

CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN

**DESIGNS OF RISK:
CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN, SOCIAL
CONTROL, AND THE PROSPECTS OF PROFESSIONALISM.**

By

PATRICK F. PARNABY, B.A.H, M.A.

A Thesis

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies

in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements

for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

McMaster University

Doctor of Philosophy (2004)

McMaster University

(Sociology)

Hamilton, Ontario

**TITLE: Designs of Risk: Crime Prevention Through Environmental
Design, Social Control, and the Prospects of Professionalism.**

AUTHOR: Patrick F. Parnaby, M.A. (Queen's University)

SUPERVISOR: Dr. Graham Knight

NUMBER OF PAGES: vii, 240

Abstract: This research paper seeks to understand how and why practitioners of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) exercise rational and strategic forms of social control over their clients. Based on data gathered from semi-structured interviews and myriad documents, I argue that practitioners frame (Goffman, 1974) crime related risks in ways that render the application of CPTED a rational and prudent course of action while at the same time establishing the professional legitimacy of their expertise. Moreover, I argue that this dynamic not only reflects the socio-economic conditions inherent in risk society, but also sheds light on contemporary forms of governmentality. I conclude by suggesting that CPTED may actually undermine our ability to engage those unlike ourselves in meaningful political dialogue while at the same time individualizing what is essentially a structural social problem.

Acknowledgements

There are a number of people who require special mention. First and foremost I would like to extend my love and gratitude to my wife Denise for all her encouragement and support. Without her, this research, and the degree for which it was conducted, would have been far less fulfilling. Many thanks to my friend and supervisor, Dr. Graham Knight who, through all the ups and downs, always managed to say the right thing at the right time. Thanks also to Dr. Dorothy Pawluch and Dr. Robert Wilton for their encouragement and oversight. Finally, I would like to extend a very special thank you to Cst. Tom McKay at Peel Regional Police for his guidance, insight, and willingness to help – thanks Tom! This research was funded, in part, by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (grant number 752-2001-1060) and for that I am truly grateful.

For Alexandra

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
The Environmental Control of Human Behaviour.....	2
CPTED in Context	7
The Canadian Experience	9
New Visions of Criminality	10
This Study	14
A Brief Word about Professionalization.....	16
Chapter Outline.....	16
CHAPTER 1: THE EMERGENCE OF CPTED	20
Urban Design as Crime Control.....	20
CPTED and Early Academic Research.....	32
Broken Windows, Community Control, and The New Urbanism.....	39
CPTED in Canada.....	41
Applied CPTED in Canada.....	45
Testing CPTED.....	48
Concluding Thoughts.....	58
CHAPTER 2: RISK SOCIETY AND THE CHALLENGES OF GOVERNANCE.....	60
The Risk Society	60
Anthropologies of Risk	66
Governing Risk Society	68
Foucault's Governmentality.....	69
Actuarial Technologies	70
Governing Risk Society: Prudentialism.....	74
Pastoralism.....	77
Tying Governmentality, Risk, and CPTED Together.....	78
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY	80
The Interviews	81
Sampling	82
The Interview Format	84
The Questions	85
Field Research.....	87
The Trials and Tribulations of Being in the Field.....	91
Content Analysis.....	94
Data Analysis	94
Finding Frames	95
Concluding Thoughts.....	96
CHAPTER 4: THE SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY BEGINS.....	98
The Search For Legitimacy.....	99
What's at Stake for CPTED Professionals.....	102
Foreseeable Danger.....	109
Foreseeable Danger in the Field.....	112

The Paradox of Common Sense.....	115
A Return to Simplification.....	117
Securing Legitimacy Through Liability.....	120
Some Preliminary Thoughts about Fear	127
Concluding Thoughts.....	130
CHAPTER 5: THE DIFFERENTIATION PROCESS.....	133
The Roots of Differentiation.....	134
Sorting People.....	137
Sorting People: Documentary evidence.....	142
Community as a Source of Legitimacy.....	148
Legitimacy, Risk, and Depoliticization.....	154
Concluding Thoughts.....	155
CHAPTER 6: RESPONSIBILIZING CPTED	157
A Brief Recap: Crime, Neo-liberalism, and Risk Society	158
The Responsibilization of CPTED.....	160
Responsibilization as a Supplement to the State.....	164
Training Standards and Official Recognition	168
CPTED Standards	169
Governmental Recognition	174
Concluding Thoughts.....	181
CHAPTER 7: CPTED AND THE CHANGING FACE OF ORDER MAINTENANCE.....	184
CPTED as Social Control	185
Social Control Spirals Outward	188
CPTED as a Form of Actuarial Control.....	189
Externalizing Risk.....	193
Externalizing Risk to Avoid Difference.....	195
Crime as an Individualized Problem.....	200
Concluding Thoughts.....	201
CONCLUSION.....	203
Where Do We Go From Here?	214
Suggestions for Future Research	216
Concluding Thoughts.....	217
Appendix A.....	219
Appendix A.....	221
Appendix B	222
Appendix C	224
References.....	225

INTRODUCTION

Not far from where I currently reside, the municipality has built a new recreational complex. Its low-lying design and glass facades allow it to easily blend into the suburban landscape. According to the building's manager, it was built that way so local residents would not complain about its size or the constant buzz of activity. By all accounts, it is truly a wonderful building.

There is more to the structure than meets the eye, however. During the planning process the architectural team ensured that the building's design incorporated numerous structural and landscape techniques thought to be capable of preventing crime and disorder. These design techniques were meant to go unannounced; their intended function being far from obvious to those not trained in Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED, pronounced 'sep-ted'). According to its proponents, CPTED involves the strategic alteration of the built environment in ways thought to reduce both the fear and incidents of crime in a given area while subsequently improving the quality of life (Crowe, 2000). My local recreational facility provides a telling example.

Along the building's perimeter, with the exception of the main entrance, the exit doors are flush with the exterior walls, thereby providing little, if any, shelter from the elements. These doors are believed to reduce the likelihood of unwanted loitering. In addition, the perimeter walls maintain straight lines whenever possible, resulting in fewer alcoves or "entrapment zones" –concealed spaces which are created when walls are constructed perpendicular to each other. In theory, fewer alcoves promise fewer zones where criminal activity can take place out of sight.

The surface texture and colour of the exterior walls varies along the entire length of the building. According to the designers and CPTED advisors who worked on the structure, varying the texture helps to reduce the likelihood of graffiti by making the surface a poor “canvas.” Where the walls change from brick to glass (a smooth surface that is easily scratched), access is restricted by the strategic planting of flowers and shrubs. Though certainly not impenetrable, these design techniques make damaging the masonry and /or glass more difficult.

Crime prevention was essential to the interior design of the building as well. Perhaps the most interesting feature is the careful positioning of the main customer service desk. Located in the centre of the main atrium, the desk affords an unobstructed view of the foyer and each of the main corridors. In fact, the open-concept design renders virtually everybody and *everything* open to natural surveillance. There are few places where one can hide, be disruptive, or vandalize the building without being seen; a design feature reminiscent of Bentham’s panopticon (see Foucault, 1995; Garland, 1991).

THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL OF HUMAN BEHAVIOUR

Deliberately controlling human behaviour through environmental design is certainly not a new idea. For centuries, governments and citizens alike have been modifying the built environment to achieve a number of social, political, and economic goals. In a sense, our individual and collective visions of how the world ought to be become manifest in mortar, concrete, and steel. At the same time, however, our buildings, roads and landscape designs are also expressions of our individual and/or collective

anxieties; sign-posts reflecting our concerns and fears at particular moments in both time and space, sometimes remaining visible from one generation to the next.

Discrepant world views, however, generally mean that the infusion of social and political sensibilities into the built environment is never a smooth process. Power struggles between vested interests frequently alter the trajectory of material development. A park, for example, is not designed to include lush trees and bushes. Instead, the concerns of a local advocacy group win the day: The risk of pedophilia is too high, they argue, to permit the planting of shrubs where assaults on children can take place. Thus, the politics of design literally define and bring to life the final product, only to fade into obscurity once the structure has been completed (see Gieryn, 2002).

The theoretical principles that underlie CPTED have been around for centuries and the examples are seemingly endless, ranging from the prolific on the one hand to the utterly mundane on the other. The following examples have been selected primarily out of personal interest. However divergent their substantive content may appear, each shares a common thread: The deliberate modification of the built environment is intended to control forms of human behaviour such that particular social, political, and/or economic objectives can be achieved.

According to Crowe (2000), approximately 2700 years ago the Greeks constructed religious temples in Sicily. Constructed from ancient stone mined from quarries which were once below sea level, each block contained high levels of phosphorous – a by-product of thousands of years of animal decomposition (Crowe, 2000). After dawn, and before dusk, the stones would cast a golden light in and around

the temples, subtly reminding people of the structure's religious significance while also showcasing priests' ability to transform solid rock into gold for the purpose of ceremony (Crowe, 2000).

During the Middle Ages, European cities were often surrounded by protective stone walls meant to keep vagrants and hostile armies at bay (Marcuse, 1997; Mumford, 1961). With outside influences left standing at the gates, however, security came at a price. Without a constant influx of new social, political, economic, or cultural ideas, many cities lost the capacity to be sufficiently reflexive. According to Mumford (1961), wide spread insularity eventually contributed to a heightened sense of individualism. As citizens continued to look inward, they were often completely unaware of the social, political, and economic changes that were taking place on the other side of the city's walls (Mumford, 1961; 1961a).

In 1700, King Louis XIV of France was informed that vandals had been ruining the streets of Paris. In response, he embarked on an ambitious security program involving the installation of nearly 7000 street lamps (Crowe, 2000). Street lights, he believed, would render the vandals visible both in the early morning hours and late at night. Without the cover of darkness, the King believed the vandals would no longer be willing to take the risk of being identified by Paris' more refined, upstanding citizens.

Over a century later, and under the command of Napoleon III, Barron Haussmann (Napoleon's Chief of Police) demanded that the city's roads be made wider and as straight as possible so as to make the transport of people and goods within the city more efficient (Girouard, 1985; Ellin, 1997). However, Haussmann's modifications were also

meant to fulfil particular security needs as well. In the event that the French working class revolted, wide, straight roads would allow the French military to manoeuvre its carriages and troop formations down the cobblestone roads with ease (Mumford, 1961; Sennett, 1992; Ralston-Saul, 1993; Ellin, 1997). Here, the modified physical environment provided the means to control particular populations living in very particular parts of the city.

In Paris, avenues were also strategically built to ensure the poor lived and worked as far from the aristocracy as possible; the French upper class was not to be exposed to the wretched ways of the city's lower class (Girouard, 1985; Sennett, 1992). As Ralston-Saul (1993) argues, modern reason began to define the nature of French urban design, ultimately working to sharpen class distinctions and solidify existing relations of power (Ralston-Saul, 1993).

Today, the relationship between social control and environmental design remains readily apparent. For example, Mike Davis' (1992) *City of Quartz* explores how crime, poverty, narcotics, and racism have led to a virtual barricading of certain neighbourhoods in Los Angeles, California. According to Davis:

In cities like Los Angeles, on the bad edge of postmodernity, one observes an unprecedented tendency to merge urban design, architecture and the police apparatus into a single, comprehensive security effort In many instances the semiotics of 'defensible space' are just about as subtle as a swaggering white cop (Davis, 1992: 224-26).

Although lower class populations tend to experience a disproportionate share of criminal activity, it is actually Los Angeles' white upper class that continues to invest in the latest security trends, including cameras, motion sensitive lighting, gated drives, and concrete walls (see Flusty, 1997). For those urbanites seeking a combination of privacy and

protection, gated communities have become a readily available, though hotly debated, option (see Blakely and Snyder, 1999).

However, it is often the more mundane applications of environmental design that alter our behaviour the most. From shopping malls to fast food restaurants, from amusement parks to high schools, particular design techniques are deliberately used to gently suggest – and sometimes outright demand – that we behave in particular ways.

For example, Crowe (2000) reveals how major fast food companies use light, colour, and music to ensure that customers not only order and eat quickly, but that they even dispose of their own trash (Crowe, 2000; also see Schlosser, 2002). Similar techniques are now used in Ikea department stores across Canada where customers are guided through a virtual maze of product show-rooms by means of foot paths and coloured direction arrows; walking against the flow of consumer traffic seeming almost forbidden.

What all of the above examples have in common is a deliberate attempt to control social behaviour through modifications to the built environment. In each instance, whether it is a crime prevention initiative in Los Angeles or the process of ordering a hamburger at a restaurant, visions of how the social world *ought* to function are, in a sense, rendered material by means of concrete, steel, or glass. When used to control human behaviour, each environmental modification becomes a real-world reflection of the socio-political context and localized visions which gave rise to it in the first place: Environmental design always reflects, albeit to varying degrees, the social, political, and cultural sensibilities of the times. This being the case, one might ask: What broad social

forces led to the emergence of CPTED in particular?

CPTED IN CONTEXT

It was the social, economic, political, and cultural transformations of the post war period that provided the fertile ground from which CPTED eventually emerged. For the United States, victory over the Axis powers sent into motion a chain of events that set the stage for unprecedented economic growth. At home, financial prosperity gave further momentum to Roosevelt's New Deal, facilitating wide spread infrastructure development and the emergence of an even larger welfare state geared toward helping those who could not help themselves (see Gilbert, 1997).

When the United States government proclaimed that every American family deserved a decent home and a suitable living environment, the subsequent demand for affordable housing was unprecedented (Rybcznski, 1995). With the help of mortgage subsidies, including the Federal Housing Act of 1949, mass produced, single family dwellings became easier to afford. In fact, the famous Levitt brothers were soon building Cape Cod-style cottages in three different styles for less than \$15,000 each (Garreau, 1992; Rybcznski, 1995). With the construction of over 80,000 homes, for example, New Jersey's "Levittown" stretched for miles and was soon swallowing up open potato fields at the rate of nearly 150 homes per day (Kunstler, 1994). The production techniques of the Ford motor company had first brought Americans affordable cars. Now the same

techniques were generating affordable homes and what looked to be a bright future.¹

When the Federal-aid Highway Act was passed by congress in 1956, over 41,000 miles of highway and 6,100 miles of urban freeway were built across the United States (Ellin, 2001; Rybczynski, 1995). However, the affordability of the automobile and the availability of relatively inexpensive homes on the outskirts of American cities set the stage for a middle class exodus from America's deteriorating inner-city neighbourhoods. With the open road paved and the family car packed, middle and upper class Americans (most of whom were white) began leaving in droves to find their piece of the suburban promise.

Yet, by the 1970s violent crime and crimes against property began to take a toll on American urban centres. According to Cohen and Felson (1979), rates of aggravated assault, forcible rape and homicide had increased by 263%, 164%, 174% and 188% respectively while the burglary rate had increased by almost 200% (Cohen and Felson, 1979). In a desperate bid to preserve falling land values and encourage economic growth, cities across the United States (and Canada) embarked on "urban renewal" programs designed to replace inner-city slums with high-rise developments. Unfortunately, many of them were poorly constructed and ultimately reflected the inevitable banality of mass-produced, government housing. According to Newman (1980), the complexes were ill-suited to the social and economic needs of residents and, as a result, quickly became hot

¹ Joel Garreau (1992) in *Edge Cities* reveals that at the present time, New Jersey's Levittown is actually a fascinating place to visit because many of the homes have been personalized and modified by families over the years.

spots for criminal activity (Hannigan, 1996; Newman 1972; 1980).² As housing projects all over the United States began showing signs of decline, and as the effects of this disorder began to ripple outward both socially and economically, it became clear that America's inner-city communities were on the brink of collapse (Fitzpatrick and LaGory, 2000).

The Canadian Experience

Between 1945 and 1975 Canada experienced similar social, economic, and cultural transitions. In the years following World War II, large-scale infrastructure development coincided with the spread of both public and private housing. When mortgage subsidies made home ownership a possibility for an increasing number of people, subdivisions not unlike Levittown began cropping up around Canada's major urban centres. Thus, Canadians too began packing their cars and heading for suburbia.

As the middle class continued to head for the suburbs, governments began destroying urban slums and replacing them with public housing projects and commercial establishments in an attempt to "clean up" the landscape. At its peak, the urban renewal process was a massive undertaking. Between 1951 and 1971, for example, the destruction of city slums resulted in the elimination of homes belonging to more than 13,000 Toronto residents (Caulfield, 1994).³ In order to provide affordable housing for those too poor to

² The most famous of these housing projects was the Pruitt-Igoe housing complex, a series of high-rise, publicly funded buildings constructed in St. Louis during the early part of the 1970s. However, by 1972, shortly after it was built, Pruitt-Igoe was torn down because property damage, drug dealing, and crime had left the building a vacant shell of its former self (Garreau, 1992; Harvey, 1990; Ellin, 1997).

³ Built in 1949, Toronto's infamous Regent Park housing development was one of the first public housing

afford their own home, high density housing complexes were constructed, many of them resembling the downtrodden structures being built south of the border.

However, Canadian inner-city communities fared somewhat better than those south of the border in the post war period. Most importantly, Canadian cities did not experience the negative effects of racial tension to the extent that American cities did (Mercer and England, 2000). Moreover, after 1945 and on through the 1970s, Canadian inner cities actually experienced moderate growth and expansion due in no small part to intensified public sector investment, a balance between big business and big unions, and more liberalized zoning codes (Filion et. al., 2000). Nevertheless, Canadian inner cities showed signs of disorder and decline as crime rates across the country continued to climb.

For a growing number of *American* urban planners and architects in particular, rising inner-city crime rates had much to do with how complexes and communities were being designed. The architectural and environmental landscape, they argued, exacerbated and sometimes nurtured criminal activity in neighbourhoods where citizens were already struggling to make ends meet. This being the case, the way inner-city neighbourhoods were being built required an immediate re-evaluation. Crime was not simply a phenomenon that emerged independent of the environmental landscape. Instead, the latter was thought to be deeply implicated in the genesis of the former.

New Visions of Criminality

projects to be developed under the edict of urban renewal. At the present time, the city of Toronto is

Important transitions were also taking place in the United States with respect to how the aetiology of crime was being understood; a transition that provided an intellectual and political climate that was conducive to the eventual success of design-based crime prevention initiatives.

Since the 1950s, the American penal welfare state had been operating on the basis of a structuralist ideology. It was generally understood that the root causes of criminal behaviour were to be found in the adverse affects of structural conditions, including economic deprivation and/or racial inequality (Garland, 2000; 2001; Feeley, 2003). With a full compliment of “experts,” a burgeoning criminal justice system emerged following World War II and a rehabilitation/punishment model became the mantra of all those who believed in the capacity of the “system” to effectively deal with disorder through various kinds of social engineering.

At the same time that architects and planners were beginning to problematize contemporary design in earnest, an abrupt shift in American penal ideology was taking place. According to Cohen (1985), by the mid 1960s reformers were becoming disenchanted with the rehabilitative criminal justice complex. A shift away from the state, the expert, and institutional care was about to begin (Cohen, 1985; see Garland 2000). Not only was the penal system discriminatory and paternalistic, critics argued, but it was also generally ineffective when it came to reducing rates of recidivism (see Garland, 2001).

Perhaps the most devastating critique came from The Working Party of the

preparing for a major reconstruction of the area (*Toronto Star*, December 20, 2002).

American Friends Service Committee, which argued that the entire rehabilitative approach lacked solid scientific support (Garland, 2001). However, the Party's mandate was not to bring about a radical rejection of penal welfarism in the United States. Instead, its members argued for the need to mitigate the state's tendency to punish offenders in a biased and unjust fashion and for the need to implement a prisoner's bill of rights. In the end, the report called the entire system into question and set the stage for future critique.

Soon after, Martinson (1974) published "What Works in Prison Reform?" in the widely read journal, *The Public Interest*. On the basis of data gathered between 1945 and 1967, Martinson concluded that, with few exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts undertaken by the U.S. criminal justice system were failing (Martinson, 1974). His conclusions, according to Garland (2001), were soon exaggerated and became the justification for a more general critique which suggested that *nothing* was working when it came to lowering crime rates in the United States (Garland, 2001).

This ideological transition was furthered once again by James Q. Wilson (1983) who argued that the criminal justice system should focus on policy initiatives that were capable of generating "real" results (Wilson, 1983). More police, harsher penalties, situational crime prevention, and a scaled-back welfare state were thought essential to reducing rates of criminal activity (Wilson, 1983).⁴ The criminal was no longer an unsuspecting victim of unfair structural conditions, but was now a rational, calculating malfeasant who carefully chose his or her target. The fight against crime was about making the consequences of such choices swift and severe while doing everything

possible to minimize criminal opportunity.

These ideas were given further credence, according to Feeley (2003), when certain politicians and analysts argued for the need to trim the bloated, wasteful, state bureaucracies that had emerged in the decades following the New Deal (Feeley, 2003). This restructuring of state bureaucracies soon translated into a much broader campaign geared toward a “return to basics;” an immediate downsizing of *all* government programs and the privatization of those services thought to be better off in the hands of the open market (Feeley, 2003). Like education and health, the criminal justice system was to be scaled back, made more efficient, and better equipped to deal with offenders who had made bad decisions under their own volition.

This disillusionment with the criminal justice system provided the fertile ground from which situational crime prevention initiatives emerged. Thus, when American architects and urban planners began exploring the relationship between design and criminal behaviour, the intellectual and political climate was ripe. The idea that criminals engaged in a rational cost/benefit analysis while in the process of committing a crime meshed well with the belief that a properly designed urban environment could effectively prevent crime. Indeed, if committing a crime was more a product of choice and less a product of structural influence, then all one had to do was design an urban landscape that made criminal decisions more difficult to make – and that is precisely what CPTED

⁴ Of course, it was Wilson who, several years later, went on to pioneer the “Broken Windows” thesis with George Kelling (see Wilson and Kelling, 1982).

practitioners set out to accomplish.⁵

THIS STUDY

Although I have had formal CPTED training, I approach this study as a sociologist, not as a CPTED practitioner. Unlike those who have made CPTED an integral part of what they do on a daily basis, I am interested in pursuing questions that extend well beyond the relative effectiveness of CPTED as a crime prevention technique. For me, questions pertaining to how well fences prevent trespassing, or how well particular kinds of light render colour in the dark, are of limited sociological importance – overshadowed, I believe, by questions which seek to elucidate the social and cultural importance of CPTED as a whole.

Initially, the social and political relevance of CPTED would appear to be a function of its role as a crime prevention strategy. Understanding the operative dynamics of CPTED is vitally important today, one might argue, because it is part and parcel of a much broader, and virtually hegemonic, socio-political mandate to fight crime across North America (see Parenti, 1999; Sacco and Kennedy, 1998). In this sense, CPTED is relevant because it offers a potential means by which criminal activity can be prevented.

However, I would argue that when CPTED is evaluated as if it were a social

⁵ But if criminals were engaging in a cost/benefit analysis of the environment to determine its suitability, surely the public was to bear some responsibility for making the environment more or less inviting? According to Cozens et. al. (2001), this was, and remains, the case. Over the past 20 years, victims of crime in Canada, the United States, and England have been suing property owners for their failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent a person's victimization on a given premises (Cozens et. al., 2001). These "premises liability" cases have served to implicate a wider range of people in the legal disputes that generally follow criminal victimization. The traditional three party dispute between the state, the offender,

phenomenon unto itself – that is, having its own unique trajectory of social, political, and cultural development – it becomes apparent that its sociological relevance extends well beyond issues of efficacy. In fact, as this study will demonstrate, CPTED actually tells us a lot about the changing face of social control in today’s “risk society” (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991). Specifically, the promotion and eventual application of CPTED reflects the highly rationalized, strategic, and calculated means by which social control is being exercised over individuals and/or groups due to the spread of expert systems (Giddens, 1990) in the area of risk management. How, exactly, do CPTED practitioners exercise social control over individuals and/or groups? To what end? And how does that exercise of control reflect risk society and its particular governmentality (Foucault, 1991)?

Using the fundamental principles behind Goffman’s (1974) frame analysis to analyze interview transcripts and CPTED-related documents, I will argue that social control is exercised through the discursive framing of crime-related risks in ways that render the application of CPTED an imperative course of action. Moreover, in addition to the prevention of crime and disorder, I will argue that these discursive techniques are used by CPTED practitioners, both consciously and unconsciously, to establish the professional legitimacy of their area of expertise.⁶

and the victim is now likely to include property owners and managers who now have a vested economic and moral interest in securing their properties from criminal activity.

⁶ What makes the professionalization of CPTED particularly interesting, especially within the context of risk society, is the fact that it is about crime prevention and not about rectifying the root causes of crime. This being the case, CPTED practitioners are constantly dealing with the hypothetical (the highly contingent possibility that a crime might occur in a particular location). This hypothetical orientation makes legitimization process even more difficult because the probability of a criminal act occurring in the future can always be called into question by a client, thereby rendering CPTED’s expertise virtually irrelevant.

A Brief Word about Professionalization

Central to this study is the argument that CPTED practitioners are attempting to establish their sense of professional legitimacy as they, in a sense, jostle to secure their own niche in the risk-management market place. Although on a substantive level little has been written about the professionalization of CPTED in particular, much has been written about the professionalization process in general. Freidson (1986; 2001), Bucher (1988), and Bucher and Strauss (1961), for example, have all written extensively on the professionalization process from both organizational and discursive points of view.

It is important to note here, however, that this study is not principally concerned with the professionalization process per se. Instead, of concern here are the discursive means by which the exercise of social control is made possible and what, if anything, those discursive processes tell us about the nature of risk society and principles of contemporary governance in particular.

Chapter Outline

In Chapter 1, I explore the development of CPTED both as a cultural phenomenon and as an area of scientific research. Although this chapter is quite rich in background information, I believe it provides an important source of historical and intellectual context for the chapters which follow. In Chapter 2, the literature on risk-society is assessed in detail, as is the literature on governmentality as it relates to late-modern forms of social control. The purpose of Chapter 2 is to set up the theoretical framework within which the discursive framing of risk will be related to issues of social control and

governmentality.

Chapter 3 provides an overview of this study's methodology, exploring in detail how semi-structured qualitative interviews, document analysis, and field research techniques were used to capture the necessary data. Most importantly, however, Chapter 3 explains why Goffman's frame analysis was aptly suited for the extraction of particular discursive strategies from the qualitative data.

In Chapter 4, I begin by examining why practitioners must constantly seek to legitimize their expertise in the first place. I begin by exploring the state of expert systems in what has become a post-industrial (Bell, 1976) risk society and then proceed to argue that all claims to expertise must be constantly reinforced and legitimated if they are to remain valid.

I then proceed to look at the importance of two discursive frames in particular, the first being "foreseeable danger" and the second being "compliance through liability." With respect to foreseeable danger, I argue that CPTED practitioners and supporters frame crime-related risks such that, (a) the aetiologies of those risks are stripped of all signs of uncertainty and are thus rendered foreseeable and impending and that, (b) the risks appear amenable to CPTED's approach to crime prevention.

With respect to compliance through liability, I argue that practitioners carefully frame a client's potential unwillingness to abide by their recommendations as a kind of "risky" behaviour in and of itself. Thus, risk becomes a source of discursive leverage through which social control is exercised. Paradoxically, however, both frames

(foreseeable danger and compliance through liability) are shown to exist in a contradictory relationship to practitioners' frequent use of "common sense" discourse.

If the frames of foreseeable danger and compliance through liability operate to establish the urgent need for professional CPTED advice, then what kind of frame is used to assure clients that CPTED is, in fact, an effective crime prevention initiative? I answer that question in Chapter 5 where I examine the way in which practitioners discursively frame the differentiation of legitimate and illegitimate users of social space in an apolitical fashion. Using the interview data and numerous CPTED documents, I argue that the differentiation process is framed apolitically so that it appears to be a straightforward, objective decision that is untainted by moral and/or ethical ambiguity. I then demonstrate how practitioners and supporters secure the validity of the differentiation process by connecting it back to a primary frame of "community."

In Chapter 6 I explore what I believe to be the most important frame of all – the "responsibilization" of CPTED. With the need and, perhaps to a lesser extent, the efficacy of CPTED established, I demonstrate how practitioners frame the use of CPTED as if it were strictly an individual responsibility. I then connect the responsibilization of risk management on the one hand to CPTED's search for both a standardized accreditation process and official government recognition on the other.

Chapter 7 departs from the frame analysis per se to explore the social and political implications of how CPTED is conceptualized. I make the argument that, in its current form, CPTED runs the risk of actually undermining our capacity to politically engage and tolerate social difference; a skill which is fundamental to the development and

maintenance of a mature civic polity. Moreover, I also make the parallel argument that CPTED works to individualize what is currently a collective social problem. I conclude the study be revisiting the association between CPTED and risk society while attempting to provide some general recommendations as to how CPTED should proceed into the future.

CHAPTER 1

THE EMERGENCE OF CPTED

URBAN DESIGN AS CRIME CONTROL

According to a select group of American urban planners and architects, inner-city crime and disorder was the result of poor community and architectural planning. In fact, it was Jane Jacobs (1992) who provided the most famous elucidation of this argument in her book *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*.⁷ As Jacobs articulated her attack on the state of urban planning in the United States, her frustration was obvious: “As in the pseudoscience of blood-letting, just so in the pseudoscience of city rebuilding and planning, years of learning and a plethora of subtle and complicated nonsense have arisen on a foundation of nonsense” (Jacobs, 1992: 13). In place of the status quo, Jacobs demanded communities be constructed in ways that were conducive to dynamic, heterogeneous social activity across as many spatial and temporal nodes as possible.

For example, sidewalks were to be plentiful and well connected to encourage casual interaction and familiarity among residents. Parks were to be situated so as to ensure their frequent use and susceptibility to forms of natural surveillance. Zoning was to be carefully mixed to discourage automobile use while encouraging pedestrian access. City blocks were to be small and streets numerous to encourage a diverse and variable flow of human activity. Lastly, cities were to encourage the presence and expression of

⁷ Although born and raised in Pennsylvania, Jacobs drew much of her inspiration from cities across the United States, including Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago – each city making its own special impression on her ideas.

diversity so as to nurture a sense of urban vitality. With more “eyes on the street” and a strong sense of community, Jacobs believed the modern urban landscape could be liveable and, by implication, less plagued by crime and disorder (Jacobs, 1992).

Jacobs’ ideas have attracted criticism, however. Mawby (1977) argues that Jacobs’ book was really just a reaction to the growing sense of “anti-urbanism” among American urban planners and architects, a position she despised (Mawby, 1977).⁸ In a manner even less forgiving, Sennett (1992) argues that Jacobs’ desire to resurrect small-town, intimate social relations in the city is nothing short of infantile – an attempt to design out the very forms of social disorder that are needed if we, as a society, are to develop a capacity for tolerance and civil arbitration (Sennett, 1992).

Regardless of how idealistic Jacobs’ ideas appear to be, she successfully challenged urban planners across North America to rethink how communities were being built. Most importantly, perhaps, Jacobs drew attention to the relationship between crime and poor urban design.

Oscar Newman (1972) soon adopted Jacobs’ ideas and, once again, championed them as potential solutions to urban disorder. While attending Washington University in St. Louis, Newman witnessed the deterioration and eventual destruction of the infamous Pruitt-Igoe housing complex. In response to this, he became convinced the building’s failure was due, in large part, to the fact that residents had been unable to feel a sense of pride and/or ownership in relation to their residences (Newman, 1996). According to

⁸ Perhaps the most noteworthy of whom was Lewis Mumford (1961) who portrayed the city as a dirty, suffocating haven where the upper class exploited opportunities to secure their own political and economic self interests (see Mumford, 1961).

Newman, this disinterest and lack of proprietary behaviour rendered the complex vulnerable to crime, disorder, and decline.

Like Jacobs, Newman was convinced that the deterioration of America's public housing complexes was the result of both poor architectural design and poor urban planning. In *Defensible Space*, Newman (1972) argued:

The crime problems facing urban America will not be answered through increased police force or firepower. We are witnessing a breakdown of the social mechanisms that once kept crime in check and gave direction and support to police activity. The small-town environments, rural or urban, which once framed and enforced their own moral codes, have virtually disappeared. We have become strangers sharing the largest collective habitats in human history (Newman, 1972: 1).

Newman's implicit lament for the small American town is accompanied by a noticeable populist desire to have citizens take control of their neighbourhoods. This theme surfaces most notably in *Guidelines for Defensible Space* (1996) where he argues that quality design and urban planning will, once again, return the hallways, lobbies, grounds, and surrounding neighbourhoods of today's housing projects back to their rightful owners; taking them out of the hands of criminals and placing them back into the hands of lawful residents (Newman, 1996).

If poor architectural design and urban planning were the issue, the primary culprit was the high-density, elevator serviced, double-loaded corridor apartment building that had become the mainstay of the U.S. government's approach to public housing since the early 1960s (Newman, 1972; 1980). According to Newman, high-density housing undermines the ability of residents to form the intimate bonds thought essential to the development of strong community relations. Most importantly, residents are unable to differentiate the "legitimate" from "illegitimate" users of social space (Newman, 1972).

In this respect, the housing projects of the 1960s and 1970s were said to be the "... very spawning grounds of criminal behavior" (Newman, 1972: 8). Of course, Newman realized that social and economic factors *did* play a key role in the onset of crime and disorder. Low socio-economic status and the divisive effects of heterogeneous populations were thought to be important factors in the explication of higher crime rates in inner-city neighbourhoods. However, with his sites set on issues of architecture and urban planning, and with funding from both the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice and the U.S. Department of Justice, Newman set out to develop his theory of defensible space, the fundamental principles of which are outlined below:

[Defensible space is] ... a model for residential environments which inhibits crime by creating the physical expression of a social fabric that defines itself ... an environment in which latent territoriality and sense of community in the inhabitants can be translated into responsibility for ensuring a safe, productive, and well-maintained living space (Newman, 1972: 3).

Using data gathered from the New York Housing authority, Newman argued that making space "defensible" required the incorporation of four interrelated principles: Territoriality, image, natural surveillance, and what will be referred to here as "proximity."

Territoriality – In its strictly behavioural form, territoriality involves the tendency of individuals to define, construct, and protect those social spaces deemed essential to their own survival. Animalistic tendencies aside, however, territoriality is an inherently social, political, and cultural phenomenon (Stevenson, 1996). The ability to delimit, interpret, and interact in and through social space generally parallels the development of a reflexive social identity – one that is capable of integrating all that is social and all that is

obdurate into a seamless conceptual field. We often pass from one physical location to another, adapting instantly to the subtle shifts in behavioural expectations while our projected self image transforms accordingly. Our capacity for freedom of action and our ability to articulate and project our “self” into the social and physical world is intimately tied to our ability to attach boundaries to space while commanding access to, or exclusion from, particular territories (Fitzpatrick and LaGory, 2000; Lyman and Scott, 1972; Mead, 1938). In this sense, territoriality is very much an organic phenomenon, generated through complex interactions between social identities, social space, and the obdurate world.

According to Newman, architectural designs that are capable of generating a sense of territoriality among residents demonstrate a clear understanding of the relationships that exist between buildings, their exterior grounds, and the tenants living within them (Newman, 1972).⁹ If territoriality exists, residents and/or property owners will take obvious pride in their places of residence. Gardens will be trimmed, grass will be cut, and a building’s exterior will be well maintained. Thus, residents will “naturally” demonstrate care and control over their property if it appears worthy of their attention in the first place (Newman, 1972).

Space that is clearly identified as being either private or semi-private *and* under the care and control of local residents will encourage residents to detect and act upon

⁹ In fact, the multivariate character of defensible space (and, as we shall see, of CPTED as well) would eventually become the basis of considerable criticism as practitioners and academics began to realize how difficult it was to effectively evaluate defensible space applications with any scientific rigor. Multivariate regression techniques required too many variables to be held constant in order to evaluate the impact of certain design features on rates of crime and disorder. In fact, many of the mitigating and mediating factors could not be effectively measured in the first place.

unwanted behaviour. While clarifying the relationship between territoriality and crime prevention, Newman argued: “An intruder who does not know the rule system, or hesitates in making his intentions clear, is easily spotted as not belonging [if territoriality is present]. He [sic] arouses suspicion which leads to the circumvention of his activities” (Newman, 1972: 63).

Whether it is a single, detached residential home or a small apartment complex, territoriality can, according to Newman, be encouraged in numerous ways. For example, walls, fences, and gates can be positioned so that the boundaries of one’s property are clearly defined. A less obvious approach involves the use of “symbolic barriers,” architectural or landscape features that *imply* a change in socio-spatial relations. For example, public space can be differentiated from private space (an important territoriality technique) by altering surface textures: At the point where a walkway transitions from public to private property, one can effectively communicate to visitors that they have made an important spatial transition requiring justification by simply switching from poured concrete to interlocking stone. This change in surface texture suggests a certain degree of care and spatial recognition on the part of the property owner while, ideally, communicating a similar message to the unwanted visitor(s).¹⁰

Of course, territoriality becomes more difficult to achieve when the density of a housing complex increases. The green space that typically surrounds a modern high-rise apartment, for example, cannot be easily modified so as to imply a sense of ownership or propriety because it would not be altogether clear *who* was laying claim to what area.

Subsequently, Newman argued that the best approach to achieving the densities required of urban living was to construct smaller buildings clustered together in groups. A collection of three or four buildings sharing a single lot can be more readily adapted so that both interior and exterior spaces appear under the care and control of specific groups of residents (Newman, 1972).

For example, a cluster of smaller buildings affords the opportunity to reduce the number of families sharing interior hallways, points of entry or exit, and if constructed properly, amenities such as playgrounds, gardens, and sitting areas (Newman, 1972). Territoriality, therefore, is about designing social space in a way that identifies certain populations as being either “desirable” or “undesirable”; it is about using environmental design to symbolically establish the grounds for either social inclusion or exclusion (see Sibley, 1995).

Natural Surveillance – Making a particular space defensible means opening it up to forms of natural surveillance. Residents, pedestrians, and even passing drivers must be capable of watching balconies, windows, parking lots, and playgrounds for untoward activity. High-risk areas such as secluded, poorly lit, and out of sight stairwells, corridors, and lobbies, for example, are to be rendered visible at all times. Doing so inevitably requires that landscapes be designed with care so that surface elevations, plantings, walkways, and gathering points all compliment, rather than obstruct, available sight lines. The growth and transformation of a landscape over time must also be taken into consideration. A small sapling will become a mature tree, perhaps casting an intimidating

¹⁰ Similar techniques are currently used in shopping malls to differentiate the floor space of private

shadow in the evening while also obstructing a clear line of sight out from a building's interior.

However, opportunities for natural surveillance are meaningless if nobody is willing or able to capitalize on them. Sight lines may be clear and landscaping may be unobtrusive, but if residents or pedestrians are not present, or if they are simply unwilling to respond when confronted with disorderly conduct, incorporating opportunities for natural surveillance into a site design becomes less meaningful. Therefore, natural surveillance and territoriality must be considered in tandem if they are to have the desired impact on criminal conduct (Newman, 1972).

Image – The urban renewal craze which swept through the United States during the 1960s and 1970s culminated in the construction of banal, homogeneous housing complexes by the thousands. As middle and upper class families continued to head for the suburbs, lower class African Americans, Latinos, and other visible minorities were forced to live in such buildings out of sheer social and economic necessity (Newman, 1972).

The negative stigma associated with these complexes, argued Newman, contributed to crime and disorder. Buildings that appeared disorderly and run-down, in a sense, invited criminal activity because the structure itself encouraged a “no one cares” attitude among residents and visitors. Dilapidated buildings, argued Newman, seemed to justify and perpetuate further decline.

In fact, according to Newman, it was not uncommon for residents to vandalize and steal from their *own* buildings. The social stigma of living in a downtrodden housing complex often created a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby housing projects in disrepair were seen as not worthy of respect and thus warranting further abuse which, in turn, would reinforce the initial stigma. Graffiti, vandalism, and drug trafficking became routine activities for residents who believed they had nothing to loose. The cycle would continue until the building collapsed socially, economically, and sometimes even physically.

Minimizing the stigma associated with living in a lower-class housing complexes required making the developments more aesthetically appealing. According to Newman, design techniques generally reserved for the middle class must be applied to inner-city buildings in order to minimize their social stigma (Newman, 1972). For example, using design as a means to encourage residents to personalize and care for their living space would not only make buildings look better, but would also create a much needed sense of territoriality. In addition, limiting the use of vandal-proof encasements on lights and fire hoses, for example, would imply a sense of trust in the residents (Newman, 1972); the idea being to minimize the social stigma associated with the housing facility itself. Most importantly, the inside and outside of each complex should be of respectable quality and be well maintained. Only then, argued Newman, would residents be likely (or willing) to regain control of their communities.

Proximity – According to Newman, urban planners were to locate housing complexes near other neighbourhoods, institutions, or facilities that tended to encourage

forms of law abiding behaviour (Newman, 1972). Newman suggested this for two reasons: First, he argued that good behaviour tends to “rub off” on those who tend to be disorderly. Second, reputable institutions tend to attract outside economic investment, thereby helping to generate social and economic capital which, under the right circumstances, can lead to the kinds of development many downtrodden communities so desperately need (Newman, 1972; 1980).

But it is when territoriality, natural surveillance, image, and proximity are integrated and working in tandem that defensible space can be said to exist (Newman, 1972; 1976). While it may be true that the components are capable of generating positive effects on their own, it was their combined “organic” effect that interested Newman the most.

In order to evaluate his theory, Newman compared two New York housing complexes. Both the Van Dyke complex (high-rise) and the Brownsville complex (low-rise) had densities approaching 288 persons per acre. In addition, they were located directly across the street from each other and, according to Newman, housed similar populations. What they did *not* share, however, were architectural similarities.

The Van Dyke building, for example, lacked defensible space characteristics. It was a classic double-loaded, elevator serviced, high-rise complex that had limited natural surveillance, poor image quality, and few opportunities for territorial expression. The Brownsville complex, on the other hand, had fewer families using each point of entry, offered better opportunities for natural surveillance, and had a more “humanized” outward appearance.

Using data gathered from the New York Housing Authority, Newman concluded that the Van Dyke building experienced 50% more crime (including three and a half times the number of robberies) when compared to the Brownsville complex (Newman, 1972; 1976). Although not unequivocal proof, Newman remained convinced that his data effectively supported his defensible space thesis.

However, with the emphasis placed squarely on the preventative implications of architecture and urban design, the subtle nuances of human social relations – including the ambiguity, the tensions, and the inevitable differences that exist among diverse populations – appear to be marginalized by Newman in favour of a highly deterministic analysis (Stevenson, 1996).

This oversight was corrected somewhat in Newman's (1980) *Community of Interest*. Although the analysis did little to explore the social-psychological principles behind defensible space theory in any depth, it was clearly an attempt to situate America's inner-city housing crisis in a broader social and political context. In doing so, Newman sought to demonstrate the importance of managing people rather than just the physical environment.

Stable inner-city communities, argued Newman, required not just defensible space, but also the careful allocation of residents based on their racial and socio-economic backgrounds (Newman, 1980). In fact, Newman was not averse to the idea of using racial and socio-economic quota systems when it came to populating housing developments or individual complexes (Newman, 1980). He believed that large, racially and economically heterogeneous communities *were* possible, provided the proportion of

upper income families was high enough to ensure that the community would benefit from the public and private services that typically follow more affluent populations (Newman, 1980). As a result, lower class families and those headed by a single parent could enjoy the benefits of a stable community. Once again, the civilizing sensibilities of the middle and upper classes were thought essential to the development of “respectable” communities populated by “good” neighbours.

However, Newman’s definition of “good neighbours” did not include low income families, those with teenage children, or those headed by a single parent. These high-risk populations were believed to be catalysts to crime and disorder (Newman, 1972; 1980). Properly housing the inner cities, therefore, not only required space that was defensible, but also a careful categorization and sorting of human populations based on their similarities, differences, needs, and perhaps most importantly, their relative disposition toward criminal conduct. All of this was to be achieved through market incentives, advertising, zoning regulations and, if necessary, quota systems.

But if architectural design and urban planning were the issue, what was to be the role of the state, the police, and the entire criminal justice system? Like so many other academics, politicians, and activists in the 1970s (see Garland, 2000; 2001), Newman argued that the police were no longer capable of fostering a sense of security and that the citizenry was to adopt this function for itself (Newman, 1972).

Newman's theoretical work has changed very little since it was first introduced over 30 years ago. Defensible space theory continues to espouse the importance of formal and informal social control at the level of community and territoriality, natural

surveillance, image, and proximity remain the architectural means by which that sense of community is to be achieved (Newman, 1972; 1995; 1976). With more “successful” case studies in toe (including the Five Oaks community in Dayton Ohio and the Clason Point housing projects in the South Bronx (see Newman, 1995)), Newman’s work remains optimistic in spirit.¹¹ His non-profit organization, The Institute for Community Design Analysis, continues to sponsor and organize inner-city development based on defensible space principles across the United States.

CPTED and Early Academic Research

During the late 1960s and on through the 1970s, the American criminal justice system was destabilized by a variety of critical voices. It was from within this fragile ideological context that many alternative visions of crime prevention and social control began to emerge. Indeed, Newman was one of many who advocated a new approach to crime prevention in the face of rising crime rates and inflated police department budgets.

Although contemporary CPTED remains more Newmannesque in theory and in practice, it actually owes its title to C. Ray Jeffery, an academic who coined the name “Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design” prior to the publication of

¹¹ In a recent on-line publication of the *Dayton City Paper*, Wilkinson (2003) suggests that, 10 years after Oscar Newman first visited the Five Oaks community in Dayton Ohio, the residents have become completely divided following the implementation of one of Newman’s ideas. In a bid to create smaller neighbourhood clusters (in order to facilitate territoriality), Newman recommended the construction of numerous gates in between properties. According to Wilkinson (2003), the gate system was appropriated by the residents as an informal way of keeping black and white residents separated. In a sense, the gates have *exacerbated* racial tensions while having only a modest impact on local crime rates (Wilkinson, 2003). Online: <http://www.daytoncitypaper.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=207>

Newman's *Defensible Space*. Be that as it may, Jeffery's work has had a profound influence on the intellectual development of CPTED.

In 1971, Jeffery published *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*, a scathing critique of the general inability of academics and professionals to understand, and subsequently control, criminal behaviour in the United States (Jeffery, 1971). If sociology was guilty of anything, argued Jeffery, it was its unwillingness and/or inability to account for the physical environment when it came to understanding the dynamics of criminal behaviour (Jeffery, 1977). Even the classic works of Shaw and McKay (1969) were said to have suffered a similar oversight. Although Shaw and McKay were able to demonstrate that delinquent behaviour manifested itself in particular geographic areas across Chicago, Jeffery argued, the analysis eventually became more about individual offenders rather than the areas within which their crimes took place (Jeffery, 1977). Therefore, the "environment" was understood to be the normative social environment rather than the physical environment.

For Jeffery, the physical environment was both the potential catalyst and medium through which criminal behaviour unfolded. Offenders, as forward looking individuals, were said to engage in a mental calculus; weighing the prospects of pleasure and pain (in a Skinnerian sense) when confronted with criminal opportunity.¹² The criminal act, therefore, was a product of the offender's personal psycho-biology and the active process of assessing the environment, *not* structural inequity (Jeffery, 1971). Therefore, Jeffery's

¹² In the early 1960s Jeffery taught at Arizona State University. Commonly referred to as "Fort Skinner of the West," Arizona State allowed Jeffery to be exposed to many young behaviourists studying the works of B. F. Skinner (Jeffery, 1977).

answer to the failures of American crime control policy was prevention grounded in the science of social behaviourism (Jeffery, 1977). Subsequent research was to be focussed on the symbiotic relationship between human biology, psychology, and the physical environment.

Jeffery soon addressed the general intellectual shifts that were taking place within urban planning, academic criminology, and sociology. In 1977 he released a second edition of his book wherein he argued that Newman's theory of defensible space was "unimaginative" (Jeffery, 1977). With respect to academic criminology, Jeffery argued that it lacked an understanding of the role played by genetic and physiological characteristics in an individual's disposition to commit a crime (Jeffery, 1977). Although criminology's growing attentiveness to the role of the environment was commendable, he argued, a bio-social awareness was still lacking.

Thus, Newman *and* Jeffery emerged on the theoretical scene around the same time, both calling traditional crime control policies into question while demanding there be a concerted emphasis on prevention. For Jeffery, CPTED required an intensive investigation into the bio-physical dynamics of the criminal event. For Newman, biology and the complexities of environmental psychology were of less interest. Instead, his focus remained on building better communities, an approach reminiscent of both Jacobs (1992) and Wood (1972).

In the 1970s, the work of Newman and Jeffery helped facilitate the emergence of "environmental criminology" as an academic discipline (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981). Unlike traditional criminological research which was preoccupied with questions

of criminal motivation, environmental criminology began by taking the presence the criminal and his or her motivation for granted (see Garland, 2001). As inherently rational and calculating individuals, criminals were said to adopt a principle of “least effort” while engaging in the criminal act, ultimately capitalizing on the most efficient means available to fulfill their objectives (Felson, 1987; Felson and Clarke, 1998; see also Hochstetler, 2001).

For the environmental criminologist, *that* mental calculus involved a careful assessment of the physical environment with respect to the presence or absence of certain territorial opportunities. Thus, why a motivated offender understands a particular target to be suitable, and how he or she comes to occupy the same spatial and temporal location as the target, are questions that must be answered if the criminal event and its environmental distribution are to be understood. For the environmental criminologist, crime is not just about individual motivation, but also about the distribution of criminal opportunities across time and space (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981). The task for the environmental criminologist, therefore, is to understand trends in that distribution (see Sacco and Kennedy, 1998).¹³

These theoretical developments eventually became the basis for criminological training at the National Crime Prevention Institute (NCPI) in Louisville Kentucky. Founded in the 1960s, the NCPI’s mandate remains one of training police officers and other law enforcement officials in the fundamental principles of crime prevention and,

¹³ It was this emphasis on the physical environment – as both a mediating and mitigating factor – that, according to Jeffery (1977) and Brantingham and Brantingham (1975), separated environmental

since 1985, in the principles of CPTED as well (Crowe, 2000). As one of the institute's most recognized spokespersons, criminologist Timothy Crowe (2000) continues to teach and apply the principles of CPTED across the United States and Canada. His impact on the emergence of CPTED in both countries has been nothing short of profound. Although based on numerous erroneous and unsubstantiated assumptions about human behaviour, his book, *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design* (2000), has now become a pseudo field manual for CPTED practitioners across North America.

Like his predecessors, Crowe (2000) applies a rational choice perspective to the understanding of criminal behaviour. However, unlike Newman – who acknowledged the importance of socio-economic factors in the aetiology of criminal conduct (albeit in a limited fashion) – Crowe effectively relegates social and structural explanations of criminal behaviour to the margins, seeing them as a part of a largely unsubstantiated cannon of sociological and criminological literature (see Crowe, 2000). For Crowe, *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design* is the only prudent response if we are to successfully manage our crime related risks and minimize both our social and economic losses.

Crowe's CPTED is actually a slightly modified version of what was first espoused by Jeffery (1971) and Newman (1972): Effective CPTED must address issues of territoriality, access control (see Appendix A, figures 4 and 5), and natural surveillance while also ensuring that the various stakeholders (property owners, residents etc.) remain

criminology from the sociological and ecological research that was once conducted at the University of Chicago during the first half of the 20th century.

fully involved in the decision making processes that will impact their lives (Crowe, 2000). According to Crowe, the nine major CPTED strategies include the following:¹⁴

1. *Provide clear border definition of controlled space:* Using fences, shrubbery, or symbolic barriers, one should make it clear to others that a transition from public to private space has taken place.
2. *Provide clearly marked transition zones:* Make all transitions from public to semi-private to private space obvious, thereby minimizing the range of excuses for improper behaviour.
3. *Relocation of gathering areas:* Consider relocating popular gathering locations to areas that demonstrate good surveillance and access control opportunities.
4. *Place safe activities in unsafe locations:* Because safe activities serve as magnets for normal users who are likely to exhibit controlling behaviour, placing them in areas where disorder is present may help to minimize unwanted behaviour.
5. *Place unsafe activities in safe locations:* Placing vulnerable activities near occupied space or space subject to natural surveillance helps to minimize the risks associated with crime and disorder.
6. *Redesignate the use of space to provide natural barriers:* Ensure that conflicting activities are physically separated from one another.
7. *Improve scheduling of space:* A well organized approach to using space leads to both productivity and the emergence of effective, informal social controls.
8. *Redesign space to increase the perception of natural surveillance:* Because the perception of surveillance is often more effective than its reality, it is essential that landscapes maintain clear lines of sight.
9. *Overcome distance and isolation:* Facilities that are isolated from other forms of social activity often encourage disorder. Minimizing isolation is, therefore, essential to crime prevention (see, for example Appendix A, figure 6). Finally, efficient communications help to ensure that distance is less of a mitigating factor in the relay of pertinent security-related information.

¹⁴ These nine strategies were adapted from Crowe's (2000) *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design* (see Crowe, 2000: 127).

It is important to realize that, for Crowe, CPTED is also about creating functional social environments. Organizations, neighbourhoods, and facilities that operate effectively and efficiently are thought to be more resistant to the onset of crime and disorder; their social routines helping to nurture a positive atmosphere which generates the informal social controls necessary to curb unwanted activity (Crowe, 2000). Whenever possible, therefore, design modifications must always help to enhance both the form and function of the landscape or institution in question.

Like Newman (1972; 1976; 1980; 1995), Crowe suggests that CPTED modifications are best incorporated into the design of a community or institution when it is still in the initial stages of *planning*. This pre-emptive approach helps to minimize, or perhaps completely negate, the need for an expensive retrofit in the event that crime and disorder begin to arise in the future. Yet, incorporating CPTED into the planning process is not just a matter of organizational and economic expediency. According to Crowe, it also offers a valuable opportunity for CPTED practitioners to confront and inform architects and planners as to the limitations of their “one-dimensional” vision (Crowe, 2000).

Similar to Jacobs and Newman, Crowe's vision carries with it a “call to arms” sensibility, one that is likely a product of the extreme social and political salience that has surrounded the North American crime problem for decades. In a sense, Crowe's work portrays the CPTED practitioner as the proverbial torch bearer, one who must teach others how to think “outside the box.”

Broken Windows, Community Control, and The New Urbanism

On a theoretical level, new and alternative concepts are easily incorporated into CPTED because there is enough theoretical and conceptual flexibility with respect to what constitutes “environmental design” that any preventative approach claiming to modify the physical and/or social environment will seem at least somewhat congruent with CPTED principles. Wilson and Kelling's (1982) “broken windows” approach to crime prevention, Neighbourhood Watch programs, and The New Urbanism, for example, are three initiatives easily incorporated into CPTED's conceptual framework.

Broken Windows – Wilson and Kelling (1982) argue that rates of crime can be reduced if police officers and citizens make an effort to reduce signs of low level disorder and decay in urban environments (Wilson and Kelling, 1982). Panhandlers, drunks, rowdy teenagers, vandalism, graffiti, and litter are to be tended to promptly before a “no one cares” attitude takes hold and eventually leads to more serious forms of criminal activity (Wilson and Kelling, 1982).¹⁵

Because of CPTED's emphasis on the importance of maintaining both the image and functionality of individual buildings and neighbourhoods, it is no wonder that the broken windows approach has been so easily appropriated. Both assume that forms of low-level disorder ultimately leads to further criminal activity while rendering a neighbourhood less able to resist further decline. As the forthcoming qualitative

¹⁵The link between low levels of disorder and fear of crime was supported most prominently by Skogan (1990). However, subsequent research by Harcourt (2001) has revealed that Skogan's analysis was fatally flawed (Harcourt, 2001). Nevertheless, the broken windows approach has been adopted in cities across

interviews with CPTED practitioners will demonstrate, the broken windows approach is often referred to by CPTED practitioners when discussing CPTED's application.

In a similar theoretical convergence, it is not uncommon for CPTED practitioners to emphasize the importance of Neighbourhood Watch programs as well (see Linden, 1990). Based on the principles of opportunity reduction, the theory behind Neighbourhood Watch emerged out of earlier research relating to how and why environmental modifications reduce criminal opportunity (Sherman and Eck, 2002; McKenna, 2000; Rosenbaum, 1987). In its most basic form, Neighbourhood Watch encourages residents to keep their "eyes on the streets" so as to report suspicious or untoward activity to the police. Thus, Neighbourhood Watch is believed "... to reduce the opportunity for criminal activity by letting would-be criminals know that the risk of detection and apprehension has increased" (Rosenbaum, 1987; see also Garofalo and McLeod, 1989). Although research has shown that the effectiveness of Neighbourhood Watch programs is inconsistent at best (Sherman and Eck, 2002; Rosenbaum, 1987; Garofalo and McLeod, 1989), it remains an important counterpart to CPTED's emphasis on design-based deterrence.

Finally, it is difficult to address CPTED without also addressing the relevance of "The New Urbanism." For the New Urbanist, our cities and suburbs are aesthetically unbearable and entirely dysfunctional – creations of an outdated, linear mode of conceptual *thinking* driven more by the demands of late capitalism than the needs of real

North America, including Toronto (see Parnaby, 2003) and New York City under the guidance of Rudolph Giuliani (see Parenti, 1999).

human beings.¹⁶ Cookie-cutter subdivisions, ever-widening roadways, and insulating property fences, for example, all seem to nurture a tragic sense of self-seclusion and individualism that undermines any sense of community. For the New Urbanist, the task at hand is one of building communities that are less dominated by the automobile, that are walkable, green, diverse, and conducive to the emergence of cohesive community relations (see Katz et. al., 1994).¹⁷ Under such conditions, it is argued, crime and disorder are less likely to occur.

In spite of harsh criticism, including Sennett's (1997) belief that New Urbanist communities represent "fantasy communities" (Sennett, 1997), CPTED practitioners have embraced the New Urbanism: The emphasis on tightly knit community relations resonates clearly with CPTED's emphasis on functional social environments where territoriality and pride go hand-in-hand. In fact, CPTED training in parts of Ontario now involves a review of New Urbanist ideas.

Thus, the theoretical flexibility inherent in the concept of "environmental design" has allowed CPTED to bring other crime prevention initiatives into the fold. The broken windows approach, Neighbourhood Watch, and The New Urbanism have all come to play unique roles within the CPTED philosophy.

CPTED in Canada

¹⁶ For an assessment of The New Urbanism argument and an interesting rebuttal that offers some praise for contemporary development patterns, see Garreau (1992).

¹⁷ The work of Andres Duany and Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk (see Katz et. al., 1994) has become virtually synonymous with The New Urbanism movement. Together, these American architects designed and constructed the picturesque Florida community of Seaside, a locale that was built using the 19th century

Canada has made fewer contributions to CPTED theory, research, and practice relative to the United States and Britain (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996). Nevertheless, there are some contributions worth noting here.

In 1976, the Justice Secretariat of the federal government assessed the prospects of CPTED in Canada. The report argued: "The more established study of social, economic, and psychological "causes" of crime offer[s] little by way of impact on crime figures. The effects of the environmental approach could, however, be both dramatic and more or less immediate" (Stanley, 1976: 35). In addition to the immediate pay-offs that CPTED appeared to offer, the report also emphasized the economic incentives of its application. Most prominent among them was the belief that insurance companies would likely reduce the premiums of those individuals or organizations who maintained their properties in accordance with CPTED principles (Stanley, 1976). Most importantly, however, CPTED appeared to offer what previous crime prevention initiatives could not: More immediate results.

In 1984, McInnis et. al. developed the Environmental Design and Management (EDM) approach to crime prevention (McInnis et. al., 1984). The EDM approach involved a unique synthesis of design-based CPTED strategies with environmental and social management principles. According to the authors, the five basic design strategies of EDM included: target hardening, the use of detection hardware, improving surveillance potential, controlling access and escape, and fostering territoriality and social cohesion (McInnis et. al., 1984). Complementing these design features, however, were to

principles of mixed zoning, walkable landscapes, and community involvement (see Katz et. al., 1994;

be social and environmental management programs undertaken by residents, landlords, the police, and members of the community (McInnis et. al., 1984).

By virtue of its clear and balanced emphasis on both the social *and* physical elements of crime prevention, the EDM approach differentiated itself from the design-driven theories of defensible space and CPTED (as envisioned by Crowe). It is because of this fusion – this blending of what Schneider and Pearcey (1996) call “American design-based traditions” with the management approach of English practitioners – that the authors believed EDM held so much promise.

Yet, with the approach still in its infancy, McInnis et. al. (1984) offered the following words of caution:

EDM is not a replacement for other crime prevention strategies. Second, EDM is not solely a set of physical design strategies. Third, EDM is not a set of solutions that can be universally applied to all environments. And finally, EDM is not an approach whose underlying assumption and effectiveness have been theoretically and empirically validated beyond dispute (McInnis et. al., 1984: 73).

In spite of EDM's apparent limitations, the authors suggested that the federal government encourage EDM research by making adequate funding available to all interested parties (McInnis et. al., 1984). In addition to a more rigorous research agenda, it was also recommended that the federal government include a section on target hardening in the national building code of Canada while ensuring that adequate performance standards for doors, locks, and windows were developed (McInnis et. al., 1984).

For McInnis et. al. (1984) and Stanley (1976), the road ahead was a promising one. CPTED, and its more socially aware counterpart EDM, had the potential to generate more immediate results, something of considerable interest to governments that were

facing both rising crime rates and an unsettling lack of confidence in the welfare state's ability to eradicate criminal behaviour through widespread social and economic investment (see Garland, 2000; 2001).

At the level of government, interest in CPTED resurfaced again in 1990 when the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Commission (CMHC) published its own analysis (see Linden, 1990). Linden's (1990) thorough review of both the criminological literature and the various permutations of defensible space and CPTED theory, however, led to a rather sobering conclusion: Although there appeared to be some prospect in adopting design-based crime prevention techniques, Linden argued that it was a truly "... comprehensive, multidimensional, and situational[ly] specific" approach to crime control that was needed (Linden, 1990: 164). Crime, he argued, is a complex phenomenon that emerges from within very particular socio-physical locations across both time and space; there are no simple solutions and the causes are extremely complicated (Linden, 1990). Thus, Linden argued that government *should* advocate for the adoption of design-based techniques, but must do so without encouraging the application of "cookie-cutter" solutions (Linden, 1990). Most importantly, however, Linden's report requested that the underlying causes of crime, including poverty, racism, and unemployment, be dealt with appropriately by means of continued social and economic investment (Linden, 1990).

On the academic front, Canadian-based scholars Patricia and Paul Brantingham have made some of the most important contributions to the development of environmental criminology and CPTED (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996). Their research with respect to the relationship between burglary and urban form (1975) and the spatial

patterning of criminal activity (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981; 1990; 1993) has proven essential to understanding how crime and the environment are interrelated in both time and space.

Applied CPTED in Canada

CPTED has been applied across Canada. British Columbia, for example, has taken a proactive role in promoting and applying CPTED across the province. Schools, parks, transit terminals, pedestrian traffic networks, shopping malls, and an *entire town* have been transformed in accordance with CPTED principles (Schneider and Pearcey, 1996). Although formal evaluations of such projects are lacking, anecdotal evidence suggests they have been reasonably successful in meeting their objectives.

There has also been considerable interest in Ontario as well. In the early 1980s the Hamilton Wentworth Police department, together with the Real Estate Board, the Society of Architects, the Home builders Association and the CMHC, attempted to certify homes that complied with CPTED principles (Linden, 1990; Schneider and Pearcey, 1996). Home owners who met the criteria outlined in the “Shield of Confidence” program were to be eligible for insurance premium deductions. The initiative, however, was never formally evaluated and was soon abandoned.

However, Ontario’s interest in CPTED has continued to grow, largely as a result of CPTED Ontario, a volunteer organization composed of police officers, civil servants, security professionals, urban planners, and politicians dedicated to spreading CPTED across the province.

For example, in the city of Mississauga, the urban planning staff review city plans in order to identify CPTED related problems before they become part of the built environment. In fact, the city has managed to incorporate specific CPTED requirements into its city by-laws (see Appendix A, figure 2).¹⁸ Similar reviews are being conducted in the cities of Oakville, Hamilton, Niagara Falls, London, and the town of Caledon.

In 1995, the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC), in partnership with the Metro Action Committee on Public Violence Against Women and Children (METRAC), began extensive environmental security reviews of TTC subway stations using the principles of CPTED (TTC Minutes, 03/09/95). Also in the Toronto area, CPTED is being applied to hospitals and university campuses. The Department of Security at York University, for example, integrates CPTED principles into the design and/or retrofit of university buildings whenever possible (see Appendix A, figure 1). At the University of Toronto, the police department performs CPTED audits on both proposed and existing campus buildings while maintaining a website where CPTED audits can be requested on-line.¹⁹ In the private sector, CPTED audits are being conducted by security companies, including Intelliguard and Intercon security.

As one moves further east, CPTED techniques are being applied in the cities of Belleville and Kingston where the police departments have officers on staff who conduct CPTED reviews as part of the department's crime prevention mandate. In Kingston, CPTED principles have also been applied to the Queen's University campus.

¹⁸This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

¹⁹ You can see the on-line CPTED request form at: <http://www.utoronto.ca/police/cpted.html>.

Under the guidance of the Ottawa Police department, the city of Ottawa has embraced CPTED as well, recently retrofitting a number of its public transit terminals. Like the city of Mississauga, residential, commercial, and industrial site plans are routinely reviewed by the Ottawa Police Department in order to ensure that CPTED principles are being properly applied. In fact, at the time of this writing, CPTED principles are being incorporated into various Ottawa city by-laws.

By all accounts, there is considerable interest in CPTED across the southern part of the province and, based on anecdotal evidence, it seems to be growing. In municipal board rooms and police departments, on university campuses and elementary school play grounds, CPTED advocates continue to draw attention to the ways in which the physical environment both mediates and mitigates criminal activity.²⁰

But does CPTED really reduce both the fear and incidents of crime? Since the early 1970s, researchers have attempting to evaluate CPTED on many different fronts. Yet, persistent methodological difficulties have made securing ideal testing environments virtually impossible. The absence of adequate control groups for the purposes of comparing across buildings or developments has made the process of ruling out spurious relationships extremely difficult (see Casteel and Peek-Asa, 2000). These methodological problems have been further complicated by the fact that offenders tend to experience their physical and social environments holistically, thereby tangling the web of social and

²⁰ Over the past decade interest in CPTED and defensible space has grown considerably at the international level. In 1996, the International CPTED Association (ICA) was formed. With its headquarters in Calgary Alberta, the association maintains chapters in the United States, England, Canada, Australia, and parts of Asia. With a new international journal titled *The CPTED Journal*, the ICA now boasts a list of over 300 members from 30 countries and has recently taken important steps toward establishing an internationally applied set of criteria for CPTED certification (*ICA Newsletter*. Vol. 5, (2), 2002: 10).

environmental relations even further (Brown and Altman, 1981; Brantingham and Brantingham, 1990). Although some theorists have attempted to generate a truly socio-environmental model of CPTED (see Taylor et. al., 1984), a parsimonious causal model of any practical value has been slow to emerge.²¹ Needless to say, almost 40 years of evaluations have generated results that have been inconsistent at best.

TESTING CPTED

Newman's classic comparison of the Brownsville and Van Dyke housing complexes suffered from major methodological weaknesses from the very beginning (see Newman, 1972). The two buildings were selected for comparison based on their proximate location, their comparable tenant populations, and their architectural differences. Most importantly, the buildings were chosen because one of them was experiencing more disorder and decline than the other.

Unfortunately, the methodological problems began with Newman's need to choose the buildings in the first place. How the Brownsville and Van Dyke complexes compared to other buildings in the area was not discussed, making it entirely possible that Newman selected the two complexes because they supported his initial hypotheses (Mawby, 1977). A more sensible approach, and one eventually adopted by Coleman (1990), would have been to analyze as many housing complexes as possible with respect

²¹ However, researchers have interviewed offenders *after* their apprehension in order to explore the effects of particular environmental features on the propensity for residential burglary. See, for example, the work of McDonald and Gifford (1989) and Ham-Rowbottom et. al. (1999).

to crime rates, architectural design, social context, and socio-demographic characteristics in order to observe trends while statistically controlling for other variables.

Most importantly, Newman failed to differentiate between those offences committed by the residents and those committed by outsiders. Given that crime and disorder were portrayed as external threats to the wellbeing of inner-city communities throughout *Defensible Space*, this oversight is not at all surprising. One can only assume that the social dynamics of defensible space would operate differently if threats to social order were originating from the inside. Newman's failure to explore this possibility only serves to weaken his argument (see Mawby, 1977).

Finally, even if the architectural differences were responsible for lower crime rates in the Van Dyke complex, Newman's failure to explore the psychological workings of specific design features in detail left questions pertaining to *why* particular features were effective unanswered. Thus, the complex social and psychological processes that underlie the behaviour/environment relationship were left unexplored, thereby allowing a sense of determinism to undermine the theoretical integrity of his work (Moran and Dolphin, 1986).

In the wake of both Newman and Jeffery's research, the Westinghouse Electric Corporation began exploring their work in the 1970s. Funded by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, the Westinghouse report called for the design of preventative environments that could be applied to residential, commercial, educational, and public transit facilities (Jeffery, 1977; McInnis and Burgess, 1984). In the end,

however, the project was enormously expensive and evaluations of its effectiveness were thought to be too difficult to perform.

Again in the 1970s, an entire neighbourhood in Hartford Connecticut was transformed using defensible space principles. Although the U.S. federal government (in particular, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA)) and private planners spent millions of dollars conducting the research, the findings were inconsistent and weak, thereby adding little scientific credibility to Newman's ideas (Mawby, 1977; Murray, 1983; McInnis and Burgess, 1984; Schneider and Pearcey, 1996).

In one of the most ambitious evaluations of CPTED at the neighbourhood level, Coleman's (1990) *Utopia on Trial* used data gathered by England's Land Use Research Unit on over 100 000 flats. The analysis revealed that 15 different designs were related to crime and disorder. Coleman's findings included the following: (1) The number of dwellings per block was positively related to signs of disorder and malaise; (2) as the number of dwellings served by a single entrance increased, signs of disorder did as well; (3) structures with numerous accesses points from the street experienced higher levels of crime and disorder; and (4) the presence of children's play areas was related to higher levels of disorder and malaise (Coleman, 1990). In its entirety, Coleman's work showed tentative support for Newman's ideas.

O'Shea's (2000) study of 566 residents and their properties in Mobile Alabama generated tentative support for CPTED as well. The author assessed burglary rates with respect to the presence or absence of particular design and/or behavioural characteristics. According to O'Shea, neighbourhoods that were socially cohesive experienced fewer

burglaries, as did those where a Neighbourhood Watch program was in place (O'Shea, 2000). Houses with solid core front doors and restricted first floor access via windows were also less likely to be broken into (O'Shea, 2000). With respect to surveillance, houses that maintained clear lines of sight to and from a neighbour's house were less vulnerable, as were houses that had alarm systems and/or that contained property that was engraved with the homeowner's identification (O'Shea, 2000).

In a similar study of residential blocks, architectural design, and signs of disorder, Perkins et. al. (1993) generated an array of different findings – some supporting CPTED and others not. Streetscapes with good lines of sight and homes with real barriers experienced lower rates of criminal activity (Perkins et. al., 1993). Outdoor lighting on private property was related to fewer disorderly offences while the presence of outdoor steps, porches, and stoops were related to heightened fears of crime but to fewer *reported* incidents of serious criminal conduct (Perkins et. al., 1993). However, in contrast to the broken windows thesis, the presence of garbage on the streets showed little or no relationship to levels of neighbourhood disorder (Perkins et. al., 1993). Finally, areas with mixed zoning appeared to be *more* criminogenic than those zoned in a more homogeneous fashion (Perkins et. al., 1993).

Similar findings were reported by Novak and Seiler (2001) who argued that mixed zoning tended to undermine the emergence of the cohesive social networks capable of exercising measures of informal social control (Novak and Seiler, 2001).

Novak and Seiler's work, therefore, challenged the ideas of Jacobs who argued that mixed zoning actually *encouraged* a strengthening of urban social relations.²²

Moving down another ecological level of analysis from the neighbourhood level to that of individual buildings, Gillis (1974) explored the relationship between high-density buildings and criminal behaviour. Gillis' findings demonstrated that both internal density (the number of people within a particular household) and external density (the number of people per square foot) were related to an increase in social pathology (Gillis, 1974). However, the relationship was likely spurious given that pathological populations may, in fact, be attracted to high density housing in the first place (Gillis, 1974; see Fischer, 1984). In contrast to Gillis, however, Mawby's (1977) research found that high density housing projects *did not* experience higher levels of crime and disorder (Mawby, 1977).

Comparing individual buildings once again, Pablant and Baxter (1975) explored the relationship between environmental design and school vandalism. Their research found that improved lighting and the use of real and symbolic barriers failed to reduce rates of vandalism (Pablant and Baxter, 1975). However, areas with adequate natural surveillance and higher rates of social activity did fare somewhat better (Taylor et. al. 1980).

Merry's (1981) study of inner-city housing projects demonstrated that defensible is not always defended. Although the housing complex in Merry's research was well

²² In *A World of Strangers*, Lofland (1973) makes a similar argument to Jacobs. The diversity of cities that comes with mixed land usage and the arrival of heterogeneous populations actually encourages people to

equipped with defensible space features, it continued to experience both crime and disorder. The fact that ethnic heterogeneity, cultural differences, mistrust, and an unwillingness to interact with strangers undermined the potential for territorial behaviour led Merry to conclude that: "Spaces may be defensible but not defended if the social apparatus for effective defense is lacking" (Merry, 1981: 419): A similar conclusion was reached by Taylor et. al. (1984).

In a study of territorial appropriation, perceptions of safety, and sense of community, Brunson and Sullivan (2001) determined that residents who reported more near-home forms of territorial appropriation also reported a stronger sense of safety but *not* a stronger sense of community (Brunson and Sullivan, 2001). Although the research seemed to confirm Newman's theory of territoriality on some level, it suffered many theoretical and methodological weaknesses. Specifically, it was extremely difficult to determine whether defensible space nurtured a sense of territoriality among the residents, or whether those who *already* felt safe and part of the community sought and appropriated the territories in question (Brunson and Sullivan, 201).

Recent research into the effects of environmental design on convenience store robberies has generated some tentative support for CPTED. Casteel and Peek-Asa's (2000) meta-analysis research suggested that the application of CPTED principles appears to be effective in reducing rates of robbery (Casteel and Peek-Asa, 2000). However, because so many researchers were unable to secure a suitable control group, many variables were left lurking. Thus, although their assessment of current research

establish their own meaningful social networks. These networks, although somewhat limited in terms of

showed some support for CPTED, "... it [did not] show clear trends regarding which components of the CPTED approach are most effective" (Casteel and Peek-Asa, 2000: 114).

At the level of social psychology, researchers have attempted to understand how offenders interpret various territorial cues when deciding whether or not to commit an offence (see Moran and Dolphin, 1986). For example, McDonald and Gifford (1989) asked 44 convicted burglars to evaluate a set of photographs containing various images of potential targets. The participants were then asked to evaluate each target and identify the features that were of concern. Although the offenders evaluated the properties holistically, it was determined that when surveillance opportunities were poor, whether from the inside of the home or from the road, the location was understood to be a more suitable target for break and enter (McDonald and Gifford, 1989; see O'Shea, 2000). Other factors included the estimated value of the premises and the appearance of poor territoriality, both of which made the premises a more attractive target (McDonald and Gifford, 1989).

In a follow up study, Ham-Rowbottom et. al. (1990) set out to determine whether burglars and police officers assess territorial vulnerability in the same way. Police officers and offenders were asked to evaluate photographs independently. The residential features that contributed to a lower vulnerability rating among officers *and* offenders included windows that were visible from the road, the close proximity of a neighbour's house, a backyard separated from the front yard by real or symbolic barriers, and the

their reach, are essential to urban habitability and vitality (Lofland, 1973).

presence of a solid front door (Ham-Rowbottom et. al., 1990). Interpretive studies such as these, however, often wrongly assume that many offenders spend considerable time evaluating their course of action and the consequences that may follow (Hochstetler, 2001). In fact, research has consistently shown that burglars often live for the moment and rarely rationalize their criminal undertakings (Hochstetler, 2001).

In more recent work, Cozens et. al. (2001) interviewed planning professionals, convicted burglars, police officers, and young adults to determine whether or not CPTED features would be interpreted in a similar fashion across each group. There was considerable agreement that high-rise buildings, multiple dwelling units, and poorly maintained properties were less defensible and, thus, more susceptible to crime and disorder (Cozens et. al., 2001).

Apart from questions of efficacy, research by Davis (1992), Blakely and Snyder (1997), and Newburn (2001) suggest that the popularity of environmental crime prevention is actually cause for concern. As was the case in many pre-modern cities, contemporary anxieties with respect to “undesirable” populations has led to the differentiation and segregation of populations on the basis of race, ethnicity, age, and socio-economic status (Rosenbaum, 1987; Davis, 1992; Blakely and Snyder, 1997, Newburn, 2001, Sibley, 1995; Rentschler, 2000; Malone, 2002; Dekeseredy et. al., 2003). In an attempt to “purify” modern space (and commercial spaces in particular), architects, builders, and security practitioners are said to be creating what Sibley (1995) calls “geographies of exclusion” (Sibley, 1995; Flusty, 1997).

Thus, whether it is a gated community in Toronto (see Appendix A, figure 3) or a “bum proof” bench in Los Angeles, scholars like Davis (1992) suggest that social space is becoming less democratic (Davis, 1992; 1998). While it may be true that all of us pass through “defensible” environments on a daily basis, Davis argues that it is primarily the poor who are being excluded as a result of the upper class's drive to create safer and more homogeneous social spaces (Davis, 1992; 1998; see also Pain, 2001).

Sennett (1995) makes an argument similar to Davis. The drive to render social space safe and untainted by those deemed “undesirable,” he argues, is an extension of an emerging collective desire to rid our lives of the discomfort that human difference tends to create (Sennett, 1995; see Sibley, 1995). In this sense, creating safer spaces through CPTED serves to undermine our collective capacity to deal with human diversity, complex social issues, and conflicting social and political ideologies. Sennett (1995) and Blakely and Snyder (1997) subsequently argue that the very essence of civic responsibility may be at risk as we continuously shy away from confrontation behind secure properties and defensible spaces (Sennett, 1995; Blakely and Snyder, 1997; see also Davis, 1992).

However, one of the most common critiques of CPTED is that it merely displaces criminal and/or disorderly activity to other locations (Stevenson, 1996; Rentschler, 2002; see also Cozens and Prescott, 2001; Dekeseredy et. al., 2003). Although many CPTED theorists and practitioners recognize the probability of displacement (see Brantingham and Brantingham, 1990; Newman, 1995; Crowe, 2000), a variety of rationales have emerged as to why it should be of little concern.

According to Brantingham and Brantingham (1990), many offenders will not bother to seek out an additional target after their initial attempt (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1990). Therefore, the displacement argument makes the wrong assumption that the offender *must* commit the crime in question, as if it were similar to the release of sexual energy (Felson and Clarke, 1998).²³ In this sense, critics are said to be overestimating the likelihood of displacement while ignoring the initial reasons for why the location was chosen by the offender in the first place (Felson and Clarke, 1998). In fact, argue Felson and Clarke (1998), the likelihood of displacement taking place is actually quite low. To support their argument, Felson and Clarke cite research conducted by the Dutch Ministry of Justice where, of the 55 cases where displacement was studied, 22 showed no evidence of it occurring. The remaining 33 indicated that some crime was, in fact, displaced but that it was usually less severe when compared to the crime that was initially intended (Felson and Clarke, 1998).

Finally, Cozens and Prescott (2001) suggest that while it may be true that CPTED displaces some criminal activity, one should not always assume that it is problematic (Cozens and Prescott, 2001). Displacing disorderly activity to a different, and perhaps more appropriate, location may, in fact, be a suitable objective depending on the nature of the behaviour in question (Cozens and Prescott, 2001). Whatever the case may be, displacement seems to be something that CPTED practitioners and theorists generally

²³Felson and Clarke (1998) outline five different kinds of displacement: geographical, which involves the offender moving from one location to another; temporal, which involves the offender committing the crime at a different time; target displacement, involving the redirection of the offender to a different target; tactical displacement, involving the use of a different method when the initial attempt fails; crime type displacement, involving the commission of a different type of crime entirely (Felson and Clarke, 1998).

acknowledge. However, it is often understood to be a less threatening consequence of a situation that could have been much worse.

Moreover, those who argue that CPTED merely displaces criminal activity often put forward the parallel argument that CPTED fails to address the root causes of crime and disorder (O'Malley, 1992; Linden 1990; see also Cohen, 1985). Social inequality (Quinney 1970; Christie, 1994; Dekeseredy et. al., 2003), discrimination (Parenti, 1999) and patriarchy (Rentschler, 2002), for example, are said to share complex associations with crime and patterns of victimization. As Linden (1990) argues, it is essential that preventative measures such as CPTED be accompanied by a concerted effort to address the structural aetiology of criminal activity (Linden, 1990). Not doing so, argues Linden, amounts to *nothing more than treating the symptoms of crime and not the causes* (Linden, 1990; see also Dekeseredy et. al., 2003).

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The emergence of CPTED as a policy initiative and as an area of scientific study has been anything but straightforward. From the very outset, CPTED has been beset by critics from all sides and the consistent lack of credible scientific support for its overall efficacy has only added fuel to the fire. These debates, however, are of marginal interest here. In fact, I chose to include this CPTED-specific literature review for a number of reasons which are largely unrelated to questions of efficacy or the appropriateness of CPTED as a crime prevention initiative.

Specifically, I would argue that examining the political and scientific development of CPTED over the course of three decades offers a useful glimpse at how the state and the scientific community have struggled (sometimes in vain) to identify, quantify, and manage the risks believed to be associated with particular environmental forms. Most importantly, it also demonstrates how the risk management approach represented, at one time, a significant departure from traditional methods of crime control (e.g., rehabilitation and proactive patrolling). Indeed, the political and scientific history of CPTED is very much a partial genealogy of risk management as a state sponsored form of social control. In the following chapter I take up those issues in their own right.

CHAPTER 2

RISK SOCIETY AND THE CHALLENGES OF GOVERNANCE

In its entirety, the literature on CPTED remains a rather disconnected mixture of scholarly and non-scholarly material, ranging from environmental criminology and psychology on the one hand, to urban design and environmental planning on the other. Concerns have tended to focus on whether or not CPTED works or on whether or not urban landscapes transformed in accordance with its principles are something that we should aspire to. Critics offer visions of fortress-like neighbourhoods where environmental design actually intensifies levels of fear (see Davis, 1992) while supporters argue that, if implemented correctly, CPTED should be all but invisible to the untrained eye (see Crowe, 2000). These two visions routinely collide, each vying to be recognized as the true representation of what CPTED is all about.

Questions about technical application and effectiveness aside, at its very heart CPTED is about identifying and managing crime-related risks. Given its twofold emphasis on risk identification and remediation, and given the popularity of CPTED among police officers, politicians, and other state representatives, CPTED almost instinctively warrants sociological investigation in relation to the risk society and governmentality literatures. Thus, both areas of research will be addressed below.

RISK SOCIETY

According to Beck (1992; 1994), modernity is now reflexively confronting its legacy at every turn. While it is true that the modern industrialized world has successfully

overcome the limitations of scarcity, a century of unbridled over-production and consumption has now created an environment where the negative repercussions of that development are virtually inescapable. Pollution, radiation, cancer, financial ruin, resource depletion, and climate change, for example, all threaten our very existence – each a by-product of modernity’s relentless push “forward” under the legitimating force of scientific reason (Beck, 1992; 1992a; 1994; see also Homer-Dixon, 2000).

The road ahead is now more volatile and uncertain as the promises of modernity are forever being tempered by a general awareness that there are serious repercussions for each and every “advance” that is made. The constant need to confront and manage those repercussions suggests that modernity is perhaps best described as being in a perpetual state of reflexive modernization: However, it is a disposition not practiced uniformly across the social, economic, or political spectrums.

Exposure to risk remains disproportionately a lower-class phenomenon as the political economy of risk exposure in North American continues to place the poor, more than anybody else, in harm’s way (Fitzpatrick and LaGory, 2000; Douglas, 1992; Homer-Dixon, 2000). Those occupying the lower socio-economic tier tend to live and work in communities where the risks of victimization, ill-health, and misfortune are more extreme. For a variety of complex social, economic, and political factors, so many individuals and families are unable to break free of their situations and are thus forced to manage risk as best they can with what they have. It is not an easy task, especially when access to the knowledge required to do so has become increasingly stratified along class lines (Beck, 1992; Fitzpatrick and LaGory, 2000).

However, as Beck argues, many of the risks associated with the late-modern condition now traverse long standing social divisions with ease. The global reach of nuclear war (Caldicott, 2002), environmental pollution (Suzuki, 2003), and resource depletion (Homer-Dixon, 2000; Suzuki, 2003), for example, render ecological, temporal, and spatial barriers increasingly meaningless; these are risks that we all face by virtue of the simple fact that we are alive. As Beck argues, “Poverty is hierarchic, smog is democratic” (Beck, 1992: 36). One could just as easily add pollution and a potential nuclear holocaust to Beck’s list of “democratic” risks.

Thus, modernization – with its tendency to look forward – has been supplanted by a kind of *reflexive* modernization. At every turn the modern industrialized world is now being forced to confront the risks associated with its past and present activities. But has modern industrial society not always been confronted by, and had to deal with, risks of one kind or another? Indeed, it has. However, as Beck argues, it is not the act of dealing with risks per se that distinguishes risk society from earlier periods in history. Instead, what makes risk society different is the extent and rate at which the latency of risk is being eliminated through scientific investigation (Beck, 1992; 1992a).

Ironically, however, modernity’s reflexive disposition towards risk depends on the capacity of scientific rationality to capture the essence of those risks. Thus, the logic which facilitated the emergence of risk society in the first place is now being used to both assess the damage and chart a different course for the future (Ruhl, 1999). According to Beck (1994) and Homer-Dixon (2000), it is no wonder that modernity’s risks often seem outside the purview of the very institutions designed to monitor them – it is as if such

organizations no longer possess the ability to step “outside the box” in order to render risk understandable (Beck, 1994; Homer-Dixon, 2000).

Nevertheless, a staggering proportion of our social, political, and economic capital is, and will continue to be, spent on uncovering the hidden dangers of scientific, industrial development. But why not? The risks of modernization are entirely real. They are not merely social constructs or the *sole* products of discourse. Although Beck recognizes the importance of competing rationality claims in relation to the process of bringing particular risks to the forefront of the public’s consciousness (as do I), he rightly understands certain risks to be undeniably real in their consequences. At the end of the day, the potential consequences of risks left unattended can be disastrous, capable of bearing down upon each and every one of us in the most concrete ways. O’Malley (2001) clarifies Beck’s realist position by suggesting that, “For Beck, risk society emerges in late modernity because this is when industrial and scientific development creates the *real global threats* that generate risk consciousness [italics mine]” (O’Malley, 2001: 86-7).

Although Beck’s work does not address the risks associated with criminal activity in particular, the broader concept of *risk consciousness* is particularly relevant here. Indeed, the boundless contingencies that define the very essence of modernity (the vast interconnections of cause and effect – both known and unknown) provide the foundation for a wide ranging and all encompassing risk optic; the world is increasingly understood in terms of risk and risk management. Thus, crime too becomes enveloped in this broader risk logic, forever understood in terms of probabilities and/or potentialities that sometimes appear calculable and sometimes not.

According to Douglas (1990), the demand for risk's identification and management is now the driving force behind social change, while constantly transforming every aspect of our social, political, and cultural existence in the process (Douglas, 1990; Beck, 1994). As such, risk identification and management has become a booming, multi-billion dollar industry across North America as the industrial system continues to profit from the deplorable state of affairs which it has created (Beck, 1992a). Indeed, the risks of modernity continue to fuel the North American gross domestic product (GDP) like never before.

For example, as Kalle Lasen (1999), the infamous editor of the Canadian-based *Adbusters* magazine argues, both the Exxon Valdez oil spill and the Gulf war in 1991 generated noticeable increases in America's GDP which, arguably, is how North Americans prefer to measure the health of society (Lasen, 1999). Although Lasen's general point is that economists must "learn to subtract" (a position also adopted by Homer-Dixon (2000) in his book, *The Ingenuity Gap*), his argument also clearly demonstrates that the risks of modernization – whether environmental and/or political – eventually line the pockets of those specializing in their amelioration.

At the helm of this juggernaut are the "experts" (some corporate, some not) who constantly remind us that the hazards we face are only *really* perceptible to those with the right credentials. Yet, experts are now faced with the task of dispensing their risk knowledge to a public that is becoming increasingly anxious (Giddens, 1990; Beck, 1992; Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; Marlow, 2002). With so many voices outlining modernity's risks, who is one to believe?

According to Furedi (1997): "... there are so many apparently expert voices trying to alert us to new dangers that their advice often seems to conflict, and confusion reigns over exactly what is safe and what is a risk" (Furedi, 1997: 4). Indeed, expert and lay voices routinely collide and become blurred – sometimes coming from all corners of the globe – as advances in communication and information technologies (of which the media plays an essential role) continue to collapse time and space with ease (Ungar, 2001). What is often left behind is nothing short of an information vacuum that assures no one.²⁴ According to Gergen (1991), this conflation of so many voices from so many different perspectives has begun to undermine our capacity to achieve a state of ontological security, leaving us with fractured, "saturated" selves (Gergen, 1991).

As the future becomes "colonized" by these thoughts of risk, and as scientific knowledge appears less able to nurture a sense of security, the way forward becomes overshadowed by a sense of uncertainty (Giddens, 1990; 1991; Furedi, 1997). In ethnomethodological terms, the taken for granted life-world becomes increasingly fragile as the individual is less able to assume that the future will resemble the present in any meaningful way (see Garfinkel, 1967). Under these conditions, lives become characterized by an ongoing interplay between anxiety, ontological insecurity, and moments of empowerment (Giddens, 1990; see Gergen, 1991).

²⁴ Yet, all is not lost. For Beck, a more reflexive modernization has caused the monopolies of industrial society to fracture. The monopoly of science on rationality, of politics over policy, and marriage on sexuality, for example, have given way to a system dominated by sub-politics where reflexivity and self-criticism have become institutionalized. According to Beck (1992): "Enabling self-criticism in all its forms is not some sort of danger, but probably the *only way* that the mistakes that would sooner or later destroy our world can be detected in advance" (Beck, 1992: 234). Although unsettling, risk society offers the possibility for a more inclusive democratic order.

For Beck (1992) and Giddens (1991), this uncertainty propels individuals through recurring phases of self definition. In Beck's case, this often amounts to a highly individuated search for a unifying personal narrative that is capable of knitting one's past and present into a coherent story; one that is less plagued by doubt and reinterpretation (Beck, 1994; Lash, 1994). For Giddens (1991), the individual life course becomes less bound by tradition which, in and of itself, no longer seems capable of effectively guiding anyone through recurring fields of risk.

In the works of Beck and Giddens, therefore, the individual appears to be at least partially liberated by the onset of risk society, cast into a world where uncertainty and opportunity play off one another, leaving the individual simultaneously free yet anxious. It is, to say the least, a turbulent state of affairs.

ANTHROPOLOGIES OF RISK

Beck's research agenda (see Beck, 1992; 1992a; 1995), as widely influential as it has been, is but only one approach to understanding the onset of risk society. In fact, Beck's realism contrasts with the work of Douglas (1990; 1991; 1991a; 1992) who promotes a slightly more anthropological approach to understanding risk and its relationship to lived experience. For Douglas (1991), the social scientist must be sensitive to the ways in which risk is rendered meaningful at the micro level (Douglas, 1991; 1992; see also Lupton, 1999). Definitions of risk, suggests Douglas (1990), are best understood to be the products of competing claims to knowledge which are typically underscored by shifting relations of power and culturally (and organizationally) specific value structures

(Douglas, 1991; Ericson and Haggerty, 1997). Indeed, culture provides the coding principles through which risks and hazards are recognized. In her essay on the relationship between risk and notions of blame, Douglas (1992) makes the compelling argument that risks are identified within a universe that is, as anthropologists well know, always moralized and politicized (Douglas, 1992).

Therefore, the cultural contexts within which risks are identified and managed generally operate on the basis of standardized notions of justice – i.e., there exists taken for granted axioms that identify what does or does not constitute a just state of affairs (Douglas, 1991). Thus, standards of accountability inevitably run through the process of risk assessment (Douglas, 1992). As Douglas' research demonstrates, these culturally specific, normative frameworks partially determine which risks will be tolerated and which will be the subject of ameliorative action (Douglas, 1991).

Douglas' emphasis on culturally specific notions of morality, blame, and justice injects the risk society scholarship with a much needed dose of cultural pluralism. However, Douglas' anthropological approach does not mean that the risk society literature has been naively realist in its claims. In fact, Douglas *too* believes that there are certain conditions that are real in every sense of the term. Where Douglas departs from Beck, however, is that she attempts to detach the *meaning* of those conditions from the conditions themselves. Meaning – and thus the designation of something as “risky” – is a cultural product that becomes attached to particular states of objectively verifiable affairs.

The job of the social scientist, therefore, is to create a theoretical framework that can effectively transcend the cultural contexts within which risks are being debated

(Douglas, 1992). Whereas Beck remains primarily interested in the origins and implications of risk, Douglas explores how risks come to be understood that way in the first place.

GOVERNING RISK SOCIETY

How exactly do we go from risk society on the one hand, to questions about the state of governmentality on the other? As O'Malley (2001) argues in a response to Rigakos and Hadden (2001), the two bodies of literature *are* quite different in terms of the theoretical questions that each poses (O'Malley, 2001). Yet, they readily converge because governance in the West is now fundamentally about managing the risks of modernization.

For example: the "tar ponds" in Sydney Nova Scotia must be contained and cleaned in order to prevent the spread of cancer-causing toxins (see the *Cape Breton Post*, May 12, 2004): new national policies must be put into place to prevent another outbreak of the deadly Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) (see *The Toronto Star* July 15, 2004): and Canada's aging Sea King military helicopters must be replaced before the risk of accident becomes too much for the public to bare (see the *National Post* July 23, 2004). Of course, these are disparate examples selected without method. That they so easily come to mind, however, is in many ways indicative of the extent to which contemporary forms of governance are geared toward addressing the risks concomitant with modern industrialization.

Today, the “fight against crime” *too* is becoming more about the implementation of the right risk management techniques than it is about traditional methods of maintaining law and order (Garland, 1997; Ericson and Haggerty, 1997). As this study of CPTED will make clear, the techniques are becoming increasingly rational, strategic, and implicit in terms of how social control is actually being exercised over criminal and non-criminal populations.

Below I will provide a cursory review of Foucault’s (1991) ideas pertaining to “governmentality” before moving on to discuss the various means by which social control is being exercised (I will also highlight those modes of social control which are particularly relevant to the study of CPTED). I will then draw ideas about CPTED, risk society, and governmentality together so as to provide a coherent theoretical framework before proceeding to explore how it is that CPTED practitioners exercise social control through particular discursive frames of crime-related risk.

Foucault’s Governmentality

According to Foucault (1991), governance emerged as a highly rational, calculated, and scientific affair after the 16th century (Foucault, 1991; Garland, 1997). This process of “governmentalization” meant that the state was becoming preoccupied with the governing of individuals, populations, and civil and economic life in general. This, according to Foucault, contrasted sharply with the state’s pre-modern emphasis on maintaining the sovereign’s control over territory via the threat of physical force and/or repression (Foucault, 1991; Garland, 1997).

Thus, after the 16th century, and into the present day, state governance has been about recognizing the importance of the active, free subject through which, and by means of which, state authority is exercised (Garland, 1997). As aptly stated by Garland (1997):

...governmental power is not 'objectifying' but 'subjectifying'. It constructs individuals who are capable of choice and action, shapes them as active subjects, and seeks to align their choices with the objectives of governing authorities. This kind of power does not seize hold of the individual's body in a disciplinary grip or regiment individuals into conformity. Instead it holds out technologies of the self, to be adopted by willing individuals who take an active part in their own 'subjectification' (Garland, 1997: 175).

For Foucault, contemporary governance is about engaging in the "conduct of conduct" (Gordon, 1991) as opposed to the infliction of pain and/or suffering. The study of governmentality, therefore, is about understanding the rationalities that provide the ideational basis for the conduct of conduct *and* understanding the particular mechanisms through which control through subjectification is exercised.

However, what is also of particular interest here is the extent to which Foucault acknowledged the role played by other institutions in the governing process. While it is true that the state engages in all kinds of governing projects, other institutions – many of which are legitimated by the state – engage in the conduct of conduct as well. Experts, religious organizations, schools, doctors, and other advice-giving individuals or institutions all exercise highly rationalized, strategic forms of social control which seek to bring the conduct of individuals and/or groups into line with prevailing governmentalities. As I will demonstrate below, control is exercised in a variety of different ways.

Actuarial Technologies

Governing risk society now entails, not just the continued exercise of power through sovereign and disciplinary means, but also a highly rationalized processes of risk assessment and risk *management* vis-à-vis entire populations. Fuelled by modern information technologies, and subsequently traversing large expanses of time and space, these “actuarial” techniques involve the sorting of individuals into particular population categories based on differing levels of risk, whether they be medical, financial, pathological, or political in origin (Simon, 1988; Gandy, 1993; Peterson, 1996; Lupton, 1999). The classification process then becomes the basis upon which regulatory decisions are made with respect to how certain populations are to be managed socially, politically, or economically.

According to Simon (1988): “Where power once sought to *manipulate* the choices of rational actors, it now seeks to predict behavior and situate subjects according to the risks they pose. The effects can be discerned on the way we understand ourselves, our communities, and our capacity for more moral judgement and political action (Simon, 1988: 772).” As Simon implies, the information gathering process and the subsequent classification of populations into *categories* of risk represents a claim to truth: An ideological assertion that particular kinds of people “belong” in certain categories that require particular forms of social control. The actuarial is, therefore, an inherently moralizing form of social regulation, predicated on moral judgements that rise clearly to the surface when the logic of classification is used to justify specific forms of social control (Gandy, 1993; Garland, 1997; Ruhl, 1999.)

The actuarial approach to governance is used by the state and other agencies in a variety of different ways, ranging from the administration of unemployment insurance on one hand, to the distribution of community redevelopment funds on the other. In a noteworthy example, Ericson and Haggerty (1997) discuss how community policing now involves the constant accumulation and exchange of data between police departments and other private sector organizations. In fact, crime data are often used as a means to classify particular neighbourhoods with respect to their relative risk of victimization.

Although law enforcement agencies generally use the information to allocate their resources more effectively, Marx (1988) argues that data processed in this fashion represents an important shift away from targeting specific individuals (or, offenders) to a categorical suspicion of *entire* neighbourhoods where all individuals are suspect (Marx, 1988). As outside investors heed the obvious warnings, levels of social and cultural capital often start to decline and opportunity structures show subsequent signs of collapse. If the neighbourhood is, as Kearns and Parkinson (2001) have suggested “.... a ‘shaper’ of who we are, both as defined by ourselves and by others ...”(Kearns and Parkinson, 2001: 2109), then the implications of using actuarial techniques to classify and control communities according to their levels of risk extend well into the future.

Actuarial technologies are used by private sector organizations as well. For example, insurance companies extend financial coverage, not to individuals per se, but to members of highly specific, interrelated categories of risk constructed on the basis of age, gender, place of residence, employment status, health, and level of education (Mitchell, 1999; Garland, 1997; Gandy, 1993; 1996). The risks being managed are entirely financial

and the important decisions being made are grounded in aggregate level data that is, by its very nature, far removed from the particularities of individual, lived experience (see Peterson, 1996; Lupton, 1999).

In a similar fashion, credit card companies manage consumer spending patterns by classifying people according to their socio-economic status before issuing them credit limits. Credit is subsequently extended to consumers based on their *probability* of defaulting on future payments (Gandy, 1993). The result is a carefully orchestrated system whereby those with assets are readily granted further spending power while those without are left in a position to prove themselves financially worthy. The extent to which both populations can participate in the market economy is, therefore, controlled by a removed actuarial system that operates on the principles of risk assessment and risk management (Gandy, 1993; 1996; see also Lyon, 1994).²⁵

Thus, the accumulation of data for the purposes of classifying populations with respect to risk (though certainly not a new process (see Hacking, 1990)), has become a central feature in the governance and control of contemporary social relations. According to O'Malley (1996), actuarial approaches are favoured for a number of reasons: they are efficient, less likely to generate concrete forms of resistance, and require fewer political and economic resources to put into practice (O'Malley, 1996; Garland, 1997; see also Marx, 1988).

²⁵Of course, the importance of surveillance is also readily apparent here. As Lyon (1994) outlines in *The Electronic Eye*, the collection and classification of personal financial data is just one way that a personal "data image" begins to emerge, eventually becoming the basis upon which essential decisions are made by others with respect to our lives (Lyon, 1994).

Whether or not their wide spread use is a forgone conclusion is difficult to tell, however. Among risk scholars there is debate as to whether the adoption of actuarial technologies is a structural extension of an ongoing shift at the macro level towards more efficient forms of governance and social control (a position which reflects the work of Foucault (1995)), or whether actuarial practices are the product of *specific* social and political contexts that arise at the individual and institutional level; an argument put forward by O'Malley, 1992).²⁶

Borrowing from Giddens' (1984) work on structuration, I would argue that the adoption of actuarial technologies is neither a forgone, structural conclusion nor entirely a product of contextually specific, political interaction. Instead, structure and agency must be understood as existing in a symbiotic relationship. Thus, the decision to adopt actuarial technologies is made in response to particular social conditions that enter the interactive equation as the unintended consequences of previous actions undertaken by others (see Giddens, 1984). In a more abstract sense, one can always make the choice whether or not to utilize actuarial technologies, but that decision will not always be made under the conditions of one's own choosing.

Prudentialism

²⁶ To substantiate his argument, O'Malley argues that actuarial approaches are not *always* understood to be the most efficient means by which populations are controlled (O'Malley, 1992). Neo-conservative governments, for example, often scrutinize the actuarial approach to government-run welfare programs, suggesting that the method is inefficient and counter productive when it comes to encouraging self-sufficiency and self control among those in need (O'Malley, 1992).

Actuarial technologies are not the only means by which populations are controlled in risk society. The state, for example, continues to exercise its sovereignty over those convicted of committing a crime in the most corporeal ways (see Rigakos and Hadden, 2001). Given that the number of people behind bars continues to climb in the United States and Canada (see Christie, 1994; Reed and Roberts, 1999), it would be nothing short of foolish to suggest that the state has entirely abandoned traditional forms of social control.

Yet, equally important to a theory of risk and social control is the emergence of what O'Malley calls "prudentialism," a governing logic that seeks to individualize risk management (O'Malley, 1992). Thus, while sifting through a virtual deluge of risk-related information, the modern citizen is expected to identify and manage his or her own exposure to risks of all kinds, especially given the state's diminishing capacity (or willingness) to do so (Lupton, 1999).

In fact, prudentialism often carries with it a sense of civic and moral obligation. The prudent and socially responsible individual is, therefore, one who carefully avoids unnecessary risk so as not to depend on state-run social services when things go wrong. For example, "good citizens" do not smoke because it is unhealthy to do so *and* because the cost of treatment is something the state can no longer afford to carry. Similarly, a "legitimate" welfare recipient is one who did everything in his or her power (i.e., all financial risks were carefully avoided) to avoid financial ruin before applying for assistance.

In each case, the onus is placed on the individual to assess and manage the risks of modernity appropriately. In fact, choosing not to do so, and worse still, requiring state assistance given one's negligence, now brings intense moral sanction. Thus, according to Hunt (1999), as the state continues to engage in various moralizing projects as part of its overall governmentality, subjects too engage in their own forms of self-governance where moral sanction is imposed both from above and from within (Hunt, 1999).

Not surprisingly, perhaps, there are close ideological ties between neo-liberal forms of governance and the onset of prudentialism as a mode of social control. As outlined above, the neo-liberal emphasis on deregulation and the scaling back of the welfare state has altered the relationship between citizens and their governing bodies such that the state is now less able or willing to provide the social support it once did.

Alongside these developments, the onset of a neo-conservative value structure emphasizing self sufficiency, thrift, prudence, and individual responsibility has helped set the moral stage for prudentialism as a whole. Indeed, within the current socio-political context, the "good" citizen is one who believes in the virtues of the free market, who rarely needs government assistance, and who sees his or her life as if it were always the end product of personal decisions for which he or she takes full responsibility.

But making informed decisions regarding risk identification and risk management is not something that can be undertaken in a solitary fashion: Not all of us are (or believe ourselves to be) fully informed about the risks around us. In this sense, while it is true that we are expected to make rational, risk-related decisions as a condition of being responsible citizens, we are also expected to do so vis-à-vis the experience and expertise

of those who profess expert knowledge. Thus, our dependence on the expertise of others opens up new opportunities for the exercise of power – pastoral power – as experts guide us through the risk management experience.

Pastoralism

According to Foucault (1988a), the exercise of “pastoral power” in the modern western world has its origins in Christian theology where the shepherd exercises “power over a flock rather than over land,” “gathers together, guides, and leads his flock,” secures its safety, and ensures its final salvation (Foucault, 1988a: 61-2). Here, power is exercised through benevolent care giving and the leading of individuals toward their ultimate salvation.

In its contemporary secular form, the exercise of pastoral power emerges most often in the form of professional advice giving where those in need of direction are guided toward their own personal salvation (see also Eide and Knight, 1999). Central to the exercise of pastoral power is the (re)subjectification of those believed to be in need of direction. Complicity is not assured by virtue of physical force, but rather by the offering of advice wherein the “proper” and “moral” course of action is made readily apparent and worthy of pursuit given that the best interests of the subject are always of the utmost concern. Pastoralism ensures that modern subjects engage in their own subjugation by virtue of their willingness to comply and do what is “best” for them.

Examples involving the exercise of pastoral power are myriad: the health nurse who gently advises each of his/her patients to take the flu shot; the television or radio talk

show host who advises worried parents about how to raise their unruly children; or the therapist who skilfully guides his or her client through a difficult divorce. In each instance, the provision of well intentioned, professional advice works to align the actions of the subject with the governing intentions of the care giver. Although at times pastoral power borders on oppression (witness the interactive dynamics on the popular television program, *The Doctor Phil Show*), more often than not it is received with open arms (Bauman, 1999).

TYING GOVERNMENTALITY, RISK, AND CPTED TOGETHER

If it is true that risk is now the engine of social change (and, I think it is), then it should come as no surprise that risk society has given way to its own characteristic governmentalities. In this sense, ideas about, and strategies for, governance now reflect the current risk-laden state of social, economic, and political life: Governance, wherever and however it is being carried out, is now fundamentally about identifying and managing risks of all kinds. Thus, CPTED provides a valuable window through which one can catch a glimpse of how and why CPTED practitioners are able to exercise particular forms of social control over the recipients of their knowledge and how that dynamic reflects the state of governmentality within risk society.

As I argued above, CPTED practitioners – like all other advice giving professionals – exercise a kind of pastoral control over those seeking their expertise while the responsabilization of the consumer adds an important moral and civic dimension. Both

dynamics are the product of discursive techniques that frame crime-related risks in very particular ways. Those techniques are of the utmost interest here.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

Understanding how CPTED practitioners discursively frame (Goffman, 1974) crime-related risks requires, first and foremost, a broad methodological approach that will facilitate the fleshing out of what Shibutani once called “verbal productions” (Shibutani in Lofland, 1971: 25), the patterns of human symbolic communication used by subjects to give meaning to the objects, events, and behaviours that comprise their social worlds. Yet, as a unit of analysis, frames of meaning can be particularly difficult to pin-down, their highly contingent nature often allowing them to slip through the fingers of even the most seasoned researcher. This being the case, one must be able to ask ever-more refined questions in order to ensure that the ensuing dialogue is sufficiently rich so as to facilitate a valid analysis of patterned discourse.

The qualitative data for this study was collected, first and foremost, through semi-structured interviews with CPTED practitioners and supporters. Moreover, supplementary data was collected using a combination of participant observation and content analyses; the latter involved assessing the various discursive techniques that were present in formal reports, CPTED audits, government documents, training manuals, and other promotional materials. In its entirety, the qualitative material was analyzed using the principles outlined in Goffman’s (1974) *Frame Analysis* as a means to draw out the particular ways in which CPTED practitioners and supporters were framing crime-related risk. Before discussing the details of Goffman’s work, however, I will first review the various means by which the qualitative data was acquired prior to its analysis.

THE INTERVIEWS

According to Kvale (1996): “ ... interviews are particularly suited for studying people’s understanding of the meanings in their lived world, describing their experiences and self-understanding, and clarifying and elaborating their own perspective on their lived world” (Kvale, 1996: 105; see also Hiller and DiLuzio, 2004). For these reasons, qualitative interviews proved to be the obvious methodological choice for this study.

The decision to use *semi-structured* interviews, however, was made for a number of important reasons. Unlike informal interviews, the semi-structured variety permits the researcher to guide the interview process *vis-à-vis* a series of pre-established questions while also giving the interviewee the flexibility to elaborate and pursue other lines of thought as they see fit. This combination of structure and flexibility was thought to be ideally suited to the present research question given, (a) the imperative of having to ask all the interviewees a similar set of questions as part of the search for conceptual continuity and, (b) the need to allow them to elaborate on the finer details of their logic so that the interconnections between various verbal productions could be assessed at a later date. Moreover, unlike the fully structured interview where little deviation from the interview itinerary is permitted, the semi-structured interview affords the researcher plenty of opportunity to ask for clarification – a technique that is absolutely essential if the interviewer and interviewee are to achieve a level of intersubjective understanding (Kvale, 1996; see Prus, 1995).

Sampling

Over the course of seven months, semi-structured interviews were conducted with numerous CPTED practitioners and supporters across the southern and eastern parts of Ontario. Participants were selected using a combination of snowball and theoretical sampling techniques (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Snowball sampling involves asking each interviewee to identify an additional, suitable contact whom they think will be interested in taking part in the research. Snowball sampling is a particularly effective technique given that participants are often in a better position than the researcher to identify the important individuals with whom interviews should be conducted.

However, as the research progressed, and as conceptual patterns began to emerge from the data, a more deliberate and controlled approach to sampling became necessary. Although each participant continued to provide the names of possible interviewees, it was often necessary to specify the kind of interviewee I was most interested in. For example, when it seemed apparent that police officers were conceptualizing crime-related risks in a way different from landscape architects, it was often necessary to ask the interviewees whether or not they knew of an architect who would be interested in taking part in the interview process.

In order to maximize the potential reach of my sample, I made initial contact with two individuals who were unknown to each other and who likely had very different professional and personal contacts. My first point of entry was established on the grounds of a long-standing axiom in qualitative research. According to Mann (1970), one must “... gain the acceptance of those who hold either formal or informal leadership positions

within the community so that the formal and informal channels of communications can be set to working in the researcher's favor" (Mann, 1970: 124). Based on my preliminary research, "Jerry" proved to be the ideal leader.

As an experienced CPTED practitioner, instructor, and police officer Jerry had become well recognized and respected across the province for his skills in the area of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. After unearthing a newspaper article about Jerry's CPTED accomplishments in a neighbourhood not far from where I was living, I became convinced that Jerry's reputation, contacts, and expertise would open a variety of doors for me within the CPTED community.

My second point of entry involved "Lauren," a politician in a large south-western Ontario city who had made CPTED part of her broader political mandate over the course of several years. I first became aware of Lauren accidentally while searching the Internet for the names of individuals or organizations practicing CPTED in Ontario. Lauren had been heading an initiative in her city to have a number of recreational facilities audited under CPTED principles and was experiencing considerable resistance. Following a lengthy email exchange, I became convinced that Lauren would provide access to a completely different segment of the CPTED community, one that was not dominated by law enforcement personnel or expert security practitioners.

Together, Jerry and Lauren provided two very different points of entry, one leading me to well recognized and highly experienced practitioners (many of whom were in the field of law enforcement) and the other leading to less experienced individuals who were, nevertheless, enthusiastic about bringing CPTED into their communities. When the

interview process finally reached its saturation point – that is, the point at which each successive interview contributed little to the knowledge already gained (Kvale, 1996: Babbie, 1995) – a total of 25 semi-structured interviews had been conducted across a variety of occupational groups. These occupations included police officers of various ranks, private security specialists, directors of security at various Ontario universities and hospitals, landscape architects, urban planners, and politicians of various statures.

Interview Format

Each participant was asked to sign a consent form that clearly explained the nature of the research project. All 25 participants consented to the interview without hesitation. As per standard research practice, each interviewee was granted full anonymity and was assigned a pseudonym. Although in retrospect it might not have been necessary to keep the identities of the participants confidential, the decision was initially made as a matter of precaution given that the CPTED community in Ontario is relatively small and that interested parties could, if they wanted to do so, “read between the lines” of the final research document in order to identify who took part.

All but one of the interviews were conducted at the interviewee’s place of work. Each participant was informed of his or her right to abstain from any line of questioning as well as his or her right to terminate the interview at any time. Each interview was recorded using a small digital recorder. The interviews ranged in length; the shortest was approximately 35 minutes and the longest exceeded 90 minutes. After the interview was complete, the audio files were downloaded onto a computer and subsequently recorded

onto a compact disk from which they were transcribed verbatim. Finally, each participant was offered a copy of his or her own transcript for personal and/or professional reasons. When the interviews were finally completed, only one of the 25 interviewees had requested a copy of the interview transcript.

The Interview Questions

I explained my research interests to each participant at the very outset. However, doing so proved to be a slightly more complicated matter than I had first expected. Because I was primarily interested in patterns and/or frames of discourse, I felt it would have been methodologically unwise to inform my participants of this prior to conducting the interviews. In all likelihood, participants would have become even more self-conscious about the way they expressed themselves than would have otherwise been the case if I had told them their words were the subject of my scrutiny. Although I had set out to conduct my research as ethically as possible, I was confronted with a dilemma I did not foresee.

Although the more ethical route, informing my participants as to the true nature of my research would have undermined the validity of my data as they would have likely adjusted their discourse to something other than its “natural” state. On the other hand, misleading my subjects with respect to my true intentions would have helped ensure that our exchanges were as uninhibited as possible.

After becoming convinced that my eventual decision would bestow few, if any, adverse effects upon those who participated, I eventually made the decision to *mislead*

my subjects and did so by informing them that I was merely interested in researching the “state of CPTED in Ontario.” By declaring such a broad (although fictional) area of interest, I was able to explore my true research agenda with greater flexibility because virtually all lines of questioning seemed congruent with such a wide area of research.²⁷

As per standard practice, each interview began with a pre-established set of 35 questions. Over the course of the interview process, various additions and adjustments were made to that initial list, usually because theoretical developments warranted slight modifications. It was not long, however, before the actual list of questions was no longer needed. I had eventually asked them so many times that they were soon committed to memory which, in retrospect, actually contributed to a more casual interview atmosphere (in the beginning, when I had several pieces of paper in front of me, I often felt as if I was conducting a job interview, and I am sure that my interviewees felt the same way).

For the most part, the pre-established interview questions were designed to explore four general areas of interest relevant to the research question, including: The practitioner’s experiences with CPTED in the field (including stories, evaluations and project successes and failures); his/her views with respect to the future of the CPTED initiative (what it required to be successful, what its current strengths and weaknesses were); his or her understanding of how CPTED works (its inherent rationale and the assumptions about social behaviour that are made); and his or her own thoughts relating

²⁷ In his research pertaining to geographies of disability, Wilton (2000) experienced a similar ethical dilemma which was eventually resolved in a similar fashion. Moreover, he aptly suggests that ethical dilemmas arising out of social research are rarely foreseen. Instead, they are generally the product of the social and political circumstances encountered by the researcher at a particular moment in time. This being the case, a researcher’s ethical framework must be “necessarily dynamic, evolving with the researcher’s understanding of the study, the context, the participants and her/himself” (Wilton, 2000: 92).

to CPTED's current efficacy. When the interviews were complete, and when they were fully transcribed, over 400 pages of text were produced.

FIELD RESEARCH

In addition to semi-structured interviews, supplementary data was also collected by means of participant observation (see Prus, 1996). Although in retrospect the interviews would have generated sufficient data on their own, the decision to include a limited amount of participant observation was made on the basis of an argument once made by Becker and Geer (1970): participant observation, they argued, is ideally suited for generating detailed information that can be used to supplement or verify the accuracy of interview data as it is being collected (Becker and Geer, 1970). Moreover, participant observation allows the researcher to become intimately familiar with the "cultural esoterica" (Becker and Geer, 1970: 136) of the group in question. Therefore, according to Becker and Geer, field research allows one to appreciate the subtle nuances that characterize the subjects' social realities. As a result, one is generally in a better position to conduct a truly informative interview. Thus, as a source of detail and context, the ethnographic data was routinely brought to bear on the interview process; helping to generate new lines of questioning and often providing a source of mutual understanding as the interviewee and I explored the various facets of the CPTED experience.

Spending time in the field with CPTED practitioners meant that I had to embark on a number of long trips across southern and eastern Ontario, shuttling from one

meeting to the next.²⁸ In late 2002, I was fortunate enough to be able to attend the annual CPTED Ontario conference in the nation's capital. That conference proved to be the start of a long journey that included a five day training seminar in January of 2003, numerous committee meetings, an audit of a local senior's complex that was beset by disgruntled youths (and from what I could tell, disgruntled seniors as well), and numerous candid, "off the record," discussions in the offices of CPTED practitioners.

Gaining access to the aforementioned events proved to be a relatively painless task. Jerry's status and reputation essentially "cleared the way" for me when I showed interest in the various events that he either directly, or indirectly, presided over. In those instances where his authority and reputation appeared less instrumental, I obtained permission by simply contacting the event organizers by email or telephone. After a brief explanation as to the nature of my research, I was often granted permission to attend the events of my choosing without hesitation. There was very little "gate keeping" in the CPTED community and, as such, I was able to enjoy a considerable degree of freedom while conducting research.

Initially, I entered the field as a "participant-as-observer;" one who participates fully with the group under investigation while also making it clear that research is being

²⁸ These long commutes proved useful, however, as I was able to think through my experiences without distraction. Better yet, I was able to dictate what seemed to be an endless stream of thoughts into a digital voice recorder that was carefully placed upon my dashboard. As it turned itself on and off automatically at the sound of my voice, I was entirely uninhibited in the process of recording thoughts that emerged at a pace far too quick to be written down in pencil. These recordings were later downloaded onto my computer hard drive and were listened to repeatedly.

conducted (Babbie, 1995).²⁹ From the very outset I assumed a relatively “low profile” (Prus in Shaffir et. al. 1980) so as to help ease myself into the field without disrupting the “natural” flow of events. CPTED conferences and training seminars, for example, were often large enough for me to fade into the background, initiating conversation only when it seemed appropriate and taking field notes while in relative seclusion.³⁰

At smaller events (a local CPTED meeting, for example) maintaining a low profile was nearly impossible. At times like these, my objective was to be both reserved enough so as to avoid disrupting the flow of events and engaged enough so as to demonstrate that I was, in fact, interested in what was taking place. Though difficult to maintain, this balanced approach proved to be relatively effective.

However, as my research neared its end, my role in the field began to change. In the fall of 2003, I was contacted by Jerry who was (and remains) on the Board of Directors for CPTED Ontario. After a brief exchange, Jerry recommended that I join the Board. Given my knowledge of CPTED and the fact that I had received my first CPTED training certificate nine months prior to our discussion, his request made organizational sense.

As flattering and surprising as the offer was, it presented its own ethical and methodological dilemmas. Becoming part of the Board of Directors would have given me unprecedented access to the inner workings of CPTED Ontario on the one hand, while

²⁹ I made the decision from the very outset to capitalize on the enthusiasm and interest that often ensues when subjects become aware that they are, in fact, the topic of research (Prus in Shaffir et. al., 1980; see also Berg, 1998).

³⁰ However, at these events, many people were taking notes of some kind. Thus, there was seldom a need to hide my own note taking.

raising serious concerns about a potential conflict of interest on the other – especially given that the data collection process was nearing its completion and the analysis was about to begin. Not surprisingly, perhaps, the question as to whether or not I could maintain a sense of objectivity remained the most daunting of all.

At the time I knew that a decision had to be made, although doing so proved to be immensely difficult. If I was to accept the invitation, I would have had to make the rather unexpected transition from a participant-observer to something approximating a *complete* participant. Unlike the traditional definition of a complete participant, however, an element of deception would not have been necessary given that I was already known to be a researcher who had interests that extended well beyond the confines of CPTED Ontario.

Ethically, I was concerned that my allegiance to my research, discipline, and sponsoring University would somehow compromise the integrity of the CPTED Ontario organization if my research (which is highly critical of CPTED at times) was to be published in the future. Similarly, I was equally concerned that a position on the Board of Directors would eventually undermine my ability to remain sufficiently critical *while* engaging in research. The sheer “seduction” (Lofland, 1971) of the field began to bare down upon me in a way that I had never experienced before. I began to feel both worried and excited at the same time.

Joining the Board of Directors would not only mean a degree of official acceptance, but would also reflect a level of institutional recognition with respect to my academic and CPTED-related skills. According to Lofland, the promise of acceptance

and recognition are precisely what makes joining the group under investigation so seductive (Lofland, 1971: see also Babbie, 1995).

The decision was eventually made to accept the offer under a number of conditions. I requested that I be able to inform the members of the Board that I would be willing to fill the position so long as they were aware that my research would continue. I also requested that I be absolved from taking part in any function that would require me to “promote” CPTED to members of the public. I would, in a sense, only attend Board meetings in an advisory capacity, sharing my knowledge of CPTED research while asking the kinds of research-driven questions I felt were important. Both pronouncements were made, and accepted, shortly after the initial invitation was made.³¹

If my being on the Board of Directors was going to have an impact on the content or style of my research, then it was my responsibility to ensure that the research process continued to reflect the principles of quality academic scholarship. That is precisely what I set out to do both before and after joining the Board. Whether or not I was successful in that regard is a decision the reader will have to make.

The Trials and Tribulations of Being in the Field

Regrettably, there were moments when the field research did not unfold as well as I had hoped. For example, being an academic sometimes made those around me feel somewhat uncomfortable. Interestingly, these moments often emerged following a

³¹ The decision to accept the offer was made after consulting my research committee. At the time of this writing, I have only attended one, rather informal, Board meeting.

sincere introduction by Jerry who routinely introduced me as a PhD student who was “very well informed” and “very sharp” with respect to CPTED. Although I was generally flattered by Jerry’s kind words, his approach differentiated me from my research subjects to an extent that proved to be somewhat detrimental.

For example, at a local CPTED meeting I was introduced as a “PhD researcher from McMaster University.” As I had expected, my official title made two of the members in attendance feel somewhat uncomfortable. In fact, in a slightly mocking tone, one of them asked me why I was spending so much time with a group of people so unlike myself while the other made a vague reference to the fact that he had only completed high school.

In retrospect, my error was clearly a methodological one. According to Babbie (1995), the route one takes toward making initial contact in the field will partially determine how one is received and how data are eventually gathered (Babbie, 1995). Although my initial entry into the field was a positive experience on many accounts, it became the source of the difficulties mentioned above.

During my initial interview with Jerry, I had made the error of disclosing my familiarity with CPTED too early. In what I now think was an unconscious attempt to gain my interviewee’s respect, it became all too clear that I was quite knowledgeable in the area of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design; something that Jerry enthusiastically acknowledged at the end of our meeting. Unfortunately, Jerry’s enthusiasm for my interest in CPTED followed us wherever we went. His glowing introductions at meetings and conferences were, in a sense, a spill-over effect from our

first engagement. Although his intentions were always good-natured and sincere, his impression of me, and the fact that he shared it with others, affected the data collection process in a way that I did not foresee when I first made the decision to be so open with him in the first place.

Although the unease demonstrated by research participants was relatively rare, these initial “reaction effects” (Shaffir et. al., 1980) served as a not-so-subtle reminder that my presentation of “self” needed careful adjustment (see Goffman, 1959). In order to down-play my status as a PhD researcher, and hopefully break down the knowledge hierarchy that seemed to be emerging, I attempted to portray myself as being slightly incompetent. My approach entailed asking as many questions as possible so as to demonstrate that I still had much to learn about CPTED and that I still depended the expertise of those around me.³²

Overall, the field research process was a rewarding experience in so far as it allowed me to collect rich ethnographic data and meet some very insightful people along the way. Many of the professional contacts I was able to make during this time proved to be beneficial many times over. On several occasions I received unsolicited newspaper clippings, official publications, documents, and Internet references from those whom I had met during my research. Indeed, one of the most rewarding aspects of researching CPTED in Ontario was the ever-present willingness of practitioners to lend a hand.

³² Ironically, I did have a lot to learn about CPTED. Although I was very familiar with the theoretical literature on Crime Prevention Through Design, I had not had the practical and applied exposure that so many police officers and urban planners seemed to have.

CONTENT ANALYSIS

To supplement the interview data, many CPTED related documents were collected over the course of my research. As mentioned above, these documents included promotional materials, CPTED audits, memos, training manuals, photographs, official city reports, and city bylaws. Most of this material was collected during the interview stage as participants were often more than willing to share whatever materials they had on hand.

The documents I collected did not require systematic sampling of any kind given that, in the end, there were too few of them to warrant such methodological rigour. This being the case, they served more as a source of context than anything else.

DATA ANALYSIS

Goffman (1959; 1961; 1974) is theoretically and methodologically slippery at the best of times; sometimes approximating a symbolic interactionist one moment and a kind of veiled structuralist the next (see Gonos, 1977). In *Frame Analysis* (1974) a similar kind of ambiguity prevails as Goffman's exploration into the "organization of experience" oscillates between a discursively driven explanation and one that is slightly more structuralist in tone.

Despite the confusion, a large body of literature has emerged on the basis of Goffman's more discursive side (see Driedger and Eyles, 2003; Garvin and Eyles, 2001; Martin, 1997). This "framing" literature continues to rely heavily on the idea that subjects organize their social worlds by using particular forms of discourse at selected moments in

time and space. Thus, as Entman (1993) argues, Goffman's ideas provide a unique methodological tool by which those patterns of discourse (or "frames") can be identified, connected to subsequent social activity, and eventually linked back to the larger social context from within which they initially emerged (Entman, 1993).

The qualitative data for this study will be examined in a similar fashion such that the discursive frames constructed by CPTED practitioners around ideas of risk will be examined in detail, linked to how CPTED practitioners are able to exercise social control over the recipients of their knowledge (while securing the legitimacy of their expertise at the same time), and then related back to broader issues concerning risk society and governmentality.

Finding Frames

The data analysis began with a cursory review of all 25 interview transcripts so as to become familiar with any broad themes (frames) that may have been readily apparent.³³ I decided early that the unit of analysis would be set at the level of the "idea," a decision that requires one to be attentive to the latent (or, implied) content of the interviews while attempting to isolate the conceptual linkages being made by the interviewee during his or her attempt to organize the social world as they saw it.

The data extraction process began with a general "open coding" of the interview transcripts. According to Weber (1985), open coding involves identifying and coding the presence of latent or manifest content in a way that is, in a sense, flexible and non-

³³ I will be using "frame" and "theme" somewhat interchangeably here.

restrictive. The researcher simply engages the material in an attempt to identify broad themes and conceptual consistencies while assigning a reference code to each of them (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Weber, 1985; Berg, 2001).³⁴ At the end of the open coding process, over 27 incipient frames were identified and each was given a tentative description and its own set of properties.

Next, a more rigorous assessment of each emerging frame was undertaken by means of what Glaser and Strauss (1967) refer to as “axial coding,” a process whereby specific variations within each general theme are accurately noted. The axial coding process proved to be difficult, however. With so many minor variations within and between frameworks, ensuring their exclusivity was nothing short of arduous. Nevertheless, after a lengthy process of collapsing and redefinition, a more parsimonious list of frames was created. With the data organized and the dominant frames identified, I carefully selected a limited number of frames for further discussion based on how well each of them would enhance and/or deepen the analysis.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Although the semi-structured interviews generated most of the data used in this study, the incorporation of participant observation and a limited amount of content analysis strengthened the overall research design. Participant observation allowed me to experience the flow of CPTED-related ideas and discourse in settings that were unlike the

³⁴ It is common for qualitative researchers to use numeric codes when identifying thematic content (see Weiss, 1998). However, I decided to use letter coding because I found it easier to relate the initial code to its full name without consulting a master sheet.

interviews. Although many of those ideas and discursive forms were very similar to what emerged within the context of the one-on-one interviews, the field research process afforded me the opportunity to experience relations of authority, modes of social organization, and the various nuances of social interaction that can easily go unnoticed.

In a similar fashion, analyzing the content of CPTED documents allowed me to explore a different side of CPTED related communication. Documents that are created for the purposes of distribution often have a “persona” all their own – their tone is generally professional and their goal is typically one of selling the virtues of CPTED to others. Thus, published materials, although embodying familiar thematic content, often revealed a mode of expression that was rather unique.

Taken together, the three methodological approaches mentioned above connected me to the CPTED community in three unique, yet mutually supportive, ways. Not only did this approach strengthen the overall research design, but it also made the research process more dynamic and, in the end, more enjoyable.

CHAPTER 4

THE SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY BEGINS

This chapter has two objectives. First, it will attempt to clearly explain why professionals – and risk management professionals in particular – must constantly engage in the process of legitimation and why discourse is so essential to that very undertaking. In a sense, I will be giving some theoretical weight to the professionalization thesis. Second, this chapter will proceed to explore the first of two discursive techniques used by CPTED practitioners to frame crime-related risks and will show how those frames are related to CPTED's search for legitimacy and its capacity to exercise social control over CPTED consumers.

The first frame to be discussed – “foreseeable danger” – involves a unique conceptualization of crime-related risk that renders the threat of crime and disorder impending and entirely amenable to CPTED's preventative logic.³⁵ The second frame – “compliance through liability” – involves a shift in discursive emphasis which takes place when CPTED clients show signs of disregard for a practitioner's expertise. In a sense, it is a remedial tactic that alters the way in which risk is conceptualized the moment the legitimacy of CPTED is called into question. Together, these two frames reveal how practitioners are able to exact their client's acquiescence while at the same time securing the legitimacy of their expertise, even when it is called into question.

³⁵ It is important to note that I am using the word “clients” very loosely to refer to those individuals who receive CPTED advice from a practitioner. I am in no way implying that CPTED expertise is always bought and sold among participants.

In the pages that follow, I will be referring to CPTED as a “profession.” This term will be used loosely, however, given that practitioners in Ontario are a rather disconnected group of people who share, at most, a basic appreciation for Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. As an incipient profession, however, CPTED is now enduring the trials and tribulations of establishing its sense of professional legitimacy. Indeed, CPTED practitioners of all kinds are avidly trying to convince others, and themselves, as to the absolute necessity of their technical knowledge (see Freidson, 2001). Although it is a campaign fraught with contradiction and paradox, it also reveals much about how certain discursive techniques have become essential to CPTED’s organizational success.

THE SEARCH FOR LEGITIMACY

Scholars working in the sociology of knowledge, occupations, and professions have long recognized the importance of the “expert” in contemporary socio-economic life (see Freidson, 1986: 2001; Bell, 1976). According to Stehr (1992), and echoing Bell’s (1976) classic post-industrial argument, the transformation of modernity’s economic base from a resource-driven, labour intensive state of industrial production to one that is now driven by the production, transmission, and consumption of knowledge (and, I would argue, information, images, and belief systems as well) has thrust the expert to the forefront of contemporary socio-economic relations (Stehr, 1992; see also Bauman, 1992; Bell, 1976). Moreover, the ongoing “...specialization of intellectual work into minute parts” (Bell, 1976: 13) constantly ensures a never ending supply of experts in any number

of areas where "... [they] define the situation for the untutored, they suggest priorities, they shape people's outlook on their life and world, and they establish standards of judgement in the different areas of expertise" (Rueschemeyer in Stehr, 1992: 110). At the same time, experts are also the subjects of unprecedented incredulity; their claims routinely devalued and judged inadequate, some eventually becoming what Foucault (1980) calls forms of "subjugated knowledge" (see Foucault, 1980: 82).

On a more existential level, however, many experts help us "trim the edges of irrational phenomena," (Bauman, 1992: 98) thereby relieving us of our various anxieties and fears only to generate new ones with each rational discovery that is made. Thus, as Giddens (1991) argues, one of the skills that all contemporary citizens must eventually learn involves the art of sorting through expert opinions in order to create a comfortable state of ontological security (Giddens, 1991). Therefore, we remain dependent on experts in so many conflicting and sometimes contradictory ways, and it is that uneasy state of dependence that helps elevate the social status of the experts themselves (see Bauman, 1992).

However, in spite of the immense social, political and economic importance of expert systems, there is nothing self-sustaining about the demand or respect for professional expertise (Bauman, 1992). Expert systems must be constantly "... concerned with justifying the privileged position of the institutions of an occupation in a political economy as well as the authority and status of its members" (Freidson, 2001: 106). Thus, as Bucher (1988) argues, the rhetoric of those involved with emerging

professions, centres “ ... upon claims relevant publics must accept if the group is to achieve legitimacy” (Bucher, 1988: 137).³⁶

It is also true, however, that claims of professional legitimacy are routinely directed toward those working on the inside of the profession as well, including management, staff, and even competing organizations. Not only do these inward forms of communication help to establish the boundaries of a profession’s particular area of expertise, but they also help build a rich professional culture wherein the legitimacy of the profession as a whole is taken for granted (see Morgan, 1986).

Thus, if all professions and/or experts have anything in common at all, it is that they must constantly engage in the act of persuasion if they are to remain socially, politically, and economically relevant – persuasion is, according to Freidson (2001), the only generic resource available to them all.

As an incipient profession, CPTED must constantly engage in acts of persuasion as well. However, the kind of expertise that CPTED practitioners offer makes the legitimation process a crucial one. Because CPTED is fundamentally about crime prevention (as opposed to eliminating the fundamental causes of crime), its sense of professional legitimacy is tied to how effectively it can mitigate crime-related risks. Yet, if it is true that experts frame the nature of a problematic condition such that it converges with their own forms of remedial expertise (Loseke, 1999; Entman, 1993), then understanding how CPTED practitioners frame the risk of criminal activity becomes a

³⁶ Bauman (1992) takes this argument one step further (*further than I think is necessary*) and suggests that the struggle to legitimate expertise of any kind often involves skills seeking application while they “ ... masquerade as problems needing resolution” (Bauman, 1992: 92).

critical route toward understanding how the profession's sense of legitimacy is established and maintained (see Loseke, 1999; Gusfield, 1981; Jenkins, 1998).

This is not meant to suggest, however, that there are not other means by which professional legitimacy can be established. Devising an official accreditation process and soliciting official forms of recognition are also common means by which professions attempt to secure the legitimacy of their claims to expertise (see Bucher and Strauss, 1961). In fact, as Chapter 6 will demonstrate, establishing an accreditation process and acquiring official forms of recognition have proven fundamental to CPTED's drive for legitimacy as well; both approaches, however, entail implicit references to how risks are to be "properly" understood.

What's at Stake

In the fall of 2002, I attended an annual CPTED conference in Ottawa, Ontario. While engaging in conversation with others, and while listening to the conversations taking place around me, it became increasingly clear that being formally trained in CPTED meant something – training and experience were clearly acting as types of social currency among the participants and were the obvious criteria for social distinction. As members spoke proudly about the inroads CPTED had made into their respective communities, I recall reading the introductory letters contained in my conference package. There were several of them, one of which came from the city's Chief of Police who proudly acknowledged the successes of CPTED under the careful guidance of one of

his fellow officers; a proverbial tip of that hat to the man who had brought CPTED to his part of Ontario.

The people around me were enthusiastic about the future of CPTED and about their capacity to “fight” crime. In a sense, it was a true moment of what Durkheim (1965) once called “creative effervescence,” or, the collective sense of belonging that emerges when groups assemble to reconstitute and reaffirm their common sentiments and world view (Durkheim, 1965: 475).

There was, however, a clear sense that the road ahead was still long. It was, after all, only the second annual CPTED conference of its kind and many of the participants were still speaking of the troubles they had encountered while trying to convince others of CPTED’s viability. Although everybody spoke with a different voice, and likely with different motivations and concerns, there was a kind of delicate unity that, at its core, reflected a clear dedication to the future development and institutionalization of CPTED as a viable crime prevention initiative.³⁷ Those in attendance had emotionally, professionally, and sometimes even financially invested themselves in CPETD’s future.

Over the course of seven months, the qualitative interviews demonstrated that CPTED practitioners enjoyed varying degrees of status and recognition as a result of their expertise. Indeed, many practitioners and supporters proudly recounted moments of public and/or professional recognition during the interviews, while others openly claimed

³⁷ As Bucher and Strauss (1961) pointed out long ago, the emergence of a profession (and, loosely interpreted, CPTED can be seen as an emerging profession of sorts) is rarely characterized by complete homogeneity. In fact, such developments are routinely characterized by conflicting visions and divergent interests that collide as different “segments” of the profession struggle for control (Bucher and Strauss, 1961).

to “know better” than their colleagues when it came to issues of crime prevention. In fact, some even went as far as to suggest that their CPTED training had made them “leaders” in their respective occupational fields where CPTED was being applied. Indeed, the interviewees left little doubt that there was status to be had and enjoyed as a crime prevention expert.

For example, David is now a retired police officer who spent many years of his career teaching CPTED across Canada. When asked whether his knowledge of CPTED had changed him as a professional, he responded:

DAVID: “...as I got more involved teaching CPTED for the Mounties [Royal Canadian Mounted Police] ... doing CPTED as part of the planning department for my city, right after that every urban planner and architect was hiring me as a consultant ... I trained a whole bunch of other people who are now sitting at all the city planning departments ... *I was the first in my province [italics added].*”

Teaching CPTED across the country had apparently bestowed upon David a reputation for being an “expert” in the field, an achievement for which he was eventually recognized when he received a prestigious award during his career as a police officer. When we began discussing his reasons for leaving the police service, David returned to the subject of his CPTED expertise. CPTED, he told me, had opened various doors for him in the consulting industry, ultimately giving him an opportunity to do work that paid “... ten times as much [as policing] ...” while allowing him to do something “... that was, frankly, much more effective.” If recognition, demand for one’s skills, and financial reward are indicative of one’s heightened social status as an expert, then David had certainly made his proverbial mark in the crime prevention community. The last time we spoke, he was living off the substantial amount of money he had saved while working in

the private security industry and was contemplating whether or not he should pursue a graduate degree in criminology.

In another telling example, an experienced CPTED practitioner and police officer compared his understanding of CPTED to that of his colleagues. When asked how CPTED had changed him as an officer, Steve responded:

STEVE: "I don't know if CPTED itself has changed me ... um ... my approach has always been pushing the envelope and out of the box, to my supervisor's chagrin ... [laughs] When I came ... I looked at CPTED and saw the broader potential *more than anybody else did*. And I don't want to be one of these ... egotists, but ... I saw the potential that it had and I saw that it wasn't being utilized to its full potential [italics added]."

In Steve's case, CPTED was certainly bound up with his professional reputation and his sense of personal accomplishment, both of which depended on the continued success of CPTED in his community. Moreover, that Steve showed no signs of hesitation when he elevated *his* skills above those of his colleagues only reaffirmed the importance of status and recognition among CPTED practitioners. In fact, not long after our interview, Steve was scheduled to fly to another part of the province where he would be sharing his CPTED knowledge with other police departments – an assignment that clearly made him proud.

Police officers were not the only individuals who acknowledged, or laid claim to, social status and expertise as a result of their CPTED skills. Ross, a security specialist, suggested that his CPTED training had brought him a considerable degree of recognition within the security industry. CPTED, he suggested with obvious pride, had "... put [his] name on the map in terms of crime prevention," allowing him to exercise his authority over those seeking his counsel.

Sharing a similar sense of enthusiasm and pride, Lauren, a city councillor, discussed the many opportunities that CPTED had afforded her. Among them, was the chance to meet and train with well known police departments across the United States, including the New York Police Department – an organization about which she spoke very highly. When asked whether CPTED had opened up new opportunities for her, Lauren responded:

LAUREN: “ ... I was just in Orlando in October and sat with their Sheriff’s office. I’m going to New York City in May ... to be trained through their policing offices. I mean, I came in on a crime prevention mandate, that was my thing when I ... ran for council ... knowing nothing ... [laughs] ... in retrospect I can say I knew nothing other than we needed to do it.

PATRICK: “Right.”

LAUREN: “... I just got an award from the Ontario Crime Commission for the initiatives that we put together here [crime prevention initiatives in general], which humours me ...”

Although at times Lauren was humble about her skills and experiences, her CPTED training and familiarity with other crime prevention techniques had certainly been a source of recognition. Her encounters with high-profile police departments, for example, had not only enhanced her political image, but also served to improve her credibility as she struggled to spread the word about CPTED among her constituents. In fact, during our interview she recounted how the head of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police once told her that her dedication and knowledge in the area of crime prevention had made her seem like something more than “just a politician” – perhaps implying that she lacked the self-serving attitude that so many other politicians are thought to have. Thus, Lauren’s political successes and reputation were undoubtedly products of the opportunities her CPTED knowledge had afforded her.

Practitioners also laid claim to status by clarifying their association with an institution or community thought to be on the “cutting edge” of crime prevention. For example, Robert is currently a CPTED practitioner in an Ontario city that, for the purposes of anonymity, I will call “Jamestown.” When asked about his experiences with community crime prevention meetings, he returned to an earlier discussion we had about the progress of CPTED in Ontario:

ROBERT: “We just ... talking about CPTED in [Jamestown] as being very proactive, I think [Jamestown] is now ... because of the work we’re doing out of this office, uh ... I would say that [Jamestown] is probably the most proactive city ... right now in Canada and our official [city] plan ... has CPTED in it. And I don’t know if there is another municipality that actually has the acronym CPTED in it.”

In this instance, Robert was sure to mention that his office had been an instrumental force behind the success of CPTED in the region. Thus, the *community’s* willingness to “proactively” institutionalize CPTED is believed to reflect positively on his organization and his role as a practitioner therein. Thus, in this example, status and expertise is achieved and/or further legitimated by virtue of the interviewee’s association with what is thought to be a progressive community or organization.

Politicians, too, aligned themselves with the CPTED related achievements of their communities. When asked whether others had ever resisted her desire to implement CPTED in her region, Janice, a councillor in a city I will call “Broadway,” responded:³⁸

JANICE: “In [Queenstown] and in [Broadway], I mean we’ve had councillors ... who believe in CPTED and as a result, we’ve pushed it through our municipalities. [Regentville] has not really had anybody on the committee that has been that impassioned about it. So if you go through the municipalities you’ll find [Regentville] is not as committed and is not doing as much application as we are in [Broadway].”

³⁸The towns and cities that Janice makes reference to have been assigned pseudonyms to protect the anonymity and integrity of all participants.

Not only did Janice understand CPTED to be a highly effective tool in the “fight against crime,” but she also understood it to be a selling point for both her city and *herself* as a politician – CPTED was thought capable of bringing status and recognition to her office and the people of Broadway.

There were many other instances where CPTED had become an interviewees “claim to fame.” One practitioner, for example, was so proud of the recognition he was accorded by the local newspaper that he sent me a copy of the publication weeks after our interview. Much to my surprise (and the officer’s as well, I am sure) the story of his successful application of CPTED made the front page of the newspaper. CPTED, it seemed, had brought him a fleeting encounter with fame.³⁹

None of this, however, is meant to suggest that the interviewees were egotistical, self-centred, or dedicated to anything less than the well being of their respective communities. Rather, the point here is that within the “expert system” (Giddens, 1990) that is CPTED, practitioners and supporters have a clear stake in the initiative’s continued success which extends well beyond, although certainly includes, securing the public good.

How, exactly, do practitioners manage to cultivate the legitimacy that is required to ensure the continued viability of the CPTED enterprise and their roles as experts therein? The answer to this question lies in the actual dynamics of the expert/lay person relationship. Practitioners must frame crime-related risk in ways that render it amenable

³⁹ There is perhaps room for a parallel argument here about the importance of fame. According to Braudy (1986), the desire to be famous (or to be recognized) has become a North American cultural obsession

to CPTED's logic of prevention if CPTED *itself* is to remain a legitimate area of specialized expertise. Thus, the nature of the problem in question (the risk of criminal activity) must appear to require the solution the expert has to offer. The frame of foreseeable danger proved essential to this very process.

FORESEEABLE DANGER

CPTED practitioners and supporters thoroughly enjoy recounting past applications of their skills. In fact, almost every person whom I interviewed had his or her own "war story" to tell. These personal narratives provided me with valuable insight as to how practitioners interacted with those seeking their professional advice. Of particular interest were the ways in which practitioners recounted, in detail, how they explained the nature of crime-related risk to their clients (and to themselves). It was during these often long-winded recollections that the frame of foreseeable danger began to emerge.

Practitioners routinely used the foreseeable danger framework when conducting environmental security audits for their clients. When crime-related risks are identified, practitioners imply that the need for remedial action is urgent and that the dangers associated with those risks are impending.⁴⁰ However, the aetiologies of the risks in question tend to be stripped of their complexity and, by implication, their sense of indeterminacy. Thus, practitioners remain focussed on the likelihood of crime and/or

(Braudy, 1986; see Parnaby and Sacco, 2004). I suspect that this broad cultural appreciation for fame and recognition factors into certain individuals' desire to become recognized CPTED experts.

disorder occurring, rather than the likelihood of it *not* occurring. Although the risks appear foreboding, they also remain entirely amenable to CPTED's logic of prevention.

Before exploring the qualitative data, however, a brief word about the importance of rendering the risk of criminal activity foreseeable is in order. What makes a CPTED practitioner an expert in risk management is his or her capacity to prepare a client for any one of many possible fates. Risk identification and management is, therefore, a product of knowledge that is extrapolated from particular interpretations of the past and the present (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1991a).

How that knowledge of crime-related risk emerges, and the way in which it is communicated to the CPTED consumer, is of particular importance to the CPTED practitioner because he or she must appear capable of foreseeing a chain of events that, in reality, is actually plagued by indeterminacy. As Erickson and Haggerty (1997) argue, risk identification and management involves making risks "visible" or conceptualizable for the interested party – risk must make the transition from the abstract to the seemingly concrete (Erickson and Haggerty, 1997).

Thus, for each CPTED audit, an interconnected web of highly contingent events must be untangled so that each element can be identified and prioritized before a suitable path of intervention can be arranged. It is at this particular moment when the legitimacy of CPTED, and the legitimacy of the practitioner's expertise, are at their most fragile point. In order to demonstrate why this is so, I will briefly turn to Merton's (1957) work on the role of the intellectual in a modern bureaucracy.

⁴⁰ According to Douglas (1990), "risk" is no longer connected to thoughts of probability. Instead, it is now

As experts and advisors, intellectuals (and social scientists in particular) routinely deal with the effects of indeterminacy on their research (Merton, 1957). By way of example, Merton argues that this is more often the case for the social scientist than for the electrician. The latter, he argues, can predict the outcome of applying electricity to a circuit based on the scientific rules of conductivity. The former, however, is not blessed with a comparable level of certainty and is, therefore, generally left in a position where the best he or she can do is help prevent “... palpable errors of judgment” (Merton, 1957: 210). Thus, the credibility of the social scientist is slightly more precarious because his or her expert proclamations about the social world are always couched in terms of probability and are, thus, generally less compatible with the objective demands of modern bureaucratic organizations (Merton, 1957).

At its heart, CPTED *too* is about assessing the probabilities associated with human action in relation to the physical environment. In this sense, CPTED is an intellectual process that is fraught with the unpredictable. Thus, if the legitimacy of CPTED is to be maintained, *that* unpredictability must be discursively mitigated so that CPTED practitioners appear capable of making all forms of uncertainty appear more certain than they really are (see Gusfield, 1981). Thus, risk must appear foreseeable and amenable to calculated, rational intervention if the CPTED practitioner is to maintain a grip on his or her role as a legitimate expert in the field.

CPTED does have the added benefit, however, of being able to capitalize on what is, in a sense, the apparent permanence of the modified physical environment. For the

entirely conflated with “danger” (Douglas, 1990).

CPTED client, one half of the crime prevention equation is something tangible and concrete, not subject to the whims of government policy, for example. If nothing else, that sense of permanence is likely to be somewhat comforting.

Foreseeable Danger in the Field

Roger, a trained CPTED practitioner and police officer, agreed to meet for an interview at the police department where he worked. Within minutes of our shaking hands, he had assured me that CPTED had a long and well-known history in his department and that, while he was no longer conducting audits as often as he once did, he was certainly part of that legacy. From the outset, Robert seemed well aware that CPTED had the potential to bring its many torch bearers a degree of status and recognition.

When asked to share a recent experience with CPTED, Roger began to describe the retrofit of a local park. In what appeared to be a mood of utter disgust, he explained his encounter with the park planners in the following way:

ROGER: “ ... *I went to the guy and said, are you nuts?! You’re allowing people to go down a lighted path into an environment where there is no activity ... and what is the possibility of something happening? ... They were going to light up the whole thing ... so the park is just an open field hidden behind all these bushes. I said you’re opening yourself up to bush parties ... kids drinking, to sexual assault, to knifings, to stabbings to shootings ... they had a shooting there the year before ... this guy had a gun. I said you’re opening yourself up because you’re taking out all the activities that people would normally go there for ... because people feel safe where there is activity [italics added].*”

The aetiology of the criminal activity in question was reduced by Roger to a simplistic, conceptual equation: a well lit pathway leading to an open, inactive area, when combined with the absence of legitimate activity, *will* generate criminal and/or disorderly conduct. Thus, like so many other CPTED practitioners, Roger stripped the hypothetical criminal

events in question of their would-be complexity and, in the process, rendered them foreseeable, impending, and more amenable to his expertise.⁴¹

But surely the chain of events leading to the crimes in question would be more complex than Roger makes them out to be? For decades criminological research has consistently shown that the number of social, psychological, and environmental variables that factor into a criminal event are myriad: their combined and individual affects creating a complex web of influence that can be extremely difficult to understand (see Miethe and Meier, 1994). In Roger's case, however, it was merely the presence of a criminal opportunity *in and of itself* that generated sufficient cause for concern. With a motivated offender always waiting in the wings (or so it seemed), for Roger it was never a matter of if the crimes would occur but, rather, when they would occur.

Finally, the unequivocal tone of Roger's assertion stems from the pretence that to understand the risks in question in any other way is to be irrational or mad (e.g., " ... I went to this guy and said are you nuts?!"). Thus, the foreseeable danger frame contains two interrelated components: A rational component that involves the careful pairing down of a causal sequence so as to make it appear more likely to unfold, and a moral/normative component that serves to imbue the logic of the former with moral consequences should it not be embraced.

Gary, a security specialist at a large Ontario museum, made use of the same discursive technique. When the exterior grounds to a local museum were being

⁴¹ I would argue that *any* event thought to be the product of a simplistic casual sequence is one that is also thought to be more likely to occur when compared to that which is the product of a complex causal sequence.

redesigned, Gary had the opportunity to meet with the landscape architects prior to the start of the project. His account of the ensuing conversation demonstrates, once again, the tendency of CPTED practitioners to present highly simplified interpretations of the causal sequences that underlie criminal activity:

PATRICK: "What were some of the [CPTED] findings on that one in particular, do you remember?"

GARY: "... they were going to put up, I don't know how many hundreds of plants ... small shrubs and let them grow exponentially. And we turned around and said well, if you want to plant trees, the branches can't be less than 8 feet off the ground. Well, why? *Well, because you don't want people hiding behind the branches ready to spring, because it's a dark area ... and even during the day it is a very quiet and remote area ... you don't want the fear of walking down this roadway and knowing that there may be somebody behind the tree. So let's eliminate the fear and let's eliminate the possibility* [italics added]."

In this instance, Gary reduced the criminogenic equation to a mere two factors: if low lying vegetation is present, he argued, an offender will conceal him or herself behind the landscape and await an opportunity to victimize the unsuspecting. Although it is certainly true that the removal of all forms of low lying vegetation would eliminate such opportunities for concealment, the assertion that the risk of victimization operates on the basis of a simple "*if A then B*" equation is simply misleading.

Similar to Roger, Gary reduces the complexity of the casual sequence to its bare minimum, thereby avoiding more complicated factors which might have included timing, climate, movement patterns, the spatial distribution of other criminal opportunities, and the mitigating impact of other environmental characteristics. With such factors conceptually marginalized, both the probability of the risk coming to fruition and *his* capacity to mitigate that risk through CPTED appear more likely.

Gary's technical advice to the planners is also imbued with a moral component as well. His assertion that: "... you don't want people hiding behind the branches ready to spring ..." not only implies a degree of inevitability with respect to the crime in question, but also entails an implicit morality claim; the assertion being made is that a reasonable, moral person would not want criminals hiding behind trees and that that same reasonable person would, therefore, utilize CPTED as a means of "ensuring" that such crimes do not occur. His entire discursive approach places the client in a position where CPTED appears to be both the most logical, and perhaps the most moral, approach to designing an environment.

The framework of foreseeable danger emerged in most, if not all, of the interviews that were conducted. As I have argued, the tendency to present crime-related risks in this fashion is an extension of the practitioners' need to compensate for the degree of indeterminacy that inevitably characterizes many of the risks in question. With the criminal act impending, and with its aetiology simplified and rendered "visible," the legitimacy of the practitioner's expertise is substantiated. Moreover, the likelihood of the consumer becoming complicit in the application of CPTED is also increased because the threat appears real, concrete, and requires swift moral action.

THE PARADOX OF COMMON SENSE

With the indeterminacy and complexity of the social world accounted for (see above), CPTED practitioners were able to frame CPTED in terms of "common sense." This discursive technique worked to legitimate CPTED by associating it with what was

assumed to be a basic, self-evident, underlying logic that is common to us all. Thus, standing in opposition to CPTED implies that, unlike everybody else, one is lacking the capacity to see that which is “obviously” true. Here, I would agree with Saul (2002) who suggests that common sense is all too often used to feed a false populist dogma.

For example, when Jennifer began sharing her views about CPTED, she suggested:

JENNIFER: “I believe in the philosophy, I haven’t taken the training but uh ... I sat with [names colleague], you know, looking over drawings ... and this and that, and give him my opinion and I sat in the [regional] CPTED meetings giving my opinion on schools, and school access for new schools and principles there for safety and all of that sort of thing. *You know what it really boils down to Patrick? and I hate to say this, to say it so bluntly ... common sense.* And I think lots of times people have just lost their common sense. I don’t know where their brains go but when I look at these things, it is common sense.”

Although Jennifer had not been formally trained in CPTED, she appeared to be very well versed in its principles. Yet, in spite of her technical knowledge, Jennifer openly classified CPTED as a form of common sense. Moreover, she took the argument one step further and implied that not seeing it that way was to be nothing short of unintelligent (e.g., “I don’t know where their brains go ...”).

In a similar fashion, Lauren declared three of CPTED’s most important techniques forms of common sense as well, and she did so at a rather inopportune moment:

LAUREN: “Well, I attended [a CPTED conference] and I thought it was the most interesting thing, like I spent three days listening. It was a three day conference and at the end I remember putting my hand up and saying ...and [names speaker] answered it ... It was planners, politicians ...you know... the whole gambit. And I said basically all you taught us was the three “Ds” of common sense [deter, detect, and delay]. And [names speaker] goes Shhh! Don’t tell anybody that.”

Not only did Lauren characterize CPTED as a form of common sense, but (perhaps unknowingly) she also revealed one of the most fascinating paradoxes about the entire CPTED movement. In order for CPTED practitioners to present their expertise in a way that is understandable, and in a way that helps to render both the risk of criminal activity and the effectiveness of CPTED readily apparent, the complexities of the socio-environmental relationship must be simplified. Thus, CPTED is routinely said to be a form of common sense. However, in doing so, practitioners *undermine* their own expertise – hence the response of the conference speaker who asked Lauren not to reveal the common sense nature of CPTED to others. Of course, if CPTED is truly about “common” sense, this begs the question: Why would anybody need a CPTED expert at all?

It is a delicate game that practitioners play quite often. On the one hand, a rhetoric of common sense partially insulates CPTED from criticism. On the other, however, it undermines the expertise of those who profess its value. How or if practitioners will reach a balance between the two is unclear. As it stands, it would appear that very few are even aware of how double edged their chosen discursive technique really is.

A RETURN TO SIMPLIFICATION

That practitioner’s feel the need to simplify the complexities of the criminal event is not surprising. Indeed, this discursive technique is not unique to CPTED at all. In his classic study of drinking and driving, for example, Gusfield (1981) argues:

The world of objective reality is, like much of natural behaviour, confused and ambiguous, and unobtainable; it must be *organized, interpreted, and compressed* to create a clear message, to form an understandable but not objective reality (Gusfield, 1981: 80).

Gusfield also argues that subjects routinely present an understanding of cause and effect that is singular, inevitably contributing to the fiction that association is ultimately the same as causation (Gusfield, 1981: 73).⁴² If Gusfield is correct, and I think he is in this regard, the tendency of many CPTED practitioners to emphasize environmental opportunity to the exclusion of myriad factors which are equally (if not more) important reflects a similar discursive ordering of the social world for highly instrumental reasons.⁴³ Thus, the foreseeable danger framework provides an essential means by which practitioners are able to legitimate both their expertise and the entire CPTED enterprise.

But do practitioners always find themselves in situations where the risk of criminal activity has to be constructed in that fashion? Although the evidence is, at this point, somewhat tentative, it appears that there is less of a need to frame the risk of crime as being foreseeable and/or impending when at least one of the following two conditions are met: first, when a criminal act has already taken place, and, second, when the CPTED consumer already understands the risk of crime as being both foreseeable and impending from the outset. Under these conditions, the practitioner's expertise and the validity of CPTED appear to require only limited justification.

⁴² Loseke (1999) argues that social problems, and their proposed resolutions, are often constructed by claims-makers in a fashion that is both simple and straightforward because simple solutions to problems that are easy to identify are more likely to be embraced by the public (Loseke, 1999).

⁴³ I suspect many practitioners would argue that emphasizing environmental opportunity to the exclusion of other factors would be a misrepresentation of what CPTED "is all about." The counter argument is a rather straightforward one: What CPTED practitioners should be doing or saying is not the issue here. As this research has clearly demonstrated thus far, practitioners are using this form of rhetoric on a routine basis and it is proving to be essential to their projection of expertise.

For example, when asked how previous victims tended to embrace the ideas behind CPTED, Roger explained:

ROGER: “[It depends] on how they perceive their fear.”

PATRICK: “Okay.”

ROGER: “Like, if they’re very fearful ... like someone in domestics [domestic assault case], they can be very fearful ... *they will take and do everything you tell them to do*. If you say, that tree is in the way ... it’s cut down [italics added].”

Ryan, a security specialist at an Ontario university suggested something similar. When asked about the importance of crime-related fear, he responded:

RYAN: “ ... a lot of times when I become involved in going over there [to a particular building] is because, Patrick, it’s because something has happened. You know? They’ve got somebody lingering the hallways or um ... maybe there is somebody that works in the office that has been a victim of a violent crime or an abusive relationship and they’re looking at enhancing their personal safety. Or they’ve been uh ... a victim of a break an enter and uh ... *they are receptive to any new ideas on how they can increase their personal safety, make them feel safer* ... [italics added].”

Similar to Roger, Ryan suggests that either fear of crime, and/or a previous victimization, tends to make people more receptive to the principles behind CPTED.

That a person’s own victimization, or the victimization of an acquaintance, contributes to a heightened fear of crime is well documented (Baumer, 1985; Skogan and Maxfield, 1981).⁴⁴ What is of interest here is that when a CPTED consumer has been a victim of crime in the past and/or when he or she already demonstrates an obvious fear of crime, there appears to be less of a need for the practitioner to persuade the consumer as to why CPTED is relevant. Exactly why this is the case is difficult to discern without further data being collected from those who have actually solicited CPTED advice. It is likely, however, that under such circumstances the prior occurrence of a criminal act

fundamentally changes the interactive dynamic that unfolds between the CPTED practitioner and the consumer. Specifically, what was likely seen as an abstract risk of criminal victimization in the past is now thought of in terms of a lived experience. Thus, the occurrence of a criminal act in the past serves to confirm that one is, in fact, vulnerable; an emotional and logical extrapolation that opens the door to the practitioner's expertise.

But if a practitioner's status, integrity, and overall legitimacy are tied to how the risk of crime is framed by the parties involved, how do practitioners react when their recommendations are not taken seriously or when they are not implemented as per the details of a CPTED audit? In addition to a general sense of frustration, many practitioners actually shift their emphasis from establishing the foreseeable nature of crime-related risks to an emphasis on the *legal* risks associated with ignoring a CPTED audit if a criminal act were to occur in the future. Once again risk, in and of itself, becomes a malleable phenomenon discursively framed in ways that assist with the cultivation of CPTED's legitimacy and the exercise of social control.

SECURING LEGITIMACY THROUGH LIABILITY

Ignoring the recommendations of a CPTED practitioner may come at a price, especially if that practitioner is a police officer or a civil servant. Because police and civil servant documents can be accessed through Canada's Freedom of Information Act (albeit with some difficulty), the recommendations laid out in a CPTED audit can be revisited at

⁴⁴ There are, of course, other correlates to fear of crime, including signs of neighbourhood disorder (Skogan

a later date should a criminal act take place on a property where the owner failed to heed a practitioner's prior warnings (this would be potentially the case during premises liability cases).

During my CPTED training sessions in 2003, the instructor made a point of emphasizing the importance of such legal technicalities to the class. We were all reminded that, should we ever be in a position to conduct a CPTED audit, our review would be considered a public document and would be accessible by the courts if necessary. We were subsequently told to remind our CPTED clients of this while pointing out the potential for legal action should the audit be ignored and a criminal event take place in the days, months, or years ahead.

Over the course of my research interviews, it became clear that many CPTED practitioners were well aware of this particular issue. Most importantly, however, this legal leverage was being used by practitioners to both increase the probability of their clients' acquiescence and, I would argue, to further secure the legitimacy of their expertise.

"Legitimacy through liability" became a recognizable frame shortly after the qualitative research began and, in many ways, captures a fascinating shift in discursive technique when the legitimacy of the practitioner's expertise is either implicitly or explicitly called into question. In its most basic form, practitioners inform consumers about the risk of legal action if a criminal event were to take place following a CPTED audit that was ignored. This potential for legal liability is explained to the CPTED

and Maxfield, 1981; Skogan, 1990), age, and gender (see Sacco and Kennedy, 1998).

consumer either before the audit process begins or, in the event that signs of non-compliance become apparent, after the audit has been completed.

For example, when I travelled to Jamestown in the summer of 2003, I was fortunate to have had the opportunity to interview several experienced CPTED practitioners, one of whom was Robert. Following our interview, he provided me with several CPTED audit forms that he and his colleagues use when asked to assess a property or structure. Included with these audit forms was a generic cover letter that contained the following advisory to prospective CPTED clients: “The comments put forward in this letter are suggestions only. There is no onus to comply, but the implications of a failure to comply should be reviewed by your legal representative” (unpublished document).

By all accounts, it is a rather ominous and misleading warning. The recipient of the letter is given the illusion of flexibility with respect to how the CPTED recommendations can be received. The assessment is said to have generated only a series of “suggestions” rather than requirements in the strictest sense of the term. Although there is technically no “onus to comply,” it is implied that serious risks warranting legal consultation await those who (foolishly?) choose the path of non-compliance. The letter’s message is clear: A CPTED audit may be acted upon in earnest or completely disregarded by the parties involved. The latter decision, however, will certainly come with its own set of legal risks that should be taken into consideration before a decision is made.

During the interview process, many practitioners spoke of warning their clients numerous times; the tone and demeanour of the interviewees often suggesting that this

was done as if they were issuing a stern warning to a stubborn child. For example, Dean is a police constable in an eastern Ontario town that I will call “Birmingham.” After completing his CPTED training, Dean quickly became, as he described it, “the go-to guy” with respect to Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. On one particular occasion, Dean was called to assess the environmental security of a large hotel following a rather brutal rape of one of its employees. Below, is Dean’s recollection of how his conversations with the hotel manager transpired before and after the crime:

DEAN: “...You know, I also warned them, I said any audit I do is public information. Anything the police do is open to ... you know ... anybody ... the victim was told the police did this audit and found piles of problems so there is going to be a civil action ... So whether or not she does sue them, and if she does I can be subpoenaed to say these are all the problems that I found. Their problem is now, if I am up on the stand and they say ... have they made any changes? I honestly have to say ... no they haven’t. And they’re going to be on the hook.”

At the time of the interview, the hotel had not followed through on any of Dean’s recommendations and a civil suit by the victim was still a very real possibility. Of particular interest, however, was that Dean warned the hotel managers that his security audit could be used against them in a court of law. Thus, not only did Dean identify crime-related risks on the property during his initial audit (referring to many of them as “crimes waiting to happen”; note the obvious use of foreseeable danger rhetoric) but he also highlighted the legal risks associated with ignoring his “expert” assessment.

Unlike the above example, Jerry – a seasoned CPTED practitioner – described how the prospects of litigation following a CPTED audit eventually convinced a major bank to comply with his recommendations:

JERRY: “I have seen it influence decisions ... I guess with banks ... where we deal with banks and we mention litigation and uh ... I know of one change that was caused and it was not the designers ... it was their lawyers that caused the change to be made because of the aspect of litigation was raised.”

Thus, the consumer's attention is redirected to what is essentially a second layer of risk – namely, the risk of civil litigation.⁴⁵ Whether the prospects of successful litigation are real or not, practitioners utilize the risk of legal liability to re-establish the legitimacy of their own expertise and that of CPTED as a whole.

Given that a CPTED consumer can be held liable for ignoring an environmental security audit, it seems only reasonable (and perhaps fair) to ask whether or not CPTED *practitioners* can be held liable for requesting environmental changes that, in the end, fail to deter criminal conduct. The answer to that question is a qualified “no.”

When I asked Dean to clarify whether or not members of the public were obliged to follow through on his CPTED recommendations, he responded:

DEAN: “No, no ... and I explained that to them ... these are strictly recommendations ... on my form that I made up is a little ... almost like a waiver, that says these are strictly recommendations ... it's up to you, if you make them great ... if you don't, that's great ... if you don't make the changes. However, [names city] Police are ... no responsibility whatsoever ... we're not guaranteeing that crimes are going to be prevented or anything. So it's strictly recommendations ...”

Dean was absolutely adamant about how important it is to warn clients that practitioners cannot be held liable if a criminal act occurs following the implementation of CPTED principles. If a practitioner fails to remind his or her client, however, there is a chance that the consumer will read the disclaimer located on virtually every CPTED audit form used in Ontario. These disclaimers are clearly intended to absolve the CPTED practitioner of all liability should his or her recommendations fail to deter criminal and/or

⁴⁵ Interestingly, however, none of the interviewees could recall an incident where a property owner had *actually* been held accountable in court because a CPTED audit had been ignored.

disorderly activity. A common disclaimer – and one that is used by police departments across southern Ontario, for example – reads as follows:

This C.P.T.E.D audit is provided by members of the [enter department name here] Police service. The recommendations provided are strictly suggestions to help reduce the chances of a crime being committed against the property. [Enter department name here] Police service and the officers conducting the audit are **not responsible** for any crime committed [sic] against the property, or any persons associated to the property.

Whether or not a disclaimer of this kind would be honoured in a court of law is difficult to tell. In fact, anecdotal evidence suggests that some practitioners are now purchasing liability insurance in case their disclaimers turn out to be ineffective or inadmissible. Nevertheless, what is important here is that these clauses are intended to at least mitigate the practitioner's liability should a crime occur in the wake of an audit that was dutifully adhered to by a CPTED consumer.

These disclaimers operate not only as forms of risk management in and of themselves, but also as open declarations which suggest that practitioners are fully aware that CPTED may fail when it is needed most. Given that both a practitioner's level of expertise and the legitimacy of CPTED are, in part, functions of his or her capacity to render the seemingly indeterminable elements of a criminal event amenable to calculated intervention, the need for a disclaimer is nothing short of a necessary evil. Indeed, in risk society, knowledge about risk comes with no guarantees and is, in and of itself, risky.

It should come as no surprise, therefore, that some CPTED practitioners “get a feel for their client” before they commit themselves to conducting a time-consuming environmental security audit. In fact, two practitioners discussed how they, in a sense, “probe” for a sense of their customers' willingness to follow through on the recommendations once the audit has been completed. More often than not, this probing

for commitment involves determining whether or not the client is willing to spend the money that may be required if an environment is to be brought up to par with CPTED's standards.

For example, during an "on the record" email exchange, Robert clarified his unofficial policy. Although this selection is somewhat lengthy, it is particularly informative and worth noting in its entirety:

ROBERT: Early when I started doing CPTED audits on a regular basis, I discovered that when things are given away for free, they are not appreciated to the degree had there been a cost associated to it. Through the police, organizations often requested CPTED audits for 'information' purposes alone. When a considerable amount of time was spent on the audit and report (at no expense to the requesting organization) and the recommendations would not be implemented, I found this to be frustrating. I soon changed the method that these audits were done through the police. I took a bold approach and right out asked if the organization was willing to make changes, and if so, did they have any funding. I have also explained that a document completed through a municipal organization such as the police is subject to freedom of information and that copies of any document can be requested by the public. If the answer was not positive, I advised that they would be put on a waiting list with low priority.

A similar approach was adopted by Dean who, when asked about how he felt when clients did not follow through on his recommendations, responded:

DEAN: "So I say, first off, if I do the audit, do you have money in the budget to make changes? Now people are saying no, but we just like to sort of see ... Well then it is not worth my time. Because if you're not going to make the changes, then ..."

PATRICK: "You sort of probe to see how committed they are?"

DEAN: "Yup. I do now."

However, beyond any real stretch of the imagination, it would seem that there is more to the process of probing for commitment than just a sense of organizational expediency. Given that most practitioners experience a considerable degree of frustration when their recommendations are not adhered to, the decision to engage only those clients who demonstrate the resources and willingness to implement their recommendations is likely

to be as much about efficiency (as many of them claimed) as it is about avoiding those relationships where the practitioner's expertise and the legitimacy of CPTED might be called into question. In a sense, it is about the practitioner ensuring that the proverbial "game" is played their way, or not played at all.

SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ABOUT FEAR

Amidst the rhetoric of foreseeable danger and that of legal liability, there would seem to be ample opportunity for CPTED practitioners and supporters to capitalize on the fears of consumers. Indeed, as the research unfolded, I found myself reflecting on this possibility time and time again.

For example, I was once approached by a corporate sponsor at a recent CPTED conference in Ontario. He worked as a distributor of transparent security films that are manufactured by the international 3M Corporation. Security films are thin, transparent plastic barriers that are applied to windows so as to help prevent them from breaking and shattering in the event of an accident or attempted break and enter (some varieties also reduce exposure to ultra violet light).

To demonstrate the product's strength, the man encouraged me to try to tear a piece of film in half using only my hands. After admitting my defeat, I asked the representative why one would bother with this product. Almost mechanically, he opened up a brochure and showed me the inside. It showed a picture of a young, white family standing on a front lawn in front of what was, ostensibly, their beautiful suburban home. On the following page, and where my attention was dutifully re-directed, the brochure

read: “Crime is up. Damage from violent storms is up. Explosions and acts of terrorism are going up. Even the UV light intensities seem to be going up. For all these reasons, 3M invented a new way to protect your home and business from a dangerous world. It’s called 3M Scotchshield ...” (3M brochure).

In a post 9/11 world, the reference to terrorism was not surprising. Of particular interest, however, was the assertion that crime rates were “going up” given that most criminological and government research presents a very different picture. In fact, the overall crime rate has been falling since the mid 1990s in both the United States and Canada and shows every indication of continuing to do so (Blumstein and Wallman, 2000). It would stand to reason, therefore, that either the 3M Corporation made a legitimate error, or the company was deliberately trying to scare the consumer into purchasing their product – the latter seems more likely.⁴⁶

This begs the following question: while in the process of legitimating both their expertise and the legitimacy of CPTED as a whole, are CPTED specialists likely to engage in a similar kind of fear mongering (perhaps as an extension of the rhetoric of foreseeable danger) so as to promote their services and/or skills? Given that fear is generally a product of both particular criminal acts and the more general experiences one has relating to crime (see Skogan and Maxfield, 1981; Skogan, 1990; Baumer, 1985), it would seem that CPTED practitioners occupy a position whereby they could contribute to

⁴⁶ I am in no way implying that the company accurately reflected the mentality of the CPTED practitioners whom were present. Rather, their presence merely helped bring questions relating to fear and its role in the practitioner/lay person dynamic to the forefront of my mind. The economics of CPTED will be addressed in chapter 6 in more detail.

a consumer's level of fear with little effort, especially if the practitioner is also a police officer.

As the research interviews progressed, it became apparent that I was not the only person asking questions about the importance of fear. For example, Brent, a senior O.P.P. officer, suggested the following:

BRENT: " ... I guess now that you've asked that questions I guess it begs the question would a private security consultant, could they be flogging CPTED to increase sales. The bottom line is, you bet they could. They could scare the hell out of an audience in ten minutes and be selling all sorts of CPTED things uh ... no question."

Brent's assertion that private security consultants are generally in a position to capitalize on fear of crime was a common one. Numerous interviewees expressed concern that the privatization of CPTED in particular could lead to the unethical promotion of fear for the purposes of financial gain. But to suggest that private CPTED consultants would be the sole benefactors is to mistakenly interpret financial gain as being the only pay-off related to CPTED's success. As the above research has indicated, public sector employees too have much to gain, including the continued recognition of their expertise and the social status that sometimes ensues.

The data gathered for this study did not allow me to come to a conclusion as to whether or not CPTED practitioners were "exploiting" the public's fear of crime. While it is true that fear of crime is implicated in the development and progress of the CPTED initiative, to assert that crime prevention practitioners exploit fear for personal and professional gain is to assume that the levels of fear being promoted are disproportionate to the actual risk of victimization. Herein lies the theoretical dilemma (and the reason for my unwillingness to draw a conclusion on this matter). At what point does fear become

disproportionate to the risk of criminal victimization? and upon what criteria can that distinction be objectively made (see Lupton and Tulloch, 1999)? To accuse CPTED practitioners of fear mongering for their own self interests is to draw normative conclusions about what is, or is not, an appropriate physiological response to a given risk. Although it seems logical that practitioners could exploit the emotions and anxieties of consumers so as to secure their own vested interests, the data gathered here does not point in any particular direction.

What can be said, however, is that the interactive dynamic that arises when a CPTED specialist engages a client is characterized by varying degrees of emotion. Indeed, the sense of urgency and importance that is expressed rhetorically when practitioners share their findings is, in part, a function of the practitioner's desire to capitalize on a shared understanding as to how emotional the risk or experience of victimization can be. Fear and/or anxiety become, in a sense, the mutual ground upon which the practitioner and the client meet.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

This chapter has sought to accomplish two tasks in particular. The first, was to outline why it is that experts/professionals must constantly legitimate their expertise. I argued that there was nothing self-sustaining about the demand for specialized, expert knowledge in post-industrial society despite how important experts have become to our contemporary way of life. As such, the relevance and applicability of expert knowledge

must always be shored up and clearly demonstrated if it is to remain worthy of special recognition.

Given that CPTED practitioners are involved in an area of expertise that requires the offsetting of future probabilities (and thus constantly deals with what is purely hypothetical), the legitimation process is both more difficult and more important to the continued viability of CPTED as a professional initiative. When all of these considerations are coupled with the fact that practitioners experience varying degrees of social status in the wake of their expertise, the legitimation process becomes crucial.

Secondly, this chapter also began the much larger process of assessing the specific ways by which CPTED practitioners legitimate their expertise through the discursive framing of crime-related risks. The frames of foreseeable danger and legitimacy through liability discursively frame risk in such a way as to render CPTED a logical and prudent course of action. The foreseeable danger frame establishes both the logical basis for CPTED's application and the urgency with which it should be applied. The framework of liability, on the other hand, works in a remedial capacity to help ensure that the CPTED client recognizes and concedes to the practitioner's professional expertise.

Taken together, both frames set the stage for the client's willing participation in their own social control as the practitioner becomes a kind of pastoral leader who carves out and presents courses of action which, although mere suggestions, are implicitly tied to a panoply of expertise that exists solely to ensure the well-being of citizens. The use of these two discursive techniques, spurred on by the need to constantly establish the

legitimacy of CPTED as an area of professional expertise, represent just two of the ways in which risk-centred governmentalities are actualized through discourse, eventually leading to the strategic exercise of rationalized social control over those who willingly consume and incorporate risk management expertise.

CHAPTER 5

THE DIFFERENTIATION PROCESS

From this point forward we may assume that the search for professional legitimacy is, in a sense, one of the driving forces behind the continued presence and promotion of CPTED in Ontario. As I argued in the last chapter, there is a lot at stake for certain practitioners when it comes to its continued viability as a crime prevention initiative.

However, the professionalization process is not really the central issues here. My primary concern thus far has been how the framing of crime-related risk permits a deeper understanding of how CPTED experts are capable of strategically exercising a highly rationalized form of social control over the recipients of their knowledge (which, of course, is intimately tied to securing their legitimacy) and how that process reflects, albeit indirectly, the state of governmentality in risk society. In this chapter, I will explore yet another critical discursive technique – one that involves a complete depoliticization of what I will refer to here as the “differentiation process.”

According to CPTED theory, the differentiation process takes place when, under the right environmental conditions, legitimate users are able to identify “illegitimate” users of social space and take the proper measures to have them routed from the environment in question. However, as I will argue below, CPTED practitioners frame the process as if it were anything *but* a political undertaking; as if the sorting of legitimate and illegitimate users was/is an inherently objective process untainted by ideology. Within this frame, CPTED-based environmental design is thought capable of bringing an

objective, self-evident, binary distinction between legitimate and illegitimate users into view for all to see and for all to judge. Below, I argue that this depoliticized frame plays not only an important role in CPTED's search for legitimacy, but also facilitates the exercise of control over both the CPTED consumer and those who are deemed illegitimate users of social space.

What follows is an analysis of how the differentiation process is conceptualized and framed by CPTED practitioners. The first task will be to situate the differentiation of legitimate and illegitimate users within CPTED's overall theoretical framework. Subsequent to this, interview and documentary data will be used to demonstrate how the differentiation process is depoliticized in CPTED-related discourse and how this framing technique is related to, and gains strength from, parallel visions of "community." Finally, I will return to the question of CPTED's legitimacy and argue that a depoliticized framing of the differentiation process – and thus a depoliticized interpretation of how risks are identified – is not only instrumental to CPTED's legitimacy, but also to the exercise of what appears to be a value-free form of social control.

THE ROOTS OF DIFFERENTIATION

CPTED involves transforming the social *and* physical opportunity structures in a given location so as to render them less amenable to criminal and/or disorderly conduct. By implication, it is generally assumed that offenders engage in a kind of mental calculus that involves weighing the pros and cons of engaging in criminal activity given the social and environmental circumstances. As noted by James, a police officer and CPTED

specialist, "... deviants go shopping where they are going to get the most bang for their buck." Thus, in its ideal form, CPTED attempts to intensify the perceived risks associated with the environment such that offenders deem it too risky to carry out the crime in question (see Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993; Crowe, 2000; Dekeseredy et. al., 2003).

The deterrent affects of CPTED are experienced by offenders on two different, yet symbiotically related, levels. First, when CPTED is applied properly, the modified environment speaks to the offender(s) in terms of thwarted physical opportunity. For example, newly installed locks may preclude access to a shed in a timely fashion, an eight-foot fence may prevent easy access to the rear of a building, or high-intensity metal halide lighting may illuminate too much space in the vicinity of an intended target.

The effects of CPTED are also experienced on a level that is slightly more social than environmental. According to many practitioners, "good" CPTED encourages and assists property owners with the task of identifying, and perhaps even controlling, illegitimate users of social space (Newman, 1972; Crowe, 2000; Cozens et. al., 2001). This defensive posture is believed to emerge in tandem with a sense of territoriality whereby residents demonstrate a willingness to exercise care and control over their environments.⁴⁷

However, research has consistently shown that territorial behaviour is never a foregone conclusion, even when the environmental design appears conducive to its

⁴⁷ This argument is an intriguing one, although I suspect that Bauman (2000) may have been right when he suggested that communities are now being defined more in terms of closely watched borders than in terms of group-oriented social action (Bauman, 2000; see also Putman, 2000).

development (see Merry, 1981; Taylor et. al., 1984; Dekeseredy et. al., 2003). Moreover, even in tightly knit communities, it is not axiomatic that members of the public will intervene when confronted with a criminal event (Mayhew, 1981; Schneider and Pearcey, 1996).

Furthermore, the implicit assumption that criminals are often outsiders is problematic, especially given that crimes routinely involve offenders who reside, work, or frequent the communities within which their crimes eventually take place. For example, husbands who beat their wives in the privacy of their own homes (Dekeseredy, 2003), youths who vandalize buildings in their own neighbourhood, employees who steal from their employers, or those who cause mischief as they pass through a given community on their way to work (see Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993; Sacco and Kennedy, 1998). These kinds of offenders essentially “belong” in their respective communities and are unlikely to appear out of the ordinary unless they are caught in the act. The probability of them being subjected to the routine natural surveillance of a community prior to their engagement in a criminal act is, therefore, relatively low – at least until such time as their crimes are discovered and the stigmatization process begins.⁴⁸ Thus, CPTED’s implicit emphasis on crimes committed by outsiders is somewhat misleading and ultimately contributes to a popular conceptualization of crime and criminality that is only partially accurate (see Rentschler, 2000).

⁴⁸ None of this is meant to suggest that CPTED is *completely* ineffective when it comes to preventing insider criminal activity. A well designed structure with effective target hardening measures in place would have a similar deterrent effect on an offender who originated from the outside as it would on someone originating from the inside.

These critiques aside, however, CPTED is believed to affect two different populations: those with criminal intentions seeking a suitable environment within which to act, and residents/property owners who are expected to exercise care and control over their immediate environment with CPTED's encouragement (Crowe, 2000). It is the latter dynamic that is of interest here.

Sorting People

The practitioners with whom I spoke rarely elaborated on how one would actually go about differentiating a legitimate user of social space from one who is illegitimate. This omission was cast into sharp relief during a CPTED conference in Ottawa, Ontario when a key-note speaker addressed the relationship between The New Urbanism and CPTED. Her argument was relatively straightforward; both movements now share a similar objective in so far as each seeks to create communities wherein strong social ties and a sense of "community" prevail. With the right environmental conditions in place, she argued, communities would be more tightly integrated. The implicit assumption underlying the argument was that design could serve as a catalyst to the further delienation and regulation of the moral and civic boundaries within a specific community. Her argument was a familiar one; introduced almost 40 years earlier by Jane Jacobs (1992) and reiterated since then by various pundits of alternative urban design (see Kunstler, 1994; 1998).

The buzz of agreement in the auditorium suggested that the theoretical connection between The New Urbanism and CPTED had been duly noted and appreciated by those

in attendance. From a CPTED perspective, communities based on the principles of The New Urbanism nurture a sense of territoriality among residents who then, in turn, are more apt to identify transgressors. Particular elements of design would facilitate that process: front porches that afford unobstructed views of neighbourhood streets; court yards and sidewalks that encourage “legitimate” social interaction; and mixed zoning that helps to ensure the social, economic, and political necessities of life are within walking distance. A less transient community (which is often a product of zoning regulations that make long commutes a fact of life) is, according to New Urbanists, also a tightly knit community which is less prone to criminal activity.

In theory, the relationship between The New Urbanism on the one hand and CPTED on the other seemed logical. What was missing from the key-note address, however, was a general awareness that the differentiation process is actually a highly political process. Determined to explore this tendency further, I became particularly sensitive to the ways in which practitioners (and their documents) were conceptualizing and framing the differentiation process. After reviewing the data it became clear to me that the depoliticization of this fundamental CPTED principle was a common thematic occurrence. In its basic form, the interviewee or document in question would generally refer to the differentiation process as if it were a matter of making a self-evident, objective decision that would never be contaminated by human subjectivity or politics. Moreover, a strong sense of community is often believed to be the operative social context for the differentiation process, both in terms of facilitating its occurrence and legitimating its use.

For example, during our discussion about the need for CPTED in certain kinds of neighbourhoods, Jennifer and I began talking about the relevance of citizen-based, crime prevention initiatives with respect to ridding communities of unwanted visitors. CPTED, she argued, was an essential undertaking because it encouraged residents to work together while exercising territorial control over their neighbourhoods. According to Jennifer:

JENNIFER: "A lot of the CPTED is ... get the place active and you'll get rid it of the problem. *Get the right people in there.* People have started doing night walks and they do it in groups and they go through the area where the *druggies* are, *where the people that they don't want on the street are*, and they go by and they give them eye contact and they deal with them right there. And eventually they just go away [italics added]."

For Jennifer, there was a clear distinction to be made between those who were legitimate users of social space ("the right people") and those who were not. Like so many other interviewees, however, Jennifer offered little or no insight as to how one could effectively differentiate people on the basis of whether or not they belonged. Although she suggested that illegal drug use was perhaps one measure of a person's acceptability, there was little indication that she recognized the potential difficulties associated with making such momentary character assessments. Indeed, because the purchase and sale of narcotics tends to be a relatively covert enterprise which spans all socio-economic strata, the identification of perpetrators is not always a straightforward task. Jennifer's "matter of fact" tone and body language, however, implied that, for her, the differentiation process was an objective one.

Jennifer's vision also clashes with what is a very different drug enforcement reality in both Canada and the United States. Research continues to demonstrate that the

fight against drugs is far from being the kind of apolitical, objective undertaking envisioned by the interviewee. Drug users and dealers are often identified and investigated on the basis of preconceived notions about race, gender, spatial location, and socio-economic status, not necessarily objective signs of drug usage or distribution (Christie, 1993; Davis, 1992; Parenti, 1999; Johnson et. al., 2000).

Interestingly, Jennifer's comments also implied there was a kind of moral and/or ethical symmetry to the world, wherein "good" people were always good and where "bad" people were always bad. Although the simplicity of her interpretation is perhaps comforting on some level, it is entirely misleading. Offenders actually spend most of their time engaging in lawful activities (see Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993). Apart from the moments when they are actually engaged in a criminal act, offenders behave a lot like the rest of us: they go to work, visit the doctor, and do their grocery shopping. Conversely, "good people" flirt with breaking the law from time to time as well. This is especially the case with respect to juveniles, many of whom are good citizens but periodically flirt with social disorder as they grow up (see Tanner, 1996). As youths age, however, their criminal inclinations generally begin to wane, eventually giving way to more conventional, non-criminal lifestyles (see Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990).

Thus, the highly depoliticized interpretation of the differentiation process put forward by Jennifer contrasts sharply with what is a very different reality in many North American neighbourhoods. With or without CPTED, risky populations are not always easy to identify and, for that very reason, the differentiation process can all too easily become an instrument of social control that operates on the basis of highly subjective

criteria that are perhaps somewhat questionable within the context of a free and democratic society.

While interviewing Donna at the police station where she worked, I realized that she too understood the differentiation process in a depoliticized way. Donna and her partner are the department's community liaison officers, a task that includes spreading the word about the importance of crime prevention and CPTED in particular. When we began discussing the effectiveness of various CPTED techniques, she suggested:

DONNA: "But just, you know ... that idea that ... that with some wrought aluminium you know that fancy kind of fencing so that things look nice and it keeps people off the property and it helps a lot of people from having undesirables on their property.

PATRICK: "Is CPTED really about addressing crimes by undesirables?"

DONNA: "That's what it's more ... yeah, that's what it's meant to do."

For Donna, CPTED was fundamentally about keeping "undesirable" populations at bay, and if that could be achieved while maintaining a keen eye for aesthetic appeal, then that was even better. Similar to the other interviewees, Donna clearly assumed that the term "undesirables" needed no further explanation, as if CPTED was somehow capable of sharpening the lines of definition around who was, or was not, a legitimate user of social space. Once again, design is believed capable of mitigating ambiguity.

Whereas Donna argued that CPTED was meant to differentiate users of social space, Christian, a senior crime prevention specialist, suggested that CPTED brings out people's *natural* capacity to identify those who do not belong in a given area (again, the assumption here is that the criminal or deviant is from the "outside"). According to Christian:

CHRISTIAN: "... one of the things that CPTED does, or a good CPTED application is that it may bring out the *natural* understanding from people ... so that there is a certain expectation like when ... you talk about natural surveillance and territoriality ... somebody stands out oddly and people start thinking they're odd. Um ... and it does it naturally ... sometimes I don't even have to be familiar with the property, but if it is designed well you know that something isn't right ... that's effective design. It is effective from the point of view that it allows me to see something ... me being a normal user [italics added]."

Christian's claim that the differentiation process is a natural extension of what it means to be human reflects the extent to which the process is understood in an apolitical fashion. As a discursive tactic, suggesting that something is "natural" implies the existence of an objective, underlying order to the world; a state of proper existence against which all other social phenomena in the "here and now" can be judged. If, as Christian implies, CPTED brings out a "natural understanding from people" with respect to who does or does not belong, then political ideology becomes a marginal factor in the process itself. Thus, if Christian is correct, illegitimate users do not belong because their presence runs counter to the natural order of things. Thus, CPTED becomes merely a tool by which that order can (and must?) be preserved.

Sorting People: Documentary evidence

A depoliticized understanding of the differentiation process also emerged in a variety of CPTED publications as well, many of which now circulate among police departments, urban planners, consultants, and politicians. For example, the *Peel CPTED Principles* document is a reference guide for municipal employees and officials in Ontario's Region of Peel. It contains a brief overview of CPTED principles and explains how various techniques can be applied when urban or suburban landscapes are being

designed and/or retrofitted. For those looking to develop a basic understanding of CPTED, it is actually an informative document.

The document begins with a basic summary of what Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design entails. In a rather convoluted passage, it reads: “CPTED involves the design of physical space in the context of the needs of the bona fide users of the space, the normal and expected (or intended) use of the space and the predictable behaviour of both bona fide users and offenders” (Peel Principles Document, 2). Although it is a confusing and rather limited definition, it is of interest here because it too implies the distinction between a bona fide user and one who is criminally inclined is an objective one.

In what is perhaps an attempt to clarify this distinction, the document’s glossary provides entries for both “Abnormal User” and “Normal User” which, respectively, are defined as follows: “Persons who you do not desire to be in a certain space” and “Persons whom you desire to be in a certain space” (Peel Principles Document, 47-8). Thus, what distinguishes the abnormal user from the normal user is a matter of personal opinion or, according to the glossary, one’s personal “desire.”

Yet, this apparent recognition of human subjectivity only goes so far. Specifically, the fact that property owners and/or citizens of a community are left to police their own social and environmental landscapes is apparently of no concern.⁴⁹ In addition, the idea that gender bias, discrimination, sexual harassment, or other manifestations of personal

⁴⁹ Interestingly, owning private property (e.g., a home) appears to provide a sense of justification for what is, in a sense, the spilling-over of normative control beyond the boundaries of that property. Thus,

ideology could impact the differentiation process is not even acknowledged. There are no warnings, per se, that the differentiation of users may generate moral or ethical points of contention. Once again, environmental design appears capable of making the entire process an objective one.

In another example, this time involving a document published by Toronto's Department of Parks and Recreation, the criteria by which legitimate and illegitimate users can be differentiated are said to become increasingly self-evident as the right design techniques are put into place. The following excerpt is long, but of particular interest:

While the term "undesirable" is subjective, there are activities which the majority of users find *unacceptable* in public parks. For example, activities which involve victimless crimes such as prostitution, gambling, drug dealing, or when areas of parks are used as meeting places for homosexual men. To discourage such activities the physical conditions that support "undesirable" situations need to be evaluated (dense plantings, poor lighting, isolated parking areas etc.) in conjunction with efforts to maximize positive park use" (*Designing and Maintaining Safe Parks*, 29).

Like the *Peel Principles Document*, there is only a brief recognition of the role played by human subjectivity in the process of sorting users of social space. However, subjectivity is not recognized to the extent that it may, in fact, complicate the distinction between desirable and undesirable populations. That such classificatory schemes could be misapplied, misused, or adopted for purposes other than securing the public good is in no way acknowledged. Instead, the document interpolates its own value position by referring to an abstract moral majority with which any "sensible" reader would align him or herself – even to the extent that homosexuality is believed to be almost criminal.

homeowners are thought to be justified in exercising control over adjoining or nearby land (public or private) because they own property themselves.

Be that as it may, the argument here is not that people are unable to identify what kinds of behaviour they abhor (in this sense, the document is correct, the public generally does not look favourably upon prostitution or drug dealing). Rather, it is that the criteria upon which unacceptable/risky people are to be identified are rarely as obvious and apolitical as the document implies. Although it is true that in some urban areas one can witness soliciting for the purposes of prostitution and/or drug dealing in plain view, for the most part such activities take place covertly. Thus, identifying illegitimate users of social space inevitably involves the use of typifications that may, or many not, be entirely accurate (or even ethical).

For example, the group of males loitering in the park are “probably” drug dealers who should be routed; the two well-dressed males strolling through the park are probably “faggots” looking for a place to have sex; and the woman dressed somewhat provocatively is likely a “whore” waiting for her client. Beyond any stretch of the imagination, these kinds of typifications are likely to inform the differentiation process all too often.

Generalizations aside, research pertaining to how particular groups experience social space clearly demonstrates that spatial access is often mitigated by preconceived, highly political, notions about race, ethnicity, gender, age, socio-economic status, and appearance (strangely, CPTED practitioners rarely acknowledge this). For example, in his evaluation of New York City’s “broken windows” approach to crime and disorder management, Harcourt (2001) reveals how race and socio-economic status became implicated in the process of ridding New York’s streets of undesirable populations

(Harcourt, 2001; see Parenti, 1999). While fixing their “broken windows,” and while attempting to reassert territorial control, citizens of New York City and members of the police force engaged in an aggressive crackdown on young black males from the city’s lower socio-economic tier, many of whom were subjected to relentless “stop and search” campaigns because they appeared to be suspicious (Harcourt, 2001). In New York City, the process of identifying and routing so-called illegitimate users of social space became intensely political as race and socio-economic status became mediating elements in the classification process (Parenti, 1999; Harcourt, 2001; see also Rentschler, 2000).

Outside the realm of policing, members of the Five Oaks community in Dayton, Ohio have had first-hand experience with the highly political nature of the differentiation process. When their community was retrofitted under the guidance of Oscar Newman in 1992, a series of gates were installed in order to generate a stronger sense of territoriality and help differentiate unwanted visitors from those who “belonged” in the community. However, as Wilkinson (2003) demonstrates, members of the community quickly appropriated Newman’s design strategy for the purposes of racial segregation. Black residents sectioned off territory to prevent the encroachment of white residents and *vice-versa* (Wilkinson, 2003). In Five Oaks, as in New York City, environmental design did make the differentiation process easier, although it was underwritten by preconceived notions about race and parallel assumptions about who does, or does not, constitute a risky individual.

Equally important are the effects of socio-economic status. Across Canada and the United States the homeless are routinely denied access to particular areas of the urban

landscape (Fitzpatrick and LaGory, 2000; see Lankenau, 1999). As centres of consumption struggle to present a consumer-friendly image of accessibility (often with the assistance of CPTED), a reality of restricted access and selective police engagement forces the homeless and other undesirables into the more desolate and removed areas of Canadian and American cities (Davis; 1992; 1998; Zukin, 1995; Hannigan, 1999; Hagan and McCarthy, 1998; Lowes, 2002). For the homeless, inner-city space has become a patchwork of accessible and restricted zones that must be carefully negotiated on a daily basis.⁵⁰

In an area less related to issues of crime and disorder, Gardner's (1995) study of gender and spatial access reveals that women are often unable to access and/or pass through particular spatial locations without being subjected to forms of harassment by male onlookers (Gardner, 1995). Therefore, women are subjected to the judgemental gaze of men who, in a sense, decide *whether* or not a particular female will remain verbally unscathed as she passes by. What Gardner effectively reveals is that gender discrimination and expressions of territoriality can, and often do, become entirely fused (Gardner, 1995; see Pain, 2001).

The point being made here is an important one. Irrespective of the environmental design, regulating access to social space (or in the case of CPTED, encouraging the regulation of social space) is an inherently political undertaking that inevitably reflects particular ideologies. O'Malley (1996) makes a similar point, arguing that all forms of risk *management* inevitably reflect the political rationalities ascendant in a given social

⁵⁰ For a broader discussion of how legal statutes in the United States are restricting the homeless' ability to

setting (O'Malley, 1996). Yet, proponents of CPTED rarely, if ever, recognize the potential for the differentiation process to become a practical extension of discriminatory lines of thought (e.g., a man is deemed illegitimate because he is black or a woman is confronted and asked to leave a building because she is dishevelled etc.). Instead, a highly depoliticized and somewhat reified understanding of the differentiation process works to marginalize questions about the specific criteria used for the exclusion of illegitimate users. As such, the sensitive moral and ethical questions that would inevitably rise to the surface if such questions were asked are entirely avoided.

COMMUNITY AS A SOURCE OF LEGITIMACY

In popular discourse, “community” generally implies a source of homogeneity, stability, and predictability; as if it were the ultimate source of refuge from the destabilizing and detraditionalizing forces of the modern world (Kearns and Parkinson, 2001). These visions of community are generally nostalgic and often reflect a palpable longing for what once was (Sennett, 1995). As Howard (1995) aptly suggests: “Such nostalgic discourse pits the allegedly alienated individualism of late-twentieth-century capitalist society against the supposed security and personal rootedness of life in the collectivity (Howard, 1995: 109). As a discursive technique, community is often used to conjure up images of a sanguine and desirable past, in spite of the fact that “... collectivities can be highly oppressive social entities” (Howard, 1995: 109). Believing in

access certain urban locales see Mitchell (1997).

the *nostalgic* rhetoric of community, argues Kingwell (2000), is nothing less than a “crucial mistake” (Kingwell, 2000: 193).

Examples of community discourse are myriad. For example, large development companies use community as a mechanism to sell homes to young, cash-strapped couples. The promise of a “secure enclave” of homes in a newly built community not only capitalizes on the image of upper class sensibilities, but also deceptively implies that the anxieties and risks of the outside world will be mysteriously kept at bay should one decide to settle in with a mortgage and children in tow.⁵¹

It all amounts to a kind of pre-packaged fiction that is, admittedly, quite seductive. Yet, despite its obvious departure from reality, the image of the community maintains a formidable grip on popular consciousness (witness the number of television shows based on a highly romanticized interpretation of the “small town”). In fact, nowhere are these visions of homogeneity, consensus, stability, and security more prevalent than when it comes to the discourses surrounding issues of crime and disorder. As Walklate (2001) argues, “community” has played a fundamental role in crime prevention policy and in academic sociology/criminology since the early part of the 20th century (Walklate, 2001). For example, a similar argument was at the very heart of the social disorganization thesis that was put forward by sociologists during the 1930s (Hagan, 1994; Sumner, 1995; Walklate, 2001). Moreover, the disorganization/ecological approach to understanding crime and deviance continues to evolve and has been used,

⁵¹ At its very extreme is Celebration Florida, a 5000 acre town built in 1996 by the Walt Disney Corporation in Osceola County, one that was designed to be a self-contained, all-American community

quite recently, to even explain crime and disorder among police departments in the United States (see Kane, 2002). In addition to its rich intellectual history, the relationship between strong communities and crime prevention remains at the forefront of both formal and informal discussions about the state of crime and disorder (see Cohen, 1985).

It should come as no surprise, therefore, that visions of tightly knit communities emerged during my interviews with CPTED practitioners and supporters. In fact, numerous interviewees suggested that a tightly knit community was fundamental to the differentiation process for two particular reasons. First, citizens who feel strongly about their community are believed to provide the natural surveillance that is required to mitigate criminal activity. Borrowing from Jacobs (1992), members of a community are routinely described as being the “eyes and ears” on the street; the people who are willing and able to contact the authorities if something goes awry (see Jacobs, 1992; Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 1995). Second, and of particular interest here, community was often used as a rhetorical justification for the differentiation process in and of itself, as if it were capable of lending a degree of moral unequivocality to the entire undertaking.⁵²

For example, after a brief discussion about The New Urbanism and its relevance to contemporary urban planning, Donna addressed the importance of developing a strong sense of community as a means of offsetting untoward activity:

DONNA: “Um ... it’s not just, it’s not just CPTED a lot of things are more uh ... woven and I think that *community building is a big portion* ... that you don’t have to be wealthy to have a strong community and when you have a strong community a lot of those other things come into play.”

which offered a strange fusion of Disneyesque purity and early 20th century planning ideals (see Hannigan, 1999).

⁵² Sometimes, however, this reference is made using different rhetorical tropes, including (but not limited to): “Tightly-knit community,” “close community,” “strong community,” or “strong neighbourhood.”

PATRICK: "Okay..."

DONNA: "If people are out and about in the street and they are interested in their neighbours and they're interested in their neighbourhood ... they become involved, they become your eyes and your ears ... *they become the ones who allow things to happen or disallow things to happen* You can have some neighbourhoods ... that don't have a lot of financial resources that can be extremely strong neighbourhoods just because people care about them [italics added]."

Strong communities, almost by definition, are believed to be comprised of citizens who are willing and able to differentiate illegitimate users of social space from those who are not. In Donna's case, *citizens* would (presumably) "allow things to happen" if the activities in question were legitimate and "disallow [sic] things to happen" if they were illegitimate. Although it was not exactly clear what Donna meant by "disallow," she was likely referring to one of two options: (1) a citizen would call the authorities, or (2) a citizen would personally engage the offender in order to route him or her from the property.

Donna's comments also entailed a "will of the people" sensibility. In many ways, this subtle form of populism acted like an axiomatic source of justification; as if the entire undertaking was an inherently virtuous one because the community was involved. Using a similar populist rhetoric, Jennifer, a career politician, proclaimed, "I honestly believe that we need to empower the people to take the community back and have some responsibility for it."⁵³

Donna and Jennifer were not alone in this regard. When I asked Jerry to comment on the importance of community relations with respect to CPTED, he answered:

JERRY: "Yeah ... you know ... it's [community] pretty much *everything*. It's, in a sense, the glue. It's um ... you know again I ... going strictly in a sense back to the theory,

⁵³ As previously mentioned in chapter two, Newman (1972) espoused a similar kind of populist sensibility.

Crowe talked about territoriality which is, in a sense, that [sense of community] too you know ... it's seen uh ... as sort of an umbrella technique which brought in surveillance and access control, it brought them together [italics added].”

On what was a slightly more theoretical level, Jerry conflated the concept of community with territoriality, natural surveillance, and access control. Thus, almost by definition, a strong community was thought to be one that kept a sharp eye on its members, protected and maintained its territorial boundaries, and exercised control over those who did not belong.

It was not long before I realized that police officers shared a similar understanding when it came to the legitimacy and importance of community self-regulation. In fact, community was quickly emerging as a kind of moral and/or ethical trump card believed to lend an unquestionable degree of legitimacy to the differentiation process. With this in mind, I presented a similar set of questions to both urban planners and landscape architects – their answers were remarkably similar to those offered by members of the policing community.

In the summer of 2004, I found myself climbing the steps of a renovated factory building in downtown Toronto to interview Dianne, an accomplished urban planner who had a reputation for being a proponent of CPTED and The New Urbanism. In fact, her company specializes in the design of urban environments using New Urbanist principles. Indeed, there are careers to be had and money to be made when it comes to changing the way people think about their physical environments.

Dianne needed very little encouragement when it came to discussing the relationship between community and social order. In fact, it seemed as if she had recited

her thoughts many times before. When I asked Dianne to explain what CPTED meant to her, she replied:

DIANNE: "So the whole premise of that I think CPTED is about is getting people on the streets and getting these eyes on the streets. *And they are the purveyors of safety in the neighbourhood.* If you read Jane Jacobs ... uh ... which you probably have ..."

PATRICK: "Yes ..."

DIANNE: "Uh ... there's some really good passages in there that she has written about the safety of communities and how it is really about having people police their own neighbourhoods ... that when there is a sense of pride and ownership and place in a neighbourhood that people will look out for each other."

Dianne truly believed, much like Jane Jacobs, that communities are capable of being their own "purveyors" of safety, especially if the right environmental conditions were present. However, as our interview progressed, it became readily apparent that she too was making the assumption that community-based self-policing was beyond reproach precisely *because* it was being undertaken by the community itself.

"Community" emerged as an important discursive frame through which the differentiation process was being legitimated. At times it was as if simply uttering the word itself was enough to establish a moral and ethical pretext for the sorting of individuals on the basis of their perceived degree of legitimacy – as if communities were somehow not capable of being malicious, discriminatory, or unjust. In a sense, it became a kind of umbrella-concept thought capable of casting a sense of legitimacy and virtue over all facets of the CPTED experience.

LEGITIMACY, RISK, AND DEPOLITICIZATION

CPTED's proclaimed ability to enhance the differentiation process through design implies that crime-related risks will move from the realm of the unknown (i.e., are there criminals here? If there are, where will they strike next?), to a state of putative transparency if CPTED is properly applied. Interestingly, the criteria for sorting users are rarely, if ever, stipulated by CPTED professionals. There are no clearly defined, carefully constructed categories into which individuals are to be placed.

However, CPTED practitioners and documents *must* construct the differentiation process in this way. As an incipient organization attempting to legitimate its claims to knowledge, and with so much of its potential efficacy dependent on the actions of others (e.g., members of various communities), CPTED cannot afford to recognize the inherent subjectivity or ideological potential of any one of its key assumptions. In fact, doing so would drastically undermine the sense of scientific objectivity, consistency, and dependability the movement requires if it is to remain a viable crime prevention initiative now and into the future.

Thus, the depoliticized framing of the differentiation process removes crime-related risks from the larger socio-political contexts which ultimately contribute to their very definition. With the potential for moral and ethical controversy minimized, the CPTED practitioner becomes a purveyor of expert knowledge that appears ideologically neutral, scientific, and by virtue of its rhetorical association with "community," unquestionably desirable.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

In his book, *The Taming of Chance*, Hacking (1990) argues that since the 19th century, the word “normal” has been used to bridge the gap between what “is” and what “ought” to be (Hacking, 1990). Normal, Hacking argues, has become one of the most powerful ideological tools of the past century in so far as it now carries with it a constructed sense of objectivity, especially when it is applied to human beings as a mode of assessing social, political or psychological states of affairs (Hacking, 1990).

Yet, that sense of objectivity is entirely misleading. The assertion that something is normal generally carries with it a parallel assumption that what is normal is also what is to be desired (Hacking, 1990). As such, normality embodies value-laden assumptions about how the world ought to be, although sometimes those assumptions are hard to detect. Thus, beneath its contemporary guise of objectivity, the normal classification always reflects a particular world view.

The proposed difference between “legitimate” from “illegitimate” users within the context of CPTED is similar to the normal/abnormal distinction discussed by Hacking. Although CPTED practitioners generally imply otherwise, the process of sorting users of social space is an inherently intersubjective undertaking that unfolds within, and reflects, particular socio-political ideologies. As Erickson and Haggerty (1997) aptly suggest, morality (which, I would argue, is part and parcel of any ideology) is never extrinsic to systems of risk management (Erickson and Haggerty, 1997).

Yet, when it comes to sorting users of social space, CPTED is remarkably apolitical. The distinction between an illegitimate and legitimate user is believed to be

made on the basis of an entirely objective set of criteria which become readily apparent with the help of the right environmental design. Thus, crime-related risks are framed as phenomena that can be objectively identified rather than being the by-products of particular social and political conditions which may introduce moral and/or ethical debate. Under this pretext, CPTED supporters and practitioners become purveyors of a kind of expert knowledge that appears scientific, rational, and very promising.

CHAPTER 6

RESPONSIBILIZING CPTED

In Chapter 4 I discussed the foreseeable danger and legitimacy through liability frames. In many ways, those frames effectively established the pressing need and overall applicability of CPTED by framing crime-related risks in ways that made them particularly foreboding yet entirely predictable (and, thus preventable). With the suitability and need of CPTED firmly established, I then demonstrated in Chapter 5 how practitioners and supporters depoliticized the differentiation process. This depoliticization process was shown to rid the underlying conceptual methodology of CPTED of its subjective elements, leaving behind an objective, scientific process unhindered by points of moral and/or ethical contention.

In this chapter I will explore how practitioners and supporters of CPTED seek to mobilize CPTED consumers, eventually making them willing participants in their own subjugation (see Foucault, 1998). Specifically, I will demonstrate how risk management through CPTED is framed such that it becomes an *individualized* responsibility. This “responsibilization” (Garland, 2000) discourse establishes a framework which makes an individual’s willingness to partake in their own risk management a precondition for a kind of moral and civic credibility (Ruhl, 1999).⁵⁴

⁵⁴ A clarification is perhaps in order here. I am using the term “responsibilization” in reference to the discursive processes adopted by practitioners and/or supporters as a means of encouraging the public to manage their own crime-related risks (see Ruhl, 1999). On a macro level, O’Malley (1996) refers to this drift toward the personalized management of risk as “prudentialism,” an increasingly dominant form of governmentality in risk society (O’Malley, 1996).

I will also make the argument that by responsabilizing CPTED, proponents nurture the growth of the very kind of risk marketplace that may, in fact, lead to their professional and organizational success. Finally, I will demonstrate how the subsequent desire for a standardized system of CPTED accreditation and for official government recognition reflects a rather predictable course of action for CPTED practitioners and supporters given their relative position within what is now a responsabilized, individualized, risk-management market place.

A BRIEF RECAP: CRIME, NEO-LIBERALISM, AND RISK SOCIETY

When American planners first began to problematize contemporary urban design in the late 1960s and on through the 1970s, criminologists, social workers, economists, and bureaucrats were starting to question the efficacy of the criminal justice system at the same time (Garland, 2001). The former believed that crime and disorder were largely extensions of poorly designed neighbourhoods that nurtured criminality while the later argued that offenders should no longer be seen as victims of unfair structural conditions; instead they were to be seen as rational actors who chose to capitalize on criminal opportunity.

These two lines of thought converged in interesting ways during the 1970s when the financially overextended criminal justice systems in both Canada and the United States appeared unable to rehabilitate offenders and reduce crime rates (Forcese, 1998; Garland, 2001). When conservative critics demanded the rehabilitative model give way to a more effective and more efficient model grounded in the principles of prevention, urban

planners and other pundits of environmental criminology were waiting in the wings. The idealism of Jacobs (1992), the scientific rationality of Jeffery (1971), and the latent determinism of Newman's (1972) work all appealed to justice critics who were looking to emphasize the importance of a highly rational, calculating offender.

As proponents of CPTED and defensible space began to experiment with numerous environmental models (albeit, with mixed success), police departments in the United States and Canada began taking their crime prevention message to the public via "community policing," a program designed to offset the continued centralization of modern police work by encouraging officers to make frequent contact with members of the community (Sherman and Eck, 2002; Silverman and Giustina, 2001; Garland, 2000; McKenna, 2000). At the same time, officers were encouraged to capitalize on the opportunity to improve their overall image (McKenna, 2000; Forcese, 1998).⁵⁵ According to Bayley and Shearing (1996), neighbourhood initiatives (e.g., Community Policing and Neighbourhood Watch) are now as "...common as McDonald's golden arches, especially in urban areas" (Bayley and Shearing, 1996: 587-88).

In addition to addressing the low-level signs of social disorder thought to be related to more serious forms of criminal activity (see Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Skogan, 1990), community policing officers also made crime prevention a more important part of their mandate. It was believed that if citizens *en mass* took appropriate measures to secure their property and themselves, police departments would receive fewer calls for

⁵⁵ Interestingly, according to Sherman and Eck (2002) one of the more effective ways that a police department can reduce the crime rate is by cultivating close, respective relations with the public (Sherman and Eck, 2002).

service. In theory, fewer calls for service meant police departments could trim their budgets (McKenna, 2000; Forcese, 1998). Therefore, no longer was the fight against crime to be the sole responsibility of the police, the public *too* was to play a pivotal role (Parks et. al., 1999).

It was not only the management of crime-related risks that had become more of an individualized responsibility, however. In the post war years – especially following the microchip revolution in the 1970s (see Castells, 1997) – the risks associated with modern living were becoming all too clear (see Chapter 3). Not only did one have to manage one’s own personal safety in relation to crime, but the side effects of modernity had to be carefully managed as well. As global markets and trans-national corporations continued to pressure nation states to cater to their economic needs (Teeple, 1995; Klein, 2000), the state’s economic capacity (or willingness?) to shore-up the welfare system began to dwindle under the weight of the neo-liberal agenda. Managing the risks of modernity (whether social, environmental, or economic) had become, more than ever before, an individualized affair (Beck, 1992). When coupled with a neo-conservative value structure, the individualized management of risk became, not only a fact of life, but a moral imperative – good citizens managed their own risks and managed them well. According to O’Malley (1996) this drift toward individualized risk management reflects the onset of “prudentialism” as a new mode of governance (O’Malley, 1996; see Newburn, 2001).

THE RESPONSIBILIZATION OF CPTED

In the early spring of 2003, I was sitting outside the office of an established urban planner who had agreed to be interviewed. On the wall beside me there was a collection of brochures, one of which was about CPTED and the role it played in the City's overall planning and design mandate. When I opened the brochure, I recognized a familiar passage from Jane Jacobs' (1992) famous book, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*:

The first thing to understand is that the public peace ... is not kept primarily by the police, necessary as police are. It is kept by an intricate, almost unconscious, network of voluntary controls and standards among the people themselves ... No amount of police can enforce civilization where the normal, casual enforcement of it has broken down (Brochure).

As if to deliberately reiterate the argument, the brochure continued, "Crime and loss prevention are inherent to human functions and activities, not just something that police or security people do" (Brochure). (The argument that crime prevention is an "inherent" human function is particularly interesting in so far as it represents an attempt to essentialize or naturalize what is truly a socio-political phenomenon). The brochure's message was clear: one can no longer leave crime prevention and order maintenance up to the police, or other agencies of social control for that matter. Instead, crime prevention, and the use of CPTED in particular, were to be part of everyone's civic duty. It was not long before I realized that this politicization of CPTED was very common among CPTED professionals.

In its most basic form, the responsabilization frame took one of two forms: (1) CPTED practitioners and supporters claimed that risk management via CPTED is always an individual's responsibility, and (2) the responsabilization of risk management is said to

be necessary because the state no longer has the resources to effectively manage those risks on its own. In either form, however, the management of risk is repoliticized and placed within a normative framework that renders it part and parcel of what it means to be a good, moral citizen.

For example, Ross, a security specialist working for a large Ontario university, began to “think out loud” about the ways in which our understanding of personal safety and security had changed over the years. When I asked him to clarify his thoughts, he replied:

ROSS: “ ... you know, probably five years ago ... it was probably politically incorrect to say ... *you’ve got to take responsibility for your own safety* ... but that is the reality. And to say anything different is really giving the person the wrong sense. Like, I’ve had people say, I’m here at school and you have to protect me. And, I said, well up to a degree but I think there is a partnership role here. And uh ... we’ll give you the tools and you’ve got to use them [italics added].”

Interestingly, Ross identified what he believed to be a shift in the way people understand the politics surrounding the management of personal safety – a transformation thought to be so comprehensive that it would render today’s understanding politically incorrect by yesterday’s standards. Ross’ comments (and his pragmatism in particular), lend considerable support to the responsabilization thesis. “Taking responsibility for your own safety” he argued, “is the [new] reality.”

When I asked Brent, an officer with the Ontario Provincial Police, to provide me with some good examples of CPTED technique, he described the various means by which neighbourhood residents could improve the environmental security of their own properties:

BRENT: “Sure, I can think of a ... and this is how you can make a good positive inroad into a community And if you can *convince these people* that the biggest deterrent to

criminal activity is a natural sight line, natural surveillance, if you could say why don't *you* compromise and make one of the fences chain link or wrought iron so that people can see in Or if you wanted to build a hedge, for perfect security that's a nice thing, but maybe *you* should punch a few holes in that hedge so that there are some sight lines."

While allowing him to make positive in-roads into a community, CPTED also afforded Brent the opportunity to encourage residents to take more responsibility for the management of their own crime-related risks; his frequent use of the pronoun "you" providing a clear indication as to how that responsabilization process typically unfolds at the level of interpersonal discourse.

One of the most revealing examples of responsabilization, however, emerged during a conversation with James, a police officer who teaches CPTED on a regular basis and who is routinely called upon to deal with troublesome youths in his community.

During our interview, James explained:

JAMES: "We get these calls, you know ... kids hiding in the alcove in the school yard all the time and the principle is calling up ... well kids are congregating and doing drugs in the after hours here, take care of it. Well. Hang on. *You own the problem*. It's ... you've got the bad design. I don't have the bad design, you do! [italics added]"

In this instance, responsibility for the problem *and* the school's design is placed squarely on the shoulders of the school principle. Although James eventually shared his CPTED expertise with the school's administration, it was assumed to be their responsibility to consume the relevant CPTED information and put it into practice.

Responsibilization is prominent throughout the CPTED literature as well. In a Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design "Fact Sheet" distributed by Ontario's Peel Regional Police, for example, the reader is asked to evaluate his or her property using a series of questions relating to natural surveillance, access control, and

territoriality. Under each section, the reader is instructed to make improvements to his or her property if the self-diagnostic questions indicate a potential problem. For example:

If you answered “yes” to any of these questions, your property’s access control needs to be improved. Consider better control of undesired movements onto and within your property. Install landscaping, fencing or barriers to increase the conspicuousness of anyone breaching a boundary or reinforce an existing boundary that’s already been subject to trespass ... For maximum landscaping effectiveness, consider a species [of shrub] with thorns.

According to the fact sheet, there is plenty of information about CPTED available, all one has to do is contact the police department. It is here that we see a clear convergence of the police’s contemporary role as knowledge brokers *about* risk and the responsabilization of risk management at the individual level (see Ericson and Haggerty, 1997). In a sense, the police, and other CPTED specialists, become repositories of information made available to those who want to diligently manage their own risk of victimization.

In fact, for many CPTED specialists, making valuable knowledge available to a generally uninformed public is what CPTED is all about – especially given that one can no longer count on the presence of a police car to deter criminal activity. As Donna suggested, “So they [the public] always ... they always rely on that big white dog [a police car] you know, driving slowly through the neighbourhood. Well, that’s just not realistic anymore.” It is because of the “white dog’s” absence that members of the public must be willing to contact their local police department or security company for more information about crime prevention.

Responsibilization as a Supplement to the State

There was a consensus among police officers, politicians, and to a lesser extent, planners that the state should no longer be expected to carry the *full* burden of crime prevention on its own. Respondents appeared to adopt this position for a mixture of logistical and financial reasons. In essence, practitioners argued that the state (or the municipality) can no longer afford to “have a police car on every corner.” Moreover, existing police resources, they argued, would be stretched too thin if departments attempted to accommodate the public’s demand for widespread crime prevention services. Thus, within this context, the responsabilization of risk management works to make up for the state’s current fiscal and logistical limitations – a kind of co-production of safety intended to lessen the economic and logistical burden on government institutions.

While interviewing James at the police department where he worked, I could not help but notice the stacks of CPTED-related material he had scattered on the floor of his office. CPTED had made James a busy man. In addition to his regular departmental responsibilities, he was reviewing municipal site plans, evaluating CPTED audit forms, and taking CPTED-related phone calls on a regular basis: His skills were in high demand.

When I asked James why he thought CPTED was important, he suggested it was because it “... takes the onus off the police ... [who now] go to a location, identify the issues, come up with some solutions and hand [them] over.” Clearly James appreciated CPTED because it placed more responsibility on the property owner when it came to preventing criminal activity. Given the piles of work that laid on the floor around us, and

given the tired and over-worked look on his face, his appreciation for the greater responsabilization of risk management was not surprising.

A number of civil servants shared a similar point of view. For example, Jennifer and I had coffee in a small café. She had taken time out from her busy political schedule to talk to me about CPTED and the visions she had for her community's future. As a supporter of CPTED and The New Urbanism, Jennifer believed that conventional methods of crime prevention were no longer effective and that CPTED represented a viable, cost effective solution:

JENNIFER: "And I think we need ... we all do, we all need ... if we're going to be involved in community spaces, and people places, and that goes for schools and rec [recreation] centres and uh ... libraries and uh ... all the community spaces that we can think of ... we need to be thinking about crime prevention when we do it. *Because we can't afford to have police on every corner...* [italics added]"

PATRICK: "Okay ..."

JENNIFER: "The taxes would never support that."

Once again, a sense of populism informed Jennifer's comments as she emphasized the need for community re-involvement in neighbourhood affairs. In fact, as our interview progressed her "will of the people" sensibility surfaced once again when she demanded that it was time residents took their communities back from the disorderly. Most importantly, however, Jennifer believed that citizens had to take responsibility for crime prevention, especially given the current fiscal crises faced by Ontario municipalities. Although she implied that it was, in fact, a collective responsibility, it was clear from our discussion that she expected individual citizens to "do their part."

Although at first Janice seemed unsure about what to say, she eventually answered my question about the relevance of fear in relation to CPTED's growing

popularity. Unexpectedly, however, she used the line of questioning to discuss issues relating to crime prevention and the importance of individual responsibility:

JANICE: “But, um ... you know ... I don’t think fear is necessarily a bad thing because sometimes it *wakes people up* and says to them ... hey, you know ... it’s time for you to take some action and you know, *the police aren’t always going to be there to protect you*. And 99% of the time they are not going to be there to protect you or to prevent it [italics added].”

Like the others, Janice believed citizens should be reminded of their responsibility to prevent crime. Moreover, her assertion that fear could actually serve to “wake people up” implied that people have been misguided, naïve, or irresponsible thus far by assuming the police will always be there to “protect them.” Similar to the interviewees discussed above, Janice was clearly calling for a newly defined relationship between the individual and the state, one where the latter would assist the former with what has become a fundamental criterion for citizenship – the self management of crime-related risks.

All three interviewees discussed above were adamant about the importance of redefining the relationship between the police and the public with respect to crime prevention. Among them, it was virtually axiomatic that the state no longer had the money or the personnel to ensure a widespread police presence. Because of these fiscal and logistical constraints, individual citizens were to supplement the state by taking on more responsibility with respect to the preservation of their own safety and security.

Yet, in order for the risk-savvy citizen to bare this new responsibility, it would seem only logical that he or she would have to solicit the expertise of a CPTED practitioner working in either the private or public sector. Thus, the responsabilization of risk helps to cultivate an individualized demand for CPTED information; it nurtures an

expert/lay person relationship that is characterized by varying degrees of dependency; and it effectively makes the consumption and acceptance of that knowledge a moral and/or civic responsibility.⁵⁶ Thus, it is here that we see the convergence of a very particular politicization of crime-related risks on the one hand, and the market potential that construction creates on the other. It all converges nicely with the contemporary neo-liberal agenda of providing citizens with the information they need to become less reliant on the state and more self sufficient. Thus, on the macro level, CPTED reflects these much larger social, political, and economic trends. On the micro level, however, we see how particular forms of discourse frame risk in such a way as to bolster CPTED's own reputation as a legitimate and responsible solution to the crime problem.

TRAINING STANDARDS AND OFFICIAL RECOGNITION

The ongoing responsabilization and individuation of risk management has made the risk market place a very competitive one, not only in terms of profit making, but also in terms of the more general struggle for recognition and legitimacy. CPTED practitioners, whether entrepreneurs or civil servants, are attempting to carve out a legitimate niche for their craft for reasons that may include profit, status, and/or social betterment. Whatever their motivations, professional success requires that clients concede

⁵⁶ As mentioned in chapter four, these dynamics are not unique to CPTED in particular. In fact, according to Butcher (1988), professions and organizations of all kinds *must* constantly cultivate demand for the products or knowledge they profess to offer (Butcher, 1988). Moreover, all expert/lay person relationships are characterized by varying degrees of dependency. In fact, Bauman (1992) takes the argument one step further, suggesting that the state of dependency that defines the expert/lay person relationship may exist because it appeals to some kind of existential need within the modern subject – a need that Bauman does not identify.

to the practitioners' expertise – success as a risk management professional requires the effective exercising of social control over the client.

Developing and maintaining a competitive presence within the risk-knowledge marketplace requires any organization or movement to present itself as if it were a united, focused, organized entity – even if that is not truly the case. As Freidson (1994) argues:

In order to have power delegated to it, an occupation must be organized as an identifiable group: it cannot be a mere aggregation of individuals who claim to have the same set of skills. Only if it is an organized group, or if someone speaking for it manages to establish a corporate identity for its members, can it be dealt with collectively as a defined social category (Freidson, 1994: 173-74).

At the present time, it would appear that CPTED Ontario is attempting to secure a more refined and homogeneous presence for CPTED. In fact, while I was a member of the board of directors, it was apparent that a number of objectives deemed necessary to CPTED's progress were being sought in an obvious attempt to pull what is currently a disjointed body of professionals together under a common vision.

Part of that process was to include the creation of CPTED training standards and the cultivation of official government recognition – both of which are standard strategies for organizations or movements seeking legitimate authority (see Freidson, 1994). The qualitative interview data collected for this study reveals a striking consensus among practitioners with respect to the need for “official” CPTED training and standards as well as the need for government recognition and support. Each theme will be explored below.

CPTED Standards

In many ways, the need for standards is at the very heart of CPTED's drive for legitimacy and authority. Most importantly, training standards provide practitioners with

an additional source of authority in so far as they can assure clients that they have passed through a recognized standardized process. With well over seventy-five percent of the interviewees believing that a standardized accreditation process is essential to the future of CPTED, there is little debate as to its importance. Over the course of the interviews, for example, participants often made passionate pleas for standardization. Although there were some discrepancies with respect to what accreditation would entail, interviewees expressed their support for standards with a sense of urgency and certainty nonetheless.

For example, there was no hesitation in Gary's voice when I asked him about the need for CPTED certification in Ontario. In fact, his tone of voice and body language seemed to imply that the answer to my question was entirely self-evident:

PATRICK: "Should people who do CPTED be certified?"

GARY: "Oh, absolutely."

PATRICK: "Yeah?"

GARY: "Oh, absolutely."

PATRICK: "What makes you say that?"

GARY: "I can't ... I can't think that anybody who isn't certified *would even attempt it*. You can only get so much out of the books. Well, when instructors have been there and have done it, it brings an added dimension that you can't get anywhere My only complaint about the whole CPTED uh ... school if you want, taking the courses ... is that I don't think they have *gone far enough* [italics added]."

Gary had been trained by the city police department and was certified in what has become known as "level one" and "level two" CPTED. He was obviously proud of his achievements and had no shortage of tales to tell about how he had been able to apply his expertise while on the job. As a security officer, Gary had found his CPTED training invaluable.

His utter disbelief that an untrained person would even attempt to apply CPTED without having had formal training is particularly informative; the implication being that, in the absence of training, the use of CPTED may cause unforeseen harm. It is not an uncommon line of reasoning among those looking to secure a niche market for their knowledge or services. In fact, according to Freidson (1994), one of the most powerful claims an organization or movement can make when seeking to establish its legitimacy is that "... there would be grave danger to the public if there were no control over those who offered their services ..." (Freidson, 1994: 174). Although it is not entirely clear that Gary was anticipating grave danger in the absence of training, he certainly did foresee negative repercussions of some kind. For Gary, CPTED should not be toyed with and, thus, should only be applied by those who have had proper, standardized training.

James answered my question with the same unequivocal tone. He *too* had been trained and certified in CPTED at both levels one and two. I asked him to share his thoughts about CPTED training:

PATRICK: "... do you think that certification as an idea is critical for CPTED?"

JAMES: "Absolutely ... absolutely. I think they need that little ... I've been on a course and I got a certificate to say ... not only for the officers themselves, but for the upper echelons of the department to say yes we've had a person who has had a basic amount of training so that they can go out and look at a problem and deal with it. I think the public um ... demands that you have some form of a certifying document *before they trust them to look after their problems* [italics added]."

Once again, standardized training and certification is believed essential to the ongoing integrity of CPTED. James clearly supported the idea of having a controlled, consistent accreditation process through which rank and file officers and their superiors could effectively assure the public that it was in the hands of experts. Thus, for James the

standardized training process would help establish an element of trust between the CPTED practitioner and the consumer (see Freidson, 1986).

At the present time, Ontario does not have a standardized CPTED training and accreditation process. It is, however, being talked about. In fact, at the time of this writing the CPTED Ontario organization has appointed a member of its board of directors to be in charge of coordinating “education and training” (CPTED Ontario minutes, 04/02/04). It is, without a doubt, an important title to be had. As Bucher and Strauss (1961) argue, certification and training principles eventually become, in a sense, historical artefacts left behind by the more powerful members of the organization or movement in question (Bucher and Strauss, 1961). Nevertheless, establishing a formalized training and certification process will likely generate a sense of unity among practitioners – even if that unity is more apparent than real. In addition, it will also allow CPTED to claim a highly specialized segment of the risk-knowledge economy as its own, thereby giving it a more solid and legitimate footing within the highly competitive risk management marketplace.

Of course, all of this depends on whether or not practitioners can agree on the criteria to be used to establish those standards. According to Freidson (1986), it is often the case that professionals hold different visions as to what their area of expertise actually entails, despite appearing entirely committed to a single vision on the outside (Freidson, 1986; Bucher and Strauss, 1961). For professions or organizations looking to establish a degree of consistency with respect to the services they offer, these fractured visions of expertise can be extremely difficult to overcome. Before establishing its standardized

criteria for training, CPTED Ontario will have to overcome the discrepant visions of its future that seem to lie just beneath the surface of what appears to be a temporary veneer of consensus.

While it is true that CPTED Ontario has yet to embark on the bumpy standards/accreditation voyage, the International CPTED Association (ICA) certainly has. Thus, using the ICA as an example (and the discussions held on their on-line forum, in particular), it becomes apparent that the process of establishing training standards is often fraught with technical and ideological difficulties (see ICA). However, if we set aside those points of contention, the transcripts from the ICA forum make one thing perfectly clear: The establishment of training standards is a function of the organization's desire to cultivate and protect its sense of legitimacy.

The following lengthy excerpt from the on-line forum makes this particular objective sufficiently clear. The following discussion emerged in response to the following question: "Should there be certification [accreditation] for CPTED?":

PARTICIPANT (A): "My personal view is that an international CPTED certification program should be developed. The continued growth in the requirement to use CPTED principles and strategies across a wide range of disciplines means that there is a need to facilitate differentiation between people "claiming" to have the skills and knowledge and those who can demonstrate that they have [those skills]" (ICA).

In response to the above comments, participant B openly acknowledges and agrees with the need for certification. Moreover, he/she also requests that the association compile anecdotal evidence of "shoddy work/questionable practices" (ICA). In response to this, participant A responds:

PARTICIPANT (A): "... we have come across numerous examples of "CPTED Reviews" that are little more than "ill-informed commentaries". This has had the effect of

clients saying that they see no value in having a CPTED review because they “had one of those before and it wasn’t worth the paper it was written on” (ICA).

Finally, participant C replies, “I’d be the first to admit that someone who “declares” him/herself to be a CPTED specialist ought to meet some minimum requirements with regard to training, etc (ICA).” Clearly, the desire for standards and accreditation is a derivative of a much larger concern that involves defining and maintaining control of the boundaries which help to define what constitutes “legitimate” CPTED expertise.

Therefore, in its entirety, the ICA on-line forum is important because it demonstrates how the pursuit of standards and accreditation is understood by CPTED professionals to be an essential step toward preventing “false” claims to CPTED knowledge and, in the process, toward protecting the legitimacy of CPTED *vis-à-vis* the risk management market place. It stands to reason, I would argue, that the ICA experience provides a vital window through which one can begin to understand why CPTED practitioners across Ontario are anxious to implement standardized training procedures as well. Indeed, the credibility, and for some the profitability, of their expertise literally depends on it. But, why stop there?

GOVERNMENTAL RECOGNITION

Although it is true that a standardized certification and accreditation program would go a long way toward putting CPTED (and CPTED Ontario) on a more sure footing, acquiring official government recognition would be the epitome of organizational and professional success (see Freidson, 1994). A stamp of approval from the government of Ontario recognizing CPTED as a tried and true crime prevention

strategy, would not only validate the knowledge of existing CPTED practitioners, but would also further expedite its entry into the mainstream private and public security markets. The CPTED practitioners with whom I spoke were well aware of the potential benefits that government recognition would bring – in fact, the majority of them supported the idea without reservation. Although there was some variation as to what would constitute “official” recognition – for example, some interviewees thought municipal endorsement was sufficient, while others believed that the support of the Ontario provincial government was critical – there was a consensus that support and recognition from a governing body was required. Overall, this theme highlights the important relationship that exists between the institutional recognition of CPTED on the one hand, and its perceived degree of legitimacy on the other.

For example, James had just finished teaching a series of CPTED courses that were well attended by his colleagues and members of the city’s planning department. As James and I spoke about the CPTED certification process, and what he would change if he could, it became apparent that he still had certain misgivings about the state of CPTED in Ontario. In particular, he believed that CPTED courses across the province were not consistent enough (i.e., not standardized), and that *that* inconsistency undermined or obscured what it meant to be a CPTED practitioner. His proposed solution to the dilemma was to acquire government recognition and/or oversight. I asked James:

PATRICK: “Would you change anything about the certification process?”

JAMES: “I would like to see the certification process have like a central core ... core course through the Ontario government so that the Ontario government says this is what you must have to be a level one certified person.”

Like many of the interviewees, James believed that discrepancies with respect to training could be rectified by having the Ontario government establish a formal set of certification criteria. He firmly believed that official government recognition and regulation were the key to organizational consistency and to establishing the legitimacy of CPTED as a crime prevention initiative. James was not alone in this regard.

Robert expressed similar views. When I asked him about the certification process, he eventually began to address the importance of government regulation and the legitimacy it would bring:

ROBERT: "I like the idea of CPTED Ontario, being a governing body and that's kind of where we want to go in the future. I think we're going there slowly ... and I think that we should be governed by them somehow through the Ontario government ... through the Sol Gen's office [Office of the Ontario Solicitor General]."

Both Robert and James presented views that were remarkably similar to those put forward by the other interviewees. Although there were minor discrepancies with respect to how official oversight and/or recognition should take place, there was a clear consensus that some kind of government oversight and recognition would bring forth the desired consistency and/or sense of legitimacy that CPTED needed if it was to remain a viable crime prevention initiative.

Finally, Janice shared a similar point of view. For her, the current level of provincial recognition was encouraging, but more support was needed, even if it meant soliciting other organizations that were affiliated with the provincial or federal governments:

PATRICK: "What is the biggest challenge, in your opinion, facing CPTED?"

JANICE: "Um ... a higher level of government recognition, I think ... Um ... provincially, we have more provincial buy in now which is good ... you know, so we are

moving there I'd like to see the uh ... FCM ... Federation of Canadian Municipalities buy into it a little bit more because they are big on crime prevention, I mean you know ... Barbara Hall did a lot of work with them and with the Federal Government on crime prevention ..."

Currently, the Ontario government does not have an official policy with respect to CPTED. However, in various cities and municipalities across the province, CPTED is being institutionalized at lower levels of government to varying degrees as CPTED proponents continue to lobby for its recognition. As municipal planning departments (for example) continue to embrace its principles, CPTED is now becoming embedded in the very structure of governance.

The city of Mississauga, for example – which, in 2002, was declared the safest large city in Canada⁵⁷ – has incorporated CPTED into its official city plan. Section 2.11.2.7, which pertains to the City's urban design goals and objectives, includes the following direct reference to Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design:

To develop an awareness, understanding and appreciation of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) concepts and principles to reduce the potential for incidence and fear of crime through the application of proper design of the physical environment. The policies to achieve this objective are integrated in various sections of the Plan (City of Mississauga, Official Plan, 1999: 11).

Mississauga has actually been using CPTED since the mid 1990s when city staff, in partnership with the Peel Regional Police, began conducting a series of CPTED audits on twenty city-owned buildings following what appeared to be an increase in social disorder (Mississauga Planning and Development Committee (MPDC) minutes 08/17/99). After a lengthy evaluation process, and after the recommended CPTED modifications were made

⁵⁷ On-line source: <http://www.mcpc.on.ca/press/index.htm>. Accessed: June 15, 2004.

to each location, the MPDC reported a substantial decrease in the number of reported incidents of criminal and/or disorderly conduct.⁵⁸

Shortly thereafter the City recognized the importance of CPTED in its strategic plan for the year 2000, suggesting that it become a part of the City's overall approach toward building "distinct and recognizable communities" (City of Mississauga, Strategic Plan 2000). As part of Mississauga's new way of "doing business," it was not long before development companies hoping to sign contracts with the City were required to show familiarity with CPTED principles. According to Christina, a city politician: "Everything that is built for the city has to be ... one of our criteria when we are putting out to tender or a request for a proposal or for an architect, is they have to show how they have applied CPTED to that property." Thus, with the City's stamp of approval, CPTED became, and remains, a fundamental part of the City's governmentality.

Mississauga is not alone, however. In October of 2000, a CPTED proponent and practitioner lobbied the Ottawa-Carleton Police Services Board (OCPSB) for its support. Specifically, the OCPSB was asked to back the forming of a CPTED Advisory Committee which "...once established, [would] discuss implementing a strategy to look at making CPTED a mandatory part of the development process" in the Ottawa-Carleton region (OCPSB minutes, 10/22/00). The motion was eventually carried and now, as part of its official city plan, the city of Ottawa reviews planning documents from a CPTED perspective on a regular basis as a matter of policy.

⁵⁸ The data in question is, at best, highly suspect given that no attempt was made to ensure the validity or reliability of the methodological approach.

Moreover, Ottawa has also taken steps to incorporate CPTED into its official planning guidelines. As part of its Park and Pathway Lighting policy, the City identifies the need for CPTED audits to be conducted routinely. Issues of concern include, "...availability for witnesses to supervise pathway users, availability of reasonable and safe alternative routes, identification of entrapment spots, analysis of crime statistics (if available) for the area in question, interviews with local community policing officers and neighbours" (City of Ottawa, People Services Dept. 06/11/03).⁵⁹ As part of the City's development plan, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design now occupies its own position amongst other criteria believed to constitute the proper design of public spaces.

Smaller cities and towns across southern Ontario have officially recognized the importance of CPTED as well. The city of Clarington, for example, has incorporated the following (rather limited) statement into its official design mandate: "In order to promote safe, pedestrian-friendly communities, dwelling designs should incorporate principles of CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design)" (Clarington General Architectural Design Guidelines, 2002: 2). Other towns that have adopted something similar include the Town of Caledon and Milton, Ontario.

Thus, although there have been some limited signs of success, the quest for a standardized accreditation process and government recognition continues. From an organizational perspective, these objectives are, without a doubt, critical to CPTED's continued success within the province of Ontario. A standardized accreditation process

⁵⁹ Online source: <http://ottawa.ca/calendar/ottawa/citycouncil/hrssc/2003/06-19/ACS2003-PEO-IDP->

would allow CPTED organizers to establish who can or cannot profess expertise in the area of environmental security; it would help sharpen the lines around what constitutes CPTED and who constitutes a bona fide CPTED expert and would subsequently contribute to the appearance of organizational unity (see Bucher and Strauss, 1961).

Official government sanction would only enhance the movement's credibility even more. In fact, if practitioners were able to successfully lobby the government of Ontario for some form of official recognition, the battle for CPTED's legitimacy would be partially, if not entirely, won. Government recognition would not only assure the public that all CPTED practitioners had demonstrated a particular level of competence, but it would also imply that there *was* a basic level of competence to be achieved in the first place.

The search for more standardized training procedures and the desire for government recognition share an interesting connection to the responsabilization of risk management *vis-à-vis* CPTED. When the responsabilization of crime risk management conflates with the construction of CPTED as an area of expertise requiring specialized training, a risk-management marketplace develops wherein the expertise of the CPTED practitioner is in demand. If it is truly one's moral and ethical responsibility to manage crime-related risks effectively (as practitioners argue), then, presumably, it is also one's responsibility to seek out and consult a highly qualified CPTED practitioner. For some, this means that CPTED knowledge can be easily turned into a steady source of income.

For others, it might mean a second term in office, more trips to conferences, or a larger discretionary budget in the forthcoming fiscal year.

The existence of an official accreditation system and of governmental recognition also alters the nature of the client/expert relationship. Specifically, both provide the expert with additional discursive opportunities to secure their clients' "willing" participation in the CPTED endeavour. Accreditation can be used to allay fears of incompetence while governmental recognition can be used to shore up the perceived legitimacy of the entire CPTED project; both paradoxically work to minimize the risks associated with consuming expert risk knowledge!

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

In her essay about the relationship between risk and justice, Douglas (1992) argues that culturally specific standards regarding accountability inform the risk identification and assessment process (Douglas, 1992). Thus, what constitutes a risk, and what the implications of that risk are believed to be, are functions of the prevailing standards by which accountability is measured. Therefore, what risks are, and how or if they should be ameliorated, are decisions which are informed by culturally specific political ideologies (Douglas, 1992).

As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, the social, political, and cultural transformations that have taken place in the United States and Canada since the late 1960s have lead to a change in the way that accountability is understood with respect to criminal victimization. Not only is the rational offender to be held fully accountable (and

less likely to be seen as a victim of unfair structural conditions), but individual citizens *too* must take some responsibility for their own careless vulnerability to crime and disorder (see Newburn, 2001). As Jennifer stated during our interview, “If a person walks down a street without any concept of where they are and what is around them, nobody can help that person ... they have made themselves a victim.”

From within this cultural context, CPTED emerged as a risk assessment and management technique that embodied new social and cultural standards of accountability. As demonstrated above, practitioners now actively promote the responsabilization of risk *vis-à-vis* CPTED and, in the process of doing so, further contribute to the development of a risk-knowledge marketplace that puts their expertise at a premium. Indeed, responsabilizing crime-related risk in this fashion (especially when combined with a discourse of foreseeable danger and the ever-present possibility of legal liability should CPTED advice be ignored (see Chapter 4)) contributes to an important state of dependency between the CPTED practitioner and the client – especially if the risk of criminal activity is thought to be particularly foreboding. Although the extent of this dependency may vary in response to a number of extraneous factors, it stands to reason that CPTED consumers will become progressively dependent on trained practitioners as CPTED continues to gain organizational momentum.

All of this leads to a number of important questions pertaining to the role of CPTED (and situational crime prevention techniques in general) as an extension of contemporary forms of governance. As CPTED becomes increasingly popular, and as it becomes apart of the way individuals, organizations, and governments understand the

relationship between crime, disorder, and social space, the way in which we, as a society, deal with crime and disorder will continue to change. If CPTED is to remain a driving force behind contemporary approaches to order maintenance, then I would argue that its particular conceptualizations of crime and disorder must be rigorously called into question. That is the objective of Chapter 7.

CHAPTER 7

CPTED AND THE CHANGING FACE OF ORDER MAINTANENCE

In Chapters 4 through 6, I outlined the various ways in which practitioners discursively framed the risk of criminal activity and how those frames, not only converged with various professional and organizational interests, but also offered us insight into the ways in which social control is being exercised over individuals in highly strategic and rational ways within the context of risk society. The simplification of risk aetiologies, the depoliticization of CPTED, the responsabilization of its undertaking, and the search for standards and official recognition have all become part of a complex framing process that has, as its ultimate goal, the acquiescence of the CPTED consumer and the subsequent legitimization of the CPTED expert.

In this chapter, I revisit the importance of understanding CPTED as a form of social control while linking it to the process by which risk is externalized from social space. My primary argument will be that using CPTED as a means to externalize crime-related risk now reflects a growing desire to avoid the challenges of social “otherness” while at the same time encouraging a highly individualized approach to the remediation of crime and disorder. Unfortunately, this dynamic – hastened by CPTED’s search for professional legitimacy and actualized by the strategic framing of crime-related risks – pulls us further away from understanding crime as *social* problem in the truest sense of the term. The result is a continuing drift away from looking at the root causes of crime and disorder in favour of temporary, quick-fix solutions.

CPTED AS SOCIAL CONTROL

Although few practitioners recognize it as such, CPTED is fundamentally about social control. The pursuit of risk-free space via CPTED involves the augmentation of the physical environment so as to control the flow of both desirable and undesirable populations in accordance with a particular interpretation of how social life ought to be.

However, not all CPTED applications are equally controlling. In fact, CPTED operates, in a heuristic sense, along a continuum of control where applications range from the highly visible and openly coercive on the one hand, to the hardly detectable and virtually banal on the other. Although there is some debate among practitioners as to where “true” CPTED lies on that continuum, suffice to say that whatever its material form, CPTED is always about controlling or manipulating the human/environment relationship.

Demonstrating the more intense and openly coercive end of the control spectrum is the city of Los Angeles, California. In *City of Quartz*, Mike Davis (1992) argues that the conflation of urban design and social control in Los Angeles has led to a “single comprehensive security effort” which threatens the very existence of accessible, public space in the city (Davis, 1992). From the notorious “bum-proof” benches to remote control security cameras, Los Angeles has embarked on a sweeping process of urban fortification. The safety and security of the middle and upper classes – thought to be a function of concrete walls, iron gates, and shiny facades – now exists in stark contrast to a growing underclass comprising disenfranchised Blacks, Latinos, and other visible

minorities, many of whom traverse the city acutely aware of where they can or cannot go (Davis, 1992; 1998).

Davis' analysis of Los Angeles has become a popular point of reference for scholars in a variety of different disciplines (see Bannister and Fyfe, 2001; Rentschler, 2000) – and for good reason. His explanation of the relationship between urban space and social control demonstrates a sharp eye for contemporary and historical detail. Yet, all too often Davis' work is carelessly cited by scholars who assume that his foreboding visions can be applied equally to any city and/or community that begins to show signs of mixing security with architecture or urban design (see Bannister and Fyfe, 2001). The use of CPTED principles does not necessarily mean that one's city, town, or facility has begun the irreversible slide toward fortification: not *all* roads lead to Los Angeles.

In fact, representing the other end of the control spectrum, many CPTED practitioners believe their craft is more effective when it goes virtually unnoticed. Good CPTED, they argue, should not appear to be CPTED at all.⁶⁰ Instead, a properly designed environment should be, first and foremost, a functional one. Beyond this, however, the affects of CPTED are not to be experienced coercively (as in Los Angeles), but as norms and expectations communicated symbolically *through* the landscape. Ideally, users should conform to the social expectations of the space in question not because of locked

⁶⁰ This is not meant to imply that more obvious techniques (such as traditional target hardening measures) are not CPTED (although some practitioners would likely debate that point). Over the course of my research it became apparent that many practitioners believed "good" CPTED technique was subtle and difficult to identify – that its purpose should not be readily apparent to the lay person and/or the potential offender.

gates, cameras, and thorny bushes, but because it just seems like the “natural” thing to do.⁶¹

For example, when I asked Jennifer to clarify what she meant by “good CPTED design,” she replied:

JENNIFER: “Good design offers sight lines, enhancing the building, provides opportunities for ecological and environmental factors, capturing sunlight, deflecting wind, ease of movement throughout the site um ... in a sense it ... whether you drive in or whether you walk in you immediately *know where you have to be* because the yellow brick road is taking you there [italics added].”

From the outset, Jennifer made it clear that a well designed environment was also a functional one. Yet, it is also one that “tells” the user – by means of symbolic barriers, lines of sight, or a “yellow brick road,” for example – where he or she is supposed to be. Therefore, the agency of the individual is to be slightly mitigated by the environmental design such that subsequent patterns of movement conform to the designer’s vision. A desire and capacity to leave the “yellow brick road” (as Jennifer referred to it) would be a clear indication that the design in question was, in some way, ineffective or substandard.

Janice too acknowledged that good CPTED should be barely discernible. When I asked her to explain what, in her mind, made CPTED so effective, she replied: “You know, you notice Neighbourhood Watch signs. There are no signs of CPTED, they’re very subtle, they’re there and you ... you don’t know when they are working but you know when something isn’t working.” For Janice, CPTED is most effective when it is

⁶¹ I am reminded here of Foucault’s (1995) discussion of Bentham’s panopticon and its capacity to induce self-discipline in the eventual absence of surveillance; the architecture itself existing as a conduit through which the sovereign’s will to rule is channeled (Foucault, 1995).

entirely covert: When the ideology that informed its implementation is not detectable or reflected in material form.⁶²

Both Janice and Jennifer clearly demonstrate that CPTED is fundamentally about controlling human behaviour in time and space. But what is also of interest here is the fact that Jennifer works as a landscape architect and Jennifer as a politician. Both women routinely promote and apply CPTED to their respective communities as a means to prevent crime and disorder. As professionals working independently of the criminal justice system, their roles as crime prevention practitioners point to an important transformation in the way that the state is now addressing crime-related risk.

SOCIAL CONTROL SPIRALS OUTWARD

On a wet afternoon in the summer of 2003, I was sitting on the steps of a municipal office building thinking about the interview I had just conducted. The landscape architect with whom I had spoken was, as a matter of routine, applying CPTED to each project that crossed his/her desk. Whether or not she was a competent CPTED practitioner was of little concern to me at the time. Instead, of interest was the fact that, as a planner, she had become partially responsible for embedding technologies of social control into the landscape around me. In fact, many urban planners, politicians, private consultants, school board volunteers, and property owners are applying CPTED to their respective environments.

⁶² The obvious paradox being that in order for practitioners to promote CPTED across the province, they must routinely expose its logic to the public.

With the push toward responsabilization at the micro level (see Chapter 6), and toward prudentialism as a governing strategy at the macro level, CPTED reflects the growing decentralization of social control. Once believed to be the sole responsibility of the state, the task of controlling undesirable populations is now part and parcel of what it means to be a good citizen. In a sense, the exercise of control for the purposes of managing crime-related risk is spiralling outward from the state into the social periphery (see Cohen, 1985). This co-production of safety is not necessarily undermining the state's authority, but merely reflects the extent to which desirable and undesirable populations (especially the latter) are now subjected to forms of social control at myriad points across both time and space; each spatial and temporal node of control reflecting the ideological vision of those responsible for putting CPTED into practice.

As the number of private and public organizations interested in what CPTED has to offer continues to grow, and as CPTED finds its place in the operative logic of the political economy, it will likely change form as it melds with, and responds to, the organizational dynamics of the myriad institutions that will soon appropriate it for their own instrumental reasons.

CPTED as a Form of Actuarial Control?

Whether CPTED will become a full-fledged form of actuarial control as it becomes increasingly fused with the broader political economy of crime control is difficult to tell. However, as I will argue below, CPTED now resembles a hybrid form of control – it is part actuarial and part situationally specific. However, the drive toward

increased efficiency and its eventual bureaucratization will *likely* lead to its complete actuarialization.⁶³

Over the course of my research, I collected many CPTED matrices, each containing a list of security considerations categorized by location (e.g., main floor, basement, entrance way, exterior, lobby). For example, a typical matrix used for a property's exterior (see Appendix B) might involve the following considerations with respect to landscaping: Are there bushes higher than four feet? Are there critical lines of sight obstructed by trees or other foliage? Or, does the existing foliage create entrapment zones? Following the security checklist, there is space for practitioners to add their comments and make their final recommendations. Overall, most practitioners believe the matrix makes the evaluation process easier, more objective, and more efficient.

A more complex system of evaluation using matrices was developed in Sydney Australia where, according to McCamley (2002), a new "risk evaluation kit was developed ... with the aim of helping practitioners to better identify, assess and minimize situational crime risk" (McCamley, 2002: 27). The Australian "instrument" is a far more complicated approach when compared to what is currently being used in Ontario in so far as it involves a careful blending of both qualitative and quantitative data in the process of generating a final risk score (see Appendix C). Although the instrument was intended to

⁶³ In Chapter 3 I discussed the relationship between risk management and the use of actuarial techniques. In essence, I argued that phenomena are slotted into abstract categories according to their perceived level of risk (Simon, 1988; Gandy, 1993; 1996). The data are then used to inform various policy decisions and often leads to an altering of people's life trajectories. Most importantly, actuarial processes are highly removed from the actual lives of the people they purport to assess.

help minimize the effects of subjectivity on CPTED assessments, McCamley (2002)

argues:

Arguably, this study [of the instrument's reliability] demonstrates the importance of diagnostic tools in CPTED practice. Statistical results have shown however, that people see manifestations of crime risk in different ways. Moreover, variance in crime risk ratings is likely to be affected by gender, ethnicity and occupation in spite of the use of directive evaluation instruments (McCamley, 2002: 32).

Although the effectiveness of the Australian instrument proved questionable at best, it remains a testament to the desire among practitioners to further rationalize the site evaluation process. That matrices and measuring instruments of all kinds are believed to bring procedural clarity, consistency, and scientific rationality to the evaluation process bodes well for practitioners looking to establish the legitimacy of their expertise.

According to O'Malley (1992) and Cohen (1985), situational crime prevention strategies (e.g., CPTED) are *inherently* actuarial because they focus more on the abstract classification of criminal opportunity than they do on the biography of individual offenders (O'Malley, 1992).⁶⁴ In this regard, O'Malley is correct in so far as matrices *are* tools of abstract classification which assist the practitioner with his or her final evaluation.

Yet, to suggest that CPTED is entirely actuarial is somewhat premature. Although it is true that CPTED practitioners are rarely interested in the biography of the offender, they are interested in the particular social and environmental characteristics of each

⁶⁴ O'Malley (1992) also argues that it is incorrect to assume that actuarial techniques are adopted for the sole purpose of increasing an organization's efficiency (I use the word "organization" loosely), an idea thought to have originated from Foucault (1995). Instead, O'Malley argues that the use of actuarial techniques is often the product of intense political debate within organizations – the link between actuarialism and efficiency is rarely a straightforward one (O'Malley, 1992). I would agree with O'Malley in this regard, especially in light of the heated discussions among some practitioners about the need for a standardized evaluation matrix.

individual case. In fact, it is not uncommon for CPTED practitioners to spend time interviewing those who have been affected by the crime(s) in question. These “stakeholder” interviews are conducted most often with local residents, victims, building managers, or company employees. According to many of the CPTED practitioners with whom I spoke, detailed stakeholder interviews are critical to the development of an effective CPTED application (see Crowe, 2000).

For example, in the summer of 2004 I accompanied Jerry on a routine CPTED audit of a large senior’s complex. The residents were complaining that young children from a nearby housing complex were trespassing, being rude, and causing general discomfort. Jerry spent most of his time carefully interviewing the property manager and head custodian of the facility. He also took the time to assess the overall functionality of the complex and made numerous suggestions with respect to its improvement in the process.

Although Jerry showed little concern for the youth’s biographies, the experience was not as actuarial as one might think. In fact, Jerry took the time to nurture a casual and highly informative atmosphere with each of his clients, carefully listening to their concerns and discussing the pros and cons of various forms of intervention. Thus, what took place was an intimate struggle for intersubjective understanding between the parties involved that was, in no way, dominated by the abstract categorization of lifestyles that would have made it an actuarial experience.

Jerry was not the only practitioner with whom I spoke who carried out his site audits in this way. Many interviewees claimed that, as a matter of routine, they attempted

to carefully interview their clients before making CPTED recommendations of any kind; they listened to personal stories, ask detailed questions, explored their client's fears, and solicited their opinions.

However, because many practitioners use CPTED matrices in addition to stakeholder interviews, it would appear that actuarial techniques (matrices in particular) are actually being used in conjunction with more traditional and less abstract forms of evaluation (the interviews). Therefore, what practitioners are actually doing, is engaging in what is essentially a hybrid form of risk assessment that entails both situationally specific evaluations and a process of abstract classification.

There is cause for concern, however. As CPTED's popularity continues to grow, and as it becomes a profitable service and/or business, practitioners and supporters will inevitably experience the pressure to work as efficiently as possible. With increased demand, practitioners will no longer be able to spend hours attending to their clients' needs. In fact, highly personable interviews and evaluations will likely give way to the use of matrices and other abstract typologies for the purposes of ensuring efficient evaluations. Moreover, bureaucratic "paper trails" will have to be created and/or more efficiently managed so as to accommodate the processing of site audits. Thus, with increased demand and the subsequent need for efficiency, CPTED, as a form of social control, will become increasingly actuarial.

EXTERNALIZING RISK

Whether actuarial or not, and by no real stretch of the imagination, the primary assumption being made by all practitioners is that a modified physical environment is capable of controlling human behaviour such that risks are externalized – pushed beyond the boundaries of a particular liminal space. In this sense, CPTED operates on the basis of a very particular ontology of risk which assumes that risks are, in a sense, *things* that can be routed from time and space under the right environmental conditions.

This ontological position is actually part of CPTED's appeal. The framing of risk as something concrete, visible, and amenable to manipulation offers CPTED consumers the appearance of control, especially vis-à-vis the expert, pastoral knowledge being provided to them. With the motivation and eventual presence of the offender virtually taken for granted, the idea that his or her efforts can be thwarted by making changes to the environment – changes that are constant, tangible, and durable – contrasts, or perhaps even counters, the unknown elements that lead to fear and anxiety. Thus, what CPTED promises (and I use the word “promises” loosely) is a “purification” of space wherein predictability, familiarity, and varying degrees of homogeneity are assumed to prevail (see Bauman, 1992; Sennett, 1995; Kingwell, 2000; 2000a).⁶⁵

This purification of space through the externalization of risk is, as mentioned in Chapter 5, an inherently political process. According to Kingwell (2000a), all forms of “place making” are political undertakings (Kingwell, 2000a; Zukin, 1995). Borrowing

⁶⁵ Ironically, this externalization of risk reflects, once again, the inside/outside dichotomy that tends to characterize so much of popular discourse with respect to crime: Threats of harm, danger, and discomfort are often thought to originate from the outside, always ready to undermine peace and security on the inside if given even the slightest opportunity (see Parnaby, 2003).

from an Aristotelian dictum, Kingwell (2000a) suggests that, "... ethics and politics are intimately related subjects, both concerned with how to live well together, how to flourish as humans – and ... such a project always includes, centrally, issues of place making (Kingwell, 2000a, 178)." It goes without saying that the criteria for "living well" and for "flourishing" are open for debate. But that is precisely Kingwell's point. The transformation of space, whether it be to mitigate criminal opportunity or to construct a new office building, is inevitably informed by visions of what constitutes desirable living.

Yet, the line between political vision and its manifestation in material form is not always a direct one. As Zukin (1995) argues in *The Culture of Cities*, the transformation of space is always the material *fallout* of particular forms of social, political, and economic interchange where any number of visions may struggle for dominance and control (Zukin, 1995; 1989; see Kingwell, 2000; 2000a; Stevens, 1995). Corporations, community organizations, governments, and individual citizens routinely clash over how space should be defined and who should have access to it. In the end, it amounts to a struggle over whose vision of how the world *ought* to be will make the transition from ideology to reality in the form of modified physical space. The social and physical environment eventually becomes a lasting vestige to the politics of the day long after the debates about what must be done have ended. As Jackson (2001) aptly states, "The spirit of an era is preserved, like amber in its public shrines; the challenge comes in translating what they memorialize" (Jackson, 2001: viii).

Externalizing Risk to Avoid Difference

More often than not, the externalization of risk through design now means ridding a specific location of forms of disorderly (although not necessarily criminal), conduct. Skateboarders, homeless people, prostitutes, and panhandlers, for example, are typically routed using any number of environmental design techniques. For example, outdoor railings are sometimes fitted with metal barbs to prevent rowdy skateboarders from sliding down the otherwise smooth surface. Doorways providing access to and from public streets are constructed flush with exterior walls so as to prevent both youths and the homeless from loitering. Low intensity, orange lighting is sometimes installed in areas where prostitutes solicit clients because its glow tends to highlight blemishes while turning red lipstick black. Thus, the potential risks associated with certain kinds of disorderly conduct are externalized by way of environmental design such that legitimate and illegitimate users of social space are less likely to converge. As mentioned earlier, this purification of space is often a product of capital's drive to secure environments conducive to the uninhibited accumulation of profit.

During the research interviews, CPTED practitioners and supporters frequently told stories about how they dealt with forms of disorderly conduct through Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design. In most cases, CPTED was applied to help allay the fears of so-called legitimate users who felt threatened by the presence of those unlike themselves. For example, Donna's experience was typical:

DONNA: "... my first complaint was from a seniors residence, city owned, in the [names town] area, not an area with a high level of crime and uh ... it had conflicts with a park and uh ... because you know the park isn't policed in the after hours you would get drinking and swearing and all the seniors, their balconies overlook this park so it was disruptive ... a quality of life issue, a huge issue."

Similarly, following numerous complaints by a local store owner, Brent, a provincial police officer, resorted to CPTED. According to the store owner, customers were feeling intimidated, anxious, and at risk because youths were congregating on the steps outside his store. This behaviour, the store owner argued, was costing him his business. Brent elaborated:

BRENT: "... several years ago, a little store on [provides street name and town] was struggling with uh ... teenagers um hanging out in front of their store for too long they didn't want somebody buying a candy bar and staying out there for 2 hours. It discouraged other customers who were coming in ... spitting and smoking and the usual things that we hear about. Um ... so we tried one of the CPTED ... a little plan was to play some very soft classical music out the window and it worked."

Both Donna and Brent used CPTED to rectify "quality of life issues;" moments where particular kinds of people engage in behaviour which, although not necessarily criminal, causes legitimate users of social space to feel anxious, upset, or at risk. CPTED facilitates the externalization of those kinds of risk by either displacing them to an adjacent property or by preventing the behaviour from occurring entirely. Indeed, it is used most often in this capacity.

What is important here, I would argue, is that the routing of illegitimate users is fundamentally about externalizing the risks thought to be associated with "otherness" (see Sibley, 1995; Sennett, 1992; 1995). In *The Uses of Disorder*, Sennett (1995) argues that "it is a truism among students of small groups that people feel most uneasy and most challenged by perceiving the "otherness" of the people around them" (Sennett, 1995: 38). On more of a psychological level, what CPTED offers the consumer is a means to remedy the uneasiness, not by encouraging the kinds of social interaction that would lead to its demystification but, rather, by designing it out of an individual or group's conscious

realm of experience entirely so as to create a world that is comfortable, manageable, and predictable.

According to Sennett (1995), the belief that such a world can or should exist reflects people's capacity to take an adolescent power for mythmaking into their adult community lives so as to lessen their conscious perception of otherness (Sennett, 1995). For Sibley (1995) and Sennett (1995), these adolescent psychological tendencies are often exacerbated by a market economy which thrives on the profit-making leverage that psychologies of risk and otherness are capable of providing (Sibley, 1995; see Kingwell, 2000a). Therefore, CPTED is about creating environments where the potential discomforts of social and political life are absent. But is this something that we should aspire to? And, if so, to what extent? Questions like these require value-laden answers that are difficult to support on purely scientific grounds. Nevertheless, my position here is that much of the disorder that CPTED attempts to eradicate actually serves a vital, although entirely latent, socio-political purpose.

Borrowing from Sennett's (1995) classic work, *The Uses of Disorder*, I would argue that our capacity to politically engage low level forms of disorder is actually a valuable skill that we, as a collective, must continue to cultivate and harbour whenever possible. When confronted with rowdy skateboarders, dishevelled homeless people, squeegee kids, prostitutes, or disgruntled teens, for example, it is in our best interest, not to simply design them out of our "public" spaces, but to continuously engage them in whatever forms of political dialogue thought possible: To exercise our capacity for

political action to the fullest extent while dealing with the inevitable difficulties of doing so along the way.

Of course, these exchanges *may* generate tension, hostility, exasperation, and perhaps even a sense of hopelessness and, on many occasions, such feelings will be entirely warranted. Yet, it is the act and capacity for political engagement *in and of itself* that we must value the most if we are to help nurture a free and democratic society into existence. The skills we promote and develop by politically engaging forms of social disorder are those that make a mature, adult, political life possible (see Sibley, 1995: Sennett, 1995: Kingwell, 2000; 2001).

In *The World We Want*, Kingwell (2000) explores a similar idea. In fact, his argument dovetails nicely with Sennett's in so far as he too argues that our willingness and capacity to engage those unlike ourselves is not only part of what it means to be a citizen, but also part of what it means to live in a community. Kingwell argues:

We may dislike those we owe a citizenly duty, and sometimes talking to them will only make us dislike them more. That does not diminish the duty, or the virtues that nurture its exercise. The relationship between citizens is friendly in the sense of feeling obligation and commitment to others – obligation and commitment that go beyond the abstract legalism of rights, using the faculty of imagination instead to make a connection between people united by, if nothing else, their human vulnerability (Kingwell, 2000: 133).

For Sennett and Kingwell, part of what it means to be a citizen is a willingness to take on the burden of experiencing the challenges, discord, anxieties, and even the pain of encountering and perhaps trying to understand those unlike ourselves.

Promoting the need to politically engage low-level forms of disorder may seem like a lofty ideal. But the alternative is far more disconcerting. In its current form, CPTED is promoting a preventative tactic that works to minimize the need and

opportunity for complex political action. By designing out social disorder, we are abdicating our social responsibilities to the broader political processes that have, and continue, to make those rights possible in the first place.⁶⁶

CRIME AS AN INDIVIDUALIZED PROBLEM

In part because it takes the presence of a motivated offender for granted (thereby paying little attention to the structural causes of crime), CPTED offers a very localized understanding of criminogenic situations. As this study has made clear (see Chapter 2), what concerns CPTED specialists the most are the very specific social and environmental factors believed to be constituent to the presence of crime-related risk. Although CPTED is a future-oriented undertaking, its remedial techniques are communicated and applied in the “here and now.”

By deemphasizing the structural aetiology of crime in favour of a localized interpretation of its causes, resolutions become conceptually limited to what individual property owners and/or managers can do to alleviate the problem. As Chapters 4 through 6 have demonstrated, the ways in which CPTED practitioners frame crime-related risk culminates in a situation where the knowledge recipient is mobilized or enrolled into their *own* risk management – often in response to forms of responsabilizing discourse, foreseeable danger, threats of liability, or some combination of all three. What CPTED

⁶⁶ But what of more serious forms of crime and disorder? Indeed, preaching the importance of political dialogue to someone living in a neighbourhood routinely traumatized by violent crime would be nothing short of irresponsible and trite, which is why CPTED must be applied with the utmost care and consideration. In those circumstances where there is a history of more serious events – more serious than disorderly teenagers or homeless people, for example – the application of CPTED may be entirely warranted.

tends to promote, therefore, is an individualized remedial approach to crime and disorder as opposed to one that is more collective in nature.

My conclusion here is, by no means, novel; although it remains critically important. The individualizing tendency of CPTED redirects attention away from the more important task of identifying and resolving the structural causes of crime and disorder. In short, CPTED may be a viable short term solution in response to certain pressing conditions, but it is certainly not enough.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

This chapter went beyond questions of discursive framing and its relationship to the legitimization of CPTED as a crime prevention initiative. My argument had a number of components. First, as a form of social control, CPTED is not only about externalizing risks from specific points in time and space, but is also about externalizing “otherness.” Second, I argued that this process actually serves to undermine our capacity to engage in the kinds of sophisticated – though perhaps disconcerting – dialogue that are fundamental to the creation and maintenance of a free and truly democratic polity. I then suggested that crime and disorder were being framed as individualized social problems. CPTED’s emphasis on spatially and temporally limited factors, when coupled with the framing techniques adopted by practitioners, deemphasizes the structural causes of crime and disorder in favour of highly individualized and localized interpretations. My final argument was that, as a temporary solution, CPTED may in fact be a worthwhile

endeavour. However, if we are to address the problem of crime and disorder in a comprehensive and socially responsible way, our primary attention must be focussed on the structural conditions which nurture its existence in the first place.

CONCLUSION

In Chapter 4, I began the process of deconstructing the complex relationship between discursive frames of crime-related risk, CPTED's need to establish its professional legitimacy, and the exercise of what is essentially a pastoral form of social control. I began with the assertion that experts now occupy a vital role in contemporary socio-economic life; they define situations; identify and shape individual and collective priorities; and often direct individual and collective courses of action. In spite of their immense social, political, and economic importance, however, their claims to specialized expert knowledge are never enough to guarantee widespread recognition or acceptance. Thus, like other expert systems, CPTED too is constantly faced with the need to establish and maintain its sense professional legitimacy.

Legitimizing CPTED means convincing others that a modified physical environment has the capacity to mitigate criminal opportunity structures and, thus, to temper the risk of victimization. In order to do so, the problem in and of itself must appear amenable to the proposed solution (CPTED). Thus, I argued that particular frames of risk have become the primary means by which CPTED practitioners and supporters attempt to legitimate their professional expertise. However, the legitimacy of the CPTED professional depends on the client's willingness to accept and act upon the practitioner's knowledge. Thus, legitimate expertise becomes a function of the practitioner's capacity to exercise control over the client within the context of providing pastoral care. That control is strategically and ever-so-subtly exercised via particular frames of crime-related risk.

Of particular importance, I argued, is the need to present the risk of criminal activity as if every element could be adequately accounted for such that none were left to chance alone. Thus, I demonstrated how practitioners utilized a discursive frame that rendered crime-related risk a foreseeable danger. This discursive technique involved several important elements: first, CPTED enthusiasts implied that they were able to foresee a crime coming to fruition given the environmental circumstances; second, the aetiology of the criminal event was stripped of its complexity and indeterminacy such that the occurrence of crime and disorder would appear predictable; finally, the rhetoric of foreseeable danger moralized the CPTED evaluation process such that the property owner was reminded of his/her moral obligation to implement the CPTED recommendations provided by the practitioner.

By framing risk in this fashion, the CPTED expert is positioned as a kind of expert visionary – one who is capable of looking into the past and the future in order to provide the kind of expert advice that will ensure the customer's well-being. However, the interview data also suggested that if an individual or group had experienced crime and/or disorder in the past, then constructing the risk of crime and disorder as foreseeable was less important because the client's previous experience essentially confirms that the current risks are too great to ignore. Under these circumstances, the grounds for the practitioner's expertise are, in a sense, established before the audit even begins.

I then moved on to explore the interactive dynamics that unfold when a CPTED practitioner's expert advice was ignored. I argued that here *too* constructions of crime-related risk play a pivotal role in (re)establishing the legitimacy of the practitioner's

claim to expertise. Rather than simply reemphasizing the dangers associated with leaving risk-prone environments unattended, practitioners shift their rhetorical emphasis to the legal risks associated with not complying with their recommendations. The risk of legal action, therefore, becomes an important source of leverage that is manipulated by practitioners in an attempt to secure the legitimacy of their expertise. Again, the legitimacy of CPTED is intimately tied to how risk is framed and conceptualized by the parties involved – it becomes a kind of conceptual medium through which roles are defined and axis of authority are established. Together, the frames of foreseeable danger and legitimacy through liability work to render the consumer complicitous in their own social control by establishing what appears to be an undeniable need for CPTED given the social and environmental circumstances.

Chapter 5 explored the framing process once again. This time, however, the frame being applied was less about the need for CPTED, and more about establishing its effectiveness as a crime prevention initiative. I argued that the apolitical means by which practitioners' framed the differentiation process implied that the difference between legitimate and illegitimate users of social space was based on objective criteria.

However, the assertion that CPTED renders the differentiation process an objective one is, I argued, very problematic. If one were to take the argument at face value, it would appear that CPTED renders the act of identifying legitimate and illegitimate users unaffected by prevailing social and political ideologies. In this sense, I argued, this particular framing technique works to depoliticize the differentiation process and, thus, absolves the practitioner(s) of the difficult political and perhaps moral

implications of sorting individuals on the basis of certain criterion that are, in reality, highly subjective.

I then made the argument that the highly depoliticized interpretation of the differentiation process contrasts sharply with a reality where the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate users is often a function of pre-existing, ideologically loaded, stereotypes. Assumptions about race, gender, age, and socio-economic status, for example, often become the grounds upon which people are classified as legitimate or illegitimate users of social space. To substantiate this argument, I briefly explored New York City's experience with quality of life policing, the difficulties faced by the Five Oak's community in Dayton, Ohio, and the plight of the homeless in cities across North America. In each instance, the differentiation and classification of individuals (and risks) has been predicated on anything but objective criteria and, in some circumstances, has sparked considerable outrage.

Moreover, practitioners also used a frame of community as an implicit means to justify the differentiation process. Borrowing on the well established – although fictitious – notion that a “true” community entails stability, security, and an upstanding moral climate, practitioners routinely referred to the “community” as if it were capable of lending a kind of moral unequivocality to the differentiation process; despite the fact that communities can be some of the most oppressive and exclusionary forms of social organization (Howard, 1995).

Overall, the apolitical framing of the differentiation process implies that crime-related risks will move from the realm of the unknown to a state of transparency where

they can be objectively delimited without political, ethical, or moral interference. It is a highly instrumental portrayal of the differentiation process, in so far as it discursively minimizes the role of human subjectivity and, in the process, leaves CPTED looking like a far more objective area of expertise than it truly is. Once again, risk is framed in such a way as to legitimate CPTED as an effective form of crime prevention.

With the need and effectiveness of CPTED discursively established, I then moved on to look at how practitioners rendered the use of CPTED the consumer's *responsibility* and how that responsabilization process converged with CPTED's search for legitimacy in interesting ways. CPTED practitioners and supporters suggested routinely that the consumption and implementation of CPTED knowledge was the responsibility of each and every citizen given the following reasons: (1) because the state can no longer be expected to carry the full economic burden of crime prevention on its own, and (2) because the state can no longer provide the levels of service that are in demand due to strictly logistical considerations. Thus the responsabilization frame minimizes the role of the state while simultaneously making it a civic and moral responsibility of the citizen to manage their own risks.

I then argued that the responsabilization of risk management has actually contributed to the explosive growth experienced by the risk management marketplace over the past 20 or 30 years. Because responsabilization encourages individualized remedial action (as opposed to a collective attempt to alter structural conditions, for example), those who provide the necessary expertise become the primary benefactors. Indeed, reason would dictate that in order for a responsible citizen to manage his or her

own risk of victimization (using CPTED, for example) the expert advice of a trained practitioner would be a sheer necessity. Thus, the responsabilization of risk helps to cultivate an expert/lay person relationship where the consumption and implementation of CPTED knowledge is believed to be both a functional and moral imperative. When the management of risk is politicized in this fashion, CPTED is, in a sense, ready and willing to pick up where the state left off.

I then diverged slightly from my emphasis on frames of risk to explore two of the ways by which CPTED practitioners are attempting to carve out and secure a niche for themselves as providers of expert knowledge in the risk management marketplace. Their first strategy has been to develop a standardized training and accreditation process; the second, to solicit official, government recognition of their expertise.

The development of a standardized training and accreditation system has proven to be extremely challenging for CPTED practitioners in Ontario and abroad. More often than not, difficulties begin to arise when it comes time to define the precise requirements for certification as personalities and vested interests begin to collide. The moment an organization or group begins to delimit the boundaries of what does or does not constitute an “expert” in the field, a system for the inclusion or exclusion of aspiring (or existing) experts is set into place. Thus, the process is as much about establishing a common vision through the codification of standards as it is about exerting a degree of control over who constitutes a legitimate expert.

As the qualitative evidence suggested, it has become almost axiomatic among CPTED practitioners that a standardized training procedure is required (of course, this

contradicts the assertion that CPTED is about common sense). What was most intriguing, however, was the assertion that *not* having a standardized training procedure in place was to place the public at risk. Allowing an untrained citizen to make CPTED recommendations, many argued, might actually increase the risk of victimization. Once again, risk becomes a rhetorical tool that is used to establish the indispensability of practitioners' expertise.

Beyond issues of accreditation, however, practitioners were also extremely adamant about securing the government's official recognition. Although the interviewees rarely acknowledged it as such, if achieved, the government's stamp of approval would effectively validate practitioners' expertise and subsequently expedite CPTED's entrance into both public and private security markets.

Using a variety of sources, I then proceeded to demonstrate how practitioners have been relatively successful in their quest for official recognition. At the present time, the most common indicator of that success has been the incorporation of CPTED principles into municipal by-laws pertaining to public safety, zoning, and building. Examples within the province of Ontario include the cities of Mississauga and Ottawa and the towns of Caledon and Milton. In each case, CPTED has become part of the municipality's overall governmentality and CPTED-style social control has become, in a sense, fused with the environmental landscape.

In Chapter 7, I ventured outside the realm of frame analysis in order to assess the implications of the framing processes outlined in Chapters 4 through 6. I made the argument that, as a form of social control, the use of CPTED to secure risk-free spaces

actually works to undermine our capacity to politically engage otherness – those individuals unlike ourselves who are routinely classified illegitimate users of social space. Moreover, I suggested that CPTED works to individualize what is inherently a collective and structural social problem.

I began by making the assertion that CPTED's capacity for social control is best understood as if it varied along a spectrum of intensity and effectiveness. On the one hand, parts of Los Angeles California provide ideal examples of where the modification of the built environment for the purpose of controlling undesirable populations has become intense and openly coercive. On the other hand, a popular argument among practitioners suggests that CPTED is most effective when its design techniques are barely recognized as being part of a crime prevention initiative. The recreational complex built in my hometown (described in the introduction to this study) provides a noteworthy example; its preventative features are barely identifiable to the untrained eye.

However, as CPTED continues to become a risk management mechanism of choice for both public and private institutions and/or organizations, and as practitioners continue their drive to legitimate CPTED as an area of professional expertise, the exercise of environmentally-based social control has begun to, in a sense, spiral outward from the state into the social periphery. Because CPTED is being applied for any number of social, political, or economic reasons, it is creating a veritable patchwork of control in time and space. Risk itself has become a type of currency by which particular visions of how the world ought to be are eventually rendered material.

I then briefly explored whether or not CPTED has become a form of actuarial control. Borrowing from the works of Simon (1988), Cohen (1985) and O'Malley (1992), I suggested that while it is true situational crime prevention initiatives like CPTED focus on the classification of criminal opportunity structures to the exclusion of individual offender biographies, it is premature to suggest that CPTED is, in fact, actuarial. Currently, CPTED practitioners across Ontario spend ample time soliciting the finest details of clients' experiences by means of stakeholder interviews in order to provide what is essentially a custom designed plan of action. In fact, one of the most hotly debated topics in the CPTED community is the tendency of practitioners to adopt "cookie-cutter" approaches to preventing crime and disorder across various locations. The possibility that generic CPTED applications are being used (and, indeed they are) has actually enraged a number of practitioners who feel that such approaches run counter to the very principles thought to underlie situationally-based initiatives in the first place.

None of this is meant to suggest, however, that abstract forms of classification are not taking place with respect to crime-related risk. As my discussion of CPTED matrices demonstrated, some practitioners are using classificatory schemes on a limited basis, although they are typically used to supplement more traditional, less rationalized, forms of risk assessment.

I then suggested that there was cause for concern, however. As the popularity of CPTED continues to expand, and as it becomes incorporated into the bureaucratic and organizational dynamics of public and private sector institutions – again, a result of the rhetorical process outlined in Chapters 4 through 6 – the need to render the application

and management of CPTED more efficient will likely alter the way in which crime-related risks are assessed and acted upon. In all likelihood, stakeholder interviews, personalized treatment, and site-specific evaluations will give way to more abstract forms of risk classification and thus more generic forms of intervention and/or social control. This will be especially the case if, or when, major insurance companies begin to take interest in what CPTED has to offer.

With CPTED established as a form of social control, I then explored what, exactly, that social control was being used to accomplish, albeit on a slightly more philosophical level. Operating on the basis of a particular ontology of risk, CPTED makes the implicit assumption that risks are, in a sense, things (as opposed to the partial products of human discourse) that can be routed from time and space via techniques of environmental design. From a client's perspective, it is likely a comforting assertion that works to counter much of the abstract anxiety and fear that so-often surrounds issues of crime and disorder.

This process of externalization, I argued, doubles as a process of spatial purification whereby the space in question is rendered less threatening, less disorderly, and less discomforting for so-called legitimate users. It is here, however, that I believe CPTED should be taken to task.

The research interviews conducted for this study revealed that the externalization of risk is more often than not about dealing with forms of low level disorder that are not necessarily criminal. Thus, the application of CPTED has become a means to ensure that legitimate users of space confront otherness less often as they embark on their daily

routines; whether it be shopping for groceries, strolling through city streets, or walking to work. Borrowing from Sennett (1995), citizens in the West are, in a sense, detouring around social discomfort.

But at what cost? The answer to that question, I argued, was that CPTED may very well be undermining our collective capacity to engage, both directly and indirectly, those unlike ourselves in meaningful forms of mature political discourse. Like Sennett (1995) and Kingwell (2000; 2001), I argued that that kind of discourse is fundamental to the development and maintenance of a truly democratic civic polity.

Yet, I also argued that, in its current form, CPTED is problematic because it renders crime and disorder a highly individualized social problem requiring individualized solutions. Consequently, CPTED practitioners promote lines of action that do little to address the structural causes of crime and disorder while simultaneously securing their professional interests in the process. Thus, the communities which CPTED seeks to create through the externalization of risk (and otherness) are not really communities at all. Instead, they are collectivities wherein all forms of true political engagement have been rendered unnecessary by virtue of the effects of exclusion and social homogeneity. Although likely to be controversial (especially among CPTED practitioners) I would argue that CPTED actually promotes a type of civic disengagement.

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

With respect to the continued use of CPTED and its expansion as an expert system, it would seem that the most pressing question is whether or not CPTED should be used at all and in what capacity. Given the highly critical tone of this study, it would seem that the most appropriate answer would be an unequivocal “no.” However, because the search for organizational/professional legitimacy by means of persuasion (Freidson, 2001) is a dynamic common to most, if not all, areas of expertise, there is no reason to dismiss CPTED on the basis of those grounds alone.

However, the argument that risk can be framed in various ways so as to reflect the interests of those involved in its management should give us pause. If nothing else, it suggests that there may be a place for a healthy dose of scepticism when it comes to following the advice of experts with respect to issues of risk management, especially given that those experts are so readily entrusted with some aspect of our individual and collective well being.

Thus, if CPTED is to be part of the way in which we, as a society, address problems of crime and disorder, I would argue that the following principles be taken into serious consideration by practitioners, supporters, and potential clients.

The importance of political dialogue: It is absolutely imperative that political dialogue – in the broadest sense – be encouraged among and between citizens, CPTED practitioners, and to whatever extent possible, those individuals or groups classified as being undesirable or illegitimate users of social space. The objective here is to encourage communities and experts to engage issues of crime and disorder in ways that are not

necessarily as expedient as possible, but as political as possible. Solutions to crime and disorder must be generated within a context of open debate and negotiation; where the potential use of CPTED can be held up to scrutiny – although not necessarily dismissed.

If, within this context, citizens and practitioners believe the use of CPTED is an *absolute* necessity, all parties must work to ensure that CPTED is applied as a supplement to other forms of remedial action which recognize the need for structural change as being the most important. In short, the highly individualized and practicable solutions offered by CPTED professionals must never be allowed to come at the expense of broad-based, collective solutions to the forces that generate crime and disorder in the first place.

The need for oversight: The practice of CPTED must be overseen by a representative, governing body capable of regulating all aspects of CPTED training and application. This body must have representatives from both the public and private spheres to help ensure legitimate representation. One of the fundamental principles according to which this body must operate is to ensure that the application of CPTED never becomes an end in itself; that its application is undertaken in accordance with the political objectives outlined above.

Undoubtedly, this will mean that private, profit-seeking interests will require constant attention given that the “higher ideal” of encouraging political dialogue will inevitably run counter to the desire to maximize profits by making the application of CPTED as efficient and practicable as possible. In sum, private interests must be watched

and regulated carefully so that the public's well being – in whatever form or definition it takes – is not compromised for the sake of profit.

These two principles, if adhered to with a sense of determination, will go a long way toward assuring that CPTED does not become a convenient (and for some, a profitable) means by which we can detour around our civic obligation to each other for the purposes of ensuring social and psychological comfort. At all turns we must remember that the rights accorded to each and every citizen – including the right to safety and security of the person – are not simply shields behind which we can hide for protection. Instead, those rights require a willingness to engage those around us in the kinds of political dialogue that, even under the most difficult circumstances, make citizenship possible. We must, at all costs, build safe environments so that we can dwell within them; we must dwell so that we can, first and foremost, act as political citizens (rather than only consumers) in a public sphere that is sometimes welcoming and sometimes not. Those are the ends toward which all CPTED practitioners and supporters should aspire.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

For a combination of logistical, financial, and personal reasons, this study focussed exclusively on how practitioners discursively framed risk so as to legitimate their CPTED expertise. Equally important, however, are the ways in which CPTED clients make sense of the expertise they are given. How, exactly, are particular frames of risk interpreted or modified by those on the receiving end? What social and political

contexts impact the way such expertise is received? By exploring what is, in a sense, the other half of the equation, a more comprehensive understanding of how risk becomes imbued with particular socio-political interests can be developed.

In addition, understanding how particular frames of risk are received is as much about analyzing discourse as it is about analyzing action. In the future, both the CPTED literature and the risk society literature could benefit immensely from an assessment of how individuals, both disorderly and “legitimate,” comply with, or resist, the implicit forms of control imbedded in landscapes designed under CPTED principles. This research would not only assist CPTED practitioners with the difficult task of communicating with clients, but would also help risk scholars better understand how discourses of risk become implicated in the way that individuals choose to traverse particular elements of the environmental landscape.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

CPTED practitioners’ search for legitimacy provides a welcomed opportunity to explore and understand how social control is being exercised within risk society as a manifestation of prevailing governmentalities. As a growing area of expertise, CPTED is an example of yet another advice-giving profession seeking to alter the behavioural patterns of citizens so as to protect them from the risks associated with criminal activity. Yet, this kind of social control is not entirely corporeal; nor is it always overtly coercive. In risk society, control is exercised through forms of risk-related, expert discourse and, as

such, its application is generally subtle, strategic, pastoral and, perhaps most importantly, driven by the relentless search for professional legitimacy.

In the world of professional crime prevention, both public and private, there are those who have nothing but the best interests of the public in mind when they set out to affect policy, change the built environment, or counsel an offender. However, there are also those whose interests lie elsewhere. Thankfully, I encountered more of the former than the latter while conducting research for this project. However, that CPTED in Ontario is largely the product of individuals who mean well is not reason enough to accept its application outright – even the best of intentions can bring forth consequences that are not wholly, or even partially, desirable. Be that as it may, it goes without saying that many CPTED practitioners and supporters will find this study difficult to read and/or appreciate, interpreting it more as an attack on their profession as opposed to a scholarly contribution to an important area of debate. Whatever the case may be, I strongly believe that many of the issues and questions I have raised must be openly acknowledged and debated before we proceed with CPTED any further. It is only when we address these issues together that we can be assured we live in something that resembles a democratic polity where our rights are protected and where our civic responsibilities and obligations to each other are always held in the highest esteem.

Appendix A




Figure 1: Interior stairwell with effective lines of sight from the stairwell to the grounds below. Interior support walls also have holes cut to facilitate natural surveillance to the other side of the stairs. York University.



Figure 2: The Trelawney community in Mississauga, Ontario was built using CPTED principles. The homes are angled toward the street to facilitate natural surveillance or, "eyes on the street." (Photo courtesy of officer Tom McKay, Peel Regional Police.)




Figure 3: The interior courtyard of a small gated community in Toronto, Ontario. Access is completely restricted from the street.



Figure 4: A small retail store that has been broken into several times. The rear of the store is in disarray and points of entry are not well secured.




Figure 5: A church in Kingston, Ontario showing a salt box that provides easy access to the roof during the winter. This church had been broken into and had lost several thousand dollars worth of musical equipment.



Figure 6: A narrow, poorly lit corridor at a senior's complex in Brampton, Ontario. Citizens here had been experiencing disorder as local youths would pass through the inner courtyard on their way to school.

Appendix B



CAMPUS SECURITY
QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY AT KINGSTON

**Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design
Audit**

DATE COMPLETED	
Level II C.P.T.E.D. OFFICER	
INCIDENT NUMBER	
BUSINESS NAME	
ADDRESS	
TELEPHONE	
CONTACT PERSON	

PLEASE NOTE:


THIS C.P.T.E.D. AUDIT IS PROVIDED BY MEMBERS OF CAMPUS SECURITY, QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY. THE RECOMMENDATIONS PROVIDED ARE STRICTLY SUGGESTIONS TO HELP REDUCE THE CHANCES OF A CRIME BEING COMMITTED AGAINST PERSON OR PROPERTY. QUEEN'S CAMPUS SECURITY AND THE STAFF MEMBERS CONDUCTING THE AUDIT ARE **NOT RESPONSIBLE** FOR ANY CRIME COMMITTED AGAINST THE PROPERTY, OR ANY PERSONS ASSOCIATED TO THE PROPERTY.

EXTERIOR

AREA	DESCRIPTION	YES	NO	N/A
HEDGES/BUSHES	Higher than 4 feet			
	Close to windows			
	Entrapment areas			
	Near windows or doors			
TREES	Blocking view of building from road			
	Entrapment areas			
FENCES	Higher than 4 feet			
	Private/semi private			
	Chain link			
	Landscaping around fences			
	Lock on gates			
LOT LIGHTING	Motion detectors			
	Incandescent lighting			
	Fluorescent lighting			
	High pressure sodium			
	Low pressure sodium			
	Metal halide			
STORAGE SHEDS				
	Secure lock on door			
	Visible from business			
PARKING	Close to main doors			
	Lighted parking lot			
GARBAGE BINS	Close to door			
	Causing entrapment zones			

Appendix C

Complex CTPED Evaluation Matrix/Model



Adapted from McCamley (2002).

References

- Alford, Robert R. 1998. *The Craft of Inquiry: Theories, Methods, Evidence*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Babbie, Earl R. 1995. *The Practice of Social Research*. 7th ed. Toronto: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
- Bannister, Jon and Nick Fyfe. 2001. Introduction: Fear and the City. *Urban Studies* 38, (5-6): 807-813.
- Bauman, Zygmunt. 2000. *Liquid Modernity*. Massachusetts: Blackwell.
- _____. 1999. *In Search of Politics*. California: Stanford University Press.
- _____. 1992. Life-world and Expertise: The social production of dependency. In *The Culture and Power of Knowledge: Inquiries into contemporary societies*, edited by Nico Stehr and Richard V. Ericson, 81-106. New York: Walter de Gruyter.
- Baumer, Terry L. 1985. Testing a General Model of Fear of Crime: Data From a National Sample. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 22, (3):239-55.
- Beck, Ulrich. 1995. *Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- _____. 1994. The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization. In *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*, edited by Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash, 1-55. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- _____. 1992. *Risk Society: Towards a new modernity*. New York: Sage.
- _____. 1992a. Modern Society As a Risk Society. In *The Culture and Power of Knowledge: Inquires into Contemporary Societies*, edited by Nico Stehr and Richard V. Ericson, 199-214. New York: Walter de Gruyter.
- Becker, Howard S. and Blanche Geer. 1970. Participant Observation and Interviewing: A Comparison. In *Qualitative Methodology: Firsthand Involvement With the Social World*, edited by William J. Filstead, 133-42. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company.
- Bell, Daniel. 1976. *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*. New York: Basic Books.
- Best, Joel. 1989. *Images of Issues Typifying Contemporary Social Problems*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

- Blakely, Edward J. and Mary G. Snyder. 1999. *Fortress America Gated Communities in the United States*. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press.
- Blumer, Herbert. 1969. *Symbolic Interactionism Perspective and Method*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- Blumstein, Alfred and Joel Wallman. 2000. *The Crime Drop in America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Body-Gendrot, Sophie. 2001. The Politics of Urban Crime. *Urban Studies* 38, (5-6): 915-928.
- Brantingham, Patricia L. and Paul J. Brantingham. 1993. Nodes, Paths and Edges: Considerations on the Complexity of Crime and the Physical Environment. *Journal of Environmental Psychology* 13: 3-28.
- _____. 1990. Situational Crime Prevention in Practice. *Canadian Journal of Criminology* January: 17-40.
- Brantingham, Paul J. and C. R. Jeffery. 1981. Afterward: Crime, Space, and Criminological Theory. In *Environmental Criminology*, edited by Paul J. Brantingham and Patricia J. Brantingham, 227-37. California: Sage Publications.
- Braudy, Leo. 1986. *The Frenzy of Renown: Fame & Its History*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bucher, Rue. 1988. On the Natural History of Health Care Occupations. *Work and Occupations* 15, (2): 131-147.
- Bucher, Rue and Anselm Strauss. 1961. Professions in Process. *American Journal of Sociology* 66: 325-334.
- Caldicott, Helen. 2002. *The New Nuclear Danger: George W. Bush's Military-Industrial Complex*. New York: The New Press.
- Canadian Press Newswire. 2001. 2001 CPTED Ontario Inaugural Workshop Held in Mississauga -- Canada's Safest City.
- Casteel, Carri and Corinne Peek-Asa. 2000. Effectiveness of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design in Reducing Robberies. *American Journal of Preventative Medicine* 18, (4S): 99-115.
- Castells, Manuel. 1997. *The Rise of the Network Society*. New York: Blackwell Publishers.

- Caulfield, Don. 1994. *City Form and Everyday Life: Toronto's Gentrification and Critical Social Practice*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Christie, Nils. 1994. *Crime Control As Industry*. New York: Routledge.
- Cohen, Lawrence E. and Marcus Felson. 1979. Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach. *American Sociological Review* 44: 588-608.
- Cohen, Stanley. 1985. *Visions of Social Control*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Coleman, Alice. 1990. *Utopia On Trial: Vision and reality in planned housing*. London: Hilary Shipman.
- Cozens, Paul, David Hillier, and Gwyn Prescott. 2001. Crime and the Design of Residential Property - Exploring the Theoretical Background (Part 1). *Property Management* 19, (2): 136-64.
- Crowe, Timothy D. 2000. *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design*. 2nd Edition. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann.
- Davis, Mike. 1992. *City of Quartz: Excavating the Future in Los Angeles*. New York: Vintage Books.
- . 1998. *Ecology of Fear Los Angeles and the Imagination of Disaster*. New York: Metropolitan Books.
- Dean, Mitchell. 1999. *Governmentality Power and Rule in Modern Society*. California: Sage Publications.
- Dekeseredy, Walter S., Shahid Alvi, Martin D. Schwartz, and Andreas Tomaszewski. 2003. *Under Siege: Poverty and Crime in a Public Housing Community*. New York: Lexington Books.
- Douglas, Mary. 1991. Risk Acceptability. In *Communities of Fate: Readings in the Social Organization of Risk*, edited by Charles E. Marske, 169-83. New York: University Press of America.
- . 1992. Risk and Blame. In *Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory*. Mary Douglas, 3-21. New York: Routledge.
- Douglas, Mary and Aaron Wildavsky. 1991a. Socially Constructed Risk. In *Communities of Fate: Readings in the Social Organization of Risk*, edited by Charles E. Marske, 55-66. Lanham: University Press of America.
- Driedger, Michelle S. and John Eyles. 2003. Different frames, different fears:

communicating about chlorinated drinking water and cancer in the Canadian media. In *Social Science & Medicine* 56: 1279-1293.

Durkheim, Emile. 1965. *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. New York: The Free Press.

Eide, Martin and Graham Knight. 1999. Service Journalism and the Problems of Everyday Life. In *European Journal of Communication* 14, (4): 525-547.

Ellin, Nan. 1997. *Architecture of Fear*. New York: Princeton Architectural Press.

_____. 2001. Thresholds of Fear: Embracing the Urban Shadow. *Urban Studies* 38, (5-6): 869-883.

Emerson, Richard M. 1993. Power-Dependence Relations. In *Power in Modern Societies*, edited by Marvin E. Olsen and Martin N. Marger, 48-58. Colorado: Westview Press.

Entman, Robert M. 1993. Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication* 43, (4): 51-58.

Ericson, Richard V. and Kevin D. Haggerty. 1997. *Policing the Risk Society*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Eyles, John and Theresa Garvin. 2001. Public health responses for skin cancer prevention: the policy framing of Sun Safety in Australia, Canada and England. In *Social Science & Medicine* 53: 1175-1189.

Feeley, Malcom M. 2003. Crime, Social Order and the Rise of Neo-Conservative Politics. *Theoretical Criminology* 7, (1):111-130.

Felson, Marcus. 1987. Routine Activities and Crime Prevention in the Developing Metropolis. *Criminology* 25, (4): 911-931.

Felson, Marcus and Ronald E. Clarke. 1998. *Opportunity Makes the Thief: Practical Theory for Crime Prevention*. London: Home Office, Policing and Reducing Crime Unit.

Filion, Pierre, Trudi Bunting, and Len Gertler. 2000. *Cities in Transition: The 21st century*. Toronto: Oxford University Press.

Fischer, Claude S. 1984. *The Urban Experience*. 2nd ed. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Fitzpatrick, Kevin and Mark LaGory. 2000. *Unhealthy Places: The Ecology of Risk in the*

Urban Landscape. New York: Routledge.

Flusty, Steven. 1997. Building Paranoia. In *Architecture of Fear*, edited by Nan Ellin, 47-59. New York: Princeton Architectural Press.

Forcese, Dennis. 1999. *Policing Canadian Society*. Toronto: Pearson Education Canada.

Foucault, Michel. 1995. *Discipline and Punish the Birth of the Prison*. New York: Vintage Books.

———. 1991. Governmentality. In *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*. Edited by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

———. 1990. *The History of Sexuality*. New York: Vintage Books.

———. 1988. *Madness and Civilization a History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*. New York: Vintage Books.

———. 1988a. Politics and Reason. In *Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture*. New York: Routledge: 57-85.

Foucault, Michel and Colin Gordon. 1980. *Power-Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*. Hassocks: Harvester Press.

Freidson, Eliot. 1986. *Professional Powers a Study of the Institutionalization of Formal Knowledge*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

———. Eliot. 2001. *Professionalism: The Third Logic*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Furedi, Frank. 1997. *Culture of Fear: Risk-Taking and the Morality of Low Expectations*. Washington: Cassell.

Gaetz, Stephen, Bill O'Grady, and Bryan Vaillancourt. 1999. *Making Money: The Shout Clinic Report on Homeless Youth and Employment*. Toronto: Central Toronto Community Health Centres.

Gandy, Oscar H. Jr. 1996. Coming to Terms With the Panoptic Sort. In *Surveillance, Computers & Privacy*, edited by David Lyon and Elia Zureik, 132-155. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

———. 1993. *The Panoptic Sort a Political Economy of Personal Information*. Colorado: Westview Press.

- Gardner, Carol B. 1995. *Passing by Gender and Public Harassment*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Garfinkel, Harold. 1967. *Studies in Ethnomethodology*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall.
- Garland, David. 2001. *The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 2000. The Culture of High Crime Societies. *British Journal of Criminology* 40: 347-375.
- . 1997. 'Governmentality' and the Problem of Crime: Foucault, criminology, sociology. *Theoretical Criminology* 1, (2): 173-214.
- Garofalo, James and Maureen McLeod. 1989. The Structure and Operations of Neighborhood Watch Programs in the United States. *Crime and Delinquency*, 35, (3): 326-44.
- Garreau, Joel. 1992. *Edge City: Life on the New Frontier*. New York: Anchor Books.
- Gergen, Kenneth J. 1991. *The Saturated Self: Dilemmas of Identity in Contemporary Life*. New York, N.Y: Basic Books.
- Giddens, Anthony. 1990. *The Consequences of Modernity*. California: Stanford University Press.
- . 1991. *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. California: Stanford University Press.
- Gieryn, Thomas F. 2002. What Buildings Do. *Theory and Society* 31: 35-74.
- Gilbert, Martin. 1997. *A History of the Twentieth Century*. London: Harper Collins.
- Gillis, R A. 1974. Population Density and Social Pathology: The Case of Building Type, Social Allowance and Juvenile Delinquency. *Social Forces* 53, (2): 306-314.
- Girouard, Mark. 1985. *Cities & People a Social and Architectural History*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Glaser, Barney G. and Anslem Strauss. 1970. Discovery of Substantive Theory: A Basic Strategy Underlying Qualitative Research. In *Qualitative Methodology: Firsthand Involvement With the Social World*, edited by William J. Filstead, 288-304. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company.

- _____. 1967. *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research*. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.
- Goffman, Erving. 1974. *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
- _____. 1961. *Asylums*. New York: Anchor Books.
- _____. 1959. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. New York: Doubleday.
- Gottfredson, Michael R. and Travis Hirschi. 1990. *A General Theory of Crime*. California: Stanford University Press.
- Gusfield, Joseph R. 1981. *The Culture of Public Problems: Drinking-Driving and the Symbolic Order*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- _____. 1976. *Symbolic Crusade*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Gutman, Robert. 1972. *People and Buildings*. New York: Basic Books.
- Hagan, John. 1994. *Crime and Disrepute*. California: Pine Forge Press.
- _____. 1984. *The Disreputable Pleasures*. Toronto: McGraw-Hill.
- Hagan, John and Bill McCarthy. 1998. *Mean Streets Youth Crime and Homelessness*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hannigan, John. 1999. *Fantasy City: Pleasure and Profit in the Postmodern Metropolis*. New York: Routledge.
- Harcourt, Bernard E. 2001. *Illusion of Order: The False Promise of Broken Windows Policing*. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Harvey, David. 1990. *The Condition of Postmodernity an Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*. Oxford England, Cambridge: Blackwell.
- Hiller, Harry H. and Linda DiLuzio. 2004. The Interviewee and the Research Interview: Analysing a Neglected Dimension in Research. *The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, 41, (1): 1-26.
- Hochstetler, Andy. 2001. Opportunities and Decisions: Interactional Dynamics in Robbery and Burglary Groups. *Criminology* 39, (3): 737-763.
- Homer-Dixon, Thomas. 2000. *The Ingenuity Gap*. Toronto: Alfred A. Knoph.

- Howard, Rhoda E. 1995. *Human Rights and the Search for Community*. Colorado: Westview Press.
- Hunt, Alan. 1999. *Governing Morals: A Social History of Moral Regulation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Jackson, Joe. 2001. *Leavenworth Train: A Fugitive's Search for Justice in the Vanishing West*. New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers.
- Jacobs, Jane. 1992. *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Jenkins, Philip. 1998. *Moral Panic: Changing Concepts of the Child Molester in Modern America*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Johnson, Bruce D., Andrew Golub, and Eloise Dunlap. 2000. The Rise and Decline of Hard Drugs, Drug Markets and Violence in Inner-City New York. In *The Crime Drop in America*, edited by Alfred Blumstein and Joel Wallman, 164-206. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kane, Robert J. 2002. The Social Ecology of Police Misconduct. *Criminology*. 40, (4): 867-896.
- Karmen, Andrew. 1996. *Crime Victims*. Scarborough: Nelson Canada.
- Karp, David A. 1996. *Speaking of Sadness: Depression, Disconnection, and the Meanings of Illness*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Katz, Peter, Vincent J. Scully, and Todd W. Bressi. 1994. *The New Urbanism: Toward an Architecture of Community*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Kingwell, Mark. 2000a. Building, Dwelling, Acting. *Queen's Quarterly*, 107, (2): 176-201.
- _____. 2000. *The World We Want: Vice, virtue, and the good citizen*. Toronto: Viking.
- Kunstler, James H. 1994. *The Geography of Nowhere*. Toronto: Simon and Schuster.
- Kunstler, James H. 1998. *Home From Nowhere: Remaking Our Everyday World for the 21st Century*. New York: Simon and Schuster Inc.
- Kvale, Steinar. 1996. *InterViews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviews*. California: Sage Publications.
- LaGrange, Randy L., Kenneth F. Ferraro, and Michael Supancic. 1992. Perceived Risk

and Fear of Crime: Role of Social and Physical Incivilities. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 29, (3): 311-334.

Lankenau, Stephen E. 1999. Stronger Than Dirt: Public Humiliation and Status Enhancement Among Panhandlers. *Journal-of-Contemporary-Ethnography* 28, (3): 288-318.

Lash, Scott. 1994. Reflexivity and Its Doubles: Structure, Aesthetics, and Community. In *The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization*, edited by Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash, 110-22. California: Stanford University Press.

Lasn, Kalle. 1999. *Culture Jam: The Uncooling of America*. New York: Eagle Brook.

Loseke, Donileen. 1999. *Thinking About Social Problems an Introduction to Constructionist Perspectives*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Lowes, Mark D. 2002. *Indy Dreams and Urban Nightmares*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Lupton, Deborah. 1999. Introduction: Risk and Sociocultural Theory. In *Risk and Sociocultural Theory: New Directions and Perspectives*, edited by Deborah Lupton. New York: Cambridge University Press.

_____. Risk As Moral Danger: The Social and Political Functions of Risk Discourse in Public Health. *International Journal of Health Services* 23, (3): 425-435.

Lyon, David. 1994. *Postmodernity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Lyotard, Jean F. 1984. *The Postmodern Condition a Report on Knowledge*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Mann, Floyd C. 1970. Human Relations Skills in Social Research. In *Qualitative Methodology: Firsthand Involvement With the Social World*, edited by William J. Filstead, 119-132. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company.

Marlow, Jim. 2002. Governmentality, Ontological Security and Ideational Stability: Preliminary Observations on the Manner, Ritual, and Logic of a Particular Art of Government. *Political Ideologies* 7, (2): 241-259.

Martin, Patricia Yancey. 1997. Gender, Accounts, and Rape Processing Work. In *Social Problems* 44, (4): 464-482.

Martinson, R. 1974. What Works in Prison Reform? *The Public Interest* 35: 22-54.

- Marx, Gary T. 1988. *Under Cover: Police Surveillance in America*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- Mawby, R. I. 1977. Defensible Space: A Theoretical and Empirical Appraisal. *Urban Studies* 14: 169-179.
- McInnis, Peter and Gail Burgess. 1984. *The Environmental Design and Management Approach to Crime Prevention in Residential Neighbourhoods*. Ottawa: Solicitor General.
- McKenna, Paul F. 2000. *Foundations of Community Policing in Canada*. Scarborough: Prentice Hall Allyn and Bacon Canada.
- Mead, George H. 1934. *Mind, Self, and Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 1938. *The Philosophy of the Act*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Mercer, John and Kim England. 2000. Canadian Cities in Continental Context: Global and Continental Perspectives of Canadian Urban Development. In *Canadian Cities in Transition: The Twenty-First Century*, edited by Pierre Filion, Trudi Bunting, and Len Gertler, 55-75. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Merry, Sally E. 1981. Defensible Space Un defended: Social Factors in Crime Control Through Environmental Design. *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 16, (4): 397-422.
- Merton, Robert K. 1957. *Social Theory and Social Structure*. Illinois: Free Press.
- Miethe, Terance D. and Robert F. Meier. 1994. *Crime and Its Social Context Toward an Integrated Theory of Offenders, Victims, and Situations*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Mitchell, Dean. 1999. Risk, Calculable and Incalculable. In *Risk and Sociocultural Theory: New Directions and Perspectives*, edited by Deborah Lupton, 131-159. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mitchell, Don. 1997. The Annihilation of Space by Law: The Roots and Implications of Anti-Homeless Laws in the United States. *Antipode* 29, (3): 303-335.
- Moran, Rosalyn and Ciaran Dolphin. 1986. The Defensible Space Concept: Theoretical and Operational Explication. *Environment and Behavior* 18, (3): 396-416.
- Morgan, Gareth. 1986. *Images of Organization*. New York: Sage.
- Mumford, Lewis. 1961. *The City in History Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.

- _____. 1961. *The Culture of Cities*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
- Murray, Charles A. 1983. The Physical Environment and Community Control of Crime. *Crime and Public Policy*, edited by James Q. Wilson. San Francisco: ICS Press.
- Newburn, Tim. 2001. The Commodification of Policing: Security Networks in the Late Modern City. *Urban Studies* 38, (5-6): 829-848.
- Newman, Oscar. 1980. *Community of Interest*. New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday.
- _____. 1996. *Creating Defensible Space*. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development.
- _____. 1972. *Defensible Space*. New York: The Macmillan Company.
- _____. 1995. Defensible Space: A New Physical Planning Tool for Urban Revitalization. *Journal of the American Planning Association* 61, (2):149-155.
- O'Grady, Bill, Robert Bright, and Eric. Cohen. 1998. Sub-Employment and Street Youths: an Analysis of the Impact of Squeegee Cleaning on Homeless Youths. *Security Journal* 11: 315-323.
- O'Malley, Pat. 2001. Discontinuity, government, and risk: A response to Rigakos and Hadden. In *Theoretical Criminology* 5, (1): 85-92.
- _____. 2000. Uncertain Subjects: Risks, Liberalism, and Contract. *Economy and Society* 29, (4): 460-484.
- _____. 1996. Risk and Responsibility. In *Foucault and Political Reason*, edited by Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose, 189-208. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- _____. 1992. Risk, Power and Crime Prevention. *Economy and Society* 21, (3): 252-275.
- O'Shea, Timothy C. 2000. The Efficacy of Home Security Measures. *American Journal of Criminal Justice* 24, (2): 155-167.
- Pain, Rachel. 2001. Gender, Race, Age and Fear in the City. *Urban Studies* 38, (5-6): 899-913.
- Parenti, Christian. 1999. *Lockdown America: Police and Prisons in the Age of Crisis*. New York: Verso.
- Parks, Roger B., Stephen D. Mastrofski, Christina Dejong, and Kevin M. Gray. 1999. How Officers Spend Their Time With The Community. *Justice Quarterly* 16, (3):

483-518.

- Parnaby, Patrick F. 2003. Disaster Through Dirty Windshields: Law, Order, and Toronto's Squeegee Kids. *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 28, (3): 281-307.
- Parnaby, Patrick F. and Vincent F. Sacco. 2004. Fame and Strain: The Contributions of Mertonian Deviance Theory to an Understanding of the Relationship Between Celebrity and Deviant Behavior. *Deviant Behavior* 25, (1): 1-26.
- Perkins, Douglas D., Abraham Wandersman, Richard C. Rich, and Ralph B. Taylor. 1993. The Physical Environment of Street Crimes: Defensible Space, Territoriality and Incivilities." *Journal of Environmental Psychology*. Vol. 13, pp. 29-49.
- Peterson, Alan R. 1996. "Risk and the Regulated Self: the Discourse of Health Promotion As Politics of Uncertainty. *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology* 32, (1): 44-57.
- Prus, Robert. 1980. Sociologist As Hustler: The Dynamics of Acquiring Information. In *Fieldwork Experience: Qualitative Approaches to Social Research*, edited by William Shaffir, Robert A. Stebbins, and Allan Turowetz, 132-44. New York: St. Martins Press.
- Putnam, Robert D. 2000. *Bowling Alone the Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Quinney, Richard. 1970. *The Social Reality of Crime*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- Rentschler, Carrie A. 2000. Designing Fear: Environmental Security and Violence Against Women. *Cultural Studies: A Research Annual* 5: 281-307.
- Rigakos, George S. 2002. *The New Parapolice: Risk markets and Commodified social control*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Rigakos, George S. and Richard W. Hadden. 2001. Crime, Capitalism, and the 'Risk Society': Toward the Same Olde Modernity? In *Theoretical Criminology* 5, (1): 61-84.
- Rosenbaum, Dennis P. 1987. The Theory and Research Behind Neighborhood Watch: Is It a Sound Fear And Crime Reduction Strategy? *Crime and Delinquency* 33, (1): 103-134.
- Ruhl, Lealle. 1999. Liberal Governance and Prenatal Care: Risk and Regulation in

Pregnancy. *Economy and Society* 28, (1): 95-117.

Rybczynski, Witold. 1995. *City Life: Urban Expectations in a New World*. Toronto: Harper Collins Publishers Ltd.

Sacco, Vincent F. and Leslie W. Kennedy. 1998. *The Criminal Event*. 2nd ed. Toronto: ITP Nelson.

Saul, John R. 2002. *On Equilibrium*. Toronto: Penguin Canada.

_____. 1993. *Voltaire's Bastards the Dictatorship of Reason in the West*. Toronto: Penguin Books.

Schlosser, Eric. 2002. *Fast Food Nation the Dark Side of the All-American Meal*. New York: Perennial.

Schneider, Steve and Patti Pearcey. 1996. *The Theory and Practice of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design: A Literature Review*. Canada Mortgage and Housing Commission.

Sennett, Richard. 1992. *The Fall of Public Man*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

_____. 1995. *The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity & City Life*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Shaffir, William B., Robert A. Stebbins, and Allan Turowetz. 1980. Introduction. In *Fieldwork Experience: Qualitative Approaches to Social Research*, edited by William Shaffir, Robert A. Stebbins, and Allan Turowetz, 3-22. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Shaw, Clifford R. and Henry D. McKay. 1969. *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sherman, L. W. and J. E. Eck. 2002. Policing for Crime Prevention. In *Evidence-Based Crime Prevention*, edited by Doug Farrington, Dorris MacKenzie, and Lawrence W. Sherman, 295-329. New York: Routledge.

Sibley, David. 1995. *Geographies of Exclusion*. New York: Routledge.

Silverman, Eli B. and Jo-Anne D. Giustina. 2001. Urban Policing and Fear of Crime. *Urban Studies* 38, (5-6): 941-957.

Simon, Jonathan. 1988. The Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices. *Law and Society Review*. 22, (4): 721-800.

- Skogan, W. G. and M. G. Maxfield. 1981. *Coping With Crime: Individual and Neighborhood Reactions*. California: Sage Publications.
- Skogan, Wesley G. 1990. *Disorder and Decline Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American Neighborhoods*. Toronto: Collier Macmillan Canada.
- Stein, Janice G. 2001. *The Cult of Efficiency*. Toronto: House of Anansi Press.
- Stevenson, Graham. 1996. Defensible Space: A Critical Review and Appraisal of a Crime Prevention Strategy. *Urban Design International* 1, (3): 235-245.
- Sumner, Colin. 1994. *The Sociology of Deviance: An Obituary*. New York: The Continuum Publishing Company.
- Suzuki, David and Holly Dressel. 2003. *Good News For a Change: How everyday people are helping the planet*. New York: Greystone Books.
- Tanner, Julian. 1996. *Teenage Troubles*. Scarborough: Nelson Canada.
- Taylor, Ralph B., Stephen D. Gottfredson, and Sidney Brower. 1984. Block Crime and Fear: Defensible Space, Local Social Ties, and Territorial Functioning. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 21, (4): 303-331.
- . 1980. The Defensibility of Defensible Space: A Critical Review and a Synthetic Framework for Future Research. In *Understanding Crime: Current Theory and Research*, edited by Travis G. M. Hirschi, 53-71. California: Sage Publications.
- Teepie, Gary. 1995. *Globalization and the Decline of Social Reform*. Toronto: Humanities Press. Garamond Press.
- Toronto Transit Commission. 1995. Minutes of Meeting. Toronto Transit Commission.
- Tulloch, John. Fear of Crime and the Media: Sociocultural Theories of Risk. In *Risk and Sociocultural Theory: New Directions and Perspectives*, edited by Deborah Lupton, 34-58. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Turner, Ralph H. 1978. The Role and the Person. *American Journal of Sociology* 84, (1): 1-21.
- Ungar, Sheldon. 2001. Moral Panic Versus the Risk Society: the Implications of the Changing Sites of Social Anxiety. *British Journal of Sociology* 52, (2): 271-291.
- Walklate, Sandra L. 2001. Fearful Communities? *Urban Studies* 38, (5-6): 929-939.
- Weber, Robert P. 1985. *Basic Content Analysis*. California: Sage Publications.

- Weiss, Carol H. 1998. *Evaluation*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Wilson, James Q. 1983. *Thinking About Crime*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Wilson, James Q. and George L. Kelling. 1982. Broken Windows. *The Atlantic Monthly* 249, (3): 29-38. Massachusetts: The Atlantic Monthly Company.
- Wilton, Robert D. 2000. "Sometimes It's OK to Be a Spy: Ethics and Politics in Geographies of Disability. *Ethics, Place, and Environment* 3: 91-97.
- Wood, Elizabeth. 1972. Housing Design: A Social Theory. In *Human Identity in the Urban Environment*, edited by Gwen Bell and Jaqueline Tyrwhitt, 327-48. Baltimore: Penguin Books.
- Woolgar, Steve and Dorothy Pawluch. 1985. Ontological Gerrymandering: The Anatomy of Social Problems Explanations. *Social Problems* 32, (3): 214-227.
- Zukin, Sharon. 1995. *The Culture of Cities*. New York: Blackwell.
- Zukin, Sharon. 1989. *Loft Living: Culture and Capital in Urban Change*. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.

Reports and Government Documents

- City of Clarington, General Architectural Guidelines, 2002.
- City of Mississauga, Official Plan, 1999.
- City of Mississauga, Strategic Plan, 2000.
- City of Mississauga, Planning and Development Committee Minutes, October 10, 2000.
- City of Ottawa, People Services Department Minutes, June 11, 2003.
- City of Toronto Department of Parks and Recreation. *Planning, Design, and Maintaining Safe Parks*. City of Toronto.
- Ministry of Municipal Affairs. 1995. *Comprehensive Set of Policy Statements*. Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario.
- Peel CPTED Advisory Committee. 2002. *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Principles (Peel Principles Document)*.

Peel Regional Police. *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design: Fact Sheet*.
Region of Peel.