THE EARLY INFLUENCE OF SECOND WAVE PSYCHOLOGY
THE EARLY INFLUENCE OF SECOND WAVE PSYCHOLOGY
ON BRITISH PROSE FICTION

BY

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Abstract

This thesis argues that literary historians and critics have tended to simplify psychological influence on twentieth-century British literature by magnifying Freud's influence and neglecting earlier dynamic psychologies, including those of William James and William McDougall. Similarly, the earliest novelists to explore these "new" psychologies in their fiction have been ignored. An examination of dynamic psychologies in proportion to their impact on writers serves to place Freud's reception in Britain into perspective. The thesis then locates a major source of distortion about this influence in the tenaciousness of the modernists' claim to the "new" and their denigration of the previous generation of writers. Several of these writers actually became most knowledgeable about dynamic psychology and were the earliest to incorporate it into their fiction. Following an assessment of two of them, the Edwardian novelist, May Sinclair, and the Georgian, J.D. Beresford, the thesis shows that one of the most outspoken champions of modernism, Virginia Woolf, drew on similar ideas of pre-Freudian psychology in her earliest fiction. These ideas carry through into her modernist works. The thesis thus represents a methodological hybrid since
it draws on cultural history, biography, psychology, and several genres, in order to rediscover and re-interpret literature both within and outside the canon.
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Table of Contents

Introduction.................................................................1

Chapter One  The "New" Psychology.................................23

Chapter Two  The British Response To Later Second Wave Psychology...............203

Chapter Three  The "New" Psychology and Mrs. Woolf's Edwardians: A Reappraisal........272

Chapter Four  May Sinclair: The Evolution of a Psychological Novelist..............303

Chapter Five  May Sinclair's Psychological Artistry.....348

Chapter Six  A Candidate For Truth: J.D. Beresford's Psychological Quest..............446

Chapter Seven  Virginia Woolf's Response to Second Wave Psychology.................538

Chapter Eight  Further Thoughts on Second Wave Psychology and British Literature....638

Notes.................................................................653

Works Cited...............................................................685
Introduction

Though the influence of psychology on the literature of the early twentieth-century is vast and complex, it has typically been underrated, and has even been ignored, by literary historians and critics alike. This thesis aims to correct that oversight by examining several of those British writers earliest and most affected by these new ideas. The argument stems from my belief in the great importance of psychology for literature and literary studies on every level. For example, an understanding of the psychology of a period or milieu, by which I mean the ways human beings are imaged individually and represented in relation to their fellows, is crucial to an understanding of the literature of that culture. Conversely, the literature of a period may help form the images of the individual, alone or in a group, which are representative for that time and place. Thus the history of psychology is a fundamental component of cultural history.

These opening pages provide an overview of the connections between psychology and literature, which is elaborated in much greater detail in Chapter One. A discussion of the specific aims of the thesis, the critical
The approach taken, the limitations of previous studies, and the contours of the present study follow this overview.

The reciprocal relationship between writers and psychology -- in its broadest, informal sense, derived from insight and a priori assumptions -- has existed for centuries, certainly long before psychology became a distinct branch of study. Philosophers and literary artists' insights about the psyche often appear to be far in advance of their time. Heraclitus's perspicacity about the fluidity of all things, for instance, can be viewed as a striking precursor of the nineteenth century 'discovery' of consciousness as a flowing stream of impressions. Many other similar insights appear quite stunning from our present perspective; however, they occurred in isolation and were generally not developed systematically.

In the early part of the nineteenth century, these insights began to be organized and methods developed to advance these insights on a scale never before seen. As the truth about man was increasingly sought by examining his mind and behaviour, rather than the external forces of mythology and religion, the study of psychology was increasingly distinguished from that of philosophy. These changes constitute what Thomas Kuhn has postulated as a paradigm shift. Developments in associationist philosophy, as well as discoveries in biology and physiology,
contributed to that shift, which I have labelled the first wave of psychology, and defined in greater detail in the first chapter. It was positivistic in nature and typically viewed man mechanistically. George Eliot was the first major literary figure to take advantage of this new knowledge, some of which she learned from her companion, the psychologist and journalist, George Henry Lewes, and their circle of friends, including Herbert Spencer.

In the late 1880’s, however, this phase of psychology found itself in a state of crisis on at least one frontier. Thomas Kuhn claims that awareness of anomaly touches off the major discovery which necessitates a paradigm shift (52-53). The phenomena of hysteria and hypnosis were the most significant anomalies in contemporary medical psychological thinking. The prevailing explanation of hysteria as a physiological condition, which occurred only in individuals tainted by heredity, could no longer adequately account for the facts. Furthermore, the belief that hypnosis was a pathological condition found only in hysteric was successfully challenged and the widespread application and success of hypnosis as a therapeutic technique gradually brought it into the medical orthodoxy. The phenomena observed while patients were under hypnosis led to a rediscovery and more precise investigation of the unconscious. As a result of this rediscovery the mind was
more frequently viewed as dynamic, and psychological approaches to healing became more common. These changes are at the core of what I have defined as the second wave of psychology. Since this wave took account of man's inner realities as well as his spiritual nature, it proved to be a greater contributor to culture and literature than the first wave had been.

In England, the main shaping force on the attitude of the British towards this new knowledge was the Society For Psychical Research,¹ which drew the nucleus of its original membership from Cambridge University. Its members interpreted findings about the psyche in light of the evidence these provided for demonstrating the survival of personality after death, one of the main aims of the society. During the Edwardian period, the S.P.R. attempted to synthesize the findings of second wave psychology. In this ambition, it reflected the general Edwardian penchant for synthesis (Rose 4). Disciplines were not as specialized or their boundaries as set as they subsequently became; consequently eclectic borrowings were common. The attitude of literary figures was no exception to this tendency. Several writers became involved in the activities of the S.P.R., and many more drew on the case material and findings of second wave psychology that the Society presented in its Journal and Proceedings.
Into this climate of open-mindedness, questing, and eclecticism, Freudian psychoanalysis was received. A discourse on its qualities was established between 1908 and 1914. Psycho-analysis thus represents a later manifestation of second wave psychology in England. The main objection raised to the Freudian system was not so much to the subject matter itself, but to the absolute and universal claims that it was perceived to make about psychic conflicts, especially involving sexuality. In contrast to the expansionist, inclusive tradition of British psychology, psychoanalysis appeared reductionist. For these and other reasons, orthodox Freudianism never gained wide acceptance in Britain, though elements of it were assimilated into various branches of psychology. Nevertheless, histories of psychology in Britain mislead readers by treating psychoanalysis in isolation and by suggesting that it completely superseded all other dynamic psychologies. The prevalence of these accounts has meant that other, earlier influential second wave psychologies and psychologists have been overshadowed.

One of the main aims of this thesis is to bring to light the simplification and distortion in traditional histories of dynamic psychology in Britain. The application of Kuhn's theory of paradigm shifts strongly suggests that a new view of man did not emerge with Freud, but was gaining momentum in the late 1880's before he had published his
first psychological paper. To substantiate this claim, British pioneers in the field have been retrieved from obscurity and their theories examined in a degree of detail proportionate to their contemporary influence. The impact of more established figures like Freud and Jung can then be seen in more accurate perspective. One of the reasons Jung’s theories were more widely accepted in England than Freud’s stems from the fact that Jung’s psychology, with its acknowledgement of the importance of man’s soul, more nearly corresponds to a certain British psychological tradition represented by William James, Frederic Myers, and James Ward.

The second major aim is to show that this distortion in historical account has carried over into, and perhaps been magnified in, literary studies. Literary historians typically assess only the importance of Freudian thought on the major modernists, or make only the briefest allusions to other significant psychological influences such as Havelock Ellis’s. This thesis demonstrates that writers drew on many of the insights of the now obscure pioneering psychologists, as well as those whose names and ideas remain familiar to us. Furthermore, critics have tended to make a similar assumption to Virginia Woolf’s that the modernists discovered the dark places of psychology, by which she means unconscious motivation and conflict, and the inner spiritual
realities of characters. In actuality, several Edwardians and non-modernist Georgians explored second wave psychological ideas in their fiction. I trace this influence on one writer of each category. Virginia Woolf herself borrowed some of the same earlier ideas of dynamic psychology as these near contemporaries in her first novels, and the influence carries through into her modernist work.

My third aim is to make this work truly interdisciplinary, that is, to achieve a balance between the two disciplines of psychology and literary studies. I am motivated to attempt this, not only because I feel that the fields are mutually illuminating, but also because there is a striking analogy between the development of the histories of psychology and of British literature. Just as the "towering" figure of Freud has overshadowed other significant contributors to dynamic psychology, so the colossal modernists, Joyce, Lawrence, and Woolf, have overshadowed figures who made modest innovations in the subject matter of the British novel.

These aims have profoundly shaped the critical approach that I have taken to the materials retrieved from the shadows. I have tried to move away from the traditional history of ideas approach, which assumes an inevitable upward progression from ignorance to current enlightenment, by suggesting that valuable information has been lost in
this movement. In addition, I have demonstrated that attitudes towards ideas, and the emotions that they arouse, are often as important as the ideas themselves, especially when they enter the literary arena. The histories that I offer are archaeological in the sense that they attempt to examine each layer of influence without allowing subsequent ones to disturb or distort the original influence. Thus current definitions and disciplinary divisions have not been imposed on this earlier period. For instance, I have used the earliest translations of various thinkers, including Bergson, Freud and Jung, even when these have been shown to contain inaccuracies, so that I would get a clearer picture of what the British public potentially read of these psychologists. More importantly, in the latter half of the twentieth century, psychology has striven to become experimental and has discarded those elements no longer considered to be within the realm of science. Some historians have adopted this modern conception when discussing turn-of-the-century psychology. The result has been that information once considered to be firmly within the sphere of psychology, notably psychical research, has been unjustly excluded or marginalized in these studies.

Since disciplinary boundaries were not as strictly drawn during the period as they now are, I have shown how a wide range of subject areas contributed to the burgeoning
discipline of psychology. This effort to provide a synthesis of the psychology of the time parallels the typical Edwardian strategy of synthesizing. Thus, the technique employed attempts to fit the subject matter and mentalité of the early twentieth century. Furthermore, the established literary canon for this period has not been taken for granted. Instead, excavation has unearthed writers who were amongst the first to assimilate the new psychological ideas intelligently, but who have been excluded from the canon, in some cases for extra-literary reasons. All of these techniques are designed to crack the polished surface of psychological and literary history.

Given the importance of the influence of dynamic psychology on the literary history of the early twentieth century in Britain, it is surprising that there have not been more studies which treat this topic thoroughly. The first significant one was Reinald Hoops's 1934 published dissertation, *Der Einfluss der Psychoanalyse auf die Englische Literatur*. Hoops had the advantage of immediacy to his subject matter, since Freudian thought was still the most burning topic of the day. Also, many of the writers Hoops studied were living, and he queried them directly about this influence; however, his work suffers from several limitations. Since Hoops attempts to describe the impact of psycho-analysis on all genres of literature and on at least
thirty writers, his treatment is necessarily superficial. Similarly to other literary critics, he isolates psychoanalysis from other variations of second wave psychology, a manoeuvre which leads him to draw too rigid a delineation between psychoanalytic novels and novels of psychological analysis (Hoops 30). His definition of the psychoanalytic novel as one which involves the study of a complex arising out of childhood is artificially narrow, since writers typically incorporated psychological insights from diverse sources in their work. Finally, Hoops was obviously not able to benefit either from the numerous collections of writers’ papers or from published diaries, memoirs and journals, which have subsequently become available. These shed a tremendous amount of light on writers’ attitudes towards the "new" psychology.

Frederick Hoffman’s *Freudianism and the Literary Mind* (1945, rev. ed. 1957) represents a considerable advance over Hoops’s pioneering study. His analyses of psychological impact are more carefully articulated and profound than Hoops’s, and he shows himself to be more aware of the intricacies of influence. His insistence on the imaginative integrity of writers who were interested in the aesthetic possibilities of Freudianism is reassuring (Hoffman 95). Nevertheless, his study also has its limitations. Like Hoops, Hoffman handles only Freudian influence. He is
obviously an admirer of Freud and is thus not as critical of the claims of the Freudians to originality as he should be. Though he restricts his study to a handful of novelists, which enables him to probe the complexities of influence more satisfactorily, he attempts to cover the spread of Freudian ideas in both England and America, a rather large territory. He is obviously more oriented towards American developments, since these are treated in great detail. His discussion of Freud’s reception in England, on the other hand, is inadequate, especially when one realizes that it differed considerably from the American reception. Hoffman restricts his discussion to the major modernist writers, including Joyce, Lawrence, Kafka, and Mann, and so does not really get at the roots of psychoanalytic influence. In so doing, he also avoids some of the more difficult cases of influence, notably that on Virginia Woolf. It is true that other studies have tackled psychoanalytic influence on individual writers, including Virginia Woolf, but none of them consider psychoanalysis as one of numerous influences which contributed to a larger shift in psychological thinking and, consequently, thinking about the subject matter of the novel.

One relatively recent exception to this approach is Keith May’s *Out of the Maelstrom: Psychology and the Novel in the Twentieth Century* (1977). May very carefully points
out analogies (rather than suggesting direct influence) between major twentieth century psychological systems and selected novelists' insights on the topics of the unconscious and identity. The time period covered, however, is so wide that, as May admits, his primary object is not to trace threads of influence historically but to use aspects of thought from both disciplines in order "to clarify contemporary views of human nature and human possibilities" (ix).

The present study seeks to overcome some of the difficulties of these studies, as well as to carve out fresh terrain. In order to avoid the problem of spreading one's analyses too thin by treating too many writers or too lengthy a period, several contours have been established. Though the work unavoidably traces the influx of the most significant European psychological ideas into Britain, the study of the reception of these ideas is confined to Britain and British literary figures. The thesis covers the impact of second wave psychological thinking primarily on the novel in the period from the late 1890's up to the mid-1920's, though the main focus is on the Edwardian and war years. Following the war, second wave psychological thinking flooded all areas of British society; consequently, teasing out specific influence on individual writers becomes increasingly complex in this period. The mid-1920's also
seems an appropriate time to draw the analysis to a close since, in 1924 and 1925, Freud's *Collected Works* were published, leading to even more widespread dissemination of his thought in England. As well, in 1926 J.D. Beresford, one of the subjects of the present work, proclaimed the decline of a certain category of psychoanalytic influence on the novel.

Several criteria were developed in order to select those writers who would best illuminate the progression of the psychological influence. The main concerns were to discover those novelists who were earliest influenced by the new psychology within the period delineated and who became most knowledgeable about it. This knowledge had to exceed what could be picked up from the *zeitgeist* and was preferably demonstrated not only in fictional works but also in critical writing, autobiographies, letters and other primary source material. An attempt was made to gather writers who worked on several levels, from those who were popular, but whose work merits attention, to the most critically acclaimed. The rationale for this manoeuvre was that popular novelists would be better guides than higher ranked ones, not only to the impact of ideas, but also to the way those ideas are (mis)interpreted. Cultural currents run closer to the surface in their books than in more strikingly original works; moreover, those writers were
sought out who had been neglected, perhaps even because of their avid interest in the latest psychology. I became particularly interested in the novelists whose early assimilation of the "new" psychology brought into relief several misconceptions about the advent of modernism, for instance that it represented a complete break from the past. In general, writers who best reflected distortions in literary history were considered most desirable. May Sinclair (1863-1946), J.D. Beresford (1873-1947) and Virginia Woolf (1882-1941) best fit these criteria, both individually and collectively. Though the reasons for these choices are thoroughly discussed in Chapters Three and Seven, a few might be suggested here. Sinclair’s assimilation of dynamic psychology can be detected in her first novel, *Audrey Craven* (1897), and the influence of this body of knowledge underwent vicissitudes throughout her career, as she made the transition from Edwardian to modernist novelist. She had written her most profound work by 1924, after which her energies petered out. J.D. Beresford did not begin to publish novels until 1911, well into the Edwardian period, but, as with Sinclair, his very first novel shows signs of formal psychological influence. He plumbed the depths of psychology for most of his prolific career, without adopting the modernist approach. However, after 1924, his novels become as concerned with the nature
of spiritual knowledge as with psychological realism. In several articles, Beresford provided insightful commentary on the progress and pitfalls of the use of psychology in fiction. Both Sinclair and Beresford were extraordinarily knowledgeable about various aspects of dynamic psychology, including psychical research, and both deserve more critical attention than they have received.

At first glance, Woolf does not appear to fulfil the criteria listed. Her reputation is continually rising and she is now considered a pillar of modernism. She criticized the Edwardians for their neglect of the dark places of psychology and her criticism has helped foster the myth that the moderns forged a completely new aesthetic. Most importantly, her response to second wave psychology is highly problematic. Unlike other modernists such as Joyce and Lawrence, she did not admit that she had been influenced by the new ideas. She claimed, for instance, that she knew of Freud only in the way of ordinary conversation. However, the inclusion of her work is crucial to the argument put forward in these pages. Woolf’s conversations on psychological topics were far from ordinary and she was extraordinarily sensitive to ideas in the air. An examination of the milieu in which she was raised, along with her Cambridge connections, suggest that she was far more aware than she ever admitted of the psychological ideas
in the air from the time of her father's generation on. A study of her earliest novels provides further evidence that she worked from some similar psychological assumptions as the Edwardians, and that these continued to influence her conception of characterization in her modernist experiments. The appearance of dynamic psychological ideas in Sinclair's, Beresford's, and Woolf's works together suggests that this influence affects writers with quite different aesthetic principles and cuts across period divisions.

In fact, numerous other writers might have been treated in this study, since their works suggest that they were aware of the influx of the new ideas. These include James Joyce, D.H. Lawrence, Dorothy Richardson, Katherine Mansfield, H.G. Wells, Somerset Maugham, Algernon Blackwood, W.L. George, Hugh Walpole, Viola Meynell, J.C. Powys, Aldous Huxley, Rose Macauley, Elizabeth Bowen, Clemence Dane, S.P.B. Mais, G.B. Stern, and Rebecca West. Several of the typical reasons for disqualifying the more important of these figures should be mentioned. A writer was excluded if the impact of the "new" psychology on him had already been thoroughly discussed. Both D.H. Lawrence and James Joyce fall into this category. The parallels in Lawrence's psychological vision, as well as his debt to second wave psychology, were recognized as early as 1916, in Alfred Booth Kuttner's "Freudian Appreciation" of Sons and Lovers.
This critical discourse was developed by such notable works as *Oedipus in Nottingham: D.H. Lawrence* (1962), and, more recently, by Daniel Schneider's *D.H. Lawrence: The Artist as Psychologist* (1984). Sheldon Brivic's *Joyce Between Freud and Jung* (1980) deals thoroughly with Joyce's relations to these two thinkers. Other writers were dropped from consideration if the "new" psychology influenced only one main aspect of the novelist's writing. Notable amongst these is Dorothy Richardson. Although her exposure to dynamic psychology parallels May Sinclair's in many ways, the psychological influence appears primarily in her development of a stream of consciousness technique. Her use of the subject matter of psychology is not as varied as Sinclair's or Beresford's and she is, therefore, not as much of a thematic innovator as they were. For instance, she did not pay as much attention to dream states or sexuality as May Sinclair. Furthermore, although never as popular a writer as Sinclair, she has received more posthumous critical attention because of her technical explorations. Some of this attention deserves to be shifted onto Sinclair.

A larger group of writers was discarded because their application of second wave psychology was relatively superficial or appeared only in a few of the writers' works. H.G. Wells and Hugh Walpole are amongst those writers who fall under this heading. Several writers knowledgeable about
the latest psychological ideas were passed over because their attitude towards it was hostile and their special use of it was for satire. Aldous Huxley's and Rose Macauley's fictions figure prominently in this category. Finally, the last five novelists listed above could not be included since they did not begin to publish psychologically informed novels until after World War One.

One more important point needs to be made about the contours of the present study. The thesis recognizes the complexity of the issue of influence. Typically, influence falls along two related continua -- superficial to serious or profound and conscious through to unconscious. Occasionally even novelists with an extensive knowledge of dynamic psychology will use an idea in a superficial manner. Clinical terms such as hysteria and obsession may be used casually for the purposes of quick characterization. On the other hand, a novelist like Virginia Woolf, who denies influence, may have unconsciously incorporated a formal psychological concept, or the concept may have given rise to an insight about human behaviour. Another possibility is that the writer may have borrowed an idea from a secondary source, such as another novelist, thus increasing the possibility that the idea will be distorted. Finally, writers may have developed lines of thinking analogous to that of the psychology of the period, and so an apparent
influence may actually be an original insight. In order to avoid some of these pitfalls of tracing such a complex process as influence, I have adopted several strategies. In many cases I suggest that the influence is a potential one. Where there are several possibilities, I have chosen the most promising, without making an absolute judgement. A step towards dealing with secondary influence has been made by suggesting the nature and extent of the relations between subjects of this study and other writers knowledgeable about second wave psychology. I have not, however, attempted to assess the impact on the chosen subjects of novelists whose psychological insights were in advance of their time, such as the Russian novelists. In addition, only the briefest allusions are made to earlier literary movements, such as naturalism, which were influenced by the earlier psychological discoveries that I have labelled the first wave. With these contours established, the thesis attempts not only to provide in-depth studies of individual writers' responses to the new psychology, but also to make some generalizations about the ways in which this influence shaped the course of the novel as a genre.

In summary, Chapter One sets the background by surveying the currents of philosophical, psychological, medical, psychiatric, and psychical thought that contributed to the formation of the "new", dynamic psychology. In the
process, it points out the distortion of the place of psychoanalytic theory within this movement. However, the main aim is to suggest the elements of a zeitgeist with potential impact on writers, rather than to identify specific influences. An overview of the response of British academics and health professionals to later second wave developments, particularly Freudian and Jungian, comprises Chapter Two. Taken together, these two chapters provide extensive evidence that there was a substantial body of dynamic psychological knowledge of both British and foreign origin available to literary artists in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Based on this evidence, Chapter Three appraises the general impact of this knowledge on the novel, beginning in the Edwardian period. The next two chapters are devoted to an intensive study of May Sinclair's developing awareness of psychological thought and of her incorporation of these ideas in her fiction. Chapter Six shows how a Georgian writer, J.D. Beresford, continued to employ dynamic psychology within traditional novel structures. Perhaps more speculative than earlier chapters, the seventh shows that the milieu in which Virginia Woolf worked was highly charged with psychological ideas, which proved influential in her earliest work through to her modernist experiments. The final chapter reaffirms the necessity of recovering the lost information that writers
transformed into art, and puts forward possibilities for further excavation of this rich site.
Chapter One
The "New" Psychology

In 1901, William James wrote about F.W.H. Myers's contribution to psychology that,

For half a century now, psychologists have fully admitted the existence of a subliminal mental region, under the name either of unconscious cerebration or of the involuntary life; but they have never definitely taken up the question of the extent of this region, never sought explicitly to map it out. Myers definitely attacks this problem, which, after him, it will be impossible to ignore ("Frederic Myers" 218),

and he asserted his belief "that Frederic Myers will always be remembered in psychology as the pioneer who staked out a vast tract of mental wilderness and planted the flag of genuine science upon it" ("Frederic Myers" 225). These tributes were not an impulsive gesture on James's part. Two years later, in a review of Myers' monumental Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death (1903), James compared Myers's "genius" to that of Charles Darwin in his scientific ability to classify and systematize a vast amount of seemingly disparate material.¹ This commentary is high praise indeed from the man traditionally acknowledged as the founder of modern psychology, but, the reader may well ask: who is Frederic Myers? Was he as significant as James suggests? If so, why have James's predictions proved so
inaccurate? As James was not given to extravagant praise, one's inclination may be to question whether James had heard of Freud by this date, since these claims about the mapping out of the unconscious are commonly reserved for the founder of psycho-analysis. However, James was well aware of Freud's early work, having introduced his and Breuer's paper "Ueber den psychischen Mechanismus hysterischer Phanomene" to America in 1894. The truth of the matter is that Myers, who was highly influential in his day because of his prolific writings on diverse psychological and psychical topics, his organization of several International Congresses of Experimental Psychology, including one held in London in 1892, and his presidency of the Society for Psychical Research, has since been unjustly relegated to obscurity. Ironically, too, though he was the first to introduce Freud's findings to Britain, his view of the psyche has been completely eclipsed by the Viennese doctor's.

Myers is not alone in his fate (the names of William McDougall and Bernard Hart also come to mind); his treatment points to one of the central problems in the histories of the "new psychology". Many of those pioneers in the fields of psychiatry, psychology, and medicine who espoused rival views to Freud's about the psyche, or who adopted an eclectic approach rather than adhering to Freudian doctrine,
have been neglected. At best they receive mention only for their contribution to the spread of Freudian ideas; at worst they are mistakenly represented as having been influenced by Freud; consequently, Freud's contribution to psychology, though admittedly great, has been exaggerated, as has his originality. The present chapter initially examines some of the causes of this distortion and attempts to set the record straight, at least in the milieu of Great Britain, where eclecticism in psychology has prevailed. More importantly for present purposes, this distortion and simplification have been reflected in literary history and criticism of the period. The majority of studies of the permeation of psychological ideas into modern literature focus almost exclusively on Freud; however, various aspects of psychology had their impact on writers long before Freud had begun to make his contribution. The main objective of this chapter, therefore, will be to detail these theories and concepts in proportion to their influence on literary artists in the early years of the twentieth century. Only then can Freud's influence during the period be seen in proper perspective.

Of several problems which face the historian of the "new psychology" in Britain, and which have contributed to obfuscation in the field, the most fundamental has to do with the nature of psychology itself. At the turn of the
century the disciplines of knowledge were not nearly as well defined as they are today in our society of specialization. Psychology in particular was still in its infancy, having only begun to detach itself from metaphysics and philosophy in general and to draw on the newer experimental life sciences in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Its province and even its claim to exist as a separate branch of knowledge were by no means firmly established. The Encyclopedia Britannica first devoted a separate article to psychology in volume twenty of the ninth edition, published in 1886. Though psychology had been defined as the 'science of mind or mental life' at least since this date, psychologists had not been able to decide what constituted mind (or, for that matter, science, as applied to this field). In the most important description of the state of the discipline in the late nineteenth century, The Principles of Psychology (1890), William James claimed that the feature for which he could most claim originality was his "strictly positivistic viewpoint". Early in the work he "laid down the law" that "no mental modification ever occurs which is not accompanied or followed by a bodily change," (I 5)³ and he proceeded to refute the existence of an unconscious as an entity as unscientific (I 163). Nevertheless, there is a slight degree of ambiguity even within his text
since he later gives the impression that individuals can be unconscious of experiences when they fail to attend to them, or when in certain pathological states. Similarly, metaphysics is never wholly banished from his consideration. At any rate, despite his avowed positivistic stance, his work stimulated an expansion of the field of psychology, especially in research into exceptional mental states.

His views on the definition of mind and the limits of psychology were by no means completely accepted, however. Only a few years prior to James's work, Myers proposed a theory of the subliminal self, by which he meant those strata of the mind which exist below the threshold of consciousness. He had great hopes that his psychical researches into the then little known regions of hallucinations, automatism, dreams, clairvoyance, thought transference, hypnosis, and hysteria would become "the cornerstone of a valid experimental psychology." James himself eventually acknowledged Myers's expansion of the concept of mind as "the most important step forward that has occurred in psychology since I have been a student of that science...." (Varieties 233).

By the early twentieth century, the debate over the definition and parameters of psychology had increased. At the Sixth International Congress of Psychology in 1909
the main theme was The Subconscious and the main report was given by the man who coined the term, Pierre Janet. Janet's concern was to distinguish the subconscious, which was a clinical concept, from the unconscious, a philosophical concept.

In the eleventh edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, James Ward concluded that "psychology cannot be defined by reference to a special subject matter" as the concrete sciences can; consequently, he resorted to a definition based on the standpoint from which psychology views experience:

The standpoint of psychology is individualistic; by whatever methods, from whatever sources its facts are ascertained, they must -- to have a psychological import -- be regarded as having place in, or as being part of, some one's consciousness or experience.... Psychology then is the science of individual experience. (548)

This definition would not have been universally accepted since it side-stepped the important issue of the constitution of mind; however, it is perhaps most appropriate and revealing for present purposes since it acknowledges the diversity of sources and methods upon which psychology drew.

Given the amorphous state of this burgeoning science', it is not surprising that discoveries which had a direct bearing on psychology were made in fields as diverse as physiology, medicine, biology, psychical research, anatomy, philosophy, neurology, spiritism and psychiatry.
Not only did this phenomenon present difficulties for those psychological pioneers trying to stake out a new territory, but it has subsequently created a dilemma for the historian. His difficulty is to determine, on one level, the degree of impact each of the sources had on psychology during the historical period, and, on another level, to know at what point an idea borrowed from another field entered the province of psychology, which in turn determines the extent to which its development should be traced in a history of psychology. A good example of the latter problem, already touched upon, is the concept of the unconscious. In the nineteenth century it became an acceptable philosophical concept, was then rejected by the first experimental psychologists, but eventually gained acceptance in the discipline of psychology in one of several modified forms -- the subconscious, subliminal, or unconscious as Freud pictured it.

This failure to acknowledge the nebulous character of psychology, and the issues surrounding its source in particular, has caused distortion in many of the histories of psychology. Even in one of the best accounts, A Short History of British Psychology, L.S. Hearnshaw imposes the current framework of experimental psychology on history and thus eliminates or marginalizes those fields like psychical
research which are no longer considered to be within the realm of psychology as science, though they had a significant impact on the course of psychology. In order to avoid these pitfalls, I have attempted not to force any structure which has subsequently emerged onto the psychology of that period, but have accepted its amorphous nature. Indeed, the richness of inquiry fostered by pioneers not hampered by disciplinary boundaries during that period has, at times, caused me to question the still widely accepted belief in the inevitable linear progression of science. Ward's definition has thus been adopted in this thesis and sources have been considered regardless of current 'scientific' status. However, to avoid writing a history of all of the above-mentioned disciplines, I have posited the existence of a nexus of ideas and findings. These are more psychological than anything else because they pertain to individual experience or consciousness, and because attempts have been made to verify them by replication. The depth of treatment of each of these ideas has also, of course, been guided by the degree of their impact on creative writers. Some areas like physiological psychology had comparatively little direct influence on writers, though the psychologists developing the field -- say Fechner or William James -- often wrote in less 'scientific' areas; consequently their
If the amorphous status of psychology is troublesome to historians, an even greater dilemma posed by the question of the definition of the "new psychology". In 1897 E.W. Scripture commented in his description of *The New Psychology* that,

> During the last few years a wide interest has been aroused in the growth of a science of mental life which employs methods hitherto peculiar to the physical sciences. The interest has been followed by misconceptions of the most varied character. Some have supposed the new science to concern itself with experiments on thought-transference and clairvoyance; others have regarded it as a presumptuous sub-department of the physiology of the senses and the brain; and still others have treated it as merely a materialistic philosophy in one of its aberrations. Amid such confusion it is no wonder that people ask: "What is the new psychology? Is it brain-physiology, or spiritualism, or a new kind of metaphysics?" And the chemist, geologist, or physicist is also inclined to ask: "Is it a science at all?" (ix)

Scripture's questions are at least as relevant today, since the passage of time has only contributed to the obfuscation of a term which was never well-defined to begin with. Scripture tried to reserve it to describe "a purely mental science founded on careful experiment and exact measurement" (14), but, almost from the conception of psychology to the present, the term has been used in a multitude of contexts. For example, in an essay entitled "The New Psychology" in the *Fortnightly* of 1879, the change away from older
psychist psychology and metaphysics towards laboratory
presentation, and in particular the contributions of
JY, were represented as the new psychology (as qtd. in
Rheinm 237). Twenty years later, in a statement about
Frederic Myers' contribution to psychology, Frank Podmore
wrote, "It was of interest to recall in this connection that
the vocabulary of the new psychology owed much to Myers;
amongst his best-known coinages were telepathy, subliminal,
and supernormal."

Annie Besant also used the term in a
less 'scientific' way in her published lectures, Theosophy
and the New Psychology (1904).

The most influential misuse of the term was made by
the more enthusiastic followers of Freud because they
equated the new psychology with Freudian psycho-analysis
exclusively. For example, in the first book of Freud's to be
translated into English, Selected Papers on Hysteria and
Other Psychoneuroses (1909), Brill claimed that, "Freud's
views are not only new and revolutionary, being based on an
entirely new psychology, but unless one is thoroughly
familiar with their development one is apt to misunderstand
them."10 Freud himself only rarely used the phrase, usually
in the context of his contributions to the new psychology.11
Nevertheless, Freud's propagandists triumphed and the phrase
increasingly became exclusively identified with
psychoanalysis, despite its earlier legitimate uses. Literary historians have uncritically accepted this narrow definition, and so they generally have not looked farther than Freud when discussing the influence of the new psychology on culture. (Routh; Frierson 223-236).

* * *

To be more accurate though, all developments in psychology from the mid-nineteenth century up to the early twentieth century should be considered new, since psychology as a discipline was only beginning to emerge as a distinct entity, as we have seen. From this more inclusive viewpoint it becomes apparent that there were two major phases or waves of "new psychology" which correspond with a paradigm shift, in Thomas Kuhn's terms. These waves have overlapped, and each has ebbed and flowed, though, paradoxically, each has influenced the other; both have gathered strength as a result. The first wave grew out of philosophical empiricism and its elaborations in associationist doctrine coupled with philosophical positivism and the experimental sciences, especially physiology and biology. It originated in the nineteenth century laboratories of Fechner, Helmholtz, and Wundt (Hearnshaw 123). From the associationists this wave
derived its view of mind as mechanistic, passive and divisive into many elementary contents, but those following Wundt generally agreed that mental experience is a composite and more than the sum of its parts (O'Neil 54-55). Though this view received a setback when it was realized that a psychology could not be based solely on brain physiology, the first wave gathered strength with the development of experimental techniques of observation and measurement (Scripture 450, 452).

The second wave, a blend of faculty psychology, medical psychology and psychiatry, was rooted, oddly enough, in both philosophical rationalism and philosophical romanticism. Receiving impetus from the researches into hysteria and hypnosis of the Frenchmen Charcot, Briquet, and Bernheim, and the new theory of schizophrenia postulated by the Swiss psychiatrist, Bleuler, it came into prominence in the late 1880's. Unlike the first wave of psychology, which tended to be objective, descriptive and organicist in nature, second wave psychology was essentially dynamic. Though, as Henri Ellenberger has pointed out, there was a plethora of definitions of dynamic (289), it generally referred to the functional rather than organic aspects of illness and posited the existence of psychic energy which was in movement in various elements of the mind. This second
wave included an "unmasking" trend in psychology, that searched "for hidden unconscious motivations, mainly of instincts and conflicts of instincts" (Ellenberger 277). Nietzsche's, F.W.H. Myers's, and Pierre Janet's psychology are all eminent early examples (as Freud's is a later one). Closely allied with, and fostered by, this new dynamic psychology was a new interest in psychotherapeutics. In 1892, Frederick van Eeden, a Dutch physician, "defined 'Psychotherapy' as the cure of the body by the mind, aided by the impulse of one mind to another."(Ellenberger 765). According to Ellenberger, by 1897 the word "psychotherapy" was the accepted term for all methods of mental healing from hypnotism to the combination of supportive, expressive and directive therapy. (Ellenberger 776, 767). Several important works reflected the new direction in psychology, beginning with Pierre Janet's L'Automatisme Psychologique, (a study of cases of multiple personality) in 1889 and continuing in the first decade of the twentieth century with Theodore Flournoy's From India to the Planet Mars (1900), Freud's Interpretation of Dreams (1900), James's Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), F.W.H. Myers's Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death (1903) and William McDougall's An Introduction to Social Psychology (1908).
Though both waves of new psychology had their impact on the literary world, the second wave generally had a more direct and intense effect on writers for numerous reasons, which will become clear. For now it is sufficient to mention the most notable of these. Second wave psychology expanded the study of the frontiers of the mind by drawing upon the abnormal, and typically presented findings in the form of individual case studies, which often read like fictional narratives. These features provided a rich source for the writer trying to depict the development of interesting and unique characters in a dramatic form. Nevertheless, in first wave psychology there are notable exceptions like James's *Principles of Psychology*. Though mainly a synthesis of first wave developments, it had a considerable influence on second wave psychologists as well as writers. The point which should be kept most in mind though, is that Freud's psycho-analysis constitutes only one element of second wave psychology, one which emerged as the second wave neared a crest and which owed much to its predecessors.

Neither Freud's followers nor historians of the psychoanalytic movement have given adequate acknowledgement to this point; thus their contributions have further misrepresented the course of development of the new psychology in several ways. Not only did early followers
misapply the term new psychology by identifying it exclusively with psycho-analysis, but in so doing they tended to exaggerate the originality of Freud's researches. Ernest Jones, one of the most influential British psychoanalytic pioneers, was no exception. This fact is puzzling when one notes Jones's claim that

I had been very familiar with the cases of multiple personality described in America by William James and Morton Prince and with the huge French literature on hysteria, the beautiful observations of Binet and Fere and the ingenious experiments of Pierre Janet ("Early History" 201), before he had been introduced to the work of Freud. In spite of his knowledge, not until 1954 did Jones admit that,

Freud has been regarded as a revolutionary genius who introduced novel and disturbing ideas. The first half of this sentence is doubtless true, but the second half needs qualification. As a result of my researches I came to the unexpected conclusion that hardly any of Freud's early ideas were completely new. ("Early History" 204)

He then describes precedents to Freud's ideas in various areas, including hysteria, dreams, sexuality, and the unconscious. Even for free association, which he had earlier claimed was Freud's most "original achievement: it was where he most showed his genius," Jones notes predecessors as prominent as Sir Francis Galton ("Early History" 207). However, Jones's claim that Freud took all the bright ideas of his forerunners seriously (implying that they did not) and wove them into a comprehensive theory is only a partial
truth, as we shall see. Freud is most accurately viewed as a brilliant synthesizer, but, of course, there were others before him, like James and Myers, who played similar roles. One of the elements which distinguished Freud's psycho-analysis from the work of these earlier systematizers was the tenacity of his followers, who could even be rather dogmatic. To demonstrate how this characteristic of a movement could be used to exaggerate the claims of the Freudians, it is only necessary to quote from W. Leslie Mackenzie's "Introduction" to the first English translation of Freud's popular On Dreams. In 1914 he claimed that,

> Already the journals of clinical psychology, normal or morbid, are full of the discussions of Professor Freud's methods and results. There is a "Freud School." That alone is a proof that the method is novel if not new. (v-vi)

Proofs were apparently easy to come by for the early Freudians; their tendency to claim proof for a theory was another means of distortion, which early on was criticized by A. Friedlander. In 1909, he objected that,

> ...instead of proving their assertions in a scientific manner, psychoanalysts content themselves with unverifiable statements. They say: "We know from psychoanalytic experience that..." and lay the burden of proof on others...(psychoanalysts do not accept any criticism nor even the expressing of the most justified of doubts, terming these "neurotic resistance." (as qtd. in Ellenberger 803)
More important, because it greatly increased the influence of psychoanalysis beyond what it deserved as a science, was "the practice of psychoanalysts of addressing themselves directly to a wide lay public, as if their theories had already been scientifically proven" (Ellenberger 803). Freudian sexual theories in particular were represented this way, as Friedlander notes. It is almost as if early psychoanalysts deliberately attempted to be provocative, perhaps to attract attention to the strength and originality of the theories and thus to ignore the criticism, also made, that "psychoanalytic ideas were often a return to older, obsolete concepts" (Ellenberger 803).

Several reasons for distortion of the place of psycho-analytic theory in the history of the new psychology cannot be directly attributed to Freudian followers. Once a theory reaches the attention of the public, it becomes subject to misinterpretation and vulgarisation, and psycho-analysis was no exception, as we shall see in Chapter Two. Also, extensions and adjunctions cannot always be clearly distinguished from the main body of Freudian theory; consequently, certain ideas have been falsely attributed to Freud. Furthermore, many ideas crystallized by Freud permeated culture in the years following the ones under consideration, and psychoanalysis achieved almost a
legendary status. As a result the tendency is to disregard the fact that Freudian theory was, in the first decade of this century, little known in England. Though it quickly gained recognition and even notoriety, at least until the twenties there was a body of "new" psychological knowledge which was equally as influential as Freudian theory, if not more so, on society at large and literary circles in particular. Finally, since Freud forged such a coherent system, it has been easier for literary critics to identify an aspect of it as an influence than to link an isolated reference in a text to the idea of a psychologist whose work was not as unified or comprehensive and whose impact has been long since forgotten. Both British psychologists and writers, however, have tended to distrust theoretical systems and so their approach has been eclectic. Writers in particular are more interested in insights into the many facets of personality and its development than in a theoretical framework.

Having outlined some of the distortions commonly encountered in the histories of the fledgling discipline of psychology, this chapter will attempt a revision of certain aspects of that history which more accurately reflect the elements of the redefined "new psychology" as they were available to be used by the literary community. Though the
focus will be on the peculiarities of British developments, foreign contributions cannot be ignored because of their significant impact in Britain. For the sake of clarity I have divided the following discussion into these areas of development: (i) Philosophy, (ii) Psychology, (iii) Medicine and Psychiatry, (iv) Psychical Research; though the interactions among various branches of knowledge and those individuals working within them will be stressed in the actual presentation. Thus Freud's position within this configuration can then be evaluated more realistically.

i. Philosophy

Several strong and opposing philosophical traditions, which directly affected the course of British psychology, had either developed in England or been transplanted there in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. My intention is not to describe these in any detail, but to sketch briefly their more psychological aspects, focusing mainly on conceptions of mind, including views about consciousness and unconsciousness, in order to illustrate important intersections between the ancient discipline with its entrenched ideas about its territory and the emerging
psychology.

Empiricist philosophy, characterized by its method of explaining wholes by parts, had its most influential British representative in John Locke. Unlike earlier philosophies, which postulated an innate sense in man, Locke held that the principal source of knowledge is our sense experience. Knowledge itself "consists of simple ideas which are not analysable into other ideas and complex ideas which are composed of simple ideas linked in temporal trains or in synchronous complexes. In this proposition, Locke asserted the central tenet of associationism" (O'Neil 26).

Though Locke did occasionally refer to mind as active, the associationist school which developed from empiricism typically depicted mind as passive. In Berkeley's view, for example, the mind consisted solely of a train of ideas; it could not know external objects. This "subjective idealism", and his "analysis of the visual perception of size and distance" (O'Neil 28) in particular, were both influential on early experimental psychologists like Wundt. Also, despite the mechanistic flavour of empiricism and associationism, they contributed much to aesthetic theory in the eighteenth century and after. The associationists' focus on successive individual elements of the mind, for example, fostered a trend towards realistic
particularism. Later eighteenth century novelists, like Samuel Richardson and Laurence Sterne, reflected this tendency in the increased attention they paid to the problems of individual identity, subjective states of consciousness, and details of place (Watt 17-28). Several novelists of the early twentieth century, most notably Virginia Woolf, looked back to these techniques in shaping their own.

In opposition to empiricism stands rationalism, identified by its method of explaining parts by wholes. Though many of its ideas can be traced to Aristotle, particularly his "division between the vegetative, the animal and the rational living principles (souls)" (O'Neil 23), its subsequent developments in the philosophy of Descartes and Leibnitz are too complex to trace here. What is significant in the present context is the contribution of rationalism to the formation of faculty psychology. Since the middle ages, the faculties, such as reason and sensation, had been hierarchically organized. The first modern systematization of faculty theory, however, occurred with Christian von Wolff (1679-1754), who was influenced by Leibnitz. Von Wolff considered the mind as an active and unifying force and he distinguished it from the faculties, which he regarded as potencies of action (O'Neil 24). His
view of mind as active, his distinction of lower (animal) and higher (distinctively human) powers and his division of faculties into cognitive, affective, and conative were all highly influential on prominent nineteenth and early twentieth-century British psychologists, including G.F. Stout and William McDougall.

Rationalism also included an attempt to establish the truth of religion by strictly rational means. Another important movement which approached religious issues from quite a different perspective, was Romantic philosophy. It postulated or accepted by faith underlying spiritual laws. In its less religiously motivated German form which developed between 1790-1830, it fostered the belief in the essential unity of man and nature. Four of its many ideas deserve especial mention here. Foremost is its new vision of the individual as absolutely unique and as perpetually becoming. This focus on spontaneous process likely acted as the original inspiration for both the case history method of second wave psychology and the Bildungsroman, with its stress on the evolution of personality (Ellenberger 200-201). Romanticism also stressed the existence of polarities in conflict in both the natural world and within the psyche. This dynamism is one of the most important elements it contributed to second wave psychology. Not only
did Romanticism emphasize polarities between man and woman, but it also conceptualized a male and female element within each individual. The idea of human bisexuality was incorporated into the later second wave psychoanalytic systems of Freud and Jung (Ellenberger 204-205). Writers such as Sinclair and Beresford, who were influenced by these psychologies, demonstrate an awareness of the bisexuality of the artist, as we shall see (Chapter Five 386, 389; Chapter Six 494). Finally, one of the most significant aspects of Romanticism was its elaboration of the concept of the unconscious. Both English and German Romantic writers like J.P.F. Richter, Wordsworth, and Coleridge intuited the importance of unconscious sources of thought prior to the turn of the nineteenth century, but the philosopher-psychologist Carl Gustav Carus was the first to outline systematically the components of it. In *Psyche* (1846), he held that the unconscious was the key to an understanding of conscious life. His schema of the unconscious had several layers and acted essentially as an indefatigable healing source for the conscious (Ellenberger 207-208).

Sir William Hamilton, a Scottish philosopher, was the first seriously to introduce the German Romantic philosophers to Britain. Though not himself a Romantic philosopher, he accepted that the unconscious represents a
much wider sphere of action and passion than the conscious
(Whyte 147). He was also the forerunner of an English school
of physicians, including W.B. Carpenter, J.D. Morell, H.
Maudsley and D.H. Tuke, who developed a doctrine of the
unconscious (Whyte 162).

Romantic philosophy did not flourish without
challenge, however. Its most potent threat came from
positivistic philosophy, which arose out of associationism
in the early nineteenth century. In England, positivism
found one of its most influential spokesmen in John Stuart
Mill, who demolished Hamilton's system in his celebrated
Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (1865).
Mill was not in any sense an experimental scientist, but he
stressed searching for the useful in philosophical matters,
and he banished the unknowable in metaphysics from the realm
of factual scientific investigation. Thus, first wave
psychology established itself with this onslaught of
positivistic thought, which became associated with
scientific materialism.

Despite the power of positivism, by the late 1870's a
reaction to it was beginning to develop in England.
Scholasticism, a religious forerunner of rationalism,
underwent a revival in 1879 (Hearnshaw 124). More
importantly, elements of Romantic philosophy resurfaced,
notably through Eduard Von Hartmann's Philosophy of the Unconscious, which was translated into English in 1884. Although Von Hartmann's monumental work was mainly a survey of German philosophy, including the Romantic philosophers, he did develop his own view of a tripartite unconscious, consisting of: the absolute, the source for the other two levels; the physiological, having an evolutionary function; and "the relative or psychological unconscious which lies at the source of our conscious mental life" (Ellenberger 210). Whyte neatly summarizes Von Hartmann's significance to psychoanalysis: "His [Von Hartmann's] work is an extraordinary achievement in 1868, and it proves that when Freud was twelve years of age, twenty-six aspects of unconscious mental activity in man had already been considered in detail in a famous work" (Whyte 164).

Several other German philosophers, all of whom had developed a dynamic view of the unconscious, also came into prominence with this revived interest in Romantic thought. Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) had written his main work, The World as Will and Idea, in 1819, but his ideas about the irrationality of man, the importance of the sexual instinct, and the origin of mental illness in repression did not achieve widespread influence until the 1880's (Ellenberger 208). Several writers have commented on the similarities
between his metaphysical descriptions and Freud's psychological ones. For example, Schopenhauer's concept of the will as composed of driving forces and his view that it is opposed to the intellect, bears striking resemblance to Freud's 'id' and 'ego' respectively. Also, both thinkers focus on the importance of sexuality, although Schopenhauer sees the sexual instinct "as a trick of the will at the service of generation, while Freud viewed that instinct in itself and seldom spoke of its relation with procreation" (Ellenberger 209).

One enthusiast of Schopenhauer's, Frederich Nietzsche, had an even greater impact than his master on second wave psychology, on culture in general, and especially on the following generation of British writers for whom he became a legend. He described the mind as a system of drives and introduced the terms 'id' to designate the impersonal elements in the psyche subject to natural law (Whyte 175), and inhibition to describe what would, in Freud's system, be termed repression (Ellenberger 274). Freud also owed his application of the concept of sublimation of sexual and aggressive drives to Nietzsche (Ellenberger 274). However, unlike Freud, Nietzsche eventually stressed the will for power over other drives (Ellenberger 274). Though there are other aspects to Nietzsche's system (such as the concepts of
the superman and of the eternal return), the aforementioned formed an important source for the second wave psychologies of Freud, Jung, and Adler, as Ellenberger notes (276). In some fiction of the early twentieth century, such as that of D.H. Lawrence's, it is almost impossible to distinguish the earlier philosophical source from those psychologists who borrowed from him.

Despite Nietzsche's profound influence, the main opposition to positivism in England came, not directly from the Romantic revival, but from an accompanying resurgence of Idealism, which also had its source in the philosophies of several Germans. Kant had founded a new idealism in the late eighteenth century with his proofs that, if any knowledge were possible, then logic had priority and most validity, and his identification of logic with the cognitive consciousness. However, his idealism was empirical, analytic and not, strictly speaking, metaphysical. Nevertheless, it was promptly converted by Hegel into a metaphysical form, which posited that being depended "on a knowing mind that transcends and envelops both the physical and psychical orders" (Perry 148). It was primarily in this Hegelian form that Idealism was revived in Britain by a school comprising T.H. Green, Edward Caird, F.H. Bradley, and J. McTaggart, amongst others. Those who championed Idealism were often
searching for a satisfactory rationale for their religious beliefs. For example, T.H. Green, perhaps the foremost British exponent, vindicated "the spiritual nature of the world and of men" (Kunitz 261) through his philosophy. At the crux of it was his doctrine of relations, which stated that "There are no relations without a relating consciousness. It is consciousness which integrates the discrete particular terms" (Kunitz 128). Consciousness became the umbrella concept for the Idealists, under which they subsumed Nature, matter and sensation. What was not known about changes in the relations of these through consciousness was of no concern to the idealists.

The importance of Idealism in England, both for psychology and the culture in general, cannot be underestimated. For a time it effectively countered the dominant psychologistic tradition in philosophy of empiricism, associationism, and positivism. Its recognition that there were problems requiring attention which lay outside the field of positivistic science kept the horizon of psychology broader than it might otherwise have been. On the other hand, the Idealists' concentration on consciousness, which had great impact on psychology, narrowed the focus of psychology by diverting attention from neo-Romantic conceptions of the unconscious. Idealism also
had the effect of keeping metaphysical questions closely linked with psychological ones and it sustained the plausibility of religious belief for many. It engendered the intense concern with the spirit and unseen realities demonstrated in the fiction of all three of the writers under study in this thesis. It also helps account for the high value they placed on moments of being or illumination since these provided glimpses into the underlying absolute spiritual reality. Idealism bolstered these writers' subjective certainty that individuals could know one another's minds and attain intimacy -- occasionally even through experiences beyond those traceable by the five senses. Furthermore, Idealism exerted such an attraction for several Edwardian writers that it coloured their view of second wave psychology and especially psychoanalysis. May Sinclair in particular attempted to integrate what she referred to as "the purified spirit of psychoanalysis" -- by which she meant the concepts of the will-to-live, the unconscious, and sublimation -- with Idealism, in A Defence of Idealism (11).

In spite of that belated defence, idealism did not withstand attack from several sides. Sinclair herself made pertinent psychological criticisms when she claimed that objective idealism failed to take into account unconscious
thinking, sleep, and forgetting, and that it did not know
what to make of "the great energies of instinct and love"
(Defence 137). More systematic criticisms came from the
philosophers; thus part of the importance of idealism must
be in the reactions it provoked in turn.

These generally took the form of philosophical
systems of the many, opposed to the quest for ultimate unity
of Idealism, as well as its increasing abstraction and
intellectualism. One form, pluralism, asserted that it is
possible to know only a limited portion of reality and,
thus, that parts of reality are self-sufficient (Perry 243).
Some streams of reality are connected to one another but
others are not. Therefore, all streams do not flow into, or
from, an absolute, which is what the idealists would have.
Even God is not absolute, but only one of many streams. This
less certain and decentralized vision of the universe,
associated with William James, more clearly reveals its
impact on psychological thought when taken together with
pragmatism, also popularized by William James.

Pragmatism is in the empiricist tradition because it
posits that perceptions may have no relations among them
but, unlike empiricism, it does not claim that they must
not. Pragmatism further argues that the world is composed
of a mixture of variety and unity. Reality is thus not a
seamless whole, but is continuous, changing and active (Bernstein xxvi). This dynamism is the most important feature of pragmatism from a psychological perspective. To the pragmatist, knowledge means a process, not merely a product. Knowing is practical, a phase of life, of action in an environment (Perry 199). There is no ultimate truth; rather, truth is equated with the useful, with what works, and so is humanly attainable. Since, in this conception, nothing is fixed or final -- "reality is not a conspiracy" -- pragmatism advocates free will rather than determinism (Perry 264).

Both pluralism and pragmatism, with their commonsensical approach to the world and their sensitivity to the flux of sensible experience, appealed to the modern age, and influenced the literary artists describing it in several ways. Writers like E.M. Forster and H.G. Wells, who could not accept either the absolute or the empiricists' atomistic view of the world, found pluralism and pragmatism most attractive. Pragmatism reinforced the romantic emphasis on process, without necessarily asserting the irrationality of the world; instead it highlighted the role of human effort. In fiction, the traditional unifying force, the omniscient narrator, analogous to the absolute of idealist metaphysics, was increasingly viewed with skepticism.
Writers devoted more attention to fictional techniques that reflected less confidence in the seamless wholeness of reality. If all one could know was a portion of reality, which might or might not be a totality in itself, then first person narration, the bildungsroman, stream of consciousness, open-endedness, and even fragmentation could more closely represent reality than the traditional methods.

Pragmatism and pluralism received impetus from the metaphysical psychology of Henri Bergson (1859-1941), which captivated the imagination of English psychologists and culture in general just prior to World War One. In the spate of enthusiastic accounts which followed the translations of his most important works, Time and Free Will in 1910 and Matter and Memory, Creative Evolution, and Laughter in 1911, Bergson was alternately hailed as the revolutionary harbinger of "the new philosophy" (Baillee 2; Le Roy 3) or "the new psychology" (Baillee 4; LeRoy 4; T.E. Hulme, as qtd. in Kumar 12).

Though these are exaggerations, Bergson's neo-Romantic vision was refreshing and either directly influenced, or shared several characteristics of, the dynamic British psychology then developing. He showed where both science and philosophy erred (Kitchen 16) and pointed out the limitations of idealism, realism, and associationist
psychology because of their dependence on abstract concepts, which distort concrete reality. Like James's philosophy, Bergson's was not so much a system as a method which recognized the necessity of taking into account the empirical facts of psychology, but also insisted that psychology must rise above empiricism to address metaphysical issues. Their mutual, active interest in psychical research reflects this expansionist view. Both rejected psychic atomism and substituted a description of psychic process as a dynamic continuum (Rao 4). They were also thus led to reaffirm common-sense views (Kitchin 6; Stephen 11; Rao 13), for example, of the "essentially utilitarian character of our mental functions" (Rao 5).

According to Karin Stephen (sister-in-law of Virginia Woolf), this pragmatic and yet intuitive approach to knowledge of Bergson's became immensely popular in England because of a general distrust of systems and logical constructions there (Stephen 10). However, a large part of his appeal also lay in his poetic writing style, in which he applied vivid metaphor to explain metaphysical problems. Though he often lamented the limitations of language, his philosophical vision proved a rich source for writers in particular, since he articulated an aesthetic by continually comparing his fine analysis of inner states with the aims of
the literary artist. A sketch of the most important topics that Bergson dealt with -- time, space, consciousness, memory, creative evolution, psychopathology, psychical research, and aesthetics -- will make clearer the nature of his influence on literature.

In *Time and Free Will*, the translation made from an essay written in 1889, Bergson attempts to refute determinism by demonstrating that both determinists and indeterminists have erred because of confusion about the characteristics of time and its relation to space. He thus attempted, as he himself says, "more clearly to render the subtleties of psychological analysis" (13). Essentially, Bergson argued that time is real, but only as conceived by memory, not by physics (Kolakowski 2). This idea of time, which Bergson called "durée", built on William James's and James Ward's conception of duration, the direct sensation that time is enduring for a maximum of about 12 seconds immediately after it has passed. Duration thus involves a little of the past, present and future, all imperceptibly shading into one another. Whereas James and Ward's conception implies that duration exists in space, that it has extensity, Bergson's argument hinged on his distinction that pure duree was not in any sense a quantity. As soon as one attempts to measure it, it becomes spatial, rather than
pure time. Duree was, therefore, not tied to matter, existing completely in the spiritual realm. The mistake of the associationist psychologists is that they conceive of psychic states as successive, and external to one another, linked as in a chain. Pure duree is, rather, qualitative and indivisible:

We can thus conceive of succession without distinction, and think of it as a mutual penetration, an interconnexion and organization of elements, each one of which represents the whole, and cannot be distinguished or isolated from it except by abstract thought. (Time and Free Will 101)

Dream states were important to Bergson's argument, since the dream provides a good example of pure duration. In the dream, duration cannot be measured as a quantity but is felt as qualitative (Time and Free Will 126). Bergson concluded that there were two kinds of time, distinguished by two forms of multiplicity: quantifiable, homogenous time, given spatial characteristics, and qualitative, heterogenous time which could only be symbolically represented in space (Kitchin 51).

Bergson's vision of time had profound implications for his view of the nature of consciousness and the self. In general, consciousness is analogous to a web (Kitchin 68) because of its characteristic of interpenetration, but it is also completely mutable and fluid, with nothing static
associated with it (Cunningham 97-98). The two kinds of time correspond with two aspects of our consciousness, one which is

clear and precise, but impersonal; the other confused, ever changing, and inexpressible, because language cannot get hold of it without arresting its mobility, or fit it into its commonplace forms without making it into public property. (Time and Free Will 129)

Furthermore, these two forms of consciousness are functions of two selves: a superficial or social self which

comes in contact with the external world at its surface; our successive sensations, although dissolving into one another, retain something of the mutual externality which belongs to their objective causes...(Time 125);

and a

deep-seated self which ponders and decides, which heats and blazes up,[6] a self whose states and changes permeate one another and undergo a deep alteration as soon as we separate them from one another in order to set them out in space. (Time 125)

These two forms of consciousness and two selves, which are really continuous with one another, are analogous in some respects to the distinctions made by other second wave psychologists, including the supernormal and subliminal of Frederic Myers and the conscious, preconscious, and unconscious proposed by Freud. However, in opposition to Freud's views, Bergson's identification of these two selves (corresponding to two times) is the foundation on which he builds his argument for free will. Determinism argues that,
given identical conditions, an event can be repeated. In contrast, Bergson states that an event can never be repeated because the centre of consciousness, in the deep-seated self, consists of pure duree. If successive moments of its experience could be isolated, it would be seen that they each contain the entire past, and that, therefore, each one is different (Kolakowski 20). The self is thus continually absorbing more past and can never return to a former state. Each act or experience is, then, free, since it cannot be predetermined by past acts or experiences.

Bergson consequently stressed the importance of memory in consciousness, even claiming that consciousness means memory (as qtd in Kolakowski 25). In Matter and Memory (1913), Bergson showed that memory had two main functions. Its primary one was "to evoke all those past perceptions which are analogous to the present perception" (299). In so doing, memory lends a subjective character to perception (Matter 80). Memory also contracts those numerous past moments of duration into a single intuition. Each one of these intuitions of memory is unique, which suggests that memory is not merely a function of the brain (Matter 315). Bergson used examples of abnormal conditions in which memory is impaired to support this argument. States of dementia and aphasia show that the brain acts only as the transmittor of
memory, not the repository of memory itself. In these states the transmitters and selection devices become damaged, but the amounts and types of memories lost indicate that memory as the sum of past experience is not destroyed (Kolakowski 47). Bergson thus used the example of memory to demonstrate the existence of spirit, independent of matter.

Bergson's most widely read and influential work, Creative Evolution (1911), likened these qualities of consciousness to the characteristics of the universe as a whole. The dynamic energy of consciousness was a product of what Bergson termed the \( \text{élan vital} \), which one commentator, Kolakowski, has summarized as

\[
\text{the original energy that, by infinite bifurcations and wrestling with the resistance of matter, produces higher and higher variations of both instinct and intelligence. Something of this original impulse is preserved in all species and all individual organisms, all of them working unconsciously in its service. (57)}
\]

As in consciousness, in life there is continuity of change, preservation of the past in the present and real duration. Both consciousness and life, or evolution, are creative in the sense that both continually give birth to new forms, which are incommensurable with their antecedents and, therefore, cannot be predicted (Bergson, as cited in Kolakowski 56). Bergson's view of life as the struggle of spirit to overcome the limitations of matter made him very
open to the aims of psychical research and affirmative of its findings. In the Presidential Address that he gave to the London Society for Psychical Research in 1913, he stated his argument that the facts about psychical phenomena ought to be determined, since these are similar in kind to those of science, in that they can be repeated and are subject to laws (Rao 162-163). He observed that the field of psychical research was large and included the study of the fringes of perception, which enter into consciousness in exceptional cases or predisposed subjects (Rao 165).

Bergson's metaphysical psychology was highly attractive to, and became influential on, literary figures, for a number of reasons. His conception of life as unpredictably changing resembles an artistic creation more closely than the operation of a machine (Kolakowski 58). Similarly, consciousness is creative since it is constantly generating totally new experience. Because experience cannot be confined within the bounds of reason, Bergson elevated intuition as a means of knowing reality, over intellectualizing. Language generally prevents knowledge of reality and contributes to intellectual distortion since it obscures and limits experience by artificially defining it, and so separating it into elements. Bergson thus offered a challenge to the writer, of capturing feelings which are in
a perpetual state of becoming, without letting language
cover over, or make impersonal, the delicate and fugitive
impressions of individual consciousness (Time 131). However,
he elevated the role of the artist by acknowledging that,
through the artist's use of intuition, he had the power to
restore to feelings and ideas "their original and living
individuality" (Time 164). Furthermore, Bergson suggested
that artists were more capable of attaining freedom than
many others, because their creative acts sometimes sprang
from, and expressed their whole personalities (Time 172).
Not only did Bergson acknowledge that art originated in the
deepest levels of consciousness, but he asserted that art is
a powerful force because it makes us open to suggestion, as
in the state of hypnosis (Time 14). Bergson also offered
numerous specific insights about the psyche that were
potentially adaptable to fiction. As did several other
psychological systems of the period, Bergson's psychology
emphasized the influential role of instincts in shaping
behaviour. Bergson suggested the importance of focussing on
memory in attempting to capture consciousness. He made it
clear that consciousness, as well as life, was in a
continual process of flux. The self was similarly fluid and
its evolution irrational (Cunningham 113). Novelists who
read Bergson would thus find it difficult to hold to the
traditional conceptions that consciousness was static, ideas were linked in chains, and the self was constant. Awareness of Bergson's position made the omniscient viewpoint seem highly artificial. Readers' willingness to suspend disbelief would be stretched beyond endurance if they were confronted with a narrator who ostensibly knew all when not even a single instant of consciousness was predictable. Bergson's vision of the psyche increased the importance of the moment to the artist. If, as Bergson claimed, the whole personality can be found in each moment of consciousness (Time 165), then each psychological detail of a narrative had to reflect that personality in order to approach reality. Several Edwardian and Georgian writers, including May Sinclair and J.D. Beresford, would have found in Bergson confirmation of their idealistic belief in a wider, unseen reality which existed independently of matter. Overall, Bergson's work drew attention to the need for a finer portrayal in fiction of the dynamic processes of consciousness and the psychic fringes of consciousness. His inclusive view of human psychology accorded a place for the spirit in a world dominated by determinism and Darwinian evolutionism.

Nevertheless, as philosophy, Bergson's ideas, as well as those of pluralism and pragmatism, did not prove to be very resilient since they amounted more to passionate and
poetic visions than to well-developed systems. A more radical departure from idealism, the New Realism of G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell in England, presented a more formidable threat to idealism because of its solid grounding in a mathematically-based formal logic. Most importantly for present purposes, the new realism, particularly as wielded by Moore, acted as a major deterrent to the development of second wave psychology in Britain. Though the new realism presented strong arguments to demonstrate, in opposition to empiricism, that all spaces and times are continuous, it did not locate reality within either individual cognition or universal consciousness as did the idealists. Instead it argued for the independence of reality from mind. Objects and, more importantly, concepts like the Good and Truth could exist independently of the awareness of, or existence of, a human being. In both sense perception and thought, an individual is not directly aware of his own mental impressions or ideas of a property or concept but of their universal property or meaning. Thus, when two people think of a concept like the Good they think of the same thing, whether they are able to distinguish this consciously or not (Regan 194). Phenomena previously thought to be subjective, such as hallucinations and dreams, are considered to be equally independent of the thinking mind. In this view the
mind becomes "the mere vehicle of reception" (Alexander, as qtd. in Sinclair, Defence 199) and consciousness and the Self are reduced to spectators of external events (Sinclair 206, 243). This anti-dynamic, anti-subjective view of the psyche left the province of psychology open to debate. Moore advocated that psychology should not study the contents of consciousness but rather, acts, even though, in his view, acts were transparent (as qtd. in Hearnshaw, Short History 208). The study of contents, or states of mind, by which he meant things that are good in themselves, should be reserved for the field of ethics. Thus he employed the tripartite division of consciousness into will, intellect, and emotion (developed by nineteenth-century psychology) for the purpose of discovering the goal of all life, not for any psychological aim (Levy 141). Although Moore's influential conservative view of psychology contributed to the blocking of its development, his philosophy and his aesthetic in particular strongly influenced the Bloomsbury circle. 17 His ideas about the importance of searching out the Truth and of appreciating beauty in art and friendship, because it is the essence of the good, became a religion for Bloomsbury. Moore also taught Bloomsbury to view artistic works as organic unities greater than the sum of their parts (Johnstone 24); he strengthened their belief in the intrinsic value of art
(Johnstone 45), which prompted them to value artistic form above all else. Finally, despite the fact that his rational approach to psychology directly opposed dynamic theories like psychoanalysis, his emphasis on cultivating pleasurable states bears some resemblance to Freud's pleasure principle (Levy 141-142), demonstrating a certain amount of intersection.

Thus, by the early twentieth century, several major philosophies had decisively shaped the course of the emerging discipline of psychology in Britain. Those philosophies which developed a mechanistic view of man and conceived of mind as passive, such as empiricism, positivism and, to a certain extent, realism, tended to provide the underpinnings for psychology of the first wave, whereas those that portrayed man more wholistically and conceived of mind as dynamic laid the groundwork for second wave psychology. The former systems generally attempted to limit the study of psychology to those questions which could be addressed empirically or logically. The latter group served mainly to expand the frontiers of psychology and so their contributions have been highlighted. The evolution of faculty psychology from rationalism established a system of psychological classification that second wave psychologists adapted. Rationalism, Romanticism and Pragmatism, with their
view of mind as an active interplay of forces, permitted the
detailed treatment of the dynamics of the mind of the second
wave. The attention paid to the unconscious by these
philosophies shows that this concept did not spring up fully
formed in second wave psychology but that, as Whyte claims,
it was thoroughly familiar and topical by the latter half of
the nineteenth century (59). Idealism represents one aspect
of a major movement to affirm religious belief logically,
scientifically, and psychologically. Another manifestation
is in psychical research, as we shall see. Idealist
philosophy provided strong impetus to keep the study of the
psyche linked with metaphysics. It thus played a crucial
role in the development and reception of second wave
psychology in England; its influence is partly what
distinguishes the reception of dynamic psychology there from
other nations. Several of the ways in which the
psychological aspects of these philosophical theories
affected literary creation have also been touched on; this
influence will become clearer upon examination of some of
the fiction of the period.
ii. Psychology

By now it will be evident that developments in philosophy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries corresponded closely with those in British psychology. Nonetheless, psychology in Britain received impetus from other fields of inquiry as well (notably biology and physiology) so that, by the early twentieth century, when psychoanalysis began to have an impact, there was a vital body of psychological knowledge available to be used by literary artists. Along with the fact that British psychologists continued to include ontological and moral concerns in their psychological writings into the twentieth century, there are two other characteristics of the British psychology of this period which cannot be underestimated. First, many prominent British psychologists found a vehicle for the expression of their ethical and metaphysical interests in the Society for Psychical Research. Though a separate section (iv) portrays the contributions of psychical research as an entity to psychology, as well as its influence on writers, links between psychologists and psychical research will be noted here. Second, British psychologists did not reject out of hand psychoanalytic theory, as psychoanalytic historians of the period such as
Edward Glover and Ernest Jones claim. Instead, they incorporated those aspects of Freudian theory that they considered to be well substantiated, and critically questioned those that were not. However, they did mistrust systems, especially when these appeared to operate on a single explanatory model, and they tended to find offensive the Freudians' assumption of the truth of their propositions. The aim of this section, then, will not be merely to outline the development of British psychology, but also to highlight these distinctive characteristics since they have been either ignored or underrated by previous historians. These characteristics are important because each of them helped condition the response of literary figures to second wave psychology in England.

Several dates and names could serve as entry points into a discussion of modern psychology, but I have chosen J.F. Herbart (1776-1841) because of the major role he played in making psychology into an independent discipline and because of the enormous influence of his revolutionary psychological ideas on second wave psychology. Though Herbart occupied a chair of philosophy for most of his career, his most significant contributions were to general and educational psychology. He laid out his most important ideas in his Textbook of Psychology (1816) and Psychology as
Science (1824). Herbart believed that the new discipline of psychology should be based on experience, metaphysics, and mathematics. Though his efforts to apply the latter field to psychology proved to be sterile (O'Neil 46), his beliefs about the role of the other two components became highly influential. Their general impact on late nineteenth and early twentieth century British psychologists can be seen in their continued inclusion of metaphysical questioning in the realm of psychology, as found in the psychology developed by the Society For Psychical Research, for example. As a measure of the high esteem in which Herbart was held in Britain during the period under examination, we note that the article on Herbart in the eleventh edition (1910) of the Encyclopedia Britannica ranked him second in importance only to Hegel out of all post-Kantians. It also claimed that he had made possible "enormous advances" in psychology (as qtd in Sand 468-469). Though Herbart's system is much more inclusive than Freud's, there are many similarities between the two, largely deriving from Freud's probable debt to Herbart and his school, as Rosemary Sand has recently detailed. This resemblance and influence make it crucial to examine Herbart's main ideas, since on several occasions critics have mistaken signs of Herbartian influence on writers for Freudian influence.
Most significantly, Herbart was the first to study systematically conscious and unconscious processes from a dynamic perspective (Ellenberger 312). Similarly to Freud, he developed a topographical model of mind, which posited that it had three layers. The top layer consisted of representations available to consciousness, which was described as narrow. The lower two levels occupied a much larger area and were divided between those representations which were partially inhibited or obscure and those which were completely so (Sand 470). Herbart termed the dividing line between the top level and the two lower levels of representation the threshold of consciousness. Since only a limited number of representations could enter consciousness at once, ideas were often what he referred to as "repressed" or "inhibited." As ideas were repressed below the threshold of consciousness, they were not destroyed, but moved from a state of reality to a state of tendency (Boring 244). Not only did Herbart introduce the idea of repression, but he stressed that repressions ranged in duration from a single moment to years. Novelists such as May Sinclair and Virginia Woolf who illustrate the brief "repressions" of their characters have more likely assimilated (whether consciously or not) a conception originating with Herbart than Freud's conception. Despite the inevitable clash of ideas striving
to enter consciousness, Herbart believed that the mind required unity (Sand 471), an idea which aligned well with idealism. What he termed "resistance" was encountered when two ideas were mutually and actively opposed (Sand 471). However, when ideas were compatible with one another, they were assimilated into what Herbart referred to as the "apperceptive mass" (Sand 472). As several of these masses were integrated the ego gradually formed (Sand 472). The imagery that Herbart used to illustrate his concepts was nearly as important as an influence as the concepts themselves. Sand points out that Herbart had borrowed from earlier philosophers the imagery of light and darkness and rising and falling to describe the relation between consciousness and unconsciousness; however, he added imagery of movement and of space in order to render vividly his ideas about consciousness. He also introduced the image of a web connecting trains of thought to describe the organization of apperceptive masses (Sand 473). All of these metaphors resurface in the works of the British novelists under investigation in this thesis.

Of more immediate consequence, Herbart's ideas were so powerful and influential that a Herbartian school came into being. Through one of Herbart's followers, Adolf Lindner, Freud may have become acquainted with Herbartian
ideas (Sand 465). Several of Lindner's elaborations on Herbartian ideas deserve mention. He compared consciousness "with a closed room with limited dimensions and the representations with people who go in and out of it" (as qtd in Sand 475), a metaphor that reappears in May Sinclair's earliest work. Lindner discussed the possibility that the ego could split, leading to the impairment of an individual's moral functioning (Sand 477). Finally, he posited the existence of a destructive drive that had to be "transformed" or sublimated "into the more noble cultural and artistic drive by which, instead of destroying, he produces new creations..." (as qtd in Sand 478). In England, G.F. Stout disseminated and developed some of the ideas of the Herbartian school, as we shall see.

While Herbart contributed greatly to the conception of psychology as a science, he did not believe that psychology could be experimental. G.T. Fechner (1801-1887) is generally acknowledged as the originator of this approach. He is best known for his formulation of the methods of quantitative psychophysics, which became the basis for modern experimental psychology. Nevertheless, Fechner was indebted in many ways to Herbart, including his idea of thresholds of consciousness. Less often mentioned aspects of Fechner's thought are his aesthetic and mystical
musings. In opposition to the materialists of his day, he believed that there was an underlying reality unifying the apparent duality of mind and body. His Romantic and mystical views that "the Universe was everywhere consciously alive, that the Earth was the body of a living Entity"; and that there existed a World-Soul or Cosmic Consciousness, influenced British mystic, supernatural novelists like Algernon Blackwood, from whose novel *The Centaur* (1911) the above quotation of Fechner's is taken (68).

Two other German experimentalists deserve mention because of their considerable impact on English psychology. Around mid-century, Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894) "systematized the experimental approach to problems of sensory perception, and measured the speed of nerve impulses" (Hearnshaw, *Shaping* 126), but he is also important because of his conception of a definite store of energy and his development of the method of introspection (Hearnshaw, *Shaping* 130-131). Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), like Freud, was an organizer and systematizer, in this case, of physiological psychology, and he established the first psychological laboratory in 1875. Though he viewed psychology as "essentially the study of consciousness" he also believed that the higher and more complex functions of the human mind could not be examined experimentally by the methods of the natural sciences, but had to be studied through their historical manifestations in culture, language,
myth, and religion. Psychology was as much a humanistic discipline as a natural science. (Hearnshaw, Shaping 136)

Whereas German psychology became increasingly experimental and methodologically rigorous after the work of these three important figures, psychology in Britain on the whole maintained the broader, multifaceted view of the German pioneers. Following the lead of Wundt, the mainstream of British psychology concerned itself with the study of consciousness. Helmoltz's introspection remained the basic method of investigation; the formal establishment of experimental psychology in England did not occur until 1897 (Hearnshaw, Short 134).

That is not to say, however, that British psychology did not feel profoundly the effects of subsequent scientific discoveries. Charles Darwin's theories of the evolution of species through natural selection and struggle for existence, which became popular with the publication of The Origin of Species in 1859, provided strong impetus in several areas of both first wave and second wave British psychology. Darwin himself applied his theories to man in The Descent of Man (1871) and The Expression of Emotions (1872) as did the social Darwinists who elaborated on, as well as distorted, those theories. His hypotheses that there was an instinctual basis for human endeavor, including
morality, and that sex was the most important instinct of selection in man, were rapidly assimilated into the realm of psychology (Ellenberger 232, 236, 230). These theories also prepared the way for important instinctually-based psychodynamic theories of the early twentieth-century, notably McDougall's hormic psychology and Freud's psychoanalysis. The emphasis on instinctual and hereditary influences in the psychology of characters, common in the fiction of the late Victorian and early Edwardian periods, is partially owing to the influence of Darwin and his popularizers.¹

In addition, Darwin's application of the principles of selection to humans sparked the brilliant psychological studies of Francis Galton (1822-1911). Though a polymath, Galton primarily concerned himself with understanding the inheritance of human qualities (Hearnshaw, Short 57). To that end he studied genius, which he believed was largely inherited, he developed psychometric techniques, and he explored the field of individual differences. Although best known for these contributions to first wave psychology, Galton can, as well, be considered an important precursor of second wave psychology in Britain. In spite of his statistical work, Galton never dispensed with the method of introspection; his use of "free association", which he named
and described as a means of probing dreams and the unconscious in general in an article in *Brain* predates Freud's ("Psychometric Experiments", July, 1879). Also prior to Freud, he expressed his belief in the importance of studying the abnormal in this connection, and he realized that sanity and insanity should not be rigidly distinguished (Hearnshaw, *Short* 60). Along with his views about the abnormal, Galton's work on genius helped spark a fascination with the unusually precocious in several novels of the Edwardian period. J.D. Beresford's *The Hampdenshire Wonder* (1911) and May Sinclair's *The Divine Fire* (1904) are but two examples. Galton's work is also mentioned in Virginia Woolf's *Night and Day* (1919, 32). Nevertheless, as is typical of British psychologists, Galton's work was diverse and his dynamically oriented speculations were unsystematic; at any rate these speculations were overshadowed by his investigations based on heredity.

Another unsystematic polymath, precipitated by Darwin into psychological investigation, but not constrained by the naturalist's approach and findings, was George Henry Lewes. Companion of novelist George Eliot, and himself a novelist, journalist, and philosopher, Lewes (1817-1878) is of particular interest in the present context since he represents a striking example of a literary figure who made
a significant contribution to psychology. However, partly as a result of the diversity of his interests, his applications to psychology of physiology and biology, and his far-reaching recognition of the influence of social factors on psychology, have been neglected. Although Lewes began in the empiricist tradition, he did not accept a purely mechanistic view of reflexes and did not limit psychology to physiology. Like Galton, he accepted the insights obtained through introspection, and several of these which he developed anticipated and contributed to second wave psychology. He did not view the mind as composed of separate, static elements, but instead believed that body, brain and mind only had significance in relation to one another. (Hearnshaw, Short 49). This holistic, dynamic perspective he referred to as organicist, and it took account of both psychological product as well as underlying processes.

According to Hearnshaw, eventually Lewes placed primary emphasis on experience and "was perhaps the first British psychologist to employ the term personality in approximately its modern sense" (Short 50). Impressions and experiences combined and recombined according to laws of grouping which Lewes formulated, and evolved into an "Inner Life", the basis of personality (Short 50). Lewes also
stressed the role of the symbolic in thinking, which Freud was to do in a slightly different way much later. Finally, in opposition to Mill, Lewes recognized that unconscious regions "play by far the greater part in mental life" and he located "motors" which determine motivation within these regions (Hearnshaw, Short 52). Though the impact of his thinking on George Eliot has been well documented (Colby 235), a few brief examples will suggest the importance of that influence. Lewes's discussions with Eliot of physiology, principles of association, and mental development increased Eliot's awareness of the significance of inherited traits, the characteristics of associative memory, and the impact of sensory stimuli on subconscious processing. As Robert Colby points out, these emphases can be clearly detected in The Mill on the Floss (235).

The Darwinian revolution also provoked a profound reaction, one religious form of which was Idealism, as has been shown. However, Samuel Butler (1835-1902), another literary figure, opposed Darwinian views on more or less scientific grounds. Himself an evolutionist, he could not accept that "chance variations could explain continuous development" but held instead that heredity was a form of memory (Hearnshaw, Short 53). Following Lamarck, he postulated that "acquired characters could be transmitted
to, or were remembered by", as he preferred to put it, "subsequent generations" (Hearnshaw, _Short_ 54). Both habits and instincts, then, were memories which had been forgotten, or become unconscious. Thus the unconscious assumed a tremendous role in Butler's system, as in later psychodynamic theories. Unlike the Freudian unconscious, however, Butler's comprised a vast storehouse of "knowledges and aptitudes that serve [an individual] better than anything he can learn or cultivate on his own account" during his lifetime (Sinclair, _Defence_ 6). These 'race memories' are closer to Jung's collective unconscious. Butler's idea that there was an underlying directive life force that determined which memories survived bears striking resemblance to the later-developed Jungian libido.

Though Butler made a less significant contribution to psychology than Lewes, he became far more influential on the next generation of writers, including G.B. Shaw, H.G. Wells, Rebecca West, Dorothy Richardson, May Sinclair, E.M. Forster, J.D. Beresford, and the Bloomsbury members E.M. Forster, Virginia Woolf and Lytton Strachey (Baker 247). They found particularly attractive his _The Way of All Flesh_ (1903), which illustrates his theory of the necessity of listening to inner impulses over the voices of others in order to achieve individuality, an act of genius. Shaw and
Forster, virtually Butler's disciples, adopted his attitude of probing beneath surfaces to reveal hidden psychological truth. Forster especially developed Butler's idea of inherited instinctual wisdom in the figures of Mrs. Wilcox and Mrs. Moore of Howards End (1910) and A Passage to India (1924) respectively (L.E. Holt 816-817). However, it was May Sinclair who took Butler's psychology most seriously, devoting a pivotal chapter to it in her A Defence of Idealism (1917). Though she accepted his theory of heredity, she denied his view that personality amounted to no more than a cluster of buried memories necessarily followed from this theory. This view did not allow for the immortality of the soul; instead, Sinclair posited that memory and the organism are dependent on personal identity (37-38). Nevertheless, Sinclair's criticism comes much later. While most late nineteenth-century psychologists would not have subscribed to Butler's extreme views on the principles of inheritance, many held that personal identity depended on memory.

* * *
William James: the psychology of everyday life

William James was another evolutionist who reacted against the theory of natural selection. He could not accept the social Darwinists' application to various aspects of morality and society of the principles of natural selection as the single explanatory model. However, his contribution to psychology is much greater than this and needs to be examined more closely. In fact, his wide ranging work renders disciplinary categories meaningless and neat summary impossible; the tendrils of his influence extend into many fields, including literature. In his career we have one of the most striking examples of the shift from first wave into second wave psychology. Formally trained in philosophy, James had written articles on psychology from 1868 onwards, but it was not until the publication of the Principles of Psychology in 1890, in which he carefully distinguished the province of psychology from both philosophy and physiology, that the full impact of his study was felt on the emerging discipline. He was also active in researching psychical phenomena, becoming a member of the Society For Psychical Research shortly after its inception, serving as Vice-President from 1890-1910 and as President in 1894-5,
founding the American branch in 1884, and investigating the medium Mrs. Piper throughout the 1890's. His work in this rapidly expanding field led to his becoming an expert on the new French experimental psychology of the subconscious. The dynamic nature of the psyche that he proposed in lectures on exceptional mental states in 1896 in turn formed the basis of his groundbreaking study of the psychology of religion, *Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902). In addition, beginning in the 1890's and continuing until his death in 1910, James devoted an increasing amount of effort to general problems of philosophy, the outcome of which is embodied in his three doctrines of pragmatism, pluralism, and radical empiricism.

In assessing James's contribution, James Kantor claims that "Jamesian psychology is a magnificent failure: magnificent because James intended to naturalize mental states, a failure because he in no sense divested himself of the assumption that psychology is concerned with spiritistic processes" (147). However, this quotation suggests a misunderstanding of James's intention and a distortion of his achievement. In the "Preface" to the *Principles of Psychology* (1890), James claims that his positivistic view "is anything but ultimate" (see also I 182), and his openmindedness caused him to deny that the book formed
anything like a closed system (vi). Following the
Principles, James realized even more fully the folly of
ignoring data arising from the flux of experience,
regardless of whether or not it transcended the traditional
bounds of scientific positivism and lent support to
spiritist theories. This expansionist view of human
psychology aligns more closely with his friend Frederic
Myers, and later Jung's, approach, than with Freud's
reductionistic model. James's psychology has been a failure
only in the sense that it has not maintained the influence
that it once had, a fate it shares with the other
expansionist theories. His achievement was to be the first
major psychologist to integrate fully philosophical,
experimental and medical psychology, as Hearnshaw claims
(Short 152), but also to incorporate findings from psychical
research and to apply all of these to the psychology of
religion. Though inevitably some of his views reflect his
nineteenth-century training, he is most accurately viewed as
the main instigator of the eclecticism which flourished in
the field of psychology in the early twentieth century in
Britain. James's impact on the literary consciousness of the
period was no less profound. Except for his idea of the
stream of consciousness, this impact has been similarly
undervalued. James was an American, but three of his texts
had a particularly strong effect in Britain. An examination of these, along with a comparison of his major ideas with Freud's and other prominent psychologists', will make the nature of his influence in both disciplinary spheres clearer.

Though James modestly intended his *Principles of Psychology* (1890) to be an advanced textbook for students, it was immediately recognized, as Frederic Myers put it, as "perhaps the completest treatment of the subject, from the purely scientific side, which any single work in our language contains" (Myers, "Principles" 111). It became a nexus of current thought on psychology and also incorporated some of the striking new developments of second wave psychology. In the "Preface" to the monumental 1400-page work, James defines the subject matter of psychology quite simply as the science of finite individual minds which has as its data thoughts and experiences. Psychology assumes a physical world in time and space with which this data coexists and which it knows (James, I vi). His approach is both descriptive and explanatory and tends to have a materialistic bias. However, the net result of James's effort is to increase our understanding of the complexity of consciousness and its relation to bodily processes.
Despite its length, there are certain deliberate omissions from his text: James claims to exclude the important subjects of pleasure and pain, as well as moral and aesthetic feelings and judgements, though there are scattered references which can be shaped into an aesthetic. Also, his positivistic stance caused him to reject, at least for the purposes of his textbook, both the mechanistic associationist theory and the spiritualist soul theory because both impose partial explanations on the facts of experience using some preconceived ideas. James's arguments against these theories reveal several important points about his own position. His rejection of the mechanist automaton theory that mental acts lie wholly in a previous nerve movement and that consciousness is merely a passive spectator, led to his view of consciousness as more active and as having causal efficacy (James, I 128). His discarding of the mind-stuff theory (the latest offshoot of the Lockean school, I 178), which proposed that our mental states are compounds, caused him to reject the concept of an unconscious. James argued that entities in the unconscious cannot sum themselves together to compose a full consciousness (I 159) and that the distinction between the unconscious and conscious being of a mental state "is the sovereign means for believing what one likes in psychology" (I 163).
Instead, James argued that the entire thought (even of a complex object) is the minimum entity which psychology can deal with on the mental side (I 177). Though he also rejected the "pure" soul theory, he did posit that the soul is possibly "a medium upon which... the manifold brain-processes combine their effects" (I 181) and he confesses "that to posit a soul influenced in some mysterious way by the brain-states and responding to them by conscious affections of its own, seems to me the line of least logical resistance, so far as we have yet attained" (I 181).

However, the only thing we can know immediately is the state of consciousness, not the soul; thus James confined himself to a study of the former. He examined consciousness more closely perhaps than anyone before him, and we now turn to consider that rich yield.

James deals with the essential nature of consciousness in the famous Chapter Nine of Principles, "The Stream of Thought." He begins with a consideration of the character of thought, which is: part of personal consciousness, always changing, sensibly continuous, selective and impulsive (I 526). According to James, the Lockean view, that ideas are associated or linked in the mind, does not correspond to reality:

Consciousness, then, does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. Such words as 'chain' or 'train' do not describe it fitly as it presents
itself in the first instance. It is nothing jointed; it flows. A 'river' or a 'stream' are the metaphors by which it is most naturally described. In talking of it hereafter, let us call it the stream of thought, of consciousness, or of subjective life. (I 237)

James's view represents a fuller analysis of consciousness because it takes into account the transitive parts of thought. Previous theories ignored these "fringes" because they were "in-flight" and therefore anonymous, and instead concentrated on the resting places or substantive elements of thought (I 246). Conversely James stressed the dynamic nature of thought:

When we think, we are to a great extent caught up in the sweep of our states of consciousness, vividly aware of images or words present until displaced by others, but also continuously aware, although less vividly and on the fringes of the words and images, of a felt direction of thought movement in thinking (as qtd. in Myers, W.J. 256).

James's analysis of consciousness as dynamic stream had several important implications for his concept of the self. James at least partially replaced the traditional notion that there is a single, unified self with the idea that there are several selves — material, social, spiritual and Ego — and he also reduced the substantiality of each. For example, he claimed that "a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind" (I 294). More significantly, the spiritual self, defined as the most inner or subjective
being taken concretely, was only "a certain portion of the stream abstracted from the rest...." (I 296). Furthermore, James demonstrated a materialistic bias when he stated that this self is really a feeling of bodily activities whose exact nature is by most men overlooked (I 302). He also called into question the assumption that there is a purely mental Arch-Ego, a pure principle of personal identity, substantial self or soul. This hypothesis, which relies on metaphysics, was not necessary to account for the common-sense feeling that thoughts have ownership. The present, 'judging' thought provided what unity there is in personal identity since it was "the representative of the entire past stream" (I 340). This present Thought appropriated to itself

the hook from which the chain of past selves dangles, planted firmly in the Present, which alone passes for real, and thus keep[s] the chain from being a purely ideal thing. Anon the hook itself will drop into the past with all it carries, and then be treated as an object and appropriated by a new thought in the new present which will serve as living hook in turn. (I 340-341)

Thus, though James strove for some unity in the stream of consciousness, the overall effect of his position was to remove confidence in the unity of selfhood.

Findings from psychical research about thought-transference, mesmeric influence, and spirit control also shaped James's conception of the self. These phenomena
reinforced James's idea about the fluidity of the self, that it lacked substantial boundaries. After reviewing the evidence, he stated that, "The definitely closed nature of our personal consciousness is probably an average statistical resultant of many conditions, but not an elementary fact or force" (I 350) and he suggested that the concept of an "anima mundi" held most promise of providing an explanation (I 346).²

Early on in Principles, James articulated the need for psychologists to look to pathology for human insight (I 54), and his knowledge of this burgeoning field also influenced his view of consciousness. He considered that the unconscious states of hysterics are really secondary consciousnesses (I 206). His chapter on "The Consciousness of Self" concluded with an examination of such phenomena as insanity, alternating personalities, and mediumships. These provided evidence of alterations in memory and disjunctions in the present self (I 373-400).

James included only a brief mention of a developmental view of consciousness and self in the Principles. Contrary to the accepted view, James argued that "Our earliest, most instinctive, least developed kind of consciousness is the objective kind; and only as reflection becomes developed do we become aware of an inner world at
James's introspective investigation of the nature of consciousness forms the core of Principles and it colours his approach to the other major topics of traditional psychology with which he deals, including habit, attention, time, memory, instinct, and emotion. James accords great importance to habit, referring to it as "the enormous fly-wheel of society" (I 121). This causes him to elevate the importance of the early years of life and also to sound very deterministic: "It [habit] dooms us all to fight out the battle of life upon the lines of our nurture or our early choice" (I 121). Philosophically, however, James was an indeterminist, believing in the necessity of purposive striving to overcome habit, though this position was based on ethical rather than psychological reasons (Myers, W.J. 392). Habit has an effect on our field of consciousness in that it diminishes the conscious attention with which our acts are performed (I 114); thus attention presides over the forming of habits.

Attention is another of the self's main activities, along with assenting, negating, and making an effort (Myers, W.J. 346). James pointed out that this topic had been ignored by the English empirical school because it implies a degree of reactive spontaneity and shows that mind is not a
pure receptacle of experience (I 402). His discussion of attention provides a corrective, and is at least partly an elaboration of his description of the selective characteristic of consciousness. Attention shapes consciousness by giving an intelligible perspective to it: "without it the consciousness of every creature would be a gray chaotic indiscriminateness...." (I 403). However, for the most part attention focusses naturally: "The stream of our thought is like a river. On the whole easy simple flowing predominates in it, the drift of things is with the pull of gravity, and effortless attention is the rule" (I 451). James also distinguishes types of, and differences in, attending, resulting from differing capacities in visualization, and hearing.

Next to the stream of consciousness, James's conception of time became most influential, though it was not wholly original. As Gerald Myers observes, for James there was an intimate connection between the concepts of consciousness and time because if time is not continuous, then neither is consciousness (W.J. 150). Nevertheless, there is a slight tension in his psychology here because James neglected the flowing nature of time in his preoccupation with its fine-grained structure (Myers, W.J. 153). Since nothing in our experience matches the concept of
an instantaneous point in time, James focussed on the enduring present, alternately referred to as duration, or specious time (Myers, W.J. 144). Fundamentally, James argued that time is directly sensed or felt. We are able to sense that the present endures, for a maximum of about twelve seconds, and this amount of time just elapsed, along with "a vaguely vanishing backward and forward fringe" constitutes the specious present (I 613). Gerald Myers comments that

The idea of the specious present helps clarify "the present moment" and the past-present-future distinction within the now. It suggests how an immediately past event can be said to be presently remembered when it would be odd to say it is remembered; or how an event coming to be is in a way both future and present. (W.J. 160)

Though James thus broadened and deepened the present moment through analysis of its elements, he also claimed that our immediate experience of time is synthetic, and in this sense it is analogous to the perception of space. In keeping with his pluralism, James postulated the existence of a multiplicity of times rather than one Real time, and in this characteristic time resembles space as well. However, Myers asserts that James did not deny objective time altogether:

Perhaps he believed that there are processes with inherent temporal lengths which can be called objective times. If our perceptions of those processes match the processes themselves in their temporal respects, then our intuitions of time are objective; if not, our intuitions are reverie or fantasy. (W.J. 156)
Finally, James's apparent denial that times and spaces are connected with larger unities reinforces the implication made earlier about the self that there is no enveloping ego to organize experience (Myers, W.J. 154).

James's conception of consciousness and of self also caused him to pay a good deal of attention to the role of memory, for two reasons. At least from one viewpoint there are many past selves (I 335), and false memories have the power to distort the consciousness of the "me", since that is constructed through the appropriation of the past by the present Thought (I 373). James evokes the relation of the stream to memory in the following: "The stream of thought flows on; but most of its segments fall into the bottomless abyss of oblivion" (I 640). Memory serves to retrieve states of mind from oblivion, presuming these originally endured long enough in consciousness to make an imprint. Memory thus focusses attention beyond the specious present; essentially it is "the feeling of belief in a peculiar complex object" (I 652). Memory itself is complex because psychic fringes of images and thoughts of the object remembered must be assimilated in the mind. In order to feel the object substantively "we must reproduce the thought as it was uttered, with every word fringed and the whole sentence bathed in that original halo of obscure relations, which,
like an horizon, then spread about its meaning" (Principles I 275-6; Myers, W.J. 164). In his section on association, James shows that he is well aware of the importance of childhood memory: "Thus it is that events lived through, only once, and in youth, may come in after years by reason of their exciting quality or emotional intensity" (I 576). However, he does not elaborate on the developmental aspect of memory.

James was clearer on the role of instincts in development. He argued that "Most instincts are implanted for the sake of giving rise to habits..." and then they naturally fade away (II 402). He also posited many diverse instincts in humans, a point which will be considered further when we come to compare James and Freud's perspectives.

For James, instinct and emotion are closely linked since "Every object that excites an instinct excites an emotion as well," the difference between the two being that "the emotional reaction usually terminates in the subject's own body, whilst the instinctive reaction is apt to go farther and enter into practical relations with the exciting object" (II 442). James's theory of emotion was actually the most revolutionary notion in Principles and it generated a great deal of commentary. Based on both physiological
experimentation and introspection, James argued that "Emotion follows upon the bodily Expression in the coarser emotions at least" (II 449). Though this concept of emotion was highly materialistic, it represented an advance over the traditional approach of categorizing various emotions in great detail because it focussed on the activity of emotion. It also, as James himself noted, "makes us realize more deeply than ever how much our mental life is knit up with our corporeal frame (II 467). James later modified the theory but the core remained that "a felt emotion is some feeling of bodily, organic change, whether or not it is a chronic or even identifiable symptom of the emotion" (Myers, W.J. 222). Unlike other psychologists swept away by the tide of materialism, James's physiological emphasis did not, as Myers observes, lead him to conclude that a person's inner life is unimportant (W.J. 228).

In fact, since James was an amazingly versatile truth-seeker, any account of his psychology would be incomplete if it concluded with Principles, as rich as that source is. The major development in James's thought after his masterpiece was the increasing attention he paid to the nature of inner life. His account of the subliminal extensions of Self in some ways countered the implications about the insubstantiality of self in Principles, and led to
a more inclusive view of man. In "The Hidden Self", an article published the same year as Principles, James stated the necessity of connecting abnormal psychology, psychical research and mental healing:

My own impression is that the trance-condition is an immensely complex and fluctuating thing, into the understanding of which we have hardly begun to penetrate .... A comparative study of trances and subconscious states is meanwhile of the most urgent importance for the comprehension of our nature.5

This synthetic approach to the field actually closely resembles that of British psychical researchers Myers and Gurney, as we shall see.6 In lectures given at the Lowell institute in Boston in 1896, James attempted to summarize the relations between abnormal or exceptional states. While these lectures have only recently been published, and thus would not have been influential on British audiences in 1896, they are important because they show that, by this time, James had developed a second-wave, dynamic or, as he referred to it, "dynamogenic" psychology of the subconscious, a point which has not been recognized by traditional scholars of James's thought (Taylor, W.J. 10). According to Eugene Taylor, dynamogenic was defined by James as

the movement of psychic energy -- in pathology when energy is locked up and expresses itself through symptoms of depression, hallucinations, or explosive emotion; and in health when we go beyond our normal limits and tap those vital reserves of
energy and power that each of us always holds in abeyance. (Taylor, W.J. 10)

In its taking into account the dynamics of both illness and health, it owes much to Myers's twin concepts of subliminal and supraliminal. James' psychodynamic perspective on the subconscious is also important because it implies a psychotherapeutic method allied as much with philosophy and religion as with experimental medicine and psychology: one based ultimately on understanding of the patient's problem followed by self-help, rather than on professional diagnosis by classification followed by impersonal treatment.

Taylor speculates that the lectures may not have been published at the time since, soon after giving them, James began work on the Gifford lectures, eventually published as The Varieties of Religious Experience in 1902. Certainly James' dynamic view of the psyche informs that work, and he elaborates on some of the same material, while simultaneously applying it to the specific problem of the essence of religion.

Varieties is important for several reasons. It represents the first major integration of the latest developments in second wave psychology with religion, by which James meant the feelings and conduct associated with religious states, rather than dogma or theories. As McDougall claims, prior to James's book, "psychology had been regarded as the natural enemy of religion" (McDougall,
"In Memory" 93), but *Varieties* changed all that. Although James followed the dictum stated in *Principles*, that we must look to the abnormal for better understanding of normality (James, *Varieties* 22), he avoided the reductiveness of previous medical approaches to religious behaviour:

To the medical mind these ecstasies signify nothing but suggested and imitated hypnoid states, on an intellectual basis of superstition, and a corporeal one of degeneration and hysteria. Undoubtedly these pathological conditions have existed in many and possibly in all cases, but that fact tells us nothing about the value for knowledge of the consciousness they induce. To pass a spiritual judgement upon these states, we must not content ourselves with superficial medical talk, but inquire into their fruits for life. (*Varieties* 413)

Partly because of this pragmatic emphasis, *Varieties* became immensely popular, a factor which heightens its importance in the present context because it brought the fruits of second-wave psychology to the attention of a wide audience. However, most significantly for present purposes, James explored further the fringes of consciousness, and their effect on personality and religion.

James argued that the development of religious consciousness is affected by personality type and temperament, significantly by whether one has a healthy-minded or morbid-minded way of viewing life (*Varieties* 162-163). Furthermore, conversion experience is seen as the unification of a divided self. In order to understand this
phenomenon, James explores the characteristics of the field of consciousness. Consciousness may expand or contract and has a margin: "Our whole past store of memories floats beyond this margin, ready at a touch to come in..." (Varieties 232). Taking Myers's concept as a basis, James claimed that the subliminal is the region beyond the margin and it is "the larger part of each of us, for it is the abode of everything that is latent and the reservoir of everything that passes unrecorded or unobserved" (Varieties 483). Though James believed that "It is the source of our dreams, and apparently they may return to it..." (Varieties 483), he was too pragmatic to argue that it was simply a source of strength. He noted that

That region contains every kind of matter: 'seraph and snake' abide there side by side. To come from thence is no infallible credential. What comes must be sifted and tested, and run the gauntlet of confrontation with the total context of experience, just like what comes from the outer world of sense. (Varieties 426-427)

This outline of the dynamics of mind presents instantaneous conversion, like automatism, as "an explosion, into the fields of ordinary consciousness, of ideas elaborated outside of those fields in subliminal regions of the mind" by people who "are in possession of a large region in which mental work can go on subliminally" (Varieties 235, 237). Similarly, mystical states spring from the subliminal or
transmarginal region (*Varieties* 426). Though much of *Varieties* deals with the extremes of religious experience, James extended his hypothesis to ordinary people. In general, what James referred to as the "more" which individuals come into contact with in religious experience is partly the subconscious continuation of conscious life. He is less definite about what this more is on the spiritual side, but he posits the "overbelief" that a power larger than ourselves impinges on the subconscious (*Varieties* 515). He thus brought the new dynamic psychology, and in particular Myers's concept of subliminal, into a central position and demonstrated its explanatory power.

In certain respects -- notably in its exploration of the subliminal and multiple personality -- *Varieties* can be seen as the third volume of *Principles*; however, in another important sense it represents a departure from the earlier work. In *Varieties*, James sets out to show the value of religious experience by empirical standards, but he is far more aware of the limitations of the positivistic view of psychology and of reason itself. His observation about the reality beyond the five senses is indicative of his stance:

> It is as if there were in the human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception of what we may call "something there," more deep and more general than any of the special and particular 'senses' by which current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally
revealed. (Varieties 58)

Rather than throwing his full support behind positivism, which proves inadequate to measure the extraordinary phenomena he deals with, James opts for a piecemeal or pluralistic view, that the universe is multi-faceted and no one system of ideas is true. The book thus provides a convincing depiction of the place of both science and religion, if not a reconciliation between the two. James asks,

And why, after all, may not the world be so complex as to consist of many interpenetrating spheres of reality, which we can thus approach in alternation by using different conceptions and assuming different attitudes.... On this view religion and science, each verified in its own way from hour to hour and from life to life, would be co-eternal. (Varieties 122)

Finally, James demonstrated clearly the relevance of psychology to larger questions, traditionally the domain of metaphysics. Dynamic psychology in particular could make sense of the seemingly disparate material of religious experience, often previously shrouded in mystery. Thus Varieties became an important work of second wave psychology.

James's focus on personal aspects of religion and their fruits forms part of his larger attitude of pragmatism, which he had first formally outlined in 1898. Pragmatism comprises a method of ascertaining truth by
evaluating "ideas in terms of their dynamic significance -- their consequences for concrete experience and practice" (Morris 26). The distinctiveness and importance of ideas can be tested by their effect on the stream of experience, their potential for changing current realities, rather than on their relation to prior knowledge or eternal principles. In this forward-looking tendency and in its emphasis on change, pragmatism is in full accord with James's view of consciousness. James's pragmatism also lent support to another of his main doctrines, radical empiricism, developed in 1904.

Radical empiricism elevated the importance of experience in defining philosophical problems. James argued that radical empiricism afforded a more intimate way of viewing reality than traditional approaches, since it focussed attention on the conjunctive and disjunctive relations between things, rather than on the things themselves or the terms or concepts by which they are expressed (Bird 66). The theory thus acknowledged the flux, and muddled, partial nature of experience. Concrete pulses of experience "run into one another continuously and seem to interpenetrate. What in them is relation and what is matter related is hard to discern" until the process of conceptualisation takes over and creates order (Pluralism
This doctrine thus supports the evidence James put forward in *Principles* that every experience is fringed by a more, extending beyond what the individual can consciously focus on (Myers, W.J. 333).

If truth is made in the course of this experience, as James's pragmatism proposes, and experience itself is not a seamless whole, which his radical empiricism makes clear, then it follows that there is no absolute unity, the position taken in James's pluralism. James developed this philosophical position in the 1908 Hibbert lectures he gave at Manchester College, Oxford, subsequently published as *A Pluralistic Universe*. In its denial that the world is fundamentally one enormous, indivisible whole, pluralism directly opposed the idealistic monism then prevalent at Oxford, but the doctrine had several implications for his psychology as well.

James realized that the position he took in *Principles* that states of consciousness could not compound themselves did not correspond to the reality of the continuity and simultaneity of mental states. In order to acknowledge this reality, he either had to posit the existence of some spiritual agent that compounded mental states or to admit the limitations of logic and the irrationality of life (*Pluralistic* 95-97). James opted for
the latter and found support in Bergson's critique of intellectualism. The rationalist and intellectualist know the world by concepts, but these abstractions quite fail to connect us with the inner life of the flux, or with the real causes that govern its direction. Instead of being interpreters of reality, concepts negate the inwardness of reality altogether. (Pluralistic 110)

Following Bergson, James turned to the world of sensation to discover features of the perpetual flux (James, Pluralistic 111). He examined closely the 'passing moment', the minimal fact of sensation, and found that "inside of the minimal pulses of experience is realised that very inner complexity which the transcendentalists say only the absolute can genuinely possess" (Pluralistic 128). Thus, James's philosophical stance prompted him to examine more accurately the nature of concrete reality and consciousness without imposing a conceptual framework on them.

Though James's three philosophical doctrines were eventually eclipsed in the profession of philosophy by logical positivism, and in psychology by trends as diverse as behaviourism and individual psychology, many acknowledged a profound debt to James, including Bertrand Russell and Carl Jung. As the emergence of pragmatic societies suggests, James's philosophy also became very popular amongst more general audiences, though his arguments were often
misinterpreted (Morris 5).

In order to clarify the nature of James's influence, it is helpful to compare his innovations with Freud's, especially since James's work demonstrates that some of the concepts with which Freud captured the imagination of the world had already been suggested by James. Through his connection with the English Society for Psychical research, James was aware of Freud's work on hypnosis and hysteria as early as 1894, when he reviewed Freud's and Breuer's paper "Ueber den psychischen Mechanismus hysterischer Phanomene" for the Psychological Review; in so doing he introduced the then unknown name of Freud to America. In both Varieties of Religious Experience (234) and A Pluralistic Universe (134), James makes favourable passing references to Freud, though he does not distinguish him from other medical investigators into hysteria and split personality; he tends to present this work in the context of Myers's subliminal consciousness. By 1909, James was curious enough about Freud that he attended Freud's lectures at Clark University. He wrote to Flournoy about this encounter that Freud gave him the "impression of a man obsessed with a fixed Idea. I can make nothing in my own case with his dream theories, and obviously 'symbolism' is a most dangerous method" (as qtd. in Barzun 232). Nevertheless, he felt that Freud and his
followers could not fail to throw light on human nature with their contributions to "functional" psychology (Barzun 232).

As Jacques Barzun notes, James quite accurately assessed Freud's psychology as functional or pragmatic, since it " depends for its chief verification on success in curing" (233). Thus both employed pragmatic methods: whereas Freud explored the psychopathology of everyday life, James wrote the psychology of everyday life. Freud, however, misconceived and was highly skeptical of pragmatism, though, ironically, it was largely for its pragmatic slant that Freud's theory and therapy triumphed over James's, which had, in some ways, prepared the ground for Freud. With an eye on practical results, both men organized and systematized the available scientific knowledge in their fields. They also relied heavily on introspection, drew upon the insights of the artistic world, and used vivid and imaginative metaphor to express their main concepts. In addition, both drew on the material of the abnormal and the exceptional to make generalizations about the normal. In so doing they collapsed age-old distinctions between the two, and were severely criticized as a result.¹ Both attempted to formulate laws about human nature (see Principles, I 539).
The major difference in their thinking, however, is that, whereas Freud believed that he had found the key to human behaviour through the dream, which led to his theories of sexuality, James distrusted any single over-arching system just as much as he distrusted the concept of the Absolute. His discussion in *Varieties of Religious Experience* of different ways of perceiving reality suggests why he thought of Freud as obsessed by a fixed idea:

But why in the name of common sense need we assume that only one such system of ideas can be true? The obvious outcome of our total experience is that the world can be handled according to many systems of ideas, and is so handled by different men, and will each time give some characteristic kind of profit, for which he cares, to the handler, while at the same time some other kind of profit has to be omitted or postponed. (122)

The consequences of their difference in vision are that Freud's system is reductive and reaches into the past of an individual's mental life, while James's theories tend to be partial, expansionist and forward-looking in their emphasis on the necessity of purposive striving.

Nevertheless, there are many points of intersection in specific areas of the psychologies of each. Both stressed the dynamic nature of consciousness. James went so far as to state that "It is of the essence of all consciousness (or the neural process which underlies it) to instigate movement of some sort" (*Principles*, II 551). Freud's development of
the free association method may even have been shaped by his exposure to James's passages on the stream of consciousness in *Principles*. Saul Rosenzweig points out that, in Freud's "Fragment of an analysis of a Case of Hysteria", written in 1901, he compares a patient's account of his life to an unnavigable stream. The method of treatment consists of filling in gaps in this initial account (Rosenzweig 255). In this first application of the idea of free association, both the stream metaphor and the language of gaps echo James (*Principles*, I 239, 251). Since Freud had read extensively in the psychological literature of England and America in the 1890's, it becomes more probable that he had some knowledge of James's highly popular work (Rosenzweig 255).

Furthermore, both had first attempted to place the dynamics of consciousness on a neurophysiological footing, James in *Principles* and Freud in his 1905 "Project for a Scientific Psychology." For example, Freud followed James in arguing that there was a neural basis for habit because "the repeated passage of excitation along nervous pathways facilitated transmission" (Gregory 276).

Though Freud's later psychological account of mental structure is more precise, systematic, and mechanistic than James's account, several references from *Principles* show that James was well aware of the basic dynamic mechanisms of
the mind long before Freud. On numerous occasions in *Principles*, James remarks on the "*impulsive quality of mental states*" (II 551), and in this he is in complete agreement with Freud. However, James would have found fault with Freud's "pleasure principle". Following the associationists, James acknowledged that feelings of pleasure and pain, above all others which have this impulsive quality, are "the most belief-compelling" and have a "widespread and searching" influence on our movements (II 306). However, he denied that pleasure and pain were the sole spurs of action, and he demonstrated "the silliness of the old-fashioned pleasure-philosophy" of Bain and others for believing this (II 551). Instead, to describe the condition which determines the impulsive and inhibitive quality of objects, James proposed the broader term "interest". It is more inclusive because it "covers not only the pleasant and the painful, but also the morbidly fascinating, the tediously haunting, and even the simply habitual..." (II 559). Thus James, always wary of single comprehensive explanations, would not have agreed with Freud's fundamental distinction between the primary process of thought, governed by the pleasure principle, and the secondary process, which reflects the demands of reality. In his view this would represent a throwback to the Herbartian
version of pleasure philosophy.

In *Principles*, James also described the process of dealing with psychic conflict. In his view this process involves the effort of attending to one idea while another is inhibited, though the 'preperception' of the latter idea goes on of its own accord.

He states that

such inhibition is a partial neutralization of the brain-energy which would otherwise be available for fluent thought. But what is lost for thought is converted into feeling, in this case into the peculiar feeling of effort, difficulty, or strain. (I 451)

He images this process as "an abstraction, a set-back, a log-jam" which stops the current of thought "creates an eddy, and makes things temporarily move the other way" (I 451). This description, with its use of the terms of force and energy, sounds very much like Freud's concepts of resistance and repression; however, the temporary blocking can also be positive if nerve currents are forced into paths leading to better thinking (Myers, W.J. 229), a concept analogous to Freudian sublimation.

James's awareness of the irrationality and chaotic nature of thought also led him to propose the mechanism of a "presiding arbiter," which decides what we ought to think and leaves unrecorded the rest (I 552).¹⁰ This "arbiter" bears striking resemblance to Freud's super-ego. James's
Varieties recognizes even more clearly than Principles the importance of the irrational. Though James spoke of fringes of consciousness, he never accepted the existence of an unconscious as an entity, preferring Frederic Myers' idea of the subliminal based on thresholds. However, James's conception of the dynamics of religious experience as a three-way interaction among the most restricted sphere of experience -- consciousness -- the larger sphere of the subconscious, which has a sluice or opening into the third sphere -- the "more" or transcendental realm -- bears some vague resemblance to Freud's much later developed tripartite structure of id, ego, and superego. Both partition realms of the psyche and show how one realm can impinge on another dynamically. Also, both doctrines were derived from examination of abnormal conditions and both Freud and James were criticized for the generalizations that they made to normality. The major difference is, of course, that James includes a metaphysical dimension.

Several other comparisons can be made along the lines of the constituents of the self. James's identification of the body as the basis of the "material self" (I 292) resembles Freud's emphasis on corporal activites of the ego (Gregory 277). Their perspectives on the development of consciousness of self are also similar. Freud argued that
mental life is originally unconscious and only becomes conscious as a result of being forced to adapt to the reality of the outside world. James believed that subjectivity and interiority are developed last, though he did not believe that these processes had an unconscious origin.

Both psychologies recognize that the first foundation of the self is in instinct, and thus both stress the importance of the role of instincts. Throughout most of his career, Freud maintained a dual instinct model, though these instincts changed from hunger and love in his early work, to sexuality, and then eros and thanatos in his later writing. James, however, posited that there are a wide variety of instincts in man and that many of these, including a child's instinct to suckle as well as sexual passion, ripen at a certain age, initiate habits, and then fade away (Principles I 398, 403). Whereas Freud stressed that instinctual behaviour is in conflict with reason and socio-cultural reality, James argued that instincts are the foundations of our capacity to adapt to the challenges of our environment" (Browning 165).

These differing views on the nature of instincts at least partially explain Freud's and James's major disagreement about the place of sexuality in human behaviour. James has been criticized for his reticence on
matters of sexuality, but, as Jacques Barzun claims, James was not unaware of or resistant to these facts (237). In *Principles*, he graphically describes the act of copulation in frogs, refers repeatedly to sexual passion (Barzun 238) and claims in his section on instincts that "sexual impulses bear on their face the most obvious signs of being instinctive, in the sense of blind, automatic and untaught" (*Principles* II 437). However, he would not have accepted Freud's dictum about libido as the well-spring of human motivation because of his instinctual pluralism and his distrust of any single all-encompassing explanation for complex behaviour. His condemnation in *Varieties of Religious Experience* of the current fashion of "criticising the religious emotions by showing a connection between them and the sexual life" is illustrative (10-12). James's reasoning was that our entire mental life develops during adolescence; consequently it is absurd to claim that intellectual interests like poetry and religion are perversions of sexual instinct (*Varieties* 12). He also saw the value in sexual restraint: "No one need be told how dependent all human social elevation is upon the prevalence of chastity" (*Principles* I 22). Though these anti-sexual tendencies are, in some respects, comparable to Freud's repression and sublimation, they do not posit a single source;
thus James's system somehow seems more complete. Browning
argues that Freud's understanding of the instincts is
directly related to his cultural vision, which depicts the
healthy individual as "transcending over and detached from
both his own chaotic instincts as well as social and
cultural authority" (160). On the other hand, James's
pluralism, with its concrete view of reality, asserted that
it is wrong to denigrate the place of the human body and
sensuous experience (Bernstein xxvi). Sensuous impulses and
instincts do not conflict with reason; reason merely helps
reinforce one impulse over another through the power of
attention. Whereas Freud's elevation of the role of sexual­
ity led him to view the relation between irrational impulses
and reason or the demands of reality, in the form of a
ceaseless conflict which could just be controlled, James's
hypothesis of multiple instincts gradually transformed
through learning into habit caused James to view instinctive
behaviour much less pessimistically; eventually in A
Pluralistic Universe James endorsed irrationalism, at least
as a philosophical postulate.

James and Freud were also far apart on at least two
other major issues. Though James occasionally sounded
deterministic in outlook, he was generally critical of all
forms of modern determinism, of which Freud's is a notable
example (Browning 38). James's and Freud's attitudes towards art and the artist are opposed as well. James took a materialistic perspective and thus believed that the aesthetic interest was a natural one and the artist a sensitive and highly sympathetic figure (Barzun 237). However, Freud depicted the artist as a neurotic who was able to channel his daydreams and fantasies into a socially acceptable product. James also insisted that pure aesthetic emotion is prompted absolutely by its effect on the senses and that, overlaid on this experience, were secondary pleasures. The relative effect of these secondary pleasures depended on one's general aesthetic orientation, for example the degree to which one's tastes were classic or romantic (Principles II 468-9). Thus James suggested a number of the dynamic mechanisms of mind which Freud later named and explained. Though there are several important intersection points between their psychologies, there are also important differences, stemming from the variance in their philosophical positions.

James's influence on Jung is more direct, profound, and, therefore, easier to document than his impact on Freud. In a 1936 lecture in which Jung surveyed his own approach to the psyche, he claimed that,

there is one [name] which I would not like to omit. It is that of William James, whose psychological vision and pragmatic philosophy have on more than
According to Eugene Taylor, one of the more important occasions on which James's thought guided Jung's occurred in 1911. Jung redefined libido to include not only the sexual but also spiritual energy, citing James's pragmatic rule that a theory should act as a "program for more work", as justification for his expansion of the original meaning of libido (as qtd in Taylor, "James and Jung" 163). James thus helped Jung to move away from the Freudian paradigm and back on to the line of thinking he had been developing before his encounter with Freud's ideas. There are several other significant instances of influence. Jung's psychological types elaborated on James's distinction in Pragmatism between tender and tough-minded characters (Taylor "James and Jung" 164). Jung's idea of a collective unconscious was shaped by his reading of James's early interpretation of Myers's concept of subliminal thresholds that extended from the bestial to the transcendent. James's formulation of the characteristics of consciousness, including the notion of "fields", psychic fringes, and the action of memory impinging on the margin of consciousness, had great impact on Jung's view of the relation between consciousness and the unconscious.
James's broadminded vision, derived from his studies in psychical research, that abnormal phenomena need not be pathological or degenerative, but could represent contact with a wider sphere of knowledge, also had an effect on Jung. Jung cited James's description of Mary Reynolds's double personality, in which her second personality was actually wiser and superior to her 'normal' self (Taylor, "James and Jung" 158), and he continued to be interested in psychical research throughout his career. Perhaps most importantly, Jung adopted James's attitude that science consisted of a plurality of principles based on individual visions, analogous to religions (Taylor, "James and Jung" 165). The wider framework for psychology that James espoused clearly shaped Jung's thought; it also had considerable impact on prominent English psychologists, as we shall see.

However, James's far reaching vision had no less an impact on the culture and, in particular, the literature of his and the next generation. The influence of his thought on the literature of the period is particularly pervasive, and often so subtle that its effect is not always as clearly recognizable as the effect of a higher profile, more contentious figure like Freud. We will now attempt to summarize the general characteristics of that impact and to suggest some of the reasons for the scope of his effect on
In *Principles*, James revealed a human nature more complex than had hitherto been imagined. "Normality" was not cleanly demarcated from aberration and abnormalities, but rather integrated with them. A comparable dissatisfaction with the simple and normal can be found in the dominant literary trends of the 1890's --Naturalism and Symbolism. James's work fuelled this curiosity for detailed knowledge of human functioning, and the abnormal aspects of normality. James's psychology was less concerned with concepts and more tuned into genuine experience than most earlier systems of psychology. It thus had a practical appeal, which was strengthened by James's vivid writing style. James's general view of the world as an artistic creation was guaranteed to appeal to the artist. Similarly, his assertion that the mind functioned like an artist made artistic endeavor appear natural and fundamental (Barzun 71). Like the artist, the mind responded spontaneously and unpredictably to experience and shaped a vision out of that experience. It selected some details and rejected others in order to do so. James stressed that the mind was not composed of ideas corresponding with objects, but that it was characterized by relations, and relations were far more important in the work of art than the individual elements which made it up.
Not only did James image the mind as artistic, but he offered many specific insights about human psychology that proved invaluable to writers, as the following brief summary will indicate. James highlighted aspects of consciousness that had been undervalued, such as its fluidity and dynamism. Subsequently, novelists who wanted to get closer to inner reality than had been done were faced with the challenge of imitating that fluidity. James pointed out how intensely personal each stream was, which caused artists to question the effectiveness of the omniscient viewpoint. Writers were also prompted to reproduce those intimate details which made characters strikingly individual, rather than to rely on readily identifiable character types. James's acknowledgement and exploration of the fringes of consciousness led writers to revel in these hitherto ignored mysteries. His questioning of the unity and substantiality of the self may have suggested to writers the possibility of creating incongruous characters. James's focus on the instability of the self, along with his exploration of the enduring moment in time, directed writers' to emphasize this expanded moment, if they had not already discovered its literary potential for themselves. The suggestion of the importance of each moment in evoking personality likely contributed to making writers much more self-conscious about
each descriptive detail included in a story. James brought the role of memory and habit to the fore, as did several other psychologists, and these aspects of psychic functioning became powerful forces in the fiction of the Edwardian and Modern periods. The legitimacy that James brought to the study of psychic phenomena contributed to its inclusion in a wider conception of the realistic novel. James's pluralism and pragmatism reinforced writers' awareness of the partial nature of experience and truth, and provided a warning to writers who had been inclined to impose a universal reality in their work. The tension between introspection and scientific objectivity that James grappled with over the course of his career is reflected in much modern literature. Writers frequently desired both to enter a character's stream of consciousness and to maintain a distance, as Joyce's Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man well illustrates. Overall, James provided writers with a much wider conception of human psychology than had previously appeared, as well as a deeper understanding of the dynamics of inner reality.

James also left this inclusive view of human psychology to British psychologists of the next generation. Though James was an American, few British psychologists at the turn of the century had not in some way been affected by
James's *Principles of Psychology* (1890). They tended to continue the tradition of eclecticism which James so well represents. Three of the most significant British psychologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries deserve mention since their approaches to the subject are representative of the trends prior to Freud's introduction to England. James Sully (1843-1923) was heavily influenced by the British empirical tradition as well as by evolution theory; he attempted to apply the findings of these to developmental psychology. Though he reacted against the imported German Idealism, and viewed psychology essentially as the study of consciousness, Hearnshaw claims that,

Sully was particularly interested in the borderland between the normal and the abnormal, in the imaginative and the fanciful, and in his book on *Illusions* (1881) he made a detailed study not only of perceptual illusions, but of dreams, hallucinations and delusions. His work on dreams was commended by Freud, and his *Studies in Childhood* excel in the chapters on imagination, play and art. (Hearnshaw, *Short* 135)

James Ward (1843-1925), who was as prominent as Sully, fulfills more of the characteristics peculiar to British psychology listed at the outset of this section. Largely for religious reasons, he rejected empiricism and associationism, favouring instead idealism, which caused him to stress the importance of an active unitary self in
psychological analysis. He asserted the necessity of keeping the biological sciences separate from psychology, but was quite willing to include metaphysical speculation within its realm.

G.F. Stout (1860-1944), a student of Ward's, essentially remained within the empirical tradition, although, like Ward, he revolted against associationism, preferring to view psychic life as unified and continuous, and mind as active. As mentioned earlier, Stout was an important proponent of Herbartian psychology; several of his ideas are based on those proposed by the Herbartian school. For instance, he elaborated on the idea of Beneke, a follower of Herbart's, that there was an element which flowed between representations in the mind by calling this element "psychical energy" (as qtd in Sand 474). Stout's main contribution was his statement that, by unity of mind he meant unity of interest. Conation, the faculty of volition, and desire held together all cognitive achievements, and at all levels the mind was active (Hearnshaw, Short 142). He also elaborated on James's concept of stream of consciousness and emphasized a developmental approach (Hearnshaw, Short 142). His dynamic view of mind activated by desire derives from Herbart's and shows similarities with Freud's system. Certainly it
anticipates the direction British psychology was to take in the first decades of the twentieth century.

Despite some differences, all three of these psychologists accepted introspection as the basic method of psychology, though two -- Sully and Ward -- were instrumental in setting up the first psychological laboratories in Britain. Whereas Sully and Stout remained broadly faithful to empiricism, none of them were dogmatic associationists; instead they developed more dynamic views of mind which in some ways anticipate later second wave psychologies. To varying degrees they were affected by, and open to, imported German philosophy and psychology. Ward and Stout in particular introduced Leibnitzian concepts like apperception, used to describe "all the assimilative processes 'by which a mental system appropriates a new element or otherwise receives a fresh determination'" (Hearnshaw, Short 142). Though not equally willing to admit metaphysical issues into their psychology, they held a view of mind similar to that of the psychical researchers. At least one of them, James Sully, was friendly with several leading psychical researchers, including Henry Sidgwick, Edmund Gurney, and F.W.H. Myers. (Hearnshaw, Short 133). As well, their approach to psychology was eclectic; none of them felt compelled to limit himself to a philosophical,
biological, evolutionary, or empirical viewpoint. Instead they concurred with Ward's authoritative statement in his Encyclopaedia Britannica article that there is no special subject matter of psychology but that the discipline deals with the whole of experience from the perspective of the individual (Hearnshaw, Short 138). Also, typical of the Victorians, their interests in general were diverse. Stout and Sully were thoroughly familiar with the English literary tradition and drew upon it as a source of insight. Sully especially benefitted from the effects of the cross-fertilization of ideas since he was friendly with leading philosophical, scientific, and literary figures of his day, including Darwin, Huxley, Lewes, Meredith, R.L. Stevenson and Leslie Stephen (Hearnshaw, Short 133). The significance of his association with the latter and its impact on Virginia Woolf will be dealt with in Chapter Seven. Finally, their views were disseminated through highly influential textbooks, in the case of Sully and Stout, and in Ward's widely-read encyclopaedia articles. Collectively, their perspective shaped the course of British psychology as it entered a new century, and thoroughly permeated the culture in general.

Havelock Ellis, equally significant, cannot be nearly as neatly categorized. Essentially an isolate, he did not
belong to, or foster, a 'school' of disciples. Also, he is a transitional figure between the Victorian and the modern age. On the one hand, his approach to psychology was more empirical and descriptive than dynamic. In his colossal seven volume *Studies in the Psychology of Sex* (1897, 1899, 1903, 1905, 1906, 1910, 1928), for which he is best known, he relied primarily on a method of collection and classification typical of nineteenth-century natural science, which has led his biographer, Phyllis Grosskurth, to claim that his investigations were more anthropological than psychological. On the other hand, in his magnum opus he thoroughly treated topics like inversion and auto-eroticism, which the Victorians either ignored or viewed with moralistic prejudice; his "acceptance of abnormal behavior and his recognition of a woman's right to a fulfilled sexual life" made his outlook particularly modern, according to Grosskurth (230). Overall, his work was the first in English to describe, precisely and scientifically, a wide range of normal sexual behaviours without attaching guilt to them (Hearnshaw, Short 162).

Ellis's position in relation to Freud is similarly ambiguous. He helped greatly to disseminate Freud's ideas in England (though he was not, as he occasionally claimed, the first to introduce Freud in England). He also often
defended Freud's views against attack, and he even distorted the history of psychology by playing down the significance of the theories of one of his fellow British psychologists, William McDougall, in favour of Freud (as qtd. in Grosskurth 387-389). However, in typical British fashion he could not swallow Freud's doctrine whole, either initially or as time passed, and, in fact, his reservations about Freud increased (Grosskurth 360).

A glance at Ellis's *World of Dreams* (1911) well illustrates the sort of contribution Ellis made, as well as his relation to Freud. By 1911 Ellis was no stranger to the study of dreams, having written several papers on the topic, beginning in 1895 (Ellis, *World* vii). Thus his book should not be viewed merely as an elaboration of Freud's ideas or a reaction to them. Also, given his expertise, his praise of Freud's *Die Traumdeutung* as "the most original, the most daring, the most challenging of recent books on dreams" (*World* vi) cannot be taken lightly. Ellis's subsequent remarks about Freud's genius in the field of morbid psychic phenomena, his "long-neglected recognition of the large place of symbolism in dreaming" (*World* 164) and his "almost epoch-making" views of hysteria (*World* 165) leave no doubt about Ellis's appreciation of, and openness to, Freud's contributions. Ellis and Freud agreed that, as
Ellis put it, "dreams may furnish us with clues to the whole of life" (World vii), that consciousness represented only a small part of the possible psychic field, (World 3), that it was necessary to determine the fundamental laws of the dream world (World 12), and that there was a certain logic to the dream (World 56-70). After this point their thoughts diverge. Ellis, unlike Freud, concerned himself with the laws of the dream world "as they occur in fairly ordinary and normal persons" (World 12), and he doubted whether Freud's conclusions drawn from the study of dreams of neurotic people can be safely held to represent the normal dream life, even if it be true that there is no definite frontier between them. Whatever may be the case among the neurotic, in ordinary normal sleep the images that drift across the field of consciousness, though they have a logic of their own, seem in a large proportion of cases to be quite explicable without resort to the theory that they stand in vital but concealed relationship to our most intimate self. (World 169)

Most importantly, Ellis criticized Freud's basic doctrine that every dream is a wish, claiming that this single explanation formula would not encompass all the "manifold varieties" and "degrees of depth" of dreams (World 171). In this criticism he is in agreement with all three of the writers under investigation in this thesis. According to Ellis, all dreams probably contained a presentative element, or external stimulus, as well as a representative
element, originating in memory (World 14).

Ellis also critically assessed and incorporated the best insights of other recent writers on the psychology of dreaming, including Prof. Sante de Sanctis, Pierre Janet, Henri Bergson and, most notably for present purposes, William James. Ellis's frequent allusions to the stream of consciousness (World 170, 204, 260) reveal a general indebtedness to James, but Ellis's assertion that emotional states cause the content of dreams rather than the other way around is a direct application of James's physiological theory of emotion, as Ellis acknowledges (World 109). Ellis's elevation of "the controlling power of emotion on dream ideas" to "the central fact in the psychology of dreaming" (World 107) shows the strength of the Jamesian influence. Ellis probably also partially owes his view that morality is not absent in dream life to James (World 122).

Shortly after its publication, The World of Dreams (1911) was described by Jung in a letter to Freud as a "watery brew" that only confused the study of dreams (as qtd. in Grosskurth 363). By this comment he probably meant that Ellis's book did not follow Freud's doctrine in every regard. It is true that Ellis devotes proportionately more space than Freud did in The Interpretation of Dreams to describing various types of dreams (ranging from aviation
through cardiac dreams) than to analyzing dynamics, and that he does not probe as deeply as Freud into psychic sources of dreams, but what the psychoanalysts failed to realize was that his aim was different from theirs. He states in the preface that his work "deals only with the fundamental elements" of normal dreaming, and he does not believe that the dreams of normal people require such probing, a belief shared by Sinclair, Beresford, and Woolf. The result is that his book is more wide-ranging and balanced than Freud's, though less revolutionary; far from distorting the field of dreams, it actually serves to place in perspective Freud's particular approach through abnormal psychology. Ellis's method of surveying previous work and providing a synthesis which incorporated his new insights typified his work, whether the subject-matter was dreams, sexuality, genius, or criminality. He was aware of the difference in this approach from Freud's. To use Ellis's own metaphor, he saw himself as a geographer of the mind, one who accurately mapped out its vast surface, whereas Freud, with his "more revolutionary speculations", was a geologist who worked from the depths upwards (as qtd. in Grosskurth 363). What Ellis could not see was that his methodology was becoming outdated rapidly; this fact partly explains why Ellis was eclipsed by Freud. Also, Ellis did not develop a coherent body of doctrine
(Grosskurth 217) that could be practically applied through a therapeutic procedure, as did Freud. Finally, Ellis's writing was not as lively and controversial as Freud's, nor did he gather followers around him to propagate his insights.

Though he was eclipsed by Freud, Ellis should not be viewed simply as a pre-Freudian, as Grosskurth sees him, following Dr. Norman Haire (Grosskurth 360). Ellis's work shows that a new attitude to sexuality in particular had emerged out of English psychological tradition, largely independent of Freudian thought. Ellis's method may not have lent itself to a dynamic approach, but his study of sexuality was undertaken in what he called the "New Spirit" (Hynes 157), which cut through myth to achieve a uniquely British balance between instinctual and moral elements of sexual behaviour.

Also, it is important to note that, up until the end of World War One, Ellis was much better known to English audiences than Freud. Freud may have been the more systematic thinker, but Ellis wrote on a wider range of topics from social hygiene to popular philosophy to literary criticism; these topics either border on the subject-matter of psychology or bear the impress of his psychological views. Since he was less scientific than Freud, and more
artistic, he tended to appeal more to literary audiences. By many he was revered as a prophet and a "splendid intellect" (V. Sackville-West, *The Nation*, as qtd. in Grosskurth 326). His *A Study of British Genius* (1904), for example, carried on (as well as modified) Galton's work and revived interest in the exceptional, an interest which percolated into the subject-matter of Edwardian novelists. In addition, writers like Radclyffe Hall welcomed his progressive thinking about sexuality and his enlightened view on homosexuality in particular (Brome 236-237).

However much Ellis 'liberated the human spirit', as he claimed to have done (as qtd. in Hynes 159), his work certainly did not liberate psychology from nineteenth-century methodology. That task was taken up by another controversial but far more systematic psychologist, William McDougall (1871-1938), who developed the first thoroughly dynamic psychology in Britain. Even though McDougall made a far greater contribution to psychology than Ellis, his wide-ranging work has as completely, and more unjustly, been displaced by Freudianism. His hormic, or instinctually-based purposive psychology, created independently of psychoanalysis, receives no mention in histories of psychodynamic thought or the new psychology, although McDougall's
introduction of it in Social Psychology (1908) was equally as ground-breaking as Freudian doctrine. It rivaled, if not surpassed, Freudian theory in influence on the direction British psychology took for several decades. Sir Cyril Burt, himself an eminent British psychologist, has summarized McDougall's unique position as follows:

To McDougall both British psychologists and British psychology owe a vast debt which has never been fully recognized.... In other countries, when psychology changed from a branch of philosophy to an experimental science, it adopted the general materialistic basis that had become so popular among scientists toward the close of the nineteenth century. The fact that this did not happen in Britain is due primarily to McDougall. He was the first experimental psychologist which this country produced. Yet, unlike many who followed him, he never became purely an experimentalist. Indeed, he was forever emphasizing the limitations of the mechanistic approach (as qtd. in Van Over 26).

However, even this commentary does not do justice to the breadth of McDougall's approach to psychology, a characteristic which he shared with his principle influences, William James, Lloyd Morgan, and G.F. Stout. McDougall began as a psychophysicist, quickly became disillusioned with the limitations of this approach, pioneered the study of social aspects of psychology, proposed a theory of animism which postulated a goal-directed soul, and elevated psychical research to a new level of sophistication through a life-long dedication
to various aspects of current psychology from his critical viewpoint. These include *Psychology, The Study of Behaviour* (1912), *An Outline of Psychology* (1923), *An Outline of Abnormal Psychology* (1926) and *Psycho-analysis and Social Psychology* (1936). Since his impact was so profound and, subsequently so neglected, it is worthwhile to summarize a few of his most important innovations.

In his *Primer of Physiological Psychology* (1905), McDougall had attempted to demonstrate the narrowness and sterility of the then-current view of psychology as the study of consciousness, with introspection as its only method, and to redefine it as "the positive science of mind in all its aspects and modes of functioning, or, as I would prefer to say, the positive science of conduct and behaviour" (*Introduction* 15), with objective measurement as an important method. In *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (1908), he explored the wider implications of his "dynamic, functional, voluntaristic view of mind" (16). Rejecting both the Lockean concept of mind and the utilitarian reduction of motives to the search for pleasure and avoidance of pain, he built up a theory of motivation based on the relation of instincts to mental processes. Whereas earlier moral philosophers up to Sidgwick had assumed that man normally acts reasonably, McDougall worked from the postulation,
based on Darwinian theory,

that men are moved by a variety of impulses whose
nature has been determined through long ages of the
evolutionary process without reference to the life
of men in civilized societies. (Introduction 10)

The central problem of psychology was, then, to determine
how man came to act morally, and the answer was to be found
in "the moulding influence of the social environment"
(Introduction 16). In his view, there were a number of
primary instincts, including flight, repulsion, curiosity,
pugnacity, self-abasement, and self-assertion. Each of them
conditioned a specific emotion, which he called primary
(Introduction 47). As these emotions conflict, then
interact, and are modified by the social environment, they
become organized into more complex sentiments. The sexual
instinct, innately connected with the parental instinct, is
one of those which is not directly linked with an emotion,
and "its specific character remains submerged and
unconscious" (Introduction 82). The self-regarding sentiment
forms the basis of the self, which is developed through
interplay with the social environment. Thus in McDougall's
system there is a new emphasis on social factors, but he
also asserts that there is continuity from "the primary
instinctive dispositions that we have in common with the
animals" to "the highest types of human will and character"
(Introduction 264).
McDougall’s general introduction to *Psychology, The Study of Behaviour* (1912), included in the popular Home University Library series, deserves mention since it provides an outline, from a typical British perspective, of the "fruitful field" of abnormal psychology. McDougall credits the French school with having made the study of hysteria and allied conditions scientific (*Psychology* 196). The field owes more to Pierre Janet than to anyone else for his conception of a synthetic energy that, unless defective, keeps the stream of mental activity unified. Freud, who is cited for the first time in a work of McDougall’s, has "further enriched" the study of pathological states of mind (*Psychology* 201) by "bringing morbid psychology into fruitful relations both with normal psychology and with the study of mental states and processes that are abnormal without being morbid" (*Psychology* 211). McDougall identifies repression as the most novel of Freud’s ideas. However, he interprets Freud using the language of his own system and in the light of his concern about the role of society in the development of morality, claiming that

the fundamental fact from which the [Freudian] theory starts out is that our organized conative tendencies are apt to come into conflict with one another, producing what we call moral struggles. (*Psychology* 202)

When temptation is conquered, for example,

our highly organized self-consciousness brings into operation a strongly organized system of conative
tendencies which support the moral or social tendency in its conflict with the immoral or socially disapproved tendency, and thus secure the defeat of the latter. (Psychology 202)

Like Ellis, he pointed out that Freud's "hypotheses are by no means generally accepted" (Psychology 202) and he criticized those "most enthusiastic exponents" of Freudianism who "have gone too far in asserting that every dream is determined by the subconscious working of a repressed tendency..." (Psychology 205).

What is most striking about McDougall's approach, though, is his claim about the motivation for studying abnormal psychology, because it clearly reveals the close connection between this branch of psychology and psychical research in England: he states that,

The study of abnormal psychology has thus become a field in which it is sought to find empirical evidence for two of the most ancient and widely held beliefs of the human race: namely, the belief in the survival of human personalities after bodily death, and the belief in the communion of human with divine mind. (Psychology 224)

He then goes on to explain how the "well-known Society for Psychical Research" has provided empirical support for each of these beliefs (Psychology 222). As an active member of the Society from 1901, McDougall was in full sympathy with their aims, but he maintained a tough-minded scientific attitude towards their findings. Thus he was just as interested in the supernormal, which revealed the positive,
transcendent effects of the subconscious operations of the mind, as he was in the morbid. The supernormal accounted for such phenomena as the production of works of genius, religious conversion, mystical experience and telepathy. Furthermore, in Body and Mind (1911), he had argued that "...Animism is the only solution of the psycho-physical problem compatible with a belief in any continuance of the personality after death..." (as qtd. in Van Over 17). His version of animism had at its centre the notion that man has a soul, "a concept more or less summed up in the phrase "unity of consciousness" (as qtd. in Van Over 18). Unlike earlier pan-psychists such as Fechner, however, he rejected the concept of a universal consciousness (as qtd. in Van Over 19). Thus, for McDougall, as for several other prominent British psychologists, psychical research was an integral part of the study of psychology, since it provided evidence to address the psychological aspects of larger metaphysical issues. As Janet Oppenheim remarks in her book on psychical research, deceased psychical researchers like Edmund Gurney and Frederick Myers "would have delighted in the knowledge that one of the creators of social psychology was building upon foundations furnished by the SPR" (Oppenheim 264).
Though McDougall -- independently of Freud -- had emphasized the role of instincts, conflict, and subconscious activity in mental life, and had early on appreciated Freud's contribution to knowledge about both mental disease and normality (Psychology 210), he became increasingly critical of Freudian doctrine. He could not accept the Freudians' insistence on the universality of the oedipus complex, the existence of distinct entities like 'the unconscious' and 'the libido', the latter of which he refused to accept as the single source of instinctive energy, or what he regarded as "the fundamental doctrine of Freud's social psychology, that all social relations are sexual" (Psycho-analysis 29). He also became annoyed at the public which so uncritically swallowed Freudian doctrine (see also McDougall, Autobiography 222). McDougall's animism and his defense of indeterminism were directly opposed to Freud's mechanistic, deterministic model of the mind.

Nevertheless, since he recognized the value in Freud's work, he attempted to open a dialogue with the Freudians in order to debate aspects of their doctrine and to establish the common ground between the disciplines. In this aim he was largely unsuccessful and he became increasingly perturbed at their dogmatic attitude. To make matters worse, McDougall did not receive proper
acknowledgement of his contribution to social psychology from the Freudians, even though Freud's forays into that field in the 1920's, which resulted in revision of some of his fundamental tenets, moved his system closer to McDougall's.

Despite the neglect, in his *Psycho-analysis and Social Psychology* (1936), McDougall welcomed Freud's modifications (105), including his revoking of the topographical aspect of the unconscious and his adoption of the super-ego, ego, and id, because they did not imply such a wide gulf between conscious and unconscious activities as his earlier model had (*Psycho-analysis* 59-62). Also, McDougall viewed as progression Freud's recognition of non-libidinous instincts, notably of aggression and death, to which he transferred some of the functions of the instincts of self-preservation and sex, and thus abandoned the dogma of the 'all-efficient' libido. Most importantly, McDougall accurately observed that Freud's revised schema of mental structure bore a striking resemblance to the four successive stages of conduct that McDougall had outlined in 1908:

...Freud's four 'realms, regions or provinces into which we divide the mental apparatus of the individual', namely, the id, the ego, the super-ego and the ego-ideal (of which the second develops out of the first, and the third out of the second, and the fourth within the third) correspond to the four levels of function of my scheme: namely, (1) the
purely instinctual level; (2) the level of control of the instinctive impulses which comes with increased range of foresight and the growth of self-consciousness and the concrete sentiments; (3) the level of self-conscious control and restraint of impulse that comes with the growth of the sentiment of self-regard or self-respect; (4) the topmost level which is achieved by the formation of the moral sentiments and an ideal of self shaped by the moral tradition. Freud's 'ego' is, in short, what in my Social Psychology is called character; while his super-ego (with its ego-ideal contained within it) corresponds to what in my book was called 'moral character.' (Psycho-analysis 104)

Yet McDougall was still not completely satisfied, arguing that Freud's addition of the concept of penis-envy to the explanation of the development of female sexuality was "fantastic and improbable in an extreme degree" (Psycho-analysis 100). As well, Freud continued to neglect other important instincts, notably fear and the tender impulse (the root of altruistic behaviour), and the role of sentiments, including those of respect and admiration, "which, at these higher levels of mental life, are the all-important dynamic factors" (Psycho-analysis 107).

McDougall also turned a critical eye on the other schools of psycho-analysis. He did not find much value in Adler's work, but his attitude towards Jung was more favorable, and this also is typical of British response, as we shall see in Chapter Two. He recognized the importance of Jung's doctrine of the archetypal modes of thinking and his distinction between introversion and extroversion, though he
was skeptical about Jung's attempt to establish personality types on this basis (Psychoanalysis and Social Psychology 109-110). He was also doubtful about the efficacy of the therapeutic procedure. After the war, he had actually undergone an analysis with Jung, and he later claimed, "I made an effort to be as open-minded as possible; and came away enlightened but not convinced" (Autobiography 211).

Thus McDougall's work well illustrates the British propensity to extract what was sound and could be replicated from psychoanalytic doctrine, rather than to reject the new theories out of hand. More significantly, his 1908 Introduction to Social Psychology contained the essential elements of a dynamic psychology, available to most British readers before psychoanalysis. If not as rich as its psychoanalytic competitor in its treatment of unconscious activities, conflict, and dreams (as McDougall admits in Psycho-analysis 103), in certain respects it accounted for phenomena, like social activity, which Freudian theory originally overlooked and eventually incorporated.

McDougall's influence, both on the discipline of psychology and on literary artists of the period, is not less significant. Hearnshaw claims that, above all, British psychology was largely shaped by McDougall's Social Psychology which was reprinted twenty-four times between 1908-1938. McDougall's postulation of
A number of primary instinctive drives, developed, organized and canalized into 'sentiments', integrated into character and a directing self -- such was what C.K. Ogden in his *A.B.C. of Psychology* (1929) would have described as the nucleus of accredited opinion. (Hearnshaw, Short 212)

McDougall appears to have been equally popular with writers, no doubt partially because of his willingness to admit the limitations of materialism and his acceptance of psychical research as a legitimate avenue of inquiry. In common with the prominent psychical researcher, F.W.H. Myers, McDougall was thoroughly immersed in, and drew upon, the English literary tradition. Both men found an idol in Wordsworth, whose *Prelude* they viewed as the epitome of introspective psychology in poetry (Van Over 11-12). That Romantic element in turn helped shape McDougall's view of the essential irrationality of man and his belief in the positive activity of the unconscious, both of which would also have appealed to the literary artist. May Sinclair, probably the most widely read in psychology of any Edwardian novelist, refers to McDougall "as a classic authority -- and on the whole, the clearest, simplest, and most convincing authority -- on the behaviour of the psyche here and now." She drew on his work extensively, supported his revitalization of the concept of a soul, but opposed his version of animism.
Though he was called one of the foremost psychologists at the time of his death, his increased involvement in psychical research in later life, in particular his advocacy of it as a university study, and his unpopular Lamarckian "conviction that he had experimentally proved that acquired characteristics can be inherited", all contributed to his neglect by historians of psychodynamic theory (Shepard 202). Also, though McDougall was as controversial a figure as Freud, he, like the other important British psychologists discussed, did not gather around him a band of adherents to disseminate his doctrine as did Freud.

Nevertheless, several prominent students of McDougall's held similar wide-ranging interests, including psychical research, and adopted his eclectic approach. Both Sir Cyril Burt and J.C. Flugel, students of McDougall's at Oxford, concurrently carried out research on standardizing intelligence tests and in psychical research on telepathy and hypnosis under McDougall's supervision. Burt, who became a leading British psychologist best known for his work in child development and statistics, continued to investigate mental telepathy and the mental imagery of mediums throughout his life (Shepard 189). Appointed to University College, London in 1909, J.C. Flugel (1884-1955), on the other hand, combined academic psychology with

Another eminent psychologist with catholic interests was William Brown (1881-1952). In academic psychology he is important for his work on mental measurement and his creation of the first laboratory of experimental psychology at Oxford, but he was also a long-time member of the Society for Psychical Research. Under his jurisdiction as head of the psychology department at King's College, London, psychical research was first taught in a university by a Miss Verrall (c. 1914). In 1932 he reviewed the evidence collected over the past fifty years by the Society for Psychical Research and declared that it was "Sufficient to make survival [of the soul after death] scientifically extremely probable" (Shepard 182). In addition, he helped disseminate psychoanalytic ideas in Britain, as we shall see, and became a psychotherapist, making significant contributions in the area of suggestion.19

In conclusion, it should be noted that not all British psychologists were as forward thinking as the ones selected, but, on the whole, British psychologists had strong ties with psychical research, and tended to be eclectic.
iii. medicine/psychiatry

Since the history of medical psychology has become the subject of a vast and controversial literature,¹ this section attempts to give only the barest outline of those discoveries which had the most profound implications for general psychology and, ultimately, most affected literature.

The interrelated developments in the study of hysteria and hypnosis are of central importance in this context for several reasons. The phenomenon of hysteria challenged fundamental assumptions about the nature of disease, eventually forcing medical professionals to shift from focussing exclusively on somatic aspects of illness (characteristic of first-wave psychology) to paying closer attention to the psyche of the patient (a second wave characteristic). Diagnosis of this illness also led to the further development of hypnosis, which became the primary tool for analyzing non-conscious layers of the mind and led to more precise mapping out of these regions. Sigmund Freud was only one of many lured away from the study of neurology by the rising interest in these "abnormal conditions". In Britain, the controversy over hysteria and hypnosis clearly reveals the issues over which the forces of first and second
wave psychology clashed, as well as, once again, the crucial role of the Society for Psychical Research. These clinical constructs serve as the starting point for a discussion of the influence of the related disciplines of neurology and psychiatry on second wave psychology in Britain. Furthermore, hysterical symptoms were demonstrated using hypnotic techniques on patients by "showmen" doctors. These spectacles attracted enormous attention from a wide lay public, and detailed case histories in written form also became immensely popular. Hysteria was linked with both degeneracy and artistic genius as well. Fiction writers soon capitalized on this fascination, and a plethora of novels dealing with these extraordinary topics emerged (Ellenberger 165).

In general, medicine, with its emphasis on the pragmatic issues of description and diagnosis, was less influenced by currents of philosophy and more influenced by scientific materialism than the burgeoning discipline of psychology. Medicine first became a contributor to the "new psychology" when the theory of evolution exerted influence on it by bringing mind into the natural world as a factor in the adaptation of organisms to their environment. Hearnshaw claims that, "Development was seen no longer as divinely preordained, but the result of a complex interaction of
genetic and environmental forces which could go wrong at any stage" (Hearnshaw, Short 151). However, genetic or hereditary influences prevailed over environmental ones as the model of explanation of many diseases for most of the latter half of the nineteenth century. The revolutionary germ theory of disease, which led to the discovery of cures for several infectious diseases such as typhoid, gave impetus to the materialistic bias in the medicine of the period (Drinka 62). It was not until the concept of the unconscious mind, or at least subconscious activity, began to gain acceptance that medicine turned its attention to psychological factors and contributed significantly to second wave psychology. Hearnshaw claims that,

As long as mind was identified with consciousness, as it was by Descartes and his successors, the 'alien' forces responsible for mental breakdown could not be located within the mind itself; they had to be regarded either as material or as supernatural. (Short 150)

The story of the gradual acceptance of hypnosis and hysteria into medical orthodoxy is crucial to an understanding of that shift in perspective.

Mesmerism, the forerunner of hypnotism, became popular in France in the late eighteenth century. Franz Mesmer, its originator, believed that a fluid called animal magnetism coursed through the body. Its flow was disturbed in illness. By putting patients into a trance and then
precipitating a crisis in them, he could transfer his own healthy animal magnetism into them (Drinka 127-128). Though magnetism became immensely popular, it remained on the margins of science. Eventually it was found to have no scientific basis and was banned in France (Drinka 131). Meanwhile, in Germany mesmerism attained greater respectability and was closely associated with Romanticism (Drinka 133); however, it was in the United States in the late 1840's that mesmerism received new impetus. While in a trance state, one Andrew Jackson Davis dictated revelations about the world of spirits (Ellenberger 83). Other incidents of paranormal communications were reported, and the widespread interest in these phenomena became known as the Spiritist movement.

Spiritism quickly spread into Europe, where its manifestations were eventually examined more systematically by the Society for Psychical Research, amongst others. As Ellenberger notes, spiritism was of great importance because it presented doctors and psychologists with new phenomena requiring explanation, like automatic writing, and led to the development of new approaches to the mind (Ellenberger 85).

In the wake of this popularity, mesmerism, or hypnosis, as it was renamed by an Englishman, James Braid
(Drinka 133), received renewed interest from the French medical community in particular. In the 1870's the world-famous neurologist Jean Martin Charcot rediscovered hypnosis and applied it to his work on hysteria. Before outlining his view of the former, it will be helpful to consider briefly the history of approaches to the latter.

From ancient times until just prior to Charcot, hysteria had been considered a woman's disease related to the uterus and had latterly been thought to be the result of erotic cravings or frustrations. Briquet initiated the systematic study of hysteria in 1859 and found that hysteria did not have a sexual root, but that both hereditary and environmental influences contributed to its onset (Ellenberger 142). Charcot generally expanded on Briquet's ideas, but he realized that very often there was a sexual component to hysteria. He divided hysterical symptoms into two categories, the seizure and the stigmata, and he held impressive demonstrations using patients to show the various stages of the seizure. Aside from his detailed descriptions of hysteria, Charcot made two main contributions to the field. He located the cause of the illness, not in the uterus, but in a weak central nervous system. More importantly, based on investigations made in 1884 and 1885, he argued that a psychic trauma or shock, like a death or
rape, could precipitate the disorder (Drinka 100). However, though he initiated the shift towards a psychological model, he fell back on the prevailing explanation of his day, by positing that a hereditary taint was the crucial predisposing factor in hysteria.

Charcot's organic bias, combined with lack of knowledge about the psychology of doctor-patient relations and a lack of interest in therapeutic techniques, caused him to view hypnosis as a physiological condition which could only occur in individuals predisposed to hysteria (Ellenberger 749). His argument, again well illustrated by spectacular demonstrations, was that only individuals who had weak nervous systems would be susceptible to domination through hypnosis (Drinka 101). No doubt partly because of the brilliance of these presentations, along with the fact that he was able to attract a powerful, cohesive group of followers, his views on hysteria and hypnosis prevailed. His famous lecture hall at the Saltpetriere was visited by almost every figure then notable or soon to become so in the fields of neurology and pathology, including Pierre Janet, Sigmund Freud, and the Englishmen F.W.H. Myers and Edmund Gurney. Writers like DeMaupassant also made pilgrimages (Drinka 88-89).
Despite Charcot's influence, though, his position did not go unchallenged. In 1860 an obscure doctor named Liebault had begun to use hypnosis on French peasant patients. He attracted the attention of Hippolyte Bernheim at the University of Nancy, who proposed that "hypnosis was not a pathological condition found only in hysterics, but it was the effect of suggestion" (Ellenberger 89). The Nancy school, as the eclectic group under Bernheim came to be called, relied on hypnosis less and less, finding that suggestions made to patients in a waking state were more effective. By the time of Charcot's death in 1893, their theory, supported by the successful results of suggestibility on thousands of patients, had thrown Charcot's ideas into disrepute. The triumph of the work of the Nancy school was crucial to the development of second wave psychology in two respects. Their conception of suggestion formed the basis of a "psychotherapeutics", which took into account psychological factors. Also, their realization that susceptibility to hypnosis did not depend on the condition of one's nerves (but that individuals of all ages and mental dispositions could be hypnotized) initiated the trend towards collapsing the gulf between abnormal and normal, a trend which prominent second wave psychologists like Freud continued.
Nevertheless, Charcot had done much to bring the practise of hypnosis into the realm of scientific orthodoxy. He also left his impress on a number of influential contributors to second wave psychology, notably Pierre Janet and Sigmund Freud. Janet began as a philosopher with psychological leanings, trained in medicine in order to pursue research in psychopathology, and later held appointments in experimental psychology. He represents yet another case of a highly influential psychologist with wide-ranging interests who was eclipsed by Freud.

Before joining Charcot, Janet had established his reputation with hypnotic experiments on the subject Léonie, beginning in 1885. This case of multiple personality attracted such interest in England that a delegation of Psychical Researchers, including Frederick Myers, his brother, Dr. A. T. Myers, and Henry Sidgwick, visited Janet at Le Havre. Published in book form as Psychological Automatism in 1889, Léonie's case along with several others provided the evidence on which Janet based several of his groundbreaking theories. Janet contended that, as a result of psychological weakness, the "field of consciousness" of hysterical patients was narrowed. Parts of the personality, designated subconscious fixed ideas, were split off from the rest and
endowed with an autonomous life and development. He [Janet] showed their origin in traumatic events of the past and the possibility of a cure of hysterical symptoms through the discovery and subsequent dissolution of these psychological symptoms. (Ellenberger 361)

Though Janet restrained himself from discussing the therapeutic implications of his research, his application of the terms of psychic force and weakness formed the basis of the first full-fledged dynamic psychology (Ellenberger 361).

However, it was not until Janet joined the staff at the Salpetriere under Charcot in 1890, and had completed a medical degree there, that he developed further his "psychological analysis". His method consisted of searching out the pathogenic subconscious fixed ideas in his hysterical patients using hypnosis, automatic writing, or distraction. Unlike Bernheim, he did not believe that it was enough to get patients to forget the original painful incidents. Bringing these ideas to consciousness was not sufficient either because they would only become conscious obsessions. Instead, he attempted to reconstruct the development of the illness and then to remove the fixed ideas by dissociating them from their source, sometimes transferring the affect associated with them to himself, and by re-educating his patients. He thus attended closely to the rapport between therapist and patient, first encouraging
it and then gradually restricting it (Ellenberger 374). This "psychological synthesis", as he referred to the process, comprised one of the first talking cures, and marked the inception of a radical shift in perspective towards therapy.

Janet extended his theories about subconscious fixed ideas and dissociation to other ailments, including severe sleeplessness and muscle spasms, but his main interest shifted to "neurasthenia." He renamed this second major cluster of conditions "psychasthenia", since "neurasthenia" "implied a neurophysiological theory for which there was no evidence" (Ellenberger 375). "Psychasthenia" incorporated both the phobias and the obsessions and differed from hysteria mainly in that the fixed ideas were conscious rather than subconscious. Work on these neuroses led to the elaboration of his dynamic theory of psychic energy in terms of force and tension. Force, the capacity to mobilize psychic energy to perform psychological acts, and tension, the capacity to utilize energy at various levels of synthesis, should operate together to create an equilibrium. If they oscillate severely, pathology results (Ellenberger 378). This economic model of the psyche is too complex to do justice to here, but it is important to note that Janet constructed a system of therapy based on it which was flexible enough to deal with virtually any neurotic illness
or patient (Ellenberger 386).

Throughout his adult life, Janet was fascinated by psychical research, having performed successful experiments with telepathy and suggestion at a distance, early in his career (Ellenberger 348). For many years he was an active corresponding member of the British Society for Psychical Research and, like many of his contemporaries in that organization, his work in abnormal psychology was prompted by his dream of reconciling science with religion.

The issue of Janet's influence is a particularly complex one. The publication of Janet's original cases preceded Freud's by several years and Janet was generally regarded as a leader who had the potential to found a great school of psychopathology before Freud was known at all (Ellenberger 407). His ideas about subconscious fixed ideas and dissociation of personality greatly influenced Myers's, William James's, Henri Bergson's, William McDougall's, Bernard Hart's, and Carl Jung's thinking about personality, to name only those who play a major role in this thesis. The influence on both James and Bergson was reciprocal. Janet was particularly indebted to James's concept of psychic energy. McDougall's focus in personality development on tendencies in conflict bears some resemblance to Janet's (Ellenberger 405). Jung's distinction between introversion
and extroversion is based on Janet's classification of two main neuroses, hysteria and psychasthenia (Ellenberger 377). Jung's conception of "complex" was originally the equivalent of Janet's subconscious fixed idea (Ellenberger 406). In general, Janet, who coined the word "subconscious", is seen as the founder of modern psychiatry (Ellenberger 331; Drinka 346).

Despite this tremendous influence, however, Janet's theories were almost totally obliterated by Freudian doctrine. On a number of occasions, aware of being unjustly treated, Janet argued that his theories had been appropriated by the Freudians. Freud, he maintained,

changed first of all the terms I was using; what I had called psychological analysis he called psychoanalysis; what I had called psychological system, in order to designate that totality of facts of consciousness and movement, whether of members or of viscera, whose association constitutes the traumatic memory, he called complex; he considered a repression what I considered a restriction of consciousness; what I referred to as a psychological dissociation, or as a moral fumigation, he baptized with the name of catharsis. But above all he transformed a clinical observation and a therapeutic treatment with a definite and limited field of use into an enormous system of medical philosophy. (Janet, Principles 41)

Undoubtedly his allegations contain some truth, which is, perhaps, part of the reason he was so virulently attacked by the Freudians, notably Ernest Jones in Britain (Ellenberger 408); however, this attack does not explain why Janet failed
to propagate his terminology as successfully as the Freudians. Unlike Freud, Janet formed no school of disciples, but remained fiercely independent (Ellenberger 408). Also, he was not as powerful a theorizer, nor was his system as comprehensive as Freud's, a point Janet himself alludes to in the above quotation. Furthermore, in keeping with the bias of his day towards hereditary factors, he tended to locate the root source of neurosis in abnormal physiological make-up, which caused him to neglect the role of fantasy in mental illness.

Nevertheless, Janet's account of the psyche and its potential malfunctions quickly caught the fancy of imaginative writers. As Ellenberger has discovered, Janet himself holds the distinction of being probably the first European psychologist to appear in a work of fiction. In Marcel Prevost's *The Autumn of A Woman* (1893), he appears thinly disguised as one Dr. Daumier, who brilliantly disentangles the characters' problems using talking therapy (Ellenberger 766-767). Though Janet was by no means the only researcher into multiple personality, his work provided inspiration for some of the many novels and plays on that topic which appeared in the 1880's and 1890's. (Ellenberger 165). In Britain, Janet's work provided the main inspiration for the pathological novel of the nineties and first decade
of the twentieth century. Concepts such as dissociation and idée fixe, sometimes used judiciously and sometimes not, permeated these works, as we shall see upon examining May Sinclair's and J.D. Beresford's early novels.

Since continental European medical practitioners were often the leaders in the field of medical psychology in the nineteenth century, their advances provide a necessary backdrop against which to view idiosyncracies in British developments. In general, the English lagged behind their European counterparts in the exploration of the functional nervous diseases, at least until the final decade of the nineteenth century. Michael J. Clark argues that psychological approaches to mental disorder were deliberately rejected for several reasons by the British medical profession. Since all disorders of the mind, including insanity, were viewed as resulting from bodily disease, which had restricted the autonomy of psychic processes, it was generally believed that the physical origins of the problems were most effectively addressed. Also, because mental pathology was characterized by defect, deficiency, or loss of rational faculty and volitional control, most doctors thought that attempting to make rational inquiry into the statements of their deranged patients was futile (Clark 276, 286). Furthermore, one of
the symptoms of the patients' loss of control was their increased suggestibility. Any method of psychotherapy, including hypnotism, which depended for its success on suggestion or "morbid introspection" could potentially exacerbate the problem it professed to solve (Clark 288-290).

In addition, there were other "non-scientific", moral considerations which blocked the advance of psychological approaches. This was the heroic age of medical practice in Britain and doctors believed that they had a moral duty to take charge of patients who had lost the ability to take responsibility for themselves because of their unsound minds. The psychoneuroses, and in particular hysteria, were viewed as signs of moral depravity and morbid egoism. Thus, the cure often consisted in the doctor ignoring the extravagances of the patients and instead providing a moral example by which the patient could be re-educated. According to Clark, this viewpoint persisted into the early twentieth-century and it provides the fundamental explanation of the opposition to dynamic approaches to the mind, and the therapies associated with them. Medical practitioners objected not so much to the frank discussions of sexuality in the works of Krafft-Ebing and Freud, but to "the perceived incompatibility of the new methods of
psychological analysis and treatment with the traditional professional conceptions of the physicians' moral-pastoral responsibilities" (Clark 298). Clark cites J.A. Ormerod, who believed that any method of suggestion, including Freud's and Breuer's,

... curiously revives the old conception of the efficacy of the confessional... but in this novel confessional the doctor is the priest, listening to subjects of extreme privacy, while the penitent does not even know what he is about to confess, and his confession... may be purely the result of imagination or of suggestion received from without... we suspect that the treatment by inquisition and confession might sometimes do more harm than good. (as qtd. in Clark 298-299)

Two other factors, not mentioned by Clark, also contributed to the resistance to a psychological conception of mental illness in England.

First, the belief that, either patients had convincing physiological symptoms (in which case they would sooner or later be incurable cases of dementia), or they suffered from some moral weakness, was entrenched in the laws about institutionalization. Until 1915, individuals were prohibited from voluntarily admitting themselves to public lunatic asylums. This law helped perpetuate the outmoded concept of illness on which it was based. According to Hearnshaw,

An individual was either mad, in which case he was certified and compulsorily shut up, or sane, when nothing need or could be done about him. No half-way stages were officially recognized, and the
early treatment of incipient breakdown was thus actively discouraged. (Hearnshaw, Short 145)

Virginia Woolf demonstrates her awareness of the inhumanity of this system in *Mrs. Dalloway*, as will be shown in Chapter Seven. Second, the rapid growth of, and discoveries in, the field of neurology in Britain after 1860 reinforced the physiological approach to insanity. Hughlings Jackson (1835-1911), the most prominent of nineteenth-century neurologists, asserted that it was necessary to be "brutally materialistic" in approaching the study of nervous disease (Hearnshaw, Short 71). Psychic symptoms should only be examined by physicians as a means of diagnosing the physiological basis of disease. Though best known for his discovery of an anatomical lesion in epilepsy, Jackson exerted considerable influence on the study of mental disorder because "he posited that similar lesions, certainly more subtle, would be discovered in such abnormal mental conditions as 'insanity' -- meaning psychosis -- schizophrenia or manic-depressive illness" (Drinka 105).

Thus there can be no doubt that there were strong impediments in the medical profession to the development of psychological approaches to mental illness in Britain. The strength of these impediments is important to note when the question of literary influence arises. Those Edwardian and Georgian novelists in Britain who divorced psychic
difficulties from morality in their characterization and who portrayed doctors as being concerned with the psyches of their patients were far in advance of their time. Both May Sinclair and J.D. Beresford demonstrate these qualities from their earliest fiction on.

However, Clark's claim that these approaches were deliberately and consistently rejected in the last decades of the nineteenth century is somewhat overstated because it is based almost exclusively on evidence from the medical orthodoxy. He tends to minimize the achievements of British pioneers and he does not pay enough attention to the role of what he himself refers to as "the impeccably orthodox Society for Psychical Research" (Clark 282). Though few in number, these pioneers had a great effect on subsequent development.

It is true that, following the postulation in the early nineteenth-century by a British surgeon, George Tate, that hysteria resulted from defective menstruation, the study of this affliction was not cultivated in England until the final two decades of the century. However, the study of hypnosis fared slightly better throughout the century until the final decades when it positively flourished. James Braid (1795-1860), a Manchester physician, did not merely rename the phenomena of mesmerism. Based on his viewing of a
mesmerist in 1841 and his later practise of the technique himself, he proposed the new theory that "the cause of the trance state lay not within a strange fluidic substance called animal magnetism but within the mind or nervous system of the patient" (Drinka 133). His views on hypnosis were not immediately accepted, though they were confirmed independently by another surgeon, John Elliotson (Ellenberger 82; Clark 278-279). In the middle years of the century, hypnosis tended to be denounced as quackery, or at least as unproven scientifically, and apparently dependent on occult powers of psychological knowledge (Clark 282). However, by 1872, D. Hack Tuke (1827-1895), an influential London specialist in mental disease, was praising Braid's pioneering efforts, and himself advocating the use of hypnotism, at the very least for the pragmatic reason that it often succeeded in controlling undesirable effects of mind on the body. More importantly, he encouraged systematic use of psychological approaches, including hypnotism, in the treatment of mental illness and he coined the term "psychotherapeutics" in an attempt to make these approaches more acceptable to orthodox medicine (Ellenberger 765; Clark 281). In the 1870's, several other medical men began to work with hypnosis, notably Milne Bramwell, C. Lloyd Tuckey, and T.W. Mitchell (Oppenheim 248). These pioneers became
members of the Society for Psychical Research after 1882. Under the able leadership of H. Sidgwick, F.W.H. Myers, and the medically trained Edmund Gurney, the Society carried on the distinctively British approach to abnormal psychology initiated by Braid. In an 1896 article, "On the Evolution of Hypnotic Theory", for example, Bramwell, the biographer of Braid, makes clear that Myers' theory of hypnosis is a direct descendant of Braid's (564-565). The Society also rapidly established itself as the main promoter of research into both hypnosis and hysteria, and it became the main vehicle for disseminating information about the latest continental developments in medical psychology. The full implications of their particular role in shaping attitudes towards this field will be discussed in the next section.

The relatively new field of psychiatry was constrained by the same biases as orthodox medicine, but was in an even worse position in the last decades of the nineteenth century since little research of any kind was being carried out in mental institutions. One exception was Sir Frederick Mott's research into dementia praecox, but it tended to focus on hereditary aspects of mental disease (Hearnshaw, Short 150). However, signs of change appeared early in the twentieth century. A new generation of psychiatrists gradually made an impact. They were influenced
by developments in abnormal psychology and more open to eclectic ideas imported from abroad, including those of Janet and Freud.

One of the first, and most important, of these was Bernard Hart (1879-1966). Trained as a psychiatrist, his wide scope led him to become the first person to hold the position of Psychologist to University College and the National Hospitals (Free 99). His work, with its limited acceptance of Freudian doctrine and willingness to draw upon other competing theories, typifies the response of British psychiatry to Freud. Several of his articles introduced the latest dynamic theories to his psychiatric colleagues in the first decade of the new century, including one on Freud's theory of hysteria, important because it included a 281 item bibliography of "most of the works of Freud and his followers." Though this article provided a succinct summary of even the most controversial aspect of Freud's theory, his views on sexuality, it was really Hart's very popular The Psychology of Insanity (1912, reprinted twenty times in the next forty years) which had the most influence in shaping attitudes towards Freud in Britain. In the Preface, Hart was careful to state his position in relation to the work of Freud, whom he acknowledged was a genius:

Although, however, I cannot easily express the extent to which I am indebted to him, I am by no means prepared to embrace the whole of the vast
body of doctrines which Freud and his followers have now laid down. Much of this is in my opinion unproven, and erected upon an unsubstantial foundation. On the other hand, many of Freud's fundamental principles are becoming more and more widely accepted, and the evidence in their favour is rapidly increasing. (Psychology vi-vii)

Hart thus concentrated on those aspects of Freud's theory, including repression, projection, identification, and the role of fantasy, which were founded on substantial evidence. He also accepted Freud's claims that the mental processes of the lunatic were not so different from the normal (Psychology 40), that psychological determinism must be adopted (Psychology 58), that conflict was the fundamental factor in the causation of insanity, and that primary instincts were at the root of conflicts. The book did not "deliberately omit[] any consideration of the sex instincts", as Hearnshaw claims (Short 167). Hart gives several examples of sex complexes (Psychology 103, 118) and even allows that the sexual instinct is one of the most prevalent sources of conflict and mental disintegration, but he cannot concur with Freud that it is the sole source, based on the accumulated evidence (Psychology 166-167). The "herd instinct", a concept proposed by a physician, Wilfrid Trotter, can be another source when in conflict with primitive instincts (Psychology 168). In addition, Hart drew on Jung's idea of the complex, and Janet's concept of disso-
The influence of James can be felt in his repeated use of the stream of consciousness metaphor (*Psychology* 40, 45, 61, 98), as well as in his description of James's Rev. Ansel Bourne case of double personality (*Psychology* 48).

The *Psychology of Insanity* proved to set a trend amongst the psychiatric profession in its partial critical acceptance of Freud's doctrines and in its eclecticism. Increasingly, other psychiatrists like Emmanuel Miller, Hugh Crichton-Miller, founder of the Tavistock, and Millais Culpin adopted similar attitudes to psychoanalysis, and orthodox Freudianism consequently never gained a large following in the first quarter of the century in English psychiatry. Nevertheless, Hart's work was also exceptional in that it garnered high praise, both from Freud, who found Hart's paper on the unconscious to be "the best on the damned topic of the unconscious I had read in the last years" and from Freud's followers Jones and Edward Glover. The latter claimed that Hart did much in England "to introduce psychoanalysis to intelligent readers and the psychiatric faculty at large" (Glover 535). As will be seen in Chapter Two, the British public also seems to have followed the attitudes of the psychological and psychiatric
professions, though their questioning of aspects of Freudian theory was not always based on as sound reasoning. Whether or not writers took their cue directly from the professionals who early on criticized Freudianism, they too adopted a similarly eclectic approach to the new, second wave psychologies.

Thus, in Europe, the puzzle of hysteria, the disease without a somatic origin but which was accompanied by apparently physiological symptoms, led to the exploration of psychological approaches to pathology, initially using hypnosis. In England where a strong materialistic bias, as well as entrenched professional and moral attitudes, caused emphasis to be placed on hereditary and physiological aspects of mental disease, developments were slower, though significant contributions had been made to medical psychology in Britain by the end of the first decade in Britain. As well, there was an openness to Freudian theory. Now we turn to examine more closely the single most important organization in prompting change from first wave to second wave psychology in Britain, the Society for Psychical Research.
iv. Psychical Research

Though glimpses have been given of the links between psychical research and the disciplines of philosophy, psychology, and medicine, it is now necessary to evaluate the full impact on second wave psychology of the Society for Psychical Research as an entity. In brief, the S.P.R. provided the British with the most complex and comprehensive native view of human psychology that they had ever possessed, prior to the development of McDougall's system. Since the S.P.R. transgressed traditional professional boundaries, that view influenced many people in diverse fields, including literature. The S.P.R. played several other roles in shaping British attitudes towards the latest psychological theories, but on all counts its considerable influence has been minimized, partly because of a tendency on the part of historians of psychology to deny those branches of its genealogy which are no longer considered scientifically acceptable.

Whereas its important role of introducing the ideas of Freud to England has been acknowledged in the histories of psychoanalysis, its much wider role of introducing, and providing a forum for the discussion of, continental developments in second wave abnormal psychology has been
virtually ignored. By positing that insight could be gained into the supernormal and even the afterlife through the psychological examination of the abnormal, the S.P.R. shaped the perceived significance and interpretation of results obtained from such inquiry amongst a broad audience. This audience included at least two prime ministers, and many titled persons, as well as ordinary citizens. Specifically, its focus on the positive aspects of mind, demonstrated using hypnotic or suggestive techniques, and its claims that the evidence from this sort of research supported traditional metaphysical speculation, generally had the effect of encouraging acceptance of approaches to the psyche which had been thought to be morally questionable by medical orthodoxy. Most importantly, the S.P.R. very nearly became part of psychological orthodoxy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries. Paradoxically, however, its original contributions to the field of abnormal psychology eventually conflicted with, and helped create resistance to, the complete acceptance of the Freudian theory which it had originally brought to the attention of English readers.

From its inception, the S.P.R. also attracted the attention, and often the active participation of, many notable literary figures, including Tennyson, Ruskin, 'Lewis Carroll', J.A. Symonds, A. Conan Doyle, Goldsworthy Lowes
Dickinson, and Roger Fry. They were characteristically reacting against the encroachments of scientific materialism and were attracted by the possibility of reinforcing the essence of traditional religious belief through modern testable methods. Novelists like May Sinclair and J.D. Beresford, who became members of the S.P.R. in the twentieth century, found subject-matter in the extraordinary case material published as psychical research. Their attitude towards the psychology which they incorporated into their fiction was altered because of their approach to it through psychical research. For other writers, including Virginia Woolf, psychical research was more peripheral but still had some impact. The Society's role in influencing these writers has been almost completely ignored in literary studies. The aim of this section, then, will be to explore these roles in greater detail, as well as to examine the reasons for the eclipse of the Society's dynamic approach to psychology and the consequences for histories of both psychology and literature.

In his history of British psychology, L.S. Hearnshaw claims that, "The links between psychical research and academic psychology in Great Britain have been few," (Short 241) and that the relation between abnormal psychology and psychical research is a problematical one (Short 157).
However, the relation is only problematic if one attempts to play down the very vital role that members of the S.P.R. had in shaping the burgeoning discipline of psychology. Links between the two were forged shortly after the establishment of the S.P.R. in 1882, when Myers and Gurney were amongst the first (along with S.P.R. members Milne Bramwell and C. Lloyd Tuckey) to rediscover and publish on hypnosis in England. The Society moved into a central position in the world of psychology through its involvement with the first four International Congresses of Physiological (later Experimental) Psychology. During the first, at Paris in 1889, Frederic Myers and William James discussed parapsychological phenomena alongside the pioneer experimental psychologists Theodule Ribot, Francis Galton, Bernheim, and Janet. At the second congress in London in 1892, the psychical researchers Henry Sidgwick and Frederic Myers were the President and Secretary respectively. Furthermore, according to the French Nobel-prize winning (1913) physiologist, Charles Richet,

To Myers the success of the International Congresses of Experimental Psychology at Paris[1889], London[1892], Munich[1896] and again at Paris last year[1900] was largely due. He compelled the adherents of the classical psychology and philosophy to pay attention to the new problems which he presented to them. (Journal of S.P.R., April, 1901 56)
By 1896 the Society could boast that its members included the following eminent psychologists: Professors James, Ramsay, Beaunis, Bernheim, Bowditch, Stanley Hall, Theodule Ribot, Liegeois, Lombroso, Charles Richet, Drs. Max Dessoir, Fere, Liebault, Schrenck-Notzing, Eduard von Hartmann, and Pierre Janet. In the twentieth century, the Society added to its ranks Freud, Jung, Morton Prince, Sir Cyril Burt, William Brown, William McDougall (President of the S.P.R. 1920-1), T. W. Mitchell (Pres. 1922), Francis Aveling, Mace, Michael Balint, Cyril Adcock (F.B.P.S.), R.H. Thouless (Pres. 1942), Ira Progoff, and David Stafford-Clark, to mention only those most prominent in their branch of the helping professions.

However, lists which prove major involvement and interest do not explain either why these leaders in their fields were attracted or how psychical research contributed to psychology, in spite of the materialistic trend in this field. In order to do so, it is essential to look more closely at the roots of psychical research and the contributions which it made to psychology.

Psychical Research grew directly out of the Spiritualist movement, which entered genteel circles in Britain around 1852. Though the Spiritualists were an amorphous group, their main aim was to verify external
manifestations of the unseen world. In this they were
directly opposed to the scientific community, which was not
impressed with their focus on the seance (Cerullo 21). The
Society For Psychical Research, formed in 1882 by the
physicist William Barrett, and E. Dawson Rogers, attempted
to raise the status of research into psychic phenomena
through better organization and the adoption of more
rigorous scientific methods. The Society's original mandate
covered six areas, including "haunted houses" and
spiritualism proper; however, the S.P.R. gradually focussed
more on the non-material aspects of the mind, largely
because of the influence of a group from Trinity College,
Cambridge, under the leadership of the well-respected Henry
Sidgwick.

Two prominent members of this group, Edmund Gurney
(1847-1888) and Frederic W.H. Myers, did more than anyone
else to align the Society's endeavors with contemporary
psychological research. In so doing, they also expanded the
territory of psychology to encompass the evidence about
psychic phenomena generated by the Society. Both men had
reacted severely to the loss of loved ones and their devoted
work in the Society was to some extent a compensation for
these losses. Nevertheless, neither was willing to accept
easy answers or to sacrifice scientific accuracy. In 1885
they had written of their "hope to lay the corner-stone of a valid experimental psychology," and in the following years they attempted to do so through their work on hypnosis, hallucinations, dreams and crisis apparitions. If this appears to be an unusual approach to experimental psychology, it should be recalled that the foremost psychologists of the day such as Janet, and even those soon to become eminent, like Freud, began their work in similar areas. According to Oppenheim, Gurney, who was medically trained, even went so far as to place

his own work in the context of 'the new psychology,' with its strong physiological emphasis, and where 'the line between the normal and the abnormal has become so shadowy that not the smallest or rarest abnormal phenomenon can be safely neglected, by those who aim at the fullest possible realisation of human nature and development.'

Gurney's ambition was never realized, however, because of his premature death by an overdose of chloroform in 1888, and it was left to Myers to place their scattered researches into a coherent system.

A poet, essayist, and polymath, as well as a psychical researcher, Myers is one of those figures whose achievements are difficult to assess because of the disjunction between the high promise of his researches, their tremendous impact on members of his and the next generation, and his subsequent neglect. In the 1880's,
Myers, a voracious reader, assimilated the continental findings in abnormal psychology with the Society's work, as well as published a series of original papers on automatic writing. This phenomenon he claimed was only one of a group of automatisms which revealed that messages could be "communicated from one stratum to another stratum of the same personality" ("Subliminal" 298). By 1893, he recognized the need to arrange the diverse observations accumulated and to consider their wider implications for the study of personality. The result was Myers's theory of the 'subliminal self', the single most popular and influential contribution made by the S.P.R. to British psychology.

Myers proposed that

the stream of consciousness in which we habitually live is not the only consciousness which exists in connection with our organism. Our habitual or empirical consciousness may consist of a mere selection from a multitude of thoughts and sensations, of which some at least are equally conscious with those that we empirically know. I accord no primacy to my ordinary waking self, except that among my potential selves this one has shown itself the fittest to meet the needs of common life. ("Subliminal" 301)

Below the threshold of the ordinary, empirical consciousness, which he named the supraliminal, was psychical action that he called subliminal. The spectrum of consciousness in the subliminal extended from automatic physiological processes no longer required as part of memory
in order to survive, to psychic impressions "which the supraliminal consciousness is incapable of receiving in any direct fashion", such as telepathic and clairvoyant messages ("Subliminal" 306). Dreams, which gave indications of "intensified power", were a good example of how more than one level of subliminal consciousness could be involved simultaneously. This subliminal self consisted of "an aggregate of potential personalities, with imperfectly known capacities of perception and action, but none of them identical with the assumed individuality beneath them..." ("Subliminal" 308). Myers preferred this term to secondary self, which gave the impression that there could only be one other self. Also, although the Subliminal self could be diseased, it was not necessarily inferior to the Supraliminal Self, which the word "secondary" implies. On the contrary, Myers believed that messages from the Subliminal Self could indicate expansion and evolution of the personality, as found in the visions of genius ("Subliminal" 317). As well, Myers viewed the supraliminal as a spectrum "bounded at one end by organic functions which we cannot by any effort assume under conscious control, and at the other end by the highest efforts of reason to which the mind can attain" ("Subliminal" 328). However, there was reason for supposing that this spectrum was not continuous,
but rather that there were gaps and interruptions in perceptions at this level. By positing that there were many different strata of consciousness both below and above a threshold point, Myers offered a more complex and balanced view of the psyche than had hitherto been proposed; it is worthwhile to examine some of the influences on it, as well as to compare competing explanations.

Though Myers's theory had its opponents, its scientific credibility was raised by its clever incorporation of the concepts of 'fitness' and evolution from social Darwinism. In addition, the theory bears the impress of William James's *Principles of Psychology* (which Myers had studied and reviewed for the *Proceedings* of the S.P.R.) in its use of the stream of consciousness metaphor. James had called into question the substantiality of the self by emphasizing its fluidity; Myers inadvertently furthered the disintegration of the traditional conception of self in his hypothesis that there are many selves, each one potentially transcendent at any given moment. He also extended the boundaries of personality, although his claim that there was an underlying unity called individuality received scant notice. Similarly to the *Principles*, Myers's theory rejected the existence of an entity called the unconscious as misleading and unprovable.
In this and in several other ways, Myers's theory differed from the economic theory of the psyche eventually proposed by Freud. Freud claimed that there were forces like resistance that blocked access to the consciousness from the unconscious, which he described as a repository of elements deliberately rejected. However, Myers hypothesized that there was not

any definite barrier between the various strata of the self. They are strata (so to say) not of immovable rock, but of imperfectly miscible fluids of various densities, and subject to currents and ebullitions which often bring to the surface a stream or a bubble from a stratum far below ("Subliminal" 307).

What was above the threshold of awareness in a normal person depended on how well suited it was to meet the exigencies of everyday life.

Most importantly, Myers' theory was the first to propose that secondary or subliminal consciousnesses need not be pathological but are a normal and fundamental part of the constitution of every individual. In this respect, he differed from James, Janet, and Freud, believing that, in the pragmatic interests of developing cures, pathologists had neglected the larger significance for the study of the positive potential of the psyche. His view thus had major implications for the conception of genius, and artistic creativity, as we shall see.
In order to avoid charges of mysticism, Myers was careful to base his theory on "actual phenomena observed and interpreted by that empirical self by whose aid science does her work" ("Subliminal" 307). His richest source for examining the content of the subliminal came from the work done on hypnotism and those (self-suggestive) psychoneuroses not dependent on organic lesion, notably hysteria; his theory has implications for both. Myers did not view hypnosis as a disease in itself, as did the school of Charcot, nor did he agree with the Nancy school that the use of suggestion by the operator sufficiently explained the hypnotic phenomenon produced ("Subliminal" 300). Instead he argued that,

Hypnotism is not a morbid state; it is the manifestation of a group of perfectly normal but habitually subjacent powers, whose beneficient operation we see in cures by therapeutic suggestions; whose neutral operation we see in ordinary hypnotic experiment; and whose diseased operation we see in the vast variety of self-suggestive maladies. ("Subliminal" 309)

Myers then classified the powers revealed through hypnosis into several groups. Pain could be inhibited under hypnosis, which Myers referred to as its "great dissociative triumph" ("Subliminal" 329). Second, organic processes could be both produced and controlled, an associative or synthetic triumph. Third, intellectual or moral progress, such as the cure of kleptomania, could be achieved. These manifestations
suggested, not only that consciousness was much more vast than formerly surmised, but that there was great potential for increased control over thought processes (what Myers's referred to as patients' "self-suggestive power", "Subliminal" 352).

Myers' claim that hysteria represented dysfunction or disease of the hypnotic stratum of the mind was equally ingenious since it explained why certain hypnotic and hysterical phenomena resembled one another. It also helped explain the more recent finding that hysterics were often difficult to hypnotise. In a review praising Myers' conception, Bramwell asked,

May not the difficulty of inducing hypnosis in the hysterical -- of making one's suggestions find a resting-place in them -- be due to the fact that the hypnotic substratum of their personality is already occupied by irrational self-suggestions which their waking will cannot control? ("Hypnotic Theory" 545)

Myers explored further the implications of his subliminal theory for understanding hysteria and its relation to genius in an 1897 article, summarized in the Journal of the S.P.R.. Building on Janet's conception, Myers claimed that "all hysterical symptoms... are equivalent to idées fixes; and a hysterical access is the explosion of an idée fixe" ("Hysteria" 55). However, departing from Janet, Myers argued that an idée fixe could be either positive or
negative. Similarly, acquisitions as well as losses could occur in hysteria, a point supported by the phenomena of hyperaesthesia. If the acquisitions, or uprush from the subliminal self, overpowered the losses and resulted in some achievement, then hysteria became genius ("Hysteria" 56-58). Myers cited, amongst other examples, Robert Louis Stevenson's dreams, in which "the content of the [nocturnal] uprush was congruous with the train of voluntary thought" ("Hysteria" 57).

Myers' view is important for several reasons. It precedes Freud's statements about the links between neuroses and genius. His stress on the psychological aspects of hysteria shows that this approach was not completely rejected, nor was mental illness always viewed as defect by the British. Finally, in statements like: the student of human personality "will justly argue that if we can trace a road by which man has gone downhill, we may be tracing a road by which man can also climb up. Processes of disintegration are lessons in integration" ("Hysteria" 51), Myers expresses a view of the human psyche similar to the one Jung would articulate to the British public a decade or so later. Though Myers's theories should not be seen as prototypical of Jung's, they do help explain widespread acceptance of the latter's position since Myers had prepared
For the rest of his life, Myers investigated the abnormal with the intent of throwing light on both the potential of the normal and the question of the persistence of human personality after death. His researches culminated in his masterpiece, *Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death*, published posthumously in 1903. The book served as comprehensive guide to the state of the art in psychical research, as well as a synthesis of findings in dynamic psychology. It rounded out earlier arguments on many topics, including dreams and genius, and provided an exhaustive classification of cases to support its claims. A discussion of dreams figured prominently as the starting point for the study of disintegrations of personality. Myers extended his theory about the relation between hysteria and genius to cover "moral genius," the "genius of sanctity," or that possession "by some altruistic idea which lies at the root of so many altruistic lives," especially religious ones (*Human* 56).

*Human Personality* received a great deal of critical notice, much of it positive, though not all.¹² The psychologist G.F. Stout, for instance, criticized the subliminal self because it appeared to be "its own separate system of mental traces and dispositions formed in the
course of its own existence", and because it seemed to act as a "tutelary genius or a guardian angel" (as qtd. in Gauld 294). Stout claimed that this conception did not align with the facts and that the normal phenomena which Myers claimed were manifestations of the subliminal could be otherwise explained. As Alan Gauld claims, Stout seems to have misconstrued the nature of the subliminal since it is anything but a separate, unified entity and because it could just as easily fall prey to disease as the "empirical" self (295). Part of the problem likely lies in the fact that the book was left incomplete at Myers's death and suffers occasionally from confusing prose. However, William McDougall also felt that Myers had stretched the concept of the subliminal in order to support the hypothesis of survival. In other respects though, McDougall praised the book, claiming that posterity would "accord to Myers a place in the history of the intellectual development of mankind" (as qtd. in Oppenheim 263). One of the most favourable reviews came from William James, who found the work "a masterpiece of coordination and unification" and claimed that Myers "shows indeed a genius not unlike that of Charles Darwin for discovering shadings and transitions, and grading down discontinuities in his argument" ("Review" 235). Thus, Myers offered the English a distinctive, if not completely
accepted, view of the overall significance of the scattered findings in abnormal psychology and psychical research.

His influence on both psychologists and British society in general was considerable. The development of William James's thought especially was shaped in several ways by his respect for Myers's accomplishments as well as his friendship with Myers. In assessing Myers's service to psychology, James claims that Myers was the first to map out the subliminal mental region ("Frederic Myers" 218). He refers to Myers's conception of hysteria, as a disease of the subliminal or hypnotic stratum, as "brilliant", claims that it was completely corroborated by Binet's and Janet's subsequent work and that, therefore, the theory "makes an epoch, not only in medical, but in psychological science, because it brings in an entirely new conception of our mental possibilities" (James, "Frederic Myers" 220). James's whole method of addressing the problem of what constituted the essence of religious belief in Varieties of Religious Experience was based on Myers's technique of applying the insights gained from studying the abnormal to the normal and "supernormal" (Varieties 22). In that work, James states his preference for the concept of "subliminal" over the "unconscious" (Varieties 207), and he asserts that Myers's discovery in 1886 of the former is "the most important step
forward that has occurred in psychology since I have been a student of that science" (Varieties 233). The major thrust of James's pragmatism, "that concrete reality and experience are richer, more dynamic, and thicker than can possibly be expressed by our concepts" owes much to Myers's revelation of the complexity of the inner life (Pluralistic xiv). In A Pluralistic Universe, James stresses his belief that most of the supernormal phenomena for which Myers advocated scientific recognition, are "rooted in reality" (Pluralistic 142). Furthermore, in these facts James finds "the strongest suggestions in favour of a superior co-consciousness being possible", part of the reason he rejects the monist view of the universe and adopts a pluralistic one (Pluralistic 140).

Myers exerted a similarly strong influence on William McDougall. McDougall used the evidence of the supernormal organized by Myers, along with his own investigations into telepathy and cross-correspondences, to combat the mechanist model of the human organism (Van Over 17). McDougall's defence of the concept of a soul in Body and Mind (1911) builds on Myers's arguments for the persistence of the personality after death. Other psychologists, not directly affiliated with psychical research, also felt its impact since they were forced to explain the phenomena that Myers had, with varying degrees of success, raised to the level of
scientific status. At the very least his work served to keep the larger ontological and metaphysical issues within the realm of psychology in Britain, even if through debate and controversy. However, as Oppenheim observes, many of the psychologists of the day, like Ward, Sully, and Stout, actually "shared many of the same assumptions about the mind, without involvement in psychical inquiries" (265).

Despite Myers's influence, his view of the psyche was gradually supplanted by those of the newer dynamic theories, notably Freud's. Since the fortunes of Myers's theory were integrally linked with the fortunes of the S.P.R. as a whole, it is worth exploring further Myers's relationship to these competing theories. Though these theories eclipsed Myers's, the reasons why are not immediately apparent. Of all the psychical researchers, Myers was most influential in introducing Freudian ideas to a British audience. In the Proceedings of the S.P.R for June 1893, he made the first reference in English to Breuer's and Freud's preliminary account of hysteria, claiming that their perspective on the relation between hypnosis and hysteria fully supported his own ("Mechanism" 14). On subsequent occasions, Myers similarly derived support from Freudian case studies, which he interpreted in the language and structure of his subliminal theory (Human Personality 50-56). He seems to have ignored
any differences between his theory and Freud's, which in any case did not become significant until after Myers's death; certainly he could not have foreseen that Freud's view would eclipse his own.

Both Freud and Jung reciprocated the interest and for their part took psychical research seriously, publishing several papers on the subject. Though Freud's attitude towards the phenomena remained cautious (Ellenberger 534), he was delighted to be offered membership in the Society For Psychical Research in 1911 and equated it with rising interest in psychoanalysis in England in a letter to Ernest Jones: "Do you think it is a sign of rising interest in psycho-analysis in your dear old England, that I have been invited to become a corresponding member of the London Society for Psychical Research? The names on their list are all excellent" (Letters to Jones, 26, 2, 1911, 4). Furthermore, in retrospect, at least one writer, Aldous Huxley, found greater merit in Myers's conception than in either Freud's or Jung's:

His [Myers] account of the unconscious is superior to Freud's in at least one respect; it is more comprehensive and truer to the data of experience. It is also, it seems to me, superior to Jung's account in being more richly documented with concrete facts and less encumbered with those psycho-anthropologico-pseudo-genetic speculations which becloud the writings of the sage of Zurich. Jung is like those classical German scholars of whom Porson once said that "they dive deeper and come up muddier than any others." Myers dives no
less deeply into that impersonal spiritual world which transcends and interpenetrates our bodies, our conscious minds and our personal unconscious -- dives no less deeply but comes up with a minimum of mud on him.

How strange and unfortunate it is that this amazingly rich, profound and disturbing book [Human Personality] should have been neglected in favour of descriptions of human nature less complete and of explanations less adequate to the given facts!" ("Foreword" 7-8)

Several explanations for this neglect have been put forth. John Cerullo claims that the Freudian paradigm offered a more functional view of the self than the protean Myersian view, in that it provided clear understanding of the way individuals were to deploy themselves in the modern world; this approach appealed more "to a mass society organized for functional efficiency..." (168-169). However, this claim is only a partial truth, since Freudianism had its main impact on intellectual elites in Britain and was never embraced by the masses. William James felt strongly that

the great obstacle to the reception of a Weltanschauung like Myers's is that the superior phenomena which it believes in are so enveloped and smothered in the mass of their degenerative congener and accompaniments that they beget a collective impression of disgust, and that only the strongest of mental stomachs can pick them over and seek the gold amongst the rubbish. ("Frederic Myers" 238)

James's explanation does not hold up any better since, if anything, Freud's similar method of applying the insights
from the abnormal to normality turned up even more unpleasant implications for the psyche.

In reality the reasons for the neglect of Myers are more numerous and complex. Both Myers and Freud were brilliant systematizers who were prompted to study psychological factors in abnormal phenomena by their early realization of the limitations of physiological explanations. Both advanced our understanding of the complexity of human psychology. However, at least in his early work, Freud carefully avoided metaphysical speculation. Myers's extension of abnormal findings beyond the normal to the traditional preserves of philosophy and religion is what made his results appear on the one hand disagreeable, as James notes, and, on the other hand, "excessively spiritual" to others. Aldous Huxley also mentions as positive, a factor in Myers's psychology which eventually weighed against him. Unlike Freud, who was a medical doctor with immediate diagnostic concerns,

F.W.H. Myers... was not a doctor and so had no vested interest in sickness. As a classical scholar, a minor poet, a conscientious observer and a platonic philosopher, he was free to pay more attention to the positive aspects of the subliminal self than to its negative and destructive aspects. (Huxley 7)

Though Myers's psychology was in some ways more balanced as a result, his work suffered from a lack of precision because
he was not concerned with testing his hypotheses directly on patients. In this sense Freud's theory was more functional.

Furthermore, as has been the case with all unsuccessful rivals of Freudian theory discussed thus far, Myers did not attempt to attract a coherent group of followers in order to propagate his view of the psyche, though he had supporters. In fact the Society For Psychical Research as a whole never really manifested much concern about the differences between Freudian theory and Myers's conception, probably because it did not perceive the Freudian view as a threat to the beliefs that it was attempting to place on scientific footing. In 1912, Freud contributed "A Note on the Unconscious in Psycho-analysis" to the Proceedings of the S.P.R.. He argued that the concept of an unconscious better accounted for the observed psychical phenomena than theories which assumed consciousness could be split up because consciousness of which one was not aware was an abuse of the word "conscious". Even after this alternate view was stated in the main organ of the S.P.R., the Society mounted no defence of Myers's subliminal self (Freud, "A Note" 315). Finally, chance appears to have played a role in the paradigm shift from the Society's more optimistic view of the psyche to the Freudian view. Both of the leaders in psychical research in the late nineteenth century, Henry
Sidgwick and Myers, died prematurely within a short period of time of each other, in 1900 and 1901 respectively. Myers had been the only researcher to attempt a synthesis of disparate phenomena and his theoretical framework remained essentially unchallenged within psychical research until the 1920's (Cerullo 103).

This discussion of the fortunes of psychical research in relation to psychoanalysis does not mean to imply that, after Freud's theories received widespread attention in England, the Society's vision of the psyche was suddenly no longer influential. Though eventually it did not keep pace with Freud's view, in the first two decades of the twentieth century it remained a vital force, largely because a more medically oriented group of psychical researchers, including Lloyd Tuckey, Milne Bramwell, V.J. Wooley, Constance Long (a translator of Jung), T.W. Mitchell, and William McDougall, proceeded to test the therapeutic applications of Myers's theory, primarily using hypnosis (Cerullo 159). In 1912 they formed a medical section in the S.P.R. and contributed to special issues on the psychological aspects of psychical research (Cerullo 160). T.W. Mitchell, a physician who was President of the British Psycho-Medical Society in 1911 and later President of the S.P.R (in 1921), probably did more than anyone else to further Myers's original intention of
demonstrating the underlying unity of soul. In "Some Types of Multiple Personality" and other articles, he presented several cases of multiple personality to show that underlying each of them was a breakdown in the physical screening process by which only one consciousness was allowed to preside at any given time. However, he argued that these battles occurred in the physiological sphere and thus did not affect the soul (Cerullo 161). Mitchell put forth a similar argument about a case of hysteria, which he treated initially using Freudian psycho-analysis before reverting to hypnotic suggestion (Cerullo 162). During the war, the medical section channelled most of its energy into the London Medico-Psychological Clinic, an organization which will be described further in Chapter Two.16

The medical group also fulfilled the very important function of keeping readers informed of the latest developments in the field of medical psychology. Continuing the tradition established by Myers, they provided summaries of important articles in both British and American periodicals such as The Psychological Bulletin and The Journal of Abnormal Psychology, as well as reviewed books like Psychopathology of Everyday Life and Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology.
However, the medical section did not survive long after World War One. As Cerullo claims, the psychical researchers had always had difficulty justifying detailed research into the causes and treatment of psychic dysfunction when their main aim was to demonstrate how manifestations of the abnormal revealed the potential of the psyche for supernormal experience (162-163). Myers's theory of the subliminal self was predicated on the argument that multiple streams of consciousness, occasionally diseased, occasionally transmitting privileged insights, were a normal and fundamental part of mental life; hence, to pay undue attention to destructive psychic elements appeared to be a distortion of emphasis. The war, however, seemed to magnify the destructive potential within the individual and drove home the necessity of focussing on both the sources of mental dysfunction and its cure.

Despite the ultimate inability of the Society For Psychical Research to secure widespread acceptance for its view of the psyche, its attempts to grapple with the problems of the relationship between body, mind, and spirit went a long way towards fulfilling a deep-seated need in British psychology and society in general. Whether or not they believed in survival, many psychologists realized the inadequacy of a materialistic, mechanistic model of the mind
and were thus unwilling to give up larger ethical and moral concerns in their psychology. Many hoped to reconcile science with religion, or at least morality, and the S.P.R. supported them in this aim. Since British psychology maintained this breadth of inquiry, even as extensive a system as Freud's was often seen as inadequate because of its determinism, reductionism, and use of mechanistic language. Thus the S.P.R. had, somewhat indirectly, a detrimental effect on Freud's reception in Britain. The Society also provided for many readers their introduction to the best of the continental second-wave theories and therapies. Most importantly, through its investigation of the dynamics of the mind, the Society brought the British into the twentieth century with a more sophisticated and sympathetic attitude towards mental illness than they might otherwise have had.

The fortunes of the Society's portrayal of the psyche did not reflect its strength as a literary influence either. The concept of the subliminal and evidence of the supernormal, whether manifested in morbid occurrences or in genius and other positive ways, repeatedly appear in novels of the Edwardian and modern period. Perhaps the popularity of these ideas owes something to a general dissatisfaction with the commonplace in an increasingly
mechanized society. The influence of these conceptions also reflects many writers' personal search for certainty about religious belief, their fascination with the idea that man has tapped only a small fragment of his psychic potential, or, at least, their concern to show that many extraordinary phenomena could not be explained by prevailing paradigms. The influence of psychical research on literature continued well into the thirties, when Mitchell, in a Myers's memorial lecture, entitled Beneath the Threshold (1931), suggested that the gap between Freud and Myers had narrowed (16), and has even continued to the present. One of the most recent and fascinating fusions of the two occurs in D.M. Thomas's The White Hotel (1981).

* * *

Thus, numerous disciplines, including philosophy, the scientific aspects of psychology, medicine, psychiatry, and psychical research contributed to the emergence of second wave psychology, through a complex web of influence. By the first decade of the twentieth century, when Freud's theories came to the attention of the British academic community,
there existed a large body of knowledge about dynamic psychology. Most of these ideas were developed independently of Freud, though some resemble ones proposed by him and others were adopted by him. It is worthwhile to summarize the development of the most important of these concepts from an historical perspective, before embarking on a chronological survey of the British reception of various forms of psychoanalysis in Chapter Two.

As early as the eighteenth century, faculty psychologists considered mind as active and unitary. Later, Romantic philosophers also emphasized the dynamism of the mind, as well as commenting on the existence of the unconscious, irrationality of man and importance of the sexual instinct. By 1830, several philosopher-psychologists had developed systematic models of the mind. Herbart is particularly noteworthy since he contributed a topographical model of mind and a theory of the development of the ego in this period. He also proposed the concepts of thresholds of consciousness, repression, and sublimation. During the middle years of the nineteenth century, further exploration of the unconscious occurred, and the idea of psychic energy was first formulated. Around this time, too, Braid located the origin of the trance state in the mind rather than in some mysterious magnetic fluid, and Briquet
carried out the first systematic study of hysteria. By 1872 hypnosis was being advocated as a technique for treating hysteria by an influential British specialist, D. Hack Tuke. Circa 1880, numerous advances in psychology were made. Nietzsche disclosed a drive theory of mind and applied the concept of repression and sublimation to sexual and aggressive drives. In England, Darwin proposed an instinctual basis for human endeavour and argued that sex was the most important instinct of selection. Galton discovered free association as a method of probing dreams. Lewes and Butler acknowledged to varying degrees the importance of the unconscious in mental life. The Society For Psychical Research was formed in 1882, and began to draw on abnormal psychology as a means of finding evidence for the survival of personality beyond death. A few years later, Charcot advanced his psychic shock theory of hysteria.

However, it was in the final decade of the nineteenth century that major breakthroughs were made in second wave psychology. Janet explored dissociations of personality and described how idee fixes could split off and exist autonomously from the rest of a personality. He also elaborated on concepts of force and psychic energy. James’s 1890 masterpiece, Principles of Psychology, was full of insights, including the following, that: consciousness was
continuous, like a stream; there were multiple, fluid selves; the instincts (viewed positively), along with habit, were central determining influences; psychical research was important in understanding human nature; there was a presiding arbiter in the psyche (analogous to a superego). By 1893, it was becoming generally accepted that hypnosis was the effect of suggestion, not a pathological condition. In that year, F.W.H. Myers proposed his threshold model of subliminal and supraliminal selves. He explored the implications for hysteria and genius four years later. At the turn of the century, a philosophy, named pragmatism, was established which evaluated ideas in terms of their dynamic significance.

In the first decade of the twentieth century, the flood of second wave psychological findings increased. James's *Varieties of Religious Experience* applied the "new" ideas to the religious impulse and adopted a pluralistic view, that no one system of ideas was true. 1903 saw the publication of Myers's *Human Personality*, which contained the most comprehensive dynamic view of the psyche to be developed in England to date. The following year, radical empiricism, which acknowledged the flux of experience, was proposed by James. To a list going back as far as Galton, Havelock Ellis added another British study of genius, which
suggests that the British continued to be fascinated with the exceptional. By 1906, five volumes out of seven of Ellis's thorough and non-judgemental study of sex had been produced. An even more thoroughly dynamic and systematic psychology than Myers's was propounded by William McDougall in 1908. Though it emphasized the role of instincts, conflict, and subconscious activity in mental life, it also made a place for the soul. Havelock Ellis's 1911 study of dreams was based on at least two decades of exploration of the topic by the British, as well as European developments. By the outset of World War One, Henri Bergson's metaphysical psychology had served to reinforce many earlier arguments, for instance about the importance of instinct, intuition, levels of selves, and memory in psychic life. In addition, he made a much finer analysis of the psychic moment than had any earlier writer and he stressed the importance of memory more than any previous psychologist, with the exception of Butler and his idea of ancestral memory.

Up to this period, the progress of second wave psychology was impeded by the outdated attitude of many psychologists and psychiatrists towards insanity, by the idea that the physician had a moral duty to the patient, and by the still widely held belief that it was dangerous to exacerbate the suggestibility of patients. Nevertheless,
these entrenched attitudes did not ultimately prevent the
diverse array of ideas listed above from circulating in
Britain and contributing to the literary zeitgeist there.
Chapter Two
The British Response to Later Second Wave Psychology

In 1909 Sigmund Freud wrote to Ernest Jones, a native of Britain, that

I consider it is a piece of psycho-analysis you are performing on your countrymen...you are not to say too much or at too early a moment, but the resistance cannot be avoided, it must come sooner or later and it is best to provoke it slowly and designedly. (February 22, 1909, Freud, Letters to Jones)

This chapter and subsequent ones examine several of the myths surrounding that "analysis" by considering the British reception of Freudian thought in a wider context than is typical in histories of psychoanalysis. Freud's ideas need to be viewed alongside those of other proponents of second wave psychology and their reception gauged in light of characteristics of the general British attitude towards psychology, in order to clarify the Freudian position.

The first myths to be dispelled in such a way are those which state that orthodox Freudianism was unfairly rejected out of hand because of psychological resistance to its theories and that, after a long struggle, it emerged as the dominant force among second wave psychologies in Britain.¹ In actuality, many prominent British social

203
scientists and intellectuals were initially attracted and gave serious consideration to Freud's views. However, their eclectic approach and judicious weighing of evidence prompted them not to accept Freud's hypotheses as a completed doctrine. Instead they remained eclectics, though many were attracted by Jung's expansionist view of human psychology, which was more in keeping with the British tradition of Myers, William James and James Ward.

Another myth, created largely by Ernest Jones and perpetuated by orthodox Freudians, claims that Jones was the most important if not the only significant representative of psychoanalysis during its formative stages in England. Though it is true that Jones was the most tenacious doctrinaire Freudian Britain ever produced, a colleague of his, M.D. Eder, was more influential in setting the British tone towards later dynamic psychologies in Britain. Certainly he was far more important than Jones in disseminating later second wave psychological ideas among literary figures. There were also numerous other figures who made a significant contribution to the acceptance of dynamic psychology in Britain. Jones typically diminishes their roles as he exaggerates his own.

A third myth, woven by Freudian literary critics like Lionel Trilling and Frederick Beharriell, states that
doctrinaire Freudianism was the most attractive psychology to writers. Beharriell, citing Trilling, claims that there is

no other psychology [than Freudian] subtle enough to compare with the mass of unorganized insights accumulated through the centuries by literature; no other psychology sophisticated enough to impress the twentieth century writer. (124-125)

Though this claim may hold for European or American writers, in Britain literary figures drew on nearly every major second wave psychology, including Freud's, even more eclectically and idiosyncratically than their counterparts in the helping professions, as will become apparent in Chapters Three through Seven. If there is any dominant trend, it would appear that writers were more attracted to Jungian thought than to psychoanalysis. Following a more detailed analysis of the first two of these myths, a chronology of selected publications and events will clarify when ideas of later second wave psychology began to circulate in England and what the response to them was. We will conclude by suggesting some of the reasons for the popularity of second wave psychology among the general public and in literary circles.

There were several striking features of British second wave psychology in the early years of the twentieth century which had a direct impact on how psychoanalysis was
received. Systems of thought were viewed with distrust and eclecticism prevailed; thus it was Freud's claims about the universality of behaviour which disturbed British psychologists, not the described behaviours themselves. Many psychologists appear to have accepted that dreams could represent wish fulfillments, but hardly any were willing to agree that all dreams had this function. A similar attitude was held about Freud's claims that sexuality invariably played a role in the etiology of the psychoneuroses and that conflict aroused by the sexual instinct was the primary motivator of behaviour. The expansionist view of human psychology, which included consideration of the spiritual aspect of man, continued to be influential. The Society For Psychical Research remained the single most significant vehicle for the dissemination of second wave psychology, at least until the end of the war. Its concentration on the problem of the survival of personality after death coloured its interpretation of second wave findings. Second wave psychology was swept up in the socialist movement in Britain. Social scientists and writers alike quickly recognized the educative potential of these newest psychologies and used them as a vehicle for social change. Most importantly, British intellectuals tended to focus on the literary, imaginative qualities of second wave
psychologies, and this concentration helps account for the considerable involvement of literary figures or well-educated individuals with literary sympathies in this form of psychology.

The prevalence of several of these characteristics in British psychology helps explain why the psychological analysis of Carl Jung came to be viewed as more acceptable than the Freudian paradigm. Jung drew eclectically on the evidence from many cultures to make his points, as well as on various psychologies, including Janet's and James's. His technique of synthesis is completely consonant with the typical Edwardian approach to knowledge. In common with many British psychologists, he never accepted Freud's assertion about the universality of sexuality in the origin of neuroses, or his idea about sexual symbolism and the Oedipus complex (Ellenberger 727). Similarly to psychical researchers, Jung attacked the materialist hypothesis and was open to the careful investigation of unknown psychic phenomena (Ellenberger 689). His view of the unconscious as a creative force and a potential source of strength aligned better with Myers's and James's concept of the subliminal and supraliminal than Freud's portrait of the unconscious as a seething mass of instincts striving for release. Jung's position was also more attractive to writers since it did
not imply that the artist was a neurotic, but rather that he had access to privileged, intuitive information. Jung's claim that religious experience was a valid part of personality (Progoff 22) that "must receive positive consideration" in psychotherapy also fit in well with Myers's and James's visions (Collected Papers 223-224). Thus it is not surprising that, as Jones claims, "Jung's conversion was hailed in the British Medical Journal as 'a return to a saner view of life' than Freud's", as early as January, 1914 (Jones Freud II 151). Freud, too, was well aware of the strength of Jung's position in England from as early as 1913 (Letter to Jones, November 22, 1913). By 1922, he admitted that Jones's claim was correct "that psycho-analysis was better known in England by Jung's work than by my own..." (Letter to Jones, June 4, 1922).²

Several of these characteristics of British psychology in the first two decades of the twentieth century are reflected in the first British institutions employing second wave psychology. The "Medical Society for the Study of Suggestive Therapeutics," later called the Psycho-Medical Society, was formed in 1907 (Wright, Obituary 204). Largely supported by members of the S.P.R., it contributed to the spread of knowledge about hypnotism. Several of its members were open to, and wrote the earliest expositions of,
psychoanalysis in Britain (Wright, Obituary 204). Ernest Jones gained his first public hearing in Britain for psychoanalysis at one of its meetings, and also at a meeting there Jung first indicated to a British audience the differences in his approach from Freud's, which led to their rift. After its dissolution at the end of World War One, its members formed the nucleus of the Medical section of the British Psychological Society, and an important element in the British Psychoanalytic Society (Wright 204). The Medico-Psychological Clinic, formed in 1913, was similarly eclectic, and also drew many of its most influential members from the S.P.R. In its recognition that "deviations from mental health are likely to be at least as common as deviations from physical health," that "Mental disorders are of various grades of severity, and arise from various causes," and in its exclusive concentration on illnesses with psychic origins, it represents a strikingly novel approach to mental health ("Psychotherapy" 314). Its socialist impulse is evidenced by the nominal fees it charged, which made treatment of this nature available to lower income classes (Boll 317). Finally, it was probably the first institution in England to recognize formally the therapeutic value of literature. At least one writer, May Sinclair, was heavily involved with, and influenced by its
activities, as will be described in more detail in Chapter Four. The Medico-Psychological Clinic set the tone for the third equally eclectic institution to put into practice the ideas of second wave psychology, The Tavistock Clinic. Established in 1920, it likewise accommodated lower income patients with modest fees (Dicks, Tavistock 1). Not until this post-war period did the character of some other British institutions change. Conceived on more rigid doctrinal lines, several came into being which were more exclusive and elitist. One of these was the British Psychoanalytic Society, founded in 1919, another was the Institute of Psycho-analysis (Brome "Ernest Jones" 138), and a third was the London Psychoanalytic Clinic, the latter two formed in 1924 (Jones, Free 258).

Ernest Jones (1879-1958) was the driving force behind all three of these later institutions and thus had an important hand in making their nature different from earlier institutions. In order to understand why these changes took place and, more importantly, to gain a clearer grasp of the development of the psychoanalytic movement in Britain, it is necessary to re-evaluate Jones's position. Not the least important of roles that Jones has played has been as the historian of the British psychoanalytic movement. Though the accounts he published in several articles -- as well as his
memoir, Free Associations, and his biography of Freud --
have prevailed, they contain numerous inaccuracies. Jones
tends to exaggerate his own importance, to play down the
contributions of others, especially if they did not follow
doctrinaire Freudian lines, and to err by omission. Several
examples should reveal the unreliability of Jones's record.
In "The Early History of Psychoanalysis", Jones claims to
have begun practising psychoanalysis in 1905 (202), while in
his memoir he claims that he began at the end of 1906 (Free
162). Both may be inaccurate since Jones may have been
practising a form of psychotherapy closer to Janet's at this
time (Brome Ernest Jones 44). Jones claims that at a January
1913 meeting of the Psycho-Medical Society at which he
spoke, Dr. T.W. Mitchell and Dr. Douglas Bryan "were
evidently impressed and before long could be counted as
recruits" (Free 229); however, Dr. Mitchell could hardly be
considered a recruit since he had published a favourable
review of psychoanalysis three years earlier and throughout
the rest of his career took an eclectic approach to Freudian
ideas (Wright, Obituary 205, 203). Jones also exaggerates
his role at the Seventeenth Congress of Medicine, as well as
stating that it took place in August 1914, when it actually
occurred in August 1913 (Free 241). In his biography of
Freud, he asserted that,

In the first week of August, there was a duel
between Janet and myself at the International Congress of Medicine, which put an end to his pretensions of having founded psychoanalysis and then seeing it spoiled by Freud. (Freud II 99)

As Ellenberger has pointed out, Jones was in reality one of nine respondents to Janet, five of whom supported Freud (818). His intervention was so brief that, unlike others, it was not even mentioned in the detailed accounts of the proceedings published in The Times (Ellenberger 819). Furthermore, in his memoir Jones claims that in the autumn of 1913, "I decided that the time had come to found a special society there [in England], a branch of the International Association." Jones makes no mention of any other contributor to this project, but in a letter to Freud at the time, he reported that "Dr. Eder and I have arranged to found a London group and expect to have perhaps a dozen members" (Letter to Freud, November 29, 1913, as cited in Brome 105).

Not only does Jones distort the historical record in ways such as these, but he also suppresses the existence of precedents to Freudian ideas. Jones was first introduced to Freud's work through the work of earlier second wave psychologists, as were the first literary figures to assimilate Freud's ideas. Jones's close friend and future brother-in-law, Wilfrid Trotter, had read Michell Clarke's early review of Freud's Studies in Hysteria (1894), as well
as Myers's synthesis of second wave psychology, *Human Personality*, and Jones asserted that he read both in 1903 when this book was published ("Reminiscent Notes" 9). Jones claims that he and Trotter began their psychological reading with the works of William James, Frederic Myers, and Milne Bramwell... We were especially interested in what is now called medical psychology, to which the French had contributed by far the major part.... The cases of multiple personality, and the beautiful experimental work carried out on patients in a state of deep hypnosis, seemed to furnish convincing proof that the mind was not coextensive with consciousness, and that complicated mental processes could be going on without the subject being in the least aware of them. The conception of an unconscious mind was therefore perfectly familiar to us, though we knew nothing about what it contained. (Free 158) 6

Either Jones did not read Myers's work carefully or, more likely, he withholds information here, since Myers certainly offered a view of what the unconscious contained, though it differed from Freud's conception, as we have seen (Chapter One 177-180). 7

Aside from Jones's unreliability as an historian, there are several other reasons why the impression he gives that he founded the British psychoanalytic movement singlehandedly and became pre-eminent in it needs to be questioned. 8 Under closer investigation, David Eder emerges as more representative of the British response and far more
influential in setting the tone towards later second wave psychology among both medical professionals and literary figures.

In the Foreword to *Memoirs of a Modern Pioneer*, a collection of essays about M.D. Eder's contributions to various fields, Freud praised Eder highly for his "rare combination of absolute love of truth and undaunted courage, together with toleration and a great capacity for love," qualities which led him to become "the first, and for a time the only doctor to practise the new therapy in England" (*Memoirs* 9). Freud's assertion so distressed Jones that he wrote to Anna Freud (since by the time of publication Freud had died) that

> I was indubitably the first person in this country (and so far as I know in the whole English-speaking world) to assimilate your father's work and to practise psycho-analysis. In the conditions of forty years ago it was a considerable feat and I suppose my reputation rests largely on it (as qtd in Brome *Ernest Jones* 211).

If Jones's claim that he began practising psychoanalysis in 1905 or 1906 is accurate,⁹ then he was the first, but David Eder might as well have been since Jones apparently did not disseminate his work at this time. Furthermore, Jones quickly lost all respectability and chance of furthering his career when he was accused three times of molesting children (Brome 39). By early 1908, he felt that he had no choice but
to leave England to start afresh in Canada. Jones resided outside Britain from March 1908 to the autumn of 1913, during the period when, as we shall see, psychoanalysis took root in England. Another of Jones's claims to a position as the original pioneer of British psychoanalysis was that he published six papers on psychoanalysis between 1907 and 1909. Though Jones leads his readers to believe that a "couple" of these were published in "English periodicals", his claim can largely be discounted since all six of these papers were published in highly specialized American periodicals (cf. Hart "Freud's Conception" 362). By his own admission, he did not speak to a British audience until a January 1913 meeting of the Psycho-Medical Society (Free 229), well after several others, including David Eder, had presented papers on psychoanalysis both at this Society and to other British Institutions.

David Eder, on the other hand, had established a medical practice in London in 1905. He had been interested in psychology as a young medical student, and described himself "as a diligent student of Ward's enlightening article on Psychology in the Encyclopaedia Britannica" (Memoirs 14, 43). In 1904, he met Jones and, like him, first employed suggestion and hypnosis in his medical practice (Glover, "Eder" 90). Eder claimed that he "first came across
Freud's work in 1905" but that he had some resistance to the ideas (Eder, "Present Position" 1214). By 1908, however, he had published a book aimed at a popular audience, The Endowment of Motherhood. In it he referred to Freud as "one of our leading neurologists" and supported the latest theory of sexuality of Freud's, but did not commit himself to it absolutely until more evidence could be gathered (Endowment 6, 15). Though Edward Glover incorrectly dates the beginning of Eder's interest in psychoanalysis as 1909, he does claim that at this time Eder

read everything about psycho-analysis he could lay his hands on and soon began trying out what he had gathered of psycho-analytic technique on patients who came to him in the course of his ordinary work in Charlotte Street. (Glover "Eder" 90)

In the summer of 1911, Eder gave the first clinical lecture in Britain on Freudian psychoanalysis at the Annual Meeting of the British Medical Association (Glover, "Eder" 89). Printed the same year in the British Medical Journal, it was the first -- not one of the first, as Jones claims ("Obituary of Eder" 144) -- case study of a psychoanalysis to be published in England. Beginning in 1912, he contributed numerous articles on psychoanalysis and other second wave psychologies to both the medical and popular press (Glover "Eder" 95); thus, he was certainly more influential in disseminating Freudian ideas in these early
years than Jones.

Several other accomplishments and characteristics of Eder's suggest that he was a more significant figure than Jones in shaping the overall attitude towards second wave psychology in Britain. Eder was an early socialist who quickly realized that the findings of psychoanalysis could substantiate the argument for the liberation of what he perceived as his society's oppressive sex morality (Endowment 5-6). Along with Wilfrid Trotter, he introduced Jones to socialism and the Fabian Society (Brome, Ernest Jones 37). Eder's socialism prompted him to oppose the Mental Deficiency Act of 1912, and to advocate educational reforms (Roberts 81, 77). Glover claims that, in 1907, he initiated and ran the first school clinic in London ("Eder" 95); Eder's involvement in this and other similar projects provided him with material for the earliest papers to be given in Britain on child psychology based on psychoanalysis (Roberts 77). He was the first person in Britain to apply psychoanalysis to these pressing issues and thus to recognize the potential for social and educational change of second wave psychology, a potential emphasized by most other intellectuals and literary figures who later became interested in psychoanalysis.
Eder's involvement in the Fabian movement brought him into contact with some of the leading literary figures of the day, including Bernard Shaw, H.G. Wells, and, later on, D.H. Lawrence. Eder also introduced Jones to this circle. Jones, however, maintained the doctrinaire Freudian view that creativity was a neurosis and consequently never established a rapport with writers. Although he apparently gave psychological advice to Frieda Lawrence on one occasion (Free 251-252), his general attitude is represented by his claim about D.H. Lawrence's "obvious lack of balance" (Free 251) and his description of James Joyce as a highly pathological case (as cited in Roazen 353). In contrast, Eder befriended many literary figures, including Lawrence (Memoirs 25-26, 119), J.D. Beresford, Dorothy Richardson, Rebecca West (Memoirs 131), and the poet, Isaac Rosenberg (Memoirs 24). They typically spoke highly of him. According to Frieda Lawrence, D.H. Lawrence was very fond of Eder (Memoirs 123). Rebecca West similarly felt very "warmly" about him and claimed that "He was such a strange mixture of charm and solid sense -- an ideal combination I never saw elsewhere" (Memoir 131). Dorothy Richardson called him "one of the kindliest human beings I have ever known" (as qtd in Memoirs 16) and remembered that his expression "carried conviction, not necessarily in regard to the ideology he
represented, but as to the value he set upon humanity" (as qtd in Memoirs 16). There is also some evidence that Eder discussed psychoanalytic ideas with these writers. Middleton Murray recounted that Sons and Lovers was "discussed by some Freudian psychologists who were enthusiastic about it because it exemplified some of Freud's main theses" and that Eder subsequently discussed Freudian doctrine with Lawrence, while Murray was present (as cited in Memoirs 117). Lawrence subsequently also discussed points about psychoanalysis in correspondence with Eder (Memoirs 119); furthermore, Eder had a professional relationship with Lawrence as his physician and had at least one gifted artist among his patients (Memoirs 129). He was a father-figure to his younger colleagues, as Professor J.C. Flugel makes clear: "[Eder] was above all the ideal of the kindly, sympathetic father, to whom one could turn with one's troubles and be sure that he would do his utmost to relieve the burdens" (Memoirs 129).

Finally, Eder typified the eclectic British response to second wave psychology. Originally he had practised a form of psychotherapy based on Janet's, and then, stimulated by Freud's ideas, he visited Freud and underwent a brief analysis with V. Tausk (Glover "Eder" 98). Around 1913, just as Jung was breaking away from Freud, Eder became attracted
to what he perceived as the wider and more optimistic perspective of Jung, over Freud. In the early 1920's, he moved closer to the Freudian position again, and underwent an analysis with Ferenczi (Glover "Eder" 100). Throughout he remained a more independent thinker than Jones; thus, because of his ability as the first publicist and popularizer of second wave psychology, interests in socialism, numerous literary contacts, and eclecticism, all facilitated by his solid, trustworthy and courageous personality, Eder did more than any other individual to gain early acceptance in diverse circles of the controversial ideas of second wave psychology. His selective approach to psychoanalysis and the use he made of it is more representative of the general British response than that of his nearest rival, Ernest Jones.

Numerous other figures contributed to the acceptance of second wave psychology in Britain, as well as determined the character of that response. Ernest Jones typically distorts the roles of those who did not accept Freudian doctrine in its entirety by several methods. He may state that they failed to make progress in the field, implying either that they lacked the intelligence to see the truth of Freud's theories or that their personal conflicts and resistances prevented them from doing so. Otherwise Jones
shows that they may have been jealous of his position, had only a "transitory" or "superficial" interest in psychoanalysis, slipped into conventionality, or had been led out of the psycho-analytic movement by blind acceptance of the ideas of either Jung or Adler. Further tactics of Jones's include playing down contributions of eclectics or omitting them altogether from his historical accounts. During the actual period, Jones carried out maneuvers in an attempt to ensure that Freudian thought would predominate. He felt so threatened by the inclusive, eclectic nature of the London Psychoanalytical Society, and particularly its willingness to discuss Jung's innovations, that he dissolved it just after World War One (Free 239-240). He claims that he immediately reconstituted it "with an improved membership" (Free 240) but, as Roazen points out, "the British Society in the early 1920's was substantially non-medical and somewhat amateurish" (Roazen 345). Jones had merely excluded those experienced members with a wide understanding of, and sympathy for, various second wave psychologies, including David Eder and Constance Long. Jones followed a similar course when he initiated the London Psychoanalytic Clinic; hence Jones was instrumental in changing the nature of several British Institutions which disseminated second wave psychology by making them divide
along rigid doctrinal lines.

A selective chronological survey of the development of psycho-analysis along with other second wave psychologies in Britain will clarify the contributions of figures neglected by Jones. More importantly, it will show when the ideas of second wave psychology began to take root in British soil. As was detailed in Chapter One, British contributions and response to second wave psychology began as early as the late 1880's, primarily through figures, like Myers, who were associated with psychical research. He headed the British contingent at the 1889 International Congress on Hypnotism in Paris and was the Secretary when the British hosted the Second International Congress on Experimental Psychology in 1892, at which psychotherapy was first defined. Britain was also the first nation outside Austria to respond sympathetically to Freud's ideas. This response was partly the result of the tendency of English investigators to place Freud in the context of their own theories. The first British reference to Freud, Myers's June 1893 summary of Freud and Breuer's preliminary account of hysteria, represents a good example. Myers claimed that Freud's findings offered most "emphatic support, from wide clinical experience" of the view of hysteria that Myers himself had expressed two years earlier ("Mechanism" 14).
Myers did, however, point out that Freud and Breuer had elaborated on the nature of one type of hysteria. They found that certain hysterical symptoms, which had been thought to be spontaneous, were actually "reproductions, more or less symbolical in character, of some definite original shock..." ("Mechanism" 12). Myers also brought to the attention of his British audience Freud's and Breuer's observation that "A momentary accident at the time of maximum shock may determine the character of years of malady."12 In the second British reference to Freud's and Breuer's work, in 1894, Dr. J. Michell Clarke similarly summarized their psychic shock theory and noted their claim that these disturbing moments often occurred in childhood ("Hysteria" 126); thus by 1894 there existed one potential source for the emphasis that writers would place on the psychological moment. Clarke followed up his initial survey of Freud's and Breuer's findings with an extensive review of Studien uber Hysterie (1895), published in Brain (XIX, 1896). He was the first person in Britain to distinguish Freud's views from those of other researchers, including Janet, and to note Freud's and Breuer's emphasis on the primary role that sexuality played in hysteria. Clarke reported the Germans' observation that many hysterical phenomena do not arise either through idea ("Review" 404) or from innate psychical
weakness, as Janet claims ("Review" 410). Rather they result from violent emotional disturbances which are converted into physical symptoms. Clarke noted that the authors lay stress on the fact that the most frequent and most powerful emotions to suffer this 'conversion' are the sexual ones; that the sexual factor is by far the most potent and most pathologically fruitful in the production of hysterical phenomena. ("Review" 410)

Finally, Clarke compared Breuer's and Freud's method to religious confession ("Review" 407) and he noted that Freud insisted that confidence in the doctor patient relationship was essential to success ("Review" 412).

F.W.H. Myers again referred to Breuer's and Freud's work in an address he gave to the S.P.R. in 1897, which was reported in its Journal (April 1897, 50-59). Here Myers continued to use their research to confirm his and Janet's view that all hysterical symptoms are equivalent to idées fixes ("Hysteria" 55). He also gave a brief summary of Freud's and Breuer's case of Anna O ("Hysteria" 55-56).

Havelock Ellis made the fifth reference to Freud in "Hysteria in Relation to the Sexual Emotions", published in the American Journal, The Alienist and Neurologist, in 1898 (XIX 599-615). Ellis agreed with Freud's ideas about the sexual etiology of hysteria and brought them much more to the fore than Clarke had done. His exposition reached a larger British audience when sections of it were reprinted
in volume one of his *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, entitled *The Evolution of Modesty* (Second Ed. 1900). However, Ellis misinterpreted Freud by claiming that he took the sexual impulse as the sole root of behaviour, a point with which Ellis took issue (Brome, Ellis 123). Ellis continued to cite Freud in subsequent volumes of his *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, as did Myers. In the latter's posthumously published *Human Personality* (1903), he made available the essentials of both the Lucy R. and Anna O. cases to English speaking audiences (51-55). He also noted that that Fraulein O. referred to her therapy as "The Talking Cure" (55).

Although I have largely avoided references to Freud in American publications, since his reception in America has been treated elsewhere (Morrison), one early article deserves mention. In February 1906, James Putnam published the first summary in the English-speaking world of Freud's method of treatment by psycho-analysis, in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*. He gave a balanced appraisal, pointing out that Freud had extended his theory of sexual repression to other psychoneuroses besides hysteria ("Recent Experiences" 27). Putnam reserved judgement about this theory until further evidence could be gathered, but he did conclude that the psycho-analytic method was difficult to
apply ("Recent Experiences" 35-36). Furthermore, it did not differ too much from other therapies which substituted one set of associations for another in order to effect a cure ("Recent Experiences" 39). Nevertheless, in closing, Putnam did assert "that Freud's method constitutes a distinct enrichment of our means of treatment" ("Recent Experiences" 41).

In 1908, Wilfrid Trotter and Ernest Jones attended the first International Psychoanalytical Congress, held at Salzburg (Jones Free 167-168). In that same year, and in 1909, Trotter first published his argument about the herd instinct, which was expanded into a book, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War (1916). Though Jones highly praises his friend's understanding of human nature and his wide knowledge of English literature (Free 102), he curiously avoids any assessment of the influence of Trotter's work. In actuality Trotter's pioneering attempt to demonstrate the biological basis of the "herd instinct" is a striking example of British second wave psychology developed independently of Freudian thought.¹⁶ The 1916 book had an enormous popular impact and was read and discussed in literary circles, including Bloomsbury, as will be seen.

M. David Eder's The Endowment of Motherhood (1908) was another popular appeal which also tried to establish a
biological basis, in this case for the socialist position. Eder argued that society should be organized in conformity with our instincts. In support he cited Freud's claim that "all the disastrous effect of civilisation can be essentially reduced to the harmful repression of the sexual life among civilised races (or classes) owing to the prevalent 'civilised' sex-morality" (Endowment 6). Eder also drew on the idea, widespread in later second wave psychologies, "that every organism is really bisexual, but that in each one sex is latent and the other prepotent" as part of his argument that the sexes should be treated equally (Endowment 10). His main proposal was that motherhood should be a paid occupation, in order to encourage early unions and

to avoid the voluntary suppression of sexual desires at an age when such desires are strong and to inhibit the various forms of sexual perversion in so far as the latter are not due to inherited traits, but are merely the expression of quelled instincts finding expression in unusual channels (Endowment 12).

Eder cited Freud's, Janet's, and Muthmann's findings that all neuroses were grounded in childhood or adolescent sexual disturbance in support of his plan (Endowment 14). He consequently advocated freedom and tolerance in sexual matters (Endowment 20). This remarkably modern document\(^{17}\) shows how implications of which Freud may not have approved were drawn
from his theory and how, as a result, his ideas were very early linked with fairly radical socialism in England. The popularity of Eder's proposal is attested to by the fact that the booklet had been reprinted from Eder's articles on the subject published in The New Age in 1907 (Roberts 78). Since this journal was the main organ of humanitarian intellectualism, Eder's ideas would also have reached the leading intellectuals of the day (Roberts 78). According to J.B. Hobman, Eder's phrase "endowment of motherhood" passed into the currency of all parties, and it is one of the ideals of the conservative reformer in H.G. Wells's New Machiavelli (Eder, Memoirs 13). We can speculate that, given this popularity, Eder's book would have done a great deal to make Freud's name, if not his theories about sexuality, pass into the intellectual currency of the period. As we have seen, William McDougall also proposed a theory in 1908 based on the primacy of the instinctual nature of man, in Introduction to Social Psychology (Chapter One 134-135). Furthermore, in the following year, the psychologist William Brown proposed that psychology was the science of the unconscious rather than of consciousness, as was traditional ("Epistemological Difficulties"). Judging from these four sources -- Trotter, Eder, McDougall, and Brown -- it would appear that the view of man, not as rational, but as drawn
by instincts which were either shaped or thwarted by his social environment was gaining momentum in Britain.

1909 was also an important year for psychoanalysis, though more so in the United States than in Britain. Both Freud and Jung were invited to deliver lectures at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts, and an interview with Freud appeared in the popular press in America. The first of Freud's books to be translated into English, his Selected Papers on Hysteria and Other Psychoneuroses, was published in New York, as was the first of Jung's books, The Psychology of Dementia Praecox. Though the contents of Freud's work had been summarized by English reviewers following its appearance in German, the appearance of the book in its entirety made several additional points clear. Not only was the "accidental moment" shown to be of seminal importance in the onset of hysteria (Selected 1), but the moment was also of great importance to Freud, the analyst (Selected 51), who realized that his "literary" technique could be likened to that of the novelist. In the following passage, Freud himself provided the cue that his subject matter was the stuff of fiction:

...even I myself am struck by the fact that the histories of the diseases which I write read like novels and, as it were, dispense with the serious features of the scientific character. Yet I must console myself with the fact that the nature of my subject is apparently more responsible for this
issue than my predilection. (Selected 55)

However, Freud's predilection was apparently for literary language to describe his technique. He claimed that

The grouping of similar reminiscences in a multiplicity of linear stratifications, as represented in a bundle of documents, in a package, etc., I have designated as the formation of a theme. These themes now show a second form of arrangement. I cannot express it differently than by saying that they are concentrically stratified around the pathogenic nucleus. (Selected 105-106)

Further on in his narrative, he compared the revelation of a new "theme" just before the close of an analytic hour to the way fiction appears in installments in a newspaper (Selected 114). Symptoms were often manifestly determined (Selected 110), just as symbols were in literature. Thus, in his concentration on the moment and his manipulation of it for dramatic purposes, and in his use of the developmental case study, literary metaphor and style, Freud virtually extended an invitation to writers to make use of his material. Furthermore, Freud repeatedly used the Jamesian stream of thought metaphor, as in the following passage: "on further investigation it is regularly found that the seemingly disconnected reminiscences are connected by close streams of thought, and that they lead quite directly to the desired pathogenic moment" (Selected 94). This metaphor and the technique it suggested was used extensively by psychological
novelists. Freud was also careful to distinguish his conversion of affect into physical symptom theory of hysteria from Janet's splitting of consciousness theory (Selected 123-125). Finally, he pointed out that his theory of the psychoneuroses did not claim an exclusive sexual etiology as its popularizers would have it, but rather that sexual impulses in conjunction with repression lay at the root of all neurosis (Selected 184).

As Ernest Jones duly acknowledged, Jung's The Psychology of Dementia Praecox "made history in psychiatry ...and extended many of Freud's ideas into the realm of the psychoses proper" (Freud II 34). What Jones neglected to mention was that Jung's ideas owed as much to his supervisor at the Burgholzli Institute, Eugene Bleuler, to Janet, and to Theodore Flournoy, as to Freud (Ellenberger 692-693). Jung introduced to English readers the idea of emotional complexes, the existence of which he had found experimental support for using word association tests. Complexes of various types, including those surrounding ambition, money, and sexual needs had been discovered in numerous patients, but he concentrated on a detailed analysis of one sixty-year-old woman (Psychology 99-146). As with Freud's case studies, Jung's had great potential appeal for literary figures such as May Sinclair. Jung concentrated on the
symbols his patient created to image her suffering (Psychology 144), and he drew numerous analogies between her and the poet, including the following:

...our patient has created a long-drawn-out and elaborately woven tissue of fancies, comparable on the one hand to an epic poem and on the other to the romances and fantasy productions of somnambulists. In our patient, as with the poet, the web of fantasy is woven in the waking state.... (Psychology 145)

Many English readers of Jung’s work would have agreed with, and found reassurance in, Jung’s eclecticism (for which he was apologetic Psychology 3), as well as his disagreement with Freud about the universality of the role that sexuality plays in the psyche (Psychology 4). However, we do not know how many Englishmen were able to obtain Jung’s work, since, according to the translator Brill, the first edition was small, soon exhausted, and not re-issued until 1938 (Psychology xi).

The next major work of second wave psychology, Freud’s Three Contributions to the Sexual Theory (trans. 1910), did not suffer the fate of Jung’s book. The date of its publication marks the beginning of what would become a fairly wide analysis of, and response to, Freudian thought in British medical, psychiatric, and psychological journals. As Ellenberger has shown, by 1905 the European zeitgeist was of extreme interest in sexual problems (502). In England,
Havelock Ellis's *Studies in the Psychology of Sex* very definitely paved the way for the acceptance of Freud's ideas. Contrary to A.A. Brill's pronouncement that before Freud "sex had been treated as an isolated phenomenon, or as (more or less) an abnormality" ("Introduction" 15), Ellis had previously treated sexuality as a part of normal life. In the Three Contributions, Freud did, however, stress that the graduations between the neuroses and normality were subtle and continuous (578). Once again he invoked the stream image, this time to describe sexual repression:

> the libido behaves like a stream, the principle bed of which is dammed; it fills the collateral roads which until now perhaps have been empty.... *(Three Contributions* 577-78)*

Freud made his theory of infantile sexuality quite clear in this work. He described the various erogenous zones, developmental phases and concept of ambivalence (*Three Contributions* 587-89, 597, 598). Tunnel imagery was employed to describe the development of sexuality:

> The normality of the sexual life is guaranteed only by the exact concurrence of the two streams directed to the sexual object and sexual aim. It is like the piercing of a tunnel from opposite sides. *(Three Contributions* 604)*

This tunnel image is particularly interesting since, perhaps coincidentally, both J.D. Beresford, in *God's Counterpoint* (1918), and Virginia Woolf, in *The Voyage Out* (1915), later use tunnel complexes or dreams to image sexual conflict.
Another aspect of Freud's theory of sexuality which writers frequently assimilated into their fiction was the concept of sublimation that he developed. Sublimation, by which sexual motive powers are deflected from sexual aims to new aims,

forms one of the sources of artistic creativity, and, depending on whether such sublimation is complete or incomplete, the analysis of the character of highly gifted, especially of artistically gifted persons, will show every kind of proportionate blending between productive ability, perversion and neurosis. (Three Contributions 625, 584)

Along with other followers of Freud, Edward Glover claimed that "Freud's discovery of infantile sexuality was a profound shock to everyone who came to hear of it..." ("Eder" 91). As Ellenberger notes, a myth has grown up that Freud's Three Contributions provoked widespread outrage and abuse; however, in England, Freud's Contributions actually garnered some praise. A positive review in the British Medical Journal (June 3, 1911) concluded that

Certainly no one can read these essays without an inward acknowledgement of the author's acumen, courage and endless patience in the pursuit of truth; nor, having read them, fail to realize more clearly the need for fuller knowledge and more careful guidance of the gradual unfolding of the sexual life. (as cited in Clarke 234)

In a 1914 essay in Mind, Wildon Carr acknowledged that Freud's claim of the predominantly sexual origin of the dream wish had been criticized, but he defended Freud's position ("Philosophical Aspects" 331-332).
In the same year that Freud's essays were published, the work of the British psychiatrist Bernard Hart stands out, both for the quantity of his output and its quality. Hart assessed various aspects of Freudian psychoanalysis in three articles, two of which were published in England. The first, "The Conception of the Subconscious," was published in America, but deserves mention since it was referred to by Freud as "the best on the damned topic of the unconscious I had read in the last years" (Letter from Sigmund Freud to Ernest Jones 10 3 1910). A second had been presented before the British Psychological Society at Oxford in May 1910. It thus has the distinction of being the first public lecture to be given in Britain summarizing Freud's ideas. However, the third was the most detailed account of Freud's system of psychology to be published in England by that time. Hart referred to all of Freud's major developments, including his dream, sex, and psychic shock theories, as well as Jung's concept of the "complex". The article was undoubtedly an important reference source since it contained a 281 item bibliography of references to psychoanalysis, forty-one of which had been published in English. Hart adopts the attitude that would become characteristic of the British response in his concluding remarks:

Freud's psychology has now reached a stage of development which calls imperatively for complete investigation and appraisement of its value. The
whole subject must be submitted to searching and impartial criticism, the basic facts must be confirmed, and the justification of the deductions built upon them accurately estimated. Should it be found that the structure satisfies the requirements of science, then Freud's achievement must be reckoned among the most considerable in the history of human knowledge. ("Freud's Conception" 358)

Hart followed up these articles with The Psychology of Insanity in 1912. This work, already summarized (Chapter One 166-168), was far more important as a popular but discriminating introduction to Freud's and other second wave psychologists' ideas than was Jones's Collected Papers (1912), the only other book, aside from Freud's own, published in England on the topic by 1912. All of these contributions, it should be noted, were made while Jones remained in exile, and for them alone, Hart deserves a more prominent position as a pioneer than Jones accords him; however, Hart remained an independent thinker on the subject of psychoanalysis, a position which probably accounted for Jones's minimization of his role.

In 1910, Dr. T. W. Mitchell reached what was likely a more varied audience than Hart's when he published a summary of several methods of psychotherapy in the Proceedings of the Society For Psychical Research. This article was not 'mainly devoted to psychoanalysis' as Ronald Clarke, a biographer of Freud's claims (373), but considered the Freudian method ("Some Recent" 673-678) along with several
others, including Morton Prince's, Boris Sidis's and Milne Bramwell's. Though Mitchell accurately distinguished Freud's conception of mental dissociation from Myers's and Janet's ("Some Recent" 674), he incorrectly attributed the concept of "complex" to Prince ("Some Recent" 666).

In the years 1911 and 1912, dynamic psychologies continued to make inroads in Britain. Ellis (The World of Dreams, 1911) and McDougall (Psychology, The Study of Behaviour, 1912) published their developments of dynamic psychology, while at the same time acknowledging Freud's work. T. W. Mitchell published two more papers which referred to psychoanalytic findings, one of which included a case study ("Some Types" and "A Study"). David Eder gave the first clinical lecture on psychoanalysis in England, to the British Medical Association ("A Case" 1911), and the first of several psycho-analytically oriented papers to the Psycho-Medical Society ("Freud's Theory" 1912).

In December of 1912, Jones's Collected Papers on Psychoanalysis were published, the most comprehensive study of Freud's work to date. In the Preface, Jones attempted to place Freud in historical context by comparing his idea of libido, which Jones claimed translated as "sexual hunger" (Collected 22), to Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's Wille Zur Macht, Bergson's élanc vital and Shaw's "life force"
Jones then condensed Freud's varied researches into seven fundamental principles \((\text{Collected} \ 13-22)\), in the manner of a follower. Jones also shows a tendency to exaggerate Freud's claims, as did other early adherents like Brill. One example occurs when Jones describes the source of pathogenic activity and the result of Freud's technique:

Their [the unconscious processes'] harmful effect is due to the fact that they are unconscious, and vanishes again as soon as they are made conscious. \((\text{Collected} \ 129)\)

Freud's suggestion of the importance of early childhood became in Jones's words "the general law that nothing happening to a child after the age of five can cause a psychoneurosis" \((\text{Collected} \ 132)\). Jones covered a wide variety of topics in the book, including the psychopathology of everyday life, a case of autopsychic amnesia, hysterical symptoms as the fulfillment of repressed wishes, psychoanalytic treatment, Jung's word association method, Freud's theory of dreams, and psychoanalysis and education. In the two papers covering the last mentioned topic, Jones strongly recommended Ellis's \textit{Sex in Relation to Society} \((\text{Collected} \ 403)\). Perhaps taking his lead from Ellis or Eder, Jones claimed that children should be told the truth about sex by their parents because otherwise children will come to realize that their parents have lied to them, a statement
that must have been perceived as controversial in 1912
("Collected" 406). Jones also elaborated on Freud's conception
of sublimation in order to demonstrate its value for edu-
cation. In the Preface to his "Collected Papers," Jones
stressed that "Freud's views had met with considerable
opposition" ("Collected" ix), but Jones's own work was
well-received in Britain. A review in the prestigious
journal "Nature" claimed that "His [Jones's] book is extremely
readable and good, chiefly by reason of its wealth of
concrete examples." The "Times" quite properly considered
Jones's book along with other second wave psychological
books on hypnotism and psychotherapy by C. Lloyd Tuckey,
Milne Bramwell, and Charles Burlureaux. The reviewer cited a
case of suppressed desire described by Jones and mentioned
how the therapist tried to effect a cure by bringing
forgotten incidents of childhood to light using dreams and
word association. He disagreed with Jones that
psychoanalysis, which was difficult and costly, would
replace hypnotism ("Times Literary Supplement" Dec. 18, 1913
614).

1913 was a pivotal year in the reception of
psychoanalysis in England. The first English translation of
Freud's magnum opus, "The Interpretation of Dreams," appeared
in that year. Despite the fact that Freud devoted nearly a
quarter of the work to his predecessors, the translator, Brill, made the large claim in the preface that "it was Freud who divested the dream of its mystery, and solved its riddles" (Interpretation xii). The work did offer the most detailed theoretical formulation of the structure of the unconscious to date, based on the imaginative analysis of dreams and the common symbols found in them. Freud introduced the idea of the Oedipus complex and suggested its universality:

Perhaps we are all destined to direct our first sexual impulses towards our mothers, and our first hatred and violent wishes towards our fathers, our dreams convince us of it. (Interpretation 223)

He outlined several dream processes, including condensation, displacement, the role of the censor, and the ideas of manifest and latent dream content (Interpretation 274, 287, 372, 260). Further into the work, he elaborated on the mechanism of repression (Interpretation 474-76). As in his earlier English translation, the stream of thought metaphor appeared repeatedly (Interpretation 414, 418, 450, 470's) and Freud drew numerous analogies between the dream and literature. In one of these he claims that,

Just as every neurotic symptom, just as the dream itself, is capable of re-interpretation, and even requires it to be perfectly intelligible, so every genuine poetical creation must have proceeded from more than one motive, more than one impulse in the mind of the poet, and must admit of more than one interpretation. (Interpretation 225)
Freud stressed the verbal nature of the dream:

The whole range of word-play is thus put at the service of the dream activity. The part played by words in the formation of dreams ought not to surprise us. A word being a point of junction for a number of conceptions, so to speak, a predestined ambiguity, and neuroses (obsessions, phobias) take advantage of the conveniences which words offer for the purposes of condensation and disguise quite as readily as the dream. (Interpretation 315)

In the conclusion of the work, he stated that the dream was valuable more for a knowledge of the past than the future (Interpretation 493). As we shall see, writers of the period frequently employed dreams in order to reveal the past. In addition, they increasingly exploited both the subject matter and the literary qualities of the dream that were highlighted, though obviously not introduced, by Freud. Modernist writers transformed the dream processes identified by Freud into literary technique.

The reviews of The Interpretation of Dreams which will be mentioned in chronological order, indicate that the British response was generally favourable. The main point of contention was the typical British one that Freud's sweeping and even absolute claims were not well enough supported by evidence. As the reviewer in The Nation put it, the psychologist must object to "The building of a huge structure upon a very slim and unstable foundation." 23
William Brown's exposition of "Freud's Theory of Dreams" in the *Lancet* (April 19 and April 26, 1913) was one of the first to commend Freud's work highly. Brown followed this up with "A Case of Extensive Amnesia of Remote Date cured by Psycho-analysis and Hypnosis" in the *British Medical Journal* (November 8, 1913). In 1914, the year he became Reader in Psychology at the University of London, Brown published two more articles on psychoanalysis. The first, entitled "What is Psychoanalysis?", appeared in *Nature* and would thus have reached a more general audience than those published in academic journals. In it, Brown called Freud's theory "Perhaps the most important and startling scientific theory of modern times..." (643). The second, published in the *British Journal of Psychology*, made some attempt to align Freud's work with William McDougall's. Brown was also a prominent member of the S.P.R. (cf. Chapter One 145), and in his later books, *Psychology and Psychotherapy* (1921) and *Suggestion and Mental Analysis* (1922), he attempted to synthesize some of the findings of psychoanalysis, psychology, and psychical research. Despite these very early contributions, his continuing interest in psychoanalysis, and his eventual prominence as President of the British Psychological Society, Brown is completely ignored in Jones's historical accounts.
Yet another pioneer neglected by Jones, who first published on Freud's ideas in 1913, was David Forsyth. Jones does admit that "An old acquaintance, Dr. David Forsyth, independently became interested in psychoanalysis to the extent of practising it" (Free 228) and published several papers on it (Free 229), both activities occurring before World War One. Forsyth was a founding member of the London Psychoanalytic Institute but, claims Jones, "attended very few meetings" because of "personal jealousy" of Jones (Free 239). However, the jealousy might well have been Jones's, since a few years earlier Forsyth had won out over Jones for a post at Charing Cross Hospital, when Jones desperately needed a job (Free 132). Forsyth's obituary claimed that "It must have needed great courage, twenty-five years ago, for a physician in a teaching hospital publicly to declare himself favourable to Freud's doctrines" ("Obituary" British Medical Journal, April 26, 1941). Like Brown, Forsyth continued to publish extensively on psychoanalysis from an eclectic standpoint. He also became a founding member of the Institute of Psycho-analysis.

However, to return to the chronology, the main psychoanalytic event of 1913 was the Seventeenth International Congress of Medicine, held in London in August. In his history of British Psychology, L.S. Hearnshaw claimed
that, in Britain, psychoanalysis did not receive any conspicuous publicity like the 1909 Clark conference in the U.S.A.; hence psychoanalysis percolated into the ken of British Psychology (Short 165). I would argue that the Medical Congress came closest to playing that role in England, and it thus marks a crucial turning point. The stage was set at an August 5th meeting of the Psycho-Medical Society, whose President was T.W. Mitchell, and honourary Secretary, another pioneer disparaged by Jones, Douglas Bryan.25 At the meeting, Jung read "Psycho-analysis" (Transactions of the Psycho-Medical Society IV, Part II 1913). In the paper, he announced his new method of "psychological analysis" (Collected Papers 206). Jung criticized Freud's method of dream interpretation by pointing out the arbitrariness of viewing some elements in a dream as symbolic and others as concrete in order to arrive at an interpretation of the contents as sexual in nature (Ellenberger 698). Similarly to Havelock Ellis, Jung stressed the many-sidedness of the meaning of dreams, including the prospective aspect (Collected Papers 220).

The Congress of Medicine opened two days later. During one session, Pierre Janet criticized Freud on several counts, including for having taken over several of his own ideas; in response Jung defended psychoanalysis from his own
perspective rather than Freud's. Not only were the
Proceedings published, but of more immediate and popular
impact, the sessions were summarized in *The Times*. One
report claimed that

Professor Janet, one of the greatest psychologists
living, made a very damaging attack on Dr. Freud's
school of thought, in a discourse abounding in
acute criticism and as full of wit and literary
finish as any novel by Bourget or Anatole France.
(Saturday August 9, 1913)

Another compared Janet's and Freud's positions in more
detail and stated that

Freud introduces the theory of repression, or
forcing back of thoughts and desires into
sub-consciousness, thereby lowering the
psychological tension, and also the theory of
transference. Whatever facts one theory will not
explain the other has to. The originality of the
doctrine of Dr. Freud lies in the fact that instead
of stating that a sexual basis is found in some
neuroses, it asserts that it is found in all. (*The
Times* August 9 1913)

This reviewer pointed out that Jung's paper, "rather than
defending Freud's central position, proved that he differed
from him in many important points" (*The Times* August 9
1913). The one cited was about "the sexual basis of all
neuroses; [Jung] found this standpoint too narrow. He
believed that the true cause occurs later in life...." (*The
Times* August 9 1913). Thus in the popular press, Freud is
identified with an absolute and extreme position, which came
under attack, while Jung's view is considered less narrow.
Through reports of the Congress, then, psychoanalysis as well as Jung's variants achieved recognition, though not always the most positive in nature. The aforementioned review concluded with a Dr. J. J. Walsh's remark that "Psycho-analysis had a large vogue at present owing to the sex element being introduced, that being to the front in people's minds at the present" (August 9, 1913).

David Eder presented the public with a much more affirmative view of psycho-analysis in a review of The Interpretation of Dreams in which he also announced that Congress.²⁷ Later in the year he presented a more detailed account of Freud's psychoanalysis in relation to Jung's and Adler's developments (Eder "Present Position"). Eder explained why Freud discarded the "shock" theory of neurosis, and he summarized Freud's theories of sexual development, the Oedipus Complex, resistance and sublimation. He was careful to point out that Jung's and Adler's opposition to Freud's sexual theory was "not the result of mere prejudice" ("Present Position" 1214). Jung found the theory "too narrow" and argued that the essence of neurosis was the failure to adapt to life. Eder also mentioned Adler's ideas that the desire for power was the more general condition of which the sexual disturbance was a particular function, and that neurotics strove to compensate
for feelings of inferiority arising from early illness ("Present Position" 1215). Eder concluded by stating that none of the theories had reached finality ("Present Position" 1215). Probably in response to growing interest displayed in psychoanalysis, Eder and Jones founded the London Psycho-Analytical Society in the late autumn of 1913 with nine original members.  

1914 opened with several articles exploring various aspects of Freud's ideas on dreams. William Brown's in the British Journal of Psychology was immediately followed by the psychologist T.H. Pear's lengthy "Analysis of Some Personal Dreams with Reference to Freud's Theory of Dream Interpretation." Pear claimed that he had been analyzing his own dreams for one and a half years ("Analysis" 288), and followed Freud's method in dissecting them. H. Wildon Carr examined "The Philosophical Aspects of Freud's Theory of Dream Interpretation" in Mind (July 1914). Carr proposed that wish indulgence needed to be distinguished from wish fulfilment and concluded that Freud's doctrine of psychic reality was "profoundly suggestive" but needed to be restated ("Philosophical Aspects" 333). V. J. Woolley, a member of the medical section of the S.P.R., applied Freud's theory to phenomena of psychical research in "Some Auto-Suggested Visions as illustrating Dream-Formation"
Freud's popularization of his dream theory, entitled *On Dreams*, also appeared in 1914. Translated by David Eder, this concise and clearly written book did more than any other of this early period to make Freud's dream theory accessible to the British public. In this work, Freud again noted the unusual wording of dream thoughts and claimed that they are "expressed symbolically by allegories and metaphors like the figurative language of the poets" (*On Dreams* 54). Though the book mentioned that "most of the dreams of adults are traced by analysis to erotic desires" (*On Dreams* 100) and cited several sexual symbols, including agricultural and building symbols, passages on more explicit sexual symbols were deleted from the translation "in deference to English opinion" (*On Dreams* 104).

The English translation of *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, another work of Freud's which would prove to be quite popular in England, was similarly published in 1914. This work operated from the premise that forgetting and other slips did not occur arbitrarily but followed lawful and rational paths (*Psychopathology* 4). It went further than any previous book of Freud's in collapsing the distinctions between normality and abnormality. For instance, Freud made the important point that even in
healthy persons "resistances are found against the memory of disagreeable impressions and the idea of painful thoughts" (Psychopathology 152). Because of its original premise, the book attempted to account for many so-called superstitions. Freud even went so far as to state about religion that

I believe that a large portion of the mythological conception of the world which reaches far into most modern religions is nothing but psychology projected into the outer world. (Psychopathology 309)

Interestingly, however, in light of his membership in the S.P.R., Freud stopped short of repudiating all supernatural phenomena (Psychopathology 311).

The Psychopathology overflowed with vivid and varied examples guaranteed to appeal to the imaginative, and perhaps for this reason above any others was widely reviewed. 29 In The New English Weekly, Leonard Woolf asserted that Freud "writes with great subtlety of mind, a broad and sweeping imagination more characteristic of the poet than the scientist or medical practitioner," but he also acknowledged that there was a "substantial amount of truth" of great value in Freud's main thesis (Psychopathology 36, 37). Constance Long, in the Proceedings of the Society For Psychical Research, and H. Ellis, in The Journal of Mental Science, likewise commended it. We can assume that the publication of The Psychopathology of
Everyday Life in the spring prompted the Symposium on "The Role of Repression in Forgetting," which was published in the British Journal of Psychology in several parts in September, 1914. Contributors included T.W. Mitchell, the psychical researcher, and the psychologists T.H. Pear, T. Loveday, and A. Wolf. More general views of psychoanalysis were provided by W.H.B. Stoddart ("Psycho-analysis"), a psychiatrist and consultant to the Medico-Psychological Clinic, and Maurice Wright, a member of the Psycho-Medical Society (Wright "Obituary" 203; "Psychology of Freud") in this year.

In addition, 1914 marked the publication of the first psychoanalytically influenced book of literary criticism cum biography in England. This was W.H.R. Rivers's Walt Whitman's Anomaly (Hoops 26). Jones gives the impression in his biography of Freud that Rivers was only brought into the psychoanalytic movement in 1919 as a figure-head of respectability. He claims that, in order to heighten the prestige of the Medical Section of his newly-formed British psycho-analytic Society, "we got W.H.R. Rivers, the distinguished anthropologist, to act as its first President, but the next seven were psychoanalysts..." (Freud III 12). However, in reality Rivers was familiar with the work of Freud and Jung before World War One and developed a parallel
theory of instincts and consecutive layers of mind to that of psychoanalysis (Slobodin 54). Though he disagreed with the Freudians on several scores, including about the universality of sexual symbolism in dreams, he supported and published on psychoanalysis during the war, as will be seen (Slobodin 77). He continued to draw on it eclectically in the post-war period, writing "in the area where psychology, psychiatry, sociology and ethnology converge" (Slobodin 74). As is typical of the British response, he also began to apply psychoanalysis to his socialist political views (Slobodin 69-79). Like Eder, he had extensive literary and intellectual connections with, for example, H.G. Wells, G.B. Shaw, and Bertrand Russell, as early as before the war, the war poets, including Siegfried Sassoon and Robert Graves, during the conflagration, and Arnold Bennett afterwards (Slobodin 68, 70-71). Of the latter two, it should be mentioned that Rivers contributed to Graves's theory of poetics (Slobodin 70); he also became an intimate friend of Bennett's and advised him on his stammering (Slobodin 78). Rivers, too, thus deserves a more prominent place than Jones has given him in the history of British psychoanalysis.

The Jungian position continued to have a hearing in Britain in 1914. Constance Long placed an article entitled "Psychoanalysis" in The Practitioner in July. She was an
early member of Eder's and Jones's London Psychoanalytic Society but since, according to Jones, she 'soon became an ardent follower of Jung', her subsequent role in disseminating second wave psychology was ignored by him (Free 239). She was one of the first public supporters of the Medico-Psychological Clinic (Boll 312), an associate of the Medical Section of the S.P.R. under T.W. Mitchell, a regular contributor to the S.P.R.'s publications, and, most importantly, a translator of Jung into English. Jung himself returned to London in the summer of 1914 to give several papers, including "The Importance of the Unconscious in Psychopathology" before the British Medical Association. It was subsequently published in the highly respected journal, Lancet. According to Jones, Jung's visit was a great success (Brome Jones 107).

In Free Associations, Ernest Jones claims that "concerning England there is little to say [about psycho-analysis] in the pre-war time" (228). It should be clear by now that Jones was particularly "free" with the facts on this point. By the early months of the war, there was a fertile, eclectic discourse on second wave psychologies, including psychoanalysis, amongst British medical professionals and academics from various fields. At least nine well respected British periodicals had published mostly
favourable reports of Freud's and Jung's ideas alone. These ideas had also been brought to the attention of the public in at least four more popular presses, including The Times. Several public lectures and case studies had been presented on British soil. More emphasis in these discussions had been placed on Freud's theory of the neuroses and dreams than on his sexual theories, but almost all of his theories to date had been mentioned. Amendments and elaborations to Freud's dream theory had been proposed. The main objections by the British as a whole were not so much to the content of his ideas, but to Freud's claim of having proof, which appeared absolute, as well as his insistence on the universality of the phenomena he described, particularly about sexuality in dreams and psychoneurosis.

Much has been made by Clarke and others of the impact of the war on fuelling negative opinion about German variants of second wave psychology (Clarke 374-376; Hoops 23-25; Brome 109). Though war did arouse a few such emotional attacks on psychoanalysis in particular, it was also vigorously defended. Jones neglects to mention in any of his accounts the fact that, in 1915, W.H.B. Stoddart gave "The Morrison Lectures" at The Royal College of Physicians in Edinburgh on "The New Psychiatry." According to his obituary, these made history (Rickman 286). He pointed out
in the strongest terms possible the danger of a prejudice against psychoanalysis that was motivated by nationalist sentiment and went on to outline Freud's theories of the unconscious, sexuality and dreams (Rickman 286). Even more importantly, psychoanalysis actually made great progress in gaining acceptance during the war. Large numbers of war casualties began to appear whose disorders could not be attributed to physical or organic sources. Psychoanalysis offered a more comprehensive explanation than other dynamic psychologies of the mental processes behind these disorders. As W.H.R. Rivers put it,

The great merit of Freud is that he has provided us with a theory of the mechanism by which this experience, not readily and directly accessible to consciousness, produces its effects, while he and his followers have devised clinical methods by which these hidden factors in the causation of disease may be brought to light. ("Freud's Psychology of the Unconscious" 914)

While on the staff at the famous Craiglockhart Hospital near Edinburgh, Rivers managed to make the time to write six additional papers, both theoretical and practical, which utilized Freudian findings. During these war years, he also developed techniques of psychotherapy based on the Freudian, as did other psychologists, including C.S. Myers, William McDougall, T. Pear, and William Brown (Hearnshaw 245), all of whom had published supportive essays on Freud before the war. In the war years a psychodynamic theory of shell shock
was developed. Whereas in *Free Associations* Jones leads his reader to believe that he himself advanced such a theory, since he does not mention any other British contributors (242), in actuality M. David Eder's observations and theory were far more influential in Britain. He first described his theory in a 1916 article and then published the first British book on the subject, *War Shock: The Psycho-Neuroses in War Psychology and Treatment* (1917). According to Glover,

> This notable contribution [*War Shock*] did much to advance the cause of clinical psychology. Up to that time a variety of functional disturbances under war conditions had for lack of psychological insight been pigeon-holed under the classification of organic diseases. Eder's book did much to rescue them from therapeutic oblivion. Moreover, by substituting the title "war shock" for "shell shock," he succeeded in broadening enormously the current aetiological conception of the whole group of war neuroses." ("Eder" 99)

The book also proves that Eder had not become devoted exclusively to Jung's ideas, but maintained a selective approach to Freud's theories, since Eder found that in some cases sex, in the form of the typical Oedipus myth, is very clearly brought out, while in other cases it was highly probable that adequate psycho-analysis would have laid bare a sexual complex which again would have shown to be itself symbolic of the individual's maladaptation. (Eder *War Shock* 12)

Nevertheless, the war neuroses made it clear to many that the Freudian sexual theory of the aetiology of neurosis
was not all-encompassing. We can speculate that this is one reason why Jung's ideas, with their more general conception of the libido as psychic energy, became so popular in Britain during these years. Another reason may have been that Jung's view of humankind affirmed the importance of man's higher qualities and his potential for adaptation and regeneration when it appeared as though these aspects of humanity had been all but shattered by the atrocities of the war. In 1915, Jung published nine lectures that he had given in New York in 1912, as The Theory of Psychoanalysis. He laid bare his differences with Freud about the libido, developmental stages and the Oedipus conflict (Ellenberger 697-698). Repeatedly he stressed the importance of psychological moments, each one of which had a special history of its own (Theory 62). More important to the British public was the publication of his Collected Papers on Analytic Psychology (1916), since it reprinted most of the papers he had given in England. The content of the opening chapters on "the Psychology and Pathology of So-called Occult Phenomena," somnambulic personalities, and automatisms would have seemed natural and appealed to the British, who had been introduced to second wave psychology through the work of the Society For Psychical Research. In T.W. Mitchell's review of the book in the Society's
Proceedings, he stressed that Jung's view of human personality was more positive than that of Freud. According to Mitchell, The Collected Papers demonstrated that the two psychologists differed most in their treatment of the symbol, for which Jung found a positive and prophetic value ("Review" 193). Whereas Freud emphasizes man's infantile, primitive cravings, and claims that these are fulfilled in the wishes of dreams, Jung views the dream as "an attempt at the solution of an unsolved problem" ("Review" 194). Mitchell concluded that, in Jung's paradigm, the symbol of the dream may play a part in the moral education of the individual similar to that which the religious symbol has played in the history of civilization. ("Review" 195)

The English translation of Jung's Psychology of the Unconscious appeared in the same year. This work drew extensively on the literatures and mythologies of the distant past in order to shed light on the problems of the individual in the modern world. In it Jung introduced his conception of the collective unconscious, that aspect of the unconscious "which not only binds the individuals among themselves to the race, but also unites them backwards with the peoples of the past and their psychology" (Psychology of the Unconscious 199). David Eder emphasized the poetic, imaginative qualities of Jung's writing, as well as his undogmatic attitude in his review for The New Age
("Psychological Perspective" 284-285). Eder's concluding remarks allude to the potential of Jung's work to counter the bleak vision of humanity which the war prompted:

Jung's great work points out to us, indeed, the dying gods; his great understanding of the human psyche would help to find new ways of life, to replace the dying with the nascent faith, to make the transition less painful and less destructive; harmless it cannot be: witness the great war. ("Psychological Perspective" 285)

May Sinclair also reviewed what she referred to as Jung's "great and terrible book", The Psychology of the Unconscious, in The Medical Press and Circular. Similarly to T.W. Mitchell, she highlighted the educative possibilities arising from Jung's work. She also took the opportunity to develop her idealistically-motivated argument about the importance of sublimation in arriving at an ultimate "psycho-synthesis" (119). Jung's ideas about dreams were developed in Maurice Nicoll's Dream Psychology (1917). Nicoll was yet another early member of the London Psychoanalytic Society who became more attracted to the Jungian perspective than the Freudian (Jones Free 239).

Freudian ideas not linked with the treatment of psychoneuroses in the war effort also continued to be made available to the British. In 1916, Brill's translation of Freud's Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious was published. Freud explained the basic operation of wit using
Jamesian language: "in wit formation a stream of thought is dropped for a moment and suddenly emerges from the unconscious as a witticism" (Wit 266). The merit of wit was that it enabled one to rebel against authority and "afford[ed] us the means of surmounting restrictions and of opening up otherwise inaccessible pleasure sources" (Wit 147). These statements on its value would have appealed to Lytton Strachey's generation, which was by this time fully engaged in using wit to rebel against its Victorian forebears. In addition, Freud offered another potential reason for valuing memory in fiction. He claimed that,

considering the close connection between recognition and remembering, the assumption is no longer daring that there exists also a pleasure in remembering, i.e. that the act of remembering in itself is accompanied by a feeling of pleasure of a similar origin. (Wit 180)

The following year, several articles appeared on various aspects of Freudian thought, including J.C. Flugel's contribution to the British Journal of Psychology, "Freudian Mechanisms as Factors in Moral Development." The second symposium to be published in the British Journal of Psychology on "Why is the 'Unconscious' unconscious?", with contributions by Jones, Rivers, and Nicoll, stands out in the list of publications on second wave psychological topics in the final years of the war.

Finally, during the war years, Adler's ideas received
some exposure. His ideas about organ inferiority and compensation had been summarized as early as 1913 by David Eder in "The Present Position of Psychoanalysis" (1213-1215), but in 1918 the first British edition of Adler's own outline of his theory appeared (The Neurotic Constitution). Like McDougall's system, Adler's psychology stressed the dynamics of interpersonal relationships. According to Ellenberger, Adler's theory "never considers the individual in an isolated and static situation, but sees him in the light of his actions and of the reactions of his environment" (609-610).

In Free Associations, Jones claims that "There seemed to be a psychological moment in every country when interest in the newness of psycho-analysis became acute" (230). Jones located this English moment "to be within the first five years after the end of the war" (Free 230). If we extend his observation to the other later second wave psychologies, including Jung's and Adler's, we can agree with him. Publications on all three psychologies, and events in which their ideas were discussed, proliferated to such a degree that only the most striking can be mentioned here.

In 1919, the year that Jones reconstituted the Psychoanalytic Society in Britain along narrower doctrinal lines, Carl Jung lectured on his belief that spirits were
projections of the psyche to the Society For Psychical Research in London (Ellenberger 673). Jung returned to England in 1920 to give a seminar, and it is thus no wonder that Jones eventually wrote to Freud that Jung's theories were better known in England than Freud's (Letter to Jones, June 4, 1922). Also in 1920, Janet gave three lectures at the University of London, and so we can see that several dynamic psychologies continued to compete for exposure in England following the war.

In addition, 1920 saw the publication of Barbara Low's *Psychoanalysis*, which greatly contributed to the dissemination of Freudian ideas on a popular level. She had been introduced by her brother-in-law, David Eder, to psychoanalysis. Like him, she was an early Fabian and well connected with literary figures, including Bernard Shaw, H.G. Wells and D.H. Lawrence, the latter of whom was "a warm friend and correspondent" (Franklin "Obituary" 473). The psychologist, J.C. Flugel, came to the fore of British psychoanalysis in 1921 with his *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Family*, which Leonard Woolf described as "an almost unknown classic in its own peculiar field, a publisher's dream" (Woolf 166). Early in that year, a debate on the dangers and merits of psychoanalysis ran concurrently with one on "The Future of the Novel" in the pages of the *Pall*
Mall Gazette. Drs. Arthur Lynch and Bernard Hollander attacked "the present craze for psychanalysis", most justifiably for its exaggerated claims (January 6, 1921). However, Flugel just as strongly defended psychoanalysis and warned against "wild" analysis (January 7, 1921). One cannot help but feel that this debate influenced the discussion on "The Future of the Novel", since the question of sex in the novel was raised (January 7, 1921). In addition, both May Sinclair and J.D. Beresford, who were knowledgeable about psychoanalysis, participated in the literary discussion.

A similar although much more lengthy debate on psychoanalysis appeared from June to October 1925 in *The Nation and Athenaeum*, of which Leonard Woolf was literary editor (Abel 15). This debate followed the publication of the first two volumes of Freud's *Collected Papers* (1924), translated by James and Alix Strachey. By this time the ideas of second wave psychology, and psychoanalysis in particular, had permeated the Bloomsbury circle, as is described in greater detail in Chapter Seven. Not only did Leonard Woolf consider himself a Freudian, and Alix and James Strachey take up careers in psychoanalysis, but the following associates of the circle also became psychoanalysts: Adrian and Karin Stephen (Virginia Woolf's brother and sister-in-law), John Rickman, and Lionel
Penrose. By the mid 1920's, psychoanalysis was both a craze and a curse, as J.D. Beresford asserted in his proclamation of the decline of psychoanalytic influence on the novel ("Le Déclin").

Though a full analysis of the reasons for the attraction to, and in some instances notoriety of, later second wave psychologies on a popular level is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is necessary to mention a few of the contributing elements, since these also have a bearing on writers' responses to second wave psychology. The following comments most strikingly apply to psychoanalysis, but they hold for other second wave psychologies, including Adler's, Jung's and Janet's, as well. Several of the motives for the attraction reflect the less noble characteristics of human nature. Because this group of ideas and therapies deals with the deepest emotional level of human beings, at which they are the most vulnerable, these ideas were continually exploited. Vincent Brome brings one vivid example to light in claiming that:

Charlatans took full advantage of the widespread publicity and every kind of exploitation for commercial purposes was brazenly explored. The bogus English Psycho-Analytical Publishing Co. put an Advertisement in The Evening Standard which read 'Would you like to make £1000 a year as a psycho-analyst... Take eight postal lessons from us at four guineas a course.' (Ernest Jones 109)

Since these ideas encroach on traditionally taboo territory,
they were bound to feed a certain morbid curiosity about pathology and voyeuristic impulse towards sexuality. In many of the condensed summaries of the theories to appear in the press, only those ideas that were most sensational were mentioned. Second wave psychologists also developed terminology to describe the phenomena they discovered. In the hands of the media, this terminology descended to the level of jargon terms such as idée fixe, collective unconscious, and Oedipus complex, which could be easily tagged and remembered. In 1930, William McDougall summarized the most negative results of his impression that psychology was now the most popular of the sciences. It is worth quoting at length:

In many ways the popular interest in psychology is a disturbing and distorting influence, especially in that it gives an undue prominence and prestige to views that are extreme, ill-balanced, fantastic and bizarre, if only they contain some modicum of truth and are put forward with persuasive skill. In America, especially, the general public, including not merely the seekers after personal benefits but also the more cultivated public, is keenly interested in the extravagances of the Freudian school, in the equally ill-balanced system of Adler with its gross exaggeration of one factor of our constitution to the neglect of all else, and in the still more ill-balanced, extravagant, and bizarre dogmas of the behaviorist school.... On the other hand, it ignores the labors of those who try to maintain and, by patient research, to develop a sane, all-round, well-balanced system of psychology that founds itself on general biology and takes account of facts revealed by all relevant lines of research, by biology, by physiology, by anthropology, by the study of animal behavior, by
the medical and social sciences, by "psychic research." For the general public such psychology is too difficult, too laborious, too lacking in sensational claims, in promises of immediate solutions of practical problems, too humdrum, too tame, too full of unverified hypotheses and confessions of ignorance. What the public likes is to be told straightforwardly and dogmatically that it has an Unconscious, source of all mysteries and all solutions; or a terrible Oedipus complex, source of all disorders; or an Inferiority Complex, source of all achievement; or a few Conditioned Reflexes that explain all human activity.... And whatever the dogma, it must be one that promises immediate profits in health, or pocketbook, or domestic harmony and relief from personal responsibility. (McDougall 222)

However, it was not only the extravagances of second wave psychology, especially as reported in the media, which fostered the interest in these ideas. Though some of the ideas of second wave psychology had been introduced in the nineteenth century and before, it was only when they were reformulated in the early decades of the twentieth century that they received widespread attention. This suggests that, in some sense, their timing was right, that these ideas met some emotional and psychological needs of the period in Britain. As has been well documented, certain traditions and practises were increasingly perceived as oppressive and inadequate around the turn of the century. Religious belief no longer sustained, child-rearing practices seemed authoritarian, and the negligible status of women in a patriarchal society was seen increasingly as unjust. Second
wave psychologies appear to have offered liberation from some of these oppressions, and so it was no coincidence that psychoanalysis, for example, was taken up by early twentieth century socialists in Britain.

Instead of attempting to suppress "undesirable" human instincts and to isolate those perceived as "abnormal", second wave psychology not only acknowledged the fundamental importance of instincts but also the harm in repressing them. It showed that normal and abnormal behaviour occurred on a continuum. For these reasons, second wave psychologies were employed in the arguments for the free expression of instinctual impulses, as in free love, and for equality between the sexes. The therapies of these psychologies typically advocated confession of one's conflicts, not to a punitive father-figure, but to an understanding ear.33 In psychoanalytic technique, the patient's associations were "free", in the sense that they were freely given but also freely responded to, without moralistic judgement.34

Though generally more discriminating about the ideas of second wave psychology, writers too occasionally applied them in their work, not always for the best motives or with the best results. In the post-war period when second wave psychologies became fashionable, some less scrupulous writers exploited that popularity; hence, the denigrating
biography and lurid "case-history" novel thrived. As J.D. Beresford has pointed out, the deliberate and arbitrary use of these ideas "produces an effect on the [intelligent] reader that may be variously irritating, unconvincing, and negligible, but is rarely, if ever, psychologically valuable" ("Psychoanalysis" 430). However, even serious writers like Beresford himself occasionally let their enthusiasm for the new theories override their better aesthetic judgement. Though the question of why writers of a higher calibre so frequently made use of these ideas is a complicated one, and largely depends on each individual writer, a few brief generalizations can be made. The ideas of second wave psychology are dramatic, in the sense that they depict the dynamics of the mind, by showing how elements, which can be likened to characters, are in active conflict with one another. Second wave psychology provides insights into human existence, including aspects formerly considered taboo, from birth to death and, in some cases, beyond. It thus envelops a wide range of behaviour and phenomena. Many of the theoretical entities that it explores cannot be seen, such as the unconscious; thus an air of suspense surrounds them, which attracted writers. Second wave psychology rewrote the definition of various aspects of behaviour: most notable is the extension of the meaning of
sexuality in psychoanalytic theory (Miller 81). Second wave psychology thus rearranged as well as enlarged the subject matter of literature. The therapies of these psychologies also absolutely rely on language for their success. An incoherent story is a sign of unhealthiness and, as Jones makes explicit, the patient must translate and revise his story in order to make the transition to healthiness:

The symptoms constitute a veiled language in which hidden thoughts and desires find the only means allowed them of coming to expression. We will have to get the patient to translate his symptoms into more direct language, and thus to understand and appreciate the origin of them. (Collected 189)

Furthermore, as Steven Marcus, Patrick Mahoney, and others have convincingly argued, Freud's literary style (Mahoney x) and his modernist approach (Marcus 58) contributed to his appeal. This claim might be extended to Janet and to some of Jung's cases as well. All three were faced with the same challenge of articulating psychic reality as was the creative writer tuned in to this reality (Mahoney 7). Writers met this challenge by developing experimental techniques which were either analogous to, or directly derived from, therapeutic techniques. The most striking of these were the various types of stream of consciousness employed by the modernists. Whereas Freud would have been more attractive as a writer than Myers or Jung, whose prose could become cloudy and convoluted, these latter two
psychologists had greater appeal on two other counts. While Freud continued to view the artist as a neurotic fleeing from reality, they portrayed the artist as having special access to the supernormal, or visionary, archetypal world. Both fully incorporated the spiritual nature of man in their systems and thus took a step towards satisfying the widespread need felt in Britain of replacing traditional religious dogma with some other acknowledgement of spirituality. Thus second wave psychology both reshaped the subject matter available to artists and suggested possibilities of style and structure because of the literary qualities of much of its work. In the following chapters, more specific results of writers' attraction to second wave psychology will be analysed in some detail.

In summary, we have seen that the later second wave psychologies, particularly psychoanalysis, were reported on from 1893 on. They took root in England from 1908 to the first World War. By this period, Freud's theories of hysteria, sexuality and repression, sublimation, and dreams had been introduced and discussed in Britain. Jung's ideas about emotional complexes and the psychological basis of dementia praecox, as well as his divergence with Freud over the significance of sexuality, the universality of the Oedipus complex, and symbolism had been brought to the
attention of the British. Adler's theories about power and inferiority had also been mentioned. In these years, Ernest Jones, the self-proclaimed leading British pioneer of psychoanalysis, lived mainly in exile in Canada and thus had little impact in Britain. It was, rather, David Eder, Bernard Hart, David Forsyth and others who first brought psychoanalysis to the attention of the British and who set the tone of eclecticism towards it. Ernest Jones did not singlehandedly perform a psycho-analysis on the English, since dissemination of Freudian ideas continued to be a collective effort after he returned to Britain. During the war, psychoanalysis flourished, mainly because psychoanalytic therapy could be adapted for the treatment of war-shocked soldiers. Nevertheless, in these years Jung's ideas also achieved greater recognition. In the post-war period, the ideas of later second wave psychologies circulated widely in Britain through the popular press. At this time Jones's deliberate attempt to keep psychoanalysis from being assimilated into other medical and social science fields began to succeed. He reformed the London Psychoanalytic Society, removing those whose ideas extended beyond orthodox Freudian ones, set up a clinic which used Freudian therapy exclusively, and arranged through James Strachey to have Freud's Collected Papers published.
Several writers gained information about psychoanalysis from David Eder and, during the war years, from W.H.R. Rivers. The eclectic response of these pioneering doctors to the latest dynamic psychologies was reflected in the attitudes of writers, who characteristically drew on whatever psychological ideas helped them to plunge deeper in their work into the unseen realities of existence.
Chapter Three
The "New" Psychology and Mrs. Woolf's Edwardians: A Reappraisal

Confusion about the status and boundaries of the "new" psychology has been reflected, and perhaps even magnified, in literary criticism. Literary histories which consider the influence of psychology at all, typically simplify ideas drastically so that their impact on literary texts will be clear, but there are other problems with proportioning influence as well. This chapter initially examines several of these major distortions before making some generalizations about the complex and occasionally subtle changes in the English novel which can be either directly or indirectly attributed to the rise of second wave psychology. A major source of error is subsequently located in the essence of modernism itself. The origins of obscured developments will then be traced by comparing several Edwardian writers, prior to detailed analysis of their fiction.

Literary critics quickly recognized the potential of the "new" psychology for elucidating texts both ancient and
modern. One of the earliest monographs in English to apply the "new" psychology, Albert Mordell's *The Erotic Motive in Literature* (1919), is typical in the large claims it makes for the impact of Freud's psychoanalysis, while ignoring other contributions. Though Mordell mentions in his introduction that "Psychoanalysis was applied to literature long before Freud" (13), and he concludes with a chapter on a thinker, Lafcadio Hearn, who anticipated Freud in certain respects, the rest of the book is devoted to exploring the "revolutionary" ideas of the "genius" Freud, since "The points of difference between him and his disciples Jung and Adler need not be touched on here. My own sympathies are with Freud" (15-16). As well, Mordell makes no reference to the English psychological tradition. According to Mordell, Freud's "new method" can explain just about every literary phenomena, from the origins of literary genius to "why certain plots and characters are indulged in by particular authors" (16).

Subsequent literary histories, perhaps taking their cue from these early enthusiasts, have also distorted the role of the "new" psychology, generally in one of three ways. Either they play down the influence of psychology altogether, preferring to investigate only literary sources of the changes in the novel, or they focus almost exclu-
sively on Freud, falsely attributing influence to him in the manner of Mordell, or they acknowledge one or two ideas of several major figures, including Freud, James, Ellis or Bergson, without beginning to assess the complexity of these influences. Ernest Baker's *The History of the English Novel* (1936), long considered to be a definitive study, is representative of the first category. Quite accurately he gives precedence to Butler's ideas of the unconscious and heredity, but then commits a vast error of omission, stating that,

> These tendencies [to portray character psychologically as Butler did] were strengthened by what the novelists learned from Freud and Jung and Adler on psychoanalysis. The result has been a large group of novelists dealing with the phenomena of mental and moral disturbances, with conflicts, complexes, inversions, and cognate disorders. It would be taking too much for granted to call them Butler's school, but at any rate they have followed his lead in a direction that has given new vitality to realistic fiction.... (247)

Baker makes little further attempt to place the contribution of the psychologists. Walter Allen similarly ignores the effect of second wave psychology, making only the briefest reference to Freud, Jung, and James in his overlapping studies *The English Novel* (1954) and *Tradition and Dream* (1964).

Of those who falsely attribute literary influence, H.V. Routh's (1946) treatment of Freud is one of the more
extreme. He writes that Freud

discovered 'the subconscious' to an age eager to know more about itself. In the past, other and greater writers had penetrated with a wider sympathy into that mystery, but as if by accident, dropping hints. The artist's insight was nearly always narrowed by the narrowness of the reader who expected characters to be clear-cut, all compact of unified avowable motives. Freud came with a scientist's authority and reminded us that such sculptured effects were due to artistic simplification.... (123)

Not only does Routh inaccurately attribute the term subconscious to Freud, but he concludes, without providing evidence, that Freud's "discoveries" prompted every sort of artistic form:

Thus Freud prepared the way for the introspective novel, the internal monologue, impressionism, surrealism, and revealed possibilities in the problem play and autobiography. (123)

A third group of literary historians recognizes the importance of psychology and more accurately places Freud in the context of one or two other important figures, like Bergson and Ellis, but does not attempt to trace the intricacies of influence and tends to ignore the English psychological tradition, as well as the impact of psychical research. Frederick Karl correctly claims that, "the biggest single influence" on the twentieth-century novel has been psychology, but he restricts his discussion to Freud's findings about the discontinuity of the mind and Bergson's ideas on time (27-28). Leon Edel, in The Psychological Novel
is typical of a number of critics who have focussed on what admittedly is, as Edel claims, "the most characteristic aspect of twentieth century fiction", the stream of consciousness technique, but who, in so doing, unfortunately have neglected other important changes in the novel emanating from psychological developments. William Tindall's Modern British Literature (1956) considers more of these changes without, however, tracing sufficiently the background to Freud's impact (187-245). Even Keith May's recent Out of the Maelstrom (1977), devoted completely to elucidating "analogies between the observations of novelists and psychologists in the period since 1890" (vii), neglects completely the British psychological tradition, including psychical research, an approach which causes him to make several false generalizations. Many other examples could be cited, but those provided should be sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a major difficulty.

Before investigating one literary source for the misproportioning of influence, it would be instructive to summarize developments in the novel which can be ascribed either indirectly or directly to the psychological sources cited in Chapters One and Two. Obviously the novel did not change overnight, nor did all novelists develop along similar lines. Also, as Frederick Myers, William McDougall,
and Freud, amongst others were well aware, exceptional writers throughout the centuries have had profound psychological insights upon which psychologists have themselves drawn; nevertheless, the main consequence of the rise of second wave psychology was to move the novel as a genre onto a new plane of sophistication about complexity of character and human interaction. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, as never before, even novelists of lesser powers could, and did, draw on the considerable body of psychological knowledge available to Englishmen, with several important results.

Man's image of himself, as conveyed through fiction, gradually changed. The self was less often and less confidently portrayed as unified and immutable and more often as many-sided and shifting. The crude division of Stevenson's *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* (1886) gave way to the subtlety and complexity of a Proustian or Woolfian portrayal. Character tended to be shown as composed of incongruous elements, often a seething mass of contradictory impulses, some of which left no doubt about man's animality. As age-old fears about the harmfulness of introspection subsided, fascination with inner life took its place. The relation of consciousness to subconscious states became a topic of particular interest, some writers suggesting a
harmonious or complementary relation, while others depicted a conflicting one. Investigation of the links between these states and various illnesses led to a breaking down of the barrier between abnormal and normal, enabling novelists to enlarge the range of behaviour which could be associated with acceptable, believable characters. Accompanying the withdrawal into the psyche, was a greater questioning of the nature of time. Flowing, psychological time began to take precedence over atomistic objective time. The moment of aesthetic inspiration described by Pater expanded to become a psychological moment of timelessness, not necessarily associated with aesthetic appreciation. Novelists more carefully explored the role of memory as both oppressor of, and informant about, present behaviour. Just as the self tended to be portrayed in constant inner movement, it became more common to convey the self from a developmental perspective, tracing its movement through early childhood to adolescence and beyond. Both heredity and early psychic collisions were depicted as determiners of adult views. In the process conventional assumptions about allegiance to the family at all costs and about male-female interactions were questioned and, as often as not, overturned.

Most of the literary criticism cited earlier, and in fact much of the traditional criticism of the novel,
focusses on the effect these psychological transformations wrought on the form of the novel, more than one critic noting, as John Fletcher does, that the moderns had "a penchant for forms" (Bradbury and Fletcher 395). Although the importance of this penchant cannot be denied, it does not represent the entire picture. Critics' focus on form has blurred other less dramatic but nonetheless important earlier innovations in the novel. The stream of consciousness technique, about which so much has been written, represents one culmination in style of the fascination with self in relation to time which would not have been conceivable without earlier efforts to expand the novel.

Both prior to, and concurrent with the rise of modernism, various Edwardian and Georgian novelists attempted in their fiction to convey reality more intimately and intensely by widening thematic concerns, viewing certain topics like genius and the supernatural in a new light, and particularly by dealing with formerly taboo subjects, including sexuality, birth, and psychosomatic illness. Though some of the impetus for these developments came from European naturalist writers like Zola, and the Russian psychological writers such as Dostoevsky, at least as important a source, and one which gave the English novel a distinctive flavour, was second wave psychology. Because of
writers' continuing interest in the spirit or soul and in psychological states emanating beyond the bounds of consciousness, English fiction never became as "scientific" or clinical as its European counterpart. These interests were shaped by the nature of second wave psychology in Britain, with its close ties to psychical research and philosophical idealism. Second wave psychology additionally provided a new vocabulary and set of concepts such as hysteria and hypnosis, of which artists took advantage. Although many of these terms dealt with pathology, novelists generally avoided creating case studies exclusively because of the eclectic nature of their borrowing. The best novelists wove the new ideas unobtrusively into the fabric of their tapestry without resorting to labelling.

If these developments, pertaining more to content than to the form of the novel, are as numerous and important as I have implied, why has their early application by the Edwardians and Georgians been so consistently ignored by literary historians? The main literary source of this oversight is at the heart of modernism itself. Though every literary generation attempts to distinguish itself from the previous one, the moderns were particularly adamant about proclaiming the novelty of their efforts, as is well known.
In the process they tended to misrepresent the generation of writers who came immediately before them. Virginia Woolf was no exception; however, her criticisms of the Edwardians have been particularly influential. Most of the literary historians cited earlier, and many critics of the novel in general, have taken one or another of her statements about human nature changing in 1910, or about the failures of the Edwardians, as the keystone to their discussions of drastic changes in the novel. As Douglas Hewitt claims, Woolf's declaration has become a locus classicus of modernist criticism.4

However, Woolf's essays, particularly "Modern Fiction" (1919), "Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown" (1923), and "Character In Fiction" (1924), seriously misrepresent the Edwardians by making generalizations about them which cannot be substantiated. In "Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown", Woolf claims that she will "reduce Edwardian fiction to a view" ("Mr. Bennett" 342). This she certainly does but it is a view which is striking for its restrictiveness. The Edwardian camp is reduced to Arnold Bennett, principally, along with John Galsworthy and H.G. Wells,5 and they are ranged against the Georgians, limited to Forster, Lawrence, Strachey, Joyce, and T.S. Eliot ("Character" 421). She accuses the Edwardian "culprits" of being materialists
because, disappointingly, "they are concerned not with the spirit but with the body" and "spend immense skill and immense industry making the trivial and the transitory appear the true and the enduring" ("Modern" 4, 5). Because of these concerns, they fail to create vivid, memorable characters as the Victorians had, and "Life escapes" their novels as a consequence ("Mr. Bennett" 342; "Modern" 5). In contrast, the younger generation, of which Joyce is the most notable, "attempt to come closer to life", even if they must discard most of the conventions of the novel in order to do so ("Modern" 6, 7). Joyce "is spiritual; he is concerned at all costs to reveal the flickerings of that innermost flame which flashes its messages through the brain..." ("Modern" 7). Woolf also reserves "for the moderns" an interest in and appreciation of the dark places of psychology. At once therefore, the accent falls a little differently; the emphasis is upon something hitherto ignored; at once a different outline of forms becomes necessary, difficult for us to grasp, incomprehensible to our predecessors. ("Modern" 8, underlining mine)

In another version of the essay, Woolf proposed that "on or about December 1910 human character changed" to account for the inadequacy of the Edwardians and the necessity for the Georgians to discard Edwardian conventions and methods ("Character" 421, 430, 432). She claims that, in 1910,
"there was no English novelist living from whom they [the Georgians] could learn their business". 6

Though Woolf certainly left her mark on the wall through this attack, 7 her remarks strike rather wide of the mark on several important counts. Lines of demarcation between the Edwardians and the Georgians were not nearly as neat as she would have us believe. Admittedly Woolf picked on three major Edwardian writers, but Edwardian writing was far more diverse and amorphous than the fiction of these three alone would indicate. There were also Georgians much more similar to Woolf's Edwardians in certain respects (especially in their attempts to convey realism in traditional forms). Most importantly, there is an important line of continuity and development from Edwardian to Georgian which she completely ignores. Certain Edwardian novelists were much more concerned with portraying the spiritual element of character than the material. 8 Not surprisingly, the most outstanding of these novelists 9 -- May Sinclair -- was one of the first to incorporate the findings of second wave psychology in her work. Human nature did not change in 1910, as Woolf provocatively suggests; rather, perceptions and portrayals of human nature changed as novelists such as Sinclair became fascinated with the dark places identified by psychology, well before the height
of modernism was reached. Nor did these novelists always find it necessary to discard old forms; Sinclair successfully blended traditions like the realistic and naturalistic with romance, fantasy, and supernatural genres to achieve desired effects. Furthermore, several novelists of Woolf's own generation continued to explore the spiritual and psychological within traditional forms. The most notable of these, because the most serious in his aims, J.D. Beresford, was accused by Woolf herself of being too blatantly psychological!  

Significantly, though very rarely commented on, Beresford responded with acumen to "Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown" in an article entitled "The Successors of Charles Dickens" (1923), published in the Nation and Athenaeum a few weeks after Woolf's appeared.  

He proposed "a valid psychological explanation" for the apparent weakness in characterization of the Edwardians. Unlike the Victorians, who tended to highlight one feature of a character, the Edwardians present human beings that satisfy "our sense of probability; inasmuch as they are, like ourselves, composite, full of irresolutions, often self-conscious, and apt to change their minds" (487). This subtlety resulted from these writers' knowledge of heredity and their empirical approach.
However, Beresford's argument about the polypsychic nature of Edwardian characterization was ignored, even though it was more accurate than Woolf's because based on his intimate knowledge of the applications of developments in psychology to the novel. Instead, the modernist canon loomed ever larger, obscuring earlier novelists' achievements. Since psychological developments in the novel were clearly more complex than either Woolf, or most subsequent literary history, portrays, we need to take a closer look at one each of these Edwardian and Georgian novelists, to explore further reasons why they have been neglected, why they are important, and how they are similar, in order to demonstrate that they are not simply anomalies. Only then can we reliably assess their contribution to the evolution of the novel. On reaching this stage it will be possible to see that, similar to the work of these novelists, Woolf's early fiction owes much to second-wave, pre-Freudian psychology.

May Sinclair (1863-1946) is firmly Edwardian by age and the timing of her achievement of critical acclaim. Sinclair was born three years before H.G. Wells and four years before Bennett and Galsworthy. Her first novel was published in 1896, one year after Wells's first, The Time Machine. Her third novel, The Divine Fire (1904), brought
her widespread critical acclaim. By the early 1920's she had been proclaimed "the greatest psychological analyst in fiction" (John Farrar, cited in Boll 16) and was recognized as the best as well as the most widely known female novelist (Thomas Moult, cited in Boll 16). Woolf's omission of Sinclair from her 1923 essay is thus very surprising, particularly since Woolf had been aware of Sinclair's work as early as 1907 and actually met Sinclair in 1909.12

J.D. Beresford fits less easily into a period, although he is generally classed with the younger generation of Georgian realists. Only slightly younger than Bennett and Galsworthy, he did not, however, begin to publish until 1911. His two novels of that year, The Hampdenshire Wonder and The Early History of Jacob Stahl, were both well received, the former becoming a classic of fantasy and futuristic fiction and the latter being viewed as the most striking of a trilogy, one of the first of a number of realistic English autobiographical novels inspired by Madame Bovary (1857) and Butler's The Way of All Flesh (1903). In 1924, the critic Abel Chevalley argued that, of the younger generation of novelists, including D.H. Lawrence, Frank Swinnerton, and Hugh Walpole, J.D. Beresford is "the one most equally endowed with that intelligence and that imagination of life which make good writers of fiction...."
(Modern 228). He added that, "it is quite possible that his voice will be heard for a longer time" than the majority of his contemporaries, mainly because of Beresford's "most remarkable production", the trilogy, considered "a solid and durable monument" (229). The Times obituary of 1947 commended him as "a novelist of considerable powers of mind and imagination, who in his earliest phase gave promise -- more than promise, indeed -- of achievement of a rare order" (as cited in A Library 84). Walter Allen concurred that in 1914 Beresford appeared to be one of the most promising young English novelists (English Novel 411). Although Beresford wrote another forty-five novels, he was largely neglected after his death, a fate which he shares, to a greater or lesser degree, with Sinclair.

The blame for the mainly unjust neglect of these writers cannot, however, be thrown entirely in the lap of Mrs. Woolf and the other exponents of modernism who followed her lead. It is worthwhile reviewing more specific reasons since these will lead us to an appreciation of the original contribution of these novelists. Both of them came to professional fiction writing relatively late in life after embarking on other careers: May Sinclair translated from German, while J.D. Beresford was an advertiser and architect. Neither was university educated, but both were
prolific Grub street writers with uneven productions. Shy and retiring by nature, they did not make large claims for their work. They were not as well connected as Strachey or Woolf, nor did they have economic independence. Sinclair faced the additional difficulty of not being taken seriously as a novelist dealing with sexual topics because she was a woman. Perhaps these details explain why they were never at the centre of literary circles, despite their popularity with their audience.

More significantly they do not fit well into genres or into the period in which they wrote. May Sinclair worked in numerous styles and genres, including naturalism, romance, supernatural, psychological realism, and the poetic novel, making her fiction difficult to categorize. In addition, her development illustrates better than any of her contemporaries a gradual and successful transition into modernism, which does not augur well with accepted theories of its break with the past. Since she dealt with such a diverse range of ideas and themes in her novels, and was not the first to use the stream of consciousness technique, she has incorrectly been viewed as "a popularizer of themes and techniques" (Kaplan 47). This perception serves to belittle her original exploration of themes, as well as the fact that she was the first to recognize, appreciate, and label
Dorothy Richardson's stream of consciousness technique as what it was (Sinclair, "Novels"). J.D. Beresford, too, has suffered at the hands of the few historians of English literature who have paid him attention because they tend to focus on his realism and ignore his substantial mystical, fantasy, and supernatural efforts; thus, these novelists have been hindered by their eclecticism, though my contention is that this quality of their work reflects the myriad-sided nature of modern life as well as the stream of consciousness technique, or any other innovation in form.

Most importantly, these novelists were ahead of their time in certain attitudes and thematic concerns. Largely because of their intensive reading in second wave psychology they were able to probe deeper than English novelists ever had before into human psychology and sexuality. Unfortunately, their audiences were unprepared for their forays into areas not considered within the proper sphere of fiction. May Sinclair in particular was continually berated by critics for her "obsessive" interest in pathology and sexuality, beginning nearly a decade before D.H. Lawrence offended sensibilities. Several critics were even led to question her morality, prompted by the widespread belief that females were not supposed to have knowledge of these topics let alone describe them in fiction. Beresford
likewise was criticized for his starkly clinical case studies.

Ironically, by the time, in the mid-twenties, that the psychological and psychoanalytical novel had become popular and more acceptable, their interests had shifted somewhat. By 1924 Sinclair had written her best psychological studies and tended towards lighter, more satirical fiction. Beresford increasingly explored metaphysical issues in his novels of the later twenties.

Neither of these writers have received the critical attention they deserve. They should be reconsidered because of their daring thematic advances, which often skilfully assimilated the new ideas of second wave psychology, for the fusion of genres this provoked, as well as for the new light these writers throw on ignored developments in Edwardian fiction. However, before documenting the influence of second wave psychology on each novelist separately and in detail, we need to compare in broad outline the reasons for their searching out and immersing themselves in this new knowledge, their attitudes towards it, and some more specific ways it affected their fiction. The striking similarities should illustrate clearly how and why it was possible for English novelists such as these to draw on knowledge from the burgeoning discipline of psychology in
the decades around the turn of the century.

Both novelists were raised in orthodox, strict, and even tyrannically religious households, dominated by the parent of the same sex as the future writer. During their childhood and for most of their early adolescence they accepted imposed beliefs, but in early adulthood they rebelled against the dogmas of orthodox religion and sought alternatives. Though this sort of revolt was not uncommon for their generation (or indeed any generation), they did not reject spiritual beliefs altogether, as did several of their important contemporaries like Wells (who became a confirmed materialist, and Galsworthy, who became a convinced agnostic). Although Beresford was temporarily led to adopt a position of skepticism, in the long run Sinclair's and Beresford's commitment to spiritual belief intensified. They read voraciously any materials which helped them make sense of pressing metaphysical concerns such as man's relation with God, and the survival of the soul beyond death, especially if these threw doubt on orthodox belief. Their reading was catholic and included studies of eastern religions, various philosophies, the mystics, and so on. The two of them were aided in their quest by mentors, who had earlier discovered knowledge which led them away from conventional belief. Significantly,
Beresford was guided by a medical doctor into independent thinking about evolutionary theory and theosophy. Sinclair's first mentor appears to have been her instructor at Cheltenham Ladies' College, an idealist psychologist who encouraged Sinclair to read in psychology and philosophy. Personal experience also led them to intensify their quest. Both reported mystical moments of inspiration or communication from their early years on.

As a result of their reading and these contacts they were inspired by philosophical idealism, which swept through England in the late nineteenth century, as was noted earlier (Chapter One 49-51). Though they never rigidly adhered to it, this philosophy had several profound and lasting effects on their thinking and novel writing. Idealism substituted humanism for dogma and this buttressed their rejection of their parents' orthodox beliefs. Since idealism stresses that the underlying unity of knowledge is made possible through self-awareness, they tended to value highly the connections made between disparate sources of information and to attempt continually to synthesize rather than to categorize. The importance of consciousness, linked as it was with man's spiritual nature in idealism, caused them to reject the Victorian notion that introspection was harmful and instead to probe with fascination the various facets of
consciousness. The attainment of self-awareness was crucial to the idealist since it brought man's spirit in touch with God, or at least a higher, or world, consciousness. These aspects of idealism led the two fledgling writers to search out the psychologies which shed most light on consciousness and its fringes. Those systems, such as psychoanalysis, which promoted the development of individual awareness were viewed most positively. These novelists thus interpreted psychoanalysis through the eyes of idealism, welcoming it for its educative possibilities, even believing that it had the potential to bring humanity onto a higher (more spiritual) plane of development. In their fiction, these concerns often become thematic ones. The development of consciousness and its relation to other levels of awareness, spiritual evolution, and ideals of duty and self-sacrifice, pervade their early works.

Beresford and Sinclair found a major source of information about psychological and psychical matters in the Society For Psychical Research, many of whose members shared their aims in general and their philosophical idealism in particular. Both Beresford and Sinclair were long-time members. From this organization the novelists learned of second wave investigations into hypnotism and hysteria but, once again, these discoveries were interpreted in the
context of the degree to which they provided answers to such questions as man's survival beyond death. In addition, Beresford joined the theosophical movement which addressed many of the same issues, although from a less "scientific" viewpoint. Though none of them became absolutely convinced of the truth of survival, the introduction to the new ideas provided by the Society prompted them to delve even more deeply into the study of the psyche. Further close associations with doctors and psychiatrists helped clarify complex concepts. Eventually their researches went far beyond those of their literary contemporaries and they reached a considerable degree of expertise. Beresford and Sinclair felt confident enough of their materials to write (extensively, in the case of Sinclair) on the development and contributions of psychology.

Having come to the study of psychology from similar backgrounds, they also shared certain attitudes towards their subject matter. Both were completely eclectic in their approach. Just as they had rejected the dogma of religious belief, so they would not commit themselves exclusively or dogmatically to any one system of psychology. They discovered that late manifestation of second wave psychology, psychoanalysis, before the beginning of the first World War, and before hard and fast doctrinal lines
had set. Initially they were impressed by Freud's discoveries and, perhaps taking their cue from early supporters, they tended to exaggerate the novelty of his ideas; however, at the same time they described Freud's theories in the language of earlier psychologies and tended to fit his theories (occasionally awkwardly) into what had come before. Although psychoanalysis initially appeared to provide a bridge between body and spirit, materialism and psychical research, these novelists became increasingly dissatisfied with Freudian insistence on sexuality as the primary motivator of behaviour, and skeptical of the reductiveness of his approach to many other topics, including dream interpretation. The disillusion which occurred did not, however, dampen the absolute fascination they shared about the dynamics of the mind. Instead they tended to favour Jungian psychology, attracted both by Jung's more sympathetic understanding of the spiritual side of man, an attitude which they perceived as being more balanced than Freud's, as well as his closer alignment with earlier British psychologies of the soul like Ward's and William McDougall's. Though both Beresford and Sinclair recognized the need for a wider, more inclusive synthesis of psychologies, their knowledge of even the present chaotic state of the discipline prompted them to feel confident that
they had made considerable gains in insight into the psyche over their literary predecessors. The discoveries of the "new" psychology, in combination with their own idealistic viewpoints, inspired them to believe that human nature itself was changing, evolving onto a more spiritual plane as more of the unconscious became conscious. Surprisingly even the war did not obliterate this view completely.

Despite the advantages they felt they obtained through their awareness of second wave psychology, neither of them wished to be labelled psychoanalytic or Freudian novelists for several reasons, not the least of which was that this would almost certainly result in widespread critical attack damaging to reputation and sales. For Beresford, in particular, the greater insights into character provided by psychoanalysis could actually be inhibitive, since he would create characters in a situation, then realize this had a psychoanalytic parallel and would be forced to resort to disguising the incident (Writing Aloud 133-135). Their knowledge of the complexity of human nature also brought with it frustration both at their ability to portray this complexity, and about the limitations imposed on them by their reading public who, for example, craved readily identifiable and consistent characters, according to Beresford (Writing Aloud 144). As he once claimed,
psychoanalysis was both the craze and the curse of the novelist ("Psychoanalysis and The Novel" 427). That these novelists persisted in their psychologically-informed portrayals of character in the face of this adversity attests to the importance they attached to these theories. May Sinclair, in particular, courageously dismissed critics who claimed she was obsessed by sex and psychoanalysis, believing that it was crucial to reveal in print hitherto ignored, though fundamental, aspects of human nature.

In their fiction these attitudes towards the subject matter of psychology are manifested in several ways. None of their novels rely exclusively on any one philosophical or psychological system but draw on a rich variety of sources. As well as expanding the range of topics discussed in fiction to include sexuality and mental disturbance, these novelists concerned themselves in much more detail and with greater sophistication than many earlier English novelists with unconscious or subconscious psychological, as opposed to conscious social or economic, motivation. Rather than presenting unified, consistent and therefore easily identifiable characters, they tended to evoke shifting, quixotic, even contradictory characters. Since these novelists believed that a long-range consistent view of character was as unreliable as it was unreal, they focussed
on the psychological moment. Though only transitory, these moments were considered more real than the vast stretches of objective time in-between because perceptions were heightened during them, and more of the whole personality was invested in them. Because Beresford and Sinclair wanted to believe in the existence of forces operating on the conscious self, which were beyond the conscious recognition of the five senses, these moments often have a semi-mystical atmosphere. The supernatural is often involved as a metaphor for, or projection of, psychological insights or changes. With these connotations, supernatural occurrences could also be used to presage humanity's spiritual evolution, or at least to suggest the connectedness of minds linked by a cosmic consciousness.

Beresford and Sinclair give doctors of various kinds a more prominent position than ever before in the English novel tradition. Medical doctors who espouse scientific materialism are generally shown to be limited and even narrow-minded, whereas psychic doctors and even psychiatrists are portrayed favourably. Psychic doctors in particular are admired for their courage and supernormal perceptions. Whatever their status, they frequently have a technical importance as narrative devices, providing objectivity, perspective on, or even explanation of,
personalities and occurrences, either throughout or at the
denouement of their novels. Their diagnoses are motivated by
truth rather than being morally sanctioned. The ambivalence
shown towards them reveals a major theme of the tension
between sanity and vision (whether extrasensory, poetic or
artistic), one of several which carries through into the
modernist tradition, as the early fiction of Virginia Woolf
demonstrates.

Though the language of the "new" psychology is used,
often unobstrusively and appropriately, as in their
criticism, Sinclair and Beresford tend to use the terms of
the initial explorers of the second wave, even when
discussing an event or condition with a Freudian or Jungian
emphasis. Furthermore, they tend to experiment first with
these ideas and terms in their short stories. Their
extensive knowledge of second wave psychology, as well as
the accuracy and vividness of their use of it in their
fiction, is attested to by the fact that novels of Beresford
and Sinclair were used as therapy for patients in clinics,
the first known use of fiction as a treatment in a formal
clinical setting.¹⁷

This observation is not to suggest, however, that the
sources of information are necessarily starkly revealed.
Though the main problems of attributing influence have been
dealt with in the introduction, it is worthwhile mentioning again the various types of influence providing a rich layering, which we will trace to these novelists in the following chapters. The most obvious type of influence occurs when an author quotes directly from a work of psychology, occasionally to the detriment of his fiction. The problem, then, becomes one of determining the extent of the influence, whether it informs the main themes, the plot, or even the structure, or whether it is used superficially or as a launching pad for the author's own ideas. Other direct sources can be determined by statements made by the authors themselves, or are strongly suggested by the accuracy of the use of the concept. Indirect influence, that is, information of a psychological origin borrowed from other fiction, criticism and so on, is more difficult to assess confidently, but it can be indicated by simplification or distortion of the source. Finally, the most complex type of influence, because more of an analogy, takes the form of discoveries or observations novelists make as inspired individuals which parallel, and are simultaneous to, those made by psychologists. These latter influences can only be proposed tentatively.

Thus, in order to trace the various types of influence of the "new" psychology on the English novel, it
is necessary to turn to, and to reevaluate the Edwardians. Though writers of this period have been accused of being materialists and of having a deadening effect on the development of the novel, in these years writers emerged, like May Sinclair, who demonstrate a concern with spirit that is linked with a new probing of the psyche. The work of the Georgian writer, J.D. Beresford, demonstrates how these preoccupations continue to be voiced in relatively traditional forms. One of the most influential critics of the Edwardians, Virginia Woolf, herself drew on these psychological sources before making the bolder experiments with form characteristic of modernism. Sinclair and Beresford have been neglected for a variety of literary and extra-literary reasons, not the least of which is the fact that they were not innovators in form, but also because their introduction of provocative themes was premature for British audiences. Each of them deserves, however, to be reconsidered, not only as the best representatives of a neglected influence, or as a corrective to literary histories which exaggerate the abruptness of the modernists' break with the past, but ultimately for the intrinsic merits of the works themselves, particularly their adept psychological analyses.
Chapter Four

May Sinclair: The Evolution

of a Psychological Novelist

May Sinclair currently stands as the most undeservedly neglected novelist of the four under discussion in this thesis, and, indeed, of all the Edwardians who made the transition into modernism. Such was not always the case, however. Her twenty-two novels, numerous short stories, poetry, literary criticism, philosophical and psychological writings, and general articles on a variety of topics, though often controversial, were generally well received and gained her a large and catholic following. Amongst the highest praise she garnered from contemporaries must be William Lyon Phelps's early recognition that, "No two of her books are alike; she is more than versatile: she has something of the range of humanity itself" (229). Further, R. Brimley Johnson observed in 1920 that,

through maintaining her youth, seeing and welcoming the best in all new movements and tendencies, she has moved with the times, so that, although she has been writing for over twenty years, she is yet absolutely one with the art of to-day.... (42-43)

and four years later John Farrar confidently asserted that Sinclair is "the greatest psychological analyst in fiction"
(as qtd. in Boll, M.S.: Novelist 16). Unfortunately, the amount of favourable criticism she received declined in proportion to her health in the later 1920's. She died in relative obscurity in 1946, having suffered for sixteen years from a debilitating neuro-physiological disease which forced her to cease writing in 1931 at age sixty-eight. Subsequent literary histories such as Walter Allen's and William York Tindall's at best accord her brief mention, and at worst are dismissive and inaccurate.¹

Sinclair was first and foremost a psychological novelist, and it is as a great, if not the "greatest psychological analyst in fiction," of the transitional period that I want to make the case for her reconsideration, though this could be done on several other grounds as well.² Following a brief sketch of the shortcomings of some earlier evaluations of Sinclair as psychological novelist, and a summary of psychological influences on her fiction, this chapter traces the path of her knowledge about psychology. The most striking and innovative manifestations of her absorbing passion for the study of human nature are then detailed in the fiction itself in the following chapter.

Not only was Sinclair in many instances the first to assimilate the ideas of second wave psychology into English fiction, but her knowledge of, and commitment to, this study
extended well beyond that of her contemporaries. Her voracious intellect and courageous determination to gather the most important strands of current thought combined with striking sensitivity to produce in her fiction detailed attention to emotional states, deepened by a framework of dynamic psychology. Since Sinclair's interest in psychology so thoroughly informs her work, it is essential to understand that fascination fully in order to assess her achievement correctly. Failure to do so has caused those who have paid her serious critical attention to fall short. One of the first studies to give her a proper place among her contemporaries, Dorothy Brewster and Angus Birrell's *Dead Reckonings* (1924), inaccurately discusses Sinclair as a Freudian, viewing her psychoanalytic treatment of character as competent though occasionally too obtrusive (201-202). In the first full-length biography, Theophilus Boll corrects this mistake by revealing Sinclair's greater sympathy for Jungian psychology (*M.S.: Novelist*, 256-257), but he elsewhere errs both in his claim that Sinclair's first novel *Audrey Craven* (1897) is a psychoanalytic novel, a far too vague use of the term, and in assuming that the source of Sinclair's psychological knowledge is in her "inborn genius" (*M.S. Collection* 2) Another biographer, Hrisey Zegger, by far the best informed about the effect of philosophy and
psychology on Sinclair's writing, incorrectly equates the "new psychology" with psychoanalysis (57). This blunder causes Zegger to attribute a "new" direction in Sinclair's novels to her reading of the "new psychology" when in reality Sinclair had been aware of the ideas of dynamic psychology for some years. Zegger also is forced to push back Sinclair's knowledge of psychoanalysis before 1913, the year Sinclair claimed to have become familiar with the writings of Freud, because Zegger finds evidence of psychoanalytic ideas in several of Sinclair's short stories in the period 1908-1913 (58). Actually, in these stories Sinclair drew on pre-Freudian dynamic psychologies which advanced ideas on similar lines to Freudian ones.

None of these best-informed critics of Sinclair has realized the full implications for her fiction of her extensive reading in philosophy and psychology. Nor have they kept pace with her refreshing eclecticism. This chapter provides a corrective to these earlier studies by arguing that Sinclair was familiar with, and made sensitive use of, important ideas such as repression, which were introduced by the precursors of second-wave psychology, well before Freud and later second wave psychologists adapted and made them more precise.
In addition, Sinclair never subscribed exclusively to a system of thought, her psychological perspective evolving as she assimilated new ideas. A list of the major philosophical and psychological influences on her gives some indication of the breadth of her knowledge. Of philosophers, she was particularly indebted to the idealists Kant, Hegel, and T.H. Green, but also owed much to Berkeley, Locke, Spinoza, Schwegler (of *The History of Philosophy* fame), Lotze, Schoepenhauer, Von Hartmann, and Bergson. In common with many of her generation, she was well aware of evolution theory, especially through the writing of Herbert Spencer. Herbart, Fechner, Von Hartmann, William James, Samuel Butler, Ribot, and Maudsley had the earliest and most formative impact on her thinking about psychology, though Pierre Janet, William McDougall, Wilfrid Trotter, Freud, and Jung were highly significant later on.

Attraction to, and the use made of, ideas is frequently motivated by psychological need. Since Sinclair's understanding of psychology figures so prominently in her fiction, it is worthwhile to consider briefly how her personality shaped this interest, before detailing the growth of her knowledge about formal psychology.

In a 1914 letter to Charlotte Mew, Sinclair wrote that she believed herself complicated. Unfortunately, she
rarely elaborated either to friends or interviewers, more than one of whom found her to be the shyest woman they had ever met (Boll, M.S.: Novelist 142; Wylie 178). Along with this reticence, those characteristics most frequently mentioned are her calmness, solemn primness, and intense but unemotional eyes (Boll, M.S.: Novelist 143). 5

However, some details of her early life can be pieced together to give a rough indication of the roots of her "complicated nature". She was the youngest child and only girl of six brought up in a strict religious household. Her mother appears to have been proud, ambitious for her sons, and overcontrolling, while her father, an alcoholic, was unreliable and tyrannical (Boll, M.S.: Novelist 27). Following his bankruptcy in 1870 when, according to Sinclair, "My family had lost everything", her parents separated (as qtd. in Steele 513). May was about seven. After this she rarely saw her father, later writing of him in one of her philosophical books that she had so little to do with her father in infancy that he was to all intents and purposes not known to her ("Way of Sublimation" 118). Her life also became more unstable following this event because her mother's restlessness and the family's attempts to stave off poverty precipitated frequent moves (Boll, M.S.: Novelist 27). Sinclair recalled that, "we were all over --
that is, we were constantly moving" (Steele 513).

Sinclair's earliest efforts to educate herself seem to have been in part attempts to escape from the unhappiness of family conflicts and the strain of onerous household duties. Later on, the tenacity of her search for knowledge was fuelled by her rebellion against her mother's attempts to restrain her from venturing beyond religious orthodoxy and from developing herself intellectually, since neither of these was considered appropriate for a woman (Boll, M.S.: Novelist 26-27). This battle of the wills extended into May's adulthood, since she lived with and cared for her mother until her mother's death in 1901, when May was thirty-eight. A comment of Sinclair's friend, G.B. Stern, about Mary Olivier suggests the intensity of the struggle. Stern claimed that she hated the character of little Mama because "I remembered you [Sinclair] told me once you had a nervous breakdown because you tried to write in the same room with your own mother" (as qtd. in Boll, M.S.: Novelist 27).

The other major formative events on Sinclair were the series of losses she experienced, effectually of her father at age seven, and permanently through his death of alcohol-related disease when May was eighteen, and the premature deaths of four of her brothers (Boll, M.S.: Novelist 25).
All of these had occurred by the time May published her first novel at age thirty-four. They dramatically compounded the instability of her family life and suggest one reason why Sinclair was so drawn to the study of psychic phenomena as providing evidence for survival beyond death. Since she could not depend on the constancy of human relations, she withdrew into the relatively safe world of ideas. Creative activity was not simply escape, however. On a deeper level it enabled her to manage conflict and to reconstruct damaged or severed relations within the structured format of the novel or short story. Her suffering in combination with her commitment to idealism also made her determined to play an educative role through her fiction, to show, for example, women thwarted by their own misplaced sacrifices.

Nevertheless, Sinclair's attempts at creative adaptation did not always prove effective, and she suffered several breakdowns (Letters to Katherine Tynan, Jan. 1, 1902; and from Gwendolyn "Zack" Keats, Letters, July 12, 1899), as well as periods of depression which brought her to the brink of despair (Boll, M.S.: Novelist 8). This aspect of Sinclair's character helps explain her insatiable thirst for knowledge about the psyche as well as her fascination in her fiction with mental states, especially "morbid" ones,
and the broad sympathy she exhibits for sufferers of mental distress.

Conversely, Sinclair's sensitive nature made her open to mystical "flash" moments of heightened psychic reality. Thus her own wide-ranging psychological experience gave her the sympathy and intuitive understanding necessary to evoke the full gamut of emotion in her fictional characters. It is also in her fiction that we find the most vivid and accurate depictions of Sinclair's own psychological developments, if not of her external environment, as she herself testified.

The initial results of Sinclair's high motivation to learn are well documented. Boll reports that, by the time that Sinclair arrived at Cheltenham Ladies College at eighteen, she had taught herself German, Greek, and French, read many Greek and English classics of literature and, most importantly for present purposes, studied Locke's *On the Human Understanding*, sections in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* on Spinoza and pantheism, Plato in Bohn's Library, Hume's *Essays* and Kant's *Kritik* (Boll, M.S.: *Novelist* 29). At Cheltenham, where Sinclair received her only formal education for just one year, she came under the influence of Dorothea Beale, the Headmistress. The impact of this relationship on Sinclair was profound and stretched over several decades. Beale recognized Sinclair's intellectual
capacity and encouraged her to read and write on philosophical idealism and psychology. She published Sinclair's essay on "Descartes" in the Cheltenham Ladies College Magazine in 1882, the first of several contributions made by Sinclair.

According to Theophilus Boll, "Beale believed that philosophy, psychology and religion branched from the same root and that the old empiricism was on the wane" (Boll, M.S.: Novelist 35). Philosophical idealism, particularly as propounded by Kant, was viewed by Beale as providing a rational, undogmatic approach to God. (Boll, M.S. Novelist 34). Herbart was the most profound influence on her thinking about psychology, and she passed this enthusiasm for him on to her pupil, May. In 1891, Beale wrote the preface to J.F. Herbart's The Application of Psychology to the Science of Education, which demonstrated how he had affected her thinking. Translated by a colleague of Beale's from Cheltenham, the work must certainly have been read by Sinclair. Attracted by his "imaginative power" and moral approach to education, Beale argued that to Herbart was owed the realization of "the importance of the subjective in every apperception" and of "the unity of the subject" (Beale viii). She stressed that she had learned from him to think of the ego as dynamically interacting with ideas, considered
"active powers, the living offspring of the thinker" (Beale vi). She described the process as follows:

That which we have received into the body of our thought does live in us, helping us to form each new conception -- rising unbidden, by the laws of association, suppressing other thoughts which we are striving to evoke, passing below the "threshold of consciousness" into the darkness, where we yet feel that it is, though we cannot always call it up.... (Beale vii)

She saw Herbart's work as developing directly from Kant's and cautioned against accepting it as a complete whole. Instead, Herbart's "good foundation" should be built upon. Though she praised the work of Stanley Hall, and William James is referred to elsewhere in the book, she recognized the necessity for

English psychologists and philosophers to naturalize the best thoughts of educational thinkers of the world, translate them, not into our language only, but into our forms of thought, adapt them to our environment. (Beale xi)

In a way not fully appreciated by Beale, Sinclair was to take up this challenge through her philosophical and psychological contributions and, more colourfully, in her fiction.

Through various references in the preface (vii, viii), Beale demonstrated her familiarity with much of Herbart's work, and it is very likely that she imparted some of this knowledge to Sinclair, as well as enticing Sinclair to study Herbart for herself. As suggested by Beale's
paraphrase of Herbart, quoted earlier, Herbart understood how the "psychic mechanism" of several degrees of consciousness, including the unconscious, determined which ideas would enter consciousness. He also described the operations of resistance, repression, and sublimation (though he did not name the latter). He believed that repressions could extend in duration from a single moment to years. For those developments, he has often been cited as a precursor of, and more recently as a direct influence on, Freud (as was described in Chapter One 69-73).

Even as devoted a disciple of Freud as Ernest Jones eventually acknowledged that,

> Herbart, seventy years previously [to Freud's discovery], had clearly enunciated the idea of unconscious mental processes and also their incompatibility and conflict with conscious ones. He actually used the word "verdrängt" (repressed) to describe their being excluded from consciousness. He postulated further two thresholds in the mind and these correspond very closely with the two censorships Freud held exist between the unconscious and preconscious and between the preconscious and consciousness respectively. (Jones 206)

Much of what appears to be Freudian in Sinclair's canon, beginning with her earliest work, *Audrey Craven* (1897), praised by Dorothea Beale for its seriousness, actually draws on Sinclair's awareness of Herbartian concepts.

Though Sinclair disagreed with Beale about the necessity of maintaining an orthodox view of God, she
otherwise shared many similar interests with her mentor. For years after Sinclair left the school she continued a fertile correspondence with her former instructress, who debated philosophical points and recommended works, including T.H. Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* (1873), which were to have a great impact on Sinclair's thought (Beale, Letters, Dec. 1886 and Jan. 1887; Boll, *M.S.: Novelist* 36). In one letter (Jan. 1887), Beale grappled with the implied contradiction in her belief in the doctrine of the unity of consciousness, while having to admit the existence of a secondary consciousness, a struggle taken up in earnest by Sinclair herself (Boll, *M.S.: Novelist* 36-37).

Sinclair found evidence against the existence of an independent, inviolable self in books on psychology and heredity recommended by a friend of her brother's, as revealed in two sections of *Mary Olivier*, declared by Sinclair to be autobiographical (M. Sinclair to Marc Loge, as qtd. in Boll, *M.S.: Novelist* 244). By 1890 Sinclair knew of Herbert Spencer's work, and in that year she read his *First Principles* (1862), *Principles of Biology* (1864, 1867) and *Principles of Psychology* (1855), along with Haeckel's *History of Creation* (1876), Maudsley's *Body and Mind* (1870), *Physiology and Pathology of Mind* (1867), and Ribot's *L'herédité Psychologique* (1873, English Trans., 1875).
Initially driven to read by fear about her own heredity, and 'terribly enchanted' by the examples of "Dr. Mitchell's ape-faced idiot; Dr. Browne's girl with the goose-face and goose-neck, billing her shoulders like a bird" (Mary Olivier 289), Sinclair likely received reassurances about her own potential for sanity from an older mentor, possibly the idealist, Professor Henry Gwatkin, as Mary did from the character Mr. Sutcliffe in the novel (Mary Olivier 293-294).

Despite this reading on heredity, which Beale would not likely have approved, Beale continued to exert an influence on Sinclair, made clear in Sinclair's first important publication, "The Ethical and Religious Import of Idealism" (1893). In addition, like her mentor, who supplied her with the book, Sinclair reviewed a work of educational psychology, Mary Pulling's The Teacher's Textbook of Practical Psychology ("Review", Cheltenham Ladies College Magazine, Spring 1896). Although brief, the review reveals almost as much about Sinclair's approach to the subject as it does Pulling's. Sinclair stresses the role of the Herbartian concept of apperception in fostering moral education ("Review" 72). She also demonstrates her familiarity with unconscious influence, in this case on perception, probably deriving from Herbart ("Review" 73). The centrality given by Sinclair's review to habit in
education likely owes something to William James, whose *Psychology, Briefer Course* had been published in 1892. Sinclair demonstrates her own inclination in suggesting "that psychology leads to metaphysics" and in admitting, almost apologetically, that she has judged the "Practical" textbook from "a theoretical rather than a practical standpoint" ("Review" 74). Finally, Sinclair praises Pulling's "touches of humour" and "epigrammatic terseness and vigour" ("Review" 71), qualities Sinclair herself displays in her early fiction.

A direct reference to William James's *Principles of Psychology* (1890) in Sinclair's second novel, *Mr. and Mrs. Nevill Tyson* (1898), confirms her familiarity with that cornerstone, and we are told by Boll that she shared with Richard Garnett, whom she met in 1899, a respect for Samuel Butler, whose contributions to psychology she commended later in *A Defence of Idealism* (1917). Thus, by the turn of the century, in addition to her expertise in idealistic philosophy, Sinclair had obtained a firm grounding in the most advanced psychology of the nineteenth century.

During the first decade of the twentieth century, as Sinclair achieved recognition, she continued to explore the latest developments in psychology imported from Germany and France, as well as those being made in England and America.
Though most of her learning must be inferred from her fiction, we do know that she corresponded with William James in 1908, having likely met him in 1905. In reference to an unknown query of Sinclair's, he responded: "How could you believe in a pack of psychologists? Of course I couldn't go to their meeting -- the dismalist of pseudo-sciences!" (Letter, May 12, 1908).

The second decade of the century, however, proved the most fruitful for Sinclair's psychological researches. In 1913 Sinclair put her psychological expertise to practical use as one of twelve founding members of the Medico-Psychological Clinic of London. Conceived by Sinclair's friend, Dr. Jessie Margaret Murray, who studied under Pierre Janet, the stated objectives of the clinic were

II. The advancement of this branch of medical science III. --The extension in the community of the laws of mental Hygiene. 
(Boll,"Medico-Psychological Clinic" 314)

Typical of the British approach to psychology and psychiatric medicine, it employed an eclectic array of treatments, including psychological analysis and re-synthesis, physical exercise, electrical therapy, and re-education. Nominal fees, far below those standard for
private consultation, were charged in order to reach patients without financial means. Nevertheless, the clinic drew on the resources of the foremost practitioners in England. The director of the psychological branch was Professor Charles Spearman, the distinguished University of London statistician, and the consulting staff included Professors William McDougall, C.S. Myers, Carveth Read, and Francis Aveling. T.W. Mitchell, Agnes Savill, and James Glover, brother of Edward, were most prominent amongst the medical staff. Early associates included Dr. Constance E. Long, translator of Jung, and Dr. Charles Tuckey, one of the first practitioners of hypnosis in England (Boll, "Medico-Psychological Clinic" 312). Its more important students included Theresa Gosse, daughter of Sir Edmund, Mrs. Susan Issacs, Miss Iseult Grant-Duff, and Mrs. Marjorie Brierley (the latter three of whom became psychoanalysts).

Though the role of the clinic has been almost completely neglected in the histories, it was highly significant in the development of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis in England. It was the first public institution of its kind in Britain, the first, and until the opening of the Tavistock in 1920, the only centre to employ psychoanalytic methods of treatment.10 Its Society for the Study of Orthophysics, whose stated objectives were the
study of human character and the training of students in applied psychology, was the first to provide training in psychoanalysis (Boll, "Medico-Psychological Clinic" 316). As Theophilus Boll has indicated, the Medico-Psychological Clinic, familiarly known as the Brunswick, exerted enormous influence on both the Tavistock Square Clinic and the British Psychoanalytic Society, the two institutions succeeding it (Boll, "Medico-Psychological Clinic" 320, 323-324).

May Sinclair played several crucial roles during the brief ten-year life of the Clinic, and her involvement led to several important developments in her own life and career. The extent of her initial commitment to the project can be measured by the large donation of £500. she made at a time when she was not wealthy (Boll, "Medico-Psychological Clinic" 312). The largest endowment made to the clinic, it made its incorporation possible (Boll, "Medico-Psychological Clinic" 312). Her enthusiasm for the organization is intimated by the fact that, within a few months of the inauguration, attended by Sinclair, she dedicated a collection of short stories to the Staff. 12

Not only did she play an administrative role as one of ten members of the governing body of the clinic until its liquidation, but she also wrote several reports on the
clinic, and prospectuses soliciting funds for it. In addition, she may have aided Dr. Murray and Miss Turner in translating Freud's work, not available to English readers in 1913, with the exception of *The Interpretation of Dreams*. Several pages of her notes on Freud's *Drei Abhandlungen Zur Sexualtheorie* (1905) survive. In them, important phrases in German are bracketed, suggesting that she made the translation herself (Sinclair, Notes). With her expertise in Greek, she is almost certainly the member who coined the word "Orthophysics" for the Society (Boll, "Medico-Psychological Clinic" 316). As evidence of her continuing interest, in December, 1920 she was the only founding member to attend a performance of Yeats's play *The Countess Cathleen* put on by the students of the Orthophysics Society. (Boll, "Medico-Psychological Clinic" 322). Perhaps the greatest tribute to her involvement, as well as to her skill in depicting human nature, occurred when the students of the Orthophysics Society read her novel, *The Tree of Heaven* (1917) both as literature and therapy (Boll, M.S.: Novelist 234).

Most importantly, Sinclair's involvement in the Medico-Psychological Clinic served to draw her right to the centre of the nexus of psychological development in Britain that the Clinic fostered. At least six of the participants
in the Clinic were also members of the Society for Psychical Research, whose *Journal* and *Proceedings* advertised the inception of the Clinic and reported on its progress. It is thus very probable that Sinclair's contacts at the Clinic led to her being elected a member of the Society for Psychical Research, as she was on May 14, 1914. Boll plays down Sinclair's interest in the Society, perhaps not wanting to associate his subject with an organization no longer considered within the realm of science, and unaware of its impressive status in English society in 1914. He erroneously claims that,

> she [Sinclair] never contributed to either the *Journal* or the *Proceedings*. She had an artist's interest in the occult story as a creative exercise, and in the mysteriously happening psychic phenomena in life, but had no patience with the assumption that psychic phenomena were matters for scientific exploration according to a scientific methodology. (Boll, M.S.: *Novelist* 105)

In actuality Sinclair contributed two letters to the *Journal*, one in 1917 and one in 1918. These concern the question of cross-correspondences, and they reveal both that Sinclair took psychical research seriously and that she was adamant about treating the evidence scientifically. Though "particularly impressed by the latest Willett scripts", she argues for the necessity of checking an alternative psychological hypothesis that such cross-correspondences may occur because of telepathy between
the living experimenters, who have a common desire that survival will be proved, rather than as signals from the beyond (Letter, Journal of S.P.R., April 26, 1917, 67). Her statement about the power of desire, as suggested in the dream-life, betrays the dual influence of Herbart and Freud:

Now, psychologically, desire, conscious or "sub-conscious," if it be strong enough, is the most purposeful and designing thing in the universe. Dream-analysis gives us some idea of the extraordinary power the psyche has of elaborating and designing its material according to its desire. It even provides the material. As the conditions of the dream-life are different, so the results are different. But though we may get nothing like the cross-correspondences, we do get elaboration, dramatisation, cunning and purposeful design. (Letter, Journal of S.P.R., April 26, 1917, 67)

Though Sinclair, in common with many psychical researchers, never was completely convinced by the evidence for the survival of psychic consciousness after death, she remained an enthusiastic follower of developments, hoping for a substantial discovery. She had alluded to psychical research in her first novel, Audrey Craven (1897 134), and remained a member of the Society at least until 1934, the year Reinald Hoops queried her about it (Hoops 47). It is true, however, that her fiction bears the best testimony to her absolute fascination with psychic phenomena both for its own sake and as a metaphor for the projection of inner states.
Sinclair's friendship with one of the directors of the Medico-Psychological Clinic, Dr. Hector Munro, led to her brief participation in a Red Cross volunteer medical unit sent to Belgium in September 1914, following the outbreak of World War One. Dr. Munro headed up the thirteen member corps, while Sinclair acted as secretary, stretcher-bearer, nurse, correspondent and fund-raiser (Boll, "Medico-Psychological Clinic" 315). Although her involvement was terminated abruptly when she was sent back to England and replaced after less than three weeks, possibly for acting independently from her orders, the experience proved invaluable to her (Boll, M.S.: Novelist 107). She came into direct contact with sufferers of shell-shock and became very aware of how the psychopathology of war exacerbated individual psychopathology. She also realized how war could engender a feeling of most intense reality (Boll, M.S.: Novelist 107). Her encounter with war was serialized in the English Review, elaborated in A Journal of Impressions in Belgium (1915), touched on in the novel Tasker Jevons (1916), and extensively developed in The Romantic (1920).

Following her return, Sinclair met, at the "Society for the Study of Orthophysics", yet another member, Professor H. Wildon Carr, who would prove influential in
directing her career onto a very different course from the intense practical concerns of the war effort, back to the world of ideas (Boll, M.S.: Novelist 109). Honorary Professor of Psychology at King’s College, Carr was an idealist who wrote an early article on the philosophical implications of Freud’s theories in 1914. As a friend of Sinclair’s and President of the highly distinguished Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy, he was likely responsible for her election to it (Boll, M.S.: Novelist 19), considered by Sinclair to be one of her greatest achievements. Perhaps more significantly, he encouraged her to continue working on the material eventually published as A Defence of Idealism in 1917 (Boll, M.S.: Novelist 109). By August 4, 1916, Sinclair reported to Charlotte Mew that she was working on a book on a psychological and metaphysical subject. The initial result of that research was published in the August 9 and 16th editions of the Medical Press as "Clinical Lecture on Symbolism and Sublimation" (118-22; 142-145).

In this review of Jung’s "great and terrible book" (119), Psychology of the Unconscious (1919), Sinclair portrays Jung as the disillusionist about the "lofty spiritual powers of the unconscious" ("Symbolism I" 118). He built on Freud’s discovery of the correlation between dream
and primitive mythological symbolism and of their common driving force in the sexual libido ("Symbolism I" 118). Throughout both parts of the review she demonstrates a striking grasp of the ideas and relative strengths of the new psychologists, including Janet and Adler, the latter then little-known (and not translated) in England; however, she also recognized the limitations of the new science, at least from an idealist's standpoint. Psychoanalysts do not stress enough the role of sublimation, viewed as the essential element in an ultimate psycho-synthesis ("Symbolism I" 119). According to Sinclair, "All religion, all art, all literature, all science are sublimations in various stages of perfection. Civilization is one vast system of sublimations" ("Symbolism I" 119). Sublimation, "the striving of the libido towards manifestation in higher and higher forms" ("Symbolism I" 119), is synonymous with evolution, since "The whole evolution of man as a moral and social being has been the lifting of the libido out of the unconsciousness into the conscious and its direction by intelligence" ("Symbolism I" 120).

Thus, Sinclair did not deny the "muck" that psychoanalysis brought to light, but she did optimistically emphasize the educative role of psychoanalysis. In addition, she was well aware of the political implications of psycho-
analysis, as well as its misuse, claiming that,

At the present moment there is a reaction against all hushing up and stamping down. The younger generation is in revolt against even such a comparatively mild form of repression as Victorian Puritanism. And the New Psychology is with it. And the psychoanalysts, Freud and Jung and their followers, have been abused like pickpockets, as if they offered us no alternative but license or repression; as if the undestructible libido must either ramp outrageously in the open or burrow beneath us and undermine our sanity; as if sublimation, the solution that they do offer, were not staring us in the face. ("Symbolism I" 120)

Sinclair also depicts psychoanalysis as a development of older psychologies. Her references to Butler, particularly his views of habit and ancestral memory, and her use of James's stream metaphor in the following passage provide some indication of this:

For the insane person it is different. With him all the paths are blocked. The enormous pressure of the stream behind the obstruction bursts the bank and the "higher channels" are merged with it in one awful inundation. The insane person's psyche is one welter of ancestral instincts and memories. ("Symbolism I" 120)

In part two, Sinclair criticizes Freud's sexual shock theory of the neuroses as being "too narrow to cover all the facts" and she considers Adler's explanation in the feeling of insufficiency of the individual as a reaction ("Symbolism II" 142). Ultimately she finds Jung's synthetic, prospective explanation of the neurotic as "the failure to solve the problem of his personality, to 'adapt himself to reality'"
("Symbolism II" 142) to be "eminently satisfactory" (
"Symbolism II" 143). As an idealist it is not surprising
that she agreed with, and brought to the attention of her
readers, Jung's statement that "Only through the mystery of
self-sacrifice is it possible to be born again" ("Symbolism
II" 143). Not only can one see sublimation operating in his
libido theory, but it takes into account "all the higher
psychic data overlooked by Freud, and all the "lower"
primitive facts whose significance Adler perhaps underrates"
("Symbolism II" 143-144).

However, Sinclair argues that all the psychoanalysts
under-rate the value of repression. Once again revealing her
idealistic leaning, she cites in particular the example of
the ascetic, "The guardian and often the source of spiritual
tradition" ("Symbolism II" 144), whose writings frequently
manifest the sublimative value of art. Sinclair further
upbraids Jung for handling "Poetry and metaphysics as if
they were nothing but primitive myths," for treating works
like the Upanishads and other highly sublimated writing
appallingly literally ("Symbolism II" 145, 143).

Nevertheless, her overall admiration for Jung is evident in
her statement that "Professor Jung is on the side of the
angels, battling for those delicate hopes and aspirations of
humanity he is supposed to have trampled under foot" ("Sym-
bolism II" 145). Finally, with what must be a degree of autobiographical interest, she noted Jung's detailed attention "to the myth of the Return to the Mother for rebirth and to the Conflict with the mother", necessarily a fight to the finish ("Symbolism II" 145).

Though cited as a sequel to The Defence of Idealism (1917), Sinclair's 137 page unpublished manuscript "The Way of Sublimation" may well have been written prior to the Defence since the 1916 Clinical lectures appear to have been extracted from it. In the Defence Sinclair stated that the subject of this sequel was "psychoanalysis and the problems it raises" (383), but "The Way of Sublimation" treats a much broader range of topics and most fully reveals the depth of Sinclair's understanding of the roots of psychology in philosophy as well as the potential power of the new psychology to address freshly, if not to resolve, age-old problems. For this reason alone, "The Way of Sublimation" is central to the development of Sinclair's thought and deserves to be published. In addition, the book is written in a lively, informal style, making difficult concepts more accessible and interesting.

In the introduction Sinclair deftly shows how philosophy dominated psychology in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries despite the efforts of Herbart and
Lotze to deal with data rather than to rely on a priori metaphysical systems ("Way of Sublimation" 2). Only Schopenhauer escaped the tyranny of systems and his conception of the world as will was strengthened by the work of his follower Von Hartmann. Sinclair reveals a "youthful enthusiasm" for Von Hartmann's Philosophy of the Unconscious despite the discouragement from reading it of her "Academic guider", likely Dorothea Beale ("Way of Sublimation" 3). Her discussion of the book and her feeling "that Von Hartmann and his humble students are avenged" because the unconscious has "come into its own" demonstrates her awareness of the continuity of development in psychology. This important point was too often submerged in the wake of Freud's popularity and was one that Lancelot Whyte felt it necessary to emphasize nearly forty years after Sinclair (Unconscious, 1960).

All of the issues covered in the two clinical essays mentioned above are then treated in more detail. Once again Sinclair devotes most attention to Jung, including a discussion of his Analytical Psychology (trans. 1916). She adds to her criticism of his work his tendency to read "into the ideas of any race or age the meaning of another race or of a later time" ("Way of Sublimation" 59). However, she praises the ability of psychoanalysis to deal with the modern
problem of the neurotic. Unlike its nearest rival, the otherwise similar activity of confession, psychoanalysis probes to the source of the aberration, removes it and gives sublimation a chance ("Way of Sublimation" 66). Sublimation, the goal of psychoanalysis, figures prominently, and Sinclair elaborates on her thesis that "Civilization is one vast system of sublimations" ("Symbolism I" 119), by examining various types and their relative merits. Religion is of imperfect sublimative value because the libido is transferred from a human and bodily object to a divine and spiritual one, but it is not transformed ("Way of Sublimation" 87). Creative art has a superior sublimative value but only for the few, and even then it may not be truly sublimative, since the creative imagination "...is apt to work largely in the subconscious, striking deep down through it into the Unconscious and drawing after it an immense trail of unsublimated stuff" ("Way of Sublimation" 97). Both science, because of the intellectual concentration involved, and concrete activity, because of the required discipline of the will, were thought to have the highest sublimative power ("Way of Sublimation" 101, 107). None of the ways are perfect, though religious behaviour holds the greatest potential.
In part two Sinclair examines in detail the limitations of psychoanalysis, whose position as a small department of general psychology she has deliberately assumed to be correct up to this point. First, Sinclair claims that psychoanalytic theories "do not seem to me to take due account of the extreme multiplicity and variety of human interests" ("Way of Sublimation" 111). This recognition of the reductiveness of much of psychoanalytic theory she shares with many of her British contemporaries. Second, psychoanalysts "do not always discriminate between the manifestations of primitive and sublimated libido" ("Way of Sublimation" 114). Third, though initially impressed by Freud's dream theory, she has come to realize that there is a considerable class of dreams which have escaped Professor Freud's net. Drawing on the data of the Society for Psychical Research, she points out that these include the telepathic, labour-saving, and problem-solving dream, as well as the dream of conscious and complete curative imagination ("Way of Sublimation 126). She also questions whether the dreams of the abnormal can be generalized from, and correctly declares that, "it is Professor Freud's critics, and perhaps his followers who have exaggerated" ("Way of Sublimation" 123). Most seriously from Sinclair's viewpoint, "psychoanalysts have not found the full
consequences and implications of their theory of sublimation" ("Way of Sublimation" 130). On the one hand psychoanalysts insist that the libido does not change, but on the other they claim that it must be transformed through sublimation ("Way of Sublimation" 131). If the transformative capacity of the libido is accepted, as Sinclair believes it should be, then "The sex references of such a Libido, instead of having the supreme importance you [that is, the psychoanalysts] have assigned to them, will be brief, trivial incidents in its stupendous career" ("Way of Sublimation" 132). Sinclair was the first to admit the importance of the sex drive (see "Way of Sublimation" 130 and her fiction), but she here implies that it is neither the prime motivator nor the exclusive goal of the psyche.

Despite these criticisms, as an idealist Sinclair received from psychoanalytic theories, particularly about dream consciousness, "the certainty we wanted as to the unity of all psychic processes though we may differ from them as to the ultimate nature of that unity" ("Way of Sublimation" 133). Psychoanalysis provided a bridge between the unconscious and conscious and linked "our symbolic dream-consciousness with the consciousness of the race" ("Way of Sublimation" 135). She thus accorded psychoanalysis more importance than was merited by the attention that it
had as yet received from psychologists, including William McDougall in his "classic" *Body and Mind* (1911), because

...I believe that certain of its findings bear on Psychology and the ultimate questions of Philosophy with a weight and a significance that are unavoidable, and that if Psychology were to ignore them it would do so at some disadvantage to itself. ("Way of Sublimation" 133)

Finally, as a modification of the Freudian view, she argued that "the psychic processes of the grown-up individual are at least as important as those he shares in common with the infant and the Race" ("Way of Sublimation" 139), an appeal in keeping with her insistence on the "supreme importance of the individual" ("Way of Sublimation" 137). Though apparently never completed, enough of "The Way of Sublimation" exists to demonstrate, not only that Sinclair was one of the first English critics to recognize the greater implications of psychoanalysis, but also that she was one of the first to evaluate it judiciously and to place it accurately in its historical and philosophical context.

Sinclair's conscientious estimation of psychoanalysis carries over into *A Defence of Idealism* (1917). In this "light-hearted essay", as she later modestly referred to it (*New Idealism* ix), Sinclair marshalls an impressive array of evidence in support of the existence of selfhood, unity of consciousness, and an ultimate spiritual reality. Along the way she criticizes those opposing philosophies
bearing on these issues, including Samuel Butler's pan-psychism, Bergson's vitalism, James's pragmatism and pluralism, and Russell's realism, though she admires the accomplishments of all these philosophers (Defence viii). In chapter one she accurately identifies some psychoanalytic findings as the corollary of the conclusions Samuel Butler drew from the processes of evolution:

The reader cannot have failed to identify that need or want, which Butler traces for us as the spring of all evolution, with the will-to-live, the "libido" which the psychoanalysts have traced for us as the source of all life and the spring of sublimation. (Defence 38)

As well as pointing out similarity and influence, Sinclair takes a balanced view of the two, for example, on the nature of the unconscious. Whereas Butler views the unconscious as perfect, and the psychoanalysts conceive it as the source of hideous material, Sinclair "see[s] no reason why it [the unconscious] should overflow with things hideous and repulsive any more than with beautiful and attractive things" (Defence 6), in effect aligning herself with the positions taken by the psychical researchers like Frederic Myers. She agrees with the "unjustly neglected" Butler on his theory of heredity but rejects his conclusions about the impossibility of individuality above and beyond ancestral inheritance. Though Butler subsumed personal identity completely, he also argued that the individual benefits from the experiences of
his hereditary forefathers. Thus the individual must participate in memory, must absorb and assimilate it, and these functions strongly suggest a self on which memory is dependent (Defence 36). Bergson is similarly criticized, in his case for putting Pure Time before the self (Defence 69).

In a chapter addressing "Some Ultimate Questions of Psychology", Sinclair takes William McDougall as "the clear-est, simplest, and most convincing authority on the behaviour of the psyche here and now" (Defence 84) in order to examine what constitutes individuality. Will comes closest to comprising selfhood but does not include states of consciousness like remembering. She rejects both of the alternatives proposed by McDougall to account for the relation between the self and the body because parallelism, a form of dualism, cannot be supported by the evidence. Instead she opts for the "fairly demonstrated" fact of psychophysical interaction, which once again justifies "the hypothesis of a self or soul as the unique ground of the unity of consciousness" (Defence 125). Chapters on Pragmatism show that it falters because of an unconscious craving for the unity [it] spurns" (Defence 147) and realism because it reduces consciousness to the role of spectator of existence, which does not square with evidence of its
dynamism. In the course of her discussion, her indebtedness to Hegelian thought becomes clear since spirit emerges as central. The result of raising "either psychic energy or physical energy to their highest pitch," spirit is the highest universal, representing the absolute reality of things (Defence 265, 332).

Making a bold departure from the traditional ground of philosophy, Sinclair concludes by examining the new mysticism from a psychological standpoint, in the manner of William James in Varieties of Religious Experience (1902). In spite of the psychopathology of the mystic, whose detachment is dissociation, in Janet's schema, and whose "psychic phenomena" can largely be accounted for by suggestion, his goal is still the unitive life (Defence 290, 300). The uniformity of experience of this "peculiar kind of genius" confirms the unity of consciousness (Defence 319). The "psychic powers", including the fact of telepathy (Defence 351) and the dream life as outlined by Freud, in particular, provide evidence that, although individuality is precarious, a single self or consciousness transcends the apparent division of the individual (Defence 295, 377). Sinclair claims that,

though our selfhood would seem to remain inviolable, our individuality holds its own precariously, at times, and with difficulty against the forces that tend to draw us back to our racial consciousness again. The facts of multiple personality, telepathy
and suggestion, the higher as well as the lower forms of dream-consciousness, indicated that our psychic life is not a water-tight compartment, but has porous walls, and is continually threatened with leakage and the flooding in of many streams. It may be that individuality is only one stage, and that not the highest and the most important stage in the real life-process of the self. (Defence 375)

For the facts of psychical phenomena, Sinclair relies heavily on the evidence gathered by the Society for Psychical Research. She demonstrates both a thorough knowledge of the literature on the subject, including Frederic Myers's Human Personality (1903), and the fact that, in her mind, psychical research and psychology are closely linked. Although inconclusive about personal immortality, psychical researchers "are preparing excellent material for psychologists on this side" (Defence 353). In conclusion, Sinclair points out that there are different kinds of certainty, including that of reason and spiritual instinct, (Defence 348), since our perceptions, like our passions, maintain themselves at higher and lower intensities" (Defence 379). The highest degree of certainty is reached at those moments when all elements support one another "with such heightening of psychic intensity that we discern Reality here and now" (Defence 379). She continues,

No reasoning allows or accounts for these moments. But lovers and poets and painters and mystics and heroes know them: moments when eternal Beauty is seized travelling through time; moments when things that we have seen all our lives without truly seeing
them, the flowers in the garden, the trees in the field, the hawthorn on the hillside, change to us in an instant of time, and show the secret and imperishable life they harbour; moments when the human creature we have known all our life without truly knowing it, reveals its incredible godhead; moments of danger that are moments of pure and perfect happiness, because then the adorable Reality gives itself to our very sight and touch.

There is no arguing against certainties like these. (Defence 379)

Despite Sinclair's ultimate appeal beyond reason to mystical moments in support of idealism, her book was treated respectfully and admired, especially for its style, by the philosophers who reviewed it, including Bertrand Russell (Boll, M.S.: Novelist 258).

In 1918 Sinclair brought her knowledge of psychology to bear on "The Novels of Dorothy Richardson" in what is undoubtedly her most innovative and important contribution to literary criticism. At first glance two of her statements in the essay do not appear to align well with A Defence of Idealism. Sinclair opens by criticizing the nineteenth-century philosophical criticism which makes the distinction between realism and idealism, objective and subjective, a distinction Sinclair herself made in defending idealism. However, she realizes that these terms are no longer precise and actually obfuscate the literary issue, since "Reality is thick and deep, too thick and deep and at the same time too fluid to be cut with any convenient
carving knife" ("Novels of Richardson" 4). In this view she agrees with J.D. Beresford, who confessed initial confusion about Dorothy Richardson's novel because of his attempt to apply the old terms. Sinclair praises Beresford's "needed" introduction because of his assertion in it that the novelist must "plunge in" to reality, but she does not concur with him that Richardson was the first to do so. Just as she was careful to point out precedents of psychoanalytic ideas, here she identifies "a growing tendency to plunge" beginning as early as the 1880's with the Goncourts and sustained as much in Joyce's Portrait of the Artist (1916) as in Richardson's work ("Novels of Richardson" 4). Nevertheless, Sinclair greatly admires Richardson's fiction because she has brought her method to "punctilious perfection" ("Novels of Richardson" 5).

Significantly, Sinclair was the first to borrow William James's term "stream of consciousness" to describe this literary method in which the reader encounters the world through the senses of the protagonist. Though Sinclair's essay will be remembered primarily for this influential application, her choice appears rather curious when it is realized that, in Defence of Idealism, she claims that she "abhors William James's way of thinking..." (ix); however, she admired his writing style and his genius
(Defence x). In support of idealism she also found more
unity in pragmatism and pluralism than James acknowledged
(Defence 158). More importantly, as Gerald Myers points out,
there are tensions between James's philosophy and his
psychology, between an idealistic and non-idealistic theory
of mind and self. Myers claims that,

The stream of thought looms in Jamesian psychology
as an idealistic framework -- an alternative to that
of the human body and its constitution -- in terms
of which the I is to be interpreted. When, as in the
metaphysics of pure experience, he reconstructed the
human body from sensations, feelings and the
introspectable stream of consciousness, his view is
so idealistic and Berkeleyan that commonsense ideas
about the body and the bodily self seemed
threatened. (353)

The stream of consciousness metaphor thus fit in well with
Sinclair's idealism and it also appeared valid from the
psychological perspective familiar to Sinclair since it
accounted for phenomena like dissociation; furthermore, it
accurately characterized Richardson's technique.

As in Defence of Idealism, Sinclair was attentive to
mysticism in her discussion of Richardson's work. She was
attracted to the moments passing one by one or overlapping,
"moments tense with vibration, moments drawn out fine,
almost to snapping point" ("Novels of Richardson" 7). When
one of these approaches ecstasy, it cannot be explained,
lending it a certain mysticism ("Novels of Richardson" 9).
Richardson's novel also appealed to Sinclair for thematic
reasons since it deals with the idealistic theme of feminine self-sacrifice central to Sinclair's own work. Her observation about Richardson's protagonist, Miriam Henderson, that there is

nothing to justify living. Everything she ever wanted was either withheld or taken from her. She is reduced to the barest minimum on which it is possible to support the life of the senses and the emotions at all ("Novels of Richardson" 9)

could equally apply to any of a number of Sinclair's characters, including Winnie Dymond in The Combined Maze (1913), Mary Olivier (1919), and particularly Harriet Frean (1922).

Another relevant piece of criticism, Sinclair's commentary on "The Future of the Novel" (Pall Mall Gazette, 1921), is also thoroughly informed by her psychological awareness and philosophical idealism. Sinclair acknowledges the difficulty of dealing with more than one consciousness in the stream of consciousness technique. However, in her suggestion that it would be possible to use the method on a man of action, she reveals her idealistic slant:

If you take the consciousness of a man of action, you will have all his actions in his consciousness -- the only place where they immediately and intimately are. The method -- whatever else may be said for it -- provides a more thorough-going unity than any other, for there is nothing more fundamental than the unity of consciousness. ("Future" 6)
The method would not lend itself to the comic, however, because there must be "incongruity between things as they are and things as they appear to consciousness" ("Future" 6). Sinclair argued that the analytic novel in which one is aware of the author all the time, is no longer viable:

The modern novelist should not dissect; he should not probe; he should not write about the emotions and thoughts of his characters. The words he uses must be the thoughts -- be the emotions. ("Future" 6)

This method of direct presentation, in what she called the synthetic psychological novel, represented the future of the novel. Though she modestly refrained from mentioning her own work in the piece, a few weeks later an interview was published in which she defended her use of psychoanalysis in *The Romantic* (1920), claiming that the application resulted from her caring about what was in people's minds (Boll, M.S.: *Novelist* 128).

In 1922, as the doors closed on the Medico-Psychological Clinic, Sinclair's second major philosophical endeavor, *The New Idealism*, was published. Once again her knowledge of psychology served her well. Though the work opened with evidence to show that the positions of realism were not as impregnable as they appeared, the argument for reconstructing idealism hinged on the distinction made between primary and secondary consciousness. Whereas our
primary consciousness perceives, feels, wills, and remembers without making a distinction between knowing and the thing known, secondary consciousness is the awareness of awareness, clicking in when reflection, judgement, inference, and reason begin. The realists' failure to make the distinction renders their assumption false, "that in knowing we know that things exist in themselves apart from any knowing" (New ix). As an illustration, Sinclair mentions that, "... primary and secondary consciousness work together in all creative art; but the finished work of art, the creation, becomes the object of primary consciousness" (New 293). The division overcame the main objection of realism to the older idealism, that being and being known are not the same (New 312). Both primary and secondary consciousness are dependent on an ultimate consciousness, holding Time and Space together, resolving their contradictions and uniting the perspectives of the finite selves (New 314). In dealing with the problem of Space-Time in consciousness, Sinclair felt that she had made an advance over the Defence, though she remained aware of "how hard it is in this [philosophical] adventure, to escape disaster" (New xiii); however, she did escape mainly unscathed since the reviews were positive. One of the best came from no less an expert than Bertrand Russell, who wrote that
The present reviewer considers that the book is one of the best defences of idealism that have appeared in recent years. It shows admirable patience in mastering books with which the author does not agree, and does complete justice to their merits. (Russell 625)

The critical test must have come when she read the nucleus of the book as "Primary and Secondary Consciousness" to the Aristotelian Society early in 1923.21

Later that year, Sinclair herself turned once again to reviewing, this time Jung's Psychological Types (1923) for the English Review. Though she praised Jung, especially for his definitions of each type, she also criticized his classification of various philosophies as either extroverted or introverted. As well, according to Boll, "She thought that Jung did not sufficiently show how dominant and repressed attitudes were reconciled in the normal individual, nor how the symbol worked in normal psychology" (Boll, M.S.: Novelist 304).

In 1925 Sinclair headed the list of "distinguished writers" invited to comment in The Bookman on the adverse criticism of "unpleasant fiction."22 By implication defending her own work as well as that of her contemporaries, Sinclair wrote that,

I consider that the attitude of the modern novelist towards sex relations is more enlightened and more sane than that of those Victorian novelists who ignored this fundamental aspect of human nature. I don't deny that his work is sometimes "unpleasant";
but it need not be. ("Unpleasant", 6)

After 1925, Sinclair's critical writing veered away from philosophical and psychological analysis and commentary. Her fiction similarly shifted, into the comic and satirical, to which psychological stream of consciousness techniques did not lend themselves, as she recognized in "The Future of the Novel" (1921). However, by this time no other English novelist could surpass the range or depth of her knowledge of matters psychological and philosophical.

In summary, several characteristics of Sinclair's approach to that knowledge stand out. The thoroughness of her grounding in philosophy, in spite of, or perhaps because of, her lack of formal education strikes one, as does her determination to become familiar enough with the major philosophical systems to be able to write about and criticize them in print. The high value that she placed on philosophical inquiry, even above creative writing, is also extraordinary.²³ One cannot but help admiring her open-mindedness and commitment to new ideas, often in the face of adverse criticism, as well as her desire for, and recognition of the necessity of, gathering the best psychological discoveries together in a psycho-synthesis. Though idealism runs as a thread through her critical work, she was not a
rigid adherent to it. Her opinion evolved as new arguments accumulated and she even admitted in *The New Idealism* that, "I have no longer any prejudice against realism, and would even be glad if somebody would convert me to it, so that I might enjoy the advantages of the position, for example, its freedom from metaphysical care" (x). Most significantly, Sinclair had the ability to clothe the dry bones of philosophical thought with the colour of imagination, as one glimpses in the following passage on the complexity of the human psyche:

Imagine then what a diagram would look like that attempted to represent the higher psychic processes of man, the complex play of many motives, determining one of many actions seen to be possible and desirable; the conflict between desire and will; the element of choice -- the will darting like a shuttle to and fro among all those infinite threads and weaving them to its own pattern. Add to this the emotions saturating the web with their own colours; and consider that you have not yet allowed for the intellectual fabric, different and distinct from this play of action and emotion and desire, yet hardly distinguishable, so close is the psychic web, so intricate the pattern. 24

Nevertheless, the fullest expression of Sinclair's psychological and philosophical expertise is to be found in her fiction, to which we now turn in order to flesh out the skeleton of facts about the impact of second wave psychology on her writing.
Chapter Five
May Sinclair's Psychological Artistry

The philosophical and psychological ideas about which Sinclair became so knowledgeable inform the main preoccupations of her fiction in a variety of ways. From her earliest novels on, several concepts of first-wave psychology, manifested in naturalistic themes, are tempered not only by idealism but also, and more importantly, by the probing of the psyches of her characters. Typically individuals make sacrifices which may or may not be meaningful, but are generally at least partially motivated by unconscious wishes. As her work develops, Sinclair gives greater scope to the role of the unconscious in influencing behaviour, while placing hereditary factors further in the background. Characters' reactions and adaptations to their environment and the degree of their spiritual and psychological awareness also become more important in determining their consequences.

Throughout her fiction Sinclair adeptly demonstrates the complexity of human motivation. Her characters are shown to have fluid and dynamic selves, which are more often than not in conflict. However, over the course of her fiction,
she becomes more explicit about portraying the disastrous
effect of repression, or the dissociation of one self from
others, particularly when the conflict involves sexuality.
Her characters' sexual natures are revealed with a
surprising degree of candidness, considering the period in
which she wrote. Sinclair also depicts the dire consequences
of the misuse of one's sexuality as a tool of manipulation.
Several of her novels explore, with open-mindedness,
changing attitudes towards marriage and the role sexuality
plays in it. Sinclair dissolves traditional boundaries
between the normal and the abnormal by showing perfectly
"sane" individuals afflicted by psychosomatic illness. The
terminology of medical and abnormal psychology is often
extended to a non-medical context and used metaphorically to
convey the intensity of emotional states. For example,
Sinclair will suggest that characters are "obsessed" by
material objects, or are becoming "hysterical". Doctors are
not stereotyped or distant figures, but rather are shown to
have very human flaws. Some are limited by the prejudices
they have learned from the medical orthodoxy, while others
demonstrate greater understanding of, and sympathy for, the
"new" psychological symptoms and unorthodox cures like
hypnotism. Sinclair's novels exhibit a fascination with the
multifarious aspects of creative genius. Rarely is
creativity viewed merely as a manifestation of neurosis but more frequently as the fortunate coalescing of heredity, talent, intelligence, and temperament. At their height, the fruits of genius represent the supreme achievement of sublimation, a concept emphasized in both Sinclair's fiction and in her psychological writing.

As might be expected given her gender, Sinclair excels at depicting the intricacies of feminine psychology. More often than not it is women who make sacrifices in an attempt to 'do the perfect thing' and who suffer because of their denial of feelings and ambitions. Her novels are populated by women who have negative attitudes towards childbearing and whose babies miscarry or die of neglect. If women who are brought up traditionally are exposed to new ideas about independence, notably the desirability of having a career, then, typically, they rebel. However, this preoccupation does not mean that the men in Sinclair's novels are painted as villains. Frequently they are victims of birth or circumstance, just as likely to suffer from the puritanical convictions of their female counterparts as to tyrannize their dependents. The relations between the sexes are never idealized in Sinclair's fiction and are often stormy, rocked or wrecked by failure in communication. Families are shown to be fragile, with children typically
faring poorly. An analysis of the thirteen most important novels, four most innovative novellas, and two most psychologically informed short stories in Sinclair's canon will confirm her extraordinary ability to adapt, for dramatic fictional purposes, the dynamics of second wave psychology, especially the revelations about unconscious motivation. Through this ability she is able to shed new light on the gamut of emotion and issues that she treats.

Sinclair's first published novel, *Audrey Craven* (1897),\(^1\) is a thoughtful as well as entertaining study, both of a woman's unenlightened quest for self-revelation and of the complex relations between life and art. It is crucial to the present discussion for several reasons. Janus-faced, it forges a bridge between first wave and second wave psychology. The novel also broaches many of the issues which Sinclair enlarges on in her later work, and which preoccupy Edwardians (and eventually moderns) concerned with psyche and spirit. This characteristic does not mean, however, that the work is burdened by the philosophical and psychological knowledge with which it is infused. The following comment by one of Sinclair's earliest and most perceptive critics, Anthony Deane, testifies to Sinclair's assimilative power:

*Technically, in the matter of style and workmanship, it [Audrey Craven] shows an enormous advance upon your earlier work. Your sentences were apt to be rather cumbrous and involved, but "Audrey Craven", as a whole, flows easily and well, and you*
seem to have escaped from the influence of German philosophers, at whose hands you have suffered many things, and whose stilted periods seemed to pursue you, at one time, even when you were writing fiction. (Deane, March 19, 1897)

Bristling with wit and irony, the novel traces the "metempsychoses" undergone by the protagonist, Audrey, as she falls under the influence of several male artists. A daughter of the modern age, Audrey is a woman with a room of her own, thirty years before Virginia Woolf evoked the room as a symbol of feminine independence. However, Audrey fails to take advantage of this position, even as a social artist, because her mind, like her room, is furnished with the ideas of others. The image effectively reveals the lack of self-knowledge which causes her to wreak havoc on those significant figures in the art world whom she attracts in her search for a revelation. Ironically, she becomes the subject of art, in a series of paintings and a novel, though these fictions are no more accurate than the fictions she lives. After witnessing the death of Vincent Hardy, the one who initially loved her, she turns very briefly to charity work and the solace of religion before marrying a successful non-entity, a final irony and fitting end to her misguided and "long quest of the eminent and superlative" (A. C. 325). Sinclair deliberately leaves Audrey's motivation for doing so open to speculation in the final pages of the novel,
suggesting that the revelation she sought may never have come.

Sinclair's acuity about psychology is best revealed in the way she accounts for motivation, including the relation between conscious and unconscious behaviour, in the way she shows the influence of various philosophies on the actions of characters, and in the way she portrays selfhood and illness. She skilfully interweaves ideas from both first and second wave psychology, as revealed in her comment: "in our modern mythology, Custom, Circumstance and Heredity are the three fates that weave the web of human life" (A.C. 10).

Drawing on first wave psychology, Sinclair suggests that the deterioration of at least one of the characters is primarily the result of an hereditary taint. Though, ironically, early in the novel we are told that Vincent Hardy "had too profound a respect for his own pedigree to lay his sins at his grand-father's door" (A.C. 11), suggesting a rejection of the Butlerian view, Hardy eventually succumbs to alcoholism, the taint apparently inherited from his mother who had been an "hysterical invalid" (A.C. 202). However, Sinclair does not naively rely on this one determinant; second wave factors of circumstance and awareness come into play as well. Hardy declines only after
Audrey rejects her engagement to him, which he had assumed with some justification to be final. Furthermore, as Sinclair has carefully informed her reader at the outset, this figure of will and action originally fails in his bid because "Hardy had rather neglected these opportunities for psychological study" of Audrey (A.C. 16). Sinclair's belief in the importance and healthiness of introspection, an attitude consonant with second wave psychology, can be confirmed in the character of Audrey. Like Hardy she is "not given to self-analysis" and her lack of understanding causes her great difficulty throughout the novel (A.C. 91).

The central theme of the nature of the self similarly shows the meeting of the older and newer psychology. Its centrality is confirmed through a letter of Sinclair's to Beale in which she expressed pleasure that at least one reviewer had "'spotted' my moral idea -- of self-revelation" (Beale, Oct. 5, 1897). Audrey's belief that there is no way she could lose her personal identity (A.C. 32), based on the nineteenth-century conception of the self as substantial and static, is closely questioned. Her self is shown to be completely fluid, subject to the invasion of another personality, and her soul prey to transformation, as in metempsychosis. This dynamic portrayal thus fuses the psychologist William James's conception of the self as stream and
Pierre Janet's findings about multiple personality, with a popular metaphysical concept. As illustration, Katherine Haviland, sister of Ted, one of those who influences Audrey, notices a "change of key" in her and realizes that

Audrey was playing a new part. Her mind was swayed by a fresh current of ideas; it had suffered the invasion of a foreign personality. The evidence for this was purely psychological but it all pointed one way.... Audrey was actually undergoing another metempsychosis.... No wonder that she would not announce her engagement. At the best of times her fluent nature shrank from everything that was fixed and irrevocable.... (A.C. 142)

It should be noted that Sinclair's portrayal of Audrey's self as fluid and insubstantial would appear to contradict her idealist belief in the self as the basis of the unity of consciousness. Sinclair struggled with this discrepancy -- made evident by second wave psychology -- on numerous occasions, as did her mentor, Dorothea Beale (cf. Chapter Four 315) along with second wave psychologists themselves, including Frederic Myers (cf. Chapter One 178).

Though Sinclair focusses on the consequences of Audrey's inability to formulate a consistent self, she does hint at the source through a developmental perspective in keeping with second-wave psychological discoveries. According to Audrey, she hardly ever saw her mother (A.C. 62). Her father appears to have been controlling, if not tyrannical, since he "had a low opinion of all women, and he
distrusted Audrey's temperament," causing him to have her inheritance held back until she is twenty-five (A.C. 8). Both parents died when Audrey was ten. Though the narrator informs us that, "The age of 10 is the age of disenchantment -- for those of us who can take a hint," Audrey never wholly experienced this state, despite their deaths (A.C. 7). The two facts together suggest that she denied her grief and thus could not allow herself disenchantment. From this point on, her cousin and lover Hardy "dominated her intellect" (A.C. 19) and controlled her, as a comment much later in the novel makes clear. In one of the few instances where a childhood trait is imputed to be the source of Audrey's adult motivation, we are told: "Fear that had made her lie to Ted, made her tell the truth to Hardy. That fear was deep-rooted, it dated from the days when they were children and Vincent had the mastery in all their play" (A.C. 196). Thus, with subtle strokes Sinclair conveys that Audrey's inability to deal with the loss of parents who would have helped shape her character, combined with forced submission to the will of her cousin, has left her unable to feel (A.C. 309). She remains in a state of child-like dependency, "a small creature struggling with things too great for her" (A.C. 324).
However, it is not simply pity that we feel for Audrey since her past misfortune is overshadowed by her present manipulations. Sinclair attends to Audrey's unconscious behaviour in order to reveal another dimension of her personality, "the secret places of her soul, its unconscious hypocrisy, its vanity, its latent capacity for evil" (A.C. 196). After hearing from the present subject of her infatuation, Ted, that he plans to leave London to study art in Paris, Audrey savagely stabs her hat with its pins. This act conveys the unconscious violence of her selfish disappointment which, we are told, contrasted oddly with "the pensive Madonna-like pose of her head" (A.C. 77). Later, in a confrontation with another lover, Hardy, who returns from Canada to find that he has been thrown over, Audrey claims that she wishes she were dead, while simultaneously "she was trying to wring the neck off a little china image" she has picked up from her mantelpiece (A.C. 191-192). Hardy then asks whether anything has happened and Audrey responds, while at the same time "The china image slipped through her fingers and was broken to bits on the hearthstone" (A.C. 192), thus betraying her unconscious feeling. This occurrence at once symbolizes her frustration at herself, at the ideal she has sacrificed, as well as her desire to destroy the old image Hardy has of her as a
fragile figurine, and as betrothed to him.

Sinclair's awareness of the consequences of the repression of unconscious impulses is made clear in the following description of Audrey's maiden aunt chaperon:

If you, being young and vivacious, take a highly nervous old lady and keep her in a state of perpetual repression, shutting her out from all your little confidences, you will find that the curiosity so natural to her age, will be sure to burst out, after such bottling, in alarming effervescence. (A.C. 23)

Her use of the term repression here must surely derive from her reading of Herbart. Sinclair also frequently shows characters suffering from psychosomatic illness, including morbid sensitivity (A.C. 207), nerves (A.C. 230, 243), depression, and moral shock (A.C. 142), the latter likely based on the psychic shock theory of Janet and others. Numerous references to the association of ideas or train of thought (A.C. 56, 79, 104, 128, 199) confirm that Sinclair's characterization is thoroughly informed by current knowledge about the dynamic nature of thought.

Though the novel is infused by many of the features of idealistic philosophy, Sinclair plays off various philosophies against each other by depicting the consequences for various characters of adhering to them. Katherine Haviland's idealism causes her to sacrifice her own artistic ambitions for her brother's greater genius (A.C. 48). Later, she
suppresses her love for Vincent Hardy even though she has sacrificed a year rehabilitating him. She is also generally far more deserving of his love than Audrey, who cares little for him (A.C. 276); it is Katherine who is left a lonely individual at his death.

However, Sinclair's portraits of Langley Wyndam and Flaxman Reed are most perceptive, and best reveal Sinclair's own aesthetic and moral position. A self-proclaimed uncompromising psychological realist, Langley Wyndam probes "below the surface ... below the solid layer of traditional morality -- deep down to the primitive passions..." in his novels (A.C. 158). His belief that "the stuff of nature" is the material of art and his experimental and analytic method place him in the naturalist school (A.C. 159). However, despite the critical success he achieves through his cruel expose of Audrey as "a mixture of vanity, stupidity and passion" in his "An Idyll of Picadilly", his naturalism is shown to be limited (A.C. 251). Though he firmly believes that he understands himself, and prides himself both on his knowledge of women, and on the scrupulousness of his conscience, he is lacking in all three areas (A.C. 120, 121, 235). After gaining Audrey's trust and love (A.C. 236, 252), he retracts his earlier declaration to Audrey that he could never marry on principle (A.C. 233) and returns to his first
love to marry (A.C. 242). His abuse of Audrey as material
for his fiction shows that his method, and his "strictly
impartial attitude as the student of human nature", are
morally bankrupt; he emerges as egoistic as Audrey (A.C.
256). The one critic that Langley esteems, Knowles,
recognizes that the novel is "conspicuously destitute of
imagination" and objects to it "as a barefaced plagiarism
from nature" (A.C. 257). Furthermore, Katherine Haviland
(who would appear to express views closest to Sinclair's
own) realizes that, though the book is "clever", it fails to
probe how the composite of other people that is Audrey holds
together and thus is "terribly superficial" (A.C. 266).

During a period of self-doubt prompted by Wyndam's
unflattering appraisal, Audrey again feels the need of a
stronger personality to pervade hers and turns to Flaxman
Reed, an Anglican priest (A.C. 372). Though Reed believes in
the provisional acceptance of truths in order to "see how
they worked out", thus aligning him with pragmatism, he
manages to penetrate further into Audrey's motivation
because he takes into account the spiritual dimension of her
character (A.C. 137). The narrator informs us that,

Flaxman Reed would certainly not have called
himself a psychological realist; but by reason of
his one strength, his habit of constant communion
with the unseen, he had solved Langley Wyndam's
problem. It would never have occurred to the great
psychological novelist, in his search for the real
Audrey, to look deeper than the "primitive
passions," or to suspect that the secret of personality could lie in so pure a piece of mechanism as the human conscience. (A.C. 325)

Flaxman is not idealized, since his "sensitive soul, made morbid by its self-imposed asceticism", recoils from Audrey's confession of sin, and he is unable to help her (A.C. 322); however, we are told that he was "the one man by whom and for whom she [Audrey] could have grown womanly and good" (A.C. 322).

Thus, Sinclair's recognition that individuals are limited and even trapped by the systems they follow, gives her characters depth and complexity. Also, Sinclair's characterization of Wyndam and Reed strongly suggests that, while aware of the potential of naturalism, she does not succumb to its temptations, but instead holds up the spiritual as the greater reality. Its profound use of psychology, coupled with concern for spirit, make this novel a good early example of fiction influenced by the "new" psychology in England.

Sinclair moved towards fulfilling the "promise" of this first novel, praised by no less than George Gissing for its "characterization and construction" (qtd. in Boll, M.S.: Novelist 56), in her second, Mr. and Mrs. Nevill Tyson (1898). In this study of marital incompatibility, Sinclair broadens the scope of her psychological enquiry by investi-
gating in depth the fluid natures of two characters, Nevill and Molly Tyson, and the dynamics of their family. She introduces what might be called a method of progressive revelation in order to do so. In addition, though idealism continues to underpin the thinking in the novel, more attention is paid to sexuality as a motivator, to dreams, to psychological moments, and to psychosomatic illness.

The character of Nevill Tyson best illustrates these new developments. Initially he appears to be the quintessential type of the clever, witty rake of the aristocratic or sub-aristocratic class in England. He flirts with a Miss Batchelor, a dabbler in psychology (Tyson 7), responding to her expression of interest in first principles by claiming that she will not be interested in him, then, "Because I haven't any principles" (Tyson 8). However, he succumbs to the charms of the twenty-two-year-old Molly Wilcox, a woman of "remarkable stupidity" (Tyson 22), and recklessly decides to marry her, in an act described as "madness" (Tyson 11). Not unexpectedly, given the information we have about him, he begins to show signs of restlessness, leaving his wife in the country to visit London on weekends. Only after Molly has a child and we learn of Nevill's response, do we get a glimpse of more complex motivation behind the facade of type. Nevill
was insanely jealous of this minute masculine thing that claimed so much of her attention. He began to have a positive dislike to seeing her with the child. There was a strain of morbid sensibility in his nature, and what was beautiful to him in a Botticelli Madonna, properly printed and framed, was not beautiful -- to him -- in Mrs. Nevill Tyson. He had the sentiment of the thing, as I said, but the thing itself, the flesh and blood of it, was altogether too much for his fastidious nerves. (Tyson 78)

No further explanation is provided at this stage for his incongruous squeamishness, though the dynamics convey with perspicacity what, from a post-Freudian perspective, would be seen as the Oedipal conflict from the father's viewpoint. In addition we soon discover that he does not have the substance of a gentleman and that he is struggling with a "primeval tendency. You expected at any moment to see a reversion to some earlier and uglier type" (Tyson 99-100). Miss Batchelor's observation that "he [Nevill] was constructed on such eccentric principles" (Tyson 100) now must be taken seriously since Tyson increasingly appears to be composed of a series of paradoxes, such as the following: "With the spirit of the soldier of fortune, Tyson had the nerves and temper of her spoilt child" (Tyson 100).

Gradually the sources of his contradictory nature are revealed, as layer after layer of his past is brought to light. Tyson bitterly resents his repressive Baptist upbringing as a "little city tailor's son" (Tyson 119). His
revolt against this past spurs his ambition but his origins also help explain his tendency to dissipation. In a comment suggesting the influence of Butler's theories of inheritance, the narrator explains that, at Oxford, Tyson had flung himself into dissipation in the spirit of dissent. His passions were the passions of Demos, violent and revolutionary. Tyson the Baptist minister had despised the world, vituperated the flesh, stamped on it and stifled it under his decent broadcloth. If it had any rights he denied them. Therefore in the person of his son they reasserted their claim; and young Tyson paid it honorably and conscientiously to the full. (Tyson 120-121)

Nevertheless, Tyson's early environment helps account for his repulsion at the sight of his wife breast-feeding his son, the product of his sexuality, whom he refers to as "the animal" (Tyson 80). He also falls prey to sentimentality, especially after his wife is badly burned while rescuing him from a fire he caused by tipping over a lamp while in a drunken stupour. Having suffered a psychic shock, Tyson temporarily determines to lead a "New Life" of the soul, but instead wallows in his feelings of remorse, and

...sentimentalism, subtlest source of moral corruption, worked in him like that hectic disease that flames in the colours of life, floating its wretched victim with an extravagant hope. The deadly taint was spreading, stirred into frightful activity by the shock of his wife's illness. He stayed indoors, lounging in easy chairs.... (Tyson 227)
The conflicting forces of heredity and environment operating on him during this stressful period are most clearly suggested in the following excerpt:

Hereditary conscience rose up and thrust him violently from the house; outside the spirit of the Baptist minister, of the guileless cultivator of orchids, haled him by the collar and dragged him home. (Tyson 228)

During a dream-like state of introspection, Tyson glimpses the truth of the limitation to the physical of his feelings for Molly, as well as the "terrific eternity of her love" for him (Tyson 238), but he rejects his insight because

The idea made him extremely uncomfortable and he put it away from him. He had drifted into the stagnant backwater of the soul where the scum of thought rises to the surface. (Tyson 238)

Sinclair deftly portrays the psychosomatic effects of this suppressed truth. Nevill develops a "nervous dread of going into [Molly's] room," and his senses become "morbidly acute" (Tyson 241). With Jamesian emphasis on habits, Sinclair suggests that Tyson has ruined any higher capabilities he once had through his habit of sensualism: "Tyson was paying the penalty of having lived the life of the senses; his brain had become their servant, and he was horrified to find that he could not command its finest faculties at pleasure" (Tyson 242). Tyson's subsequent impulse to leave his wife for military adventure in the Sudan is imaged as a "mania" and a "world-madness" (Tyson 262).
However, Tyson mistakenly believes that it was his act of marrying which was "lunatic" (Tyson 262). His more perceptive friend, Stanistreet, corrects him, claiming that "your marriage did nothing for you that was not very well done before" (Tyson 263). One further clue as to the origins of Tyson's character then surfaces. Apparently a premature sexual episode destroyed Tyson's "immortal soul" (Tyson 263). Stanistreet "knew the horrible story, of a mad boy and a bad woman. Perhaps it accounted for the ugliest facts in Tyson's character. He was warped from his youth, the bitter, premature manhood, so soon corrupt" (Tyson 264). Sinclair does not allow this latest revelation to take precedence, however, since she makes clear that a continuing source of Tyson's marital difficulty is his unrealistic attitude towards his wife. Right until his dying moments he views her simplistically as an ideal, "not a woman; she was an adorable mixture -- two parts child and one part angel" (Tyson 291).

By that time he has written three contradictory documents capturing the complexity of his nature (Tyson 290-292). From his wife he asks forgiveness, claiming that he has sinned against the highest part of himself; to his friend Stanistreet he sends a long, "irregular diary" account of his military manoeuvres; finally he writes a
postscript to Stanistreet in defence of his position. In it he asserts that he was not an angel and it has been a long time since he had been a child: "That accounted for everything" (Tyson 291). The narrator corrects the latter view, claiming that, "Taken singly, the three documents were misleading, taken together they formed a masterpiece of autobiography" (Tyson 291). The three could never be presented as a unified document because of Tyson's paradoxical nature. He may have struck the contemporary reader as Bergson's individual struggling perpetually to be, but without the resources of insight necessary to do so. In a final twist, he receives news of Molly's death and just has time to destroy the letter to her and the apology to Stanistreet. He then responds to attack and rushes into the desert, "his heart beating with the brutal, jubilant lust of battle" (Tyson 296), suggesting that Tyson is fundamentally dominated by this base impulse; his lust for Molly's flesh has merely been sublimated. Ironically, the deceptions which pervade his personal life have been destroyed. He presents a unified front to the public and, at any rate, his sins, unlike his wife's, are forgiven because of his war heroism (Tyson 297).

Although Molly Tyson suffers a great deal at the hands of both her husband and society, she is a more sympa-
thetic figure and actually achieves greater awareness and integration of personality before succumbing to the disastrous circumstances of her life. A brief glance at several aspects of her personality illustrates further developments in Sinclair's method. Initially Molly appears to be a superficial, foolish flirt, nearly as quixotic a figure as Tyson. However, after she bears Nevill's child, she makes what is viewed in the terms of idealism as a "supreme sacrifice," of her motherhood (Tyson 233). With neurotic intensity Tyson pressures her to stop breast-feeding "Because it takes up your time, wastes your strength, ruins your figure -- it has ruined your complexion -- and it -- it makes you a public nuisance" (Tyson 80). Fearing to lose Nevill, Molly does abruptly wean her child, though it causes her to go "into a fit of hysterics" (Tyson 82). The effect on the child is described with great psychological insight:

> Of those three worlds that were his, the world of light, the world of sleep, and the world of his mother's breast, they had taken away the one that he liked best -- the warm living world of which he had been lord and master, that was flesh of his flesh, given to his hands to hold, and obedient to the pressure of his lips. (Tyson 86-87)

As a result, the child deteriorates and dies, leaving Molly pining after him and Tyson absent and indifferent.

After Tyson returns to Molly, she makes a second sacrifice of her physical beauty by saving Nevill from the
fire which disfigures her. Despite the agony, the disaster has a transforming effect on her:

It seemed as though her beauty being dead, all that was blind and selfish in her passion for Nevill had died with it. She was glad to be delivered from the torment of the senses, to feel that the immortal human soul of her love was free. (Tyson 215-216)

Her cleansed soul lifts his up temporarily, and this is framed as a psychological moment of unity:

For one luminous perfect moment he stood face to face with her in the mystic marriage-chamber of the soul; he heard -- if it were only for a moment -- the unspeakable epithalamium; he saw incomprehensible things. (Tyson 224)

However, Molly enters a new life of the spirit alone. She further develops into a perpetual thinker (Tyson 229) and the process of her thought is conveyed adroitly: "...so many ideas cropped up to be gathered instantly, and wreathed into the sequence of her thought" (Tyson 231). Upon becoming pregnant again, Molly dauntlessly renews hope, only to have it quashed by Nevill's unannounced departure for the battlefront. Her response is most compellingly revealed in a dream, in which the dead child and the unborn child were one (Tyson 283). Although overlooked by the attending doctor, who searches for a physical source, the dream not only suggests Molly's mingled guilt and fear about her babies but, following the psychical researchers' conception of the dream, it is prophetic of Nevill's death in the desert as well.
In Mr. and Mrs. Nevill Tyson, then, Sinclair is able to move from character type to complex human being by weaving a complex web of motivations, and showing the influence of both heredity and environmental elements on Nevill; in the case of Molly, idealistic sacrifices act as devices to deepen her characterization.

Though the characterization is necessarily not as developed in the two novellas that make up Two Sides of the Question (1901), Sinclair's subsequent effort, these deserve mention for the evidence they provide about Sinclair's knowledge of psychic states and psychopathology in particular. In the first, "The Cosmopolitan", a young woman, Miss Tancred, has been "repressed" by the habits of her domineering father into "an agony of self-renunciation, an eternal effort not to be" (Two Sides 82). Stimulated by the arrival of a worldly young man, the painter, Durant, she discovers a longing for freedom and escapes, with the help of a cousin, in order to travel the world. Though she and Durant share a psychic understanding and he eventually proposes to her, she loves her freedom too much to accept.

In the story Durant is the main vehicle of the new psychological knowledge. He has read articles on hypnotism in the Nineteenth Century and claims that, of all motives, "the last reality was sex" (Two Sides 58). Sinclair
underlines the effect of Miss Tancred on him by claiming that he is "being hypnotised" (Two Sides 25). However, Miss Tancred's portrayal is also touched by the latest developments in psychology. Though she eventually comes to believe in the tyranny of sex, her motives are initially shown to be conflicting (Two Sides 59), and she overcomes her repression through the voice of another self: "It was not she that cried out, but some other self, unacknowledged and unappeased, smothered and crushed and hidden out of sight" (Two Sides 81). This tale, considered by Sinclair to be a failure, illustrates the idealistic triumph of personal conviction and strength over the conflicting forces of heredity and environment.

The second story, "Superseded," balances that optimism in its depiction of an ineffectual elderly school mistress who succumbs to hysteria and eventually dies, a victim both of her slavish attitude towards the occupation she is no longer competent to handle and of a family history of pathology. The story represents Sinclair's most sophisticated and yet moving study of psychological suffering to date. According to a letter of her friend Zack (Gwendolen Keats), Sinclair consulted a medical textbook for accuracy (as qtd in Boll, M.S. Novelist 177). Judging from the description of Miss Quincey's hysteria and the reference
to fixed ideas, the work was likely Pierre Janet's *The Mental State of Hystericals*, published in English in 1901, though available to the French-speaking Sinclair from 1893. Nevertheless, Sinclair does not allow this informed background to obtrude.

The story also features the first doctor with the perspective of the second wave psychologist, and it depicts him as being sensitive to the psychological symptoms of his patient. Dr. Cautley, we are told, gradually became disillusioned with medicine, "finally coming to the conclusion that the soul of things was Neuroses" (*Two Sides* 273). Whereas Miss Quincey voices the first wave attitude to mental disease in her resolve to "suppress" the existence of a psychosomatically-induced heart problem "by ignoring it. That she understood was the right treatment for hysteria" (*Two Sides* 323), Dr. Cautley implements a very forward-thinking talking cure. On his first visit he has Miss Quincey give him "a complete pathological story of the Moons and Quinceys," her relatives (*Two Sides* 233). Realizing that she suffers from "brain exhaustion," he advises her to take three months rest from work, and then "prescribe[s] a course of light literature" (*Two Sides* 244), perhaps the first fictional instance of bibliotherapy. He also makes the dynamics of psychosomatic illness clear to her, stating
"Don't you know -- you are a teacher, so you ought to know -- that overstrain of the higher faculties is sometimes followed by astonishing demonstrations on the part of Nature" (Two Sides 276). What he fails to realize is that Miss Quincey's astounding demonstrations are directed towards him, causing his psychotherapy to misfire. In striking anticipation of the Freudian concept of transference, Sinclair shows that the attentions paid by Cautley to Quincey have the effect of releasing some suppressed emotion, causing her to fall prey to "the fixed idea" that he loves her (Two Sides 289). Pathetically, she succumbs to the "sinful passion for a blouse" in order to appear more attractive to him (Two Sides 253). Gradually her delusion overtakes her, the narrator underlining this in the assertion that "the dream is the reality" (Two Sides 322), a conception very much in keeping with second wave psychological thinking. Only after Quincey sees Rhoda and Dr. Cautley together in the park is her dream shattered; she dies that night. This story is thus important because it is the first in which the entire plot hinges on the psychology of an illness, and it is a good illustration that this approach can be accomplished without clinical obtrusions.

In The Divine Fire (1904), the novel which garnered her widespread recognition, Sinclair continues to bring her
psychological expertise to bear on previously introduced issues, which need only be mentioned here. Infused with the ideas of idealism, the novel details the protagonist, Rickman's, sacrifice in order to uphold his honour. The physical health of several of the characters is affected by their mental preoccupations and they suffer from nervous illness (Divine 178, 402, 563, 580, 585), manifest mania, (Divine 131, 505), are driven by obsession (Divine 189) and undergo repression (Divine 4). Unconscious motivation (Divine 21, 119, 157, 448, 553) and the "primitive appetites" are acknowledged (Divine 225, 562), and the dream serves as both revelation of past conflict and prophecy (Divine 163).

The main departure from earlier works, however, is Sinclair's intense study of genius in its many aspects, causing her to cover new psychological terrain. She appears to adapt a similar conception of genius to Frederic Myers', as expressed in Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death (1903). In that work Myers claims that

the man of genius is for us the best type of the normal man, in so far as he effects a successful cooperation of an unusually large number of elements of his personality -- reaching a stage of integration slightly in advance of our own. (Myers 74)

Nevertheless, though the genius may approach the "super-normal" through his "power of appropriating the results of
subliminal mentation to subserve the supraliminal stream of thought", he is also prey to the "degeneration and insanities" emanating from subliminal uprushes. The border between genius and hysteria consequently is not clear cut; both hold idées fixes. Myers broadened his conception of genius beyond the purely intellectual form to include "'moral genius,' the 'genius of sanctity,' or that 'possession' by some altruistic idea which lies at the root of so many heroic lives" (Myers, 1903 56).

At the outset Sinclair makes it quite clear that the protagonist, Savage Keith Rickman, "had not yet found himself" because he is composed of numerous, conflicting elements (Divine 29). As a bookseller, out of necessity he assumes a business persona. He is also humble student and recluse, impudent Junior journalist, young man about town, "serene and perfect intelligence," commonplace cockney, genius suddenly transformed by the descent of "divine ideas", and drunk. Following this resumé, Sinclair comments that, "In short, it was a very confusing state of affairs, and that made it almost impossible for Mr. Rickman to establish his identity" (Divine 31).

During the course of the novel, Sinclair depicts the struggle Rickman undergoes in order to achieve integration as a whole individual, viewed by her as the antecedent
condition to the highest artistic accomplishment. She thus focusses on the development of his moral genius, touched off by his contact with a beautiful woman, Lucia Harden, possessed of great moral insight. Above him in social class, she represents an unattainable ideal, inspiring him with the "divine fire". Following her father's death, the library which has been in her family's possession for generations is sold to Rickman's father, who unscrupulously profits from the sale. As a result Rickman breaks with his father and becomes possessed of the altruistic idea of restoring the library to its rightful owner. His own father's death brings that goal into the realm of the possible, since Rickman inherits many of the books, though still not probable, because the books are being held as a lien against the Harden estate. Rickman must sacrifice the energy he should -- by virtue of his prodigious capacity -- be devoting to creating in the highest art forms, for the drudgery of journalism in order to raise money. He also suffers great deprivation, actually starving himself in order to fulfil his quest. Rickman "felt that his genius, conscious of its hour," possessed him utterly" (Divine 513). Sinclair shows with tremendous perception how this obsession brings him to the brink of madness, preventing him from continuing to write:
Now it [his sensation] was of a plunging heart that suddenly reversed engines while his brain shivered with the shock; now of a little white wave that swamped his brain with one pulse of oblivion; now it was a sudden giving way of the floor of consciousness, through which his thoughts dropped downwards, headlong, into the abyss. He had great agony and distress in following their flight. At night, as he lay in bed, watching the feeble, automatic procession of ideas, he noticed that they arrived in an order that was not the order of sanity, that if he took note of the language they clothed themselves in, he found himself listening as it were to the gabble of idiocy or aphasia. At such moment[s] he trembled for his reason. (Divine 520)

Nevertheless, enroute he obtains clarity about himself, as well as significant psychological insights about art, similarly infused by Sinclair's psychological awareness. During one inspired moment he rejects the romantic impulse of returning to nature in poetry, imaging this in the terms of the dynamics of mother and child:

You can't go for ever hanging on your mother's breasts; it isn't decent, and it isn't manly. Return to nature! It's only too easy to return, and stay. You'll do no good at all if you've ever been there; but if you mean to grow up you must break loose and get away. The great mother is inclined to hug some of her children rather too tight, I fancy; and by Heaven! it's pretty tough work for some of them wriggling out of their arms. (Divine 479)

He proposes instead that the more "virile" poets of the future will "be the poets of human nature -- dramatic poets to a man" (Divine 480). Significantly, Rickman, whose mother died giving birth to him, eventually becomes one of these dramatic poets. As well, he ultimately manages to act on the
idea of reconciliation, through the "wedding of the dream to reality", the theme he wishfully expressed in his first drama (Divine 148). He succeeds in paying off the debt against the library and returns it to Lucia, without revealing that the effort has nearly cost him his life.

However, she glimpses the truth and recognizes his single-minded devotion to her. She also realizes that she has suppressed her own feeling for him, which has caused her to suffer psychosomatic illness. They now meet and decide to marry as equals. That Rickman has become purified and unified by his struggle and his love, is symbolized by his ascetic appearance, particularly his lean body, "refined almost to emaciation" (Divine 553). It is confirmed by the high achievement of his verse drama, "The Triumph of Life" (Divine 560), a feat earlier considered impossible by his discoverer, Jewdwine. Thus, throughout this portrait of moral genius, Sinclair convincingly shows that moral and spiritual growth and the growth of literary genius are mutually dependent.

Sinclair's next novel, The Helpmate (1907), represents a turning point, both because of the attitude taken towards the psychological themes dealt with and because of its style, appropriately more direct than that of The Divine Fire. Although her second novel of marital
difficulties, *The Helpmate* adopts quite a different perspective from *Mr. and Mrs. Nevill Tyson* (1898) by depicting a husband wronged by his wife, whose rigidity and fastidiousness cause her to withhold sex in their marriage. The inspirational moral purity admired in *The Divine Fire* is here taken to an extreme, where it is shown to be constricting and destructive. The novel is Sinclair's most thorough and compelling study of the effects of repression to date, and, to her credit, this potentially clinical theme evolves naturally through dramatic incident.

In a stunning departure from the moral conventions of 1907, the novel opens with the couple in bed and, as Sinclair wrote to a friend, goes "straight to the roots of the matter" (qtd. in McDowell 238). Anne Majendie cannot sleep because she is wrestling with the "devastating idea" she has heard earlier in the fourth day of her marriage that her husband, Walter, had an affair with one Lady Cayley seven years earlier. Failing utterly to reconcile this shocking image with her "beloved and divine belief" in his goodness (*Helpmate* 2), and unsatisfied with his reasonable, though somewhat casual response to her queries, she obeys "the young despotic instinct" in her which prompts her "to obtain a sort of spiritual divorce from him, while she martyrisèd her body which was wedded to him" (*Helpmate* 5).
Now believing that she has married far beneath herself spiritually, she endeavors to bring her husband up to her level by denying him and herself mortal passion (Helpmate 47). Without realizing it, Anne's narrow and proud moral stance only serves to arouse the emotional antagonism between them, vividly symbolized in a church-going episode. At the level of intensity Lawrence was later acclaimed for, Sinclair states that, after Walter escorts his wife to church, "The door was shut in Majendie's face, and he turned away, intending to kill, to murder the next hour at his club" (Helpmate 52). Meanwhile, inside, Anne manages to "annihilate" her husband (Helpmate 53).

However, Anne is unable to repress her sexual desires completely; she succumbs to them in another very Lawrentian incident, towards the end of a day trip into the country. At a cottage near Westleydale where they pause for a rest, she holds a clinging child, which awakens her maternal instinct (Helpmate 112). They then drink from the same cup of water, symbolically uniting them with the suggestion of a natural eucharist. In a moment of illumination touched off by the enchanted atmosphere of the woods to which they return, Anne sees Walter afresh as innocent. The hyacinths that Walter "pours" into her lap, with their "thick streaming juices", further lower her inhibitions and she surrenders completely
to passion (Helpmate 114).

Upon their return to the routine of married life, however, Anne reverts to her former ambition, quashing the memory of her "supreme mood" (Helpmate 117). Following Anne's encounter with Lady Cayley, "the phantom of her [Anne's] own horror made flesh" (Helpmate 144), the effect of Anne's suppression of emotion is graphically portrayed:

With the closing of her eyes she opened some back room in her brain, a hot room, now dark, and now charged with a red light, vapid and vivid, that ran in furious pulses, as it were the currents of her blood made visible. (Helpmate 153)

Anne finds a temporary outlet for her feelings in the child that she bears, but this event changes nothing in her obsessively "fixed" (Helpmate 259) attitude towards Walter since, through motherhood, Anne creates another sanctuary to keep him out (Helpmate 229). Instead, her neurosis deepens and she becomes no healthier than the sickly child whom she smothers with affection.

Sinclair also portrays with convincing psychological realism the consequences of Walter's being denied expression of his affection for his child, Peggy, and his passion for his wife. Initially he attempts to sublimate his longings by finding pleasure in making money (Helpmate 266) but eventually his unnatural circumstance begins to tell on his health. He is plagued by headaches and depression and is
prone to irritability (Helpmate 281). Unattainable, Anne becomes increasingly desirable until Walter's "passion for her became almost insane through its frustration" (Helpmate 280). Still she refuses to acknowledge his "hunger" for the "caresses" she lavishes on her child (Helpmate 281). Finally, Majendie is driven into accepting the love of a flower-girl, Maggie, whom he initially visits on an errand of mercy (Helpmate 247). He establishes her in a country cottage which he visits on weekends, gradually coming to believe in the illusion that the affectionate, domestic Maggie "was the pure spouse, the helpmate, and Anne, in the house on Prior street, the unwedded, unacknowledged mistress, the distant, the secret, the forbidden..." (Helpmate 320). Eventually Anne learns of his affair from the equally repressed Lady Cayley (Helpmate 349) and then breaks down in response to the next telegram that Walter sends to inform her that he will not return at night. In bed with her weeping mother, Peggy -- who has a heart condition -- thinks that her father is dead and, in her upset, suffers a fatal heart attack (Helpmate 309). Meanwhile, Walter, who has resolved to give up Maggie, returns home to have Anne accuse him of killing Peggy (Helpmate 395). Distraught and shocked, Walter revisits the location where he spent his honeymoon, gets drunk and suffers haemorrhage of the brain.
The possibility that he will be partially paralyzed is an ironic symbol, since Majendie has been in that state psychologically and emotionally throughout his marriage because of his wife's unnatural relation to him.

However, unbeknownst to Walter, Anne has slowly changed, as evinced by the fact that she has fallen away from the sanctimonious circle of friends, who fostered her hypersensitive conscience, and become closer to the compassionate Mrs. Gardner. The suffering caused by Peggy's death and her realization of the part she has played in precipitating Walter's illness complete the process of her humanization. With perhaps too much concession to her potentially religious audience (McDowell 240), Sinclair presents Anne's discovery of her "spiritual pride" as religious revelation and husband and wife become reconciled as soul-mates.

At several points in the work, dreams provide the key to the deepest longings of both Walter and Anne, as when the latter envisions herself "once more in the arms of the green hills, the folding hills of Westleydale" following her rejection of the passion she experienced there (Helpmate 211-212, 92). Though Sinclair's assimilative power makes direct psychological sources difficult to determine, the influence of William James can be felt in the ideas about
pragmatism, the social self, and the strenuous soul, expressed by Dr. Gardner, friend of the Majendies. Himself the "possessor of a strenuous soul," and one of the most perceptive characters in the novel, he immediately grasps the truth of the Majendie's difficulty, suggesting some admiration of the Jamesian methods on Sinclair's part (Helpmate 225). The candidness of Sinclair's portrayal of a marriage is attested to by the degree of controversy it provoked when published serially in The Atlantic, causing the editor to issue a caveat (as qtd. in Stevenson 260).

The Jamesian idea of the strenuous life figures more prominently in Sinclair's ensuing novella, The Judgement of Eve (1908), which reverses several of the circumstances of The Helpmate. A fastidious young woman, Aggie, chooses to marry an apparent soul-mate over a vigorous young farmer. They intend to live the strenuous life together but their sexuality and its consequence in numerous children gradually undermine their ideals. Stressed by the demands of her peevish husband and strained by caring for too many children, Aggie eventually dies while bearing yet another unwanted child.

In The Creators (1910), Sinclair returns to the subject of genius, treating it more comprehensively and with greater realism and insight than in The Divine Fire. She
follows the development of five strikingly different geniuses and the effects of their gifts on their personal relationships, the variety enabling her to move beyond the conception of genius as a type. She also expands her use of unconscious motivation by showing its operation in all five, as well as a few minor characters. For the first time in her fiction, two doctors with opposing views are used to contrast the medical view of genius as neurosis with a more visionary view of it as the capacity to channel spiritual energies. This conflict underlies the central dilemma addressed in the novel, of whether literary genius is a handicap or a benefit, a taint or a gift, especially for a woman; the conflict can be expressed as the theme of insanity versus vision.

Early in the novel we are introduced to George Tanquery's perspective on his genius:

He denied perversely that genius was two-sexed, or that it was even essentially a virile thing. The fruitful genius was feminine, rather, humble and passive in its attitude to life. It yearned perpetually for the embrace, the momentary embrace of the real. But no more. (Creators 15)

Since the narrator calls Tanquery's denial of the bisexuality and virility of creativity perverse, we assume that this view, suggesting a Nietzschean influence, is the one viewed as being more accurate. Tanquery also refers to genius as an uncontrollable "insane hallucination" (Creators
17). Although considered one of the two greatest psychological novelists of his time, ironically, like his precursor, Langley Wyndam in *Audrey Craven*, Tanquery "can't see inside himself" (*Creators* 183), causing him to act foolishly. Instead of proposing to Jane Holland, the other great psychological novelist, with whom he is in love and has an intimate though potentially demanding relationship, he obeys his impulse for detachment, believing this to be in the service of his art. Nevertheless, his unconscious sexual urges persist, causing him to become attracted to and eventually to marry an uneducated woman, with whom he has none but a physical connection and from whom he can easily detach himself.

More psychologically aware than Tanquery, Jane realizes during a characteristic moment of illumination prior to Tanquery's engagement that she could easily entice him, but she follows her conscience and also her suspicion that Tanquery cares more for her genius than for herself. This awareness causes her to feel ambivalence toward her talent, "a hatred of her genius, this thing that had been tacked on to her" (*Creators* 12). Throughout the novel, genius for a woman is regarded as difficult. In the shock of Tanquery's death to her through his marriage (*Creators* 91), she becomes possessed by the fixed, "tyrannous idea" of him,
denies her creativity, and hardens her heart (Creators 109). However, an act of unthinking cruelty to a small boy that she witnesses releases her suppressed emotions. Some days later she experiences a moment of heightened illumination, bearing uncanny resemblance to the moments of being that Virginia Woolf would begin to describe over a decade later:

She could not say how or at what moment the incredible thing happened, but of a sudden the world she looked at became luminous and insubstantial and divinely still. She could not tell whether the stillness of the world had passed into her heart, or her heart into the stillness of the world. (Creators 111)

Inspired with a new idea for a book, she once again immerses herself in her work. Her genius only becomes divided after she marries Hugh Broderick, a materialistic magazine editor, who encourages Jane's womanly qualities rather than her literary ambitions. Initially she succumbs to the comfort of her married life, ceases writing, and then concentrates her passion on her new-born son; however, her unwedded self reemerges. She becomes fatigued and depressed because she feels restrained from pursuing her writing, the activity most natural to her (Creators 327).

Hugh's brother, Dr. Henry Broderick, propounds the medical view of genius in "diagnosing" Jane. He claims that her writing "wrecked her nerves" and although he admits that she is "...a great genius; but great genius, what was it,
after all but a great Neurosis?" (Creators 360). Henry's powerfully stated prognosis so convinces Hugh that "in spite of himself he [Hugh] was coming around to Henry's view, regarding genius as a malady, a thing abnormal, disastrous, not of nature..." (Creators 328). Henry's advice to Jane that to embark on another novel would be ruinous, frightens and angers her (Creators 399, 410).

The main voice of opposition to Henry's medical opinion comes from a third genius, Owen Prospero, also trained as a doctor. He has become a doctor of the soul and poet, and he is more sympathetically portrayed because more spiritually aware than any of the Broderick clan. He allays Jane's fears that she is responsible for her son's weak state by claiming that she is not neurotic: "Your nerves are very highly-strung -- they're bound to be, or they wouldn't respond as perfectly as they do -- but they're the soundest nerves I know" (Creators 413). Prospero also discredits Henry by revealing that Hugh and Jane's child's faulty nervous system is an inheritance from the Brodericks, several of whom suffer from the same condition (Creators 413). His insight is further supported by the ironic fact that even Henry himself is eventually accused of being neurotic by the two younger Brodericks, who, we are later told, "got on his nerves" (Creators 454, 497). Owen's
attitude towards genius is more in line with that of the S.P.R., as his following retort to Henry illustrates:

There were cases, he declared, where disease was a higher sort of health. "Take," he said, "a genius with a pronounced neurosis. His body may be a previous poor medium for all ordinary purposes. But he couldn't have a more delicate, more lyrical, more perfectly adjusted instrument for his purposes than the nervous system you [Henry] call diseased. (Creators 420)

Owen's vindication of genius is credited by the success of his marriage to yet another creator, Laura, a woman who has made deep sacrifices for her art. Their relationship, founded on mutual compassion, is the only one which fosters the single flame of creativity within each of them without dividing them, until Owen succumbs to tuberculosis (Creators 317).

Nina Lempriere, the fifth creator, provides a foil for both Jane and Laura in the way that she, as a woman, handles the creative drive which feels like a second, aggressive sex within, plaguing her (Creators 105). She is a living embodiment of the belief she shares with Jane that a woman must remain independent in order "to do anything stupendous" (Creators 106). Hereditary influences again play a role since Nina comes from a "family of untamed hereditary wildness" (Creators 180). However, it is as an individual "single flame", driven at least partially by sexual
frustration, that she achieves greatness in her writing (Creators 451-452).

Owen Prospero's opinion that the genius is perfectly adapted to his temperament is also, finally, borne out by Jane's experience. Although an illness inclines her to believe Hugh's doctor brother that genius is neurosis, she begins to recover and realizes that she must get away from her family. Alone in the Devonshire countryside, "an instinct of self-preservation" tells her to trust to nature's way, and she thus heals naturally:

Nature's way was to weave over again the web of life so strained and worn, so tangled and broken by the impact of other lives. Nature's wisdom was to make her single and strong, a new creature, with a clear vision and an imagination once more virgin to the world. In short, Nature's beneficient intention was to restore her whole to the genius which was also part of Nature's plan. (Creators 459)

Her return to her intrinsic vocation is made clear by the moment of illumination that she experiences several weeks later. Notice that, in keeping with the psychical researchers' view, this moment is framed as a visitation from the supernatural realm:

Walking back to the farm late one evening, the moors veiled from her passion by the half-darkness, her Idea came back to her. It came, not yet with the vividness of flesh and blood, but like a ghost. It had ghostly hands and feet, and like a ghost it walked the road with her. But through its presence she felt in herself again that nascent ecstasy which foretold, infallibly, the onset of the incredible act and labour of creation.
Throughout the novel Sinclair deepens her exploration of genius by showing how the subtle play of unconscious motives influences behaviour, as when Jane unconsciously becomes closer to Broderick after Tanquery, who has recently hurt her, warns her to stay clear of him. Sinclair also adroitly demonstrates the mainly negative effects of repression (Creators 449, 473, 489, 492, 510). There are brilliant descriptions of its manifestation in psychosomatic illness. For instance, Gertrude Collett, the secretary with "a genius for order" who is unconsciously in love with her employer, Hugh Broderick, demonstrates the symptoms of hysteria following Jane Holland's arrival on the scene (Creators 256). Although the psychological difficulties associated with genius are treated in all their complexity, and the medical view, later elaborated by Freud, is given fair consideration, Sinclair illustrates that creativity as a natural activity transcends this paradigm, a perspective very much contingent with Myers', the Society for Psychical Research's, and, later, Jung's.

Sinclair began the new decade by experimenting with short stories which examine the extent of the meeting ground of psychological and supernatural experience. "The Intercessor" (July, 1911) represents the first of several stories
to probe the idea that if certain features of personality, particularly intense feelings, are blocked from expression during a life-time, they persist in the spirit world, indestructible until satisfied. In this tale -- which imaginatively embroiders the findings of the Society for Psychical Research on persistence of personality after death, psychic invasion, and suggestion -- a recluse by the name of Garvin unwittingly gets caught up in the psychic imbroglio of the sinister Falshaw family, with whom he is boarding. His nerves shaken by the appearance of an apparition, he consults a doctor sensitive to psychic phenomena, who happens to know the history of the wife's abusiveness and frustration and the husband's infidelity. Garvin then realizes that his personality has been penetrated by the ghost of a child who died from her mother's neglect (Intercessor 182). Through Garvin, the child seeks to make sense of the evil it witnessed and to assuage its thwarted passion for its mother. Following the delivery of a second child, which is still-born, Mrs. Falshaw becomes unhinged, refusing to allow it to be buried. That night Garvin acts as intercessor by removing the dead baby from the sleeping mother's arms, enabling the spirit child to slip into its place and "recover the love that had been withheld from her" (Intercessor 185). Mrs. Falshaw's
guilt is also apparently dissipated since she eventually returns to sanity. In its implication that psychological health is not merely dependent on the physical, but is facilitated by contact with the supernatural realm, Sinclair expresses in "The Intercessor" a belief held by many of those exponents of second wave psychology in Britain.

"Between the Lines" (Dec. 1911), a story written later that same year, provides good illustration of Sinclair's versatility with her psychological material. By altering tone and circumstance, she achieves comic effect using similar themes to those of "The Intercessor", including suggestibility, and the invasion of personality. Colonel Lumby, a contented though unimaginative bachelor, whose "secretaryship to the Braid Hospital for Nervous Diseases had kept him in wholesome, benevolent activity" (Tales 87), becomes easy prey of the new, "preposterously feminine" matron, Miss Manisty (Tales 93). In order to ensnare him, she convinces him that he is "in for double neurasthenia" and needs a rest cure (Tales 98). The amused narrator, Simpson, comments that,

I could see it all. Fitz [Col. Lumby] hadn't got neurasthenia any more than I had, but he had been compelled to think he had it. He had been the victim of suggestion, if you like to call it that.... (Tales 100)
Following his inadvertent proposal of marriage to Miss Manisty, Lumby enlists Simpson to rescue him from the hospital and to help him write an excuse. In an ironic twist, Simpson manages to plant the suggestion of a previous engagement into Lumby, inspiring this prosaic man to write a visionary tale and develop his imagination. Simpson is one of the first of several psychologically aware characters who throw events into a psychological light at the close of a Sinclair story; he claims that,

just as he [Lumby] had produced his neurasthenia at a hint from Miss Manisty, so at a hint from me [Simpson] he had produced that astounding tale of his. I'm inclined to think, myself, that the whole thing was written in him somewhere and could have been read by those queer people who do read things, you know -- between the lines of consciousness, I mean. But it was a sort of uprush from the submerged depths of Fitz's personality; that it could only have appeared under the excitement, the disintegration, if you like, of a supreme terror; that, in the grip of his mortal danger, he gave out something that was not his and yet was in him -- perhaps as an ancestral passion, an ancestral memory. If you'd read the Throgmorton Memoirs (he hadn't, you'll remember) you'd know that his maternal grandmother, the beautiful Lady Adelaide, died of an attachment -- a previous and unhappy one. There are things in her letters, things written between the lines, that show. (Tales 114)

With one deft touch Sinclair pokes fun at the unmasking impulse of second wave psychology, Janet's psychic shock theory, and Butler's ideas about ancestral memory.

In The Flaw in the Crystal (English Review, 1912), Sinclair uses the supernatural to quite a different effect
than in "The Intercessor", to show that belief in it can be a hindrance to psychological awareness. The novella brings together unobtrusively the psychological ideas of thresholds of consciousness and repression, with mystical, psychical ideas of moments of inspiration, telepathy, and psychic invasion.

The protagonist spinster, Agatha Verrall, believes that she has the "uncanny, unaccountable" gift of telepathy, of influencing and even healing people at a distance. In her mind this power hinges on her ability to keep herself free from desires, from conflicting ideas, and to remain a "flawless crystal". She practises this emotional restraint with Rodney Lanyon, who visits her whenever he can escape from his nerve-wracked wife, Bella. Though Agatha refuses to influence him to come to her, she does exercise her power, "sacredly, incorruptibly" to calm his strained nerves (Uncanny 85). She is convinced that nothing can alter the "charmed circle" she has drawn around their relationship, until the arrival of mutual acquaintances, Molly and Harding Powell, at the next farm to hers in the Buckinghamshire countryside (Uncanny 101-102). This event throws their sacred relationship into a new light; Rodney's agitation had brushed aside some veil and had let her see something that up until now her crystal vision had refused to see, something that was more than a lurking possibility. She discovered in him a desire, an intention that up until now he had
concealed from her. It had left its hiding place; it rose on terrifying wings and fluttered before her, troubling her. She was reminded that, though there were no lurking possibilities in her, with him it might be different. (Uncanny 102)

Nevertheless, these misgivings are submerged since she turns her attention to the newcomers and decides to extend her gift to the paranoid Harding, who is on the brink of insanity. Initially, believing her power "immeasurable, inexhaustible" (Uncanny 120), she finds it as easy as drawing breath to help him (Uncanny 128), especially since "the process belonged to a region that was not of times or time" (Uncanny 128). The contrast between her vision and his is made explicit through a moment of illumination that Agatha experiences while on a walk with Harding, who experiences nothing. Agatha observes the valley from a height of land and

At that moment, in a flash that came like a shifting of the eyes, the world she looked at suffered a change. And yet it did not change. All the appearances of things, their colours, the movement and the stillness remained as if constant in their rhythm and their scale; but they were heightened, intensified; they were carried to a pitch that would have been vehement, vibrant, but that the stillness as the movement was intense. She was not dazzled by it or confused in any way. Her senses were exalted, adjusted to the pitch....In every leaf, in every blade of grass, this life was manifest as a strange, a divine translucence. She was about to point it out to the man [Harding] at her side when she remembered that he had eyes for the beauty of
the earth, but no sense of its secret and supernatural light. (Uncanny 130-131)

Despite Agatha's privileged position, Harding's madness has a power which invades her after she breaks down "those innermost walls of personality that divide and protect, mercifully, one spirit from another" (Uncanny 176). Agatha restores Harding to health but, as she observes, "It was her sanity, not his, that he walked in" (Uncanny 167). She now becomes possessed of all the symptoms of Harding's madness.

Meanwhile, she has also been able to cure Bella, Rodney Lanyon's wife, with the result that he visits Agatha much less frequently. Agatha's desire to see him increases, though "Each time she beat it [desire] back, in an instant, to its burrow below the threshold, and hid it there, it ran underground" (Uncanny 142). Ironically, as she becomes possessed, the one thread that ties her to sanity is "the desire [for Rodney] that no longer ran underground, but emerged and appeared before her, lit by lucid flashes, naked and unashamed" (Uncanny 176-177). This love enables her to identify herself and keep from being completely engulfed by Harding's personality. She manages to extract herself from the psychic connexion with Harding but is now forced to acknowledge the physical side of her love for Rodney.
Since she continues to believe that impurity of purpose has been the flaw in the crystal which has sapped her psychic powers, she decides to renounce this love. Though the conflicts are set in a supernatural context, Sinclair cleverly leaves the events open to a psychological explanation. There is the possibility that it has taken a psychological crisis for Agatha to release, or at least acknowledge, formerly repressed sexual desires. Her guilt about being attracted to a married man may reinforce her superstition that she must remain free of such passions; she may be deluding herself that she will be able to do so and still exercise her uncanny power.

In The Combined Maze (1913), Sinclair returns from the realm of the supernatural to a very physical world, though several of her interests in the short stories resonate through this realistic novel (which resembles superficially Wells' works of realism). One of its foci is on the remarkable persistence of a personality trait, though not beyond death, as in "The Intercessor". The protagonist Ranny Ransome's optimism and decency are shown to be virtually indestructible, despite disastrous experiences. The Combined Maze also vividly illustrates the powerful effects of suggestion and repression. More importantly, the novel shows as clearly as Audrey Craven Sinclair's melding
of first and second wave explanations of behaviour. Though heredity, with deterministic force, limits characters' lives -- circumstance and the dynamics of relationships fill the foreground. This novel introduces as a major theme, and treats with great insight, the consequences of an overly close bond of love between mother and son, a theme with which D.H. Lawrence captured the imagination of the literary world later that year when *Sons and Lovers* (1913) was published. In another departure for Sinclair, the novel deals with the lower-middle-class of clerks and shop keepers. A glance at the characterization of Ranny Ransome, his relationship with his mother and the two other important women in his life -- Winnie Dymond and Violet Usher -- and the philosophical and sexual symbolism underlining these relationships, will demonstrate Sinclair's preoccupations.

Ranny Ransome convincingly functions as both unique individual and type. His youth and "genius for adventure" (*Combined* 4) make him unpredictable but his position as an insignificant clerk with a devotion to physical exercise identify him as "...the image and the type of these forlorn, foredoomed young athletes, these exponents of a city's desperate adolescence, these inarticulate enthusiasts of the earth" (*Combined* 2-3). His cultivation of a superb physique is, in part, a response (or reaction-formation) to his
father's flabbiness, and the environment of "drugs" and "disease" that he was brought up in as a chemist's son (Combined 2). His father is also alcoholic and hypocritical. Ranny's mother, who nearly died in childbirth with Ranny, has been blocked from relating to her husband in any significant way because of his addiction, which she euphemistically refers to as his "headaches". Consequently, she has redirected her passions towards her son, Ranny, who had always been more like a lover to her than a son. Mr. Ransome's transports (if he could be said to have transports) of affection were violent, with long intermissions and most brief. Ranny had ways, soft words, cajoleries, caresses that charmed her in her secret desolation. Balancing himself on the arm of her chair, he had his face hidden in the nape of her neck, where he affected ecstasy and the sniffing in of fragrance, as if his mother were a flower. (Combined 47)

An adherent of the strenuous life, as promulgated by the Poly where Ranny spends most of his time, he has up until the opening of the novel taken no interest in members of the opposite sex, whom he considers to be universally "flabby" (Combined 8). Gradually he awakens to love and sexuality, and this impulse is linked with his affection for his mother. While kissing her he receives the suggestion to kiss Winny, a girl he has been seeing home from the poly as a sort of 'game' (Combined 15); however, he does not feel free to develop a relationship with this clever, athletic girl because he cannot bring her home and will not have a
sufficient income to marry for years. When he confesses his complete lack of prospects to her, she misinterprets him and withdraws, and Ranny is left open to the machinations of Winnie's friend, Violet Usher, who entices him through her softness and mysterious potency. The link between Ranny's attraction for both women, and the source of these feelings in his relationship with his mother, is deepened by the symbol of violets, of which Ranny is unconscious. He buys a sachet patterned and scented with violets to give to Winny for her birthday, not consciously realizing that this is the fragrance his mother wears when he 'makes love' to her (Combined 47). Significantly, he literally puts the lid on the smell by placing the sachet, which he decides not to give to Winny, into a tin box. The feelings he thus represses reemerge when he senses "a faint odour of violets, familiar yet wonderful" on Violet (Combined 61, 70).

Sinclair continues to embue the text with sexual imagery in the scenes leading up to Ranny's seduction by Violet. Ironically, an impassioned oration at a religious meeting contributes to that seduction by releasing pent-up emotion in Ranny. The day prior to the service, Ranny loses a race because he is distracted by seeing, in the audience, Violet, who has returned from a sojourn of several months in the country. He comes straight to the service from seeing
Violet, whom he plans to walk out with afterwards. His nerves are thus keyed to their "highest pitch", though Sinclair also gives play to hereditary influence in explaining his state:

For though there was nothing in his flesh and blood and muscle that suggested an inebriate father, yet in his profounder and obscurer being he was Fulleymore Ransome's son. The secret instability that made Fulleymore Ransome drink had had its effect on Ranny's nervous system. His nerves, though he was not aware of it, were finely woven and highly strung. He had a tendency to be carried away and to be excited, exalted and upset. (Combined 89)

The preacher, another of Sinclair's "surgeon[s] of the Soul" (Combined 92), intends to root out the "disease" of sin and sensual thought in his audience, but has the opposite effect on Ranny:

The submerged feelings rose in him [Ranny]; they were swollen, intensified, dominated beyond recognition by the virile and unspiritual passion that leaped up and ran together with them and made them one. It gave them an obscene but superb sanction and significance. (Combined 91)

The use of the word "serpentine" in the following passage links Ranny's experience as listener with the archetypal seduction: "...nothing could have been more devious, more mysterious and serpentine than the discourse that turned and wound and wormed its way into the last obscurities and secrecies of Ranny's being" (Combined 92). In summary, Sinclair frames Ranny's seduction as a moment of sensual
illumination, during which the suggestion is subconsciously implanted in Ranny that the passions he has assumed to be sinful are actually "normal" and even "expected":

In the mission church of St. Matthew's, Ranny underwent illumination. It was as if all that was dark and passionate in him had been interpreted by the preacher. Interpreted, it became in some perverse way justified. (Combined 92)

The imagery occurring just prior to Ranny's actual seduction by Violet, though made to connect with the earlier episode, has more of a Freudian flavour, suggesting that Sinclair had read something of the psychoanalyst's work, possibly Three Contributions to the Sexual Theory (1905; Eng. trans. 1910) during the course of writing the novel. Upon returning to her lodging, Violet finds that she has forgotten her key and assumes a passive, helpless role. In a move with symbolic overtones, Ranny penetrates her house using his pocket knife to slip the sash (Combined 96). After Ranny has been "drawn over the threshold" (Combined 97) like an unsuspecting bride, association to the earlier arousing incident is made through the claim that "he still felt that triumphant sense of sanction and completion, of acquiescence in an end foreappointed and foreseen" (Combined 98).

The determinism implicit in Ranny's triumphant belief is developed more fully through the central symbol in the novel -- the combined maze. An athletic spectacle in which
women and men run together, weaving a pattern, the combined maze initially captures the idealistic innocence of its participants, including Winnie and Ranny, who are "wed" by the comradeship it fosters (Combined 26). The sacredness and magic of the dynamic event, "the supreme symbol of the great wheel of Eight spokes, the Wheel of Life" (Combined 25), lifts these shop girls and clerks out of their regulated lives, and they experience a primitive joy. Violet's lack of understanding of this life-affirming dance foreshadows the deadening effect she will have on Ranny after their marriage. More importantly, her disapproval of this pageant, in her eyes improper because both men and women mingle, takes away Ranny's innocence about it and reduces it to something sordidly sexual. As Ranny's marriage deteriorates because of his wife's restlessness, neglect of their children, and unfaithfulness, the image of the combined maze increasingly comes to signify the oppressive inevitability of the conditions in which the couple find themselves. His spontaneity quashed by circumstance, Ranny eventually retrieves the image to articulate his deterministic outlook:

They [Ranny and Violet] couldn't help themselves. They had been caught up and flung together and carried away in a maze; like the combined maze at the Poly., it was, when they had to run -- to run, locked together. (Combined 190)
A possibility of escaping the maze occurs when Violet deserts Rannie and he manages to save enough money to obtain a divorce, which will enable him to marry the self-sacrificing Winny. However, in a cruel twist of fate, Violet returns destitute, and Ranny remains locked to her. The idealism prevalent in Sinclair's earlier novels thus gives way to a vision in which instincts, particularly sexual ones, play a large role in determining life's experiences.

The consequences of the repression of this desire are revealed as pervasive and damaging in Sinclair's next novel, *The Three Sisters* (1914), one of her best. As never before, almost all of the characters suffer from psychosomatic disturbances. These unconsciously motivated maladies provide the focus of the dramatic incident, drive the plot of the novel, and yet generally arise naturally from circumstances.

Both the setting of the novel in the bleak Yorkshire dales and the oppressive atmosphere created of a Vicar's household, owe much to Sinclair's study of the Bronte family, *The Three Brontës* (1912). However, Sinclair shifts the time frame to the late Victorian period, and no direct parallels can be made between the Cartaret sisters of the novel and the Brontës. Also, Sinclair gives one character, the by now recognizable doctor of the soul,
knowledge of and sympathy for the new dynamic approach to the human psyche.

The father emerges more clearly than ever before in a Sinclair novel as the major repressive force, and his psychology is convincingly portrayed. Two wives have died on Vicar Cartaret and a third has escaped to London to live with friends, leaving him feeling failed by women in enforced celibacy, to which he is "unsuited" (Sisters 20). Though having the appearance of an ascetic, he is tormented by his secret sensuality, symbolized by the "heavy, virile odor" which emanates from his study (Sisters 18), a characteristic which may well have shocked readers of the period. His response to this frustration is to "stamp on other people's passions" (Sisters 58). The power of his obsession is conveyed through the detail that, prior to the opening of the novel, he has moved his family from a comfortable seaside town to the barren, northern village of Garth in order to punish his youngest daughter, Alice, for having enticed a suitor. He continues to attempt to suppress the emotions of his three daughters, while at the same time his actions betray his own stifled sexual urges. As he cruelly informs Alice that her sister has gone for a walk with Rowcliffe (the doctor whom Alice desires), we are told that, "The Vicar, with his hands plunged in his trousers pockets,
jerked forward at her from the waist. It was his gesture when he thrust" (Sisters 169). After Alice decides to marry the socially inferior Jim Greateorex, who has made her pregnant, the Vicar suffers a stroke. Sinclair leaves no doubt as to the psychosomatic genesis of this illness since the shock of recognition that his control has been undermined precipitates it, and one of the persistent symptoms is loss of memory about the events leading up to it (Sisters 300, 331-332). Though the Vicar's tyrannical power is, at least outwardly, drastically reduced, by this time the damage has been done, as an examination of the daughters' response to his tyranny indicates.

All three are initially attracted to Dr. Rowcliffe, virtually the only eligible suitor within striking distance. As a ploy to attract his attention, Alice develops hysterical symptoms (Sisters 80) and a death wish after she becomes aware of Rowcliffe's attraction to Gwendolyn (Sisters 175). However, Rowcliffe, who has been reading Janet's *État Mental des Hystériques*, realizes both that Alice is ill because she is unhappy and that she will not die but may go mad (Sisters 179). In opposition to the Vicar's voicing of the nineteenth-century medical view that Alice should control herself, Rowcliffe sympathizes with her restrictive situation (Sisters 180-181). He plants the
suggestion in her to become acquainted with Jim Greatorex, with whom she eventually forms a relationship. However, she does this only in shocked response to Mary's announcement of her engagement to Rowcliffe, which leaves Alice "morally inert" (Sisters 249). That she has suffered permanent psychological damage as a result of her environment is intimated by the fact that she develops a complex of fears (labelled a "morbid obsession" by Rowcliffe) that she is responsible for her father's sickness, and that he is going to die.

In contrast, Gwendolyn, the most passionate of the three sisters, initially responds to her father's attempts to stifle her by directing her love towards the natural beauty of Garthdale (Sisters 58). Though Rowcliffe is attracted to her, and they are obviously kindred spirits (Sisters 65), once Gwendolyn realizes that Alice would get better and be happy with Rowcliffe, she decides to leave Garthdale. This departure is a supreme sacrifice since she undergoes a "death" while doing so (Sisters 185). It also turns out to be futile because Mary steps in and claims Rowcliffe. Gwendolyn returns for their wedding and again sacrifices herself by staying on to care for the father she despised. Rowcliffe originally identified Gwendolyn as a perfectly "balanced person" and it is true that her nerves
are more stable than Alice's (Sisters 98). However, in Gwendolyn's present situation, despite mystical moments of being with Rowcliffe (Sisters 306-307), and of union with her environment (Sisters 339), there is a fundamental split in her between the passionate and submissive woman (Sisters 337). She attempts to subdue her passionate self through voracious reading of metaphysical books, including Bergson's Evolution Créatrice (Sisters 347), but the imagery contained in the explanation for doing so reveals that her sublimations are imperfect:

She took to metaphysics as you take to dram-drinking. She must have strong, heavy stuff that drugged her brain. And when she found that she could trust her intellect she set it deliberately to fight her passion. (Sisters 351-352)

Gwendolyn's dream of Mary with dead child, after her sister successfully bears a son, reinforces the impression of her conflicting feelings; thus, through this most complex character Gwendolyn, Sinclair seems to suggest the futility of idealistic sacrifice and the imperfection of sublimation as remedy.

Mary's psychological response to her father's repressive tyranny is most subtly portrayed and yet most devastating for her and those she deceives. She develops the habit of posturing to such perfection that she loses all sense of self. Because she is nice and provides comfort for
Steven, she is able to trap him into marrying her. However, the lie she tells that Gwendolyn no longer cares for Steven is eventually uncovered and poisons her relationship. Slips of the tongue betray her guilt and unconscious hostility towards Gwendolyn (*Sisters* 313).

Though Dr. Rowcliffe provides generally perceptive psychological commentary on the unconscious dimension of several characters in the novel, he too is shown to be limited in his understanding, for which he suffers greatly. He totally misconstrues Gwendolyn's decision to leave Garthdale, believing her "utterly selfish, a cold mass of egotism" and "no worse, and no better, than the rest of them [women]", when she is actually making her biggest sacrifice (*Sisters* 201-202). With equally serious consequences, he fails to understand how he has been manipulated by Mary, and that it is the association he makes between a past love's red hair and Mary's that finally ensnares him:

> And up to the end and to the end of the end Rowcliffe never knew that, though he had been made subject to a sequence of relentless inhibitions, and of suggestions overpowering in their nature and persistently sustained, it was ultimately by aid of that one unconscious and irresistible association that Mary had cast her spell. (*Sisters* 241-242)

Finally, even the doctor is not immune to psychosomatic illness, in the form of headaches induced by Mary's suggestion. Like Gwendolyn he is split but, unlike her, he
sinks into apathy, smothered by the comfort Mary provides. He continues to misinterpret Gwendolyn to the end. In fact, the only one who sympathizes with Gwendolyn's loneliness and who understands that it underlies her mystical vision is Jim Greatorex (Boll, M.S. Novelist 227). Since he is the most instinctive of the characters, and least subject to inhibition, Sinclair implies that his way is the healthiest. Nevertheless, at the denouement, Gwendolyn at least has her freedom and this vision, whereas Effy, the Cartaret's servant, who became pregnant out of wedlock, has been bound. She is overheard "scolding her little son, avenging on him the cruelty of life" (Sisters 388).

Thus, in The Three Sisters Sinclair portrays more carefully and thoroughly than in any earlier work the devastation of repression, during the period of her late Victorian adolescence. Never had she supported so stunningly her psychological realism using the bleak natural environment.

The psychology of Sinclair's following novel, Tasker Jevons (1916), is not nearly as dark or complex as The Three Sisters and the few signs of influence can be dealt with briefly. The vulgar but ambitious protagonist, James Tasker Jevons, an aspiring writer, is initially presented as the living embodiment of Bergson's élan vital. The rather stuffy...
narrator, Walter Furnival, relates that Tasker "trace[s] for [his] benefit the path of some natural force, some upward-tending, indestructible Energy that happened to be him [Tasker]" (Tasker 6). This force is later described as "the suicidal élan", by Furnival (Tasker 22). Following Jevons's marriage and his success as a novelist, he wallows in materialism. Sinclair strikingly conveys the abnormality of his passion for objects, particularly his motor-car, by using both religious and medical language. He feels "idolatry" and "worship" for it, and "madness" and insanity" possess him because of it (Tasker 220, 222, 223). Other applications of the terminology and complexes of second wave psychology are, for Sinclair, relatively superficial as well.

Sinclair's effort of the following year, The Tree of Heaven (1917), is more innovative and substantial than Tasker Jevons. In it Sinclair makes her first and most extensive foray into group psychology, assimilating rapidly and treating imaginatively the large implications of Wilfrid Trotter's Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, published the previous year.\textsuperscript{11} She does not neglect, however, the subtle dynamics of individual psychology that her readers had come to expect of her, but focusses on the individual's response to collective phenomena. She leaves the impression
that only psychic experience transcends the pull of collectivism.

The novel primarily traces the responses to social change of the extended Harrison family during the period from 1895 to 1916. Significantly, the older generation is depicted as suffering most from psychological ills, notably repression. Three maiden aunts are the victims of an oppressive upbringing, only able to vent their repressed emotion when they become involved in the suffragette movement. An uncle, Bartholomew, a "jealous egoist", provides comic relief because of his neurotic suggestibility (Tree 74). His sister-in-law, Frances Harrison, claims that

he never would be better till chemists were forbidden to advertise and the British Medical Journal and The Lancet were suppressed. Bertie would read them; and they supplied him with all sorts of extraordinary diseases. (Tree 264)

The fate of two other psychologically troubled members of the family is more serious and foreshadows best the event that will engulf the entire family. The solution found to the difficulties presented by these two misfit uncles is to pack them off to the Boer War, this act in miniature giving the subtlest suggestion of a society only too willing to deal with its ills through war. One of them returns, wounded, and is so depressed that he takes to drink. His warning to patriotic family members about the
reality of the war goes unheeded. *(Tree 79-81)*

Though Sinclair stresses that to be young is to be in revolt against the forces that have produced these victims *(Tree 163)*, the champions of the new century are themselves caught up in what Sinclair refers to as "vortices", suggesting the influence of her friend, Ezra Pound. The feminist movement is the first major one to be introduced. Dorothea, the daughter, who is somewhat neglected in favour of her brothers by their mother, is initially eager to help the cause of the Women's Franchise Union. She attends a meeting in 1910 but, feeling wary and "afraid of the Feminist Vortex," resists joining it *(Tree 124)*. Nevertheless, much later she attends a demonstration and is incarcerated. At a banquet celebrating the release of the feminists, Sinclair suggests that pent-up sexuality underlies and drives the frenzied excitement manifested. Dorothea's Aunt Emmeline, for instance, beats the measure of the [pulsating] music: "Her head was thrown back; and on her face there was a look of ecstasy, of a holy rapture, exalted, half savage, not quite sane" *(Tree 225)*. Witnessing this event, Dorothea once again experiences "terror of the collective soul" *(Tree 225)*. Following the death of her fiancé in the war, Dorothea regrets the time she wasted caught up "over that silly suffrage" *(Tree 317)*.
The mother, Frances, sees her children swept towards an "unclean moral vortex" (Tree 156), the second described by Sinclair. Frances's second son Nicky suffers most as the victim of the new sexual freedoms. He is sent down from Oxford for seducing a Professor's wife when, in actuality, she had "made hysterical love to him" and he had lied to protect her (Tree 137). He then agrees to live with the woman he loves, Phyllis Desmond, who, as Zegger notes, "has applied the slogan 'freedom for women' to her sex life" (Zegger 89). He marries her, only to be left by her after the baby she had by another man dies and she moves on to another affair (Tree 200).

The eldest son, Michael, is, meanwhile, "being drawn into the Vortex of revolutionary Art" (Tree 233). However, he has always been suspicious of collective activity from the time, as a child, that he refused to attend a party because he could not be himself (Tree 18), through his school days when he experienced fear of the herd mentality there (Tree 86). Once he senses that the new doctrines are hardening, Michael feels "his old horror of the collective soul" and goes his own way (Tree 246).

The war is the most powerful vortex described and envelops all others (Tree 299). Psychological language is used to evoke the unreality and abnormality of the "orgias
tic" crowd which fills the streets of London after war is proclaimed (Tree 282). Their movement "...was like impossible, grotesque encounters in a dream" (Tree 284). The crowd is "hypnotized" by the palace and referred to as "this demented herd of swine" by Michael, who becomes even more determined to oppose the collective soul (Tree 284). All of the others, however, are eventually drawn in. The aunts knit socks, and Dorothea and the men unfit for active service work for ambulance units. After Nicky takes as his second wife, Veronica, with whom he has had a psychic connection from childhood, he enlists and has an "exquisite" sense of being "up against reality" while in battle (Tree 369). Once again Sinclair suggests that at the centre of a vortex is the sex instinct, through the voice of Michael, whose poem implying that Nicky's fight-feeling "is nothing but a form of sex madness" is rejected by Nicky (Tree 368). Virtually the only one still resisting, Michael in turn comes to realize that it is not the war itself but the "collective war-spirit, clamouring for his private soul" that has threatened him (Tree 376). Report of Nicky's death arrives and Michael decides to go out, deluding himself into believing that he is going by his own will and not as a result of pressure from the herd. Though the reversal of his attitude is unbelievable, the air of melancholy and lack of
patriotism in the family after he is killed and the third son is about to be sent is more realistic (Tree 407-408).

Veronica's psychic gift is the one highly individualistic power transcending the vortex which has swept both Nicky and Michael away from their home and family. She has a vision of Nicky in the garden between her and the family's tree of heaven, symbol of unity and protection (Tree 370-371). This moment of being, with similarities to Lily's in Woolf's To The Lighthouse, brings her happiness, even though we later discover that it is Nicky's farewell to her since he is killed at about the time she experiences it (Tree 379). Veronica later acts as the mediator between the souls of the two sons and their grieving mother (Tree 402). Her gift, tapping an inner reality more important than the outward strife, provides yet another illustration of how Sinclair viewed the resources of the unconscious as far more extensive than did Freud and the psychoanalysts. Though The Tree of Heaven is overly sentimental in some sections, on the whole Sinclair captures forcefully the various group pressures operating in the new century.

In May Sinclair's masterpiece, Mary Olivier (1919), the focus shifts back onto the individual, though the protagonist's struggles occur very much in the context of family and friends. The main development is stylistic, for Mary
Olivier is one of the earliest British examples of a stream of consciousness bildungsroman. However, as in Virginia Woolf's writing, the stream of consciousness is used selectively to record Mary's most striking sense impressions. Mary also speaks in the second person voice, and even dissociates and describes herself from the third-person viewpoint. Her impressions are recorded with imagistic brevity, giving the sense of separate flash moments strung together. These technical innovations throw new light on psychological themes and elements found in earlier Sinclair novels.

The developmental perspective is more vividly evoked than ever before. As well, the accompanying theme of the struggle for selfhood and self-knowledge against the forces of heredity and circumstance moves into a more central position in this novel. Mary Olivier's life is traced from infancy to middle age. Her first recorded impressions as a child are of her parents and these have a sexual undertone. She awakes from a dream, only to be terrified by the image of her bearded, half-naked father moving towards her (Mary 4). Her screaming results in her being taken into her parents' bed where she caresses her mother's breast and feels soothed, this scene subtly suggesting a family romance fantasy and thus a Freudian influence (Mary 4). Freudian
sexual symbolism and Oedipal dynamics in particular infuse the entire novel, gradually becoming more complex as Mary's consciousness of her sexuality and the dynamics of her family develop. In one early instance embued with phallic symbolism, Mary builds a tower as an unsuccessful bid to draw her mother's attention away from her sons, who are building a snowman in the yard (Mary 9-10). Later a sumach tree symbolizes the devotion of Mary's oldest brother Mark to his mother (Mary 148). As in The Combined Maze, the relationship of mother and son is evoked as a lover's relationship, one which makes Mary feel a complete outsider.

Mama wanted him. Mamma had him. As long as they lived she would have him. Mamma and Mark were happy together; their happiness tingled, you could feel it tingling, like the happiness of lovers. They didn't want anybody but each other. You existed for them as an object in some unintelligible time and in a space outside their space. The only difference was that Mark knew you were there and Mamma didn't. (Mary 241)

This symbolism and these dynamics, however, provide the backdrop against which Mary's self develops. Initially she is unformed, but life experiences such as the death of a white lamb (a present from her Papa) and the separation from her brothers Mark and Dan, when they leave for school, begin to shape her (Mary 16). From her earliest years, moments of being, independent of family circumstances, bring insight, clarity, and happiness:

By the gate of the field her sudden, secret
happiness came to her.

She could never tell when it was coming, nor what it would come from. It had something to do with the trees standing up in the golden white light. It had come before with a certain sharp white light flooding the fields, flooding the room.

It had happened so often that she received it now with a shock of recognition; and when it was over she wanted it to happen again. She would go back and back to the places where it had come, looking for it, thinking that any minute it might happen again. But it never came twice to the same place in the same way. (Mary 93-94)

Following this particular experience, Mary comes to the realization that she has more than one self, though it is implied that underlying these is a unified individual, from whom emanates her "secret happiness".

Sometimes she had queer glimpses of the persons that were called Mary Olivier. There was Mrs. Olivier's only daughter, proud of her power over the sewing-machine. When she brought the pile of hemmed sheets to her mother her heart swelled with joy in her own goodness. There was Mark Olivier's sister, who rejoiced in the movements of her body, the strain of the taut muscles throbbing on their own leash, the bound forwards, the push of the wind on her knees and breast, the hard feel of the ground under her padding feet. And there was Mary Olivier, the little girl of thirteen whom her mother and Aunt Bella whispered about to each other with mysterious references to her age.

Her secret happiness had nothing to do with any of these Mary Oliviers. It was not like any other happiness. It had nothing to do with Mamma or Dan or Roddy, or even Mark. (Mary 94)

Her efforts at educating herself formally also play a large part in shaping her. After becoming thoroughly familiar with the Bible and various histories of England, at age nine Mary moves on to the classics of English literature
(Mary 74-77). By age eleven she has been drawn towards philosophy and is reading Locke's essay *On the Human Understanding* (Mary 82). Her precocious reading helps her to reason out her own beliefs and to reject the orthodox teachings on which she has been brought up.

In recognition of the complexity of her protagonist's growth, Sinclair shows that several forces operate on Mary to prevent the development of her self. Early on Mary develops the fear that she has inherited a taint through her father's line, since he is alcoholic (and eventually dies from alcoholism) and his sister, Mary's spinster aunt, Charlotte, is an hysteric, considered mad and locked away. Mary's interpretation of her rejection by a friend of her brother's, an intellectual equal, in favour of a common woman causes Mary to wonder whether she is going mad (Mary 288). Her reading of Darwin, Ribot, and Maudsley on heredity only exacerbates her terror, and badly shakes her sense of self:

You had been wrong all the time. You had thought of your family, Papa and Mamma, perhaps Grandpapa and Grandmamma, as powerful, but independent and separate entities, in themselves sacred and inviolable, working against you from the outside: either with open or secret and inscrutable hostility, hindering, thwarting, crushing you down. But always from the outside. You had thought of yourself as a somewhat less powerful, but still independent and separate entity, a sacred, inviolable self, struggling against them for completer freedom and detachment. Crushed down, but always getting up and going on again; fighting a
more and more successful battle for your own; beating them in the end. But it was not so. There were no independent, separate entities, no sacred, inviolable selves. They were one immense organism and you were part of it; you were nothing that they had not been before you. It was no good struggling. You were caught in the net; you couldn't get out. (Mary 290)

The reassurances of a mentor, Mr. Sutcliffe, whom we discover is actually in love with her, only temporarily assuage her doubts (Mary 293-294).

However, the main inhibiting force on Mary's growth comes from "little holy Mamma" (Mary 69), who dominates and manipulates by being weak and exhibiting signs of suffering when disobeyed. Starved for affection by her husband, her love has been redirected to her sons and Mary is perceived as a rival for their affection by her. While still only a child, Mary unsuccessfully tries to get "Little Mamma" to say she loves her, without success (Mary 69-70). When Mary finally realizes that Mrs. Olivier "never had loved her", Mary's childhood "dies" (Mary 145). Though denying her, Mary's Mamma on the other hand attempts to control Mary in numerous subtle ways in order to keep her dependent. Notably she tries to force on Mary her own orthodox religious beliefs, in one instance by having her memorize the thirty-nine articles in preparation for being confirmed, and at another, falsely claiming that Mary has been expelled from school because of her faithlessness (Mary 114). Mary's
unbelief and the intellectual challenge she continues to present to her mother through her intensive study of the literature of the classical civilizations and philosophy, only serves to exacerbate the conflict between them. At one point Mary recognizes that "To be happy with her mother you or she had to be broken, to be helpless and little like a child" (Mary 194). This passage must at least partially reflect Sinclair's reading of Jung on the conflict with the great Mother in Mythology (Jung, Psychology of the Unconscious 33).

Mary's response on various levels is incredibly convincingly drawn. Though she realizes intellectually the effect her mother is having on her, she is caught in her mother's emotional net and consequently feels intense ambivalence. In response to her mother's comment that "I don't want my only daughter to go marry and leave me" (Mary 229), Mary says that,

"I shall never go away and leave you," she said. She hated her mother and she adored her. An hour later, when she found her in the garden kneeling by the violet bed, weeding it, she knelt down beside her, and weeded too. (Mary 229)
As emotions escalate and pain accumulates, the conflict between them assumes the proportions of a life and death struggle. Mary confesses to her incredulous brother Mark that,

Ever since I began to grow up I felt there was something about Mamma that would kill me if I let it.... I've had to fight for every single thing I've wanted. It's awful fighting her, when she's so sweet and gentle. But it's either that or go under. (Mary 249)

After Mary refuses to marry her lover, Richard Nicholson, because she feels that she must care for Mamma, she has apparently lost that fight. Immediately following her rejection of him she suffers the shock of recognition that "I've killed myself ...This isn't me" (Mary 349). And yet she courageously decides to become Richard's mistress instead (Mary 353, 361). As well, throughout the novel Sinclair suggests that Mary's ability to sublimate her thwarted passions through her intellectual striving and, more concretely, through writing poetry, enables her to keep a part of herself intact and to generate happiness from within:

Happiness, the happiness that came from writing poems; happiness that other people couldn't have, that you couldn't give to them; happiness that was no good to Mamma, no good to anybody but you, secret and selfish; that was your happiness. It was deadly sin. (Mary 234)
Ultimately, at age fifty-three when we leave her, she achieves the insight that the problem has been to attach her happiness to "certain things and certain people", whereas she now believes that it has and must come from within all along (Mary 378).

The frequency of deaths in the family is a third force of circumstance which, Sinclair intimates, has an overall effect of hampering Mary's attempts to develop a stable sense of self. The novel is punctuated by a series of deaths, including Mary's nurse-maid, Jenny (Mary 74), her father (Mary 189), her brothers Roddy and Mark (Mary 268-269; 301-302), her mother (Mary 371), and her Uncle Victor by suicide (Mary 327-328). As a child Mary develops a phobia about funerals (Mary 71), and is later repulsed by funereal hypocrisy (Mary 198). Following her father's death, she wishes that she had died rather than him because of the oppression she feels in the wake of his loss (Mary 190). Each death also makes Mamma more dependent on Mary. Though her mother's death does release Mary, it comes too late since Mary's lover, Richard, marries another woman ten days after Mamma's demise. Mary is left with a sense of guilt, implied in her comment that "It was horrible this living on other people's deaths" (Mary 372). The pervasiveness of this theme of death as it affects Mary forces the reader to
acknowledge that, if clarity has been achieved by Mary at the denouement, it has been achieved at the cost of considerable suffering.

Sinclair's sophistication about the role of dreams, greater than in earlier novels, enables her to convey imaginatively her protagonist's half-realized fears and desires. Her earliest dream is provoked by a glimpse of her Aunt Charlotte's sexual nature, a subject which is taboo in her own family. In it she views her hysterical Aunt taking off all her clothes. Sinclair's understanding of the concept of repression and the Freudian distinction between manifest and latent content is suggested by the commentary on Mary's response to the dream: "In the dream there was no break between the end and the beginning. But when she remembered it afterwards it split into two pieces with a dark gap in between" (Mary 38). Much later, dreams that her mother has died operate as wish fulfilment and underline the intensity of the animosity Mary feels towards this figure of repression (Mary 352). Thus Sinclair brought to her adaptation of the stream of consciousness technique the psychological sophistication and clarity necessary to plunge deeply into the psychology of an individual mind.

Sinclair's novel of 1920, The Romantic, retreats from the experimentation of Mary Olivier, but it does enter fresh
thematic territory. It is the first Sinclair novel, and the third in the history of British Literature, which depends for the resolution of its dramatic conflict on psychotherapy, and in which a psychotherapist plays the major role in bringing about this resolution. The novel has been criticized by Zegger (129) for being too clinical, and there is some truth to this, especially during the psychotherapist, Dr. McClane's, concluding diagnostic remarks about the co-protagonist, John Conway. Also, the sentiment about war, even if some of it is voiced by the deluded Conway, is difficult for modern audiences to bear. For these reasons, The Romantic does not rank amongst those novels of Sinclair's most worthy of enduring. Nevertheless, for present purposes it is exceedingly valuable for the fascinating glimpse it provides into Sinclair's contemporary attitude to this new healing profession of psychotherapy. Of additional interest, Sinclair cleverly makes a link between the malaise of the individual and of the psychology of the group in war-time.

As in Mr. and Mrs. Nevill Tyson (1898), Sinclair employs a method of progressive revelation of character. However, in The Romantic, there is a twist, since the revelations are made not only to the reader but by one of the protagonists -- Charlotte Redhead -- whose viewpoint is
shown, about the other protagonist -- John Conway -- whose viewpoint is never entered. At the outset, Charlotte is recuperating from an affair with her city employer and has decided to start afresh by taking up farming. She encounters John Conway in the countryside, mistaking him for a farmer. Part of her attraction to him is sexual. On one occasion she looks down at his back and hips and "she could feel the sudden crush of her breath in her chest and the sighing throb in her throat and her lips parting" (Romantic 27). Though she notices his "romantic apathy" (Romantic 29), she does not attach any larger significance to his attitude that farming is a kind of "fight" (Romantic 26) or his confession that "if I know a woman wants me, it makes me loathe her" (Romantic 44).

As in earlier Sinclair novels, dreams convey information that a character has picked up subconsciously but repressed. Charlotte has a series of three dreams. In the first, John has gone away and Charlotte discovers him with another woman. The second reveals that he has left and she finds him in a foreign place with foreign women. He shows hatred towards Charlotte and does not otherwise acknowledge her when she finds him. In the third, Charlotte knows that John, in danger, wants her and yet she cannot reach him. In these dreams she has assessed his ambivalence
towards her accurately; they are also prophetic of events the two will experience.

John and Charlotte join an ambulance unit directed by a Dr. Sutton, which is being sent to Belgium. Similarly to earlier works, Sinclair uses medical terminology to intimate the unhealthiness of their attitude and to link it with an unfulfilled sexual impulse. Their preparations to go to the front are exhaustive and seemingly endless: "And under it all, like a passion, like a hidden illness, their impatience, their intolerable longing to be out there" (Romantic 50). Once in Belgium, they conduct their own battle for glory and preference (Romantic 65) with a rival unit led by Dr. McClane, the psychotherapist. On their first day out, the sexual undertones of their feelings are again alluded to: "They were one in the almost palpable excitement that they shared; locked close, closer than their bodies could have joined them, in the strange and poignant ecstasy of danger" (Romantic 79). Gradually, however, Charlotte becomes disillusioned with the war, and their insignificant part in it (Romantic 112-113), but Conway continues to live his romantic, heroic illusion about it. Despite his ecstasy, he leaves Charlotte stranded in dangerous situations. Only after the second occurrence is she forced to admit that

[John] funked and lied. The two things she couldn't stand. His funk and his lying were a real part of him. And it was as if she had always known it, as
if all the movements of her mind had been an effort to escape her knowledge. (Romantic 131).

Worse still, his fear of being discovered turns to cruelty against Charlotte. In these acts it is as though he "has satisfied a lust" and yet he is able to slip back into his old romantic self, seemingly at will (Romantic 149). We are told at this stage that Charlotte could see that his cowardice had something to do with his cruelty and that his cruelty was somehow linked up with his cowardice; but she couldn't for the life of her imagine the secret of the bond. She only felt that it would be something secret and horrible; something she would rather not know about. (Romantic 145)

She never does untangle John's secret herself, since he continues his accusations towards her until he is shot in the back and killed while in the act of deserting a wounded Captain (Romantic 187). Rather it is the psychotherapist, McClane, who finally explains John's true nature to her; it is interesting to note her changing attitude towards McClane.

Initially, Charlotte believes that McClane is jealous of John, idealistically reasoning that, if a great psychologist,...he would see everything going on inside people, then, all the things he didn't want to see; he wouldn't miss anything, and he would know all the time what John was like. (Romantic 88)

She attributes almost clairvoyant powers to him, with the ironic implication that, therefore, McClane must be able to
see how great John is. Actually McClane quickly becomes aware of John's psychological difficulties and attempts to warn Charlotte that John must be got away from the front or he will "break down" (Romantic 127). Though suspicious of McClane's detachment, Charlotte nevertheless dutifully attempts to persuade John to leave, without success (Romantic 130-131). Having Charlotte express doubt about McClane's motivation is a rather clever technique on Sinclair's part, since her readers would have identified with Charlotte's feelings about this profession, generally viewed with suspicion at this early date. Only after she is advised by her own unit commander, a medical doctor, that she should approach McClane to gain understanding of John because "[McClane's] a psychotherapist. He knows more about people's souls than I know about their bodies. He probably knows all about Conway's soul" does she confide in him (Romantic 195). He interprets one of her dreams as prophetic and one as telepathic and uses them to deepen her understanding of the feelings of desire for, and anger at, John, feelings that she has unsuccessfully repressed (Romantic 197). Even so, she continues to rebel against his explanations, and particularly his suggestion that she will break down, unless she reconciles the fight going on within her between her feeling for Conway and her knowledge of him
Drawing on Adler's theories about inferiority and power, Sinclair has McClane argue that John's aggression and his obsessive drive for power are really desperate attempts to compensate for some physical inadequacy. According to McClane,

[John] jumped at everything that helped him to get compensation, to get power. He jumped at your feeling for him because it gave him power. He jumped at the war because the thrill he got out of it gave him the sense of power.

By the time Charlotte finally admits the obvious sincerity of McClane's aims, the reader has already become sympathetic to his viewpoint.

Characteristic of Sinclair's doctors of the soul, McClane then offers the further profound insight which provokes a moment of illumination in Charlotte and sets John's dilemma into a much wider perspective. He implies that John has been driven by "something bigger than he was", "[s]omething that degeneracy is always trying to keep under.... Power. A power in retreat, fighting to get back its lost ground." In a visionary flash, Charlotte sees John in his romantic delusion and in the next instant images "the long lines of beaten men, reeling slowly to the footway, passing slowly, endlessly, regiment by regiment, in retreat." The reader is left to make the connection, focussed in the word "retreat", that John's
fantasy, with its underlying malaise, is a microcosm of the larger group phenomena which has resulted in such wide-scale destruction. In both instances the result is a retreat in disillusionment and fear.

Sinclair's next novel, *Mr. Waddington of Wyck* (1921), foreshadows her tendency, from the mid-1920's on, to write from a more comic, and therefore more distanced perspective. Since fewer psychological influences are manifested, the novel can be dealt with in passing. Mr. Waddington is a confirmed egotist, the victim both of his fixed ideas about his greatness and of the seven others, including his wife, who amuse themselves by playing on his folly. Sinclair is most perceptive and convincing when she portrays the blundering attempts of this fifty-year-old to seduce two women, suggesting that he is motivated by a mainly subconscious feeling of declining potency. It is a tribute to her skill at controlling the tone of irony that, at the denouement, Waddington manages to evoke sympathy as he returns to his mother, the only one who really loves him, to have her stroke his ego.

A final return to the mother closes Sinclair's subsequent novel, *Life and Death of Harriet Frean* (January, 1922), but it is as different from *Mr. Waddington* in tone, theme, and style as could be imagined. With great precision
and economy, Sinclair evokes the pathos of Harriet's unfulfilled life, of the meaningless sacrifices made to 'do the right thing', to please her parents, which leave her bereft of any sense of self. Along with this implicit rejection of idealistic thought, May Sinclair also shifts attention from hereditary factors to focus primarily on the effects of environment, a perspective more consonant with second-wave psychology. In this aspect, *Life and Death of Harriet Frean* is perhaps more forward-looking than *Mary Olivier*. It is also more innovative in its compressed, imagistic style and in its combination of stream of consciousness with omniscient narration. Harriet's is a much more restricted consciousness and therefore more difficult to convey vividly than Mary Olivier's; the technique gives needed perspective on her character.

Unlike Mary Olivier, Harriet's character is shaped by Victorian parents who are well-meaning and intelligent, if over-protective. Her father is well-educated, reads Darwin, Huxley, and Spencer, and writes for the *Spectator* (*Harriet* 33, 48-49). Harriet does not inherit that intelligence, that quickness of perception, as illustrated by her struggle through Spencer without understanding a word of it (*Harriet* 34). Also in contrast to Mary, however, Harriet, barring one brief act of disobedience as a child, does not question
their assumptions about behaviour, their philosophy of life (Harriet 19-20). Instead she decides to be good and behave "beautifully; as beautifully as she could. They [her parents] wanted you to; they wanted it more than anything because they were so beautiful. So good. So wise" (Harriet 21). Her adoption of this stance and her unusual closeness with her parents are put to the test when Robin, the fiance of one of her few friends, falls in love with her. She repudiates Robin's argument that it would be more dishonorable to marry the friend, Priscilla, when he does not love her than to undo the engagement. Her parents reinforce this act of "goodness", her father claiming that "You've done the right thing" (Harriet 46), even though she spends the next months crying herself to sleep.

Sinclair's elaboration of the psychological response to this climactic moment is most convincingly done. Harriet suffers depression and retreats further into the "peace" she experiences when alone with her parents (Harriet 48, 55). In a brilliant example of how Sinclair employs her knowledge of second wave psychology naturally and unobtrusively, Priscilla eventually develops a "mysterious paralysis", a psychosomatic illness that forces her husband to keep his waning attention on her (Harriet 51).
Regressively, Harriet's world shrinks as her delusions grow. Although forced to hear from a niece of Robin's the truth about the error of her sacrifice and the misery it provoked, Harriet responds automatically that she would do the same tomorrow. However, she feels less certain about the incorruptibility of her adopted moral beauty (Harriet 108). Increasingly locked into her emotional investment in her mother, Harriet's sense of security slips away following her mother's death:

The feeling of insecurity had grown on her... She had no clear illumination, only a mournful acquiescence in her own futility, an almost physical sense of shrinkage, the crumbling away, bit by bit, of her beautiful and honorable self, dying with the objects of its three profound affections: her father, her mother, Robin. (Harriet 109)

Reminiscent of Miss Quincey in Sinclair's Two Sides of a Question, Harriet, now in her fifties, becomes a victim of habit (Harriet 110, 119), prey to the feelings she has all her life repressed. During an illness she relishes the attentions of her doctor and does not want to get well:

She loved the doctor's visits at twelve o'clock, his air of brooding absorption in her case, his consultations with Maggie, the seriousness and sanctity he attached to the humblest details of her existence.... She didn't want to get well. (Harriet 119-120)

She dislikes leaving her house; Sinclair's demonstration of her obsessive affection for it draws on Freudian sexual symbolism, as in the following excerpt:
The house had become a part of herself, an extension of her body, a protective shell. She was uneasy when away from it. The thought of it drew her with passion.... (Harriet 124)

Gradually, Harriet surrenders "the grown-up self she had maintained with so much effort" (Harriet 124) and operates mainly on an instinctual level: "There was something voluptuous about the beginning of this state; she would give herself up to it with animal pleasure and content" (Harriet 126). Sinclair's acknowledgement of the instinctual level underlying the self confirms an understanding of McDougall's and Freud's theories of instinct. Final release of repression occurs as she awakens from being anesthetized, but her disjointed statements about dead babies and keeping the doctor away also betray, in swift strokes, the disintegration of her mind (Harriet 132-133). Her pathetic, repressed state is crystallized in the final lines when she mistakes her friend, Connie, for her "Mamma". Life and Death of Harriet Frean, an appropriate title since her life really is a sort of slow death, is Sinclair's most psychologically probing and yet moving study of a character by now familiar in Sinclair's canon: the weak person who fails to overcome circumstance in order to attain individuation.

Sinclair's second novel of 1922, Anne Severn and the Fieldings (November), covers a larger canvas in its exploration of the psychological growth of a woman, who, for all
intents and purposes, has been orphaned, and her relationships with members of the family that adopts her. The principles of association figure prominently in the shaping of these relationships, and sexual passion is boldly, if occasionally melodramatically, portrayed. As in The Three Sisters and The Romantic, amongst others, the plot of Anne Severn hinges on the presence of psychosomatic illnesses. One of these is cleared up by self-analysis leading to a moment of illumination, and the other is identified and solved by yet another of Sinclair's sympathetic, psychologically-informed doctors.

Immediately following her mother's death, Anne Severn, aged ten, is deposited by her adventure-seeking father with the family of Adeline Fielding, an old flame of his. Association is used to evoke Anne's sensitivity to her loss. Anne doesn't want to look in a goldfish pond, and realizes why when she suddenly accesses a memory:

Her mother stood with her by the pond, dark and white and slender.... Anne's sadness came over her again; sadness so heavy that it kept her from crying; sadness that crushed her breast and made her throat ache. (Anne 5-6)

Anne also refuses the caresses of Mrs. Fielding, a dominant maternal figure bearing some resemblance to Mrs. Ramsay in Woolf's To the Lighthouse, because she does not want there to be an association between her own mother and this
stranger. Nevertheless, with great psychological insight, Sinclair has Anne respond to one of the brothers, Jerrold's, gift of a rabbit, which gives her a feeling of "maternal tenderness" (Anne 11). She reacts by forming a particular attachment to Jerrold, and loving him (Anne 13). Anne also receives kindness from the eldest brother, Eliot, when her rabbit dies (Anne 23). She in turn comforts the youngest brother, Colin, after his brothers leave for school.

Sinclair again shows her psychological acuity by suggesting that the pattern of these attachments, made directly following her mother's death, is significant and greatly influences Anne's later relationships with the three brothers.

Another death, of Anne's cat, brings Jerrold and Anne much closer together; he first gives her a passionate kiss in response to her suffering (Anne 72). However, shortly thereafter Anne fetches Jerrold to his father's deathbed. Jerrold's budding passion for her then becomes associated with the shock of his father's death (Anne 82). As a result, Anne feels that she must give up Jerrold (Anne 87).

Meanwhile, Colin, who has a nervous temperament, becomes sexually attracted to, and marries an older woman, even though she is cruel to him (Anne 106-107). Despite the warning of Eliot, who has by now become a doctor, that Colin
is psychologically unfit for the war, he enlists, but is sent back from the front with shell shock. Anne, who has herself been at the front, makes a second sacrifice to stay and care for Colin when his wife refuses to return from the front. In this situation, health is equated with finding one's real self (Anne 132). With help from Anne along the way, Colin finally achieves this self-knowledge during a moment of illumination in Sicily when he discovers that he has been hanging on to his illness (Anne 230).

Jerrold himself finally eradicates his psychosomatic affliction, which has caused him to link Anne with his suffering over his father's death, only to misperceive the nature of Anne's relationship with Colin. Despairing of ever having Anne, he marries Maisie, a woman he does not really love, and a third, and crucial incident of psychosomatic illness unfolds. Once Jerrold discovers that Anne is not involved with Colin, he enters into an affair with her. Concurrently, Jerrold's wife, Maisie, who is frigid, has a series of minor heart attacks. The doctor pronounces these false angina, a neurosis, but is unable to determine their genesis (Anne 260-261).

Enter Eliot, the third brother, who has sublimated his unfulfilled love for Anne by becoming a bacteriologist (Anne 94). He realizes that both Anne and Jerrold are
suffering and that they will break down if they continue in their hopelessly frustrating situation. He also suggests that Maisie has become neurotic because she knew long before she was married to Jerrold that he did not care for her and that "the idea's stuck -- It's left a wound in her memory" (Anne 272). The wound has been repressed because

Maisie's mind couldn't bear the reality, so it escaped into a neurosis. Maisie's behaving as though she wasn't married, so that her mind can say to itself that her marriage is incomplete because she's ill, not because Jerry doesn't care for her. (Anne 272)

With incredible kindness, considering that he continues to hope to marry Anne, Eliot proposes that Maisie will be cured if made to face the reality of her husband's affection for Anne, and this opens the way to a solution, but not before Anne has decided to leave. Sinclair's vivid description of Jerrold's response is likely informed by James's writing on attention and conflicting ideas. Jerrold has been sick, but he couldn't lie still; and presently he got up and went out again, up to the Far Acres field to the ploughing. He couldn't overcome the physical sickness of his misery, but he could force himself to move, to tramp up and down the stiff furrows, watching the tractor; he kept himself going by the sheer strength of his will. (Anne Severn 296)

Ironically, the unhealthy Maisie consults Eliot and, faced with the reality, decides to set Jerrold free of her own accord, so that Anne's departure is avoided (Anne 308). The denouement is vaguely Freudian in that Maisie's adaptation
to the reality principle releases Anne and Jerrold to the pleasure principle; their exeunt "hand in hand, like children" has an aura of wish-fulfillment about it (Anne 320).

Certainly sexuality has played a major role in their affair, Jerrold believing that he is faithful to Anne, since he has never had sex with Maisie (Anne 209). Jerrold associates his love of the land with his love for Anne (Anne 213) and, appropriately, most of their encounters occur in a natural setting. Creating the rhythm of repetition in her prose, Sinclair describes these midnight rendezvous with Lawrentian boldness:

Night after night, between eleven and midnight, he came to her. Night after night, she lay awake waiting till the light rustling in the meadow grass told her he was there: on moonlit nights a quick brushing sound; in the thick blackness a sound like a slow shearing as he felt his way. The moon would show him clear, as he stood in the open frame of the shelter, looking in at her; or she would see him grey, twilit and mysterious; or looming, darker than dark, on black nights without moon or stars. They loved the clear nights when their bodies showed to each other white under the white moon; they loved the dark nights that brought them close, shutting them in, annihilating every sensation but that of his tense, hard muscles pressing down, of her body crushed and yielding, tightening and slackening in surrender; of their brains swimming in their dark ecstasy. (Anne 232-233)

Thus Anne Severn and the Fieldings demonstrates particularly well Sinclair's versatility. The subtlety with which she conveys the tremendously important effects of association
and psychosomatic illness is balanced by the courageousness of her depiction of sexuality.

Though Sinclair continued to produce fiction bearing the imprint of her psychological knowledge, these subsequent works either tended to subordinate this knowledge to other aims, notably the comic, or, more frequently, to repeat, with slight variations, the psychological themes of the earlier books. An example of the former is *A Cure of Souls* (1924), in which comedy issues from the controversy between a lackadaisical clergyman and his two curates, one evangelical and one doubting. *Arnold Waterlow* (1924) well represents the latter, since in essence it reworks the *Mary Olivier* theme of conflict with the powerful mother, but from the male son's perspective (Boll 283). Also, these last novels were written quickly -- seven between 1924 and 1927 -- and consequently are not of the highest quality. Perhaps, as Zegger notes, this artistic decline contributed to her eclipse after her death (142).

However, as the preceding pages have attempted to illustrate, the depth, range and versatility of Sinclair's writing warrants a revision of her literary fate. Though it would be a distortion to underestimate her genius, particularly her native intuition about character, it has become clear that the best features of Sinclair's fiction owe much
to her thorough and committed knowledge of dynamic psych­ology. More importantly, they are owing to her ability to assimilate the insights drawn from this knowledge, rapidly and, for the most part, unobtrusively, into her fiction.

In summary, several characteristics and aims of her adaptation of the new psychology have clearly emerged. This knowledge enabled her to present a fuller, deeper, and more convincing vision of reality than had been conveyed by those previous and contemporary novelists who focussed on external realities. In her early fiction she provides glimpses, and in her later, more elaborate pictures of the unconscious desires shaping so much of our "rational" activity. Her dedication to expressing (and even exposing) these fundamental emotions, instincts, and yearnings is striking. She portrays sexual motivation, in particular, with effective candidness and vigour, and without moral disapprobation, as so many of her artistic forebears had done. Her commitment to showing the intricate relations of mind to body is also remarkable. She depicts the consequence of the repression of instinctual behaviour in psychosomatic illness with considerable insight, and yet her idealism prompts her to convey the possibility of release from confining psychological nets, and growth towards individuation. Through the figure of the psychic doctor, she
characteristically reveals the source of psychic conflict, as well as the path to recovery. In her eagerness to illustrate the possibilities offered by these new theories, of overcoming the determinism implicit in her religious background and much of her early reading on evolution, occasionally she errs in having these doctors reveal too much of the skeleton beneath the cloak of fiction. She is better off when she allows characters to unify disparate selves and achieve individuation through self-induced psychic experience, as in moments of illumination or dreams. For her this enmeshed spiritual-psychological reality is greater than any other. Finally, Sinclair never completely rejected the first wave discoveries on heredity that impressed her in her youth, as her last novel The Allinghams (1927) well illustrates. Instead, prompted by her open-mindedness and her rapacious intellect, psychological sources accumulate, blend, and provide an increasingly rich tapestry up to the period of her greatest insights into the psychology of the individual, in the novels between 1919 and 1922, notably Mary Olivier and Harriet Frean.
Chapter Six

A Candidate For Truth:

J.D. Beresford's Psychological Quest

Though never as popular a novelist as May Sinclair, J. D. Beresford was highly commended by discerning critics during the early part of his career but more completely neglected than Sinclair after his death. His first novel, Jacob Stahl (1911), heralded by the New York Times (amongst others) as "one of the most brilliant psychological novels of recent years", 1 rapidly established Beresford as the leader of the younger generation of realists (Gerber, "Beresford Bibliography" 201). The two books which complete the autobiographical Jacob Stahl trilogy, A Candidate For Truth (1912) and The Invisible Event (1915), were similarly well-received and praised for their characterization and construction. 2 By 1924, when Beresford was at the height of his powers and popularity, Gerald Gould, the well-known English poet and critic, could assert with conviction that "the writer of our generation who has carried the biographical method at once to its logical extreme and its aesthetic height is, beyond doubt, Mr. J.D. Beresford"
However, in his large oeuvre of forty-nine novels and five collections of short stories, Beresford tackled numerous other genres and sub-genres as well, including fantasy, the futuristic and visionary tale, scientific romance, and ghost story. In attempting to place Beresford, Gould recognized that, although master of autobiographical fiction,

he [Beresford] comes also with Miss May Sinclair and Miss Rebecca West, under the psychoanalytic head; he has attempted the sociological and succeeded in the fantastic; he cannot be labelled. (17-18)

Although his versatility is an indicator of his talents, it is also one of several factors which have contributed to his neglect. Like May Sinclair, he has fallen outside the categories of genre and period created by critics. Since his death, critical references to him tend to focus on Beresford as either a psychological realist or a writer of early twentieth-century fantasy tales. It is as the latter that the main interest in him has been sustained, ironically so because he did not consider these tales as his most serious and important work. The use he made of second wave psychology and particularly psychoanalysis is a second factor which contributed to contemporary critical attack and subsequent obscurity. His impulse to deal with what were referred to as the more "unpleasant" aspects of human
pathology in his fiction was often viewed as an unfortunate aberration. Despite his praise, Gould called the psychological novelist in Beresford "wayward" and "truant" (29). A. St. John Adcock spoke for many of Beresford's severest critics when he claimed that "one deprecates his [Beresford's] excursions into eccentricities of psychology" (39). A third and slightly more justifiable reason for the tepid retrospective response to Beresford is that some, but not all, of his novels from the late 1920's lack the imaginative penetration of his earlier work, and became increasingly didactic. Notable exceptions include The Camberwell Miracle (1933) and Peckover (1934).

That his work has not obtained even a minor position in literary history since his death is illustrated by the continued absence of discussion of his work from the major studies of the novel, including Pelham Edgar's The Art of the Novel (1933), Arnold Kettle's Introduction to the English Novel (1951), William York Tindall's Forces in Modern British Literature (1956) and, most recently, Douglas Hewitt's English Fiction of the Early Modern Period 1890-1940 (1988). Perhaps even more surprising, considering the continued criticism Beresford endured during his lifetime for his extensive psychological interest, he is not accorded a single line in any of the major studies of

However, Beresford deserves a place both in the general literary histories of the Georgian period and especially in the discourse on the influence of psychology on the novel, for a number of reasons. Beresford's interest in psychology was neither unfortunate deviation nor acquiescence in fashion (as the critic Brian Stableford has averred. "Beresford" 458). Though displayed most blatantly and, perhaps, without quite enough artistry in the psychoanalytic novels *God's Counterpoint* (1918) and *An Imperfect Mother* (1920), Beresford's fascination with the psychology of both the individual and the group is demonstrated in his fiction from his first novel. That fascination is fundamental to a thorough understanding of his achievement. His impressive knowledge of second wave psychology informs his characterization and, in combination with metaphysics, provides his fiction with a framework of ideas. In *Writing Aloud* (1928), a work which reveals him to have been a stream of consciousness novelist manqué, Beresford has left an insightful account of the process of creating fiction, the
problems of using the stream of consciousness technique and of bringing his psychological knowledge to bear on his fiction. Because he was so prolific and drew on so many sources, his work gauges well the change in the sort of influence various psychologies exerted on the novel in the first quarter of the twentieth century. He also wrote extensively and critically about the impact of the new ideas on his literary contemporaries and on the novel as a genre. In this accomplishment he stands apart, even from his nearest rival, May Sinclair. Of greatest importance and value, however, he has left, in several autobiographical works, a most detailed account of the growth of his knowledge of matters psychological. He has also articulated more clearly than his contemporaries his changing attitudes towards the latest developments in this area. Following a summary of those aspects of his personality which best explain Beresford’s initial attraction to, and extensive exploration of, the new psychology, I will trace the evolution of Beresford’s awareness of psychology. Only then can the manifestations of his knowledge and his success in assimilating the ideas be assessed accurately in his fiction.

In the envoy to the third volume of Beresford’s autobiographical trilogy, the narrator claims that the
protagonist, Jacob, "would still describe himself, in Emerson’s words, as a candidate for truth" and "that earnest search of his for some aspect of permanent truth keeps his spirit young" (Invisible 388). These statements apply equally well to Beresford himself and are essential to understanding his motivation and his attitude to the new psychology. Numerous friends, relations and critics have commented on the passion he invested in this search for knowledge and understanding (Swinnerton 240-241; T. Beresford 5, 36, 60; Gerber "Study" 21, 56; Gould 53). He himself acknowledged near the end of his life that he valued this goal even above the writing of fiction (Introduction 9-10). Beresford’s truth-seeking is, however, an integral part of his impulse to write fiction. As he revealed in Writing Aloud, "...I have but a single theme, the re-education of human beings" (53). He concluded this discourse on the process of writing by claiming that, "The truth is, I presume, that my single pleasure is in the continued re-telling of the story of my own intellectual and spiritual life...." (Writing 201-202). While this impulse engenders a wealth of ideas in his fiction, it also led to the didacticism which marred some of his later work. Closely allied with this most salient feature of Beresford’s personality is his eclecticism. In his unpublished
autobiography, Beresford speculated:

...I must have been born with the eclectic tendency, although owing to the cramping of my mind by early associations and education, the tendency did not manifest itself until I had come of age. ("Memories" 355)

Specifically, Beresford developed this tendency by adopting the principles of the open mind, as described by Allen Upward in The New Word (1908). In What I Believe (1934), Beresford's record of his spiritual pilgrimage, he articulates what that concept had come to mean for him:

For by an "open mind", I mean a mind emptied as far as may be, of every preconception with regard to the meaning and purpose of life. All the cherished opinions that we boast with such pride must be temporarily abandoned, every conception of the self that is represented by the evidence of our personality and constitutes our idea of the kind of person we believe ourselves to be. We have to think ourselves back into a pristine innocence, before we can make any enquiry of the true self, the immortal principle that is hidden from us by the activity of the intelligence. (What I Believe 74)

The fruits of this eclectic attitude are clearly indicated by the number and variety of sources that most influenced Beresford throughout his life. In the early years of his self-education (to about 1904), his thinking was shaped primarily by Samuel Laing (What I Believe 24), the evolutionist thinkers Darwin and Huxley, Nietzsche, and then Ernst Haeckel's The Riddle of the Universe (1902), F.W.H. Myers' The Human Personality (1903), T.J. Hudson's Law of Psychic Phenomena (1903), Henri Bergson (Matter and Memory,

However, Beresford’s most important source of information about complexities of the psyche was his own psyche; he believed himself to be introspective and highly self-aware, claiming that:

I’m too self-conscious. I don’t mean in the colloquial sense that applies chiefly to timid young men and women in society, but in the psychological sense of being endowed or cursed with a high degree of self-awareness.... That is partly the result of my youthful habit of introspection. My motto in those days was, "Inquire within for everything".... I hardly knew when this early tendency of mine to introversion began to grow less marked. If it had increased I should have probably ended as Nietzsche did, in a lunatic asylum.... (Writing Aloud 95) 

Beresford’s habit of introspection and self-awareness, confirmed by others who knew him ("Memories" 72), was an
endowment for the novelist because it enabled him to describe the minutiae of conscious thought, and to probe the depths of subconscious motivation with great skill. For several reasons, it was also a curse. In his autobiography, Beresford more than once speaks of his early lack of self-confidence ("Memories" 65, 86), and reveals that a habit of self-deprecation hampered him in his initial attempts to write short stories ("Memories" 89). Excessive introspection could also frequently bring to light unacceptable impulses. Beresford suggests how these were dealt with in his repeated assertions that he has a particularly strong "censor who nearly always hovers behind my left shoulder when I am writing" ("Memories" 25; see also "Memories" 340 and Writing 34-35). The unfortunate effect of this censor is traceable in portions of several of his novels, which are not vividly or dynamically portrayed. Their detached quality suggests that Beresford was not fully engaged with the emotion he was attempting to convey. Though he began to describe sexuality boldly in the Jacob Stahl trilogy, he becomes increasingly reticent about it in his fiction, a characteristic remarked on even by his son (T. Beresford, "Portrait" 24). In discussing D.H. Lawrence, whom Beresford knew and liked, Beresford made one of the few revelations about his attitude to sexuality:
His [Lawrence's] obsession with sex bored me, as in this relation I have always been a normal man, regarding the animal expression of sexual love as one of the physical functions that, however important, is not of overwhelming interest. And to elevate sex, as such, into a subject of supreme importance, seems to me a dangerous distortion of human values. ("Memories" 244)

Beresford's introspective habit also made him prey to an acute sense of division, experienced from his early years until into his fifties. In essays on "The Discovery of the Self", he recalled that

The representative tendency of this period was a steadily increasing struggle between the inner guide that still urged me to go further in my search for truth, and the inhibiting force of my reason.... (March 31, 134)

For Beresford the novelist, this could be a benefit since it facilitated his ability to shape aspects of his personality into characters, once he had realized that, "I was not one, nor two, but fifty people" (Writing 49). On one occasion, he surmises about two of his characters who appear to be very different: Nevertheless, Wilfred Hornby and Foster Innes must have represented some germ that I found in myself, a germ that I abstracted and cultivated in new surroundings of my own imagination, and nurtured into the passable likeness of a true species. Even Jacob Stahl was not myself, only one side of myself from which I built a complete man. (Writing 48)

Thus we now have a sense of the fundamental aspects of the mature Beresford: truth-seeking, eclectic, introspective, censorious, and divided. Several of the roots of
these characteristics will become clearer as we trace the growth of his interest in and knowledge about the psyche.

In the most comprehensive survey of Beresford’s life and works to date, Helmut Gerber divides Beresford’s life into five distinct phases and his writing career into three. According to Gerber, in the first phase of his literary career, Beresford wrote in the vein of sociological and psychological realism (1911-1924); the second was characterized by his expression in fiction of his search for metaphysical truth (1924-1938); and in the third, as an "undogmatic philosopher," he displayed the truth he had attained ("Study" 1, 56). While this degree of order, imposed in retrospect, may be comforting to the biographer and his readers, in Beresford’s case, at least, it misrepresents the considerable uncertainty and flux which were characteristic of his life. As his son, Tristram, was only too well aware, his father’s life was "not a tidy progression" ("Portrait" 42). This short summary of Beresford’s psychological quest attempts to provide a corrective to Gerber’s by acknowledging that uncertainty, and underlining the courage displayed by Beresford in considering, adopting, and defending new and often unpopular psychological ideas.

By Beresford’s own account, the childhood incident
which had the greatest consequences for his psychological development was an accident he suffered at age three-and-a-half. A nurse neglected to change his clothes after he got wet during a carriage ride, and he succumbed to infantile paralysis, causing permanent lameness. Beresford recollects some of the powerful emotion evoked by the event when he claims in his autobiography that, "The name of that nurse had a place in my youth among the outstanding criminals of the century" ("Memories" 30). Beresford’s first memories are of the aftermath of the disaster and reveal how quickly the child turned it to his advantage, as an attention-getting measure. His first memory is of his mother’s believing he was shamming, and the second, of his excitement as we entered the big front gates of the drive in the little basket carriage we had in those days, at the prospect of exhibiting my lameness to our two maids. That was, indeed, a peculiarity to be proud of. ("Memories" 31)

The event also drew the mother closer to her second son, J.D.. According to Beresford’s son, Tristram, J.D.’s mother already "lived virtually estranged from her husband," who was an ascetic, evangelical clergyman, fourteen years her senior ("Portrait" 2). Whereas J.D. Beresford’s father viewed his second son’s affliction as an embarrassment and so invested his aspirations in his firstborn, J.D.’s mother found her only outlet for affection in her sons, partic-
ularly J.D., on whom she "proffered much maternal care...." ("Portrait" 2, 3). Not surprisingly, Beresford made detailed studies of intense mother-son relationships and the resulting difficulties in achieving individuation in several of his novels, notably An Imperfect Mother (1920).

Beresford's lack of mobility would also help account for his early-developed habit of introspection. In addition, Beresford claims that his lameness "was a factor that helped to decide my choice of careers" (Kunitz 130). Furthermore, we can speculate that it widened his sympathy for, and directed his attention in his writing towards, individuals afflicted with either physical or psychosomatic difficulties, since such characters frequently appear as heroes in his novels (such as Jacob Stahl, God's Counterpoint, and Love's Pilgrim).

Most importantly for present purposes, Beresford's lameness and his parents' reaction to it had considerable impact on his education. In one article explaining the effect of psychoanalysis on novelists, Beresford asserts the relative importance of education on the writer, an acknowledgement rather uncommon in his vocation: he claims that,

...it must be remembered that while the novelist's best material undoubtedly comes from his personal contacts, almost infinitely extended by his powers of entering with an emotional sympathy into the
experiences of other lives either presented or recounted, he cannot entirely neglect the precedents afforded by learning. Such precedents may only serve him as a test and a formula for correction, but should he overlook them altogether he will be liable to fall into the error of regarding his personal equation as a universal standard and generalise from the atypical.
("Psychoanalysis" 434)

Significantly, Beresford believed that his own "mental development was quite abnormally slow" ("Memories" 10). One probable contributing factor is that, in Beresford's words, "My education was a very haphazard affair" ("Memories" 35). Tristram Beresford speculates that J.D.'s training was neglected because J.D.'s father did not want to provide an expensive education for a cripple ("Portrait" 2). However, when he did attend school in Peterborough, his disability made it an unpleasant experience, since, in his recollection,

Most of the young savages found me a tempting butt for bullying, much of it of the merely teasing variety. I was called Miss Beresford, but I remember being tied to an apple-tree in the playground and being pelted with chestnuts. I suppose it helped to harden me, but bullying does no good to the character either of the agent or the subject. ("Memories" 38)

No wonder Beresford claimed that he lacked "any pride in acquiring knowledge" and "powers of steady application" in these early years ("Memories" 52, 65).

Nevertheless, he made his first contribution to writing at age fourteen while at school. Tristram Beresford
concludes that because J.D.'s education was intermittent and because he mainly had to rely on his own resources, "his youthful misfortune was the making of him" ("Portrait" 3). This claim is also true in the sense that Beresford may well have taken up writing initially as an escape from the torments he experienced because of his condition, as a way of imaginatively recreating a world in which he was not defective or in which his defect became an asset. 7

Beresford also viewed his upbringing as the son of a Church of England clergyman as an impediment to his psychical growth, since he accepted unquestioningly the creed that both his parents rigidly held (What I Believe 15). He did, however, experience moments of inspiration or "ecstasies" as he refers to them, at the time interpreted within the religious context in which he was raised. These experiences suggest that his was not merely a mechanical adherence to the creed of his parents; he himself admits that they were signs of "true religious feeling" (What I Believe, 16). Nevertheless, Beresford does assert that "I never even began to think until I was 21" (53) at which age he threw off "those shackles of orthodoxy...in a single evening" ("Discovery", March 1931, 133). The catalyst was Beresford's first mentor, a London doctor named G.F. Rogers, versed in Theosophy, who suggested that the "theories of
Orthodox Christianity were neither logical nor probable" ("Discovery", March 1931, 133). Beresford does admit, however, that after he had left school at seventeen and taken up architecture in London at eighteen, he had a vague sense of duality because of moral laxity; he adds that, "a doubt of that Evangelic religion had been steadily working below the level of my conscious mind." 8

Once he had escaped his mental prison, his first tutor in print was the agnostic Samuel Laing, whose Modern Science and Modern Thought (1885) and Human Origins (1892) introduced him to the study of biology and physical evolution. For the next nine years, he mainly read works which supported the materialist, positivist theory of evolution, including Darwin’s Origin of Species and Descent of Man (Jacob Stahl 256). Probably during this period he also became interested in progressive education, including Herbart’s, as did May Sinclair. 9 In 1902 he met a second mentor, Arthur Scaife, who gave Beresford his sociological education ("Memories" 114), and who, some years later, pronounced an early novel of Beresford’s "worthless" ("Memories" 156).

However, the major influence of this period which changed Beresford’s entire way of thinking was F.W.H. Myers’s Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death
(1903). Beresford recalled that,

...in 1903, I came across a book of modern wonders that gave my mind a new twist. This book was F.W.H. Myers's Human Personality. It was in some sense my introduction to the new science of psychology, and I found in it a foreshadowing of the possibility that I might recover a prospect of surviving death without incurring the awful penalties threatened by the creed in which I had been educated. For Myers made it appear inherently probable that there was a non-physical element in the human personality, even if it was only that contradictory, incomprehensible alter ego, the "Subliminal" self. (What I Believe 27-8)

Because of his "scientific habit of mind" (What I Believe 29), Beresford initially attempted to "characterise and rationalise" Myers's amorphous concept of subliminal self, but eventually he realized that its vagueness gave it an advantage over Janet's conception of subconscious or Freud's unconscious, the latter of which he described as "hopelessly misleading" (What I Believe 28). Through Myers's descriptions, Beresford was introduced to the essential features of the subliminal, that it was

at once wise and ignorant, immoral and beneficent, uncontrollable... and apt to manifest itself when violently opposed, particularly on moral grounds, by cunning subterfuges that might in extreme cases destroy the health, the sanity or even the life of its senior partner. (What I Believe 28)

The cases of multiple personality cited by Myers also vividly illustrated to Beresford that the subliminal was not necessarily a single entity. Most importantly, Myers's work activated Beresford's dormant imagination and led him,
gradually, "to abandon the realist for the idealist position" (What I Believe 30). Nevertheless, on the long and extensive quest for the soul that Myers’s book initiated Beresford continued to demand scientific proof. This requirement made the psychical research done by the Society For Psychical Research, based on experiment, particularly attractive to him. Beresford claims that,

It took me along a path that has never terminated in a dead end. I have on my shelves between sixty and seventy books dealing with Spiritualism and Psychic Phenomena, books by Richet, Geley, Schrenck-Notzing, Podmore, Carrington, Crawford, and a host of minor works, including a pile of the Proceedings issued by the S.P.R. The number of these authorities will testify to the eagerness of my examination of Spiritualism in search of evidence for the existence of the soul. But I have to confess that this particular evidence has so far failed to convince me that we can, in full possession of normal consciousness, step from this life to another in which, given the right conditions, we are able to communicate with those who are still in the flesh. So far I remain a sceptic in this condition. I am quite sure, nevertheless, that many strange phenomena, at present beyond the range of scientific enquiry, do occur, phenomena that illuminate some of the astonishing potentialities yet undeveloped in the great mystery that is man. (What I Believe 31)

His reading of Ernst Haeckel’s The Riddle of the Universe in 1904 temporarily dampened his enthusiasm for his new pursuit, but eventually it made him question even more closely the materialist explanation of life it argued.¹⁰

In succeeding years, his practical idealism evolved, based on reason. Foremost, Beresford held that this is a
spiritual, not a physical universe (What I Believe 118) and that mankind was developing "an increased spirituality, a deeper, fuller consciousness" (Writing 118). This position reinforced his tendency towards introspection. He also believed in an immortal principle residing within every man (Gerber 50) and in the ideal of unselfishness (Writing 119).

Beresford found additional evidence to support this idealistic stance (and to refute the materialist one) in the further exploration into the new psychology that he made after his discovery of it through Myers's book in 1904. He asserts that,

Among this objective evidence were such cases as Dr. Morton Prince's descriptions of the multiple personalities of Sally Beauchamp, the strange phenomena of hypnotism [and] the cases of precocious genius such as that of Mozart or of the child wonder of Lubeck.... (Introduction to "The Unchangeable Priesthood" xvii- xviii)

His reading of Henri Bergson's Time and Free Will (trans. 1910) and Matter and Memory (trans. 1911) along with his knowledge of the then recent discovery of the theory of relativity helped convince him that

Time, in fact, [is] a function of motion, and in a static universe in which all movement and therefore all change has ceased, the conception of time has no meaning. (What I Believe 57)

Beresford later found confirmation of this hypothesis in W.J. Dunne's An Experiment With Time (1927) with its "theory of humanity's power to enter another dimension in which the
cross-section of time that is all we can realize in this three dimensional state, becomes a line" (What I Believe 57). The theory used the dream state to show that, freed from the illusions of matter, we may live for an instant or so in what we, here, regard as the future, and occasionally retain the memory of the anticipated experience in the message of a fugitive dream. (What I Believe 57)\textsuperscript{11}

Both time and space, then, were illusions of the senses (What I Believe 57). Dreams also illustrated the process of rationalization, as did the problem of post-hypnotic suggestion, which made him question the reliability of the reasoning faculty, on which he had placed such emphasis up to this point (What I Believe 58-59). Beresford continued his theosophical researches in the first decade of the century under the guidance of his best male friend, Arthur Scott-Cravens, and through reviewing books on the subject.\textsuperscript{12}

In addition, his personal experience demonstrated that the materialistic hypothesis did not account for all the facts of experience. From his youth he mentions experiencing moments of illumination, or what he refers to as "fugitive ecstasies" (What I Believe 16, 47), and he later claimed:

...I can find nothing in psychology ... still less in physiology -- to account for those rare moments of exaltation in which every possible ambition was imaginatively consummated without effort.
During the period of his apprenticeship as a writer (1901-1908), Beresford attended parties at which there were psychics ("Memories" 99), and was told by one of these "psychometrists" that she saw him "always with a pen in [his] hand" ("Memories" 162). Regardless of how seriously Beresford took this prophecy, theosophy, psychical research, and the new developments in psychology which threw doubt on the materialist hypothesis, were the main influences on Beresford as he began to write his autobiographical novel, *Jacob Stahl*, in 1908.

The next major advance in Beresford's knowledge of the new psychology came with his introduction to psychoanalysis in 1912. In one source he wrote that,

> I was first interested in P.-A. [psychoanalysis] somewhat before the war, through my friend Dr. M.D. Eder and his wife, and as you will infer my earlier reading was strictly Freudian. Later I reacted strongly in favour of Jung's psychology, which I found more inclusive and more probable, and it is still Jung's general position that I favour rather than that of Freud or even Adler. (25 November 1931, as qtd in Hoops 104-105)

As did May Sinclair, Beresford interpreted Freudian psychoanalysis in the light of the findings of psychical research and sought in it further information about the soul, "the ghostly family in occupation of the physical body" (*What I Believe* 34). He was "instantly fascinated" by the image of
the endo-psychic censor, another member of that family. Although he eventually viewed it as a "convenient parable" of the process by which our dreams are disguised and lower desires are clothed in fantasy during waking life, he very quickly realized that it was a "false trail" in his search for the soul (What I Believe 35). Nevertheless, psychoanalysis also

provided much rich material for the characterization of the strange partner whom I had first known as the subliminal self, a far more benevolent creature than the ravening, erotic "unconscious" portrayed by Freud. Not that I was ever convinced of its exclusively sexual preoccupation. Even before I read Jung, I could not make that theory work with what knowledge I already had of the working of the convention of body, mind and spirit we recognize as a human being. (What I Believe 36)

Beresford admits that he was prejudiced in his attitude to Freudian theory because of his own psychological constitution, but he also asserts that,

in my approach to psychoanalysis I had a reasonably open mind. And my rejection of the Freudian theory was due more to logic than to any traceable wish to believe in its truth or falsity. (What I Believe 36)

Aside from the undue emphasis placed on the sexual preoccupation of the unconscious, Beresford enumerated several other flaws and limitations of psychoanalytic theory. First, as he claimed in his autobiography,

The Freudians, like their master, have a particular dogma that leads them into all kinds of illogical absurdities. They can see only the theory they are
looking for, and turn a blind eye to anything that may confute their own pet theory. ("Memories" 229)

Second, the "uninspired terminology" (What I Believe 73) that the Freudians used to describe various levels of consciousness "as if they were strata in a geological formation" distorted these functions of the mind by making them appear as concrete entities when they were in essence neither spatial nor temporal (What I Believe 36-37, 73).

Third, the findings of psychoanalysis gave no support to the theory of the survival of consciousness after the earthly partnership was dissolved. Indeed that which we commonly regard as our consciousness seemed the most ephemeral of the group, a kind of effluvium given off in our waking hours by the activities below. (What I Believe 37)

Finally, the psychoanalytic paradigm rendered no explanation of the moral sense (What I Believe 37).

What psychoanalysis did offer to Beresford was confirmation of the power of unconscious or subconscious processes and of the inadequacy of the mechanistic theory of man's being (What I Believe 37). Along with psychical research, psychoanalysis helped Beresford develop a new, less rational, more symbolic technique of thinking, about the mind in particular (What I Believe 33). In addition, Beresford's reaction to psychoanalysis provoked further investigation into the source of man's religious tendency and the nature of soul and psyche. In the second decade of
the century, he continued to find the most enlightened approach to these enigmas in the work of the S.P.R.. Several articles reflect this interest, including "A New Form of Matter" (1919), "The Crux of Psychical Research" (1920), and "More New Facts in Psychical Research" (1922). Beresford shared, and was encouraged in, this pursuit by his friend and collaborator, Kenneth Richmond, a psychiatrist and long-time member, along with his wife, of the S.P.R..¹⁵

Beresford also kept up his associations with theosophy during this period. A.R. Orage, the editor of The New Age, introduced him and Katherine Mansfield to the teachings of Gurdieff, as expounded by M. Ouspensky. He practised these teachings from about 1914 (Gerber, "Study" 35-36) to 1922 when it became clear that the degree of self-awareness necessary to following this practice was having a detrimental effect on his novel-writing. Beresford wrote that,

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this continual watch upon, and awareness of, the self could not be maintained while all the attention of the writer is concentrated upon the world of his imagination, and the submerging of his own personality in that of his characters. ("Memories" 222)
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As well, a mystic friend of Beresford's, Millar Dunning, pointed out the lack of "unselfed love" in the Ouspensky teachings, and Beresford's wife was opposed to them (Gerber, "Study" 37).
Following his break from the Ouspensky group, Beresford experienced several months "of extraordinary calm of spirit" under the guidance of Millar Dunning ("Discovery", March 1931 309). However, once again he became plagued by self-doubt and entered a period of considerable spiritual and psychological turmoil. This state was compounded by financial stress and not alleviated by a four year sojourn in France (Autumn 1923-1927). As Gerber notes, Beresford's self-doubt is reflected in his bitter questioning of the worth of artistic endeavour and his own attempts at fiction in particular, and the attitude emerges in his work itself (Gerber 40). Beresford eventually turned to mysticism and faith-healing as he renewed his quest for truth. These concerns are treated in works of the early 1930's, notably The Camberwell Miracle (1933) and The Case for Faith Healing (1934).

Concurrently, and more importantly for present purposes, Beresford's attitude towards the new psychology and especially psychoanalysis changed. The above-mentioned personal vicissitudes as well as the shift Beresford observed in the influence of psychoanalysis on the novel in general are clearly illustrated in two of Beresford's most significant articles, "Psychoanalysis and the Novel" (1919), and "Le Declin de L'Influence de la Psycho-analyse Sur Le
Roman Anglais" (1926). In a third article, "The Chaos of Modern Psychology", Beresford proposes the requirements for a psychology of the future. Consideration of these three articles will be followed by an examination of Beresford's Writing Aloud, on the process of creation. This work serves as a bridge between Beresford's theorizing on the impact of the new psychology and the actual consequences in his fiction.

Beresford begins the article "Psychoanalysis and the Novel" by parroting the outraged reviewer who cannot understand characters in modern novels who are psychologically divided, have their unconsciousses revealed, and suffer from Oedipus complexes. He then considers why these developments, arising from psychoanalysis, have such an adverse effect on reviewers and the reading public. At first glance, this attitude is curious since "of all theories of the nature of man ever put forward by a reputable scientist, that of Sigmund Freud is the most attractive and adaptable for fiction" ("Psychoanalysis" 426). His theories deal with sex -- the universal theme of the novel -- give a new mystery to the human mind, suggest the necessity of a freer morality and provide unworked complications of motive for the novelist. The reason for the adversity of critics lies in the manner in which these
theories are applied by novelists. Beresford makes the crucial distinction between opportunists -- who grasp psychoanalysis intellectually and superficially and who apply it arbitrarily and mechanically -- and those who have assimilated it and use it with conviction to illuminate a mode of experience ("Psychoanalysis" 427). The former approach produces an effect of irritation and disbelief in the reader. To illustrate the latter approach, Beresford evokes the example of Dostoevsky, who perfectly analyzed an "inferiority complex" in _Notes From the Underground_ (1864), based on his own personality, rather than on any knowledge of psychoanalysis. Dostoevsky's work demonstrates "that certain morbid conditions of mind, now clearly indicated and with obvious limitations explained by the psychoanalysts, may be artistically treated in the best fiction" ("Psychoanalysis" 430). From this point, Beresford moves into a consideration of how this theory illuminates the problems of normal psychology and in what respects it is new. It is in this discussion that his own approach becomes most apparent.

Significantly, Beresford begins by pointing out that "psychoanalysis throws very little light on the problem of the survival of the personality" ("Psychoanalysis" 431), a comment suggesting that for Beresford psychology is, first
and foremost, the study of the soul, as it is for the S.P.R. researchers. According to Beresford, Freud's main innovation is that his pathological method enabled him to characterize the unconscious by "singlemindedly" relating the information conveyed in dreams to an individual's past, "before Jung restored the balance" ("Psychoanalysis" 431). Beresford slips into the older terminology of multiple personality (as used by Morton Prince or Pierre Janet) when he claims that dream interpretation shows that "we are endowed with a double consciousness", that there is "a dual personality in every human being" ("Psychoanalysis" 431). One of the strongest facts uncovered by Freud is that this second personality can only communicate with the first in the language of symbol ("Psychoanalysis" 432). However, the aspect of the unconscious which has most captured the popular imagination is its role as "the primitive immoral instigator of all the animal passions" ("Psychoanalysis" 433). Once again, Beresford takes Jung's position that this character of the unconsciousness is not universal, but that the unconscious is the complement of the conscious and, therefore, "the character of the unconscious is as various as the character of man" ("Psychoanalysis" 433).

With great enthusiasm and optimism, Beresford asserts that the unconscious has an immense influence on our
thoughts and actions, and that the discoveries about it cannot possibly be kept out of the novel:

Personally, I believe that neither the distastes of the reviewer nor that more influential factor the distaste of the public will avail to bar the conclusions of psycho-analysis from the fiction of the future. ("Psychoanalysis" 433)

Beresford's idealism, and his agreement with the attitude of the Society For Psychical Research, are evident in the implications he draws from the discoveries of psycho-analysis. He "submit[s] that we are at this moment passing through a new phase of evolution that must have a characteristic effect on the fiction of the future..." ("Psychoanalysis" 434). The unconscious has evolved with consciousness, a proposition supported by the recognition, phrased in Jungian terms by Beresford, "that it is this other shadowed self that is responsible for all that is best and most permanent in literature" ("Psychoanalysis" 434). His concluding optimistic speculation very much bears the imprint of F.W.H. Myers in its emphasis on the beneficial nature of the unconscious and the necessity, therefore, for making its contents conscious. He asks whether the education of the subconscious will not proceed ever more rapidly,

And to what end, unless it be that in the strange process of our earthly evolution this artificial shell of the conscious will be gradually broken and absorbed to reveal the single and relatively perfect individual that has been so steadily developing underground? ("Psychoanalysis" 434)
That optimism and the confidence with which Beresford extolled the advantages of psychoanalytic findings for the novelist had completely dissipated by 1926 when Beresford wrote "Le Déclin de L'Influence...." In this article, Beresford locates the most significant influence of psychoanalysis on the English novel during the years between 1918 and 1922. He then distinguishes three categories of novels: those which would have been written had Freud never existed; those in which the influence is subconscious rather than intellectual; and

those which, in a precise or avowed fashion, are based on the principle that the repression of thought and those infantile tendencies can reappear during the course of adult experience in the form of a perversion or of a 'complex'. ("Le Déclin" 257)

Beresford focuses on the third category, and his division enables him to exclude from this category D.H. Lawrence, Clemence Dane, and Dorothy Richardson, since he claims that they belong to the second group. The three most striking examples of the third approach are Beresford's own God's Counterpoint (1918), Rebecca West's The Return of the Soldier (1918), and May Sinclair's The Romantic (1920), although the satirical works Dangerous Ages (1921) by Rose Macauley and The Farcical History of Richard Greenow (1920) by Aldous Huxley also fall under this heading.

According to Beresford, the rapid decline of the
psychoanalytic stimulus in fiction can be accounted for by three factors. First, critics condemned the application to fiction because of their "essentially British attitude of suspicion and extreme repugnance vis-à-vis all that is new" and because they felt that the themes were "unhealthy" and "displeasing" ("Déclin" 261). Second, the censorious British public rejected "any study of morbid psychology", although it tolerated "Habitual sexual immorality, adultery and seduction" as long as the descriptions of it were not detailed ("Déclin" 262). Novelists who cared for their reputations responded and excluded the "offensive" topics, with the exception of such extraordinarily talented and committed writers as May Sinclair ("Déclin" 263). Third, and most important, claims Beresford, writers themselves realized that the Freudian theories "scarcely lend themselves as subjects for fictional work" ("Déclin" 264). They concern abnormality and run counter to the novelist’s aim of presenting representative types ("Déclin" 264). Consequently, Beresford concludes "that there cannot be a future for the psychoanalytical novel such as the genre which is in the third category established at the beginning of this article" and he predicts that "there will be no renaissance of the Freudian vogue which exercised such an influence on the English novel from 1918-1922" ("Déclin" 465).
Beresford claims that his personal experience, which he imagines "is more or less the same as Miss Sinclair['s]" ("Déclin" 265), corresponds with the general trend he has outlined. Initially "the joy of this first discovery [of psychoanalysis arose because it] allows a more full and profound understanding of human motives." In the long term this knowledge has caused him to modify his judgements on human conduct ("Déclin" 265). However, he remains sceptical of the Freudian interpretation of dreams and doubts whether the study of an abnormal individual suffering from infantile repression can offer any insight to the novelist concerned with type. Nevertheless, he does admit that if the naturalist school is to survive, then it must continue to draw on traces or modifications of psychoanalysis.

What Beresford’s essay reveals is the degree to which he has followed the propagandists of psychoanalysis in isolating the Freudian views from those of the other new psychologies.16 His definition of psychoanalytic novels as those which deal with the consequences of a childhood repression in adult perversions or a complex is very restrictive and excludes other types of influence; thus the definition enables him to dismiss the theory as a lasting influence. The result is that, by omission, Beresford actually contributes to minimizing the larger impact on the
novel of the new psychology, of which the Freudian is only one late manifestation. Though Beresford was well aware of the various psychological influences on his own fiction, one reason that he proclaimed the decline of psychoanalytic influence in particular has to do with his own experience when he focused almost exclusively on applying Freudian theory to his two novels, *God's Counterpoint* (1918) and *An Imperfect Mother* (1920), as we shall see.

Another reason becomes apparent upon considering "The Chaos of Modern Psychology." In this article, Beresford classifies psychology under three heads: classical psychology, treated in its relation to philosophy; the "New Psychology"; and "all that material deriving originally from the work of Freud, however variously developed by Jung and Adler..." ("Chaos" 399). He defines the second category, the "New Psychology", in one of its most limited early senses, as representing "the scientific attempt to analyse the personality in the laboratory or classroom by such criteria as reaction tests" ("Chaos" 399). In so doing, he shows that he does not see the rival theories to the Freudian of Pierre Janet and William McDougall, for example, as comprising a movement which might be labelled new (or, as I have done, second wave). In addition, he claims that, "the third type of psychology has no real relation to the other two. It
arose almost exclusively from the work of one man..." ("Chaos" 399). By making such clear-cut distinctions, Beresford, like the Freudian acolytes, exaggerates the discontinuity between them and ignores the developments which made Freud’s theories possible.

Regardless of this distortion, the use Beresford wanted to make of psychoanalysis emerges clearly and is instructive. He claims that "its [psychoanalysis’s] study outside the clinic may be conducted on the lines of philosophy, and pushed far beyond the limits laid down by practical experiment" ("Chaos" 400). He proposes that the unconscious not be considered secondary, but as the primary entity which mediates between the ego and "the largely automatic creature that plays its part in the world" ("Chaos" 401). "A truly enlightening psychology" would take account of the functions of the unconscious as deduced by modern psychology and align these with "the main assumption of an immortal principle" of the older philosophical psychology, in order to arrive at a more accurate conception of the soul. This new synthesis would include the wisdom of the East and would encourage individuals to relate the purely intellectual knowledge of psychology to themselves on some deeper level of consciousness. It would stimulate self-examination and lead the way "towards that increase of
consciousness which the followers of psychoanalysis dimly apprehend as the goal of their ambition, but do nothing whatever to further by their practice ("Chaos" 403). Thus, by 1932 Beresford has extracted psychoanalysis from its contemporary explanations and incorporated the glimpse of truth he found in it into a wider framework, encompassing the philosophical psychology which preceded it.

This mainly theoretical and hypothetical approach of Beresford's to psychology has been emphasized thus far. However, in his unique combination of stream of consciousness novel manqué and autobiographical work in progress, Writing Aloud (1928), Beresford reveals the very pragmatic concerns and attitudes about handling psychological influence which arise as he is in the process of developing a novel. His hybrid is thus of immense value in gaining insight about some fundamental ways in which formal psychological knowledge affects the creative process of the novelist. Beresford's description of how the book was conceived immediately brings home the importance of the influence of psychical research on his consciousness. He began without purpose, and then

...it came to me that it would be delightful to write a formless book, allowing this impulse to manifest itself as it pleased, almost as if I were a medium engaged in writing automatic script. (Writing 1)
Beresford generally allows the characters he has conceived to guide him (Writing 53, 79), but he also includes his opinions on diverse topics, as well as biographical information supplied in the third person in square brackets. Several attitudes emerge very clearly about psychoanalytic theory, its applications to characterization, and critics' and readers' response to it in fiction.

Once again, Beresford demonstrates that he approaches psychoanalysis from the idealist's viewpoint. He emphasizes that element which best aligns with his single theme of re-educating human beings, asserting that,

The principle of it [psychoanalysis] is so admirable; it is the practice only, with its tendency to degenerate into dogma, that has smirched it in the popular estimation. It is so essential to keep the generating theory fluid. And the principle of P.A. [psychoanalysis] is that which I was considering a few minutes ago -- the winning of self-knowledge and a free mind by the eradication of deep-seated habits of thought. (Writing 148)

Since in practice psychoanalysis has that tendency to become dogmatic, Beresford's approach to it is very selective. Though he recognized that all good fiction must have a dream quality in it (Writing 147), and dreams play a significant role in his work, he discounted the Freudian interpretation of dreams when it did not fit the evidence. On one such occasion he claims that,

I have rejected the Freudian interpretation, which
might have a certain validity in some cases, because having tried it, as it were, on myself, I can get no satisfaction from it, no sense of having gratifyingly solved the riddle. (Writing 85)

Despite the flaws in its practical applications, psychoanalysis is contributing to the considerable change in human beings that Beresford observes. He claims that, "...I am willing to maintain that we do know much more about the hidden springs of conduct than our ancestors did" (Writing 118). For Beresford, the change in humanity also has a religious element, as the following quotation illustrates: "I do so sincerely believe in evolution, development; in the coming of an increased spirituality, a deeper, fuller consciousness" (Writing 118).

This idealistic attitude in turn influences Beresford's conception of character. He recollects that,

In a review of my first novel, Jacob Stahl, the writer very pointedly warned me that 'character does not change,' and looking back over these seventeen years, it seems to me that all my work since has been devoted to proving that unknown reviewer in the wrong. (Writing 54)

Beresford does not merely want to "present a slice of life, neatly dissected and displayed" (Writing 79), but desires to convey something of his "characters' inner life that could never be expressed either in action or speech" (Writing 117). Though he respects the realists, including Galsworthy, Bennett, and Wells, "who attempted to draw humanity as they
...my desire is to go even deeper than any one of the admired novelists I have selected. I am not content to picture the doings and sayings of typical humanity; I want to know why they do and say these things, which is a mistake from the artist's point of view. That is work for the clinic. *(Writing 143)*

Several forces combine to thwart this desire and "to compel him to misrepresent humanity in fiction... [by] making it far too consistent" *(Writing 144)*. Repeatedly Beresford criticizes the tastes of the general reading public, who constrain his fascination with experimentation since he does not have economic independence *(Writing 141)*. The general reading public, or "GRP," as he refers to them, want recognizable types that come from other books rather than from life *(Writing 42, 142)*, do not care to know about the influence of heredity on behaviour *(Writing 14-15)* and in general lack interest "in learning anything new about themselves or the human mind in general" *(Writing 174)*. Their response to psychoanalysis in fiction is particularly "shallow", some even arguing, for example, "that because Dickens never wrote of anything approaching a passionate relationship between mother and son, the 'mother-complex' either does not exist or is not a proper subject for a novel" *(Writing 33, 34)*. They are joined in their aversion to the application of psychoanalysis by the critics.
Beresford muses that,

If I am not careful I shall be told that I have written another "psycho-analytic" novel. The hint of a "suppression into the unconscious" will be quite enough to make some people sit up and write half a column about Freudianism being *vieux jeu* in fiction. (Writing 33)

Nevertheless, his "passion for discovery" of the unconscious motives of his characters necessitates bringing the insights of psychoanalysis to his work. Beresford attempts to resolve the dilemma by proposing to disguise the influence. At one stage in his hypothetical novel, a mother, Emma, will come into contact, after nineteen years of separation, with her illegitimate daughter, tentatively named J.J.. Emma recognizes that the girl is confused about religion and will play the role of psychoanalyst without knowing it in order to help her achieve clarity about her feelings (Writing 133). Beresford claims that,

I should love to do the interviews between these two if I could be sure of completely disguising the psycho-analytic technique and making the whole business appear as the outcome of a perfectly natural relation between mother and daughter in these very unusual circumstances, the mother alone knowing all the secrets of the daughter's conception and infant history. (Writing 134)

As he develops the idea, he supplies Emma with a motive for helping J.J., which "will distract, I hope, the reader's attention from all comparisons with the methods of the clinic" (Writing 135). He also gives a clear indication of
what he is trying to achieve:

What I want is no more than a sound analogy between the two processes, and the typical Freudian complex in this case shall serve me only as a parallel that I propose to render into familiar everyday language. (Writing 135-136)

After struggling for some time to incorporate this conception, Beresford comes to the realization that, in the interests of making the action more natural and the characters more probable to the reading public and critics, he will have to discard any parallels with psychoanalysis (Writing 173-174). Furthermore, although all along he had intended to write from the point of view of the stream of consciousness of his heroine, "the psychical history" he has designed for her, including complex and revelation of unconscious motivation, would make that direct method unacceptable, and perhaps impossible (Writing 178). Instead, Beresford decides to try and make it a "purely objective book", but he concludes that it will likely relate his own experience in a semi-autobiographical mode, as he has done in most of his previous novels (Writing 202).

Thus, Writing Aloud records with considerable candour some of the very practical pressures influencing the novelist as he writes. Beresford reveals both his fascination with psychoanalysis, and with the obstacle it presents, his impulse to probe the deeper mysteries of human
conduct in his work, and the checks to that impulse. The extent to which Beresford dared to follow through this impulse, to challenge the conventions of the novel, and to overcome the constraints placed on him, can now be assessed over his early career by considering representative works. However, it is useful to preface this analysis with a few remarks on the general psychological preoccupations of Beresford’s fiction.

From the outset of his career, Beresford’s empirical, almost scientific approach to the minute details of human existence, constituting what he calls realism, is moderated and balanced by his idealism, mysticism and probing of the psyche, a broad tendency he shares with May Sinclair; consequently he is always aware of the limits of realism. Drawing on the features of personality emphasized by first-wave psychology, Beresford reveals the hereditary forces and habits which shape his characters’ behaviour. Nevertheless, he also portrays the inconsistency of characters, gives access to their dream lives, and increasingly reveals the influence of subconscious processes on their actions. He consistently approaches characterization from a developmental perspective, assigning great importance both to crucial traumatic events and moments of illumination which may either block or facilitate growth into
individuation. This growth is figured most frequently as a quest for truth about identity, vocation, and love.

Though Beresford’s characters are not as varied as Sinclair’s, and patterns more clearly emerge over the course of Beresford’s work than Sinclair’s, he is equally attentive to the motivation of his characters. All of his protagonists are male, with the exception of the woman J.-J. in Writing Aloud, who appears to dominate that narrative. Typically they are quite introspective, self-doubting, somewhat weak physically and psychically, sensitive and effeminate, but also intellectually courageous and adventurous. Intent on overcoming the dogmas of their upbringing, they value open-mindedness a great deal, but find themselves in frequent conflict with those limited by prejudice. These central characters are also deeply divided, often on more than one level. To their own disadvantage, they tend to rely too heavily on intellect, lack passion, and instead seek maternal comfort. Sensitive mothers generally meet this need, but they also quietly exert powerful and binding influence over the protagonists. Their jealousy of the protagonists’ burgeoning relationships with women temporarily thwarts the protagonists’ psychological growth. The young women who are the object of the heroes’ quests are often initially distant and idealized. As the shy protag-
onists painfully make advances towards intimacy, these women are revealed to be more conventional in attitudes towards religion, marriage, and sensuality than the protagonists. Sexuality tends to be dealt with obliquely by Beresford. The heroes are generally rewarded in their quest, but achieve only partial success in converting their women to their less conventional views. They may be approaching marriage, living together, or married as the novel closes. Other women in more minor roles make sacrifices, suffer from hysteria or, less commonly, rebel as proto-feminists, are sexually loose, or function as seductresses. Fathers and symbolic representations of them in institutions like the church are depicted as authoritarian and are restraining forces. Fathers often die early in Beresford's novels.

Beresford's exposure to psychoanalysis generally helped to clarify and refine the approach to character which had been shaped by his earlier studies in psychical research. He shifts focus from studies of so-called normal, or typical characters onto abnormal ones, although the normal and abnormal become increasingly difficult to distinguish. As an influence, heredity slips into the background and is replaced by psychosomatic symptoms indicating repression. Moments of illumination are imaged more as the cathartic release of repressed impulses. Though
Beresford rarely used symbolism in his early work (Gerber 197), he begins to employ Freudian symbolism to reveal subconscious attraction and conflict. Finally, psychoanalytic influence emerges in later works as characters either undergo talking cures, initiate self-analysis, or employ literature as therapy.

Beresford’s astuteness and development as a psychological novelist are best illustrated in his two contrasting early works -- the *Jacob Stahl* trilogy and *The Hampdenshire Wonder* -- and two novels -- *These Lynnekers* and *Housemates* -- which employ psychology in a wider social context. The consequences of adhering too closely to Freudian doctrine can be studied in *God’s Counterpoint*, while Beresford’s move to draw, once again, on more varied and integrated sources is foreshadowed in *An Imperfect Mother* (1920) and clearly shown in *Love’s Pilgrim* (1923).

Beresford most often applied his knowledge of the "new" psychology within the realistic genre in his early novels. In the *Jacob Stahl* trilogy (1911, 1912, 1915), he deepened realism in the manner of Wells and Bennett by attending to unconscious motivation and the spiritual quest. These autobiographical novels depict the circuitous evolution of the introspective protagonist, Jacob, into awareness and the profession of novelist. We can also
identify a certain evolution in Beresford's technique of revealing the psychology of his characters over the course of the three novels. Beresford conveys more of their subconscious desires, ambitions, and conflicts. He does so increasingly by making readers privy to characters' unconscious reveries, rather than spelling out from the omniscient viewpoint their logical trains of thought. In this respect, his technique is analogous to the stream of consciousness. His introduction of it corresponds with his exposure to psychoanalytic thought. 19

In the first volume, The Early History of Jacob Stahl, Beresford traces the primary forces which shape Jacob's character: his growth into manhood, the breaking-up of the original mould, his dissipation, the process of his intellectual discovery, his marriage to and separation from the egotistical Lola Wilmot. The novel closes on an optimistic note, with Jacob, having had a vision of eternal values, now fully prepared to enter the next stage of his life.

Beresford's psychological orientation is suggested at the outset of the novel, since he focuses on the temperament and habits of Jacob's mother and nurse-maid Nancy; these aspects of personality help account for the first of the incidents having profound emotional consequences
for Jacob. His mother’s habit of procrastination indirectly, and Nancy’s negligence directly, result in Jacob’s fall from a pram at seven months. He becomes permanently lame. Furthermore, in filling out Jacob’s family background, Beresford places most stress on heredity, an emphasis consonant with first wave psychology. Whereas Jacob’s brother Eric represents a solid conglomerate of hereditary tendencies,

In Hermann Stahl [Jacob’s father] they [the hereditary tendencies] were all awash, bumping and tumbling; some two or three of the bigger always in evidence, the others, sometimes on top, at others forced below the surface; an untidy heterogenous collection of qualities with nothing to bind them together. (Jacob Stahl 10)

Jacob inherits his father’s conflicting tendencies, but also his Irish mother’s imagination and laziness. Beresford establishes the primacy of this biological influence in the following excerpt:

Jacob had none of his brother’s talent for application. It is true that his early training encouraged him in a habit of idleness, but the effect of training on character is merely that of development. There was a bias in Jacob’s mind that no amount of education would have counteracted, just as in the case of Eric there was a combination that had no solvent. In the case of these two boys, it so chanced that each, by force of circumstances, fell under the influences best calculated to exaggerate his natural bent.... (Jacob Stahl 13-14)

Even with such an emphasis on biological determinants, however, Beresford does not neglect the importance of
Jacob's early environment. Since his father is authoritarian, distant, and possessed of "unsteady desires," the young Jacob seeks comfort in his mother, thus initiating a pattern in his relations with other women. Beresford's skipping over external events of Jacob's life in order to bring into bold relief the second traumatic event of Jacob's youth confirms the novelist's primary interest in the psychology of his protagonist. When Jacob is fourteen, his mother dies from typhoid. Though initially Jacob "unconsciously" adopts the adults' attitude of resignation, his first recorded dream represents the reality for him:

> But in the night he dreamed of his mother, and when he awoke the bitter tears, the desperate longing, the agony of desire for her presence, were all intensely real; and the reality stayed with him.... (Jacob Stahl 32)

Jacob's practical, confident Aunt Hester then takes up where his mother left off.

Beresford also shows the role that Jacob's love and sexual relationships play in shaping him. His attraction to the opposite sex begins in adolescence at a "moment of tension", "subconsciously noted" by Jacob as he gazes at a fourteen year old girl (Jacob Stahl 52). She turns out to be Madeline Felmersdale, the daughter of an aristocrat, and thus far above him in class. There is the oblique suggestion that Jacob eventually makes love to her (Jacob Stahl
126-127), only to discover that she is not as innocent as she has appeared to him, having had an earlier physical relationship (Jacob Stahl 115). In renouncing her, Jacob also rejects the upper-class standards that she represents (Jacob Stahl 159) and is provoked into deciding to explore life (Jacob Stahl 125). Several years later, after a night of debauchery in London, Jacob has a blatantly sexual dream. (Jacob Stahl 195). Beresford also implies that Jacob’s Aunt Hester is more like a lover than a substitute mother to Jacob, since she feels superseded by Madeline. She also feels "jilted" and her life is shortened because of bitterness and grief when he leaves her for London (Jacob Stahl 228).

Occasionally Jacob’s thoughts are shown to have emerged from his subconscious (Jacob Stahl 124, 241, 359) and Beresford confirms the consequence that characters are "disgustingly inconsistent" in real life. At several points, Beresford suggests why Jacob would be of interest to an anonymous psychologist (Jacob Stahl 215, 256). In his attitude towards Jacob’s stressed condition following the deterioration of his marriage, Beresford sides with this hypothetical psychologist -- in viewing him as a pathological case -- over the philosopher of human nature, who would find Jacob culpable on a priori grounds (Jacob
Beresford claims that, 

Jacob must not be judged by the philosopher’s index, his case was pathological. He had come to believe in his own incapacity, and, mentally, wrote the story of his failure. (Jacob Stahl 358)

This view is reinforced by the glimpse Beresford affords us into the darker side of Jacob as he contemplates suicide (Jacob Stahl 358) before he takes hold of his life and begins anew.

The sequel, A Candidate For Truth, develops the spiritual dimension of the protagonist. Jacob becomes attracted to the ideal of self-sacrifice under the influence of the charismatic preacher and social worker Cecil Barker. A “superman”, completely devoted to self-denial, he takes on the case of Jacob’s soul and provides him with a job as his personal secretary until he realizes that Jacob takes the approach of a dilettante to his spiritual growth (Candidate 128). While working for Barker, Jacob finishes his first novel, in the realistic genre. Once again, dreams convey Jacob’s motivation or longings. One which "possesses" him while alone in a restaurant suggests the burgeoning artist’s bisexual nature and may well draw on Nietzsche’s conception of the artist, since Nietzsche is mentioned in another context in the novel (Candidate 356):

Within him was conceived the story of a man who longed passionately for love, sympathy, and admiration, but who was dumb to express his
longing; who by some twist of fate was unable to attract love or admiration from either man or woman. The secret lay in the fact that the man had a feminine soul imprisoned in his masculine body, a soul which expressed itself in the manner of a woman. (Candidate 101-102)

Following his break from Barker, Jacob enters the advertising business, is unsuccessfully pursued by a sexually repressed widow, and falls in love with the woman, Betty Gale, who runs the boarding house at which he lives. At this stage Jacob finally rejects Barker’s ideal of self-sacrifice and renunciation (Candidate 357), courting Betty even though he has not been able to obtain a divorce from his estranged wife. All of the issues touched on are treated realistically, including love. We are told initially that Betty “was not desperately in love with Jacob” (Candidate 359). By the close of the novel, they express their passion openly in a park and declare their independence as lovers from the world’s opinion (Candidate 402).

However, not until the third volume, The Invisible Event, do they actually put that declaration into practice by living together. This decision is reached only after a painful struggle on Betty’s part to defy her upbringing as a clergyman’s daughter. When it is recalled that psychoanalysis confirmed for Beresford the necessity of a freer morality ("Psychoanalysis" 426), we can speculate that Beresford’s exposure to the new science while working on The
Invisible Event was, at least, one factor in enabling him to defy still current moral convention. Several subtle allusions to repression and neuroses at least strongly suggest that Beresford had by this time begun to assimilate some second wave psychological ideas. While in Cornwall awaiting Betty's decision, Jacob gives vent to his suppressed Celtic strain which urges him to seek out places of wild and isolated natural beauty:

Never had he traced these sudden flights from duty to any impulse of a primitive wander-lust, to any inborn eagerness to throw off the bonds of necessity and march out, unshackled, into the free spaces of earth. The desire had moved feebly within him, like a child in the womb, and he had restlessly shaken himself, desiring to quiet the irk and pain of its struggle. And even now, when no duty withheld him, he feared the familiar emotion to this response to beauty as some wild, incomprehensible thing that was antagonistic to his well-being; something to be ashamed of, something that must be repressed. (Invisible 127)

After Betty's arrival, Jacob confesses that, while not exactly "neurotic", he has some "inherent weakness of mind" which caused him to fall into complete inertia (Invisible 175). He also becomes aware of Betty's tendency to repress her qualms about their present relation: "He had a queer picture in his mind of all those inhibited thoughts being thrust down and growing malignantly under the surface..." (Invisible 188).

In this third volume, too, Jacob's reveries are
explored more fully and his increasing awareness reflected through the image of waves succeeding and "overleaping" one another (Invisible 241). On one occasion as he sits and watches these waves, "...his thought began to emerge in an effortless, unconscious process -- thought that seemed to have a greater intensity and reality than life itself" (Invisible 241). More than once, he realizes that he has undergone such immense inner change that his younger self is like a completely different person who has died and been replaced (Invisible 123-124, 241). This new awareness of his shifting and even disjunctive self emerges in the next novel that he conceives. To Betty he confides that,

It's slightly fantastic...an allegory of sorts, I suppose -- and yet the fundamental idea comes out of my own experience. The theory is of a man who reacts so tremendously to his circumstances that he is a different person altogether in different conditions. It's an enlargement of the Jekyll and Hyde business in one way, but treated realistically, you know. There would not be any romantic potions or spells. (Invisible 275)

He elaborates:

The idea is that he goes on increasingly reacting to his circumstances until he can be, for all intents and purposes, a dozen different people in one day. (Invisible 276)

At the denouement, "my man discovers for the first time that he has a personality of his own that has been unconsciously growing out of all his reactions" (Invisible 276). The idea for this novel, "The Creature of Circumstance," is of course
only a slight exaggeration of the history of the development of Jacob’s fluid personality. In an ironic twist, after his divorce, Jacob must persuade Betty to marry for the sake of their first child. At the close of The Invisible Event, however, he continues to refuse to accept dogmas, instead renewing his search for that permanent truth that "...keeps his spirit young" (Invisible 388). He upholds the principle of the open mind so that he will not "fall into the habit of fixed opinions", claims Beresford with a William Jamesian emphasis on habit (cf. Principles I 104-127).

While Beresford’s use of the new psychology is neither extensive nor revolutionary in the trilogy, its influence does help to set the tone of the work by providing language and concepts, and generally giving scope to his own psychological impulse. The trilogy reveals that subtle incorporation of psychological ideas can convincingly increase the psychological complexity of character. Beresford’s assimilation of these ideas goes a long way towards explaining why the trilogy was recognized as a psychological masterpiece.

Beresford applied similar concepts to a very different end with equal success in The Hampdenshire Wonder (1911). The novel explores the development and treatment by society of an "abnormal" child genius, Victor Stott, whose
stupendous intellect enables him to make sense of the phenomena of life from his own observation before he devours the accumulated knowledge of civilization, most of which he rejects. Victor's story is told by a journalist who is, ironically, working on a book on the progress of the philosophical method. Though he obtains the Wonder's confidence for a brief period, the Wonder's precocity and the narrator's realization of his own intellectual limitations eventually bring the narrator to the brink of despair. In addition, the Wonder agitates in various ways most of those who come into contact with him. When he is discovered to have drowned in a pond, no-one is directly accused, but the implication is that the most narrow of those whose path the Wonder has crossed -- the Rector, Crashaw -- is responsible for the death.

The novel was praised by no less than G. B. Shaw, and became established as a classic of the science -- fantasy genre. In the Magill Survey of Science Fiction, Brian Stableford claims that "...the book [The Hampdenshire Wonder] remains one of the best science fiction novels ever written, outstanding in terms of both its literary and ideative merits" ("Hampdenshire" 948). As the most notable early exception to Beresford's psychologically realistic novels,²² we will consider it as representative of Beres-
ford's impulse to fantasy writing and of his handling of the new psychology in that genre.

In The Invisible Event (1915), Beresford informs us that Jacob's brother recommended Bergson in the original French to him in 1897. Regardless of the autobiographical accuracy of that statement, certainly by 1911 Beresford was thoroughly familiar with Bergson's thought, since it serves as the main influence in The Hampdenshire Wonder. The novel opens in a train compartment, where the narrator is engrossed in the English translation of Henri Bergson's Time and Free Will, with whose conclusion the narrator agrees in advance but reads in order to master the reasoning (Wonder 3). He looks up, catches his first glimpse of the abnormal-looking baby Victor Stott, and then continues reading the following passage:

It is at the great and solemn crisis, decisive of our reputation with others, that we choose in deference of what is conventionally called a motive, and this absence of any tangible reason is the more striking the deeper our freedom goes. ²³

This passage from Bergson's chapter on free will in Time and Free Will is significant for a number of reasons. On the one hand, the Wonder's life represents the complete antithesis to Bergson's argument, since the child's powerful intellect and reasoning capability make him entirely free from the prejudices and habits which limit our perceptions and knowledge. On the other hand, the Wonder's untimely and
mysterious death may very well confirm Bergson’s position, if it is construed that the Wonder is the victim of an irrational act carried out freely (in the sense that it is in response to the Rector’s deepest fears) by the Rector, Crashaw, who feels threatened by the Wonder’s total rationality and denial of God.

Third, this early passage is subtly related to the idea of creative evolution, which underpins the thinking in the book and helps explain otherwise curious aspects of the novel. That Bergson’s most popular work, Creative Evolution, has a special place in the novel is intimated by the fact that Victor Stott ‘hesitates longer’ over it during his self-education than the works of other philosophers, including Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Fichte, Leibnitz, Nietzsche, Hume, Bradley, and William James (Wonder 236). In Creative Evolution, recall that Bergson opposed the strict rationality and determinism implicit in Darwin’s evolutionary theory by postulating that the overcoming of inert matter by the life force could produce genuine novelty, and that, therefore, evolution was creative. Beresford develops the imaginative possibilities of Bergson’s speculation by suggesting that Victor Stott is the product of a creative skip in evolution. Victor’s father, Ginger, is himself “exceptional”, but in the physical realm (Wonder 27). An extraordinary cricketer, Ginger becomes obsessed with
teaching his method to another person. After an accident prematurely ends his career, he rather indiscriminately accepts the marriage proposal of a forty-two year old woman, with an eye to having progeny to train in cricket. According to the narrator, "certain primitive, human emotions seem to have played no part in his character" (Wonder 108). Though no athlete, Victor's mother, Ellen Mary, is also atypical in that she is possessed of a reasoning, "open and mobile intelligence" (Wonder 69), and is unfettered by academic study (Wonder 67). The suggestion is that Victor's position at a higher stage of evolution arises partly from his mother's intelligence compounded by the genetic transformation of Ginger's physical prowess into intellectual capacity, but ultimately it cannot be entirely accounted for. One of Brian Stableford's few criticisms of The Hampdenshire Wonder is that "The prelude recounting the history of Ginger Stott appears to have so little connection with the main theme as to be almost bizarre" ("Hampdenshire" 948). However, Ginger's history is essential to understanding the origin and nature of the Wonder's genius.

Beresford also drew on several other sources in order to make Victor's condition convincing and to develop the theme of abnormality versus normality, sanity versus insanity. Though the narrator footnotes Galton's study of
genius (Wonder 68) and finds a precedent for Victor in Schoneich’s account of the child wonder of Lubeck, Christian Heinrich Heinecken, the theory he develops owes more to William James and F.W.H. Myers. It was in Myers’s Human Personality that Beresford actually became acquainted with the child wonder (Introduction to "The Unchangeable Priesthood" xvii). Like James, the narrator stresses the role of habits. He argues that the Wonder was born without habits: "During the period of gestation, one thought had dominated the minds of both parents -- the desire to have a son born without habits" (Wonder 60). In concluding that, "The child was supernormal, a cause of fear to the normal man, as all truly supernormal things are to our primitive, animal instincts" (Wonder 61), the narrator draws on the terminology of F.W.H. Myers, and his analogy between genius and evolution. In Human Personality, Myers claimed that, in genius,

> there is here no real departure from normality; no abnormality at least in the sense of degeneration; but rather a fulfilment of the true norm of man, with suggestions, it may be, of something Supernormal -- of something which transcends existing normality as an advanced stage of evolutionary progress transcends an earlier stage. (Myers 74)

The genius of the Wonder also operates on a symbolic level. In his empirical attitude, "instructed common sense", and elusive swiftness, he figures as an allegory of the spirit
of the modern age, surpassing the reactionary force of men like Crashaw (Wonder 212).

Beresford’s questioning of the boundaries of abnormality and normality, sanity and insanity, is entirely consonant with second-wave psychological thinking. Initially the narrator, along with the other train passengers, is ‘disgusted’ by the abnormal appearance of the Wonder with his massive domed, bald head (Wonder 3-4), an attitude reflected in the first-wave treatment of the insane by isolation. Underlying this is their fear of the fixed gaze of the Wonder (Wonder 13) -- a fear which the narrator copes with, at least temporarily, by fitting the Wonder into his theory of genius (Wonder 60-61). The Wonder is also labelled "mad" and an "imbecile" by a train passenger (Wonder 12). However, as his extraordinary powers of reason become evident, he emerges as consummately sane, whereas those around him, with their blindness, prejudice, and pride appear less ‘normal’ and even insane. Crashaw the Rector, who considers the child possessed, becomes obsessed with having him submitted to a regular, indoctrinating education. He is revealed as a fanatical bigot (Wonder 211). Even the narrator, a paragon of "normality", approaches madness because of his vain ambition to write the intellectual history of the Wonder (Wonder 146). Later, as he struggles with another book on the growth of philosophical knowledge,
he again totters on the brink of insanity. He experiences delirium and confesses that,

I had begun to lose my hold on reality. Silence, contemplation, a long-continued wrestle with the profound problems of life, were combining to break up the intimacy of life and matter, and my brain was not of the calibre to endure the strain. (Wonder 264)

Closely allied with this theme of the nature of normality and sanity is Beresford’s concern with the limitations of human understanding and of various approaches to attaining knowledge. In subsequent editions of The Hampdenshire Wonder, the passage from Bergson which the narrator reads on the train is replaced by one from Baillie’s translation of Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Mind (1807, trans. 1910) on the truth bearing role of knowledge (Wonder, 1917, 12). Once again, Crashaw’s approach to knowledge, through dogmatic adherence to religious principles, is shown to be the most limited and dangerous of those illustrated. The narrator, too, is restricted by habits of thought (Wonder 49) and becomes painfully aware both of the limitations of his intellect and of philosophical knowledge in general (Wonder 252). Challis, the local magnate and amateur anthropologist, who takes an interest in the exceptional Stott, fares somewhat better. An agnostic scholar and decadent, Challis protects the Wonder from the ravings of the Rector and gives him access to his
substantial library. He comes closer to maintaining objectivity about the Wonder and about the means of acquiring knowledge, claiming that,

> I’m no pragmatist, as you know; but there can be no doubt that with the majority of us the wish to believe a thing is true constitutes the truth of that thing for us. And that is, in my opinion, the wrong attitude for either scientist or philosopher. (Wonder 136)

However, even he fails to comprehend the synthesis of knowledge that the Wonder outlines. Moreover, he too assumes an "armour of mental resistance" once he realizes that life would hold no further pleasure for him if he accepted that theory [the Wonder’s] of origin, evolution and final adjustment; he found in this cosmogony no place for his own idealism. (Wonder 172)

Nevertheless the limitations of Challis’s idealistic approach are criticized much less severely than the first wave associationism and positivism of his assistant, Gregory Lewes, ²⁵ a student of psychology who plans on taking up laboratory work (Wonder 140). He suggests taking measurements of the Wonder’s skull (Wonder 141) and eventually carries out an "inquiry into association in connection with memory" (Wonder 160). The narrator’s parenthetical remark that, "The only result up to the present time is his [Lewes’] little brochure Reflexive Associations, which has hardly added to our knowledge of the subject" implies that this method of obtaining knowledge is a
fruitless one (Wonder 160-161). It certainly prevents Lewes from making any sense of the Wonder’s synthesis:

One sees that Lewes entered upon the interview [with the Wonder] with a mind predisposed to criticise, to destroy. There can be no doubt that as he listened his uninformed mind was endeavouring to analyze, to weigh, and to oppose; and this antagonism and his own thoughts continually interposed between him and the thought of the speaker. Lewes’s account of what was spoken on that afternoon is utterly worthless. (Wonder 171)

Only Challis learns from his experience with the Wonder because his idealism permits more openness than the others’ approaches. As well, he is not intimidated by the child’s powerful gaze, but is able to see him as a whole individual, with limitations. Probably drawing on Nietzsche’s conception of sublimation, Challis offers that the Wonder represents a paradox:

Sublimated material. Intellectual insight and absolute spiritual blindness.... The child has gone too far in one direction -- in another he has not made one step. His mind is a magnificent, terrible machine. He has the imagination of a mathematician and a logician developed beyond all conception, he has not one spark of the imagination of a poet. And so he cannot deal with men; he can’t understand their weaknesses and limitations; they are geese and hens to him, creatures to be scared out of his vicinity. (Wonder 193)

In the epilogue, "The Uses of Mystery", the narrator, who has learned from Challis, would appear to voice Beresford’s own position on the question of knowledge. Following Bergson, he claims that we must conceive a philosophy
which starts by the assumption that we can have no impression of reality until we have rid ourselves of the interposing and utterly false concepts of space and time, which delimit the whole world of human thought. (Wonder 290)

This elimination can be done only by grappling with the mystery of consciousness and yet, claims Challis, we must wait for the slow process of evolution to reveal that mystery (Wonder 291). Mystery is essential since when all is known, the stimulus for action ceases; when all is known there is quiescence, nothingness. Perfect knowledge implies the state of being one -- our pleasures are derived from action, from differences, from heterogeneity. (Wonder 291)

Beresford elevates mystery and the role of the mystic for psychological as well as psychical reasons; the elimination of mystery would result in universal psychological suffering and perhaps even mass suicide (Wonder 292).

Thus, Beresford’s tale of the Wonder -- who, at an advanced level of evolution, appropriately dies under a cloud of mystery -- enables Beresford to expose the limitations of various approaches to knowledge, including scientific positivism and, by implication, naturalism and even realism. In this critique, he is firmly in the tradition of second wave psychological thinking, with its recognition of the dynamics and individuality of the psyche and its fascination with the psychical element in man.

Beresford continued to develop his interest in the mystical, psychical phenomena beyond the boundaries of
realism in the many short stories he wrote, particularly between 1912 and 1916. Stableford claims of these unpopular tales that

The vignettes are ahead of their time in their method and their preoccupations. They are surreal and oblique, playing with time and space in a manner that was not to become fashionable for many years. Their interest in psychological theory and in the peculiarities of man's existential predicament was virtually unprecedented in English fiction, though not in Russian or French short stories. ("J.D. Beresford" 489)

One of the earliest, "The Criminal" (June, 1912), concerns two reporters' attempts to satisfy their curiosity about the appearance of "the arch-criminal, the very creator of crime" (392), who has been brought to an in-camera trial in order to simulate fairness. Since both reporters have adopted the principle of the open mind ("Criminal" 393), they remain outsiders who do not join in the "great cry for revenge" voiced by "the whole civilisation of Christendom" ("Criminal" 391). Everyone else has a stake in the execution of the criminal because he has caused universal suffering ("Criminal" 391-392). That statement, along with the following one that the number of deaths for which he is responsible is incalculable ("Criminal" 392), suggests that he represents the evil within all of us or within the collective unconscious. This possibility is strengthened when the reporters obtain strongly conflicting reports of
his appearance from those who are admitted to the trial. The two persist until one of them finally gains admittance and takes photographs secretly. Beresford invokes a supernatural element when the two discover that no trace of the criminal appears in the pictures, though the surroundings turn out perfectly on the film. In a letter to Sir Edward Howard Marsh (February 14, 1918), Beresford wrote:

The Criminal was an abortive attempt to pose the suggestion that crime was a figment of the imagination, and that the arch criminal merely presented some force antagonistic to our own tendencies, and hence that we see him as the negation of some pet ideal of our own. I had not read a word of psychoanalysis, when I wrote it, but I see now, that many of Jung’s theories are implicit in my idea. (Letter to Marsh)

Others of the stories deal with psychic manifestations of unconscious yearnings and fears ("Expiation", 1920), the visions of those possessed with psychic powers ("The Misanthrope", 1914; "Young Strickland’s Career", 1921), or question the nature of external reality ("The Lost Suburb", 1913).

Despite these forays into the psychically unconventional, the main thrust of Beresford’s work remained in the realm of realism. These Lynnekers (1916) shows Beresford applying new psychological thought sparingly and subtly to the autobiographical family novel. At various stages, he attends to the subconscious conflict, suggestion, inclin-
ation and envy of his characters (Lynnekers 26, 102, 169, 255). Family members experience hysteria and "nervous irritability" (Lynnekers 225, 258).

However, the plot focuses on the development of Dickie, a younger son who is determined to break through the "web" of religious orthodoxy and tradition threatening to crystallize him before his growth is complete. Both "web" and "net" imagery convey this struggle (Lynnekers 194, 213, 301); it is tempting to locate the original source for these, as with Sinclair's use of them, in J. F. Herbart, though this cannot be proved conclusively. Dickie's self-education includes study of the intricacies of higher mathematics, Samuel Butler's Erewhon (Lynnekers 101), and Herbert Spencer's Principles of Ethics (Lynnekers 172). In his striving to obtain knowledge necessary to refute this orthodoxy, Dickie comes to inhibit thoughts about sexuality "almost automatically" (Lynnekers 213). Similarly to other Beresford heroes, Dickie has an overly close relationship with his mother, resembling that of a lover's relationship, but he does not find release for his repressed thoughts until they are triggered by the lewd remarks of novelist A. B. Ellis (based on H. G. Wells), as they observe the beautiful Sibyl Groome.
Beresford's commentary convincingly employs the idea of sublimation to deepen our understanding of Dickie's behaviour:

He had recognized the part sexuality played in the life of men without criticism and without applying any test to his own feelings. In his waking hours he never dwelt on the dreams that emanated from the secret hiding places of his inhibited desires. He had always found an outlet in mental application, in all kinds of work and in his splendid capacities for physical exertion. In London his single panacea for what he had called "stuffiness" had been the gymnasium.

But now, some black magic of Ellis's personality had suddenly released all those suppressed images to dance about Dickie's brain, distorted and crippled by their long confinement. And all their obscene contortions were reflected, as it seemed to him, in the person of the brilliant novelist who had so unexpectedly called them forth. (Lynnekers 345-346)

Not surprisingly, Sibyl becomes the object of Dickie's attraction, "the incarnation of some primitive response to all the desire of his life" (Lynnekers 421). Nor is Dickie's spiritual nature neglected by Beresford. Dickie occasionally experiences flashes of vision (Lynnekers 435). On one such occasion, he reaches his personal solution that no stage in his life or in the progress of humanity

must be judged as an absolute....Behind all progress and all life was this permanent spirit of endurance, of resistance, of power: endurance to maintain the truth of independence to all material pains and changes; resistance to demonstrate the transience of the image; power to prove that while the symbol may be changed, the spirit shall endure inalterable to find ever new forms of expression. (Lynnekers 447-448)
Beresford applies strokes of new psychological insight to a larger canvas in *Housemates* (1917), in the sense that a wider variety of individuals and classes is represented. Even so, *Housemates* is a much bolder and more intimate account than that found in *These Lynnekers* of the mental odyssey of the protagonist, facilitated by its first person viewpoint. The theme of Wilfrid Hornby's growth into independent thinking is quickly made explicit using the metaphor of a shell hatching the chicken. Wilfrid confides that,

> the history of my hatching, so far as I can trace it, is written in my consciousness. I admit that I am quite unable to explain the impulse to germination. (*Housemates* 4)

Indulged and protected by his parents and governess in his youth (*Housemates* 4), Wilfrid emerges from his shell only after he breaks his engagement to a woman who typifies the conventional world and becomes otherwise engaged in the life at the slightly disreputable boarding-house, where he begins his practice of architecture. The plot coheres around several incidents taking place there, which force Wilfrid to overcome his fear of humanity and to assert his independence. His success is measured by his marriage to the woman who is appropriate for him.

In such a *bildungsroman*, the protagonist’s conception of his "self" is important and revealing. Wilfrid believes
his to be both fragile and insubstantial, claiming in the opening pages that,

I must search the uncertain diary of my memory for any indications of growth that were marked at the time by the little glimmer of recording consciousness which seems at the last analysis to be the thing I recognize as my personality. (Housemates 3)

With great insight, Beresford also shows that Wilfrid’s self is deeply divided, and that it became so following his suppression of grief at his father’s death when Wilfrid was seventeen. At this time, as Wilfrid details to the doctor the events leading up to his father’s death,

below all the ebullition of my excited chatter, another personality, reserved and timid, held itself aloof, occupied with some general impression of things that had little relevance to all this apparent preoccupation with the new experience I was suffering. When I look back now I see that rather fair-haired callow youth of seventeen from outside. Memory recalls a picture of him and the sound of his voice, but nothing of what he felt. (Housemates 26)

Wilfrid does not recognize his duality, emanating from this divorce from emotion, until a cathartic moment at the boarding house. One Saturday night, the landlord attempts to evict one of the boarders, Rose Whiting, for her activities as a prostitute. She strips off her clothes while screaming that the landlord can turn her out naked. Though a relatively weak and fragile creature, in “the recklessness of her passion”, she dominates and intimidates the brute
opposing her. Wilfrid admires her for this, and because "she was at that moment, a single and powerful personality" ([Housemates 133]). The vision of Rose inspires the following revelation in Wilfrid:

I struggled then as if I were fighting for the control of my reason. I was very much aware of my duality; and presently, as I began more successfully to defend myself against the invasion of the single image which had nearly obsessed me, my visions took another shape.

I remembered the night of my father's death and my walk home with the little deformed doctor through the moonlight; and more particularly I recalled the clearness of my recognition that there were two Wilfrid Hornbys. ([Housemates 142])

His recognition releases him to begin to overcome the division. The next day, he recounts that "a load of resentment and oppression had been lifted from my mind" ([Housemates 145]), and he admits to himself that he is in love with another boarder, Judith.

As Wilfrid emerges into awareness, Beresford makes the reader privy, far more frequently than was the case in These Lynnekers, to his protagonist's subconscious motivations and feelings. In one instance, Wilfrid confronts the man who has swept away the fiance for whom his attraction was waning anyway. We are told that "'You infernal ass! was the unspoken comment of my bubbling subconsciousness" ([Housemates 123]).
The protagonist’s developing sexuality is also more candidly conveyed than in *These Lynnekers*. Beresford links the religious emotions and conversion experienced by Wilfrid at puberty with his sexual awakening: "But the true characteristic of my conversion was associated with those sexual yearnings which had just begun to find queer forms of expression" (*Housemates* 15). As a young man, Wilfrid has sexual relations with a loose woman, Nellie Roberts (*Housemates* 52), before becoming engaged to his cousin, Gladys, who does not attract him physically at all (*Housemates* 77).

Once again, Beresford demonstrates his sensitivity to the role that the mother-son relationship plays in his protagonist’s relations with women as an adult. Following his engagement at twenty-seven, Wilfrid finds it inconceivable that he would be separated from his mother (*Housemates* 77) and "wonder[s] whether she [his mother] was not divided between her love for me...and something that can only be called jealousy" (*Housemates* 78). Beresford is very astute in implying the further consequences of this over-dependence. While arguing with the admittedly shrill "feminist", Mrs. Hargreave, Wilfrid realizes that,

in my experience the bullies had all been women. Gladys had nagged me; my aunt had kept Uncle David
in subjection by the constant threat of her ill-health; Miss Whiting had delighted in her power to intimidate Pferdminger [the landlord] and myself; and this woman now cross-examining me was the very type of an autocrat. (Housemates 159)

In addition, Beresford explores more fully than in These Lynnekers the secular soul, the mystical nature of his protagonist. Wilfrid refers to "these transitory flashes of ecstasy", experienced from his youth on, as the state of "being exalte" (Housemates 7, 8). They involve his most intimate self and have been kept secret, even from his mother (Housemates 8). His "first great experience" concerns one which significantly occurs as he is reunited with his parents upon returning from a traumatic episode of being bullied at boarding school. He catches his first glimpse of his home

And the sight of that rich colour, outlining the beauty of form that was so sharply picked out by the direct light of the high sun, stirred me for a moment to a higher consciousness of being. I hovered for an instant, with a keen sense of expectation, on the edge of some amazing adventure. It was as if I had discovered some pin-prick in the world of my reality, a tiny hole that let in the dazzling light of a richer, infinitely more beautiful world beyond. It seemed to me that if I could but hold myself intensely still, I might peep through the curtain of appearances and catch one glimpse of something indefinable that was the fountain of all ecstasy. (Housemates 6)

In these moments, so strikingly similar to the ones Virginia Woolf would evoke, Wilfrid surmounts feelings of anxiety and dividedness. Later in life, they arouse in Wilfrid
sensations of union with his environment\textsuperscript{30} or of fellowship with humanity (\textit{Housemates} 70), though they can be prompted by elements of abnormality and surprise (\textit{Housemates} 69). Unlike in \textit{These Lynnekers}, Beresford touches on the supernatural in this novel, even though he referred to it as "ultra-realism" (\textit{Writing Aloud} 49). The night that Rose Whiting is murdered at the boarding house, Wilfrid is in a "condition of nervous exhaustion which so often gives us the power to transcend our physical limitations" (\textit{Housemates} 293). He is, therefore, an ideally receptive medium of extraordinary occurrences. Wilfrid cannot be certain that he hears her cry out. The cry may have reached his subconscious (\textit{Housemates} 253) or his response may be attributable to "a supernatural agent" (\textit{Housemates} 305). Though never conclusively determined, it is appropriate that Wilfrid should be linked psychically to Rose, since her earlier impassioned action opened his consciousness to his dividedness.

Finally, mental illness lurks in the shadows of this novel. Aside from his nervous exhaustion, Wilfrid experiences paranoia and becomes "obsessed" with the idea that Helen, Judith's close female friend, is a female devil because of her attempts to thwart the advances Wilfrid makes towards Judith. Wilfrid admits that his "mental processes
were all a trifle abnormal about that time" (Housemates 172), but Helen does eventually betray her hysterically jealous response by offering herself sexually to Wilfrid in an attempt to divert his attention from Judith (Housemates 248). In the epilogue, Wilfrid labels her a monomaniac and claims that, subsequent to the period covered in the novel, she had a serious nervous breakdown (Housemates 349). He himself suffered shell shock. Beresford's astute suggestion that, through writing, Wilfrid effected his own therapy and cure is very much in keeping with second wave psychological thought. Wilfrid confesses that,

when I began this book in January, I did it in order to forget. I was in danger of becoming insane then and I found relief by plunging myself back into the past. (Housemates 347)

Thus, in its representation of the struggle to overcome dividedness and achieve individuation, concern with sexuality, the mystical, and mental illness, Housemates contains many of the elements, some in embryo, which were to preoccupy Beresford in his future writing.

In contrast, Beresford's next novel, God's Counterpoint (1918), stands out in his canon, for several reasons. According to Beresford himself, it was the first English novel that was thoroughly informed by Freudian psychoanalysis. It was also the only one of his novels that he acknowledged to have been thoroughly influenced by psycho-
analysis ("Declin" 259). Finally, it suffers from clinical obtrusiveness more than any other of Beresford’s novels in the period under discussion (to 1924). Nevertheless, as a pioneering work, its flaws are instructive. They raise the question of whether reliance on one psychological source primarily, and in particular the Freudian source, weakens the artistic merit of the novel, making it too much of a temptation to use the source overly systematically and blatantly.

As in earlier works, the novel operates from a developmental perspective, but incidents from childhood are given much greater weight in explanations of the protagonist’s adult behaviour. The father is viewed as more of a repressive force than in previous novels, and the consequences for the protagonist’s psyche are explored more fully. Beresford’s knowledge of psychosomatic illness and dreams also make his characterization more vivid. In keeping with the close association in Beresford’s mind between psychical research and psychology, he frames his protagonist’s release from repression as a moment of illumination. Nevertheless, as Beresford himself acknowledged, the protagonist’s transformation would not be as believable or perhaps even understandable without some knowledge of Freudian dynamics of repression. Finally, in a
fashion which typifies second wave psychology, once again the protagonist's "cure" involves talking, and literature is viewed as therapeutic.

As the narrator claims in the opening apology, the novel traces the atypical conditions that lead to the enlightenment of Philip Maning, the protagonist (God's 9). In God's Counterpoint, Beresford emphasizes more of the sexual and psychological aspects of enlightenment than the intellectual, which had been stressed in both Jacob Stahl and Housemates. Philip's particularly punitive father is shown to be the dominant influence in his early years. He internalizes his father's repressive "Don'ts" (God's 13), and the unstated feelings of insecurity and incompetence presumably aroused by his father's characteristic attitude are crystallized during an episode when Philip is fourteen. On his way to the train station, and anticipating a feeling of grandeur when he will observe leisurely the harried workers on the opposite platform, Philip passes through a tunnel. We read:

And then without the least warning, he suffered a sensation that strongly reversed his anticipation of glory. He became suddenly aware of himself as of something small and negligible, a creature of ignoble thoughts and ambitions. And the self that watched had no relief of conscious superiority. (God's 19-20)
Though in itself a trivial incident, the event and the "beastly, mean feeling" that Philip associates with it, develop into a complex through repetition.

The second incident highlighted by Beresford as an illustration of Philip's restrictive upbringing occurs when he is seventeen. He and a friend, Georgie Wood, hear feminine cries from a woods as they pass, and on further investigation happen on a couple making love. The incident seems "beastly" to both of them (God's 24). However, Georgie later throws off his shame and jokes about the scene,

But Philip thrust his horror from him, deep down into the unknown spaces of his subconsciousness; whither it sometimes emerged at night, in dreams that shook him with visions of some vague and awful threat; so that once he cried out in his sleep, and woke to hear his own voice repeating "No; No. Please. Please don't." He got out of bed, then, and prayed desperately. What terrified him was not the note of fear but the undertone of repressed longing. (God's 24-25)

Henceforth, beastliness and sexuality are closely associated in Philip's mind (God's 33). These sensations are linked to literature, which has already been made an area of prohibition by Philip's father. Mr. Maning's opinion about the Oscar Wilde scandal, that hanging is too good for Wilde, fills Philip's mind with the "horror of unimaginable evil" and gives him a feeling of being small and helpless, similar to that experienced when in the tunnel (God's 34).
Nevertheless, Philip determines to embark on a literary career by working for a publisher, and must deceive his father by pretending indifference in order to do so. His choice implies his subconscious attraction to the forbidden area.

Philip's father exerts less overt control on his son from this point on, and dies just after Philip, at twenty-seven, becomes engaged. However, Philip encounters several father figures, who clearly demonstrate that Philip's feelings of inferiority and fear of emotions relating to sexuality persist. Their actions also inadvertently exacerbate these feelings. Whenever Philip innocently displays these emotions, he is either misunderstood and chastised by these figures or there is the threat that he will be. One of them, the romance novelist, Edgar Norman, whom Philip idolizes, chastises him for what Norman considers to be Philip's attempt to pick up a woman by gazing at her. For Philip, though, this is a moment of heightened illumination (God's 56). The woman, Evelyn, reappears five years later, hired on at the publishing firm where Philip works. Soon after Philip's feelings for her are aroused, he has what he refers to as an abasement experience on the way to work, similar to the one that occurred in the tunnel (God's 70). Some days later, his employer, another
father figure, makes advances towards Evelyn. Philip openly reprimands him at the risk of being fired, and then succumbs to his own passion for her by kissing her. His natural response is marred, this time by the threat of punishment and being charged with hypocrisy by his employer (God's 114). Beresford astutely claims that "in that instant of fear, all the mischief of Philip's life-long repression had been cruelly aggravated" (God's 115). He responds consciously by attempting to keep Evelyn remote and ideal, but Beresford employs dreams to convey Philip's inner state of tormented desire. In one, Evelyn transforms into a "great white ewe that wore a horrible aspect of lascivious humanity" (God's 133). Another suggests that Philip associates sexuality with shame and public exposure (God's 180).

Philip eventually marries Evelyn, though only after he obtains the assurance from her that they will abstain from carnal relations. Subsequently aroused by Evelyn's French cousin, Helene, whom he refers to as a "serpent" in a slip of the tongue (God's 200), Philip relaxes his puritanical conviction briefly, on his honeymoon. Evelyn becomes pregnant and bears a child. Thereafter, he is increasingly determined to preserve Evelyn as "an unattainable, intangible ideal" (God's 236). Beresford intimates the
psychic toll that this aim is taking on Philip through dreams and by suggesting that his illnesses are psychosomatic. He suffers neuralgia and insomnia and feels divided (God's 273). His mental state is likened to a prison (God's 258, 312). Evelyn, for her part, experiences hysteria until she sublimates her desires into creative writing (God's 260). For several years, their relationship remains blocked, until Helene, the French cousin, makes a visit.

About the time of Helen's arrival, Philip finds a poetic correlative for his tunnel experience in Francis Thompson's "Hound of Heaven" (God's 312), the first of subconscious changes in him. He then has what turns out to be a prophetic dream. Though outwardly Philip detests Helene, her arrival provokes in him a "new kind of dream" in which he embraces her, before she transforms into Evelyn and then his mother. Meanwhile, Evelyn finally decides to leave Philip and tells him that she is doing so because his mind is "poisoned and unhealthy" (God's 304). Philip's long-felt fear of feeling abasement now finds its fulfilment in reality (God's 312). The feeling leaves him open to seduction by Helene, who readily takes the opportunity, and they leave the Maning home together (God's 321). Part of Philip's attraction to her is that he is able to confess his tortured emotions to this collaborator in evil (God's 317).
She also educates him so that he begins to participate in the adventures of life (God's 330).

As evidence of his idealism, Beresford frames Philip's return to mental health as an integrating revelation. Following a break with Helene, he experiences a moment of vision about humanity in which "All apparent discords and ugliness were, it seemed to him, but accentuations of the eternal rhythm; the necessary beat of an undertone, God's counterpoint" (God's 331). Returning to Evelyn, he once again makes a confession, this time of his madness and moral suicide in departing with Helene (God's 376-377).

Several flaws weaken the effect of this novel. Philip's exposition of what he refers to as his pathology in his childhood perhaps resembles too closely a case study. Also, despite Beresford's cloaking of Philip's transfiguration as a moment of spiritual insight, the believability of this sudden change relies too heavily on knowledge of the Freudian principle of the cathartic release of repression. However, these flaws in themselves do not constitute the main problem with this novel. Nor does it arise, as Reinald Hoops claims, because the novel deals with an unusual individual of interest only to the psychologist (Hoops 99). Rather, in his enthusiasm for applying Freudian
insights and scientific objectivity, Beresford does not permit the reader to get close enough to the protagonist, to feel either his agony or his joy. This problem is compounded by the fact that the priggish, fastidious Philip is not a particularly likeable character to begin with.

Beresford is much better off when he absorbs the Freudian material more fully, allowing psychological conflicts and resolution to arise naturally out of dramatic incident, and refraining from providing explanation of them. His work is more engaging when he draws eclectically on a variety of intellectual and psychological sources.

In *An Imperfect Mother* (1920), Beresford more nearly achieves integration of his Freudian materials into an aesthetic whole, though the total effect is marred by a "Retrospect" that unnecessarily underlines the psychogenesis of the protagonist's "slight departure from the normal" (*Imperfect* 307). The main focus of the novel is on the resolution in adulthood of the conflict arising from an overly close bond between mother and son, which presumably originated in an oedipal complex (though this aspect of the relationship is left vague). Despite that bond, the son, Stephen, is not as fastidious as Philip Maning, and his sexual impulses receive more attention. Dreams and Freudian symbolism convey the nature of his desire and the dynamics
of Stephen's relations with women. Aside from this Freudian influence, Beresford's work also betrays the influence of Adler's inferiority complex in its portrayal of the father. The concepts and language of second wave psychology reinforce the intensity of characters' moods. Resolution of the conflict hinges on misinterpretation of an hysterical response.

The vicissitudes in the relationship between Stephen, an eldest son, and his mother, Cecilia, are, on the whole, traced convincingly. Unfulfilled in her marriage, the selfish, passionate Cecilia unfairly leans on Stephen for intimacy and love until she realizes that he has become self-sufficient, at which point she deserts the family. She embarks on a career as a London actress, taking her younger lover, a church organist, with her. Stephen's response to her decision is ambivalent. Though he has an "obsession" for his mother (Imperfect 65) and their arguments over her leaving are described as "lover's quarrels" (Imperfect 67), he feels some freedom at the thought of losing his mother (Imperfect 68). This feeling is heightened because Stephen has recently experienced his first infatuation with a girl, Margaret Weatherly, the fourteen-year-old daughter of the schoolmaster (Imperfect 12). Both Margaret and his mother
are subsequently unattainable and Stephen's desires for them mingle in his dreams (Imperfect 132).

Stephen's father's response to his wife's desertion is more devastating. Once again Beresford, following James, stresses the importance of habit, in showing Mr. Kirkwood to be the victim of long-held habits of thought. Over the course of years of Cecilia's flirtations, he has developed the habit of denying the possibility that she will leave. He continues to do so in the face of incontrovertible evidence. In addition, from the time of his marriage to Cecilia, above him in both class and talent, "he had been handicapped by a sense of his unworthiness" (Imperfect 113). He disguises his inferiority complex in eccentric behaviour. However, after his wife's departure, his divorce from reality is complete; he regresses, goes insane, and dies of "sheer inanition" (Imperfect 115).

Left to his own devices, Stephen pursues a career in building, under the guidance of his employer, Dickinson, another father figure (Imperfect 129). Following several years of separation from his mother and two sexual adventures, aborted because of thoughts of her at critical moments (Imperfect 138, 150, 185), Stephen, lonely and desirous of a wife, seeks out his mother. As he awaits her at a stage door, he catches his second glimpse of Margaret,
the girl who had entranced him many years before. We are told that "she had appeared, leaping suddenly out of the even background of his life, at two critical moments of spiritual disturbance arising from his relations with his mother" (Imperfect 198). Perhaps too conveniently, it turns out that Stephen has plenty of opportunity to meet Margaret, since she travels in the same social circles as his mother. However, Stephen realizes that if he falls in love with her, he will risk destruction, for several reasons: Margaret is far above him in social standing, and therefore unattainable; love for her would preclude faithfulness to his mother (Imperfect 198); most fundamentally, he fears that his response to Margaret's ideal beauty will be obsessive. "The passion would grow until it dominated him; until his sanity, his regard for all the reasonable joys of life, was drowned in one overwhelming lust for possession" (Imperfect 203).

The dynamics of the scene in which Margaret and Stephen are drawn together is subtly reinforced with Freudian imagery. At the request of his six-year-old half-brother, Chris, Stephen self-consciously displays his building prowess by erecting a tower out of blocks. In a bid to capture her defiant little son, Chris, Cecilia inadvertently knocks over the tower. Cecilia takes the boy
to bed while Stephen reconstructs the tower. Margaret admires his talent, claiming that "You really do it awfully well" (Imperfect 216), and expresses curiosity about visiting his "real building" (Imperfect 216). She eventually does so, and Stephen takes her up in the crane bucket, where she realizes that Stephen is different from the other men she has been flirting with (Imperfect 233). The symbolism of the mother, faced with a rival, attempting to castrate the son before he succeeds in captivating his lover through phallic prowess, would not likely be lost on, and might even seem obvious to, modern readers inured to Freud. Considering, however, that not one of the fifty to sixty reviewers of Beresford’s previous novel, God’s Counterpoint, even recognized that it was psychoanalytically influenced, it is probable that the imagery would appear fresh and might even have gone unnoticed by contemporary audiences ("Déclin" 261). Certainly two most perceptive critics, Katherine Mansfield and Virginia Woolf, did not mention this imagery in their critical reviews of An Imperfect Mother.

In spite of Stephen’s initial success, Cecilia is not yet willing to surrender to her rival, especially when Stephen reveals to her that the day she sensed he was no longer dependent on her was the exact day Margaret had smiled at him, while at school (Imperfect 242). At Stephen’s
first setback with Margaret, he comes in despair to Cecilia. He confesses that he has seen Margaret with another man and that she laughed cruelly at him, reminding him of his mother’s laugh in response to Stephen’s begging her not to leave with the organist (Imperfect 280-281). His remark that he felt like banging his head against the wall triggers the memory in Cecilia of an incident from his childhood when she laughed at him and he actually did this. Stephen’s comment, "I feel as if what you told me, about that first time, at home, explains everything", aligns well with psychoanalytic emphasis on childhood determinants of later complexes (Imperfect 282). This revelation would have been more convincing had incidents developing Stephen’s childhood relation with his mother initially been portrayed by Beresford. Nevertheless, since Cecilia realizes that her hysterical laugh had been forced from her by her love for Stephen and that Margaret’s must have been as well, she has the balance of power in her hands (Imperfect 281). Instead of concealing this insight from Stephen and attempting to keep him for herself, she decides to make him a present of his desire by revealing that both hers and Margaret’s laughter was hysterical and defended against feelings of dividedness (Imperfect 287). Beresford’s idealism surfaces briefly as he has Cecilia impute her action to the "motive
of self-renunciation" (Imperfect 287). Stephen pursues Margaret with renewed vigour and marries her, despite opposition from her father.

Apparently aiming at objectivity, Beresford claims that his "excruciating" retrospect "may be taken as a kind of appendix, or lengthy foot-note, designed to give a detached historical summary of certain subsequent events..." (Imperfect 307). Unfortunately, in keeping with the academic apparatus to which it is compared, the retrospect has the effect of suggesting to the reader that the previous narrative should be viewed as a scientific case study. Virginia Woolf may very well have taken her cue from it when she claimed, in her review of the novel, that, "in the ardours of discovery [of the new psychology], Mr. Beresford has unduly stinted his people of flesh and blood. In becoming cases they have ceased to be individuals ("Freudian Fiction" 154).

In Love's Pilgrim (1923), Beresford overcame his apparent enthusiasm for scientific objectivity and avoided the clinical retrospect. Though he treats psychological themes similar to those in his earlier psychoanalytic novels, his varied sources are less obtrusive and the net result is a far more convincing study of an individual. The protagonist, Foster Innes, is similar to Stephen Kirkwood in
that his bond with his unfulfilled mother is overly close, to Philip Maning in that he is repressed and fastidious about sexuality, to Wilfrid Hornby in that he narrates his own story, and to Jacob Stahl in that he is a self-conscious cripple. Though Beresford continues to explore Freudian insights about the mother fixation, he draws more centrally on the imaginative implications of the inferiority complex (as developed by Adler and Jung), and also brings his interest in psychical research, idealism, and mysticism more fully into play.

Having inherited his disability from his father, Foster Innes's defect has drawn him closer to his mother because of her over-protectiveness of him and since he believes that "No woman, except my mother, could ever love me completely since I was incomplete" (Love's 26). The physical basis of his feeling of incompleteness, inferiority, and fragmentation is compounded by his sense of divided loyalties following his mother's "sinister" (Love's 36) response to his half-hearted attempts at love relationships (Love's 43, 58, 121). His subsequent effort to hide his disability warps him in some respects because he moves into a fantasy world as compensation (Love's 58). This situation persists until he becomes angry at his mother after she tells him that his desire to have a relationship with a
farmer's daughter, Claire, cannot be fulfilled. His anger prompts him to free himself from his mother's domination (Love's 158). Foster's burgeoning relationship with Claire receives a setback, however, when she confesses that her father, Mr. Morton, has been tried for the murder of his wife (though she believes that her mother committed suicide).

Foster's loyalties remain split on a subconscious level until, during a drive, he views a panorama with Mr. Morton and experiences a moment of heightened illumination. This experience gives them "a mystical knowledge of one another" and removes any doubt in Foster's mind that Mr. Morton is indeed innocent (Love's 244). As William James had argued in Varieties of Religious Experience, this supernatural moment of certainty begins the process of healing dividedness. For Foster this process is completed upon his fulfilment of a selfless quest as "love's pilgrim" to find Claire's sister, who has hysterically confessed to the murder of her mother and then run off into a storm. Though Claire has acted as a confessor and carried out a natural analysis on Foster, thus helping him on the road to individuation, his love for her is essentially selfless. It is, therefore, fulfilling, unlike his love for his mother. Love's Pilgrim confirms once again Beresford's ability to
depict unusual aspects of character naturally, as arising out of dramatic incident, and to convey the complexity of human relationships with sensitivity.

Thus, the nine novels selected illustrate fairly completely the range of psychological knowledge that Beresford drew on and his overall success at imaginatively adapting the ideas of the new psychology to fiction. In his early novels, insights gained from Janet, Myers, and Bergson about subconscious motivation, genius, and creative evolution subtly percolate through his prose. While his initial enthusiasm for the educative potential of psycho-analysis caused Beresford to render these new ideas too blatantly and clinically, the first of his novels of this sort, *God's Counterpart* and *An Imperfect Mother*, are, nonetheless, courageous. They probe frankly the neuroses and obsessions motivating individuals subconsciously, and thus frequently do not reveal these characters at their most impressive; this sort of probing was not traditionally considered proper material for fiction. In addition, Beresford's thematic treatment of the mother fixation and the inferiority complex would likely have appeared fresh to Beresford's contemporary audiences, though these themes may have worn thin since then. As Beresford's interest shifted (once again) towards the mystical and psychical, the
psychoanalytic influence was absorbed into a larger metaphysical structuring of his novels. A glimpse of this change is provided in *Love's Pilgrim*, which depends less heavily on psychoanalytic thought and draws eclectically on idealistic and mystical ideas. On the whole, the profound and lasting influence of psychology on Beresford was a positive one, widening his subject-matter and deepening his insight into the psyche. He ought to be better remembered both for these pioneering fictional efforts and for his commentary on the psychologizing of the English novel.
Chapter Seven
Virginia Woolf's Response to Second Wave Psychology

"... let us always remember -- influences are infinitely numerous; writers are infinitely sensitive." ("The Leaning Tower", Collected Essays II 163)

"You can't think what a raging furnace it is still to me -- madness and doctors and being forced. But let's change the subject." (May 1, 1925, Letters III 180)

Virginia Woolf was the most adamant of the modernists in her claim that "We are sharply cut off from our predecessors" (Essays III 357), as we have seen (Chapter Three). However, she also believed in the continuity of culture, and in writers' role as "receptacles" of cultural currents (Meisel 160). At the close of "How It Strikes a Contemporary", from which the above quotation was taken, she challenged critics to view "writers as if they were engaged upon some vast building, which being built by common effort, the separate workmen may well remain anonymous" (Common Reader 304). Using a different metaphor, in A Room of One's Own, she argued that

masterpieces are not single and solitary births; they are the outcome of many years of thinking in common, of thinking by the body of the people, so that the experience of the mass is behind the single voice. (Room 63)

538
Despite Woolf's historical, sociological view of literature -- derived, significantly enough, from her father, Leslie Stephen (Annan 271; Hill, 356) -- many critical studies of Woolf consider her work ahistorically. Typically, neither psychological nor feminist studies attempt to link the ideas Woolf expressed in her fiction and essays with the cultural currents to which she was so sensitive (Rosenbaum "An Educated Man's" 35). While I do not wish to deny the often valuable insights provided by these approaches, this chapter attempts to provide a counterbalance to them by approaching her work from a similar perspective to the one she held on cultural transmission, and by situating Woolf firmly in her historical milieu.

One literary historian, S.P. Rosenbaum, does place Woolf in this manner; however, his claim that Woolf's "writing was shaped by a series of intellectual assumptions about reality, perception, morality, government, and art" needs to be extended to include human psychology ("Virginia Woolf" 11). Woolf was directly influenced by psychologists' working hypotheses about all aspects of personality, and her extraordinarily sensitive antennae picked up psychological ideas in the air. In her own ambivalent, idiosyncratic way, Woolf acknowledged both of these sources in a draft of
"Character in Fiction" (1924), a paper given before the Cambridge Heretics Society. She claimed:

No generation since the world began has known quite so much about character as our generation. I am not saying that we are the best judges of character; for that unfortunately does not necessarily follow. What I do say is that the average man or woman today thinks more about character than his or her grandparents; character interests them more; they get closer, they dive deeper in to the real emotions and motives of their fellow creatures. There are scientific reasons why this should be so. If you read Freud you know in ten minutes some facts -- or at least some possibilities -- which our parents could not have guessed for themselves. That is a very debatable point. But how much we can learn from science that is real ... and make our own from science? And then there is a ... vaguer force at work -- a force which is sometimes called the Spirit of the Age or the Tendency of the Age. This mysterious power is taking us by the hand, I think, and making us look much more closely into the reasons why people do and say and think things.... (May 18, 1924, Essays III 504)

Here Woolf chooses Freud as representative of scientists of the mind, perhaps not surprisingly, since by 1924 he had the highest profile of psychologists whose ideas were discussed by the Bloomsbury group. Though the Bloomsbury connection with Freud has been documented (Meisel Bloomsbury), and Woolf's problematic relationship to this thinker suggested (Goldstein, Abel, Orr), the extent and depth of that connection has not been fully acknowledged. In this chapter, I approach this goal by outlining chronologically Woolf's probable contacts with Freudian thought. More importantly, I
deal with several previously neglected strands of influence which led to Bloomsbury's fascination with Freud. As with other British intellectuals, the ideas of earlier proponents of second wave psychology, especially those of the Society For Psychical Research, initially captivated the imagination of members of the Bloomsbury circle and prompted them to explore psychology further -- several through careers in psychoanalysis.

In the case of Virginia Woolf, a milieu in which questioning of formal psychological ideas occurred was established in her early youth through the influence of her father, Leslie Stephen. Through her brothers -- Thoby and Adrian -- and friends -- Lytton and James Strachey -- her connection with the psychological thought originating at Cambridge further advanced her psychological knowledge. By the period during which she wrote her first novel (1908-1913), these two sources had already helped shape Woolf's fundamental assumptions about personality and the individual's relation to the group. Furthermore, many of the currents of thought that she continued to assimilate from these sources are strikingly similar to those which influenced May Sinclair and J. D. Beresford, both of whom were sensitive to the influx of the new ideas in these Edwardian years. Following a brief consideration of the
possibility that these near contemporaries directly influenced Woolf, Woolf's earliest sources of psychological knowledge and the impact of Freudian thought on her will be evaluated. The similarities in basic psychological themes to the fiction discussed in earlier chapters will be illustrated in Woolf's two relatively traditional early works, *The Voyage Out* and *Night and Day*. A glance at *Jacob's Room*, her third novel, and a more thorough analysis of *Mrs. Dalloway*, will show that these themes persist into her mature, modernist work. It must be kept in mind throughout that this discussion is not meant to devalue Woolf's highly creative personal vision, but to suggest the nature of some of the more important base materials which were submitted to the crucible of her imagination. In the concluding section, I suggest the possibility that second wave psychological thought exerted a pervasive influence from the Edwardian period on; it was one force which diminished the differences between advanced Edwardian writers and modernists like Woolf.

There is no denying that Virginia Woolf's background and position in British literary society differs widely from those of May Sinclair and J.D. Beresford. She was born into a distinguished literary family. To mention only two obvious connections, her father, Leslie Stephen, was an acclaimed
essayist, and editor of both Cornhill magazine and the Dictionary of National Biography; his first wife was a daughter of Thackeray. Woolf occupied a privileged position as a member of the upper-middle class, and class, both she and her father agreed, was the most distinguishing feature of a writer (Hill 355, 357). Woolf also followed her father's lead in her agnosticism. Woolf was an integral member of a coterie of well-educated, avant-garde intellectuals, whose collective aims, though less coherent, make it analogous in some respects to the Freudian movement. Her experiments in poetic, controlled stream of consciousness form clearly identified her as a modernist. The list could go on, but the extent of these differences is enough to suggest that any similarities among Woolf, Sinclair, and Beresford should be all the more striking.

In actuality, these writers share several features in common. Like May Sinclair, Woolf both suffered a series of losses of family members in the early part of her life, and she experienced several nervous breakdowns. Although from a privileged, well-educated family, Woolf herself, like Sinclair and Beresford, did not receive university education, as did her brothers. She always regretted that she was not given this opportunity because she was female, and her gender continued to make her feel that she was an
outsider. She also reacted against her father's authoritarian agnosticism, as evidenced by her fascination with the spirit and the survival of personality beyond death; this interest placed her outside of family tradition as well. Because of their rebellion against religious orthodoxy, both Sinclair and Beresford similarly felt that they were outside the tradition into which they were born. Though a member of a group of intelligentsia, Woolf was often highly critical of other members, and developed a very individual vision. Neither Sinclair nor Beresford were members of any recognizable intellectual group; thus their work developed along individual lines. Though a modernist, Woolf's first two novels are as traditional as Sinclair's and Beresford's early works. In her treatment of certain subjects, such as sexuality, and in her portrayal of doctors, she is more reactionary than either Sinclair or Beresford. Woolf's agnosticism did not prevent her from exploring the tenets of idealism in her early novels. Throughout her writing career, she shows that intense concern with the spiritual element of human beings which is also characteristic of Sinclair's and Beresford's work. In their earliest novels, all three demonstrate an impulse to break convention and to write about the formerly unwritten by creating characters engaged in writing novels. Sinclair's
George Tanqueray and Jane Holland (*The Creators*), Beresford's Jacob Stahl (the *Jacob Stahl* trilogy) and Woolf's Terence Hewet (*The Voyage Out*) all desire to write from a new perspective, to delve more deeply than their predecessors. Woolf held that her generation knew more about character than any before it, an optimism she shared with both Sinclair and Beresford (Essays III 504). Like them, Woolf explores unconscious and subconscious motivation and conflicts of her characters, their dreams and psychosomatic illnesses. Avrom Fleishman emphasizes Woolf's "encyclopedic style." He claims that, "In composing a train of verbal associations, she makes a synthesis of the sentiments, values and perceptions of her tradition" and that this "network of allusions" is part of "the dominant mode in modern British literature" ("Virginia Woolf" 134). Furthermore, Woolf merges genres in her "fictions", which she did not want to be classified as novels (Hill 359). According to Fleishman, "we have come to expect generic innovation as a mark of modernity" ("Virginia Woolf" 135). However, as has been argued in preceding chapters, Sinclair and Beresford also draw on highly eclectic sources, demonstrate what Jonathan Rose describes as the Edwardian impulse to synthesize (*The Edwardian Temperament* 27), and fuse genres in their work.
These similarities in thematic preoccupation and in approach to fiction writing raise the question of whether Woolf was in any way influenced by either Sinclair or Beresford, both of whom began writing psychological novels slightly ahead of her. The evidence for such an influence is not extensive. Woolf first mentions Sinclair in a letter to Violet Dickinson in November 1907. She defends Sinclair's The Helpmate (1907) against her friend Lady Robert Cecil's objection to it on moral grounds. Though Woolf claims not to have read the book, she observes that, even if its morality is questionable, it does not necessarily damage the artistic merit of the book (Letters I 317). Less than two years later, Woolf writes in a letter to Lady Cecil in which she mentions "these psychical people", that "Yesterday I met your friend Miss [May] Sinclair" (Letters I 390). Though critical of Sinclair's "medicinal morality," Woolf records that Sinclair "talked very seriously of her 'work'; and ecstatic moods in which she swings... halfway to Heaven, detached from earth" (Letters I 390). As has been discussed, Sinclair portrayed moments of ecstasy very similar to those of Woolf's from her earliest work on (Chapter Four 339; Chapter Five 369, 387). Woolf does not mention Sinclair again in her letters for over a decade, but, as both Walter Allen and Hrisey Zegger point out, Woolf is indebted to
Sinclair's groundbreaking 1918 essay on Dorothy Richardson's *Pilgrimage*, in which Sinclair applied William James's term "stream of consciousness" to Richardson's technique. Woolf drew on the same passage from James in "Modern Fiction", published one year after Sinclair's article. Allen's and Zegger's speculations are confirmed by Woolf's more recently published reading notes. One notebook entitled *Modern Novels* contains both Woolf's notes on Sinclair's article and a sketch of her own essay. These notes reveal that Woolf borrowed Sinclair's idea that the novelist must capture reality, described by Sinclair as "thick and deep", at first hand (Silver *Reading Notebooks* 18-19; 155-56). When Woolf does again directly refer to Sinclair, it is in response to Lytton Strachey's recommendation that Woolf read Sinclair's recently published poetic novel, *The Life and Death of Harriet Frean* (January 1922). On February 8 or 9, 1922, Woolf writes "And you read Miss Sinclair! So shall I perhaps. But I'd rather read Lytton Strachey" (Letters II 503). Woolf never confirms whether she took up Strachey's suggestion, and she makes no further reference to Sinclair. While it is difficult to believe that Woolf did not read a single novel of the woman who was considered the foremost woman novelist prior to Woolf, especially since Woolf made a point of reading the works of other experimenters in the
psychological novel, including James Joyce and Dorothy Richardson (Silver 155; Bishop 48-49), the fact remains that there is no evidence to suggest that she did. Woolf's apparent avoidance of Sinclair's work may be a factor of Woolf's snobbishness, since Sinclair was of a lower class than Woolf and frequently wrote about people of classes below Woolf's, or, more likely, it is an instance of the anxiety of influence. The relatively few documented intersection points in the lives of these two writers, then, cannot account either for the similarities in their approach to human psychology or for the abundance of common imagery they use to reflect psychic states. A few striking examples confirm the existence of these parallels, nevertheless. Both portray the self as fluid, insubstantial, and divided. They image consciousness as a web, net, or wave. In her very first novel, Audrey Craven, Sinclair draws an analogy between her protagonist's room and her mind (202) and Woolf also makes this comparison in several contexts (The Voyage Out; A Room of One's Own). In Audrey Craven, Sinclair also expands the conception of artist to include social artist, an idea Woolf develops most fully in her portrait of Mrs. Ramsay in To The Lighthouse (1927). Sinclair images Audrey Craven's instinctual desires using moth and star imagery (Audrey Craven 113) and, in her second novel, alters the
image to one of a "human moth fluttering around the lamps of town" (Mr. and Mrs. Nevill Tyson 66). Woolf's use of the moth and flame imagery is well known. Finally, both use as focal points instances of telepathy, which suggest the existence of a supernatural group or collective (sub)consciousness. The climax of Sinclair's The Tree of Heaven centres on Veronica's vision of Nicky near the tree of heaven in the garden. Correspondingly, Woolf's Mrs. Dalloway is linked psychically to Septimus Smith near the close of that novel; Lily Briscoe is connected to the group boating to the lighthouse, after she has had a vision of Mrs. Ramsay, in To the Lighthouse. Since Sinclair does not appear to have exerted a significant direct influence on Woolf, these resemblances point towards sources common to both. I intend to show that one important cluster of mutual sources are the ideas of first and, more importantly, second wave psychology.

Woolf appears to have known more of J.D. Beresford's works than of Sinclair's, but also to have had a more ambivalent attitude towards his approach to fiction. Pleased to have been asked "to preside over" him (December 19, 1920, Diary II 80), in a review of his An Imperfect Mother (1920), she criticized his scientific approach to characterization, claiming that he had created cases rather than individuals
(Essays III 197). At the very least, Woolf's chosen task would have forced her to increase the accuracy of her knowledge of Freudian thought, which she correctly identified as an important source for the novel. She also criticized a subsequent novel of Beresford's, Revolution, because it was over-deliberate. Yet in her review of it she acknowledged that Beresford is a writer "who can make you interested in his characters" (Essays III 279). She also cited "Jacob Stahl, The House in Demetrius Road and These Lynnekers, to name three very memorable novels out of a total now amounting to fourteen", suggesting that she had read at least these three (Essays III 280). Her attitude towards him changed once again following his published response to Woolf's "Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown", in which he defended Edwardian techniques of characterization. Incensed by his disagreement with her, she referred to his article as "that stupid Mr. Beresford's" (Letters III 90). As with Sinclair, the slight degree of contact Woolf had with Beresford does not begin to explain the correspondence of psychological themes in their work, as we shall see. Thus, having questioned the likelihood that either Sinclair or Beresford significantly influenced Woolf directly, it is necessary to account for similarities in their work by
probing further into the origins of Woolf's knowledge of psychology.

Virginia Woolf acquired a good deal of training and knowledge from both her father and her Cambridge connections, as was mentioned earlier. My aim in examining these sources is threefold. I wish to bring to light possible influences through these sources which have been ignored or undervalued, and to avoid dealing with the obvious influences which lie outside the realm of formal psychology, such as the impact of the Russian novelists on Woolf. Most importantly, my intention is not primarily to argue for direct influence but to evoke the milieu, or as Woolf calls it, "the Spirit of the Age" and place in which Woolf first encountered psychological ideas.

Several literary historians, including Katherine Hill and S.P. Rosenbaum, have shown that Leslie Stephen provided his daughter Virginia with a rich intellectual legacy, despite his tyranny over her (Hill; Rosenbaum "An Educated Man's"). They rightly emphasize that Stephen tutored her extensively in biography, history, novels, and poetry (Hill 353, 354; Rosenbaum "An Educated Man's" 42-49). However, Leslie Stephen's literary theory included the tenets that "literature is the highest imaginative embodiment of a period's philosophy" and that the literary artist, more
attuned to his culture than most, "senses new ideas as they struggle to be born and seeks to express them in an appropriate form" (Hill 355, 359). Stephen himself both was fully aware of philosophical tradition and kept abreast of contemporary intellectual developments. His knowledge of philosophical psychology was a part of Virginia Woolf's legacy. Noel Annan, Stephen's biographer, claims that by the time his subject was twenty-eight, in 1860, "he had read Mill and Comte, Kant and his English adapter Sir William Hamilton, Hobbes and Locke, Berkeley and Hume and most of the main intellectual works of his day..." (41). Stephen became an adherent of Mill and Utilitarianism and emphasized the development of this line of thought in The History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century (1876, 1902) and The English Utilitarians (1900). However, his role as historian of philosophy in these works challenged him to gain expertise in rival systems of thought, including idealism. In addition, he was profoundly influenced by his most important contemporaries. One of the first supporters of Darwin, he was also an early advocate of the social and ethical implications of evolutionary theory. His main contribution to the new social science, The Science of Ethics, attempted to make the social sciences do the work of religion (Annan 289). This work was published in 1882, the
year of Virginia's birth, and also the year in which the Society for Psychical Research came into being. Significantly, the book was influenced by one of the Society's founders and a foremost thinker on ethics, Henry Sidgwick. According to Stephen, Sidgwick's attempt to revitalize utilitarian ethics "set me thinking..." (Annan 282). Sidgwick also critically reviewed the book. S.P. Rosenbaum claims that Sidgwick's most relevant objection to it, in light of Bloomsbury's aesthetics, was "that many cultivated pleasures, such as aesthetic ones, have little or nothing to do with the social evolution on which Stephen based his ethical science" ("An Educated Man's" 38-39). Stephen knew Sidgwick well, and, despite the rebuff, wrote to Sidgwick that he was "in perfect charity with my critic" (Maitland 351). In 1901, Stephen wrote a summary of Sidgwick's life in Mind, two copies of which Leonard and Virginia retained along with a selection of Leslie's books until their deaths (Steele 332). This article may very well have had a special significance since Sidgwick's influence carries through to the Bloomsbury group, as we shall see.

However, Leslie Stephen's most important, though completely ignored, source of information about psychology, the newest of the social sciences, was James Sully. According to L.S. Hearnshaw, Sully and James Ward were "the
leading luminaries of London and Cambridge psychology at the end of the century" (132). Through his extensive connections, Sully also provided a link between psychological, philosophical, and literary thought for his and Leslie Stephen's generations, much in the same way as M.D. Eder did for Virginia Woolf's generation, as has been shown (Chapter Two). Sully's account of his friendships in his memoir, *My Life and Friends* (1918), reads like a list of Who's Who for the later Victorian Age. Not only did he know leading scientists, philosophers, psychologists, and psychical researchers such as Darwin, Huxley, Spencer, Tylor, Hughlings Jackson, Bain, Sidgwick, Lewes, Ward, William James, Edmund Gurney, and Frederic Myers, but he was also close to such literary figures as Robert Louis Stevenson, George Eliot, George Meredith, and Leslie Stephen. Sully was well suited to his role of connecting ideas from the sciences and the humanities since, in addition to his extensive knowledge of evolution theory and both the British and German traditions of psychology, he was gifted musically, was interested in aesthetics, had published short stories, and was an accomplished essayist. It was in the latter capacity that he first introduced himself to Leslie Stephen, then editor of *Cornhill* Magazine. Though their relationship was initially one of student to
tutor, they soon became very close friends and exerted a mutual influence on one another. Sully wrote a series of articles for *Cornhill* from 1875-1882, including "serious" ones on Self-esteem and Self-admiration and "The Laws of Dream-fancy." The latter provoked Stephen to convey to Sully several of his dreams, and Sully claimed that Stephen generally 

brought his own experiences and his reading to bear upon what I was writing about. Among the subjects which drew him out in this way, I remember dreams, children's ways, and the precocity of genius. (*My Life* 299)

Stephen's interest in Sully's work also prompted him to go back and read Sully's first book, *Sensation and Intuition: Studies in Psychology and Aesthetics* (1874; *My Life* 299). For his part Sully sympathetically reviewed both Stephen's *The History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century* and *The Science of Ethics* (*My Life* 300). According to Sully, his participation in the day-long walking excursions known as the Sunday Tramps, and in the more intimate Scratch Eight, both organized by Stephen, provided "rich opportunities of increasing our mutual knowledge." Since one of the members of the Scratch Eight, Edmund Gurney, was the Secretary of the Society For Psychical Research, this topic, along with philosophy, must have been discussed. After these excursions ended in 1891, Sully records that he took tramps
with Stephen alone. An even better opportunity for Sully to commune with Stephen's innermost self afforded itself during Sully's visit to the Stephens' summer house at St. Ives around this time. Virginia Woolf was apparently not the only one who felt the tremendous impact of this location and the experiences which occurred there, since Sully claimed that "this visit to St. Ives was one of the memorable experiences of my life" (My Life 312). Following this event, claims Sully, Stephen continued to show his old interest in my work; and, after reading my "Studies in Childhood," [1895] he sent me an account of his one childish lie -- a horrid, hideous, deliberate lie which I could not mention even now! (My Life 313-314)

While the extent of the intimacy between the two men should now be clear, it is not as easy to summarize the impact of Sully's thought on Stephen. As was noted in Chapter One, Sully expressed numerous ideas which were in advance of his time, and Stephen appears to have been attracted by several of these. He was certainly sympathetic to Sully's aim of demonstrating the implications of evolution theory for human psychology, particularly in the area of aesthetics. Sully opened Sensation and Intuition (1874) with a section entitled "The Relation of the Evolution Hypothesis to Human Psychology." One of the books that Stephen is known to have read, it predates
Stephen's own work in applications of evolution theory by eight years. As a man of letters, Stephen must also have been interested in Sully's chapters on "The Aesthetic Aspects of Character" and "The Representation of Character in Art." In these Sully argued that pleasure in artistic works is derived not only from verisimilitude, but also from appropriate selection of nature's details (Sensation 288, 290). The novel, however, possesses the greatest scope for representation of character, since in this form one can witness "the gradual development of a character as a whole, and the successive transfiguration which it undergoes with physical growth and with the accumulated effects of experience" (Sensation 310). The stress he laid on the developmental perspective in the novel foreshadows the preoccupation of second wave psychology with the developmental aspects of character, as well as Sully's own interest in this area, developed most fully in Studies in Childhood (1895). This work, another which Stephen read, excels in the chapters on imagination, play, and art, according to Hearnshaw (135).

Most importantly for present purposes, both Stephen and Sully were fascinated by the workings of the mind. In his memoir Sully rhetorically asks, "Were we [Sully and Stephen] not, despite the differences in our years and
status, scribblers who were supremely interested in the processes of thought?" (My Life 300). Sully is being modest about his own achievement here, since, as Hearnshaw claims, Sully was "the author of the most scholarly, comprehensive and well-balanced factual textbook of psychology ever produced by a British psychologist" (134). Hearnshaw adds that, "There is an attractive combination in Sully's work of scholarly thoroughness and an almost playful sensitivity to the nuances and mysteriousness of the human mind" (135).

But what would Stephen have learned from this foremost thinker on the mind? Sully believed that "psychology proper" was "the science which has to disentangle and reduce to simplicity the web of consciousness" (Human Mind vi). To this end he divided the functions of the mind into three: thinking, feeling, and willing, and traced their separate development (Human Mind 71). In considering the role of feeling, Sully stressed the relationship between pain and pleasure, and quoted Leslie Stephen's claim that pleasure is a state of equilibrium (Human Mind 199). In his Outline of Psychology (1884), Sully devoted considerable space to classifying different types of association and examining their effect on memory. He refers to trains of images and of movements in this connexion (Outline 242, 247, 618). He also
showed that mind was active and acknowledged the importance of unconscious processes, claiming that

at any time there is a whole aggregate or complex of mental phenomena, sensations, impressions, thoughts, etc., most of which are obscure, transitory, and not distinguished. With this wide obscure region of the subconscious, there stands contrasted the narrow luminous region of the clearly conscious. An impression or thought must be presumed to be already present in the first or subconscious region before the mind by an effort of attention can draw it into the second region. (Origins 74)

Furthermore, he was particularly interested "in the borderland between the normal and abnormal, in the imaginative and the fanciful (Hearnshaw 135), perhaps partly owing to his associations with psychical researchers Edmund Gurney and F.W.H. Myers.13 He elaborated on his ideas about dreams, which so intrigued Stephen, in Illusions, and in "The Dream as Revelation" Fortnightly Review (53 354). These ideas are cited with approval by Freud from the 1914 edition of Interpretation of Dreams onwards, not surprisingly since they represent the earliest British example of the second wave approach to dreams. They even pre-date Havelock Ellis' exploration. First, in the words of Freud, Sully "was more firmly convinced, perhaps, than any other psychologist that dreams have a disguised meaning" and were not utter nonsense (Interpretation 60). Sully was thus an early proponent of the unmasking trend in second wave psychology. Second, Sully
argued that these meanings often related to long-past experiences. He stated that

our dreams are a means of conserving these successive [earlier] personalities. When asleep we go back to the old ways of looking at things and of feeling about them, to impulses and activities which long ago dominated us. (As cited in Freud, Interpretation 60)

Finally, Sully asserted that the interpretative function of dreams was similar to that by which sense is made of events in the waking state (as cited in Freud 501-502). Thus, Leslie Stephen certainly had the opportunity of acquainting himself with the latest developments in English psychology through Sully.

Though it is almost certain that at least the two books that Stephen is known to have read of Sully's would have been part of his library, to which Virginia gained access from 1897, we have no record of whether the aspiring novelist ever read them, and cannot assume so. Nevertheless, we do know that Woolf knew Sully from references to him in her letters. In 1908 she wrote to Clive Bell that Professor Sully says "nice things" of her writing (Letters I 356). The high regard in which she held his opinion is suggested by the burst of enthusiasm about her work that his praise appears to have provoked. In the following lines of the same letter, she speaks of how she will become a popular "lady biographist" and "shall re-form
the novel and capture multitudes of things at present fugitive, enclose the whole, and shape infinite strange shapes" (Letters I 356). As late as 1912, she mentions to Madge Vaughan that she will write to Mr. Sully "whom I well remember" (Letters I 501). More important, however, are the correspondences in their basic approaches to human psychology. Like Sully, Woolf refers to consciousness as a web, and yet evokes the three functions of personality -- thinking, feeling, and willing -- in separate contexts in the characterization of her early works. She also uses the word "luminous" in referring to consciousness, as did Sully in the above quoted passage, and she attends very closely to her characters' states of consciousness. Her frequent references to variations on the train of thought metaphor demonstrate that she was aware of the importance of the differing types of association in memory. Allusions to the unconscious feelings of characters illustrate her familiarity with that concept. Finally, the information that she presents in the dreams contained within her narratives suggest that she held Sully's view that dreams carried hidden messages about conflict in the distant psychic past.

Leslie Stephen was also very much aware of William James's thought, and the latter is another psychologist whose ideas resurface in Virginia Woolf's writing. Stephen
wrote of James that "He is the one really lively philosopher, but I am afraid that he is trying the old dodge of twisting 'faith' out of moonshine" (Maitland 445). This comment neatly summarizes Stephen's attitude to James. Though Stephen admired him, as an agnostic he could not agree with the necessity to believe in a metaphysical system. Though he reviewed James's *The Will to Believe* (1897), he later wrote to James of the rationality of his own position of holding neither a positive nor negative religious creed, a position not considered in James's book (Annan 250). Leonard and Virginia Woolf possessed a copy of James's *Human Immortality* (1917 ed., Steele 307), but it is to James's psychological writings that Virginia is more indebted. As was already noted, she drew on the same passage of James's on the stream of consciousness as May Sinclair did. J. Isaacs has pointed out that Woolf's imagery describing life as a "halo" and "semi-transparent envelope" closely echoes James's words in the section of *Principles of Psychology* on consciousness.15

Thus, at the very least, it should be clear that Virginia Woolf was raised in an environment in which current psychological, as well as philosophical, ideas were being discussed. The impact of this earliest milieu was overlaid by Woolf's exposure to Cambridge thought, her second source
of information about philosophical psychology. Michael Holroyd, amongst others, has asserted that Bloomsbury cannot be dissociated from Cambridge (Lytton Strachey 422); the ideas of G.E. Moore are widely acknowledged as the central Cambridge influence on Bloomsbury. However, the figure of G.E. Moore has loomed so large that other Cambridge influences on Bloomsbury, and on Moore himself, have been obscured. When it is realized that Moore's teachers included the most distinguished psychical researcher of his day, Henry Sidgwick, an idealist, J. McTaggart, and two of the most eminent English psychologists of the day, G.F. Stout and James Ward, one cannot help but wonder to what degree the currents of thought expounded by them permeated the Cambridge atmosphere.

As Professor of Moral Philosophy and a major contributor to several university reforms, Henry Sidgwick had considerable impact on Cambridge thought. In 1869 he had resigned his Trinity Fellowship because he was no longer able to fulfill the requirement of professing the established religion, and this action led to a change in the law (Levy 77). For this bold move, he was considered a champion by subsequent non-religious members of the select, secret debating society known as the Apostles, including G.E. Moore, Lytton and James Strachey, and Leonard Woolf.
He was also an important influence on the thinking of G.E. Moore. Moore readily acknowledged that the ideas considered most original in his magnum opus Principia Ethica (1903), the book which was the main source of Moore's ideas for the Bloomsbury Group, actually originated in the works of Sidgwick (Levy 77). For instance, Moore borrowed the important idea that the Good was indefinable from Sidgwick (Levy 142). While the realist side of Moore would not have been sympathetic to Sidgwick's attempts to prove the immortality of the soul through psychical research, he certainly respected Sidgwick's pursuit of the truth and commonsense (Levy 168), which would have made Moore more open to Sidgwick's unorthodox inquiry. Also, Apostolic interest in psychical research resurfaces in the younger generation, as will become apparent when we examine early influences on James Strachey. Finally, Sidgwick exerted influence on Moore and Bloomsbury indirectly through his pupil, John McTaggart, who was Cambridge lecturer on moral philosophy from 1897 to 1923.

McTaggart was an idealist who constructed a philosophy to justify beliefs he held, an impulse similar to that of the psychical researchers. He believed in immortality, denied the reality of space and shared time, and interpreted the Absolute as a community of immortal,
loving souls or selves. As Rosenbaum claims, his is a philosophy of love and of mystical pluralism or perspectivism (Victorian Bloomsbury 190). Moore's is also a philosophy of love, and he credited McTaggart with great influence on him. Though Moore eventually swung away from formal philosophical Idealism, Moore's legacy to Bloomsbury consisted of a series of Ideals, including friendship and love, which replaced traditional morality. In addition, as Johnstone has averred, "Moore's ideal is spiritual. There is a certain mysticism associated with his rational, scholastic method" (32), which suggests the continuing influence of idealism.

McTaggart's contacts with members of the Bloomsbury group were fairly extensive. He was a great friend of Roger Fry (Levy 104). Lytton Strachey, Leonard Woolf, and Saxon Sydney-Turner held Thursday evening discussions with him at Cambridge before they came under the influence of Moore (Holroyd 131). Lytton Strachey attended his lectures there (Holroyd 306). Virginia Woolf did not likely read McTaggart until preparing to write Roger Fry's biography, at which time she claimed to be "surprised to find how interesting mystic Hegelianism is to me" (Letters VI 6).

However, several intersection points can be located between the structure of ideas in Woolf's early fiction and
McTaggart's ideas, or those filtered through Moore. Woolf's characters have highly individual perspectives on life. Their perspectives tend to isolate them, and yet at moments of spiritual intensity (in which it could be said that they are approaching the Absolute), there occurs a mystical, psychic connection between them. In both Mrs. Dalloway and To the Lighthouse there is at least the possibility that this psychical communion takes place between living people and dead ones. Several characters in Woolf's early fiction are motivated by unworldly ideals as well.

Not only did philosophical ideas outside the realist school have an impact at Cambridge and on Bloomsbury. The Moral Science Tripos that McTaggart, Moore, and James Strachey -- amongst other Apostles -- wrote (Levy 261) included the study of psychology (Levy 103). James Ward, whose psychological ideas were highly influential on British psychology for over sixty years (Hearnshaw 136; cf. Chapter One 122-123), was one of G. E. Moore's teachers in philosophy. At the time, it must be remembered, there was considerable overlap between the older discipline and psychology. According to Levy, "Moore admired Ward more than any other of those who taught him" (59). Like McTaggart, he was an idealist and encouraged Moore to read Rudolph Lotze (1817-1881), a German idealist philosopher who
also helped in the founding of physiological psychology (Webster's 919). In Ward's psychological writings, as paraphrased by Hearnshaw, he stressed that psychology is the study of individual experience, of concrete individuals, "the innumerable unique personalities" we encounter in real life.... Personality is shown not merely in what a man is, but in what he is striving to be. (Hearnshaw 139)

Both Moore and Bloomsbury would have found attractive this emphasis on the uniqueness of the individual.

G. F. Stout was the second of Moore's philosophy professors who was also an important British psychologist (cf. Chapter One 123).\(^{19}\) Stout's lectures, which Moore found "interesting and exciting," covered "the history of modern philosophy from Descartes to Schopenhauer and beyond!" (Levy 59-60). He was the main English exponent of the psychology of Herbart, whose ideas about momentary repression we have found to be so influential on both Freud and Sinclair.\(^{20}\) Partly owing to Stout's extensive knowledge of German psychology, several of his ideas on the subject have a modern, second-wave component. He held that all levels of mind are active, and borrowed William James's stream metaphor to describe consciousness (Analytical Psychology I 147, as cited in Hearnshaw 142). He emphasized the developmental perspective, and his Manual of Psychology
(1898) "analyzed in detail the development of our perception of the external world" (Hearnshaw 143).

Given Moore's contact with these two psychologists, it is not surprising that psychological ideas appear in Moore's earliest Apostle papers. In 1894, he gave a paper in which he first emphasized that friendship and aesthetic enjoyments are the greatest goods, the idea as later expressed in Principia Ethica that would captivate Bloomsbury (Levy 140). In order to prove the value of friendship, he analyzed consciousness in three parts -- will, intellect, and emotion (Levy 141) -- the most acceptable division from the time that Sully made use of it onwards.

Moore later veered away from psychological analysis, but the philosophical, psychical, and psychological ideas in the air at Cambridge, both while Moore was a student there and then as a teacher, attracted the attention of several Apostles and Cambridge undergraduates who were also Bloomsbury members. At least two of those, James Strachey and Adrian Stephen, investigated some of these ideas through the earlier exponents of second wave psychology before taking up psychoanalysis.

In the fall of 1905, James Strachey followed in his brother Lytton's footsteps and went up to Cambridge. He became an Apostle relatively quickly, in February 1906. He
also befriended A. G. Tansley, who would become one of the first scientists to acknowledge and publish a book on the significance of Freud's work (*The New Psychology* 1920). Most importantly for present purposes, it was during his undergraduate years that Strachey became interested in psychical research. Cambridge had been a centre for psychical research since the time of Henry Sidgwick, when psychical experiments had been carried out there, in 1895 (*Gould Founders* 237). As an undergraduate, older brother Lytton had met at a luncheon the Sidgwicks, who were both intrepid psychical researchers (*Holroyd* 95). We also know that some years later, in February 1907, he was asked to tea by Mrs. Sidgwick, whom he claimed had "an infinitely remote mind, which, mysteriously, realizes all" (*Holroyd* 303). With these personal contacts, it may well have been Lytton who introduced James to the work of the S. P. R.. At any rate, as early as August 1907, James is using the terminology of psychical research in correspondence with Lytton, claiming that "I do no work and am mostly in trances, though I read a little" (as cited in Meisel 19, underlining mine). Less than a year later, James writes that he is spending his days reading the extraordinary narrative just published in the S. P. R. Proceedings of Mrs. Holland and Miss V.. They say that very soon the most
remarkable of all--Mrs. V. and Mrs. Piper--will come out. (July 10, 1908, British Library)

In November of the same year, James's humorous allusion to F. W. H. Myers in another letter to Lytton demonstrates his familiarity with this most important S. P. R. thinker:

I feel that I am dead at last; and that I'm passionately trying, like the late F. W. H. Myers, to convince people that I'm not. Very often I can't even read, I sink into trances which leave me raving or in tears. (Nov. 26, 1908, British Library)

Drawing on James Strachey's unpublished "Autobiography of Hebephrenic," Levy claims: "it was as an undergraduate that James Strachey attended a meeting of the S. P. R. in the first decade of this century, and heard a paper by Freud read" (Levy 85). While it is highly unlikely that Strachey heard a paper by Freud, since Freud did not make a contribution to the Proceedings of the Society until 1912, he may well have heard a paper which discussed Freud's ideas, since, as we have seen, the society was well aware of these ideas from the 1890's on.

In his obituary of Strachey, D. W. Winnicott incorrectly states that Strachey was "positively influenced by a quotation from Freud in a book by C. G. S. Meyer" ("James Strachey" 129). The author was actually F. W. H. Myers, and the book not, as Perry Meisel claims, The Future of Science (Bloomsbury 26), but that source book for so many
thinkers captivated by the ideas of second wave psychology -- Myers's posthumously published *Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death* (1903). Though Meisel argues that Strachey did not read Myers until 1912, the hitherto unnoticed letters cited above make it conceivable that Strachey had perused *Human Personality* as an undergraduate. During the same period of correspondence (1908-9), the brothers also discuss their "underground" and "subconscious" feelings, sexual dreams, melancholic and nervous illness, as well as mystical moments and visions. Their use of this terminology and these concepts suggests that they had a fairly wide conversational knowledge of second wave psychology, which either the *Proceedings* of the S. P. R. or Myers's book could have provided.

In 1909, James Strachey went down from Cambridge and became secretary to his cousin St. Loe Strachey, editor of *The Spectator*. He contributed reviews and articles on psychical research, philosophy, psychology, and literature. His first, a review of a biography of "John Dee" (Oct. 23, 1909), reveals his continuing interest in psychical research, since he focusses on the fascination with mediums and crystal balls of this Elizabethan man of science (Meisel *Bloomsbury* 26). A year later, he wrote a positive review of Frank Podmore's *The Newer Spiritualism*, entitled "The
Progress of Psychical Research" (Spectator October 15, 1910 608). Other articles attributed to him include "Memory and the Individual" (April 16 1910, 618), also on the topic of psychical research, "A Dreamer's Tales" (February 25, 1911 288), and "The Meaning of Individuality" (Nov. 3, 1912, 710). By 1912, he had become a member of the S. P. R., along with his friend Harry Norton. While James was employed with The Spectator, the magazine also published extensive reviews of Bergson's Time and Free Will, Creative Evolution, Matter and Memory, Laughter, and his 1911 London University Lectures, William McDougall's Body and Mind, and all of Algernon Blackwood's novels of the period, which were heavily influenced by the ideas of psychical research and second wave psychology. Although it is not known whether James wrote any of these, as personal secretary to the editor he would likely been aware of their inclusion in the paper. During the years 1908-1910, Strachey undoubtedly increased his knowledge of philosophy since he spent a good deal of time with G.E. Moore, who was fond of Strachey and found that he had an aptitude for philosophical discussion.

Virginia Woolf also came to know James, the brother of one of her best friends, Lytton Strachey, during these years; she first makes a reference to him in a letter
written Christmas Day 1909 (Letters I 390). By March 1911 she is inviting him to a gathering at her cottage in Firle, at which, she claims, "There will only be the pleasures of the soul" (Letters I 452). Like James, she was mainly a reviewer in these years, and she did not just review literature. In 1908 she wrote that "I have refused to review any more novels for the Times; and they send me Philosophy."^27

In addition, she was also well aware of the activities of psychical researchers, as a comment in the same letter in which she mentions having met May Sinclair makes clear:

There should be threads floating in the air, which would merely have to be taken hold of, in order to talk. You would walk about the world like a spider in the middle of a web. In 100 years time, I daresay these psychical people will have made all this apparent -- now seen only by the eye of genius. (April 13, 1909, Letters I 390)

Though slightly flippant, Woolf here shows some confidence that psychical research will provide the answer to a question about psychic connections which puzzles her. Woolf subsequently reveals an interest in the psychical and supernatural in several of her essays. In a 1917 review of Elinor Mordaunt's short stories, Before Midnight, she claims that she does not like the supernatural in fiction. However, by the supernatural here she means the traditional 'violent old ghosts' and other external phenomena (Essays III 324).
She objects to "the methods of the conjurer" by which these phenomena are used as a crude replacement for analysis of uncanny states of mind ("Before Midnight" Essays II 87-88). Her own perspective is most clearly revealed in her comment about what she would have liked Mrs. Mordaunt to have accomplished:

Nobody can deny that our life is largely at the mercy of dreams and visions which we cannot account for logically; on the contrary, if Mrs. Mordaunt had devoted every page of her book to the discovery of some of these uncharted territories of the mind we should have nothing but thanks for her. ("Before Midnight" Essays II 87)

A year later Woolf reviewed The Supernatural in Modern Fiction (1917) and noted with approval that the author, Dorothy Scarborough, included stories about "abnormal states of mind" along with ghost tales. Woolf demonstrates a considerable understanding of the psychology of our attraction to these stories, and she draws on the concept of repression to illustrate the effect of this genre on an historical period:

It is worth noticing that the craving for the supernatural in literature coincided in the eighteenth-century with a period of rationalism in thought, as if the effect of damming the human instincts at one point causes them to overflow at another. ("Across the Border" Essays II 218)

She also reaffirms her opinion that modern supernatural writers must not seek to terrify readers with the sorts of descriptions of external apparitions used in the past, "but
by those ghosts which are living within ourselves" ("Across the Border" Essays II 218-19). Most importantly, Woolf acknowledges the function of psychical research as a source for the modern attraction to the supernatural in her claim that "A rational age is succeeded by one which seeks the supernatural in the soul of man, and the development of psychical research offers a basis of disputed fact for this desire to feed upon." The insights Woolf expresses show that she had given some thought to the psychological processes involved in the supernatural. Woolf claims that these processes are to be found in much modern fiction ("Across the Border" Essays II 220), and, it might be added, can be located in her own fiction.

Woolf might have gained some knowledge of psychical research and the related field of abnormal psychology from Bloomsbury psychological parties. They were held as early as 1912, though some members were apparently ambivalent towards them. James Strachey replied to Maynard Keynes's invitation to one by stating: "It's very nice of you to ask me. D'you really think I'd better come, though? It might make your party psychological -- which is always a thing to be avoided" (July 17, 1912, as cited in Meisel 27). Though we do not know for certain the nature or extent of either James Strachey's discussions with Virginia Woolf or of the
discussions of psychical research and psychology at these Bloomsbury gatherings, it is tempting to speculate that Virginia was made aware of these currents of thought by James. At the very least, the ideas of psychical research, along with the philosophical ideas of G.E. Moore, were in the Bloomsbury air. Several members and associates of Bloomsbury, including James and Lytton Strachey and Harry Norton, were interested in psychical research, perhaps partly because of its unorthodox nature, before they investigated the ideas of Freud, for similar reasons.

Adrian Stephen was another member of Bloomsbury who was introduced to the ideas of second wave psychology through other proponents of it than Freud. His study of Morton Prince's *Dissociation of a Personality* (1906), just after World War One, led Stephen to the conclusion that the study of human personality was the most interesting and important task for [his] generation" ("Obituary" 5). As we shall see, Virginia Woolf was well aware of her brother Adrian's interest in psychology and psychoanalysis, since she commented on the impact of this fascination on his life and relationships.

Having set the background of psychological influence on Bloomsbury, we now come to the problem of the degree to which Woolf was exposed to and influenced by the thought of
Freud and other later exponents of second wave psychology. Woolf's direct references are scattered and vary in attitude. However, a chronological survey, which focusses on Woolf and includes the involvement of other Bloomsbury members with second wave thought, reveals that Woolf's opportunities for engaging with these new ideas were numerous, and that she availed herself of these opportunities on several occasions.

Before embarking on this survey, it will be helpful to make a few general remarks about the long-debated question of why Woolf was herself never analyzed, since this omission bears on her basic attitude towards the mental health profession. Several explanations have been put forward. Alix Strachey, wife of James, suggests that Leonard, whom she implies had considerable control over Virginia, "decided not to let her be psychoanalyzed" ("Alix Strachey" Noble 143). He may have judged that an analysis would have interfered with her creativity ("Alix Strachey" 143). Jan Goldstein claims that Woolf "clung to an old-fashioned treatment" of rest cure, just as she "clung to an old-fashioned conception of her illness as nervous exhaustion" (Goldstein 238). However, the anger Woolf expressed at this form of treatment, both in Mrs. Dalloway and in her letters, refutes this claim. Douglas Orr
concludes that Woolf could not have had an analysis even if she had wanted one because there was no one in England in the 1920's (when it would have been most advantageous for her to have analysis) who could have handled her case (Orr 160). This point is debatable, but even if we grant its accuracy, there is no reason why Woolf could not have gone to Europe for analysis, as James and Alix Strachey did.

While each of these explanations may contain a grain of truth, it seems to me that the reasons for Woolf's avoidance of analysis are more fundamental. Unlike other writers examined in this thesis, Woolf initially came into contact with, and was treated by, mental health professionals who embodied first wave ideas about "mental disease." As Stephen Trombley has documented in great detail, Woolf was the victim of doctors who believed in the restraint and control of their patients. They confused mental suffering with lack of morality, and their prescriptions of food, rest, and the avoidance of intellectual stimulation and society often contradicted Woolf's own insights about her needs. Consequently, Woolf early on formed a very negative opinion, rooted in fear, of the physicians who treated mental illness. In a 1907 letter to Violet Dickinson, she expresses this opinion forcefully: "all I can say is, why do you see doctors? They are a profoundly untrustworthy race; either
they lie, or they mistake" (August 25 Letters I 306). Woolf does not make distinctions between doctors who employ differing methods of treatment, even though those differences are vast. Ernest Jones, a proponent of second wave psychology, in fact condemned three of Woolf's doctors -- George Savage, Maurice Craig and T.B. Hyslop -- for their limited treatment of isolating patients by placing them in expensive hospitals (Jones, Free Associations 123). Woolf must have recognized intellectually that the analyses which her near contemporaries, friends and relations -- including Alix and James Strachey and Adrian and Karin Stephen -- were receiving and carrying out were not very much like the treatment she had received; however, she continued on some deep level to distrust the diagnoses or "false verdicts" as she referred to them, of physicians and nerve specialists en masse (Letters IV 227, 325-326, 342).

Furthermore, Woolf's only experience and perception of the healing professions coloured her attitude towards her friends involved in analysis. Though objectively the difficulties in their private lives may not have inspired confidence in what they professed, Woolf's observations of the negative effects of psychoanalysis on them are particularly acute, as we shall see.
Despite Woolf's fundamental suspicion of the competence of doctors and neurologists, which in my view mainly accounts for her avoidance of any therapy, including psychoanalytic, she was intrigued by some of the ideas of psychoanalysis. Again several factors help explain her reticence about expressing this interest in print. First, she was surrounded by experts on psychoanalysis. To make commentary on a field in which she was not as knowledgeable as they were would be to invite criticism from those whose criticisms she respected. We do know from a witness that in 1936 Woolf engaged in a verbal battle about psychoanalysis with Alix Strachey at which Woolf was "worsted" (as cited in Orr 155). Second, as Elizabeth Abel has pointed out, Woolf would have felt psychoanalysis as a threat since she herself staked a claim to "the dark places of psychology" (Abel 14). Woolf might have perceived psychoanalysis as an encroachment, especially since Freud's works were early on interpreted in a literary context as imaginative, in Britain, and particularly in Bloomsbury (Abel 15). The rivalry would have been intensified because Woolf's Hogarth Press published Freud's works concurrently with her own. Perry Meisel has made a convincing case that Woolf felt the anxiety of influence of Walter Pater (The Absent Father), to whom she rarely refers in her work, and there is no reason
to think that she would not have felt similar anxiety about Freud and psychoanalysis. Finally, it is possible that Woolf minimized her stated knowledge of Freud for the very same reasons as Sinclair and Beresford did. To be labelled a Freudian novelist could be damaging to sales and, more importantly in Woolf's case, to reputation.

Given these provisos, it is surprising that Woolf referred to Freud and psychoanalysis as much as she did. In his autobiography, Leonard Woolf claimed that "In the decade before 1924 in the so-called Bloomsbury circle there was great interest in Freud and psychoanalysis, and the interest was extremely serious" (Downhill 164). As we have seen, this interest was initiated somewhat before 1914, at the latest by James Strachey's probable reading of Freud's November 1912 contribution to the S.P.R., "On the Unconscious." Certainly by 1913, the year Virginia finished revising The Voyage Out, James and Lytton's discussion of Butler's The Way of All Flesh strongly suggests that they were aware of Freud's theories about childhood sexuality. Lytton wrote to James on April 13:

"Considering the whole story turns on an attempted rape, it seems incredible that the man should have escamoted the sex question during the hero's early life to such an extent." (British Library)

Probably in 1914, Lytton Strachey wrote a parodic dialogue entitled "According to Freud", which directly alludes to
Freud's *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life.* However, the first "serious" document about Freud by a Bloomsbury member was Leonard Woolf's June 13, 1914 review of Freud's *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* for the *New English Weekly*. Though Woolf refers to Freud's theories as "peculiar" ("Everyday Life" 36), he praises the subtlety of Freud's writing and his "broad and sweeping imagination more characteristic of the poet than the scientist or medical practitioner" ("Everyday Life" 36). His claim that "No one is really competent to give a final judgement upon even *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* who has not studied *The Interpretation of Dreams*, and Freud's more distinctly pathological writings" ("Everyday Life" 36) suggests that Leonard had read these. Finally, in typical Bloomsbury fashion, Woolf reserved his highest praise for the truth-value of Freud's work:

> But this may be said categorically and confidently that there can be no doubt that there is a substantial amount of truth in the main thesis of Freud's book, and that truth is of great value. ("Everyday Life" 37)

During this same year, Woolf also met Walter Lippman, an American popularizer of Freud. Leonard recorded his excitement at the frankness of their discussion of psychoanalysis and insanity (as cited in Goldstein 248-249). Given Woolf's recognition of the literary merit of Freud's work,
his obvious fascination with the ideas expressed in it, and his enthusiasm in talking about psychoanalysis, it is hard to believe that he did not discuss Freud's ideas with his wife, Virginia. Although Virginia apparently left no record of such a discussion, years later in a letter to Erwin Steinberg, Leonard admitted that Virginia had read *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* at some point before she wrote *Mrs. Dalloway*. He added that he did not think that Virginia had read *The Interpretation of Dreams* (Steinberg "Note" 64). However, since the Woolfs owned a copy of Dr. Eder's 1914 translation of *On Dreams*, Freud's popularization of his dream theory (Holleyman), it would have been more likely that she had read this lively account rather than the more technical *Interpretation*. By 1915, at least one other copy of Freud's *Interpretation* was circulating in Bloomsbury, since on October 15 Alix asked James Strachey to lend her his copy (Meisel 27).

In 1916 Leonard favourably reviewed another important work of second wave psychology, Wilfrid Trotter's *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War* (1916), a copy of which the Woolf's retained in their library (Holleyman). According to the critic Allen McLaurin, the book prompted Leonard "to see the crowd in terms of the non-rational or instinctive motivation" (37). Two weeks after the July 8th review,
Virginia began thinking of a new novel, *Night and Day*. This sequence is significant because in the case of Trotter's book, we do know that Virginia was involved in discussions about it. Over a year later, in her November 27, 1917 diary entry, Woolf agrees with Roger Fry, whom she detects is influenced by "Trotter and the herd", about the future of the world (*Diary I* 80). Freud continued to be a topic of discussion, as a letter in which Virginia describes the ad hoc analysis that Leonard performed on her makes clear. She wrote to Saxon Sydney-Turner that, after she had a nightmare and woke Leonard in the night to look for Zeppelins, "He then applied the Freud method to my mind, and analysed it down to Clytemnestra and the watch fires, which so pleased him that he forgave me" (*Letters II*, February 3, 1917 141).

By 1918, she was certainly aware of Freud's theories of sexuality, since in a January 21 diary entry she recounts having engaged in "hours of talk" with Lytton Strachey about his involvement in the British Society for the Study of Sex Psychology. Woolf wrote that

> Among other things [Lytton] gave us an amazing account of the British Sex Society which meets at Hampstead. The sound would suggest a third variety of human being, and it seems that the audience had that appearance. Notwithstanding, they were surprisingly frank; and 50 people of both sexes and various ages discussed without shame such questions as the deformity of Dean Swift's penis: whether cats use the w.c.; self-abuse; incest -- Incest between parent and child when they are both unconscious of it, was their main theme, derived
from Freud. I think of becoming a member....
(Diary I 110)

Though Woolf initially mentions frivolous topics in her entry, suggesting a flippant attitude towards the Society, she moves on to the more serious issue of incest, which we now know would have had direct bearing on her own experience. The degree of fascination with these taboo subjects and with the Society is indicated by her intention of joining. Havelock Ellis was an ex officio member of the Society, founded in July, 1914. Although he never attended its meetings, which were apparently frequented by homosexuals (Grosskurth 377), Ellis contributed three papers to the Society, including "The Erotic Rights of Woman" and "The Objects of Marriage" in 1918 (Grosskurth 371, 472). Whether or not the Woolfs became more familiar with Ellis's ideas about sex through the Society is unknown, but we do know that the Woolfs possessed at least five of Ellis's books, including a 1926 edition of The World of Dreams (Holleyman; cf. Chapter One 127-131).

Late in 1918, in the same diary entry in which Woolf mentions that she has written the last lines of Night and Day, she makes the first reference to the involvement of a friend with psychoanalysis:

Poor James Strachey was as soft as moss, lethargic as an earthworm. James, billed at the 17 Club to lecture on "Onanism", proposes to earn his living as an exponent of Freud in Harley Street. For one
thing you can dispense with a degree. (Diary I 221)

Woolf's remark about the advantage of not needing a degree in medicine suggests that Woolf took part in a discussion of James's ambition.

By 1919 psychoanalytic ideas and terminology were in widespread use amongst Bloomsbury members. On January 22, Woolf wrote to her sister, Vanessa Bell, about Alix Strachey's affair with Harry Norton that they practised Copulation every 10 days in order to free his suppressed instincts! I rather think she'll marry him in the end. She asked my advice. I told her on no account to copulate from a sense of duty, but to advise him to invest his capital either in a new theatre or picture gallery or string quartet and his instincts would be liberated spontaneously. (Letters II 319)

The passage well illustrates Woolf's ability to render a concept like sublimation into colloquial language. Adrian and Karin Stephen provided Woolf with one source of information about psychoanalysis. In 1919 they embarked on a medical training with a view to becoming psychoanalysts, which Woolf claims is "the surface bait that has drawn them" to medicine (Diary I 282).

The next year Woolf applied some of her psychoanalytic knowledge in book reviews. She titled her review of J.D. Beresford's An Imperfect Mother "Freudian Fiction" (Times Literary Supplement, March 25, 1920). Not only did
she correctly identify the main influence on the novel, but she had the confidence to judge the novel "a success as an essay in morbid psychology..." (Essays III 196). Though one comment of Woolf's about the positive results of psychoanalytic therapy is flippant, she demonstrates awareness of unconscious love, unacknowledged passion for the mother, and even admits the possibility that "our conduct in crucial moments is immensely influenced, if not decided, by some forgotten incident in childhood" (Essays III 197). She alludes to the importance of childhood sexuality and Freudian symbolism in another review a month later:

Dr. Freud may very well have discovered something entirely new and completely devastating about children's toys. What, when you come to think of it, is a Teddy Bear? (April 17, 1920, Essays III 207)

A definite milestone in Bloomsbury's relations with psychoanalysis was marked in June 1920 when Alix and James Strachey went to Vienna to study psychoanalysis directly from the founder. Woolf has left no comment on their departure but, shortly after their return, she wrote that

The last people I saw were James and Alix, fresh from Freud -- Alix grown gaunt and vigorous -- James puny and languid -- such is the effect of ten months psycho-analysis. (September 2, 1921, Letters II 482)

In her diary entry of September 12, she added that "Freud has certainly brought out the lines in Alix" (Diary II 135).
Woolf's notice and attribution of the Strachey's physical condition to the negative effects of psychoanalytic therapy probably reveals as much about her own unpleasant experiences in treatment as the Stracheys'. It was James Strachey who approached Leonard Woolf in 1924 about publishing the Psycho-Analytic Library; however, prior to this time the Woolfs owned two 1921 issues from the International Psychoanalytic Press. One was the British psychologist J.C. Flugel's *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Family*, which the Woolfs' Hogarth Press eventually took over publishing. Leonard Woolf demonstrates a knowledge of its contents in his autobiography, claiming that "It is an original book, an almost unknown classic in its own peculiar field, a publisher's dream" (*Downhill* 166). The other was Sandor Ferenczi's *Psychoanalysis and the War Neuroses*, which has an introduction by Freud. We do not know whether Virginia Woolf read either of these.

Woolf's second observation of the detrimental effects of psychoanalysis on a person close to her occurs in her diary, May 12, 1923. She states that

Adrian is altogether broken up by psycho analysis [sic]....His soul rent into pieces with a view to reconstruction. The doctor says he is a tragedy: and this tragedy consists in the fact that he can't enjoy life with zest. I am probably responsible. I should have paired with him, instead of hanging on to the elders. So he wilted, pale, under a stone of vivacious brothers and sisters. (*Diary* II 242)
She continues:

The truth is [Karin Stephen] does not fertilise the sunk places in Adrian. Neither did I. Had mother lived, or father been screened off -- well it puts it too high to call it a tragedy....For my part I doubt if family life has all the evil attributed to it, or psycho-analysis of good. I liked Karin; pitied her too; and then felt come over me some mood of depression, not worth entering upon here. (Diary II 242)

Here, and later that year when Woolf learns that Adrian and Karin are separating, she looks for an explanation of her brother Adrian's present difficulties in his family and in childhood (Diary II 277). This concern suggests either that Woolf was aware of the contents of Flugel's book, or that she was influenced more generally by the Freudian ideas on these topics which were in circulation at the time. In May, 1924, the Woolfs negotiated with Dr. James Glover of the British Psychoanalytic Society to publish Freud. Despite Virginia's perception of the negative effects of psychoanalytic therapy on friends and relations, she makes the "sweeping statement" in an essay written that same month that her generation knows more about character than any previous one, partially owing to scientists like Freud ("Character in Fiction" draft, Essays II 504).

In October, Woolf's distrust of psychoanalytic therapy, as distinguished from Freud's ideas about character, surfaces once again. After reading the proofs of
Lecture Seventeen of Freud's *Introductory Lectures* (Abel 18), Woolf writes that

we are publishing all Dr. Freud, and I glance at the proof and read how Mr. A.B. threw a bottle of red ink on to the sheets of his marriage bed to excuse his impotence to the housemaid, but threw it in the wrong place, which unhinged his wife's mind, -- and to this day she pours claret on the dinner table. We could all go on like that for hours; and yet these Germans think it proves something -- besides their own gull-like imbecility. (*Letters III* 134-135)

Critics who have taken this passage as confirmation of Woolf's resistance to Freud fail to make the above distinction (Orr 154). Woolf's attitude actually aligns well with her earlier experiences and observations. During the weeks preceding this letter she had been writing the last sections of *Mrs. Dalloway*. The novel reflects her own bad experiences in its depiction of the doctors' incompetent treatment of Septimus Smith; thus her feelings on this issue were aroused. It is not surprising, then, that she directs her anger in the letter towards what she perceived as yet another doctor's irresponsible diagnosis. The intellectual and rationalist in her (a legacy from her father) would also not likely have had patience for the seemingly far-fetched associations that "these Germans" make between past events and present behaviour. Regardless of her attitude towards Freudian therapy, she continued to work on the physical production of Volumes one and two of Freud's *Collected*
Papers, published in November 1924 by the Hogarth Press. In the same diary entry of November 18 in which she mentions that "I am driving my way through the mad chapters of Mrs. D. My wonder is whether the book would have been better without them" (Diary II 321), she also notes that she is "doing up Freud" (Diary II 321-322). The appearance of the Collected Papers sparked a five month debate (June 1925-October 1925) in the Nation and Athenæum. Since Leonard was its literary editor, and the Woolfs had a vested interest in ensuring the success of the publication, there can be no doubt that Virginia was aware of this debate. Though she did not contribute to it in print, she certainly expressed her opinions amongst her friends on the most burning issue of the day. On May 14, James Strachey wrote to his wife, who was then in analysis in Berlin (Meisel Bloomsbury 31), that he had dined with 'the Wolves' and "Virginia made a more than usually ferocious onslaught upon psychoanalysis and psychoanalysts, more particularly the latter" (Meisel Bloomsbury 264). He added that their book, the third volume of Freud's Collected Papers, had been published that day, as had Virginia's Mrs. Dalloway (Meisel Bloomsbury 265). It is tempting to speculate that Woolf felt the rivalry between her psychological insight and psychoanalysis particularly acutely that evening, and that this helps account for the
violence of her attitude, which she does not mention herself.

Woolf was again near the centre of psychoanalytic debate in July 1925 when Melanie Klein delivered lectures on child-analysis to the British Psychoanalytic Society. Organized and translated by the Stracheys, the lectures were held at 50 Gordon Square, the home of Adrian and Karin Stephen, while Woolf was working on To The Lighthouse "next door" (Abel 13). Adrian visited his sister three days after the conference was over and must have discussed it with her, though again Woolf is silent (Abel 13). Nevertheless she continues to use psychoanalytic concepts in her letters. Late in July, Philip Morrell wrote to Woolf that he always felt that he resembled the dullest characters in her books. Woolf replied, "One thing interests me very much -- that you should think yourself the dullest man in the book [Mrs. Dalloway] -- I wonder what extraordinary complex this springs from?" (July 27, 1925. Letters III 195). Here she appears gently to allude to the inferiority complex.

During the period under discussion in this thesis (to 1926), Woolf had contacts of varying types with the practice of psychoanalytic therapy as well as psychoanalytic ideas. The claim she made in 1931 to Reinald Hoops that she knew psychoanalysis "only in the way of ordinary conversation"
(Dec. 7, 1931, Hoops 147) thus represents a severe 
understatement. Whether Woolf fully realized it or not, the 
conversations she had about psychoanalysis were far from 
ordinary, since they took place with those who were at the 
forefront of the psychoanalytic movement in Britain. Before 
probing the effects of those "conversations" on her early 
fiction, a few of the most significant subsequent contacts 
that Woolf had with psychoanalysis should be mentioned 
b briefly. 

Woolf continued to make scattered references to Freud 
and psychoanalysis in her writing through to the 1930's. In 1935 she consented to have a brief "analysis." She was 
persuaded to do so by Marie and Aldous Huxley, the latter of 
whom was interested in psychical research and would highly 
praise Myers's *Human Personality* in a foreword to a new 
edition. The "analyst" was Charlotte Wolff, a palm reader 
who had done "careful research in clinics and hospitals in 
an effort to make hand-reading a scientific discipline" (Orr 
157). She read Woolf's palm, analyzed her character and 
then, over tea, answered Woolf's questions about psycho- 
analytic therapy. Since Wolff had had a Jungian analysis, 
she described this experience to Virginia. It is no 
coincidence that Woolf entered into this brief "analysis" 
and discussion of psychoanalysis through a researcher into
psychic phenomena. The combination would appear natural to Woolf since she would have associated the two fields of inquiry from her earlier contact with Cambridge thought as well as James Strachey, whose interest in psychical research led to his professing psychoanalysis. Though Leonard Woolf called the palm-reading incident "disgusting humbug," Virginia kept an open mind and recorded that "I kept my distance [from Leonard's side of the argument], having the idea that after all some kind of communication is possible between beings, that cant [sic] be accounted for; or what about my dive into them in fiction?" (Letters V 452).

In January of 1939 the Woolfs visited Freud, whom Virginia found "inarticulate: but alert" (Diary V 202). A few weeks later, on 8 March 1939, she attended the twenty-fifth anniversary dinner of the British Psychoanalytic Society (Orr 158). There she "set upon" and asked Melanie Klein to dine with her, which Klein did (Orr 158). As Elizabeth Abel notes, the invitation suggests that Woolf was aware of Klein's work and importance (19). Later in the year, and in June 1940, she read Freud's The Future of An Illusion, Civilization and Its Discontents, and Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego in order "to enlarge the circumference. to (sic) give my brain a wider scope: to make it objective; to get outside. Thus defeat the shrinkage
of age..." (Diary V 248). Once again, she made use in her writing of the concepts she had learned. For example, in A Sketch of the Past, she liberally employs the term "ambivalence" to describe her feelings towards her father (Orr 158).

Thus by the late thirties, Woolf had gained enough respect for psychoanalytic thought that she believed it could enlarge her perspective, and help her centre her turbulent feelings (Diary V 299). Some of Freud's ideas also disturbed her (Diary V 250). However, she finally directly confronted these ideas and applied them to her own life in A Sketch of the Past, as she had been assimilating the earlier ideas of Freud and second wave psychology in her fiction for years.

We now turn to Woolf's earliest fiction in order to examine the degree to which second wave psychological ideas helped her to "capture multitudes of things at present fugitive" (Letters I 356). Many of the psychological aspects of characterization, themes, and terminology running through Sinclair's and Beresford's work can also be identified in Woolf's first novels, even those labelled modernist because of their experimentation in form. As in Sinclair's and Beresford's novels, too, Woolf's characters are often
insubstantial, divided, and even inconsistent, for which she was criticized by Arnold Bennett ("Is the Novel Decaying?", Cassell's Weekly 28 March 1923, as cited in Woolf, Essays III 388). In a private response to Bennett's remarks, Woolf affirmed that this approach to character was her aim, claiming that "I insubstantise, wilfully to some extent, distrusting reality -- its cheapness." (19 June 1923, Diary II 248). Woolf avoids the limitations of realism by probing the deeper psychical and spiritual reality of her characters and invoking some of the ideas of idealism, as well as a mystical, supernatural element. She shows human relations to be fragmentary, and her characters are often isolated in objective time; however, she suggests that they most successfully enter into communion, either with their surroundings or with another person, in moments of being, out of time. Memory is important in Woolf's novels since it provides depth to consciousness, but also because it can be a force which must be overcome. Woolf focusses a great deal on the conscious states of mind of her characters, but she also fully acknowledges the impact of unconscious processes, including dreams, on their actions. She shows that individuals are motivated by irrational impulses and desires, especially when love is involved. None of Woolf's novels under discussion could be described as bildungs­romane. However, she does, like Sinclair, embrace a
developmental perspective by employing the method of progressive revelation to reveal the forces out of the past which operate on characters in the present. As with Beresford, Woolf's treatment of sexuality is oblique. Illness, on the other hand, figures prominently in two of Woolf's first four novels. In both, Woolf recognizes the psychosomatic origin of these illnesses, but she also blurs the distinction between those afflicted and the supposedly normal or sane. The latter misperceive or hallucinate almost to the same degree as the ill do, and the "sane" are shown to be psychically linked to the "insane". While Woolf attacks conventional doctors who employ first wave techniques, by depicting their inappropriate behaviour, she also creates characters who function as psychic doctors of the soul. These psychic confessors more successfully rely on intuition and employ the talking method to cure their patients' psychic distress. Finally, the language of second wave psychology, as well as psychical research, percolates into Woolf's prose, though admittedly more subtly than is characteristic in the works of Beresford and Sinclair.

Before examining these psychological themes and techniques in Woolf's first four novels, one fundamental similarity in the first two should be noted. Woolf's first novel, *The Voyage Out*, was written during the years
1908-1913 when the psychological ideas of her father's generation and those, including psychical research, emanating from Cambridge, would have had their greatest impact on her. She wrote her second novel, *Night and Day*, during a period from 1916 to 1919, following her first exposure to Freudian ideas. However, on one level, both novels depict the consequences of the protagonists' attempts to deal with the repressions of youth forced on them by society, family, and their positions in that society as women. Whereas in *The Voyage Out* Rachel's bid is unsuccessful and leads to her death, in *Night and Day*, Katherine successfully overcomes restraining forces and develops her individuality, enabling her to marry a man outside the conventions established by her family's position. Since the Herbartian conception of repression had begun to circulate in Britain from the time of G.F. Stout's essays comparing Herbart with English psychologists (cf. Chapter One 73, 123), it is probably this general notion of repression that Woolf works with, rather than the Freudian. In both novels she shows that the repression bears on all aspects of the characters affected. Following an examination of this pervasive theme in *The Voyage Out*, it will be shown that Woolf's attitudes towards the consequences of repression, dreams, intimacy, conscious states, moments of
being, sexuality, the talking cure, and psychosomatic illness are consonant with attitudes expressed by second wave psychologists on these topics.

In *The Voyage Out*, Rachel's repressions cause her to feel divided from others as well as within herself. Early in the novel, Rachel realizes that

To feel anything strongly was to create an abyss between oneself and others who feel strongly perhaps but differently.... It appeared that nobody ever said a thing they meant, or ever talked of a feeling they felt, but that was what music was for. Reality dwelling in what one saw and felt, but did not talk about, one could accept a system in which things went round quite satisfactorily to other people, without often troubling to think about it, except as something superficially strange. Absorbed by her music she accepted her lot very complacently, blazing into indignation perhaps once a fortnight, and subsiding as she subsided now. (*Voyage* 32)

The quotation illustrates that Rachel copes with the emotions that she feels she must deny by channelling them into her music. Woolf's concrete representation of the idea of sublimation resembles that which Sinclair depicts in *The Divine Fire* through the passionate piano playing of the stifled heroine, Lucia Harding. That Rachel has successfully channelled her rage is suggested by the fact that, immediately following her playing, she enters into a moment of union with her surroundings:

Inextricably mixed in dreamy confusion, her mind seemed to enter into communion, to be delightfully expanded and combined with the spirit of Beethoven
Op. 112, even with the spirit of poor William Cowper there at Olney. (Voyage 33)

While this moment resembles a Paterian one in that it invokes a feeling of aesthetic harmony, the difference is that it is prompted by a psychological revelation. Rachel also responds to conflicted feelings and unpleasantness by making her mind absent (Voyage 17), a technique that Woolf elaborates on in developing the psychology of the protagonist of Night and Day, Katherine Hilbery. A third way in which Woolf suggests that Rachel's suppressed feelings are dealt with is through her protagonist's dream life. In a moment of passion on board ship, Richard Dalloway kisses Rachel. She forces down the emotion she experiences, though she realizes that "she and Richard had seen something together which is hidden in ordinary life" (Voyage 73). Nevertheless, the aroused feelings find expression in her dream that night:

She dreamt that she was walking down a long tunnel, which grew so narrow by degrees that she could touch the damp bricks on either side. At length the tunnel opened and became a vault; she found herself trapped in it, bricks meeting her wherever she turned, alone with a little deformed man who squatted on the floor gibbering, with long nails. His face was pitted and like the face of an animal. The wall behind him oozed with damp, which collected into drops and slid down. Still and cold as death she lay, not daring to move, until she broke the agony by tossing herself across the bed, and woke crying 'Oh!' (Voyage 74)
The dream suggests, among other things, Rachel's terror at the animality of men, as well as her feeling of being trapped and not able to move out of the situation she has been thrust into by Richard Dalloway. As a fearful tunnel dream which creates a feeling of abasement in the dreamer, it resembles Philip Maning's dream in Beresford's *God's Counterpoint*.

However painful the kissing incident is, it does awaken Rachel to her own sexuality, so long ignored. Her new awareness of sexuality in turn brings her into closer intimacy with Helen Ambrose (*Voyage 81*). Most importantly, it enables Rachel, who has been described as "unformed" (*Voyage 30*), to discover herself as an individual.

The vision of her own personality, of herself as a real everlasting thing, different from anything else, unmergeable, like the sea or the wind, flashed into Rachel's mind, and she became profoundly excited at the thought of living. 'I can be m-m-myself,' she stammered, 'in spite of you [Helen], in spite of the Dalloways, and Mr. Pepper, and Father, and my Aunts....' (*Voyage 81*)

Rachel subsequently makes a valiant attempt at remaining true to her personality, but her self is eventually shown to be shifting. At the hotel dance, Rachel claims that "I've changed my view of life completely!" (*Voyage 161*). Helen comments that "That's typical of Rachel... she changes her view of life about every other day" (*Voyage 161*). After Rachel falls in love with Hewet, Helen justifiably finds the
fluidity of Rachel's personality cause for alarm (Voyage 226). She compares Rachel's fluctuating moods "to the sliding of a river, quick, quicker, quicker still, as it races to a waterfall. Her instinct was to cry out Stop!" (Voyage 225).

Though Rachel and Helen are initially brought closer together through their discussion of Rachel's experiences with Richard Dalloway, complete understanding of one another is blocked by the twenty years difference in their age. Isolation resulting from inability to communicate fully is not limited to Rachel. Mr. Dalloway had earlier expressed a similar sentiment, exclaiming "What solitary iceburgs we are, Miss Vinrace! How little we can communicate! There are lots of things I should like to tell you about -- to have your opinion of" (Voyage 72). The theme is later voiced by Hirst and Hewet (Voyage 142-143, 192), and is shown vividly in the conversation between Rachel and Miss Allen (Voyage 258). Woolf does, however, suggest that human beings connect most significantly on a psychic level, beyond or below language. Onboard ship, Clarissa Dalloway experiences "fantastic dreams," and the narrator comments that

The dreams were not confined to her indeed, but went from one brain to another. They all dreamt of each other that night, as was natural, considering how thin the partitions were between them, and how strangely they had been lifted off the earth to sit next each other in mid-ocean, and see every
detail of each others' faces, and hear whatever they chanced to say. (Voyage 49)

Woolf's intimation of a group consciousness, or at least that characters can be in contact without using the five senses, may derive from McTaggart's idealism, as Fleishman avers (721, 725), or it could be the result of Woolf's awareness of psychical research through James Strachey. During the expedition up the river into the jungle, Rachel and Hewet connect on this level. Once again Woolf uses the dream-state to invoke this deeper reality. In a trance-like state, "They [Rachel and Hewet] walked on in silence as people walking in their sleep, and were oddly conscious now and again of the mass of their bodies" (Voyage 277). On returning to the party, Hewet listens to the civilized talk and realizes

that existence went on in two different layers. Here were the Flushings talking, talking somewhere high up in the air above him, and he and Rachel had dropped to the bottom of the world together. (Voyage 278)

At this level in which they have accessed subconscious, instinctual feelings, language is a hindrance; hence, in the midst of conversation, they remain "perfectly silent at the bottom of the world" (Voyage 280). Hewet's recognition of two layers of existence, one in which language is effective and one which goes deeper than language, resembles Bergson's two levels of consciousness, one of which is clear and
precise, and the other inexpressible. These correspond with
two selves, a superficial or social one and a deep-seated
one, as we have seen (Chapter One 58). Rachel's experience
with Hewet in turn would seem to represent one of the few
times when she is able to escape from her social self.
Whether or not Woolf drew explicitly on Bergson in this
passage, she certainly explored both the conscious and
subconscious states of her characters. Woolf uses the
language of associationist psychology, probably as modified
by a psychologist like Sully, in her many references to
characters' trains of thought (Voyage 20, 182, 203) and in
her illustration of characters' chance associations (Voyage
31, 47).

In The Voyage Out, there is evidence that Woolf has
also assimilated the concept, elaborated by both Herbart and
James, that ideas compete for attention. "Unconsciously",
Rachel attempts to avoid confronting the idea that she is in
love by walking quickly until she reaches a peak. There
"[s]he was no longer able to juggle with several ideas, but
must deal with the most persistent, and a kind of melancholy
replaced her excitement" (Voyage 174). In her descriptions
of the conscious states of her characters, Woolf focusses
alternately on thought, feeling, and will, a characteristic
which represents another parallel with Sully's threefold
division of personality. For example, Rachel's will is shown to be an important element of her personality. The loss of "any will of her own" marks a critical stage in her illness (Voyage 351). Along with dreams, Woolf refers to other unconscious behaviours of her characters on numerous occasions (Voyage 174, 193, 205, 216, 270, 274). Throughout the novel, Woolf also works creatively with the language of second wave medical psychology: Helen behaves "hysterically" (Voyage 26), Helen's and Rachel's moods and minds are described as fixed (Voyage 7, 31) and morbid (Voyage 290), and Rachel is "hypnotized" on at least two occasions (Voyage 174, 303).

Another psychological feature of the novel is that both moments out of time and memory have important roles. Rachel's moments of escape from "impersonal" (Voyage 123), objective time are not always positive experiences, as the one mentioned earlier was (Voyage 32). They can also involve feelings of loss of self. On one occasion after reading, Rachel succumbs to such a moment and

Her dissolution became so complete that she could not raise her finger any more, and sat perfectly still, looking always at the same spot. It became stranger and stranger. She was overcome with awe that things should exist at all.... She forgot that she had any fingers to raise.... The things that existed were so immense and so desolate.... (Voyage 123)
Similarly, memory has a dual function. It can make individuals feel more substantial by binding them together. Several hotel visitors share a common memory of Mrs. Parry's drawing-room and "they who had no solidity or anchorage before seemed to be attached to it somehow, and at once grown more substantial" (Voyage 145). However, as Rachel's past is progressively revealed, we realize that memory is primarily an oppressive force to her. She recounts to Hewet that her aunts built up

the fine, closely woven substance of their life at home. They were less splendid but more natural than her father was. All her rages had been against them; it was their world with its four meals, its punctuality, and servants on the stairs at half-past ten, that she examined so closely and wanted so vehemently to smash to atoms. 36

Woolf also shows that Rachel's failure to come to terms with her sexuality continues to cause her to suffer. As has been shown, Rachel's awakening to sexuality was forced, abrupt, and associated with pain. Though attracted to Hewet, Rachel's ambivalent feelings towards sexual passion persist. When the two interrupt Arthur Venning and Susan Warrington in their love-making, Rachel feels highly agitated (Voyage 138). In the aftermath of the experience

the impression of the lovers lost some of its force, though a certain intensity of vision, which was probably the result of the sight, remained with them. As a day upon which any emotion has been repressed is different from other days, so this day was now different, merely because they had seen

[36]
other people at a crisis of their lives. (Voyage 139)

Rachel's emotions about the instinctual life remain "repressed" throughout the novel, though she is also attracted to this aspect of life, as Woolf reveals through a curious incident. In the midst of a futile conversation with Evelyn Murgatroyd about love, Rachel glances out the hotel window to the garden where, Evelyn informs her, they kill the hens by cutting their heads off (Voyage 254). Rachel immediately decides to explore this "wrong side of hotel life, which was cut off from the right side by a maze of small bushes" (Voyage 255). In this garden she witnesses an old Spanish woman filled with "furious rage", triumphantly cutting off a chicken's head. The narrator informs us that "the blood and the ugly wriggling fascinated Rachel..." (Voyage 255). The duality of hotel life appears to function as a metaphor for the split in Rachel between her controlled rational self and her hidden instinctual self. The elderly spinster Miss Allen also witnesses the scene and unwittingly provides appropriate commentary on it through her statement that it is "Not a pretty sight...although I daresay it's really more humane than our method" (Voyage 255). The old Spanish woman's direct expression of passion is more honest and, therefore, more humane than the repression of those feelings by civilized
society. Miss Allen then invites Rachel to see her room, which is very ordered. On a symbolic level, Miss Allan presents the alternative to the free expression of passion, in her barren spinsterhood. Rachel finds the experience of being in Miss Allan's room to be intolerable and, upon finding the passage blocked as they walk down to tea, leaves Miss Allan abruptly (Voyage 260). The accumulated effect of Rachel's denial of feeling throughout the day and her exposure to the instinctual level of life is revealed through her tears of frustration, her realization that "All day long she had been tantalized and put off" (Voyage 261), and her accompanying physical state:

Meanwhile the steady beat of her own pulse represented the hot current of feeling that ran down beneath; beating, struggling, fretting. For the time, her own body was the source of all the life in the world, which tried to burst forth here -- there -- and was repressed now by Mr. Bax, now by Evelyn, now by the imposition of ponderous stupidity, the weight of the entire world. (Voyage 261)

That Rachel's repressions are linked to her fatal illness is suggested by Woolf through imagery. At the onset of her illness, Rachel hallucinates about the movement of the blind in her room. It "seemed to her terrifying, as if it were the movement of an animal in the room" (Voyage 333). Later Rachel's fear of instinctual, sexual feeling is made more explicit. As Hewet kisses her, "she only saw an old woman slicing a man's head off with a knife" (Voyage 344). Rachel
continues to associate the expression of passion with violence; it would appear that she has not dealt with the anger she must have felt after Richard Dalloway first forced a kiss on her.

Rachel's illness and the "therapy" intended to foster her health also reveal that Woolf's attitude is consonant with that of second wave psychology. Helen Ambrose clearly resembles the psychic doctors of the soul that we have encountered in both Beresford's and Sinclair's novels. After Rachel confesses to Helen her feelings about the kissing incident, Helen realizes the extent of the younger woman's naïvety, unnatural for her age. She decides to take Rachel under her wing and she relies primarily on talking for therapy:

Talk was the medicine she trusted to, talk about everything, talk that was free, unguarded, and as candid as a habit of talking with men made natural in her own case. Nor did she encourage those habits of unselfishness and amiability founded upon insincerity which are put at so high a value in mixed households of men and women. (Voyage 122)

Helen also acts as psychic confessor to Hirst and Evelyn M. (Voyage 160, 223). However, she is more successful with these two because their feelings are less intense. With Rachel her "cure" fails because she understands neither the depth of Rachel's feeling nor the extremity of her mood changes (Voyage 225). Though Helen's instinct warns her to
interfere (Voyage 225), she refrains from doing so and "a curious atmosphere of reserve [grows] up between them" (Voyage 224). Nevertheless, it is Helen who first recognizes that the doctor, Rodriguez, is incompetent, and who insists that a second opinion be sought (Voyage 342). The replacement, Dr. Lesage, inspires more confidence because of his "sulky, masterful manner" (Voyage 347). Though their diagnoses are never directly revealed, both doctors would appear to be limited in their understanding, since they only make pronouncements about Rachel's physical condition.

Woolf, however, clearly indicates that both the origins of Rachel's illness in repression and the symptoms are psychosomatic. Rachel experiences delirium (Voyage 338) and hallucinations (Voyage 346, 352), as well as a split between her body and mind:

But for long spaces of time she would merely lie conscious of her body floating on the top of her bed and her mind driven to some remote corner of her body, or escaped and gone flitting around the room. (Voyage 352)

Also in accord with second wave psychology, Woolf breaks down the distinctions between normal and abnormal. Hewet, supposedly sane, experiences hallucinations too. He believes that Rachel is better and talks to her, when in reality she is dead (Voyage 358). There is the possibility that this is a moment of psychic union, which would be appropriate since,
aside from Helen, Hewet shows the greatest awareness of psychic phenomena in the novel. To the rationalist, Hirst, he claims that people have invisible "bubbles" or auras around them and that "all we see of each other is a speck, like the wick in the middle of the flame" (Voyage 107). Following Rachel's death, Woolf invokes a more clearly supernatural element, which brings up the possibility of the survival of personality after death. At the hotel, Evelyn M. handles a photograph that Rachel had looked at:

Suddenly the keen feeling of someone's personality, which things that they have owned or handled sometimes preserves, overcame her; she felt Rachel in the room with her; it was as if she were on a ship at sea, and the life of the day was as unreal as the land in the distance. But by degrees the feeling of Rachel's presence passed away, and she could no longer realize her, for she had scarcely known her. But this momentary sensation left her depressed and fatigued. (Voyage 369)

Thus, in her depiction of Rachel's illness and death, Woolf demonstrates an awareness both of the psychosomatic nature of illness, first given serious attention by second wave psychology, and of the greater reality of psychic communication, studied exhaustively by the S.P.R.

Woolf's forays into these aspects of psychic life suggest that the philosophy Woolf presents in the book does not completely align with G.E. Moore's Realism. Though several critics have used Woolf's reference to Principia Ethica in The Voyage Out in order to substantiate their
arguments about Moore's influence on the book, they have not pointed out that Woolf also appears to be critical of his approach (Johnstone 20, 126; Levy 2-3). On finishing *Principia Ethica*, Woolf wrote that "I believe I can disagree with him [Moore], over one matter" (*Letters* I 364). Given the evidence in *The Voyage Out*, we can speculate what that disagreement might have been about. Moore placed a great deal of emphasis on linguistic analysis in order to reveal ambiguities and to elucidate the truth (Collinson 138). However, Woolf reacts against this by pointing out the limitations of language in discovering the ultimate truth about individuals and relationships. For instance, Rachel and Hewet reach their most profound understanding of one another in the jungle, where they are silent. On this point Woolf would appear to come closer to Bergson's belief that language cannot capture the deepest feelings. Thus Woolf shows herself to be highly sensitive to the discoveries of second wave psychology, and to draw eclectically on various philosophical and psychological sources in her first novel, *The Voyage Out*.

Woolf continued her inward, psychological voyage in *Night and Day* (1919), as an analysis of her treatment of repression, dividedness, dreams, union and fragmentation in relationships, psychic and spiritual states, and
philosophical ideas will demonstrate. In it, memory and the past are even more repressive forces than in The Voyage Out and the psychological effects on the protagonist, Katherine Hilbery, more intricately woven. Katherine belongs to a family which worships its illustrious ancestors, the most notable of whom was Katherine's grandfather, a famous nineteenth-century poet. Though she aids her mother in writing his biography, she has not inherited a poetic sensibility and would rather spend her time studying geometry (Night 36). Since she is forced to hide this original aspect of herself and feels constrained by the tradition of greatness into which she has been born, she feels depressed and divided:

Katherine had her moments of despondency. The glorious past, in which men and women grew to unexampled size, intruded too much upon the present, and dwarfed it too consistently, to be altogether encouraging to one forced to make her experiment in living when the great age was dead. (Night 35)

Woolf reveals Katherine's dividedness by concentrating on her mental states. Very frequently we are told that Katherine engages only part of her mind on her present occupation or conversation. For instance, early in the novel Ralph Denham notices "that she [Katherine] attended only with the surface skin of her mind."39

However, Katherine is not the only one divided between her inner reality and external circumstance. Ralph Denham
becomes divided in this way upon coming into contact with Katherine. He is an obscure young lawyer of a lower class than Katherine, who has become acquainted with her father through writing an article for his magazine (Night 24). Though he despises the supremely civilized atmosphere of the Hilbery's drawing room, along with their relics, his experience there leaves a strong impression on him, which overpowers his subsequent attentions to his own family life (Night 29). More importantly, his attraction to Katherine in that setting causes him to feel ambivalent about her way of life as well as his own democratic, working class values (Night 29). In his behaviour towards Katherine, he manifests this sense of dividedness. On one occasion he muses about walking to her house and imagining her within,

and then he rejected the plan almost with a blush as, with a curious division of consciousness, one plucks a flower sentimentally and throws it away, with a blush, when it is actually picked. (Night 117)

One of the ways Woolf uses dreams in the novel is to make vivid Katherine and Ralph's divided perceptions of themselves and each other. Ralph, for instance, concocts in his mind a "phantom Katherine" who is highly vital, imaginative, and sympathetic, and who does not correspond with the reality. He speculates that

To walk with Katherine in the flesh would either feed that phantom with fresh food, which, as all who nourish dreams are aware, is a process that becomes
necessary from time to time, or refine it to such a
degree of thinness that it was scarcely serviceable
any longer; and that, too, is sometimes a welcome
change to a dreamer. And all the time Ralph was
well aware that the bulk of Katherine was not
represented in his dreams at all, so that when he
met her he was bewildered by the fact that she had
nothing to do with his dream of her. (Night 82)

Woolf also uses dreams in order to question the
assumption that external reality is more substantial and
significant than internal reality, and to show that the
inner realities of two people can coincide.

Initially Ralph "pride[s] himself on a life rigidly
divided into the hours of work and those of dreams" (Night
114), but as his feelings for Katherine grow, his dream life
and waking life become less distinguishable. As Ralph waits
for Katherine, the physical environment of Katherine's that
he observes has the atmosphere of a dream. When she enters,
"she overflowed the edges of the dream" (Night 131). Ralph
is also described as looking as if he is walking in his
sleep (Night 143), as are other characters on a few
occasions (Night 163, 328). He comes to realize that he has
"lived almost entirely among delusions" in the world that he
formerly thought was substantial (Night 200). For Katherine,
too, dreams are initially an escape, but she has a stronger
sense of their importance. On one occasion she wonders how
she will avoid marrying William Rodney and then,

putting the thought of marriage away, fell into a
dream state, in which she became another person and
the whole world seemed changed. Being a frequent visitor to that world, she could find her way there unhesitatingly. If she had tried to analyse her impressions, she would have said that there dwelt the realities of the appearances which figure in our world; so direct, powerful, and unimpeded were her sensations there, compared with those called forth in actual life. There dwelt the things one might have felt, had there been cause; the perfect happiness of which here we taste the fragment; the beauty seen here in flying glimpses only...It was a place where feelings were liberated from the constraint which the real world puts upon them; and the process of awakenment was always marked by resignation and a kind of stoical acceptance of facts. She met no acquaintance there, as Denham did, miraculously transfigured; she played no heroic part. But there certainly she loved some magnanimous hero, and as they swept together among the leaf-hung trees of an unknown world, they shared the feelings which come fresh and fast as the waves on the shore. (Night 127)

Katherine's dream world is thus less romantic and more therapeutic than Ralph's, since in this state her repressions are unloosed.

Eventually both Katherine and Ralph are able to exchange their actual conditions for something approaching the conditions of their dreams (Night 268, 393). Katherine disengages herself from the 'unreal' William Rodney; in his relationship with Katherine, Ralph overcomes the external impediment of class. Through their intimacy, in which they express feelings honestly, they create an internal reality more powerful and immediate than all external forces, including the past, one of the most oppressive for Katherine. After her relationship with Ralph has developed,
she continues to help her mother with the ancestral biography. However, her attitude towards this task, and her family's illustrious past in general, has changed. As she works, and waits for a telephone call from Ralph, we are told that, "She might hear another summons of greater interest to her than the whole of the nineteenth century" (Night 279). Her activities of the present moment have far greater significance than the past. Thus, through the voices of Ralph and Katherine, Woolf demonstrates an acute awareness of the function and importance of the dream life in transfiguring reality, an attitude completely consonant with second wave psychology.

Nevertheless, as in The Voyage Out, Woolf also suggests that, although human beings can share an inner reality to some degree, they are more typically isolated and their relationships fragmentary. Katherine and William Rodney frequently talk past one another (123, 213-215, 256-257). Even with her favourite cousin, Henry, Katherine feels frustrated about communicating:

She knew that any intercourse between people is extremely partial; from the whole mass of her feelings, only one or two could be selected for Henry's inspection, and therefore she sighed. (Night 178)

Katherine and Ralph's early attempts to communicate are failures or are interrupted, as Katherine observes (Night
270). After their dreams have merged and become a partially shared reality, they continue to experience what they term "lapses" (Night 428). These breakdowns in communication occur on Ralph's side when he becomes overwhelmed by the romance of Katherine and she punctuates his vision with the facts. On the other hand,

If the lapse was on her side it took the form of gradual detachment until she became completely absorbed in her own thoughts, which carried her away with such intensity that she sharply resented any recall to her companion's side. It was useless to assert that these trances were always originated by Ralph himself, however little in their later stages they had to do with him. The fact remained that she had no need of him and was very loath to be reminded of him. How then, could they be in love? The fragmentary nature of their relationship was but too apparent. (Night 429)

As a counterbalance to this vision of the isolating and fragmentary aspects of relationships, Woolf shows that, during moments of illumination or being, communion can occur. More often than not these moments penetrate more deeply than language and thus happen in periods of silence. Towards the end of the novel, Ralph and Katherine experience one as they walk together:

They brought themselves by these means, acting on a mood of profound happiness, to a state of clear-sightedness where the lifting of a finger had effect, and one word spoke more than a sentence. They lapsed gently into silence, travelling the dark paths of thought side by side towards something discerned in the distance which gradually possessed them both. They were victors, masters of life, but at the same time absorbed in the flame, giving their
life to increase its brightness, to testify to their faith. (Night 457)

Aside from depicting these moments and the dream lives of her characters, Woolf explores a variety of other psychological processes and states, both conscious and unconscious. Willing, thinking, and feeling states can often be distinguished. Ralph's will is an identifiable element of his personality, though interconnected with thinking and feeling states. Shortly after Ralph has first met Katherine, Woolf informs us that "his will-power was rigidly set upon a single objective -- that Miss Hilbery should obey him" (Night 55). With regards to thinking states, Woolf shows the process by which conflicting ideas compete for attention (Night 24), or press for utterance (Night 74). In describing the result of one thought dominating over another, she alludes to the concept of idée fixe:

These states of mind transmit themselves very often without the use of language, and it was evident to Katherine that this young man [Ralph] had fixed his mind on her.40

Woolf images the succession of thoughts in the mind as streams (Night 141, 243), or more frequently as "trains" (Night 52, 153, 163, 167, 216, 245). Beneath these trains of thought lie feeling states. Woolf fully acknowledges the importance of the subconscious region in which these "wash".
At one point Mary Datchet is besieged by "different trains of thought" until the lights of her building cheer her and all these different states of mind were submerged in the deep flood of desires, thoughts, perceptions, antagonisms, which washed perpetually at the base of her being, to rise into prominence in turn when the conditions of the upper world were favourable. (Night 154)

The minds and behaviours of Woolf's characters are on several occasions shown to be "unconsciously" motivated, affected, or occupied (Night 20, 58, 95, 101, 176, 200, 216, 425, 434). Though Woolf does not deal directly with characters' sexual feelings, she does reveal that her protagonists are sometimes tormented by strong desires related to sexual attraction. In one instance, she associates this desire with those experienced in childhood. Although "a person controlled by habit," Katherine succumbs to a "desperate desire to find Ralph Denham. It was a desire now -- wild, irrational, unexplained, resembling something felt in childhood."#41

Woolf also attends to the spiritual nature of her characters and infuses major themes of memory, and reality versus unreality with an ethereal element. In order to do so, she employs the language of the supernatural, associated with psychical research. Characters are "hypnotized" (Night 19, 241), fall into "trances" (Night 429), or write automatically (Night 149). The imagery of ghosts and
apparitions operates in a variety of contexts, suggesting Woolf's belief in a realm beyond the five senses. Mrs. Hilbery feels driven to lay "the ghost of her parents' sorrow to rest" (Night 91) and is "haunted by the ghosts of phrases" (Night 275). In a description of Ralph's attitude towards the engaged couple, William and Katherine, Woolf links the supernatural world with the unconscious. Ralph might feel anger at William Rodney

[a]nd yet at the moment, Rodney and Katherine herself seemed disembodied ghosts. He could scarcely remember the look of them. His mind plunged lower and lower. Their marriage seemed of no importance to him. All things had turned to ghosts; the whole mass of the world was insubstantial vapour, surrounding the solitary spark in his mind, whose burning point he could remember, for it burnt no more. (Night 142)

Mary Datchet is in touch with the "ghosts of past moods" on a familiar walk (Night 167), and Ralph feels that his depression is "only a sentimental ghost" (Night 199). At the other extremity of mood, Ralph's feeling of communion with Katherine is framed as a moment of "almost supernatural exaltation" (Night 273). Finally, Woolf invokes the metaphor of the survival of personality beyond death to capture Katherine's sense of the unreality of socializing and the reality of the dream life. Katherine isolates herself in the midst of a social gathering, looks out the window, and attempts
to forget private misfortunes, to forget herself, to forget individual lives. With her eyes upon the dark sky, voices reached from the room in which she was standing. She heard them as if they came from people in another world, a world antecedent to her world, a world that was the prelude, the antechamber to reality; it was as if, lately dead, she heard the living talking. The dream nature of our life had never been more apparent to her, never had life been more certainly an affair of four walls, whose objects existed only within the range of lights and fires, beyond which lay nothing, or nothing more than darkness. (Night 319)

Through the inclusion of several philosophical ideas, Woolf also reveals the spiritual nature of her characters. Whereas Mrs. Hilbery, representative of the older generation, believes in love as the only truth (Night 277), Katherine's philosophy resembles pluralism on at least one count. Approaching the question of truth from an empirical perspective,

"The only truth she [Katherine] could discover was the truth of what she herself felt -- a frail beam when compared with the broad illumination shed by the eyes of all the people who are in agreement to see together...." (Night 283)

In contrast, Ralph appears to view the world from an idealist's perspective. Unlike Richard Dalloway in The Voyage Out, whose behaviour betrays his rhetoric about ideals, Ralph's ideals are shown to be genuine. He doggedly works towards ideals, believing, for instance, that poetry is the only thing worth doing because "it keeps an ideal alive which might die otherwise" (Night 132). Similarly to
any one of several male characters in either a Sinclair or a Beresford novel, Ralph confesses to Katherine that he has made her his ideal (Night 270). Towards the end of the novel, he writes to Katherine about his belief that they have shared in the creation of an ideal together (Night 441).

Thus, in the techniques and ideas that Woolf marshals in order to probe the psyche and spirit of her characters, she appears to draw on similar sources in second wave psychology as Sinclair and Beresford. We cannot be certain of the depth of her knowledge of Freud by this point, or whether she had read Interpretation of Dreams. However, Night and Day can certainly be viewed as her interpretation of the importance of the dream life in overcoming repression.

Woolf's third novel, Jacob's Room (1922), marks the beginning of her modernist experimentation with form in the novel genre. The fiction adopts the developmental perspective, insofar as it traces the life of Jacob Flanders from the time of his childhood to his premature death in World War One. However, Jacob is not often at the centre of the brief impressionistic episodes -- some trivial, some important -- which make up the novel. In this rapid succession of images, Woolf imitates mental processes; her view of
the mind as dynamic corresponds with the approach to it of second wave psychology. Despite these changes in technique, which move Jacob's Room closer to a stream of consciousness novel, the glimpses that Woolf presents us with show that some of her fundamental assumptions about personality remain the same as in her first two novels. Jacob's self is fluid, and the narrator comments on several occasions that neither Jacob nor any person can be summed up (Jacob's 28, 146). Woolf also alludes to a group mind, an idea that Allen McLaurin has demonstrated is linked with her knowledge of Trotter's concept of the herd instinct ("Consciousness" 28-40). The narrator states that

There is in the British museum an enormous mind. Consider that Plato is there cheek by jowl with Aristotle; and Shakespeare with Marlowe. The great mind is hoarded beyond the power of any single mind to possess it...And then there is science, pictures, architecture -- an enormous mind. (Jacob's 102)

Finally, Woolf refers to the importance of moments of being or communion to various individuals (Jacob's 67, 153).

The psychology of Woolf's next novel, Mrs. Dalloway, is more complex and better integrated with her experimentation with form than in Jacob's Room. Awareness of this psychology is also far more critical to a full appreciation of the work. Woolf's realization of this fact
appears to be part of the cause of her anxiety about her creation. In her diary, Woolf considered whether

The reviewers will say that it [Mrs. Dalloway] is disjointed because of the mad scenes not connecting with the Dalloway scenes. And I suppose there is some superficial glittery writing. But is it 'unreal'? Is it mere accomplishment? I think not. And as I think I said before, it seems to leave me plunged in the richest strata of my mind. (December 13, 1924, Diary II 323)

If we recognize that Woolf once again draws on ideas about psychic communication and collective consciousness, then the mad scenes and the Dalloway scenes appear to be perfectly integrated.

During the course of the novel, which takes place in a single day, we most often enter the consciousness of Mrs. Clarissa Dalloway as she prepares for her party in the evening. Similarly to Sinclair's Audrey Craven, Mrs. Dalloway has genius as a social artist (Mrs. Dalloway 69): she acts as a catalyst and draws people together. Her social self is thus highly developed and well defined, as she realizes upon looking at herself in the mirror:

That was her self -- pointed; dart-like; definite. That was her self when some effort, some call on her to be herself, drew the parts together, she alone knew how different, how incompatible and composed so for the world only into one centre, one diamond, one woman who sat in her drawing-room and made a meeting-point.... (Mrs. Dalloway 34-35)

However, beneath this social self she lacks a sense of being, reflected in her insubstantial physical presence. We
are informed that "She had the oddest sense of being herself invisible; unseen; unknown..." (Mrs. Dalloway 11). She later attempts to define this emptiness further:

She could see what she lacked. It was not beauty; it was not mind. It was something central which permeated; something warm which broke up surfaces and rippled the cold contact of men and women, or of women together. (Mrs. Dalloway 30)

On revisiting Clarissa Dalloway after many years absence, Peter Walsh senses the insubstantiality of her personality. Woolf employs a dream in order to reveal the process by which Peter comes to articulate what he has realized about Clarissa subconsciously. Sitting on a park bench, Peter dreams, and Woolf alludes to the characteristic of condensation in that dream, stating that "myriads of things merged in one thing" during it (Mrs. Dalloway 52). On awakening, Peter exclaims "The death of the soul", which clearly represents the manifest content of the dream (Mrs. Dalloway 53). Through the process of association, Peter gradually uncovers the latent content: "The words attached themselves to some scene, to some room, to some past he had been dreaming of" (Mrs. Dalloway 53). He recalls the moment at Bourton when Clarissa's soul died. She repudiated her close friend Sally Seton for making a remark about pre-marital sexuality; thus Clarissa retreated into conventionality.
Notice that Peter frames Clarissa's loss using the language of the spirit.

However, Clarissa's lack of a strong sense of identity has a positive aspect as well, in that it makes her particularly sensitive to the identity of others. She believes that "Her only gift was knowing people almost by instinct..." (Mrs. Dalloway 10). Peter recollects that in her youth she had formed a theory in order to account for her experience. She felt herself "everywhere", rather than gathered into a unified, well-defined personality, and thus able to make contact with the most unlikely people and places:

Odd affinities she had with people she had never spoken to, some woman in the street, some man behind a counter -- even trees, or barns. It ended in a transcendental theory which, with her horror of death, allowed her to believe, or say that she believed (for all her skepticism), that since our apparitions, the part of us which appears, are so momentary compared with the other, the unseen part of us, which spreads wide, the unseen might survive, be recovered somehow attached to this person or that, or even haunting certain places, after death. Perhaps -- perhaps. (Mrs. Dalloway 136)

Clarissa's "transcendental theory" bears a striking affinity with that of the psychical researchers. They too believed that the world beyond the five senses was far more extensive than that within and tried to prove the survival of the personality after death. Clarissa's theory also provides the
key to her uncanny connection with Septimus Smith, as will become apparent.

The second protagonist of the novel, Septimus Smith, is a young, married man, who has suffered a psychological shock in the war and is now suicidal (Mrs. Dalloway 16). On the surface he has absolutely no connection with most of the other characters in the novel, since he is of a lower, self-educated class. And yet, through Septimus, Woolf breaks down the distinctions between madness and sanity and compares the vision of the insane with that of the psychically gifted. Septimus has been labelled insane, but several of his symptoms can be detected in those considered quite sane, including Peter Walsh, the doctors who treat Septimus, and Clarissa. Similarly to Septimus, Peter's character is considered flawed (Mrs. Dalloway 96). Septimus shows signs of paranoia in believing that he is the centre of attention, when it is really the passing motor-car of a distinguished person (Mrs. Dalloway 15). Peter likewise manifests paranoia, as revealed in his recollection of a scene at Bourton: "he had a feeling that they were all gathered together in a conspiracy against him -- laughing and talking -- behind his back" (Mrs. Dalloway 56). Furthermore, Woolf portrays Septimus's doctors as being far more "insane" than Septimus himself. Septimus has lost the
ability to feel and believes that he must seek "scientific" explanations above all things (Mrs. Dalloway 61). His doctors are shown to have similar characteristics in their inability to sympathize with Septimus's suffering and in their "scientific" diagnoses of his case as "nerve symptoms and nothing more" (Mrs. Dalloway 82), or a lack of proportion. Whereas we feel sympathy for Septimus, they are reprehensible because there is no justification for their behaviour and because they are in positions of power, which they abuse. Both doctors are depicted as extremes. Dr. Holmes takes a materialistic approach to medicine, which denies the spiritual in man, and he is associated with animality in the description of him as "the brute with the red nostrils" (Mrs. Dalloway 83). Sir William Bradshaw, on the other hand, with his theory that health equals proportion, is associated with excessive rationality. In a fashion typical of first wave treatment of mental illness, both control their patients by restraining and secluding them in rest homes (Mrs. Dalloway 82, 87). Sir William Bradshaw is shown to be particularly "mad" in his worship of the Goddess Proportion. In making his cure of proportion a universal one, Bradshaw's approach to healing has become analogous to a dogmatic and rigid religion. He also worships the sister Goddess Conversion, the motive behind an
aggressive imperialism which "offers help, but desires power" (Mrs. Dalloway 89). Through his complete and blinding devotion to these goddesses, Bradshaw is himself shown to lack proportion.

On the deepest psychological level, aspects of Septimus are mirrored in Clarissa. Both have experienced the death of someone so close to them that it has changed their approach to life. The loss in the war of his close friend and officer, Evans, in the war, caused Septimus's mind to become unhinged (Mrs. Dalloway 78). Clarissa witnessed her sister being killed by a falling tree and evolved "an atheist's religion of doing good for the sake of goodness" (Mrs. Dalloway 70). There is the suggestion, which is very oblique in Clarissa's case, that both failed to mourn these losses properly and that this failure partly accounts for their difficulty in feeling. Whereas Clarissa subsequently has a horror of death, Septimus has a fascination with it (Mrs. Dalloway 135, 60). However, it is a powerful presence in both of their lives, which helps explain Clarissa's immediate understanding that Septimus's suicide was an act of defiance (Mrs. Dalloway 163). Most importantly, Clarissa is linked psychically with Septimus Smith. They share streams of consciousness, as the critic K. Stamirowska, amongst others, has pointed out (217). These
streams contain water imagery and the quotation from Shakespeare's *Cymbeline* "Fear no more the heat o' the sun" (IV, ii, 258). In response to a feeling of rejection, Clarissa mentions the phrase (*Mrs. Dalloway* 28), and it later emerges in her stream of consciousness when she has composed herself by sewing:

> So on a summer's day waves collect, overbalance, and fall, collect and fall, and the whole world seems to be saying 'that is all' more and more ponderously, until even the heart in the body which lies in the sun on the beach says too, that is all. Fear no more says the heart. Fear no more says the heart, committing its burden to some sea, which sighs collectively for all sorrows, and renews, begins, collects, lets fall. And the body alone listens to the passing bee; the wave breaking, the dog barking, far away barking and barking. (*Mrs. Dalloway* 37)

Though Septimus's feeling of rejection by society is far greater than Clarissa's, he is similarly soothed by this current of thought. He lies on his sofa watching the watery gold glow and fade with the astonishing sensibility of some live creature on the roses, on the wall-paper. Outside the trees dragged their leaves like nets through the depths of the air; the sound of water was in the room, and through the waves came the voices of birds singing. Every power poured its treasures on his head, and his hand lay there on the back of the sofa, as he had seen his hand lie when he was bathing, floating, on the top of the waves, while far away on shore he heard dogs barking and barking far away. Fear no more, says the heart in the body; fear no more. (*Mrs. Dalloway* 124)

Though Clarissa never meets Septimus, her sense of identification with him and the reentry into her
consciousness of the phrase "Fear no more the heat of the sun" when she hears of his death confirms their psychic connection (Mrs. Dalloway 165). Having acknowledged the nature of this link between them, it is possible to view Septimus's disjointed, hallucinatory visions as the reverse side of the same coin on which are stamped Clarissa's moments of vision. Several critics, including K. Stamirowska and F. Karl, have used these links as the basis for their arguments that Septimus is Clarissa's irrational double or alter ego (Stamirowska 217; Karl 134).

Thus, in yet another novel Woolf suggests that communication between individuals can transcend the limitations of the five senses. In implying that Clarissa and Septimus are linked in this way, and that other characters, including Septimus's doctors, manifest symptoms of madness similar to, or worse than Septimus's, Woolf deliberately blurs the traditional distinctions between insanity and sanity, madness and vision. In Varieties of Religious Experience, William James similarly questioned those rigid boundaries, as Freud and other second wave psychologists did elsewhere.

In a striking parallel with Bergson's metaphysical psychology, Woolf also demonstrates the pervasive influence and multiple significance of memory in the novel. Though
Peter believes that "women live much more in the past than [men] do" (Mrs. Dalloway 51), both he and Septimus are as caught up in their memories as Clarissa is. Memory causes all three to suffer (Mrs. Dalloway: Peter 39; Septimus 60; Clarissa 156), but it also enriches them and provides a sense of connectedness with fellow human beings. Peter makes the association in musing that "The past enriched, and experience, and having cared for one or two people..." (Mrs. Dalloway 144). Both Clarissa and Septimus remember moments of intimacy in their past: for Clarissa, "the most exquisite moment of her whole life" was when her young friend, Sally, kissed her in the garden at Bourton (Mrs. Dalloway 33); for Septimus these moments occurred during the period of his close friendship with Evans (Mrs. Dalloway 77). With possibly a Freudian touch, Woolf alludes to the importance of childhood memory in one of Peter's speculations: "There was Regent's Park -- Yes -- as a child he had walked in Regent's Park -- odd, he thought, how the thought of childhood keeps coming back to me... (Mrs. Dalloway 51).

Finally, it is Peter's memories of Clarissa, including one in which she descends the stairs in white (Mrs. Dalloway 46), which expand the moment and fill him with extraordinary excitement when he views her as the novel closes (Mrs. Dalloway 172).
In her description of Peter's philosophy, Woolf once again acknowledges ideas outside the realm of realism, which are associated with second wave psychology. Both Clarissa and Peter are "nominally" atheists (Mrs. Dalloway 70, 52). However, their experience of reality, and of moments of being in particular, causes them to embrace beliefs about a higher, spiritual reality. As we have seen, Clarissa has her transcendental theory. Peter, on the other hand, is an idealist, who believes in the existence of the soul, as his concern with whether Clarissa's soul has been stifled indicates (Mrs. Dalloway 65). During Peter's dream, Woolf expresses the idealist belief in mind over matter:

By conviction an atheist perhaps, he is taken by surprise with moments of extraordinary exultation. Nothing exists outside us except a state of mind, he thinks... But if he can conceive of her, then in some sort she exists.... (Mrs. Dalloway 52)

Thus, the metaphysical psychological ideas expressed in Mrs. Dalloway likewise appear to align with the trends of second wave psychology.

Though Mrs. Dalloway is Woolf's first mature, modernist work, several of the psychological themes and ideas that Woolf introduced in her more derivative earlier novels persist here. Woolf shows that Clarissa Dalloway's personality is divided between a strong social self and an underlying insubstantial and fearful private self. Dreams
and moments of being focus subconscious material. Woolf reacts against the first wave approach of doctors to illness and insists on the link between insanity and vision. Characters communicate on an intuitive, psychic level outside of language. Memory is pervasive and creates both horror and richness of experience. The enduring presence of these ideas in Woolf's first four novels suggests that currents of second wave psychological thought entered Woolf's consciousness during her apprenticeship years and had considerable impact on her vision of humanity.

These currents of second wave psychology continued to give shape to Woolf's individual thematic preoccupations in her subsequent mature modernist experiments as well. In To The Lighthouse (1927), which followed Mrs. Dalloway, Woolf entertains the possibility of the survival of personality through Lily's vision of Mrs. Ramsay. In addition, as Erwin Steinburg has pointed out, Woolf fused Freudian symbolism with highly imaginative descriptions in that novel (Steinburg 4-5). In Orlando (1928), a biographical time-travel fantasy, Woolf extended the fluidity of self to include sexuality. The irrational and changeable protagonist, Orlando, begins life as a male Elizabethan before transforming into a female in the Eighteenth century. In The Waves (1931), the work that Leonard Woolf referred to
as her masterpiece, Virginia returns to an imaginative exploration of the idea of group consciousness, which had intrigued her two decades earlier following the publication of Trotter's book on the herd instinct. The selves of the six main characters merge and their voices become indistinguishable. Woolf's attraction to idealism resurfaces as well, since, as Jean Guiget points out, places have lost any reality outside of the characters' perceiving consciousnesses (287). On one level the novel represents an attempt to capture a single act of perception, or moment of being (Guiget 287, 289). Her final work, Between the Acts (1941), abandons individuality altogether and instead depicts, through the play within the work, the collective experience of an entire culture (Guiget 323). In addition she grapples more directly than ever before with the intense feelings of attraction and repulsion underscoring sexual relationships in this swan song. Guiget suggests that she may have been encouraged to broach this subject -- so painful to her -- by her reading of Freud at this time (324).

Thus, Woolf both sought out knowledge of second wave psychology and suppressed that knowledge throughout her career. In a similar manner, she became acquainted with her Edwardian predecessor, May Sinclair, as well as her more
conventional contemporary, J.D. Beresford, but did not acknowledge that they too had discovered the dark places of psychology. Clearly, all three of these writers drew on similar psychological sources; their discovery of these sources helped all three to avoid the limitations of the materialist's realism and to plunge into a deeper psychic reality in their novels.
Chapter 8
Further Thoughts On Second Wave Psychology
And British Literature

This thesis has brought together the two disciplines of psychology and literature in order to explore the influence of what I have termed the second wave of psychology on several Edwardian and early Georgian writers with very different aesthetic aims. It should now be clear both that this influence is diverse and extensive, and that there is a certain symmetry in the way that history has treated developments in the two disciplines. In the histories of psychology, and particularly of psychoanalysis, the admittedly important findings of Sigmund Freud have been so magnified and divorced from their sources that they have overshadowed and in some cases obliterated earlier significant advances in psychological knowledge. Similarly, the brilliant innovations in literary form made by the modernists such as Joyce, Woolf, and Eliot have so captured the attention of literary critics that earlier, more modest enlargements of the thematic territory of the novel using the insights of now all-but-forgotten second wave psychologists have been ignored. Both Freudian followers and
exponents of modernism helped ensure the triumph of their approaches by insisting on their novelty and by attacking or disclaiming predecessors. In contrast to those claims, this thesis has been an exercise in the restoration of those predecessors and reconstruction of the continuity of thought and development in both fields during the early twentieth century. It is worthwhile to review the most salient features of the restoration undertaken in both psychology and literature before commenting on some of the implications of this act and on some possibilities for further excavation.

In Chapter One the problems outlined surrounding the definition of the "new" psychology made apparent the necessity for re-identifying the various movements which contributed to the birth of modern psychology. The application of Thomas Kuhn's idea of paradigm shift to the problem made it possible to see that, by the twentieth century, two phases or waves of psychology had come into being. The first, which tended to view man mechanistically and statically, was not of as great interest in the context of literary influence as the second wave, which approached the puzzle of human psychology dynamically and probed unseen dimensions of the mind. This thesis hypothesized that the shift from the first wave to second wave psychology began in
the late 1880's. An extensive study of the forces contributing to this shift, including philosophy, main-stream psychology, medicine, psychiatry, and psychical research confirmed both the existence of this shift and the relevance to literary figures of the material brought to light by second wave psychology.

In Britain, widespread interest in second wave psychology did not occur as rapidly as in Europe. That it occurred at all was largely a result of the influx of idealistic philosophy into Britain and of the efforts of the pioneers of psychical research. Idealistic philosophy prompted closer examination into the elements of mind, since it held that the mind was more real and fundamental than the body. In its postulation of an Absolute spirit, Idealism also offered an alternative to traditional religious dogma and it helped sustain the plausibility of the concept of a soul. Psychical Researchers reflected the metaphysical concerns of Idealism in their main aim of proving the survival of personality beyond death. Their original impetus for examining the then-recent findings of abnormal psychology on hysteria, hypnosis, multiple personality, and idées fixes, to name only the most prominent of topics, was in order to find evidence to support the hypothesis of survival. Frederic Myers made the greatest single
contribution to this study in *Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily Death* (1903). His most important theory, of the subliminal self, is idealistic in the sense that it assumes that the mind is more powerful than the brain, and thus not dependent on it. The theory is broader than Freud's on the unconscious in at least one regard, in that it attempts to account not only for pathological phenomena, but also for supernormal phenomena, including that of artistic inspiration and genius (Brown 75). The influence in Britain of Myers's theory, and of his magnum opus, *Human Personality*, cannot be underestimated. As we have seen, Myers's work provided an introduction to dynamic, second wave psychology for figures as diverse as William James, William McDougall, James Strachey, Ernest Jones, J.D. Beresford, and May Sinclair. In many of their minds dynamic psychology thus became associated with the quest to prove survival, or at least with metaphysical and moral concerns. The impact of idealism, Myers's work, and psychical research in general, then, explain to a large extent why ontological and moral questions continued to be asked within the realm of psychology in Britain during the first quarter of the twentieth century.

The addition to these two influences of the work of William James, Havelock Ellis, James Sully, Henri Bergson,
and William McDougall, proves that there was a vital body of dynamic psychological knowledge available to literary figures by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century in Britain. This psychology was characterized by its eclecticism and distrust of over-arching systems.

The retrieval of this body of knowledge from obscurity made it possible to re-evaluate Freud's position in the history of British psychology. In Chapter Two it was argued that his work was a later manifestation of second wave psychology there, and one that was never wholly endorsed by the professions of psychology and psychiatry, just as much because of the universality of the claims made by the followers of Freud's work as because of its subject matter. Jung's departure from Freud, along with his eclectic attitude and inclusion in his psychology of a mystical, quasi-religious element, made his work more popular than Freud's among British psychologists and literary figures. Nevertheless, Freudian psychoanalysis received an enormous boost during the First World War, since it had the best developed therapeutic techniques for dealing with victims of shell shock.

In the post-war period, psychoanalysis achieved a great deal of attention among the public in Britain, and in the process was vulgarized. However, as a postscript to the
present study, it should be noted that the functionalist thrust of psychoanalysis, which brought it to the fore during the war, caused it to survive through the 1920's and 1930's, albeit in modified forms, such as that developed by Melanie Klein and the English school. In this characteristic it fit in well with all of the dominant psychologies of the post-war period since, according to O'Neil, they were all functionalist in the sense that they were

all committed to the description, explanation and prediction of the conduct or behaviour of animals, especially man, in adjusting themselves to their environments and their environments to them. (O'Neil 137)

Dynamic depth psychologies remained at the core of second wave psychology between the wars, though cognitive theorists also adopted a dynamic approach to mind. Elements of first wave psychology, on the other hand, reappeared in the work of stimulus-response theorists who analyzed the "associations mediated by the nervous system" (O'Neil 137). In this atmosphere of functionalism, the protean view of the self promulgated by psychical research, as well as the expansionist, inclusive attitude towards psychology of William James and others gradually lost their hearing. Though research into psychical and paranormal phenomena has continued to be carried out to the present day, some of the evidence gathered during the early twentieth century has
been called into question (Hall). As well, psychical research no longer attracts the elite of society as it did during the late-Victorian and Edwardian years.

These changes in the currents of psychological thinking do not, however, invalidate as literary influences those views of the psyche that were current in the early twentieth century. Literary critics have typically either ignored the psychological influence altogether or have focussed exclusively on Freud's impact, in some instances falsely attributing influence to him. The extensive analysis in Chapters Three through Seven of the influence of dynamic psychology on May Sinclair, J.D. Beresford, and Virginia Woolf has revealed several similarities in their knowledge and attitudes. All three fell under the sway of idealism to the extent that they believed that individuals could know one another's minds. In exceptional cases, this knowledge could occur through telepathic communication; they even entertained the possibility that communications could be made from beyond the realm of the living; furthermore, they believed that the contents of the mind and soul were of greater significance than external objects. There was an idealistic impulse behind each of these novelists' portrayal of moments of heightened illumination or being, since they believed that individuals could glimpse a higher spiritual
reality during such periods, which expanded time; these novelists thus explored moments of being in detail disproportionate to the clock time in which they occurred. As well, following the insights of William James and others, all three authors drew characters whose selves were fluid and even contradictory. Before they had knowledge of Freudian thought they were fascinated by the subconscious wellsprings influencing behaviour. Myers', Janet's and, later, Freud's curious case studies gave rise to these writers' interest in psychosomatic illness, which they did not associate with a deviation from morality, as their Victorian predecessors might have done. Instead, they probed the developmental roots of these illnesses, typically pointing to repression as the source of psychic distress in otherwise normal characters. These three novelists, along with others who discovered second wave psychology, succeeded in enlarging the range of characters that could be considered acceptable and believable and in articulating with deeper insight the inner realities these characters experienced. Finally, at their best, the three authors borrowed ideas eclectically from second wave psychologies. Rather than adhering slavishly to psychological systems, they discovered the imaginative possibilities of ideas which the psychological originators had never even dreamt of. For
this reason the psychoanalytic novel cannot be rigidly
distinguished from the psychologically informed novel, as
both Reinald Hoops and J.D. Beresford attempted to do.

The occurrence of these similarities in the
fundamental approach to human psychology of three writers
with very different backgrounds, personalities, and
aesthetic principles suggests that they were drawing on
common sources, either directly or through the zeitgeist.
The similarities between the Edwardian, May Sinclair,
traditional Georgian, J.D. Beresford, and modernist,
Virginia Woolf, also throw doubt on Virginia Woolf's
assertions that the moderns discovered the dark places of
psychology, which were incomprehensible to their
predecessors, and that, therefore, the efforts of the
Edwardians must be strictly demarcated from those of the
moderns. In addition, these similarities in influence prompt
the questions of whether the distinctiveness and novelty of
modernism have been exaggerated, or whether the boundaries
of modernism need to be extended to include advanced
Edwardians like May Sinclair. Evidence of psychological
influence in other Edwardians' works needs to be gathered
before more conclusive answers to these questions can be
reached. The motivation behind Virginia Woolf's denial of
both literary and psychological influence would also be
worthy of further investigation.

Thus the act of retrieving from obscurity figures and ideas in the fields of both psychology and literature has made it necessary to re-evaluate in particular the role of psychoanalysis in the history of psychology and as a literary influence, as well as to question the contours of literary periods and the position of writers within these periods. Some of the more general implications of this manoeuvre now need to be considered. First, the technique employed raises the question of whether views and information which disappear from the mainstream of thought of a culture necessarily deserve their fate. The broadminded, holistic approaches of William James and Frederic Myers suggest that the answer is no. A similar question might be asked about literary figures who have never been included in the 'canon'. May Sinclair's fiction contains profound insights into human nature and yet it has been neglected. These facts suggest in particular both that literary history does not necessarily deal justly with pioneering figures and that a continuing process of revision to literary history is necessary. The results of the archeological technique employed also affirm that this method is a valuable one, if difficult to employ. In addition, it has been seen that psychobiography can be an
invaluable tool in undertaking such an excavation, since the development of thinking about psychology is inextricably bound up with psychological need. Finally, this extensive study of influence serves to reinforce the view about literature that texts are not sealed vessels but are interconnected with other texts and with ideas that are much more fully developed than the glimpses given of them within the literary texts themselves would imply.

This text is of course also a good example of this interrelation because it represents a process of investigation that is incomplete, and thus offers numerous possibilities for further excavation. One issue that deserves future examination is that of secondary influence. To what extent did British novelists assimilate psychological ideas which can be considered second wave from European naturalist writers or Russian psychological novelists? A second possibility for more extensive research concerns the issue of the popular reception of second wave psychology. It would be instructive to analyze in detail the typical distortions that occurred, particularly in Freudian theory, when these were presented in the print media, since these distortions would likely help explain some of the opposition to dynamic theories. Because literary figures were likely exposed to these print sources, this analysis
could also shed more light on the attitude of writers to second wave psychology. In this connexion, it might be interesting to consider further the reasons why psychoanalysis became associated with socialism in Britain. A third related possibility for additional inquiry derives from a prediction that could be made based on the evidence contained within the present study, namely that the popularization of second wave psychology moved the novel as a whole onto a higher plane of sophistication about human nature than had been reached previously. Psychological influence would have to be examined on more writers of every kind, from those whose works were the most ephemeral to others whose works have endured, in order to make more confident generalizations than the tentative ones made here.

Additional aspects of the psychological influence could be brought to light by categorizing writers in several ways. They could be treated according to their attitudes towards second wave psychology. For instance, it would be valuable to analyze those writers, including Aldous Huxley and Rose Macauley, who satirized second wave psychology, not only for the intrinsic merits of such an investigation, but also for the insight it could provide into the reasons why novelists like Sinclair and Beresford feared being labelled psychoanalytic novelists. Writers' works could be compared
according to prevalent psychological themes. Changing attitudes towards sexuality in the fiction of the period would make a fascinating study, for example. Another interesting comparison could be made between male and female writers' responses to second wave psychology. It could be hypothesized that women novelists might have been more open than men to psychoanalysis in particular, and thus may have employed it differently than men, if, for instance, they saw in it a means of overcoming traditional repressive attitudes towards sexuality. In addition, the impact of second wave psychology might profitably be considered on writing in other genres, including biography and poetry.

One final possibility for future excavation deserves serious consideration. A fundamental common denominator between those most responsible for introducing second wave psychology into Britain -- the psychical researchers -- and the writers who most seriously explored the imaginative possibilities of this psychology in their fiction is their deeply-felt experience of personal loss. Of the psychical researchers, at least two of the most prominent -- Edmund Gurney and Frederic Myers -- experienced such traumatic losses (cf. Chapter One 165, and note). All of the novelists under consideration in this thesis similarly suffered: both Sinclair and Woolf felt profoundly the loss during their
early years of several family members, while J.D. Beresford lost his full physical capacity because of a childhood accident. It would be worth exploring the extent to which these losses fuelled these thinkers' and writers' fascination with second wave psychology. Earlier second wave psychologies attempted to probe unseen realities and, in some instances, to prove scientifically the survival of personality beyond death. These psychologies may thus have helped writers compensate or at least cope with loss. On a much larger scale, second wave psychology may at least temporarily have superseded first wave psychology because of the appeal it would have had for a society attempting to overcome loss of traditional religious belief. The literature of the period could be examined to determine in what specific ways this theme is treated psychologically and how extensively it is employed.

As these brief suggestions make clear, there is great potential for ongoing excavation of this psychological and literary terrain, even though the yield thus far has been rich. The present investigation has revealed that distortion and simplification have occurred in both psychological and literary history. Some years before the height of modernism was reached, several writers discovered the fictional possibilities of a new wave of psychology. This information
enabled them to plunge more deeply into the hidden realities of existence, to capture, as was Virginia Woolf's aim, "multitudes of things at present fugitive" (Letters I 356).
Introduction

1. "Society For Psychical Research" is hereafter designated by its acronym "S.P.R.."


8. According to Ellenberger, Janet claimed that "The former term had been devised to summarize the singular features presented by certain personality disturbances in one particular neurosis, hysteria" (800).


11. According to the *Concordance to the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (Guttman, et al), there are only nine references to 'new psychological' and 'new psychology', the earliest of which appears in a letter to Fliess, Dec. 6 1896, and the last of which occurs in *Lay Analysis*, 1926.

12. See, for example, Friedlander's criticisms of psycho--analysis (as cited in Ellenberger 803).

13. *Free* 161. Even though Jones's memoir, *Free Associations*, was not published until 1959, his son tells us that Jones wrote the manuscript in 1944 (*Free* 258).


16. O'Neil, *The Beginnings of Modern Psychology* 26. Much of the following discussion is indebted to this concise account.

17. Since that influence has been thoroughly treated elsewhere, I have accorded it only the briefest mention here and in Chapter Seven. See, for example, J.K. Johnstone, *The Bloomsbury Group*, London, 1954, and Tom Regan, *Bloomsbury's Prophet*, Philadelphia, 1986.
1. The fiction of H.G. Wells and May Sinclair is a good example.

2. Gerald Myers provides some insight into this early position of James's:

"A world of individual and substantial selves, each private and irrevocably removed from its neighbour was not an attractive idea for James. He preferred to believe in a world where continuity prevails, including that between individual streams of consciousness; to the extent that the concept of a substantial self encourages the belief in metaphysical discontinuity between individual selves, he opposed it. It is a common judgement that James's Anschauung was excessively individualistic and ignored the role of community; on the contrary, he sought notions of self and reality that permit communality of the profoundest sort -- in the depths of the most intimate personal experience." (Myers, W.J. 350)

3. In his discussion of "The Perception of Time", James acknowledges Mr. E.R. Clay as originator of the idea of the "specious present" (Principles I 609).

4. James claimed that, "...the original experience of both space and time is always of something already given as a unit, inside of which attention afterward discriminates parts in relation to each other" (Principles I 610).

5. *Scribner's Magazine* 7 (1890): 373, as qtd. in Myers, W.J. 375.


7. Taylor, "James and Jung" 12. In this article, Taylor claims that James's view of the unconscious influenced the Boston School of Psychotherapy, which developed a broader and more eclectic view than Freud's. Their methods of psychotherapy were also more eclectic. According to Taylor,

"It was an unusual blend of religious, philosophical, medical, and psychological perspectives, and nearly the last of what was to be heard from such a Jamesian outlook after the
onslaught of Freud and his followers at Clark." ("James and Jung" 159)

8. For example, James's use of this method in Varieties was called unsound by Rev. A. Rudolph (Recent Religious Psychology 73).

9. He cites "artificially acquired performances which have become habitual", instincts, and emotions as counter examples (Principles II 552).

10. James states that, "Reason is only one out of a thousand possibilities in the thinking of each of us. Who can count all the silly fancies, the grotesque suppositions, the utterly irrelevant reflections he makes in the course of a day? Who can swear that his prejudices and irrational beliefs constitute a less bulky part of his mental furniture than his clarified opinions? It is true that a presiding arbiter seems to sit aloft in the mind, and emphasize the better suggestions into permanence, while it ends by drooping (sic) out and leaving unrecorded the confusion." (Principles I 552)

11. For instance, Harold Lasswell claims that, "The Principles of Psychology does not have much to say about sexuality, and the de-sexualized vocabulary of James creates a human being fully clothed and seated in Victorian decency chatting amiably about permissible subjects" (54).


13. In an autobiographical statement in A History of Psychology in Autobiography, McDougall writes that, during his years as a student at St. Thomas' Hospital, "The most important effect of my reading at this time came from William James' Principles of Psychology. I had, while still an undergraduate, determined that a life devoted to the nervous system was the most desirable of all; for in the brain, it seemed to me, were locked the secrets of human nature. But James showed me that neurological research is not the only road to the uncovering of those secrets, and led me to believe that they should be approached from two sides, from below upwards by way of physiology and neurology, and from above downwards by way of psychology, philosophy, and the various human sciences" (200). He later mentions that, "James and Stout are the only two men of
whom I have felt myself to be in some degree the disciple and humble pupil" (209).

14. In his autobiographical sketch, McDougall mentions that the book "had a very considerable circulation, running somewhere near 100,000 copies (A History of Psychology in Autobiography 210).

15. As qtd. in Van Over, 16, 27. In his autobiographical sketch, McDougall writes that, "I was led to make some study of this field [psychical research] by my desire to know the truth.... Further, I saw in the Society for Psychical Research a body of earnest seekers after truth, conscientiously using methods which might reveal truth; and these researches were largely in the field of psychology...." (Murchison 219)

16. Part of the reason for this refusal may be found in McDougall's Autobiography, in A History of Psychology in Autobiography. In describing how he came to be skeptical of Christian doctrine, he wrote that, "I had never been persecuted; I had no resentment against the Church, and no father-complex to prompt me to rebellion. My indulgent, erratic, rather brilliant father had never ruled me. I was a little exasperated sometimes by his inconsistencies; but, while appreciative of his qualities, I viewed his weaknesses and eccentricities with kindly tolerance. It is, I think, this relation to my father which makes for me now the whole elaborate Freudian structure of the father-complex seem purely mythological and unreal when propounded, as it is, as a universal factor in the life of mankind." (194-195)

17. In Social Psychology and Psycho-analysis, McDougall repeated an assertion made earlier in Outline of Abnormal Psychology that, in his opinion, "Freud has, quite unquestionably, done more for the advancement of our understanding of human nature than any other man since Aristotle." (17; see also 18-22 following).


20. Freud later refers to "sexual streams" (Three Contributions 624).

21. 508, 792. Ernest Jones contributed to that myth by writing that commentators asserted that "the three essays were shockingly wicked. Freud was a man with an evil and obscene mind" (Freud II 13).

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30. Not, as Ronald Clarke claims, "during the first winter of the War" (374).

31. Sinclair may have taken her cue from Eder's discussion of sublimation in "The Present Position of Psycho-analysis." He claimed that

"Psycho-analysis cannot be regarded as complete until this synthesis is achieved, although how far sublimation or re-education can be effected in any case depends, first, upon the completeness with which the resistances have been overcome; and secondly, upon the general level of the patient's intelligence and morale." (1214)

32. Wehr 218. Jung's biographer claims that Jung enjoyed travelling throughout his life and that "The Anglo-Saxon world held a particular attraction for him" (Wehr 217). He returned to England in 1925 to give another seminar of twelve lectures on the practice of dream analysis (Wehr 234).

33. Jung, for instance, wrote that "The psychoanalytic physician knows his own shortcomings too well, and therefore cannot believe that he can be father and leader. His highest ambition must only consist in educating his patients to become independent personalities..." (Theory of Psychoanalysis 105).

34. Jung claimed that "Modern humanity demands moral autonomy" and that psychoanalysis allowed for this (Theory of Psychoanalysis 105).
1. This is at least partially owing to Michel Foucault's *Madness and Civilization* (1961, tr. 1965).

2. This material would not have been considered appropriate in a thesis for the *doctorat es-lettres* (Ellenberger 359).

3. Ellenberger 404. James, in turn, may have derived his ideas from G.F. Stout's.

4. According to Drinka, "Janet's attempt to locate in the brain the functions of the mind is really the heart of modern psychiatry. His thought seems solidly mainstream, quintessentially post-Freudian, and very modern." (Drinka 346)


Chapter One: Psychical Research Section

1. Henceforth the Society For Psychical Research will be designated by the abbreviation S.P.R.

2. Janet Oppenheim states that, on the occasion of the London Congress in 1892, Sidgwick and Myers reported that, "the majority of English members attending were either members of the S.P.R. or at least in avowed sympathy with its aims" (245).

3. John Cerullo claims that, by the 1896 Munich Congress, "psychical research was a foray into the actual nature and composition of human selfhood in this world. In fact, it was on the verge of offering the psychological profession as comprehensive an interpretation of personal identity as had yet been had." (99)

4. Gurney's mother had died when he was ten and his father several years later, but it was after he lost three sisters in a boating accident in 1875 that he turned to the study of medicine and then to psychical research. Myers had been particularly inspired by a cousin's wife, Annie Marshall, whom he had wished to marry, and he was devastated by her suicide in 1876.


7. Myers published his observations about these characteristics of dreams as early as 1885 in the Contemporary Review, as qtd. in Myers "Subliminal Consciousness" 314.

8. Myers claimed that, "I here use the word 'self' as a brief descriptive term for any chain of memory sufficiently continuous, and embracing sufficient particulars, to acquire what is popularly called a character of its own. There will thus be one distinct supraliminal self at a time: but more than one subliminal self may exist, or may be called into existence." (305-306)

10. For example, William James, one of Myers's closest readers, claimed in 1901 that, "The cornerstone of his [Myers's] conception is the fact that consciousness has no essential unity. It aggregates and dissipates, and what we call normal consciousness -- the 'human mind' of classic psychology -- is not even typical, but only one case out of thousands" (James, "Frederic Myers" 222).

11. Myers, "Subliminal" 305. In his review of James's *Principles*, Myers described the relation between various strata of consciousness using the following apt analogy: "Where the floating iceberg meets the sea there is no internal line of stratification. The proportion of submergence is determined by nothing in the iceberg's essential structure, but solely by the relation between the specific gravities of water in different states. Even so the water-line between the empirical and the subjacent consciousness in man may be determined by no break of continuity in the processes which take place within him, but merely by the relation which his transcendental self bears to the material world in which it is immersed." (Myers, "Principles" 122)

12. Cerullo claims that Myers's book was so influential on psychical research that the "entire period in the history of psychical research from the turn of the century to the 1920's can justly be called the age of Myers." (103)

13. Myers had an early interest in "unconscious cerebration" but then rejected neural explanations of phenomena like telepathy (Gauld 295).

14. Huxley admits that the latter characteristic holds true for some tastes ("Foreword" to *Human Personality* 7).

15. In a review of an article by Ernest Jones on Freud's psychology (*Psychological Bulletin* April 15, 1910), for example, T.W. Mitchell writes that, "Freud's Unconscious is in truth not very different from Myers's Subliminal, but it seems to be more acceptable to the scientific world, in so far as it has been invoked to account for normal and abnormal phenomena only, and does not lay its supporters open to the implication of belief in supernormal happenings." (Journal of the Society for Psychical Research July, 1910, 353)
16. The medical section was not discontinued during the war as Cerullo claims (166). T.W. Mitchell was secretary of the section from 1911-1918 (Biographical Dictionary of Parapsychology 211).

17. These concepts appear in the works of Sinclair, Beresford, Rebecca West, Algernon Blackwood, and Barbara Comyns, amongst others.
Chapter Two

1. In a chapter of his biography of Freud, entitled "Opposition", Jones makes quite a point of portraying the resistance to psycho-analysis, which he claims occurred in England, as elsewhere. It is with strong language that he claims, "In those days Freud and his followers were regarded not only as sexual perverts but as either obsessional or paranoic psychopaths as well, and the combination was felt to be a real danger to the community. Freud's theories were interpreted as direct incitements to surrendering all restraint, to reverting to a state of primitive license and savagery. No less than civilization itself was at stake. As happens in such circumstances, the panic aroused led in itself to the loss of that very restraint the opponents believed they were defending. All ideas of good manners, of tolerance and even a sense of decency -- let alone any thought of objective discussion or investigation -- simply went by the board." (Freud II 121-22) He adds that "much could be written about the opposition psycho-analysis encountered in England" (Jones, Freud II 134).

2. Edward Glover provides corroboration of this fact. He wrote that, even by the 1920's, "there was still a numerical preponderence of non-Freudian over Freudian practitioners" in England, but "psychoanalysts were no longer on the defence" ("Eder" 101).

3. The Journal of the S.P.R. reported in 1915 that "Six members of the medical staff of the [Medico-Psychological] clinic belong to the S.P.R., and the Chairman of the Board of Management is a member of our Council." (February, 1915 25).

4. 229. Later he repeats that he founded the Society (Free 239).

5. Elsewhere, Jones incorrectly dates this review as 1898 (Free 159). Brome incorrectly claims that it was Bernard Hart's 1910-11 article, "Freud's conception of Hysteria" that Trotter first read (Ernest Jones 45).

7. Even though Jones claimed to be familiar with the literature of medical psychology, he did not recognize until 1954 the precedents to Freud's thoughts ("Early History" 204-207).

8. Jones claims, for instance, that his decision to found a London Psychoanalytic Society "was a hardy venture, for the material then available soon proved to be of not the best quality" (Free 229). Since the group comprised some of the most promising mental health professionals in Britain, who later made considerable contributions in their respective fields, we must assume that by "not the best quality" Jones means "not devoted exclusively to the doctrines of Sigmund Freud." Jones also refers to the London Psychoanalytic Society as "my promising Society" (Free 240). Note the apparent contradiction, as well as the evidence of Jones's possessiveness.

9. The biographer of Jones, Vincent Brome, claims that Jones followed Janet's method of therapy involving hypnosis during these years (Ernest Jones 43-45).

10. Most of this time he spent in Canada, though he also made two excursions to Europe and several trips to England to visit relatives (Free 197, 199, 228).

11. Freud's statement to Jones that "Your intention to purge the London Society of the jungish members is excellent" probably strikes closer to the truth of Jones's motivation than his later claims (Letter from Freud to Jones, February 18, 1919).


13. His article was praised by Freud (Brome Ellis 123-124).

14. Jones claims that this volume was published in 1904 (Freud II).


16. When Freud came to write Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (Eng. ed. 1922), he referred to Trotter's work as "thoughtful", and wrote to Jones that "I am glad to have devoted a thorough study to Trotter's clever book..." (Letter to Jones, March 8, 1920).
17. The exception to its forward-looking character is in its discussion of eugenics, which has a vague ring of Swift's *Modest Proposal* about it! (*Endowment* 28).


19. Freud later refers to "sexual streams" (*Three Contributions* 624).

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Chapter Three


2. For example, if May had been more informed about William James, and especially William McDougall's ideas about purposive (i.e. goal directed) striving, both of whose ideas circulated in the first two decades of the twentieth century, he would not have made the following erroneous statement:

"At the time of The Rainbow [1915], the most widely-read psychologists, Freud and Jung, looked backwards in order to explain a person's present behavior. Their procedure was historical or aetiological. Only Adler, the exponent of individual psychology, explained behaviour in relation to an individual's goals." (36)

In addition, May errs in assuming that Freud and Jung were the most widely read in 1915. Adler, on the other hand, had not even been translated into English by this time.


4. 7. Though Hewitt recognizes that Woolf's statements have been used to construct "an ideology which ignores some of the evidence" (132), even he excuses Woolf on the grounds that she was "taking part in a local argument" and that those "parochial essays" and "evening lectures" were not meant to be taken as Holy Writ (132). The fact she promulgated her views on the Edwardians in at least five versions and that these were reprinted as many times within a few years of their original appearance, one as a separate Hogarth Press pamphlet, suggests that these were not casual statements but that she was very serious about having her criticisms of the earlier generation widely known and accepted.

5. Woolf does express gratitude to Hardy, Conrad, and W.H. Hudson, but does not explain why ("Modern Novels" 31).
6. She excludes Conrad rather whimsically because he is Polish and Hardy because he had not written a novel since 1895 ("Character" 427).

7. It should be noted that this attack was at least partly motivated by a criticism made by Arnold Bennett, that her "characters do not vitally survive in the mind because the author has been obsessed by details of originality and cleverness" in Jacob's Room, her third novel. Cited in Woolf Collected Essays III 388.


9. Others who wrote at least some fiction in this vein include Algernon Blackwood, Charles Marriott, and Maurice Baring (see Swinnerton 229), Evelyn Underhill, Katherine Tynan, Clemence Dane, Ethel Sidgwick, W.L. George, and Hugh Walpole. (The source of information on the latter novelists is J.D. Beresford, Memories and Reflections, his unpublished autobiography, 1947); See also R. Hoops, Der Einflus.

10. In "Freudian Fiction", a review of Beresford's "An Imperfect Mother", Woolf argued that, "Judged as an essay in morbid psychology, An Imperfect Mother is an interesting document; judged as a novel it is a failure" because Beresford applied psychoanalysis as a key to unlock all doors ("Freudian" 196).


12. Woolf Letters I 390. See also Chapter Seven. If one delves into the deeper psychological motivation of Woolf's, this omission may not be as surprising since it may very well be a case of the anxiety of influence described by Harold Bloom. Woolf eventually took over Sinclair's position as the most respected British female novelist.

13. Frederick Cooper claimed that "Her novels are hopelessly, irremediably incommensurate; they have no common denominator; they reveal nothing in the way of a logical progression, of mental or spiritual growth from book to book, from theme to theme; The Tysons, The Divine Fire, The Helpmate, the three conspicuous volumes of three separate periods, might, so far as any sequence in thought or method is concerned, be the product of three different brains, striving diversely towards three several artistic ideals" (English Story Tellers 252).

Viewing her canon in retrospect, Robert Morss Lovett and Helen Sard
Hughes claimed that "She is an eclectic novelist" (1932, as cited in "May Sinclair," Twentieth Century Vol. 3: 440).


17. In an article, "Le Declin de L'Influence de la Psychoanalyse Sur Le Roman Anglais" (1926), Beresford claims, "in passing that numerous psychoanalysts frequently refer to this novel God's Counterpoint [Beresford's 1918 novel]; of which they recommend the reading to their patients, in order that these could better understand the erring of their sexual inclinations[1]." (260)

According to May Sinclair's biographer, Theophilus Boll, the students of the Orthophysiology Society read Sinclair's The Tree of Heaven (1917) "as literature and as therapy." The Society was a branch of the Medico-Psychological Clinic, of which Sinclair was a founding member (Boll 234).
1. Not even accurate about her dates, Walter Allen wrote in The English Novel that, "May Sinclair (?1870-1946) stands rereading more successfully, yet she doesn't seem more now than a pioneer in a kind of psychological fiction later women novelists were to do better" (390-391). Ernest Baker is equally perfunctory on Sinclair (The English Novel 357) and William Tindall, who provides a brief summary of The Three Sisters (1914) and Mary Olivier (1919), dismisses her for being too scientific and lacking penetration (218-219).

2. For example, Sinclair deserves study as an early, moderate feminist novelist, and as the feminine counterpart to H.G. Wells, particularly in the development of the sociological novel.

3. In reply to Reinald Hoops, Sinclair stated that, "I first began to study psychoanalysis in 1913 or 1914. I knew nothing about it when I wrote 'Two Sides of a Question'" (Hoops 41).


5. She also had a slightly halting walk as a result of lameness from an ice-skating mishap (Letter from Dorothy Hyde to Theophilus Boll, Nov. 1, 1966, Box 49, Sinclair papers, University of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania).

6. Sinclair lost her brothers at disturbingly regular intervals, when she was twenty-four, twenty-six, twenty-eight, and thirty-three. Her last brother died in 1905, four years after her mother (Boll, M.S.: Novelist 27).

7. She described these in her letters, non-fiction, and fiction (Letter from G.B. Stern, June 15, 1919, Box 57, May Sinclair Papers, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia; Defence 379; Three Sisters 339; Mary Olivier 93-94).

8. Sinclair on Mary Olivier, (as qtd. in Boll, M.S.: Novelist 242). Mary Olivier (1919) is the best example but The Helpmate (1907) also offers an autobiographical portrait of her parents, as Boll observes (M.S.: Novelist 195), and there are numerous other such sketches.

9. In his biography of Sinclair, Boll claims that "Mr. Sutcliffe originated in Professor Gwatkin" (245); however, Sinclair did not meet Gwatkin until the summer of 1894. He had been attracted by her article on idealism published in 1893. In Mary Olivier, Mary becomes a friend of Mr. Sutcliffe long before this date and the factual section in which he dissipates Mary's fears occurs in 1890-1891 (M.S.: Novelist 294).
10. There was a Psycho-Therapeutic Clinic for Suggestive Treatment in Liverpool, under the direction of Dr. Albert E. Davis, prior to the Psycho-Medical Clinic (Boll, "M.S. and the Medico-Psychological Clinic" 312).

11. In contradiction to Boll's statement ("M.S. and the Medico-Psychological Clinic" 312) based on his informant, Laura E. Price, it apparently never used psychoanalysis exclusively (Letter from Laura E. Price to Theophilus Boll, Nov. 21, 1961, Box 49, May Sinclair Papers, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia).

12. The Judgement of Eve and Other Stories (1908; Boll, M.S.: Novelist 104).


14. According to Alan Gauld, cross-correspondences are "the series of parallel or interlinked communications obtained through different mediums and automatists, and allegedly devised by the spirits of deceased members of the Sidgwick group for the benefit of their colleagues still in the flesh" (274).


16. She belonged to the Aristote lian Society until 1943 (Boll, M.S.: Novelist 19).


18. She actually says that, "We have had the Philosophy of the Unconscious. Now we have its Psychology" ("Way of Sublimation" 3).

19. "Way of Sublimation" 124. The net image is one frequently found in both Sinclair's non-fiction and fictional works (see Mary Olivier 353) and, indeed, it also appeared to be popular amongst her contemporaries. (See, for example, J.D. Beresford's These Lynnekers 213).
20. Sinclair disliked pragmatism and pluralism only slightly less than realism. She also did not agree with James about the merits of Herbartian psychology. James wrote, "I must confess that to my mind there is something unclean in the glib Herbartian jargon (as qtd. in Boris Sidis, "The Theory of the Subconscious," Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research 26, 1912-13: 336).

21. Published in the Proceedings. Meeting of the Aristotelian Society at 21, Gower Street, W.C. 1, on Feb. 5, 1923.

22. The Bookman had always kept a close eye on Sinclair's development as a writer.

23. The novelist I.A.R. Wylie, a friend and neighbour of May Sinclair, recorded that "She [Sinclair] was much prouder of being a member of the Aristotelian Society than of having written novels which I believe influenced English and American letters far more profoundly and lastingly than all the Obfuscationists who afterward succeeded in covering up the paucity of their matter by the obscurity of their method." (179)

24. Defence 117. Recall that Herbart also imaged the mind as a web (Chapter One 72; cf. Sand 473).
Chapter Five

1. Hereafter denoted A.C. in parentheses.

2. In one passage rich with irony Audrey says to her latest admirer, Ted, that
   "I'm not in the least conventional, and I don't think I'm weak-minded. And I want my room to express my character, to be a bit of myself. So give me some ideas. You don't mind my asking you, do you? You're the only artist I know." (A. C. 54)

3. She also undoubtedly drew on the experience of her own family.

4. In the dream she finds herself "walking over sand towards a dead man" (Tyson 284).

5. Despite this determinism, however, there is the suggestion at the close that Miss Quincey's life was a necessary sacrifice since it brought together Miss Quincey's colleague and her doctor, Cautley, both of a younger, more robust generation.

6. Sinclair could also have gained her knowledge of Janet's ideas from Myers' summaries of developments in French psychiatry, published in the Proceedings of the S.P.R. (Oppenheim 255-256).

7. We are later told that "as for making love, it was his mother who had put into his head that exquisitely agitating idea" (Combined 50).

8. As was mentioned earlier, we do know that Sinclair read this work, since several pages of her notes on it have survived (Sinclair, Notes).

9. As a final revelation of the closeness of the bond between Ranny and his mother, and of her jealousy, she is shown to be more bitter towards Winnie than Violet when Ranny announces his divorce, because "married to Violet he [Rannie] was still dependent on his mother" whereas Winnie satisfies more of Rannie's needs (Combined 297).

10. In its theme of the consequences of repression, the novel also owes much to Butler's The Way of All Flesh (1903).
11. Two of the essays in the book had been published in the Sociological Review in 1908 and 1909. (See Chapter Two, 212).

12. Rebecca West's, The Return of the Soldier and J.D. Beresford's God's Counterpoint, both published in 1918, preceded it (Boll, M.S.: Novelist 245).

13. Notice that, for Sinclair, psychotherapy continues to be associated with spiritual healing of the soul.

14. In The Allinghams, Sinclair traces the manifestations of a grandfather's hereditary taint in his six grandchildren. Three of the grandchildren's lives are wrecked, or nearly wrecked, by insanity, despair, or alcoholism while the others manage to overcome their abnormal impulses.
Chapter Six

3. In Edgar's summary, Beresford appears only in a list of "precocious" younger brothers and sisters of Wells and Bennett (222), and in Tindall's in a list of novels of adolescence (148). Walter Allen (411, 412) and Ernest Baker (247, 254) give him only passing acknowledgement.
4. Beresford shows familiarity with the thesis of Bergson's work, Laughter, in Writing Aloud 175.
5. I am indebted to Gerber, "Freudian" for several of these references (78-79).
7. Beresford also created worlds in which defects are minimized. His impulse to write Utopian fantasy later in his career would lend support to this speculation.
8. He left the most vivid account in Jacob Stahl (256).
9. Helmut Gerber claims that, in the period between 1889-1916, Beresford gave his whole-hearted support to progressive education ("Study" 15).
10. Unpublished typescript of Introduction to "The Unchangeable Priesthood" xv. A similar point is made in Beresford's autobiographical novel The Prisoner (as qtd. in Gerber, "Study" 169).
11. Note the similarities with Jung's ideas about the predictive dream.
12. Gerber 28. Beresford attributed a psychical influence involving reincarnation to his lifelong friendship with Scott-Cravens, who was killed at war in 1917 ("Memories" 163).
13. See also Aryan Path, March 1931, 136.
14. Similar points are made in "The Decline of Influence" 259, and What I Believe 34.
15. Richmond wrote on education, including *The Permanent Values of Education* (1917) and "School Science: the Synthetic Method." He collaborated with J.D. Beresford on *W.E. Ford* (1917), a mock biography (Gerber, "Study" 29; Tristram Beresford 21).

16. Freud's views often did appear to be particularly revolutionary, especially when they were not considered in the context of Freud's predecessors and near contemporaries.

17. On page 174 he explains why.

18. Though this is not definite since the work is in progress.

19. Gerber makes a similar point about Beresford's changing technique, but he does not link it with a Freudian influence ("Study" 197).

20. Unbeknownst to his wife, Hermann is unfaithful to her.

21. Of course he had literary precedents in Thomas Hardy's *Jude the Obscure* (1897), amongst others.

22. Nevertheless, like Beresford's *Jacob Stahl* trilogy, *The Hampdenshire Wonder* is in some sense autobiographical. Beresford's friend, Frank Swinerton wrote

"That early book of his, 'The Hampdenshire Wonder,' which some suppose to be the tale of a monster, is in reality a dream fantasy, the tale of a child who fulfilled Beresford's own ambition, to be as full of knowledge as the 'Encyclopaedia Britannica'." (Georgian 241)

Beresford, who claimed that *The Hampdenshire Wonder* flowed from him, confirms this, referring to the work as a compensation fantasy. ("Memories" 341)

23. *Wonder* 4. There is great irony in the fact that the narrator is attempting to master the reasoning of a book and a passage in particular which shows the limits of reason. Bergson often does not employ reasons in his argument but rather attempts to convince by means of poetic illustrations.

24. This account was published in 1726.

25. It would appear that Gregory Lewes is named after G.H. Lewes. See Chapter One 77-79.
26. In his autobiography, Beresford claimed that, "The nearest I ever came to anything like a description of the Beresford family was in the novel These Lynnekers (1916), in which there are one or two near portraits, although the central character is far from being autobiographical." ("Memories" 14)

27. They could easily have been drawn from Butler's The Way of All Flesh (1903) or from Henri Bergson.

28. The scene in which Mrs. Lynneker bursts into tears after confessing to Dickie her financial imprudence is described as "like a lover's quarrel" (Lynnekers 128).

29. Gerber claims that Beresford portrays Wells as A.B. Ellis in The Invisible Event, and that character is consistent with the A.B. Ellis drawn in These Lynnekers ("Study" 30).

30. While walking in London, one of these moments occurs. Wilfrid claims, "I was no more aware of myself as an individual presence. My spirit was entering into the body of London..." (Housemates 56).

31. "Declin" 259. Given Beresford's strict definition of the psychoanalytic novel, this statement would appear to be accurate.

32. Philip's father chastises him for reading Shakespeare at a very early age (God's 14-15).

33. God's 296. The dream suggests, among other things, that Philip unconsciously realizes that both Evelyn and his mother have a sexual aspect and are not embodiments of the lofty ideals that he has made them out to be.
Chapter Seven

1. Woolf's mother, Julia, died when Virginia was thirteen. Virginia's step-sister died two years later. At twenty-two Virginia lost her father; her brother Thoby succumbed to typhoid nearly three years later.

2. Woolf's earliest serious nervous breakdowns occurred in 1895, 1904, and 1913.


4. Zegger has suggested that the conclusion of Strachey's Queen Victoria echoes the conclusion of Sinclair's Harriet Frean (162). Though Sinclair's novel was published serially in The North American Review from December 1920 to March 1921, it does not appear probable that Strachey could have been influenced by its conclusion since he had completed and handed his biography to the publisher by January 27, 1921 (Holroyd II 390). As well, the similarities between Woolf's Jacob's Room and Harriet Frean in brevity and poetic form suggest Sinclair's influence. Though Woolf began Jacob's Room on April 8, 1920, and finished it November 4, 1921, which means that she could have read or heard about Sinclair's latest novel while writing, her comment to Strachey provides strong evidence to suggest that the similarities are coincidental.

5. Woolf claimed to admire Beresford's "intellectual efficiency" in Revolution (28).

6. They had both resigned Cambridge fellowships because they could no longer adhere to orthodox religion, and together belonged to several select societies, including the Metaphysical (Annan 277).


8. Stephen resigned as editor at this time.


10. Maitland claims that this group, which included himself and the psychical researcher Edmund Gurney, "used to dine together and talk philosophy" (Maitland 363). Sully and Stephen also both
belonged to the Metaphysical Society, Stephen joining in 1877 (Maitland 362).

11. Sully My Life 299. The Bloomsbury group came honestly by the high value that it placed on friendship and talk since this older generation also emphasized these values, the motive of the Sunday Tramps, for instance, being "to have the whole day free for talking and getting to know one's friends better (Sully My Life 302). Virginia Woolf later recalled that, although her father "was an agnostic[,] nobody believed more profoundly in the worth of human relationships..." (Woolf, "Leslie Stephen" 16).

12. vii. Sully claimed that this book reflected his two chief scientific interests, psychology and aesthetics" (My Life 147).

13. Sully shared the Secretaryship of the Second International Congress of Psychology, held in London in 1892, with Myers.

14. In "Leslie Stephen, the Philosopher at Home: A Daughter's Memories", Woolf recalled with gratitude that her father allowed her "the free run of a large and quite unexpurgated library" when she was fifteen (The Times, Monday November 28, 1932 16).

15. As cited in Zegger 98-99. Woolf mentions the work of another American psychologist -- John Dewey's Psychology (1887) -- in her essay "Hours in a Library" (Times Literary Supplement November 30 1916 565-566; Essays II 55-61). Woolf may very well have read this work since she includes it in "a list of the books that someone read in a past January at the age of twenty" (Essays II 56), and we can speculate that this someone may well have been Woolf herself.

16. Leonard Woolf wrote of "the historical psychology of an era" that helped condition personal relations at Cambridge, and he claimed the "the spiritual roots" of Bloomsbury were in Cambridge (L. Woolf Sowing 162 and Woolf Papers, University of Sussex, as cited in Rosenbaum Victorian 246).

17. Johnstone 20-45; Rosenbaum 214-238. Leonard Woolf himself wrote that "The colour of our minds and thought had been given to us by the climate of Cambridge and Moore's philosophy" (Levy 295).

18. Sidgwick himself had been a member.

19. Stout had been a student of Ward's at Cambridge.
20. Stout gave a detailed exposition of Herbart's psychology in *Mind* (No. 51, July 1888, 321-338; No. 52 Oct. 1888 473-498) and followed this up with a comparison of Herbart and the English psychologists (No. 53 January 1889, 1-26).

21. In this book, Tansley interpreted Freud's theories in biological terms. He became a member of the British Psycho-analytical Society in 1926 (Obituary. International Journal of Psycho-analysis Vol. XXXVIII 1956, 197 by S. M. Payne). Tansley also provided Woolf with the name of her academic character in *To the Lighthouse* (Meisel 19).

22. Freud was not asked to be a corresponding member until 1911.


24. Charles R. Sanders' *The Strachey Family 1588-1932* includes a list of *The Spectator* articles that both James and Lytton Strachey are known to have contributed (317-321).

25. Meisel 27. It seems possible that James also reviewed the Presidential Addresses to the Society For Psychical Research 1882-1911, amongst whose authors included Henry Sidgwick, Frederic Myers, and William James (*Spectator* July 27 1912, 137).

26. Levy 261-63. They both attended reading parties held in 1908 and 1909 (Levy 262).

27. *Letters* I 331. I have been unable to discover to what works of philosophy Woolf refers, since most of her reviews of this period in *The Essays of Virginia Woolf* I are of memoirs, letters, and diaries (188-220). However, similarly to James, she became further acquainted with the thought of G.E. Moore during this year and records reading his *Principia* through August (*Letters* I 340, 347, 352, 357, 364).

28. "Across the Border" *Essays* II 217. Though Scarborough does not make any references either to Sinclair's or to Beresford's forays into this genre, she does mention nearly all of Algernon Blackwood's novels on psychic subjects.
29. 219. In a third essay, "Henry James's Ghost Stories", she praises those ghosts created by James which have their origins within us, as in "The Turn of the Screw" (22 December, 1921, Essays III 324).

30. Alix Strachey wrote that "James [Strachey] often wondered why Leonard did not persuade Virginia to see a psychoanalyst about her mental breakdowns. There were analysts with sufficient knowledge to understand her illness in those days (Noble Recollections 143).

31. The Really Interesting Question and Other Papers 111-120; Sherman 351; Meisel Bloomsbury 40.

32. We do know that he read the Interpretation of Dreams in May, 1914, in preparation for the review (Bishop 29).

33. Thoughts of the after-life would also appear to have been of interest to one or other of the Woolfs that year since they possessed a copy of the 1917 edition of William James's Human Immortality.

34. Recall that James Glover had been involved in the Medico-Psychological Clinic with May Sinclair and was interested in psychical research as well. He visited the Woolfs in May of 1924 (Diary II 302).

35. References to Freud can be found in the following passages: A Room of One's Own 31-32; 19 March 1932 and 16 August 1932, Letters V 36, 91; Notebooks, 1933, I, Silver 45; 11 November, 1936, Diary V 32; Letters VI 312, 346.

36. Voyage 216. During her illness, we are told that, "the sight of Terence was the greatest effort, because he forced her to join mind to body in the desire to remember something. She did not wish to remember, it troubled her when people tried to disturb her loneliness; she wished to be alone." (Voyage 352)

37. Rachel does manage to broach the subject of her ignorance of sexuality with Hewet (Voyage 217).

38. The analogy between rooms in the hotel and characters' minds is later made more explicit (Voyage 262).
39. Other examples occur on 7, 123, 251, 271, 383, 392 of Night and Day.

40. Night 55. Later we are told that Ralph is "obsessed" with Katherine (Night 202).

41. Night 400. Desires such as these are shown to be inconsistent (Night 319) and irrational (Night 258).

42. Mrs. Dalloway 70, 78. In Clarissa, this quality is manifested in her "virginity preserved through childbirth which clung to her like a sheet" and has caused her to fail Richard, presumably sexually (Mrs. Dalloway 29). Peter Walsh refers to Clarissa's inability to feel as her woodenness and coldness (Mrs. Dalloway 55, 72).
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