the populations from which the samples were drawn. Cochran, Mosteller, and Tukey illustrate this with a hypothetical example of an anthropological study.42 Suppose a random sample of 100 adults was drawn in a tribe where 50% of the adults were male and 50% female. The sample, on the other hand, contains 60% males and only 40% females. If 59 of the 60 men had herded sheep at some time in their lives, but none of the women had done so, the finding from the biased sample would be that 59% of the tribe had herded sheep at some time. But if the sample is corrected for the over-representation of men and under-representation of women, then the estimated proportion of the tribe who had herded sheep is reduced to 49%. By adjusting for bias in this manner a better indicator of what actually goes on in the wider population can be obtained.

The problem arises, however, that men who share a certain characteristic (for example, a similar occupation) may be dissimilar in their possession of other attributes (for example, religious affiliation or ethnic background). A weighting system that improved the degree of fit between the sample and the population parameters in terms of the attribute chosen for adjustment, but which created problems on other dimensions by worsening the degree of fit, would be counter-productive. There must be theoretical grounds for assuming that the

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42 Ibid., pp. 176-177.
variable chosen for weighting is related to other variables in the data set, hence for assuming that the skew on that variable is a contributing factor to the skews on the other variables concerned. Unless checks are made of its effects on other variables there is the danger that a weighting system could worsen the skews in these other cases. Hence, the concern is to find a weighting system that not only improves the degree of fit with the check data for the variable chosen for the weighting scheme, but also provides the best balanced performance - one that improves as many cases as possible, and that also has the least negative consequences.

Three possible weighting systems were considered as possible ways to improve the representativeness of the samples. The variables subjected to weighting were occupation, education, and age. Variation in response rates by occupational composition and educational level are forms of response bias that are expected, and most understood, by sociologists. Position in the socio-economic hierarchy is known to be associated with a plethora of other factors, hence improving the degree of fit between the samples and the census check data, on either of these two variables, could be expected to improve the fit with other variables as well. Age was chosen as the third possibility because, with the large discrepancies on this dimension, it was expected

that this would also contribute to the discrepancies with other variables such as occupation, education, period of immigration, and place of birth; variables which are, to some extent, age-related.

The weighting was accomplished by adjusting the frequency distributions of the variables being weighted, so that the number of respondents in each category of the variable corresponded to the proportion of men in that same category in the census check data. The weighting procedure has the effect, therefore, of altering the distribution of cases, in the variable weighted, so that there is a near-perfect fit between the sample and check data. This procedure was applied separately to the samples for each of the four communities. With the occupation weighting, for example, every man in the Hamilton sample who was coded as "owners and managers" was assigned a weight of .59.\textsuperscript{44} In the calculations from the data, every time a case is encountered that has this occupation code it only adds .59 to the number of cases in the appropriate category of the variable being considered. Thus, not only is the variable of occupation adjusted on this basis, but all other variables are tabulated according

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\textsuperscript{44} The categories used in weighting occupation were not quite the same as those shown in Table II-7. The category "transport and communications workers" was divided into manual and non-manual components. Also, foremen were separated from the categories containing miners, and craftsmen and production process workers. This, as the next section will show, was done in the attempt to obtain an adequate division of the sample into manual and non-manual workers. The census data is detailed enough to allow this manipulation, so these revised categories were used.
to the revised weight of each individual case. The same basic procedure was applied to the samples with respect to all three weighting systems, and computer tabulations were made with each weighting system for the other variables that constitute the check factors discussed in this chapter.45

From the three sets of revised statistics new comparisons were made with the census check data, and chi-square values measuring the degree of fit were calculated. The lower the chi-square value, given the appropriate degrees of freedom, the better the degree of fit between the sample data and the census check data. Thus every time the chi-square yielded by a comparison of the weighted sample and the check data is lower than that obtained with the original samples, there has been some improvement in the degree of fit. When discussing the relative merits of the weighting systems there are two criteria for evaluation; the effect of the weighting on the sum of the chi-square values,46 and

45It might have been desirable to experiment with some combined weighting systems, say, for example, of occupation, education, and age simultaneously. This however, would have required cross-tabulation of the census data but, unfortunately, such statistics are not available. Another inhibiting factor came from a limit on the number of statements for weighting that could be used with the computer programme. The user's manual for this package computer programme is, N. Nie, D.H. Bent, & C.H. Hull, Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970).

46It is possible to sum the results of a number of individual chi-square tests and, by the application of the formula \( \sqrt{\chi^2 - \frac{1}{2} \text{df}} \), to achieve a kind of average of the measures. See H.M. Blalock, Social Statistics, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), pp. 238-239.
the effect on the individual chi-squares that go to make up that sum. It is possible that a weighting system could reduce the sum of chi-squares by having a very large positive effect on one variable which compensates for the negative effects it has on other variables. Merely examining the sum of chi-squares, in such a case, would suggest that the weighting scheme is successful, whereas taking into account its effects on individual variables would lead to the opposite conclusion. One would hardly be satisfied with a weighting scheme that improved a sample on one dimension only at the expense of many other variables.

Bearing these two criteria in mind, it is possible to examine the results of the weighting schemes, which are presented in Table II-12. In terms of the number of improvements in the degree of fit with the census check data, weighting by age is the most successful. With the twenty-eight separate chi-square values, weighting by age leads to improvement in twenty-one cases. However, age weighting has to be rejected because of the damage it does to the other seven chi-square values. In particular, weighting for age worsens the degree of fit in the cases of ethnic background in the Lindsay sample, education in the Hamilton sample, and occupation and education in Sudbury. As these are among those that show the greatest discrepancy with the census check data, a weighting system that worsens the degree of fit in such cases has to be rejected. Looking at the total sum of chi-squares for all twenty-eight comparisons, it is clear that weighting by age has the least over-all effect of any of the three weighting systems. In fact, in the case of Sudbury, weighting by age produces a sum of chi-square
Table II-12.--Degree of fit with census data (chi-square values) for seven sample variables, with samples weighted and unweighted.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unweighted</th>
<th>Weighting System</th>
<th>D.F.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occn. Edn. Age</td>
<td>Occn. Edn. Age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of birth</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>2.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period of immigration</td>
<td>7.56</td>
<td>6.18</td>
<td>4.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age groups</td>
<td>72.66a</td>
<td>63.10a</td>
<td>79.34a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>81.81a</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39.04a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>80.25a</td>
<td>62.89a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Affiliation</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>7.79</td>
<td>3.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic background</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>14.58a</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sum x^2$</td>
<td>254.95</td>
<td>157.64</td>
<td>132.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sqrt{2x^2} - \sqrt{2df-1}$</td>
<td>13.69</td>
<td>8.87</td>
<td>7.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of birth</td>
<td>11.59a</td>
<td>20.66a</td>
<td>19.06a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period of immigration</td>
<td>9.82a</td>
<td>18.09a</td>
<td>9.95a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>40.87a</td>
<td>28.20a</td>
<td>40.87a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>46.12a</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28.99a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>82.87a</td>
<td>39.35a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious affiliation</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td>2.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic background</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>4.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sum x^2$</td>
<td>203.55</td>
<td>112.54</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sqrt{2x^2} - \sqrt{2df-1}$</td>
<td>11.29</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>5.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindsay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of birth</td>
<td>15.34a</td>
<td>21.00a</td>
<td>9.47a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period of immigration</td>
<td>9.75a</td>
<td>6.79</td>
<td>11.32a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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</tr>
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<td>58.18a</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>51.39a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>132.12a</td>
<td>99.76a</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious affiliation</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>3.67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic background</td>
<td>69.33a</td>
<td>67.77a</td>
<td>79.22a</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\sum x^2$</td>
<td>321.91</td>
<td>234.79</td>
<td>175.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sqrt{2x^2} - \sqrt{2df-1}$</td>
<td>16.71</td>
<td>13.01</td>
<td>10.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudbury</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of birth</td>
<td>30.02a</td>
<td>23.10a</td>
<td>45.79a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period of immigration</td>
<td>10.68a</td>
<td>14.17a</td>
<td>15.04a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>28.88a</td>
<td>37.08a</td>
<td>63.92a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Some values are marked with 'a', indicating significance levels.
Table II-12.—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unweighted</th>
<th>Weighting Systems</th>
<th>D.F.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Occn.</td>
<td>Edn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudbury</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>128.36&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21.37&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>209.70&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>75.16&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious affiliation</td>
<td>5.89&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.71&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.00&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic background</td>
<td>37.58&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>28.35&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>24.21&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sum \chi^2$</td>
<td>451.11</td>
<td>179.54</td>
<td>176.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sqrt{\sum \chi^2 - \sqrt{2df-1}}$</td>
<td>21.04</td>
<td>9.95</td>
<td>9.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total $\sum \chi^2$</td>
<td>1231.52</td>
<td>684.50</td>
<td>590.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total $\sqrt{\sum \chi^2 - \sqrt{2df-1}}$</td>
<td>31.82</td>
<td>19.20</td>
<td>16.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of improvements</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Underlined chi-squares are those improved by weighting.

<sup>a</sup>Chi-square significant at .05 level.

Values that is greater than that resulting from the unweighted comparisons. In both its effects on the sum of chi-squares, and its performance on the individual chi-square values, where the improvement it makes in twenty-one cases is offset by the harm caused in the other seven cases, this weighting system is the poorest of the three attempted. Clearly, such a weighting system has little to offer to the attempt to improve the representativeness of the samples.

Weighting by occupation improves the degree of fit with the census check data in nineteen cases. There are slight increases in the cases of age and religious affiliation in Lindsay, and larger increases in the other seven cases. But in only one case does weighting by occupation lead to a chi-square becoming statistically significant
where it was not so in the unweighted comparisons (ethnic background in Ottawa), and in one case (period of immigration in Lindsay) it leads to a previously significant value becoming insignificant (in addition, of course, to the fact that it reduces to nil the values from the comparisons on occupation). In only one case, age in Sudbury, does weighting by occupation lead to an increase in one of the more substantial discrepancies.

Weighting by education improves the degree of fit with the check data in fifteen instances. In the cases of period of immigration and ethnic background in Hamilton, religious affiliation and age groups in Ottawa, religious affiliation in Sudbury, and period of immigration and religious affiliation in Lindsay it only increases the chi-square values slightly, but there are more substantial increases in the other six instances, especially with place of birth and age in Sudbury. In no case, except in the comparisons on education itself, is there a change in the significance or insignificance of the chi-square values.

The education weighting scheme has a greater effect in reducing the sum of chi-squares for each community than does occupation, but, except in the case of Ottawa, this is attributable to the greater magnitude of the skew on education and the greater impact its removal by weighting has on the sums of the chi-square values.

Both the occupation and education weighting schemes offer some improvement in the representativeness of the samples. But in terms of over-all improvement, it would appear that occupation offers most as the basis for weighting the samples. It improves the degree
of fit with the census check data in more cases, is, after allowing for differences in the magnitudes of the skews on occupation and education, as efficient in reducing the sum of chi-square values, and it has less drastic consequences than education weighting in the instances where there are increases in the chi-squares. Thus the balance of consequences of using a weighting system based on occupation are of a positive nature, having the over-all effect on improving the degree of fit between the samples and the population parameters. 47

Whilst a weighting system may improve the samples along the dimensions measured by the census check data, is it legitimate to infer that it also improves the samples along the dimensions of variables for which there are no population estimates? It is conceivable that a weighting system could improve a sample on all check variables but still introduce skews on other variables. It was shown earlier

47 It may be suggested that use of 1961 census data as a basis for the weighting by occupation could bias the samples because of changes in the labour force since then. At the time of writing the 1971 census data on the labour forces of the four communities were not available, but labour force survey data comparing the total Canadian male labour forces of 1961 and 1971 show that the major changes between 1961 and 1971 have been that professional and technical workers have increased from about 8% to about 12% of the male labour force, and that farmers and farmworkers have declined from 14% to 8% of the labour force. Thus weighting on the basis of the 1961 census may over-compensate for the over-representation of professional and technical workers in the sample. But apart from these two changes the composition of the male labour force has not altered substantially in the ten years between 1961 and 1971. Those people who are the main subjects of this thesis, i.e. manual workers, made up 35% of the male labour force in 1961 and 37% in 1971. So use of the 1961 census data (assuming that changes in the four communities have conformed to the general pattern) as the basis of the weighting scheme would not appear to present great problems on this score. (Labour force survey data presented in, Canada Department of Labour, Women in the Labour Force, 1971. Ottawa: Labour Canada, n.d.).
that, in the case of the unweighted sample data, a fairly close correspondence between the results of this study and the Pineo/Porter study existed, at least in terms of the association of a number of socio-economic attributes and class identification. If the weighting scheme resulted in a series of correlations between class identification and socio-economic attributes that differed substantially from those obtained with the unweighted data, then it would be difficult to judge which were the best estimates of the "real" effects of socio-economic factors on peoples' class identifications. But, as Table II-13 shows, there is, in fact, little difference between the correlations with class identification yielded by the weighted and unweighted data.

Table II-13.--Zero-order correlations of class identification with socio-economic attributes from the unweighted sample and the sample weighted by occupation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Unweighted sample</th>
<th>Sample weighted by occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of respondent</td>
<td>.45 (N=969)</td>
<td>.45 (N=965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of respondent</td>
<td>.42 (N=958)</td>
<td>.40 (N=946)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income of respondent</td>
<td>.44 (N=950)</td>
<td>.41 (N=937)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of respondent's father</td>
<td>.23 (N=880)</td>
<td>.21 (N=862)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of respondent's wife</td>
<td>.29 (N=500)</td>
<td>.30 (N=483)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of respondent's best (male) friend</td>
<td>.37 (N=566)</td>
<td>.36 (N=546)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The numbers on which the correlations are based are not the same for the weighted and unweighted samples, because weighting had the effect of increasing the no answers somewhat.
The largest difference in the correlations is among those of class identification with the respondent's income, and even here the difference is only .03. And the larger discrepancies are such that the correlations based on the weighted sample are closer to the Pineo/Porter correlations than are those based on the unweighted sample. It appears from these comparisons that weighting the sample has not affected the inter-relationships of variables within the sample.48 It might be suggested that this renders the weighting system redundant. But, for example, if weighting the sample led to a situation where socio-economic factors were far less related to the class identifications of respondents than in the unweighted case, it would be difficult to adjudicate between the conflicting findings. This would be especially true where the findings of the unweighted sample correspond closely to those of a study, such as Pineo and Porter's, which received a far better response. That this situation has not occurred is some support for the belief that improvement of the sample to correspond more closely to the census data has not introduced other forms of bias into

48 Another test of the effect of the weighting scheme was made. Six variables, central to this thesis were selected (union membership, class identification on an open-ended question, class model, party choice at the last provincial election, political model, and industrial model), and the marginal distributions for each town, with the unweighted and weighted samples, were compared. In only one out of twenty-four checks was there a statistically significant difference (at the .05 level) between the marginals. With this number of comparisons, one such result could be expected by chance, so the results of this test reinforce the findings of the comparisons of the correlations with class identification.
the results. Even though weighting by occupation has not, it appears, substantially affected the results of this study it is still advisable to work with the weighted sample, for it approximates the actual social composition (in occupational terms) of the communities studied.

The Working-class Sub-sample

The previous section has discussed the response to the survey by men in all social classes in the communities studied. This thesis, however, is concerned with the attitudes of working-class men, so it is necessary to define that component of the entire sample that shall be regarded as containing the working-class respondents to the survey.

This thesis will follow the fairly common procedure of taking occupation as the main indicator of class position. Working-class men will be defined as those men who are employed in manual (or blue-collar) occupations. Using occupation as the primary determinant of social class raises the question that, because a man performs a manual occupation, it does not necessarily follow that he ranks lower than a non-manual worker in the possession of other attributes that are correlated with occupation. There may, for example, be little difference between the income of a manual worker at the top of the manual category and many white-collar workers' earnings. 49 Likewise, there are bound to be manual

---

49 There is, in fact, little difference in the earnings of manual and clerical workers in the study. In fact the manual workers, as a group, earned slightly more than the clerical workers. The mean income for all manual workers is approximately $7,750, whereas that for clerical workers (excluding stock clerks, shipping clerks, and baggagemen) is about $7,700.
workers who are better educated than some men in clerical occupations. 50

But, as Parkin argues:

It should be emphasised that this division (between manual and non-manual occupations) does not rest upon mere differences of income; indeed, there is clearly a good deal of overlap in the actual earnings of groups which cluster at the margins of the class dividing line. But when we speak of rewards, and even more narrowly of material rewards, we mean much more than income. For example, when comparing the position of blue-collar groups with that of white-collar groups, including those in lower occupational categories, it is necessary to take account of the various concealed or long-term advantages that the latter enjoy over the former. 51

White-collar workers tend to enjoy more extensive fringe benefits (sick leave, pension rights, etc.); more amenable hours of work (general freedom from shift work, later starting hours, less overtime, etc.); less close supervision at work (how many clerks have to clock-in?); at least some possibility of career advancement; and, last, but by no means least, pleasanter and safer working conditions.

When discussing an individual's class position it is necessary, as Lockwood points out in *The Blackcoated Worker*, to take account not only of his "market situation", but also of his "work situation" and his "status situation". 52 "Market situation" refers to the economic position

50 The clerical workers are somewhat better educated than the manual workers, the mean years of education being 11.9 and 9.4, respectively.


of the individual, in terms of income, job security, and the opportunity for upward mobility. "Work situation" relates to the nature of the social relationships that the individual is involved in at his place of work. And "status situation" refers to the position of the individual in the societal hierarchy of prestige (which is very much determined by his occupation). It is the configuration of these three components of class situation that lends the manual/non-manual distinction its salience, and justifies the use of such a class-dividing line. Although a manual worker may enjoy a more favourable "market situation" than some clerical workers (at least with regard to some aspects of "market situation"), he will very likely be in an inferior class position because of the more favourable "work" and "status situations" of the clerical worker.  

Given that occupation shall be used as the criterion of class membership, there then arises the question of measurement. The current occupation of every respondent was coded under the scheme provided in the Census of Canada (1961) occupation classification code. The


54 Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Occupational Classification Manual, Census of Canada, 1961, (Ottawa: the Queen's Printer, 1961). This code was used because it is easily translatable into the Blishen socio-economic index of occupations. The 1971 Census manual was not used, as the Blishen index is constructed on the basis on the 1961 code. For the Blishen index, see B. Blishen, "A Socio-Economic Index
Census code subsumes over sixteen thousand occupational terms under two hundred and seventy-three categories, which are then placed into twelve major occupational divisions. The code classifies occupations primarily in terms of the nature of the work performed, in an attempt to obtain groups of occupations as homogeneous as possible. The criteria used include education and training, materials worked with, tools and equipment used, and work environment. It is stated in the manual that the relative importance of each factor varies according to the occupation being classified.

It is not always easy to determine whether a particular division is comprised totally of manual or non-manual workers. There is little problem, in this regard, concerning the divisions referring to managerial, and professional and technical occupations. No great problems arise when considering the divisions of the code referring to farmers and

for Occupations in Canada", in B. Blishen, et al. (eds), Canadian Society, (Toronto: MacMillan, 1969), pp. 741-754. The same codings (Census and Blishen) were applied to first job of respondent, respondent's father's job, job of best friend, and respondent's wife's job.


56 Occupational Classification manual, p. 8.
farmworkers, loggers and related workers, and fishermen, trappers and hunters, as these occupations are rarely represented in urban labour forces. Only nine men reported such occupations in the original sample, becoming sixteen cases in the weighted sample. Although, for example, it may be difficult to place the farm labourer, such a problem is of little relevance to this study, concerned as it is with the urban working-class. Because of the small numbers, and the admixture of working and non-working-class occupations in this category, it was decided to exclude such men from the analysis.

The division of the census classification scheme relating to clerical occupations includes some occupations, such as stock clerks, store keepers, and shippers and receivers, which may, at least, be marginally working-class. Some men coded as such may spend most of their time in manual pursuits such as loading and unloading stores, whereas others are likely to perform primarily clerical duties. It is impossible to distinguish such differences by inspection of the census codes, so it would be safer to assign all such individuals to the non-manual sector. This procedure has the attraction that, if it introduces any bias, it does so in a conservative direction, lessening differences between manual and non-manual workers.57

A similar problem applies to the occupations in the three divisions for sales, service and recreation, and transport and communic-
ations occupations, where manual and non-manual occupations seem to be freely intermixed. Sales and service workers, even those at the lower income levels, are difficult to classify into manual or non-manual, so the decision was made to omit them from the analysis. With transport and communications occupations this could not be done, one reason being the long history of unionization of some groups in this category, such as railroad workers and truck drivers. It was fairly easy, by inspection, to determine which occupations in this category are blue-collar and which not. Inspectors and foremen of transport occupations, and air pilots, navigators and flight engineers were assigned to the non-manual category. All other transport occupations represented among the respondents to the survey (railroad operators, road transport operators, and other transport occupations) were categorised as manual occupations. This procedure contributed a total of sixty-three men to the numbers of manual workers in the weighted sample. An inspection of the Blishen index values assigned to the various occupations subsumed under the headings of "supervisors of communication operations" and "other

58 A similar strategy is adopted by W.G. Marston in "Social Class Segregation within Ethnic Groups in Toronto", Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 6:2 (1969), pp. 65-79. Marston includes service and recreation workers in the blue-collar category. But this is a very heterogeneous category, including army officers and privates, actors and waiters, athletes and barbers, and so on and so forth. Because of this heterogeneity, it was decided to exclude service & recreation workers.

59 There is also a code for "operators, water transport", but no respondent reported such an occupation.

60 There were 26 men in the unweighted sample with such an occupation.
communication occupations" suggested that they could be assigned to the non-manual category. 61

The remaining categories encompass those men coded as miners, quarrymen and related workers, craftsmen, production process and related workers, and labourers not elsewhere specified. And it is these men, together with the transport workers discussed above, who will form the group designated as working-class. Even here, however, some adjustment has to be made to account for the inclusion of foremen in these categories. As foremen generally occupy an intermediate position between management and men, and have authority over the men they supervise, it is difficult to see them as sharing the same total class situation as manual workers.

The census occupation code adopts two strategies when classifying foremen. In some cases, such as foremen in a skilled trade like carpentry, foremen are assigned the same code as operatives in the occupation. The rationale is that, in such cases, foremen work alongside the men, performing the same tasks, and here, consequently, the supervisory function is secondary. In other cases, where they are deemed to perform more clearly supervisory functions, separate codes are provided for "foremen - mine, quarry, petrol. well", "general foremen and inspectors - construction", and "foremen not elsewhere specified".

61 The only exception, possibly, being postmen & mail carriers, and messengers. As there were only 5 such men in the unweighted sample, if does not make much difference if they are excluded from the working-class group.
It is difficult to ascertain how many foremen, coded under the first strategy, are included in the sample. But there are fifty-one men in the original sample who were coded under the specific codes for foremen (this number reduces to twenty-nine cases in the weighted sample), and these men are excluded from the manual worker group. With those men assigned the same code as operatives, if the logic of the census code is correct, it might be expected that such foremen would have attitudes more similar to those held by operatives than would foremen whose primary function is supervisory. This consideration provides some assurance that the impossibility of removing such men from the working-class sub-sample will not create any great bias. There is also the likelihood that, as in the case of the clerical division, any bias arising from this source will affect the results in the conservative direction.

The weighting scheme based on occupation that is used in this study allowed for the extra considerations outlined above. Thus the census occupational divisions for transport and communications occupations, miners, quarrymen and related workers, and craftsmen, production process and related workers were all divided into supervisory and non-supervisory components, and the appropriate weights were applied for these additional categories. The working-class sub-sample which will be the basis for this study, therefore, is comprised of manual, non-supervisory workers in occupations classified as rail, road and other transport workers, miners and quarrymen, craftsmen, production process and related workers, and labourers not elsewhere specified.
In total there are five hundred and five working-class men in the weighted sample, made up of sixty-three rail, road and other transport workers (5.7% of the total sample), sixty-five miners, quarrymen and related workers (5.8%), three hundred and nine craftsmen, production process and related workers (28%), and sixty-eight labourers (6.2%). In all, working-class men form 45.7% of the entire weighted sample. Ottawa has the lowest number of working-class respondents, there being eighty such men out of a total of three hundred and ten (or 25.8%). There are one hundred and ten working-class men in the Lindsay sample of two hundred and thirty-six men (46.8%), one hundred and forty out of a total of two hundred and seventy-nine men in the Hamilton sample (50.3%), and one hundred and seventy-five working-class men in the Sudbury sample of two hundred and seventy-nine (or 62.2%). As expected, the most "working-class" of the four communities is Sudbury, and the least "working-class" is Ottawa.

Having decided on the sub-sample that will be regarded as the working-class component of the larger sample, it is in order, for the remainder of this chapter, to briefly outline some of the characteristics of the working-class men in this study. Table II-14 shows the occupational composition of the working-class sub-sample.

Except in the case of Sudbury, the majority of working-class men are employed as craftsmen, production process or related workers. In Sudbury, over a third of the men are miners, while another 42% are craftsmen, production process, and related workers. Men in transport occupations are a minority in every community, but their representation
ranges from 18% of the Ottawa workers to only 8% of those in Sudbury.

And labourers, too, are only a small minority of the workers.

Table II-14.--Occcupations of workers in the four communities (in percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Ottawa</th>
<th>Hamilton</th>
<th>Lindsay</th>
<th>Sudbury</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rail, road &amp; other transport</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miners, quarrymen, etc.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsmen, production process etc.</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers nes</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=)</td>
<td>(80)</td>
<td>(140)</td>
<td>(110)</td>
<td>(175)</td>
<td>(505)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A majority of the workers in every community, as Table II-15 shows, are Canadian born. Lindsay has the greatest proportion born in Canada, with over three-quarters of the Lindsay workers being born in Ontario, and another 5% born elsewhere in Canada (though not in Quebec). Ottawa has the next highest proportion born in Canada (75%), with 14% of the workers born in Quebec. Sudbury has a similar proportion of its workers born in Canada, and also it is similar to Ottawa in the number of men born in Quebec. Hamilton has the lowest proportion of Canadian born workers. It will be noted that Hamilton differs from Ottawa and Sudbury more because of the very few Quebec-born men in Hamilton, rather than because of a lower proportion of men born in Ontario.

62Percentage figures presented throughout this thesis will be rounded to the nearest whole number.
Table II-15.--Birthplaces of workers in the four communities (in percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birthplace</th>
<th>Ottawa</th>
<th>Hamilton</th>
<th>Lindsay</th>
<th>Sudbury</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Canada</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total Canada)</td>
<td>(75)</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>(82)</td>
<td>(73)</td>
<td>(73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Isles</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(140)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
<td>(100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=)</td>
<td>(80)</td>
<td>(137)</td>
<td>(108)</td>
<td>(174)</td>
<td>(494)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the immigrants, the British make up the largest single group over all, but they tend to be concentrated more in Hamilton and Lindsay. Men born in Italy make up a larger proportion of the working-class samples in Ottawa and Sudbury but, because there are no Italian born men in Lindsay, the British make up a larger proportion of the entire sample.

Table II-16 shows the ages of the workers in the study.

Table II-16.--Ages of workers in the four communities (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Ottawa</th>
<th>Hamilton</th>
<th>Lindsay</th>
<th>Sudbury</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 - 29</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 39</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 - 49</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 59</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 - 64</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 &amp; over</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=)</td>
<td>(75)</td>
<td>(137)</td>
<td>(108)</td>
<td>(174)</td>
<td>(494)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The mean age of manual workers does not vary substantially between communities, being 42.3 years in Hamilton, 42.7 in Sudbury, 44.0 in Lindsay, and 44.8 in Ottawa. But although the means are similar, there are quite large differences in the distribution around these means. In all four communities, approximately forty percent of the workers are aged between twenty and forty. But, there are proportionately more men in the age group 40 to 49 in Hamilton and Lindsay, and proportionately more of the 50 to 59 group in Ottawa and Sudbury. There is a large proportion of men between 60 to 64 in Ottawa than in the other four communities, and a larger group aged over 65 in Lindsay. However, if these two age groups are combined, the percentages do not differ greatly, the highest being Ottawa, with 18% of its working-class men over 60 years of age, and the lowest being Sudbury, where the corresponding figure is 11%. Although, when analysed in terms of ten years age groups, there are these differences in the age structures of the four communities, in wider terms 67 to 71 percent of the workers in each community are between the ages of thirty and sixty.

Table II-17.—Marital status of workers in the four communities (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Ottawa</th>
<th>Hamilton</th>
<th>Lindsay</th>
<th>Sudbury</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Separated</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N=) (80) (139) (109) (175) (503)
The overwhelming majority of workers in all communities are married. As Table 11-17 shows, over 90% of the workers in Lindsay and Hamilton are married, as are over 80% of those in Ottawa and Sudbury. This, it seems, is a rather high figure, but it may possibly be accounted for by two considerations. The first is that men aged between 20 and 29 (as can be seen from Table II-16) are in a minority, compared to other age groups. As men this age are more likely to be single than men in older age groups, it is to be expected that the under-representation of this age group will boost the proportion of the sample who are married. The second consideration is that married men are more likely to be more stable residentially than are single men, and are so more likely to have been contacted in the survey.

There was, unfortunately, no question relating to the children of respondents, so there is no possibility of going further into the marital and familial situations of the respondents.

Table II-18.--Educational attainments of workers in the four communities (in percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of education</th>
<th>Ottawa</th>
<th>Hamilton</th>
<th>Lindsay</th>
<th>Sudbury</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 - 10</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 - 12</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 - 15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 &amp; over</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N=) 79 141 110 174 504
Table II-18 shows the educational attainments of the workers in the four communities. Mean years of schooling, going from low to high, are 8.8 years in Lindsay, 8.9 in Sudbury, 9.1 in Hamilton, and 9.8 in Ottawa. The communities, with the partial exception of Ottawa, are very similar in terms of the average educational achievements of their working-class occupants. But the actual distribution does vary between the four communities. About 10% of the workers of Ottawa and Lindsay received no formal education (or did not report it), as against only 3% of the workers in the other communities. Very few men in any community received between 1 to 4 years of schooling. Over one-third of the workers in Hamilton and Sudbury attended school for between 5 and 8 years, a proportion quite higher than in Ottawa or Lindsay. In Lindsay the largest proportion of workers, about 41%, spent 9 to 10 years in school. The largest proportion of Hamilton workers are also in this category, whereas, in Ottawa, the largest single group (31%) received 11 to 12 years of full-time education.

In every community, the great majority of working-class men attended school between 5 and 12 years. In Ottawa, 75% were in this category, and in the other three communities almost 90% of the workers were in this group. Few men received more than 12 years of schooling, with the exception of Ottawa, where 15% reported between 13 and 15 years of formal education.

As Table II-19 indicates, there are variations in the religious affiliations of the workers in the four communities. In Ottawa, Hamilton and Sudbury, the largest single denomination is the Roman
Catholic church. In fact, in Ottawa and Sudbury, members of the Roman Catholic church, among the working-class, outnumber the members of all Protestant denominations. In Hamilton, Protestants of all denominations outnumber Catholics by about three to two, but the Roman Catholic church has about twice as many adherents as the largest Protestant denomination, the United Church. Lindsay, by way of contrast, is overwhelmingly Protestant, with three quarters of the workers identifying with one or other of the Protestant churches.

Table II-19.--Religious affiliations of workers in the four communities (in percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious Affiliation</th>
<th>Ottawa</th>
<th>Hamilton</th>
<th>Lindsay</th>
<th>Sudbury</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglican</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Church</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other protestant</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No formal affiliation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are few men who report other than either the Catholic or Protestant denominations, the 8% of the Hamilton workers being the largest proportion of any community. And few men stated that they had no formal religious affiliation; the 11% in Ottawa being the largest group in any community.

63 'Other' includes Greek Orthodox, Ukrainian Catholic, Jewish, and any non-Christian faith.
Most workers, then, report some kind of religious affiliation. Whether this religious affiliation is translated into involvement in church activities is, however, another question. The respondents were asked if they belonged to, attending at least occasionally, a church or church group. The percentages of manual workers who answered in the affirmative are: in Ottawa - 17%, in Lindsay - 42%, in Hamilton - 33%, and in Sudbury - 30%. There is, therefore, a fairly wide range in the degree of church involvement among the workers in the four communities. For a substantial number of the workers, however, religious affiliation appears largely as a formal attribute which does not lead to involvement in church activities.

In terms of ethnicity, as Table II-20 shows, Lindsay is the most homogeneous of the four communities. Almost 80% of the workers in Lindsay reported that they are of English, Scottish, Irish or Welsh origin. Another 14% traced their origins to north western Europe, and only 2% gave their ethnicity as French. In Ottawa, on the other hand, almost as many men claim French ethnicity as claim British, and together they make up 70% of the workers in Ottawa. Another 18% claimed Italian, German, or Dutch ancestry.

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64 Question 5:11-12, Appendix C.

65 In a secondary analysis of data on church attendance collected in an election survey in 1965, H. Mol has found that, for Canada as a whole, regular church attendance among manual workers varies by religious denomination (regular attendance being defined as at least twice a month). Only 9.7% of Anglican workers regularly attended Church, compared to 12.4% of United Church affiliates, 60.5% of English Catholics, 86.3% of French Catholics, and 28.0% of workers with other religious affiliations. (Personal communication from Professor H. Mol, Department of Religion, McMaster University).
Table II-20.--Ethnic backgrounds* of workers in the four communities (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Ottawa</th>
<th>Hamilton</th>
<th>Lindsay</th>
<th>Sudbury</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N=) 104 (134) (94) (162) (454)

*Ethnicity determined on the basis of the ethnic or cultural group to which the respondent or his ancestors (on the male side) belonged on coming to this continent.

Over 20% of the Sudbury workers are of French extraction, about half the number of those who are of British origin. This community has the largest proportion of workers of Italian and Ukrainian ancestry. There are, proportionately, more British and fewer French in Sudbury than in Ottawa, but together the two charter groups make up similar proportions of the working-class of both communities.

Slightly over one-half of the workers in Hamilton are of British origin, the second highest percentage, after Lindsay, among the four communities. Only 8% claim French ancestry, and hence the charter groups together make up a smaller proportion of the Hamilton working-class than of the working-classes of the other communities studied.

Lieberson indices of homogeneity were calculated from the data on ethnic background. The index for Lindsay is .639, indicating

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that Lindsay is the most homogeneous of the four communities. Hamilton, with an index of .313, is a much more ethnically diversified community, but, according to the indices, Ottawa and Sudbury, with indices of .272 and .274 respectively, are even more diversified. The reason for the greater diversity of the latter two communities is that there are few men of French extraction in Hamilton, whereas a fair proportion of the native born in Ottawa and Sudbury are French Canadians.

If Lieberson indices are calculated on the basis of place of birth (treating all those workers who were born in Canada as one group), Lindsay, with an index of .685, is again the most homogeneous community. The positions of Hamilton and the other two communities are, however, reversed. In terms of place of birth, the Hamilton working-class is the most diversified, the Lieberson index being .404. The corresponding indices for Ottawa and Sudbury are .587 and .553 respectively. Whichever basis of calculation is used, however, the Lindsay working-class is a relatively ethnically homogeneous entity, whereas there is considerable ethnic diversity in the working-class populations of the other three communities.

Table II-21 shows the pre-tax incomes of the workers in this

 approaches unity, the greater the probability that two persons, randomly sampled from the community, would share the same characteristic. Lieberson's index, strictly speaking, is a measure of diversity. The indices presented here are the obverse of that, and are calculated by subtracting the index of diversity from unity.
study. There are substantial differences between communities in regard to the earnings of workers in the twelve months preceding the study.

Table II-21.--Pre-tax incomes of workers in the four communities (in percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Ottawa</th>
<th>Hamilton</th>
<th>Lindsay</th>
<th>Sudbury</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under $7000</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$7000 - $8999</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$9000 &amp; over(^a)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) The great majority of men in this group earned between $9000 and $13000. Of 161 men in this category, only 16 earned over $13000, and only 6 of these earned over $15000, but less than $20000.

The mean annual pre-tax incomes of workers in the four communities range, from low to high, from $6185 in Lindsay, $7774 in Hamilton, $7869 in Ottawa, to $8394 in Sudbury. The Lindsay workers, even though the survey in that community was conducted some eight months after the main survey (and this in a time of inflation) are the lowest paid, with 56% earning under $7000 in the year preceding the study. Even if the ten men aged over 65 are removed from the Lindsay figures (and assuming that they all received less than $7000), over half the Lindsay workers are still in this category.

The Sudbury working-class, then, is the most prosperous of the four studied. Ottawa and Hamilton occupy intermediate positions, and the Lindsay workers are the least well paid of all. This discussion of the earnings of workers concludes the outline of characteristics of the working-class men in the four communities. There are
some small differences between the workers of the four communities in regard to age and marital status. There are more substantial differences between the communities when place of birth, educational attainment, religious affiliation, ethnic background, and incomes of the workers are considered. The task of the next chapter will be to consider the effect of one of these differences, that of income, on differences in attitudes toward class and politics among the workers in the four communities.

**Summary**

This chapter considered some of the methodological aspects of the study on which this thesis is based. It was shown how the choice of the communities in which to conduct the study was determined by consideration of the labour force composition of the communities, the industrial distribution of the labour force, and the scale and degree of concentration of industry in the communities.

The next section of this chapter dealt with the problem of how the low response rate to the questionnaire survey created problems of representativeness among the samples. Through an examination of the distribution of a number of characteristics within the samples compared to the distributions expected on the basis of information collected in the 1961 Census of Canada, it was found that the samples were seriously skewed. It was, however, argued that the samples could still serve the purposes of this thesis, because manual workers did not respond in numbers too far from their expected proportions, and also because the primary concern of the thesis is to compare the attitudes of workers
in the four communities. It was also shown that the findings of this study, with regard to the association of socio-economic variables with class identification, do not differ substantially from those of another recent Canadian study where a more adequate response rate was achieved.

In order to increase the representativeness of the samples, three possible weighting systems were experimented with. It was decided that weighting the samples by the expected frequency distributions of occupations (expected, that is, on the basis of the 1961 Census) was the most satisfactory manner in which to adjust for the distortion in the samples. A comparison of the correlations of socio-economic variables with class identification computed from the unweighted and weighted samples showed that weighting did not greatly alter such correlations. This, it was concluded, enhanced the attractiveness of the weighting scheme, for it did not create the problem of having to decide which was the situation more closely corresponding to the population parameters. The sample weighted by occupation, therefore, is the data-set on which the rest of the analysis in this dissertation will be based.

The last section of the chapter dealt with the selection of the working-class sub-sample which will provide the main subject matter of this study. The chapter concluded with an analysis of some of the characteristics of the working-class men in the sample.
CHAPTER III
THE INFLUENCE OF INCOME DIFFERENCES

The major focus of this thesis is on the sources of variation in working-class attitudes toward class and politics. One possible source of such variation could be the differences in standard of living between workers. A fairly common viewpoint has argued that, with the rise in working-class living standards, especially since World War 2, there has been a process of *embourgeoisement* of the working-class.¹ This view holds that the working-class is ceasing to be a distinct social entity, and that working-class people, particularly those who are the most prosperous, are more and more adopting the attitudes and values of the non-manual, middle-class. As Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechhofer, and Platt explain the *embourgeoisement* thesis, one likely consequence of a worker being in the upper income bracket (at least in terms of blue-collar work) would be that his attitudes on class and politics would be closer to those of people in the middle-class than to those working-class people who are not in such...

¹The "affluent worker" series of books and articles are the primary (British) sources for the discussion of the *embourgeoisement* thesis, and represent the efforts of the authors to falsify the thesis. For a general discussion of the *embourgeoisement* thesis, see J.H. Goldthorpe, D. Lockwood, F. Bechhofer, and J. Platt, *The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 1-29.
a favourable economic position.

There are two reasons for examining the influence of income on workers' attitudes. Although Goldthorpe, Lockwood, et al. have shown in a fairly convincing fashion that the embourgeoisement thesis is not an accurate description of the current situation among the British working-class, it is still possible that embourgeoisement is relevant in the Canadian context. The second reason for devoting attention to income differences is simply that, even if higher income does lead workers to adopt a middle-class perspective, it might still be suggested that income differences could perhaps provide a more parsimonious explanation of differences in working-class attitudes than the kind of analysis suggested in Chapter I.

Before devoting attention to such factors, however, it will be necessary to establish that differences in conceptions of class and politics exist between manual and non-manual workers. It would be of little interest to look for a process of embourgeoisement among highly paid workers if, in fact, no clear differences in attitudes existed between the working-class and middle-class respondents.

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Manual/Non-manual Differences

If class position plays a part in influencing the individual's conception of the distribution of rewards and privileges in society, then it is to be expected that working-class individuals will hold views on these matters that are distinguishable from those adopted
by middle-class persons. This section will examine the question of to what degree middle and working-class men differ in their conceptions of the social order.

The first question that will be considered is the subjective class identifications of the respondents. Table III-1 shows the responses by the upper middle, lower middle, and working-class respondent's to the pre-coded class identification question. Throughout this section, the term "upper middle-class" will be applied to those men employed as owners and managers, or as professional and technical workers. The "lower middle-class" will be defined as those men working as clerical workers, sales workers, communications and miscellaneous workers, and foremen. The sub-section of the sample that is designated as "working-class" has been defined in Chapter II.

As one would expect, if there were any congruence between objective class position and subjective class identification, manual workers are far more likely to claim to be working-class than are men in lower middle or upper middle-class occupations. The fact that a

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2 Question 3:35, Appendix C. Two versions of the class identification question were included in the questionnaire, one open-ended, the other pre-coded. The pre-coded class identification question is the version that will be analysed in this thesis. See Appendix B for arguments justifying such a procedure.

3 This classification excludes farmers, etc. (of whom there were very few), and service and recreation workers. The latter is such an heterogeneous category that it was thought best to exclude such workers from the analysis.

4 See Chapter II, pp. 99-118.
Table III-1.--Subjective class identification by objective class membership (in percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjective class Identification</th>
<th>Objective class position</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upper middle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(N=217) (N=192) (N=449) (N=858)

No answers, "don't know", "there's no such thing" = 93

\[ \chi^2 = 189.27, \text{ with } 2df (p<.001) \]

\[ \text{Tau C} = .49 (p<.001) \]

\[ ^a \text{Includes those identifying as "upper class" or "upper middle-class".} \]

\[ ^b \text{Includes those identifying as "lower-class".} \]

third of the working-class respondents identify with the middle-
class will be dealt with in more detail in the next chapter. What

is of more immediate interest is that those men designated as working-
class are far more likely to identify themselves as working-class

than are the non-manual workers, even though the lower middle-class

men, 68% of whom claim to be middle-class, have incomes very similar

\[ ^5 \text{Throughout this thesis, the criterion of statistical significance will be set at the .05 level. When a statistic is assigned the notation "p<.05", this indicates that the chances of achieving such a result through chance are less than five in one hundred. Where the chance is less than one in one hundred the notation "p<.01" will be used, and where the chance is less than one in one thousand this will be indicated by "p<.001".} \]
to the working-class men. 6

Not only do the men in the various social classes tend to assign themselves to different classes, but they also differ in the strength of their feelings of belonging to those social classes.

Table III-2.--Strength of feelings of belonging to a social class by objective class membership (in percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strength of feelings</th>
<th>Upper Middle</th>
<th>Objective class position</th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly strong</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all strong</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=229)</td>
<td>(N=197)</td>
<td>(N=458)</td>
<td>(N=884)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, "don't know", etc. = 67

χ² = 34.10, with 4df (p<.001). Tau B = -.16 (p<.001)

Working-class men, as Table III-2 indicates, are the most likely to say that they feel very strongly about belonging to a social class. However, the differences are not great, with 21% of the workers responding in this manner, compared to 19% of the lower middle-class and 12% of the upper middle-class men. But more working-class men also state that their feelings of belonging to a social class are fairly strong. Taking these responses together, 61% of the working-class respondents chose one or other of these two alternatives, as compared to

6See footnote 49, Chapter II, p. 97.
52% of the lower middle, and 37% of the upper middle-class men. From the simple cross-tabulation presented in Table III-2, it is impossible to determine whether there are differences in strength of feelings of belonging to a social class between men in the same objective class position depending on which class they identify with, but, at this juncture, this is unimportant. What is important is the further illustration that differences in attitudes exist between members of the different social classes in the communities studied.

It is often pointed out that Canada has a lower incidence of class voting than other industrialized western societies, but even then, there is some class influence on the way people vote. Four questions were included in the questionnaire that related to voting preferences. Respondents were asked how they usually vote in provincial and federal elections, and also how they planned to vote in the next provincial and federal elections. Table III-3 shows how the members of the three social classes planned to vote in the next provincial and

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7 See Table III-9, where this is done for the working-class respondents.
9 Questions 4:38, 4:39, 4:40, and 4:41, Appendix C. In the case of Lindsay, the provincial election had taken place between the administration of the major survey and its application to Lindsay. The question concerning intended provincial vote was modified to take account of that fact.
federal elections (both of which have now taken place). 10

Table III-3.--Intended party support at the next provincial and federal elections by objective class membership (in percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intended Party support</th>
<th>Objective class position</th>
<th>Upper middle</th>
<th>Lower Middle</th>
<th>Working</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provincial electiona</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Conservative</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democrat</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=185)</td>
<td>(N=181)</td>
<td>(N=403)</td>
<td>(N=782)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal electionb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Conservative</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democrat</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=185)</td>
<td>(N=174)</td>
<td>(N=398)</td>
<td>(N=757)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a No answers, "don't know", etc. = 169 (includes those who replied that they vote for the candidate, not the party).
\[ \chi^2 = 52.86, \text{ with 6df (p<.001)} \]

b No answers, "don't know", etc. = 194 (includes those who replied that they vote for the candidate, not the party).
\[ \chi^2 = 36.20, \text{ with 6df (p<.001)} \]

10 The figures on intended provincial and federal votes presented in Table III-3 differ from the actual voting patterns in the provincial election of 1971 and the federal election of 1972. The figures referring to provincial vote differ from the actual votes in the four communities mainly by the size of the intended Liberal vote. In the actual election, in terms of total votes cast in all four communities, the Progressive Conservatives gained 40% of the vote, the NDP 31%, and the Liberal Party 28% (Figures taken from 1969 By-Election, 1971 General Election. Ontario Elections. Return from the Records,
Although no one political party receives overwhelming majority support from a particular social class, it is apparent that there is some influence of social class on voting intentions, particularly in the case of the Progressive Conservative and New Democratic parties. In both provincial and federal voting intentions, the proportion of men planning to support the Progressive Conservatives increases as we ascend the class hierarchy. This is most pronounced in the provincial voting intentions, where there is a nineteen point difference between the working and upper-middle class, whereas the difference is only eight points in the case of voting intentions for the federal election.

Toronto: The Queen's Printer, 1972). Thus the table over-estimates the strength of the Liberal Party, and under-estimates that of the Tories. A similar pattern emerges when examining the actual votes cast in the four communities in the federal election. The Progressive Conservatives took 38% of all votes cast in the four towns, the Liberals 40%, the NDP 22%, while under 1% of the vote went to Social Credit and other candidates. Thus Table III-3 under-estimates the strength of the Tories, while over-estimating the strength of the other parties. (Figures taken from Twenty-Ninth General Election, 1972 - Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973).

Several factors may account for these discrepancies; factors such as the exclusion of women voters from the four communities study; the time-lag (in all cases except the provincial election in Lindsay) between the survey and the two elections; the discrepancy, in the case of the provincial election, between the 80% of all respondents giving a party preference in the questionnaire returns as against a total turnout of about 71%; and the possibility that men excluded from the tabulations because they did not give a party preference (often stating that they vote "for the man, not the party") did vote in the election, not necessarily distributing their votes among the candidates in the same proportions as the men who gave a party preference. But even if the figures given in Table III-3 do not provide an accurate reflection of what actually transpired in the two elections, they can still provide evidence of differences between the classes in political preferences. There is no evidence that members of one class shifted their allegiances in greater proportions than any other, so it is still possible to compare the voting preferences of members of different classes.
The proportion of support going to the N.D.P., on the other hand, declines with increasing class status. Provincially, there is a twenty-two point difference in support for the N.D.P. between the working and upper-middle class, and, federally, the difference is nineteen points. But the N.D.P. receives nothing like the same degree of support from manual workers as social democratic parties do in Europe. Both federally and provincially, only about one third of the manual workers intended to support the N.D.P. In fact, in the federal election, a larger percentage of manual workers intended to vote for the Liberal Party. Nevertheless, in the cases of the Progressive Conservative and New Democratic parties there is a clear, if not too strong, relationship between social class and political preference.

With intended support for the Liberal Party, there is not such a clear relationship. In terms of voting intentions for the provincial election, there is practically no difference in the proportions of each class supporting the Liberal Party. With the federal election there is a decline in support for the Liberal Party as we move from the middle-classes to the working-class, but the difference of thirteen points is smaller than in the case of support for the New Democrats. But if we think in more broad terms, of support for the New Democratic Party as against the two "old-line parties", then, as has been noted before, there is a relationship between class and party support, with support for the N.D.P. increasing as we move from the middle to the working-class.

This can be seen more clearly by looking at party support from
the perspective of the proportions of the support for each party coming from the various social classes. Table III-4 shows the percentage of total support for each party coming from each social class.

Table III-4.--Percentage of total intended votes for each political party provided by each social class.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective class membership</th>
<th>Progressive Conservative Party</th>
<th>Liberal Party</th>
<th>New Democratic Party</th>
<th>% Class is of all voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provincial election(^a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper-middle</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-middle</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=252)</td>
<td>(N=283)</td>
<td>(N=210)</td>
<td>(N=782)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Federal election\(^b\)  |                               |               |                      |                         |
| Upper-middle               | 29                            | 26            | 15                   | 25                      |
| Lower-middle               | 24                            | 27            | 15                   | 23                      |
| Working                    | 48                            | 46            | 71                   | 52                      |
| (N=204)                    | (N=319)                       | (N=194)       | (N=757)              |                         |

\(^a\)\(\chi^2 = 51.93, \) with 4df (\(p<.001\))

\(^b\)\(\chi^2 = 33.33, \) with 4df (\(p<.001\))

*Includes those intending to vote for other parties.

As Table III-4 shows, the New Democratic Party receives nearly three quarters of its total support from manual workers. Workers constitute 52% of the men included in the table, so the N.D.P. gains a disproportionate part of its support from this class. Members of the lower middle and upper middle-classes, on the other hand, are substantially under-represented among N.D.P. supporters. The Liberal Party,
as the panels in Table III-4 referring to voting intentions for both the provincial and federal elections show, recruits its supporters in proportions far closer to their actual distribution among the total electorate. The Progressive Conservative Party also gains its support from a more "representative" cross-section of the male population than does the New Democratic Party, but, particularly in relation to provincial election voting intentions, manual workers are somewhat under-represented, and the upper middle-class is somewhat over-represented. The evidence in Table III-3 and III-4, then, shows that there are differences in the political preferences of the different social classes, even if they are not so pronounced as they are, say, in Britain.

The preceding examples of class identification, strength of feelings of belonging to a social class, and intended party support, have shown that there are indeed differences between members of the various social classes with regard to questions relating to social stratification. Table III-5 gives a listing of other items on the questionnaire that relate to class attitudes. Chi-square and Tau correlation values are shown (the latter only where the independent variable is ordinal), the values being those yielded when the responses to the questions listed are cross-tabulated against the social class of the respondents.

Out of a total of twenty-seven cross-tabulations listed in Table III-5, there are twenty cases where the replies given by members of the working class are significantly different from those given by
Table III-5.--Cross-tabulation of questions referring to class-related topics by objective class position.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question (no. on questionnaire in parenthesis)</th>
<th>Chi-square</th>
<th>(df)</th>
<th>Tau**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Referring to the determinants of class &amp; class identification</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3:33) Class Identification (open-ended)</td>
<td>116.57</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3:35) Class Identification (pre-coded)</td>
<td>189.27</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3:37) Strength of feeling of belonging to a social class</td>
<td>34.10</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3:39) Determinants of class (1)</td>
<td>22.18</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>-a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3:40) Determinants of class (2)</td>
<td>17.87</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>-a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3:41) Determinants of class (3)</td>
<td>15.45</td>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>-a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:21) Class models</td>
<td>18.29</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluations of the class system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:20) Degree of consciousness of class today vs. 20 or 30 years ago</td>
<td>40.43</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>-.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:22) You will remain in the same social class until you die</td>
<td>29.41</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>-.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:23) Higher classes are best able to run things</td>
<td>12.41</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:24) Upper classes can't be counted upon</td>
<td>45.81</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>-.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:25) I don't really feel that my interests are like those of people in a position similar to me</td>
<td>17.42</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:26) Working-class people have to stick together</td>
<td>31.22</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>-.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:27) Agreement or disagreement between classes</td>
<td>11.53</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:28) Mobility chances of a lower or working-class boy</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:29) Mobility chances of lower or working-class boy compared to middle or upper-class boy</td>
<td>18.67</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>-.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:30) Ease of acquiring life style of higher class</td>
<td>15.46</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table III-5.--Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question (no. on questionnaire in parenthesis)</th>
<th>Chi-square</th>
<th>(df)</th>
<th>Tau</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Referring to industrial matters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1:45) Membership in union or professional association</td>
<td>186.98</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:67) Labour unions have too much power</td>
<td>76.82</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:68) Big businessmen have too much power</td>
<td>42.54</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:69) Willingness to strike in different circumstances</td>
<td>46.72</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:70) Approval of union affiliation with the N.D.P.</td>
<td>36.97</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:71) Industrial models</td>
<td>16.42</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referring to political matters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:40) Intended provincial vote</td>
<td>52.86</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:41) Intended federal vote</td>
<td>36.20</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:62) Degree of say in how Canada is governed</td>
<td>15.04</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:63) Political models</td>
<td>35.30</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Under-lining of Chi-square and Tau values indicates statistically significant differences at the .05 level or better.


aTau values not calculable because independent variable is not an ordinal scale.

members of the lower and upper middle-classes. The questions are arranged in four sub-groups, depending on the subject matter of the questions. With the sub-groups referring to industrial and political matters, there are class differences on every question listed. With
the more abstract questions relating to the determinants of class and subjective class identification, and to evaluations of the system of social inequality, there is not such a clear cut division between the classes. But, even here, there are ten cases out of seventeen where differences in response between the classes reach a statistically significant level.

All in all, therefore, the evidence presented in this section does support the contention that manual workers differ from members of the middle-classes in their conceptions of their position in the class structure, their evaluations of the system of social stratification, their attitudes on industrial matters, their attitudes to the political system, and the parties they support. Having found that such differences do exist, it is now possible to turn to a discussion of whether or not higher income leads manual workers to adopt attitudes closer to those held by middle-class individuals.

**Income Differences and Working-class Attitudes**

As was noted earlier, the *embourgeoisement* thesis would suggest that men with different levels of income, even if they are all from within the working-class, are likely to hold differing views as a result of these variations in levels of affluence. The Goldthorpe, Lockwood, *et al.* study of the "affluent worker" in England has dealt the *embourgeoisement* thesis a severe blow.\(^{11}\) Goldthorpe,

\(^{11}\)See note 55, Chapter I, p. 32 for details of the books resulting from this study.
Lockwood, et al. concluded, from their study, that affluence does not result in workers becoming "middle-class", although it may lead to privatization, and the shift from "solidaristic collectivism" to "instrumental collectivism. However, in the "affluent worker" study, the only comparisons were between "affluent" manual workers and clerical workers. There was no attempt at an empirical comparison of the "affluent worker" with more "traditional" types of workers; there being only an implicit comparison against ideal-types constructed by the authors. It is conceivable that not only the "affluent worker" but also the more "traditional" worker is shifting away from "solidaristic collectivism" toward "instrumental collectivism" and, if this is the case, other factors beside affluence must be at work.

One of the purposes of this present study is to attempt a comparison of workers in a diversity of situations, some "modern", some more

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13 In The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure, Goldthorpe, Lockwood, et al. attempt to come to grips with this question. One of their arguments is that the growth of "instrumental collectivism" has been encouraged by the attitudes and activities of the leaders of the Labour movement. For a critical review of the "affluent worker" study, with particular reference to the political consequences of "instrumental collectivism", see J. Westergaard, "The Rediscovery of the Cash Nexus", The Socialist Register 1970, edited by R. Milliband & J. Saville, (London: Merlin, 1970). Another study, in a strongly traditional ship-building town in northern England, found that "traditional proletarianism" did not exist, in a "pure" form, in this community, due to structural conditions of the work process that led to rivalries between the workers. See R. Brown & P. Brannen, "Social Relations and Social Perspectives Amongst Shipbuilding Workers - A Preliminary Statement", Sociology, 4 (1970), pp. 71-84 & 197-211.
"traditional". As a first step we shall now turn to an examination of the effects of income differences on class imagery and political attitudes and preferences, expecting that this shall offer a test of the embourgeoisement thesis, in that, if that thesis is correct, the higher earners among the working-class should be expected to exhibit more "middle-class" attitudes than their poorer brethren.

About one third of the workers in this study earned less than $7,000 in the twelve months immediately preceding the survey. Another third earned between $7,000 and $8,999, and the top third earned $9,000 or more. Table III-6 gives the chi-square and Tau correlations yielded from contingency tables cross-tabulating income with the replies of workers to the same questions listed in Table III-5.

Out of a total of twenty-seven chi-square values yielded by the cross-tabulations, ten indicate statistically significant differences at the .05 level or better. There are four cases where the Tau value is statistically significant, even though the chi-square does not reach significance. But the Tau correlations in these cases, though statistically significant, are not large; and, in two of these four cases (those referring to the mobility chances of a lower or working-class boy as compared to an upper or middle-class boy, and to the power of trade unions), the higher paid workers adopt a more "radical" stance than those at lower incomes. Most of the statistically

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14See Table II-21, Chapter II, p. 115.
Table III-6.--Cross-tabulations of questions referring to class-related topics by income of workers.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question (no. on questionnaire in parenthesis)</th>
<th>Chi-square (df)</th>
<th>Tau**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Referring to the determinants of class, &amp; class identification</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3:33) Class identification (open-ended)</td>
<td>9.53 (2)</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3:35) Class identification (pre-coded)</td>
<td>7.57 (2)</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3:37) Strength of feeling of belonging to a social class</td>
<td>18.84 (4)</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3:39) Determinants of class (1)</td>
<td>21.51 (14)</td>
<td>.a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3:40) Determinants of class (2)</td>
<td>31.88 (16)</td>
<td>.a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3:41) Determinants of class (3)</td>
<td>21.05 (16)</td>
<td>.a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:21) Class Models</td>
<td>3.56 (4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluations of the class system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:20) Degree of consciousness of class today vs. 20 or 30 years ago</td>
<td>8.71 (8)</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:22) You will remain in the same social class until you die</td>
<td>14.82 (8)</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:23) Higher classes are best able to run things</td>
<td>12.63 (8)</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:24) Upper classes can't be counted upon</td>
<td>12.05 (8)</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:25) I don't really feel that my interests are like those of people in a position similar to me</td>
<td>18.08 (8)</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:26) Working-class people have to stick together</td>
<td>0.64 (2)</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:27) Agreement or disagreement between classes</td>
<td>21.37 (8)</td>
<td>-.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:28) Mobility chances of a lower or working-class boy</td>
<td>0.84 (4)</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:29) Mobility chances of lower or working-class boy compared to middle or upper-class boy</td>
<td>9.90 (8)</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:30) Ease of acquiring life style of higher class</td>
<td>24.59 (8)</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referring to industrial matters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1:45) Union membership</td>
<td>11.92 (2)</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table III-6.--Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question (no. on questionnaire in parenthesis)</th>
<th>Chi-square</th>
<th>(df)</th>
<th>Tau**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(4:67) Labour unions have too much power</td>
<td>5.85</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:68) Big businessmen have too much power</td>
<td>15.23</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:69) Willingness to strike in different circumstances</td>
<td>5.80</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:70) Approval of union affiliation with the NDP</td>
<td>7.55</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:71) Industrial models</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Referring to political matters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question (no. on questionnaire in parenthesis)</th>
<th>Chi-square</th>
<th>(df)</th>
<th>Tau**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(4:40) Intended provincial vote</td>
<td>25.87</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>.a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:41) Intended federal vote</td>
<td>15.89</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>.a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:62) Degree of say in how Canada is governed</td>
<td>7.12</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:63) Political models</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>.a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Under-lining of Chi-square and Tau values indicates statistically significant differences at the .05 level or better.

**Tau B correlation when there are equal numbers of rows and columns, Tau C when rows and columns are unequal in number.

^a Tau values not calculable, because independent variable is not an ordinal scale.

significant chi-square values occur with the questions relating to the determinants of class and subjective class identification, and to evaluations of the class system. Only one of the questions referring to industrial matters, that concerning union membership, shows a significant relationship with income; and two of the four questions referring to political matters, those on intended vote in the provincial and federal elections, yield statistically significant chi-squares. It would be appropriate to discuss those cases where
there are significant differences between income groups, beginning with union membership.

Of the workers earning under $7,000, 61% are members of trade unions, compared to 79% of those earning between $7,000 and $8999, and 72% of the men earning $9,000 or more. The direction of the relationship between income and union membership, however, is not the one which would be expected from the embourgeoisement thesis. Given that trade unions are not positively valued by middle-class people, if increasing income led workers to adopt middle-class values and attitudes, it should be expected that there would be less support for trade unions among high income workers. But the higher income workers are members of trade unions in larger proportions than those in the lowest income category. The reason for this is not very difficult to conjecture. It should be expected that the most organized workers would be the highest earners, so it could be argued that high income among manual workers is, to some extent, a consequence of union membership. If the road to higher income, for the manual worker, is contingent on union membership then it would not appear to be in the high income worker's interests to decline to join a trade union. It could, however, still be that the high income worker's commitment to the union is more narrowly utilitarian than that of the low paid worker. But on other questions relating to ind-

15As can be seen by the Tau C correlation of .24 between high objective class position and belief that unions have too much power. See Table III-5.
ustrial matters there are no significant differences in the responses of workers in the three income groups.

In the group of questions referring to the determinants of class and subjective class identification, four of the seven cross-tabulations show significant differences between the three income groups. As Table III-7 shows, there are significant differences in the class identifications of the workers in the three income groups. (As the pre-coded class identification question is used as the measure of class identification throughout this thesis, only the replies to that question are presented in Table III-7). 16

Table III-7.--Subjective class identification by income (in percentages) 17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Identification</th>
<th>Under $7,000</th>
<th>$7,000 to $8,999</th>
<th>$9,000 &amp; over</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class</td>
<td>76 (100)</td>
<td>62 (100)</td>
<td>63 (100)</td>
<td>66 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=126)</td>
<td>(N=146)</td>
<td>(N=153)</td>
<td>(N=425)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, etc = 80

\( \chi^2 = 7.57 \), with 2df (p<.05). Tau C = .11 (p<.05)

There is a decline in the proportion of workers claiming to be working-class with higher income. There is, however, little

16 See Appendix B for arguments justifying this decision.

17 Throughout this thesis, from this point on, men identifying with the middle-class will include those claiming to be upper or upper middle-class, and working-class identifiers will include those men claiming to be members of the lower class. In response to the pre-coded class identification question, three manual workers claimed to be upper-class, seven
difference between the class identifications of men in the two higher income groups. It appears, therefore, that higher income workers are more likely to identify with the middle-class than are lower income workers. But this trend is, it seems, halted at a fairly low level. The workers earning the highest incomes ($9,000 and over) are, if anything, slightly less inclined to adopt middle-class identification than are those in the mid-income group. It does not appear that the *embourgeoisement* process is operating in a clear manner for, if it were, then middle-class identification would increase directly with income.

It may be, however, that the workers earning between $7,000 and $8,999 (and the highest income workers) have reached a similar pattern of class identification as the lower middle-class non-manual workers. But a glance at Table III-1 shows that 68% of the lower middle-class men identify with the middle-class, a much higher proportion than the 38% of the mid-income workers, the most 'middle-class' of the three working-class income groups. It cannot, therefore, be said that the two highest income working-class groups are identical, or even similar, in their class identifications, to the lower middle-class men.

---

18 The zero-order, product-moment correlation of income with class identification among working-class respondents is .17. First-order partial correlations were calculated and, in no case did the correlation between income and class identification disappear. The variables controlled for (one at a time) are occupation of respondent, first job of respondent, education of respondent, respondent's father's occupation, age, place of birth, place of residence at 16, size of place of residence at 16, religious affiliation (Catholic/Protestant), plant size, union membership, and community. Partialling out the effect of current job reduced the correlation to .12, but income and current job (socio-economic status) are closely related, and this hardly renders the original relationship spurious.
Another variable in the series of questions relating to the determinants of class and class identification that is significantly associated with income is the strength of the worker's feelings of belonging to a social class. Table III-8 shows that, although the chi-square measure indicates significant differences in strength of feelings of belonging to a social class, the Tau B correlation shows that there is no consistency in the direction of these differences.

Table III-8.--Strength of feeling of belonging to a social class by income (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strength of feeling of belonging to a social class</th>
<th>Under $7,000</th>
<th>$7,000 to $8,999</th>
<th>$9,000 &amp; over</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all strong</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly strong</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=154)</td>
<td>(N=152)</td>
<td>(N=150)</td>
<td>(N=456)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers = 69. $\chi^2 = 18.84$, with 4 df (p < .001). Tau B = -.01 (n.s.)

The group of men earning between $7,000 and $8,999 contains the fewest men who feel very strongly about being a member of the social class they identify themselves with. Taking the very strong and fairly strong responses together, the men with the highest incomes selected either of these two responses in the largest proportions, while the mid-income group did so the least. Looking at the table as it stands, one would conclude that there is no simple relationship between income and strength of feeling of belonging to a social class. However, taking into account the class
the men identify with may throw more light on this factor.

Table III-9 shows the strength of feeling of belonging to a social class by income, controlling for subjective class identification. More of the working-class identifiers stated that they feel very strongly about being a member of their social class (24%) than did the middle-class identifiers (15%).

Table III-9.--Strength of feeling of belonging to a social class by income, by subjective class identification (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strength of feeling of belonging to a social class</th>
<th>Under $7,000</th>
<th>$7,000 to $8,999</th>
<th>$9,000 &amp; over</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working-class Identifiers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all strong</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly strong</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=92)</td>
<td>(N=86)</td>
<td>(N=92)</td>
<td>(N=270)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class Identifiers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all strong</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly strong</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very strong</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=29)</td>
<td>(N=56)</td>
<td>(N=57)</td>
<td>(N=142)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answer, don't know, etc. = 94

\( \chi^2 = 11.41, \text{ with } 4 \text{ df (p<.05)} \).  \( \text{Tau B = .004 (n.s.)} \)

\( \chi^2 = 6.16, \text{ with } 4 \text{ df (n.s.)} \).  \( \text{Tau B = -.02 (n.s.)} \)
Among both the middle and working-class identifiers, there is no clear monotonic relationship between income and strength of feeling of belonging to the social class involved. In both groups, the middle income workers are the least likely to have very strong feelings about their class membership. Among middle-class identifiers, the lowest paid workers are the workers most likely to feel very strongly about their class membership. As the *embourgeoisement* thesis would lead one to expect that the highest income workers would be the strongest in their sense of affiliation with the middle-class, this finding does appear to cast doubt on such a view. Conversely, the highest paid workers among the working-class identifiers are the group who most often responded that they felt very strongly about their class membership. If high income leads workers away from their class affiliation, even if they still maintain a working-class identification, one would not expect them to be the ones to feel most strongly about their membership of the working-class. But, in the present study, this is indeed the case, and, therefore, controlling for class identification, does not alter the conclusion that there is no clear relationship between income and strength of feeling of belonging to a social class.

The other question in the first group of questions in Table III-6 that shows significant variation with income is that referring to the determinants of social class. Respondents were asked "What things decide what social class a man belongs to?" Up to three

---

19 Question 3:39-42, Appendix C.
responses were coded, but only in the case of the second response are there significant differences between workers earning different incomes. But when the total number of determinants of social class are computed, there are significant differences between the three income groups, as Table III-10 shows. Although the chi-square value is significant at the .05 level, the magnitude of the differences is not great. The higher income workers are more likely to mention education than are the lowest income workers. Education is the determinant of social class most mentioned by the workers earning over $9,000.\textsuperscript{20} Wealth and income are also mentioned by the highest earning workers in proportions almost as high as education. Among the mid-income workers the most frequently mentioned factor is income. No single determinant of social class received such frequent mention among the lowest income workers (note the higher percentage of "other" determinants), but wealth was the most mentioned factor, followed closely by income.

\textsuperscript{20}The "other" category is very large. The question was included in the questionnaire for the purposes of J.C. Goyder and he developed the coding scheme. Because of the large number in the "other" category he developed additional codes, consisting of "family", "social standing", "activities and interests", and "other". Goyder worked with the original study, which included Hull but excluded Lindsay, and found that fewer people mentioned any one of these factors than mentioned any of the socio-economic factors, or personal qualities. Because of the relative infrequency of any one single type of response, and because only the original codings were available, it was deemed unnecessary to break down the "other" category. For details of the coding, see Goyder, "Subjective Social Class Identification and Objective Socio-Economic Status", (Ph.D. dissertation, McMaster University, 1972), p. 49.
Table III-10.--All responses to question asking the determinants of social class by income (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Determinants of social class</th>
<th>Under $7,000</th>
<th>$7,000 to $8,999</th>
<th>$9,000 &amp; over</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Style of Life</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal qualities</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=248)</td>
<td>(N=285)</td>
<td>(N=303)</td>
<td>(N=836)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 21.92, \text{ with } 12 \text{df (}p<.05) \]

The major reasons, therefore, for the significant differences among the income groups are the largeness of the "other" category among the workers earning under $7,000, the greater emphasis upon education among the workers with higher incomes, and the greater emphasis upon income (and consequent de-emphasis on wealth) among the mid-income workers. Whether these differences represent embourgeoisement, however, is by no means clear. As Table III-5 shows, there are no significant differences between the members of the different social classes in terms of the factors they regard as determining social class. Among manual workers, the only clear trend with income, in Table III-10, is that education receives more mention as income rises. But when the lower middle-class respondents are considered, it is found that education comprises 13% of the total number of determinants of social class mentioned. The highest income workers, by emphasising education as a determinant of social class,
are not similar to the lower-middle class respondents in this regard.

It would appear, therefore, that the differences between workers at different income levels, in terms of what they regard as the determinants of social class, are not of such a nature that the highest earning workers hold views that are more similar to those of the lower middle-class men than to workers at lower levels of income.

There are ten questions grouped in the second category of Table III-5, and in three cases there are significant differences between the income groups. There are statistically significant differences in the responses of workers in the three income groups to a question seeking to gain some measure of the degree of privatization among the workers in the four communities. The question asked, "Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? I don't really feel that my interests are like those of people in a position similar to me. If my family and I have enough to get by on, nothing else really matters."\textsuperscript{21}

If higher incomes have the effect of "isolating" the worker from his social class, this process could have one of two possible consequences. The first is that the worker identifies with the middle-class and identifies his interests with it. The other possible consequence (a more likely one, perhaps, given the occupational differences between the higher paid manual worker and the lowest paid non-manual worker) is that the worker becomes marginal to both classes and, consequently, has difficulty identifying his interests with any

\textsuperscript{21}Question 4:25, Appendix C.
Table III-11.--Responses to privatization question by income (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Under $7,000</th>
<th>$7,000 to $8,999</th>
<th>$9,000 over</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mildly disagree</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mildly agree</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 18.08, \text{with 8df (p}<.05). \text{ Tau C } = .07 (p<.05). \]

social class. Being in a marginal situation, he would be more subject to cross-pressures from various sources, and would be less likely to identify strongly with any one group. However, the evidence presented in Table III-11 does not offer much support for this kind of interpretation. Although the Tau C correlation shows some relationship between income and privatization, the men earning over $9,000 are the least likely to strongly agree with the sentiments expressed in the question. These men are, on the other hand, the most likely to mildly agree with this sentiment. If these two responses ("strongly agree"

\[ \chi^2 = 18.08, \text{with 8df (p}<.05). \text{ Tau C } = .07 (p<.05). \]

social class. Being in a marginal situation, he would be more subject to cross-pressures from various sources, and would be less likely to identify strongly with any one group. However, the evidence presented in Table III-11 does not offer much support for this kind of interpretation. Although the Tau C correlation shows some relationship between income and privatization, the men earning over $9,000 are the least likely to strongly agree with the sentiments expressed in the question. These men are, on the other hand, the most likely to mildly agree with this sentiment. If these two responses ("strongly agree"
and "mildly agree") are taken together, then the same proportions (32%) of the two higher income groups expressed such sentiments, compared to 21% of the workers earning less than $7,000.

The lowest paid workers were the most likely to strongly or mildly disagree with the sentiments expressed in the privatization question; 61% of this group so responded, compared to 55% of the mid-income workers, and 53% of the highest paid workers. There is, then, some relation between income and disagreement with the privatization statement, but the difference only amounts to 8%, which is not very great. In addition to this, a majority of every income group expressed disapproval of the sentiment. Although, therefore, there are differences between the income groups, the size of the Tau C correlation (not to mention an inspection of the distribution of responses) indicates that the sizes of the differences are not large enough to offer any strong support for the embourgeoisement thesis.

Table III-12 shows the responses, by income, to the question, "Suppose that votes were taken on a lot of questions about the future of Canada, do you think the social classes would agree on these issues, or would they tend to disagree."

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23 Question 4: 27, Appendix C. This question is a revised version of a question used by J.C. Johnstone in his study of young people's images of Canadian society. The original question is, "Suppose that votes were taken on a lot of other questions about the future of Canada. Do you think Canadians would agree on most things about Canada's future, or that they'd tend to disagree?" (This question followed one asking about whether Canadians would agree or disagree over the question of a new national flag.) See J.C. Johnstone, Young People's Images of Canadian Society, Studies of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism, No. 2, (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1969).
Table III-12.--Responses to question concerning agreement between the social classes by income (in percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Under $7,000</th>
<th>$7,000 to $8,999</th>
<th>$9,000 &amp; over</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>They'd agree on practically everything</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They'd agree on most things</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They'd agree on half &amp; disagree on half</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They'd disagree on most things</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They'd disagree on practically</td>
<td>13 (100)</td>
<td>6 (100)</td>
<td>7 (101)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>everything</td>
<td>(N=130)</td>
<td>(N=150)</td>
<td>(N=148)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers = 77

$\chi^2 = 21.37$, with 8df (p<.01). Tau C = -.002 (n.s.).

Very few workers thought that the social classes would agree on practically everything, but when this response is combined with the response that the classes would agree on most things, there is little difference between the three income groups. If anything, the most prosperous workers are less likely to respond in this manner. The mid-income workers are the most likely to see the classes as agreeing half the time and disagreeing the other half. The higher income workers are the most likely to see the classes disagreeing on most things, or on practically everything (33%), closely followed by those earning the least. Ten percent of the mid-income workers selected either of these two alternatives.

A glance at the figures in Table III-12, therefore, shows that
there is not a monotonic relationship between income and views on the level of agreement between the social classes, a conclusion that is supported by the Tau C correlation being almost zero.

The other question in the group relating to evaluations of the class system that displays significant variation with income asked, "How easy or difficult would it be for a person moving from a lower to a higher social class to adopt the social graces and style of life appropriate to the higher class?" 24

Table III-13.--Ease or difficulty of adopting the social graces and style of life of a higher social class by income (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Under $7,000</th>
<th>$7,000 to $8,999</th>
<th>$9,000 &amp; over</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impossible</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0\textsuperscript{a}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very difficult</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly difficult</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairly easy</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very easy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100\textsuperscript{(N=159)}</td>
<td>101\textsuperscript{(N=150)}</td>
<td>100\textsuperscript{(N=154)}</td>
<td>99\textsuperscript{(N=443)}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers = 62

$\chi^2 = 24.59$, with 8df ($p < .01$). Tau C = .10 ($p < .001$).

\textsuperscript{a}Only one case

24 Question 4:30, Appendix C.
Only one man among the manual workers thought that it would be impossible for someone from a lower-class to assimilate into a higher class. Generally speaking, as Table III-13 shows, higher income workers are more optimistic about the possibility of acquiring the social graces and style of life of a higher class. The most frequently chosen response, by every income group (although, in the case of the mid-income workers, only by 1% over the "fairly easy" category), was that such a move would be fairly difficult. But there is still a tendency for the higher income workers to adopt a slightly rosier view than those in the lowest income bracket. Combining the "fairly easy" and "very easy" responses, 29% of the workers earning under $7,000 agreed with one or other of these choices, compared to 47% of those earning between $7,000 and $8,999, and 45% of those earning over $9,000.

As in other instances (the case of subjective class identification, for example), the major dividing line is at the $7,000 mark. There is little difference between the responses of the men in the two higher income categories, which would suggest that embourgeoisement, if this is what it is, halts at a fairly low level. But this is not to deny that, in this instance, income differences do result in some, though not large, differences in evaluations of the class system.

In two of the three cases where the cross-tabulations of income with questions concerning evaluations of the class system resulted in significant differences, therefore, there is evidence consistent with
the *embourgeoisement* thesis. But the differences are not very great. In the other case, that concerning the level of agreement or disagreement between the social classes, the differences do not follow a clear monotonic pattern. The fourth group of questions listed in Table III-6 relate to political matters, and in two of the four cases, there are significant differences between the responses of the men in the three income groups. These questions concern the voting intentions of the working-class men in the next provincial and federal elections.

As Table III-14 shows, there are significant differences between the voting intentions, for both the provincial and federal elections, of the workers in the different income groups. When voting is dichotomized as other or N.D.P. (and income is regrouped in the original seventeen categories) the zero-order correlation between income and N.D.P. voting intention in the provincial election is .22. For the federal election the corresponding correlation is .14. Unfortunately, for any hypothesis that asserts that higher incomes lead working-class individuals to adopt middle-class preferences, the direction of the relationship is the reverse of that expected on the basis of such an hypothesis.

It is precisely the highest paid workers who are the most likely of all manual workers to vote for Canada's social democratic party, the N.D.P. In the case of provincial election voting intentions, there is a 27% difference in support for the N.D.P. between the lowest and the highest earners. In the federal case the difference is 20%. Support for the Liberal Party is highest amongst the mid-income workers, whereas the highest level of support for the Progressive Conservatives comes from the lowest income workers.
Table III-14.--Voting intentions in the next provincial and federal elections by income (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voting intention</th>
<th>Under $7,000</th>
<th>$7,000 to $8,999</th>
<th>$9,000 &amp; over</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provincial election&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democratic</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=115)</td>
<td>(N=121)</td>
<td>(N=118)</td>
<td>(N=354)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal election&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democratic</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=111)</td>
<td>(N=120)</td>
<td>(N=124)</td>
<td>(N=355)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> No answer, etc. = 151 (includes 17 votes for other parties)

χ² = 25.87, with 4df (p<.001) r= .22 (p<.001) (voting dichotomized as NDP/other).

<sup>b</sup> No answer, etc = 150 (includes 14 votes for other parties).

χ² = 15.89, with 4df (p<.01) r= .14 (p<.01) (voting dichotomized as NDP/other).

Under the assumptions of the *embrorgeousment* thesis it would seem that the workers who earn the most should be the least likely to support the political party most clearly identified with the working-class. The New Democratic Party, being a social democratic party, and being officially supported by a good number of unions (particularly the larger unions), would fit this description. For present purposes, it does not matter how "left" the ideology of the
party is, it only matters that the N.D.P. is the major party of the
left in Canada, and is also the party most clearly identified with the
organized working-class movement. It has already been seen (Table
III-3) that the non-manual workers in the study are less likely to
support the N.D.P. than are manual workers. If increasing income led
working-class individuals to adopt the preferences of the middle-class,
then N.D.P. support among workers should be lowest among the better
paid. But this is not the case in the present study,\(^{25}\) and, therefore,
higher income does not appear, in the case of political preferences,
to lead to embourgeoisement.

Out of a total of twenty-seven questions referring to some
aspects of the system of social inequality in society, the responses
of workers show variation with income in ten instances. When these ten
cases are examined in terms of the possible support they offer to the
embourgeoisement thesis, only in four of them are the differences be­
tween the income groups at all consistent even with a weak process of
embourgeoisement. High income workers are more likely to claim to be
middle-class than are lower paid workers. But the major dividing line
is at a low level ($7,000), and, even then, the group of workers most
prone to middle-class identification (the mid-income workers) are more
similar to lower paid workers than to lower middle-class non-manual
workers in their class identifications.

\(^{25}\) As was noted in Chapter I, Nordlinger (The Working-class Tories
(London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1967), p. 170) found that the Labour vote
in Britain was higher among high income workers in his study.
Income differences in responses to the question concerning feelings that the worker's interests are not really like those of people in a position similar to him are also consistent with the embourgeoisement thesis. But it has been seen that the differences between the income groups are not very large, and that a majority of workers in every income group strongly or mildly disagree with the sentiments expressed in the question. Variation with income also has some consistent direction in the case of responses to the question concerning the ease or difficulty of a lower class individual acquiring the social graces and style of life of a higher class. The higher income workers were more optimistic than the low income workers that it would be possible, but, again, the main differences occur at a relatively low level of income.

The other question that showed consistent differences with income was that concerning the determinants of social class. The major difference was that education assumed greater importance with higher income. But it was also noted that there was no significant variation between the classes on this question, and that, in regard to the emphasis on education, the lower income workers were more similar to the lower middle-class non-manual workers than were workers with higher incomes.

Thus even in the four cases where there is a relatively clear direction to the differences, the evidence is hardly overwhelmingly in favour of the embourgeoisement thesis. With the cases of strength of feelings of belonging to a social class, and on the agreement or
disagreement between the social classes, there is no clear direction to the differences, even though the chi-square values indicate significant differences between the responses of men in the three income groups. And, in the three other cases of union membership and provincial and federal voting intentions, the direction of the relationships is the reverse of that which one would expect on the basis of the embourgeoisement thesis.

It would appear, therefore, that the evidence from the four communities offers little support to the view that higher income workers hold views on class and related matters that are closer to those of non-manual workers than to the views of workers in a less fortunate economic position. Neither does the evidence examined in this chapter suggest that, regardless of whether or not high income workers hold views similar to the middle-class, differences in income can explain a good deal of the variation in working-class attitudes on class and related matters. Having decided this, it is now possible to examine variation in working-class attitudes in terms of the kinds of factors discussed in Chapter I. The next chapter, therefore, will be devoted to a discussion of the class identifications of the workers in the four communities.

Summary

This chapter examined the influence of income differences on variation in working-class attitudes toward the class system. The first section of the chapter dealt with differences in attitudes
toward class and related matters between manual workers and non-manual workers. It was found that, in a discussion of the results of cross-tabulations of twenty-seven questions concerning class and related matters, class differences in attitudes did, in fact, exist.

The existence of class differences made it worthwhile to examine the possibility that higher income among workers led to embourgeoisement - the adoption of attitudes and values closer to those held by the non-manual middle-class. Cross-tabulation of the responses of workers to the twenty-seven questions relating to class matters by income revealed that only in very few instances were significant differences between workers at different income levels of such a nature as to be consistent with the embourgeoisement thesis.

At the same time as providing a test of the embourgeoisement thesis in the Canadian environment, the discussion also showed that income differences cannot explain much of the variation in working-class attitudes that does exist. It thus provides a justification for the kind of analysis which will occupy the remainder of this thesis.
CHAPTER IV
CLASS IDENTIFICATION

This chapter will discuss the class identifications of the working-class respondents in the four communities. The questionnaire that was mailed to the respondents contained two questions asking the respondents to indicate the social class they identified with. The first question was open-ended, asking, "What social class do you consider yourself a member of?", and a space was provided for the respondent to write in the name of the social class. The second question was pre-coded, presenting the respondent with a list of class labels, and asking him to choose one. The question asked, "If you had to pick one, which of the following five social classes would you say you were in?" The class labels were; "upper class", "upper-middle class", "middle class", "working class", and "lower class". In addition to the five class names, there were two further statements, "don't know" and "there is no such thing".

As has already been stated in Chapter III, the analysis of class identification undertaken in this thesis will be based on the responses of working-class men to the pre-coded question. In order to

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1 Question 3:33-34, Appendix C.
2 Question 3:35, Appendix C.
3 See Appendix B for the reasons for this decision.
facilitate analysis the class identifications will be dichotomized into middle-class and working-class. Out of the five hundred and five working-class respondents to the survey, four hundred and forty-nine (89%) said that they were members of one or other of the five social classes named in the question.\footnote{Twelve men (2.4%) checked the "don't know" box, 22 (4.3%) checked the "there is no such thing" response, while the remaining 22 men (4.3%) did not answer the question.} One hundred and thirty-eight men (27% of all the working-class men) claimed middle-class status, whereas two hundred and ninety-eight men (59%) said they were working-class. Only thirteen men gave a class identification other than either of these, three claiming to be upper-class, seven upper middle, and three claimed lower-class status. It was decided to include the lower-class identifiers with the working-class identifiers, and to add the upper and upper middle-class identifiers to the middle-class identifiers. Thus, of the men who provided some kind of class identification, 33% are middle-class identifiers, while 67% are working-class in their subjective class identification.

In compliance with the discussion in Chapter I, the analysis of the class identifications of the workers will begin with a discussion of community differences in workers' class identifications. This will be followed by sections dealing with the work situations of the men, and with the influence of white-collar contacts on workers' estimations of their class position. Finally, other influences on workers' class identifications will be considered (including an elaboration of
the analysis of socio-economic influences which the discussion of the influence of income differences in Chapter III hinted at), and an attempt will be made to assess the relative importance of all these factors on the worker's conception of his class membership.

**Community Differences and Workers' Class Identifications**

As was argued in Chapter I, the major assumption on which this thesis is based is that workers view the class system of their society from a perspective influenced by their experiences in the community and at work, and by their involvement, if any, with people from non-manual backgrounds. Following the arguments of Lockwood and Parkin, it was suggested that the more a worker is involved in environments predominantly working-class in nature, the more he is involved in *intra-class*, rather than *inter-class*, interactions, the more will he adhere to a conception of the class system that is distinct from that held by middle-class persons. It would follow from this that the more the worker is primarily involved in relationships with other working-class people, the less likely would he be to claim to be anything other than working-class. Conversely, it would be expected that the worker who has significant contact with middle-class people would be more likely to claim to be *middle-class* himself.

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In Chapter I this argument was supported by citing evidence from the British studies by Martin, and by Young and Willmott, showing that working-class individuals in areas with a significant middle-class population were more likely to claim to be middle-class than were working-class people residing in areas where the middle-class presence was not so strong. From the evidence of the British studies it would be predicted that the workers in the four communities would differ in the extent to which middle-class identification is claimed by some of these workers, such differences being dependent, in part, on the social class composition of the communities involved. The larger the proportion of manual workers in the total male labour force, it would be predicted, the higher would be the proportion of manual workers in that community who identified as working-class. As was noted in Chapter II, the percentage that working-class men make up of the labour forces of the four communities ranges from 26% in Ottawa, through 47% in Lindsay, 50% in Hamilton, to 62% in Sudbury. On the assumption that working-class identification among manual workers varies with the extent to which the community they reside in is comprised of working-class people, it would be expected that the low-


7 Page 107.

8 These percentages, unlike those given in Chapter II, are rounded to the nearest whole number.
est level of working-class identification would be found among the Ottawa workers. The Sudbury workers should display the highest level of working-class identification, with the workers of Lindsay and Hamilton occupying an intermediate position. It would, perhaps, be wrong to expect much difference in the class identification of the Hamilton and Lindsay workers, as the proportionate sizes of the working-class populations of these two communities are quite similar. But, for the sake of clarity, and to facilitate correlation analysis, it will be hypothesized that the Hamilton workers will claim working-class status in higher proportions than the workers of Lindsay.

A complicating factor may arise, however, with the case of a small, socially heterogeneous community such as Lindsay where, Lockwood suggests, we might find the working-class "deferential". Although such communities are class heterogeneous it would appear, from the logic of Lockwood's argument, that middle-class influences would not, in this case, lead the worker to claim middle-class status. He would, rather, accept the justice of the stratification system, agree

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9 Throughout this thesis one of the measures of association used will be the Pearsonian product-moment correlation. Much of the data does not fully satisfy the conditions required for this statistic (such as the requirement for interval scales), but a current view argues that such violations do not substantially alter the results (see S. Labovitz, "The assignment of numbers to rank order categories", American Sociological Review, 35 (1970), pp. 515-524; and, E.F. Borgatta, "My student, the purist: a lament", Sociological Quarterly, 9:1, (1968), pp. 29-34). In many cases, tabulations are presented, and other statistics, such as chi-square and Tau correlations are given, as well as the product-moment correlation.

that he is working-class, and defer to the dominant values of the society. If this were so, then class heterogeneity in a small community may be associated with the workers identifying with the working-class but also holding a deferential view of the class system, whereas in a larger community, with larger scale industry, it may result in the worker claiming middle-class status. If this were true in the study at hand, then the order of working-class identification between the other three communities would remain the same, but the workers of Lindsay may identify as working-class in numbers greater than would be expected if one relied solely on the occupational composition of the town's labour force as a guide.

There are, then, two possible hypotheses as to the relationship between type of community and the class identifications of workers. Table IV-1 shows the class identifications made by the workers in the four communities.

Table IV-1.--Class identification by community (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Identification</th>
<th>Ottawa</th>
<th>Lindsay</th>
<th>Hamilton</th>
<th>Sudbury</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=65)</td>
<td>(N=99)</td>
<td>(N=125)</td>
<td>(N=159)</td>
<td>(N=448)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, don't know, etc. = 57

\[ \chi^2 = 1.89, \text{ with } 3\text{df (n.s.)}. \quad \text{Tau.C} = .04 \text{ (n.s.)} \]

\[ r = .05 \text{ (n.s.)}. \quad \text{(communities scored by \% of male labour force in manual occupations; class identification scored 1 for middle-class identification, 2 for working-class identification).} \]
It is clear from Table IV-1 that there are no great differences between the workers of the four communities with regard to their choices of class membership. The chi-square, Tau C, and zero-order product moment correlations all indicate that there are no significant differences between the workers of the four communities in this regard. Only eight percentage points separate the workers of Ottawa, those claiming middle-class membership in the largest proportion, from those of Lindsay, the workers least likely to claim to be middle-class. Ottawa, the most "middle-class" of the four communities, does have the highest proportion of workers claiming middle-class status, but fully 32% of the Sudbury workers also identify with the middle-class, a far larger percentage than would be expected on the basis of the British evidence. Only two percentage points separate Sudbury and Hamilton, even though the greater middle-class presence in the latter city might suggest that the difference would be greater. And the workers of Lindsay claim middle-class status in lower proportions than even the workers of Sudbury!

First-order partial correlations of class identification with community scored by the percentage of the male labour force in manual occupations were calculated, partialling out the influences (one variable at a time) of thirty other variables that could possibly be obscuring the

11 Compare this with the difference between Dagenham, where only 13% of the working-class said they were middle-class, and Woodford, where the figure was 34%. See Willmott & Young, op.cit., p. 115.
expected relationship between working-class identification and the class composition of the communities studied.\footnote{12} In no case, however, did partialling out the influence of an intervening variable have the effect of bringing to light the hypothesized relationship.\footnote{13}

The conclusion, therefore, must be that there is no direct relationship between working-class identification among workers and the extent to which a community's population is made up of working-class people.

It will be remembered that it was suggested that an alternative hypothesis might predict that the workers of Lindsay would claim to be working-class in proportions greater than one would expect from the occupational composition of the community's male labour force. This would reflect the fact that Lindsay is the kind of community where, on Lockwood's reasoning, one might expect to find the working-class "deferential". It will, however, be shown in Chapter V that the workers of Lindsay are no more

\footnote{12}The control variables applied (and the codings for these variables are as follows: respondent's occupation, respondent's first job, father's occupation, wife's occupation, best (male) friend's occupation, and father-in-law's occupation (all coded in the three digit Milsen socio-economic index of occupations); education of respondent, father, wife, best friend, father-in-law (all coded in years of full-time education); income (coded into under $2,000, then in $1,000 intervals to $14,999, then in $2,000 intervals to $19,999, and $20,000 and over); home ownership (coded as 1. non-owner, 2. home-owner); index of possession of consumer goods (total number of items owned or rented in the list in question 3:10-31); type of workplace (dichotomized as 1. other, 2. transport or outside work); length of employment in current firm (1. under 6 months; 2. 6 months to 2 years; 3. 2 to 5 years; 4. 5 to 10 years; 5. over 10 years); plant size (1. under 50 employees; 2. 50 to 100; 3. 100 to 500; 4. 500 to 1,000; 5. 1,000 to 5,000; 6. 5,000 to 10,000; 7. over 10,000); determinant of workspeed (1. other; 2. worker); union membership (1. non-member; 2. member); number of jobs held (coded into number held); skill level (1. did not serve apprenticeship; 2. served apprenticeship); age (coded in years of age); country of birth (1. Canada; 2. other); religion}
likely than workers in other communities to display attitudes toward the class system which might be characterized as "deferential", in Lockwood's sense of the word. A glance at Table IV-1 shows that the ordering of class identification between the communities does follow that predicted by the modified hypothesis, but, as stated previously, the differences are hardly large. When the zero-order product moment correlation between community and working-class identification is recalculated (communities being scored, from 1 to 4, in terms of the proportion of workers claiming working-class identification), the correlation is only .05, the same as that yielded when community is scored by percentage of the labour force in manual occupations. 14

It thus appears that neither of the two possible hypotheses concerning the relationship of community to working-class identification

(1. Protestant; 2. Catholic); ethnicity (prestige score developed by P.C. Pineo & J. Porter); place of residence at age 16 (1. same as at present; 2. different); size of place of residence at 16 (1. farm; 2. under 1,000 persons; 3. 1,000 to 50,000; 4. 50,000 to 100,000; 5. 100,000 to 500,000; 6. over 500,000); period of residence in present neighbourhood (number of years); number of association memberships (number of organizations belonged to, from list in question 5:11-22); class composition of immediate neighbourhood (percentage of male labour force in census tract in manual occupations - in 10% intervals).

13The largest first-order partial correlation obtained is .07, when plant size is partialled out.

14First-order partial correlations were again calculated, using the variables described in footnote 12. The largest correlation yielded was .07, partialling out the effect of country of birth.
among manual workers are confirmed by the evidence of this study. It may be that the units being dealt with are too large, and that the communities exhibit substantial differentiation in terms of areas within them. Hamilton and Ottawa are both communities whose metropolitan areas contain over 300,000 people, and Sudbury has a population of close to 100,000. There may not be much of a problem in regard to Lindsay, where the population is only in the region of 12,000, but areas within the other three communities may vary considerably in social class composition. It is possible that by examining smaller units a relationship between working-class identification among workers and class composition may emerge.

In order to examine this possibility a unit smaller than the entire community (in the cases of Ottawa, Hamilton, and Sudbury) is required. The unit that was selected was the census tract, for which data from the 1961 Census of Canada were available. The 1961 Census divides the city of Hamilton into sixty-five census tracts, the town of Burlington into six tracts, and the other three areas in the Hamilton sample, Ancaster, Dundas, and Stoney Creek, are each treated as a single tract. There are sixty-five tracts in metropolitan Ottawa (excluding the area on the Quebec side of the Ottawa River), and the city of Sudbury is divided into fifteen census tracts (including the town of Copper Cliff).

The census tract data were extracted from Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1961 Census of Canada, Census Tract Series, (Ottawa: the Queen's Printer, 1963), Bulletin CT-8, pp. 16-21 (Table 1), Bulletin CT-13, pp. 16-21 (Table 1), and Bulletin CT-14, pp. 8-9 (Table 1). The census divides a number of large communities into smaller units (or census tracts). The tracts are relatively uniform in area and population, and the information is provided to facilitate comparisons within a community. At the time of the study the 1961 figures were the most up-to-date available.
Lindsay is too small to be broken down into census tracts (several of the census tracts in the other communities contain more people than Lindsay), so it will be treated as one area.

The percentage that manual workers made up of the male labour force in each census tract was calculated, and the tracts were grouped into nine categories, in ten percent intervals, depending on the proportion of manual workers in the labour force. Each respondent who replied to the survey (save for six men who had obliterated the identification number on the questionnaire, and whose addresses could not be traced) was assigned the appropriate code for the census tract within which he resided.

As might be expected, the communities differ in the occupational composition of census tracts. No census tract in Ottawa has a population where over 50% of the men are in manual occupations, the range being from 4% to 45%. In Sudbury, the range is from 46% to 74%. Lindsay, being regarded as one area, has 42% of its male labour force in manual occupations. The community displaying the widest diversity is Hamilton, where the census tracts range from having 11% to 68% of their male labour forces in manual occupations.

Table IV-2 shows the class identifications of the workers, class-

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16 Only major categories of occupations are presented in the census tract data. It was not possible to break down the category, "transport and communications occupations", as had been done when defining the manual workers sub-sample. The percentage of the labour force in manual occupations in the census tracts, therefore, does not include any from this category.
ified by the occupational composition of the immediate neighbourhood (as signified by the census tract) within which they reside. The chi-square statistic, which measures whether the contingency table exhibits over-all differences which are greater than those expected by chance, does not reach significance at the .05 level. However, both the Tau C and zero-order product moment correlations show a statistically significant, moderate relationship between the class composition of an area and the level of working-class identification among workers. The percentages of workers claiming to be working-class in the two lower categories are identical at 65%, but 77% of the workers residing in the areas with the greatest concentration of manual workers identify with the working-class. The fact that the chi-square is not significant seems due to the similarity of responses in the two lower categories, whereas

The re-grouping of census tracts into the categories adopted in Table IV-2 was dictated partly by the need to ensure that cells in the table would be large enough for the chi-square test. The intermediate group (men residing in tracts where from 40% to 59% of the male labour force are in manual occupations) is considerably larger than the other two and is made up of 157 men residing in areas with 40% to 49% in manual occupations and 83 men in areas with 50% to 59% in manual occupations. It might, at first glance, have been better to expand the third category to include all those men residing in areas where over 50% of the male labour force was in manual occupations, but to have done this would have blurred a distinction in levels of working-class identification between these men. Of the men in the tracts with 40 to 49% in manual occupations, 65% identified as working-class, and 64% of those in the 50 to 59% areas did the same. But 75% of the men residing in areas with 60% to 69% in manual occupations claimed to be working-class. So, from the point of view of best illustrating differences in class identification as they are related to differences in the social class composition of areas in which workers reside, the divisions adopted in Table IV-2 appeared to be the most appropriate.
both differ from the third by twelve percentage points. Combining the responses in the two lower categories and calculating a difference of proportion test between this figure and that for the higher category yields a Z value of 2.305, a statistic that is significant at the .05 level.\textsuperscript{18}

Table IV-2.--Class identification by class composition of immediate neighbourhood (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Identification</th>
<th>Under 40% manual</th>
<th>40% to 59% manual</th>
<th>60% manual &amp; over*</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class</td>
<td>65 (N=86)</td>
<td>65 (N=240)</td>
<td>77 (N=110)</td>
<td>68 (N=436)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, etc. = 69

\(\chi^2 = 5.31\), with 2df (n.s.). Tau C = .09 (p<.01)

r = .11 (p<.05) (census tract composition in original nine categories)

*No census tract has over 80% of its male labour force in manual occupations.

It appears, then, that working-class identification does not vary in a direct manner with the class composition of the area within which a worker resides. There has to be a relatively high proportion of working-class people in an area before an effect is noticeable.

Partialling out the influence of other variables shows the relationship between class composition of an area and working-class identification to be smaller than that indicated by the zero-order relationship. The first-order partial correlation of working-class identification with class composition of immediate neighbourhood, partialling out trade union membership, is .04. This suggests that the reason workers residing in the most working-class neighbourhoods are the most likely to identify as working-class is because they are members of trade unions in larger proportions than workers residing in areas with less of a concentration of working-class people.

Table IV-3.--Class identification by class composition of immediate neighbourhood, by trade union membership (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Identification</th>
<th>Under 40% manual</th>
<th>40% to 59% manual</th>
<th>60% manual &amp; over</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-members</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class</td>
<td>53 (100/33)</td>
<td>44 (100/69)</td>
<td>26 (100/8)</td>
<td>45 (100/110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Union members</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class</td>
<td>73 (100/49)</td>
<td>73 (100/160)</td>
<td>81 (100/99)</td>
<td>76 (100/508)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers (to one or more of the three questions) = 87

\[ \chi^2 = 1.969, \text{ with } 2 \text{df (n.s.)}. \quad \text{ Tau } C = -.12 (p<.05). \]

\[ \chi^2 = 2.494, \text{ with } 2 \text{df (n.s.)}. \quad \text{ Tau } C = .07 (p<.05). \]
Table IV-3 shows the class identifications of working-class men residing in areas of different class compositions, showing the figures separately for union members and non-members. It is clear that taking union membership into account reduces the relationship between class identification and class composition of immediate neighbourhood. In fact, among the non-members, the workers in the least working-class areas are the most likely to claim to be working-class. Among the union members, the percentages still show some increase in the level of working-class identification with increasing manual worker representation in the population of the census tracts, but the differences are not very large, as the insignificant chi-square and the Tau C correlation of .07 indicate.

It thus appears that differences in the degree to which the workers in areas of differing class composition are members of trade unions account for part of the differences in working-class identification, and that the remaining variation is not very great.

In the four communities study, contrary to the experience of British studies, no great differences in the percentages of workers claiming working-class status were found to exist between the four communities. The degree to which a community's male labour force is composed of manual workers is not highly related to the extent to which workers in that community choose to identify as middle- or working-class. When the hypothesis is modified slightly, to take account of Lockwood's discussion of the

19 With the small numbers involved it is, perhaps, dangerous to make too much of this. The direction, nonetheless, is clear.
working-class "deferential", although the rank ordering of class identification in the four communities is consistent with this modified hypothesis, the zero-order correlation of .05 shows that the relationship is not statistically significant.

Narrowing down the focus by concentrating on the smaller, more immediate neighbourhood within which the worker resides still does not bring to light a very strong relationship between working-class identification among workers and a predominantly working-class residential environment. A more detailed discussion of the possible reason for this difference between the British evidence and the findings of this study shall be undertaken in Chapter V. The immediate task will be to examine the influence of differences in the work situations of workers on their class identifications.

The Impact of the Work World

In Chapter I it is suggested that a number of factors in the work situations of manual workers are likely to be associated with variation in attitudes to the class system. One important element in the work situation of manual workers is the trade union. In Chapter I evidence from studies by Lipset, McDonald, Butler and Stokes, Nordlinger, and Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechhofer and Platt was presented to show that workers who are members of trade unions are more likely to vote for left wing political parties than are workers who are not members. Another

\[\text{footnote} 66, \text{page} 38\]
study\textsuperscript{21} found that working-class identifiers among the working-class are more likely to vote for the left wing party than are middle-class identifiers, so it might be inferred that union members would be more likely to adopt working-class identification than non-members.

The total column in Table IV-3 shows that this is indeed the case. When all the workers who gave a class identification and who said whether or not they are a member of a trade union (four hundred and twenty-seven men) are considered, $75\%$ of the trade union members claim to be members of the working-class, compared to $47\%$ of the workers who are not members of trade unions.\textsuperscript{22} This is a highly significant difference,\textsuperscript{23} and the zero-order product moment correlation between trade union membership and working-class identification among workers is $.27 (p<.001)$.

Having established that there is a relatively substantial relationship between union membership and the likelihood of workers adopting a working-class identification, a problem arises as to the causal direction of this relationship. Does trade union membership influence the worker toward identification with the working-class, or do workers who are conscious of their membership of the working-class join trade unions in greater proportions than those who identify with the middle-


\textsuperscript{22}These percentages are slightly different from those given in the totals column of Table IV-3 because nine more cases are included. This is because information on census tract composition was not available for these nine men.

\textsuperscript{23}$\chi^2 = 30.34$, with 1df ($p<.001$), Tau B = .27 ($p<.001$)
class? The first possibility is consistent with Parkin's argument that a strong working-class environment helps to insulate the worker from the dominant culture by involving him in a viable working-class subculture. It is also in keeping with Anderson's insistence that the union, if only partly, has the effect of changing the worker's ideological consciousness in the direction of a more militant position.

It cannot be denied, however, that the second possibility has a certain plausibility. It may be that those workers who identify with the middle-class would be more likely to accept the values of middle-class individualism, and shy away from working-class defensive organizations (especially from trade unions, which are accorded a fairly prominent place in middle-class demonology). There are, however, many instances where the worker does not have a choice; if the plant is unionized, he may have to join (unless he has religious reasons for not joining).

---

26 It was not possible to find information that applied only to Ontario, but, for Canada as a whole, a Canada Department of Labour survey of 2,378 collective agreements, covering 1,947,681 employees, found that 44.6% of the employees were covered by union shop and modified union shop agreements, while another 4.2% were covered by closed shop agreements. Just over half of the employees were covered by agreements that contained no clauses dealing with membership provisions, but it is likely that many of these were covered by the Rand formula, which specifies a check-off of union dues even for those who choose not to join the union. According to Mr. C. Hardy, of the Economics and Research Division, Canada Department of Labour, agreements covering about 46% of all employees in Canada covered by collective agreements conform to the Rand formula (private communication from C. Hardy).
This is true, for instance, of some (at least) of the large plants in Hamilton (such as the Steel Company of Canada, and Canadian Westinghouse), and Sudbury (International Nickel, and Falconbridge).

It is probable that the causal flow, in this instance, is not exclusively in one direction. In some cases, membership in trade unions may influence workers toward working-class identification, whereas, in other cases, working-class consciousness may lead workers to join unions.

Unfortunately, the questionnaire did not include a question that sought to discover whether union membership was voluntary or compulsory, so it is difficult to adjudicate between the two possibilities.

If it is possible to show that, regardless of other differences between workers, there is still a relationship between union membership and working-class identification, then this may persuade us that union membership does have some causal influence on working-class identification. If the willingness to join unions were purely, or even mostly, the result of existing working-class consciousness, then other factors have to be invoked to explain the variation in class identification among workers. By holding constant the effect of other factors on both class identification and trade union membership, a better appreciation of the

\[27\text{See D. Butler \& D. Stokes, Political Change in Britain, (London: MacMillan, 1969), pp. 151-170, for a discussion of the impact of union membership upon voting preferences in Britain. They conclude that, among voluntary members of unions, class feelings (as indicated by Labour voting) leading the worker to join a union, are more important than union membership leading to class awareness. However, they only present evidence on current union membership, so there is no way of knowing whether or not union membership in the past had any influence on the individual's political beliefs and class attitudes.}\]
relationship may be obtained. Table IV-4 shows the first-order partial correlations between union membership and working-class identification, holding constant the single influence of a number of intervening variables. The table also gives the zero-order correlations between the control variables and both class identification and union membership.

The control variables in Table IV-4 represent a variety of factors, some of which presumably, would have influenced the worker's conception of his class membership in the past (such as education, occupation at 16, father's occupation, and community of residence at 16), while others may be presumed to have a more current influence (such as income, current occupation, and class composition of immediate neighbourhood). In only one case does partialling out the effect of an intervening variable reduce the correlation between trade union membership and working-class identification by more than two points. Working-class identification among manual workers is inversely related to the socio-economic status of their wives' occupations (either current occupation, or the last full-time occupation held). There is also a tendency for workers whose wives performed higher status occupations to be members of trade unions in lower proportions than those whose wives performed jobs with a lower socio-economic ranking. Thus, part of the relationship between trade union membership and working-class identification can be accounted for by the fact that workers whose wives perform (or performed) jobs with a higher socio-economic ranking are more likely to claim middle-class status, and not to be members of trade unions. But, even in this case, the reduction in the size of the
Table IV-4.--First-order partial correlations of class identification with trade union membership (also showing zero-order correlations of the intervening variable with class identification and trade union membership)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control variable</th>
<th>Partial correlation</th>
<th>Zero-order correlation with class ident.</th>
<th>Zero-order correlation with union membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of respondent</td>
<td>.29&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-10&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of respondent</td>
<td>.27&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-15&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income of respondent</td>
<td>.28&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-17&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of respondent</td>
<td>.27&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.10&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>at 16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of respondent's</td>
<td>.27&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.08&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>father</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of respondent's</td>
<td>.26&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.14&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.10&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>father</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of respondent's</td>
<td>.23&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.38&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.16&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wife</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of respondent's</td>
<td>.27&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.13&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wife</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of respondent's</td>
<td>.27&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>father-in-law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of respondent's</td>
<td>.26&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.26&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>father-in-law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of respondent's</td>
<td>.26&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.15&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>best friend</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of respondent's</td>
<td>.27&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>best friend</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of birth</td>
<td>.27&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.14&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.27&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community at age 16</td>
<td>.27&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.09&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of community at age 16</td>
<td>.27&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.11&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious affiliation</td>
<td>.28&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.14&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>.26&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.11&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>-.11&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class composition of community</td>
<td>.27&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.20&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordering of communities by</td>
<td>.27&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% working-class identification</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class composition of immediate</td>
<td>.25&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.11&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.26&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neighbourhood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>p<.05 level or better (one-tailed test)

<sup>28</sup>For details of the coding of these variables, see footnote 12 to this chapter.
relationship is small, and a clear relationship between union membership
and working-class identification still exists after the influence of
wife's occupation has been accounted for. 29

The partial correlation is a measure of the association between
two variables, independent of the effect of a third variable. 30 If trade
union membership results from working-class identification, rather than
being a factor influencing the worker to make such an identification,
then other differences would have to lead to differences in working-class
identification. At the same time, such differences should also be related to

29 The regular partialling procedure involved pair-wise deletion
of no answers, where a case is excluded (because of no answers) only
from the zero-order correlation involving the variable on which there is
no response. The other zero-order correlations in the partialling
equation (if information is available) are calculated from figures that
include the case that was excluded from the calculation of the first
correlation. This procedure was adopted because the computing procedure
involved in list-wise deletion of no answers (where a case is excluded
from all calculations if a no answer is recorded on any of the variables)
was much more complex, and also because, when a number of variables
are included in a correlation matrix, the number of cases quickly diminishes
if list-wise deletion is used. It was felt that pair-wise deletion of no
answers would be adequate, especially in instances where the no answer
rates are fairly low. But problems might arise where (as in the instance
of wife's occupation) the no answer rate is high. In the case of union
membership, for instance, it might be argued that list-wise deletion of
no answers might produce very different correlations than those presented
in Table IV-4. To test this the first-order partial correlation of union
membership with class identification, controlling for wife's occupation,
was calculated on the basis of list-wise deletion of no answers. Although
the case base is reduced to 199, the correlation yielded is, at .21, similar
to that shown in Table IV-4 (.23). As wife's occupation is a variable
with one of the highest no answer rates this would suggest that pair-wise
deletion of no answers, at least with the data analysed in this thesis,
does not lead to unreliable correlations.

30 For a discussion of partial correlation, see Blalock,
*op.cit.*, pp. 329-343.
variation in union membership. But, as Table IV-4 shows, few of the variables that are significantly correlated with class identification are also correlated with union membership. And, in the instances where this is the case, the correlations are not large enough to render spurious the original relationship between union membership and working-class identification.

The evidence presented in Table IV-4 lends support to the hypothesis that union membership has an independent effect on the class identification of workers. (Unless there is some unmeasured variable that would obliterate the relationship). If working-class identification was causally prior to trade union membership, then both these factors should vary, in the same manner, with other variables that are related to class identification. Controlling for these variables should, therefore, have the effect of reducing the relationship, but this has not happened in the analysis that has been presented here.

There is, then, evidence of a fairly strong influence of one element of the work situation of manual workers, trade union membership, on the class identification of workers. And it has been established that the dominant causal influence, in this study at least, flows from trade union membership to working-class identification. This is not to assert that there may never be instances where the influence may be in the other direction, in fact such a possibility seems to occur with the next factor in the work situation of workers to be discussed, that of plant size.

It was asserted, in Chapter I, that working-class identification among workers should increase with the size of plant in which they work. Cannon found, in his study of compositors in London, England, that men in
the larger printing firms claimed working-class status in larger proportions than those in smaller firms. Among the workers in the four communities, however, there is not, as Table IV-5 shows, a clear relationship between working-class identification and employment in large size plants.

Table IV-5.--Class identification by size of plant (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Identification</th>
<th>No. of employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to 499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to 999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to 4,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Over 5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=127)</td>
<td>(N=77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=48)</td>
<td>(N=75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=89)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, don't know, etc. = 89.

χ² = 15.703, with 4df (p<.01). Tau C = -.11 (p<.001)

r = -.10 (p<.05) (calculated with original 7 plant size categories; under 50, 50-99, 100-499, 500-999, 1,000-4,999, 5,000-9,000, 10,000 or more).

There is not a clear monotonic relationship between plant size and class identification, for working-class identification rises slightly moving from the smallest firms, is fairly stable among firms ranging from one hundred to five thousand employees, and then falls dramatically among the workers employed in the largest plants. It is this decline in the largest plants that accounts for the negative zero-order correlation...

---

between working-class identification and plant size. And it is precisely in these giant plants that one would expect the "interaction effect", that Ingham refers to, to be at its strongest.32

One possible explanation of the generally observed relationship between plant size and left-wing voting is that trade union activities are most intense in the large plants, and that trade union membership is higher. But, in the four communities studied, the workers employed in the largest plants are not the group with the highest level of trade union membership. Approximately 75% of these workers are in trade unions, compared to roughly 90% of the men in firms employing from between 100 to 5,000 men.33 However, as Table IV-6 shows, the relatively lower level of union membership among the men in the largest plants does not account for the high level of middle-class identification.

Controlling for union membership, in fact, throws the negative relationship between plant size and working-class identification into sharper relief. Among the non-unionists, with the exception of the men in plants employing from 100 to 499 men (who show the highest level of middle-class identification), middle-class identification increases with


33 Whether this is generally true of very large plants in Ontario is difficult to say. In this study, one of the large firms, Dofasco in Hamilton, is not organized, and this may account for the lower level of union membership among workers employed in the very large plants.
Table IV-6.--Class identification by size of plant, by trade union membership (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Identification</th>
<th>Under 100</th>
<th>100 to 499</th>
<th>500 to 999</th>
<th>1,000 to 4,999</th>
<th>Over 5,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-members(^a)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=68)</td>
<td>(N=8)</td>
<td>(N=4)</td>
<td>(N=8)</td>
<td>(N=21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union members(^b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=52)</td>
<td>(N=64)</td>
<td>(N=41)</td>
<td>(N=68)</td>
<td>(N=65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union members as % of all workers</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, etc. = 106

\(^a\)\(X^2 = 7.12\), with 4df (n.s.). Tau C = -.20 (p<.001)

\(^b\)\(X^2 = 17.51\), with 4df (p<.01). Tau C = -.22 (p<.001)

First-order partial correlation of plant size with working-class identification, controlling for union membership = -.20 (p<.01)

It was argued, in the discussion of the influence of union membership on class identification, that the predominant causal flow in that relationship appeared to be from union membership to working-class identification. But the data presented in Table IV-6 suggests that, in the
case of workers employed in the smaller plants, the influence may be in
the other direction. It is possible that the workers in the smallest
plants chose to be members of trade unions to a greater extent than work­
ers in the larger plants. Only 43% of the workers in the plants employ­
ing less than 100 people are members of trade unions, but the unionists
among this group have the highest level of working-class identification
of any group of workers. The low level of unionization in these firms
may suggest that union membership is more voluntary in this situation.
In such circumstances the worker will, in all probability, have to be
more committed to the principles of trade unionism than his counterpart
in the larger plant, where union membership is more likely to be obligat­
ory. Hence, it might be expected that the unionist in the small plant,
who is likely to be involved in interaction with the employer and other
management personnel,\(^{34}\) will have to be more conscious of his membership
of the working-class to maintain his union membership.

This emphasis on the possibility that voluntary union membership
among workers in the smallest plants results in the high level of working­
class identification among such workers does not dispose of the problem
of the negative relationship between plant size and working-class identi­
fication, for the same relationship also occurs among the non-unionized
workers. Partialling out the influence of those control variables applied

\(^{34}\)References to the conservative influence of employer-employee
interactions are to be found in Lockwood, op.cit., p. 253; Parkin,
earlier in this chapter, in no case yielded a first-order partial correlation showing the expected positive relationship between plant size and working-class identification. Although, for example, partialling out the effect of income differences reduces the correlation to -.07 it does not explain why the expected relationship does not occur.

How then can the findings of this study be explained, especially as they are inconsistent with the findings of other studies? Richard Hamilton's study of workers in France may provide a clue. Hamilton did not look at the question of class identification, but he was interested in the variation of certain indices of radicalism with plant size. There was not, however, a consistent pattern between the various indices. In terms of pro-Soviet attitudes, the workers in the very largest firms were the most pro-Soviet, but when asked whether or not they expected social change to occur through revolution, workers in small plants expressed agreement more often than those in the larger plants. Hamilton argues that this is so because the former work in small, family owned, non-expanding plants, where the chances for promotion or increases in pay are minimal. So the only possibility for change would be through radical

35 See footnote 12.

36 The lowest partial correlation yielded is still negative, being -.07 when income is partialled out. Partialling out union membership, as has been seen, boosts the negative correlation to -.20, the largest yielded.

social transformation. He goes on;

In most larger plants, by comparison, the chances for personal betterment are highly visible in the high productivity and the obvious profitability of the firm. The worker in this setting can 'see' the possibility of a direct solution to his problems, a solution which does not necessitate a social revolution.38

While there is nothing like the same radicalism among the majority of Canadian workers as there is among a substantial segment of the French working-class, the general distinction that Hamilton makes would appear to make sense in the Canadian context. Workers in the largest plants may "see" the possibility of prosperity and job mobility to a greater extent than the worker in the smaller plant. If this is so, then the fact that such a worker claims middle-class status may be related to his perception of himself as occupying a relatively privileged position vis a vis other workers. In income terms alone, as Table IV-7 shows, the workers in the largest plants are in an advantageous position.

Table IV-7.--Mean income of workers by plant size.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank order of mean incomes</th>
<th>Rank order of middle-class identification</th>
<th>Mean income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Over 5,000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$9,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000 to 4,999</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>$7,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 to 999</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>$8,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 to 499</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>$7,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 100</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$7,511</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The mean income of workers in plants employing over 5,000 people is nearly $700 higher than that of the group with the next highest mean income. Pineo and Porter found, in their study of the Canadian status system, that people rank industries in prestige terms, and that the highest correlation of any objective attribute with the prestige of an industry is with the incomes of people working in that industry. It is, perhaps, not fanciful to suggest that this prestige rubs off on the workers in the industry, enhancing their self-images, and leading more of them to claim middle-class status. In addition to the evaluation aspect, there is also the possibility that, because the largest plants offer the possibility of higher economic rewards, the worker has a vision of increasing economic prosperity, and this may increase the likelihood of such workers identifying with the middle-class.

A glance at the two lower rows in Table IV-7 shows that there is not a one-for-one correspondence between mean income and degree of middle-class identification. But the differences are not great. The men employed in the smallest plants are third in terms of mean income but second in terms of middle-class identification. The men in the plants ranging from 100 to 4,999 employees are all "inconsistent", but when it is remembered that only three percentage points separate the groups with the highest and lowest levels of middle-class identification in this range, it is perhaps

39 Private communication from P.C. Pineo, Department of Sociology, McMaster University. The correlation between prestige scores accorded industries and income of the labour forces in those industries was .59.
asking too much for there to be complete consistency. The major difference in class identification is that between the men working in the very largest plants, and the rest of the workers. And here it would appear that the more favourable prospects of the former may account for this. With the information available, this would seem to offer the only explanation for the unanticipated negative relationship between plant size and working-class identification, a relationship that is the result of the high level of middle-class identification among workers employed in the largest plants.

A further point referring to the plant size question is whether or not a linear relationship between plant size and working-class identification should be expected. As Ingham points out, it is the possibility of intra-class communication, and lack of contact with people in higher positions, that is generally regarded as the reason for the higher incidence of left-wing attitudes among workers in large plants.40 It is possible that this does not operate in a linear fashion, but that there is a point (possibly at a relatively small size) where intra-class communication, and lack of inter-class communication, does its work. If this is the case, it is not surprising that the correlation between plant size and working-class identification is not very large. Thus, the workers in plants employing less than 100 people are slightly more likely to claim to be members of the middle-class than are the workers in the larger plants (with, of course, the exception of those in the very largest plants). The "non-conformity" of the workers in the plants employ-

40 Ingham, op.cit., p. 237.
ing over 5,000 people seems to be a result of the high economic rewards of those plants outweighing the effect of plant size.

Thus, so far in the discussion of the influence of elements in the work situations of manual workers on their class identifications, it has been found that trade union membership, as expected, influences the worker toward identifying with the working-class. Contrary to expectations, however, employment in large plants does not influence workers to claim working-class status. There are two other factors regarding work where there is some variation in working-class identification among workers. Workers in the category comprised of transportation (such as truck driving) and outside work (such as construction) are more likely to claim working-class status than are workers employed in other types of workplace. Of the workers in the transport and outside work category, 78% identified as working-class, compared to 66% of those employed in factories, production plants or workshops, and 65% of those working in mines. Of the workers employed in other work settings (such as schools, hospitals, etc.), only 56% identified as working-class.

Controlling for the intervention of other factors does not identify any third variable that accounts for the higher level of working-class identification among workers in the transport and outside work category. The survey cannot, therefore, provide any explanation of

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41 Question 1:30, Appendix C. The differences are statistically significant ($X^2 = 8.39$, with 3df, $p < .05$). When the variable is dichotomized into 1. other, and 2. transport or outside work, the zero-order product moment correlation with working-class identification is .12 ($p < .01$).
this difference. It is possible that factors in the work situation of these men incline them toward working-class identification in greater proportions than workers employed in other types of workplace, but, with the information available, it is impossible to attempt an explanation. What can be noted at this point is that the workers in this category do not, as will become clear in later chapters, adopt a perspective that is consistently more "working-class" than workers employed in other work settings. Only in regard to class identification do these workers stand out as being more inclined toward such a perspective.

The other aspect of the work situations of workers that varies with class identification concerns the primary determinant of the speed at which the worker works. Thirty-nine percent of the workers who said that they themselves decide the speed at which they work claim to be members of the middle-class, compared to 25% of workers who say that their work speed is determined by factors outside their personal control, factors such as the boss, the work group, or machinery.\(^\text{42}\) When this variable is dichotomized into whether or not the worker controls his own workspeed, the zero-order product moment correlation between working-class identification and worker determination of work speed is -.15 (p<.001).

In *Alienation and Freedom*, Robert Blauner argues that the ability of the worker to determine his own work speed is one of the factors that

\(^{42}\chi^2 = 8.92, \text{ with } 1 \text{ df (p<.01), Tau B } = .15 (p<.001).\)
lessen the degree of "powerlessness" felt by workers in their jobs.\footnote{43} For Blaumer, greater control over the work process results in the worker being less alienated from his work. It is possible that this drifts over into attitudes that are not so closely related to the work setting, such as class identification, so that the workers who are, relatively speaking, the least powerless in the work world also have less of a feeling of "powerlessness" in the wider social world.\footnote{44} Being less estranged from the dominant cultural system, it is possible that these workers will be more likely to identify with the dominant cultural ethos, which in Canada, as Porter suggests, is basically a middle-class one.\footnote{45}

When trade union membership is taken into account, however, the negative relationship is attenuated somewhat, the correlation being reduced to -.09. This reduction is due more to the fact that there is very little difference among trade unionists rather than to the fact that non-union members are more likely to say that they have control over the speed at which they work.\footnote{46} Thus, 27\% of the union members who say that they determine their own work speed identify with the middle-class, compared to 23\% of the unionists who say that the speed at which they work is


\footnote{44}Meissner refers to this kind of argument as the "spill-over hypothesis", and finds some corroboration for it in his study of leisure activities. In his study in British Columbia, Meissner found evidence that lack of control of the work process "spilled-over" into non-activist forms of leisure. See M. Meissner, "The long arm of the job: a study of work and leisure", Industrial Relations, 10(1971), pp. 239-260.


\footnote{46}This, in fact, is the case; 76\% of the non-unionists, compared to 50\% of the union members, saying that they control their own work speed.
beyond their personal control. Among non-unionists, on the other hand, 58% of the workers who determine their own workspeed claim middle-class status, compared to 37% of those who do not. It appears, therefore, that union membership, in this instance, acts as a countervailing influence, reducing the influence of an aspect of the work situation that inclines some workers toward middle-class identification.

The evidence presented in this section, therefore, does offer some confirmation for the argument in Chapter I that involvement in a working-class occupational sub-culture will influence the worker toward working-class identification. In this study the main element of this working-class sub-culture is the trade union, and union membership is seen to be an important influence toward working-class identification. But it also appears, as is seen in the instances of plant size, type of workplace, and determinants of work speed, that factors exist which have a divisive influence on the occupational sub-culture. Some workers enjoy a more favourable work situation than others, either in terms of income, socio-economic status, or working conditions, and this appears to incline such workers to middle-class identification in greater proportions than workers who are less favourably situated. On the other hand trade union membership sets limits on the effects of such differences, and it seems that the existence of trade unions prevents such differences from having even more of an impact on the class identities of workers.

\[ \chi^2 = 0.271, \text{ with 1 df (n.s.). Tau B = } -0.04 \text{ (n.s.)}. \]

\[ \chi^2 = 2.862, \text{ with 1 df (n.s.). Tau B = } 0.18 \text{ (p<.01)}. \]
Non-manual Affiliations

In Chapter I evidence from other studies was presented which suggested that, in addition to community and work influences, the extent of workers' contacts with people in non-manual occupations would have an influence on their class identifications. Relationships with people from non-manual backgrounds would influence the worker to identify with the middle-class and, conversely, relationships that were primarily with other people in manual occupations would provide another structural barrier to the permeation of middle-class influences among working-class people.

In the questionnaire, there were a number of questions that relate to this issue. The respondents were asked to give the occupation they first performed on a full-time basis, and the occupation and education of their fathers, their wives, their fathers-in-law, and their best friends. Following the lead given by Runciman, and by Goldthorpe and Lockwood and their associates, it would be expected that those workers who have contact with the non-manual world, either by birth, marriage, occupational history, or friendship, would be more likely to identify with the middle-class than would workers without such contacts. Table IV-8 gives the zero-order correlations between class identification and such variables, and shows that the expectations mentioned above were justified. In all the correlations occupation is measured by the Blishen socio-economic

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index of occupations, \(^{50}\) while education is measured in number of years of full-time education completed.

The highest correlation presented in Table IV-8 is that between working-class identification and wife's occupation. Respondents were asked to indicate their wives' current full-time occupation, or the last full-time occupation they performed. As the number in parenthesis under the correlation shows, only 208 of the working-class respondents answered this question. \(^{51}\) But, among those men who answered the question, their wife's social status, as measured by occupation, plays an important part in their class identification. The higher the socio-economic status of the respondent's wife, the more likely is he to claim to be middle-class.

Only 4% of the 34 men whose wives' occupations scored between 20.0 and 29.9 on the Blishen scale claimed middle-class status. Among the 69 men whose wives' occupations scored between 30.0 and 39.9, 21% identified as middle-class. And 52% of the men whose wives' occupations were assigned a Blishen scale value of 40.0 or more said that they were members of the middle-class (there being 107 men in this category). \(^{52}\)

Clearly, the fact of having a wife who performs, or did perform, a high status job strongly influences a worker to identify with the middle-class. And this is not the result of socio-economic differences


\(^{51}\)Many men reported their wife's occupation as housewife. As the Blishen index does not assign a value to such a category, such replies are excluded from the analysis.

\(^{52}\)\( \chi^2 = 34.26, \text{ with } 2 \text{ df (p<.001). } \) Tau C = -.40 (p<.001).
Table IV-8.--Zero-order correlations of working-class identification with measures of non-manual affiliations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>r</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respondent's first full-time occupation</td>
<td>-.10&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (N=434)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of respondent's father</td>
<td>-.08&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (N=390)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of respondent's father</td>
<td>-.14&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (N=309)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of respondent's wife</td>
<td>-.38&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (N=208)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of respondent's wife</td>
<td>-.13&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (N=369)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of respondent's father-in-law</td>
<td>-.09 (N=269)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of respondent's father-in-law</td>
<td>-.26&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (N=269)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of respondent's best (male) friend</td>
<td>-.15&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (N=246)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of respondent's best (male) friend</td>
<td>-.03 (N=272)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>p<.05 or better (one-tailed test)

among the workers themselves. Partialling out the influence of the worker's occupation scarcely influences the relationship, the first-order partial correlation being -.37. Partialling out the worker's income

<sup>53</sup>As was pointed out in footnote 29, the first-order partial correlations were calculated on the basis of pair-wise deletion of no answers. The partial correlations of class identification with wife's occupation that are presented in the text were re-calculated with no answers excluded on a list-wise basis. On this basis the first-order partial
only brings the correlation down to -.36, while partialling out the worker's education yields a first-order partial correlation of -.35. No other variable is creating this relationship, hence it seems safe to assert that contact with the non-manual world, through marriage, plays a significant role in the worker's adoption of a middle-class identification.

It may be suggested that this relationship does not indicate that the worker who marries a woman with a non-manual occupational history is influenced toward middle-class identification, but, rather, suggests that workers aspiring to middle-class status will select mates who are of higher socio-economic status. However, the same argument applies here as applied with the influence of trade union membership. If the relationship between class identification and wife's occupation were the result of middle-class identifiers choosing to marry higher status wives, then other factors should account for the prior middle-class identification and, when controlled for, should indicate that the relationship is due to the influence of these other factors. However, as was noted in the previous paragraph, partialling out the influence of a variety of other factors hardly influences the relationship at all. This, it seems,

correlations are: partialling out the worker's occupation, -.37; partialling out the worker's income -.37; and partialling out the worker's education, -.33. The greatest difference occurs when education is controlled, but even here the correlation based on list-wise deletion is only .02 lower than that based on pair-wise deletion. This, it would appear, supports the contention that pair-wise deletion of no answers is an adequate method.

Calculating first order partial correlations, using the variables listed in footnote 12, the most influential intervening variable is wife's father's occupation. Even here the first-order partial correlation between wife's occupation and working-class identification is still -.31.
would offer support to the contention that the worker who marries a
girl from a non-manual occupational background is influenced by this
fact toward identifying as middle-class. (Assuming, of course, that
there is no unmeasured variable that would obliterate the relationship).

No other form of non-manual contact plays as strong a role in the
worker's class identification. The second highest correlation in Table
IV-8 is that of -.26 between working-class identification and the educ-
ation of the respondent's father-in-law. But fathers-in-law who are
relatively highly educated tend to have daughters who perform higher
status occupations, and when wife's occupation is partialled out, the
first-order partial correlation between working-class identification and
father-in-law's education is -.12.

The family background in which the worker grew up does not play
as important a role in his class identification as his marriage partner.
The correlations of working-class identification with father's occupation
and father's education are substantially lower than the correlation
with wife's occupation, and first-order partial correlations, controlling
for the effect of those variables applied elsewhere in this chapter, do
not indicate that another intervening variable is obscuring stronger
relationships.

Friendship with higher status individuals, too, plays less of a
role in the worker's class identification than does marriage to a woman

\[ r = .42 \ (p<.001). \]

\[ ^{56} \text{See note 12 for details of these control variables.} \]
who is of relatively high social status. The zero-order correlation of working-class identification with best friend's occupation is -.15, and there is virtually no relationship between a man's class identification and his best friend's education \( r = -.03 \).\(^{57}\)

It would appear, therefore, that a worker's self identity owes more to the kind of person he married than to his friends. The evidence presented also suggests that a man's current kinship affiliations, in the form of the socio-economic status of his marriage partner, are more influential on his class identity than the socio-economic background of the family he grew up in. It also appears that the fact that the worker's first full-time job may have been non-manual is less influential on his class identity than the fact that he married a woman from a non-manual background.

The evidence presented in Table IV-8, therefore, supports the contention that affiliation with non-manual persons influences a worker to reject identification with the working-class. Relationships with people from other class backgrounds weaken the influence of working-class culture by exposing the worker to other life-styles, and inclines him to identify with such people.

**Other Influences on Class Identification**

It has been shown, so far, that community differences do not play

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\(^{57}\) The occupation of a worker's best friend plays less of a role in influencing class identification among workers than is true of the entire sample in the four communities study, where the comparable correlation is .30.
the role in influencing the class identifications of working-class men that was assigned to them in Chapter I. It has, however, been shown that elements in the work situations of manual workers, and affiliations with people from non-working-class backgrounds, do influence whether the worker identifies with the middle or the working-class. It remains to examine the question of what other factors may also influence the class identifications of working-class men.

Table IV-9 presents the zero-order correlations between working-class identification and a number of other variables that were expected to show some relationship with class identification. The first five correlations show that workers who are, in socio-economic terms, relatively privileged compared to other workers claim middle-class status in higher numbers than their less privileged brethren. The highest negative correlation of working-class identification with any of the socio-economic attributes is with the index of possession of consumer goods, indicating that those workers who possess more of a series of consumer durables listed in the questionnaire are more likely to claim to be middle-class than are workers who possess fewer of these items. This relationship is largely independent of income differences among workers, for the first-order partial correlation, partialling out income, is -.17. Regardless of income level, therefore, workers who devote more of their income to the purchase or renting of consumer durables seem more likely to see

58 Question 3:16-31 (Appendix C) asked respondents to check a list of consumer goods, checking all those that they own or rent. The index of consumer goods is the sum total of items that each respondent owns or rents.
Table IV-9.--Zero-order correlations of working-class identification with measures of socio-economic status, and other variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>r*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of respondent</td>
<td>-0.19a (N=444)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of respondent</td>
<td>-0.15a (N=422)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income of respondent</td>
<td>-0.17a (N=422)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home ownership</td>
<td>-0.17a (N=409)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of possession of consumer goods</td>
<td>-0.21a (N=436)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of birth</td>
<td>0.14a (N=443)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious affiliation</td>
<td>-0.04a (N=389)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>-0.11a (N=384)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Place of residence at age 16</td>
<td>0.09a (N=442)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of place of residence at age 16</td>
<td>-0.11a (N=434)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a p<.05 or better (one-tailed test).

*In the case of the socio-economic variables, and of ethnicity and size of place of residence at age 16, the negative signs result from the decision to relate working-class identification to high values of the independent variables. In other cases, whether the sign is positive or negative is purely a function of the coding, and implies nothing about the ordering of the dichotomous independent variables.

59 See note 12 for details of the coding for these variables.
this as a mark of middle-class status, and hence are more likely to identify with the middle-class.

It has already been shown, in Chapter III, that workers with higher incomes are more likely to claim middle-class status. All the other indicators of socio-economic status presented in Table IV-9 (education, occupation, home ownership, and the index of consumer goods) show some negative association with working-class identification. As workers with higher incomes are more likely to claim middle-class status than are those at lower income levels, it is hardly surprising, when comparing workers on other dimensions of socio-economic status, that working-class identification is lower among workers who rank high on these other dimensions.

The correlation of .14 between country of birth and working-class identification indicates that workers born in other countries are somewhat more likely to claim to be working-class than are workers born in Canada. Of the foreign born workers, 77% identified with the working-class, compared to 63% of the Canadian born workers. There was a difference stands the test of controlling for the influence of a third variable. As most of the foreign born workers are from Europe (with men from Britain and Italy making up almost half of all foreign born workers) the fact that they are, regardless of other differences, more likely to claim to be working-

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60 $\chi^2 = 7.746$ (p<.01) Tau B = .14 (p<.001). There were 127 foreign born, and 319 Canadian born workers who answered the class identification question.

61 Wife's occupation is the variable that produces the lowest first-order partial correlation, of .09, which, although small, indicates some tendency for foreign born workers to claim working-class status in larger proportions than the Canadian born.
class is, presumably, not incomprehensible. It is generally accepted that the "language of class" has greater salience in European societies than in North America, and it is likely that many foreign born workers would retain, at least in part, the class conceptions developed before coming to Canada.  

Ethnic background (measured by a prestige score developed by Pineo and Porter) too shows some variation with working-class identification, with men of British ethnicity being more likely than members of other ethnic groups to identify with the middle-class. But the correlation (of -.11) indicates only a moderate relationship, and when country of birth is taken into account the first-order partial correlation drops to -.06. It appears, therefore, that the major reason for the relationship between ethnicity and class identification is that men of British ethnicity are a larger proportion of the Canadian born men than they are of the foreign born workers.

Working-class identification shows very little variation with the religious affiliation of workers, the zero-order correlation of -.04 indicating that there is only a very slight tendency for Protestant workers to identify with the working class.

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63 Foreign born workers have been very active in the Canadian labour movement. In one instance with which I am familiar, at Local 1005 of the United Steelworkers of America in Hamilton, the President, the Recording Secretary, the Grievance Committee Chairman, and several other Executive members were all immigrants from Britain.

64 Pineo and Porter developed a prestige ranking of ethnic groups based on the rankings made by respondents to their study. The ethnic group group prestige score used here is the one made by English Canadians. (Private communication from P.C. Pineo).
to claim working-class status more than Catholic workers.  

The moderate zero-order correlation of .09 between working-class identification and place of residence at age 16 indicates that workers who live in the same community today that they lived in when 16 years of age are slightly more likely to claim middle-class identification than workers who are geographically mobile. However, it has also been noted that foreign born workers display a higher level of working-class identification than Canadian born workers, so this fact might account for the relationship. The first-order partial correlation between working-class identification and place of residence at age 16, controlling for place of birth, is only .05, and this confirms the suspicion that the country of origin of the workers concerned is the real factor at work in this instance.

The remaining correlation listed in Table IV-9 shows a moderate relationship (r=-.11) between size of place of residence at 16 and working-class identification. Workers who grew up in larger communities claim middle-class status in slightly higher proportions than workers raised in smaller communities. However, when it is taken into account that the workers raised in larger communities are generally better educated than

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65 Goyder in an analysis of the Pineo/Porter occupational prestige data, found a correlation of .11 between class identification and the religious affiliations (dichotomized as Protestant or Catholic) of all the respondents to the survey. Thus, it seems, religious affiliations play a larger role (even if still minor) in the class identifications of the general population than among manual workers only. See J.C. Goyder, "Subjective Social Class Identification and Objective Socio-Economic Status", (Ph.D. dissertation, McMaster University, 1972), pp. 81-82.
workers from smaller communities \( r = .30 \), and bearing in mind that education is negatively associated with working-class identification, controlling for the effect of educational differences reduces an already moderate correlation between working-class identification and size of community at 16 to -.07.

In addition, therefore, to differences in work situation and non-manual affiliations, the other factors contributing to variation in class identification among working-class men in the four communities are socio-economic factors, such as income, education, occupation, and possession of durable consumer goods, and the country of origin of the worker.

**Summary**

This chapter has examined the sources of variation in the class identifications made by workers in the four communities. It was found that, contrary to the theoretical expectations outlined in Chapter I, differences in the class compositions of the communities concerned do not contribute to this variation. A worker residing in a predominantly working-class community is not, because of this fact, much more inclined to identify with the working-class than a worker residing in a community where middle-class persons make up a more significant proportion of the population. When smaller units, in the form of census tracts, are considered, there is some increase in the level of working-class identification among workers residing in the most working-class areas. But the relationship is not large, and, when controls are introduced, appears to be a result of the fact that workers in the most working-class census tracts
are more likely to be members of trade unions than are workers residing in more heterogeneous neighbourhoods.

Although community differences did not play the role expected of them, class identification was found to be related to differences in the work situations of the men in the study. Trade union members identified as working-class in numbers substantially higher than non-members. Plant size, on the other hand, did not influence class identification in the way expected, in that workers employed in the largest plants were not the most likely to identify as working-class. On the contrary, these workers displayed the highest level of middle-class identification. Class identification also varied with type of workplace and whether or not the worker could determine the speed at which he worked. It was concluded that the trade union, at least in this study, is the main element in the work situation of manual workers reinforcing the worker's sense of a distinct class identity. Other factors, such as favourable working conditions or higher rewards, act as divisive influences, influences that would have even more impact if not kept in check by the influence of union membership.

Contact with the non-manual world was also found to play the role expected of it in influencing the worker's choice of class membership. In particular, workers whose wives work (or did work) in the higher status occupations are much more likely to identify with the middle-class than are workers whose wives perform more "humble" occupations.

Besides the kinds of influences examined because of their relevance to the theoretical expectations underlying this thesis, it was found that workers who were relatively privileged in socio-economic terms were also more prone to middle-class identification. And, finally, it was found that
Canadian born workers were more likely than foreign born workers to assign themselves to the middle-class.

In terms of their zero-order correlations with working-class identification, wife's occupation and trade union membership are the two strongest influences on the class identifications of the workers in the four communities. Throughout this chapter reference has been made to the influences of intervening variables which may or may not inflate the "real" relationship between class identification and the variable under discussion. Table IV-10 shows the lowest first-order partial correlations obtained between working-class identification and the variables discussed in this chapter, partialling out the influence of the variable that has the strongest influence on the zero-order correlation. In this manner, it is possible to get a clearer idea as to the relative importance of all the factors in influencing whether workers will identify with the middle-or working-class. 66

66 Some readers may have preferred to see all variables simultaneously controlled for, by the use of multiple regression techniques. However, the correlations which would be used in the calculation of the multiple-regression equation would be based on very different numbers of cases (for example, the correlation of class identification with union membership is based on 424 cases, whereas, because of the high no answer rate, that of class identification with wife's occupation is based on 208 cases). It was suggested earlier that pair-wise deletion of no answers did not appear to greatly affect the partial correlations presented, but it is doubtful that a multiple regression, utilizing many more variables, would be reliable. If, on the other hand, list-wise deletion of missing cases were to be used, the number of cases in the regression would be fewer than two hundred, for only those cases with complete information for every variable used in the regression would be included.
The second column in Table IV-10 shows the lowest first-order partial correlations obtained when partialling out the influences (one at a time) of the variables that have been used as control variables throughout this chapter. The third column identifies, for each case, the control variable which has the most effect in reducing the original relationship. It is clear that, after controlling for intervening variables in this manner, the single most important influence on a worker's class identification is still the socio-economic standing of his wife's occupation. Trade union membership maintains its position as second in relative order of importance. After these two indicators of non-manual affiliations and work situation, next in order of importance are socio-economic differences, as indicated by differences in the possession of durable consumer goods, occupation, and income. But there is quite a gap between the first two correlations (-.31 and .23) and the correlation which has the next highest value, that of the index of consumer goods (-.15).

Of about equal influence as the socio-economic variables is father-in-law's education, which, even after allowing for the influence of wife's occupation, still shows some variation with class identification. The variables next in order of importance (and which show a slight association with class identification) are associated with the work world (type of workplace, determinant of workspeed, and plant size), or with socio-economic differences (home ownership), or with the country of origin of the worker.

The calculation of first-order partial correlations, to show the lowest possible degree of relationship by controlling for the influence
Table IV-10.--Zero-order and lowest first-order partial correlations between working-class identification and other attributes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>$r$ First-order partial correlation</th>
<th>Control variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wife's occupation</td>
<td>-.38 -.31 father-in-law's education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union membership</td>
<td>.27 .23 wife's occupation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father-in-law's</td>
<td>-.26 -.12 wife's occupation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of consumer</td>
<td>-.21 -.15 wife's occupation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>goods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent's</td>
<td>-.19 -.14 income</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occupation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.17 -.11 index of consumer goods</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home ownership</td>
<td>-.17 -.08 index of consumer goods</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent's</td>
<td>-.15 -.03 wife's occupation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation of best</td>
<td>-.15 -.06 wife's occupation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>friend</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker determination of work speed</td>
<td>-.15 -.09 union membership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father's education</td>
<td>-.14 -.06 wife's occupation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of birth</td>
<td>.14 .09 wife's occupation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife's education</td>
<td>-.13 -.01 father-in-law's education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of workplace</td>
<td>.12 .10 respondent's occupation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class composition of immediate neighbourhood</td>
<td>.11 .04 union membership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant size</td>
<td>-.10 -.07 respondent's occupation at age 16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent's</td>
<td>-.10 -.05 respondent's education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occupation at age 16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father-in-law's</td>
<td>-.09 -.02 wife's occupation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occupation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father's occupation</td>
<td>-.08 .01 wife's occupation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community (scored by % in manual jobs)</td>
<td>.05 -.01 union membership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community (scored by % middle-class identification)</td>
<td>.05 .03 respondent's occupation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of best friend</td>
<td>-.03 -.01 respondent's occupation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(in each case) of the variable that has the most effect on the original zero-order relationships, does not alter the original conclusion. The
greatest influence on the class identifications of a manual worker in the four communities is the occupational background of his wife. Second only to wife's occupation is the trade union, membership of which influences the worker to identify with the working-class. The examination of the class identifications of the working-class men in the four communities study confirms, therefore, two of the expectations of Chapter I. Differences among workers in the way they conceive their class membership can be traced, in part, to differences in the situations they face in the work world, and to differences in the degree to which they come into contact with people from non-manual backgrounds. The third expectation, that working-class identification among manual workers would vary with the class composition of the communities in which workers reside, did not find confirmation in this study. Possible reasons for the lack of a distinct community effect will be examined in the next chapter.
In Chapter IV the class identifications made by manual workers in the four communities were studied, and an attempt was made to isolate the major factors influencing the worker to identify with either the middle or working-class. The worker, in addition to having a conception of himself as occupying a certain position in the stratification system, presumably also has an image of the nature of that stratification system. This chapter will discuss the bases of variations in the class imagery of workers.

Lockwood, as was seen in Chapter I, distinguishes three "ideal-types" or models of class structure which, he suggests, are likely to be held by workers. He argues that the nature of the social relationships in which the worker is involved, at work and in the wider community, will influence strongly the type of model the worker adheres to. According to Lockwood, workers employed in more "traditional" industries, and residing in homogeneous working-class communities, will likely view the class system in dichotomous terms. The world will be divided into "them" and "us", with differences in social class being seen in terms of the power individuals

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in the dominant class have over the lives of people in the working-class.

The second type of class model that Lockwood distinguishes, the deferential prestige model, will, he suggests, be held by the worker who resides in small, class heterogeneous communities, and who also works in small industrial plants. Involved in social relationships that, in the British context at least, are based on deference to people in higher social positions, the worker in this kind of situation will view the class system in prestige terms, deferring to people in the higher social classes because of their ascriptive rights to these privileged positions.

The third working-class model of class structure, in Lockwood's scheme, is a pecuniary model. Differences in income and wealth are seen as the primary bases of social differentiation, with most people included in one large, central class, bounded by the very poor on one side, and the very rich on the other. Workers likely to hold this model of the class structure are, in Lockwood's view, members of the "new working-class", the mobile individuals who work in the newer, technologically advanced industries, and who reside in less residentially stable communities which are more heterogeneous in social composition than the traditional working-class community.²

It was suggested in Chapter I that a fourth "type" of worker should be added to Lockwood's typology; the worker who resides in a large urban

centre that is predominantly middle-class in social composition. He too is likely to adhere to a prestige model of the class system, but would also be more likely to see the class system as based on achievement criteria than would Lockwood's "traditional deferential". In terms of Lockwood's argument, this type of class model would not be deferential, but there is a sense in which it is. Remembering Parkin's discussion of the structural conditions necessary for working-class "deviant" political behaviour, it could be argued that a prestige model, even one based on achievement criteria, is basically a middle-class image of the class system. Working-class acceptance of an achievement-based prestige model would, therefore, be as much an act of deference to the dominant ideology as would acceptance of a deferential prestige model. Indeed, it could be further argued that the deferential model is typical of a by-gone era, even in Britain, and that a model based on achievement criteria would be closer to middle-class values than one emphasising ascriptive criteria for the bestowing of social rank. Thus it is possible that we shall not find much acceptance of the "deferential" image, as Lockwood describes it, but it could still be asserted that any prestige model is an acceptance by workers of the dominant values of the society. In contradistinction to this, then, both the power model and the pecuniary models would be "proletarian" models of the class system, in that both reject, to some extent, claims to special status that go beyond differences in power or income.

Because the study was based on a mailed questionnaire, it was not possible to go into great detail on the content of class models held by respondents, but it was possible to include a question that, however condensed it may have been, did give the respondents the opportunity to choose between the three basic models. Brief descriptions of the three models, based on Lockwood's outline of them, were presented to the respondents, and they were asked to indicate which model they most agreed with. To differentiate between a deferential prestige model and one based on achievement criteria, other questions were included. The class models question was worded as follows:

Here are three views about what social class is. Would you please circle the viewpoint you most agree with.

1. Differences in power create social classes. Some people are in positions of power and authority and have the means to greatly affect the lives of those people who are subject to that power and authority. So the class you belong to is decided by the amount of power and authority you possess.

2. Differences in status, prestige, and style of life create social classes. Social classes are made up of people with similar interests, life styles, attributes, backgrounds, cultural pursuits, educational attainments, and so on.

3. Differences in wealth and money create social classes. The money you earn and the things you own are the major factors in deciding the class you belong to. It doesn't matter much what kind of education you have, or whether you work in an office or a factory, the main thing is money.

Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechhofer, and Platt, for instance, held relatively unstructured interviews on class imagery, and in some cases made records of over 2,000 words of the replies of respondents. See The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), Appendix C, pp. 200-202.

Question 4:21, Appendix C.
This chapter will be concerned with the replies given to this question by the working-class men in the four communities. The first problem, however, is to examine whether or not "deference", as Lockwood means it, is to be found among workers in the four communities.

**Working-class Deference**

The distinguishing characteristic of the kind of working-class deference discussed by Lockwood is the acceptance of one's lowly position in society, and the consequent deference to the rights of those higher in the system to occupy such positions. In view of Lockwood's discussion, it would seem that a worker who displays a deferential attitude should also espouse the prestige model of class structure, although, as has already been argued, not all holders of a prestige model would necessarily be deferential, at least not in the more restricted sense in which the term is being used here. It would also follow that, if deference attitudes were to be found among the workers who participated in this study, they would be found among the workers of Lindsay, a community selected for study because it resembled the kind of community discussed by Lockwood.

The questionnaire contained several questions that were designed to ascertain the extent of deferential attitudes among the workers in the four communities. First, the respondents were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with the statement, "you are born into a particular social class and you will remain in that social class until the day you die". Table V-1 shows the responses to this question, cross-
tabulated by choice of class model. 6

Table V-1.--Class model by agreement or disagreement with question regarding the impossibility of class mobility (in percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prestige model</th>
<th>Pecuniary or power model</th>
<th>All workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;You are born into a particular social class...&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mildly agree</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mildly disagree</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=254)</td>
<td>(N=194)</td>
<td>(N=448)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, don't know, etc. = 57

\( \chi^2 = 1.557, \text{ with } 4 \text{ df (n.s.)}. \) Tau C = -.003 (n.s.).

Only 8% of all workers strongly agreed with the sentiments expressed in the statement, while a further 12% indicated mild agreement. This kind of sentiment appears to reflect the attitude of Lockwood's deferential, and it is clear that such a sentiment is held by only a minority of the workers in the four communities.

Table V-1 also shows that workers who view the class system in prestige terms are no more likely to believe in the immutability of ascribed class position than are workers who chose either the power or pec-

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6 At this point, interest centers on the relationship of deference to selection of the prestige model. It is, therefore, possible to combine the choices of the power and pecuniary model.
uniary models. When community differences are considered, the workers of Lindsay are not to most likely to agree with the sentiments expressed in the statement. Only 19% of the Lindsay workers either strongly or mildly agreed with the statement, as did 17% of the Hamilton workers, 19% of the Sudbury workers, and 29% of the workers in Ottawa. Except for the workers of Ottawa, therefore, there are virtually no differences between workers in the different communities in regard to their beliefs as to the immutability of class position. If the working-class deferential were to be found in Lindsay, however, it would be expected that proportionately more of the Lindsay workers would express agreement with the statement.

A belief that one's place in the class system cannot be changed appears to be necessary to the working-class deferential, but it could also be espoused by a non-deferential who believes that this is true, but whose reaction is the direction of class conscious militancy.

Another question was included in the questionnaire which, it was thought, would apply solely to the "deferential". The question asked workers to agree or disagree with the statement that, "the higher classes are best able to run things, and the others should be content with their positions in society and leave the big decision making to them. If everyone accepts his position in society then everything will be fine". If society is

\[ \chi^2 = 8.420, \text{ with } 12 \text{df (n.s.)}. \] N = 483, which is larger than the total in Table V-1 because a number of men did not answer the class model question.
seen as an organic unity, then it is possible for a working-class man to argue that social stability depends on all people diligently performing the roles assigned to them. This would imply that there are no basic conflicts of interests between rulers and subordinates, and that those in subordinate positions should defer to the authority vested in persons of higher social rank. If the workers espousing a prestige model adhere to a deferential variant then it would be expected that they, more than those who chose either of the other two class models, would agree that the higher classes are best able to run things. And if the Lindsay workers are the most deferential then they, more than workers in other communities, should agree with this sentiment. Table V-2 gives the responses to this question, by class model.

It is clear that there is even less agreement with this statement than there was with the one concerning ascriptive class membership. Only 11% of all workers either strongly or mildly agreed that the upper classes are best able to run things, and there are no appreciable differences between those men who selected the prestige model and those who opted for either the power or pecuniary model. If the prestige model espoused by over half of the workers in this study were of the type Lockwood sees as

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9 The Tau C correlation, though small, is statistically significant, but this is not due to differences at the agreement end of the continuum, but because of differences in the proportions of those selecting the prestige model or one of the other two models either mildly or strongly disagreeing with the statement.
Table V-2.--Class model by agreement or disagreement with the statement
that the higher classes are best able to run things (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&quot;The higher classes are best able to run things...&quot;</th>
<th>Prestige model</th>
<th>Pecuniary or power model</th>
<th>All workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mildly agree</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mildly disagree</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>59 (N=247)</td>
<td>68 (N=193)</td>
<td>63 (N=440)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answer, don't know, etc. = 65

$\chi^2 = 3.878$, with 4df (n.s.). Tau C = .08 (p<.01).

being held by the working-class "deferential", then not only should a
greater number of the respondents agree with this statement, but also the
men selecting the prestige model should have been more likely to express
agreement. Neither of these expectations are met, hence the responses to
this question indicate little of the deference that Lockwood describes.
This is confirmed by the fact that there is practically no difference
between the workers of the four communities in this respect. In Ottawa,
Lindsay, and Sudbury, only 12% of the manual workers in each community
either strongly or mildly agreed that the higher classes are best able to
run things, and the comparable figure for Hamilton is 11%.  

$\chi^2 = 19.577$, with 12df (n.s.).
One further question may be utilized to show that the kind of working-class deference described by Lockwood does not exist, to any great extent, among the workers who are the subjects for this study. The respondents were presented with the question, "suppose there were two men, one is the son of a prominent businessman who was educated at a private school and then went on to McGill and Harvard universities. The other man is the son of a skilled mechanic who went to his local high school and then to the university in his own town. Which of these two men do you think would be best suited for high public office?" This question was designed to correspond to questions used by Nordlinger in his study of English working-class Tories, where workers were asked to choose between the son of a member of the House of Lords and the son of a file clerk, and then between a man who went to Eton (a major English Public School) and one who went to his local grammar school. He defined the deferential working-class Tories as those who preferred the peer's son over the file clerk's, and the Eton man over the grammar school man. Nordlinger argues that working-class "deferentials" will:

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11 E.A. Nordlinger, The Working-class Tories, (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1967), pp. 63-81. Nordlinger found, out of a sample of 447 English manual workers, that 90 of the men, or about 20%, expressed deferential attitudes. However, the sample was biased in that it over-represented working-class Conservatives. If the sample had been closer to reality (i.e., with approximately twice as many Labour voters as Tories, the proportion who would be deferential would be about 9%. The study, however, was restricted to workers residing in urban areas of over 70,000 population. If smaller centres had been included the percentage of workers expressing deferential attitudes would probably have been higher.
Manifest a strong preference for men of high status as their government leaders. They are deferring to the occupants of high social positions by allowing them, rather than the members of their own class, to enjoy positions of political leadership and government authority.\textsuperscript{12}

As there is no hereditary peerage in Canada, it was decided to give respondents a choice between the son of a prominent businessman and the son of a skilled mechanic, assuming that many of those who selected the son of the businessman would be expressing a deferential attitude. Table V-3 shows the choices made by the manual workers.

Table V-3.--Class model by choice of son of businessman or mechanic for high political office (in percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice for high political office</th>
<th>Prestige model</th>
<th>Pecuniary or power model</th>
<th>All workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Son of businessman</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Son of mechanic</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both of them</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                                  | \begin{array}{l}
|                                  | \text{100} \ (N=250) \end{array} | \begin{array}{l}
|                                  | \text{100} \ (N=190) \end{array} | \begin{array}{l}
|                                  | \text{99} \ (N=440) \end{array}   |

No answers, don't know, etc. = 65.

\(\chi^2 = 10.616\), with 2df (p<.01).

Only 10\% of all workers chose the son of the businessman as being most suited for high political office, and there is not a great deal of difference between those who selected the prestige model and

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 64.
those who chose either the pecuniary or power model. As in the two previous instances, there are no great differences between the communities, with 8% of the workers of both Lindsay and Hamilton agreeing on the son of the businessman, compared to 12% of the Sudbury workers, and 14% of those in Ottawa.

It is also possible that those men who suggested that the son of the businessman was better suited for political office were not necessarily motivated by deferential criteria. The respondents were also asked to give their reasons for their choice. Only 22 of the men who selected the son of the businessman gave replies that indicate deference, replies to the effect that his upbringing and background provided training for leadership, or that he would have better social, business, and political connections. These 22 men constitute only 6% of the 400 men who gave reasons for their choice. Not all these 22 men had selected the prestige model as the most appropriate description of the class structure (14 had), and they were not concentrated in any particular community.

The evidence from the responses to these four questions clearly indicates that working-class deference, as Lockwood defines it, is not

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13 The statistically significant chi-square value is mostly a reflection of the greater tendency of those who chose the power or pecuniary models to say that the son of the mechanic would be best suited for political office (and their subsequent less frequent use of the "both of them" option).

14 $\chi^2 = 18.086$, with 6df ($p<.01$). The significance of the chi-square value is primarily due to differences between the workers in the four communities in saying that the son of the mechanic is best suited rather than agreeing that either would be suitable.
very widespread among the manual workers who are the subjects of this study. Those men who do display attitudes that might be regarded as deferential are no more likely to adopt the prestige model than are men who are not deferential. And the workers of Lindsay who, in terms of Lockwood's typology, should be the men expected to display such deferential attitudes, are no more likely to do so than the small minority of workers in the other communities.

It has already been argued that deference to ascriptive elites may, even in Britain, be a declining attitude among working-class men. Lipset argues that Canada occupies a half-way position on a scale of elitism/equalitarianism (with Britain at the elitist pole, and the U.S.A. at the equalitarian pole). If Lipset is correct then, ignoring the possibility that deference is dwindling in Britain, it is to be expected that deference, as defined by Lockwood, will not play such a large role among the Canadian working-class. It is still possible to assert that acceptance of any prestige model, even one that allows for the possibility of mobility between classes, is a form of deference. By accepting this model the worker, it may be suggested, accepts the "conventional wisdom" of his society, a wisdom that is promulgated by those classes that have a vested interest in the continued existence of the status quo. If acceptance of the prestige model which allows for class mobility is a form of deference, then, if Lockwood is correct, workers in small heterogeneous communities would still

be expected to see the class system in prestige terms, even though they may not see the system as closed. Thus, in the light of the evidence presented in this section, the original hypothesis would have to be revised to state that workers in Ottawa and Lindsay, both socially heterogeneous communities, would be more likely to select the prestige model, but that workers in both communities would be likely to adopt an achievement oriented variant of that model. The workers of Sudbury would be expected to select the power model in greatest proportions, while the pecuniary model should command most acceptance in Hamilton.

Having established that deference to ascriptive authority is not a very prevalent attitude among the workers in the study, and that deference, in so far as it exists, is not related to choice of class model or type of community, it is now possible to turn to a discussion of the influences that lead a worker to select one or other of the three models of class.

Differences in Choice of Class Model

In their choices of class model, the workers in the four communities opted most strongly for the prestige model. Among all the working-class men, 57% said that the prestige model is the description of the class system they most agree with.\(^\text{16}\) The pecuniary model was chosen

\(^\text{16}\) Among all the men in the sample, 73% of managerial and professional workers opted for the prestige model, as did 62% of those in white-collar occupations. There is, then, a slight relationship between class position and choice of class model, but even among manual workers the prestige model is the most popular choice.
by 34% of the men, while the remaining 10% selected the power model.\(^{17}\)

Given that, on the basis of theoretical expectations outlined in Chapter I, the workers of Ottawa and Lindsay were expected to opt for the prestige model, the predominance of this model might be expected. But Table V-4 shows that the greater allegiance to the prestige model is not confined to these two communities.

Table V-4.--Class model by community (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class model</th>
<th>Ottawa</th>
<th>Lindsay</th>
<th>Hamilton</th>
<th>Sudbury</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power model</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prestige model</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pecuniary model</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(\chi^2 = 17.87, \text{ with } 6 \text{df} (p<.01).\)

No answers, etc. = 56.

In all four communities the most common choice was the prestige model. In three of the communities a majority of workers selected this description of the class system, and in Sudbury nearly half the workers did the same. Contrary to expectations, the Lindsay workers were not among those who chose this model in the highest proportions, and the Hamilton workers, who were expected to be the most likely to select the pecuniary model, in fact were the most likely to see the prestige model

\(^{17}\)In numerical terms, 255 men chose the prestige model, 151 the pecuniary model, and 43 the power model, while another 56 men made no selection.
as the best description of the class system.

The power model was chosen by only a minority of workers in each community. In Sudbury, where this model was expected to command wide acceptance, only 11% of the workers did choose this model. Even allowing for the infrequency of the choice, the Sudbury workers were not even the most likely to select the power model, that honour going to the Ottawa workers. It may be that their proximity to the center of political power in Canada inclines the workers of Ottawa toward the power model in greater proportions than workers in other communities.

While the hypothesis concerning community variation in choice of class models could not predict that all the workers in a particular community would share the same basic image of the class system, it should predict that most would do so, or, at the very least, that workers in one community would choose a particular model more frequently than those in other communities. But the figures presented in Table V-4 show that even this minimum requirement has not been met. Only the Ottawa workers conformed somewhat to expectations. The Hamilton workers did not select the pecuniary model as expected, but opted for the prestige model (in slightly higher proportions than even the Ottawa workers). Both the Lindsay and Sudbury workers, on the other hand, expressed agreement with the pecuniary model in greater numbers than expected, while not selecting the models expected (the prestige and power models respectively) in the greatest proportions.

Because of the infrequency of choice of the power model, it is difficult to keep this as a distinct category once controls are introd-
uced, so from this point on choice of class model will be dichotomized into prestige model and pecuniary or power model. This dichotomy does offer some value, in that it contrasts "middle-class" with "working-class" models of the class structure.\textsuperscript{18} Controlling for the intervention of other factors (by calculation of first-order partial correlations, and by cross-tabulations) failed to produce the expected relationship between choice of class model and community type.\textsuperscript{19} There is no intervening variable (at least, not one measured in this study) that accounts for the fact that workers in Lindsay do not select the prestige model in higher proportions than those in other communities, or for the fact that the pecuniary model is not chosen in the highest proportions by the workers of Hamilton, or for the fact that the Sudbury workers do not, by and large, see the class system in terms of a power model.

In fact, the introduction of controls brings the observed relationship (as opposed to that expected) into sharper focus. It will be remembered that it was shown in Chapter IV that foreign born and Canadian born workers differ in the degree to which they identify with the working-class. This was explained by arguing that foreign born workers

\textsuperscript{18}By combining the choices of power model or pecuniary model we do lose sight of any possibility of finding out if any group of workers are particularly prone to select the power model. But when a number of controls were introduced no group of workers appeared much more likely to select the power model than any other group. In order, then, to facilitate the application of statistical tests, the choices of either the power model or pecuniary model have been combined.

\textsuperscript{19}For a listing of the control variables used (and details of the coding) see Chapter IV, page 165, footnote 12.
hold beliefs at least partly shaped by their experiences in their country of origin. It might be expected that foreign born workers would differ from Canadian born workers in their conceptions of the bases of social class, and it was hoped that controlling for country of birth would show the hypothesized relationship between community type and class model, at least among the Canadian born workers. However, as Table V-5 shows, this is not the case.

Table V-5.--Class model by community, by country of birth (in percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ottawa</th>
<th>Lindsay</th>
<th>Hamilton</th>
<th>Sudbury</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Born in Canada</strong>&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prestige model</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pecuniary or power model</td>
<td>31&lt;sup&gt;100&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>52&lt;sup&gt;100&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>39&lt;sup&gt;100&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>61&lt;sup&gt;100&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>49&lt;sup&gt;100&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=49)</td>
<td>(N=82)</td>
<td>(N=75)</td>
<td>(N=114)</td>
<td>(N=518)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign born</strong>&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prestige model</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pecuniary or power model</td>
<td>50&lt;sup&gt;100&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>19&lt;sup&gt;100&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>29&lt;sup&gt;100&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>22&lt;sup&gt;100&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>28&lt;sup&gt;100&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=16)</td>
<td>(N=16)</td>
<td>(N=52)</td>
<td>(N=44)</td>
<td>(N=128)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, etc. = 59

<sup>a</sup><sup>x^2</sup> = 16.171, with 3df (p<.001)

<sup>b</sup><sup>x^2</sup> = 5.221, with 3df (n.s.).

The pattern of choice of class models among the Canadian born workers is very similar to that of the sample as a whole, with the one exception that the Ottawa workers are the most likely to choose the
prestige model, being eight percentage points above the Hamilton workers. The basic finding is still that the Hamilton workers selected the prestige model in higher proportions than expected, while the Lindsay workers were not the most likely to select this model. Controlling for place of birth highlights the observation that the prestige model is least popular among the workers of Sudbury, but (a point not shown in the table) the single most chosen model is not the power model (10% of the Canadian born workers selected this model) but the pecuniary model (chosen by 51%).

Among the foreign born workers, with the exception of those in Ottawa, the incidence of choice of the prestige model is uniformly high. And even the lower figure for Ottawa may be the result of chance, a possibility reflected in the fact that the chi-square statistic is not significant at the .05 level. An inspection of the totals column in Table V-5 shows that, as a group, foreign born workers are far more likely to see the class system in prestige terms, a finding that will be returned to presently. For the moment it suffices to note that controlling for place of birth provides an illustration that the observed relationship between choice of class model and community type is not an artifact of differences between the workers in the four communities along the dimensions of any of the control variables used throughout this thesis.

Having failed to find any intervening variable that explains the unexpected nature of the relationship between community and choice of class model, it is necessary to return to the proposition that differences
between the communities, in terms of "structural effects" rather than
differences in the distribution of attributes among the workers,
account for the differences. This would be highly satisfactory if the
observed frequencies of choice of class model followed a pattern consist­
tent with the hypothesis. Unfortunately they do not! How, then, can we
explain the failure of the hypothesis, and at the same time, account
for the actual variation?

One of the assumptions underlying Lockwood's analysis of both
the "traditional proletarian" and the "traditional deferential" is that
both are anchored in a stable system of social relationships in communi­
ities that experience little changeover in population. This stability
of population would lead to the kinds of intense social relationships
that contribute to the formation of attitudes supposedly held by the
"traditional proletarian" and "traditional deferential". Do the communi­
eties studied exhibit such population stability? Table V-6 shows the
percentages of manual workers, and of owners, managers, professional and
technical workers, in each community who resided in that same community
at age 16.

It will be remembered that Lockwood's discussion of the "tradit­
ional deferential" emphasises that workers in small, socially hetero­
geneous communities are likely to defer to the status claims of an
ascriptive elite. Stacey's study of Banbury provides an illustration

20See P.M. Blau, "Structural Effects", American Sociological
Table V-6.--Percentages of manual workers, and of owners, managerial, professional and technical workers, in each community who resided in the same community at age 16.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ottawa</th>
<th>Lindsay</th>
<th>Hamilton</th>
<th>Sudbury</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owners, managers, etc.</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=94)</td>
<td>(N=51)</td>
<td>(N=50)</td>
<td>(N=40)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual workers</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=74)</td>
<td>(N=108)</td>
<td>(N=140)</td>
<td>(N=173)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of this process. She also notes the impact of the setting up of a new industrial plant in Banbury, and the consequent appearance of a parallel stratification system among the newcomers who flowed into the town. Working-class deference, in Lockwood's sense, would appear to be contingent on the existence of an elite group in the community, sufficiently well-established so that it may legitimate its superior status and prestige in terms of its heritage and long association with the community.

With these observations in mind, it is not difficult to under-


22Warner and Low's study of a strike in Yankee City provides an American example of this process. One of the factors contributing to the development of union organization in Yankee City was the transfer of ownership of the town's shoe industry from local owners to outside corporations. Transfer of ownership led to the severing of extra-organizational ties of reciprocity and, in the Marxist phraseology, only the 'cash nexus' remained. Whereas the workers had resisted unionization under the old owners, relying on the latter's sense of noblesse oblige, they soon accepted the union when the outside corporations took over. See W. Lloyd Warner & J.O. Low, The Social System of a Modern Factory, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947).
stand why the Lindsay workers do not exhibit such deferential attitudes. Table V-6 shows that, not only did less than half the Lindsay workers live there when they were 16 years of age, but also that less than one fifth of the men occupying positions at the apex of the occupational hierarchy lived in Lindsay at that age. By inference, the majority of high status men in Lindsay were raised elsewhere. If traditional working-class deference depends on the existence of an old, established elite then this would explain the lack of deferential attitudes among the workers of Lindsay.  

Lindsay is not unique among small towns in Ontario in this respect. A study of the 1968 federal election in Ontario, conducted by D. Hoffman and F. Schindler, provides data that can be analysed to provide an estimate of the degree of migration into small communities in Ontario. The Hoffman/Schindler data, which cover all but the two northernmost federal ridings, show that only just over 14% of the managerial professional and technical workers residing in urban areas of under 15,000 population lived in the same community when they were 16 years of age. Among manual workers the comparable figure is 34%. Thus Lindsay is not unique among small towns, in fact is population is more stable than is usual (47% of the manual workers lived in Lindsay at 16).

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23 On a field trip to Lindsay I asked one informant whether people in Lindsay thought in class terms. The reply was, "Oh yes, this is a very snooty town". When asked what determined membership of the higher classes the informant stated, "it used to be old families, but now its by your pocket book".

24 This study, "Social and Political Attitudes in Ontario", was conducted by D. Hoffman & F. Schindler under the auspices of the Survey Research Center, Institute for Behavioural Research, York University, Toronto (Project No. 102). I am grateful for the assistance of Mr. Nick
Both the present study and the Hoffman/Schindler study would suggest that the small stable, socially heterogeneous community depicted by Lockwood would be difficult to find in Ontario. 25

The absence of a long-established occupational elite in Lindsay may explain the non-appearance of the "traditional deferential", but it does not explain why the Lindsay workers were less likely than the workers of Ottawa and Hamilton to opt for a more "open" version of the prestige model. A discussion of the possible reasons for the predominance of the prestige model among the Hamilton workers may also cast light on the choices made by the Lindsay workers. Hamilton, being a large, occupation-ally and industrially diversified city, with a labour force that is quite heterogeneous in terms of ethnicity and national origin, would seem to be the model of a community where privatization, the root of the pecuniary model of social stratification, would exist among the working-class. The occupational elite of Hamilton is the most stable of the four communities' (although, at 31%, this is still a minority), but the large size of Hamilton would suggest that this elite would not be too visible. However, several other characteristics of the city may contribute to the workers finding in the prestige model a viable description of the class structure.

Sidoruk, of the Department of Political Science, McMaster University, in locating this study, and helping me to solve some of the coding problems when conducting this secondary analysis. It should also be noted that the Census of Canada does not provide information in the detail required.

25 In Britain, Margaret Stacey has conducted a re-study of Banbury which may show a similar decline in deference in that community. Unfortunately, at the time of writing, this study has not yet been published.
It has already been noted that Hamilton is the most diversified of the four communities studied, in terms of the occupational structures of areas within the city. It is not unlikely that residents of the city can differentiate the areas of the city on this basis. With such a diversity of life styles it is plausible that people may make finer distinctions than can be coped with in a "simple" pecuniary model.

In addition to the above consideration, the very fact that a large proportion of Hamilton's population are migrants of one kind or another may, contrary to the arguments of Goldthorpe, Lockwood, et al., reinforce the salience of the prestige model. Goldthorpe, Lockwood, et al. suggest that the mobile, "affluent worker" will tend toward a pecuniary image of the class structure. These workers are not involved in the kinds of "interactional status systems" that would enable them to focus on other factors, besides income and wealth, which differentiate between people. But Britain is, to a large extent, ethnically homogeneous, so one other possible basis of social differentiation is largely absent. On the other hand, Hamilton is an ethnically diversified city and,

26 In pilot interviews conducted in Hamilton, respondents were asked to indicate what kinds of people lived in the various areas of the city. There was, it seems to me, a fair degree of accuracy in the respondents' assessments of these areas.

27 This diversity of life styles can be observed in the cultural life of the city, which includes a professional orchestra, a number of high status clubs, and a large university, all of which may help to persuade people that social stratification is based on other factors besides income.

28 Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechofer, and Platt, op.cit., Chapter 4.
because a large part of the population is made up of immigrants to Canada, ethnicity is a visible factor in the life of the city. It is known that ethnic background is related to occupational level,\textsuperscript{29} and, as Pineo and Porter discovered in their study of the Canadian status system, the Canadian population does rank ethnic groups in terms of relative prestige.\textsuperscript{30} Ethnicity is yet another basis for differentiating between people, and this probably adds to the likelihood that the pecuniary model is not, for the majority of workers in Hamilton, a sufficient basis from which to envision the class system.

It appears, therefore, that although Hamilton displays certain characteristics that might be assumed to be related to the likelihood that the pecuniary model would be particularly relevant to workers, there are other features that make it explicable why the workers do not, in the proportions expected, adopt this model of class structure. The workers of Lindsay, on the other hand, reside in a far more ethnically homogeneous community, so this basis for differentiating between people is not so relevant. At the same time, the lack of an indigenous local elite makes it more likely that status will not be accorded to people high in the occupational hierarchy on the basis of their involvement in the local


\textsuperscript{30} Private communication from Professor P.C. Pineo.
community. This may account for the fact that a larger number of
workers in Lindsay chose the pecuniary model than would be expected on
the basis of the hypothesis developed in Chapter I.

Similar considerations may be applied to the finding that the
power model is not a very frequent choice among the Sudbury workers. The
city is more homogeneous in class composition than the other comm-
unities, and the range of diversity between areas of the city is quite
limited. The fact that the predominant life style in the city is a
working-class one would suggest that the prestige model would not be
the predominant class imagery among workers in the city, and that a more
"working-class" model would be more appropriate. At the same time, the
high level of migration into the city (only 29% of the workers having
lived there at age 16), and the ethnic diversity, would appear to
preclude the intense solidarity which, according to Lockwood, typifies
the traditional working-class community. Lockwood draws a distinction
between "interactional" and "attributonal" status systems; the former

31 Ronald Frankenberg, in Communities in Britain (Harmondsworth:
"cosmopolitans" and "locals" to characterize differences in the elite
groups in small towns in Britain. "Locals", the people with long-
established connections with the community, tend to be involved in the
life of the community, whereas "cosmopolitans", people who have moved into
the town, tend to be oriented to reference groups outside the community.
It is not improbable that many of the managers and professionals in
Lindsay, coming as they do from outside the community, adopt this
"cosmopolitan" orientation.

32 Among the respondents, 27% of the workers in Sudbury are foreign
born. In addition, there is a large French Canadian group in Sudbury (22%
of all workers), and people of British ethnicity make up only 43% of all
the workers.
are characterised by intense involvement in the community, and detailed knowledge of the ramifications of the status system among the participants, the latter involve much less interaction and, hence, status is accorded on the basis of a few, readily observable criteria, such as income. He further argues that traditional working-class communities have interactional status systems, whereas the housing estates of the "affluent worker" have attributional status systems. Discussing the social milieux of the "affluent worker", Lockwood says:

The most salient feature of these estates is that they bring together a population of strangers, who have little in common save that they have all experienced residential mobility and that most of them gain their livelihood from some kind of manual labour. In such communities, social life is very different from the communal sociability of the traditional working-class community. Unrelated by the ascriptive ties of kinship, long-standing neighbourliness and shared work experiences, and lacking also the facility for readily creating middle-class patterns of sociability, workers on the estates tend to live a socially isolated, home-centred existence. Such conditions favour the emergence of attributional rather than interactional status systems. Whereas in the traditional proletarian community status is allocated (or more precisely made indeterminate) through the individual's participation in several overlapping cliques, the status order of the housing estate is based on conspicuous consumption, by means of which people judge their social standing relative to others without usually associating with them in formal or informal leisure-time activities.

Bearing in mind that Lockwood is presenting an ideal-type and that, as such, this is an extreme view of privatization, there are elements in the situation of the Sudbury workers that suggest that attributional criteria may be the basis of the status system. Although most men in Sudbury

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33 Lockwood, op.cit., p. 254.
34 Ibid., p. 257.
do share relatively common work experiences, they are also geographically mobile, and ethnically dissimilar. As many come to Sudbury in response to the relatively high paying jobs, and as they lack the kind of solidarities that typify the "traditional proletarian", it is understandable that the pecuniary model, and not the power model, is the description of the class system that makes most sense to the majority (at least among the Canadian born workers) of the workers in Sudbury.

Ottawa is the only community where the workers' choices of class models comply with expectations. Because of the predominantly non-manual character of the city, and because of the ethnic diversity, it is not surprising that the prestige model should recommend itself to the majority of workers. The fact that the power model was chosen by a larger proportion of the Ottawa workers than of any other community (though still a minority) would seem to reflect the fact, not that these workers are "traditional proletarians", but that Ottawa is the center of political power in Canada and, hence, power is a "visible" social phenomenon.

It would appear, therefore, that the two factors operating to thwart the predictions of the hypothesis as to the nature of variation in class imagery between workers in the four communities are geographical mobility and ethnic diversity. The degree of residential mobility in Ontario appears to preclude the existence of the kinds of communities which, in Britain, are the homes of the "traditional proletarian" and the "traditional deferential". Where there exists in a community both social class and ethnic diversity (as in Hamilton and Ottawa) the workers
select the prestige model in the largest proportions. Where only one of these two forms of social differentiation appears important (as in Lindsay, which is class diversified, and Sudbury, which is ethnically diversified) the workers are more likely than their brethren in the other communities to see the class system in pecuniary terms.

It should be re-emphasized that this discussion has been prefaced by the observation that, when workers are considered regardless of place of birth, the prestige model is the single most popular model in all four communities. When place of birth is taken into account, it is found that, in Sudbury and Lindsay, a majority of workers opted for a description of the class system in other than prestige terms (although in Lindsay only by 2%). But only in Sudbury was the prestige model the single most popular description of the class system.

It has already been noted that Lipset sees Canada as occupying a middle position on a scale of equalitarianism/elitism; with the U.S.A. at the equalitarian pole, emphasizing income and possessions as the primary arbiters of social rank, and Britain at the elitist pole, where the emphasis is placed far more on ascribed status characteristics.35 With this in mind, it is possible that, at the middle of this continuum, influences from both poles could be operating. Thus it is possible that the middle-class would adopt a prestige model, albeit with more emphasis on achievement criteria than in the British case. It has been suggested that geographical mobility and ethnic diversity (not to mention

the mass media could prevent the emergence of the kinds of structural barriers that Parkin refers to, and this would suggest that the Canadian working-class would be more influenced by the dominant cultural system than would the "traditional proletarians" described in the British literature. And when the barriers to the dominant system are relatively strong the alternative to the prestige model is not, in many cases, the power model but a model based on a pecuniary image of the stratification system.

It has to be concluded, therefore, that community differences do not lead to the variation in class imagery that would be expected on the basis of the theoretical considerations outlined in Chapter I. Mobility and ethnic differentiation appear to reduce the impact that differences in the class compositions of communities were expected to have. Similarly the same considerations may be applied to the finding, reported in Chapter IV, that there are not the expected community variations in level of middle-class identification among workers. If the impact of the community is diluted then it may be expected that the fact that one community has a larger working-class population will not greatly influence the workers of that community to claim working-class status in greater proportions than workers in more heterogeneous comm-

36 The argument that mobility, ethnic differentiation, and the permeation of the influence of the mass media would have the effect of preventing the emergence of the structural barriers to the influence of the dominant culture is similar, in some respects, to the perspective that sees modern society as a "mass society". In this perspective industrialization, bureaucratization, and the development of mass culture are seen as having the effect of breaking down the particularistic ties that bound the individual to intermediate groups, leaving only a "mass" of individuals with no protection against the blandishments
unities.

Thus far it has been shown that such community differences in choice of class models as exist do not follow a pattern consistent with the theoretical considerations outlined in Chapter I. It is now necessary to examine if any other factors may account for the variation in choice of class models among the working-class men in the study. Table V-7 shows the zero-order correlations between choice of class model and the variables relating to work situation, white-collar affiliations, socio-economic attributes, and other factors that were used in the analysis of class identification in Chapter IV.

The first fact noticeable from Table V-7 is that the correlations are generally smaller than is the case with class identification. The largest correlation is that of country of birth with class model which, at .19, is considerably smaller than the largest correlation with class identification (—.38 with wife's occupation). Whether this is due to the fact that the variation in workers' choices of class models is attributable to idiosyncratic factors, or whether other factors not measured in the questionnaire survey influence the worker's class imagery, is not a question that can be conclusively demonstrated. However it is clear that the factors which play a large part in the explanation of variation in workers' class identifications are less important in the explanation of variation in class models.

Table V-7.--Zero-order correlations of class model with other factors*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>r</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community (scored by % in manual jobs)</td>
<td>-.10&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Occupational best friend</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=447)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=260)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class composition of immediate neighbourhood</td>
<td>-.11&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Education of best friend</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=436)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=285)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union membership</td>
<td>.10&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Respondent's occupation</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=421)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=445)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plant size</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=421)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=413)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of workplace</td>
<td>.12&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Respondent's education</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=429)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=430)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determinant of work speed</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>Respondent's occupation at age 16</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=418)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=443)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife's occupation</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>Home ownership</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=222)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=402)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife's education</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>Index of consumer goods</td>
<td>.09&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=387)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=428)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father's occupation</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>Country of birth</td>
<td>.19&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=390)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=444)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father's education</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>Religious affiliation</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=314)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=389)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father-in-law's occupation</td>
<td>.13&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=307)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=386)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father-in-law's education</td>
<td>.12&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Place of residence at age 16</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=283)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=442)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Size of place of residence at 16</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(N=437)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Class model scored 1. pecuniary or power model, 2. prestige model. For details of the coding of independent variables see Chapter IV, page 165, footnote 12.

<sup>a</sup>p<.05, or better (one-tailed test)
Turning to a discussion of the correlations presented in Table V-7, it has already been noted that the variable that is most highly related to choice of class model is country of birth. Foreign born workers are more likely to adopt the prestige model than their Canadian born counterparts. In percentage terms, 72% of the foreign born workers selected the prestige model, compared to 51% of the Canadian born workers. In Chapter IV it was argued that foreign born workers are more likely to claim working-class status because they generally come from societies where the salience of class is more apparent. Similarly, as the majority of foreign born workers are of European origin, they come from societies where the emphasis on status distinctions is more pronounced, at least in popular belief, than in Canada. It is to be expected, therefore, that they will be more likely to select an image of the class system based on differences of prestige and status, especially as they are no longer anchored (if they ever were) in the kinds of relationships that might foster the development of a more "proletarian" image of the class system. The Canadian born workers, on the other hand, were raised in a society where the emphasis on style of life and status distinctions is not, at least in the popular mind, so pronounced, and where money and material possessions play a more important role in the assignment of social rank.

When we turn to the influence of the work situation on choice of class model it is clear that the world of work has not such a great impact on the worker's choice of class model as it does on his class identification. Neither plant size nor determinants of work speed
show any significant association with choice of class model. Both union membership and type of workplace show some association with choice of class model, but, in the case of union membership the relationship is smaller than in the instance of class identification. Among members of trade unions, 59% selected the prestige model, whereas only 48% of the non-unionists did so. The direction of the difference is perplexing, as union members are more likely to identify as working-class yet the prestige model is generally assumed to be a middle-class image of the class system. It could be that the working-class identifiers among the trade unionists are no more likely to opt for the prestige model than are their counterparts among the non-unionists, and that the differences are confined solely to the middle-class identifiers. However, 59% of the working-class identifying unionists chose the prestige model, compared to 48% of the working-class identifying non-unionists. (Among middle-class identifiers, the comparable figures are 66% and 53% respectively). The greater propensity of union members to select the

37 $\chi^2 = 3.650$, with 1 df (n.s., $p=.056$). Tau B = .10 ($p<.01$). The chi-square does not quite reach statistical significance, but both the Tau C and zero-order correlations indicate a moderate relationship.

38 There is, in fact, little difference in the class identifications of men who chose the prestige model from those who chose either of the other two models. Of the former, 35% claim to be middle-class, as compared to 31% of the latter ($\chi^2 = 0.621$, with 1 df (n.s.), a point that will be discussed in Chapter VI.

39 The figures seem mathematically suspect, in that the percentages for working-class identifiers are the same as those for the workers as a whole, whereas those for middle-class identifiers are quite different. But the case bases are different, for once class identification is taken into account, 33 cases are lost because no information is available on the workers' class identifications, and the case base drops from 424 to 391.
prestige model is not confined to the men who claim to be middle-class and who, in this respect, are deviant from the majority of their fellows.

Table V-8.--Percentages of workers selecting prestige model by union membership, by type of workplace, by income.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of workplace</th>
<th>Under $7,000 Non-union Union</th>
<th>$7,000-$8,999 Non-union Union</th>
<th>$9,000 &amp; over Non-union Union</th>
<th>All workers* Non-union Union</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under $7,000 Non-union Union</td>
<td>$7,000-$8,999 Non-union Union</td>
<td>$9,000 &amp; over Non-union Union</td>
<td>All workers* Non-union Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under $7,000 Non-union Union</td>
<td>$7,000-$8,999 Non-union Union</td>
<td>$9,000 &amp; over Non-union Union</td>
<td>All workers* Non-union Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production plant, factory or workshop</td>
<td>43% (16) 49% (51)</td>
<td>65% (20) 62% (65)</td>
<td>50% (22) 56% (36)</td>
<td>51% (59) 56% (152)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>**χ² = 0.089, with 1 df (n.s.)</td>
<td>**χ² = 0.01, with 1 df (n.s.)</td>
<td>**χ² = 0.06, with 1 df (n.s.)</td>
<td>**χ² = 0.284, with 1 df (n.s.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine</td>
<td>- 57% (0) (9) **</td>
<td>- 36% (0) (25) **</td>
<td>0 61% (4) (28) **</td>
<td>0 49% (4) (65) **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>**χ² = 0.02, with 1 df (n.s.)</td>
<td>**χ² = 2.729, with 1 df (n.s.)</td>
<td>**χ² = 1.672, with 1 df (n.s.)</td>
<td>**χ² = 1.672, with 1 df (n.s.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and outside</td>
<td>52% (15) 56% (16)</td>
<td>0 67% (5) (9) Fisher's exact test, p = .028</td>
<td>0 85% (2) (36) Fisher's exact test, p &lt; .05</td>
<td>37% (24) 76% (68) Fisher's exact test, p &lt; .01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>**χ² = 5.742, with 1 df (p &lt; .05)</td>
<td>**χ² = 10.372, with 1 df (p &lt; .01)</td>
<td>**χ² = 10.372, with 1 df (p &lt; .01)</td>
<td>**χ² = 10.372, with 1 df (p &lt; .01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>40% (5) (0) **</td>
<td>50% (4) (8) Fisher's exact test, p = .406</td>
<td>42% (8) (4) Fisher's exact test, p = .849</td>
<td>47% (19) 74% (16) Fisher's exact test, p = .849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>**χ² = 1.658, with 1 df (n.s.)</td>
<td>**χ² = 1.658, with 1 df (n.s.)</td>
<td>**χ² = 1.658, with 1 df (n.s.)</td>
<td>**χ² = 1.658, with 1 df (n.s.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Numbers in parenthesis represent the total number of workers in each group. The numbers in the column for "all workers" are not the same as the sum of the three income columns, for these figures are based on calculations ignoring income, and several cases are lost once income is considered, due to men not reporting their income.

**No statistical tests are possible, as table has only one column.
By simultaneously controlling for type of workplace and income, the differences between union members and non-members are narrowed down considerably and, at the same time, this offers an explanation of the fact that workers employed in transportation or outside work are more likely to select the prestige model than workers employed in other types of workplaces.

A glance at the column for "all workers" in Table V-8 shows that only among the workers employed in transport and outside work is there a statistically significant difference in choice of class models between union members and non-members, 76% of the former selecting the prestige model, as against 37% of the latter. Among workers employed in factories, production plants, or workshops there is only a 5% difference, and while there is quite a large percentage difference between unionists and non-unionists in the "other" category there are two few cases for this to be interpreted with any confidence. This is also true of the miners, where there are only four men who say they are not members of a union.

When income is introduced as an additional control variable, differences between union members and non-unionists are narrowed down even further. Among the workers employed in transport or outside work there is virtually no difference between unionists and non-unionists earning less than $7,000. There are few non-unionists among the men employed in transport or outside work who earn over $7,000, and it is the high level of choice of the prestige model among the men (predominantly union members) in the two upper income groups that accounts for the difference in choice of class models between union members and non-unionists among the workers employed in transport or outside work.
work and, beyond that, among the manual workers as a whole. Thus a
difference in choice of class models between union members and non-
unionists appears, with the introduction of controls, to be a con-
sequence of differences between high income workers in different types
of workplace. Not only do the high income workers in transport or out-
side work (who are also predominantly members of unions) differ in their
choice of the prestige model from high income workers in other work
settings, but they also differ from low income men in the same work
setting.

Table V-9 shows the mean income of union members and non-
unionists in each type of workplace. The workers in transport and
outside work are unique in the degree to which the incomes of union
members exceed those of non-unionists. With such a wide differential
it is possible that the union members are more likely to see the class
system in prestige terms because they are, in their own work environment,
a relatively privileged group. The low income non-unionists (and the low
income union members), earning less than is typical of men in their
situation, may emphasize the monetary aspects of society, comparing
themselves against their wealthier counterparts. On the other hand, the
man who has reached a higher income level, which probably represents the
highest level he may expect to reach in his occupation, may seek to make
finer distinctions between people, and thus emphasize other factors
besides income. This income disparity between union members and non-
unionists is not so large in other types of workplace, and this could
account for the fact that there are no statistically significant differ-
ences in choice of class model between union members and non-unionists
in these other work settings.
Table V-9.--Mean incomes of union members and non-unionists by type of workplace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of workplace</th>
<th>Union members</th>
<th>Non-members</th>
<th>All workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factory, production plant or workshop</td>
<td>$7,704</td>
<td>$8,310</td>
<td>$7,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine</td>
<td>$8,919</td>
<td>$11,000</td>
<td>$9,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport or outside work</td>
<td>$8,984</td>
<td>$6,227</td>
<td>$8,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>$9,000</td>
<td>$8,529</td>
<td>$8,724</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Differences in choice of class model between union members and non-unionists, therefore, are explained by taking into account the type of workplaces the workers are employed in, where it is seen that only among workers in transport or outside work do these differences persist. And this difference was accounted for by the relative positions of union members and non-unionists within that occupational setting. The relatively privileged position of union members among those workers employed in transport or outside work appears to be the only factor possibly explaining the observation that workers in this work setting chose the prestige model in the highest proportions. As far as the

40 Looking at choice of class model by type of workplace, 67% of the workers employed in transport or outside work selected the prestige model, compared to 55% of those employed in factories, production plants or workshops, 46% of those in mines, and 54% of those employed in other work settings. \(N = 432, \chi^2 = 7.555, \text{ with 3 df (n.s.)}\).
influence of differences in work situation are concerned, therefore, it appears that they have little effect on the worker's choice of statement describing the bases of social class in Canada. Only in the cases of union membership and type of workplace is there any variation, and even these are at the border-line of statistical significance, and, in both cases, are restricted to a relatively small number of workers once controls are introduced.

White-collar affiliations, too, do not appear as very important influences on the worker's choice of class model. As Table V-7 indicates, choice of class model is not significantly correlated with the majority of variables that indicate whether or not the workers have any significant contact with the white-collar world. Thus, the correlation of wife's occupation with choice of the prestige model is only .09 (n.s.), whereas wife's occupation showed the highest correlation with class identification (.38). The only two white-collar affiliation variables that are significantly correlated with choice of class model are father-in-law's occupation (.13) and father-in-law's education (.12). But when the cross-tabulations are looked at, in neither case are the chi-square values yielded high enough to reach statistical significance. When father-in-law's occupation is divided into three categories, grouped on the basis of the Blishen socio-economic index, 56% of the men whose father-in-law's occupation scored between 20.0 to 29.9 on the Blishen index selected the prestige model, compared to 54% of those ranging from 30.0 to 39.9, and 60% of those whose fathers-in-law performed occupations scoring at least 40.0 on the Blishen
Thus, although the correlation coefficient suggests a statistically significant relationship between choice of class model and father-in-law's occupation, an examination of the cross-tabulations shows that, in percentage terms, the differences are only slight.

Similar considerations apply to the case of father-in-law's education, so it can be safely asserted that affiliation with people higher in social status does not greatly influence the manual workers in his beliefs as to the basis of the class system. Socio-economic differences among the working-class men also show little association with their choice of class model. Table V-7 shows only one correlation between choice of class model and a socio-economic variable that is statistically significant. The correlation between choice of the prestige model and the index of consumer goods is .09, which indicates a moderate tendency for those workers who possess more of the durable consumer goods listed in the questionnaire to be more likely to select the prestige model. None of the other socio-economic attributes show a statistically significant association with class model.

The zero-order correlation between income and class model is only .07. Workers earning over $9,000 are the most likely to select the prestige model, but they are only 9% more likely to do so than the men

\[ \chi^2 = 1.136, \text{ with } 2 \text{ df (n.s.)} \]

Of those men whose fathers-in-law had less than 8 years of formal education, 57% selected the prestige model. Men whose fathers-in-law received 9 to 10 years of education were the most likely to select the prestige model (71% doing so), whereas 64% of those whose fathers-in-law received 11 or more years of schooling selected this model. The relationship, therefore, is not monotonic, and the chi-square value (3.437, with 2 df) is not statistically significant at the .05 level.
earning under $7,000, who are the least likely to do so.43 There is even less variation when workers are classified according to the socio-economic status of their occupations. The zero-order correlation is only -.03 (which, even though insignificant, is in the opposite direction than income). When workers are categorized into three groups according to the Blishen socio-economic index (the groups being those men scoring from 20.0 to 29.9, from 30.0 to 39.9, and over 40.0) there is only a six percentage point difference between the group with the highest level of choice of the prestige model (the group between 20.0 and 29.9) and that with the lowest (the group scoring between 30.0 and 39.9).44 Education too shows a low (and, again, negative) association with choice of the prestige model (r = -.05), where the group most likely to select the prestige model (those men with under eight years of schooling) is only 9% more likely to do so that the group with the lowest level of choice of the prestige model (those men with more than thirteen years of formal education).45 Not only, therefore, do socio-economic factors not show any great variation with choice of class model, but there is no consistency in what little variation there is. Some socio-economic factors show a slight, positive variation with choice of the prestige model, whereas in other cases what direction there is is negative.

43 $\chi^2 = 3.562$, with 4 df (n.s.).

44 $\chi^2 = 5.599$, with 4 df (n.s.).

45 $\chi^2 = 2.370$, with 6 df (n.s.).
The only other variable listed in Table V-7 that is significantly correlated with choice of class model is class composition of immediate neighbourhood, where the correlation of -.11 shows a moderate tendency for workers in neighbourhoods with less of a proportion of the male labour force in manual occupations to be more likely to select the prestige model. But the correlation is about the same size as that of class model with community (scored by percentage of male labour force in manual occupations), so this does not tell us anything more.

A review of the choices of class models made by the manual worker respondents in the four communities, therefore, shows that the prestige model is the most popular choice. Community variations in choice of class model do not follow the pattern expected, and variables related to the workers' work situations, non-manual affiliations, and socioeconomic levels are not all associated with differences in choice of class model. Those variables that are significantly related to choice of class model are only moderately related, and, especially with those relating to work situation, the direction of the relationships is often not that expected.

Summary

This chapter has attempted to examine the differences in the way manual workers envisage the basic nature of the stratification system. It was first established that working-class deference, in the sense of the acceptance of the legitimacy of an ascriptive class system, is not a very common attitude among the workers studied. What deference
there was, moreover, was not related either to the choice of class model made by the workers, or to the communities in which the workers reside. Deference, however, need not involve the worker's self-subordination to an ascriptive elite. In a relatively "open" class system it is likely that the view of social stratification held by the dominant groups in society would allow for some mobility through the system. It was argued, therefore, that working-class deference in Canada could possibly involve the acceptance of any type of prestige model, even one that allowed for the possibility of class mobility.

When variation in choice of class models was examined, however, it was discovered that differences in choice of class model did not follow the pattern expected. The prestige model emerged as the choice of the majority of workers. Community differences did not produce the differences in images of class expected on the basis of theoretical considerations. More precisely, the images of class associated with Lockwood's "traditional proletarian" and "traditional deferential" were not espoused, to any great extent, by the workers of Sudbury and Lindsay. The Hamilton workers were not the most likely to select the pecuniary model of the class system, rather they were among the most likely to opt for the prestige model. The majority of workers who did not select the prestige model opted for the pecuniary model, which was chosen in the greatest proportions by the workers of Sudbury and Lindsay.

It was argued that the combined influences of geographical mobility and ethnic differentiation operate, in the four communities, to counter the influence of social class composition on the formation of workers'
images of the class system. It appears that where a community is both class and ethnically diversified the prestige model is selected by a disproportionate number of workers. Where, on the other hand, only one of these two types of social diversity is present it appears that proportionately more workers opt for the pecuniary model of the class system. But this is a matter of degree, and only among the workers of Sudbury is the prestige model not the single most chosen model of class structure.

Influences from the world of work do not greatly influence the worker's choice of class model. Of the elements of work situation considered, only trade union membership and type of workplace showed any relationship with choice of class model. Even here the relationship was not that expected, for trade union members and workers employed in transport or outside work were more likely to select the prestige model. However, it was shown that the greater tendency for union members to opt for the prestige model is restricted only to workers in transport or outside work, and that this itself appears to be due to the unusually favourable position, compared to non-unionists, of union members in this work setting.

The third group of factors that were centred upon as possible sources of variation in working-class attitudes toward the class system, factors relating to the extent of workers' affiliations with people of non-manual backgrounds, show little association with differences in workers' choice of class models. In addition, socio-economic differences were not found to play any significant part in influencing the worker's selection of class model. The only other factor which was found to be
related to class model is place of birth. Foreign born workers are more likely to say that the class system is based on differences in status and prestige than are Canadian born workers. It was suggested that this is due to the fact that foreign born workers come mainly from Europe, where there is more emphasis on status distinctions than there is in Canada.

Unlike class identification, therefore, variation in workers' images of the basic causes of stratification does not appear to be influenced greatly by the extent to which workers are involved in a series of relationships that do or do not involve interaction with persons from non-manual backgrounds. The greatest influence on choice of class model appears to be place of birth, but even among the Canadian born workers a majority said that the prestige model was the description of the causes of social stratification that they most agreed with. Does this imply that a majority of the workers in this study are deferential, in the broader sense of the term? If the prestige model is a mark of working-class deferences to the predominant middle-class value system, it is strange that trade union members are no less likely to adopt this model than are non-unionists. Trade union members are less likely than non-unionists to claim to be middle-class, and foreign born workers are less likely than Canadian born workers to do so. Yet foreign born workers, too, select the prestige model in higher proportions. On the face of it, this seems to suggest that adherence by manual workers to a prestige model of the class structure is no more a mark of deference than is adherence to a view of the class system in pecuniary terms. Whether or
not selection of the prestige model reflects, in fact, a more deferential attitude will be one of the topics covered in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VI
THE SOURCES OF MILITANCY

It has been seen that the prestige model is the model of the class system most often selected by the workers in the four communities. Pardoxically, union members are no less likely to select this model than non-unionists, a finding that leads to the suspicion that the prestige model need not carry the connotations that Lockwood imputes to it. It may also be that the levels of generality and abstraction of the descriptions of the class system are not sufficiently concrete to call forth the differentiation in workers' responses that was expected. In this chapter an analysis will be made of the workers' replies to a number of questions concerning social class and related matters that are more specific in their content, and which may serve to provide another measure of differences in attitudes among manual workers. The analysis will be conducted by the development of an index of militancy, a score indicating the degree to which workers adopt a militant attitude toward the inequalities that they face in their everyday lives. As in other chapters, the sources of variation in militancy among workers will be discussed, and the militancy score will also be examined in relation to the connection between militancy and class identification and choice of class models among the workers in the four communities.
The Militancy Score

The questionnaire contained several questions, the answers to which may be combined to constitute what Sellitz et al. refer to as a "summated scale". A number of questions, all with seemingly disparate subject matters, may all relate to some underlying attitude. By assigning numerical values to the responses to each question (for example, if all the questions have only two responses, by scoring a favourable response 2, and an unfavourable response 1) it is possible to sum these values to obtain a scale (or score) which indicates the degree to which the respondent is favourably or unfavourably disposed to the general attitude underlying the individual questions. If favourable responses were scored higher than unfavourable responses, then a high score would indicate that the respondent is consistently favourable to the attitude, whereas a low score would indicate a consistently unfavourable attitude. A medium score, however, could indicate that the respondent gave a consistently undecided response (assuming, that is, that the questions allowed for such a response) but it could also indicate that he responded favourably to some questions and unfavourably to others. It might be suggested that this is a serious drawback to such a measure, but even where the respondent answers favourably on some questions and unfavourably on others, the medium score would still indicate an ambivalent attitude over-all, a fact that, assuming

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the individual items do relate to the same general attitude, is reflected in the inconsistency of his replies to the individual questions.

The score developed in this chapter indicates the degree to which a worker adopts what might be termed a "militant" attitude on questions relating to social inequalities, including those experienced in the work world. The responses to five questions were chosen to constitute the score, each question reflecting, in one way or another, whether or not the worker holds attitudes that may be described as militant. In three questions the respondents were presented with five set categories of response, namely strongly agree, mildly agree, neither agree nor disagree, mildly disagree, and strongly disagree. These questions asked the worker to indicate agreement or disagreement with statements that the upper classes cannot be counted upon to look after the interests of his social class, that labour unions have too much power (for consistency the scoring is reversed on this item), and that big businessmen have too much power. A fourth question presented the respondent with two statements, of which he had to choose the one he agreed to; the one statement asserting that working-class people have to stick together, the other that they should try to get on on their own. The fifth question (which was identical to one used by Goldthorpe, Lockwood, et al. in the "affluent worker" study) presented four statements indicating under what circumstances a person should go on strike, and the respondent was asked to indicate which statement he most agreed with. The statements differ in the degree to which striking is favourably regarded, ranging from never, through only with the support of the union, through with or
without the support of the union if it is necessary to secure fair
treatment, to anytime it is necessary to support the interests of workers
and the working-class movement.

The militancy score, therefore, consists of the summation of
numerical values assigned to the responses to the five questions, the
higher the score the greater the militancy on the part of the worker
concerned.\(^2\) For individual items to be retained as components of the
score the responses to the item have to show a sufficient degree of
consistency with the total score, otherwise it is impossible to argue
that the score is unidimensional; that the items reflect the attitude
supposedly underlying them. With a score constructed from five items
the correlation between each item and the score must be at least .45
in order to establish that the correlation is not spurious.\(^3\) Table V-1
shows the correlations between the score and its constituent items.\(^4\)

\(^2\)Because the items comprising the score did not all contain the
same number of categories, to merely assign whole numbers to each response
category, starting from 1 for the least militant response, would have
assigned undue importance to the items with the greatest number of response
categories. The method adopted to overcome this problem was to score the
three questions with five categories from 1 to 5, and to weight the responses
for the other two questions so as to assign them approximately equal weight
with the other three questions. Thus the question concerning strikes,
which contained four response categories, was scored 1, 2.33, 3.66, and 5.
The other question contained only two response categories, but to score
these response categories 1 and 5 would have made the standard deviation on
this question much larger than that of the others and would have over-weighted
this item. Instead the responses were scored as 2 and 4, which reduced the
standard deviation to something like the magnitude of those of the other
items, hence assigning this item something approaching equal weight in
the total score.

\(^3\)This criterion is derived by the formula \(\frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\) (where \(n\) is the number
of items constituting the score). See, S. Henrysson, "Correction of item-
total correlations in item analysis", Psychometrika, 28 (1963), p. 211.

\(^4\)Originally the score contained six items, the five used in the
final score plus one relating to the respondent's attitude as to whether
Table VI-1. -- Correlations of the militancy score with constituent items (question no. in parenthesis)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>r</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(4:24) Agreement that the upper classes can't be counted on</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:26) Agreement that working-class people have to stick together</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:67) Disagreement that labour unions have too much power</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:68) Agreement that big businessmen have too much power</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4:69) Positive attitude toward going on strike</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*If a respondent failed to answer one or more of the questions his case was not scored, so only those cases where there are complete sets of item-responses are analyzed in this chapter.

The correlations presented in Table VI-1 are all higher than the lower limit suggested as the criterion for acceptability as a score item. The lowest correlation is with the item concerning the power of big businessmen, but the correlation is still large enough to permit the retention of this question as a score item.

The range of possible scores is from six to twenty-four, and there are four hundred and thirty-two cases where the workers answered all the questions and could hence be assigned a score. Only two workers scored the minimum of six, and only five scored the maximum of twenty-four, but

or not it was best to leave decision-making to the upper-classes (question 4:23). But the correlation of this item with the score was not large enough to withstand the test of spuriousness, and the militancy score was computed without this item.
the range of scores approximates a normal distribution \( (skew = 0.11) \). In the analysis that follows, the scores will be divided into three groups, representing low, medium, and high levels of militancy. As the scores were rounded to the nearest whole number, and as the distribution of scores was such that it was impossible to divide the workers into three equal size groups, the workers will be divided into three groups that are the closest approximation of equal size. One hundred and twenty-two men \( (28\%) \) scored between 6 and 13 on the militancy score, and they will be regarded as the group of workers displaying low militancy. One hundred and seventy-three men \( (40\%) \) scored between 14 and 17, and they will be treated as the medium scoring group. And one hundred and thirty-seven men \( (32\%) \) scored between 18 and 24, and will be regarded as the group of workers showing high levels of militancy.

**Correlates of Militancy**

As the militancy score represents another device for analyzing differences in attitudes among the workers in the four communities, the same kind of factors brought into the analysis of class identification and class models should be examined in the attempt to account for variation in militancy. Table VI-2 shows the distribution of militancy scores among the workers in the four communities. In this case there are significant differences between the workers in the different communities, differences which are of greater magnitude than the differences found in the instances of class identification and choice of class models.
Table VI-2.--Militancy by community (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Militancy</th>
<th>Ottawa</th>
<th>Lindsay</th>
<th>Hamilton</th>
<th>Sudbury</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>12/100</td>
<td>32/99</td>
<td>26/100</td>
<td>43/100</td>
<td>32/100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=57)</td>
<td>(N=92)</td>
<td>(N=129)</td>
<td>(N=154)</td>
<td>(N=432)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean*</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviation*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, etc. = 73.

\[ \chi^2 = 27.227, \text{ with 6df (p}<.001). \text{ Tau } C = .14 \text{ (p}<.001) \]

*Means and standard deviations presented in all tables in this chapter are calculated on the ungrouped scores.

Workers from Sudbury are the most likely to be among the most militant workers, whereas the Ottawa workers are the most underrepresented in this category. The Lindsay workers are somewhat more likely than the Hamilton workers to be in this group, and this would seem to support the argument advanced in Chapter V, namely that the high degree of mobility by managerial and professional workers into and out of Lindsay has removed one of the crucial prerequisites for working-class deference, a long-established local elite.

Among the low scorers, the workers of Sudbury are the least represented, but the largest representation is not from the Ottawa workers, but from those in Hamilton. The distribution of scores among the Hamilton workers is more even than it is in the other communities,
which probably reflects the fact that Hamilton is a more diversified community than Sudbury or Lindsay, or, for that matter, Ottawa, where the low percentage of workers among the most militant group is a reflection of the predominantly middle-class influences in that community.

On the average, as the mean scores of workers in the four communities indicate, the Sudbury workers are the most militant, followed quite closely by the workers of Lindsay. The mean scores are fairly close, but it has been seen that 11% more of the Sudbury workers are among the most militant workers. The mean scores of the Hamilton and Ottawa workers are quite similar but, as the lower standard deviation for Ottawa shows (and as the fact that 56% of the Ottawa workers are medium scorers also indicates) the Hamilton workers vary among themselves to a greater extent than the Ottawa workers. The rank ordering of mean scores does not completely follow the expected pattern, for the Lindsay workers are, on average, more militant than the Hamilton workers. But, as the Tau C correlation of .14 and the zero-order product moment correlation of .16 (p<.001) show, there is a moderate relationship between the class compositions of the communities studied and the extent of militant attitudes among workers in these communities. And, as has already been noted, this relationship is larger than in the cases of class identification or choice of class models.

Community differences in levels of militancy among workers survive the introduction of controls, hence it is necessary to explain

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5 For details of these control variables, and their codings, see Chapter IV, page 165, footnote 12.
why it is that differences in militancy between the workers of the four communities are greater than differences in either class identification or selection of class models. Comparing choice of class model with levels of militancy, the communities where the prestige model was chosen the least are also those communities where militancy among workers is the highest. And, although community differences in class identification are not statistically significant, the rank ordering of communities on this dimension is similar to their ordering in terms of levels of militancy (the exception being that the Lindsay workers, highest on working-class identification, are second to the Sudbury workers in terms of militancy). Thus the direction of community differences is similar in all three instances, but there are greater differences between the communities in terms of militant attitudes among the workers.

Particularly in the case of class models, but also with regard to class identification, the concepts involved are at a somewhat higher level of abstraction than are the questions from which the militancy score is derived. The worker may not devote a great deal of thought to the question of the basis of class distinctions, but he is more likely to have an opinion on whether or not, for example, labour unions have too much power, or under what circumstances he would support strike action, or even whether or not people in the higher social classes can be relied upon to protect his interests. Because these issues are more

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concrete it is more likely that the worker will adopt a more thought-out position and, if this is so, it is also more probable that greater differences in workers' attitudes will emerge.

The militancy score does, therefore, provide some evidence that differences in the class composition of the communities in which they reside have some influence on workers' attitudes toward social inequality. That such differences are more pronounced than at the more abstract level of class identification and class models may indicate that the influence of community, because of the factors of geographical mobility and ethnic diversity, is not strong enough to greatly affect the worker at an ideological level, but that in the more concrete realm of every-day experiences differences in the class composition of communities are related to the way in which the worker views social inequality. This finding shall be pursued further in Chapter VII, when the political preferences of manual workers are discussed. For the moment, however, it is sufficient to note that the first of the structural supports for working-class 'deviance' from the dominant cultural values, that of community, has been found to be related to the extent of militancy among manual workers.

Militant attitudes among manual workers also vary depending on their location in the second structural setting focused upon, namely the world of work. As Table VI-3 shows, members of trade unions are more likely than non-unionists to be among the workers who score highest on the militancy score.
Table VI-3.--Militancy by union membership (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Militancy</th>
<th>Non-unionists</th>
<th>Union members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>18 (N=110)</td>
<td>38 (N=301)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, etc. = 94

\[ \chi^2 = 47.971, \text{ with } 2 \text{ df (p<.001).}\ Tau C = .30 (p<.001). \]

As in the instance of working-class identification, union members and non-unionists differ considerably on this question. Over half of the non-unionists express non-militant attitudes, compared to 19% of the trade unionists. At the other pole, 38% of the trade unionists are among the most militant workers, compared to 18% of the non-unionists. The Tau C correlation of .30 between militancy and union membership is the highest Tau correlation yielded from all cross-tabulations made against the militancy score, hence it may be concluded that the trade union is the single most important influence on the worker's adoption of militant attitudes.\(^7\) Once again the trade union appears as a very

\(^7\) The zero-order product moment correlation of union membership with militancy is .31. The introduction of controls makes little difference to this relationship, the lowest first-order partial correlation yielded being .29, when wife's occupation is partialled out. The fact that controlling for the intervention of other variables does not substantially alter the relationship between union membership and militancy suggests that (as in the
important component in whatever structural supports the worker relies on to maintain a perspective that is, in a number of respects, divergent from the perspective of groups in more dominant positions in society. There still remains the paradox that union members, although being more likely to identify as working-class, and to hold militant views, are also slightly more inclined to select the prestige model. The discussion of this will be postponed until later in this chapter, when the relationship of militancy to class identification and class imagery will be discussed.

Levels of militancy also vary with plant size and, as Table VI-4 indicates, the pattern is similar to that found in the case of class identification.

Workers in the medium size plants (those from 500 to 4,999 employees) are more likely to be among the most militant workers than are workers employed in smaller concerns, but the workers employed in the very largest plants are no more militant than those in the small plants. As in the instance of the relationship between plant size and class identification, the relationship stands the test of controlling for the influence of a number of intervening variables. Controlling for union membership again shows that union members in the smallest plants do not conform to the general pattern, for they contain the second

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case of union membership and class identification) the relationship is primarily the result of union membership influencing workers toward more militant attitudes. If the causal direction was from militancy to union membership then other factors would have to account for differences in militancy and, when controlled for, should obliterate the original relationship. As this does not happen it would appear that it is union membership that influences workers to the adoption of militant attitudes, rather than the reverse.
Table VI-4.--Militancy by plant size (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Militancy</th>
<th>Under 100</th>
<th>100 to 499</th>
<th>500 to 999</th>
<th>1,000 to 4,999</th>
<th>Over 5,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>29/100</td>
<td>27/100</td>
<td>38/100</td>
<td>52/100</td>
<td>25/100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=126)</td>
<td>(N=71)</td>
<td>(N=46)</td>
<td>(N=79)</td>
<td>(N=85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, etc. = 98

$\chi^2 = 36.651$, with 8df (p<.001). Tau C = .07 (p<.05)

highest proportion of the most militant workers among union members, 40% of these workers being among the workers who score high on the militancy score, compared to 54% of those union members in plants employing between 1,000 and 4,999 people. But over-all the observation remains that plant size has a slight effect in increasing worker militancy until the very largest plants are encountered, where worker militancy declines to the same level as that found in the smallest plants. It has already been suggested that the reversal that occurs in the largest plants is probably a product of the greater economic benefits, and greater opportunities for improvement, accruing to the workers in these giant plants.

Workers who say that they control the speed at which they work
are, as Table VI-5 shows, less militant than workers whose work speed is determined by factors beyond their personal control.

Table VI-5. Militancy by determinant of work speed (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Militancy</th>
<th>Worker controls work speed</th>
<th>Other factors determine work speed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[ \frac{100}{N=225} ]</td>
<td>[ \frac{100}{N=176} ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers = 104

\[ \chi^2 = 9.592, \text{ with } 2 \text{df} (p<.05). \text{ Tau } C = .14 (p<.001). \]

It was argued in Chapter IV, following Blauner, that workers who control their own work speed are likely to be less estranged from their work than are those who are compelled to work at a pace decided by some external factor, and that this probably carries over into the non-work world. If this is so, the worker who controls his own work speed may have a greater sense of being able to control the direction of his own life, will be less likely to identify his problems as coll-

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\(^8 R. \text{ Blauner, } \text{Alienation and Freedom}, \text{ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 16-22.}\)
ective ones, and, consequently, will be less likely to express militant attitudes.

It was also seen, in the discussion of class identification, that union membership tends to reduce the differences between workers classified according to whether or not they control their own work speed. The same is true, though to a lesser extent, with militancy. Among non-unionists, 14% of the workers who control their own work speed are among the most militant workers, compared to 29% of those who do not. The comparable percentages for union members are 32% and 42%, so although the difference is still there it is not so large as where the union does not intervene to counteract the divisive influence.

The other variable relating to work situation that has been referred to throughout this thesis is type of workplace, and Table VI-6 shows the militancy scores of the workers employed in the various types of workplace.

Men employed in mines, although they are not the most likely to identify as working-class, are by far the most represented among the most militant workers. Conversely, men employed in transport or outside work, although the most likely to claim to be working-class, are the least likely to score high on the militancy score. It has often been suggested that miners are among the most militant members of the working-class, being members of a particularly cohesive occupational
Table VI-6. -- Militancy by type of workplace (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Militancy</th>
<th>Factory, production plant, or workshop</th>
<th>Mine</th>
<th>Transport or outside</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>31 (%)</td>
<td>51 (%)</td>
<td>22 (%)</td>
<td>24 (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=210)</td>
<td>(N=65)</td>
<td>(N=92)</td>
<td>(N=48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, etc. = 90.

\[ \chi^2 = 22.228, \text{ with } 6 \text{ df (p<.05).} \]

group, hence the finding in Table VI-6 is not unanticipated. The fact that they are not the most likely, also, to identify as working-class is perplexing. The relationship between class identification and militancy will be discussed in the next section.

Apart from the high level of militancy among miners the other

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10It might be suggested that, as the men employed in mines almost all live in Sudbury, that this really reflects a community difference. Looking solely at Sudbury, 43% of the factory workers, 32% of those in transport or outside work, 16% of those in the "other" category, and 52% of the miners score high on the militancy score. Although the workers of Sudbury (excluding those in the "other" category) are generally more militant than workers in the other communities, miners are still more militant than workers in other work settings.
noticeable fact is the low level of militancy among men in transport and outside work compared to those employed in factories, production plants, or workshops. But the difference is not great, and when union membership is taken into account it is seen that the difference is narrower among union members than among non-members. Among non-unionists, 19% of the factory workers and 8% of the transport and outside workers score high on the militancy score, but because of the small case base the difference is not statistically significant. Among union members, on the other hand, there is only a difference of 6 points between the proportions of factory workers and workers in transport or outside work who score high on the militancy score, and it would be difficult to impute much meaning to this difference. Hence the major fact to note in Table VI-6 is the high level of militancy among the men employed in mines.

The second structural barrier, that which is created by the conditions many workers face in the world of work, is, therefore, seen to be an influence on the level of militancy among workers. Membership of a trade union is the single most important factor influencing a

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11 Because of the heterogeneity of the "other" category it is difficult to interpret the results as far as they are concerned. But in class identification, choice of class model, and militancy these workers are generally the most "conservative".

12 Comparing the militancy scores of non-unionists in all four work settings (103) men yields a chi-square of 7.399, with 6df, which is not significant at the .05 level.

13 The percentages are 35% and 29% respectively.
worker to adopt a militant attitude, and the fact that miners are the workers most likely to be among the most militant group of workers indicates that, at this more concrete level, work group cohesiveness influences the worker to a sense of shared interests with his fellow workers. The evidence relating to plant size and determinants of work speed, on the other hand, indicates that there are divisive factors involved in the work world.

The third structural barrier is that provided by the absence of any significant associations with people of non-manual backgrounds. It has been seen that marriage to a woman of relatively high socio-economic status (as indicated by the Blishen score allocated to her current, or last, occupation) is associated with middle-class identification by the worker. Table VI-7 shows that militancy, too, varies depending on the class background into which the worker marries.\(^{14}\)

Inspection of the percentage figures presented in Table VI-7 would suggest that, although men with the highest status wives are the least likely to be among the most militant workers, there is not a clear monotonic relationship between militancy and wife's occupation.

\(^{14}\)It has already been noted, in Chapter IV, that many workers did not give their wife's occupation. There are still sufficient cases to warrant analysis however. It could be argued that the replies of the men who provided information on their wives' occupations could be very different from those of the men who did not. However, in comparing the marginal distributions of militancy scores among men who gave their wives' occupations with the militancy scores of all workers, it is found that the proportions of the former scoring low, medium, and high, are 32%, 55%, and 34%, compared to 28%, 40%, and 32% for the latter. Although there are differences (especially among the medium scorers) they are not large enough that discussion of this variable is precluded.
Men whose wives' occupations are in the middle category are the most likely to be among the most militant workers. But the mean scores shown at the foot of Table VI-7, together with a Tau B correlation of -.23 and a zero-order product moment correlation of -.19 (p<.01), indicate that there is an underlying negative relationship. It is clear, therefore, that workers whose wives perform (or performed) high status occupations are less likely to be among the most militant workers than are those whose wives perform (or performed) occupations of a lower socio-economic status.15

Table VI-7.--Militancy by wife's occupation (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Militancy</th>
<th>Blishen score of wife's occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20.0 to 29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>41/100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( \chi^2 = 20.570, \text{ with } 4 \text{df (p<.001)}. \text{ Tau } B = -.23 \text{ (p<.001)}. \)

15 The zero-order correlation between militancy and wife's occupation is -.19 (p<.01). Partialling out the influence of other variables does not appreciably diminish this relationship, and the lowest first-order partial correlation yielded is -.16, which results when the worker's educational attainment is controlled for. The same logic would appear to apply here as applied in the case of the relationship between union membership and militancy (see note 7, page 266), and this suggests that the major causal
Militancy among workers is also related to the socio-economic status of the occupation of the worker's best (male) friend. Of the men whose best friend's occupation scores between 20.0 and 29.9 on the Blishein index, 44% are among the most militant workers, compared to 34% of those whose best friend's occupation ranks between 30.0 and 39.9, and 27% of those whose best friend's occupation is assigned a Blishen index value of 40.0 or more.

It has been seen that having a father who performs (or performed) a relatively high status occupation does not influence the worker to identify as middle-class, or to select one or other of the class models. Likewise, a non-militant attitude among workers is not associated with the worker having a father with high socio-economic status. But the evidence from wife's and best friend's occupations provides ample support flow is from wife's occupation to militancy.

The partial correlations were, as was the regular practice, calculated on the basis of pair-wise deletion of missing cases. As in the case of the correlations of class identification with wife's occupation (see Chapter IV, page 195, footnote 53) a number of partial correlations were calculated on the basis of list-wise deletion, but, again, the results were not very different.

\[ N = 248, \chi^2 = 12.588, \text{ with } 4 \text{ df } (p<.05). \] \[ \text{Tau } B = -.15 (p<.001). \]

Mean scores, and standard deviations for each group are as follows: for men whose best friends rank between 20.0 and 29.9 on the Blishen index, \( (N=23), \) mean=17.3, standard deviation=2.3; between 30.0 and 39.9 \( (N=17), \) mean=16.1, standard deviation=5.5; and for those with best friends scoring over 40.0 on the Blishen index \( (N=78) \) mean=15.1, standard deviation=3.8

In fact, men whose fathers performed occupations with a Blishen index value of 40.0 or more were the most likely to score high on the militancy score, 40% doing so, compared to 32% of those with fathers in the lowest socio-economic category, and 27% of those in the intermediate group. But the chi-square value \( (9.680, \text{ with } 4 \text{ df}) \) only just reaches significance at the .05 level, and the Tau B correlation is only .04 (n.s.).
for the hypothesis that the absence of relationships with non-manual workers means the absence of one source of cross-pressures on the worker, and makes it more likely that he will be conscious of his subordinate position in society and adopt a militant attitude toward the problems that confront him.

Interestingly, none of the socio-economic variables show any great association with levels of militancy. Income, which is significantly related to class identification, shows little association with militancy. Only four percentage points separate the proportions of workers in each income group who are among the most militant workers. There are no significant differences in militancy when differences in education or the socio-economic status of worker's occupation are taken into account. And, in addition, neither home ownership nor the possession of consumer goods (both additional indicators of a possibly "middle-class" life style) show any significant association with militancy. This finding adds support to the assertion made in Chapter III, namely that a simple embourgeoisement hypothesis, arguing that economic affluence leads workers to a middle-class perspective, explains little of the differences in class attitudes among manual workers.

Thus, in the case of militancy, all three structural bases of

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18 The percentages of high scorers in each income group are 33% in the under $7,000 group, 34% in the $7,000 to $8,999 group, and 30% in the $9,000 and over group. The chi-square statistic for the 3 x 3 contingency table just reaches significance at the .05 level (9.702, with 4df), and this is mainly due to the paucity of low scorers in the low income group. But the over-all relationship between income and militancy is minimal, as is witnessed by a Tau B correlation of only .04. The mean score of each income group, going from low to high income, is 16.1 (S.D.=3.3), 15.6 (S.D.=3.8), and 15.0 (S.D.=3.3).
support for working-class "deviance" from the values of groups higher in the stratification system are found to operate in the manner hypothesized in Chapter I. The more "working-class" the milieu within which the worker lives out his life the more will he express militant attitudes.

Militancy, Class Identification, and Class Models

It was suggested in Chapter I that class identification, class imagery, and political preference may, in the light of Parkin's essay, all be viewed as components of a "package" of related attitudes. Thus it might be expected, for example, that working-class identification, selection of the power or pecuniary model, and militancy would all be related, and that all should vary in the same manner when examined in the light of explanatory variables. This expectation is borne out when looking, for example, at community differences and determinants of work speed. Workers in Sudbury and Lindsay are more likely than the workers of Hamilton and Ottawa to identify as working-class, select the power or pecuniary model, and score high on the militancy score. The same is true of workers whose work speed is controlled by some external factor, as compared to workers who themselves control the pace at which they work. But when variation according to union membership is considered, it is found that while union members are more likely than non-unionists to identify with the working-class, and to be among the most militant workers, they are also more likely to select the prestige model. Granted, as has been established in Chapter V, that the differences in choice of class models between union members and non-unionists are largely restricted
to those workers employed in transport or outside work, even then the question arises as to why the union members (excluding those in transport or outside work) are still no more likely than non-unionists to select a model other than the prestige model.

In all cases, working-class identification and militancy vary in the same manner with the explanatory variables, whereas in some cases working-class identification and militancy are accompanied by the choice of the pecuniary or power models, in others by selection of the prestige model. This would appear to suggest that choice of class model is unrelated to either class identification or level of militancy. It has already been noted that there is no relationship between class identification and choice of class model, but what of the relationship between militancy and both class identification and choice of class model? As Table VI-8 shows, militancy is, in fact, associated with both class identification and choice of the pecuniary or power models.

Working-class identifiers are more likely to be among the most militant group of workers than are middle-class identifiers, there being a fifteen point difference between them. There is virtually no difference between middle and working-class identifiers in terms of the medium scoring group, but among the least militant workers middle-class identifiers are (proportionately) represented in twice the numbers of working-class identifiers. In regard to choice of class model, men who selected the pecuniary or power models are more likely to be among

---

19See Chapter V, page 243, footnote 38.
Table VI-8. Militancy by class identification and choice of class model (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Militancy</th>
<th>Class identification&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Class model&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle-class</td>
<td>Working-class</td>
<td>Prestige</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>25&lt;sup&gt;100&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>40&lt;sup&gt;100&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>26&lt;sup&gt;100&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=128)</td>
<td>(N=258)</td>
<td>(N=224)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> No answers, etc. = 119. $X^2 = 15.454$, with 2df (p<.001). Tau C = .20 (p<.001).

<sup>b</sup> No answers, etc. = 97. $X^2 = 10.159$, with 2df (p<.01). Tau C = .15 (p<.001).

The most militant workers than are those who chose the prestige model, there being a fourteen point difference between the two groups. Men who selected the prestige model are somewhat more likely to be in the medium scoring group, and, consequently, there is not such a great difference between those who chose the prestige model or the other models in terms of their representation among the low scorers as there is in the case of class identification.

There is, then, a relationship between militancy and both working-class identification and selection of the pecuniary or power models. But the relationships are by no means perfect. Thus about 25% of the workers who claim to be middle-class also score high in terms of militancy,
whereas 20% of the working-class identifiers answered the questions making up the militancy index in such a manner as to place them among the least militant of the workers in the four communities. Likewise, over one-quarter of the workers who selected the prestige model appear among the most militant group of workers, while almost one-quarter of those who selected the pecuniary or the power model are among the least militant workers.

Table VI-9.--Choice of class model by class identification, by militancy (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice of class model</th>
<th>Class identification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle-class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low militancy$^a$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prestige model</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pecuniary or power model</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium militancy$^b$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prestige model</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pecuniary or power model</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High militancy$^c$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prestige model</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pecuniary or power model</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=32)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, etc. = 132.

$^{a}$ $\chi^2 = 0.065$, with 1 df (n.s.). Tau B = -.05 (n.s.)

$^{b}$ $\chi^2 = 0.101$, with 1 df (n.s.). Tau B = .04 (n.s.)

$^{c}$ $\chi^2 = 0.910$, with 1 df (n.s.). Tau B = .10 (p<.05).

(N.B. All chi-square values are corrected for continuity, to allow for the possibility of small expected cell frequencies).
Table VI-9 examines the possibility that controlling for level of militancy brings to light a relationship between class identification and choice of class model. Among both middle-class and working-class identifiers, as Table VI-9 shows, selection of the prestige model declines with increasing levels of militancy. However, when comparing middle-class and working-class identifiers at any given level of militancy, differences in choice of class model do not reach statistically significant proportions. At the low and medium levels of militancy there are no large percentage differences in choice of class model by middle and working-class identifiers. Among the most militant workers there is a twelve point difference, with working-class identifiers being less likely to select the prestige model, but, as the insignificant chi-square value shows, it is a minimal relationship at best. What is of note, however, is that over 40% of the most militant workers, who also identify as working-class, still see the prestige model as the most accurate description of the bases of the stratification system. A comparable finding is provided by examining the relationship between union membership and choice of class model, controlling for level of militancy.

Table VI-10 shows that the level of militancy of non-unionists makes little difference in their choice of class models, but among

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20 The relationship between militancy and choice of class model among the middle-class identifiers is not statistically significant ($\chi^2 = 1.475$, with 2df (n.s.)). Tau C = .08 (n.s.)), but that among working-class identifiers is significant ($\chi^2 = 12.914$, with 2df (p<.01). Tau C = .24 (p<.001)).

21 $\chi^2 = 0.790$, with 2df (n.s.). Tau C = .08 (n.s.).
Table VI-10.--Choice of class model by union membership, by militancy (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choice of class model</th>
<th>Non-Unionists</th>
<th>Union members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low militancy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prestige model</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pecuniary or power model</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100 (N=51)</td>
<td>100 (N=52)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium militancy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prestige model</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pecuniary or power model</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100 (N=31)</td>
<td>100 (N=127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High militancy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prestige model</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pecuniary or power model</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100 (N=18)</td>
<td>100 (N=111)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, etc. = 115

\(^a\chi^2 = 4.255,\) with 1 df (p < .05). Tau B = -.22 (p < .001).

\(^b\chi^2 = 2.310,\) with 1 df (n.s.). Tau B = -.14 (p < .01).

\(^c\chi^2 = 0.130,\) with 1 df (n.s.). Tau B = -.05 (n.s.).

Union members the higher the level of militancy the less the proportion of men selecting the prestige model. 22 When comparing union members with non-unionists at the different levels of militancy it is seen that

\(^{22}\chi^2 = 13.316,\) with 2 df (p < .01). Tau C = .22 (p < .001).
differences in choice of class model diminish with increasing militancy. Thus union members among the least militant workers are 22 percentage points above non-unionists in their choice of the prestige model. The comparable differences are 17 points among the medium scorers, and 8 points among the most militant workers. But controlling for level of militancy does not show that even the most militant union members are less likely to adopt the prestige model than the most militant non-unionists. And, as in the case of the most militant working-class identifiers, over 40% of the most militant union members selected the prestige model as the most accurate description of the class system.

Thus, although men who selected the pecuniary or power model are more likely to be among the most militant workers, it is still the case that a number of men who selected the prestige model also scored high on militancy and identified as working-class. Thus it is possible for a worker to be conscious of his class interests and yet see the class system in terms of status and prestige differences.

Merely because one believes that differences in status and prestige are the bases of the stratification system, it does not necessarily follow that one accepts the justice of such a system. A worker may, for instance, be very aware that the president of the company he works for is accorded much higher status and prestige than himself, but he may also regard this as unjustified. The finding that a number of workers select the prestige model while still identifying as working-class and being among the most militant workers suggests, therefore, that agreement that the stratification system is based on the distribution of prestige in society
does not necessarily lead to the normative acceptance of the existing societal arrangements.

This would seem to comply with the often heard complaint by manual workers that they do the real work in society yet do not gain the proper recognition from the rest of society. Evidence of this is found in Young and Willmott's study of the prestige rankings of occupations made by manual workers in England. A number of manual workers (albeit a minority) accorded manual occupations a higher rank than non-manual occupations, on the grounds that these occupations performed more important functions for society. If, then, manual workers can adopt a prestige model of social stratification which does not accept the existing distribution of status and prestige this would cast doubt on the argument implied in Lockwood's discussion of class imagery, namely that the only two possibly variants of a prestige model are either a deferential model or a middle-class model. The fact that a number of militant manual workers see society in prestige terms, along with the evidence presented in Young and Willmott's essay, suggests that other working-class versions of a prestige model of the stratification system are indeed possible, and that more detailed research is needed to ascertain the extent and variety of the ways in which workers regard the distribution of status and prestige in society.

Not only do about one-quarter of the men who selected the prestige

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model rank among the most militant workers, but also about one-quarter of the middle-class identifiers do likewise. This would suggest that middle-class identification does not, for all the workers who so identify, mean an identification with what sociologists would normally regard as the middle-class. Runciman, in *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice*, has shown that not all workers who identify as middle-class have a conception of "middle-classness" that emphasizes status differences or places them outside the class to which they regard most manual workers as belonging to.\(^{24}\) Likewise, Martin, in his study of class identification in Britain, found that many workers who identified as middle-class revised the class boundaries, so as to include themselves, and many of their manual worker compatriots, in a large middle-class composed of people in both manual and non-manual occupations.\(^{25}\) And Goldthorpe, Lockwood, et al. found that a number of "affluent workers" felt that they could be described as either middle-class or working-class.

If some workers who call themselves middle-class do not identify

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\(^{24}\)Runciman, *op. cit.*, p. 159. Of the 26% of the manual workers who gave a middle-class identification, only about one-third gave criteria that Runciman regards as fitting with commonly agreed sociological definitions of "middle-classness" (such as conscious association with non-manual persons, or emphasis on style of life).

\(^{25}\)F. M. Martin, "Some Subjective Aspects of Social Stratification", in D.V. Glass (ed.), *Social Mobility in Britain*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954), pp. 59-62. Martin found that 38% of the manual workers who identified as middle-class defined the middle-class as being composed of "everyone who works for a living".

with what sociologists conventionally regard as the middle-class, then it would be possible for them to claim middle-class status and to be aware of themselves as sharing common interests with other manual workers. The figures presented in Table VI-8, namely those showing that 25% of the manual workers who identified as middle-class nevertheless rank among the most militant workers, would appear to confirm this interpretation.

In the ideal-typical situation of the "traditional proletarian" it might be that militancy would always exist hand-in-hand with working-class identification and a dichotomous power model of the stratification system. But, as has been noted before, none of the communities studied are characterized by the stability, homogeneity, and isolation from the influences of the wider society that is implied by this ideal-type. In the more fluid social relationships that the workers are involved in, even in Sudbury, it is, perhaps, not surprising that the degree of consistency between the attitudes held by the manual workers in the four communities is less than one might expect to find in the "extreme" case of the "traditional proletarian".

Thus, in examining the relationship between militancy, class identification, and choice of class models it has been found that, although militancy is associated with both working-class identification and choice of the power or pecuniary models, it is still possible for a worker who holds fairly militant views to identify with the middle-class or to see the class system in terms of a prestige model. Hence the instance of trade union membership being associated with militancy,
working-class identification, and selection of the prestige model. There still remains the question of how workers' attitudes to social inequality are related to their political attitudes and party preferences. This question will be considered in the next chapter, which will be devoted to an examination of the factors underlying working-class support for the New Democratic Party.

**Summary**

In this chapter a score indicating the degree of militancy expressed by workers in their responses to five questions was constructed, in an attempt to provide another measure of differences in attitudes among workers in the four communities. It was found that differences in militancy between the workers of the four communities were greater than comparable differences in class identification and choice of class models. Community differences in militancy did follow the pattern that workers in the more "working-class" communities were more likely to be among the most militant workers than were the workers in the most "middle-class" community, Ottawa. It was suggested that community differences were greater in this instance because the topics which comprised the items from which the score was constructed were more concrete than the issues of class identification and class models, and that this concreteness meant that the topics were of more immediate relevance to the every day experiences of the workers in the study.

Militancy also varied, in the expected manner, with the other two groups of factors which have been focused upon in this thesis, namely factors relating to the work situations and family and friendship
affiliations of the workers in the study. Thus, more than in the cases of class identification and class models, the structural supports for distinctly working-class attitudes were found to operate in the manner hypothesized in Chapter I.

It was also noted that the relationship between militancy, working-class identification, and choice of the pecuniary or power models was by no means a perfect one. Although militancy tended to be associated with these other attitudes there were a reasonably large number of men who adopted an "inconsistent" set of attitudes. It was argued that this suggests that the prestige model does not, for all the workers who adopt it, necessarily imply acceptance of the existing bases for conferring status and prestige, and also that middle-class identification on the part of manual workers does not necessarily involve identification with those social groups that are conventionally regarded as making up the middle-class.

The source of this "inconsistency" between the attitudes of many of the manual workers was suggested to be the fact that few, if any of the workers in this study, had experienced the consistency of experiences implied in Lockwood's typology of different workers. As one example, not even Sudbury, because of the high degree of geographical mobility among workers in that city, can provide the integration necessary for the development of a full-blown proletarian traditionalism.
CHAPTER VII

NDP SUPPORT AMONG MANUAL WORKERS

It has been pointed out that the influence of social class membership on party choice is not as strong in Canada as in other industrial societies.\(^1\) In Britain, for instance, approximately two-thirds of the manual working-class generally vote for the Labour Party, whereas only about 25\% of those in non-manual pursuits support that party.\(^2\)

In the United States the Democratic Party is the main recipient of the working-class vote.\(^3\) But, in Canada, no single political party receives the majority of working-class votes. However, as Alford points out, Canada's social democratic party, the New Democratic Party, although it does not generally gain the majority of working-class votes, does receive the bulk of its support from manual workers,\(^4\) a finding that is replicated in this study, where it is found that over 70\% of the men intending to vote for the NDP in the Provincial and Federal elections...

---


(of 1971 and 1972, respectively) were manual workers. The NDP is similar in this respect to other left-wing parties - it gains most of its support from manual workers, and in this sense can be referred to as a working-class party. In this chapter an examination of the sources of working-class support for the New Democratic Party will be undertaken, and this may provide some clues not only as to why certain workers are more likely to vote for the NDP than others, but also why the majority do not. If the theoretical expectations outlined in Chapter I apply to voting it is to be predicted that those workers most involved in strictly working-class relationships, in the community, at work, and in their family and friendship affiliations, will be the most likely to support the New Democratic Party.

The Sources of NDP Support

There were four questions on the questionnaire concerning party allegiances. The respondents were asked to indicate which political party they usually support in Federal and Provincial elections, and also which party they planned to support in the next Federal and Provincial elections.  

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5See Chapter III, Table III-4, p. 129.

6The first part of the survey was conducted in May 1971, before the Provincial Election of 1971 and the Federal Election of 1972. The Lindsay survey was conducted after the Provincial Election, so the wording of the appropriate question was altered, asking how the respondent had voted in that election.
On each of the four questions over 80 men failed to provide a party identification, while only a small minority said that they supported parties other than the Progressive Conservatives, Liberals, or New Democrats. The twelve men who said that they usually support the Social Credit Party in Federal elections were the largest group giving support to any party other than the three mentioned above. The analysis in this chapter will be based on the replies of the 376 manual workers who gave a party identification in response to all four questions. Table VII-1 shows the stated party affiliations of these workers, showing those workers who reported that they consistently support the same party, and those "floating voters" who transfer their allegiance from one party to another.

The New Democratic Party consistently gains the support of 27% of the manual workers who replied to all four questions. Another 14% support the NDP in some elections, while supporting other parties on other occasions. The Progressive Conservative Party is consistently supported by 18% of those workers who are being considered, while (a fact not shown in the table) another 14% sometimes support that party. The Liberal Party is the consistent choice of 29% of the workers included in Table VII-1, and (again, something not shown in the table) a further 18% float between the Liberals and other parties. The Liberals, therefore, gain the support of the largest group of workers, followed fairly closely by the New Democrats. All in all, 58% of the workers considered in Table VII-1 adopt a consistently non-NDP voting position.

In the analysis that follows the main concern will be to examine
Table VII-1.--Political allegiances of manual workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political allegiance</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consistent Progressive Conservative supporters</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent Liberal supporters</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent NDP supporters</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent Social Credit supporters</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent supporters of other parties</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floating voters who never support the NDP</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floating voters who sometimes support the NDP</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=376)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Only those cases where a party identification was made for all four questions are included.

The sources of working-class support for the NDP. Consequently, the manual workers will be divided into three groups; those who consistently support parties other than the NDP, those who float between the NDP and other parties, and those who consistently support the NDP. This procedure may, of course, obscure differences between supporters of the

7The respondents were asked to indicate their party preferences regardless of whether or not their citizenship status entitled them to vote. It might be argued that the inclusion of non-citizens would make the results non-comparable with actual voting behaviour. But, firstly, this survey is primarily concerned with the attitudes of all workers in the study. And, secondly, a comparison of the political preferences of Canadian and foreign born workers shows no significant differences between them (chi-square = 0.139, with 2 df [n.s.]), which suggests that the inclusion of non-citizens does not drastically affect the results.
Progressive Conservative and Liberal parties (there being too few Social Credit supporters for any analysis), but the major focus of this thesis is on the influence of social structural factors in fostering among manual workers a perspective that is "deviant" from that of the more privileged groups in society. Regardless of the ideological "purity" of the NDP, the fact that the party gains such a large part of its support from manual workers suggests that it is the only major political party in Ontario that does deviate from the political values of the classes higher in the stratification system. Because of this it is legitimate to concentrate on differences in the social characteristics of supporters and opponents of this political party among the working-class. However, reference will also be made to any major differences between the supporters of the Progressive Conservative and Liberal parties.

As in other chapters, the first factor that will be discussed is the influence of community differences on working-class support for the NDP. Butler and Stokes, in their analysis of British poll data, found that the higher the proportionate representation of working-class people among the voters in a constituency, the larger the proportion of manual workers who voted for the Labour Party. Table VII-2 shows the levels of working-class support for the NDP in the four communities, and establishes that community differences are indeed related to variations in support for the NDP.

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Table VII-2.--NDP support by community (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ottawa</th>
<th>Lindsay</th>
<th>Hamilton</th>
<th>Sudbury</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consistent NDP</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floaters</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent non-NDP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(\chi^2 = 25.133\), with 6df (\(p<.001\)). Tau \(\text{C} = .18\) (\(p<.001\)).

Workers in Sudbury are the most likely to support the New Democratic Party, 39% being consistent supporters of the NDP, and another 14% fluctuate between the NDP and other parties. At the other extreme, only 7% of the workers in Ottawa consistently support the NDP. Eleven percentage points separate the workers of Lindsay and Hamilton who consistently vote for the NDP, a figure larger than one would expect if only the actual occupational compositions of the two communities are considered. But Lindsay is part of a larger electoral riding which has never returned an NDP representative (at either the Federal or Provincial level), whereas Hamilton contains a number of electoral ridings and, in three of the Provincial ridings, NDP members are elected fairly consistently. Thus the possibility of electing an NDP representative is obvious in Hamilton, whereas, in Lindsay, it might legitimately be thought that a vote for the NDP is a wasted vote. This conjecture appears to be
supported by the fact that the workers of Lindsay are less decisive than those in Hamilton, as is seen by comparing the percentage of floating voters in the two communities. Looking at the consistently non-NDP workers, it is noticeable that only 4 percentage points separate the workers of the two communities.

Controlling for the influence of the intervening variables referred to throughout this thesis does not show the relationship between community and NDP support to be spurious, so it appears safe to assert that the more a community's labour force is made up of manual workers the more likely it is that workers in that community will support the New Democratic Party. This finding also appears to support the interpretation presented in Chapter VI that community differences in workers' attitudes are more pronounced when the questions concerned relate to more concrete issues that are likely to appear relevant to the worker's every day experiences.

Thus the first structural factor, that of community structure,

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9 The zero-order product moment correlation between NDP support and class composition of community is .22. Partilling out the effects of intervening variables does not substantially reduce this correlation (see Chapter IV, p. 165, footnote 12 for details of the control variables). The lowest first-order partial correlation is .17 (p<.01), which results when union membership is controlled.

The variable measuring NDP support was created by assigning a value to the response on each of the four voting questions (scoring support for the NDP as 1, and support for any other party as 0) and summing these values. The respondent was assigned a score, ranging from 0 to 4, based on how many of the four questions relating to voting he responded to in favour of the NDP.

10 Comparing the consistent supporters of the three major parties, Progressive Conservative support is highest in Lindsay, where 53% of the consistent supporters support that party, and lowest in Sudbury, where the figure is 13%. Liberal support is strongest in Ottawa (67%) and weakest in Lindsay (23%). The relative ordering of NDP support between the four communities does not alter.
is found to operate in the manner hypothesized, namely that the more working-class the milieux in which the worker resides the more likely is it that he will make the decision to support the political party that, even if only moderately, presents a challenge to the basis on which the society is presently organized. Table VII-3 shows the relationship between NDP support and union membership, the element of the second structural factor, the work situation, that has been found to be most influential on workers' attitudes.

Table VII-3.--NDP support by union membership (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-unionists</th>
<th>Union members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consistent non-NDP</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floaters</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent NDP</td>
<td>9/100 (N=100)</td>
<td>35/100 (N=260)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, etc. = 145.

\[ \chi^2 = 26.555, \text{ with } 2 \text{df} (p<.001). \]  
\[ \text{Tau C} = .24 \ (p<.001). \]

The trade union again emerges as one of the strongest influences leading the worker to a "deviant" perspective. The Tau C correlation of .24 indicates that union membership is the single most important factor discovered in this study accounting for variation in working-class support for the NDP.\(^\text{11}\) Only 9% of the non-unionists consistently support

\(^\text{11}\)The zero-order product moment correlation between union membership and NDP support is .28, and first-order partial correlations, controlling for the usual variables, are not appreciably different. The lowest first-order partial correlation is .25, yielded when the class composition of community is partialled out.

The fact that controlling for the intervention of other variables
the NDP, compared to 35% of the union members, while a further 15% of both groups of workers float between the NDP and other parties. Even among union members, therefore, consistent support for the NDP is a minority position, but if many of the labour unions in Ontario did not support the New Democratic Party, it seems safe to assert that the cause of social democracy in this province would face far greater disadvantages than it already does.

Comparing consistent supporters of the Progressive Conservative and Liberal parties with those of the NDP, non-unionists are much likelier than union members to support the Conservatives (50% of the former, compared to 16% of the latter). Union membership, however, has little effect on the Liberal vote, for 37% of the non-unionists who consistently support one of the three major parties support the Liberal Party, compared to 38% of the union members. The division between non-unionists does not obliterate the relationship between union membership and support for the NDP would, applying the same argument that was presented in the discussions of the relationship of union membership to both class identification and militancy, suggest that the relationship primarily results from union membership influencing the worker to support the NDP, rather than resulting from the effect of other factors which influence the worker both to join a trade union and to support the NDP. Butler and Stokes (op.cit., pp. 151-170) argue, from the evidence of their study of voting in Britain, that the relationship between current union membership and Labour voting results primarily from the prior existence of class feelings that influence workers both to join unions and to support the Labour Party. They do not, however, consider the possibility that it might have been membership of unions in an earlier period of their lives that influenced the workers to hold such class attitudes. Be that as it may, the evidence from the four communities suggests that in Ontario (especially as union membership is often a condition of employment) membership in a trade union does have an independent influence on the political attitudes of manual workers.

Among the consistent party supporters only, the NDP is supported by 14% of the non-unionists and 46% of the union members. If consistency is a measure of political commitment it would appear the NDP has extra strength among the more politically committed trade unionists.
and union members parallels the differences between the social classes, where the Progressive Conservatives gain disproportionate support from the non-manual classes, the Liberal Party gains support from both manual and non-manual groups, and the NDP gains most of its support among manual workers.\footnote{See Chapter III, Table III-4, p. 129.}

Support for the NDP among manual workers, as Table VII-4 shows, also varies with the size of plants within which the workers are employed. Table VII-4.--NDP support by plant size (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of employees</th>
<th>Under 100</th>
<th>100 to 499</th>
<th>500 to 999</th>
<th>1,000 to 4,999</th>
<th>5,000 &amp; over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consistent non-NDP</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floaters</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent NDP</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=101)</td>
<td>(N=67)</td>
<td>(N=42)</td>
<td>(N=75)</td>
<td>(N=73)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, etc. = 147

\[ \chi^2 = 26.575, \text{ with 8df (p<.001). Tau C} = .09 \ (p<.01). \]

Workers in the smaller plants are less likely to support the NDP than are workers in larger plants. Only 18\% of the workers working in plants employing less than 100 employees consistently support the NDP, and only 24\% of the workers in the next smallest plants (those employing between 100 and 499 people) do likewise. The greatest support for the NDP is from among those employed in plants with 500 to 999 employees,
whereafter support declines in the larger plants, but is still above that given by workers in the smaller plants.\footnote{14} It would appear, therefore, that plant size does have an effect on political allegiance. But, as Table VII-5 shows, when union membership is taken into account it appears that differences in the extent of union organization account for a good deal of the effect of plant size.

Very few non-unionists work in anything but the very small and the very large plants, and there is little difference in levels of NDP support between these two groups of workers. Among trade unionists, workers in the smallest plants are only slightly less likely to consistently support the NDP than are workers in the two largest categories of plant size. In fact consistent non-NDP supporters are a smaller percentage of the workers in the smallest plants than they are in the two largest categories. Consistent NDP support is lowest in the plants employing 100 to 499 people, and highest among workers employed in plants with 500 to 999 employees (where there is also the largest proportion of floating NDP supporters). What Table VII-5 shows, therefore, is that the differences in political preferences among workers in the

\footnote{14} Consistent supporters of the Progressive Conservative Party are most numerous among workers in the smallest plants (45% being supporters of the Conservatives). Support for the Liberal Party is fairly similar in all size plants, with the exceptions that it is low in the smallest plants (because of the extra support for the Conservatives) and in those employing between 500 to 999 people (because of the strength of the NDP among these workers). It has already been noted that support for the Progressive Conservatives is fairly strong among non-unionists. About 60% of the workers in the smallest plants are non-unionists, and this accounts for the high degree of support accorded the Conservatives among the workers in the smallest plants.
Table VII-5.--NDP support by plant size, by union membership (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Employees</th>
<th>Under 100</th>
<th>100 to 499</th>
<th>500 to 999</th>
<th>1,000 to 4,999</th>
<th>5,000 &amp; over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-unionists</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent non-NDP</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floaters</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent NDP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=63)</td>
<td>(N=6)</td>
<td>(N=4)</td>
<td>(N=5)</td>
<td>(N=20)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Union members</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent non-NDP</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floaters</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent NDP</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=56)</td>
<td>(N=57)</td>
<td>(N=37)</td>
<td>(N=69)</td>
<td>(N=51)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, etc. = 157

$\chi^2 = 7.011$, with 8df (n.s.). Tau C = -.02 (n.s.).

$\chi^2 = 21.958$, with 8df ($p<.01$). Tau C = .02 (n.s.).

Various sized plants are diminished considerably once union membership is taken into account, a point that is further illustrated by the fact that the zero-order correlation of plant size with NDP support is .12 ($p<.05$), whereas the first-order partial correlation, controlling for union membership, is only .04 (n.s.). The remaining differences do not support the hypothesis that increasing plant size has an independent effect on left voting among manual workers.
Variation in support for the NDP is also related to the type of workplace in which the worker carries out his occupation. Men who work in mines are far more likely to support the NDP than are men in other types of workplace. Among miners, 47% consistently support the NDP, while 27% of those employed in factories, production plants or workshops, 24% of those in transport or outside work, and 6% of those employed in other work settings do likewise.\footnote{\[\chi^2 = 25.272, \text{ with 6df (p<.001).}\]} The high level of NDP support among the miners parallels the high level of militancy among these workers, but in this instance it appears that the differences are a reflection of the fact that all but one of the men engaged in mining reside in Sudbury. Among the Sudbury workers, 46% of the miners consistently support the NDP, but 44% of the workers employed in factories, production plants, or workshops do the same.\footnote{Support for the NDP among transport or outside workers in Sudbury is lower, with only 26% consistently supporting that party. But there are only 22 of these men (compared to 59 miners and 36 factory workers) so the figures are probably less reliable. And even allowing for the lower level of support, it is still higher than that found among transport or outside workers generally. There are only 7 workers in Sudbury who fit into the "other" category, none of whom consistently support the NDP.} Thus the greater support that the NDP receives from miners is more attributable to the fact that these men reside in the most working-class of the four
communities than to a general predisposition of miners, more than other workers, to support the NDP.

The other element of work situation that has been found to be associated with differences in workers' attitudes is their ability to control the speed at which they work. When party allegiances are considered, however, it is found that 25% of the workers who control their work speed consistently support the NDP, a figure not very different from the 29% of the men whose work speed is determined by factors beyond their personal control.\(^\text{17}\) The direction of the difference is the same as in the case of other attitudes but is not so large, say, as the difference in levels of working-class identification.

Thus, when considering party affiliations, the only element of work situation which is shown to have a strong independent effect on party choice is union membership. Differences in party choice due to the size of the plant in which the worker is employed are seen to be primarily attributable to differences in the extent of unionization in these plants, and the high NDP vote among miners is seen to be mostly a reflection of the community in which the miners reside. Although in the instances of class identification and militancy, other work situation variables do have some effect, the strength of their influence is much

\(^{17}\chi^2 = 1.213, \text{ with } 2 \text{df (n.s.), Tau C = .01 (n.s.). Eighteen percent of the men who determine their own work speed are floating NDP supporters, compared to 14% of those who do not determine the speed at which they work. The percentages of consistent non-NDP supporters are 57% for the former, and 58% for the latter. When consistent supporters of the three major parties are considered, determination of work speed still shows no significant association with party choice (}\chi^2 = 3.201, \text{ with } 2 \text{df (n.s.)).}
less than that of union membership, so the findings with regard to political allegiance are not inconsistent with others presented earlier. And the strength of the relationship between union membership and NDP support confirms the hypothesis that the collective adaptations that workers evolve in response to their experience in the work world present one structural support for the adoption of attitudes that differ from those of groups higher in the social order.

The other factor considered throughout this thesis concerns the nature of the worker's kinship and friendship affiliations. Table VII-6 shows the support for the New Democratic Party among workers classified by the socio-economic status of their wives' occupations.

Table VII-6.--NDP support by wife's occupation (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blishen index</th>
<th>20.0 - 29.9</th>
<th>30.0 - 39.9</th>
<th>40.0 &amp; over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consistent non-NDP</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floaters</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent NDP</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=24)</td>
<td>(N=62)</td>
<td>(N=104)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, etc. = 315

χ² = 10.001, with 4df (p<.05). Tau B = -.13 (p<.01).

In the case of choice of class model, no work situation variable bears a very strong relationship with that variable.
There are only 190 cases where the worker reported the current or previous occupation of his wife, and also gave a party identification in response to all four voting questions. But, it would still be useful to analyze the political preferences of these workers, especially as the party identifications of all these workers are not very different from all the workers who responded to all four voting questions.\(^\text{19}\)

As in the case of militancy, the relationship between wife's occupation and NDP support is not monotonic, for the highest level of NDP support is found among the workers with wives in the middle category in Table VII-6. But there are not many men in the lowest category, so it is not possible to make much of the low level of NDP support among them.\(^\text{20}\) Where there are sufficient numbers of workers to provide more assurance in making comparisons it is seen that NDP support declines with increases in the socio-economic status of wives' occupations, there being a 21 point difference between the proportions of workers consistently supporting the NDP.\(^\text{21}\) Hence contact with the non-manual

\(^{19}\) Of the workers who both gave their wife's occupation and answered all four voting questions, 55\% are consistent non-NDP supporters, compared to 58\% of all workers who answered the voting questions, 15\% are floaters, the same proportion as in the wider group, and 30\% are consistent NDP supporters, compared to 27\% of all workers for whom information is available. The differences are rather small, and this affords some assurance that it is legitimate to examine the pattern of party support among this sub-group of workers.

\(^{20}\) The actual numbers involved are 15 men who are consistent non-NDP, 3 floaters, and 6 consistent NDP supporters. If there were statistical independence the distribution would be 13, 4, and 7, hardly a very different distribution of responses.

\(^{21}\) When considering only those men who consistently support one or other of the three main parties (137 cases), support for the Conservatives does not vary appreciably between those in the intermediate and upper groups (22\% and 27\%), but Liberal support increases (from 22\% to 38\%) while that for the NDP declines (from 56\% to 34\%).
world through marriage has a conservative influence on the worker's political beliefs, an influence parallel to that found in the instances of class identification and militancy.22

This is the only variable concerning non-manual affiliations that shows any statistically significant relationship with political preferences. The socio-economic level of his father is not at all related to the worker's choice of political party, a finding that is consistent with the results presented in earlier chapters.23 Neither is the socio-economic status of the worker's best friend significantly related (as measured by chi-square) to party choice, although the direction of the differences that do exist is as expected. Thus 40% of the workers whose best friend's occupation places between 20.0 and

22 The zero-order product moment correlation between NDP support and wife's occupation is -.19 (p<.001). Partialling out union membership reduces the correlation to -.16 (the lowest correlation yielded from the partial correlations computed), but the correlation shows that there is still a relationship between wife's occupation and NDP support among workers. On the same basis as the argument concerning the direction of the relationship between union membership and NDP support (see footnote 11, p. 296), it would appear that the relationship does not result from the fact that some other variable explains both the tendency of some workers to marry women from a higher socio-economic bracket, and the variation in support for the NDP. Rather, it seems, marriage to a woman with a relatively high socio-economic status influences the worker to support parties more favourably regarded by groups higher in the social hierarchy.

The partial correlations were calculated on the basis of pair-wise deletion of no answers. Recalculation of several correlations on the basis of list-wise deletion of no answers did not appreciably alter the results. In the correlation matrix involving NDP support, wife's occupation, and union membership (where there were 164 cases), the zero-order correlation between NDP support and wife's occupation is -.18 (p<.05). Controlling for union membership reduces the correlation to -.13 (p<.05), which is slightly lower than that yielded by the method of pair-wise deletion. Nonetheless, both methods produce fairly similar results and, as was suggested in Chapter IV, pair-wise deletion is a far more economical procedure.

23 Neither father's occupation (N=334, $\chi^2 = 4.563$, with 4df (n.s.), Tau B = .04 [n.s.]) nor father's education (N=269, $\chi^2 = 1.449$, with 4df (n.s.), Tau B = -.04 [n.s.]) are associated with support for the NDP among manual workers.
29.9 on the Blishen index are consistent NDP supporters, compared to 31% of those with friends whose occupation ranks between 30.0 and 39.9, and 23% of those whose friend's occupation ranks over 40.0.\textsuperscript{24}

The results of the analysis of the influence of non-manual affiliations on support for the NDP are, therefore, the same as those arrived at in the discussions of class identification and militancy, namely that marriage to a woman with a non-manual occupational history is the most important affiliation influencing the worker away from a "deviant" perspective. Thus far, therefore, the evidence presented supports the hypothesis, stated at the beginning of this chapter, that NDP voting would be strongest among those workers "protected" from the influence of the dominant culture by their involvement in relationships predominantly working-class in character.

With regard to the relationship between the worker's own socio-economic status and support for the NDP, it has already been shown in Chapter III that high income does not lead to a decline in working-class support for the NDP. Table VII-7 shows the level of support for the NDP among workers at different income levels.

Table VII-7 establishes that the findings presented in Chapter III did not merely reflect the fact that high income workers "floated" toward the NDP in the Provincial and Federal elections held after the major part of the survey was conducted. Rather, consistent support for the NDP is highest among the workers with the highest incomes. It

\textsuperscript{24}N = 221, \(\chi^2 = 6.999\), with 4df (n.s.), Tau B = -.12 (p<.01). Educational differences do not attain even this level of directionality, as is seen by the Tau B correlation of -.06 (n.s.) between support for the NDP and education of best friend.
Table VII-7.--NDP support by income (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Under $7,000</th>
<th>$7,000-$8,999</th>
<th>$9,000 &amp; over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consistent non-NDP</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floaters</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent NDP</td>
<td>22 (N=114)</td>
<td>26 (N=119)</td>
<td>35 (N=117)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, etc. = 155.

χ² = 29.204, with 4df (p<.001). Tau B = .21 (p<.001).

might be thought that this relationship is the result of union membership, on the assumption that union members earn more than non-unionists. But controlling for union membership does not show the positive relationship between NDP support and income to be spurious. The zero-order correlation is .18 (p<.001), and partialing out union membership yields a correlation of .19 (p<.01). No other intervening variable is creating the relationship between income and NDP support, so at the very least it can be said that increasing income does not, among the workers in the four communities, lead to one of the supposed manifestations of embourgeoisement, the drift away from left-wing voting. Merely because a worker is among the better paid section of the working-class it does not follow

25 Controlling for the type of workplace, however, shows that the only strong relationship between income and NDP support is among men who work in mines. But in the cases of workers employed in other work settings, consistent NDP support either does not vary with income or increases slightly with rising incomes. In all cases floating NDP support increases with income.
that he will identify his interests as being similar to those of non-manual workers in a similar income bracket. The very reverse may occur, in that the worker may resent the greater social status assigned to white-collar workers who, in material terms, are no better than he is.

Neither of the other two main indicators of socio-economic status, education and the socio-economic status of the individual's occupation, show any clear relationship with NDP support. Consistent NDP support is highest among those workers intermediate in educational attainment (9 to 10 years of schooling), while consistent non-NDP support is higher (and at a similar level) both among those with less than nine years of schooling, and those with eleven or more years of formal education. Thus the evidence does not show that NDP support is clearly (and negatively) associated with education.

Similarly, with the socio-economic status of the workers' occupations, consistent NDP support is highest among those workers intermediate in terms of the Blishen index (30.0 to 39.9). Thirty-one percent of these workers consistently support the NDP, compared to 20% of the workers in both the lower (20.0 to 29.9) and higher (40.0 and over) status occupations. Consistent non-NDP support is highest among the lowest status workers, at 70%, whereas 55% of the intermediate group,

\[ \chi^2 = 22.199, \text{ with } 4 \text{df (p<.001)}, \text{ Tau B = -.01 (n.s.)}. \] Consistent NDP support ranges, from low to high educational attainment, from 25%, through 38%, to 17%. Corresponding figures for consistent non-NDP support are 67%, 43%, and 66%.
and 56\% of the highest status workers fall into this category.\textsuperscript{27} None
of the major socio-economic indicators, therefore, show a pattern of
decreasing support for the New Democratic Party with increasing socio-
economic status among workers.

There are two other possible sources of variation in working-class
support for the NDP that have to be examined, religious and ethnic
differentiation, both of which have been held to be influential in party
choice in Canada.\textsuperscript{28} As far as religious differences among manual
workers are concerned, however, Table VII-8 shows that NDP support does
not vary according to the religious affiliation of the worker.

Table VII-8.--NDP support by religious affiliation (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Roman Catholic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consistent non-NDP</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floaters</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent NDP</td>
<td>26(100)</td>
<td>27(100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=166)</td>
<td>(N=162)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, etc. = 177.

\[ \chi^2 = 0.787, \text{ with } 2\text{df (n.s.)}. \quad \text{Tau C} = -0.02 (\text{n.s.}) \]

\textsuperscript{27}N = 374, \[ \chi^2 = 10.819, \text{ with } 4\text{df (p<0.05)}, \quad \text{Tau B} = 0.09 (p<0.01). \]
Both education and socio-economic status of current occupation show
significant chi-square association with NDP support, but the direction of
such differences as exist is not negative. Thus education shows an
insignificant Tau B correlation with NDP support, and socio-economic status
of occupation shows a moderate positive relationship with NDP support.

\textsuperscript{28}See, for example, McDonald, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 420.
There is practically no difference in the proportion of Protestant and Roman Catholics who support the NDP, but what is disguised in Table VII-8 is the difference in support for the other two parties between the two religious groupings. When consistent supporters of the three major parties are considered, religious differences are seen to play a part in the workers' party affiliations.

Table VII-9.--Consistent supporters of the three major parties by religious affiliation (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Roman Catholic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Conservative</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democrat</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=116)</td>
<td>(N=126)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, etc. = 263.

\[\chi^2 = 30.891, \text{ with } 2\text{df } (p<.001).\]

Again there is not a great deal of difference in the proportions of Protestant and Roman Catholic manual workers who support the NDP, but the Conservatives gain far more support from Protestants than Catholics, 38% of the former supporting that party compared to only 12% of the latter (these percentages being based only on those workers who consistently gave the same party identification on all four voting questions). Roman Catholic workers are strongly inclined to support the Liberal Party, the Liberals gaining the support of 54% of the Catholic workers represented in Table VII-9, whereas they only gain the support of 24% of the Protestant
workers. This finding is paralleled by McDonald's study of the 1968 Federal election in Ontario, where she found, for a cross-section of the Ontario electorate, that religious affiliation has a stronger influence on Liberal and Conservative voting than do class related factors, whereas the reverse is true of the NDP vote.29

Although the proportions of Roman Catholic and Protestant workers who consistently support the NDP are similar, the strength of the Liberals among Catholic workers means that the Liberal Party is the strongest party among the workers in this study. Thus the working-class vote does not split evenly between the three parties, and this, it would appear, lessens the chance for the NDP to have its candidates elected to office.

National origin is not related to the level of NDP support among manual workers in the four communities, for 27% of the Canadian born workers are consistent NDP supporters, a proportion almost identical to the 28% of foreign born workers who answered all four voting questions who consistently support that party.30 But NDP support among manual workers, as Table VII-10 shows, does vary according to the ethnic background of the workers concerned. Consistent NDP support is strongest among workers of British ethnicity, followed closely by those of French extraction. Workers whose ethnic background is other than of either the two charter groups, however, are much less likely to support the NDP,

29 Ibid.

30 N = 374, $\chi^2 = 0.139$, with 2df (n.s.), $\text{tau C} = .01$ (n.s.). The same result is found when comparing only those who consistently support one or other of the three major political parties (N = 274, $\chi^2 = 1.962$, with 2df [n.s.]).
17% so doing, compared to 30% of those of French ethnicity, and 33% of the workers of British ethnic background.

Table VII-10.--NDP support by ethnic background (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>British</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consistent non-NDP</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floaters</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent NDP</td>
<td>33(^{100})</td>
<td>30(^{100})</td>
<td>17(^{100})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=182)</td>
<td>(N=57)</td>
<td>(N=109)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, etc. = 157.
\[\chi^2 = 11.318, \text{ with } 4\text{df (p<.05)}.\]

Considering consistent non-NDP workers, the workers of British ethnicity are less likely to be in this category than the workers of either French or other ethnic backgrounds. None of the control variables applied throughout this thesis (including religious affiliation) explain these differences, but it is possible to look at the distribution of consistent support for the three major parties in order to gain some clues as to the reason for these ethnic differences.

Table VII-11 shows that both French Canadian and other non-British workers are most likely to support the Liberal Party; 59% of the French Canadian workers who consistently support one or other of the three political parties support the Liberal Party, and the same proportion of workers of other non-British ethnicities do the same. Among workers of British ethnic origin, the largest proportion, 45%, support the NDP,
Table VII-11. — Consistent supporters of the three major parties by ethnic background (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>British</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Conservative</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democrat</td>
<td>45(\frac{100}{133})</td>
<td>38(\frac{100}{45})</td>
<td>24(\frac{100}{79})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, etc. = 248.
\(\chi^2 = 43.948\), with 4 df (p < .001).

and support for the other two parties, although the Conservatives are stronger, is divided more equally than among the other ethnic groups. Traditionally the Liberal Party has been the party of the non-British, non-Protestant groups in Canada, and the figures presented in Table VII-11 show that this is true of the workers in this study. Particularly among the French Canadian workers, the worker who does not vote Liberal is still unlikely to vote for the Conservatives, but the hold that the Liberal Party has on the loyalties of workers of non-British ethnicity is stronger than that of any party among the workers of British origin. And the strength of the Liberal Party among workers of non-British ethnicity is one of the factors preventing the NDP from being the strongest political party among the workers in this study.

\(^{31}\) Alford, *Party and Society*, p. 258.
In the discussion of the sources of working-class support for the New Democratic Party it was found that all three factors focused upon throughout this thesis do have the hypothesized effect on political affiliation among manual workers. NDP support is highest among manual workers residing in Sudbury, the community that is most working-class in social composition. Likewise, workers who are members of trade unions, a major feature of the work situation faced by manual workers, are more likely to vote for the NDP than workers who do not belong to unions. And workers with the least contact with the non-manual world through marriage or friendship are more likely to support the NDP than workers with such contacts. The findings do, therefore, provide some support for the theoretical expectations outlined in Chapter I, but the fact remains that the NDP is not the choice of a majority of manual workers. Consideration of the configuration of factors discussed in this and other chapters may provide some clues as to why this is the case.

Situations conducive to unity and solidarity within the working-class, such as a predominantly working-class community environment or extensive union organization, co-exist with other situations and conditions that promote schisms within the working-class. Thus Sudbury, although it is predominantly working-class in social composition, is also characterized by high rates of geographical mobility, by ethnic diversity, and by religious differentiation. It has already been argued, in Chapter V, that the instability of the Sudbury population precludes the kinds of intense solidarity upon which the model of the "traditional proletarian"
is premised. It is highly probable that many workers bring with them to Sudbury attitudes and values nurtured in environments often very different from that faced in Sudbury, and this would be one factor possibly reducing the impact of the working-class milieux in engendering attitudes favourable to the NDP. Likewise, the fact that many workers in Sudbury are of non-British ethnicity, and that Roman Catholicism is the major religious denomination, would suggest that many workers are subject to cross-pressures; their class situation influencing them to support the NDP, while their ethnic and religious affiliations lead them to support the Liberal Party. In such a situation it is not surprising that the workers divide and that, consequently, support for the NDP is not as high as one might expect if one considered only the social class composition of the community. And Sudbury, in terms of class composition, union organization, and industrial structure would, under any circumstances, be a favourable milieu for the development of working-class politics. If NDP support in Sudbury is found only among a minority of workers (albeit that

32 There is, in Sudbury, the additional influence of the inter-union rivalries that occurred in the late 1950's and early 1960's, which led to the United Steelworkers of America replacing the International Union of Mine Mill and Smelter Workers as the bargaining agent for the manual workers employed by International Nickel. The NDP (previously the CCF) was involved in this struggle, at least tacitly, on the side of the Steelworkers, and the "Steel raids" left a legacy of bitterness, which added to the divisions among the workers of Sudbury. To what extent bitterness toward the Steelworkers led to a rejection of the NDP is difficult to assess, but interviews in Sudbury indicated that some workers still feel their loyalty to the NDP strained by its involvement in the labour struggles. For an account of the "Steel raids" see J.B. Lang, "A Lion in a Den of Daniels: a History of the International Union of Mine Mill and Smelter Workers in Sudbury, Ontario, 1942-1962", (M.A. Dissertation, University of Guelph, 1970).
the NDP is the strongest party among the workers), under conditions most suitable for the growth of a party based on the working-class, then it is hardly surprising that the NDP is not the political preference of a majority of workers in Ontario as a whole.

When it is also noted that one hundred and four of the one-hundred and ninety men who both reported their wife's occupation, and answered all four voting questions, are married to women who perform (or performed) non-manual occupations, it is clear that many workers are subjected to cross-pressures from this source as well. Their objective class position may incline them to support the NDP, but they also face influences from a different class milieu pressuring them to support a different political party.

Thus it appears that the countervailing influence of divisive factors prevents the elements centred upon in this thesis as sources of working-class "deviance" from the dominant values from having such a widespread influence among the workers in the four communities as to lead to majority support for the NDP. It is nonetheless true that workers who do support the NDP are more likely to be involved in the kinds of social relationships hypothesized as influencing the worker to support the party of the left. It remains to be seen, however, if NDP supporters see their support for the NDP as being based on class interests.

**NDP Support and Class Attitudes**

The assumption that has governed the analysis presented in this chapter is that the New Democratic Party is, of the major political
parties in Ontario, the party most closely aligned to working-class interests. The greater part of the support for the NDP comes from manual workers, and many trade unions maintain close ties with the party, but there is still the question of whether or not manual workers who support the NDP see their support in class terms.

The study respondents were asked to give their reasons for supporting the political party of their choice. The question was open-ended, with respondents being asked to write their replies in the space provided. The replies were examined and a code was developed to subsume the responses under a small number of categories. Table VII-12 shows the reasons given by the workers who replied to all four voting questions for their choice of political party, classifying workers by their support or non-support for the NDP.

Table VII-12 shows that 40% of the consistent NDP supporters say they vote for that political party because it best represents the interests of "working people" or the "working-class". This compares with only 4% of the consistent non-NDP workers, and 8% of the workers who float between supporting the NDP and other parties. Among the consistent NDP supporters this reason for party choice is by far the most frequently mentioned, the next most frequent being the need for a change in government. There are few NDP supporters who mention the qualities of party leaders or local candidates, only 1% citing this reason, compared to 10% of the floaters, and 18% of the consistent non-NDP voters. This in itself might suggest that consistent NDP supporters generally support this party for reasons related to social class, for de-emphasizing leadership qualities.
Table VII-12.--Reasons for party choice by NDP support (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Consistent non-NDP</th>
<th>Floaters</th>
<th>Consistent NDP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Best party for province, and/or Canada</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualities of leaders, and/or local candi­d­ates</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best party for working people, working-­class, etc.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for a change</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval of policies, and/or performance</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative reasons (e.g., &quot;best of a bad bunch&quot;)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=165)</td>
<td>(N=44)</td>
<td>(N=92)</td>
<td>(N=301)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes "family tradition, or habit" (6 cases), anti-socialist reasons (9 cases), and socialist reasons (5 cases). As the NDP is a democratic socialist party it would have been preferable to keep the last reason as a separate category, but the paucity of cases prevents this.

No answers, etc. = 204.

\[ \chi^2 = 100.523, \text{ with } 12 \text{ df} (p < .001). \]

may indicate that the party, and the things that it stands for, are the things that matter.

Fewer NDP supporters give as their reason for supporting the party that it best represents the needs of the province, or of Canada,
a reason that seems to reflect a more conservative frame of mind, in
that it would appear to assume that there is a general interest that
transcends sectional interests.

The evidence in Table VII-12, therefore, clearly indicates that
NDP supporters, much more than supporters of other political parties,
support that party because they see it as representing the interests of
people in a situation similar to themselves.

Further evidence that NDP supporters are more likely to see pol­
itics in terms of class division and social inequality is provided by
a comparison of the responses of NDP supporters and others to two quest­
ions, one concerning the nature of the Canadian political system, the
other the nature of industrial relations. Respondents were presented
with three statements presenting alternative conceptions of how Canada
is governed. One statement described Canada as a pluralist society, with
diverse interest groups all influencing political decisions. The
second statement described the political system in elite terms, stating
that political decision-making is in the hands of an elite made up of
corporate leaders, media operators, top church leaders, high civil servants,
and influential M.P.'s and senators. The third statement described the
Canadian political system in terms of a ruling class model, asserting
that the major political parties are dominated by the heads of the large
corporations. See question 4:63, Appendix C for the complete wording of this
question. The question was adapted from a similar one used by W.H. Form
and J. Rytina in a study in the U.S.A. The pluralist description is taken
verbatim from that study, while the other two statements were modified
slightly to take account of differences between the U.S.A. and Canada.
came closest to their view of the distribution of political power in Canada, and Table VII-13 shows the responses of manual workers to this question, classified by support for the NDP.

Table VII-13.--Conceptions of the distribution of political power in Canada by NDP support (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Consistent non-NDP</th>
<th>Floaters</th>
<th>Consistent NDP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pluralism</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite rule</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruling class</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=210)</td>
<td>(N=55)</td>
<td>(N=91)</td>
<td>(N=356)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, etc. = 149.

\[ \chi^2 = 36.218, \text{ with } 4 \text{df (}p<.001). \]

Consistent NDP supporters are the least likely to see the political system as a "market place" of competing interest groups, all with more or less equal influence on political decision making. Among consistent NDP supporters, only 21% see the political system in pluralist terms, compared to 29% of the workers who float between the NDP and other parties, and 52% of the consistent non-NDP supporters. The differences between the workers are not so great with regard to the proportions in each group who see the political system in elite terms. But 46% of the consistent NDP supporters see the political system as

being dominated by the big business interests, compared to 35% of the floaters, and only 19% of the consistent non-NDP workers. The worker who is most strongly committed to the NDP (at least in terms of electoral support) is the most likely to all workers to hold a view of the distribution of political power in Canada that is opposed to the conventional view of Canada as a pluralist democracy. And this provides further evidence that support for the NDP is an indication of "deviance" from the conventional wisdom of Canadian society, a conventional wisdom that often denies the salience of class as an arbiter of political power and influence in the society.

Respondents were also asked to indicate whether they believe that industrial relations are typically harmonious, that a company is like a football team where teamwork is to everyone's advantage, or whether they believe that teamwork in industry is impossible and that conflict between workers and management is an inevitable feature of industrial relations. While this is not strictly related to political matters, the question does provide some indication of whether or not workers see society in conflict terms. \(^{34}\) Table VII-14 shows the responses

\(^{34}\) See question 4:71, Appendix C, for the complete wording of this question. The question was adapted from one used by the authors of the affluent worker study. See J.H. Goldthorpe, D. Lockwood, F. Bechofer, and J. Platt, The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 73. The same question was asked by D. Wedderburn and R. Crompton in Workers' Attitudes and Technology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 43; and by S. Cottgrove and C. Vamplew, "Technology, Class and Politics: the Case of the Process Workers", Sociology, 6 (1972), pp. 171-172.
of the manual workers to this question, the workers being classified by level of support for the NDP.

Table VII-14.--Attitudes to industrial relations by NDP support (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Consistent non-NDP</th>
<th>Floaters</th>
<th>Consistent NDP</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;A company is like a football team...&quot;</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Teamwork in industry is impossible...&quot;</td>
<td>16 (N=215)</td>
<td>12 (N=56)</td>
<td>37 (N=90)</td>
<td>21 (N=361)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, etc. = 144.

\[ \chi^2 = 19.397, \text{ with } 2 \text{df} (p < .001), \text{ Tau C} = .15 (p < .001) \]

Less than one quarter of all workers included in Table VII-14 agreed that teamwork in industry is impossible. But this may be a conservative estimate of the numbers who regard industrial relations in terms of conflict, for agreement with the statement that a company is like a football team may express feelings about a desired state of affairs, not necessarily a description of current reality.\(^35\) Even if

\(^{35}\) In Goldthorpe, Lockwood, et al., op.cit., 65% of all manual workers expressed agreement with the teamwork option. In Wedderburn and Crompton, op.cit., the figure is 70%, while in Cottgrove and Vamplew, op.cit., the figures range from 53% to 85% depending on the region in which the worker lives.
this is the case, Table VII-14 still shows that proportionately more than twice as many consistent NDP supporters see industrial relations as conflictual as do either consistent non-NDP voters or workers who vary their political allegiances between the NDP and other parties. This provides further evidence that workers who consistently support the NDP are the most likely of all workers to reject the notions of social harmony propounded by groups with a more established interest in society.

Thus differences in reasons for party choice, views as to the nature of the political system, and attitudes toward industrial relations all indicate that working-class supporters of the NDP hold views that are more critical of the existing distribution of power and privilege in society than workers who fluctuate between support of the NDP and other parties, or those who consistently support parties other than the NDP. Support for the NDP does, therefore, involve a more critical orientation, and this finding supports the general thesis underlying this study, namely that working-class "deviance" will be greatest among those workers most involved in relationships that present structural barriers to the permeation of values associated with higher social classes.

The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the extent to which support for the New Democratic Party is associated with the class attitudes discussed earlier in this thesis, namely class identification, class models, and militancy. Table VII-15 shows the

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36 Ninety percent of the non-manual respondents in the four communities agreed with the teamwork option.
relationship between NDP support and class identification.

Table VII-15.--NDP support by class identification
(in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Middle-class</th>
<th>Working-class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consistent non-NDP</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floaters</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent NDP</td>
<td>18 (100)</td>
<td>34 (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, etc. = 164.

\[ \chi^2 = 9.454, \text{ with 2df (p<.01), Tau C} = .14 (p<.001). \]

Only 18% of the workers who claim middle-class status consistently support the NDP, compared to 34% of the men who identify as working class, while 67% of the middle-class identifiers consistently support other parties as against 54% of the working-class identifiers. 37

Thus there is a relationship between class identification and NDP voting but, as in the case of militancy and class identification, it is far from perfect. Over half the workers who claim to be working-class consistently support parties other than the NDP, which suggests that they do not feel sufficiently strongly about their class position to

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37 Considering consistent supporters of all three political parties, support for the Progressive Conservative, Liberal, and New Democrat parties among the middle-class identifiers is (proportionately) 28%, 45%, and 26%. Among working-class identifiers the figures are 21%, 35%, and 44%. Thus, among the working-class identifiers, the NDP is the single strongest party.
support the political party that is most clearly aligned to the organized labour movement.

Table VII-16. NDP support by choice of class model (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prestige model</th>
<th>Pecuniary or power model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consistent non-NDP</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floaters</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent NDP</td>
<td>27/100 (N=196)</td>
<td>28/101 (N=151)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No answers, etc. = 158.

$\chi^2 = 3.160$, with 2df (n.s.), Tau C = .06 (n.s.).

Table VII-16 shows that there is not a statistically significant relationship between the model of the class structure the worker adheres to and his propensity to support the NDP. Of those workers who selected the prestige model, 27% are consistent NDP supporters, whereas the comparable figure among those who chose either the pecuniary or power model is 28%. Those who selected the prestige model are slightly more likely to consistently support other political parties, but the difference is not large enough to reach statistical significance. Thus choice of class model is associated neither with class identification nor with political

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38. There are no significant differences when consistent supporters of the three parties are considered ($N = 252$, $\chi^2 = 1.203$, with 2df (n.s.)).
allegiance, although, as was shown in Chapter VI, the most militant workers are more likely to select either the pecuniary or power model than are less militant workers.

Table VII-17.--NDP support by militancy (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Militancy Level</th>
<th>Low Militancy</th>
<th>Medium Militancy</th>
<th>High Militancy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consistent non-NDP</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floaters</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent NDP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 43.875, \text{ with } 4 \text{df (p<.001)}, \text{ Tau B} = .30 \text{ (p<.001)} \]

Table VII-17 shows that militancy is quite highly associated with support for the NDP, with only 7% of the least militant workers being consistent supporters of the NDP, compared to 23% of those who rank among the intermediate group, and 46% of the most militant workers. In fact, among the most militant workers, consistent NDP supporters outnumber the workers who consistently support other parties. Put another way, 60% of the consistent NDP supporters are workers who rank high on the militancy score, compared to 25% of the consistent non-NDP voters. 39 The fact that militancy is the attribute most closely associated

39 Considering consistent supporters of the three parties, the least militant workers are fairly evenly divided between Conservative and Liberal supporters (48% and 42% respectively, the remaining 10% being New Democrats), support for the Conservatives declines in the intermediate
with support for the NDP would seem to support the argument presented both in this chapter and in Chapter VI, namely that differences between workers are more pronounced when they relate to attitudes at a more concrete level than those associated with class models and class identification.

The findings presented in Tables VII-15 to VII-17 further illustrate the argument put forward in Chapter VI, namely that the degree of "consistency" between the various attitudes indicating working-class "deviance" is not perfect. Thus, although class identification is associated with NDP voting, over half of the workers who identify as working-class support parties other than the NDP. The fact that there is no significant association between NDP support and choice of class model again suggests that many workers who adopt a prestige model do not hold to either a "deferential" or "middle-class" variant of such a model. And, although militancy is the attitude most strongly related to NDP support, it is still true that over two fifths of the most militant workers consistently support one or other of the parties that are more closely aligned with the dominant ideological ethos associated with more dominant groups in Canadian society.

The level of "inconsistency" between the various indicators of working-class "deviance" from the dominant cultural values suggests that, although the factors centred upon in this thesis do have an

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group (the percentages being 18%, 48%, and 34%), and then support for the Liberals declines among the most militant workers (the percentages being 13%, 30%, and 58%).
influence on the attitudes of manual workers, leading them to a more clearly "working-class" perspective, their influence is not strong enough, in many instances, to counteract the influences emanating from the dominant culture. It may be suggested, therefore, that the relative weakness of the structural supports for working-class "deviance" is one of the factors contributing to the fact that democratic socialism, although based on the working-class, does not gain the allegiance of the majority of manual workers in the four communities.

**Summary**

It was argued that, although the NDP does not gain the support of a majority of manual workers in Ontario, the fact that the major part of the support that the NDP does receive comes from manual workers suggests that this party, more than the other major parties in Ontario, would be the party least attuned to the values of the dominant culture in Ontario. It was predicted, therefore, that those workers most involved in the kinds of relationships acting as barriers to the influence of the dominant culture would be the most likely of all workers to support the New Democratic Party. In a comparison of workers who consistently support the NDP with those who float between the NDP and other parties, and those who consistently support other parties, it was found that NDP support was, as expected, highest among those workers residing in Sudbury, the most working-class of the four communities. Union membership was the element of work situation most strongly associated with support for the NDP, and white-collar affiliations (in the form of
being married to a woman who performed a high status occupation) were found to influence the worker away from supporting the NDP.

Thus, although the majority of workers do not consistently support the NDP, variation in NDP support among manual workers does follow the expected pattern. Socio-economic factors such as income, education, and the socio-economic status of the workers' occupations were not found to be negatively associated with NDP support, a further illustration that a simple embourgeoisement hypothesis does not contribute greatly to the explanation of differences in working-class attitudes toward class and politics. It was also found that, although religious differences influence the worker in his support of the Conservative and Liberal parties, the NDP received support from about the same proportions of Catholic and Protestant workers. But ethnicity was found to be associated with NDP support, with NDP support highest among men of British ethnicity, and lowest among workers from ethnic backgrounds of other than either of the two charter groups. The strength of the Liberal Party among Catholic workers, and among workers of non-British ethnicity, lessens the possibility of the NDP returning elected representatives, it was suggested, because the working-class vote does not split evenly between the three parties. It was also argued that ethnicity and religious affiliation are likely to weaken the NDP by creating cross-pressures on workers, counteracting the influence of the social structural factors that might incline them to support the NDP.

It was demonstrated that supporters of the NDP are more likely to see politics in class terms. NDP supporters were far more likely than
supporters of other parties to see their support for the NDP in class terms; were more likely to see the political system as controlled by corporate leaders; and they were more likely to see industrial relations as conflictual. The chapter concluded with a discussion of the relationship between NDP support and the other attitudes discussed throughout this thesis. It was found that there are no significant differences in party support between workers who selected the prestige model and those who chose either the pecuniary or power models. But workers who identified as working-class, and those who are among the most militant workers, are significantly more inclined to support the NDP. The lack of complete consistency between the various indicators of working-class "deviance" was attributed to the relative weakness of the structural barriers to the influence of the dominant cultural values among the workers in the four communities studied.
CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study grew out of a concern with the observation that working-class individuals, even though they share a common objective class situation, do not all share similar attitudes on issues related to social inequality, class, and politics. A review of the literature suggested that one of the primary sources of differences in working-class attitudes is the extent to which manual workers are involved in primarily working-class milieux. Parkin's analysis of working-class Conservatism was taken as the basis for a theoretical framework within which to study variation in working-class attitudes.¹ The basic argument is that a distinctly "working-class" perspective is, in a sense, "deviant" from the dominant values existing in a largely capitalistic society. Such working-class "deviance", if it is to develop, requires that a worker be involved in a series of social relationships that act as barriers to the influence of the wider culture and permit the development of such a "deviant" perspective. Such a perspective, it was suggested, develops out of the worker's experiences in the community, at work, and in his friendship and kinship networks. The more the relationships the

worker is involved in are with other working-class people the more, it was hypothesized, the worker would adopt such a "deviant" perspective. The indicators of such "deviancy" examined in this thesis are class identification, class models, militancy, and party allegiance.

A questionnaire survey was conducted in four Ontario communities which differ in terms of occupational composition and industrial structure. It was hoped that selecting communities that differed in characteristics expected to influence the attitudes of workers would provide a sample that was adequate for the analysis of such community effects, and of other factors expected to influence workers' attitudes toward social class and related matters.

What follows is a brief summary of the main findings of this study, concentrating on each structural barrier separately.

The four aspects of working-class attitudes examined in this study are class identification, choice of class model, militancy, and support for the New Democratic Party. The influence of community structure on these attitudes is not uniform. It was expected that working-class identification among manual workers would vary with the degree to which the community's male labour force was comprised of manual workers, but community variations in the level of working-class identification among manual workers were, in fact, quite small.

Differences in choice of class model did not follow the expected pattern. It was predicted that the workers of Sudbury would be most likely to select the power model, that the Hamilton workers would be the most likely to choose the pecuniary model, and that the prestige model
would be chosen in the highest proportions by the workers of Ottawa and Lindsay. In fact the prestige model was chosen by a majority of all the workers, and only in Sudbury did less than half the workers indicate their agreement with this description of the stratification system. Not only this, but the power model (chosen by only a minority of workers) was not chosen in greater proportions by the Sudbury workers. The Ottawa workers did rank among those workers most likely to select the prestige model, but the Hamilton workers, contrary to expectations, were the most likely of all to choose this model. And the Lindsay workers, again contrary to expectations, were among the most likely, together with those in Sudbury, to select the pecuniary model.

It was suggested that two factors seem to account for the fact that the class composition of the communities was not associated with class identification and choice of class model in the expected manner. These factors are the extensive geographical mobility among the workers, and the ethnic composition of the communities. Even in Lindsay, for example, over half the workers did not reside in that community at age sixteen. And, more importantly, there was extensive in-migration among the community's occupational elite; thus removing one pre-condition of working-class deference, namely a long established local elite. This, it was argued, meant that the prestige model was no more likely to be the choice of the Lindsay workers than of those in the other communities. In Hamilton, on the other hand, extensive geographical mobility was expected to incline the workers toward privatization and the choice of the pecuniary model. But it was suggested that the ethnic differentiation of
the community, combined with its comparative occupational heterogeneity, may create another basis for differentiating between people, and thus enhance the salience of the prestige model. More generally it was argued that the extensive geographical mobility among manual workers may weaken the influence of the community on the worker's attitudes. It was also suggested that where a community is both occupationally heterogeneous and ethnically diversified (as in Ottawa and Hamilton) the tendency to select the prestige model is particularly strong. Where only ethnic diversity (as in Sudbury) or occupational heterogeneity (as in Lindsay) typifies the community, it was suggested that the pressure toward acceptance of the prestige model is not as strong and, hence, more workers would opt to describe the class system in pecuniary terms.

Thus geographical mobility and ethnic differentiation, it would appear, weaken the influence of community class structure on workers' class identifications and choices of class models. In the instances of militancy, and support for the NDP, however, community differences were found to comply more with the expectations derived from the theoretical considerations outlined in Chapter I. The workers of Sudbury were the most likely to score high on the militancy index, while the lowest level of militancy was found among the Ottawa workers. However, the Lindsay workers were, on average, more militant than the Hamilton men. It was suggested that the lower level of militancy among the Hamilton workers may be the result of the fact that Hamilton, being a more diversified community than Lindsay, has a more internally diversified working-class. But overall it does appear that militancy among workers varies with the
social class compositions of the communities they reside in. When support for the NDP was examined, there were no exceptions - support for the NDP among manual workers was found to be higher in those communities with larger proportions of their labour forces in manual occupations.

It was suggested that, at the more abstract levels of class identification and choice of class model, community differences (due to the countervailing influences of geographical mobility and ethnic differentiation) do not appear strong enough to influence workers' attitudes, but at the more concrete level attained with the questions making up the index of militancy, and with party support, community differences are still strong enough to influence the workers. Thus community differences are seen to have some influence on workers' attitudes but, at the more abstract, ideological level, countervailing influences operate to curtail their impact. ²

The second structural barrier focused upon was that provided by the work situation of manual workers. The most important element of work situation found to be associated with differences in working-class attitudes was the trade union. Trade union members were found to be more

²It might be suggested that community differences are more pronounced in the cases of militancy and support for the NDP because the class identification and class models questions are inadequate. However, it has been seen that the expected variation in class identification did exist in other instances (such as union membership and wife's occupation), which would indicate that the pre-coded class identification question did indeed serve its purpose. In the case of the class models question, there was community variation in choice of class models (which became clearer when country of birth was controlled for), but the variation did not follow the expected pattern. The form of the question was dictated by the need to test Lockwood's discussion of class imagery. At the very least, the responses to the question indicate that Lockwood's typology of working-class images of the class structure is inadequate; in particular, the study indicates that a worker may envision the stratification system in prestige terms without adhering to a deferential or middle-class variant of such a class model.
likely than their non-unionist counterparts to identify as working-class, to be among the most militant workers, and to support the New Democratic Party. Union members were also, against expectations, more likely to select the prestige model. But the association was only weak, and, once controls were introduced, differences in choice of class model between union members and non-unionists were found to be restricted to workers employed in transport or outside work. Even here, such differences appeared attributable to the fact that union members in this work setting are in a far more favourable economic position than non-unionists. But even allowing for this it is still true that union members in other work settings were no less likely to select the prestige model, and this raises the probability, reinforced by an examination of the inter-relationships of the four attitude variables, that adherence to a prestige model need not imply either working-class deference or a middle-class image of the class structure.

In the instances of class identification, militancy, and support for the NDP, union membership is one of the factors most strongly associated with these attitudes. Union membership is, of the influences found in this study, the second strongest factor affecting a worker's class identification, and it is the strongest single attribute related to militancy and support for the NDP. None of the other work situation variables examined in this thesis bear such a close relationship to the attitudes of manual workers. Thus plant size did not show any great association with workers' attitudes. Choice of class model was not found to be significantly associated with the size of plant in which
the worker is employed. And, although class identification, militancy, and support for the NDP were found to be significantly associated with plant size, the direction of the relationship was not monotonic, and workers in the very largest plants, contrary to indications from other studies, were among the more conservative of the workers who replied to this survey. It was suggested that the relative conservatism of the workers employed in the largest plants may be attributable to the fact that these workers are the most economically prosperous of all the workers, and probably enjoy the greatest job security, and that this may incline them to a more conservative position. Even here, once differences in the degree of unionization were taken into account, differences in levels of support for the NDP largely disappeared. Thus this study found no clear indication that increasing plant size necessarily leads to a radicalization of workers. What does appear to be the case is that plant size does have a minor influence in this direction but that, in the very largest plants, this is counteracted by the greater economic security offered.

Differences in the type of workplace workers are employed in do not appear to be consistently (or strongly) related to differences in work attitudes. Thus workers employed in transport or outside work were more likely to identify as working-class than were workers employed in factories, production plants, and workshops, or in mines. They were also found to be more likely to select the prestige model, although this difference only applied to high income union members employed in this work setting. On the other hand, when militancy and support for the NDP were considered, transport or outside workers did not differ significantly
from factory workers, but rather the men engaged in mining stood out as
being more militant, and as being stronger in their support for the NDP.
The greater militancy of the miners was attributed to the oft-noted
cohesiveness of work groups in such a work setting. In the instance of
the stronger support for the NDP, however, this seemed to be explained
largely by the fact that all but one of the miners reside in Sudbury,
where support for the NDP is strong among men employed in all work
settings. There is not, therefore, any consistency in variations in
workers' attitudes as they relate to differences in type of workplace,
and most of what variation there is can be explained by the introduction
of third factors.

The other work situation variable considered was the primary
determinant of the speed at which the worker works. Workers who control
the speed at which they work were more likely than workers whose work
speed is determined by external factors to identify as middle-class, and
to be among the less militant workers. It was argued, on the basis of
evidence presented by Blauner,³ that it is likely that workers who them­
selves control the speed at which they work are less estranged from their
work than are those whose work speed is dictated by some external factor,
and it was suggested that this difference may carry over into their att­
titudes regarding the world beyond work. NDP support, however, was not
found to be significantly associated with determinant of work speed,

³R. Blauner, Alienation and Freedom, (Chicago: University of
although there was a slight tendency for NDP support to be higher among those who do not control their work speed. And there was no association between determinant of work speed and choice of class model.

Thus, in this study, the element of work situation found to be most associated with differences in the attitudes of manual workers toward social class, and politics, is the trade union. Trade union membership influences the worker to adopt a "deviant" orientation toward class, and politics, leading him to a perspective different from the dominant value perspectives of Canadian society which, as John Porter points out, are basically middle-class in derivation and content. 4

The other barrier to the influence of the dominant cultural values that was focused upon in this thesis is the lack of any significant involvement by the worker in social relationships with people from the white-collar world. It was found that the strongest single white-collar influence on the worker's attitudes is to be found in his marriage to a woman who has (or had) a high status occupation. It was seen that workers whose wives' current or previous occupations rank high on the Blisshen socio-economic index of occupations are the most likely to identify as middle-class, to be among the least militant workers, and to support political parties other than the NDP. In all three instances, marriage to a woman with a higher status occupational history (i.e., non-manual) is one of the factors most strongly related

to a "non-deviant" perspective. In the case of class models, however, wife's occupation was not found to be significantly associated with type of model selected.

Although marriage into a white-collar environment is the strongest affiliation variable, another indication of the conservative influence of white-collar affiliations is provided by the fact that workers whose best friends are engaged in high status occupations were found to be less likely than those with friends of a lower socio-economic status to identify as working-class, score high on the militancy index, or (although only marginally) support the NDP. The social origin of the worker, in the sense of his father's occupation, did not, however, appear to be related to his attitudes toward social class, and politics. But the evidence provided by the instances of wife's and best friend's occupations is clear: affiliation with the white-collar world through marriage or friendship is one of the most potent factors inducing the worker to adopt values and attitudes more "appropriate" to people in the non-manual category.

Socio-economic differences among manual workers were not found to play a very significant role in accounting for variations in attitudes. Only in the case of class identification was there evidence that high income among workers is associated with their adoption of a more middle-class perspective, in that high income showed a moderate relationship with middle-class identification. But socio-economic attributes showed no significant association with either choice of class model or level of militancy, and, in the case of political allegiances, the workers
in the most favourable economic position were seen to be more likely to support the New Democratic Party than their less prosperous brethren.

It was concluded, therefore, that a simple embourgeoisement thesis, seeking to account for variations in workers' attitudes by arguing that the more affluent workers will hold attitudes closer to those held by non-manual workers than those held by less affluent manual workers, found little support in the evidence provided by the four communities study.

In addition to the aforementioned influences on workers' attitudes the study found no other factors that were as closely related to variation in such attitudes. Thus foreign born workers were found to be more likely than Canadian born workers to both identify as working-class and select the prestige model. It was thought that, as most of the foreign born workers come from European societies, the fact that the societies foreign born workers hail from are, at least in the popular mind, more class stratified than Canada would suggest that these workers would be more likely to be aware of the "language of class", and that this could account for such differences. At the more concrete level, however, country of origin was not found to be associated with either level of militancy or support for the NDP. It would appear, therefore, that although foreign born workers are, for example, more willing to claim to be working-class this, in itself, does not incline them to a more radical perspective in other matters.

Neither religious affiliation nor ethnic background were found to show any association with class identification, choice of class models, or militancy. Both, however, do have some influence on the political preferences
of the manual workers in the four communities. In terms of religious affiliation, there are no differences in the proportions of Protestant and Catholic workers supporting the NDP, but it was found that, among workers who consistently support parties other than the NDP, Protestant workers incline toward the Progressive Conservative Party, whereas Catholics tend strongly toward the Liberals. Workers of British ethnicity were found to be the most likely to support the NDP, followed fairly closely by those of French extraction, but NDP support was low among workers from other ethnic backgrounds. It was also found that workers of non-British ethnicity who do not support the NDP are strongly inclined to support the Liberal Party. It was suggested that the fact that non-British, non-Protestant workers who do not support the NDP are most likely to support the Liberal Party has negative consequences for the electoral chances of the NDP, in that the working-class vote does not split fairly evenly between the three parties (which would increase the NDP's chances of electoral success). It was also suggested that ethnicity and religious affiliation may exert cross-pressures on the worker whose class situation inclines him to support the NDP. Thus the Sudbury worker, for example, resides in a largely working-class community, and is likely a member of a trade union, and both these considerations would suggest that he is a supporter of the NDP. But, on the other hand, many Sudbury workers are of non-British ethnicity and are Roman Catholics, and, in such a situation, it is likely that class factors are counteracted by the influence of ethnicity and religion.
The results of the study show, therefore, that the theoretical considerations outlined in Chapter I do, to a certain extent, apply in the context of Ontario. By and large the factors centred upon as sources of variation in working-class attitudes toward social class were found to be the factors that were most strongly associated with differences in class attitudes among the workers in the four communities. But the general strength of the relationships indicates that the influence of the structural barriers to the permeation of the dominant culture among manual workers in Ontario is limited. Thus, for example, differences in the class structures of the communities studied do not have as great a relationship with variations in working-class attitudes as might be expected if one only considered the class and industrial compositions of these communities. But when account is also taken of the extent of geographical mobility among workers residing in these communities, and (in the cases of all the communities save Lindsay) the additional differentiating factor of ethnicity, it is understandable why differences in the class structures of the communities do not lead to greater differences in attitudes between the working-class residents of the four communities. That Sudbury, for example, has a large working-class population would suggest the possibility that workers in the community would express attitudes similar to those expected of "traditional proletarians". But Sudbury is also an ethnically diversified community, and, in addition, the majority of Sudbury workers were not raised in that community. It would appear that one of the preconditions for the development of
"traditional proletarianism" would be a sufficient stability of population to allow the kinds of solidarity ties out of which such a perspective develops. With such high rates of geographical mobility among workers it would appear unlikely that communal solidarity would be strong enough to lead to such a perspective among working-class residents of the community. And ethnic differentiation would be another influence with likely divisive consequences and, hence, would further weaken the ties of solidarity upon which the development of "traditional proletarianism" depends. Thus, even in Sudbury, whose workers were found to be the most likely to hold attitudes which "deviate" from the status quo, there is by no means a consensus among workers on issues related to social inequality, social class, or politics, and many workers adhere to views more in line with those of people higher in the social hierarchy.

The example of Sudbury provides a good illustration of the obstacles to the development of consensus among the working-class in Ontario. For there to be consensus among workers, particularly for there to be consensus around a set of values which, in a number of crucial ways, challenge the existing system of rewards and privileges in society, there has to be a solid basis of similar conditions and experiences among the workers. It was shown in Chapter I that, even in societies where social class differences play a significant part in social life, dissensus exists among members of the working-class, and this dissensus is at least partly attributable to differences in the types of relationships workers are involved in in the community, at work, and in their kinship and friendship networks. This study has
shown that the same types of factors operate in the Ontario context, but it has also shown that these structural sources of dissensus appear to be particularly widespread in Ontario. The consequence is that a consistent "deviant" working-class perspective is found only among a minority of the workers in the four communities.

It has been shown that important factors in influencing the worker to adopt a "non-deviant" perspective are kinship and friendship affiliations that encompass people who have performed non-manual occupations. Of the men who reported their wife's current or previous occupation, over half were married to women who had, at one time or another, been employed in white-collar occupations. Where such a large number of manual workers are subject to the influence of the non-manual world it is likely that, even if they are also involved in working-class relationships in the community and at work, they will be subject to cross-pressures; cross-pressures which may result in them holding "inconsistent" attitudes or adopting the value perspectives of more privileged classes. When it is also noted that, at least in this study, the factors of geographical mobility and ethnic differentiation appear to weaken the solidarity ties that exist in even the most class homogeneous community, this would suggest that one counter-influence to the permeation of the dominant culture is greatly weakened. Especially in the case of the worker who maintains some form of white-collar affiliation, this again would increase the likelihood of the worker either espousing an "inconsistent" set of beliefs or adopting the middle-class norm.

The adoption by manual workers of a "deviant" perspective appears
to be contingent upon their being supported in such "deviance" by the structural barriers to the influence of the dominant culture. It would also seem that such structural barriers are mutually reinforcing, so that removal of one or more of these barriers would lessen the likelihood that the worker will, in fact, adhere to "deviant" attitudes. It has been suggested that, even where a community, such as Sudbury, is predominately working-class in social composition, the combined processes of geographical mobility and ethnic differentiation have weakened (although, it seems, not entirely removed) one such barrier to the influence of the dominant culture. And the fairly extensive contact that many manual workers have with the white-collar world further allows the permeation of the dominant values within the working-class. The most important influence found in this study that leads the worker to a more "deviant" perspective is his involvement in the industrial sub-culture of the working-class, more precisely his membership of a trade union. But unionization among manual workers in Ontario is not as extensive as in some other societies⁵ (even in this study, which included workers in two highly unionized communities, about one-third of the workers were not members of a trade union), so the extent of the influence of this barrier is restricted. But where trade unions exist, they do exert an

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⁵In 1966, 9.4% of the total population of Ontario were members of trade unions. In the same year (although, because they include areas probably not so industrialized as Ontario, the figures are not strictly comparable) similar figures for other societies were 9.0% in the U.S.A., 18.6% in the United Kingdom, and 28.4% in Sweden. Source: Canada Department of Labour, Union Growth in Canada, 1921-1967, (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970), p. 76, Tables VB and VC.
influence on their members' attitudes and, has been noted several times, among the workers in this study membership of a trade union is the most important influence leading to a more distinctive "working-class" orientation among manual workers.

Thus, in this study, factors in the industrial milieux of manual workers create the most successful barrier to the total permeation among the working-class of values more "appropriately" held by members of more privileged social classes. But the weakness of the other two structural barriers leads to a restriction of the dispersion of a more "proletarian" orientation, and subjects the worker to cross-pressures which, as has been seen in the analysis of the inter-relationships of the attitudes examined in this thesis, may lead him to adopt attitudes which are not consistently divergent from those held by people in the higher social strata.

One of the concerns underlying the formation of this research was the observation that the Ontario working-class did not provide the kind of support for Canada's major left-wing party, the New Democratic Party, that the working-classes of other industrialized societies provide for parties of the left. It is not suggested that only those factors discussed in this thesis account for the weakness of social democracy in Ontario, and in Canada generally. But the findings of this study would suggest that one of the reasons why the New Democratic Party does not gain the support of the majority of manual workers in Ontario is that the consciousness among manual workers that they share a class interest that is distinct from that of the more privileged groups is not
particularly widespread in this province. One cause of the lack of such a widespread consciousness of shared class interests is the relative weakness of the structural barriers to the influence of the dominant culture that have been discussed throughout this thesis. The trade union movement emerges as the most important factor influencing manual workers to support the political party most clearly identified with the interests of the organized working-class. That its influence is not strong enough to lead to a majority of manual workers supporting the NDP appears to be partly attributable to the weakness of the other structural supports for working-class "deviance" from the dominant culture, a "deviance" which, according to Parkin, includes left-wing voting. But without the trade union connection it appears safe to assert that the prospects of social democracy in Ontario would be bleak indeed.
APPENDIX A
RESEARCH PROCEDURES

The data which are analysed in this thesis were collected in the course of a larger survey being conducted by Professors F.E. Jones and P.C. Pineo of McMaster University, and Professor J. Porter of Carleton University. They were interested in carrying out a major study of occupational mobility in Canada, and their research funds allowed for a substantial pre-test of a questionnaire that would be administered to a national sample of the Canadian population. In return for assisting in the administration of the survey I had the opportunity to include a number of questions that related to my research interests.

The pre-test questionnaire was administered in the cities of Hamilton, Sudbury, Ottawa, and Hull. The replies from workers in Hull were not considered in this thesis because I was interested in the attitudes of workers in the four communities I selected because of their class compositions and industrial structures. The pre-test did not include Lindsay so the questionnaire was administered in that community at a later date.

Because I was interested in the attitudes of manual workers in a variety of community and work settings my study required a fairly large case base. With the limited resources at my disposal it would have not been possible to hire people to conduct interviews, and, because of the need for a large case base, it would have been impractical
for me to obtain sufficient numbers of interviews working on my own. A questionnaire survey offered the only realistic possibility of contacting sufficient numbers of people to provide the information I required. Two thousand, five hundred and ninety-eight questionnaires were mailed to Ottawa, Hamilton, and Sudbury, while a further 931 were sent to Lindsay, making a total of 3,529 questionnaires. Even though I was only interested in the replies of manual workers, my association with the mobility pre-test provided a large sample for my analysis.

I conducted pilot interviews in Hamilton with the purpose of testing questions that I hoped to include on the final questionnaire, and also made field trips to Sudbury and Lindsay to gain background information on the communities and (in Sudbury) to conduct more pilot interviews. In addition to the pilot surveys related specifically to my research, two minor pre-tests were conducted for the mobility survey, the primary motive being to develop adequate questions for eliciting the respondent's occupation and the type of industry he was employed in. Both pre-tests were conducted in Hamilton, and both were in questionnaire format. The second pre-test also afforded the opportunity to compare the yields from a drop-off questionnaire and from a mailed questionnaire, and also to find out whether a telephone follow-up produced a greater response than a mailed postcard.

Two hundred names were selected at random from the Hamilton City Directory, one hundred people to receive the mailed questionnaire while the other hundred were to be visited by a person who was to deliver a questionnaire. The persons delivering questionnaires were instructed to call back if no one answered and only after three attempts
were they to leave the questionnaire without making contact. The post office returned four of the mailed questionnaires because the recipient had moved, so ninety-six people received the mailed questionnaire, whereas eighty-nine people received the drop-off version, the other eleven people either having moved or refused to accept the questionnaire.

First-wave response rates were 37% for the mailed questionnaire, and 45% for the drop-off. For the follow-up campaign, half the people who had not returned the questionnaire, in both the mail and drop-off samples, were sent another questionnaire with a request that they complete and return it. The other people were telephoned by myself or another graduate student and asked to return a completed questionnaire or, if the original had been misplaced, whether they would accept another copy.

Among the people who had received the mailed questionnaire, the mail follow-up produced a further 5% response, while the telephone follow-up yielded a further 10%. With the group who received the drop-off questionnaire, the mail follow-up yielded a further 7% response, while the telephone follow-up produced a further 11%. Thus the drop-off questionnaire produced a better response than the mailed questionnaire. The difference in success between the telephone and mailed follow-ups was more marked among those who received the mailed questionnaire than among those who received the drop-off questionnaire. So it would appear that some kind of personal contact, even over the phone, produces a better response rate than does contact solely by mail.

On the basis of the actual return rates it is possible to est-
imate the response we would have achieved, in both the mailed and drop-off surveys, if all the follow-ups had been either telephone or mailed. With the drop-off questionnaire, assuming that all people who received a follow-up were telephoned and that they responded in the same proportions as those who in fact were telephoned, this would have added 21% to the response achieved on the first-wave, producing a total response rate of 66%. If, on the other hand, all the follow-ups had been by mail, this would have added 19%, producing a total response rate of 64%. Thus, with a drop-off questionnaire, the telephone follow-up would not have greatly increased the response rate. But with the mailed questionnaire a telephone follow-up to all those who did not reply on the first-wave, again assuming the same response rate as the achieved from those who were actually telephoned, would have added 19% to the first-wave response, producing a total response rate of 56%. A completely mailed follow-up, on the other hand, would have added 10%, giving a total response of 47%. The pilot survey suggested, therefore, that with a mailed questionnaire a telephone follow-up could add to the response rate by 9% over that of a mailed follow-up.

Although a drop-off questionnaire would probably have produced a larger response rate, it was decided to opt for a mailed questionnaire survey. A large case base was required by all the participants in the mobility pre-test, and the additional cost of a drop-off questionnaire meant that the extra yield in terms of response rate would have been more than offset by the reduced sample size that the drop-off method would have necessitated. But it was decided to conduct a telephone follow-up, as the experience of the Hamilton pre-test suggested that
this method, as opposed to a mail follow-up, could improve the response rate by a reasonable proportion.

In a combined research project such as this it was not possible for every participant to include every question they might wish. After all attempts were made to trim down the questionnaire it still contained 187 questions, which would have meant a questionnaire of 17 pages. To reduce the size of the questionnaire, two versions were formulated, with 37 questions (not related to my research) being divided between the two versions, 19 questions being allocated to an "A" form and 18 to a "B" form. The remaining questions were included in both versions. Half of the respondents were to receive the "A" form, while the "B" form was to be sent to the rest. Even with this economy of space the questionnaires were still fourteen pages in length (not including the introductory letter).

The questionnaire was also translated into French by Professor Georges Potvin, of the Department of Geography at McMaster University. A number of crucial questions were also translated by a translator working with Professor Jacques Brazeau of the University of Montreal, and the two versions compared. Finally the whole translation was studied by Mrs. Claudette Lamy, a French Canadian with translating experience.

The major reason for the translation was that the questionnaire could then be administered in Hull. But copies of the questionnaire in French were also mailed out in Ottawa and Sudbury.

For all communities save Lindsay the samples were drawn from the alphabetical section of City Directories. The alphabetical section
lists all adult residents over the age of eighteen, hence it was more suitable than the street section which only lists the head of the household and spouse. The number of pages in the alphabetical section were divided by the number of respondents required in each community, giving the number of names to be drawn from each page. As the other study participants required a substantial French Canadian sub-sample it was decided to draw larger samples in Hull and Sudbury. When the pages from which the names were to be drawn were determined, the names were drawn at random by consulting a list of random numbers and counting down the names until the required number was reached. As only men were to be drawn in the sample, every time a female name was encountered it was ignored and the next male name was selected.

With the Lindsay sample no City Directory was available so the sample was drawn from the Municipal Assessment Rolls. With the budget at my disposal I could sample about nine hundred people in Lindsay. There were approximately 5,500 listings in the Lindsay Assessment Rolls so the first respondent was selected at random, on the first page of the Assessment Rolls, and then every sixth name was drawn. As the Rolls did not list business premises separately from residences, every time a business premises were encountered it was ignored and the next residential listing was drawn.

The final sample sizes were 1040 for Hull, 1000 for Sudbury, 800 for Hamilton, 798 for Ottawa, and 931 for Lindsay. The questionnaires to all communities save Lindsay, were mailed out between July 7 and July 9, 1971, and included with the questionnaire was a return envelope with guaranteed postage. Only the English version was sent
out in Hamilton, whereas both English and French questionnaires were mailed out in the other communities. The language used by the respondent was assumed from his surname. This was bound to lead to errors, but we were reasonably confident that any such errors could be rectified in the follow-up campaign. As an additional safeguard, where there was any doubt, both the English and French versions were sent to the respondent. The Lindsay questionnaire was mailed out between March 14 and March 17, 1972, and only the English version was administered in that community.

In discussing the response to the questionnaire survey I shall concentrate on the four communities that I was interested in, ignoring the response from Hull.

Because of the lag between the time information is collected for city directories and assessment rolls and the time a sample is drawn, it is to be expected that some people will have moved by the time the questionnaire is mailed to them. The post office returned a total of 268 undelivered questionnaires that were not delivered to the respondent because he had moved or was not known at the address given. What was unexpected was the divergence in the numbers undeliverable in the different communities. Only five questionnaires were returned undelivered from Hamilton, 8 from Ottawa, and 11 from Sudbury. On the other hand, 136 questionnaires were returned undeliverable from Lindsay. These figures are difficult to accept, as they yield percentage rates (of the total numbers sent to each community) ranging from 0.6% from Hamilton to 14.6% for Lindsay. There is some check
provided from the telephone follow-ups (which were conducted in all communities except Lindsay) from those people who were listed in the city directories (and their telephone given) but who were untraceable at the time of the telephone follow-up. There were 88 such cases in Hamilton, and 113 in Sudbury. In Ottawa the follow-up personnel included those cases where the respondent had died in their figures, but it seems fair to assume that these cases made up a relatively small part of the total figure, and there were 108 people in the Ottawa sample for whom we had telephone numbers but could not trace.

Post Office policy with letters addressed to people who move is, for the first ninety days after they have moved, to forward mail to them at their new address. After that, if there is a return address on the envelope, it is returned to the sender. The only exception is with advertising or promotional literature, where mail will only be returned to the sender if there is a specific request printed on the envelope. Failing this the mail is sent to the "dead letter" department. However, on inquiring at the Hamilton Post Office, I was informed that their practice with second and third class mailings from large organizations is to "kill" any undeliverable mail unless there is (in addition to the sender's address) a specific request to return it. As the questionnaire bore the McMaster University imprint it appears likely that the undeliverable questionnaires from Hamilton were consigned to the "dead letter" department. This disjunction between rules and practice apparently stems from the desire of large organizations not to pay return postage on undeliverable mail when they
undertake a general mailing. What is true of Hamilton may very well be true of Ottawa and Sudbury, and may explain the different rates of undeliverable mail received by us.

As not all the people in the samples had telephones it is likely that this is a conservative estimate of the people who did not receive a questionnaire. However it cannot legitimately be assumed, either, that all those people who could not be contacted during the telephone follow-up did not, in fact, receive a questionnaire, for it is likely, in at least some cases, that the questionnaires were forwarded to their new addresses. To ensure that only those people who definitely did not receive a questionnaire are removed from the sample it is necessary to restrict ourselves to cases where the Post Office returned the questionnaires as undeliverable. As this errs on the conservative side, and places the response rate at the lowest possible figure, it would appear to be the most appropriate method. But is also fair to say that it is likely that the true response rate is somewhat better than the one reported. Removing those cases where the questionnaires were returned undeliverable, the revised total target sample size is 3,369 persons.

Two weeks after the questionnaires were mailed to Hamilton, Ottawa, and Sudbury, the telephone follow-up campaign was begun. It is impossible to estimate how many people who returned questionnaires after the follow-up would have done so even if there had been no follow-up. It is also difficult, because of the fact that the telephone follow-ups were conducted over a period of two weeks, to
know with any certainty if any people returned questionnaires after the commencement of the follow-up campaign but before they had personally been contacted. Bearing these imponderables in mind, however, it is possible to gain some measure of the efficacy of the follow-up campaign by examining when the questionnaires were returned.

The response rate before any follow-up varied as between the three communities. The initial response was highest in Ottawa, where 11.6% of the possible respondents returned a completed questionnaire before any follow-up. Comparable figures for Hamilton and Sudbury are 11.3% and 6.9% respectively. The first-wave response rates compare very unfavourably with that obtained in the Hamilton pre-test, where 36.5% of all those mailed a questionnaire returned it before any follow-up. After the beginning of the telephone follow-ups in the three communities the response rate for Ottawa was increased by 25.2%, that for Hamilton by 20.3%, and that for Sudbury by 18.2%. The telephone follow-up, therefore, produced a yield of about the proportions expected on the basis of the Hamilton pre-test.

In an attempt to improve the response rates in the three communities a mailed follow-up was conducted at the end of September. All those who had not returned a completed questionnaire were mailed a postage pre-paid postcard, and were requested either to complete and return the questionnaire in their possession or to return the postcard requesting another copy of the questionnaire. The second follow-up did not add substantially to the response rates, adding 3.5% to the response rates for Hamilton and Sudbury, and 2.4% to the
response rate from the Ottawa sample. After all follow-ups, therefore, the final response rates, based on the revised total target samples for the three communities, were 39.2% for Ottawa, 35.1% for Hamilton, and 28.6% for Sudbury.

The Lindsay study was conducted about eight months after the administration of the survey in the other three communities. Because of budgetary considerations it was not possible to conduct a telephone follow-up campaign in Lindsay, but a mailed postcard was sent out after two full weeks had elapsed after the original mailing. The postcard did not elicit any requests for another questionnaire, as it was merely a request that respondents complete and return the questionnaire they had already received. Finally, three weeks after this follow-up, all those who had not returned questionnaires were sent the same postage pre-paid postcard that was used in the final follow-up in the other communities.

The initial response rate in Lindsay was 12.3%, which was slightly higher than that received from Ottawa and Hamilton, and quite a bit higher than the initial response in Sudbury. The first follow-up, however, only added 13.4% to the response rate, so it is clear that the postal follow-up was not as successful as the telephone follow-up used in the other three communities. The final postal follow-up added a further 3.8% to the Lindsay response rate, so that the final response rate for that community was 29.5%.

Hence the follow-up campaigns, especially the telephone follow-ups, added more to the final response rates than did the first wave of
questionnaires. Without the follow-ups the response rate would have been substantially lower. The follow-ups yielded responses somewhat in line with expectations based on experiences with the Hamilton pilot study. What did not coincide with expectations was the low first-wave response, the factor which appears to have prevented us from achieving the results we had expected on the basis of the Hamilton pilot study.

All in all, one thousand, one hundred and seven people from Ottawa, Hamilton, Sudbury, and Lindsay returned completed questionnaires. The over-all response rate, based on the total sample size after the removal of those who had moved (based on the undelivered questionnaires) was 32.9%, but the response rates for the individual communities vary from this figure. The highest response came from Ottawa, where 39.2% of those who received questionnaires completed them. Hamilton had the next highest response rate, of 35.1%, followed by Lindsay with 29.5%, and the lowest response came from Sudbury, where the response rate was 28.6%. Thus the response rates varied by as much as 10.6% as between the four communities. In the light of the diverse characteristics of the communities studied, and of the varying willingness of different types of people to complete questionnaires, this is perhaps to be expected.

It appears that the rank orderings of the response rates of the four communities coincide quite closely with the varying socio-economic compositions of the communities. Thus the mean educational levels of the male population in the four communities are 10.6 years in Ottawa, 9.0 years in Lindsay, 8.9 years in Hamilton, and 8.5 years in
The ranking of the communities in terms of response rates and levels of education are quite similar, with the one exception that the Lindsay educational level is slightly higher than that of Hamilton, while the Hamilton response rate is higher than Lindsay's. Two things, however, may be noted about this one reversal. Firstly, the educational differences are very small, being only 0.1 years. Secondly, Lindsay is placed in a disadvantageous position relative to the other communities in terms of response rates due to the fact that a telephone follow-up was not undertaken. If Lindsay had received a telephone follow-up this would very likely have boosted the response rate in that community, and it probably would have exceeded the Hamilton rate.

Looking at the occupational compositions of the four communities the rank ordering of the response rates is similar to the rank ordering of the communities in terms of the percentage of male workers in manual occupations. With the exception of the reversal between Hamilton and Lindsay, the response rate is higher in the communities with the lowest proportion of men in manual occupations. Ottawa is the community with the smallest proportionate manual working.

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1 Figures calculated from the data presented in the 1961 Census of Canada. See Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1961 Census of Canada, Volume 1, Part 2, (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1963), Bulletin 1.2-10, Table 75, pp. 75-5 to 75-16.

2 Figures taken from the 1961 Census of Canada. See Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1961 Census of Canada, Volume 3, Part 1, (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1963), Bulletin 3.1-4, Table 7, pp. 7-1 to 7-14, and Table 8, pp. 8-2 to 8-14, and Bulletin 3.1-6, Table 11, pp. 11-25 to 11-35.
population (26%) and the largest response was received from this community. Sudbury, with 62% of its male labour force in manual occupations, has the most working-class labour force, and the response rate was lowest in that community. The rank orderings of Lindsay and Hamilton (with 47% and 50% in manual occupations, respectively) are reversed, but the two considerations outlined when discussing levels of education also apply here. Both educational level and labour force composition are measures of socio-economic differences, and appear to offer some explanation for the diversity of response rates in the different communities.

Even if we ignore the variation in response rates, the overall response rate is a disappointment. Our expectations were set by the Hamilton pilot study, and we were hoping for a response rate in the region of 55%. Our actual response rate is 22% below that expectation. In attempting to explain the low response rate, several possibilities spring to mind. It was first thought that the low response may have been due partly to the fact that the initial survey was conducted in the three communities barely a month after the administration of the 1971 Census of Canada. But this explanation has to be abandoned, because the Lindsay survey, conducted eight months after the Census, did not yield better results. Even if the telephone follow-up had been conducted in Lindsay, and even if the response to this was as favourable as it was in Ottawa, this would have boosted the response rate to just over 40%, slightly higher than the Ottawa rate. This seems to suggest that the Census may have had a marginal effect,
reducing our response by several percentage points, but not enough to explain the low response rate.

The similarity between the Lindsay response rate and those from the other communities also destroys another possible hypothesis, namely that the initial survey, having been conducted in the summer, may have suffered because people were not prepared to sacrifice time that they could otherwise devote to other pursuits. This, however, falls down when it is noted that the Lindsay survey was conducted in March, before the spring had arrived.

We are left then with the hypothesis that the low response rate was the result of the sheer length of the questionnaire, the rather personal nature of many of the questions (where the guarantee of anonymity may not have convinced some people), and the possibility that more generally people are becoming weary of responding to questionnaire surveys. In point of fact, the final questionnaire was a good deal longer than the one used in the Hamilton pilot survey, being fourteen pages in length compared to nine for the pilot questionnaire. It has been suggested that once a questionnaire gets over the length of about ten pages, any extra pages do not greatly affect completion rates. But in this survey, not only was the final questionnaire five pages longer than the pilot, but it also contained one hundred and sixty-eight questions, as opposed to twenty-nine on the pilot questionnaire.

This was achieved by typing the questionnaire on large paper and having it photographed down to legal size before printing, thus making it an altogether more imposing document than the pilot questionnaire. It is difficult to estimate what effect this had on response rates, but it seems fair to assume that the combination of size and complexity has some effect on the willingness of respondents to complete and return questionnaires.

The fact remains that we received 1107 completed questionnaires from the four communities, which is a fairly large case base on which to conduct analysis. The question of to what degree the samples were representative of the communities studied, and an outline of the weighting system adopted to improve the representativeness of the samples has already been presented in Chapter II.
The questionnaire used in the four communities study presented the respondent with two questions regarding his class identification. The first question was completely open-ended, merely asking "which social class do you consider yourself a member of?", and providing space for the respondent to write his answer. The second was a pre-coded question asking, "if you had to pick one, which of the following five social classes would you say you were in?", and providing a list of class names from which the respondent was asked to choose one. The list comprised of "upper class", "upper-middle class", "middle class", "working class", and "lower class". It was also possible for the respondent to check one of two other statements, namely "don't know" or "there is no such thing". Table B-1 shows the responses of the manual workers in the four communities to these two questions, after the responses to the open-ended questions had been coded in terms of the class names included in the pre-coded question.

The first thing to note about the responses to the two questions is the high non-response rate to the open-ended question. Twenty-seven percent of the manual workers did not assign themselves to a social class in response to the open-ended question (this figure includes six men who provided a response that was uncodable). Thirty-
two percent of workers claimed working-class status, while another four percent said that they were members of the lower class. Taken together these men represent 49% of the men who assigned themselves to a class in response to the open-ended question. Thirty-six percent claimed to middle-class on the open-ended question, and, together with the two men who claimed to be upper-middle class, constitute 51% of those who assigned themselves to a social class.

Table B-1.--Responses of the manual workers to the open-ended and pre-coded class identification questions (in percentages).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Open-ended question</th>
<th>Pre-coded question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper-class</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper middle-class</td>
<td>-*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-class</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no such thing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer, uncodable</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=505)</td>
<td>(N=505)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Only two cases.
In replying to the pre-coded question, only 5% either refused to answer the question or answered in such a way as to make it impossible to assign them a code. Two percent stated that they did not know which class they belonged to, while another 4% said that there is no such thing as social class. Thus, in response to the pre-coded question, 11% of the manual workers refused to assign themselves to a social class, compared to 27% with the open-ended question. Twenty-seven percent claimed to be middle-class, while 1% claimed to be upper middle and another 1% claimed membership of the upper-class. Taken together these men represent 29% of all the manual workers, and 33% of all those who actually gave a class identification. Fifty-nine percent of the manual workers identified with the working-class, while another 1% claimed to be lower-class, and together these men constitute 67% of those identifying with a social class.

On both questions the great majority of workers who gave a class identification identified with either the middle or working-class. Only 4% gave any other identification in response to the open-ended question, while only 3% did so in response to the pre-coded question. Because of the small numbers involved, and to facilitate analysis (especially when cross-tabulations are involved), from this point on (as in the text of this thesis) the men who identified as upper middle or upper-class will be included among the middle class identifiers, while those who claimed membership of the lower-class will be included among the working-class identifiers.

The major difference, then, between the responses to the open-
ended and pre-coded versions of the class identification question is that a far larger number of men refused to assign themselves to a social class in response to the former. About 7% more of the manual workers claimed middle-class status on the open-ended question as did on the pre-coded question. When comparing only those who actually identified with a social class there is a difference of 18% in the percentages identifying with the middle-class, but in absolute terms, comparing all workers, the difference is less than half this size. On the other hand, there is a difference of 24% in the percentages of all workers who claimed working-class status in response to the two questions. Thus it would appear that the majority of men who did not provide a class identification on the open-ended question, but who did so in response to the pre-coded question, identified with the working-class on the latter.

It would appear, at first blush, that the open-ended question is the superior method of eliciting class identification, in that it leaves the individual free to select his own frame of reference, and possibly to refuse to make such an identification. But a number of considerations led to the pre-coded question being the source for the class identifications analyzed in this thesis. Firstly, use of a pre-coded question follows a well established tradition in sociology, ranging from the pioneer studies of Richard Centers to the recent studies of Hodge and Treiman in the U.S.A. and of Pineo and Goyder in
Canada. In order to compare the results of this study with previous studies it would be necessary to adopt a similar question format.

Secondly, the respondents to the four communities survey did, in fact, have the opportunity of not identifying with a social class. There were two additional response categories, a "don't know" option, and one that stated, "there is no such thing as social class". In addition, of course, the respondent could always refuse to answer the question and, as the questionnaire was mailed, there was no interviewer present to prompt him to select one of the class names. Nonetheless, fully 89% of the manual workers opted to make a choice and not to deny the existence of social classes, or to refuse to identify themselves with a class. This would appear to suggest that the higher refusal rate on the open-ended question is not attributable to a refusal of these workers to think in terms of social class, but perhaps reflects a tendency on the part of some respondents not to answer open-ended questions.

Thirdly, in terms of the utility of the class identification question for the purpose of cross-tabulation of responses to other questions, the open-ended question is less desirable because of the much higher refusal rate.

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Finally, if, as in this study, the purpose of the question is linked with a desire to find out how middle-class identifiers differ from other workers, it would be necessary to concentrate analysis on those workers who are consistent in their claim to middle-class status. Table B-2 shows that, in fact, a substantial proportion of those workers who claimed to be middle-class when responding to the open-ended question changed their mind when answering the pre-coded question. Of the 186 men who identified as middle-class on the open-ended question, only 59% maintained that identification when answering the pre-coded question. Thirty-seven percent of those who identified as middle-class on the open-ended question shifted to working-class in response to the pre-coded question, while three men (less than 2% of the total) shifted to saying there is no such thing as social class, and another three gave no answer (perhaps feeling the second question to be redundant).

Table B-2.--Cross tabulation of the replies to the two forms of class identification question (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-coded question</th>
<th>No answer</th>
<th>Open-ended question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Middle-class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Working-class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uncodable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-class</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-class</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no such thing</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>135</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>180</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Only 1 case.
There is far greater consistency among the men who identified as working-class on the open-ended question. Only 7% of these men checked the middle-class response on the pre-coded question, while 89% checked the working-class response. Only 1% did not answer the question, while the remaining 4% said that they did not know the social class they belonged to, or that there is no such thing as social class.\(^2\)

Of the 133 men who did not answer the open-ended question, only 14% did not answer the pre-coded question, while 4% checked the don't know response, and 10% the response that stated that there is no such thing as social class. Thus 72% of these men identified with a social class in response to the pre-coded question, with 53% claiming to be working-class and 19% middle-class. These men were more likely to refuse to answer the pre-coded question than other workers but the majority did so. There were only six men who provided answers to the open-ended question that were uncodable, and, of these, five men identified as working-class on the pre-coded question, while the other man said that there is no such thing as social class.

It appears, then, that a considerable number of men who identified with the middle-class in response to the open-ended question do not have a very clear and consistent conception of themselves as middle-

\(^2\)The apparent inconsistency of providing a class identification on the open-ended question and then refusing to do so on the pre-coded question may be the result of a coding problem. Coders were asked to code responses similar to "working-class" as "working-class", and some error may have crept in here. The higher probability of coder error on an open-ended question may be cited as another mark against it.
class in any "traditional" sense, and can quite easily shift to describing themselves as working-class. It would appear plausible to argue that such men are different from those who maintain a middle-class identification in the face of a set of class labels that specifies both middle and working-class.

Goldthorpe, Lockwood, et al., in their study of "affluent workers" in Britain, found that only 14% of the workers described themselves as middle-class, while a further 8% said that they could equally well be described as middle or working-class. They further point out that half of the middle-class identifiers (who provided their class identifications in response to an open-ended question) did not see their identification as a claim to membership of what sociologists would conventionally regard as the middle-class. There is the possibility that the wording of an open-ended question invites a different frame of reference than does a pre-coded question. It is possible that the worker, when answering an open-ended question, is thinking in terms of general prosperity and standards of living and, perhaps, comparing his situation with the past. When he is presented with a pre-coded list of class names an occupational referent is introduced and he may then think in terms

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3 If a man gave such an identification as "average" he was (because of the interests of another participant in the research) coded as middle-class. It is doubtful, however, whether such responses should be regarded as showing middle-class identification, and this provides yet another reason for preferring the pre-coded question.

of distinctions between manual and non-manual workers. It is probable that the worker who clings to his middle-class identification in the face of such a change in frames of reference is more likely to be identifying with a middle-class distinct from the manual working-class, and that it is with the differences in attitudes between such workers and those who can (and do) identify as working-class that a study of variation in working-class attitudes should concern itself.

If men who shift their identification from middle-class on the open-ended to working-class on the pre-coded question are, in fact, more similar to those who persistently identify as middle-class than they are to those who persistently identify as working-class, then using the replies to the pre-coded question should diminish differences on other dimensions between middle and working-class identifiers. For example, if class identification is associated with party choice, and if those who shift their class identification are more similar to the middle-class identifiers, then the relationship between class identification and party choice should be stronger using the open-ended responses than using the replies to the pre-coded question. Inclusion of the men who shifted in their class identification from middle to working-class into the category of working-class identifiers should make this category more heterogeneous, and thus tend to reduce differences between middle and working-class identifiers. Table B-3 shows that this supposition is unfounded.
Table B-3.--Zero-order correlations of responses to both class identification questions with objective characteristics and voting preferences.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Open-ended question</th>
<th>Pre-coded question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current occupation</td>
<td>-.18 (N=367)</td>
<td>-.19 (N=447)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.15 (N=352)</td>
<td>-.17 (N=424)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.07 (N=355)</td>
<td>-.15 (N=425)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of birth</td>
<td>.13 (N=366)</td>
<td>.14 (N=446)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife's occupation</td>
<td>-.34 (N=181)</td>
<td>-.38 (N=211)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best (male) friend's occupation</td>
<td>-.13 (N=205)</td>
<td>-.15 (N=249)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union membership</td>
<td>.20 (N=347)</td>
<td>.27 (N=427)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intended provincial vote</td>
<td>.07 (N=290)</td>
<td>.11 (N=354)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intended federal vote</td>
<td>.08 (N=289)</td>
<td>.15 (N=356)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For coding details see Chapter IV, footnote 12.

Table B-3 shows the zero-order correlations of the worker's class identifications, as measured by both the pre-coded and open-ended questions, with a number of objective characteristics, and with the worker's intended party support at the provincial and federal elections (both variables dichotomized as non-NDP and NDP). In no case is there a
higher zero-order correlation with class identification measured by the open-ended question than with the workers' class identifications as measured by their responses to the pre-coded question. In most cases the correlations are similar, but in every instance the correlation with the responses to the pre-coded question is, if only marginally, somewhat larger.

It cannot be argued, therefore, that the use of responses to the pre-coded question as the basis for comparisons between workers blurs the distinction between middle and working-class identifiers by creating categories that are too heterogeneous. Because of this fact, and because of the other advantages cited earlier, the pre-coded question was the question chosen to obtain the class identifications of workers discussed in this thesis.
APPENDIX C

THE QUESTIONNAIRE
Dear Sir:

We are conducting a survey of attitudes and experiences of men living in Canadian communities in relation to work and various aspects of community relationships. We invite you to participate in our research by completing this questionnaire and returning it to us as promptly as possible.

Although the results of the research may not benefit you directly, we expect to obtain knowledge that may, for example, help people to find jobs that make the best use of their skills or that may help understand the experiences of persons who have moved from one job level to another.

To keep down the cost of our research, we are asking only a small number of persons, selected by chance, to answer our questionnaire, so it is very important that each person chosen for our sample return the completed questionnaire to us.

When we analyse and report the results of the survey, we shall not refer to the replies of any individual as we are interested only in similarities and differences among replies from persons grouped together by, for example, age, income, and community. Consequently, your replies will be regarded as strictly confidential and you will not be identified in any reports of the research. The large number stamped on the questionnaire is only to keep our records straight and will not be used to identify your answers.

You will probably notice that our numbering scheme for the questions is unusual. This is for clerical purposes and we hope you will not find it annoying.

If you have received questionnaires in English and in French, please complete and return only the one in the language you prefer. We thank you very much for your cooperation.

Yours sincerely,

John Goyder, Ph.D. Candidate
Vincent Keddie, Ph.D. Candidate
Frank E. Jones, Professor of Sociology
Peter C. Pineo, Professor of Sociology
MOST QUESTIONS CAN BE ANSWERED BY CIRCLING THE NUMBER BESIDE THE APPROPRIATE ANSWER

1: 6  Sex: 1. Male  2. Female

7 What is the name of the community you live in? ____________________________

8-9 In what province (or country) were you born?

7. Manitoba 15. Netherlands 23. Other (Please specify)
8. Saskatchewan

10-11 If you were not born in Canada, in what year did you immigrate to Canada?


12-13 In what province (or country) was your father born?

7. Manitoba 15. Netherlands 23. Other (Please specify)
8. Saskatchewan

14 Were you ever a member of the Armed Services (do not include Reserve, COTC, TA, etc.)?

1. Yes, for less than a year
2. Yes, for 1 to 3 years
3. Yes, for more than 3 years
4. No

15-17 In what year were you born? ____________________________

18 Are you


19-24 What kind of work do you do? Please give the complete title of your job or occupation. If, for any reason, you are no longer in full-time employment, please give details about the last full-time job you held, in this question and in all the other questions concerning your employment. Examples of complete and incomplete job titles are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complete</th>
<th>Incomplete</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drill-press operator</td>
<td>Machine operator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school English teacher</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invoice clerk</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical X-ray technician</td>
<td>Technician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrician foreman</td>
<td>Foreman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office machine mechanic</td>
<td>Mechanic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm owner</td>
<td>Farmer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm hand</td>
<td>Farmer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The complete title of my occupation is ____________________________

25-27 In what kind of industry do you work?

(For example: auto assembly plant, radio service, retail supermarket, farm.)

28 IF FARM OKNER: Main produce is ____________________________ Acreage is ____________________________
Are you or were you:
1. Working for wages or salary for an individual, a private company, or a business
2. Working for tips, fees, commissions, business profits, etc. for an individual, a private company, or a business
3. A government employee (Federal, Provincial, County or Municipal Government)
4. Self-employed and own business, professional practice or farm
5. Working without pay in a family business or farm?

What kind of place do you work in?
1. Factory, production plant, or workshop
2. Office
3. Retail store
4. Farm
5. Mine
6. Transportation (truck driving, etc.)
7. Outside work (construction, logger, etc.)
8. Other (Please specify)

How long have you been employed in your present company? (If self-employed, how long have you been in your present line of work?)
1. Under 6 months
2. 6 months to 2 years
3. 2 to 5 years
4. 5 to 10 years
5. Over 10 years

If you work in a factory, production plant, or workshop, what is the main kind of machinery, equipment, or installation you work on?
1. Assembly line
2. Large installations (e.g., blast furnaces, boilers, etc.)
3. Large machinery (e.g., lathes, looms, etc.)
4. Hand tools (powered or not)
5. Automated equipment (such as in large installations, e.g., blast furnaces, oil refining, chemical manufacturing, etc.)
6. Other (Please specify)

How many people would you say were employed at the place you work? (Not just in your department, but in the whole plant, factory, or office)
1. Under 50
2. 50 to 100
3. 100 to 500
4. 500 to 1,000
5. 1,000 to 5,000
6. 5,000 to 10,000
7. 10,000 or more

How many people would you say were employed in the entire company in this area?
1. Under 50
2. 50 to 100
3. 100 to 500
4. 500 to 1,000
5. 1,000 to 5,000
6. 5,000 to 10,000
7. 10,000 or more

Does your work involve doing the same thing in the same way repeatedly, the same kind of thing in a number of different ways, or a number of different kinds of things?
1. The same thing in the same way
2. The same thing in a number of different ways
3. A number of different things

Do you have a fixed work place or do you move around during your work?
1. Fixed work place
2. Move around

Do you work mostly on your own or do you work in a team or a gang?
1. Work on my own
2. Work in a team or gang

How much do you talk to your workmates?
While working (check one) ___________________________
During breaks (check one) ___________________________
Before & after work (check one) ______________________

Do you and the people you work with do similar or different types of jobs?
1. Very similar
2. Pretty similar
3. Different

What decides the speed at which you work?
1. Myself
2. My work group
3. Other (Please specify):

How closely would you say you were supervised?
1. Very closely
2. Moderately
3. Left pretty much alone
1:45 Are you a member of a labour union or professional association?
1. Yes, labour union  2. Yes, professional association  3. No

46 If you answered Yes to question 45 above, which of the statements below comes closest to describing your degree of involvement in the activities of your union or professional association?
1. Officer, committee man, or steward
2. Regularly attend meetings and vote in elections
3. Occasionally attend meetings and vote in elections
4. Rarely attend meetings but vote in elections
5. Neither vote nor attend meetings
6. Not a member of a union or professional association

47-48 Below are listed some of the things often thought important in a job. Please circle the one you would look for first in a job.
1. Chance to help people  7. Chances for advancement
2. Interest and variety  8. Security
3. Good pay  9. A supervisor who leaves you alone
4. The chance of overtime  10. Pleasant working conditions
5. Good workmates  11. A strong and active union
6. Short working hours  12. Important work giving a feeling of accomplishment

49 So far as this first thing is concerned, how would you rate your present job?
2. Fairly good  4. Fairly bad

50-51 Please circle the second important thing you would look for in a job.
1. Chance to help people  7. Chances for advancement
2. Interest and variety  8. Security
3. Good pay  9. A supervisor who leaves you alone
4. The chance of overtime  10. Pleasant working conditions
5. Good workmates  11. A strong and active union
6. Short working hours  12. Important work giving a feeling of accomplishment

52 So far as this second thing is concerned, how would you rate your present job?
2. Fairly good  4. Fairly bad

53 What chance do you think you have of getting a promotion in your company or firm?
1. A very good chance  3. Not much of a chance
2. A fairly good chance  4. No chance at all

54 How do you feel about the company or firm you work for?
1. It's a very good company  4. It's a fairly bad company
2. It's a fairly good company  5. It's a very bad company
3. Undecided

55-56 How old were you when you began your first full-time job after you left school? (Include service in the Armed Forces only if you joined for a career.)

57-62 What kind of work were you doing in your first full-time job? Please give the complete job title (see question 19 for examples of complete and incomplete job titles).
The complete title of my first full-time job was __________________________

63-65 What kind of industry was this?
(For example: auto assembly plant, radio service, retail supermarket, farm.)

66 IF FARM OWNER: Main produce was __________________________ Acreage was ______________

67 Were you:
1. Working for wages, salary or commissions for an individual, a private company, or a business
2. A government employee (Federal, Provincial, County or Municipal Government)
3. Self-employed and own business, professional practice or farm
4. Working without pay in a family business or farm?
1:68 My first job:
1. Was exactly the kind of job I wanted
2. Suited me but was not quite what I wanted
3. Was not very close to the kind of job I wanted
4. Was far from the kind of job I wanted

70 For my first job:
1. I took the first job I could find
2. I looked around a little before I took a job
3. I looked around quite a while before I took a job

71 Would you say that your present job is the direct result of your first job?
1. Yes
2. No

73 If you compare your present job with your first job in terms of its social standing, would you say your present job has
1. A much higher standing
2. A higher standing
3. About the same
4. A much lower standing
5. A lower standing

74-75 How many different types of jobs (not places of employment) have you had? #

76-77 How many years of formal education have you completed? ____________________________ Years

78 Since leaving school, have you ever been an apprentice?
1. Yes, completed
2. Yes, but did not complete
3. Yes, still apprenticed
4. No

2:6-8 IF YES, for what kind of job? _______________________________________________________

Since leaving school, have you ever attempted or completed any of the following courses? (Circle as many as apply.)

1. Academic course (such as courses that can be taken at high school, college, etc.)
2. Technical course (such as public health nursing, electronics, blue-print reading, tool design, eye testing)
3. Teacher training course (such as teaching methods, instructorships in driving, skiing, and other special skills)
4. Professional course (such as accounting, law, library science, industrial relations)
5. Business administration or management (such as executive training, life insurance, office management)
6. Sales and advertising course (such as salesmanship, advertising, distributive skills)
7. Office techniques course (such as data processing machines, typing, shorthand, bookkeeping)
8. Skilled trades course (such as auto repairs, appliance repairs, welding, millinery, truck driving)
9. Service skills course (such as health professions, protection and security services)
10. Personal service skills (such as barber, hairdresser, waiter, service station attendant)
11. Other (Please specify)
12. Have taken no courses

22-23 If you had the chance to start all over again at 16 years of age, would you choose the same type of job or would you do something different?
1. The same job
2. Different (please specify) __________________________________________________________

24 At the time you left school, did you think you had all the education you needed?
1. I was sure I had sufficient education
2. I was fairly sure I had sufficient education
3. I was uncertain whether or not I had sufficient education
4. I was fairly sure I needed more education
5. I was sure I needed more education

26 In the light of your occupational experience, do you now think you had all the education you needed?
1. I am sure I had sufficient education
2. I am fairly sure I had sufficient education
3. I am uncertain whether or not I had sufficient education
4. I am fairly sure I needed more education
5. I am sure I needed more education
2:27- Please indicate which of the following were sources of information and advice in helping you decide on the kind of job you hoped to find. (Circle as many as apply.)

1. Father  
2. Mother  
3. Brother  
4. Sister  
5. Teacher  
6. Vocational guidance counsellor  
7. Friend  
8. Other (Please specify) 

33-34 Please circle one or two of the following whose information and advice had the most influence in shaping your ideas about the job you wanted.

1. Father  
2. Mother  
3. Brother  
4. Sister  
5. Teacher  
6. Vocational guidance counsellor  
7. Friend  
8. Other (Please specify) 

38 When I was about 16, I spent my free time

1. Mostly with lots of friends  
2. Mostly with a few friends  
3. Mostly by myself  

40 Would you say that your friends' educational plans were 

1. More ambitious than your own  
2. About the same as your own  
3. Less ambitious than your own  

44 When you were about sixteen, were both your parents living?

1. Both parents were living  
2. Only your mother living  
3. Only your father living  
4. Neither parents were living  

45 When you were about sixteen, with whom did you live?

1. Your mother and father  
2. Your mother and stepfather  
3. Your father and stepmother  
4. With your mother only  
5. With your father only  
6. With someone other than your parents  
7. Alone 

46-51 What kind of work was your father (or the head of your family) doing when you were 16? Please give the most exact title or description that you can remember.

My father's job was ____________________________________________________________

52-54 What kind of industry was this?

(For example: auto assembly plant, radio service, retail supermarket, farm.)

55 If he was a farm owner: Main produce was ___________ Acreage was ___________

56 Was your father (or the head of your family)

1. Working for wages, salary or commissions for an individual, a private company, or a business  
2. A government employee (Federal, Provincial, County or Municipal Government)  
3. Self-employed and own business, professional practice or farm  
4. Working without pay in a family business or farm  

57-58 In what country did your father receive most of his education? _______________________

59-60 How many years of formal education did your father complete? ____________________ Years

61 Where were you living when you were 16 years old?

1. In the same community as at the present time  
2. In a different community. Please give its name _________________________________

62 Was the community you lived in when you were sixteen

1. A very large city (over 500,000 persons)  
2. A fairly large city, or a suburb of a fairly large city (between 100,000 and 500,000 persons)  
3. A middle-sized city (between 50,000 and 100,000 persons)  
4. A town or village (more than 1,000 but less than 50,000 persons)  
5. A village of less than 1,000 persons or the open country (but not on a farm)  
6. I lived on a farm
2:63 Including those no longer living, how many sisters have you? __________ sisters.
64 Including those no longer living, how many brothers have you? __________ brothers
65 How many of your sisters were older than you? ________________
66 How many of your brothers were older than you? ________________
67 How many of your sisters, now living, reside in Canada? ________________
68 How many of your brothers, now living, reside in Canada? ________________
69-70 What is your religion?
2. Baptist 6. Roman Catholic 10. Other Protestant
3. Greek Orthodox 7. United Church 11. No formal religious affiliation
4. Jewish 8. Presbyterian 12. Other (Please specify)
71 What is your mother tongue (the language you first learned to speak)?
1. English 4. Italian 7. Ukrainian
2. French 5. Dutch 8. Yiddish
3. German 6. Polish 9. Other (Please specify)
72 Can you speak English or French well enough to conduct a conversation?
1. English only 3. Both English and French
2. French only 4. Neither English nor French
73 Which of the following best describes your reading ability in French?
74 Which best describes your ability to write French?
75 Which best describes your ability to understand spoken French?
76 Which best describes your speaking ability in French?
77-79 What circumstances enabled you to learn French? (Circle as many as apply.)
1. Your family circle 5. Your work
2. The area where you lived 6. Other (Please specify)
3. Your school 7. Don't know
4. Travel
3: 6 What language do you speak most of the time at work?
1. English 2. French 3. Other
7 Of your colleagues or workmates at the place where you work, how many are of the same language group as you?
1. All of them 4. One-quarter of them
2. Three-quarters of them 5. None of them
3. One-half of them
8 Of the clients or customers that you come into contact with at work, how many are of the same language group as you?
1. All of them 4. One-quarter of them
2. Three-quarters of them 5. None of them
3. One-half of them
9-10 To what ethnic or cultural group did you or your ancestor (on the male side) belong on coming to this continent?
5. Hungarian 11. Polish 17. Other (Specify)
What was your income, before taxes, during the last 12 months? (If you are self-employed, state the amount after the deduction of business expenses.)

1. Less than $2,000
2. $2,000 - 2,999
3. 3,000 - 3,999
4. 4,000 - 4,999
5. 5,000 - 5,999
6. 6,000 - 6,999
7. $7,000 - 7,999
8. 8,000 - 8,999
9. 9,000 - 9,999
10. 10,000 - 10,999
11. 11,000 - 11,999
12. 12,000 - 12,999
13. $13,000 - 13,999
14. 14,000 - 14,999
15. 15,000 - 15,999
16. 16,000 - 16,999
17. 17,000 - 19,999
18. 20,000 and over

How many weeks did you work in the past 12 months?

1. None
2. 1 - 4 weeks
3. 5 - 13 weeks
4. 14 - 26 weeks
5. 27 - 39 weeks
6. 40 - 48 weeks
7. 49 - 52 weeks

In the place you are living in, are you

1. The owner
2. Renting from your employer
3. Renting from someone else
4. Living with relatives
5. Other (Please specify)

Is the place you live in

1. A house
2. An apartment or flat
3. A duplex or triplex
4. Other (Please specify)

Please check off on the list below all of the items that you own or rent (or that are included in a rental agreement).

- One flush toilet
- A second flush toilet
- Refrigerator
- Home freezer
- Automatic washer
- Electric clothes dryer
- Automatic dishwasher
- One telephone
- A second telephone
- Black and white T.V.
- A second black & white T.V.
- A colour T.V.
- One car
- A second car
- A second black & white T.V.
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- Black and white T.V.
3: How important would you say the following things are in determining what social class a man belongs to? Please circle one of the choices: very important, somewhat important, slightly important, or of no importance at all, for each thing.

43 His income
   1. Very important  2. Somewhat important  3. Slightly important  4. Of no importance at all

44 His wife's occupation
   1. Very important  2. Somewhat important  3. Slightly important  4. Of no importance at all

45 His own education
   1. Very important  2. Somewhat important  3. Slightly important  4. Of no importance at all

46 His own occupation
   1. Very important  2. Somewhat important  3. Slightly important  4. Of no importance at all

47 His best friend's occupation
   1. Very important  2. Somewhat important  3. Slightly important  4. Of no importance at all

48 His wife's income
   1. Very important  2. Somewhat important  3. Slightly important  4. Of no importance at all

49 What social class would you say people in semi-professional jobs (such as commercial artists, librarians, T.V. announcers, Y.M.C.A. directors) belong to?

50 What social class would you say people in clerical and sales jobs belong to?

51 What social class would you say semi-skilled workers belong to?

52 What social class would you say people who are owners or executives in large businesses belong to?

53 What social class would you say professional workers (such as doctors or lawyers) belong to?

54 What social class would you say people who are owners or managers of small businesses belong to?

55 What social class would you say unskilled workers belong to?

56 What social class would you say skilled workers belong to?

During an average month, how many times do you get together with neighbours, relatives, workmates, and other friends, either at each other's homes or going out together?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>More than 5 times a month</th>
<th>3 to 5 times a month</th>
<th>Once or twice a month</th>
<th>Less than once a month</th>
<th>Never</th>
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<tr>
<td>Neighbours</td>
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<td>Workmates</td>
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<td>Other friends</td>
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3:61 Is your best friend male or female?
   1. Male  2. Female

62-67 What does your best friend do for a living?

68-69 How many years of formal education has your best friend completed? ________ years.

70 What is your best friend's mother tongue (the language he or she first learned to speak)?
   1. English  2. French  3. Other (Please specify) ________

71 What social class would you say your best friend belongs to?

72 Does your wife work? 1. Yes, full time  2. Yes, part time  3. No
   Please give the complete title of your wife's job or occupation. If, for any reason, she is no longer in full-time employment, please give details about the last full-time job she held.

73-78 The complete title of my wife's occupation is ________________________________

4:6-7 If married, what was your wife's income, before taxes, during the last 12 months? (If she is self-employed, state the amount after the deduction of business expenses.)

1. Less than $2,000  7. $7,000 - 7,999  13. $15,000 - 15,999
2. $2,000 - 2,999  8. $8,000 - 8,999  14. $14,000 - 14,999
3. 3,000 - 3,999  9. $9,000 - 9,999  15. $15,000 - 16,999
4. 4,000 - 4,999  10. $10,000 - 10,999  16. $17,000 - 19,999
5. 5,000 - 5,999  11. $11,000 - 11,999  17. $20,000 and over
6. 6,000 - 6,999  12. $12,000 - 12,999  18. No income, did not work for pay
19. Not married

8-9 How many years of formal education has your wife completed? ________ Years.

10 What social class would you say your wife belongs to?

What kind of work was your father-in-law (or the head of your wife's family) doing when your wife was 16?

11-16 My father-in-law's job was ________________________________

17-18 How many years of formal education has your father-in-law completed? ________ years

19 What social class would you say your father-in-law belongs (belonged) to?

20 How conscious are people today of belonging to a social class compared to people 20 or 30 years ago?
   1. Much more conscious of belonging to a social class than people 20 or 30 years ago
2. Somewhat more conscious than people 20 or 30 years ago
3. No difference between people now and 20 or 30 years ago
4. Somewhat less conscious than people 20 or 30 years ago
5. Much less conscious than people 20 or 30 years ago

21 Here are three views about what social class is. Would you please circle the viewpoint you most agree with.

1. Differences in power create social classes. Some people are in positions of power and authority and have the means to greatly affect the lives of those people who are subject to that power and authority. So the class you belong to is decided by the amount of power and authority you possess.

2. Differences in status, prestige, and style of life create social classes. Social classes are made up of people with similar interests, life styles, abilities, backgrounds, cultural pursuits, educational attainments, and so on.

3. Differences in wealth and money create social classes. The money you earn and the things you own are the major factors in deciding the class you belong to. It doesn't matter much what kind of education you have, or whether you work in an office or a factory, the main thing is money.
4:22 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: You are born into a particular social class and you will remain in that social class until the day you die?
   1. Strongly agree 3. Neither agree nor disagree 5. Strongly disagree

23 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? The higher classes are best able to run things, and the others should be content with their positions in society and leave the big decision making to them. If everyone accepts his position in society then everything will be fine.
   1. Strongly agree 3. Neither agree nor disagree 5. Strongly disagree

24 What about if someone were to say: The upper classes can't be counted upon to look after anyone's interests but their own, so people in my social class must stick together to protect their own interests?
   1. Strongly agree 3. Neither agree nor disagree 5. Strongly disagree

25 Do you agree or disagree with the following statement? I don't really feel that my interests are like those of people in a position similar to me. If my family and I have enough to get by on, nothing else really matters.
   1. Strongly agree 3. Neither agree nor disagree 5. Strongly disagree

26 Some people say that if working class people want to get their fair share of society's benefits they have to stick together and stick up for one another. Other people say that each person ought to try and get on on his own. How do you feel about this?
   1. Working class people have to stick together
   2. They should try and get on on their own as individuals

27 Suppose that votes were taken on a lot of questions about the future of Canada, do you think the social classes would agree on these issues or would they tend to disagree?
   1. They'd agree on practically everything
   2. They'd agree on most things
   3. They'd agree on half and disagree on half
   4. They'd disagree on most things
   5. They'd disagree on practically everything

28 What chance do you think a boy born into a lower or working class family has to become a lawyer, a doctor, a top business executive, or to obtain a similarly high level job?
   1. He has a good chance
   2. He has some chance
   3. He has very little chance
   4. He has no chance

29 What do you think of his chances compared to those of a boy born into a middle or upper class family?
   1. He has a better chance
   2. He has the same chance
   3. He has slightly less chance
   4. His chances are much lower
   5. He has no chance compared to the other boy

30 How easy or difficult would it be for a person moving from a lower to a higher social class to adopt the social graces and style of life appropriate to the higher class?
   1. It would be very easy
   2. It would be fairly easy
   3. It would be impossible
   4. It would be very difficult

31 If you had to pick one, which of the following income groups would you say you were in?
   1. Upper
   2. Upper-middle
   3. Middle
   4. Lower-middle
   5. Lower

32 Compared to most Canadians, I am
   1. Much more cultured and refined
   2. Somewhat more cultured and refined
   3. As cultured and refined
   4. Somewhat less cultured and refined
   5. Much less cultured and refined

33 Compared to most Canadians, I am
   1. Much more honest
   2. Somewhat more honest
   3. As honest
   4. Somewhat less honest
   5. Much less honest
You are riding in a car driven by a close friend, and he hits a pedestrian. You know he was going at least 35 miles an hour in a 20 mile-an-hour speed zone. There are no other witnesses. His lawyer says that if you testify under oath that the speed was only 20 miles an hour, it would save him from serious consequences.

What right has your friend to expect you to protect him? (Circle only one)

1. My friend has a definite right as a friend to expect me to testify to the lower figure.
2. He has some right as a friend to expect me to testify to the lower figure.
3. He has no right as a friend to expect me to testify to the lower figure.

What do you think you'd probably do in view of the obligations of a sworn witness and the obligations to your friend?

1. Testify that he was going 20 miles an hour.
2. Not testify that he was going 20 miles an hour.

When looking for a job, a person ought to find a position in a place located near his parents, even if that means losing a good opportunity elsewhere.

1. Agree
2. Agree somewhat
3. Don't know
4. Disagree somewhat
5. Disagree

If you have the chance to hire an assistant in your work, it is always better to hire a relative than a stranger.

1. Agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Don't know
4. Somewhat disagree
5. Disagree

Please answer questions 38, 39, 40, 41, and 42 even if you are not eligible to vote in provincial or federal elections.

Which political party do you normally support in Federal elections?

1. Progressive Conservative
2. Liberal
3. New Democrats
4. Social Credit/Creditiste
5. Other (Please specify)

Which political party do you normally support in Provincial elections?

1. Progressive Conservative
2. Liberal
3. New Democrats
4. Social Credit/Creditiste
5. Parti Quebecois
6. Union Nationale
7. Other (Please specify)

Would you please indicate which political party you plan to support in the next Provincial election?

1. Progressive Conservative
2. Liberal
3. New Democrats
4. Social Credit/Creditiste
5. Parti Quebecois
6. Union Nationale
7. Other (Please specify)

Would you please indicate which political party you plan to support in the next Federal election?

1. Progressive Conservative
2. Liberal
3. New Democrats
4. Social Credit/Creditiste
5. Other (Please specify)

In the space below, could you state your reasons for supporting the political party (or parties) you generally vote for?
Many people say that the political parties represent the interests of different classes of people. Would you indicate which group or groups you think is represented by the political parties listed below. (Check the appropriate spaces)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Social Classes</th>
<th>Factory Workers</th>
<th>Office Workers</th>
<th>Managerial People</th>
<th>Professional People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Conservatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Democrats</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Credit/Creditistes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parti Quebecois</td>
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<tr>
<td>Union Nationale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Please specify)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How much say do people like yourself have in how Canada is governed?
1. A good deal of say  2. A little say  3. No say at all

Here are three differing views on how Canada is governed. Would you indicate which viewpoint you most agree with?
1. No one group really runs the government of this country. Instead, important decisions about national policy are made by a lot of different people, such as labour, business, religious, and educational groups, and so on. These groups influence all political parties, but no single group can dictate to the others, and each group is strong enough to protect its own interests.
2. A close-knit group of men at the top really run this country. These are the heads of the large business corporations, bankers, newspaper, television and radio station owners, top church leaders, top provincial and federal civil servants, and a few important M.P.'s and Senators in Ottawa and the Provinces.
3. Big businessmen really run the government of this country. The heads of the large corporations dominate the major political parties. This means that things in Ottawa go pretty much the way big businessmen want them to.

Suppose there were two men, one is the son of a prominent businessman who was educated at a private school and then went on to McGill and Harvard Universities. The other man is the son of a skilled mechanic who went to his local high school and then to the university in his home town. Which of these two men do you think would be best suited for high political office?
1. The son of the businessman  2. The son of the mechanic  3. Both of them

Would you briefly state your reasons for your choice?

Some people say that labour unions have too much power in this country. Would you agree or disagree with this view?

Some people say that big businessmen have too much power in this country. Would you agree or disagree with this view?
Which of the following views on strikes do you most agree with?

1. I don’t believe that going on strike could ever benefit me, and I would not do so under any conditions.
2. I would not be prepared to go on strike unless it was the only way to defend my rights, and the strike had the full support of the union.
3. I would be prepared to strike if necessary to secure fair treatment at my place of work, whether or not top union officials approved of this.
4. I would be prepared to strike at any time that it was necessary to support the interests of workers and to help the working class movement anywhere in the country.

How do you feel about the policy of a number of labour unions of affiliating with the New Democratic Party?

1. Strongly approve
2. Mildly approve
3. Neither approve nor disapprove
4. Mildly disapprove
5. Strongly disapprove

Here are two opposing views about industry generally. Would you please indicate which you agree with most?

1. A company is like a football team because good teamwork means success and is to everyone’s advantage
2. Teamwork in industry is impossible because employers and workers are really on opposite sides.

Of the people listed below, would you say that their political feelings are very like yours, somewhat like yours, half alike and half different, somewhat different from yours or very different from yours?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very like mine</th>
<th>Somewhat like mine</th>
<th>Half Like</th>
<th>Somewhat Different</th>
<th>Very Different</th>
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Your wife
Your parents
Your friends
Your workmates
Your neighbours

Which of the following descriptions best fits the area you live in?

1. A very mixed area
2. A rather select area
3. An ordinary working class area
4. A pretty rough area
5. A nice, quiet & respectable area
6. A middle class area
7. An upper class area
8. Other (Please specify)

In some neighbourhoods the residents are all very much alike, while in others they are very different from one another. What about the area you live in?

1. People are very similar to one another
2. There are a few differences between people
3. There are several differences between people
4. People are very different from one another

When did you move into your present neighbourhood? State year

If you had to leave this neighbourhood, would you be

1. Very sorry
2. A little sorry
3. Not really sorry
4. A little glad to leave
5. Very glad to leave

Could you briefly state your reasons for your answer to question 5:8?
Do you belong, attending at least occasionally, to any of the following clubs or organizations? (Circle as many as apply.)

1. Employees Club
2. Social Club
3. Political Party
4. Parent-Teacher Association
5. Tenants Association
6. Residents Association
7. Church or Church Group
8. Sports Club
9. Canadian Legion
10. Other (Specify)

Imagine you have a son who is ten years old. Which three qualities of those listed below would you say are the most desirable for a boy of that age to have? Circle the three you consider the most desirable.

1. that he has good manners
2. that he tries hard to succeed
3. that he is honest
4. that he is neat and clean
5. that he has good sense and sound judgment
6. that he has self-control
7. that he acts like a boy should
8. that he gets along well with other children
9. that he obeys his parents well
10. that he is responsible
11. that he is considerate of others
12. that he is interested in how and why things happen
13. that he is a good student

Finally, here are some questions about your feelings and beliefs. Please check for each one the most appropriate answer.

36 There are two kinds of people in the world: the weak and the strong.
1. Strongly agree
2. Agree somewhat
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree somewhat
5. Disagree strongly

37 It's all right to get around the law as long as you don't actually break it.
1. Strongly agree
2. Agree somewhat
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree somewhat
5. Disagree strongly

38 The most important thing to teach children is absolute obedience to their parents.
1. Strongly agree
2. Agree somewhat
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree somewhat
5. Disagree strongly

39 In this complicated world the only way to know what to do is to rely on leaders and experts.
1. Strongly agree
2. Agree somewhat
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree somewhat
5. Disagree strongly

40 It's all right to do anything you want as long as you stay out of trouble.
1. Strongly agree
2. Agree somewhat
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree somewhat
5. Disagree strongly

41 Do you think that most people can be trusted?
1. Yes
2. No

42 Are you the sort of person who takes life as it comes or are you working toward some definite goal?
1. I take life as it comes
2. I am working toward some definite goal

43 According to your general impression, how often do your ideas and opinions about important matters differ from those of your relatives?
1. Always
2. Frequently
3. Sometimes
4. Rarely
5. Never

44 How about from those of other people with your religious background?
1. Always
2. Frequently
3. Sometimes
4. Rarely
5. Never

THANK YOU VERY MUCH
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