AUGUSTINE RE-ENCOUNTERED
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by

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ABSTRACT

The problem of how one can reconcile the omnipotence and omniscience of God with human freedom has penetrated a good deal of philosophical and theological thought. On occasion it has even been reduced to a unsolvable problem unworthy of consideration. Saint Augustine, however, clearly did not think this was the case.

Augustine defends human freedom as a good which must be preserved even if it does allow for the possibility of evil. David R. Griffin, on the other hand, maintains that men cannot exert their own will, when they are considered to be subject to the will of an omnipotent God and that the occurrence of evil in the world must ultimately be allowed by God. William L. Rowe also maintains that there is a problem in claiming that human beings are free, but this time, because of God's omniscience rather than His omnipotence. Rowe argues that since whatever God foreknows must necessarily happen and He knows that evil will happen, man's decision to sin is not one of freedom but of necessity. These are generally considered the two main arguments for opposing Augustine's Free Will Defense, and although Rowe eventually shows the inadequacies of the 'omniscience argument', his presentation of the traditional view is most valuable.
It is the contention of this paper that neither divine omnipotence nor omniscience, when considered independently, present sufficient evidence to seriously jeopardize Augustine's position, and this can only partially be achieved by combining these divine attributes and pitting them against the possibility of human freedom. This thesis is defended by a demonstration of the weaknesses of the independent arguments which are overcome, or at least strengthened, when combined.
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- Anonymous

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Introduction

Augustine's argument that evil is the result of man's free will has in effect provided the staple for discussions on the problem of evil, since it was written in 395 A.D. Many attacks and adaptations of the Free Will Argument have been offered since that time, leading to various questions concerning the validity of the Argument itself, and its relative significance when compared to other explanations of evil in a world created by an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God. The major problem which arises with regard to the problem of evil, however, is the question of how God can be morally justified in allowing evil in the world. And related to this problem is the query as to whether or not man is predetermined to do evil and what the moral implications of this may be. Such will be the considerations of this paper.

The main problem is formalized by David R. Griffin, in his *God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy.*

1. God is a perfect reality. (Definition)
2. A perfect reality is an omnipotent being. (By Definition)
3. An omnipotent being could unilaterally bring about an actual world without any genuine evil. (By Definition)
4. A perfect reality is a morally perfect being. (By Definition)
5. A morally perfect being would want to bring about an actual world without any genuine evil. (By Definition)
6. If there is genuine evil in the world, then there is no God. (Logical conclusion from 1 through 5)
7. There is genuine evil in the world. (Factual Statement)
8. Therefore, there is no God. (Logical conclusion from 6 and 7)

Although, as we can obviously see, this particular argument deals with the problem of evil as a proof against the existence of God, Griffin's comments as to how Augustine deals with this difficulty will be of great assistance in our analysis of Augustine's defense of God against the accusation of non-morality.

Another formal argument worthy of our consideration towards this end, is that of William L. Rowe in his essay "Augustine on Foreknowledge and Free Will" which captures the problem of whether or not God's omniscience opposes human freedom, in the following manner:

(1) God has foreknowledge of all future events
(2) Hence, if a man is going to sin, God knows that he will sin.
(3) Whatever God foreknows must necessarily happen.
(4) Hence, if God foreknows that a man will sin, he must necessarily sin.
(5) But if such a man must necessarily sin, there is no voluntary choice in his sinning.
(6) Therefore, such a man does not have free will.2

Now, God's morality in permitting evil can be called into question by reformulating Griffin's and Rowe's arguments in the manner suggested below:

1. God is a perfect reality.
2. A perfect reality is an omniscient and
omnipotent being.

3. An omniscient being knows that man will sin (commit evil).

4. Whatever God foreknows must necessarily happen.

5. Therefore, man's sin (committing evil) must necessarily happen.

6. Whatever occurs of necessity an omnipotent being willingly allows to happen.

7. Therefore, God willingly allows evil to happen.

8. A morally perfect being would not willingly allow evil to happen.

9. Therefore God is not a morally perfect being.

And from this reformulation, the focus of our discussion will be on the various characteristics which God is ascribed and what His relation to man is seen to be within such a structure. For instance, would a morally perfect being want to bring about an actual world without any genuine evil? Must whatever God foreknows necessarily happen? What does it mean to say that action is necessitated by foreknowledge? Certain aspects of God's nature must be understood in order to answer these questions adequately.

Is God temporal? Does God play an active role in human activity? Or is He a passive Creator? Only when such questions have been answered can the problem of whether or not God can be morally justified in allowing evil, be placed in the proper perspective.

Towards this end, our discussion will take the following approach: We shall begin by taking a general look at Augustine's argument from free will. We shall proceed by examining Griffin's and Rowe's arguments
against the existence of God and the freedom of man and see how they view Augustine in light of these arguments. Then Augustine's defense of God's morality as a whole will be considered. We shall conclude with a critical assessment of the information accumulated throughout the dissertation and attempt to make some significant projections from our findings.
PART I: THE DEFENSE
Chapter One; Augustine's Argument On Free Will

Augustine's doctrine of evil as a result of man's free choice of will is, obviously, very well known throughout the Christian tradition. A factor which would probably surprise many people who all too readily tend to categorize Augustine as a Christian theologian, therefore, is that his initial approach to the problem was strictly philosophical, bearing no Christian overtones whatsoever. As a Manichaean, Augustine was taught that good and evil were caused by two independent opposing forces, and that all things in the universe were held in their control. Augustine's sense that individuals are responsible for their actions and his concern as to the irreconcilability of all-powerful opposing forces, though, prevented him from being able to thoroughly accept the Manichaean ways and he soon turned to reject them in search of a more consistent philosophy.

It was this rejection of Manichaeism which set Augustine well on his way to finding the 'solution' (or at least 'possible solution') to the problem of evil, which he would find infinitely more satisfying than the dualism which he had been contending with for years. Having left the Manichaees, Augustine turned to neo-Platonism which he found particularly inspiring because of the skill of the neo-Platonists in giving reasonable Platonic explanations of
scriptural doctrine which were often regarded as "matters for faith alone". In the words of Peter Brown in *Augustine of Hippo*, "...[t]he effect of neo-Platonism was to free him from the shackles of materialism, and to facilitate his acceptance of the idea of immaterial reality".³

Upon his subsequent conversion to Christianity, then, Augustine had all the ammunition to launch his own attack on the problem of evil, and it is the culmination of this attack which we are now presented as the "Free Will Defense".

Although Augustine explicates the Free Will Argument in many works probably no single piece includes all its aspects and implications. The three books entitled *De libero arbitrio* or "On Free Will", though, do provide the most systematic and concise development, and as such will serve as the basis for this elaboration of the Argument itself. Also, it should prove worth while to examine briefly the degree to which the Free Will Argument adheres to Genesis 1-3, not only because this is the primary source for the traditional Judeo-Christian description of the role of man and God with regard to evil, but also because since one of Augustine's primary criticisms of the Manichæans was that their philosophy/theology was inconsistent with their doctrine, it should be interesting to see how well he could defend himself from such a criticism.

Augustine begins "On Free Will" by explaining that "...we usually speak of evil in two ways: first when we say that someone has done evil; second, when someone has
suffered something evil". Augustine maintains that the evil a man does is his own responsibility, whereas the evil he suffers is due to God. In effect, man's responsibility for his own evil deeds constitutes the fundamental basis of the Free Will Argument.

Augustine's first move in proving such claims is to defend God's right to 'cause' evil in the sense of punishment, while freeing Him from responsibility for the evil men themselves do, on the grounds of divine justice.

But if you know or take it on faith that God is good (and it would be irreligious to think differently), then He does no evil. Again, if we acknowledge that God is just (and to deny this would be sacrilegious), then, as He bestows rewards upon the good, so does He mete out punishments to the wicked. To those who suffer them, such punishments are of course evil. Accordingly, if no one suffers penalties unjustly (and this we must believe since we believe that the universe is ruled by Divine Providence), God is not at all the Cause of the first kind of evil, though He is of the second...it is no one person but rather each evil man that is the author of his own misdeeds. If you have any doubt of this, take note of our earlier remark that evil deeds are punished by God's justice. For unless they were committed voluntarily, their punishment would not be just.5

So, since we understand God to be good and just, and His rewards and punishments to be just, God can not be responsible for the sins of men, as it would be unjust for Him to reprimand men for something which He Himself has caused. Therefore, there must be some other cause of the evil done by men, and this, Augustine suggests, is the men
themselves (since he had ruled out the possibility of another omnipotent force initiating evil in his rejection of Manichaean dualism earlier in his career\(^6\)). In other words, because God is of an entirely different order than man, or, if you will, because He bears a different ontological status, He can justly be the cause of the evil a man suffers without being in anyway responsible for the evil a man does. This responsibility is entirely man's own.

Now, the first fairly obvious question which arises when man is accused of his own evil deeds is how does man commit evil, or what is it in man which makes him turn to sin? In order to answer this, Augustine seeks the "root" of evil. He begins by rejecting that which "...law forbids..."\(^7\) as an adequate criterion for classifying acts as evil since laws are not always just, and goes on to reject that which is "do[ne] to another [which the doer] is unwilling to have done to himself...,"\(^8\) because acts of evil can be committed with mutual consent of all involved parties. Augustine also eliminates that which is "condemned"\(^9\) from his list of possible depictions of evil as, even in Augustine's day, many righteous men were condemned. So, he finally settles on lust or concupiscence as the "root" of evil.

Augustine makes this point using adultery as his example.

Perhaps it is passion that is evil in adultery. But as long as you look for the evil in the outward act itself, which can be seen, you will run into difficulties. To give you an idea how
the evil of adultery is passion, let us suppose that there is no opportunity for intercourse with another man's wife, though it is somehow evident that one has the desire and would do the act if he could. In this case he is no less guilty than if he were caught in the act.

Augustine defines lust, culpable cupidity, concupiscence, or passion as "...love of things which each one may lose against his will," and in the case of adultery it is quite evident that one's spouse may be lost against one's will. If, for instance, a man desires not only his own wife but another woman as well, the chances of him losing one woman or the other in desire of the two becomes fairly high. But, what is it that makes such a passion evil, rather than merely foolish or careless?

The solution to this problem must be found by glancing over Augustine's cosmology, in order that we discover the place of lust in a more general scheme of things. The part of Augustine's concept of the universe relevant to this point is largely contained in his discussion of temporal versus eternal law.

AUG. Therefore, let me explain briefly, as well as I can put it in words, the notion of that eternal law which is impressed upon our nature: 'It is that law in virtue of which it is just that all things exist in perfect order.' If you think differently just say so.

EV. When you say what is true, there is nothing for me to contradict.

AUG. Since this law, therefore, is the one which is the source for all the variations in those temporal laws for governing men, is the eternal law itself capable of any variation?
EV. I see that this is absolutely impossible, for there is no force, no chance-occurrence, no natural upheaval that could ever bring it about that justice would no longer mean the perfect ordering of all things. Temporal law, then, is the law made by men to govern themselves and which may change over the course of time and circumstance. Eternal law, on the other hand, is changeless. In fact, Augustine claims, "...that law called supreme reason, which must always be obeyed, whereby the wicked merit an unhappy life and the virtuous a happy life [is also that eternal and unchangeable law]...by which...that law which we called 'temporal' can be justly enacted and justly changed." Eternal law is just for all time and all places, and has an order intrinsic to it. Moreover, since this order must be immutable, it must be a perfect order as it can never adapt itself to varying conditions.

By now, the relationship which all this has to lust should be becoming clear. Lust attempts to corrupt the perfect order ordained by eternal law. How does this happen? Augustine explains:

Here is what I am trying to say: Whatever sets man above the beast, whether we call it 'mind' or 'spirit' or, more correctly both, since we find both terms in the Scriptures, if this rules over and commands the other parts that make up man, then man's life is in perfect order. We see how many things we share in common not only with brute animals but also with trees and plants...We excel some animals in all these respects, in
others, we are their equal, while in others, we are even surpassed by some animals...
Again, there is the love of praise and glory, and the lust for power which, though absent in the beasts, must not make us think that we are better than the beasts because of our desire for such things. When this desire is not subject to reason, it makes men unhappy, and no one has ever thought that unhappiness should make him better than someone else. We are to think of a man as well-ordered, therefore, when his reason rules over these movements of the soul, for we must not speak of right order, or of order at all, when the more perfect is made subject to the less perfect...It follows, therefore, that when reason, or mind, or spirit, rules over the irrational movements of the soul, then that is in control in man which ought to be by virtue of that law which we found to be eternal.14

Certainly, to consider rationality man's highest quality, the quality which separates him from the animals, is by no means particularly strange or novel. And to suggest that this rationality should take a superior and guiding role to the emotions and more bestial desires, is quite generally accepted too. Furthermore, the claim that some natural or perfect order may be violated if lust should attempt to prevail also gains plausibility when we maintain the apparent dominion of reason over the passions. But so far, this only indicates that lust places people in an unnatural or abnormal state, not an evil one.

The element which makes lust evil, for Augustine, is not simply that choosing the side of lust is an attempt to upset the perfect order, but that it tries to upset the perfect order established by eternal law, ordained by God.
In other words, eternal law has its authority on the grounds of divine justice, and any action which attempts to violate that law is unjust and ultimately evil.

Furthermore, since eternal law proclaims that reason should rule the passions, and because eternal law is immutable, resolute and strong, invulnerable to any contenders, the only way in which man can be swayed to allow his lust to dominate his mind is through his own choice and free will. Augustine argues:

AUG. Do you think that the power of passion is greater than the mind, which we know has been given mastery over the passions? Personally, I do not think so. For there could be no perfect order if the weaker should lord it over the stronger. Consequently, I feel that the power of the mind must be greater than the desire for the very reason that it is only right and just that it should hold sway over desire.
EV. I feel the same way, too.
AUG. We can have no hesitation, then, in preferring every virtue to all vices, so that a virtue is more perfect and sublime to the extent that it becomes stronger and more invincible?
EV. Unquestionably.
...
AUG. For the time being we can be sure that whatever that nature is which rightfully excels a mind adorned with virtue, it cannot possibly be unjust. Consequently, though it were within its power to do so, not even this nature will force the mind to become a slave to passion.
EV. Anyone could see that right away.
AUG. Whatever, therefore, is the equal of mind, or superior to it, will not make it a slave to lust because of its own justice, provided the mind is in control and is strong in virtue. On the other hand, anything inferior to the mind cannot do so because
of its own weakness, as we have learned from what we already agreed upon. We are faced with the conclusion, then, that nothing else can make the mind a companion of evil desire except its own will and free choice. 15

What we have arrived at thus far, then, is noticing how significant the 'other-ness' of God is for Augustine. Because God is of an entirely different order than man, a perfect and eternal order, He is in a position of judgement over man and hence can justly inflict what may seem evil as punishment. Augustine even gives us some idea of which acts might receive such punishment, namely, those acts which attempt to disrupt God's perfect order, acts of passion or lust. Finally, Augustine points to the 'compulsion' of the perfect order by maintaining that even evil acts must be a result of 'will and free choice', will, of course, bearing the higher ontological status in the perfect order than passion.

We find much the same emphasis on God's 'other-worldliness' or different ontological status in "The Nature of the Good", and here we also get an idea of how well Augustine's Free Will Argument fits in with the biblical narrative of Genesis. There are five major stages in the biblical exposition of Genesis, each of which Augustine approaches with great insight. These include the world as God created it, the temptation of man, the fall of man, man's knowledge of evil, and the subsequent punishment of man. Each of these can be dealt with now, with the exception
of the prohibition, to further support the relationship which Augustine has established between God and man and their respective roles in the problem of evil. The prohibition will be considered shortly in the context of problems arising within the Free Will Argument itself.

The paradise described in Genesis 1:27-31, portrays a time when man lived in a world free from evil and sin. Whether this paradise existed in actuality or not is virtually irrelevant to the considerations at hand. The true significance of this passage lies not in its account of early man or prehistoric earth, but rather in the one claim which it makes about creation and Creator:

And God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good.16

For Augustine, it was completely unreasonable to think of a kind benevolent God creating anything other than that which is good. In his view, all things, in as much as they exist, are good. The very fact that they are created by God makes them good, and although this goodness may occur to greater or lesser degrees, all things, and hence all men, are still inherently good. This is supported in "The Nature of the Good", where Augustine says:

...all good things throughout the ranks of being, whether great or small, can derive their being only from God. Every natural being, so far as it is such, is good. There can be no being which does not derive its existence from the most high and true God. All are not supremely good, but they approximate to the supreme good, and even the very lowest goods,
which are far distant from the supreme good, can only derive their existence from the supreme good.\(^{17}\)

The amount or degree of goodness which Augustine speaks of here, is dependent on what he calls generic good things, which again from "The Nature of the Good" we discover to be "measure, form and order".\(^{18}\) The greater degree to which something has these generic good things, the closer it approximates to the supreme good.

Once again we are faced with the problem of what causes some men to be less good than others, or what deteriorates the measure, form and order of some men more than of others? The answer to this in Genesis lies in the notion of temptation, and this coincides beautifully with Augustine's concept of free will. The key point to bear in mind when considering temptation of any sort is that, in order for temptation to occur, there must be something in the nature of man which can be tempted. Yet how can this happen if man is supposed to be inherently good? It will soon become apparent that, for Augustine, the susceptibility of man to temptation is not merely something which may occur, but rather is something which must necessarily occur.

Before continuing, it is vital to determine what is meant by temptation. In a sense, temptation is nothing more than the presentation of a choice. If we consider the temptation of Eve in the Garden of Eden, for instance, the entire temptation is fundamentally captured in the lines:
But the serpent said to the woman, "You will not die, For God knows that when you eat of [the forbidden tree] your eyes will be opened and you will be like God, knowing good and evil".19

Basically, there is nothing coercive, devious or deceitful in these lines. Everything which the serpent says is true, and what he is really doing is presenting an option. Susceptibility to temptation, then, is in fact nothing more than being available to choices.

What gives man this availability to choices? In Augustine's view, the same quality which allowed man to dominate the animals, to tame them and make them do his bidding, is also what makes him susceptible to decision making. Clearly, this quality is reason. Because reason gives man dominion over the animals, so too man must recognize that reason has to control his more bestial tendencies so that a consistent order will prevail. We recall from "On Free Will":

We are to think of a man as well-ordered, therefore, when his reason rules over these movements of the soul, for we must not speak of right order, or of order at all, when the more perfect is made subject to the less perfect...20

Therefore, reason is considered the aspect of man's nature which makes him capable of making decisions, and even if on occasion it makes the wrong decisions, reason or the intellect should not be faulted for this. As Augustine points out in City of God,

...[I]t does not follow that other creatures
in the universe are better off merely because they are incapable of misery [through incorrect decision making]. That would be like saying the other members of the body are better than the eyes because they can never become blind ...a rational nature even in misery is higher than one which, because it lacks reason or sensation, cannot suffer misery. 21

What, though, initiates the decision making process once it is recognized that man has this capacity within him? We can anticipate Augustine's answer in a single word: will. Because of the superiority of the mind or spirit, nothing can subject it unwittingly to the lesser goods of bestial pleasures. Hence, Augustine concludes that the only way in which this can possibly occur is through the "will and free choice of the mind". To reiterate:

Whatever, therefore, is the equal of the mind, or superior to it, will not make it a slave to lust because of its own justice, provided the mind is in control and is strong in virtue. On the other hand, anything inferior to the mind cannot do so because of its own weakness, as we have learned from what we already agreed upon. We are faced with the conclusion, then, that nothing else can make the mind a companion of evil desire except its own will and free choice.22

Again, we are confronted with seeking the specifics of what makes a particular act of will evil rather than good. In order to discover this, we must determine where, precisely, the evil of Eden lay. It has already been stated that all which God created is good. Therefore, the serpent, the tree of knowledge and its fruit, and mankind, must all be good, since they are all His creations. It has
also been suggested that the temptation itself was not evil, since there was nothing particularly 'wrong' involved in it. Perhaps man's desire for knowledge was responsible for his downfall, but this too is unlikely since knowledge is that which appeals to man's reason, and reason is considered man's greatest good.

Where, then was the evil of Eden? This has already been partially answered. The evil was not in choosing to partake of knowledge, but was in the deterioration of natural measure, form and order. In "The Nature of the Good", Augustine says:

If we ask whence comes evil, we should first ask what evil is. It is nothing but the corruption of natural measure, form or order. What is called an evil nature is a corrupt nature. If it were not corrupt it would be good. But even when it is corrupted, so far as it remains a natural thing, it is good. It is bad only so far as it is corrupted.

Clearly, the act of disobedience to God's will would be the ultimate corruption of measure, form and order in the universe. How could this natural scheme of things be more violated than by the contradiction of God's command, by Adam and Eve eating of the tree which God had forbidden them? The Creator being disobeyed by His creations has to be the epitome of violations.

Surely, the idea of the disruption of the balance of the universe, and lust, are very strongly related. For, as we recall from earlier in our discussion, the evil
thing in lust is its attempt to upset the eternal order whereby the mind is designed to rule the passions. Once again, the thing which moves towards lust, or chooses to corrupt measure, form and order, is the will. The will to live rightly keeps the motive in an action pure, and the methods of achieving a goal good. A lack of this will, however, results in evil.

...those who are happy -and they must also be good -are not happy simply because they willed to live the happy life, for bad men do this too, but because they wished to live upright lives, which bad men are unwilling to do.24

We return once again, then, to the assertion that if we do not live according to God's eternal order, and live uprightly according to His plan, we shall be evil. And, since our evil actions occur through no fault of God, He can justly punish us for our sins.

...therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the Garden of Eden, to till the ground from which he was taken.25

Clearly, Augustine is intent on stressing the justice of God when man commits evil. But he is quite aware that such a claim is considerably more problematic that what has been presented thus far. Take, for example, the prohibition of Adam and Eve to eat of the forbidden tree, which was mentioned earlier. The obvious question here, is, why did God create an evil for man to choose? If God had not forbidden something, no violation of His will could have occurred. So, why did God "set man up"
for the fall?

Augustine argues:

The reason for the prohibition was to show that the rational soul is not in its own power but ought to be subject to God, and must guard the order of its salvation by obedience, or by disobedience be corrupted. Hence God called the tree which He had forbidden to be touched, the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, because anyone who had touched it contrary to the prohibition would discover the penalty of sin, and so would be able to distinguish between the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience. 

Given the pointed description of the order of the universe which we have already seen in Augustine's works, this argument is certainly quite plausible. For surely, the prohibition would not only bring to light the proper place of reason over the passions, by making a moral issue of partaking of food; but it also suggests the inferiority of man to God in the eternal order by exemplifying His authority over man.

Now, although this may not be a perfect solution to the problem of the prohibition, as we are left questioning the need of an omnipotent Being to provide such an example, it does fit quite well into Augustine's general propositions concerning order, the importance of reason, man's role with respect to God and so on. However, there are questions which penetrate the core of the Free Will Argument even more deeply than this, and Augustine considers these as well.

The third book of "On Free Will" outlines three
major problems of the Free Will Argument. It was written sufficiently after the first more expositional book to be considered a response not only to Augustine's own reflections on his argument but also to the objections of his contemporaries as well (Book 1 of *De libero arbitrio* was written in 388 A.D. whereas Books 2 and 3 were written between 391 and 395 A.D.). There is the problem of how human will can be said to be free if God, in His omniscience, has foreknowledge of the choices of that will, and if whatever God foreknows must necessarily happen. There is the problem of how God can justly punish what He foreknows and necessitates to happen. And, finally, there is the question of God's responsibility for his Creation.

Augustine outlines the first problem as follows:

...insofar as God foreknew that man was going to sin, that had to take place which God foreknew was going to happen. How, therefore, is the will free where there appears to be such inevitable necessity? 

Augustine's defense against the accusation that sin is necessitated by God's omniscience is that the assumption that God causes what he foreknows is misleading, and in fact illogical. In other words, it may well be that what is foreknown must happen, but it does not follow from this that the 'foreknewer' caused such event to occur. Augustine elaborates this position in a dialogue with Evodius.

AUG. Well, then if you foreknew that someone was going to sin, would he have to sin?  
EV. Indeed he would. Unless I foreknew what
is certain, I would not have foreknowledge. AUG. Therefore, what God foreknows must come about, not because God foreknows it, but only because it is foreknown. If foreknowledge is not certain, there is no foreknowledge.28

If I offer a certain two year old child a choice between jelly beans and broccoli, I know she will choose jelly beans. But I have in no way forced or caused her to choose the jelly beans. In fact, I would have preferred her to choose broccoli, which would be much better for her teeth and weight. What I foreknew did not occur because of compulsion, but was accurately predicted because of the nature of foreknowledge itself.

This provides the clue for the second problem as to how God can justly punish what He foreknows and causes to happen. That is, He does not cause the evil which men do, so why should He not punish those who attempt to disrupt His perfect order? As Augustine puts it,

You must see from this what that justice is which makes God punish sins, since He does not perpetrate what He knows is going to happen. For if He ought not to punish sinners because He foreknows that they are going to sin, then neither ought He to reward the righteous, since He foresees equally well that they will do what is right. Let us rather acknowledge that God's foreknowledge requires that nothing future be hidden from His view, while His justice demands that sin, being a voluntary offense, should not go unpunished by His judgement, since it was not necessitated by his foreknowledge.29

Although it is doubtful that Augustine is going to
convince any hard opposition that God should punish sinners in order that He can reward the righteous, he does have a valid counter-question for those who question God's right to punish the sins of men. Namely, "Why...should a just God not punish sins which He has not forced anyone to commit because of His foreknowledge?" Why, if it is a false assumption to equate foreknowledge with causal necessity, should the 'foreknower' not be in a position of judgement? In fact, as Augustine points out, "If God knows what you are going to will tomorrow, and if He foresees that every man now and in the future is going to will, then all the more does He foresee how He will deal with the just and the wicked." Again, the solution which Augustine has offered coincides beautifully with his prior arguments. Above all, divine justice must prevail. But there is one difficulty which Augustine recognizes, which he can not so easily conquer. Considering the small child for another moment, we can say that she freely chose the jelly beans over the broccoli, and I may even be considered well within my rights to reprimand her for always eating candy even though she knows I do not like her to do so because I do not consider it to be in her best interest. But, some could argue, it is her 'nature' to choose the candy, and I, as one of her role models, am in some sense responsible for cultivating such a 'nature'. Her parents, of course, are saddled with even
more responsibility for her 'natural' behaviour, since they are considered to have considerably more influence on her. The related problem is clear. God as Creator and omnipotent force must be responsible for what happens in His creation. "(H)ow...can...we fail to ascribe to the Creator whatever takes place of necessity in His Creation."  

Now, necessity takes on a new complexion. Augustine is referring here not only to necessary action, in the sense of directly forced or compelled action which he has dealt with fairly successfully already, but also necessary action understood as characteristic of human nature. Why, to refer to the example once more, was the little girl so susceptible to choosing candy instead of the noble broccoli? If God does not want to intervene in men's daily activity in order that they remain free, why did He create mankind to be sinful in the first place? Why did He not create man virtuous enough to choose good over evil consistently? Or, why did He not offer man a choice between one or more goods rather than a choice between good and evil?  

To the latter question, Augustine would undoubtedly respond, and quite rightly too, that a choice between two things of the same nature (i.e. good) is really not a choice at all. Ask any two year old, and they will inevitably tell you that a choice between broccoli and cabbage is not much of a choice. Moreover, there is no merit in choosing good when good is the only alternative.
Augustine often refers to the 'praiseworthiness' of choosing good over evil. This is a praise, however, based not on the freedom to choose, but rather on the freedom to choose between distinct and significant options. Augustine writes, for instance:

But if the movement by which the will can turn in different directions were not voluntary and subject to our control, a man ought not to be praised or blamed when, so to speak, he turns the hinge of his will in the opposite directions of higher and lower goods.33

This passage, of course, also reflects the notion of divine justice described above, whereby we know that God is just and it would be unjust for Him to punish us for sins or praise us for goods which he has caused, hence we must freely choose our acts of good and evil. Similarly, by offering us a choice between goods only, He would be causing us to choose good and He cannot ascribe merit to us for something He has done.

Augustine's response to the problem of why men are not virtuous enough to withstand the temptations of evil, and make the more noble choice of good though, is considerably weaker to say the least. He does make a few meritorious mutterings about things fitting properly into "the order" and how we are too ignorant to understand God's ultimate scheme of things, such as in the following passages, but he never does get very definitive.

...If you are elated by a creature that
perseveres fully in its will not to sin, there can be no doubt that you are right to prefer it to one that sins. But just as you give this creature a preference in your thinking, so has God the Creator given it preference in the ordering of the universe. You must believe that a creature of this kind exists in the higher realms and has its abode on high in heaven. For if the Creator shows His goodness in making a creature who He foresees is going to sin, He cannot fail to show that same goodness in making one that He foreknew would not sin.34

...Older people either disregard entirely, or at least patiently await for correction, judgements made by children who prefer the death of any man...to the death of a pet-sparrow...Something the same is done by those whose intellectual growth has enabled them to advance in wisdom whenever they come upon men of poor judgement. Such praise God for His lesser creatures because they are better suited to their carnal sense while, in regard to His higher and nobler creatures, they either give Him little or no praise, or even censure Him or try to improve upon Him, or do not believe that He is their Maker. Those wiser men should accustom themselves either to disregard such judgements completely, if they cannot correct them, or to endure them patiently until they can correct them.35

After some consideration, it becomes evident that the problem which we are in fact dealing with is one of specifying God's ontological status. That is, Augustine has to decide whether he wants to recognize God as continually acting in human history, or whether he wants to accept Him as a one time Creator who now passively sits by and watches His creation in motion. Only by resolving these difficulties can Augustine begin to decipher the mysteries
as to why God does not intervene to prevent the sins which
men commit in their daily lives, or why God initially
created man such that he was susceptible to doing evil.

So far, Augustine's main line of defense seems to be that even though God certainly knows the movements or actions of His creation, He is not directly participating in them because He seeks to maintain the will and free choice of men. But this defense creates a multitude of problems for Augustine. An example is the dilemma which he outlines in the following passage concerning the cause of 'true happiness' if it is not directly imparted by God. This passage reflects the difficulty which Augustine himself has in adequately defining God's role in the history of mankind.

AUG. Then God does nothing in His creation?
EV. God has decreed once and for all that order is to be achieved in the universe which He created, and He does not govern anything with a new decree of His will.
AUG. Does not God make anyone happy?
EV. He does indeed.
AUG. When a man is made happy, God is certainly acting at that time?
EV. That is true. 36

Despite the apparent ambiguity of Augustine's view of God's role in human history which we obtain from "On Free Will", it does at least provide us with the 'spirit' of his thought on this matter. (For more concrete evidence of Augustine's views on Providence and Grace as notions of God in history please refer to: De gratia et libero arbitrio.) We have already discussed, for instance, Augustine's notion
of God's eternal, non-temporal and unchanging nature. And Augustine also comments, "...we may truly say that we do not age freely, but of necessity, or that we do not die freely, but of necessity, and so on. But not even a madman would venture to assert that we do not will by our own will." 37 It seems safe to assume, therefore, that, in Augustine's view, matters of will are free, but that mankind still has some sort of unalterable nature which was established in creation. Men can move towards or away from God, and thus become happy or miserable, but with the exceptions of this 'established nature' and divine justice, God leaves man to do as he will(s). In other words, it is man's actions regarding God that have temporal history, for Augustine; it is not God who must be bound to this constraint.

As well as this understanding adapts itself to Augustine's Defense of Free Will, it gets him into considerable difficulty with regard to God's morality. For certainly it would be less than moral for a God who had the power to create a world without evil not to do so. And this is precisely the point which Augustine cannot seem to overcome.

Let us, therefore, leave Augustine at this point, to examine this problem of God's morality a little more carefully in David R. Griffin's analysis of the Free Will Argument in his God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy.
PART II: THE TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST AUGUSTINE
Chapter Two: David R. Griffin's Analysis of the
Free Will Argument

Left with Augustine's rather evasive response to
the problem of why an omnipotent, benevolent God would
create a world such that evil could occur, namely, that in
His ultimate plan God knows what He is doing and man should
not criticize Him in his own ignorance, Griffin says that
he feels uneasy. He maintains that there is no real in-
consistency with such a claim when considered in the context
of the Free Will Argument as a whole, but adds:

Faced with this answer...many people would
want to stand with Ivan in the chapter
entitled "Rebellion" in Dostoevsky's The
Brothers Karamazov. Ivan admits that at
the end of the world a "higher harmony"
may be realized, and that if he is there,
he may then cry aloud with the rest, "Thou
art just, O Lord, for Thy ways are revealed."
But, both in spite of this possibility and
because of it, he wants to get his protest
on the record in advance. He announces that
he hopes he will not join that chorus, for
he cannot accept the idea that any "higher
harmony" could justify the evils that were
allegedly necessary for this harmony, such
as the suffering of innocent children.38

Griffin proposes, therefore, to seek out some
firmer defense of Augustine's position based on his own
formal argument, outlined in the introduction of this
discussion. He proceeds towards this end, first by
dismissing Augustine's argument that divine omniscience is
compatible with human freedom, then by investigating what he considers the most substantial features of Augustine's view of the divine omnipotence versus human freedom issue. Via this inquiry Griffin arrives at what he deems the only viable method for consistently maintaining Augustine's claims.

Griffin maintains that the obvious flaw in Augustine's argument that men can be free despite God's omniscience, is that Augustine insists that God be recognized as immutable as well as omniscient. Griffin describes the traditional problem in the following way:

...when one is asking whether an action is "free" in a context in which the issue is whether the agent could justifiably be held responsible in the sense of being liable to incur blame, one must be asking whether the agent could have done otherwise. Or, since some people (such as Augustine) distinguish between willing and doing, one could be asking whether a person's willing is blameworthy. One would then have to be asking whether the individual could have willed something different from what he did in fact will. But, Griffin argues, the only possible answer to these questions, because of the immutability clause, is a loud and resounding "no".

Griffin argues that omniscience, taken on its own, does not necessarily have to be incompatible with human freedom. Griffin manages to defend this position by allowing enough flexibility in his understanding of omniscience to make it accommodate free will. He describes an omni-
scient being in the following way:

...this being knows all things that are knowable, and one could maintain that a free choice is not knowable until after it is made. In other words, the omniscient being would not know the future (except insofar as some more or less abstract characteristics of the future are already settled in the present).40

So far, this does not conflict with Augustine's argument that acts which were foreknown could be accurately predicted simply because of the nature of foreknowledge itself, but Griffin says that bringing in the element of immutability changes all that. The foreknowledge itself now bears a quality: immutability, 'unchangingness'. And that which cannot be changed is, by definition, necessary and not free. The flexibility which Griffin previously considered possible, is lost when God is described as immutable as well as omniscient. So Griffin concludes:

If this analysis is correct, then an immutably omniscient God...would be unjustified in condemning anyone to punishment for sinning. For, from the moment of conception, a person's life could not have been one iota different from its actual course. So the person exercises no freedom in any sense that would justify blame. This conclusion follows merely from the definition of God as an omniscient being who is also immutable in all respects.41

Augustine's best response to such a conclusion would be that his understanding of a free act is something other than 'that which could have occurred otherwise' or at least, something other than that which could have occurred
otherwise than from how it was foreknown. And this does, in fact, seem to be his view. Augustine would undoubtedly argue that Griffin's analysis loses the forest for the trees, or, more to the point, loses Augustine's meaning in his words. And this criticism is, surely, fair enough. For what Augustine is clearly driving at, is that for all intents and purposes man at the time when he sins is involving himself in a 'free' act inasmuch as he chooses it at that time whether there was immutable foreknowledge of the act prior to the choice or not. And Augustine is, at this point at least, little concerned with the fact that God seems to have created man with a nature such that his choices could be evil, or a particular man so that he could not avoid sin. (It may be added that these factors apparently bothered Augustine even less later in his career when he seemed to favour the idea of predestination towards salvation, more and more).

But this defense of the compatibility of divine omniscience with human freedom does not get Augustine, or God, off the hook. Now the question of divine omnipotence and human freedom charges forth even more aggressively than before. Why, if God is all-powerful and morally perfect, would He create man, or anything else for that matter, such that he could cause evil?

Griffin outlines Augustine's position on this problem quite accurately, as follows:
God created the world, willing that everything be good. God included beings with free will in this good creation. Some of these beings (some of the angels, and all of the humans, except the God-man) use their free will to sin, which means willing in a way that is contrary to God's will. Of course, God foresees this sin, and builds appropriate responses to it into the divine eternal plan. On the one hand, God includes a plan of mercy... On the other hand, God includes punishments for the sin.42

But, asks Griffin, how can sin, or action against the will of God, occur if God is truly omnipotent? In order to get to the "why" of this problem, then, Griffin is first taking us on the route of "how" divine omnipotence and human freedom can be compatible. And the real issue here is, does Augustine consider omnipotence to be a sort of remote abstract principle pertaining to God in the sense that God has the power to do anything he wills eventually, or does he see omnipotence as an active force exerting God's will at all times? Or, is the power of God potential and never, in fact, activated or actualized?

We have already seen one indication of Augustine's point of view on this question, as well as Griffin's acknowledgment of it, in our discussion of man's ignorance concerning the ways of God where God was portrayed in quite a passive role, or an 'unseen' role at least. Then, as now, however, such a response is not good enough for Griffin, who seeks to pin Augustine down to a more specific
and direct answer.

Griffin wants to argue that,

...although this is the sense that Augustine often gives to the notion that creatures cannot impede the divine will, and although this is the sense which he must suggest if his statement that creatures are justifiably punished for their actions is to have some plausibility, this is not the stronger sense which he gives to the notion elsewhere, and which his doctrine of God requires. According to this stronger sense, nothing happens other than what God wills to happen...And, whether God is said to "cause" something or merely "allow" it, if it happens this is because God wills it: "For it would not be done without his allowing it -and surely his permission is not unwilling but willing." (E. XXVI. 100).43

Now there are several points here for Griffin to defend. The first is, does the "stronger sense" of omnipotence genuinely portray Augustine's view, and why is this sense so essential to Augustine's doctrine of God. Our initial problem in resolving this difficulty lies in the fact that Griffin's strongest support comes from a work of Augustine's which we have not chosen for study ("Enchiridion"). This is not so great a difficulty as it may first appear, however, as there are similar references made in "On Free Will", such as when Augustine asserts "...that all things are ruled by providence"44, where "all things" includes all manner of change and movement. We would, no doubt, be greatly assisted if Griffin supported his claim that Augustine's doctrine of God requires such a view, but after making this statement, he abandons it and leaves us somewhat
at a loss.

Our second dilemma, is to determine whether or not Augustine's argument is destroyed, if we do accept God as the kind of 'absolutely' omnipotent force which Griffin describes. Since our evidence suggests that this may well be the case, let us assume that Griffin is correct in his forceful definition of omnipotence. He has not yet made an omnipotent God and human freedom fully incompatible. Augustine can respond, as before,

...God's goodness and justice and power are far greater than [questioners] conceive in their mind. And they should further understand, if they examine themselves, that they would have a duty to give thanks to God even if He had willed to make them something less perfect than they are...45

Again, though, we must remember that Griffin never does claim that divine omnipotence and human freedom are thoroughly incompatible. What he wants to do, and what his argument has set him on his way to doing, is to demonstrate the terms of their compatibility. And the terms, which Griffin has established for God's omnipotence, at this point are: (i) if God is omnipotent and men are not free but still do evil, then God is not moral; or (ii) God is omnipotent and men freely choose evil (and self-contradictions are acceptable when dealing with God); or, (iii) if God is omnipotent and all-moral then, man is not free and only does good.

Now clearly, Augustine, whose exalted soliloquies on God's goodness and justice46 demonstrate his commitment,
would never accept the possibility of God being immoral, ammoral, or even a little less than perfectly moral. So, the first alternative can be omitted as impossible, for Augustine.

The second and third alternatives, however, shed light on some interesting views. The question of whether or not self-contradictions can be made valid when dealing with God by means of some kind of double causation (whereby God causes each element of the contradiction simultaneously), for instance, is one which has bothered theologians for centuries. It is usually reduced to an "unanswerable question" but continues to rise again from the flames at the most disturbing moments. Can God make a round square? Or can He give men free will and simultaneously exert His own will over them? Augustine's answer seems to be that He can. For surely, this is the source of his evasiveness. We may not be able to explain how God can make apparent contradictions, but we should not question his ability to do so. Certainly the man who exalted God's power and glory, in the manner which we find in the following passage, would never doubt God's ability to do anything. Augustine proclaims:

...thou supreme, most powerful, most merciful, most just, most secret, most present, most beautiful, most mighty, most constant and incomprehensible; immutable, yet changing all things; never new and never old, yet renewing all things, and drawing such as are proud into decay, although they mark it not. Even in action, and ever quiet; heaping up, yet
needing nothing; upholding, filling and protecting, creating, nourishing and perfecting all things.47

Of course it is doubtful that Augustine would admit that God does in fact do contradictory things, but that He is capable of making apparent contradictions Augustine would certainly assert.

Griffin, on the other hand, maintains what he considers to be the view of "[m]ost theists", namely, "...that God cannot do the self-contradictory" and "that the ...doctrine of double causation...is not intelligible...".48 Griffin himself admits that this opinion is largely dogmatic, but his motivations in making the claim are fairly obvious.

Referring back to his original argument structure, then, Griffin completes his analysis of Augustine's position. The argument is as follows:

1. God is a perfect reality. (Definition)
2. A perfect reality is an omnipotent being. (By Definition)
3. An omnipotent being could unilaterally bring about an actual world without any genuine evil. (By Definition)
4. A perfect reality is a morally perfect being. (By Definition)
5. A morally perfect being would want to bring about an actual world without any genuine evil. (By Definition)
6. If there is genuine evil in the world, then there is no God. (Logical conclusion from 1 through 5)
7. There is genuine evil in the world. (Factual Statement)
8. Therefore, there is no God. (Logical conclusion from 6 and 7)49

And, based on this argument, Griffin assesses that
Augustine would maintain premises 1 and 2, for obvious reasons, as well as premise 3, since in his many elaborations of God's omnipotence Augustine makes it quite clear that there is no sufficient or necessary condition for evil. Griffin also adds that Augustine would undoubtedly assert God's moral perfection, again, for fairly obvious reasons.

Griffin furthers his argument by insisting that the rejection of statement 6 would be an abandonment of the validity of logic when considering God and the world, so we are now left with premises 5 and 7. Griffin claims that Augustine would reject premise 7 and maintain premise 5 (and hence reject the impending conclusion), because of the qualifier "genuine" in regard to evil.\textsuperscript{50} We shall pursue this hypothesis momentarily, but for now, let us examine the accuracy of the claims which Griffin has made thus far.

It is fairly obvious that Griffin is correct in claiming that Augustine would emphatically assert God's perfection and omnipotence. And that this perfection and omnipotence includes the ability to create a world without evil, is of little doubt either. For, as Griffin is quick to point out, Augustine himself chides, "For who will dare to believe or say that it was not in God's power to prevent both angels and men from sinning?"\textsuperscript{51}

Also, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that perfection includes moral perfection, particularly when we consider the age old kinship between religion and ethics.
The conclusion (6) which Griffin draws from the first five premises is that there is a direct contradiction between the existence of God and the occurrence of "genuine evil" in the world. Griffin's argument, of course, is that to reject this conclusion would be to take God's dealings with men out of the realm of logic, and this hardly seems acceptable if one wants to maintain that reason is the highest faculty which God gave us. For why would God give us reason and then obscure Himself from it?

But now, instead of with "Ivan" our sympathies must surely lie with Kierkegaard, with his cuttingly penetrating remarks in *Philosophical Fragments*:

> ...one should not think slightly of the paradoxical; for the paradox is the source of the thinker's passion, and the thinker without a paradox is like a lover without feeling: a paltry mediocrity. But the highest pitch of every passion is always to will its own downfall; and so it is also the supreme passion of the Reason to seek a collision though this collision must in one way or another prove its undoing. The supreme paradox of all thought is the attempt to discover something that thought cannot think.52

Was Augustine progressive enough in his thinking to accept this kind of radical departure from tradition? It is difficult to say. Augustine certainly never formulated this type of exhortation in any of his works, but whether the seeds of such musings as these were planted by him, remains to be seen.

Griffin, though, does not think that this is the
case. He claims

...I do not believe Augustine to be making the formal point that logic has to be suspended in these matters. Rather, his intention is that now we often cannot understand how the content of God's judgements is compatible with God's righteousness. He has no doubt that at the day of judgement we will understand the compatibility of omnipotent goodness and worldly evil. And just as there is no suggestion that this will involve seeing that God is "beyond good and evil", there is no suggestion that this will involve transcending the laws of formal thought. 53

Moreover, this view is not without justification. But Griffin must be careful. He has criticized Augustine for protecting God from the full impact of His omnipotence when that omnipotence was seen as a threat to human freedom. Now Griffin himself must not restrict God's power by implying that He ultimately should not transcend the human intellect. Griffin himself should not be so presumptuous as to assume that man with all his failings and limitations is ever meant to understand the ways of God, let alone to be instructed by God, with the coming of the day of judgement, in a way which is pleasing to man's meagre intellect. We recall, for instance, from the quote from the Confessions above that Augustine offers "incomprehensibility" as an attribute of God, and this is an attribute which he does not restrict to his present life.

Let us once again, however, grant Griffin the benefit of the doubt and assume that Augustine would not reject statement six. As Griffin has already stated, we are
now left with premises five and seven, and the crucial issue in these statements, as well as in the third of Griffin's terms discussed earlier, is whether or not there is "genuine evil" in the world. Griffin argues that the only way Augustine can save himself from affirming the non-existence of God, as demonstrated by Griffin's argument, is to deny that "genuine evil" exists.

Although Griffin never actually defines "genuine evil" outright, he indicates that by "genuine" he means "intrinsic", "instrumental" and "contributing to the whole". 54 And, as we, and Griffin, recall those words from "The Nature of the Good", there can be no doubt whatsoever of Augustine's thorough rejection of any evil of that sort.

...and good things throughout the ranks of being whether great or small, can derive their being only from God. Every natural being, so far as it is such, is good. There can be no being which does not derive its existence from the most high and true God. All are not supremely good, but they approximate to the supreme good and even the very lowest goods, which are far distant from the supreme good, can only derive their existence from the supreme good. 55

If, however, "...everything is intrinsically good; everything has a positive instrumental value; and everything contributes to the good of the whole so that there is no genuine evil in this realm," 56 as Griffin claims must be Augustine's view, how then, does Augustine account for some of the gross atrocities of our world? This, of course, is where Augustine's familiar notion of evil as the
privation of good comes into play.

Primarily because of his long-standing disputes with the Manichaeans and his personal disillusionment with and rejection of Manichaeism, Augustine, in many of his works, appears bent on rejecting the idea of a positive, or if you prefer, active force of evil. We find Augustine lamenting his own initial attachment to Manichaeism, on the grounds that that philosophy had caused him to shun the responsibility for his own actions. He remarks in The Confessions:

...as yet it still seemed to me that it was not we who sinned, but that this was done by I know not what other nature that remained in us...I loved to excuse myself, and accuse some other thing which was with me and yet was not I.57

Convinced of the error of his ways as a Manichaean, then, Augustine had to develop a concept of evil which would not only make men responsible for their sins, since this could be accomplished by freedom of choice. But furthermore, he required a concept of evil which did not directly compete with the 'Lord God Almighty' and His good works. And this, of course, is achieved by the notion of privation.

We remember that Augustine distinguished between two types of evil: the evil caused by God as a punishment for the sins of men which attempts to re-establish the balance of the perfect order, and the attempt of men to corrupt God's eternal plan. Clearly, of these categories Augustine's primary concern was to show the privative nature of the
second type of evil, since he would not begin to deny that the evil administered as punishment is actively caused by God. And, if we briefly recall the train of thought in "On Free Will" and "The Nature of the Good", we will find this concept of privation to be more than apparent.

In "On Free Will", for instance, man was seen as using his free will to allow lust to dominate his reason, and thereby deteriorate the established order of God. As Augustine commented,

...we must not speak of right order, or of order at all, when the more perfect is made subject to the less perfect...It follows, therefore, that when reason, or mind, or spirit, rules over the irrational movements of the soul, then that is in control in man which ought to be by virtue of that law which we found to be eternal.58

And this same sense of corruption or deterioration of order is argued for even more strongly in "The Nature of the Good", where Augustine describes the obliteration of the generic goods "measure, form, and order". Again,

We, Catholic Christians, worship God, from whom are all things, great or small, all measure great or small, all form great or small, all order great or small. All things are good; better in proportion as they are better measured, formed and ordered, less good where there is less of measure, form and order...Where these things are present in a high degree there are great goods, where they are present in a low degree there are small goods. And where they are absent there is no goodness. Moreover, where these things are present in a high degree there are things great by nature. Where there are things present in a low degree there are things small by
nature. Where they are absent there is no natural thing at all. Therefore, every natural existent is good.59

Augustine's account of 'apparent' evil as a deterioration, or privation of good, then, is really to affirm the position that there really is no such thing as "genuine evil" at all, only lesser goods. And, this, of course, is what Griffin claims to be Augustine's only defense against supporting the argument for the non-existence of God. Augustine's only recourse, according to Griffin, is to affirm that ultimately God's power is apparent in the goodness of men. That is not to say that all men are perfectly good, but that they are all more or less good and their free will contributes to their goodness (even though men may use this will to sin). That which seems to be evil is in effect prima facie evil, or apparent evil, construed as "genuine evil", when taken out of its proper context. Griffin states:

In summary, Augustine's position is that there is only one thing that is clearly evil intrinsically, and this is sin, or evil willing. But this prima facie evil is only apparently evil, for the universe is a better place with sin than it would have been without it. The one other thing that might be considered intrinsically evil, i.e., suffering, is never genuinely evil, for it is always a just punishment for sin and/or an aid toward achieving eternal life, which is such a great good that it more than compensates for any suffering. And those things which seem instrumentally evil within a limited context or from a partial perspective are not evil within the context of the universe as a whole. Accordingly there
is no genuine evil. 60

In light of Augustine's view that there is no "genuine evil" in the world, Griffin makes the following analysis, leaving us with two very pertinent questions for our further discussion,

This is a possible position to hold in the sense that it is not inconsistent (even though each person holding such a position may have inconsistencies in his thought). But two questions can be asked: First, is this position adequate to our experience? Or do we have intuitions about the reality of genuine evil which should be given higher credibility than at least one of the traditional Christian premises about the nature of a "perfect reality". Second, is this conclusion that there is no genuine evil in the world adequate to Christian faith itself? 61

Needless to say, this is a pair of questions of insurmountable impact, and to launch into a discussion of them at this point seems a little premature. Let us, therefore, take a look at the work of another commentator, William L. Rowe, on some related issues, in order to gain a fuller perspective with which to meet challenges such as these, in order to acquire an even more penetrating analysis of Augustine's argument on free will.
Chapter Three: William L. Rowe's Analysis of the Free Will Argument

Unlike Griffin, Rowe considers the main threat to human freedom and God's morality to be the omniscience of God, not His omnipotence. Griffin promptly dismissed the possibility of man's freedom being compatible with divine omniscience, and hence never really stopped to consider the moral implications if this were, in fact, the case. Rowe, on the other hand, thinks that it is quite acceptable to assert, simultaneously, God's omniscience and human freedom, though not in the way proposed by Augustine. Let us examine Rowe's argument, therefore, to see if it does alter Griffin's or Augustine's positions.

Beginning with the pointed question which Evodius asked of Augustine in "On Free Will", "How...is the will free where there appears to be such inevitable necessity?" Rowe formulates an argument demonstrating the fundamental problem of divine omniscience and human freedom, as follows:

(1) God has foreknowledge of all future events.
(2) Hence, if a man is going to sin, God foreknows that he will sin.
(3) Whatever God foreknows must necessarily happen.
(4) Hence, if God foreknows that a man will sin, he must necessarily sin.
(5) But if such a man must necessarily sin, there is no voluntary choice in his sinning.
(6) Therefore, such a man does not have
free will. 63

We recall that Augustine's defense against arguments such as this was that foreknowledge does not presuppose causal necessity (see page 21). An action which is foreknown must (necessarily) happen, but this is not to say that the foreknower in some way caused its occurrence. As Augustine said,

What God foreknows must come about not because God foreknows it, but only because it is foreknown. If foreknowledge is not certain, there is no foreknowledge. 64

Now, this seems to be a rejection of premise three, but Rowe argues that it is a rejection of premise five. This is a perfectly permissible transition as long as we bear in mind that by "necessarily" Rowe is not referring to causal necessity. And, in fact, to avoid any confusion on this point, the word "necessarily" could be left out of both premises three and five altogether. In this case, Augustine would certainly agree with Rowe and affirm premise three, that "Whatever God foreknows must...happen", 65 because of the nature of foreknowledge itself. And, as Rowe has suggested, Augustine would not accept premise five, that "if such a man must...sin, there is no voluntary choice in his sinning", 66 since he is so adamant in maintaining, "...not even a madman would venture to assert that we do not will by our own will." 67

Rowe identifies the new problem as follows:

"...[I]f a man must...will or choose to sin, how can we
claim that he, nevertheless, voluntariness or freely wills to sin?"68 Rowe bases his view of Augustine's position on this question, on the many passages in "On Free Will"69 (such as the one above) promoting man's freedom of choice and power or control over his own will. It is on these grounds that Rowe states:

Augustine's answer to the question just raised is that even though a man [must] will to sin he, nevertheless, freely wills to sin. The reason this is so is that the will is something that is always in our power, and whatever is in our power is free.70

Of course, the next question which comes to mind is, how can Augustine support this idea that the will is in our own power, regardless of whether or not its decisions are foreknown? As we are discovering to be his trait, we find Rowe undaunted by this query as well. Rowe claims:

Augustine's view is to say that x is not in a man's power is to say (roughly) that the presence or absence of x is not a result of the man's will. That is, x is not in a man's power if and only if either, (1) x fails to occur even though the man wills to do x - for example, running a mile in four minutes is not in my power because the feat fails to be accomplished even though I will to accomplish it - or (2) x occurs even though the man does not will to do x - for example, my growing old is not in my power because it occurs even though I do not will it to occur. Thus where x is something that occurs, the question whether x is in our power reduces to the question whether x would occur even though we do not will it.71

Now, what does all this have to do with the problem
of human freedom? According to Rowe, Augustine has set things up so that the only condition under which an action could not be in our power is if we will against that action and it still happens. In other words, if I do not will to sin, but still do so, my will is not in my own power. Also, in Rowe's description of Augustine's view, a distinction is drawn between not willing an action which nevertheless occurs and willing an action which does not occur. An example of the latter would be a man who wishes to run a mile in four minutes, but cannot. This, of course, is the logical equivalent of the first condition and is identified as such by Rowe. Rowe's interpretation of Augustine is that "... the act of will would not occur if...[a]...man did not will," so, according to the first condition, "to say that ...[a]...man willing to sin is not in his power is to say that the man wills to sin even though he does not will to sin - and this is impossible." 

Rowe now argues that this is faulty reasoning, and in a sense he is correct. We cannot go from:

| x is not in my power | \( \rightarrow \) | I do not will x

| (my will to sin) is not in my power | \( \rightarrow \) | (my will to sin) would occur even though I do not will it. |
since x has been stipulated as "...something that occurs". 74 That is, x must be an act, not a will to act. Now, therefore, we arrive at the direct adaptation of the first condition offered before,

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{(to sin) is not in my power} \\
= \\
\text{(to sin) would occur even though I do not will (to sin).}
\end{array}
\]

The expanded analysis, however, comes not from a direct adaptation, but with the addition of Rowe's Augustinian premise: "...the act of will would not occur if the man did not will." 75 So, now we do have a dependent relationship between the action and the will to act. But, Rowe points out, this still does not result in:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{(my will to sin) is not in my power} \\
= \\
\text{(my will to sin) would not occur even though I do not will it.}
\end{array}
\]

The new formula is:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{(willing x) is not in my power} \\
= \\
\text{(willing x) would occur even though I do not will (willing x).}
\end{array}
\]

which substitutes as:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{(willing to sin) is not in my power,} \\
= \\
\text{(willing to sin) would occur even though I do not will (willing to sin).}
\end{array}
\]

In Rowe's own words, "If the case of my willing to sin is parallel to the...[first condition]...then to say that
my willing to sin is not in my power is not to say that I
will to sin even though I do not will to sin; rather it is to
say that I will to sin even though I do not will to will to
sin."^76

Rowe further argues that the same problem arises
when taking the second condition for something 'not being
in my power'

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{x is not in my power} \\
\Rightarrow \text{x would not occur even though I do will x}
\end{array}
\]

In this case the expanded formula is:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{(willing x) is not in my power} \\
\Rightarrow \text{(willing x) would not occur even though I do will (willing x).}
\end{array}
\]

which, with the instance of "willing to refrain from
sinning", substitutes as:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{(willing to refrain from sinning) is not in my power} \\
\Rightarrow \text{(willing to refrain from sinning) would not occur even though I do will (willing to refrain from sinning).}
\end{array}
\]

Rowe states that this amounts to:

(a) I fail to will to refrain from sinning even though I will to
will to refrain from sinning
rather than

(b) I fail to will to refrain from sinning even though I will to
refrain from sinning.^77

Rowe argues that (b) expresses an impossibility
which would verify Augustine's claim that our will is in our own power. But statement (a) Rowe considers to bear little meaning at all, and, if it does have meaning, its meaning must be "...that I fail to will to refrain from sinning even though I make an effort to will or choose to refrain from sinning." 78 And this, Rowe maintains, does not remotely approach the impossibility of (b). Surely, says Rowe, "...(a) may be true." 79 Certainly it is possible that we may not accomplish our will to refrain from sinning, yet continue to will for it.

In light of the deficiencies which Rowe finds in Augustine's defense of divine omniscience being compatible with human freedom, Rowe derives his own argument to support this position. Considering the formal argument of the problem, as he saw it, Rowe's primary concerns are with lines three, four, and five,

(3) Whatever God foreknows must necessarily happen.
(4) Hence, if God foreknows that a man will sin, he must necessarily sin.
(5) But if such a man must necessarily sin, there is no voluntary choice in his sinning. 80

Rowe is mainly disturbed by premise three, which he maintains can bear either one of two meanings depending on where the idea of necessity is placed. According to Rowe, then, premise three could be read as either "(3a) It is necessary that if God foreknows p, p will happen," or (3b) If God foreknows p, p will happen necessarily," 81
where p represents "some event". Rowe's point is that, in order to get to man committing a necessary sin (premise 5), one must assume the necessity of the action from the foreknowledge (3b). This is precisely the kind of causal necessity from foreknowledge which we have seen Augustine argue against, quite legitimately, earlier (page 21). But Rowe goes on, although premise (3a) has been held by classical theology, this has not been the case with premise (3b). "Hence," Rowe concludes,

...either the inference from (3) to (4) is valid but (3) (interpreted as (3b)) is not true or (3) (interpreted as 3a)) is true but the inference from (3) to (4) in invalid. On either account, we have sufficient grounds for rejecting the argument.82

Now, where does all this 'formal argumentation' leave Griffin and Augustine? Well, if we recall Griffin's criterion for determining whether or not an action remains 'in our power', we remember that it was whether or not the agent "could have done otherwise...[or, in the case of free will]...[o]ne would then have to be asking whether the individual could have willed something different from what he did in fact will."83 How does this compare with Rowe's criterion? Let us see.

If x represents an action, according to Griffin,

| x is in my power | x could have occurred otherwise (than I will), |
or equivalently:

| x is not in my power | = | x could not have occurred otherwise (than I will) |

And, Rowe's criterion is:

| x is not in my power | = | x would occur even though I do not will x. OR, x would not occur even though I do will x. |

Clearly, saying that an action could not have occurred as I will it, and that an action would not occur even though I do will it, is saying exactly the same thing. For surely, what Rowe is getting at, by saying an action does not occur even though I will it, is that a particular action, willed in a particular way, does not occur even though I will it, which would obviously accommodate Griffin. From this it seems fairly evident that Rowe would consider Griffin as correct in dismissing Augustine's argument as Rowe himself.

Griffin could argue, however, that his argument is different from Rowe's inasmuch as he brings in the notion of God's immutability which Rowe does not, and this could seriously jeopardize Rowe's concluding argument. Griffin would undoubtedly argue that, whether premise (3b) ("If God foreknows p, p will happen necessarily"\textsuperscript{84}) has been maintained by classical theology or not, it is true because of God's immutability, and therefore, the move from premise three to
five via premise four is perfectly legitimate, and the conclusion that if God is omniscient man is not free is absolutely accurate. Clearly, whether or not divine omniscience eradicates the possibility of human freedom because of God's immutability remains to be seen, as does the question of whether or not a premise which entails this immutability can viably be brought to an argument promulgating Augustine's view, anyway. This shall be considered shortly, in our closing discussion.

For the moment, though, let us examine whether or not the attack on Augustine's argument, similarly presented by both Griffin and Rowe, is a fair rejection of his position.

Probably the most unfair aspect of the objections posed by Rowe is that they are based on an argument which Augustine never actually makes. Rowe takes basic views of Augustine and puts them into a formal argument which he then proceeds to prove wrong. The question now is, can we reasonably go from the assertions which clearly are Augustine's to Rowe's argument?

Beginning with the first premise,

| x is not in my power | = | x would not occur even though I do will x. |

we can get an affirmation that this is, in fact Augustine's view, quite quickly. We find in "On Free Will",

...we cannot deny that we have the power unless we fail to make our own the very
thing we are willing. 85

In other words,

| we do not have the power | = | we fail to make our own the very thing we are willing |

which is, in meaning at least, identical to the initial premise.

As for the additional qualification which leads to the expanded argument, "...the act of will would not occur if the man did not will", 86 we can find some sort of evidence for this in "On Free Will", as well, where Augustine asks the more or less rhetorical question,

So you will be happy against your will? 87 suggesting that one would never be happy if one did not will to be so.

And, as we have already seen (pages 50 -51 ) these factors, with the instance of 'refraining from sinning', combine to form the conclusion:

| (willing to refrain from sinning) is not in my power | = | (willing to refrain from sinning) would not occur even though I do will (to refrain from sinning - I will to refrain from sinning). |

And this, as Rowe has said, is equivalent to saying,

I fail to will to refrain from sinning even though I will to will to refrain from sinning, 88
the implications of which have already been discussed.

Thus far, then, it seems as if Griffin and Rowe have placed Augustine in a very tricky situation. But it seems to me that they have overlooked some very significant possibilities, and that the argument from omniscience may well be more important than either Griffin or Rowe may have suspected.
PART III: THE ANALYSIS
Chapter Four: A Critical Assessment

I have already mentioned that neither Griffin nor Rowe use formal arguments which Augustine himself has developed; they choose, instead, to use Augustine's basic ideas to formulate arguments which they then proceed to refute. This seems particularly unfair when we consider that Augustine does present perfectly valid arguments of his own in defense of divine omniscience and human free will. Furthermore, it is only when we simultaneously maintain God's omnipotence with His omniscience, and vice versa, that a genuine difficulty arises, as we shall now see. Beginning with a re-examination of Griffin's and Rowe's attacks on the compatibility of divine omniscience and human freedom, then, let us consider the viability of Augustine's defense and the implications which it has in light of God's omnipotence.

As we recall, Griffin's main argument against the compatibility of God's omniscience with human freedom was primarily based on the notion of "immutability". Griffin maintained that the fact that God's knowledge as to which action a man will choose could not change meant that men's actions could not be other than what God knew them to be, and therefore, if God is omniscient, then men cannot be free. Because we are not talking about foreknowledge, but
immutable foreknowledge, man's actions must be determined by God from birth.

But what is the difference between foreknowledge and immutable foreknowledge? Augustine has already admitted, "If foreknowledge is not certain [i.e. can change], there is no foreknowledge." Again, Griffin may well be granted that, by definition, immutable foreknowledge of an action means that that action must happen. Augustine would not dispute this. But just because there is certain, unchanging knowledge that an action will happen, this does not preclude the possibility of there being free choice involved in the action. For certainly absolute foreknowledge, immutable foreknowledge, or whatever, cannot, in and of itself, be considered compulsive or determining in any way.

Rowe, on the other hand, has a much more logical attack on Augustine's argument, but as we have already mentioned, it is grounded in a formal argument which is not Augustine's own. Moreover, although we have found evidence in the works of Augustine, of both premises of the argument which Rowe develops, they are not presented in the same section of "On Free Will", much less the same argument. The all-so-crucial relationship which Rowe insists exists between will and action, is not a part of the argument which Augustine actually offers. As just mentioned, this is particularly appalling when we realize that Augustine does present perfectly valid arguments of his own.
In "On Free Will", Augustine argues first for evil actions being the result of "free choice of the will". due to the perfect order established by God.

...there could be no perfect order, if the weaker should lord it over the stronger... [we (intuitively) recognize that mind is strong and passion weak]
...Consequently, ...the power of the mind must be greater than the desire [we also (intuitively) recognize that virtue is strong and vice is weak]
...we can have no hesitation, then, in preferring every virtue to all vices...
For the time being we can be sure that whatever that nature is which rightfully excels a mind adorned with virtue, it cannot be unjust
Consequently, though it were within its power to do so, not even this nature will force the mind to become a slave to passion...
...Whatever, therefore, is the equal of the mind or superior to it, will not make it a slave to lust because of its own justice, provided the mind is in control and is strong in virtue...
...On the other hand, anything inferior to the mind cannot do so because of its own weakness.
[Some aspect of mind, therefore, must be responsible]
...We are faced with the conclusion, then, that nothing else can make the mind a companion of evil desire except its own will and free choice.91

Now there are some very interesting features of this argument. The first is that it appeals to what we intuitively feel to be accurate. We do think that mind is superior to passion, and virtue to vice. And, in the end, it does not seem too atrocious to say that we intuitively feel that we are making our moral judgements, of our own free volition.
Furthermore, as Griffin has already pointed out, in his criticisms of Augustine's defense of divine omnipotence and human freedom based on the notion that there is no "genuine evil" in the world, our "gut feelings" should not be too severely undermined.

The other noteworthy aspect of this argument is that in order for Augustine to arrive at the conclusion which he does, he has to concede that some aspect of mind must allow the mind to become subject to passion; and, as we have seen, this is our own will and free choice. The one thing which I wish to briefly draw attention to here is that, in order for free will to do this, possession of it must be considered quite a high good in Augustine's overall scheme of things. For otherwise it could not be such a powerful feature of mind. This is not to say that free will is all good, but that there must be many lesser goods which it can dominate, and perhaps even more significantly, many higher goods which it can control, if it so chooses, as well.

The argument of Augustine's which Rowe refers to (though not completely accurately) is that which he offers in "On Free Will", III, iii, 8, where he states,

...we cannot deny that we have the power unless we fail to make our own the very thing we are willing. But if the will itself is not at our disposal while we will, then, of course, we are not willing at all. But if it is impossible for us not to will while we are willing, then the will is present to us whenever we will. There is nothing in our power except that which is present while we are willing.
Unless, then, it is within our power, our will is no will. Furthermore, it is because the will is in our power that it is free. What is not within our power, or cannot be, does not come under our freedom.92

And, since Rowe seems to be so fond of dealing with the validity of formal arguments, we can formalize this argument in this way:

1. We do not deny that we have the power unless we fail to make our own the very thing we are willing.
2. But if the will itself is not at our disposal while we are willing, then, of course, we are not willing at all.
3. But if it is impossible for us not to will while we are willing, then the will is present to us whenever we will.
4. There is nothing in our power except that which is present while we are willing.
5. Therefore, unless the will is within our power, our will is no will.
(6. Therefore, the will is in our power. And, since whatever is in our power is free, we have free will.)

When we combine this argument with the one referred to earlier, whereby foreknowledge has no causal effect on the will, we arrive at the conclusion that, regardless of whether or not God is omniscient, human beings have free will, because they always maintain their will within their power.

Rowe would undoubtedly argue that Augustine's second argument (see ) is circular having a conclusion (5) which is the same as one of the premises (2), and perhaps this is why Rowe adopted this premise (2) alone for use in his own construction of Augustine's argument. But when we
consider this argument (from page 62) along with the first argument the posits in "On Free Will" (see page 60), as well as with his insistence that foreknowledge does not include causal necessity, Augustine's position seems to be every bit as viable as Rowe's. In fact it is more viable, because it deals with an argument which Augustine himself makes, rather than one of Rowe's own construction. And it is certain that Rowe himself would object to having various of his statements, of another author's own choosing, plucked from their context and thrust into a formal argument to undergo the most scrupulous of scrutinies. In this light, therefore, Augustine's own defense of divine omniscience and human freedom seems perfectly adequate; but even if we choose to reject it, as did Rowe, Rowe has demonstrated another (though in my opinion not as commendable) argument supporting this view, which could have only been refuted by Griffin's "immutability clause", which we have now seen is not that damaging.

Since God's omniscience, then, does not appear to pose too great a threat to human freedom when viewed in and of itself, we must now consider the impact of His omnipotence. As we have seen, Griffin's main argument in this area is that it is impossible for God to simultaneously exert His will over men and allow them free will. So, in order to save God from the accusation of immorality (or non-existence), Griffin maintains that Augustine's only recourse is to deny
that there is "genuine evil" in the world. This denial, Griffin has suggested, may not only be contrary to what we intuitively consider to be the case, but it may also be contrary to Christian doctrine.

We have already examined some of the problems with this view of Griffin's, such as the question of whether it is possible, if God is truly all-powerful, for Him to exert His will over men while simultaneously allowing them free will. The status of free will, described above, makes us wonder if evil is merely the price which must be paid for the greater good of freedom of the will to be maintained (since, as we have also said before, a choice between two goods is really no choice at all). Furthermore, if we bear such a possibility in mind, does it not make the idea of lesser goods, in fact, more palatable to our intuition than "genuine evil"? Finally, we must remember that even Griffin himself does not deny the possibility of divine omnipotence and human freedom; he simply has difficulty reconciling the two.

It is on this basis that I wish to argue that neither divine omniscience nor omnipotence poses a serious threat to human freedom when considered independently. It is only when we combine these two divine attributes that serious (though not necessarily insurmountable) difficulties arise. Let us, therefore, formulate a new argument including all of the significant premises from both Griffin's and Rowe's arguments. As indicated in the introduction, such an argument would be as
follows:

1. God is a perfect reality.
2. A perfect reality is an omniscient and omnipotent being.
3. An omniscient being knows that man will sin (commit evil).
4. Whatever God foreknows must necessarily happen.
5. Therefore, man's sin (committing evil) must necessarily happen.
6. Whatever occurs of necessity an omnipotent being willingly allows to happen.
7. Therefore, God willingly allows evil to happen.
8. A morally perfect being would not allow evil to happen.
9. Therefore God is not a morally perfect being.

Now let us consider the problems which this argument creates, which were avoided by the arguments which treated omniscience and omnipotence independently. We have already seen that Augustine's response to the problem of divine omniscience versus human freedom would be that omniscience, even immutable omniscience, does not involve causal necessity. But the question now arises, how can man's freedom be preserved when God is characterized as not only knowing all that will happen but by his omnipotence causing all that happens as well.

Conversely, Augustine will argue that God's omnipotence serves to promote only good and that free will, even if it chooses evil, is a greater good than a compelled will. To which we can now respond that if God knows (through His omniscience) what the ultimate good of the universe will be, why,
if He is truly omnipotent can He not realize this state without any evil whatsoever?

Let us now continue our discussion, with the examination of the implications of this argument in the form of a dialogue between myself and Augustine. I shall take the role of posing the difficulties found within the argument beginning with those which have already been discussed, and Augustine will disclose the possible solutions which Augustine himself may have given to these problems:

I- Which of the premises of the preceding argument would you most strongly disagree with, most learned Augustine?

AUG- Clearly premise 7, that God willingly allows evil to happen. I have already explained that foreknowledge does not presuppose causal necessity; therefore, simply because men do, in fact, choose evil, does not mean that God is responsible for them doing so.

I- But surely, you cannot deny premise 6 that whatever occurs of necessity an omnipotent being willingly allows to happen.

AUG- Of course not.

I- Do you then deny that there is 'genuine evil' in the world? Or, how else can you defend your position that God does not cause evil?

AUG- I would deny that there is 'genuine evil' in the world and suggest, instead, that what seems to us to be 'genuine evil', is in fact only apparent evil, since even existence itself is a good created by God, and clearly, without existence, there would be no evil at all. So, yes, in this sense I would deny that there is 'genuine evil' in the world.

I- Don't you find it difficult to make an assertion such as this, when all around us in our daily experience we see such horrendous evils? Surely you would be hard-pressed to find any goodness in the existence of these evils whatsoever!
I realize that this often seems to be the case, but when we consider that the evils which take place in the world are necessary in order that we remain free to choose as we will, they then must be considered far more good than evil, to preserve so great a good as this.

But if this is true, must we not question whether it is moral of God to give man free will at all, if the expense is so great as this?

No doubt, this question is fair enough indeed, but now you must rely on your experience and intuition as you asked me to do only a short time ago. For surely, it suggests that free will is worth more than the price He has asked us.

This may all be well and good, Augustine, but why if God is truly omnipotent can He not maintain our freedom without evil? Surely there must be some other option available to an all-powerful being such as Him.

The ways of the Lord are not all known to us, but we must believe that they are for our good.

Well, then, what of this question? If God is omniscient and knows that we will sin, and if He is thoroughly omnipotent and can prevent us from sinning without restricting our freedom, how can you still maintain that God is not responsible when man sins, if only through negligence, if nothing else?

The ways of the Lord are not all known to us, but we must believe that they are for our good.

Now clearly, it is impossible to say with absolute certainty that this is precisely how Augustine would have responded to each of these questions. But, my intention was to demonstrate the difficulties which arise when an argument combining divine omniscience and omnipotence pitted against human freedom is presented. It is my contention that either view considered independently provides virtually
no opposition whatsoever for the meticulous Augustine, and
that a stronger attack can only be found when the two are
combined. I wish to maintain further that Augustine himself
was aware of this fact, and that this is the reasonwhy
continually goes back and forth between arguments on omniscience
and omnipotence, recognizing that any assertions which are
made in one argument must be continued in the other, and the
implications made in either argument must likewise be
carried over to the other. I also consider that this accounts
for any ambiguities in Augustine's work, but feel that the
perseverance which he displays in dealing with the most
complex, and difficult to resolve, problems facing him,
deserves some patience. Even considering our new argument,
it is difficult to say whether or not Augustine can really
be defeated. For Augustine's Free Will defense should never
be considered lightly.
FOOTNOTES


5. Ibid.

6. Augustine, De natura boni, "The Nature of the Good".

7. Augustine, De libero arbitrio, I.iii.6.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid. I.iii.7.

10. Ibid. I.iii.8.

11. Ibid. I.iv.10.

12. Ibid. I.vi.15.

13. Ibid.


15. Ibid. I.x.20-xi.21.


17. Augustine, De natura boni, i.

18. Ibid.

19. Augustine, De libero arbitrio, I.vii,18.
22. Augustine, De libero arbitrio, I.x.20.
23. Augustine, De natura boni, iv.
27. Augustine, De libero arbitrio, III.ii.4.
28. Ibid. III.iv.9.
29. Ibid. III.iv.11.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid. III.iii.6.
32. Ibid. III.v.12.
33. Ibid. III.i.3.
35. Ibid. III.v.17.
36. Ibid. III.iii.6.
37. Ibid. III.iii.7.
39. Ibid. p. 60.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid. p. 62.
42. Ibid. p. 63.
43. Ibid.
44. Augustine, De libero arbitrio, II.xvii.45 and III.ii.5.
45. Ibid. III.iii.5.
46. Ibid. I.ii.5.
47. Augustine, Confessiones, I.iii.


49. Ibid. p. 9.


51. Augustine, De civitate dei, IV.27.


54. Ibid. p. 69.

55. Augustine, De natura boni, i.


57. Augustine, Confessiones, V.10.

58. Augustine, De libero arbitrio, I.viii.18.

59. Augustine; De natura boni, iii.


61. Ibid.

62. Augustine, De libero arbitrio, III.ii.4.


64. Augustine, De libero arbitrio, III.iv.9.


66. Ibid.

67. Augustine, De libero arbitrio, III.iii.7.

69. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio*, III.iii.8.


85. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio*, III.iii.8.


87. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio*, III.iii.7.

88. Rowe, "Augustine on Foreknowledge and Free Will", in *Augustine: A Collection of Critical Essays* ed. by
R.A. Markus, p. 213.

89. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio*, III.iv.9.


93. *Ibid*. III.
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