THOMAS AQUINAS' CONCEPT OF DIVINE POWER
CHARLES HARTSHORNE'S CRITIQUE

OF

THOMAS AQUINAS' CONCEPT OF DIVINE POWER

By

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines Charles Hartshorne's critique of classical theism, as it relates to the subject of divine power. My specific aim is to evaluate whether Hartshorne's critique applies to Thomas Aquinas' concept of divine power. Chapter One undertakes an exposition of Thomas' conception of the power of God and its implications for the human power of free choice. Chapter Two explores Hartshorne's critique of the classical concept of God, focusing on the negative implications he draws from the classical concept of omnipotence. In Chapter Three, I apply Hartshorne's critique of classical theism to Thomas' concept of divine power, in order to judge whether Hartshorne has an accurate understanding of the classical position and whether his critique reveals serious problems in Thomas' concept of divine power. My evaluation centres around Hartshorne's objections to Thomas' claim that God possesses purely actual power, and his insistence that God's omnipotence, as construed by Thomas, robs human beings of the power of free choice. Chapter Three also compares the similarities and differences between their approaches to the knowledge of God as determined by their basic metaphysical principles and their use of analogy.
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ABBREVIATIONS

All references to the works of Thomas Aquinas and Charles Hartshorne will appear in the body of the thesis under the following abbreviations:

Thomas Aquinas

C.G. Summa Contra Gentiles
S.Th. Summa Theologiae

Charles Hartshorne

AW Aquinas to Whitehead: Seven Centuries of Metaphysics of Religion
CSPM Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method
DR The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God
LP The Logic of Perfection
MVG Man's Vision of God
NTOT A Natural Theology for Our Time
OOTM Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes
PSG Philosophers Speak of God
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INTRODUCTION

Broadly speaking, this thesis seeks to assess the criticism which Charles Hartshorne directs at what he calls "classical theism." Hartshorne is a prominent critic of classical theism, which he defines as a school of thought characterized by an emphasis on God's unchanging perfection, unity, omniscience and omnipotence. He traces the origins of classical theism back to Plato's Republic where "deity is defined as 'perfect,' meaning possessed of value or worth so great that no increase or improvement would be conceivable, and no decrease either, since the possibility of such corruption would be a defect." (AW, 4) Representatives of classical theism are figures such as Philo (20 B.C.- 54 A.D.), Augustine (354-430), Anselm (1033-1109), Maimonides (1135-1204), Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), Descartes (1596-1650), Leibnitz (1646-1716) and Kant (1724-1804) (PSG, 76-150). The classical concept of God has been prominent in Christian thought from early times up until the present century.

Hartshorne's critique of the classical concept of God challenges its very foundations. Hartshorne thinks that classical theism was too strongly influenced by Greek
philosophy which considered being more fundamental than becoming. For example, he objects to the classical assumption that the metaphysical notions of being, unity, actuality, and necessity are superior to their ultimate contraries, becoming, multiplicity, potentiality and contingency, and only the former are applicable to God. As a "process" philosopher, Hartshorne asserts that metaphysical opposites are mutually interdependent and correlative, therefore both extremes ought to be applied to God, in different senses (PSG, 2). Although Hartshorne definitively rejects classical theism, he acknowledges that he is indebted to it for articulating and developing crucial questions relating to the concept of God. In particular, he compliments Thomas Aquinas for stating with precision what other classical theists had long been holding more vaguely and confusedly; although Hartshorne considers Thomas' doctrine of God to be "shipwrecked on certain rocks of contradiction," he applauds Thomas for having "left us an admirable chart showing the location of the rocks." (DR, xii)

Hartshorne's challenge to classical theism has aroused considerable debate among philosophers and theologians. The challenge has renewed contemporary interest in the assertions of classical theism concerning such aspects of the concept of God as divine perfection and divine power. By calling into question traditional
doctrines of the concept of God, Hartshorne's critique demands a re-examination of the assertions of classical theism.

This thesis applies Hartshorne's critique to the writings of Thomas Aquinas, focusing on the subject of divine power. The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate whether Hartshorne's criticism of the classical doctrine of divine omnipotence applies to Thomas Aquinas' concept of divine power. I have chosen to focus on the divine attribute of power because his criticism of the classical doctrine of omnipotence is one of the key elements in his critique of classical theism; furthermore, Hartshorne refers specifically to the position of Thomas a number of times in his critique of divine omnipotence.¹

The thesis is organized into three chapters. Chapter One contains an exposition of Thomas' discussion of divine power, based on S.Th. I, 25 entitled "The Power of God" and parallel texts. The chapter ends with a section on his approach to knowledge of God. Chapter Two presents an overview of Hartshorne's critique of classical theism, and a detailed investigation of his criticism of the classical notion of divine power. The discussion of Hartshorne's approach to knowledge of God considers the basis from which

he criticizes classical theism. Finally, Chapter Three applies Hartshorne's criticism of classical omnipotence to Thomas' concept of divine power. In particular, I discuss Hartshorne's objections to purely actual divine power, as set forth by Thomas, and to divine omnipotence which according to Hartshorne robs human beings of the power of free choice. In the Conclusion, I evaluate whether the negative religious implications which Hartshorne finds in the classical concept of divine power apply to Thomas' understanding of God's power.
CHAPTER ONE

An Exposition of Thomas Aquinas' Conception of Divine Power

The purpose of this chapter is to explore Thomas Aquinas' writings on divine power. My exposition of Thomas' conception of God's power is based on *Summa Theologicae* I, 25, entitled "The Power of God." I chose this text as my starting point because it presents a comprehensive but concise discussion of divine power, as befits a work which is intended for the instruction of beginners (*S.Th.*, prol.). Parallel texts in *Summa Contra Gentiles* are relied on for their more detailed exploration of omnipotence and what the omnipotent God cannot do (*C.G.* II, 22-25).

The first part of the present chapter is divided into three sections which investigate: 1) the nature of God's power, 2) the meaning of omnipotence and, conversely, what God cannot do, and 3) human power in relation to God's power. The chapter closes with a discussion of Thomas' overall approach to the formulation of the concept of God under three headings: metaphysics, knowledge of God, and criteria of adequacy. This section briefly discusses such topics as Thomas' understanding of the role of metaphysics,
the use of analogy, and the role of Scripture and past theologians as authorities.

A. God's Active Power

In the *Summa Theologiae* Part I, the first article of Question 25 asks "whether there is power in God." Thomas answers in the affirmative, and proceeds to characterize divine power. He begins by stating that there are two kinds of power: active and passive. They are defined as follows:

For active power is the principle of acting upon something else; wheras passive power is the principle of being acted upon by something else, as the Philosopher says. (*S.Th.* I, 25,1)

In God there is no passive power, but "active power in the highest degree." (*S.Th.* I, 25,1) Thomas declines to attribute passive power to God because he, following Aristotle, believes that passivity or potentiality implies deficiency and imperfection. To understand the reasons for the superiority of active power over passive power, it is necessary to examine the foundation of the concept of God, established at the very beginning of the *Summa Theologiae*. The relevant sections are located in Questions 2, 3 and 4, entitled "The Existence of God," "The Simplicity of God," and "The Perfection of God" respectively.

In order to understand the concepts of potentiality and actuality, one must examine their first appearance in the *Summa*, in the first proof for the existence of God, also
known as the argument from motion (S. Th. I, 2, 3). The argument begins with the observation that, "It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion." (ibid.) What could possibly be in motion but is not, is said to be in a state of potentiality, while what is in fact in motion is said to have received actuality. Thomas defines motion as "the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality." (ibid.) The only way for the movement from potentiality to actuality to occur is for something in a state of actuality to act on something in a potential state. The example Thomas uses is that of fire: when fire comes into contact with wood it makes the wood which is potentially hot, actually hot. Thomas considers this reasoned argument sufficient proof that "whatever is moved is moved by another." (ibid.) Using this example, he shows further that it is not possible that something be both in potentiality and actuality in the same respect: burning wood may potentially become cold, but it is impossible that burning wood become hot (because it already is hot, in actuality).

By observation it is apparent that the world consists of continual interaction between movers and things moved. Thomas argues that this process is not infinite. From the observation that "whatever is moved is moved by another," he reasons that a first mover is required to account for the motion observed in the world. (S. Th. I,
2,3). Since a starting point is necessary to account for the occurrence of motion, therefore the sequence of motion in the world is not infinite. Thomas concludes his proof of the existence of God from motion as follows: "Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, moved by no other; and this everyone understands to be God." (ibid.)

Thomas has thus far established that there must be a first mover, whom he calls God on the basis of the generally accepted Christian idea of God as creator and efficient cause. The first mover must be in actuality because "absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality is reduced to actuality only by some being in actuality." (S.Th. I, 3,1) Since it was proven that God is the "first mover," therefore it follows that God is in actuality. Thomas maintains that it is impossible that there be any potentiality in God; God is pure actuality (actus purus). One might suggest, as Charles Hartshorne does, that God could possess some aspect of potentiality which is activated either by his actuality or other actualities; however, potentiality is not compatible with the unity and perfection of God's nature, according to Thomas.

The concept of actus purus is an important one, but may be misleading. The term "act" in common usage implies motion, however God, as the unmoved mover, is unchangeable. Movement is incompatible with God's perfection because it
implies either a movement away from perfection or the acquisition of a perfection formerly lacking. As Thomas uses it, the term *actus purus* is best translated as "pure actuality." The meaning of the title *actus purus* is best clarified by examining Thomas' understanding of God's perfection.

Thomas thinks that God possesses both the "perfection of being" and the perfection of his attributes, such as goodness and power (*S.Th. I, 4,2*). The assertion that God is perfect in being means that God is self-subsistent and that he is the giver and sustainer of being of all created things. The self-subsistence of God's being is crucial to his role as unmoved mover and first cause. Pure actuality means that God actually is without ceasing and that every one of his attributes is fully actualized in his being. Everything is brought into being by God, therefore no thing has perfect being since each is dependent on God. The attributes of a thing are excellent to the degree that the thing possesses these attributes in actuality. Thomas writes that, "a thing is said to be perfect in proportion to its actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection." (*S.Th. I, 4,1*) Created things partially actualize the attributes belonging to them, but only God fully actualizes every one of his attributes; therefore, only God who is
actus purus is perfect. The movement towards greater actuality implies movement towards perfection.

Since God's power is part of his being, along with the related attributes of knowledge and will, this seeming multiplicity must be reconciled with God's simplicity and unity. Thomas maintains that,

Power is predicated not as something really distinct from his knowledge and will, but as differing from them logically; inasmuch (namely) as power implies the notion of a principle putting into execution what the will commands and what knowledge directs.

(S.Th. I, 25,1)

God's simplicity is not compromised by the consideration of power as an attribute distinct from knowledge and will for there is no real distinction; according to Thomas, the notion of power is contained in the knowledge and will of God.

God's power is immutable because God's power is one with God's being. It is significant that in Question 9 entitled "The Immutability of God," Thomas uses the actuality of God as the first piece of evidence for God's immutability (S.Th. I, 9,1). Since the ability to change requires potentiality, and since God is pure act "without the admixture of any potentiality," therefore "it is impossible for God to change in any way." (ibid.) The actuality of God's power is inextricably linked to his perfection. God's actual power has two implications: since God is pure actuality, he has the greatest possible capacity to give being to things; and since he possesses actual
power to the maximal degree, he is therefore perfect (S.Th. I, 4,1). The concept of God as pure act, possessing only actual power, is consistent with the attribute of immutability and can be easily related to God's role as creator and world-sustainer; however, when one's perspective leaves the realm of metaphysical necessities and turns to the realm of history and God's dealings with human beings, it is difficult to imagine a God who has no potentiality, and thus no ability to change, responding to human concerns.

Thomas' insistence that there is active power in God, and no passive power, can be accounted for by the fact that his concept of God is based on God's role as creator of the universe. In S.Th. I, 2, the first proof for God's existence is based on God's role as first mover which, according to Thomas, necessitates that God be in a state of pure actuality. His view of God's power as wholly actual reflects his primary concern with God's role as creator of the universe, rather than God's interaction with individual human beings. Thomas seeks to form a concept of God which can account for the existence of the physical universe, and his development of God's love or friendship with human beings is treated only after it is established that God is the unmoved mover and first cause.² His insistence on God's

² For example, the practical issue of whether God responds to petitionary prayer is explained in light of the previously established fact that God's disposition never
unchanging perfection entails that God has no passive power and thus no relativity or response to human affairs. Thomas maintains consistently that God is never affected by human actions, therefore God can neither be acted on by a causal agent nor receive anything from anybody else.

B. God's Omnipotence

Thomas finds that omnipotence is often attributed to God while at the same time the meaning of the word "omnipotence" is not carefully defined. In the *Summa Theologica*, he begins the article on omnipotence with the following remark:

All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what his omnipotence precisely consists. For there may be a doubt as to the precise meaning of the word `all' when we say that God can do all things. (*S.Th. I, 25,3*)

Thomas specifies that the phrase "God can do all things" means that God can do all things that are possible absolutely. A thing is possible absolutely if the subject and the predicate are compatible, for example as in the assertion "Socrates sits." On the other hand, the sentence "a man is an ass" is an absolute impossibility because the subject and predicate are incompatible (*ibid.*). Everything which does not imply a contradiction in terms is possible for God.

changes (*C.G. III, 95*).
Thomas explains the scope of God's power in terms of agent and effect. He puts forward the principle that "every agent produces an effect like itself", thus the nature of the active power corresponds with "a thing possible as its proper object" (S.Th. I, 25,3). Now since God's power is infinite, "it is not limited to any class of being, but possesses within itself the perfection of all being." (ibid.) God is omnipotent in the sense that he has the infinite power to bestow being from his essence which is the perfection of being, but his power is limited to effects which are absolutely possible, i.e., things which are not opposed to being.

Thomas further explores how God can do all things in Summa Contra Gentiles Book II, chapter 22, entitled "That God is Omnipotent." He writes that "there are three reasons why some particular effect may escape the power of some particular agent." (C.G. II, 22,6). The three restrictions of the power of an agent are as follows: first, an agent cannot produce an effect which has no likeness to itself; secondly, an agent cannot produce an effect which is superior in excellence to the agent; and thirdly, the effect of an agent is limited to a matter on which it is able to act. The first restriction does not apply to God because God is being in actuality, therefore anything which has being bears likeness to him. Further, since God possesses the perfection of being, there is no effect which
can surpass God's excellence, thus the second restriction does not apply. And lastly, God can act on any kind of matter because he is the creator of matter, and furthermore, he can bring a thing into being without the presence of any matter. As creator, God can use his active power to create something out of nothing, and in his dealings with the world he can "do everything whatsoever that lies within the potency of the created being." (C.G. II, 22,5)

In the last two articles of the question on God's power, Thomas speculates on whether God could have created the world differently or whether God could have made the world better than it is (S.Th. I, 25, 5 and 6). In article five, Thomas answers the question "whether God can do what he does not" with a resounding yes. The divine power is not "restricted to this present scheme of things" for that would imply that God is not above the order he created but equal to it. Thomas asserts that God's power and wisdom exceed "created things beyond all proportion." (S.Th. I, 25,5)

Therefore, God could have willed a different order of things if he had chosen to do so, and his actions are definitely not determined by natural necessity.

Article 6 asks the question: "whether God can do better than what he does?" He distinguishes between the use of "better" as an adjective and as a noun. Using the adjectival sense of the word; the question can be reworded as "can God make better things than the things he has made?"
In response, Thomas distinguishes between two ways in which a thing can be made better: in its essence or in its qualities. The essence of a thing cannot be made better, because to change the essence would change the thing into something else. Thomas is eager to emphasize that all things made are the best, in essence, that they could possibly be. Taking the universe as an example, Thomas writes that the existing universe cannot be better than it is, "for if any one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed." (ibid.) Likewise, since it belongs to the essence of human beings to be rational, a human being who did not possess the capacity to reason would not be a human being, but something else. However, the goodness of certain human qualities can be increased; for example, it is possible to increase a person's wisdom or virtue. According to Thomas, God can make the qualities of a thing better than he has made them, if he chooses.

Concerning the second usage of the word "better," as an adverb, Thomas insists that God cannot perform any act in a better way than he does. Since God is perfect, "God cannot make anything better (melius) than he makes it, because he cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness." (S.Th. I, 25,6) There can be no improvement in God himself, in either his being or his actions, hence the creation of this universe, or theoretically a different and better universe, would be done with equal ability.
In the discussion of omnipotence, it has already been observed that Thomas limits God's power to what is absolutely possible (S.Th. I, 25, 3). For example, God cannot bring about the state of affairs in which a subject and predicate are contradictory, he cannot do anything that is opposed to being, and his power is restricted to "what lies within the potency of the created being." (C.G. II, 22) The common principle behind the restrictions on God's power listed above is that God cannot do anything that involves a contradiction. The following paragraphs will look closely at C.G. II, 25, which is entitled "How the omnipotent God is said to be incapable of certain things."

In Chapter Twenty-five, Thomas discusses three respects in which God's power is limited (C.G. II, 25). The first instance is that "God is unable to do those things whose possibility entails passive potency." The second is that "God is unable to do whatever is contrary to the nature of being as being." And the third is that God cannot do what he cannot will. In each case, God's power is restricted because to exercise certain possibilities would involve God in contradiction between who he is and what he does. These three aspects of limitation of God's power shall be discussed in turn.

First of all, passive potency does not exist in God, and correspondingly neither does motion or change. God is not subject to alteration by increase or decrease, and in
him there is no coming to be or passing away. Therefore, God can lack nothing, "since a deprivation is a certain loss of being," and by the same token God cannot fail, because "every failing follows upon some privation." (C.G. II, 25, 5-6) In addition, God cannot be weary or forgetful because each of these characteristics results from a defect or lack: "weariness results from a defect of power, and forgetfulness from defect of knowledge." (ibid.) There are no emotions in God, such as anger, sorrow or regret, because passion is linked with defect and obviously with change. And lastly, God cannot "be overcome or suffer violence, for these are found only in something having a movable nature"; in other words, God is not subject to coercion or injury. It is implied that this is impossible not only because God does not possess passive potency, but also because God is vastly superior to all other powers.

Secondly, Thomas writes that God cannot "do whatever is contrary to the nature of being as being, or of made being as made." (C.G. II, 25,10) God's active power cannot operate without a suitable object, that is, an object which is capable of receiving being. Also, God cannot make a thing simultaneously be and not be, and likewise he cannot make two contradictory predicates apply to the same subject, i.e., a thing cannot be both black and white in the same respect. Moreover, God cannot create a thing without including all of the thing's essential principles; for
example, God cannot create a person without a soul or fire that does not burn. Thomas explains that "to take away an essential principle of any thing is to take away the thing itself." (C.Q. II, 25,13) Furthermore, God cannot act in contradiction to the formal principles of certain sciences, namely logic, geometry and arithmetic. As an example, Thomas uses the geometric fact that the three interior angles of a rectilinear triangle must be equal to two right angles (180 degrees). Thomas continues his list of impossibilities to establish that God cannot make God, and that God cannot make something equal to God, on the basis that these assertions contradict the essence of God as a being who is unsurpassable. The final restriction on God's power to be considered here is encapsulated in one sentence in Summa Contra Gentiles but is treated at greater length in the Summa Theologiae, in an article entitled "Whether God can make the past not to have been?" (S.Th. I, 25,4)

Thomas answers the question in the negative. The main point of the argument is that it is a contradiction to maintain that something that happened in the past did not happen. To suppose that God can make the past not to have been, according to Thomas and Augustine, is the same as asking God to make what is true, false. God cannot change what happened in the past. However, Thomas adds as clarification that although God cannot change the fact that a certain person has died, it is possible for God to raise a
dead person to life. In the same way, a penitent person can be forgiven and considered by God to be without sin, yet the fact remains that the person did sin in the past. This specific case illustrates the general principle that the scope of God's omnipotence does not extend to the doing of things that imply a contradiction (S.Th. I, 25,4).

The third type of restriction on God's power, mentioned in Summa Contra Gentiles II, 25, is that God cannot do what he cannot will. Now it has already been noted that God's will, knowledge and power are distinct logically but are all part of God's simple nature and thus not distinct in reality (S.Th. I, 25,1). In this light, it is evident that Thomas is focusing the discussion of "what God cannot do" on the character of God's will specifically. Thomas explores two respects in which God's will may restrict God's omnipotence. First, God cannot will himself to be different than he is; in this sense, there is "necessity in the divine will" (C.G. II, 25,20). For instance, God necessarily wills himself to be good and happy, moreover, God cannot will any evil thus God cannot sin. But God's will is necessary only as it pertains to the divine being; regarding creatures God's will has what Thomas calls "suppositional necessity". (S.Th. I, 19,3)

The restriction on God's will with respect to creatures is as follows: on the supposition that God has willed something, what he willed must be fulfilled, thus it
is a suppositional necessity. In this sense, God does not have the power to act against his will. However Thomas adds the qualification that considered absolutely, God's actions which involve the world are not determined by necessity. God is free to will what he chooses regarding creatures, thus he is subject to no absolute necessity; but once he has willed something it is irrevocable. Recall Thomas' answer to the question "can God do better than what he does?" (S.Th. I, 25,6) Thomas claims that God could have made a different universe which is better than the existing one on the condition that the new universe must be different from ours. In other words, there was no absolute necessity for God to will the creation of the present world. Likewise with human actions, an act such as sitting is not performed by absolute necessity, but once it has been performed it has suppositional or hypothetical necessity. As Thomas puts it, "...it is not necessary that Socrates sits: hence it is not necessary absolutely, but it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting." (S.Th. I, 19,3) The only restriction on God's power in his dealings with creatures is that once God has willed a certain thing, his will must be fulfilled.

C. Human Power

A necessary complement to the consideration of God's power in itself, is the investigation of the status of human power in relation to God's power. It has been shown that
God's omnipotence is not the possession of "all" power, but rather the power to do what does not involve a contradiction, according to Thomas. The present question for investigation is to what extent God has the power to control human affairs. Do human beings have any power of their own, as subjects of an omnipotent God? Thomas would answer yes, whereby it is clear that "power" is an analogical concept applied to both human beings and God. He asserts that human beings possess the power of free choice. The present section will discuss the human power of free choice and the power of the will. Three passages from the *Summa Theologiae* will be discussed in turn.

Thomas argues that human beings possess free choice in the question entitled "Free Choice" (S. Th. I, 83,1). His proof begins as follows: "I answer that, man has free choice, or otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards and punishments would be in vain." (ibid.) Human beings do not act from natural instinct like animals, but from rational deliberation and judgment. Thomas insists that rational judgment, unlike natural instinct, does not have a predetermined outcome.

However, Thomas places a restriction on human free choice in reply to the third objection which claims that God's role as First Mover, and hence mover of the will, is incompatible with human free choice. This objection
states that since God moves the will, as the scriptures attest, human beings do not have free choice. In reply, Thomas writes:

Free choice is the cause of its own movement, because by his free choice man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, who moves causes both natural and voluntary. 

(S.Th. I, 83,1)

It is rather paradoxical to assert that God moves voluntary causes, i.e., human agents, since a voluntary action is one that proceeds from an individual's own power without the influence of external compulsion. How then is God's movement as first cause compatible with free choice? Thomas answers the question as follows:

...by moving voluntary causes he does not deprive their actions of being voluntary; but rather is he the cause of this very thing in them, for he operates in each thing according to its own nature. (ibid.)

What Thomas wishes to emphasize is that God, as actus purus, is the source of being for all things and in this sense he is the mover of all things, including the human will. Human action can be called free because it results from human deliberation, but the ability to deliberate exists by virtue of God's active power as first cause. This important idea will be discussed in Chapter Three.

The involvement of God in the very nature of a thing is discussed in S.Th. I, 82,1, which asks "Whether the will desires something of necessity?" Thomas answers that the
will desires happiness on account of natural necessity, not absolute necessity. Absolute necessity, also called "the necessity of coercion," is a state of affairs in which one is forced to act against natural inclination by means of external coercion. However, Thomas argues that "this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant to the will," because by definition "the very movement of the will is an inclination to something." (S.Th. I, 82,1) Natural necessity means that the agent has an intrinsic drive towards something, which is not imposed by external coercion. Thomas maintains that the will is by natural inclination directed towards happiness, therefore the will desires happiness as its end by natural necessity.

Now if God places the natural inclination for happiness in human nature, does God determine human actions by external force, or can human acts be said to be voluntary? Thomas treats this issue in the subsequent article entitled, "Whether the will desires of necessity whatever it desires?" (S.Th. I, 82,2) Given that the will desires happiness by natural necessity as established in article 1, it could be inferred that each thing the will desires is desired by necessity. But Thomas insists that the will is not bound by necessity in every situation because the "good is of many kinds," therefore more than one possibility exists which may be judged to lead to happiness. The will desires whatever it desires by choice, not by
necessity, with one exception. Thomas writes that "the will of the man who sees God in his essence of necessity adheres to God." (ibid.) This kind of necessity is brought about by conviction, not by coercion; moreover, the sight of God's essence does not occur in this life. In general, the will is free to desire anything which it judges as leading towards happiness.

The third text to be discussed, on the topic of human power, is located in the question entitled "On that which moves the will" (S.Th. I-II, 9,6). The article picks up on the issue of absolute necessity and external coercion discussed above (S.Th. I, 82,1). It asks the question, "Whether the will is moved by God alone as by an extrinsic principle?" Thomas answers yes, but his concept of an extrinsic principle is subtle. In all cases but one, movement of the will caused by an extrinsic principle is involuntary. However, voluntary or natural movement of the will can be caused by one extrinsic principle, namely God, the cause and creator of the human will. To understand how this paradoxical state of affairs is possible, it is necessary to examine Thomas' reasoning.

Thomas asserts that the human will is moved from within by a natural movement. As an example of natural movement, Thomas gives the fall of a stone: when a stone is moved upward by a human hand, its movement is not natural, but its fall is a natural movement (S.Th. I-II, 9,6). The
reason the latter movement is natural is that the cause of the movement lies in the one who gave the stone its nature, i.e., God the creator. Thomas seems to believe that the property of falling existed in the nature of the stone, but the discovery that gravity makes it fall does not change the fact that God is the one who caused gravity to exist and therefore he is the cause of the stone's natural movement. In relation to the human will, normally movement of the will by an extrinsic principle causes involuntary movement, but as an exception to this rule, God alone can cause natural movement of the will which is towards the good (S.Th. I, 82,2). In Thomas' words, "...that alone which is in some way the cause of a thing's nature can cause a natural movement in that thing." (S.Th. I-II, 9,6) The fact that God is creator entails that God moves the will towards the good, but at the same time the movement is voluntary because it is in accord with the nature of the rational soul of which the will is a power.

From a human perspective, free choice seems obvious because, as Thomas says, commands and prohibitions make no sense without the power of choice which the rational intellect possesses (S.Th. I, 82,1). But Thomas passes over this point rather quickly as he proceeds to examine the human power of the will as it depends on God for its existence. Since God is the origin of all creatures, therefore he caused the will as a power of the rational soul
to be as it is. By its created nature, the will is oriented towards the good; therefore movement towards the good can be called natural, not coerced. Thomas explains the dependence of the will on God as follows:

God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is the good. And without this universal motion man cannot will anything. But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that, which is a true or apparent good.

(S.Th. I-II, 9,6)

In most cases, it is up to human choice to determine what to will as the good, but Thomas reserves God's right to move the will towards the good "specially" by the power of his grace. On the whole, God can be said to move the will because he designed the nature of the human species and gave it existence; he created the will and oriented it towards the good. Individual decisions can be said to be voluntary because they are in accord with the nature of man, but the fact is inescapable that God is the cause, creator and mover of the will in the broadest terms.

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3 Thomas distinguishes between operating and cooperating grace. In the case of operating grace, God is the sole mover and the operation is attributed to God, but this operation works only on the human mind; it does not produce an exterior act. Cooperating grace helps strengthen the human will to perform an exterior act, which is attributed to both the will and God's grace. Thomas' discussion of grace is long and detailed, but oddly enough does not directly address the question of whether grace imposes necessity on the will. See the "Treatise on Grace," (S.Th. I-II, 109-114).
D. Approach to Knowledge of God

Having looked carefully at the key texts on the subject of divine power, this section aims to give an overview of Thomas Aquinas' approach to the development of the concept of God. Firstly, his views on the means and ends of metaphysical investigation will be outlined. It will be observed that Thomas' basis for the concept of God is metaphysical in character, since the divine attributes are founded on the metaphysical proofs for God's existence. Secondly, Thomas' view of knowledge of God as negative and predication by analogy will be discussed. Thirdly, I will explore what I call his "criteria of adequacy" for the concept of God. In other words, what are the standards of authority which Thomas uses to guide his formulation of a concept of God which he considers adequate -- the Bible, church doctrine, a certain philosophy, or religious experience? It is found that his criteria for an adequate concept of God are both philosophical and religious, for he strives to meet the philosophical demands of logical coherence as well as to preserve traditional Christian beliefs.

Metaphysics

According to Thomas, all philosophy is based on experience. What distinguishes metaphysics from philosophy
in general is that metaphysics attempts to use the data of experience to gain knowledge of what transcends human experience. Therefore, Thomas considers metaphysics to be the "last part of philosophy to be learned" (C.G., I,4). Thomas thinks that metaphysics is limited in its ability to achieve knowledge of God, therefore revelation must supplement the efforts of human reason to discover truths about God. Concerning the necessity of revelation for theology, Thomas writes that,

> it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths about God which human reason can investigate, it was necessary that man be taught by a divine revelation. For the truth about God, such as reason can know it, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors. (S.Th. I, 1,2)

Thomas believes that metaphysical knowledge of God can support the concept of God presented by revelation through Scripture. Both metaphysical reflection and reflection on revealed truths are considered important ways of achieving an understanding of God and the significance of human existence.

Thomas' five proofs for the existence of God have an empirical point of departure. According to Thomas, experience shows that all effects have some cause, and from this fact he draws the general conclusion that "everything which is moved must be moved by another", and further, that there is a first mover, moved by no other (S.Th. I, 2,3).
The relationship of cause and effect between God and human beings is the foundation for Thomas' concept of analogy; human language may be used to describe God because the causal relationship entails analogical likeness.\(^4\)

**Analogy**

Thomas approaches knowledge of God's nature, or essence, by investigating what attributes are compatible with God's existence as "first unmoved mover, first efficient cause, absolutely necessary and supremely perfect being."\(^5\) For example, it was mentioned early in the chapter that since Thomas believes that God is the first mover, he reasons that it is impossible that God should contain any potentiality (S.Th. I, 3,1). Certain human attributes are applied to God analogically, which means that they are not used in the same sense (univocally), or else total anthropomorphism would result, or in a totally different sense (equivocally), or else they would be meaningless (S.Th. I, 13,5). The primary meaning of an analogical attribute such as "wisdom" or "goodness" is based on human experience, but in fact, these perfections belong most properly to God. These attributes exist in human beings


only because they exist in a more excellent way in God, and because God as creator is the cause of these perfections in creatures (St. Th. I, 13,6).

A sense of inadequacy accompanies the use of analogy because although the attributes of goodness, for example, is positive in relation to human experience, God possesses the quality of goodness in such a degree of excellence that "we can only attempt to purify it or correct its inadequacies by means of negations." (St. Th. I, 3,1) If knowledge of God's nature surpasses human understanding, then how can Thomas justify his choice of predicates which he attributes to God? For Thomas, the foundational element for knowledge of God is the fact that God is the unmoved mover, first cause, and necessary being, and that all creatures have God as their efficient and exemplary cause. Since every effect resembles its cause, the predication of certain human attributes to God is justified, due to the fact that creatures participate in and reflect the divine perfections.6

Criteria of Adequacy

In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas uses the authority of Scripture in order to substantiate his views, but also numerous quotations from Aristotle, Augustine, and other

"authorities." The use of many references to well-known writers was characteristic of scholastic scholarship, but it was canonical Scripture which was the most important text for Thomas Aquinas in his theological writings. 7 Due to the resurgence of biblical scholarship in the twelfth century, catalyzed by the biblically inspired radical movements such as the Waldensians, the theological curriculum of the universities became centred on the teaching and study of the Bible. The title of a professor of theology, held by Thomas at the University of Paris, was magister in sacra pagina, i.e., teacher of holy Scripture. 8 Membership in the newly-founded Dominican Order gave Thomas further reason to place strong emphasis on the Bible. The Dominicans, also known as the Order of Preachers, called for a "return to the gospel" in word and deed; they attempted to carry out "the program of 'apostolic life' itself, with its community form of existence, its itinerant preaching, [and] its teaching of the masses based on the testimony of exemplary living." 9 Thomas' membership in an evangelical movement along with the


8 Persson, pp. 4-7.

9 Chenu, p. 45.
resurgence of biblical study in the universities account for his emphasis on the authority of Scripture.¹⁰

There is clear evidence in the *Summa Theologicae* that Thomas considers the Bible to be the primary authoritative document for theology. In the discussion of whether sacred doctrine can be argued from authority, he answers that,

> It is especially proper to this doctrine to argue from authority, inasmuch as its principles are obtained by revelation; and hence we must believe the authority of those to whom the revelation has been made.

(*S.Th. I, 1,8*)

Thomas remarks further that it is not a weakness of theology to depend on Scripture for authority because revelation is a more reliable guide to truth than human reason. He states that "the argument from authority based on human reason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine revelation is the strongest." (*S.Th. I, 1,8*) In his view, the role of human reason is to make clear what is expounded in Scripture, not to prove faith. In comparison to the authority of the canonical Scriptures which provide "necessary demonstration," Thomas considers the writings of the "doctors of the church" in comparison to contain merely "probable arguments" (*S.Th. I, 1,8*). Thomas considers the

¹⁰ Thomas' formal style of expression may seem at odds with the Dominican goals of living and preaching the gospel ideal as described above. Two factors account for this discrepancy: his scholastic training which taught him to use and admire abstract, subtle logical reasoning, and his metaphysical approach to the development of the concept of God in the *Summa Theologicae*. It may be noted that his commentaries on the Bible are less dry and formal than the works studied in this thesis.
"revelations (if any such there are) made to other doctors" to be unauthoritative and doubtful, which proves that he does not accept personal religious experience as a source of authority comparable to the Bible.

Concerning philosophical authority, he holds that theology "makes use also of the authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able to know the truth by natural reason." (S.Th. I, 1,8) In particular, Thomas often appeals to "the Philosopher," Aristotle, as a source of authority, but it is incorrect to assume that Thomas considers Aristotle as being either infallible or consistently in agreement with Christian doctrine. Thomas admires Aristotle as a great philosopher who had many valid insights which Thomas believes to be true, as well as ideas which Thomas rejects. It is interesting to note that the ecclesiastical authorities of his day often rejected Aristotle outright because his writings contained ideas which were incompatible with Christianity. In contrast, Thomas respects Aristotle and at the same time uses Aristotle's ideas critically and selectively, often changing the emphasis of historic Aristotelianism in significant ways.11

11 Although Thomas does not appeal to the authority of Plato as he does to Aristotle, he was influenced by Platonic thought which pervaded philosophy in the thirteenth century. See Chenu, p. 29.
In general, logical consistency as well as coherence with Christian doctrine are the main criteria of adequacy for Thomas Aquinas. He takes metaphysical principles as a starting point for the development of the concept of God, while existential relevance is not a formative concern. He then develops the attributes of God in such a way as to be consistent with sacred doctrine and to meet the demands of philosophical consistency.

E. Concluding Remarks

Thomas Aquinas holds the distinctive feature of God's power to be its pure actuality which gives being to the universe. God can have no passive power because the potential to be moved would subordinate God to whatever moves him. In order to be the origin of all things, God must be dependent on nothing. It seems as though the concept of omnipotence is thrust upon Thomas both by the verse of scripture, "No word shall be impossible with God" (Luke 1.37), which he quotes prior to his answer in S.Th. I, 25,3, and by Christian doctrine. Although Thomas maintains that God can do whatever is possible absolutely, considering the fairly substantial list of things which God cannot do the term "all-power" is misleading. God's power, which consists in giving being to things according to their God-given nature, does not infringe on the human power to
choose. According to Thomas, God can be said to move the will because his power is the cause of human existence. God determines the nature of the human being, thus the human will is oriented towards the good, but what particular good a human chooses is subject to the human power of the will.

The distinctive foundation of Thomas Aquinas' concept of God, the metaphysical proofs for the existence of God, influences the subsequent development of the divine attributes: for example, the role of God as first mover requires that his power be entirely actual and in no way potential. The method of predication by analogy attributes certain human characteristics to God but not in the sense that we have definite positive knowledge of what God is. The predicates which Thomas attributes to God are chosen according to their coherence with his metaphysical framework and their support of sacred doctrine based on canonical Scripture.
CHAPTER TWO

Charles Hartshorne's Critique of the Classical Conception of God's Power

Charles Hartshorne rejects the classical concept of God, developed by such figures as Philo, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas. His objections are on the one hand philosophical, for he suggests that the metaphysical basis of classical theism is flawed, and on the other hand religious because he thinks that the classical concept of God fails to incorporate adequately important aspects of God's relatedness to human beings as expressed in biblical writings and "concrete personal piety" (OOTM, 1). Hartshorne is not only a critic of classical theism, but also a theist himself. While carefully trying to avoid past theological mistakes, he has developed his own concept of God based not only Greek philosophy and Christian doctrine but also on a current of thought which he traces from Socinius (1539-1604), through Fechner (1801-87), Lequier (1814-62) and Whitehead (1861-1947). The defining characteristic of this movement is a common belief that in some sense God is in process, that God is capable of feeling and change, that God embodies polarities within himself.
Each author anticipates what Hartshorne calls the "principle of dual transcendence," which posits that "God is, in uniquely excellent ways, both necessary and contingent, both infinite and finite, independent and dependent, eternal and temporal." (AW, 22) Certain aspects of Hartshorne's constructive proposal for a dipolar concept of God will emerge in my discussion of his critique of the classical doctrine of divine power, due to the fact that his writings combine discussion of the flaws in classical theism with the development of his own "neoclassical theism".

This chapter will present first a brief sketch of Hartshorne's critique of the classical attributes of perfection, omniscience and impassibility, which will provide background for the discussion of Hartshorne's understanding of the classical notion of divine power. In particular, Hartshorne takes issue with two basic elements in the classical view of divine power: the notion that divine power is exclusively active, and the claim that God possesses "all-power" or absolute power. His objections to the classical view of God's power will be discussed in three sections, parallel in structure to Chapter One: God's active power, the classical concept of omnipotence, and the status of human power. The aim of Chapter Three will be to relate Hartshorne's critique of the classical notion of divine power to the views on the subject held by Thomas
Aquinas, an eminent proponent of what Hartshorne calls "classical theism".

A. Hartshorne's Critique of Classical Theism

Hartshorne's writings contain numerous critical remarks concerning inadequacies in the classical concept of God, and as noted previously, his own "neo-classical theism" was developed as an alternative to classical theism. A book which summarizes his objections to classical theism is pointedly entitled Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes. According to Hartshorne, the perpetrators of these mistakes are certain theologians of the Christian, Islamic, and to a lesser extent, the Jewish tradition (OOTM, 1). The common link Hartshorne points out between the three religions is that they have all been exposed to, and to some extent have incorporated, certain assumptions of Greek philosophy. Hartshorne lists four theological mistakes which are foundational to the classical concept of God: the belief that God is immutable, omnipotent, omniscient and impassible. Hartshorne uses examples from different religious traditions to illustrate his critique of classical theism, but he does not examine any one tradition or any one thinker in detail. It is worth noting, however, that in the section on omnipotence Hartshorne devotes almost two
paragraphs to Thomas Aquinas' view of God's power. The following pages provide an overview of his critique of classical theism, by briefly presenting Hartshorne's objections to the divine attributes of immutability, omniscience and impassibility as classically conceived, in order to set the stage for Hartshorne's critique of divine power.

Immutable Perfection

According to Hartshorne, the first and fundamental mistake in classical theism which underlies all other mistakes is the belief that God is unchanging. The doctrine of God's immutability is based on the Platonic view of perfection. In Plato's Republic, it is stated that since God is perfect, he cannot change, because perfection by definition means that there can be no better (OOTM, 2). Any change in God was thought to betray negativity. If he changes for the better in some way, then he must not have been perfect in the first place; if he changes for the worse, he exhibits weakness and thus imperfection. The connection between change and imperfection was developed by

In Philosophers Speak of God, Hartshorne discusses excerpts from the Summa Theologicae which focus on God's relations to the world, God's knowledge, and the divine will. Although his discussion does not centre on divine power, since Thomas is specifically criticized, use will be made of Hartshorne's remarks in that work where relevant.
classical theists into a doctrine of God which required God to be immutable because perfect.

Hartshorne questions the classical assumption that what is perfect is unchanging. He points out that many common uses of the word "perfect" do not exclude change, for example when applied to a human being (OOTM, 2).

Furthermore, where biblical writers speak of God as perfect, Hartshorne thinks that it is not accurate to infer that God's perfection is understood as unchanging in every respect. For example, when the Bible describes God as unchanging or being "without shadow of turning", it refers to God's ethical constancy, but does not imply that God is totally immutable (NTOT, 18-19). Hartshorne writes,

God might be absolutely unchangeable in righteousness ...but changeable in ways compatible with, neutral to, or even required by, this unswerving constancy in righteousness... If the creatures behave according to God's will, God will appreciate this behavior; if not, God will have a different response, equally appropriate and expressive of the divine goodness. (OOTM, 2)

Hartshorne points out that biblical writers were not involved in Greek philosophical issues, although classical theologians have seemingly presumed such concerns. Biblical references to divine perfection, which Hartshorne understands as refering to God's ethical constancy, have been misinterpreted by classical theists as asserting divine immutability in the Greek philosophical sense. In Hartshorne's opinion, this assumption has lead to the
mistaken attribution of unchanging perfection with respect to power and knowledge to God.

Hartshorne finds the classical doctrine of unchanging perfection untenable first of all on logical grounds. If perfection is defined as the possession of "an absolute maximum of value in every conceivable respect", then it must be proven that it is possible to actualize all possible values simultaneously (OOTM, 3). Moreover, if the perfection of one value is considered, Hartshorne asks whether "it makes sense to think of a value so great or marvelous that it could in no sense whatever be excelled or surpassed." (OOTM, 7) In mathematics, there is no such thing as a highest infinity, argues Hartshorne, therefore one should not assume that it makes sense to apply a maximum of perfection to God. Hartshorne prefers to say that God is perfect in the sense that he is unsurpassable by any other except himself (LP, 35). Hartshorne concludes that "the traditional idea of divine perfection or infinity is hopelessly unclear or ambiguous and that persisting in that tradition is bound to cause increasing skepticism, confusion and human suffering." (OOTM, 8)

Up to this point, the logical unclarity of the classical doctrine of divine power has been discussed, but as the last quotation illustrates, Hartshorne is also deeply concerned with the negative practical implications of classical theism. The doctrine of immutable perfection
implies that God is not changed or affected by what happens in the world. Since God is perfect in himself, the world adds nothing to God's greatness, according to classical theists. To Hartshorne, this idea is absurd practically speaking and it has severe negative implications for the value of each human being. He asks the classical theist, "why talk about 'serving God', who, you say, gains nothing whatever from our existence?" (OOTM, 8) There is no motivation for human beings to serve God or worship him if God is unresponsive.

The belief in God's unchanging perfection is the source of the other three mistakes of classical theism: omniscience, impassibility and omnipotence. According to Hartshorne, all three in differing degrees are both philosophically inconsistent and religiously objectionable.

Omniscience

The classical doctrine of omniscience is based on the assumption that God's knowledge is perfect and unchanging. Perfect knowledge, classically understood, implies that God knows all things, i.e., he is free from ignorance. Since such perfection requires immutability, God's knowledge cannot increase as events happen, therefore he must know the future, past and present simultaneously. If God gained his knowledge by observing what decisions creatures made, then his knowledge would be incomplete or
imperfect because it would be progressive and thus changing. From a philosophical perspective, Hartshorne thinks that there are numerous reasons for rejecting the classical belief that God knows past, present and future simultaneously.\textsuperscript{13} One of his main objections centres around the impossibility of divine knowledge of future events. He argues that the contingency of future events cannot be reconciled with God's perfect and immutable knowledge (AW, 15).

If the classical assumption that God has complete knowledge of what will happen in the world is true, Hartshorne argues that it follows logically that future events are necessary, not contingent. If God knows that event E will happen, then it must necessarily happen or else God's knowledge is false, which is impossible. The belief that God's knowledge is perfect and immutable implies that future events are determined (PSG, 132). Or taking the other extreme of the paradox as a starting point, if contingent events do occur in the world as classical theists claim, and if God has knowledge of these contingent events, then God's knowledge must not be wholly necessary but partially contingent or changeable (AW, 6-7).

\textsuperscript{13} For a good discussion of Hartshorne's objections to the Thomistic position on God's foreknowledge of the future in relation to the absence of contingency in God's knowledge and actions, see his "Efficient Causality in Aristotle and St. Thomas: A Review Article," Journal of Religion, XXVI (January, 1945), pp. 25-32.
In *Philosophers Speak of God*, Hartshorne quotes and analyzes Thomas Aquinas' main statements on divine omniscience which occur in the *Summa Theologiae*. But since the focus of my thesis is on divine power, it is beyond the scope of this project to explore the philosophical intricacies of Hartshorne's critique of omniscience. It is sufficient to note that the classical view of perfection is responsible for the logical difficulties in relating God's immutable knowledge to a contingent world, and that according to Hartshorne, Thomas Aquinas' doctrine of divine omniscience implies determinism, i.e., the necessity of all events.

Impassibility

Hartshorne's objections to the classical doctrine of impassibility are for the most part based on its practical implications. It is inconceivable to Hartshorne that human beings worship a God who feels nothing, and who is not affected by what happens on earth (*OOTM*, 29). He considers the source of the attribute of impassibility to be the Greek assumption that perfection is unchanging, thus the attribute of feeling was thought to imply weakness in God. However, Hartshorne mentions that classical theists are inconsistent in the exclusion of feeling from God. He uses Origen as an example of such inconsistency: "The Church father Origen

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14 See *Philosophers Speak of God*, pp. 119-133.
said that God felt compassion for humanity and therefore
sent the Son as Redeemer. But Origen did not systematically
develop the point into a significant philosophical
doctrine." (OOTM, 27) According to Hartshorne, it is common
for classical theists to fail to integrate the attribute of
feeling into their philosophical development of the concept
of God; the doctrine of the Trinity and the significance of
the sufferings of Christ are usually treated secondarily in
light of God's primary role as unmoved mover and first
cause. Classical theists strive to understand God in his
unity, simplicity and perfection, a project which relies on
the Greek philosophical idea of immutable perfection as the
foundation of their theological system. For example, Thomas
Aquinas begins the Summa Theologiae by developing a concept
of God based on the attributes of simplicity and perfection
(S.Th. I, 3 and 4). This approach is responsible for what
Hartshorne thinks is a major deficiency in the classical
concept of God, the fact that feeling is given no place in
its fundamental philosophical framework. (OOTM, 27)

He hypothesizes that one reason for this deficiency
is the fact that classical theists considered extreme
anthropomorphism to be a pitfall in the development of a
concept of God and they wished to avoid this mistake.
Classical theists were so concerned about the dangers of
"exaggerating the likeness of the divine and the human" that
they went too far in the opposite direction, according to Hartshorne. He writes:

Using the word 'love', they emptied it of its most essential kernel, the element of sympathy, of the feeling of others' feelings. It became mere beneficence, totally unmoved (to use their own word) by the sufferings or joys of the creatures. Who wants a friend who loves only in that sense? (OCTM, 29)

Hartshorne thinks that the avoidance of anthropomorphism resulted in a concept of God which does not satisfactorily account for God's love or compassion for creatures. Hartshorne considers divine love to be superior to human love; thus he asks, if the classical view of God's love is not desirable in even a human, i.e., imperfect, friend, why should we attribute it to God, who after all is believed to be perfect? It is evident that Hartshorne's use of anthropomorphic comparison, or analogy, between human characteristics and God's attributes is not acceptable to classical theists. In Chapter Three, I will discuss the differences between Hartshorne and Thomas Aquinas in their use of analogy.

B. Hartshorne's Critique of the Classical Doctrine of Divine Power

This section presents Hartshorne's characterization of the classical concept of divine power accompanied by his critique of the classical position. Hartshorne's objections to the classical view of God's power will be discussed under
three headings: active power, omnipotence and human power. In each of the three sections, Hartshorne's understanding of the classical position will be presented before his critical comments are explored. Hartshorne uses two methods of persuasion in his critique: the demonstration of logical problems evident within the classical concept, and the claim that the classical God does not adequately meet human religious needs and thus is not worthy of worship. The criteria for adequacy which provide the basis for Hartshorne's critique of the classical view of divine power will be taken up at the end of this chapter.

1) God's Active Power

Hartshorne objects to the classical conception of God's power as solely active. In general, Hartshorne feels that the classical view of divine power one-sidedly portrays God as acting but not reacting, influencing and determining, but being incapable of being affected. The basis for his critique is the notion that the classical system of metaphysics wrongly posited the superiority of activity over passivity, cause over effect, immutability over mutability, and self-sufficiency over dependence (NTOT, 134). According to Hartshorne, classical theism mistakenly linked perfection with purely actual power, and thus omitted potentiality or response from God. Hartshorne questions this reasoning on logical grounds; moreover, as noted above, he claims that
the resulting classical concept of God is religiously inadequate.

Hartshorne examines the classical assumption that active power is superior to passive power. He writes, "The classical doctrine, of course, regarded deity as exclusively actual (actus purus). Whereas an ordinary or imperfect individual (we normally assume) always fails to actualize some of its potentialities, this was denied of the perfect." (LP, 35) Hartshorne questions whether it is really an imperfection if an agent fails to actualize all available potentialities. Having to chose only some of many possibilities is not necessarily a sign of defect but indeed a sign of excellence. He points out that in the natural order of things, an amoeba has fewer choices than an ape, and an ape has fewer possibilities than a human being in terms of thought and action. Therefore by extension, God as the highest being, reasons Hartshorne, ought to have the greatest richness of choice.

Moreover, the classical insistence that God is pure actuality fails to acknowledge that in most situations there are mutually incompatible possibilities. Even a classical theist, Hartshorne remarks, would admit that "God makes this sort of creation, or that instead, but not both: hence He possesses this actual world or that, but not both." (LP, 36) It is a sign of his omnipotence, in the classical sense, that God could have created our world differently, or
another world entirely, but classical theists would deny that deciding to create one world instead of another implies any unactualized potentiality in God. However, Hartshorne argues that if God could have created different worlds but chose not to do so, then there are unactualized possibilities in God, hence God possesses potential power. He points out that "if it be denied that there are unactualized potentialities in God, it is contradictory to say that He could have produced other worlds..." (LP, 37) In sum, Hartshorne is unconvinced that a God who is fully actual is superior to one who has potential power, moreover, he finds the classical assertion that God has no potential power to be logically inconsistent.

Furthermore, Hartshorne questions the religious adequacy of the classical notion of God's active power. He maintains that a God devoid of potentiality is not worthy of worship. According to Hartshorne, the motivation for worship is perfection, and he defines something perfect as something "completely worthy of admiration and respect." (LP, 46) Hartshorne follows the Judaeo-Christian tradition in defining worship as loving God with all of one's heart, mind, soul and strength (LP, 40). But he questions whether human beings are inspired to love and worship a God who has no potentiality, which means that he cannot be affected by human actions (LP, 41). Such a God cannot react with joy at what is good and with sorrow at what is evil, therefore it
seems not to matter to God what happens to human beings. Chapter Three will investigate how Thomas Aquinas reconciles God's lack of potentiality with the fact that God values and loves the world.

In the *Divine Relativity*, Hartshorne points out that theologians have construed the criteria for admiration or worship of God differently at different times. He writes: "To some of us, nothing is more deeply shocking than certain directions frequently taken by theological admiration." (DR, 42) What he finds shocking in the context of the above quotation is classical theologians' admiration of a God whose power resembles that of a tyrant. According to Hartshorne, it is characteristic of a tyrant or a monarch to be "more or less impassive, [and] insensitive to the feelings of others." (MVG, 203) The God of classical theism, whose power is purely actual, possesses sheer independence from creatures who depend on him totally. Such a God is neutral or impassive with respect to anything that happens whether good or bad. An impassive and immutable God who is not affected by the welfare of human beings is not admirable or worthy of worship, in Hartshorne's opinion (DR, 43). He considers "the assumption that the best or optimal dependence is zero dependence" to be groundless, and to be the cause of the "metaphysical snobbery toward relativity, dependence, or passivity, this... worship of mere
absoluteness, independence, and one-sided activity of power." (DR, 50)

Hartshorne identifies two different ways of conceiving independence, one of which has been ignored by classical theism. Independence may be understood to mean that God's existence is not dependent on what happens in the world, that God has "no need to adjust to changes" but rather he is "indifferent and neutral to them all." (LP, 136) Such is the classical view of power which posits divine independence in the above sense. On the other hand, Hartshorne's neoclassical theism describes God as both absolute (in some respects) and relative (in others).15 God's independence consists in the "infallible power to harmonize relativities in Himself, to respond coherently to diverse stimuli," however God is not independent in the sense that he is unaffected by creatures (LP, 137) Therefore, according to Hartshorne God is both "the supreme beneficiary or recipient of achievement, hence supremely relative to all achieved actualities, as that he is the supreme benefactor or source of achievement, and in so far nonrelative to its results." (DR, 58) Such a social conception of God's power implies that God possesses both

15 Hartshorne puts forward a dipolar concept of God: "God is, in uniquely excellent ways, both necessary and contingent, both infinite and finite, independent and dependent, eternal and temporal." (AW, 22) This duality in God does not imply contradiction because God can possess attribute p and not-p in different respects.
active and passive power. But the balance of God's power is more active than passive, according to Hartshorne. He thinks that God influences human beings to a great extent, and human beings influence God by their experiences to a lesser extent (DR, 141).

Hartshorne illustrates the questionable value of non-relativity or independence by the analogy between God and a parent: would it be admirable for a child to have a one-way dependence on a parent while the parent is unaffected by the life of the child? Obviously not, for the parent should respond to the welfare of the child appropriately, in light of the circumstances. The only form of independence which a parent, or God, should possess is ethical independence. To be ethically good in all situations implies immutability of character but not of action, since the particular response is dependent on the situation. According to Hartshorne, ethical perfection or independence is a quality which makes God worthy of worship, but otherwise the lack of potentiality or ability to respond is undesirable (DR, 44).

2) God's Omnipotence

In *Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes*, Hartshorne criticizes the classical conception of omnipotence by showing how it is logically flawed and religiously inadequate. According to Hartshorne, the
classical doctrine of divine power was extrapolated from the foundational attribute of perfection, which lead to the conclusion that God's power must be perfect. Classical theists reasoned that perfect power must be defined as the highest power, or maximal power. Hartshorne agrees with this statement as it stands, but he objects to the way classical theists construed the "highest conceivable power." (OTTM, 10) They considered maximal power to be omnipotence or all-power. In Hartshorne's view, classical theists considered omnipotence to be all the power there is united into one individual power. Hartshorne understands the classical notion of omnipotence to mean that God has a monopoly of power which depletes the power available to human beings.

Criticizing the classical notion of omnipotence, Hartshorne writes that, "To say that omnipotence is the power to do anything that could be done is to equivocate or talk nonsense." (DR, 134) According to Hartshorne, classical theists believe that cosmic power involves causing local agents to do things, thus producing a predicted effect (DR, 135). He thinks that it is impossible to conceive of a power that could control human actions because he distinguishes between things that can be accomplished by a universal or cosmic power, and those that can be executed by a nonuniversal or local power. According to Hartshorne, God's cosmic power is "power to set conditions which are
maximally favorable to desirable decisions on the part of local agents," which does not imply that human decisions are determined by God (DR, 135). In this way, Hartshorne preserves the freedom of human agents within the limitations set by divine power. In Hartshorne's own view, God's power is greater than any other power, hence maximal, however God does not possess all-power but he shares power with human beings (DR, 138). By rejecting the classical concept of divine omnipotence, Hartshorne does not feel that he is limiting God's power. Firstly, he thinks that the ideal of omnipotence is an impossibility on both a cosmic and local level, and secondly, such omnipotence, were it possible, limits God's worthiness of worship.

While Hartshorne's main logical objection to the classical concept of omnipotence is the identification of maximal power with all-power or omnipotence, the real force of his critique lies in the exploration of the negative implications which stem from the attribute of omnipotence. One major implication of divine omnipotence is that God has the power to determine human actions, and therefore, according to Hartshorne, human freedom is compromised. Another related objection is that omnipotence implies that creatures are unilaterally dependent on God who has power over creatures like an all-powerful tyrant. Hartshorne maintains that the possession of such omnipotence makes the God of classical theism unworthy of admiration or worship.
The following section will explore the damaging implications of the classical notion of God's power on human power, as Hartshorne understands them.

3) Human Power

Hartshorne suspects that classical theologians recognized that there were difficulties in reconciling the doctrine of omnipotence with a belief in human free choice, and in his opinion they could hardly have been satisfied with the clarity of their explanations (OOTM, 11). For Hartshorne, the classical view of God's omnipotence naturally implies that God has power over human actions. For example, classical theists believe that sin is the result of the human choice to disobey God's law, but they also believe that God has power over everything. Since God has power over what happens in the world, does God cause human beings to sin? In an effort to reconcile the concept of sin with their concept of God's power, classical theists "indulged in double-talk," according to Hartshorne (OOTM, 11). They argued that God "permits" sin to take place, however he does not determine that a person sin. But Hartshorne asks, "How could one disobey an omnipotent will?" He argues that God does not "permit" sin in the ordinary sense of the word, because permission usually implies that the outcome of the situation is not decided in every detail.
But given God's omnipotence, then human beings are puppets of an all-powerful God in Hartshorne's analysis.

It is significant that Hartshorne mentions Thomas Aquinas specifically as a good example of one who engages in "double-talk" on the issue of God's power. I shall quote in full his description of Thomas' method of reconciling the paradox of divine omnipotence and human freedom. Hartshorne expresses Thomas' solution to the paradox as follows:

God decides that the creature shall perform act A, but the divine decision is that nevertheless the act shall be performed "freely". Don't laugh, the saintly theologian is serious. Serious but engaging in double-talk. It is determined exactly what the creature will do, but determined that he or she will do it freely. (OOTM, 12)

His objections to the classical doctrine of omnipotence are expressed somewhat more formally in the following quotation:

...in spite of what Thomists say, it is impossible that our act should be both free and yet a logical consequence of a divine action which "infallibly" produces its effect. Power to cause someone to perform by his own choice an act precisely defined by the cause is meaningless. (DR, 135)

The connection between divine power, will and knowledge in the thought of Thomas Aquinas is reflected in Hartshorne's critique of omnipotence. In Chapter Three, I will examine whether Hartshorne is correct in reasoning that determinism is the logical implication of Thomas' doctrine of divine omnipotence.

Hartshorne writes that omnipotence, classically understood, includes "the power to determine every detail of
what happens in the world. (OOTM, 11) Such a view of omnipotence makes God ultimately responsible for every human action and all events. If classical theists believe God to have the power to control every event, as Hartshorne asserts, then "the most unfortunate occurrences and the most bitter suffering and frustrations must be justified as selected by deity for some wise and kindly purpose." (DR, 135) Clearly such a view of omnipotence which implies determinism of human actions also implies that God is responsible for evil. However, the problems surrounding the classical theodicy will not be treated in this thesis.16

In terms of religious adequacy, Hartshorne thinks that the classical concept of God's active power fails to portray a God worthy of admiration who inspires worship.17 In his opinion, the classical view of omnipotence gives God the attributes of an earthly tyrant: the possession of all power and total control. Hartshorne quotes Whitehead as saying that classical theists "gave unto God the properties that belonged unto Caesar" (OOTM, 14), a clever twist on Jesus' command in Matthew's gospel which reads "Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's" (Matt 22.21). Hartshorne thinks


17 In Hartshorne's terms, worship is admiration or respect for God's perfection (LP, 46).
that a tyrant-God is not worthy of worship. He asks, "Can we worship a God so devoid of generosity as to deny us a share, however humble, in determining the details of the world, as minor participants in the creative process that is reality?" (OOTM, 16) Hartshorne does not believe that the possession of all-power makes God admirable; in his opinion, divine love which includes responsiveness is an attribute more worthy of worship (OOTM, 14).

C. Approach to Knowledge of God

Having given an overview of Hartshorne's critique of the classical concept of God and having specifically outlined his objections to divine power as classically conceived, it is appropriate to close the chapter with some remarks on the method which Hartshorne uses as a means of gaining knowledge of God. Although this thesis does not endeavor to explore the process concept of God developed by Hartshorne, the method which he uses to obtain knowledge of God is relevant to this study because it provides him with a standpoint from which to criticize classical theism. In Chapter Three, I will discuss how the differences in approach to knowledge of God between Thomas Aquinas and Charles Hartshorne relates to their differences of opinion on the issue of God's power.
The discussion of Hartshorne's method is organized under three headings which parallel those in the section on Thomas Aquinas' approach: metaphysics, knowledge of God, and criteria of adequacy.

Metaphysics

The central tenet of Charles Hartshorne's understanding of metaphysics is the assertion that metaphysical knowledge is based on experience. Metaphysics is not the study of what is wholly transcendent or supersensible nor is it a search for essences of material things; rather Hartshorne understands metaphysics as the study of the general features of experience (CSPM, 19). What is unique to metaphysics is that it draws out universal principles from experience. According to Hartshorne, classical metaphysics is at odds with experience because of its one-sided and abstract emphasis on the metaphysical attributes of actuality, self-sufficiency, simplicity and immutability. One metaphysical principle which Hartshorne draws from "experience, logic, and intellectual history" is the "law of polarity."

According to this law, ultimate contraries are correlatives, mutually interdependent, so that nothing real can be described by the wholly one-sided assertion of simplicity, being, actuality, and the like, each in a "pure" form, devoid and independent of complexity, becoming, potentiality, and related contraries. (PSG, 2)
Experience does not prove the classical assumption that complexity is inferior to simplicity, or that passivity is inferior to activity, according to Hartshorne; rather experience supports the assertion that God possesses "both poles of each pair of ultimate contraries." (PSG, 4)

Hartshorne thinks that, "Metaphysical truths may be described as such that no experience can contradict them, but also such that any experience must illustrate them" (LP, 285), therefore metaphysical truths are universal in character. Since a metaphysical truth is universal, it cannot be contradicted by facts of experience, and thus it is necessary. Universality and necessity are strong claims to make for metaphysical assertions, but at the same time Hartshorne is aware of the conditional character of human understanding. He does not hold metaphysical knowledge to be absolutely certain, but considers it an ongoing search to discover what is universally and necessarily true. (CSPM, 172) The two main criteria for the evaluation of metaphysical claims are logical coherence and experiential adequacy: adequacy may be checked by comparing a metaphysical claim with general experience, while coherence is verified by logical analysis. Moreover, Hartshorne acknowledges that study of the metaphysical assertions of philosophers of the past aids the modern thinker in the search for metaphysical truths (PSG, ix).
Analogy

Hartshorne distinguishes between three types of knowledge of God: symbolic, formal and analogical. Symbolic knowledge is gained through the comparison of God with material objects, such as "a rock, a king, a shepherd, or a parent." (LP, 134) A symbolic predicate is secondarily applied to God but it applies primarily and originally to a material object or person. Symbolic predicates are do not apply to God literally because obviously God is not just like a human ruler or parent. By formal predication, on the other hand, literal statements about God are possible. According to Hartshorne, formal predicates are such abstract philosophical terms as necessity, contingency and relativity. Formal, or literal, statements are considered to give positive knowledge of God. Formal attributes are generally metaphysical categories such as necessary and contingent, or absolute and relative (Ogden, 24).

The third kind of knowledge of God, through analogy, involves applying certain human characteristics to God, such as knowledge, feeling, sympathy and love (LP, 140). Hartshorne makes an interesting point about the attribution of anthropomorphic traits to God using analogical comparison. He points out that traditionally each attribute

predicated analogically is considered to belong to human beings literally and to God analogically; however Hartshorne asserts that "there is a strange sense in which the analogical concepts apply literally to deity, and analogically to creatures." (LP, 141) What he means is that the definition of an analogical attribute, such as love, can only be fully actualized by God. Human limitations prevent any one person from consistently showing love by "appreciating the qualities of others, and caring about their weal and woe, wishing them well" and so forth (LP, 141). Only God can completely fulfil this definition of love, therefore the attribute love can be used of God literally but of human beings analogically. Likewise, the verb "know", which means having assurance by evidence that certain things are true, applies literally to God who has certain knowledge while analogically to human beings who may be mistaken in what they know. The concept of love or knowing is precisely fulfilled when applied to God, but rather indefinite when applied to human beings. According to Hartshorne, God exhibits precisely what is meant by an analogical term in an exemplary fashion, but at the same time the meaning of the term is drawn from human beings.\footnote{Ogden points out that Hartshorne employs, if not in so many words, Thomas Aquinas' distinction between what is meant by an analogical term (its \textit{res significata}) and how the term signifies (its \textit{modus significandi}) (S.Th. I, 13,4).}
Despite Hartshorne's belief that positive knowledge of God is possible, he also insists that mystery remains in God. An abstract concept of God can be achieved by philosophical means, but the total divine actuality is more than an abstraction. The "actual God" is encountered through personal relationship on a religious, not a philosophical, level (NTOT, 132).

Criteria of Adequacy

Hartshorne holds three criteria of evaluation against which the concept of God may be tested: the standards of philosophical logic, life experience and religious insight. The first is basic to philosophy. The standards it requires are avoidance of contradiction, investigation of all angles of a question, sound reasoning, and so forth. The criteria of logic are rather objective in comparison to the criteria of experience and religious insight. The standard of experience requires that the concept of God be compatible with the way the world is according to the evidence of experience -- it involves asking whether my understanding of God fits with my understanding of the world. The religious criterion for the concept of God is whether a particular depiction of God presents us with a being who deserves the title of 'supremely worshipful.' (LP, 135) For Hartshorne, the central traits which make God worthy of worship are infinite
relativity, relatedness, and sensitivity, the attributes which he considers to be essential to genuine love (LP, 323). As discussed above, Hartshorne objects to the classical concept of omnipotence because an all-powerful tyrant God, independent of human activities, is repugnant to modern sensibilities. According to Hartshorne, human experience proves that love is superior to all-controlling power, while logic shows that the attribute of relativity is preferable to immutability for the development of a philosophically coherent concept of God.

The standards of logic and experience do not depend on any historical authority, either philosophical or religious. Hartshorne considers himself to be part of a philosophical tradition, as he acknowledges his indebtedness to Whitehead and others; but as an original thinker, Hartshorne has changed and adapted their ideas in the development of his own position. They are not authorities for him, for he does not require of course that his ideas agree with his predecessors on every point. The authority of his statements lies in the public realm because he thinks that metaphysical truths, which are provable by experience, are valid for all time and for every conceivable state of affairs, and therefore are transhistorical.\footnote{Sheila Greeve Davaney, Divine Power: A Study of Karl Barth and Charles Hartshorne (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), p. 108.} Hartshorne does not develop his position on the concept of God in a
historical vacuum, but his goal is to understand experience as accurately as possible, and therefore, to reach insights which transcend historical limitations and thus are universally true.

Hartshorne studies historical Christian thinkers with a view to subjecting their ideas about God to the test of philosophical and religious adequacy. The standards of philosophical adequacy have been summarized above. Regarding the religious criteria of adequacy, Hartshorne thinks that the concept of God should be judged in relation to "the religious idea of God." He develops a concept of this religious idea of God by examining a number of religious traditions. Hartshorne turns to the "higher" theistic religions in his search for the religious idea of God --Hindu, Chinese, Mohammedan, as well as Christian (MVG, 91). His reason for doing so is that he believes the religious idea of God to be shaped by "privileged religious experiences." (MVG, 86) Prior to testing this idea for philosophical adequacy, it is important to understand the religious idea of God on its own terms, according to Hartshorne (MVG, 86). His double approach to defining this religious idea of God consists in the study of religious Scriptures and religious practices. In his search, he explicitly avoids the assumption that scriptural texts are infallible or completely consistent, and he avoids any "absorbing preoccupations" such as church authority or faith
in earlier commentators (MVG, 91). The basic insights which he arrives at can be summarized as follows:

The God of religion is certainly to be described as the supremely loving friend, the perfectly righteous judge, and the primordial and everlasting ruler or supreme controlling power of the universe. He is that without which all lesser individuals would be nothing. (MVG, 94)

As a supremely loving friend, God is affected by his relations with others.

Hartshorne notes that classical theologians have held certain "non-religious" tenets alongside the religious insights described above, such as the belief in God's pure activity, simplicity, and non-temporality (MVG, 95). He insists that the religious idea of God does not sufficiently inform the philosophical framework of classical theism; rather religion has been forced to bow to the non-religious or philosophical tenets (ibid., 95). He states that, "Not the Gospels and the Old Testament, but Greek philosophy was the decisive source for the classical idea of divine perfection." (LP, 34) In his opinion, the classical conception of God's power is a good example of how focus on philosophical interests, such as the belief in perfection as unchanging, can shift the emphasis away from the central insights of the religious idea of God.
D. Concluding Remarks

Hartshorne traces the classical insistence on God's solely active power and his omnipotence back to the assumption that God must possess immutable perfection. He finds that there is no logical basis for the claim that God's perfection rests at an unchanging maximum, or that God is omnipotent. He thinks that a perfect power which excludes any potentiality and which holds a monopoly on power does not seem worthy of admiration. According to Hartshorne's interpretation, the classical concept of divine omnipotence implies that God controls all things, and therefore human freedom is compromised.

The aim of Chapter Three is to evaluate whether Hartshorne's criticism of the classical concept of God applies to Thomas Aquinas' view of divine power. In addition, the approaches of Hartshorne and Thomas Aquinas will be compared to ascertain the extent to which their differences in approach to knowledge of God are responsible for the differences in their conceptions of God's power.
CHAPTER THREE

An Application of Hartshorne's Critique to Thomas Aquinas' Conception of Divine Power

The aim of this chapter is to judge whether Charles Hartshorne's critique of the classical notion of divine power outlined in Chapter Two discredits the position of classical theist Thomas Aquinas. There are many important questions to be raised regarding such an evaluation. For one, does Hartshorne correctly understand the position of Thomas Aquinas where in his writings Hartshorne mentions Thomas directly? Or more broadly, does the position of Thomas typify the flaws in classical theism's approach to divine power which Hartshorne criticizes? In other words, does Hartshorne's general designation "classical theism" accurately represent the views of Thomas with respect to the notion of divine power? Further, does his critique succeed in proving that the view of divine power held by Thomas is severely flawed? In this chapter I will re-examine the approach taken by Thomas to the development of the concept of God's power in light of Hartshorne's critique under the familiar headings of active power, omnipotence, and human

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power. Subsequently, I shall consider some issues of method which underly Hartshorne's criticism directed at Thomas.

A. God's Active Power

Thomas begins his development of the concept of God with the assertion that God is the first mover, and from this fact he draws the conclusion that God must be purely in actuality, hence his power is solely actual. Thomas refers to God as *actus purus* because there is no potentiality in him. One consequence of being pure actuality is that God cannot change because he possesses no potentiality (*S.Th. I, 9,1*). Another implication of God's pure actuality is that God is perfect; according to Thomas, every divine attribute is realized or actual to its fullest potential; therefore God lacks nothing (*S.Th. I, 4,1*). The direct connection between God's pure actuality and his perfection is expressed by Thomas as follows: "Everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it is being [ens]; for being [esse] is the actuality of every thing." (*S.Th. I, 5,1*) Thomas establishes God's perfection and actuality prior to his examination of the nature of God's power. His understanding of God's power as solely actual, in *S.Th. I, 25,1*, is clearly based on the earlier establishment of the first mover's pure actuality.
Hartshorne is acutely aware of the classical insistence on pure actuality, its importance in the classical doctrine of creation, and its implications for other divine attributes, such as power. However, Hartshorne strongly objects to the classical assumption that perfect power is actual power which excludes potentiality. In my estimation, Hartshorne is perceptive in his analysis of the importance of perfection and immutability which shape the classical notion of God's power. With respect to Thomas, Hartshorne's focus on pure actuality is right on target, as God's role as actus purus is a central part of Thomas' concept of God. Hartshorne questions the assumption that actual power is superior to potential power; he also asks why classical theists refuse to admit any potentiality in God. I will not repeat the technical philosophical arguments which Hartshorne puts forward against God's pure actuality, in order to focus on the negative religious implications which Hartshorne draws from the classical insistence on God's actuality.21

Hartshorne's criteria of evaluation for the concept of God is that the given picture of God be worthy of worship. It is God's perfection which ought to inspire worship, meaning his perfect love, goodness, wisdom, etc.

21 Hartshorne expounds his philosophical objections to the direct connection which classical theists draw between perfection and actuality in such writings as LP, 34-44, and MVG, 230-250.
In Hartshorne's estimation, the perfect God of classical theism is unworthy of worship because this God has no potential for receiving anything whatsoever, including worship (LP, 39). This criticism directed towards classical theists applies to Thomas' concept of God. Since according to Thomas, God lacks potential power, God does not have the capacity to be influenced by human actions and God never responds to human concerns. The lack of potentiality or receptiveness in the classical concept of God is one of the main reasons for Hartshorne's dissatisfaction with the classical conception of divine power.

From the classical notion of actual power, held by Thomas, Hartshorne concludes that God possesses complete independence from the world. The classical God is aloof and removed from what goes on in the world, argues Hartshorne, since he has no potential to be affected. Does Thomas' conception of divine power imply that God possesses independence or aloofness in a negative sense? Hartshorne correctly understands the view of Thomas when he reasons that God's purely actual power means that God does not depend on anything. However, Thomas does not think that this independence means that God is aloof and removed from the world in a negative sense. According to Thomas, God is present in all things as the cause of being and his presence is necessary continually in order to sustain the being of every thing (S.Th. I, 8,1). He believes that God "is not
merely present in one of his effects, but in all of them"; nothing is distant from God because God is in all things in the fashion of an agent cause (C.G. III, 68). Therefore contrary to Hartshorne's analysis, God's actual power does not imply that God is distant from the world. On the contrary, through his actual power God is intimately linked to each existing thing as the source of all.

Another negative implication which Hartshorne draws from the classical view of actual power is the fact that God does not love human beings or care about events on earth because God does not have potential power which would enable him to respond. This lack of reciprocity between God and the world, which Hartshorne claims is implied in the classical notion of actuality, is unacceptable to Hartshorne because it implies a lack of concern on God's part. Hartshorne complains that as a result of the classical insistence on divine power as purely actual, things in the world have no significance to God because they contribute nothing to God (LP, 41). In my opinion, Hartshorne correctly understands Thomas Aquinas to be asserting that God does not receive anything from the world; however Thomas would deny the negative implications of actual power which Hartshorne draws. It is striking that the one way actuality of God's power never leads Thomas to conclude that God does not love created things. The explanation for this discrepancy is that Thomas and Hartshorne have strikingly
different conceptions of how God ought to show love or appreciation of value.

According to Thomas, the defining characteristic of love is "to will good for a person." For human beings, to love is to put another person in one's own place or to regard the good done to the other as done to oneself. (S.Th. I, 20,1). God's love cannot be compared to human love because human beings are moved to love by the goodness present in a thing, while God's love is demonstrated by the goodness which he gives to things as he creates them. A person loves a thing because "its goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth (our) love ... whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness in things." (S.Th. I, 20,2). Every created thing possesses goodness because existence or being is itself a good according to Thomas (ibid.). God loves things without having the capacity to receive anything from them and without having the potential power to respond to specific situations. In sum, God's love is shown by the fact that as creator he is the cause of goodness in things, a capacity of love which humans cannot possess.

In contrast, Hartshorne's sees God's love as superior to human love in degree but not in kind. Hartshorne thinks that God's love should exemplify the ideal form of a parent's love for a child or of a person's love for a friend. He points out that a God who wills our good but at the same time is totally unmoved by the sufferings
and joys of his creatures lacks the qualities of a good friend because sympathy, or feeling others' feelings, is an essential part of friendship (OOTM, 27). Likewise he argues that it is not loving for a parent to be unaffected by the joys and sorrows of a child, and yet classical theists maintain that God is impassible. The important aspects of love for Hartshorne are sympathy, compassion, responsiveness, and ethical consistency (OOTM, 29). With such a view of love, clearly Hartshorne cannot fail to be disappointed by divine love as portrayed by Thomas Aquinas. The belief of classical theists that God lacks potential power excludes any sympathy or responsiveness from God. Hartshorne points out that classical theists attempted to avoid anthropomorphism in their development of the conception of divine love, a tendency which he views as negative (OOTM, 29). He thinks that they were so eager to emphasize God's greatness that they over-exaggerated the differences between the attributes of God and human characteristics. Hartshorne is correct to claim that God's wholly actual power has negative implications only if it can be proven that potential power is an essential feature of divine love.

Is Hartshorne justified in concluding that the classical view of actual power, as presented by Thomas

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22 The topic of analogy, the attribution of human attributes to God, as understood by Hartshorne and Thomas will be taken up later in this chapter in the section on method.
Aquinas, implies that God does not love or care about the world? In my opinion, the independence from the world which God has by virtue of his actual power does not necessarily imply that God is aloof or distant from the world. There is a sense of intimacy evoked by Thomas' view that God is the source and foundation of all creation, and that he must be present every moment to sustain being in each thing (S.Th. I, 8,1). But one could argue that this kind of sustinance is rather impersonal and thus inadequate to explain the relationship between God and human beings. As Hartshorne rightly points out, a God who lacks potential power cannot be affected by human beings; but his conclusion that such a God is unloving is valid only if responsiveness is considered a necessary component of divine love. Thomas defines love as willing the good towards others, a definition with which Hartshorne would likely agree, but he would insist that responsiveness, or relativity, be included in the concept of divine love which entails both emotional response (sympathy) and active response. I agree with Hartshorne that relativity is a necessary feature of human love, but the crucial question is whether responsiveness is a necessary feature of divine love, and hence divine power. This issue will be evaluated in my conclusion.
B. God's Omnipotence

Hartshorne's objections to the classical attribute of omnipotence are vehement because he thinks that this concept of all-power is based on faulty logic and, worse, it portrays God as having the monopoly on power of a tyrant. W. Norris Clarke vividly expresses Hartshorne's strong rejection of the classical doctrine of omnipotence thus:

He [Hartshorne] is absolutely adamant about rejecting such an attribute as inappropriate to God. Here is the real \textit{bête noire}. The very term is like a red rag to a bull for Hartshorne -- and for good reasons if the classical notion were what he understands it to be. "Omnipotence," for him, seems to mean that God is not only the source of all power but also holds onto it all, determining all actions himself, so that He is the sole powerful one, so to speak.\footnote{W. Norris Clarke, "Charles Hartshorne's Philosophy of God: A Thomistic Critique," in \textit{Charles Hartshorne's Concept of God}, ed. by Santiago Sia (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), p. 106.}

The most offensive implication of the classical view of omnipotence for Hartshorne is that "all power" seems to mean that God has full control over what happens on earth, therefore the human power of free choice is merely illusory. The following paragraphs will compare Thomas' definition of omnipotence with Hartshorne's understanding and critique of the classical concept of omnipotence. My aim is to determine whether Thomas' notion of divine omnipotence implies, as Hartshorne claims, that God has the power of a tyrant, which entails a monopoly on power and total control.
It is interesting that both Aquinas and Hartshorne express dissatisfaction with the use of the word omnipotence as an attribute of God. Thomas begins his discussion of omnipotence by mentioning that the precise meaning of the term is often unclear; however he continues to use the word 'omnipotence' after having delineated its precise meaning. Hartshorne, on the other hand, thinks that the word 'omnipotence' should no longer be used because it "has been so fearfully misdefined and has so catastrophically misled so many thinkers" (OOTM, 26). His rejection of the term is based on the fact that it is so commonly misunderstood, but Hartshorne is actually willing to attribute omnipotence to God on the condition that the term is redefined. As Hartshorne defines it, omnipotence means that God has the highest conceivable form of power which extends to all things (OOTM, 26). Now this definition is acceptable to Thomas as well as to Hartshorne, but they differ on the issue of how the "highest conceivable form of power" is construed. Hartshorne highlights the point of dispute over the nature of omnipotence as follows:

Omnipotence (alas, our only word for perfection of power!) is power to the highest degree possible and over all that exists, it is 'all' the power that could be exercised by any one individual over 'all' that is; but it remains to be shown how much power could be exercised in this fashion. (MVG, 30)

Hartshorne believes that God has the greatest possible power in the sense that he can do for the cosmos all desirable things that could by done and need be done by one universal
and cosmic agent: namely, God is the only being who can maintain the society or cosmos of which he is a member (DR, 134). God maximizes the possibilities for good and minimizes possibilities of evil, although the latter must remain if human beings are to have freedom (DR, 135). According to Hartshorne God's unsurpassable power, or omnipotence, allows for the existence of other powers. Hartshorne's social conception of power maintains that God influences rather than coerces or determines the actions of others, moreover, secondary powers can produce effects on the primary agent.24

Hartshorne thinks that classical theists have wrongly asserted that it is possible for God to possess all power, understood as a sheer monopoly on power. Hartshorne defines the classical concept of omnipotence as God's possession of "all the power that exists united into one individual power." (MVG, 30) A God with all power in that sense is responsible for everything that happens in the universe; God's power is the movement behind all events, even human decisions (OOTM, 11). According to Hartshorne, the classical view of omnipotence implies that God is like a tyrant who has the power to control human beings, reducing his subjects to mere puppets.

In his critique of the classical concept of omnipotence, does Hartshorne accurately represent Thomas' position on the nature of divine omnipotence? Thomas' treatment of omnipotence in *S.Th.* I, 25,3 basically elaborates the idea that God can do anything that does not imply a contradiction. Within our universe, God cannot make the past not to have been, he cannot break the rules of mathematics, and he cannot make a thing which lacks any one of its essential attributes (e.g., he cannot create a person without a soul). God does not have the power to act contrary to what he has previously willed. On the supposition that God has willed something, that thing is necessarily going to happen (although it was not necessary for God to will that thing). Further, what God cannot do is anything which requires passive power. He cannot change, therefore his perfection never decreases; he cannot forget, and he is never angry or sorrowful. The only mention of God's omnipotent power specifically in relation to human beings, in article 3, is that divine omnipotence is particularly shown in having mercy and forgiving sins which shows that he is not bound by laws of justice (*S.Th.* I, 25,3). Thomas does not address the issue of human power or free choice in his exploration of the meaning of divine omnipotence in *S.Th.* I, 25,3.

However, Hartshorne places the implications of omnipotence for human power at the centre of his critique;
in comparison, he seems to have little interest in the
details of what things are logically contradictory and
therefore impossible for God to do, according to Thomas.\textsuperscript{25} Hartshorne criticizes the classical notion of omnipotence
because it seems to give God the power of a tyrant.
Specifically, he objects to God's monopoly on power which
leaves human beings without power, and God's controlling
power which determines the outcome of all human affairs. If
indeed classical theists hold such a view of divine power,
it implies that human freedom is illusory, and moreover,
that God is responsible for events both good and evil.

In his criticism of the classical concept of
omnipotence, Hartshorne directs his objections not only at
classical theists in general, but specifically at Thomas.
He believes that Thomas represents the view that "our acts
should be both free and yet a logical consequence of a
divine action which "infallibly" produces its effect." (DR,
135) He finds such a view blatantly contradictory because
if God moves in creatures to produce an effect, then
creatures are not free. He claims that Thomas Aquinas
solves this paradox in an unconvincing way by claiming that
"God decides that the creature shall perform act A, but the

\textsuperscript{25} For example, Hartshorne is not interested in such
logical conundrums as "Can God create a stone too heavy to
lift?" or "Can God do what he does not?" which are
philosophical aspects of omnipotence. Such questions are
discussed in the anthology on divine power by Linwood Urban
and Douglas N. Walton, eds., \textit{The Power of God} (New York:
divine decision is that nevertheless the act shall be performed 'freely'." (OCTM, 12) Whether Hartshorne is correct in stating that Thomas' concept of divine omnipotence denies power to human agents and controls the outcome of human decisions is the subject of the following section.

The question posed earlier, whether Hartshorne correctly understands Thomas' concept of omnipotence, does not call for a straightfoward answer. It is difficult to tell if Hartshorne is familiar with all the details of Thomas' concept of omnipotence because he focuses on basically only one of its implications. Hartshorne does not concern himself with many of the issues developed in Thomas' definition of omnipotence located in S.Th. I, 25,3 and C.G. I, 22-25. Conversely, Thomas' exploration of omnipotence centres on what God cannot do in logical terms, but only touches on how human actions are effected by divine power which is Hartshorne's main concern. I conclude that there is no evidence for or against the conclusion that Hartshorne is aware of the intricacies of Thomas' concept of omnipotence because he choses not to confront these details. Thus the pertinent question is not whether Hartshorne has accurately represented Thomas' concept of omnipotence as a whole, but whether the negative implications which Hartshorne draws from it are valid.
C. Human Power

The major negative implication which Hartshorne draws from Thomas' concept of omnipotence is the conclusion that God's power is a tyrant's power, meaning that God has maximum influence over others and is subject to minimum influence from them (DR, 42). This section will attempt to determine whether Thomas Aquinas' position on divine power contains the negative implications which Hartshorne claims. My investigation will be organized in two parts, each focusing around one of the factors which Hartshorne takes as evidence that God's power is that of a tyrant. The two questions which I shall investigate are the following: 1) does Thomas' concept of omnipotence imply that God has a sheer monopoly of power? and 2) does omnipotence imply that God has the power to control the human will?

Hartshorne claims that Thomas' concept of omnipotence gives God a monopoly on power such that creatures have no power, they are merely puppets who rely entirely on God's power. Thomas addresses this accusation in S.Th. I, 105 entitled "The Movement of God in Creatures." Thomas maintains that God works in every agent, but he claims that God's power at work does not imply that the power of creatures has no part in this work (S.Th. I, 105,5). In a parallel text, Thomas mentions that "some people" have mistakenly concluded that God alone produces
all effects, and that "no creature has an active role in the production of natural effects" (C.G. III, 69,1). Thomas' wish to refute this view shows that he does not believe that created agents are merely puppets under God's control. According to Thomas, God works in things as a first cause, "but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents is superfluous." (S.Th. I, 105,5) I shall proceed to examine how Thomas understands God's work in every agent, and then examine the role of creatures in such work.

Thomas states that God works in every agent in three ways. First, God has created things such that their end is the good, real or apparent (recall that according to Thomas the good is of many kinds (S.Th. I 82,2)). Secondly, since every agent depends on motion from a preceding agent, and since originally the first mover is God, the unmoved mover, therefore God is the cause of motion or action in every agent. Lastly, God gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being, thus it is because of him that they are active. Thomas sums up this explanation by asserting that "God works intimately in all things." (S.Th. I, 105,5) The three ways in which God works in things reinforces the fact that God is the creator of all, and by his creative

26 The persons holding such a view include Averroes, Avicenna and Maimonides. They are all perpetrators of the erroneous view that God alone produces all natural effects, i.e., that God does the actions which seem to be done by bodies (C.G. III, 69).
movement, or actual power, creatures have movement. Concerning the human will, God moves the created will "by its object, which is the good" and by having created the power of willing in the first place. (S.Th. I, 105,4) This explanation basically mirrors the three ways God moves in every agent listed above. According to Thomas, God does not coerce the human will into moving in the direction he wishes. Human beings can be said to have the power to will because of God's movement in them which does not force the will, but it gives the will its own natural inclination, the inclination towards the good as its object. There is no suggestion in this discussion that the outcome of God's movement in the human agent is determining. Thomas states that the fact that the created will is moved by God does not prevent its being moved from within itself, i.e., according to its nature, therefore reward or blame belong to the human agent (S.Th. I, 105,4).

I conclude that it is inaccurate to say that Thomas' concept of divine power implies that God has a sheer monopoly on power which excludes creature's possession of power. Rather, Thomas thinks that it is a combination of God's power and creature's power that results in movement or the production of effects. He believes that the same action can proceed from a primary and a secondary agent simultaneously (S.Th. I, 105,5). Thomas portrays God's power as producing effects together with created powers,
which certainly does not fit Hartshorne's characterization of a tyrant's power. Thomas claims that God's omnipotence does not make created powers superfluous. However, Hartshorne's accusation that divine omnipotence gives God a tyrant's power is still valid if it is the case that God controls how human agents exercise their power.

The second question for investigation is whether Thomas' view of God's power implies that God has the power to determine the outcome of human decisions. Thomas' response to this question would definitely be "no", as is clear from his writings on the human power of free choice (S.Th. I, 83). However, this assertion is not sufficient to deflect Hartshorne's criticism. The question raised by Hartshorne is not whether Thomas deliberately intends to negate human freedom, but whether determinism is the logical result of Thomas' concept of God's omnipotence. To address this question, I shall discuss the texts examined in Chapter One on free choice (S.Th. I, 83,1) and on how God moves the will (S.Th. I-II, 9,6), along with parallel texts. My aim is to evaluate whether there is evidence to support Hartshorne's claim that divine omnipotence implies determinism, in Thomas' writings.

Thomas asserts that human beings have the power of free choice (S.Th. I, 83,1), but he also asserts that God moves the will (S.Th. I-II, 9,6). Thomas insists that

God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is the good. And
without this universal motion man cannot will anything. But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that, which is a true or apparent good.

(S.Th. I-II, 9,6)

He puts the point slightly differently in a parallel passage concerning the human will:

The will is said to have dominion over its own act not by exclusion of the First Cause, but because the First Cause does not act on the will in such a way as to determine it by necessity to one object...and therefore the determination of the act remains in the power of the intellect and the will.

(De Potentia Dei 3,7, ad obj. 13)

These passages deny Hartshorne's claim that Thomas' concept of divine power gives God the power of a tyrant to control human beings and determine their actions, by virtue of his omnipotence.27

But, I expect that Hartshorne would not be convinced that it is logically possible for God to move the human will and at the same time to claim that human actions are voluntary. Hartshorne's objection is raised by Thomas himself in the question on free choice, where Thomas states that one could argue that "what is moved by another is not free" hence since God moves the will, human beings have no

27 My conclusion is supported by W. Norris Clarke in his critique of Hartshorne's characterization of the classical concept of omnipotence. Clarke demonstrates that Hartshorne's understanding of classical omnipotence is inaccurate with respect to the position of Thomas Aquinas. He admits that there is a more "extreme" brand of Thomism, the school of Bañez, which maintains a strong predetermining power of God over every action while asserting that God causes our actions to be free, but Clarke believes that their reading of Thomas' teachings is inaccurate. Clarke, "Charles Hartshorne's Philosophy of God: A Thomistic Critique," p. 107.
free choice (S.Th. I, 83,1, obj. 3). To this objection, Thomas replies that what is free is not necessarily the first cause of itself. God can move voluntary causes without preventing their actions from being voluntary, according to Thomas, because "he operates in each thing according to its own nature" (S.Th. I, 83,1).

Thomas rephrases the same point in his affirmative answer to the question, whether the will is moved by God alone, as exterior principle (S.Th. I-II, 9,6). Unlike all other extrinsic principles, God, acting as an extrinsic principle, can cause voluntary movement of the human will because God himself is the cause of the will (S.Th. I-II, 9,6). God is the cause of the will in two senses: he created the will by causing it to exist, and he ordained the will to the universal good; thus he caused the will to have the good as its end by natural necessity. The movement towards the good is an intrinsic drive in human beings, yet the inclination of the will is voluntary because the individual must choose among the many possible ways to will the good (S.Th. I, 82,2).

A third passage attempts to explain how God as exterior mover can move the human will without imputing necessity to the things willed (S.Th. I-II, 10,4). In this question, Thomas explains the movement of the will in terms of necessity and contingency. He writes,

[God] moves all things in accordance with their conditions, in such a way that from necessary causes,
through the divine motion, effects follow of necessity, but from contingent causes effects follow contingently. Since, therefore, the will is not determined to one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things, God so moves it that he does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and not necessary. (S.Th. I-II, 10,4)

Thomas makes the assertion that the divine motion can move the human will such that its movement is contingent, not necessary. This passage is crucial in relation to Hartshorne's critique.

Thomas anticipates Hartshorne's criticism in the objections raised at the beginning of S.Th. I-II, 10,4. Objection 1 reasons that it could be argued that the human will is moved of necessity by the divine will because the divine will is irresistible (S.Th. I-II, 10,4). In fact, this point is one that Hartshorne makes centuries later. Thomas' response is that God moves the will freely because it would be "repugnant to the divine motion for the will to be moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature." (S.Th. I-II, 10,4, ad obj. 1) But this does not answer the logical question of how an irresistible divine will can move the human will freely. It is this dilemma that suggested to Hartshorne a God who possesses a tyrant's ideal of power; a God who after determining what is to be done says, "You are going to like it"; a God who "determines that the creature shall perform act A, but the divine decision is that nevertheless the act shall be performed 'freely'." (OOTM, 12)
Hartshorne thinks that Thomas' claim that human actions are voluntary is inconsistent with his concept of divine will and power. In particular, Hartshorne objects to Thomas' statement that God by necessity makes contingent effects flow from contingent causes; an assertion which is parallel to Thomas' claim that God can move voluntary causes without depriving their actions of being voluntary (S.Th. I, 83,1). Hartshorne's criticism of this topic, as developed in Philosophers Speak of God, is based on Thomas' writings on God's will, not power. He analyzes S.Th. I, 19,3 and 8 entitled "Whether whatever God wills he wills necessarily" and "Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed," respectively.

To the former question, Hartshorne replies that God wills what he wills necessarily because since God's will is part of his immutable essence, God always wills what he wills from eternity. Therefore, Hartshorne find it self-contradictory to claim, as Thomas does, that God's will for creatures has only suppositional necessity, and at the same time to assert that God's will is eternally unchanging. The supposition that God could have willed something other than he willed is merely a theoretical supposition. But since God's will is eternal and immutable, therefore God cannot change his mind about what he wills. I agree with Hartshorne that since God's will is immutable and eternal and part of God's essence, God does will what he wills.
necessarily. Thomas' way out of this conclusion, to assert that God's will is only necessary by supposition, is not convincing given the character of the divine will.

In answer to the latter question, Hartshorne claims, contrary to Thomas, that the divine will imposes necessity on things willed. He insists that it is impossible for God to will any effect to occur contingently because "since God wills (with his very essence, hence necessarily) that we do something, we must necessarily do it, for his will is said to be irresistible." (PSG, 133) Hartshorne represents Thomas' concept of God correctly, as Thomas asserts that what God wills never changes and it cannot fail to come to pass (S.Th. I, 19,6 and 7). Since there is no possibility that the human will can fail to do what God has willed it to do, Hartshorne concludes that decisions of the human will cannot be considered contingent. Hartshorne reasons that the absence of contingency implies that human beings do not have the power of free choice, a position which Thomas explicitly denies.

In order to understand the objections which Hartshorne levels against divine power, I found that it is necessary to examine Hartshorne's criticism of Thomas' concept of the divine will. And further, I discovered that Hartshorne's arguments against Thomas' concept of divine power, as stated in OOTM for example, are logically supported by Hartshorne's critique of the divine will. Now
Hartshorne's critique of the divine will directly relates to divine power because according to Thomas God's power is not really distinct from his knowledge and will. Divine power puts into execution what the will commands and what knowledge directs (S.Th. I, 25,1). The type of reasoning that Thomas uses to explain how God's power moves voluntary causes without depriving their actions of being voluntary and how God wills certain effects to occur contingently is evidently analogous. Hartshorne makes a critique of Thomas' concept of the divine will in Philosophers Speak of God, but his remarks are legitimately applied to divine power. I think that the necessity which Hartshorne argues that God's will imposes on things can be extended to God's power, because God's power unfailingly carries out God's will. Therefore, Hartshorne's claim that Thomas' concept of omnipotence implies that God has the controlling power of a tyrant is correct, although in my opinion the proof lies more in Hartshorne's critique of God's will than God's power. There is a marked contrast between Hartshorne's portrayal of the classical concept of God as a controlling tyrant, and Thomas' description of a God who operates in each thing according to its nature. The coercive power which Hartshorne describes is remarkably different from Thomas' own conception of how God's power moves in creatures.
D. Comparison of Method

Metaphysics

A major point of difference between Hartshorne and Thomas centres on the basic principles of metaphysics. Their metaphysical differences are accentuated by the fact that they are wrestling with similar questions. Thomas develops a metaphysics of being (esse). He considers God to possess the perfection of being because God is self-subsisting being, his being has no cause, and he gives being to all other things as the first cause (S.Th. I, 4,2). Hartshorne also considers God to be perfect, but he objects to the primacy of being and immutability in classical metaphysics. He believes that metaphysical opposites are mutually interdependent, a principle he calls the "law of polarity", therefore such opposites as being and becoming, actuality and potentiality, necessity and contingency, are inseparable (PSG, 2). While Thomas asserts that God is pure actuality or actus purus, Hartshorne argues that the prejudice of classical theism for the "superior" pole of these opposites was misguided. Although classical theists claimed that there were reasons for favouring only one side

28 For example, they both try to formulate a concept of God with respect to the metaphysical opposites of being and becoming, necessity and contingency, actuality and potentiality, and so forth; they both try to formulate a concept of divine perfection; they both struggle with the meanings of such attributes as power and love as applied to God.
of the metaphysical contrasts, Hartshorne thinks that their reasons for doing are not supported by experience; he insists that "experience does not exhibit the implied essential inferiority of the theologically despised contraries." (PSG, 3) For instance, he uses human beings to demonstrate that there are defective forms of both actuality and potentiality. It is a defect for a person to be too passive to the influences of others, but also for one to be too controlling or unresponsive. The positive attributes of sensitivity, responsiveness, adaptability, and sympathy are possible by virtue of potentiality (PSG, 4). Hartshorne concludes that God, who possesses supreme excellence, integrates both extremes of the polarities: God possesses the highest forms of both actuality and potentiality, unity and diversity, and so on. Hartshorne's concept of God is dipolar rather than monopolar, as is the case with the classical concept of God.

The contrast between the metaphysical reasoning of Thomas and Hartshorne is striking, and it interests me greatly how these two thinkers who base their metaphysics on experience reach such disparate conclusions. I have observed that the focus of Thomas' development of divine power is on God's role as creator and sustainer of the universe, while Hartshorne's emphasis is on God's relations to human beings in particular. W. Norris Clarke makes a perceptive observation which sheds some light on their
metaphysical differences. He notes that Thomas and Hartshorne draw their metaphysical concepts from different aspects of experience: Thomas, following Aristotle, uses the physical and biological world as the prime analogate for metaphysical concepts, while Hartshorne uses the model of the person and interpersonal relations as his reference point. Thomas' emphasis on God as the purely actual first mover is based on physical observations of cause and effect, while Hartshorne's insistence on the positive aspects of potentiality is based on his observation of human relationships. The different models of experience from which Thomas and Hartshorne draw metaphysical concepts is one explanation for the differences in their concepts of God.

Analogy

The basic question plaguing all attempts to reach knowledge of God is how can human beings know and describe something which is by definition far superior to and qualitatively different from themselves. The criteria used to determine what attributes are chosen to apply to God, and how each attribute is defined are open to dispute. Both Thomas and Hartshorne use analogy to apply human attributes to God, however they disagree on which attributes are appropriate. David Tracy points out that the dispute

29 Clarke, The Philosophical Approach to God, p. 91.
between Thomists and process thinkers is based on disagreement over "the rubrics under which any anthropological term embodying human aspiration can serve as an appropriate or inappropriate candidate of a focal meaning for analogical God-language." Both thinkers accept such human attributes as goodness, wisdom, justice; but Hartshorne alone applies such terms as sociability, relativity and dynamic creativity to God. Thomas and Hartshorne disagree on the extent to which the concept of God ought to be based on human beings as a model. Hartshorne thinks that classical theists like Thomas hold the mistaken assumption that avoiding anthropomorphism is a way of affirming God's superiority.

Thomas and Hartshorne disagree over what degree of anthropomorphism is acceptable in analogical attribution to God. The underlying question involving the legitimacy of analogy concerns what sort of basis there is to support the claim implicit in analogy that there is a connection between the nature of human beings and God. According to Thomas, the basis for analogy is the causal relationship between God as creator and human beings. He writes "For we can name God only from creatures. Hence, whatever is said of God and

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30 David Tracy and John B. Cobb, Jr., Talking About God (New York: Seabury Press, 1983), p. 34.

creatures is said according as there is some relation of the creature to God as to its principle and cause, wherein all the perfections of things pre-exist excellently." (S.Th. I, 13,5) In contrast, Hartshorne asserts that we can speak of God analogically because God is in some respect spatial and temporal. He reasons that "all our meanings involve space and time, and if God is simply non-spatial and non-temporal, then he is for us unknowable, even by analogy."32 Analogy is valid in Hartshorne's scheme of things because his dipolar concept of God is in some sense temporal and spatial, as well as absolute and the principal cause of the world. From Hartshorne's perspective, the classical concept of a God who is transcendent, non-temporal and so on, is not reachable by analogy.

Upon what basis do Thomas and Hartshorne choose the attributes to be extended analogously to God? Thomas frequently appeals to sources of authority to justify his development of the concept of God, namely Scripture and respected theologians, although his work is guided by his own discernment and is not merely repetitive of others' viewpoints. Moreover, his thought is undeniably shaped by his philosophical heritage, dominated by the figures of Plato and Aristotle. He aims to shape a concept of God which is faithful to Christian doctrine and Scripture, within his own metaphysical framework.

For Hartshorne there are two bases for his choice and definition of analogical attributes: extension from human experience, and the intuition or awareness which we have of God (CSPM, 155). In his detailed analysis of Hartshorne's theory of analogy, Schubert Ogden argues that Hartshorne's attempt to establish a ground for analogy is a failure. Ogden states that Hartshorne vacillates concerning the level of certainty he attributes to the religious intuition of God; he describes it alternately as "dim awareness" or as a direct "intuition...which we have of God." (CSPM, 155) In Ogden's estimation, only the former weaker claim for awareness of God is credible, "given the sheer fact of non- and even a-theistic religions and philosophies." However, this weak claim is insufficient to establish analogy (Ogden, 32). Ogden points out that Hartshorne is not at fault here because this failure to ground analogy in direct awareness of God is a necessary failure because our knowledge of God is derived from the knowledge we have of ourselves and is therefore symbolic, not analogical. Symbolic knowledge of God is defined as "the secondary and derivative application to God of concepts which apply primarily to ourselves," while analogical attributes, according to Hartshorne, apply primarily to God.

and only secondarily to ourselves (Ogden, 33-4). We recall from Chapter Two that Hartshorne maintains that analogical concepts in a sense apply literally to deity and analogically to creatures because only God can fully actualize such attributes as love or knowledge (LP, 141). According to Ogden, Hartshorne does not have a basis for positing analogical, as distinct from symbolic, knowledge of God because the attributes which human beings apply to God are based on human experience. There is no basis for the claim that analogical attributes apply primarily to God because human beings have no direct awareness of God.

Criteria of Adequacy

Thomas and Hartshorne both seek internal logical consistency in their development of the concept of God. They also agree that the concept of God, like all metaphysical concepts, ought to cohere with experiential evidence. Each thinker follows to some extent to his philosophical predecessors: Thomas, the Peripatetic tradition, and Hartshorne, Whitehead and others. On religious terms, they each have a standard of evaluation for the concept of God. Thomas appeals to Scriptural authority and church doctrine, while Hartshorne takes the religious idea of God along with the tenets of process philosophy to develop a unique concept of God which is not answerable to traditional beliefs but which stands on its own merits.
Thomas is an interpreter of Scripture, a theologian loyal to the Christian tradition. However, Hartshorne would argue that he misrepresents the religious idea of God found in Christian Scriptures, mainly as a result of trying to make the Christian concept of God fit his philosophical framework. Hartshorne takes an objective or outside look at the Christian tradition as well as other religious traditions to discover the central religious insight about God, which he judges to be compatible with his philosophical development of the concept of God.
CONCLUSION

An Evaluation of Hartshorne's Critique of Thomas' Concept of Divine Power

This concluding section will summarize my evaluation of the main criticisms which Hartshorne directs at the classical view of God's power, and examine whether the negative religious implications which Hartshorne finds in the classical concept of God apply to the position of Thomas Aquinas.

Actual Power

In the section on actual power, it was observed that the negative implications which Hartshorne draws from God's lack of potential power centre around the issue of whether a God who is non-relative is capable of caring for human beings. Is responsiveness a necessary feature of divine love, hence of divine power? Hartshorne claims that God as supremely worshipful must possess love which includes potential power, or relativity (LP, 135). He believes that the religious idea of God supports his view that God is a supremely loving friend, which is understood to imply divine responsiveness to human concerns (MVG, 94).
It is interesting that the Neo-Thomist, W. Norris Clarke, has shifted his position as a result of Hartshorne's challenge to classical theism. He has decided to affirm without hesitation that God is really related to the world in the order of his personal consciousness, which means that God is positively affected by the response of love of created persons. As a "creative Neo-Thomist" or, as he prefers, "Thomistically inspired metaphysician," Clarke incorporates this aspect of Hartshorne's critique of classical theism into his basically Thomistic concept of God. He thinks that the affirmation that God is really related to the world is necessary in order to "do justice to the implications of Christian (or any personalist) religious language and to the very nature of interpersonal relations as we understand them more reflectively today." Clarke thinks that a shift away from the Thomistic framework of metaphysics is required in order to explain God's relation to the world convincingly to modern people.

In my opinion, the religious idea of God, as expressed by Christian Scriptures and doctrine, does suggest that God is affected by human concerns and responds to them,  

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34 Clarke explains that he thinks that Thomas' doctrine that "God is not really related to the world" can be defended when understood in its strict technical sense as found in St. Thomas, but he considers this context "too narrow and restrictive to do justice to the problem for our time." W. Norris Clarke, The Philosophical Approach to God (Winston-Salem, N.C.: Wake Forest University, 1979), p. 90-91.
therefore that God has potential power. However, I defend Thomas' view of divine power in the sense that I do not find it entirely religiously repugnant, as Hartshorne does, and I would not state that such a God is unworthy of worship or admiration. A God with wholly actual power who wills the good for all things as their source and end does not evidence a lack of love, just a less anthropomorphic sort of love. There is no firm justification for Hartshorne to insist that it is appropriate for God to have the qualities one would expect in a friend or parent. It cannot be definitively proven that potential power is a necessary aspect of divine love; there is simply no empirical basis on which to do so.

It is clear that Thomas and Hartshorne use different criteria to assess what is worshipful in God, which can be partially accounted for by the different models from which they draw metaphysical concepts. As already mentioned,

35 I decline to extend my remarks to the other traditions Hartshorne mentions -- Jewish, Islamic, Hindu or Chinese. Hartshorne was raised in the Christian tradition and it is mainly among Christian theists that dialogue has taken place. I find his inclusion of other "higher theistic traditions" to be generalizations which appear unsupported by detailed examination of the particular religions (MVG, 91).

36 H. P. Owen thinks that Hartshorne models the concept of divine personality univocally on the concept of its human counterpart, which he calls "a piece of gratuitous anthropomorphism." He writes, "Because change and growth, in response to environment, characterise human personality, it does not follow that they also characterise the personality of God." H. P. Owen, Concepts of Deity (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1971), p. 85.
Thomas draws his metaphysical concepts from the physical universe and God's role as creator and sustainer of the world; Hartshorne for his part uses inter-personal relations as a model for the relationship between God and human beings. But of course, Thomas deals not only with the physical realm but to a great extent with the human realm as well, in his discussion of religious anthropology and ethics. Likewise, Hartshorne teaches that God is the creator of all actualities and possibilities; but unlike Thomas, Hartshorne does not consider creation to be God's fundamental act. In fact, he rejects the revealed doctrine that God created the world ex nihilo, in favour of the notion of "transformative creation" in which God creates the world out of an earlier substratum with no definite beginning (MVG, 230). Hartshorne's basic concern seems to be how God relates to human beings in their sorrows and joys. For Thomas Aquinas, the interactive involvement of God in the concerns of the world was either taken for granted in Christian practice (outside of philosophical theology) or simply not a crucial issue. Hartshorne's strong interest in divine relativity as a sign of God's care for human beings accounts for his rejection of the God of

37 Hartshorne proudly points out that "The highest authority in traditional theology, Thomas Aquinas, admitted that this conception is open to no objections except those derived from revelation," from which he concludes that "there is no reason why the 'creator' need be supposed to have created out of nothing." (MVG, 232)
classical theism whom he sees as a cold, unresponsive, omnipotent tyrant. As an alternative to the image of the tyrant, Hartshorne elaborates a metaphysics of democracy based on the principle that "he who is most adequately influenced by all may most appropriately exert influence upon all." (DR, 50)

Both Thomas and Hartshorne try to the best of their ability to create an adequate concept of God, but it is evident that each author is inextricably bound to the prevailing interests of his own time. For example, Hartshorne thinks that democracy is the ideal form of leadership, while Thomas thinks that a just monarchy is the best form of government and tyranny the worst. The major differences in their religious concerns may be partially accounted for by the seven centuries separating them; however, such a question is far beyond the scope of this thesis.

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38 Dino Bigongiari, The Political Ideas of St. Thomas Aquinas, Representative Selections (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1953), p. 181. Thomas' defines a king as "a shepherd seeking the common good of the multitude and not his own" as opposed to a tyrant who "seeks his own benefit from his rule... [and] oppresses by might instead of ruling by justice." Thomas considers democracy to be inferior to monarchy because when the multitude rules, conflict and disunity result, p. 178 The king as ideal ruler expresses love by "willing the good for others," the same formulation that Thomas uses to describe divine love (S.Th. I, 20,1).
Divine Omnipotence and Human Free Choice

When I examined Hartshorne's understanding of the classical view of divine omnipotence, I found divine omnipotence characterized as God's power to determine what creatures do while withholding every power from human beings. Hartshorne's view of the classical position is very different from Thomas' presentation of the nature of divine omnipotence expressed in S.Th. I, 25,3 or C.G. I, 22-25. Hartshorne does not attempt to explore the details of Thomas' conception of omnipotence, for he is basically concerned with one implication which he draws from it — that divine omnipotence negates human free choice.

In preparation for the evaluation of this particular criticism, I examined Thomas' writings on "The Will" (S.Th. I, 82), "Free Choice" (S.Th. I, 83) "What moves the will" (S.Th. I-II, 9) and "How the will is moved" (S.Th. I-II, 10). I found that, according to Thomas, God moves the created will in such a way that he does not deprive human actions from being voluntary because God operates in each thing according to its nature (S.Th. I, 83,1). Thomas does not assert that God has a monopoly on power; rather, it is God's power working along with human power which results in movement (S.Th. I, 105,4). According to Thomas, God moves all things "in accordance with their conditions" in such a way that from contingent causes effects follow contingently (S.Th. I-II, 10,4). Thomas apparently does not believe that
God controls the actions of human beings or that human beings are puppets of an all-powerful God.

I find Thomas' explanation of how God's power works alongside human power persuasive. Thomas understands God's power as inextricably linked to his role as the first mover who created the human will and oriented it towards the good. The statement that God can move voluntary causes does not seem to imply determinism because the movement consists in orienting the will towards the good, real or apparent, with no determinate outcome (STh I, 83,1 and 82,2). However, Thomas' statement that the divine motion moves necessary causes necessarily and contingent causes contingently immediately recalled to mind Hartshorne's critique of the divine will in Philosophers Speak of God. After tracing Hartshorne's reasoning in his critique of S.Th. I, 19, 3 and 8, I concluded that he has a strong case for stating that God's immutable will, and thus his power, implies the divine determination of human actions.

Since power is directly linked to the divine will, according to Thomas, it is legitimate for Hartshorne to draw implications for the determining character of God's will on God's power. Thomas writes that "the knowledge or will of God, as it is an effective principle, has the notion of power contained in it." (S.Th. I, 25,1). But even though it is perfectly legitimate to extend the necessity God's will imposes on things to God's power, Hartshorne's depiction of
classical omnipotence is hardly recognizable when one reads
the passages on divine power in Thomas. I find Hartshorne's
characterization of divine omnipotence as giving God the
controlling power of a tyrant to inaccurately represent
Thomas' view of divine power. Hartshorne directs his
accusation that the classical concept of God has the all-
controlling power of a tyrant at Thomas' concept of
omnipotence, but in my analysis the support for his
assertions lies in his critique of the logical
inconsistencies in Thomas' concept of the divine will. I
think that it is more accurately God's will which one can
argue imposes necessity on things. Although God's power is
inextricably related to God's will according to Thomas, it
would make the terms of the debate more precise if
Hartshorne argued against Thomas' concept of the divine will
rather than divine power.

Criteria of Evaluation

Broadly speaking, the criteria of evaluation for the
concept of God can be divided into two areas: philosophical
and religious. Philosophical evaluation of the concept of
God on the basis of internal logic and coherence is fairly
straightforward because logical grounds are commonly

39 W. Norris Clarke complains that Hartshorne "shows no
appreciation of the authentic classical doctrine of St.
Thomas." Clarke, "Charles Hartshorne's Philosophy of God:
accepted as objective. I find Thomas' concept of divine power to be internally consistent because God's purely actual power follows from the first proof which established that God is the unmoved mover (S.Th. I, 2, 3). The questionable point of logic lies in Thomas' assertions that God moves voluntary causes to produce voluntary effects (S.Th. I, 83, 1), and that likewise, God uses contingent causes to produce contingent effects (S.Th. I-II, 10, 4). In the case of human choice, Thomas claims that the divine motion determines that the will desire the good but God does not determine the exact choice. Hartshorne accuses Thomas' concept of divine power of implying determinism on the basis of the logical argument that a God whose will is immutable and irresistible cannot produce contingent effects. Therefore, the flaw that Hartshorne reveals in Thomas' thought is a logical flaw relating to God's will primarily and to God's power by implication.

Thomas and Hartshorne have different metaphysical frameworks which underly their formulations of the concept of God. From my point of view, it is impossible to adjudicate which framework is "correct" or truer to experience, because there is much room for dispute over the experiential evidence which supports metaphysical assertions. If, as Clarke claims, the difference in their metaphysical frameworks results from their using different models of experience on which to build their metaphysical
frameworks, I suggest that it is possible for both of them to have true insights regarding different aspects of experience.\textsuperscript{40}

Religious criteria of evaluation are problematic because Thomas and Hartshorne share no common consensus by which to judge the adequacy of the concept of God. If the Bible is accepted as containing revealed truths about God, then the concept of God can be tested against the Bible, or alternately, against Christian doctrine. Thomas uses Christian doctrine and Scriptures as authorities against which to test his concept of God; however, Hartshorne does not accept church doctrine or scriptural authority. He forms his "religious idea of God" on the basis of general conclusions drawn from a number of religious traditions, and he judges the adequacy of his concept of God by its ability to express the religious idea of God as he understands it, and its philosophical coherence. It has been noted that Hartshorne's expectations for God's relations to human beings require that God possess what are considered more "anthropomorphic" traits (such as the capacity to be affected and to respond) because he thinks that a God who is not relative in that sense cannot be said to love. On the other hand, there are thinkers like H. P. Owen who claim that Hartshorne's concept of God is inappropriately anthropomorphic. In my opinion, an issue such as

\textsuperscript{40} Clarke, The Philosophical Approach to God, p. 91.
anthropomorphism in the concept of God cannot be judged academically unless there is some religious criteria of evaluation agreed upon.

At the end of this investigation, I shall take the opportunity to mention some promising directions for further work on the topic of divine power. Hartshorne's claim that the classical concept of omnipotence portrays God's power as that of an all-controlling tyrant is based on the logical implications of Thomas' concept of the divine will, which Hartshorne extends to divine power. It would be instructive to examine Thomas' conception of the divine will in detail, to study the relationship between God's will and his power, and to examine how a defender of classical theism would answer Hartshorne's charge that God's will, as classically conceived, entails that all effects produced by the First Mover are necessary. This thesis has shown that God's power is not tyrannical or controlling in Thomas' view. The question that remains is whether his claim that God's power is not determining is logically compatible with his assertion that the nature of God's will is irresistible and immutable.
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