A VICTORIAN FRAME OF MIND:

THE THOUGHT OF JOHN CLARK MURRAY
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Abstract

John Clark Murray (1836 - 1917) held the Chair of Mental and Moral Philosophy at Queen's College from 1862 to 1872, and at McGill University from 1872 until his retirement in 1903. The purpose of the present study is to offer a close historical examination of a thinker who has often been treated as a transitional thinker in histories of philosophical activity in nineteenth century Canada. The opening biographical chapter establishes the Scottish cultural tradition in which Murray was raised and whose social and educational values he continued to perpetuate in his own writing and teaching. The Scottish tradition clarifies the critical discussion in Chapter Two of some of the ambiguities of Murray's position with regard to the philosophical movements of the nineteenth century. In particular, the difficulties of classing Murray with either the Scottish Common Sense Realists, the Neo-Kantian or Neo-Hegelian Idealists, or the rising group of 'professional' philosophers are considered. Specific elements of the intellectual framework of John Clark Murray's thought are dealt with in Chapter Three. Such characteristic concerns as the structure of knowledge, the relation of materialism and idealism, freedom and necessity, and moral philosophy are considered in themselves and as components of the unified order of truth which Murray found best expressed in Christianity. The final chapter focuses on Murray's effort to formulate a response to the social problems
emerging as a consequence of industrialism. After establishing the ideological strength of Murray's economic and political liberalism, this chapter traces the efforts of a concerned liberal to understand contemporary problems and offer solutions to them.
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INTRODUCTION

The image of the nineteenth century as an age of overturned orthodoxies has been so firmly established as to become an historiographical commonplace. Although the eighteenth century is hardly renowned as an age of faith, the nineteenth is commonly seen as the time when those beliefs which did weather the winds of Enlightenment rationalism were finally sunk in the waves of secularism, materialism and higher criticism, with only the flotsam and jetsam left to wash ashore on Dover Beach. In consequence, nineteenth century intellectual history is pre-occupied with transitions, and with the deaths and births of schools and theories by which transitions are marked.

The theme of transition has marked the majority of studies of philosophical activity in nineteenth century Canada. While this theme aptly conveys the sense of developments in the period, it can occasionally do rough justice to those thinkers who do not wholly fit the established pattern. John Clark Murray is one such figure. As a philosopher who falls between the two schools of Common Sense Realism and Neo-Hegelian Idealism which set the poles of Canadian thought in the period, he has most often been interpreted in terms appropriate to larger synthetic studies without yet having received thorough historical treatment on his own terms.

The purpose of the present study is to offer a closer historical and cultural examination of this 'transitional thinker' in an attempt to determine the intellectual framework and personal
agenda of a man who held an ambiguous position in the fraternity of North American philosophers.

The opening biographical chapter establishes the Scottish cultural tradition in which John Clark Murray was raised and whose social and educational values he continued to perpetuate in his own writings and teaching. The Scottish tradition clarifies the critical discussion in Chapter Two of some of the ambiguities in Murray's position vis-à-vis the philosophical movements of the nineteenth century. In particular, the difficulties of classing Murray with either the Scottish Common Sense Realists, the Neo-Kantian or Neo-Hegelian Idealists and, indeed, 'professional' philosophers will be considered.

From the discussion of historical ambiguities, the study will move to ambiguities of a different sort with the reconstruction in Chapter Three of the intellectual framework of John Clark Murray's thought. Such characteristic concerns as the structure of knowledge, the relation of materialism and idealism, freedom and necessity, and moral philosophy will be considered in themselves and as components in the unified order of truth which Murray found to be best expressed through Christianity. Finally, the study will focus in Chapter Four on Murray's effort to formulate a response to the social problems emerging as a consequence of industrialization. After establishing the dogmatic strength of Murray's economic and political liberalism, this chapter will trace the efforts of a concerned liberal to understand contemporary problems and offer solutions to them. Though the solutions are first formulated within the liberal political creed,
they come increasingly to reflect an apolitical and amillenial understand­ing of Christian ethics.
CHAPTER ONE

Shaping a Young Culture

John Clark Murray was born March 19, 1836, a year marked by the rise to a philosophic chair of one man who led British philosophy at mid-century, Sir William Hamilton, and the birth of another who was to do much to bring a new -- or renewed -- spirit to that philosophy later in the century, Thomas Hill Green. Murray was born in the industrial town of Paisley in western Scotland, one of the elder children of a businessman and rising liberal politician David Murray, and Elizabeth Clark, a member of a family active in Paisley cloth and thread manufacturing. The year was as auspicious for the Murray family as for British philosophy: 1836 was also marked by the election of David Murray to municipal council with a slim majority soon after the 1833 reform of the Scottish municipal system.¹

Election victory brought greater responsibility than David Murray may have anticipated. The beginning of Murray's political career coincided with the beginning of yet another of the periodic and prolonged depressions which marked the transition of the small and stable cloth town outside of Glasgow into a large textile manufacturing centre. Paisley's rapid growth in times of prosperity only increased its problems in times of depression, and the city had seen recurring unemployment, hunger, and workers' demonstrations for economic and parliamentary reform since the end of the Napoleonic
wars. ²

It was in these conditions that David Murray worked for economic reform, first as Manager of the Poor concerned with unemployment relief in 1832, and after 1836 through his offices in the political system. He had work enough: the depression in the cloth industries which began in 1836 lasted for fourteen years, throwing an estimated 14,000 to 17,000 people out of work in a town of less than 40,000, and working its way systematically through the economy of the whole community, bankrupting secondary and service industries and finally the town itself.³ David Murray was in municipal government for the duration of the depression, first as town Treasurer and after 1844 as the Chief Magistrate, or Provost. In order to repair the economic health of the town, he encouraged further mechanization and diversification of local industries. Although recovery did not begin until after he had left office in 1850, David Murray had gained sufficient confidence among both workers and manufacturers to be re-elected in 1869. He was, according to his son, a liberal in whom conservatives had confidence, working for social change but refusing to strain traditional forms of government in order to achieve it.⁴

David Murray's career and political views are of significance in this study of his son because comparison of the two shows how closely the son followed the ideals, if not precisely the path of his father. The debt was far-reaching. John Clark inherited a form of the evangelical theology and social concern which had led his father to quit the Church of Scotland in the Free Church secession of 1843. He also took on an abiding love of the ballads, songs and popular
culture of Scotland which was eventually translated into the academic form of books and articles on Scottish folk culture.

But apart from particular debts, David Murray exemplified and passed on the strengths of Scottish urban culture developed in the eighteenth century and still very much alive in the nineteenth. Liberalism, moderation and intelligence informed a life in which education was not defined by the length of time spent in formal schooling. In this culture it was not unusual for a young businessman like David Murray to deliver, in French, an essay on self-culture to a small literary society. Nor was it unusual that this young man should instill in his children that love of books, music and serious discussion which is the animating spirit of self-culture. This humane influence is no less significant for being difficult to identify or quantify.

John Clark Murray was noted throughout his life as a gentleman of wide interests and deep learning. He was not an academic specialist whose active life was defined by the limits of a book-lined room, but a cultured generalist in the Scottish tradition, concerned with the development of an active cultural life in his college students and in Canada as a whole. Such a life would be marked in both individuals and nation by a thoughtful concern with the full range of daily affairs that was informed by ideals which transcended individuals and events. This is not to say that Murray was a formal, philosophical idealist. Just as true education went beyond formal schooling, so the true, well-lived life went beyond the pragmatic solution of practical necessities alone.

John Clark Murray's formal schooling began with the traditional
classical program offered by the Paisley Grammar School in preparation for university studies. He moved to the University of Glasgow in 1850, spending the following four years in a varied course which included a good deal of theology, classics and literature, but little in philosophy beyond logic. Here he made the acquaintance as classmates of such future academic colleagues as Edward Caird, George Monro Grant and John Nichol.

Philosophy began to figure more in the two years which followed at the Free Church seminary, New College, which was associated with the University of Edinburgh. The change was the result of the presence at the university of Sir William Hamilton, the leading exponent of Common Sense philosophy and by that time nearing the end of his life. Murray took Hamilton's class in Metaphysics during his first session at Edinburgh and the effect was profound. Although the elderly philosopher, weakened by a stroke some years before, could not speak without a stutter or lecture without an assistant, and although he had lost control over the classroom to the extent that the rear rows were more often engaged in fighting than in writing, Murray later recalled that,

in spite of all this, down to the very last days of his life there used to be found on the front benches, pressing near to to the professor's chair, a fair gathering of young men who hung with reverent attention on every word that fell from his stammering lips, and who felt, in his very personality, as well as in the charm with which he led them into new realms of of thought and untrodden fields of learning, a peculiar spell that made them forget all the imperfection of his utterance.

The spell of the mentor reinforced the spell of the field. Murray became one of Hamilton's favorite students and, in the eyes
of fellow students and the professor's assistants, one of the most able as well. He showed what one of the assistants termed "an acute and clear intellect, well fitted for dealing with philosophical questions and well informed regarding them."\(^{13}\)

After the first session at Edinburgh, the young theology student began to concentrate on philosophy. He was elected President of the Metaphysical and Ethical Society by fellow students, and appears to have spent the year gaining a more thorough acquaintance with the history of philosophy, ethics and certain speculative questions in the area of philosophical psychology, an interest he shared with Hamilton.\(^{14}\)

Yet Murray's apprenticeship with Hamilton was to come to an abrupt and premature end. Shortly after the end of the 1855 - 56 Session, the overworked and disabled Hamilton sustained brain damage and died. Taking a path theological students were only then beginning to discover, Murray moved to Germany and divided a year of study in theology between Heidelberg and the acknowledged centre of higher criticism, Göttingen, before returning to Edinburgh.\(^{15}\) One of the many fellow Scots in Heidelberg at the time was James Hutchison Stirling, a philosophy student who was to stir British philosophical circles nine years later with the publication of *The Secret of Hegel*.\(^{16}\) Student records show that Stirling was not formally enrolled in the university at the time. Although Murray may have had friendly contact with Stirling at this formative time, most of his friends in Heidelberg were Scottish and German theology students.\(^{17}\)

The three years following return to Scotland were spent in further theological study at New College, culminating in a year as
President of the Edinburgh Theological Society and graduation in 1860 with a licentiate. Murray was now ready to embark on a life in the ministry. Yet despite an active preaching schedule and no shortage of permanent opportunities, he seems to have had little inclination for this career. While former classmates took on pastoral charges, Murray wrote articles for *Chamber's Encyclopedia*. A fellow theologue who went on to the ministry wrote,

> Mr. Murray is a born thinker. He first applied himself to the study of Philosophy from a philosophic instinct. The same instinctive impulse which made him a student of Philosophy, keeps him one.

In the fall of 1861, Murray followed the advice of friends and applied for the office of Examiner in Mental Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. In spite of glowing testimonials, he came in second in the competition, losing to a man whose works he was later to employ in courses on moral philosophy, Henry Calderwood. Scottish universities had, in the 1850's and 1860's, become battle-grounds in the continuing cultural and political conflicts rising out of the 1843 Free Church secession. Although Murray was nominally of the politically aggressive Free Church party, he was discouraged by ecclesiastical rivalry and seems to have had little enthusiasm for the struggle which erupted whenever a vacant philosophical chair was to be filled. There seemed to be little hope of advancement for one who lacked the drive of a partisan.

But a new opportunity appeared the summer following the loss of the Glasgow competition in the person of Principal Leitch of
Queen's University in Kingston, Canada West. Leitch had long been a pastor in Scotland and continued to spend his summers there after the appointment to Queen's, relaxing and engaging in attempts to gain support for the Church of Scotland college from Scottish congregations. In 1862 he had an additional mission. Private scandal had forced the resignation of Dr. James George from the chair of Mental and Moral Philosophy, and Leitch was engaged in examining Scottish applicants for the vacant post. Murray quickly applied and, thanks to vacillation on the part of the leading contender and recommendations from Church officials and philosophy professors in Scotland, was appointed to the chair.22

Murray's supporters had praised his analytic and speculative abilities; Leitch had different standards in mind when he advised the Queen's Board of Trustees that the young Free Church applicant "would prove a genuine Churchman".23 In Canada the new professor proved to fit both descriptions, giving thorough philosophical education to students who were often heading for the ministry, and reversing his father's steps by joining the Church of Scotland.

After crossing the Atlantic in the company of Principal Leitch, John Clark Murray was installed with public ceremony in the chair of Mental and Moral Philosophy on November 24, 1862. The next ten years were spent in what he was later to term an "apprenticeship" at Queen's. It was a time of maturing as a thinker, writer and teacher. Murray consolidated his views on the Scottish Common Sense school in general and on Hamilton in particular, and began developing critical distance from the tradition and its last prominent exponent. The
intellectual ferment of the 1860's in Britain resulted in the publication of a number of critical works on Hamilton and the Common Sense school, not the least of which was J.S. Mill's *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, published in 1865. Murray contributed to this general review with four articles in the *Canadian Journal* from 1866 to 1867; an anticipated fifth installment was never published. The series gave a review of Scottish philosophy since the eighteenth century thinker Francis Hutchinson, before moving to an analysis and criticism of Hamilton's synthesis of Thomas Reid and Immanuel Kant. The articles also took Mill's criticisms into account, distinguishing sound points from what Murray often thought were faulty interpretations.

Although Hamilton's star was rapidly fading in the British philosophical firmament, it continued to guide students in the colonial universities. Queen's was no exception. Professor Murray used Hamilton's works extensively and, to facilitate teaching, published *An Outline of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy* in 1870. The work has been hailed as the "first technical philosophical book written in Canada", a claim more notable for nationalist ambition than scholarly accuracy. The *Outline* was simply an edited version of Hamilton's rambling 1836 *Lectures on Metaphysics*; Murray was careful to point out that even the organization was Hamilton's own. Written in Scotland, edited in Canada, and published in the United States, the *Outline* was an example of the type of work Murray was to concentrate on in the future. Although published widely he was, unlike John Watson, his successor at Queen's, not a very original thinker. Just as Murray's strength lay in teaching, so the bulk of his academic work lay in
introductory textbooks and commentaries on the work of other thinkers.

But this was still in the future. Throughout his term at
Queen's, Murray took an active interest in all aspects of the
administration and general life of the still tiny college. He served
as Registrar, as Secretary of the Senate, and as Treasurer of the
Queen's-based Botanical Society of Canada. Active participation in
student social life, a busy public lecture and sermon schedule, and
the establishment of a college literary society won him the esteem of
college students and the Kingston public. By 1870, he was one of
three faculty members living on campus in Summerhill, a home converted
back to residential use after years as the main classroom building of
the college.

But he was still an expatriate. Like many colonial colleagues,
Murray's personal life spanned the ocean; winters were spent in
Canada, but the end of the college term brought return to Scotland for
the summer. This pattern was continued for some years after his
marriage in 1865 to a highly gifted Paisley woman, Margaret Polson.

Murray had come to Canada professing the hope that he would
find the intellectual conditions for the elucidation of a philosophy
which could transcend purely national boundaries. Perhaps as a
result of this hope, he refrained for some years from commenting on
Canadian issues, save as they involved general principles. A
commitment to the improvement of higher education in Canada led early
on to qualified support for university reform which would see Queen's
become an independent college within the University of Toronto. This position may have helped him win appointment as an Examiner at
the University of Toronto, but it could hardly have endeared him to
the Queen's trustees, who saw in amalgamation the effective elimination
of their college. A further type of university reform emerged with
his support later in the decade for the admission of women into the
college on equal terms with men. Murray was among the first three
professors to deliver lectures to the Kingston Ladies Educational
Association in 1869, and he spoke out strongly for the extension of
their right to full college education in a commencement address given
the following year under the title, "The Higher Education of Women".
The address was published as a pamphlet and circulated widely, attract­
ing attention in the British press. 28

If the Queen's decade was a time of philosophical and social
maturing for John Clark Murray, it was a decade of maturing of a quite
different sort for the college. The 1860's was "a decade of disasters"
at Queen's, marked by continuing staff dissension, declining enrolment,
and numerous threats to its continued existence. 29 The threats came
from a variety of sources: from provincial university reformers
intent on entirely absorbing the college and its endowment into the
University of Toronto; from Free Church unionists aiming to emasculate
the Church of Scotland college by closing its theological faculty;
and from the collapse in 1868 of the Commercial Bank in which the bulk
of the Queen's endowment was held. 30 This last threat was the most
severe, for it came just as university reform and confederation
combined to deprive Queen's of the provincial subsidy it had received
since 1845. As the college tottered on the brink of bankruptcy, Murray
and three other junior professors donated a third of their salaries
to the drive for a new endowment.\textsuperscript{31}

The drive was successful, but Murray may have been a little tired of the air of uncertainty which prevailed over the college. Enrolment in the Arts and Theology program had dropped from sixty in 1863 to a mere twenty-nine in 1870: "the college appeared to be reaching the vanishing point."\textsuperscript{32} Hearing in the fall of 1871 that an equivalent position might be opening up at McGill College in Montreal, he wrote to McGill Principal John William Dawson asking for details. Dawson's reply convinced him that the position -- that of an Assistant Professorship -- was inferior to his own at Queen's, and so Murray dropped the matter.\textsuperscript{33}

Dawson, however, did not. As part of a long term program to upgrade the Arts Faculty, he had brought in a Professor Forbes to fill the chair of Mental and Moral Philosophy, which had been filled by the Anglican Archdeacon William Turnbull Leach since 1853. But Forbes died soon after his arrival for the 1871 - 72 Session, and the work had reverted to the reluctant Leach. Dawson needed a replacement and was encouraged by the expression of interest received from an established teacher and scholar at Queen's. He may also have anticipated help from Murray in lecturing to the recently founded Montreal Ladies Educational Association, a pet project of the Principal which received only lukewarm support from his faculty. In any event, the philosophy chair was offered to Murray in March of 1872, and after a month's negotiations on salary and duties -- with Murray looking forward to the possibility of a combined chair of Philosophy and English Literature -- a letter of acceptance was received from Kingston.\textsuperscript{34}
In his eagerness to get Murray, Dawson turned down a number of applicants for the chair, including one he must later have regretted rejecting, John Watson.

Murray was 37 years old when he came to take up the chair of Mental and Moral Philosophy at McGill. He was to remain at McGill for the rest of his career and in Montreal for the rest of his life, developing a reputation as a teacher, a reformer, and a scholar.

As a teacher, Murray continued to emphasize to students the necessity of finding and taking their education beyond classroom walls. Class lectures were widely appreciated by students, but so too was Murray's continued support for extracurricular activities, in particular the independent literary societies promoted by the professor as instruments for self culture and as participating bodies in the ordering of formal university life. Speaking to the McGill Undergraduate Literary Society in 1888, Murray,

confessed that even though he had studied under men of European reputation he had received more benefit from societies, in the culture obtained by readiness in thought, arranging ideas, quickly seeing falsity, and coming in contact and conflict with fellow men.

Education was more than Gradgrind's facts. It was a preparation for the assumption of responsibility in individual and social life. In the necessities of their internal government and through participation in university administration, student societies helped to:

develop respect for orderly government and constitutional procedure, to influence opinion by an appeal to reason and conscience, to form tendencies which will grow into the widest political habit, the only safeguard against political adventurers among a free people.
The liberal politics of David Murray found their echo in his son. They were received more enthusiastically by the students than by the McGill administration, which viewed with Tory horror the participation of either students or professors in its own operations, and which sought to silence the professors and curb the students when public controversy revealed opposition to its policies and procedures.

Murray's widely attested popularity as a teacher stemmed from his interest in the lives of his students. The injunction that they pursue education beyond the classroom was reciprocated by an interest which went beyond concern for their ability to recite philosophical arguments. He followed the careers of students long after graduation, and assembled a photo album containing the pictures of many of those who had won the Prince of Wales Gold Medal or had achieved First Rank Honours upon graduation. The annotations in the album, together with other sources, indicate that students from both Queen's and McGill often went on to further academic distinction. Of the Queen's graduates, one Robert Jardine had "carried alone and with highest commendation the degree of Doctor of Science, by the excellence of his examinations in Mental Philosophy" at Edinburgh, and had gone on to be appointed President of the Church of Scotland college in Calcutta. A second Queen's student, Robert Campbell, had won prestigious prizes in logic and metaphysics at Edinburgh, beating out competition from a first class honours graduate of the University of London. Of the McGill graduates, some went on to posts in different fields at American universities (John C. Bracey in French Literature at Vassar; James Eduard Le Rossignol in Economics at Ohio and Denver; James A. Craig in Semitics at Michigan), while others
such as P.T. Lafleur and J.W.A. Hickson became lecturers in philosophy at McGill.\textsuperscript{40} Hickson had completed an M.A. in philosophical psychology at McGill, and returned in 1901 after further work in Berlin, Freiburg and Halle, where he completed a dissertation on Nietzsche.\textsuperscript{41} Graduate work in Europe also attracted one of the first female graduates, Donalda McFee, who went to the University of Zurich to continue studies on Berkeley begun with Murray. McFee's work culminated in a dissertation in German relating schools of thought which figured prominently in Murray's courses. Entitled \textit{Berkeley's New Theory of Vision and its Development in the English Association School and the Modern Empirical School in Germany}, the work was published in 1895 and reviewed by Murray for the Canadian press.\textsuperscript{42}

McFee's work owed more to her professor than suggestions for its topic alone. As a member of the first class of women to graduate from McGill, she was a beneficiary of Murray's efforts to open the university to women. Murray's efforts in this struggle exemplified the greater involvement in practical social issues which distinguished his years in Montreal from those in Kingston. In a public speech given shortly after arriving at McGill, he identified the place of women in society and the relation of capital and labour as "the two great social problems, of which our time is called to attempt a solution."\textsuperscript{43}

Murray's public writings on the education of women go back to the 1870 address on "The Higher Education of Women". Generally, however, his attempt to develop alternatives to the existing economic and social system can be traced back to 1874, and a review article on "Co-operative Housekeeping" in the Montreal Daily Witness. Yet it was not until the
imminent collapse of the Liberal government of Alexander Mackenzie in 1878 that Murray began writing on social issues in earnest, taking to the first issue of the short-lived, liberal Canadian Spectator to call pointedly for educated and principled politicians, and using later issues to discuss in somewhat less than academic tones, "The Ethics of a National Policy". Adopting the arguments and procedures of evangelical and utilitarian reformers earlier in the century, Murray began from the mid-1870's to demonstrate a pre-occupation with the need for moral change and practical improvement in all areas of society. Dominion politics was a recurring concern, but so too were education, the rights of women and workers, and a variety of issues ranging from book taxes, the treatment of the handicapped and gambling, to the spelling reforms proposed by the Fonetic Society. As the following chapters will establish, Murray approached reform as a liberal and a Christian, seeking a rationalization of social procedures reminiscent of utilitarianism and an infusion into human affairs of Christian principles reminiscent of evangelicalism. This ideological fusion was less than successful in all cases, for Murray's ethics often demanded a transcendence of the very utilitarian practicality which marked liberal reform.

Murray's concern with social issues was absorbed into and eventually superseded by more purely academic work. While the decades of the 1870's and 1880's were marked by a steady stream of articles on economic, political or social issues, in the 1890's there occurred a maturing of philosophic viewpoint and an increase in academic publications.

The earlier articles were published in widely circulated Montreal
newspapers or in one of the many short-lived Canadian weeklies or monthlies which attempted to appeal to an intelligent reading public located somewhere between the daily paper and the scholarly journal. Recent events usually prompted these articles, whose analytic substance witnessed to Murray's efforts to find solutions to the economic problems rooted in decades of laissez-faire liberalism without seriously altering the liberal philosophy itself. In tone, topic and medium, these writings were clearly intended for a large and educated public. As such, they represented attempts to put into practice Murray's abiding conviction that the development of Canada's culture and the solution of its problems were dependant on the intelligent public discussion of the issues which arose in the life of the nation. His promotion of this discussion extended to participation in the establishment of one such journal which was short-lived even by nineteenth century Canadian standards. The first issue of the Montreal-based Dominion Review, "A Canadian Monthly Journal of Politics and Literature", appeared on July 15, 1882, bearing four articles written by the McGill professor.

The articles in the Dominion Review reflect the wide range of issues which Murray believed ought to be discussed in the country. A lead editorial on "The Political Situation in Canada" was followed by a selection on "The Scientific Outlook". Two review articles sought to make readers aware of recent intellectual movements, and of the major role Canadian scholars were playing in their development. One dealt with the most recent work by the Glasgow fellow-student who had become one of the leading British thinkers in the Idealist revival, Edward Caird's *The Problem of Philosophy at the Present Time* (1881).
The second was a comparative review which noted the contributions of Canadians to the revival in Kantian scholarship. J.G. Schurman of Acadia, and later of Dalhousie and Cornell, had recently published his first work, *Kantian Ethics and the Ethics of Evolution*. This was compared to another first work by Caird's pupil and Murray's successor at Queen's, John Watson's *Kant and His English Critics*. The reviews were laudatory without being critical, more a notice than an analysis of the works at hand. As such, the reviews were as typical of the generalist approach to philosophy exemplified by Murray, as the books reviewed were typical of a new and far more specialist approach to philosophy.

Murray gave no indication of his personal reaction to the changes these men represented in philosophical scholarship. Younger, more highly trained, and far more technical than he, they were typical of the professional scholars emerging from German and American graduate schools. As such, they were distinct from the broadly cultured philosophy teachers who had been the proud product of the Scottish universities, and who were represented in Canada by Murray and most of his established colleagues. As will be seen in Chapter Two, the 'professionalization' of philosophy in English universities went hand-in-hand with the revival of Idealism spurred by Murray's peers, T.H. Green and Edward Caird. How Murray would respond to these developments was still not clear in 1882.

The *Dominion Review* was notable more for ambition than achievement, and was not long a vehicle for Murray's ideas. Its first issue was also its last. and thereafter Murray took to writing in periodicals
of a similar purpose such as Goldwin Smith's *The Week* and the Montreal magazine, *The Argus*.

Even in this period, Murray's writing was not restricted to social issues. Religious and philosophical controversies also attracted his pen. He contributed to the controversy raised by John Tyndall's 1874 Presidential Address to the British Association for the Advancement of Science meeting in Belfast with an article in the *Canadian Monthly and National Review* entitled "Atomism and Theism".\(^49\) Tyndall had asserted that the answers to man's search for meaning lay in material science rather than in traditional religion, eliciting responses characterized more often by heat than light. Murray's rebuttal is characteristic in its systematic ordering of arguments, its ironic analysis, and its disinclination to elaborate an alternative scientific theory.

Murray believed that on scientific grounds, Tyndall's argument fell short of its author's own standards; atomism was no less hypothetical than the religion Tyndall had sought to displace, and so had no greater methodological credibility.\(^50\) In fact, it likely had less, for it was unable to provide convincing explanation of the facts or acts of consciousness. Murray strikes a note of Baconian conservatism: the fact that molecular movements accompany thoughts and feelings is in itself no proof that they cause these acts of consciousness. Some relation is probable, but these acts testify to a level of existence beyond the sensations.\(^51\)

But the flaws of Tyndall's argument were more than scientific. On philosophical grounds, it was weakened by lacunae and contradictions. Atomism itself failed to explain the "fundamental principle and origin
Tyndall had attempted to fill the gap by asserting the existence of some unknowable primal cause beyond those mental impressions which are our only immediately known facts. Yet Murray could see no valid reason for inferring the existence of a Being while denying that He could be known; the inference itself, together with the assertion as to what the Being was not, was an assertion of knowledge, however weak an assertion it might be.\(^5^3\)

In short, Murray did not take up a challenge to disprove Tyndall or to prove theism. He merely showed by logical steps how Tyndall's case had not been proven, and that indeed the argument employed in asserting it was no different in its logical form from the argument Tyndall found so unacceptable when used to assert theism. The onus was not on Christians to prove theism, but on Tyndall to disprove it conclusively.\(^5^4\) Murray was to adopt this position and method of argument in much of his subsequent work touching on the relation of materialism and Christianity. Save in the realm of ethics, he did not work on questions of truth involving arguments of proof and refutation.

The article on "Atomism and Theism" provides a suitable introduction to the methods and thought of John Clark Murray. Suitable both because of its characteristic content and uncharacteristic topic; its arguments were common to questions or topics on which Murray expended more scholarly effort. One of these areas was philosophical psychology, the subject which, together with ethics, attracted the greatest part of his speculative energy.

Philosophical psychology was explored through restricted analyses of such problems as the nature of dreams, the possible relations between
psychology and medicine and the nature and value of cramming. It found its summary in Murray's *Handbook of Psychology*, a text first published in 1885 and revised four times thereafter before being retitled *And Introduction to Psychology*. This work represented the mature treatment of an interest which had begun under Hamilton and whose subsequent study had, as the following chapter will demonstrate, led Murray beyond his mentor.

The subject of Hamilton and the Common Sense philosophy had occasioned a number of critical essays beginning with the 1866/7 four part series in the *Canadian Journal* and continued in British reviews through the 1870's and 1880's. The choice of periodicals indicated developments of more than one sort. Since Canada did not have the appropriate philosophical journals or audience, and because the questions dealt with were under discussion elsewhere, Murray virtually ceased publishing serious work in Canada, turning instead to British journals in the 1880's and increasingly to newly created American journals in the 1890's.

More significantly for Murray's own intellectual development, these books and articles indicated a gradual shift of interest away from the Scottish philosophy and towards more diverse thinkers and schools. In 1885 he published an article on the eighteenth century philosopher, Solomon Maimon, in the *British Quarterly Review*. A contemporary and critic of Kant, Maimon had produced what Kant himself believed was the only cogent criticism of the Critical Philosophy before falling into virtual obscurity with the advent of Hegelian idealism. Murray's article was inspired by the accidental discovery in a Toronto
bookstore of a rare copy of Maimon's autobiography. The next four years were spent translating the work from its original German into English; the translated edition of this lively and satiric work is the only work of Murray's which has continued in publication through the twentieth century.\(^5\) The motivation for this task is difficult to determine. Maimon expressed many of Murray's criticisms of the Kantian system, in particular of the concepts of *a priori* categories of experience and of a noumenal realm which is both within and beyond imagination and consciousness. Yet in Murray's translation, the philosophical passages were largely omitted; many of those retained were, in the judgement of a later Maimon scholar, interpreted and translated inaccurately.\(^6\)

The decades following the publication of the work on Maimon were marked by articles on figures equally obscure or ones better known. From Hegesias the Cyreniac to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the diversity of subjects testified to the ending of Murray's scholarly preoccupation with the Scottish philosophy and its replacement with a type of academic eclecticism.\(^6\) Parallel with this was an increasing number of writings which testified to the emergence of a new synthesis of convictions. Beginning roughly in the 1890's, Murray's attention turned more and more to Ethics, treating it first in the general terms of a textbook but, in successive writings, in relation to Christianity and its bearing on social problems. The synthesis of formal ethics and liberal Christianity was not unusual in the intellectual climate of the late nineteenth century, but in Murray's treatment the theological component of the synthesis retained more than simply a trace of orthodoxy.
As Chapter 4 will demonstrate further, his application of this hybrid to social problems clarified the distinctions between Murray and neo-Hegelian new liberals such as T.H. Green and Arnold Toynbee.

This distinction is intriguing in itself and all the more so in that it occurs at the time that Murray was coming into greater contact with American philosophers, in particular those of the Hegelian St. Louis School. The initiation of this contact appears to have been fortuitous. The chief contact with the group was through Thomas Davidson, a man of varied interests who had become one of the leading members of the philosophical school while teaching high school in St. Louis in the 1860's and 1870's. One of Davidson's interests was in Scottish culture and folklore, and it appears from the nature of their friendship that this was the firmest link of intellectual kinship with Murray. Articles in the *Scottish American Journal* may have initially brought the two to each other's attention though Davidson was hardly an unknown figure in the nineteenth century intellectual world. Whatever the cause, by 1892 John Clark Murray was joining in the sessions of the Glenmore Summer School of Philosophy conducted by Davidson at his farm in the Adirondacks. Established in the mode and after the demise of the Emersonian Concord School of Philosophy, Glenmore was not a formal institution, but a vehicle established to maintain philosophical activity on a popular level outside of the university. As such, it drew on amateur philosophical clubs and societies as well as established universities for its students. Teachers included both the older, independent and self-taught figures of the St. Louis movement, and "many of the coming scholars of the period". With
Murray and Davidson at the 1892 session were Dr. W.T. Harris, the leading light of the St. Louis School, a close personal friend of Davidson and by this time the U.S. Commissioner of Education; John Dewey, then beginning to make a name for himself in psychology and ethics at the University of Michigan; and Josiah Royce of Harvard then rapidly rising to prominence as a leading American exponent of Absolute Idealism, who gave a series of lectures on "Recent Tendencies in Ethical Speculation". The philosophers were joined by two scholars of Semitic literature, Dr. Max Margolis of Columbia and Dr. A.J. Leon of Johns Hopkins.

The precise intellectual effect of close and informal contact with this circle would be difficult to gauge, particularly since Murray was not unfamiliar with the concepts and proponents of the Idealist movement in either America, Canada or Britain. Nor were these men unfamiliar with him; Harris had responded to Murray's gift a year earlier of his recently published *Introduction to Ethics* with the note that,

> I can see at once [that it] is a piece of fine thinking and thorough scholarship. It is a pleasure to take in one's hands a book of such maturity, a book that applies its high theories to questions that arise in the experience of the present day.

Though far from the Hegelianism of the St. Louis School, Murray's own turn toward ethical idealism becomes prominent at this time. The *Introduction to Ethics* had been, like the *Handbook of Psychology*, a non-speculative review of the field written primarily for the benefit of beginning students in philosophy. Subsequent work began to look
more particularly at the relations of ethics, liberal Christianity and social problems, culminating with the publication in 1908 of the far more personal *Handbook of Christian Ethics*.

Participation in the 1892 summer school marked the beginning of Murray's greater involvement in American philosophic circles. The year also saw his appointment, together with the philosophical psychologist James Baldwin of the University of Toronto, as one of the two delegates representing Canada in the planning sessions for the Philosophical Congress to be held conjointly with the 1893 Chicago World's Fair. The Congress itself provided an opportunity to deliver a paper on "Philosophy and Industrial Life" before an international audience; the paper was subsequently published in *The Monist*. In the same year he addressed the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association on the subject of dreams. With growing frequency, he began to join in debates in American journals, choosing opponents as diverse as Andrew Carnegie for a discussion on Canada and continental union, and Josiah Royce for a telling challenge on the proper relation between professors of philosophy and organized churches. After 1891, he seldom published serious work in anything other than American journals, choosing *The Monist, The Philosophical Review, The International Journal of Ethics, the Open Court* and the *Educational Review* for philosophical essays and book reviews. It is significant that these specialised journals were the product of the generation of scholars who had received professional training in graduate schools. In turning to them, Murray was turning away from those more general British and Canadian periodicals such as *Macmillan's* and *The Week*.
whose broader range reflected the intellectual milieu in which Murray himself had been trained. But though he might alter the medium, the work itself continued to reflect that earlier milieu which had fostered the ideal of the gentleman scholar; Murray's articles were discursive rather than analytic, not like the complex and at times convoluted works of philosophical scholarship which were the published fruit of the new educational ideal and which set the tone of the new journals. Consequently, his work was published only as these journals were themselves in their formative stages; their maturing was a maturing towards a depth of specialization which eventually excluded the older generation of philosophy teachers represented by Murray.

However short-lived, the American connection was evidently to Murray's liking. In addition to the publications, he continued to participate in Davidson's Summer School of Philosophy and in 1903 he went to give a series of public lectures on "The Ethics of Habit" to the Brooklyn Institute in New York. He returned to New York the following year to deliver a series on "The Evolution of Social Morality" to The Peoples Institute. America provided a more varied and hence potentially more appreciative audience; according to one authority, the Handbook of Psychology received little attention in Canada, where the more purely idealist approach of George Paxton Young or the more purely empiricist approach of James Baldwin was preferred. The book, however, had considerable success in America until the rise of a new psychology under William James.

Eclipsed by Royce, James and even John G. Watson, who had preceded Murray into both Idealism and the American philosophical
world, Murray never reached the level of philosophical scholarship or recognition attained by these other thinkers. His work was neither inventive nor profound and his reputation lay in interpretation and teaching, strengths which seldom sustain a philosopher's reputation long after his death.

Yet it would be an excessively narrow study which would evaluate Murray on the strength of his academic work alone. Literature was another field of interest and activity which went beyond mere diversion. Murray's first lectures to the ladies classes at Queen's had been on English Composition, which was characteristically analysed into a Primary Law of Perspicuity and Secondary Laws of Vigour, Elegance and Simplicity -- Laws which free his own writing from the verbosity which makes so much of Victorian academic prose unrelievably turgid. The promotion of literary societies has already been noted, as was the attempt to secure a combined chair in English Literature and Philosophy at McGill. Had he been successful in this latter effort, more writings on literary topics may have been produced. Some of those which did appear imaginatively combined two interests, such as an 1899 article on "The Merchant of Venice as an Exponent of Industrial Ethics".

The literary work was both critical and creative. Murray wrote and published poetry throughout his life and in 1904 published the novel *He That Had Received the Five Talents*. He also wrote but did not publish a play entitled *Judas of Kerioth*. Unlike some of the academic writing, these works fully deserve the indifference received from the literary world. Unfortunately, Murray's interest
in literature did not result in writing any more inspired than the mass of works produced for the middle class nineteenth-century public.

But if his creative exercises seldom achieved more than mediocre results, Murray was able to produce consistent and valuable work in an area which combined ethnography with literary criticism. His earliest work of original scholarship was not a text in philosophy, but The Ballads and Songs of Scotland, In View of Their Influence on the Character of the People, an 1874 work begun in undergraduate days and completed as a Prize Essay for the St. Andrews Society of Glasgow. Murray looked on his work in Scottish folklore as a leisure activity, but interest in the work was such that long after the publication of Ballads and Songs he wrote short articles on individual pieces, attempting to arrive at a critical version of a song through the comparison of regional variations. Most of these works were published in The Scottish-American Journal, a weekly based in New York. The critical method employed was a Higher Criticism of folk literature, the ethnographic historicism of Herder and Goethe:

"The character of a nation, as well as of an individual, is moulded by all the influences in the midst of which the nation or the individual lives ... Every manifestation of character is thus at once evidence of the existence of a certain tendency, and a contribution to the force of the tendency from which it has sprung ... The object [of the present work] has been, after arranging the ballads and songs into groups, to elicit some of the features by which each group is distinguished, to point out the effects which such features are calculated to produce and to trace these effects in Scottish life.""}

The primary effect was the development of poetical taste and ability among Scottish people. This was not simply significant, but
also encouraging to the immigrant author. Just as the ballads had nurtured Scott, and the songs produced Burns, so newer Scottish authors would continue to draw inspiration from traditional literature and the living characteristics it displayed, even if they abandoned the dialect or left the country. Scottish literature would preserve Scottish life in a world which was moving beyond national boundaries. 79

Murray resigned from active teaching at McGill in 1903, at age sixty-seven. Retirement was attended by the controversy which had marked the career itself. Murray, together with Alexander Johnson, a mathematics teacher who had taught at the university since 1857, was the first victim of a compulsory retirement policy adopted by the McGill Board of Governors. 80 Neither Murray nor his students, nor, for that matter, the Montreal public, believed the policy was justified in its general aims or particular applications. The Montreal Star reported the philosophy professor as claiming "He did not feel that he and his colleagues were old enough to be placed on the shelf." 81 The claim was bold for, according to one source, Murray was deaf by this time. 82 Despite the public outcry, the Board of Governors acted with characteristic inflexibility and finality in the matter.

For most of his thirty-one years at the university, Murray had been the Philosophy Department. Apart from the hiring of a part-time lecturer in 1886 to assist with women's courses and Murray's own invitation to the new principal of the Royal Victoria College, Hilda Diana Oakeley, to join as an associate member, it was not until the appointment of Dr. J.W. Hickson in 1901 that the Philosophy Department gained a second full-time member. 83 Throughout his tenure, all students
graduating in arts were required to take the third or fourth year course in Moral Philosophy, a course the department chairman seldom allotted to a lecturer, associate or colleague. In Murray's hands the course embraced political economy as well as ethics, the former being treated as the practical outcome and application of the latter. This understanding of ethics was imparted to almost every graduate of McGill from 1872 to 1903. If the tributes occasioned by retirement be accepted, moral philosophy was the heart of Murray's legacy as a teacher.

While Murray's personal forte was in the teaching of moral philosophy, he looked forward to the expansion of his department to include aesthetics and courses in the philosophies of law, religion, science and education. These ambitions reflected contemporary Idealist opinion that knowledge of a field was not complete without the study of its philosophical principles; since the strength of the university was in its programs in law and the sciences, and since many of the arts graduates continued on to seminary courses, the planned expansion was closely tied to what Murray perceived as the philosophical needs of the university community as a whole. Complete implementation of an 1898 proposal setting out this curriculum reform would have greatly expanded the influence of the department, but in turn would have required a greatly expanded department. In the event, Murray received neither the funds for full implementation nor the time to oversee it. H.D. Oakeley provided expansion into ancient philosophy and J.W. Hickson brought expertise in modern philosophy, but little was done to increase the range of subjects covered. When Murray himself was replaced,
it was with two men: A.E. Taylor, then at an early stage in what
was to be a notable career, and W. Caldwell, a man born the year after
Murray had first come to Canada and who of all the appointees most
exemplified the new direction in philosophical scholarship. Oakeley
and Taylor were products of the traditional classically-oriented Oxford
program in *literae humaniores*. Hickson was better trained in philos-
ophy at an advanced level, but Caldwell was a far more accomplished
scholar. Trained in Scotland, Germany, France and England, he had
already taught at the universities of Edinburgh, Cornell, Chicago
and Northwestern before coming to McGill, where he remained until
retirement in 1933. Caldwell had done work on the Scottish philosophy,
but his real interest was Schopenhauer. The ability of the university
to attract men of the calibre of Taylor and Caldwell says much about
the department which Murray had created and overseen. But the ambitions
of the former Chairman were no closer to realization under its new
faculty. The department expanded its offerings in the history of
contemporary philosophy but continued to ignore the expansion into
other disciplines envisioned by Murray.

The McGill Board of Governors may have refused to relent on
its decision to retire Murray, but it was at pains to emphasize that
its actions did not reflect any official displeasure with the professor.
In appointing him professor emeritus, the Board noted that "It is within
the knowledge of every member of the Board that no Professor has exerted
a greater influence for good in the minds of his students and that
no member of the staff has ever been more highly respected in every
section of the community". The words had particular irony for those
familiar with Murray's bitter clashes with the board over the education of women in the 1880's, culminating in near dismissal in 1888. Public newspapers and college journals echoed the board's praise for his scholarly work, wide culture and personal integrity. The journal of the Montreal Presbyterian College, most of whose students had attended McGill and where Murray himself had given frequent lectures, printed an editorial of praise noting that:

in the cold intellectual pursuits of college life his lectures gave us higher conceptions of man and nobler aspirations. We never felt that he was merely toying with fancies, playing with ideas or indulging in idle speculation but was bringing all his theories into immediate contact with our daily life. He is a man of the widest scholarship and of the highest culture, yet his lectures always go deeper than mere scholarship and culture; they touch the wellsprings of culture.

Apart from occasional teaching in Christian ethics and the philosophy of religion at the Presbyterian College, the resignation from McGill was the resignation from active academic life. Murray returned to social issues and the popular press with individual articles and extended series, such as a column on "Questions of the Day" in The Argus and "The Professor's Armchair" in The Family Herald and Weekly Star. His writing for The Scottish-American Journal now consisted largely of obituaries. Apart from the Introduction to Christian Ethics and a series of entries for the Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, his scholarly work all but ceased until the publication late in life of review articles on "Human Progress" and "Pragmatism" in the University Magazine. In 1912, he resigned from the Royal Society of Canada, one of the few charter members still living. Murray now occupied his time in a variety of pursuits ranging from
work on a Clark family tree to exercising his hobbies of snowshoeing and bicycle riding. Participation in the Summer School in Philosophy was continued after the death of Thomas Davidson in 1900, but by 1909 interest in the Glenmore had dwindled to the point where only 4 or 5 students were planning to attend.

John Clark Murray lived to see the outbreak of the war which shattered the confident faith of many idealists in cultural progress, but though bewildered by its atrocities, he refused to let it shake his "cheerful faith in mankind". Even so, such a faith could only be sustained in voluntary isolation:

He refused to read any more war literature, which concerned itself with the mad dance of the world of sense, and wisely absorbed himself again in the great classics of philosophy which move in the liberating sphere of eternal things. Almost to the end he was mentally active. In the summer of 1916 he remarked that he had lived longer than Kant, was in better health and felt far from singing a nunc dimittis. Serene and clam, he proceeded through life, confident, after a thoughtful survey, that the course of human affairs ultimately tended to the good.

In November of 1917, as a bitter election campaign over conscription was being fought in Canada and the Bolshevik Revolution was underway in Russia, Murray fell ill; on November 20, 1917 he died.
Footnotes to Chapter One

1 All information on the life of David Murray is drawn from J.C. Murray, Memoir of David Murray, Late Provost of Paisley; With Sketches of Local History in His Time (Paisley: Alexander Gardner, 1881).


3 Ibid., pp. 103; 145.

4 Murray, Memoir of David Murray, p. 111.


6 David Fate Norton has provided the best definition to date in his, "The Scottish Enlightenment Exported: John Clark Murray (1836 - 1917)" (unpublished Canadian Historical Association paper, 1977).


8 Chitnis, Scottish Enlightenment, pp. 6; 143.

9 As indicated by the notebooks and papers in the collected papers of John Clark Murray held in the McGill University Archives (hereafter MUA): MUA 611/8 - 34.

10 H. Jones and J.H. Muirhead, The Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird (Glasgow: Macklehose, 1921), p. 16.

11 John Clark Murray, "Notes from the Lectures of Sir William Hamilton on Metaphysics" [1854 - 1856], MUA 611/13.


13 Alexander Nicolson in "Testimonials in Favour of the Reverend John C. Murray, Licentiate in Theology, for the Office of Examiner in Mental Philosophy in the University of Glasgow"[ed. J.C. Murray], (Glasgow: B. Stewart, 1861), p. 8.

14 Andrew Crichton in Ibid., p. 12.

15 Student address books for both universities indicated the Faculty in which students were registered. Both list John Clark Murray as a student in Theology: Addressbuch Der Ruprecht-Karls Universitat in Heidelberg (Heidelberg: Julius Groos, 1856),

A "John Hutchison" is listed as coming from J.H. Stirling's home city of Glasgow, but is included in the Faculty of Theology. Most of the names checked off by Murray in the Heidelberg book are those of theology students from other parts of Germany and from Britain. His address of 9 Redarstrasse was shared by a pharmacology student, R.D. Laenger, and a student of jurisprudence, Eduard Fisher. See: *Addressbuch der Ruprecht-Karls Universität*, p. 12.

John Clark Murray, "A Vindication of Theology: Being an Address to Theology Students" (Montreal: Dawson Brothers, 1877), p. 3.


Queen's University Letters: Principal Leitch to the Board of Trustees, September 20, 1862. Calderwood's success in the competition is indicated in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, vol. XXII, s.v. "Calderwood, Sir Henry".


Queen's University Letters: Principal Leitch to the Board of Trustees, September 20, 1862 and September 27, 1862; John Clark Murray to William Ireland, Secretary of the Board of Trustees, October 24, 1862.

Queen's University Letters: Principal Leitch to the Board of Trustees, September 27, 1862.


Queen's University Letters: John Clark Murray to the Board of Trustees, April 26, 1866; August 27, 1866; March 24, 1868.

M. Angus, "The Old Stones of Queen's, 1842 - 1900", *Historic Kingston* 20, (1972), p. 11.

John Clark Murray, "Introductory Address at the Opening of Session 1967 - 68 in Queen's College, Kingston", MUA 611/2, p.5.

"Chair of Logic, Mental and Moral Philosophy in McGill University", *Kingston Daily News*, May 1, 1872, MUA 611/2, p.13.


31 Neatby, Queen's University, p. 117; Queen's University Letters: John Clark Murray to the Board of Trustees, April 28, 1871.

32 Neatby, Queen's University, p. 131; "Annual Report of the Trustees of Queen's University and College", Acts and Proceedings of the Synod of the Presbyterian Church of Canada in Connection with the Church of Scotland (np: Presbyterian Church of Canada, 1865), p. 56; Ibid. (1871), p. 76.

33 John Clark Murray, "Letter to the Board of Governors of McGill College" MUA 909A/4/3. This printed, 17 page letter was Murray's summary statement in a decade-long salary dispute with the McGill Board of Governors. Minutes of the Governors' meetings indicate that it was submitted on December 17, 1887. Murray claimed that the financial conditions of his appointment had never been fulfilled, and demanded that approximately $2000 in deferred salary be repaid. The Board protested that it had neither the funds nor the obligation to fulfill the disputed conditions of employment. The initial protest had been raised in April, 1879 [MUA 681/4A, p. 285], but was pressed more vigorously by Murray in late 1885, when the professor began questioning the moral and financial wisdom of McGill's policy of separate classes for women -- a policy which was more expensive to implement than the alternative long advocated by Murray, co-education. Although the college had received a special endowment from Donald A. Smith to provide for the separate classes, it was widely suspected that the exclusive terms of the grant had been inspired, if not quite dictated, by the most avid 'separationist' at McGill, Principal J.W. Dawson. There can be little doubt that the Board of Governors' willingness to embark on separate classes incited Murray to challenge its unwillingness to provide the College professors with a decent salary. Murray certainly connected the two issues; the salary controversy was resolved only when Murray withdrew his claim on March 23, 1888, one month before giving a public speech which sparked an open fight with Dawson and the Board of Governors over the issue of women's higher education. MUA 681/5B, p.308. The bulk of the material in the salary dispute can be found in the Governors' Minute Book, MUA 681/5B, pp. 154-167.

34 "McGill University Governors' Minute Book" MUA 681/4B, pp. 25 (March 7, 1872); 39 (April 11, 1872); 43 (April 27, 1872).

35 John Watson subsequently wrote to Principal Snodgrass of Queen's College, applying for the "chair of Mental Science" and including with his application a copy of the testimonials printed for the earlier application to McGill. Queen's University Letters: John Watson to Principal Snodgrass, May 2, 1872.


37 Ibid.

38 Other students went into missions. Wilberforce Lee wrote in 1892 from a school and mission post in Benquella, West Africa, thanking Murray for the gift of a copy of the
Introduction to Ethics, and informing the professor that he had been converted to Free Trade by discussions in Murray's class in Ethics. MUA 611/83 (September 30, 1892). A second student wrote from Moose Fort on James Bay, where he was working with the Christian Missionary Society. T. Bird Holland had taken his notes from courses in Psychology and Ethics with him to mission field, and was using the former to make observations on the "primitive natives" of the North. MUA 611/83 (April 15, 1901).

The achievements of Jardine and Campbell are given in the Queen's Trustees' "Report to Synod", Queen's University Letters, April 27, 1871, p.3. Robert Jardine taught philosophy for a year at the University of New Brunswick before proceeding to Edinburgh.


"McGill University Faculty of Arts Minute Book", MUA 48/32/1/4, p.40; Old McGill vol. VI, p. 22.


The speech was a revision of "The Higher Education of Women", delivered originally at the Queen's College Convocation for 1870 - 1871, and amended for delivery to the Montreal Ladies Educational Association on October 2, 1872. The identification of "the two great social problems" does not appear in the printed version of the original lecture, but does appear in annotations to a revised version in the Murray Papers: MUA 611/81, p. 5. Contemporary newspaper reports include the addition and so confirm that it was this revised version which was delivered to the M.L.E.A.: Montreal Gazette, (October 3, 1872); Montreal Daily Witness, (October 3, 1872).


The Dominion Review was an anonymous work. Neither its editors nor its contributors were indicated by name in the first issue; all correspondance was to be directed to publisher W. Drysdale of Montreal. Murray's own articles are indicated by penned initials in the copy held with the John Clark Murray Papers in the McGill Archives.

Davie, Democratic Intellect, pp. 4; 260 - 261.

Tyndall did not feel obliged to take up the challenge of thoroughly disproving theism. One month after "Atomism and Theism", the Canadian Monthly and National Review published Tyndall's "Reply to Critics of the Belfast Address", the preface to the seventh edition of the Address, in which the President of the British Association for the Advancement of Science responded to some of his more agitated and less educated critics. Neither Murray nor his arguments were dealt with in this rebuttal. The dispute lies on one level between materialist scientism and religion, but on another, it demonstrates the difference between the metaphysical approach to science characteristic of Scottish university teaching, and the positivist experimental approach adopted earlier in Britain and exemplified by Tyndall. Davie, Democratic Intellect, pp. 190 - 191.


Idem, "A Remarkable Scot - Thomas Davidson", The Scottish American (December 5, 1900).


John Clark Murray, "Summer School of Philosophy", Scottish Review (January, 1892), pp. 98 - 112. The Glenmore School was a phase in the transition from 'amateur' to 'professional' philosophy which occurred in America through the late 1880's and early...

65 W.T. Harris, U.S. Commissioner of Education, to John Clark Murray, MUA 611/83, (November 10, 1893). Harris believed that the inclusion of practical applications into the Introduction to Ethics was an advance on existing texts which limited themselves to abstract principles: "They do not seem to have learned precisely the scope and penetration of the ideas which they set up. I think your book ought to have a favourable reception in all our colleges."


68 Idem, "Do We Ever Dream of Tasting?", Proceedings of the American Psychological Association, MUA 611/2, p.66.


70 Idem, "The Ethics of Habit", MUA 611/62.

71 The lecturship program can be found in Murray's papers: MUA 611/62.

72 H.H., "Professor J. Clark Murray", University Magazine XVII (1918), p.563; Tory Hoff, "The Controversial Appointment of James Mark Baldwin to the University of Toronto in 1889", (MA thesis: Carleton University, 1980), p. 222. Hoff deals with the dispute between Idealism and Empiricism as it emerged, with nationalist overtones, in the search for a successor to George Paxton Young's chair of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. Canada Firsters wanted an Idealist who would perpetuate Young's philosophy, which they considered distinctly Canadian. As a result, they were doubly opposed Baldwin, who was American by birth and a Common Sense Realist by Princeton training. The episode throws into question the common interpretation of Canadian philosophy as moving from Common Sense Realism to Idealism through the 1870's and 1880's.

73 John Clark Murray, "Lectures on English Composition: Session 1869 - 1870", MUA 611/42.


Idem, "Judas of Kerioth", MUA 611/76 - 80A.

Idem, The Ballads and Songs of Scotland, in View of Their Influence on the Character of the People (London: Macmillan, 1874). The award of the St. Andrew Society is noted in the Preface.

Ibid., pp. xii - xiv.

Ibid., p. 197.

"Editorial", Montreal Daily Witness (February 21, 1903), MUA 611/83.

"Professor J. Clark Murray", Montreal Star (March 28, 1903), MUA 611/83.

Annabella Square, Interview with Dr. Elizabeth Trott (Ottawa, 1979); transcript in possession of Dr. E. Trott. According to grand-daughter Annabella Square, Murray continued to lecture to classes after the onset of deafness; unlike those of Sir William Hamilton's, these classes were respectfully silent.

P.T. Lafleur was appointed part-time lecturer in both the Philosophy and English Departments in 1886. The bulk of his teaching in philosophy consisted of courses of logic for both sexes. "McGill University Governors' Minute Book", MUA 681/58, p. 141, (January 23, 1886). Despite his opposition to the idea of a separate ladies college, Murray approached both Oakeley and Anne McLean, who had a Ph.D in Sociology from the University of Chicago, with the invitation to join the Philosophy Department. Oakeley, who later recalled Murray as "a much-respected, liberal-minded and genial person", agreed and began teaching courses in Ancient Philosophy and Ethics, H.D. Oakeley, My Adventures in Education (London: Williams and Norgate, 1939), p.86. The appointment of Hickson followed immediately after the underfunding of the Philosophy Department attracted notice in the McGill Annual Report: "It is a complete anomaly that there should exist today in an institution of such high standing as McGill a double chair in Mental and Moral Philosophy, and the separation of Ethics from Logic and Psychology becomes a matter of pressing urgency." Annual Report of the Governor, Principal and Fellows of McGill University, Montreal, for the Year 1900 - 1901 (Montreal: Gazette Printing, 1901), p.2.


"Revised Curriculum: Reports of Committees", McGill University Faculty of Arts Minute Book", MUA 48/32/1/4, (1899).

A.E. Taylor was the formal replacement, filling Murray's former post, the 'John Frothingham Chair in Mental and Moral Philosophy' from 1903 to 1908. Reflecting changes in the conception of philosophy and psychology since the original endowment in 1872, the chair was renamed the 'Frothingham Chair of Philosophy'. A new chair was
endowed by businessman William Macdonald for Dr. William Caldwell. "McGill University Governors' Minute Book", MUA 681/7, p. 246 (April 17, 1903).

Oakeley, Adventures, p. 60. Oakeley had studied under Edward Caird at Balliol before joining the faculty of the Morley College for Working Men and Women in 1898. In coming to McGill, she had turned down a research studentship at the London School of Economics. Old McGill III (Montreal: np, 1901), p. 141.


"McGill University Board of Governors' Minute Book" MUA 681/7, p. 239 (February 2, 1903).

To Whom Honour is Due", Montreal Gazette (May 6, 1903), in MUA 639/1, p. 29.


Murray wrote entries on "agniology"; "amiability"; "bigotry"; "goodwill"; "habit"; "idleness"; "ignorance"; and "peevishness". Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (Edinburgh: T.and T.Clark, 1908 - 1927). The review articles were Murray's only contribution to the University Magazine: John Clark Murray, "Human Progress", University Magazine XI (1912), pp. 156 - 169; Idem, "Pragmatism", University Magazine XIV (1915), pp. 102 - 113.


Letter from John Martin to John Clark Murray, MUA 611/80, August 2, 1909.


Ibid., pp. 565 - 566.
CHAPTER TWO

The Critical Framework

Serene and calm, he proceeded through life, confident, after a thoughtful survey, that the course of human affairs ultimately tended to the good.¹

The "thoughtful survey" which so heartened John Clark Murray began with university studies in Scotland, continued through early years of teaching at Queen's and matured during the years in Montreal. Its scope was broad: the metaphysical structure of reality, the nature of knowledge, the task of philosophy, the human prospect -- all figured in the survey as it gained expression in books and articles produced over a fifty year span.

A study of the evolution of this survey cannot proceed without a preliminary investigation into the contextual problem of the 'place' of John Clark Murray in the history of philosophy. The categories of such an investigation have been established in the works of four authors who have, in the last thirty years, established nineteenth century Canadian philosophy as a distinct field of historical study. Though interpretations have varied, a basic interpretive framework has unified the approach to John Clark Murray in the works of these historians and philosophers. From John Irving's overview articles of the 1950's to the more recent works by A. B. McKillop and Leslie Armour and Elizabeth Trott, Murray has been interpreted by reference
to one or another of the dominant schools of the period; most notably Scottish Common Sense Realism and the Idealism revived in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.\(^2\)

It is certainly necessary to locate Murray in his 'times'. What is not beyond question however, is the assumption that formal philosophical schools constitute the appropriate intellectual context for Murray's own thought. What is also not beyond question is the assumption that there exists an additional category — that of Canadian philosophy — into which Murray must be made to fit. The appropriateness of these assumptions will be examined in this chapter. In addition, an effort will be made to arrive at alternative categories for the understanding of the nature and content of John Clark Murray's thought.

It is difficult to credit the work of those who would argue in favour of the existence of a distinctly Canadian philosophy in the nineteenth century.\(^3\) It is not enough to compile the views of individual thinkers with an eye to determining parallels or similarities when these similarities are shared by most thinkers in the English speaking world. Nor is it enough to define it in negative terms as that which British and American philosophy were not, an approach which often reveals more backwater mediocrity than original thought. A national school must be based on the existence of an identifiable national philosophic community defined by a concentration on a distinct set of issues or a characteristic methodology that has served to draw thinkers together in spite of geographical and generational separation.
If it is to be seen as a school, it must be marked by frequent and public -- that is, published -- discussion of these topics and techniques among the different members. There must be a succession of thinkers, of teachers and their students through whom the distinct thought of the school is explained in the changing terms of new philosophical movements, and by whom the school is perpetuated.

Such a body of thinkers and thoughts cannot be identified in the history of philosophy in Canada. On the whole, Canadian philosophers of the nineteenth century considered themselves as part of an international, rather than national community. Their serious books and articles were more often published in Britain and America, where the international audience was centred, than in Canada. When controversies were joined it was with British and American thinkers rather than Canadian colleagues. There was little serious and continuous discussion among Canadian philosophers of any questions, whether specifically Canadian or of more general import. A Canadian philosophical association was not formed until 1958 and the first Canadian philosophical journal did not appear until 1962.

This is neither surprising nor, contra nationalists, particularly shameful. It would be as difficult to determine the speculative problems or approaches that are unique to Canada as it would be to determine the nature of the philosophy peculiar to Australia or New Zealand. There is no inherent reason why national schools of philosophy should result from national governments or all national cultures. There is even less reason when the government and culture are colonial. J.G. Bourinot confirmed this in his 1893 Presidential Address to the Royal...
Society of Canada, admitting that in spite of even his own grander, national ambitions,

Perhaps the literature of a colonial dependency, or a relatively new country, must necessarily in its first stages be imitative, and it is only now and then an original mind bursts the fetters of intellectual subordination.

Colonial universities across the British empire were small and often separated by great distances. Their 'Philosophy Departments' seldom included more than one or two faculty members who, in turn, were often educated overseas. Working individually and feeling closer to former classmates and teachers than to colleagues five hundred miles away with whom they might share little more than allegiance to a common government, these men lacked the numbers, opportunity or incentive to develop a significant national philosophic community.

Looking beyond historian's expectations to philosophers thoughts, it becomes clear than many nineteenth century thinkers were consciously working to transcend purely national distinctions and arrive at a philosophy which would point to a new international, or, more correctly, supra-national world order. Indeed, philosophy itself was seen as best suited to this task, for the abstract necessities of rational thought recognized no national boundaries. John Clark Murray expressed this vision as he left civilized Scotland to take up an unprestigious post at a struggling denominational college in a small, remote town of an undeveloped colony. Friends would be justified in pitying the cultured young professor his colonial fate, but their colleague had already considered the positive opportunities of the post. Speaking at a farewell dinner hosted by friends in Paisley, he explained his
optimism:

For a long time past, in meditating on the possible sphere in which I might find the best opportunity for using whatever powers had been bestowed on me, I had often turned my thoughts to those young countries which are growing up in different parts of the world under the fostering care of our own fatherland... Having accepted the position of a philosophical professor in Canada, it necessarily became a very important consideration with me, whether the circumstances of the country were likely to make it favourable to the advancement of philosophy. Now the most prominent feature of Canada, as of all our Colonies, is its youth, and it is this very feature which I would hit upon as that which gives the strongest hope of its being likely to contribute towards the inauguration of that larger philosophy which the enlarged necessities of human speculation demand.

Lest any hearers miss the negative implications of the connection drawn between philosophy and nationality, Murray expanded on the theme

We, like most old countries, already possess a school of philosophy, in the support of which we feel as if our national honour were in a measure involved; and this attachment to a national system is one of the prejudices from which we must be freed before we can appreciate the systems of other nations, or look at things as they are in themselves.

Canada's lack of philosophical tradition gave it an advantage in a world optimistically—and erroneously—portrayed as entering a new age marked by the evaporation of all purely national distinctions

The new countries which form the British Colonies are not only unfettered by any such prejudices, but they are growing up in a period of human history in which it is impossible that they can ever be trammelled by nationalism to such an extent as the nations of the past.

Murray recognized that Technology was the main instrument in the erosion of nation, cultural, economic and political boundaries which had been in progress since the fifteenth century invention of the printing press. The process of erosion was allowing the growth of truly
international thought. Imperial links could only speed this growth. As an example, Murray claimed that Britain's rule over India gave her the practical means to begin the work of effecting a higher synthesis of Eastern and Western philosophy. And even though the newly appointed Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy did not intend to reconcile Hamilton and Hinduism, he could say boldly that "It is with the hope of contributing something, and of exciting others to contribute something, towards the attainment of this wider, more human philosophy, that I go to the work which is to separate me from you and from my native land." The creation of a distinctly Canadian philosophy was certainly not to be a conscious aim.

But while modern philosophy might transcend national boundaries, John Clark Murray did not intend to transcend his own cultural heritage. In the same bold Paisley speech he declared,

But though I go to Canada with these more cosmopolitan aspirations, I need scarcely assure those of you who have known me truly that, wherever I may be, I shall never cease to remember that I am a Scotchman. I can never forget that I was first taught philosophy by the most Scottish of all Scotchmen, the late Sir William Hamilton, and that my philosophical studies were carried on in the society of companions with whom I became acquainted in the Grammar School of Paisley, in the classrooms of Scottish Universities, and in the general social life of Scotland.

Is there anything more here than a polite after-dinner speech? Is Murray to be understood not in terms of Canadian, but of Scottish philosophy? The problem is reversed. If Canadian philosophy is too meagre to identify, Scottish philosophy is too varied to pin down. Murray himself did not limit it to the Common Sense Realism foreshadowed by Frances Hutcheson, developed by Thomas Reid, continued by Dugald
Stewart and transformed by Sir William Hamilton. In his treatment
Scottish philosophy became purely and thoroughly national thought,
expanding to include the empiricism of David Hume and the idealism of
Bishop Berkeley, James Ferrier and J.H. Stirling.\(^{15}\) Berkeley's only
flaw was his lack of Scots blood, but his influence on Hume and Reid,
albeit negative in both cases, was sufficient cause to allow him to join
the fraternity. If, then, Murray is to be understood in terms of Scottish
philosophy, what precisely is Scottish philosophy?

Murray's philosophical ecumenicity aside, the most distinct
school under the Scottish national heading is that of Common Sense
Realism. Determining Murray's relation to this school has always been
a problem for commentators. John Irving, whose treatment owes more to
published obituaries than original study, covered all possible bases
when he concluded that "It is difficult to classify Murray in terms of
the conventional schools . . . his final position is perhaps best
described as an eclectic idealism. But Sir William Hamilton was never
far beneath the surface."\(^{16}\) A.B. McKillop is more original and more
definite, believing that Hamilton's favourite pupil began to entertain
doubts about the school in the 1860's and that "by 1878, Murray's break
with Common Sense was complete".\(^{17}\) The resulting gap was filled with a
form of idealism. Leslie Armour and Elizabeth Trott have been bolder
still. In what is by far the most thoroughly analytic and philosophically
informed study of Murray to date, they conclude not only that
Murray was never a true Hamiltonian, but that even in student days he
entertained sympathies for James Ferrier's idealism.\(^{18}\)

Hardly a consensus. The problem springs in part from the
nature of Hamilton's synthesis of Reid's Common Sense and Kant's Transcendental Idealism. As will be seen below, Murray followed his mentor in the characteristically Scottish attempt to find some mediation of empiricist realism and rationalist idealism. His thought is strongly Kantian in formal structure and yet it abandons Kant precisely when he is most idealist -- i.e., in the concept of the noumenal realm (a concept, moreover, which Hamilton accepts in his philosophy of the Unconditioned.) On balance, Murray's thought cannot be traced in terms of a progression from realism to idealism, from Hamilton to Kant, Hegel or Ferrier. It can be more accurately seen as an attempt better to complete the type of synthesis of the two schools which Hamilton himself was working on. Murray simply chose different models and emphases.

He clearly rejects the realism of Hamilton's predecessors. From his earliest writings he pictured Thomas Reid as a pedestrian and sloppy thinker, unaware of the Humean and Berkeleian implications in his refutations of Hume and Berkeley, unsystematic in his enumeration of first principles and sadly mistaken in his attempt to found an epistemology on Common Sense:

The truth is, Reid's thinking never represents the speculative toil of a philosophic intellect, but merely the refined opinions of ordinary intelligence . . . His writings, when they go beyond some interesting details of psychology, are little more than reassertions of the universal beliefs, as they are expressed in the universal language of mankind.

This was the thinker on who Hamilton had expended so much editorial and evangelical effort.

As for Dugald Stewart, Murray confirmed the common view that he had done little more than restate Reid's mediocre ideas with
greater eloquence and erudition but "not with a more comprehensive grasp of principles, or any bolder originality in their application... We have no considerable addition to the substance, no new trait in the character of the philosophy."²² Quoting 'Christopher North', "He seems terrified to place one foot before the other."²³ Stewart was also a philosopher admired and promoted by Hamilton.

It appears that Murray never accepted Common Sense realism as a firm epistemological foundation for philosophy. In his early articles on Hamilton, he said little more than that it was the rock on which Hamilton's philosophy had struck, a conclusion made all the more puzzling by the fact that Hamilton was aware of the problems it had posed for earlier thinkers.²⁴ Later writings were less charitable in evaluating Hamilton's scholarly refining of the doctrine, claiming that "... the very explicitness, which he has given to the doctrine, has only shown more clearly how untenable it is," for "he never succeeds in establishing any real distinction between a philosophical appeal to Common Sense and the unphilosophical citation of vulgar opinion against unpalatable conclusions of science."²⁵ The desire on the part of the author of "Atomism and Theism" to preserve such a distinction indicates a judicious spirit in the context of the often heated nineteenth century "warfare of Science with Theology".²⁶

If the philosophy of Common Sense was so clearly unacceptable, what of the balance of Hamilton's philosophy? When Murray gave an edited summary in the 1870 Outline of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, he ignored the common sense epistemology as it had been formulated in Hamilton's extensive annotations to his editions of the collected works.
of Reid and Stewart and in the *Dissertations on Common Sense* and expanded instead on the account of philosophy in *Lectures On Metaphysics*, a somewhat disorganized set of lectures prepared by Hamilton for his university classes in 1836. In that account, Hamilton approached metaphysics, like Reid and Stewart before him and to some extent Murray after him, through Psychology. The three main branches of philosophy were phenomenal, nomological and inferential psychology. Phenomenal psychology took the world as it appeared to the central agency of consciousness, subdividing it into the realms of cognitions (the faculties), of emotions, and of conations (desires and volitions). Thus rooted in consciousness, the object of phenomenal psychology was as much man as the world. Nomological psychology dealt with the laws which governed these realms and inferential psychology with the possible extensions which thought could make beyond them. As will be seen below, Murray may have owed to Hamilton the derivation and initial subdivision of consciousness; he accepted in part Hamilton's analysis of the nature of man and the phenomenal realm. Yet this acceptance was so qualified as to be hardly an intellectual debt. The six faculties (Presentative, Conservative, Reproductive, Representative, Elaborative and Regulative) which for Hamilton constituted the realm of cognitions play no part in Murray's thought; in some cases, their content was explicitly rejected. So too with emotions and conations; Murray adopted little more than the names when he went on to examine human nature in his works on psychology and ethics. But most significantly, Hamilton's elaboration of the nature of consciousness was explicitly and extensively rejected by his student. The nature of the contrast between the two will be seen in the
context of Murray's doctrine of consciousness.

One reason for the distinction has to do with a related doctrine significant as part of Hamilton's transposition of Kant into the Common Sense context. Hamilton held that knowledge was relational: objects were known through their relation to other objects and by their relation to the knowing consciousness and the conditions of intelligibility (i.e., time, space, substance, qualities, etc.).

Everything in the phenomenal world was relative, limited or conditioned. As a result, the absolute, the infinite and the unconditioned were held to be beyond intelligibility. They were not, however, beyond existence. The existence of the Absolute, the Infinite and the Unconditioned was necessary for the completion of Hamilton's metaphysics, but this existence could, like Kant's postulates of practical reason, only be asserted as necessary concepts derived through the negation of what is known -- that is, only through logical negation of the relative, the limited, and the conditioned.

Hamilton went on to describe the Absolute and the Infinite as mutually contradictory elements within the unknown and unknowable realm of the Unconditioned, but by this point in speculation, Murray had already left him to join such critics as James Ferrier and J.H. Stirling. With them, the author of "Atomism and Theism" believed the cornerstone of both science and philosophy to be the assertion of the rational order and ultimate intelligibility of the universe. Murray judged ludicrous the attempts by transcendental idealists like Hamilton and positivist materialists like Tyndall to assert that our knowledge was limited to the phenomenal realm and the advance by negation to some Higher Realm whose unintelligibility proved no barrier
to attempts to populate it with all manner of Supreme Beings, Ultimate Minds, and diverse structures of pure reason which could act magnetically as a final cause on the phenomenal world below.\(^{32}\) The recourse of materialists to this type of realm was only proof of the untenability of their atomistic doctrines. The offense of idealists -- and those like Hamilton who suffered only temporary lapses -- was an excess of speculative energy which lifted philosophy off the ground of human experience and sent it irretrievably into the clouds.\(^{33}\) Ironically, similar convictions had motivated Thomas Reid to reconstruct philosophy on the basis of simple and unspeculative Common Sense.\(^{34}\)

In sum, though Murray followed Hamilton in seeking a moderate philosophy between the scepticism of empiricism and the gnosticism of idealism, the student seems to have drawn little of doctrinal substance from the teacher. Yet the teacher cannot be denied all influence. Murray spoke appreciatively of him long afterwards as one whose manner and enthusiasm had made philosophy itself come alive.\(^{35}\) But for Hamilton, Murray might well have spent his days in obscurity as a Free Church minister in Scotland. There was a second debt as well. Murray adopted the extremely systematic and classificatory approach to issues and problems which marked Hamilton's writings. The study of each issue began with etymological definitions of the key terms and moved through manifold divisions and subdivisions to create an architectural complex of inter-related parts to which expression can seldom be given with any appreciable degree of literary grace. Murray's use of this method relaxed somewhat in the first decades after leaving Scotland but as the later textbooks (for which it was appropriate) show, it was never
entirely abandoned. These aims and debts show Murray to have been one of those who, in the analysis of G.E. Davie, followed the moderate spirit but not the Common Sense letter of Sir William Hamilton -- a distinction made increasingly untenable for Scottish philosophers as Common Sense philosophy became one of the banners in the political, cultural and religious battles which divided Scotland after the Free Church Secession.

If Murray did not subscribe to Common Sense, and if his debt to Hamilton was one of inspiration and form rather than content, what of the third category? Is he best understood in terms of Idealism?

The problem of definition rises once again. The main currents of philosophical Idealism in nineteenth century Britain were those of transcendental or critical idealism stemming from Kant, and absolute idealism stemming from Hegel. The British public had come into contact with both streams through the writings of Carlyle and Coleridge in the first part of the century, but it was not until later that idealism began to take firm hold in intellectual circles. The English Idealism which resulted was an eclectic mixture which owed more to Hegel than to Kant. Kant's categorical imperative was embraced by many thinkers seeking a rational framework which would preserve moral philosophy from collapse as the unceasing erosion of religious faith continued. But the categorical imperative was given a new context as the dialectically evolving Reason of Hegel with its promise of an end to all dualisms and oppositions, most notably that of faith and science, was taken up by an increasing number of philosophers and cultural critics. This promise was "The Secret of Hegel"; and when J.H. Stirling published his
introductory work of that title in 1865 he recognized two important facts about the British clerisy. On one hand, it knew very little of the Hegelian system; on the other, this system was the answer to the intellectual needs of an age committed to a vague but comprehensive notion of "progress" and characterized by nothing so much as doubt in its struggle to retain a Christian morality while embracing the "promise" of materialistic science. 38

Hegelian idealism appeared to be a perfect compromise, for it wedded what many believed were the antithetical realities of spiritual religion and material science. Or perhaps the two were only betrothed; the Hegelian promise could be widely embraced because it was vague enough to allow a high degree of individual interpretation. The eventual union of Christianity and science was a future event and, as Kierkegaard had already found, the Hegelian future never comes. 39 More to the point, the "spiritual realm" had little specifically Christian definition to begin with and this little was lost as responsibility for the formulation of English Idealism passed from the troubled consciences of the early Hegelians to those younger authors such as Bernard Bosanquet and J.M.E. McTaggart who had not passed through the mid-century period of religious doubt. 40 The realm of science, on the other hand, appeared daily to gain greater definition. By the end of the century scientific experiments and discoveries were covered in the press with the regularity that decades before had marked the reporting of sermons.

In the 1860's, idealism was still both a secret and a promise. And while it took on characteristics of both critical and absolute
idealism, the Idealist movement shaped by Edward Caird, T.H. Green and John Watson was more a Hegelian than a Kantian revival.

Where does John Clark Murray stand in relation to this revival? He was a peer of its main figures, Caird, Green and Stirling. Like them, he was a university student in the 1850's, studying at Glasgow with Caird and in Heidelberg with Stirling. Yet his later work is so removed from theirs in depth and tone that it would be easy to consider him the representative of an earlier generation. The reasons for this distinction lie in the circumstances of the early stages of the idealist revival and its 'charismatic' appeal as a movement rather than simply a school of thought.

The generation which passed through British universities had three options open to it in the way of academic careers. Some, such as Henry Calderwood, were able to win appointments in British universities soon after graduation. These philosophers continued for years to work within the established modes or paradigms of mid-century British philosophy, primarily those of Common Sense Realism and empiricism.

A second group of philosophy students including J.C. Murray and Henry Laurie turned to the new colonial universities in their search for academic appointments. Like their professional colleagues in Britain, their theoretical work continued to be articulated and refined through the framework received in undergraduate years. The relative isolation of colonial universities and the consequent lack of direct exposure to new philosophical movements resulted in the perpetuation of these mid-century frameworks long after their abandonment in Britain.

A third group of students was unable immediately to win academic
appointment in Britain and unable or unwilling to take recourse to colonial universities. These individuals - Caird, Green, Stirling and others - continued their studies and in due course discovered "the secret of Hegel". It is important to realize that the revival of idealism was more than simply the adoption of a set of philosophical doctrines. It was a discovery made by a group of young men who were allied by college friendships, strengthened through such associations as the "Old Mortality" at Oxford, and unified in the search for a philosophical system which would preserve society while reforming it and preserve religion while modernizing it. Personal connections and shared concerns facilitated the spread of Hegelianism within this circle, whose members were to rise to academic appointments and distinctions in the 1860's and so come to influence a new generation of students. Their influence was quickly felt: though he graduated only a decade later than John Clark Murray, John Watson carried a new philosophical paradigm with him when he came to Canada -- a Hegelian paradigm received from Murray's former fellow student Edward Caird.

Added to this distinction of individual careers was the traditional distinction between the philosophy curricula of the Scottish and British universities. Philosophy had long been prominent in the Scottish curriculum, both in the doctrinal form of Common Sense realism and in the broader cultural form of Hume's "metaphysical moderatism". Nationalist Scots were proud of the reputation of 'metaphysical Scotland', and the inherent strength of this tradition was re-inforced in mid-century religious struggles when the evangelical Free Church party sought further to establish the tradition by securing adherents of its
of its doctrinal form in university chairs. The reinforcing of cultural nationalism by evangelicalism frustrated the efforts of anglophile university reformers who wished to see a re-organization of the Scottish philosophy curriculum on Oxbridge lines. Since the form of the discussion-oriented Scottish curriculum was peculiarly adapted to the teaching of Common Sense philosophy, its continuation had the effect of insulating Scottish universities from the Idealist revival from the time of its earliest conception in Benjamin Jowett's Ballool to the beginning of its full flowering in the 1860's. Hence the Scottish universities were largely closed to Idealism during the period of Murray's higher education -- and for some time afterward. Ironically, it was largely due to the strength of personal connections that the philosophically untried -- and likely unacceptable -- Edward Caird was able to win appointment at Glasgow. He had not yet ruined his Scottish prospects through public pronouncement of his Hegelianism. For years Caird was a relatively isolated Idealist at Glasgow, where he deliberately abandoned the established pedagogical method of class discussion in order to present his extremely popular lectures on Moral Philosophy which placed man's hopes in the Hegelian continuum of progressing reason. What Caird offered to students like John Watson was a far cry from the less glowing picture of man's fate and future that was presented in the ethics of Common Sense realism.

Absolute idealism was focused on the central principle of the progressive evolution or self-realisation of reason. As the spiritual principle unifying the whole of reality, the evolution of reason was to be traced through the entire history of civilization -- in effect through
all the thoughts and deeds of men. The dialectic dissolved the opposition between schools of thought which others had long attempted to resolve, and the conviction that Reason suffused all reality carried the assurance that the realization of its goal could not be prevented.

A.B. McKillop has admirably conveyed both the fundamental simplicity and the expansive complexity of absolute idealism in *A Disciplined Intelligence*. In treating J.C. Murray as a transitional thinker within his organizing progression from Common Sense to Idealism, McKillop correctly recognizes that Murray does not entirely adopt the absolute idealism of Caird and Watson. 51 Though a believer in reason and in progress, Murray never expresses the confidence in Reason's self-realisation which characterizes his idealist counterparts. And, as his social philosophy demonstrates, he could not follow the absolute idealists in their turn towards the state as the context for personal development and the agent of social reform.

What then of critical idealism? Murray had come to Kant before the Kantian revival, and he came with mixed feelings. He had become familiar with Kant through Hamilton, and much of the organization, if somewhat less of the actual content, of his thought shows a debt to the formal structure of reason raised by Kant in epistemology and particularly in ethics. Can Murray's use of Kant be said to qualify him as a Neo-Kantian, particularly since "Neo-Kantianism assumed pretty well as many shapes as it had representatives"? 52 Like the Neo-Kantians in Germany, Murray rejected the concepts of the noumenal realm and the thing-in-itself. 53 These were the sole points, apart from ethics, in which he made reference to Kant. A possible similarly to the Neo-
Kantians lies in the role given to consciousness as that which organizes perceptions and so makes knowledge possible. Yet even here, consciousness merely recognizes the order already inherent in God's creation; it does not create or impose an order of its own.

This points up a fundamental distinction between Murray and the Neo-Kantians: whereas they followed Kant in formulating subjective conditions of experience, Murray's epistemology and metaphysics -- to the point which they can be said to exist -- were built around a rejection of such a creative and determinative role for human consciousness. Consciousness clarifies an order which exists by divine creation and maintenance. As will be seen below, a similar appreciation of method coupled by a rejection of underlying aims is adopted toward the Kantian ethics. Like many absolute idealists, Murray was drawn towards the categorical imperative as the form of a proper, consistent, rational ethic. Yet his adoption of additional Christian principles -- most notably self-sacrifice -- upset the internal necessities of the Kantian Ethics.

Given these departures from the norms of both critical and absolute idealism, was the McGill professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy an idealist? Murray's idealism was, as J.A. Irving has pointed out, eclectic in its sources. Doctrines of both the critical and absolute idealists can be identified in his thought, but they are always modified to fit a theological context. The resulting 'theological idealism' lacks the systematic organization and scholarly rigour which characterized nineteenth century philosophical idealism. At the same time, it shows some affinities to the intertwining of religion and
and philosophy which characterized the approach taken to philosophy by Murray's Free Church teachers in Edinburgh, particularly the professor of Ethics, P.C. MacDougall. This idealism addresses culture generally, rather than the academy, and so could be identified as "cultural idealism", were it not for the theological modes in which it finds expression. Drawn from eighteenth century philosophical antecedents and an increasingly liberal theology, it took on the character of the 'Christ of Culture' in H. Richard Niebuhr's classic typology. It was not a product, but an assumption of philosophical activity.

It would appear, then, that John Clark Murray does not fit easily into the conventional national or philosophical categories most often brought to the study of his work. A more fruitful approach may lie in the abandonment of this 'deductive method' of study in the light of preferred categories and the adoption instead of an 'inductive' approach which conveys a sense of the method, ideas and priorities which inform Murray's writings.

One of the first impressions which emerges in such an approach is the doubtful value of any interpretation which casts Murray in the role of a speculative philosopher or inventive thinker. The academic work reveals a critic, commentator and teacher. Despite their variety, the writings reveal a lack of originality and, in some cases, of development. They are often limited to general level studies which employ and often, from one piece to another, repeat basic and uncontentious points. Much of an 1878 article in MacMillan's Magazine on "The Scottish Philosophy" is drawn verbatim with very few substantial changes from the introductory article in the four part series on
Sir William Hamilton's philosophy which had appeared in the 1867 *Canadian Journal*. Similarly, an 1886 review article in *The Scottish Review* on "Sir William Hamilton" is almost identical to the handwritten manuscript of a lecture given to students some twenty years earlier.56

In the latter case this lack of development may be excused for the article was simply biographical. Yet a closer look at some other articles reveals a similar lack of analytic or speculative substance. The 1887 *MacMillan's* review article on "The Revived Study of Berkeley" says virtually nothing about the five books which occasioned it and only slightly more about Berkeley's philosophy itself; the bulk of it is given over to biographical material. This is also the case in the 1885 article on Solomon Maimon.

Was Murray's work then uniformly mediocre or unsophisticated? Not entirely. Contributions to general thought were made with such articles as "Atomism and Theism" noted earlier and "The Study of Political Philosophy".57 In addition there were short notices on the minutiae of particular fields such as logic and psychology.58 And, as noted in the previous chapter, more scholarly work began to appear in the 1890's. Much of it appeared in the form of commentaries on the works of other philosophers, but individual pieces show more of the analytic skill demonstrated in the early series on Hamilton.

To judge Murray's work in such modest terms is not to dismiss the author from the ranks of the philosophically significant but simply to caution those who would infer great things from bibliographic lists. The work has value, but as a corpus made up almost entirely of reviews, biographies, introductory textbooks and general commentaries, it is a
value within a more restricted sphere than is often assumed.

That value lies in the area of teaching. However misinformed the supposed necessary opposition of teaching and research may be, the dichotomy appears appropriate when applied to Murray's career and work. In the absence of autobiographical ruminations, this can only be an interpretation. He certainly never sought, as others have, to justify lightweight scholarship by appeal to a heavy teaching load. Nor, as his criticism of Hamilton shows, did he allow a preoccupation with teaching to provide excuse for any failure to bring critical and systematic expression to one's ideas. All the same, Murray's reputation and much of his work reflected the abilities of a teacher. The praise of students and colleagues in this regard was noted in the previous chapter. And to return to the work, its modest nature is more easily explained when seen in this light. Even the serious articles of the 1890's are, in their narrative style and conventional content, obviously course lectures adapted for publication. So too with the books: the Outline of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy is sub-titled "A Textbook for Students"; the Handbook of Psychology contains the Prefatory note that, this handbook is designed primarily to introduce students to the science of psychology; and to this design every other purpose, which the book may serve, has been made subordinate... It is not advisable to perplex the beginner with a prefatory discussion of controverted questions; and to the more advanced student, who may honour the book with a perusal, its general standpoint ought to be evident without preliminary explanations. Hardly what might be described as ambitious claims. In the Introduction to Ethics, Murray is even more anxious to clear up any misconceptions which the title might give rise to:
This book is intended to be what its title describes, an *Introduction* to Ethics; but as the term *Introduction* has, in this connection, received an ambiguous meaning, a word of explanation may not be out of place. This term is sometimes employed to denote a philosophical discussion of the ultimate concepts which lie at the foundation of a science; in which case a preliminary study of the science is indispensable as a preparation for the intelligent perusal of the *Introduction*. This is not the sense in which the present work is meant to be an *Introduction* to Ethics. It is intended to introduce to the science those who are as yet unfamiliar with its fundamental concepts, except in so far as these are implied in all our ordinary thoughts about human life.61

With such modest claims for the works, it seems inappropriate to seek in them the elements of speculative metaphysics or epistemology. As general works from which even advanced students were turned away, they cannot fairly be seen as contributions to contemporary scholarly debates. One can even question the extent to which they expressed only the author's own views. Murray's pedagogical method, as expressed in the *Outline of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, did not emphasize original expression:

> I believe . . . that the teaching of philosophy must still, at least, be conducted by helping the student to master the varying points of view from which the different representative systems look out on the field of speculation.62

Eulogistic notices at his retirement and death confirm that this comparative method was retained throughout Murray's teaching career.

His student and later colleague, J.W. Hickson, wrote:

> He always endeavoured and for the most part succeeded in presenting the standpoint of opponents adequately and fairly . . . His classroom was one of the few places of free discussion and bracing intellectual activity in which one felt, in sharp contrast to the deadening atmosphere of others, that everything was not once forever fixed and settled in the world.63
It is interesting to note in light of this question that the one work not aimed solely at the college classroom, "The Industrial Kingdom of God", was never published by Murray, even though it shows signs of having reached the stage of a final manuscript. He certainly did not fear the controversy it might arouse, for the ideas it contained were often put before the wider reading public in articles for daily papers or weekly journals. As will be seen in Chapter Four, changes in Murray's assessment of and answer to contemporary social problems occurred with a frequency which frustrated publication.

If John Clark Murray is to be seen as a philosophical teacher rather than a speculative thinkers, it is more appropriate to approach his works in terms of the underlying worldview these reveal, rather than the speculative systems to which they may, with help and inference, be co-ordinated. Murray's worldview does not lack interest and value for its being expressed in modest forms, nor does it gain interest and value by being stretched to accommodate larger ambitions. Ironically, it falls to some of the criticisms Murray himself raised against Thomas Reid and Sir William Hamilton. Like Reid's, the thought of Murray seldom "represents the speculative toil of a philosophic intellect, but merely the refined opinions of ordinary intelligence", albeit an intelligence informed by some of the more active intellectual currents of the nineteenth century. And like Hamilton, the threads of thought spun out in various articles, books and lectures were never drawn together by their author into the tighter web of a coherent philosophy. Murray adopted the systematic approach of Hamilton but, like the mentor, it brought him no nearer to a final synthesis. His
most frequent -- and for the person attempting to reconstruct his world-view, most frustrating -- qualifier in works on any theme was that detailed treatment of a question was beyond the scope of the study at hand.\textsuperscript{65} But detailed treatment was never given. Murray seldom pursued ideas to completion, unwilling, perhaps, to commit himself to any position without the most thorough study or, more likely, unable to arrive at satisfactory answers to social or philosophical questions. Even the attempt to demonstrate the social ideal in a novel, where he might legitimately allow imagination free play without worrying about practical limitations, suffers from this lack of precision. He is simply unable to give a clear picture of the reforms which might constitute the road to Utopia, though he gladly describes the happiness and prosperity of that social paradise.

At issue here is the question of Murray's status as a philosopher at a time when philosophy was undergoing its 'professionalization' as a discipline within the university curriculum. Although the concept is not without its difficulties, distinct changes in philosophical training and teaching can be traced to the mid-nineteenth century movement for university reform and the parallel revival of Idealism.

University reform was a cause very much alive in Britain from the 1820's and in America from the 1850's. After a prolonged decay into insignificance in the course of the eighteenth century, universities were being called upon to address the need for advanced liberal education in the sciences and humanities. University appointments had previously been made on the basis of personal connection or local
convenience, with little regard for any but the most rudimentary academic qualifications; a general university education was most often regarded as sufficient. With university reform, the model of intensive and specialized preparation found in Benjamin Jowett's Balliol or the graduate schools of German universities was invoked as necessary to meet contemporary intellectual challenges. Similar demands were raised in Canada, were the issue was not the reform of old institutions but the maturation of new ones. Commentators as diverse as Cardinal J.H. Newman, the Harvard Board of Overseers, and Egerton Ryerson were in fundamental agreement that the nineteenth century tide of secularization was so strong that the preparation of young men to meet the philosophical challenges of an age of doubt could not be left to amateurs.  

As professional graduate training became a pre-requisite for teaching positions within the university, the generalist man of letters was superseded by the academic philosopher; the amateur was replaced by the professional.

This shift was not without effect on the form of philosophizing. Bruce Kuklick has pointed out in his study of the process of professionalization in the United States that, "although some thinkers still reserved time for careers outside the discipline, philosophy narrowed to a domain of more arcane interests, competence in which was more subject to expert evaluation." A professional structure of academic associations and journals evolved, and there emerged a greater emphasis on the improvement of status within the profession and standing within the university through scholarly publication.
Correlations have often been drawn between these changes in the form of philosophizing and changes in the nature of the ideas under discussion. In effect, professionalization did not simply mark a stage in the history of education, but indicated a new stage in the history of philosophy as well. Analyzing this shift in America, Kuklick found that many amateur philosophers were indebted to the Scottish Common Sense tradition while professional philosophers were responsible for the promulgation of Idealism in the universities. J.H. Irving noted the same correlation in Canadian philosophy. And M. Richter quotes R.C.K. Ensor's assessment that, "whatever be thought of the English Idealist school, which [T.H.] Green did so much to found, they at least conceived their task as one for fully trained and organized professionals, not for gifted but isolated amateurs."

The correlation of a generalist approach with Common Sense Realism is not, as might be assumed, an indication of lesser intelligence or less applied philosophical rigour on the part of Common Sense teachers of philosophy, a good number of whom were ordained churchmen. On the contrary, the Common Sense tradition was self-consciously and quite deliberately generalist, just as the British Idealists were self-consciously and deliberately specialist.

The controversy between generalists and specialists had raged in Scotland from the time of the appointment of the first Royal Commission to investigate the Scottish universities in 1826. While the generalists argued in the tradition of the eighteenth century Scottish Enlightenment for a curriculum which was broad in scope but thoroughly philosophical in content, specialists appealed to the greater
complexities of nineteenth century commercial and industrial society, and advocated a narrower study of the methods and content of a limited number of fields. As indicated earlier, this was as much a dispute over culture as over curriculum. Although its final resolution was imposed from London in the form of 1892 legislation which preserved both types while favouring specialization, the prolonged and heated discussion makes it likely that those schooled in the Common Sense tradition did not base their generalism in intellectual weakness but in determined cultural conviction.

What then of John Clark Murray? Irving judged that Murray was "the first thoroughly trained and the first professional philosopher to appear in Central Canada", a judgement which McKillop quotes with approval. Certainly this would appear to be the case if one judges from Murray's bibliography. But, as noted above, when one looks more closely at the content of the articles cited, one finds that in scholarly rigour as in philosophical doctrine, Murray was a transitional figure. As already seen, when he addresses the topics current in late nineteenth century academic philosophy -- as, for example, the revivals of Berkeley and Spinoza -- it is on the general level characteristic of the man of letters, rather than the scholarly level of the professional philosopher. 'Man of letters' and 'pedagogue' are not only more charitable terms than Kuklick's 'amateur philosopher', but more sensitive to the divisions in Scotland and more appropriate to the Canadian situation as well.

In the American setting, Kuklick makes institutional affiliation a key criterion of professional status and hence of scholarly rigour.
As seen above, the nature of the dispute in Scotland was such that Idealist specialists had little hope of advancement until the 1870's. Institutional affiliation was a less significant factor in Canada. With fewer universities or colleges and less 'turn-over' of faculty than in America, such collateral conditions as the expansion of Philosophy Departments themselves did not occur until later in the century. Further, Canada did not have the extensive network of clubs, summer schools and journals which gave definition to and sustained the amateur philosophical movement in the United States. With few exceptions, such as civil servant William Dawson LeSueur, philosophy in Canada "has flourished only in the universities".76

John Clark Murray's status, then, was less that of a professional philosopher and more that of a man of letters in the tradition of the Scottish Enlightenment: an educated gentleman whose extra-philosophical interests and concerns were at least as great as, if not greater than, his professional interests as the Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in one of Canada's leading universities.

Significantly, the only attention Murray gave to any form of this distinction of specialists and generalists was critical. Discussing the attitude of teachers of philosophy towards religion in a 1904 article, he rejected the limitation of the term 'philosopher' to 'teacher of philosophy'. There were distinct echoes of the Scottish ideal of higher education in the arguments that philosophical education sought the broader dissemination of culture and that,

teachers of philosophy themselves often find that their best students -- those who have caught the philosophical spirit most fully -- go into all sorts of occupations, -- theology, law, medicine, applied science, literature,
manufactures, commerce. These do not abandon their philosophical tastes and habits of thought entirely in their practical occupations. ... consciously or unconsciously they become teachers. They leaven society with the spirit of their own thought, and they do so sometimes more extensively and more intensively than the professional teachers of philosophy.\textsuperscript{77}

Although the distinction drawn here is not entirely parallel to that between 'amateur' and 'professional' philosophers, it is clear from the passage that Murray would have rejected the notion that lack of professional expertise resulted in a lack of critical insight or philosophical thought. And he would have regretted the narrowing of interest which accompanied professionalization. The movement of talented philosophy students into careers outside the discipline was to be encouraged for,

this wider diffusion of philosophical interest seems to me wholly beneficial. It may be fairly questioned whether it does not act beneficially on philosophy itself by keeping it in more intimate touch with the realities of nature and of life.\textsuperscript{78}

Quite obviously, one of the characteristics of the man of letters was a disinclination to draw -- much less observe -- firm boundaries between the disciplines. The field or discipline which, apart from philosophy, most drew John Clark Murray's attention, was theology. Less troubled by the doubts which worried Matthew Arnold and George Eliot, Murray saw no opposition between religious faith and critical thought. He certainly did not believe that theological studies had disqualified him from philosophical pursuits. On the contrary, such studies obligated him to engage in philosophical work. And not philosophy only; theology was not the queen of the sciences,
but the theologian must be the master of them if he is to do theology justice. These convictions were expressed at an early stage in Murray's career in the 1860 Presidential Address to the Theological Society of Edinburgh. They were reaffirmed seventeen years later when the address was published and dedicated to the theological students of Montreal because, as a prefatory note stated, "Some recent utterances in this city seem to call for a vindication of the rank which theology claims among the higher spheres of intellectual labour."79 In contrast to the vagueness and indecision of some other works, Murray here is not modest in his claims or his call to responsibility. First the claim:

Christianity as the absolute religion, maintains all religious life, so far as really religious, and all truth, so far as really true, to be Christian life and Christian truth; it denies, therefore, that any intelligent thinking or any noble living can possibly be out of harmony with it. In consequence of this sublime claim, the scientific study of Christianity involves a reference, more or less direct, to every possible object of human knowledge. No other science, therefore, can demand such a severe and thorough investigation of the relations in which the separate truths of all the sciences are comprehended in the harmonious parts of one intellectual system.80

Hardly the positivist ideal of value-free study. The Calvinist confession that all life was lived coram Deo (in the presence of God) implied a commitment to the view that all truth was Christian truth. Theology was an interpretive tool -- not a regulative or synthetic agent -- employed to understand the contribution of separate fields of inquiry to the unified field of knowledge. The assumption of Christianity defined, and so implicitly limited that field, however it did not thereby relieve the thinker from the responsibilities
of critical inquiry:

The theologian, if he be honest to his calling, cannot avoid carrying his researches to the limits themselves of all speculation. Fearful of no consequence so much as corrupting his conscience by dishonesty to the questionings of his own mind, and untouched — as he, who would preach eternal truth, should surely be — by temporal temptations to tamper with his honesty, the theological student must be prepared to face the task of searching into the very grounds of being, — of searching even whether all that seems to be is not merely a meaningless phantasmagory of being, and ourselves but ephemeral trifles that have been unintelligibly tossed up in the midst of the universal illusion. 81

Theology was not an isolated discipline. Many of its problems could be solved only by reference to psychology, ethics, political philosophy and the philosophy of religion. 82 Moreover, its own inherent meaning was revealed only through the study of such allied disciplines as philology, ethnography and history. 83 It was, in short, a relative study which could not be honestly undertaken in the isolation of histories of dogma or the timidity of unquestioning fideism. Yet this very boldness was possible only on the assumption that all truth is Christian truth. Conviction was not to hamper the critical intellect, but nurture it.

Murray expressed these convictions fully aware of the questions of belief and intellectual honesty which the Victorian crisis of faith was stirring up:

My chief design has been to vindicate the rank of theological studies among the higher intellectual pursuits; and the remarks I have made express the answer which I have long silently given, not only to the common insinuations of literary snobs, but to the more serious assertions of more earnest men, and to the still more serious fears which have arisen at times within my own mind, that the higher intellectual life must be abandoned in entering
the clerical profession. 84

With these quotations, we begin to enter into Murray's views on the ultimate basis and nature of truth and meaning. But as revealing as it may appear, the assertion that the separate researches of individual sciences resolve into a single harmonious system in which all truth is Christian truth can hide as much as it reveals, particularly when made by a mid-nineteenth century student of theology and philosophy. Assertions of the systematic unity and Christian character of all truth could be made with equal vigour and confidence by the Hegelian J. H. Stirling and the evangelical Presbyterian Thomas Chalmers. Needless to say, only the words would be the same. What then did such an assertion mean to John Clark Murray?

Murray's meaning emerges when his assertion is seen as the context for the answer to a number of other philosophical problems, each of which emerges frequently and is answered consistently in almost six decades of writing and lecturing. Murray was not static in his approach to basic issues, but change occurred more in the specific application than in the theoretical foundations of his thought. Basic convictions served as the anchors or co-ordinates for thought which unfolded in the light of the philosophical and social developments of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

In their most formal expressions, these convictions covered the areas of epistemology, ontology and ethics. For Murray, the particular problems were the structure of knowledge, the relation of materialism and idealism, the fact of human freedom and the nature of moral
philosophy and its relation to Christianity. The lack of formal, philosophical treatment of these issues means that in many cases Murray's position can only be described in the simple terms through which it was first conveyed in textbooks and articles. The issues involve controversies which Murray himself seldom touched on, much less actively sought to resolve.

Footnotes to Chapter Two


3 As Armour and Trott attempt to establish in "Backgrounds and Themes", the first chapter of Faces of Reason (pp. 1 - 31). A.B. McKillop takes the more conventional view that nineteenth century Canadian thinkers were pre-occupied with the attempt to establish and preserve "a broad moral code that would constitute the core of a way of life reconciling belief and inquiry, tradition and innovation, concern and freedom." Disciplined Intelligence, p. ix. Given that this quest could describe the aims of most philosophers from Socrates to Hegel and beyond, this 'search for a moral code' is too universal a theme to give particular national identity to the work of Canadian thinkers.

4 This conclusion, unpalatable to some, was affirmed by one of Murray's successors in the McGill Philosophy Department, Charles W. Hendel, MacDonald Professor of Moral Philosophy and Chairman of the department from 1929 - 1940. Hendel found the lack of national self-consciousness a characteristic mark of Canadian philosophers, to the extent that it was misleading to speak of Canadian philosophy.
In transcending national distinctions, Canadian philosophers not only kept themselves "whole and sound for philosophy", but exemplified a truly "humanistic attitude and vision". C.W. Hendel, "The Character of Philosophy in Canada", Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XII (1952), pp. 365; 372.

5 Ibid., p. 365.


7 There are many parallels between the histories of philosophical work in Australia and Canada. A dependence on British teachers, a strong Common Sense tradition gradually superseded by Idealism, and a pre-occupation with moral philosophy characterize both. Philosophy as a discipline was slower in getting started in Australian universities but it is interesting to note that when it did, the most prominent figure was a friend of Murray's from Edinburgh, Henry Laurie. E.M. Miller, "The Beginnings of Philosophy in Australia and the Work of Henry Laurie", Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy VII (1929), pp. 241 - 251; VIII (1930), pp. 1 - 22.


11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.


16 Irving, "Philosophy in Central Canada", p. 249.

17 McKillop, Disciplined Intelligence, p. 180.

18 Armour and Trott, Faces of Reason, pp. 131 - 132.
Davie identifies the search for "a metaphysical mean" between empiricism and a priorism as characteristic of Scottish thinkers both in and out of the Common Sense Realist tradition. A corollary "metaphysical moderatism" is ascribed to David Hume.

Achieving such a synthesis occupied the minds of a number of Hamilton's pupils and followers, including James Ferrier and the scientist Clerk Maxwell. Davie, Democratic Intellect, pp. 192; 277.


H. Laurie, Scottish Philosophy in its National Development (Glasgow: Maclehose, 1902), pp. 222; 269.


Ibid., p. 12; Merz, European Thought, 3; 380 - 381.


Writing at the time of Murray's retirement, English professor Charles E. Moyse noted that, "to hear Dr. Murray speak in terms of deep emotion about the teachings of Sir William Hamilton... is to become conscious of the truth, not always fully recognized, that persons even more than facts are the secret of academic fruit." MUA 611/83. Hamilton exerted a similar force over many of his students in Edinburgh: A.L. Drummond and J. Bulloch, *The Church in Victorian Scotland* (Edinburgh: St. Andrew Press, 1975), p. 278.

Davie, *Democratic Intellect*, p. 271. Removed from the scene of the battle after 1862, Murray falls between the two tendencies or schools as they polarised in the years following Ferrier's failure to win appointment to the Chair of Logic after Hamilton's death in 1856. While the moderates under Ferrier began a gradual drift towards Hegel, the Common Sense party became increasingly doctrinaire. Ibid., p. 303.


Expressing this shift, Bosanquet later judged of the 'first generation' of Idealists such as T.H. Green, that they "allowed to small an interval between experience specifically moral and specifically religious," cited Muirhead, "Past and Present", p.316.


Ibid., pp. 11; 70.


Drummond and Bulloch, *Church in Victorian Scotland*, p. 279.

Davie, *Democratic Intellect*, pp. 41 - 47.

Ibid., pp. 10 - 17; 205 - 206.

50. Davie, Democratic Intellect, p. 329.

51. McKillop, Disciplined Intelligence, pp. 176 - 181.


55. Davie, Democratic Intellect, p. 291.


62. Idem, Outline of Hamilton's Philosophy, p. xii.

63. W.H., "Professor Murray", p. 563. The semi-anonymous author of this notice demonstrates a familiarity with Murray's work which would have come from having been both a student and a colleague in the Philosophy Department. In particular, he writes of Murray's lectures of the 1890's -- the time when J.W. Hickson was a student in Murray's classes.


68. Ibid., pp. 102; 136 - 138.


71 Chittnis, Scottish Enlightenment, pp. 6; 143 - 144.

72 Davie, Democratic Intellect, pp. 4 - 7.

73 One of the best expressions of this commitment to a generalist approach is George Jardine's Outlines of Philosophical Education, published in 1818. Jardine was Professor of Logic at the University of Glasgow from 1774 - 1827. Ibid., pp. 10 - 11.

74 Irving, "Philosophy in Central Canada", p. 268; McKillop, Disciplined Intelligence, p. 176.

75 Kuklick, American Philosophy, p. 62. The criterion of institutional affiliation is commonly cited to explain the failure of the St. Louis Hegelian movement to have a lasting influence beyond the charismatic appeal of its individual members. There was no 'second generation' groomed through the universities and, as a result, the later revival of Hegelian Idealism in the universities owed more to such men as Josiah Royce who had received graduate training in Germany, than to the St. Louis Hegelians, even though the latter had been active since the 1850's and organized into a society by 1866. P.R. Anderson, Platonism in the Midwest (New York: Temple University, 1963), pp. 189 - 194; 200; H.A. Pochmann, New England Transcendentalism and St. Louis Hegelianism (New York: Haskell House, 1970), pp. 118; 123.

76 Irving, "Philosophy in Central Canada", p. 252.


78 Ibid., p. 356.

79 Ibid., A Vindication of Theology: Being an Address to Theology Students" (Montreal: Dawson Brothers, 1877), p. 3.

80 Ibid., p. 11.

81 Ibid., p. 11.

82 Ibid., p. 12.

83 Ibid., pp. 12 - 14.

84 Ibid., p. 14.
CHAPTER THREE

The Intellectual Framework

In the case of Britain, we are able to recognise the presence of, and the universal respect for, an existing law and order of things, and, as a background for ethical speculation, the conception of this order as national, political, moral or divine, according to the various individual leanings and predilections of different thinkers or schools of thought. This order was, however, rather taken for granted than intellectually demonstrated. On the other side, we find that in Germany a strong desire had made itself felt to throw the light of reason upon these fundamental presuppositions of any and every moral system.  

J. T. Merz amplified on his turn-of-the-century distinction with the observation that, whereas Continental philosophy was often absorbed in ultimate questions, British philosophy had for centuries "prided itself rather on finding its way out of metaphysics and reverting to common-sense."  

Quiet, British confidence in the existence of a universal order pervades the philosophical thought of John Clark Murray, and a disinclination to pursue this order to its furthest metaphysical roots marks the writings in which that thought is expressed. Faith and common-sense become the indistinguishable bases from which the philosophical issues of the nineteenth century were addressed. In particular, Murray dealt with the structure of knowledge, the relation of materialism and idealism, freedom and necessity, and the nature of moral philosophy and
its relation to Christianity. As already noted, the sense of order which emerges in the study of these philosophical issues takes the form of a 'theological idealism', a liberal, amillenial Christianity embraced through faith and providing the final answers to all ultimate questions.

The structure of knowledge was a matter on which Murray was to express opinion soon after arriving in Canada. Introduced by Principal Leitch to the Queen's community as an apologetic dragon slayer whose studies in Germany had given him first-hand acquaintance with the ideas of those who would attack the true faith, Murray replied with an inaugural address less bellicose in tone or dogmatic in content. Philosophy, he claimed, does not deal in unquestioned finalities. This could be seen in its relation to other fields of study:

The other sciences investigate each one class of the various objects presented in our knowledge. Philosophy asks a question prior, in the order of things, to that with which they are occupied. It asks not, What is this or that particular object of knowledge? but what is knowledge itself? But of the objects presented to us we say not only that we know them, we say also that they exist. The other sciences inquire into these existing objects. Philosophy again reminds them of a previous question, What is existence? This twofold object, knowing and being, science and existence, constitute the entire matter about which philosophy is conversant.3

Philosophy was no more queen of the sciences than theology. It was, rather, their foundation.

Now before the results of the sciences can be vindicated as unmistakably correct, the questions must be answered, whether in the act of knowledge there have been no elements to disturb the process of scientific inquiry, and whether
our theories of existing things have not overlooked the conditions themselves of existence.\footnote{4}

In the career which followed, the proper process of scientific inquiry was to be studied in the context of the inter-relation of materialism and idealism, while the conditions of existence were to be treated, as they had been by Hamilton, in the context of psychology.

The idea of such an inquiry is reminiscent of the Kantian transcendental critique, and indeed, Murray appears indebted to Kant both for the formal approach to the union of all knowledge into one rational whole, and for the construction of a rational ethical system. Like Kant, too, he gives an active role to consciousness as that which reveals the conditions and hence the possibility of knowledge. But the debt here is qualified by a commitment to empirical limits to reason which were more restrictive than those Kant had set; certainly the transcendental \textit{a priori} was rejected. The Kantian principles of pure reason, innate to all intelligent beings and constituting the origin and conditions of all knowledge apart from experience violated the balance of empiricism and idealism which Murray strived to maintain. Murray expressed the two elements of the relation in terms of Reason and Understanding, stating that,

\begin{quote}
Understanding is often used, in a special sense, to designate intelligence considered merely as constructing cognitions of an empirical and particular nature, while Reason is, in contrast, applied to intelligence as furnishing by its own nature, those \textit{a priori} principles which form the supreme categories, the highest unification of knowledge. The further explanation of this distinction, with the modification it has received from different writers, would lead, however, into controversies of a philosophical nature. It need only be added that, whatever distinctions of this kind may be recognised, they must not be
\end{quote}
conceived as breaking up the essential unity of self-conscious intelligence; for it is in virtue of this unity that intelligence forms the supreme categories that give a structure to all experience.\textsuperscript{5}

Rejecting the extremes of both idealism and empiricism, and neatly side-stepping the questions which could be raised by the adoption of what might appear to be a Kantian epistemology, Murray was attempting to find a via media which would lead to that "wider, more human philosophy" of which he had spoken so hopefully in Paisley. The quotation on Reason and Understanding is drawn from a chapter in \textit{A Handbook of Psychology} entitled, "The General Nature of Knowledge". Leslie Armour and Elizabeth Trott have dealt with this chapter on a formal philosophical level in \textit{The Faces of Reason}, treating it in what are often more complex terms than those used by Murray himself.\textsuperscript{6} Since Murray's work in the area was so limited, it may be more appropriate to treat the synthesis of idealism and empiricism on the simpler level of assumptions and intentions, rather than as a finished project or clearly detailed direction.

"The General Nature of Knowledge" comes as the concluding chapter in that part of the \textit{Handbook of Psychology} which deals with Cognitions. Cognition, together with Feeling and Volition, is one of the three anthropological divisions of "Special Psychology". Although Cognition is not elaborated in terms of faculties, Murray does offer an analysis of the intellectual powers it covers. These are Perception, Generalisation, Reasoning, Idealisation, and Illusory Cognitions. Analysis of these powers led naturally to certain conclusions about the inter-relation of man and knowledge:
To sum up, there is evolved to our consciousness a world of objects, placed over against ourselves, extending throughout an immeasurable space, and undergoing alterations during a limitless time -- alterations which are produced in the objects by each other in consequence of their reciprocal causality. There are, therefore, certain supreme categories, under which the intelligible world is thought, and which are indicated in the terms italicised in the preceding sentence. These being the universal categories of the intelligible world, their interpretation involves the interpretation of the general nature of knowledge.!

A fitting introduction. After raising the requisite caveats that this is a psychological rather than philosophical discussion, and that the problem is far from settled even at that, Murray moves into a treatment of the categories or conditions of all knowledge: self-consciousness; time; space; substance; and cause. Significantly, although critical idealism is implicitly rejected as a priorism in introductory passages, it is empiricism as developed by Mill, Bain and Spencer which figures most prominently in the discussion of the categories; the categories are unfolded in terms of their distinction from empiricist associationism. It is in this unfolding that key points of Murray's worldview emerge.

The categories are set out with laudable brevity. On self-consciousness, Murray states that,

the very earliest step in forming the simplest perception is the consciousness of a sensation. This means that the sensation is no longer a purely subjective state, in which the sentient being is absorbed; it must have become an object of knowledge, to be compared with others, -- to be identified and discriminated. But this objectifying of a sensation implies that it is projected from me: in this act I become conscious of something which is not I; and this consciousness of that which is not I is the consciousness at the same time of myself. Self-consciousness, therefore, is involved in the very beginning of knowledge.8
As seen in the first chapter of the present study, self-consciousness was a key element in Murray's rejection of the atomism proclaimed by John Tyndall in his 1874 Belfast Address. Having asserted that consciousness is a key element distinguishing man from the natural world, Murray goes on to give a simple and fairly standard logical rejection of the possibility of a material origin of consciousness itself:

self-consciousness is not so much an essential factor of intelligence, as rather intelligence itself. It cannot, therefore, be a product of processes of intelligence, themselves products of non-intelligent forces; for processes of intelligence without self-consciousness would be processes of intelligence without intelligence; and the forces, producing processes of intelligence would, though non-intelligent themselves, be intelligible, and an intelligible system of forces presupposes an intelligence, to which it is related.

It is not possible to get intelligence out of a stone. Although materialists such as Tyndall or J.S. Mill might not recoil in horror from the necessary contradictions of their materialism, Murray had sufficient faith in the ultimate rational intelligibility of the universe to think a simple logical proof sufficient to establish his position against materialist evolutionary science and empiricist psychology.

He had somewhat less faith in his former mentor. Murray had followed Sir William Hamilton in deriving consciousness as a logical necessity in the contact of the self with the phenomenal world, or not-self. At the same time he attempted to go beyond Hamilton, staying on the same course but clearing up inconsistencies and avoiding the shoals of Common Sense Realism. Due to the failure to bring his
diverse writings into one coherent system, Hamilton had argued in separate places that consciousness was both a condition and a mode of states of mind; that it was both equivalent to and distinct from self-consciousness; and that it gave both the true knowledge of Common Sense and the relative, limited knowledge of the realm of the Conditioned. Murray identified consciousness with self-consciousness, making it a condition of all mental states and the only key to true knowledge. It also retained a dependence on empirical reality and critical reason. Whereas Hamilton had asserted in the context of Common Sense epistemology that the intuitions of consciousness were beyond scepticism, Murray would not put the subjective deliverances of a subjective power beyond question. The fact of consciousness was indubitable, but the facts of consciousness were not.

The fact of consciousness becomes one of the foundations of Murray's philosophical via media between idealism and materialism. The active, intelligent self-consciousness becomes the necessary condition for the other categories of experience. Without it, no sense of Time can be created out of the passage of sensations. The passive mind of empiricism, acting on associationist principles, is not able in itself to determine prior and posterior relations. It may gain an awareness of succession, but this is still a logical step removed from what we normally conceive of as Time:

If our mental life be merely a succession of feelings, if the consciousness of each moment absolutely vanishes as that moment passes away, there can be no principle in consciousness to connect the different moments by a comparison which goes beyond each and cognises its relation of priority or posteriority to others. For this there must be some permanent factor
of consciousness -- a factor that is out of the succession which it observes. That factor is self-consciousness; and without self-consciousness, the consciousness of time is thus seen to be impossible.\footnote{12}

If mind is sensation, there can be no capacity for judgements of sensation -- no capacity for giving individual sensations an order in experience and hence no capacity for recollection. Memory is possible only on the assumption of an intelligence not defined by the flow of sensations and hence not limited to their chance sequence and ephemeral existence:

For if there were no permanent self, continuing identical amidst all the changes of consciousness -- if there were but a perpetually altering consciousness, in which each moment absolutely perishes as the next supervenes, -- then there might perhaps be suggestion of one feeling by another, but there could be no memory. For memory is the consciousness that I, remembering in the present, am identical with my self of the past remembered.\footnote{13}

The argument for Space is similarly dependent on the activity of a central conscious self able to recognize and plot the relations between objects. Contrary to Kant, Space is relation, and relations can be drawn only by an intelligence transcending immediate sensations and perceptions.\footnote{14}

Consciousness of temporal and spatial relations is consciousness of some permanence in a world of change. But how can we be assured of the existence of this phenomenal world, particularly when radical empiricism atomizes experience into a materialist sequence of sensations? Murray offers an argument reminiscent of the Kantian transcendental deduction by accepting the reciprocal necessities of the intelligible and the phenomenal world:
How comes it that the world shapes itself thus to intelligence? It arises from the fact, that otherwise there would be no intelligible world at all; it is therefore the form of the world, that is implied in the very nature of intelligence. For to be intelligent is to be self-conscious; and to be conscious of self is to be conscious of notself [i.e., all that is other than self; the distinction is that between the subjective and objective worlds]. Consequently, the very act of intelligence, by which we are conscious of sensations, projects these into an objective sphere, transmuting them into qualities of objects, and thus forming out of them a world that is not ourselves.

Accordingly, in their psychological aspect at least, qualities are simply the form in which self-conscious intelligence construes sensations.  

Since changing qualities can only be conceived in relation to something permanent, the concept of substance as the unity underlying change becomes necessary as well. Substance does not, however, have the absolute and independent existence granted it in some forms of empiricism. It exists as a necessary construct of consciousness, which alone has an identity transcending Time and a unity transcending Space. As part of the notself which is the contrasted result or negative creation of the consciousness of self, substance is subject to the conditions or forms of intelligibility: Time and Space.

If substance is the unity of co-existing phenomena, cause may be seen as the unity of consecutive phenomena. The apparent circularity in their derivation attests to Murray's desire to keep idealist concepts on an empirical leash. Both derive their identity from a consciousness seeking only to label the patterns it has noted in the intelligible world. Substance, then, is a necessary notion of Space and cause a necessary notion of Time.
It is obvious from "The General Nature of Knowledge" that consciousness plays a major role in the formulation of Murray's philosophical middle way. Consciousness is the first product and primary proof of intelligence. It is also the origin of those conditions which formed the structure of knowledge.

But the concept was not without its difficulties. Nineteenth century critics had pointed to a tension in the Kantian epistemology, which held that the conditions of experience were both a priori categories of rational consciousness and a corresponding structure in reality itself. If an objective, empirical structure existed, why should a subjective, rational structure be necessary? Kant had been led to this tension by the untenability of an earlier belief that a fundamentally chaotic reality was brought into order only by the organizing categories of consciousness. John Clark Murray's thought approaches this tension; given its less detailed statement it might more sympathetically be labelled an 'ambiguity'. Consciousness determines the conditions of intelligibility, but does so through contact with the empirical world. An empirical element is injected into the transcendental deduction by means of a doctrine termed, in a later revision of the Handbook of Psychology, "The Relativity of Knowledge":

Knowledge is, in the first place, a relation between a subject and an object, between a knower and a thing known. But not only must the object be related in the consciousness to the subject knowing; it must also, in the second place, be related to other objects. That is to say, it must be identified with those which it resembles and discriminated from those with which it differs.
The doctrine of the relativity of knowledge placed Murray's philosophical via media in an organizing consciousness and an associationist structure. The first relation would satisfy some idealists eager to assert the alliance of mind and matter (save for Kant, for whom 'knowledge' was the non-relational, a priori intuition of the concepts of pure reason). The second would satisfy empiricists otherwise suspicious of any talk of structures of experience. But would this synthesis, which appeared more a revival of Deism than any new contribution, really satisfy either? Certain idealists might balk at the thorough dependence of consciousness on empirical conditions and tests, but empiricists certainly had greater cause to question the supposed proffering of the olive branch.

Much of Murray's discussion of self-consciousness takes the form of a debate with strict empiricism, itself characterized as associationism. The associationist held that perception of the self, of Time, Space and the rest, is merely the result of the continued association of phenomena in the mind. These associations are links made out of custom, mechanical repetition or, in more scientific nineteenth century versions, through chemical compound. In short, the links were formed through means observable, measureable and predictable.

Murray had no difficulty accepting associationism as a simple psychological process. His rejection of it as a substitute for the conscious self is simple and occasionally frustrated: "Need it be repeated that association can merely associate?" Association is not equivalent to intelligent relation; individual sensations are as atomic as dots on a page. To Murray, only an intelligence independent
of these dots can draw the lines that will connect them and reveal a picture. The dots themselves have no inner power to draw any line whatsoever, much less the correct line. So too, sensations have no power in themselves to connect them to other sensations and so create ordered experience and intelligent reflection. At the same time, there is an inherent, intelligible order to the apparently random collection which sets out necessary relations and so creates the picture — or the experience.²⁴

The rejection of associationism did not entail a rejection of empirical psychology. Physiological theories were being advanced by some of the empiricists as a means of explaining the mental phenomena used by idealists as proof of a reality transcending the material order. Unlike many idealists such as George Paxton Young of the University of Toronto, Murray did not see physiology in itself as a threat to the concept of consciousness and so did not paint it as being in necessary opposition to true psychology.²⁵ Physiology was no less able to shed light on the nature of consciousness than philosophical psychology; body and mind could be paralleled and found to be in harmony.

An assumption of harmony was as far as Murray was willing to go in describing the relation between the two sciences and, more significantly, between the two philosophical approaches at issue. Over two thousand years of debate between the schools did not shake his conviction that the unity of truth demanded that the truths of each side be open to resolution into a single, coherent system. More tellingly, the liveliness of the debate in the latter half of the nineteenth
century did not stir him into anything more speculative or detailed than the assumption common in Common Sense epistemology that the two sides must be in some, unspecified harmony which incorporated the insights of both idealism and materialism or empiricism. The qualified acceptance of physiology provides only a very conventional guide to union. Physiology was seen as telling much of the mechanisms of psychological phenomena, but all hypotheses which went on to state that these observable relations expressed all that could be known of psychology were dismissed as unwarranted. In short, like many contemporaries, Murray was willing to acknowledge material explanations while firmly rejecting materialism, that confident reductionism which would not credit the existence of anything empirically unobservable. As seen in Chapter One, this was a theme in the reply to John Tyndall's Belfast Address.

The central role of consciousness and the rejection of materialism combine to leave little doubt as to the nature of Murray's views on the third of his major concerns: the relation of freedom and necessity. Not surprisingly, it is with this problem that the ethical orientation of the entire worldview becomes prominent. Murray never referred to human freedom without making it dependant on action and responsibility on the part of conscious, intelligent beings. What was at stake was not simply human identity, but identity as a specifically moral agent.

Necessity, or determinism, had often been characterised as Augustinianism or Calvinism. Murray believed that its most potent
nineteenth century manifestation was not in theology, but as the philosophical counterpart to evolutionary science. In evolutionary theory,

man's consciousness is simply the product of the forces in his environment acting on his complicated sensibility, and of that sensibility reacting on the environment. His consciousness, therefore, stands related to other phenomena precisely as these are related to each other, each being acted upon by the rest, and reacting upon them, so that all are absolutely determined by this reciprocity of action. 29

Such determinism effectively eliminated any real role for consciousness and, in consequence, eliminated man's identity as an intelligent being. Only consciousness could prove and guarantee human freedom. And as with consciousness, the proof of the concept rested in the definition of the term:

A volition . . . is not merely an action unreflectively prompted, suggested by a previous association with some pleasure it produces. It implies a consciousness of this association, a conscious comparison of action and pleasure with a cognition of their relation as means and end. It is only when we thus reflect on the end to be attained by an action, that the action becomes voluntary. This fact is apt to be lost sight of, as it is obscured by an ambiguity in the use of the word motive. This term is sometimes employed to denote an impulse of sensibility, by which we are moved to act without reflection; and such an act implies no intelligent control. But in a higher application, the term is identified with intention or intelligent purpose; that is to say, a motive, in this sense, is an object set before consciousness as the end to be reached by the performance of an action. It is only actions directed by this higher sort of motive that are voluntary. A volition is an act of an intelligent being acting intelligently. 30

This description, drawn from the Handbook of Psychology, was re-inforced in the Introduction to Ethics:
A voluntary action -- a volition -- is precisely an action directed by intelligence to the accomplishment of a certain end. It is only then that action becomes moral; and an action cannot but have a moral character, when it is voluntarily controlled by an intelligent purpose.31

Intelligence, then, was a necessary condition for freedom. But how was freedom to be used intelligently?

The necessary relation of freedom and ethics was expressed directly by Murray as early as his inaugural address at Queen's in 1862. Following Hamilton, and anticipating his own later work, the newly appointed Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy analysed philosophy by means of a division of human nature into the three elements of Knowledge, Feelings and Action.32 If freedom was a necessary implication of action, responsibility was an equally necessary inference:

In the element of action we shall have to view the fact that there are events of which no account can be given except as originated by ourselves; and the consciousness of accountableness or responsibility, as of an imperative law of duty, with the necessary inferences will bring us at last to the most important department of the studies with which we are to be engaged, the science of ethics, moral philosophy.33

Ethics the queen of the sciences? Although his motives were not those of Kant, Mill or Matthew Arnold, Murray adopted the intellectual hierarchy of an age as obsessed with morality as it was disenchanted with religion. The conviction that ethics represented the culmination of philosophy was as much a point of practice as of principle. Apart from later revisions of the 1885 Handbook of
Psychology, the bulk of Murray's later works, including two published books, two significant unpublished manuscripts, and numerous articles published from the late 1880's, dealt with ethical themes. So too, in the university curriculum; in forty years of undergraduate teaching, moral philosophy was taught to students only in their senior years as the crowning point not only of philosophy itself but also, for Arts students for whom it was an obligatory course, as the proper culmination of university studies in general.

The moral philosophy taught to students at Queen's and McGill embraced far more than ethics alone. After studying the development of ethical theories from the pre-Socratics to Hegel, the senior students moved from theory into social practice as this was found in political science and economics. The movement was reciprocal, for ethics moved between the real and ideal worlds, seeking "to find a law which is imposed upon human life by the very nature of things", while realising that "the essential nature of things is determined by the Primal Cause that gives them existence". Specifically, moral philosophy begins with the study of the present state of man as revealed in psychology and political science, moves to the determination of the individual good as found in ethics, expands to consider the social good determined by political philosophy and culminates in the universal good that forms the subject matter of theology. This progressive movement of moral philosophy is reciprocated by the relative nature of theology itself, and by the conviction, examined below, of the necessary inter-relation between theory and practice.

The Kantian elements found in "The General Nature of Knowledge"
emerge more clearly in Murray's ethics. Again, however, they are not adopted with a consistency sufficient to classify Murray with the Neo-Kantians. The debt is qualified and unacknowledged, confirming that, however much Murray's thought may have been informed by an early training in the Kantian philosophy, it derived its ultimate shape from a prior commitment to Christianity and from the effort to mediate idealism and materialism.

Ethics, the study of the good, must begin with some conception of human nature. Like Kant, Murray never tired of affirming that man's value is given, not derived. It does not rest in the fulfillment of standards or the completion of duties, but in an essential identity as an intelligent and responsible moral being. Man is a self, and deserves to be treated as an end in himself, rather than as a means to the ends of others. Beyond this, man's distinction rests in his nature as a rational being. Man has natural rights, but innate reason elevates him above natural law.

Reason itself is constantly developing, both in its analytic scope and in its influence over individual and social action. In Murray's view, this development turned contemporary anthropological convention on the evolution of ethics on its head. The view held since Rousseau and Herder, that the simplest societies are those most primitive or nearest the 'state of nature', had led many to search for the most basic elements of human ethical consciousness in these primitive societies. But Murray believed that such forms of historicism obscured the true functioning of reason in man and society. Inasmuch as the activity of reason brings increasing order and clarity into human
affairs, it is obvious that the early stages of civilization are not the simplest, but the most complex. 39 The totality of beliefs, superstitions and values has, in these societies, not yet been analysed into constituent parts. 40 It is the advanced societies with philosophical traditions and refined analytic capacities which are better able to reach the simple level of inquiry. Hence an understanding of the fundamental nature of moral consciousness must be based on the "highly differentiated moral activity which forms the latest and noblest fruit of civilization", and not on the study of tribal customs and primitive behaviour. 41 Earlier civilizations were motivated by fear of unknown or capricious forces; the modern moral consciousness rises out of a sense of law in the universe. Through reason it is able to give a name to this sense:

Duty! thou sublime great name ... what is the origin that is worthy of thee, and where are we to find the root of thy noble descent? 42

A footnote would hardly be necessary. In turning to Kant for assistance, Murray turned away from both empirical and intuitional theories of the origins of ethics. Once again, empiricism was equated with materialism, and materialist theories in the form of utilitarianism could never rise from the indicative to the imperative when describing human action. Practical consequences alone do not elicit a sense of principle or obligation. 43

Rejected too was the inner sense or moral faculty proposed by intuitionists like Lord Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson and expanded on by the Common Sense philosophers. Intuitional theory made moral consciousness ultimately dependent on subjective states of mind. 44
Murray believed, by contrast, that any true moral order must be objective, though not at the sacrifice of this vital connection to human moral consciousness. It must not be obtained at the expense of becoming an external and essentially hidden order to which man can only submit in stoic resignation. Nor must it be arbitrary. The moral order that is at once both truly objective and truly human must be based in reason, that power which identifies man's nature and determines his prospects.

Committed to the Kantian notion of Duty, Murray could not but accept the corollary commitment to Reason. Although he found Kant's terminology "unnecessarily scholastic", he accepted the basic distinction of hypothetical and categorical imperatives, characterizing the former as the "conditional command" of practical reason determining the means to the various ends of the individual, and the latter as the "unconditional command" of pure reason determining the ultimate and absolute ends of all rational beings.

Under the guidance of reason, ethical action became the fulfillment of the essential nature of rational humanity:

The consciousness of an unconditional obligation to do certain actions is seen to be one of which we cannot wholly divest ourselves without ceasing to be reasonable beings.

The voice of conscience was the verifiable law of reason; to Murray it became the voice of God speaking in the soul of man.

 Needless to say, man did not always listen. The growth and sophistication of moral consciousness depended on the growth of reason in society. Moral obligations reflected the needs of society as well
as universal rules, and as these needs changed, so too did the understanding of obligation. The Graeco-Roman emphasis on the family and the polis as the focus of highest obligation was broadened by the nineteenth century to an emphasis on the larger community of the world. Similarly, the military needs of embattled or aggressive societies led to an ethic which valued virility and, as at least one consequence, denigrated women. Industrial society had provided a humane counteractive to the military spirit. Although industrialism was attended by great suffering, "it would be a misreading of history to suppose that the evils of industrialism ever reach the appalling magnitude of those which have flowed from the military spirit." 

Social needs influenced moral consciousness, but the centre of responsibility still lay in the individual. Murray was firm in stating that evil did not rest ultimately in the environment or in ignorance, but he was evasive in offering alternate origins.

Environmental approaches were unacceptably deterministic, for they took ultimate responsibility out of the hands of the individual by holding that he or she could not but act as they did under the immediate or long-term consequences. Not only did the individual lose any sense of responsibility; evil took on a far more mild character: "crime and all kinds of moral imperfection are simply misfortunes -- diseases to be cured by an application of the proper remedies."

Those theories which rooted evil in ignorance were judged unacceptable for a similar failure to acknowledge that evil involved the will as well as the mind. This was addressed indirectly through
the division of moral consciousness into the familiar cognitive, emotive and volitional elements already encountered in the Handbook of Psychology. Any ethical theory -- and so, by implication, any theory of evil -- which did not address the tripartite nature of moral consciousness was incomplete.

For this reason, a third possible source of evil was also rejected. The concept of sin receives a simple and non-committal nod in the Introduction to Ethics, but is treated as a term commonly employed to describe wrong-doing, rather than as a source or embodiment of evil.

An article published five years later expands on the interpretation of sin as a literary term used for psychological effect, and in so doing, more explicitly rejects it as a realistic explanation of evil:

The deeper consciousness of sin, evoked by a higher conception of righteousness, has undoubtedly given a sharper antithesis to the ideas of God and Devil, of angel and demon, of heaven and hell, which make up a large part of distinctly Christian thought. The grotesque imagery of horror which has been evolved out of this dread dualism, is indeed one of the most repulsive regions in the popular mythology of Christendom, yet it is not without a certain terrible fascination which has attracted the poets of Christendom to it as offering a fit material for the highest tragic art.

The passage is drawn from an 1896 article in the Monist entitled "The Dualistic Conception of Nature", in which dualistic thought is traced from the Ionians through Augustine to Spinoza and Rousseau in preparation for the affirmation that "monism is a necessary concept of science." Ontology is the ostensible subject, but much of the
discussion is taken up with ethical questions. Murray here traces the concept of sin to Stoic and Manichean roots which came to be absorbed into Christianity through Augustine's extreme contrast of good and evil in the form of the antithesis of nature and grace.

The real foe is Manichean dualism:

It is evident that all dualistic separations of man's life into spheres that are mutually exclusive originate in an imperfect conception of nature in general, but of man's nature in particular. 58

Murray believed this Manicheism had been brought into Christianity through the Augustinian teaching on sin. From Christianity, it had exercised an influence on fifteen hundred years of European thought. It was the work of the nineteenth century to bring this influence to an end.

Whether expressed in terms of the distinction between rationality and irrationality, or between good and evil, the very attempt to circumvent Manichean dualism led Murray to dependence on a conventional idealist dualism whose resolution into an absolute monism is more readily expressed by general hopes than definite programs. In its general outlines, this second dualism was a nineteenth century commonplace shared equally by hard-nosed empiricists and 'sweetness and light' idealists. It was often cast as a distinction between lower and higher orders of life; a realm of necessity and one of freedom. The origins of this dualism were by nature ontological, but its resolution was presumed to be voluntarist and ethical. 'Reason' alone, as a concept bearing more hopes than definition, crossed the boundary dividing the two realms by a power widely recognized, if never quite
made clear. The distinction of the two realms is clearly expressed in Murray's description of "Personal Duties" in the *Introduction to Ethics*:

There is a higher self, represented by the universal reason of which we partake; there is a lower self, represented by the merely rational or non-rational impulses of our sensibility; and when a man's life is surrendered to the control of non-rational impulses that overbear the decision of reason, his lower self may with a certain truth be described as unjust to his higher self.\(^6^0\)

Platonic idealists such as Matthew Arnold had followed this ethical resolution of an ontological problem by arguing that the greatest development of the higher self could take place only at the expense of the lower self: man must give up the impulses, emotions and gratifications of the lower self if he was to perfect his inherent rational nature.\(^6^1\) The practical effect of this dualism was to make ethics a disengaged science in which the good life became a contemplative, intellectual ideal. It was in this way that ethical -- read rational -- behaviour was an affirmation of man's true -- read rational -- nature.

But Murray could not accept this. The tripartite nature of man was violated by an ethic that located the ideal in the cognitive terms of a contemplative life or dealt with duties in abstract and categorical terms alone.\(^6^2\) The two natures were not to be defined by a division of the cognitive from the emotive and volitional, but in terms of the balance or imbalance between these three elements:

Emotion and will, divorced from conscious intelligence, would sink to the level of purely natural impulses on a par with the instinctive cravings of an animal or any other mechanical agency in the organic world. The value of emotion and will themselves ... is a truth which intelligence alone can
Evil, then, was not simply a succumbing to the temptations of will or emotion. It was the result of intelligence, will and emotion falling out of balance. Although this balance was determined and led by the cognitive element of intelligence, Murray apparently believed that evil would just as surely result if the cognitive element were to dominate and repress the emotions and the will. The cognitions determined the balance, but the emotions informed it and the volitions preserved it. The natural impulses of will and emotion were not in themselves evil; they were "absolutely non-moral". In short, the 'lower nature' was defined by an imbalance of the elements, and the higher nature by the proper balance. The 'proper balance' was not determined in the abstract, but according to the particular natures and habits of individual people.

Hence any attempt to impute evil of any sort to individuals in advance of action, whether through ontological dualisms or original sin, was illegitimate: "Original sin, interpreted in its strict sense, is a contradiction in terms, is, therefore, as meaningless and unthinkable as a square circle." As will be seen in the context of Murray's social philosophy, this analysis was too individualistic to encourage recognition of evil in existing social structures, and so led to the offering of only voluntarist and moralist solutions to social problems.

The respect for emotions and volitions demonstrated by John Clark Murray stems from the recognition that ethics deals with life, and hence with ideals that are concrete and active rather than merely disengaged or contemplative:
The moral standard has no significance except in relation to the particular conditions of our mental and physical life, which it would bring into harmony with the universal requirements of reason.69

Since ethics was not simply a cognitive study, it must promote an ideal which combined the mind with emotions and will. Given this necessity, it could never be a theoretical science alone; theory must be actualized in practice. Indeed, practice became the necessary test of theory.70 It was the inadaptability of contemplative or formalist systems, characterized by Plato and Kant respectively, which rendered them ultimately untenable.71 Once again, the Kantian system was abandoned just as the keystone was about to be set in place.

Murray had his own keystone, one which brought ethics and theology together. That stone was Christ, the fulfillment of the two individually and the agent who merged them into one.

Christianity was the model for Murray's distinctly un-pragmatic view of the necessary relation of theory and practice. In the Christian context, it was the relation of faith and practice. The distinction between Christian dogmatics and Christian ethics was no more than a distinction between the doctrinal statement and daily realisation of Christian truth.72 It expressed no fundamental division, for "faith without works is dead". Murray's horror of this deadness extended back to college days, when, in what must have been an exceedingly dry lecture by Professor James Buchanan, he used a notebook page to compose "A Theologic Lay":

"A Theologic Lay"
Ye whose hearts are poor and simple,
Who have faith in all that's ancient,
Who believe in all the writings
Of the Reformation period,
Of the times of grand, old Luther,
Of the times of Knox and Calvin,
Ye who long for those sound doctrines
Taught in all the Puritan systems,
In the works of good John Owen;
And who look with strong suspicion
At the teachings of these ages,
At the Essays of a Maurice,
At the novels of a Kingsley,
Come and hear the good Buchanan,
Hear the simple, old Buchanan.73

The poem demonstrates in equal degrees frustration with unquestioned orthodoxy and interest in the activist faith of Christian Socialists F.D. Maurice and Charles Kingsley. Murray could not abide an orthodoxy absorbed in the refinement of its dogmatic forms. Yet it would be a mistake simply to class him with theological liberals without distinguishing varying shades of this liberalism. For though he found the statements of such orthodox stalwarts as McGill Principal John William Dawson and British Liberal leader William Ewart Gladstone surprising and amusing respectively, he was nonetheless more orthodox in his faith than such Idealist philosophical and theological contemporaries as Edward Caird and Josiah Royce.74

The strong emphasis on the practice of Christianity was already given public expression before Murray left Scotland. In his 1860 Presidential Address to the Theological Society of Edinburgh, Murray warned fellow students that "all attempts to find the permanent good of humanity in anything but the noble lives of God-serving men must be utterly resisted", adding that it was not solely doctrine or
hotly defended forms of church government which would "accomplish the
world's regeneration". 75 Was this a departure from the orthodoxy of
the Westminster Confession? Hardly. If anything, Murray saw it as the
very meaning and fulfillment of that catechism:

in truth, if the chief end of man is to glorify God and
enjoy Him forever, tell me wherein that man comes short
of this who attains the complete and harmonious develop­
ment of the nature given him by God . . . Now if we
render glory to God in proportion to the perfection in
which we retain his likeness, and if our enjoyment of
Him is to be estimated by the force of our revolt against
all that is unlike Him, there is no other destination for
man than to wage unwearying war against all that impedes
the full, free, and harmonious growth of his own God­
like nature.76

Although the emphasis may have been more spirited, these state­
ments in themselves hardly constituted a radical departure from conven­
tional views in either the liberal or conservative theological camps.
Or, for that matter, from traditional philosophical thought.
Aristotle's practical advance upon Socrates and Plato was often quoted
by Murray with approval: "We do not make these inquiries in order that
we may know what virtue is, but in order that we may become good men."77
To Murray, the very universality of this position was only further
proof of its truth. He was a little perplexed by those positive
responses to Pragmatism whose enthusiasm was based in the belief that
the assertion of "the simple fact of human action" was in some way new
to philosophy.78 Pragmatism's novelty was also its error, for in
taking practice as the origin rather than the test of truth, it amounted
to "a renewal of the attempt to dethrone reason from its position of
supreme authority as a final court of appeal in all questions with
regard to reality or truth."^79

The commitment to an active faith introduced an element of particularity which distinguished Murray from the broad, all-absorbing ecumenism of such absolute idealists as Josiah Royce, who defined "Religion in its higher sense", as:

the consciousness of practical relations to a real, but at present unseen, spiritual order, whose authority as furnishing a rule for our conduct is conceived as absolute, and whose worth and dignity we recognize as above every other worth and dignity known to us . . . I expressly define the general term so that Buddhism and Christianity, the so-called Ethical Religions of some modern teachers, and the more positive creeds of tradition equally fall within the scope of my definition."^80

Royce drew from this definition the claim that professors of philosophy ought to keep "aloof from the visible church" in demonstration of the lack of divisive particularity in sound religious consciousness."^81

Murray countered with the argument that aloofness from the life of the church was equivalent to aloofness from the life of the faith. The church was an association of believers joined in commitment to the outworking of the gospel. By contrast,

the contention of Professor Royce, with regard to the main value of religious association seems to assume that religious life can be separated from philanthropic work; or, in other words, that there can be genuine service of God distinct from the service of our fellowmen."^82

Stepping further away from the ecumenicity of Idealist religion, the assertion that practice verified, but did not initiate truth could be construed as supporting the argument that Christianity alone was
the true religion. In the apologetics of liberal theology, the role of Christ took on special significance. But to Murray, Christ was not simply the Great Moral Teacher whose life and purpose were centred on the Sermon on the Mount rather than the Mount of Calvary; nor was divinity sacrificed in a search for the historical Jesus.

Expanding on the union of faith and practice, Murray claimed that:

True religion . . . is, in its essential nature, that complete unison between the life of man and the will of God which flows from the communion of the human spirit with the Divine. This communion is more or less imperfectly expressed in all religions; for man becomes religious only when he becomes conscious, however dimly, of his relation to God. But this essential truth of all religion finds its perfect expression in Christianity. The central doctrine of Christianity is the incarnation of God in the person of Christ. The central object, therefore, of the Christian's faith -- the highest ideal of his speculative conceptions as of his practical endeavours -- is a Being who represents the embodiment of the Divine Spirit in human form.83

Of all religions, only Christianity could point to the completed union of the divine and the human. Since the ideal and the real were combined in an historical person, only Christianity could legitimately portray the ethical ideal as an achieved reality and not merely as an anticipated hope. Though admittedly only an inference from the passage quoted above, on this basis, only Christianity could lay claim to being the 'True Religion'.

The criteria of truth made it necessary to uphold Christ's character as fully human and fully divine. Hence, though Murray appreciated some of the results of Higher Criticism, he could not accept any presuppositions or conclusions whose effect was to
undercut Christ's equality with God by limiting him to a role as an enlightened but thoroughly human moral teacher alone:

By enduring the cross and despising its shame, He has been set down at the right hand of the throne of God. Is not that a historical fact, is it not a historical fact that by rejecting the splendour of an earthly kingdom, he has been set down at the right hand of the throne of heaven?84

The religion which undergirded ethics was distinctly Christian, however much it might stray from the standards of evangelical Presbyterian orthodoxy and towards the theological liberalism of Albrecht Ritschl. The value of this religion was not dependent on any sociological function in holding communities together, nor could it be tailored in order better to fit the demands of a philosophical system or an ecumenical age: "For the purposes of the moral life, however, religious aspiration must not be allowed to evaporate in a vague abstraction of the divine, separating it completely from the concrete interests of human life."85

In a stronger statement, Murray quoted favourably and at length, Nietzsche's ridicule of those who,

are quit of the Christian God, and believe themselves all the more bound to hold fast Christian morality . . . If Christian faith is given up, the right to Christian morality is pulled from under the feet . . . Christianity is a system, a logically connected and integral view of things. Break off one of the leading ideas -- the belief in God -- and the whole goes to pieces.86

The former theological student did not elaborate on the theological implications of his Christology. The metaphor, however, of arch and keystone is appropriate, for it expresses the union of Christian and philosophical ethics, and hence of all truth. Briefly,
while philosophical ethics works up to the ideal of Christ, Christian ethics assumes the ideal and works out from it. The content in both cases is the same, for the two arms of the arch mirror each other, but the methods are inductive and deductive respectively.

It is in this way that for Murray all truth becomes Christian truth. Christ expresses the ideal of rational ethics, the human embodiment of the Divine Will. This will can be seen both as an ethical and a cosmological law, for "the laws of Nature are expressions of the Divine Will." Logical entailment or semantic trick? Murray makes the transition by resorting once again to idealist dualism:

If, then, the moral law is the real law of the universe, and its obligation is a real fact, it must transcend the laws of nature by which our natural life is determined; and the moral consciousness of man, in grasping such a law, brings him into touch with an order of things which transcends the order of nature ... The moral order can be a reality only if there really is a Perfect Reason who knows the law of a perfectly reasonable life, and who, as himself the realisation of that law, imposes it upon all reasonable beings. In such a Supreme Reason the moral order, which for us is an ideal to be realized, becomes a reality eternally existent; and the infinite authority of the moral law becomes the infinite authority of an Infinite Being, in whom wisdom and righteousness are perfectly realised.

Both the law of nature and the moral law are rooted in the divine will. Murray turns Kant on his head by arguing that God is the proof of the rational order, and not a Kantian postulate of practical reason. With this argument from 'moral design', he preserves his own practical theory of truth in face of the Kantian emphasis on the over-riding necessities of pure reason. The unity of truth is assumed in regard to the order of nature, and proven only in the
ethical realm. The proof is assumed to have validity because of the inherent superiority, on unstated standards, of the moral realm. The moral order transcends the natural order, but its laws have some vague jurisdiction in that lower realm.

The link, of course, is Reason. Although it would properly have a different definition in the two realms, the fact that it is rooted in God's will for both appears to give it validity as the unifying agent in truth. Though one could argue that the end result is the same, the choice to reverse the order and hence assert the primacy of God over Reason is hardly insignificant. Murray has not given a sound argument for his theory of the unity of truth, but his semantic solution to the problem points clearly to the priorities which informed his worldview.

Christ's role in ethics is expressed in terms of Supreme Reason, but Murray's choice to use a person rather than an abstract concept such as the kingdom of ends to express the fulfillment of ethics points to a further and more significant departure from Kant. With Christ, ethics took on the personal note that was lacking in Kant but that was at the heart of Murray's own tripartite anthropology. Christ expressed the cognitive dimension when understood as the Supreme Reason; He expressed the volitional dimension in the choice to die for human salvation; \(^90\) but most significantly, he expressed the emotive dimension in the law of love. As the exemplification of love, Christ introduced an element of feeling which Kant's Law of Duty had specifically excluded. Duty led the individual to fulfill the demands of justice as these had been determined by Reason. But to Murray, justice was only one part of man's social obligation; "bare justice
is not the highest reach of moral character; it is, as I.H. Fichte has pithily put it, 'the minimum of the moral will'.

This mention of will was as significant a departure from rationalist ethics as was the reliance on love, for it too rooted ethical obligation in a broader conception of human nature.

The perfect fulfillment of one's ethical nature, therefore, was not equivalent to fulfillment of a rational nature alone:

thus the moral consciousness is not completely satisfied with the lifeless abstraction of duty as an infinite obligation. It demands to know what this infinite obligation means as a living fact, and it finds the vitalizing force of the fact in the authority of a perfectly wise and righteous Being. The moral consciousness thus passes over into the religious consciousness; and consciousness of duty reaches its culmination in consciousness of God. Nature, awed by the grandeur of the moral revelation, sees clearly that she must have derived it from a source transcending her own limits.

The prospect of swooning Nature re-opens the question of Murray's idealism. Yet in spite of the heady prose, the statements themselves confirm that what is being expressed is not the Absolute idealism of a neo-Hegelian or the Critical idealism of a Neo-Kantian. It is, rather, a personal idealism saturated with the primacy of God. As such, it is reminiscent of two thinkers for whom Murray expressed great appreciation and who, he believed, had long been misunderstood: Spinoza and Berkeley.

Spinoza was the lesser influence. Murray found his adoption of a geometric model of truth to be a denial of the purpose and integrity of philosophy as expressed in the lecture to the Queen's community at the very beginning of his career:
the extension of such methods to Philosophy overlooks the fact that Philosophy is an inquiry into the validity of these methods themselves. Such an inquiry, however, must obviously go beyond the methods inquired into, and cannot, to begin with, assume these methods as valid for its own direction.\textsuperscript{93}

Murray understood that Spinoza had assumed the geometric model as necessary to the intelligibility of the universe.\textsuperscript{94} Ironically, in his criticism of such an adoption of untested models, he was oblivious to a very similar circularity in his own interdependent assumptions regarding the nature of the universe and the structure of human knowledge.

Conventional criticism of Spinoza since the seventeenth century had focussed on individual points within the whole philosophy. Such 'atonistic' approaches to the history of philosophy had, by the nineteenth century, been superseded by a Hegelian emphasis on the analysis of integral wholes. Taking a page from the German idealist histories of philosophy which he employed in the McGill classroom, Murray argued that a sound interpretation of Spinoza's philosophy could not proceed through determining the tenability of individual doctrines but by taking the Spinozan system, "as a whole in the light of what appears to be its essential drift."\textsuperscript{95} This drift was idealistic, a view of the universe as "essentially an evolution of intelligence".\textsuperscript{96}

In nature, this process was manifested in the evolution of the infinite attributes of substance, a necessary construct of pure reason, into the infinite variety of modes, the concrete form in which attributes achieve reality. But there was an independent, parallel 'order of ideas' which moved from opinion, through inductive,
generalizing science, to deductive, demonstrative science and which allowed the ultimate interpretation of all facts in terms of essence or thought. Since the ideas were the essence rather than the reflection of sensible things, the intellectual order had an integrity and immortality not threatened by the possible decay or destruction of the natural order. Thought lives immortal, and it lives in the mind of God. Through thought, therefore, man left the deterministic necessity of the natural realm and entered the realm of freedom. Murray expresses the transition with an almost uncharacteristic flush of idealist rhetoric that conveys considerable appreciation:

Here, in fact, Spinoza follows Plato in his ascent to those serene heights of mental life in which genuine knowledge is illuminated with a moral spendor, by being identified with genuine love: while the fierce light of geometrical demonstration, which seemed to fuse all existence into a violent mechanical union, becomes mellowed into a glorious haze in which the finite spirit feels as if all its harsh self-assertion faded away into a mystical communion of love with the Infinite Spirit, in whom all live, and move, and have their being.97

From the systematic investigations of Hamilton to the 'glorious haze' of Spinoza; Murray had apparently moved far since leaving Scotland. In this interpretation, Spinoza offered exactly that combination of cosmology and ethics which Murray himself was aiming to achieve. All knowledge is "essentially a knowledge of God has he reveals Himself in the innumerable modes of His attributes."98 But it is knowledge attained only through love; cognitions combine with emotions in an act of volition. The ultimate aim is a form of fellowship between God and man. Human joy rests in attaining the greater perfection which results from advances in knowledge. The object of knowledge is God, and,
When an object is conceived as the cause of joy, the joy takes the form of love for the object which is its cause; and consequently, the joy derived from that knowledge of God which is the highest activity of intellectual life becomes an intellectual love of God.99

This joy is blessedness, this blessedness is freedom, and this freedom is fellowship with God. Murray charts a Spinozan progression, but finds the statements on man at this level a little extreme: "He is described as assimilated to God in language such as can be paralleled only in the excesses of the literature of Mysticism."100 All the same, the ethical piety which infuses the cosmological system was highly compelling.

The more moderate expression this piety finds in Berkeley is one reason for an apparent preference for the Irish Bishop over the Jewish-Dutch lens grinder. Contemporaries believed Murray over-rated Berkeley, and it is obvious that serious appreciation was given in classes to the thought of the eighteenth century idealist.101 However, Murray wrote no extended or substantial study of Berkeley. Aside from references to him in articles given over to the Scottish philosophy, Murray published only the single article entitled "The Revived Study of Berkeley." Ostensibly a review of five recently published works, the article was in fact an extended biography which included a brief defense of Berkeley's idealism against the dismissals of those like Hume who found him unanswerable but unconvincing, and others like Samuel Johnson who found him simply absurd.

Murray argued that Berkeley did not reject the existence of matter as such, but only the empiricist position that Matter represents
an unknowable substance and is represented to us by immaterial ideas. If anything, Berkeley was a superior empiricist, for he believed that matter needed no explanation beyond its being perceived. What we perceive is not an image of the material world, but the material world itself. Since continued existence cannot be dependent on our sporadic perceptions, "the absolute existence of the universe implies that it is known by an Infinite and Universal Mind. Berkeley provides Murray with the ultimate alternative to materialism: "To him, the world is not a mere piece of splendid mechanism moved by unconscious forces: it is the really existing ideas of the living God speaking to us through all our varied senses."

From this proceed some pious extrapolations which go beyond the word without violating the spirit of Berkeley's philosophy:

Accordingly, on this doctrine, the face of Nature is, without straining a figure, the Face of God: the sounds of Nature are the voice of God ... God is not a Being whose existence needs to be proved by arguments. He is a living person whom we see every time we open our eyes more closely than we ever see any other -- a Person whose actual thoughts are spoken to us at every moment more distinctly than the thoughts of any human being.

Once again the transposition from cosmology to ethics is effected with a few deft strokes which result in a theological idealism similar to that fashioned out of the "drift" of Spinoza and expressed indirectly in Murray's works on ethics.

This theological idealism is born in piety. And sustained in piety. Murray does not trouble with counter-arguments of scepticism and, as seen above, he easily dismisses materialism. Rather, he states his position with that simple confidence in order -- a divine and
ethical order -- which J. T. Merz had identified as a characteristic of British ethical thought. The world simply is filled with the Spirit of God, it is structured by His rule. Nature is "not an irrational matter but rather intrinsically a rational form, spiritual reality."\textsuperscript{107}

This knowledge is understood through revelation, not as a Kantian postulate of practical reason or a Hegelian stage of developing religious consciousness. Murray placed the ultimate source of knowledge not in the human mind, but in God, "the Infinite Mind, who knows all things and imparts to our minds what of his knowledge their limited nature enables them to receive."\textsuperscript{108}

One thing our minds can receive is the knowledge that God is not simply mind. The emphasis in Murray's ethics on faculties of emotion and will, in particular through the central role given to love, and the belief that truth reaches its highest form in ethical practice and so is exemplified by the incarnate Christ who is wholly divine God and wholly historic man, combine to distinguish Murray's specifically Christian theological idealism from the religious universalism of such philosophical contemporaries as Josiah Royce.

Also received by our minds is the confidence that Christianity represents a unified system of truth which provides a basis for philosophical thought in such areas as epistemology, psychology and ethics. Murray's confidence in the intrinsic rational form and spiritual reality of Nature allows that assumption of harmony which is the extent of reconciliation or synthesis attempted between philosophical schools. In theory, critical thought is free to appeal to the ultimate standards of reason in examining the basis and justification of such
confident assumptions. In practice, Murray seldom offered explanations for his confidence apart from comments dropped at the conclusion of sermons and lectures on theological themes.

The context was appropriate, for Murray's confidence rested in a fideism based on the contemplation of God's works in nature, history and the individual life, and clarified through the insight gained in a life lived according to the standards of Christian ethics. Its simplest, yet for a philosopher boldest statement came in a remark at the end of "Atomism and Theism", Murray's reply to John Tyndall's 1874 Belfast Address. Tyndall's rejection of a God who would not fit under the microscope or into the test-tube had stirred apologists of the faith into a vigorous re-stating of all manner of proofs of the existence of the deity. Murray rejected these logical deductions and rational creations when he chose instead to close his reply to Tyndall with a quotation which moved the epistemological question into a Christian ethical context:

"Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God."

But would this Christian ethic be equal to the challenges of nineteenth century industrial civilization?
Footnotes to Chapter Three


2 Ibid., p. 128.

3 "Queen's College", MUA 611/2, p. 2.

4 Ibid., p. 2.


7 Murray, Handbook of Psychology, pp. 282 - 283.

8 Ibid., p. 287.

9 Ibid., pp. 287 - 288.


12 Ibid., p. 297.

13 Ibid., p. 298.

14 Ibid., pp. 302 - 303. Solomon Maimon also derived Space and Time empirically from the differences within and between objects. This does not detract from their function as conditions of intelligible experience; it merely eliminates the Kantian distinction between a priori form and empirical content. S. Atlas, From Critical to Speculative Idealism: The Philosophy of Solomon Maimon (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), pp. 170 - 171.


16 Ibid., p. 306.

17 Ibid., p. 307.
18 Ibid., p. 309.

19 Ibid., pp. 310 - 311.


21 Ibid., p. 144.


23 Murray, Handbook of Psychology, p. 296.

24 Ibid., pp. 305 - 306.

25 Although Sir William Hamilton strongly rejected the idea that physiology could inform psychology, those trained in the Common Sense tradition were, on the whole, better able to accept the findings of empirical science in psychology. The realist school confidently assumed that the existence and deliverances of consciousness were on a par with those of the empirical world. Henry Calderwood, a student and successor of Hamilton's at Edinburgh wrote, "Physiology and Psychology when taken together are sciences of human life: they cannot be dissociated. Only when they are combined can we be said to have a science of the life of man." H. Calderwood, The Relations of Mind and Brain 3rd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1892), p. 2. George Paxton Young at the University of Toronto was a former Common Sense realist turned Idealist who was strongly opposed to Calderwood's Common Sense realism in ethics and psychology. T. Hoff, "The Controversial Appointment of James Mark Baldwin to the University of Toronto in 1889", (M.A. Thesis: Carleton University, 1980), p. 45.


27 Andrew Seth portrayed the assumption of harmony as a characteristic of Common Sense philosophy, in which mental faculties were seen as corresponding by divine creation to the structure of the world. Murray comes close to this position without troubling with such details as faculties. Seth attempted in 1885 to expand on the theme of harmony by uniting the Common Sense philosophy with Hegelian idealism, finding in the Hegelian method a means "which professes to guarantee both the inner-connectedness of all the conceptions, and the self-completing integrity of the resulting scheme." Seth, Scottish Philosophy, p. 197.

28 John Clark Murray, An Introduction to Ethics (Montreal: Wm. Foster Brown, 1891), pp. 41 - 50. Although Murray used Calderwood's Handbook of Moral Philosophy in classes in Ethics before the publication of his own Introduction, The Relations of Mind and Brain was never included in the reading lists for the courses in Mental Philosophy.

29 Murray, Handbook of Psychology, p. 428.

30 Ibid., p. 409.

31 Idem, Introduction to Ethics, p. 27.
32 The division into Knowledge, Feelings and Action was subsequently used to structure both the Handbook of Psychology and the Introduction to Ethics.

33 "Queen's College", MUA 611/2, p. 2.

34 M. Abbot, "Moral Philosophy Notes: Lecturer Dr. Murray", MUA 684/2, ref 38/180/4/20. This can also be seen in the description of "Social Duties" in the Introduction to Ethics, pp. 241 - 326.

35 Murray, Introduction to Ethics, p. 6.

36 Ibid., p. 7.

37 Ibid., p. 255.

38 Ibid., p. 28. This was the basis of Murray's rejection of Rousseau: Idem, "Rousseau: His Position in the History of Philosophy" Philosophical Review VIII (1899), pp. 359; 364 - 365.


40 Ibid., pp. 32 - 34.

41 Ibid., p. 38.

42 Ibid., p. 41.

43 Ibid., p. 54.

44 Ibid., p. 60.


46 Ibid., p. 67.

47 Ibid., p. 67.

48 Ibid., p. 68.

49 Ibid., p. 71.

50 Ibid., p. 77.

51 Ibid., p. 283.

52 Ibid., p. 136.

53 Ibid., p. 135.

54 Ibid., pp. 102; 109; 220; 230; Idem, "The Dualistic Conception of Nature", 
The Monist VI (1896), pp. 386 - 387.

55. Idem, Introduction to Ethics, pp. 96; 317; 383.


57. Ibid., p. 382.

58. Ibid., p. 394.

59. Ibid., p. 389. A similar assessment was given when Murray addressed the problems of Christian ethics more directly in A Handbook of Christian Ethics (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1908), p. 140.

60. Idem, Introduction to Ethics, p. 335; Christian Ethics, p. 116.


64. Idem, Christian Ethics, p. 146.


67. Ibid., p. 150.

68. Ibid., p. 151.


73. MUA 611/9, np. A native of Paisley, James Buchanan had been a preacher famed for vigorous, evangelical sermons before being appointed Professor of Apologetics in the Free Church seminary, New College, in 1845. He succeeded Thomas Chalmers in the chair of Systematic Theology upon the latter's death in 1847, and remained there until resignation in 1868. Murray's assessment of Buchanan's originality is stated more politely in the Dictionary of National Biography: "Though not eminent for his powers of original thought, Buchanan had a remarkable faculty of collecting what was valuable in the researches and arguments of others, and presenting it in clear form and lucid


75 John Clark Murray, "A Vindication of Theology: Being And Address to Theological Students" (Montreal: Dawson Brothers, 1877), pp. 7 - 8.

76 Ibid., p. 9.


79 Ibid., p. 111.


81 Ibid., p. 285.


85 Idem, Introduction to Ethics, p. 351.

86 Idem, Christian Ethics, p. 20n.


88 Idem, Introduction to Ethics, p. 339.

89 Ibid., p. 358.


91 Idem, Introduction to Ethics, p. 250.

92 Ibid., p. 358.


95 Ibid., p. 473.
96 Ibid., p. 474.
97 Ibid., p. 486.
98 Ibid., p. 486.
99 Ibid., p. 487.
100 Ibid., p. 487.
103 Ibid., p. 214.
105 Ibid., p. 167.
106 Ibid., p. 167.
CHAPTER FOUR

Towards a Just Society

The young professor who sailed to Canada in 1862 left Scotland with more than the toasts of well-wishers in mind. The lessons of David Murray were no more to be forgotten than those received from Glasgow or Edinburgh professors. Personal culture was to be developed, but never at the expense of working for the improvement of political and social culture.

The lessons of David Murray formed the pre-occupations of his son. If Canada's undeveloped culture provided the proper environment for the development of a philosophy untrammeled by national tradition, how much more did it provide an atmosphere conducive to the creation of a new society on lines laid out in the thought of liberal political reformers? The progress of liberalism in Britain was seen by its promoters as a progress won against restrictive traditions. A nation free of tradition was a nation ready to be molded along the lines of the best economic and political thought.

Caught up in the demands of teaching at Queen's College, Murray was unable to bring his political convictions to public expression until well after his arrival in Canada. When he did speak out, it was often in response to contemporary events and situations; as a result, the development of Murray's social thought is closely tied to events and
and changes in Canada in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Since his attention and pen were drawn to many issues, the development traced in this chapter is necessarily selective. It covers primarily the political and economic issues of the period and shows how Murray's thought moved from the classical liberalism of his Scottish upbringing towards the new liberalism of the later years of the nineteenth century. It was a development which paralleled that of J. S. Mill or such later figures as T. H. Green, a development from the laissez-faire doctrines of Adam Smith to the "reformed capitalism" of the co-operative movements which grew in strength from the 1870's. This movement is paralleled by the growth of ethical concerns in Murray's general philosophical outlook. Though it has an independent, if related, identity before 1890, the social philosophy becomes less distinguishable from the ethical philosophy after this time -- each is developed in terms of the other.

Two relevant concerns which have been excluded from this chapter are Murray's support of the temperance movement and his work for the recognition of the rights of women to higher education. His views on temperance are quite similar to those of many contemporaries. Despite its significance, the issue of women's access to higher education was an isolated concern related more to Murray's involvement in the university and perhaps, like J. S. Mill, to his marriage to a highly gifted woman. The rights of women generally formed no part of his social philosophy as it was developed both at the time of the controversy surrounding the issue at McGill and in subsequent years. It was not extended to advocacy of or even commentary on suffrage.
debates which were underway from the 1880's. Further, though his earliest arguments favouring women's admission to the universities were based on a natural rights assumption of sexual equality, Murray appears later to have adopted the distinctly unequalitarian maternal feminist view of men and women inhabiting ethically and occupationally separate spheres.¹

A focus on political and economic issues allows a clearer picture of Murray's thought on social issues to emerge. The initial setting for the development of this thought is established in a series of articles on political themes written in the 1870's and early 1880's. The topics of these articles move between British traditions, philosophic ideals and Canadian reality, but the outlook is always characterized by the political and economic rationalism, the individualism and the moralism which together characterized Murray's middle class, mid-Victorian liberalism.

The reformer's son would have found difficulty in accepting the Whig assumption that the British parliamentary system was a fore­shadowing of government in the City of God, yet as a democratic and constitutional order, it did provide the best model on which the government of Canada should be patterned. Furthermore, a young liberal could take heart that the very novelty of the Canadian experiment assured that those outworn traditions and corrupt practices which still frustrated political confreres in Britain could be dispensed with before they became a hindrance in the new world.

But in spite of its novelty, Canadian parliamentary reality proved as readily corruptible as the British; at times it seemed
even to outdo the mother parliament in the scale of its corruption. A distressed Murray was forced to formulate a philosophical corrective. Both his criticism and the corrective reflected the moralist assumption common to reformers of the period that problems were rooted less in the political system itself than in the motivations of politicians, and in some cases voters.

The ideal of political rationalism found expression through criticism of one flaw of the British parliamentary system which had been exported to Canada: the party system. Murray's was one of the first voices in what was to be a chorus of criticism raised by Canadian intellectuals against the parliamentary tradition of party politics. This inheritance was believed to be an unnecessary perpetrator of artificial antagonism which encouraged corruption and prevented elected representatives from working co-operatively for the general welfare of the nation on the basis of the best principles of political economy and philosophy. The historical origins of parties could be understood, but like many contemporaries, Murray did not believe that history alone could justify the continuation of a divisive system that was hindering the realization of civilization's evolution towards unity:

It is surely no universal and eternal law of human life that men can govern themselves only by splitting into hostile cliques who shall create fictitious causes of quarrel if the natural course of events do not furnish them with real ones.

Nor were party lines tacitly observed when it came to assigning responsibility for the continuation of party politics into post-Confederation politics. In Murray's opinion, it was the Liberal
George Brown who had argued strongly and misguided for it. The Canadian experience confirmed that the party system clouded sound decision-making in a fog of corruption. Governments might always use control over purse and appointments in order to cement power, but the enormous expenditure necessary for the creation of a new level of government in Canada had amplified the problem to unprecedented proportions -- as demonstrated in the Pacific Railway Scandal which brought the new Confederation's first elected administration a resounding defeat in the election of 1873.

The party system had introduced corruption into Canadian politics or, more correctly, had revealed the corruptibility of Canadian politicians. Murray looked on the accession of the Liberal administration of Alexander Mackenzie as a return to responsibility in politics, but the morality of individual ministries and politicians was too weak a guarantee of the continuation of political justice in a party system. If the problem lay with the motivations of politicians, surely the answer must begin at that level as well.

Murray expressed his moralist corrective to Canada's political system on the occasion of McGill's gala Annual University Lecture for 1877. Politicians, businessmen, professors and students came to hear the Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy address "The Study of Political Philosophy". What they heard was not an abstract discourse on principles, but an indictment of the state of affairs in Canadian politics. Their speaker explained that democratic government was at once the best and most vulnerable of political systems. While it assured the representation of voters, it could not ensure the quality of
representatives. This posed little problem in England, where politicians were drawn largely from a leisure class which possessed the time for study, the wealth to be relatively immune from corruption, and the motivation to work for social and political improvement. The analysis might appear more Tory than Liberal, but Murray was undoubtedly thinking of such men as J.S. Mill and Lord Shaftesbury.

Canada possessed no aristocracy and no leisure class. According to the professor, its men of wealth -- some of whom were undoubtedly in the audience -- preferred self-gratification to the pursuit of culture and the exercise of political responsibility. Its politicians -- also present in the audience -- approached their task as a job rather than a duty. Moreover, they were seldom best suited by intelligence for the job. In short, politics in Canada was a profession rather than a calling. Professional politicians could not be trusted to act as selflessly in the pursuit of justice as those who looked on political service as a social duty. The lack of a leisure class in Canada was a danger to the survival of constitutional government.

Statements as strong as these could be expected to cause a few of those present to shift uncomfortably in their seats and lead others more familiar with Murray's politics to scratch their heads in puzzlement. But qualifiers were on their way. Together with Canada's other pre-eminent expatriate liberal, Goldwin Smith, Murray believed that Britain's advantage in this regard lay not in the simple existence of an aristocracy, but in a social order which ensured that those who
governed were educated in and obedient to the higher duties of justice. But Murray did not follow Smith in finding a solution in the balanced structures of republican democracy. The problem was not one of political structure, but one of political will. Canada must augment by education what it lacked in social organization and ideals. The strength of a nation lay in the intelligent loyalty of its leaders and citizens. Since the popular mind was often educated by its political leaders, it was of the greatest necessity to ensure that these leaders were provided with a solid higher education in political science. In short, the study of political philosophy in a college or university ought to be a pre-requisite of political office.

This would not be an education in political administration. It was to include the study of constitutional law, but go further to focus on the fundamental principles and ideals of human society. Reform of defective political practice was to be effected through the moral reform of the politicians.

Those familiar with Murray's aims for philosophy in general and ethics in particular can not have been surprised by the universalistic Christian tone which he gave to political philosophy. Included in this evangelical Christianity was a sure faith in the essential unity of the moral order and the order of rational politics. The aim of all politicians and nations must be the achievement of a universal government in which the interests of mankind as a whole would take priority over selfish individual, party and national goals. Christ had taught a universal morality, and had given it power by adding "the inspired force of a life sacrificed in the practical realisation of the theoretic
ideal." So too, politicians must co-operate to uphold the British constitutional model and adapt it to Canadian conditions, but at the same time they must never lose sight of the ultimate demands of universal justice. They must be prepared to see the nation disappear with the advent of a universal or world government and, together with the entire population, rest content in the knowledge that Canada had, during its brief existence and through its self-sacrifice, demonstrated its commitment to the highest demands of justice and morality.

The McGill address was nothing if not timely. Canada's future was hardly a settled question in 1877. A preference for the British constitution showed that Murray was far from advocating continental union -- an option he was clearly to reject some years later. But it would be too hasty to find in his words a proposal for imperial federation. Canadian politicians were not being called to cede sovereignty to an other nation or international body. They were being called to frame legislation according to the demands of a universal morality regardless of its effect on the continuation of Canada as a separate nation.

Murray's audience at McGill was fully aware that this was not simply an abstract improbability. The timeliness of the directive rested in debates then underway and soon to be intensified on the merits of free trade as an economic policy for Canada. Free trade was, to Murray, more than a freely chosen political policy. It was an undeniable demand of economic rationalism and hence an unavoidable policy and test of moral and rational government. Free trade was a
philosophical issue. And free trade became the primary political issue in the federal election held only months after Murray's McGill speech.

Canada had not been spared the effects of the world recession which began in 1873. These effects had been aggravated by the dumping of manufactured products on the unprotected Canadian market by British and American industries. Seeking an issue on which to return to office after its defeat in 1873, and sensing undercurrents of discontent with the honest but uninspired Liberal administration of Alexander Mackenzie, the Conservative party under John A. Macdonald advanced a "National Policy" guaranteed to lift Canada out of the depression and spur it to new heights of prosperity. Although it lacked clear definition, the Policy had one easily grasped point: protective tariffs. The Liberal Party continued to advocate and practice a policy of free trade in spite of strong calls from business groups for protection of the home market.

Murray's lecture on political philosophy had been delivered to a select group. With the election call and the unveiling of the Conservative's National Policy, he took to the liberal Canadian Spectator in a three-part series to spread his message further. The opening article, "What is a National Policy?", defended the Mackenzie government's honesty in sharp contrast to the opportunistic and corrupt Macdonald administration which had preceded it. A second article under the same title layed out the classical liberal arguments against protective tariffs: tariffs were burdensome taxes which caused an artificial and unproductive rise in prices and so contravened
the first law of economics, "a man seeks to obtain what he wants at the
cost of as little labour as possible." In addition, tariffs could be
reciprocated, and so would have the eventual effect of excluding
Canada from world markets. The common belief that tariffs would bring
prosperity was "hallucination" and self-delusion.

In a final article published only two days before the election,
Murray addressed "The Ethics of a National Policy". The analysis was
divided into two parts: International morality and National morality.
Echoes of the McGill speech sounded in the discussion of international
morality, as Murray asserted that "the very nature of our moral
convictions implies a progress towards the recognition of obligations
to mankind apart from all distinctions of nationality." The
universality of Christian ethics, as embodied in liberal politics, was
to take unchallenged priority over the particular demands of patriotism,
no matter what the consequences:

If Free Trade is a splendid ideal of international communion
which must be realised in the perfected development of the
human race, then at the peril of our souls let us work for it,
at the peril of our national honour let us strive to make it
the policy of our country... Is it not better to lose our
separate existence in teaching a great lesson to the world, than
to live in ignoble luxuries obtained by shirking the national
obligations imposed upon us by Providence?

The arguments on national morality anticipated themes which
would emerge in the social writings of the coming decade. Protective
tariffs, it was argued, were a regressive tax which helped a small
number of manufacturers at the expense of many labourers, farmers and
other citizens. The tariffs aggravated economic inequalities by
giving to a small portion of the population an artificial advantage
for the rapid accumulation of wealth with relatively little effort. They suspended the natural laws of the marketplace, and so would lead to the shifting of capital and labour from the most remunerative to less remunerative industries. Finally and most personally, they interfered with the freedom of individual action:

The essence of individual freedom is, that I shall be allowed to act up to my conviction of what is right as long as by doing so I do not infringe upon the like freedom on the part of others. Is it not an outrage upon the principles of liberty, that I should be compelled by law to adopt, in my trading transactions, a course which, in an economical point of view, appears to me insane? 24

It did not appear insane to the majority of Canadian voters. Caught in the grip of depression and inspired by the first stirrings of nationalism, they saw greater comfort in "hallucination" than in the preservation of abstract principles of liberty and morality. 25 The Conservative party was returned to power with 137 seats to the Liberal's 69.

John Clark Murray continued to lecture against protectionism when in the McGill classroom, but he did not write on the tariff until after the following election in 1882. Addressing "The Political Situation in Canada" in the inaugural issue of the Dominion Review, he ascribed the victory of the Conservatives in 1878 to the willingness of voters to try any new policy in the midst of financial despair. 26 The renewal of the Conservative's mandate in the 1882 election was a regrettable, but undeniable vindication of protection by due democratic process. Having expected little of the voters, Murray could resign himself to their choice. But having expected much of his political compatriots, he was less generous with the "so-called Liberal Party".
The popularity of the National Policy had led the Liberal party to moderate its free trade stance and advocate instead some limited continuation of the protective tariff. Though still seen as a free trade party in the eyes of most voters, Murray could not accept any wavering from the Liberals when crucial matters of fundamental philosophical principle were at stake. Once again, the "exigencies of party warfare" had led to the betrayal of individual freedom and the rejection of economic and political rationalism. The cautious professor who had given support to the Mackenzie administration was from this time a liberal without a party, claiming that, "the Liberal who has none of the interests of the partisan at stake, [need not] feel that any unmitigated calamity has been sustained in the late elections." Protection was no less immoral for having won qualified support from the Liberal Party. It was still opposed to the best scientific thought in political economy and as such was doomed to fail in time.

The judgement of the liberal professor against the Liberal party was dogmatically harsh. The Liberals had favoured only a partial retention of the protective tariff and continued to campaign on a free trade platform until at least 1896. But in its philosophical dimension, free trade was an all-or-nothing cause. With the loss to that cause of the Liberal party, Murray no longer felt the need or motivation to address contemporary political issues as directly as he had done previously. Free trade was advocated no less firmly in articles and lectures, but as a natural necessity and not as a political platform.
As he turned in the 1880's to address the emerging social problems of a nation undergoing industrialization, Murray's liberal ideology was intact. The world was still conceived of as ordered in such a way that the demands of ethics and the demands of rational economics could not possibly come into conflict. It was the world of Adam Smith and the Manchester School, the world of individuals advancing the good of the community as they pursued their own interests. It was a world which was to be radically altered in the coming decades.

The appropriateness and perhaps the irony of John Clark Murray's shift in attention to social problems lies in the fact that their growth in Canada can be attributed in part to the National Policy. The tariff wall which had added up to 40% to the value of imported products, together with the gradual easing of world depression, created the conditions for a rapid expansion of industry. That Canadians were "rather dazzled by the glare of the present prosperity" Murray could easily recognize. The relation of this prosperity to the National Policy, whether for good or ill, was not so readily granted, though it was admitted that the health of the Canadian economy threw "a false glamour over the policy of the present government." The recognition of prosperity was tempered by the recognition that all was not well in industrial society. The 1880's was the decade in which 'the social problem' became current. A profusion of
practical and philosophic works addressing this problem testifies to
the efforts on the part of the middle class to understand what had
gone wrong in industrial society and how matters were to be put right.
In Britain, this was the period when the evolution of the new liberal-
ism was taking shape under the influence of the writing and memory of
Thomas Hill Green. In America, enormous popularity was accorded such
works as Henry George's Progress and Poverty (1880) and Edward
Bellamy's Looking Backward (1888). In Canada, quite typically, three
Royal Commissions were appointed in the course of the decade to
investigate aspects of industrial society. The most significant of
these was the Royal Commission on the Relations of Labour and Capital,
appointed in 1887 and eventually delivering two reports in 1889 after
a split roughly paralleling that between labour and capital developed
among the commissioners. Across North America, labour organizations
reported rapid growth. The most influential in the decade, the Knights
of Labor, was so successful that its meteoric rise in membership is
seen by some as a cause for its equally rapid demise in the following
decade. 33

David Murray's son had not been unaware of the problems of
industrial society. Throughout his youth Paisley was lodged in
economic depression. Moving on to university in Glasgow provided no
relief, for he found himself attending classes in the middle of the
slums. Only a police superintendent's report could do justice to the
neighbourhood of the university before it moved from quarters first
established in the seventeenth century to a new building on Gilmorehill
in 1870. James Smart wrote:
The College of Glasgow is situated in an old and decayed part of the city where the very poorest of the population reside and where, as is usual in such localities, there is a very large number of whiskey shops, little pawns and houses in which disreputable persons of both sexes are harboured. The district is one of the worst in the city, as to the character of the inhabitants. Crime and disorder are of daily occurrence, rendering it one of the most troublesome parts of the city to police. From the character of the district altogether, it appears to me an unfit place for a great educational institution such as the university.34

It was in districts such as these that Murray's attitudes to social and industrial problems were formed. The slums of Montreal would subsequently serve as a reminder of the results of industrial poverty.

If his upbringing had given him some insight into the conditions of the workers, it had also given more direct exposure to the position of the employers. David Murray had operated a shop before becoming Provost of Paisley and, on a scale more relevant to the issues faced in the 1880's, his brother William Murray was a manufacturer in Kingston.35

The social philosophy which developed in these conditions can be considered both on the level of its doctrinal formulation, and in light of the ethically-oriented worldview which motivated much of the change and which came in time to define the social philosophy itself. In its ideological content, this philosophy follows an evolution similar to that of J.S. Mill, T.H. Green, and Arnold Toynbee. Doubt and disillusionment overtake faith in the doctrines of Adam Smith and push Murray towards a re-assessment of some of the basic tenets of liberalism. In particular, the confidence in the unity of the ethical and economic orders is shaken as Murray begins to look more closely at
the liberal view of the state and eventually comes to question the very limited role given it in classical liberal theory; this does not, however, lead him to embrace as positive a view of the state and of legislation as can be found in Green and Toynbee. The re-assessment of the role of the state is necessitated in part by the expanded definition of freedom which begins to appear in Murray's writings at the end of the 1880's; the negative definition of freedom which appears in the writings on free trade gives way to a positive definition identifying freedom with the development of the "higher nature" in workers and employers alike. Through all these revisions, two pillars of liberalism remain unaltered: neither capitalism as an economic system nor private property as its chief component is ever called into question. Far from being rejected, private property becomes an indispensible element in the proposals for reform of the industrial system.

On the level of its animating worldview, the social philosophy shifts in its balance from being an economically oriented system to becoming an increasingly -- and almost exclusively -- ethical system. The distinction is not hard and fast, for no social philosophy can exclude either economic or ethical doctrines. Yet as Murray comes to accept and employ the idealist distinction of lower and higher orders of existence, the ultimate aim of social philosophy -- that of securing a better ordering of social relationships and a greater degree of economic justice for the labouring classes -- becomes confused with the idealist aim of the development of individual moral culture. Once the industrial Kingdom of God is identified with the idealist's higher order, concrete proposals for social change are dismissed as either
unnecessary or counter-productive. Hence while idealism has been cited as the philosophical motivation behind nineteenth century middle-class reform movements, for Murray it became the motivation for an abandonment of specific reform proposals and a concentration instead on eulogizing the "higher order of existence", that Idealist grab-bag heaven which always seemed to elude precise definition. 36

John Clark Murray's changing views of the contemporary social problem are laid out in a number of published and unpublished writings. These include articles and lectures from the 1880's; a recently published 1887 study into the social problem entitled The Industrial Kingdom of God and a circa 1898 revised but unpublished version entitled simply "Christian Ethics"; two published books on ethics and the novel, He That Had Received the Five Talents. As an attempt to create in fiction the new society sketched in other writings, the novel serves as a particularly good indicator of Murray's understanding of the problems of industrialism and of the attitudes, assumptions and imagination which guided his writings on the subject.

Taken as a whole, these writings contained no bold new program. On the whole, the solutions they advanced for the social and industrial problems of the day were widely held and dealt with in more detail by other contemporary writers and organizations. Murray's contribution lay in the attempt to provide a religious and philosophical analysis of the relations between capital and labour, and an ethical framework for such ideas as arbitration boards and producer and consumer co-operatives. 37
The first excursion into the realm of social problems shows cracks appearing in the coherence of the rational ethical and economic systems as Murray attempts to address the issue of wages and strikes from within an unaltered liberal framework. "The Cry of the Labourers" appeared in 1883 in the liberal, evangelical Montreal Daily Witness after a strike of telegraph operators had been in progress for two weeks, suspending communications across the continent and causing a widespread uproar against strikes and unions. Without addressing this strike in particular, Murray attempted in the article "to draw attention to the problems of social economy and justice which a strike involves." In the process, he arrived at two answers to the problem of just remuneration.

The first was ethical. Beginning with the assumption that wealth is the joint creation and hence the joint property of two parties -- labour and capital -- Murray saw that the question of remuneration was one of proportionate distribution. It was necessary to determine the rightful share each party had to the total wealth created and this must be linked in some way to the effort which each party had put into that creation. Each party would naturally have a different opinion on the proper proportion, whether motivated by good intentions or greed. Settlement of the resulting dispute could occur through either of two methods: a court of adjudication operating with judicial impartiality and judicial power, or a strike. In the absence of courts, the two parties could not but operate as warring nations struggling for control of limited resources. For workers who had exhausted all other alternatives, "the hostile method of striking may
become a last unwelcome necessity." 39

A judicial court was a rational and peaceful alternative. Intelligent discussion of both sides of the dispute and legally binding decisions would render strikes unnecessary. In placing responsibility for the establishment of such courts squarely on the government, Murray appeared to acknowledge the shortcomings of the laissez faire emphasis of classical liberalism. He had not, however, lost faith in the operation of Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' as it operated through the Law of Supply and Demand.

The second, economically-oriented formula for remuneration put forward in "The Cry of the Labourers" was not entirely compatible with the first. Although attracted to a policy of dividing profits between capitalist and labourer, Murray was still liberal enough to see competition between workers as that which would ultimately determine wage levels. From the labour theory of value, he went back to the Law of Supply and Demand, apparently unaware of the opposition between the two. The famous law was being widely cited by many opponents of the telegraphers' strike for higher pay and Murray agreed that the operation of supply and demand in determining wages was "indisputable":

The price of any commodity is a fact; and any attempt to alter it by the artifice of legislative or judicial process would be flouted with the same jeering raillery with which we should receive any proposal to make a coin of less value than a hundred cents pass in the world for a dollar by simply enacting a law to that effect. 40

In other words, human lawmaking could not interfere with the rational and natural economic law of the marketplace. A legislator who attempted to set wage levels above the floor determined by the law
of supply and demand would be more a Canute than a Solomon.

If the law of supply and demand provided an indisputable formula, breakdowns in wage negotiations could only indicate disagreements in the variables: "it is one thing to say that the price of labour is a fact; it is quite another thing to say that the price is a fact known and acknowledged by all men". In industrial society the proportion was not a "self-evident quantity" but a problem of "insoluble complication" which could not be "disentangled by minds not specially trained for such a task." Enter the professional:

But the disentanglement of complicated facts is precisely the work of a judicial inquiry -- the work for which the judicial mind is peculiarly qualified... A competent court of adjudication would, therefore, form the most reasonable mode of deciding whether the actual wages which a particular class of labourers receive express the real proportion between the demand for their labour and its supply.

The institution of courts of arbitration as an alternative to costly and needless strikes had been advocated by parties as diverse as the Knights of Labor and Andrew Carnegie. Most envisioned courts which would determine the best division of profits in the co-operative organization of industry, a position with which Murray agreed in the first half of "The Cry of the Labourers". The shift to a more conventional liberal position on the determination of wages in the second part of the article was done with an ease which suggests that Murray was not aware of the incompatibility of the two schemes. The determination of wages by relation to industrial productivity was an ethical step beyond determination by competition within the labour pool. But the conviction that labour competition was failing to secure just
wages for workers was as yet unable to lead to the recognition that the economic law of supply and demand was at fault. Murray preferred at this point to adjust and refine the operation of that law in the conviction that it was still as much an ethical as an economic law. This conviction was to be shaken in the coming four years as industrial unrest increased and as various authors began to call the confident assumptions of liberal economics into question.

The influence of this questioning can be seen in two subsequent efforts to address contemporary social issues, the "Lectures on Political Economy" delivered to the Ladies Educational Association of Montreal in 1883 - 1884, and the 1887 work, The Industrial Kingdom of God. Though prepared at different times and for different purposes, they can be considered together; the notebook for the lectures contains critical marginalia dating from 1888 - 1889 and so serves to show the particular areas in which Murray's thought changed most significantly.

The Industrial Kingdom of God contains the most systematic treatment of the labour question to be found in Murray's writings. In a characteristic pattern of analysis, the problem is approached through a consideration of the nature, the rights and the reciprocal obligations of the two parties involved in the industrial struggle. The only departure from the pattern comes in the treatment of labour where an additional chapter on "The Disadvantages of Labour" is added between the chapters dealing with rights and obligations.

However thorough it may have been, this exercise in analysis did not entirely relieve the tensions apparent in Murray's liberalism in 1883. The problems dealt with explicitly in the work include the
definition of labour and the labour theory of value; the law of supply and demand; the role of the state; private property and the continuance of the capitalist system. It was in this work too that the over-riding necessity of moral regeneration in individual and social life was put forward as the key to reform of industrial society.

Murray's awareness of the need to employ both ethics and economics to solve what was essentially a new social problem is apparent in the Prefatory Note to the Industrial Kingdom. Simple moral platitudes and practical truisms would be of little help in attempting,

to see how the general principles of a spiritual morality are to be traced through all the entanglements of men's industrial relations... To do this it seemed to me necessary to look calmly, but boldly, at the sternest facts of our industrial situation, and to interpret them in the light of those elementary principles of economical science, which are generally accepted by all schools of economists.46

Calm and bold certainly, but the investigation was to spring out of strong commitment. While traditional liberals, bolstered by the social darwinism of Spencer, might hold that 'undeserving poor' was a contradiction in terms, Murray calmly and boldly asserted that

the key to the situation is to be found in the disadvantages under which labour suffers, inasmuch as these, more than anything else, determine the obligations both of labourers and of wealthy men.47

The ethical setting for the discussion is established in the "Introduction" with the statement of two conventional distinctions often employed in subsequent works. Much use was made of the distinction between theory and practice and that between legal and moral
obligations. The first serves as a self-imposed limit on the ambitions of the work which is to follow. Theory may enlighten, but it is useful only insofar as it is fulfilled in practice. Speculative thought is ultimately of less value and effect than simple action motivated by an honest heart. The second distinction of legal and moral obligation is essentially one between social structure and human motivation. There is some room for reform achieved through legislation, but "Christianity can attach but little value to any scheme for the social amelioration of mankind which is not based on the spiritual regeneration of man." Legislation can be only poorly framed and more poorly enforced, but more to the point, the problem in question is not one of weak law, but one of weak will -- or a lack of good will on the part of both parties in industrial conflicts. The social problem of industrialism, then, was not primarily one of economics, but one of ethics. In the popular phrase of the day, virtue could not be legislated. The regeneration of society must begin with the regeneration of man.

In turning to "The Nature of Labour", Murray developed a labour theory of value more moderate than that found in contemporary socialist thought. Essentially, labour is "an exertion of human power which modifies any material so as to increase its value". Labour cannot, as in Marxist thought, create value any more than man can create matter. Raw materials have an inherent value which is enhanced by labour. This value is normally expressed by price, but not by price alone. The ambiguity of the word 'value' allowed the use of ethical standards in the determination of economic value.
The labour which adds value to raw materials is customarily said to be productive. Murray added a qualifier by linking productivity to purpose. There was no true value and hence no genuine productivity in goods manufactured to further human vice. Labour expended in the creation of armaments, liquor or articles of extravagant luxury is therefore unproductive because it adds only to the profits of isolated individuals or groups with no regard for -- and often positive dangers to -- the improvement of society as a whole. As a corollary of this priority of purpose over price, recreational, cultural and educational activities which develop personality and health are judged productive even though they may generate little or no direct economic profit. 51

Murray had been working on these ideas for some time. In the "Lecures on Political Economy", productive labour had been defined in strictly economic terms as that which created a permanent product or article of wealth. Unproductive labour, by contrast, left no exchangeable product. This left recreational and cultural activities as unproductive while the manufacture of armaments and the distilling of liquor could be classed as productive, a difficulty only partially alleviated by the qualifier that unproductive labour is not useless labour inasmuch as the accumulation of wealth is not the highest end of man. 52 The redefinitions provided in The Industrial Kingdom of God gave greater consistency and rhetorical force to these concepts of productivity. 53 They were transmitted to the lectures in the later annotations to the text. With this reformulation, human value was coming to take priority over purely economic value.
The emphasis on human value is reinforced in the discussion of the "Rights of Labour". These fall into two classes: the inalienable natural rights which belong to each man as a person; and the acquired or real rights which come to him by virtue of his work.

In the first class, Murray took a definition to which no classical liberal could object:

the fundamental right of personality is the right of freedom, that is, the right of a man to use himself -- or to use his powers -- in any way that seems good to him, so long as in doing it he does not interfere with the same right on the part of others.54

This negative definition was broadened with the addition of a positive and Kantian modifier on the right of the labourer to be treated as an end in himself and not merely as a means to the ends of others. The modified definition was used to show the inconsistencies of classical liberalism and advance to a more sympathetic assessment of the rights of labourers to a greater share of the profits of industrial enterprise.

Murray argued that classical liberalism did not really treat workers as humans. In its economic theories, the reliance on the metaphor of the purchase and sale of labour according to the law of supply and demand which applied to commodities implied that labour itself was a commodity and the labourer a machine. But the labourer is a person and his labour is not a commodity but a service -- the application of his mental and physical powers in the service of the capitalist to enhance the value of raw materials.55

This was not simply an abstract point. The purchase of a
commodity is a transaction without subsequent obligations. The employment of service implies a different view of the creation and therefore of the distribution of wealth. Murray did not shy from making the connection in an argument which showed a strengthening of the ideas first expressed in 1883:

Nothing, as we have seen, can possess economical value, which can be got without labour; it is therefore the labour required for its production, that gives it its value as part of the owner's property. Man's first property, therefore, is the direct product of his own labour... Consequently it is the fundamental principle of justice, lying at the root of all property, that demands for the labourer the enjoyment of the fruit of his labour... the labourer is in justice entitled to a share of the product proportional to the value of his contribution to the whole, when compared with the contribution from other sources. 56

It was the failure of all but a few employers to recognize and act on these rights which resulted in the crippling "Disadvantages of Labour". If wealth created wealth, poverty was equally self-perpetuating. Quoting Proverbs 10: 15, Murray asserted that "the destruction of the poor is their poverty", before considering the spiritual and economic effects of poverty.

Crowded and unsanitary cities and houses, poor diets and clothing, and the lack of leisure time prevented workers from developing their higher moral nature and forced them instead to a lower animalistic level of existence in which life was no more than a struggle for survival. These were the environmental results and manifestations of poverty which could possibly be eased by legislation. 57 It was the intrinsic disadvantages of labour which posed a greater economic problem.
The intrinsic disadvantages were the natural consequences of the labourer's position as a labourer. Curiously, Murray did not see that the consequences were 'natural' only within a system of laissez faire capitalism. Though by now critical of Manchester School economics, Murray's choice to interpret the problems as intrinsic to labour rather than capitalism, allowed him to continue to endorse capitalism as the only rational economic system. This choice also allowed him to posit the solution to the 'labour problem' as lying in an individualistic ethical reform program rather than in wide scale social and economic reform.

There were at least four intrinsic disadvantages to the position of labourers. First, "labour is a commodity that cannot keep." Time lost was money lost, and so the worker faced with the need of selling his services quickly — and even then for only starvation wages — found himself in a weak bargaining position. The collective strength of unions moderated this to a degree, but the major weapon of the strike was of limited effect in view of a second major disadvantage: the excess of supply over demand in the labour pool. With high unemployment among skilled and unskilled workers, pervasive poverty and debt, and little developed sense of solidarity in the working class, there were always too many people willing to take the place vacated by a striker. The individual and collective weakness of the workers was compounded by the relative strength of their employers. Since employers held the organizational advantage of fewer numbers, they were better able to close ranks against the workers when labour unrest threatened.
A third disadvantage lay in the fact that unlike land and raw material, labour had no inherent market value. The labourer was dependent for survival upon the capitalist to a degree which was not reciprocated. This recognition had motivated Henry George and Karl Marx to propose means of allowing labourers to bypass or overthrow the capitalists and gain direct access to property. Each had a specific focus and neither was acceptable to Murray. George, he believed, had exaggerated the evils of property; the labourers' problem had more correctly been identified by the socialists who claimed that the worker was not simply at the mercy of the landowner for raw material, but more thoroughly at the mercy of the capitalist for the provision of the tools and machines which provided the means of exercising his skill. By implication, George's emphasis on land reform was failing to address the needs of industrial society. Marx was more alive to the root of the problem, but if George's weakness was in analysis, Marx's was in communication. *Capital* was "the most systematic defense of industrial socialism ever written", but so "rigidly scientific" as to be impenetrable to all but the most loyal and studious disciples. This was in contrast to George's *Progress and Poverty*, "which, without sacrificing by any means scientific thoroughness, makes no unnecessary parade of the mere scaffolding of scientific method by which its conclusions are built up."

Murray was not impressed with what he believed were the scientific pretensions of Marxism, but this was not the end of his disagreement. He believed that any solution to the industrial problem which was based on Marx's labour theory of value would only reverse
the current inequalities. It was obviously false that neither land nor capital had any value whatsoever apart from that given by the addition of labour. It was therefore unacceptable to hold that all profits of industrial enterprise ought to go to the labourers. The industrial problem was not to be solved by the elimination of one of the parties, but by the recognition in theory and remuneration of the co-operative contributions of both.

Such a recognition must be advanced through a redirection of the power which the capitalists held by virtue of their wealth and leisure. In describing this fourth intrinsic disadvantage of labour, Murray accepted Marx's analysis of the means by which the power of the capitalists was consolidated and perpetuated. Monopolies created by trusts, mergers or legislation allowed capitalists to increase their wealth more rapidly by artificial means than workers could ever hope to by honest labour. Wealth brought leisure, and leisure allowed entry into a political process which could, if abused in the form of monopolies created by legislation, bring yet more wealth. This was the less attractive side which sometimes emerged in the example provided by the political involvement of the British leisure class. For the industrial problem had an unavoidable political dimension:

All through history, in fact, the legislative tyranny of wealth over poverty is revealed. History is very largely made up of the struggles of contending parties in society; and these parties are usually, on one side, the wealthy capitalists and landowners fighting in defense of their privileges and, on the other side, the poor labourers of the world forced to toil incessantly to produce wealth which they were never allowed to enjoy, goaded at last by the unendurable hardships of their wretched existence into fierce rebellion against their oppressors, and either obtaining
some mitigation of their sufferings or beaten back into a state of still more cruel oppression.67

Not quite Marx's "rigidly scientific" plotting of the class struggle, but an assessment which similarly recognized, in distinction from such contemporary defenders of the classical liberal creed as Herbert Spencer, that industrial poverty was not rooted entirely in working class ignorance, immorality or negligence:

The whole industrial history of the human race, therefore, may be said to be an illustration of those intrinsic disadvantages attaching to the position of labourers, which have always crippled them in their efforts to obtain anything like a reasonable share of the wealth which is produced by their labour.68

If these were the rights and disadvantages of labour, what of its obligations? Once again, there were two classes: personal and social. The former were expressed through the conventional idealist distinction of the lower and the higher self:

The duties which a man owes to himself personally, may be described as implying the general law that he ought to realise in his own person that ideal of humanity -- that pattern of what God would have all men be -- which has been revealed in Jesus Christ.69

The labourer must improve personal habits ranging from cleanliness to temperance and must cultivate through education, industry and thrift, "that spirit -- that habitual condition of the inner life -- which will lead to right conduct as its natural expression."70

Social duties were those owed to employers, fellow workers and the community as a whole. Employers and employees were to co-operate "to provide the community with the genuine articles they [sic] want,
and at the lowest cost compatible with justice." The labourer for his part must give a fair day's work for a fair day's wage. He must put the full labour value into a manufactured article. So too, he must not rob his fellow workers by working slower than they and so reducing the company productivity which determines the wages of all employees. He must not consent to a strike without carefully considering its effect on the families of workers in his own trade, in those trades dependent on his, and on consumers. Unions for their part must be free and voluntary associations above the use of power politics and physical force. But the worker's greatest social obligation was to work for the reform of the economic order. This reform would not be won through violence or industrial action. Strikes were to be avoided not only because of the economic hardship they created, but because whatever the small gains which might be won, they failed to get at the root of the problem.

The real problem lay in determining how the labourers were to gain "a fair share of the wealth they co-operate in producing". Given Murray's co-operative labour theory of value, the issue was not on the scale of the Marxist's 'alienation', but more simply involved the greater recognition of individual effort in remuneration. The industrial order was not to be overthrown, but modified.

A first step of reform within the existing system was to move from payment in wages to payment by piece-work. Such payment was based more directly on the worker's contribution, but it was not itself without problems. The difficulty of determining the eventual price of goods and so of setting a just rate based on the average worker's pace
made the piecework system little more than a provisional solution.\textsuperscript{74}

A better alternative lay in full recognition of the co-operative nature of industrial enterprise:

Workingmen will therefore find in many trades, that their position is advanced towards a more perfect industrial organization by seeking an arrangement in which they become virtually partners with the capitalists by whom they are employed.\textsuperscript{75}

This might be achieved through an agreement that all profits exceeding the average rate of return on the capitalist's investment would be divided "in some equitable proportion" between the capitalist and the labourers. A basic wage would ensure the worker's "security of subsistence", but the year-end division of profits would more accurately reflect the worker's share of the enterprise. In fact, Murray believed that allowing workers to purchase shares in a company would increase the extent of partnership by giving them a role in determining the direction of the enterprise.\textsuperscript{76}

But even this profit-sharing system was only a stage, "an additional step towards that higher ideal of complete co-operation, in which workmen become their own employers."\textsuperscript{77} The capital requirements of modern industry made return to the society of independent tradesmen and artisan impracticable. What was needed was a pooling of the workers' resources -- both personal savings and union funds -- to finance the establishment of producer and consumer co-operatives.\textsuperscript{78}

Workers were not to revolt against the system, but invest in it.

This was the doctrine of self-help, a doctrine central to much of Victorian middle class reformist thought. Capitalism was not
simply defended; it was vindicated and turned into a necessary vehicle of industrial reform.\textsuperscript{79} If the opportunities of the capitalist system were shared more equitably with workers, the threat of revolution would pass. Working men would be the strongest defenders of the existing social and economic system if only they were given a more just share of the benefits it produced.

Murray was not advocating a conscious policy of embourgeoisement in order to avert class warfare while preserving middle and upper class privilege. The effect of his reformist program was to allow a greater number of people to enjoy the benefits of culture and education which had hitherto been restricted to the middle and upper class. There was no class war to be feared, much less averted, for,

Those who are accustomed to look on all labour movements as governed by a spirit of violent revolution would probably be astonished to find how genuinely conservative the working classes are, especially when under the guidance of a regular organization.\textsuperscript{80}

There need be no fear of nihilism or anarchy. The moderation of such groups as the Knights of Labor demonstrated that it was possible to,

depend on the working men of America, if ever there is a call to defend the civilization we have won against any attempt of a foolhardy madness to throw us back into an unknown social chaos. Let us trust that the labouring class will preserve this decided attitude towards the aimless strivings of a blind revolutionary fury.\textsuperscript{81}

The condemnation of revolutionary action was as firm as the condemnation of capitalist greed. But it was not on as strong a note as this that the consideration of labour's role in the industrial
Kingdom of God was considered. Returning to the quietist moralism which marked his theory of social regeneration, Murray asserted that change in society would come only with the spread of "the undying spirit of self sacrifice". One might well question who was to sacrifice in this limited and simplistic view of Christian ethics:

And so it is that this spirit finds expression in those lives of quiet industry, which are being lived by many good and intelligent men among the working classes, and which are doing more than all revolutionary fanaticism, more even than the most brilliant economic speculation to hasten the coming period of industrial development, when, in the deepest and fullest sense, 'the rich and poor shall live together'.

The precise means by which these "good and intelligent men" in the vanguard were hastening "the coming period of industrial development" were left unspecified; certainly it would appear that lives of quiet industry led by uncomplaining workers acted more to reinforce than to change the unjust economic order. But if Murray conceived of any content for Christian ethics beyond the principle of self-sacrifice, he did not specify it. Firm in the optimism that justice would triumph, he turned his attention to the other partner in the social equation: Property.

Given his criticism of Henry George, it might seem odd that Murray would choose the term 'Property' rather than 'Capital' to title the second part of The Industrial Kingdom of God. This was a recent change, for in the "Lectures on Political Economy" the discussion had indeed been of 'Capital'. The change in terminology was a matter of convenience rather than substance -- and one which showed again how
ideas had developed in the mid-1880's -- for it allowed more obvious entry for the labour theory of value which underlay the argument for co-partnership or co-operation in industry. Property was far more than land or possessions; "Property is a creation of labour; and the fundamental principle, on which the rights of property rest, is the fundamental right of labour itself -- the right of every man to enjoy the fruits of his own labour". 85

On this definition, those of wealth could not plead the inviolability of private property without implicitly recognizing the rights of their employees to a share of the wealth created by their investments. 86 Private property was not a right but a trust; its superiority to communism could be asserted only because it provided a more effective means of distributing to each man the fruit of labour. 87

Despite positions such as these, Murray revealed when he turned to discussion of the "Obligations of Property" that his imagination in proposing reform was limited to the duties of paternalism. The duties of the rich were the duties of noblesse oblige. Property was not to be distributed wholesale or even in part so as to allow the working class to gain the resources necessary for the establishment of co-operative enterprises. Murray's man of wealth was not to put responsibility for the use of property in the hands of the working class; he was to look on these resources as constituting "like his personal powers, a gift of God, to be used for promoting those great purposes of the divine government, that have been declared to men in Jesus Christ our Lord." 88
The man of wealth was to serve the community rather than himself. He must not stand in the way of social improvement which might take the form of gas-and-water municipal socialism and which in that form might take from him some of his sources of wealth. He must not act, through price-gouging monopolies to enrich himself at the expense of the community. Rather, like Andrew Carnegie, he was obligated to return his wealth to the community in the form of benefactions. 89

Duties to workers were both more specific and more paternalistic. The need for improved housing, food and social amenities was sufficient to give focus to the benevolent work of the capitalist. The Pullman community in Chicago was cited as an example of beneficial total care; Murray appears to have been completely unaware of the degree of opposition expressed by workers to this and similar company-run communities. 90

More direct obligations to one's own employees included the frequent payment of wages -- a point advocated by many reformers concerned by the large indebtedness of workers -- and a willingness to pay more than the minimum wage determined by the law of supply and demand. This generosity need not be entirely altruistic, for well paid workers were eager consumers. 91

Murray had curiously little to say to employers regarding the re-ordering of industrial relations on a co-operative model. Only a brief comment was offered, and its thrust was hardly egalitarian. Enjoining capitalists to share their profits with their workers and so "fulfill their true function by becoming leaders in the great industrial armies of the world", Murray added that,
Even if such noble leaders of the industrial crusade against want can ever be dispensed with, -- even if they will ultimately be displaced by a system of complete co-operation, -- it can only be by giving the labourers such a share of the wealth they produce as may enable them, with hopeful thrift, to gather the capital required for originating co-operative enterprises.\textsuperscript{92}

This was no clarion call to follow the example of Robert Owen in initiating co-operative enterprises. Neither Owen's New Lanark nor any other practical scheme for establishing co-operative enterprises was dealt with in the discussion of the obligations of property. Murray retreated to the uncontentious obscurity of moralism when summing up the role of the wealthy in establishing the industrial Kingdom of God. Industrial leaders were simply to follow "the inspirations of an unselfish Christian morality", realising "that their organising energy and intelligence will for a long time be required to carry on successfully the industrial work of the world".\textsuperscript{93} This 'unselfish Christian morality' appeared to have no specific content which could be expressed through goals and definite obligations; the selfless will would presumably be its own guide.

The discussion on "Property" in the \textit{Industrial Kingdom of God} was short and general, comprising less than a quarter of the entire work. At thirty-five pages in the edition published in 1982, it is shorter than the discussion on the 'Obligations of Labour" alone. The ruling assumption of the section is that the industrial problem is not rooted in capitalism as such, but more simply in the division of profits generated by the capitalist system. As a result, there was little to say to those who had succeeded within the system. Concerned social commentators could only follow the example of T. H. Green in
attempting to stir up feelings of guilt within the middle and upper classes so as to improve receptivity to the ethical injunction that they be more generous in sharing their wealth. The effect of the practical suggestions to labourers was that they work either individually or collectively to attain to the position of capitalists themselves.

The odd conjunction of doctrines of self-help and paternalism which was so characteristic of middle-class reformist thought in the nineteenth century is therefore not absent from The Industrial Kingdom of God. Employers were to be generous and kind, but such practical actions as the establishment of producer and consumer co-operatives was left as the responsibility of the workers themselves. Yet the benevolent actions of those of wealth were to be conducted without consultation of the working class. There was little or no effort to introduce co-operation as a principle in these most primary steps of industrial reform. Murray's proposals contained little which would contribute in practical ways to the breakdown in nineteenth century society of those divisions of class and wealth which would be absent from the future industrial kingdom of God.

The deficiency of practical proposals results in part from Murray's reluctance to draw in a third party to which other reformers were increasingly turning -- the state. This is not to say that there was no role for government in reform. Murray was critical of, a narrow political philosophy which would reduce government to the limits of a police-establishment with no function beyond that of keeping men from flying at each other's throats... whenever individual action is
insufficient to work out a scheme that is essential to the welfare of society, social action becomes justifiable and obligatory. 95

Such a statement could conceivably justify the establishment of anything ranging from modest welfare provisions to the most thorough-going state socialism. But Murray was not willing to go much further than the position taken by J.S. Mill in his later years. There were clearly limits to the exercise of social reform through legislation. Virtue could not be legislated. The resources of the state could be called upon to deal with needs in housing, sanitation and social insurance, but there was no call for legislative reform of those elements of the economic system which had created those needs in the first place. The role of the state lay in amelioration of the visible effects of poverty, not in legislative change of the roots of the social problem. Unlike Henry George and Phillips Thompson, but like many committed liberal academic reformers, Murray was writing in response to what he saw and not out of any personal experience of the poverty which he was able to identify as the chief disadvantage of labour. This may account for the relatively mild proposals for economic reform and the emphasis instead on environmental problems and ethical solutions which marked the early stages of nineteenth century middle class reform movements.

The ruling pre-occupation continued to be one of individual moral development. This pre-occupation defined what was fundamentally evil in the conditions of working class life:

In general therefore, the external conditions of existence among the labouring poor impose upon them manners of life, which surely no one would prefer to maintain if they could be
thrown aside, and which render it more difficult to cultivate those finer sensibilities that form the natural soul of our morality. 96

Such an emphasis on the development of personal culture could even bring out the silver lining in the dark cloud of poverty.

Christian obligation, then, does not require us to view the condition of the poor labourer as one of irremediable wretchedness, but rather as one adapted for that wholesome discipline by which the best features of human character are brought out, and the highest ends of human life secured . . . What Christianity requires of all -- rich and poor alike -- is to make the best use of the circumstances in which they are placed for the promoting of their welfare. 97

In the analysis of the industrial problem and in the attempt to frame a solution, economic conditions and proposals were significant in proportion to their effect on the spirit or moral culture of man. This was effectively the message of the statement that social amelioration must begin with the spiritual regeneration of man when combined with the closing emphasis in each of the two parts of The Industrial Kingdom of God on the over-riding necessity of self-sacrifice. "Self-sacrifice" had come to be seen by a conscience-stricken middle class as the key to the regeneration of Christianity along ethical lines. Such regeneration was believed to be essential if Christianity was to be awakened from its dogmatic slumbers to address the social problem. But the resulting New Christianity was a limited, ethical faith which seemed ludicrous when its message of self-sacrifice was addressed to the poor. In the blindness of the well-meaning, much was asked from those to whom little had been given. 98

The Industrial Kingdom of God was a transitional work. On the level of liberal theory, it contained the recognition that injunctions
to ethical and economic rationality were no longer equivalent. Since the law of supply and demand could not ensure economic justice, it could no longer be evoked in the determination of wages. Change was to occur by the moral regeneration of the existing system -- a regeneration centred on the revised appraisal of human freedom in the context of the distinction of higher and lower levels of existence.

This distinction allowed liberals like Murray to live with the split which had upset the well-structured world of Adam Smith. Natural laws of the marketplace could still be recognized, but recognized now as part of a 'lower order' of necessity. Since the 'higher order' was an ethical realm of freedom, social reform was to be achieved through voluntarist action within an unquestioned capitalist order. The split realm allowed a redefinition of key liberal tenets in terms favourable to the aims of reformers. Hence 'freedom' implied not simply the protection of existing rights, but the development of moral qualities. Since 'the individual' was not a machine, his labour could not be treated as a commodity to be traded in the marketplace of supply and demand, but must be recognized as a service which produced wealth. Therefore, by virtue of redefinition, it was possible to outdo classical liberals in the defense of 'property rights' -- understanding thereby the property of the labourer contained in the product of his labour.

As Murray had explained to those wives and daughters of the Montreal commercial particiate who made up the Ladies Educational Association of Montreal,

The real basis of property rights ought to be understood. It is simply a scheme for securing to each productive labourer the fruit of his labour, and it can be justified
merely in so far as it does so more efficiently than any other scheme. 99

The state could still be called on to do no more than ensure the social conditions necessary to individual freedom, but this now implied some degree of positive action in place of the purely preventive functions of the Benthamite police state.

The Industrial Kingdom of God was therefore pre-eminently a work of the Victorlial liberal middle class: a work of conscience and of optimism. Conscience was stirred by the awareness of the great injustices resident in the current economic system, but an optimistic faith in progress informed the view of the future. In line with 'sanitized' evolutionary thought, society was believed to have progressed beyond anything achieved in earlier civilizations. 100 The fervour for the moral reform of the lower classes was not inspired by fear as much as by the sincere belief that culture in and of itself had the power to transform society. 101 Reform which concerned itself strictly with the material world was lacking in its vision of the future.

This belief was undoubtedly more easily maintained in a professor's study than in a Montreal tenement. Did this realization lead Murray to withhold publication of The Industrial Kingdom of God? In this question as in so many regarding his life, the lack of personal comments in letters or journals hinders speculation on his motives. The manuscript is by all appearances in completed form, wanting nothing more than the effort of delivering it to a publisher to allow it to exercise its influence in the world.

Murray may have believed the practical suggestions contained
in the work to be insufficient at a time when many more extended analyses and specific proposals for reform of the industrial system were being published. Even the two books from which he had derived most of his data on the state of industrial society, William Thomas Thornton's *On Labour* and Richard T. Ely's *The Labour Movement in America*, were far more detailed and prescriptive than *The Industrial Kingdom of God*. By 1888 the report of the Royal Commission on the Relation of Capital and Labour had been released, as had Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward* and Phillips Thompson's *The Politics of Labour*. Murray's manuscript lacked the practical bite of these works and its author may have decided that publication was unnecessary. Or at least publication as an entire work was unnecessary.

Significantly, the more practical suggestions on co-operative enterprises, the division of profits and the law of supply and demand were released in a series of articles in *The Week* in the autumn of 1888. As to moral philosophy, a good deal of the Introduction was published verbatim as "Christian Ethics" in the *Presbyterian College Journal* in 1889. Other sections were to find their way into the 1891 *Introduction to Ethics*. And as the notes of Maude Abbott, a student in Murray's class on ethics in 1890-91 reveal, a good deal of the work was broadcast in the lecture halls of McGill.

More plausibly, Murray may not have doubted the value of his specific proposals, but their necessity. In his distinction of practice and theory, the former is associated with simple, honest labour done out of a good heart and in the spirit of uncomplaining self-sacrifice, while the latter is often seen as disengaged and abstract commentary of
little practical value -- hence Marx's "unnecessary parade of the mere scaffolding of scientific method". The high demands of moral culture were not dependent on occupation and class, and Murray may have come to the conviction that the true need of the hour was not a work directed to industrial problems in particular, but a guide to the development of moral culture in industrial society in general. Confirmation of this may be found in the fact that subsequent publications treated industrial problems in general terms and gave more emphasis to the development of a 'higher spiritual morality' within industrial society. Significantly, these works were directed more overtly to the middle class -- to the current and future professionals, merchants, managers and businessmen who would have comprised the majority of Murray's readers and students.

The framework for this shift was provided by the publication in 1891 of the Introduction to Ethics and the view of society which this work contained. A greater emphasis was now placed on the relationships of trust and dependency within society than on the absolute rights of free individuals or the absolute obligations of membership in a social whole. Attempting to steer between classical liberalism and socialism, Murray argued that society was too complex to be adequately described as analogous to mechanisms or organisms:

Society is certainly more than a mechanical combination; it is an organism: but it is also something greater. In mere organization the members have no function except as organs, as means to the ends of the whole organism. In society, members are indeed, in one aspect, organs serving as means to promote the end of the whole community; but there is a profounder aspect in which the social organism is merely a means to promote the ends of its individual members . . . Society is formed for the purpose of securing that free
development of individual humanity which cannot be realized either in the life of the solitary or in an anarchic collocation of individuals. ... the fundamental constitution of society is therefore equality of obligations and rights on the part of its members; and all social institutions must have for their aim to conserve this constitution.  

In taking a middle ground between socialism and classical liberalism, Murray argued that the state was more than simply a police force, but less than an agent of social change. It must "respect the freedom of individuals by imposing on that freedom only such restrictions as are indispensable to social well being", yet it must also "secure the external social conditions without which moral existence would be impossible". The extent of these conditions had not yet broadened beyond housing and sanitation, for Murray still argued that the necessary advancement to the highest stage of life -- and hence of industrial organization -- could not be achieved through legislation. Rather, the distinction of higher and lower orders allowed a return of sorts to the minimalist government of classical liberalism -- but on a very different basis. The legal code structured a lower plane of contractual obligation and judicial force. The moral code structured the vaguely defined higher realm of self-less generosity where force was not needed. Without arguing for anarchy, Murray claimed that the Church rather than the State provided the model of government for this higher realm, precisely because it would not enforce its aims and directives through physical compulsion but had to rely on changing society by addressing the heart or conscience of man.  

Murray vacillated when it came to determining the role of the state. The influence of an upbringing in the early Victorian period,
when liberalism was a cause as much as a doctrine, was too strong. Though able to see the shortcomings of that earlier view, Murray was still, in the Introduction to Ethics, reluctant to accept the possibility of state action to the degree endorsed by British contemporaries such as T. H. Green. Certainly the concept of moral citizenship sketched by Green found no echo in the works of Murray.108

What distinguished Murray from T. H. Green, Edward Caird and others who were reshaping liberal political theory in the image of Hegelian social philosophy was a fundamental disagreement on the basis of the state. The neo-Hegelians considered the state as based on will -- and indeed as the supreme expression of social will.107 Hence the will of society to care for its weakest and poorest members was properly implemented through legislation. Legislated reform was an appropriate expression of the collective will to advance society to the "higher plane".

But John Clark Murray was not under the Hegelian spell. He viewed the state not as an agency of collective development, but as one of co-ercive power. Its basis was not social will, but force -- and force played a minor role in genuine social improvement.110 However similar their analyses of the priority of individual moral development and the necessity of change within capitalism, Murray and the new liberals were headed in opposite directions when discussion turned to the methods and agencies of reform.

In choosing to define the higher realm -- which was the ultimate goal of society -- as a realm free of necessity, Murray prevented himself from advocating fundamental reform through the
legislative power of the state. The state could not directly attack
the economic injustices which caused poverty; that was, by implication,
the work of the ethicists and the churches.

So for example, in the problem of low wages, the solution lay
not in challenging the operation of supply and demand as a natural law
of the labour marketplace, but in getting employers to recognize that
it was not a moral law. Despite its ultimate superiority, the higher
law carried no more weight in the natural order of the marketplace than
individual employers were willing to grant it. Confident that moral
progress would attend industrial progress, Murray believed that this
assent would not be long in coming.

As evidence, he argued for the inherent peacefulness of
industrial society. Addressing the World Philosophical Congress held
in Chicago in 1893 on the topic of "Philosophy and Industrial Life",
Murray claimed that the two were not in an antithetical relation as so
often supposed, but in reciprocal and beneficial inter-connection.
With its wealth, security and consequent leisure, industrial society
had replaced the violent struggle for existence which characterized
military society and so created conditions conducive to abstract
thought.111 It was now the duty of philosophers to "repay industrial-
ism" by directing its efforts to ends beyond the mere struggle for
existence.

Philosophy, being necessarily occupied with the ultimate
meaning and purpose of existence must, when reflected [sic]
upon industrial life, endeavour to grasp the supreme end
to which the particular aims of industrialism are subservient,
as well as the means by which industrialism endeavours to
reach that end.112
Industrialists might seek wealth, but in its etymology wealth was not calculated in monetary terms; it signified "weal" or "social well-being". With this definition, the concepts of productivity and the labour theory of value developed in The Industrial Kingdom of God could be introduced into the discussion. The former dealt with the ultimate ends of civilization and the latter with the means by which these ends might be obtained. The problem of remuneration was also philosophical inasmuch as it dealt with recognizing "the right which a man acquires over a product of nature when by his labour he communicates to it a utility which without his labour it would not have possessed". When approached as a philosophical question, the production of wealth could not be divorced from distribution.

It was in this speech that Murray first recognized and criticized the assumptions which had underlain the political philosophy of his youth. Commenting on the assumed coherence of the ethical and economic orders, he noted that classical liberals had proceeded on the Stoic assumption that man was adapted by nature to promote his own welfare "so that to secure this welfare nothing is required but to allow his nature free play by emancipating it from the artificial restrictions by which its full development is impeded." Rousseau had argued a similar theme, and by the end of the eighteenth century, the movement to abolish restrictions on life had built into a "great wave of thought and life" which swept many social rules and legislation away. The result by the end of the nineteenth century was not the anticipated goal of peaceful co-operation and social harmony, but a war of all against all more reminiscent of Hobbes than of Rousseau. The pursuit
of liberty had ended in virtual anarchy.

Murray told his philosophical colleagues that the search for a solution must begin with a rejection of the extreme individualism of classical liberalism and recognition of the possible benefits of state intervention in industrial relations. A distinction was to be drawn between the mercantilist regulations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the social regulations of the nineteenth. Whereas the former limited production, the latter attempted to make it more efficient and equitable. The state was still limited to the role of securing the conditions for the development of moral culture, but Murray’s understanding of those conditions was broadening:

the progress of industrial life, with its ever-increasing complications, is rendering it more and more evidently impossible for either producers or distributors to fulfill their social functions effectively without some mutual understanding of a more or less explicit kind... the establishment and enforcement of regulations to secure co-operation among industrial workers, and to avoid the enormous waste created by their present antagonisms, would not in any way interfere with the real freedom of individuals.¹¹⁶

Freedom would likely be expanded. State intervention into the organization of industrial life would secure the worker a more equitable share of the fruit of his labour and so free him from the anxieties of the struggle for existence. Thus relieved, the worker would "win the required leisure for entry into the spiritual inheritance which humanity has already attained".¹¹⁷ Some workers might even "enjoy the opportunities of a development that would enrich the intellectual and moral civilisation of the world."¹¹⁸

Individual and property rights were once more re-affirmed in
the Chicago speech. Murray shared the common belief that without the possibility of private property, healthy competition would die away and society and culture would sink into mediocrity. A little less persuasively, he argued that property was necessary for the better exercise of generosity. In fact, "the evolution of society, instead of introducing a forcible, external, legal communism, will rather inspire the old concept of property by a new ideal."

That ideal was, not surprisingly, the ideal of selfless generosity, the ideal put forward in The Industrial Kingdom of God. The clearest indication of Murray's dissatisfaction with that work lies in the existence of a second manuscript among his papers, dating from the 1890's and entitled simply, "Christian Ethics". The subject of "Christian Ethics" was parallel to that of the "Industrial Kingdom":

It endeavours to find out the supreme inspiration of Christian morality, and then to trace the influence which that inspiration must exert in moulding the industrial life of the world.

Yet the purpose of the second work is to treat this subject in more strictly ethical terms. It was clearly intended as a substitute for The Industrial Kingdom of God. Portions of it are lifted whole or expanded with emendations from the earlier work. On many pages, leaves from an earlier draft have been pasted into the manuscript; the use in the former of 1887 statistics, together with the content and tenor of the writing suggest that these are pages from a draft of The Industrial Kingdom of God. The addition of updated statistics and new citations in the footnotes provide some guide to dating the work. All are from the 1890's, with the latest dating from 1898. The writing of
"Christian Ethics" appears to have occupied Murray's attention intermittently through the decade, but without much success. The manuscript is clearly not a finished work.

However unfinished, the "Christian Ethics" confirms the ethical direction of Murray's social thought and the liberal orientation of his ethical thought. The work was Christocentric insofar as Christ was considered the exemplar of all good qualities:

It is surely for all men a simple historical fact, that Jesus is still the Spiritual Lord of our civilisation, and on any of the great issues of social morality it is impossible to ignore the impact of His teaching.123

The organization of the manuscript eliminates the failed balance of two parties attempted in the Industrial Kingdom. In place of the distinction and systematic treatment of Labour and Capital, it progresses through the life of Christ (Chapters I - IV); the conditions and claims of the labouring populace (Chapters V - IX); and the ethical motivations of industrial life (Chapters X - XII). The content itself deviates little from the ideas put forward in The Industrial Kingdom of God, The Introduction to Ethics and "Philosophy and Industrial Life", and may be read from the chapter titles:

1. The Dawn of the Idea
2. The Crisis
3. The First Announcement
4. The New Jurisprudence
5. The Physical Condition of the Labourer
6. Spiritual Disadvantages of the Labourer's Physical Condition
7. The Helpless Position of the Labourer
8. Vox Clamantis
9. The Claim of the Labourer in the Light of Simple Justice
10. The Morality of Self-Interest as the Motive of Industrial Life
11. The Economical Value of the Higher Motive
12. The Possibility of Unselfishness as the Motive of Industrial Life.124
Within Murray's understanding of Christian ethics, the path to improvement was narrow indeed:

The Kingdom of God, whose industrial laws we are seeking to discover, -- the Kingdom of God described in the teaching of Jesus, -- is not a kingdom of this world. It is not of the type of this world's kingdoms, because it depends for its maintenance and expression, not on the rude methods of police or military violence, but on those divine methods which are typified in the calm, silent, irresistible processes or organic growth . . . But this faith in the adequacy of moral forces to renovate society carries us beyond the narrow ideals of justice as commonly understood with their exacting definitions of right and their restricted definitions of obligation.125

The Christ whose teachings were to be followed was the 'Christ of Culture'; Murray's conceptions bear out H. Richard Niebuhr's typology.126 The kingdom of God was a kingdom of this world in the sense that it embodied all that was of value in contemporary culture. The simple faith of idealism in the ultimate primacy of good over evil was sufficient to maintain the further faith that progress to this kingdom was inevitable. Christ was called on to verify an amillenial cultural idealism:

Is it not evident that scepticism in regard to the possibility of unselfishness in industrial life is really infidelity to Christ? All religion, indeed that is worthy of the name implies faith in the superior power of goodness and the certainty of victory over evil . . . such hopeful confidence is the very essence of Christian faith.127

The Great Commission of the nineteenth century lay in working for this victory of goodness. Contrary to trends in neo-Hegelian political thought which emphasized the power society wielded through the state, this commission could only be undertaken by the Church:

The church is therefore untrue to her mission if she falters
in her protest against any doctrine, even if it is falsely
called science, which pretends that there is no power in the
universe capable of delivering man from the cruel exactions
of selfish competition in his industrial life. To protest
against this immoral teaching of a baseless economical theory
is the special call of the church at the present day. What
the state can do to aid the efforts of the church it is not
the special purpose of this book to discuss; and we have seen
that, under our present industrial system of free contract, the
state appears helpless to grapple with some of our most serious
evils. But it is well to be reminded once more that a Christian
dare not undervalue the might of those moral forces which are
wielded by the church. Certainly the church is unfaithful to
her spiritual Lord if she maintains the attitude of looking to
the State to accomplish imperfectly, by its clumsy methods of
physical compulsion, what she can accomplish more effectively
by the force of spiritual conviction.\textsuperscript{128}

And so the more positive view of state action in industrial
relations which had emerged in "Philosophy and Industrial Life" was
reversed. The suspicion of the state which had marked Murray's early
articles advocating free trade now returned. A third party was still
necessary for the resolution of the industrial problem, but it was now
a third party of a very different nature and very different methods.\textsuperscript{129}

The "Christian Ethics" proved no more satisfactory a vehicle
for the expression of Murray's social philosophy than The Industrial
Kingdom of God" had been. Fulfilling a form of his own oft-repeated
directive that honest action was better than abstract speculation,
Murray turned to fiction to create a model of that improved society
which had eluded theoretical expression.

He That Had Received the Five Talents contained that model.
Murray was not a novelist, and this work is a parade of wishful
stereotypes with few, if any, literary merits. Yet in its creation
of a world which conforms to Murray's attitudes and assumptions on a
wide range of issues, the novel is an indispensible test of any
interpretations of *The Industrial Kingdom of God* in particular and Murray's social thought in general. Freed by the vehicle of fiction from the necessity of dealing with actual conditions in society, it demonstrates a reunion on "the higher plane" of ethics and economics. And, as in the earlier union of the two which was a feature of classical liberal theory, there was no need of the agency of the state to effect the combination.

The novel centres on the efforts of two generations of the Forbes family to develop an ethical industrial system in a Scottish town. George Forbes is an eager and self-educating mechanic who performs well at a time of difficulty in his place of employment and is elevated to partnership by a thankful employer. Upon the death of his patron and partner some time later, Forbes sells his share in the factory and returns to his rural home village of Arderholm to establish a new factory and with it a new, industrial town. There he marries the virtuous orphan Mary Freer and the couple are blessed with two children: Jamie and William. The children are educated for a time by the wife of the factory manager, James Nicholl, a temperate and intelligent man who was led by financial obligations and intellectual reservations to abandon his original goal of entering the ministry and join the industrial world instead.

The two Forbes boys mature in different directions. While William grows in virtue, Jamie turns through intemperance, biological predisposition and the promptings of the dissolute village doctor to alcohol. The doctor is eventually replaced by an upstanding medic who establishes a local Y.M.C.A. and urges the enforcement of sanitation
laws. But the damage is done: Jamie Forbes remains a drunk.

William, on the other hand, becomes a seminary student in Edinburgh. He soon falls under the spell of Rev. John Downes, "the priest of the revolution", who eschews preaching in a comfortable parish church but chooses to bring his message to the slums instead. The church, he believes, must leave the struggle of the reformation behind and turn its attention to the social and economic problems of the industrial age. He tutors William through Past and Present, Chartism and The Latter Day Pamphlets and, thus inspired by the secular faith of Carlyle, William neglects his university studies in order to work with Downes in helping the poor and sick of the slums. 130

Shocked by slum conditions, he becomes convinced of the absolute necessity of the philanthropic mission of the Christian churches to the poor.

At the end of the academic year, William returns to Alderholm in order to help in the factory office. Jamie is drinking heavily now and George Forbes is ill. Both pass away in the course of the summer, though in his omnipotence, the novelist squeezes reform and repentance out of Jamie before handing this eldest son over to Death. The factory, with its 1000 employees and large profits, now falls entirely to William. Aware of his great responsibilities, the young student returns to Edinburgh to seek the advice of Rev. Downes.

But Downes has little chance to speak as William explains his dilemma and his convictions. Should he continue preparation for the ministry, or should he direct his attention to the family business; should he be engaged in preaching or in practice? How can he accept wealth which is not his in any but the shallowest sense of property
rights? There are moral and spiritual foundations to the law which modify the 'rights' of inheritance, particularly when, as an inheritance, the wealth is not earned by one's own labour.

Yet William is hardly ready to follow those radical reformers who would overthrow the established customs and relations of the social whole. Gradual growth is better than radical change. It is not necessary to abolish property or turn to the political sphere to achieve change. Wealth does not render virtue impossible as long as the man of wealth recognizes the moral rule that we may not do as we will with what we own. He must freely act to distribute his wealth. Having preached his first sermon, William asks Downes to return with him to Arderholm to advise and assist as he tries to determine how the surplus wealth of the factory can "go in some way to benefit the working people who have co-operated with my father in making it".131

Downes does come to Arderholm and, together with James Nicholl, helps William Forbes dispose of both his accumulated inheritance and his annual income. Portions are set aside for the provision of mother Mary Forbes and for special projects and business insurance. The balance is allotted for improvements in the food, clothing, housing and education of the workers. In addition, a combined library, gymnasium, bathing pool and games room is to be built in a newly created park for the use of the inhabitants of Arderholm.

Turning to the factory itself, Forbes decides to retain the basic employer/employee relation for administrative purposes, but to make the factory a co-operative enterprise through the introduction of profit sharing. Wages will not be raised, but a year-end bonus will
be paid to all workers, part of it in cash and part of it in the form of community improvements. In addition, a fund will be created out of profits to provide insurance for sickness, old age and death.

The reorganization of the mill extends to the office as well. In thanks for services rendered over many years, Forbes raises Nicholl to full partnership in the firm. His joy is subsequently made complete when he is able by marriage to rescue a local woman from poverty brought about by her father's questionable business dealings.

All parties live happily ever after in the years following the introduction of "the new order of things in the Arderholm mill". Schools and parks multiply, a hospital and health service are established, sanitation is improved and insurance takes care of the sick. Forbes and Nicholl come to be known as fellow-workers rather than masters -- in short, an industrial kingdom of God is created in a small Scottish town.

Heaven comes to earth in this moralistic tale whose sentiments are reminiscent of Dickens, Bellamy and a host of other reform-minded novelists whose works found their most appreciative audience in the middle class. There was much to reassure this readership. Though visions of New Lanark might spring to mind, there was no threat of Owenite radicalism here. The animating values and basic elements of the existing social structure remained intact. The camel had gone through the eye of the needle with the creation by a well-motivated rich man of an industrial heaven in Arderholm. Capitalism and private property were maintained -- although inspired with the new ideal of selfless generosity. Individual recognition was preserved in the
co-operative system and above all, the State was nowhere to be seen. For all the book reveals, Arderholm may not even have had a mayor or any form of municipal government. Reform of the economic order is achieved through the Christian -- not to be confused with ecclesiastical -- motivation of the wealthy industrialist.

The ethical character of Murray's Christianity is once more reinforced through the criticism of the purely theological preoccupations of the established church and the doctrinal character of the faith shared by the novel's three main figures, William Forbes, James Nicholl and John Downes. It is certainly no accident that all three are products to a greater or lesser extent of the seminary. The leadership of the Christian church in social reform is thereby confirmed, but the necessity of a reformed Christianity is upheld in the unorthodoxy of Downes and the abandonment of seminary for practical work by both Nicholl and William Forbes.

He That Had Received the Five Talents illustrates in clearest form the nature of Murray's social philosophy. While it can be criticized for its awkwardness, it can more usefully be used to criticize the assumptions and oversights of its author's social philosophy. Murray brings his happy kingdom to earth, but for one with so little use for orthodox theology, he has a firm and convenient dependence on the guiding hand of a kind providence. The outside world does not enter in. Arderholm is sheltered from the effects of trade cycles and depressions to a degree never shared by either Paisley or Montreal. It is those very conditions which aggravated 'the industrial problem', and their absence from Arderholm implies a similar absence from
Murray's mind as he sought to understand the causes of and solutions for the problem. Coupled with the lack of any firm detail in the depiction of the industrial utopia, this oversight raises questions about the degree to which Murray can be said to have understood either the problem or the solution.

The solution is limited to being a matter of improved motivation within the existing system and the implication is that ethics and economics can be re-united in a natural order existing on a higher plane. Murray was convinced that capitalists would see their productivity rise if only they adopted the ethics of self-sacrifice. Building on implications in the "Christian Ethics", evil had no existence apart from the greed and self-service of workers and employers. Hence the adoption of a properly ethical approach to business would naturally bring prosperity inasmuch as it would entail the removal of that source of evil which hindered economic health. This reunion of ethical and economic law on a higher plane brought with it the implicit return to theories of moral prosperity and immoral poverty, though this union was distinct from that of Herbert Spencer in nature and removed to the utopian future in time. Whether upheld by providence or the inevitable result of a transfer of life to the higher plane, this union can be seen in the ease with which conflicts are resolved -- if they arise at all -- in the world of the novel.

It can certainly be questioned whether 'self-sacrifice' is compatible with 'capitalism', which derives its motivation from self-interest. Murray even recognizes this in the retention of both a degree of individualism and a degree of competition in his industrial
utopia. No attempt is made to explain how self-sacrifice and self-interest may be reconciled; indeed, since capitalism itself is never brought into question, the issue of whether its characteristic motivation is compatible with Murray's 'higher plane' motivation is never raised. Is non-competitive capitalism possible? Murray appears both to claim openly that it is while admitting implicitly that it is not. The extent to which he truly understood the contemporary industrial and economic problem is once more called into question.

Finally, He That Had Received the Five Talents reveals the limited confidence which Murray had in the ability of the working class to choose freely 'the higher way' if given the opportunity. At no time do Forbes, Downes or Nicholl consult with the workers in order to discover their opinion on how the wealth might best be distributed or the factory re-arranged. Though the workers have co-operated in producing the wealth, they are not asked to co-operate in its distribution. As a result, the new Christianity emerges as a religion which no less clerical than its discredited predecessor. Though its advocates aspire to transform it into a religion which is relevant to the common man, they are unwilling to allow those standards of relevance to be set by the common man himself. The clericism of the higher plane is indistinguishable from the paternalism of the lower plane.

Though he continued to publish articles on social themes, Murray's social philosophy did not develop in new directions after the publication of He That Had Received the Five Talents. The 1908 Handbook of Christian Ethics was largely an expansion on the idealist two-realm theories which limited Christian ethics to the teaching and
example of Jesus, and once more repeated that progress to a better stage of civilisation would come primarily through the peaceful methods of the church rather than the legislative methods of the state. Needless to say, "Revolution" remained outside of Murray's political vocabulary.

These two themes sum up the limitations of Murray's final position in social philosophy. The rejection of legislative reform was an implicit rejection of the concept of active citizenship advanced and practiced by T. H. Green and Arnold Toynbee. If the practical outworkings of their theories are to be found not so much in their own actions but in the actions of those students who as politicians and bureaucrats instituted the social reforms of the pre-war Liberal ministry in Britain, so too the lack of similar programmes in Canada at the time may be due in part to the lack of an activist philosophy, advanced through the university, which appreciated the possibilities of legislated reform. Perhaps Murray now despaired that the teaching of political philosophy to potential politicians would significantly improve the morality of Canadian politics and so render the state a fit agency of social reform. Ultimately, however, it was the demands of his philosophy rather than the shortcomings of politicians which led to the rejection of legislated reform. Like some Neo-Kantian contemporaries in Germany, Murray may have been more consistent to the idealist standard in his argument that the progress towards the ideal society can only be achieved by adopting the method of the ideal rather than the methods of the militarist society which civilisation was leaving behind. Yet that consistency robbed his
his philosophy of the cultural power which characterized the new liberalism in Britain. Perhaps too, the confidence that progress towards the ideal was inevitable may have induced a certain quietism in regard to participation in reform movements.

Rejecting legislated reform in favour of individual moral development may have given Murray's social philosophy greater internal consistency, but it failed to eliminate entirely the element of co-ercion involved in reform. To the extent that workers were excluded from participation in deciding the division of wealth and the new ordering of society, they were subject to an imposed reform bearing no more relation to their inner moral state than if these changes had been the result of legislation. It could even be argued that the element of co-ercion was greater. While legislative reform was conducted through elected, representative assemblies, Murray's paternalist or clerical alternative was imposed from behind the closed doors of the factory office or church study. As with much of middle class reform in the period, the adoption of paternalist methods belied the profession of democratic intent. There was little beyond ineffective disclaimers to distinguish this liberalism from traditional Toryism.

The lack of cultural power can also be attributed to the second limitation of Murray's social philosophy: its lack of practical detail. This is rooted partially in the lack of that professional training which could have made his economic analysis less simplistic, but more directly in the interpretation given to Christian ethics. An ethic centred on nothing more explicit than the attitude of loving self-sacrifice offers little indication of what a future society might
resemble and so gives little direction to reform efforts. Murray reduced Christianity and Christian ethics to a matter of good but essentially undirected motivations. The idealist 'higher realm', which in Murray's pen was known more by its adjecatives than by its nouns, was similarly vague. There was a definite notion that things would be better, but no guidance as to what form improvement would take. Focussed on the reform of individual motivation, and lacking substantive definition, it could not -- and indeed would not -- give explicit direction to the aim of social and industrial reform:

the aim of Jesus was not primarily any external reconstruction of social order ... His aim was primarily a moral regeneration of men; and that will construct for itself such industrial arrangements as may form its fittest embodiment.140

What most hobbled Murray's social philosophy was the inability of his amillenial Christian ethics to offer any fundamental critique of contemporary society. The values and aims of his higher realm kingdom of God were largely indistinguishable from the values and aims of enlightened and conscientious middle class culture. Faith in capitalism and in progress were as strong as faith in God. And though he might disagree with those Idealists who would put libraries and concert halls in the place of the church, there was in Murray's Christian ethics no prophetic task allotted to the church which could justify this opposition to replacing the temple of God with the temples of culture. Murray was too decided a Christian to make 'Culture' the religion of the higher realm, but in view of the eventual adoctrinal character of his Christianity and the undifferentiated 'spirituality' of all aspects of the higher realm, it is legitimate to ask what,
apart from the reservations of a former Free Church theology student, kept him from this conclusion.

The life of Christ is a narrow foundation for Christian ethics, but Murray's suspicion of traditional theology left little room for expanding this base. As a result, this Christ became the Christ of the nineteenth century, the Christ of J. S. Mill and of Holman Hunt, the pleasant Christ of Culture. Murray often quoted Mill's description of Christ's merits with approval:

Religion cannot be said to have made a bad choice in pitching on this man as the ideal representative and guide of humanity; nor, even now, would it be easy for an unbeliever, to find a better translation of the rule of virtue from the abstract into the concrete than to endeavour so to act that Christ would approve our life.141

This man had nothing to offer to J. S. Mill; this Christ could tell the nineteenth century nothing it did not want to hear. The "Man from Galilee" was brought in to affirm the ideal of a moralistically 'reformed' capitalism, not to render judgement on the contemporary economic and social order. Hence, for Murray as for so many contemporaries, Christian ethics, despite some redirection toward social ends, was unable entirely to escape an individualistic moralism and as such was robbed of its potential to be an incentive to and agency of thorough social change.
Footnotes to Chapter Four


5 John Clark Murray, "The First Ten Years of the Canadian Dominion", British Quarterly Review LXVII (1878), p. 162.

6 Ibid., p. 162.

7 Idem, "The Study of Political Philosophy" (Paisley: Paisley Herald, 1877).

8 Ibid., p. 9; George Monro Grant was later to echo this analysis in his speeches on Canadian politics and politicians. Berger, Sense of Power, p. 208.

9 Murray, "Political Philosophy", p. 10.

10 Ibid., p. 9.

11 Ibid., p. 10.

12 Goldwin Smith, Canada and the Canada Question (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), pp. 135 - 136.

13 Murray, "Political Philosophy", p. 8. An emphasis on the need to educate politicians was in contrast to J.S. Mill, who argued that the education of voters was the necessary element in the improvement of representative government. D.L. Manning, Liberalism (London: Dent, 1976), p. 127.
14 Murray, "Political Philosophy", p. 15.

15 Ibid., p. 17.

16 Idem, "Can Canada be Co-erced into the Union? -- A Canadian View", Open Court 411 (1895).


20 John Clark Murray, "What is a National Policy?", Canadian Spectator, August 8, 1878, in MUA 611/2, p. 22.

21 Idem, "What is a National Policy?", Canadian Spectator, August 31, 1878, in MUA 611/2, p. 23.

22 Idem, "The Ethics of a National Policy", Canadian Spectator, September 14, 1878, in MUA 611/2, p. 22.

23 Ibid.


25 Canadians were not much moved by appeals to 'political economy'. Since only free traders attempted to provide this 'scientific' grounding for their views, economics as a discipline and free trade as a doctrine became identified in the public mind -- hence the "dismal science". Goodwin, Canadian Economic Thought, p. 110.


27 Ibid., p. 5.

28 Goodwin, Canadian Economic Thought, p. 67 - 68.

29 Heilbroner, Worldly Philosophers, pp. 53; 69.
30 Murray, "Political Situation in Canada", p. 5.

31 Ibid., p. 5.


34 Glasgow University Centenary Committee, The Curious Diversity: Glasgow University on Gilmorehill: The First Hundred Years (Glasgow: University of Glasgow, 1970), p. 9.


36 Walter Houghton argues that in failing to define the "higher plane", the Victorians were betraying a preference for the quest over the goal. John Clark Murray preferred the goal, but an attachment to the achievements of western civilization made it difficult for him to define that goal in distinction from contemporary society. W.E. Houghton, The Victorian Frame of Mind, 1830 - 1870 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957), p. 291f.

37 This approach to economics through moral philosophy was shared by Adam Shortt, Professor in Political Science at Queen's University from 1888 to 1908, and Chairman of the Civil Service Commission from 1908 to 1917. Goodwin, Canadian Economic Thought, p. 186.


39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.


Murray, *Industrial Kingdom*, p. 5.

Ibid., p. 5; Manning, *Liberalism*, p. 97.

Murray, *Industrial Kingdom*, p. 11.

Houghton, *Victorian Frame*, p. 239.


Ibid., pp. 20 - 22.


Murray, *Industrial Kingdom*, p. 28.


Murray, *Industrial Kingdom*, p. 31. The idea of man's most fundamental right being to the fruit of his own labour was shared by Adam Smith, though Smith saw it as a right of producers to be defended against government regulations. Murray brought the principle into the context of industrial wage labour, where he was later to argue for a time that full recognition of the principle might only be granted through some form of government regulation. Manning, *Liberalism*, p. 72; John Clark Murray, "Philosophy and Industrial Life", *The Monist* IV (1894), p. 543.


This tendency to exonerate capitalism by locating the industrial problem on the side of labour was common to many contemporary liberal reformers. Richter, *Politics of Conscience*, pp. 268 - 270.


Ibid., p. 56.

Ibid., p. 59.

Murray, "Political Economy", p. 130.
Perhaps the most well known expression of this common distinction was Matthew Arnold's separation of the "ordinary self" from the "best self". M. Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 97.

Murray may have had the federated co-operatives of the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society (S.C.W.S.) in mind when suggesting that a network of co-operatives be established by the working class itself. Established in 1868, the S.C.W.S. was involved in the production and distribution of a wide range of industrial and consumer goods. Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society, 1868 - 1936: Historical and Descriptive Handbook (Glasgow: S.C.W.S., 1936).

Engels commented with less satisfaction that, "the English proletariat is becoming more and more bourgeois, so that this most bourgeois of all nations is apparently aiming ultimately at the possession of a bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat as well as a bourgeoisie". Cited in Heilbroner, *Worldly Philosophers*, p. 166.

Murray's interest in the Knights of Labour may have been due in part to the prominence of the labour organization in
Montreal. As the Industrial Kingdom was being written in the summer of 1887, the
Knights were recording the existence of 38 local assemblies with 2522 members in
Montreal, one of the highest concentrations of membership in Canada. On the basis of
this strength, the Knights had established a co-operative store in the city and, in
August 1887, established a co-operative trunk-factory to provide work for striking
trunk-makers who had been fired. The Knights embodied many of the principles which
Murray was advocating, and his support for them came at a time when the order was
being wrongly implicated in and roundly criticised for the 1886 Chicago Haymarket
Riots. Murray's subsequent silence on the Knights may have been due in part to the
international boycott of the Clark's Cotton Thread Company, organized by the Knights
as a result of an industrial dispute. The Clark company was owned by maternal
relatives of Murray. Kennedy, "Knights of Labour", pp. 38; 43 - 44; 75; 104; 110; 122.

82 Murray, Industrial Kingdom, p. 105.
83 Ibid., p. 105.
85 Idem, Industrial Kingdom, p. 113.
86 Ibid., p. 114. Murray here assumes that the capitalist derives his wealth
solely from the profits generated by the factories under his control, and not from a
wide range of interlocking investments.
87 Ibid., p. 116.
88 Ibid., p. 120.
89 Ibid., pp. 122 - 126.
90 Ibid., pp. 128 - 134. T.W. Powderly, Grand Master Workman of the Knights of
Labor was only one of many labour leaders strongly critical of company stores and
similar schemes. See: Knights of Labour, Labour Rights and Wrongs, p. 84.
91 Murray, Industrial Kingdom, p. 141.
92 Ibid., p. 144.
93 Ibid., p. 144.
95 Murray, Industrial Kingdom, p. 128.
96 Ibid., p. 43.
97 Ibid., p. 73.
The conjunction of self-sacrifice and self development was a Victorian commonplace advocated by figures ranging from the utilitarian J.S. Mill to the cultural idealist Matthew Arnold. Houghton, *Victorian Frame*, p. 287.


A more extreme version of this point was advanced by Matthew Arnold in the context of his criticism of the "Hebraist" activism of liberal reformers. Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy*, p. 180.


Ibid., p. 276.

Although he shared the dualistic approach which characterized Murray's thought, T.H. Green avoided this logical consequence by arguing that the basis of the state was not force, but will. As the chief agency for the expression of social will, Green's State could fulfill the functions allotted to the Church by Murray. See T.H. Green, *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation* (London: Longman's Green, 1941), pp. 121; 124.

Ibid., p. 129.


Murray, "Industrial Life", p. 535.


122. Ibid., p. 194n.

123. Ibid., p. i.

124. Ibid., p. iii.

125. Ibid., p. 158.


128. Ibid., pp. 219 - 220.

129. Murray's view of the church as a mediator in industrial disputes was later taken up in some of the official pronouncements of the Presbyterian Church in Canada on the problems of labour and capital. Christie, "Presbyterian Church", p. 64.

130. It would be tempting to regard this use of Thomas Carlyle to 'convert' Willie as an autobiographical admission of influence, but there is little in Murray's writings to indicate a reliance on Carlyle. Differences in such specific and, for Murray, significant areas as laissez-faire economics and the role of the government in reform over-ride a general agreement that the "Condition of England" question had to be addressed in all industrial nations. Unlike such contemporaries as Edward Caird and John Nichol who had come under the sway of the Scottish Sage, Murray never wrote about Carlyle. Most of the few references to the man which do appear in his writings are for the purpose of illustration or criticism rather than confirmation. At the same time, Murray would have been aware of the powerful effect of Carlyle's work when writing of William Forbes' 'awakening'. Glasgow classmate John Nichol claimed that many students became "flaming hero-worshippers", while Edward Caird acknowledged Carlyle as "the author
who exercised the most powerful charm on students who were beginning to think." Jones and Muirhead, Edward Caird, pp. 21 - 22. Perhaps Murray had already begun to think; as noted in Chapter Three of the present study, his undergraduate preference was for the Christian Socialists F.D. Maurice and Charles Kingsley, and he would likely have found the effusive Carlyle somewhat distasteful.

131 Murray, Five Talents, p. 267.

132 Although the example of New Lanark would have given the Arderholm model some much-needed detail, Murray studiously refrained from any reference to Robert Owen or to the co-operative communities founded through his influence. Owenism was too commonly associated with radicalisms and atheism to allow its use as a model for Arderholm, even though a number of Murray's aims and methods parallel those of later Owenism and Co-operative Socialism. Murray may have wished to prove that a Christian co-operative could be established as an alternative to New Lanark; in fact, Arderholm emerges as the urban, industrial equivalent to an enlightened paternalist's well-run rural estate. E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London: Penguin, 1966), pp. 884 - 887.

133 Like Adam Smith, Murray rejected but could not thoroughly refute the 'capitalism' of de Mandeville's Fable of the Bees. He dismissed the work as a notorious example of "coarsist egoism" without arguing convincingly for a capitalism based on disinterestedness. Murray, Introduction to Ethics, pp. 45; 167; Goudzwaard, Capitalism and Progress, p. 29.

134 This parallels the ambivalence found in Carlyle's call to industrial co-partnership and his praise for the aggressive, 'heroic' captains of industry. Houghton, Victorian Frame, pp. 208 - 209.


137 Adam Shortt, Professor of Political Science at Queen's University from 1888 - 1908, argued both for minimal government and for the greater use of experts and intellectuals as civil service advisors. In his subsequent role as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission from 1908 - 1917, he worked for the elimination of what was likely the greatest impediment to a reformist civil service, the filling of civil service positions by political patronage rather than open competition. S.E.O. Shortt, The Search for an Ideal: Six Canadian Intellectuals and Their Convictions in an Age of Transition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1976), pp. 100; 108; 111. In general however, reform movements in Canada arose more directly out of the churches. The Methodist church was the most radical, with its advocacy early in the twentieth century of the public ownership of basic industries, social security, and the regulation of profit. The Presbyterian Church held to the more moderate position which Murray had advocated, calling for the recognition of the rights of workers to share in equally with capitalists in the profits of production. R. Allen, The Social Passion: Religion and Social Reform in Canada, 1914 - 1928 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973),


139 With such views, Murray put distance between himself and the more activist social gospel advocates then rising in the Canadian churches. Allen, *Social Passion*, pp. 15 - 17.


Conclusion

The failure of John Clark Murray's social philosophy to offer a clear direction for reform of industrial society demonstrates a fundamental tension in his thought. From the time of university studies in Glasgow and Edinburgh, Murray had professed the Scottish cultural conviction that the alliance of Christianity and philosophy provided a unified creed for active life in society. Christianity provided the basis for philosophy, and philosophy clarified Christian creeds. As generations of Queen's and McGill students were to learn, the two together formed a critical tool for the understanding and improvement of social and cultural life.

This creed engendered confidence, and Murray appears to have weathered the mid-nineteenth century crisis of faith relatively unperturbed. Those doubts he did admit to were of the value of extensive doctrinal formulations, which seemed more often to cause divisive creedal disputes than to clarify the united faith of Christians. Like many at the time, Murray believed that Christians must be unified if cultural leadership were to be provided; certainly the post-1843 cultural unrest in Scotland's churches and universities cannot but have strengthened this belief. But further strengthening was received when, by the 1880's, the underside of industrialism became inescapable. The Christian-philosophical creed had always been intended as a means of social and cultural improvement; here
now was a pressing problem which called for all the relief a
Christian social philosophy could provide.

But was John Clark Murray's philosophy equal to the challenge?
In shying away from explicit theological formulations of Christianity
or clearly defined philosophical positions, Murray had been left with
an intellectual framework which had little precise definition.

Murray's thought had not been shaped primarily in continuing
dialogue with philosophical contemporaries, but according to an agenda
received in Glasgow and Edinburgh and carried out in over fifty years
of teaching and writing. That agenda called for the search for a
middle way which would reconcile the opposing tendencies of material­
ism and idealism in philosophical thought. A basic commitment to
Christianity predisposed John Clark Murray to a form of idealism, but
continuing differences in basic outlook and the principle of mediation
prevented him from allying himself with the neo-Hegelians and neo­
Kantians whose thought his own came partially to resemble. Unable to
accept without question the evangelical Presbyterianism or Common
Sense Realism of his upbringing, he was also unwilling to identify
with the major schools of philosophical or theological thought as they
developed later in the century.

Murray's philosophical isolation was re-inforced by his
reluctance to accept the new ideals of professionalization which
were reshaping the teaching and writing of philosophy by the 1880's.
The likelihood of fruitful dialogue which could clarify his thought
was reduced with the rise of a new generation of professional
philosophers who spoke in more technical language and out of less expansive cultural aims than the generation represented by John Clark Murray. And the opportunity for such dialogue was limited by the form in which Murray's thought was most often expressed: even-handed textbooks and review articles were not grist for the mill of philosophical dispute.

At least one consequence of Murray's reluctance to embrace particular philosophical or theological positions, or to enter into dialogue on fundamental issues was the failure of his philosophy to develop a level of definition which would make it adequate to deal with contemporary issues in detail. Murray's thought was ultimately animated by two principles: the assurance that reality was a unified and comprehensible system maintained by God, and the injunction that in a world where moral responsibility could not be avoided, the law of self-less love was to govern individual and social relationships. The former belief allowed Murray only to ignore those challenges of rationalism and materialism which a more critical and systematic Christian philosophy may have been able to answer. The latter belief in self-less love as the single principle of Christian ethics left him unable convincingly to challenge the injustices of late nineteenth century industrial capitalism.

The work of later proponents of the social gospel such as Salem Bland was to demonstrate that a critical stance towards culture could be developed from within liberal Christianity. And the work of such contemporaries as Thomas Hill Green and Arnold Toynbee
demonstrated that an activist approach to social problems could also be developed out of the relatively more orthodox pre-Rauschenbusch evangelical liberalism of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. What factors kept Murray from similar conclusions?

What directed both Bland and Green was a greater consciousness of an antithesis existing between contemporary social conditions and the Christian ideal, and a greater willingness to employ established agencies of power within society -- chiefly the state -- to effect change. Both the new liberals and the social gospellers looked on social evil as thoroughly penetrating the existing social system. A Christian social ethic had to be at least as penetrating if it was to offer guidance for the age.

But this ran contrary to the very confidence with which Murray looked on the world as held in God's hand. A decision to emphasize the positive aspects of Christianity had left him with little in the way of a concept of evil apart from individual imbalances in the faculties of mind, emotion and will. Hence, although Murray could recognize that the ethical and economic orders might not always be in natural harmony, he could never accept the deep-rootedness of social injustice. Within his understanding of Christian ethics, this would have implied a failing on God's part. Unwilling to propose radical change of the social system, Murray's only alternative was to advocate change of individual motivation, in the hope that good will and generosity would be sufficient to purify society.

It is at this point that the concept of higher and lower
planes or realms of existence enters in. The concept has some parallels to the Christian concept of the old and the new man, and it is clear that Murray looked on it in these terms. Yet the amillenial mold in which his renewed Christianity had been cast had no place for the idea that total renewal of the world would be both a radical and a super-human event; it had lost the 'already/not-yet' tension of salvation as an achieved reality whose full manifestation would only come with Christ's return.

This loss was the loss of a critical lever on society. Left with the conviction that the New Jerusalem of social harmony -- the universal Arderholm -- would gradually unfold out of existing society, Murray was compelled to look within the values and aims of that society for models of goodness. The ethical principle of self-less love pointed only to those popular conceptions of the Higher Realm as an indistinct plane above the ordinary, and Murray was left with a social philosophy which closely duplicated the ideals of 'maternal feminism', a contemporary movement which found in romantic conceptions of 'feminine nature' the qualities necessary for the reform of society. The ideological pre-dispositions of many modern feminist historians of this romantic ideal lead them to depict it as a means by which men ensured that women would remain barred from positions of power -- if only because ideals of self-sacrifice and love put them on a pedestal above the competitive jungle of business and politics, or in a domestic sphere removed from it. In fact, men were to be equally removed. Feminists are correct in asserting that the ideal was most
consistently applied only in relation to women, but it is necessary
to note that it was framed as an ideal for all of society -- and
hence also necessary to note that its effectiveness in substantially
improving social conditions was as poor as its effectiveness in
improving the status of women. This should not be read as a dismissal
of the wide range of schemes for social improvement which arose out
of the romantic ideal and which were often initiated by women. At
the same time, a distinction must be maintained between the
palliative reform programs of the romantic ideal and later social
gospel proposals which called for a radical restructuring of society.

The theological idealism of John Clark Murray represents an
attempt to find a cure for society's ills by appealing to society's
own values. This cultural Christianity drew strength from the
conviction that the world was upheld by a Divine order, but was weaken-
ed by an unwillingness or inability to penetrate just how far that
order diverged radically from the ideals of late nineteenth century
civilized society. As a result, and in vivid contrast to the Scottish
cultural ideal, Murray's apolitical, amillenial Christian philosophy
was effectively disengaged from society at the time when it was
most needed. As with romantic, maternal feminism, his Christian
social ideals were raised so high as to become only objects of
wishful contemplation, and not directives to effective action.
Bibliography

The published and unpublished papers of the John Clark Murray Collection in the McGill University Archives (hereafter referred to as MUA) constituted the major source of primary materials employed in this study. A significant limiting factor has been the small number of personal papers or private correspondance filed in the collection. This has resulted in a study which may appear more an investigation of works than an investigation of a person. Reference to other manuscript collections has failed to provide correspondance or additional material on John Clark Murray's private life. Of collections of major intellectual contemporaries such as George Monro Grant and John Watson, only the papers of McGill Principal John William Dawson contained letters from John Clark Murray. Almost all of these regard the disputes over salary and the admission of women to university classes, issues which divided the principal and the professor for half of the two decade span in which they were colleagues at McGill. The archival collections of American philosophical colleagues met at the Glenmore Summer School and the Australian philosopher Henry Laurie, who was a friend and fellow student at Edinburgh, also failed to contain correspondance from John Clark Murray.

For ease of reference, this bibliography has been sub-divided into eight sections within the basic division of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources include largely unpublished documentary material, books and articles by John Clark Murray, contemporary newspaper reports, and writings by contemporary philosophers and cultural commentators. Secondary sources include published book-length studies, articles, and theses, dissertations and unpublished articles.

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