A VICTORIAN FRAME OF MIND:

THE THOUGHT OF JOHN CLARK MURRAY

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By

CHARLES NICHOLAS TERPSTRA, B.A.

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AUTHOR: Charles Nicholas Terpstra, B.A.   (McMaster University)

SUPERVISOR: Dr. A.R. Allen

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Abstract

John Clark Murray (1836 - 1917) held the Chair of Mental and
Moral Philosophy at Queen's College from 1862 to 1872, and at McGill
University from 1872 until his retirement in 1903. The purpose of
the present study is to offer a close historical examination of a
thinker who has often been treated as a transitional thinker in
histories of philosophical activity in nineteenth century Canada.
The opening biographical chapter establishes the Scottish cultural
tradition in which Murray was raised and whose social and educational
values he continued to perpetuate in his own writing and teaching.
The Scottish tradition clarifies the critical discussion in Chapter
Two of some of the ambiguities of Murray's position with regard to
the philosophical movements of the nineteenth century. In particular,
the difficulties of classing Murray with either the Scottish Common
Sense Realists, the Neo-Kantian or Neo-Hegelian Idealists, or the
rising group of 'professional' philosophers are considered. Specific
elements of the intellectual framework of John Clark Murray's thought
are dealt with in Chapter Three. Such characteristic concerns as the
structure of knowledge, the relation of materialism and idealism,
freedom and necessity, and moral philosophy are considered in them-
selves and as components of the unified order of truth which Murray
found best expressed in Christianity. The final chapter focuses on
Murray's effort to formulate a response to the social problems

emerging as a consequence of industrialism. After establishing the

ideological strength of Murray's economic and political liberalism,

this chapter traces the efforts of a concerned liberal to understand

contemporary problems and offer solutions to them.

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INTRODUCTION

The image of the nineteenth century as an age of overturned

orthodoxies has been so firmly established as to become an historio-

graphical commonplace. Although the eighteenth century is hardly

renowned as an age of faith, the nineteenth is commonly seen as the

time when those beliefs which did weather the winds of Enlightenment

rationalism were finally sunk in the waves of secularism, materialism

and higher criticism, with only the flotsam and jetsam left to wash

ashore on Dover Beach. In consequence, nineteenth century intellectual

history is pre-occupied with transitions, and with the deaths and

births of schools and theories by which transitions are marked.

The theme of transition has marked the majority of studies

of philosophical activity in nineteenth century Canada. While this

theme aptly conveys the sense of developments in the period, it can

occasionally do rough justice to those thinkers who do not wholly

fit the established pattern. John Clark Murray is one such figure.

As a philosopher who falls between the two schools of Common Sense

Realism and Neo-Hegelian Idealism which set the poles of Canadian

thought in the period, he has most often been interpreted in terms

appropriate to larger synthetic studies without yet having received

thorough historical treatment on his own terms.

The purpose of the present study is to offer a closer

historical and cultural examination of this 'transitional thinker'

in an attempt to determine the intellectual framework and personal

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agenda of a man who held an ambiguous position in the fraternity
of North American philosophers.

The opening biographical chapter establishes the Scottish
cultural tradition in which John Clark Murray was raised and whose
social and educational values he continued to perpetuate in his own
writings and teaching. The Scottish tradition clarifies the critical
discussion in Chapter Two of some of the ambiguities in Murray's
position vis-à-vis the philosophical movements of the nineteenth
century. In particular, the difficulties of classing Murray with
either the Scottish Common Sense Realists, the Neo-Kantian or
Neo-Hegelian Idealists and, indeed, 'professional' philosophers will
be considered.

From the discussion of historical ambiguities, the study will
move to ambiguities of a different sort with the reconstruction in
Chapter Three of the intellectual framework of John Clark Murray's
thought. Such characteristic concerns as the structure of knowledge,
the relation of materialism and idealism, freedom and necessity, and
moral philosophy will be considered in themselves and as components
in the unified order of truth which Murray found to be best expressed
through Christianity. Finally, the study will focus in Chapter Four
on Murray's effort to formulate a response to the social problems
emerging as a consequence of industrialization. After establishing
the dogmatic strength of Murray's economic and political liberalism,
this chapter will trace the efforts of a concerned liberal to under-
stand contemporary problems and offer solutions to them. Though the
solutions are first formulated within the liberal political creed,

they come increasingly to reflect an apolitical and amillenial under-

standing of Christian ethics.

CHAPTER ONE

Shaping a Young Culture

John Clark Murray was born March 19, 1836, a year marked by

the rise to a philosophic chair of one man who led British philosophy

at mid-century, Sir William Hamilton, and the birth of another who

was to do much to bring a new -- or renewed -- spirit to that philosophy

later in the century, Thomas Hill Green. Murray was born in the

industrial town of Paisley in western Scotland, one of the elder

children of a businessman and rising liberal politician David Murray,

and Elizabeth Clark, a member of a family active in Paisley cloth

and thread manufacturing. The year was as auspicious for the Murray

family as for British philosophy: 1836 was also marked by the election

of David Murray to municipal council with a slim majority soon after

the 1833 reform of the Scottish municipal system.[1]

Election victory brought greater responsibility than David

Murray may have anticipated. The beginning of Murray's political

career coincided with the beginning of yet another of the periodic

and prolonged depressions which marked the transition of the small

and stable cloth town outside of Glasgow into a large textile

manufacturing centre. Paisley's rapid growth in times of prosperity

only increased its problems in times of depression, and the city had

seen recurring unemployment, hunger, and workers' demonstrations for

economic and parliamentary reform since the end of the Napoleonic

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wars.[2]

It was in these conditions that David Murray worked for economic

reform, first as Manager of the Poor concerned with unemployment relief

in 1832, and after 1836 through his offices in the political system.

He had work enough: the depression in the cloth industries which began

in 1836 lasted for fourteen years, throwing an estimated 14,000 to

17,000 people out of work in a town of less than 40,000, and working its

way systematically through the economy of the whole community, bankrupt-

ing secondary and service industries and finally the town itself.[3]

David Murray was in municipal government for the duration of the

depression, first as town Treasurer and after 1844 as the Chief

Magistrate, or Provost. In order to repair the economic health of the

town, he encouraged further mechanization and diversification of local

industries. Although recovery did not begin until after he had left

office in 1850, David Murray had gained sufficient confidence among

both workers and manufacturers to be re-elected in 1869. He was,

according to his son, a liberal in whom conservatives had confidence,

working for social change but refusing to strain traditional forms of

government in order to achieve it.[4]

David Murray's career and political views are of significance

in this study of his son because comparison of the two shows how

closely the son followed the ideals, if not precisely the path of his

father. The debt was far-reaching. John Clark inherited a form of

the evangelical theology and social concern which had led his father

to quit the Church of Scotland in the Free Church secession of 1843.

He also took on an abiding love of the ballads, songs and popular

culture of Scotland which was eventually translated into the academic
form of books and articles on Scottish folk culture.

But apart from particular debts, David Murray exemplified
and passed on the strengths of Scottish urban culture developed in the
eighteenth century and still very much alive in the nineteenth.
Liberalism, moderation and intelligence informed a life in which
education was not defined by the length of time spent in formal
schooling. In this culture it was not unusual for a young businessman
like David Murray to deliver, in French, an essay on self-culture to
a small literary society. Nor was it unusual that this young man should
instill in his children that love of books, music and serious disucssion
which is the animating spirit of self-culture.[5] This humane influence
is no less significant for being difficult to identify or quantify.[6]
John Clark Murray was noted throughout his life as a gentleman of wide
interests and deep learning. He was not an academic specialist whose
active life was defined by the limits of a book-lined room, but a
cultured generalist in the Scottish tradition, concerned with the
development of an active cultural life in his college students and in
Canada as a whole.[7] Such a life would be marked in both individuals
and nation by a thoughtful concern with the full range of daily affairs
that was informed by ideals which transcended individuals and events.
This is not to say that Murray was a formal, philosophical idealist.
Just as true education went beyond formal schooling, so the true,
well-lived life went beyond the pragmatic solution of practical
necessities alone.[8]

John Clark Murray's formal schooling began with the traditional

classical program offered by the Paisley Grammar School in preparation

for university studies. He moved to the University of Glasgow in 1850,

spending the following four years in a varied course which included

a good deal of theology, classics and literature, but little in

philosophy beyond logic.[9] Here he made the acquaintance as classmates

of such future academic colleagues as Edward Caird, George Monro Grant

and John Nichol.[10]

Philosophy began to figure more in the two years which followed

at the Free Church seminary, New College, which was associated with

the University of Edinburgh. The change was the result of the presence

at the university of Sir William Hamilton, the leading exponent of

Common Sense philosophy and by that time nearing the end of his life.

Murray took Hamilton's class in Metaphysics during his first session

at Edinburgh and the effect was profound.[11] Although the elderly

philosopher, weakened by a stroke some years before, could not speak

without a stutter or lecture without an assistant, and although he had

lost control over the classroom to the extent that the rear rows were

more often engaged in fighting than in writing, Murray later recalled

that,

> in spite of all this, down to the very last days of his life
> there used to be found on the front benches, pressing near to
> to the professor's chair, a fair gathering of young men who
> hung with reverent attention on every word that fell from his
> stammering lips, and who felt, in his very personality, as
> well as in the charm with which he led them into new realms of
> of thought and untrodden fields of learning, a peculiar spell[12]
> that made them forget all the imperfection of his utterance.

The spell of the mentor reinforced the spell of the field.

Murray became one of Hamilton's favorite students and, in the eyes

of fellow students and the professor's assistants, one of the most able
as well. He showed what one of the assistants termed "an acute and
clear intellect, well fitted for dealing with philosophical questions
and well informed regarding them."[13]

After the first session at Edinburgh, the young theology student
began to concentrate on philosophy. He was elected President of the
Metaphysical and Ethical Society by fellow students, and appears to
have spent the year gaining a more thorough acquaintance with the
history of philosophy, ethics and certain speculative questions in the
area of philosophical psychology, an interest he shared with Hamilton.[14]

Yet Murray's apprenticeship with Hamilton was to come to an
abrupt and premature end. Shortly after the end of the 1855 - 56
Session, the overworked and disabled Hamilton sustained brain damage
and died. Taking a path theological students were only then beginning
to discover, Murray moved to Germany and divided a year of study in
theology between Heidelberg and the acknowledged centre of higher
criticism, Göttingen, before returning to Edinburgh.[15] One of the
many fellow Scots in Heidelberg at the time was James Hutchison
Stirling, a philosophy student who was to stir British philosophical
circles nine years later with the publication of The Secret of Hegel.[16]
Student records show that Stirling was not formally enrolled in the
university at the time. Although Murray may have had friendly contact
with Stirling at this formative time, most of his friends in
Heidelberg were Scottish and German theology students.[17]

The three years following return to Scotland were spent in
further theological study at New College, culminating in a year as

President of the Edinburgh Theological Society and graduation in 1860
with a licentiate.[18] Murray was now ready to embark on a life in the
ministry. Yet despite an active preaching schedule and no shortage
of permanent opportunities, he seems to have had little inclination
for this career. While former classmates took on pastoral charges,
Murray wrote articles for Chamber's Encyclopedia. A fellow theologue
who went on to the ministry wrote,

> Mr. Murray is a born thinker. He first applied himself to
> the study of Philosophy from a philosophic instinct. The
> same instinctive impulse which made him a student of
> Philosophy, keeps him one.[19]

In the fall of 1861, Murray followed the advice of friends
and applied for the office of Examiner in Mental Philosophy at the
University of Glasgow. In spite of glowing testimonials, he came in
second in the competition, losing to a man whose works he was later
to employ in courses on moral philosophy, Henry Calderwood.[20]
Scottish universities had, in the 1850's and 1860's, become battle-
grounds in the continuing cultural and political conflicts rising out
of the 1843 Free Church secession.[21] Although Murray was nominally
of the politically aggressive Free Church party, he was discouraged
by ecclesiastical rivalry and seems to have had little enthusiasm
for the struggle which erupted whenever a vacant philosophical chair
was to be filled. There seemed to be little hope of advancement for
one who lacked the drive of a partisan.

But a new opportunity appeared the summer following the loss
of the Glasgow competition in the person of Principal Leitch of

Queen's University in Kingston, Canada West. Leitch had long been a pastor in Scotland and continued to spend his summers there after the appointment to Queen's, relaxing and engaging in attempts to gain support for the Church of Scotland college from Scottish congregations. In 1862 he had an additional mission. Private scandal had forced the resignation of Dr. James George from the chair of Mental and Moral Philosophy, and Leitch was engaged in examining Scottish applicants for the vacant post. Murray quickly applied and, thanks to vacillation on the part of the leading contender and recommendations from Church officials and philosophy professors in Scotland, was appointed to the chair.[22]

Murray's supporters had praised his analytic and speculative abilities; Leitch had different standards in mind when he advised the Queen's Board of Trustees that the young Free Church applicant "would prove a genuine Churchman".[23] In Canada the new professor proved to fit both descriptions, giving thorough philosophical education to students who were often heading for the ministry, and reversing his father's steps by joining the Church of Scotland.

After crossing the Atlantic in the company of Principal Leitch, John Clark Murray was installed with public ceremony in the chair of Mental and Moral Philosophy on November 24, 1862. The next ten years were spent in what he was later to term an "apprenticeship" at Queen's. It was a time of maturing as a thinker, writer and teacher. Murray consolidated his views on the Scottish Common Sense school in general and on Hamilton in particular, and began developing critical distance from the tradition and its last prominent exponent. The

intellectual ferment of the 1860's in Britain resulted in the publication

of a number of critical works on Hamilton and the Common Sense school,

not the least of which was J.S. Mill's An Examination of Sir William

Hamilton's Philosophy, published in 1865. Murray contributed to this

general review with four articles in the Canadian Journal from 1866 to

1867; an anticipated fifth installment was never published. The series

gave a review of Scottish philosophy since the eighteenth century thinker

Francis Hutchinson, before moving to an analysis and criticism of

Hamilton's synthesis of Thomas Reid and Immanuel Kant. The articles

also took Mill's criticisms into account, distinguishing sound points

from what Murray often thought were faulty interpretations.

Although Hamilton's star was rapidly fading in the British

philosophical firmament, it continued to guide students in the colonial

universities. Queen's was no exception. Professor Murray used

Hamilton's works extensively and, to facilitate teaching, published

An Outline of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy in 1870. The work has

been hailed as the "first technical philosophical book written in

Canada", a claim more notable for nationalist ambition than scholarly

accuracy.[24] The Outline was simply an edited version of Hamilton's

rambling 1836 Lectures on Metaphysics; Murray was careful to point out

that even the organization was Hamilton's own. Written in Scotland,

edited in Canada. and published in the United States, the Outline

was an example of the type of work Murray was to concentrate on in the

future. Although published widely he was, unlike John Watson, his

successor at Queen's, not a very original thinker. Just as Murray's

strength lay in teaching, so the bulk of his academic work lay in

introductory textbooks and commentaries on the work of other thinkers.

But this was still in the future. Throughout his term at Queen's, Murray took an active interest in all aspects of the administration and general life of the still tiny college. He served as Registrar, as Secretary of the Senate, and as Treasurer of the Queen's-based Botanical Society of Canada.[25] Active participation in student social life, a busy public lecture and sermon schedule, and the establishment of a college literary society won him the esteem of college students and the Kingston public. By 1870, he was one of three faculty members living on campus in Summerhill, a home converted back to residential use after years as the main classroom building of the college.[26]

But he was still an expatriate. Like many colonial colleagues, Murray's personal life spanned the ocean; winters were spent in Canada, but the end of the college term brought return to Scotland for the summer. This pattern was continued for some years after his marriage in 1865 to a highly gifted Paisley woman, Margaret Polson.

Murray had come to Canada professing the hope that he would find the intellectual conditions for the elucidation of a philosophy which could transcend purely national boundaries. Perhaps as a result of this hope, he refrained for some years from commenting on Canadian issues, save as they involved general principles. A commitment to the improvement of higher education in Canada led early on to qualified support for university reform which would see Queen's become an independent college within the University of Toronto.[27] This position may have helped him win appointment as an Examiner at

the University of Toronto, but it could hardly have endeared him to the Queen's trustees, who saw in amalgamation the effective elimination of their college. A further type of university reform emerged with his support later in the decade for the admission of women into the college on equal terms with men. Murray was among the first three professors to deliver lectures to the Kingston Ladies Educational Association in 1869, and he spoke out strongly for the extension of their right to full college education in a commencement address given the following year under the title, "The Higher Education of Women". The address was published as a pamphlet and circulated widely, attracting attention in the British press.[28]

If the Queen's decade was a time of philosophical and social maturing for John Clark Murray, it was a decade of maturing of a quite different sort for the college. The 1860's was "a decade of disasters" at Queen's, marked by continuing staff dissension, declining enrolment, and numerous threats to its continued existence.[29] The threats came from a variety of sources: from provincial university reformers intent on entirely absorbing the college and its endowment into the University of Toronto; from Free Church unionists aiming to emasculate the Church of Scotland college by closing its theological faculty; and from the collapse in 1868 of the Commercial Bank in which the bulk of the Queen's endowment was held.[30] This last threat was the most severe, for it came just as university reform and confederation combined to deprive Queen's of the provincial subsidy it had received since 1845. As the college tottered on the brink of bankruptcy, Murray and three other junior professors donated a third of their salaries

to the drive for a new endowment.[31]

The drive was successful, but Murray may have been a little
tired of the air of uncertainty which prevailed over the college.
Enrolment in the Arts and Theology program had dropped from sixty in
1863 to a mere twenty-nine in 1870: "the college appeared to be
reaching the vanishing point."[32] Hearing in the fall of 1871 that an
equivalent position might be opening up at McGill College in Montreal,
he wrote to McGill Principal John William Dawson asking for details.
Dawson's reply convinced him that the position -- that of an Assistant
Professorship -- was inferior to his own at Queen's, and so Murray
dropped the matter.[33]

Dawson, however, did not. As part of a long term program to
upgrade the Arts Faculty, he had brought in a Professor Forbes to fill
the chair of Mental and Moral Philosophy, which had been filled by the
Anglican Archdeacon William Turnbull Leach since 1853. But Forbes died
soon after his arrival for the 1871 - 72 Session, and the work had
reverted to the reluctant Leach. Dawson needed a replacement and
was encouraged by the expression of interest received from an
established teacher and scholar at Queen's. He may also have anticipated
help from Murray in lecturing to the recently founded Montreal Ladies
Educational Association, a pet project of the Principal which
received only lukewarm support from his faculty. In any event, the
philosophy chair was offered to Murray in March of 1872, and after a
month's negotiations on salary and duties -- with Murray looking forward
to the possibility of a combined chair of Philosophy and English
Literature -- a letter of acceptance was received from Kingston.[34]

In his eagerness to get Murray, Dawson turned down a number of applicants

for the chair, including one he must later have regretted rejecting,

John Watson.[35]

Murray was 37 years old when he came to take up the chair of

Mental and Moral Philosophy at McGill. He was to remain at McGill

for the rest of his career and in Montreal for the rest of his life,

developing a reputation as a teacher, a reformer, and a scholar.

As a teacher, Murray continued to emphasize to students the

necessity of finding and taking their education beyond classroom walls.

Class lectures were widely appreciated by students, but so too was

Murray's continued support for extracurricular activities, in particular

the independent literary societies promoted by the professor as instruments

for self culture and as participating bodies in the ordering of formal

university life. Speaking to the McGill Undergraduate Literary Society

in 1888, Murray,

> confessed that even though he had studied under men of European
> reputation ne had received more benefit from societies, in the
> culture obtained by readiness in thought, arranging ideas,
> quickly seeing a falsity, and coming in contact and conflict
> with fellow men.[36]

Education was more than Gradgrind's facts. It was a preparation

for the assumption of responsibility in individual and social life.

In the necessities of their internal government and through participation

in university administration, student societies helped to:

> develop respect for orderly government and constitutional
> procedure, to influence opinion by an appeal to reason and
> conscience, to form tendencies which will grow into the widest
> political habit, the only safeguard against political adventurers
> among a free people.[37]

The liberal politics of David Murray found their echo in his son.
They were received more enthusiastically by the students than by the
McGill administration, which viewed with Tory horror the participation of
either students or professors in its own operations, and which sought to
silence the professors and curb the students when public controversy
revealed opposition to its policies and procedures.

Murray's widely attested popularity as a teacher stemmed from his
interest in the lives of his students. The injunction that they pursue
education beyond the classroom was reciprocated by an interest which
went beyond concern for their ability to recite philosophical arguments.
He followed the careers of students long after graduation, and assembled
a photo album containing the pictures of many of those who had won the
Prince of Wales Gold Medal or had achieved First Rank Honours upon
graduation. The annotations in the album, together with other sources,
indicate that students from both Queen's and McGill often went on to
further academic distinction.[38] Of the Queen's graduates, one Robert
Jardine had "carried alone and with highest commendation the degree of
Doctor of Science, by the excellence of his examinations in Mental
Philosophy" at Edinburgh, and had gone on to be appointed President of
the Church of Scotland college in Calcutta. A second Queen's student,
Robert Campbell, had won prestigious prizes in logic and metaphysics at
Edinburgh, beating out competition from a first class honours graduate
of the University of London.[39] Of the McGill graduates, some went on to
posts in different fields at American universities (John C. Bracey in
French Literature at Vassar; James Eduard Le Rossignol in Economics at
Ohio and Denver; James A. Craig in Semitics at Michigan), while others

such as P.T. Lafleur and J.W.A. Hickson became lecturers in philosophy
at McGill.[40] Hickson had completed an M.A. in philosophical psychology at
McGill, and returned in 1901 after further work in Berlin, Freiburg and
Halle, where he completed a dissertation on Nietzsche.[41] Graduate work
in Europe also attracted one of the first female graduates, Donalda
McFee, who went to the University of Zurich to continue studies on
Berkeley begun with Murray. McFee's work culminated in a dissertation in
German relating schools of thought which figured prominently in Murray's
courses. Entitled <u>Berkeley's New Theory of Vision and its Development
in the English Association School and the Modern Empirical School in
Germany</u>, the work was published in 1895 and reviewed by Murray for the
Canadian press.[42]

McFee's work owed more to her professor than suggestions for its
topic alone. As a member of the first class of women to graduate from
McGill, she was a beneficiary of Murray's efforts to open the university
to women. Murray's efforts in this struggle exemplified the greater
involvement in practical social issues which distinguished his years in
Montreal from those in Kingston. In a public speech given shortly after
arriving at McGill, he identified the place of women in society and the
relation of capital and labour as "the two great social problems, of
which our time is called to attempt a solution."[43]

Murray's public writings on the education of women go back to the
1870 address on "The Higher Education of Women". Generally, however,
his attempt to develop alternatives to the existing economic and social
system can be traced back to 1874, and a review article on "Co-operative
Housekeeping" in the Montreal Daily Witness. Yet it was not until the

imminent collapse of the Liberal government of Alexander Mackenzie in
1878 that Murray began writing on social issues in earnest, taking to
the first issue of the short-lived, liberal Canadian Spectator to call
pointedly for educated and principled politicians, and using later issues
to discuss in somewhat less than academic tones, "The Ethics of a
National Policy".[45] Adopting the arguments and procedures of evangelical
and utilitarian reformers earlier in the century, Murray began from the
mid-1870's to demonstrate a pre-occupation with the need for moral
change and practical improvement in all areas of society. Dominion
politics was a recurring concern, but so to were education, the rights of
women and workers, and a variety of issues ranging from book taxes, the
treatment of the handicapped and gambling, to the spelling reforms
proposed by the Fonetic Society.[46] As the following chapters will
establish, Murray approached reform as a liberal and a Christian, seeking
a rationalization of social procedures reminiscent of utilitarianism and
an infusion into human affairs of Christian principles reminiscent of
evangelicalism. This ideological fusion was less than successful in all
cases, for Murray's ethics often demanded a transcendence of the very
utilitarian practicality which marked liberal reform.

Murray's concern with social issues was absorbed into and even-
tually superseded by more purely academic work. While the decades of
the 1870's and 1880's were marked by a steady stream of articles on
economic, political or social issues, in the 1890's there occurred a
maturing of philosophic viewpoint and an increase in academic
publications.

The earlier articles were published in widely circulated Montreal

newspapers or in one of the many short-lived Canadian weeklies or

monthlies which attempted to appeal to an intelligent reading public

located somewhere between the daily paper and the scholarly journal.

Recent events usually prompted these articles, whose analytic substance

witnessed to Murray's efforts to find solutions to the economic problems

rooted in decades of laissez-faire liberalism without seriously altering

the liberal philosophy itself. In tone, topic and medium, these

writings were clearly intended for a large and educated public. As such,

they represented attempts to put into practice Murray's abiding convic-

tion that the development of Canada's culture and the solution of its

problems were dependant on the intelligent public discussion of the

issues which arose in the life of the nation. His promotion of this

discussion extended to participation in the establishment of one such

journal which was short-lived even by nineteenth century Canadian

standards. The first issue of the Montreal-based Dominion Review,

"A Canadian Monthly Journal of Politics and Literature", appeared on

July 15, 1882, bearing four articles written by the McGill professor.[47]

The articles in the Dominion Review reflect the wide range of

issues which Murray believed ought to be discussed in the country. A

lead editorial on "The Political Situation in Canada" was followed by

a selection on "The Scientific Outlook". Two review articles sought

to make readers aware of recent intellectual movements, and of the

major role Canadian scholars were playing in their development. One

dealt with the most recent work by the Glasgow fellow-student who had

become one of the leading British thinkers in the Idealist revival,

Edward Caird's The Problem of Philosophy at the Present Time (1881).

The second was a comparative review which noted the contributions of Canadians to the revival in Kantian scholarship. J.G. Schurman of Acadia, and later of Dalhousie and Cornell, had recently published his first work, Kantian Ethics and the Ethics of Evolution. This was compared to another first work by Caird's pupil and Murray's successor at Queen's, John Watson's Kant and His English Critics. The reviews were laudatory without being critical, more a notice than an analysis of the works at hand. As such, the reviews were as typical of the generalist approach to philosophy exemplified by Murray, as the books reviewed were typical of a new and far more specialist approach to philosophy.

Murray gave no indication of his personal reaction to the changes these men represented in philosophical scholarship. Younger, more highly trained, and far more technical than he, they were typical of the professional scholars emerging from German and American graduate schools. As such, they were distinct from the broadly cultured philosophy teachers who had been the proud product of the Scottish universities, and who were represented in Canada by Murray and most of his established colleagues.[48] As will be seen in Chapter Two, the 'professionalization' of philosophy in English universities went hand-in-hand with the revival of Idealism spurred by Murray's peers, T.H. Green and Edward Caird. How Murray would respond to these developments was still not clear in 1882.

The Dominion Review was notable more for ambition than achievement, and was not long a vehicle for Murray's ideas. Its first issue was also its last. and thereafter Murray took to writing in periodicals

of a similar purpose such as Goldwin Smith's The Week and the Montreal
magazine, The Argus.

Even in this period, Murray's writing was not restricted to
social issues. Religious and philosophical controversies also attracted
his pen. He contributed to the controversy raised by John Tyndall's
1874 Presidential Address to the British Association for the Advancement
of Science meeting in Belfast with an article in the Canadian Monthly and
National Review entitled "Atomism and Theism".[49] Tyndall had asserted
that the answers to man's search for meaning lay in material science
rather than in traditional religion, eliciting responses characterized
more often by heat than light. Murray's rebuttal is characteristic in
its systematic ordering of arguments, its ironic analysis, and its
disinclination to elaborate an alternative scientific theory.

Murray believed that on scientific grounds, Tyndall's argument
fell short of its author's own standards; atomism was no less hypo-
thetical than the religion Tyndall had sought to displace, and so had
no greater methodological credibility.[50] In fact, it likely had less,
for it was unable to provide convincing explanation of the facts or acts
of consciousness. Murray strikes a note of Baconian conservatism: the
fact that molecular movements accompany thoughts and feelings is in
itself no proof that they cause these acts of consciousness. Some
relation is probable, but these acts testify to a level of existence
beyond the sensations.[51]

But the flaws of Tyndall's argument were more than scientific.
On philosophical grounds, it was weakened by lacunae and contradictions.
Atomism itself failed to explain the "fundamental principle and origin

of things."[52] Tyndall had attempted to fill the gap by asserting the existence of some unknowable primal cause beyond those mental impressions which are our only immediately known facts. Yet Murray could see no valid reason for inferring the existence of a Being while denying that He could be known; the inference itself, together with the assertion as to what the Being was not, was an assertion of knowledge, however weak an assertion it might be.[53]

In short, Murray did not take up a challenge to disprove Tyndall or to prove theism. He merely showed by logical steps how Tyndall's case had not been proven, and that indeed the argument employed in asserting it was no different in its logical form from the argument Tyndall found so unacceptable when used to assert theism. The onus was not on Christians to prove theism, but on Tyndall to disprove it conclusively.[54] Murray was to adopt this position and method of argument in much of his subsequent work touching on the relation of materialism and Christianity. Save in the realm of ethics, he did not work on questions of truth involving arguments of proof and refutation.

The article on "Atomism and Theism" provides a suitable introduction to the methods and thought of John Clark Murray. Suitable both because of its characteristic content and uncharacteristic topic; its arguments were common to questions or topics on which Murray expended more scholarly effort. One of these areas was philosophical psychology, the subject which, together with ethics, attracted the greatest part of his speculative energy.

Philosophical psychology was explored through restricted analyses of such problems as the nature of dreams, the possible relations between

psychology and medicine and the nature and value of cramming.[55] It

found its summary in Murray's Handbook of Psychology, a text first

published in 1885 and revised four times thereafter before being retitled

And Introduction to Psychology.[56] This work represented the mature

treatment of an interest which had begun under Hamilton and whose subse-

quent study had, as the following chapter will demonstrate, led Murray

beyond his mentor.

The subject of Hamilton and the Common Sense philosophy had

occasioned a number of critical essays beginning with the 1866/7 four

part series in the Canadian Journal and continued in British reviews

through the 1870's and 1880's.[57] The choice of periodicals indicated

developments of more than one sort. Since Canada did not have the

appropriate philosophical journals or audience, and because the questions

dealt with were under discussion elsewhere, Murray virtually ceased

publishing serious work in Canada, turning instead to British journals

in the 1880's and increasingly to newly created American journals in

the 1890's.

More significantly for Murray's own intellectual development,

these books and articles indicated a gradual shift of interest away

from the Scottish philosophy and towards more diverse thinkers and

schools. In 1885 he published an article on the eighteenth century

philosoher, Solomon Maimon, in the British Quarterly Review.[58] A

contemporary and critic of Kant, Maimon had produced what Kant himself

believed was the only cogent criticism of the Critical Philosohy before

falling into virtual obscurity with the advent of Hegelian idealism.

Murray's article was inspired by the accidental discovery in a Toronto

bookstore of a rare copy of Maimon's autobiography. The next four

years were spent translating the work from its original German into

English; the translated edition of this lively and satiric work is

the only work of Murray's which has continued in publication through

the twentieth century.[59] The motivation for this task is difficult

to determine. Maimon expressed many of Murray's criticisms of the

Kantian system, in particular of the concepts of a priori

categories of experience and of a noumenal realm which is both within

and beyond imagination and consciousness. Yet in Murray's translation,

the philosophical passages were largely omitted; many of those retained

were, in the judgement of a later Maimon scholar, interpreted and

translated inaccurately.[60]

The decades following the publication of the work on Maimon

were marked by articles on figures equally obscure or ones better

known. From Hegesias the Cyreniac to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the

diversity of subjects testified to the ending of Murray's scholarly

preoccupation with the Scottish philosophy and its replacement with

a type of academic eclecticism.[61] Parallel with this was an increasing

number of writings which testified to the emergence of a new synthesis

of convictions. Beginning roughly in the 1890's, Murray's attention

turned more and more to Ethics, treating it first in the general terms

of a textbook but, in successive writings, in relation to Christianity

and its bearing on social problems. The synthesis of formal ethics

and liberal Christianity was not unusual in the intellectual climate

of the late nineteenth century, but in Murray's treatment the theological

component of the synthesis retained more than simply a trace of orthodoxy.

As Chapter 4 will demonstrate further, his application of this hybrid

to social problems clarified the distinctions between Murray and neo-

Hegelian new liberals such as T.H. Green and Arnold Toynbee.

This distinction is intriguing in itself and all the more

so in that it occurs at the time that Murray was coming into greater

contact with American philosophers, in particular those of the Hegelian

St. Louis School. The initiation of this contact appears to have

been fortuitous. The chief contact with the group was through Thomas

Davidson, a man of varied interests who had become one of the leading

members of the philosophical school while teaching high school in

St. Louis in the 1860's and 1870's. One of Davidson's interests was

in Scottish culture and folklore, and it appears from the nature of

their friendship that this was the firmest link of intellectual kinship

with Murray.[62] Articles in the <u>Scottish American Journal</u> may have

initially brought the two to each other's attention though Davidson

was hardly an unknown figure in the nineteenth century intellectual

world. Whatever the cause, by 1892 John Clark Murray was joining

in the sessions of the Glenmore Summer School of Philosophy conducted

by Davidson at his farm in the Adirondacks. Established in the mode

and after the demise of the Emersonian Concord School of Philosophy,

Glenmore was not a formal institution, but a vehicle established to

maintain philosophical activity on a popular level outside of the

university. As such, it drew on amateur philosophical clubs and societies

as well as established universities for its students. Teachers included

both the older, independent and self-taught figures of the St. Louis

movement, and "many of the coming scholars of the period".[63] With

Murray and Davidson at the 1892 session were Dr. W.T. Harris, the

leading light of the St. Louis School, a close personal friend of

Davidson and by this time the U.S. Commissioner of Education; John

Dewey, then beginning to make a name for himself in psychology and

ethics at the University of Michigan; and Josiah Royce of Harvard

then rapidly rising to prominence as a leading American exponent of

Absolute Idealism, who gave a series of lectures on "Recent Tendencies

in Ethical Speculation". The philosophers were joined by two scholars

of Semitic literature, Dr. Max Margolis of Columbia and Dr. A.J. Leon

of Johns Hopkins.[64]

The precise intellectual effect of close and informal contact

with this circle would be difficult to gauge, particularly since Murray

was not unfamiliar with the concepts and proponents of the Idealist

movement in either America, Canada or Britain. Nor were these men

unfamiliar with him; Harris had responded to Murray's gift a year

earlier of his recently published Introduction to Ethics with the

note that,

> I can see at once [that it] is a piece of fine thinking
> and thorough scholarship. It is a pleasure to take in one's
> hands a book of such maturity, a book that applies its high
> theories to questions that arise in the experience of the
> present day.[65]

Though far from the Hegelianism of the St. Louis School, Murray's

own turn toward ethical idealism becomes prominent at this time. The

Introduction to Ethics had been, like the Handbook of Psychology,

a non-speculative review of the field written primarily for the benefit

of beginning students in philosophy. Subsequent work began to look

more particularly at the relations of ethics, liberal Christianity
and social problems, culminating with the publication in 1908 of
the far more personal Handbook of Christian Ethics.

Participation in the 1892 summer school marked the beginning of
Murray's greater involvement in American philosophic circles. The
year also saw his appointment, together with the philosophical
psychologist James Baldwin of the University of Toronto, as one of the
two delegates representing Canada in the planning sessions for the
Philosophical Congress to be held conjointly with the 1893 Chicago
World's Fair.[66] The Congress itself provided an opportunity to
deliver a paper on "Philosophy and Industrial Life" before an interna-
tional audience; the paper was subsequently published in The Monist.[67]
In the same year he addressed the annual meeting of the American
Psychological Association on the subject of dreams.[68] With growing
frequency, he began to join in debates in American journals, choosing
opponents as diverse as Andrew Carnegie for a discussion on Canada and
continental union, and Josiah Royce for a telling challenge on the
proper relation between professors of philosophy and organized
churches.[69] After 1891, he seldom published serious work in anything
other than American journals, choosing The Monist, The Philosophical
Review, The International Journal of Ethics, the Open Court and the
Educational Review for philosophical essays and book reviews. It is
significant that these specialised journals were the product of the
generation of scholars who had received professional training in graduate
schools. In turning to them, Murray was turning away from those more
general British and Canadian periodicals such as Macmillan's and The Week

whose broader range reflected the intellectual milieu in which Murray
himself had been trained. But though he might alter the medium, the
work itself continued to reflect that earlier milieu which had fostered
the ideal of the gentleman scholar; Murray's articles were discursive
rather than analytic, not like the complex and at times convoluted
works of philosophical scholarship which were the published fruit
of the new educational ideal and which set the tone of the new journals.
Consequently, his work was published only as these journals were them-
selves in their formative stages; their maturing was a maturing towards
a depth of specialization which eventually excluded the older generation
of philosophy teachers represented by Murray.

However short-lived, the American connection was evidently
to Murray's liking. In addition to the publications, he continued
to participate in Davidson's Summer School of Philosophy and in 1903
he went to give a series of public lectures on "The Ethics of Habit"
to the Brooklyn Institute in New York.[70] He returned to New York
the following year to deliver a series on "The Evolution of Social
Morality" to The Peoples Institute.[71] America provided a more varied
and hence potentially more appreciative audience; according to one
authority, the Handbook of Psychology received little attention in
Canada, where the more purely idealist approach of George Paxton Young
or the more purely empiricist approach of James Baldwin was preferred.
The book, however, had considerable success in America until the rise
of a new psychology under William James.[72]

Eclipsed by Royce, James and even John G. Watson, who had
preceded Murray into both Idealism and the American philosophical

world, Murray never reached the level of philosophical scholarship
or recognition attained by these other thinkers. His work was neither
inventive nor profound and his reputation lay in interpretation and
teaching, strengths which seldom sustain a philosopher's reputation
long after his death.

Yet it would be an excessively narrow study which would evaluate
Murray on the strength of his academic work alone. Literature was
another field of interest and activity which went beyond mere diversion.
Murray's first lectures to the ladies classes at Queen's had been
on English Composition, which was characteristically analysed into
a Primary Law of Perspicuity and Secondary Laws of Vigour, Elegance
and Simplicity -- Laws which free his own writing from the verbosity
which makes so much of Victorian academic prose unrelievedly turgid.[73]
The promotion of literary societies has already been noted, as was
the attempt to secure a combined chair in English Literature and
Philosophy at McGill. Had he been successful in this latter effort,
more writings on literary topics may have been produced. Some of
those which did appear imaginatively combined two interests, such
as an 1899 article on "The Merchant of Venice as an Exponent of Industrial
Ethics".[74]

The literary work was both critical and creative. Murray
wrote and published poetry throughout his life and in 1904 published
the novel He That Had Received the Five Talents.[75] He also wrote
but did not publish a play entitled Judas of Kerioth.[76] Unlike some
of the academic writing, these works fully deserve the indifference
received from the literary world. Unfortunately, Murray's interest

in literature did not result in writing any more inspired than the mass of works produced for the middle class nineteenth-century public.

But if his creative exercises seldom achieved more than mediocre results, Murray was able to produce consistent and valuable work in an area which combined ethnography with literary criticism. His earliest work of original scholarship was not a text in philosophy, but The Ballads and Songs of Scotland, In View of Their Influence on the Character of the People, an 1874 work begun in undergraduate days and completed as a Prize Essay for the St. Andrews Society of Glasgow.[77] Murray looked on his work in Scottish folklore as a leisure activity, but interest in the work was such that long after the publication of Ballads and Songs he wrote short articles on individual pieces, attempting to arrive at a critical version of a song through the comparison of regional variations. Most of these works were published in The Scottish-American Journal, a weekly based in New York. The critical method employed was a Higher Criticism of folk literature, the ethnographic historicism of Herder and Goethe:

> The character of a nation, as well as of an individual, is
> moulded by all the influences in the midst of which the
> nation or the individual lives . . . Every manifestation of
> character is thus at once evidence of the existence of a
> certain tendency, and a contribution to the force of the
> tendency from which it has sprung . . . The object [of the
> present work] has been, after arranging the ballads and
> songs into groups, to elicit some of the features by which
> each group is distinguished, to point out the effects which
> such features are calculated to produce and to trace these
> effects in Scottish life.[78]

The primary effect was the development of poetical taste and ability among Scottish people. This was not simply significant, but

also encouraging to the immigrant author. Just as the ballads had

nurtured Scott, and the songs produced Burns, so newer Scottish authors

would continue to draw inspiration from traditional literature and

the living characteristics it displayed, even if they abandoned the

dialect or left the country. Scottish literature would preserve

Scottish life in a world which was moving beyond national boundaries.[79]

Murray resigned from active teaching at McGill in 1903,

at age sixty-seven. Retirement was attended by the controversy which

had marked the career itself. Murray, together with Alexander Johnson,

a mathematics teacher who had taught at the university since 1857,

was the first victim of a compulsory retirement policy adopted by

the McGill Board of Governors.[80] Neither Murray nor his students,

nor, for that matter, the Montreal public, believed the policy was

justified in its general aims or particular applications. The Montreal

Star reported the philosophy professor as claiming "He did not feel that

he and his colleagues were old enough to be placed on the shelf."[81]

The claim was bold for, according to one source, Murray was deaf by

this time.[82] Despite the public outcry, the Board of Governors acted

with characteristic inflexibility and finality in the matter.

For most of his thirty-one years at the university, Murray

had been the Philosophy Department. Apart from the hiring of a part-

time lecturer in 1886 to assist with women's courses and Murray's

own invitation to the new principal of the Royal Victoria College,

Hilda Diana Oakeley, to join as an associate member, it was not until

the appointment of Dr. J.W. Hickson in 1901 that the Philsophy Department

gained a second full-time member.[83] Throughout his tenure, all students

graduating in arts were required to take the third or fourth year
course in Moral Philosophy, a course the department chairman seldom
allotted to a lecturer, associate or colleague. In Murray's hands
the course embraced political economy as well as ethics, the former
being treated as the practical outcome and application of the latter.[84]
This understanding of ethics was imparted to almost every graduate
of McGill from 1872 to 1903. If the tributes occasioned by retirement
be accepted, moral philosophy was the heart of Murray's legacy as
a teacher.

While Murray's personal forte was in the teaching of moral
philosophy, he looked forward to the expansion of his department to
include aesthetics and courses in the philosophies of law, religion,
science and education.[85] These ambitions reflected contemporary Idealist
opinion that knowledge of a field was not complete without the study
of its philosophical principles; since the strength of the university
was in its programs in law and the sciences, and since many of the
arts graduates continued on to seminary courses, the planned expansion
was closely tied to what Murray perceived as the philosophical needs
of the university community as a whole. Complete implementation of
an 1898 proposal setting out this curriculum reform would have greatly
expanded the influence of the department, but in turn would have
required a greatly expanded department. In the event, Murray received
neither the funds for full implementation nor the time to oversee it.
H.D. Oakeley provided expansion into ancient philosophy and J.W. Hickson
brought expertise in modern philosophy, but little was done to increase
the range of subjects covered. When Murray himself was replaced,

it was with two men: A.E. Taylor, then at an early stage in what

was to be a notable career, and W. Caldwell, a man born the year after

Murray had first come to Canada and who of all the appointees most

exemplified the new direction in philosophical scholarship.[86] Oakeley

and Taylor were products of the traditional classically-oriented Oxford

program in literae humanitores.[87] Hickson was better trained in philos-

ophy at an advanced level, but Caldwell was a far more accomplished

scholar. Trained in Scotland, Germany, France and England, he had

already taught at the universities of Edinburgh, Cornell, Chicago

and Northwestern before coming to McGill, where he remained until

retirement in 1933. Caldwell had done work on the Scottish philosophy,

but his real interest was Schopenhauer.[88] The ability of the university

to attract men of the calibre of Taylor and Caldwell says much about

the department which Murray had created and overseen. But the ambitions

of the former Chairman were no closer to realization under its new

faculty. The department expanded its offerings in the history of

contemporary philosophy but continued to ignore the expansion into

other disciplines envisioned by Murray.

The McGill Board of Governors may have refused to relent on

its decision to retire Murray, but it was at pains to emphasize that

its actions did not reflect any official displeasure with the professor.

In appointing him professor emeritus, the Board noted that "It is within

the knowledge of every member of the Board that no Professor has exerted

a greater influence for good in the minds of his students and that

no member of the staff has ever been more highly respected in every

section of the community"[89] The words had particular irony for those

familiar with Murray's bitter clashes with the board over the education

of women in the 1880's, culminating in near dismissal in 1888. Public

newspapers and college journals echoed the board's praise for his

scholarly work, wide culture and personal integrity.[90] The journal

of the Montreal Presbyterian College, most of whose students had attended

McGill and where Murray himself had given frequent lectures, printed

an editorial of praise noting that:

> in the cold intellectual pursuits of college life his
> lectures gave us higher conceptions of man and nobler
> aspirations. We never felt that he was merely toying
> with fancies, playing with ideas or indulging in idle
> speculation but was bringing all his theories into
> immediate contact with our daily life. He is a man of
> the widest scholarship and of the highest culture, yet
> his lectures always go deeper than mere scholarship
> and culture; they touch the wellsprings of culture.[91]

Apart from occasional teaching in Christian ethics and the

philosophy of religion at the Presbyterian College, the resignation

from McGill was the resignation from active academic life. Murray

returned to social issues and the popular press with individual articles

and extended series, such as a column on "Questions of the Day" in

The Argus and "The Professor's Armchair" in The Family Herald and

Weekly Star.[92] His writing for The Scottish-American Journal now

consisted largely of obituaries. Apart from the Introduction to

Christian Ethics and a series of entries for the Encyclopedia of Religion

and Ethics, his scholarly work all but ceased until the publication

late in life of review articles on "Human Progress" and "Pragmatism"

in the University Magazine.[93] In 1912, he resigned from the Royal

Society of Canada, one of the few charter members still living.

Murray now occupied his time in a variety of pursuits ranging from

work on a Clark family tree to exercising his hobbies of snowshoeing and bicycle riding.[94] Participation in the Summer School in Philosophy was continued after the death of Thomas Davidson in 1900, but by 1909 interest in the Glenmore had dwindled to the point where only 4 or 5 students were planning to attend.[95]

John Clark Murray lived to see the outbreak of the war which shattered the confident faith of many idealists in cultural progress, but though bewildered by its atrocities, he refused to let it shake his "cheerful faith in mankind"[96] Even so, such a faith could only be sustained in voluntary isolation:

> He refused to read any more war literature, which concerned itself with the mad dance of the world of sense, and wisely absorbed himself again in the great classics of philosophy which move in the liberating sphere of eternal things. Almost to the end he was mentally active. In the summer of 1916 he remarked that he had lived longer than Kant, was in better health and felt far from singing a nunc dimittis. Serene and clam, he proceeded through life, confident, after a thoughtful survey, that the course of human affairs ultimately tended to the good.[97]

In November of 1917, as a bitter election campaign over conscription was being fought in Canada and the Bolshevik Revolution was underway in Russia, Murray fell ill; on November 20, 1917 he died.

Footnotes to Chapter One

[1] All information on the life of David Murray is drawn from J.C. Murray, Memoir of David Murray, Late Provost of Paisley; With Sketches of Local History in His Time (Paisley: Alexander Gardner, 1881).

[2] Anthony Slaven, The Development of the West of Scotland: 1750 - 1960 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 101; 103; 145.

[3] Ibid., pp. 103; 146.

[4] Murray, Memoir of David Murray, p. 111.

[5] Ibid., p. 31; Anand C. Chitnis, The Scottish Enlightenment: A social History (London: Croom Helm, 1976), pp. 195 - 210.

[6] David Fate Norton has provided the best definition to date in his, "The Scottish Enlightenment Exported: John Clark Murray (1836 - 1917)" (unpublished Canadian Historical Association paper, 1977).

[7] G.E. Davie, The Democratic Intellect (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1961), pp. 4;50.

[8] Chitnis, Scottish Enlightenment, pp. 6; 143.

[9] As indicated by the notebooks and papers in the collected papers of John Clark Murray held in the McGill University Archives (hereafter MUA): MUA 611/8 - 34.

[10] H. Jones and J.H. Muirhead, The Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird (Glasgow: Macklehose, 1921), p. 16.

[11] John Clark Murray, "Notes from the Lectures of Sir William Hamilton on Metaphysics" [1854 - 1856], MUA 611/13.

[12] John Clark Murray, "Sir William Hamilton", The Scottish Review (July, 1886), p. 39.

[13] Alexander Nicolson in "Testimonials in Favour of the Reverend John C. Murray, Licentiate in Theology, for the Office of Examiner in Mental Philosophy in the University of Glasgow"[ed. J.C. Murray], (Glasgow: B. Stewart, 1861), p. 8.

[14] Andrew Crichton in Ibid., p. 12.

[15] Student address books for both universities indicated the Faculty in which students were registered. Both list John Clark Murray as a student in Theology: Addressbuch Der Ruprecht-Karls Universitat in Heidelberg (Heidelberg: Julius Groos, 1856),

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p. 16; Personal Bestand der Georg Augustus Universitat zu Göttingen (Göttingen: Universitat Buchdrukerei, 1857), p.19. Both books may be found in the Murray Papers, MUA 611/35;37.

[16] J.H. Muirhead, The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1931), p. 164.

[17] A "John Hutchison" is listed as coming from J.H. Stirling's home city of Glasgow, but is included in the Faculty of Theology. Most of the names checked off by Murray in the Heidelberg book are those of theology students from other parts of Germany and from Britain. His address of 9 Redarstrasse was shared by a pharmacology student, R.D. Laenger, and a student of jurisprudence, Eduard Fisher. See: Addressbuch der Ruprecht-Karls Universitat, p. 12.

[18] John Clark Murray, "A Vindication of Theology: Being an Address to Theology Students" (Montreal: Dawson Brothers, 1877), p. 3.

[19] Rev. S.M. M'Lelland in "Testimonials in Favour of the Reverend John C. Murray", p. 13.

[20] Queen's University Letters: Principal Leitch to the Board of Trustees, September 20, 1862. Calderwood's success in the competition is indicated in the Dictionary of National Biography, vol. XXII, s.v. "Calderwood, Sir Henry".

[21] Davie, Democratic Intellect, pp. 318 - 319; A.L. Drummond and J. Bulloch, The Scottish Church: 1688 - 1843 (Edinburgh: St. Andrew Press, 1975), p. 279.

[22] Queen's University Letters: Principal Leitch to the Board of Trustees, September 20, 1862 and September 27, 1862; John Clark Murray to William Ireland, Secretary of the Board of Trustees, October 24, 1862.

[23] Queen's University Letters: Principal Leitch to the Board of Trustees, September 27, 1862.

[24] J.A. Irving, "The Development of Philosophy in Central Canada from 1850 to 1900", Canadian Historical Review XXXI (1950), p. 281.

[25] Queen's University Letters: John Clark Murray to the Board of Trustees, April 26, 1866; August 27, 1866; March 24, 1868.

[26] M. Angus, "The Old Stones of Queen's, 1842 - 1900", Historic Kingston 20, (1972), p. 11.

[27] John Clark Murray, "Introductory Address at the Opening of Session 1867 - 68 in Queen's College, Kingston", MUA 611/2, p.5.

[28] "Chair of Logic, Mental and Moral Philosophy in McGill University", Kingston Daily News, May 1, 1872, MUA 611/2, p.13.

[29] H.B. Neatby, Queen's University, vol. I; 1841 - 1917, ed. F.W. Gibson and R. Graham (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1978), p. 84.

[30] Ibid., pp. 115-126; J.A. Johnston, "Factors in the Formation of the Presbyterian Church in Canada" (Ph.D dissertation, McGill University, 1955), pp. 346-351; 373.

[31] Neatby, Queen's University, p. 117; Queen's University Letters: John Clark Murray to the Board of Trustees, April 28, 1871.

[32] Neatby, Queen's University, p. 131; "Annual Report of the Trustees of Queen's University and College", Acts and Proceedings of the Synod of the Presbyterian Church of Canada in Connection with the Church of Scotland (np: Presbyterian Church of Canada, 1865), p. 56; Ibid.(1871), p. 76.

[33] John Clark Murray, "Letter to the Board of Governors of McGill College" MUA 909A/4/3. This printed, 17 page letter was Murray's summary statement in a decade-long salary dispute with the McGill Board of Governors. Minutes of the Governors' meetings indicate that it was submitted on December 17, 1887. Murray claimed that the financial conditions of his appointment had never been fulfilled, and demanded that approximately $2000 in deferred salary be repaid. The Board protested that it had neither the funds nor the obligation to fulfill the disputed conditions of employment. The initial protest had been raised in April, 1879 [MUA 681/4A, p. 285], but was pressed more vigorously by Murray in late 1885, when the professor began questionning the moral and financial wisdom of McGill's policy of separate classes for women -- a policy which was more expensive to implement than the alternative long advocated by Murray, co-education. Although the college had received a special endowment from Donald A. Smith to provide for the separate classes, it was widely suspected that the exclusive terms of the grant had been inspired, if not quite dictated, by the most avid 'separationist' at McGill, Principal J.W. Dawson. There can be little doubt that the Board of Governors' willingness to embark on separate classes incited Murray to challenge its unwillingness to provide the College professors with a decent salary. Murray certainly connected the two issues; the salary controversy was resolved only when Murray withdrew his claim on March 23, 1888, one month before giving a public speech which sparked an open fight with Dawson and the Board of Governors over the issue of women's higher education. MUA 681/5B, p.308. The bulk of the material in the salary dispute can be found in the "Governors' Minute Book," MUA 681/5B, pp. 154-167.

[34] "McGill University Governors' Minute Book" MUA 681/4B, pp. 25 (March 7, 1872); 39 (April 11, 1872); 43 (April 27, 1872).

[35] John Watson subsequently wrote to Principal Snodgrass of Queen's College, applying for the "chair of Mental Science" and including with his application a copy of the testimonials printed for the earlier application to McGill. Queen's University Letters: John Watson to Principal Snodgrass, May 2, 1872.

[36] "McGill Undergraduates: The Literary Society Addressed by Dr. Murray on its Merits as a Means of Education", Montreal Gazette (March 17, 1888), MUA 611/2, p.25.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Other students went into missions. Wilberforce Lee wrote in 1892 from a school and mission post in Benquella, West Africa, thanking Murray for the gift of a copy of the

Introduction to Ethics, and informing the professor that he had been converted to Free
Trade by discussions in Murray's class in Ethics. MUA 611/83 (September 30, 1892).
A second student wrote from Moose Fort on James Bay, where he was working with the
Christian Missionary Society. T. Bird Holland had taken his notes from courses in
Psychology and Ethics with him to mission field, and was using the former to make
observations on the "primitive natives" of the North. MUA 611/83 (April 15, 1901).

[39]The achievements of Jardine and Campbell are given in the Queen's Trustees'
"Report to Synod", Queen's University Letters, April 27, 1871, p.3. Robert Jardine
taught philosophy for a year at the University of New Brunswick before proceeding to
Edinburgh.

[40]MUA 611/3; Old McGill vol. VI (Montreal: np, 1903), p. 21.

[41]"McGill University Faculty of Arts Minute Book", MUA 48/32/1/4, p.40;
Old McGill vol. VI, p. 22.

[42]John Clark Murray, "The New Theory of Vision" MUA 611/2, p. 69.

[43]The speech was a revision of "The Higher Education of Women", delivered
originally at the Queen's College Convocation for 1870 - 1871, and amended for
delivery to the Montreal Ladies Educational Association on October 2, 1872. The
identification of "the two great social problems" does not appear in the printed
version of the original lecture, but does appear in annotations to a revised version
in the Murray Papers: MUA 611/81, p. 5. Contemporary newspaper reports include the
addition and so confirm that it was this revised version which was delivered to the
M.L.E.A.: Montreal Gazette, (October 3, 1872); Montreal Daily Witness, (October 3, 1872).

[44]John Clark Murray, "Co-Operative Housekeeping", Montreal Daily Witness
(November 9, 1874), MUA 611/2, p.15.

[45]John Clark Murray, "The Philosophy of Politics", Canadian Spectator,
January 5, 1878, MUA 611/2, p. 19; Idem, "The Ethics of a National Policy",
Canadian Spectator, January 14, 1878, MUA 611/2, p. 22.

[46]John Clark Murray, "The Political Situation in Canada", Dominion Review
I (1882), p. 5; Idem, "Personal vs. Local Representation", The Week (June 10, 1892),
MUA 611/2, p.55; Idem, "Politics Run Wild" The Argus (October 29, 1904), MUA 611/2, p.87;
Idem, "Technical Education", Canadian Magazine of Science (January, 1883), MUA 611/2,
p. 30; Idem, "Spelling Reform", MUA 611/2, p.25.

[47]The Dominion Review was an anonymous work. Neither its editors nor its
contributors were indicated by name in the first issue; all correspondance was to be
directed to publisher W. Drysdale of Montreal. Murray's own articles are indicated by
penned initials in the copy held with the John Clark Murray Papers in the McGill Archives.

[48]Davie, Democratic Intellect, pp. 4; 260 - 261.

[49]John Clark Murray, "Atomism and Theism" Canadian Monthly and National Review
VII (1875), pp. 31 - 39.

[50] Ibid., pp. 32 - 33.

[51] Ibid., p. 35.

[52] Ibid., p. 36.

[53] Ibid., pp. 37 - 38.

[54] Tyndall did not feel obliged to take up the challenge of thoroughly disproving theism. One month after "Atomism and Theism", the Canadian Monthly and National Review published Tyndall's "Reply to Critics of the Belfast Address", the preface to the seventh edition of the Address, in which the President of the British Association for the Advancement of Science responded to some of his more agitated and less educated critics. Neither Murray nor his arguments were dealt with in this rebuttal. The dispute lies on one level between materialist scientism and religion, but on another, it demonstrates the difference between the metaphysical approach to science characteristic of Scottish university teaching, and the positivist experimental approach adopted earlier in Britain and exemplified by Tyndall. Davie, Democratic Intellect, pp. 190 - 191.

[55] John Clark Murray, "Dreams", New Dominion Monthly XIX (1877), pp. 481 - 487; Idem, "Psychology in Medicine", Montreal Medical Journal XX (1892), pp. 881 - 895; Idem, "The Relations of Physiology to Psychology", Annual University Lecture (Montreal: McGill University, 1872); Idem, "The Faculty of Cramming: Its Psychological Analysis and Practical Value", Educational Review (April, 1893), pp. 375 - 381.

[56] John Clark Murray, A Handbook of Psychology (London: Alexander Gardner, 1885); Idem, Introduction to Psychology (Boston: Little, Brown, 1904).

[57] Idem, "The Scottish Philosophy", Macmillans XXXIX (1878), pp. 112 - 126; Idem, "Sir William Hamilton", The Scottish Review (July, 1886), pp. 20 - 40; Idem, "The Revived Study of Berkeley", Macmillan's LVI (1887), pp. 161 - 173.

[58] Idem, "Solomon Maimon", British Quarterly Review LXXXII (1885), pp. 77 - 94.

[59] John Clark Murray (trans.), The Autobiography of Solomon Maimon (London: East and West Library, 1954).

[60] S. Atlas, From Critical to Speculative Idealism: The Philosophy of Solomon Maimon (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), p.2n.

[61] John Clark Murray, "An Ancient Pessimist", Philosophical Review II (1893), pp. 24 - 34; Idem, "Rousseau: His Position in the History of Philosophy", Philosophical Review VIII (1899), pp.357 - 370.

[62] Idem, "A Remarkable Scot - Thomas Davidson", The Scottish American (December 5, 1900).

[63] P. Anderson, Platonism in the Midwest (New York: Temple University, 1963), p.3.

[64] John Clark Murray, "Summer School of Philosophy", Scottish Review (January, 1892), PP. 98 - 112. The Glenmore School was a phase in the transition from 'amateur' to 'professional' philosophy which occurred in America through the late 1880's and early

1890's. As a German emphasis on historical study and analysis came to define the teach-
ing of philosophy in American universities, Philosophy became, in the judgement of one
modern critic, more a vocation than an avocation. Anderson, Midwest Platonism, pp. 194;
200; B. Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977), pp. 54 - 62; H.A. Pochmann, New England Transcendentalism and St. Louis
Hegelianism (New York: Haskell House, 1970), pp. 119; 121-123.

[65] W.T. Harris, U.S. Commissioner of Education, to John Clark Murray,
MUA 611/83, (November 10, 1893). Harris believed that the inclusion of practical
applications into the Introduction to Ethics was an advance on existing texts which
limited themselves to abstract principles: "They do not seem to have learned precisely
the scope and penetration of the ideas which they set up. I think your book ought to
have a favourable reception in all our colleges."

[66] John Clark Murray, "Philosophers Convene -- Preparations Made for the
Philosophical Congress Next Summer", Montreal Daily Herald (January 2, 1893),
MUA 611/2, p.58.

[67] Idem, "Philosophy and Industrial Life", The Monist IV (1894), pp. 533 - 544.

[68] Idem, "Do We Ever Dream of Tasting?", Proceedings of the American Psychological
Association, MUA 611/2, p.66.

[69] Idem, "Can Canada Be Co-Erced Into the Union -- A Canadian View", The Open
Court 411 (1895), pp. 4561 - 4566; Idem, "What Should be the Attitude of Teachers of
Philosophy Towards Religion? -- A Reply", International Journal of Ethics IV (1904),
pp. 353 - 362.

[70] Idem, "The Ethics of Habit", MUA 611/62.

[71] The lectureship program can be found in Murray's papers: MUA 611/62.

[72] W.H., "Professor J. Clark Murray", University Magazine XVII (1918), p.563;
Tory Hoff, "The Controversial Appointment of James Mark Baldwin to the University of
Toronto in 1889", (MA thesis: Carleton University, 1980), p. 222. Hoff deals with
the dispute between Idealism and Empiricism as it emerged, with nationalist overtones,
in the search for a successor to George Paxton Young's chair of Philosophy at the
University of Toronto. Canada Firsters wanted an Idealist who would perpetuate
Young's philosophy, which they considered distinctly Canadian. As a result, they
were doubly opposed Baldwin, who was American by birth and a Common Sense Realist by
Princeton training. The episode throws into question the common interpretation of
Canadian philosophy as moving from Common Sense Realism to Idealism through the 1870's
and 1880's.

[73] John Clark Murray, "Lectures on English Composition: Session 1869 - 1870",
MUA 611/42.

[74] Idem, "The Merchant of Venice as an Exponent of Industrial Ethics",
International Journal of Ethics IX (1899), pp. 331 - 349.

[75] Idem, He That Had Received the Five Talents (London: T.Fisher Unwin, 1904); Idem, "Adieu", MUA 611/2, p. 16; Idem, "The Voice of the Sea", The Week (August 23, 1888), MUA 611/2, p. 43; Idem, "The Origin of Love", The Standard (October 21, 1905), MUA 611/2, p. 121; Idem, "Epimethus" , MUA 611/73A.

[76] Idem, "Judas of Kerioth", MUA 611/76 - 80A.

[77] Idem, The Ballads and Songs of Scotland, in View of Their Influence on the Character of the People (London: Macmillan, 1874). The award of the St. Andrew Society is noted in the Preface.

[78] Ibid., pp. xii - xiv.

[79] Ibid., p. 197.

[80] "Editorial", Montreal Daily Witness (February 21, 1903), MUA 611/83.

[81] "Professor J. Clark Murray", Montreal Star (March 28, 1903), MUA 611/83.

[82] Annabella Square, Interview with Dr. Elizabeth Trott (Ottawa, 1979): transcript in possession of Dr. E. Trott. According to grand-daughter Anabella Square, Murray continued to lecture to classes after the onset of deafness; unlike those of Sir William Hamilton's, these classes were respectfully silent.

[83] P.T. Lafleur was appointed part-time lecturer in both the Philosophy and English Departments in 1886. The bulk of his teaching in philosophy consisted of courses of logic for both sexes. "McGill University Governors' Minute Book", MUA 681/5B, p. 141, (January 23, 1886). Despite his opposition to the idea of a separate ladies college, Murray approached both Oakeley and Anne McLean, who had a Ph.D in Sociology from the University of Chicago, with the invitation to join the Philosophy Department. Oakeley, who later recalled Murray as "a much-respected, liberal-minded and genial person", agreed and began teaching courses in Ancient Philosophy and Ethics. H.D. Oakeley, My Adventures in Education (London: Williams and Norgate, 1939), p.86. The appointment of Hickson followed immediately after the underfunding of the Philosophy Department attracted notice in the McGill Annual Report: "It is a complete anomaly that there should exist today in an institution of such high standing as McGill a double chair in Mental and Moral Philosophy, and the separation of Ethics from Logic and Psychology becomes a matter of pressing urgency." Annual Report of the Governor, Principal and Fellows of McGill University, Montreal, for the Year 1900 - 1901 (Montreal: Gazette Printing, 1901), p.2.

[84] M.E. Abbot, "Moral Philosophy Notes; Lecturer Dr. Murray" [1889 - 1890], MUA 684/20. Ref. 38/180/4/20.

[85] "Revised Curriculum: Reports of Committees", "McGill University Faculty of Arts Minute Book", MUA 48/32/1/4, (1898).

[86] A.E. Taylor was the formal replacement, filling Murray's former post, the 'John Frothingham Chair in Mental and Moral Philosophy' from 1903 to 1908. Reflecting changes in the conception of philosophy and psychology since the original endowment in 1872, the chair was renamed the 'Frothingham Chair of Philosophy'. A new chair was

endowed by businessman William Macdonald for Dr. William Caldwell. "McGill University Governors' Minute Book" , MUA 681/7, p. 246 (April 17, 1903).

[87]Oakeley, Adventures, p. 60. Oakeley had studied under Edward Caird at Balliol before joining the faculty of the Morley College for Working Men and Women in 1898. In coming to McGill, she had turned down a research studentship at the London School of Economics. Old McGill III (Montreal: np, 1901), p. 141.

[88]Caldwell's major publications were Schopenhauer's System in its Philosophical Significance (1896) and Pragmatism and Idealism (1913). Canadian Who's Who, vol II (1936 - 1937), s.v. "Caldwell, William"; Macmillan Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 4th ed., s.v. "Caldwell, William".

[89]"McGill University Board of Governors' Minute Book" MUA 681/7, p. 239 (February 2, 1903).

[90]"To Whom Honour is Due", Montreal Gazette (May 6, 1903), in MUA 639/1, p. 29.

[91]"Editorial" Presbyterial College Journal XXII (1903), p.394.

[92]John Clark Murray, "Questions of the Day", The Argus (October 8, 1904 - June 3, 1905); Idem, "The Professor's Armchair", The Family Herald and Weekly Star (October 6, 1909 - June 15, 1910).

[93]Murray wrote entries on "agniology"; "amiability"; "bigotry"; "goodwill"; "habit"; "idleness"; "ignorance"; and "peevishness". Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (Edinburgh: T.and T.Clark, 1908 - 1927). The review articles were Murray's only contribution to the University Magazine; John Clark Murray, "Human Progress", University Magazine XI (1912), pp. 156 - 169; Idem, "Pragmatism", University Magazine XIV (1915), pp. 102 - 113.

[94]Who's Who, 1902 ed., s.v. "Murray, John Clark".

[95]letter from John Martin to John Clark Murray, MUA 611/80, August 2, 1909.

[96]W.H. "Professor J. Clark Murray", University Magazine XVII (1918), p. 565.

[97]Ibid., pp. 565 - 566.

CHAPTER TWO

The Critical Framework

> Serene and calm, he proceeded through life, confident,
> after a thoughtful survey, that the course of human
> affairs ultimately tended to the good.[1]

The "thoughtful survey" which so heartened John Clark Murray

began with university studies in Scotland, continued through early

years of teaching at Queen's and matured during the years in Montreal.

Its scope was broad: the metaphysical structure of reality, the nature

of knowledge, the task of philosophy, the human prospect -- all figured

in the survey as it gained expression in books and articles produced

over a fifty year span.

A study of the evolution of this survey cannot proceed without

a preliminary investigation into the contextual problem of the 'place'

of John Clark Murray in the history of philosophy. The categories

of such an investigation have been established in the works of four

authors who have, in the last thirty years, established nineteenth

century Canadian philosophy as a distinct field of historical study.

Though interpretations have varied, a basic interpretive framework

has unified the approach to John Clark Murray in the works of these

historians and philosophers. From John Irving's overview articles

of the 1950's to the more recent works by A. B. McKillop and Leslie

Armour and Elizabeth Trott, Murray has been interpreted by reference

to one or another of the dominant schools of the period; most notably

Scottish Common Sense Realism and the Idealism revived in the last

quarter of the nineteenth century.[2]

It is certainly necessary to locate Murray in his 'times'.

What is not beyond question however, is the assumption that formal

philosophical schools constitute the appropriate intellectual context

for Murray's own thought. What is also not beyond question is the

assumption that there exists an additional category -- that of Canadian

philosophy --into which Murray must be made to fit. The appropriateness

of these assumptions will be examined in this chapter. In addition,

an effort will be made to arrive at alternative categories for the

understanding of the nature and content of John Clark Murray's thought.

It is difficult to credit the work of those who would argue

in favour of the existence of a distinctly Canadian philosophy in

the nineteenth century.[3] It is not enough to compile the views of

individual thinkers with an eye to determining parallels or similarities

when these similarities are shared by most thinkers in the English

speaking world. Nor is it enough to define it in negative terms as

that which British and American philosophy were not, an approach which

often reveals more backwater mediocrity than original thought. A

national school must be based on the existence of an identifiable

national philosophic community defined by a concentration on a distinct

set of issues or a characteristic methodology that has served to draw

thinkers together in spite of geographical and generational separation.

If it is to be seen as a school, it must be marked by frequent and
public -- that is, published -- discussion of these topics and techniques
among the different members. There must be a succession of thinkers,
of teachers and their students through whom the distinct thought of
the school is explained in the changing terms of new philosophical
movements, and by whom the school is perpetuated.

Such a body of thinkers and thoughts cannot be identified
in the history of philosophy in Canada. On the whole, Canadian philos-
ophers of the nineteenth century considered themselves as part of
an international, rather than national community.[4] Their serious
books and articles were more often published in Britain and America,
where the international audience was centred, than in Canada. When
controversies were joined it was with British and American thinkers
rather than Canadian colleagues. There was little serious and continuous
discussion among Canadian philosophers of any questions, whether specifi-
cally Canadian or of more general import.[5] A Canadian philosophical
association was not formed until 1958 and the first Canadian philosophical
journal did not appear until 1962.[6]

This is neither surprising nor, contra nationalists, particularly
shameful. It would be as difficult to determine the speculative problems
or approaches that are unique to Canada as it would be to determine
the nature of the philosophy peculiar to Australia or New Zealand.[7]
There is no inherent reason why national schools of philosophy should
result from national governments or all national cultures. There is
even less reason when the government and culture are colonial. J.G.
Bourinot confirmed this in his 1893 Presidential Address to the Royal

Society of Canada, admitting that in spite of even his own grander,

national ambitions,

> Perhaps the literature of a colonial dependancy, or a
> relatively new country, must necessarily in its first
> stages be imitative, and it is only now and then an
> original mind bursts the fetters of intellectual
> subordination.[8]

Colonial universities across the British empire were small

and often separated by great distances. Their 'Philosophy Departments'

seldom included more than one or two faculty members who, in turn,

were often educated overseas. Working individually and feeling closer

to former classmates and teachers than to colleagues five hundred miles

away with whom they might share little more than allegiance to a common

government, these men lacked the numbers, opportunity or incentive

to develop a significant national philosophic community.

Looking beyond historian's expectations to philosophers thoughts,

it becomes clear than many nineteenth century thinkers were consciously

working to transcend purely national distinctions and arrive at a

philosophy which would point to a new international, or, more correctly,

supra-national world order. Indeed, philosophy itself was seen as

best suited to this task, for the abstract necessities of rational

thought recognized no national boundaries.[9] John Clark Murray expressed

this vision as he left civilized Scotland to take up an unprestigious

post at a struggling denominational college in a small, remote town

of an undeveloped colony. Friends would be justified in pitying the

cultured young professor his colonial fate, but their colleague had

already considered the positive opportunities of the post. Speaking

at a farewell dinner hosted by friends in Paisley, he explained his

optimism:

> For a long time past, in meditating on the possible sphere
> in which I might find the best opportunity for using whatever
> powers had been bestowed on me, I had often turned my thoughts
> to those young countries which are growing up in different
> parts of the world under the fostering care of our own father-
> land . . . Having accepted the position of a philosophical
> professor in Canada, it necessarily became a very important
> consideration with me, whether the circumstances of the
> country were likely to make it favourable to the advancement
> of philosophy. Now the most prominent feature of Canada, as
> of all our Colonies, is its youth, and it is this very feature
> which I would hit upon as that which gives the strongest hope
> of its being likely to contribute towards the inauguration of
> that larger philosophy which the enlarged necessities of human
> speculation demand.[10]

Lest any hearers miss the negative implications of the connection

drawn between philosophy and nationality, Murray expanded on the theme

> We, like most old countries, already possess a school of
> philosophy, in the support of which we feel as if our
> national honour were in a measure involved; and this
> attachment to a national system is one of the prejudices
> from which we must be freed before we can appreciate the
> systems of other nations, or look at things as they are in
> themselves.[11]

Canada's lack of philosophical tradition gave it an advantage in a

world optimistically -and erroneously- portrayed as entering a new

age marked by the evaporation of all purely national distinctions

> The new countries which form the British Colonies are not
> only unfettered by any such prejudices, but they are growing
> up in a period of human history in which it is impossible
> that they can ever be trammelled by nationalism to such an
> extent as the nations of the past.[12]

Murray recognized that Technology was the main instrument in

the erosion of nation, cultural, economic and political boundaries which

had been in progress since the fifteenth century invention of the print-

ing press. The process of erosion was allowing the growth of truly

international thought. Imperial links could only speed this growth.

As an example, Murray claimed that Britain's rule over India gave her

the practical means to begin the work of effecting a higher synthesis

of Eastern and Western philosophy. And even though the newly appointed

Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy did not intend to reconcile

Hamilton and Hinduism, he could say boldly that "It is with the hope

. . . of contributing something, and of exciting others to contribute

something, towards the attainment of this wider, more human philosophy,

that I go to the work which is to separate me from you and from my

native land."[13] The creation of a distinctly Canadian philosophy was

certainly not to be a conscious aim.

But while modern philosophy might transcend national boundaries,

John Clark Murray did not intend to transcend his own cultural heritage.

In the same bold Paisley speech he declared,

> But though I go to Canada with these more cosmospolitan
> aspirations, I need scarcely assure those of you who have
> known me truly that, wherever I may be, I shall never cease
> to remember that I am a Scotchman. I can never forget that
> I was first taught philosophy by the most Scottish of all
> Scotchmen, the late Sir William Hamilton, and that my
> philosophical studies were carried on in the society of
> companions with whom I became acquainted in the Grammar
> School of Paisley, in the classrooms of Scottish
> Universities, and in the general social life of Scotland.[14]

Is there anything more here than a polite after-dinner speech?

Is Murray to be understood not in terms of Canadian, but of Scottish

philosophy? The problem is reversed. If Canadian philosophy is too

meagre to identify, Scottish philosophy is too varied to pin down.

Murray himself did not limit it to the Common Sense Realism foreshadowed

by Frances Hutcheson, developed by Thomas Reid, continued by Dugald

Stewart and transformed by Sir William Hamilton. In his treatment

Scottish philosophy became purely and thoroughly national thought,

expanding to include the empiricism of David Hume and the idealism of

Bishop Berkeley, James Ferrier and J.H. Stirling.[15] Berkeley's only

flaw was his lack of Scots blood, but his influence on Hume and Reid,

albeit negative in both cases, was sufficient cause to allow him to join

the fraternity. If, then, Murray is to be understood in terms of Scottish

philosophy, what precisely is Scottish philosophy?

Murray's philosophical ecumenicity aside, the most distinct

school under the Scottish national heading is that of Common Sense

Realism. Determining Murray's relation to this school has always been

a problem for commentators. John Irving, whose treatment owes more to

published obituaries than original study, covered all possible bases

when he concluded that "It is difficult to classify Murray in terms of

the conventional schools . . . his final position is perhaps best

described as an eclectic idealism. But Sir William Hamilton was never

far beneath the surface."[16] A.B. McKillop is more original and more

definite, believing that Hamilton's favourite pupil began to entertain

doubts about the school in the 1860's and that "by 1878, Murray's break

with Common Sense was complete".[17] The resulting gap was filled with a

form of idealism. Leslie Armour and Elizabeth Trott have been bolder

still. In what is by far the most thoroughly analytic and philosoph-

ically informed study of Murray to date, they conclude not only that

Murray was never a true Hamiltonian, but that even in student days he

entertained sympathies for James Ferrier's idealism.[18]

Hardly a consensus. The problem springs in part from the

nature of Hamilton's synthesis of Reid's Common Sense and Kant's

Transcendental Idealism. As will be seen below, Murray followed his

mentor in the characteristically Scottish attempt to find some mediation

of empiricist realism and rationalist idealism.[19] His thought is

strongly Kantian in formal structure and yet it abandons Kant precisely

when he is most idealist -- ie., in the concept of the noumenal realm

(a concept, moreover, which Hamilton accepts in his philosophy of the

Unconditioned.) On balance, Murray's thought cannot be traced in terms

of a progression from realism to idealism, from Hamilton to Kant, Hegel

or Ferrier. It can be more accurately seen as an attempt better to

complete the type of synthesis of the two schools which Hamilton himself

was working on.[20] Murray simply chose different models and emphases.

He clearly rejects the realism of Hamilton's predecessors. From

his earliest writings he pictured Thomas Reid as a pedestrian and sloppy

thinker, unaware of the Humean and Berkeleian implications in his refu-

tations of Hume and Berkeley, unsystematic in his enumeration of first

principles and sadly mistaken in his attempt to found an epistemology

on Common Sense:

> The truth is, Reid's thinking never represents the speculative
> toil of a philosophic intellect, but merely the refined opinions
> of ordinary intelligence . . . His writings, when they go beyond
> some interesting details of psychology, are little more than
> reassertions of the universal beliefs, as they are expressed in
> the universal language of mankind.[21]

This was the thinker on who Hamilton had expended so much editorial

and evangelical effort.

As for Dugald Stewart, Murray confirmed the common view that

he had done little more than restate Reid's mediocre ideas with

greater eloquence and erudition but "not with a more comprehensive grasp of principles, or any bolder originality in their application . . . We have no considerable addition to the substance, no new trait in the character of the philosophy."[22] Quoting 'Christopher North', "He seems terrified to place one foot before the other."[23] Stewart was also a philosopher admired and promoted by Hamilton.

It appears that Murray never accepted Common Sense realism as a firm epistemological foundation for philosophy. In his early articles on Hamilton, he said little more than that it was the rock on which Hamilton's philosophy had struck, a conclusion made all the more puzzling by the fact that Hamilton was aware of the problems it had posed for earlier thinkers.[24] Later writings were less charitable in evaluating Hamilton's scholarly refining of the doctrine, claiming that ". . . the very explicitness, which he has given to the doctrine, has only shown more clearly how untenable it is," for "he never succeeds in establishing any real distinction between a philosophical appeal to Common Sense and the unphilosophical citation of vulgar opinion against unpalatable conclusions of science."[25] The desire on the part of the author of "Atomism and Theism" to preserve such a distinction indicates a judicious spirit in the context of the often heated nineteenth century "warfare of Science with Theology".[26]

If the philosophy of Common Sense was so clearly unacceptable, what of the balance of Hamilton's philosophy? When Murray gave an edited summary in the 1870 Outline of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, he ignored the common sense epistemology as it had been formulated in Hamilton's extensive annotations to his editions of the collected works

of Reid and Stewart and in the <u>Dissertations on Common Sense</u> and
expanded instead on the account of philosophy in <u>Lectures On Metaphysics</u>,
a somewhat disorganized set of lectures prepared by Hamilton for his
university classes in 1836. In that account, Hamilton approached
metaphysics, like Reid and Stewart before him and to some extent Murray
after him, through Psychology.[27] The three main branches of philosophy
were phenomenal, nomological and inferential psychology. Phenomenal
psychology took the world as it appeared to the central agency of
consciousness, subdividing it into the realms of cognitions (the
faculties), of emotions, and of conations (desires and volitions).
Thus rooted in consciousness, the object of phenomenal psychology was
as much man as the world. Nomological psychology dealt with the laws
which governed these realms and inferential psychology with the possible
extensions which thought could make beyond them. As will be seen below,
Murray may have owed to Hamilton the derivation and initial subdivision
of consciousness; he accepted in part Hamilton's analysis of the nature
of man and the phenomenal realm. Yet this acceptance was so qualified
as to be hardly an intellectual debt. The six faculties (Presentative,
Conservative, Reproductive, Representative, Elaborative and Regulative)
which for Hamilton constituted the realm of cognitions play no part in
Murray's thought; in some cases, their content was explicitly rejected.
So too with emotions and conations; Murray adopted little more than the
names when he went on to examine human nature in his works on psychology
and ethics. But most significantly, Hamilton's elaboration of the
nature of consciousness was explicitly and extensively rejected by his
student. The nature of the contrast between the two will be seen in the

context of Murray's doctrine of consciousness.

One reason for the distinction has to do with a related doctrine significant as part of Hamilton's transposition of Kant into the Common Sense context. Hamilton held that knowledge was relational: objects were known through their relation to other objects and by their relation to the knowing consciousness and the conditions of intelligibility (i.e., time, space, substance, qualities, etc.).[28] Everything in the phenomenal world was relative, limited or conditioned. As a result, the absolute, the infinite and the unconditioned were held to be beyond intelligibility.[29] They were not, however, beyond existence. The existence of the Absolute, the Infinite and the Unconditioned was necessary for the completion of Hamilton's metaphysics, but this existence could, like Kant's postulates of practical reason, only be asserted as necessary concepts derived through the negation of what is known -- that is, only through logical negation of the relative, the limited, and the conditioned.[30] Hamilton went on to describe the Absolute and the Infinite as mutually contradictory elements within the unknown and unknowable realm of the Unconditioned, but by this point in speculation, Murray had already left him to join such critics as James Ferrier and J.H. Stirling.[31] With them, the author of "Atomism and Theism" believed the cornerstone of both science and philosophy to be the assertion of the rational order and ultimate intelligibility of the universe. Murray judged ludicrous the attempts by transcendental idealists like Hamilton and positivist materialists like Tyndall to assert that our knowledge was limited to the phenomenal realm and the advance by negation to some Higher Realm whose unintelligibility proved no barrier

to attempts to populate it with all manner of Supreme Beings, Ultimate

Minds, and diverse structures of pure reason which could act magnetically

as a final cause on the phenomenal world below.[32] The recourse of

materialists to this type of realm was only proof of the untenability

of their atomistic doctrines. The offense of idealists -- and those

like Hamilton who suffered only temporary lapses -- was an excess of

speculative energy which lifted philosophy off the ground of human

experience and sent it irretrievably into the clouds.[33] Ironically,

similar convictions had motivated Thomas Reid to reconstruct philosophy

on the basis of simple and unspeculative Common Sense.[34]

In sum, though Murray followed Hamilton in seeking a moderate

philosophy between the scepticism of empiricism and the gnosticism of

idealism, the student seems to have drawn little of doctrinal substance

from the teacher. Yet the teacher cannot be denied all influence.

Murray spoke appreciatively of him long afterwards as one whose manner

and enthusiasm had made philosophy itself come alive.[35] But for

Hamilton, Murray might well have spent his days in obscurity as a Free

Church minister in Scotland. There was a second debt as well. Murray

adopted the extremely systematic and classificatory approach to issues

and problems which marked Hamilton's writings. The study of each issue

began with etymological definitions of the key terms and moved through

manifold divisions and subdivisions to create an architectural complex

of inter-related parts to which expression can seldom be given with any

appreciable degree of literary grace. Murray's use of this method

relaxed somewhat in the first decades after leaving Scotland but as the

later textbooks (for which it was appropriate) show, it was never

entirely abandoned. These aims and debts show Murray to have been one of those who, in the analysis of G.E. Davie, followed the moderate spirit but not the Common Sense letter of Sir William Hamilton -- a distinction made increasingly untenable for Scottish philosophers as Common Sense philosophy became one of the banners in the political, cultural and religious battles which divided Scotland after the Free Church Secession.[36]

If Murray did not subscribe to Common Sense, and if his debt to Hamilton was one of inspiration and form rather than content, what of the third category? Is he best understood in terms of Idealism?

The problem of definition rises once again. The main currents of philosophical Idealism in nineteenth century Britain were those of transcendental or critical idealism stemming from Kant, and absolute idealism stemming from Hegel. The British public had come into contact with both streams through the writings of Carlyle and Coleridge in the first part of the century, but it was not until later that idealism began to take firm hold in intellectual circles. The English Idealism which resulted was an eclectic mixture which owed more to Hegel than to Kant.[37] Kant's categorical imperative was embraced by many thinkers seeking a rational framework which would preserve moral philosophy from collapse as the unceasing erosion of religious faith continued. But the categorical imperative was given a new context as the dialectically evolving Reason of Hegel with its promise of an end to all dualisms and oppositions, most notably that of faith and science, was taken up by an increasing number of philosophers and cultural critics. This promise was "The Secret of Hegel"; and when J.H. Stirling published his

introductory work of that title in 1865 he recognized two important
facts about the British clerisy. On one hand, it knew very little of
the Hegelian system; on the other, this system was the answer to the
intellectual needs of an age committed to a vague but comprehensive
notion of "progress" and characterized by nothing so much as doubt in
its struggle to retain a Christian morality while embracing the "promise"
of materialistic science.[38]

Hegelian idealism appeared to be a perfect compromise, for it
wedded what many believed were the antithetical realities of spiritual
religion and material science. Or perhaps the two were only betrothed;
the Hegelian promise could be widely embraced because it was vague
enough to allow a high degree of individual interpretation. The
eventual union of Christianity and science was a future event and, as
Kierkegaard had already found, the Hegelian future never comes.[39] More
to the point, the "spiritual realm" had little specifically Christian
definition to begin with and this little was lost as responsibility
for the formulation of English Idealism passed from the troubled
consciences of the early Hegelians to those younger authors such as
Bernard Bosanquet and J.M.E. McTaggart who had not passed through the
mid-century period of religious doubt.[40] The realm of science, on the
other hand, appeared daily to gain greater definition. By the end of
the century scientific experiments and discoveries were covered in the
press with the regularity that decades before had marked the reporting
of sermons.

In the 1860's, idealism was still both a secret and a promise.
And while it took on characteristics of both critical and absolute

idealism, the Idealist movement shaped by Edward Caird, T.H. Green and John Watson was more a Hegelian than a Kantian revival.[45]

Where does John Clark Murray stand in relation to this revival? He was a peer of its main figures, Caird, Green and Stirling. Like them, he was a university student in the 1850's, studying at Glasgow with Caird and in Heidelberg with Stirling. Yet his later work is so removed from theirs in depth and tone that it would be easy to consider him the representative of an earlier generation. The reasons for this distinction lie in the circumstances of the early stages of the idealist revival and its 'charismatic' appeal as a movement rather than simply a school of thought.

The generation which passed through British universities had three options open to it in the way of academic careers. Some, such as Henry Calderwood, were able to win appointments in British universities soon after graduation. These philosophers continued for years to work within the established modes or paradigms of mid-century British philosophy, primarily those of Common Sense Realism and empiricism.

A second group of philosophy students including J.C. Murray and Henry Laurie turned to the new colonial universities in their search for academic appointments. Like their professional colleagues in Britain, their theoretical work continued to be articulated and refined through the framework received in undergraduate years. The relative isolation of colonial universities and the consequent lack of direct exposure to new philosophical movements resulted in the perpetuation of these mid-century frameworks long after their abandonment in Britain.

A third group of students was unable immediately to win academic

appointment in Britain and unable or unwilling to take recourse to
colonial universities. These individuals - Caird, Green, Stirling and
others - continued their studies and in due course discovered "the secret
of Hegel"[42] It is important to realize that the revival of idealism was
more than simply the adoption of a set of philosophical doctrines. It
was a discovery made by a group of young men who were allied by college
friendships, strengthened through such associations as the "Old Mortality"
at Oxford, and unified in the search for a philosophical system which
would preserve society while reforming it and preserve religion while
modernizing it.[43] Personal connections and shared concerns facilitated
the spread of Hegelianism within this circle, whose members were to rise
to academic appointments and distinctions in the 1860's and so come to
influence a new generation of students.[44] Their influence was quickly
felt: though he graduated only a decade later than John Clark Murray,
John Watson carried a new philosophical paradigm with him when he came
to Canada -- a Hegelian paradigm received from Murray's former fellow
student Edward Caird.

Added to this distinction of individual careers was the tradi-
tional distinction between the philosophy curricula of the Scottish
and British universities. Philosophy had long been prominent in the
Scottish curriculum, both in the doctrinal form of Common Sense realism
and in the broader cultural form of Hume's "metaphysical moderatism".[45]
Nationalist Scots were proud of the reputation of 'metaphysical Scotland',
and the inherent strength of this tradition was re-inforced in mid-
century religious struggles when the evangelical Free Church party
sought further to establish the tradition by securing adherents of its

of its doctrinal form in university chairs.[46] The reinforcing of

cultural nationalism by evangelicalism frustrated the efforts of

anglophile university reformers who wished to see a re-organization of

the Scottish philosophy curriculum on Oxbridge lines.[47] Since the form

of the discussion-oriented Scottish curriculum was peculiarly adapted

to the teaching of Common Sense philosophy, its continuation had the

effect of insulating Scottish universities from the Idealist revival

from the time of its earliest conception in Benjamin Jowett's Balloil

to the beginning of its full flowering in the 1860's.[48] Hence the

Scottish universities were largely closed to Idealism during the period

of Murray's higher education -- and for some time afterward. Ironically,

it was largely due to the strength of personal connections that the

philosophically untried -- and likely unacceptable -- Edward Caird was

able to win appointment at Glasgow.[49] He had not yet ruined his

Scottish prospects through public pronouncement of his Hegelianism.

For years Caird was a relatively isolated Idealist at Glasgow, where he

deliberately abandoned the established pedagogical method of class

discussion in order to present his extremely popular lectures on Moral

Philosophy which placed man's hopes in the Hegelian continuum of

progressing reason.[50] What Caird offered to students like John Watson

was a far cry from the less glowing picture of man's fate and future

that was presented in the ethics of Common Sense realism.

Absolute idealism was focussed on the central principle of the

progressive evolution or self-realisation of reason. As the spiritual

principle unifying the whole of reality, the evolution of reason was to

be traced through the entire history of civilization -- in effect through

all the thoughts and deeds of men. The dialectic dissolved the opposi-
tion between schools of thought which others had long attempted to
resolve, and the conviction that Reason suffused all reality carried the
assurance that the realization of its goal could not be prevented.

A.B. McKillop has admirably conveyed both the fundamental
simplicity and the expansive complexity of absolute idealism in
A Disciplined Intelligence. In treating J.C. Murray as a transitional
thinker within his organizing progression from Common Sense to Idealism,
McKillop correctly recognizes that Murray does not entirely adopt the
absolute idealism of Caird and Watson.[51] Though a believer in reason
and in progress, Murray never expresses the confidence in Reason's self-
realisation which characterizes his idealist counterparts. And, as his
social philosophy demonstrates, he could not follow the absolute
idealists in their turn towards the state as the context for personal
development and the agent of social reform.

What then of critical idealism? Murray had come to Kant before
the Kantian revival, and he came with mixed feelings. He had become
familiar with Kant through Hamilton, and much of the organization, if
somewhat less of the actual content, of his thought shows a debt to the
formal structure of reason raised by Kant in epistemology and particu-
larly in ethics. Can Murray's use of Kant be said to qualify him as a
Neo-Kantian, particularly since "Neo-Kantianism assumed pretty well as
many shapes as it had representatives"?[52] Like the Neo-Kantians in
Germany, Murray rejected the concepts of the noumenal realm and the
thing-in-itself.[53] These were the sole points, apart from ethics, in
which he made reference to Kant. A possible similarily to the Neo-

Kantians lies in the role given to consciousness as that which organizes perceptions and so makes knowledge possible. Yet even here, consciousness merely recognizes the order already inherent in God's creation; it does not create or impose an order of its own.

This points up a fundamental distinction between Murray and the Neo-Kantians: whereas they followed Kant in formulating subjective conditions of experience, Murray's epistemology and metaphysics -- to the point which they can be said to exist -- were built around a rejection of such a creative and determinative role for human consciousness. Consciousness clarifies an order which exists by divine creation and maintenance. As will be seen below, a similar appreciation of method coupled by a rejection of underlying aims is adopted toward the Kantian ethics. Like many absolute idealists, Murray was drawn towards the categorical imperative as the form of a proper, consistent, rational ethic. Yet his adoption of additional Christian principles -- most notably self-sacrifice -- upset the internal necessities of the Kantian Ethics.

Given these departures from the norms of both critical and absolute idealism, was the McGill professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy an idealist? Murray's idealism was, as J.A. Irving has pointed out, eclectic in its sources.[54] Doctrines of both the critical and absolute idealists can be identified in his thought, but they are always modified to fit a theological context. The resulting 'theological idealism' lacks the systematic organization and scholarly rigour which characterized nineteenth century philosophical idealism. At the same time, it shows some affinities to the intertwining of religion and

and philosophy which characterized the approach taken to philosophy by Murray's Free Church teachers in Edinburgh, particularly the professor of Ethics, P.C. MacDougall.[55] This idealism addresses culture generally, rather than the academy, and so could be identified as "cultural idealism", were it not for the theological modes in which it finds expression. Drawn from eighteenth century philosophical antecedents and an increasingly liberal theology, it took on the character of the "Christ of Culture" in H. Richard Niebuhr's classic typology. It was not a product, but an assumption of philosophical activity.

It would appear, then, that John Clark Murray does not fit easily into the conventional national or philosophical categories most often brought to the study of his work. A more fruitful approach may lie in the abandonment of this 'deductive method' of study in the light of preferred categories and the adoption instead of an 'inductive' approach which conveys a sense of the method, ideas and priorities which inform Murray's writings.

One of the first impressions which emerges in such an approach is the doubtful value of any interpretation which casts Murray in the role of a speculative philosopher or inventive thinker. The academic work reveals a critic, commentator and teacher. Despite their variety, the writings reveal a lack of originality and, in some cases, of development. They are often limited to general level studies which employ and often, from one piece to another, repeat basic and uncontentious points. Much of an 1878 article in MacMillan's Magazine on "The Scottish Philosophy" is drawn verbatim with very few substantial changes from the introductory article in the four part series on

Sir William Hamilton's philosophy which had appeared in the 1867
Canadian Journal. Similarly, an 1886 review article in The Scottish
Review on "Sir William Hamilton" is almost identical to the handwritten
manuscript of a lecture given to students some twenty years earlier.[56]

In the latter case this lack of development may be excused for
the article was simply biographical. Yet a closer look at some other
articles reveals a similar lack of analytic or speculative substance.
The 1887 MacMillan's review article on "The Revived Study of Berkeley"
says virtually nothing about the five books which occasioned it and
only slightly more about Berkeley's philosophy itself; the bulk of it
is given over to biographical material. This is also the case in the
1885 article on Solomon Maimon.

Was Murray's work then uniformly mediocre or unsophisticated?
Not entirely. Contributions to general thought were made with such
articles as "Atomism and Theism" noted earlier and "The Study of
Political Philosophy".[57] In addition there were short notices on the
minutae of particular fields such as logic and psychology.[58] And, as
noted in the previous chapter, more scholarly work began to appear in
the 1890's. Much of it appeared in the form of commentaries on the
works of other philosophers, but individual pieces show more of the
analytic skill demonstrated in the early series on Hamilton.

To judge Murray's work in such modest terms is not to dismiss
the author from the ranks of the philosophically significant but simply
to caution those who would infer great things from bibliographic lists.
The work has value, but as a corpus made up almost entirely of reviews,
biographies, introductory textbooks and general commentaries, it is a

value within a more restricted sphere than is often assumed.

That value lies in the area of teaching. However misinformed the supposed necessary opposition of teaching and research may be, the dichotomy appears appropriate when applied to Murray's career and work. In the absence of autobiographical ruminations, this can only be an interpretation. He certainly never sought, as others have, to justify lightweight scholarship by appeal to a heavy teaching load. Nor, as his criticism of Hamilton shows, did he allow a preoccupation with teaching to provide excuse for any failure to bring critical and systematic expression to one's ideas.[59] All the same, Murray's reputation and much of his work reflected the abilities of a teacher. The praise of students and colleagues in this regard was noted in the previous chapter. And to return to the work, its modest nature is more easily explained when seen in this light. Even the serious articles of the 1890's are, in their narrative style and conventional content, obviously course lectures adapted for publication. So too with the books: the Outline of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy is sub-titled "A Textbook for Students"; the Handbook of Psychology contains the Prefatory note that,

> this handbook is designed primarily to introduce students
> to the science of psychology; and to this design every
> other purpose, which the book may serve, has been made
> subordinate . . . It is not advisable to perplex the
> beginner with a prefatory discussion of controverted
> questions; and to the more advanced student, who may
> honour the book with a perusal, its general standpoint
> ought to be evident without preliminary explanations.[60]

Hardly what might be described as ambitious claims. In the Introduction to Ethics, Murray is even more anxious to clear up any misconceptions which the title might give rise to:

> This book is intended to be what its title describes, an
> Introduction to Ethics; but as the term Introduction has,
> in this connection, received an ambiguous meaning, a word
> of explanation may not be out of place. This term is some-
> times employed to denote a philosophical discussion of the
> ultimate concepts which lie at the foundation of a science;
> in which case a preliminary study of the science is indis-
> pensable as a preparation for the intelligent perusal of the
> Introduction. This is not the sense in which the present
> work is meant to be an Introduction to Ethics. It is intended
> to introduce to the science those who are as yet unfamiliar
> with its fundamental concepts, except in so far as these are
> implied in all our ordinary thoughts about human life.[61]

With such modest claims for the works, it seems inappropriate to seek

in them the elements of speculative metaphysics or epistemology. As

general works from which even advanced students were turned away, they

cannot fairly be seen as contributions to contemporary scholarly debates.

One can even question the extent to which they expressed only the

author's own views. Murray's pedagogical method, as expressed in the

Outline of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, did not emphasize

original expression:

> I believe . . . that the teaching of philosophy must still,
> at least, be conducted by helping the student to master the
> varying points of view from which the different representative
> systems look out on the field of speculation.[62]

Eulogistic notices at his retirement and death confirm that this

comparative method was retained throughout Murray's teaching career.

His student and later colleague, J.W. Hickson, wrote:

> He always endeavoured and for the most part succeeded in
> presenting the standpoint of opponents adequately and
> fairly . . . His classroom was one of the few places of free
> discussion and bracing intellectual activity in which one
> felt, in sharp contrast to the deadening atmosphere of others,
> that everything was not once forever fixed and settled in
> the world.[63]

It is interesting to note in light of this question that the one work not aimed solely at the college classroom, "The Industrial Kingdom of God", was never published by Murray, even though it shows signs of having reached the stage of a final manuscript. He certainly did not fear the controversy it might arouse, for the ideas it contained were often put before the wider reading public in articles for daily papers or weekly journals. As will be seen in Chapter Four, changes in Murray's assessment of and answer to contemporary social problems occurred with a frequency which frustrated publication.

If John Clark Murray is to be seen as a philosophical teacher rather than a speculative thinkers, it is more appropriate to approach his works in terms of the underlying worldview these reveal, rather than the speculative systems to which they may, with help and inference, be co-ordinated. Murray's worldview does not lack interest and value for its being expressed in modest forms, nor does it gain interest and value by being stretched to accommodate larger ambitions. Ironically, it falls to some of the criticisms Murray himself raised against Thomas Reid and Sir William Hamilton. Like Reid's, the thought of Murray seldom "represents the speculative toil of a philosophic intellect, but merely the refined opinions of ordinary intelligence",[64] albeit an intelligence informed by some of the more active intellectual currents of the nineteenth century. And like Hamilton, the threads of thought spun out in various articles, books and lectures were never drawn together by their author into the tighter web of a coherent philosophy. Murray adopted the systematic approach of Hamilton but, like the mentor, it brought him no nearer to a final synthesis. His

most frequent -- and for the person attempting to reconstruct his

world-view, most frustrating -- qualifier in works on any theme was

that detailed treatment of a question was beyond the scope of the

study at hand.[65] But detailed treatment was never given. Murray

seldom pursued ideas to completion, unwilling, perhaps, to commit

himself to any position without the most thorough study or, more

likely, unable to arrive at satisfactory answers to social or

philosophical questions. Even the attempt to demonstrate the social

ideal in a novel, where he might legitimately allow imagination free

play without worrying about practical limitations, suffers from this

lack of precision. He is simply unable to give a clear picture of

the reforms which might constitute the road to Utopia, though he

gladly describes the happiness and prosperity of that social paradise.

At issue here is the question of Murray's status as a

philosopher at a time when philosophy was undergoing its 'professional-

ization' as a discipline within the university curriculum. Although

the concept is not without its difficulties, distinct changes in

philosophical training and teaching can be traced to the mid-

nineteenth century movement for university reform and the parallel

revival of Idealism.

University reform was a cause very much alive in Britain from

the 1820's and in America from the 1850's. After a prolonged decay into

insignificance in the course of the eighteenth century, universities

were being called upon to address the need for advanced liberal

education in the sciences and humanities. University appointments

had previously been made on the basis of personal connection or local

convenience, with little regard for any but the most rudimentary

academic qualifications; a general university education was most

often regarded as sufficient. With university reform, the model of

intensive and specialized preparation found in Benjamin Jowett's

Balliol or the graduate schools of German universities was invoked as

necessary to meet contemprary intellectual challenges. Similar demands

were raised in Canada, were the isse was not the reform of old

institutions but the maturation of new ones. Commentators as diverse

as Cardinal J.H. Newman, the Harvard Board of Overseers, and Egerton

Ryerson were in fundamental agreement that the nineteenth century tide

of secularization was so strong that the preparation of young men to

meet the philosophical challenges of an age of doubt could not be left

to amateurs.[66]

As professional graduate training became a pre-requisite for

teaching positions within the university, the generalist man of letters

was superseded by the academic philosopher; the amateur was replaced

by the professional.

This shift was not without effect on the form of philosophizing.

Bruce Kuklick has pointed out in his study of the process of

professionalization in the United States that, "although some thinkers

still reserved time for careers outside the discipline, philosophy

narrowed to a domain of more arcane interests, competence in which

was more subject to expert evaluation."[67] A professional structure

of academic associations and journals evolved, and there emerged a

greater emphasis on the improvement of status within the profession and

standing within the university through scholarly publication.

Correlations have often been drawn between these changes in the form of philosophizing and changes in the nature of the ideas under discussion. In effect, professionalization did not simply mark a stage in the history of education, but indicated a new stage in the history of philosophy as well. Analyzing this shift in America, Kuklick found that many amateur philosophers were indebted to the Scottish Common Sense tradition while professional philosophers were responsible for the promulgation of Idealism in the universities.[68] J.H. Irving noted the same correlation in Canadian philosophy.[69] And M. Richter quotes R.C.K. Ensor's assessment that, "whatever be thought of the English Idealist school, which [T.H.] Green did so much to found, they at least conceived their task as one for fully trained and organized professionals, not for gifted but isolated amateurs."[70]

The correlation of a generalist approach with Common Sense Realism is not, as might be assumed, an indication of lesser intelligence or less applied philosophical rigour on the part of Common Sense teachers of philosophy, a good number of whom were ordained churchmen. On the contrary, the Common Sense tradition was self-consciously and quite deliberately generalist, just as the British Idealists were self-consciously and deliberately specialist.[71]

The controversy between generalists and specialists had raged in Scotland from the time of the appointment of the first Royal Commission to investigate the Scottish universities in 1826. While the generalists argued in the tradition of the eighteenth century Scottish Enlightenment for a curriculum which was broad in scope but thoroughly philosophical in content, specialists appealed to the greater

complexities of nineteenth century commercial and industrial society,
and advocated a narrower study of the methods and content of a limited
number of fields.[72] As indicated earlier, this was as much a dispute
over culture as over curriculum. Although its final resolution was
imposed from London in the form of 1892 legislation which preserved
both types while favouring specialization, the prolonged and heated
discussion makes it likely that those schooled in the Common Sense
tradition did not base their generalism in intellectual weakness but in
determined cultural conviction.[73]

What then of John Clark Murray? Irving judged that Murray was
"the first thoroughly trained and the first professional philosopher
to appear in Central Canada", a judgement which McKillop quotes with
approval.[74] Certainly this would appear to be the case if one judges
from Murray's bibliography. But, as noted above, when one looks more
closely at the content of the articles cited, one finds that in
scholarly rigour as in philosophical doctrine, Murray was a transitional
figure. As already seen, when he addresses the topics current in late
nineteenth century academic philosophy -- as, for example, the revivals
of Berkeley and Spinoza -- it is on the general level characteristic of
the man of letters, rather than the scholarly level of the professional
philosopher. 'Man of letters' and 'pedagogue' are not only more
charitable terms than Kuklick's 'amateur philosopher', but more
sensitive to the divisions in Scotland and more appropriate to the
Canadian situation as well.

In the American setting, Kuklick makes institutional affiliation
a key criterion of professional status and hence of scholarly rigour.[75]

As seen above, the nature of the dispute in Scotland was such that

Idealist specialists had little hope of advancement until the 1870's.

Institutional affiliation was a less significant factor in Canada.

With fewer universities or colleges and less 'turn-over' of faculty

than in America, such collateral conditions as the expansion of

Philosophy Departments themselves did not occur until later in the

century. Further, Canada did not have the extensive network of clubs,

summer schools and journals which gave definition to and sustained

the amateur philosophical movement in the United States. With few

exceptions, such as civil servant William Dawson LeSueur, philosophy

in Canada "has flourished only in the universities".[76]

John Clark Murray's status, then, was less that of a

professional philosopher and more that of a man of letters in the

tradition of the Scottish Enlightenment: an educated gentleman whose

extra-philosophical interests and concerns were at least as great as,

if not greater than, his professional interests as the Professor of

Mental and Moral Philosophy in one of Canada's leading universities.

Significantly, the only attention Murray gave to any form of

this distinction of specialists and generalists was critical.

Discussing the attitude of teachers of philosophy towards religion in

a 1904 article, he rejected the limitation of the term 'philosopher'

to 'teacher of philosophy'. There were distinct echoes of the

Scottish ideal of higher education in the arguments that philosophical

education sought the broader dissemination of culture and that,

> teachers of philosophy themselves often find that their
> best students -- those who have caught the philosophical
> spirit most fully -- go into all sorts of occupations, --
> theology, law, medicine, applied science, literature,

> manufactures, commerce. These do not abandon their
> philosophical tastes and habits of thought entirely in
> their practical occupations . . . consciously or
> unconsciously they become teachers. They leaven society
> with the spirit of their own thought, and they do so
> sometimes more extensively and more intensively than the
> professional teachers of philosophy.[77]

Although the distinction drawn here is not entirely parallel to

that between 'amateur' and 'professional' philosophers, it is clear

from the passage that Murray would have rejected the notion that lack

of professional expertise resulted in a lack of critical insight or

philosophical thought. And he would have regretted the narrowing of

interest which accompanied professionalization. The movement of

talented philosophy students into careers outside the discipline was

to be encouraged for,

> this wider diffusion of philosophical interest seems to
> me wholly beneficial. It may be fairly questioned whether
> it does not act beneficially on philosophy itself by
> keeping it in more intimate touch with the realities of
> nature and of life.[78]

Quite obviously, one of the characteristics of the man of

letters was a disinclination to draw -- much less observe -- firm

boundaries between the disciplines. The field or discipline which,

apart from philosophy, most drew John Clark Murray's attention, was

theology. Less troubled by the doubts which worried Matthew Arnold

and George Eliot, Murray saw no opposition between religious faith

and critical thought. He certainly did not believe that theological

studies had disqualified him from philosophical pursuits. On the

contrary, such studies obligated him to engage in philosophical work.

And not philosophy only; theology was not the queen of the sciences,

but the theologian must be the master of them if he is to do theology

justice. These convictions were expressed at an early stage in Murray's

career in the 1860 Presidential Address to the Theological Society of

Edinburgh. They were reaffirmed seventeen years later when the address

was published and dedicated to the theological students of Montreal

because, as a prefatory note stated, "Some recent utterances in this

city seem to call for a vindication of the rank which theology claims

among the higher spheres of intellectual labour."[79] In contrast to the

vagueness and indecision of some other works, Murray here is not modest

in his claims or his call to responsibility. First the claim:

> Christianity as the absolute religion, maintains all
> religious life, so far as really religious, and all
> truth, so far as really true, to be Christian life
> and Christian truth; it denies, therefore, that any
> intelligent thinking or any noble living can possibly
> be out of harmony with it. In consequence of this
> sublime claim, the scientific study of Christianity
> involves a reference, more or less direct, to every
> possible object of human knowledge. No other science,
> therefore, can demand such a severe and thorough
> investigation of the relations in which the separate
> truths of all the sciences are comprehended in the
> harmonious parts of one intellectual system.[80]

Hardly the positivist ideal of value-free study. The Calvinist

confession that all life was lived coram Deo (in the presence of God)

implied a commitment to the view that all truth was Christian truth.

Theology was an interpretive tool -- not a regulative or synthetic

agent -- employed to understand the contribution of separate fields of

inquiry to the unified field of knowledge. The assumption of

Christianity defined, and so implicitly limited that field,

however it did not thereby relieve the thinker from the responsibilities

of critical inquiry:

> The theologian, if he be honest to his calling, cannot
> avoid carrying his researches to the limits themselves
> of all speculation. Fearful of no consequence so much
> as corrupting his conscience by dishonesty to the
> questionings of his own mind, and untouched -- as he,
> who would preach eternal truth, should surely be -- by
> temporal temptations to tamper with his honesty, the
> theological student must be prepared to face the task
> of searching into the very grounds of being, -- of
> searching even whether all that seems to be is not
> merely a meaningless phantasmagory of being, and
> ourselves but ephemeral trifles that have been unintel-
> ligibly tossed up in the midst of the universal illusion. [81]

Theology was not an isolated discipline. Many of its problems

could be solved only by reference to psychology, ethics, political

philosophy and the philosophy of religion.[82] Moreover, its own

inherent meaning was revealed only through the study of such allied

disciplines as philology, ethnography and history.[83] It was, in short,

a relative study which could not be honestly undertaken in the isolation

of histories of dogma or the timidity of unquestioning fideism. Yet

this very boldness was possible only on the assumption that all truth

is Christian truth. Conviction was not to hamper the critical

intellect, but nurture it.

Murray expressed these convictions fully aware of the questions

of belief and intellectual honesty which the Victorian crisis of faith

was stirring up:

> My chief design has been to vindicate the rank of theol-
> ogical studies among the higher intellectual pursuits;
> and the remarks I have made express the answer which I
> have long silently given, not only to the common insinu-
> ations of literary snobs, but to the more serious asser-
> tions of more earnest men, and to the still more serious
> fears which have arisen at times within my own mind, that
> the higher intellectual life must be abandoned in entering

the clerical profession.[84]

With these quotations, we begin to enter into Murray's views on the ultimate basis and nature of truth and meaning. But as revealing as it may appear, the assertion that the separate researches of individual sciences resolve into a single harmonious system in which all truth is Christian truth can hide as much as it reveals, particularly when made by a mid-nineteenth century student of theology and philosophy. Assertions of the systematic unity and Christian character of all truth could be made with equal vigour and confidence by the Hegelian J. H. Stirling and the evangelical Presbyterian Thomas Chalmers. Needless to say, only the words would be the same. What then did such an assertion mean to John Clark Murray?

Murray's meaning emerges when his assertion is seen as the context for the answer to a number of other philosophical problems, each of which emerges frequently and is answered consistently in almost six decades of writing and lecturing. Murray was not static in his approach to basic issues, but change occurred more in the specific application than in the theoretical foundations of his thought. Basic convictions served as the anchors or co-ordinates for thought which unfolded in the light of the philosophical and social developments of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In their most formal expressions, these convictions covered the areas of epistemology, ontology and ethics. For Murray, the particular problems were the structure of knowledge, the relation of materialism and idealism, the fact of human freedom and the nature of moral

philosophy and its relation to Christianity. The lack of formal,

philosophical treatment of these issues means that in many cases

Murray's position can only be described in the simple terms through

which it was first conveyed in textbooks and articles. The issues

involve controversies which Murray himself seldom touched on, much

less actively sought to resolve.

Footnotes to Chapter Two

[1] W.H., "Professor J. Clark Murray", _University Magazine_ XVII (1918), p.566.

[2] J.H. Irving, "The Development of Philosophy in Central Canada from 1850 to 1990", _Canadian Historical Review_ XXXI (1950), pp. 252 - 287; A.B. McKillop, _A Disciplined Intelligence: Critical Inquiry and Canadian Thought in the Victorian Era_ (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1979); L. Armour and E. Trott, _The Faces of Reason: An Essay on Philosophy and Culture in English Canada, 1850 - 1950_ (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1981).

[3] As Armour and Trott attempt to establish in "Backgrounds and Themes", the first chapter of _Faces of Reason_ (pp. 1 - 31). A.B. McKillop takes the more conventional view that nineteenth century Canadian thinkers were pre-occupied with the attempt to establish and preserve "a broad moral code that would constitute the core of a way of life reconciling belief and inquiry, tradition and innovation, concern and freedom." _Disciplined Intelligence_, p. ix. Given that this quest could describe the aims of most philosophers from Socrates to Hegel and beyond, this 'search for a moral code' is too universal a theme to give particular national identity to the work of Canadian thinkers.

[4] This conclusion, unpalatable to some, was affirmed by one of Murray's successors in the McGill Philosophy Department, Charles W. Hendel, MacDonald Professor of Moral Philosophy and Chairman of the department from 1929 - 1940. Hendel found the lack of national self-consciousness a characteristic mark of Canadian philosophers, to the extent that it was misleading to speak of _Canadian philosophy_.

In transcending national distinctions, Canadian philosophers not only kept themselves "whole and sound for philosophy", but exemplified a truly "humanistic attitude and vision". C.W. Hendel, "The Character of Philosophy in Canada", Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XII (1952), pp. 365; 372.

[5] Ibid., p. 365.

[6] T.A. Goudge, "Philosophical Literature", in C.F. Klinck, et al, ed., Literary History of Canada, 2nd ed., 3 vols. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), 3: 84. In tone and topical ordering, Goudge ignores the question of national identity in Canadian philosophy.

[7] There are many parallels between the histories of philosophical work in Australia and Canada. A dependence on British teachers, a strong Common Sense tradition gradually superseded by Idealism, and a pre-occupation with moral philosophy characterize both. Philosophy as a discipline was slower in getting started in Australian universities but it is interesting to note that when it did, the most prominent figure was a friend of Murray's from Edinburgh, Henry Laurie. E.M. Miller, "The Beginnings of Philosophy in Australia and the Work of Henry Laurie", Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy VII (1929), pp. 241 - 251; VIII (1930), pp. 1 - 22.

[8] J.G. Bourinot, Our Intellectual Strength and Weakness: A Short Historical and Critical Review of Literature, Art and Education In Canada (Montreal: Foster Brown, 1893), p. 23. E.M. Miller demonstrates a similar combination of nationalist hope and humble, realistic evaluation in his articles on Australian philosophy: Miller, "Philosophy in Australia", pp. 240 - 245.

[9] J.T. Merz, A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century, 4 vols. (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1912 - 1914), 3: 187.

[10] "Dinner in Honour of the Rev. Professor Murray", Paisley Herald (October 29, 1862), in MUA 611/2, p.1.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] John Clark Murray, "Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy: An Exposition and Criticism; Scottish Philosophy", Canadian Journal XI (1867), pp. 207 - 224; Idem, "The Scottish Philosophy", Macmillans XXXIX (1878), pp. 112 - 126.

[16] Irving, "Philosophy in Central Canada", p. 249.

[17] McKillop, Disciplined Intelligence, p. 180.

[18] Armour and Trott, Faces of Reason, pp. 131 - 132.

[19] G.E. Davie, _The Democratic Intellect: Scotland and Her Universities in the Nineteenth Century_ (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1961), pp. 273 - 274. Davie identifies the search for "a metaphysical mean" between empiricism and _a priorism_ as characteristic of Scottish thinkers both in and out of the Common Sense Realist tradition. A corollary "metaphysical moderatism" is ascribed to David Hume.

[20] Achieving such a synthesis occupied the minds of a number of Hamilton's pupils and followers, including James Ferrier and the scientist Clerk Maxwell. Davie, _Democratic Intellect_, pp. 192; 277.

[21] John Clark Murray, "The Scottish Philosophy", _Macmillans_ XXXIX (1878), p. 121.

[22] Idem, "Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy: An Exposition and Criticism; Scottish Philosophy", _Canadian Journal_ XI (1867), p. 224.

[23] Idem, "The Scottish Philosophy", _Macmillans_ XXXIX (1878), p. 112.

[24] Idem, "Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy: An Exposition and Criticism", _Canadian Journal_ XII (1868), p. 69.

[25] Idem, "The Scottish Philosophy", _Macmillans_ XXXIX (1878), p. 123.

[26] A.D. White, _A History of the Warfare of Science With Theology in Christendom_, 2 vols. (New York: D. Appleton, 1896).

[27] H. Laurie, _Scottish Philosophy in its National Development_ (Glasgow: Maclehose, 1902), pp. 222; 269.

[28] John Clark Murray, _An Outline of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy_ (New York: Sheldon, 1870), pp. 169 - 174; W. Hamilton, "Conditions of the Thinkable Systematised -- Alphabet of Human Thought", _Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform_ (Edinburgh: Wm. Blackwood, 1852), pp. 598 - 599.

[29] W. Hamilton, "Philosophy of the Unconditioned; In Reference to Cousin's Infinito-Absolute", _Discussions on Philosophy and Literature_, p. 13.

[30] _Ibid._, p. 12; Merz, _European Thought_, 3; 380 - 381.

[31] Laurie, _Scottish Philosophy_, p. 263; A. Seth, _Scottish Philosophy: A Comparison of the Scottish and German Responses to Hume_ (New York: Burt Franklin, 1971), pp. 165 - 166.

[32] John Clark Murray, "Atomism and Theism" _Canadian Monthly and National Review_ VII (1875), p. 36. The contradictions in the assumption of a realm beyond experience whose constituent elements determined the intelligibility of the realm of experience were pointed out in Solomon Maimon's criticism of the Kantian dualism of noumenal and phenomenal realms. S. Atlas, _From Critical to Speculative Idealism: The Philosophy of Solomon Maimon_ (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), pp. 15; 19.

[33] John Clark Murray, _An Introduction to Ethics_ (Montreal: Wm. Foster Brown, 1891), p. 229.

[34] Seth, Scottish Philosophy, p. 114.

[35] Writing at the time of Murray's retirement, English professor Charles E. Moyse noted that, "to hear Dr. Murray speak in terms of deep emotion about the teachings of Sir William Hamilton . . . is to become conscious of the truth, not always fully recognized, that persons even more than facts are the secret of academic fruit." MUA 611/83. Hamilton exerted a similar force over many of his students in Edinburgh: A.L. Drummond and J. Bulloch, The Church in Victorian Scotland (Edinburgh: St. Andrew Press, 1975), p. 278.

[36] Davie, Democratic Intellect, p. 271. Removed from the scene of the battle after 1862, Murray falls between the two tendencies or schools as they polarised in the years following Ferrier's failure to win appointment to the Chair of Logic after Hamilton's death in 1856. While the moderates under Ferrier began a gradual drift towards Hegel, the Common Sense party became increasingly doctrinaire. Ibid., p. 303.

[37] A.J.M. Milne, The Social Philosophy of English Idealism (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1962), p. 14.

[38] J.H. Muirhead, "Past and Present in Contemporary Philosophy", J.H. Muirhead, ed., Contemporary British Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1924), p. 310.

[39] S. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript (trans. D.F. Swenson and W. Lowrie), (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 34.

[40] Expressing this shift, Bosanquet later judged of the 'first generation' of Idealists such as T.H. Green, that they "allowed to small an interval between experience specifically moral and specifically religious." cited Muirhead, "Past and Present", p.316.

[41] P. Gordon and J. White, Philosophers as Educational Reformers: The Influence of Idealism on British Educational Thought and Practice (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), pp. 3; 9.

[42] Ibid., pp. 11; 70.

[43] Muirhead, "Past and Present", p. 311; H. Jones and J.H. Muirhead, The Life And Philosophy of Edward Caird (Glasgow: Maclehose, 1921), pp. 27 - 37.

[44] Gordon and White, Educational Reformers, pp. 7; 9.

[45] A. Chitnis, The Scottish Enlightenment: A Social History (London: Croom Helm, 1976), p. 143.

[46] Drummond and Bulloch, Church in Victorian Scotland, p. 279.

[47] Davie, Democratic Intellect, pp. 41 - 47.

[48] Ibid., pp. 10 - 17; 205 - 206.

[49] Ibid., p. 318; R.M. Wenley, "An Unborn Idealist", G. Adams and W.P. Montague, ed., Contemporary American Philosophy, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1930), 2: 389 - 390.

[50] Davie, Democratic Intellect, p. 329.

[51] McKillop, Disciplined Intelligence, pp. 176 - 181.

[52] F. Copleston, A History of Modern Philosophy, 7 vols. (Garden City: Doubleday Image Books, 1965), 7, Pt. 2: 134.

[53] T.E. Willey, Back to Kant: The Revival of Kantianism in German Social and Historical Thought, 1860 - 1914 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978), p. 37.

[54] Irving, "Philosophy in Central Canada", p. 279.

[55] Davie, Democratic Intellect, p. 291.

[56] John Clark Murray, "Sir William Hamilton", Scottish Review (July, 1886), pp. 20 - 40; Idem, "Sir William Hamilton - His Life and Philosophy", MUA 611/56.

[57] Idem, "The Study of Political Philosophy" (Paisley: Paisley Herald, 1877).

[58] Idem, "An Addition to the Logical Square of Opposition", Proceedings and Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada I (1883), pp. 95 - 96; Idem, "Nomenclature of the Laws of Association", Ibid., pp. 93 - 95.

[59] Idem, "Sir William Hamilton", Scottish Review (July, 1886), p. 36.

[60] Idem, A Handbook of Psychology (London: Alexander Gardner, 1885), p. v.

[61] Idem, An Introduction To Ethics (Montreal: Wm. Foster Brown, 1891), p. iii.

[62] Idem, Outline of Hamilton's Philosophy, p. xii.

[63] W.H., "Professor Murray", p. 563. The semi-anonymous author of this notice demonstrates a familiarity with Murray's work which would have come from having been both a student and a colleague in the Philosophy Department. In particular, he writes of Murray's lectures of the 1890's -- the time when J.W. Hickson was a student in Murray's classes.

[64] John Clark Murray, "The Scottish Philosophy", Macmillans XXXIX (1878), p. 121.

[65] Idem, "Co-Operative Housekeeping", Montreal Daily Witness (November 9, 1874), in MUA 611/2, p. 15; Idem, Handbook of Psychology, pp. 213; 239; Idem, Introduction to Ethics, p. 23.

[66] John Henry Cardinal Newman, The Idea of a University (Garden City: Doubleday Image Books, 1959), pp. 13 - 15; 236; B. Kuklick, The Rise of American Philosophy(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. xv; McKillop, Disciplined Intelligence, p. 13.

[67] Kuklick, American Philosophy, p. xxii.

[68] Ibid., pp. 102; 136 - 138.

[69] Irving, "Philosophy in Central Canada", pp. 283 - 284.

[70] M. Richter, <u>The Politics of Conscience: T.H. Green and His Age</u> (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), p. 140.

[71] Chitnis, <u>Scottish Enlightenment</u>, pp. 6; 143 - 144.

[72] Davie, <u>Democratic Intellect</u>, pp. 4 - 7.

[73] One of the best expressions of this commitment to a generalist approach is George Jardine's <u>Outlines of Philosophical Education</u>, published in 1818. Jardine was Professor of Logic at the University of Glasgow from 1774 - 1827. <u>Ibid</u>., pp. 10 - 11.

[74] Irving, "Philosophy in Central Canada", p. 268; McKillop, <u>Disciplined Intelligence</u>, p. 176.

[75] Kuklick, <u>American Philosophy</u>, p. 62. The criterion of institutional affiliation is commonly cited to explain the failure of the St. Louis Hegelian movement to have a lasting influence beyond the charismatic appeal of its individual members. There was no 'second generation' groomed through the universities and, as a result, the later revival of Hegelian Idealism in the universities owed more to such men as Josiah Royce who had received graduate training in Germany, than to the St. Louis Hegelians, even though the latter had been active since the 1850's and organized into a society by 1866. P.R. Anderson, <u>Platonism in the Midwest</u> (New York: Temple University, 1963), pp. 189 - 194; 200; H.A. Pochmann, <u>New England Transcendentalism and St. Louis Hegelianism</u> (New York: Haskell House, 1970), pp. 116; 123.

[76] Irving, "Philosophy in Central Canada", p. 252.

[77] John Clark Murray, "'What Should be the Attitude of Teachers of Philosophy Towards Religion' -- A Reply", <u>International Journal of Ethics</u> XIV (1904), pp. 355 - 356.

[78] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 356.

[79] Idem, "A Vindication of Theology: Being an Address to Theology Students" (Montreal: Dawson Brothers, 1877), p. 3.

[80] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 11.

[81] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 11

[82] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 12.

[83] <u>Ibid</u>., pp. 12 - 14.

[84] <u>Ibid</u>., p. 14.

CHAPTER THREE

The Intellectual Framework

> In the case of Britain, we [are] able to recognise
> the presence of, and the universal respect for, an
> existing law and order of things, and, as a background
> for ethical speculation, the conception of this order
> as national, political, moral or divine, according to
> the various individual leanings and predilections of
> different thinkers or schools of thought. This order
> was, however, rather taken for granted than intel-
> lectually demonstrated. On the other side, we find
> that in Germany a strong desire had made itself felt
> to throw the light of reason upon these fundamental
> presuppositions of any and every moral system.[1]

J. T. Merz amplified on his turn-of-the-century distinction with

the observation that, whereas Continental philosophy was often absorbed

in ultimate questions, British philosophy had for centuries "prided

itself rather on finding its way out of metaphysics and reverting to

common-sense."[2]

Quiet, British confidence in the existence of a universal order

pervades the philosophical thought of John Clark Murray, and a disincli-

nation to pursue this order to its furthest metaphysical roots marks the

writings in which that thought is expressed. Faith and common-sense

become the indistinguishable bases from which the philosophical issues

of the nineteenth century were addressed. In particular, Murray dealt

with the structure of knowledge, the relation of materialism and

idealism, freedom and necessity, and the nature of moral philosophy and

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its relation to Christianity. As already noted, the sense of order

which emerges in the study of these philosophical issues takes the

form of a 'theological idealism', a liberal, amillenial Christianity

embraced through faith and providing the final answers to all ultimate

questions.

The structure of knowledge was a matter on which Murray was to

express opinion soon after arriving in Canada. Introduced by Principal

Leitch to the Queen's community as an apologetic dragon slayer whose

studies in Germany had given him first-hand acquaintance with the ideas

of those who would attack the true faith, Murray replied with an

inaugural address less bellicose in tone or dogmatic in content.

Philosophy, he claimed, does not deal in unquestioned finalities.

This could be seen in its relation to other fields of study:

> The other sciences investigate each one class of the various
> objects presented in our knowledge. Philosophy asks a
> question prior, in the order of things, to that with which
> they are occupied. It asks not, What is this or that
> particular object of knowledge? but what is knowledge itself?
> But of the objects presented to us we say not only that we
> know them, we say also that they exist. The other sciences
> inquire into these existing objects. Philosophy again
> reminds them of a previous question, What is existence?
> This twofold object, knowing and being, science and
> existence, constitute the entire matter about which philosophy
> is conversant.[3]

Philosophy was no more queen of the sciences than theology.

It was, rather, their foundation.

> Now before the results of the sciences can be vindicated
> as unmistakably correct, the questions must be answered,
> whether in the act of knowledge there have been no elements
> to disturb the process of scientific inquiry, and whether

our theories of existing things have not overlooked
the conditions themselves of existence.[4]

In the career which followed, the proper process of scientific
inquiry was to be studied in the context of the inter-relation of
materialism and idealism, while the conditions of existence were to
be treated, as they had been by Hamilton, in the context of psychology.

The idea of such an inquiry is reminiscent of the Kantian
transcendental critique, and indeed, Murray appears indebted to Kant
both for the formal approach to the union of all knowledge into one
rational whole, and for the construction of a rational ethical system.
Like Kant, too, he gives an active role to consciousness as that which
reveals the conditions and hence the possibility of knowledge. But the
debt here is qualified by a commitment to empirical limits to reason
which were more restrictive than those Kant had set; certainly the
transcendental a priori was rejected. The Kantian principles of pure
reason, innate to all intelligent beings and constituting the origin
and conditions of all knowledge apart from experience violated the
balance of empiricism and idealism which Murray strived to maintain.
Murray expressed the two elements of the relation in terms of Reason
and Understanding, stating that,

> Understanding is often used, in a special sense, to designate
> intelligence considered merely as constructing cognitions of
> an empirical and particular nature, while Reason is, in contrast,
> applied to intelligence as furnishing by its own nature,
> those a priori principles which form the supreme categories, the
> highest unification of knowledge. The further explanation of
> this distinction, with the modification it has received from
> different writers, would lead, however, into controversies of
> a philosophical nature. It need only be added that, whatever
> distinctions of this kind may be recognised, they must not be

conceived as breaking up the essential unity of self-
conscious intelligence; for it is in virtue of this
unity that intelligence forms the supreme categories
that give a structure to all experience.[5]

Rejecting the extremes of both idealism and empiricism,
and neatly side-stepping the questions which could be raised by the
adoption of what might appear to be a Kantian epistemology, Murray
was attempting to find a _via media_ which would lead to that "wider,
more human philosophy" of which he had spoken so hopefully in
Paisley. The quotation on Reason and Understanding is drawn from
a chapter in A Handbook of Psychology entitled, "The General Nature
of Knowledge". Leslie Armour and Elizabeth Trott have dealt with
this chapter on a formal philosophical level in The Faces of Reason,
treating it in what are often more complex terms than those used by
Murray himself.[6] Since Murray's work in the area was so limited,
it may be more appropriate to treat the synthesis of idealism and
empiricism on the simpler level of assumptions and intentions, rather
than as a finished project or clearly detailed direction.

"The General Nature of Knowledge" comes as the concluding
chapter in that part of the Handbook of Psychology which deals with
Cognitions. Cognition, together with Feeling and Volition, is one of
the three anthropological divisions of "Special Psychology". Although
Cognition is not elaborated in terms of faculties, Murray does offer an
analysis of the intellectual powers it covers. These are Perception,
Generalisation, Reasoning, Idealisation, and Illusory Cognitions.
Analysis of these powers led naturally to certain conclusions about
the inter-relation of man and knowledge:

> To sum up, there is evolved to our consciousness a world of
> _objects_, placed over against _ourselves_, extending throughout
> an immeasureable _space_, and undergoing alterations during a
> limitless _time_ -- alterations which are produced in the
> objects by eachother in consequence of their reciprocal
> causality. There are, therefore, certain supreme categories,
> under which the intelligible world is thought, and which are
> indicated in the terms italicised in the preceeding sentence.
> These being the universal categories of the intelligible
> world, their interpretation involves the interpretation of
> the general nature of knowledge.[7]

A fitting introduction. After raising the requisite caveats
that this is a psychological rather than philosophical discussion,
and that the problem is far from settled even at that, Murray moves
into a treatment of the categories or conditions of all knowledge:
self-consciousness; time; space; substance; and cause. Significantly,
although critical idealism is implicitly rejected as _a priorism_ in
introductory passages, it is empiricism as developed by Mill, Bain and
Spencer which figures most prominently in the discussion of the
categories; the categories are unfolded in terms of their distinction
from empiricist associationism. It is in this unfolding that key points
of Murray's worldview emerge.

The categories are set out with laudable brevity. On
self-consciousness, Murray states that,

> the very earliest step in forming the simplest perception is
> the consciousness of a sensation. This means that the sen-
> sation is no longer a purely subjective state, in which the
> sentient being is absorbed; it must have become an object of
> knowledge, to be compared with others, -- to be identified
> and discriminated. But this objectifying of a sensation
> implies that it is projected from me: in this act I become
> conscious of something which is not I; and this consciousness
> of that which is not I is the consciousness at the same time
> of myself. Self-consciousness, therefore, is involved in the
> very beginning of knowledge.[8]

As seen in the first chapter of the present study, self-consciousness was a key element in Murray's rejection of the atomism proclaimed by John Tyndall in his 1874 Belfast Address. Having asserted that consciousness is a key element distinguishing man from the natural world, Murray goes on to give a simple and fairly standard logical rejection of the possibility of a material origin of consciousness itself:

> self-consciousness is not so much an essential factor of intelligence, as rather intelligence itself. It cannot, therefore, be a product of processes of intelligence, themselves products of non-intelligent forces; for processes of intelligence without self-consciousness would be processes of intelligence without intelligence; and the forces, producing processes of intelligence would, though non-intelligent themselves, be intelligible, and an intelligible system of forces presupposes an intelligence, to which it is related.[9]

It is not possible to get intelligence out of a stone. Although materialists such as Tyndall or J.S. Mill might not recoil in horror from the necessary contradictions of their materialism, Murray had sufficient faith in the ultimate rational intelligibility of the universe to think a simple logical proof sufficient to establish his position against materialist evolutionary science and empiricist psychology.

He had somewhat less faith in his former mentor. Murray had followed Sir William Hamilton in deriving consciousness as a logical necessity in the contact of the self with the phenomenal world, or not-self. At the same time he attempted to go beyond Hamilton, staying on the same course but clearing up inconsistencies and avoiding the shoals of Common Sense Realism. Due to the failure to bring his

diverse writings into one coherent system, Hamilton had argued in
separate places that consciousness was both a condition and a mode of
states of mind; that it was both equivalent to and distinct from self-
consciousness; and that it gave both the true knowledge of Common
Sense and the relative, limited knowledge of the realm of the
Conditioned. [10] Murray identified consciousness with self-consciousness,
making it a condition of all mental states and the only key to true
knowledge. It also retained a dependence on empirical reality and
critical reason. Whereas Hamilton had asserted in the context of
Common Sense epistemology that the intuitions of consciousness were
beyond scepticism, Murray would not put the subjective deliverances
of a subjective power beyond question. The _fact_ of consciousness was
indubitable, but the _facts_ of consciousness were not. [11]

The fact of consciousness becomes one of the foundations of
Murray's philosophical _via media_ between idealism and materialism. The
active, intelligent self-consciousness becomes the necessary condition
for the other categories of experience. Without it, no sense of Time
can be created out of the passage of sensations. The passive mind of
empiricism, acting on associationist principles, is not able in itself
to determine prior and posterior relations. It may gain an awareness
of succession, but this is still a logical step removed from what we
normally conceive of as Time:

> If our mental life be merely a succession of feelings, if the
> consciousness of each moment absolutely vanishes as that
> moment passes away, there can be no principle in consciousness
> to connect the different moments by a comparison which goes
> beyond each and cognises its relation of priority or posterior-
> ity to others. For this there must be some permanent factor

of consciousness -- a factor that is out of the succession which
it observes. That factor is self-consciousness; and without
self-consciousness, the consciousness of time is thus seen to
be impossible.[12]

If mind _is_ sensation, there can be no capacity for judgements

_of_ sensation -- no capacity for giving individual sensations an order

in experience and hence no capacity for recollection. Memory is

possible only on the assumption of an intelligence not defined by the

flow of sensations and hence not limited to their chance sequence and

ephemeral existence:

> For if there were no permanent self, continuing identical
> amidst all the changes of consciousness -- if there were
> but a perpetually altering consciousness, in which each
> moment absolutely perishes as the next supervenes, -- then
> there might perhaps be suggestion of one feeling by another,
> but there could be no memory. For memory is the conscious-
> ness that I, remembering in the present, am identical with
> my self of the past remembered.[13]

The argument for Space is similarly dependent on the activity

of a central conscious self able to recognize and plot the relations

between objects. Contrary to Kant, Space _is_ relation, and relations

can be drawn only by an intelligence transcending immediate

sensations and perceptions.[14]

Consciousness of temporal and spatial relations is conscious-

ness of some permanence in a world of change. But how can we be

assured of the existence of this phenomenal world, particularly when

radical empiricism atomizes experience into a materialist sequence of

sensations? Murray offers an argument reminiscent of the Kantian

transcendental deduction by accepting the reciprocal necessities of

the intelligible and the phenomenal world:

> How comes it that the world shapes itself thus to
> intelligence? It arises from the fact, that otherwise
> there would be no intelligible world at all; it is
> therefore the form of the world, that is implied in
> the very nature of intelligence. For to be
> intelligent is to be self-conscious; and to be
> conscious of self is to be conscious of notself
> [ie., all that is other than self; the distinction is
> that between the subjective and objective worlds].
> Consequently, the very act of intelligence, by which we
> are conscious of sensations, projects these into an
> objective sphere, transmuting them into qualities of
> objects, and thus forming out of them a world that is
> not ourselves.
>   Accordingly, in their psychological aspect at least,
> qualities are simply the form in which self-conscious
> intelligence construes sensations.[15]

Since changing qualities can only be conceived in relation to something permanent, the concept of substance as the unity underlying change becomes necessary as well. Substance does not, however, have the absolute and independent existence granted it in some forms of empiricism. It exists as a necessary construct of consciousness, which alone has an identity transcending Time and a unity transcending Space.[16] As part of the notself which is the contrasted result or negative creation of the consciousness of self, substance is subject to the conditions or forms of intelligibility: Time and Space.[17]

If substance is the unity of co-existing phenomena, cause may be seen as the unity of consecutive phenomena.[18] The apparent circularity in their derivation attests to Murray's desire to keep idealist concepts on an empirical leash. Both derive their identity from a consciousness seeking only to label the patterns it has noted in the intelligible world. Substance, then, is a necessary notion of Space and cause a necessary notion of Time.[19]

It is obvious from "The General Nature of Knowledge" that
consciousness plays a major role in the formulation of Murray's
philosophical middle way. Consciousness is the first product and
primary proof of intelligence. It is also the origin of those
conditions which formed the structure of knowledge.

But the concept was not without its difficulties. Nineteenth
century critics had pointed to a tension in the Kantian epistemology,
which held that the conditions of experience were both a priori
categories of rational consciousness and a corresponding structure in
reality itself.[20] If an objective, empirical structure existed, why
should a subjective, rational structure be necessary? Kant had been led
to this tension by the untenability of an earlier belief that a
fundamentally chaotic reality was brought into order only by the
organizing categories of consciousness.[21] John Clark Murray's
thought approaches this tension; given its less detailed statement
it might more sympathetically be labelled an 'ambiguity'. Consciousness
determines the conditions of intelligibility, but does so through
contact with the empirical world. An empirical element is injected into
the transcendental deduction by means of a doctrine termed, in a later
revision of the Handbook of Psychology, "The Relativity of Knowledge":

> Knowledge is, in the first place, a relation between a subject
> and an object, between a knower and a thing known. But not only
> must the object be related in the consciousness to the subject
> knowing; it must also, in the second place, be related to other
> objects. That is to say, it must be identified with those which[22]
> it resembles and discriminated from those with which it differs.

The doctrine of the relativity of knowledge placed Murray's philosophical _via media_ in an organizing consciousness and an associationist structure. The first relation would satisfy some idealists eager to assert the allliance of mind and matter (save for Kant, for whom 'knowledge' was the non-relational, _a priori_ intuition of the concepts of pure reason). The second would satisfy empiricists otherwise suspicious of any talk of structures of experience. But would this synthesis, which appeared more a revival of Deism than any new contribution, really satisfy either? Certain idealists might balk at the thorough dependence of consciousness on empirical conditions and tests, but empiricists certainly had greater cause to question the supposed proffering of the olive branch.

Much of Murray's discussion of self-consciousness takes the form of a debate with strict empiricism, itself characterized as associationism. The associationist held that perception of the self, of Time, Space and the rest, is merely the result of the continued association of phenomena in the mind. These associations are links made out of custom, mechanical repetition or, in more scientific nineteenth century versions, through chemical compound. In short, the links were formed through means observable, measureable and predictable.

Murray had no difficulty accepting associationism as a simple psychological process. His rejection of it as a substitute for the conscious self is simple and occasionally frustrated: "Need it be repeated that association can merely associate?"[23] Association is not equivalent to intelligent relation; individual sensations are as atomic as dots on a page. To Murray, only an intelligence independent

of these dots can draw the lines that will connect them and reveal a picture. The dots themselves have no inner power to draw any line whatsoever, much less the correct line. So too, sensations have no power in themselves to connect them to other sensations and so create ordered experience and intelligent reflection. At the same time, there is an inherent, intelligible order to the apparently random collection which sets out necessary relations and so creates the picture -- or the experience.[24]

The rejection of associationism did not entail a rejection of empirical psychology. Physiological theories were being advanced by some of the empiricists as a means of explaining the mental phenomena used by idealists as proof of a reality transcending the material order. Unlike many idealists such as George Paxton Young of the University of Toronto, Murray did not see physiology in itself as a threat to the concept of consciousness and so did not paint it as being in necessary opposition to true psychology.[25] Physiology was no less able to shed light on the nature of consciousness than philosophical psychology; body and mind could be paralleled and found to be in harmony.

An assumption of harmony was as far as Murray was willing to go in describing the relation between the two sciences and, more significantly, between the two philosophical approaches at issue. Over two thousand years of debate between the schools did not shake his conviction that the unity of truth demanded that the truths of each side be open to resolution into a single, coherent system. More tellingly, the liveliness of the debate in the latter half of the nineteenth

century did not stir him into anything more speculative or detailed than the assumption common in Common Sense epistemology that the two sides must be in some, unspecified harmony which incorporated the insights of both idealism and materialism or empiricism.[27] The qualified acceptance of physiology provides only a very conventional guide to union. Physiology was seen as telling much of the mechanisms of psychological phenomena, but all hypotheses which went on to state that these observable relations expressed all that could be known of psychology were dismissed as unwarranted. In short, like many contemporaries, Murray was willing to acknowledge material explanations while firmly rejecting materialism, that confident reductionism which would not credit the existence of anything empirically unobservable.[28] As seen in Chapter One, this was a theme in the reply to John Tyndall's Belfast Address.

The central role of consciousness and the rejection of materialism combine to leave little doubt as to the nature of Murray's views on the third of his major concerns: the relation of freedom and necessity. Not surprisingly, it is with this problem that the ethical orientation of the entire worldview becomes prominent. Murray never referred to human freedom without making it dependant on action and responsibility on the part of conscious, intelligent beings. What was at stake was not simply human identity, but identity as a specifically moral agent.

Necessity, or determinism, had often been characterised as Augustinianism or Calvinism. Murray believed that its most potent

nineteenth century manifestation was not in theology, but as the

philosophical counterpart to evolutionary science. In evolutionary

theory,

> man's consciousness is simply the product of the forces in
> his environment acting on his complicated sensibility, and
> of that sensibility reacting on the environment. His
> consciousness, therefore, stands related to other phenomena
> precisely as these are related to each other, each being
> acted upon by the rest, and reacting upon them, so that all
> are absolutely determined by this reciprocity of action.[29]

Such determinism effectively eliminated any real role for

consciousness and, in consequence, eliminated man's identity as an

intelligent being. Only consciousness could prove and guarantee human

freedom. And as with consciousness, the proof of the concept rested

in the definition of the term:

> A volition . . . is not merely an action unreflectively
> prompted, suggested by a previous association with some
> pleasure it produces. It implies a consciousness of this
> association, a conscious comparison of action and
> pleasure with a cognition of their relation as means and
> end. It is only when we thus reflect on the end to be
> attained by an action, that the action becomes voluntary.
> This fact is apt to be lost sight of, as it is obscured
> by an ambiguity in the use of the word motive. This term
> is sometimes employed to denote an impulse of sensibility,
> by which we are moved to act without reflection; and such
> an act implies no intelligent control. But in a higher
> application, the term is identified with intention or
> intelligent purpose; that is to say, a motive, in this
> sense, is an object set before consciousness as the end
> to be reached by the performance of an action. It is only
> actions directed by this higher sort of motive that are
> voluntary. A volition is an act of an intelligent being
> acting intelligently.[30]

This description, drawn from the Handbook of Psychology, was

re-inforced in the Introduction to Ethics:

> A voluntary action -- a volition -- is precisely an action
> directed by intelligence to the accomplishment of a certain
> end. It is only then that action becomes moral; and an
> action cannot but have a moral character, when it is
> voluntarily controlled by an intelligent purpose.[31]

Intelligence, then, was a necessary condition for freedom. But how

was freedom to be used intelligently?

The necessary relation of freedom and ethics was expressed

directly by Murray as early as his inaugural address at Queen's

in 1862. Following Hamilton, and anticipating his own later work,

the newly appointed Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy analysed

philosophy by means of a division of human nature into the three

elements of Knowledge, Feelings and Action.[32] If freedom was a

necessary implication of action, responsibility was an equally

necessary inference:

> In the element of action we shall have to view the fact
> that there are events of which no account can be given
> except as originated by ourselves; and the consciousness
> of accountableness or responsibility, as of an imperative
> law of duty, with the necessary inferences will bring us
> at last to the most important department of the studies
> with which we are to be engaged, the science of ethics,
> moral philosophy.[33]

Ethics the queen of the sciences? Although his motives were

not those of Kant, Mill or Matthew Arnold, Murray adopted the

intellectual hierarchy of an age as obsessed with morality as it was

disenchanted with religion. The conviction that ethics represented

the culmination of philosophy was as much a point of practice as of

principle. Apart from later revisions of the 1885 <u>Handbook of</u>

Psychology, the bulk of Murray's later works, including two published
books, two significant unpublished manuscripts, and numerous articles
published from the late 1880's, dealt with ethical themes. So too, in
the university curriculum; in forty years of undergraduate teaching,
moral philosophy was taught to students only in their senior years
as the crowning point not only of philosophy itself but also, for
Arts students for whom it was an obligatory course, as the proper
culmination of university studies in general.

The moral philosophy taught to students at Queen's and McGill
embraced far more than ethics alone. After studying the development of
ethical theories from the pre-Socratics to Hegel, the senior students
moved from theory into social practice as this was found in political
science and economics.[34] The movement was reciprocal, for ethics
moved between the real and ideal worlds, seeking "to find a law which is
imposed upon human life by the very nature of things", while realising
that "the essential nature of things is determined by the Primal Cause
that gives them existence".[35] Specifically, moral philosophy begins
with the study of the present state of man as revealed in psychology
and political science, moves to the determination of the individual
good as found in ethics, expands to consider the social good determined
by political philosophy and culminates in the universal good that forms
the subject matter of theology.[36] This progressive movement of moral
philosophy is reciprocated by the relative nature of theology itself,
and by the conviction, examined below, of the necessary inter-relation
between theory and practice.

The Kantian elements found in "The General Nature of Knowledge"

emerge more clearly in Murray's ethics. Again, however, they are not
adopted with a consistency sufficient to classify Murray with the Neo-
Kantians. The debt is qualified and unacknowledged, confirming that,
however much Murray's thought may have been informed by an early train-
ing in the Kantian philosophy, it derived its ultimate shape from a
prior commitment to Christianity and from the effort to mediate
idealism and materialism.

Ethics, the study of the good, must begin with some conception
of human nature. Like Kant, Murray never tired of affirming that man's
value is given, not derived. It does not rest in the fulfillment of
standards or the completion of duties, but in an essential identity as
an intelligent and responsible moral being. Man is a self, and
deserves to be treated as an end in himself, rather than as a means to
the ends of others.[37] Beyond this, man's distinction rests in his
nature as a rational being. Man has natural rights, but innate reason
elevates him above natural law.[38]

Reason itself is constantly developing, both in its analytic
scope and in its influence over individual and social action. In
Murray's view, this development turned contemporary anthropological
convention on the evolution of ethics on its head. The view held since
Rousseau and Herder, that the simplest societies are those most
primitive or nearest the 'state of nature', had led many to search for
the most basic elements of human ethical consciousness in these
primitive societies. But Murray believed that such forms of historicism
obscured the true functioning of reason in man and society. Inasmuch as
the activity of reason brings increasing order and clarity into human

affairs, it is obvious that the early stages of civilization are not the simplest, but the most complex.[39] The totality of beliefs, superstitions and values has, in these societies, not yet been analysed into constitutent parts.[40] It is the advanced societies with philosophical traditions and refined analytic capacities which are better able to reach the simple level of inquiry. Hence an understanding of the fundamental nature of moral consciousness must be based on the "highly differentiated moral activity which forms the latest and noblest fruit of civilization", and not on the study of tribal customs and primitive behaviour.[41] Earlier civilizations were motivated by fear of unknown or capricious forces; the modern moral consciousness rises out of a sense of law in the universe. Through reason it is able to give a name to this sense:

> Duty! thou sublime great name . . . what is the origin
> that is worthy of thee, and where are we to find the root
> of thy noble descent?[42]

A footnote would hardly be necessary. In turning to Kant for assistance, Murray turned away from both empirical and intuitional theories of the origins of ethics. Once again, empiricism was equated with materialism, and materialist theores in the form of utilitarianism could never rise from the indicative to the imperative when describing human action. Practical consequences alone do not elicit a sense of principle or obligation.[43]

Rejected too was the inner sense or moral faculty proposed by intuitionists like Lord Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson and expanded on by the Common Sense philosophers. Intuitional theory made moral consciousness ultimately dependent on subjective states of mind.[44]

Murray believed, by contrast, that any true moral order must be objective, though not at the sacrifice of this vital connection to human moral consciousness.[45] It must not be obtained at the expense of becoming an external and essentially hidden order to which man can only submit in stoic resignation. Nor must it be arbitrary. The moral order that is at once both truly objective and truly human must be based in reason, that power which identifies man's nature and determines his prospects.

Committed to the Kantian notion of Duty, Murray could not but accept the corollary commitment to Reason. Although he found Kant's terminology "unnecessarily scholastic", he accepted the basic distintion of hypothetical and categorical imperatives, characterizing the former as the "conditional command" of practical reason determining the means to the various ends of the individual, and the latter as the "unconditional command" of pure reason determining the ultimate and absolute ends of all rational beings.[46]

Under the guidance of reason, ethical action became the fulfillment of the essential nature of rational humanity:

> The consciousness of an unconditional obligation to
> do certain actions is seen to be one of which we
> cannot wholly divest ourselves without ceasing to be
> reasonable beings.[47]

The voice of conscience was the verifiable law of reason; to Murray it became the voice of God speaking in the soul of man.[48]

Needless to say, man did not always listen. The growth and sophistication of moral consciousness depended on the growth of reason in society. Moral obligations reflected the needs of society as well

as universal rules, and as these needs changed, so too did the under-
standing of obligation. The Graeco-Roman emphasis on the family and
the polis as the focus of highest obligation was broadened by the
nineteenth century to an emphasis on the larger community of the
world.[49] Similarly, the military needs of embattled or aggressive
societies led to an ethic which valued virility and, as at least one
consequence, denigrated women. Industrial society had provided a
humane counteractive to the military spirit.[50] Although industrialism
was attended by great suffering, "it would be a misreading of history
to suppose that the evils of industrialism ever reach the appalling
magnitude of those which have flowed from the military spirit."[51]

Social needs influenced moral consciousness, but the centre of
responsibility still lay in the individual. Murray was firm in
stating that evil did not rest ultimately in the environment or in
ignorance, but he was evasive in offering alternate origins.

Environmental approaches were unacceptably deterministic, for
they took ultimate responsibility out of the hands of the individual by
holding that he or she could not but act as they did under the
immediate or long-term consequences.[52] Not only did the individual
lose any sense of responsibility; evil took on a far more mild
character: "crime and all kinds of moral imperfection are simply mis-
fortunes -- diseases to be cured by an application of the proper
remedies."[53]

Those theories which rooted evil in ignorance were judged
unacceptable for a similar failure to acknowledge that evil involved
the will as well as the mind. This was addressed indirectly through

the division of moral consciousness into the familiar cognitive,

emotive and volitional elements already encountered in the Handbook

of Psychology. Any ethical theory -- and so, by implication, any

theory of evil -- which did not address the tripartite nature of moral

consciousness was incomplete.[54]

For this reason, a third possible source of evil was also

rejected. The concept of sin receives a simple and non-commital nod

in the Introduction to Ethics, but is treated as a term commonly

employed to describe wrong-doing, rather than as a source or

embodiment of evil.

An article published five years later expands on the interpre-

tation of sin as a literary term used for psychological effect, and in

so doing, more explicitly rejects it as a realistic explanation of

evil:

> The deeper consciousness of sin, evoked by a higher
> conception of righteousness, has undoubtedly given a
> sharper antithesis to the ideas of God and Devil, of
> angel and demon, of heaven and hell, which make up a
> large part of distinctly Christian thought. The
> grotesque imagery of horror which has been evolved out
> of this dread dualism, is indeed one of the most repul-
> sive regions in the popular mythology of Christendom,
> yet it is not without a certain terrible fascination
> which has attracted the poets of Christendom to it as
> offering a fit material for the highest tragic art.[56]

The passage is drawn from an 1896 article in the Monist entitled

"The Dualistic Conception of Nature", in which dualistic thought is

traced from the Ionians through Augustine to Spinoza and Rousseau in

preparation for the affirmation that "monism is a necessary concept of

science."[57] Ontology is the ostensible subject, but much of the

discussion is taken up with ethical questions. Murray here traces the

concept of sin to Stoic and Manichean roots which came to be absorbed

into Christianity through Augustine's extreme contrast of good and evil

in the form of the antithesis of nature and grace.

The real foe is Manichean dualism:

> It is evident that all dualistic separations of man's life
> into spheres that are mutually exclusive originate in an
> imperfect conception of nature in general, but of man's
> nature in particular.[58]

Murray believed this Manicheism had been brought into Christianity

through the Augustinian teaching on sin. From Christianity, it had

exercised an influence on fifteen hundred years of European thought.

It was the work of the nineteenth century to bring this influence to an

end.

Whether expressed in terms of the distinction between

rationality and irrationality, or between good and evil, the very

attempt to circumvent Manichean dualism led Murray to dependence on a

conventional idealist dualism whose resolution into an absolute monism

is more readily expressed by general hopes than definite programs.

In its general outlines, this second dualism was a nineteenth century

commonplace shared equally by hard-nosed empiricists and 'sweetness and

light' idealists. It was often cast as a distinction between lower and

higher orders of life; a realm of necessity and one of freedom. The

origins of this dualism were by nature ontological, but its resolution

was presumed to be voluntarist and ethical. 'Reason' alone, as a

concept bearing more hopes than definition, crossed the boundary

dividing the two realms by a power widely recognized, if never quite

made clear. The distinction of the two realms is clearly expressed in Murray's description of "Personal Duties" in the Introduction to Ethics:

> There is a higher self, represented by the universal reason
> of which we partake; there is a lower self, represented by
> the merely rational or non-rational impulses of our sensi-
> bility; and when a man's life is surrendered to the control
> of non-rational impulses that overbear the decision of reason,
> his lower self may with a certain truth be described as
> unjust to his higher self.[60]

Platonic idealists such as Matthew Arnold had followed this ethical resolution of an ontological problem by arguing that the greatest development of the higher self could take place only at the expense of the lower self: man must give up the impulses, emotions and gratifications of the lower self if he was to perfect his inherent rational nature.[61] The practical effect of this dualism was to make ethics a disengaged science in which the good life became a contemplative, intellectual ideal. It was in this way that ethical -- read rational -- behaviour was an affirmation of man's true -- read rational -- nature.

But Murray could not accept this. The tripartite nature of man was violated by an ethic that located the ideal in the cognitive terms of a contemplative life or dealt with duties in abstract and categorical terms alone.[62] The two natures were not to be defined by a division of the cognitive from the emotive and volitional, but in terms of the balance or imbalance between these three elements:

> Emotion and will, divorced from conscious intelligence, would
> sink to the level of purely natural impulses on a par with
> the instinctive cravings of an animal or any other mechanical
> agency in the organic world. The value of emotion and will
> themselves . . . is a truth which intelligence alone can

discover or appreciate.[63]

Evil, then, was not simply a succumbing to the temptations of will or emotion. It was the result of intelligence, will and emotion falling out of balance.[64] Although this balance was determined and led by the cognitive element of intelligence, Murray apparently believed that evil would just as surely result if the cognitive element were to dominate and repress the emotions and the will.[65] The cognitions determined the balance, but the emotions informed it and the volitions preserved it. The natural impulses of will and emotion were not in themselves evil; they were "absolutely non-moral".[66] In short, the 'lower nature' was defined by an imbalance of the elements, and the higher nature by the proper balance. The 'proper balance' was not determined in the abstract, but according to the particular natures and habits of individual people.[67]

Hence any attempt to impute evil of any sort to individuals in advance of action, whether through ontological dualisms or original sin, was illegitimate: "Original sin, interpreted in its strict sense, is a contradiction in terms, is, therefore, as meaningless and unthinkable as a square circle."[68] As will be seen in the context of Murray's social philosophy, this analysis was too individualistic to encourage recognition of evil in existing social structures, and so led to the offering of only voluntarist and moralist solutions to social problems.

The respect for emotions and volitions demonstrated by John Clark Murray stems from the recognition that ethics deals with life, and hence with ideals that are concrete and active rather than merely disengaged or contemplative:

> The moral standard has no significance except in
> relation to the particular conditions of our mental
> and physical life, which it would bring into harmony
> with the universal requirements of reason.[69]

Since ethics was not simply a cognitive study, it must promote

an ideal which combined the mind with emotions and will. Given this

necessity, it could never be a theoretical science alone; theory

must be actualized in practice. Indeed, practice became the

necessary test of theory.[70] It was the inadaptability of contemplative

or formalist systems, characterized by Plato and Kant respectively,

which rendered them ultimately untenable.[71] Once again, the Kantian

system was abandoned just as the keystone was about to be set in

place.

Murray had his own keystone, one which brought ethics and

theology together. That stone was Christ, the fulfillment of the two

individually and the agent who merged them into one.

Christianity was the model for Murray's distinctly

un-pragmatic view of the necessary relation of theory and practice.

In the Christian context, it was the relation of faith and practice.

The distinction between Christian dogmatics and Christian ethics was

no more than a distinction between the doctrinal statement and daily

realisation of Christian truth.[72] It expressed no fundamental division,

for "faith without works is dead". Murray's horror of this deadness

extended back to college days, when, in what must have been an

exceedingly dry lecture by Professor James Buchanan, he used a notebook

page to compose "A Theologic Lay":

Ye whose hearts are poor and simple,
Who have faith in all that's ancient,
Who believe in all the writings
Of the Reformation period,
Of the times of grand, old Luther,
Of the times of Knox and Calvin,
Ye who long for those sound doctrines
Taught in all the Puritan systems,
In the works of good John Owen;
And who look with strong suspicion
At the teachings of these ages,
At the Essays of a Maurice,
At the novels of a Kingsley,
Come and hear the good Buchanan,
Hear the simple, old Buchanan.[73]

The poem demonstrates in equal degrees frustration with
unquestioned orthodoxy and interest in the activist faith of Christian
Socialists F.D. Maurice and Charles Kingsley. Murray could not abide an
orthodoxy absorbed in the refinement of its dogmatic forms. Yet it
would be a mistake simply to class him with theological liberals without
distinguishing varying shades of this liberalism. For though he found
the statements of such orthodox stalwarts as McGill Principal John
William Dawson and British Liberal leader William Ewart Gladstone
surprising and amusing respectively, he was nonetheless more orthodox
in his faith than such Idealist philosophical and theological contem-
poraries as Edward Caird and Josiah Royce.[74]

The strong emphasis on the practice of Christianity was
already given public expression before Murray left Scotland. In his
1860 Presidential Address to the Theological Society of Edinburgh,
Murray warned fellow students that "all attempts to find the permanent
good of humanity in anything but the noble lives of God-serving men
must be utterly resisted", adding that it was not solely doctrine or

hotly defended forms of church government which would "accomplish the world's regeneration".[75] Was this a departure from the orthodoxy of the Westminster Confession? Hardly. If anything, Murray saw it as the very meaning and fulfillment of that catechism:

> in truth, if the chief end of man is to glorify God and enjoy Him forever, tell me wherein that man comes short of this who attains the complete and harmonious develop- ment of the nature given him by God . . . Now if we render glory to God in proportion to the perfection in which we retain his likeness, and if our enjoyment of Him is to be estimated by the force of our revolt against all that is unlike Him, there is no other destination for man than to wage unwearying war against all that impedes the full, free, and harmonious growth of his own God- like nature.[76]

Although the emphasis may have been more spirited, these state- ments in themselves hardly constituted a radical departure from conven- tional views in either the liberal or conservative theological camps. Or, for that matter, from traditional philosophical thought. Aristotle's practical advance upon Socrates and Plato was often quoted by Murray with approval: "We do not make these inquiries in order that we may know what virtue is, but in order that we may become good men."[77] To Murray, the very universality of this position was only further proof of its truth. He was a little perplexed by those positive responses to Pragmatism whose enthusiasm was based in the belief that the assertion of "the simple fact of human action" was in some way new to philosophy.[78] Pragmatism's novelty was also its error, for in taking practice as the origin rather than the test of truth, it amounted to "a renewal of the attempt to dethrone reason from its position of supreme authority as a final court of appeal in all questions with

regard to reality or truth."[79]

The commitment to an active faith introduced an element of particularity which distinguished Murray from the broad, all-absorbing ecumenism of such absolute idealists as Josiah Royce, who defined "Religion in its higher sense", as:

> the consciousness of practical relations to a real, but at present unseen, spiritual order, whose authority as furnishing a rule for our conduct is conceived as absolute, and whose worth and dignity we recognize as above every other worth and dignity known to us . . . I expressly define the general term so that Buddhism and Christianity, the so-called Ethical Religions of some modern teachers, and the more positive creeds of tradition equally fall within the scope of my definition.[80]

Royce drew from this definition the claim that professors of philosophy ought to keep "aloof from the visible church" in demonstration of the lack of divisive particularity in sound religious consciousness.[81]

Murray countered with the argument that aloofness from the life of the church was equivalent to aloofness from the life of the faith. The church was an association of believers joined in commitment to the outworking of the gospel. By contrast,

> the contention of Professor Royce, with regard to the main value of religious association seems to assume that religious life can be separated from philanthropic work; or, in other words, that there can be genuine service of God distinct from the service of our fellowmen.[82]

Stepping further away from the ecumenicity of Idealist religion, the assertion that practice verified, but did not initiate truth could be construed as supporting the argument that Christianity alone was

the true religion. In the apologetics of liberal theology, the role of

Christ took on special significance. But to Murray, Christ was not

simply the Great Moral Teacher whose life and purpose were centred on

the Sermon on the Mount rather than the Mount of Calvary; nor was

divinity sacrificed in a search for the historical Jesus.

Expanding on the union of faith and practice, Murray claimed

that:

> True religion . . . is, in its essential nature, that complete
> unison between the life of man and the will of God which flows
> from the communion of the human spirit with the Divine. This
> communion is more or less imperfectly expressed in all
> religions; for man becomes religious only when he becomes
> conscious, however dimly, of his relation to God. But this
> essentialtruth of all religion finds its perfect expression in
> Christianity. The central doctrine of Christianity is the
> incarnation of God in the person of Christ. The central
> object, therefore, of the Christian's faith -- the highest
> ideal of his speculative conceptions as of his practical
> endeavours -- is a Being who represents the embodiment of
> the Divine Spirit in human form.[83]

Of all religions, only Christianity could point to the completed

union of the divine and the human. Since the ideal and the real were

combined in an historical person, only Christianity could legitimately

portray the ethical ideal as an achieved reality and not merely as an

anticipated hope. Though admittedly only an inference from the passage

quoted above, on this basis, only Christianity could lay claim to

being the 'True Religion'.

The criteria of truth made it necessary to uphold Christ's

character as fully human and fully divine. Hence, though Murray

appreciated some of the results of Higher Criticism, he could not

accept any presuppositions or conclusions whose effect was to

undercut Christ's equality with God by limiting him to a role as an

enlightened but thoroughly human moral teacher alone:

> By enduring the cross and despising its shame, He has been
> set down at the right hand of the throne of God. Is not
> that a historical fact, is it not a historical fact that by
> rejecting the splendour of an earthly kingdom, he has been
> set down at the right hand of the throne of heaven?[84]

The religion which undergirded ethics was distinctly Christian, however

much it might stray from the standards of evangelical Presbyterian

orthodoxy and towards the theological liberalism of Albrecht Ritschl.

The value of this religion was not dependent on any sociological

function in holding communities together, nor could it be tailored

in order better to fit the demands of a philosophical system or

an ecumenical age: "For the purposes of the moral life, however,

religious aspiration must not be allowed to evaporate in a vague abst-

raction of the divine, separating it completely from the concrete

interests of human life."[85]

In a stronger statement, Murray quoted favourably and at

length, Nietzsche's ridicule of those who,

> are quit of the Christian God, and believe themselves all
> the more bound to hold fast Christian morality . . . If
> Christian faith is given up, the _right_ to Christian
> morality is pulled from under the feet . . . Christianity
> is a system, a logically connected and _integral_ view of
> things. Break off one of the leading ideas -- the belief
> in God -- and the whole goes to pieces.[86]

The former theological student did not elaborate on the

theological implications of his Christology. The metaphor, however,

of arch and keystone is appropriate, for it expresses the union of

Christian and philosophical ethics, and hence of all truth. Briefly,

while philosophical ethics works up to the ideal of Christ, Christian

ethics assumes the ideal and works out from it.[87] The content in both

cases is the same, for the two arms of the arch mirror eachother, but

the methods are inductive and deductive respectively.

It is in this way that for Murray all truth becomes Christian

truth. Christ expresses the ideal of rational ethics, the human

embodiment of the Divine Will. This will can be seen both as an

ethical and a cosmological law, for "the laws of Nature are expressions

of the Divine Will."[88] Logical entailment or semantic trick? Murray

makes the transition by resorting once again to idealist dualism:

> If, then, the moral law is the real law of the universe,
> and its obligation is a real fact, it must transcend the
> laws of nature by which our natural life is determined;
> and the moral consciousness of man, in grasping such a
> law, brings him into touch with an order of things which
> transcends the order of nature . . . The moral order can
> be a reality only if there really is a Perfect Reason who
> knows the law of a perfectly reasonable life, and who, as
> himself the realisation of that law, imposes it upon all
> reasonable beings. In such a Supreme Reason the moral
> order, which for us is an ideal to be realized, becomes
> a reality eternally existent; and the infinite authority
> of the moral law becomes the infinite authority of an
> Infinite Being, in whom wisdom and righteousness are
> perfectly realised.[89]

Both the law of nature and the moral law are rooted in the

divine will. Murray turns Kant on his head by arguing that God is the

proof of the rational order, and not a Kantian postulate of practical

reason. With this argument from 'moral design', he preserves his own

practical theory of truth in face of the Kantian emphasis on the

over-riding necessities of pure reason. The unity of truth is

assumed in regard to the order of nature, and proven only in the

ethical realm. The proof is assumed to have validity because of the inherent superiority, on unstated standards, of the moral realm. The moral order transcends the natural order, but its laws have some vague jurisdiction in that lower realm.

The link, of course, is Reason. Although it would properly have a different definition in the two realms, the fact that it is rooted in God's will for both appears to give it validity as the unifying agent in truth. Though one could argue that the end result is the same, the choice to reverse the order and hence assert the primacy of God over Reason is hardly insignificant. Murray has not given a sound argument for his theory of the unity of truth, but his semantic solution to the problem points clearly to the priorities which informed his worldview.

Christ's role in ethics is expressed in terms of Supreme Reason but Murray's choice to use a person rather than an abstract concept such as the kingdom of ends to express the fulfillment of ethics points to a further and more significant departure from Kant. With Christ, ethics took on the personal note that was lacking in Kant but that was at the heart of Murray's own tripartite anthropology. Christ expressed the cognitive dimension when understood as the Supreme Reason; He expressed the volitional dimension in the choice to die for human salvation;[90] but most significantly, he expressed the emotive dimension in the law of love. As the exemplification of love, Christ introduced an element of feeling which Kant's Law of Duty had specifically excluded. Duty led the individual to fulfill the demands of justice as these had been determined by Reason. But to Murray, justice was only one part of man's social obligation; "bare justice

is not the highest reach of moral character; it is, as I.H. Fichte

has pithily put it, 'the minimum of the moral will'."[91] This mention

of will was as significant a departure from rationalist ethics as was

the reliance on love, for it too rooted ethical obligation in a

broader conception of human nature.

The perfect fulfillment of one's ethical nature, therefore,

was not equivalent to fulfillment of a rational nature alone:

> thus the moral consciousness is not completely satisfied
> with the lifeless abstraction of duty as an infinite
> obligation. It demands to know what this infinite obli-
> gation means as a living fact, and it finds the vitalizing
> force of the fact in the authority of a perfectly wise and
> righteous Being. The moral consciousness thus passes over
> into the religious consciousness; and consciousness of
> duty reaches its culmination in consciousness of God.
> Nature, awed by the grandeur of the moral revelation, sees
> clearly that she must have derived it from a source
> transcending her own limits.[92]

The prospect of swooning Nature re-opens the question of

Murray's idealism. Yet in spite of the heady prose, the statements

themselves confirm that what is being expressed is not the Absolute

idealism of a neo-Hegelian or the Critical idealism of a Neo-Kantian.

It is, rather, a personal idealism saturated with the primacy of

God. As such, it is reminiscent of two thinkers for whom Murray

expressed great appreciation and who, he believed, had long been

misunderstood: Spinoza and Berkeley.

Spinoza was the lesser influence. Murray found his adoption of

a geometric model of truth to be a denial of the purpose and integrity

of philosophy as expressed in the lecture to the Queen's community at

the very beginning of his career:

> the extension of such methods to Philosophy overlooks
> the fact that Philosophy is an inquiry into the validity
> of these methods themselves. Such an inquiry, however,
> must obviously go beyond the methods inquired into, and
> cannot, to begin with, assume these methods as valid for
> its own direction.[93]

Murray understood that Spinoza had assumed the geometric model as necessary to the intelligibility of the universe.[94] Ironically, in his criticism of such an adoption of untested models, he was oblivious to a very similar circularity in his own interdependent assumptions regarding the nature of the universe and the structure of human knowledge.

Conventional criticism of Spinoza since the seventeenth century had focussed on individual points within the whole philosophy. Such 'atomistic' approaches to the history of philosophy had, by the nineteenth century, been superseded by a Hegelian emphasis on the analysis of integral wholes. Taking a page from the German idealist histories of philosophy which he employed in the McGill classroom, Murray argued that a sound interpretation of Spinoza's philosophy could not proceed through determining the tenability of individual doctrines but by taking the Spinozan system, "as a whole in the light of what appears to be its essential drift."[95] This drift was idealistic, a view of the universe as "essentially an evolution of intelligence".[96]

In nature, this process was manifested in the evolution of the infinite attributes of substance, a necessary construct of pure reason, into the infinite variety of modes, the concrete form in which attributes achieve reality. But there was an independent, parallel 'order of ideas' which moved from opinion, through inductive,

generalizing science, to deductive, demonstrative science and which

allowed the ultimate imterpretation of all facts in terms of essence

or thought. Since the ideas were the essence rather than the reflection

of sensible things, the intellectual order had an integrity and immor-

tality not threatened by the possible decay or destruction of the

natural order. Thought lives immortal, and it lives in the mind of

God. Through thought, therefore, man left the deterministic necessity

of the natural realm and entered the realm of freedom. Murray expresses

the transition with an almost uncharacteristic flush of idealist

rhetoric that conveys considerable appreciation:

> Here, in fact, Spinoza follows Plato in his ascent to those
> serene heights of mental life in which genuine knowledge
> is illuminated with a moral spendor, by being identified with
> genuine love: while the fierce light of geometrical
> demonstration, which seemed to fuse all existence into a
> violent mechanical union, becomes mellowed into a glorious
> haze in which the finite spirit feels as if all its harsh
> self-assertion faded away into a mystical communion of
> love with the Infinite Spirit, in whom all live, and move,
> and have their being.[97]

From the systematic investigations of Hamilton to the 'glorious

haze' of Spinoza; Murray had apparently moved far since leaving Scotland.

In this interpretation, Spinoza offered exactly that combination of

cosmology and ethics which Murray himself was aiming to achieve. All

knowledge is "essentially a knowledge of God has he reveals Himself in

the innumerable modes of His attributes."[98] But it is knowledge

attained only through love; cognitions combine with emotions in an act

of volition. The ultimate aim is a form of fellowship between God and

man. Human joy rests in attaining the greater perfection which results

from advances in knowledge. The object of knowledge is God, and,

> when an object is conceived as the cause of joy, the joy
> takes the form of love for the object which is its cause;
> and consequently, the joy derived from that knowledge
> of God which is the highest activity of intellectual life
> becomes an intellectual love of God.[99]

This joy is blessedness, this blessedness is freedom, and this
freedom is fellowship with God. Murray charts a Spinozan progression,
but finds the statements on man at this level a little extreme: "He
is described as assimilated to God in language such as can be paralleled
only in the excesses of the literature of Mysticism."[100] All the same,
the ethical piety which infuses the cosmological system was highly
compelling.

The more moderate expression this piety finds in Berkeley is one
reason for an apparent preference for the Irish Bishop over the Jewish-
Dutch lens grinder. Contemporaries believed Murray over-rated Berkeley,
and it is obvious that serious appreciation was given in classes to the
thought of the eighteenth century idealist.[101] However, Murray wrote
no extended or substanial study of Berkeley. Aside from references
to him in articles given over to the Scottish philosophy, Murray pub-
lished only the single article entitled "The Revived Study of Berkeley."
Ostensibly a review of five recently published works, the article was
in fact an extended biography which included a brief defense of
Berkeley's idealism against the dismissals of those like Hume who
found him unanswerable but unconvincing, and others like Samuel Johnson
who found him simply absurd.

Murray argued that Berkeley did not reject the existence of
matter as such, but only the empiricist position that Matter represents

an unknowable substance and is represented to us by immaterial ideas.[102] If anything, Berkeley was a superior empiricist, for he believed that matter needed no explanation beyond its being perceived. What we perceive is not an image of the material world, but the material world itself.[103] Since continued existence cannot be dependent on our sporadic perceptions, "the absolute existence of the universe implies that it is known by an Infinite and Universal Mind.[104]

Berkeley provides Murray with the ultimate alternative to materialism: "To him, the world is not a mere piece of splendid mechanism moved by unconscious forces: it is the really existing ideas of the living God speaking to us through all our varied senses."[105]

From this proceed some pious extrapolations which go beyond the word without violating the spirit of Berkeley's philosophy:

> Accordingly, on this doctrine, the face of Nature is, without
> straining a figure, the Face of God: the sounds of Nature
> are the voice of God . . . God is not a Being whose existence
> needs to be proved by arguments. He is a living person whom
> we see every time we open our eyes more closely than we ever
> see any other -- a Person whose actual thoughts are spoken to
> us at every moment more distinctly than the thoughts of any
> human being.[106]

Once again the transposition from cosmology to ethics is effected with a few deft strokes which result in a theological idealism similar to that fashioned out of the "drift" of Spinoza and expressed indirectly in Murray's works on ethics.

This theological idealism is born in piety. And sustained in piety. Murray does not trouble with counter-arguments of scepticism and, as seen above, he easily dismisses materialism. Rather, he states his position with that simple confidence in order -- a divine and

ethical order -- which J. T. Merz had identified as a characteristic of British ethical thought. The world simply is filled with the Spirit of God, it is structured by His rule. Nature is "not an irrational matter but rather intrinsically a rational form, spiritual reality."[107]

This knowledge is understood through revelation, not as a Kantian postulate of practical reason or a Hegelian stage of developing religious consciousness. Murray placed the ultimate source of knowledge not in the human mind, but in God, "the Infinite Mind, who knows all things and imparts to our minds what of his knowledge their limited nature enables them to receive"[108]

One thing our minds can receive is the knowledge that God is not simply mind. The emphasis in Murray's ethics on faculties of emotion and will, in particular through the central role given to love, and the belief that truth reaches its highest form in ethical practice and so is exemplified by the incarnate Christ who is wholly divine God and wholly historic man, combine to distinguish Murray's specifically Christian theological idealism from the religious universalism of such philosophical contemporaries as Josiah Royce.

Also received by our minds is the confidence that Christianity represents a unified system of truth which provides a basis for philosophical thought in such areas as epistemology, psychology and ethics. Murray's confidence in the intrinsic rational form and spiritual reality of Nature allows that assumption of harmony which is the extent of reconciliation or synthesis attempted between philosophical schools. In theory, critical thought is free to appeal to the ultimate standards of reason in examining the basis and justification of such

confident assumptions. In practice, Murray seldom offered explanations for his confidence apart from comments dropped at the conclusion of sermons and lectures on theological themes.

The context was appropriate, for Murray's confidence rested in a fideism based on the contemplation of God's works in nature, history and the individual life, and clarified through the insight gained in a life lived according to the standards of Christian ethics. Its simplest, yet for a philosoher boldest statement came in a remark at the end of "Atomism and Theism", Murray's reply to John Tyndall's 1874 Belfast Address. Tyndall's rejection of a God who would not fit under the microscope or into the test-tube had stirred apologetes of the faith into a vigorous re-stating of all manner of proofs of the existence of the deity. Murray rejected these logical deductions and rational creations when he chose instead to close his reply to Tyndall with a quotation which moved the epistemological question into a Christian ethical context:

"Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God."

But would this Christian ethic be equal to the challenges of nineteenth century industrial civilization?

Footnotes to Chapter Three

[1] J.T. Merz, A History of European Thought In the Nineteenth Century, 4 vols. (Edinburgh: Wm. Blackwood, 1912 - 1914), 4: 133.

[2] Ibid., p. 128.

[3] "Queen's College", MUA 611/2, p. 2.

[4] Ibid., p. 2.

[5] John Clark Murray, A Handbook of Psychology (London: Alexander Gardner, 1885), pp. 286 - 287.

[6] L. Armour and E. Trott, The Faces of Reason: An Essay on Philosophy and Culture in English Canada, 1850 - 1950 (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press: 1981), pp. 138 - 175.

[7] Murray, Handbook of Psychology, pp. 282 - 283.

[8] Ibid., p. 287.

[9] Ibid., pp. 287 - 288.

[10] Idem, "Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy: An Exposition and Criticism", Canadian Journal XI (1867), pp. 370; 373; 376.

[11] Idem, Handbook of Psychology, p. 387.

[12] Ibid., p. 297.

[13] Ibid., p. 298.

[14] Ibid., pp. 302 - 303. Solomon Maimon also derived Space and Time empirically from the differences within and between objects. This does not detract from their function as conditions of intelligible experience; it merely eliminates the Kantian distinction between a priori form and empirical content. S. Atlas, From Critical to Speculative Idealism: The Philosophy of Solomon Maimon (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), pp. 170 - 171.

[15] Murray, Handbook of Psychology, pp. 305 - 306.

[16] Ibid., p. 306.

[17] Ibid., p. 307.

[18] Ibid., p. 309.

[19] Ibid., pp. 310 - 311.

[20] A. Seth, _Scottish Philosophy: A Comparison of the Scottish and German Responses to Hume_ (New York: Burt Franklin, 1971), p. 139.

[21] Ibid., p. 144.

[22] John Clark Murray, _An Introduction to Psychology_ (Boston: DeWolfe, Fiske, 1904), p. 332.

[23] Murray, _Handbook of Psychology_, p. 296.

[24] Ibid., pp. 305 - 306.

[25] Although Sir William Hamilton strongly rejected the idea that physiology could inform psychology, those trained in the Common Sense tradition were, on the whole, better able to accept the findings of empirical science in psychology. The realist school confidently assumed that the existence and deliverances of consciousness were on a par with those of the empirical world. Henry Calderwood, a student and successor of Hamilton's at Edinburgh wrote, "Physiology and Psychology when taken together are sciences of human life; they cannot be dissociated. Only when they are combined can we be said to have a science of the life of man." H. Calderwood, _The Relations of Mind and Brain_ 3rd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1892), p. 2. George Paxton Young at the University of Toronto was a former Common Sense realist turned Idealist who was strongly opposed to Calderwood's Common Sense realism in ethics and psychology. T. Hoff, "The Controversial Appointment of James Mark Baldwin to the University of Toronto in 1889", (M.A. Thesis: Carleton University, 1980), p. 45.

[26] Hoff, "Controversial Appointment", pp. 220 - 224.

[27] Andrew Seth portrayed the assumption of harmony as a characteristic of Common Sense philosophy, in which mental faculties were seen as corresponding by divine creation to the structure of the world. Murray comes close to this position without troubling with such details as faculties. Seth attempted in 1885 to expand on the theme of harmony by uniting the Common Sense philosophy with Hegelian idealism, finding in the Hegelian method a means "which professes to guarantee both the inner-connectedness of allthe conceptions, and the self-completing integrity of the resulting scheme." Seth, _Scottish Philosophy_, p. 197.

[28] John Clark Murray, _An Introduction to Ethics_ (Montreal: Wm. Foster Brown, 1891), pp. 41 - 50. Although Murray used Calderwood's _Handbook of Moral Philosophy_ in classes in Ethics before the publication of his own _Introduction_, _The Relations of Mind and Brain_ was never included in the reading lists for the courses in Mental Philosophy.

[29] Murray, _Handbook of Psychology_, p. 428.

[30] Ibid., p. 409.

[31] Idem, _Introduction to Ethics_, p. 27.

[32] The division into Knowledge, Feelings and Action was subsequently used to structure both the _Handbook of Psychology_ and the _Introduction to Ethics._

[33] "Queen's College", MUA 611/2, p. 2.

[34] M. Abbot, "Moral Philosophy Notes: Lecturer Dr. Murray", MUA 684/2, ref 38/180/4/20. This can also be seen in the description of "Social Duties" in the _Introduction to Ethics_, pp. 241 - 326.

[35] Murray, _Introduction to Ethics_, p. 6.

[36] _Ibid._, p. 7.

[37] _Ibid._, p. 255.

[38] _Ibid._, p. 29. This was the basis of Murray's rejection of Rousseau: Idem, "Rousseau: His Position in the History of Philosophy" _Philosophical Review_ VIII (1899), pp. 359; 364 - 365.

[39] Idem, _Introduction to Ethics_, pp. 30 - 31.

[40] _Ibid._, pp. 32 - 34.

[41] _Ibid._, p. 38.

[42] _Ibid._, p. 41.

[43] _Ibid._, p. 54.

[44] _Ibid._, p. 60.

[45] _Ibid._, pp. 62 - 63.

[46] _Ibid._, p. 67.

[47] _Ibid._, p. 67.

[48] _Ibid._, p. 68.

[49] _Ibid._, p. 71.

[50] _Ibid._, p. 77.

[51] _Ibid._, p. 283.

[52] _Ibid._, p. 136.

[53] _Ibid._ p. 135.

[54] _Ibid._, pp. 102; 109; 220; 230; Idem, "The Dualistic Conception of Nature",

The Monist VI (1896), pp. 386 - 387.

[55] Idem, Introduction to Ethics. pp. 96; 317; 383.

[56] Idem, "Dualistic Conception", p. 388.

[57] Ibid., p. 382.

[58] Ibid., p. 394.

[59] Ibid., p. 389. A similar assessment was given when Murray addressed the problems of Christian ethics more directly in A Handbook of Christian Ethics (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1908), p. 140.

[60] Idem, Introduction to Ethics, p. 335; Christian Ethics, p. 116.

[61] M. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 64; 97; 163.

[62] Murray, Introduction to Ethics, p. 220.

[63] Idem, "Pragmatism", University Magazine XIV (1915), p. 111.

[64] Idem, Christian Ethics, p. 146.

[65] Idem, Introduction to Ethics, p. 229.

[66] Idem, Christian Ethics. p. 151.

[67] Ibid., p. 150.

[68] Ibid., p. 151.

[69] Idem, Introduction to Ethics, p. 230.

[70] Idem, "Pragmatism", pp. 106 - 107; Idem, "Christian Ethics", Presbyterian Colege Journal IX (1889), p. 339.

[71] Idem, Introduction to Ethics, pp. 220 - 229.

[72] Idem, Christian Ethics, pp. 21 - 22.

[73] MUA 611/9, np. A native of Paisley, James Buchanan had been a preacher famed for vigorous, evangelical sermons before being appointed Professor of Apologetics in the Free Church seminary, New College, in 1845. He succeeded Thomas Chalmers in the chair of Systematic Theology upon the latter's death in 1847, and remained there until resignation in 1868. Murray's assessment of Buchanan's originality is stated more politely in the Dictionary of National Biography: "Though not eminent for his powers of original thought, Buchanan had a remarkable faculty of collecting what was valuable in the researches and arguments of others, and presenting it in clear form and lucid

language." Dictionary of National Biography, vol. III, s.v. "Buchanan, James".

[74] W.H., "Professor J. Clark Murray", University Magazine XVII (1918), pp. 364 - 365.

[75] John Clark Murray, "A Vindication of Theology: Being And Address to Theological Students" (Montreal: Dawson Brothers, 1877), pp. 7 - 8.

[76] Ibid., p. 9.

[77] Idem, "Christian Ethics", p. 339.

[78] Idem, "Pragmatism", p. 105.

[79] Ibid., p. 111.

[80] J. Royce, "What Sould be the Attitude of Teachers of Philosophy Towards Religion?" International Journal of Philosophy XIII (1903), p. 280.

[81] Ibid., p. 285.

[82] John Clark Murray, "'What Should be the Attitude of Teachers of Philosophy Towards Religion?' -- A Reply", International Journal of Ethics XIV (1904), p. 361.

[83] Idem, "Christian Ethics", p. 340.

[84] Idem, "The Temptation of Christ", Presbyterian College Journal XVI (1896), p. 104.

[85] Idem, Introduction to Ethics, p. 361.

[86] Idem, Christian Ethics, p. 20n.

[87] Ibid., p. 9; Idem, "Christian Ethics", p. 341; Idem, "Religion and Morality", Presbyterian College Journal XXIII (1903), pp. 4 - 5.

[88] Idem, Introduction to Ethics, p. 339.

[89] Ibid., p. 358.

[90] Idem, "Religion and Morality", p. 7.

[91] Idem, Introduction to Ethics, p. 250.

[92] Ibid., p. 358.

[93] "Queen's College", MUA 611/2, p. 2: John Clark Murray, "The Idealism of Spinoza", Philosophical Review V (1896), p. 476.

[94] Murray, "Spinoza", p. 479.

[95] Ibid., p. 473.

[96] *Ibid.*, p. 474.

[97] *Ibid.*, p. 486.

[98] *Ibid.*, p. 486.

[99] *Ibid.*, p. 487.

[100] *Ibid.*, p. 487.

[101] W.H., "Professor Murray", p. 563.

[102] John Clark Murray, "Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy: An Exposition and Criticism; Scottish Philosophy", *Canadian Journal* XI (1867), p. 214.

[103] *Ibid.*, p. 214.

[104] Idem, "The Revived Study of Berkeley", *Macmillans* LVI (1887), p. 167.

[105] *Ibid.*, p. 167.

[106] *Ibid.*, p. 167.

[107] Idem, "Pragmatism", p. 113.

[108] Idem, "Berkeley", p. 167.

CHAPTER FOUR

Towards a Just Society

The young professor who sailed to Canada in 1862 left Scotland

with more than the toasts of well-wishers in mind. The lessons of

David Murray were no more to be forgotten than those received from

Glasgow or Edinburgh professors. Personal culture was to be developed,

but never at the expense of working for the improvement of political

and social culture.

The lessons of David Murray formed the pre-occupations of his

son. If Canada's undeveloped culture provided the proper environment

for the development of a philosophy untrammeled by national tradition,

how much more did it provide an atmosphere conducive to the creation

of a new society on lines laid out in the thought of liberal political

reformers? The progress of liberalism in Britain was seen by its

promoters as a progress won against restrictive traditions. A nation

free of tradition was a nation ready to be molded along the lines of

the best economic and political thought.

Caught up in the demands of teaching at Queen's College, Murray

was unable to bring his political convictions to public expression until

well after his arrival in Canada. When he did speak out, it was often

in response to contemporary events and situations; as a result, the

development of Murray's social thought is closely tied to events and

and changes in Canada in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
Since his attention and pen were drawn to many issues, the development
traced in this chapter is necessarily selective. It covers primarily
the political and economic issues of the period and shows how Murray's
thought moved from the classical liberalism of his Scottish upbringing
towards the new liberalism of the later years of the nineteenth century.
It was a development which paralleled that of J. S. Mill or such later
figures as T. H. Green, a development from the laissez-faire doctrines
of Adam Smith to the "reformed capitalism" of the co-operative move-
ments which grew in strength from tne 1870's. This movement is paral-
leled by the growth of ethical concerns in Murray's general philoso-
phical outlook. Though it has an independent, if related, identity
before 1890, the social philosophy becomes less distinguishable from
the ethical philosophy after this time -- each is developed in terms
of the other.

Two relevant concerns which have been excluded from this
chapter are Murray's support of the temperance movement and his work
for the recognition of the rights of women to higher education. His
views on temperance are quite similar to those of many contemporaries.[1]
Despite its significance, the issue of womens' access to higher educa-
tion was an isolated concern related more to Murray's involvement in
the university and perhaps, like J. S. Mill, to his marriage to a
highly gifted woman.[2] The rights of women generally formed no part of
his social philosophy as it was developed both at the time of the
controversy surrounding the issue at McGill and in subsequent years.
It was not extended to advocacy of or even commentary on suffrage

debates which were underway from the 1880's. Further, though his

earliest arguments favouring women's admission to the universities

were based on a natural rights assumption of sexual equality, Murray

appears later to have adopted the distinctly unequalitarian maternal

feminist view of men and women inhabiting ethically and occupationally

separate spheres.[3]

A focus on political and economic issues allows a clearer pic-

ture of Murray's thought on social issues to emerge. The initial

setting for the development of this thought is established in a series

of articles on political themes written in the 1870's and early 1880's.

The topics of these articles move between British traditions, philo-

sophic ideals and Canadian reality, but the outlook is always charac-

terized by the political and economic rationalism, the individualism

and the moralism which together characterized Murray's middle class,

mid-Victorian liberalism.

The reformer's son would have found difficulty in accepting

the Whig assumption that the British parliamentary system was a fore-

shadowing of government in the City of God, yet as a democratic and

constitutional order, it did provide the best model on which the

government of Canada should be patterned. Furthermore, a young liberal

could take heart that the very novelty of the Canadian experiment

assured that those outworn traditions and corrupt practices which still

frustrated political confreres in Britain could be dispensed with

before they became a hindrance in the new world.

But in spite of its novelty, Canadian parliamentary reality

proved as readily corruptible as the British; at times it seemed

even to outdo the mother parliament in the scale of its corruption. A distressed Murray was forced to formulate a philosophical corrective. Both his criticism and the corrective reflected the moralist assumption common to reformers of the period that problems were rooted less in the political system itself than in the motivations of politicians, and in some cases voters.

The ideal of political rationalism found expression through criticism of one flaw of the British parliamentary system which had been exported to Canada: the party system. Murray's was one of the first voices in what was to be a chorus of criticism raised by Canadian intellectuals against the parliamentary tradition of party politics.[4] This inheritance was believed to be an unnecessary perpetrator of artificial antagonism which encouraged corruption and prevented elected representatives from working co-operatively for the general welfare of the nation on the basis of the best principles of political economy and philosophy. The historical origins of parties could be understood, but like many contemporaries, Murray did not believe that history alone could justify the continuation of a divisive system that was hindering the realization of civilization's evolution towards unity:

> It is surely no universal and eternal law of human life that
> men can govern themselves only by splitting into hostile cliques
> who shall create fictious causes of quarrel if the natural
> course of events do not furnish them with real ones.[5]

Nor were party lines tacitly observed when it came to assigning responsibility for the continuation of party politics into post-Confederation politics. In Murray's opinion, it was the Liberal

George Brown who had argued strongly and misguidedly for it.[6] The

Canadian experience confirmed that the party system clouded sound

decision-making in a fog of corruption. Governments might always use

control over purse and appointments in order to cement power, but the

enormous expenditure necessary for the creation of a new level of

government in Canada had amplified the problem to unprecedented

proportions -- as demonstrated in the Pacific Railway Scandal which

brought the new Confederation's first elected administration a

resounding defeat in the election of 1873.

The party system had introduced corruption into Canadian

politics or, more correctly, had revealed the corruptibility of

Canadian politicians. Murray looked on the accession of the Liberal

administration of Alexander Mackenzie as a return to responsibility in

politics, but the morality of individual ministries and politicians was

too weak a guarantee of the continuation of political justice in a

party system. If the problem lay with the motivations of politicians,

surely the answer must begin at that level as well.

Murray expressed his moralist corrective to Canada's political

system on the occasion of McGill's gala Annual University Lecture for

1877. Politicians, businessmen, professors and students came to hear

the Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy address "The Study of

Political Philosophy".[7] What they heard was not an abstract discourse

on principles, but an indictment of the state of affairs in Canadian

politics. Their speaker explained that democratic government was at

once the best and most vulnerable of political systems. While it

assured the representation of voters, it could not ensure the quality of

representatives. This posed little problem in England, where
politicians were drawn largely from a leisure class which possessed
the time for study, the wealth to be relatively immune from
corruption, and the motivation to work for social and political
improvement.[8] The analysis might appear more Tory than Liberal, but
Murray was undoubtedly thinking of such men as J.S. Mill and
Lord Shaftesbury.

Canada possessed no aristocracy and no leisure class.
According to the professor, its men of wealth -- some of whom were
undoubtedly in the audience -- preferred self-gratification to the
pursuit of culture and the exercise of political responsibility.[9] Its
politicians -- also present in the audience -- approached their task as
a job rather than a duty. Moreover, they were seldom best suited by
intelligence for the job.[10] In short, politics in Canada was a
profession rather than a calling. Professional politicians could not
be trusted to act as selflessly in the pursuit of justice as those who
looked on political service as a social duty. The lack of a leisure
class in Canada was a danger to the survival of constitutional govern-
ment.[11]

Statements as strong as these could be expected to cause a few
of those present to shift uncomfortably in their seats and lead others
more familiar with Murray's politics to scratch their heads in puzzle-
ment. But qualifiers were on their way. Together with Canada's other
pre-eminent expatriate liberal, Goldwin Smith, Murray believed that
Britain's advantage in this regard lay not in the simple existence of
an aristocracy, but in a social order which ensured that those who

governed were educated in and obedient to the higher duties of justice.[12] But Murray did not follow Smith in finding a solution in the balanced structures of republican democracy. The problem was not one of political structure, but one of political will. Canada must augment by education what it lacked in social organization and ideals. The strength of a nation lay in the intelligent loyalty of its leaders and citizens. Since the popular mind was often educated by its political leaders, it was of the greatest necessity to ensure that these leaders were provided with a solid higher education in political science.[13] In short, the study of political philosophy in a college or university ought to be a pre-requisite of political office.

This would not be an education in political administration. It was to include the study of constitutional law, but go further to focus of the fundamental principles and ideals of human society. Reform of defective political practice was to be effected through the moral reform of the politicans.

Those familiar with Murray's aims for philosophy in general and ethics in particular can not have been surprised by the universalistic Christian tone which he gave to political philosophy. Included in this evangelical Christianity was a sure faith in the essential unity of the moral order and the order of rational politics. The aim of all politicians and nations must be the achievement of a universal government in which the interests of mankind as a whole would take priority over selfish individual, party and national goals. Christ had taught a universal morality, and had given it power by adding "the inspired force of a life sacrificed in the practical realisation of the theoretic

ideal."[14] So too, politicians must co-operate to uphold the British

constitutional model and adapt it to Canadian conditions, but at the

same time they must never lose sight of the ultimate demands of

universal justice. They must be prepared to see the nation disappear

with the advent of a universal or world government and, together with

the entire population, rest content in the knowledge that Canada had,

during its brief existence and through its self-sacrifice,

demonstrated its commitment to the highest demands of justice and

morality.[15]

The McGill address was nothing if not timely. Canada's future

was hardly a settled question in 1877. A preference for the British

constitution showed that Murray was far from advocating continental

union -- an option he was clearly to reject some years later.[16] But

it would be too hasty to find in his words a proposal for imperial

federation. Canadian politicians were not being called to cede

sovereignty to an other nation or international body. They were being

called to frame legislation according to the demands of a universal

morality regardless of its effect on the continuation of Canada as a

separate nation.

Murray's audience at McGill was fully aware that this was not

simply an abstract improbability. The timeliness of the directive

rested in debates then underway and soon to be intensified on the

merits of free trade as an economic policy for Canada.[17] Free trade

was, to Murray, more than a freely chosen political policy. It was an

undeniable demand of economic rationalism and hence an unavoidable

policy and test of moral and rational government. Free trade was a

philosophical issue.[18] And free trade became the primary political issue in the federal election held only month's after Murray's McGill speech.

Canada had not been spared the effects of the world recession which began in 1873. These effects had been aggravated by the dumping of manufactured products on the unprotected Canadian market by British and American industries. Seeking an issue on which to return to office after its defeat in 1873, and sensing undercurrents of discontent with the honest but uninspired Liberal administration of Alexander Mackenzie, the Conservative party under John A. Macdonald advanced a "National Policy" guaranteed to lift Canada out of the depression and spur it to new heights of prosperity. Although it lacked clear definition, the Policy had one easily grasped point: protective tariffs. The Liberal Party continued to advocate and practice a policy of free trade in spite of strong calls from business groups for protection of the home market.[19]

Murray's lecture on political philosophy had been delivered to a select group. With the election call and the unveiling of the Conservative's National Policy, he took to the liberal Canadian Spectator in a three-part series to spread his message further. The opening article, "What is a National Policy?", defended the Mackenzie government's honesty in sharp contrast to the opportunistic and corrupt Macdonald administration which had preceded it.[20] A second article under the same title layed out the classical liberal arguments against protective tariffs: tariffs were burdensome taxes which caused an artificial and unproductive rise in prices and so contravened

the first law of economics, "a man seeks to obtain what he wants at the cost of as little labour as possible."[21] In addition, tariffs could be reciprocated, and so would have the eventual effect of excluding Canada from world markets. The common belief that tariffs would bring prosperity was "hallucination" and self-delusion.

In a final article published only two days before the election, Murray addressed "The Ethics of a National Policy". The analysis was divided into two parts: International morality and National morality. Echoes of the McGill speech sounded in the discussion of international morality, as Murray asserted that "the very nature of our moral convictions implies a progress towards the recognition of obligations to mankind apart from all distinctions of nationality."[22] The universality of Christian ethics, as embodied in liberal politics, was to take unchallenged priority over the particular demands of patriotism, no matter what the consequences:

> If Free Trade is a splendid ideal of international communion
> which must be realised in the perfected development of the
> human race, then at the peril of our souls let us work for it,
> at the peril of our national honour let us strive to make it
> the policy of our country . . . Is it not better to lose our
> separate existence in teaching a great lesson to the world, than
> to live in ignoble luxuries obtained by shirking the national
> obligations imposed upon us by Providence?[23]

The arguments on national morality anticipated themes which would emerge in the social writings of the coming decade. Protective tariffs, it was argued, were a regressive tax which helped a small number of manufacturers at the expense of many labourers, farmers and other citizens. The tariffs aggravated economic inequalitites by giving to a small portion of the population an artificial advantage

for the rapid accumulation of wealth with relatively little effort.
They suspended the natural laws of the marketplace, and so would lead
to the shifting of capital and labour from the most remunerative to
less remunerative industries. Finally and most personally, they
interfered with the freedom of individual action:

> The essence of individual freedom is, that I shall be
> allowed to act up to my conviction of what is right as
> long as by doing so I do not infringe upon the like
> freedom on the part of others. Is it not an outrage
> upon the principles of liberty, that I should be compelled
> by law to adopt, in my trading transactions, a course
> which, in an economical point of view, appears to me insane?[24]

It did not appear insane to the majority of Canadian voters.
Caught in the grip of depression and inspired by the first stirrings
of nationalism, they saw greater comfort in "hallucination" than in
the preservation of abstract principles of liberty and morality.[25]
The Conservative party was returned to power with 137 seats to the
Liberal's 69.

John Clark Murray continued to lecture against protectionism
when in the McGill classroom, but he did not write on the tariff until
after the following election in 1882. Addressing "The Political
Situation in Canada" in the inaugural issue of the Dominion Review, he
ascribed the victory of the Conservatives in 1878 to the willingness of
voters to try any new policy in the midst of financial despair.[26] The
renewal of the Conservative's mandate in the 1882 election was a
regrettable, but undeniable vindication of protection by due democratic
process. Having expected little of the voters, Murray could resign
himself to their choice. But having expected much of his political
compatriots, he was less generous with the "so-called Liberal Party".

The popularity of the National Policy had led the Liberal party to moderate its free trade stance and advocate instead some limited continuation of the protective tariff. Though still seen as a free trade party in the eyes of most voters, Murray could not accept any wavering from the Liberals when crucial matters of fundamental philosophical principle were at stake. Once again, the "exigencies of party warfare" had led to the betrayal of individual freedom and the rejection of economic and political rationalism. The cautious professor who had given support to the Mackenzie administration was from this time a liberal without a party, claiming that, "the Liberal who has none of the interests of the partisan at stake, [need not] feel that any unmitigated calamity has been sustained in the late elections."[27] Protection was no less immoral for having won qualified support from the Liberal Party. It was still opposed to the best scientific thought in political economy and as such was doomed to fail in time.

The judgement of the liberal professor against the Liberal party was dogmatically harsh. The Liberals had favoured only a partial retention of the protective tariff and continued to campaign on a free trade platform until at least 1896.[28] But in its philosophical dimension, free trade was an all-or-nothing cause. With the loss to that cause of the Liberal party, Murray no longer felt the need or motivation to address contemporary political issues as directly as he had done previously. Free trade was advocated no less firmly in articles and lectures, but as a natural necessity and not as a political platform.

As he turned in the 1880's to address the emerging social
problems of a nation undergoing industrialization, Murray's liberal
ideology was intact. The world was still conceived of as ordered in
such a way that the demands of ethics and the demands of rational
economics could not possibly come into conflict. It was the world
of Adam Smith and the Manchester School, the world of individuals
advancing the good of the community as they pursued their own
interests.[29] It was a world which was to be radically altered in the
coming decades.

The appropriateness and perhaps the irony of John Clark
Murray's shift in attention to social problems lies in the fact that
their growth in Canada can be attributed in part to the National
Policy. The tariff wall which had added up to 40% to the value of
imported products, together with the gradual easing of world
depression, created the conditions for a rapid expansion of industry.
That Canadians were "rather dazzled by the glare of the present
prosperity" Murray could easily recognize.[30] The relation of this
prosperity to the National Policy, whether for good or ill, was not
so readily granted, though it was admitted that the health of the
Canadian economy threw "a false glamour over the policy of the present
government."[31]

The recognition of prosperity was tempered by the recognition
that all was not well in industrial society. The 1880's was the decade
in which 'the social problem' became current.[32] A profusion of

practical and philosophic works addressing this problem testifies to
the efforts on the part of the middle class to understand what had
gone wrong in industrial society and how matters were to be put right.
In Britain, this was the period when the evolution of the new liberal-
ism was taking shape under the influence of the writing and memory of
Thomas Hill Green. In America, enormous popularity was accorded such
works as Henry George's Progress and Poverty (1880) and Edward
Bellamy's Looking Backward (1888). In Canada, quite typically, three
Royal Commissions were appointed in the course of the decade to
investigate aspects of industrial society. The most significant of
these was the Royal Commission on the Relations of Labour and Capital,
appointed in 1887 and eventually delivering two reports in 1889 after
a split roughly paralleling that between labour and capital developed
among the commissioners. Across North America, labour organizations
reported rapid growth. The most influential in the decade, the Knights
of Labor, was so successful that its meteoric rise in membership is
seen by some as a cause for its equally rapid demise in the following
decade.[33]

David Murray's son had not been unaware of the problems of
industrial society. Throughout his youth Paisley was lodged in
economic depression. Moving on to university in Glasgow provided no
relief, for he found himself attending classes in the middle of the
slums. Only a police superintendent's report could do justice to the
neighbourhood of the university before it moved from quarters first
established in the seventeenth century to a new building on Gilmorehill
in 1870. James Smart wrote:

> The College of Glasgow is situated in an old and decayed part
> of the city where the very poorest of the population reside
> and where, as is usual in such localities, there is a very large
> number of whiskey shops, little pawns and houses in which dis-
> reputable persons of both sexes are harboured. The district is
> one of the worst in the city, as to the character of the
> inhabitants. Crime and disorder are of daily occurrence,
> rendering it one of the most troublesome parts of the city to
> police. From the character of the district altogether, it
> appears to me an unfit place for a great educational
> institution such as the university.[34]

It was in districts such as these that Murray's attitudes to social

and industrial problems were formed. The slums of Montreal would

subsequently serve as a reminder of the results of industrial poverty.

If his upbringing had given him some insight into the

conditions of the workers, it had also given more direct exposure to

the position of the employers. David Murray had operated a shop before

becoming Provost of Paisley and, on a scale more relevant to the issues

faced in the 1880's, his brother William Murray was a manufacturer

in Kingston.[35]

The social philosophy which developed in these conditions can

be considered both on the level of its doctrinal formulation, and in

light of the ethically-oriented worldview which motivated much of the

change and which came in time to define the social philosophy itself.

In its ideological content, this philosophy follows an evolution

similar to that of J.S. Mill, T.H. Green, and Arnold Toynbee. Doubt

and disillusionment overtake faith in the doctrines of Adam Smith and

push Murray towards a re-assessment of some of the basic tenets of

liberalism. In particular, the confidence in the unity of the ethical

and economic orders is shaken as Murray begins to look more closely at

the liberal view of the state and eventually comes to question the
very limited role given it in classical liberal theory; this does not,
however, lead him to embrace as positive a view of the state and of
legislation as can be found in Green and Toynbee. The re-assessment
of the role of the state is necessitated in part by the expanded
definition of freedom which begins to appear in Murray's writings
at the end of the 1880's; the negative definition of freedom which
appears in the writings on free trade gives way to a positive defini-
tion identifying freedom with the development of the "higher nature"
in workers and employers alike. Through all these revisions, two pillars
of liberalism remain unaltered: neither capitalism as an economic
system nor private property as its chief component is ever called into
question. Far from being rejected, private property becomes an indis-
pensable element in the proposals for reform of the industrial system.

On the level of its animating worldview, the social philosophy
shifts in its balance from being an economically oriented system to
becoming an increasingly -- and almost exclusively -- ethical system.
The distinction is not hard and fast, for no social philosophy can
exclude either economic or ethical doctrines. Yet as Murray comes to
accept and employ the idealist distinction of lower and higher orders
of existence, the ultimate aim of social philosophy -- that of securing
a better ordering of social relationships and a greater degree of
economic justice for the labouring classes -- becomes confused with
the idealist aim of the development of individual moral culture. Once
the industrial Kingdom of God is identified with the idealist's higher
order, concrete proposals for social change are dismissed as either

unnecessary or counter-productive. Hence while idealism has been cited as the philosophical motivation behind nineteenth century middle-class reform movements, for Murray it became the motivation for an abandonment of specific reform proposals and a concentration instead on eulogizing the "higher order of existence", that Idealist grab-bag heaven which always seemed to elude precise definition.[36]

John Clark Murray's changing views of the contemporary social problem are laid out in a number of published and unpublished writings. These include articles and lectures from the 1880's; a recently published 1887 study into the social problem entitled The Industrial Kingdom of God and a circa 1898 revised but unpublished version entitled simply "Christian Ethics"; two published books on ethics and the novel, He That Had Received the Five Talents. As an attempt to create in fiction the new society sketched in other writings, the novel serves as a particularly good indicator of Murray's understanding of the problems of industrialism and of the attitudes, assumptions and imagination which guided his writings on the subject.

Taken as a whole, these writings contained no bold new program. On the whole, the solutions they advanced for the social and industrial problems of the day were widely held and dealt with in more detail by other contemporary writers and organizations. Murray's contribution lay in the attempt to provide a religious and philosophical analysis of the relations between capital and labour, and an ethical framework for such ideas as arbitration boards and producer and consumer co-operatives.[37]

The first excursion into the realm of social problems shows
cracks appearing in the coherence of the rational ethical and economic
systems as Murray attempts to address the issue of wages and strikes
from within an unaltered liberal framework. "The Cry of the Labourers"
appeared in 1883 in the liberal, evangelical Montreal Daily Witness
after a strike of telegraph operators had been in progress for two
weeks, suspending communications across the continent and causing a
widespread uproar against strikes and unions. Without addressing this
strike in particular, Murray attempted in the article "to draw attention
to the problems of social economy and justice which a strike
involves."[38] In the process, he arrived at two answers to the
problem of just remuneration.

The first was ethical. Beginning with the assumption that
wealth is the joint creation and hence the joint property of two
parties -- labour and capital -- Murray saw that the question of
remuneration was one of proportionate distribution. It was necessary
to determine the rightful share each party had to the total wealth
created and this must be linked in some way to the effort which each
party had put into that creation. Each party would naturally have a
different opinion on the proper proportion, whether motivated by good
intentions or greed. Settlement of the resulting dispute could occur
through either of two methods: a court of adjudication operating with
judicial impartiality and judicial power, or a strike. In the absence
of courts, the two parties could not but operate as warring nations
struggling for control of limited resources. For workers who had
exhausted all other alternatives, "the hostile method of striking may

become a last unwelcome necessity".[39]

A judicial court was a rational and peaceful alternative. Intelligent discussion of both sides of the dispute and legally binding decisions would render strikes unnecessary. In placing responsibility for the establishment of such courts squarely on the government, Murray appeared to acknowledge the shortcomings of the _laissez faire_ emphasis of classical liberalism. He had not, however, lost faith in the operation of Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' as it operated through the Law of Supply and Demand.

The second, economically-oriented formula for remuneration put forward in "The Cry of the Labourers" was not entirely compatible with the first. Although attracted to a policy of dividing profits between capitalist and labourer, Murray was still liberal enough to see competition between workers as that which would ultimately determine wage levels. From the labour theory of value, he went back to the Law of Supply and Demand, apparently unaware of the opposition between the two. The famous law was being widely cited by many opponents of the telegraphers' strike for higher pay and Murray agreed that the operation of supply and demand in determining wages was "indisputable":

> The price of any commodity is a fact; and any attempt to
> alter it by the artifice of legislative or judicial
> process would be flouted with the same jeering raillery
> with which we should receive any proposal to make a coin
> of less value than a hundred cents pass in the world for
> a dollar by simply enacting a law to that effect.[40]

In other words, human lawmaking could not interfere with the rational and natural economic law of the marketplace. A legislator who attempted to set wage levels above the floor determined by the law

of supply and demand would be more a Canute than a Solomon.

If the law of supply and demand provided an indisputable formula, breakdowns in wage negotiations could only indicate disagreements in the variables: "it is one thing to say that the price of labour is a fact; it is quite another thing to say that the price is a fact known and acknowledged by all men".[41] In industrial society the proportion was not a "self-evident quantity" but a problem of "insoluble complication" which could not be "disentangled by minds not specially trained for such a task."[42] Enter the professional:

> But the disentanglement of complicated facts is precisely
> the work of a judicial inquiry -- the work for which the
> judicial mind is peculiarly qualified. . . A competent
> court of adjudication would, therefore, form the most
> reasonable mode of deciding whether the actual wages
> which a particular class of labourers receive express
> the real proportion between the demand for their labour
> and its supply.[43]

The institution of courts of arbitration as an alternative to costly and needless strikes had been advocated by parties as diverse as the Knights of Labor and Andrew Carnegie.[44] Most envisioned courts which would determine the best division of profits in the co-operative organization of industry, a position with which Murray agreed in the first half of "The Cry of the Labourers". The shift to a more conventional liberal position on the determination of wages in the second part of the article was done with an ease which suggests that Murray was not aware of the incompatibility of the two schemes. The determination of wages by relation to industrial productivity was an ethical step beyond determination by competition within the labour pool. But the conviction that labour competition was failing to secure just

wages for workers was as yet unable to lead to the recognition that the economic law of supply and demand was at fault. Murray preferred at this point to adjust and refine the operation of that law in the conviction that it was still as much an ethical as an economic law. This conviction was to be shaken in the coming four years as industrial unrest increased and as various authors began to call the confident assumptions of liberal economics into question.

The influence of this questioning can be seen in two subsequent efforts to address contemporary social issues, the "Lectures on Political Economy" delivered to the Ladies Educational Association of Montreal in 1883 - 1884, and the 1887 work, The Industrial Kingdom of God.[45] Though prepared at different times and for different purposes, they can be considered together; the notebook for the lectures contains critical marginalia dating from 1888 - 1889 and so serves to show the particular areas in which Murray's thought changed most significantly.

The Industrial Kingdom of God contains the most systematic treatment of the labour question to be found in Murray's writings. In a characteristic pattern of analysis, the problem is approached through a consideration of the nature, the rights and the reciprocal obligations of the two parties involved in the industrial struggle. The only departure from the pattern comes in the treatment of labour where an additional chapter on "The Disadvantages of Labour" is added between the chapters dealing with rights and obligations.

However thorough it may have been, this exercise in analysis did not entirely relieve the tensions apparent in Murray's liberalism in 1883. The problems dealt with explicitly in the work include the

definition of labour and the labour theory of value; the law of supply

and demand; the role of the state; private property and the continuance

of the capitalist system. It was in this work too that the over-riding

necessity of moral regeneration in individual and social life was put

forward as the key to reform of industrial society.

Murray's awareness of the need to employ both ethics and

economics to solve what was essentially a new social problem is

apparent in the Prefatory Note to the Industrial Kingdom . Simple

moral platitudes and practical truisms would be of little help in

attempting,

> to see how the general principles of a spiritual morality
> are to be traced through all the entanglements of men's
> industrial relations . . . To do this it seemed to me
> necessary to look calmly, but boldly, at the sternest
> facts of our industrial situation, and to interpret them
> in the light of those elementary principles of economical
> science, which are generally accepted by all schools of
> economists.[46]

Calm and bold certainly, but the investigation was to spring

out of strong commitment. While traditional liberals, bolstered by the

social darwinism of Spencer, might hold that 'undeserving poor' was a

contradiction in terms, Murray calmly and boldly asserted that

> the key to the situation is to be found in the disadvantages
> under which labour suffers, inasmuch as these, more than
> anything else, determine the obligations both of labourers
> and of wealthy men.[47]

The ethical setting for the discussion is established in the

"Introduction" with the statement of two conventional distinctions

often employed in subsequent works. Much use was made of the distinc-

tion between theory and practice and that between legal and moral

obligations. The first serves as a self-imposed limit on the ambitions of the work which is to follow. Theory may enlighten, but it is useful only insofar as it is fulfilled in practice. Speculative thought is ultimately of less value and effect than simple action motivated by an honest heart. The second distinction of legal and moral obligation is essentially one between social structure and human motivation. There is some room for reform achieved through legislation, but "Christianity can attach but little value to any scheme for the social amelioration of mankind which is not based on the spiritual regeneration of man."[48] Legislation can be only poorly framed and more poorly enforced, but more to the point, the problem in question is not one of weak law, but one of weak will -- or a lack of good will on the part of both parties in industrial conflicts. The social problem of industrialism, then, was not primarily one of economics, but one of ethics. In the popular phrase of the day, virtue could not be legislated. The regeneration of society must begin with the regeneration of man.[49]

In turning to "The Nature of Labour", Murray developed a labour theory of value more moderate than that found in contemporary socialist thought. Essentially, labour is "an exertion of human power which modifies any material so as to increase its value".[50] Labour cannot, as in Marxist thought, create value any more than man can create matter. Raw materials have an inherent value which is enhanced by labour. This value is normally expressed by price, but not by price alone. The ambiguity of the word 'value' allowed the use of ethical standards in the determination of economic value.

The labour which adds value to raw materials is customarily said to be productive. Murray added a qualifier by linking productivity to purpose. There was no true value and hence no genuine productivity in goods manufactured to further human vice. Labour expended in the creation of armaments, liquor or articles of extravagant luxury is therefore unproductive because it adds only to the profits of isolated individuals or groups with no regard for -- and often positive dangers to -- the improvement of society as a whole. As a corollary of this priority of purpose over price, recreational, cultural and educational activities which develop personality and health are judged productive even though they may generate little or no direct economic profit.[51]

Murray had been working on these ideas for some time. In the "Lecures on Political Economy", productive labour had been defined in strictly economic terms as that which created a permanent product or article of wealth. Unproductive labour, by contrast, left no exchangeable product. This left recreational and cultural activities as unproductive while the manufacture of armaments and the distilling of liquor could be classed as productive, a difficulty only partially alleviated by the qualifier that unproductive labour is not useless labour inasmuch as the accumulation of wealth is not the highest end of man.[52] The redefinitions provided in The Industrial Kingdom of God gave greater consistency and rhetorical force to these concepts of productivity.[53] They were transmitted to the lectures in the later annotations to the text. With this reformulation, human value was coming to take priority over purely economic value.

The emphasis on human value is reinforced in the discussion of the "Rights of Labour". These fall into two classes: the inalienable natural rights which belong to each man as a person; and the acquired or real rights which come to him by virtue of his work.

In the first class, Murray took a definition to which no classical liberal could object:

> the fundamental right of personality is the right of freedom, that is, the right of a man to use himself -- or to use his powers -- in any way that seems good to him, so long as in doing it he does not interfere with the same right on the part of others.[54]

This negative definition was broadened with the addition of a positive and Kantian modifier on the right of the labourer to be treated as an end in himself and not merely as a means to the ends of others. The modified definition was used to show the inconsistencies of classical liberalism and advance to a more sympathetic assessment of the rights of labourers to a greater share of the profits of industrial enterprise.

Murray argued that classical liberalism did not really treat workers as humans. In its economic theories, the reliance on the metaphor of the purchase and sale of labour according to the law of supply and demand which applied to commodities implied that labour itself was a commodity and the labourer a machine. But the labourer is a person and his labour is not a commodity but a service -- the application of his mental and physical powers in the service of the capitalist to enhance the value of raw materials.[55]

This was not simply an abstract point. The purchase of a

commodity is a transaction without subsequent obligations. The employ-
ment of service implies a different view of the creation and therefore
of the distribution of wealth. Murray did not shy from making the
connection in an argument which showed a strengthening of the ideas
first expressed in 1883:

> Nothing, as we have seen, can possess economical value,
> which can be got without labour; it is therefore the
> labour required for its production, that gives it its
> value as part of the owner's property. Man's first
> property, therefore, is the direct product of his own
> labour . . . Consequently it is the fundamental
> principle of justice, lying at the root of all property,
> that demands for the labourer the enjoyment of the
> fruit of his labour . . . the labourer is in justice
> entitled to a share of the product proportional to the
> value of his contribution to the whole, when compared
> with the contribution from other sources.[56]

It was the failure of all but a few employers to recognize
and act on these rights which resulted in the crippling "Disadvantages
of Labour". If wealth created wealth, poverty was equally self-
perpetuating. Quoting Proverbs 10: 15, Murray asserted that "the
destruction of the poor is their poverty", before considering the
spiritual and economic effects of poverty.

Crowded and unsanitary cities and houses, poor diets and
clothing, and the lack of leisure time prevented workers from develop-
ing their higher moral nature and forced them instead to a lower
animalistic level of existence in which life was no more than a
struggle for survival. These were the environmental results and
manifestations of poverty which could possibly be eased by legislat-
ion.[57] It was the intrinsic disadvantages of labour which posed a
greater economic problem.

The intrinsic disadvantages were the natural consequences of the labourer's position as a labourer. Curiously, Murray did not see that the consequences were 'natural' only within a system of <u>laissez faire</u> capitalism. Though by now critical of Manchester School economics, Murray's choice to interpret the problems as intrinsic to labour rather than capitalism, allowed him to continue to endorse capitalism as the only rational economic system. This choice also allowed him to posit the solution to the 'labour problem' as lying in an individualistic ethical reform program rather than in wide scale social and economic reform.[58]

There were at least four intrinsic disadvantages to the position of labourers. First, "labour is a commodity that cannot keep."[59] Time lost was money lost, and so the worker faced with the need of selling his services quickly -- and even then for only starvation wages -- found himself in a weak bargaining position. The collective strength of unions moderated this to a degree, but the major weapon of the strike was of limited effect in view of a second major disadvantage: the excess of supply over demand in the labour pool.[60] With high unemployment among skilled and unskilled workers, pervasive poverty and debt, and little developed sense of solidarity in the working class, there were always too many people willing to take the place vacated by a striker. The individual and collective weakness of the workers was compounded by the relative strength of their employers. Since employers held the organizational advantage of fewer numbers, they were better able to close ranks against the workers when labour unrest threatened.

A third disadvantage lay in the fact that unlike land and raw material, labour had no inherent market value.[61] The labourer was dependent for survival upon the capitalist to a degree which was not reciprocated. This recognition had motivated Henry George and Karl Marx to propose means of allowing labourers to bypass or overthrow the capitalists and gain direct access to property. Each had a specific focus and neither was acceptable to Murray. George, he believed, had exaggerated the evils of property; the labourers' problem had more correctly been identified by the socialists who claimed that the worker was not simply at the mercy of the landowner for raw material, but more thoroughly at the mercy of the capitalist for the provision of the tools and machines which provided the means of exercising his skill.[62] By implication, George's emphasis on land reform was failing to address the needs of industrial society.[63] Marx was more alive to the root of the problem, but if George's weakness was in analysis, Marx's was in communication. Capital was "the most systematic defense of industrial socialism ever written", but so "rigidly scientific" as to be impenetrable to all but the most loyal and studious disciples.[64] This was in contrast to George's Progress and Poverty, "which, without sacrificing by any means scientific thoroughness, makes no unnecessary parade of the mere scaffolding of scientific method by which its conclusions are built up."[65]

Murray was not impressed with what he believed were the scientific pretensions of Marxism, but this was not the end of his disagreement. He believed that any solution to the industrial problem which was based on Marx's labour theory of value would only reverse

the current inequalities. It was obviously false that neither land

nor capital had any value whatsoever apart from that given by the

addition of labour. It was therefore unacceptable to hold that all

profits of industrial enterprise ought to go to the labourers. The

industrial problem was not to be solved by the elimination of one of

the parties, but by the recognition in theory and remuneration of the

co-operative contributions of both.

Such a recognition must be advanced through a redirection of

the power which the capitalists held by virtue of their wealth and

leisure.[66] In describing this fourth intrinsic disadvantage of labour,

Murray accepted Marx's analysis of the means by which the power of the

capitalists was consolidated and perpetuated. Monopolies created by

trusts, mergers or legislation allowed capitalists to increase their

wealth more rapidly by artificial means than workers could ever hope

to by honest labour. Wealth brought leisure, and leisure allowed entry

into a political process which could, if abused in the form of mono-

polies created by legislation, bring yet more wealth. This was the

less attractive side which sometimes emerged in the example provided

by the political involvement of the British leisure class. For the

industrial problem had an unavoidable political dimension:

> All through history, in fact, the legislative tyranny of
> wealth over poverty is revealed. History is very largely
> made up of the struggles of contending parties in society;
> and these parties are usually, on one side, the wealthy
> capitalists and landowners fighting in defense of their
> privelages and, on the other side, the poor labourers of the
> world forced to toil incessantly to produce wealth which they
> were never allowed to enjoy, goaded at last by the unendur-
> able hardships of their wretched existence into fierce
> rebellion against their oppressors, and either obtaining

some mitigation of their sufferings or beaten back into a
state of still more cruel oppression.[67]

Not quite Marx's "rigidly scientific" plotting of the class
struggle, but an assessment which similarly recognized, in distinction
from such contemporary defenders of the classical liberal creed as
Herbert Spencer, that industrial poverty was not rooted entirely in
working class ignorance, immorality or negligence:

> The whole industrial history of the human race, therefore, may
> be said to be an illustration of those intrinsic disadvantages
> attaching to the position of labourers, which have always crip-
> pled them in their efforts to obtain anything like a reasonable
> share of the wealth which is produced by their labour.[68]

If these were the rights and disadvantages of labour, what of
its obligations? Once again, there were two classes: personal and
social. The former were expressed through the conventional idealist
distinction of the lower and the higher self:

> The duties which a man owes to himself personally, may be
> described as implying the general law that he ought to
> realise in his own person that ideal of humanity -- that
> pattern of what God would have all men be -- which has
> been revealed in Jesus Christ.[69]

The labourer must improve personal habits ranging from cleanliness to
temperance and must cultivate through education, industry and thrift,
"that spirit -- that habitual condition of the inner life -- which will
lead to right conduct as its natural expression."[70]

Social duties were those owed to employers, fellow workers and
the community as a whole. Employers and employees were to co-operate
"to provide the community with the genuine articles they [sic] want,

and at the lowest cost compatible with justice."[71] The labourer for

his part must give a fair day's work for a fair day's wage. He must

put the full labour value into a manufactured article. So too, he must

not rob his fellow workers by working slower than they and so reducing

the company productivity which determines the wages of all employees.

He must not consent to a strike without carefully considering its

effect on the families of workers in his own trade, in those trades

dependent on his, and on consumers. Unions for their part must be

free and voluntary associations above the use of power politics and

physical force. But the worker's greatest social obligation was to

work for the reform of the economic order. This reform would not be

won through violence or industrial action. Strikes were to be avoided

not only because of the economic hardship they created, but because

whatever the small gains which might be won, they failed to get at the

root of the problem.[72]

The real problem lay in determining how the labourers were to

gain "a fair share of the wealth they co-operate in producing".[73]

Given Murray's co-operative labour theory of value, the issue was not

on the scale of the Marxist's 'alienation', but more simply involved

the greater recogntion of individual effort in remuneration. The

industrial order was not to be overthrown, but modified.

A first step of reform within the existing system was to move

from payment in wages to payment by piece-work. Such payment was based

more directly on the worker's contribution, but it was not itself with-

out problems. The difficulty of determining the eventual price of

goods and so of setting a just rate based on the average worker's pace

made the piecework system little more than a provisional solution.[74]

A better alternative lay in full recognition of the co-operative nature of industrial enterprise:

> Workingmen will therefore find in many trades, that their position is advanced towards a more perfect industrial organization by seeking an arrangement in which they become virtually partners with the capitalists by whom they are employed.[75]

This might be achieved through an agreement that all profits exceeding the average rate of return on the capitalist's investment would be divided "in some equitable proportion" between the capitalist and the labourers. A basic wage would ensure the worker's "security of subsistence", but the year-end division of profits would more accurately reflect the worker's share of the enterprise. In fact, Murray believed that allowing workers to purchase shares in a company would increase the extent of partnership by giving them a role in determining the direction of the enterprise.[76]

But even this profit-sharing system was only a stage, "an additional step towards that higher ideal of complete co-operation, in which workmen become their own employers."[77] The capital requirements of modern industry made return to the society of independent tradesmen and artisan impracticable. What was needed was a pooling of the workers' resources -- both personal savings and union funds -- to finance the establishment of producer and consumer co-operatives.[78] Workers were not to revolt against the system, but invest in it.

This was the doctrine of self-help, a doctrine central to much of Victorian middle class reformist thought. Capitalism was not

simply defended; it was vindicated and turned into a necessary vehicle of industrial reform.[79] If the opportunities of the capitalist system were shared more equitably with workers, the threat of revolution would pass. Working men would be the strongest defenders of the existing social and economic system if only they were given a more just share of the benefits it produced.

Murray was not advocating a conscious policy of embourgeoisment in order to avert class warfare while preserving middle and upper class privilege. The effect of his reformist program was to allow a greater number of people to enjoy the benefits of culture and education which had hitherto been restricted to the middle and upper class. There was no class war to be feared, much less averted, for,

> Those who are accustomed to look on all labour movements
> as governed by a spirit of violent revolution would
> probably be astonished to find how genuninely conservative
> the working classes are, especially when under the
> guidance of a regular organization.[80]

There need be no fear of nihilism or anarchy. The moderation of such groups as the Knights of Labor demonstrated that it was possible to,

> depend on the working men of America, if ever there is a
> call to defend the civilization we have won against any
> attempt of a foolhardy madness to throw us back into an
> unknown social chaos. Let us trust that the labouring
> class will preserve this decided attitude towards the
> aimless strivings of a blind revolutionary fury.[81]

The condemnation of revolutionary action was as firm as the condemnation of capitalist greed. But it was not on as strong a note as this that the consideration of labour's role in the industrial

Kingdom of God was considered. Returning to the quietist moralism
which marked his theory of social regeneration, Murray asserted that
change in society would come only with the spread of "the undying
spirit of self sacrifice".[82] One might well question who was to
sacrifice in this limited and simplistic view of Christian ethics:

> And so it is that this spirit finds expression in those
> lives of quiet industry, which are being lived by many
> good and intelligent men among the working classes, and
> which are doing more than all revolutionary fanaticism,
> more even than the most brilliant economic speculation
> to hasten the coming period of industrial development,
> when, in the deepest and fullest sense, 'the rich and
> poor shall live together'.[83]

The precise means by which these "good and intelligent men" in the
vanguard were hastening "the coming period of industrial development"
were left unspecified; certainly it would appear that lives of quiet
industry led by uncomplaining workers acted more to reinforce than
to change the unjust economic order. But if Murray conceived of any
content for Christian ethics beyond the principle of self-sacrifice,
he did not specify it. Firm in the optimism that justice would
triumph, he turned his attention to the other partner in the social
equation: Property.

Given his criticism of Henry George, it might seem odd that
Murray would choose the term 'Property' rather than 'Capital' to title
the second part of The Industrial Kingdom of God. This was a recent
change, for in the "Lectures on Political Economy" the discussion had
indeed been of 'Capital'.[84] The change in terminology was a matter of
convenience rather than substance -- and one which showed again how

ideas had developed in the mid-1880's -- for it allowed more obvious

entry for the labour theory of value which underlay the argument for

co-partnership or co-operation in industry. Property was far more

than land or possessions; "Property is a creation of labour; and the

fundamental principle, on which the rights of property rest, is the

fundamental right of labour itself -- the right of every man to enjoy

the fruits of his own labour".[85]

On this definition, those of wealth could not plead the

inviolability of private property without implicitly recognizing the

rights of their employees to a share of the wealth created by their

investments.[86] Private property was not a right but a trust; its

superiority to communism could be asserted only because it provided

a more effective means of distributing to each man the fruit of

labour.[87]

Despite positions such as these, Murray revealed when he

turned to discussion of the "Obligations of Property" that his imagina-

tion in proposing reform was limited to the duties of paternalism.

The duties of the rich were the duties of noblesse oblige. Property

was not to be distributed wholesale or even in part so as to allow the

working class to gain the resources necessary for the establishment of

co-operative enterprises. Murray's man of wealth was not to put

responsibility for the use of property in the hands of the working

class; he was to look on these resources as constituting "like his

personal powers, a gift of God, to be used for promoting those great

purposes of the divine government, that have been declared to men in

Jesus Christ our Lord."[88]

The man of wealth was to serve the community rather than him-
self. He must not stand in the way of social improvement which might
take the form of gas-and-water municipal socialism and which in that
form might take from him some of his sources of wealth. He must not
act, through price-gouging monopolies to enrich himself at the expense
of the community. Rather, like Andrew Carnegie, he was obligated to
return his wealth to the community in the form of benefactions.[89]

Duties to workers were both more specific and more paternal-
istic. The need for improved housing, food and social amenities was
sufficient to give focus to the benevolent work of the capitalist.
The Pullman community in Chicago was cited as an example of beneficial
total care; Murray appears to have been completely unaware of the
degree of opposition expressed by workers to this and similar company-
run communities.[90]

More direct obligations to one's own employees included the
frequent payment of wages -- a point advocated by many reformers
concerned by the large indebtedness of workers -- and a willingness to
pay more than the minimum wage determined by the law of supply and
demand. This generosity need not be entirely altruistic, for well paid
workers were eager consumers.[91]

Murray had curiously little to say to employers regarding the
re-ordering of industrial relations on a co-operative model. Only a
brief comment was offered, and its thrust was hardly egalitarian.
Enjoining capitalists to share their profits with their workers and
so "fulfill their true function by becoming leaders in the great
industrial armies of the world", Murray added that,

> Even if such noble leaders of the industrial crusade
> against want can ever be dispensed with, — even if they
> will ultimately be displaced by a system of complete
> co-operation, — it can only be by giving the labourers
> such a share of the wealth they produce as may enable
> them, with hopeful thrift, to gather the capital required
> for originating co-operative enterprises.[92]

This was no clarion call to follow the example of Robert Owen in initiating co-operative enterprises. Neither Owen's New Lanark nor any other practical scheme for establishing co-operative enterprises was dealt with in the discussion of the obligations of property. Murray retreated to the uncontentious obscurity of moralism when summing up the role of the wealthy in establishing the industrial Kingdom of God. Industrial leaders were simply to follow "the inspirations of an unselfish Christian morality", realising "that their organising energy and intelligence will for a long time be required to carry on successfully the industrial work of the world".[93] This 'unselfish Christian morality' appeared to have no specific content which could be expressed through goals and definite obligations; the selfless will would presumably be its own guide.

The discussion on "Property" in the Industrial Kingdom of God was short and general, comprising less than a quarter of the entire work. At thirty-five pages in the edition published in 1982, it is shorter than the discussion on the 'Obligations of Labour" alone. The ruling assumption of the section is that the industrial problem is not rooted in capitalism as such, but more simply in the division of profits generated by the capitalist system. As a result, there was little to say to those who had succeeded within the system. Concerned social commentators could only follow the example of T. H. Green in

attempting to stir up feelings of guilt within the middle and upper

classes so as to improve receptivity to the ethical injunction that

they be more generous in sharing their wealth.[94] The effect of the

practical suggestions to labourers was that they work either individ-

ually or collectively to attain to the position of capitalists them-

selves.

The odd conjunction of doctrines of self-help and paternalism

which was so characteristic of middle-class reformist thought in the

nineteenth century is therefore not absent from The Industrial Kingdom

of God. Employers were to be generous and kind, but such practical

actions as the establishment of producer and consumer co-operatives was

left as the responsibility of the workers themselves. Yet the benevo-

lent actions of those of wealth were to be conducted without consulta-

tion of the working class. There was little or no effort to introduce

co-operation as a principle in these most primary steps of industrial

reform. Murray's proposals contained little which would contribute in

practical ways to the breakdown in nineteenth century society of those

divisions of class and .wealth which would be absent from the future

industrial kingdom of God.

The deficiency of practical proposals results in part from

Murray's reluctance to draw in a third party to which other reformers

were increasingly turning -- the state. This is not to say that there

was no role for government in reform. Murray was critical of,

> a narrow political philosophy which would reduce
> government to the limits of a police-establishment with
> no function beyond that of keeping men from flying at
> each other's throats. . . whenever individual action is

insufficient to work out a scheme that is essential to
the welfare of society, social action becomes
justifiable and obligatory.[95]

Such a statement could conceivably justify the establishment
of anything ranging from modest welfare provisions to the most thorough-
going state socialism. But Murray was not willing to go much further
than the position taken by J.S. Mill in his later years. There were
clearly limits to the exercise of social reform through legislation.
Virtue could not be legislated. The resources of the state could be
called upon to deal with needs in housing, sanitation and social
insurance, but there was no call for legislative reform of those
elements of the economic system which had created those needs in the
first place. The role of the state lay in amelioration of the visible
effects of poverty, not in legislative change of the roots of the social
problem. Unlike Henry George and Phillips Thompson, but like many
committed liberal academic reformers, Murray was writing in response
to what he saw and not out of any personal experience of the poverty
which he was able to identify as the chief disadvantage of labour.
This may account for the relatively mild proposals for economic reform
and the emphasis instead on environmental problems and ethical solutions
which marked the early stages of nineteenth century middle class reform
movements.

The ruling pre-occupation continued to be one of individual
moral development. This pre-occupation defined what was fundamentally
evil in the conditions of working class life:

In general therefore, the external conditions of existence
among the labouring poor impose upon them manners of life,
which surely no one would prefer to maintain if they could be

thrown aside, and which render it more difficult to cultivate those finer sensibilities that form the natural soul of our morality.[96]

Such an emphasis on the development of personal culture could even bring out the silver lining in the dark cloud of poverty.

> Christian obligation, then, does not require us to view the condition of the poor labourer as one of irremediable wretchedness, but rather as one adapted for that wholesome discipline by which the best features of human character are brought out, and the highest ends of human life secured . . . What Christianity requires of all -- rich and poor alike -- is to make the best use of the circumstances in which they are placed for the promoting of their welfare.[97]

In the analysis of the industrial problem and in the attempt to frame a solution, economic conditions and proposals were significant in proportion to their effect on the spirit or moral culture of man. This was effectively the message of the statement that social amelioration must begin with the spiritual regeneration of man when combined with the closing emphasis in each of the two parts of The Industrial Kingdom of God on the over-riding necessity of self-sacrifice. "Self-sacrifice" had come to be seen by a conscience-striken middle class as the key to the regeneration of Christianity along ethical lines. Such regeneration was believed to be essential if Christianity was to be awakened from its dogmatic slumbers to address the social problem. But the resulting New Christianity was a limited, ethical faith which seemed ludicrous when its message of self-sacrifice was addressed to the poor. In the blindness of the well-meaning, much was asked from those to whom little had been given.[98]

The Industrial Kingdom of God was a transitional work. On the level of liberal theory, it contained the recognition that injunctions

to ethical and economic rationality were no longer equivalent. Since the law of supply and demand could not ensure economic justice, it could no longer be evoked in the determination of wages. Change was to occur by the moral regeneration of the existing system -- a regeneration centred on the revised appraisal of human freedom in the context of the distinction of higher and lower levels of existence.

This distinction allowed liberals like Murray to live with the split which had upset the well-structured world of Adam Smith. Natural laws of the marketplace could still be recognized, but recognized now as part of a 'lower order' of necessity. Since the 'higher order' was an ethical realm of freedom, social reform was to be achieved through voluntarist action within an unquestioned capitalist order. The split realm allowed a redefinition of key liberal tenets in terms favourable to the aims of reformers. Hence 'freedom' implied not simply the protection of existing rights, but the development of moral qualities. Since 'the individual' was not a machine, his labour could not be treated as a commodity to be traded in the marketplace of supply and demand, but must be recognized as a service which produced wealth. Therefore, by virtue of redefinition, it was possible to outdo classical liberals in the defense of 'property rights' -- understanding thereby the property of the labourer contained in the product of his labour. As Murray had explained to those wives and daughters of the Montreal commercial particiate who made up the Ladies Educational Association of Montreal,

> The real basis of property rights ought to be understood.
> It is simply a scheme for securing to each productive
> labourer the fruit of his labour, and it can be justified

> merely in so far as it does so more efficiently than any
> other scheme.[99]

The state could still be called on to do no more than ensure the social
conditions necessary to individual freedom, but this now implied some
degree of positive action in place of the purely preventive functions
of the Benthamite police state.

The Industrial Kingdom of God was therefore pre-eminently a
work of the Victorial liberal middle class: a work of conscience and
of optimism. Conscience was stirred by the awareness of the great
injustices resident in the current economic system, but an optimistic
faith in progress informed the view of the future. In line with
'sanitized' evolutionary thought, society was believed to have prog-
ressed beyond anything achieved in earlier civilizations.[100] The
fervour for the moral reform of the lower classes was not inspired by
fear as much as by the sincere belief that culture in and of itself had
the power to transform society.[101] Reform which concerned itself
strictly with the material world was lacking in its vision of the
future.

This belief was undoubtedly more easily maintained in a
professor's study than in a Montreal tenement. Did this realization
lead Murray to withhold publication of The Industrial Kingdom of God?
In this question as in so many regarding his life, the lack of personal
comments in letters or journals hinders speculation on his motives.
The manuscript is by all appearances in completed form, wanting nothing
more than the effort of delivering it to a publisher to allow it to
exercise its influence in the world.

Murray may have believed the practical suggestions contained

in the work to be insufficient at a time when many more extended
analyses and specific proposals for reform of the industrial system
were being published. Even the two books from which he had derived
most of his data on the state of industrial society, William Thomas
Thornton's On Labour and Richard T. Ely's The Labour Movement in America,
were far more detailed and prescriptive than The Industrial Kingdom of
God. By 1888 the report of the Royal Commission on the Relation of
Capital and Labour had been released, as had Edward Bellamy's Looking
Backward and Phillips Thompson's The Politics of Labour. Murray's
manuscript lacked the practical bite of these works and its author may
have decided that publication was unnecessary. Or at least publication
as an entire work was unnecessary.

Significantly, the more practical suggestions on co-operative
enterprises, the division of profits and the law of supply and demand
were released in a series of articles in The Week in the autumn of
1888.[102] As to moral philosophy, a good deal of the Introduction was
published verbatim as "Christian Ethics" in the Presbyterian College
Journal in 1889.[103] Other sections were to find their way into the
1891 Introduction to Ethics. And as the notes of Maude Abbott, a
student in Murray's class on ethics in 1890-91 reveal, a good deal of
the work was broadcast in the lecture halls of McGill.[104]

More plausibly, Murray may not have doubted the value of his
specific proposals, but their necessity. In his distinction of practice
and theory, the former is associated with simple, honest labour done
out of a good heart and in the spirit of uncomplaining self-sacrifice,
while the latter is often seen as disengaged and abstract commentary of

little practical value -- hence Marx's "unnecessary parade of the mere
scaffolding of scientific method". The high demands of moral culture
were not dependent on occupation and class, and Murray may have come to
the conviction that the true need of the hour was not a work directed
to industrial problems in particular, but a guide to the development
of moral culture in industrial society in general. Confirmation of
this may be found in the fact that subsequent publications treated
industrial problems in general terms and gave more emphasis to the
development of a 'higher spiritual morality' within industrial society.
Significantly, these works were directed more overtly to the middle
class -- to the current and future professionals, merchants, managers
and businessmen who would have comprised the majority of Murray's
readers and students.

The framework for this shift was provided by the publication
in 1891 of the <u>Introduction to Ethics</u> and the view of society which
this work contained. A greater emphasis was now placed on the rela-
tionships of trust and dependency within society than on the absolute
rights of free individuals or the absolute obligations of membership
ina social whole. Attempting to steer between classical liberalism
and socialism, Murray argued that society was too complex to be
adequately described as analagous to mechanisms or organisms:

> Society is certainly more than a mechanical combination; it
> <u>is</u> an organism: but it is also something greater. In mere
> organization the members have no function except as organs,
> as <u>means</u> to the <u>ends</u> of the whole organism. In society,
> members are indeed, in one aspect, organs serving as means to
> promote the end of the whole community; but there is a
> profounder aspect in which the social organism is merely a
> means to promote the ends of its individual members . . .
> Society is formed for the purpose of securing that free

development of individual humanity which cannot be realized
either in the life of the solitary or in an anarchic
collocation of individuals . . . the fundamental constitution
of society is therefore equality of obligations and rights on
the part of its members; and all social institutions must have
for their aim to conserve this constitution.[105]

In taking a middle ground between socialism and classical
liberalism, Murray argued that the state was more than simply a police
force, but less than an agent of social change. It must "respect the
freedom of individuals by imposing on that freedom only such restric-
tions as are indispensible to social well being", yet it must also
"secure the external social conditions without which moral existence
would be impossible".[106] The extent of these conditions had not yet
broadened beyond housing and sanitation, for Murray still argued that
the necessary advancement to the highest stage of life -- and hence of
industrial organization -- could not be achieved through legislation.
Rather, the distinction of higher and lower orders allowed a return of
sorts to the minimalist government of classical liberalism -- but on a
very different basis. The legal code structured a lower plane of
contractual obligation and judicial force. The moral code structured
the vaguely defined higher realm of self-less generosity where force
was not needed. Without arguing for anarchy, Murray claimed that the
Church rather than the State provided the model of government for this
higher realm, precisely because it would not enforce its aims and
directives through physical compulsion but had to rely on changing
society by addressing the heart or conscience of man.[107]

Murray vacillated when it came to determining the role of the
state. The influence of an upbringing in the early Victorian period,

when liberalism was a cause as much as a doctrine, was too strong.

Though able to see the shortcomings of that earlier view, Murray was

still, in the Introduction to Ethics, reluctant to accept the possi-

bility of state action to the degree endorsed by British contemporaries

such as T. H. Green. Certainly the concept of moral citizenship

sketched by Green found no echo in the works of Murray.[108]

What distinguished Murray from T. H. Green, Edward Caird and

others who were reshaping liberal political theory in the image of

Hegelian social philosophy was a fundamental disagreement on the basis

of the state. The neo-Hegelians considered the state as based on will

-- and indeed as the supreme expression of social will.[107] Hence the

will of society to care for its weakest and poorest members was properly

implemented through legislation. Legislated reform was an appropriate

expression of the collective will to advance society to the "higher

plane".

But John Clark Murray was not under the Hegelian spell. He

viewed the state not as an agency of collective development, but as one

of co-ercive power. Its basis was not social will, but force -- and

force played a minor role in genuine social improvement.[110] However

similar their analyses of the priority of individual moral development

and the necessity of change within capitalism, Murray and the new

liberals were headed in opposite directions when discussion turned to

the methods and agencies of reform.

In choosing to define the higher realm -- which was the

ultimate goal of society -- as a realm free of necessity, Murray

prevented himself from advocating fundamental reform through the

legislative power of the state. The state could not directly attack the economic injustices which caused poverty; that was, by implication, the work of the ethicists and the churches.

So for example, in the problem of low wages, the solution lay not in challenging the operation of supply and demand as a natural law of the labour marketplace, but in getting employers to recognize that it was not a moral law. Despite its ultimate superiority, the higher law carried no more weight in the natural order of the marketplace than individual employers were willing to grant it. Confident that moral progress would attend industrial progress, Murray believed that this assent would not be long in coming.

As evidence, he argued for the inherent peacefulness of industrial society. Addressing the World Philosophical Congress held in Chicago in 1893 on the topic of "Philosophy and Industrial Life", Murray claimed that the two were not in an antithetical relation as so often supposed, but in reciprocal and beneficial inter-connection. With its wealth, security and consequent leisure, industrial society had replaced the violent struggle for existence which characterized military society and so created conditions conducive to abstract thought.[111] It was now the duty of philosophers to "repay industrialism" by directing its efforts to ends beyond the mere struggle for existence.

> Philosophy, being necessarily occupied with the ultimate
> meaning and purpose of existence must, when reflected [sic]
> upon industrial life, endeavour to grasp the supreme end
> to which the particular aims of industrialism are subservient,
> as well as the means by which industrialism endeavours to
> reach that end.[112]

Industrialists might seek wealth, but in its etymology wealth was not calculated in monetary terms; it signified "weal" or "social well-being". With this definition, the concepts of productivity and the labour theory of value developed in The Industrial Kingdom of God could be introduced into the discussion. The former dealt with the ultimate ends of civilization and the latter with the means by which these ends might be obtained. The problem of remuneration was also philosophical inasmuch as it dealt with recognizing "the right which a man acquires over a product of nature when by his labour he communicates to it a utility which without his labour it would not have possessed".[113] When approached as a philsophical question, the production of wealth could not be divorced from distribution.

It was in this speech that Murray first recognized and criticised the assumptions which had underlain the political philosophy of his youth. Commenting on the assumed coherence of the ethical and economic orders, he noted that classical liberals had proceeded on the Stoic assumption that man was adapted by nature to promote his own welfare "so that to secure this welfare nothing is required but to allow his nature free play by emancipating it from the artificial restrictions by which its full development is impeded."[114] Rousseau had argued a similar theme, and by the end of the eighteenth century, the movement to abolish restrictions on life had built into a "great wave of thought and life" which swept many social rules and legislation away. The result by the end of the nineteenth century was not the anticipated goal of peaceful co-operation and social harmony, but a war of all against all more reminiscent of Hobbes than of Rousseau.[115] The pursuit

of liberty had ended in virtual anarchy.

Murray told his philosophical colleagues that the search for a solution must begin with a rejection of the extreme individualism of classical liberalism and recognition of the possible benefits of state intervention in industrial relations. A distinction was to be drawn between the mercantilist regulations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the social regulations of the nineteenth. Whereas the former limited production, the latter attempted to make it more efficient and equitable. The state was still limited to the role of securing the conditions for the development of moral culture, but Murray's understanding of those conditions was broadening:

> the progress of industrial life, with its ever-increasing complications, is rendering it more and more evidently impossible for either producers or distributors to fulfill their social functions effectively without some mutual understanding of a more or less explicit kind . . . the establishment and enforcement of regulations to secure co-operation among industrial workers, and to avoid the enormous waste created by their present antagonisms, would not in any way interfere with the real freedom of individuals.[116]

Freedom would likely be expanded. State intervention into the organization of industrial life would secure the worker a more equitable share of the fruit of his labour and so free him from the anxieties of the struggle for existence. Thus relieved, the worker would "win the required leisure for entry into the spiritual inheritance which humanity has already attained".[117] Some workers might even "enjoy the opportunities of a development that would enrich the intellectual and moral civilisation of the world."[118]

Individual and property rights were once more re-affirmed in

the Chicago speech. Murray shared the common belief that without the possibility of private property, healthy competition would die away and society and culture would sink into mediocrity.[119] A little less persuasively, he argued that property was necessary for the better exercise of generosity. In fact, "the evolution of society, instead of introducing a forcible, external, legal communism, will rather inspire the old concept of property by a new ideal."[120]

That ideal was, not surprisingly, the ideal of selfless generosity, the ideal put forward in The Industrial Kingdom of God. The clearest indication of Murray's dissatisfaction with that work lies in the existence of a second manuscript among his papers, dating from the 1890's and entitled simply, "Christian Ethics". The subject of "Christian Ethics" was parallel to that of the "Industrial Kingdom":

> It endeavours to find out the supreme inspiration of
> Christian morality, and then to trace the influence
> which that inspiration must exert in moulding the
> industrial life of the world.[121]

Yet the purpose of the second work is to treat this subject in more strictly ethical terms. It was clearly intended as a substitute for The Industrial Kingdom of God. Portions of it are lifted whole or expanded with emmendations from the earlier work. On many pages, leaves from an earlier draft have been pasted into the manuscript; the use in the former of 1887 statistics, together with the content and tenor of the writing suggest that these are pages from a draft of The Industrial Kingdom of God. The addition of updated statistics and new citations in the footnotes provide some guide to dating the work. All are from the 1890's, with the latest dating from 1898.[122] The writing of

"Christian Ethics" appears to have occupied Murray's attention inter-
mittently through the decade, but without much success. The manuscript
is clearly not a finished work.

However unfinished, the "Christian Ethics" confirms the ethical
direction of Murray's social thought and the liberal orientation of his
ethical thought. The work was Christocentric insofar as Christ was
considered the exemplar of all good qualities:

> It is surely for all men a simple historical fact, that
> Jesus is still the Spiritual Lord of our civilisation, and
> on any of the great issues of social morality it is
> impossible to ignore the impact of His teaching.[123]

The organization of the manuscript eliminates the failed
balance of two parties attempted in the Industrial Kingdom. In place
of the distinction and systematic treatment of Labour and Capital, it
progresses through the life of Christ (Chapters I - IV); the conditions
and claims of the labouring populace (Chapters V - IX); and the ethical
motivations of industrial life (Chapters X - XII). The content itself
deviates little from the ideas put forward in The Industrial Kingdom of
God, The Introduction to Ethics and "Philosophy and Industrial Life",
and may be read from the chapter titles:

1. The Dawn of the Idea
2. The Crisis
3. The First Announcement
4. The New Jurisprudence
5. The Physical Condition of the Labourer
6. Spiritual Disadvantages of the Labourer's Physical Condition
7. The Helpless Position of the Labourer
8. Vox Clamantis
9. The Claim of the Labourer in the Light of Simple Justice
10. The Morality of Self-Interest as the Motive of Industrial Life
11. The Economical Value of the Higher Motive
12. The Possibility of Unselfishness as the Motive of Industrial
    Life.[124]

Within Murray's understanding of Christian ethics, the path to

improvement was narrow indeed:

> The Kingdom of God, whose industrial laws we are seeking to
> discover, -- the Kingdom of God described in the teaching of
> Jesus, -- is not a kingdom of this world. It is not of the
> type of this world's kingdoms, because it depends for its
> maintenance and expression, not on the rude mthods of police
> or military violence, but on those divine methods which are
> typified in the calm, silent, irresistable processes or organic
> growth . . . But this faith in the adequacy of moral forces to
> renovate society carries us beyond the narrow ideals of justice
> as commonly understood with their exacting definitions of right
> and their restricted definitions of obligation.[125]

The Christ whose teachings were to be followed was the 'Christ

of Culture'; Murray's conceptions bear out H. Richard Niebuhr's

typology.[126] The kingdom of God _was_ a kingdom of this world in the

sense that it embodied all that was of value in contemporary culture.

The simple faith of idealism in the ultimate primacy of good over evil

was sufficient to maintain the further faith that progress to this

kingdom was inevitable. Christ was called on to verify an amillenial

cultural idealism:

> Is it not evident that scepticism in regard to the possibility
> of unselfishness in industrial life is really infidelity to
> Christ? All religion, indeed that is worthy of the name
> implies faith in the superior power of goodness and the
> certainty of victory over evil . . . such hopeful confidence
> is the very essence of Christian faith.[127]

The Great Commission of the nineteenth century lay in working

for this victory of goodness. Contrary to trends in neo-Hegelian

political thought which emphasized the power society wielded through

the state, this commission could only be undertaken by the Church:

The church is therefore untrue to her mission if she falters

in her protest against any doctrine, even if it is falsely
called science, which pretends that there is no power in the
universe capable of delivering man from the cruel exactions
of selfish competition in his industrial life. To protest
against this immoral teaching of a baseless economical theory
is the special call of the church at the present day. What
the state can do to aid the efforts of the church it is not
the special purpose of this book to discuss; and we have seen
that, under our present industrial system of free contract, the
state appears helpless to grapple with some of our most serious
evils. But it is well to be reminded once more that a Christian
dare not undervalue the might of those moral forces which are
wielded by the church. Certainly the church is unfaithful to
her spiritual Lord if she maintains the attitude of looking to
the State to accomplish imperfectly, by its clumsy methods of
physical compulsion, what she can accomplish more effectively
by the force of spiritual conviction.[128]

And so the more positive view of state action in industrial
relations which had emerged in "Philosophy and Industrial Life" was
reversed. The suspicion of the state which had marked Murray's early
articles advocating free trade now returned. A third party was still
necessary for the resolution of the industrial problem, but it was now
a third party of a very different nature and very different methods.[129]

The "Christian Ethics" proved no more satisfactory a vehicle
for the expression of Murray's social philosophy than The Industrial
Kingdom of God" had been. Fulfilling a form of his own oft-repeated
directive that honest action was better than abstract speculation,
Murray turned to fiction to create a model of that improved society
which had eluded theoretical expression.

He That Had Received the Five Talents contained that model.
Murray was not a novelist, and this work is a parade of wishful
stereotypes with few, if any, literary merits. Yet in its creation
of a world which conforms to Murray's attitudes and assumptions on a
wide range of issues, the novel is an indispensible test of any

interpretations of The Industrial Kingdom of God in particular and Murray's social thought in general. Freed by the vehicle of fiction from the necessity of dealing with actual conditions in society, it demonstrates a reunion on "the higher plane" of ethics and economics. And, as in the earlier union of the two which was a feature of classical liberal theory, there was no need of the agency of the state to effect the combination.

The novel centres on the efforts of two generations of the Forbes family to develop an ethical industrial system in a Scottish town. George Forbes is an eager and self-educating mechanic who performs well at a time of difficulty in his place of employment and is elevated to partnership by a thankful employer. Upon the death of his patron and partner some time later, Forbes sells his share in the factory and returns to his rural home village of Arderholm to establish a new factory and with it a new, industrial town. There he marries the virtuous orphan Mary Freer and the couple are blessed with two children: Jamie and William. The children are educated for a time by the wife of the factory manager, James Nicholl, a temperate and intelligent man who was led by financial obligations and intellectual reservations to abandon his original goal of entering the ministry and join the industrial world instead.

The two Forbes boys mature in different directions. While William grows in virtue, Jamie turns through imtemperance, biological predisposition and the promptings of the dissolute village doctor to alcohol. The doctor is eventually replaced by an upstanding medic who establishes a local Y.M.C.A. and urges the enforcement of sanitation

laws. But the damage is done: Jamie Forbes remains a drunk.

William, on the other hand, becomes a seminary student in Edinburgh. He soon falls under the spell of Rev. John Downes, "the priest of the revolution", who eschews preaching in a comfortable parish church but chooses to bring his message to the slums instead. The church, he believes, must leave the struggle of the reformation behind and turn its attention to the social and economic problems of the industrial age. He tutors William through Past and Present, Chartism and The Latter Day Pamphlets and, thus inspired by the secular faith of Carlyle, William neglects his university studies in order to work with Downes in helping the poor and sick of the slums.[130] Shocked by slum conditions, he becomes convinced of the absolute necessity of the philanthropic mission of the Christian churches to the poor.

At the end of the academic year, William returns to Alderholm in order to help in the factory office. Jamie is drinking heavily now and George Forbes is ill. Both pass away in the course of the summer, though in his omnipotence, the novelist squeezes reform and repentance out of Jamie before handing this eldest son over to Death. The factory, with its 1000 employees and large profits, now falls entirely to William. Aware of his great responsibilities, the young student returns to Edinburgh to seek the advice of Rev. Downes.

But Downes has little chance to speak as William explains his dilemma and his convictions. Should he continue preparation for the ministry, or should he direct his attention to the family business; should he be engaged in preaching or in practice? How can he accept wealth which is not his in any but the shallowest sense of property

rights? There are moral and spiritual foundations to the law which
modify the 'rights' of inheritance, particularly when, as an inheri-
tance, the wealth is not earned by one's own labour.

Yet William is hardly ready to follow those radical reformers
who would overthrow the established customs and relations of the social
whole. Gradual growth is better than radical change. It is not
necessary to abolish property or turn to the political sphere to
achieve change. Wealth does not render virtue impossible as long as
the man of wealth recognizes the moral rule that we may not do as we
will with what we own. He must freely act to distribute his wealth.
Having preached his first sermon, William asks Downes to return with
him to Arderholm to advise and assist as he tries to determine how the
surplus wealth of the factory can "go in some way to benefit the
working people who have co-operated with my father in making it".[131]

Downes does come to Arderholm and, together with James
Nicholl, helps William Forbes dispose of both his accumulated inheri-
tance and his annual income. Portions are set aside for the provision
of mother Mary Forbes and for special projects and business insurance.
The balance is allotted for improvements in the food, clothing,
housing and education of the workers. In addition, a combined library,
gymnasium, bathing pool and games room is to be built in a newly
created park for the use of the inhabitants of Arderholm.

Turning to the factory itself, Forbes decides to retain the
basic employer/employee relation for administrative purposes, but to
make the factory a co-operative enterprise through the introduction
of profit sharing. Wages will not be raised, but a year-end bonus will

be paid to all workers, part of it in cash and part of it in the form
of community improvements. In addition, a fund will be created out of
profits to provide insurance for sickness, old age and death.

The reorganization of the mill extends to the office as well.
In thanks for services rendered over many years, Forbes raises Nicholl
to full partnership in the firm. His joy is subsequently made complete
when he is able by marriage to rescue a local woman from poverty
brought about by her father's questionable business dealings.

All parties live happily ever after in the years following
the introduction of "the new order of things in the Arderholm mill".
Schools and parks multiply, a hospital and health service are estab-
lished, sanitation is improved and insurance takes care of the sick.
Forbes and Nicholl come to be known as fellow-workers rather than
masters -- in short, an industrial kingdom of God is created in a
small Scottish town.

Heaven comes to earth in this moralistic tale whose sentiments
are reminiscent of Dickens, Bellamy and a host of other reform-minded
novelists whose works found their most appreciative audience in the
middle class. There was much to reassure this readership. Though
visions of New Lanark might spring to mind, there was no threat of
Owenite radicalism here.[132] The animating values and basic elements
of the existing social structure remained intact. The camel had gone
through the eye of the needle with the creation by a well-motivated
rich man of an industrial heaven in Arderholm. Capitalism and private
property were maintained -- although inspired with the new ideal of
selfless generosity. Individual recognition was preserved in the

co-operative system and above all, the State was nowhere to be seen.
For all the book reveals, Arderholm may not even have had a mayor or
any form of municipal government. Reform of the economic order is
achieved through the Christian -- not to be confused with ecclesiastical
-- motivation of the wealthy industrialist.

The ethical character of Murray's Christianity is once more
reinforced through the criticism of the purely theological pre-occupa-
tions of the established church and the adoctrinal character of the
faith shared by the novel's three main figures, William Forbes, James
Nicholl and John Downes. It is certainly no accident that all three
are products to a greater or lesser extent of the seminary. The
leadership of the Christian church in social reform is thereby
confirmed, but the necessity of a reformed Christianity is upheld in
the unorthodoxy of Downes and the abandonment of seminary for practical
work by both Nicholl and William Forbes.

He That Had Received the Five Talents illustrates in clearest
form the nature of Murray's social philosophy. While it can be
criticized for its awkwardness, it can more usefully be used to
criticize the assumptions and oversights of its author's social philo-
sophy. Murray brings his happy kingdom to earth, but for one with so
little use for orthodox theology, he has a firm and convenient depen-
dance on the guiding hand of a kind providence. The outside world does
not enter in. Arderholm is sheltered from the effects of trade cycles
and depressions to a degree never shared by either Paisley or Montreal.
It is those very conditions which aggravated 'the industrial problem',
and their absence from Arderholm implies a similar absence from

Murray's mind as he sought to understand the causes of and solutions

for the problem. Coupled with the lack of any firm detail in the

depiction of the industrial utopia, this oversight raises questions

about the degree to which Murray can be said to have understood either

the problem or the solution.

The solution is limited to being a matter of improved motiva-

tion within the existing system and the implication is that ethics and

economics can be re-united in a natural order existing on a higher

plane. Murray was convinced that capitalists would see their produc-

tivity rise if only they adopted the ethics of self-sacrifice.

Building on implications in the "Christian Ethics", evil had no exis-

tence apart from the greed and self-service of workers and employers.

Hence the adoption of a properly ethical approach to business would

naturally bring prosperity inasmuch as it would entail the removal of

that source of evil which hindered economic health. This reunion of

ethical and economic law on a higher plane brought with it the implicit

return to theories of moral prosperity and immoral poverty, though this

union was distinct from that of Herbert Spencer in nature and removed

to the utopian future in time. Whether upheld by providence or the

inevitable result of a transfer of life to the higher plane, this

union can be seen in the ease with which conflicts are resolved -- if

they arise at all -- in the world of the novel.

It can certainly be questioned whether 'self-sacrifice' is

compatible with 'capitalism', which derives its motivation from self-

interest. Murray even recognizes this in the retention of both a

degree of individualism and a degree of competition in his industrial

utopia. No attempt is made to explain how self-sacrifice and self-interest may be reconciled; indeed, since capitalism itself is never brought into question, the issue of whether its characteristic motivation is compatible with Murray's 'higher plane' motivation is never raised.[133] Is non-competitive capitalism possible? Murray appears both to claim openly that it is while admitting implicitly that it is not.[134] The extent to which he truly understood the contemporary industrial and economic problem is once more called into question.

Finally, He That Had Received the Five Talents reveals the limited confidence which Murray had in the ability of the working class to choose freely 'the higher way' if given the opportunity. At no time do Forbes, Downes or Nicholl consult with the workers in order to discover their opinion on how the wealth might best be distributed or the factory re-arranged. Though the workers have co-operated in producing the wealth, they are not asked to co-operate in its distribution. As a result, the new Christianity emerges as a religion which no less clerical than its discredited predecessor. Though its advocates aspire to transform it into a religion which is relevant to the common man, they are unwilling to allow those standards of relevance to be set by the common man himself. The clericism of the higher plane is indistinguishable from the paternalism of the lower plane.

Though he continued to publish articles on social themes, Murray's social philosophy did not develop in new directions after the publication of He That Had Received the Five Talents. The 1908 Handbook of Christian Ethics was largely an expansion on the idealist two-realm theories which limited Christian ethics to the teaching and

example of Jesus, and once more repeated that progress to a better
stage of civilisation would come primarily through the peaceful methods
of the church rather than the legislative methods of the state.[135]
Needless to say, "Revolution" remained outside of Murray's political
vocabulary.

These two themes sum up the limitations of Murray's final
position in social philosophy. The rejection of legislative reform was
an implicit rejection of the concept of active citizenship advanced
and practiced by T. H. Green and Arnold Toynbee.[136] If the practical
outworkings of their theories are to be found not so much in their own
actions but in the actions of those students who as politicians and
bureaucrats instituted the social reforms of the pre-war Liberal
ministry in Britain, so too the lack of similar programmes in Canada
at the time may be due in part to the lack of an activist philosophy,
advanced through the university, which appreciated the possibilities
of legislated reform.[137] Perhaps Murray now despaired that the
teaching of political philosophy to potential politicians would
significantly improve the morality of Canadian politics and so render
the state a fit agency of social reform. Ultimately, however, it was
the demands of his philosophy rather than the shortcomings of politi-
cians which led to the rejection of legislated reform. Like some Neo-
Kantian contemporaries in Germany, Murray may have been more consistent
to the idealist standard in his argument that the progress towards
the ideal society can only be achieved by adopting the method of the
ideal rather than the methods of the militarist society which
civilisation was leaving behind.[138] Yet that consistency robbed his

his philosophy of the cultural power which characterized the new liberalism in Britain. Perhaps too, the confidence that progress towards the ideal was inevitable may have induced a certain quietism in regard to participation in reform movements.

Rejecting legislated reform in favour of individual moral development may have given Murray's social philosophy greater internal consistency, but it failed to eliminate entirely the element of co-ercion involved in reform. To the extent that workers were excluded from participation in deciding the division of wealth and the new ordering of society, they were subject to an imposed reform bearing no more relation to their inner moral state than if these changes had been the result of legislation. It could even be argued that the element of co-ercion was greater. While legislative reform was conducted through elected, representative assemblies, Murray's paternalist or clerical alternative was imposed from behind the closed doors of the factory office or church study. As with much of middle class reform in the period, the adoption of paternalist methods belied the profession of democratic intent. There was little beyond ineffective disclaimers to distinguish this liberalism from traditional Toryism.

The lack of cultural power can also be attributed to the second limitation of Murray's social philsophy: its lack of practical detail. This is rooted partially in the lack of that professional training which could have made his economic analysis less simplistic, but more directly in the interpretation given to Christian ethics. An ethic centred on nothing more explicit than the attitude of loving self-sacrifice offers little indication of what a future society might

resemble and so gives little direction to reform efforts.[139] Murray

reduced Christianity and Christian ethics to a matter of good but

essentially undirected motivations. The idealist 'higher realm',

which in Murray's pen was known more by its adjecatives than by its

nouns, was similarly vague. There was a definite notion that things

would be better, but no guidance as to what form improvement would

take. Focussed on the reform of individual motivation, and lacking

substantive definition, it could not -- and indeed would not -- give

explicit direction to the aim of social and industrial reform:

> the aim of Jesus was not primarily any external reconstruc-
> tion of social order . . . His aim was primarily a moral
> regeneration of men; and that will construct for itself
> such industrial arrangements as may form its fittest
> embodiment.[140]

What most hobbled Murray's social philosophy was the inability

of his amillenial Christian ethics to offer any fundamental critique

of contemporary society. The values and aims of his higher realm

kingdom of God were largely indistinguishable from the values and aims

of enlightened and conscientious middle class culture. Faith in

capitalism and in progress were as strong as faith in God. And though

he might disagree with those Idealists who would put libraries and

concert halls in the place of the church, there was in Murray's

Christian ethics no prophetic task allotted to the church which could

justify this opposition to replacing the temple of God with the temples

of culture. Murray was too decided a Christian to make 'Culture' the

religion of the higher realm, but in view of the eventual adoctrinal

character of his Christianity and the undifferentiated 'spirituality'

of all aspects of the higher realm, it is legitimate to ask what,

apart from the reservations of a former Free Church theology student,

kept him from this conclusion.

The life of Christ is a narrow foundation for Christian ethics,

but Murray's suspicion of traditional theology left little room for

expanding this base. As a result, this Christ became the Christ of

the nineteenth century, the Christ of J. S. Mill and of Holman Hunt,

the pleasant Christ of Culture. Murray often quoted Mill's description

of Christ's merits with approval:

> Religion cannot be said to have made a bad choice in
> pitching on this man as the ideal representative and
> guide of humanity; nor, even now, would it be easy
> for an unbeliever, to find a better translation of the
> rule of virtue from the abstract into the concrete than
> to endeavour so to act that Christ would approve our
> life.[141]

This man had nothing to offer to J. S. Mill; this Christ could

tell the nineteenth century nothing it did not want to hear. The "Man

from Galilee" was brought in to affirm the ideal of a moralistically

'reformed' capitalism, not to render judgement on the contemporary

economic and social order. Hence, for Murray as for so many contempo-

raries, Christian ethics, despite some redirection toward social

ends, was unable entirely to escape an individualistic moralism and as

such was robbed of its potential to be an incentive to and agency of

thorough social change.

Footnotes to Chapter Four

[1] John Clark Murray, "Are License Commissioners a Necessary Evil?", _Canadian Spectator_, January 26, 1878, in MUA 611/2, p.19; Idem, "The Problem of Alcohol", _The Argus_, May 13, 1905, in MUA 611/2, p. 117; M. Richter, _The Politics of Conscience: T.H. Green and His Age_ (LOndon: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), p. 362; G. Decarie, "Something Old, Something New . . .: Aspects of Prohibitionism in Ontario in the 1890's", D. Swainson (ed), _Oliver Mowat's Ontario_ (Toronto: Macmillan, 1972), p. 167; E.A. Christie, "The Presbyterian Church in Canada and its Official Attitude Toward Public and Social Problems: 1875 - 1925", (M.A. Thesis: University of Toronto, 1955), p. 272.

[2] M. Gillett, _We Walked Very Warily: A History of Women at McGill_ (Montreal: Eden Press, 1981, pp. 113 - 148.

[3] John Clark Murray, "The Higher Education of Women: An Address Delivered at the Opening of Queen's College, Kingston, Session 1871 - 1872" (Kingston: np, 1871), pp. 7 - 8; Idem, "Human Progress", _University Magazine_ XI (1912), pp. 168 - 169.

[4] C. Berger, _The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867 - 1914_ (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), pp. 199 - 210.

[5] John Clark Murray, "The First Ten Years of the Canadian Dominion", _British Quarterly Review_ LXVII (1878), p. 162.

[6] _Ibid._, p. 162.

[7] Idem, "The Study of Political Philosophy" (Paisley: Paisley Herald, 1877).

[8] _Ibid._, p. 9; George Monro Grant was later to echo this analysis in his speeches on Canadian politics and politicians. Berger, _Sense of Power_, p. 208.

[9] Murray, "Political Philosophy", p. 10.

[10] _Ibid._, p. 9.

[11] _Ibid._, p. 10.

[12] Goldwin Smith, _Canada and the Canada Question_ (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), pp. 135 - 136.

[13] Murray, "Political Philosophy", p. 8. An emphasis on the need to educate politicians was in contrast to J.S. Mill, who argued that the education of voters was the necessary element in the improvement of representative government. D.L. Manning, _Liberalism_ (London: Dent, 1976), p. 127.

[14]Murray, "Political Philosophy", p. 15.

[15]Ibid., p. 17.

[16]Idem, "Can Canada be Co-erced into the Union? -- A Canadian View", Open Court 411 (1895).

[17]C.D.W. Goodwin, Canadian Economic Thought: The Political Economy of a Developing Nation (Durham: Duke University Press, 1961), pp. 42 - 50.

[18]Adam Smith had also approached free trade as a philosophical issue, rather than simply an economic doctrine. R.L. Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives Times and Ideas of the Great Economic Thinkers, 4th ed. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), pp. 68 - 69.

[19]B. Forster, "The Coming of the National Policy: Business, Government and the Tariff, 1876 - 1879", Journal of Canadian Studies XIV (1979), p. 39.

[20]John Clark Murray, "What is a National Policy?", Canadian Spectator, August 8, 1878, in MUA 611/2, p. 22.

[21]Idem, "What is a National Policy?", Canadian Spectator, August 31, 1878, in MUA 611/2, p. 23.

[22]Idem, "The Ethics of a National Policy", Canadian Spectator, September 14, 1878, in MUA 611/2, p. 22.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Ibid. This compares to Mill's standard definition of individual liberty: J.S. Mill, On Liberty (Chicago: Great Books, 1949), p. 15. Murray wrote highly of the "ennobling inspiration" which could be gained from reading Mill's On Liberty: John Clark Murray, An Introduction to Ethics (Montreal: Wm. Foster Brown, 1891), p. 307n.

[25]Canadians were not much moved by appeals to 'political economy'. Since only free traders attempted to provide this 'scientific' grounding for their views, economics as a discipline and free trade as a doctrine became identified in the public mind -- hence the "dismal science". Goodwin, Canadian Economic Thought, p. 110.

[26]John Clark Murray, "The Political Situation in Canada", Dominion Review I (1882), p. 5.

[27]Ibid., p. 5.

[28]Goodwin, Canadian Economic Thought, p. 67 - 68.

[29]Heilbroner, Worldly Philosophers, pp. 53; 69.

[30] Murray, "Political Situation in Canada", p. 5.

[31] Ibid., p. 5.

[32] M. Bliss, A Living Profit: Studies in the Social History of Canadian Business, 1883 - 1911 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), p. 55.

[33] D.R. Kennedy, The Knights of Labour in Canada (London: University of Western Ontario, 1956), p. 101.

[34] Glasgow University Centenary Committee, The Curious Diversity: Glasgow University on Gilmorehill; The First Hundred Years (Glasgow: University of Glasgow, 1970), p. 9.

[35] Murray was an executor in brother William's estate: MUA 611/4. William was a partner with Anton Haaz in the Kingston Vinegar Works: Foster's Kingston Directory, 1895 - 1896 (Toronto: Foster, 1895), p. 145.

[36] Walter Houghton argues that in failing to define the "higher plane", the Victorians were betraying a preference for the quest over the goal. John Clark Murray preferred the goal, but an attachment to the achievements of western civilization made it difficult for him to define that goal in distinction from contemporary society. W.E. Houghton, The Victorian Frame of Mind, 1830 - 1870 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), p. 291f.

[37] This approach to economics through moral philosophy was shared by Adam Shortt, Professor in Political Science at Queen's University from 1888 to 1908, and Chairman of the Civil Service Commission from 1908 to 1917. Goodwin, Canadian Economic Thought, p. 186.

[38] John Clark Murray, "The Cry of the Labourers", Montreal Daily Witness, August 11, 1883, in MUA 611/2, p. 32.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Kennedy, "Knights of Labour", p. 16; A. Carnegie, "An Employer's View of the Labor Question", Knights of Labor, Labour: Its Rights and Wrongs (Washington: Labor Publishing Co., 1886), pp. 95 - 95; 102.

[45] John Clark Murray, "Lectures on Political Economy", MUA 611/45 - 46; Idem, The Industrial Kingdom of God (ed. L. Armour and E. Trott) (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1982).

[46] Murray, _Industrial Kingdom_, p. 5.

[47] _Ibid._, p. 5; Manning, _Liberalism_, p. 97.

[48] Murray, _Industrial Kingdom_, p. 11.

[49] Houghton, _Victorian Frame_, p. 239.

[50] Murray, _Industrial Kingdom_, p. 17.

[51] _Ibid._, pp. 20 - 22.

[52] Idem, "Political Economy", pp. 59; 61 - 62.

[53] Murray's redefinitions also modified the economic reductionism of classical economic theory by allowing standards of value beyond that of price alone. See B. Goudzwaard, _Capitalism and Progress_ (Toronto: Wedge Publishing, 1979), p. 24.

[54] Murray, _Industrial Kingdom_, p. 28.

[55] _Ibid._, p. 30. Similar formulations were expressed by Henry George and Richard Ely: Henry George, _Progress and Poverty_ (New York: Robert Schalkenback Foundation, 1960), p. 353; Richard T. Ely, _The Labour Movement in America_ 3rd. ed. (New York: T.Y. Crowell, 1890), p. 98.

[56] Murray, _Industrial Kingdom_, p. 31. The idea of man's most fundamental right being to the fruit of his own labour was shared by Adam Smith, though Smith saw it as a right of producers to be defended against government regulations. Murray brought the principle into the context of industrial wage labour, where he was later to argue for a time that full recognition of the principle might only be granted through some form of government regulation. Manning, _Liberalism_, p. 72; John Clark Murray, "Philosophy and Industrial Life", _The Monist_ IV (1894), p. 543.

[57] Murray, _Industrial Kingdom_, pp. 40 - 47.

[58] This tendency to exonerate capitalism by locating the industrial problem on the side of labour was common to many contemporary liberal reformers. Richter, _Politics of Conscience_, pp. 268 - 270.

[59] Murray, _Industrial Kingdom_, p. 48. The choice of the term "commodity" is curious in light of the earlier criticism of its use. The point itself is also made by Ely, _Labor Movement_, p. 101.

[60] Murray, _Industrial Kingdom_, pp. 53 - 55.

[61] _Ibid._, p. 56.

[62] _Ibid._, p. 59.

[63] Murray, "Political Economy", p. 130.

[64] Murray, _Industrial Kingdom_, p. 60.

[65] _Ibid._, p. 60.

[66] _Ibid._, p. 63.

[67] _Ibid._, p. 64.

[68] _Ibid._, p. 66.

[69] _Ibid._, p. 67. Perhaps the most well known expression of this common distinction was Matthew Arnold's separation of the "ordinary self" from the "best self". M. Arnold, _Culture and Anarchy_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 97.

[70] Murray, _Industrial Kingdom_, p. 75.

[71] _Ibid._, p. 86.

[72] _Ibid._, pp. 91 - 99.

[73] _Ibid._, p. 101.

[74] _Ibid._, p. 102.

[75] _Ibid._, p. 102.

[76] _Ibid._, p. 102.

[77] _Ibid._, p. 102.

[78] _Ibid._, p. 104. Murray may have had the federated co-operatives of the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society (S.C.W.S.) in mind when suggesting that a newtowrk of co-operatives be established by the working class itself. Established in 1868, the S.C.W.S. was involved in the production and distribution of a wide range of industrial and consumer goods. Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society, _1868 - 1936: Historical and Descriptive Handbook_ (Glasgow: S.C.W.S., 1936).

[79] I.M. Greengarten, _Thomas Hill Green and the Development of Liberal-Democratic Thought_ (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), p. 88; Bliss, _Living Profit_, p. 63.

[80] Murray, _Industrial Kingdom_, p. 104. Engels commented with less satisfaction that, "the English proleteriat is becoming more and more bourgeois, so that this most bourgeois of all nations is apparently aiming ultimately at the possession of a bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois proleteriat _as well as a bourgeoisie_". Cited in Heilbroner, _Worldly Philosophers_, p. 166.

[81] Murray, _Industrial Kingdom_ , p. 104. Murray's interest in the Knights of Labour may have been due in part to the prominence of the labour organization in

Montreal. As the Industrial Kingdom was being written in the summer of 1887, the Knights were recording the existence of 38 local assemblies with 2522 members in Montreal, one of the highest concentrations of membership in Canada. On the basis of this strength, the Knights had established a co-operative store in the city and, in August 1887, established a co-operative trunk-factory to provide work for striking trunk-makers who had been fired. The Knights embodied many of the principles which Murray was advocating, and his support for them came at a time when the order was being wrongly implicated in and roundly criticised for the 1886 Chicago Haymarket Riots. Murray's subsequent silence on the Knights may have been due in part to the international boycott of the Clark's Cotton Thread Company, organized by the Knights as a result of an industrial dispute. The Clark company was owned by maternal relatives of Murray. Kennedy, "Knights of Labour", pp. 38; 43 - 44; 75; 104; 110; 122.

[82] Murray, Industrial Kingdom, p. 105.

[83] Ibid., p. 105.

[84] Murray, "Political Economy", pp. 67ff.

[85] Idem, Industrial Kingdom, p. 113.

[86] Ibid., p. 114. Murray here assumes that the capitalist derives his wealth solely from the profits generated by the factories under his control, and not from a wide range of interlocking investments.

[87] Ibid., p. 116.

[88] Ibid., p. 120.

[89] Ibid., pp. 122 - 126.

[90] Ibid., pp. 128 - 134. T.W. Powderly, Grand Master Workman of the Knights of Labor was only one of many labour leaders strongly critical of company stores and similar schemes. See: Knights of Labour, Labour: Rights and Wrongs, p. 84.

[91] Murray, Industrial Kingdom, p. 141.

[92] Ibid., p. 144.

[93] Ibid., p. 144.

[94] Richter, Politics of Conscience, p. 134.

[95] Murray, Industrial Kingdom, p. 128.

[96] Ibid., p. 43.

[97] Ibid., p. 73.

[98] The conjunction of self-sacrifice and self development was a Victorian commonplace advocated by figures ranging from the utilitarian J.S. Mill to the cultural idealist Matthew Arnold. Houghton, Victorian Frame, p. 287.

[99] Murray, "Political Economy", p. 119.

[100] Houghton, Victorian Frame, p. 38.

[101] A more extreme version of this point was advanced by Matthew Arnold in the context of his criticism of the "Hebraist" activism of liberal reformers. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 180.

[102] John Clark Murray, "The Claims of Industrial Co-operation", The Week, November 1, 1888, in MUA 611/2, p. 44; Idem, "The Remuneration of Labour", The Week, November 8, 1888, in MUA 611/2, p. 45; Idem, "The Law of Supply and Demand", The Week, January 18, 1889, in MUA 611/2, p. 46.

[103] Idem, "Christian Ethics", Presbyterian College Journal IX (1889), pp. 338 - 344.

[104] M.E. Abbot, "Moral Philosophy Notes -- Lecturer Dr. Murray", MUA 684/2, Ref. 38/180/4/20.

[105] John Clark Murray, An Introduction to Ethics (Montreal: Wm. Foster Brown, 1891), p. 261.

[106] Ibid., p. 276.

[107] Although he shared the dualistic approach which characterized Murray's thought, T.H. Green avoided this logical consequence by arguing that the basis of the state was not force, but will. As the chief agency for the expression of social will, Green's State could fulfill the functions allotted to the Church by Murray. See T.H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London: Longman's Green, 1941), pp. 121; 124.

[108] Ibid., p. 129.

[109] H. Jones and J.H. Muirhead, The Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird (Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 1921), pp. 327 - 328.

[110] Murray, Introduction to Ethics, p. 272.

[111] Idem, "Philosophy and Industrial Life", The Monist IV (1894), p. 533. The belief in the inherent peacefulness of industrial life arose out of the optimism that formed part of the Victorian frame of mind and found expression in such standard college texts as H.T. Buckle's History of Civilization in England, and W.E.H. Lecky's History of Rationalism. Houghton, Victorian Frame, pp. 41 - 42.

[112] Murray, "Industrial Life", p. 535.

[113] Ibid., p. 540.

[114] Ibid., p. 541.

[115] Ibid., p. 542.

[116] Ibid., p. 543.

[117] Ibid., p. 544.

[118] Ibid., p. 544.

[119] John Clark Murray, He That Had Received the Five Talents (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1904), p. 264.

[120] Idem, "Industrial Life", p. 532.

[121] Idem, "Christian Ethics", MUA 611/74, p. i.

[122] Ibid., p. 194n.

[123] Ibid., p. i.

[124] Ibid., p. iii.

[125] Ibid., p. 158.

[126] H.R. Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York: Harper and Row, 1951), pp. 83 - 94.

[127] Murray, "Christian Ethics", MUA 611/74, p. 218.

[128] Ibid., pp. 219 - 220.

[129] Murray's view of the church as a mediator in industrial disputes was later taken up in some of the official pronouncements of the Presbyterian Church in Canada on the problems of labour and capital. Christie, "Presbyterian Church", p. 64.

[130] It would be tempting to regard this use of Thomas Carlyle to 'convert' Willie as an autobiographical admission of influence, but there is little in Murray's writings to indicate a reliance on Carlyle. Differences in such specific and, for Murray, significant areas as laissez-faire economics and the role of the government in reform over-ride a general agreement that the "Condition of England" question had to be addressed in all industrial nations. Unlike such contemporaries as Edward Caird and John Nichol who had come under the sway of the Scottish Sage, Murray never wrote about Carlyle. Most of the few references to the man which do appear in his writings are for the purpose of illustration or criticism rather than confirmation. At the same time, Murray would have been aware of the powerful effect of Carlyle's work when writing of William Forbes' 'awakening'. Glasgow classmate John Nichol claimed that many students became "flaming hero-worshippers", while Edward Caird acknowledged Carlyle as "the author

who exercised the most powerful charm on students who were beginning to think." Jones
and Muirhead, Edward Caird, pp. 21 - 22. Perhaps Murray had already begun to think;
as noted in Chapter Three of the present study, his undergraduate preference was for
the Christian Socialists F.D. Maurice and Charles Kingsley, and he would likely have
found the effusive Carlyle somewhat distasteful.

[131] Murray, Five Talents, p. 267.

[132] Although the example of New Lanark would have given the Arderholm model some
much-needed detail, Murray studiously refrained from any reference to Robert Owen or to
the co-operative communities founded through his influence. Owenism was too commonly
associated with radicalims and atheism to allow its use as a model for Arderholm, even
though a number of Murray's aims and methods parallel those of later Owenism and
Co-operative Socialism. Murray may have wished to prove that a Christian co-operative
could be established as an alternative to New Lanark; in fact, Arderholm emerges as
the urban, industrial equivalent to an enlightened paternalist's well-run rural estate.
E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London: Penguin, 1968),
pp. 884 - 887.

[133] Like Adam Smith, Murray rejected but could not thoroughly refute the
'capitalism' of de Mandeville's Fable of the Bees. He dismissed the work as a notorious
example of "coarsist egoism" without arguing convincingly for a capitalism based on
disinterestedness. Murray, Introduction to Ethics, pp. 45; 167; Goudzwaard,
Capitalism and Progress, p. 29.

[134] This parallels the ambivalence found in Carlyle's call to industrial
co-partnership and his praise for the aggressive, 'heroic' captains of industry.
Houghton, Victorian Frame, pp. 208 - 209.

[135] John Clark Murray, A Handbook of Christian Ethics (Edinburgh: T. and T.
Clark, 1908), pp. 91 - 114; 268 - 289.

[136] Richter, Politics of Conscience, pp. 344ff.

[137] Adam Shortt, Professor of Political Science at Queen's University from 1888 -
1908, argued both for minimal government and for the greater use of experts and
intellectuals as civil service advisors. In his subsequent role as Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission from 1908 - 1917, he worked for the elimination of what was
likely the greatest impediment to a reformist civil service, the filling of civil
service positions by political patronage rather than open competition. S.E.D. Shortt,
The Search for an Ideal: Six Canadian Intellectuals and Their Convictions in an Age of
Transition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), pp. 100; 108; 111. In general
however, reform movements in Canada arose more directly out of the churches. The
Methodist church was the most radical, with its advocacy early in the twentieth century
of the public ownership of basic industries, social security, and the regulation of
profit. The Presbyterian Church held to the more moderate position which Murray had
advocated, calling for the recognition of the rights of workers to share in equally
with capitalists in the profits of production. R. Allen, The Social Passion: Religion
and Social Reform in Canada, 1914 - 1928 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973),

pp. 3 - 17; S. Crysdale, <u>The Industrial Struggle and Protestant Ethics in Canada</u> (Toronto: Ryerson, 1961), p. 31.

[138]T.E. Willey, <u>Back to Kant: The Revival of Kantianism in German Social and Historical Thought, 1860 - 1914</u> (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978), p. 181.

[139]With such views, Murray put distance between himself and the more activist social gospel advocates then rising in the Canadian churches. Allen, <u>Social Passion</u>, pp. 15 - 17.

[140]Murray, <u>Christian Ethics</u>, p. 277.

[141]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 8; Idem, <u>Introduction to Ethics</u>, p. 362; Idem, <u>Industrial Kingdom</u>, p. 12; Idem, "Christian Ethics", MUA 611/74, pp i - ii; Idem, "Christian Ethics", <u>Presbyterian College Journal</u> IX (1889), p. 343.

Conclusion

The failure of John Clark Murray's social philosophy to
offer a clear direction for reform of industrial society demonstrates
a fundamental tension in his thought. From the time of university
studies in Glasgow and Edinburgh, Murray had professed the Scottish
cultural conviction that the alliance of Christianity and philosophy
provided a unified creed for active life in society. Christianity
provided the basis for philosophy, and philosophy clarified Christian
creeds. As generations of Queen's and McGill students were to learn,
the two together formed a critical tool for the understanding and
improvement of social and cultural life.

This creed engendered confidence, and Murray appears to have
weathered the mid-nineteenth century crisis of faith relatively
unperturbed. Those doubts he did admit to were of the value of
extensive doctrinal formulations, which seemed more often to cause
divisive creedal disputes than to clarify the united faith of
Christians. Like many at the time, Murray believed that Christians
must be unified if cultural leadership were to be provided; certainly
the post-1843 cultural unrest in Scotland's churches and universities
cannot but have strengthened this belief. But further strengthening
was received when, by the 1880's, the underside of industrialism
became inescapable. The Christian-philosophical creed had always
been intended as a means of social and cultural improvement; here

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now was a pressing problem which called for all the relief a

Christian social philosophy could provide.

But was John Clark Murray's philosophy equal to the challenge?

In shying away from explicit theological formulations of Christianity

or clearly defined philosophical positions, Murray had been left with

an intellectual framework which had little precise definition.

Murray's thought had not been shaped primarily in continuing

dialogue with philosophical contemporaries, but according to an agenda

received in Glasgow and Edinburgh and carried out in over fifty years

of teaching and writing. That agenda called for the search for a

middle way which would reconcile the opposing tendencies of material-

ism and idealism in philosophical thought. A basic commitment to

Christianity predisposed John Clark Murray to a form of idealism, but

continuing differences in basic outlook and the principle of mediation

prevented him from allying himself with the neo-Hegelians and neo-

Kantians whose thought his own came partially to resemble. Unable to

accept without question the evangelical Presbyterianism or Common

Sense Realism of his upbringing, he was also unwilling to identify

with the major schools of philosophical or theological thought as they

developed later in the century.

Murray's philosophical isolation was re-inforced by his

reluctance to accept the new ideals of professionalization which

were reshaping the teaching and writing of philosophy by the 1880's.

The likelihood of fruitful dialogue which could clarify his thought

was reduced with the rise of a new generation of professional

philosophers who spoke in more technical language and out of less expansive cultural aims than the generation represented by John Clark Murray. And the opportunity for such dialogue was limited by the form in which Murray's thought was most often expressed: even-handed textbooks and review articles were not grist for the mill of philosophical dispute.

At least one consequence of Murray's reluctance to embrace particular philosophical or theological positions, or to enter into dialogue on fundamental issues was the failure of his philosophy to develop a level of definition which would make it adequate to deal with contemporary issues in detail. Murray's thought was ultimately animated by two principles: the assurance that reality was a unified and comprehensible system maintained by God, and the injunction that in a world where moral responsiblity could not be avoided, the law of self-less love was to govern individual and social relationships. The former belief allowed Murray only to ignore those challenges of rationalism and materialism which a more critical and systematic Christian philosophy may have been able to answer. The latter belief in self-less love as the single principle of Christian ethics left him unable convincingly to challenge the injustices of late nineteenth century industrial capitalism.

The work of later proponents of the social gospel such as Salem Bland was to demonstrate that a critical stance towards culture could be developed from within liberal Christianity. And the work of such contemporaries as Thomas Hill Green and Arnold Toynbee

demonstrated that an activist approach to social problems could also
be developed out of the relatively more orthodox pre-Rauschenbusch
evangelical liberalism of the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
What factors kept Murray from similar conclusions?

What directed both Bland and Green was a greater conscious-
ness of an antithesis existing between contemporary social conditions
and the Christian ideal, and a greater willingness to employ
established agencies of power within society -- chiefly the state --
to effect change. Both the new liberals and the social gospellers
looked on social evil as thoroughly penetrating the existing social
system. A Christian social ethic had to be at least as penetrating
if it was to offer guidance for the age.

But this ran contrary to the very confidence with which Murray
looked on the world as held in God's hand. A decision to emphasize
the positive aspects of Christianity had left him with little in the
way of a concept of evil apart from individual imbalances in the
faculties of mind, emotion and will. Hence, although Murray could
recognize that the ethical and economic orders might not always be in
natural harmony, he could never accept the deep-rootedness of social
injustice. Within his understanding of Christian ethics, this would
have implied a failing on God's part. Unwilling to propose radical
change of the social system, Murray's only alternative was to
advocate change of individual motivation, in the hope that good will
and generosity would be sufficient to purify society.

It is at this point that the concept of higher and lower

planes or realms of existence enters in. The concept has some
parallels to the Christian concept of the old and the new man, and it
is clear that Murray looked on it in these terms. Yet the amillenial
mold in which his renewed Christianity had been cast had no place for
the idea that total renewal of the world would be both a radical and
a super-human event; it had lost the 'already/not-yet' tension of
salvation as an achieved reality whose full manifestation would only
come with Christ's return.

This loss was the loss of a critical lever on society. Left
with the conviction that the New Jerusalem of social harmony -- the
universal Arderholm -- would gradually unfold out of existing society,
Murray was compelled to look within the values and aims of that
society for models of goodness. The ethical principle of self-less
love pointed only to those popular conceptions of the Higher Realm
as an indistinct plane above the ordinary, and Murray was left with a
social philosophy which closely duplicated the ideals of 'maternal
feminism', a contemporary movement which found in romantic conceptions
of 'feminine nature' the qualities necessary for the reform of society.
The ideological pre-dispositions of many modern feminist historians
of this romantic ideal lead them to depict it as a means by which men
ensured that women would remain barred from positions of power -- if
only because ideals of self-sacrifice and love put them on a pedestal
above the competitive jungle of business and politics, or in a
domestic sphere removed from it. In fact, men were to be equally
removed. Feminists are correct in asserting that the ideal was most

consistently applied only in relation to women, but it is necessary

to note that it was framed as an ideal for all of society -- and

hence also necessary to note that its effectiveness in substantially

improving social conditions was as poor as its effectiveness in

improving the status of women. This should not be read as a dismissal

of the wide range of schemes for social improvement which arose out

of the romantic ideal and which were often initiated by women. At

the same time, a distinction must be maintained between the

palliative reform programs of the romantic ideal and later social

gospel proposals which called for a radical restructuring of society.

The theological idealism of John Clark Murray represents an

attempt to find a cure for society's ills by appealing to society's

own values. This cultural Christianity drew strength from the

conviction that the world was upheld by a Divine order, but was weaken-

ed by an unwillingness or inability to penetrate just how far that

order diverged radically from the ideals of late nineteenth century

civilized society. As a result, and in vivid contrast to the Scottish

cultural ideal, Murray's apolitical, amillenial Christian philosophy

was effectively disengaged from society at the time when it was

most needed. As with romantic, maternal feminism, his Christian

social ideals were raised so high as to become only objects of

wishful contemplation, and not directives to effective action.

Bibliography

The published and unpublished papers of the John Clark Murray Collection in the McGill University Archives (hereafter refered to as MUA) constituted the major source of primary materials employed in this study. A significant limiting factor has been the small number of personal papers or private correspondance filed in the collection. This has resulted in a study which may appear more an investigation of works than an investigation of a person. Reference to other manuscript collections has failed to provide correspondance or additional material on John Clark Murray's private life. Of collections of major intellectual contemporaries such as George Monro Grant and John Watson, only the papers of McGill Principal John William Dawson contained letters from John Clark Murray. Almost all of these regard the disputes over salary and the admission of women to university classes, issues which divided the principal and the professor for half of the two decade span in which they were colleagues at McGill. The archival collections of American philosophical colleagues met at the Glenmore Summer School and the Australian philosopher Henry Laurie, who was a friend and fellow student at Edinburgh, also failed to contain correspondance from John Clark Murray.

For ease of reference, this bibliography has been sub-divided into eight sections within the basic division of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include largely unpublished documentary material, books and articles by John Clark Murray, contemporary newspaper reports, and writings by contemporary philosophers and cultural commentators. Secondary sources include published book-length studies, articles, and theses, dissertations and unpublished articles.

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