A FOUNDATION FOR FREEDOM IN
WHITEHEAD'S COSMOLOGY
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By
CONO SPITALE, B. A.

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AUTHOR: Cono Spitale, B. A. (McMaster University)

SUPERVISOR: Professor S. Najm

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SCOPE AND PURPOSE:

To present an analysis of the concept of freedom as found in
Whitehead; and through this to show that it is possible to
establish a philosophical foundation for the notion of
freedom found in ordinary experience.
INTRODUCTION

There is a multiplicity of key notions which any analysis of Whitehead's cosmology must include. To take each one and give a satisfactory rendering would be to rewrite Whitehead's entire *Process and Reality*. Certainly such a program would prove unwise for this thesis. Some pruning will have to be done if this paper is to have any validity of its own. But pruning cannot be justified merely on grounds of irrelevancy, for there must be evidence that indeed such notions are irrelevant to the original system. To prune for the sake of emphasis is altogether different, and requires no prior justification. With this in mind the present paper will forgo analysis of certain notions which are not essential for the purpose of this paper.

'Freedom' is one element of human experience which has been the focal point of argument in many philosophical systems. It has been the banner of men who have struggled unceasingly. "Give me liberty or give me death" became the call for armed rebellion in American history; and such has been echoed throughout world history. This concept cannot be dismissed as simply illusory, with the result that it is either explained away or not explained at all. Because of
its importance Whitehead accepts this element as one of the core ingredients in ordinary experience; an element that must find a central place in any scheme of thought. And so, Whitehead gives 'freedom' categoricale importance in his cos-

The aim of this paper is to provide an analysis of Whitehead's cosmology for the purpose of drawing from it the meaning of freedom. The paper will consist of five parts. Chapter I will deal with the concepts of 'creativity', 'novelty' and 'process', as forming the skeletal framework within which freedom becomes meaningful. It will seek to show that freedom as presented by Whitehead, is not simply an external or internal condition of man, but a fundamental chord running through the entire breadth of the universe, excluding nothing. This part will include an examination of the concept of 'actuality' - what it means to be real for Whitehead. It will present a general discussion of an 'actual occasion' as constituting the building block of the universe. This is intended to provide a preliminary answer to the question "Why can an occasion be said to be free?".

Chapters II and III will present the structure of the actual occasion in greater detail attempting to make clear why it is valid to say that all occasions are free. In presenting the various phases of concrescence it will become evident how freedom is woven into the very nature
of the occasion. The problem of God as a limiting factor will be examined in the light of the occasion's becoming.

Chapter IV will attempt to reconcile the notion of 'causality' in Whitehead with that of freedom. It will seek to show that, although causality is a real factor in the development of the occasion, instead of contradicting the presence of freedom it makes the case for freedom stronger. In this connection the problem of the 'epochal' theory of time will be discussed. The concluding chapter will raise some implications that Whitehead's notion of freedom has for man and human society.
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Very special thanks are due to Professor H. Dulmage not only for the helpful criticisms and suggestions offered, but for kindly coming back to act as my second reader. Beyond this, I am grateful to him for kindling in me the interest and respect for Whitehead's ideas.

To Professor Aczenstat who consented to be my third reader on short notice, I would also like to express my appreciation. His penetrating questions pointed out the difficulty of attempting to fashion a comprehensive set of concepts from which all fundamental notions can be drawn.

Finally, for one who has been my side during the entire process, for one who has kept me from leaving this task undone, and for one who has laboured to give it final form while co-creating our other masterpiece, I give her thanks by dedicating to her the continuing growth of my freedom.
The following abbreviations of titles are used to refer to works by Alfred North Whitehead:

AI  Adventures of Ideas
FR  Function of Reason
MT  Modes of Thought
PR  Process and Reality
RM  Religion in the Making
SMW Science in the Modern World
SYM Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect
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CHAPTER I
SEVERAL KEY CONCEPTS

Section A - Freedom

'Freedom' for Whitehead is a key notion which permeates the various categorical divisions. It is not limited to human endeavour, but is witnessed to a greater or lesser extent in all actual occasions, (PR 41, 75, 130, 135). Life itself, in its development, is that freedom exemplified; life becomes a bid for freedom, and the opposite, death, the end of freedom. In Symbolism Whitehead states, "The emergence of life is better conceived as a bid for freedom on the part of the organisms, a bid for a certain independence of individuality with self-interests and activities not to be construed purely in terms of environmental obligations" (p. 76). Freedom for any living creature means having a say in what it will become; it is self-determination, setting its own goals, and deciding how to pursue those goals. The entire experience of life becomes this bid for freedom.

Though defining freedom at the outset is putting the cart before the horse, it will be helpful to provide a synoptic preview of what Whitehead regards as freedom. Freedom can be described as the inner process whereby the occasion becomes what it is. It is the process of concrescence by which the occasion is said to be causa sui, that is, it becomes a definite individual by reason of its own decisions.
The more important these decisions are to the final satisfaction, the greater the freedom is; or to put it in another way, the greater the control it has over what it becomes, the more effective is its freedom. Every occasion to some extent is its own cause for what it becomes, but in some the past has a greater influence than in others. This is the basis for holding that the 'society' that constitutes a rock has less freedom than the 'society' that constitutes a man, that is to say, a man can deviate from his environment to a more fundamental extent than a rock.

To speak of self-causation as freedom is to say that the occasion is responsible for what it includes and how it includes it. The freedom of the occasion is also the ability to make the determinate that which is vague and indeterminate as provided by the past. In excluding certain data and emphasizing others the occasion is functioning to make itself determinate. The freedom is evidenced by the growing complexity in the synthesis of feeling, in that, it begins with simple data and may conclude with complex intellectual feeling. This growing complexity also demonstrates the novelty that arises in the occasion. The more pronounced is the complexity in its synthesis, the farther removed is the occasion from external control, and the more is it characterized by a life of freedom. This brief preview of what Whitehead presents as freedom must be seen in conjunction
with the actual process of concrescence, for it is how the occasion becomes that dictates the degree of freedom that it will experience. As will be seen later when the various phases of concrescence are examined, the freedom ultimately depends on the extent to which the novel occasion departs from and adds to the past world.

It must be noted at the outset that Whitehead does not intend to give any formal proofs for the existence of freedom. His main reason for this lies in his views on 'Speculative Philosophy'. He sets forth the position that "Speculative Philosophy is the endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which every element of our experience can be interpreted. By this notion of 'interpretation' I mean that everything of which we are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed, or thought, shall have the character of a particular instance of the general scheme" (PR 4). Once it is acknowledged that the notion of freedom is an undeniable factor in experience it remains to provide an adequate explanation of such a notion for the reason that "Whatever is found in 'practice' must lie within the scope of the metaphysical description. When the description fails to include the 'practice', the metaphysics is inadequate and requires revision" (PR 19).

Though he does not attempt to give any formal proof,
he does give strong reasons why attempts at refuting the existence of freedom are doomed to failure. That present actions appear to be connected to prior events is not itself proof that we are indeed determined to act that way, or to choose to act that way. Whitehead approaches the problem of scientific findings which point to causal determinism in human action, with the view that no scientific evidence would be even relevant to a final decision as to whether man is, or is not, free. Science does not deal with man in his entirety, that is, science does not investigate man as both the initiator of action and the focal point of feelings. At best, science departmentalizes what in fact works as a unit. It is this deficiency in methodology which science must necessarily adopt if it is to work, that leads Whitehead to state that "In fact science conceived as relying on mere sense-perception, with no other source of observation, is bankrupt, so far as concerns its claim to self-sufficiency. Science can find no individual enjoyment in nature: Science can find no aim in nature..." (M.T. 154). Elsewhere he says "In Physics, there is an abstraction. The science ignores what anything is in itself. Its entities are merely considered in respect to their extrinsic reality that is to say, in respect to their aspects in others things." (S.M.W. 220). Whitehead believes that his scheme is better suited to come to grips with reality because it always falls back on
ordinary experience which is to be considered the final arbiter of what is an adequate explanation. It remains then, to present what it means to be 'free'.

To set the tone of Whitehead's notion of freedom the following quotation is of value: "The doctrine of the philosophy of organism is that, however far the sphere of efficient causation be pushed in the determination of components of a concrescence - its data, its emotions, its appreciations, its purposes, its phases of subjective aim - beyond the determination of these components there always remains the final reaction of the self-creative unity of the universe.... The doctrine is that each concrescence is to be referred to a definite free initiation and a definite free conclusion" (PR 75). In a nutshell this is the view of Whitehead; every occasion is its own cause for what it becomes. But that freedom is qualified.

Freedom must always emerge from within some settled conditions. Such conditions are not only its immediate environment but are the totality of the world as it has been developing to the present moment when the new occasion emerges. The limits imposed are strict limits, and the occasion cannot exceed that capacity inherited from its past. A stone cannot become a flower nor a legless child a ballerina. Whitehead recognizes that, "there is no such fact as absolute freedom; every actual entity possesses
only such freedom as is inherent in the primary phase 'given' by its standpoint of relativity to its actual universe" (PR 202).

The degree of freedom depends on three elements: 1) indetermination, 2) novelty, 3) self-causation. The first expresses the condition that an occasion is limited in its general outlines by past conditions. These outlines form the blueprint of the occasion, the 'dry-bones' which must be clothed. The new occasion must work within those given conditions, but such conditions are indeterminate; they are mere general guidelines which must be made specific through the occasion's own decisions. The new occasion is free to choose up to the maximum potential allowed.

In everyday experience people choose to become doctors, teachers, hairdressers; these choices are limited only by unspecific physical, mental, and emotional capacities. Whether I eat a ham sandwich or a cheese sandwich, and what I put in them is not completely determined by what lies in my past or present environment. There are many influences affecting individual choices, but how I feel about my sandwich is also one causal factor which is my decision made at that very moment. Everyday activities and long term decisions are limited to some extent, but Whitehead is saying that, such limitations
are not completely specified by conditions external to my choosing, nor is my choice itself completely determined by my past. To say that all my past as a given element determines my choice at this very moment of having a ham sandwich rather than a cheese sandwich is to beg the question and foreclose all further discussion. Indetermination means that the present is not the sum of its past. Something remains to be done which the past does not provide.

The second element 'novelty' means that the new occasion is different from any past occasion. Whitehead felt that this element has been ignored by classical philosophers. He saw that their systems had brought an impasse between enduring primary entities and radical novelty. The question arises: how can there be real change if such enduring entities are bound to their lineage because of their primary characteristic of identity? Novelty attempts to resolve this problem by allowing for a certain originality in the response of each occasion to its past. This originality may be distinguished between a) the novelty which arises from a new perspective given to the past data by the new occasion; and b) novelty resulting from the functioning of the mental pole in considering ideal alternatives (e.g. reversion). The former aspect results from the pure physical feelings provided to the new occasion in a new but deterministic fashion, that is to say, the raw
material presented to the new occasion is determined by whatever has been the route of occasions leading to this new concrescence. Even the simplest occasion exhibits some degree of novelty even if it is only in providing a new perspective of the past data. The latter aspect of novelty involves the novel aim that is characteristic of the new occasion. It is this aspect that involves the spontaneity, the originality of decisions (AI 332). Whitehead points to the pervasiveness of novelty when he delcares that no thinker thinks twice, and no subject experiences twice (PR 43). Because its future is not wholly contained in the past, the occasion is a genuinely novel entity. No two occasions can be said to duplicate each other. Physical change is one example of novelty in nature. The flow of nature is a flow because of the novelty coming to the fore. It is not merely change of place or change of order, but genuine orginality that is involved in such developing occasion that characterizes the ongoingness of life. Novelty is an expression of life gaining new force and vitality in each element found in nature. Nothing is static as science itself recognizes. For Whitehead, novelty is that aspect of concrescence from which arises intensity of feeling and an urge to new synthesis. Once novelty ceases, the occasion stops growing and becomes a past event to be superseded by a new concrescence in which the novelty again is manifest.
'Self-causation' as the third element gives meaning to the notion that every occasion is causa sui that is "It is finally responsible for the decision by which any lure for feeling is admitted to efficiency" (PR 135). It becomes what it is because of its own internal decisions. The occasion begins with a 'given', but it can choose to exploit fully those given conditions, or to shy away from that maximum. I can 'rev-up' the motor to its limit, or I can merely keep it idling. A person can choose to become the best plumber he can, or merely achieve mediocrity. "The ultimate freedom of things, lying beyond all determinations, was whispered by Galileo - E pur si muove - freedom for inquisitors to think wrongly, for Galileo to think rightly, and for the world to move in despite of Galileo and inquisitors" (PR 75). Each occasion no matter how much it conforms to its past, is finally a result of its own decisions, for the past cannot decide for it because as past it is no longer alive. The self-causation is the occasion being responsible for what it includes and how it includes it. The new occasion is alive and responsible for conforming itself to its immediate past. The self-causation is the culmination of an occasion's indetermination and novelty. Because the past data are not complete the occasion must be responsible for completing itself by deciding what the data are to become. The new perspective which can
characterize the occasion's novelty is a product of self-causation, a product of the decision making power of the new occasion as to what it will finally become. In this fundamental sense it is *causa sui*.

Creativity is the principle of novelty (31). The 'creative advance' is the application of this ultimate principle of creativity to each novel situation which it originates (32).

The ultimate metaphysical principle is the advance from disjunction to conjunction, creating a novel entity other than the entities given in disjunction (32).

The process (of becoming) is constituted by the influx of eternal objects into a novel determinateness of feeling which absorbs the actual world into a novel actuality (72).

Referring to the Categories of Explanation the interconnection of these notions becomes evident: category (I) the actual world is a process; (III) in the becoming of an actual entity, novelty arises; (VI) each actual entity decides what and how it will become determinate; (IX) how an actual entity becomes, constitutes what it is, and this principle is process: (XXII) through self-formation it is self-creative and this turns the incoherence of the world into coherence.

It is Whitehead's purpose to show that freedom needs the elements of 'creativity', 'novelty' and 'process', for, without these, freedom becomes an empty emotive term without any real reference to the constitution of an individual, whether that individual be a rock or a person.
In turn, without freedom these notions become equivalent to mere change, neither of positive nor of negative value. Freedom is manifested through these accompanying notions (PR 135), and these notions become significant and important only through freedom expressed in the individual occasion.
Section B - Creativity

To understand Whitehead's concept of creativity is one of the more difficult tasks encountered. Whitehead himself, in explaining what this concept means adopts language that is difficult to grasp; "Creativity is the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matters of fact. It is that ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe disjunctively become the one actual occasion which is the universe conjunctively" (PR 31). Elsewhere, he describes it as "the throbbing emotion of the past hurling itself into a new transcendent fact. It is the flying dart of which Lucretius speaks, hurled beyond the bounds of the world" (AI 227). It must not be forgotten that Whitehead's purpose in employing such language was to capture certain insights of human experience which the traditional philosophical systems of Hume and Kant had abandoned. In the end, if his language does not make much sense it is because one is attempting to look at it through traditional eye glasses and traditional terminology. This is not to say that it must not be examined in a critical vein, but it is to say that one must seek to understand Whitehead's insights in the light of ordinary experience which is often forgotten when one turns to philosophical discussion.
Though Whitehead labels creativity as the "Category of the Ultimate" with the result that no final explanation for it can be given, some understanding of this notion may be gathered by examining how it is used. In Modes of Thought the term 'power' is found in place of creativity. Power becomes the urge toward composition, toward actuality. This urge constitutes the "drive of the universe" (MT 119). This drive is for continual synthesis. It is compared to Aristotelian 'matter': "Creativity is without a character of its own.... It is the ultimate notion of the highest generality at the base of actuality. It cannot be characterized because all characters are more specific than itself" (PR 47). Johnson takes this 'ultimate notion' to mean that "creativity is an Idea (eternal object) which is exemplified in particular actual entities".¹ There is ground for such an interpretation, for Whitehead when referring to the 'Category of the Ultimate', uses terms such as 'general idea' and 'universals'. If it is not an eternal object then Whitehead would have to give it a special status above the 'Categories of Existence'. What status would this be? The problem is precisely this, that by making a special category, that of the 'Category of the Ultimate', Whitehead has given creativity a special status different
from an eternal object. That is why his ultimate appeal is to intuition (PR 32). Can it be said that Johnson is mistaken as to what Whitehead has done? Certainly Whitehead intended that it not be considered on the same level as other eternal objects but the problem remains whether in fact Creativity is any different.

Lawrence, in describing what Whitehead intends, says that he is redefining the term 'creation'. It takes the meaning of 'arising alone' in the sense that it does not have a creator nor can it be said to be created.2 Because of his theory of actuality, Whitehead cannot appeal to a creator who, like the God of Orthodox Christianity keeps the machine continually working to bring out new creations. The freedom of the universe would be compromised and to speak of self-creation would be to speak only of God and not of his creatures. Whitehead must introduce this category in order to give meaning to that continual process where one concrescence supercedes another, all the while each being responsible for what it becomes.

Is it to be concluded then that creativity is an agency above the actual entities themselves merely replacing God as the initiator of creation? Whitehead does not intend this conclusion. He emphasizes that creativity is not separable from its creatures (RM 92), but is the actualization of the potential inherent in the ongoing
process. In describing it as a 'throbbing emotion', Whitehead wants to make clear that there is creativity only because there are actual occasions. "All actual entities share with God this characteristic of self-causation. For this reason every actual entity also shares with God the characteristic of transcending all other actual entities, including God. The universe is thus a creative advance into novelty. The alternative to this is a static morphological universe" (PR 339-340).

Whitehead denies that creativity comes from nothing. The notion of creativity must abide by the 'Ontological Principle' which asserts that only actual entities are reasons, and nothing floats into the world from nowhere (PR 36, 373). The only real facts are actual entities - God and actual occasions, both past and present. Beyond these there is non-entity. Creativity functions only through these to allow novel concrescence.

It is this principle of creativity that accounts for the ongoingness of the universe: one concrescence succeeding another. It ensures that there will be a future which will continue to go beyond what is given in the present. The many become one and are increased by one; and this one is always novel and diverse from everything else in the universe (PR 32). Creativity involves unending novelty giving rise to new opportunities for synthesis.
This means that no actual occasion is completely determined by other actual entities. They condition, in that they are the raw matter which is a prior necessity, but they do not determine what the new concrescence will become.

Creativity guarantees that the entity which emerges from concrescence is causa sui and not the product of God. It allows Whitehead to say that it is genuinely the self's decision to choose what it will become; to choose one rather than another datum; to exclude some and relegate others to irrelevance. Such decisions are not a mere expression of its character as determined by its past because the past does not include the future which is novel in a very meaningful sense. Going beyond what is given is the essence of creativity if it is true creativity and not mere reproduction. Each occasion becomes an example of it because it is not only self-creative but also different from any member of its past.

Freedom, thus, requires the concept of creativity in order to escape the route inevitably leading to some version of determinism. Creativity allows the freedom in each occasion by making sure that no matter how closely the present occasion resembles its past there is always an element of originality which is not found in that past. This element of novelty allows for new standpoints of experience for which the new occasion is itself responsible and for which it can be said to be free.
Whitehead's philosophy has been legitimately characterized as process philosophy; generation after generation of actual occasions succeeding one another without end. Without going into the analysis of the actual process of an occasion's becoming, it may be profitable at this point briefly to mention how Whitehead presents this process. Each occasion has a certain 'life span' after which it is said to become immortal and another occasion is born. How to explain the continual birth of occasions which are not created by the past, is left to the concept of creativity. There is no rational explanation why the world should continue to exist and continue to become. Neither Kant nor Hume nor science offers an adequate explanation. In providing the concept of creativity Whitehead attempts to bridge that gap. Part of the structure of every occasion is an urge toward the future, an 'appetition' which is fulfilled by the continual concrescence of new occasions. Creativity is, thus, the concept offered by Whitehead to explain how one occasion is superceded by another novel occasion.
Section C - Actuality

Category of Explanation No. XIX states, "That the fundamental types of entities are actual entities and eternal objects; and that the other types of entities only express how all entities of the two fundamental types are in community with each other, in the actual world" (PR 37). But it is only the actual entity that is finally real while the eternal object is to be found either in God or in another actual entity. Whitehead feels that any explanation of reality must fall back on an examination of actual entities, for these "are the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real" (PR 27-28). These are the 'drops of experience' that make up the world. The traditional notion of 'substance', then, becomes replaced by the first category of existence, 'actual entity', and the notion of matter as an enduring substance must be dismissed if the philosophy of process is to be consistent. Whitehead summarizes his position in Category of Explanation (XVIII): "That every condition to which the process of becoming conforms in any particular instance, has its reason either in the character of some actual entity in the actual world of that concrescence, or in the character of the subject which is in process of concrescence" (PR 37).
Whitehead has redefined the 'really-real'. No longer can one appeal to an enduring substance, nor seek substance itself. What is left is an actuality that is exemplified in process - the continual generation of actual entities. Those which are called 'things' in ordinary experience, become in the Whiteheadian scheme, aggregates or 'societies' of actual entities. According to Sherburne, Whitehead "advocates a neutral monism in which actual entities are neither bits of material stuff nor Leibnizian souls, but, rather, units of process that may be linked to other actual entities to form temporal strands of matter, or perhaps linked with other sophisticated actual entities, all of which are intricately involved with a complex society like a brain, to form a route of inheritance that we identify as the conscious soul of an enduring person."³

A distinction within the term actual entities needs to be made. This term usually includes both God and actual occasions, therefore, to eliminate any possible confusion the term 'actual occasion' will be used when referring to the process and outcome of concrescence. It must be emphasized that, there is no essential difference between the two; "God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles.... He is their chief exemplification" (PR 521). The important difference lies within the phase of satisfaction. While the occasion can
be said to cease growing, God never arrives at a point where his nature stops developing; he never becomes mere data, but always continues to grow.

In order to understand what actuality means, it is essential to examine the nature or structure of an actual occasion. Though each actual occasion is said to be novel and diverse from any entity in its past or future, the way each differs is found in its internal constitution. It must conform to a given world which is its immediate past, and it does so in its own special way. The data given to it, the way it feels the data, and what it decides to do with them, come together in a novel synthesis. In the sense that it is self-creative, it also aims for some novel realization. It determines itself in this sense, that it is responsible for the way all these aspects come together into a 'concrescent unity', into a determinate 'unity of experience'.

An actual occasion is not a mere aggregate of data or 'feelings'. It is a creative synthesis that fuses its data according to its 'subjective aim' or 'ideal' of itself. This ideal acts as the guiding principle for that synthesis. The subjective aim acts as the final cause leading the concrescence forward. Because of this ideal or subjective aim, the occasion can be said to be causa sui (PR 135, 338). It is free precisely because it is the result of its own internal decisions reflecting
its ideal, but only reflecting it not duplicating it. "Its very existence is the presentation of its many components to itself, for the sake of its own ends. In other words, actuality is a complex unity, which can be analyzed as a process of feeling its own components. This is the doctrine that each actuality is an occasion of experience, the outcome of its own purposes" (FR 30-31). In distinguishing feeling from mere data, Whitehead makes clear that the occasion is not merely the sum of the data but a novel reaction to them.

An occasion can be said to be actual when it has significance for itself, that is, when it functions according to its own purposes or determinations and not solely according to those purposes offered to it. In this it acts as a self-creative agent, transforming incoherence (past data), into coherence (the novel occasion). It is in the fusion of the past with the subjective aim that the novel entity comes into being for it is none other than the actual process itself that constitutes that occasion. This last point is critical in understanding what an actual occasion is for: there is no initial self which exists prior to the process of concrescence. The subject which results is the unity of feeling, and prior to these feelings there are mere data (FR 136). As will be seen in the analysis of the process of concrescence the subject is at one with the process
itself, and is neither the data nor the subjective aim alone which is supplied by God in the form of initial aim. This raises the problem of how a subject can experience feeling when there is no prior subject. The crux of the matter lies in Whitehead's 'epochal' theory of time. To present a brief outline at this point, Whitehead believes that ordinary time is a consequence of concrescence, and concrescence itself does not take time. Also, to speak of before and after in the process of concrescence, is really improper since the process occurs 'out of time'. In actuality, the concrescence occurs 'all-at-once', with the experiencing subject being both, a result of the coming together of various feelings, and the cause of the coming together, (see references to Pol's criticism, P 36, 37 and to Cobb's and Ford's articles on epochal time, P 107, 108). To say, that, in the fusion of past data with the ideal aim, the creative process results in a novel entity which is an experiencing subject, is not to contradict the fact that, the occasion itself as subject decides how it will use the data. This is to say that no subject exists prior to completion of the concrescence yet since concrescence happens all-at-once there is no time when the occasion cannot be said to be subject of its own concrescence. The whole presupposes the data coming together, and the coming together of the data presupposes the whole. This is the effect of Whitehead's epochal
theory of time.

It has been stated that the world is self-created, in that each occasion is responsible for what it includes, and how it includes it. The occasion also functions as an organ for continued concrescence beyond itself, in the sense that it is partly responsible for what the future becomes. The present occasion acts as a 'lure for feeling' on the future in seeking to influence the arising occasion. In satisfaction the occasion 'looks' into the future with a vision of what it would want to come about. The concrescing occasion includes feelings that vary in emphasis; one feeling might invoke 'aversion' with the possible result that it would not be incorporated in its successor; another feeling might be felt with 'adversion', increasing in importance in the new concrescence, and passing on to the future with the same accompanying mood. It is in this way that the present occasion influences the future.

Whitehead attempts to reconcile two important notions - that of self-creation and responsibility for he recognizes that freedom must involve the notion of responsibility if it is to be a meaningful freedom. "In defence of this notion of self-production arising out of some primary given phase, I would remind you that apart from it, there can be no moral responsibility. The potter and not the pot, is responsible for the shape of the pot" (SYM 8-9).
"Actual entities perish but do not change" (PR 52; 122). There is anticipation in the present actuality of the future, an urge that affects its own satisfaction. This principle of unrest (PR 43), involves a categorical demand for change, but such change is not internal change in the present completed actuality. In the earlier phases of the occasion this principle is embodied in 'appetition' toward completion of the internal process, in satisfaction it becomes embodied as anticipatory feeling of the transcendent future. Change becomes manifested in the occasion's cessation as a present act of experience and its supercession by another actual occasion which takes up the banner of the past occasion, though reflecting its own new purposes. This is the continuous process into novelty which the universe reflects. Such anticipatory feeling is "one element in the immediate feelings of the concrescent subject" (PR 424–425). This 'urge' is one in which the present affects the future; an act of causation as well as an incident of moral responsibility.

Actuality is said to be a decision among possibilities. It becomes a limitation on pure creativity; a limitation that is reflected in decisions arising between alternative possibilities. "To be an actual thing is to be limited. An actual thing is an elicited feeling-value, which is analyzable as the outcome of a
graded grasping of the elements of the universe into the unity of one fact" (RM 150). Unlimited possibility and abstract creativity can procure nothing by themselves. It is decision which limits mere possibility by becoming this rather than that, that makes the actuality meaningful and definite. An occasion is a process of decision making which leads to a definite conclusion or satisfaction. This is expressed as the process of becoming being the transformation of incoherence into coherence, (see Cat. Obl. I, II, III, and Cat of Exp. XXVI, XXVII). The potentiality available through God comes to have a particular function in the process of concrescence. In this way actuality is truly a process of decision among mere possibilities. These two notions, one of incoherence into coherence, and the other of possibility turned into actuality, can be witnessed in the labour of an artist.

The artist's idea becomes actuality in the creation of an art object. The work itself can be the novel expression of contrasts in colour and emotions coming together in a complex and intense art object. Picasso's Guernica is an outstanding example of the fusion of emotions, shades and shapes, for the purpose of grasping and immortalizing the tragedy of war. Examined without the emotion, the picture remains bizarre and its various elements appear merely to be put together without order, resulting in a shallow chaotic scene. With the emotion
and feeling Picasso added to that work, it comes to have a synthesis that is heightened by the bizarre.

Complete understanding of the nature of an occasion can be gathered only as the occasion fully becomes in satisfaction. Then, each partial phase in that process of concrescence will be seen as contributing its part to make the total result complete. In one sense, a picture jig-saw puzzle is an example of this relationship. Each piece is incomplete, lacks identity and meaning. Only when all the pieces are in place, does the picture emerge. But, again, this reference to a puzzle is only accurate in a static sense. The occasion is not a unity of parts, but a 'concrescence', a synthesis, growing larger from that which was given in the initial stage. Furthermore, the occasion becomes what it is through its own decisions; it is self-creative, responsible for what it contains and how it contains it. Emmet expresses that idea thus, "the final phase of the actual entity, when it has 'achieved definiteness' shows its own reason for what it includes and what it omits".4

If an occasion cannot be understood apart from its completion, then, efficient causation is not sufficient to explain what that entity is, or what it will become in any later phase, without reference to final causation, that is, the occasion itself deciding how and what it will add to the world. It is its own reason for what it becomes,
how it determines itself internally by deciding what it will accept, what it will leave out, and what it will emphasize and what it will de-emphasize. Freedom becomes all of this internal process of becoming; the manner in which mere data are transformed in an organized feeling entity ultimately responsible to its own self.
CHAPTER II

THE MAIN ASPECTS OF AN OCCASION

The preceding discussion centred on the role of the actual occasion as a self-creative process. The aim was to present a general background to Whitehead's theory of actuality, without any analysis of the actual process. Although the occasion is said to be a creative unity without any internal division, it can be analysed into various elements which will help to explain that process. The concepts which are to be considered - 'subjective aim', 'subjective form' and 'prehensions' are not elements which have existence apart from the occasion; but are to be taken as concepts which enable Whitehead to make clear what the process of concrescence involves. Nor does the division into phases, which will be presented later, represent any real division in the occasion. These divisions are presented only for the purpose of analysis (PR 434). No such 'genetic division' occurs in the concrescence. More will be said of this in Chapter III.
SECTION A - SUBJECTIVE AIM

Whitehead defines 'subjective aim' as that "which controls the becoming of a subject" and "that subject feeling a proposition with the subjective form or purpose to realize it in that process of self-creation" (PR 37). It is said to be the ideal which guides the concrescence of an occasion as to what it should include and exclude (PR 133), as well as guiding the way in which the objective data are to be integrated by the occasion. It is important to keep in mind that this ideal is only a guide to and not a ruler of the occasion's becoming. "The determinate unity of an actual entity is bound together by the final causation towards an ideal progressively defined by its progressive relation to the determinations and indeterminations of the datum. The ideal, itself felt, defines what 'self' shall arise from the datum; and the ideal is also an element in the self-which thus arises" (PR 228). The various apprehensions which comprise an actual occasion are interrelated because of the guidance provided by the subjective aim (PR 341-342; Category of Subjective Unity I).

The subjective aim, is itself a proposition felt along with other data, but it acts as the unifying factor for these various feelings. In this connection it is called the 'lure for feeling' (PR 281, 130). It is given to the occasion in its initial phase along with the rest
of the data which comprise past occasions. These occasions are objectified, alternative possibilities are entertained, and a new synthesis comes about, all according to what is possible in that situation and what will enable that occasion, not only to enjoy its own satisfaction, but also, to contribute to the society of which it is part (PR 128).

The subjective aim is modified during its life 'epoch', though it does retain its substantial identity as the basic unifying factor of the occasion (PR 343). Such modification is expressed in simplification from high abstraction to particular decisions and choices. It is this subjective aim that becomes responsible for this selection of concrete and abstract data, and for the use to which they are put (Category Explanation VI). "This basic conceptual feeling (subjective aim as initial aim), suffers simplification in the successive phases of concrescence. It starts with conditioned alternatives, and by the successive decisions is reduced to coherence. The doctrine of responsibility is entirely concerned with this modification" (PR 342; 74, 375). It is already to be noticed that the subjective aim is not a single-minded path which the occasion must follow, but is to be considered more of a blue print in which there is room for variety.

This modification or self-determination of the aim can be said to be the focal point of freedom within the limits set by the past (God and past occasion). The "novel
concrècence acts with creative freedom or self-determination in three ways (a) in the autonomy of the subjective form of its initial aim; (b) in its specification of its subjective aim; and (c) in its concrete actualization of its aim...

The valuation of this relevant possibility, the progressive clarification of the ideal aim, and the realization of this aim in concrete feeling of satisfaction, all belong not to God but to the self-creative activity of the novel occasion. 'Thus an originality in the temporal world is conditioned though not determined by an initial subjective aim supplied by the ground of all order and of all originality' (PR 164).  

Whitehead describes the final outcome as "the autonomous master of its own concrescence into subject-superject" (PR 374). The occasion can be said to be subject because the outcome is guided by its own internal process going beyond the merely given; it presides over its own immediacy of becoming (PR 71). It is superject in that it seeks to go beyond itself in influencing the future as an immortal fact. To stress this autonomy of the subjective aim as the final outcome Whitehead makes the curt statement that "There is nothing above it by way of final condition" (PR 375).
"According to the ontological principle there is nothing which floats into the world from nowhere" (PR 373). The question which arises is: where does this original idea which the concrescence adopts as its ideal, come from? There are three distinct aspects to this question: why is there a subjective aim; where does it come from; why is there this one and not another?

Whitehead comes close to giving an answer to the second question in the following statement: "This subjective aim is both an example and limitation of the ontological principle. It is an example, in that the principle is here applied to the immediacy of concrescent fact. The subject completes itself during the process of concrescence by a self-criticism of its own incomplete phases. In another sense the subjective aim limits the ontological principle by its own autonomy. But the initial stage of its aim is an endowment which the subject inherits from the inevitable ordering of things, conceptually realized in the nature of God.... Thus the initial stage of the aim is rooted in the nature of God and its completion depends on the self-creation of the subject-superject" (PR 373). The question, 'where does it come from', has been answered by reference to God as the supplier of the 'initial aim'.

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To examine in more detail, the source of the subjective aim, that which has been called the 'initial aim' must receive the focus of attention. The subjective aim is initiated as an aim derived from God. The initial phase of the subjective aim (PR 104), variously called, the 'basic conceptual aim' (PR 54), the 'initial subjective aim' (PR 164, 375), and the 'initial aim' (PR 374), is a conceptual feeling of some eternal object with a subjective form of appetition, that is an urge to become actualized. This conceptual feeling must be found somewhere, that is, if it is to follow the ontological principle it must be in some actual entity. It cannot be derived from contemporary or future occasions, nor can it come from an antecedent occasion for the essential reason that it must be novel. What is left is the locus of all eternal objects, God (PR 373). He becomes "that actual entity from which each temporal concrescence receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts" (PR 374, 104, 164, 527).

This derived conceptual feeling is available to the concrescence at its initiation, thus, it comes in the form of a hybrid physical prehension, for only physical prehensions are available in the initial phase. It is hybrid because it originates as a conceptual feeling in the nature of God, and the "prehension by one subject of a conceptual prehension, or of an 'impure' prehension, belonging to the mentality of another subject" is called
a hybrid prehension (PR 163). God prehends in his nature all eternal objects with an accompanying subjective form or mood of appetition, and when an eternal object becomes the initial aim, the accompanying subjective form is also reproduced by the concrescence. In this manner God acts as the originator of the initial aim leaving to the occasion the fulfilment of that ideal.

The first question, 'why is there a subjective aim', receives a different type of answer. The 'Category of the Ultimate', (PR 31) requires that there be a continual flow from incoherence to coherence; the world must constantly regenerate itself into novel unity. Thus, Whitehead has need of an ordering principle beyond God who merely offers order rather than makes order. In the macrocosm God orders the universe through 'divine persuasion'; in the microcosm the subjective aim fulfills that role by acting as the ideal to be followed in every concrescence. The many prehensions must come together in synthesis, not haphazardly but in a meaningful unity. This unity is guided by the subjective aim. Whitehead needs the subjective aim then, so that "the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the world conjunctively", according to the ideal pattern set out by the subjective aim.

At this point it would help to clarify a problem raised by Poles, that of the "conflict between subjective
aim considered as an indivisible unity belonging to the whole of the actual entity, and the same subjective aim considered as undergoing successive modifications." If it is not adequately dealt with, he says, "there will be some grounds for thinking of an actual entity a function of two perfectly determinate elements: an actual world exercising efficient causation, and a God described in terms of a static valuation of eternal objects." Puls argues that Whitehead insists both, that the subjective aim remains unchanged throughout the concrescence, and that the subjective aim does change. This creates the following dilemma. If the subjective aim remains unchanged, then the concrescence is not internally determined by its own decisions, but is really externally determined by God who supplies this particular subjective aim. On the other hand, if the subjective aim does change, then what is that ideal which is supposed to guide the concrescence and supply the necessary unifying factor for the feelings?

In addition to this dilemma, there also arises another problem connected to the changing subjective aim. If, as Whitehead argues, there is no before and after in the stages of concrescence, then what sense does it make to say that the subjective aim undergoes change, for this implies one state following another? Furthermore, if the subjective aim undergoes change, then the first elements of its development will influence the later elements, with
the result that the actuality cannot be said to be a result of its own decisions, but merely the result of the first elements of its development, those being given by God through the initial aim. This would lead to the conclusion that the past is the real cause of the occasion and not the occasion itself.

Dealing with the dilemma, Whitehead does say that each occasion has one and only one subjective aim which retains its identity throughout concrescence. Poln himself realizes that the subjective aim "takes its start from a hybrid physical feeling of God". This means that one of the physical feelings of the concrescence is the feeling of God as objectified by one of its conceptual feelings - an eternal object (PR 343). This eternal object becomes the initial aim. Since eternal objects are pure potentials or ideals, they provide only an outline to the concrescence, a blueprint to be followed. They do not change in the course of actualization, but they do become more specific as a consequence of concrescence, in that the "basic conceptual feeling suffers simplification... It starts with conditioned alternatives, and by successive decisions is reduced to coherence" (PR 342).

The fact that the initial aim is a hybrid feeling which, as an eternal object, must undergo simplification in the sense that potentiality is made concrete, makes Poln's dilemma inoperable. It is consistent with self-
creativity that there is one initial aim derived from God, which undergoes specification in the life of the occasion. To bring this to the level of ordinary experience, the boy who decides to be a doctor has a guiding idea which begins fairly undefined. As he grows he will begin to act upon this goal, taking the relevant courses in school and making the necessary inquiries. The vague idea of doctor becomes more and more specified; he wants to become a general practitioner later specializing in gynaecology. In the same manner the initial aim which is vague and general becomes specific and definite.

The second problem arising from the changing subjective aim, stems from the time element 'before and after' necessarily involved in speaking of change. A complete answer to this requires an explanation of the 'epochal' theory of time. Whitehead argues that the occasion does not 'take time' in the ordinary sense of time, that is, there is no actual development from one stage to another, on to final satisfaction. This takes place 'all at once', and only for the purpose of analysis can the occasion be said to have stages of development. Whitehead expresses this difficult notion in the context of 'Zeno's Paradox': "The conclusion is that in every act of becoming there is the becoming of something with temporal extension; but that the act itself is not extensive, in the sense that it is divisible into earlier and later acts of becoming
which correspond to the extensive divisibility of what has become.... the doctrine is enunciated that the creature is extensive, but that its act of becoming is not extensive" (PR 107). In a later part Whitehead repeats the same notion: "This genetic passage from phase to phase is not in physical time: the exactly converse point of view expresses the relationship of concrescence to physical time. It can be put shortly by saying, that physical time expresses some features of the growth, but not the growth of the features. The final complete feeling is the 'satisfaction'" (PR 434).

More will be said in the final part of this paper in connection with the problem of causality. Whitehead does attempt to present an answer to the problem of time. Because there is no before and after in concrescence, the subjective aim cannot be said to be determined by any prior stage of development except in so far as there is a maximum allowed to it by the initial aim supplied by God. Within these limits the subjective aim is freely determined by its own self-production. If Whitehead's theory of time is plausible, and science does appear to speak in similar terms when referring to quantum of energy and energy pulsation, then there is no fundamental problem in speaking about the 'all-at-onceness' of concrescence rather than the becoming of concrescence in the sense of definite stages. The stumbling block which Pols makes reference to, is the language itself that is used in describing what goes on.
It must be remembered that the language itself proves to be an obstacle in understanding Whitehead's radical notions; and to overcome this obstacle the reader must be continually aware that Whitehead is presenting a slice of process, stopped for the benefit of analysis. Once stopped it becomes an abstraction which is analysed in terms of stages of development.
SECTION C - THE ROLE OF GOD IN THE FORMATION OF SUBJECTIVE AIM

The answer to the question, 'where does the initial aim come from', introduced the concept of God in this analysis. This concept becomes relevant not only to the above question, but also to the third question, 'why is there this subjective aim and not another?' The role of God must be examined in order to make fully clear whether the subjective aim allows freedom to the occasion, or acts as the agent by which God determines it.

Whitehead describes God as the 'initial agent', the eternal organ of novelty (PR 104); "He is the lure for feeling, the eternal urge of desire. His particular relevance to each creative act as it arises from its conditioned standpoint in the world, constitutes Him the initial 'object of desire' establishing the initial phase of each subjective aim" (PR 522). It is God who supplies each occasion with the eternal object, called the initial aim, which provides a primary structure for order. This primary order allows for gradations of relevance of the rest of the initial data. It is said to constitute the primary phase of feeling from which flows further valuation and emphasis. The first phase, as presented later, is composed of physical feelings that are drawn from past occasions. These feelings need to be ordered, and it is the role of God to provide some element of structure. But God's role must not be taken as creator, either of
the subjective aim, or of that particular order. His function is to act as a 'lure' for the ongoing process: "The true metaphysical position is that God is the aboriginal condition which qualified action" (PR 344). He gives structure to each concrescence by providing a 'blueprint' in the form of initial aim around which the data are organized.

In the creation of every actual occasion certain elements must come together; there must be past occasions to provide the raw material, eternal objects to be determined, God to provide the initial aim, and the decisions on the part of the concrescence itself. All these elements are essential, none by itself is sufficient. Eternal objects provide the potentiality that becomes determined, but as potential they must have a link with actuality. God acts as that link through his primordial nature which envisages all eternal objects ordering them into relevant patterns (PR 522). In this manner some eternal objects are made available to each occasion as initial aim.

How is it that the concrescence derives this potentiality and not that, from its prehension of God? It cannot be said that the occasion chooses that particular aim since this would presuppose a subject prior to the subjective aim. An occasion in its initial stage, is a bundle of prehensions of which the initial aim is one. It is not a subject which feels but a subject which results because of the feelings. It must be remembered that
Whitehead sees the process itself as the centre of our attention, not the result of this process. The occasion is said to be the process itself. This process is one of emergence of feelings, not of a feeler. When Whitehead looks at an individual, he sees that individual as the result of a certain ongoing process. To speak of John Smith is to experience a synthesis of complex feelings which result in a unity called John Smith, not John Smith experiencing complex feelings. To this point Whitehead makes an important clarification: "The term 'subject' has been retained because in this sense it is familiar in philosophy. But it is misleading. The term 'superject' would be better. The subject-superject is the purpose of the process originating the feelings. The feelings are inseparable from the end at which they aim, and this end is the feeler. The feelings aim at the feeler, as their final cause. The feelings are what they are in order that their subject may be what it is" (PR 339). To speak, then, of a subject deciding which initial pattern to choose is to misunderstand Whitehead's thesis; it is to attempt to put the cart before the horse. One of the major stumbling blocks to overcome in Whitehead is to understand the meaning and consequence of this notion.

It has been stated that in the process of self-creation there is no creator, yet the process cannot come from nothing for that would do violence to the ontological principle. Some agent is required to provide a stimulus to
the process of concrescence. It is the function of God to provide that ideal possibility around which the other feelings will come together. God aims at maximum intensity of experience for himself and the world by conceiving of a certain ordering of all possibilities (PR 522, 373, 46). For any given set of conditions there will be available a particular possibility which if actualized would produce maximum intensity of feeling. As viewed primordially Godprehends all possibilities with equal relevance, but through his consequent nature God becomes conscious of the actual world as it is developing. Whitehead states the consequent nature originates with the physical experience derived from the temporal world and that it acquires integration with the primordial side (PR 524). Through this integration emerges the ideal possibility for that actual world which if taken up will result in maximum intensity. If Whitehead is to be taken at his word and God is no exception to his system, then like the actual occasion which is subject-superject God does have a superjective nature (PR 135) which influences the future. Whitehead does not elaborate on this aspect of God but he does say that "The 'superjective' nature of God is the character of the pragmatic value of his specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity in the various temporal instances." (PR 135). It is suggested that it is through this aspect that God urges the occasion to accept the initial aim offered to it as its guiding principle.
The past actual occasions also contribute to the decision as to which ideal will be actualized: "There will be additional ground of relevance for select eternal objects by reason of their ingression into derivative actual entities belonging to the actual world of the concrescent occasion in question" (PR 46). Past occasions add to the relevance of certain possibilities for succeeding occasions by their nature as subject-superject. Through appetition there is an urge for the future beyond the satisfaction itself. Each occasion becomes a 'stubborn fact' of which every future occasion must take notice. The past data do not present themselves as neutral but involve their own subjective forms which the occasion receiving them must take into consideration. The following example will attempt to illustrate the various elements as they affect concrescence. The eternal object 'blue' would have some relevance for an occasion by virtue of its inclusion in God's primordial vision. It would take an added relevance for an occasion in whose world blue things are important. In this manner the past world does exert its influence on which initial aim will be most suited for that concrescence. It does not decree which will become the initial aim, but will affect the degree of intensity. In this way the pattern of relevance of eternal objects is modified with the creative advance of nature.

In this creative advance new possibilities are
continually being opened up due to the novelty which each new concrescence adds to the world. The change in intensity and the added relevance of some eternal objects, add to the relevance and difference between pure possibility and real potentiality. The actual occasions, as they come to pass, lay down conditions for their successors; and God, in his consequent nature, takes notice of this change; both contributing to the ordering of nature. "If we prefer the phraseology, we can say that God and the actual world constitute the character of creativity for the initial phase of novel concrescence" (PR 374; 527). "Apart from God, there would be no actual world; apart from the actual world with its creativity, there would be no rational explanation of the ideal vision which constitutes God" (RM 157). The factors which determine which initial aim will be given to the new occasion, have been shown to be God acting as lure by offering the ideal possibility and the past world influencing God's consequent nature in presenting that ideal which will allow the greatest intensity of feeling in the new occasion. God cannot ignore the influence of nature, and, though his primordial nature is unchanging, it is God through his consequent nature acting upon his primordial nature that allows the relevant ideal to be made available to the emerging world through the primordial nature.

But, as will be shown next, the world need not accept that particular order or intensity. The freedom of each occasion
lies partly in deviating from what the past and God give to it.
SECTION D - DOES THE CONCEPT OF GOD COMPROMISE THE REAL INDIVIDUALITY OF THE OCCASION?

Since it is God who supplies the ideal aim, is there any justification for concluding that God does compromise the real individuality of the occasion as a self-creative entity? There are indications which would suggest a positive reply. Certainly the comment that "the initial stage of its aim is an endowment which the subject inherits from the inevitable ordering of things conceptually realized in the nature of God" (PR 373), suggests some strong deterministic elements in Whitehead's scheme stemming from his concept of God. But, a deeper examination of the concept of God will show that the occasion is not determined by God except as being supplied with that general outline consisting of the initial aim.

Whitehead has been accused of inserting this bogus notion of God as an attempt to save his system. Proof of this may be the following statement of Whitehead: "It may be doubted whether any properly general metaphysics can ever, without the illicit introduction of other considerations, get much further than Aristotle" (SMW 249-250). Is this what Whitehead has done? He does state that no reason can be given for the nature of God because, "God is the ultimate limitation, and His Existence is the ultimate irrationality" (SMW 257). Although he makes God the ultimate irrationality, he does place him under his scheme of Categories; "God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles,
invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification" (PR 521). He is given both a mental and physical pole, referred to as the primordial and consequent natures. Like other occasions, these contribute to his superject nature which puts its stamp on the evolving world (PR 135). He is one among many occasions; "Both are in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty" (PR 529). Certainly Whitehead's God is not the absolute being of orthodox religion.

There is nothing in Whitehead of the nature of Aquinas' proofs for the existence of God. Yet, he feels justified in asserting the existence of God because he is trying to fit into a coherent scheme some real insights that occur in human experience. His initial position concerning speculative philosophy is that it cannot deduce the facts of the temporal world, but attempts to construct a set of categories which describe adequately the conditions under which these 'facts' occur. God must be introduced, according to Whitehead, as fulfilling certain important and necessary functions; "Apart from the intervention of God, there could be nothing new in the world, and no order in the world. The course of creation would be a dead level of ineffectiveness, with all balance and intensity progressively excluded by the cross currents of incompatibility. The novel hybrid feelings derived from God, with the derivative sympathetic conceptual valuations, are the foundations of progress" (PR 377).
The most important function performed by God is to bridge the gap between mere possibility and actuality for "Unlimited possibility and abstract creativity can procure nothing" (RM 91). God becomes the means by which the actual world in becoming acquires order and balance within a framework of novelty. Without such order novelty would be merely a chaos of incompatible feelings. Each datum would reflect only its past without taking account of the entire given world; "From this point of view, he is the principle of concretion; the principle whereby there is initiated a definite outcome from a situation riddled with ambiguity" (PR 523).

God in his primordial nature envisages all possibilities available to the world. These possibilities are the eternal objects which are provided for the concrescence. In their self-creation, actual occasions require eternal objects as the ideal to be followed; an ideal to guide the concrescence. But, unless there is some order among them, they will be of little benefit. God's role is to arrange these eternal objects in patterns which will meet the demands of the evolving world, and to make them available to the new occasions (PR 348). In this manner God acts as an initiating principle in the concrescence by providing the initial subjective aim that meets the appropriate conditions of harmony and order (PR 164). Without God there would not be available to Whitehead a receptacle holding together the realm of unlimited possibility; there would be no ordering principle; and creation would be
repetition of what has occurred in the past.

By supplying the ideal pattern to the occasion, God functions not as force (SMW 276), but "his purpose in the creative advance is the evocation of intensities" (PR 161); 'evocation' being the form of persuasion. What matters to God is not one and only one end for an occasion, but the achievement of an actuality that seeks to realize the greatest possible degree of intensity of feeling. In supplying a particular aim, he seeks this end, but it is left to the occasion itself how it will use and follow the ideal. The principle of creativity means that no actual entity is completely determined by other actual entities, God included (PR 339). Once God supplies that initial aim, his importance for that occasion ceases. The rest of the occasion's becoming is dependent only on itself.

God does not compromise the real individuality of the occasion. Though he supplies the initial aim, his effect on the concrescence stops there. To understand this, one must remember that the initial aim is merely a guide, an eternal object whose nature lacks actuality; it is mere potentiality, mere ideal. It presents a certain range of potential from which the occasion's subjective aim defines itself. The exclusion of this datum and the emphasis of that, lie in the nature of its self-becoming, not in the nature of God. Each actual occasion becomes responsible for the use it makes of the pattern provided by God. "It derives from God its basic
conceptual aim, relevant to its actual world, yet with indeterminations awaiting its own decisions" (PR 343). The occasion has the power to make determinate that which is vague and indeterminate at its initial stage.

According to Christian, there are three ways in which the initial aim allows creative freedom: a) in the autonomy of its subjective form; b) in the specification of its subjective aim; and c) in the concrete actualization of its aim. According to (a), the subjective form is not a mere reproduction of the subjective form of God's conceptual feeling. It is "affected by the totality of the actual occasion" (PR 292), as well as "by the qualitative element in the objective content" (AI 326). More will be said of 'subjective form' in the next section. As to (b), the occasion does arise with a relevant ideal, but one which is vague and which must await concrescence to see what this ideal will mean in the particular context. It is vague in that various possibilities and relationships are open to it. In concrescence, the aim becomes 'this thing and no other'.

The third aspect is similar to the second except for the ideal pattern given to it. The process of concrescence is not given nor controlled by external factors. The occasion has freedom in that, it chooses what it will become. Any attempt at understanding or predicting the outcome of a particular concrescence from an analysis of its initial phase, cannot succeed because the occasion is not fully actual until all
indeterminations and indecisions have become determinate. Only at satisfaction is there a determinate concrescence whereby the subjective aim is no longer an ideal pattern, but a fully determinate entity. In this sense, the occasion is internally determined and externally free. It is internally determined in that it is solely responsible for the way all its various aspects finally come together into a unity of experience. Except in being given its start, it is not influenced by external elements and in this it is said to be externally free. In this sense it is also self-creative.

To summarize the status of God, it must be remembered that he is not all powerful, for neither did he create the metaphysical basis of all being, nor can he modify its laws. His aim is to lead the world on a path that will result in the greatest possible harmony and beauty by making available to each occasion the initial aim.
SECTION E - THE SUBJECTIVE FORM OF FEELING

Another important concept that expresses the freedom of an occasion is 'subjective form'. It is always said to be the subjective form of a prehension or feeling. It is the 'how' of a feeling or ingestion. The attitude taken toward a prehended datum, or the emotional reaction of the subject to its datum, is the subjective form of feeling. "It is the mode of ingestion of eternal objects into the actual occasion" (PR 131).

Every prehension consists of three factors: a) the 'subject' which is prehending; b) the 'datum' which is prehended; and c) the subjective form which is how that subject prehends that datum (PR 35, Category of Explanation (XI)). The third factor can be exemplified by many species of subject forms: emotions, valuations, purposes, adversions, aversions, and consciousness (PR 35). For Whitehead, these present an important source of novelty, especially where feelings are concerned. "The essential novelty of a feeling attaches to its subjective form. The initial data, and even the nexus which is the objective datum, may have served other feelings with other subjects. But the subjective form is the immediate novelty; it is how that subject is feeling that objective datum" (PR 354). It is the source of novelty because it is that by which there is a transformation of a datum as mere datum into an element of feeling in a novel concrescence (PR 249).

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Even where two occasions feel the same datum, they will not feel it in the same way. The how of feeling, or the way it is considered and used will always be different to some relevant degree. "There is no tearing away this subjective form from the novelty of this concrescence. It is enveloped in the immediacy of its immediate present" (PR 354). The same incident may be observed by two people, but their reactions to it may be totally different. At a football game two spectators cheering for opposing teams see the referee call a penalty on the play. Jack who is cheering for the Tigers, on seeing the call, becomes hysterical, shouting obscenities at the referee. The touchdown just scored by the Tigers is going to be nullified because of the penalty. Jim also sees the same penalty called. He too becomes excited jumping up and down for joy because he is cheering for the opposing team. The same datum is prehended but with completely different subjective forms.

Another example clearly demonstrates the importance subjective form can have in the outcome of concrescence. John Smith picks up his newspaper and sees a photograph with the caption "Patricia Jones at Monte Carlo". He is not interested and goes on to the next article. This man man is affected by the datum only to the degree that he now knows there is a woman called Patricia Jones at Monte Carlo. This fact is registered with little or no accompanying interest. Another man, Tom Jones sees the
same photograph and slumps weakly into his chair. It is his wife whom he had thought long dead. He too is changed, but violently. This datum leads to his committing suicide. Certainly the datum is the same but the arising subjective form is vastly different. For Whitehead, the extent of originality in the subjective form from one occasion to another will always vary in degree and in no case is there bare conformity. "The feeling is always novel in reference to its data since its subjective form, though it must always have reproductive reference to the data, is not wholly determined by them" (PR 355).

'Valuations' which are a species of subjective form characterize the subjective forms of conceptual feelings, that is, those involving the mental pole (PR 367). These can be either valuations up, called adersions, or valuations down, aversions (PR 388). Adversion signifies that there has been an enhancement in intensity of the conceptual feeling accompanying the physical feeling, while with aversion the physical feeling is either eliminated or transmitted with lessened intensity. As a result of valuation, the importance of a given datum as an eternal object for the final unity of feeling at satisfaction is either enhanced or attenuated. Not only does it become a matter of approval or disapproval, but in cases of complex conceptual feelings there is an ordering of importance with reference to the subjective aim. Subjective ways of feeling are not merely receptive
of the data as alien facts; they clothe the dry bones with
the flesh of a real being, emotional, purposive, appreciative.

Valuation has two aspects: a) quality, that is, how the eternal object is going to be used; b) intensity, that is, the degree of importance of its utilization (PR 368-69). The two examples given previously are also useful here. In the case of the man seeing the picture of the woman, no qualitative change or effect could be noticed except for disinterest. In the case of Tom Jones there is both a deep qualitative and intensive change in him. The valuation of the conceptual feeling is catastrophic. In the first example concerning the football penalty, each spectator had a different qualitative valuation but equal intensity of emotion - one of extreme joy and the other of extreme anger.

Valuation can occur either as adversion or aversion - either valuation up or valuation down; the feeling in question can assume importance in the concrescence or be reduced to ineffectualness. Whitehead describes them as follows: the "physical feeling, whose valuation produces adversion, is thereby an element with some force of persistence into the future beyond its own subject.... When there is aversion, instead of adversion, the transcendent creativity assumes the character that it inhibits, or attenuates, the objectification of that subject in the guise of that feeling" (PR 422).

The subjective form becomes a centre for novelty in the concrescence and thus, an important expression of
freedom in the self-creative occasion. More than anything else, it testifies to the occasion's freedom from past influences, "though it must always have reproductive reference to the data, it is not wholly determined by them" (PR 355). The occasion is what it becomes not only according to its subjective aim, but just as important, according to the subjective forms of its feelings.
SECTION F - PREHENSIONS AND FEELINGS

The process in which an actual entity reacts to its environment is called 'prehension'. Prehensions constitute the vehicle by which one actual entity can be said to objectify another; they are said to be 'vectors' in that "they feel what is there and transform it into what is here" (PR 133). They are also termed 'Concrete' Facts of Relatedness', and are presented as one of the 'Categories of Existence" (PR 32). In analysing actual occasions, what one discovers is complexity of prehensions; "The first analysis of an actual entity into its most concrete elements, discloses it to be a concrescence of prehensions, which have originated in its process of becoming. All further analysis is an analysis of prehensions" (PR 35, Category of Explanation (X)).

There are two general divisions of prehensions: a) negative prehension - exclusion from concrescence; b) positive prehension - inclusion in concrescence. A negative prehension is one in which the datum is not accepted in the make up of the new occasion. The occasion is said to hold its datum as 'inoperative'. In positive prehensions the data become internalized and part of the new occasion. This is the process that is termed 'feeling'. 'Feelings' are more complex in the Whiteheadian scheme than in ordinary language. This process of feeling can be analysed into five factors: "(I) the 'subject' which feels, (II) the 'initial data' which are to be felt, (III) the 'elimination' in
virtue of negative prehension, (IV) the 'objective datum' which is felt, (V) the 'subjective form' which is how that subject feels that objective datum" (PR 337-338)

Positive prehensions are further subdivided into 'conceptual prehensions' and 'physical prehensions'. The former is a prehension whose datum is an eternal object (PR 35), and this occurs in the second phase of concrescence. Physical prehensions involve the transfer of data from other actual entities by a process described a 're-enaction', 'reproduction' or 'conformation' (PR 364). This occurs in the first phase of concrescence, and provides a link between the past and present. But, though the link is a real one, it cannot be said to open the door to further determinism for this transfer of material from past to present is not exact, since "in this reproduction there is abstraction from the various totalities of feeling" (PR 364). The new occasion is responsible for what it accepts, how it uses it, and what subjective form is given to it. Negative prehensions are themselves examples of how the new occasion has some control on what it accepts.

The following chart makes clear the division of prehensions:
PREHENSIONS

Positive Prehensions (feelings)  Negative Prehensions (exclusion from feelings)

Conceptual feelings (of eternal objects)  Physical feelings (of actual entities)

Transmuted feelings (of nexus)  Simple feelings (of one actual entity (PR 361-362))

Pure (where an actual entity is objectified by one of its physical feelings (PR 469))  Hybrid (where an actual entity is objectified by one of its conceptual feelings e.g. initial aim (PR 376))
"This word 'feeling' is a mere technical term; but it has been chosen to suggest that functioning through which the concrescent actuality appropriates the datum so as to make it its own" (PR 249). Feelings are said to be 'vectors', feeling what is there and transforming it into what is here (PR 133). Each occasion becomes an act of experience arising out of data which are felt and absorbed in a special and novel way so as to result in a novel unity of feeling called a concrescence. Whitehead describes it as "the agent which reduces the universe to its perspective for fact" (MT 13). Without such 'perspective' we would be bombarded with infinite detail. This is born out in daily experience in which the individual is constantly bombarded with sense data. The individual blocks most of it out without consciously realizing it. When one looks at a painting, one does not see every detail or aspect all at once.

The gaze shifts from one series of details to another. The same occurs in listening to a symphony. Not every instrument is heard at the same time, but certain ones stand out while others recede to inaudibility. As one's concentration increases, new sounds are caught. Feeling is that process which differentiates what is to become part of experience and what is to remain external.

A feeling cannot be abstracted from the actual entity entertaining it, for it is in virtue of its feelings that the subject is what it is (PR 339); and in virtue of
its subject that the feeling is what it is (PR 338). "This mutual determination of the elements involved in a feeling is one expression of the truth that the subject of the feeling is 'causa sui'. The partial nature of a feeling, other than the complete satisfaction, is manifest by the impossibility of understanding its generation without recourse to the whole subject" (PR 338). It is in this manner that the subject is not determined by any single past event, whether God or other actual entities. Though feelings originate as objective data from the past, they are feelings because of how they are synthesized to form this new subject-superject. They are not merely a sum of data coming from the past, for then feelings would be mere reproduction; they are novel 'concrescence', a new synthesis, which transcends all other actual occasions including God (PR 339).

Feelings are important because they give rise to responsibility; "The subject is responsible for being what it is in virtue of its feelings. It is derivately responsible for the consequences of its existence because they flow from its feelings" (PR 339). The subject begins with conditioned alternatives, which by successive decisions are reduced to coherence. Modifications and new combinations occur in the successive stages of concrescence until satisfaction is achieved. In these modifications the subject becomes responsible for what it becomes (PR 342), and in this the subject has freedom; the freedom to make of itself what it wishes, within the scope of its subjective aim.
CHAPTER III

PHASES OF CONCRESCENCE

So far the various components of an actual occasion have been presented as distinct elements in the process of concrescence. The picture created has been of something like a machine building itself up by means of various levers, nuts and bolts; a machine that has been studied in its various aspects. For Whitehead nothing can be further from his intent. Such separation of elements does not represent what actually goes on in concrescence. This mode of analysis is a method of explaining how Whitehead interprets the on-going process of creation. It helps one to grasp ordinary experience and interpret it into a coherent, logical and adequate metaphysical scheme. The following division of concrescence into phases or stages, likewise, will be helpful in understanding how Whitehead's scheme is a satisfactory method of analysis and explanation of ordinary experience. But it must be understood from the outset that, no such division occurs in reality, the process of concrescence is a unity, a synthesis, devoid of any division.

The following division of concrescence into phases is termed 'genetic' division (PR 433), and is described by Whitehead as follows: "In the 'genetic' mode, the prehensions are exhibited in their genetic relationship to each other. The actual entity is seen as a process; there is a growth from phase to phase; there are processes of integration and
of reintegration (PR 434). If taken literally, that is, that there is a first phase, followed by a second phase, until finally satisfaction occurs, then the concrescence is not a real unity of feeling but a progression of feeling in which the first phase may be said to determine the latter phases, and to speak of final and efficient cause working together becomes meaningless since it really is efficient cause that is at work. Connected with this is the problem of time expressed in the form of Zeno's paradox (PR 106-107), that is, time as being able to be divided into 'before' and 'after'. Whitehead answers that "such a view is exactly what is denied by the epochal theory of time. Each phase in the genetic process presupposes the entire quantum, and so does each feeling in each phase.... The problem dominating the concrescence is the actualization of the quantum in solido" (PR 434).

Whitehead wants to make sense of the concrescence happening 'outside' our sense of time. Though the "actual entity is the enjoyment of a certain quantum of physical time" (PR 435), it does not take time for the process to happen; "The conclusion is that in every act of becoming there is the becoming of something with temporal extension; but that the act itself is not extensive, in the sense that it is divisible into earlier and later acts of becoming which correspond to the extensive divisibility of what has become" (PR 107). This extensive divisibility is in the coordinate
analysis of the satisfaction which, together with the attention to the succession of actual entities, pertains to physical time.

An explanation of 'epochal' time is part of the key to understanding that the concrescence is self-creating, final cause coming together with efficient cause. The feeler being the result of the feelings, yet without there being one without the other at any point in the concrescence, is a consequence of saying that the concrescence does not take time but is there all at once. "The difficulty involves the relation of the genetic process to physical time. Whitehead incorporates the relativity theory of modern physics... into the basic principles of his system. This theory entails the idea that there is no absolute time as a sort of container within which actual entities become; rather, time is an abstraction from the succession of actual entities. Concrescence is not in time; rather, time is in concrescence in the sense of being an abstraction from actual entities". ¹⁰ It is through the succession of concrescences that we can divide reality into past, present and future.
SECTION A PHASE I - PHYSICAL FEELINGS

"The first phase is the phase of pure reception of the actual world in its guise of objective datum for aesthetic synthesis. In this phase there is mere reception of the actual world as a multiplicity of private centres of feeling, implicated in a nexus of mutual presuppositions" (PR 323). In this initial or 'Conformal' phase the occasion is merely the sum of all its separate prehensions: God, eternal objects, past actual entities, initial aim. A link is provided from the past to the present by the absorption of data in a subjective unity of feeling (PR 261). These conformal feelings, so called because they conform to the past, act as vectors, "for they feel what is there and transform it into what is here" (PR 133). Up to this point, these feelings are felt as belonging to the past, not to a new synthesis, for the unifying agent, the subjective aim, is only one feeling among many. The feelings must await other phases before they are "absorbed into the private immediacy" (PR 323).

It is at this primary level that nature repeats itself with the resulting experience that there is continuity in nature. Such continuity becomes the corner stone of efficient causation as acting on the world, so that, it can be said that the past does influence the present. The past occasion includes certain subjective forms of feeling that involve repetition. In becoming objective data for the new
concrescence these accompanying subjective forms of feeling may be re-enacted in the new concrescence as part of its own subjective feeling. In this way the concrescence's role as superject is experienced, urging itself on the future by means of these subjective forms accompanying the physical data.

The following diagram represents what occurs at the conformal phase:

```
X
Y
a
W
Z
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I Conformal Phase

particular physical feeling presenting past occasions

Supplemental Phases

Past Actual Occasion or Nexus forms the Initial Data

New Concrescence (a) becomes the objective datum

Though the main machinery of this stage is conformation (PR 211, 446), and reproduction of the past, it is not wholly correct to say there is bare conformity; for, as the above diagram shows, there is a degree of selectivity occurring. Not all the initial data are incorporated into the new occasion. Through negative prehension some material is
eliminated from feeling, or held inactive in the synthesis of feeling. Only a certain aspect of the initial data, called objective datum, is accepted for further feeling.

It is one of the requirements of the 'Category of Subjective Unity' that feelings entering concrescence be compatible for integration; therefore, at this initial phase elimination occurs because not all data for possible feeling are compatible. "There is a flow of feeling. But the re-enactment is not perfect. The categorial demands of the concrescence require adjustments of the pattern of emotional intensities" (PR 363). Contributing to these adjustments are five factors, none of which can be ignored: "(1) the 'subject' which feels, (2) the 'initial data' which are felt, (3) the 'elimination' in virtue of negative prehensions, (4) the 'objective datum' which is felt, and (5) the 'subjective form' which is how that subject feels that objective datum" (PR 337-338).

"This mutual determination of the elements involved in a feeling is one expression of the truth that the subject of the feeling is causa sui. The partial nature of a feeling, other than the complete satisfaction, is manifest by the impossibility of understanding its generation without recourse to the whole subject. There is a mutual sensitivity of feeling in one subject, governed by categorial conditions. This mutual sensitivity expresses the notion of final causation in the guise of a pre-established harmony".11
Whereas the conformal phase was characterized by repetition or re-enaction, the second phase can be characterized in turn by 'appetition'. Appetition is "at once the conceptual valuation of an immediate physical feeling combined with the urge towards realization of the datum conceptually prehended" (PR 47). Each physical feeling gives rise to a conceptual counterpart which is characterized by valuation in the form of aversion or adversion. Appetition through valuation, embodies a principle of unrest (PR 47). It becomes an urge for the future realization of this feeling either in the following phase or in a future occasion.

In this phase, the eternal objects are 'pried loose' from the physical feelings, and become the potentials for further determinations. According to the 'Category of Conceptual Valuation', "from each physical feeling there is
the derivation of a purely conceptual feeling whose datum is
the eternal object exemplified in the definiteness of the
actual entity, or the nexus, physically felt" (PR 379).
Whereas the feelings of the conformal phase were felt as
belonging to some other entity, in this stage they become
shaped for this concrescence, and are no longer some other
entity's feelings (PR 323). The feelings assume an emotional
character belonging only to this concrescence.

The conceptual feeling becomes the basis for the
mental pole which originates as the conceptual counterpart
of the physical pole. The term, 'mentality' is also used in
this connection to suggest the subjective side of experience
which involves the essential uniqueness of the individual
reaction to data (PR 423). It is such mentality that involves
the important introduction of emphasis, valuation, and purpose.
The degree of control that an occasion can exercise over its
own creation depends on the mental pole. Where this is weak,
for example, a rock, the entity is mainly, though not completely,
the re-iteration of the past (PR 269). Where it is dominant,
novelty is its main characteristic. "Mental experience is
the organ of novelty, the urge beyond. It seeks to vivify
the massive physical fact, which is repetitive, with the
novelties which beckon.... In its lowest form, mental experience
can be canalized into slavish conformity. It is merely the
appetition towards, or from whatever in fact already is....
But when mentality is working at a high level, it brings
novelty into the appetitions of mental experience" (PR 33).

"There is a secondary origination of conceptual feelings with data which are partially identical with, and partially diverse from, the eternal objects forming the data in the primary phase of the mental pole" (PR 40; 380). This is the 'Category of Conceptual Reversion' which allows for relevant alternatives to be introduced in concrescence. Reversion gives rise to added novelty of content by introducing eternal objects which are not to be found in the direct line of inheritance from past occasions. "It is the category by which novelty enters the world; so that even amid stability there is never undifferentiated endurance" (PR 381).

Diagram of Reversion

In the conformal phase, physical feeling (a) has eternal object (b) as part of the feeling. In the conceptual phase, instead of eternal object (b) being abstracted for valuation, (b') is also conceptualized and takes priority over (b) for
further determination in the following phases.

In the day to day context of ordinary experience, reversion can be evidenced in events which involve mistakes which are obvious but overlooked. The following clearly exemplified this notion. In a conversation with several teachers, the topic 'Ukranian Easter' came up. In the ensuing discussion one teacher used the term 'Ukranian Christmas'. The listeners did not catch the bogus phrase. It was taken for granted that the proper term 'Ukranian Easter' had been said. Reversion occurred involving the replacement by the speaker, of 'Ukranian Easter' with 'Ukranian Christmas'.

Something else happened in the conversation which also demonstrates 'double reversion'. Not only did the speaker experience reversion, but the listeners, while in fact hearing 'Ukranian Christmas', registered the proper term 'Ukranian Easter'. Another remark about this conversation shows what can happen with reversion. Both listeners and speaker realized moments later the error made by the speaker in saying 'Ukranian Christmas'. This emphasises the originality that a concrescence can exemplify in that it is not tied down to what the past has offered to it, but goes beyond it. Though merely a mistake, the fact that it is a mistake, that it is different from what was offered to it is evidence that the occasion has a varying degree of freedom and is not completely determined. It demonstrates
how the occasion makes use of the past for its own ends, and it evidences the freedom available to it.

Translating the above example into diagram form, this is what appears to occur:

(1) The Speaker as Subject

(2) The Listeners as Subject
The second phase involves a further feature of how the present occasion differs from past data which it synthesises. An occasion can have a number of physical feelings all with the same derivative conceptual feeling 'redness'. The occasion, instead of prehending each one separately, can prehend the whole nexus characterizing it by the one eternal object 'redness'. This mechanism, which accounts for the perception of a nexus rather than mere individuals, is termed 'transmutation'. A transmuted feeling can be described as arising from the integration of a number of simple physical feelings with a conceptual feeling derived impartially from all of them; the many are experienced as one. Each grain of sand on a beach is not experienced singly, but forming together one nexus — a beach. The experience arising from looking at a beautiful woman: it is not the individual parts viewed separately, that give rise to beauty or desire, but the woman in totality — her body, her eyes, her smile. Whitehead gives the following description to the process of transmutation:

Thus pure and hybrid physical feelings, issuing into a single conceptual feeling, constitute the preliminary phase of this transmutation in the prehending subject. The integration of these feelings in that subject leads to the transmuted physical feeling of a nexus as qualified by that eternal object which is the datum of the single conceptual feeling. In this way the world is physically felt as a unity, and is felt as divisible into parts which are unities, namely, nexus (PR 383).
Through transmutation the world is felt as a community. Order appears by reason of the similarities between the various members of the prehended nexus and the elimination of differences. In diagram form, transmutation appears as the following:

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Initial Data                  New Concrescence
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In the second phase the complexity of concrescence is seen in the various ways physical feelings give rise to their conceptual counterparts. Eternal objects are pried loose from physical feelings and are made available for new determinations; feelings assume valuation as either adversion or aversion; and reversion presents further evidence that the occasion challenges the past by presenting novelty in content.
Finally, the conceptual phase becomes responsible for the way in which the occasion experiences the past in reorganizing it to suit itself. Novelty is very much present in the conceptual phase of concrescence; and with novelty, the freedom that an occasion exhibits becomes evident. The occasion is free to operate on its physical phase, limited only by the scope of its subjective aim. That the second phase is a product of self-creation, has been demonstrated by the manner it either agrees with, or deviates from, the primary given phase of concrescence. The novelty that arises in the occasion is the expression of the way in which each occasion is different from every other occasion past and present. This novelty exemplifies the freedom that is available to the occasion even in this relatively simple phase.
SECTION C PHASE III AND IV - COMPARATIVE FEELINGS

Phases III and IV are considered together because of the type of feelings to which they give rise, that is, 'comparative feelings'. As the name implies, there occurs a comparison of feelings, both physical and conceptual, into more complex types. Whitehead distinguishes two main types: "One type arises from the integration of a 'propositional feeling' with the 'indicative feeling' from which it is partly derived. Feelings of this type will be termed 'intellectual feelings'.... Comparative feelings of the other type are termed 'physical purposes'. Such a feeling arises from the integration of a conceptual feeling with the basic physical feeling from which it is derived, either directly according to categorereal condition (IV) (the Category of Conceptual Valuation), or indirectly according to categorereal condition (V) (Category of Conceptual Reversion)" (PR 406).

If the third phase is a preparation for Phase IV, then, comparative feelings are termed propositional feelings, such propositional feelings also act as lures for further synthesis of feeling in the next phase. But if Phase III gives rise to physical purposes, no further synthesis will occur, since all aspects of concrescence have been completely specified. Nothing else remains to be done; all indeterminations have become determinate. This phase can then be considered terminal.
The explanation as to why one type of feeling rather than another arises in the third phase, is to be found in the character of the integration between conceptual feeling and physical feeling. "If in the integration the eternal object that is the datum of the conceptual feeling retains its indetermination to fact, its universality, its transcendence of fact, then the integration results in a propositional feeling at Phase III. If, however, the eternal object loses its indetermination to fact, its transcendence, and sinks back into immanence in fact, into union with itself as originally exemplified in the physical feeling Phase I, then the integration results in a physical purpose at Phase III"\(^{12}\), (see PR 421-422).

Physical purpose is the integration of physical and conceptual feelings with the resultant new feeling that differs from the original physical feeling in its subjective form. The subjective form involves either adversion or aversion (PR 406). If adversion is the case the physical feeling becomes an element of importance in future concrescences. Such an element will be taken account of in the new concrescences until incompatibilities negate its further value to the concrescence (PR 422). With aversion that element is attenuated from further concrescence. Through adversion order is promoted, while with aversion change dominates.

In occasions where Phase III is the last important phase, it must be emphasized that it is not merely efficient
cause that determines the concrescence. Final causation is evidenced in subjective valuation. It is the work of the concrescence itself in the form of conceptual valuation that contributes, in proportion to its importance, what place that feeling will have in the occasion, as well as any further integrations beyond itself (PR 423).

Stages of Concrescence\textsuperscript{12}:

Circle (a) represents the simple physical feelings derived from the initial data. Line (X) represents advance to conceptual feeling (b) derived from (a); (b') represents reverted feeling which may or may not occur; (c) represents simple comparative feeling arising from the contrast of (a) and (b) represented by bracket (Y). (c) can be the physical purpose if in the contrast of (a) and (b), (b) as eternal object is merely the reiteration of itself as found in (a) without any indetermination beyond (a). In this case nothing
remains except subjective valuation. Phase IV is not necessary. But if in (c) there remains indeterminations and (b) has gone beyond (a) as mere fact, then (c) becomes a propositional feeling with its own lures demanding further synthesis in (d).

In the diagram, (d) represents complex comparative feelings which arise from the integration of a propositional feeling with the indicative feeling resulting in a generic contrast termed the 'affirmation - negation contrast'. "It is the contrast between the affirmation of objectified fact in the physical feeling, and the mere potentiality, which is the negation of such affirmation, in the propositional feeling" (PR 407). (d) might be the judgment that '(a) is (b)' or '(a) is not (b)'. It is here that consciousness arises in its simplest form, the integration of propositional feeling with the indicative feeling to which the proposition ultimately refers. The mechanics can be seen in the following example. A person sees a stone, and in the arising propositional feeling the proposition states 'the stone is grey'. But it is not a statement of truth or falsity at this point; 'grey' and 'stone' are joined together without judgment being made. That is why it is called a proposition. This propositional feeling is contrasted to the original physical feeling experienced in seeing the stone. The resultant feeling of contrast gives rise to an intellectual feeling or decision which might be
'the stone is not grey'. It is at this point that consciousness arises, how the subject feels the propositional contrast (PR 391, 245).

It is at this point in concrescence that the degree of novelty is at its greatest level. With propositional feelings decisions take place within the concrescence as to the meaning and status of its content. Not only are vague possibilities being quickly eliminated, but new syntheses of feeling occur, in which the level of integration becomes very complex, as witnessed in human thought.

It is the role of propositions to act as lures for further integration and decision. In the example of the proposition 'the stone is grey', the process can be examined to show what occurs as a result of the propositional feeling. The proposition presents the possibility of that predicate (conceptual feeling), applying in that assigned way to that logical subject (physical feeling). The question of truth and falsity does not apply as yet. There are two possible outcomes; the proposition may be conformal, or non-conformal to the actual world, that is, the proposition may turn out to be true or false. Conformal feeling means that there has been conformation of feeling to fact; 'the stone is grey' is true. "When a non-conformal proposition is admitted into feeling, the reaction to the datum has resulted in the synthesis of fact with the alternative potentiality of the complex predicate. A novelty has emerged into creation. The novelty
may promote or destroy order; it may be good or bad. But it
is new, a new type of individual, and not merely a new
intensity of individual feeling. That member of the locus
has introduced a new form into the actual world; or at
least, an old form in a new function. Though the
proposition 'the stone is grey' is false, the individual
may decide to paint the stone grey; or he may decide he
would like this colourful stone for his patio or rock garden.
The propositional feeling has resulted in new patterns of
thought and action to be taken. For Whitehead it is not
truth and falsity that are of prime importance, but the
novel decisions and intensity that are generated.

Intellectual feelings were said to be represented
by (d) in the diagram. The datum for these is - the contrast
between (a) and proposition (c). The accompanying subjective
form of this feeling becomes consciousness (PR 407); the
consciousness of the contrast between the fact and the
theory, between the proposition and the physical feeling.
Consciousness is said to arise "by reason of intellectual
feelings, and in proportion to the variety and intensity of
such feelings" (PR 407).

The following diagrams supplied by Professor H.
Dulmage depict the structural development of feeling in
concrescence, and offer a summary of the remaining elements
of feeling.
As the diagram on P. 84 illustrates, intellectual feelings can be subdivided into 'conscious perceptions' and intuitive judgments. The distinction made is between what is perceived as factual and what is imagined; "...what differentiates an intuitive judgment from a conscious perception is that a conscious perception is the outcome of an originate process which has its closest possible restriction to the fact, thus consciously perceived" (PR 415). But, as Whitehead warns, "the distinction between the two species is not absolute" (PR 415).

The aim at synthesis has been the aim at final satisfaction of concrescence. "The actual entity terminates its becoming in one complex feeling involving a completely determinate bond with every item in the universe, the bond being either a positive or a negative prehension. This termination is the 'satisfaction' of the actual entity" (PR 71). The occasion reaches fulfilment in all its decisions. Nothing is left undecided; all becomes fully determinate. The occasion which began with a number of separate feelings and a vague initial aim, has become one, single, specific occasion, where the initial aim has become a completed subject-superject. "The process of concrescence is a progressive integration of feelings controlled by their subjective forms. In this synthesis, feelings of an earlier phase sink into the components of some more complex feeling of a later phase. Thus each adds its element of novelty,"
until the final phase in which one complex 'satisfaction' is reached". 14

This completes the analysis of the process of concrescence into various phases. Again, it must be emphasized that no such division occurs in the actual process of concrescence. The process is indivisible and occurs all at once. The justification of such an analysis lies in its value for making clear that which occurs in the process of concrescence. If it could stand still, this is what would be understood as occurring.

The purpose of this analysis has also been to demonstrate the occasion as being self-creative. Though the first ingredients are provided by the world and God, these will amount to nothing unless the occasion acts on them through final causation, that is, the occasion itself putting its imprint on these primary elements. The initial phase is the efficient causation working on the occasion and the supplemental phases are the occasion as final causation turning back on itself leading these primary elements to a unique synthesis that it is finally its own reason for what it has become. "This final reaction completes the self-creative act by putting the decisive stamp of creative emphasis upon the determination of efficient cause" (PR 75). It is through its own self-originating decisions that the occasion becomes what it does. It is because the occasion is free from external control that it is self-creative; and
because it is self-creative that it can be said to be free. Its freedom is evidenced by the growing complexity in the synthesis of feeling. From simple separate data the occasion becomes the locus for complex thought and judgment. Certainly, not all occasions are examples of this complexity, but it is through Whitehead's genius that the variety in complexity gives meaning to degrees of freedom, from the stone to man.
CHAPTER IV

THE NOTION OF CAUSALITY IN WHITEHEAD

SECTION A - EFFICIENT AND FINAL CAUSATION

This section is not meant to present a detailed investigation into Whitehead's concept of causality. But a discussion of freedom would be incomplete if the notion of causality were not presented, even briefly. It is Whitehead's special notion of causality that, instead of limiting the possibility of freedom, emphasizes its existence in each occasion no matter how simple.

Causality in Whitehead appears as two distinct forces working together in the concrescence; efficient causation and final causation. The former "expresses the transition from actual entity to actual entity; and final causation expresses the internal process whereby the actual entity becomes itself.... This latter becoming is the immediate actual process. An entity is at once the product of the efficient past, and is also, in Spinoza's phrase, causa sui" (PR 228). By causa sui it is meant that the process of concrescence is ultimately the result of the occasion's own decisions as how it will use the data given to it.

The supplemental phases of concrescence, as evidenced in the formation of conceptual feelings, propositional feeling, and intellectual feelings, are the elements of final causation, for they are the occasion
becoming something novel. None of these are given from external agents, but are the result of the occasion's own inner synthesis. Final causation which expresses the freedom of the occasion is this inner synthesis that results in novel feelings; feelings that produce a new perspective independent from its past. Final causation is the occasion becoming what it chooses to be; not something that the past or God decides for it. It is the occasion's own reaction to the external world. The nature of freedom of an occasion is the outcrop of this fundamental character; that the occasion is the result of final causation beyond merely efficient causation. "The doctrine of the philosophy of organism is that, however far the sphere of efficient causation be pushed in the determination of components of a concrescence... beyond the determination of these components there always remains the final reaction of the self-creative unity of the universe. This final reaction completes the self-creative act by putting the decisive stamp of creative emphasis upon the determinations of efficient cause" (PR 75).

Although the term final causation is used, it may be better to speak of self-creation in conjunction with efficient causation. Whitehead's theory presents an entity that occurs 'all-at-once' in the sense that one cannot speak of actual development from first phase to final satisfaction. It is this particular feature that makes Whitehead speak of final causation. Each phase is actually concurrent with the
rest and in this sense the satisfaction is as much a case of what the occasion becomes as is the reproductive or conformal phase. In the occasion deciding how it will use the data supplied by the past it becomes proper to speak of final causation working together with efficient causation. Beyond what is given to it there remains the occasion itself to make actual the potentiality. It is the internal process of self-creation climaxing in complete specificity at satisfaction that is said to be final causation at work. It makes sense in Whitehead’s scheme to say that the coming together of the ingredients supplied by the past presupposes the whole and the whole presupposes the coming together of these ingredients.

It is important to the notion of freedom, to examine what it means that the occasion is also a product of efficient causation. If it can be shown that, no matter how complex its inner structure, the occasion is the outcome of the influence of the past, then final causation is merely an embellishment without essential importance to the final outcome, and freedom turns out to be a negligible factor in the life of the occasion. But, if it is demonstrated that efficient causation by itself, could not explain what that occasion becomes at satisfaction, then, no matter how important the element of efficient causation be, freedom remains an integral part, evident in the life of the occasion, with real meaning and effect.
In the simplest terms, causality can be expressed as the influence of A upon B; to rephrase this, A influences B in some manner. An appropriate example would be the following; a young boy is taken to the theatre to see a play. He enjoys it so much that he decides to become an actor when he grows up. In fact, in later years he does become an actor.

For Whitehead efficient causation is a dynamic process expressing "the transition from actual entity to actual entity" (PR 228). It can be described in the following manner: "Occasion B prehends occasion A as an antecedent subject experiencing a sensum with emotional intensity. Also B's subjective form of emotion is conformed to A's subjective form. Thus there is a vector transmission of emotional feeling of a sensum from A to B. In this way B feels the sensum as derived from A and feels it with an emotional form also derived from A" (PR 479-480; 176-177). It is crucial to notice the phrasing of this description. Whitehead states that the present occasion prehends or feels the past occasion. The relation between the present and the past is one of the 'appropriation' of the dead by the living; the dead being the past occasions which have passed, at satisfaction, into the realm of objective immortality; that, the past no longer undergoes change; and the living being the new occasion. Satisfaction "closes up the entity; and yet is the superject adding its character to the creativity whereby there is a becoming of entities superseding the one in question" (PR 129).
In describing the past as being appropriated by the present the interaction of final cause with efficient cause is manifest. It is the occasion which becomes partly responsible for what it accepts from the past and wholly responsible in how it uses it. In the latter phases it is final causation that is expressed in that the occasion is its own reason for what it finally becomes. In this sense it is finally internally determined by its own decisions and externally free in that the past does not influence it beyond the initial stage.

It is important to the order of the universe that the past does influence the present, and the present, in turn, influences the future. For Whitehead, the world does need both stability and change, order and novelty; and it is efficient causation that ensures this stability and order. Beyond order the past is essential to concrescence for "Our experience arises out of the past; it enriches with purpose its presentation of the contemporary world; and it bequeaths its character to the future, in the guise of an effective element forever adding to, or subtracting from the riches of the world" (SYM 69).

It is not, then, Whitehead's intent to dismiss or diminish the force or importance of efficient causation. On the contrary, he wants to make it a real effective mechanism in the ongoingness of the universe. Though he does not object to the view that causality can be expressed
in terms of mere succession of data, in so far as science needs a workable model (MT 202), he denies that this view has any validity in ordinary experience. "Science can find no creativity in nature; it finds mere rules of succession" (MT 211). Beyond this statistical instrument, efficient causation is more than mere succession of data.

The extent of efficient causation is emphasized by the following statement: "The character of an actual entity is finally governed by its datum; whatever be the freedom of feeling arising in the concrescence, there can be no transgression of the limitations of capacity inherent in the datum. The datum both limits and supplies" (PR 168). If 'determinism' is to find support, it is here in the 'limitation' of the concrescing occasion by the past. There is a real limitation because what can be inherited is limited. The past is said to have 'objective efficacy' (PR 341), influencing the present through degrees of intensities. Though each occasion is presented with the whole universe (PR 340), not all is presented with the same degree of emotional tone. Since in each occasion there are differences in the subjective form of feeling, not all aspects of the past are passed on with the same intensity. Some data come to the foreground, others fall into the background. The distinction between negative and positive prehension takes root, in part, because of this difference in the data. Also, because of their variety the data that come to the occasion
must be felt with a subjective form that makes them compatible with each other. This again becomes the occasion functioning as final cause.

After all this has been said, just how the past is incorporated in the present, is not a matter determined by the past, but by the concrescence itself. Although the past must be included, and even though the past does limit the present, one cannot say that the past determines what the new occasion will become. This is the crucial point in the problem of determinism, that the past conditions the occasion by providing limits to what it can become; but, in no way does it determine what it will eventually become within those limits. "One event follows another, the repetitive element in change is basic to thought. But the occasion itself departs from the pattern to make room for judgment, the will, the perils of responsibility. Like a wave it repeats itself, but on its crest it bears the novel and the unpredicatable". 15 It is the new subject's activity which 'absorbs' and 'transforms' the object from 'out there' into 'in here'. In this transformation there is an accompanying modification in the data; part excluded and part enhanced.

Where the efficient causation merely provides those outer limits, the occasion as final cause fills in what it actually becomes.

Because the occasion does not consist merely of the first phase of concrescence, and since it has been
shown that the supplemental phases are an important source of novelty, efficient causation, by itself, does not provide a sufficient explanation as to what the occasion becomes. Efficient causation needs final causation to explain what the concrescence has become. At no point prior to satisfaction can one say, this is what the occasion will be. In this sense the following comes to have real meaning. "The concrescence of each individual actual entity is internally determined and is externally free" (PR 41, Category of Obligation (IX)). It is efficient causation that allows Whitehead to explain how order and continuity are exemplified in nature. In making the past relevant in what the occasion becomes efficient causation can be said to be responsible for the repetition of physical feeling, reproduction of emotional tone and the reiteration of pattern. In the example of the snow flake, nature repeats itself over and over. Each snow flake is always the same geometrical pattern never varying in the number of sides it has. Yet it is never identical. Where efficient causation preserves the pattern, final causation is demonstrated in that each and every snow flake is unique in its own special design. Whitehead would say that the occasion is responsible for the way in which it will achieve the basic pattern required and in this it is acting self-creatively.
SECTION B - CAUSALITY AND WHITEHEAD'S EPOCHAL THEORY OF TIME

The problem of 'epochal' time was brought out in Chapter II, Section B, as it affected the initial subjective aim. The problem also relates itself to efficient causation and its relation to the developing concrescence. If there is change in the course of concrescence, then, it should follow that there is a 'before' and 'after' in the process. This has the result that what comes before influences what comes after; and the first phase influences the outcome. Thus, efficient causation works not only in the first phase, but right through the entire concrescence up to satisfaction.

Because of Whitehead's theory of epochal time, this problem does not arise. Whitehead denies repeatedly (PR 96, 347, 434), that concrescence takes time. Time comes to have meaning only when one makes the distinction between present, past and future, and not within the life of one concrescing occasion. The occasion does not take time to become. When Whitehead speaks of the atomicity of an occasion, this is what he means: "Physical time makes its appearance in the 'coordinate' analysis of the 'satisfaction'. The actual entity is the enjoyment of a certain quantum of physical time. But the genetic process is not the temporal succession: such a view is exactly what is denied by the epochal theory of time. Each phase in the genetic process presupposes the entire quantum, and so does each feeling in each phase" (PR 434). With this understanding of what occurs
in concrescence, the problem of determinism from phase to phase does not materialize. To clarify further this issue of the 'all-at-onceness' of the process of concrescence, two articles by Cobb and Ford provide additional help.

Cobb states that part of the problem is in the language Whitehead uses in describing the process. He speaks of earlier and later, antecedent and subsequent, phases of concrescence. This itself creates the misleading impression that each phase of the process takes time. Though this is due to the nature of the language itself, Cobb goes on to say that "Whitehead never lost sight of the basic doctrine of the all-at-onceness of the becoming of the individual occasions. He never writes as if there were any other subject ofprehensions than the occasion as a whole, and he does not grant existence toprehensions prior to their subject."\(^{16}\) In stating that the occasion does not develop in phases he eliminates causal efficacy in the various stages. There is no actuality except in the occasion as a whole. Each part presupposes the whole, just as the whole presupposes the coming together of the ingredients.

Because there is no development such that one part precedes the other, to speak of efficient causation determining that development is not proper. The problem of causal determinism by the past does not arise since the past acts only to supply the occasion with the initial ingredients. Beyond this the occasion is solely responsible for the use
these are put. In presupposing the whole concrescence the initial data are determined not only by the past but also by the occasion, and to this extent it is less dependent on the past for what it becomes.

Ford's article approaches the problem emphasizing that aspect which makes the occasion self-determining. The act which constitutes concrescence is a unity which is not divisible into parts. Only if viewed genetically (not actually) can it be analyzable into a successive process of decisions. Each phase takes from the preceding one the material with which it must work, but that material comes to it unintegrated. It is up to that new phase to integrate the various feelings inherited and reach a new level of synthesis and complexity. "If we think of the occasion as a whole we may distinguish between the totality of causal influences inherited from the past actual world and its causa sui which is finally expressed in the way it has completely integrated these causal influences (by inclusion and/or exclusion) in the satisfaction."¹⁷

The various phases are each involved in a process whereby the occasion becomes more and more definite in its decisions. They bring the occasion into a higher level of specificity and complexity until final satisfaction is achieved. It is therefore, incorrect to say that each antecedent phase acts upon the next as a causal determinant; but it is the next phase that takes in the antecedent phase to further synthesize it. The process must not be viewed as a building block
structure where one block supports another and the final structure is merely a sum of building blocks. Rather concrescence is a process of becoming in which feelings are dynamically related (physical and conceptual feelings with their subjective forms). There is a mutual determination or as Whitehead states "a mutual sensitivity of feelings in one subject, governed by categorial conditions" (PR 338). It is in this sense that Whitehead is justified in stating that the occasion is the result of self-causation and not determinism. "This mutual determination of the elements involved in a feeling is one expression of the truth that the subject of the feeling is causa sui" (PR 338).
CHAPTER V - WHITEHEAD'S NOTION OF FREEDOM AND
THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL AND HUMAN SOCIETY

Assuming that Whitehead has laid a sufficient foundation for freedom as an integral part of human life, one must ask the question 'What does Whitehead's notion of freedom entail for man and human society?'. Though the question is broken up into two parts, 'human individual' and 'human society', they are really inseparable, for man is a member of society, and without society he would be radically different. Therefore, the answer given bears this relationship in mind.

Whitehead believes that man is at the apex of creation up to this moment, in so far as complexity of his nature is concerned; though, he does not deny the possibility of some other form surpassing him. This complexity has the accompanying feature of enabling him to experience the most intense feelings and the greatest degree of novelty. Because of this, Whitehead attributes to man the capacity for the greatest expression of freedom. This is not to deny that freedom is a characteristic of all creation, but in man it finds its highest exponent since man has the greatest potential to deviate from his given past.

Man's ability to experience freedom is rooted in his highly developed mental pole, which is capable of conceptual novelty to a greater extent than non-human 'societies'. It is this mental pole which allows man to imagine alternative
possibilities, and plan for the future in minute detail. Man can also create his own opportunity for novelty and intensity; and in so doing he increases his freedom to deviate from his past. But this is not to say that all men have the same experience of freedom, nor do all men have greater freedom than all other non-human societies. Part of man's freedom is being able to increase his potential for freedom.

When Whitehead speaks of freedom, he also speaks of 'process' and 'creativity'. Man is free in so far as he is becoming that which he was not before. 'Creativity' becomes central for man in expressing and increasing his freedom. For the individual it means he must be continually developing in every aspect of his life. His ideas, his abilities, his behaviour, must be constantly expanding to procure for himself an ever-enlarging sphere of possibilities and opportunities. The individual who becomes satisfied with himself and ceases to grow, is slowly dying in a real sense. "Repetition produces a gradual lowering of vivid appreciation. Convention dominates. A learned orthodoxy suppresses adventure." (AI 227). For Whitehead these are the signs of the last breaths of decaying society, and it can also be said of the individual who has ceased to grow, to be adventurous.

Novelty is the outcome of process, and without novelty process would lack the intensity that makes one experience more worthwhile than another. Novelty of feeling, novelty of
ideas and ideals - all intensify the value of human life. Where it is minimal and conformity is at its maximum, there will be little to distinguish the life of a man from the life of an ant. In societies where certain groups were prevented from participating in the general advancement of the privileged class life became mere drudgery and repetition. Novelty of experience and the value of human life was measured in the number of hours they were able to work.

Out of process and novelty comes the notion of 'adventure'. It becomes this element of adventure that makes life soar to its heights. Christopher Columbus was not satisfied in leading an ordinary existence. He sought adventure, not only in action, but just as important, in expressing his ideas. He sought to go against the majority's opinion even to the point of sacrificing his life. Einstein expressed his search for adventure in his mathematical struggles. Children seek adventure every day in seeking to discover what their world contains. It is in adventure that novelty and process achieve their greatest expression; and it is the adventurous man that is most free. The one who is confined to struggling for his physical needs from day to day does not have the opportunity for adventure in his life. Novelty becomes for him a word applying to the rich, or to those who do not have to struggle to support their family. Adventure for this individual becomes a
luxury which he cannot afford.

The individual who ceases to seek adventure in his daily life, ceases to grow in experience and to develop new opportunities. He begins to stagnate, and becomes a product of his past life. Freedom gives way to habit and conformity. The past becomes the dominant force in his daily actions and thoughts. Life becomes characterized by repetition of the same feelings (see AI 277). "A race preserves its vigour so long as it harbours a real contrast between what has been and what may be; and so long as it is nerved by the vigour to adventure beyond the safeties of the past. Without adventure civilization is in full decay" (AI 279).

Since man is a creature born out of a society of men, his freedom is affected to a great extent by the society in which he finds himself a member. Not only is he influenced by other members of that society, but also by the culture as expressed in its ideals and its products. The relationship between the individual and society is a most crucial factor affecting the extent that man can be said to be free. In a society where he is controlled by his product and social environment, man's freedom shrinks the more he becomes attached to and dependent on it. In a society where one class is working for the enslavement of another, freedom becomes limited to the extent that the individual is no longer master of his life. The more he is controlled by society to pick and choose as society dictates, the less
his potentiality for growth and novelty. In Whiteheadian terms the occasion becomes more of a product of the past than of self-creativity. Every aspect of society must contribute to the individual's positive growth of freedom, otherwise that society becomes a limiting factor in the life of an individual.

Freedom as an expression of man's life cannot be limited either to the external or the internal. His mental life must be equally free as his physical life if man is to experience maximum freedom. A man who has been limited in thought by his society is as unfree as one who is chained in a prison. The implications of these to the type of society best suited to a free individual are obvious.

If a society is to be considered free it must value the freedom of its individual members. The individual must be able to fulfill his own potentiality in his own way unfettered by the demands of society whether he differs or agrees. The ways in which an individual becomes limited by the society are many. Not only is coercion provided by physical means, but the lack of opportunity becomes as great if not a greater barrier to freedom. A healthy society must provide the individual with an environment which will stimulate the adventurous spirit of every member. In such a society the individual can satisfy whatever needs he may have and such needs will recognize the needs of his fellow individuals. His socially necessary labour will be
reduced to its bare minimum so that ample opportunity will be provided for expanding one's capacities for experiencing novelty and satisfaction, and developing a personality that can be said to be free and creative.

Such a society must be free from material scarcity, inequality and oppression. Opportunity for satisfying other than economic needs will be present for all members. Slums exist not only because of physical and economic deprivation, but also, because of the scarcity of intellectual opportunity. Society must provide man with leisure characterized by educated discernment and intelligent choice. This type of society will not exclude troublesome or discordant individuals and ideas. It will provide maximum diversity and intensity of feeling. It is in the synthesis of variety that freedom comes to be expressed the strongest.

The breadth, the variety, the quality of opportunity, comes from the nature of the social organization and from what it can extract from the material and human resources at hand. In a society in which individuals live isolated lives the opportunities are limited; in a society in which social institutions and organizations are backward, the lack or excess of authority does not improve the individual's capacity for wise choice and action. Freedom in a society demands the conditions which will enable all individuals to expand their potentialities and turn them into actualities. To the extent that man is restrained by
any forces, whether social or material, he is incapable of exercising deliberate and purposeful action to his fullest; and without such action there can be no achievement, no self-determination, no development, no freedom. For man to be free society must be free; and for society to be free each individual must express freedom to his limit. Such freedom must not be confused with license for freedom is a recognition that man must ultimately be responsible for what he himself becomes. If he interferes with others, to that extent the other's freedom becomes limited. In conclusion, Whitehead's notion of freedom as self-causation and self-creation allows a basis for the growth of human potential to its fullest, limited only by the most basic biological requirements such that society has continuity and order which enhance human development and allow the growth of human freedom.
FOOTNOTES

2. N. Lawrence. Whitehead's Philosophical Development. p. 346
7. Ibid., p. 109
8. Christian, op. cit., p. 312
9. Pols, op. cit., p.36
10. Key to Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 38
11. Ibid., p. 43
13. Key to Process and Reality, op. cit., p. 63
14. Ibid., p. 69

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