

CHANTED LANGUAGE
IN THE
CHĀNDOGYA UPANISAD

TO
MY MOTHER

THE DOCTRINE
OF
CHANTED LANGUAGE
IN THE
CHĀNDOGYA UPANISAD

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ABSTRACT

The Chāndogya Upaniṣad is one of the most important pieces of literature in orthodox Hinduism. It contains some of the most crucial statements for the religion about salvation and ritualistic uses of language. This dissertation attempts to explain to modern Western readers what the Chāndogya Upaniṣad says about the nature of language and in so doing explain the meaning of the Upaniṣad. In order to do this the traditional explanations of the text have been considered as carefully as possible. One aspect of this consideration has been that whereas previous explanations of the text have not considered the implications of the ChU's relation to the Chāndogya Brāhmaṇa this has. Another aspect has been that whereas previous explanations have not sought to understand this text as a complete and necessary whole this one has.

Consequently part of the dissertation seeks implicitly and explicitly to demarcate the assumptions of previous scholarship from the assumptions of the ChU. The result of this is to show modern scholarship's desire to point out the historicity of the ChU and the ChU's desire to point out the uninformativeness of historicity. The paradigmatic case of these incompatible desires is etymology which in the ChU is seen to imply the unity inherent to eternal being and in modern linguistics is seen to be the record of the historicity of beings, in particular, man. Another result of this part of the investigation was to discover that the

transmission of upāsana's (teachings) was a central cohesive theme of the ChU and that the ritualization of speech was inherent to this transmission.

The central thesis of this dissertation is that chanted or ritualistic language is said in the ChU to be founded in desire which necessarily implies a dependent order of being. Language, which exists within this being, articulates various limits of dependency most authentically in a ritualistic manner. The primordial form of ritualistic speech is the pronoun, tat, which implies that the central phenomenon of all things is that they can be counted. We show during the course of the explanation of this thesis how the ChU points out what this dependency and numericality mean with respect to sacrifice, religious language, etymology, social order, propriety, duty, and education. In so doing we hope to have explained many of the more obscure portions of the text as well as to have presented the context in which several later theological discussions took place in the tradition.

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TRANSLITERATION

a	अ	g	ग	dh	ध
ā	आ	gh	घ	n	न
i	इ	ñ	उ.	p	प
ī	ई	c	च	ph	फ
u	उ	ch	छ	b	ब
ū	ऊ	j	ज	bh	भ
r.	ऋ	jh	झ	m	म
ṛ.	ॠ	ñ	ञ	y	य
l.	लृ	t.	ट	r	र
ḷ.	लृ	th	ठ	l	ल
e	ए	d.	ड	v	व
ai	ऐ	dh	ढ	ś	श
o	ओ	n.	ण	s.	ष
au	औ	t	त	s	स
k	क	th	थ	h	ह
kh	ख	d	द	m̐	<u>anusvara</u>

One of the problems in a work of this kind is that during the course of the last 100 years of scholarship the method of transliterating Sanskrit has changed many times. We have decided upon that which is in most recent use in the Sanskrit method of Antoine, the Journal of the American Oriental Society and Annals

of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. This is very similar to the method of Monier-Williams, Renou, and Whitney. The method of MacDonnell and the Sacred Books of the East is radically different and largely out of use. The principal differences between the three former scholars' methods and ours are listed below.

<u>JAOS</u>	Monier-Williams	Whitney	Renou
ṛ	[ṛi]	ṛ	ṛ
r̄	[r̄i]	r̄	r̄
ṛ	ṛ	[ṛ or ṛ]	ṛ
ś	[ś]	[ç]	[ç]
ṣ	[sh]	ṣ	ṣ
s	s	s	s
ṁ	several	ṁ	[ṁ]

ABBREVIATIONS

<u>BG</u>	<u>Bhagavad Gītā</u>
<u>BU</u>	<u>Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad</u>
<u>ChB</u>	<u>Chāndogya Brāhmaṇa</u>
<u>ChU</u>	<u>Chāndogya Upaniṣad</u>
<u>GGŚ</u>	<u>Gobhila Grhya Sūtra</u> , H. Oldenberg, trans.
<u>PVB</u>	<u>Pancaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa</u> , W. Caland, trans.
<u>RV</u>	<u>Rg Veda</u>
<u>SV</u>	<u>Sāma Veda</u>
<u>ŚB</u>	<u>Śabara Bhāṣya</u> , G. Jha, trans.
<u>SBE</u>	<u>Sacred Books of the East</u>
<u>VPS</u>	<u>Vivarana Prameya Saṁgraha</u> , S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri and Saileswar Sen, trans.
<u>VSRB</u>	<u>Vedānta Sūtra Rāmānuja Bhāṣya</u> , Thibaut, trans.
<u>VSSB</u>	<u>Vedānta Sūtra Śaṅkara Bhāṣya</u>

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	v
TRANSLITERATION	vi
ABBREVIATIONS	viii
INTRODUCTION	1
I. THE MODERN CRITICISM OF LINGUISTIC SCIENCE AND ETYMOLOGY IN THE <u>CHĀNDOGYA UPANISAD</u>	
1. Opinions of <u>Chāndogya Upanisad</u> Etymology	11
2. The Growth and Nature of Modern Philology	16
3. The Mutual Contradiction Between the Tenets of Modern Philology and those of the <u>Chāndogya Upanisad</u>	37
II. THE TEXT OF THE <u>CHĀNDOGYA UPANISAD</u>	
1. Editions and Translations	44
2. The Problem of Textual Coherency	62
3. Architectonic of the <u>Upanisad</u> : The Dramatic Attempt to Obtain <u>Jñāna</u>	68
4. Conclusions	87
III. RITUAL LANGUAGE IN THE <u>CHĀNDOGYA UPANISAD</u>	
1. Importance of Verbal Repetition in <u>Vedānta</u>	97
2. <u>Chandoga Sāman</u> Chanting:	107
Importance of Mathematics and Astronomy to the Chant	107
Number	116
The Chant, Number and The Esoteric Character of Things	122
3. Conclusions	134
IV. DESIRE	
1. Introduction	139
2. Meaning of Desire	150
3. Dependency as a Linguistic Relation Implying Substance	173
4. Summary	184
5. Substance as " <u>tat</u> "	188
6. Substance and Species	198

V. HIERARCHY: A CLARIFICATION OF DEPENDENCY

- | | |
|---|-----|
| 1. The Implications of this Concept of Language
for Human Action | 226 |
| 2. Linguistic Foundations of Hierarchy | 228 |

VI. CONCLUSION

- | | |
|---|-----|
| 1. Summary of the Doctrine of Chanted Language
in the <u>Chāndogya Upaniṣad</u> | 259 |
| 2. Reason, Revelation and the Anti-historical
Arguments of the <u>Chāndogya Upaniṣad</u> | 262 |
| 3. Etymology | 268 |
| 4. <u>Upāsana</u> | 273 |
| 5. Epilogue | 276 |

APPENDIX

- | | |
|--|-----|
| ŚAṆKARA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE <u>CHĀNDOGYA UPANIṢAD</u>
WITH ĀNANDAGIRI'S <u>TIKĀ</u> | 278 |
|--|-----|

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- | | |
|---|-----|
| 1. Primary Sources: Sanskrit Texts and Translations
of Sanskrit and Pali Texts Arranged by Title | 298 |
| 2. Secondary Sources: Non-Sanskrit Works Arranged
by Author | |
| A. Books | 301 |
| B. Articles | 307 |

INTRODUCTION

Hinduism has a vast corpus of literature about metaphysical and theological issues. This literature was developed among the six darśanas or orthodox schools of Hinduism. Orthodoxy is defined by the belief that the Vedas are the ultimate authority on matters which cannot be determined on the basis of the senses and reason.¹ Hence

¹"The relation of the word with its denotation is inborn. -- Instruction is the means of knowing it (Dharma), -- infallible regarding all that is imperceptible; it is a valid means of knowledge, as it is independent, -- according to Bādarāyaṇa." -- Ganganatha Jha, trans., ŚB, 1.1.5, Vol. I, p. 8. Cf. VSŚB, 2.1.11.

"Of the systems of thought or darshanas, six became more famous than others, viz., Gautama's Nyāya, Kaṇāda's Vaiśeṣika, Kapila's Sāṃkhya, Patanjali's Yoga, Jaimini's Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Bādarāyaṇa's Uttara Mīmāṃsā or the Vedānta. They are the Brahmanical systems, since they all accept the authority of the Vedas. The systems of thought which admit the validity of the Vedas are called āstika and those which repudiate it nāstika. The āstika, or nāstika character of a system does not depend on its positive or negative conclusions regarding the nature of the supreme spirit, but on the acceptance or non-acceptance of the authority of the Vedas." -- S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, II, 20.

"With these two limitations [acceptance of caste and infallibility of the Veda, the latter being the foundation of the former] the utmost freedom of thought prevailed in Brahmanism. Hence the boldest philosophical speculation and conformity with the popular religion went hand in hand to a degree which has never been equalled in any other country." -- A. MacDonnell, A History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 390.

the Vedas are the common heritage of all schools of Hinduism and the foundation for the legitimation of the morals and beliefs of those who understand themselves to be Hindus. All later metaphysical and theological discussion which Hinduism has inherited is based upon Veda.

"Veda" refers to two sets of writings. The one referred to until now is the large corpus of revealed writings which were heard and handed down by the ṛsis.² The second set is part of the first and consists of the writings known as the 3-fold knowledge, viz., Rg Veda, Sāma Veda, and Yajur Veda, as well as the Atharva Veda. Each Veda is followed by a special set of writings called Brāhmaṇas and within each Brāhmaṇa or sometimes in addition to it there is a writing called Upaniṣad. This entire set of Vedas, Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads constitutes the revealed foundation of orthodoxy called Veda or śruti. There is in addition to this literature an enormous secondary literature which explains it.³ Some of it is clearly derived and explanatory such as Pāṇini's grammar, while some of it occupies a fuzzy position halfway between Veda and explanation. For example the gāṇa (songbooks) which explain the singing of the

²Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, "veda," p.1015.

³There is, for example, in addition to the six darśanas, the six vedāṅgas. Vedāṅga is the name "of certain works or classes of works regarded as auxiliary to and even in some sense as part of the Veda" (Monier-Williams, p. 1016), and which consists of works on Śikṣā (phonetics), Chandas (metre), Vyākaraṇa (grammar), Nirukta (etymologically based explanations of words), Jyotiṣa (determination of auspicious days), and Kalpa (ceremony).

Sāma Veda (which is its only use) presuppose its proper singing as Veda and properly speaking simply report this. Similarly the Gobhila Grhya Sūtra presupposes the proper use of the Chāndogya Brahmana. Because the ChB is simply those things recited at the ritual moments prescribed by the GGŚ neither makes much sense without the other.

There is considerable discussion over whether the schools (darśanas) are related to each other as adversaries or complements. We tend to think the latter because of the striking degree to which discussions in the schools do not overlap. The schools are essentially pairs dealing with proper descriptive and theoretical accounts of that learned by the senses and reason, meditation and religious devotion, and Vedic ritual and recitation.⁴ Two of the schools, Pūrva and Uttara Mīmāṃsā, are the only schools specifically concerned with the interpretation of the Vedas. While the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā is concerned with those portions dealing with dharma,⁵ the Uttara Mīmāṃsā is concerned with the nature of Brahman.⁶ Those

⁴M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, pp. 182-184.
G. Jha, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in Its Sources, pp. 1-5.

⁵"Next therefore (comes) the enquiry into Dharma." -- ŚB, 1.1.1.1, Vol. I, p. 1.

⁶"Then therefore the Inquiry into Brahman." -- Thibaut, VŚŚB, 1.1.1, Vol. I, p. 9.

texts in which there is the greatest amount of discussion of Brahman are the Upaniṣads which are collectively referred to as Vedānta.

Because there is some discussion as to what Brahman really is, Uttara Mīmāṃsā is divided into various schools of thought which stem from the first thinkers of each particular interpretation. All of the recognized divisions are characterized by a numerical description of the nature of Brahman, viz., Advaita (non-dualism), Viśiṣṭādvaita (qualified non-dualism), and Dvaita (dualism). Even the schools have their own divisions according to interpretation. Hence Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta is divided initially into the Vivaraṇa and Bhāmati schools.⁷ But all of the schools of the Vedānta look to three sources for interpretation of Brahman and seek to explain these sources: the Vedānta-Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa, the Bhagavad Gītā, and the Upaniṣads. Of these only the Upaniṣads are śruti (absolutely and unquestionably revealed Veda). Hence the first two and all of Uttara Mīmāṃsā thought essentially stems from the Upaniṣads. Although there is virtually an unending stream of Upaniṣads those which were of importance to the teachers of the original schools are considered to be the principal and most

⁷D. Venkataramiah, trans., The Pañcapādikā of Padmapada, pp. vi and vii, and Swamī Madhavananda, trans., Vedānta-Paribhāṣā of Dharmaraja Adhvarīndra, p. v. Both of these works as well as the Vivaraṇa-Prameya-Saṅgraha are in the Vivaraṇa school which will be the line of interpretation we will primarily follow in our examination of the ChU.

trustworthy Upaniṣads.⁸ Of these Upaniṣads, the Chāndogya Upaniṣad and Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad occupy a central position.

The ChU is the most frequently quoted text in the principal commentaries on the Vedānta Sūtras and in the Vedānta Sūtras themselves,⁹ is thought to be among the oldest,¹⁰ is one of the most complex, long and coherent, and contains one of the most discussed statements in the Upaniṣads, "tat tvam asi".¹¹ Rāmānuja refers to

⁸S. Radhakrishnan, trans., The Principal Upaniṣads, p. 6 and pp. 20-24. P. Deussen, The System of the Vedānta, p. 9. M. Müller, trans., The Upanishads, p. lxix.

⁹In VSSB it is quoted 810 times versus 567 times for the nearest contender, the BU. (Deussen, The System of the Vedānta, pp. 30-31.) In VSRB a similar ratio obtains. References in the Vedānta Sūtras are highly abbreviated (no less than 30), but nonetheless form the subject for many other Sūtras (no less than 78).

¹⁰Dating the Upaniṣads is however highly speculative even though relative ages may be somewhat accurately arrived at. Cf. p. 8 in R. E. Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads.

¹¹J. A. B. Van Buitenen puts this unequivocally in his Introduction to the Vedārthasamgraha, p. 4:

We may depart from the sadvidyā of Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6, Uddālaka's teaching of his son, Śvetaketu, easily the most celebrated śruti text. It plays an important part in Vedāntamīmāṃsā, not only for its own sake, but also indirectly because it has been dealt with in the Brahmasutras, so that all system-building commentators had to explain it precisely. Their explanations concern invariably the relation between the first cause and the effected world, and in so far as this relation is the fundamental problem of Vedānta the commentaries on the ārambhanadhikaraṇa represent the central doctrines of the systems.

the ChU more than any other text in his commentary on the Vedānta Sūtras and it is central to his discussion in the Vedārtha Samgraha. Śaṅkara also refers to it more than any other text in the VSSB while one of his major commentaries is on the ChU. Of course the writings of his epigones are likewise strewn with references to it. This central role of the ChU in Hindu tradition and metaphysics seems to us to originate from the care with which it was composed and the depth with which it considered the nature of language, a problem which has preoccupied much of Indian thought.

Obviously there are many interpretations of the ChU within the tradition and we cannot hope nor do we wish to provide the definitive interpretation for the tradition. What we do hope is to be able to show what the skeletal structure of the ChU is such that it provided a foundation for Uttara Mīmāṃsā and much of Hindu religious thought. In so doing we hope to expose the issues that provoked so much later discussion and the form of argument which a reader of the text should expect. A general theory of language will then be presented which is sufficiently unique to delimit the possible conclusions about chanted language from other beliefs about language. At the same time it is hoped that those issues which separate the schools of Vedānta will merely become issues and not be decided. Hence the form of this thesis will be one of a progressive differentiation of linguistic theory with respect to the ChU and a presentation of issues involved in it and knowledge presupposed by it.

Within these confines the general theory of language in the ChU will be reported.

The central concern of the ChU is implied by its name. The Chāndogya Upaniṣad is the Upaniṣad of the Chandogas who were the Brahmins responsible for chanting during vedic sacrifice. "Upaniṣad" which is usually explained as "secret doctrine" and sometimes as "sitting down together"¹² is explained by Śaṅkara as follows:

The word upanisad is derived by adding upa (near) and ni (with certainty) as prefixes and kṛip as a suffix to the root sad, meaning to split up (destroy), go (reach, attain), or loosen. And by the word upanisad is denoted the knowledge of the knowable entity, presented in the book that is going to be explained.

Thus with regard to knowledge, the word upanisad is used in its primary sense, while with regard to the book it is used in a secondary sense.

Thus from the very derivation of the word upanisad, it is suggested that one who is possessed of special attributes is qualified for knowledge. And the subject matter of the knowledge is also shown to be a unique thing, viz., the supreme Brahman that is the indwelling Self. ¹³

¹²Cf. Monier-Williams, p. 201, M. Muller, The Upanishads, pp. lxxix-lxxxiv, and S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads, pp. 19-20.

¹³Śaṅkara, "Introduction" to the Katha Upanishad, in Swāmī Gambhīrānanda, trans., Eight Upaniṣads with the Commentary of Śaṅkarācārya, Vol. I, pp. 99 and 101.

This Upanisad was an attempt to explain the meaning of the Chandogas to themselves in the deepest, that is most hidden, sense. This meant, in effect, an explanation of chanted language. For the Chandogas were preeminently the chanters of the udgītha at the soma sacrifice and the ones who handed down this particular Upanisad.

Language occupies a central role in Hindu metaphysical discussions.¹⁴ This is due partly to each of the following reasons: the definition of orthodoxy as the acceptance of śruti, the role of speech in the most prominent accounts of the nature of the world, and the prominence of chanting in the everyday religious observances of Hindus.¹⁵

¹⁴"Among the themes intensely pondered in the Vedantic tradition, none is more central than that of language. The Indian interest in the language problem goes back to the Rgveda, according to which Vāc or Vāk (personified speech) is the ultimate principle of the universe. The importance of the speech principle continues through the Brahmanas and the Upanishads in manifold ways." -- J. G. Arapura, "Language and Knowledge: A Vedantic Examination of a Barthian Issue", p. 151. Cf. Arapura, "Language and Phenomena", pp. 43-45.

Cf. W. Whillier, Vāk.

¹⁵These famous mantrams, which the Hindus think so much of, are nothing more than prayers or consecrated formulas, but they are considered so powerful that they can, as the Hindus say, enchain the power of the gods themselves. Mantrams are used for invocation, for evocation, or as spells. They may be either preservative or destructive, beneficent, or maleficent, salutary or harmful. In fact, there is no effect that they are not capable of producing." -- Abbé J. A. Dubois, Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies, p. 138.

For a discussion of the relation of modern popular Hinduism to the Veda see J. Gonda, Change and Continuity in Indian Religion, pp. 7-19.

The argument for the authority of the Vedas is based on a general argument about the origin of language and the Vedas in particular as well as an argument about the limits of reason. It, therefore, seeks to prove that not only are the Vedas the origin of language, hence of all beings and knowledge, but also that it gives us particular information which we cannot do without and which cannot be obtained elsewhere. Because of this importance a vast literature of interpretation of Veda has grown up called Vedāṅga. It is due to the concern with a theory of grammar, one of the six Vedāṅgas, that some of the major discussions about language in general have taken place, e.g., the śphotavāda discussion.

Śaṅkara's discussion of the nature of the world as adhyāsa is one of the most prominent and the one which we will be most inclined to consult and accept. This discussion is implied by the early vedic speculations about Vāc as well as the later concern with Aum. Adhyāsa, Śaṅkara says, is the superimposition of name and form upon the actual substratum which is Brahman.¹⁶ The world

¹⁶Thibaut, VSSB, "Introduction", Vol. I, pp. 3-9.

The discussion of adhyāsa is most carefully developed in VSSB 2.1.14 where it forms an extensive discussion of ChU 6.1.4 and ChU 6.4.1.

"Brahman" itself, it is sometimes pointed out, is related to language because it can mean "prayer." See Monier-Williams, p. 737. But Gonda, (Notes on Brahman) says there is insufficient proof on an etymological basis. His rejection of Brahman's connection with prayer is only a rejection of superficiality and a particular methodology, for there is an intrinsic and direct connection shown by Gonda between sacred language and the foundation of things (Brahman). He traces the meaning of Brahman from the root brh, meaning "strength" or "power" (p.20 et passim) through its likeness to a mountain "the firm ground which remains unchanged in all the unrest of mutation" (p.36) which is also rta, to "a fundamental principle on which everything rests" (p.47) and hence to language (p.57), and the keeper of language, Brhaspati (p.67).

is hence determined by its linguistic nature, the substance of which is hidden by its form. Hence the knowledge about what truly is is to be obtained primarily through an enquiry into the nature of Brahman and secondarily through an enquiry into the nature of language. However, our main concern will be to understand how language must be appropriated such that both enquiries are meaningful and what this appropriation implies about the nature of things.

I

THE MODERN CRITICISM OF LINGUISTIC SCIENCE AND ETYMOLOGY IN THE CHĀNDOGYA UPANISAD

1. Opinions of Chāndogya Upaniṣad Etymology.

The modern science of philology embodies some of the most potent weapons ever to be turned against religious tradition. Similarly it provides a tremendous defense of novelty and positivism. From its inception by Leibniz to its culmination in Von Humboldt, to the modern positivistic transformation of Von Humboldt, philology has been dominated by historical assertions about language and the world. Leibniz explained the origins of language in sounds or signs which served communication. Language, as an instrument for use in a world which can be completely described by dynamics, is itself no more than a part of that world. But that world is being progressively transformed through the proper use of language and man's other dynamic instruments, and hence language evolves just as the world and man in it does. Von Humboldt simply added that this transformation of the whole is the purpose of man and that the language which best serves as both transformer and the transformable is most valuable to man. Conversely, that language which is least dynamic is most detrimental.

Modern philology was most encouraged by its discovery of Sanskrit¹ and Sanskrit study was likewise promoted by philology. Indeed many of the greatest philologists and etymologists were eminent Sanskritists whose interpretations and translations remain some of the most cogent available to the English reader. Max Muller and W. D. Whitney still hold enormous influence and prestige among contemporary philologists and orientalists.² And it is a commonplace among discussions of Pāṇini's grammar and Yāska's Nirukta to state that in these works we have the origins in one way or another of scientific philology and etymology.³ Such a mutual

¹Otto Jespersen, Language Its Nature, Development and Origin, p. 33.

²W. D. Lehmann, A Reader in Nineteenth Century Historical Indo-European Linguistics, pp. 225-226.

³Lakshman Sarup (trans. and ed.), The Nighantu and the Nirukta: The Oldest Indian Treatise on Etymology, Philology and Semantics, pp. 3, 54, and 64-66. Also S. K. Chatterji, "Levels of Linguistic Analysis" in Bulletin of the Philological Society of Calcutta, Vol. 7, 1966. In this article the author shows a great deal of understanding of the difference between modern philology and Indian studies of language. He opts, however, for the modern understanding of language and hence the science it requires even while attempting to account for the Indian view.

warmth notwithstanding, modern philology has thrust hard at the source of this warmth and left one of the central prides of Sanskrit, its explanation of the meanings of words by means of their elements, sorely wounded.⁴ For time and again the painstaking efforts of the Upanisads to understand words by analyzing them are mocked by philologists as "fanciful."

To explain the depths of modern philology is not the task of this writer. But in briefly delineating its course and explicit pronouncements we believe that the modern concern with language can be differentiated significantly from the concern which we encounter in the Upanisads. We may thereby expose the subjects which must be explained in attempting to understand the doctrine of language maintained by one of the wisest and most highly regarded of these texts. In delineating modern philology we must deal with its development as well as its more basic principles, even though our treatment may be only elementary. In so doing, our ignorance and misunderstanding in the face of a very foreign treatment of language will force us to turn from our modern definitions of the Indian activities, namely as philology and etymology, which are themselves designations provided by modern philology, and turn towards the reasons which promoted "fanciful etymology."

⁴For an example of this thrust on the basis of a "process" view of languages see "Introduction" to Sanskrit Grammar by W. D. Whitney.

For all modern philologists are agreed upon one thing: the early Sanskritists were dreadful when it came to proposing an etymology. "Max Muller who produced an excellent and extremely helpful translation of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad could not resist a jibe at the earlier "philologists." "The commentator [Śaṅkara] supplies explanations to all these fanciful etymologies. ...All this is very childish, and worse than childish, but it is interesting as a phase of human folly which is not restricted to the Brahmins of India."⁵ Swāhānanda, a recent translator of the Upaniṣad, follows suit. "Here again another fanciful etymology is made use of for clarifying another doctrine."⁶ J. Gonda goes for a more general condemnation. Commentators were led, he says in reference to etymologies, "to invent fantastic explanations of more or less obscure proper names" and this inventiveness strayed into the field of ordinary words also.⁷ R. E. Hume is moderately disposed toward the etymologies "which now appear absurd,

⁵F. Max Muller (trans.), The Upanishads, Part I in Sacred Books of the East, Vol. I, fn. p. 8.

⁶Swāhānanda (trans.), The Chāndogya Upaniṣad, p. 448.

⁷J. Gonda, Notes on Names and the Name of God in Ancient India, pp. 20 and 29. In 1953 Gonda expressed clearly his linguistic/historicist interest very much in the language of Max Muller (Reflections on the Numerals "One" and "Two" in Ancient Indo-European Languages, pp. 5 & 9) and summarized himself by quoting Von Humboldt (p. 11). He did however indicate that there were some problems in an historicist approach and seemed to opt for a "value-free" phenomenology. By 1959 he seemed to be attempting to effect a reunion with comparative linguistics and indology by contributing to syntactical studies through the study of vedic style (Stylistic Repetition in the Veda). He states certain principles necessary to such a contribution to which we can heartily subscribe even though our overall purposes may not coincide with his.

...we should not consider any deviation from the requirements of our modern Western logic or our classical ideal a defect in an Indian literary product or a logical shortcoming, we should not regard as identical phenomena those which at first sight have a strong resemblance to one another. (p. 14)

but which originally were regarded as important explanations."⁸

Wilhelm Von Humboldt would have agreed with this widespread opinion.

"The Hindu grammarians constructed their system, certainly too artificial but on the whole remarkably clever, on the assumption that the vocabulary present in their language could be explained entirely by its own material. They therefore regarded their language as an original one and thought they had excluded all possibility of the assimilation of foreign loan words in the course of time. Both assumptions were indisputably false."⁹ Franklin Edgerton also concurs: "Sometimes the identification is made only by what we should call verbal distortions or bad puns; but to the authors these are just as serious as what we might term sound 'philological' identifications."¹⁰ Von Humboldt and Edgerton have a very restrained view of what is going on but even with them the same thing seems to be present, namely that etymology as we understand it was being attempted in the old Vedic texts. Even a modern Indian scholar,

⁸R. E. Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, p. 7.

⁹Wilhelm von Humboldt, Linguistic Variability and Intellectual Development, p. 73.

¹⁰Franklin Edgerton, "The Upanishads: What do They Seek and Why", p. 111.

Fatah Singh, the author of a very valuable and highly sympathetic reference work, must finally conclude that although much that is enlightening about various authors' thoughts with respect to words is to be gleaned from their etymologies, the etymologies themselves are sometimes "artificial" and "hypothetical."¹¹ This is a serious difficulty; for the word, "sāman" which explicitly poses this dilemma to him, is central to the ChU where the etymology in question occurs.

2. The Growth and Nature of Modern Philology

Philology is the study of the origin, structure, and growth of language.¹² More specifically philology seeks to know how language changes. W. D. Whitney, still one of the most venerated of philologists and one of the greatest Sanskrit scholars,¹³ says in The Life and Growth of Language that linguistic science, that is philology, sets out

to discover the cause of resemblances and differences of languages and to effect a classification of them. ...It seeks to determine what language is in relation to thought, and how it came to sustain this

¹¹Fatah Singh, The Vedic Etymology: A Critical Evaluation of the Science of Etymology as found in Vedic Literature, p.c. and p.230.

¹²R. V. Jahagirdar, An Introduction to the Comparative Philology of Indo-Aryan Languages, p. 154.

¹³Lehmann, p. 226, "Any member of the Linguistic Society of America knows the veneration still accorded him." and Jespersen, p.88, "The leading exponent of general linguistics after the death of Schleicher...".

relation; what keeps up its life and what has kept it in existence in past time, and even, if possible, how it came into existence at all. It seeks to know what language is worth to the mind, and what has been its part in the development of our race. And, less directly, it seeks to learn and set forth what it may of the history of human development, and of the history of races, their movements and connections, so far as these are to be read in the facts of language. ¹⁴

With this definition of the realm of philology most modern linguists would concur.¹⁵ The study of language is thus an historical science of an entity which is best considered as a living creature or an integral part of a biological entity which changes with it. Hence philology as the study of a type of natural history invites a Darwinian approach and the jargon of the ethnologist.

Philologists are divided as to the exact role of philology as a historical discipline. Sir William Jones and Friedrich Von Schlegel agree that linguistics is only one of many ways of studying antiquity. Franz Bopp believed historical relations could be discovered through comparative grammar. Jacob Grimm believed that although we may never find a record of the actual origin of language

¹⁴W. D. Whitney, The Life and Growth of Language: An Outline of Linguistic Science, p. 4.

¹⁵Cf. August Schleicher, "A Compendium of Comparative Grammar" in Lehmann, p. 90, and Jacob Grimm, "Germanic Grammar" in Lehmann, p. 55. Also Heidegger, On the Way to Language, pp. 115-119.

we may nonetheless discover its theoretical origin. Such a discovery depends on a knowledge of the actual historical relationships between languages which permit extrapolations according to demonstrated sound shifts. Hence as to philology's historical concern there is virtual unanimity.¹⁶

The biological approach in philology has been consistent as witnessed by some of the most prominent titles in the field, viz., Whitney's The Life and Growth of Language, Max Muller's Biographies of Words ..., Jespersen's Language Its Nature, Development, and Origin, Von Raumer's "Die sprachgeschichtliche Umwandlung und die naturgeschichtliche Bestimmung der Laute," (Zeitschrift fur die Osterreichischen Gymnasien, V, 1856), etc. Von Schlegel drew heavily on biology for his methodology.¹⁷ The climax of this kind of thought in which language is viewed as an integral evolutionary and thus racial determinant of the biological entity man occurs in Wilhelm Von Humboldt's Uber die

¹⁶"There is only one 'object of study': specific acts of speech, as historic events, in their behavioral settings, observable in part overtly and in different part introspectively; this includes certain earlier acts of speech observable only through written records." -- Hockett, The State of the Art, p. 65.

¹⁷"Schlegel also is applauded for introducing the term 'comparative grammar' into linguistics. In basing this term on comparative anatomy and incorporating the notion of family trees for languages, he drew on biology for linguistic methodology, foreshadowing Schleicher and his reliance on Darwinism." -- Lehmann, p. 25.

Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss
auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschichts.

Although the professional terminology has changed, the principles of modern philology do not seem to have significantly changed since philology's foundation by Leibniz in a dynamic conception of the universe. If this is so then the judgements of the most recent philologists about Sanskrit linguistic theory will be fundamentally the same as their more outspoken predecessors. Indeed philologists seem to be agreed in despising linguistic science prior to 1800. Whitney states that "the body of truth discovered in earlier times has been so small, that the science of language is to be regarded as a modern one, as much so as geology and chemistry; it belongs like them, to the nineteenth century."¹⁸ A contemporary philologist, Alan Ross, agrees saying that "true Comparative Philology" began some one-hundred-fifty years ago. He distinguishes this modern "scientific 'Etymology'" from "Popular Etymology" and says of the latter, "This subject is one quite without value" and "is one of the great breeders of popular fallacies."¹⁹

Why this is held to be the case is explained by one of the most highly respected contemporary linguists, Charles Hockett, during

¹⁸ Whitney, The Life and Growth of Languages, pp. 4 -5.

¹⁹ Alan S. C. Ross, Etymology, pp. 42 and 68.

the course of an attack on Noam Chomsky, another linguistic theorist. Hockett says, "Every language is undergoing at all times, a slow but unceasing process of linguistic change."²⁰ In support of this he quotes the great linguist Leonard Bloomfield:

It may be urged that change in language is due ultimately to the deviations of individuals from the rigid system. But it appears that even here individual variations are ineffective; whole groups of speakers must, for some reason unknown to us, coincide in a deviation, if it is to result in a linguistic change. Change in language does not reflect individual variability, but seems to be a massive, uniform, and gradual alteration, at every moment of which the system is just as rigid as at every other moment.²¹

Hockett explains and supports Bloomfield theoretically and through an explanatory model. Theoretically he demonstrates by an examination of individual speech acts and by drawing a distinction between a "well-defined" and "ill-defined" system of language that "A language is a kind of system in which every actual utterance, whether spoken aloud or merely thought to oneself, at one and the same time by and large conforms to (or manifests) the system, and changes the system, however slightly. The distinction between

²⁰Hockett, p. 13.

²¹L. Bloomfield, "Review of J. O. H. Jespersen, The Philosophy of Grammar" in Journal of English and Germanic Philology, quoted in Hockett, p. 13.

system-conforming and system-changing events cannot, in principle, be made."²² He demonstrates this by the example of a clock powered by an induction motor and the criterion by which we would be able to say that it runs smoothly or by jerks.²³ Thus for Hockett and for Hockett's interpretation of Bloomfield, which seems to be correct, the very essence of language is change.

It follows, therefore, that language in the form of any text cannot possibly be an ultimate authority about the nature of things. The careful study of the development of languages through old inscriptions, writings and the origins of current usages can only inform us about history. In an essay entitled, "New Proposals", Leibniz says, "I maintain that of everything not written the spoken languages themselves are the best and the most significant remains of the past on which we can draw for light on the origins of peoples, and often, on the origins of things."²⁴ This continues to be a central impetus in philological research. History is of importance according to Leibniz because it inspires men to seek a place in it, it provides a "record of the advantages mankind has already gained

²²Hockett, p. 83.

²³Ibid., p. 85.

²⁴Leibniz, "New Proposals", trans. by P. P. Wiener in Leibniz Selections, p. 577.

over nature"²⁵ (i.e., history demonstrates progress), and it is the absolutely necessary basis for a proof of the truth of any religion (i.e., any religion must be able to prove historically that it has a "wholly divine origin"²⁶ to be a true and convincing religion.) Leibniz sought to institute philological studies of this sort by, among other things, a letter to Peter the Great of Russia in which he urges that all the languages be recorded and compared by making "complete dictionaries and grammars of the languages opposite one another."²⁷ This initiative bore fruit as Peter the Great and Catherine II promoted the project and huge catalogues of all languages then known were formed.²⁸

Credit also has been given to Leibniz for freeing man of "the prejudice that Hebrew had been the primitive speech of mankind."²⁹

²⁵Ibid., p. 576.

²⁶Ibid., p. 578.

²⁷Leibniz, "Letter to Peter the Great," trans. by Wiener in Leibniz Selections, p. 599.

²⁸Jespersen, p. 22.

²⁹W. B. Lockwood, Indo European Philology, p. 21.

In a very remarkable work, "Dialogue on the Connection Between Things and Words," Leibniz concludes that words begin in "the arbitrary will"³⁰ of man. They are signs by which man is able to reason for only by signs and symbols can reason occur; language in its ultimate form being a type of mathematics which reflects the order of things as they are. As such a mathematical entity language has as its final purpose bringing forth the maximum number of new statements about things.³¹ But the words themselves are nothing but matter which has gained its meanings through union with reason.³² Any number of languages could have started wherever

³⁰Leibniz, "Dialogue on the Connection Between Things and Words," trans. by Wiener in Leibniz Selections, p. 8. "I believe in fact that without the desire to have ourselves understood we should never have formed any mode of language, but once formed, language serves man in reasoning by himself..." -- Leibniz, New Essays on the Human Understanding, Bk. III, Ch. 1, Part 2, trans. by G. M. Duncan in Leibniz Selections, p. 449. This was written as a direct and complementary response to Locke.

³¹Leibniz, "Towards a Universal Characteristic," trans. by Wiener in Leibniz Selections, p. 18. Language can and should "embrace both the technique of discovering new propositions and their critical examination," ibid., p. 18. Cf. "New Proposals," p. 578. By "mathematical" it is meant that each word has one single and constant meaning like a number or an algebraic symbol.

³²Leibniz, "A Letter to M. Remond de Montmort, containing Remarks on the Book of Father Tertre against Father Malebranche," trans. by G. M. Duncan in Leibniz Selections, p. 554.

and whenever men desired to be understood. If God has spoken to men he has adopted their pre-formed language for his speeches but this language was not the most perfect possible language as that language has yet to be formed. Thus it is that a "secure ethics"³³ has also not yet been given to man because the language which is unambiguous and in which it is possible to write without error³⁴ has not yet been made. Hence the arbiter of truth is men's reason and not any particular text.

The linguistic theory of Leibniz still flourishes not only in philology but in symbolic logic and the linguistic analysis of contemporary philosophy. Linguistic theory, it seems, has broad implications for thought or at least is symptomatic of a trend in thought. Through Leibniz, language was conceived as a physical entity subject to the laws of physics. Because the physical world was dynamic so was language. But because it was adopted as a special tool by man its change was dictated not only by physical laws of phonetics, sound changes, and the physiognomy of the mouth but also by the mental capacity and instinctual disposition of the race. Hence insofar as man is a historical creature, that is one who is

³³Leibniz, "Preface to the General Science," trans. by Wiener in Leibniz Selections, p. 13.

³⁴Ibid., p. 16.

never complete but always coming to be and is hence totally enfolded in temporality,³⁵ so is his language. His language, conceived historically, is thus no closer to the eternal than his teeth.

The de-sacralization of language is an explicit part of philology. This is clear in Leibniz³⁶ and is strongly reiterated by Whitney.

If language itself were a gift, a faculty, a capacity, it might admit of being regarded as the subject of direct bestowal; being only a result, a historical result, to assert that it sprang into developed being along with man is to assert a miracle; the doctrine has no right to make its appearance except in company with a general miraculous account of the beginnings of human existence. That view of the nature of language which linguistic science establishes takes entirely away the foundation on which the doctrine of divine origin, in its form as once held, reposed.

The human capacity to which the production of language is most directly due is, as has been seen, the power of intelligently, and not by blind instinct alone, adapting means to ends.³⁷

The assertion that language is not divine also seemed to be indicated in one of the first discoveries of modern philology.

³⁵G. P. Grant, Time as History, p. 27.

³⁶Lockwood, Indo-European Philology, p. 21.

³⁷W. D. Whitney, The Life and Growth of Language, pp. 302-303. Cf. Max Müller, Biographies of Words, pp. 17 and 20.

For some time it had been believed that Hebrew was the original language of man, spoken to him by God. Hence all language was a modification of Hebrew. Sir William Jones, the first Western Sanskritist and one of the first modern philologists divided language into three families: Indic, Arabic, and Tartar³⁸ and made it clear thereby that Hebrew is not related to Indo-European. Later Schleicher confirmed what was at the time an improperly documented division.³⁹ The original language of the divine was hence no longer thought related to the language of the spirit for Western Christianity. That is, Hebrew, it was thought, had been superseded by Indo-European and was in no way related to the spirit of Christianity.

For those who no longer believed that what moved men could transcend their particular language the linguistic and hence spiritual origin of the best development among men passed by philological means from the Jews to the Aryans. The consequent supposed radical superiority of Aryan to Hebrew did not pass unnoticed and this superiority was not lacking in violent implications for those who asserted Hebrew speech against Aryan. "There is no Aryan race in blood, but whoever,

³⁸Friedrich Von Schlegel, "Language and Wisdom of the Indians," in Lehmann, p. 28.

³⁹August Schleicher, "Introduction to a Compendium of the Comparative Grammar of the Indo-European, Sanskrit, Greek and Latin Languages," in Lehmann, pp. 87-96.

through the imposition of hands, whether of his parents or his foreign masters, has received the Aryan blessing, belongs to that unbroken spiritual succession which began with the first apostles of that noble speech, and continues to the present day in every part of the globe."⁴⁰ Nietzsche, a philologist who was deeply aware of this general opinion, remarked acidly, "It is a curious thing that God learned Greek when he wished to turn author -- and that he did not learn it better."⁴¹

We have seen how the early concern in philology was to establish the genealogy and hence pedigree of languages. In so doing, it was believed that laws of change in language as well as in the history of man in general would exhibit themselves. What man is as shown in his relationship to that which had been the constant home and companion of his spirit would be demonstrated. One particular concrete result of successful philology (and its most characteristic result) is to be able to give a true account of the coming to be of particular words and the relationship of them to other words. This result is an etymology. The true account of a word is how it came to be or its history.

⁴⁰ "Max Muller, Biographies of Words and the Home of the Aryans, p. 89. Cf. "On the Primary Differences between Languages in Accordance with the Purity of Their Principle of Formation," Ch. 19 of von Humboldt's Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues... in Lehmann, pp. 65-66. This contains a sustained argument for the superiority ("everything of benefit to the spirit which can develop from language") of Aryan speech on the basis of its thorough inflectional system against which the "weakness of the language-forming instinct" can be seen in non-Aryans.

⁴¹ F. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, #121, p. 86.

The relationship between languages is ascertained by the regularity of differences and similarities between different languages. That languages could be explained in terms of the regularity of their differences from other languages and that some forms of speech are prior to other different forms indicated that language changes according to certain laws of its own. The change of language was thought to be mechanical whenever more minute differences could be accounted for. Jacob Grimm and Karl Verner contributed much to this argument. Grimm concludes his presentation of the rules of sound shifts, "Grimm's law", by saying "[Two types of similar sound shifts] are great events in the history of our language and neither is without inner necessity. It is almost not to be overlooked that each gradation fills ever smaller circles."⁴² Verner strengthened the mechanical view in an article described by Lehmann as possibly "the single most influential publication in linguistics."⁴³ "Eine Ausnahme der ersten Lautverschiebung." But on the other hand the intimate bond between thought and language suggested that linguistic change was related to the coming to be of reason and its products. Language hence seemed to be a clear record of the progress of thought and of the inevitability of the progress. The languages of those countries in which industrializ-

⁴² Jacob Grimm, "Germanic Grammar," trans. in Lehmann p. 57, from Deutsche Grammatik, I, p. 590. Cf. Lehmann p. 48 from Deutsche Grammatik, I, p. 580.

⁴³ Lehmann, p. 132. Karl Verner, "Eine Ausnahme der ersten Lautverschiebung," Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung auf dem Gebiete der Indogermanischen Sprachen, 23.2 (1875), 97-130.

ation and modern science was most advanced, hence had the most advanced linguistic tools. Thought and meaning understood by the evidence of words, i.e., philologically, is thus mechanical and explicable as an historical phenomenon.

"Max Muller, the great Sanskrit scholar who also translated Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, was outspoken in maintaining that philology could inform philosophy about the meaning of things because of the mechanical and historical character of the words which designate them. "From most philosophers we get but uncertain and evasive answers to these questions, and perhaps even here, in the darkest passages of psychological and metaphysical inquiry, a true knowledge of language may prove our best guide."⁴⁴ Although he carefully implies in The Science of Thought and Biographies of Words... that great and thoughtful decisions mark changes in linguistic usage his ultimate belief in the biological nature of linguistic change is betrayed by his own casual treatment of the great thoughts and thinkers involved (he explains Śāṅkara as half-educated)⁴⁵ and by his adherence to the physiological and mechanical accounts of linguistic change. Max Muller shows clearly what it means to believe that thought is an historical process. The

⁴⁴"Max Muller, Biographies of Words, p. 46.

⁴⁵"Max Muller, The Upanishads, p. lxxx.

human mind, he says, climbed up from the lower valleys of mere matter of fact to the commanding heights of abstract thought. Men appropriate words to approximate intimations about things and as the intimations are refined so are the words but sometimes the words resist the transformation.⁴⁶ In examining what "typical" is he states what its root meant, what it came to mean, and then states that in discerning that potential which could and only could be transformed into its present use the true meaning of a word has been ascertained.⁴⁷ Nietzsche draws this argument into its ultimate form very succinctly:

The wonderful family resemblance of all Indian, Greek, and German philosophising is easily enough explained. In fact, where there is affinity of language, owing to the common philosophy of grammar -- I mean owing to the unconscious domination and guidance of similar grammatical functions -- it cannot but be that everything is prepared at the outset for a similar development and succession of philosophical

⁴⁶Max Muller, Biographies of Words, p. 45.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 56. "Typos, however derived from τύπτειν, must originally have meant that which strikes or that which is struck, and before it could be applied to a mere outline it must have meant the rude figure hammered out of metal or chiselled out of stone. This was called the type of a man, before it became his likeness; it was therefore the general form of man, and thus only could type have been used afterwards for the general form or idea of a thing, and a typical instance be employed in the sense of a general example, containing all that is really essential." Max Müller's choice of words to examine is not accidental. The typical usage contains the real essence of the meaning of things and this meaning is historical. To the extent that he does not accept the mechanical view of thought and language Max Müller has been heavily criticized by Whitney and modern linguists.

systems; just as the way seems barred against certain other possibilities of world-interpretation. It is highly probable that philosophers within the domain of the Ural-Altaic languages (where the conception of the subject is least developed) look otherwise 'into the world,' and will be found on paths of thought different from those of the Indo-Germans and Mussulmans, the spell of certain grammatical functions is ultimately also the spell of physiological valuations and racial conditions. ⁴⁸

At the same time as the full flowering of the mechanically progressing view of language, the opinion first expressed by Sir William Jones that the original language of the Indo-Europeans was not Sanskrit gained wide adherence. Proto Indo-European was referred to as the theoretical predecessor of all Indo-European languages. Grassman maintained successfully that Germanic retained some forms that were older than those retained by Sanskrit and thereby ended the general concern with the genealogy of language and focused concern on the simple process of linguistic change. Because progress in language was most important the origin became of consequence only insofar as it had potential for development. As Max Müller put it, "To know what a thing is, we must always try to learn what it can become."⁴⁹

⁴⁸Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, #20, p. 29.

⁴⁹Max Müller, Biographies of Words, p. 17.

Progress occurs due to thought and its activity in language. Insofar as progress was seen as the purpose of language and progress was inevitable and endless, the change in language or its dynamism was the most important subject of study. The hope that meaning can be understood from the potential plus its manifestations was negated by the fact that language had not fully developed. Language was viewed in this way, i.e., as pure process, by "one of the profoundest thinkers in the domain of linguistics," Wilhelm Von Humboldt.⁵⁰ Language is not a finished product, he says, but an activity. "It lies in the nature of language to be a progressive development under the influence of the intellectual power of its speakers in every case."⁵¹ It needs freedom to go its own way which is also the way of thought. Novelty, in all aspects of speech, is hence an extremely important part of a living language. Those languages which are not undergoing continuous and even fundamental change although they may be used by great numbers of men or the best among them are "dead" languages and hence no longer of consequence to thought.

The true advantage of a language is only its development from a guiding principle and with a factor of freedom, enabling it to maintain all intellectual capacities of man in a state of lively activity, to serve them as a

⁵⁰Jespersen, p. 53.

⁵¹Wilhelm von Humboldt, Chapter 16, p. 121.

sufficient vehicle of communication, and, by semantic repleteness and intellectual governing principles which it preserves, to exert always a stimulating effect. In this formal qualitative aptitude reposes everything developed from language that reacts beneficially upon the intellect. ⁵²

Changes in language are seen to be due in part to physiology.

Rudolf Von Raumer after examining the physical production of speech sounds concludes, in part, "since the [phonetic] change is not due to an individual peculiarity of the speaker, but rather to the mechanism of the human speech organs in general, among the other members of society it will also be effected, not merely through imitation, but also through the structure of their own speech organs."⁵³ The dynamic mechanism of language hence implies that the physiological characteristics of the majority of speakers, i.e., race, will determine its development. Indeed the appearance of a particular language is to be accounted for by its inventors' physiology. It is claimed by Von Humboldt that:

Feebleness of the speech building drive in some cases, as in Chinese, does not allow the inflectional method to react with the phoneme; in other cases, such as in those languages which follow only an incorporative process, it is not permitted to predominate freely. ⁵⁴

⁵²Ibid., p. 125.

⁵³Rudolf von Raumer, "Die Sprachgeschichtliche Ummwandlung und die naturgeschichtliche Bestimmung der Laute," Zeitschrift für die österreichischen Gymnasien V (1856), 353-73 in Lehmann, p. 74.

⁵⁴Wilhelm von Humboldt, pp. 123-124.

Lest there be any doubt that Von Humboldt has here formulated his criterion for racial evaluation he adds to the preceding quotation that "the inflectional method appears to be a genial one, proceeding from the true intuition of the language."

The best language, that is the language with the best manifested potential for scientific progress, is due to the best physiology, in the main, of its speakers. The cultivation of the spirit and thus of the full flowering of language involves the removal from discourse of those with weak inflectional instincts. Aryan languages,⁵⁵ being the source of science, and Germanic in particular, being its vanguard, the assimilation or presence of Jewish speakers, who are characterized by inflectional weakness, constitutes a definite threat

⁵⁵The Aryan/Semitic distinction, it should be clear, is a modern philological distinction which pretends to classify whole collections of peoples but in fact refers to two very specific peoples, Germans and Jews. "Semitic" comes from a distinction in Genesis 10-11 (Whitney, The Life and Growth of Language, p. 246). The ancestor of the Jews who was a son of Noah was Shem. While Aryan refers, insofar as one is concerned with its essential form, to Germanic.

to the life and growth of language and the spirit.⁵⁶ Like Whitney,

⁵⁶ It is on this argument that the evaluation of languages rests. Heidegger for example begins with the historical doctrine of etymology. In What is Called Thinking, Lecture III (p.138 in the Wieck and Gray translation) he demonstrates his belief that words have histories and the origin of the word reveals what is essentially true about the word. Words, however, are inextricably tied to the physiology of the speaker. "Language is the tongue." and "Language is the flower of the mouth." (Heidegger, On The Way To Language, trans. P. D. Hertz, pp. 96 & 99). Now etymology "proves" that the purity of a language is necessary if it is not to lose any power or meaning. (Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Manheim, p. 61.) But what is the power desired on the basis of which one should effect a purification? It is a language's transformative power. "...a transformation of language is needed which we can neither compel nor invent." (Heidegger, On The Way To Language, p. 135.) The transformation is dependent on the language of a dynamic people. Heidegger explicitly agrees with von Humboldt in this (Heidegger, On The Way To Language, p. 116.) drawing the same conclusion that Greek and Germanic are the highest languages (Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 47). He concludes that the transformative power is released in poetry and philosophy. "All reflective thinking is poetic, and all poetry in turn is a kind of thinking." (Heidegger, On The Way To Language, p. 136.) To clarify this and in approbation he quotes von Humboldt: "All this is a lasting fruit of a people's literature, and within literature essentially of poetry and philosophy." (Heidegger, On The Way To Language, p. 136, quoted from von Humboldt, p. 65 where it is translated differently.)

The domain of modern linguistics impresses one by the extreme specialization the field requires and the subtlety of judgement required to make etymological decisions. Indeed it is apparent that there has been considerable cooling of enthusiasm for the construction of etymologies largely due to the factors now recognized as present in any linguistic transformation. Ross gives several examples of this and warns that the conclusions to be drawn from a stated etymology had best be drawn by an etymologist. Gonda provides an effective criticism of a particular type of historical etymology in Notes on Brahman (particularly p. 4). Yakov Malkiel perhaps best sums up the collective judgement of contemporary linguists in Etymological Dictionaries, which was published in 1976 and provides an up to date survey of etymology:

Approximately one hundred years ago, William D. Whitney in one of the classics of nineteenth-century linguistics, The Life and Growth of Language, declared emphatically that etymology,

"
Max Muller denies the racial and implicitly anti-Jewish results of
their disciplines but like Whitney he adheres to Von Humboldt's
argument and evaluation.⁵⁷

i.e., the study of word origins, was the
cornerstone of any progressive, truly scientific
inquiry into language. Few practitioners and
even fewer theorists of general linguistics
today would subscribe to such a flattering
assessment of the role of etymology, a discipline
whose fall from high estate, accelerated over the
last thirty or forty years, has been quite
dramatic. (p. vii.)

That other contemporary and professional etymologists seem on
the one hand to have lost their nerve in asserting historical or actual
relationships between words of different languages or on the other hand
in evaluating languages does not imply that they have relaxed their
disdain and judgement. For example Ross' evaluation, already quoted,
is accompanied by a disclaimer that his judgement about popular etymology
is only in the context of certain "axioms" of Comparative Philology whose
final validity he implies cannot be argued but is only due to a subject-
ive choice of definitions etc., etc. Modern researches prove even more
clearly how specious an argument is which proceeds by an etymology
(particularly one that can be proved wrong even though the correct one
cannot be proved). But at the same time they can be taken to prove
how subtle is the determination of thought by language and history.
Similarly, the loss of concern for either past civilizations or the con-
stitution of the good in favor of a simple devotion to the service of
dynamism in no way negates those explicit or implicit evaluations of what
is most dynamic.

This is not to say that any doctrine of language which views lan-
guage as something which changes need necessarily be racist. But in the
absence of any contrary metaphysics the presence of the elements outlined
above leads to a rather predictable outcome. Linguists like Hockett on
the other hand posit change as indigenous to all languages and are loathe
to say anything more than this.

⁵⁷"The testimony of language to race is thus not that of a physical
characteristic...." (Whitney, The Life and Growth of Language, p.271.)
"Aryan, in scientific language is utterly inapplicable to race." (Max
Müller, Biographies of Words, p. 89.)

But: "The Semitic family of languages and races is, after the Indo-
European, by far the most prominent in the history of the world. None
but the Semites have, since the dawn of the historic period, seriously dis-
puted with our family the headship of the human race; and, of the three
great conquering religions, two, Christianity and Mohammedanism, are of
Semitic birth -- although the former won its world-wide dominion in connec-
tion with its transfer to the hands of Indo-Europeans, the Greeks and Romans."
(Whitney, The Life and Growth of Language, pp.247-248. See Max Müller,
Biographies of Words, p. 89. quoted above on pp. 8-9.

The further consequence of this principle of the evaluation of language is that judgements about those things spoken of within language, as it were, become impossible. In the preeminence of change and novelty it is clear that we live in ignorance of that about which we speak and the end of this ignorance is dependent on transformations of speech which occur of themselves. These transformations are dependent on the passage of time, the developments of speech among men, and the devotion of those people to novelty. Philology can meanwhile discover the techniques of transforming language by carefully attending the way language changes using a purely hypothetical a priori original language, such as Proto Indo-European, for the sake of developing models and descriptions. Scientific "etymology" is dependent in the end on a proper knowledge of the way things change.⁵⁸ But because of living in the middle of process speech can never make certain or true judgements about what is good.

3. The Mutual Contradiction Between the Tenets of Modern Philology and those of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad

Language, as the philologist understands it, is thus a dynamic entity which is moved by instincts attempting to overcome necessity.

⁵⁸Ross, p. 42.

It has no inherent relation to truth but only to physiognomy. Truth simply is an unknown external limit to statements' applicability. For language is an historical entity which cannot therefore join its speaker with all that is. It is neither given by, founded in, or especially related to the eternal. Its origin although necessary is not good. It is made by man to serve his most basic desires in response to an inherently evil world. If the Good manifests itself at all it is at the end of an infinite process.

It is with respect to such a theory of language that philology has continuously from the time of Leibniz defined its role. It concerns itself with explaining language as an historical entity. It hence produces "comparative grammars" instead of "prescriptive grammars" as language has not achieved a perfect form.⁵⁹ Similarly its dictionaries are based on historical principles to demonstrate an openness to the coming to be of meanings or they are simply collections to assert the impossibility of judgement about the principle meaning of a word, and so forth. Etymology, which is established by philology, is the record of the changes of a word and the accompanying uses according to philology's proper knowledge of the way language changes. An etymology is the fruit of a dynamic language tree.

⁵⁹Jespersen, p. 24.

It is apparent that there is a total ontological orientation underlying the modern philological-etymological approach to language.⁶⁰ We cannot hope to explore it further here as it would entail more than a thesis, much less an introduction to one, but in considering the nature of an etymology which philologists claim is attempted in literature such as the Chāndogya Upaniṣad we may be given to understand that the total orientation of the philologist is contrary to that of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad in which the analysis of words forms an integral part. It may be that many philologists have misinterpreted the significance of history, that to believe history is significant is a misinterpretation of the world, or it may be that the lack of history is an error filled omission in Upaniṣadic thought. These seem to

⁶⁰One of the greatest theoreticians in philology was Nietzsche and it would be necessary to study him carefully in order to thoroughly examine philology. Nonetheless he has been attacked vehemently by philologists while much of his writing constitutes an attack on the same philology which has been described herein. His response to von Humboldt's theory of linguistic evaluation (in Beyond Good and Evil) replaces "potential for manifestation" as a criterion by "non-historical or textual depth of meaning." While German is mocked for its inferiority in this respect Hebrew is said to be the most excellent. Nietzsche introduced the idea of foreground and background meanings as a method of textual and linguistic as well as artistic interpretation. The depth of a word is textually not historically established, he says. This he says in opposition to the etymological assertion that a literal meaning is a coherent rendition of the elements of the word, an ordinary meaning is the common usage, and the depth of a word is discovered in the history of the elements of the word. Furthermore, textual depth, Nietzsche says, is absolutely desirable and algebraic symbolism cannot be substituted for it. Whether Nietzsche sought to destroy, transform, or advance modern philology is a very difficult question and this is not the place to seek its answer.

represent clear, exclusive alternatives. But that philology and etymology are thoroughly and self-consciously imbued with history is undeniable.

In other words to conceive of language historically is to conceive of it as, first, produced and second, produced by adopting means to ends and finally the bringing forth of the new is that to which modern philology is dedicated.⁶¹ But what if language is simply the manifestation of that which is and has always been; hence what if language's purpose is a destruction of what has been brought forth so as to bring us to what always is. Its analysis would show only what is more deeply and eternally and not what is initially and crudely, i.e., furthest from men's highest potential. Or to put it differently, coming to the origin would be to come toward the nature of what is and hence come to what is in its clearest form; the coming away from the origin, that is, the coming to be of the present would be a falling away from the highest and best. To know what a thing is would not be to know what it can become but to know what it is dependent upon. Hence to understand the nature of the linguistic analysis in the ChU we would have to understand dependence in speech and those factors according to it which are

⁶¹"Those who conceive time as history are turned to what will happen in the future." Grant, Time as History, p. 10.

ontologically determinative of the appearance of a word.

We do not mean by such statements that the doctrine of language in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad is simply diametrically opposed to the treatment afforded it by modern philology. It is a more complex issue than simply trying to put a glove on a foot. But several factors indicate that the analysis of words in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad imply something other than fanciful, half-educated attempts at etymology or for that matter any kind of attempt at etymology. 1) The language of the Vedas, which includes the ChU, is eternal (not historical) according to all of the traditional commentators.⁶² 2) Words refer to universals (not to the collective historical). The argument over particulars and universals, although it may account for the same facts, takes place within the context of a non-historical view of language. In D. M. Datta's discussion of the universal/particular argument he does not even acknowledge the historical solution.⁶³ This is in

⁶² Jha, Ganganatha, trans. ŚB, 1.1,1-6, pp. 1-41.

⁶³ Datta, D. M., The Six Ways of Knowing, pp. 270 & 272. The historical solution to the question of whether the meaning of a word has reference to a universal or particular is that words are historical entities which change, develop, are born, and die. They are used in conjunction with particular situations and entities but as the nature of the being of the word reveals itself through the historical role of itself what is understood about the being of the word changes. For example, it may be said that thinking is primordial thankfulness before it determines the transformation of nature or a "tree" is the incarnation of truth before it is pulp, cords, and boardfeet. A word consequently is an historical entity whose full meaning is in principle not present to us and hence cannot be considered as a universal nor does it refer to a collection of entities. The argument over universals and particulars is hence specious as it is an abstraction from language.

keeping with the view of the Vedānta Paribhāṣā. 3) Roots are considered by most commentators, to be neither completely verbal, the product of chance, nor made by men. The Nirukta says that the derivation of all nouns from verbs is theoretically impossible and there are two other non-verbal parts of speech, prepositions and particles.⁶⁴ 4) One of the ways of acquiring true and certain knowledge particularly about what is good is through statements in the Vedas (Śabda).⁶⁵ Furthermore, the Vedas and especially the syllable "aum" are capable of leading to a comprehension of the whole.

In such a linguistic milieu, where the analysis of words is part of a revelation from eternity, calling such analysis etymology is clearly out of place. But then our task is to understand what it should be called and for the moment we can make only one observation. The explanation of words according to their parts shows nothing about the true nature of things referred to by those

⁶⁴ Sarup, Laksman, editor and trans., The Nighantu and the Nirukta, Section 1, pp. 12-14.

⁶⁵ VSŚB, 2.1.11, pp. 314-317. In this same passage Śāṅkara maintains that the foundation of reason is "the assumption that the past, the present and the future are uniform" not in intelligently adopting means to ends so that the greatest change occurs.

words, as Socrates shows in the Cratylus 438-440, unless the words occur in a text about the true nature of things which is revealed by the eternal. Similarly the explanation of the meaning of words or linguistic units according to their parts as an interpretive principle of a text makes no sense unless there is such a divine text which is to be or already is the basis of a community.

II

THE TEXT OF THE CHĀNDOGYA UPANISAD

1. Editions and Translations

Understanding the Chāndogya Upanisad presents problems even before one begins to read it. What edition should one choose? Two principle alternatives present themselves: those editions and translations which rely on the manuscripts and texts that have been handed down and whose basic form was settled by the great commentator, Śaṅkara, and those editions based on Western textual criticism.¹ The Hindu tradition, whenever it accepts śruti as an authority, does not dispute the text Śaṅkara comments upon in any essential way. The traditional

¹In this study we have been limited by several purely technical things. Translations and editions have been limited to those in Sanskrit, French, German and English. There are recent translations and editions in Russian, Italian, Danish, Hindi and Marathi which the author was unable to consult. The limitation this imposed upon our study was not critical however; our general effort simply was not able to benefit from insights written in these other languages.

For a good account of the ChU from the text-critical point of view see Belvalkar and Ranade, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II. Walter Ruben's Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie, provides an interesting Marxist critique of "bourgeois" historicism and still maintains an historicist point of view. His interpretation of the ChU is particularly intriguing because he maintains that Uddālaka's teaching is materialist or "hylozoist" and adds that materialism was easily incorporated into Hinduism because of the affinity between pantheism and materialism ("Uddālaka and Yājñavalkya" in Studies in Ancient Indian Thought, p. 90).

disputes have to do with interpretation and they do not result in any major variant readings. Max Muller's translation is definitive within the traditional context. All English translators except Hume have been heavily dependent on him.

The revised editions represented by Whitney, Bohtlingk, Senart and Morgenroth involve in each case radical textual changes. The reason for these changes is that in the opinion of the philologists concerned the text is discontinuous and incoherent. According to them, this can be accounted for if one assumes that the ChU represents different authors from different historical periods with different interests. Morgenroth is exemplary of this opinion.

The ChU is a collection of various and in part contradictory teachings. These teachings were evidently transmitted first as separate small Upanisads and then as a collection. The ends of these original distinct pieces are signified through the repetition of phrases at the end of 32 khandas. The ChU has been sub-divided so well by them that I have clearly separated the parts lying between these repetitions and constructed the substance of my interpretation on this division.²

²Translation mine. "Die Chāndogya-Upanisad ist eine Sammlung verschiedener und zum Teil widersprüchlicher Lehren. Diese Lehren wurden offenbar zuerst einzeln bzw. zu kleinsten Upanisaden vereinigt überliefert. Die Grenzen dieser ursprünglichen Einzelstücke sind wohl durch die Wiederholungen von Wortgruppen am Ende von 32 Khanda's gegeben. Durch sie wird die Chāndogya-Upanisad so gut unterteilt, dass ich die zwischen ihnen liegenden Stücke äußerlich deutlich voneinander getrennt habe und auch meine inhaltliche Interpretation darauf aufbaue." Wolfgang Morgenroth, Chāndogya-Upanisad, p. 15.

The consistency and binding together of the text was performed by later generations of commentators who bent and interpolated the text to suit their needs. When one disentangles the text, runs the argument, one discovers two elements: 1) the primal metaphysical speculation that we have come to respect or disparage in our day, i.e., a concern with knowledge, truth, being, etc., and a healthy but unscientific concern with etymology, and 2) various superstitious incantations. Edgerton discusses this problem and agrees that this is why most Sanskritists have divided the Upanisads. "...even those who recognize the occurrence of both [magic and philosophy] side by side in the same texts think of this juxtaposition as a mixture of basically unrelated things."³ He goes on to show that the spirit of philosophy as the moderns know it (disinterested knowledge) is the opposite of knowledge as used in the Upanisads (gaining release, for nothing is done without a purpose). Consequently those who make these divisions are not able to give a good account of the purpose of the Upanisads.

Renou adheres to Morgenroth's method of division but says that the collection is relatively coherent.

One can imagine that at an initial period of composition these sections formed so many little Upanisads which will have been joined

³F. Edgerton, "The Upanisads: What do They Seek and Why", p. 101.

and modified such that they were integrated into a superior unity -- relatively coherent and unified in style -- which is the ChU.⁴

Thus the ChU by Renou and Morgenroth's manner of division is 32 fragments joined together. While each of these fragments, being composed of philosophical and sacrificial elements pieces of each of which are repeated in other Upanisads, is to be considered a collection of fragments or interpolations and fragments. Renou's hypothesis and the one mentioned by Edgerton together result in a picture of this Upaniṣad as an extraordinarily incoherent jumble requiring for explication an adherence to solid historical evidence (who collected what, from where, why, when, and how) of which there is virtually none. The priority of the fragments to the vision which unifies the whole is difficult to show when it is that vision which holds the evidence. Furthermore, is there any proof that the units the repetitions denote are any more disjunctive than chapters in Western books?

Of what use, however, is this collection of fragments to those who are discerning them as fragments? The superstition, they seem to be saying, can be thrown out while the metaphysics when all the dust and incrustations have been cleaned off, can be exhibited

⁴Translation mine. "On peut imaginer qu'a un stade initial de la composition, ces sections formaient autant de petites Upaniṣad qui auront été rejointes ensuite et remaniées de manière à s'intégrer dans cette unité supérieure, relativement cohérente et unitaire de style, qu'est la Chāndogya." L. Renou, "Remarques sur la Chāndogya-Upaniṣad", p. 91.

proudly in a museum of metaphysics. Thus Whitney says:

What is of interest to us in the Upanishads is chiefly their historical content, the light they cast on the transitions of Hindu belief, their exhibition of the germs of later doctrines and systems of doctrines springing up and developing; hence the historical thread is the one to be held and followed; we need not delay and turn aside in order by artful interpretation to put sense into non-sense...interesting and valuable as the Brahmanas in their way are, we have long been justly taught to recognize their predominant inanity: the inexpressibly dreary artificiality of their ceremonial, the preposterousness of the reasons given for it, the absurdity of their etymologies and explanations. The Upanishads possess their full share of the same characteristics...⁵

This is not to deny that the majority of translators of the Śāṅkarite text fundamentally agree with this opinion about the incoherency of the text; they simply find the task of historical exegesis impossible. On the other hand we assume the ChU to be and find it to be a very logical and coherent document from within its perspective. But this is why a broad discussion of theory was necessary in the first chapter if we were even to begin to read.

We are greatly dependent upon Śāṅkara's commentary as it brings to us the ChU. Max Muller's introduction to his translation

⁵W. D. Whitney, "The Upanishads and their Latest Translation", p. 1.

explains the reasons why.

With regard to a critical restoration of the text of the Upanishads, I have seldom relied on the authority of the new MSS., but have endeavoured throughout to follow that text which is presupposed by the commentaries, whether they are the work of the old Śaṅkarākarya, or of the more modern Śaṅkarananda, or Śaṅkara, or others. Though there still prevails some uncertainty as to the date of Śaṅkarākarya, commonly assigned to the eighth century A.D., yet I doubt whether any MSS. of the Upanishads could now be found prior to 1000 A.D. The text, therefore, which Śaṅkara had before his eyes, or, it may be, his ears, commands, I think, a higher authority than that of any MSS. likely to be recovered at present.

.

It has also been supposed that Śaṅkara, who, in writing his commentaries on the Upanishad, was chiefly guided by philosophical considerations, his chief object being to use the Upanishads as a sacred foundation for the Vedānta philosophy, may now and then have taken liberties with the text. That may be so, but no stringent proof of it has as yet been brought forward, and I therefore hold that when we succeed in establishing throughout that text which served as the basis of Śaṅkara's commentaries, we have done enough for the present, and have fulfilled at all events the first and indispensable task in a critical treatment of the text of the Upanishads. ⁶

In this context the most definitive edition of the text to date is the Ānandaśrama edition (Agase, editor), Volume 14. It is with this edition that the most recent criticism of the text begins.⁷ The discovery of

⁶Max Müller, The Upanishads, Part I, p. lxxi.

⁷"Mein Text beruht in erster Linie auf dem indischen Druck der Chāndogya-Upaniṣad in Bd. 14 der Ānandaśramasamskrtagranthavali, dem ein umfangreiches Lesartenverzeichnis beigegeben ist." Morgenroth, ChU, p. 2.

new MSS. and new commentaries will no doubt be helpful in determining a final edition but this valuable task was not mine in the present thesis.

All major changes in the text are modern and arise out of an attempt to explain on modern (i.e., historical) principles what is not understood by those whose total orientation and understanding runs against the text. The understanding arising from these modifications is therefore totally outside of the tradition in which it was held, incapable of explaining the text as part of a different world view which is tangential to the ultimate tenets of the historical quest, and self-contradictory insofar as its "explanation" for large parts of the text is that the text is inexplicable. This understanding is not that understanding whereby the text was cherished and maintained nor that through which any subsequent understanding could be held. As implied in the first chapter, no interpretations expressive of the difference of this world view and which nonetheless seek to make sense of this world view's approach to language, which is fundamental, have appeared.

In addition, one must ask, if the Upaniṣads are incoherent parts tossed together, why toss them? Why didn't the ChB contain, let us say, the first three prapāthakas of the ChU which are commonly dismissed as sacrificial mumbo-jumbo? Why not join the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad, which begins with the same line as the ChU, to the ChU? Why are stories about the same characters, for example Raikva, de-

veloped in different Upanisads instead of all together?⁸ Isn't it necessary to give an account of the reasons for collecting particular things before dismissing the collection? Why does Śaṅkara find it necessary in the VSSB to deal with all of the same elements present in the ChU in a systematic treatise? Having done so he could surely afford to let the parts of the ChU stand separate from each other without his position eroding but he explicitly has the contrary aim in his introduction. "This little treatise [Śaṅkara's commentary] explains that [Upanisad] simply and concisely for those desiring to understand its meaning." Ānandagiri explains:

Even though this Upanisad has already been explained in detail, a concise explanation is being written of the Upanisad in its entirety because it is more easily understandable by summarizing the content. Moreover the Śariraka bhāṣya [VSSB] did not explain the Chāndogya Upanisad according to the order of the text, but here it is explained without violating the order of the text.⁹

In other words the ChU has a common purpose running throughout it, which can be stated, and this purpose is manifested not in isolated cases but in the progressive unfolding of the text.

⁸Raikva is the principle character in the Subāla Upanisad as well as in ChU 4. Raikva's teacher, Ghorā Āṅgīrasa, is mentioned in ChU 3.17.1 as well as in Subala Upanisad 7.1.

⁹Appendix II, pp. 1 and 2.

"
Bohtlingk was the first person to try to form a new text.
The principle of his criticism which he defended against Whitney¹⁰
was that the authors of the ChU were educated people who wrote their
language as they had learned it, i.e., according to Pāṇini. Because
it does not come down to us in that form, the text must be corrected.
The character of his translation is apparent from his complete dis-
missal of Śaṅkara's commentary.

[My translation] is a purely philological
work, in which absolutely no regard has
been had for the vedāntic explanation of
Śaṅkarācārya, and none should be had, for
this expresses a completely false impression
of the upanīṣad.¹¹

"
Hence Bohtlingk made textual judgements on the basis of Pāṇini's
grammar and simply eliminated everything that did not comply with
the strict rules of grammar, ignoring the commentary and not attempt-
ing to make sense of the text as a whole. Whitney wanted to trace

¹⁰ "Otto Bohtlingk, "Zu den von mir bearbeiteten Upanīṣaden",
Bericht über die Verhandlungen der Königlich-Sächsischen-
Gesellschaft der Wissenschaftlichen Leipzig, Vol. 43 (1891), p. 70
referred to by Morgenroth, n. p. 9.

¹¹ Translation mine. "Es [his translation] ist eine rein
philologische Arbeit, bei der auf die vedāntistische Auslegung des
Ṣaṅkarākārja gar keine Rücksicht genommen worden ist und nicht
genommen werden durfte, da diese der Upanishad ein ganz falsches
Gepräge aufdrückt." Otto Böhtlingk, Khāndogjopanishad, p. ix.

such expressions back to a pre-Upaniṣadic dialect and thus make a case for different historical periods of authorship. For this reason although Whitney acclaims Bohtlingk's translation he suggests an enormous number of changes in it. Bohtlingk's principle requires the definite establishment of a post-Pāṇinian date for this Upaniṣad which has not been done. Morgenroth criticizes Bohtlingk on the basis of Whitney even though in his opinion Bohtlingk is the best translator so far.

Hertel (Mundaka Upaniṣad 36) has already pointed out that one cannot simply blindly strike out those forms which deviate from classical grammar.¹²

Morgenroth then goes on to describe his work which is to uncover through conjecture more evidence of the historical nature of the text. But therewith, to repeat, we lose the entire perspective of the text and are in no way aided in seeing what was seen by those who thereby have maintained allegiance to this text and preserved it for us. This enterprise may be useful philologically but in terms of understanding the text's religious import, our primary purpose, it is not useful. Even Śaṅkara would admit that this text is a collection used by the Chandogas which may contain material which is identical to material

¹²Translation mine. "Schon Hertel hat (Mund.-Up. 36) daraufhingewiesen, dass man Formen, die von der klassischen Grammatik abweichen, nicht einfach blindlings herauskonjizieren kann." Morgenroth, pp. 9-10.

in other collections. The question is, however, why was this material collected and what dictated its compilation, for Śaṅkara considers it coherent enough to separate it from other texts related to it and to write a separate commentary on it.¹³

"
In short, while Max Muller in his translation is willing to think that people could believe what he thinks is incredible, Whitney is not so willing. Therefore Whitney describes Max Muller's translation, contrary to the evidence of most translations offered since, as "made in so slovenly a manner as to be practically worthless."¹⁴
"
Max Muller's translation, we reply, represents a decent compromise between the needs of a reader for something sensible while getting the

¹³VSŚB 3.3.24 and VSRB 3.3.24 both consider the problem of those texts in different rescensions having similar statements and establish a number of criteria for deciding whether the texts are identical. The commentary on the next sūtra indicates, with respect to the very specific problem of whether mantras and sacrificial acts are to be combined with particular meditations (upasanas) if they appear together in the text, that the problem of the cohesion of particular texts was considered carefully by the commentators. To determine the meaning of something is neither a simple nor an historical task according to them. The commentators then refer one to the ŚB 3.3.14 (Vol. I, pp. 449-464) where six means of determining the meaning of something are ordered according to their ability to determine what was meant by a particular body of statements.

¹⁴"
W. D. Whitney, "Bohtlingk's Upanishads", p. 407.

flavor of the text, the need to respect traditional commentators' opinions about the meaning of the text, and the need to give a rendition that is as close to the tense and syntax of the original as possible. To go to any one of these extremes would be in the first case to write an interpretation, in the second to translate only the commentator, and in the third to provide simply an untranslated edition. In a compromise such as this some interpretation and interpolation will be necessary.

The critical edition of the text commented upon by Śaṅkara was first published in 1890 after Max Muller's translation and in revised form is still the authoritative text.¹⁵ Translators after this date work from or in consultation with this text. One's choice of translation will depend on one's needs. All translations and editions consulted are listed together in the Bibliography. Hume is very good but often uses archaic or neologistic expressions. For example he uses "reverence" for "upāsanam" which is translated by Max Muller as "meditate". While in ChU 2.21.2 Hume adopts Deussen's translation for "sarvasvin" as "Weltall" and translates "World-all" which is meaningless although common enough in German where it means "universe" or "cosmos". Ganganatha Jha has translated Śaṅkara's

¹⁵K. S. Agase, editor, Chāndogyaopaniṣat, Vol. 14 in Ānandaśramasamskṛtagranthāvaliḥ.

complete commentary which is very worthwhile. Deussen, because he

"
is free of the Bohtlingk attempt is good in German.

"
The reading of his [Bohtlingk's] edition
of the ChU affords a similar pleasure
of that of hearing Bentley; his comments
are always interesting and instructive,
but in very few cases may one consent
to his conjectures.¹⁶

The posthumously published edition in French by Senart is interesting and convenient as it contains the transliterated Sanskrit and it will be seen that we follow Senart's translation of upās. All attempts mentioned are of value insofar as they aid the reader in considering the meaning of his rendering. But a partial rendering is inadequate for a grasp of the whole and in most cases has been offered by their translators for purposes extraneous to our own.

With the exception of those who have radically altered
the original text all translators are deeply indebted to Max Muller.
Consequently the integrity of his prose and coherence of his vision
is best maintained by recourse to his translation. The degree to
which translators follow Max Muller can be seen in the following

¹⁶ Translation mine. "Die Lektüre seiner, [Bohtlingk's]
Ausgabe der Chāndogya-Upanishad gewährt einen ähnlichen Genuss
wie die des Bentley'schen Horaz; seine Anmerkungen, sind überall
interessant und belehrend, aber in den wenigsten Fällen wird man
seines Konjekturen zustimmen können." Paul Deussen, Sechzig
Upanishad's des Veda, pp. xxiii-xxiv.

example of the translation of ChU 3.1.2 & 3, all translations of which occurred after Max Muller's. Hume's relation to Deussen is apparent as is the resultant awkwardness. Bohtlingk's and Senart's independence is also apparent but everyone else adopts Max Muller (who is in turn dependent on Śaṅkara) with only minor changes which generally produce more awkward phrasing.

Sanskrit --

tasya ye prāṇco raśmayah tāh eva asya
prācyo madhunādyah /
rca eva madhukṛta rgveda eva puṣpaṁ tā
amṛtā āpah tā vā etā rcāh // 2.
etam rgvedam abhyatapan ¹⁷

Bohtlingk --

2. Die nach vorn gehenden Honigzellen sind die nach Osten gehenden Strahlen der Sonne, die Bienen sind die Rk, die Blume ist der Rgveda, und auch das unsterbliche Wasser ist dieses. Diese Rk
 3. Bebrüteten den Rgveda. ¹⁸

Senart --

2. Les rayons qu'il projette vers l'est, ce sont les alveoles de devant. Les rc sont les abeilles, le Rg-Veda la fleur; il y a aussi des liqueurs d'immortalité. Ces rc
 3. Couvèrent le Rg-Veda (le sacrifice); ¹⁹

¹⁷ Agase, ed., Chandogyopanīṣat, Vol. 14, pp. 133-134.

¹⁸ Bohtlingk, Āchāndogyopanīṣad, First Published 1889, p. 24.

¹⁹ Senart, Chandogya Upanīṣad, First Published 1930, p. 31.

Deussen --

- "
2. Die östlichen Strahlen der Sonne, die sind
die östlichen Honigzellen; die Bienen sind
die R̥igverse, die Blume ist der R̥igveda,
die Nektarflussigkeit ist diese, dass jene
R̥igverse
3. den R̥igveda bebrüteten, und aus ihm...²⁰

Hume --

2. The eastern rays are its eastern honeycells.
The bees are the Rig verses. The flower is the
Rig-Veda. The drops of nectar fluid (arose as
follows).
Verily, these Rig verses (3) brooded upon that
Rig-Veda; ²¹

Max Müller --

2. The Eastern rays of the sun are the
honey-cells in front. The Rik verses are the
bees, the Rig-veda (sacrifice) is the nectar
(of the flowers).
3. Those very Rik verses then (as bees) brooded
over the Rig-veda sacrifice (the flower);
and from it,...²²

Ganganatha Jha --

2. Its Eastward rays are the eastern honey-cells;
the Rk-verses are the honey-producers [defined
as "bees" in commentary]; the R̥gveda is the flower;
and those waters are the nectar; or those same
Rk-verses.
3. They pressed this R̥gveda. ²³

²⁰Deussen, Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda, First Published 1897,
p. 101.

²¹Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, First Published 1921,
p. 203.

²²Max Müller, The Upanishads, First Published 1879, Part I,
p. 38.

²³Ganganatha Jha, The Chāndogyaopaniṣad, First Published 1899,
pp. 123-124.

Swāhānanda --

2. The eastern rays of that sun are its eastern honey cells; the Rks are the bees, (the ritual of) the R̥gveda is the flower and those waters are the nectar. Those very Rks (the bees) pressed this R̥gveda.²⁴

Radhakrishnan --

2. The eastern rays of that sun are its eastern honey cells. The Rks are the producers of honey. The R̥g Veda is the flower and those waters are the nectar and those very Rks indeed (are the bees). 3. These brooded on the R̥g Veda...²⁵

Nikhilananda --

2. The eastern rays of the sun are the eastern honey-cells. The Rik-verses are the bees. (The ritual laid down in) the Rig-Veda is the flower. The water (of the sacrificial libations) is the nectar (of the flower). These Riks heated the Rig-Veda...²⁶

The question for a translator is how to interpret the analogy and what to do with the final line of verse 2, "Verily, these Rig verses" according to Hume. Everyone follows Max Müller on the meaning of "the water is the nectar" except Deussen, Senart, and Hume who are forced to leave "nectar" outside of the analogy. The same problem

²⁴Swāhānanda, Chāndogya Upaniṣad, First Published 1956 [?], p. 174.

²⁵S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads, First Published 1953, p. 379.

²⁶S. Nikhilananda, The Upanishads, First Published 1959, Vol. IV, p. 185. Cf. "Preface" p. v, where Nikhilananda acknowledges "his indebtedness" to Max Müller.

occurs with the final line of verse 2. The devanagari has it connected with verse 2 but everyone including Śaṅkara²⁷ connects it syntactically with verse 3. This latter connection is reinforced by the parallel structure of later sets of verses in which the devanagari is actually connected to the third verse in each set. Still Jha and Radhakrishnan attempt to keep it separate and are stuck with a non sequitor.

It is therefore, remarkable that in an article which attempts to discredit Max Muller's translation and Śaṅkara's interpretation, the author, F. B. J. Kuiper, begins by saying, "It has long been recognized that the late arrangement of the text in paragraphs is wrong in par. 2, where the words tā vā etā rcaḥ belong to para. 3. The parallel passages III.2.2 and 3.2 leave no doubt as to this point. For this reason alone Max Muller's translation cannot be correct." 28.

Kuiper attacks Max Muller's translation and Śaṅkara's interpretation of "the water is the nectar" for being "ritualistic" and "referring to the sacrifice". The important thing, Kuiper says,

²⁷Jha, ChU, p. 124. Śaṅkara makes this syntactical connection unequivocal in his commentary on ChU 3.1.3 when he asks: "What is that 'Essence' which is described as proceeding from the pressure exerted by the bees in the shape of the Rk-verses?"

²⁸F. B. J. Kuiper, "Interpretation of Chāndogya Upaniṣad III, 1, 2", pp. 36-39.

is to be able to reconstruct a "chain of associations" as opposed to reasons. The preceding part of the ChU has been about sacrifice and this section describes how sacrifice results in the sun by an analogy of the sky to the inside of a bee hive and the sacrifice to the bees' gathering of honey for the hive. Kuiper rejects this and suggests that water and nectar refers to "the Water of Life" due to a series of associations completely separate from this passage as well as the Upaniṣad but said to be evoked in him by the word madhu. Hence Kuiper prefers: "the Rg veda is a flower, it is also the water of Life." Not only are the associations not shown to be necessary but we are right back at the beginning with a textually incoherent statement. Yet water and honey will become important in ChU 6 as the image of a substance which is infinitely divisible and at the same time a whole.

It is for these kinds of reasons that Max Muller's translation is recommended. We base it on the theoretical position of the first chapter, combined with the belief that coherent prose is better than incoherent prose if the meaning intended in each case is the same or if no meaning is intended in the second case. On the one hand, this illustrates the degree to which our understanding of the ChU is dependent on Max Muller's translation. On the other hand, Radhakrishnan and Jha, whose translations similarly rely on Śaṅkara and Ānandagiri, as well as Max Muller have also proved very helpful to this author.

2. The Problem of Textual Coherency

The apparent incoherency and fragmentation of the ChU is not only due to the alternation between magical and philosophical elements, repetitions of phrases, and the presence of strange grammatical constructions which suggest different periods of authorship. It is also due to a number of structural characteristics which were very obvious to Śaṅkara and any other reader of the text. The ChU has the appearance of being a simple collection of stories, truths, and ritualistic formulas.

There are many brief stories which appear to have nothing to do with the explicit teachings at the end of each story. The stories seem unrelated to each other as well as to the text as a whole. In the stories as well as attached to other teachings are at least forty different characters about whom very little is said.

There are twelve principal teachings which are not explicitly related and not obviously implicitly related. They are: 1) Prajāpati teaching Indra in ChU 8; 2) Sanatkumāra teaching Nārada in ChU 7; 3) Uddālaka Āruṇi teaching Śvetaketu in ChU 6; 4) Aśvapati Kaikeya teaching five other people as well as Uddālaka Āruṇi in ChU 5.11-24; 5) Pravāhaṇa teaching Śvetaketu Aruṇeya and Gautama his father in ChU 5.3-10; 6) Satyakāma Jābāla being taught and teaching in ChU 4.4-17 and 5.1-2; 7) Raikva teaching Jānaśruti in ChU 4.1-3; 8) The teaching of Ghora Āṅgīrasa in ChU 3.16-17; 9) Sāṇḍilya's

teaching in ChU 3.12-15; 10) The teaching of Uddālaka Āruṇi in ChU 3.1-11; 11) The unattributed teaching of ChU 2 which contains mantras used in the Agniṣṭoma sacrifice; 12) The diverse teachings in ChU 1 which includes those of Pravāhana Jaivali, Baka Dālbhya and Uṣasti Cākṛāyana. There are many more minor segments which could be construed as complete in themselves, a goodly proportion of which have been marked by repetitions at their conclusions.

A variety of things are prescribed as objects of meditation (upāsana or vidyā) during the course of the teachings and many of these prescriptions (such as meditating on prāṇa or "breath") are repeated over and over again. In addition there are some passages which are clearly copies or the originals of similar passages in other Upaniṣads (viz., ChU 5.3-10 and BU 6.2.1-16, ChU 5.2.3 and BU 6.3.1, ChU 1.1.1. and Mand U 1 etc.). Some passages within the text are repeated either in whole or in part (viz., ChU 3.11.4-6 and ChU 8.15.1, ChU 4.15.1 and ChU 8.7.4, ChU 4.15.5 and ChU 5.10.1, ChU 6.15.1-2 and ChU 8.6.4, etc.). The copies have suggested to some a careless compilation whose only raison d'être was the need to collect everything handed down.²⁹ To others (notably Bohtlingk and those favorable to him) it is proof that what we have is something that in some way has definitely been altered from its original state and hence needs restoration.

²⁹ Whitney, "Bohtlingk's Upanishads", p. 439.

Consider a related collection of disparate teachings. The brāhmaṇa of which the ChU is a part contains a collection of mantras which are only related by their use in a number of important rites which take place throughout a person's life. They are unexplained by the collection and depend upon the Gobhila Ghrya Sūtra for their integration into some meaningful framework. One might tend to think, therefore, that it is not unreasonable that the ChU is simply an incoherent collection. It must be remembered that the major part of the ChU is related to upāsanas, not mantras and that at any rate the mantra collection of the ChB is a coherent body of material when taken together with its ghrya sūtra. But what is even more significant, could it really be that at the very point in the tradition where thought and knowledge are proclaimed to be so important, coherency and reason break down completely?

With such a massive collection of diverse and unrelated things it is remarkable that the majority of statements about it have had to do with interpolations, etc. Rather, the question is, how is one to distinguish any unified text? This is obviously a collection of teachings from any point of view. Why didn't the vedic theologians decide that this was an essentially incoherent collection of statements which perhaps could be accounted for in a separate text like the Vedānta Sūtras? Why did at least Śaṅkara want to keep it whole?

The coherency of the text, we maintain, occurs on a number of different levels which are ultimately interrelated. There is

a constant elaboration of the nature and function of speech particularly in its ritualistic role. In the latter case there is a successive and coherent account of the role of the chant in sacrifice. At the same time there is a coherent development of an explanation for the relationship between desire and its fulfillment in mokṣa and this also serves to explain ritualized language. There is a carefully developed and demonstrated thesis about education in which the caste system is subtly involved. In this the axiom that the student determines the quality of the teaching he receives by his own inherent quality is consistently maintained often through the contrast between students. The text coagulates around the teaching of Uddālaka Āruṇi as a teacher and father who is able to fulfill desire properly. Ultimately these demonstrations about teaching are a protracted proof of the sanctity of tradition and the eternality and esotericism of the vedic teachings and words. Finally the characters are unified through the succession of teachers and pupils.

This final chronological cohesion, although able most clearly to demonstrate the architectonic of the text, in so doing, is relegated to a minor position with respect to knowledge. The passage of time is something, it seems to say, which is constantly degenerative and which must be continuously corrected by the most arduous efforts. Time never contains a rational unfolding of the meaning of things. Things which should be learned earlier (i.e., as they are given in the text) are learned later (i.e., as they in fact were learned).

Things once set forth clearly become confused and filled with errors and with partial and incomplete knowledge, through careless transmission to necessarily inferior beings. Hence the ChU demonstrates different types of teachings which are indicated by the three teachers upon whom the composer of the ChU seems to have been dependent as well as the teachers upon whom they, in turn, were dependent.

The importance of this problem of teaching is explicitly stated throughout the text.

This doctrine (beginning with III, 1, 1) Brahman (m. Hiranyagarbha) told to Pragāpati (Virāg), Pragāpati to Manu...A father may therefore tell that doctrine of Brahman to his eldest son, or to a worthy pupil. ³⁰

'For I have heard from men like you, Sir, that only knowledge which is learnt from a teacher (Akarya) leads to real good.' Then he taught him the same knowledge. ³¹

'Then why did you say (you had been) instructed? How could anybody who did not know these things say that he had been instructed?' ³²

³⁰Max Müller, trans., The Upanishads, Part I, p. 44, ChU 3.11.4-5.

³¹Ibid., p. 64, ChU 4.9.3.

³²Ibid., p. 77, ChU 5.3.4.

Other important passages also occur: ChU 6.1.1-2; ChU 6.14.1-2; ChU 7.1.1, and ChU 7.16.1. The last such passage, ChU 8.15, is where the term "guru" in the sense of "teacher" first appears in the early Indian texts, according to Gonda.³³ In another passage, ChU 8.8, Prajāpati, the origin of all the teachings, muses about the problems of learning.

To maintain the importance of good and proper teaching is particularly important and appropriate in a text which can so easily be construed as the only necessary teacher and yet as such is merely a book. This means, however, that the ChU is maintaining a social doctrine in a quite explicit way. The teaching about education (how jñāna is obtained) is one of the more important cohesive teachings of the text as a whole. A striking characteristic of the Indian tradition is the memory of the succession of teachers and pupils, e.g., BU 2.6.1-3; 4.6.1-3, and 6.5.1-4. Another is the tradition of commenting upon commentaries which are upon other commentaries, etc., which are upon texts. In other words the extreme reverence shown one's teacher and the important social role of the guru or acārya has been strikingly and continuously cultivated in Hinduism.³⁴

³³ Jan Gonda, Change and Continuity in Indian Religion, p. 235.

³⁴ Gonda, "The Guru" in Change and Continuity..., pp. 229-283.

Max Weber, The Religion of India, pp. 318-325, discusses the extraordinary role of the guru in maintaining Indian culture.

Dubois, Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies, pp. 123-133. He notes that the guru is the highest person in each caste and generally the highest member of society.

If the personal teacher was so important then the best place for this to be said would be in the midst of impersonal teaching, i.e., a text.

3. Architectonic of the Upaniṣad :

The Dramatic Attempt to Obtain Jñāna.

There are three teachers from whom all else could be learned in the ChU because the teachings had been given to them by others in the Upaniṣad or others had been given the teachings by them. One teacher is Sanatkumāra who teaches Nārada, a ṛṣi. Ghorā Āṅgīrasa, a second teacher, is noted for being hungry. Śvetaketu, the third teacher, is a proud son with a father who is eager for knowledge. In this tradition people are accustomed to having several teachers and consequently this is not an unreasonable number for obtaining a complete vision of truth. For example, Uddālaka Āruṇi is taught by Pravāhaṇa Jaivali (ChU 5.3.6), Manu (ChU 3.11.4), and Aśvapati Kaikeya (ChU 5.11.2) in the ChU alone. While King Janaka in the BU is always being taught by someone new. The ChU, according to its tradition, is the inheritance of the Chandogas and we think that it is similar to all the other inheritances mentioned therein. That is, it is self-consciously the inheritance from these three teachers. But the literary function of these three basic teachings seems to us to be the function of contrast for the sake of showing what social and educational milieu is best.

Sanatkumāra teaches explicitly all of ChU 7. We think ChU 8.1-3 is textually related to ChU 7 but probably was not taught by Sanatkumāra as it is out of character with the preceding text. It is related because it elaborates the theme of self-rule introduced in ChU 7.25.2, the theme of obtaining desires in ChU 7.26.1, and even continues the use of a particular desiderative verbal construction. Yet ChU 8.1-3 is not nearly so methodical as is ChU 7 and, while ChU 8.2 and 8.3 are related through the development of the theme of desire, ChU 8.3 uses an etymological explanation for the first time in these two chapters. ChU 7 therefore is fairly separated from the rest of the Upaniṣad largely through its methodical delimitation of dependency and the concluding statements at ChU 7.26.2. However, the reader is prepared for the appearance of the character Nārada, the student, by ChU 1.7.6, "[The person seen within the eye] is the lord of the worlds which are under this one and also of men's desires. So those who sing of the vīṇā sing of him."³⁵ Nārada was the inventor of the vīṇā and music is the principal characteristic of the Sāma Veda. The SV is supposed by the Hindu tradition to be the origin of music. ChU 7 is also prepared for by the preceding discussions of speech and is woven into these discussions by ChU 8. This occurs particularly in ChU 8.7 and 8 when Prajāpati is teaching Indra. Here Sanatkumāra's

³⁵Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads, p. 349.

teaching about the importance of vijijñāsa ("the desire to understand") in teaching is illustrated. It is this teaching which explicitly demands that the reader contemplate the text closely and demand explanations of it.

ChU 7 is the most explicit and consistently laid out portion of the ChU. Ironically more than any other part of the ChU it demands at 7.1.2 that we bring traditional knowledge to the text. But in itself it tells us nothing about the way people in fact learn. It does not explain why some men are more ignorant than others, why sacrifice should be performed, etc. In sum, those things having to do with living are untouched. Consequently, the basis of life, desire, which dominates all of the other teachers does not dominate Sanatkumāra. It is mainly mentioned here in the form of a desiderative verbal construction, "vijijñāsa" ³⁶ and is used in order to show that Nārada tends to lose interest or is too easily satisfied. At any rate, he comes to Sanatkumāra who is a child. Prior to coming he taught the necessity of sons and sacrifice and the futility of asceticism. Sanatkumāra perfectly fits Ghora Āṅgīrasa's ideal (being a child) without contradicting Nārada's ideal, which Nārada states in the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa as follows:

³⁶ ChU 7.16-23 uses vijijñāsitavyam (desiderative future passive participle) and vijijñāse (present atmanepada) from the present stem vijijñāsa and root jñā (to know). The future passive participle is also found in ChU 8.1.1 and 8.7.1. See also a very similar usage in BU 3.1.1 where King Janaka of Videha has a vijijñāsā ("desire to know" noun form).

The father pays a debt in his son, and gains immortality, when he beholds the face of a son living, who was born to him.

The pleasure which a father has in his son exceeds the enjoyment of all other beings be they on the earth, or in the fire, or in the water.

Fathers always overcome great difficulties through a son. (In him) the Self is born out of Self. The son is like a well-provisioned boat, which carries him over....

'What is the use of living unwashed, wearing the goatskin, and beard? What is the use of performing austerities? You should wish for a son, O Brahmins!' Thus people talk of them (who forego the married life on account of religious devotion)

Food preserves life, clothes protect from cold, gold (golden ornaments) give beauty, marriages produce wealth in cattle; the wife is the friend, the daughter object of compassion, but the son shines as his light in the highest heaven. ³⁷

Nārada represents very closely the ideal of the teaching learned by Śvetaketu.

The extraordinarily high and subtle function of desire in Sanatkumāra's teaching (one should desire to learn, but desire nothing else) is also the origin of Ghora Āṅgīrasa's teaching which he transmits to Raikva, an ascetic and Ghora's pupil. Sanatkumāra is the archetype of the properly educated person for Ghora.

³⁷W. H. Robinson, The Golden Legend of India [Aitareya Brahmana 7.3], pp. 18-20 (prose trans.), Aitareya Brāhmana 7.3.13.1-5.

Sanatkumāra's character is maintained within his teaching. He explains the dependent order of things (by analyzing the material cause or essence of language in ChU 7.1-15) which is the fulfillment and hence overcoming of desire (shown in ChU 7.16-23 where language properly used demonstrably fulfills itself) without being himself involved in that order, i.e., without desire or attachment.

Sanatkumāra is represented in Indian tradition as the eternal child. Brahma-vaivarta Purāṇa makes out that he is eternally a child of five years, who did not undergo the usual samskāras, a pupil of the very God, Nārāyaṇa....

Harivamśa confirms this view....

Vāmana Purāṇa makes out that Sanatkumāra is the son of virtue by the wife of non-violence.³⁸

Ghora Āṅgīrasa teaches the desirability of Sanatkumāra's condition to Raikva in Subāla Upaniṣad 13.

One should cultivate the characteristics of a child. The characteristics of a child are non-attachment and innocence (freedom from notions of right and wrong). By abstinence from speech, by learning, by non-observance of conventions relating to the classes and stages of life one acquires the state of aloneness proclaimed by the Vedas. Prajā-pati said thus: After knowing the highest state (the sage) should reside at the foot of a tree. With a rag as his loin cloth, with no one to help him, all alone, remaining in concentration, with his desire for the self, with all desires fulfilled, with no desires, with desires consumed, recognising in the elephant, in the lion,

³⁸Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads, n. p. 468.

in the tiger, in the mosquito, in the mungoose, in the snake, the demon and the faery spirit so many forms of death, he is not afraid of them on any account. He should be (unmoved) like a tree. Even if cut asunder, he should not get angry, he should not quake. He should be like a rock and even if cut asunder should not get angry, should not quake. He should be like the sky and should not get angry, should not quake. ³⁹

That the two teachers are in fundamental agreement over the best condition of man does not mean that their pupils are identical to this. There would be nothing to teach if they were. The teaching, however, also does not assume that the pupil is immediately to become according to the way he is taught. The teaching is more or less simply the described proper state of things for a particular state. The character of the pupils is revealed by the degree to which they do not match this ideal. But this degree is not a measure of virtue, it is the difference between āśramas (stages of life) and conditions.

Nārada has taught and represents the virtues of being a householder. It is then that it becomes proper for him to understand Sanatkumāra's teaching. Nārada's pride must be appealed to so as to make him learn. Similarly Raikva, who also will be driven by the wish to become a householder, will be characterized by pride. In both

³⁹Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads, p.888. Cf. Subāla Upaniṣad 7, on Raikva.

cases the precondition to entering the ideal represented by Sanatkumāra seems to be becoming a householder. Nārada has already done this, hence at the end of the story he is "brought to the other side of darkness". Raikva has yet to become a householder and although he desires it, he is still too poor to become one. This permits him the knowledge of dependency but not the knowledge of the duties of the householder (or more generally āśramadharmā) which Śvetaketu has and of which he can seek the essence. Whereas a dependent order is explicitly taught to Nārada it is taught by artificial deprivation to Śvetaketu and by necessity to Raikva. The case is similar with Raikva's teacher.

Ghora Āṅgīrasa is the teacher of ChU 3.15-17 because ChU 3.17.6 says that he taught all of 3.17 and this section is a development of the theme of offering the sacrifice, having a son and preserving him which begins at 3.15. The central result of the teaching (that man is the sacrifice) is to become thirstless or desireless (apipāsah). This term is not used again until ChU 6.8 where it occurs in the course of explaining what thirst or desire means. The importance of being thirstless is brought up several times in the ChU with people who are very hungry or worried about food. The Āṅgīrasas, who were descendants of a ṛṣi of the same name, were known by the tradition as poverty stricken people.⁴⁰ They are on the verge of death by starvation in

⁴⁰ Śaṅkara explains the meaning of the family name as the name of the ṛṣi to whose race one belongs. See Jha, ChU, p. 190, Commentāry on 4.4.1.

the Aiteraya Brāhmaṇa 7.3.5.12.

It is then finally desire which will cause Raikva to teach although his pride, which in other cases will cause students to learn, here will cause him to teach with great deception (which will be discussed in Chapter 6). Determining what is going on in this brief story and what causes Raikva's behavior is not easy and has apparently vexed the tradition. The major concern is why Raikva should call Janaśruti a śūdra and then teach him. The caste issue which is raised here provokes a confusion in the reader which is not settled or made clear except through the efforts of Uddālaka Āruni and his son. Hence the rules for the dissemination of the Śruti are determined by ChU 3.11.5⁴¹ and explained by the discussion with Pravāhaṇa in ChU 5.3.10. Raikva, fittingly introduces confusion about caste because he has not received the teaching of ChU 5.3-10. Here this knowledge, previously reserved for Kṣatriyas, is given for the first time to a Brahman. Raikva was a Brahman and hence does not understand the foundations of caste because he never interacts with those or descendants of those who receive this

⁴¹"A father may therefore tell that doctrine of Brahman to his eldest son, or to a worthy pupil.

But no one should tell it to anybody else, even if he gave him the whole sea-girt earth, full of treasure, for this doctrine is worth more than that, yea, it is worth more." (Max Muller, Upanishads, Part I, p.44, ChU 3.11.5.)

teaching. The issue of transmission which is grounded in caste doctrine is thus the central issue here in the story of Raikva. As Śaṅkara says in his "Introduction" to ChU 4,

The story [of Raikva] has been introduced, for the purpose of making the teaching easily intelligible, and also for the purpose of laying down the procedure by which the Teaching is to be imparted and received; -- and the story also shows how the attainment of the knowledge of the Teaching is to be brought about by such means as faith, giving of food, absence of haughtiness (humility) and so forth.⁴²

The caste question is first introduced when Jānaśruti sends a ksattā (attendant) to find Raikva. A "ksattā", says Swāhānanda, is "the name of a member of a caste described as born of Ksatriya and Śūdra parents."⁴³ Sending this servant is a slight insult and introduces literarily the possibility of referring to Jānaśruti as a Śūdra but Raikva is most provoked by Jānaśruti's overt behavior which indicates a lack of respect. Jānaśruti addresses Raikva by his name instead of as "revered sir", the most common form of respectful address. The prime requisite of knowledge is humility. It is attention to such details as the form of address and thus one's social position that determines one's salvation as well as the coherency of this Upanisad.

⁴²Jha, ChU, p. 176.

⁴³Swāhānanda, ChU, p. 262.

The reason for the disrespect is that Jānaśruti resents Raikva's preeminence as a sage. Raikva alludes, by mentioning dice, to the speech of two flamingos, which speech had caused Jānaśruti to come to him. This indicates that Raikva indeed had supernatural powers, which Śaṅkara also refers to. Raikva's greatness makes Jānaśruti unhappy ("śuchā") which is finally why Raikva calls him a śūdra. Bādarāyaṇa, Śaṅkara, and Rāmaṇuja (at VŚB and VSRB 1.3.34) explain carefully that this is the reason for Raikva's choice of words.

What finally then causes the transmission of the teaching in spite of Jānaśruti is the gift of his daughter. Śaṅkara says that Raikva wishes to become a householder and for this reason is won over by the gifts, particularly the gift of the daughter. Max Müller is misleading when he decides that Raikva has opened her mouth, mukham upodgrhnan, to find out her age.⁴⁴ In fact Kane reports⁴⁵ no auspicious or inauspicious signs which may be determined by looking inside of the mouth, and Śaṅkara implies that Raikva is moved by a desire for the girl. Hence we take mukham upodgrhnan as "perceiving her countenance" and decide that Raikva is indeed moved to transmit the teaching by desire. Raikva is uniquely dominated not only by a pride but by a

⁴⁴Max Müller, Upanishads, Part I, p. 57, n. 2.

⁴⁵Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra, Vol. II, Part I, Chapter 9.

desire which although apparently different from the type taught by Sanātkumara is nonetheless related for it permits the transmission of sacred teachings. Still, one of the striking facts of these two stories is that whereas Nārada does not seem to be moved to transmit this teaching, Raikva transmits it to another who may also transmit it although this one, Janaśruti seems to covet it for himself. The purpose of Raikva's transmission is to gain a position where, like Uddālaka, who is able to transmit it to his son, he may transmit it to one who is his self and hence, who need not be taught deceptively. Of the three who learn a teaching one suspects that only Śvetaketu has the intention while learning it of transmitting it and of all those who teach only Uddālaka is clearly one who learns for the sake of a complete transmission.

The outstanding and most complete knowledge and that which is most intimate with the longest line of teachers, however, is Śvetaketu's. Sanatkumara's is the teaching of a demi-god directly to a ṛṣi. Ghora Āṅgīrasa's is the teaching of a descendant (not far removed) of a ṛṣi to a sage. With this sage, Raikva, the hazards and problems of transmission begin to become apparent. For not only must transmission not result in immediate understanding but it may be handed on deviously for mercenary motives. Śvetaketu's knowledge encompasses the knowledge of nineteen other people which is learned largely due to the care of his father and his own pride. His father is a famous teacher but makes no pretense to complete knowledge. Still it is only in the course of

the education of Śvetaketu that the full range of Prajāpati's teaching, which Uddālaka Āruṇi claims to have received through Manu (ChU 3.11.4), appears such that the teachings of Ghora Āṅgīrasa and Sanatkumāra are counterpunctal and the story of Prajāpati (in ChU 8) becomes a summation. The moment at which the original and divine words are recalled (presumably by a descendent of Uddālaka Āruṇi) hence has a great dramatic potency as we have witnessed by this moment (ChU 8) immense difficulties in transmitting them to us.

The most straightforward teaching by Uddālaka Āruṇi occurs in ChU 6 as it is given to Śvetaketu, and it encompasses or explains much that occurs elsewhere in the Upaniṣad. For this and other reasons, it is justly termed the central or quintessential part of the ChU by the tradition.

The other straightforward teaching occurs in ChU 5.3-10. It contrasts well with the story of Raikva on the one hand and with the teaching in ChU 6 on the other hand. In both ChU 5.3-10 and ChU 6 Śvetaketu's character is drawn carefully, explicitly and consistently. He is proud, self-confident, demanding, well-educated, and at ease in the best circumstances. This characterization puts Śvetaketu into contrast with the other important student of the Upaniṣad Satyakāma Jābāla.

ChU 5.3-10 contains the assertion by Śvetaketu's father, called "Gautama" here, that he has told him everything he knows (ChU 5.3.5). This means that all that Uddālaka Āruṇi knows Śvetaketu must know.

It also indicates that ChU 5.3-10 occurred chronologically after ChU 6 since by ChU 5.3-10 Śvetaketu must have received his instruction, which is given in ChU 6, from his father. This indicates that the teaching of ChU 5.3-10 is an unrealized necessary consequence of ChU 6 as it follows the central truth of the ChU (in ChU 6) and does not contradict it while not being necessary for ChU 6 to be understood as true. Hence it is helpful in explaining ChU 6 but not essential to it. It is furthermore clear that the author of ChU as well as the readers he expects are not interested in an explicit chronological relating of events even though they are aware of them. As will be seen, organization according to chronology is the last factor to rule the setting forth of the teaching of the ChU and, consequently, is ultimately radically subordinated to other kinds of knowledge.

We know that "Gautama" in ChU 5.3-10 is Uddālaka Āruni because Śvetaketu is here said to be the grandson of Āruna (Āruneya) which means he must be the son of Āruni, and, finally, Śvetaketu can only have one father. The same story is told in BU 6.2 and at the end of BU 6 (BU 6.5.3) the line of transmission is said to pass from Āruna to Uddālaka while "Gautama", who is present in the other two genealogies of the BU is not mentioned in this one.

The teaching at ChU 5.3-10 is learned from Pravāhana Jaivali who also teaches at ChU 1.8-9. It encompasses what is taught at ChU 1.8-9 because the question (and finally the answer) is the same. The question is "to what do things go [gatiṃ] ultimately?" The

answer involves the listing of an order of dependency. In ChU 1.8-9 this is asked with respect to the chant, something about which Uddālaka knew much. In ChU 5.3-10 it is connected with political things (transmigration and justice which are things necessary for a king to know) but in both instances it is heavily reliant on analogy to the sacrifice. There is a similar dependent order in both places but it culminates in "space" in ChU 1.9.1 while in ChU 5.10.4 space leads to the moon which is the food of the gods. In ChU 1.9.2 the teaching is said to result in "the highest and best worlds". Throughout ChU 5.10 how this result occurs is explained in detail.

The teaching at ChU 1.8-9 is given to one Caikitāyana of the Dalbha family and another person. Baka Dālbhya, a member of the same family, is said to have known ChU 1.2 which is that the breath in the mouth is the udgītha as well as ChU 1.12 where the relationship of animals to stobha syllables (seemingly meaningless fill-in sounds used in chanting during the sacrifice) and sound is considered. The reason for animal sounds is here determined to be the desire for food and water. Both of these things are known by Caikitāyana when questioned by Śīlaka in ChU 1.8.4. At least therefore he knows what Baka Dalbha knows and it is reasonable to assume that he inherited what he knows from Baka Dalbha.

[Śīlaka] asked, 'Upon what does Sāman depend?' [Caikitāyana] replied, 'Sound.'
 He asked, 'Upon what does sound depend?'
 He replied, 'Breath.' He asked, 'Upon

what does breath depend?' He replied,
 'Food.' He asked, 'Upon what does food
 depend?' He replied, 'Water.' ⁴⁶

Listening in or having received the teaching of ChU 1.8-9 is one Atidhanvā Śaunaka who teaches it to one Udara Śāṇḍilya. The records of the transmission of teachings in the BU indicate that there may have been many Śāṇḍilyas, but this or probably an ancestor of this Udara teaches at ChU 3.12-14. It appears that Udara knows little of ChU 3.12-14. Śāṇḍilya's teaching, the identity of atman and Brahman, although contained in ChU 6 by the doctrine of tat tvam asi, seems to have been forgotten by his descendents and is only specifically referred to in ChU 8. The reader is dependent on the fourth teacher, Śāṇḍilya, to learn of it. How then was Uddālaka able to teach it? We think Prajāpati taught it to both teachers' ancestors who were then separated. This would tend to convince one that Prajāpati did in fact teach it.

There is some support for this in the genealogies of the BU. The first two genealogies given in BU 2.6.1-3 and 4.6.1-3 suggest that it is uncertain whether Uddālaka (who is mentioned in the text prior to each genealogy) taught Śāṇḍilya or vice-versa, and appears to solve the dilemma by suggesting that they involve two separate lines of transmission of the same thing. Gautama, who is established in BU 6 as a synonym for Uddālaka, is mentioned as "Gautama" in the succession of teachers for BU 1-2 and BU 3-4 but as "Uddālaka"

⁴⁶ Author's translation.

in the rest of these two sections where he transmits actual teachings. While in BU 5-6, where the synonym is established, he appears in both the records of the succession of teachers and the text as Uddālaka but in the succession of teachers and pupils no Gautama is mentioned. The line of transmission is similar in BU 1-2 and BU 3-4 but very different in BU 5-6. However BU 4.6.3 and BU 2.6.3 say that Gautama learned from Vātsya who learned from Śāṇḍilya. Earlier in the same successions Śāṇḍilya is said to have learned from Kauśika and Gautama (BU 2.6.1 and BU 4.6.1). These may be different people here, but if they are not, such a reciprocal relationship is not unusual. In the BU for example it is said that Uddālaka Āruni learned from Yājñavalkya and vice-versa. Even Śvetaketu who was initially taught by Uddālaka is instrumental in Uddālaka's learning something new in the ChU. In BU 6.5 the same teaching is said to have been transmitted in two ways which met in the son of Śāṇḍilya. BU 6.5.4 says that it was learned from Prajāpati, handed down through three people to Vātsya, from Vātsya Śāṇḍilya learned it, and from him, via several others, Śāṇḍilya's son learned it. Śaṅkara informs us that Prajāpati was also known as Kaśyapa in his commentary on ChU 2.23.2. Those descended from Kaśyapa are said in BU 6.5.3. to have taught it to Aruṇa who taught it to Uddālaka from whom it was transmitted, through several people, to the son of Śāṇḍilya. All of this supports our contention that Śāṇḍilya and Uddālaka Āruni were in receipt of the same teachings through different lines of transmission. Śaṅkara says as much in his commentary

on BU 6.5.4. In addition, we have the fact that the genealogy of BU 6.5.4 is also given in Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 10.6.4.9, and follows a passage very similar to Śāṇḍilya's teaching in ChU 3.14 which is also here ascribed to Śāṇḍilya. While just prior to this in Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 10.6.1.1-11 the teaching Uddālaka receives in ChU 5.11-24 is repeated.

The succession of teachers, and hence transmission of teachings, are important not only to promote a theory of education but also as proof that the words of the Vedas are in fact unchanged from the eternal words emanating from the supreme eternal source, Brahman. The succession proves that the teaching is true or as true as possible because it comes from the highest authority.

The question finally is what else must Śvetaketu know if Uddālaka Āruni taught all that he knew to him? ChU 5.11-24 was learned by Uddālaka, in the company of five others, from Aśvapati Kaikeya and hence was available to Śvetaketu. ChU 3.1-11 was learned by Uddālaka according to the text from the descendents of Manu who got it from Prajāpati. This passage as a whole is an explanation of the whole of ChU 2 which because it contains in passing two texts essential to the Agnistoma sacrifice when performed by a Chandoga brahman and not given in any other text had to be known by Uddālaka in order to perform it.

Uddālaka is said in the BU to have taught Yājñavalkya twice and to have been taught by him once. This again suggests the complexity

in a record of the transmission of a teaching that one may appear several times in conjunction with the same person as teacher or as pupil. At any rate, Yājñavalkya proves in BU 3 that he is the smartest when Uddālaka tests him at BU 3.7. Previous to this (BU 3.4) Uṣasti Cākrāyana, whose story appears at ChU 1.10-11, tests him, giving Uddālaka who is present, the chance to have known him and also to learn what he knows at this point. Uṣasti has a rather modest knowledge of things and is easily subdued by Yājñavalkya. Uddālaka is more profound.

In BU 6.3.1-7 Uddālaka teaches Yājñavalkya about sacrifice and teaches the words used in ChU 5.2.3 which are here handed down by Yājñavalkya eventually to Satyakāma Jābāla who teaches them in ChU 4.3-5.2. Thus Satyakāma was an indirect pupil of Uddālaka. (We are not told who Satyakāma's teacher was in the ChU.) Furthermore, Satyakāma knows what was taught by Pravāhana Jaivali to Uddālaka and hence is even more necessarily a pupil of Uddālaka's. Satyakāma, it appears, learned badly because in BU 4.1.6 Yājñavalkya discovers that Satyakāma had taught King Janaka that mind is Brahman which Yājñavalkya says, is an insufficient account of Brahman. Because Satyakāma inherits what Śvetaketu inherits, his inclusion in the ChU cannot be solely to record his inheritance. The purpose of his inclusion is his character in contrast with Śvetaketu's character [discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 below].

Uddālaka is portrayed in BU 6 as a teacher who is primarily

interested in the satisfaction of desire and consequently in the having of sons. He is in many respects the ideal householder. This characterization is continued in the ChU. Uddālaka is not outstandingly wealthy compared with his peers, but is comfortable with sons, cattle and food.⁴⁷ He is most conscious of rituals and what they mean.⁴⁸ He teaches his son carefully and thoroughly because he wants him to be educated properly.

Uddālaka Āruni claims in ChU 3.11.4 to have obtained his teaching from Prajāpati. This teaching of Prajāpati is given in ChU 8. It contains allusion after allusion to the preceding seven chapters and hence confirms that the collection given here is Prajāpati's teaching as transmitted. The obvious question is why was it necessary to give the other accounts when this one account was present, full and complete. On the one hand, the meaning of the previous seven chapters could be said to have been deduced from them in the eighth. On the other hand, because ChU 8 was also subject to the identical transmission which Uddālaka inherited in ChU 3.11.4⁴⁹

⁴⁷ChU 5.17.

⁴⁸ChU 3.1-11.

⁴⁹"This doctrine (beginning with III,1,1) Brahman (m. Hiranyagarbha) told to Prajāpati (Virāg), Prajāpati to Manu, Manu to his offspring (Ikshvāku, &c.) /And the father told that (doctrine of) Brahman (n.) to Uddālaka Āruni." -- Max Müller, The Upanishads, p. 44. (ChU 3.11.4)

"Brahmā (Hiranyagarbha or Paramesvara) told this to Prajāpati (Kāśyapa), Prajāpati to Manu (his son), Manu to mankind / He who has learnt the Veda...". -- Max Müller, The Upanishads, p. 144, (ChU 8.15.1).

The identical Sanskrit occurs in both passages up to the slash in the preceding translations as follows: "tadd haitad brahmā prajāpataya uvāca, prajāpatir manave, manuḥ prajābhyah". This peculiar succession of teachers does not occur at all in the BU. Hence the similarity may not be dismissed simply as traditional or stylistic.


and contains much that can be traced to Uddālaka, we may infer that it is another teaching of Uddālaka. Or possibly it is a teaching transmitted by the author of the Upaniṣad inherited in part from Ghora Āṅgīrasa, Nārada, and Śvetaketu.

The diagram on the following page summarizes the preceding discussion of the succession of teachers in the ChU. Arrows indicate that the teaching was transmitted to the person to whom the arrow points. A single line indicates a direct teaching. A double line indicates that several teachers were intermediaries. Numbers indicate the passages in the ChU known to the person. As one inherits a teaching one inherits the textual passages in the ChU known to the teacher insofar as we can surmise that they have been made available to the pupil.

4. Conclusions

In addition to the cohesion of a didactic tradition and all that implies about education there are other cohesive factors in the ChU, obvious to the tradition. In each of his introductions to the Upaniṣads Śaṅkara clarifies problems (e.g., what the meaning of "upaniṣad" is according to its parts in his "Introduction" to the Katha Upaniṣad), reviews the most general and important theme of all the Upaniṣads (advaita-ātma-jñāna), and then states what the unique subject and character of the particular Upaniṣad is. In the case of the ChU he notes the distinctive concern with upāsanās whose essence is characterized by "secrecy" and "the continuous activity of a mind

Transmission of Teachings of Śvetaketu



functioning with respect to something taken as the support [of upāsana]." ⁵⁰ The "Introductions" to the Iśa and Kena Upaniṣads are notably similar in subject matter to the "Introduction" to the ChU with the sole major exception of "upāsana". Besides this Śaṅkara particularly points out two analogies in the ChU: the thief who undergoes trial by ordeal (ChU 6.16) and the independent ruler (ChU 7.25.2). Both analogies have to do with ruling and conclude ChU 6 and 7 respectively. In other words, a particular instance of proper rule is approvingly referred to as a summary image of salvation. Therefore the relation of the social and political realm to salvation is being discussed. As already discussed, Śaṅkara pointedly connects passage to passage in his commentary thus demonstrating the continuity of the Upaniṣad.

We think that the ChU itself draws attention to its cohesiveness by introductory verses in ChU 1.1. Here problems which will be discussed at length throughout the Upaniṣad are introduced while the conclusions will take up all of ChU 8. This literary role of ChU 1.1 and ChU 8 is emphasized by their relationship to the teachers of the ChU. In the latter case the teacher is Prajāpati. In the former case of ChU 1.1 no teacher whatsoever is referred to.

The subjects introduced in ChU 1.1 fall under the general question raised by ChU 1.1.2: how can the essence of everything be

⁵⁰ Appendix II, pp. 17-18.

present in everything and yet only be made known by something separate from everything else, i.e., a particular part of speech? Why is this essence the syllable Aum which is in turn the essence of speech? Why is the discovery of the essence of things attendant upon the fulfillment of desire (ChU 1.1.6-8)? Hence what is desire (kāma) and what is essence (rasa)? And consequently what is the relationship between desire and essence? Finally why is it proper to describe this relationship in terms of a dependent hierarchy?

It is in the course of drawing out the actual relationship between knowledge and desire that the condition for the occurrence of knowledge, an unbroken line of transmission, becomes problematic. But transmission is not just peripherally interesting, it is central to the entire possibility of knowledge. Without a certain line of transmission of things eternal to man there can be no certainty about those things. That is, men cannot know what is proper and therefore what the greatest good is without revelation. Hence the entire possibility of any truth rests on absolute certainty about the most important and timeless things and this requires the proper transmission of true statements. The very complexity of the transmission vouches for its veracity and at the same time for one's dependence on a tradition received and handed on intact. The pupil is thus an extremely important factor in this exchange for upon him all later people depend. Indeed, the ChU emphasizes that obtaining the tradition is the pupil's responsibility, not the teacher's. It is only thus that the demonic are kept

from obtaining what is important and infecting it with what is bad.

Śvetaketu is paradigmatic in this respect. He is notably ignorant about his ignorance. This means he is dependent on the transmission of tradition and not on his powers of reason for knowledge. It is only because his father cares for him and because he is proud of what he knows that he learns. Such pride would make it difficult for him to learn from others, but it would make him attached to what he knows. Part of Śvetaketu's pride stems from the certainty of his lineage as a brāhman. He is irritated that a ksatriya could know what a brāhman does not. Each of the pupils in the ChU has a peculiar type of ignorance. Satyakāma Jābāla is ignorant about his caste. Nārada is ignorant about learning. He has to be taught that "one must desire to understand". His teacher does not proceed until he gets Nārada to express this desire. Raikva is ignorant about the political or social order. He refers to the king as a śūdra. All of the pupils are somewhat defective but Śvetaketu is the least defective and has the best conditions for learning.

The ultimate division between defective or faulty and proper transmission is shown by the contrast of Indra with the demon, Virocana, when they are both pupils. The demonic do not persist in asking questions. They begin questioning but are predisposed to being satisfied by intentionally misleading answers (ChU 8.8.4). They do not "desire to understand". Prajāpati seems to teach a doctrine that will intentionally mislead those who do not truly desire to understand or whose inherent

character has no affinity with knowledge.

ChU 3.11.5 sets severe limits on the dissemination of the highest wisdom. It can be given only to the eldest son or to a worthy disciple. The disciple has to prove his worthiness and consequently can never be sure that what he has is what his teacher holds to be ultimately true. Śvetaketu has no such uncertainty and his father assures him that nothing has been concealed. The text does not require Śvetaketu to prove himself because he is the same as the teacher and because Uddālaka's desire for a son is so intense. These sentiments are inherent to the father-son relationship, according to the tradition, and are ritualized in the Chāndogya Brāhmaṇa.

Become [Guṇaviṣṇu adds "like"] a stone,
become [like] an axe, become [like]
indestructible gold. You are my self
oh son, may you never die. Live a hundred
harvests. ⁵¹

The whole of the ChB and the ChU, in other words, states what the dramatic reasons are for the teaching between Uddālaka and Śvetaketu being the central teaching. That is to say, while all of the other teachers and pupils are unrelated, Śvetaketu is the son of Uddālaka. Of all relationships this is the one most likely to

⁵¹ Author's translation, ChB 1.5.18.
There are six specific requests in the course of the marriage and pregnancy rites for a son (ChB 1.1.15, 1.2.17, 1.2.19, 1.2.20, 1.4.8, 1.4.9) and many other requests for children.

lead to truth and this is precisely the virtue of this relationship.⁵²

At the same time it invokes a whole social texture which in general is in agreement with these dramatic reasons. Everyone of the ChB group should feel towards his son as Uddālaka does. While every other teacher calls a halt to his teaching or is devious or reluctant (with the possible exception of Sanatkumāra who is teaching someone who asserts the value of sons) Uddālaka is unstinting in his attempt to gain for Śvetaketu a thorough teaching. Ranade notes that even Yājñavalkya in the BU eventually leaves off teaching his wife Maitreyi.⁵³

(The BU also confirms that the thing dearest to one is a son [BU 1.4.8] while the purpose of a wife is the procreation of a son [BU 1.4.17].)

The widely known and widely held vedic belief in the supreme importance of a son simply underlines what the ChU explicitly maintains and makes use of. Transmission is best accomplished by having sons and teaching them and the most essential and valuable teaching in the text will occur between a father and son. Raikva's treatment of Janaśruti, the story of Satyakāma Jābāla, and Prajāpati's teaching to Indra is otherwise senseless even as a memory.

⁵²The rules of conduct given in ChU 5.10.9 emphasize this. Instead of stating rules about family relationships the rules have to do with teachers and hence only indirectly with one's father. The family hence exists as a means to knowledge and jñāna and not for its own sake.

⁵³R. D. Ranade, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 191.

The necessary and proper conditions for salvation are identical to the proper transmission of the tradition.

He who has learnt the Veda from a family of teachers, according to the sacred rule, in the leisure time left from the duties to be performed for the Guru, who after receiving his discharge, has settled in his own house, keeping up the memory of what he has learnt by repeating it regularly in some sacred spot, who has begotten virtuous sons, and concentrated all his senses on the Self, never giving pain to any creature, except at the tīrthas (sacrifices, &c.), he who behaves thus all his life, reaches the world of Brahman, and does not return, yea, he does not return. ⁵⁴

We can thus see that there is a unity of the characters of the ChU based on theory as well as inheritance. There is also a variety of teachings and situations which indicate the various degrees of authenticity possible for particular pupils. Prajāpati is preceded by Sanatkumāra, the child of two gods. Sanatkumāra is preceded by Uddālaka Āruni who transmits the tradition faithfully and diligently. Uddālaka Āruni is preceded by partial teachings all of which he has inherited with the exception of Ghora Āṅgīrasa's whose teaching is about to die because of being transmitted to someone who is not a householder. The entire teaching of the Upaniṣad stems from Brahman and the ṛsis

⁵⁴Max Müller, The Upanishads, Part I, p. 144, ChU 8.15.1.

which is proof that this is Veda and that these are eternal teachings and words. There is furthermore a unification around the specific teaching of Uddālaka Āruni and his character as one who works for the sake of his son and in all senses is able to fulfill desire as a householder.

Uddālaka's character as the proper householder is very reasonable at this point. Unlike Yājñavalkya, he is not about to leave his wife as a wandering mendicant. He is still "begetting virtuous sons." Although Yājñavalkya brings desire to its end when he bids goodbye to his wife and explains the meaning of desire, Uddālaka explains to his son who is about to become a householder the meaning of the highest product of desire, language. Yājñavalkya states the implication and conclusions of the tradition (epitomized in the phrase 'neti-neti') while Uddālaka transmits the tradition (epitomized in the phrase 'tat tvam asi'). The ChU is, appropriately enough then, part of a larger work, the ChB, whose remaining portion, usually called the Mantra Brāhmaṇa, is meant exclusively for the performance of household rites.⁵⁵ The ChU explains the meaning of

⁵⁵Traditional literature is divided according to Veda and school (śākha) for determining what core of Śruti was to be preserved by a particular group of people. Hence that literature belonging to such a particular group would be that which they would have greatest access to for understanding particular parts of their inheritance. The Kauthuma śākha of the Sama Veda is the one to which the ChU, ChB, GGS and PVB belong (Caland, PVB, pp. i-ix). Thus they deserve priority in answering questions of linguistic usage and the meaning of technical terminology. The ChU requires this sort of reference because it makes continual reference to things which are only understood with reference to other texts, e.g., the Agnistoma and Agnihotra sacrifices, the SV which is only partially quoted in ChU 3.17.7, etc. Moreover the tradition considers the

the household life as well as those things, the mantras, that cause its successful living by teaching the meaning of the most essential element of this life, chanted language.

Recognizing that transmission is necessary for realizing what is eternal and therefore true, one problem is how to maintain the transmission. The other problem is understanding the eternally true. Maintaining the proper transmission of what is eternally true can only be done in one way. The transmission must seek to be as perfect as possible, but the text demonstrates that this rarely happens. If it is to happen in any way the words must at least be identical. Therefore what is ultimately to be transmitted is the essence of the word as ritual; that is to say, as precisely and exactly transmitted. To understand the eternally true is then and only then to understand the meaning of chanted language.

ChU to be one work, hence Śaṅkara quotes ChB 1.1.1. saying "At the beginning of the Upanishad of the Tāṇḍins we have the mantra, O God Savitar..." (VSŚB 3.3.25, Vol. 2, p. 222). Thus to consult the ChB in order to understand what cannot be understood in the ChU is a most reasonable procedure.

III

RITUAL LANGUAGE IN THE CHĀNDOGYA UPANIṢAD

1. Importance of Verbal Repetition in Vedānta

Repetition of identical passages in the Upaniṣads, would to many initially look like sloppiness, accident, or borrowing. Yet, as we have seen, it has a structural and instructive role as well as indicating a general opinion about knowledge. Furthermore, repetition is a central feature of the vedic texts¹ while verbal repetition is highly praised within the tradition. Śaṅkara notes that "The Japa [changing of names and formulas] is said to be the best of all Dharmas, and also Japa begins with non-injury to beings."² There are five principal types of verbal repetition: bīja mantras, mantras, stotras, stories, and sacred texts which include mahāvākyas (i.e., particularly important statements in the texts) and upāsanas (a statement or series of statements to be meditated upon which assert something about the nature of things). Repetition may be divided into two kinds: japa or that which is willed, and ajapa or that

¹"...the total of repeated padas in the Rig-Veda, if we include close catenary imitation, is likely to concern...not less than 1/5 of the entire Rig-Veda collection." M. Bloomfield, Rig-Veda Repetitions, pp. 3-4.

²R. A. Sastry, trans., The Vishnu Sahasranama..., p. 5.

which occurs automatically. Thus it is said that one of the great mantras is breathing. Japa is the recital of words which are somehow extraordinary. It is of three kinds: a) when the words are spoken audibly, b) when the lips are moving but no sound is heard, c) mental repetition in which there is no external movement.³

Bīja mantras are one syllable sounds which stand for a particular devata (deity). "Bīja" which is often translated as "egg" means the source out of which everything emanates. Due to our biology, "egg" no longer conveys what was meant. "Seed" is a better choice if it is taken as a neuter word. Thus it is said: "And what is the seed [bījam] of all being, that also am I, O Arjuna. There is no being, whether moving or unmoving, that can exist without me."⁴ One of the greatest authorities on mantra and tantra, J. G. Woodroffe, explains bīja mantra as follows:

Though a Mantra such as a Bīja-mantra may not convey its meaning on its face, the initiate knows that its meaning is the own form (Svarūpa) of the particular Devatā whose Mantra it is, and that the essence of the Bīja is that which makes letters sound and exists in all which we say or hear. Every Mantra is thus a particular sound form (Rupa) of the Brahman.⁵

³J. Woodroffe, Śakti and Śākta, p. 454.

⁴A. M. Sastri, trans., The Bhagavad-Gītā with the Commentary of Śrī Śankaracharya, p. 275. BG 10.39.

⁵Woodroffe, Śakti and Śākta, p. 490.

Aum (also spelled "Om" in some cases) is the most important example of this kind of mantra. One is to say it at the beginning and end of sacrifices and lessons, in addition to meditating on it.

Bīja mantras are the smallest units of repetition. They are said to be the names of "natural" sounds and certain deities. Natural names are the imitation of the sound produced by a thing. Thus, for example, the natural name of trees would take into account the sound of the sap rising in them. This natural sound, however, is heard only by the supreme ear. Thus even Aum is not entirely natural.⁶ Natural sound is part of the movement of the stars according to ChU 1.5.1: "The udgītha is the pranava, the pranava is the udgītha. And as the udgītha is the sun, so is the pranava, for he (the sun) goes sounding Om."⁷

The natural sound of a person is also the natural sound of his unique deity and this sound is the bīja mantra. Careful selection of this sound is very important and requires a guru.⁸ Because it is often very difficult to determine the precise sound of a confused person the visual manifestation of one's sound is sometimes sought. This connection of the visual, which was indicated in the last para-

⁶J. Woodroffe, Garland of Letters, pp. 64-74.

⁷Max Muller, The Upanishads, Part I, p. 12.

⁸Woodroffe, Garland of Letters, pp. 65-66.

graph, continues in the selection of bīja mantras by reading the signs of the stars which in turn show the forces operating in the body of the devotee.⁹ Once given the mantra, which is usually unrelated to ordinary language, by his guru, the devotee is to repeat it while attempting to merge in the sound and thus the deity.

Aum, the word which the ChU begins by considering, is the universal and most important bīja mantra. It precedes all sacrifices. It is composed of the letters a, u, and m. Over the Aum [ॐ] is written a crescent with a dot. This is called nāda and bindu.

Woodroffe offers the traditional explanation of them as follows:

Nada, is the mantra name for the first going forth of power (Sakti) which gathers itself together in massive strength as Bindu to create the universe, and which Bindu as so creating, differentiates into a trinity of Energies which are symbolized by A, U, M.¹⁰

What Aum means most deeply is tied up closely with its "inherent power," and its importance and function within the tradition. In common usage it is the expression of assent:

That syllable is a syllable of permission, for whenever we permit anything, we say Om, yes. Now permission is gratification. He who knowing this meditates on the syllable (Om), the udgītha, becomes indeed a gratifier of desires.¹¹

⁹Woodroffe, Principles of Tantra, p. 524.

¹⁰Woodroffe, Garlands of Letters, p. 206.

¹¹Max Müller, The Upanishads, Part I, p. 2, ChU 1.1.8.

Aum is the means of becoming united with Brahman for Brahman is its inherent power. This position of Aum is put most clearly by the Maitri Upanisad. Aum is "...the support of the meditation on Brahma." "The body is the bow. The arrow is aum. The mind is its point, darkness is the mark." Presumably as long as the mark is missed one would have to keep shooting (repeating) Aum. "By sound alone is the non-sound revealed. Now here the sound is aum." "Those who know the sound Brahman get to the higher Brahman."¹²

Rāmanuja elaborates on this. There are two brahmans, the para (highest) and apara (lower). The apara or effected (kārya) Brahman is of two kinds. Meditation on the sound as having one syllable obtains a reward in this world (terrestrial Brahman). Meditation as two syllables obtains a reward in the superterrestrial world, while the para Brahman is reached by means of the three syllabled Aum.¹³

Śaṅkara seems to concur with this view while discussing the fruit of meditation. "He who meditates on the highest Self by means of the syllable Om, as consisting of three mātrās [letters], obtains for his (first) reward the world of Brahman, and after that, gradually, complete intuition."¹⁴ Brahman is not the only result of the repetition

¹²Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upanisads, Maitri Up. 7.11, p. 858; 6.24, p. 834; 6.22, p. 833.

¹³Thibaut, VSRB I.3.12, pp. 313-314.

¹⁴Thibaut, trans., VSSB, I.3.13, Vol. I, p. 174

of Aum. It is said¹⁵ that vedic rites are performed for the worship of Aum and these rites in turn produce rain, food, crops, and sustenance for the sacrificer.

Manu attributes to it the ability to aid memory and expiate guilt. "Let him always pronounce the syllable Om at the beginning and at the end of (a lesson in) the Veda; (for) unless the syllable Om precede (the lesson) will slip away (from him), and unless it follow it will fade away."¹⁶ "Sixteen suppressions of the breath (prāṇāyāma) accompanied by (the recitation of) the Vyāhrtis and of the syllable Om, purify if they are repeated daily, after a month even the murderer of a learned Brāhmaṇa."¹⁷ A vyāhrti is a declaration or statement usually of formulae consisting of somewhat disconnected words. The words usually referred to as such are bhūr bhuvah sva (earth sky heaven) and are mentioned in ChU 2.23.2 and 4.17.3-6

A use of word sounds similar to the bīja mantra is the stobha syllable, consideration of which occurs at ChU 1.13 immediately after a passage about a kind of chant which sounds like nothing but Aum. Stobha syllables are used in the chanting of the Sāman in vedic

¹⁵ ChU 1.1.9.

¹⁶ Bühler, The Laws of Manu, II.74, p. 43.

¹⁷ Ibid., XI. 249, pp. 479-480.

sacrifice. They are not part of ordinary language and are unrelated by sound to the text being sung. Śabara defines them as follows:

"That which is in addition to (in excess of) the syllables of the verse, and is dissimilar to them, -- i.e., does not belong to the same 'class' of letters as those, -- is what is called 'stobha'."¹⁸

In the ChU they are said to mean particular things which meaning when known and meditated upon while chanting them has particular results. The presence of such meanings being ascribed to sounds whose meaning is totally unknown if heard during the sacrifice is not at all unusual as we shall see later on.

Mantras are verses which are repeated. They can be a prayer, sacred text, or instrument of thought. Mantras, which include stotras and bīja mantras, are, however, very different from personal prayer. They are not used for talking with God and they are highly formalized while not being intended merely as an example. Woodroffe says, "There is nothing necessarily holy or prayerful about a Mantra. Mantra is a power which lends itself impartially to any use. A man may be injured or killed by Mantra."¹⁹ "To produce the designed effect, the Mantra must be intoned in the proper way, according to both sound (varṇa) and

¹⁸ SB 9.2.18.39, Vol. III, p. 1533.

¹⁹ Woodroffe, The Serpent Power, p. 83 quoted in Jhavery, Comparative and Critical Study of Mantra-Sastra, p. 33.

rhythm (svara). For these reasons, a Mantra when translated ceases to be such, and becomes a mere word or sentence."²⁰ Mantras can have any number of effects aside from uniting one with one's personal deity. They are used for divining the future, charming others, causing and preventing snake bites, stopping motion, paralyzing an army, appeasing an angry person, stopping fire, and warding off enemies and epidemics.²¹ The power of mantra is the reason for the use of mantras in the ChB to bring children back to health (ChB 2.6.18), protect oneself from snakes (ChB 2.1.1-7), and rid oneself or others of worms (ChB 2.7).

A mantra is a different thing from an upāsana although they are both sacred statements which are repeated. A mantra's aim is some result in the world, usually by the intercession of a god, whereas upāsanas, of which one type are mahāvākyas such as tat tvam asi ("That thou art"),²² aim at union with something by the power of knowledge. The similarity in form and proximity of location of upāsanas and mantras, e.g., mantras are given in ChU 2.29, led to their having to be distinguished in the VSŚB.

Similarly other mantras also -- which, either by 'indication' (linga), or 'syntactical connexion' (vākya), or some other means of proof, are shown to be

²⁰Woodroffe, Sakti and Śākta, p. 487.

²¹Jhavery, Comparative and Critical Study of Mantra-Sastra, pp. 297- 298.

²²VSŚB 3.3.26.

subordinate to certain sacrificial actions -- cannot, because they occur in the Upanishads also, be connected with the vidyas [upāsanās] on the ground of mere proximity.²³

In the Bhagavad Gītā IX, 16 where it is said, "I am mantra" Śaṅkara explains, "I am the mantra, the chant with which the oblation is offered to the Pitris and the Devatas."²⁴ Hymns or mantras are chanted while offering sacrifice partly as purification, partly as invocation, and partly as an offering. They are all contained in the Veda.

The most sacred and efficacious mantra²⁵ is the gayatrī which is discussed at ChU 3.12. It occurs at Rg Veda 3.62.10 and in the other Vedas and is discussed throughout the Vedic literature.

The inestimable advantages which the gayatrī mantram procures are proportionate to the number of times it is repeated. Thus for a thousand repetitions you would obtain success in all your undertakings; for ten thousand, the forgiveness of sins and abundance of this world's goods; for twenty thousand, the spirit of wisdom and the gift of knowledge; for a hundred thousand, the supreme grace of becoming a Vishnu after death.

²³Thibaut, VSSB 3.3.25, Vol. 2, p. 224.

²⁴Sastri, The Bhagavad-Gītā..., p. 249.

²⁵Dubois, Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies, n. p. 255
Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra, Vol. II, Part I, pp. 303-304.

It is considered most meritorious to solemnly undertake to recite the gayatri for a certain fixed time daily, the credit gained thereby being graduated according to the length of time devoted to the exercise. It depends, that is to say, on the choice that one makes of the three following periods: (1) from sunrise to sunset; (2) from sunrise to noon; and (3) at intervals of about three hours. ²⁶

Stotras are particular types of hymns of praise, a verse or text which is sung, or the verse written. There are four sahasranāma stotras in the Mahābhārata. Each one consists of a thousand names of the deity who is thus invoked by the reciter. Within a stotra there may be repetition of words or meanings. In the former case, it is explained, the meaning changes and in the latter a unity between different words is realized. Ordinarily a word is not repeated within a stotra if the intended meaning is the same.

The reciting of the names in a sahasranāma stotra must be done very carefully, for each of the names is considered to be a mantra by itself and not only a descriptive term. When this care is taken, the devotee, the mantra, and the devatā he worships become non-different. But this can only happen when the meaning becomes understood. The great importance of the meaning is borne witness to by at least fifteen different commentaries on the Viṣṇu Sahasranāma alone. Śaṅkara says,

²⁶Dubois, pp. 262-263.

"one should not think that by merely reciting (this hymn) salvation is assured; because it is by knowledge alone that one can attain to Moksha."²⁷ Careful recitation frees one from wrath, jealousy, cupidity, and evil thoughts, while at the same time gains prosperity, intelligence, memory and fame. Reciting is called a "mental bath" which removes desire and hatred, sins and fear.

From all of this we can see the vast importance of linguistic repetition in orthodox Hindu religion as a whole and that the ChU is implicated in every aspect of such repetition. The most obvious concern of the ChU as far as chanting is concerned, however, is the chanting of the Sāma Veda which it was the Chandogas' duty to do.

2. Chandoga Sāman Chanting

Importance of Mathematics and Astronomy to the Chant

The particular occupation of the Chandogas after which this Upaniṣad is named was to chant (or "sing") the Sāmans at the vedic sacrifices.

The ṛks of the Ṛg-Veda were recited by hotrakas and the sāmans of the Sāma-Veda sung by Chāndogas, but before these chanters gave their performance they had the opportunity of calling to memory completely and accurately words and

²⁷ R. A. Sastry, trans., The Vishnu Sahasranama (with Sankara's Commentary), p. 161.

See also R. A. Sastry, trans., Siya Sahasranama Stotra with Nilikantha's Commentary.

meanings of their chants. And this was very necessary, the hymns being sung so as to render everything quite unrecognizable.²⁸

The most important type of sacrifice was the soma sacrifice and the most important soma sacrifice was the agnistoma.

The prakṛti or elementary form of the soma-sacrifices is the Agni-stoma with which sacrifice the adept of the priestly office makes his first acquaintance, as soon as he undertakes the study of the soma-sacrifices.²⁹

The Pancaviṃśa Brāhmaṇa, a Sāma Veda Brāhmaṇa in the same rescension as the ChB and ChU (the Kauthuma)³⁰ is very clear about the centrality of the Agnistoma:

The other sacrifices are performed for
(the obtainment of) one (special) desire,
(but) the agnistoma for (the obtainment of)
all. [6.3.2]

.

The agnistoma, indeed, is the chief
sacrifice: [6.3.8]³¹

Much of ChU 1-5 considers elements necessary for sacrifice and two sacrifices in particular: the most essential soma sacrifice,

²⁸ Barend Faddegon, Studies on the Samaveda, p. 1. He calls the hymns "japas".

²⁹ Van der Hoogt, The Vedic Chant Studied in its Textual and Melodic Form, p. 61.

³⁰ Caland, trans., Pañcaviṃśa-Brāhmaṇa, [hereafter referred to as PVB], p. i.

³¹ PVB 6.3.2, p. 101. PVB 6.3.8, p. 102.

the Agniṣṭoma and the most essential household sacrifice, the Agnihotra. The Agnihotra is mentioned in ChU 5.24 but is also the subject of discussion throughout chapter 5 and is that which is the final purpose of the fires tended by the students in ChU 4. The three fires named in the ChU are essential to both the Agniṣṭoma and the Agnihotra, however. The Agnihotra is notable for its use of milk for libations as opposed to soma in the Agniṣṭoma.

The central sacrificial concern in ChU 1-2, however, is the Agniṣṭoma. The verses to be spoken in ChU 2.24 are necessary for the performance of the Agniṣṭoma by a Chandoga but are only found here in the ChU. The hymn explained at ChU 1.12 is explained with reference to a particular type of performance of it which occurs in the Agniṣṭoma. The chants listed in ChU 2.11-20 are the principal Agniṣṭoma chants and principal chants in the twelve day rite (daśaratra) the first and last days of which are Agniṣṭomas.³² As the most general and important form of the soma sacrifice, concern with it is only natural. The origin of the series of explanations in the ChU is thus founded in the need to explain the meaning of the chanting in the

³²PVB 10.4.2, 5.5, 7.1-8.7, 10.6.1. The Gāyatra is the most important chant. The Rājana is used to consecrate the altar. The Yajñayajñīya has particular use in inducing procreation. Vairūpa, Vairāja, Sakvarīs, and Revātis are the primary prīṣṭha chants the father of which is the Vāmadevya (PVB 7.9.5), the Rāthantara and Brihat which are second in importance only to Gāyatra are also out of doors chants.

Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra, Vol. II, pt. 2, p. 1189 says that ChB 1.8.1, and 1.8.17 are used in the Agniṣṭoma.

Agnistoma and the Agnihotra both in the most particular and in the most general way. But these explanations presuppose a great deal of knowledge not dealt with in the ChU, which knowledge is nonetheless taken advantage of by it. Note, for example, the education presupposed by Nārada at ChU 7.1.2.

Caland and Henry report the following sacrificial action which is repeated with the variations stated in ChU 2.24 at midday and evening in the Agnistoma.

Before 'bringing or leading' the morning litany, the sacrificiant, if he is a Chandoga, enters into the pracinavaṁśa (sacrificial hut), sits down behind the śālāmukhiya (edge of the hut), facing north, and sings the sāman called lokadvāram or vāsavam sāma (consecrated to the Vasus) three times: 'Open the door of the site, that we may see you in order to (obtain) domination!' [ChU 2.24.4, 8-12, 13.]

Next, facing the east, he makes a butter libation, with the sruva ["a spoon of a small, standard unit of measure, made of 'khadira' wood, of which the front end is a hollow head the diameter of a thumb."],³³ in the same fire while saying: 'Hommage to Agni who inhabits the earth, who inhabits the site; for me the sacrificiant, conquer the site, because that there is the site of the sacrificiant. It is there that I the sacrificiant, must go beyond life. Svāhā!' [ChU 2.24.5, 9, 14-15] He puts a log on the fire, in silence, while thinking of Prajāpati, and then says: 'Make the

³³ Caland and Henry, L'Agnistoma - Description Complète de la Forme Normale du Sacrifice de Soma. Translation mine, Vol. I, p. xliv.

bar (or bolt) jump.' [ChU 2.24.6,
10,15] ³⁴

The prācīnavamśa or sacrificial hut is a carefully laid out building in which the three principal fires exist (gārhapatya [ChU 4.11], anvāhāryapacana or dakṣiṇāgni [ChU 4.12], āhavanīya [ChU 4.13]). The hut is so named because the main beam (vaṁśa) of the hut is oriented from west to east. (Prāg or Prācīna means "toward the east".) The hut has an opening towards each of the four celestial regions, that is to say, four doors facing north, south, east and west. The southern side is a little bit higher than the northern side. The floor is a rectangle 16 by 12 prakramas or 12 by 10 prakramas.³⁵ The south of the hut is used for cooking mash while outside and to the west is the sacrificer's wife's hut (patnīśālā). The gārhapatya fire is 2 1/2 padas before the western post of the prācīnavamśa. The āhavanīya fire is 1 1/2 padas behind the eastern pillar. And so on and so forth.³⁶ The fires involve equally careful measurement and placement with respect to the stars. The altar which is outside

³⁴ Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 129-30. Translation mine. See also Vol. II, pp. 267 and 329, for accounts of the midday and evening extractions.

³⁵ 1 prakrama = 2 padas = 30 aṅgulas
1 aṅgula (or "thumb") = 34 sesame seeds side by side = 14 grains of the anu plant. Satyaprakash and R. S. Sharma, ed., Baudhayana-Sulbasutram, [hereafter referred to as BSS] trans. G. Thibaut, 1.4,5, 9,15, p. 41.

³⁶ See BSS, 1.64-69, pp. 61-63; BSS, p. 3; Caland and Henry, Vol. I, pp. 7-8.

of and to the east of the hut involves intricate planning and measurement and can be found described in Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 7 and 8. It is not our place to go into a more detailed description of the sacrifice but one more example will suffice to show the degree to which mathematics enter it. The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (7.1.1.32-37) says that the gārhapatya altar must be circular and the āhavanīya must be square while their areas must be equal. This poses a rather difficult problem as the side of a square is equal to the square root of pi (the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter) multiplied by the radius of a circle of equal area to that square and pi is an irrational ratio. An incommensurable can often be constructed but in this case such a construction is not attempted but only the construction of an approximate measurement which will yield an area close to that of either a pre-existent square or circle is suggested. This involves very interesting operations sometimes employing other irrational numbers. It indicates that irrational numbers posed a great unsolved difficulty both theoretically and practically. For example, a sacrifice could never be done properly except by

accident.³⁷

In the BSS discussion of this problem and in a later approximation of the square root of two there is no textual suggestion

³⁷I. This problem of "squaring the circle", which plagued the Greeks as well, is discussed in an "Excursus" on Bk. I, Ch. ii, 185a of Aristotle's Physics by P. H. Wicksteed in Aristotle, Physics, trans. Wicksteed, Vol. I, pp. 98-101.

II. Proof that the ratio of the area of a circle to the area of a square is irrational:

Area of a circle of radius $r = \pi r^2$

$$\pi = \frac{\text{circumference of a circle}}{2 \times (\text{radius of that circle})}$$

Area of a square of sides $2s = 4s^2$

$$\pi r^2 = 4s^2$$

$$\frac{\pi}{4} = \frac{s^2}{r^2}$$

$$\frac{\sqrt{\pi}}{2} = \frac{s}{r} \approx .886$$

III. In order of decreasing precision the following methods of construction are suggested by the BSS.

BSS 1.58: "If you wish to turn a square into a circle, draw half of the cord stretched in the diagonal from the centre towards the prācī - line (i.e., stretch a cord from the centre of the square to one of the corners, for instance to the north-east corner and move then the loose end of the cord towards south until the cord covers the prācī the line running from the center of the eastern side of the square to the center of the western side; a piece of the cord will then of course lie outside the square, describe the circle together with the third part of that piece of the cord which stands over (i.e., take for the radius of the circle the whole piece of the cord which lies inside the square plus the third part of the piece which lies outside)." [If Area of square = 4 then the area of a circle by this method = 4.05 or a deviance of 1.2%]

BSS 1.59 "If you wish to turn a circle into a square, divide the diameter into eight parts and one of these eight parts into twenty-nine parts: of these twenty-nine parts remove twenty-eight and moreover the sixth part (of the one left part) less the eighth part (of the sixth part)." [Area of Circle = 3.1428, Area of square = 3.0883 or a deviance of 1.7%]

BSS 1.60 "Or else divide (the diameter) into fifteen parts and remove two that is the gross side of the square." [Area of Circle = 177, Area of square = 169, 4.5% deviance] -- BSS pp. 59-60.

that in principle these are irrational numbers. On the contrary it seems to be suggested that a small enough fraction can be found to make the ratio mensurable. This discovery of a fraction is furthermore not systematic as far as we can tell. In other words neither a calculus nor an algebraic expression for an irrational number is hinted at. Number in the face of an important and difficult problem has retained the character of units which can be counted and which come to be as a proportion of the whole.

Bergaigne devotes Chapter Five of Part One in his Vedic Religion to this proposition in the more specific case of the Rg Veda. His most general conclusion is that number expresses "A sense of totality, and of a totality corresponding basically to all the parts of the universe collectively...".³⁸ More specifically the numbers in the Rg Veda can be shown to have been derived from certain primary divisions of the universe either through the addition of one, multiplication, or a combination of both. As this process of number derivation is fairly explicit it could reasonably be supposed that this is what these numbers meant to most people. The same numbers and methods of division pervade the ChU. Therefore we concur with Bergaigne:

³⁸ Abel Bergaigne, Vedic Religion According to the Hymns of the Rgveda, trans., V. G. Paranjpe, Vol. II, p. 158.

Now then we shall state our conclusion as follows. In the large majority of the mythological numbers of the RV and especially in the numbers two, three, five and seven, we have an expression not merely of an 'indeterminate plurality' but of a 'totality', and this totality as a rule corresponds to all the worlds collectively. In this sense we can say (and this is practically a third rule as the mythological arithmetic which is to be added to those which have been detailed in the first two sections), that these different numbers are all to [be] regarded as equivalent in-as-much as they are expressions, each one in its own particular system of division, of the sum total of the parts of an identical whole, which is none other than the universe itself.³⁹

We have pointed out the relationship of the layout of the sacrifice to the stars. The time of the sacrifice is dictated as well by the positions of the stars. The Agnistoma is performed in the spring when the sun and moon are in opposition or conjunction.⁴⁰ There are numerous occasions when the path of the stars and their position is likewise mentioned in the ChU. Directions are always with respect to the position of the stars. "North" means "in the direction of the north star". "East" means "in the direction of the rising sun at the spring equinox", etc. Hence, the precondition to the performance of any rite was that the

³⁹Ibid., p. 163.

⁴⁰Caland and Henry, Vol. I, p. 1.

sacrificer was able to establish an absolutely correct relationship to the stars in time and space.⁴¹ The question is why was this important and why was number so steadily invoked?

Number

The importance of number was linked to the stars in the tradition, for the sixth Vedaṅga or area of study necessary for understanding the Vedas was called jyotiṣa and comprised mathematics and astronomy. Jyotiṣa is a pre-condition for all ritualistic action.

⁴¹"The earth is round. The Brāhmanas repeatedly say that the whole earth, once floating and mobile remained in this condition until the cardinal points, becoming fixed themselves, also fixed the earth. In its fixed position it is spoken of as four-cornered (caturbhrsti, RV. X. 58.3) or four pointed (catussrakṭi, Ś.B. VI.1.2.29). These points are where heaven and earth seem to meet, where the sun appears to rise and set; East and West and the other cardinal points complete the square. The earth, in its contact with heaven of which the sky is the figure, is kept in position by this contact, by the regular appearance and disappearance of the sun, at these points, which are the seal on the marriage of heaven and earth then contracted. The four cardinal points, the four orients, are beheld periodically and become known as perpetually recurring permanent in a cyclical sense, by which the days are measured and time. In Indian symbolism, the earth, fixed and ruled over by time, is known as, and correspondingly drawn as, four-cornered, each side of the square ruled over by the regent of the cardinal point situated at its middle." Stella Kramrisch, The Hindu Temple, Vol. I, p. 29.

...The Vedas arose for the purpose of
 (use in) sacrifices; sacrifices are enjoined
 according to the order of times; therefore
 he who knows Jyotisa which is the science
 laying down the proper times knows
 sacrifices. ⁴²

We think that the two subjects were dealt with not only because mathematics was necessary to calculate the paths of the stars but also because they both provided the physical foundation for the belief in an immanent being. It is in fact the geometrical regularity of the stars (i.e., their subordination to mathematics) that makes them convincing images of order.

Time is the counting off of celestial positions that are so closely related to things on earth that these positions seem to change at continuously regular intervals. As in numbers, which were conceived of as divisions of a whole unitary thing, and as in the universe which is a whole unitary being⁴³ so temporal periods were conceived of as divisions of completed cycles. One day, for example, is one complete cycle of the sun while an hour is 1/24th of this cycle. "Days" in Hinduism actually were determined as divisions of the lunar month and were called "tithi". One tithi is "the time or period required by the moon to gain twelve degrees on the sun."⁴⁴ Thus there are always 30

⁴²Quoted from Vedaṅga Jyōtisa in Kane, Vol. V, pt. I, p. 478.

⁴³ChU 3.1-11, 3.13, 3.15, 3.19, 4.5-8.

⁴⁴Kane, Vol. V, p. 68.

tithis to a lunar month but the length of tithi varies with respect to a day due to a certain irregularity of the moon. Nonetheless, all terrestrial activities are determined according to tithis and other repeating celestial patterns. There is an "auspicious time for undertaking anything" which is called "muhūrta".⁴⁵ The position of stars, etc., is therefore the occasion for certain rites to be done as well as vows to be taken.

Time is not a detail; it is a cause, the occasion, for the performance, as has been explained already. Hence it follows that, as it has not been enjoined as to be done at any but the stated times, the offerings, even though made at other times, would be as good as not made. Hence it is only at the stated times throughout one's life, that the sacrifice is to be performed.⁴⁶

The importance of astrology and what this implies is the following. The perfect regularity of substance, its countability, is given to men as a constant (i.e., time and space) over against all other events. This substantiality or material cause precedes all effects and hence causes them. Those other events must in some way conform to this regularity, for everything is in essence one

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 556. Cf. Belvalkar and Ranade, History of Indian Philosophy, p. 40, where it is noted that the proper lunar mansion is a common subject of most Brahmanas.

⁴⁶ SB, 6.2.8.25, Vol. II, p. 1033, and 6.2.8.27, Vol. II, p. 1034.

being and that being to exist as such must exhibit a perfect causality. Things must be as regular as the stars. Because things on earth occur in time which is the same time as the stars, the positions of the stars are a perfect record of events on earth. Because men can predict precisely the motion of the stars but not events on earth then events on earth are said to be dependent on the stars hence "all beings are dependent on him (the sun)".⁴⁷ Such an astrological conclusion is an absolutely necessary corollary to a doctrine of immanent being.

The ChU refers to the stars and sun as divinities (ChU 1.6, 1.11.7, 2.20). Indeed the sun is said to be closely related to the sāman and it is the divinity of the udgītha. To ascertain the relation of celestial movement to number then it is necessary to follow closely statements about the sun.

"Sameness" is the character of things which can be counted; hence of that in them which can be numbered. In counting anything as "one" we consider it to be equal to any other "one". Hence any "one" is the same as any other "one". Everything, which is in some way, can be counted as "thus". But in so doing, the way in which it is, is rendered neutral or simply "that". ChU 2.9 prepares for

⁴⁷Max Müller, The Upanishads, ChU 2.9.2, p. 26.

a discourse on number as taking advantage of this character of counting and at this point also states that all things are dependent on this numbering principle which is identical to the sun.⁴⁸ The sun is said by Uddālaka Āruṇi (ChU 3.1) to be the honey of the gods. This is then explained by him in ChU 6.9 to indicate that all things are essentially the same and that sameness as multiplicity (i.e., as many things which are identical) precedes sameness differentiated (i.e., as many things which have different characteristics). For unity of substance is necessary for sameness.

As the bees, my son, make honey by
collecting the juices of distant trees,
and reduce the juice into one form,

And as these juices have no discrimination,
so that they might say, I am the juice of
this tree or that, in the same manner, my son,
all these creatures, when they have become
merged in the True (either in deep sleep or
in death), know not that they are merged
in the True.⁴⁹

Nectar, honey and water are discussed thoroughly in ChU 3. The sun which is honey gets the honey through its rays which bring water to it and likewise the nectar which becomes honey. That

⁴⁸ See also PVB 6.3.6 where equality is said to consist of being made up of many things which are the same. On number as counting see Jacob Klein, Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra, Chapter 6.

⁴⁹ "Max Müller, The Upanishads, ChU 6.9.1-2, p. 101.

action which brings from the differentiated the essence which is one is the "brooding over the sacrifice".⁵⁰ This activity is the actual recitation or chanting of the respective vedic verses as opposed to the Vedas themselves (the flowers). The verses are performed with varying meters etc., (PVB 8.8.24) hence the distinctive essence brought to the sun and which when added to the libations and verses produces "honey" is the chanting. Chanting in itself is the food of the gods. Thus it is said that by chant Prajāpati gives food (PVB 8.8.14) and the food of the gods is the sāman (PVB 6.4.13). For these reasons Śaṅkara, going one step further, comments:

Inasmuch as the name 'Rgveda' is applied to the collections of Rks and Brāhmanas, which are mere words, there cannot flow from these any such juices or effects (like Honey) as could be tasted (enjoyed); hence the term 'Rgveda' here should be taken as standing for the Acts prescribed in the Rgveda; as it is only from these acts that there can flow honey-like results. Just as the bees produce honey out of the juices extracted from flowers, -- so the Rk-verses produce 'honey' out of the waters (results) extracted from the Acts (which are thus like flowers),...⁵¹

⁵⁰ChU 3.1.3, i.e., the "production of honey" -- Max Müller, The Upanishads, p. 38.

⁵¹Jha, ChU, pp. 123-124.

The Chant, Number and The Esoteric Character of Things

Thus what ChU 3 brings under consideration is not simply the "meaning" of the verses used in the sacrifice but the manner in which they are used and modified. The considerations of sāman which begin with ChU 1.1.2 and continue through ChU 3.17.3 clearly distinguish between Rk and Sāman. The Śābara bhāṣya on the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā Sūtras is very explicit in saying that "the name 'Sāman' applies to the music, not to the mantra texts set to music."⁵² Later it elaborates on this. "'Sāman' stands for the whole of the music along with all its details of verse, stobha, accent, time and repetition."⁵³ The question is very particular: "Why is the specific activity of this chanting done in this way meaningful, important, or reasonable?" In order to answer a question which is raised over and over again in the first three chapters, the ChU must provide specific answers that proceed from individual instances to the most general case and show why the nature of things requires this chanting of language.

The question is raised at the very beginning. ChU 1.1.1. reads "aum iti etad aksaram udgītham upāsīta." "What one understands by the udgītha is this syllable, aum." The Upaniṣad text which it parallels (Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad) reads "aum iti etad aksaram idam sarvam", "All

⁵² SB 9.2.1.2, Vol. III, p. 1493.

⁵³ SB 9.2.17.35, Vol. III, pp. 1530-1531.

this is this syllable, aum." The interest is different in the two texts. Although later on the ChU will indeed consider that everything is aum (ChU 2.23.3) and that everything is name (ChU 7), it is interested in a specific teaching (upās) about "aum", as it is connected with the udgītha, the "High Chant" or that chant performed by the udgatr priest.⁵⁴ The reason for this interest is that "one begins with aum" (ChU 1.1.1). In the Agnistoma at the second divided chant of the mid-day ceremony (the Rathantara) the Udgatr solely among the chanters begins his recitation with aum followed by vāk. He then replaces all of the consonants with bh and keeps the vowels hence reciting, "aum, vāg, bhā bhu bhā bhibha bhebhabha" for "ādugdhā iva dhenavah" meaning "like un milked cows".⁵⁵ Another similar practice in the Agnistoma is reported by Van Buitenen as follows:

At the three climaxes of the agnistoma ceremonial, the three soma pressings, the udgītha is chanted in a most curious way. In the samans proper to these stages, the pavamanastotras, the udgītha is chanted with aniruktagāna. This "chanting without actually pronouncing" is done by substituting the sound o for every syllable, so that for example the first udgītha of the bahispava-manastotra [ChU 1.12 explicitly discusses this] which reads pāvamānāyēndave abhī devām īya- (RV. 9.11.1 = SV 651; 763)

⁵⁴"Noteworthy in the Ch Up. is the special relation between OM and udgītha, which as far as I can see, does not occur before." Van Buitenen, "Akśara", p. 180.

⁵⁵B. Faddegon, "Ritualistic Dadaism", pp. 180-181.

is actually sounded as

1r 2 2 1 r r 2
OM-02̄-02̄-0-0-0-0-02̄-0-0-0-0-0-01212.

When one hears it chanted, it sounds like the repetition of the initial OM with which the udgītha begins. And that is what it must have been: LaṭṢṢ. 7.10.20 prescribes here:
sesam udgātā manasā tu svabhaktim omkaram
tathā svaram vācā gāyet "the udgātā must chant the remaining portion (i.e., after the prastāva); his actual part, however, he must chant in thought, (having the words themselves in mind), and just the Om̐kāra and also (its) vowel with the voice." Caland ²¹ quotes a prayoga which explains: om̐kāreṇākṣaraṇicchādayan vācā gāyet "he (the udgātā) must chant (the udgītha) aloud with his voice while concealing the actual syllables with OM." ⁵⁶

Faddegon notes in several places that the central purpose of this substitution as well as of the stobha syllables is to hide the meaning of the verse.⁵⁷ The reason the meaning must be hidden is to keep others from knowing it. In fact the central motivation of singing is said to be fear whose cause is death.

⁵⁶ Van Buitenen, "Akśara", pp. 180-181. Anirukta singing is referred to at ChU 2.22.1 where different types of singing are mentioned. Here it is said that this particular type of singing is sacred to Prajāpati, who is an ultimate source of the ChU as we show in the previous chapter.

See also PVB 7.1.2 & 8 where Caland notes that all syllables of udgītha and gāyatra in the out-of-doors-laud are replaced by "0".

Caland-Henri, L'Agnistoma..., p. 180, n. 21.

Faddegon, Studies on the Samaveda, p. 15 reports both practices.

⁵⁷ Faddegon, "Ritualistic Dadaism", p. 182.

Faddegon, Studies on the Samaveda, p. 57.

Death saw them there in the Rg, in the Sāman and in the Yajus just as one might see a fish in water. When they found this out, they rose out of the Rg, out of the Sāman, out of the Yajus and took refuge in sound.⁵⁸

Just as the motive of singing is fear, the function of chandas is to hide and protect:

Verily, the gods, when they were afraid of death, took refuge in the threefold knowledge. They covered themselves with metres. Because they covered themselves with these, therefore the metres are called chandas.⁵⁹

Fear is said to originate in the existence of others, i.e., more than oneself.

He was afraid. Therefore one who is alone is afraid. This one then thought to himself, "since there is nothing else than myself, of what am I afraid?" Thereupon his fear, verily, passed away, for, of what should he have been afraid? Assuredly it is from a second that fear arises.⁶⁰

Ironically, the ultimate and final purpose of sāman or music then is to remove or overcome the threat of multiplicity.

⁵⁸Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upanisads, ChU 1.4.3, p. 345. "Svara" is best translated as "sound" because of the context in which it appears, its meaning in other literature, its technical meaning of "musical note", and its use in ChU 1.3.2 which is expanded by a distinction between that which causes a word to be audible and the word in ChU 1.1.5.

⁵⁹Ibid., ChU 1.4.2, p. 345.

⁶⁰Ibid., BU 1.4.2, p. 164. Cf. ChU 7.24.1.

The Bahispavamaṇa hymn which is chanted in the Agnistoma rite and which we have already mentioned, is discussed at ChU 1.12 where three things are said to characterize it: the omnipresence of the word aum, moving about holding each other, and hunger. Hunger we are told means death and hence fear, but it is at the same time synonymous with desire. This manner of chanting whose purpose is obfuscation through production of meaningless sounds is followed immediately by a discussion of stobha syllables which have a similar appearance and, by implication, function to the actual singing of the latter hymn. Another consideration given to the Agnistoma occurs in ChU 1.10.11 where the Udgatr priest and two of his subordinate priests (Prastotr and Pratihartṛ) are mentioned along with the person offering the sacrifice. The priests are told that if they don't know the hidden meaning of their chants their heads will fall off and they are told this by someone who is desperately hungry. Here again obfuscation is juxtaposed with fear and desire.

Thus far we have maintained that stobha syllables are related to Bīja mantras, are thought to have some meaning which according to Śaṅkara's commentary on ChU 1.13 is due in part to the hymn in conjunction with which they occur and in part to the meaning of their component parts and finally that they obfuscate the meaning of the hymn by means of their sound. It is the function of the Upaniṣad to explain that which is hidden but this is a delicate process for in fact that means rendering oneself vulnerable. Thus the Upaniṣad

must reveal in a very hidden way. As has been shown, careful deception is so much a part of the life of the sacrifice that to have a related text as straightforward as the ChU is remarkable. Van der Hoogt gives an additional reason for understanding the chant in terms of obfuscation (esotericism) and number while disagreeing with Hillebrandt as to the origin of stobhas. The stobha Van der Hoogt claims (and we concur) is essentially part of the chanting and not the mantras. Hillebrandt says to the contrary:

The same stanza may at times be sung to one or to various melodies, then again the same melody to various stanzas. Hence it is often necessary to model, to enlarge, to modify the rcas in correspondence with the sāmans, and the creation of the staubhika form developed a technical literature that like the Pūspa Sūtra serves the purpose of modelling the rcas.⁶¹

Van der Hoogt argues as follows and is worth reading in full.

There is no reason for putting the question here whether some melodies of the Sāma-Veda are possibly older than the texts of the Rg-Veda. The subject now is the origin of the stobhas, and Hillebrandt's hypothesis thereabout must be decidedly refused. Those stobhas did not come into being because a melody of an octosyllabic verse was sung, e.g., to a twelve-syllabic one. In such a case the same part of a melody was repeated. There are sufficient instances of such a manipulation in the preceding pages. No more trouble arose whilst singing a melody of a twelve-syllabic verse to an octosyllabic one; a part simply was dropped.

⁶¹Trans. from Hillebrandt, Ritual Literature, p. 100 in Van der Hoogt, p. 72.

Hillebrandt's hypothesis on the one side is based on a wrong conception about the substance of the Vedic melody, and on the other side on a misunderstanding of the stobha. The stobhas by themselves were no unimportant support of the voice; on the contrary a great sacral significance was attached to the mostly meaningless syllables, and only with the help of ethnological facts is it possible to understand their importance. Both the great significance of onomatopoeic burdens in all popular poetry, especially in all nursery-rhymes and the use of meaningless syllables in the sacral chant of primitive tribes must be recalled to mind here.

A Vedic melody in some respect may be compared with a Gregorian chant. As this ecclesiastical singing uses certain determined tone-figures in order to mark the interpunction, so the Vedic melodizing indicates the end of the pādas by its tone-figures; the singing of a sāman might be called the melodical counting of the pāda-syllables.⁶²

The actual tune of the sāman was composed of five or six tones the intervals of which contained a major whole tone, minor whole tone and tertial semitone whose proportion was thought to be 4:3:2.

The gamut, then, which on historical grounds and for the sake of further investigation I have accepted runs in downward direction as edcag = 12345. But in a small set of sāmans, there was introduced a sixth tone, which, however, did not get the character of

⁶²Van der Hoogt, p. 72-73.

a tonic. So perhaps the pentachord edcag was turned into the hexachord edcagf with tone 5 functioning as drone tone and regular final tone. Further as an ancient source informs us, the tones 1-3 were respectively udūhas or harmonic derivatives of the tones 4-6; and in the practice of the chandogas the tones 4 and 5 were often used as substitutes for 1 and 2.⁶³

India just as much as Greece considered proportion to be the basis of tonality. The fundamental determinative element in the sound of the chant is the proportion of the tones. It is thus fitting that one of the more blatantly esoteric portions of the ChU, 1.13, is the place where number is more carefully, although not obviously, apotheosized. Number is more clearly important in ChU 2.10. Here seven parts of the chant⁶⁴ are eulogized according to the number of syllables in them which taken as three pairs of three each plus one set of three total twenty-one.

⁶³Faddegon, Studies on the Sāmaveda, p. 33. Out of this tonal system developed the classical Indian raga and tonal system [Faddegon, Studies..., p. 13.]

The tune determines who will do which singing. "The parvans at the beginning of a saman that are sung to the tones 4,5,6 belong to the prastāva, but as soon as a parvan begins with one of the three high tones the udgītha commences." [R. Simon, Das Pañcavidha-Sūtra, quoted by Van der Hoogt, p. 61] "A parvan is the part of a melody between two rests..." [Van der Hoogt, p. 36] The prastāva is a stanza connected with one or more parvans that either entirely or partly consist of stobhas and connected in addition with a nidhana or parts of a nidhana. A nidhana is a refrain which three chanters sing in unison. [Faddegon, Studies..., p. 13 and Van der Hoogt, p. 62]

⁶⁴Himkāra, the syllable which precedes the introduction. 2) Prastāva, the introduction. 3) Ādi, the beginning of the High Chant (udgītha) or aum. 4) Udgītha, the High Chant itself. 5) Pratihara, continuation. 6) Upadrava, interruption. 7) Nidhana, unison chorus [Faddegon, "Ritualistic Dadaism", p. 185.]

Barend Faddeggon referring, to stobha syllables as "dadaisms" after the stobha "da", notes the following numerical ordering in ChU 1.13.

The first six terms give a naive sketch of the sacrifice itself and surrounding nature: around lies stretched out the sacrifice-field, that is the earth; above blows the wind; still higher the moon pursues its path during the time of sacrifice; beneath its rays the sacrificer sleeps; the altar-fires burn around him; the sun sets and shines in the sky. It is noticeable here that the descriptive terms are arranged in pairs: earth beneath, wind above; moon above, man beneath; fires beneath, sun above. The last seven terms sum up the blessings of the sacrifice.

The first six dadaisms form a rhythmic cadence: hā-u, hā-i; atha, iha; ī, ū. Together they are ten syllables, the number found in the verse that is likewise called viraj. The last seven dadaisms make up two groups, and each group contains five syllables: e, au-ho-i, hin; -- svara, yā, vac, hum. In this way the dadaisms chosen follow the rule of number. ⁶⁵

The role of number is here well pointed out and what it indicates is that a kind of symmetry governs the choice of terms and that certain numbers, notably 3 and 7 are highly esteemed. What is poorly explained is the following. 1) The most important number in the passage is 13. (There are 13 stobha syllables in the 13th chapter.) 2) Contrary to the symmetry which Faddeggon points out the text itself is divided into

⁶⁵Faddeggon, "Ritualistic Dadism", pp. 188-189.

5 stobhas (ChU 1.13.1), 7 stobhas (ChU 1.13.2), and 1 stobha (ChU 1.13.3). Why? Faddegon implies that this is simply playful hide and go seek. 3) In ChU 1.13 the extra 1 stobha is spoken of as necessary to the whole implying two groups of 5 and 8. In ChU 2.10 the extra one is spoken of as excessive. 4) Other numbers abound: in ChU 2.10 Him-ka-ra is counted as 3. In ChU 1.13 kara is added to ten of the stobhas. Should this change the entire collection of numbers? That number is being impressed upon us here is indisputable. Our own speculation as to the meaning of these particular unaccounted for numbers as well as the ones Faddegon mentions is contained in footnote 66 which derives from the BSS discussion in footnote 38.

Elsewhere in the ChU numbers are discussed. ChU 1.1.3 mentions the number of essences (raṣa) as 8. ChU 3.6 discusses a series of periods of enjoyment as being twice that of each previous length. ChU 3.16.7 mentions that Mahīdāsa Aitareya lived 116 years. ChU 8.11.3 mentions that Indra studied with Prajāpati for 101 years. ChU 6 discusses the belief that the entire world is composed of different proportions of 3 components (guṇas).

Four numerical orderings occur in the ChU. 1) Things have a length proper to them (Mahīdāsa and Indra). 2) Things are ordered by pairs having an equal number (viz., ChU 3.6: 2x1, 2x2, 2x4, 2x8; ChU 2.10: 2x3, 2x3, 2x3, 1x3; ChU 1.13: 2 groups of 10 syllables, 3 pairs of syllables, 2 groups of 5 syllables). 3) Things occur in series. ChU 3.6 gives 2,4,8,16..., 2^n . Taking ChU 1.1, 1.13, and

2.10 together due to their containing the only explicitly mentioned numbers in themselves connected with the Sāman gives 8, 13, 21..., [(n-1) & (n-2)].⁶⁶ 4) Things are a proportion of 3 things hence can be known numerically (ChU 6).

⁶⁶ Another instance of this same series occurs at ChU 1.1.2. It begins by saying "earth is the essence of all beings" hence it is the same in them and thus to be known by the number 1. The essence of earth is thus "one" which is also water. In ChU 1.6 we note that Sāma is said to be dependent on (rests on) Rk. While at ChU 1.1.5 Rk and Sāman are spoken of as a couple which is joined together and fulfills each member in a third member which is dependent on them (ChU 1.1.6) i.e., om. This suggests that Śaṅkara is right in saying that each member mentioned in ChU 1.1.2 is dependent on the previous member while being the essence or fulfillment of it. [See his commentary on ChU 1.1.2-3]. But it also suggests that each member is the product of the coupling of the two previous members. Thus herbs are the joining of water and earth which is 2. Water and herbs result in man which is 3. Man and herbs result in speech which is 5. Speech and man results in Rk which is 8. Man and Rk results in Sāman which is 13. Rk and Sāman results in Udgitha which is 21. Sāman alters the Rk most clearly through the activities alluded to in ChU 1.12 and ChU 1.13. But the hidden meaning of this peculiar Sāman character, is most carefully set forth in ChU 1.13 where it is characterized by the adulation of 5, 7 & 1, and 13. The proportion, implied by the limit of this series (when it is infinitely large) or by its algebraic expression of such couples is a number which can't be counted (the golden mean). It is irrational and fulfills at the same time the rational. The joining of couples is said to be the fulfillment of desire (ChU 1.1.6 & 1.1.7) thus indicating that countable number (multiplicity) in itself is unfulfilled desire.

This makes the following fact the more interesting. If, following the lead of ChU 2.10, one adds the syllables of the stobhas in ChU 1.13 including the kara one obtains the number 34 (21 & 13). To do this one must not count humkara because it is simply him kara repeated, nor must one count svara which is in fact not a stobha syllable. [The two sources which are most concerned with this type of problem are Bergaigne, Vedic Religion According to the Hymns of the Rgveda, already discussed, and J. Przyluski, "La Loi du Symmetrie", which develops one part of the Bergaigne argument as it applies to the ChU but does not mention the problem of series. On the series implying the Golden mean, see V. E. Hoggatt, Jr., Fibonacci and Lucas Numbers.

It is in this final property that the other uses of number can be understood. All proportion is at least two numbers measured against each other. When two numbers are equal (of identical proportion) the proportion is sāma (good) or unitary (ChU 2.10). All counting hence numbering of things requires considering each thing as equal to every other thing which is counted as one. Thus sāma as sameness is established in ChU 2.9 prior to the discussion in ChU 2.10 of number. All proportion is originally dependent on the proportion 1:1. The proportion between a proper measure and any other measure is less perfect the further it is from one. The series mentioned here imply a proportion in any two succeeding numbers of the series. In ChU the proportion is 2 while the proportion in the series of ChU 1.1 and in 8, 13, 21 is a successively closer approximation to an irrational proportion known as the "golden mean". This latter series and proportion is originally dependent on the proportion 1:1. Thus the series goes 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13 etc. The proportions implied in ChU 6 are unique to each thing. But what is implied here in each case is that the ultimate constituents of things are numbers. All things taken as numbers are taken as the same, i.e., as in some sense composed of equal things. It is this numericality which ChU 2 refers to as the essence of sāman or as good. Things are good insofar as they can be counted. The question remains, what specifically does the activity of taking things as numbers imply about them? Why is it possible to take things as

something to be enumerated?

3. Conclusions

We have shown the great concern of the ChU with very particular aspects of the Agnistoma, namely those aspects which stand out to a Chandoga who is offering a sacrifice, and the prior necessity of an astrological foundation for these rites. Astrology is the visual proof of the immanence of being but it is founded upon the self-sameness of all things or their countability. The emphasis in countability is seen in the plethora of instances enumerated.

That the ChU in fact maintains that the being of things or Brahman is that which makes countability or the equation "all is one" possible and as such is number, is evident from several things. The convincing example for Śvetaketu (ChU 6.16) is one in which substance exists as a thing which affects things. It is therefore not separate from the world but a participant in it in the most pervasive and literal way. Every other example in ChU 6 (honey, water, a tree from a seed, salty water) is that of many different things having one thing which is the same for all of them and these same things when taken together are so similar that they do not retain separate identities but because of the sheer quantity and similarity are incapable of differentiation. Thus the infinite (bhūmā) is defined as "where there is nothing else" while the finite (alpa) is "where there is something else". At the same

time the finite is what causes "longing for something more" which implies that the infinite possesses everything. This is why Śaṅkara gives, as synonyms for "infinite", things implying great quantity or in other words countability, viz., "large", "unexcelled", "much".⁶⁷ Number is ontologically prior to things because Being always first desires to multiply and then produces names and forms (ChU 6.3). Thus ChU 6.2.3 states that for one thing to become many means for it to become many different types of things, i.e., fire, water, etc. In other words the most radically different things must be considered multiples of one thing. Therefore Śaṅkara says, "what we assert is that it is Being itself which is perceived in a form other than its own, through duality and diversity; and there is no non-existence of anything anywhere."⁶⁸

Countability implies an equation of things counted, i.e., taking them as in essence the same. Words are so equated in the Bahispavamaṇa rite. Thus hiding meanings exposes a more central meaning (their mutual being), which is the possibility of words being joined to music. A similar meaning is implied by the demonstrative pronouns "idam" or "etad", and "tat" ("this" and "that") which are used inordinately much throughout the first six parts of the ChU. These pronouns

⁶⁷ChU 7.23 and commentary.

⁶⁸Jha, ChU 6.2.3, p. 305.

culminate in the teaching, "tat tvam asi". Words are obfuscated and in effect equated when the thusness which they indicate is removed leaving a mere thatness. This is the function of the entirety of ChU 7 and of much of ChU 6.⁶⁹ The question then is what is this "thatness" and how is it to be known.

The Being of all things, i.e., the being which is immanent, is the being of number. The being of number, i.e., the being of multiplicity is that being which counts all things as the same or does not recognize their specific character (name). It is consequently beyond any characterization and finally, therefore, not to be enumerated. That being of number is the being of the chant which is also characterized by number. But the chant is motivated by fear and in fact multiplicity or number is the cause of fear. Hence, fear hides within fear. Now the chant may be motivated by fear but its purpose is the fulfillment of desire.⁷⁰ Desire thus is intimately related to fear. We will show in the next chapter that

⁶⁹Because the premise for the profound importance of Tattvamasi in Uttara Mimamsā rests in this general thesis that the countability of being is prior to the particular form it assumes which is linguistically manifested in the demonstrative pronoun, we have not and will not give much attention to the deep arguments between Śaṅkara and Ramanuja on the precise meaning of this phrase. Instead we shall be content to have exposed the relationship between this phrase and the text in which it occurs and the reasons for its importance.

⁷⁰Because the sacrifice is done for the fulfillment of desires, desire is its foundation. Only because of the Sāman does the sacrifice work. Bhagavan Das, hence, calls the Sama Veda, the Veda of desire (The Science of the Sacred Word, Vol. I, p. lxxxii).

for the ChU desire was caused by needs not filled, while fear is the possibility that they will not be. Fear, the being of desire, is the origin of the awareness of dependancy and the meaning of dependancy. Those who depend upon another, desire that other and fear his absence. Hence as will be discussed in the fifth chapter, true sovereignty and hence true political rule is logically prior to fulfilled desire, for true sovereignty is free of dependency and consequently free of fear and hence of multiplicity but also in principle is capable of fulfilling every desire.

So far, however, we have shown the relationship between ritual language and ritual as a whole. The specific rational for ritual language as part of a larger ritual does not explain the large quantity of specialized ritualistic and linguistic forms, the power attributed to them, and their sacred status. These and other things indicate that ritual word forms are theoretically prior to ritualized existence. They are theoretically prior even assuming that the same thing causes both the essential characteristics of the sāman and the esoteric and hence problematic transmission of teachings. This thing was the need to prevent the words from being understood by the demons.⁷¹ Ritual word forms are theoretically

⁷¹Faddegon, Studies in the Sāma Veda, p. 45.

prior insofar as we can show that this ritualistic view took the primordial being of the world to mean number and fear. For then the order of authentic speech would proceed from chant to everyday speech as one goes from the most authentic to the least.

IV

DESIRE

1. Introduction

We have seen that the ChU considers the essence of speech to be sāman (ChU 1.1.2) and that as such speech is ruled by two things, number and the need to hide. The two properties are determinative of man's approach to things. The second, however, is derived from the first or the true experiencing of the first.

The need to hide is based on fear and fear is a product of one's felt dependency. Dependency¹ means a state of requiring

¹Our use of "dependency" is liable to appear to waver between the meaning of "contingency" in the sense of "determinable according to man's will" (see "contingent" in The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Third Edition with corrections, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968) p. 483.) and "necessity" in the sense of "being inevitably fixed or determined" (see "necessity", Ibid., p. 1316). This is because dependency in the English speaking world is understood within the framework of liberal democracy where political dependency is considered to be an arbitrary and not necessary or natural thing. It is also because this has been extended by some to the realm of necessity where hunger and even the existence of human beings is considered to be an arbitrary and not necessary or natural thing. However, because "will" never really enters the picture, as we will show, dependency in our use combines contingency or having existence conditioned by the existence of something else with necessity or inevitability. Dependency, as we speak of it here, is not meant to imply either logical uncertainty ("I accept your argument but it is contingent on your premise being

something else for one's existence. The cause of one's existence, hence, is what one is dependent upon. Insofar as one is the cause of one's own existence one is independent and similarly insofar as anything has the ability to deprive one of existence, i.e., to remove the causes of oneself, one is dependent. The power for something to be rests in that upon which the thing depends. As long as one is dependent two things must naturally occur; desire for that depended upon and fear of the deprivation of that depended upon. Fear is concomitant with desire. Fear contains certainty about its dependency and multiplicity. It is directed towards the others while desire which is for the sake of itself is a directing of others towards oneself.

Fear becomes the determinative element in a hierarchy of dependency according to ChU 5.1. There, a determination of the oldest and the best (jyestham and śreṣṭham), which are here necessarily concurrent, is based on what it is most necessary for the contenders to have to survive. Each sense leaves in order to test, through deprivation, the ability of the other senses to get

true.") or natural uncertainty ("Men may not always be subject to death."). However, we use dependency in order to imply something more than necessity. We mean "the relation of having existence conditioned by the existence of something else" which conditioning is inevitable and compelling but which relation is not eternally necessary.

along without it. When breath is about to leave, the other senses, realizing their dependency, beg him to stay. They then declare that because of this dependency breath is the essence of each of them while each of them is in this way the same. At the same time breath is granted each of the individual attributes of the senses and by being the essence and what is common to all he is singularly independent. Breath is the only one who counts.

Thus dependence is the determinant of essence. The essence of a thing is that upon which it is dependent. Dependence exists when one thing cannot survive the deprivation of (i.e., is dependent upon) another thing or when another thing has the power to deprive it of things necessary for its survival. The acknowledgement of this dependent status or belief in it is the meaning of fear. Wherever there is more than one there is the potential for the destruction of that one if they are all equal and independent. But if one thing is essential to the existence of everything else then only one thing in essence exists. Therefore breath in the previous instance would be fearless. Conversely, if there is no warranted fear than there can only be one being.

He was afraid. Therefore one who is alone is afraid. This one then thought to himself, 'since there is nothing else than myself, of what am I afraid?' Thereupon

his fear, verily passed away, for of what should he have been afraid? Assuredly it is from a second that fear arises.²

From this it can be seen that the true self or essence is "fearless" (because it is the only one) and is "immortal" (because fear is always ultimately of death and the only one, or what is the same -- everything --, can never be caused to cease to be) as is stated in ChU 8.7.4. The end to fear and the end to desire is the same and hence they are necessarily concurrent states of mind. That their resolution is in that independent essence being the self is stated in ChU 8.7.3, 8.1.5, and 7.25.2. The latter passage is an explanation of the term "infinite": "Wherein one sees nothing else, hears nothing else and understands nothing else, that is the Infinite; wherein one sees something else, hears something else, and understands something else, -- that is Finite."³

Dependency which implies fear of that depended upon which is other than oneself, does not preclude that which is depended upon being one's support. It requires it. This is most clearly illustrated in ChU 1.1. A series of things are said to be

²Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upanisads, BU 1.4.2, p. 164.

³Jha, ChU 7.24.1, pp. 402-403. BU 1.4.2 and ChU 1.3.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.3, and 8.3.4 use various grammatical forms of bhi which Monier-Williams defines as "to fear, be afraid of...to fear for, be anxious about...to terrify, put in a fright, intimidate...fear, apprehension, fright, alarm, dread of" (p. 758).

succeedingly more essential (rasa). Two things in succession are spoken of as a pair or couple (mithunam). The mithunam is joined by that thing which is more essential than both but most directly by the essence of that member of the pair which is the essence of the other member. They are not mutually dependent but only hierarchically dependent. That is, the essence of each thing is not in the other. Only one thing can be essential for another. Thus, it is because the essence of Sāman, udgītha, is made present by means of Rk that Sāman is joined to Rk, and it is because Sāman is the essence of Rk that Rk is joined to Sāman. Therefore the ChU 1.1.6 says "Verily, whenever a pair come together, āpayato vai tāv anyo'nyasya kāmam" ("they fulfill each other's desire"). Desire as well as couples occurs in a dependent hierarchy. Only through participation in this dependent hierarchy are desires fulfilled. Desire must occur, then, with respect to essence (rasa). What something truly is, is its rasa.

Rasa has two principal uses. One is as the pith or sap of something i.e., its life and hence essence. The other is as the central word in the Sanskrit literature of literary criticism⁴

⁴Masson & Patwardhan, Aesthetic Rapture, Vol. I, pp. 24-25.

where it refers to the mood or experience produced by language.⁵
 A linguistic experience is necessarily at a distance from oneself.
 One is not really involved as one would be if one was in fact the
 characters described.⁶ Therefore when the ChU is referring to the
 essence of things as the self it draws away from using rasa. But
 insofar as rasa in both principal uses refers to the experience
 of the essence of a thing and insofar as things are essentially
 linguistic,⁷ rasa in both uses would appear to have the same meaning.

The fulfillment of desire by the union with rasa has the
 same meaning in the ChU at this point as it does in the Sanskrit
 authorities on rasa. For both, the presence of rasa means pleasure⁸
 and for both, just as desire (kāma) means sexual pleasure, so the
 most important rasa was śṛṅgāra (the erotic mood).⁹ Śṛṅgāra
 was the most important rasa according to Rudraṭa, who was the first
 to recognize rasa as the vital element in literary composition in

⁵ Ibid., p. 17.

⁶ cf. Ibid., pp. 23-24 & 27-28.

⁷ This remains to be shown but for preliminary readings see
 Falk, Nāma-Rūpa and Dharma-Rupa

⁸ Hari Ram Mishra, Theory of Rasa in Sanskrit Drama, p. 236.

⁹ Ibid., p. 208.

general. Indeed to put it differently, Masson says that rasa is parallel to the "mystical experience" of the Vedāntin¹⁰ who describes it as ānanda (bliss). According to Abhinavagupta, the greatest authority on rasa in literary art, the essential characteristic of rasa is also ānanda.¹¹ In other words although the ChU in explaining essence discontinues the use of "rasa", it, in many respects, is conjuring up the same world of erotic pleasure in a more metaphysical form, by using "sat", "kāma", and "ānanda", as exists in literary art through its use of rasa. In this way the problem of language and meaning in the ChU is the problem of desire. The essence of a linguistic entity, which is a mithuna, is identical to the essence of kāma, which is erotic pleasure or desire.¹²

The thing desired is desired for its essence, its pith or its sap, which is its self. Since the essence of oneself is that thing most desired from another, the purpose or end of desire is not that thing desired but the one desiring. The BU 2.4.5 and 4.5.6 states

¹⁰Masson, p. 32. He qualifies this ambiguously in a footnote (#263, Vol. 2, p. 45) by saying that the absolute Yogic moment is not the same Cf. Mishra, pp. 310-316.

¹¹Mishra, pp. 240-241 and p. 237. cf. Masson, p. 18.

¹²Lest there be any doubt about this, śṛṅgāra is explicitly said to be a relation between animals (Masson, p. 42, who documents this by the example of Kalidasa). It may be in part due to this that animals throughout the ChU will be able to inform men of the highest things.

this very clearly:

na vā are patyuh kāmāya patih priyo bhavati

ātmanas tu kāmāya patih priyo bhavati;

Not for the husband's desire is the husband dear (priyo)

but for the self's desire is the husband dear;

Kāma is used here together with priya in such a way that a subtle difference of meaning is made apparent. Kāma is used to interpret priya. The abstract noun, kāma, is derived from the root kam while the verbal noun, priya, is derived from the root prī whose abstract noun is preman (prema). Monier-Williams translates prī as "to please, gladden, delight, gratify, cheer, comfort, soothe, propitiate ...to be pleased or satisfied with, delight in, enjoy...to like, love, be kind to", while prema is translated as "love, affection, kindness, tender regard, favour, predilection, fondness."¹³ Kam is translated as "to wish, desire, long for, to love, be in love with, have sexual intercourse with", while kāma is translated as "wish, desire, longing...desire for, longing after...love, affection, object of desire or of love or of pleasure...pleasure, enjoyment;

¹³ Monier-Williams, p. 710 and p. 711 respectively. It is interesting that in the Sanskrit translation by The Bible Society of India and Ceylon of the New Testament prema is used for the Christian concept of agape. How justified this choice was we do not know.

love, especially sexual love or sensuality."¹⁴ Kāma stands here for a fundamental and pervasive attitude toward the world which explains priya. Pri is thus ontologically weaker than kam. The interpretation of kāma must be vague to a certain extent partially due to its foundational role in chanted language. One must proceed very cautiously in distinguishing these meanings for the problem of kāma is complicated by the impersonal conception of self inherent to the self understood initially, as we shall later point out as "name".

Dr. J.G. Arapura, in a seminal article, "Language and Phenomena" makes the difficulty of the interpretation of these words very clear. He points out a very important usage of a word derived from pri, prenā in RV 10.71 which hymn abounds in references to friendship (sakhāya) and speech (vāk). But even in this beautiful hymn there is an equivocalness which causes Dr. Arapura to suggest that "prenā" be considered as "piety".¹⁵

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 252 and p. 271 respectively. K.M. Panikkar defines kāma simply as "the life of the senses" in "Introduction" to The Kama Sutra of Vatsyayana, p. 43.

¹⁵ J.G. Arapura, "Language and Phenomena", Annual Proceedings of the Canadian Society for the Study of Religion, (McMaster University, 1969), p. 20 and in Canadian Journal of Theology, 16, 1 and 2, 1970, p. 43.

This is because sakhāya, used here seems to indicate a kind of professional association of priests for the purpose of performing the sacrifice (RV 10.71.10-11). This interpretation is taken up by Sāyana who explains sakhāya as "those who possess knowledge of the Shastras" and sacividaṃ (the duty of a friend) as "the teacher who is the friend of the Veda because he shows his gratitude to the Veda by preventing the destruction of tradition."¹⁶

Desire is in essence a thrust of the self towards itself. Only insofar as it is unfulfilled is there fear. Desire is self-interested and self-directed. Similarly, ChU 8.2.10 says: "Of whatever object he becomes desirous, whatever desire he desires, out of his mere thought it arises. Possessed of it he is happy." Here the text leaves no doubt as to the ontological value of desire for this is immediately followed by: "These same are true desires, with a covering of what is false." (ChU 8.3.1)

Therefore in any relationship one's concern is appropriately with the self, not with the things in the relationship or with the form of the relationship. That is, the experience of the being of things, is primarily desire and the true movement of desire is the

¹⁶Wilson, RV, Vol. VI, p. 355. For another major use of prema see RV 10.95 which is the indirect source of Kalidasa's Vikramorvaśī.

seeking out of its material cause or essence. While sacrifice is done for the sake of desire it is itself determined in its form by fear. Why this concomitance of fear and desire should be,¹⁷ is explicable by the dependency which is inherent in both. It is this which makes an escape from the world ruled by dependency desirable.

¹⁷"The Devas, being afraid of death, entered upon (the performance of the sacrifice prescribed in) the threefold knowledge (the three Vedas). They covered (khad) themselves with the hymns, therefore the hymns are called khandas." (Max Muller, Upanishads, Part I, p. 11 ChU 1.4.2).

But note that immediately preceding this, singing also obtains one's desires:

...let him sing the hymn of praise, reflecting on his desire, and avoiding all mistakes in pronunciation &c. Quickly will the desire be then fulfilled to him, for the sake of which he may have offered his hymn of praise. (Ibid., p. 10, ChU 1.3.11)

Hence the fulfillment of fear and desire occurs by means of and solely through chanted language.

While Chandas is a covering from fear, Monier-Williams lists its primary meaning as "desire, longing for, or will" (p. 405). A "chandoga" is particularly interested in these explanations for he is a "singer in metre [chandas]".

2. Meaning of Desire

Desire (kāma) can be for anything. A synonym of it is "Āśā" (ChU 7.14) which is defined by Śaṅkara as "the desire for things one has not got."¹⁸ As such it is the precondition for memory and thus all of tradition and culture and hence ritual.¹⁹ Āśā is here (ChU 7.15) said to be that mood and state of being closest to the being of things or its spirit (prāṇa). The central and most specific instance of desire is sexual intercourse which is alluded to by ChU 1.1.6, and directly mentioned in ChU 2.13, 5.8, and 8.2.9.

We have said in explaining ChU 1.1.6 that between any two successive members of a hierarchy joined by dependency there is desire. This is where desire exists. Two successive members form a pair or couple (mithuna). The principal instance of mithuna after ChU 1.1.6 is at ChU 2.13.²⁰ The Vāmadevyā chant, the subject of ChU 2.13, is described as the father of the Prsthā

¹⁸ āśā aprāpta vastu ākāṅkṣā āśā tṛṣṇā kāma iti "'Āśā is 'the desire for things one has not got'. It is synonymous with 'thirst' [tṛṣṇā] and 'desire' [kāma]."

¹⁹ Jha, ChU, Śaṅkara's comment on 7.14.1, p. 392.

²⁰ Here Radhakrishnan simply translates it as "sex intercourse" (The Principal Upaniṣads, p. 368).

chants in PV3 7.9.1. It is alluded to in ChU 1.13 and by Śaṅkara's commentary thereon as the sexual union of wind and wave. This is supported by the PVB:

Unto the Waters came the seasonal period
(the period favourable for conception).
Vāyu (the Wind) moved over their back
(‘surface’). Therefrom came into existence
a beautiful (thing). This was espied
by Mitra and Varuna; they said: ‘A
beautiful (vāmam) (thing), verily, has
here been born in the Gods’ (deveṣu).
Therefore there is the vāmadevya (chant).

In that it is (chanted) on verses containing
(the word) ka, thereby it belongs to
Prajāpati, for Prajāpati is Ka; in that
it is (chanted) on ‘unexpressed’ verses,
thereby it belongs to Prajāpati, for
Prajāpati is ‘unexpressed.’²¹

“Ka” is later explained at ChU 4.10 to Upakosala. Śaṅkara notes here that ka is well known as denoting kāma. The text explains that desire is the substance of spirit and vice-versa or in other words that it is the essence of all things. The close relationship between desire and spirit in ChU 7 is here repeated but unlike in ChU 7 “desire” appears to be ontologically prior to spirit. This inconsistency points up the bona fide centrality

²¹PVB 7.8.1 & 3, p. 153.

of desire in the text but reflects at the same time the character of Upakosala who is overwhelmed at this point by desire. The Vāmadevya chant in ChU 2.13 is thus said to be similar to mithuna which is then described as the copulation of man and woman. It concludes:

One who thus knows the Vāmadevya as interwoven in the couple becomes companionated, goes on from coupling to coupling, attains the full span of life, lives gloriously, becomes great in offspring and cattle, great in fame. His observance is that he should not avoid any woman.²²

Although kāma is a continual subject in every chapter of the ChU it is most directly addressed by the ChB. Kāma, it says, is something like alcohol; when indulged in, it intoxicates. The woman who is about to become a wife is told this during one event in the marriage ceremony described in GGS 2.1.10. Kāma is specifically identified with the sexual act which is identified with sacrifice in general. The wife is the altar containing Agni on which oblations are made. As the wife's genitals are washed and various oblations are made over her the following is recited:

²²ChU 2.13.2.

Kāma, I know your name. Intoxication
 [mado] is your name. Bring _____
 [asau, the name of the husband concerned]
 here. Surā [a fluid] was created for you.
 Your origin here is excellent. Oh Agni,
 you were created from heat, svahā! (2)

I join this genital by the intoxicating
 liquid [madhu]. It is the second mouth of
 Prajāpati. May you conquer all men through
 it. May you, oh queen, subdue everything
 unsubdued, svāhā. (3)

The ṛṣis of old made the carnivorous Agni
 and concealed it in the genital of women.
 By means of it they made Tvāṣṭra [the creator
 of living beings],²³ He shall place it in
 you, svāhā. (4)

A very similar ceremony occurs in the late afternoon during
 the agnistoma sacrifice²⁴ while the yajñā-yajñīya chant is being
 chanted. The yajñā-yajñīya is described as "the pith of the

23

ChB 1.1.2-4, translation mine.

²⁴ PVB 8.7, pp. 179-182.

sacrifice" meaning that it is the essence of it.²⁵ The purpose of this intoxication which surrounds the sexual act and hence the wife, who conceals a "carnivorous" appetite, is the production of wealth and children, the husband says.²⁶ This means that one appetite is simply seen to serve another appetite. The focal point of desire is referred to in the language of political power. The "womb", in ChB 1.2, enables one to "conquer" like a "queen". Desire encloses all of them and is the essence of them. Kama thus means that intoxication of indulged appetites (as well as longing for such) which determines rule.

²⁵The Gods divided among themselves the sacred lore; what pith of it was left over, that became the yajñāyajñīya (sāman).

The yajñāyajñīya, forsooth, is the pith of the sacred lore. By chanting the yajñāyajñīya they establish the sacrifice in the pith of the sacred lore.

The yajñāyajñīya is a womb: out of this womb Prajāpati created (emitted, brought forth) the sacrifice; in that he created sacrifice after sacrifice (yajñam yajñam), therefore it is (called) yajñāyajñīya.

Therefore, formerly the Brāhmins used to hold the out-of-doors-laud with this (sāman), (thinking): 'Beginning at its womb let us go on to extend the sacrifice'. But, by chanting it at the end, they establish the sacrifice in its womb. (PVB 8.6.1-4, p. 176)

Cf. Caland, PVB, p. 211: "The yajñāyajñīya is the agniṣṭoma-sāman."

²⁶ChB 1.1.7, GGŚ 2.1.19.

Kāma is problematic precisely because it cannot be endlessly indulged. One can't always get what one wants. The chaos of multifarious desires must be ordered according to its true nature or else desire itself will be destroyed. This proper order occurs through deprivation whose end is death, the origin of fear.²⁷ That desire which can be fulfilled hence is desire permeated by fear. The fulfillment of desire is the central purpose of the ChU. This will become clear through the consideration of several examples. The ordering of desire by deprivation is considered paradigmatically in ChU 4.10.3 and more deeply but in a similar form in ChU 8.

In ChU 4.10.3 there is a student named Upakosala Kāmalāyanah whose last name means "son of Kamala" or "son of Kāma". Kamala, "lotus" or "deer", is derived from the same root as Kāma i.e., kam, as is kāmala which means "lustful". This student complains that he is filled with many desires, "vāmāni",²⁸ meaning the desire for things such as women, wealth, etc. He is the student of Satyakāma ("desire of the truth") Jābāla, who is the son of a woman so

²⁷Cf. BU 1.2.1 where hunger is equated with death.

²⁸ChU 4.10.3 and in a different context ChU 4.15.

promiscuous that she couldn't tell her son who his father was. Because of his many desires Upakosala is filled with sorrow whose natural result is lack of appetite which causes him to perform tapas. The three sacrificial fires of the agnistoma and agnihotra then teach him about kam. At the same time they teach him about prāṇa (life) and kham (ākāśa or space) and say that each of the three is identical to Brahman. By understanding it properly it is fulfilled, for such understanding destroys sin, obtains loka (regions or a place), causes one to live long, and assures one that one's lineage will not be destroyed.

It is for these reasons that sacrifice conceived sexually as we have described it is said to obtain the same results as tapas (ChU 5.8-10). That is, tapas does not deny desire, it fulfills it. Deprivation orders one's desire and in ordering it permits its fulfillment.

'The Woman, O Gautama, is the Fire; of that the Organ is the Fuel, -- the Confabulation, the smoke, -- the Vagina, the Flame, -- the Penetration is the Embers, -- the Raptures, the Sparks.' [ChU 5.8.1]

'Into this Fire, the Deities offer semen; and out of that libation is born the Embryo.' [ChU 5.8.2]

'Those who know this and also those who, in the forest, meditate upon 'faith and penance, go to light;...There lies a Person not human; he carries them to Brahman.' [ChU 5.10.1]

In both of these cases the fires teach the meaning of kāma and that kāma fulfilled causes men to obtain the highest good. But this fulfillment occurs only when kāma is understood as the relationship of men to deprivation.²⁹ This understanding permeates the ChU. In ChU 8.1.5 and in an identical passage in ChU 8.7.3 it is asserted that desire is fulfilled by the absence of evil (apahata pāpmā), not becoming old (vijarah), not being liable to death (vimrtyuh), not sorrowing (viśokah), not desiring to eat (viḡighatsah), and not thirsting (apipāsah). The end of desire is the negation of itself and yet if it is not present in sufficient degree, e.g., in the desire for understanding, it cannot end. Hence desire will perform an important role even in asceticism (being a muni). Desire must see itself as the desire for the absence of deprivation. Thirst (pipāsa)³⁰ is used in ChU 3.16-17 as a figurative term for desire during the course of teaching about tapas. It is later used to teach about dependency at ChU 6.7 & 8. Food as the result of a sacrifice (and hence as an end to deprivation or hunger) is mentioned many times (viz., ChU 1.10-12, 3.1-10, 4.3.8, 5.18-24).

²⁹ Cf. Jha, ChU, p. 255, Śaṅkara's comment on 5.10.2.

³⁰ Cf. Matthews, The Concept of Craving in Early Buddhism, for a discussion of the parallel theme of tanha (thirst) in Buddhism.

Belvalkar and Ranade agree that deprivation is the fundamental implication of desire and the foundation of every act: "Hunger and thirst...of course are the preliminary condition of every functional activity." -- History of Indian Philosophy, p. 160.

Kāma is intoxicating but it is fundamentally deprivation. Deprivation is the absence of that which is necessary for one's existence. Deprivation as the essential character of kāma permits the very dynamic of kāma to imply the satisfaction of every desire and hence the absence of desire altogether in an ultimate state of bliss. This final state is thus characterized by independence while kāma is a state of dependence. The character of kāma as deprivation is emphasized by the synonyms used in conjunction with it viz., pipāsa (thirst) and āśā (hope), and the concomitant use of tapas as well as the centrality of stories involving extreme deprivation. The only time kāma is "truly" used and implies fullness and not deprivation is in conjunction with rasa when desire is fulfilled in the couple. There kāma relates two things one of which is essential for the existence of the other. This can be seen in ChU 8 as well. There the expression of unfulfilled desire as the impetus to understanding is also maintained while the fulfillment of desire³¹ is said to similarly occur through deprivation but when fulfillment occurs it means absolute power to satisfy appetites.

³¹Two words are used in ChU 1.1.6-8 for "the fulfillment or completion of desire". The first, āpayato, means to cause to reach or obtain or gain. The second, samṛddhi, means to succeed well, prosper, flourish, increase or grow greatly.

The teaching which follows ChU 8.1.5 is Prajāpati's to Indra. It is predicated on fulfilling a desire. That is, one's purpose in doing something is always the fulfillment of a desire.³² When Indra objects to the inadequacy of a teaching he says, "nāham atra bhogyam paśyāmitī", "I don't see any good in this." Hume translates "bhogyam" as "enjoyable".³³ Indra's statement according to his previously established criteria means that his desire has not been fulfilled and this lends credence to Hume's translation.

The entire discussion in ChU 8 follows the form of ChU 4.10.3 but here it uses the metaphor of political rule throughout. The city of Brahman (ChU 8.1) is the locus of all desires (ChU 8.1.4) however only the king of a city is able to satisfy all of his desires.

'Next follows the explanation of the Infinite as the Self: Self is below, above, behind, before, right and left -- Self is all this.

"He who sees, perceives, and understands this, loves the Self, delights in the Self, revels in the Self, rejoices in the Self -- he becomes a Svarāg, (an autocrat or self-ruler); he is lord and master in all the worlds.

³²"Desiring what have you dwelt here?...it is desiring this that we have dwelt here." - ChU 8.7.3.

³³Hume, Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads, p. 270.

'But those who think differently from this, live in perishable worlds, and have other beings for their rulers.'³⁴

Sorrow, "the separation from what is desirable"³⁵ is resolved by having "true desires". It is then recommended that one be a brahmacāri, or student "free from all longings for all external objects"³⁶ in order to obtain "unlimited freedom to do as one pleases" (kāma-cārobhavati).³⁷ This "learning" (i.e., being a brahmacāri) is said

³⁴Max Muller, Upanishads, Part I, ChU 7.25.2, p. 124. Cf. ChU 8.1.5-6.

³⁵Jha, ChU, p. 420, Śaṅkara's comment on 8.1.5.

³⁶Ibid., p. 441.

³⁷ChU 8.4.3, 8.5.4. "moving freely, following one's own pleasure, unrestrained, free unrestrained motion, independent or spontaneous action; the following one's own desires, sensuality, selfishness" - Monier-Williams, p. 272.

ChU 8.7.1 and 8.1.1 contain two desiderative constructions which are reminiscent of ChU 7, anveṣṭavyam and vijijñāsītavyam. (The Siddhānta Kaumudī of Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita 2.9.2608, pp. 522-523 says that the desiderative formation has the sense of wishing (icchāyām). For iccha as "desire" see ChU 8.7.3 where iccha is used synonymously with kāma.) These have been discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis where it was noted that a very high form of desire becomes the central criterion of the proper transmission of teachings. This high form of desire is what finally might seem to subordinate sexual desire. The overcoming of this is first advocated in ChU 8.5. Then a long series of statements about the difference between body and Self occurs and finally at ChU 8.14 the vagina is described as something which devours men. Śaṅkara adds that it "destroys those who are addicted thereto, by depriving them of Energy, Strength, Virility, Understanding and Merit." (Jha, ChU, p. 487) But the problem here is more the preservation of oneself from being expended and consumed by another than of experiencing a deprivation. One here attempts to preserve oneself from deprivation by abstinence. The centrality of deprivation in order to have "true desires" will reappear later in this chapter in the concept of a "true brāhmaṇa".

to be "sacrifice" because particular parts of the two words are the same. Acquiring of "true desires" occurs through a certain amount of tapas.

Desire, we have said, is for anything. It is in principle limitless.

He who sees this does not see death nor illness nor any sorrow. He who sees this sees everything and obtains everything everywhere.³⁸

The greatest or largest (bhūmā) is the end or fulfillment of desire.

That which is largest is happiness, there is no happiness in what is small. The largest only is happiness. But one must desire to understand the largest.

Revered sir, I desire to understand the largest.

Wherein one sees nothing else, hears nothing else and understands nothing else, -- that is the Largest; wherein one sees something else, hears something else, and understands something else, that is small. That which is largest is immortal; that which is small is mortal.

Revered sir, wherein does that rest?³⁹
In its own greatness or not in greatness.

Śaṅkara explains the relation between largeness and desire as follows:

³⁸ "Max Muller, Upanishads, Part I, ChU 7.26.2, p. 124.

³⁹ ChU 7.23.1 my translation following Jha's.

That which is Infinite, -- large, unexcelled (highest), Much -- all these are synonyms; -- and this is Bliss; [sukham] -- what is less than the Infinite is excelled by this letter; hence, it is called 'finite' (small); hence, in what is finite there is no Bliss; because the finite or the small always gives rise to longing for what is more than that; and all longing is a source of pain;⁴⁰

Raikva is a good example of enormous kāma. He takes virtually everything of King Janaśruti's and teaches him the nature of desire (here it is about hunger). The limitlessness of desire is due to the fact that the infinite is the end of multiplicity and the original desire of Prajāpati is for multiplicity. "Bahu syām

("may I be many")⁴¹ is the origin of everything beyond non-duality. All of the accounts of the separate parts of the agniṣṭoma are explained in just this way.

On the origin of the agniṣṭoma:

Prajāpati desired: 'may I be more (than one), may I be reproduced.' He saw that agniṣṭoma and practised⁴² it; by it he created the creatures.

On the origin of the dronakalaśa (pressing stones):

⁴⁰Jha, ChU, p. 402.

⁴¹ChU 6.1. Syam is an optative, not a desiderative but still implies "desire".

⁴²PVB 6.1.1, p. 97.

Prajāpati desired: 'May I be more (than one), may I be reproduced'. He languished and out of the head of him who languished the sun was created...⁴³

On the origin of the midday chant:

Prajāpati desired: 'May I be more (than one), may I be reproduced'. He was in a languishing and unhappy (amahīgamānah) state; he saw this āmahīyava (melody)...⁴⁴

All things come to be in fact through kāma according to ChU 1.1.3. It is the cosmic creative principle.⁴⁵ The text in other words gives an account of the many and the relation of the many to the whole by defining the relation in terms of desire and the essence of desire as deprivation.

⁴³PVB 6.5.1, p. 107.

⁴⁴PVB 7.5.1, p. 143. Also on origin of brhat (sāman) PVB 7.6.1, p. 145.

⁴⁵This is not to imply that kāma is the ultimate being but it is a means emanating from Brahman and very close to him. This difference is meticulously explained by Śaṅkara: "All desires: i.e., all His desires are free from evil; as declared in the Smṛti-Text, -- 'Among living beings, I am such Desire as is not inconsistent with Right'. -- Objection: -- "Inasmuch as in this Smṛti-Text, God speaks of Himself as being Desire itself, the term all-desire in the Upaniṣad text should not be construed as a Bahuvrīhi compound meaning 'having all desires'". -- It is not right to argue thus; Desire is something to be done, brought into existence, and if God were desire itself, like sound and other things, He also would be subservient to the purposes of other persons. For these reasons, the expression 'I am desire' in the Smṛti-text quoted is to be taken in the same sense that is afforded by the term 'all-desire' taken as a Bahuvrīhi-compound." Jha, trans., ChU, pp. 153-154, commentary on ChU 3.14.2.

The difference between true and untrue desire⁴⁶ is a difference in the meaning or purpose of desire. Untrue desire is not unrestrained appetites, for truth here is an epistemic problem, not a moral problem. "That is the true Brahman-City; in this are all desires contained."⁴⁷ "Untrue" desire does not recognize the ordering factor of deprivation which founds desire in the self. It is the longing for external things such as women, food, clothes, etc.,⁴⁸ (the vimāni of Upakosala) and not the longing for the self. The purpose of true desire is one's own self-interest.⁴⁹

Because "true desire" is for the sake of oneself and not for others, multiplicity (or the others) is in essence unpleasant. In fact it produces fear. Hence "untrue desires" must be identical with that which produces fear. The origin of fear is ultimately death. But this means that the dynamic of untrue desires inevitably drives one to the fulfillment of them in true desires. Thus the

⁴⁶ ChU 8.1.5-8.3.5.

⁴⁷ ChU 8.1.5.

⁴⁸ ChU 8.4., Jha, ChU, p. 426.

⁴⁹ Cf. Appendix I, p. 15. Attachment is always the true interpretation of one's relationship to others and means taking others as or for oneself. Detachment is the goal of lifelong effort and means recognizing that one is not implicated in others.

proper fulfillment of "untrue desires" is the immortal and fearless which is the same as "the true" (ChU 8.3.4). The most limitless desire is to be immortal, i.e., to never return. It is the desire (or wish to end fear) to escape the product of desires (multiplicity) that ultimately leads one to fulfill desire's purpose. Consequently the reference to Brahman as "the immortal and fearless"⁵⁰ is always a reference to the fulfillment of desire as the womb out of which comes number.

Desire requires celibacy as a precondition to proper learning. Celibacy has a pedantic function. For through deprivation of that which is needed one learns the meaning of dependency. Continually throughout the ChU there is a reduction of desires to minimal desires. Tapas is required for the fulfillment of desire.⁵¹ A hierarchy

⁵⁰ChU 1.4.4, 4.15, 7.26.2, 8.3.4, 8.7.4.

⁵¹RV 10.129.3-4 makes explicit the primordial nature of the foundational elements of desire: countability as a linguistic origin, and deprivation. Griffith and Wilson, who follows Śaṅkara, disagree about the order of these elements. For reasons already developed we tend to follow Wilson's order.

Wilson, RV, Vol. VI, p. 236:

That empty united (world) which was covered by a mere nothing, was produced through the power of austerity.

In the beginning there was desire, which was the first seed of mind.

Griffith, The Hymns of the Rgveda, p. 633:

All that existed then was void and formless: by the great power of warmth was born that Unit.

Thereafter rose Desire in the beginning, Desire the primal seed and germ of Spirit.

in desire is established on the basis of need by which in turn is established limits on desire which is in essence unlimited.

Earlier in this chapter we noted the political component of desire understood as dependency and noted that kāma is "that intoxication of indulged appetites which determines rule". Later we saw that ChU 8 itself drew out the political theme implied in dependency.

The order which pervades the whole and which organizes the city as well as the many is thus an order of limits. The limit⁵² is a practical division of the whole whose practicality is determined by man's purposes which are determined by desires founded in deprivation. Thus ChU 6.7 consists of showing that memory doesn't work without food and that one's essence is brought forth by food. Similarly ChU 5.1.6-15 establishes the dependency of all the senses on breath.

⁵²"Limits" here means simply words which will then have to be explained later as designations which imply a substance which is essentially tied to the character spoken of by the word but which nonetheless is not ontologically equivalent to this character. This consideration of words in terms of "limits" was developed into a theory of linguistic analysis by the Navya-Nyāya in which limit (avacchedaka) gained many particular and specialized uses. Matilal says that this development was in response to Buddhist attacks (Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis, p. 59) while Ingalls claims that although it perhaps grew out of a tradition of attacks on Buddhism it was primarily directed against Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta (Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic, p. 5). At any rate, determining the meaning of words as limited substance has been the source of major disagreements among these groups.

Desire is always a case of dependence on another. Dependence means to be unfree according to ChU 8.1.5-6.⁵³ Lack of freedom

⁵³Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads, p. 492, ChU 8.1.5, "For, just as here on earth people follow in obedience to command (as they are commanded), of whatever object they are desirous, be it a country or a part of a field, on that they live dependent." Śaṅkara comments on this, "This example illustrates the harm that accrues to one through not being self-dependent, and being dependent upon the experiences that follow from his merit." Jha, ChU, p. 422.

This example is one of the two cited by Śaṅkara in his introduction. Śaṅkara uses svatantra for "self-dependent" here and paratantra for "dependent" in his "Introduction". Tantra here means "the essential part" while paratantra means "dependent on" or "obedient to" and notably "that which keeping up a family is dependent on" or "propagation". The word used for "dependent" in ChU 8.1.5 is "anvāviśanti". It similarly has the sense of obedience while it has a sense of progression and can thus mean "to follow" or "flow after". Two of these secondary senses are preserved in the other major word for dependent anvāyatta, which is used in ChU 2.9.3-5. The primary implication of dependency in all of these words and in the contexts in which they appear is that there is some one thing common to all who are dependent on it which in the light of it make them equal to each other, makes them vulnerable to it, and which has priority to them. The secondary connotations of anvāyatta are progeny, being in order or line and mainly being connected with.

The same relationship between desire and dependency appears in the ChB.2.6.6 - 2.6.8. There someone wishing to have his desires filled seeks to make those who can fill them his dependents so that they will give him what he wants. Dependency here is clearly a political concept which implies subjection to the commands of someone else. The word used is vaśa.

(because it is akāma caro bhavati) is necessarily to be ruled by others. Freedom can be ranked according to the preconditions necessary for things to exist. This is the function of the entirety of ChU 7 which ranks the degree of independence (kāma caro bhavati) according to its size (bhūyah). Therefore the teacher, Ghora Āṅgīrasa, who points to the importance of Sanatkumāra's teaching in ChU 7, teaches something because he has become free from desire (ChU 3.17.6).

Dependency which is initially perceived by desire is hence the criterion of rank. Because, however, it is desire which provides the epistemic foundation of dependency, desire in itself establishes a rank which has already been explained in our discussion of learning. The foundation of learning and the ranking of intelligence which is wisdom about tradition is determined by the desire for understanding.

The "desire to understand" (vijijñāsā) which is extolled continually in ChU 7.16-23 is completely implicated in an intense and protracted discussion in the VSŚB 1.1.1 and two commentaries on it.⁵⁴ The discussion is about the meaning of "atha'to brahma

⁵⁴VPS 1.10-11, pp. 12-14; 1.170-174, pp. 214-221. Pañcapādikā of Padmapada, Varnaka III, 3.2, pp. 278-279; 3.64-66, pp. 360-362. Vijijñāsā and jijñāsā mean essentially the same thing here. For similar usages which also demonstrate the differences in the two terms see Introduction to the ChU, Appendix I.

jijñāsā", "then therefore the desire to know Brahman." The discussion is striking because it admits the importance of desire, says that desire cannot be caused but must spring up naturally, discusses the importance of a student having a particular disposition embracing four main attributes for the entry into the study of Brahman, and implies that a vast knowledge of other subjects is assumed by the teaching about Brahman.⁵⁵ The last point is made clear in ChU 7.1, 6.1, and 5.1 where direct reference to great learning in many subjects is made prior to the teaching of each chapter. As we have shown earlier, this is also implied by the many allusions to other things known throughout the rest of the Upaniṣad.

The question raised is whether "jijñāsā" should be taken etymologically as "desire to know" or figuratively as "inquiry". The issue is without question about the degree to which "desire" (here referred to as "iccha") determines release and hence the highest order of things. It is carefully stated that the entire sūtra in question implies that a student must have a particular disposition. That one can and must study to a certain extent whether or not one has this disposition is clearly and endlessly repeated with many

⁵⁵Cf. Thibaut, trans., VSĀB 1.1.1, p. 13.

references to ChU 6.1 where the importance of study is asserted.

The required disposition for the most important study is however,

the discrimination of what is eternal and what is non-eternal; the renunciation of all desire to enjoy the fruit (of one's actions) both there and hereafter; the acquirement of tranquillity, self-restraint, and the other means, and the desire of final release.⁵⁶

It is decided, due to this antecedent condition that "jijñāsā" means "desire for understanding" as well as "inquiry" because desire is so intimately tied to an inquiry.⁵⁷ This relationship is described as follows:

. . . let inquiry, which is capable of being undertaken, be secondarily implied by the word "jijñāsā". And the relation of inseparability (required for the secondary significance) is easily achieved by the application of the rule of "(grasping tight as with) tongs". Grasped tight indeed is inquiry between "cognition" and "desire", for when first, there is desire, only when there is inquiry subsequently, is there the origination of cognition.⁵⁸

This desire must occur naturally; it cannot be commanded nor is it sufficient to be devoid of external desires. This is not a disinterested inquiry; it is supremely self-interested.

⁵⁶ VSŚB, 1.1.1, p. 12.

⁵⁷ VPS, 3.2, p. 279.

⁵⁸ VPS, 1.10, p. 13.

But it cannot be determined (i.e., made to occur) except through fortune which means karma. Thus it is said, "He controls the regions below this, and also the desires of Men."⁵⁹

The more demonic one is the less curious one is. The greatest understanding is reserved for those with the greatest desire which is for immortality. This understanding is not based on a reasoning capacity but more fundamentally on proper teaching and proper birth. The reasoning capacity is symptomatic of a more fundamental instinctual desire.

When owing to the influence of the maturation of accumulated religious merit some individual desires to attain the unsurpassable (supreme) goal of man, he seeks for its means in the Veda and understands this (which follows). As it is said in the text, "For the love of the self, however everything is dear", that everything else is dear only as subsidiary to the self, he who has no attachment to things other than the self is the eligible person;⁶⁰

Kāma is, so to speak, a genetic and physiological trait. It is the precondition to learning and in a more limited form as hope, to memory. It is for this reason that in commenting on BU 1.4.2 (where fear is said to arise from a second) that Śaṅkara refers us

⁵⁹ Jha, ChU, 1.7.6, p. 46.

⁶⁰ VPS, 1.1, p. 2.

firstly to Iśa Upaniṣad 7 where there is a discussion of the problem of unity and multiplicity. Secondly, he discusses the importance of proper birth and proper teaching while noting the inefficacy of reason alone. Finally he refers us to ChU 6.14.2 where the importance of the teacher is asserted and where he discusses the role of karma extensively and also refers us to ChU 4.9.3 where knowledge learned from the teacher is also extolled.

Desire is hence seen by the ChU to be the fundamental mood of being. Its essence is deprivation. The greater the feeling of deprivation the greater one's desire. Also, however, because deprivation teaches the order of dependancy, the greater one's desire the greater one's learning capacity. True desire, however, is totally self-centered. Selfishness is, therefore, the determinant of salvation which is brought into being by an inherited physiological characteristic, the quantum of desire. Desire is thus the experiencing of the dynamic material cause of all things and this is identical with that material cause of language. Language we shall show was therefore properly the primordial product of being because it is the most immediate product of men's desire. Because its material cause is true desire it is the natural articulation of the structure of dependancy, while its substance behaves identically to that of the world. Because of this identity language is incapable of operating over and against the world. The innate potential of

the student is prior to his education and is in no way changed by education. This is the point of the passage at ChU 6.14 where a person in the woods is lost and has to be told where he is (or what his station in life is in other cases in the Upanisads). Language does not change us. It is appropriate to us.

3. Dependency as a linguistic relation implying substance.

Understanding things as essentially dependent and not as essentially discrete beings radically alters one's understanding of the signification of language and its function in revealing the nature of things. First it should be noted that dependency and desire are relational terms which always point to something else. But the ChU interpretation of this "relation" is that it is essentially negated in its dualism as soon as it is understood. This is because the essence of things such that they are dependent on that essence is something common (sama) to each one of them. But if all attributes are also acquired due to that essence then that essence determines them also. Thus it is improper to describe beings whose essence is founded in desire in terms of anything but that upon which they depend which is according to this reasoning their material cause. The statement of logic which refers to this state of affairs is that all qualities rest upon or depend upon a ground. Thus the essence of a being is not the species to which

it belongs but the substance (dravya) upon which it depends.

Insofar as all species are dependent on the same thing and that state of dependency is to be considered as truly grounded in the self of each thing, then each species is in essence formed out of the same essence. The species to which a thing belongs then has radically little to do with what it is. That upon which a species depends is determinative of what it is. Conceived in terms of species, the essence of a species always lies in another species, e.g., in ChU 1.8.4 food or plants are said to depend on water. Śāṅkara says of this, "When one thing is made up of another it is said to have that for its essence, its ultimate basis."⁶¹

From the point of view of dependency, form is a poor criterion of essence. Language then, insofar as it is capable of revealing the truth about things, must be reconceived from the common connection of it with species to the expression of states of dependency. This is why Śāṅkara offers such a cautious interpretation of the meaning of origination due to the word. He says it is best understood when seen in comparison with human actions which are, according to him, always preceded by words.

⁶¹Jha, ChU, p. 50. It is for this reason that the sort of transmigration of the soul described by Pravāhana Jaivali in ChU 4.10 occurs. This will be discussed further in the next chapter.

The origination of the world from the 'word' is not to be understood in that sense, that the word constitutes the material cause of the world, as Brahman does; but while there exist the everlasting words, whose essence is the power of denotation in connexion with their eternal sense (i.e., the ākritis denoted), the accomplishment of such individual things as are capable of having those words applied to them is called an origination from those words.

How then is it known that the world originates from the word? -- 'From perception and inference.' Perception here denotes Scripture which, in order to be authoritative, is independent (of anything else). 'Inference' denotes Smṛiti which, in order to be authoritative, depends on something else (viz. Scripture). These two declare that creation is preceded by the word.⁶²

Hence, the Vedas contain what always has been and always will be capable of being spoken with respect to the world. Veda operates just like the world but reveals what is not revealed by the world. Just as things have dependency on other things so will words. And just as dependents are dependent on one thing in common so are words. But this can only be discovered through language and the true origins of true speech.

⁶²Thibaut, VSŚB, 1.3.28, Vol. I, p. 203. Here we are now in the center of the controversy between the Advaita and the Sphotavadins. That is, the Sphotavadin will maintain that the word creates the world or is its material cause. This is what Śankara is disagreeing with by saying that words are not material causes but denote the eternal potentialities for individual things.

The Vedas are not collections of imperfect ideas, they are the embodiment of that which is eternal about the universe.⁶³ At the same time the existence of Veda justifies our characterizing the nature of what is fundamentally indescribable (the nature of the world).

. . . this world when being dissolved (in a mahāpralaya) is dissolved to that extent only that the potentiality (sakti) of the world remains, and (when it is produced again) it is produced from the root of that potentiality; otherwise we should have to admit an effect without a cause. Nor have we the right to assume potentialities of different kind . . . For it is impossible to imagine that the relation of senses and sense objects should be different in different creations, so that, for instance, in some new creation a sixth sense and a corresponding sixth sense-object should manifest themselves.⁶⁴

Thus the foundation of language as it is given in the Veda is the nature of that substance which is the material cause of the Veda. The analysis of language and consequent reduction of it to demonstrative pronouns is the discovering of the inherent linguistic denotation of the material cause of language. All things in the world can be distinguished by their "thatness". This primordial

⁶³Thibaut, VSŚB 1.3.29-30, Vol. I, pp. 211-215.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 214.

linguistic fact diminishes the implication of names of species that species are ontologically discrete. Language, properly understood, is a product of dependent relations among things, for one speaks due to desire. The proper description of dependency is however that which is common to all things dependent.⁶⁵ This is the ontological origin of pronouns. For language, conceived as we have, reduces all things to substance (dravya) or "thatness" and attributes (guna) or "thus-ness". Any thing is really just an adjective of that thing which is an unknown. The proper grammatical form for designating an unattributed thing is the pronoun. That is, language originating as it does in dependency contains in itself that substance upon which everything depends as well as being the sum of those characterizations ("names" according to ChU 7.1.2) of dependent relations. This dependency is what makes possible a hierarchy of things not based on morphology or complexity but on substance. Causality is then understood in terms of the transformation of substance or, more properly, the revealing of an illusion about the nature of the substance at hand, and not in terms of a succession of events or the origination of beings. What

⁶⁵ChU 2.9.

substance is considered to be, will determine the manner of treatment of it in the world. The primal substance of words is originally identical in the dependent order with the substance of things in the world which has nothing essential to do with their form. Language alone therefore has the possibility of revealing the proper order of things. As the political image which convinces Śvetaketu (ChU 6.16 and whose political implications are derived in ChU 5.10) would put it, language alone has the possibility of revealing true justice.

This does not mean that we deny the general advaitin doctrine of the meaning of a word as being "a universal as the essential generic character"⁶⁶ i.e., we assert that our knowledge of things which can be denoted by words is not a knowledge of particulars but of the essence of the species to which it belongs. Śaṅkara shows in VŚB 1.3.28 that words refer to species (ākṛti) and not to individuals (vyakti). Species are eternal as are the words which denote them and the relation of a word to its meaning, says Śaṅkara.

⁶⁶Datta, Six Ways of Knowing, p. 272.

In any case of recognition there will be something which is the same and hence eternal and something which is secondary to the recognition that separates it from other members of the same species. Words are made up of syllables and it is these which are first recognized, the word being derivative from them.

There is an eternal connection of the word with its sense or the thing denoted by it. If a corporeal god which plays a part in sacrifices is meant by the word then due to the god's birth and death, the eternality of the word and hence the eternality of the Veda is denied. But this is not the case because the world, gods, and other beings originate from the word. Words are connected with species, not with individuals which are infinite in number. Species are eternal and even the gods are a species...

The letters are in fact the word, says Śaṅkara. They are recognized as the same each time they appear, hence they don't really pass away. If they did we would not even be able to say that one thing is similar to another thing. One may say either that the individual letters are always the same when they appear or that it is the species, e.g., of the letter "a", which appears. In either case we have to account for the appearance of species in the individual to account for recognition.

Words always refer to the species which are eternal. The differentiation between particular individuals belonging to a species (such as chairs) is due to the individuals holding together other things which also belong to a species (such as wood, plastic, or metal)...Recognition of a species is due to the intrinsic nature of the thing cognized. In order to recognize the difference, for example, between speakers one has to recognize both the letter and the speech characteristics (the qualities of the letter common to such and such a speaker).⁶⁷

⁶⁷Post, "Śaṅkara's Objection to the Sphoṭavada" in Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Vol. LVI, 1975, pp. 71-72.

But even this essence has to be understood as completely present in any entity or recognition of such entity, and hence there is no room for the perfection or imperfection of that being as such. Thus, beings of a particular species are as such identical and not discrete. More important, however, is that this essence of a given species is precisely what is being referred to in the language of our text. Not only are the individuals of a particular species not discrete beings but the species are also not discrete beings at a deeper level. In themselves these species are dependently related and hence are not discrete at all, for their dependence is directed towards their essence or self.

In other words, the hierarchy of better and best is not against a given measure but against dependency. That upon which a thing depends is its origin, source, root, or cause; it is that of which it is formed or its substance. That is because, as we have already pointed out,⁶⁸ multiplicity is originally possible due to an original substance characterized by desire and pointed to by fear. It is only through all things being understood as dependent and moved by desire that number can gain a high ontological position

⁶⁸Chapter III.

such that it actually characterizes things in our experience.
 This internal dynamic of substance is what makes numericality reveal
 itself. The measure of a species is therefore its proportional
 dependence on this whole.⁶⁹

Only when things are understood thus as dependent entities
 containing or being filled "to the tips of the fingers" (ChU 1.6.6)
 by that upon which they are in fact dependent is it possible for
 many different species to be admitted by those who assert that non-
 being has no meaning.

What we assert is that it is Being itself
 which is perceived in a form other than its
 own, through duality and diversity; and
 there is ⁷⁰no non-existence of anything
 anywhere.

Only because of desire does one recognize dependency.
 "True desire" is the recognition of that upon which one's existence
 is truly contingent. The extent of desire determines the dependency

⁶⁹For example, Achilles must prove that he is the best
not by competition or measure against a standard but by being
 that without whom the Greeks cannot win. The order is not one in
 which like is given to like for there is no one like unto Achilles.
 No one can give to Achilles for he is greater than all. He is more
 essential than the collective. Similarly breath in the ChU is
 more essential than the rest because the rest are totally dependent
 on it. The other senses are not the essence of each other nor the
 body because the body doesn't depend on them to survive.

⁷⁰Jha, ChU, p. 305.

understood. We have already mentioned how it appears from desire in ChU 7. In ChU 2.1-9 dependency is discussed in relation to sāma which is here considered as sādhu (good) and samah (sameness). The latter aspect (which in ChU 2.10 will be shown as the countability of things) is the foundation for saying that many things can be dependent on one thing (ChU 2.9.1). The example given is the sun but it is then said that different groups of things are dependent on different forms of things (ChU 2.9.2-8) which things are called parts of the Sāman. These parts, excluding the "adi" and "upadrava" have been ranked in ChU 2.1-7 according to the same criterion (here called "parovariyah") as in ChU 7 where there is also an order of dependency. But while the dependency in ChU 7 is closely related to political rule and subservience, here it is, more strictly, a case of propriety in the presence of rule.

Thus they also say, he approached him with Sāman, i.e. becomingly; and he approached him without Sāman, i.e. unbecomingly.⁷¹

Although the impetus is towards what is the same in everything it is nonetheless recognized that there are subsidiary

⁷¹ "Max Muller, The Upanishads, Part I, p. 23, ChU 2.2.2.

forms of things depended upon. There is room for different causes joining to produce a thing but these too must be ordered into a hierarchy. There is, in other words, a continual movement from difference to identity on the basis of what something is made of. The recognition of sameness is the same type of recognition whether it is of species or substances i.e. efficient or material causes. Because many things or forms are one thing if a common substance pervades them, the substance of something, by which is meant that which is formless, is prior to the form. It is the more essential cause.

The essence of a person is speech and the essence of speech is its form as chanted says ChU 1.1.2. This form as chant we have seen determined essentially by desire and fear; for the origin, purpose, and context of such chanting is the fulfillment of desires. Deprivation, which one is conscious of through fear, makes it possible for desire to be fulfilled by an order consisting of dependency and quantity of desire. Because speech is created by desire which is ordered by dependency the world is naturally and authentically appropriated by fear. Man's speaking is always a representation of his dependency. Thus insofar as he is independent man is not driven by speech.

He from whom all works, all desires, all
 sweet odours and tastes proceed, who
 embraces all this, who never speaks and who
 is never surprised, he, ⁷²my self within the
 heart is that Brahman.

The end of fear is produced by chanting speech which has as its conclusion the end of others, which others produce fear. Hence that state of the fulfillment of desire is called "kaivalya" or the state of aloneness.⁷³ The chant is in itself conceived of as a non-communicative non-related activity not only because the word meanings are hidden from others but because its essential purpose is kaivalya. Chanted language has as its thrust the coming towards that upon which things depend and hence the turning away from the picturing or describing of things. It seeks the essential or material cause of words which appears initially as number, next as desire, and finally as Brahman.

4. Summary

We see thus that language, shot through with desire and structured therefore by dependence, has the capacity of bringing

⁷²Ibid., p. 48, ChU 3.14.4.

⁷³Appendix II, pp. 17-18. ChU 6.2.1-2, 7.24-25.

us to the heart of what truly is (ChU 6.2.1 "That which is . . .") according to the ChU. This which truly is prior to language and multiplicity and is substantial like clay, gold or iron ("the difference being only a name" ChU 6.1.4, 5, 6). Multiplicity is grounded in desire ("may I be many" -- ChU 6.2.2.) whose inter-relationship is determined as a dependency (as "sent forth") upon the whole (ChU 6.2) and thus is properly considered in terms of proportion and not difference (everything is "some combination of those three beings" -- ChU 6.4.7). That one is completely imbued with the entirety of this differentiated substance is evident from our dependency on food (ChU 6.5-7) for our highest and most characteristic attribute. For the essence of man is speech and the essence of speech is the chanted Vedas (ChU 1.1.2). This dependency is discovered in desire ("hunger and thirst" -- ChU 6.8.3). Deprivation of what is needed to prevent death is what indicates a true dependency ("a root or cause" -- ChU 6.8.3). The substance which is true (ChU 6.8.6) is best designated by a pronoun which can apply to anything. "That which (is) this cause, all this (has) (its) self (in) that. That (is) satya. That (is) self. That thou art, oh Śvetaketu."⁷⁴ This substance

⁷⁴The plethora of ten pronouns in this short line is not accidental for this line is repeated at ChU 6.8.7, 6.9.4, 6.10.3, 6.11.3, 6.12.3, 6.13.3, 6.14.3, & 6.15.2. cf. ChU 6.16.2.

is to be understood as that which makes measure and hence political rule or the ordering of human affairs possible (ChU 6.16). But for this to be possible that teaching or tradition which articulates this order must be transmitted intact ("a man who meets with a teacher to inform him, obtains the true knowledge" ChU 6.14.2). The proper reception and transmission of such a teaching is however dependent on true desire or desire ordered by dependency and this desire, limited to a particular nature or species, is that which is concomitant with fear which occurs through the apprehension of death (ChU 6.15). Hence the context of this teaching is the explanation of death (ChU 6.8.6 & 6.15-16).

Far from what our modern ears are inclined to believe, language says that in all but the most fundamental relationship that of being to itself (which is not actually a relation) relations are never between equals they are always dependent. Communication is absurd in a dependent relation for the proper implication of dependency is the state of being which is kaivalya or "aloneness".

The keynote of the Vedānta metaphysics is the relation that obtains between the world and Brahman, the false and the real. This relation is not only the prius but is the exemplar of all relations. To say that relation is of the nature of the relation between the false and the real is to say that all relation is false. The general formula is: the two terms sustaining a relation are not of the same order, one is

higher, and the other lower; the two terms are neither mutually dependent nor mutually independent; relation is neither 'internal' nor 'external'. If mutually dependent, we cannot distinguish between the two terms, as they so necessarily imply each other that one cannot exist without the other any time. We cannot even say that there are two terms, as the basis of distinction is lacking. If mutually independent, there is no basis of connection; each term is a self, a self-contained universe as it were. To escape this dilemma, we have to conceive one term as basic and capable of existing apart from its relation to the other and the other incapable of so doing and therefore dependent. One term, the higher, is not exhausted in the relationship; it has a transcendent or non-implicatory existence which is its intrinsic nature. The other term, however, is entirely exhausted within the relation⁷⁵ and has no non-relative existence.

The consequence of this doctrine for language is that language, primordially, has nothing to do with "communication" nor with the exchange of information. These are secondary and inauthentic activities. The primary and proper use of language is in ritual. This ritual cannot be a talking to or with Brahman⁷⁶ because words as such do not reach it, viz., "wherefrom words turn back" --

⁷⁵T.R.V. Murti, "The Two Definitions of Brahman in the Advaita" in the Krishna Chandra Bhattacharyya Memorial Volume, pp. 142-143.

⁷⁶Hume, Thirteen Principal Upanishads, p. 40.

Tait. Up 2.4.9, "not by speech, not by mind, not by the eye can it be obtained. How can it be known other than saying 'it is'." --
 Katha Up. 2.3.12, "there is something better than a name" -- ChU 7.1.5.

5. Substance as "tat"

Language is in itself that out of which the world is made because language is of substantial origin or has a material cause, because the species it denotes are all that can be known of the world, and because it is manifested by the essence of the relations between species, dependency. It is on the basis of such an explanation in ChU 6 that an extensive list of knowledge is produced in ChU 7 which is first analyzed as "nāma" (name) and then the essence of this is seen to be "bhūma" (everything). The reverse of this explanation of things is their order of origination. Hence a more abbreviated but similar list occurs at BU 2.4.10 which is followed in BU 2.4.11 & 12 by some of the same examples used in ChU 6.

As from a lighted fire laid with damp fuel, various (clouds of) smoke issue forth, even so, my dear, the Rg Veda, the Yajur Veda, the Sāma Veda, Ātharvāṅgīrasa, history, ancient lore, sciences, Upaniṣads, verses, aphorisms, explanations and commentaries. From this, indeed are all these breathed forth.

As the ocean is the one goal (uniting place) of all waters, as the skin is the one goal of all kinds of touch, as the nostrils are the one goal of all smells, as the tongue...as speech is the one goal of all Vedas.

As a lump of salt thrown in water becomes dissolved in water and there would not be any of it to seize forth as it were, but wherever one may take it is salty indeed, so, verily, this great being, infinite, limitless, consists of nothing but knowledge. Arising from out of these elements one vanishes away into them...⁷⁷

Śaṅkara explains this in the following way:

. . . that great Being, which in sport as it were, easily as a man sends forth his breath, has produced the vast mass of holy texts known as the Rig-veda, etc., the mine of all knowledge, consisting of manifold branches, the cause of the distinction of all the different classes and conditions of gods, animals, and men!⁷⁸

As before the separation of the sparks, smoke, embers and flames, all these are nothing but fire, and therefore there is but one substance, fire, so it is reasonable to suppose that this universe differentiated into names and forms is, before its origin, nothing but Pure Intelligence.⁷⁹

In a more general way the VPS also asserts that language has a

⁷⁷Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upaniṣads, pp. 199-200, BU 2.4.10-12.

⁷⁸Thibaut, VSŚB, Vol I, p. 20, commentary on 1.1.3.

⁷⁹Madhavananda, trans., BU, p. 361, commentary on 2.4.10. Cf. Marly Falk, Nāma-Rupa Dharma Rupa.

material cause, Brahman, while explaining the same sūtra of Bādarāyana as we have just quoted Śaṅkara on.

Because of (Brahman) being the material cause of words, the capacities present in words to reveal things exist with Brahman alone . . .

. . . for the Veda falls within the world of name, and the material causality of Brahman in respect of the world of name and form is established by all the Upaniṣads.⁸⁰

The material basis of words as their most important cause strikes us as very odd. Words we tend to think are ideas first and sounds, impulses, and order second. The species is prior, one wishes to think, to the substance out of which the species is realized as a particular. But the demonstrative pronoun, "that", is also a word and a word which indicates the simple being of a thing and of anything. In Chapter III, following a long analysis of chanted language we concluded that the essential character of this language was desire characterized by fear which made present number. Number was the central character of things causing fear and protecting from fear. But number or countability implied taking all things as the same. The paradigm for this in the chant

⁸⁰ VPS 3.6.2 & 3, pp. 446-447. For a long discussion of this see VSŚB 1.3.28.

was called aniruktagāna while in ordinary language this taking of something as neutral is accomplished by pronouns. Words are obfuscated and in effect equated when the thusness which they indicate is removed leaving a mere thatness.

That the problem of whether the material or the efficient cause was prior was considered and resolved to the Vedānta's satisfaction is very clear. It is prepared for by the examination of desire which is fulfilled through acquisition of that depended upon. That depended upon for a thing to be is its essence. That essence is what a thing is made out of. Thus ChU 6 is filled with examples of things made out of something which is the essence of those things.

'As the bees, my son, make honey by collecting the juices of distant tree, and reduce the juice into one form.⁸¹

'These rivers, my son, run, the eastern (like the Gangā) toward the east, the western (like the Sindhu) toward the west. They go from sea to sea (i.e. the clouds lift up the water from the sea to the sky, and send it back as rain to the sea). They become indeed sea. And as those rivers, when they are in⁸² the sea, do not know, I am this or that river,

⁸¹Max Müller, The Upanishads, Part I, p. 101, ChU 6.9.1.

⁸²Ibid., p. 102, ChU 6.10.1.

'If some one were to strike at the root of this large tree here it would bleed, but live. If he were to strike at its stem, it would bleed, but live. If he were to strike at its top, it would bleed, but live. Pervaded by the living Self that tree stands firm, drinking in its nourishment and rejoicing;⁸³

The father said: 'My son, that subtle essence which you do not perceive there [inside a tiny seed], of that very essence this great Nyagrodha tree exists.⁸⁴

'Place this salt in water, and then wait on me in the morning.'

The son did as he was commanded.

The father said to him: 'Bring me the salt, which you placed in the water last night.'

The son having looked for it, found it not, for, of course, it was melted.⁸⁵

In each of these cases one thing can be distinguished from many things which thing is common to all and determinative of each unique thing. The many are reducible to one or the one disseminates itself into many. This is done through an order of dependency.

ChU 6.8.1-2 discusses something upon which man is absolutely dependent, sleep. Man is said to be bound to it. Binding in ChU

⁸³ Ibid., p. 103, ChU 6.11.1.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 104, ChU 6.12.2.

⁸⁵ Ibid., pp. 104-105, ChU 6.13.1.

7 is the image of dependency. It is also the image of truth as a physiological condition at the end of ChU 6. Man desires and depends on sleep just as much as on food and water. Thus just as man is said to be breath because he depends on breath, water because he depends on water, food because he depends on food, so he is sleep.

The text next delineates a dependent order which draws one to the substance of what one is which is designated by a pronoun. In the ordinary or mundane world, each species e.g., food (ChU 6.8.4) has a substance e.g., water, which has a word designating it. In other words a pot which is made of clay has clay for its substance which is called "clay" (ChU 6.1.4). Each supposed substance has a place in the dependent order resting in speech. A thing is ultimately known as substantial, however, because speech can ascribe to it a "that" e.g., ChU 6.8.7. "That" is the substance of a thing which when given attributes during the course of speech becomes particularized. By knowing that one can be a "that" one knows that one is an indescribable substance which is known at the moment as a species or genus.

Patañjali asserts one possible implication of this situation by claiming the integrity of substance and species ("generic feature").

The generic feature does not abandon the substance from (the moment of) its origination up to its destruction. Moreover, the separateness of the generic

feature from the substance is not conveyed by an expression. Because there is no (expression) as śābaleyasya gauḥ: 'bullness of (a) brindled (bull)'.

"then what (expression do we use)? (We say) gauḥ śābaleyah: 'a brindled bull'. Therefore we understand that a substance is inseparably connected with a generic feature. Consequently, a word expressing a generic feature is established as a word expressing a substance.⁸⁶

Although here he seems to be taking issue with the Navya-nyāya explanation of words Patañjali is at the same time going much further than Advaita Vedānta, which will never claim a true and final integrity of substance and species.

All species are encountered as substances e.g., a gold necklace is encountered as gold but these substances exist in dependent relations with each other e.g., ChU 1.1.2. In such relations the substances assume the character of qualities or attributes of a thing. The thing thus qualified can be designated by a pronoun (as an "it") while the substance thus qualifying has lost its substantiality (which resides in the "it"). Thus dependency turns all differentiation into qualities and substances which can be designated as simply "another" or countable substance. In this way pronouns encompass all things. Bhartrhari to this extent agrees with us:

That in reference to which a pronoun can be used is substance, presented as something to be differentiated.

⁸⁶ Joshi and Roodbergen, ed. and trans., Patañjali's Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya, p. 146.

Whatever rests on something else
(samsargi) differentiates it (bhedaka)
and is understood in that function
(savyāpāra), is, being dependent, called
'quality' in the śāstra.⁸⁷

K.A. Subramania Iyer in summarizing Helārāja's commentary on this similarly emphasizes that language brings one to the very edge of true substance by means of the pronoun.

Pronouns can do one of two things. Some merely denote things in general, like 'sarva'. Others denote particular things like 'anyatara'. It is the former which are used to refer to substance. In fact, that is just the characteristic of substance, namely, that it can be referred to by a pronoun (sarvanāmapratyavamarśayogyatvam). Pronouns refer to things in general either as present or as past. When the element of present or past is discarded, what remains is just the thing in general and that is substance. It is presented as something to be qualified by such limiting factors as the universal. What is meant by 'presented' is that what is being defined is not external reality, but reality as presented by words. Thus, even a universal, when presented as something to be qualified, becomes substance.

. . .

Just as it has been shown that action is a universal,⁸⁸ it can also be shown that it is a substance.

⁸⁷ K.A. Subramania Iyer, trans., The Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari, Chapter III, pt. i, 3.4.3 & 3.5.1, pp. 123 & 126.

⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 123-125.

The use of "this" and "that" in the ChU is truly outstanding. It would be pointless to enumerate all of the instances of their usage. One common usage is for "this" to stand for the whole universe, e.g., ChU 3.19.1. Another is to designate Brahman as "this" which is being understood in a particular way ("thus"), e.g., ChU 3.13. Still another is to point something out with "this" and then, designating it as "that", to say what it is, e.g., ChU 4.15 or ChU 1.3.2.

The centrality of pronouns in speech due to their being its essence is also underlined explicitly by Sāyana in his commentary on RV 10.71.1. This hymn, having been heard by Brhaspati of the Āṅgiras family whose teachings are part of the ChU and whose deity is Jñāna while its subject is speech, is, for these reasons, appropriately considered here. Wilson, based on Sāyana's commentary, translates:

That, Brihaspati, is the best (part) of speech which those giving a name (to objects) first utter; that which was the best of those (words) and free from defect, (Saraswatī) reveals it though secretly implanted, by means of affection.⁸⁹

⁸⁹Wilson, trans., RV, Vol. VI, p. 127. Cf. n. p. 121.

Sāyana considers tat to be the subject of this hymn. It is the essence of knowledge because it is the "meaning of the Veda". It is first uttered because when children begin to speak they say "tata".

On the importance of this demonstrative pronoun Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja are agreed. Because it has such grave importance it is on the specific interpretation of it and hence of the meaning of the phrase, tat tvam asi, that they are in great disagreement. Therefore, much of the Vedārthasaṃgraha is taken up with this problem. Madhva also is convinced of the importance of the pronoun "tat". He seems to agree with our exposition of tat as well. He defines it as that which "pervades all".⁹⁰ But the phrase used in ChU 6.8-16, "tat tvam asi", seems to him such an equation between the name Śvetaketu and the pronoun that he interprets tat as atat. The purpose of Madhva's commentary on this section is to establish that the phrase concerned is atat tvam asi and refers to the distinction between Śvetaketu and tat. The extent to which Śvetaketu retains any kind of identity in the final analysis of these statements is a critical issue between Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and

⁹⁰ S.C. Vasu, trans., ChU with the Commentary of Śrī Madhvāchārya, Commentary on ChU 6.8.7, p. 415, and on ChU 6.16.3, pp. 435-452.

Madhva and only goes to show the difficulty and ambiguity surrounding this statement. Just as the true meaning of Śvetaketu is at issue so we will see that there is a problem in understanding the meaning of satya which is also equated with tat.

6. Substance and Species

The place where tat is most carefully and explicitly discussed is the second half of ChU 6. Over and over again the following series of statements is explained, "aitad ātmyam idam sarvam tat satyam sa ātmā tat tvam asi śvetaketu". Only with the final example at ChU 6.16 does Śvetaketu understand the meaning of these phrases. One is forced to conclude that the example at this point is what explains the statements to Śvetaketu's satisfaction. The example is of trial by ordeal. What is crucial in this example is that it is about the use of satya in the trial. Śvetaketu is having problems understanding the meaning of satya, for a good reason as will become apparent, and this example somehow clarifies the problem.

Satya is of consequence throughout ChU 6 for it is introduced at the very beginning of this chapter (6.1.4-6) where it means that which many things are made of, e.g., clay is the satya of a clay pot. What something really is, is the satya of that thing. But by the very example given here it can be seen that satya

can be used in a relative sense, for several different things are called satya, clay, gold and iron in ChU 6.1.4-6. Only at the end of ChU 6 is satya used in such a way that it seems to be no longer relative for there it points to an ultimate thing, tat, which can refer to all things. Hence satya applies to a variety of levels of reality.

This makes the convincing example all the more curious for it is specifically about telling the truth. But before considering this peculiar example we should note one other thing about this passage: the opposite of satya here is anṛta or the privative form of ṛta. Rta according to Dr. W.K. Whillier should be understood as "truth in sacred speech", that is, as truth which is not separate from speech which is held to be sacred and not ordinary. Such is the case in the trial by ordeal as will be seen.

W. Norman Brown in several articles about the meaning of satya notes that when ṛta and satya occur in the same context they are not always synonymous.

ṛta refers to Cosmic Truth, the principles and rules by which our universe operates -- or ought to operate. But satya in those contexts refers to Individual Truth, the perfect fulfillment by an individual, whether a human being or a deity, of his personal duty under the ṛta. . . . A being, whether deity or man, who does his duty perfectly,

that is fulfills his obligations under the
rta may be called rtavan . . . More frequently
 such a being may be said to be satya . . .⁹¹

Elsewhere Brown argues that in the "act of truth" or when one
 makes a formal declaration of truth ". . . the Act must be based
 upon the perfect performance of one's function in the universe."⁹²

The idea that one can bend cosmic forces
 to his will by performing his personal
 function (vrata, RV 9.112) with perfection
 seems to be as old as the Rig Veda. To do
 so constitutes living according to cosmic
 truth (satya, rta), whereby a being is
anuvrata, and becomes rtāvan or satyādharmān.⁹³

⁹¹W. Norman Brown, "Duty as Truth in the Rig Veda" in India
 Maior Congratulatory Volume Presented to J. Gonda, pp. 60 & 63.

⁹²W. Norman Brown, "The Metaphysics of the Truth Act"
 (Satyakriyā) in Mélanges D'Indianisme à la Mémoire de Louis Renou,
 p. 172. This article consists of some added notes which tend to
 confirm an earlier article, "The Basis for the Hindu Act of Truth",
 in Review of Religion, Vol. 5, pp. 36-45, 1940. Zimmer, Philosophies
 of India, pp. 151-169 supports this explanation of "satya".

See also Marlya Falk, Nāma-Rūpa Dharma Rūpa, p. 31: "Else-
 where [in the BU] (1, 6) the meaning of the term (satya) is
 completely inverted, and -- owing to the fundamentally immanent
 character of satya -- it becomes a synonym of nāma rūpa, denoting
 the mortal side of reality."

⁹³Brown, "The Metaphysics of the Truth Act", p. 173.

In other words the satya in the context of trial by ordeal most obviously means the proper performance of one's own duty. On some levels one's duty will be fairly obvious. The obvious duty of a brahman is to be a brahman. The question left unconsidered by Brown is what is the deepest meaning of this duty and hence what is one's true duty. This problem is suggested at the beginning of ChU 6 by Uddālaka when he tells Śvetaketu to not be a brahman in name only. To approach this we must look at trial by ordeal more closely and in this context try to understand satya. For in addition to the importance of satya already noted it plays an important part in the gaining of Brahman knowledge by Satyakāma Jābāla who is the only other significant student in the ChU and is taught by Uddālaka. Satyakāma's name implies his great "desire for satya". It is the subject of his name (whereby his caste and hence qualification to be taught could be determined) which tests and proves his unflinching devotion to satya. Śaṅkara comments that it is the rightful duty of the Brahman caste to not flinch from the truth (satya).

Trial by ordeal (divya) must not be confused with torturing a person in order to elicit the truth. This latter practice, as a systematic judicial procedure, came in with trial by jury to the West. Instances of the use of trial by ordeal in the West are recorded as late as 1811 and a related phenomenon, trial by battle, is recorded even later. But by the end of the 12th century

the difficulty of obtaining convictions and the access of corruption to its process had brought it into disrepute.⁹⁴ Trial by ordeal was abolished by the Lateran Council in 1215. Two problems then arose: making people stand trial by petty jury and obtaining convictions. Both problems were met with solutions involving torture. The solution to the first problem was formalized in English law until 1772.

. . . on an indictment for felony consent to be tried by a jury was compelled by the peine forte et dure. In 1275 statutory force was given to this expedient.⁹⁵

Fortunately for English jurisprudence, trust in the strength of the law and a certain lack of concern over the quantity of convictions seems to have protected it from trusting to a great extent in torture for convictions.⁹⁶ Elsewhere in Europe the primary reason for torture was not only the end of trial by ordeal but also the desire to convict heretics.

Every safeguard of innocence was abolished or disregarded; torture was freely used. Everything seems to be done that can possibly be done to secure a conviction. This procedure, inquisitory and secret, gradually forced its way into the temporal courts;

⁹⁴ Holdsworth, History of English Law, Vol. I, pp. 310-311.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 327.

⁹⁶ Pollack & Maitland, The History of English Law, Vol. II, pp. 546-552 & 655-659.

we may almost say that the common law of Western Europe adopted it.⁹⁷

England rid itself of a major source of heresy however by simply banishing the Jews in 1290 under Edward I, which banishment was not altered until 1674.⁹⁸

There are other differences beside the different purposes and historical origins. A quick examination of the ordeals used in India together with the reader's imagination as to their probable outcome should be sufficient to indicate the difference in cruelty as well as findings of guilt. We don't imply by this however that because torture is more cruel than some of the following ordeals, trial by jury is less just than trial by ordeal. What we think we hear in these historical conflicts is the extent to which trial by jury was offensive to some people's sense of hierarchy so much so that they would rather undergo peine forte et dure. Conversely trial by ordeal seemed to satisfy this sense.

In Hinduism different ordeals sometimes were matched with different crimes while convicted thieves were often fined in proportion to

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 657.

⁹⁸Holdsworth, p. 46.

caste, the Brahmans being fined the most for the same crime.⁹⁹

Different ordeals were often also reserved for different castes and conditions of people.

Yaj. [Yajnavalkyasmṛti] II.98 states that the ordeal of balance should be given to women, a minor (under 16), a very old person (above eighty years), the blind, the cripple, brāhmaṇas and the diseased; the fire ordeal (i.e., heated ploughshare and heated māṣa) to kṣatriyas, water ordeal to vaiśyas, poison to śūdras.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹Kane, Katyayana on Vyavahara, pp. 198-199 #417-419 and pp. 291 n. #824.

According to Kane (History of Dharmaśāstra, Vol. 3, p. 375) the ordeal mentioned in ChU 6.15 is meant for cattle thieves and consists of licking a red-hot ploughshare. Unfortunately I have not been able to locate the sources upon which he bases this assertion which seems to contradict the ChU's statement that holding an axe head in the hand constituted the ordeal.

Kane points out that the ChU reference to ordeals is the second earliest in Sanskrit literature. It is interesting that the earliest is the PVB and is concerned with the same problem (being a true Brahman), in a more explicit form, with a similar ordeal.

The Pancaviṃśa (or Tāṇḍya) Brahmana 14.6.6 refers to the story of Vatsa, who was abused by his step-brother that the former was the son of a śūdra woman, against which Vatsa protested, urged that he was a brāhmaṇa, entered fire to prove the truth of his assertion and came out of the fire unscathed.

(Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra, Vol. III, p. 361).

¹⁰⁰Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra, Vol. III, p. 365.

The ordeal of balance involves weighing an accused before and after his declaration of innocence. The fire ordeal involves taking eight steps while carrying a red hot piece of iron in one's hands which are covered with flour, milk, 14 leaves and seven pieces of grass. The water ordeal involves the ability to stay under water for the period of time it takes someone to run twice the distance of a shot arrow. The poison ordeal involves swallowing poison and surviving three days. Other more dangerous ordeals are also recorded.¹⁰¹

The purohita always ritualistically addresses the object used in the ordeal and asks it to determine the truth.

Scales, the gods have appointed you to
dispense justice to mankind.

.....
O fire, you know the secrets of men.

.....
Water . . . settle the doubtful question.

.....
Poison . . . if in reality he is not guilty
divest yourself of your injurious qualities.¹⁰²

The capacity of non-human things to respond to speech is central to the possibility of satya determining through rta the outcome of activity. For according to Ānandagiri (Appendix II, p. 11) ChU 6.16 is

¹⁰¹Dubois, Hindu Manners, Customs, and Morals, pp. 717-722.

¹⁰²Ibid.

definitely a discussion of one who really thinks he is innocent and is not simply lying.¹⁰³ Thus what becomes apparent from trial by ordeal is the degree to which truth is the province of non-human or non-particular things. This is an outcome of the denigration of the qualities of a thing in favor of its substance. For no matter how real an image of a cow may seem, if it is fake and made out of clay this is the truth about it. What can be made out of a substance is ultimately not determined by human ingenuity but by the substance. Language as one of these makings is thus ultimately determined in its potentiality by the final elements of it. But its potentiality

¹⁰³ This is in fact the discussion of "one who thinks quite incorrectly" and not "one who thinks what he says is false" for the following reasons.

1) If "mithya" ("incorrectly") was an object as in the case of satyatvābhimānah ["supposing (something) to be real"] and not a qualification as in the case of anrte'bhisamdha it would be rendered mithyatvābhimānah.

2) Mithyaiyābhimanānasya has the same grammatical functions as well as being virtually synonymous with anrte'bhisamdha. "abhisamdha" is considered to be synonymous with abhimāna.

3) "To lie" is usually rendered in Sanskrit by "mithya" plus either √bru, √vac, or √vad.

This doctrine of truth must also be understood in the context of it being a metaphor of Advaita. Thief equals ignorant man while non-thief equals enlightened man. Hence the thief, to completely fill out the analogy, must not know he is a thief, just as an ignorant man doesn't know things are non-dual.

is the determination of human action and thus duty or the making present of the natures of things. Thus language is a substance prior to human essence. Speech thus holds a position independent of men. Men depend on it (ChU 1.1.1-3, 2.23.2-3, 4.12.1-4).

Because all things are made of the same substance, including speech, a speech act is not essentially different from any physical act but it is more primordial. The unity of the universe requires this. Words can effect all substances not just human substance and all substances may have speech emanate through them. For this reason and the prior reason of men's dependency on speech not only can birds and animals speak and hear, but also fire and the gods can speak and hear.¹⁰⁴

ChU 3.1-10 describes different Vedas or sets of teachings as composed of the three colors in the sun. The sun is that which is the same in all. The entirety of religious teaching is hence said to be composed of these three substances. This problem is then discussed systematically in ChU 6.1-7. Being produces out of itself, Uddālaka says, that element which other than itself is

¹⁰⁴ChU 1.12, 2.9.2, 4.1.1-4, 4.5-6, 4.10-14. "All things being triplicate in their constitution, everything is possible everywhere. As a matter of fact, no one eats food that is not triplicate in its constitution; nor does anyone drink Water that is not triplicate, nor does anyone eat Fire that is not triplicate in its constitution. So that for those who eat Food, -- such as, rats and the like, -- there is nothing incongruous in their being endowed with Speech and Life-breath." [Jha, ChU, p. 322, Commentary on 6.5.4]. See also Ibid., p. 226-227, Commentary on 5.1.15.

most present or necessary for all things, fire. In this way the order of creation proceeds from Being in its dependent order to produce three dependently related substances: fire, water and food. These substances are always constituted by a certain proportion of three other entities one of which is dominant.

the 'triplication' of each would mean the indicating of one of the three constituent factors as the primary and the other two as secondary factors; otherwise (if all the three constituents were equal) there would be a single common 'triplication', and not a distinct 'triplication' for each of the three.¹⁰⁵

Everything named has a particular proportion of these three things.¹⁰⁶

This however does not preclude thinking of many things as being made of other derivative constituents, for any substance with a particular proportion containing other particular proportions could be said to be made of those also. The reason these three things are not even ultimate constituents is that they exist as causes and effects in order of emanation from being and must be capable of being measured into proportions. These two characteristics indicate that like the dependent order of things in ChU 1 these substances (or here gunas) must also be definable as conglomerations of units

¹⁰⁵ Jha, ChU, p. 313, Commentary on 6.3.3. A.S. Gupta, ChU Samkhya Point of View, p. 16 agrees.

¹⁰⁶ ChU 6.4.1-4, viz. Fire, Sun, Moon, Lightning.

each conglomeration of which is eternally united with a name.

Thus, then, if the whole Universe has been triplicated, then, just as, in the case of Fire, the Fireness vanished and all that was real was three colours only, so of the Universe also, the universeness should vanish. Similarly, Food also being a product of water, Water alone would be the only real element in it, and the Food would be only a modification of words. Similarly, Water also being the product of Fire, Water would be a mere modification of words, and Fire would be the only real factor in it. Of Fire also, -- inasmuch as it is the product of Being, -- Fire would be a mere modification of words, and Being would be the only real factor. All this is meant by the text.¹⁰⁷

Thus a creature as that substance which is his species and hence duty or who is satya is substantially different from one who is in some additional or other way.

Threefold is that faith born of the individual nature of the embodied -- Sattvic, Rajasic, and Tamasic. Do thou hear of it.

The faith of each is in accordance with his nature, O Bharata. The man is made up of his faith; as a man's faith is, so is he.

Sattvic men worship the Gods; Rajasic, the Yakshas and the Rakshasas; the others -- Tamasic men, the Pretas and the hosts of Bhutas.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ Jha, ChU, p. 317.

¹⁰⁸ Sastry, trans., BG 17.2-4, pp. 428-429.

His interaction, for this additional reason, with other substance (which can be language) will produce different effects. Thus some language only interacts positively with some substance and must be kept from other substance for the good of all. In other words meaning is only appropriate to or can only be appropriated by a particular species.¹⁰⁹ Similar types always adhere to each other.

Food, eaten, is made threefold; its grossest matter becomes faeces; the middling part, flesh and the subtlest part, mind.

Water, drunk, is made threefold: its grossest matter becomes Urine; the middling matter becomes Blood, and the subtlest matter becomes the Lifebreath (prāṇa).

Fire, eaten, is made threefold; of that, the grossest matter becomes Bone; the middling matter becomes Marrow, and the subtlest matter becomes Speech.¹¹⁰

To see this by the example of the ChU, even when the demons obtain the teaching from Prajāpati they do not understand it because they do not have sufficient desire which is to say they are without that essence which is most determinative of the character of all things.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. BG 17.15-17. ChU 2.11-21 repeats over and over that certain speeches and teachings are appropriate to certain kinds of people.

¹¹⁰ Jha, ChU 6.5.1-3.

This is the essence of that teaching which preserved vedic knowledge for Brahmans and above all caused its careful transmission.

It was on knowing this -- that the ancient great Householders and great Vedic Scholars, said. -- For us, -- there is nothing that any one would point out as being unheard, unthought or unknown: -- and they knew it from these.¹¹¹

Śaṅkara explains that this is the essential issue in ChU 6.1-7.

It is hard to understand how food, water and heat develop by their essences the mind, the breath-of-life, and speech in one single body without interrupting the regular order of its own species [svajāti anatikramena].¹¹²

With this understood clearly the ultimate revelation of language taught by ChU 6.8-16 will confirm Śvetaketu in his desire for satya.

Yet the relationship between caste and the highest knowledge should not be construed as an unequivocal one. There seems to have been a desire by Śaṅkara to establish a great sense of caution with respect to this in part because there was a tendency on the part of some to simply equate the brahman caste with the knowers of Brahman (VSŚB 1.1.4) and in part because there was a tendency on the other hand to see no relationship whatsoever. Still further was the

¹¹¹ Ibid., 6.4.5.

¹¹² Commentary on ChU 6.5.4.

need to make it clear that the final state of one knowing Brahman was one in which qualities had no meaning and hence where recognition of caste condition could not occur. These distinctions subtle as they are were made more easily confused by the fact that primary access to those statements essential to jñāna was had by the brahman caste. The Hindu tradition records the difficulty of making clear to others these distinctions by recording attacks on one system of interpretation by another in terms of the former's supposed undermining of caste while at the same time the latter would be attacking the former on the grounds that there is not sufficient accessibility to the highest good. Rāmaṇuja attacks Śaṅkara for this and Śaṅkara attacks the Sphotavadins in a similar, although less rancorous, way.

Śaṅkara's discussion of this problem is based largely on his interpretation of BU 3.5.1. This passage must be considered because it discusses with great care the relationship between the origination of knowledge due to being a Muni (an adult ascetic like Raikva) and the other āśramas and the relationship between the brahman caste and the knower of Brahman. This discussion takes place in Śaṅkara's commentary on BU 3.5.1 and in VSŚB 3.4.47. Śaṅkara explicitly intends this to apply to ChU 8.15.1 by his final comment in VSŚB 3.4.47 and by the whole of VSŚB 3.4.48. More importantly his discussion of BU 3.5.1 serves to clarify an emerging problem in

the total understanding of the ChU, namely, to what extent does the advocacy of a particular kind of behavior, the Muni or Sannyasin which we see suggested subtly in ChU 2.23.1, undercut the dominant concern for the householder that we are showing to be present in the ChU? To what extent does Śaṅkara's interpretation advocate such an undercutting and does he contradict the purposes of the ChU? To what extent is caste implied by the true understanding of the ChU and should the ChU imply, according to Śaṅkara, a necessary relationship between caste and jñāna?

The problem first appears when the BU establishes that "brāhmaṇa" means both the caste and the knower of Brahman. Is a member of the caste necessarily a knower of Brahman and can a knower of Brahman ever not be a member of that caste? The full equivocalness of this problem is put well by Śaṅkara.

Further, I am the glory, -- i.e. the Self named 'glory' -- of Brahmaṇas; Brāhmaṇas alone particularly meditate upon the Self, hence I am the glory of Brahmaṇas; -- so also of Kṣātrīyas and Vaiśhyas. -- these also are entitled to meditate upon, hence I am the Self of those men also.¹¹³

The other part of the problem is that if being a Muni is necessary

¹¹³ Jha, ChU commentary on 8.14.1, p. 487.

for the highest good does this mean that the other āśramas and caste distinctions in general have no purpose or foundation?

Śaṅkara's discussion in the VSŚB is preceded by a long series of statements (VSŚB 3.4.26-46) advocating the importance of āśramas for the sake of the origination of knowledge and for the sake of the achievements of ordinary desires. This tends to imply that the most crucial directive, although not the most crucial salvific statement, is in ChU 2.23.1 where the Brahmanical duties according to stage of life are enumerated. The Vedānta Sūtras here unequivocally assert as do the commentators that āśrama duties are important for jñāna to originate as well as important even if one doesn't care for or believe in jñāna. They are a precondition and a cause of "resting in Brahman" or settling into that substance underlying speech" from which there is no rebirth. ChU 8.15 emphasizes this relationship between satya and advaita atma jñāna or the ontological understanding of ritual. Yet Śaṅkara then says¹¹⁴ that one who is a "brāhmaṇa", has become a Sannyāsin, cognized the Self and risen above desire may still need to become a Muni in order to obtain the highest knowledge

¹¹⁴Thibaut, trans., VSŚB 3.4.47, Vol. 2, p. 324.

because "multiplicity is too strongly established." Śaṅkara's audience is necessarily those who wear the sacred thread because he then says that "Brāhmaṇas" or "knowers of Brahman" give up the sacred thread.¹¹⁵ They become childlike which is not to become ostentatiously anti-social but to not manifest oneself through a display and to be free from concerns over the opinions of the world. In other words seeking historical greatness is of absolutely no consequence to the highest product of the tradition. But because one can become a Muni at any time this strong advocacy of it would tend to threaten the very existence of the fundamental caste distinction between twice born (the wearers of the sacred thread or the upper three castes) and those not so twice born.

In his discussion of BU 3.5.1 Śaṅkara carefully distinguishes between three kinds of brāhmaṇas. The highest and best state in which the name is "literally true" is one in which the bearer of the title is convinced "that all is Brahman". His behavior and deportment can't be described hence it is inappropriate to conceive of the title as a caste distinction. Prior to this state Śaṅkara makes a strong case for a brāhmaṇa becoming childlike and giving

¹¹⁵Madhavananda, trans., BU p. 482.

up all things which give him a place in the social order including the sacred thread, which distinguishes one as a brāhmaṇa, and having a family. This action has for its purpose nothing but knowing Brahman and involves seeking a particular manner of life and attitude which is conducive to such knowing. It undercuts the claim of caste to determine salvation by stepping away from it. But the same step is one whereby the transmission of tradition comes to an end. It is a step in fulfilling the transmitted teachings that makes their ritualistically transmitted character apparent to all who transmit them. Those who are engaged in transmission and in the continuation of the species cannot possibly understand what they are doing for they have not renounced desires or dedicated themselves to the highest desire. We can now understand Sanatkumara's childlikeness in ChU 7.

Those who make this renunciation in order to become Munis are called Brāhmaṇas. Here it is most tempting to think that what is meant is the caste. Śaṅkara is very aware of this temptation in his audience who are entirely twice-born thread bearers (because the commentary is on Śruti), hence he discusses the problem in great detail.¹¹⁶ One problem is that twice-born non-Brahmans

¹¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 480-490.

might think themselves excluded from the discussion. Another problem is that members of the Brahman caste might think they were necessarily included as having to become ascetics instead of householders. The effect of Śaṅkara's qualification of the meaning of the term here would be to preserve most readers in their caste roles. He qualifies this use of brāhmaṇa by saying that it refers to an age which no longer resembles the present, "'Brāhmaṇas' in the text means those of past times."¹¹⁷ The lesson to be learned from that age is then that of the need of those who have come to a very thorough understanding of Brahman to renounce everything possible which has desire as its cause. ". . . they alone are qualified for renunciation."¹¹⁸ At what point are they so qualified? They become sufficient knowers of Brahman such that they should renounce desires when "having known all about scholarship or this knowledge of the Self from the teacher and the Śrutis -- having fully mastered it -- should renounce desire."¹¹⁹

That even this state of renunciation was not the highest state but a means to it was understood by all. It was also

¹¹⁷Ibid., p. 482.

¹¹⁸Ibid., p. 480.

¹¹⁹Ibid., p. 490.

carefully understood that once having become a Muni one could not re-enter society, hence it was something not lightly undertaken.¹²⁰ Hence the renunciation of caste involved careful rules for the protection of social order as a whole from this renunciation. At the same time renunciation supported the recognition of the state of ignorance in which all men lived and the ritualism involved in their appropriation of the most sacred scriptures. That ritualism permitted the recognition of one's ritualistic character insofar as one can be denoted by name in the highest and deepest sense (as opposed to the "merely ritualistic" sense). This recognition was essential to one's wishing and being driven to fulfill the true and final meaning of one's denotation as "brāhmaṇa".

But what one is called is constantly denigrated as only a name and hence is not to be construed as the absolute limit of all possibilities. Another possibility is admitted by Śaṅkara that one may know Brahman outside of the caste order. In VSŚB 1.3.38 he says that jñāna may be acquired by śūdras due to prior samskāras (births) and constantly the Bhagavad Gītā which śūdras have access to is referred to as supportive of certain points. Still it is always the case that this text must be interpreted in the light of

¹²⁰VSŚB 3.4.40-43.

Śruti and those who obtain jñāna outside of the caste order are clearly dependent on the order of rebirth. All things it must be recalled necessarily imply the truth but one may never come to see it without the aid of revelation and one may never be certain about the truth of things without such a revelation. The accidental character of jñāna posed by this exception is precisely what revelation seeks to alter. One of the ways it alters this accidental character is by explaining the causes of it. Nonetheless this is a necessary qualification. It is an outstanding recognition which nonetheless is not used to increase the accessibility of Veda. It should at the same time be noted that true Brahma-vidya or knowledge of Brahman has no social form whatsoever. Hence the existence of such exceptions would have little effect on social order or the pre-eminence of śruti. On the other hand because it is an attractive state to the extent it was felt to obtain, to that extent it would tend to the breakdown of caste.

The problem of the caste nature of Śvetaketu and his proper relationship to it is the beginning of his relationship to knowledge and education.

"Hariḥ, Om. There lived once Svetaketu
 Āruneya (the grandson of Aruṇa). To him his
 father (Uddālaka, the son of Aruṇa) said:
 'Svetaketu, go to school; for there is none
 belonging to our race, darling [priya], who,

not having studied (the Veda), is, as it were, a Brahmana by birth only.¹²¹

To be a true Brahman is to know all that is proper to a Brahman. This problem with which ChU 6 opens is concluded by the final verse in ChU 6. The chapter begins by the need to fulfill a particular duty and ends by Śvetaketu's understanding of this which is the satya of a Brahman. Thus the substance of him to which all other things are subordinate (his rasa (juice), his river, his life, his seed, or his salt) is that little coal (the "root") which by being fed can blaze up into a reciter of the Veda (ChU 6.7). This is the first thing Śvetaketu must understand prior to the discourse which explains the meaning of tat tvam asi (ChU 6.8-16) for the text carefully reminds us in ChU 6.9 and 10 that the existence of species is not negated by its being construed as a "that".

'Whatever these creatures are here,
whether a lion, or a wolf, or a boar, or a
worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a mosquito,
that they become again and again.

'Now that which is that subtle essence,
in it all that exists has its self. It is
the True. It is the Self, and thou, O
Svetaketu, art it.¹²²

¹²¹ "Max Muller, The Upanishads, ChU 6.1.1, p. 92.

¹²² "Max Muller, The Upanishads, ChU 6.9.3-4, p. 101.

The second thing he understands is that only through participation in this linguistic structure which is one of dependency is there independence from it. This he learns in ChU 6.16.

Śvetaketu must seek his satya as a creature by being a reciter of the Veda. Thereby he understands himself as tat and ceases to think of himself as Śvetaketu. Śvetaketu per se must not be spoken of as satya for by being "that" he is no longer thou or Śvetaketu with which "thou" (tvam) is equated. These latter designations are only names and only "that" is "satya". Only by understanding Śvetaketu as in essence duty and hence a linguistic entity, however, is Śvetaketu's thatness properly understood.

'Now that serene being which, after having risen from out this earthly body, and having reached the highest light (self-knowledge), appears in its true form, that is the Self,' thus he spoke (when asked by his pupils). This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman. And of that Brahman the name is the True, Satyam.

This name Sattyam consists of three syllables, sat-tī-yam. Sat signifies the immortal, t, the mortal, and with yam he binds both. Because he binds both, the immortal and the mortal, therefore it is yam. He who knows this goes day by day into heaven (svarga).¹²³

¹²³ Ibid., ChU 8.3.4-5, pp. 129-130.

The satya protects him from dependency insofar as he makes himself satya. When he does not do this he is anrta (untrue) the consequence of which is binding and death. Understanding himself as a creature of duty whose salvation is in the perfect fulfillment of duty, which salvation is to be the substance of everything and which duty is the transmission of the Veda is learned in ChU 6.16.

The substance of a being as duty or species when perfectly entered into or satya is hence ultimately identical to merging into the substance of all species or sat.

— Om! Verily Meditation upon the whole Sama is good; whatever is good that they call 'Sama' (excellent); and what is not excellent that they call 'Asama' (not-good).

In this connection they declare thus -- When they say 'he approached him with Sama' what they mean is that 'he approached him in a good manner'; and when they say 'he approached him with a-sāma,' what they may mean is that 'he approached him in an improper manner.'

Then again, they say 'Verily it is Sāma for us'; when something is good they say it is good. They say 'Verily there is a-sāma for us'; when they say something is not good, they say it is not good.

If anyone knowing thus meditate upon Sāma as good, all right duties would readily come to him and accrue to him.¹²⁴

¹²⁴ Jha, ChU 2.1.1-4, pp. 71-72.

Śaṅkara in explaining this says: "What is connoted by the term 'good' is Duty (Right Conduct) or Brahman; in either case, it is what subsists in all such products as the Regions."¹²⁵ That being which is substance and which is the substance of everything hence requires the total subordination of one to the duties of his species. His species is that designation of him in the Veda which gives him specific duties.

Thus it is that the duty of one particular caste or the nature of it is such that its caste duty (satya) and the truth (satya) coincide, for it is this caste which has complete access to that language in which truth is enclosed, Veda. Satyakāma Jābāla is known to be a Brahman because he speaks with satya and none but a Brahman is so capable. This must be remembered when Sanātkumara appeals to Nārāda's pride to make him desire to speak with satya. It is the essence of satya which leads Nārāda to the highest knowledge.

Thus while we perceive a dependent relatedness between all things, which is founded upon their desire which is self-centered, we then understand the satya of a being to be defined as the

¹²⁵Ibid., p. 73.

fulfilled duties of his jāti or species. Only thus is one's self served truly and only thus can one merge into the essence of all things. That is, the self which kāma turns one towards is impersonal for it is that wordlike substance which is one's species. A human jāti can be defined in terms of rules of conduct as well as by name.

The proper way of telling one what one's name or gotra (family name) is is established by the story of Satyakāma Jābāla. He is told, "Satyakāma nāma tvam asi", "you are named Satyakāma." The position occupied by tat in tat tvam asi is here occupied by the name and gotra which reveals the caste of the person. "Tat tvam asi" is in fact the concluding explanatory statement for explaining that the substance which is undifferentiated yet contains and preserves the selfsame potentiality and species identity of what is merged into it, is the substance of Śvetaketu.

'Just as, my dear, the bees make honey, by collecting the juices of many distant trees, and then reducing them to one unit in the form of one juice.'

'And there, as those juices have no discrimination, such as I am the juice of this tree; I am the juice of that tree; in the same manner, my dear, all these creatures having merged into Being, do not know that we are merging into Being'.

'Whatever these creatures are here -- a tiger, or a lion, or a wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or an insect, or a gadfly, or a mosquito, -- that they become again.'

'Now, that which is this Subtle Essence, --
 in That has all this its Self; That is the Self;
 That is the True; Thatthou art; O Shvētakētu' --
 'Revered Sir, please explain this to me, again.'
 -- 'Be it so, my boy', he said.'¹²⁶

In other words satya is first apprehended through being completely absorbed in satya or one's duty as defined in the Veda. Thus ChU 6.16 explains that only when one satyam ātmānam kurute, makes the self what really is, sa satyābhisandhah, gives the self over to what really is, and satyenātmanam antardhāya, covers the self with what really is, can one really know the satya of the self. For satya is ultimately the essence of Veda or ritualistic language which is tat and as such the essence of all things.

¹²⁶ Jha, ChU 6.9.1-4, pp. 340-342.

HIERARCHY: A CLARIFICATION OF DEPENDENCY

1. The Implications of this Concept of Language for Human Action

In the previous chapter we began to see the origins of some of the central arguments among the orthodox. At the same time we saw that what was convincing for Śvetaketu was a truth he understood and believed which was about his duty. In other words a particular set of political activities was so obviously and transparently true for him that by seeing that the nature of things is intimately tied to them he was able to see the truth about the nature of things. This connection was certainly felt by the tradition for one finds it literally bound together in the ChU, śmr̥ti (e.g., BG), as well as explanatory texts (e.g., VSŚB).¹ But in what way is the connection made in the ChU? Śaṅkara takes great pains to establish the relation-

¹The parallel to this in logic is striking. Reason must be absolutely realized in the world hence all syllogisms must provide a supporting example drawn from the world.

The Indian logician says that you cannot state your general premise or the universal proposition unless you can cite a supporting "example" (dr̥stānta).

B.K. Matilal, Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis, p. 129.

ship between the ontology of things and their specific worldly arrangement particularly in VSŠB 1.3 & 3.1 both of which involve extensive reference and exegesis of passages in the ChU. Ānandagiri also takes Śaṅkara's statements on rebirth and caste as worthy of lengthy explanation.² Kane notes that "The only passage of Vedic literature on which reliance can be placed for some definite statement about cāṇḍālas is in the Chāndogya Up. V. 10.7"³ Often those positions Śaṅkara argues against or those who argue against him do not see that what is at issue is this coherence between a doctrine of language and human institutions. (There is in fact a good reason for this "blindness" which shall be discussed below.) For example, one of the implications of this dependent view of language is a certain exclusiveness which is the separation between the dependent and the depended upon. This separation tends to be destroyed if all are equally dependents which is the case with Rāmānuja "...when he lays hold of bhakti (devotion) as the ultimate leveller."⁴ Dependency not only suggests, as we showed above, need (for food, etc.) but also obedience to a human ruling authority

²Appendix II, p. 9.

³P.V. Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra, Vol. II, Pt. I, p. 166.

⁴J.G. Arapura, "Problematic of Sacred Knowledge Forbidden Outside the Circle of Orthodoxy", p. 22.

and this combined with the unequal conditions of men is what will join human institutions to language.

2. Linguistic Foundations of Hierarchy

The meaning of language according to the ChU as we have explained it up to this point requires a peculiar concept of hierarchy based on the dependency of things. Precisely because it is grounded in this way the definition of species permits the intermingling in the ontological order of what we would call species of one genus with species of a different genus e.g., memory and fire, earth and men. For example, the order in ChU 7 is name, speech, mind, will, intelligence, contemplation, learning, power, food, water, fire, space, memory, desire, and spirit which is very similar to ChU 1.8.3. Or in ChU 2.1-9 it is regions, rain, bodies of water, seasons, animals, senses, speech, sun which is very similar to ChU 1.1.2-3. Things listed in these series show that as things become higher the essence of what pervades all of them is manifested and what at first looks like a dependency in one direction is actually a hierarchical dependency upon the highest or essence of all and proceeds in the other direction. By species we mean anything which occurs in several individuals such that it can be recognized. Ākrīti is used in VŚB 1.3.28 for what we mean by species and Śaṅkara uses jāti in commenting on ChU 1.1.4 synonymously.

The very predominance of rankings as essential to salvation or salvific knowledge is a massive reason for the similar ranking

of all other human things.⁵ This concept of hierarchy will permeate the socio-political order and the transmission of the Vedas while permitting the belief in transmigration. Hence a list of the order of species from highest to lowest will appear as Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya, dog, hog, and candāla (ChU 5.10.7). This particular ordering of things permits, for example, food proscriptions to be grounded in the very nature of things. The role of food in all of the complete orders of the ChU cannot be overlooked as indicating its participation in one's essence. But that there are different types of food corresponding to different types of people just as in the case of speech is equally prepared for by the discussion of the gunas in ChU 6.⁶ Food is shown to be central to one's essence because one is dependent on it for the performance of duty. It must be incorporated to be what one is. Thus at the very beginning of ChU 1.10 there is a discussion of incurring sin by eating what is polluted by another. The importance of being able to ground food discrimination in the order of things is thus underlined by the ChU, as it should, for proscriptions against certain types of food are central to caste consciousness as well as the general conscious-

⁵See ChU 5.1.6-15 which is repeated at ChU 1.2.

⁶cf. BG 17.7-10.

ness of exclusivity.⁷

That this rationalization of a hierarchical social order and hence legitimation of it by the Vedas occurs has always been the assertion of the orthodox tradition. Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja both support the caste system in their commentaries.⁸ The rationalization of the social order is implicit in the assertion that a unity pervades the universe. But the social system is most directly implied when it is asserted that the world is created from the word.

Śaṅkara uses the explanation of what the meaning of a word is (in VSŚB 1.3.28) to provide the reason for a particular ordering of society, the subject in VSŚB 1.3.24-39. Śaṅkara shows that meaning arises through the

⁷The absence of food proscriptions is only to occur with the highest knowledge according to ChU 5.24.4-5 and then accidentally or they may be waived due to the most desperate need according to ChU 1.10. See also Senart, Caste in India, p. 49 & p. 181; Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus, pp. 83-90.

⁸VSRB 3.1.8.

The dharmic order and its attendant ritual activities Śaṅkara clearly accepts as the sacred context for the immediate and direct origination of the desire for Brahman-knowledge....But he rejects the prior obligation to make the dharmic order the essential object of contemplation.

J.G. Arapura, "Problematic of Sacred Knowledge Forbidden Outside the Circle of Orthodoxy", pp. 10-11.

natural and necessary perception of series as a whole. Hierarchy is however inherent to all series for them to be understood. Consequently because socio-political things are defined linguistically and in the Vedas, they are inherently hierarchical.

We understand things in a hierarchical fashion. The less deep has to precede the more deep as in the case of words, or the more encompassing category is preceded by the less encompassing. There is however no ultimate difference between the "physical" and the "mental" (or "capacity for grasping meaning"). In fact the status of the physical can be ascertained from speech as in the case of Jābala whose caste was determined by his relationship to truth....Therefore social inherited hierarchy which is based on spiritual capability is established in the very nature of things.⁹

The sphoṭa-vādins, Śaṅkara implies, tend to introduce a sense of equality where there should be hierarchy.

Because language is founded in desire and ordered by the dependency inherent to this desire which assures one of the substance grounding desire, the position of one in this order of dependency is a position with respect to the possibility of death. The final purpose of desire is to not return to inevitable death

⁹Post, "Śaṅkara's Argument Against the Sphoṭa-vadin" p. 71.

and the origin of all fear (that which orders desire) is death.

ChU 1.3.12 promises that by proper meditation on the parts of the chant "Quickly will be fulfilled for him that desire seeking for which he would sing the chant." The final fulfillment is explained then as follows.

When one gets at the Rk, one loudly pronounces Om; similarly with the Sāman; similarly with the Yajus. That indeed is Svara which is this syllable, which is immortal, fearless. Having entered this, the Divinities became immortal and fearless.

One who, knowing this, eulogises this syllable, enters this same syllable, the immortal and fearless Svara; having entered it he becomes immortal just as the Divinities became immortal.¹⁰

Similarly the conclusion of the pursuit by Indra for the Self is defined as attaining "all regions and all desires" (ChU 8.7.2-3) and this conclusion is finally defined at ChU 8.15.1 as reaching a location such that one does not return again (na ca punar āvartate).

The hierarchy present in language is one of dependent and radical inequality.¹¹ The only possible relationships between

¹⁰ Jha, ChU 1.4.4-5, p. 35.

¹¹ Dumont (Homo Hierarchicus, p. 66) defines hierarchy as "the principle by which the elements of a whole are ranked in relation to the whole". The hierarchical principle in India, he says, is a religious one based on the opposition between the pure and the impure. Although this is acceptable to us as far as it goes, it seems too vague (probably due to the author's universalizing tendency) and we wish to be more specific particularly with respect to Brahmanical society.

things are absolute identity and dependency. Hierarchy here cannot be determined on the basis of the degree of perfection in individuals of species for to the extent that a species is perceived it is completely present. Nor is hierarchy determined on some ordering according to the development of particular abilities by discrete species, for species in the sense of distinct beings do not have any ontological existence.

what we hold is that it [the jīvātman or living self of a being] is real, in so far as it is of the nature of Being. In fact, all modifications -- Name and Form are real in so far as they are of the nature of 'Being', -- in themselves, they are all unreal; as it has been declared that 'All modification -- is a mere product of words, a mere name.'¹²

Hierarchy here is based originally on one unified substance which, characterized by desire, becomes mathematically ordered according to quantity of substance which is something inherited and transmitted.¹³ That quantum of substance (and in particular, proportional

¹²Jha, ChU, p. 313, Commentary on 6.3.2.

¹³We have previously pointed out the vedic attempts to deal with irrational numbers in the problem of squaring a circle and noted the probable hint at a non-irrational solution in the use of series to approximate irrationals which seems to be the point of the numbers used in ChU 1. This belief that irrational numbers could in some way be counted off and did not have an actual existence solely through geometrical construction (and sometimes not even there) seems to indicate a deep desire on the part of the ChU or Vedic thinkers to not allow an independent or irreducible being (i.e., an irrational number) to exist. This suggests that the sorts of critiques which Plato and Aristotle leveled against the Pythagoreans might apply to Vedānta. For an account of these critiques see Klein, Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra, especially pp. 66-71 and pp. 112-113.

quantum) is definable relative to the dependency of others on it and nameable according to the duties incumbent upon it.

This order is most readily apparent in transmigration for here the order of species with respect to rebirth and hence the likelihood of not being reborn is made clear. But this order does not necessarily need to be understood in the fulfillment of a Chandoga Brahman's own nature whose proper fulfillment is transcendence of rebirth. It is this fulfillment which is most central to the ChU because the readers of the ChU had this possibility in their grasp. Hence the discussion of transmigration is relegated to that caste which is most concerned with it because it directly explains the order of that which they must rule and provides a foundation for law. Nonetheless it has a useful explanatory function for the Chandoga because it indicates a hierarchy the height of which is the deepest desire of the highest creature. The precondition for understanding the significance of Brahmanical satya is understanding that without this satya rebirth is inevitable.

Just as some kinds of knowledge are appropriate to Chandoga Brahmins some kinds of knowledge are appropriate to kings. It is in this context that the particular knowledge of transmigration which is very useful to ruling is taught by a king for the first time to a Brahman.¹⁴ The king teaches next that the being of all

¹⁴ Jha, ChU 5.3.7, p. 239 "...0, Gautama, before you, this philosophy never went to Brahmanas; it is for this reason that, among all people, it was only with the Ksatriya that the teaching of this rested."

things is fire. This teaching is superseded by Uddālaka's teaching in ChU 6 which is perhaps one reason why the king's teaching occurs earlier in the text even though ChU 5 must have chronologically followed ChU 6. We are then given the answers to the questions Śvetaketu could not answer which caused this teaching. The first answer at ChU 5.10.1-2 which is of most interest to a reader of the ChU is repeated word for word in ChU 4.15.4-5 by Satyakāma Jābāla. For reasons discussed earlier we have deduced that Jābāla's teachings must have been obtained from Uddālaka but from this passage we can see that the text intends the reader to know that ChU 4.15.4-5 must have followed ChU 5 chronologically because it could only have been learned through Uddālaka or Śvetaketu. This teaching which is about how rebirth almost ceases is followed by a teaching of how rebirth occurs, something which a Brahman would tend to overlook. Similarly at another point a kind of knowledge overlooked by a king who is independent is taught by Raikva; namely, the meaning of dependency. At any rate it is appropriate that the ruling knowledge of rebirth is explained in ChU 5.10.3-10 with the specific purpose of inculcating the desire to behave properly.

On neither of these two ways those small creatures (flies, worms, &c.) are continually returning of whom it may be said, Live and die. Theirs is a third place.

Therefore that world never becomes full
(cf. V,3,2).

Hence let a man take care to himself!

And thus it is said in the following Sloka: --

A man who steals gold, who drinks spirits,
who dishonours his Guru's bed, who kills a
Brahman, these four fall, and¹⁵ as a fifth
he who associates with them.

Transmigration is explained as the possibility of the self of a species moving from species to species and becoming that species due to particular actions as a particular species. This is a knowledge which supports rule because it guarantees justice in the life to come and hence supports its encouragement now on the basis of acting according to the duties of one's species. But it depends for its reasonableness on a belief that all things are absolutely and totally ruled by one thing which comprises them and consequently is totally uncontradicted. True dependency requires such a rigorous causality that injustice can never occur. Śaṅkara explains the necessity of grounding transmigration on this unity of being while explaining ChU 5.10.7.

'Those whose conduct (karana) has been good
will quickly attain some good birth, the
birth of a Brāhmaṇa, or a Kshatriya, or a
Vaiśya. But those whose conduct has been

¹⁵ "Max Muller, Upanishads, Pt I, pp. 82-84, ChU 5.10.8-9.

evil will quickly attain an evil birth, the birth of a dog, or a hog, or a Kandala.' That the word karana here means the remainder (of the works) will be shown later on. Moreover, the different degrees of enjoyment which are implied in the difference of birth on the part of the living beings point, as they cannot be accidental, to the existence of such a remainder of works. For we know from scripture that good fortune as well as misfortune is caused by good and evil works. Smṛiti also teaches that the members of the different castes and āśramas do, in accordance with their works, at first enjoy the fruit of their works and then enter into new existences, in which they are distinguished from each other by locality, caste, family, shape, length of life, knowledge, conduct, property, pleasure, and intelligence; which doctrine implies that¹⁶ they descend with a remainder of their works.

It is with this in mind that the prohibitions for Chandogas or perhaps Brahmans in general are related. (Chandogas, while not really a caste form an occupational division while the different rescensions of the text would more clearly define a caste.) The rules given are interesting for us insofar as they define the desired and central character of a person. They are misleading insofar as they are incomplete. The outstanding character of the rules is their relation to the teacher and to education. Only one

¹⁶Thibaut, trans., VSŚB, Vol. II, p. 114 Commentary on 3.1.8. VSRB on the same sutra quotes other works to the same effect, p. 590.

of them (not-drinking) has to do with something other than ways of treating the teacher and that can be construed as being for the sake of lucidity. Education or knowledge and one's teacher are absolutely central to one's salvation. The punishment for breaking the rules is a decline in one's caste or species position. Indeed the animals and what we would call inanimate things such as fire are as human here as the people. Consequently movement from caste to caste is as much of a move as from species to species. In other words, for the caste system or therefore karma to work, total mutation of species essence must be possible. The whole of ChU 5.10 is devoted to this teaching and all of VŚB 3.1 is devoted to explaining the teaching. The problem that Śaṅkara deals with is making absolutely clear when and how rebirth occurs. He distinguishes two processes. One is the movement of the soul of the good man from one location to the next which location may be animated by other souls (ChU 5.10.1-6). The other is actually turning into non-twice-born beings (ChU 5.10.7-8). While the good soul travels on a set path involving plants etc. whose inevitable end is being a twice-born person, the bad soul may become a dog, pig, chāṇḍāla or even a plant. Śaṅkara is primarily interested in the path of pious twice-born men.

Nor can to be born as rice and other plants
be considered analogous to being born as dogs
&c. For the latter birth scripture teaches
with reference to men of evil conduct only;

while no such specific qualification is stated in the case of vegetable existence. Hence we conclude that when scripture states that the souls descending from the moon become plants, it only means that they become enclosed in plants.¹⁷

However, he carefully leaves room for the change in species.

We do not entirely deny that vegetable existence may afford a place for enjoyment; it may do so in the case of other beings which, in consequence of their unholy deeds, have become plants.¹⁸

Caste differences are defined in terms of the fulfillment of one's caste duties, satya. The preeminent duty of a Chandoga Brahman is learning the Vedas.

'O Śveta-ketu, live the life of the Religious Student; verily, my boy, no one in our family has ever been unlearned and hence Brāhmaṇa only in name.'¹⁹

Thus the movement in the caste order is finally in terms of educational virtue or in access to sacred language. O.C. Cox²⁰ is in agreement with this for he makes it clear that the central core of the caste system is maintained by the Brahmans largely by being most literate and keeping caste in the literature. In fact part of salvific knowledge is "He should not decry the Brahman." (ChU 2.20.2)

¹⁷ Thibaut, trans., VSŠB, Vol. II, p. 131, Commentary on 3.1.25.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 130, Commentary on 3.1.24.

¹⁹ Jha, ChU, 6.1.1, p. 291.

²⁰ Cox's fine work, Caste, Class, and Race is a very good differentiation of these things. He does not seek out the theoretical underpinnings of caste within the traditional literature but only seeks to describe it as it presently exists and in this does admirably well. cf. Dumont p. 247.

The hierarchy of dependency that we have pointed to as the theoretical foundation for the caste system in which the more essential encompasses the less essential or in which at each point in the system those lower in the hierarchy are dependent on those who are higher makes for "a series of successive dichotomies or inclusions" which can be defined as the dependents and those depended upon.

The set of the four varnas divides into two: the last category, that of the Shudras, is opposed to the block of the first three, whose members are 'twice-born' in the sense that they participate in initiation, second birth, and in the religious life in general. These twice born in turn divide into two: the Vaishyas are opposed to the block formed by the kshatriyas and the Brahmins. . . .²¹

This ordering is fine insofar as it involves the same kind of hierarchy present in the ChU but it is indefinite and tends to be satisfied with describing alone. The problem is that in actual fact the Brahmins are the only "caste" to have been documented as actually existing under this name²² (which also conforms with this understanding of hierarchy) which means that the sociological

²¹Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus, p. 67.

²²Cox, Caste, Class and Race, pp. 105-107.

ordering so described is an account of traditional theory without offering any of the reasons of traditional theory.

As well as by other characteristics, the castes can be distinguished by their closeness to the Veda but this we think is central to their ranking.

The Br. and no other should explain the Veda...

.....
[The kshatriya] may at times teach the holy law, he is at all times to study, and be careful in observing charity and ceremonial rites.

.....
[The Vaishya] reads Veda, gives sacrifices etc.

.....
[The Śūdra] may not study nor hear the Vedas recited but he may be present at the small family sacrifices and religious ceremonies.²³

Śaṅkara asserts this when in explaining the first substantial question in the ChU regarding caste (ChU 4.2) he notes two problems in understanding why Raikva calls Janaśruti a Śūdra: if Janaśruti was a king how could he be a Śūdra and if Janaśruti was thought to be a Śūdra by Raikva why does Raikva teach him as it is illegal to impart this knowledge to a Śūdra. In VSŚB 1.3.34-38 Śaṅkara sees the central issue in this story and the Satyakama Jābāla

²³Hopkins, The Mutual Relations of the Four Castes, pp. 54, 105, 104, 103 respectively. This is a study of the Laws of Manu.

story to be those qualities which characterize a Brahman such that Brahmins have access to Veda and Śūdras are excluded from it. Similarly Rāmaṇuja sees this as the central issue and quotes severe punishments for Śūdras who transgress prohibitions against hearing Veda. He then takes issue with the Advaita Vedāntins precisely because he believes their doctrine will lead to the breakdown of this exclusive soteriology. The exclusion of non-Brahmins from salvific knowledge through the Veda is taught even more subtly in the following way. Two of the three kings encountered in the ChU are misled or not taught the highest truth which appears to be known by the Brahman they talk with. Yet this is rendered ambiguous by the ChU's image of the absolute despot as the best state of man.

The first case of a king going away from a discussion with a Brahman without having learned what the Brahman considers to be the highest truth is in the story of Raikva and the grandson of Janaśruti whose name means "famous" (ChU 4.1-3). To some extent we have already discussed this in the second chapter where it was noted that the issue which dominates the story and commentators' remarks about it is caste but two interesting things occur during this encounter. The first will become more important as the Upaniṣad proceeds. It consists of the significance attached to Raikva's arrogance, i.e., the behavior proper to one upon whom all else is dependent. The second is the way in which Raikva

conceals the highest truth from Jānaśruti which concealing can be observed by the reader but not by Jānaśruti and which concealing is done in the same way as in ChU 8 with respect to the demons. Śaṅkara is very aware of Raikva's behavior. For example he points out Raikva's use of the word, āre ("fellow"), which Śvetaketu will later use to refer to Pravāhana Jaivali, and which is a term of disdain. This behavior is however prefigured in the discourse of the two flamingoes which causes Jānaśruti to seek out Raikva. One flamingo, "who finds his [the other's] arrogance unpardonable",²⁴ taunts the other by pointing out the superior condition of Jānaśruti. The arrogant flamingo says scornfully and within earshot of Jānaśruti, who is really a good king, that Jānaśruti is nothing compared to Raikva who, as we will find out, is not so magnificent to look at. The arrogant flamingo proves to be correct as the story turns out and his arrogance is justified while the other flamingo's mockery is not.

When Jānaśruti and Raikva meet, Raikva has nothing but contempt for Jānaśruti and for Jānaśruti's servant. Śaṅkara in no way condemns Raikva's manner but justifies it as a sign of

²⁴ Jha, ChU, p. 177, Commentary on 4.1.2.

Raikva's supernatural powers and justifiable anger at the king's insufficient respect. He also introduces the story by saying that this is an example of proper teacher pupil relations and the method of producing a proper state of humility.

Raikva eventually teaches by means of an anecdote and the dependent ordering of elements, that Virāt, the Eater of Food, is the essence of everything. Jānaśruti presumably asks no questions. The reader knows from ChU 1.13 that Virāt is the same as Vāk or sacred speech which is Veda. Jānaśruti has no such knowledge and one can only presume that he is left with the simple impression of a deity. The text does not say that he understood even this as it does for Śvetaketu in ChU 6.7.6 and 6.16.3, nor does it say anything to the effect that he was shown beyond darkness as in 7.26.2 it is said of Nārada. Jānaśruti is looking for a deity and so is given one, but he is not given an understanding of the self.

This misinterpretation through the absence of questions is what happens to Virochana in ChU 8.8.3-4. Jānaśruti, it seems, deserves this misinterpretation because he envies Raikva and seeks to become greater than him (which is why according to Śaṅkara he is in a state of sorrow), because he is niggardly in gifts, and because the servant he sends to find Raikva is the result of intercourse with a Śūdra. At the same time Raikva assumes that the king has nothing to teach him and so remains fundamentally

ignorant about transmigration and the social system. He knows only that he is the best of creatures.

Raikva's attitude next appears in Śvetaketu who is the ideal student. Śvetaketu is driven by two things: pride in his caste and pride in his knowledge of the Veda. The first time this appears in Śvetaketu's life is in ChU 6, the second time in ChU 5. The two are brought together by his father who insists that he not be a brahman in name only. Pride in caste thus serves coming to know Veda which as the essence of man's activity hence determines the propriety of caste. Like Raikva, Śvetaketu's caste pride is deeply hurt by the lack of respect of a lower caste. This is the essence of his dislike of Pravāhana Jaivali to whom he refers as "that fellow of a Kṣatriya" (ChU 5.3.5). Śaṅkara justifies this dislike by saying that Pravāhana is "ill-behaved"²⁵, apparently because Pravāhana tries to make Śvetaketu seem ignorant. Śvetaketu doesn't attempt to teach Pravāhana the final nature of things and is never asked to. But this is proper because just as Pravāhana notes that some things are only to be known by ksatriyas so some things are only to be known by brahmans. The king, it seems, is unjustified in trying to diminish

²⁵ Jha, ChU, p. 238, Commentary on 5.3.6.

Śvetaketu's arrogance which is in fact proper to him.

Understanding what is proper to a particular caste is crucial in understanding when proper humility and proper arrogance or pride is present. Whereas Jānaśruti is considered insufficiently humble when he gives half his kingdom and his daughter away, the group of brahmins who approach a king in ChU 5.11 are humble enough just by having approached him as a teacher and by having brought fuel. A large part of learning is ruled by pride. A teacher will only teach those who show him respect while a pupil is very much driven by the wish for this same respect. It is ignorance which humbles the proud and it is knowledge which finally determines the respective status of men. The desirability of attaining the highest status is repeated indirectly in ChU 5.19-23 when "brahmic glory" is listed frequently each time as a very desirable result. "Brahmic glory" (brahmavarcaśī) is defined in two different places by Śaṅkara as "glory that comes from the complete mastery of the Veda" and "glory due to the proper accomplishment of character and learning".²⁶ It is desire for this which is a proper motivation for Śvetaketu but not for Jānaśruti.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 145, Commentary on 3.13.3, and p. 286, Commentary on 5.19.2.

This proud, caste-conscious, character of Śvetaketu was hence by no means either an incidental or a negative character but one proper to a potential knower of brahman. It is preserved in the retelling of the story of Śvetaketu in two Buddhist Jātaka tales: No. 377, Setaketu-Jātaka, and No. 487, Uddālaka Jātaka. In both tales the main character recites the same speeches and is moved by the same things. Setaketu is a proud Brahmin who is disgraced by a Candāla who proves he is ignorant. He then tries to obtain favors from a king by acting like a great ascetic. He is exposed by a priest which exposure causes him to doubt the validity of Veda study. The priest assures him that studying the Veda is fine but proper conduct is more important whereupon Setaketu and his ascetic friends become the king's soldiers. Uddālaka, according to the Jātaka tale, is the illegitimate offspring of a brahman and a śūdra. He tries to obtain favors from a king and the story is the same as with Setaketu. In both cases the impropriety of the caste relations merely reflect the importance of caste to those involved. It is this importance which drives them to know what is true. What they come to know in no way negates anything taught in the ChU. The conclusion of the Setaketu Jātaka could as easily be from the BG or ChU.

Nay Vedas are not useless utterly:
 Though works with self-restraint true
 doctrine is
 Study of Vedas lifts man's name on high
 But 'tis by conduct that he reaches Bliss.²⁷

As Hopkins points out²⁸ and as ChU 5 & 6 repeat over and over this

²⁷ Cowell, editor, The Jātaka, Vol. 3, p. 155.

²⁸ Cf. Appendix I, p. 285. Hopkins, pp. 106-107, emphasizes the degree to which Brahmanical origin was not sufficient to gain respect but depended on the conduct of the person. This supports our statements. He goes further however and implies contrary to what we have claimed that it is not proper to consider the different castes as different as species are different with the proviso that species are not considered as different from each other as in much of Western thought. We would begin a reply by pointing out that Hopkins is here only considering the four castes as comprising "man".

Similarly the absence of difference among men (as well as among all species) which is solely the preserve of the most wise, a position never presumed by the ignorant, is taught by the Uddālaka Jātaka using the same examples as the ChU.

Even so, when men are purified, so is it here on earth: The good perceive that they are saints and never ask their birth, (Uddālaka Jātaka in Cowell, The Jātaka, Vol. 4, p. 191. Therefore, if one knowing this were to offer the remnant of his food to a Candāla, it would be offering to his Vaiśvanara-Self. (ChU 5.24.4).

One who thus knows these Five Fires, -- even though he associates with those, -- does not become contaminated by sin. (ChU 5.10.10)

is the constant theme of brahmanical thought. One must not simply be able to recite the Vedas, one must come to know that which causes one "to abandon action". Śvetaketu understands this from the example of the thief.

The primary difference between the Jātaka tales and the ChU is that where the one who knows the highest good becomes a king in the ChU and learns it through other sages who are not kings, in the Jātaka tales the king is the teacher and whoever knows the highest good enters the service of the king. But even here it is the king's priest who causes the knowledge to occur and the king, who has been deceived about Setaketu and Uddālaka is also enlightened by the priest (who is actually the Buddha in a previous birth). Even here, in other words, the king is subordinate to the brahmin and the real ruler is the priest.²⁹

²⁹The point here is not that there is no difference between Buddhism and Vedānta. The purpose of these examples is to show that our assertion of the importance of Śvetaketu's character as an archetype and our interpretation of this character was widely held. When this famous character was adopted by Buddhist story telling his characteristics which we assert are central to him were kept completely intact and are seen to have the same positive functions. The differences between ideologies are fairly irrelevant in this context. The critique of asceticism is implicit in all versions. The uncritical assumption of caste distinctions is clear in both cases. The value of being driven by caste pride is clear in both cases. And the conclusion of being associated with the king is also the same.

The account of Uddālaka's birth and naming in the Jātaka tale is remarkably like the account of Satyakāma Jābāla in the ChU. They both have the same dubious parentage and desire for knowledge. This dubious parentage illustrates the same virtue that is taught to Śvetaketu by Uddālaka in ChU 6.1: the central determinant of true brahmanhood is satya which is ultimately obtained by knowing the true meaning of the Veda. This educational virtue makes a comparison between Satyakāma and Śvetaketu, both inheritors of Uddālaka's knowledge, inherent to the text and helps explain why the Uddālaka of the Jātaka tale combines their characters. It is the degree of proper virtues which forms the substance of comparison of the various pupils and this virtue is determined by its affinity to the highest knowledge, as in the obvious case

One would entirely miss the point of the stories if one were to consider them simply as attacks on caste consciousness. Amusement at someone else's awkward and uncomfortable position can as easily reinforce these concepts of comfort and propriety as undermine them. This is admirably put by H. Luders, whom we have followed, in his essay "Setaketu". There he shows that the Śvetaketu of the ChU is the same as the Setaketu and Uddālaka of the Jātaka tales. He supports this through references to other discussions of Śvetaketu's character as well as through certain linguistic considerations. He concludes that these tales are not Buddhist attacks on Hinduism but, on the contrary, "Mir scheint es unverkennbar, dass Brahmanen und Buddhisten hier auf gemeinsamem Boden stehen." (p. 360).

of Indra and Virocana. A comparison of characters is in essence a determination of species for the sake of delimiting a particular species.³⁰ Hence we read Satyakāma Jābāla as a foil to Śvetaketu, the archetype of the species for whom the highest knowledge is appropriate. Similarly the kings are an extreme example in difference in types in the ChU which extremity is exaggerated in the Setaketu Jātaka by having a Caṇḍāla take the place of Pravāhana Jaivali.

The image of absolute independence as that of the king is constantly referred to throughout the ChU and throughout Śaṅkara's

³⁰It is because of this that the name of a person becomes very important in the tradition. Datta explains this as follows (The Six Ways of Knowing, p. 285):

A proper name stands for the ideal synthesis of the various stages and phases of the substantive. As such it connotes a universal concept, namely the essential characteristics common to the various states of the substantive. In the words of the great author of the Sarvadarśana-saṃgrah, "The universal (jāti) connoted by a proper name (saṃjñā) like Devadatta is proved on the basis of the knowledge of his identity (as, 'it is he'), from his birth till his death, through all the changing stages of childhood, boyhood and youth.'"

commentary on it.³¹ Yet the image of that caste which is in fact kings is one of people who are deceived, simple, and humble in the presence of brahmans. The disparity is extraordinary for the actual political life portrayed by the ChU is one radically subordinate to the social system of caste. In other words the actual political domain is of minor interest because it is essentially determined by the social-salvific vision. What so determines it is a vision of rule which is totally despotic. The political domain is legitimate in the case of Indra, Jānaśruti, and Pravāhana because

³¹Commentary on 1.3.5: "...like the serving of the king is more fruitful than the serving of the Minister." Commentary on 1.4.5: rank in a court is based on the degree of intimacy with a king. Also 1.10.6, 1.11, 2.1.2, 2.23.1. 3.13 compares the heart to a city and hence Śaṅkara compares the meditation on the heart to gaining access to the king of the city. (Jha, ChU pp. 143-144). Commentary on 3.19.1 compares the sun with a king to explain how asat is being used figuratively. 4.1.1 mentions what an excellent king Jānaśruti is. 5-6 is a series of stories about kings. 8 is also about kings while 7 concludes with the image of "being one's own king." Śaṅkara refers to kings almost entirely in the context of an analogy between the highest state of man and kingship. On the other hand when the ChU mentions particular kings by name they do not seem to have obtained this highest state. Even when the people prosper under them they are not spoken of as highly as when rule is an analogy for the highest state. That is, having the power and being the despot is of greater consequence than proper temporal rule. The implication seems to be that temporal rule does not have this power possibility. See ChU 8.1.5-6.

their despotism is essentially subordinate to the highest knowledge or the brahmans. The true legitimate ruler, one who is his own king,³² in each case subordinates his inferior or maintains rule. In no case does the political domain become problematic because it finally interferes with salvation or disrupts the proper order of things. In other words actual political rule is inevitably subordinate to the true dependent order and hence unproblematic. Actual caste order is properly a product of the true dependent order found in Śruti.

It is in this context that the contrast between Satyakāma and Śvetaketu is important. The reader must ask himself what is the cause of or criterion for Satyakāma never receiving that explanation of the end of Vedic knowledge which Śvetaketu receives?

Satyakāma does know some of the things that Śvetaketu knows word for word. But his teaching follows similarly the exact pattern of his own learning experience. Hence there is good reason to believe that what he teaches does not have the same understanding in it as what is taught in ChU 6. If it did it would follow the same pattern of learning or at least contain exactly the same words imparted

³²"...he becomes the 'Self-sovereign' (or King of Heaven) he becomes free to do what he pleases, in all regions; while those that know otherwise than this are ruled by others, and live in perishable regions. . . ." (Jha, ChU, p. 407, 7.25.2).

by Uddālaka. Nonetheless there is much that the two pupils know in common. They both have an unflinching desire for satya. They are both taught that knowledge learned from a teacher is best. Satyakāma, like Śvetaketu, knows things as having 16 parts (ChU 4.5-8) and in both cases caste is a central problem. The difference in what is finally known is very subtle. Śvetaketu understands the identity between the personal pronoun and the demonstrative pronoun. Satyakāma teaches something which overcomes the knowledge that "this is thus" (etam evam) in ChU 4.5-13. This teaching however is only about the nature of "this" it is fundamentally still an etam evam teaching. Thus the fruit of this knowledge is a qualified absence of return to rebirth. (ChU 4.15.5)

In both Śvetaketu's interaction with Pravāhana and with Uddālaka his pride in his learning and in being a brahman seems to cause his audience to give him further knowledge. Once Śvetaketu is aware that there is something he doesn't know he pursues it until it is understood. This pursuit we have elsewhere noted is central to the nature of things. It is this desire to understand which distinguishes him from Nārada and likens him to Indra and it is his pride which likens him to Raikva and enables him to carry on his pursuit. Satyakāma cannot afford such pride for he doesn't know if he is a brahman or not. He doesn't have a father who will seek to overcome his pride by fulfilling it. What he seeks is limited by the testing he must undergo (he has to raise a cowherd) and the

humility he must undergo as one who is a complete dependent. Hence Satyakāma is characterized by diverse desires as opposed to pride. As a "natural" brahman he learns everything from "nature" but therein lies the crunch. All along we have asserted that śruti is very distinct from what is available to reason alone. The first explicit hint of this occurs in Pravāhana's speech to Uddālaka. There we are told that the knowledge of transmigration, the duties of brahmins and the traditions behind various words denoting particular things are forms of knowledge dependent on inheritance. While the nature of the student is part of the story in determining his salvation, receiving a full transmission is the other part, one is radically dependent on both. Satyakāma's radical dependency on this or at least his pupil's radical dependency is made apparent by the text.³³ That dependency is only knowable as well as the dependency it reveals to the reader by one's participation in the order of caste and āśrama (the four stages of life). The inclusion of āśrama is

³³My boy, thou appearest as if thou knew Brahman; now who has taught thee? -- He answered -- 'People other than human beings. But I wish that you alone, Revered Sir, should teach me.'

'For I have heard from persons like your Reverence that it is only knowledge learnt from the Teacher that becomes the best.' -- Thereupon the Teacher taught the same thing,..." (Jha, Chu 4.9. 2-3, pp. 197-198.)

necessary in the text for it explains how teachings about detachment can be transmitted prior to becoming detached. This lack of complete understanding necessitates that all that is taught be simply precisely transmitted and memorized.

In the context of indicating why he will teach, Raikva points to the role of āśrama as determinative of transmission. We then notice that earlier in the text ChU 2.23.1 indicated that āśramas determine the point of realization of the meaning of what one teaches at a different point than when one teaches it. Raikva explains that it is only due to desire, his being entranced by Jānaśruti's daughter, and hence his becoming a householder that causes him to teach Jānaśruti. Or as Śaṅkara says in VSŚB 3.4.36, it is only when Raikva is able to enter the āśramas that he transmits the teaching. This means that Raikva is not completely ruled by what his teaching aims at for he is not detached and that it is in such a state of attachment that one teaches or transmits. Therefore Śaṅkara quotes by way of explanation:

The Religious Student, the giver of wealth, the exceptionally intelligent, the Vedic scholar, a person who is dear [priyah], and learning itself, -- these are my six channels, said knowledge.³⁴

³⁴ Jha, ChU, p. 183, Commentary on 4.2.5.

With this in mind it then becomes significant that Uddālaka always refers to Śvetaketu as "priya" whereas no one else is called that in the ChU.

Śaṅkara then indicates that there is a particular condition in which one is to realize what the final meaning of the Veda is and that is the concluding and fourth stage of life of one who has been as one should. He does this in the course of explaining that the meaning of ChU 2.23.1 is a delineation of the four āśramas for the purpose of stating in which one advaita-atma-jñāna (resting in Brahman) occurs. He first asserts that the final meaning of Veda can only be obtained through Veda but this meaning requires the discarding of doing anything more with respect to them or anything else³⁵ i.e., becoming a member of the fourth āśrama. Śaṅkara carefully defines the fourth āśrama as, "Wandering Mendicant, i.e., the Renunciate who has entered upon the final life-stage, and is technically called 'Paramhansa'."³⁶ He then shows that it is only possible in the fourth āśrama that this understanding is possible and concludes:

³⁵ Ibid., p. 107, Commentary on 2.23.1.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 113, Commentary on 2.23.1.

From all this it follows that it is only when on the strength of the Vedantic Texts, one has reached firm conviction regarding Unity, that he reaches the real 'Renunciation of Action' which constitutes the stage of the Wandering Mendicant and that of 'Resting in Brahman'.³⁷

It follows from this that the essence of language is such that when passed on a teaching cannot be fully understood. But language, understood precisely in this way and cleaved to as such, will indicate certain and sufficient things about what it is to be, such that life can be lived properly. Only at this point in life, the end of life of the highest form of life, is the final state of independence reached. Only then does the entire order of life ordered by this doctrine of chanted language fulfill itself and become meaningful. Only then does the truth about language which is received and transmitted unchanged become realized as the end of all movement.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 114, Commentary on 2.23.1. VSRB 3.4.19-20 asserts that it is ChU 2.23.1 and other unmentioned texts which establish the three stages of life. However, Rāmānuja holds contrary to Śaṅkara that the fourth stage of life is not meant here by "Resting in Brahman" which he says is possible in all three stages. Nonetheless he asserts with Bādarāyaṇa that, "...it is thus a settled conclusion that the texts discussed, although primarily concerned with other topics, must at the same time be viewed as proving the validity of the several conditions of life." (p. 696)

Later in discussing the meaning of the last statement in the ChU he says, "...worship consists in daily repeated meditation on Him, assisted by the performance of all the practices prescribed for each caste and āśrama...."(VSRB 4.4.22, p. 770).

VI

CONCLUSION

1. Summary of the Doctrine of Chanted Language in the ChU

Our inquiry into the Chāndogya Upaniṣad's explanation of chanted language began with two problems. One was to see if there were reasons given in the ChU for using language ritualistically and the other was to explain the Chāndogya Upaniṣad as best we could. The ChU was chosen because of its importance to the Hindu tradition and because so much of it is obviously devoted to chanted language. The two questions were further related because we observed that very explicit aspects of the ChU's treatment of language, such as etymology, were singled out for disparagement by those who at the same time thought the ChU to be incoherent. It seemed to us that perhaps it was on the issue of language that the coherency of the ChU turned.

Before turning to the ChU, which has been brought to Western readers and explained to them by those who were very critical of it, it was necessary to discover as far as possible the foundations of this scholarship. Making these foundations explicit would enable us to see more clearly what assumptions were central to the ChU as well as to the criticism of it. Accordingly we looked closely

at 19th century comparative linguistics, and followed it briefly into the present. We discovered that the central assumption of this linguistics was that meaning, thought and language changes throughout history, and that this belief in the omnipotence of history in determining or unfolding the meaning of all things dominated the efforts of these linguists. An etymology, for example, explains the meaning of a word by demonstrating how a particular word has been altered over the years and clarifying what meaning its various historical forms have had. This belief in the historicity of meaning is not asserted by the ChU with respect to the particular case of etymology and is contradicted by the Orthodox Hindu tradition's assertion that truth about the most important things was eternal and present for all time in the Veda. It therefore seemed to us that the eternal revelation which the orthodox Hindu tradition claimed the ChU to be was what had to be assumed in order to understand the ChU on its own terms.

The assumption that the ChU is eternal is precisely what most modern Western discussions of the ChU argue against. Their claim is that one can perceive the historicity of the ChU in its incoherency. How can one ignore the fragments in the ChU and the historical character of the ChU, they ask. Our reply to this was that the ChU did not ignore this historical problem. In fact the question of the meaningfulness of history had provided a self-conscious stylistic

device for ordering the Upanisad around a critical problem: how does one protect and transmit the most sacred truths? This in turn enabled us to understand the ChU as arguing strongly for a particular social order and an esoteric and highly ritualistic form of language. This form of language is one in which speech can only carry the truth from generation to generation if it is precisely and exactly repeated in each transmission. Truth for all time is hence that which characterizes ritualized, repetitive language.

As the ChU considers the forms of this repetitive language it points out some things which characterize it: multiplicity, desire, and the dependency of things. That words can be repeated, can be divided into parts and that the demonstrative pronoun can be used to refer to anything exposes the countability of things and hence their essential sameness. But how can things be the same?

The ChU points out that desire is inherent to multiplicity. All human action proceeds from desire. The most essential human action is speech which in its truest form implies multiplicity, and so desire is always with respect to multiplicity.

Through the ChU's extensive analysis of desire we see that desire implies dependency on that desired. Just as all things can be counted, so all things are dependent and can be ordered according to what depends upon them and what they are dependent upon. To understand all things not as independent and discrete beings but

as characterized by dependency and deriving their very identity from this dependency became the burden of much of the remainder of the thesis.

2. Reason, Revelation and the Anti-historical Arguments of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad

Reasoning is founded upon the Veda according to Śaṅkara.¹ Reasoning has learned its premises from what could not be determined by man alone. What man needs in order to live must finally be attributed to what he has derived from these texts. The ChU must finally be regarded as the working out of particular premises the truth of which is not subject to what can be determined by reasoning. Two reasons for this are given by Śaṅkara: 1) the cause of the world is not something which is obvious, and 2) therefore our opinions about it will fluctuate.

The true nature of the cause of the world on which final emancipation depends cannot, on account of its excessive abstruseness, even be thought of without the help of the holy texts; for, as already remarked, it cannot become the object of perception, because it

¹VŚB 2.1.6.

does not possess qualities such as form and the like, and as it is devoid of characteristic signs it does not lend itself to inference and the other means of right knowledge.

.....
Now, it is clear that in the case of perfect knowledge a mutual conflict of men's opinions is impossible. But that cognitions founded on reasoning do conflict is generally known; for we continually observe that what one logician endeavours to establish as perfect knowledge is demolished by another, who, in his turn, is treated alike by a third. How therefore can knowledge, which is founded on reasoning, and whose object is not something permanently uniform, be perfect knowledge?²

Reasons lacks certainty wherever it cannot prove its demonstrations by presenting things which are perceivable, hence assertions about things unperceived will always change. Among these unperceived things are the foundations of reason; that is, the criteria of true assertions and conclusions.

Reason is always with respect to things. It is instrumental. Hence its laws if universally applicable must be founded on what is universally the case. But Śaṅkara subtly reveals through the Pūrvapakṣin's discussion that it is man's historical condition which makes reason subordinate to revelation. "Men act," he says, "on the assumption that the past, the present, and the future are

²Thibaut, VSŚB 2.1.11, Vol. I, p. 316. Cf. Thibaut, VSRB 2.1.11-12, pp. 425-426, Rāmaṇuja is in essential agreement.

uniform."³ He then has the Siddhanta say that it is this perfect uniformity which is the criterion of truth. Both reason and revelation must accept this in order to have validity but only revelation can take advantage of the fact. For only a speech from that which is uniform throughout time can assure us that this uniformity is the case.

Other sacred texts also whose purport it is to intimate the unity of the Self are to be quoted here, in accordance with the 'and others' of the Sūtra. Such texts are, 'In that all this has its Self; it is the True, it is the Self, thou art that' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 7) . . . On any other assumption it would not be possible to maintain that by the knowledge of one thing everything becomes known (as the text quoted above declares).⁴

³Thibaut, VSŚB 2.1.11, Vol. I, p. 315.

⁴Ibid., 2.1.14, Vol. I, p. 321.

In place of tautology the Vedanta uses a method unique in Indian philosophy: namely, the method known as non-contradictoriness (abādhitatva). Specifically, the Vedanta emphasizes truth as the absence of contradiction (satyatvam bādharāhityam).

As does Barth, the Vedanta finds an archimedean point outside reason from which to move, criticize, control, or even reject reason. Barth finds it in the Word of God and the Vedanta finds it in the Veda (Sruti).

-- J.G. Arapura, "Language and Knowledge: A Vedantic Examination of a Barthian Issue", p. 162.

The speech of the ChU is uniquely immune to being reasoned about as to its truth, whether the reasoning is on the basis of its historical origin (i.e., who wrote the Veda) or whether what it states is the case, for both things require the assumption of uniformity. Śaṅkara's arguments for the eternality of the Vedas (VSŚB 1.3.30) can afford to be somewhat brief for they are outgrowths of this central premise. The only other possible foundation for reason must come from a different revelation which, if it is to prove it is not derivative of this revelation, must not contain this premise. The absence of the premise that things are in some sense uniform throughout time is unimaginable to a human being because we cannot imagine a potentiality other than our own just as we cannot imagine a sixth sense.⁵ Therefore if someone were to assert a foundation for reason other than this, he would constitute a different species altogether. Thus truth in a very important sense is determinative of one's species. Truth is one's being. But because it requires revelation to be known, one's being or species is seen to be determined in the Veda.

The crucial element in this assertion of the preeminence of

⁵Thibaut, VSŚB 1.3.30, Vol. I, p. 215.

śruti over reason is the uniformity in time of the truths in scripture. That is, the assertion is not that time is real and as such exists separated from or adjunct to what is non-temporal. The uniformity asserted by scripture is precisely within the temporal framework and hence not only are different things ontologically uniform but there are no new contingencies or developments or events in time. There is no "news". This is the foundation for then asserting that even time has no meaning or is ontologically unreal.

The meaning of words therefore is not historically conditioned but absolute, existing throughout time with reference at all times to the self-same species. The word is either in a corrupt or in an uncorrupt state which can be judged by its proper use in śruti. There can be no "original" meaning of a word and a subsequent development of that meaning, for example, into its opposite which then illustrates either a change in thought about things (if the word can be shown to have been applied to the same circumstances), or the problems in interpreting what exactly an author in the midst of this transition is doing (viz. referring back, referring forward, effecting a change, or abiding by others' changing of meanings).

Aside from this anti-historical argument of the uniformity of things in time and the consequent identity of linguistic meaning

through time, we should note three other major teachings of the ChU which contradict the educational or truth value of chronology. One, which we have explored in detail, is the manner in which the order of the text runs with an obvious disregard to the historical order of the actual acquisition of the teachings. While the text runs in a carefully connected manner from point to point which Śāṅkara shows, it establishes in a random manner the connection of Śvetaketu to the teachings, and historically the teachings occur almost in reverse order to the manner in which the text thinks it is best for the reader to learn them. This is something which is not dependent for acknowledgement on modern scholarship but was part of the obvious teaching of the text to its oldest readers and is coherent with the meaning of the text.

The second aspect of the text running against an historical conception is the existence in it of two creation accounts; one in explanation of the doctrine that the sun is Brahman (ChU 3.19.1) and the other in explanation of "that through which the unknown becomes known" (ChU 6.2.1). The two accounts follow each other logically as the second explicitly explains the true meaning of the first. The second account is acquainted with the first account, but the explanation proceeds by showing what would be contradictory about one particular interpretation of the first account. In neither case does this account of the beginning of

things see any pedantic value to placing itself either at the beginning of the text or at the heart of the teaching. Knowing how things come to be is neither the first order of business for the student nor the most important order of things. The order of creation is then an order consistent with events which happen everyday such as perspiring and growing food. Third, creation is not related in such a way that the reader has any historical connection with this moment of creation.⁶ This continues more clearly in the doctrine of transmigration which by asserting a justice which is set for all time recognizes no historical change of species or circumstances and allows the individual to exit from and reenter the historical stream at different disconnected points. In short, nothing is to be learned from the chronological succession of events except their meaninglessness and irrelevance for the most important things.

3. Etymology

We begin to see then that an historical etymology has no

⁶"Eternity and superhuman origin imply sanctity and supreme authority; the orthodox hold that nothing is cited in the Veda from history. For other particulars: J. Muir, *Original Sanskrit texts*, III, London 1873, p. 321 (Index, s.v.); R.N. Dandekar, in *Univ. of Ceylon Review* 11 (1953), p. 135." -- J. Gonda, Vedic Literature, p. 7.

consequence not because the Veda was believed to have escaped the ravages of time (for the ravages of time, or better, of those who are not good pupils, are part of the teaching against history) but because history and the historical world was ontologically meaningless. Reasoning alone doesn't have the power to discover what is most important for men. If the Veda had appeared after men existed while at the same time "The true nature of the cause of the world on which final emancipation depends cannot, on account of its excessive abstruseness, even be thought of without the help of the holy texts"⁷ then instead of man having a place equal to that of all other elements in the world, that is, justly determined, he would be the subject of a positively antagonistic order. Śruti has been given by Prajāpati to men, however, from the very beginning when Manu received it. Etymology in the ChU, then, has to be grasped within this understanding of śruti and as part of the complete vision of the text.

The primary units of speech are those units knowing which the meaning of the speech can be ascertained. Each such unit hence has meaning which can be recognized and hence is a species. These

⁷Ibid., 2.1.1, Vol. I, p. 316.

primary units are the letters or considered differently the syllables. Just as the letters are the foundations of meaning they are also the foundation of obfuscation in the ritual.

It is for this reason that we claim that the central fact of etymology in the ChU is its role in ritual. It is the meter which reveals the counting of language and its fulfillment. From this we could see that the possibility of designating each thing by tat does for all things what the analysis of language does for letters. Śaṅkara implies this when he refuses to separate the actually occurring sounds of a word from its meaning.⁸ At this very point the question arises for him of how there can be unity in multiplicity. The units of language are hence of the highest import when seen in their potential for subordination to number. For it is this very uniformity between different things which permits any etymology.

Each syllabic unit has the potential for denoting the numericality of things and hence a word can truly determine a numerical pattern through which other things can be grasped and the numericality of the word be made present. This is made explicit in ChU 2.10. Thus "sāma" determines a division by twos (ChU 1.6.1-1.7.4) while

⁸"The hypothesis of him who maintains that the letters are the word may therefore be finally formulated as follows. The letters of which a word consists -- assisted by a certain order and number -- have, through traditional use, entered into a connexion with a definite sense." -- Thibaut, VSŚB 1.3.28, p. 210.

"udgītha" determines a division by threes (ChU 1.3.6-7). Because a syllable's having meaning was guaranteed by its existence in the Veda, it became the interpreter's task to discover it or realize it. The text, however, teaches the multiplicity present in the word by pointing out the meaning of the parts just as the differentiation of the world is understood in terms of its "thusness". Hence the stobha syllables' meanings are stated in ChU 1.13 and the deities of particular classes of letters are stated in ChU 2.22.3-5.

A third etymological usage more customary to us was prepared for by the preceding less customary but more important usages. This was the use by interpreters of the analysis of an ordinary word to understand what it means or why it is used in an unusual situation or to explain a pun as in the case of "śudra" (ChU 4.2). But this was a heavily circumscribed interpretive device used only as a last resort and heavily determined by the possibilities of the context. Thus Śabara carefully places interpretation by "name" i.e., etymology, at the end of his list of interpretive devices.

Among 'Direct Assertion', 'Indicative Power', 'Syntactical Connection', 'Context', 'Place' and 'Name', -- that which follows is weaker than that which precedes; -- because it is more remote from the final objective.⁹

⁹ ŚB 3.3.7.14, Vol. I, pp. 449-464.

When the meaning is already known and the purpose of etymology is to understand the rules of grammar then one can pursue the essential function of etymology which is to reduce words to their roots.¹⁰ This is discussed in detail in Yaska's Nirukta which is not only the oldest known work on the roots of words but at the same time forms the oldest extant commentary on the Veda. Obviously a word by itself was never explained by an etymology for there was no pursuit of the final reasons for things undetermined by revelation. Etymology was finally then a limited form of explanation within a particular body of literature.

The first two "etymological usages" we have mentioned are by no means centrally concerned with root derivation. To ascribe an historical purpose to them is clearly out of place. To see them as a foundational analytic discussion requires seeing them in terms of the theoretical purposes of this foundation. The modern critique of ChU etymology in the last analysis only betrays how the text is being appropriated and what must be missed in such an appropriation.

¹⁰ Sarup, The Nighantu & The Nirukta 1.15 and 2.7, pp. 15 and 26 respectively.

4. Upāsana

The ChU appears to us as a collection of revelations or specific teachings about the meaning of things. But the collection itself is śruti and, hence, what it does as a whole is also, according to tradition, revelation. The entirety of the text explains why reason cannot come to a final decision between various teachings and why there should necessarily be various teachings. The hierarchy of dependency dictates that there will be a variety of different teachings corresponding to different types of people.

The word which corresponds to "teaching" here is "upāsana". We have taken it as involving some kind of thoughtful explanation as opposed to an irrational equation of two things or meditation on the fanciful similarities of two things. This manner of considering upāsana we have shown serves us well by permitting a train of thought to envelop more than one upāsana and a series of upāsanas to develop particular ideas.

Such an understanding of upāsana was developed by Senart in an incisive essay, "Upās-Upaniṣad" about which Renou says: "on sait depuis Senart que les expressions upās -- et upaniṣad sont synonymiques".¹¹ Hume, Deussen, and Bothlingk's understanding of

¹¹Renou, "Remarques sur la Chāndogya-Upaniṣad", p. 95.

upāsana, and hence of the related verb upās and noun upanisad, was that it primarily implied to honor, adore, worship or revere something. Several things indicate however that this is an unacceptable rendering. In some cases the context forces these scholars to render "upās" by "believe". In other cases the commentators themselves give explanations and synonyms for upās such as jñā,¹² dhyai etc. which do not imply worship as much as understanding. Even the texts use parallel phrasing to clarify the meaning of upās, one of the most common being vid e.g., in ChU 1.9.3-4.

Senart considers the use of upās in the ChU in detail to prove his point. He notes that the translation of upās as "revere" results in some extraordinarily meaningless statements such as that one should "worship an opinion" (as distinct from "knowing what is true") as in the case of ChU 2.21.4. "Revere" is not able to account for the presence of explanations and reasons which are called for when upās indicates instruction or teaching. Senart concludes that upās has the sense of knowing, understanding or believing (savoir, connaître, croire) but not of worshipping

¹²See Śaṅkara's "Introduction" where the difference between upāsana and jñāna is discussed at length and the two are in fact seen to be quite similar.

(adorer).¹³ Thus, far from prescribing a particular form of worship, an upāsana represents a teaching (enseignement).¹⁴ While "upanisad" has the primary sense of "understanding" or "doctrine" ("connaissance, doctrine").

To maintain that the upāsanas are hierarchically ordered, we have seen throughout this thesis, then, is a critical part of the teaching. The foundations of hierarchy, however, then become a more central problem both in the establishing of a ritualistic view of language and of society. This the text does by showing that a true understanding of desire leads necessarily to the foundation of dependency in the highest development of men's potential which potential is latent in all things. Thereby, it is possible to show that a variety of teachings can be hierarchically ordered due to being about the same thing or that there can be a multiplicity of "truths" and yet finally only one truth. The different potentials of

¹³"De l'aperçu qui précède, il ressort que des cas, nombreux on le voit, où la Chāndogya upaniṣad ramène le verbe upās, la grosse majorité réclame impérieusement le sens de 'connaître, croire, savoir d'une science intime et certaine'." Senart, "Upās-Upaniṣad", p. 531.

¹⁴"IV, 5, 3; 6, 4; 8, 4, le Taureau, Agni, etc., promettent à Satyakāma un enseignement, une révélation (bravāṇi) sur le pied de brahman, impliquant une fois de plus pour upās le seul sens de 'connaître'."-- Ibid., p. 579.

being in its manifestation as different orders of types of men exist at all times in history and hence make a present consensus according to reason or a developing historical consensus according to reason ontologically impossible. Men require these differences in being to understand their dependency. The hierarchy of dependency as a temporal event negates the possibility of consensus as a criterion of truth and leaves only what is revealed and inherited. Thus the ChU is finally able to ritualize or comprehend within ritualization the educational process.

5. Epilogue

We have attempted two things in this thesis. One was to present in detail what the ChU's vision of an order based on dependency means. The other was to provide a detailed exegesis of this text with respect to the problems encountered in reading it in that part of the world which is historicist. The order based on dependency in the ChU is based on a profound consideration of language and the totality of its uses in religion, society and thought. If we reject its account we cannot do so simply on the basis of the progress of the sciences nor on the basis of feeling historical for the ChU has considered these problems.

Much that seems to be the case with the ChU is still uncertain with respect to the tradition as a whole. It may be that a broader

consideration of the Hindu tradition would establish a different sense of proportion and alter the significance of some of the things we believe are present. The subtlety of the drama around Raikva and the foreignness of the central concept of trial by ordeal should be warning enough that we are dealing with very difficult questions where the slightest nuance may indicate an enormous difference in meaning. It would be of some interest for example to determine the function of other genealogies in other texts. A thorough knowledge of the legendary status of many of the characters in the ChU might give us a clearer idea of their dramatic function. The extent to which we have been able to describe desire is clearly circumscribed by the texts concerned and merely suggests the value of a more careful and painstaking determination of its meaning throughout a much larger collection of relevant and important texts while at the same time clarifying what such a concept means in the West. Finally, of course, our study has never pretended to be more than a preliminary stage setting for the difficult and very serious differences between the various ācāryas and their schools. We would be content if the context in which their disagreements take place and become meaningful was made any clearer.

APPENDIX

Śaṅkara's Introduction to the Chāndogya Upaniṣad with Ānandagiri's Tīkā¹

Śaṅkara -- This is the Chāndogya Upaniṣad which has eight parts and begins thus: "This syllable is 'om'." This little treatise explains that [Upaniṣad] simply and concisely for those desiring to understand its meaning.

Ānandagiri -- Reverence to Hari, the highest self whose body is highest bliss, who is the cause of the annihilation of bondage which is the connection with things beginning with birth.

Reverence to the teacher, who is clever in destroying the stream of darkness of the opponents and who, like the sun who brings forth the lotus, brings forth the meaning of the collection of the end of the three Vedas [i.e., the Upaniṣads]. The revered commentator, who is desirous of explaining this particular Upaniṣad of the Chandogas shows the essence of that which is to be explained. He has performed an initial incantation which is characterized by the utterance of "om". This is to achieve the destruction of many difficulties and obstacles

¹Translated from Agase and Apte, ed., Chāndogyopanīṣat, (Poona: Anandasrama, 1934) under the guidance of Mr. K. Venugopaliṅ of Deccan College and Dr. P. L. Bhargava formerly of McMaster University.

and to achieve the successful completion of the treatise which he wished to write. Therefore he says, "This...is 'om'."

[Śaṅkara] promises that his commentary has a purpose. Therefore he says, "This little treatise...".

Is it not the case that this Upaniṣad has been explained in detail in many places in the Śārīraka Bhāṣya? Why then is this commentary now begun? In reply Śaṅkara says that the present commentary is "concise". Even though this Upaniṣad has already been explained in detail, a concise explanation is being written of the Upaniṣad in its entirety because it is more easily understandable by summarizing the content. Moreover the Śārīraka Bhāṣya did not explain the Chāndogya Upaniṣad according to the order of the text, but here it is explained without violating the order of the text. Thus this commentary is warranted he says because it is a running commentary. The meaning of a "running commentary" in the commentary on the present Upaniṣad is clarification of the meaning, which is a "vivaranam" [commentary], according to the order of the text, "rju" [running].

Now the Drāvidabhāṣya has also been written in accordance with the order of the text, so why have this commentary? Śaṅkara replies that his treatise is little. Nevertheless in the absence of one who is particularly qualified [to study it] why is this treatise begun? Śaṅkara replies that it is for those who desire to know the meaning. Thus this commentary was written for those who, having the desire for release from eternal rebirth, wish to know the meaning intended

in the words of this Upaniṣad. Therefore given the existence of one who is particularly qualified, the beginning of this commentary occurs. The incidental result of this is a complete understanding of the meaning of the present Upaniṣad, whereby the supreme result which is freedom from bondage [is obtained].

Śaṅkara -- The connection [between karma khanda, meaning Sāma Veda, Chāndogya Brāhmaṇa, etc., and the text which follows, namely jñāna kanda] is as follows. The sum of ritual action which is explained including the knowledge of the gods beginning with Prāṇa is the cause of reaching Brahman by the path of light. Karma without such explanation is the cause of reaching the region of the moon by the smoky path. It is said that they fall to a lower state of misery who fall from both of these two paths and follow their own inclinations.

Ānandagiri -- However the Upaniṣads are a part of the ritual injunctions [i.e., the Vedas] and those injunctions have been explained. The explanation having been done, the problem is that there is commentary enough on this Upaniṣad. The result of further commentary would be like the result of pounding what has already been pounded.

Śaṅkara thinks that there is an absence of proof for the Upaniṣads being related to the ritual injunction as a part is to the whole. He therefore states that there is a connection between the earlier and later parts of the Veda [i.e., ritual and explanatory parts] which is that of an essential and eternal relation of the posterior to the prior. Therefore he says, "The connection is as follows."

That is, he is mentioning the connection between the ritual instruction and this present Upaniṣad, which he will explain.

As there is a question about what the relation is and he desires to answer it, he states the goal of ritual texts. Thus he says, "The sum...". In the initial texts [those books containing instructions for ritual] prescribed and proscribed actions are made known. The 'prescribed' actions are also divided into accompanied [by viññāna or upāsana] and unaccompanied actions. Thus, accepting these two types of prescribed actions, Śaṅkara explains the fruit of accompanied actions. Hence he says, "Beginning with prāna...". The "special knowledge" of the deities such as Prāna, Agni, and so forth, which means the "upāsanaṁ" of them, when accompanying rites beginning with the agnihotra are the cause of reaching the Brahman which is a product [i.e., Hiranyagarbha who is a product of the ultimate Brahma] by the path of the gods, which path is indicated by light and so forth. But this is not the cause of reaching Brahman itself. That is because the latter Brahman has an absence of the characteristic of being something which is to be attained [i.e., there is no question of reaching or attaining in its case] and because there is the demonstrated truth of this characteristic of the Brahman which is a product in the "Badaryadhi karana" [Vedānta Sūtras 4.3.7-14]. Therefore the meaning of this section is that the enjoined ritual acts accompanied [by upāsana] are not the means for achieving the ultimate goal of man. Then he says in the statement "Karma without..." that there are fruits for those ritual acts which are not accompanied.

Having stated the goal of those duties which are enjoined Śaṅkara states what prohibited acts lead to and hence says "...inclinations." There are those who take pleasure in acting according to their desires being motivated by dependence on instinct and live without the guidance of the Vedic teachings, which means they live according to what is innate. Because of the absence of the knowledge of karma they are not entitled to either the gods' or the fathers' paths. According to the text [ChU 4.15] they acquire the lowest place, the state of being an animal of the small type in which freedom from rebirth is difficult to obtain.

Śaṅkara -- And of the two paths, neither path even has the absolute accomplishment of the goal of man. Therefore the special knowledge of the non-dual self which knowledge is independent of enjoined works is to be spoken of. By means of this speaking there is destruction of the cause of the three types of existence, [i.e., that leading to Brahmaloka, that leading to pitrloka and that leading to being a small animal]. With this purpose the Upaniṣad is begun.

Ānandagiri -- Śaṅkara says, "of the two paths..." with respect to the following belief. The highest goal of man will be accomplished by those who are entitled to either path for the results of the two are known to be eternal and it is said in Smṛti,² "These white and

²BG 8.26. "These white and dark parths of the world are considered to be eternal; by the one a man goes to return not, by the other he returns again."

dark paths of the world are considered to be eternal." To this assertion he says, "neither path...". Now one may think that for those who drop down from the two paths as long as there is the presence of man's purpose that purpose will be achieved just as in any one of the two paths. However, the attainment of man's highest goal is not present even when the means is the path of the gods. This is because of the qualifications "to this" and "in this" in the two following phrases: "There is no return to this creation of Manu." [ChU 4.15.5] and "For those there is no return again in this." [BU 6.2.15-16] as well as the "no return" in Smṛti [BG 8.26], "For such a one there is no return...". Here the reference of "no return" is to this particular cycle because the earlier qualifications of the same phrase would be without purpose if there was no return even to the other kalpas. [As smṛti cannot contradict śruti the qualification of the first two phrases must be implicit in the third phrase.] Neither is the path to the world of the fathers the way to the supreme attainment of the goal of man, for it is known that one drops back from the place of the moon by the statements, "They return again to Samsara." [ChU 4.15.6] and "By the other [i.e., the smoky path] they return again." [BG 8.26]. Therefore there is no attainment of the supreme goal of man because of the influence of enjoined acts [Karma]. That is the meaning.

Thus having restated the results of enjoined acts Śaṅkara speaks of the connection [between enjoined acts and Upaniṣads] by saying,

"Therefore...". As we have said above, since acts are not the means to the highest goal of man, one who is detached from the pre-requisite things for a ritual act, the performance of such acts, and the results of them, and who desires the highest goal of man, should be told the means. The means is knowledge of the self and nothing else. By separating it from enjoined acts which are the cause of the three previously mentioned routes comprising transmigratory existence [samsara] and from the cause of the acts, the means is told. With the intention of stating this the Upaniṣad begins. Indeed one does not obtain the highest aim of man by the performance of enjoined acts because of the vedic statements beginning with, "In this, as in this world..." [ChU 8.1.6] which means that the results of acts are perishable. The commencement of this Upaniṣad has for its object the imparting of knowledge which is the means of salvation for one who is desirous of it and has become detached by having his mind purified as a result of performing good deeds with a spirit of dedication to god. This cause and effect relationship thus described is the connection and that is its meaning.

Śaṅkara -- The highest and unexcelled is not obtained apart from the special knowledge [vijñāna] of the non-dual self. Thus it will be said, "Those who think differently from this are rulers of destructible things" [ChU 7.25.2] while he who thinks the opposite "...is king of himself." [ChU 7.25.2]

Ānandagiri -- One might object: "Because one desires mokṣa one would not proceed to the performance of rites which are prohibited or are for the sake of satisfying one's desires. But wishing to avoid error one should perform those rites which are eternally obligatory and those which are obligatory due to certain special occasions [such as an eclipse]." Thus because of this speech of the elders, self-interested and prohibited rites are not to be done. One who desires release and who continues doing rites which are eternally obligatory and obligatory due to special occasions obtains release effortlessly without knowledge. For there is the absence of an underlying reason for grasping another body again when the present body falls off. Why then is this Upaniṣad begun for the sake of release?

To this Śāṅkara says, "...not...". No, that which has been imagined by you as the means to release is chosen without authority. A personal speech without a basic authority [i.e., vedic statement] is no authority at all. In this matter neither śruti nor smṛti nor perception and so forth [i.e., the means of knowledge] is considered basic. Even one whose conduct is as described acquires another body because of the residue of karma. All karmic residue is never completely exhausted in one birth. "Those whose deeds are good in this world..." [ChU 5.10.7-10]: "That remainder..." [VSŚB 3.1.8 where Śāṅkara also quotes the previous phrase]; and other such statements in śruti and smṛti contradict you. Therefore release is caused only

by knowledge of the self. This is the essence of the matter. A secondary supportive statement beginning with "It will be said..." proves authoritatively that the results of those performing ritual acts, revering the knowledge of difference, and thus ultimately being bereft of the knowledge of the non-dual self are always perishable. The meaning of the word "from this" is that what follows occurs immediately after instruction about the non-dual self. But those who have not approached [an-upas] a teacher and therefore are devoid of instruction, think that the nature of things is merely dual in accordance with their own reason, as opposed to non-dual in accordance with what is stated [i.e., sruti]. Being dependent on something else and performing rites because of their appetites they would be connected with perishable results. This is the sense of the upanisadic passage. Now, because of the knowledge of the non-dual self the supreme goal of man is obtained, and there is a supportive statement, conducive to this, introduced by, "...while he who thinks the opposite ...". "While" indicates that the verb in this latter statement is drawn from a previous place [namely, "It will be said."]. [The statement means that] the wise man, from whom impurity, that is ignorance [avidya] and so forth, is removed by knowledge [vidya] of himself becomes, due to complete self-knowledge, the supreme self, because the cause of the knowledge of difference is completely cut off.

Śaṅkara -- Thus whoever believes in the untrue which has reference to the dual nature of things obtains bondage and the pain of transmigratory

existence. This is like a thief who while holding the heated axe becomes burned and bound [ChU 6.16.1-2]. Similarly whoever believes in the non-dual self which is true, like the man who is not a thief and does not become burned and bound while holding the heated axe, is released and the pain of samsara desists. Hence enjoined acts do not at all exist with the witnessing of the non-dual self.

Anandagiri -- The supreme goal of man is not achieved by those devoted to difference and activity but the goal will be achieved by those devoted to non-duality and who abandon acts. With respect to this Śāṅkara alludes to a supportive statement [shows the distinctive mark of a secondary supportive statement] in the passage beginning with "Thus whoever...". Objects being merely dual according to the śruti passage beginning with "words only..." [ChU 6.1.4], whoever believes i.e., imagines to be true, what is untrue [i.e., not actual or real] is in bondage, is bereft of the rise of the highest happiness, and is in misery which is essentially transmigration. If one who is in fact a thief says, "I am not a thief" while falsely believing such, the contrary becomes evident when he grasps the axe, heated for interrogation and incurs burning, binding, and suffering. This is a similar case to one who is entirely devoted to duality as has been said earlier. Having been called a thief by others, one who is in fact not a thief is not burned, etc., when grasping the heated axe during interrogation. Similarly the absence of duality is indicated when one possesses the imagination of the true ultimate reality in

the inward self. One's mind is turned from duality, danger is destroyed, and thus supreme bliss arises. "Hence" [at the end of Śaṅkara's statement] indicates that what will be said in śruti later on is in accordance with the meaning of what has been said here. Knowledge of the self is by itself the cause of absolute isolation [i.e., mokṣa]. The Upaniṣad is begun for the sake of obtaining this isolation. Thus our side has been made apparent.

Among those closely related to us are those claiming that the Upaniṣad is begun for the sake of the knowledge of the self accompanied by enjoined acts all of which is the means to release. Śaṅkara says against them, "Hence...". With that which is produced, that which is perishable is inseparably present. This supports the śruti statement beginning with "Just as here in this world..." [ChU 8.1.6]. Now because of the realization that the fruits of enjoined acts are not eternal, as was just stated in śruti, while the obtainment of the fruit of knowledge is eternal, "The knower of Brahman gets the supreme..." [Taittiriya Upaniṣad 2.1], therefore it must be acknowledged that enjoined acts and knowledge have fruits which are opposite in essence. To wit, the apprehension of the self which is non-dual, is never able to occur along with action. [For example,] the conjunction of light and darkness, which are opposites, is not possible. Hence this means that the Upaniṣad does not originate for the sake of accompanied knowledge.

Śaṅkara -- The means of destroying the difference between acts, agent, and result is that produced by statements such as, "This being is one alone and non-dual" and "All this is self alone" [ChU 6.2.1]. This is because a proof which annuls them never occurs. But, one may say that the rules of action are such a proof. They are not such because he, having known the disposition of agent and enjoyer and having been blemished by attachment³ and antagonism for the fruits of action which blemish is produced by such knowledge; he has been enjoined to ritual. One might say that because ritual is enjoined on one who has learned the entire meaning of the Vedas, it is also to be performed by one possessed of the knowledge of non-duality. This is not the case because the one, who is entitled to perform an act, hence knowing the agent and enjoyer, has his disposition destroyed by "This one being is non-dual..." and "This self is indeed this..." which are irrefutable. Hence actions are enjoined for those blemished by ignorance and so forth and not for those possessing the knowledge of non-duality. Therefore it is said, "All these obtain good places; but he who is firmly grounded in Brahman obtains immortality." [ChU 2.23.2].

³Anything that concerns one or that one cares for is re-interpreted in terms of possession. That is one identifies oneself with it and is again worried for the sake of oneself and not for the sake of another. Furthermore it must be made clear that knowing that "one is all this" involves a prior radical detachment from the peculiar fortunes of "all this".

Ānandagiri -- Furthermore, the knowledge of the non-dual self needs karma⁴ [rites] either for achieving the obtainment of itself or for the removal [vidhūnana -- shaking off] of factors opposed to it. The former is not the case because this knowledge is not an obtained result. With this in mind Śaṅkara refutes the second alternative beginning with "This is because...". What is implied by "that which is produced" is the knowledge of the non-dual self. Having no contradiction, this does not require assistance for the sake of avoiding contradiction. This is the meaning.

It is objected in the statement "...the rules of action..." that the absence of an authority which annuls does not obtain. That which relates to action, by an authoritative rule which is produced from a rule involving "should" and so forth, contains knowledge of what is to be done. And because that requires the sense of being an agent and so forth within the self it is an authoritative obstacle to the knowledge of the self which is not an agent. This is the meaning of the objection.

He to whom the rules of ritual are addressed is either ignorant

⁴Karma refers to 1) action, particularly that which is prescribed or is a rite, 2) the totality of actions which must occur sooner or later and which potential (latent potential for the production of a future result) has been produced by an act [sanchitakarma], 3) the process of actualizing the potential and therefore of producing fruits [prarabdhakarma]. [Conversation with Mr. Venugopalin].

or enlightened. Śaṅkara speaks with respect to the former with, "...not such...". Whoever possesses false knowledge arising out of nature without dependence on any means of valid knowledge, and whoever possesses the defects of attachment and so forth whose object is the fruit of rituals which is produced by means of false knowledge, for such a one ritual is enjoined. In the absence of attachment and so forth to false knowledge beginning with "I am the doer," it is not possible to enjoin action. "Whatever one who is born does is the physical movement of desire" says smṛti. Therefore, in the case of the ignorant proponent of enjoined acts, the belief in what is false, because it is not valid, does not form an obstacle [to the knowledge of non-duality]. The second objection begins with "one who has learned". One who has learned what is one's own to be learned is qualified to perform the rites of the Veda and the fruit of learning is the knowledge of the meaning. This last phrase is the final view of Mīmāṃsā. Therefore even the knowledge of the self is to be understood as being a part of the ritual by one possessed of learning and who knows the meaning of all of the Veda because of the enjoining of acts beginning with "one should sacrifice...". There is no obstacle to the knowledge of the self because there is no opposition [between enjoined acts and knowledge of the self]. This is the meaning of the objection.

That knowing the meaning is the fruit of learning is not supported by any authority at all while it is well established among

the learned that the fruit is to have obtained the letters. [That is, the result of learning is simply to have memorized the text.] Hence there is no connection due to the injunction to learn the Veda between required rites and the knowledge of the self. In this manner, Śaṅkara's statement beginning with "This is not..." refutes the prior assertions. Śaṅkara says, "one entitled to perform..." with respect to whoever asserts, "This action is mine" and has known that prescribed acts have power. Such a one, having made something his object and having started a rite, has a special thought of the form of "the agent" and so forth. This thought is obtained instinctively without needing any authoritative source. Its removal is effected by that proper knowledge which arises from statements [of the Upaniṣads]. Consequent to this removal even the performance of rites is difficult due to one's dissociation from attachments, etc., to the fruits of results. Hence karma is not applicable to one who knows the self. The final, conclusive result, asserted by "therefore..." is that the tendency to perform rites is essentially opposed to the knowledge of the non-dual self. With "therefore..." Śruti is invoked in support of the assertion that the ignorant is enjoined to ritual but not the knower of the self. "These" means only the members of the three orders of life who are entitled to ritual. You might say that as the student, householder, and forest dweller are all expected to do rites, likewise the knower of Brahman [who belongs to the fourth order] does rites, but then he should not have been mentioned separately.

Due to this separation there is no ritual enjoined for him. Considering this it has been said, "He who is firmly grounded in Brahman...". Śaṅkara -- Thus while this treatise contains the knowledge of non-duality, those upāsanas which are the means to prosperity are spoken of. Also there are upāsanas such as "consisting of the form of mind, having prāṇa as its body..." [ChU 3.14.2] and so forth. These relate to the Brahman which is slightly modified from non-duality as their fruits are very close to the state of being alone [i.e., final deliverance]. There are also upāsanas which are related to parts of a rite and improve the fruits of the rite.

Secrecy is common [to all the upāsanas and self knowledge] and the function of the mind is also common. Just as the knowledge of non-duality is entirely a use of the mind so are the other upāsanas forms of using the mind. Thus upāsanas and the knowledge of non-duality are similar. In that case what is the difference between the knowledge of non-duality and the upāsanas?

It is said that special knowledge of non-duality removes that which is inborn, is erroneously transferred to the non-acting self, [and removes that which] is the special knowledge [viñāna] of the difference between the result, act, and functional factors such as the agent and so forth. As in the case of the rope and so forth ["and so forth" refers to the other standard examples of illusion], which is known by the erroneously transferred sign of a serpent, certainty about its nature as a rope is caused by light. However upāsana, which is established

in the śāstra, is merely the continuous activity of a mind functioning with respect to something taken as the support [that which is ultimately depended upon]. This activity is unbroken by any different ideas. This is the difference.

Ānandagiri -- If the Upaniṣad is begun with the purpose of obtaining absolute aloneness, because of the impossibility of accompaniment [with rites] but by means of the knowledge of the self alone, how can it be that in this Upaniṣad three kinds of upāsanas are set forth? To meet this objection he says "Thus while...". The sense is that where the Upaniṣad has been begun in a particular manner set forth above, i.e., "He who knows the wind as a child of the quarters, doesn't weep over a son" [ChU 3.15.2, i.e., his son doesn't die] and so forth are upāsanas which result in worldly prosperity. The type of reward which is very near to solitude is called the fruit of progressive release [i.e., attainment of the world of Hiranyagarbha]. In this case Brahman, endowed with qualities is changed only a little bit from non-duality which is without manifestation. There are upāsanas such as the udgītha and so forth whose fruits improve rituals, that is they make the fruit of the ritual better. This is the meaning. The reason for setting forth three kinds of upāsana in a treatise concerning self-knowledge is given in the phrase beginning with "secrecy ...". The reason is that the characteristic quality which is to be known from the word "Upaniṣad" [cf. Mundaka and Katha Upaniṣad introductions] is indistinguishable in all the upāsanas as well as

the knowledge about the self. In this same statement Śaṅkara explains by postulating another reason: "The mind functions...etc."

If, as has been said, the common factor between the knowledge of the self and upāsanā is desirable, then should not the distinction according to the results also be given? With this in mind Śaṅkara gives an objection, "In that case...". Śaṅkara shows the distinction according to the result when he replies, "It is said...". He shows first the difference between the knowledge of the self and upāsanā by "that which is inborn...". That which is produced from ignorance is indicated by the word, "inborn", to wit, the special knowledge of the form of the agent and so forth which is superimposed on the innermost self which is devoid of the distinctions of agent, act and fruit and is as changeless as an anvil. The remover of that [avidyā] is knowledge in accordance with the nature of the self which is the substantial ground and which is characterized by non-duality and so forth. This is like the case of false knowledge in the form of placing a snake and so forth upon that place which is a rope and so forth. This false knowledge is abolished by certainty about the place and form of the rope and so forth. This certainty is produced by a cause, namely light, etc. Now Śaṅkara shows the distinction between upāsanā and the knowledge of non-duality by "However an upāsana...". "Authoritative teaching" means something like "One should perform the upāsana, 'mind is Brahman'." "Some support" is intended to show that the support begins with the "mind". One may assert that by performing a series

of identical thoughts one may also contemplate fruitfully with many interruptions. Śaṅkara explains by denying the previous statement with "This activity is unbroken...". He concludes that this is the distinction between the knowledge of the self and upāsanas respectively by saying, "This is the difference."

Śaṅkara -- Precisely those upāsanas are set forth first because by bringing about the purification [the detachment of a being from what it is attached to] of a being the real nature of a thing makes its appearance and thus upāsanas assist the knowledge of non-duality. Also because of their having an objective support upāsanas succeed easily.

Because the repetition of ritual has caused an adherence to it, it is a miserable thing to apply one's mind just to an upāsana, having completely renounced ritual. Hence the upāsana relating to parts of a rite is mentioned in the beginning.

Ānandagiri -- Now let it be said that in the case of the treatise about [non-dual] knowledge, instruction about the upāsanas, as has been said, occurs. However because of the importance of the knowledge let that be said first and the upāsanas being not as important they should be mentioned later.

Thus expecting the objection Śaṅkara replies to this by "Precisely those...". Now, upāsanas, by means of the purification of the mind, are causes of knowledge, like the obligatory rites performed with the idea of dedication to God, and it is well established

that the cause is prior to the effect. Also, performance with objects having a shape is easy for those who are slow. Hence the instructions about the upāsanas occur right at the start of those treatises.

Even then, of all the kinds of upāsana, why is that upāsana which is tied to a part of a rite spoken of first [namely the syllable 'Om']? To that Śaṅkara says "There...". Because ritual action has been firmly impressed on (the mind of) an average person by the unconscious memory of beginningless past actions it is difficult to apply the mind in the case of doing an upāsana by itself which is unrelated to karma which has been renounced but previously was frequently done. Thus the upāsana which is tied to a part of the rite is now spoken of. The meaning is that having spoken thus in the beginning, other upāsanas will have to be progressively mentioned later on.

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