TESTAMENT OF A MINORITY IN WARTIME
TESTAMENT OF A MINORITY IN WARTIME: 
THE PEACE PLEDGE UNION 
AND VERA BRITTAIN, 1939-1945

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ABSTRACT

The Peace Pledge Union was Britain's premier pacifist organisation during the years of the Second World War, and Vera Brittain one of its most influential leaders. Neither has been the subject of close historical examination.

The Union, founded fifty years ago by Canon 'Dick' Sheppard, was a direct product of the "never again" mood so pervasive in Britain during the 1920s and 1930s, although its sources of inspiration and principles resulted from deeper traditions. The heritage of the Peace Pledge Union was Christian, Radical, Liberal, Dissenting, Humanitarian and Socialist. It was also peculiarly English because the experience of relatively stable parliamentary government made generous allowance for the expression of dissent. But the Second World War placed British democracy and its associated traditions in a crucible. Yet the vitality of these values was sustained by the Peace Pledge Union and other voices of dissent.

Until recent years radical groups and their leaders have tended to be relegated to the sidelines of history as the "also rans", a tendency that has arguably distorted the historical balance. The present study seeks to contribute to a partial redressing of this balance by exploring the inspiration, background and work of the wartime Peace Pledge Union. By its continued existence, and determination to express its minority view, the Peace Pledge Union made an important contribution to the maintenance of the democratic right of dissent and the privileges of English parliamentary democracy.
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My greatest debt, as always, is to my family in England and in Canada for their selfless love and constant, unflagging, encouragement. To them and to my grandmother, Alicja Antonina Marszałek, I dedicate this thesis, ad majorem Dei gloriam.
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PREFACE

Violets

Violets from Plug Street Wood,
Sweet, I send to you oversea.
(It is strange that they should be blue,
Blue, when his soaked blood was red,
For they grew around his head;
It is strange they should be blue.)
Violets from Plug Street Wood -
Think what they have meant to me -
Life and Hope and Love and You,
(And you did not see them grow
Where his mangled body lay,
Hiding horror from the day;
Sweetest, it was better so.)
Violets from oversea,
To your dear, far, forgetting land
These I send in memory,
Knowing you will understand.


Vera Mary Brittain and her fiancé Lieutenant Roland Aubrey Leighton regularly exchanged letters after Lieutenant Leighton went to the Western front in March 1915. A number of these letters contained poems, although none attained the superb creative or stylistic qualities of a Rosenberg, Owen or Sassoon. But they did capture--often vividly, sometimes clumsily, occasionally pathetically and frequently, poignantly--the confused emotions and feelings of two individuals facing the tide of terrible carnage and numbing devastation which characterised the Great War.

Since 1918 the tools of modern warfare have been so perfected, and chillingly refined, that the carnage of
Passchendaele and the Somme, and the slaughter of Dachau and Dresden, can be achieved in minutes, rather than hours or days, and without the inconvenience of the appalling material destruction of these conflicts. The scientific advances in the development of weaponry over the last fifty years have indeed been unquestionably impressive. But whether or not man's moral ability to control responsibly his inventions and passions has enjoyed a commensurate development is a moot point. Against the backdrop of the Vietnam war, an American professor of social ethics wrote:

Moral principles have not been in style of late. We have suffered a fad for contextualism or situationalism in ethics .... The claim that every situation is utterly unique and impervious to moral illumination prior to the moment in which one is immersed in the totality of the context means that we must be left to follow our inclinations and intuitive judgements concerning that which is fitting.

Pacifism--the belief that all disputes must be settled by peaceful means--has much to commend itself in the context of the last quarter of the twentieth century. Yet its historical appeal, spanning two millenniums, has, with the exception of only three centuries, always been a minority one.

The respect for human life has formed a basic principle of nearly all man's religious and moral systems, but the first uncompromising rejection of war was made by the early Christian Church. For three hundred years, following the death of Christ, Christianity embraced pacifism as a central tenet of its belief and code of behaviour. In 313 A.D. this belief began seriously to erode with the
conversion of the Roman Emperor Constantine.

Christians were no longer members of a small, persecuted sect on the fringe of society. They now were invited to help guide the policy of the state.6

By 438 A.D. only Christians were allowed to serve in the imperial legions and pacifism "became a subterranean element within the church."7 The theological justification for this volte face was supplied by Saint Augustine of Hippo. In his City of God, completed in 426 A.D., Augustine expounded his theory of the just war, namely, that war

may be justified as an act of charity, a tragic but inevitable necessity done out of love to restore the possibility of decent human life to people who have been wrongly made to suffer.8

This justification was echoed by William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury, fifteen hundred years later when Britain and her allies fought the Hitlerian menace.

We are involved in an entanglement due to the sin of mankind, including our own, in which the best thing we can do is still a bad thing. None the less, it is right to do it because it is the best possible. And so we have got to do it and be penitent while we do it.9

Not all, however, agreed with this Augustinian justification. A small, but vocal pacifist minority, of which Vera Brittain was a leading figure, maintained the non-violent tradition of the persecuted early Christian Church.

In recent years a mounting interest in the peace movement in Britain during the nineteen twenties and thirties has become apparent.10 An inexplicable gap occurs, however, in the historiography of the British peace movement during the years of the Second World War. A path-finding article
by Richard A. Rempel, a cursory chapter in Martin Ceadel, *Pacifism in Britain, 1914-1945*, and Denis Hayes's book on conscientious objectors in Britain during the Second World War and Rachel Barker's work on the same subject are the only published scholarly histories of the wartime pacifist movement. Peter Brock, *Twentieth Century Pacifism*, is a solid summary history but has little to say on the wartime movement in Britain. Sybil Morrison's *I Renounce War. The Story of the Peace Pledge Union* is a useful but brief popular account of the PPU's history. Mention is made of the pacifists in Angus Calder's invaluable social history of Britain during the Second World War. But it is difficult to disagree with Kenneth O. Morgan's assessment that "British pacifism, in fact, has been more often derided than described, let alone subjected to scholarly examination."

This present study attempts to remedy the omission by employing a biographical and institutional approach. The method permits a narrative account and analytical assessment of a hitherto unexplored aspect of the history of the Second World War. The dissertation also makes an original contribution to the history of the British peace movement. Research in this field is very much in its infancy, and, although the data is often scattered among many and frequently obscure repositories, it is both rich and diverse. One of the most recent monographs on the pacifist movement, Martin Ceadel's *Pacifism in Britain, 1914-1945*, draws some tentative conclusions regarding the class background and general appeal
of pacifists and pacifism. The thesis, however, aspires to advance considerably beyond the range of Ceadel's work in this area. By employing additional and hitherto unused sources, it offers conclusions of greater substance about the Peace Pledge Union in the Second World War. Ceadel's fine study has been criticised by one reviewer for its failure to view pacifism as a social movement and for "treating it rather as a patchwork of transient individual beliefs." The present study aims to examine the personal beliefs of Vera Brittain—their formation, development and implementation. But it also seeks to show how Brittain, and more importantly the Peace Pledge Union, applied these and other pacifist beliefs and ideas through both individual and collective action. Another recent monograph by Rachel Barker dealing with the question of wartime conscientious objection has been criticised for not utilising interviews and personal reminiscences. It was also criticised for its survey of the Peace Pledge Union since the book did not "adequately show the complex issues and dilemmas facing these organizations and their members." Again, this dissertation has sought to make good such omission in the historiography of the peace movement.

To accomplish these ends, the thesis has been divided into six principal chapters. In each the institutional and biographical approaches have been employed. The latter approach has been intentionally used in an expressly subsidiary and illustrative manner. The
focus of the thesis is primarily upon the Peace Pledge Union, although within this context Brittain's role has significance. Her prominence within the PPU and her patent position as symptomatic of the wartime leadership, and much of its general membership, afford the researcher unique insights into the Peace Pledge Union.

The first section of the opening chapter introduces the reader to the institutional and intellectual heritage of the Peace Pledge Union by surveying the development of the English peace movement since 1815. This overview is followed by a complementary section tracing Brittain's personal history up to her conversion to pacifism in 1937. The second chapter opens with a brief examination of a number of pacifist conversion experiences. There then follows an analysis of the membership and distribution of the Peace Pledge Union. The third chapter examines the overall philosophical bases of pacifist theory before dealing with the practical and political problems facing the Peace Pledge Union. The fourth and fifth chapters build upon the third in that they both explore the theme of the theory in practice. The fourth chapter deals with the wartime interaction between the government and the Peace Pledge Union. The fifth chapter takes up the major themes of the preceding three chapters through a detailed examination of the two major campaigns waged by the Peace Pledge Union between the years 1939 and 1945, namely, the Negotiated Peace Campaign and the Food Relief Campaign. Continuity is
provided by Vera Brittain's both typical and atypical roles in the PPU which at once illustrate the precarious balance of coherence and diversity within the movement.

The PPU was Britain's--and Europe's--largest pacifist organisation and its most significant one; all others were ancillary to it. A reading of British government papers for the period of the Second World War shows that the PPU was the only pacifist organisation to give the government cause for concern. In many official documents the names "pacifist" and "PPU" were used interchangeably. Furthermore, the Union was very representative of the British peace movement, since on its National and Executive Councils were to be found prominent members and officers of other peace groups, such as the Fellowship of Reconciliation, Anglican Pacifist Fellowship and the Society of Friends. For example, Charles Raven, chairman of the FoR, was the author of one of the PPU's Bond of Peace pamphlets--the PPU's wartime statement of policy and aim--whilst Maurice Rowntree, a weighty Friend, served as wartime Treasurer of the Union. Similarly, Vera Brittain was, as already noted, in a myriad of ways representative and typical of the Peace Pledge Union's leadership and much of its rank and file. Her personal history and experience of the Great War, her work for the League of Nations Union and active political interest, her social class, education and strong sense of individuality were shared by many "PPUers" of her generation. Brittain was, however, atypical in her public pre-eminence and high
profile, a result of the unqualified success of her book, *Testament of Youth*, first published in 1933. During the Second World War her countrywide involvement in pacifist campaigns for food relief for occupied Europe and against saturation bombing, her addresses at public and private pacifist meetings and gatherings and her wartime writings on peace and pacifism, all made Vera Brittain one of the United Kingdom's leading pacifists. It is incontrovertibly true that Brittain was the most important woman pacifist in twentieth-century Britain. Brittain's membership in the Peace Pledge Union contributes a strong logical argument for a combined institutional and biographical approach. From an entirely utilitarian standpoint this method of approach also facilitates the maximum use of the largely disparate and fragmentary evidence available to the researcher. From the Brittain papers much information and data can be verified or clarified: a terse minute or *non sequitur* in the Peace Pledge Union's minute books is, for example, frequently explained by reference to Brittain's copious notes, diaries and letters of the same period.

The thesis is original in its extensive use of unpublished primary materials, the principal corpus being the Vera M. Brittain Collection at McMaster University. The collection is far and away the largest and most important individual British pacifist collection of the Second World War. It includes extensive personal diaries and correspondence, the original manuscripts and typescripts of almost all
Brittain's published and unpublished writings, one hundred scrapbooks and a wealth of press cuttings. Not all of these materials relate to pacifism or the Second World War, but both subjects are well represented. The collection, which was acquired by McMaster University in 1971, has not been extensively used before.

Other major unpublished primary sources which have been employed include documents and reports in the Mass Observation Archives at the University of Sussex, England. The Mass Observation holdings provide an unrivalled source of materials relating to the social history of the period 1939-1945, and were used extensively by Angus Calder in his book *The People's War*. The minute books and pamphlet collection of the Peace Pledge Union provide a detailed picture of the day-to-day work and concerns, policies and activities of the wartime Union. Unfortunately no correspondence or other documentation of the PPU is extant (save that which exists in other collections, such as the Brittain MSS) having been destroyed as a result of enemy action, or accidentally lost. The British Broadcasting Company's Written Archives in Caversham, England, yielded files which show the interesting and serious moral dilemma posed by the pacifists for the Department of Religious Broadcasting. The Ministry of Information and Foreign Office files deposited in the Public Record Office, Kew, Richmond, England, addressed the broader government policies and concerns regarding pacifists; interestingly, not all of those
files are open to the public. Several other smaller private collections were utilised, together with a reading of a number of pacifist publications—the most significant being *Peace News*, the wartime organ of the Peace Pledge Union—and major contemporary newspapers and journals. The picture of the pacifist movement which emerges is, of necessity, a composite one. Much of the evidence available to the researcher is of a fragmentary nature. This may be partially explained by the fact that the thrust of any peace movement is rightly concentrated on the present and the future, and unfortunately for the historian, not upon the past.

Finally, one of the great advantages (and pleasures) of studying contemporary history is the opportunity afforded the historian to conduct interviews with those directly involved in the historical events under study. This thesis draws also upon the recollections and reflections of several leading wartime pacifists. As a number of these individuals are quite advanced in years, the interviews conducted in the course of research naturally assume an added importance.

One difficulty which historians have experienced in writing about the pacifist movement has been in providing a satisfactory etymology. Martin Ceadel devotes the opening pages of his monograph to a discussion of this problem and arrives, self-admittedly, at a contrived definition. 18 Peter Brock provides the most exhaustive definition of pacifism, to which David Martin has added his own variations. 19 These definitions, however, are either not wholly satisfactory or,
because of their complexity, add a needless degree of confusion to the question: What is pacifism? The central difficulty concerns the distinction between "pacifism":

the belief that all war is always wrong and should never be resorted to, whatever the consequences of abstaining from fighting, [and "pacifism"]; the assumption that war, though sometimes necessary, is always an irrational and inhumane way to solve disputes, and that its prevention should always be an overriding political priority.20

These two terms may be separated theoretically and etymologically, but to separate them practically is to introduce a false construct into the history of the British peace movement.

The vast majority of individuals prefer to seek peaceful solutions to potentially violent situations and to live in a state of peace rather than a state of war. The individuals who choose for these ends to involve themselves actively through their personal commitment, lifestyle and work can fairly be called pacifists. But within this very broad grouping there are a number of equally valid pacifist positions. In Anglicanism there has been historically three clearly distinguishable theological traditions: the High, Broad and Low.21 Each of these is uncontestably Christian and Protestant, but each represents a markedly different approach to the central Christian message of the Incarnation and the Resurrection of Christ. The divisions within the pacifist body--with its central message of peace--are very similar. "Low pacifism" approximates to a loose conjunction of individuals--such as the League of Nations
Union--dedicated to the advancement of the cause of peace but willing, as a final recourse, to employ military sanctions to ensure peace. The "high pacifist" is equally dedicated to the cause of peace, but does not accept military or violent intervention under any circumstances. The "broad pacifist" position straddles these two other positions. Although its adherents believe, with the high pacifists, that all war is wrong, they are still prepared to work with the low pacifists for the general cause of peace. The high pacifists look upon such an association as a serious breach of principle. It is foreign to the history and the reality of the British peace movement to impose very precise lines of demarcation between these three groups since they collectively constitute the movement. This is particularly true of the interwar period.

In the wartime peace movement, however, the points of stress were more easily identifiable. Low pacifism all but disappeared, overwhelmed by the national emergency. The high and broad variants remained, united in their total rejection of war. But a critical point of tension opened up over the permissible degree of involvement of pacifists in a society engaged in the waging of a total war. The high pacifists were absolutists, rejecting any complicity in the war effort. The broad pacifist position accepted the possibility of an active witness in the community or alternative service. The latter frequently took the form of non-combatant war service or land service, as dictated by
the government tribunals. Absolutists did not accept the authority of the tribunals. Vera Brittain belonged to the broad pacifist camp; she was prepared to explore any peaceful avenues to bring an end to the war or to alleviate the suffering inflicted by conflict. But she was one with the high pacifists in her rejection of war.

The attitude of the government and the British public to the pacifist element is revealing since the experience of the pacifists addresses the fundamental question of the openness of British wartime politics and society. Moral dissenters were perceived as a potential threat to the Government which by design studiously avoided any direct confrontation with the pacifists, opting rather for indirect policies to gradually erode their position. In April 1942 Vera Brittain wrote in a letter to the National Council for Civil Liberties:

I agree with Professor Laski that the "system of private warnings, private threats and private controls" is far more serious, though this may be an egotistical reaction based upon much bitter experience. It does seem to me that the suppression of potentially influential individuals who hold unpopular opinions ... goes further in this war than the last, though it is done very quietly .... 22

Neil Stammers, the author of an unpublished doctoral thesis on civil liberties in Britain during the Second World War, found that his extensive researches led him to much the same conclusion as Laski and Brittain, although the very nature of the suppression makes the gathering of evidence a difficult task. 23 Indeed, through the control of media and the ever-present threat of Emergency Powers, dissenters were
subtly pushed into conformity (or something which approximated the same) and the latent moral consciousness of the British public effectively neutralised.

The pacifist movement, by its very existence and in its determination to continue, against whatever odds, to voice its minority opinion, did much toward maintaining the principles of democracy and free speech, and ensuring their continuation in Britain after the war. The neglect, by historians, of the peace movement is indeed extraordinary, especially in view of the fact that, as Kenneth Morgan was to comment in the *Times Literary Supplement*:

> It is transparently clear that these variegated even anarchistic rebels, frequently prone to incorrigible minority-mindedness, provide a major theme in our [British] political and intellectual history.24

The pacifists were (and are), in part, both the progenitors and the heirs of the British liberal tradition, and guardians of civil liberties.
FOOTNOTES

PREFACE

1R. A. Leighton, "Violets", 25 April 1915, in Vera Brittain Collection (hereafter VBC), Holograph Daily Diary 1915 (hereafter D5), McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. This poem was written after only a month at the front.

2This was one of the central themes in a collection of essays edited by G. K. Hibbert and first published in 1936. See G. K. Hibbert (ed.), The New Pacifism (New York: Garland Publishing, 1972). It was also a point frequently made by Vera Brittain in her pacifist writings.


7 Brock, Pacifism in Europe, 24.

8 Beitz and Herman, Peace and War, 4. See also Augustine, City of God, trans. H. Bettenson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972). First published 1467.


17 Vera Brittain's correspondence (hereafter VBC/C) includes some twenty-five thousand letters, the majority of which are complemented by a carbon or holograph copy of her reply. All letters received by Brittain (hereafter Rec.) are filed alphabetically. All those authored by Brittain (hereafter Rep.) are filed chronologically by month and year. The collection has been catalogued by Terry Smart who has also been the principal compiler of a detailed guide to the Vera Brittain Archive, of which three volumes have so far been published. See McMaster University Library Research News 4 No/3 (1977), 4 No/4 (1978), 4 No/5 (1979), Mills Memorial Library, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario.

18 Martin Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain 1914-1945, 3.


20 Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 3.

21 Elizabeth Isichei, Victorian Quakers (London: Oxford University Press, 1970). Isichei uses the term "high pacifist" in a slightly different sense to that in which it is used here. The use and meaning attached to the terms "broad pacifist" and "low pacifist" are my own.

22 VBC/C/Rep., Vera Brittain to Miss Acland Allen, National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL), 12 April 1942.


CHAPTER ONE

THE MOVEMENT AND THE INDIVIDUAL

Conferences, adjournments, ultimatums, 
Flights in the air, castles in the air, 
The autopsy of treaties, dynamite under bridges, 
The end of laissez faire. 1

The British Peace Movement 
from Napoleon to Hitler

The long and the distinguished heritage of the Peace Pledge Union has been overlooked, or at best treated with a myopia which has completely distorted its historical importance. English pacifism and the Peace Pledge Union stood four-square in the English Radical, Dissenting tradition; its roots were deeply embedded in the nineteenth century, in Liberalism and Evangelicalism. An historical appreciation of the Peace Pledge Union requires, therefore, an elemental tracing of its nineteenth-century roots, together with a consideration of the impact of the Great War and the Treaty of Versailles upon English pacifism and that large part of the English public which was liberally inclined. Without this background the history of the Peace Pledge Union cannot be fully comprehended. Although the Second World War constitutes a hiatus in the historiography of the peace
movement, a growing number of sources--the majority of which have appeared in the last decade--enable the lineal descent of the Peace Pledge Union to be traced, without interruption, from the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars.

From the fifth century "the soldier of Christ replaced the Christian martyr as the symbol of faith." Pacifism, however, soldiered on under the protection of Christian monasticism and in the Middle Ages was adopted by many of the dissenting sects--the Waldenses, Lollards, Czech Brethren and Anabaptists. But the Henrician Reformation showed an equal lack of sympathy for foreign sects as it did for Roman monasticism. When pacifism emerged in Britain in the seventeenth century it was, therefore, an almost wholly indigenous phenomenon--an outgrowth of Quakerism--that by 1661 was firmly established as a central tenet of the Quaker faith. The Society of Friends, as its eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century adherents to the Peculiar Ideal would admit, was a Dissenting body, and did not seek close contact with English society. But Quakerism, like English society itself in the mid-Victorian decades, succumbed to the influence of the Evangelicals, to be shaped by them, in their own distinct image. In consequence, the traditional Quaker tenets of the peace testimony and the Inner Light were, for half a century, to be upheld by a Quietist Rump. Yet the resultant ascendancy of the Evangelical Quakers ensured the induction of the Friends into the mainstream of English life and politics, where they were to prove adept swimmers.
In 1816 a Quaker, William Allen, founded the first organised peace society, the Society for the Promotion of Permanent and Universal Peace, or more simply, the London Peace Society. Of this Society, Elizabeth Isichei writes:

It took the so-called high pacifist position, condemning war, not on humanitarian or economic grounds, but as contrary to Christianity... its members tended to pride themselves on their refusal to seek a broader basis.7

The activities of the early Peace Society were therefore limited, and indeed the Society did little toward expanding its appeal in the first twenty-five years of its existence. In the 1840s, however, nonconformity became increasingly assertive

Pre-disposing many ministers and laymen for active participation in anti-"Establishment" reform movements .... 8

In 1843, at the Peace Society's first International Conference, a clause was added to the Society's constitution which urged the submission of all international disputes to neutralist arbitration.9 The adoption of International Congresses--initially largely Anglo-American affairs--and of clauses and resolutions of practical and pragmatic value, accelerated the politicisation of the Peace Society and pitched it headlong into the rapids of mid-Victorian political life. Once the breach had been made, and the Peace Society accepted the admixture of religion and practical politics, the basis of its support widened considerably. Indeed, by 1849 its principal supporters were liberals and radicals; "the Peace Society had become a
part of the lib-lab alliance ...."10 Its energies were also considerably enlivened by those of the Free Trade Movement as "the moralism" of the Peace Society "and the utilitarianism of the" Free Trade Movement "very broadly overlapped." For Cobden the cause of each was indistinguishable.11 The high water mark of the mid-Victorian peace movement came in 1851 as the Great Exhibition proclaimed the "gospel of free trade and universal peace."12 But in the next two decades the Peace Society and the peace movement generally broke up after floundering on the rocks of the Crimean and American wars and other military entanglements, both threatened and actual. More ominously, the peace movement had to combat the rising swell of popular nationalism. In 1862, the secretary of the Peace Society, Henry Richard, was moved to write:

> I am not sure whether the best thing would not be to dissolve the [Peace] Society altogether. Every new war that rises, detaches from us some class of our friends, .... If things go on so, I expect to find myself at last standing alone in the full maintenance of principle.13

During the Crimean conflict, however, Richard Cobden, the champion of free trade, and his Quaker political partner, John Bright, opposed the war on economic and rational grounds. Their witness, which earned them the full opprobrium of the moment, was to have important repercussions for the peace movement since it also captured the attention of a young Peelite politician, W. E. Gladstone. The ensuing cooperation between these three men--Cobden, Bright and Gladstone--"tended toward the foundation of the Liberal
Party.\textsuperscript{14} A. J. P. Taylor, as is his wont, is rather more categorical:

The favour of the Cobdenite Radicals had carried Gladstone to the leadership of the Liberal Party. His dislike of increased expenditure on armaments - indeed on anything - gave him a bond of sympathy with them.\textsuperscript{15}

Politically the Quakers and pacifists aligned themselves with the Liberal Party, the Tory Party being \textit{ipso facto} uncongenial to pacifism.\textsuperscript{16} The Liberal Party became the party of Dissent, and Dissent "the strength and marrow of the Liberal Party."\textsuperscript{17} It was a political allegiance which in the context of the nineteenth century became an automatic association. Thus pacifism and liberalism, first visibly conjoined by the rational and pragmatic common denominator of free trade, established a symbiotic relationship which was only to be torn asunder by the Great War. Before Free Trade, Charles James Fox and Tom Paine had contributed toward the fashioning of a secular liberal conscience for which war and conflict were anathema.\textsuperscript{18} Liberals and pacifists shared a common and distinguished, if diffuse, ancestry of dissent.

During the 1870s the London Peace Society enjoyed a brief renaissance as arbitration became the rallying cry of the peace movement:

Many who saw little point in the constant reiteration of abstract sentiments in favour of peace - which, in the abstract, never found a serious opponent - were prepared to support a concrete policy with some chance of success.\textsuperscript{19}

Political viability was to be a recurring problem for the
peace movement both in terms of gathering support, and in provoking contention among pacifists themselves. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century a number of new peace organisations were formed. In 1870 the Workmen's Peace Committee was established by Randal Cremer. In the following year (under its new title of the Workmen's Peace Association) it drew up a plan embodying two novel features—peaceful sanctions and binding arbitration by an international court—which foreshadowed the League of Nations. Interestingly, Lord Salisbury—the British Prime Minister—held a rather dim view of these new ideas for peace, commenting:

I am afraid that, like competitive examinations and sewage irrigation, arbitration is one of the famous nostrums of the age. Like them it will have its day and will pass away, and future ages will look with pity and contempt on those who could have believed in such an expedient for bridling the ferocity of human passions.

The Working Men's Peace Association, and newer internationally oriented bodies, such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Universal Peace Congresses, quickly eclipsed and surpassed the older Peace Society in importance. These developments constituted the third and the final phase in the development of the peace movement from the defeat of Napoleon to the outbreak of the Great War.

The first phase had been predominantly religious and educational; initially sectarian it had concluded in a series of international conferences held between 1848 and 1853. The second phase, following the marriage of pacifism and free trade, was economic in character. During this
period governmental approval was secured in Britain for the principle of arbitration; the peace movement was internationally organised and its efforts concerted appropriately. The third phase saw renewed efforts at international co-operation and the co-ordination of peace activities, aimed primarily at the further education of governments and the popularisation of peace among an increasingly bellicose citizenry. The phrase "League of Nations" was in common currency, envisaging a "federal union of independent sovereign states ... equipped with a Tribunal and a Code of Law." The peace movement in England and in twenty-five other countries around the world entered the new century sharing a considerable degree of understandable optimism. The shock of August 1914 could not have been more complete nor more traumatic. The much heralded dawn of the millenium proved to be "The Great Illusion".

The closing years of the nineteenth century also witnessed a radically important internal realignment of the Society of Friends. This was in response to the growth of liberal theology which stressed religious experience as the basis of faith. The implicit rejection of dogma and of a transcendent God spoke powerfully to the Friends' Quietist tradition. Evangelicalism had contributed a good deal toward the popularisation of peace, but it had also diluted the peace testimony and all but extinguished the Inner Light. Popularisation had been achieved at the cost of compromising principle. The Quaker renaissance, with its timely
reassertion of the traditional tenets of Quakerism, reaffirmed the Friends' historic testimony. The renaissance enabled the Society to summon the necessary spiritual and moral conviction of purpose to withstand the considerable stresses arising from its opposition to the First World War.29 The experience of the Friends raises, once again, the perplexing question for the peace movement of translating ideals and principles into practical terms, with a mass appeal. Of this difficulty Martin Ceadel writes:

... pacifism is pulled in two opposed directions in its relationship with society: toward preserving its purity; or towards maximizing its political relevance. The relative strength of these pulls is determined by the society. If it is enlightened and has a strong pacifist tradition it will make political participation hard to resist; on the other hand the more repressive and hostile the society, the greater the pacifist's readiness to incur its displeasure and the more vital his pacifist witness.30

The Great War provided a vivid illustration of this dilemma.

The history of the British peace movement during the 1914-1918 conflict has been considered in detail by a number of historians.31 The enfranchised worker felt a new-found loyalty and duty to the state, carefully nurtured by the forces of nationalism, which in 1914 proved stronger than the clarion call to international proletarian solidarity. Others found their internationalist and pacific pretensions as illusory and impotent as the Second International: "The international elite was grossly outnumbered by the nationalistic multitudes."32 In England even the Peace Society enigmatically "refused to condemn the declaration of war."33
But if the older peace societies and organisations were inert, others were formed to take their place. In England, before the close of 1914 three new bodies were founded which in varying degree continued the prewar traditions of peace, liberalism and Dissent. The first and most important of these was the Union of Democratic Control. Its founding members were E. D. Morel, Norman Angell, C. P. Trevelyan, Arthur Ponsonby, Ramsay MacDonald and Philip Snowden. The Union sought to discredit the practice of the balance of power and secret diplomacy which, it was believed, had been in large measure responsible for the outbreak of the war. It also sought to address itself to the task of laying the foundations for a lasting peace and, as the title of the organisation implied, it also hoped to secure popular control of foreign policy. Finally the UDC advocated arms reduction. To achieve these ends the UDC anticipated the formation of a federal Europe and a League of Nations. Out of this developed the League of Nations Society formed in May 1915, which in the autumn of 1918 merged with the Free Nations Association to form the League of Nations Union.

The two other organisations formed in response to the outbreak of war and the concomitant failure of the peace movement were the No-Conscription Fellowship (N-CF) and the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FoR). These were quite distinct in aim from the UDC in that both sought to witness to an expressly pacifist position. The leadership of the N-CF, in contrast to the pronounced Liberal cast of the UDC,
comprised "young middle class I.L.P. socialists." Those from the FoR represented a minority drawn from the ranks of pacifism's oldest inspiration, Christianity. Specifically most came from a group with a historical peace witness, the nonconformists and most notably the Quakers. Although liberalism, socialism and Christianity had all manifestly failed to save peace in 1914, all three took immediate steps to resuscitate their witness, the UDC through education and debate, the N-CF through confrontation with the government and the FoR by a reticent and persistent but resolute quietism. When conscription was introduced in March 1916, high or absolute pacifists seeking unconditional exemption from military service began a cat-and-mouse game with the government which was to pass into the folklore of the pacifist movement. Only 1,298 pacifists and conscientious objectors were granted total exemption out of some sixteen and a half thousand objectors, but the integrity of many of these individuals was to prevail over the contemporary disdain for those who would not fight. Cases of ill-treatment by the authorities earned the pacifists much sympathy and moral credibility; consequently, during the Second World War, the Government was careful to avoid creating martyrs out of dissenters.

Nevertheless, despite the impressive witness of the pacifists, in the decade following the Great War the thrust of the peace movement reverted once again to internationalism, arbitration and disarmament. The war itself assumed the
identity of an unforgettable but temporary aberration in the international order which the League of Nations would ensure could not recur. The N-CF and the FoR had embraced the dissenting tradition in a very narrow, pristine sense. Unfortunately, by taking themselves out of the mainstream of affairs through the adoption of a sectarian stance, both bodies rendered themselves politically impotent. Fenner Brockway, founder of the N-CF and a leader of the Independent Labour Party, learnt this lesson when the ILP disaffiliated itself from the Labour Party—"the worst mistake of my life." Understandably the UDC, which interpreted its dissenting witness in a broad sense, made a considerable contribution to, and impression upon, the postwar decades: its influence was twofold. In the immediate postwar years the UDC's internationalist ideas were widely and favourably received. A number were taken up by the League of Nations Union, formed in 1918, which in a few years superseded the UDC as the premier peace society. Secondly, and of greater long-term significance for the British peace movement, the thinking of the UDC intellectuals converged with that of the Labour Party over the issue of the Versailles Treaty. The conjunction marked the passing of the mantle of the liberal and dissenting traditions to the Labour Party. For many Liberals, their party had demonstrated its moral and ideological bankruptcy during the First World War and accordingly

the UDC liberals as a whole ... at the end of the war ...
transferred their loyalties en masse to the Labour Party .... "The Labour Party", in Leonard Woolf's words, "inherited its foreign policy from Cobden and Bright through Gladstonian Liberalism." 45

Both the LNU and the Labour Party received the seeds of the Dissenting tradition from the UDC. The UDC itself never developed beyond a laudable internationalism, unable to extricate itself sufficiently from a static variety of Gladstonian Liberalism, at least in foreign matters. In the LNU the Dissenting tradition was in large part absorbed so that "... Henceforth the liberal conscience was to speak primarily though by no means exclusively, through the organs of the Labour Party." 46 This development was heavily underscored when in 1924 fifteen members of the Union of Democratic Control joined the minority first Labour Government. 47

The Labour Party, however, like the LNU found deep fissures opening up within itself. But these were eminently more serious for Labour since they arose out of a fundamental socialist perception and understanding of the issues of peace, war and armament. Pacifism, it could be argued, was an expression of its [socialism's] idealism, of its belief in human brotherhood and international socialism, its suspicions of imperialism and the economic and political exploitation of man by man. It represented much that was best and most inspiring in early socialism. 48

The Labour Party was therefore forced by circumstance and external pressure to search its soul and reassess its priorities. For Labour such self-examination has always been a traumatic experience since its elements are diverse and
retain their identity in the heterogeneous compound that is
the Party. The Labour Party in the 1930s embraced a set of
conflicting traditions; for example, pacifism and the desire
for revolutionary change, which were never reconciled, but
which alternated in ascendancy as dictated by circumstance.

In 1931, following Labour's crushing electoral
defeat and the deeply damaging defection of MacDonald, the
Labour Party endeavoured to rally its numerically and
spiritually decimated ranks around a sheet anchor of
fundamental party principles. George Lansbury, one of the
survivors of the maelstrom of 1931 and something of an
"intellectual lightweight", 49 (the judgment that was handed
down by Beatrice Webb) became leader. Admittedly, the party
was manifestly bereft of elder statesmen. Lansbury was the
only ex-Labour minister of the 1929-31 Labour Government to
retain his parliamentary seat. Yet he was by no means the
anachronism which his age might suggest. 50 For Labour,
Lansbury reassuringly embodied the humanitarian, international,
pacifist and Christian ideals of British socialism. In the
same way, Baldwin personified, through his evoking of Tory
tradition, the confidence that all would come right in the
end. If these leaders were evading realities, both nation
and party respectively were, initially at least, "only too
glad to follow." 51 And if the Conservative Party numbered
Churchill and Eden among its realists, Bevin and Dalton were
their Labour counterparts. The latter two

were first among national leaders to seek to impress
on the movement the need for collective action and rearmament as counter-measures to fascist aggression .... 52

Understandably this brought both men into conflict with Lansbury and prevailing party tradition. Differences came to a head over Abyssinia: Lansbury opposed the imposition of economic sanctions against Italy for fear that they would trigger war. At the Labour Party's Annual Conference in Brighton at the end of September 1935, Bevin unleashed an uncompromising attack on Lansbury:

It is placing the Executive and the Movement in an absolutely wrong position to be taking your conscience round from body to body asking to be told what to do with it. 53

In October, Lansbury, having felt the full weight of Bevin's criticism, concluded that his position was no longer tenable. He resigned as leader and was replaced by Clement Attlee.

But the English interwar peace stage was dominated by the low pacifism of the League of Nations Union. The LNU enunciated policies which were broadly catholic in their appeal--arbitration and multilateral disarmament--and quickly "acquired a membership unprecedented in the peace movement in terms of both quality and quantity." 54 Many pacifists, understandably, opted to collaborate with the LNU internationalists although ideologically (notably over the military commitment implicit in collective security) the two were not strongly compatible.

Conditioned by the Liberal-Protestant tradition, they found attractive ... [an] emphasis upon persuasion,
moral sensitivities, voluntary association, and the use of reason.\textsuperscript{55}

The LNU's Royal Charter was a supremely optimistic document which embodied "both a vision and a belief that the world is basically rational and can be organised on rational lines."\textsuperscript{56} The approach of the LNU—like that of the early nineteenth-century peace movement—was therefore primarily educational and infused with not a small degree of moral fervour.\textsuperscript{57} By 1933 its membership exceeded one million.\textsuperscript{58}

The Union was able to build up such a formidable following because of the understandable recoil of the general public from war and indeed from any policy or attitude which smacked of militarism. The government of Lloyd George understood this well: "Never Again", Michael Howard comments,

... was to be more than epitaph; it was to be a policy — and one which was to have disastrous results.\textsuperscript{59}

That collective security was immensely popular—if poorly understood—was evident from the results of the Peace Ballot.\textsuperscript{60} The Ballot, conducted by the LNU in the last months of 1934 and the first months of 1935, concerned the questions of disarmament and the League of Nations. The idea of a ballot was conceived by Lord Robert Cecil as a measure designed to boost the flagging fortunes of the League of Nations Union,\textsuperscript{61} since by the mid-1930s public sentiment over the issue of war was polarizing markedly between those advocating rearmament and those advocating a strictly
pacifist option. The latter were increasingly getting their own way in the councils of the LNU.\textsuperscript{62} Caught between two stools, Cecil devised the Peace Ballot as "a public relations exercise."\textsuperscript{63} But it was clear from the results that a high proportion of the respondents laboured under the illusion that collective security was possible without recourse to military commitment.\textsuperscript{64} The LNU failed to clarify this point for the public and the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, aware that "to be seen as the party of peace was the most crucial political asset of the inter-war period," held his peace.\textsuperscript{65} The British public, however, did grow gradually aware of the political and military realities of collective security, despite the reticence of the LNU and the unwillingness of Baldwin to "dictate to democracy."\textsuperscript{66} The proportion of the respondents willing to endorse military sanctions fell significantly in the early months of 1935--commensurate with a growing mood of isolationism.\textsuperscript{67} This mood was "conducive to pacifism", although the final results of the Ballot revealed a very poor showing by the Christian pacifists.\textsuperscript{68} This apparent paradox can be explained by the withdrawal of many individuals to a high pacifist position. Whilst slightly less than seventeen and a half thousand Peace Ballot respondents identified with the specifically Christian pacifist option to the fifth question of the Ballot,\textsuperscript{69} fully fifty thousand pledged their support of a private absolutist, national appeal made in October 1934 by an Anglican priest:
We renounce war and never again, directly or indirectly, will we support or sanction another.70 and 71

Wishing first to assess and to consolidate his support, Canon 'Dick' Sheppard did not form any coherent or official body until July 1935.72 The Sheppard Peace Movement, as it was initially named, became the Peace Pledge Union in May 1936.73 Less than a month later in June 1936, Vera Brittain spoke as an advocate of collective security at a Peace Pledge Union rally. As she spoke, she became graphically aware of the yawning moral chasm between the advocates of collective security and those advocates of the high pacifist position.

For fifteen years after the First World War, this wide moral division between the supporters of collective security and the exponents of revolutionary pacifism had always existed but had not been emphasised. But with the threat of a second World War, the gulf became clear. Individuals who believed that war was wrong in all circumstances could no longer join with those who were prepared to fight in the last resort.74

The Peace Pledge Union was born of this realisation.

By 1935-1936, therefore, pacifists were being forced to acknowledge and reckon with the unfolding logic of their position. The Abyssinian war, the remilitarisation of the Rhineland and the Spanish civil war--each successive crisis saw the escalation of European tension. It also witnessed the widening of the rift between advocates of collective security--reinforced by military sanctions--and their former high and broad pacifist allies. The Conservative Party tended to follow Baldwin's lead (or more accurately speaking, Baldwin's drift) toward rearmament.75
For the fledgling Peace Pledge Union the international tensions of 1935-36 were followed in 1937 by the sudden death of Canon Sheppard. This event had a demoralizing effect upon the PPU, since Sheppard had done so much to inspire, direct and unify its disparate elements. Straightway, the Union's internal problems were laid bare. The most telling were the policy and directional differences between the older established leaders of the Union, the Sponsors, and its younger activists. These clashes were in part caused, and in part complicated, by the tendency of the leadership to be religiously inspired, apolitical and partly sectarian. Much of the PPU's ascending rank and file was, however, highly politically conscious and active. The differences between the two sides were not to be reconciled and were to be given formal expression in the subsequent formation of the more cautious Forethought Committee and the more assertive Forward Movement during the opening months of the Second World War. The growing split distressed Vera Brittain. In March 1938 she wrote to Canon Stuart Morris:

I do see coming very soon a split between the religious minded and the political minded Sponsors as to which type of objective is the most important for the P.P.U. at the present moment ... willing martyrdom on behalf of Peace ... [or] influence on the side of negotiation [with the dictators].

Brittain was herself a politically minded pacifist, although like many in the Union, her religious sense grew deeper during the war. At no time, however, did she lose her belief in the validity of activism and the possibility
of co-operative action with non-pacifists. Many of the older high pacifists, however, were to eschew such co-operation as anathema to the focus of their peace testimony. Thus they were to shun such future PPU wartime campaigns as food relief for occupied Europe and the protest against the allied policy of area bombing. But in the three years immediately preceding the war there was one policy on which broad and high pacifists were able to unite--their collective understanding of appeasement. Thus, whilst denouncing the League of Nations and collective security as euphemisms for military coercion and war, the PPU found the distance between itself and the government of Neville Chamberlain, formed in 1937, progressively narrowing, as Chamberlain pursued his policy of positive appeasement. The pacifist position on appeasement reflected a pervasive liberal belief in the injustices of Versailles and a desire to redress the wrongs done Germany by the allies. Thus, ironically, the pacifists found themselves in tandem with Conservative appeasers and, even more remarkably, with the British Union of Fascists. When war did break out, the Chamberlain cabinet was divided over the question of the possibilities for negotiation. But the PPU and BUF stuck fast--although for entirely different motives--to their demands for reconciliation and peace. This association undoubtedly tainted the PPU in the public mind as Nazi sympathisers.

Meanwhile the Labour movement, following Lansbury's departure from its leadership, still remained markedly
pacifist in tone despite supporting the government's defence budget in 1937. Indeed, until 22 August 1939 the Labour movement from

... Right to Left retained its old principles or, if you prefer, its old illusions. It still held the outlook of Keir Hardie and E. D. Morel, of Brailsford and J. A. Hobson .... Two simple sentences expressed it all. Imperialist capitalism was the cause of war. Socialists should oppose both war and capitalism.82

These positions were essentially those of the UDC developed in the 1914-18 war.83 But after September 3rd, 1939 the low pacifists of the LNU and the Labour Party alike joined with the Conservatives in their readiness to offer armed resistance to Hitler. The Peace Pledge Union and its ancillaries thus found themselves as what might be viewed as the final repositories of doctrinaire, implacable libertarian values as surely as the treasures of the National Gallery "found their wartime home in a cave in a disused slate quarry in North Wales."84 Simon Maccoby, in a six-volume study of English Radicalism, writes of the Peace Pledge Union in the last volume:

It has, of course, always been one of the greatest risks of British radical politics that foreign enemies would seek to take advantage of its insatiable urge to crusade against the alleged iniquities of Toryism and of its over-readiness, especially when in Opposition, to put all possible blame on the London Government for whatever was amiss in the world. So it was in the days of the Jacobins and of Napoleon, so it was again during the days of Salisbury and Balfour, and so it was to be in the crisis years of 1933-9 when such organizations as the League of Nations Union, the Peace Pledge Union and the National Peace Council, manned in large part by similar elements to those which had made up the essential strength of the old Radicalism, continued to do to Hitler at least as much service as did the British Fascist Movement.85
What Maccoby and others have overlooked is that when the exigencies of the Second World War were in operation the traditions of the Enlightenment, of Liberalism, Dissent and Painite Radicalism were nurtured and preserved among groups like the Peace Pledge Union. Its members became latter-day guardians of the "Liberty Tree". Yet the guardianship of the Liberty Tree was fraught with all manner of obstacles. Within the Peace Pledge Union the war finally forced upon the Union the making of decisions regarding policy which had been visible since 1936 as unanswered questions arising from the differences between activists and quietists. The struggle joined at the time of Sheppard's death continued unabated throughout the war. And from without, the Peace Pledge Union had to cope with the stresses and dilemmas posed by life in a society engaged in a war for its very survival. Thus the Peace Pledge Union was to find itself struggling in the entangling web of governmental emergency powers as the authorities understandably sought to define the bounds of permissible dissent. Pacifism, and the Peace Pledge Union in particular, accordingly became the subject not only of Cabinet discussion, but also a focus of attention in the Ministry of Information (MoI), and the touchstone of controversy over policy within the British Broadcasting Company (BBC). Wartime laws and conditions also decreed that pacifists, individually and collectively, respond to the challenge of an entirely new and often adverse situation as they sought to live their
peace testimony in the midst of total war.

Vera Brittain: Emergence from the Victorian Chrysalis

In cities and in hamlets we were born,
And little towns behind the van of time;
A closing era mocked our guileless dawn
With jingles of a military rhyme.
But in that song we heard no warning chime,
Nor visualised in hours benign and sweet
The threatening woe that our adventurous feet
Would starkly meet.

Vera Brittain, 1932

Just as the institutional history and development of the Peace Pledge Union begs an appreciation of its historical antecedents, so the personal history of Vera Brittain has a direct bearing upon the inception and subsequent growth of her pacifist beliefs, and her decision to join the Peace Pledge Union. Neither the institutional form nor the individual decision developed out of an historical void, but rather in response to clearly demarcated historical circumstances. The case of Vera Brittain's personal progress to pacifism is worthy of note, not least because her life experience—her Victorian upper-middle-class upbringing, her education, her experience of the Great War, her interwar interest and involvement in international and domestic politics, her very profession—make her a typical representative of the Peace Pledge Union's wartime leadership and, to a slightly lesser degree, of the movement's general membership.
Vera Brittain died March 1970 at the age of seventy-seven years. Her three principal autobiographical works: Testament of Youth, Testament of Friendship and Testament of Experience, reveal a very complex woman. She was an individual of fierce determination and will power, moral courage and conviction of purpose, indefatigable energy and industry, and a remarkable consistency of belief. Brittain was also self-admittedly egotistical, vain, and singularly humourless. Brittain's Testaments have recently been republished following the BBC's highly acclaimed dramatisation of Testament of Youth, which was screened by the CBC in the autumn of 1980. In writing these books Brittain relied heavily upon her extensive personal diaries and correspondence.

Her diaries, almost without interruption, span a period of fifty-seven years, from 1911 to 1968. As such they form a unique historical record and commentary. An authoress by profession, Vera Brittain moved in prominent literary circles and, as a politically conscious individual on the left of centre of the Labour Party, she also knew many important political figures. Among her intimates she counted three of the most noted women writers of the interwar years: Winifred Holtby, Phyllis Bentley and (Margaret) Storm Jameson. A perusal of Vera Brittain's appointment books for the nineteen-thirties reveals an impressive list of literary, political and other figures including H. G. Wells, Wyndham Lewis, H. N. Brailsford, Charles Trevelyan, James Maxton,
The diaries and the wealth of personal correspondence which comprise a large portion of the Vera Brittain MSS are pre-eminently personal records. They are of a great interest and value to the historian as Brittain was a keen observer of national and international events. The materials record the development of the thought and the actions of an individual pacifist. They are unique in the insight and detail which they afford, with regard to the peace movement in general, and the Peace Pledge Union in particular.

Vera Mary Brittain was born in Staffordshire in 1893. Her father, Thomas Arthur Brittain, was a successful provincial manufacturer, a member of that class to whom the nineteenth century seemed to belong. Vera Brittain and her younger brother, Edward Harold Brittain, were given a comfortable and conventional upper-middle-class upbringing by their parents. Miss Brittain, however, showed the symptoms of revolt and revealed from her early adolescence a dogged determination to realise her ambitions. She had decided upon a literary career, producing her first novel at the age of seven and a further four before the age of eleven. Brittain described these initial efforts as being "full of misunderstanding, catastrophe, agonised soliloquies, deathbed scenes and repentances." Quite clearly she did not escape the pervasive influence of the Evangelicalism, its devotion to good works and seriousness toward causes, which as a sensitive child she absorbed with osmotic thoroughness. But
as Brittain approached her middle teens she became angrily aware of what she perceived as the restrictive nature of her upbringing, and of the constraints that late Victorian society placed upon individuals, particularly upon women. It is clear that her boarding school, St. Monica's in Kingswood, Surrey, guided by its progressive headmistress, Miss Heath-Jones, nurtured Brittain's nascent feminism.

Having decided upon becoming a writer, Brittain further determined to that end to attend university. This decision was greeted with dismay by her parents. An early marriage and subsequent motherhood were the expected developments for a young woman of Brittain's class. In 1913 she wrote: "It feels sad to be a woman! Men seem to have so much more the choice as to what they are intended for." Against, therefore, the daunting opposition of her parents—notably her father—Vera Brittain applied to Oxford and won an Exhibition at Somerville to read English. Her struggle to ensure a higher education for herself contrasted sharply with the expectation of her parents that her brother, Edward, would automatically go up to Oxford after leaving public school. This differentiation naturally reinforced her feminist beliefs. It was, therefore, with considerable satisfaction that Brittain anticipated going up to Oxford, in the autumn of 1914, in the company of her brother and his close schoolfriend, Roland Leighton—to whom she was shortly to become engaged. The advent of war shattered these hard-won dreams. Edward, Roland, and two of their school friends—
Geoffrey Thurlow and Victor Richardson—both of whom were also very well known to Vera Brittain, immediately volunteered for military service and were quickly commissioned. Brittain, for her part, was unable to endure a "secluded life of scholastic vegetation" since life at Oxford contrasted too sharply with the privations of her brother and friends. Accordingly, Brittain interrupted her studies at the end of her first year and in June 1915 began training as a Volunteer Aid Detachment nurse. She subsequently saw nursing service in England and Malta, and in field hospitals in Western France. These experiences left an indelible mark upon her and are recounted in Testament of Youth. More indelible, however, were the marks left by the successive deaths of Roland, Geoffrey, Victor and Edward.

After the war, feeling that almost all she had ever loved and valued in life had been taken from her, Brittain attempted to salvage that which did remain, namely, her literary ambitions. In 1919 she returned to Oxford to resume her studies. One measure of the war's impact was her decision to read History rather than English. This was prompted by her desire to understand the making of the cataclysmic events which had heralded the twentieth century. Another result of the war was the feeling of isolation and discomfort she experienced among younger women undergraduates who had no experience of war, nor any apparent desire or concern to learn about the conflict. The chapter in Testament of Youth which details Brittain's return to Oxford
is poignantly titled "Survivors Not Wanted". A number of writers have commented upon this generational discontinuity. Brittain was a survivor of an Oxford generation, the majority of whom had either been killed or so transformed by their wartime service that they could not join in the pretence that an unfortunate episode had been concluded, and that it was now possible to live life as if nothing had happened. The first generation of students to go up to Oxford after the war thought confusedly of the war years; they were repelled by its brutality and wholesale slaughter, but they were envious of those who had seen service and guilty at not having participated themselves. Philip Toynbee commented:

Even in our Anti-War campaigns of the early thirties we were half in love with the horrors we cried out against, and as a boy I can remember murmuring the name 'Passchendaele' in an ecstacy of excitement and regret.

But it was in the first troubled months of her return to Somerville that Brittain met Winifred Holtby, a gifted writer and a former member of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps who had also chosen to return to her studies following the conclusion of hostilities. Thus began a profound friendship that ended only with Holtby's untimely death in 1935. This story is told in Testament of Friendship. After successfully completing their degrees, Brittain and Holtby pooled their resources and took a flat together in Bloomsbury. Brittain was anxious to "make it" in London's literary circles. Holtby, by contrast, was
less overtly ambitious; she was a Yorkshire woman and
confident in the fiercely proud regionalism shared by
natives of the North of England, notably Yorkshire. But
for Vera Brittain, her provincial background and upbringing
were burdens and symbols of the constraints she had felt
and fought as a young woman. Her Buxton identity was one
that she passionately wanted to shed and she attempted to do
so in her first novels. In 1923 and in 1924, after much
struggling, Brittain published The Dark Tide and Not Without
Honour. Neither was received with critical acclaim, nor
did they bring their author much financial remuneration
although The Dark Tide was reprinted four times.

Both The Dark Tide and Not Without Honour revolved
about feminist themes and were not concerned with the
provincial world she had vowed to leave behind and about
which Holtby was to write so brilliantly in South Riding.
The Dark Tide told of life in a women's college in Oxford
and was coolly received by Somerville which boycotted the
book. Brittain's style tended at first to be lugubrious
and laborious. Although in later years it assumed a rather
more streamlined and fluent form, it still placed demands on
the reader. Brittain modelled herself on the school of
nineteenth-century realists of whom George Eliot was the
greatest example. Winifred Holtby, Phyllis Bentley and
Storm Jameson were also of this school. Their writings,
however, were more successful works since they were naturally
talented writers of fiction. Brittain was a capable writer
and her determination to succeed unrelenting, but her abilities and gifts were not suited to the accepted genre of the twenties, and her efforts were consequently forced. When Brittain did excel was in reportage; she was a keen and perceptive observer of events. Her study of history and international relations at Oxford caused her to strive for a theoretical and analytical approach to her work. This stood her in good stead during the early years of her life as an author, since she derived a semblance of an income from writing a variety of articles for newspapers and journals. Brittain was also better able to convey her political and social ideas through this medium; in her novels, they assume a certain turgidity. Brittain did not write very subtly; a short, sharp delivery where motive and purpose did not require complexity suited her style and approach to writing best of all. Unfortunately, Brittain tried to mould her own style into what she thought was the expected and accepted literary style. In imitating the nineteenth-century realists Brittain doused her own spark of creativity and originality, for as a writer she did possess qualities of style and approach which were unique, and indeed precursive of much of the documentary form of writing of the "Auden generation" of the thirties.

The 1930s was a decade of commitment by intellectuals to causes, most notably the condition of the working classes. Reconstruction had failed—there were no homes fit for heroes—and for many cynicism and despair replaced
what seemed, in retrospect, a misplaced faith in liberal humanism either to build houses or to keep the European peace. Implicit in Brittain's hope for a new world and European order was a commitment to social reform. As early as 1922, through the League of Nations Union, Brittain had met (Sir) Percy Harris, the soon to be successful Liberal candidate in the general election of that year for South-West Bethnal Green. Favourably impressed by Harris, Brittain agreed to help in the election campaign, speaking from political platforms and penning speeches of a Radical-Socialist hue. Brittain's excursions into London's East End constituted a social and political "journey to Damascus". Brittain's reactions are of great interest since they convey some of the shock and indignation at prevailing social conditions which contributed to the radicalisation of many Oxbridge graduates a decade later and won for Russian communism some of its most infamous British recruits.

For the first time, during those General Elections of 1922 and 1923, I came into intimate contact with the homes of the poor, and learnt, as my provincial middle-class upbringing had never permitted me to learn, the semi-barbarous conditions - intensified beyond calculation by the War and its consequences - under which four-fifths of the population are obliged to live in a confused and suffering world. I saw men fighting one losing battle against economic depression and increasing unemployment, while the women waged another against excessive procreation combined with an accumulation of wasteful, interminable domestic detail ....

And like George Orwell, who was to undertake his researches for *The Road to Wigan Pier* over ten years later, Brittain did not think philanthropy was any answer but merely an
exercise in self-deception.  

[The social conditions Brittain saw] made me politically minded once and for all; I knew that for the rest of my life I could never again feel free from the obligation of working with those who were trying to change the social system that had made this grim chaos possible, and I began to turn more definitely towards the Party which represented the spirit as well as the substance of that democracy to whose future I was for ever bound by the common experiences of the War.

The "Party" in question was the Labour Party which Brittain and Holtby joined in 1924, after resigning their short-lived membership in the National Liberal Club.

One writer has commented that in the early thirties the activists of the Labour movement concentrated their energies on two issues: first, upon the reincarnated "condition of England question", and secondly upon the Great War and its manifold repercussions. Brittain identified herself with these two issues and was working for their resolution over half a decade before Labour activists began their concerted campaigns. Brittain, with considerable acumen, had anticipated the commitment of intellectuals to causes which were to figure so largely in the nineteen-thirties.

In the late 1920s and during the 1930s British writers also experienced a rediscovery of their European identity. A number travelled to the Continent, the best known being Christopher Isherwood. Brittain, together with Holtby, had also anticipated this trend and shown herself to be in the vanguard of the politically aware. In September 1921, after coming down from Oxford, Brittain and Holtby
exhausted their savings on a European holiday, anxious to see postwar Europe for themselves. In the following year, Brittain was also on the Continent, attending a League of Nations Union summer school in Geneva, and in 1924 she and Holtby visited Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Germany. Of the postwar atmosphere in Germany she commented: "This country frightens me." Germany was oppressive and England, the League of Nations and the postwar order had, in Brittain's mind, entirely failed to enact positive change. Her first-hand look at Europe compounded by her experiences in Bethnal Green convinced Vera Brittain that the world order had to be changed: "So it was that I became a Socialist ...." Brittain still shared the view held by many liberals that her generation had been betrayed at Versailles. Similarly she shared their guilt over the punitive peace and their lament for the miscarriage of the promised new world of social and international justice. In Testament of Youth Brittain said that she knew little of the Union of Democratic Control, or of pacifism, but I had already started on the road which was ultimately to lead me to association with the group that accepted internationalism as a creed.

The hope of a new world order, however, grew increasingly tenuous and by the end of the twenties novels expressed a deep and bitter disillusionment with the prevailing social and political situation. Individuals reflected upon the enormous sacrifices which had been made during the Great War and which had, apparently, come to
nought. Moreover, to the negativism of "Never Again" was added a mental fatalism or mood which, paradoxically, accepted the possibility of another European bloodletting. Such was the peculiar thirties state of mind, a sense of being bracketed by wars, like a lost battalion pinned down by shellfire that will eventually be on target.\textsuperscript{125}

The public imagination quickly concluded, given that "the bomber would always get through",\textsuperscript{126} that European civilisation could not withstand another cataclysmic convulsion. The prevalence of this belief, and of the escalating irrationality with which some individuals reacted, is well captured in Evelyn Waugh's \textit{Vile Bodies}.\textsuperscript{127} Causes and vocations are abandoned and life becomes one round of parties, shot through with affectation, coxcombry and derision: "It is a generation's judgment of a world emptied of significance."\textsuperscript{128} Father Rothschild, one character with some claim to vocation, is of the view that war is inevitable not because individuals have willed it, but because

\begin{quote}
there is a radical instability in our whole world-order, and soon we shall all be walking into the jaws of destruction again, protesting our pacific intentions.\textsuperscript{129}
\end{quote}

But Brittain did not escape the sort of world captured and portrayed by Waugh, for it was not entirely parabolic. The late twenties and early thirties saw in Vera Brittain's own life a strange admixture of reality and unreality, of falsity and deep sincerity. These dual and
divergent patterns derived from Brittain's determination to break into London's charmed literary circle which, she had concluded, had to be done on that circle's terms, rather than on her own. This mood is very readily apparent in Brittain's personal diary for the year 1934. Several entries reveal Brittain's desire to be associated with the titled and famous. She craved the acceptance and approval of her literary friends. In her appointment books appear an endless catalogue of parties, luncheons and dinners. Her diary entries provide the reader with a glimpse of the sort of society portrayed and satirised in Vile Bodies, which Vera Brittain saw performed on stage in 1932. But although Brittain's social life might have a quality of unreality about it, she was, at the same time, deeply involved in working for the League of Nations Union—work which she approached with an overwhelming degree of commitment and a selfless expenditure of energy.

Brittain's own literary ambitions had been greatly frustrated by the indifference of the publishing world. Already in 1922 Brittain had wished to publish her own war diaries under the title: A Chronicle of Youth. In 1924 she entered an autobiographical competition in which she was unsuccessful. Of her manuscript she wrote: "Naive, amusing, pathetic; hence worth keeping, and possibly, when far enough back in history, worth publishing." The diary entries have an arresting quality about them, an immediacy and directness which is in some measure lost in Testament of
Youth. Although the latter is a powerful book, Brittain felt constrained to adapt her style and presentation to her perception of the prevailing literary fashion. The original diaries are infinitely more poignant. Nevertheless Testament of Youth was published by Victor Gollancz in 1933 and was immediately acclaimed by the critics and the general public alike. The success of the book catapulted Brittain into the literary limelight, giving her the public recognition as a writer which she had always sought. In the twenty-five years following its publication, Testament of Youth passed through nineteen editions and remains the best-selling book ever to be published by Gollancz.

Brittain had hoped to achieve two ends by publishing the book: first, to speak in the cause of peace, and second:

To show why the particular generation caught up in the war was so easily exploited [owing] ... to the standards universally held by the middle classes in our childhood and youth. These standards, especially as she perceived them relating to war, Brittain was dedicated to demolishing and replacing. In this she was part of a larger rebellion by British youth and the emerging intelligentsia against the standards and values that were identified with the old men of Europe—with those who had presided over the war and so disastrously over the reconstruction which ostensibly was to have followed. This failure, made emotively graphic by such protests as the hunger marches of the 1930s, resuscitated a general political and social activism. The revival was
reflected in publishers lists—notably in an outpouring of books about the Great War. This heightened sensitivity may explain the willingness of both publishers and public to accept Brittain's work in 1933, and its apparent failure to make any impression nine years earlier. Testament of Youth is noteworthy not only for its literary and autobiographical content, but also in the type of writing it represents. Hynes writes that from 1933 one, documentary writing assumed an increasingly important role among the literary genres of the thirties, and that literary realism virtually disappeared, overwhelmed, one might say, by reality itself.

Brittain's A Chronicle of Youth had anticipated this genre; Testament of Youth was very close to the subsequent documentary movement of the middle thirties, although Brittain's continued adherence to the nineteenth-century realists marred its purity.

Faithful to her stated purpose in writing Testament of Youth, Brittain utilised her new-found acclaim as much as she could, speaking at innumerable League of Nations meetings. But by the end of the 1930s, it was readily apparent to Brittain that the leadership of the Union was becoming uninspiring and myopic, whilst the organisation as a whole was systematically ousting the "left-wing element" to which Brittain belonged. She was also of the opinion that the League of Nations platform was being used to advocate rearmament, not so much in the name of collective security, but as a pretext for strengthening Britain
militarily.\textsuperscript{140}

In short, Brittain felt that the successful development and growth of the League of Nations was, like the Weimar Republic—another arguably still-born creation of Versailles—severely limited. The League never enjoyed adequate conditions for life, and those which did prevail produced a gross deformity. Hence, by the autumn of 1936, Vera Brittain was forced to admit that the League of Nations Union was no longer the organisation in support of which she had spoken from so many platforms. Accordingly, in January 1937 she became a sponsor of Dick Sheppard's recently formed Peace Pledge Union\textsuperscript{141} and, in keeping with her new broad pacifist position, Brittain took a neutralist stance over the issue of the Spanish civil war. The war, which began in 1936, had a very significant impact on a number of British writers.\textsuperscript{142} Brittain, however, remained largely outside the passionate debate generated by the conflict. She was not untouched by the war; her husband, George Catlin, visited Spain early in 1937 as a representative of the National Joint Committee for Spanish Relief.\textsuperscript{143} From him, Brittain was able to learn of the physical realities of the civil war, but she neither wrote at length about the war nor of her opinions regarding it.\textsuperscript{144} Her own position was neutral, although neutrality was viewed with equal loathing by those writers and intellectuals who supported the Republican Government and those who supported Franco. In 1937 Brittain responded to a question posed to writers by the
Left Review urging them to declare their respective stances on the Spanish issue. In Testament of Experience Brittain decried the departure (which this inquiry represented) of intellectuals "from their supreme function of disseminating impartial wisdom." She nevertheless responded in terms which heavily underscored her broad pacifist commitment:

AS AN UNCOMPROMISING PACIFIST, I hold war to be a crime against humanity, whoever fights it and against whomever it is fought. I believe in liberty, democracy, free thought and free speech. I detest Fascism and all that it stands for, but I do not believe that we shall destroy it by fighting it. And I do not feel that we serve either the Spanish people or the cause of civilisation by continuing to make Spain the battleground for a new series of Wars of Religion.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER ONE


2 Brock, Pacifism in Europe, 25.

3 The Quaker peace testimony was embodied in a document entitled: "A Declaration from the Harmless and Innocent People of God ..." set before Charles II in January 1661. See Brock, Pacifism in Europe, 268-71.

4 Elizabeth Isichei, Victorian Quakers, 10 and 162-5.

5 Of the moral revolution wrought by the Evangelicals, one historian has written:

   Between 1780 and 1850 the English ceased to be one of the most aggressive, brutal, rowdy, outspoken, cruel and bloodthirsty nations in the world and became one of the most inhibited, polite, orderly, tender-minded, prudish and hypocritical.


6 Isichei, Victorian Quakers, 16-25.

7 Isichei, Victorian Quakers, 220.


10 Tyrrell, "Making the Millennium", 85. For the lib-lab alliance see Brian Harrison and Patricia Hollis, "Chartism, liberalism and the life of Robert Lowrey", English Historical Review LXXXII (1967), 503-35. Harrison and Hollis seek to redress the balance which has hitherto discounted the connection between and the impact of Chartism and Liberalism. "If Chartists must be incorporated into political party pedigrees, Liberals have as much claim to them as Labour." Harrison and Hollis, "Chartism, liberalism", 505.


13 Tyrrell, "Making the Millennium", 95. See also Beales, History of Peace, 96-116.


15 A. J. P. Taylor, The Trouble Makers. Dissent over Foreign Policy, 1792-1939 (London: Panther, 1969). This quotation exaggerates the influence of Cobden. If Taylor is correct, it is hard to account for the ascendancy of Palmerston, 1855-65.

16 Isichei, Victorian Quakers, 200-01.

17 Isichei, Victorian Quakers, 200.

19 Isichei, Victorian Quakers, 225. See also Beales, History of Peace, 137-49. That which immediately follows is derived principally from Beales whose analysis and assessment of the nineteenth-century English peace movement is a most useful and well written guide to which I am considerably indebted.

20 Beales, History of Peace, 136-7. Cremer was to be the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1903. Note Gladstone's arbitration of the Alabama dispute.

21 Beales, History of Peace, 140. Beales points out that Salisbury was to later change his mind on the issue of arbitration.

22 Beales, History of Peace, 191-5; 222-7 and 273-4.


26 In 1899 and 1907 the Hague Peace Conferences were held. That of 1899 established the International Hague Court--the Permanent Court of Arbitration--which dealt with fifteen cases before 1914. See S. J. Hemleben, Plans for World Peace through Six Centuries (New York: Garland, 1972), especially 96-137.

The Peace Conferences held at the Hague were the first truly international assemblies meeting in time of peace for the purpose of preserving peace, not of concluding a war then in progress. They marked an epoch in the history of international relations.


28 Isichei, Victorian Quakers, 35.

30 Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 16. This was also a dilemma for the Labour Party in the interwar years. See R. W. Lyman, "The British Labour Party: The Conflict between Socialist Ideals and Practical Politics between the Wars", Journal of British Studies V (1965), 140-52.

31 Some of these works include: David Boulton, Objection Overruled (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1967); Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain; Thomas C. Kennedy, The Hound of Conscience: a History of the No-Conscription Fellowship 1914-1919 (Fayetteville, Ark.: University of Arkansas Press, 1981); John Rae, Conscience and Politics. The British Government and the Conscientious Objector to Military Service, 1916-1919 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970); Keith Robbins, The Abolition of War. The 'Peace Movement' in Britain, 1914-1919 (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1976); Peter Stansky (ed.), The Left and the War: The British Labour Party and World War I (New York: OUP, 1969); Marvin Swartz, The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics during the First World War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971); Jo Vellacott, Bertrand Russell and the Pacifists in the First World War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980). The above may be richly supplemented from a plenum of autobiographies and memoirs. No attempt is being made in this section to repeat that history but only to continue to trace the Liberal, Dissenting tradition to which the PPU was heir. The outline which follows is indebted to Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 31-61.


33 Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 32.

34 Swartz, The Union of Democratic Control.


36 Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience, 75-8. The similarity between the analysis of the causes of the war and the aims of the UDC, and the Fourteen Points enunciated by President Woodrow Wilson in January 1918 is plain. The latter "constituted the most comprehensive and striking presentation yet of a liberal programme, almost exactly endorsing the aims of the British radicals." Howard, 81.
37 Ceadel, *Pacifism in Britain*, 31-61.


The influence of the pacifist elements within the I.L.P. has ... been exaggerated by its opponents and some observers. There was, it is true, a large pacifist minority in the I.L.P. but it was a minority. No pacifist resolutions were passed at any I.L.P. conference during the period of this study and the I.L.P.'s opposition to the war was based on socialist principles which were accepted by other parties which could never be described as pacifist. Some pacifists did advocate peace at any price during the Second World War, but the majority of I.L.P.ers were committed to fighting to defend a socialist Britain and the party had a thriving Forces branch.

The majority of I.L.P.ers seem to have been pacificist rather than pacifist. Thwaites, 37.


40 See Stansky, *The Left and War*. The PPU's diversity was such that exponents and advocates of all three modes of witness were to be found among the Union's membership.

41 Ceadel, *Pacifism in Britain*, 41.


47 Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 62. The pacifists also felt comfortable in the Labour Party because many of the socialist idealists shared with them a commitment to their respective beliefs which transcended politics.

To Michael Foot . . . [and others] it is distasteful, even perhaps immoral, for Labour to accept the role of a mere political party. They require a more exalted view than that. For them, Labour exists as a social movement, which aims at a fundamental reordering of society. It must be revolutionary in every sense but that of requiring violence at the barricades.


49 Raymond Postgate, The Life of George Lansbury (London: Longmans and Green, 1951). Vera Brittain had been keen to write Lansbury's biography but his family was worried that Brittain "would make him 'pacifist-in-chief' and disregard his involvement with the Labour Party." Postgate was Lansbury's son-in-law. Interview, Rache Lovat Dickson, Toronto, Ontario, 3 May 1979. Brittain reviewed Postgate's biography of Lansbury in Peace News, 30 November 1951.

50 Lansbury was born in 1859.


52 Pimlott, Labour and the Left, 26-7.

53 Pimlott, Labour and the Left, 73.

54 Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 62.


57 Thompson, "Lord Cecil", 950.


61 Pugh, "Pacifism and Politics", 652-4.


63 Pugh, "Pacifism and Politics", 654.

64 Ceadel notes that the greatest response to the Peace Ballot came from traditional areas of nonconformity. "Peace Ballot", 829.


66 Blake, "Baldwin and the Right", 56.

67 Pugh, "Pacifism and Politics", 655.

68 Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 125.
69 Pugh, "Pacifism and Politics", 654.

70 Morrison, I Renounce War, 100.

71 Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 178. After twelve months 80,000 signatures had been received. D. Lucowitz, "British Pacifists and Appeasement: The Peace Pledge Union", Journal of Contemporary History 9 (1974), 11. Canon Sheppard's appeal prompted G. K. Chesterton to write to the Church Times that Sheppard's action "finally convinced me of his solid, stupendous, and stupefying innocence." Quoted in Adeline (Schiller) Kyle, "The Peace Pledge Union" (M.A. paper, McMaster University, 1979), 44.

72 Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 178. Women were not, at first, invited to join the PPU. See H. R. L. Sheppard, "Women and Peace", New Statesman and Nation, 4 July 1936, 11.


80 See Lukowitz, "British Pacifists and Appeasement".

81 See, for example, Rebecca West, The Meaning of Treason (London: Macmillan, 1952). First published 1947. See also VBC/Notebook, "Notes on Pethick Lawrence and the P.P.U."

82 Taylor, The Trouble Makers, 181. Even the announcement of the unholy pact between Stalin and Hitler did not purge the Labour Party of pacifism. Pacifism became a subterranean stream which periodically continues to burst the banks of the Labour Party.

83 Swartz, Union of Democratic Control.
84 Calder, *The People's War*, 41.


88 *The Times*, 30 March 1970.


90 The author of Brittain's obituary notice in *The Times* noted Brittain's lack of humour. A number of persons interviewed who knew Brittain also commented on her inability to muster much more than a social smile.


V. A. Nurse: The Voluntary Aid Detachments were established in 1910, under the management of the British Red Cross Society and the St. Johns' Ambulance Association, to assist the professional military nursing services of the Territorial Force in any emergency. A Women's Voluntary Aid Detachment usually consisted of 23 women, but the initials "V.A.D." quickly came to refer to an individual member.

From Alan Bishop (ed.), Chronicle of Youth, note 216, unpub. mss.

Lt. Geoffery Robert Youngman Thurlow.
10th Sherwood Foresters.
Killed in action--Monchy-Le-Preux, 23 April 1917.
Grave unknown.

Lt. Victor Richardson, M.C.
9th Kings Royal Rifle Corps.
Blinded at Vimy Ridge, 9 April 1917. Died of wounds 2nd London Hospital, 9 June 1917.
Buried Hove, Sussex.

Capt. Edward Harold Brittain, M.C.
11th Sherwood Foresters.
Killed in action on the Italian Front, 15 June 1918.
Buried Granezza, Lusiania.
Lt. Roland Aubrey Leighton.
7th Worcesters.
Died of wounds received near Hébuterne,
23 December 1915.
Buried Louvencourt.

99 Brittain, Testament of Youth, 467-534.


103 Vera Brittain, The Dark Tide (London: Grant Richards, 1923); Vera Brittain, Not Without Honour (London: Grant Richards, 1924). See VBC/A1; A2.

104 It was, however, through correspondence regarding her first novel that Brittain met her husband, George Catlin, whom she married in 1925. See Sir George Catlin, For God's Sake Go! (Gerrard's Cross: Smythe, 1972).


106 Brittain, Testament of Youth, 611. Brittain's name remains an unpopular one with the College to this day.

107 I am grateful to Dr. Alan Bishop for clarifying a number of points regarding this school of English literature.

108 Interview with H. Lovat Dickson, Toronto, 3 May 1979. Lovat Dickson was Brittain's publisher.

109 Interview with H. Lovat Dickson.


112 Hynes, The Auden Generation, 131, 303-07.

113 Brittain, Testament of Youth, 570.


119 Brittain, Testament of Youth, 640.

120 Brittain, Testament of Youth, 647-8.

121 Brittain, Testament of Youth, 470. Also, Vera Brittain's poem, below, "Lament of the Demobilised".
"Four years," some day consolingly. "Oh well, What's that? You're young. And then it must have been A very fine experience for you!"
And they forget
How others stayed behind and just got on -
Got on the better since we were away.
And we came home and found
They had achieved, and men revered their names,
But never mentioned ours;
And no one talked heroics now, and we
Must just go back and start again once more.
"You threw four years into the melting-pot -
Did you indeed!", these others cry. "Oh well,
The more fool you!"
And we're beginning to agree with them.

Vera Brittain, Testament of Youth, 467.

122 Brittain, Testament of Youth, 472.

123 Brittain, Testament of Youth, 473. The VBC does contain some correspondence, of a general nature, dating from December 1930 between Brittain and the UDC. It is recorded that Brittain made financial contributions to the organisation in 1936, 1939 and 1944.

124 T. O. Lloyd, From Empire to Welfare State, 151.


126 The phrase is that of Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin.


129 Waugh, Vile Bodies, 133. A view to which Vera Brittain would have added a fervent "Amen".

130 VBC/D16, Holograph Diary, 1934.

131 Vera Brittain attended a performance of Vile Bodies at the Vaudeville Theatre with Phyllis Bentley on 10 May 1932. Her comment was: "very amusing". VBC/D14, "Reflective Road, 1932".
She was also raising two children, a son John, born in 1927 and a daughter Shirley, born in 1930.


Alan Bishop (ed.), *Chronicle of Youth* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1981) has shown this.


CHAPTER TWO

THE PEACE PLEDGE UNION--
MEMBERSHIP AND GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION

Well then, if war is madness and Hitler is mad, why reply to madness with madness? Why fight? Why not be a pacifist?

Stephen Spender

Some Roads to Damascus

The Peace Pledge Union, as already noted, was founded in 1934-5 by an Anglican priest, Canon Hugh Richard Lawrie Sheppard. Of 'Dick' Sheppard much has been written, and it would seem that all are agreed on many counts that he was an exceptional individual. He was a Canon of St. Paul's Cathedral, a man of independent wealth, education and social connection. But Sheppard also had a presence and charisma which communicated his genuine warmth and concern for people across class barriers, to individuals from all walks of life. Roy Walker, a youthful and prominent member of the wartime PPU, recalled that "Dick Sheppard could turn a crowd into a community just because he was there." Indeed, the extent of Sheppard's personal appeal cannot be underestimated. For many who joined the PPU, Dick Sheppard

72
was the personification of the movement and the wellspring of that pacifist inspiration. Sheppard's own source of inspiration was deeply Christian but he wished the Union to have a universal appeal. The only qualification for membership involved the signing of a pledge card; all other factors, political, religious or economic were of secondary importance. This is well illustrated by his invitation to Vera Brittain to become a member and sponsor of the PPU.

In 1936 Brittain was an authoress of considerable acclaim, on the strength of the extraordinary success of *Testament of Youth*. She was a supporter of collective security and a member of the League of Nations Union. In other words, Brittain was a low pacifist. It was therefore to her considerable alarm that on 20 June 1936 she found herself addressing a high and broad Christian pacifist peace rally of fifteen thousand people in the company of Dick Sheppard and a number of the Union's best known leaders, George Lansbury, Donald Soper and Laurence Housman. She was, however, to describe the day as "a turning point of my life." Writing to her husband on 21 June 1936, Brittain admitted that she felt herself increasingly drawn to the "complete pacifist outlook." The reasons, which she outlined in her letter, clearly showed her disillusionment with collective security and sanctions. Once even the possibility of war was admitted, justifications could "always be found." Brittain was also becoming increasingly persuaded that it
was the responsibility of writers, artists and religious leaders--the cultural elite--in contradistinction to politicians and statesmen, to "hold up before humanity the as yet, but not always, unattainable ideal." ⁹

In early July 1936 Vera Brittain wrote to Canon Sheppard indicating her changing position,

or rather, perhaps, it would be more truer [sic] to say that my views have remained unchanged while those of some among the numerous peace organizations to which I belong have turned aside (or so it seems to me) towards an uncomfortable degree of militarism. ¹⁰

But her missive was couched in cautious terms and she made clear that she was not yet ready to entirely change positions. In October, writing to Philip Yumfurd, treasurer of the PPU, she admitted her inclination to complete pacifism, but she could not envisage such a position ever being widely accepted as policy until after some experiment in genuine collective security has succeeded the present phase of reactionary nationalism. ¹¹

Three months later, however, Brittain's passage of conversion from low pacifism to broad pacifism was complete. Her frame of reference clearly underwent an important qualitative change. The Peace Pledge Union, she wrote,

 stands for such an utterly different conception of international relationships from anything we have had before that I can well understand that it seems strange and unthinkable to many people. It is, in effect, asking people to accept Christianity as a way of life when they have hitherto given it only lip-service and gone on as before. ¹²

On 27 January 1937, Sheppard wrote to Brittain asking if she
would become a sponsor of the Union. She agreed, and on 2 February Dick Sheppard jubilantly informed her of her unanimous election.\textsuperscript{13}

The seeds of this conversion had been planted some twenty years before, in the summer of 1917, when Brittain was nursing at a military hospital in Étaples.

One day, when I finished the gruesome and complicated dressing of a desperately wounded prisoner, a disturbing thought struck me. Wasn't it somehow odd that I, in Étaples, should be trying to save the life of a man whom my brother up at Ypres had perhaps done his best to kill? And didn't that argue the existence of some fundamental absurdity in the whole tragic situation?\textsuperscript{14}

But such thoughts of tragic irony did not emotionally catapult Brittain into a broad pacifist position. It was only with great reluctance that she admitted the bankruptcy of the trust she placed in the League of Nations for a new world order. Her pacifism, from its inception, was rationally and pragmatically inspired. Brittain's change of position was not sudden, but involved the gradual and at times unconscious adoption of a set of beliefs and values which crystallized into a total renunciation of war.

The conversion experiences of other leading pacifists varied; few were instantaneous. Sybil Morrison, an ex-public schoolgirl and Scottish field hockey international who drove an ambulance in France during the First War, became a pacifist when she saw a Zeppelin on fire, coming down over Harrow. She was horrified and revolted to see British people cheering at the gruesome fate of those individuals unlucky enough to be "roasting above their heads."\textsuperscript{15}
Patrick Figgis, for three years General Secretary of the PPU, similarly recalled the lasting impression created by the wreckage of a crashed Zeppelin, and the sight of a German who had cheated death by landing in a haystack. Figgis's conversion to pacifism was not an instant one. It was the result, first, of an attraction for the adversity inherent in belonging to a minority—a reason of which he was not proud. Secondly, when as a Christian minister he sought to help his congregation to understand the New Testament, he found the challenge of Christ's teaching concerning returning good for evil, and trying to love one's enemies, inescapable. Thirdly he recognised that if war came, no one could benefit from the ensuing conflict—"the bomber would always get through."

Nancy Rouse, a grass-roots member of the Union whose husband, a major in the Royal Army Medical Corps, died on Crete in May 1941, was only a child during the Great War. She clearly recalled, however, being taken by her governess to watch Pathe News films of the conflict at the cinema and being unable to reconcile what she saw with the obviously contradictory message emanating from the pulpit every Sunday. When, in the late 1930s John Barclay, the PPU group organiser, came to speak to the local Round Table in Worthing, he stayed as an overnight guest in her home. Rouse and Barclay discussed pacifism late into the night and a few months afterward Nancy Rouse joined the Union.

Unlike Brittain, Figgis, Morrison or Rouse, Mrs. Page—a member of the Walthamstow Peace Pledge Union—enjoyed
some familial support for her views. Her father, who had been brought up in the Liberal party, was a staunch Trade Unionist, a Methodist and a member of the No-Conscription Fellowship. Her brother, an accountant, was a Quaker and conscientious objector. Page recalled her father going to the Methodist church one Sunday and, upon hearing the minister praying for victory, walked out, never to return. She herself attended Sunday school and learnt that all men were brothers. This, she reasoned, precluded mutual slaughter. One evening, as an adult, when coming home from work she bought a copy of Peace News, read it, and decided to join the PPU. Another Methodist, Harry Mister, worked as a distributor of Peace News during the Second World War. Mister's father had been an RAMC stretcher bearer throughout the First War. At his father's knee he heard stories of the conflict and grew up with "a built in knowledge" of war which repelled him by its inhumanity. As a young man he abandoned the Church of England for the Methodists whom he found to be eminently "more vigorous and idealistic." The minister of the North London Methodist Church which he attended, Colin Roberts, was a Christian socialist who preached "straight pacifism" and a radical Christianity which called for revolutionary changes of attitudes in society. To underline the latter point Roberts opened his church hall for the hunger marchers during the 1930s. For Mister the powerful inspirational quality of witness by men like Roberts and Sheppard was an important factor in his conversion and in
that of many other individuals. Sheppard, he thought, appealed to the Christian conscience of Britain and placed Christianity in the contemporary social context, demonstrating its immediacy in a political sense rather than in terms of "the ultimacy of heaven." 20

Another leading pacifist, David Spreckley, arrived by the rather remarkable route of Dartmouth and Sandhurst. Forced to abandon a keenly anticipated naval career due to poor eyesight Spreckley went to Sandhurst and on passing out was commissioned in the 1st Royal Dragoons and posted to India. Life in the army, with twenty-three servants, left time for reading and in the library he found A. A. Milne, *Peace with Honour*. He resigned his commission and went to work for the Peace Pledge Union on a voluntary basis since he had a private income. His conversion, however, was not a sudden one. In 1932, at the age of seventeen, he had spent a year in Germany, living with a German family. He had been appalled by the social and economic situation prevailing in the country, and impressed by many of the people he met. The experience taught him not only "that there were two sides to every question" but also that there were "good" Germans. 21

At Dartmouth Spreckley had been duly impressed by naval standards, but at Sandhurst he was impressed only by the inordinate number of "clots" he met there. Spreckley's simultaneous questioning of the competence of army officers led him to question war itself. When he joined the FPU he did so on purely rational grounds. 22
It is readily apparent, even from this limited sample, that a number of varied factors, never acting in isolation, accounted for the decision of each individual to embrace pacifism and amply demonstrate the catholicity of the Union's appeal.

The Membership of the Peace Pledge Union

And in a Dark Age there is only one thing that individual men and women can do and that is to keep the little glimmers of reason and humanity alight.

G. S. Spinks

The membership and regional distribution of the Peace Pledge Union has never before been the subject of precise calibration or of close description. The following two sections represent the first extended analysis of the degrees of linkage between personal experience, motivation, class, education, regional location, traditional religious dissent and the profession of pacifism. The understandable failure of the Peace Pledge Union to appreciate the relevance of these variables for its public appeal, and its inability to overcome the barriers of class and education, shed considerable light upon the subsequent wartime successes and failures of the Union.

Martin Ceadel, in his book Pacifism in Britain, 1914-1945, devotes one chapter to a brief discussion of the types of individuals drawn to the pacifist movement. He comments that the historian, in "trying to find out what was
the distinctive appeal of pacifism ... cannot explore his own hunches ...", yet Ceadel seems, at times, to come very close to doing just that. 25 Ceadel advances a hypothesis which suggests that many of the individuals who joined the Peace Pledge Union did so because they were eccentrics. 26 There is, certainly, a detectable correlation between an artistic temperament, or vegetarian diet, or homosexual proclivity and pacifism, but these characteristics alone do not account for the membership of the pacifist movement. Indeed, one must wonder why some homosexuals chose the PPU and others the Guards. Ceadel also notes that a high proportion of the leading pacifists were experiencing difficulties of one sort or another at the time of their conversion to pacifism. Certainly serious problems frequently demand drastic solutions and many experiences of religious conversion have come as a result of unusual personal circumstances. The Damascus experience is not a Pauline prerogative.

That the leading pacifists were, to use Donald Soper's expression, "an odd lot", is not surprising, in that "odd" or exceptional people frequently rise to the leadership ranks of any group. 27 Proportionally speaking, the number of "oddities" in the Peace Pledge Union might not have been more than in any other group. 28 A Mass Observation report on Conscientious Objection concluded in 1940:

Actually the chief odd things about them [the pacifists] from the conventional point of view are a tendency to
be vegetarian, love their mothers, love animals, and not all these things are unconventional.\textsuperscript{29}

Yet popular perceptions die hard and stereotyping is the norm of wartime propagandists. In another Mass Observation report on the attitude of people to pacifists, in September 1943, the tendency to typecast is at once evident:

Well, of course, they're just a lot of frustrated individuals who can't make anything of their lives. The whole lot of them are neurotic, when they aren't plain frauds.\textsuperscript{[M35B]}\textsuperscript{30}

But having questioned Ceadel's treatment of the leadership of the Peace Pledge Union on the grounds of a tendency to portray pacifists as a collection of individuals blighted by all manner of mental, physical and sexual oddities, one must agree that "the leading pacifists were ... memorable and unusual personalities."\textsuperscript{31}

With respect to the class background of pacifists, Ceadel convincingly shows that the leaders of the Union were solidly middle and upper class. He tentatively suggests that the rank and file were probably also almost exclusively drawn from these classes, with the qualification that "the P.P.U.'s leading activists ... were probably more socially elevated than most of its supporters."\textsuperscript{32} The evidence of the class background of the rank and file is very limited. The student has to construct what can only be at best a composite picture from the limited assortment of fragmentary evidence which is available. Rache Lovat Dickson, Vera Brittain's publisher, described "taking up with causes" as "an ingrained English middle class habit" which, as Ceadel
observes, can be indulged on the strength of the amount of leisure, the degree of education and the economic security available to the middle class.\(^3\) The barriers of class were very difficult for the leadership of the PPU to overcome in order to draw in support from other classes, especially at a time when class distinctions were clearly pronounced.\(^4\) One of Vera Brittain's correspondents spiritedly expressed something of the barriers represented by class and economic security:

> Yes, if I was Mrs Vera Britain (sic) of 2 Cheyne Walk Chelsea, I think I could have noble ideas ... but could I, if I was Mrs Vera Britain (sic) of 2 Peabody Bldgs with an income of soldier's allowance or pension ....\(^5\)

The educational barrier was no less real. Another individual of working class background, who saw wartime service with the RAF Regiment, developed strongly pacifist views after arresting the survivor of a crashed German Dornier, which he had helped to shoot down. The German was a young man, about his own age (19) "who looked every bit as miserable and frightened as me." But although he could feel this degree of self-identification with the enemy, he could not identify with the pacifists because he felt "they were all eggheads [and] not like us."\(^6\) Donald Soper, when questioned about the lack of working class participation, said that the working class was always difficult to rouse to the point of involvement, since as a class they were too preoccupied with the business of living.\(^7\) Similarly, a correspondent in Peace News made the point that the working classes had no
time for causes. In other words, the appeal of pacifism and Christianity, both of which involved material detachment, could only be very limited for people who had little enough from which they could detach themselves.38 Soper also felt that the working class acquired a new-found sense of power during the difficult interwar years. This, he believed, embodied violence and dynamic action and as such was the antithesis of pacifism.39

Mass Observation stationed an observer at five Labour Exchanges in July 1940, on Registration days, to note the occupations of objectors.40 (Not all of these individuals could have registered as objectors on strictly pacifist grounds.) The observer was particularly impressed by the large number of those registering as COs who were in occupations "requiring particular intelligence, intuitive or educational training"; a high proportion were civil servants, of whom there were sufficient to form an occupational pacifist organisation, numbering 650 members.41 Two other occupational groups, well represented, were the Post Office and newspaper offices. The observer concluded his report by stating:

Only a small fraction of the whole lot could possibly be called working class. ... [and] as many again are skilled artisans. But the great majority are black coated workers, or people in special jobs indicating responsibility or personal ability above the mass level.42

These conclusions were further borne out by a limited survey of twenty-six conscientious objectors, the majority of whom
were pacifists on religious grounds. This also revealed that the respondents shared a high level of culture and intelligence and a marked preference for classical music and individual sports. In commenting upon this the author of the Bulletin, somewhat aggressively, explained that such "strongly individualistic people of the middle class" had the least stake in society because their individual talents were sufficiently specialised as to have a scarcity value, ensuring a future without struggle, regardless of the political system. An observer attending the PPU's Annual General Meeting in April 1942 similarly found the middle class to be the predominant group. There were roughly a thousand persons present at the session he attended, of whom two-fifths were women and three-fifths were men. Three-fifths of the audience were under forty years of age, while four-fifths were, he judged, to be drawn from the rich and middle classes and the remaining fifth from the ranks of artisans and skilled workers. A visitor to the Adelphi Centre in February 1942 reported: "Most of the people there have intellectual pretensions as most C.O.'s have - i.e. there are poets who don't write poetry and authors who don't write books ...." But he did have considerable praise for Joe Watson, the Warden and "the most ... sane person in the Centre." Responding to a directive issued by the MO in October 1942 an observer reported that I met members of the P.F.U. and was impressed by their arguments, though rather irritated by their intolerance and condescension, like members of an exclusive religion.
Vera Brittain herself was well aware of the existence of such damaging tendencies, particularly among die-hard pacifists.

You and I may think the State is wrong when it goes to war, but this does not mean that we are automatically right in every action we do and every decision we take. We cannot expect our country to adopt the humble and contrite heart which real peace-making requires unless we begin by modifying our own arrogance as a contribution.49

Brittain's conciliatory words reflected her broad pacifist position.

Another pacifist, a young man of twenty-four, wrote to Tom Harrisson, founder and head of the Mass Observation group:

You may be interested to know that I am secretary of a Pacifist group - we are not so fearfully subversive as the press would paint us, being harmless members of the Church of England. 50

He proceeded to supply Harrisson with a description of the group which included four clerks, three teachers, two engineers, two library assistants, three printers, two artists, the vicar and his wife (a former teacher), one unemployed person (sacked for his views) and one elderly gentleman of independent means.51 Once again the middle and upper class character of the group is evident and reflected in their obvious educational training and creative talents. The inclusion, in this group, of three active teachers is unusual. Ceadel remarks that the pressure to conform was stronger in the thirties than in the more liberal sixties, and this may explain why schoolteachers, one of the C.N.D.'s largest occupational
categories, seem to have played less of a role in the P.P.U. ....52

Many town councils dismissed or suspended conscientious objectors and since councils were important employers of teachers, numbers must have been affected by the independent decisions of individual councils; indeed, in Cardiff the ban specifically applied only to teachers.53 F. S. Way, an observer and teacher at the Blue Coat School in Reading, replying to MO's October 1942 directive, wrote:

Pacifists or C.O. 's, I won't distinguish them, seem to have had a poor time from the authorities, judging by the press, and there is one here that is being harmed wickedly. They are not content to let him be, a good schoolmaster who knows his job and is doing a good job, but will have him out, eventually, to work on the land or to clink again. People look all askance when I mention them, we have 3 out of 5, but when I say there is nobody else and so forth, they make no comment, though they take a poor view of me, I fancy, for breathing the same air.54

The pressures to conform, at least in this individual case, were clearly considerable.

One group of people noted frequently for their lack of conformity are artists, actors and writers. The PPU counted among its ranks such individuals as Benjamin Britten, Michael Tippett, Peter Piers, Eric Gill, Sybil Thorndike and Rose Macaulay. Undoubtedly, there existed a significant correlation between pacifism and the arts. In Edinburgh Art College, for example, there was a considerable pacifist element, while at the University apathy was widespread. The Mass Observation Report which notes this contrast comments that the situation at the Art College "does not originate
with party politics, nor can it be termed religious", but
the report offers no explanation of the situation.55 Donald
Soper, no particular friend of the arts, believed this
phenomenon was in part an aesthetic reaction, war being "such
a dirty business."56 Sybil Morrison carried this explanation
to a somewhat deeper level, expressing the opinion that
artists as a group, being creative and highly sensitive, also
possessed a natural instinct that forbade killing and gave
the example of Sir Michael Tippett as "an instinctive
conscientious objector."57 Tippett is probably the foremost
of contemporary British composers and current President of
the Peace Pledge Union. In 1944 he wrote a small penny
pamphlet entitled _Abundance of Creation_, which addressed
itself to the role of the artist in peace and politics. In
a section significantly entitled "La trahison des Clercs",
Tippett wrote:

> I remember in prison [in 1943 Tippett spent three months
in prison for his pacifist convictions] meeting the
general notion that anyone who had a gift such as music
should be exempted. Behind this feeling has the idea
that the whole province of art is outside the
disillusionment of war and politics; ... When the
church compounds with the state and there is a general
decline of values with no apparent bottom, then, as
Gill saw, artists have to contract-out individually if
art itself is to have value.58

Vera Brittain tackled this same question in an issue
of her _Letter to Peace Lovers_. The problem, as she saw it,
was that of reconciling aesthetic values with politics,
morality and social responsibility. Creativity was a pure
and eternal value, a human truth, that required its
witnesses to be above the vagaries of contingency and time:
"He who 'takes sides' merges the aesthetic in the political and begins to suppress truth ...." Interestingly, twenty-seven years earlier, in the autumn of 1914 Vera Brittain made the following entry in her diary:

I do not think that genii should be allowed in the Army. For one thing there are so few of the really great that their number could make no difference when battles are fought between millions, whereas in their own walks of life they make all the difference in the world .... Proud though a nation may be of the genius it has produced, that genius is not a national but a universal possession and should not be made to risk itself in a national quarrel.

In October 1939, Storm Jameson wrote a strong article in the *Times Literary Supplement* on the importance of truth and the writer's vocation to uphold it. Truth, she contended, was not a luxury the state could afford to sacrifice:

'Victory at all costs' is not a policy that a sane man, whether he be writer, politician, or general, can accept. There are Passchendaeles of the spirit as hideous, as useless, as dangerous as the prolonged agony of defeat.

The artist and the pacifist were frequently, therefore, found to be fighting the same war.

*The Regional Distribution of the Peace Pledge Union*

Beyond death's night
Lies the hour of birth,
When they the meek, shall inherit the earth.

Vera Brittain, 1950

The distribution of pacifists across the country was not uniform (see Map A in the map section at the conclusion of the chapter). London and the south of England produced a
higher proportion of registered COs than elsewhere. A Mass Observation report claimed that this was due to the fact that people in the south and London area were influenced more quickly by contemporary fashions in thought and also centred in London is a higher proportion of intelligent people - and most Pacifists who do not derive their convictions from particular religious beliefs do so from a highly intelligent and rational attitude to world affairs.

Certainly, the leadership of the Peace Pledge Union was not intellectually a lightweight one. It is also true that many of its leaders lived and pursued careers in and around the London area. Dick Sheppard House, the PPU's headquarters, provided a convenient focal point for the orchestration of activities. The distribution of materials, the availability of prominent speakers—such as Vera Brittain or Donald Soper—the full-time workers at the Peace Pledge Union offices, all of these provided a centre that was both strong and reinforcing. This partially explains the PPU's concentration in the London area. The same Mass Observation report also named Wales as an area of high pacifist concentration, which it attributed in the main to the strength of Methodism. The report notes that Methodists had the "largest Pacifist fellowship of any of the non-conformist sects (4,000 members)." Welsh nationalism is treated only as a contributory factor which would seem to contradict, to a certain extent, the understanding of the correlation shared by both the Civil Defence Committee of the Cabinet and the Peace Pledge Union. In the case of Scotland the relation-
ship between nonconformity and pacifism is again apparent;\textsuperscript{66} no mention is made of Scottish nationalism. In England the tendency for a regionalisation of sympathies based on nonconformity produced pockets of pacifist opinion. Norwich is mentioned as one notable centre of pacifism, a fact which is accounted for by the observation that the Norwich area was the home of Max Plowman and Middleton Murry of the \textit{New Adelphi}, and the location also of "week-end schools in Pacifism."\textsuperscript{67}

In 1941, John Barclay, the National Development Officer of the Peace Pledge Union, compiled an invaluable report on "Area Development Covering the Period 15 February-31 May, 1942". The PPU, for organisational and administrative purposes, divided Britain into seventeen districts (see Map B).\textsuperscript{68} These were overseen by Barclay, brother-in-law of Kingsley Martin, the editor of the \textit{New Statesman}, in his capacity as NDO until June 1942.\textsuperscript{69} In this work he was assisted by Area Representatives, elected by regional annual general meetings, with places on the National Council and who were responsible, in their turn, to the Area Committees.\textsuperscript{70} John Barclay described the job of the NDO as being...

\textquotedblleft... open to much criticism as everyone had his own ideas about organisation. I believe I am carrying out the wishes of the National Development Committee when I give practical expression to the policy of Development by seeking to create a synthesis between politics and religion. By this I mean the building up of a new political machine, the driving force of which is spiritual inspiration."\textsuperscript{71}

In fact, Barclay was, amid much dissension, dismissed as
NDO on account of his alleged disorganisation.72

From the first area, that of Northern Ireland, little information was available. The PPU group met regularly each week—no numbers are given—and Peace News was distributed from Belfast by group members. Peace News, in January 1941, reported that groups in Belfast continued to meet but that the public sale of Peace News had been abandoned in favour of a "private system of distribution." Weekly sales of the newspaper stood at seventy-two copies which can probably be taken as a rough guide to the PPU's Belfast membership.73 Northern Ireland may not have proved conducive territory to pacifism, historically speaking. The position in Scotland (Area 2) was not very encouraging. By 1942 the pacifist centre was shifting from Glasgow to Edinburgh but Scottish activities were hampered by "dead weight". John Glover, the Area Secretary, reported that

... I have not the slightest hope of progress being made by the P.P.U. during the war years and feel that if we can hold together the present nucleus of enthusiasts until more propitious times we shall have done all that can be done.74

In the Lake District (Area 3) activity had also abated and only four groups were reported to be active: Carlisle, Kendal, Windermere and Sedburgh. The Keswick FPU had become a Fellowship of Reconciliation group, while the members at Workington and Cockermouth had almost ceased meeting. In the North East (Area 4), Newcastle was the main centre, but pacifist activity was "dominated" by the War Resisters International, "and there is a distinct cleavage between
them and the more religiously minded members."\textsuperscript{75} The area boasted thirteen groups, all of whom, it would appear, held public meetings and distributed pacifist literature, including \textit{Peace News}. But these activities were on a strictly local level with little enthusiasm for proselytization. In contrast, the North Western region (Area 5) numbered some seventy-four groups of which thirty were "area-minded."\textsuperscript{76} At the close of 1941 it was recorded that the total average attendance at group meetings was six hundred and twenty-two. Significantly, the area had close contacts with the North West and with London, and its financial position was sound. The Yorkshire region (Area 6) would seem to have enjoyed relative strength. Activity here centred upon Hull in the east, and upon Sheffield and Doncaster in the south. The West Yorkshire region did not, however, favour "merging its identity" with the remainder of Yorkshire and was opposed to the formation of an area committee.\textsuperscript{77}

North Wales (Area 7) possessed twelve active groups although no centres are specified.

\textbf{The area is fairly equally divided between Welsh and English groups} .... The language difficulty is a real one and one which must not be allowed to grow. It can be overcome by sympathetic understanding of the deep roots of Welsh nationalism.\textsuperscript{78}

The report continued by observing that

\ldots Although the basis of the Welsh pacifist movement is religious and development is mainly along these lines, there is a strong political faith that is interwoven with the religious and therefore a very strong movement is growing which is out of touch with our own deliberations in London.\textsuperscript{79}
The PPU did make some effort to reach its Welsh audience by publishing some of its literature in Welsh and arranging for Welsh speakers to address public meetings—the area's principal activity. But Barclay was quite correct in pointing to the growing distance between London and North Wales and to the difficulties of communication in that region. Another powerful factor may have been the contrast between the seeming quietism of the London national executive council and the apparent political activism of the Welsh.

Yet if there was a distance between North Wales and London, there was equally a distance between the north and the south of Wales. The central part of that country offered little hope for development, a fact that may be explained by historical and geographical factors. In assessing South Wales (Area 11) Barclay remarked that development was "largely along religious and political lines" but with little stress, or interest, in either internal organisation or area development. Newport, Cardiff and Swansea are named as the main centres, there being

a political nucleus in Newport and Cardiff which is strongly socialist. The early groups that were formed in 1937 in the Rhondda have never lost their faith ...80

In the West Midlands (Area 8) the fortunes of the Peace Pledge Union were mixed, the area "consisting of a highly developed Birmingham region and of a very undeveloped Western region needing a great deal of special attention."81

Birmingham was a Quaker stronghold and clearly a very strong and prominent centre of PPU activity. The Birmingham
committee published some of its own materials, held weekly open air public meetings, and extended its influence beyond the city boundaries to Evesham, Coventry and Kidderminster. Oswestry and Shrewsbury were in some decline "though at one time" Oswestry was "one of the most progressive groups." The East Midlands (Area 9), however, was judged to be the "most active area in the country", having thirty-two groups. Internal regional development, study groups and weekend conferences counted among its area activities but its financial situation was not secure. Surprisingly, little is said of East Anglia (Area 10) save that pacifist activity was scattered and that the difficulties of distance militated against a better organisation of the area. Cambridge, Norwich and Ipswich are given as the three main centres of activity. The Western Region (Area 12) was said, in the report, to be "steadily improving." The region included Gloucestershire, Somerset, Wiltshire and Dorset--areas, that at first glance, would appear to show more promise as the retiring pastures of Colonel Blimps than the spawning grounds of nascent pacifist cells. In the neighbouring area of Buckinghamshire, Berkshire and Oxfordshire (Area 13), development was "mainly along political lines", perhaps a reflection of the region's good rail connections with London. The main centres of activity were Oxford, Reading and High Wycombe. But internal communications in the region did pose some problems for development. In London itself (Area 14) there were one
hundred and twelve groups—a mixed blessing since Barclay was concerned about the "danger of the country being run by London ideas", if the situation was not treated with due caution. He also noted that "spiritual development in the London area as far as the P.P.U. is concerned is slow." Prospects in Devon and Cornwall (Area 15) were poor, there being little hope for area development. The Southern Region (Area 16), despite its rural character and proliferation of aerodromes and military encampments, did offer some rays of hope. "There are 25 groups and most of them come within restricted defence areas." The South Eastern Region (Area 17) was similarly active, supporting twenty-one groups, although Brighton was singled out as affording "no luck."

In concluding his report on area development, John Barclay remarked that some individuals "are only too willing to support the movement if they can be assured that politics will be kept out, whilst others threaten to leave us if we become religious!" Understandably, the difficulties of area development were compounded by such diametrically opposing views which defied any attempts at conciliation. In his report Barclay accounts for some 317 groups. The official general report of the Sixth Annual General Meeting of the PPU, held in London in May 1943, recorded that 374 groups were recognised as meeting at the end of 1942.

It is important to analyse John Barclay's findings
and to account for the uneven distribution of the Peace Pledge Union's support across the country. The varying strength of the Union can best be explained by study of any given region's political history, tradition, culture, geography and religious affiliation. Considering the difficulties of contemporary electoral geographers, M. A. Busteed has written:

One of the greatest disadvantages lies in the fact that they must rely on data sources which may not enumerate all the politically relevant elements in a society. One important factor which by its nature cannot be enumerated in Census Reports is political history and tradition. Equally Census Reports may not enumerate some of the more tangible cultural variables which may also have political significance.

In a similar vein, J. P. D. Dunbabin in a recent article observed: "... the political personality of an area is largely the product of the locally dominant groups, interests and traditions." He concluded that local tradition has had an important influence on the outcome of British elections in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Moreover, Dunbabin asserts that a systematic study of these elections reveals a clear regional dimension with consistent patterns emerging in many areas. J. D. Gay, in a valuable book on The Geography of Religion in England, also shows the importance of the historical dimension in the case of religious affiliation.

If present patterns of denominational allegiance are to be understood, they have to be seen as part of a long-term dynamic process stretching right back into our past history.

To illustrate this point Gay cites W. M. William's study of
Gosforth where an indifference to religion may be traced back to the Reformation. 94

Historians have, in large measure, neglected these promising areas of enquiry. One exception, however, is Henry Pelling who, in 1967, published a pioneering Social Geography of British Elections 1885-1910. 95 Undeniably electoral politics underwent fundamental changes in the thirty-five years between 1910 and 1945, but the First World War was not as powerful a dissolving agent of local political, religious, historical and cultural traditions as its successor. 96 British society during the interwar years was remarkably stable and staid--a condition reflected in the choice of Stanley Baldwin as Prime Minister. 97 The people's war, however, transformed social attitudes and expectations--facts which received trenchant expression at the polls in 1945. 98 The findings of Pelling are, therefore, arguably admissible as evidence in constructing an explanation for the distribution of pacifist support. Indeed, as Busteed and Dunbabin both attest many historically conditioned variables, peculiar to individual regions, survive today.

In his study, Pelling is repeatedly impressed by the recurring pattern of connection between nonconformity and Liberalism, to which may be added the dimension of pacifism. 99 In his report Barclay had commented optimistically on the signs of activity in South and South Eastern England (Areas 16 and 17 respectively--see Map A). Of these same areas
Felling writes:

Nonconformity was strongest in the coastal towns and in the areas close by. Ports such as Portsmouth and Poole had a tradition of Dissent going back to the sixteenth century; from these strongholds, no doubt, it had spread into the neighbouring countryside . . . . The land was in any case good territory for Dissent.

Moving inland, to Wiltshire, in one Mass Observation report it is noted that pacifism was "doing well" in Salisbury, especially among lay readers and students. Interestingly, Felling says of Salisbury that it was very similar to Winchester, in that it was politically a Conservative city, but that occasional Liberal sympathies did manifest themselves at the Cathedral. Salisbury was also not a barracks town and its nonconformist minority was stronger than that of Winchester. Turning westward, Pelling concludes that east Gloucestershire and Cirencester were mainly Conservative, but that there were pockets of radicalism to be found.

In general . . . the strength of Nonconformity [in the Bristol Region] was considerably in excess of that normal in the South [of England] . . . .

A glance at Maps D, E and F would support this assessment, and Vera Brittain's considerable correspondence contains a number of supportive letters from writers in the west of England. On the whole, however, the Established Church reigned supreme since the west was, to an extent, geographically isolated, and breakdown of traditional village life and allegiances slow. In the West Midland's nonconformity produced a strong centre for pacifism in
Birmingham. Barclay comments in his report on the strength of the PPU in Birmingham, which, he notes, contrasts sharply with that city's environs. Dunbabin's study shows that from the middle of the eighteen-eighties the Conservatives and Liberal Unionists were advancing steadily in the West Midlands. Reference to Maps E and G reveals the comparative strength of the Church of England against that of nonconformity. In sharp contrast, however, the East Midlands was judged by Barclay to be the most active area in the country. Pelling notes that in the East Midlands, the 1851 religious census pointed quite conclusively to "the unusual strength of Nonconformity not only in the industrial areas but also in the rural parts." D Dunbabin, contrasting the political persuasions of the West and East Midlands, concludes that "the East Midlands were predominantly Liberal."

Like the Midlands, East Anglia was a region of divided loyalty. In his report Barclay commented on the scattered nature of pacifist activity and its tendency to concentrate around Cambridge, Norwich and Ipswich. A comparison of Maps E, F and G reveals that East Anglia was divided in its religious affiliation. The northern part of the region favoured nonconformity and the southern portion, the Church of England. This division is faithfully mirrored in the support shown to the Peace Pledge Union--Map B. Both Dunbabin and Pelling found that agricultural regions have tended to favour conservatism. Liberalism,
prior to the First World War, did, however, enjoy considerable support in East Anglia, and although the Conservatives assumed the ascendancy in the interwar years, the Liberal Party held out against competition from Labour.\textsuperscript{107} The concentration of pacifist support around Norwich may have a more specific origin. At the turn of the century, when the Church of England enjoyed its greatest strength in East Anglia, the Norwich area resisted because of the combined influence of Primitive Methodism and Quakerism.\textsuperscript{108} It is probably significant that in the sixteenth century Ipswich had a Puritan-dominated town corporation, whilst during the Second World War its parliamentary representative was the ex-headboy of Downside and Labour politician Richard (Dick) Stokes.\textsuperscript{109} Stokes was a persistent critic of Churchill's government, a self-described Roman Catholic communist, whose sympathy for the pacifists was well known. According to intelligence sources, Stokes--"the irrepressible Mr. Stokes" as he was once called by Duff Cooper--ran a one-man "stop-the-war" campaign, which enjoyed the support of the local Ipswich press.\textsuperscript{110} In December 1939 a MoI report noted:

\textit{Ipswich group of papers adopting the attitude that everything the Government does is wrong and everything any of its Departments or representatives do is wrong.}\textsuperscript{111}

Part of this attack may have sprung from a feeling of apathy about the war generally that characterised the period of the "bore" war. It may also have been an expression of
protest against the frequent irritations of some of the early wartime regulations and attendant bureaucracy.

In Wales the connections between nonconformity, Liberalism and pacifism were complicated by a fourth factor: that of the Welsh language. Indeed, there emerges a clear link between those areas which were predominantly Welsh-speaking and the holding of pacifist opinions, especially in North Wales. In South Wales the correlation is not quite as evident, although the mining population of the south where Pelling found to be solidly Liberal, if not radical, and politically activist--potentially causative factors in pacifism. In his report Barclay had ruefully noted that central Wales, in contrast to both the north and south of the country, offered very little hope of development. Significantly, Pelling found that central Wales contained several boroughs that were only marginally Liberal or even Conservative.

... the boroughs were the outposts of English influence in Wales, as they had been in the Middle Ages when the castles around which the towns so often huddled were focal points of English control.  

In the three counties which compose central Wales--Montgomery, Radnor and Brecknock--in the first named 52.5% of the population spoke only English, in the second 93.6% and in Brecknock 54.0%. These three counties, with the exception of Flint, also had the highest number of Church of England communicants, expressed as a percentage of total Protestant church members.
Among the papers in the Mass Observation Archive is a copy of a secret intelligence report giving an assessment of pacifist support at four Scottish universities: St. Andrews, University College Dundee, Aberdeen and Glasgow. The Principal of St. Andrews, Sir James Irvine, reported that student morale and opinion concerning opposition to war declined markedly after June 1939. At about this time Irvine had spoken with leading students and was relieved to find them whole-heartedly opposed to Nazism. But with the departure of these students to the military, the pacifists and opponents of war came vocally into the ascendancy. This was especially true of religious pacifists, as the university's theology students were exempt from service. In short,

the pacifists and left wing religious students are now the seniors and leaders, so that the students' hierarchy is now tending to impart to the University an anti-war bias.

At Aberdeen the situation was very similar. The Principal welcomed the idea of speakers, commenting that

through the good offices of Chatham House, isolated districts of Canada are better served in this respect than Aberdeen University, which, owing to its peripheral situation has been neglected.

Glasgow University students, who in 1937 had elected Dick Sheppard as rector over Winston Churchill, supported the war although it was

... admitted that the enthusiasm of the last war is generally lacking. This is due, at least in part, to a fuller appreciation of the implications of war and a more realistic outlook.
Interestingly the report concluded that the pacifist reputation of Glasgow was merited, although the Pacifist Society could boast only about one hundred members, equally divided between religious and political objectors. Sheppard had been elected as a personality rather than a pacifist. In Edinburgh University apathy was the mood of the day. In the Art College, however, there was a considerable pacifist element which "does not originate with party politics, nor can it be termed religious." But the report offers no explanation, accepting the situation as a truism. Once again, the significant connection between pacifism and the arts is apparent.

Unfortunately, there do not appear to be any comparable studies done by Mass Observation of English and Welsh universities, though evidence suggests that these were undertaken. Among Cambridge University students, one section was particularly influenced by the Peace Pledge Union—perhaps led by the example of Dr. Alex Wood. But a survey of every tenth student (probably conducted in early 1940) concluded that student thought was quite conformist. There is no mention of Oxford University, although a letter from the Oxford Pacifist Association, apparently located in St. Edmund Hall, to the National Council for Civil Liberties in March 1941 would seem to indicate some pacifist activity. This is also borne out by a brief report in *Peace News* in May 1941 of a pacifist students' conference composed of representatives from the Student Pacifist Federation. Oxford
University is named, in addition to Cambridge, Manchester, Birmingham, Reading, Nottingham, Bristol, Goldsmiths, King's College (London) and Loughborough College. It is interesting to note that each of the cities named were PPUPU strongholds.

What emerges with clarity is that historical, geographical, religious and cultural variables are important factors in explaining the success, or failure, of pacifism's appeal in any given area. These variables are difficult to marshal, but they cannot be described as either random or coincidental factors. Nonconformity and Liberalism have been shown, conclusively, to share a symbiotic relationship; pacifism, an important dimension of England's liberal tradition, was fed by the same tap root. With the increased secularization of society at the turn of the century, nonconformity began its eclipse to be followed in the interwar period by the decline of the political power of Liberalism. England's liberal tradition, however, survived although there were those who feared for its life. Wilfred Wellock, a prominent member of the Peace Pledge Union, wrote in 1943 to George Catlin, in the following vein:

Liberal Democracy is going, and I doubt if it can be saved. Yet it is important that this fact should be clearly recognized NOW, before the war ends, and also the need for discovering and trying to establish as soon as possible the conditions of the democracy that is to take its place. The matter is urgent, for once democracy succumbs to totalitarianism it is impossible to say how the latter can be overthrown.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER TWO

1Spender, The Thirties and After, "September Journal", 4 September 1939, 103.

Imperial War Museum (hereafter IWM), Department of Sound Records, "The Anti-War Movement in Britain, 1939-1945", Joan Pascoe interview, 4707/03/01-02; former member, Slough PPU. Pascoe recalled that there was, within PPU ranks, a "bit of a cult about Dick Sheppard" and that there were "pilgrimages to Canterbury" to look at his grave. See also IWM, Patrick Figgis interview, 4593/05/04.

3One member of the PPU recalled that Sheppard was known to have taken off his clerical collar, rolled up his sleeves and played cricket with the down and outs outside St. Martin-in-the-Fields. He identified himself with the people, not with the pulpit. IWM, Mrs. Page interview, 4659/07/02.


5The original wording of the Pledge, as it appeared on 16 October, read: "We renounce war and never again, directly or indirectly, will we support or sanction another."
Writing to Vera Brittain in July 1936, Dick Sheppard commented:
I do regret the fact that these Peace Rallies are opened with prayer or Bible-reading. I am sure it is the wrong note, and I am doing my best to stop it. It so often chokes off just the right fellow.
VEC/C/Rec., Dick Sheppard to Vera Brittain, 6 July 1936.
6 Brittain, Testament of Experience, 164

7 VBC/C/Rep., Vera Brittain to George Catlin, 21 June 1936.

8 VBC/C/Rep., Vera Brittain to George Catlin, 21 June 1936. Attached to this letter is an interesting photograph of the speakers platform which reveals that the majority of the audience, within the camera's focus, were male. Judging by their dress the majority were also of lower-middle-class backgrounds, between twenty and forty years of age.


10 VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Sheppard, 3 July 1936.

11 VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Philip Mumford, 28 October 1936.


14 VBC/H341, Vera Brittain, "From War to Pacifism". Published in Forward, 9 September 1939 as "What can we do in War Time? Work for a Sane Peace".


16 Patrick Figgis, IWM interview 4593/05/01.

17 Nancy Rouse, IWM interview 4606/03/01.

18 Mrs. Page was the only individual to have a strong regional (London) accent as opposed to a standardised English middle-class or Oxbridge accent.

19 Mrs. Page, IWM interview 4659/07/01-02.


Interview with David Spreckley.


Ceadel, *Pacifism in Britain*, 222-41.

Ceadel, *Pacifism in Britain*, 222-41.


Ceadel speaks of C. E. J. Joad's compulsive womanising (p. 239). Certainly, this would seem equally to have been a failure of many Conservative Party politicians and even peers of the realm. Moreover, Joad recanted his pacifism.

Mass Observation (hereafter MO), File 312, Report on Conscientious Objectors, prepared by MO Observer, S. H., 30 July 1940 [96 pp.1, summary, a); see also MO, File 1913, MO Bulletin, 1 September 1943, 7, marked 'Confidential', 'Circulation very strictly limited'. Observers identified their respondents according to sex, age and social class. A--rich people; B--middle classes; C--artisans and skilled workers; D--unskilled workers and the least economically trained. Thus M35B denotes a male respondent, aged 35 years, of the middle classes. Most observers were drawn from the ranks of the middle classes. MO was a pioneering social research organisation founded in 1937 by Tom Harrisson and Charles Madge. Its sampling techniques and methods are undoubtedly open to modern-day question with respect to their scientific accuracy. But the fact remains that the MO archives are a unique, and unrivalled source of information and data for the social and political historian. Harrisson and Madge were well known fellow travellers. See Tom Harrisson, *Living Through the Blitz* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978). Also D. G. Boyce, "Public Opinion and Historians", *History* 63 (208), June 1978, 214-28.
James resembled the pacifist of caricature when I was with him for the first time in his dark Sunday suit, with spectacles and boots and a clerkly 'white collar.' ... A lower middle class pansy's voice, with much excitable modulation, hissed S's .... When talking to me he used all the correct expressions—"Simply amazing!" "Quite staggering!" "How ghastly" "Most extraordinary!" and these were mingled with the characteristic jargon of the petty-bourgeoisie--"Well I must say!" "Ever so ... etc.

On the whole the gardeners teased him very little though they referred to him as "Pansy" occasionally. And James had no inferiority complex. He was a budding chartered accountant and proud of it, and very vexed with the Government for taking him away from it and putting him on "this". "It'll put me back with my exams." He frankly regarded himself as a far superior being to the proletarian element in the hostel .... But James bore up very well, and his face, under its blue and white scarf generally bore a sort of owlish smug smirk, even on the lorry.
Page added the comment that Tippett could not "talk to the man on the street."
Speaking of Naomi Jacobs, Page was of the opinion that she too "was divorced from the man in the street" and that her words had "to be translated" for Page's neighbours. Vera Brittain was similarly assessed. Donald Soper, however, "attracted crowds" and was "very good with hecklers"--as indeed he continues to be to this day.
Patrick Figgis also makes a number of interesting, insightful observations about Michael Tippett, Donald Soper, Alex Wood, Stuart Morris, Vera Brittain, Charles Raven, Laurence Housman and Dick Sheppard. IWM interview 4593/05/01-05.

38 Peace News, 29 September 1939, 7.
39 Interview with Donald Soper.
40 The PPU gave a great deal of moral and material assistance to CO's.
41 MO, Report on Conscientious Objectors, 33.
42 MO, Report on Conscientious Objectors, 33. See Appendix I.
43 MO Bulletin, 3. One respondent was evidently a humorist and in response to the question 'how long a pacifist' [sic], replied: "Since my children cried at night and I decided not to kill them." MO Surveys, Box 311B, File A, Pacifist Questionnaire. (The respondent was a member of the Society of Friends.)
44 MO Surveys, Box 311B, File C, Pacifist Analysis.
45 MO Bulletin, 3.
46 MO, Conscientious Objection and Pacifism, Box 311, File A, Cultural Aspects - Various Pacifist Events, Observer Reports, AGM of the Peace Pledge Union, 25-4-42, 1. The observer is identified as P. J.
47 MO, Box 311, File A, Observer Reports--Notes on the Adelphi Centre, 1. The observer is identified as M. C.
110


49. Vera Brittain, Letter to Peace Lovers (hereafter LPL), No/56, 8 May 1941. This section contains a stringent criticism of die-hard (absolutist) pacifists and was crossed out in Brittain's revised collected edition of Fortnightly Letters which was intended for publication ("... but never published [too unpopular].") VBC/A12, Printed Matter, Box 2, "Personal Letter to Peace Lovers." One Voice. The LPL was a personal, fortnightly newsletter. See Winifred Eden-Green, "Foreward", in Vera Brittain, England's Hour. An Autobiography 1939-1941 (London: Futura Publications, 1981), 4-6.

50. MO, Box 311, File A, Letter from John Snow to Tom Harrisson, 2-10-40.

51. Letter from John Snow to Tom Harrisson. Snow arranged the members of the group in a list according to age and sex.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 clerks</td>
<td>2M (21-24)</td>
<td>2F (20-8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 teachers</td>
<td>3F (25?-29?-48?)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 engineers</td>
<td>2M (24-30)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 library assistants</td>
<td>(the same library--but until group formed they did not realise their convictions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 unemployed</td>
<td>(sacked for convictions)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 printers</td>
<td>3M (20-48) (T.U. Representative)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 artists</td>
<td>2M (20-40?) (unemployed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The vicar</td>
<td>1M (40?)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicar's wife</td>
<td>1F (45?)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old gent</td>
<td>1M (about 80+)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52. Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 235. See also Frank Parkin, Middle Class Radicalism: The Social Bases of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1968).

53. MO, Report on Conscientious Objectors. See Appendix II.

55 MO, Box 311, File C, University Students and the War.


Eric Gill, the prominent artist and sculptor, died 1940. For comments and appreciations of Gill, see: B. Kelly, "Eric Gill's social principles", Blackfriars 22 (1941), 82-7; Blackfriars 21 (1940), 690-3; Tablet, 30 November 1940, 425-6.

59 Brittain, LPL, No/66, 25 September 1941.

60 VBC/D4, Friday, 18 September 1914.


62 Brittain, Testament of Experience, 164.


65 Peace Pledge Union Offices, Dick Sheppard House, 6 Endsleigh Street, London, England. Peace Pledge Union Minute Book, March 1940-June 1942. "Report on Area Development Covering the Period 15th. February - 31st May, 1942." No/7 North Wales; No/11 South Wales. The report summarises information submitted to John Barclay by area representatives in the form of area minutes, secretary reports, correspondence with area officers and group leaders' letters. Unfortunately all this material has either been lost or destroyed. It should be noted that the minutes of both the National
and Executive Councils of the PPU, and its various committees, are contained together in several volumes for the period 1939-1945 and are housed at the Union's offices in Endsleigh St., London. For the sake of clarity these have been numbered as follows:
Vol. I, July 1939-February 1940
Vol. II, March 1940-June 1942
Vol. III, June 1942-October 1943
Vol. IV, November 1943-June 1945

The minutes of the National and Executive Councils, and the PPU's principal committees are cited as follows:
Sponsors Meetings, PPU/SM
National Council, PPU/NCM
Executive Council, PPU/ECM
Development Committee, PPU/DCM
Armistice Campaign Committee Minutes, PPU/ACCM
Negotiated Peace Campaign Committee, PPU/NPCCM
Food Relief Campaign Committee, PPU/FRCCM
Forethought Committee, PPU/FTCM
London Area Minutes, PPU/LAM

See also PRO CAB 73/3, CDC (40) 8, "Home Front Propaganda". Memo by the Minister of Information, 3-3-40, section III 2(a); PRO, INF 1/319, "Anti-War Movements", undated and unsigned report--probably early 1940.

69Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 59.

70The Area Representatives on the National Council in June 1942 were as follows:
Ireland - Tom Finnegan
Scotland -
Lakeland -
North East - Frank Maitland
North West - Alderman Bland
Yorkshire - G. Tattershall
N. Wales - Gwyndaff Williams
S. East - Audrey Jupp
W. Midland - Constance Braithwaite
E. Midland - Harold Higgs
E. Anglia - Albert Tomlinson
S. Wales - Gwynfor Evans
Western - Bill Bryant
Bucks, Berks and Oxon - Dennis Davies
London - Ronald Smith
Devon and Cornwall - Harold Steele
South - Ida Hullman


The Development Committee, meeting in July 1942, described the aims of development as being a) a strengthening of the organisation of each area b) the encouragement of individuals in framing and implementing policy. Its emphasis was not, however, to be upon policy making, but on organisation. PPU/DCM, Vol. III, 4 July 1942.

Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 312. Also PPU/DCM, Vol. II, 30 May 1942.


The West Yorkshire region to this day is very conscious of its distinctive identity.


Report on Area Development, 1942. West Midlands. A partial explanation for Oswestry's decline may have been
sectional hostility, harassment and actual physical violence on the part of some elements toward the PPU group in Oswestry. In July 1940, the Hon. Sec. of the Oswestry PPU group wrote to the Superintendent of the County Police to inform him that the group had decided to temporarily discontinue meetings at the Dick Sheppard Centre. In June "three youths accompanied on each occasion by two or more soldiers disrupted meetings using abusive language ..." and shouting "Let's lynch 'em boys." Books, notices, periodicals and pictures were destroyed. In two separate incidents, members of the local PPU group were "harassed at their places of work." Honorary Secretary, Oswestry PPU, to Superintendent Dickinson, County Police Station, 1st July 1940, National Council for Civil Liberties (hereafter NCCL) Papers, University of Hull, Hull, Yorks., England. NCCL 16/4, Peace Pledge Union, 1940-1941.


92Dunbabin, "British Elections", 265 and 266.


98 This point is strongly and concisely argued by Derek Fraser, *The Evolution of the Welfare State* (London: Macmillan, 1973, 1978). Fraser is far more optimistic in his assessment of the changes wrought by the war than Angus Calder.


100 Pelling, *Social Geography*, 127.

101 MO, *Conscientious Objection and Pacifism*, Box 311, File C, *Pacifism in Great Britain*, Pacifism in St. Albans, 13/3/40. The students mentioned were probably those of the art college.

102 The Royal Green Jackets have their headquarters in Winchester.


104 See Gay, *Geography of Religion*, 79. Pockets of West County radicalism were apparent during the English Civil War; Gloucester City was a Parliamentarian stronghold in what was very decidedly a Royalist region.

105 Pelling, *Social Geography*, 206. See also 184.


109 Gay, Geography of Religion, 103. See Map C.

110 PRO, INF 1/319, Memorandum from H. V. Rhodes to M. Adams, 17 February 1940; PRO, INF 1/177, Duff Cooper to Clement Attlee, 3 April 1941; PRO, INF 1/319, Pacifism, Stop-the-War, etc., in Eastern Region, (No/4) Extract from Intelligence Report dated 19 January 1940.

111 PRO, INF 1/319, Pacifism, Stop-the-War, etc., in Eastern Region, (No/4), 6 December 1939.

112 Pelling, Social Geography, 357-8.

113 Pelling, Social Geography, 347.

114 MO, Box 311, File C, University Students and the War. The copy of the report is dated 22 February 1940 but the discussions of the RIO's are clearly based on the findings recorded in this document.

115 MO, University Students and the War.

116 MO, University Students and the War. It is interesting to note that many students were apparently depressed because of poor employment prospects.

117 MO, University Students and the War. Brittain records her euphoria at hearing of Sheppard's success (he polled 538 votes to Churchill's 218) and her great sorrow at his death which followed within weeks of the rectorial decision. Testament of Experience, 185.

118 MO, University Students and the War.

119 MO, University Students and the War.

120 PRO, INF 1/319, Anti-War Movements, Memorandum by M. Chandler, n.d. [probably February 1940].
117

121 PRO, CAB 73/3 CDC (40) 8, Home Front Propaganda. Memorandum by the Minister of Information, 3 March 1940. Appendix II, Student Opinion: Summary of Two Special Reports. [Surveys conducted at Cambridge University and St. Andrews University.]

122 NCCL 62/5, Oxford University Pacifist Association, St. Edmund Hall, to the National Council for Civil Liberties, 14 March 1941.


124 Catlin Papers, Correspondence, McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Wilfred Wellock to George Catlin, 27 March 1943.
CHAPTER THREE

BRITTAINE AND THE PACIFISTS ON PACIFISM:
PACIFISM IN THEORY

Brittain on War and Peace

Pacifism is nothing other than a belief in the ultimate transcendence of love over power. This belief comes from an inward assurance. It is untouched by logic and beyond argument - though there are many arguments both for and against it. And each person's assurance is individual; his inspiration cannot arise from another's reasons, nor can its authority be questioned by another's scepticism.¹

Brittain's definition of pacifism is very revealing of the facets of the pacifist faith. There are, inescapably, certain unquantifiable factors which must be accepted as given by any who would wish to study the British pacifist movement from without. An appreciation or acknowledgement of the dimension of faith is essential. In pragmatic terms, pacifism will always seem a humanly unattainable ideal.

The pacifist tries to live in accordance with the values of a society which has not yet come .... He must point ceaselessly to the ideals of a nobler community even though he knows it is far away and he is unlikely ever to see it.²

In support of their case, pacifists have entered certain arguments and proofs of the truth of their faith; but its last rigour, since pacifism is a faith even for the non-
Vera Brittain, who joined the Peace Pledge Union while only nominally Christian, did so out of an inner and "spiritual conviction."

For her, pacifism was a religious and moral faith, ultimately rationally unsanctionable. It was a personal trust, the success or failure of which could not be gauged in "measurable time", but in the light of eternity and the Second Coming. In 1941 Brittain wrote to a correspondent:

... what matters is that Christ's ideas survived whereas Rome in all its power and might disappeared long ago. That is the kind of consideration which persuades me to go on.7

For Vera Brittain, the knowledge and belief that her life as a pacifist contributed positively to the long-term goals of peace and a war-free world absorbed the disappointments and frustrations of apparent failures in the short term. The logic was that of the Cross. Christ had died believing that whatever the immediate results

of a course determined by conviction and ending in apparent total failure, His Father would reveal in time's long perspective that the action performed in accordance with the Divine Will would produce the results desired for His world.8

Brittain's pacifist beliefs were, for her, beyond argument.

Brittain's analysis of international policies in the interwar years had been prompted by the desire to find an explanation for the fundamental causes of modern war and, more important, to seek a solution to the problem of war. Her conclusions highlighted for her the bankruptcy of liberalism and convinced Brittain of the necessity of
socialism. The Labour Party gained recognition as "the party of peace, disarmament and social reform ... the left wing forces saw themselves forging ahead as the recreators of England and the peace-makers of the world." But the confidence of the left proved short lived. As early as 1931 the formation of the National Government under Ramsay MacDonald bitterly divided groups on the political left. The accession to power of Hitler furthered divisions over the issue of how properly to combat fascism: "Groups range from those who desire peace at any price to others who advocate war at all costs."10

The war which came in 1939 was not, for Vera Brittain, the fault of any one man. It resulted both from the collective and general fault of Western Christianity and from "convulsive historic forces which are themselves the product of spiritual maladjustments."11

... I came to believe in the existence of God as the fundamental fact of man's life here on earth. Sheer human disobedience to His laws has been, it seemed, solely responsible for the apocalyptic crises of our time. Conversely I became convinced that only by obedience to those laws could we hope to live, and that if we continue to disobey them, we should literally die.12

Adolf Hitler was the personification of both an acute symptom of evil and of the deep "economic and political diseases at the root of society" which men had brought upon themselves.13 The roots of war and totalitarianism had a fourfold explanation: nationalism, imperialism, man's moral inability to keep pace with his scientific advances, and lastly, the
break-up of the unity of medieval Christendom, and the commensurate loss of the Church's independence. The two world wars of the twentieth century were the cumulative manifestations of the cancer called capitalism which was consuming Western civilisation. Nineteenth-century nationalism and the fierce competition for foreign markets among the capitalist powers had signalled the onset of the imperial race which had received penultimate expression in the First World War, of which the Second was but a continuation. Totalitarianism, for its part, was rooted in the dehumanisation process inherent in industrialism. Anonymity had mushroomed into irresponsibility. Totalitarianism, touted as a cure-all, continued to deny man that which he most needed, to be at peace with himself--his spiritual and creative self.

The Peace Pledge Union passed through two distinct phases during the interwar period, mirroring the uncertainty of its own proper response to the international situation and to these problems of peace. In its first year of life the PPU favoured the Gandhian policy of non-violence as enumerated by Richard Gregg in a book entitled *The Power of Non-Violence*. This was supplemented by a training manual--*Training for Peace: A Programme for Peace Workers*. Sheppard's own lead in policy was not entirely clear. He had founded the Union as a mass movement, capable--he had hoped--of inciting and influencing political policy and action. But he was prone to offering allegorical advice
on how this was to be achieved--advice which seemed to indicate his support of non-violence:

Last night I had a dream. In it George Lansbury and I were playing tennis against Hitler and Mussolini. George had a game leg and I was asthmatic but we won six-love.20

But the policy of non-violence, which enjoyed much initial success, backfired as it degenerated into faddism and crankiness:

We have gossiped about vegetarianism and knitting and Indian ahimsa when we ought to have pondered economics and Parliament and Spain.21

The PPU accordingly underwent a major policy shift and endorsed "economic appeasement and reconciliation."22 This was a more active and politically acceptable policy entailing co-operation with non-pacifists, well suited to Vera Brittain's political interests and broad pacifist attitude. Economic appeasement meant acknowledging the validity of the grievances of the dictators and treating their claims justly, if necessary, by magnanimous unilateral action.23 Reconciliation translated into meeting aggression with friendship and acknowledging "that which is good in the point of view which conflicts with our own conclusions."24

Misrepresentation and suspicion of pacifists as pro-Nazi was seemingly given credence by the pacifists' willingness to assume the burden of the world's sin and their willingness to admit Britain's complicity in giving Germany "cause for grievance [and making Germany] a land fit for Adolph Hitler to live in."25 Economic appeasement and reconciliation took
up the moral call of the interwar liberal conscience for
the repudiation of Versailles and wedded it to the socialist
demand for an entirely revamped and newly orientated world
order. The pacifists might not have been so discredited if
the policy of appeasement pursued by the government of
Chamberlain had not soured and declared them guilty by
association—a verdict Brittain denied. The Peace Pledge
Union's

revolutionary conception of peace had nothing in
common with the cowardly policies by which the
politicians of the nineteen-thirties created animosity
in neighbouring countries, and then purchased immunity
from the consequences at other people's expense.26

But the Union had become a political misfit, a pariah bereft
of the parliamentary support it had previously enjoyed.
This, together with the declaration of war, caused pacifists
to formulate another policy that reflected wartime
contingencies.

We are organising immediately, for those pacifists who
feel that their best witness in war-time is the service
of humanity, a Pacifist Service Corps .... We are in
communication with the Ministry of Labour. They are
giving favourable consideration to the proposal ....27

A year before Kingsley Martin had foreseen this need:

...the pacifist is wise to base his argument on ethical
and not on political grounds. If he wishes to do
public work in present society, he must confine
himself to those types of social service and propaganda
which Quakers have long made peculiarly their own.28

Martin Ceadel, whose work very thoroughly considers
the shifts and changes of pacifist policy in the interwar
period, observes that as the Second World War drew near
pacifists generally became apolitical and religious. R. A. Rempel has also commented on the largely Christian composition of the wartime peace movement. The PPU, although it was the only peace organisation that was avowedly secular in theory, was remarkably Christian in practice. Ceadel believes that the pacifist movement as a whole naturally progressed from "rational pacifism to religious pacifism" which meant, in other words, "from practical, socialist pacifism towards Christianity and sectarianism." The Union had begun as a movement destined for a politically active role in society and there were those among its leaders, including Lord Ponsonby, James Hudson and Vera Brittain, who understood its purpose in these terms. These, however, vied with others who eschewed political involvement and, instead, sought to form a fellowship of believers--almost a pacifist fallout shelter. Using the example of John Middleton Murry, the editor of Peace News, Ceadel traces this fundamental change in PPU and the peace movement's orientation. But by using Murry, Ceadel has chosen one of the most extreme examples of the apolitical outlook, an outlook which arguably applied to the Peace Pledge Union only for the first year of the war, whilst bearings were taken and depths sounded, and furthermore was especially peculiar to the leadership of the movement. Vera Brittain provides an important balance to Ceadel's analysis. The movement became religious, but it did not become sectarian.

Brittain was a Christian, although not of the
conventional "Sunday church-going variety." 31 Those who remember her have conflicting opinions regarding the external manifestations of inner religiosity. 32 An Anglican by birth and married to a Roman Catholic, Brittain once described herself as "an all-but-convinced Rationalist". 33 But whilst she struggled with her Christian faith prior to the second war, the war itself "reversed, for me, the spiritual process of the past which made me for a time a Rationalist." 34 John Middleton Murry's return to Christianity had similar roots. In 1941-42 Brittain very seriously considered becoming a Quaker and met and corresponded with Corder Catchpool on the subject. 35 She came to the conclusion, however, that she was not personally fitted to be a Quaker. But more importantly, she remained an Anglican because she fervently believed that the Church of England, in spite of its many manifest failings, was the only starting point for the fundamental changes in society, politics and economics which as a pacifist she deemed the necessary prerequisites for a pacifist world. 36

The catalytic agent of war was man's spiritual failure and rejection of God. Brittain's strictures regarding the failings of the Church were legion. The pacifist movement was itself a measure and result of the Church's inadequacy. 37 The Christian community had not lived its faith but paid it lip-service. During the First War the Church had been seriously compromised and its authority had been further undone. It was essential for the Church to
revitalise itself and reassert its authority for

... Religion alone remains outside political control. The vital question of our day is whether organised religion can make that independence a reality, and thus develop a new spiritual power sufficient to challenge and subdue the anti-Christian authority of the totalitarian machine.38

Brittain believed spiritual power to be "mankind's only sure weapon", and with the return of some form of religious unity—perhaps an International Federation of Churches—an effective check on political power might be found.39 Rather wistfully possibly, Brittain speculated in one Letter to Peace Lovers on the valuable power excommunication might have in undermining the authority of a dictator in the context of a revived Church.40 Brittain was certainly not alone in the importance she attached to religion; Middleton Murry, interviewed by the Evening News, commented:

The last five years (1933-1938) have really convinced me that nothing has power to withstand modern Paganism except the organised Christian Church. By Paganism I mean all that is involved in the complete subordination of the individual person to the secular state.41

The Church, they reasoned, ought to be recognisable as the Church and forge an independent lead with the integrity to protest evil on whatever side.42 One of Brittain's correspondents, in all likelihood the secretary to Archbishop Downey, wrote:

... I fear that the English Hierarchy have determined to, in all things, please the Government, be the Government right or wrong. This is not a new phenomenon in Ecclesiastics, and has brought much damage to Religion in the past.43

Christianity needed to be tried, international power politics
abandoned, and Christian principles applied to international relations. Other prerequisites necessary to ensure peace were the abolition of the bomber, national sovereignty as a "natural loyalty", and the introduction of a new economic order in which "the economic control of society would pass from private profit" to be replaced by a social motivator. All of these things were possible because of the infinite "capacity for spiritual resurrection" and the "persistence of the divine spark." At another level they were possible because of the social revolution occurring in wartime Britain.

It [social revolution] has already begun, and cannot be avoided; it is inherent in the revolutionary war situation .... The England of tomorrow will be determined, it is true, by the results of this terrible and once avoidable war. But it will also be determined - and perhaps more permanently - by the choice that you and I make, here and now, between serving society and serving ourselves.

Brittain's speeches and writings, like Middleton Murry's, were heavily religious in content during the war, although always conciliatory and appreciative of the non-pacifist position.

We can hardly expect men and women who have not yet accepted the ideal of love as a way of life for themselves to incur odium and criticism by exercising toleration on our behalf.

The religious dimension of Brittain's pacifist beliefs achieved overt expression and was commented upon by a number of her correspondents. Yet Brittain saw little merit in sectarianism and withdrawal from the world, save in the witness afforded by serious community experiments in pacifist living.
Brittain was an advocate of community living, but for others. She did spend weekends at The Oaks, in Langham, but these were in the nature of retreats and only temporary stays. Writing to her husband about one such visit, Brittain said that she found The Oaks "intensely interesting" and the pacifist initiative more alive there than in PPU Committees. But only five months later she was to write that community experiments were well and good for agricultural and domestic workers, but not for "creative people". The height of Brittain's enthusiasm for community probably occurred in 1938 when she felt overwhelmed by the general acceptance of the inevitability of war. If the pacifists failed to make any headway, "can't we all emigrate as other groups which saw further than their community have done (the Quakers in Pennsylvania for example)?" In May 1940, when it was readily apparent that war could not be stopped, Brittain, with important qualifications, supported the view taken by Murry and others "to become a sort of religious fellowship, a nucleus of sanity, to help prepare people for whatever is coming." More fully, she recorded in her diary in June 1940:

Definite split as usual in P.P.U. between the 'practical men' who wanted to carry on aggressive propaganda ... and the 'intellectuals' (eg. John Middleton Murry) who wished to establish 'nucleii' of resistance to tyranny which would enable the ideas we believe in to survive even in a totalitarian world, and instead of challenging, meet challenge only when it came. I agree with the latter position, & spoke saying that the reason of my own failure to convince & that of others in spite of apparent popular success had still to be thought out.
The differences began to show themselves over such issues as to whether the pacifist service units should distribute propaganda in addition to their relief work. Also, conflict is evident in continued policy splits between Middleton Murry's "philosophical policy and Roy Walker's activist one." Roy Walker, one of the younger members of the Union, felt continually frustrated by what he adjudged to be Middleton Murry's quietist line. From a diary entry made in December 1940 it would seem, however, that Brittain, after giving the necessary thought to the issues, opted to stand with Walker's faction:

At executive usual discussion abt. public meetings & 'cautions' arose & I told Roy Walker that if we were a set of poltroons we shouldn't be in that room.

Certainly, her heavy involvement with Roy Walker in the Food Relief Campaign (FRC) would indicate this. Brittain admired and appreciated Middleton Murry's intellectual thought, but not his sectarianism which, by his editorship of Peace News, he did try to impose on others. Vera Brittain often felt that he intentionally tried to block or put difficulties in the way particularly of the FRC.

And just as Brittain did not retreat into sectarianism neither did she become apolitical, since she never lost or abandoned her great interest in politics. In December 1938 she wrote to James Hudson, a leading politico of the PPU:

I think it is most important for the political side of the Pacifist Movement to be kept alive in
order to counterbalance the outlook of those with more doctrinaire views who might otherwise tend to get out of touch with political realities. Owing to the very fact that the Pacifist Movement tends to attract idealists and specialists, I feel that it should be closely associated with those who have the political situation to deal with ....\textsuperscript{60}

In November 1939 it was suggested that Vera Brittain run as a pacifist candidate for Macclesfield. She accepted the idea enthusiastically and felt optimistic about putting up a strong candidacy, but the idea was abandoned by her sponsors because "the Labour vote was largely a booze vote and unlikely to go to a pacifist."\textsuperscript{61} During the war leading pacifists stood for election in three by-elections--a fact not mentioned by Ceadel--and Pat Figgis, a General Secretary of the PPU, had the distinction of even saving his deposit.\textsuperscript{62} Vera Brittain supported and spoke publicly for two of these candidates, though they were not officially supported by the Union.

The differences between Brittain and Murry, in fact, had not a little to do with attitude. Murry was a thinker and a dreamer; Brittain was a tireless worker of positive and granite-like convictions. Writing to Arthur Wragg about Murry in 1942 Brittain commented:

I agree with you about the element of 'defeatism' in Peace News. The trouble is that the origin of it is Murry himself. He regards it as his chief function to be a 'debunker' .... but like you I should be glad to see more 'affirmations'.\textsuperscript{63}

And although Brittain was a member of the Forethought Committee--the think-tank of the quietists in the Union--
she clearly had great sympathy for the young militants and socialists of the PPU like Howard Whitten and Roy Walker. She was herself to the left of centre of the Labour Party and would have joined the ILP if it had not been for her husband's political ambitions in the Labour Party. It is not without significance that Brittain wrote a clearly favourable introduction to a pamphlet written by four of the Union's militants, lamenting the mental gulf between the leadership and younger members of the PPU. It is equally significant to note in this regard that there were a number of Quaker members of the Peace Pledge Union who were very active in its affairs. A possible reason for this—and one supported by Roy Walker—was that the Quakers, whilst undertaking invaluable social and relief work during the war, were most reluctant to undertake any political activities or campaigns which might be other than neutral. The Quakers in the Union joined because the PPU was not an apolitical body and fulfilled their desire for political expression and activism.

Brittain had very decided views on the role of the pacifist in wartime and was very critical of what she regarded as the suicidal attempt to "divide pacifist and non-pacifist society into 'we' and 'they' ..."—a tendency naturally inherent in Middleton Murry's sectarianism.

The Peace Pledge Union:
Theory and Policy Differences

With hatred now all lips and wings
the human mind does silly things.
Common sense has fled, and reason is definitely out of season.
Ian Serraillier

The division of opinions regarding what approach the Peace Pledge Union should take to the war is apparent from the minutes of the Union's first wartime council meeting. Wilfred Wellock, an absolutist, was unrestrained in his deprecation of the proposal that the PPU devote itself "to relief and restorative work", arguing rather for a concentration of effort upon spiritual strengthening and education of both the movement and public at large. Alfred Salter, long-time member of Parliament for Bermondsey, argued a counter-position. Given wartime conditions it was, in his opinion, near to impossible for the Peace Pledge Union's groups to operate at all, save under the approving benedicite of the Government. After what was described, probably euphemistically, as a "long discussion" the Pacifist Service Corps was accepted as a functioning branch of the PPU's wartime community-oriented activities. Martin Ceadel observes that...

... For most pacifists social service was a means of atoning for being a tolerated sect without a political solution to offer. In their keenness to help, their outlook became in some cases almost apologetic.

But Ceadel's assessment strongly implies that the motivation of pacifists was a negative one, that they were guilty of wronging or injuring the societal order—in short, that the pacifists were apologising for their existence. This was
not the case. The rationale for their actions was, in fact, far more subtle and thoughtful, and involved an appreciation of important developments in the Union's understanding of itself and its purpose. The purity of the absolutist position had, in the 1914-18 war, cast the grey shadow of compromise over the alternativist position. The Union itself had been born out of the perceived necessity to reassert the absolutist position and it never lost that vision. But the catholicity of the PPU allowed the parallel development of a school of thought which recognised the corporate responsibility of society for the social and economic ills giving rise to fascism and war. The absolutist position was not thereby rendered defunct, but to this orthodox position was added an unfolding revisionist one, which sought to reform the social order from within. Most absolutists accepted these developments and embraced their outward expression whilst cautioning against the temptation to compromise values and misplace emphasis. Pacifists, in short, should not water down their message in the hope of making it more palatable for their audience. Neither should they lose sight of the fact that the assistance they might render to the community, whilst not insignificant of itself, was not as significant as the raison d'être of which a community action was but an outward sign. Ceadel also seems to ignore an important emotional variable: many of the pacifists were patriots.

Regrettably, however, misunderstandings surrounded
the birth of the Pacifist Service Units (PSU). Stuart Morris, the Union's General Secretary, approached the Ministry of Labour with a view to discussing the functions and potential service to the community of the newly formed PSU only to find charges of compromise raining down upon him. In a memo to Group Leaders Morris spoke out powerfully against this misinterpretation of interest, noting that a thousand PPU members had already volunteered their services. These differences in the approach to pacifism do help to explain in some measure, the failure of the Union to capitalise upon the latent support of the general public. Certainly, Morris was very conscious of the need to harmonise the Union's witness.

On 10 November 1939, Stuart Morris circulated a letter to members of the general council raising a number of issues for discussion. These included the formation of a committee responsible for the Peace Pledge Union's overall policy directives. The necessity for such a committee was underscored, Morris noted, by the desire of Canon Charles Raven to resign from the PPU on account of serious policy differences with Wilfred Wellock.

Charles Raven's letter raises the question as to whether the P.P.U. can continue to hold together those who approach pacifism from such varied angles. At an executive meeting in mid-November, 1939, Morris read three letters from Raven criticising the directions being taken by the PPU and advocating the establishment of the Forethought Committee to act as a form of "think-tank" and provide clear, central directives for the Union membership.
The subsequent activities of the Forethought Committee can only be spasmodically traced through the National and Executive Committee minutes and through some of the papers extant in the Vera Brittain collection, but there can be no doubt that within the Peace Pledge Union this body was without parallel influence. The moot point is that, as Ceadel rightly comments, the Forethought Committee was, in effect, a reconstituted executive. Roy Walker and other activists had long felt that the leadership of the movement was not fully attuned to the views of the general membership. 82

In May 1940 the Forethought Committee presented a document to the National Council and Sponsors which it regarded as the proper portrayal of the wartime policies of the PPU. 83 The document itself is not extant but a draft document of the same month, tabled in note form and recording the proceedings of a Forethought Committee meeting, would seem to be an earlier version of the same. 84 The document reflects a cautious approach, understandably reflective of the prevailing military and political climate. It was generally agreed that there should be no premature confrontation with the government—at least until the full ramifications of the new body of Defence Regulations were clearly understood. The unwisdom of pressing for a negotiated peace was accepted. The committee stated that "a new depth of social awareness" was required of the movement. 85 In accordance with this view poster propaganda was cautioned against as being undesirable and like much of
the Union's publications "out of date and at the moment inopportune." The literature department's activities were not to be ended, but to be decidedly circumscribed, mindful of "the growing fear of Nazism." In this light the Committee understood the principal business of the Union to lie in "a) maintaining our fellowship [and], b) raising what is at the moment a movement of conscience on to the plane of a new religious, political and social consciousness." To achieve these ends it was proposed by the Forethought Committee that the PPU pursue four types of activity:

a) To conduct educational work based on a positive analysis of the social and personal roots of war and its consequences.

b) Definite activity in assisting victims of war, tyranny and social injustice.

c) The creation of a nucleii of resistance to tyranny, based on an understanding of the need for making the future collectively serve a truly social purpose (this includes a study of non-violent action).

d) The adoption of a mode of living in simplicity and the renunciation of economic privilege.

The thrust of the Peace Pledge Union was thus clearly perceived by the Committee, at least in theory, as embracing the alternativist, broad pacifist orientation. The activities outlined by the Forethought Committee were to be an integral and vital expression of the PPU's wartime identity. But the strains between the various factions in the Peace Pledge Union continued to show themselves.

In June 1940 the divisions within the Union were the subject of debate among the Sponsors. Alfred Salter understood the division to be between the collectivists and the
anarchists.90 Attached to the proceedings of the meeting a memo, probably penned by Philip Mumford, did not minimize the seriousness of the division. Indeed, the memo expressed the view that to "camouflage or minimize the fundamental nature of the split" would be "very dangerous to the movement." It was felt that

a policy of putting up the cracks or trying to build a false facade (sic) of unity must mean disaster at some future date when a real strain is put upon us from some outside source.91

Mumford was most fearful of the dangers inherent in the tendency of part of the pacifist movement to mark themselves off from the remainder of society, seeking to emphasize the complete moral difference in outlook between the pacifist and non-pacifist - a difference which they continually point out must permeate their entire activity.92

Mumford argued that such an elitist approach sounded the death knell for practical pacifism:

This stressing of our differences is a dangerous fallacy, leading us away from the man in the street, away from simplicity, from humility and from humanity. Once we get away from the simplicity of our message we land ourselves in conscious idealism, conscious martyrdom and finally to introspective crankiness .... If we continue much further along the same road we shall soon be known as a Movement of fanatical visionaries - and then the man in the street will turn elsewhere in his search for deliverance from modern war.93

Roy Walker, a high pacifist and yet one of the principal protagonists for the active involvement of pacifists in the community, spoke very powerfully of the dangers inherent in withdrawing from society. At the PPU Annual General Meeting in the spring of 1941 he decried the policy of "strategic
withdrawals", noting that the grass roots of the movement were of the view that "any battle would be better than another year of retreat." The directives of the Union Leadership had become so restrictive and impracticable as to be utopian, warning that "community and the land" should be regarded "as the vocation of the few and not as the refuge of the many." At the AGM of the following year Walker was still making the point that the movement placed too much concentration upon ends and not sufficient upon means. In a similar vein, at a National Council meeting in September 1941, Vera Brittain argued for "a greater appeal to non-pacifist sympathisers and to critics [and] the establishment of closer contact with new political organisations whose aims were analogous to those of the P.P.U." At an Executive meeting in October of the same year Brittain spoke of what she regarded as the very positive and constructive role which pacifists could play by becoming members of organisations which were not expressly pacifist nor expressly political, thus demonstrating to the government the "integrity" of the peace movement.

The differences in approach to the pacifist witness were, in part, dictated and influenced by the military course of the war. John Barclay, the National Group Organiser, commented at the 1941 AGM:

From being a body of outside propagandists, pacifists rapidly (after September 7, 1940) and noticeably became introspective. It was not until Coventry, Sheffield, Southampton and Birmingham became targets that the change spread over all the country.
Group activity, in consequence, became either more spiritual in its nature and muted, or in some cases was seriously eroded. Part of the problem stemmed from the insecurities of pacifists inherent in the wartime situation, and the divisions in the leadership over the most suitable course to be taken. The London Area PPU minutes show that these problems were closely discussed. One practical solution was felt to be a greater degree of decentralisation and by extension a greater degree of autonomy for groups.

... In the past the movement has relied too much on the Fuehrer principle with the result that the removal of the Group leader and, perhaps, one other active member has been enough to wreck a sound meetings program and render the group virtually inactive .... Some group programs would compare unfavourably with that of a mother's meeting; and there is no annual outing ....

One of the most vocal and articulate critics of PPU policy—or lack of it—was Alex Miller, a clergyman and London Area representative to the National Council. Miller was strongly concerned that the PPU demonstrate a greater flexibility in organisation and a readier adaptation to the terms of total war. The Pledge, as a sole basis of resistance to war had proved ineffective, and indeed, reflected a social situation which no longer existed. Consequently, Miller argued the Union had to define

... a social outlook which recognises the threat of totalitarianism and which allows co-operation with all men of good will ....

The PPU leadership did, in fact, seek to overcome some of these divisions by defining its position for the membership at large. It was generally accepted that its statement of
policy and direction, and the essential tenets of its credo, were contained in a series of pamphlets published in early 1940 entitled the *Bond of Peace*. 104

Four pamphlets comprised the series, but their very diversity was, ironically, a clear reminder of the Union's differences. Their publication under one title was, however, intended to be a signal of "unity in diversity." 105 The authors--Eric Gill, Charles Raven, Wilfred Wellock and John Middleton Murry--were all men with impeccable pacifist credentials, but each was a man of a very different stamp. The pamphlets were developments of four "peace Affirmations" which the National Council understood not as dogmas but expressions of "the corporate mind of the Peace Pledge Union." 106

The first of the affirmations declared that "we are agreed in attaching supreme value to the human person and the integrity of the individual." 107 Gill's pamphlet, entitled the *Human Person and Society*, developed this theme from a Christian vantage point. Gill began with the premise that it is only when peace prevails that man can fulfil himself spiritually, and in relation with his fellows. The primary task of the PPU Gill understood to be the "preparation of peace, the rediscovery of the foundations of human order and the winning of men to build upon them." 108 The human order had broken down because the individual was not functioning as an integral material and spiritual unit. Man's inability
to reconcile himself to this innate paradox caused him to deny one of the very aspects of himself. Most commonly this was the primary aspect, that of the spirit. "... to deny our spiritual nature and its primacy is not merely dangerous, it is man's damnation." The capitalist system, Gill argued, had increased the dichotomy between matter and spirit and fostered the exploitation of man by man. It had also undermined the two forces capable of arousing man to altruistic heights--Religion and Patriotism. As a result of this

... we are confronted by two main and commanding ideas of society - democracy and totalitarianism, the failure of one leading to the acceptance and even the inevitability of the other.

Democracy had become subverted by capitalism and totalitarianism was an attempt to restore order. "But if our plutocracy destroys the person, totalitarianism denies it." The PPU sought to restore the integrated person and in place of the failed and failing systems to restore "the human way, therefore the way of Christ."

In the second pamphlet of the series, The Starting Point of Pacifism, Charles Raven took up Gill's theme expanding upon the second affirmation, namely "that the individual only achieves full personality through the establishment of right relationship with others." Raven continued the idea of the "human way", the integration of body and spirit by which ... [man] can free himself from enslavement
to economic and political exploitation for the service of his own spiritual end, the well-being of individual and society, the glory, and praise of God.\textsuperscript{115}

Through the attainment of economic right and justice, born of the re-establishment of the primacy of the spirit of man, peace—the proper condition of human existence—will be achieved. In terms and sentiments echoing St. Paul, Raven isolated, as one of the chief tasks of pacifists the recognition of the shared humanity of all human beings, the fostering of right relationships between them to effect the transformation of society.\textsuperscript{116} Raven recognised and valued the contribution to be made by the high pacifist in a closed community but he perceived these individuals as having a special function. The majority of pacifists, on the other hand, understanding themselves to be members of the corporate body of society, ought to shoulder their social burdens and responsibilities and acknowledge their "common responsibility and common guilt."\textsuperscript{117} Raven argued that this was a new and necessary development of pacifism, an inescapable consequence of a world where "absolute non-co-operation is impossible."\textsuperscript{118} But he added a crucial caveat for the modern pacifist, namely, that the recognition of reality and the responsibility for evil—of which "war is only a symptom"—should not terminate in acquiescence.\textsuperscript{119} Pacifists had to embrace a certain "quality of temper" which would of itself compel a critical change in the way individuals interacted. Raven, however, disagreed that this
qualitative change required to be reduced to a specific social or economic formula, diplomatically chiding those in the pacifist movement who thought otherwise:

It may not be the business of us all to throw ourselves unitedly into the advocacy of monetary reform, social ownership of the means of production, the federalising of Europe, or any other of the specific proposals now popular: but it will be proof of our failure to fulfill our obligation if the evils against which such proposals are put forward go unredressed.120

Raven counselled pacifists to accept a diversity of witness and to see in this not a weakness but a strength in attaining "the fellowship of a fully personalised social order."121

The third pamphlet in the series, that by Wilfred Wellock, entitled Money Has Destroyed Your Peace, developed the third PPU affirmation: "Apprehension of the increasing power of the existing social order to destroy the individual and prohibit real community."122 Wellock's pamphlet is in marked contrast to those of Gill and Raven, in both tone and content. Wellock uncompromisingly identified war as the logical outcome of the workings of the capitalist system and the loss of the human personality. Like Gill and Raven he understood the task of pacifists to be the restoration of human dignity with its inevitably catalytic effect in transforming the social system. Wellock's identification and enumeration of the ills besetting humankind was very specific: imperialism, the Great War, Versailles, the failure of the League of Nations.123 All of these dramatically illustrated for Wellock the utter depravity of capitalism and its responsibility for the growth of market monopoly,
totalitarianism and, ultimately, world war. Wellock's analysis borrows heavily from Marxism-Leninism and is deterministic: "The principle of profit-making, which is inherent in capitalism, insures its final collapse .... If capitalism sacrifices liberty, totalitarianism will sacrifice capitalism in the end." 124 Like Lenin, Wellock understood that the Great War had been a "competition for the world's free markets" and the Second War a continuation of the same struggle. 125 Britain, for her part, had only avoided dictatorship on account of her highly favoured economic and financial position. But when capitalism's inevitable collapse overtakes this country, the privileged classes, who have tolerated democracy so long as it accepted their domination, will not hesitate to throw it over once their ascendancy is threatened, unless in the meantime a wave of enlightenment overtakes them ....126

The nature of this enlightenment would be an overcoming of man's feeling of alienation and dehumanisation which could only result from a change in the social system. Although a high pacifist Wellock, like Raven, disputed the efficacy of community living and argued for an educational assault on the general public, to bring them to an awareness of the evils of capitalism and to plead for the equitable distribution of the world's wealth.

As Lenin once said, abundance is the gateway to a classless society .... 'Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat ... nor yet for your body what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than meat, and the body than raiment?' In those words we have the basis of a true socialism.127

Wellock did not renounce Christianity; in fact he saw the
necessity of a spiritual revolution, affecting an economic one. But he roundly denounced the Church for having compromised itself with capitalism, thereby denying the injunctions of Christ. 128

The points of agreement and the very marked differences in analytical emphasis between Raven and Wellock throw into sharp relief the sometimes uneasy and stormy co-existence of pacifists within the Peace Pledge Union. Raven’s pacifism was, understandably, profoundly Christian and richly steeped in the theology of the Sermon on the Mount. His emphasis was upon the primacy of the spirit and the power of Christian love. War had its roots “in the egotisms and lovelessness of each one of us ....” 129 He postulated that a principal reason for these wrongs stemmed from a failure to appreciate “man’s spiritual needs.” 130 Wellock’s pamphlet, in contrast, was a far more pragmatic and political document, shot through with economic and social interpretations reflective of a Christian-Marxist position:

The crying need of the hour is to get rid of this wealth-based, class ridden, materialistic civilization, which up to now has received the benediction of a church whose Master and founder it flagrantly and shamelessly denies .... Thus what we seek is an economic revolution that is inspired by a spiritual revolution. 131

Wellock is uncompromising in his statement. Where Raven stresses reconciliation, Wellock conveys a sense of struggle and confrontation.

Last in the series was a pamphlet authored by John
Middleton Murry which developed the affirmation that "our task is always to take the most creative and constructive action in the face of existing circumstances." Middleton Murry, too, agreed that a revolutionary change was necessary in the very substance of society if peace was to become the condition of life. Interestingly, Wellock's secular, socialist strains are complemented by the equally strident Christian rhetoric of Murry who endeavoured, not without success, to accommodate both the political and religious impulses in his writing, noting that "William Morris and Keir Hardie ... grasped the essentially religious nature of Socialism." 

Like Wellock, Murry, in *The Brotherhood of Peace*, acknowledged that the Christian churches had failed to provide the response and leadership necessary to prevent the gathering of forces making for war. But the perversity of the world had thrown up a pacifist vanguard which had a shared vision of a new spiritual reality. The spiritual point of critical mass was the realisation that pacifism, as a political movement, was a failed one. The individual pacifist found himself torn between spirit and self in the manner of St. Paul. Thus the pacifist simultaneously carried on within himself the battle which had to be fought in the world at large.

No fiat of political power will ever create [peace] .... But that awareness of the final inefficiency of large-scale political action to create a society that satisfies the demand of love does not absolve us from pressing for such action ....
As a basis for action the Bond of Peace pamphlets enunciated lofty aims in a language which was, in many ways, intelligible only to the initiated. As an expression of "the corporate mind of the Peace Pledge Union" this series of writings certainly highlighted the Union's diversity of views, beliefs and character. But that such a pot-pourri of statements might provide a firm sense of direction for questioning members or interested outsiders, or still differences and reconcile Union factions, was a vain hope from the outset—even though the effort was a necessary and laudable one. The corporate mind of the PPU wished to create a world without war, but it was really only on this much that it could agree. The means by which all was to be achieved remained an area of avid, and sometimes, acrid debate, occasionally fuelled by sharp personal differences. An additional point to be noted with respect to the Bond of Peace pamphlets is that although each rendered an understanding of the pacifist witness from a different vantage, none of the four authors advocated the brand of militant political activism shared by many of the younger members of the PPU, most notably those belonging to the Forward Movement. The Bond of Peace pamphlets were a double-edged sword. On the one side they did, perhaps, afford a comforting sense of catholicity, but their very generality highlighted and promised the persistence of internal differences, inevitably sapping the inner resources of the Union.

Martin Ceadel asserts that the polarisation of the
pacifist movement over the issues of voluntary service and relief work—which was the practical expression of these theoretical differences within the Union—"never materialised."\textsuperscript{136}

That the two sides—the absolutist, high pacifist, and the alternativist, broad pacifist—did not divide and form separate entities is certainly so, but this should not obscure the unfortunate fact that the PPU stood as a house divided. This division was further complicated by some subtle overlays. The high and the broad orientations persisted but these very traditional differences became overshadowed by the differences which emerged between quietists and activists, between religious and political pacifists. Interestingly, the demands of total war transposed traditional responses; high pacifists often tended to become activists, whilst broad pacifists frequently tended to become quietists and theoreticians. The explanation may lie in the fact that the government's handling of pacifists in the Second World War produced an opposite response to that of the Great War. High pacifists perhaps sensed the reverse psychology being employed by the government and responded accordingly. Certainly, this would help to explain the deep involvement of men like Roy Walker in such campaigns as food relief for occupied Europe.

The Forward Movement and its friends had hoped to initiate a programme of non-violent resistance. The subsequent position in which it found itself illustrates well some of the fundamental differences between activists
and quietists. At an Executive meeting in November 1940 a letter from David Spreckley, a leading member of the Forward Movement, was the subject of discussion. Spreckley protested the quietist attitude of the executive of the PPU and its reluctance to sponsor public meetings. Four months later, at a National Council meeting, the Forethought Committee presented a report on the "Stop the War" campaign. The tension between the sides was evident in the wording of the minutes:

Though some members of the Council felt strongly that a more definite lead should be given by the National Council and some more specific action taken by the P.P.U. to stimulate a demand for peace by negotiation, many others felt that it was unwise at this time to commit the movement to a particular campaign for a definite period.

The Forethought Committee, however, was of the opinion that the education of the general public in the causes of war was the most efficacious route to follow in the circumstances of 1940. The debate continued at the Annual General Meeting in 1941. Roy Walker argued powerfully against quietism and the policy of "strategic withdrawals" which he believed the PPU Executive had been conducting as part of an unspoken policy. He warned that such a policy could well result in "loss of morale and consequent disintegration." Walker was concerned that

... In the place of action they had been provided with moral uplift and as opportunities narrowed down under the pressure of war, aspirations soared into the regions of Utopia.

Moral theorising and conviction had taken the place of
reality, yet pacifism also needed its empiricists and rationalists. In this spirit Walker also warned that community living and land experiments should be seen "as the vocation of the few and not as the refuge of the many." Indeed, the National Secretary's report to the AGM also voiced a demand for "more active political action." 

Possibly in response to these clearly voiced differences the PPU published, in 1941, a pamphlet entitled The Unity of the Spirit. This sought to develop the theme of "diversity in unity" and advocated the purposeful avoidance of orthodoxy and rigidity, which might serve to heighten and highlight differences between pacifists. At least one example hinted at the desperate attempts which were being made to hold the movement on an even keel: "Thus, there is no reason why a Conservative who renounces war should not be a member of the Union ...." (Such a scenario was, in reality, as probable as Winston Churchill's acceptance of an honorary sponsorship of the Union.) The anonymous author of the pamphlet sought to explain the differences in policy and opinion as being part of a periodic examination of conscience by which the Union sought to develop its analysis of the problem of war and its impingement upon the social, economic and spiritual realms of life. But he recognised that much controversy revolved around the issue of how the revolutionary change to society, which the PPU sought, might be attained: "wholly or mainly by legislation, or wholly or mainly by an effort towards
The proponents of the latter view held that the British political system, like the capitalist economic system to which it was inextricably bound, was inevitably doomed. The most vital contribution, therefore, which could be made by pacifists was to form community living situations and thus begin the task of altering the accepted patterns of social intercourse in preparation for the collapse of capitalist democracy. The exponents of the former view, however, held that there were elements of political democracy which merited salvage and which could be used in establishing a lasting postwar peace. Moreover, the advocates of this view, such as Vera Brittain, believed that these unassailably true and unalterable values of civilisation should be further defended and preserved "by all available political means, and if necessary by individual and corporate non-violent action." There was, in short, to be no opting out of the social or political arenas. The writer of the pamphlet did not veil his criticism of those advocates of community living, warning against the forsaking of social and political responsibilities. The way of community is at once the way to the good life and to the good society. The recognition of this in the P.P.U. should be regarded as a reinforcement of the written and spoken word and not a substitution for it.

The Forward Movement of the Peace Pledge Union probably came closest to achieving an organisational harmony between the absolutist and active orientations. But their
call to militant action created tension with the cautiously and conventionally minded council. The Forethought Committee in May 1940 tentatively defined the activities of the PPU under four headings: firstly, educational work—tracing the social and individual roots of war; secondly, relief work—giving assistance to those suffering mentally, physically and materially from the effects of war; thirdly, forming a 'nucleus of resistance to tyranny' and lastly adopting a way and style of life reflecting a renunciation of economic advantage. 148 None of these activities were "high profile", reflecting rather the idea that socialists should work quietly as leaven within the dough. The mood of the Forward Movement, however, was ever on the offensive. Indeed, as Ceadel points out, by 1941 a number of younger pacifists were embracing anarchism. 149 Both Spreckley and Walker had experienced communal living in the nineteen-thirties, 150 and in 1943 Howard Whitten, a militant absolutist and member of the Forward Movement, was to write:

Unpalatable as it may appear to some bourgeois pacifists, anarchism is the ultimate goal of the process in which we involve ourselves by renouncing war. The unanswered question is: How rapidly [emphasis Whitten's] can we extend our trust in the common man when once the present de-humanising trend is reversed? 151

This was the central and most enduring problem of the pacifists—the political translation of pacifism. 152 Some pacifists espoused the view that pacifism was, and should remain, apolitical, depending upon the collective personal witness for its propagation. Others like the members of
the Forward Movement, and individuals like Vera Brittain, Stuart Morris and Patrick Figgis, believed pacifism should be carried into the market place and on to the hustings, and that it had something unique to offer.

The distinctive contribution of pacifists is one of method. They believe that the basis of economic and political planning must be peaceful co-operation between all men. In standing for that form of political morality, they also make their spiritual contribution ... the creation of a universal political responsibility is the surest bulwark against tyranny and war ....

The Forward Movement generated a number of writings on the subject of pacifism and politics. Its manifesto, *Religion is Politics, Politics is Brotherhood*, was an uncompromising denunciation of "the nice calculations of a colourless expediency" and

a spontaneous expression of revolt against doctrinaire pacifism with its tacit acceptance of capitalist values ... the pacifist movement in this country will not succeed in fulfilling its true creative purpose until it realises that under capitalism real peace is unattainable.

The Forward Movement desired to give real and active expression to the Four Affirmations of the PPU, developed in the *Bond of Peace* series, and to which the Executive, it felt, was only giving lip-service. The primary means of achieving this was to be through "individual and corporate action in the spheres of both propaganda and example and a pattern of community style living or general community consciousness - depending upon individual preference."

Within this context "the recognition and acceptance of the
necessity of individual personal integrity as the basis of the common weal" was to be fostered by non-violent, creative and sacrificial living. ¹⁵⁶

These ideas were more fully developed in a pamphlet entitled the *Forward Movement of the Peace Pledge Union*, written by David Spreckley. ¹⁵⁷ Here Spreckley outlined his vision of a Utopian society, "A world where there will be equality ... and a spirit of universal brotherhood ...." ¹⁵⁸ To attain this end members of the Forward Movement had to raise themselves to new levels of political and social consciousness and simultaneously to carry on a mass revolution, overturning the capitalist economic and political order. ¹⁵⁹ Of paramount importance in this process was the appreciation of the personality of the individual and the incalculable value of individuality. ¹⁶⁰ Accordingly, the political system envisaged by the Forward group placed an inordinate degree of stress upon the necessity for decentralisation.

There must be a complete reversal in the present trend of politics, which is towards the "leader-principle" of fascism .... In a word, Anarchosyndicalism. ¹⁶¹ Industry was to be run in the public interest and land publicly owned. Money was to be nothing more than a convenient means of exchange and the legal system would be entirely revamped so as to enshrine human, as opposed to capitalistic, values. The "idea of universal brotherhood" would thus be given fresh meaning and become "the basis of
international relations." Religious worship was to be without restriction. This political programme was, of course, socialist in inspiration, but differing from some brands of socialism in its stress upon decentralisation and its rejection of violence. Land communities were seen to have a vital role to play as microcosmic representations of the human society which the Forward Movement anticipated. They were not to be "a funk hole for the escapist" whilst the advocacy of a system of pooled incomes would have helped sift out the self-servers.

One of the most observable differences between the Forward Movement and the Forethought Committee—and hence the PPU National Executive—was therefore in the matter of faith in the viability of a pacifist political programme. The Forward Movement's political theories and programmes were rooted in the four affirmations of the PPU, but they also represented an attempt to demonstrate the feasibility of the political translation of the message contained in the *Bond of Peace* series. This marked them off from those who favoured batten down the hatches in order to weather the storm, in short, those who became narrowly sectarian in orientation. It also served to mark them off from the senior leaders of the movement. Wartime circumstances conspired to heighten these differences so that in the early, and long, years of the war, the majority of PPU leaders, mindful of Allied reversals and the besieged mood of the general public, tended
to be anxious to prove their integrity and avoid involvement in any contentious issue. They also, undeniably, felt a great degree of responsibility for the movement. This pattern may be traced in the minute books of the Union. The war caught the PPU, like the government, in a state of some disarray. For over two years the Union was greatly preoccupied with soul-searching over the proper expression for pacifism and the applicability of pacifist theory to wartime conditions. Total war severely limited the room available for manoeuvre. But by 1943 it is quite apparent that these difficulties had, in large measure, been settled in favour of an active commitment to relief and restorative work, and after 1942 the minutes show a marked change in content and preoccupation.

This does not mean that the politicos faded from the scene; rather, they dispersed down avenues of their own persuasion. This was unfortunate, since the strength which the PPU might have gained in unity was lost in diversity, whilst the moment for politicising the wider public disappeared altogether. Some apolitical pacifists like John Middleton Murry threw themselves into community living experiments. At the same time politically minded pacifists like Vera Brittain never lost the opportunity to expound upon the political implications of pacifism and its promise for the postwar world. Other dyed-in-the-wool absolutists, like Roy Walker, spent themselves with Quaker-like dedication and
zeal in relief work. Pacifist Service Units rationalised and directed the efforts of pacifist volunteer relief workers. Some like Walker and Brittain did not cease to expound upon the pacifist way; others hoped to educate by example, but a very large number of pacifists struggled, often in vain,

to avoid feeling that they are in the wrong with society and because of this to prevent a cautious, even diffident, manner from creeping into their relations with others.165

Still other pacifists, as Ceadel notes, discovered that the cathartic effect of two years of total war was to reveal that their own beliefs were, in fact, those of low pacifists or extreme pacificists.166 Of no small interest in this regard is the content of a pamphlet, published in 1943, entitled The Politics of Peace. This was the product of five militantly minded socialist pacifists, all active members of the Peace Pledge Union and each with a strong sense of the political dimension of pacifism:

Only if it is rediscovered that Pacifism and Socialism are inseparable components of one philosophy can the world be saved from totalitarianism. Only Pacifism can bring the spirit back into Socialism; only Socialism can provide the political body in which the spirit of Pacifism works. Socialism without Pacifism is sterile.167

But two of the contributors voiced their acceptance of the necessity for the violent overthrow of the bourgeoisie. One went so far as to comment:

An obsolete doctrinaire pacifism which has naively assumed that wherever violence is used it is equally wrong and equally removed from social decency has done a disservice to peace-making.168
The entry of the Soviet Union into the war, the inescapably obvious nature of Nazism, the suffering of occupied Europe, and the growing knowledge of the fate of the Jews, caused many pacifists, whose pacifism rested upon a political or humanitarian basis, to recant. The seemingly overwhelming evil of fascism, the example of the Soviet Union, and the total effort of the British people were factors in persuading some--often only after great mental struggle--into an acceptance of violence as a necessary means to a good end. By the beginning of 1943, therefore, those pacifists who remained were overwhelmingly religiously inspired, although there were notable exceptions, such as Roy Walker and Sybil Morrison. And pacifism itself emerged, ever more clearly, as a profound and exacting faith.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER THREE


3 Sybil Morrison, an atheist and humanitarian pacifist, stated that pacifism was for her an all encompassing and an absolute faith. Interview with S. Morrison, London, England, 6 July 1979. See also Morrison, I Renounce War, 97-8. Martin Ceadel also understands pacifism as a faith—note the subtitle of his monograph, The Defining of a Faith.

4 VBC/C/Rep., Vera Brittain to Phyllis Bentley, 15 December 1940.


6 Brittain, Testament of Experience, 171-2; LPL, No/104, 11 November 1943.

7 VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to J. S. Barr, 27 May 1941.


10 Brittain, "Crisis". See also Fenner Brockway, Pacifism and the Left Wing (London: Pacifist Publicity Unit, 1938).


12 VBC/A12, Printed Matter, Box 2, "Personal Letters to Peace Lovers" One Voice, Forward, VIII. John Middleton Murry similarly found that events in Europe were to bring him back to a belief in Christianity. VBC/E20, "The Man Who Came Back to God", unidentified newspaper cutting [either Evening News or Evening Standard], 11 December 1938.

13 VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Maurice Richardson, 3 November 1939. Brittain continued her letter with the observation:

Moreover, by destroying [Hitler] we shall not be negotiating with a democratic Germany ... but with a revolutionary Germany in the hands of Stalin's puppets. Since I do not fancy one dictator any more than the other, I would rather make peace now ....

14 Brittain to the Editor, the Doncaster Chronicle, 9 November 1941. Vera Brittain had spoken to the Doncaster Pacifist Fellowship on 20 October 1941, on "The Shape of the Future", to an audience of over two hundred people. The report of the meeting, which appeared in the Doncaster Chronicle of 23 October 1941, provoked a considerable controversy. See Doncaster Chronicle, 30 October 1941 and 3 November 1941. VBC/Scrapbook, No/24 and VBC/G562. Also Brittain, Vera Brittain writes on and Middleton Murry, The Dilemma of Christianity (London: James Clarke, [n.d.]), 12; also, Stuart Morris, "War - Its Causes and Remedies" [n.p., n.d.], in PPU pamphlet collection [PPU/PC].

the Colonies, A Policy for Socialists and Pacifists (London: Pacifist Research Bureau, 1939).

16 Wellock, Money Has Destroyed Your Peace.


18 Martin Ceadele provides a detailed discussion of the phases through which the peace movement and the Peace Pledge Union passed during the interwar years. My debt to him for the section which follows will be readily apparent. Ceadele, Pacifism in Britain, 242-93.


20 Brittain, Testament of Experience, 172, quoted by Ceadele, Pacifism in Britain, 257.

21 Peace News, 17 April 1937, quoted by Ceadele, Pacifism in Britain, 255.

22 Ceadele, Pacifism in Britain, 274. See also David Lukowitz, "British Pacifists and Appeasement", 116-27.


24 VBC/A20, Research Material, Testament of Experience, Box 3, Chapter 5 Re. Dick's death--notes for T. of E. Lansbury wrote to Benes: "Friendship to Aggression, without limit, is the way of Christ." Quoted by Ceadele, Pacifism in Britain, 278.

26 Brittain, Testament of Experience, 166. See also Middleton Murry, The Dilemma of Christianity, 9.

27 VBC/A20, Research Material, Chapter 6, Folder 9, Research material on Chapter 6, PPU Notice to Group Leaders, 5 September 1939. Preliminary notice of a pacifist service corps.

28 Quoted by Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 293. A cutting of this article may be found in VBC/A20, Brittain's research materials for Testament of Experience.

29 John Middleton Murry, The Pledge of Peace, 10, quoted by Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 286.

30 Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 289.


34 VBC/D25, 27 January 1942.


36 Brittain, LPL, No/61, 17 July 1941.

37 Brittain, LPL, No/61, 17 July 1941. Brittain noted the great number of clergymen among the leadership of the peace movement: Dick Sheppard, Charles Raven, Paul
Gliddon, Percy Harthill, Leyton Richards, Reginald Sorensen, Percy Bartlett, Stuart Morris.

38 Brittain, Vera Brittain writes on. Also LPL, No/71, 4 December 1941.
See also Moira Neill, The Church and Pacifism (London: Group of Pacifist Socialists, 1940). The views expressed by Neill are very close to those of Vera Brittain. The Ministry of Information experienced problems in attempting to enlist religious values on behalf of the war effort.

Could not more be done to revive the religious sense of the people? The English are supposed to be deeply religious, and much of their past achievements are said to have been derived from their fervent Protestantism. Could more not be done to call the people back to sterner virtues, and nobler ideals? We are all being asked to make sacrifices, might these be easier in the name of religion than in that of necessity?

PRO INF 1/250, Home Press Summaries to Mr. Macadam, 15 July 1940.

39 VBC/F75, Brittain, Lecture to the Friends, 22 November 1941 and VBC/F72, "Dick Sheppard Centre" (Lecture at opening of), 6 September 1941.

40 Brittain, LPL, No/71, 4 December 1941.


42 Neill, The Church and Pacifism, 4; VBC/D26, 4 February 1943.


44 Brittain, LPL, No/64, 28 August 1941; Baptist Times, 9 April 1942.


46 VBC/F75.

47 Brittain, LPL, No/79, 26 March 1942.
Brittain, LPL, No/43, 24 October 1940.

VBC/C/Rep. [misfiled], Graham Thomas (theological student) to Brittain, 27 April 1942; VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Thomas, 1 May 1942.

VBC/E24, article about the Adelphi Centre in the Essex County Standard entitled "Where Celebrities Helped Wash Up", 6 February, 1943. Vera Brittain was listed among those doing dishes. Ceadel creates the impression Brittain was a great enthusiast of community living. Community living was a wartime expression of the pacifist witness, but the numbers of individuals involved were small and their consequent distance and detachment from society meant that they had a negligible impact. The Peace Pledge Union, as an organisation, had little to do with community living experiments although some individuals, like John Middleton Murry,* were involved. Community living has not, therefore, been considered in this dissertation. *See Colin Middleton Murry, Shadows on the Grass (London: Victor Gollancz, 1977).

VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to George Catlin, [?] March 1941. Brittain commented on it being "a bit like living in a monastery, very simple and lacking in heating."

VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to George Catlin, 19 August 1941.


VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Jameson, 18 May 1940.

VBC/D23, 2 June 1940.

VBC/D23, 8 October 1940 and 20 April 1941.


VBC/D23, 3 December 1940.

Murry's leader about the Food Relief Campaign in Peace News, which she felt undermined the efforts of those working for the campaign. By using the word "sectarian" I mean that Murry and his supporters constituted an identifiable faction within the Peace Pledge Union which became increasingly separate and distinct from the rest. Their distance from general society was thus, in its turn, greatly increased.

In March 1943, Hudson wrote to Vera Brittain:

With reference to the political future, I am hoping for a good deal by the re-casting of the Armistice Committee. If we can get the meeting out of the hands of the P.P.U. Executive into that of a number of people in Glasgow, Birmingham, Manchester as well as in London, there may be some political future. At the moment I am distrustful of the I.L.P., although I wish that they would make up their minds and follow Maxton instead of some of the dead heads in the office!

VBC/C/PPU Corr., 1943, Hudson to Brittain, 29 March 1943.

61 VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Catlin, 9 November 1939.
62 Patrick Figgis, IWM interview 4593/05/02.
63 VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Wragg, 13 May 1942.
64 Whitten worked with Brittain on the Food Relief Campaign. Both Whitten and Walker were imprisoned more than once for their views.
65 VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Catlin, 16 March 1942.
67 Interview with Roy Walker, 8 January 1980.


73 Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 307.

74 Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 306.

75 Vera Brittain provides a good example of the revisionist-absolutist, a combination of the high and broad pacifist positions.

76 Roy Walker, PPU Annual General Meeting, 19-20 April 1941. Walker was "a critic of the view that a cup of tea handed out by a pacifist was in some ways more significant that one dispensed by a non-pacifist ...." Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 306. Also, interview with Roy Walker, Ipswich, England, 8 January 1980.


81 PPU/ECM, 18 November 1939.


84PPU/FTCM, Meeting, Jordan’s, 15 and 16 May 1940, in VBC/A20, Testament of Experience research materials, Box 4.

85PPU/FTCM, Meeting, 15 and 16 May 1940.

86PPU/FTCM, Meeting, 15 and 16 May 1940.

87PPU/FTCM, Meeting, 15 and 16 May 1940. By the spring of 1940 the PPU had been taken to court under the Defence Regulations over an old campaign poster and had also been forced to withdraw from circulation a pamphlet by B. de Ligt entitled The Conquest of Violence which was regarded as defeatist in tone. See also PPU/LAM, Memo by Alex Miller, "The P.P.U. and the changed situation: the practical effect of total war", [c. 23 May 1940].

88PPU/FTCM, Meeting, 15 and 16 May 1940.

89PPU/FTCM, Meeting, 15 and 16 May 1940.

90PPU/SM, Vol. I, 2 June 1940. Before May 1939 the Sponsors were personally selected by Dick Sheppard to act for the movement in an executive capacity. After this date the title became an honorary one. In September 1940 there were eighteen Sponsors. See Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, Appendix II.

91PPU/SM, Vol. I, 2 June 1940, unsigned memo (probably penned by Philip Mumford) on the "Organisation of the P.P.U."

92"Organisation of the P.P.U."

93"Organisation of the P.P.U."

94PPU record of Fourth Annual General Meeting, 19 and 20 April 1941. Includes discussion on "The Meaning of Freedom and How to Defend it".

95PPU record of Fifth AGM, 25 and 26 April 1942.

97 PPU/ECM, Vol. II, 7 October 1941.

98 PPU record of Fourth AGM, 19 and 20 April 1941, "National Group Organiser's Report".

99 "Let us be frank and admit that if the Area ceased to exist tomorrow, Groups would not notice very much difference." PPU/LAM, 2 July 1940, W. J. S. N. Grindlay to London Group Leader, circular dated October 1940. It was estimated that there were "5,000 nominally active pacifists in the London Area" and it was also noted that there were a few groups "to which the blitz seems to have acted as a stimulant ... On the other hand, the toll taken in the East & South East [of London] has been heavy and when groups which have ceased to function for that reason are added to others ... it is found that over a hundred of a possible two hundred and ten are now non-existent." PPU/LAM, 4 May 1941.

100 PPU/LAM, [n.d.], AGM Minutes, 4 May 1941, address by Roy Walker. See also Alex Miller, memo on "The P.P.U. & The Changed Situation ...".

101 PPU/LAM, 4 April 1941, "Some Notes on Area Organisation", prepared for Frank D[awtry] by Donald P[ort].

102 PPU/LAM, 4 June 1940.

103 Miller, "The P.P.U. & The Changed Situation ...".

104 The four pamphlets in the series were:


105 This was the title of another PPU publication, issued in 1941.

106 The affirmations were reproduced in full on the first page of each pamphlet in the Bond of Peace series.
107 Gill, The Human Person, 3.
108 Gill, The Human Person, 7.
109 Gill, The Human Person, 10.
110 Gill, The Human Person, 16-18.
111 Gill, The Human Person, 21.
112 Gill, The Human Person, 22.
113 Gill, The Human Person, 23.
114 Raven, The Starting Point, 3.
115 Raven, The Starting Point, 5.
117 Raven, The Starting Point, 15.
118 Raven, The Starting Point, 16.
119 Raven, The Starting Point, 16.
120 Raven, The Starting Point, 19.
121 Raven, The Starting Point, 21.
122 Wellock, Money Has Destroyed Your Peace, 3.
123 Wellock, Money Has, 7.
124 Wellock, Money Has, 13. See his discussion of Imperialism, 11.
125 Wellock, Money Has, 12.
126 Wellock, Money Has, 17.
127 Wellock, Money Has, 24.

Raven, *The Starting Point*, 17.

Raven, *The Starting Point*, 17.


cedel, *Pacifism in Britain*, 306.


PPU record of Fourth AGM, 19 and 20 April 1941.

Roy Walker, PPU Fourth AGM, 19-20 April 1941.

Roy Walker, PPU Fourth AGM, 19-20 April 1941.

John Barclay, PPU Fourth AGM, 19-20 April 1941.


Anon., *Unity of the Spirit*, 11.
171


148 PPU/FTCM, 15 and 16 May 1940.

149 Seadel, *Pacifism in Britain*, 307-08.


151 Howard Whitten, "Howard Whitten", in *The Politics of Peace* (London: Peace Commentary Publication, 1943). Other contributors included: Bill Grindlay, Donald Port and Ronald H. Smith. The foreward to the pamphlet was penned by Vera Brittain and was critical of the gulf which had opened between the younger pacifists and their seniors. She also criticised the leadership for its lack of dynamism and poured scorn upon the doctrinaire pacifists.


156 Anon., *Religion is Politics*, 2.


The minutes of the London Area Groups provide a very rich example of this particular debate.

Peace News, 21 February 1941.

Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 311. Ceadel gives the example of Fenner Brockway.

Bill Grindlay, Politics of Peace, 9.

Howard Whitten, Politics of Peace, 23.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE GOVERNMENT, THE PEACE PLEDGE UNION
AND VERA BRITTAIN

Government Policy and Pacifism

The Sermon on the Mount is the last word in Christian ethics. Everyone respects the Quakers. Still, it is not on these terms that Ministers assume their responsibilities of guiding states.... These are the tormenting dilemmas upon which mankind has throughout its history been so frequently impaled.

Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm

When war was declared in September 1939 the government, with understandable concern, moved quickly to identify those groups whose policies and activities were potentially or actually subversive. The government position was not codified but tended to reflect the tide of the war in the European theatre, the regional strength of the pacifist organisation at home and the potency of pacifist propaganda. "Organized pacifism" was never viewed as dangerous, save by some alarmists, but its possible threat was not overlooked. The monitoring of pacifist activities by the Ministry of Information (MoI) attests to the government's concern regarding dissident elements.

National policy dealing with pacifism was determined by
the Home Policy and the Civil Defence Committees of the Cabinet largely, it seems, on the basis of intelligence reports submitted by the MoI.

Among pacifist groups the government recognised the pre-eminence of the Peace Pledge Union not only in numerical terms, but also as the pacifist body most actively and visibly opposed to the war. The PPU posed "conscience questions" for both the government and the public, focusing persistently upon such issues as: a negotiated peace, food relief for occupied Europe and saturation bombing. By voicing such moral concerns--the luxuries of a stable democracy--the pacifists made a positive contribution to the maintenance of the British democratic tradition. The continued existence of the organisation was a constant reminder of these traditional freedoms. As such the PPU counselled publicly against any rash government fiats arising from wartime contingencies.

Control and suspension of civil liberties may be easily effected in a society engaged in serious war. But the imposition of such measures does establish unfortunate precedents and may cause a serious, even permanent, erosion of civil rights. Decontrols are not always synonymous with a complete reinstatement of the status quo ante. Wartime discussions of the pacifist issue frequently evoked earnest consideration of the plight of democracy and the issue of free speech. On this fundamental question of the right to dissent, the Home Secretary, Sir John Anderson, commented:
It is, of course, extremely difficult to interfere with these activities without contravening the traditional principle of allowing free speech and free association for political objects, even if these objects are prejudicial to what the great majority of our people regard as the essential interests of the country.  

Vera Brittain believed that one of the obligations of a pacifist in wartime was "to save rational values of civilization from hatred." Writing in her *Letter to Peace Lovers* in February 1940 she praised British democracy, adding:

> So long as we are allowed that traditional liberty which permits us to express our opinions and meet to discuss them, the rest of the country may feel assured that freedom here is still a living reality.

Despite being unpopular, the pacifists were able to act as an important counterbalance to the centralist, bureaucratic and conformist tendencies inherent in total war.

The Peace Pledge Union first came to the attention of the War Cabinet in October 1939. A memorandum was circulated which discussed the possibility of prosecuting the PPU. This course of action was rejected since the organisation was deemed to be quite respectable and best left undisturbed.  

Storm Jameson, the novelist and prewar sponsor of the Union, spoke of its members as "... awfully respectable ... such good people - but they didn't know much about life."

Numerically, in relation to other peace organisations, the Peace Pledge Union was an important body. In 1939 it boasted a total membership of some 130,000, though probably only about 30% of this number, or 39,000, might be regarded as active and/or "sound". Of these perhaps a third, 13,000,
to a quarter, 9,500, were active in the sense of occasionally attending meetings, distributing *Peace News* and being otherwise involved in the movement.\(^{12}\)

On 3 March 1940 the Home Policy Committee of the Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Home Secretary concerning the issue of inciting men to evade military service. Sir John Anderson stated that "the organization principally responsible for these activities is the Peace Pledge Union."\(^{13}\) The memo, which outlined the Union's "Stop the War" activities, the picketing of labour exchanges (which handled military registration), and the holding of mock tribunals to help conscientious objectors prepare their cases, continued with the observation that

How far this organization, which was inspired in its inception by the highest motives, is being used to provide convenient cover for persons who hold subversive views it is difficult to say, but the intensity and character of some of its propaganda suggest infiltration from subversive organizations ... it would not be inconsistent with the policy [of the Communist Party] to have 'cells' in the Peace Pledge Union as well as in the Forces.\(^{14}\)

The Government was fearful of Communist infiltration--far more so than of Fascist incursions.\(^{15}\) The Peace Pledge Union did number, among its younger members particularly, several left-wingers and fellow travellers, but when the suggestion was made to Roy Walker that the Union might have been infiltrated by Communists, he responded:

As to 'Communist infiltration' it's nigh incredible that anyone would imagine Communists would dissipate their very limited man-power in so futile an exercise as trying to get into the P.P.U. to influence its policy, if any. We were a disgrace in their eyes in
being self-evidently reformist rather than revolutionary. We were also allergic to atheistic (sic) as a philosophy .... No, as a smear on the P.P.U., 'Moscow gold' was always a non-starter. 16

The advice of the Director of Public Prosecutions was that the activities of the PPU could not be curtailed by resort to common law prosecution; nor did their organisation fall within the provisions of existing Defence Regulations. 17

The Defence Regulations were a part of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act passed on 24 August 1939. 18 The constitutional provision and precedent for this act was the Emergency Powers Act of 1920. The last-named Act had been passed to deal with critical domestic situations and was a perpetuation of the Defence of the Realm Acts (DORA) of the First World War. 19

In 1920 a miner's strike precipitated Lloyd George's action:

By the Emergency Powers Act he made permanent the dictatorial powers which the government had possessed in wartime under the Defence of the Realm Acts - as big a blow against the traditional constitution as any ever levelled. 20

The Emergency Powers Act of 1939 made possible the expansion of government authority in whatever direction it deemed necessary "simply by issuing the appropriate regulation." 21

Indeed, when Clement Attlee introduced on 22 June 1940,

an extension of the original Emergency Powers Act of the previous August ... [he] explained '... It is necessary that the Government should be given complete control over persons and property, not just some persons of some particular class of the community, but of all persons, rich and poor, employer and workman, man or woman, and all property.' 22

Anderson favoured the drafting of a new regulation to embrace the novel contingencies arising from PPU activity,
but without infringing on freedom of speech. He hoped to achieve this by excluding

from the [proposed] Regulation ordinary discussion or propaganda of a religious or political character, and the action of a spiritual adviser or friend who is asked by a person who has genuine doubt as to whether he ought to seek exemption from Military Service on grounds of conscience.23

In a memorandum prepared by the Minister of Information, Sir John Reith, in March 1940, the findings of the MoI's fledgling intelligence service were reported upon.24 It accused three organisations of being primarily responsible for anti-war activities: the Communist Party, the British Union of Fascists and the Peace Pledge Union--together with marginal contributions by "more or less unorganized Christian pacifism".25 These activities most commonly took the form of leafleting and exiguous gatherings, which because of their local nature tended to be "impetuous and inadequately directed from the centre."26 The allegations of collusion between the Peace Pledge Union and the British Union of Fascists were discounted. The memo further sought to differentiate between "political pacifism" (which it was thought might be subversive) and "conscientious pacifism", neither of which it concluded had attained unacceptable levels.27 But it was felt that if the state of affairs were to continue, both kinds of pacifism might burgeon "and political pacifism will further strengthen itself behind the cloak of moral pacifism."28

Reith did not favour a policy of confrontation in
countering anti-war activity and propaganda, but advocated instead adroit persuasion and cunning. The emphasis was to be placed on the positive expression of government policy, not by incorrigible opponents of pacifism but by those who might be expected under different conditions to feel certain sympathy with it. For this reason members of the Labour Party have been asked to speak at a number of anti-pacifist or anti-Communist meetings arranged by the Ministry, particularly in universities.29

This policy was reiterated by the Home Morale Emergency Committee—a Government agency of which Harold Nicolson and Kenneth Clark were members—that suggested "... Broadcasts by certain leftwing leaders who have come round to support the national cause (eg., Strachey, Vera Brittain, etc...)."30

The mention of Brittain in this context, as a supporter of the national cause and the war effort, is entirely at variance with Cabinet committee and Foreign Office papers and also with Brittain's own writings and communications with the MoI. (Unfortunately, the Home Morale Emergency Committee did not explain her inclusion which must have been based on inaccurate information.) On 10 September 1940, Brittain responded to an MoI inquiry about her co-operation in a writing capacity with the Ministry.31

I shall be happy to cooperate with the Ministry of Information in any way which does not conflict with my beliefs as a pacifist. Though I could not undertake any form of military propaganda, I would gladly assist in the study, discussion and exposition of peace aims, preliminary peace terms, and peace negotiations.32

The Minister of Information was thus strongly opposed
to the outright suppression of anti-war propaganda. Such suppression, he feared, would be likely to create martyrs out of those posing as champions of free speech and would generate for the agitators an unwelcome degree of free publicity. Therefore the methods and measures were to be adopted "as unobtrusively as possible"; they could not, in any event, be applied universally since the problem of the pacifists was characterised by marked regional variation:

Around Glasgow for example it is largely Communist; in Wales it appears to be associated with Nationalism; in East Anglia it is characteristically Fascist; in Kent it is largely controlled by the Peace Pledge Union.

A number of examples can be given of the surreptitious skills employed by the MoI in subverting anti-war organisations. A hall, commonly retained for Communist meetings, was given over to the 'Pleasant Sunday Evening' group at the instigation of the Ministry. A variety of other entirely apolitical and innocuous voluntary organisations and clubs were also encouraged to hold regular meetings to expound the national cause. Vera Brittain noted the dearth of meeting places in her diary after she spoke in a "crowded basement room of the Imperial Cafe as no halls or hotels are now available in Harrogate (all commandeered by the govt. ...)."

In Kent, where the anti-war propaganda of the pacifists had attained rather more serious proportions, the local press had been approached and invited "to publish short accounts of the arguments advanced by Conscientious Objectors at tribunals."

Lengthier reports, it was argued, focused undue attention on
CO's and provided them with a free and important vehicle for the dissemination of their views. A review of the local press, of four evening papers and fifty-nine weekly ones, conducted by the Ministry of Information's Southern Region, found that during February 1940 a considerable number of letters appeared in the correspondence columns forcefully stating the pacifist case.

The principal point about these columns is that the 'Stop-the-War' element marshals its arguments more cogently than their patriotic opponents. This is doubtless because the pacifists' effusions are systematically inspired while those of the patriots come from the unregimented heart.

The press was further encouraged "to undertake an intensive drive against the activities of the Peace Pledge Union ...." The Ministry itself planned the publication of numerous leaflets giving detailed responses to questions posed by the anti-war minority. It was anxious primarily to reach those individuals on the fringes of the movement, motivated by boredom and discontent rather than by conviction. It was felt, however, that there was little hope of apostasy from the ranks of the believers. In Testament of Experience Vera Brittain quotes the rather amusing aphorism of one pacifist: "There is more rejoicing in the Ministry of Information over one repentant pacifist, than over ninety and nine good militarists which need no repentance." The MoI concluded that although the situation in March 1940 was not serious it could be "unless anti-war methods are countered in both words and deeds ...."
A shift would seem to have taken place in April 1940, presaged by a Home Policy committee meeting which considered the thorny subject of the Fifth Column. This was probably in direct response to Hitler's attack on Norway and Denmark launched on 9 April 1940. The Fifth Column was defined rather loosely as "those elements which oppose the National war effort ...", more specifically Communists, Fascists, pacifists and aliens. The Peace Pledge Union was identified as the "chief focus of pacifist thought with a membership of 136,000." But the Minister of Information did endeavour to distinguish between two kinds of pacifism—the political and the religious—it being conceded that while the former "is the tool of varying interest", the latter "have a moral standpoint which is often quite genuine." A few days prior to Reith's memorandum, Sir John Anderson submitted a memo to the Home Policy Committee which stated that feeling in the country was beginning to run high against Communists, Fascists and the Peace Pledge Union. Pressure was mounting "in favour of more drastic action." Four days later, on 26 April 1940, at an Executive Meeting of the PPU, it was reported that the Ministry of Information was considering plans to counter pacifist propaganda, even to the extent of perhaps breaking up meetings. An inquiry to the Ministry had solicited the response that it was not the purpose of the Ministry to mis-represent the P.P.U. but that they were concerned to see that the country as a whole fully supported the war effort.
But pacifist and anti-war propaganda was still within the law and the government's power of intervention very limited. At the April Executive Meeting, however, Stuart Morris reported that he had been visited by two men from Scotland Yard regarding a poster published by the Union in 1938, which was still being used. Obviously an intentionally ironic adaptation of a famous recruiting poster of the Great War, it proclaimed: "War will cease when men refuse to fight. What are YOU going to do about it?" (Interestingly The Times' report substituted the word 'soldiers' in place of 'men' in its report of the trial.) After discussing the possibility of a successful prosecution of the Union under Defence Regulation 39A with the Director of Public Prosecutions, Anderson decided that charges should be laid. On 23 May 1940, Stuart Morris (General Secretary), Alex Wood (Chairman), Maurice Rowntree (Treasurer), John Barclay (National Development Organiser), together with two Group Leaders, Ronald Smith and Sidney Todd, were charged accordingly.

... that you between the 1st February, 1940 and the 26th day of April, 1940, at 6, Endsleigh Street, W.C.1, did endeavour to cause among persons in His Majesties Service, Disaffection likely to lead to breaches of their duty Contrary to Regulation 39a (1)a of the Defence (Ground) Regulations.

Also the men were found with

... documents of such a nature that dissemination of copies thereof amongst persons in His Majesties Service would constitute such a contravention contrary to Regulation 39a (1)(b) of the Defence (Ground) Regulations, 1939.52

Wood denied that the poster in question had been intended to
expressly influence members of the Armed Forces; it had been in use before the war. He acknowledged that the Home Office was endeavouring to maintain freedom of expression for minority views and undertook that the Union would not abuse that freedom.\textsuperscript{53} Indeed, the National Council of the PPU passed a resolution, accepted by the Prosecution, which read:

\begin{quote}
In order to avoid ... misinterpretation the Council hereby withdraws the poster and instructs its Officers to exercise due care in the issue of future literature .... They are satisfied that to give any further undertaking would be to surrender liberties which Sir John Anderson has explicitly promised to maintain for the present. In this Resolution the Defendants concur.\textsuperscript{54}
\end{quote}

That this was accepted by the Chief Magistrate was implicit in the judgment passed, which bound over the defendants under the Probation of Offenders Act on what amounted to a technicality, namely, that under present conditions the poster was an infringement of the Defence Regulations and liable to misinterpretation. The offenders were accordingly fined thirty-six guineas, which Vera Brittain promptly volunteered to pay.\textsuperscript{55}

The failure of the Anglo-French intervention in Norway in May 1940 probably further stimulated the Government in its decision to embark upon a renewed exploratory discussion of legislative action "against persons seeking to hinder the war effort of the country."\textsuperscript{56} The main thrust of the legal changes related to a refinement of existing legislation. It was hoped that the legal net of defence regulations would then ensnare those individuals discouraging
others from support of the war effort, encouraging evasion of military duty or disaffection, or interfering with voluntary enrollment.57 Underlying this mounting hostility toward the pacifists was the real fear of a Nazi invasion of Britain and the uncertainty of the pacifist response. Indeed, the question of the integrity of the movement was one which plainly exercised the minds of pacifists and doubly so the leadership of the movement. The PPU, in fact, conducted a survey of its groups on the subject of the possible invasion of Britain by the Nazis.58 The survey is dated November 1942 but it was probably conducted much earlier than this. A total of 131 groups replied and one hundred of these submitted full replies. On the question of providing assistance to the military forces of either side great unanimity was expressed in giving uniform refusal. Billeting proved a more contentious issue: 47 groups were willing to billet; 24 would yield under protest; 19 would refuse to billet and 10 were uncertain of their response. A more sensitive question was also posed, relating to the sheltering of military personnel. Fifty-four groups responded that they would "shelter all in need, but not hide deserters", 34 would "shelter and hide deserters", 5 were undecided and 6 would not shelter deserters nor escaping prisoners. On the issue of co-operation with the invaders, only three groups stated that they would refuse whilst the remainder agreed that they would co-operate only within very closely set limits and
"for purely humanitarian purposes." On the very sensitive issue of informing the Government, whilst thirty groups agreed that they would volunteer no information, the majority stated that they would, adding the rider that the issue was one on which it was impossible to achieve unanimity. But "nearly all [the groups] were willing to co-operate in resistance to oppression up to the point when others used violence." On the thorny question of the nature of relations with the occupying army only two of the groups responding to the questionnaire opted for a policy of ignoring the enemy; eight felt that such a choice could only be made at an individual level, whilst the balance felt that the enemy should be treated "as we should treat our fellow citizens"; about half of them approved of "being as friendly as possible" in the belief that such an advance would yield favourable results. In keeping with this approach the large majority of groups believed that "a strict adherence to truth was essential"--only twenty regarding the obfuscation of truth for the protection of others as acceptable behaviour. It is surprising, therefore, that twenty-four groups were prepared to participate in limited forms of sabotage, whilst the remainder understood such acts to be expressions of violence, irreconcilable with pacifist principles. The majority of group members stated that they would continue in their place of employment, under enemy management, "until they were asked to violate their conscience." Beyond this,
26 groups felt that the decision to run the risk of the death penalty was an expressly individual choice; 29 felt that pacifists ought to carefully conserve their strength; 18 groups were of the view that real principles should be defended at all costs, whilst 1 group "felt it was never worth while to be shot." 59

By November of 1942 the invasion question was becoming an academic one. The responses of the groups are, however, of interest in illuminating their attitudes toward issues which did exercise the mind of government. Under a Vichy-like arrangement the majority of groups would have been able to function rather as they envisioned; under the conditions of a full-blown occupation it is quite probable that the pacifist movement would have produced its martyrs of conscience—and its quislings. 60 But the response of the London Group Area Meeting on 2 July 1940 to the fall of France should be noted:

The question of capitulation was raised and the meeting agreed that we do not stand for capitulation by cowardice or despair, but something very different. We were not happy about France, it appeared to be a 'Fascist sell out' to prevent a social revolution. Pétain was upholding a régime (sic) to which we felt we could not agree. 61

Another proposal of far-reaching consequence which came under discussion was the introduction of new powers to provide an effective penalty to deter printers from allowing their plant to be used for the printing of mischievous propaganda .... It is thought that the production of this type of propaganda can be checked by providing a really effective deterrent for printers; and there is little doubt that the threat of sealing up their plant will deter printers far more effectively [than a fine or imprisonment] .... 62
The subject of pacifist and anti-war publications had been discussed at length in a Home Policy Committee meeting early in May 1940. The most important pacifist publication by far was judged to be Peace News, to which was ascribed the somewhat inflated circulation figure of 36,000 per week. If, however, it were possible to calculate "snowball" reading, this figure would in all likelihood be a reasonably accurate one. The paper and its contents were respectfully regarded by the compilers of the memo:

on the editorial board [of Peace News] and in the policy committee there are a number of distinguished persons e.g. Canon Charles Raven, Lord Ponsonby, Wilfred Wellock, Vera Brittain, Dr. Herbert Grey, Arthur Wragg, Canon Stuart Morris .... Well printed and containing articles of considerable literary and cultural merit.63

But the memo also perceptively noted the division of opinion in "the policy committee about the propriety and expediency of incorporating political policies within the framework of the Union's Christian principles." A number of other newspapers and publications came under the scrutiny of the Government. But in terms of circulation figures only five were considered "significant" including Peace News. This was referred to as a "reputable journal". Interestingly, the memo concludes by noting: "A war-time phenomenon worth special attention [is] ... the increase of newsletters of which there are nearly 100."64 Vera Brittain's Letter to Peace Lovers was singled out as one of the most important of the pacifist publications of this sort. About her Letter and the Government's interest in it Brittain was, after the
war, to write that she had published it

under the vigilant eye of the Home Office, which during
the period of the invasion panic sent a policeman to
make inquiries at my secretary's house ....65

There was never any Government hindrance or interference
in its publication. The Letter was, however, in all
probability a factor in Brittain's failure to get an exit
permit to the United States in late 1940.

But in June 1940 the Government introduced new
Defence Regulations. The printer of Peace News cancelled
his contract to print the newspaper and the Wholesale
Newsagents Association announced that they would no longer
handle the paper's distribution.66 When this draft
legislation was discussed with representatives of the
parliamentary parties there was a general agreement that
the situation warranted sterner measures. Only the Opposition
Liberals "were influenced by the consideration that a
regulation in these terms could be used to stifle academic
expression and pacifist opinion ...."67 It was fitting that
the Opposition Liberals, in a last echo of nonconformity,
should have spoken for the pacifists. Both were fighting a
rearguard action in an increasingly secular and pragmatic
society. The political and societal changes of the 1930s,
accelerated by the war, left in their wake a stricken
nonconformist conscience and an uncertain pacifist movement.

After June 1940 Government action regarding the
pacifist element largely followed the guidelines set out in
the first ten months of the war. The amended Defence
Regulations proved sufficient to contain the pacifist problem. The manner in which this was achieved, and the government's policies interpreted 'in the field', can be seen from looking at some of the activities of the Ministry of Information, the British Broadcasting Company, and the Foreign and Home Offices.

The Peace Pledge Union and the Ministry of Information

Draw back the curtains, 
Dim the electric light. 
Now the stage is set for 
Our impromptu first night. 
Keith Footit

The Ministry of Information, like the Peace Pledge Union, subdivided the country, with a Regional Information Officer being made responsible for each area. The varying regional strength of the PPU meant that some RIO's had a decidedly distorted and jaundiced view of the relative influence of the pacifists. This was especially true of the South Eastern division where the RIO, Hubert Banner, felt besieged by sedition. In January 1940 the RIO's met at the London University Senate House, wartime headquarters of the Ministry of Information, to discuss the means that could be best employed to combat pacifism. An issue which particularly concerned the assembled group was the apparent inroads made by pacifism into the universities. It was agreed that carefully selected speakers of good intellectual calibre would have to be dispatched to meet with the
disaffected students. Mr. Hilton, the Director of the Home Publicity Division, informed the meeting that "the Ministry were now conferring with the National Union of Students and that a general scheme for approaching students had been worked out ...." To counteract any pacifist ideas among the public-at-large the government campaign against pacifism was to be carried on through the medium of public meetings and the distribution of pamphlet literature. The Ministry of Information hoped to make about fifty pamphlets available for distribution at the discretion of the RIO. Given the localised nature of the pacifist 'sickness', the medicine dispensed was to be curative rather than preventative. It was nowhere dispensed with more enthusiasm than by Hubert Banner.

Responsible for an area noted for its PPU activity, Banner employed various means to counter pacifist influences. He took it upon himself to address a confidential letter to all the local newspaper editors in his region,

inviting their co-operation in our 'drive' against organised Pacifism. Already the response has begun. Last Saturday's 'Kent Messenger' came out with a slashing front page article, culminating in a declaration of uncompromising hostility to the Pacifist organisations henceforth and the last issue of the 'Eastbourne Gazette' printed a stern leader incorporating most of the arguments which we had suggested in our confidential communication. Several other articles in like strain have been definitely promised.

Other methods used by Banner included the advertising of incidents that portrayed the PPU in a discreditable manner
and ensuring that such episodes were fully aired in the regional press.

... we have brought to our notice an incident in Hastings in which an ardent supporter of the war effort has made the local Peace Pledge Union people look little more than ridiculous. We are using this episode as the subject matter of a news bulletin to the whole Regional Press.76

But Banner's efforts came rather abruptly to grief. A person, or persons unknown, showed Banner's confidential letter to the editors of the regional press to Peace News, which promptly reproduced part in facsimile on its front page. Peace News printed the entire text of the letter, highlighting the suggestions made for discrediting the Peace Pledge Union and the confidential notes on anti-pacifist arguments.77 Banner wrote to a superior: "I feel bound to expect that our Editors' style will be somewhat cramped for some little time to come."78 Indeed, angered by the fact that the pacifists had won an important propaganda victory, Banner pressed his superiors to make Peace News divulge its sources.79

... I do want to know who it was that betrayed my confidence, and I hope my suggestion of taking action under the Official Secrets Act ... may lead to results. I should imagine that 'Peace News' could quite easily be scared into giving the information wanted.80

But D. B. Briggs, Banner's superior, felt it best that the whole affair pass into "the general obscurity which, ..., 'Peace News' enjoys with the majority of editors."31 His lack of enthusiasm for pressing Banner's request should probably be interpreted as the gentle restraining of an
overly zealous subordinate, whose enthusiasm might stir a
nest of hornets. The Government was consistent in its
efforts to sidestep an open and direct confrontation with
the pacifists. It thereby hoped to avoid giving them
publicity, which might further their efforts to win recruits
from the ranks of public apathy.

On the other hand, reports were also reaching the
Ministry of Information of public anger over Government
inaction vis-à-vis pacifism. In the South East a Regional
Police Staff Officer reported:

There is no doubt that the Government's tolerance
towards subversive pacifist propaganda is causing much
concern to the general public, and may tend towards
breaches of the peace. 82

The officer was to be proved correct in both his predictions.
Among the papers of the National Council for Civil Liberties
are numerous cases and reports of attacks on pacifists and
their property. The Dick Sheppard Centre in Oswestry,
Shropshire, on three occasions in June 1940 was the subject
of sectional hostility of sufficient violence to cause its
temporary closure. 83 But perhaps the saddest incident
concerned an elderly woman. Her husband's statement
reported that

... arriving home on May 31 [1940] at about 7:00pm
from London, where I had been to consult my heart
specialist, I found my wife in a serious state of
terror, incoherent in speech, shaking violently from
head to foot, with severe palpitation. 84

She had been threatened by two men and told that people were
coming from the town to "smash up" her home. On 6 June 1940,
the couple were visited by two police officers who informed them that unless Mr. Penn, a retired civil servant, withdrew from all activities of the Workers Educational Association and the Peace Pledge Union he would be liable for internment.85 Two days later Penn wrote to the police sergeant at Haslemere:

In your interview with me you explained that if we did not resign from these societies [the WEA and PPU] we were liable to be taken and detained for the duration of the war. I understand that such detention would take place without any opportunity of rebutting or refuting statements in any court or otherwise. We are too old and feeble to live under such a terrifying menace.86

This last incident, albeit the only one of its sort in the NCCL files for the period, demonstrates at least the possibility of and potential for violence and vigilante behaviour in a situation where the majority accept unquestioning conformity. Moreover, when certain individuals take it upon themselves to enforce the "tyranny of the majority", then one of democracy's most vital aspects, that of minority rights, may be seriously endangered. At the British Broadcasting Company minority rights and freedom of speech became critical issues. These controversies were particularly appropriate to the Religious Broadcasting Department where pacifist speakers were the subject of debate.

On the Air, or Off the Air?: Pacifists and the British Broadcasting Corporation

If love was set to music,  
And played at Albert Hall,  
Man would love his neighbour,  
There'd be no war at all.  

K. Foottit87
In fact the borderline between religion and politics seemed to be one of the most dangerous frontiers to argue about during the war. The question confronting the BBC was how far it should allow controversy to affect broadcasting. Should it seek, within the limits open to it, to maintain reasonably free access to the microphone or should it exercise self-discipline in what the Government believed were the interests of the nation?88

In 1936, the Ullswater Report on broadcasting had 'recognised' that in the event of a national emergency the government would have to assume full control over the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).89 There was, however, considerable resistance to this proposal within the BBC; indeed, a year earlier the Corporation's chairman, Lord Reith, pledged co-operation with the Government, but resisted the suggestion that in time of war the executive functions and decisions of the BBC should be surrendered.90 In August 1939 the Corporation was, in fact, given the responsibility of censorship, which was to be conducted on a voluntary basis in co-operation with the Press Division of the Ministry of Information.91 Its independence could not, however, be taken for granted and there were, as Ian McLaine notes, frequent demands made to subjugate the BBC to total government control.92 But under Duff Cooper and Brendan Bracken, the Ministry of Information stolidly maintained the inviolability of the BBC. Speaking to the House of Commons in January 1942, Bracken made it clear that he thought it "a very bad thing" if the BBC were to become an "appendage" of his Ministry.93 In the same month The
Times stoutly declared:

... it would cut still more deeply at the roots of democratic institutions if broadcasting in this country were to become a Government monopoly or anything approaching it. The position of the B.B.C. and the credit it now enjoys would be rapidly undermined if it came to be generally believed that only opinions acceptable to the Government could be heard ... and that, perhaps at some moment of internal political crisis the Government of the day could avail themselves of this immensely powerful organ of publicity to the exclusion of any dissentient view.94

It is quite apparent from a reading of Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, that the BBC from its inception possessed a considerable esprit de corps, and was both conscious and proud of its reputation for the impartiality of news. Within Broadcasting House, headquarters of the BBC, there was, therefore, much painstaking discussion given over to questions dealing with freedom of expression. But the debate was probably nowhere more immediate and complex than in the Religious Broadcasting Department (RBD) which had close dealings with a number of prominent pacifist clergymen.95 The course of the debate in the RBD serves as a valuable case study of the formation and diversity of opinions among a group of highly visible, and audible, civil servants as to the demands which may, or may not, be rightfully imposed by wartime contingency upon minority opinion. It also affords a graphic illustration of the unhappily divided position of the Church of England.

In June 1940, the rump which composed the wartime Board of Governors of the BBC issued, by their own authority, a policy directive on religious broadcasting which stated:
The Governors, considering the war-time situation, are clear that there cannot be complete freedom of speech in broadcasting, and that Christian ministers cannot be given a position of exceptional privilege in this regard. They consider that religious broadcasting, and all other broadcasting talks which deal with the war, should be in full accord with the national effort and with the view that the cause for which the nation is fighting is a righteous one, and that in religious broadcasting there should be no hesitation in praying regularly for victory for our forces.

It would be clearly inconsistent with these aims to invite any known member of an organisation or any individual who does not hold these views to broadcast.96 The directive was initialled by the powerful Chairman of the Board, Sir Allan Powell. Two months later the Director of Religious Broadcasting, J. W. Welch, an Anglican clergyman, sent a strongly worded memorandum to the Director-General, F. W. Ogilvie, which challenged the June directive and asked for advice and a decision with respect to the engagement of conscientious objectors for broadcasting. Welch noted that clergymen were commissioned by "the Church of God and not by the B.B.C.," and that in 1933 the Corporation had appointed as DRB a priest of the Church of England, "whose first and highest loyalty was to the Church of which he was an ordained servant."97 He reminded the Director-General of a late July memorandum issued by the Home Secretary and Department of Home Security which declared:

The first principle to be observed is that in this country no person should be penalised for the mere holding of an opinion, however unpopular that opinion may be to the majority.98

He added spiritual weight to this secular argument by quoting the joint ruling of the Archbishops of Canterbury and York regarding pacifist priests:
We have never ceased to recognise that sincerity of Pacifists, nor have we retracted our declaration as to their right to hold and expound their views within the Church of England. Pacifist priests should certainly be allowed to exercise their ministry. Pacifism is a genuine vocation for some; the point of disagreement is that Pacifists claim that Pacifism must be the normal practice in the Christian Church.99

Welch's memorandum plainly and painfully highlighted difficulties in the four hundred year old compromise between the English Church and the State. But unlike Elizabeth I, the Board of Governors appeared bent on making windows into men's souls.101 Welch was not concerned about those persons who were pacifists through political or humanitarian conviction, but those "who feel directly called by God to follow the example of Our Lord in meeting evil only by love ...."102 Although Welch agreed that it would be wrong to broadcast pacifist convictions, he felt it a great wrong that pacifist priests should be forbidden also to preach the Gospel:

What, I submit, we cannot say to ordained priests and ministers of the Church of God is 'We understand that you have a sincere vocation to resisting evil by non-violence and that this conviction is for you an absolute. We cannot broadcast your pacifist convictions. But also because you have this vocation we cannot allow you to preach the Gospel ... through broadcasting. From that part of your ministry we must "excommunicate you".' .... Though the B.B.C. is a Christian Corporation ... it remains a secular organisation; and to deny to a minister the exercise of his ministry in the preaching of the Gospel through broadcasting, because he has a vocation to pacifism, is to make a judgement which is fundamentally religious or even theological.103

Welch concluded his memorandum with the words:

This memorandum is an appeal to you to allow such men to continue in their work of religious broadcasting though
we may and do refuse to allow them to broadcast their opinions on an issue which at present divides the Church.\textsuperscript{104}

Welch's plain speaking was not, however, appreciated by the Board of Governors. Ogilvie,\textsuperscript{105} who appeared well disposed to Welch, informed him that his memo had served only to antagonise the Board and urged that in future he and Welch meet to "take informal counsel ... in important matters like these. Tactics are not irrelevant to the attainment of an objective!"\textsuperscript{106} In recording a meeting with the DRB on 15 August 1940, the Director-General wrote that

... the Governors did not wish him to conduct a private inquisition into the views of ministers .... The test was: known expression or views not fully in accord with the national effort.\textsuperscript{107}

But Welch obviously was a man not easily dissuaded, for on the next day he went to see Powell. The latter argued three points: first, that complete freedom of speech was not permissible in wartime; secondly, that the Churches had in the past accepted restrictions on the preaching of Christian truths and the clergy's freedom of speech; and finally that to bring pacifists to the microphone would only damage public morale.\textsuperscript{108} Powell stressed that the Corporation was not seeking to meddle with the practice or doctrine of the Church:

... even in peace-time the Corporation did select ministers and churches, and that he was only asking for a new application of this selective principle.\textsuperscript{109}

In responding to these points Welch observed that in religious broadcasting at least, it was "the will of God"
that was paramount,

and the express wish of the Church of God had to be more important than the wish and will of the Government and even of the B.B.C. I told him that, in the long run, the Corporation would never regret standing on its principles and saying "We do not agree with the individual convictions of a certain minister who is a pacifist and indeed we think that all that Christianity stands for will be jeopardised if the war is not won by force; but that does not invalidate the Gospel this man is preaching, and we believe he ought to broadcast the word of God no matter what his personal convictions are on a controversial point." 110

Powell, in turn, reiterated that a man known to be a pacifist and to have worked or preached against the national war effort could not be invited to broadcast. He was willing to concede, however, "if a minister is not known ... to be notorious as a pacifist, that he should be invited to broadcast without our making any enquiries as to what he himself would do if called upon to carry arms." 111 Under these terms Powell felt able to allow Donald Soper and George MacLeod to take part in the broadcasts they had been invited to give prior to the issuing of the June directive, though it was made clear that they would "not be invited to broadcast again under present conditions." 112 It seemed, however, that Canon Raven had attained the requisite degree of notoriety, and "because of his public utterances and writings" would not be allowed to broadcast. 113 Simultaneously the BBC talks department were mulling over the possibility of inviting Vera Brittain to take part in "Britain Speaks" to be broadcast to the United States. Brittain was known to both the Ministry of Information and
the Foreign Office as a pacifist but there is no mention of her pacifism in the BBC file.\footnote{114}

Welch personally informed Raven of the Board of Governors' ruling and kept a record of his meeting with Powell. Raven "was at first greatly upset" because he felt that the BBC, by excluding pacifists, were no longer properly representing the churches; and like Welch he believed that the first loyalty in religious broadcasting should be owed to God and the Church, and secondly to the State.

He pointed to the Kerrl dispute in Nazi Germany (Kerrl denied the microphone to the confessional churches because they would not support the State) and said that though our cause was righteous and the Nazi cause really evil, he felt the principle was not in essence different; and he pleaded with us to keep the national cause righteous by "refusing to become like the thing we are fighting."\footnote{115}

Raven did not oppose the national effort; indeed, he asserted that he would not encourage men to become pacifists since that would encourage and strengthen the Nazi evil; for pacifism is a vocation - you are called or you are not. But for me, the Teaching of Our Lord is an absolute, and 'I can do no other'; and if asked to kill I should refuse.\footnote{116}

At the end of the account of the interview Welch added some reflections of his own on his position as Director of Religious Broadcasting which he regarded as a very troubled one. Welch clearly felt that the department had fallen heavily between the two stools of church and state:

... it might be said of the work of my department 'if a Christian minister supported the State he was allowed to broadcast the Gospel, but not otherwise.' Knowing a little of Germany I fear this interpretation, this "Caesar not Christ" contrast men like to make, when the
passions of war subside. I am desperately anxious that we should come out of this war with clean hands, with our loyalty to God, and His church which I serve, un tarnished. 117

Finally, Welch summarised the magnitude and the tensions of his task:

I am trying to serve the Corporation, the State, religious broadcasting and the Church, as best I can. It is not easy. 118

Welch did not, however, send the letter in which these remarks were made to Powell. Instead, he submitted a somewhat muted version in which he was clearly endeavouring to be dispassionate and objective. 119 Powell remained immovable. M. Dinwiddie, the Scottish Director of the BBC, wrote to Welch that he had found the Chairman quite recalcitrant and unwilling to alter his previous decision ....

The Chairman was adamant in his opinion that those who had declared or shown themselves in public to be pacifists must be forbidden to broadcast and there the matter rests at present. 120

But such a debate could not be confined to Broadcasting House and was taken up vigourously in both the House of Commons and the national press. In early January 1941 the News-Chronicle announced: "BBC Anti-Pacifist Blockade Extended. 3 Famous Preachers on Radio Black-List." The article noted that the BBC was presumed to have acted as an instrument of state in the matter and observed the individual's notoriety as a pacifist was clearly the criterion for exclusion. The author of the article did not agree with the judgment of the BBC. 121 Toward the end of the month the public debate about the pacifist clergymen
escalated somewhat, and on 31 January The Times published the text of a letter from the Archbishop of York, William Temple, to Sir Allan Powell. The letter unequivocally stated that

... no man should be excluded from the privilege of broadcasting the message of the Gospel on the ground that he is known to be a pacifist, provided that he undertakes not to use this occasion to advocate the pacifist position.\textsuperscript{122}

Finally, in March 1941, Sir Winston Churchill was drawn publicly into the debate following the BBC's ban on Sir Hugh Robertson, the conductor of the Glasgow Orpheus Choir.\textsuperscript{123} Robertson was a declared pacifist, and although, as the Birmingham Post pointed out, the choir was not composed of pacifists, nor the broadcast propaganda but music, the ban was complete.\textsuperscript{124} The press, particularly the left-wing press, and the House of Commons, with occasional exceptions, treated the ban with considerable mockery. It inspired such headlines as "Has BBC Gone Daft? Our Little Hitlers and Sir Hugh Robertson", Jail the Orpheus Choir!" and "'Kultur' and the BBC".\textsuperscript{125} In the Commons Churchill moved to assure the House that persecution, victimisation and man-hunting were "odious to the British people. (Cheers)." And in response to a direct question regarding a pacifist musician from an inveterate opponent of pacifism, the Prime Minister said:

If he were allowed to broadcast it would be in his capacity as a musician or in a musical performance and would have no relation to his political or conscientious view, but I think we should have to retain a certain amount of power in the selection of music. (Laughter). A very spirited rendering of Deutschland Uber Alles could hardly be allowed. (Laughter).\textsuperscript{126}
In light of the Prime Minister's remarks the Powellite directive of June 1940 was replaced by a note issued on 17 July 1941, "Broadcasting in Wartime":

This note supersedes previous instructions, under this title or otherwise, dealing with invitations to take part in broadcasts ....

As regards speakers in any programme, nothing is to be broadcast which is contrary to the national war effort. Nor should particular speakers who are well known for their opposition to the national war effort, be invited to speak (or have an invitation withheld) without reference to the Director-General through the Controller concerned.

As regards all other artists in any programme, invitations should be issued or withheld on programme merits alone.127

In light of the slight tempering of the Corporation's policy towards pacifists, Welch decided, in August 1941, to seek permission for Raven and Soper to broadcast.128 In this he was supported by the Controller of Programmes, B. E. Nicholls, who forwarded his request to the Chairman. But in a private and confidential note the Chairman expressed himself unable to accede to the request. First, Raven and Soper were both sponsors of the Peace Pledge Union and their names appeared on that organisation's notepaper. Second, the Minister of Information had specified that Raven should not be asked to broadcast. A third name mentioned was that of the pacifist Bishop of Birmingham, E. W. Barnes, whose name and utterances had been distributed in printed form by the PPU.129 None of these reasons would seem overwhelmingly damning, save the specific request made by the Minister of Information, but Powell had proved himself to be consistently and implacably opposed to broadcasts by pacifists. It is
difficult to know if this was on account of strongly held personal convictions or because Powell feared that the detractors of the BBC might use evidence of a weak policy toward pacifism as final proof of the Corporation's inability to manage its affairs responsibly in time of crisis. At a board meeting in November 1941 Raven, Soper and Barnes were blacklisted. Lord Soper stated that he was never officially informed by the BBC of its decision and there is no documentary evidence extant to suggest that any of the individuals were informed. Indeed, there is a notable hiatus in the BBC correspondence files of both Soper and Raven between September 1940 and January 1946.

John Middleton Murry, like Soper and Raven, was not used by the BBC because of his known pacifist opinions. In December 1939 Major-General J. A. Beith, Director of Public Relations at the War Office, protested that Middleton Murry's views were "hardly suitable for consumption by the soldier in war-time." The Director of Religious Broadcasting nevertheless defended the use of Middleton Murry for a series of talks entitled "Europe in Travail", given in the winter of 1939. The DRB noted that they contained no pacifism and were a "brilliant exposure of the falsehoods of Marxism and Nazism." The matter did not end there, however. In the summer of 1940 Henry Strauss, a "Norfolk neighbour" of Middleton Murry, wrote a letter to The Times, (prompted possibly by personal differences), which was printed under the title "BBC Talks. Communism and Mr.
The memos and notes spawned by this action at the BBC made it clear that while those responsible stood firm in their choice of Murry, there was a fear that captions, such as that which appeared in *The Times*, would compromise the corporation's Talks Department. The MoI had received some ten letters on the subject and these were subsequently acknowledged, with the assurance that Middleton Murry would not be asked to broadcast again. But the stir caused by the affair centred not upon Middleton Murry's pacifism, but the sensitive area of communism—a creed which he had first embraced and then uncompromisingly rejected, as had been made abundantly clear in his series of talks. The BBC decided not to pursue the issue publicly in *The Times*, although Harold Nicolson did rise in the House of Commons to defend the Talks Department's choice of Murry. Murry was thus relegated to the ranks of the pacifist untouchables. In August 1944 an internal BBC memo pinpointed the cause:

He has not broadcast since 1939 partly because his close association with the Peace Pledge Union has not endeared him to the Powers that Be— at any rate in connection with our particular subject matter in this department.

But in December 1944 Middleton Murry did broadcast a literary talk on Shakespeare's play *King John*. Unfortunately, there is no accompanying documentation to explain this apparent change in policy, which did not extend to either Raven or Soper.

Before the boom descended upon pacifist broadcasters,
Welch did arrange some broadcasts including a service from Carrs Lane Congregationalist Church in Birmingham conducted by Leyton Richards, a well-known pacifist. Welch intentionally invited Richards because he felt pacifist convictions should be aired and that the opportunity simultaneously taken to affirm the essential unity of Christendom. 144

I am particularly anxious that pacifists should broadcast and speak about the Christian verities at stake in these days, quite apart from preaching pure pacifism; it would be a triumph of the spirit if pacifists could unite on the things we hold in common. 145

Welch also wished to avoid those nationalistic and Old Testament tendencies which he felt were emerging in the Church.

Similarly it will be important to bring to the microphone men who are not pacifists but who are most alive to the real issues of this war and are quite prepared to criticize, as Christians, many of the things that seem to be in danger if we follow the government too blindly, or let ourselves drift into nationalistic Christianity. 146

The DRB felt that his department, especially, should witness to freedom of speech. 147 Richards's sermon, which was broadcast on 11 February 1940, caused only a minor stir although, since it was heard by approximately five or six million listeners, Welch had been expecting some trouble. Welch himself admitted that he profoundly disagreed with Richards's exposition and application--indeed, he chided him for using his prayers to preach pacifism--but he also observed:

I think the fact that you could preach - and not
without some bellicosity in your utterance! - such a pacifist sermon ... without receiving any important protest, is a striking point.148

A few days later Welch was to write to Richards again to report:

I hear from our Controller of Public Relations at Head Office today, that one or two people fairly high in government circles have been writing letters of protest about the broadcast to the Corporation ....149

The DRB also commented upon the numerous letters which Richards had received in response to his sermons.

... I really think we must do some more Christian thinking about the feelings and thoughts revealed by those letters, especially from parents of men in the Forces. In itself the conflict of loyalties is a good thing, because religious broadcasting has often tended to supply comfort and sanctified entertainment, instead of giving people pain in the mind. Looking back on the sermon now, I am inclined to think ... that some direct advice on what to do now that we are at war might be most useful, particularly in stressing the value of us who are no longer pacifists - both in time of war with regard to our method of conducting it, and when the time comes to "impose" the peace.150

The Department of Religious Broadcasting, under the leadership of Dr. Welch, clearly sought to retain and maintain a high degree of integrity and independence in the area of religious broadcasting. The moral choices and tensions generated by the volatile admixture of pacifism, Christianity and the democratic freedoms of conscience and expression, are abundantly clear when placed in a wartime crucible.

Vera Brittain and Whitehall Capers

Deeply as I detest war ... I wouldn't have missed this show for anything.

Vera Brittain, 1940151
The Brittain papers and the governmental records deposited in the Public Record Office show that Vera Brittain also experienced very specific and considerable personal difficulties in her dealings with the authorities because of her pacifist beliefs. The government viewed Brittain as a potential trouble-maker, although tacitly acknowledging the strength of her conviction. It also recognised the considerable influence which her high profile as a successful authoress and popular speaker enabled her to exert upon large audiences both in England and in the United States. Given the complexities of Brittain's case, it is an interesting record of the governmental and bureaucratic attitude toward a leading member of the Peace Pledge Union. It is also revealing of the British Government's sensitivity toward American public opinion. Similarly, it throws light upon wartime departmental rankings. Brittain's repeated application for an exit permit involved the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Information and the Home Office. Significantly, despite the reputation of the Foreign Office as Whitehall's equivalent of the Senior Service, it was the view of the Home Office which overrode all others and passed final judgment.

In January 1940 Brittain was granted an exit permit to the United States to deliver a series of lectures. These had been arranged and scheduled before the war by her American agents. Three days prior to her departure Charles Peake, Head of the News Department of the Foreign Office and
Chief Press Adviser to the Ministry of Information, received a visit from Lady Margaret Rhondda, the editor of *Time and Tide*. Rhondda, whose personal relations with Vera Brittain, both as an editor and an acquaintance of long standing, were decidedly strained, told Peake of a PPU resolution which she believed Brittain intended to take with her to the United States and publicise before American audiences. The resolution, according to Rhondda, had been passed at a PPU meeting chaired by the actress Dame Sybil Thorndike. It spoke of the desire of English women for peace "and appealed to Mrs. Roosevelt, whom Miss Brittain was to see, to do her utmost to bring about a cessation of war by means of negotiation with Germany."

Brittain, it would seem, did leave for the United States with papers of a somewhat compromising nature--according to the Government's interpretation--including a Union resolution. But the Ministry of Information, on discovering these materials, decided not to confiscate them.

The Foreign Office reasoned that whilst Brittain could have been denied them,

probably a bigger sensation would have been caused if Miss Brittain had announced the fact in the United States of America than will result if she is unable to make such allegations about the attempted suppression of the free press etc in this country.

Charles Peake was also very wary of the degree of adverse publicity which Vera Brittain was well capable of fermenting in America.
Miss Brittain is a determined pacifist and it is for consideration whether we ought to stop her going. She is also a crank and a self-opinionated one at that but she must be well known in the United States by reason of a remarkable book entitled "Testament of Youth" which she wrote several years ago ....160

Peake felt that to deny Brittain an exit permit would create unwanted publicity for the Peace Pledge Union but he advised that as a precautionary measure, Lord Lothian, British Ambassador to the United States, be told of Miss Brittain's impending descent.161

Peake's memo was circulated among FO officials and gathered a number of initialled comments, all of which concurred with Peake's assessment. The comments highlighted the sensitivity of the government to any charges relating to violations of civil liberty, especially in the event that they might be made before an American audience. One of the officials to read Peake's memo was the then Under Secretary of the Foreign Office, the late Lord Butler.162 He also agreed that Brittain should be permitted to travel, indeed, that she should receive "m.f.n. treatment", but that she should "be watched!"163 The Foreign Office also gave thought to the preparation of a "possible counter-blast from the women of Great Britain" in the event that Brittain could not be dissuaded from her course.164 But at least one official was very dubious of the merits of such action.

I should prefer to leave Miss Brittain alone. She is of the kind that thrives on opposition and counter-blast will merely call forth counterblast and give her more publicity than before.165
The Foreign Office did, however, dispatch a coded warning telegram to Lord Lothian informing him of the imminent arrival of the "aggressive pacifist", Vera Brittain. It continued by advising Lothian that the resolution in her possession

... was in no sense representative of anything but a few well known pacifist cranks.

You may think it desirable to represent the [true--this word is deleted from the text] facts in the proper quarter.166

The Foreign Office clearly treated Brittain with both caution and circumspection, somewhat belying their own assessment of her as an inconsequential crank. After her arrival in the United States Brittain surprised her FO monitors on at least one occasion. After less than a fortnight in the United States Brittain sent a letter to the American Division of the Ministry of Information, detailing the attitude of the American Middle West--as she perceived it--toward Britain, especially with "respect to such issues as the war debt and British censorship of U.S. mails."167 One FO official was moved to comment: "Miss Brittain is quite sensible in this letter - may she remain so!" But others were not as impressed. One responded by saying: "I'm afraid this does not alter my views on the unwisdom of letting her loose in the U.S.A."168 T. North Whitehead of the Foreign Office was also cautious in his response to Brittain's display of sensibleness.

I saw something of Miss Vera Brittain on her last two lecture tours in the USA ... at that time her utterances, both public and private, were most unhelpful
to us - (one small example: I have heard her state to crowded audiences, that there would have been no war in 1914 if the "old men" in the British Cabinet had been in the slightest danger of being sent to the trenches). Miss Brittain's letter (to the American Division, MoI) seems to show a greater sense of responsibility - Would it be possible to get a line on the kind of thing she is saying this time?169

The Survey Section of the Foreign Office was, accordingly, asked to pass any important comments which came to their attention as a result of Brittain's lecture tour.170 It seems, however, that Brittain said nothing to which her monitors took exception. Indeed, it was the considered opinion of Lord Lothian and Frank Darvall of the American Division of the MoI that Brittain "has not done any real harm by what she has said or done [in the U.S.] ...."171 Brittain was also privately informed that a representative of the British Library of Information in the United States was sending a "substantially favourable" report of her tour to Whitehall.172

In the summer of 1940, therefore, when Brittain routinely applied for a second exit permit, she was somewhat surprised to learn that one would not be readily forthcoming. Her children, John and Shirley, had been evacuated to Minnesota in June 1940, and her husband was leaving for the United States in the autumn to lecture at Kansas State University. Brittain had a standing invitation from her American agents and publishers to give another series of lectures, and after receiving one such approval for wartime travel could not comprehend the prevarications of the authorities.
I concluded that I was a temporary victim of official pomposity ....

I still had to learn how far a frightened democracy will go in using such powers to impose conformity upon its intellectual or moral dissenters, and thus repudiate the very ends for which it professes to be fighting. 173

Frank Darvall, upon being pressed by Brittain, did however admit that her membership of the Peace Pledge Union, and the fact that she had featured in a Parliamentary question period in February 1940, combined to make granting an exit permit most doubtful. 174 This was also confirmed by Darvall's superior, Sir Frederick Whyte, the Director of the American Division who explained that the government department responsible for the granting of exit permits had explicit instructions from the Government to issue Exit Permits only to those whose work can be described as of national importance. 175

Only the day before Brittain had written in a somewhat exasperated tone to Storm Jameson:

Knowing the ways of governments as well as I do I still find it incredible that homosexual actors and politicians with shady reputations can be sent out as official representatives of this country .... 176

The Foreign Office and Ministry of Information files show, however, that whilst neither department was enthusiastic about Brittain's proposed second journey to the States, neither actively opposed her application. Indeed, both supported it on the negative grounds that a refusal would cause greater consternation to the government than to Miss Brittain. The Foreign Office, appropriately enough, diplomatically avoided assuming the responsibility for making a decision in Brittain's case: "From F.O. pt. of
view - i.e. the pt. of view of Anglo-American rels. it wd. seem that it wd. be better to let her go."\textsuperscript{177} The memo indicates that the Passport Office files were appropriately marked—the Passport Office being the responsibility of the Foreign Office proper. But the FO did add an important \textit{caveat emptor}: "What she does or says when she gets there may make Parliamentary trouble here, but that is not a point for F.O. to advise on."\textsuperscript{178} The Ministry of Information was less equivocal in its support for Brittain's application and Darvall formally asked for MoI authority in pressing for a permit.\textsuperscript{179} He was therefore very surprised to learn that Brittain's request was turned down.\textsuperscript{180}

Frustrated, but very far from deterred, Brittain set about the task of unearthing "who my enemy [is] among the powers that be ...."\textsuperscript{181} To this end she mobilised the help of Arthur Creech Jones, M.P., the Parliamentary Secretary to Ernest Bevin, and a personal friend. Brittain was coming to the conclusion, so she confided to her husband, that

\ldots{} There is obviously some kind of drive on against pacifists which is concerned not to persecute us but completely silence our voices ....\textsuperscript{182}

In late September 1940 Jones reported to Brittain that he had spoken to R. A. Butler about Brittain's case and that the Under Secretary had informed him that the refusal of the permit had been the work of the Home Office.\textsuperscript{183} In October Jones telegrammed Brittain to inform her that he was "continuing to press Peake."\textsuperscript{184} Osbert Peake, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the Home Office from 1939 until
1944, rapidly emerged at least in the eyes of Vera Brittain as the man primarily responsible for her difficulties. Peake, Jones was able to inform Brittain, was "in control of" the Security department at the Home Office, and after the departure of Sir John Anderson from the post of Home Secretary, was wielding considerable influence over his replacement, Herbert Morrison—a man with "undue respect for bureaucratic opinion." In early November 1940 Creech Jones's sustained inquiries yielded a letter from the Home Office which gave assurances that Brittain's application for an exit permit had been turned down because Brittain did not fall within any of the qualifying categories. In an interview, Jones wrote:

He [Peake] assured me that it was not a matter of your personal opinions though, confidentially, the Foreign Office don't like very much free lance lecturers in the States! Jones was not impressed with the arguments employed by the Home Office whilst Brittain was convinced that Osbert Peake was her stumbling block.

... reactionary stupidity on part of Home Office. My enemy not really Morrison but Peake. Morrison grumbles about 'these literary people' trying to go to America and be comfortable; when Jon [Creech Jones] points out that when I could have stayed I deliberately came home & went through the Blitz with everyone else, Peake says that by doing that, or by failing to accompany the children, I put myself out of a category! They really object to my opinions & to the question asked abt me in the House ....

Brittain thus came to the conclusion that a permit was being refused her because "the Home Office wants to suppress me", ...
a measure which she regarded as "a piece of Gestapoism ...." 189

There does appear to be considerable confusion over
the precise source of Brittain's exit permit refusal, at
least initially. Letters from Creech Jones to Vera Brittain
in the autumn of 1940 reveal the Ministry of Information and
the Foreign Office to be unclear over the allotment of
jurisdiction and dextrously passing the bureaucratic buck. 190
At least one senior Ministry of Information official, Frank
Darvall, was under the impression that the Exit Permit
Department was "a subsidiary of the Foreign Office". 191 This
may have been the normal bureaucratic practice but it is
clear, certainly in Brittain's case, that the Home Office as
the department most intimately concerned with national
security vetted her application in the name of security and
censorship, and overrode the recommendations of the MoI and
FO--testimony to the power and influence of the Home Office
and its Security Department. 192 In November 1940 Darvall
and T. North Whitehead combined forces to appeal Brittain's
case. Darvall wrote of the MoI's support for Brittain's
application to the US, believing "that there is a case for
appeal on Miss Brittain's behalf by the Ministry of Informa-
tion to the Home Office." 193 Darvall's letter continued by
summarising the FO view that preventing Brittain from
travelling would

on balance ... do more harm than she herself would be
likely to do if allowed to lecture in the U.S.A. ... now that Miss Brittain's husband is in the United
States ... it is quite impossible to prevent a fuss
being made .... We [the MoI] would very much like to know, before dispatching any letter to the Home Office, that you agree and would support our line if the Home Office were to consult you in the matter. 194

North Whitehead's reply was unequivocal in its support of the MoI position, and a letter was accordingly dispatched from the MoI to the Home Office. This letter expressed not only the combined assessments of the FO and MoI and asked that Brittain's case be reconsidered, but also gave emphatic expression to the Ministry's disapproval of the Home Office's arbitrary and non-consultative decision-making practice. 195 It concludes:

If you still decide that a permit must be refused, we must leave it to you to justify the decision and to explain the position to Miss Brittain. 196

Brittain's application for an exit permit, bolstered by an official invitation to attend the 1940 All-India Women's Conference as the British delegate, was again refused. In December Creech Jones wrote to Brittain:

I despair of Morrison. All liberal conduct is contemptuously dismissed by him as "classical liberalism" & put into cold storage for the war. He seems blind to all liberal doctrine .... (In the last war, he called himself a C.O. & thought there was some virtue in tolerance & the liberal spirit!) 197

Brittain, for her part, despaired of Morrison's eminence grise, Osbert Peake, and the Home Security department.

I have a hunch that he [O. Peake] thinks of me as quite a different person from the one that I am - a sort of wild revolutionary who is out to make trouble! 198

On two further occasions Brittain tried, unsuccessfully, to be granted a permit. No explanation from the Home Office
was forthcoming save that her application did not fall under any of the designated categorisations. The Home Office made no mention of her pacifism: "Peake assured me you were not treated in this way because of your opinions ...." 199

Why Vera Brittain was not granted an exit permit after her first trip to the United States in January 1940 remains, therefore, a difficult question to answer. It would seem, from the evidence available, that the Home Office in Brittain's own words, "has me taped under a Red Tape label" for pacifist opinions which they did not wish her to publicise. 200 In January 1941, Storm Jameson wrote a brief note to Brittain, enclosing a newspaper cutting from the Daily Telegraph of 2 January 1941. The cutting was of an article about the departure to the United States, on a lecture tour, of John McGovern, M.P., a known communist and pacifist. McGovern had apparently given "an assurance that he will say nothing to impede the British war effort." 201 Jameson commented of this: "It seems to dispose of any shred of excuse for not giving you your permit." 202

The Cabinet discussions, the Ministry of Information's activities, the formulation of BBC policy and the treatment of Vera Brittain by the Foreign Office and the Home Office have a common thread. In each case the position taken by the pacifists, whether collectively or as individuals, raised the delicate issue of the wartime place of those jealously guarded prerogatives of democracy--civil liberty, the rights of minorities, the freedoms of speech and expression--upon
which the English, not without due cause, pride themselves. The admixture of unease and caution with which the pacifists were treated bespoke the implicit recognition of these values the pacifists held in trust.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER FOUR


2PRO INF 1/319, Extract from South-Eastern Region Progress Report, 11/3/40.

3The Home Policy and Civil Defence Committees of the Cabinet were set up immediately upon the outbreak of the war.

4CAB 73/3 CDC (40) 8, "Home Front Propaganda", Memo by the Minister of Information, 3/3/40.

5R. Benewick, *The Fascist Movement in Britain* (London: Allen Lane, 1972). Benewick discusses the difficulties posed any democratic government by political activism and considers the government response to the British fascist movement and the question of civil liberties. The question is also considered by A. S. Kileman, "Emergency Powers and Liberal Democracy in Britain", *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 16 (1978), 190-211. One of the conclusions reached by Kileman is that:

   Initial recourse to the constitutional provision will lower the first and perhaps even the major barrier constitutionalism has against the distortion of democracy by emergencies. ... But once used it becomes considerably easier thereafter and in succeeding instances to dismiss reservations and doubts, for emergency proclamations will then have a body of precedent in addition to bearing the stamp of legality.

Kileman, 209.
See also VBC/A20, Box 4, Research materials for Chapt. 7, Folder 8: NCCL, notes and news articles on the rights of democratic criticism and democratic control.
CAB 75/7 HPC (40) 87, War Cabinet Home Policy Committee Anti-War Propaganda, Memorandum by the Home Secretary, 22 April 1940. MO conducted a survey in the Fulham district of London, 3-4 April 1940. Respondents were asked if they thought it good or bad that pacifists be allowed to express their opinions. A number of respondents replied that Britain was a free country and that the war was being fought in the name of that freedom. Therefore, the pacifists should be free to voice their opinions. MO, Box 311, File B and MO, File 312.

John Gordon, in "The Nosey Parkers are having a fine time", Sunday Express, 21 July 1940, argued strongly for greater freedom of speech: ". . . We do not want to put down Hitlers abroad only to raise them up at home."

Brittain, LPL, No/34, 20 June 1940.

The propaganda value of free discussion did not escape the MoI. The MoI's Parliamentary Secretary to Mr. Harold Nicolson for observation, 15/1/41. Also Sir Richard McConachie (BBC Director of Talks) to Mr. Harold Nicolson, 16/3/41. Nicolson was in part "responsible for formulating propaganda policy" at the MoI.


See Trevor Lloyd, Empire to Welfare State. English History 1906-1967 (London: Oxford University Press, 1970). Lloyd notes a number of centralising tendencies in Britain during the interwar years, notably the role of the BBC.

Roy Walker, a leading wartime member of the PPU, responding to a question about the nature and extent of pacifism's contribution to British wartime society stressed this aspect of pacifism's impact. Interview, Ipswich, 27 July 1979.

Sybil Morrison concurred—not without regret—that the PPU was indeed regarded as a respectable body. When she was arrested in 1940 for causing a breach of the peace, Morrison was delighted when the magistrate called her "a dangerous woman". Sentenced to one month's imprisonment, the reading material supplied her by the Holloway authorities comprised various lives of famous British Field Marshals. Interview, London, 6 July 1979.

Interview with Margaret Storm Jameson, Cambridge,
20 July 1979. See also PRO INF 1/319, "Muddle-Headed Pacifists", cutting from the Yorkshire Post, 17 February 1940.

12 PPU/DCM, Vol. IV, 22 April 1945. From February to April 1945, 1,431 signatories of the PPU were checked by headquarters and of these 432 (slightly under 30%) were found to be active and/or sound. I believe this to be a reasonable guide to the fortunes of the PPU's membership during the war.

It is interesting to note that Benewick observes that R. Forgan, deputy leader of the British Union of Fascists, claimed a maximum membership of only 40,000. In 1940 the Home Secretary announced that there were approximately 1,000 active fascists in the country. See Benewick, The Fascist Movement, 110.

13 PRO CAB 75/6 HPC (40) 45, "Military Service Acts. Incitement to Evade", Memorandum by the Home Secretary, 2/3/40. Angus Calder has a rather cutting assessment of Anderson who, he contends, "... represented no section of the human race whatsoever .... Before the computer was perfected, Anderson was a tolerable substitute." Calder, The People's War, 119.

14 PRO CAB 75/6 HPC (40) 45. In the preceding month Sir John had assured the House of Commons that the activities of the PPU were being carefully monitored. House of Commons Debates, Vol. 357, col. 1505-1506, 22 February 1940. See also Anon., "Truth About the Peace Pledge Union. Criticisms Answered", Peace News, 1 March 1940, 1 and 12.

15 See Neil Stammers, "Civil Liberties in Britain during World War II" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sussex, 1980). I am grateful to Mr. Stammers for his generosity, kindness and unselfish help and advice.


17 PRO CAB 75/6 HPC (40) 45, "Military Service Acts. Incitement to Evade.", Memorandum by the Home Secretary, 2 March 1940.

18 Calder, The People's War, 35-6. See also


23 PRO CAB 75/6 HPC (40) 45, "Military Service Acts."

24 Reith was Minister of Information until May 1940. See McLaine, *Ministry of Morale*, 45.

25 PRO CAB 73/3 CDC (40) 8, "Home Front Propaganda", Memorandum by the Minister of Information, 3/3/40.

26 PRO CAB 73/3 CDC (40) 8, "Home Front Propaganda". On Armistice Day, 11 November 1939, Peace News attained a circulation of 40,000 copies out of 42,000 printed. Peace News, 17 November 1939, 2. Its circulation in September 1939 was 22,000 copies per week. In November 1939 it had standing orders for 12,000 copies. Its circulation in November 1941 was 18,400 and it was to remain around this figure throughout the war. It should be noted that the Union advocated "snowball" reading. In November 1939, Peace News published a sales chart. Peace News, 24 November 1939, 6.
The March 15, 1940 issue of Peace News contained an article entitled "Penetration of the P.P.U.". This reported that Lord Arthur Ponsonby, Alex Wood and Stuart Morris—officers of the PPU—had sent a letter to The Times denying the allegation that the PPU was being used as a cover for propaganda by Communists and Fascists. Peace News, 15 March 1940, 2. See also "'Suspect' Pacifist Propaganda", Peace News, 26 January 1940, 3 and the letters column of the Manchester Guardian, 13 January 1940.

A study by P. J. Madgwick, with N. Griffiths and V. Walker, of the Politics of Rural Wales. A Study of Cardiganshire (London: Hutchinson, 1973) makes a clear connection between Welsh nationalism and pacifism. A Nationalist councillor in Aberystwyth, November 1939, is quoted as stating "Peace is the religion of Wales." Madgwick, 130-1.

Hubert Banner, an MoI Regional Information Officer (RIO), frequently advocated that committees should pass resolutions against the Peace Pledge Union. In March 1940 he reported the passage of one such resolution by the Maidstone Conservative and Unionist Association.

The meeting urges that steps be taken drastically to curtail the potentiality for evil of the Peace Pledge Union and other movements which direct their insidious
propaganda against the safety and unity of the Nation. PRO INF 1/319, Memorandum from Banner to Rhodes, 16/3/40.

37 VBC/D22, 5 December 1939.

38 PRO CAB 73/3 CDC (40) 8, "Home Front Propaganda".

39 PRO INF 1/319, MoI Southern Region, February Review--Press, 6 March 1940.

40 PRO CAB 73/3 CDC (40) 8, "Home Front Propaganda".

41 Brittain, Testament of Experience, 217.

42 PRO CAB 73/3 CDC (40) 8, "Home Front Propaganda".

43 PRO CAB 75/7 HPC (40) 92, "Home Front Propaganda", Memorandum by the Minister of Information, 27 April 1940.

44 PRO CAB 75/7 HPC (40) 92, "Home Front Propaganda".

45 PRO CAB 75/7 HPC (40) 92, "Home Front Propaganda".

46 PRO CAB 75/7 HPC (40) 92, "Home Front Propaganda". Mary Adams, who had been appointed Director of Home Intelligence at the MoI in December 1939, entered a strong plea for differentiations to be made between varieties of pacifism and that "due allowance be made for 'conscience'." INF 1/319, Mary Adams to Rhodes, 22 February 1940.

Sir John Anderson also made a statement to the Commons on 18 January 1940 indicating that he was aware of the differing sources of inspiration for pacifism. H of C Debates, Vol. 356, Col. 212, 18 January 1940.

47 PRO CAB 75/7 HPC (40) 87, War Cabinet Home Policy Committee, Anti-War Propaganda, Memorandum by the House Secretary, 22 April 1940.

48 PPU/ECM, Emergency business, 26 April 1940. It is not clear if Vera Brittain was present for this meeting.

49 PPU/ECM, 'Ministry of Information', 26 April 1940. The minute continued with an account of police inaction regarding the distribution in Hyde Park of leaflets advocating the suppression of Communists which did not carry
the required imprint. "A question on this point had been submitted by Alfred Salter, but disallowed by the Speaker." This would seem to support the contention that the Government was afraid of Communist infiltration and influence.

50 I am grateful to Neil Stammers, who first brought this discrepancy to my attention.

51 PRO CAB 75/7 HPC (40) 87, War Cabinet Home Policy Committee. Within four days Stuart Morris received his visitors from Scotland Yard.

Vera Brittain gives a somewhat journalistic account of the trial in England's Hour (Toronto: Macmillan, 1940), 45-51. Another commentary may be found in Morrison, I Renounce War, 45-9.
The Counsel for the Defence noted that "it was probably unique for the Attorney General himself to come to a Magistrate's Court instructed and accompanied by the Director of Public Prosecutions to prosecute in a charge for misdemeanor." Pacifists at Bow Street, Explanatory note.
Vera Brittain paid the costs of the defendants. VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Nancy Richardson, 22 June 1940.

53 The transcript of the proceedings (Pacifists at Bow Street) is worthy of perusal since both the Attorney General and Chief Magistrate had words of respect and praise for the defendants, the latter believing "them to be honourable men ...." There is much talk of freedom, democracy and idealism. In his concluding remarks the judge observed that

This is a free country. We are fighting to keep it a free country, as I understand it, and these gentlemen, fortunately for them, in my judgement, are living in a country where they can express their pacifism, or their non-pacifism, with perfect freedom. They ought to be grateful to the men who are sacrificing their lives to preserve that right.

Pacifists at Bow Street, 41.
Vera Brittain commented in her diary that she found the "whole proceeding an inspiration." VBC/D23, 6 June 1940.

54 Sybil Morrison, I Renounce War, 48.
55 VBC/D23, 6 June 1940. In March 1940 a London group of Peace News sellers were caught in a police swoop and charged with obstruction. Peace News, 8 March 1940, 8 and 15 March 1940, 8.

56 PRO CAB 75/7 HPC (40) 94, Peace Propaganda and Other Anti-War Activities, Memorandum by the Home Secretary, n.d.

57 PRO CAB 75/7 HPC (40) 94, Peace Propaganda.

58 PPU/NCM, 7/8 November 1942, PPU Questionnaire on Invasion, dated 6 November 1942, signed by Alex Wood (Gen. Secretary), 23 January 1943.

59 PPU/NCM, PPU Questionnaire on Invasion.

60 Pacifists like Vera Brittain were well aware of the problem of defeatism within their own ranks. Writing to Arthur Wragg in May 1942, Brittain commented:

I agree with you about the element of 'defeatism' in Peace News. The trouble is that the origin of it is Murry himself. He regards it as his chief function to be a 'debunker'... I have spoken my mind often enough on the theme that there is too much apparent [emphasis Brittain's] pro-Nazism in the paper - only to be indirectly taken to task by Murry as a 'polite' pacifist who doesn't want to 'get in wrong' with the govt.

VBC/A20, Box Research Notes, Folder 1, Notes on Chapt. 8, Brittain to Arthur Wragg, 13 May 1942.

61 PPU/LAM, 2 July 1940.

62 PRO CAB 75/7 HPC (40) 94, Peace Propaganda.

63 PRO CAB 75/7 HPC (40) 103, Memorandum on Anti-War Publications, 4 May 1940.

64 PRO CAB 75/7 HPC (40) 103, Anti-War Publications. Also PRO CAB 73/3 CDC (40) 8, "Home Front Propaganda".

65 Brittain, Testament of Experience.

67 PRO CAB 75/7 HPC (40) 102, Draft dealing with the corruption of public morale, 4 May 1940.


70 See Map H, "Great Britain: Areas Influenced by the Communists, Welsh Nationalists and the Peace Pledge Union". Adapted from PRO INF 1/319, Anti-War Movements, Memo by M. Chandler, n.d. [probably February, 1940.]

71 PRO INF 1/319, Minutes of the Conference of Regional Information Officers at the Senate House, 6 January 1940.

72 PRO INF 1/319, Minutes of RIO Conference.

73 PRO CAB 73/3 CDC (40) 8, "Home Front Propaganda".

74 McLaine, Ministry of Morale, 57-8.

75 PRO INF 1/319, Extract from South-Eastern Region Progress Report, 11/3/40.

76 PRO INF 1/319, Minute from RIO South-Eastern Region to Regional Administration Division, 26 February 1940.

77 Peace News, 22 March 1940, 1 and 5; McLaine, Ministry of Morale, 57-8.

78 PRO INF 1/319, Banner to Ivison Macadam, 27 March 1940.

79 PRO INF 1/319, Banner to Macadam, 21 March 1940.

80 PRO INF 1/319, Banner to D. B. Briggs, 28 March 1940 and Banner to Briggs, 2 April 1940.

81 PRO INF 1/319, Briggs to Banner, 30 March 1940.
PRO INF 1/319, South-Eastern Region. Intelligence Report, 11 March 1940. See also PRO INF 1/319, Anti-War Movements.

NCCL 16/4, Peace Pledge Union, 1940-1941. Hon. Sec. Dick Sheppard Centre, Oswestry, Shropshire to Superintendent Dickson, County Police Station, 1 July 1940.

NCCL 76/1, Archives 1939-1941, Correspondence (references to the Peace Pledge Union), March 1939-December 1941, "Statement by Mr. J. B. Penn", 'Pax', Half Moon Hill, Haslemere, n.d.

NCCL 76/1, "Statement by Mr. J. B. Penn".

NCCL 76/1, Notification of resignation, "Copy to Police Sergeant", Haslemere, 8 June 1940.

Keith Footit, "Two Pairs of Shoes".


McLaine, Ministry of Morale, 230-1.


Canon Dick Sheppard made the first religious service broadcast to be heard on British wireless from his parish church of St. Martin-in-the-Fields.
96 Note by the Board of Governors on Religious
Broadcasting in War-Time, 6 June 1940. The note is
initialled A. [llan] P. [owell] and bears the pencilled
comment "No inquisition". BBC/R34/807.
That the Board of Governors issued the directive of their
own volition is supported by a note from F. W. Ogilvie to
J. W. Welch:

... as I have mentioned to you privately (and you won't
pass it on, of course), the Governors acted on their
own in this whole C.O. business, and very precipitately
and determinedly too. (Give them their due, this is the
only example, so far of their acting in an important
matter without advice.)

F. W. Ogilvie to J. W. Welch, 5 August 1940. BBC/R34/807,
Policy. Religion. Pacifism in Religious Broadcasting, 1940-
1941. Also bears the title Religion: Religious Broadcasts
1939-1942 and 1943-1944. Accession No./44930, BBC Written
Archives, Caversham, Reading, England.
All materials relating to pacifism used in this chapter are
to be found in the files bearing the Accession Number 44930
and the designation R34/807, Policy, unless otherwise stated.

97 BBC/G.16/40, Welch to Ogilvie, Copy of DRB's
memorandum, "Ordained Ministers with Conscientious Objections
to Military Service", 2 August 1940.

98 A copy of this memo as issued to the Local
Education Authorities may be found in the Brittain papers.
Circular 1522, 26 July 1940, VBC/A10, England's Hour,
Folder One.

99 BBC/G.16/40, Copy of DRB's memorandum. See also
Rev. M. E. Tupper, "The Lot of a Pacifist Priest in War",
Peace News, 2 February 1940, 3.

100 The allusion is, of course, to the Elizabethan
Settlement of 1559.

101 A meeting was held in November 1940 between the
Scottish Director of the BBC and the Chairman of the Board
of Governors to decide what questions might be asked of a
suspect pacifist clergyman before allowing him to approach
the microphone. One of the questions suggested was, "Is he
willing to pray for victory?". It would not perhaps be
stretching historical parallels too far to suggest that the
position of the pacifists in 1940 was not unlike that of
Roman Catholics in England in 1588. BBC/R34/807, Policy,
Private and Confidential, Report of a Meeting in Head
Office with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the 
BBC, 22 November 1940.

102 BBC/G.16/40, Copy of DRB's memorandum.

103 BBC/G.16/40, Copy of DRB's memorandum.

104 BBC/G.16/40, Copy of DRB's memorandum.

105 In a diary entry made on 13 June 1940 Vera 
Brittain noted an attack made in the House of Lords on 
Ogilvie, labelling him a "pacifist".

106 BBC/R34/807, Policy, Ogilvie to Welch, 6 August 
1940. This is an informal note written on Athenaeum note­
paper. Welch was officially informed of the Governors'
decision 10 August 1940. BBC/R34/807, Policy, BBC Internal 
circulating Memo, "Ordained Ministers with Conscientious 
Objections", D-G to DRB through C (F), 10 August 1940. 
See also Ogilvie to Welch, 5 August 1940. In this letter 
Ogilvie expresses agreement with Welch's viewpoint and 
reveals that

... I have been waging war on this internal front also 
for the last fortnight or so. I am reasonably confident 
of winning but the battle cannot be hurried - broadc­
casting by C.O. ministers is only one part of the 
larger problem ....

Lastly, in the same file there is an undated and unidentified 
minute which I suspect records a meeting of the BBC's 
Central Religious Advisory Committee.

... After discussion (of Powell's directive) the 
Chairman of the Committee said that it would be wiser 
not to pass any resolution. The Governors had reached 
a definite decision .... The majority of the Committee, 
while understanding the reasons and appreciating all 
that had been done by the Corporation was not in 
agreement with the decision.

BBC/R34/807, Policy, Minute on Pacifism.

107 BBC/R34/807, Policy, Ogilvie to Powell, 15 
August 1940.

108 BBC/R34/807, Policy, "Conversation between D.R.B. 
and the Chairman of the B.B.C. Board of Governors".
In support of these points, Powell also noted that the Corporation was supported, in part, by national licence fees. Further, he referred to the BBC as the "fourth arm of the Services" and as such it was compelled to accept the directive of the Ministry of Information. But the directive in question was quite clearly Powell's and tends to lend weight to the view in many contemporary minds, that the Chairman was the éminence grise. See Briggs, War of Words, 339.

109 BBC/R34/807, Policy, Conversation between DRB and Chairman.

110 Conversation between DRB and Chairman.

111 Conversation between DRB and Chairman.

112 Conversation between DRB and Chairman. See also BBC/R34/807, Policy, "Record of the Interview at Broadcasting House with D.R.B. on the Subject of Ordained Ministers with Conscientious Objections", 16 August 1940, and signed by Allan Powell. The memo has marginal notes by the Director-General [D.G.] and the Controller of Programmes [C.P.]. Also BBC/R34/807, Policy, Powell to Welch, 20 August 1940. From this letter it is clear that Welch intended to take the matter to Duff Cooper. Both Powell and Ogilvie felt, however, that such an interview would be "of doubtful wisdom at present".

113 Conversation between DRB and Chairman.

114 Vera Brittain was apparently rejected for this broadcast on the basis of her judged inadequacies as a speaker.

Although, obviously, her name is known in the States, she has a very weak, ineffective voice at the microphone. I don't think she would strike at all the right note at the moment. Whenever I have heard her talk, she always sounded rather sad and complaining!

Personal File, Talks File I (1940-1962), Brittain, Vera, Miss. BBC Internal Circulating Memo, 23 August 1940.

115 BBC/R34/807, Policy, Welch to Powell, 8 October 1940. Letter marked "not sent". See also A. Powell to R. W. Welch, 20 August 1940; C. Raven to R. W. Welch, 12 September 1940. Also BBC/R34/807, Policy, "Broadcasting in Wartime", text issued to all Regional Directors on 4 September
1940 from D. G. [Ogilvie]. Also BBC/R34/807, Policy, "Religious Broadcasts by Pacifist Ministers", unsigned [Welch?], undated memo. The memo seeks to give a summary of the position of the BBC.

116 BBC/R34/807, Welch to Powell, 8 October 1940.

117 BBC/R34/807, Welch to Powell, 8 October 1940. On 19 November 1940 Powell sent a note to Welch denying the allegation that the Corporation put "Caesar before Christ". See also Powell to Welch, 18 November 1940.

118 BBC/R34/807, Welch to Powell, 8 October 1940.

119 BBC/R34/807, Welch to Powell, 14 November 1940. This letter replaced the one of Welch to Powell of 8/10/40 which he did not send.

120 BBC/R34/807, Policy, M. Dinwiddie, Director of Scottish Broadcasting, to Welch, 17 November 1940.

121 News-Chronicle, 4 January 1941. The three preachers named were Soper, Raven and MacLeod.

The ordinary young fellow--who is not a pacifist--has nothing but contempt for the Church's attitude in regard to the war. He will join up; but he knows in his heart that you just can't square Christ's teaching with war, even though distinguished prelates walk that tight-rope with the skill of long experience.

Leyton Richards to Welch, 22 February 1940, quoting a South country rector. There certainly appears to have been an unspoken, general feeling that the Church should not be the subject of such debate. BBC/R30/106, Outside Broadcasts - Sound, Birmingham: Carrs Lane Congregational Church 1927-1945, BBC Accession N0/40252.

122 The Times, 31 January 1941. But the pacifist clergymen did not always enjoy the toleration of their confreres. One irate Anglican priest wrote to the Daily Telegraph expressing the view that the 371 Anglican clergymen in the Anglican Pacifist Fellowship, "those crazy gangs", were "371 self-deluded visionaries ... too many when the Empire is fighting for its life." BBC/Pacifism, 1939-1942, Box 1-1c, Broadcasting and War, Rev. E. L. Macassey to The Editor, Daily Telegraph, 17 February 1941.
H of C Debates, Vol. 371, cols. 25-6, 22 April 1941.


Forward, 7 December 1940; Forward, 14 December 1940 and New Leader, 14 December 1940. See also Aberdeen Press and Journal, 10 December 1940; Manchester Guardian, 3 and 6 December 1940; Scotsman, 13 December 1940; Spectator, 6 December 1940, 10 and 17 January 1941; The Times, 3 December 1940 and Yorkshire Post, 31 January 1941.

The Times, 21 March 1941.

BBC/R34/807, Policy, "Broadcasting in Wartime", Memo from Assistant Controller (Administration) to Head Office, and all Regional Directors, Engineers in Charge, etc., 17 July 1941.

BBC/R34/807, Policy, Welch to C (P) London, 21 August 1941.

BBC/G.85/41, "Pacifist Speakers - Note by Chairman", Private and Confidential, 29 October 1941.

See McLaine, Ministry of Morale, 231.

BBC/R34/807, Policy, BBC Memo (17 November 1941), Pacifist Speakers, Board Minute, 13 November 1941. B. E. Nicholls C (P) to DRB.


Major-General J. A. Beith, Director of Public Relations, WO to BBC, 5 December 1939, Middleton Murry, J. Talks 1, 1939-1956.

The series of talks was subsequently published in The Listener.
136 J. Welch (DRB) to J. A. Beith, DPR, W.O.,

Memo from Welch to M. G. Farguharson, DS,
20 June 1940. The Times, 8 June 1940, in J. M. M. Talks 1,
1939-1956.

138 Note by R. Maconachie, 10 June 1940, in J. M. M.
Talks 1, 1939-1956; memo, DS to DRB, 27 June 1940; memo,
DS to AC (H), 18 June 1940.

Memo, DS to AC (H), 18 June 1940, in J. M. M.
Talks 1, 1939-1956.

See also F. A. Lea, The Life of John Middleton
Murry (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1959), 244-55.

H of C Debates, Vol. 360, col. 1194, 7 May 1940.

Memo, ADRB [?] to Mrs. Salmon, 17 August 1944, in
A note contained in Middleton Murry's file observes that he
had communicated with the BBC, concerning a play, on Peace

Vera Brittain's file is not overly informative. As stated
in #114 above, she was not considered by the talks
department to be an adequate speaker. There is no record
of any wartime broadcast after April 1940, although in
January 1944 Brittain records in her diary that she was
preparing a six hundred word talk for a broadcast to India.
VBC/D27, 4 January 1944. There is no mention of Brittain's
pacifism. She did, however, take part in the "B.B.C.'s
Parlour Game 'Truth'" on 21 April 1940. Variety Booking
Manager to Brittain, 30 April 1940, Personal File, Brittain,
Talks, File 1.

Middleton Murry was also judged to be a "bad broadcaster",
guilty of using language whose meaning quite escaped the
"ordinary listener who goes through life on single
syllabled words." Memo from SEA (Adult) to ADRB (Bristol),

BBC/R30/106, Welch to Leyton Richards, 2 February
1940; BBC/R30/106, Welch to Richards, 7 February 1940; BBC/
R30/106, memo by DRB to MR Ex., "Address by the Reverend
Leyton Richards", 16 February 1940.
BBC/R30/106, Welch to Richards, 24 February 1940.

BBC/R30/106, Welch to Richards, 24 February 1940. See also Welch to Raven, 21 February 1940. In this last letter Welch comments, "The Church is hopelessly divided on the question of pacifism, and I do not think the cocksure attitude of some pacifists is any help to the people; ...."


BBC/R30/106, Welch to Richards, 19 February 1940.

BBC/R30/106, Welch to Richards, 22 February 1940.

BBC/R30/106, Welch to Richards, 22 February 1940.

VBC/C/Rep., Vera Brittain to George Brett, 15 August 1940.

Not all of the materials in the PRO that contain mention of Brittain are open to the public, being marked either as not available or non-existent, e.g.: FO 372, Vera Brittain: British Exit Permit Facilities for US, and FO 370, Vera Brittain: Question of Lecture Tour in Sweden, Pacifist Activities of.

PRO FO 371/24245, FO Minute from Charles Peake to Mr. Scott, 2 January 1940. Marked Confidential. File marked Visit of Miss Vera Brittain to the United States of America.

PRO FO 371/24245, Peake to Scott.

PRO FO 371/24245, Peake to Scott. It had been the plan of the meeting to afterward march on Buckingham Palace, "but this the police had declined to allow."

PRO FO 371/24245, Peake to Scott.

PRO FO 371/24245, Peake to Scott.
PRO FO 371/24245, FO Minute dated 11 January 1940, signature indecipherable. See also attached initialled comment by B. Gage.

PRO FO 371/24245, FO Minute, 11 January 1940.

PRO FO 371/24245, Peake to Scott.

PRO FO 371/24245, FO telegram to Marquess of Lothian (Washington), NO/45R, 3:10 PM, 10 January 1940. The code telegram to the US stated that Brittain had the resolution in her possession.

Lord Butler's initialled signature has been verified by Alex Saunders, an archivist at Trinity College, Cambridge, who has been engaged in the cataloguing of the Butler Papers.

PRO FO 371/24245, Butler, R. A., FO Minute, 9 January 1940. Mentioned in conjunction with Brittain is K. de Comey, a personality very much on the political Right. Butler, interestingly, has written: "I prefer de Comey, at any rate if he goes abroad, she must and vice versa ...". Another official commented:

I suppose it would be undesirable to refuse Miss Brittain an exit permit, esp. as she would see to it that our action was represented as widely as possible and in as unfavourable light as possible through her cronies in the U.S.

PRO FO 371/24245, FO Minute, 8 January 1940, from C. Scott. Also FO Minute, 8 January 1940, from R. Cowell: "Yes: I think we'd better not stop her. But warn Ld. L. [Lord Lothian]."

PRO FO 371/24245, B. Gage, FO Minute, 13 January 1940 and J. [Delfum?], FO Minute, 13 January 1940.

PRO FO 371/24245, FO Minute dated 13 January 1940, signature indecipherable.

PRO FO 371/24245, FO telegram to Lothian, 10 January 1940.

PRO FO 371/24227, British lecturers in the United States: Miss Vera Brittain, Vera Brittain to Frank Durvall, Deputy Director, American Division, Ministry of Information, 23 January 1940.
PRO FO 371/24227, FO Minutes dated 22 and 23 February 1940. It is possible that the comment was made by one Gladwyn Jebb or by Sir Robert Vansittart. Brittain's file was marked for the attention of both.

R. A. Butler, noting an observation made by Brittain about the considerable degree of sympathy in the North and Middle West for Finland and antipathy toward Russia, commented that if concern was so evident, why had this not translated itself into more concrete expressions of help for the Finns.

PRO FO 371/24227, FO Minute, 24 February 1940.

PRO FO 371/24227, FO Minute from T. North Whitehead, 12 February 1940.

PRO FO 371/24227, F. R. Cowell, Foreign Office, to A. S. Fletcher, CBE, FO Survey Section, 14 March 1940.

PRO FO 371/24227, Frank Darvall to E. Rowed-Dutton, 18 May 1940.

But in September of 1941 Margaret Storm Jameson reported to Brittain on the careful enquiries she had made concerning the exit permit controversy surrounding Brittain:

"... your R.P.U. work, speeches etc., etc. were the basis of the original refusal. The P.P.U. is regarded with great disfavour as a fifth-column (or potentially fifth-column) body. Second, I am pretty sure that, in spite of what you were yourself told by the Information people in New York there were adverse reports made on you by some of your American listeners."

VBC/C/Rec., Margaret Storm Jameson to Brittain, 6 September 1941.

VBC/C/Rec., Jameson to Brittain, 6 September 1941.

Brittain, Testament of Experience, 260.

VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Jameson, 4 August 1940.

See also Testament of Experience, 280.

The questioner in the House was Sir Henry Page Croft, Member for Bournemouth, who ran a spirited and bombastic campaign against the local branch of the PPU. Croft, Brittain notes, was generally recognised "as the 'Colonel Blimp' of the House." Testament of Experience, 260. See Archives of Lord Croft of Bournemouth, Churchill College, Cambridge.

VBC/C/Ministry of Information (hereafter MoI), Sir Frederick Whyte to Vera Brittain, 8 August 1940.
176 VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Jameson, 7 August 1940.

177 PRO FO 371/24227, Foreign Office Memo, dated 8 November 1940, signed by J. V. [R-B-P?].

178 PRO FO 371/24227, FO Memo, 8 November 1940.

179 VBC/C/Moi, Whyte to Brittain, 8 August 1940.

180 VBC/C/Moi, F. Darvall to Brittain, 16 October 1940.

181 VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Jameson, 4 August 1940.

182 VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to George Catlin, 19 October 1940.

183 VBC/C/Moi, Arthur Creech Jones to Brittain, 29 September 1940.

184 VBC/C/Moi, Jones to Brittain, 16 October 1940.

185 VBC/C/Moi, Jones to Brittain, 17 November 1940.

186 VBC/C/Moi, Jones to Brittain, 7 November 1940. Letter from Home Office attached. Also VBC/C/Moi, Osbert Peake to Jones, 31 October 1940.

187 VBC/C/Moi, Jones to Brittain, 7 and 17 November 1940.

188 VBC/D23, 6 December 1940. Also, VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Harold Nicolson, 30 September 1940.

189 VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to [H?] Ould, 11 November 1940.

190 VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Agatha Harrison, 2 November 1940.

191 VBC/C/Moi, Frank Darvall to Brittain, 16 October 1940.
This would seem to be borne out by a letter from the MoI to the HO discussing Brittain's application. It is noted that "the Home Office have instructed the Passport Office that an exit permit is not to be granted in her case." PRO FO 371/24227, E. St. J. Bamford, MoI, to F. A. Newsam, HO, 25 November 1940. Also PRO FO 371/24227, Bamford to T. North Whitehead, 25 November 1940.

PRO FO 371/24227, F. Darvall to T. North Whitehead, 7 November 1940.

PRO FO 371/24227, Darvall to Whitehead, 7 November 1940 and Whitehead to Darvall, 7 November 1940.

PRO FO 371/24227, Bamford to Newsam, 25 November 1940. See also VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Phyllis Bentley, 5 December 1940.

PRO FO 371/24227, Bamford to Newsam, 25 November 1940.

VBC/C/MoI, Jones to Brittain, 12 December 1940.

VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Jones, 27 May 1941.

VBC/C/MoI, Jones to Brittain, 17 November 1940. Jones comments, however, that "the arguments used by the Home Office in justification of their decision seem to me to be very thin."

VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Jameson, 1 May 1940.

Daily Telegraph, 2 January 1941.

VBC/C/Rec., Jameson to Brittain, 3 January 1941.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE PEACE PLEDGE UNION AND VERA BRITTAIIN.

PACIFISM IN PRACTICE: AT WAR FOR PEACE, 1939-1945

Mobilisation

Damn our enemies, bless our friends. I'm not such a hypocrite as to bless them that hate us or if a man strike me on the cheek to turn the other cheek. No, knock him down, by God.¹

Bloody awful. If we were all pacifists the Fuhrer would be here tomorrow.²

I think they're a lot of twirps.³

Needs a lot of pluck don't it?⁴

I reckon they're bloody heroes.⁵

The attitudes of the general public toward pacifists were very mixed, including attitudes of overt hostility, studied indifference, latent sympathy and open admiration. In the summer of 1940 Mass Observation compiled an extensive report on conscientious objectors and pacifists.⁶ The findings of two hundred and fifty interviews conducted in Fulham in April 1940 revealed that "conscientious objectors" and "pacifists" were synonymous labels in the minds of many respondents; their responses to questions about the two groups were, therefore, very similar.
Statistically speaking, the survey showed that there was a "constant degree of anti-war sympathy" at one end of the scale and "a much larger degree of strong patriotic antagonism" at the other end. The balance was a darker shade of grey "shading off from tolerance to mild criticism, generally leaning in quality toward antagonism." 

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<tr>
<th>Opinion About Pacifists</th>
<th>A-B</th>
<th>C-D</th>
<th>M</th>
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<th>30+</th>
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<th>TOTALS</th>
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<td>Pro</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>Half &amp; Half</td>
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<td>Strongly Anti</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>36</td>
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The above table reveals the statistical breakdown of the report's findings. The high proportion of "don't knows" has a very important explanation: a lack of understanding of the word "pacifist". When asked about conscientious objectors the same respondents returned only 14% "don't knows", increasing the "anti" categories from 40% to 46%, the "pros" from 7% to 9% and the "half and half"--the willing to tolerate bracket--from 10% to 24%. The report is quick to point out, however, that toleration was not grounded in positive qualitative reasoning, but was the product of a rather vague and amorphous recognition and acknowledgement of the Englishman's right to hold his own opinions and to express them freely. This tolerance would appear to be borne out by another of the survey's questions relating to the freedom of pacifists to express their views. The
findings showed that a very clear majority placed a high premium on freedom of speech.\textsuperscript{11}

**FREEDOM OF PACIFISTS TO EXPRESS THEIR OPINIONS\textsuperscript{12}**

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<th>A-B</th>
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<tr>
<td>DON'T KNOW</td>
<td>12</td>
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But one of the conclusions of the survey was to acknowledge a considerable reservoir of active support for conscientious objectors, and by extension pacifists, in the order of around 9\%.\textsuperscript{13} If pacifists had been able to convert this support into an active political element they could have made themselves a formidable opposition force. Credence is given this contention when it is seen that in addition to actual military objection—in April 1940 about 1.5\% of those registering—there was a great deal of latent objection; a ration of two latent for every one actual.\textsuperscript{14} This figure would appear to be confirmed by contemporary by-election returns which revealed an average of 8\% support among voters for anti-war candidates.\textsuperscript{15} As one latent objector was to comment:

> I would be a C.O. if I thought any good would come of it, but C.O.'s will influence nobody by their objection, it seems to me - the Government's policy of leaving them alone is subtle.\textsuperscript{16}

The compiler of the report, identified only as "S. H.", admits that "there is no clearly demarked border-line between C.O.'s and the Rest." He at one moment refers to CO's as
"a seriously obstructive minority in the national war effort", although the words "seriously obstructive" were subsequently scored out to read "non co-operative".

From a reading of the report's findings it is readily apparent that pacifists in the first months of the war might have made a great impact upon a sizeable section of the community using as an initial starting point a stolid phalanx of support which remained constantly between seven and nine per cent. This consolidation of strength did not happen because the PPU--more specifically its older National Executive--made crucial misjudgments and miscalculations in policy decisions. The leaders' miscalculations were based on an inadequate gauging of public receptivity and a failure by pacifists to perceive themselves--and consequently also to project themselves--as a viable political and social option. As the Fulham survey revealed, "This country does not divide simply into C.O.'s and whole-hearted war-workers ...." In their failure to address resolutely and with imagination, this middle constituency and provide them with alternative leadership, the pacifists emasculated themselves. The government was thus spared the potentially very unpopular and unsavoury task of silencing them by force. Of the respondents 53% favoured freedom of speech whilst of the A-B group the percentage was 60.

There are a number of ways to explain the failure of pacifists in this regard. First, for many the outbreak of war
was itself a bitter personal defeat. Vera Brittain expressed this well when she wrote of her reception of Chamberlain's wireless broadcast announcing war: "... I found that the tears were running down my cheeks - I suppose from some subconscious realization of the failure of my efforts for peace over twenty years." Many found it difficult to recover from this blow and resigned themselves to the fact of war. Others harking back to the Great War anticipated the descent of the heavy hand of the law and prepared for clandestine work and an underground peace movement.

... money was drawn from the Bank and divided among the Officers, each of whom banked in their own banks under their own names. Arrangements for liaison with the Group leaders were made, and Minute Books and important files were also distributed.

Naturally, this mentality did not lend itself to an advocacy of the pacifist platform and caused many leaders of the PPU to approach wartime conditions in an exclusively defensive manner. The more extreme members of this division frankly anticipated martyrdom and not a few were disappointed that such a fate eluded them. Like some of the early Christians the prospect of martyrdom or the equivalent of an imminent Second Coming dissuaded many from making provisions for the future: "no creative ideas were expressed as to personal or national conduct in the future." Yet another section of pacifist opinion believed that the soundest response to war was to maintain a low profile, not to antagonise the authorities, and thus at least to keep pacifism quietly alive.
in anticipation of a postwar revival. A number of the PPU National Executive thought in these terms which clearly precluded a dynamic and unified leadership. Some of the experiences which led pacifists to such conclusions are given expression in a personal report submitted to Mass Observation by a pacifist observer.

The chief result that the war has had upon my outlook has been personal - that I no longer feel able to hold political and spiritual views with that ease of tenure which distinguished pre-war discussions. Before one could call upon friends in the evening and talk about war, politics, education, art, one could defend philosophies in which one did not believe and it made little difference whether one was a pacifist or a socialist or not.

But now these people (or more particularly their parents) hold that all else is secondary to the prosecution of the war and the middle-aged greet pacifism as traitorous. Because of the bitterness of their parents I am now not able to visit five of my friends.

The generational gap to which Ronald Frank alludes was a very real one. The findings of the Mass Observation survey in Fulham and the clashes in policy opinion between the younger and the older members of the Peace Pledge Union underscored the differences between generations and in the case of Fulham, also between classes. Of the under-thirty age group 11% were strongly sympathetic toward pacifists, as against only 6% in the over-thirty age group. The under-thirty bracket also only showed 3% to be strongly anti-pacifist whereas the over-thirty category recorded a strongly anti lobby of 13%. The Fulham sample also shows quite clearly that the wealthy upper classes and the middle classes were far more decided in their opinions. Hence it was
revealed that only 20% of the A-B's registered as "don't knows" when asked their opinions about pacifists--as against 55% of the C-D's--and 62% were anti or strongly anti, against only 24% of the skilled and unskilled respondents. The wealthy and middle-class respondents registered only 18% in favour (5%) and tolerant (13%) as against 23% in favour (10%) and tolerant (13%) from the skilled and unskilled. This breakdown had significant connotations for the leadership and, by extension, for the membership of the peace movement. Its leadership, together with much of its active membership, was drawn heavily from the wealthy and middle classes. The movement thus had an in-built class bias which separated it from a potential constituency. Some of the verbatim responses to the Fulham survey reflected these differences:

I don't know them, isn't it these young well to-do fellows who don't go?25

Oh I don't know. There are better educated people than I who do those things. I can't possibly answer them.26

Such differences were exceedingly difficult to bridge and overcome, and they were compounded by the small and very cautious attempts that were made by the Peace Pledge Union and its sister organisations in the early months of the war to appeal to this section of the community.27

The Peace Pledge Union exceeded all other groups in the extent of its organisation. Until 1939 the control of the Peace Pledge Union was in the hands of a group of Sponsors, invited to serve by Dick Sheppard. This body, however, gave way to a National Executive appointed by a National Council.
The latter body was elected, indirectly, and directly by the general membership. The basic unit of the PPU—the group—was organised at regional and area levels, with area representatives claiming seats on the National, one from each area and two each for Scotland and Wales for a total of twenty-one. A further eighteen National Council members were elected directly by group members using a postal ballot, based on a system of proportional representation. Elections were annual affairs, taking place just prior to the Annual General Meeting which was open to all the membership. The offices of Chairman and Treasurer were subject to a separate ballot and these officers of the Union, together with the General Secretary, were ex-officio members of the National Council.

The war accelerated the programme of decentralisation which the Peace Pledge Union had begun to implement in the late nineteen-thirties. An increasing amount of organisational work devolved upon the area organisational structure and the revenue distribution practices of the Union were revamped so that all levels of the Union shared the benefits of proportionally distributed, fixed sums. At the group level, active signatories were strongly encouraged to maintain contact with more nominally inclined members and to involve them in the workings and activities of the movement. Beyond this group members were also asked to cultivate contacts with progressive groups and individuals [and] to know the
people with special civic responsibility, ministers of religion, service workers and such useful business contacts as printers, reporters and bill posters.32

During the early months of the war, however, the activity of many pacifists, whilst not furtive, was certainly cautious. At the local level individual PPUers frequently found themselves running afoul of the local constabulary.33 Consequently, the careful organisation of pacifist groups, or cells, was very important in helping to maintain the morale of pacifists. Groups fostered a spirit of community and kinship through discussions and lectures, social gatherings and organised walks.34

The Mass Observation Archives contain an extensive report on pacifism and conscientious objection, written in July 1940, which is useful not only for its detail but also because it was compiled from evidence gathered by both pacifist and non-pacifist observers. Commonly, such organisations as the Peace Pledge Union met in the private homes of members, in church halls, or Friends Meeting Houses.35 The activities were of the sort commonly sponsored by church groups. The Walthamstow Peace Pledge Union group numbered somewhere in the region of twenty to thirty members and attracted between forty and fifty-five per cent of these to its weekly meetings.36 These sessions frequently featured a guest speaker with a general discussion following. The express aims of such evenings were to educate pacifists in their pacifism, to help maintain their resolve and also to make pacifists more confident proselytes. The Fellowship of
Reconciliation had a similar programme and frequently PPU and FoR groups would combine forces and pool such resources as outside speakers. At Cambridge the PPU and FoR groups met together very regularly and the minutes of the Cambridge PPU contain numerous references to joint activities. More formal links also existed between the two bodies: Stuart Morris, a member of the PPU's National Executive, was a member of the FoR Executive Committee and Leslie Artingstall, an FoR officer, was a member of the PPU executive.

Speakers addressed a wide variety of subjects not all of which were directly linked to pacifism. The observers frequently made very detailed notes. One who was present at the PPU Annual General Meeting in April 1942 recorded that when Vera Brittain rose and moved to the microphone, "there is 12 seconds applause ...", whilst John Middleton Murry's similar journey brought "eighteen seconds applause ...". The observers were not, on occasion, without humour. At a PPU meeting in Chingford, attended by over two hundred people, the main speaker, Donald Soper, was introduced by a local woman councillor.

She was a bit bumptious and flattered Soper quite a lot. She emphasised that she was there in her personal capacity (of which there was quite a lot). Not all meetings were formal; some were purely social occasions featuring activities as diverse as dancing and darts, and lacking any pacifist connotation. The numbers of
people drawn to these activities far exceeded attendance at the regular weekly or fortnightly meetings of any given group, often numbering in excess of one hundred persons. The public meetings addressed by men and women like Donald Soper and Vera Brittain drew even greater numbers. These large-scale public meetings were frequently jointly arranged and advertised by a number of pacifist groups. The reception by audiences was varied: some mild heckling was always to be expected but a crowd could occasionally show itself to be singularly unreceptive, especially at open-air meetings. Sybil Morrison recalled being "dislodged" from her perch on the wall at Tower Hill, whilst an MO observer was witness to a mildly riotous open-air meeting on the Embankment at Fulham in 1940. The principal speaker was being taunted by the crowd with such questions as: "Where did you leave your parachute?" The observer noted that "the speaker ... was under considerable mental strain ..." and was finally "brought down by a plain clothes detective assisted by uniformed officers." Comments from the crowd were the reverse of sympathetic: "'About time too.' '... jail 'em.' 'Five months 'ard.'" The timing of this particular meeting, in the late spring of 1940 coinciding with the fall of France in May and June 1940, probably accounts for the very overt hostility of the crowd. A review of Peace News at the same date reveals a hiatus in the number of open-air meetings. But not all forms of meeting were suspended. In March and April 1940 large crowds gathered at the Queen's Hall, London, and
the Free Trade Hall in Manchester to listen to speakers address the topic of a negotiated peace. Yet the number of public meetings being held did fall as the PPU executive combined caution with a stress upon maximum propagandistic effect. By the summer of 1940 Vera Brittain came to feel that the Union's long-range interests would not be well served if public opinion was continually being negatively stirred and that circumspection was desirable. The PPU executive as a whole was hesitant about the wisdom of promoting public meetings and unnecessarily antagonising the general public.

This issue was one which very seriously divided the Peace Pledge Union. Roy Walker, who was responsible for arranging speakers for groups and larger public meetings on such questions as the effects of the blockade on Europe, felt very strongly that certain members of the Executive were simply gutless quietists. In early December 1940 Walker was having to defend the efficacy of public meetings against a very reluctant and seemingly timid Executive.

Roy Walker said that he thought the Committee should face the possibility of large meetings on such subjects as Blockade .... After a long discussion it was agreed not to reach a conclusion about such meetings until further opportunity had been allowed for 'experimenting' and that the minute be continued for a further report after the meeting in Holborn Town Hall at which John Middleton Murry was to speak .... Manchester and Birmingham had been asked if they would 'try out' similar meetings.

Roy Walker's policy of more direct action and propaganda had the enthusiastic support of the younger members of the PPU,
individual members of the Executive, such as Vera Brittain, and a goodly number of the Union's groups for whom such activities were very important in terms of building and sustaining morale. Moreover, it would seem from the results of the Fulham survey that, at least during the first year of the war, the pacifists could have gained greater public support than many of the leaders perceived themselves as capable of achieving. There was no need for the Government to intervene overtly; a subtle and covert policy of fostering passive anonymity was sufficient to control a radical, but essentially established and law-abiding middle-class group.

As one Peace News article later commented in 1943:

The Government believes that it has found the ideal way of dealing with pacifism in this country. The pacifist minority is allowed almost unrestricted liberty on the assumption that, like all minorities, it will fall into the usual traps, so that the vast majority of the nation will refuse to take seriously anything said by pacifists.49

Others recognised the corner in which the Executive was pointing the movement. One, Alex Miller, a clergyman, also saw that the dilemma of the PPU was not only a result of timorous leadership but, more fundamentally, that it was intimately related to the PPU's limited understanding of itself and of its purpose. The war produced in the Peace Pledge Union a profound identity crisis and a new set of reference points by which the Union would have to steer. It was the acknowledgement and acceptance of these new conditions which many found difficult.

Now the 'phony war' has become a total war ... a
desperate struggle for 'national survival'. These cataclysmic events have challenged us before we were ready for them, before we were agreed about our common stand.\textsuperscript{50} 

Miller argued for a change in the whole ethos of the Union, a movement away from what he saw as a suffocating, self-imposed exclusivity and a regrettable negativism.

We do not want a creed for our Movement, nor do we want a purge .... We have stood, and we still stand for human rights, but we must do so in an imaginative relationship with the wider society in the midst of which we live ....

If we renounce war, there is a liability upon us to say what we will do .... The P.P.U. must have a dynamic or it will die.\textsuperscript{51} 

Roy Walker, to whose heart this debate was very close, commented at a much later meeting that the fundamental problem of the Union was its lack of purpose.\textsuperscript{52} Walker also believed that the PPU could afford to be more daring in its public actions and in this he had appreciable support at the grassroots level.

The acclamation [sic] given to Roy Walker's speech at the National A.G.M. seemed to indicate [a need for change] in P.P.U. policy. (i.e., propaganda and direct action)\textsuperscript{53} 

Neither was the debate limited to the London area. The same discussions and divisions appeared in the Cambridge PPU group in the spring of 1942.

In discussion Dr. Wood indicated the present importance of the division between the demonstrative and non-demonstrative elements within the P.P.U. Although not personally inclined to public demonstration he felt it had its place in the movement.\textsuperscript{54} 

This debate, in fact, was to last the full course of the war and at its end was still unresolved.
When the hostilities began the Peace Pledge Union had on hand a number of publications designed to give the pacifist practical ideas and guidelines as to the activities which they might or ought properly to pursue. Most of these prewar publications were heavily activist in orientation, giving practical expression to pacifist theory and philosophy. The interwar PPU marched, rallied, and held mass demonstrations with impunity: the wartime PPU had to adjust to the long shadow of the Defence Regulations. Only one of its publications brought the PPU directly into conflict with the wartime authorities. This was a book written by a Dutch anarchist, Bart De Ligt, entitled *The Conquest of Violence.* At an Executive Committee meeting in early December 1940 it was reported that "the Home Office took a serious view of the situation and would not accept the book with the appendix removed or discuss any compromise." The Union accordingly agreed to put away all its copies of the offending book, part of which it had also published in pamphlet form in March 1939. This comprised De Ligt's "Plan of Campaign against All War and All Preparation for War". The introduction to the PPU version commented:

The Plan is particularly recommended to study groups within such organisations as the Peace Pledge Union; provided that such groups are prepared to follow study by action.

The campaign, which De Ligt had first presented to the international conference of the War Resisters International in July 1934, was a blueprint for effecting an organised and
orchestrated programme of non-violent resistance to war in peacetime and in wartime. The plan was a comprehensive one and included all manner of action from the refusal of military service to the refusal to manufacture military toys. If soldiers were to be billeted, the pacifist was advised either to refuse outright,

... Or they may be received hospitably and as imposed guests may be subjected to judicious anti-militarist propaganda while the indemnity paid by the State may be used in favour of anti-war propaganda.58

The plan contained special words of instruction for the part the pacifist historian might play in helping to prevent the formation of a mentality accepting, and actively supporting, war by refusing to commit the common error of making the history of one's own nation the starting point of world history by elevating it as the chosen one above any other nation and by refusing exclusively to glorify one's own race ... by taking universal life as a starting point, pointing out the qualities of every nation and race, demonstrating the relations and influence which each has with and upon the others and showing according to universal history the existence of an undeniable tendency towards a social life which would be as free as it would be varied, offering to every individual the greatest possibility of free development.59

De Ligt also had words of advice for saddle and harness makers, philosophers, journalists, jurists, sociologists, medical doctors and men of science. His plan was impressive in its comprehensiveness and organisation, and it is interesting that the Home Office intervened with a swift and decisive refusal to brook anything other than the work's complete withdrawal.

Another influential pamphlet, Training for Peace,
was written by Richard Gregg (an American advocate of Gandhian non-violence), although by the outbreak of the war it was largely discredited, cutting little ice with the majority of leading pacifists. Max Plowman wrote:

I only know that I've felt an unconscious resistance to intense Study Groups and all Yogi-Bogie exercises as seeming to partake of the nature of the ingrowth [emphasis his] and that what I was looking for was the contrary - something that would release [emphasis his] the latent resistance to war ...

In May 1939, however, the Peace Pledge Union issued a booklet compiled by one of its own number, David Spreckley, in a first-edition run of one hundred thousand copies. In the following month a further hundred thousand copies were printed. The booklet, entitled Peace Service Handbook, sought to offer suggestions for ways in which pacifists might serve in the cause of peace. Spreckley first recommended that pacifists work to inform themselves of the truths surrounding current events and then use that knowledge to enlighten and influence national public opinion. Too much information, Spreckley warned, was obscured by euphemistically phrased half-truths.

The Archbishop of Canterbury has said, justifying our country's preparations, "that the use of force, of the sword, is the instrument of God for the protection of the people." But if he had been realistic he would have said: "The high-explosive shell, the poison gas, the bomb, the blockade, the lying propaganda, and all the other weapons of modern war are the instrument of God for the protection of the people." Could that be true under any circumstances?

For those interested in obtaining factual information the Handbook listed organisations from which reading materials could be obtained, study groups, conferences and summer
schools organised, or public meetings and lectures arranged. Among the list of recommended newspapers and magazines the Anglo-German Review and The Link appeared. The appearance of the latter was noted by the author of an article in the Daily Telegraph in July 1939 entitled, "Views of Peace Pledge Union".

Allegations that the Peace Pledge Union is being used as 'a channel' for Nazi propaganda in Britain are made in a memorandum issued yesterday by the Research Department of the Economic League. In the Peace Service Handbook, issued by the Peace Pledge Union, there are to be found several indications that this organisation, consciously or unconsciously, has become a channel for Nazi propaganda. In this booklet Peace Pledge Union supporters are advised to correspond with a German organisation, 'Friendship League for Cultivating Personal Friends Abroad', whose offices are in Berlin. Frequent reference is made to the 'Anglo-German Review' which, the memorandum points out, operates from the same address and does not seem to have any separate identity from a pro-Nazi organisation called the Link.

The article concluded:

The use of the union by Germany for propaganda 'hostile to the British Government and directed against the best interests of the British people' is given as an example of the subtle undermining of British organisations. Such publicity was clearly to the detriment of the PPU. The Handbook sought to help its readers foster internationalism by advocating pen friends, holidays overseas and international workcamps arranged through such groups as the English Globe Trotters Association or International Tramping Tours. Its inclusion of the Friendship League and the Link was as naive as it was unwise and damaging. The Handbook also gave advice on how to best ensure the dissemination of peace propaganda, suggesting the use of types of activity long
practiced by the PPU: public meetings, correspondence columns in newspapers, parades, displays and dramatisations of peace plays. Spreckley also recommended involvement in social service.

... every activity compatible with peace, whether it be working at a desk or bathing a baby, driving a train or sitting on a local council, is peace service.

A year after the start of the war the PPU issued another pamphlet, *An Outline for Pacifist Study*, with an introduction by Charles Raven. The mood of this publication was more realistic and cognisant of the limitations imposed upon the PPU by the war. Indeed, the jolt delivered by the war was acknowledged. Frustration, ostracism, recriminatory exchanges between pacifists over compromises forced by wartime regulations were cited in describing conditions within the PPU. Pacifists were accordingly cautioned not to make the mistake of retiring from society altogether or, on the other hand, becoming so engrossed in service to the community as to lose sight of the initial inspiration for that service. The readers of the Outline were encouraged to look at the Union in a realistic light, accepting its weaknesses, but also mindful of its strengths.

Have we ever sufficiently realised the remarkable nature of the P.P.U.? By building it on a minimum assent, the Pledge, instead of a maximum, a complete policy, we have obtained a movement which perhaps more than any other could be an experimental ground, and in time a model, for a whole community ....

Instead of regretting the variety of opinion ... rejoice in it. And while rejoicing in it recognise it as the vital problem of the movement, and to seek a solution within it.
The Mass Observation findings show that early in the war local groups followed many of the prescriptions for group activity laid down in the Outline and Peace Service Handbook. But as the war lengthened and its totality bit into the fabric of English life, the strictures imposed upon society caused public attitudes toward pacifists to change. Similarly, individual pacifists had to reassess their own beliefs in light of the exactions, moral and mental, which the war placed upon them. Meanwhile, the leadership of the Peace Pledge Union debated, without respite, the proper course of development for itself, as it struggled—faithful to the Pledge—to express unity in and through diversity. Some of the most popular forms of PPU activity in the interwar years were poster-parades, mass demonstrations and open-air meetings. These, as already noted, continued to be held during the first year of the war, although they declined markedly in number and were the focus of much police attention. Groups were not, however, bereft of somewhat original ideas in their attempt to ensure freedom of expression. The PPU Group in Peckham planned a poster-parade on bicycles and received the following advice from the NCCL Legal Department:

The cyclists ... should be careful not to obstruct other traffic. Needless to say the posters should not in any way effect the proper control of their bicycles.

The attitude of the public toward pacifists, as evidenced by the Fulham survey, was not wholly unsympathetic.
The chief problem was public indifference: like the "Don't Knows" in a pre-election poll, the moot question was which way would they swing? The daily press was, by definition, in a very powerful position to influence public opinion and no segment of it was pro-pacifist. The *Daily Herald*, according to MO findings, made the greatest effort in terms of giving the CO a fair press and criticising the more blatant biases of some of the tribunals.\(^7^8\) This defence had, indeed, caused some patriots to stop receiving the *Herald* although others supported the paper's position.

It will be a sad day for England when liberty of conscience is no longer respected. Is it not our priceless heritage? ... 

*Pro Patria et Pace*--Devon.\(^7^9\)

The cases of genuine conscientious objectors were undoubtedly harmed by newspaper reports of claimants showing little evidence of the veracity of their objection.

Producing a book called "Imitation of Buddha", William J. Roberts (20) told a Manchester Conscientious Objectors' Tribunal yesterday that he was a singer training for opera and a Buddhist. He said he had studied the book night and day, but the chairman said the book showed no sign whatever of daily use, and Roberts was removed from the register of conscientious objectors.\(^8^0\)

There were a number of papers which took strong lines against CO's, including the *Daily Mail* and the *Sunday Pictorial*. The latter, in June 1940, produced a black-edged leader which ran:

The *Sunday Pictorial* declares war on the nauseating young men who pretend that they believe in "peace". And this weekend, when the B.E.F. heroes set foot again on English soil, provides an appropriate moment to strike the first blow ....Make no mistake about it -- THESE YOUNG PERVERTS, IDIOTS AND RACKETEERS ARE DANGEROUS.
And if you don't believe us, cast your eye over the brass-faced muck they shout out in our conchie courts every day .... PUT THE BUNCH OF THEM BEHIND BARBED WIRE!81

The Government, in short, did not have to orchestrate the press in this regard.

The MO also investigated the attitude of town councils to CO employees over the period 11 May 1940 to 7 July 1940, discovering "where figures for voting on the matter are available ... [there is] considerable minority support for C.O.'s."82 Perhaps predictably, Conservatives tended to vote against CO's and Labour in their favour. Union attitudes unfortunately were not surveyed, although it was noted that NALGO "has now ceased trying to protect its C.O. members from victimisation, and locally even takes part in agitation against them."83

The correspondence files of the National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL) substantiate the rising tide of anti-pacifist feeling in Britain in the summer of 1940, leading the NCCL to the conclusion that there was a "slowly gathering attack on the P.P.U. [by government]."84 The Legal Department of the NCCL were of the view that the PPU might be banned "as an organisation subject to foreign or [sic] control or the persons in charge of which have had association with an enemy government."85 In March 1940, the Paddington and North Kensington PPU Group were warned of the possibility of the PPU being proceeded against, the NCCL concluding with the comment: "I understand that the policy of your headquarters
This concluding remark arguably contained the veiled caveat that the NCCL would not always and unreservedly "go to bat" for the PPU. Indeed, it is possible, that in the case of the PPU the NCCL was temporising and, worse still, the victim of popular misconception.

There is a strong argument for our independent organisation not appearing to have too close an association with the victimised societies - the P.P.U. and the C.P. [Communist Party].

A Peace News leader in December 1943 was critical of the NCCL and accused it of being "shy of C.O.'s" and of pursuing a policy which caused it to refrain from protesting against any encroachments upon civil liberties that were technically within the limits of the law. The Peace Pledge Union's guardianship of the "Liberty Tree" was thus at once doubly vital but isolating.

One of the oft-repeated themes appearing throughout the war in the columns of Peace News, in pacifist publications and also, for example, in Vera Brittain's writings, was the responsibility of the pacifist movement in upholding traditional English liberties and democratic practices. In a front page article in Peace News entitled "Pacifism or Tyranny", the author pointed out the dangers to democracy inherent in fighting a total war, the inevitable regimentation and adoption of totalitarian practices. A year later, Humphrey Moore, the former editor of Peace News, wrote in scriptural vein:
What shall it profit Britain if she win a total war and lose her own soul? Deep in the soul of Britain are liberty and tolerance. Total war is gradually destroying them, and the effort to win involves more and more ruthless adoption of totalitarian methods with a corresponding hastening of the destruction of values that are fundamental to the soul of Britain.91

Laurence Housman took up a similar theme in a commentary on the extension of Cabinet power over the House of Commons, and the domination, by Winston Churchill, of the Cabinet.92 In the autumn of 1941 John Middleton Murry had warned that Britain's liberties and civil rights were being "whittled away" and that Parliament was not defending itself.93 There was therefore an essential function for a real opposition to perform in terms of the protection of these fundamental rights. The topic was the subject of a January leader in 1942:

British liberty is not a simple forthright conception. It has to be delicately adjusted in times of national danger ... the preservation of the maximum of civil liberty is vital to the survival of Britain as a society with value for the world.94

But perhaps the charge of the pacifists, and the dangers to the British parliamentary system of government were most eloquently and pithily expressed in a Peace News article entitled, "Must Freedom Die?".

Under war-stresses Parliament has retreated from its principle of incorporating within itself an alternative to the Government. We and Parliament are the poorer by that retreat .... A people can be no more free than its Parliament. Let it be remembered that Fox in opposition is a true symbol of Britain, and of freedom, as the triumphant Pitt in office.95

The pacifists were conscious of the radical tradition of
which they were the heirs.

Yet the task of communicating with the public and conveying their weighty concerns became increasingly difficult for the pacifists. Public attitudes toward them, following the initial tide of sympathy and toleration, hardened after the fall of France and thereafter generally flowed in a reverse direction. In October 1942 the Mass Observation volunteers were asked to respond to a directive that they gauge from their own experience and knowledge, the attitudes of people toward minorities, including pacifists, and to comment upon any changes in public attitude since the outbreak of hostilities. The replies were somewhat mixed. One observer felt that whilst the stand of pacifists was probably understood by religious people, for the "man in the street" they were "the most detested, with perhaps the few fascist which exist." One soldier reported that in his opinion intolerance toward pacifists had increased markedly, whilst a pacifist serving with the RAMC reported little or no intolerance and indeed an improvement in attitudes toward pacifists. Another man, serving with the FAU in Liverpool, also reported little hostility, save from "armchair strategists." But another observer recorded that "Pacifists are now exposed to continuous bad treatment in spite of the legal formality which allows them to exist." The PPU, on a number of occasions, rated special mention. H. Miller replied to the directive: "On the face of things, people are
more tolerant towards minorities, except of course those directly opposed to the war effort (P.P.U.)." A woman observer probably captured the emotional response of many.

In the last war I personally used to think it rather brave of conscientious objectors to stick to their principles but that was because my boy was safe in his cradle. Now that he is fighting I feel very angry with them .... The sight of a notice in a window with the words "Peace Pledge Union" now makes me furious. A Canadian pilot serving with the Royal Air Force commented:

We are all in it - one can't keep out - I hate, loathe and dread killing by bombing, tho' I love flying. Why should I do the dirty work to allow others to spare their own feelings, and keep their ideals?

In August 1943 a brief MO survey of people's attitudes to pacifists concluded, "they have come to be regarded more and more as peculiar, and as outcasts from moral society." The survey provoked such responses as

I don't know, I really can't understand their attitude. Of course, they're all pretty odd sort of people, what I can see of them. Vegetarians, or pansies or something.

Assessments such as these said little for the success of the pacifists in conveying any sense of their spirit to their potential, non-pacifist audience.

As the war proceeded the position of pacifists, in relation to society, became increasingly perceived by the popular mind in terms of their distance from the community pale--a drift which the activists had repeatedly warned against. It had the regrettable political effect of temporarily removing pacifists as a political and moral force, as they lost the viability they had possessed but never
collectively recognised themselves. The nucleus of support that pacifists might have capitalised upon may be partially measured by examining by-election returns. Between September 1939 and February 1940, out of 54,273 votes cast, 8,553 votes—or 15.75%—were cast in favour of Stop-the-War candidates. It was during this same period that the police were very active against Peace Pledge Union groups. Peace News regarded this as "a tribute to the growing strength of the Stop-the-War demand." In October 1939, two thousand people turned out to hear James Maxton (leader of the Independent Labour Party) address an anti-war rally in Glasgow and some Scottish unions were also calling for peace.

Indeed, it was probably not entirely coincidental that the Home Secretary chose to warn a Scottish audience, at Edinburgh in January 1940, of the dangers of pacifist propaganda. At a by-election in Stretford, in December 1939, the Stop-the-War candidate, an ILPer named Bob Edwards, claimed 15.09% of the vote. The Communist Party candidate in the election—also an anti-war candidate—polled 5.84% of the vote, for a total anti-war vote of 20.2%. It is possible that the swift moves by the police against pacifists and the high anti-war vote are related factors, showing the government's willingness to act if threatened. But the very swiftness and readiness of the government response cowed and divided pacifism's middle-class leadership and left the Peace Pledge Union weakly co-ordinated. Thus, without
much ado, the Government delivered the pacifists a telling blow which allowed them still to stay in the ring—a "victory" for British democracy—but ensured that they would be incapable of going the distance. In other words, the Government did not have to extract a troublesome fang, it fell out of its own accord. One historian, Paul Addison, has commented on wartime by-elections:

Wartime by-elections served many purposes .... For hard-pressed Cabinet Ministers, operating an almost totalitarian system for the emergency, the high adverse votes were a tiresome but useful reminder that they were supposed to be democratic politicians.111

The Peace Pledge Union sought always to remind the Government of this fact.

The Problems of the General Staff

I looked at Heart, the hot tears through,
And saw that Heart was crying too.
Richard Spender112

The "adverse votes" to which Addison refers were, in large measure, a reflection of the leftward trend in British political life, which in 1945 was to sweep the Labour Party into office. But the Peace Pledge Union were unable to utilise this swing to their own advantage. The most obvious obstacle was the unpopularity of pacifism itself as a political policy. In the popular mind pacifism translated into a capitulation before totalitarian aggression. Whatever pacifists might say about the Beveridge Report and social reform, their popular image cast a long shadow. At the same
time pacifists enjoyed consistent levels of support, a fact reflected in electoral statistics and the circulation figures for Peace News. The problem was, in large part, the perennial one of peace movements—political translation, and the difficulty of mixing pacifism and politics. As George M. Lloyd Davies, a prominent Welsh PPUer remarked, Lansbury and Hardie had suffered greatly on this account, and before that Cobden found that lasting and reliable conviction against war was only to be found in religious or Quaker conviction, yet even Cobden shrank from accepting the principle of non-resistance since "it put one completely out of court as a practical politician".113

The pacifists were deeply divided on the question of political activity and the wartime columns of Peace News carried many discussions of the subject and of the need to establish a working balance between politics and religion. Alex Wood, the very able chairman of the PPU, writing in the spring of 1940 noted that there were two schools of thought within the PPU. The first of these expressed itself through a personalised individual witness, its exponents being religious pacifists who understood themselves to be the leaven within the lump that was society. The other was essentially a political witness, given to overt demonstration, protest and "missionary" endeavour.114 A classic expression of the difference between the two appeared in Peace News in July and August of 1940 when the powerful pens of John Middleton Murry and Roy Walker clashed. In July Middleton
Murry wrote an article on the need of pacifists to face the reality of the newly emerging social order: liberal-democratic civilisation, in his view, was beyond redemption. Walker begged to differ, arguing that there was much in democracy worthy of salvage and that pacifists had been inordinately remiss in neither acknowledging their debt to democracy nor in defending it. The Peace Pledge Union, he felt, "can only preserve its integrity by leaving some casualties on the democratic field." Similarly, Frank Lea, an anarchist, warned that the peace movement could not hope to escape the opprobrium of the general public by avoiding military service with an appeal to the Sermon on the Mount and simultaneously to lay claim to all the rights of citizenship. In February 1941 another Peace News contributor called for a new dynamic for the Union, judging that the historical situation had rendered the Pledge an "anachronism". The Peace Pledge Union had become a compilation of "mere doctrinaire discussions with a dash of social service." Three months later Bill Grindlay, a member of the Forward Movement, contributed an article in a series on PPU policy which stated categorically that the Union was a political organisation and had a responsibility to act as the conscience of the community. Similarly, Max Plowman, one of the most respected sages of the PPU, argued that the movement did have a political function in terms of creating a "new path of democracy". But he was of the view that greater effort
needed to be expended on formulating a clear social doctrine for pacifism. On a solely political plane pacifism, in 1941, was a liability, and a reasoned and viable social policy offered hope of greater recognition. But only one week later, the assistant editor of Peace News, Andrew Stewart, acknowledging the reigning "confusion about the fundamental nature of the movement", stated that it was impossible for the PPU to share a collective conscience as the approaches to the Pledge were legion. The same reasoning, he continued, meant that it was impossible for the Peace Pledge Union to have any sort of a programme for itself. As another writer was to point out that theoretically, the PPU could have as many policies as members.

The trouble is that the forces for war are one and indivisible but the forces for peace, peace with honour and sanity, are as divided as the fixed stars. Yet there were those who understood the diversity of the PPU to be its great strength. In an effort perhaps to control the burgeoning debate and correspondence, Maurice Rowntree— in one of the last articles he was to write before his death—sought to focus the attention of the Union, once more, upon the Bond of Peace series. In 1944, his was but another voice.

Throughout the war the Peace Pledge Union, therefore, had to deal with its membership's diverse interpretations of the Union's general inspiration and proper wartime activity. The broad divisions into political and religious inspirations,
and the absolutist and alternativist expressions of pacifism, meant in practice that every proposed policy or activity spawned camps of supporters and camps of detractors. The Peace Pledge Union, in short, laboured much under the weight of its own internal problems. These dichotomous responses to issues can be traced in the columns of Peace News and in the National Council and Executive minutes. Unfortunately, the levels of disharmony bred and sustained factional configurations. Roy Walker has commented that in the Peace Pledge Union much energy was expended upon trying "to love our enemies and simultaneously hating each other." The PPUers did not live in an isolated utopia, dreaming of brotherly love; they were well aware of the manifold difficulties inherent in loving one's neighbour.

A number of examples may be given to illustrate the pervasiveness of Union differences and the manner in which the Union tethered and hobbled itself. These examples range from matters of individual scale, such as consideration of questions relating to sexual conduct, or the reverberations surrounding the arrest of Stuart Morris, the Union's General Secretary, under the Official Secrets Act, to the Union's big wartime campaigns for a negotiated peace and for food relief for occupied Europe. Each demonstrates that the pledge was in deed and in fact the only point of agreement on which PPUers could be assured of unanimity. For toleration and liberty of expression it was a strength but in terms of practical utility it was a severe limitation.
Personal differences and personality clashes were frequent at Dick Sheppard House and undoubtedly undermined morale, detracting pitifully from pacifism's raison d'être. The matrimonial difficulties of Canon Stuart Morris, chairman of the Union, seriously divided the movement in the critical autumn of 1939. Writing to her husband, Vera Brittain confided that Morris's love affair had torn the PPu and that Alfred Salter, Maurice Rowntree and Charles Raven were of the opinion that Morris was not a fit leader. 128 Morris was accordingly removed from the Chairmanship, although he retained the position of General Secretary. John Middleton Murry, who lived a life of nightmarish quality with his third wife, came under severe criticism for his affair with Mary Gamble—shortly to become his fourth wife. 129 This relationship, although not expressly named, was the springboard for a motion proposed at a National Council meeting in July 1943. James Hudson, a Quaker and politically left-leaning member of the Executive, introduced a motion that proposed that all persons employed by the Peace Pledge Union should refrain from irregular sexual relations—and if they could not, they were to sever their official connection with the movement. 130 The motion was seconded by Salter and carried by seventeen votes to seven, but the National Council refused to take the matter further and by August Salter and Hudson resigned. 131 Ethical codes and morality were still, however, the subject of discussion in October—whilst the majority of Britons were following the Sicilian and Italian
campaigns. The protraction of the debate and the time and energy undoubtedly expended upon disagreement might seem unconscionably disproportionate when set against the backdrop of a world war, and current social and sexual mores. Yet these serve to illustrate the concern that many in the PPU had with respectability, and by extension, acceptability. In not a few circles, the Peace Pledge Union was regarded as being rather less than respectable. Patrick Figgis, when interviewed in 1980, commented that "things have greatly changed, but then if a man and girl were living together, the question arose if they were suitable people to be working at Dick Sheppard House." He explained that if one was known to be quarrelsome, then that individual could not speak for the PPU. Similarly one "couldn't afford to live improperly if [one] hoped to cut any ice in society." This concern with respectability does seem to have influenced relations between the Quakers and the PPU. On several occasions proposals for joint activities by the Union were diplomatically turned down. But the most overt expressions of concern with respectability emerged in the co-ordination of famine relief efforts which were spearheaded by two groups--the "respectable Food Relief Committee (Chairman the Bishop of Chichester and the two Archbishops among the supporters)" and the PPU's own Food Relief Campaign Committee led by Roy Walker and Vera Brittain. In 1943 Brittain recorded in her diary that a private meeting had been held with the FRC to discuss relations "and the part to be played by pacifists
and 'respectables'. There were some fiery passages on this between Cammaerts and Roy ...."136

The respectability of the Peace Pledge Union in 1943 was being held up for inspection on grounds other than possible sexual "impropriety" and the questionable respectability of pacifism. Stuart Morris, the Union's General Secretary, was arrested in 1943 under the Official Secrets Act. A dark pall was cast over the leadership of the Union in the opening months of that year when it became known that Morris had admitted possession of "confidential contingency plans for dealing with rebellion by Gandhi in India ...."137 The Times's report of the trial mentioned that the documents in question were in fact found at the PPU offices, which was hardly welcome publicity for the movement.138 Once again, a crisis produced not unity but a deep division in the Union's leadership. From the first Vera Brittain's sympathies lay fully with Morris, and she was most scornful of her fellow committee members' "cold feet" and "high moral line".139 She suspected a government "frame up": at the initial hearing the court had been willing to grant bail, but had been overruled by the India Office.140 The judge had also wished the trial to be open, but this too had been overruled. Morris's minimal sentence caused Brittain to remark upon what she understood as the "obvious conflict between judiciary and legislature."141

Brittain conceded that Morris's involvement had been "wrong and indiscreet", but she countered that he had only
sought "to make a normal democratic use of the information."\textsuperscript{142} This charity was not, however, the response of many of the Union's leaders. The furor which ensued surrounded Morris's tendered resignation. The majority position of the Executive—that taken by Alex Wood, Donald Soper and John Middleton Murry—called for the acceptance of the resignation.\textsuperscript{143} Vera Brittain, James Hudson and Wilfred Wellock were all signatories to a statement of protest contesting this majority decision. "A. W. commented that it wouldn't be 'edifying' for members of the Council to be publicly contradicting each other ...",\textsuperscript{144} but when the matter was put to a vote of the National Council it was found that the majority vote of the Executive was repudiated, "... thus showing", as Brittain was to comment in her diary,

that the Executive does not really represent the Council, & that the younger & more obscure members of the movement have more courage than some of its distinguished leaders.\textsuperscript{145}

The result provoked what Brittain was to describe as a needless public airing of dirty linen. She feared that the publicity surrounding the PPU's internal politics would have a very adverse effect on the PPU: "If we are now closed down I shall not be surprised."\textsuperscript{146}

Brittain was consistent in the expression of her opinion throughout the crisis which caused her to reflect upon the PPU's need for an infusion of new blood and a "substantially different Executive".\textsuperscript{147} To James Hudson she confessed that she had little use for the Union "under its present cautious and timid direction."\textsuperscript{148} Yet in the Spring
elections of 1943 Brittain was sadly to observe that "with incredible conservatism, the organisation has simply elected back practically the same old crowd all over again." Stuart Morris temporarily departed from the scene, a guest of His Majesty in Wormwood Scrubs where he was to remain until July 1943. In January 1944 he resigned from the National Council, and it was not until 1946 that he resumed his position of General Secretary, which he then held until 1964. In the interim the position was occupied byPatrick Figgis, an Oxonian and nonconformist minister. In 1943 Figgis left Kingsley Hall, the Methodist mission in central London, at the invitation of the Peace Pledge Union to become its General Secretary. Already a member of the National Council Figgis was, however, "little known to those at the centre [and] may have seemed safe and able to prevent the movement from getting into further trouble." Such placidity, however, was not the nature of the PPU.

Moving from a consideration of affairs which specifically and personally concerned the Executive of the Union to those which involved the movement as a whole, the paradoxical common denominator was, again, the sharp division which quickly developed around any proposed policy decision or campaign undertaking. Unanimity eluded the PPU. As the war progressed pacifists found no escape from the totality of the war machinery and the divisive elements were sharpened by the fundamental dilemmas of the pacifist position in wartime.
One of the first responses of the PPU to the war emergency had been the formation of Quaker-like Pacifist Service Units. These were designed to provide highly mobile relief units of the sort particularly pertinent to the immediate medical needs of air raid victims. But very quickly the work of the units expanded to include the organisation of shelters and the provision of attendant services. The PSU ran their own shelters and lent their assistance in numerous others. In addition, the PSU sought to provide aid to the permanently homeless at rest and evacuation centres, paying special attention to the elderly.

The units were well organised. Those members of Anglican pacifist units passed through a preparatory six-week training period. A unit normally comprised of ten individuals, men and women, who lived communally, receiving board and lodging and pocket monies of two shillings and sixpence for a week. The budget for the year ending 1943 provides a good account of the limited financing of the organisation. Part-time units were also in operation from the first months of the war and Vera Brittain expressed to Paul Cadbury her interest in giving some of her time and nursing experience to Quaker units. But as the character of the emergency changed so also did the work of the PSU, shifting from paramedical procedures to "social relief work". Even by 1942/1943 the full-time PSU effort was small—ten groups, manned by approximately sixty people. Reminiscent of the VAD's of the Great War, the PSU members
served as "theatre orderlies, surgery assistants and ward workers". One unit was attached to one of London's most respected hospitals, Guy's.159 Other units served in capacities as varied as guinea pigs for medical experiments, firefighting and firewatching teams, the supervising of emergency hostels for dehoused, problem families, monitoring evacuees and ensuring adequate social provisions and services. The units were also involved in youth work, notably through club organisations. In South East London the PSU became involved in providing social and recreational amenities for some one thousand young people, the offspring of poorer families "rehoused from Deptford and Bermondsey."160 Other Pacifist Service Units located in Stepney, Manchester, Cardiff and Liverpool were predominantly involved in family casework; indeed, in the last, exclusively so. These duties involved work with the most disadvantaged families and in a surprising comment, reminiscent of the Evangelical philanthropists of the nineteenth century, the PSU report for 1942-1943, remarking on the utility of work among these groups, stated:

... there is a limitless scope for service amongst a class largely untouched by existing social services. It is mercifully limited in numbers, but presents a much greater social problem than its size would suggest, since it acts as a source of physical and moral infection to its more respectable neighbours.161

The PSU report for 1944-1945 was in large measure a statement of the philosophy of the organisation's *modus operandi et vivendi* and showed the continued commitment to
the twentieth-century condition of England question, conditions of a degrading situation graphically portrayed by Orwell and once more exposed by war. The PSU sought to approach social problems holistically, seeking not only to delouse the heads of children but to also repair the mental damage, brutalisation and violence wrought by dire poverty and deprivation. The 1944-1945 report details physical and psychological conditions that read as a mid-twentieth-century version of Henry Mayhew’s *London Labour and the London Poor*. The housing described by the report dated from that earlier century, its defects exacerbated by the effects of German bombing, with the exception of lighting and ventilation, which was markedly improved! Roy Walker believed that the PSU was one of the most lasting legacies and contributions made by the pacifist movement in the fight for peace. Yet all were not agreed.

A very vocal minority of pacifists looked upon the Pacifist Service Units as antithetical to pacifism—as inner contradictions. This was on the grounds that relief work compromised pacifism by arguably blurring pacifism’s complete and utter rejection of war and all its works. It was a question seriously dividing pacifists before the war and no less during it. In January 1939 Laurence Housman had addressed the thorny subject in a *Peace News* article in which he discussed the relationship between pacifists and social service in war and peace. His views were akin to those of Vera Brittain who maintained that the absolutist
position, in its most orthodox sense, became untenable for the vast majority of pacifists and liable to be construed as hand-washing by the majority of non-pacifists. In October 1939 one E. G. Smith contributed to Peace News an article entitled "Pacifists can be Patriots - with a Wider Vision", which indeed served to underscore the desire of many pacifists to reassure the general population that pacifists were not, by definition, traitorous material. David Spreckley gave the debate a political dimension in the following month with an article severely criticising the absolutists, whom he significantly termed "monastics", who believed that political activism could have no effect on stopping hostilities. The following week Wilfred Wellock and Philip Mumford took up the debate between the absolutists and the moderates. Wellock was subsequently to make the pilgrimage from monastic absolutism to that of a more worldly kind. Mumford, however, was to leave the Union and renounce his pacifism. The shift caused by the recognition of the implications of total war made Mumford's moderate peacetime position increasingly untenable, in the same way that Wellock's original orthodox absolutist position was modified. In January 1940, Peace News carried the letter of a minority group of the PPU criticising the leadership of the movement for placing a damper on its desire for activity. Max Plowman took up the debate in February with an article on what he termed "creative pacifism"--an advocacy of community-oriented service. Frank Dawtry, a long-time pacifist once
active in the NMWM, concurred with Plowman in attaching value to service in the community at large. But Dawtry did add the caveat that such service should always seek to evoke in the minds of pacifists the peculiarly pacifist principles inspiring their activity. Given the pressures of total war, there was a danger that community service could become a "panaceic" end in itself.171

Perhaps on account of the gravity of the wartime situation, the threat of invasion and the consequent and attendant pressures upon pacifists, the discussion of these issues ceased for almost a year. It revived again with an article by R. W. Harris entitled "Does Relief Work Compromise Pacifism?".172 This question was followed by two articles in May 1941 by Wilfred Wellock and Roy Walker, respectively. The difference in their absolutism was one of degree. Wellock urged a creative pacifism which embraced service and co-operation, but he warned against the inherent negativism of a protestant pacifism. Roy Walker, for his part, raised an issue which he understood to be vital to the conveyance of the pacifist charism, namely, the avoidance of separation from ordinary people and the adoption of a sectarian orientation.173 Fundamental to this was a point raised by Max Plowman, namely, that a critical weakness in pacifism was its lack of a clearly delineated social doctrine. Plowman cogently argued that on the political plane pacifism had little appeal and, indeed, had produced a marked public aversion. To enable pacifists to reach the public on the
political plane Plowman pointed to the necessity of responding first to the social needs and expectations of the public—a shrewd and accurate assessment which the public reception of the Beveridge Report the next year was dramatically to underscore. But by 1942 Plowman was dead, and a deeply respected and hence unifying voice of pacifism was silent. This debate, of course, brought the pacifists back to a fundamental questioning of the nature of the pacifist movement; to its lack of a collective understanding of the Pledge and to the inherent and consequent difficulties in providing the PPU with a programme. Theoretically the PPU could have as many policies as members but the theme of the necessity of a social programme and social involvement reasserted itself in the autumn of 1941—again at a time when the war pressures upon pacifists and the community at large saw a commensurate increase. Indeed, the author of "Pacifist Strategy and Service" argued that pacifist social service established a vital credibility for pacifism in the community. A week later the same theme was taken up in another article which gave vent to the frustration felt by pacifists on account of their political impotence and which advocated social action as a viable alternate and complementary activity. By December 1941 the gravity of the Allied position was self-evident: the European war, with the entry of the United States and escalating hostilities in the Pacific theatre, had become a world war. The dilemmas facing the pacifists reached new
levels of sophistication and complexity; although conscience forbade partaking in the war effort, many did not want to see the allied effort fail and Europe succumb to Nazi enslavement. The interconnectedness of life in the midst of total war was also hard, if not impossible, to escape and summarised in the reflection that every meal was, in some way, by courtesy of the Merchant Navy. 178

The growing appreciation of that dilemma, which crystallised in 1941-1942, caused increasing numbers of pacifists to involve themselves in humanitarian work and brought about the general involvement of the PPU in such campaigns as food relief for occupied Europe and the protesting of mass bombing. These shifts served also to deepen fundamental divisions between pacifists over the validity and efficacy of resisting specific weapons of war or the endeavour to humanise the ordeal itself. One of the first into the fray was Sybil Morrison, a high pacifist, who understood campaigns against aspects of war as so much pacifist doublethink. 179 Her first reply came from Vera Brittain who profoundly disagreed with Morrison, arguing that to find a slim purchase of agreement between pacifists and non-pacifists was "Thus [to] make the first breeches in the solid wall of popular war-acceptance." 180 Reginald Sorensen, one of the few pacifists in Parliament, having represented West Leyton since 1929, was particularly well placed to experience fully and appreciate the dilemmas of those who shared his faith. Like Vera Brittain he could
not accept the stance taken by Sybil Morrison.

The problem haunts every thinking person and is insoluble. Ultimate moral and spiritual values in their translation are affected by immediate social necessities and human limitations, like refracted light waves.181

Pacifists, he believed, could not hope to impose pacifism upon others. "Even those who are amenable to tripe can suffer emitical surfeit."182 Rather they should seek the conversion of individuals which, as Vera Brittain clearly understood, involved coming down from the mountain top and keeping the tablets intact.183 But Morrison was not alone in her views. One letter of support for her position voiced the opinion that failure to adhere to orthodox, absolutist principles could only spell death for the Union.184 Another correspondent, who identified himself as a legless veteran of Passchendaele, wrote: "... to contract out is the best example pacifists can render the world in these times."185 A year later one absolutist was roundly criticising the extent of the "apologetics for the exemptionist" as opposed to positive arguments for the absolutist case.186 There were those, even among the inveterate absolutists, the high pacifists, who sought to find a common ground, but it was narrow.

The only exemptionists who need feel that they are compromising are those who, if they had obeyed their inner light implicitly would have been absolutists.187

Roy Walker, an active absolutist, was deeply frustrated at what he regarded as this fruitless division of pacifists into absolutists and conditionalists and lamented the debilitating
effect of such divisions upon the pacifist movement. And although the majority view of the PPU was for involvement and activism, the division Roy Walker so clearly saw was indeed an important factor in hampering at least one broad pacifist campaign and in causing yet another, strongly absolutist one, to flounder seriously. The Peace Pledge Union was riding a hobbled horse.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER FIVE


2 MO, Box 311B, File B, Pacifism Interview. Interview conducted by H. N. in Fulham, 3-5 April 1940. Question: What do you think of pacifists? Female respondent, aged 40, middle class.

3 MO, Pacifism Interview, male respondent, aged 35, skilled.

4 MO, Pacifism Interview, male respondent, aged 25, skilled.

5 MO Pacifism Interview, female respondent, aged 40, unskilled.

6 MO Report on Conscientious Objectors.


8 MO Report on Conscientious Objectors, 109. The total number of respondents was 250.

9 Table taken from MO Report on Conscientious Objectors, 91. 'A' denotes 'rich people'; 'B', middle class; 'C', artisans and skilled workers; 'D', unskilled and least economically trained. 'M' denotes male; 'F', female; '30+', over thirty; '30-', under thirty.

10 Statistical information from MO Report on Conscientious Objectors, "Opinion about C.O.'s", 92. A Metropolitan cross-section opinion poll conducted in January
1940 showed 42% of people against pacifism, 24% in favour, 10% partially in favour and 24% didn't know. MO File 23, Religion and the War.

11 "This insistence on the right to hold independent views is one that every political philosophy in England admits; school-history books of the most elementary kind also insist on it from the time of Magna Charta onwards .... It is not surprising to find the right to them figures so largely in [the interviews]." MO Report on Conscientious Objectors, 99.

12 MO Report on Conscientious Objectors, 106.


14 MO Report on Conscientious Objectors, 89.

15 MO Report on Conscientious Objectors, 89.

16 MO Report on Conscientious Objectors, 89.


19 VBC/D22, 3 September 1939.


It was quite possible that at this time a number of these files were misplaced or simply never returned to Endsleigh Street.

21 MO Report on Conscientious Objectors, 57, account of PPU group meeting in Bedford. One pacifist observer for MO had some cutting words to say of this group: namely, that they "Do right for the wrong reason by waiting with dog-like submissiveness for 'persecution' and seeking masochistic satisfaction in the sort of restrictions which all pacifists have expected on the outbreak of war." MO, Box 311B, File A, R. H. F. [Ronald Frank], 25/4/40, Report on alteration in general outlook caused by the war, 3.

22 MO Report on Conscientious Objectors, 57.
"Other pacifists also leaven their greater enthusiasm with greater caution." MO, Frank, *Report on alteration*, 3.


MO, Pacifism Interview, Results of Analysis, Question 6.

MO, Pacifism Interview, female respondent, aged 50, skilled.

See Peace News, 29 September 1939, 7; 6 October 1939, 9; 5 December 1941, 2.

Donald Port (ed.), *Working for the P.P.U.* (London: PPU, June 1945), 5. The arrangement is described diagrammatically below.

The list of National Council Members in April 1940 was as follows:

President: George Lansbury [ex-officio]
Chairman: Alex Wood [ex-officio]
Hon. Treasurer: Maurice Rowntree [ex-officio]


VBC/A20, Research Materials, Box 4, Chapter 7, Folder 6,
Material on the Peace Pledge Union.
See also Yorkshire Evening News, 26 February 1940. The paper ran an article on the PPU entitled "Facts About the Peace Pledge Union", which discussed the sponsors. In the Patriot, 29 February 1940, they were described as "cranks".

Port, Working for the P.P.U., 5 and 16-17.
The National Council met two times a year; the Executive Council fortnightly. The officership and organisation--administrative and financial--of the PPU is fully described in a series of articles which appeared in Peace News in 1942:

Donald Port, "The Area Representative", PN, 24 July 1942, 3.
Ronald H. Smith, "The Area Committee", PN, 31 July 1942, 3.
Alan Staniland, "The Contact Member", PN, 14 August 1942, 3.
Frank Dawtry, "Development and Democracy", PN, 21 August 1942, 3.
Stuart Morris, "Show me a Penny", PN, 28 August 1942, 3.

Until the end of August 1942, Peace News ran a regular weekly column appearing on page three entitled "Group Notes", authored by John Barclay, until the spring of 1942. The column was then phased out and replaced by a monthly "Development Secretary's Report" in January 1943, written by Albert Tomlinson.

The financing of the Union, its groups and its various activities was always, at best, a somewhat precarious affair. The reports of the PPU's AGMs always contained detailed financial statements. For examples of financing at the National and Group levels and at the Campaign level, see Appendix VII.

This was given diagramatic expression in Port, Working for the P.P.U., 7. See following page.
Port, Working for the P.P.U., 7, i.e., persons employed in bill posting!

This was especially true of those selling Peace News. See John Nichol to the Secretary, NCCL, 1 March 1941. Also NCCL to Chief Constable of Sussex, 2 August 1940; Chief Constable of Sussex to Secretary NCCL, 8 August 1940; K. F. Wray, Hastings PPU to NCCL, 29 July 1940—mentions reluctance of witnesses to come forward and testify on behalf of PPU members; Alan Staniland to Secretary NCCL, 10 July 1940 and NCCL to John Barclay, 3 July 1940; Jim MacNaughton Secretary, Arbroath PPU to R. Kidd, 22 February 1940 and Dorothy Burdon, Leeds PPU to NCCL Legal Dept., 2 February 1940. NCCL 16/4, PPU, 1940-1941.

For examples of group activity see John Barclay's "Group Notes" in Peace News, e.g.:

PN, 3 January 1941, 3--dealing with Belfast
PN, 10 January 1941, 3--Harrow
PN, 17 January 1941, 3--Abingdon and Bermondsey
PN, 24 January 1941, 3--Birmingham
PN, 14 February 1941, 3--Swindon
PN, 21 February 1941, 3--Cambridge
PN, 28 February 1941, 3--Cambridge
PN, 9 May 1941, 3--Sheffield

Report on Conscientious Objectors, 57.
36. MO Report on Conscientious Objectors, 52. The PPU, Letchworth Branch, Annual Report provides a good insight into the activities of an active local group. The report notes "908 attendances at 44 meetings since the last A.G.M. giving an average attendance of 20." MO, Box 311, File C, Pacifism in Great Britain. See Appendix VI.


39. MO, Conscientious Objection and Pacifism, Box 311, File A, Cultural Aspects - Various Pacifist Events, Observer Reports, AGM of the Peace Pledge Union, 25-4-42, 1. The observer is identified as P. J.

40. MO Report on Conscientious Objectors, 58 and 58A. See also PPU East Anglia Area Bulletin, December 1942, report of Address by Stuart Morris at East Anglian Area Conference. MO, Box 311, File C, Pacifism in Great Britain.


43. MO Report on Conscientious Objectors, 68. The speaker was asked by the police not to continue to hold such meetings to which he had agreed.

44. MO Report on Conscientious Objectors, 70. See also Peace News, 15 March 1940 and 28 April 1940.

45. VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to S. Morris, 13 November 1943. It should be noted that Brittain's views may have been influenced by the fact that she was in the throes of trying to obtain an exit permit to the US from the Home Office.

46. PPU/ECM, October to December 1939.
48 PPU/ECM, 3 December 1940.

49 Vera Brittain was present at this meeting. "H. S. A. Smith warns Pacifists of the Dangers of Being Few", Peace News, 6 August 1943, 3.

50 PPU/LAM, memo by Alex Miller, "The P.P.U. and the Change of Situation: the practical effect of total war", c. 23 May 1940.

51 PPU/LAM, Alex Miller, 4 June 1940. The minutes were signed by Maurice Rowntree, a PPUer and a prominent Quaker.


53 PPU/LAM, Minutes of AGM, 4 May 1941.

54 Cambridge PPU minutes, 15 April 1942.


56 PPU/ECM, 3 December 1940. Vera Brittain was present at this meeting and, with Roy Walker, criticised the leadership as spiritless cowards. VBC/D23, 3 December 1940. See also PPU/NCCL 16/4, 1940-1941, memo to Mr. Kidd, NCCL, 13 November 1940. The DPP alleged that the book contravened Defence Regulation 39A (1) D.


58 De Ligt, Plan of Campaign, 5.

59 De Ligt, Plan of Campaign, 8.

60 Richard Gregg, Training for Peace: A Programme for Peace Workers (London: George Routledge and Sons and PPU,
n.d. [1936]).
Gregg, *Pacifist Program in Time of War, Threatened War, or Fascism* (Wallingford, Penn: n.p., Pendle Hill Pamphlet Number Five, 1939).
See also Gregg, "A Programme for Pacifists in Time of War", *Peace News*, 13 January 1939, 9.
For a full discussion of Greggism, see Ceadel, *Pacifism in Britain*, 250-7.


62 David Spreckley to Yvonne Bennett. Spreckley's editorship was anonymous.


66 "Views of Peace Pledge Union". See also *News Chronicle*, 11 August 1939.
And in *Peace News*: Andrew Stewart, "Stuart Morris, The Link and the P.P.U.", 18 August 1939, 7 and 12.


In June 1940 the Hon. Secretary of the Reading University Pacifist Group wrote to the NCCL about the group's intention to perform a pacifist play, "Flowers of the Forest", and the legal position the group might thereby find themselves occupying. John Coffynm to R. Kidd, 6 June 1940, NCCL 16/4.


An Outline for Pacifist Study, 6 and 7. See VBC/D23, 20 May 1940.

An Outline for Pacifist Study, 7.

An Outline for Pacifist Study, 7-8.

The Catholic Herald, reporting on a three-day meeting held by pacifists at Friends House to discuss fascist economics, recorded there had been little harmony of political views and that the last session had "almost ended in a brawl"! "Pacifists Discuss Fascist Economics", Catholic Herald, 3 February 1939, 7.


The English weather was not always on the side of pacifists holding open-air meetings. See report on the Bermondsey Group Meeting, Peace News, 2 February 1940. Also correspondence, Peace News, 12 January 1940, 6.

PPU/NCCL 16/3, 1939-1940, Legal Departments, NCCL to L. H. Hislam, PPU, Peckham, n.d.

MO Report on Conscientious Objectors, Section III. The Second War produced some of its own CO jokes:

"Mr. Smith, you say you are a conscientious objector. What would you do if you saw a great hulking German soldier coming down your street to attack your mother?" Mr. Smith needed no time to consider his reply.

"I'd lay six to four on the old woman."


Their complaint of peace is not unlike that of the Cockney coiner who complained to a pacifist fellow-prisoner: "They say the country's short of money; and when you makes 'em a bit, they locks you up."


Daily Herald, 22 March 1940, quoted in MO Report on Conscientious Objectors, III. See also News Chronicle, 20 January 1940 and the Star, 21 February 1940.
This report appeared in the *News Chronicle* and is quoted in *MO Report on Conscientious Objectors*, 111-12.

Sunday Pictorial, 2 June 1940, quoted in *MO Report on Conscientious Objectors*, 114. See also *Daily Express*, 29 November 1939; *The Times*, 19 April 1940; *Evening Standard*, 17 April 1940; *Sunday Graphic*, 2 June 1940.

In the autumn of 1942 one MO observer did comment:

... of course since the war began, people are bound to become more intolerant of certain minorities, such as pacifists, who are the objects of [illegible] attack by the country's propaganda machine.


Vera Brittain was the subject of press attacks. See VBC/D15, 31 August 1933; VBC/D25, 11 March 1942; *LPL*, No/15, 4 January 1940; *LPL*, No/21, 29 February 1940; *LPL*, No/154, 8 February 1945.

*MO Report on Conscientious Objectors*, 132. See following section on by-election results and the showing of anti-war candidates. See also *Peace News*, 16 February 1940, 3.

*MO Report on Conscientious Objectors*, 132, NALGO (National and Local Government Officers' Association). For a "List of Councils that have Dismissed or Suspended C.O.'s", see Appendix II.

PPU/NCCL 16/4, memo to R. Kidd.

PPU/NCCL 16/4, Legal Department, NCCL to Peace Pledge Union, 1940.

PPU/NCCL 16/3, Legal Dept., NCCL to Paddington & North Kensington PPU, 21 March 1940. In fact the Legal Department was of the view that "the active members of the Peace Pledge Union could easily be prosecuted at the moment under one or other of the Defence Regulations." Legal Dept., NCCL to K.H. Bell, member NCCL, 14 March 1940. See also PPU/NCCL 16/3, Sec. of NCCL to Stuart Morris, 14 October 1939.

NCCL to Stuart Morris, 20 August 1940.

See Vera Brittain, LPL, No/15, 18 January 1940; LPL, No/65, 11 September 1941; LPL, No/17, 1 February 1940; VBC/D26, 28 April 1943.

Cyril Hughes, "Pacifism or Tyranny", Peace News, 28 February 1941, 1.


John Middleton Murry, "Liberty is in Danger", Peace News, 7 November 1942, 1.


Wellock commented:

These losses [democratic values and civil liberties] are integral and irreparable for they were the cement which gave to the old English village its solidity and strength.


A. Argent (25, soldier, single) 1264, November 1942. T. L. C. Bluett 2703 (RAMC). [Bluett's initials seem singularly appropriate to his vocation.] See "Pacifist dies from wounds", Peace News, 14 July 1944, 4. The short article records the death--from fatal wounds received in France--of one R. Glyn Roberts of Caernarvonshire, RAMC, who had served in Libya, Tunisia and Italy and had been twice wounded--at El Alamein and Tunis.

L. C. Edwards 3058 (FAU, Liverpool), 29 October 1942.
L. A. Haddock 2753.

H. Miller 2799.

MO Directive Replies (Women), October 1942.
C. Hartland.
See also G. Turner (Glasgow) 2910.


MO Bulletin, 7.

MO Bulletin, 7.

See also Roy Walker, "What is Happening in the P.P.U.?", Peace News, 14 March 1941, 2.


"Stop Press", Peace News, 13 October 1939, 8; "Police Stop Peace Propaganda", PN, 6 October 1939, 3; "Interference with Pacifist Propaganda", PN, 20 October 1939, 7; "Police Ban Women's Silent March", PN, 8 December 1939, 1 and 6.
See also Daily Telegraph, 24 February 1940, "Peace Leaflets in Letter Boxes - Complaints to Police", cutting in PPU/NCCL 16/3.

Peace News, 6 October 1939, 7. Also, "Railwaymen and Miners call for Peace", PN, 13 October 1939, 5; "Record Week for Peace News" [34,971 copies], PN, 13 October 1939, 8; PN, 27 October 1939, 5.


See Peace News, 1 December 1939, 3 and 15 December 1939, 2.

The MO archive contains a detailed and invaluable report on the King's Norton by-election of May 1941. In this by-election, Stuart Morris, General Secretary of the Peace Pledge Union, ran as an independent pacifist candidate, losing his deposit but capturing 6.25% of the poll. The report is also interesting for the light it sheds upon the Cadbury-Bourneville response to Morris's candidacy. James Maxton supported Morris. MO, "Report on King's Norton By-
Election" (Marked Confidential - Please Return to Tom Harrisson), 10/5/1941.
See also VBC/D24, 8 February 1941, 30 April 1941, 2 May 1941.

See also Peace News, 28 February 1941, 1.


117Roy Walker, Peace News, 23 August 1940, 3.
Vera Brittain admitted the temporary weakness of liberalism (LPL, No/151, 28 December 1944) but she had words of praise for British democracy (LPL, No/17, 1 February 1940) and like Roy Walker felt that there was much which was salvageable.

118F. A. Lea, "Anarchism and Democracy", Peace News, 3 January 1941, 3. Also see Part II, Peace News, 10 January 1941, 3.


Andrew Stewart, "The P.P.U. & Total War", Peace News, 20 June 1941, 3 and 4. Stewart did, however, concede that the PPU could demonstrate a limited, collective witness. Papers on PPU Policy, No/15.


H. Barratt, "Why the Peace Movement is Weak?", Peace News, Letters, 27 November 1942, 3. See also Maurice Cranston, "Pacifism and Politics", Peace News, 11 December 1942, 3. Cranston quotes Jawaharlal Nehru’s objections to the PPU: "Because the English pacifist movement has no concept of peace apart from the absence of war, he argued, it has become scarcely distinguishable from those who are anti-war because they are pro-Fascist."


Maurice Rowntree, "Has the Peace Pledge Union a Policy?", Peace News, 7 January 1944, 1. See also Alex Wood, "Maurice L. Rowntree. An Appreciation by Dr. Alex Wood", PN, 1 September 1944, 1.


VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to George Catlin, 21 November 1939. VBC/C/PPU, Stuart Morris to Brittain, 21 September 1939. Morris also informed Brittain that he intended, in consequence, to renounce his priestly orders. Also VBC/C/PPU, Morris to Brittain, 4 May 1940.


PPU/NCM, 24-25 July 1943. It was agreed that this decision should not be published in Peace News or the Group Letters.
Salter resigned as a Sponsor of the PPU. It is probable that Hudson did also but this is not clear.

PPU/ECM, 2-3 October 1943. See also PPU/ECM, 28 September 1943. Canon Raven also indicated his willingness to resign as a Sponsor in protest. Also VBC/D26, 15 September 1943, which records a row at the Executive meeting of 14 September between Figgis and J. M. Murry over the issue.

Canon Raven also indicated his willingness to resign as a Sponsor in protest. Also VBC/D26, 15 September 1943, which records a row at the Executive meeting of 14 September between Figgis and J. M. Murry over the issue.

IWM, Patrick Figgis interview. Figgis noted that the matter was finally settled by agreeing to a distinction being drawn between "living irresponsibly" and "living regularly"—there was nothing to be done about the latter.

See Friends Peace Committee Minutes, Vol. 160, September 1938-December 1942, Friends House, Euston Rd., London, England. Salter and Hudson were both Quakers, but it should be noted that the shared position of Treasurer which they vacated was filled by another Quaker, Maurice Rowntree.

VBC/D25, 3 November 1942. [Emphasis hers.]

VBC/D26, 15 May 1943. Roy Walker felt very bitterly about the attitudes of the "respectables". Interview, Ipswich, England, January 1980. The FRC was largely composed of Quakers with Bishop Bell as their figurehead.

Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 312.

The Times, 17 February 1943. See also VBC/D26, 17 February 1943 and the Daily Herald of the same date.

See VBC/D, 18 January 1943 and D26, 23 January 1943.

On 5 January 1943 Vera Brittain wrote in her diary:

It suddenly occurred to me that it was just too convenient for the government for a leading pacifist to have acquired, & used, secret information on which he could be arrested, & I suddenly saw the 'document'
presented him in Hyde Park ... as a deliberate official 'plant' to make him incriminate himself.
See also VBC/D26, 12 January 1943 and D26, 23 January 1943.

141 VBC/D26, 19 January 1943.
Morris's entrapment had been effected, in part, by a question posed in the House of Commons by Reginald Sorensen, a pacifist member. Leo Amery had sent for Sorensen and demanded to know the source of his information. See VBC/D26, 28 January 1943.

142 VBC/D26, 28 January 1943.

143 See VBC/D26, 5 February 1943; 16 February 1943; 17 February 1943 and 20 February 1943.

144 VBC/D26, 1 February 1943.

145 VBC/D26, 20 February 1943. The vote was 16-11.

146 VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to James Hudson, 5 March 1943.
See also the following: Peace News, 5 March 1943, 3; Evening Standard, 6 March 1943; VBC/D26, 13 March 1943 and 20 October 1943; VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Alex Wood, 29 January 1943; Brittain to Kathleen Ruthford, 2 February 1943; Brittain to James Hudson, 11 February 1943; Brittain to Lord Ponsonby, 5 March 1943; Brittain to Hudson, 10 March 1943 and Brittain to Maurice Rowntree, 11 March 1943.

147 VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Alan Staniland (marked 'not sent'), 10 March 1943.


149 VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Maurice [Rowntree or Browne], 7 May 1943.
Although Brittain profoundly disagreed with Alex Wood's treatment of Stuart Morris she had opposed his subsequent resignation and was pleased to see him restored to the Chairmanship of the Union. See VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Alex Wood, 21 February 1943 and 26 February 1943.

IWM, Patrick Figgis interview.


The government registered these under the War Charities Act. The PSB was refused a similar request by the LCC on the ground that it was not established or was it likely to be conducted in good faith. See PPU, Vol. III, Finance Committee, 3 March 1942.

Paul Glidden, "Pacifist Service Units", Christian Pacifist (December 1940), 281-2.

Glidden, "Pacifist Service Units", 282.


VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Paul Cadbury, 26 May 1940. See also Humiliation with Honour, 79-80 and England's Hour, 151-3.

Anon., The Third Year, 1.

Anon., The Third Year, 1.

See PPU/ECM, 16 February 1943 re. arrangements for twenty-two volunteers to be inoculated for yellow fever tests. Also Pacifist Service Bureau Committee, 14 March 1944 re. twelve volunteers for malaria experiments. Also Kenneth Mellanby, "How Pacifists Share in the Search for Health", Peace News, 14 June 1944, 4; Anon., The Third Year, 1-4.

Anon., The Third Year, 6. There were also a number of part-time units, functioning in other English cities.

George Orwell, The Road to Wigan Pier. This was especially true of the Boer War--revelations of working-class conditions spawning the National Efficiency Movement, albeit with the intent of producing fitter recruits for the Services.

164 Interview with Roy Walker, 8 January 1980.


166 E. G. Smith, "Pacifists can be Patriots - with a Wider Vision", Peace News, 6 October 1939, 8. See also "Pacifists not anti-British", PN, 19 January 1940, 2.


169 Peace News, 12 January 1940, 6.

170 Max Plowman, "Creative Pacifism", Peace News, 23 February 1940, 4. See also Plowman, "Reform it Altogether", PN, 1 March 1940, 5.

171 Frank Dawtry, "How Pacifists Can Help to Create a New World Order", Peace News, 1 March 1940, 3.

172 R. W. Harris, "Does Relief Compromise Pacifism?", Peace News, 21 February 1941, 3.


Reginald Sorensen, A Backbencher's Pilgrimage, 190.

Sorensen's beliefs and moderate, broad pacifist understanding drew public fire from his fellow pacifists on at least one occasion. See: Reginald Reynolds, "Pacifists in Parliament", Peace News, 6 March 1942, 3 and the ensuing debate, PN, 13 March 1942, 3 and 27 March 1942, 3. Also VBC/D25, 6 March 1942 and John Silk, "The Value of Pacifism", PN, 29 January 1943, 3.


Rawlins, "Another Absolutist", 3.

CHAPTER SIX

TWO WARTIME CAMPAIGNS

Negotiated Peace--An
Abortive Offensive

The dark forces rise like a flood.
Men's hearts are heavy; they cry for peace.

Michael Tippett

The Union's first campaign of the war, which initially had the support of all pacifists, was a Stop-the-War campaign which in the period of the bore-war did not appear to be wholly impractical. N. Fieldhouse, writing in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada in 1971, showed that there were powerful figures in the upper echelons of government and outside who, like the pacifists, sought a negotiated peace. The names of those actively interested or understood to be open to such avenues of inquiry included eminent and respected individuals--the common interwar blend of pacifist and pacifist interest, inspired by "the Gladstonian tradition of highmindedness in foreign policy." Fieldhouse refers to the moves for negotiated peace as being "the last manifestation of a great British tradition"--a somewhat hasty assessment since the pacifists, who do not rate even an honourable mention in his article, were very
much the heirs and progeny of this tradition and carried it on, long after the efforts of those prominent in public life, had faltered and failed.

That the efforts of the group associated with the Buxton brothers—Charles Roden Buxton, a prominent Quaker, and Edward Noel Buxton, later Lord Noel-Buxton—should have been tolerated and, to some extent, indulged was because these men and women were respectable liberal pacifists. Their appeals for negotiation were based, in part, on typically nineteenth-century traditional liberal economic arguments, best expressed by the then editor of the Economist, Francis Hirst: war was wasteful and destructive, disruptive of trade and commerce and promising only a wholesale European collapse. Another oft-repeated chevaux de frise was the injustice done Germany at Versailles, which had struck such a responsive guilty chord in interwar liberal opinion. From Basil Liddell Hart, a front runner of the group, came the most cogently prophetic argument for a negotiated peace. Hart, a military historian and strategist, argued for a limited war ended by a negotiated peace on the grounds that a war fought "to the finish" would not yield a lasting peace. But these essentially liberal positions were seriously undermined by the clearly illiberal features of Nazism which could themselves be "defeated, only by a decision to be firm, which itself sprang from a moral sense, the belief that Hitlerism was evil." The pacifists found themselves in a maze which had only one exit, the point by
which they had entered.

In early 1940 Lord Beaverbrook was coming to the attention of the Foreign Office because of his involvement in a campaign "to promote and finance ... a speedy peace on a compromise basis." It had been reported that to this end Beaverbrook had met with three members of the Independent Labour Party in March 1940. This rumour was confirmed by a reliable source. Mr. Kingsley Martin, Editor of 'The New Statesman' & not apt to be uncharitable to the Left, told me that he is seriously disturbed at the extent to which left and right wing pacifists are making common cause, & according to him making definite steady progress.

Such an alliance between "The Money-in-our-Time Brigade" and the political left would seem an unlikely one but important enough for the Foreign Office minute to conclude that:

The Prime Minister and Lord Halifax should send for him [Lord Beaverbrook] together, and ask him to drop it, both as a matter of patriotism and common-sense.

For the peace he has in mind would only result without fail in our all having our throats cut in a couple of years.

The Peace Pledge Union in fact lost its own momentum for peace in the early months of the war, never to regain it adequately. Fear of government action was undoubtedly a large factor: the PPU could hardly expect a cordial explanatory interview with the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary.

Government-induced docility, encouraged by fearful uncertainty of extraordinary governmental powers, touched not only the PPU but also the respectable National Peace Council,
a venerable organisation which was essentially a low pacifist
vehicle steered by the Buxton coterie, and the National
Council for Civil Liberties. At the first PPU National
Council Meeting of the war, at which Vera Brittain was
present, the cautious tone of the leadership was reflected
in John Middleton Murry's request that the Union press the
government to "publish terms of peace by consent." Vera
Brittain's diary entry for that day also notes that the
meeting expressed "general approval for co-operation with
the Ministry of Information on peace-making only." Two
weeks later, under the heading of "Future Policy" the National
Council decided to establish a sub-committee, endowed with
executive powers, to formulate a campaign with the specific
purpose of harnessing increased public opinion against the
war. Yet at the same meeting, "it was agreed not to
address any representations to the Government on the bombing
of open towns and the blockade." Similarly, in January
1940 when Roy Walker raised the subject of an unofficial
plebiscite calling for a start to peace negotiations, the
majority of the National Council opposed his proposal. At
an earlier Executive Committee meeting the possibility of a
peace ballot and petition had been raised by "many groups"
but discussion on the subject had been deferred. At the
same meeting Sybil Morrison reported that many of the
London area group leaders wanted
to take some active step toward stopping the war and
[reported upon] their general dissatisfaction with what
they considered to be the inertia of the P.P.U.
Certainly, the dearth of action apparent from a reading of the Union's minute books is at variance with the active calls to stop the war and negotiate a peace, which peppered the news and correspondence columns of Peace News between September 1939 and the following spring. Articles in this period were confident that all parties concerned could be made to see reason and that negotiation was a feasible policy, even though the onus appeared to rest primarily with Britain. The optimism was perhaps best expressed by John Barclay: "Civilization cannot go down the drain so long as there are enough pacifists sitting in the plug-hole." But in the spring a mood of apprehension swept over the Peace Pledge Union, with regular reports of police action or interference at meetings, or the arrest of Peace News sellers. In May the Union absorbed a double blow—the Poster Trial and the death of George Lansbury—whilst in June the French lost France and the British came close to losing the BEF. The tone of Peace News changed almost as dramatically, with such articles appearing on its front page as: "What of Pacifism Now?", "What Can We Save From the Wreckage?", "The Crisis of Pacifism", "The Acid Test". Significantly, the public discussion of a negotiated peace was stilled both in Peace News and at PPU Executive and National Council meetings, until the spring of 1941 when the debate was taken up with a mixture of caution and vigour. At a National Council meeting in March 1941 discussion included the report on a Forethought Committee consideration
of "Policy and Future Action". This had been initiated for the specific purpose of encouraging "the P.P.U. to take a more definite lead in the campaign to stop the war." The minute reports that a long debate preceded the approval of the final minute which was a cautious and qualified statement reflective of the PPU think-tank's attitude.

Though some members of the Council felt strongly that a more definite lead should be given by the National Council and some more specific action taken by the P.P.U. to stimulate a demand for peace by negotiation, many others felt that it was unwise at this time to commit the movement to a particular campaign for a definite period. ... The day-by-day job of the P.P.U. was something more than that of stopping the war .... Indeed, the most effective propaganda for a peace by negotiation was that of interpreting to the public the significance of the war, its causes, its inevitable effects and the spiritual and economic revolution which the circumstances demand.

Yet the stark conclusion was that the education of the general public was a nebulous and not a particularly new nor inspiring call for the Union's activists, whose disenchantment thereby deepened.

The minutes of the London area PP'U are more revealing on this subject. At a policy discussion meeting in August 1941, those present were "divided almost evenly on the advisability of advocating negotiated peace now ...." Maurice Rowntree introduced the issue of Britain's responsibility toward the Continent and the price that would inevitably "be paid by the conquered countries" in any unqualified peace negotiations. Bill Grindlay, a member of the Forward Movement, disagreed profoundly with Rowntree's position, upholding the view that "the price of peace must
morally be less than the price of war" and that a European federation was, anyway, in the logic of history. Neither was the debate confined to the Peace Pledge Union. The Christian Pacifist, the key journal of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, also engaged in the ongoing discussion concerning negotiation. In April and July 1941 the Rev. G. Lloyd Phelps contributed two articles in which he argued against an immediate negotiated peace on the grounds that the demand was "a gross simplification of the difficulties" implicit in negotiation.

Let us face frankly that there can be no lasting peace while the Nazis are in power in Germany; nor can there be a just peace expected from our Tory and Labour imperialists. Phelps's way to cut the Gordian knot was a Socialist peace, and the task of pacifists was to prepare the way for such a peace. His words stirred a storm and a further article appeared in the Christian Pacifist in July 1941 in which Phelps sought to develop and clarify his position. Charles Raven was among those who chose to respond to Phelps. He confirmed the "distressing division of pacifists that involves a conflict of opinion which is weakening to our witness and may easily be damaging to our unity." The tension produced by this conflict and the impotence of the pacifist position emerges in Raven's own writing. The social revolution advocated by Phelps--and by the Rev. Alex Miller in the PPU--was, to Raven's mind, "at least as Utopian as the advocacy of peace by negotiation .... Which is more
liable to the charge of wishful thinking, the belief that the country may be induced to 'negotiate now' or the belief that it may be induced to accomplish a social revolution[?]"32

For the Peace Pledge Union the state of the debate was summarised in a pamphlet issued in late 1941 by Alex Wood, its chairman. For the one side within the PPU the debate was very clear-cut--"a policy of apparent surrender" was the only consistent response.33 Wood admitted that such a policy, in late 1941, had little hope of success and proceeded to outline two alternative policies. The first was that pacifists should aim at the re-education of their countrymen's national attitude and thus effectively renounce the possibility of any "immediate political" change. The second approach, apparently favoured by Wood, was to establish common ground between pacifists and non-pacifists and to work toward producing a conjointly acceptable peace initiative. For Wood, as for Vera Brittain, the avoidance of a fight to the finish was of paramount importance.34 But Wood was cognisant of the many objections that the non-pacifist might raise against the publication of terms for negotiation. The most telling of these was that "it would leave the evil of Nazism unchecked, if not triumphant."35 To this Wood responded by stating:

The end of the fighting is the first condition of a successful attack on the evil which we both agree in hating and which we both desire to overcome. Peace by negotiation is therefore always our policy although not always our tactic. We can never retreat from it although at any given moment it might be unwise to campaign on it.36
Similarly, Wood recognised that "the only terms possible might involve demands morally repugnant", but he sought to assure non-pacifists that pacifists did not have an innate proclivity to accept peace on any terms—a debatable point with many. A strongly vocal minority of the PPU were arguing that very case.

After much debate, by mid-1942 the Armistice Committee of the PPU had decided upon two possible types of campaign for the PPU. First, a clear-cut demand for an Armistice and second, an educational campaign. In support of the former one of the most salient arguments, it was reasoned, was that it "arises directly out of the Pledge and would not tend to divide the movement." But the shortcomings of an "Armistice Now" campaign were recognisably serious and the Committee's assessment of them was pragmatic. An "Armistice Now" campaign would open the Peace Pledge Union to

exploitation by a reactionary group or to premature suppression by the authorities [and] association even by implication with a reactionary group would split the movement even more seriously than the adoption of a definitely Socialist programme.

The committee also foresaw the none too delicate possibility of the PPU finding itself bereft of a policy if the Allies agreed to, and called for, an armistice and the enemy failed to respond! Finally, the Armistice Committee concluded that an "Armistice Now" campaign would "require more agreement than possible in the Union at the moment."

Yet the subject could not be abandoned. In October
1942 Stuart Morris's name appeared as the author of a revised draft of an "Armistice Manifesto" to be considered by the Union's executive.\textsuperscript{41} The minutes of the Armistice Committee in late October 1942 still showed that the Committee believed the general view of the Union was opposed and that there "did not seem to be sufficient conviction in the P.P.U. to warrant a nationwide campaign."\textsuperscript{42} But the minutes of the National Council Meeting of November 7/8 1942 revealed that fifty-nine groups were in favour of a campaign, twenty-three were opposed and three were divided.\textsuperscript{43} When, at the National Council Meeting, Maurice Rowntree pressed for the adoption of an educational campaign, only three members of the National Council voted in his favour.\textsuperscript{44} It seems clear that the issue of the proposed Armistice call brought leading pacifists to loggerheads. The Executive of the Union, which had control over the London-based committees, reflected one view, but the National Council, being a more broadly based body, was a more accurate barometer of grass-roots feeling and opinion. More immediately, the division between the two factions had the regrettable effect of paralysing the decision-making process. When the Armistice Campaign was launched at half-cock in January 1943, its purpose was defined as the "education of public opinion to the acceptance of an Armistice."\textsuperscript{45} As Bismarck balanced alliances between Austria-Hungary and Russia, so, with equal dexterity, the PPU sought to keep the peace.

In March 1943 the report of the Armistice Committee
reaffirmed its January objective and continued to compromise in the matter of making direct demands for an immediate armistice. The wisdom of this policy was borne out by the findings of a poll published in *Peace News* in May 1943, which showed 759 against the campaign and 1,410 in favour. Moreover, a resolution calling for an immediate armistice produced a substantive opposition of one-third. Articles appeared in *Peace News* calling for support for the campaign; one author roundly declared that since 1940 the hearts of the PPUers had failed them

and collective witness has been reduced to the uncoordinated activities of keen local groups and the occasional efforts of parliamentary bye-elections.

But by July 1943 Alex Wood was writing to *Peace News* to report that letters were being received complaining of the imposition by the majority of their view upon the minority.

In September 1943 the Armistice Campaign changed its name to the Negotiated Peace Campaign, perhaps reflective of the growing confidence in an Allied victory. In December 1943 *Peace News* carried a leader highly critical of the effects of the Allied policy of unconditional surrender agreed at Casablanca in January 1943, but a week later an article appeared confirming the continuing lack of PPU support for the Campaign under whatever name or guise, and a degree of nervousness on the part of potential supporters. In an attempt to rally the faithful the PPU published, in early 1944, a pamphlet by Henry Hilditch entitled: *A Case For Peace by Negotiation*. The central argument made in the
pamphlet was that a negotiated peace was more likely to yield a satisfactory peace than one born of total victory, like that of 1919. To support this position, Hilditch recalled the words of Basil Liddell Hart:

If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought of the after effects ... it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war, this is a lesson supported by abundance of experience.  

Hilditch was, predictably, highly critical of the policy of unconditional surrender which he believed blinkered the government to the pursuit of victory whilst blinding them in regard to the pursuit of peace.  

Britain had gone to war for the defence of the "territorial integrity of Poland. That war aim is now impossible of fulfillment .... Unconditional surrender and a dictated peace will mean for Poland not freedom but domination by a great power."  

From late 1943 onward Peace News carried a number of articles and letters dealing with the shape and form of peace, but the efforts of the advocates of a Negotiated Peace increasingly appeared as so much whistling in the dark. The campaigners held meetings across the country but the response enjoyed was marginal. In June 1944 the Campaign suffered a more serious setback when Corder Catchpool reported that he had been in touch with Noel Buxton who had informed him "that far from being opportune to sponsor any movement toward negotiation, the position had considerably deteriorated."  

And almost as if the weariness of the war
and the longing to end it by whatever means had become too
great a burden, an article appeared in Peace News in June
1944. "May it be Brief" hoped for a swift and victorious
conclusion to the invasion of Europe. Humphrey Moore, the
former editor of Peace News, reacted strongly, criticising
the editorship of Peace News and the

complete absence of any hint of a better alternative
and its suggestion not that we should be just now,
instead of fighting, but that we should accompany
fighting with a bigger and better offer of justice
sometime apparently after victory.

Implicit in Moore's criticism was the contention that Peace
News was not acting as the faithful voice of pacifism and the
PPU. In this he was partly right. Peace News's editor, John
Middleton Murry,

was quite capable of denouncing the 'official' policy
of the Union in the leading article of its 'official'
paper, promulgating his own instead.

The fact of the matter was that Murry was becoming steadily
disillusioned with what he perceived as the compromised
viability and honesty of the pacifist position.

... it seems to me that the scientific terrorism of
the totalitarian police-state ... has changed the whole
frame of reference within which modern pacifism was
conceived.

The Negotiated Peace Campaign, however, still
persisted, holding meetings which drew from 120 to 600
people at a time. Indeed, a meeting planned for Trafalgar
Square merited the distinction of being banned by Herbert
Morrison as likely to cause a severe public disturbance.
The final reference to the Campaign in the PPU minutes came
in early October 1944. Gerald Bailey, the Secretary of NPC, informed the Executive committee that the NPC would be happy if their campaign for liberal peace terms was promoted in P.P.U. circles by a member of P.P.U. Head Office Staff provided that the P.P.U. did not figure too prominently in connection with the campaign throughout the country.63

The PPU, having waged a struggle both within and without itself as witness to peace, and after consistently having called upon the Allies to avoid exacting a victor's peace, now suffered a moral coup de grâce from the National Peace Council. That the actively committed members of the PPU should have felt the onset of weariness at the war's end was not surprising.

One of those most active early and persistently as an advocate of a negotiated peace was Vera Brittain. In January 1942 she had ventured the view that "the victory of neither side would be best."64 Six months later she was of the opinion that "the worst peace would not have caused one hundredth of the suffering which this war has caused."65 Winston Churchill was for Vera Brittain the cause of the war's protraction: "Getting Churchill out ... is the one thing we need to bring this senseless war to a sane end."66 When, in August 1942, some hope of the latter was partially raised, Brittain noted in her diary that Lloyd George was of the opinion that Stalingrad would fall and that the Russians would be negotiating a peace by November.67 In her Letter to Peace Lovers Brittain discussed on several occasions the
subject of a negotiated peace. In February 1942 she had argued that the Allies should offer an immediate Armistice coupled with a promise of substantial food and resource sharing. She understood that this would not turn the hearts of the "German and Japanese militarists, whose power flourishes on Allied ruthlessness, but it would remove from the Germans and Japanese their main reason for supporting their present leaders." For the same reason Vera Brittain was consistently an outspoken critic of unconditional surrender, believing that the policy served only to harden the resolve of the Axis populations. Brittain recognised the mounting pressures within the pacifist movement to abandon the call for an Armistice but she firmly believed these should be resisted.

We are still very far from that New Jerusalem but if the early Christians had abandoned its [sic] as "impracticable" in the same way as modern pacifists are urged to repudiate their conception of a true international society as "utopia", the teaching of the Gospels would not have survived through the ages to be a constant summons to courage and a perpetual challenge to despair.

But on a pragmatic level and with the advantage of hindsight, Noel Fieldhouse does concede the victory in the debate over Negotiated Peace to its advocates.

The advocates of a negotiated peace failed of their purpose ... [but they] were right. Victory at all costs proved a great deal too costly, and war to the bitter end did not produce a durable peace. Peace with Germany could have been had for the asking on the one condition that the United Kingdom abandon its policy of checking Germany in Eastern Europe. It went to war to destroy Hitlerism and to check Germany in Eastern Europe as part of the policy of the Balance of Power. It succeeded in destroying Hitlerism at the cost of being
excluded from Eastern Europe by Russia instead of Germany, and of destroying the Balance of Power in the Old World. 71

Yet what Fieldhouse seems, almost glibly, to leave out of his reckoning and assessment is the fate of the Jewish people and the Slavic populations of Eastern Europe. In September 1944 John Middleton Murry gave voice to a dilemma that was, in all probability, crystallising in the mind of many pacifists:

If the Nazis have really been guilty of the unspeakable crimes circumstancially imputed to them, then - let us make no mistake - pacifism is faced with a situation with which it cannot cope. The conventional pacifist conception of a reasonable or a generous peace is irrelevant to this reality. 72

It was possibly this realisation that caused the collapse of the PPU's Negotiated Peace Campaign in the autumn of 1944.

The fate of the Jewish people and others who perished in the Nazi death camps and concentration camps was a question not faced directly by pacifists before the end of the war. Nor, for that matter, was the issue a priority of the British Government during the war. 73 But the pacifists, like the British Government, were broadly aware of the horror. In August 1944 Vera Brittain received a letter from a critic pointing out that she had never referred to the death of four million Jews and that her love of Christ must be

... so exclusive that you can only have something like the reverse for the rest of his race. Or is it even possible that you may privately consider a massacre of four million innocents an unwarrantable competition with your own stock-in-trade .... 74
Surprising though it may seem, the principal reason for the lack of a pacifist response was utter incredulity; that man could commit such heinous crimes was beyond the comprehension of most pacifists. This refusal to accept the possibility of genocide is well expressed in a letter written by Corder Catchpool to Vera Brittain in April 1945.

... the papers are so full of concentration camp horrors one wonders whether the conditions in the camps has recently deteriorated, and in some way is related to Allied bombing atrocities. Possibly the build-up of opinion against the German people has a purpose in neutralising a wave of pity which might arise when fuller reports of bombing, and later of starvation, begin to filter through.

A few days later Catchpool was to write to Brittain again. His letter is worthy of a fuller quotation, since it clearly shows his unwillingness to accept a truth which he was nevertheless increasingly realising he could not escape.

In Belsen, Red Cross parcels were being received up till December last, from Switzerland....

One wonders whether there is some purpose behind all the publicity. As I said, I do not mean to suggest any information has been faked; but whether the revelations of conditions in the Camps has not come as a godsend to our authorities just at this juncture, and that the most is being made of it ... a hardening of opinion against the German people may be regarded here as a welcome sort of safeguard against a wave of 'sentimentality' ... and finally, a good deal that has appeared in the Press suggests an attempt to force a more drastic and speedy procedure in dealing with war criminals....

I have put down a few thoughts on this subject because I think it needs watching, and possibly some attempt at moderating publicity, though that is a matter of fearful difficulty in view of the undoubted validity of the reports, and the need to avoid anything which would appear like condoning, or perhaps suggesting extenuating circumstances.

Catchpool's words illustrate very clearly the degree of
The Food Relief Campaign—A Second Front

Within the walls of Europe's citadel
A million mothers watch their children die.

Vera Brittain, 1943

The second major wartime campaign of the PPU was the Food Relief Campaign to which Vera Brittain was also deeply committed, serving as its chairman from March 1943. Unlike the Negotiated Peace Campaign, the Food Relief Campaign (FRC) was relatively successful although the PPU were denied recognition for their work, largely because of the "sheer piracy" tactics of the 'respectable' Famine Relief Committee.78 But like the Negotiated Peace Campaign, the FRC was also blighted by internal opposition and obstruction, and its fortunes illustrate well the leperous isolation of the PPU.

The outbreak of war in 1939 had brought with it the blockade of continental Europe.

... the paramount and over-riding consideration of the Ministry of Economic Warfare, as in every other Government Department, is to win the war. Nothing must be allowed to get in the way of that, and blockade is, of course, an essential weapon of modern war.79

The blockade was total. According to the terms of the Declaration of London, 1909, foodstuffs were understood to be conditional-contraband, liable to confiscation if proven bound for other than civilian stomachs.80
But that is a distinction that becomes absolutely unreal when the enemy is a totalitarian state, a state in which the activities of every citizen are harnessed in one way or another to the war machine ... all the conditions of modern total war make it quite impossible to observe the distinction which was followed 100 years ago .... In this war there could never be any question of allowing foodstuffs or any other necessaries of life to reach the population of the enemy countries.81

The raison d'etre of the FRC was to win Government and general public over to the case for controlled food relief for occupied Europe.

The policy of blockading was questioned from the outset by people as varied as the Bishop of Birmingham and H. G. Wells.82 An article in The Christian Pacifist in November 1940 also made the point that the Germans would not in fact suffer, only Britain's fallen European allies, and that the blockade would prove "a useful psychological weapon in the hands of Germany ...."83 Activating the FRC was not, however, swiftly accomplished and it was not until 1941 that concerted attempts were being made to alter government thinking and policy. Although the PPU did publish a pamphlet in October 1940 entitled Wor Starves, the first reference to the European food situation in the PPU minutes is to a National Council Meeting at which Vera Brittain was present in September 1941.84 The meeting was informed that Stuart Morris and Roy Walker had visited the Belgian Legation in London and had returned with the impression that the Belgian Government were unwilling to press for relief measures in view of the implacable British attitude toward the blockade. Moreover, it could not be guaranteed that
food supplies would benefit their intended recipients rather than the Wehrmacht, and that the German Government were not prepared to accept American supervision of distribution.85 Undaunted, in the fall of 1941 the PPU decided upon a major campaign and at an Executive Committee meeting in December 1941, under a minute headed "Food Blockade" it was noted that the "campaign is being strongly taken up by P.P.U. groups."86 But at a National Council Meeting in mid-December the first signs of difficulty from supposedly friendly forces became apparent when it was reported that "one or two Friends [were] doubtful about the wisdom of a campaign conducted by the P.P.U."87

But within the PPU itself the FRC was to encounter formidable, if veiled, opposition. In January 1942 Roy Walker, in his capacity as Secretary of the FRC sub-committee of the PPU, delivered a report to the Executive on the progress of the Campaign.88 Lord Ponsonby and the Bishop of Chichester were to raise the matter of Food Relief in the Lords, whilst R. R. Stokes and Rhys Davies were to address the Parliamentary Labour Party, and an FRC meeting had been arranged for the Aeolian Hall. But Walker was deeply critical of the obstructive attitude of Peace News in denying essential publicity for the campaign. Middleton Murry retorted that, as editor of Peace News, he was "unable to accept the view that adoption by the National Council of any particular campaign carried with it de jure appropriation
of space in *Peace News* in defiance of editorial judgement."89

In a leading article in *Peace News* published five months later, Murry's true reasoning was made public:

It would seem to be an unwise use of the small forces of pacifism to concentrate them on a campaign which has no hope of success.90

He continued by firing a broadside at the FRC which smelt of cordite and red herring:

... a food relief campaign must not be expected to open a discreet and easy side-door by which non-pacifists may be inveigled into the pacifist fold.91

The following day Vera Brittain addressed a strong letter of protest to Alex Wood pointing out that Middleton Murry's leader undermined the efforts of all involved in the FRC. "In this case, I fear that John's antagonism to Roy Walker has run away with him."92 She did not feel inclined to take on Murry herself since she did not wish "to stir the latent antagonism between them [caused by] his D. H. Lawrence inspired attitude toward women." Brittain later confided in Andrew Dakers on the subject of Murry and her suspicion that *Humiliation with Honour* was being deliberately "played down" in *Peace News* by Murry.93

At the next Executive meeting in February there was no recorded exchange of differences between Middleton Murry on the one side, and Vera Brittain and Roy Walker on the other, although the FRC came under long discussion.94 The meeting at the Aeolian Hall, which had been addressed by Vera Brittain, had proven very successful.95 Thirty
thousand copies of Roy Walker's *Famine*, a whole edition, had been ordered and there were four thousand, five hundred additional copies requested. Perhaps inspired by this success it was decided to elevate the status of the FRC by initiating a National Committee composed of notables for its co-ordination, and to facilitate working in tandem with any group or organisation similarly engaged in working for controlled famine relief. The Executive also discussed the suitability of using a black flag as a symbol of the campaign, but "... Some members of Committee felt a difficulty about using the emblem lest it should be regarded as a stunt or too closely associated with Fascism." Accordingly, at the next Executive, it was recommended that demonstrations and marches should avoid using a black flag. The Executive also discussed the reprinting of *Famine*. A total of forty thousand copies had not proved adequate and further orders were being received. In response, an additional ten thousand copies had been printed. Predictably, the unusually heavy demand for paper had caused a question to be asked in the House of Commons of the Paper Controller about the source of supply. At the same time the PPU had arranged for a question to be posed in the House concerning a broadcast on the famine situation in Greece, scheduled for February 6, 1942, which had been summarily cancelled, apparently "owing to a lack of factual knowledge." The composition of the National Committee proposed by the PPU came under scrutiny--a total of thirty-six names
being suggested. These included the Bishop of Chichester who had "not yet given final answer", wanting "to know the names of others suggested." At the Executive meeting on 3 March 1942, Stuart Morris reported that the Bishop of Chichester was a doubtful starter since he was dubious about the possibility of forming a representative national committee. In truth, the Bishop may have been concerned about being openly and publicly linked with the Peace Pledge Union. Undaunted, at the end of March 1942, Stuart Morris and Roy Walker "went over to Rome", being "sympathetically received by the Apostolic Delegate who had assured them of the Pope's concern and desire to help." Earlier that month the Friends and the PPU, together with the National Peace Council, had arranged a meeting on food relief to be addressed by Dingle Foot, MP, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare. Roy Walker and Edith Pye spoke for the PPU and Friends respectively. The meeting was, however, a private one, and the transcript of the proceedings was marked "confidential". The presence of Dingle Foot gave testimony to the power of the Friends and possibly to a government opinion or strategy that dictated paying court to Quaker influence and ensuring that "respectable" dissent towed the line.

Undeterred, the Peace Pledge Union proceeded to arrange local meetings in and around the London area but on 14 April 1942, it reported that a prominent non-pacifist speaker had not been found for a large London meeting and
that such a meeting would not go forward until a representative platform was assembled. Vera Brittain was a frequent pacifist speaker during these early months. In April 1942 she gave the Chairman's address to the Richmond and District European Food Relief Association and in early May spoke at another Food Relief meeting "under the usual auspices of a 'neutral' Committee", with the Master of Selwyn in the chair. At the PPU Executive on 5 May 1942, it was becoming increasingly evident that the call to form a National Committee was falling on deaf ears, and it was consequently decided to form a small co-ordinating committee to act as an intelligence-gathering agency on continental food conditions. The reason for the foot-dragging on the part of the respectables approached, regarding a National Committee sponsored by the PPU, crystallised at the May 19 Executive. A Central Committee was to be formed whose purpose was to obtain authoritative information on the supply of food in German-occupied countries and to advocate relief schemes for food and vitamins to be directed to the most needy areas.

Since the main purposes of the Committee would be to maintain contact with Government parties no member of the Peace Pledge Union had been asked to serve but it had been suggested that Wood's name be proposed. The administrative work would be done in the office of the Friends Service Committee.

Thus the Famine Relief Committee came to be born and at the National Council Meeting of 14 June 1942, the PPU was informed that "the Committee were apparently not going to
invite Alex Wood to join them or allow an observer from the PPU."\textsuperscript{112} Furthermore, the Committee had sent out a circular to Food Relief groups, organised by the Peace Pledge Union, introducing itself and stating "it is not considered that public agitation is necessary or advisable."\textsuperscript{113} The \textit{coup de théâtre} was complete.\textsuperscript{114} Thus the Famine Relief Committee was formed but expressly "without any P.P.U. representation on the plea that it would antagonise the government. The Friends argued that pacifist involvement would antagonise the government!"\textsuperscript{115} Thus, by the middle of 1942 the issue of food relief was being advocated by two wings of the peace movement, the respectable and the unrespectable--"the P.P.U. being the unrespectable portion."\textsuperscript{116} Roy Walker was, understandably, displeased by what he understood to be the deft maneuvering of the Friends, largely because he felt that Quaker diplomacy was too apt to 'quake' on word from Whitehall. This did not, however, discourage him from supplying briefs for Bishop Bell and Lord Ponsonby for their speeches in the Lords.\textsuperscript{117}

The Food Relief Campaign, however, doggedly clung to its own witness and on 16 June 1942, the Executive discussed the possibility of staging a demonstration in Trafalgar Square in the following month.\textsuperscript{118} At another meeting at the end of June Middleton Murry expressed the opinion that the "worsening conditions [had] altered certain basic assumptions and [that the] campaign should not be conducted in an idealistic vacuum."\textsuperscript{119} The Food Relief
Campaign Committee replied to Murry with a strongly worded statement refuting his manifold criticisms and justifying their raison d'être. The statement noted that in 1942 the British Government had conceded ground to those pressing for food relief and had "declared a willingness to authorise a monthly shipment of wheat or flour from Canada to Greece under a Swedish scheme." The statement continued:

We have reason to know that our efforts have played some part in securing these measures of relief and that a continued Campaign would materially assist further efforts to secure the marginal relief for Belgium and Poland which is believed to be under consideration by the British Government. In what was a rare, categorical statement from the Union's National Executive, and one clearly framed to quash any doubt about the status of the Campaign, it declared and concluded:

The National Executive therefore approves the vigorous prosecution of the Campaign to this end as one of the major activities of the Union, and as a demonstration of our deep concern for the starving people of Europe in their ordeal.

Just under two weeks later the mass outdoor demonstration in Trafalgar Square went ahead as planned. Approximately two hundred and thirty members of the Union had taken part in three poster-parades, and a crowd allegedly of between three and five thousand had gathered in the Square to listen to addresses by Vera Brittain, Patrick Figgis, Stuart Morris, Reginald Sorensen, Sybil Morrison and Donald Soper, among others. It was to this very technique of public demonstration that in January 1943 the Food Relief Campaign recorded a satisfying conversion, the Famine
Relief Committee "after for some time favouring more
diplomatic methods, [it] had recently been forced to realise
the need for sustained public education on the matter [of
famine relief]." This realisation may have been spurred
by the outcome of a deputation to the Prime Minister:

The respectable Food Relief Committee (Chairman the
Bishop of Chichester and the two Archbishops among the
supporters) is shortly taking a deputation to Churchill
to urge a humane policy of Food [sic] relief - and if
this move fails, will come out against the
government themselves!

Perceiving a possible change of heart and attitude,
the Food Relief Campaign Committee hoped that the two bodies
could work together and overcome the barriers that had
previously precluded their collaboration. To this end Roy
Walker and Alex Wood met with the Bishop of Chichester, "who
had given them a sympathetic hearing on the question of the
P.P.U.'s relations with the Famine Relief Committee." Such optimism that might, accordingly, have been engendered
was quickly stamped out. Only a month later,

Alex Wood reported that from his discussions with members
of the Famine Relief Committee he thought that there was
no possibility of their co-opting Vera Brittain or
accepting any close contact with the campaign ... since
hostility to Pacifism on the Committee was very strong.

Undoubtedly, the Food Relief Campaign might have benefited
from contacts afforded it by the Famine Relief Committee but
it could still boast Parliamentary contacts of its own, such
as Alfred Salter and Reginald Sorensen and R. R. Stokes.

Indeed, writing in a very balanced tone to Howard Kershner,
the Director of Relief in Europe 1939-1942 for the American
Friends Service Committee, Brittain noted in January 1944 that the FRC had been able to make some headway through Parliament and that the mixed committees of Food and Famine Relief members now numbered approximately one hundred and fifty.

By keeping in the background in this way - we recognise that our pacifism is not always an asset in these matters - we nevertheless exercise a strong influence, more particularly as the Famine Relief Committee eschews organising and campaigning of all kinds.  

Mindful of the "complications" of being a pacifist, and the circumspection this implied, Brittain wrote to Howard Whitten that she did not wish the PPU to circulate her pamphlet, One of These Little Ones, published in early 1943, fearing that "it might be less effective with M.P. 's." This caution seems strange since Brittain's name was well known to MP's and her PPU connection was hardly a secret. Brittain's implicit concern about the possible reception of her pamphlet was not, however, entirely misplaced. In March 1943 Brittain ran afoul of the editor of the Evening News. A reporter interviewed her about the food relief situation and an article had been produced. This had passed muster until reaching the desk of the chief editor, H. W. Bourne.

This gentleman said that he could not possibly insert any paragraph mentioning my name because I was a member of the Peace Pledge Union and it was the policy of the paper to attack that body and everyone belonging to it. But Brittain could console herself as being in good company. In the late fall of 1942 the Archbishops of Canterbury and
Westminster had met with the Foreign Secretary to discuss a moderate scheme of relief for Greece and Belgium.

Their [the Archbishops'] memorandum asks for navicerts for the minimum which should be given for children up to 16 years of age, expectant and nursing mothers and invalids for the maintenance of life in Greece and Belgium during the coming winter. This represents the maximum of nourishment for the minimum of shipping space and makes for certainty of control in handling, since the bulk is small and can be surely and conveniently distributed by the welfare and feeding centres under the supervision of Swedish and Swiss Red Cross Societies.133

Their proposals were turned down. But the Archbishop of Canterbury, nevertheless, elected to address both Houses of Parliament in February 1943. One of the papers in the Archbishop's hands before the address was Brittain's pamphlet, One of These Little Ones.

Andrew Dakers rang up this morning to say that the Bp. of Chichester sent my pamphlet on to the Archbp. of Canterbury, who does'nt [sic] want it publicly associated with his address to the members of both Houses of Parlt on Feb. 17th because of its mild and vague criticism of the Gov! ... But this dreadful willingness of the official Church to let the Govt. get away with anti-Christian evil without ecclesiastical protest!134

Unfortunately, the Archbishop's effort was not an unmitigated success because members were listening to a debate on the Beveridge Report.135

But the efforts of those involved in famine relief—on both sides—escalated during 1943 and 1944 and won some powerful and influential converts. Harold Nicolson, writing in the Spectator in April 1943, clearly was not opposed to food relief, although he did show himself to be critical of the Peace Pledge Union.

... we need not steel our hearts merely because the
protagonists of the 'Feed Starving Europe' movement ... are identified to some extent with the Peace Pledge Union .... It may be irritating to discover that those who today are most anxious that we should feed Greece, or Czechoslovakia, or Poland, are the people who in 1938-1941 were most ardent in their opposition to our defending these countries against aggression.136

In this, Nicolson probably gave voice to what was an understandable and generally held opinion. But Nicolson did not "steel his heart"; in November 1943 he spoke in support of food relief in the Commons.137 Yet the common purpose of the Food Relief Campaign and the Famine Relief Committee did nothing to improve working relations between the two despite the effort, initiated by the PPU, to "mend fences" in May 1943. Indeed, following a Famine Relief Meeting on Saturday, 15 May 1943, jointly addressed by Vera Brittain and Professor Emile Cammaerts, a private meeting was held to discuss relations between the two bodies, and the different roles to be assumed on the one hand, by the pacifists, and on the other, by the conventionally respectable supporters of food relief. The meeting failed to produce a consensus.138

At a National Council Meeting toward the end of May it was recorded that the Famine Relief Committee was failing "to coordinate campaign work, and the suggestion had been made that there ought to be an essentially non-political campaign committee."139 In late June correspondence with the King's Lynn Famine Relief Committee "indicated that the Famine Relief Committee were not prepared to share platforms with pacifists."140 The odium of pacifism was clearly and undoubtedly the reason for the Famine Relief Committee's singularly unhelpful and unco-operative attitude.141 In a
very real sense the latter was using the former.

[Miss Pye] feels that the pacifist Food Relief Campaign acts as a kind of spear-head to make a way for the more discreet Famine Relief Committee to follow.\textsuperscript{142}

A year later relations between the two bodies were at their nadir. In July 1944 Edith Pye wrote to Roy Walker that the Peace Pledge Union "was not the proper organisation" to run the food relief campaign because its pacifism negated its appeal for a non-pacifist audience.\textsuperscript{143} Furthermore, public receptivity to the famine situation had favourably improved and the employment of pacifist and humanitarian arguments (rather than purely humanitarian ones) by well known pacifists only threatened what Pye adjudged to be the newly won success of the Famine Relief Committee.\textsuperscript{144} Accordingly, she felt it best if, henceforth, the two groups spoke from independent platforms using their own speakers.\textsuperscript{145} On 29 July 1944, Brittain replied to Pye, noting that the Famine Relief Committee had shown a distinct lack of magnanimity in not recognising the seminal and initiating role of the Food Relief Campaign and of pacifists—particularly Roy Walker—in the work for Europe's undernourished and starving. Moreover, Brittain contended that there was latitude enough for both campaigns since one worked through "judicious negotiation" and the other sought "to educate the public and urge it to use its democratic rights."\textsuperscript{146} Continuing their efforts, in October of 1943 representatives of the Food Relief Campaign met with Richard Stokes, in his capacity as representative of the Parliamentary Peace Aims Group.
... [A]s a result a series of questions had been put to the Government on October 25 and 26. The replies had provided useful information." Some Members of Parliament were also briefed for a debate on 10 November. Roy Walker also reported to an Executive meeting at the end of December 1943 that Harold Nicolson had been able to arrange for a broadcast on the Greek food situation and that "three questions had been asked in the House of Commons by Mr. Oldfield at the instigation of the Manchester Food Relief Committee."

In the spirit of the Campaign, the committee on Food Relief, meeting in early November 1943, also discussed the possibility of staging a fast to raise monies for the campaign. This idea had, in all probability, been discussed somewhat earlier by those concerned since in September Brittain reported confidentially to Roy Walker that she had tried a forty-eight hour fast without experiencing any side-effects. In her diary entry for Sunday, 3 October 1943, Brittain recorded that a Famine Relief fast proposal was passed by twenty votes to five. Interestingly, she also noted: "J.M.M. insultingly opposed ('middle class mentality' behind the proposal, according to him) ...." The fast, however, went ahead and involved nearly seven hundred people, raising, by 11 January 1944, one hundred pounds. The fast had been well received by the press and news of it was carried in six national newspapers and some thirty provincial papers. "The most notable feature was the absence of hostile
comment and in all cases the P.P.U. had been given as the source." 153 The next year, 1944, the campaign decided that if the British government issued extra rations to its citizens, the supporters of food relief would "send the extra to needy causes, advising the Gov. of their gesture." 154 In August 1944 Vera Brittain had published a letter in the Sunday Express expressing her willingness also to continue rationing if such a move would help European children. 155 A "spate" of "abusive" letters had followed this public proposal, including an anonymous postcard which read: "Are you simple or just plain 'nuts'?" 156

Throughout 1944 the Peace Pledge Union's Food Relief Campaign kept up its efforts for food relief, encouraging local committees, lobbying members of parliament, engineering questions in the House of Commons through sympathetic members, and holding public meetings on the famine issue throughout the country. At the end of the year it was "rewarded" with adverse publicity in the House of Lords. 157

Roy Walker reported that, in a debate in the House of Lords on December 14, Lord Selbourne had strongly criticised the Famine Relief Committee. The Bishop of Chichester had protested that those criticisms should have been directed to "another organisation". A letter had been sent to the Bishop, who in reply had admitted that the MEW maintained its statements about the Famine Relief Committee, but that his own references to 'another organisation' had been justified. A further letter had not yet brought a reply to the challenge to prove his statements. A letter to Lord Selbourne had offered a public apology if he could prove that the Campaign had been guilty of mis-leading propaganda. The reply to this confirmed that the remarks in the debate had referred to the Famine Relief Committee. 158

It was in the following spring, in March 1945--two years
after Brittain had become chairman of the campaign— that the Food Relief Campaign decided to finish its work. The war in Europe was clearly coming to an end and European relief therefore assured. Thus the second of the Peace Pledge Union's major campaigns of the war came to a close. The Food Relief Campaign had contributed considerably toward keeping the fate of Britain's occupied, civilian European allies in the governmental and public consciousness. The issue of food relief also raised perplexing and troubling questions about the nature of modern total war and the place of morality in wars of the twentieth century.

The Peace Pledge Union and the Bombing Restriction Committee— A Note

"And what shall I ride in?"
quoth Lucifer then—
"If I follow'd my taste indeed,
I should mount in a waggon of wounded men,
And smile to see them bleed."160

In addition to the campaigns for food relief and a negotiated peace, a number of prominent PPUers and, to a much lesser extent the Union itself, were involved in a significant protest against area (or saturation) bombing. This very controversial policy has also been called mass bombing, obliteration bombing, carpet bombing and more often by the military, strategic bombing. The protest was spearheaded by the Bombing Restriction Committee (BRC) of which Corder Catchpool was the founder and Vera Brittain, Thomas C. Foley and Stuart Morris founding members. All were
either members of the Peace Pledge Union or the Society of Friends. The BRC was formed in April 1942 and grew out of the Committee for the Abolition of Night Bombing (CANB) which had been founded in the summer of 1941. Others who were deeply involved in protesting area bombing and who had close connections with the CANB/BRC were George Bell, Bishop of Chichester, Richard Stokes MP, Reginald Sorensen MP, and Rhys Davies MP.

Although the BRC's leadership was predominantly a pacifist one, it was composed of pacifists drawn from the broad pacifist camp. Indeed, the intended purpose of the founders was to co-ordinate a protest against area bombing together with non-pacifists who shared their disapproval of the bombing policy of the Royal Air Force on either moral or strategic grounds. In keeping with this objective the BRC co-opted as its Chairman, in 1943, Professor H. S. Jevons who had become a member of the BRC in June 1942. Jevons (like his famous father W. S. Jevons) was an economist, but he was not a pacifist.

Co-operation between pacifists and non-pacifists had proved, in the experience of the PPU's Food Relief Campaign, an extremely difficult task. Moreover, the broad pacifists had also to contend with the outright opposition of many of the high pacifists within the Union. In the case of the FRC this opposition was not sufficient to immobilise the resources and organisation of the Union on behalf of Food Relief. But, if the PPU minute books may be taken as any
sort of indicator, the campaign against area bombing evoked a far greater degree of opposition on the part of high pacifists. In consequence, the participation of the Peace Pledge Union, as a body, in the activities of the BRC was far less than its activities in support of Food Relief. The PPU was, indeed, deeply divided between those who supported the BRC--individuals such as Vera Brittain--and those who felt--like Sybil Morrison and Middleton Murry--that attempts to humanise war, or to select one of war's atrocities for protest, was inconsistent with a true pacifist position. 163

Sybil Morrison, for example, regarded Vera Brittain's involvement with the BRC as an aberration of her pacifism. For the same reasons Morrison was later to eschew involvement in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) since it was a campaign against one particular weapon and hence "not pure pacifism". 164

Why the BRC should have received a dustier welcome within the PPU than the FRC is not easy to say. The principle of seeking to humanise war was certainly germane to both campaigns, although the protest against saturation bombing did leave the broad pacifists open to the charge of implicitly condoning pin-point bombing. The campaign also left the supporters of the CANB/BRC open to allegations of defeatism and co-operation with German interest. 165 These accusations greatly troubled Brittain, but she answered her own doubts, however, by reasoning that the alleviation of a degree of suffering on the part of the innocent victims of
war justified her involvement with non-pacifists whose criticism of area bombing was founded on arguments very different to her own, and the risk of being branded as a Nazi sympathiser. The BRC protest was thus being made at two levels. The non-pacifist supporters of the BRC expressed the view that area bombing would not break German morale and that the limited resources of the RAF could be better deployed either in pin-point raids on German communications and industrial nerve-centres or, particularly in 1942, in providing greater support for RAF Coastal Command in the critical Battle of the Atlantic. The pacifists, like Vera Brittain, Corder Catchpool and Stuart Morris, concerned themselves primarily with protesting against what they viewed as the immoral killing of civilians. The latter's protest was first and foremost an ethical one, but they were not slow to identify the inconsistencies in government statements regarding the bombardment of German cities. Similarly, like their non-pacifist colleagues, they also challenged the premise that area bombing would break German civilian morale, shorten the war and thus save lives. Yet, by involving themselves in such disputation the broad pacifists left themselves vulnerable, on the one hand, to criticism from the high-pacifist purists as betrayers of their trust, and on the other by non-pacifists, as "superior prigs".

Because of the dispute over the issue of bombing the PPU's activities on behalf of the bombing protest were relatively small. The Union did endorse a petition against
night bombing which its groups helped to circulate, and by March 1942 the Union offices had received back 1,291 petition forms bearing 14,513 signatures. A number of prominent people both in ecclesiastical and secular society were approached and asked to agree to become initiating signatories for the petition. The role of the Church in the conflict, caught as it was between the Beatitudes and the Thirty-Nine Articles, was a rather ambivalent one. A letter received by T. C. Foley from William Temple, Archbishop of York, reflected this ambivalence and uneasy state of mind.

We have confined ourselves to military objectives; our only method of bringing the Germans to do the same would be to say that, unless they do it we shall take to the deliberate bombing of their civilian population. I do not know that I should feel obliged to resist such a policy, but I certainly could not advocate it.

Much of the correspondence which Foley received from churchmen revealed the anomaly of their position. And the anomalies became contradictions following the publication of a truly extraordinary document, *The Church and the Atom*, the report of a Church of England Commission published in 1948 which condemned strategic bombing. In addition to assisting in the collection of signatures the PPU organisational network was used to help distribute literature published by the BRC. The Union also registered its collective and official disapproval of area bombing, though a high pacifist contingent was opposed. Significantly, both *Peace News* and the *Friend* gave the campaign short, dismissive shrift in their columns because
of the high-pacifist stance of both editors on the bombing issue. Indeed, the main contribution to the campaign came not from organised pacifism but from individual pacifists like Vera Brittain and Corder Catchpool. Both endeavoured continually to bring the issue of area bombing before the membership of the Peace Pledge Union and also, through Catchpool, before the Society of Friends. But both did most of their work for the BRC as individual pacifists, independently either of the PPU or the Quakers.

One of the greatest ironies was that whilst the issue of mass bombing was not being debated in the columns of two of the premier pacifist publications it was being very openly debated in Parliament. Both the CANB and the BRC enjoyed direct access to the Lords and to the Commons. The Foley MSS contain several letters between Foley and Stokes in which information and advice on bombing policy was exchanged. On at least one occasion Stokes asked a question of the Government in the House which had been suggested to him by Foley. Writing to Stokes in September 1943, Foley commented:

I think the results of our night bombing compare very unfavourably with the results obtained by the American Fortresses. Would it be possible to ask a question somewhat on the following lines:

To ask the Secretary of State for Air for the nine months ending Sept. 30, 1943, how many British bombers have been lost in night operations over Europe and how many enemy machines they had shot down during those operations; further during the same period how many American Fortresses have been lost in daylight operations over Europe and how many enemy machines had been shot down during these operations?

The question needs a little more consideration to try
Similarly, the Bishop of Chichester, who led the assault on bombing policy in the House of Lords, relied upon the resources of the BRC. Of particular interest are two letters by Chichester to Foley in February 1944. The first requested any available statistics and additional information which Chichester might use for what was to be his remarkable speech in the House of Lords indicting the architects of obliteration bombing. The second letter was penned on the day of the debate.

I am most grateful for all the trouble you have taken in helping me with facts and figures, and cuttings, which I return herewith. ...

I am writing this just before going off for the debate.

Vera Brittain's individual contribution to the campaign against area bombing was considerable. Her most important and notable written contribution was a small book entitled Seed of Chaos which was published in England in April 1944. The publication received little attention in England and was chiefly to be noted for the savage criticism it provoked from George Orwell. But extracts from an earlier version of the book were also published in the United States. Twenty-eight leading American Protestant clergymen had appended their signatures to a postscript supporting Brittain's critique of mass bombing, and this produced a "'furore' [which] ... had even inspired three and a half columns of adverse criticism in the New York Times."
Recent scholarship has tended, however, to vindicate much of the criticism of the BRC. Solly Zuckerman has written on the subject of aerial bombardment and the collapse of morale.

As we now know, bombing at about a hundred times the intensity of anything ever suffered by European cities during the Second World War at no moment broke the spirit of the people of Vietnam against whom the American forces were fighting between 1964 and 1973. In those nine years, seven million tons of bombs were dropped on South Vietnam ... North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia--three times the total tonnage of British, American and German bombs dropped on European soil in the Second World War. And the seven million tons brought no victory--only death and destruction.183

The Bombing Restriction Committee's protest may be seen as more than an echo in an age of nuclear war. In 1957 Brittain wrote: "As soon as 'obliteration' bombing became part of Allied war strategy, atom and hydrogen bombs 'lay in the logic of history'."184 But in 1942 Adolf Hitler was a fact of history.

What perhaps should be noted for the purpose of this present study is that the Peace Pledge Union's limited involvement in the bombing protest, together with its appeals for a negotiated peace and for food relief, asserted the continuing right of a dissenting minority within a democracy to register and actively maintain its position. For Great Britain, the home of parliamentary democracy, the Union, and individuals like Vera Brittain, posed the essential question of the degree to which, and under what conditions, British democracy could enforce conformity, exercise censorship and suppress dissent before venerated constitutional ideals were
violated. Equally, the experiences of the Peace Pledge Union and the Bombing Restriction Committee demonstrate the extent to which British society was tolerant and respectful of democratic protest.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER SIX


4 Fieldhouse, "The Anglo-German War", 309.

5 Fieldhouse, "The Anglo-German War", 290-1.

6 Fieldhouse, "The Anglo-German War", 289 and 311.


8 Fieldhouse, "The Anglo-German War", 311.

9 PRO FO 371/24363, Campaign by Lord Beaverbrook to promote peace.

10 PRO FO 371/24363, Campaign by Lord Beaverbrook.

11 PRO FO 371/24363, Campaign by Lord Beaverbrook.

12 PRO FO 371/24363, Campaign by Lord Beaverbrook.
The subcommittee was to be composed of Maurice Rowntree, Eric Gill, Wilfred Wellock, Alfred Salter and Stuart Morris. At the National Council Meeting of 14 October 1939 it was agreed not to attempt to organise an alternative Armistice Day Service or demonstration. At a meeting of the London Area PPU on 10 October 1939 the "suggestion of placing white poppies on the Cenotaf [sic] was not encouraged".

In the autumn of 1939 Vera Brittain spoke at meetings across the country in favour of an armistice and a negotiated, early peace. See: Evening Times [Glasgow], 28 October 1939; Oxford Mail, 1 November 1939; Westmorland Gazette, 4 November 1939; Glasgow Herald, 13 November 1939; The Scotsman, 13 November 1939; Nottingham Journal, 17 November 1939; Forward, 18 November 1939; Express and Echo [Exeter], 22 November 1939; Birmingham Evening Post, 24 November 1939 and Evening News [Portsmouth], 25 November 1939. See also A. F. C. Beales, "Catholics and the Peace Settlement", Clergy Review 18 [new series] (1940), 189-210.


20 Anon., "'Peace News' Sellers in Court", Peace News, 8 March 1940, 8; Anon., "'Penetration' of the P.P.U.", PN, 15 March 1940, 2; Anon., "Apprehension at activities of
peace organisations", PN, April 1940, 2; Anon., "Who is Behind 'Fifth Column' Clamour", PN, 26 April 1940, 1.


22 Maurice Rowntree, "What of Pacifism Now?", Peace News, 14 June 1940, 1; Vera Brittain, "What Can We Save From the Wreckage", PN, 28 June 1940, 1 and 4; John Middleton Murry, "The Crisis of Pacifism", PN, 5 July 1940, 1 and 3; Alan Shadwick, "The Acid Test", PN, 26 July 1940, 2.

23 It is interesting to note that the columns of Christian Pacifist also follow this pattern.

24 PPU/NCM, 15-16 March 1941.
25 PPU/NCM, 15-16 March 1941.
26 PPU/LAM, 10 August 1941.
27 PPU/LAM, 10 August 1941.
28 PPU/LAM, 10 August 1941.
30 See also Phelps, "Against Negotiation Now" (II), Christian Pacifist (July 1941), 128-9.
31 Reverend Charles Raven, "Negotiation or Revolution?", Christian Pacifist (September 1941), 156.
32 Raven, "Negotiation or Revolution?", 156. Raven's article produced a voluminous and animated correspondence. See Christian Pacifist (November 1941), 189.
33 Alex Wood, Peace by Negotiation (London: Peace
Pledge Union, n.d. [probably between September 1941 and February 1942]).

34 Alex Wood, Peace by Negotiation, 3. Also VBC/D25, 14 February 1942, 3 September 1942; 13 September 1942; 19 September 1942. Finally, LPL, No/152, 11 January 1945: "When the history of this age comes to be impartially written, I believe that 'unconditional surrender' will be shown as the greatest blunder ever made by blind and obstinate statesmanship."

35 Wood, Peace by Negotiation, 3.

36 Wood, Peace by Negotiation, 3-4.

37 Wood, Peace by Negotiation, 4.

38 PPU/ACCM, 1 July 1942.

39 PPU/ACCM, 1 July 1942.

40 PPU/ACCM, 1 July 1942.

41 Stuart Morris, "Revised Draft of Armistice Manifesto", 16 October 1942.

42 PPU/ACCM, 28 October 1942.

43 PPU/NCM, 7-8 November 1942. Another sixteen groups felt that a campaign in support of Indian independence was of greater importance and relevance.

44 PPU/NCM, 7-8 November 1942.

45 PPU/ACCM, 26 January 1943. See also PPU/NCM, 23-24 January 1943 and PPU/ECM, 5 January 1943, Armistice Questionnaire dated 6/1/43.


49 Alex Wood, "Armistice Campaign" (a message to groups), Peace News, 9 July 1943, 4.


51 Henry Hilditch, A Case For Peace by Negotiation (London: Negotiated Peace Campaign of the PPU, 1944).

52 Basil Liddell Hart, Methodist Recorder (18 April 1940), quoted in Hilditch, A Case, 1.


54 Hilditch, A Case, 8.

In May 1944 the Negotiated Peace Campaign organisers' report recorded that two hundred posters had been ordered--hardly sufficient for a national campaign--and three of the slogans had been censored by the British Poster Advertising Association. These were: "Durable Peace can only be obtained by Negotiation"; "Victory sows the seeds of future wars"; "Peace cannot be dictated". PPU/NPCCM, 2 May 1944.

56 PPU/NPCCM, 5 June 1944.

57 Humphrey Moore, "May it be Brief", Peace News, 14 June 1944, 1. Moore was referring to the Allied invasion of Normandy (D-Day), 6 June 1944. Throughout June Peace News carried a number of articles on the Second Front, e.g., Alex Wood, "Pacifists and the Second Front", 30 June 1944, 4.
58 Moore, "May it be Brief", Peace News, 14 June 1944, 1.

59 Frank Lea, John Middleton Murry (London: Methuen, 1959), 310-11. Colin Middleton Murry, One Hand Clapping (London: Gollancz, 1975) and Shadows in the Grass (London: Gollancz, 1977) are two finely written memoirs by Murry's son. They are as absorbing as they are insightful into the life and motivations of his father.

60 Lea, John Middleton Murry, 313.

61 PPU/NPCCM, 9 September 1944 and 15 August 1944.

62 PPU/NPCCM, 26 September 1944. The minutes of the Executive Committee of the PPU for 24 October 1944 contain a report of a PPU deputation to the Home Office and subsequent discussion of the Trafalgar Square ban.

A further letter had been received stating that the Home Secretary only had powers to prohibit the holding of a meeting if he was satisfied that the holding thereof at a particular time and in particular circumstances would be likely to cause serious public disorder or promote disaffection. [Like Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, the latitude for interpretation was without limit] ... If on a future occasion, [the Home Secretary--Herbert Morrison] in light of circumstances prevailing at the time, ... found it necessary again to exercise the powers in respect of a meeting organised by the Peace Pledge Union, it would be open to the P.P.U. to make representations to him, and any such representation would then be considered.

PPU/ECM, 24 October 1944.

63 PPU/ECM, 10 October 1944.

64 VBC/D25, 30 January 1942.

65 VBC/D25, 1 June 1942.

66 VBC/D25, 3 July 1942. Brittain's dislike of Churchill was intense. See VBC/D24, 14 July '41; D25, 26 January 1942; 2 June 1942; 3 July 1942; 25 November 1942; 3 October 1942; 1 October 1942; 26 November 1942; 15 November 1942; also LPL, No/151, 28 December 1944 and No/76, 12 February 1942.
355

67 VBC/D25, 10 August 1942; also VBC/D25, 13 September 1942; 14 September 1942 and 19 September 1942.

68 Brittain, LPL, №/99, 3 December 1942; №/64, 28 August 1941; №/15, 4 January 1940.

69 LPL, №/77, 26 February 1942.

70 LPL, №/77, 26 February 1942.

71 Fieldhouse, "Anglo-German War", 308-09.


74 VBC/Bombing Restriction Committee File, 1944, A. L. Spiting [?] to Vera Brittain, 14 August 1944. See also VBC/D18, 31 March and 1 April 1936; VBC/D25, 11 December and 20 December 1942.

75 VBC/BRC File, 1945-1949, Corder Catchpool to Vera Brittain, 19 April 1945.


77 Vera Brittain, "Europe's Children", The Friend, 22 October 1943.


79 Dingle Foot (brother of the former leader of the Labour Party), Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare in "Food Relief For Occupied Europe",
Report of Addresses given to a meeting of the Peace Aims Conference held in London on 9 March 1942, by Mr. Dingle Foot, MP, Miss Edith Pye, Mr. Roy Walker, with Mr. Herbert H. Elvin in the Chair. The document is marked 'Private' and 'Confidential'--and priced at fourpence!

80 See Dingle Foot, "Food Relief", 1 and Roy Walker, Famine Over Europe. The Problem of Controlled Food Relief (London: Andrew Dakers, n.d. [1941]), 22.

81 Foot, "Food Relief", 1.

82 See "Food Relief - Blockade", Peace News, 26 January 1940, 2 and "H. G. Wells - Bomb the Germans, kinder than starving them", PN, 2 February 1940, 2. MO published a report on public attitudes toward the blockade in August 1940. See MO File 354, Attitudes to the Blockade, 15 August 1940.

83 B. J. Cogge, "Europe's Food and the Blockade", Christian Pacifist (November 1940), 256.

84 PPU/NCM, 13-14 September 1941.

85 PPU/NCM, 13-14 September 1941.

86 PPU/ECM, 2 December 1941.

87 PPU/NCM, 13-14 December 1941.

88 PPU/ECM, 20 January 1942.

89 PPU/ECM, 20 January 1942. See also VBC/D25 20 January 1942.

Sybil Morrison was to comment that there was great admiration for Middleton Murry as a literary critic but there was the joke among the Peace News office staff to call him "God" and genuflect outside his office door. Interview, London, England, 6 July 1979.

90 John Middleton Murry, Peace News leading article, 19 June 1942.

91 Middleton Murry, Peace News, 19 June 1942.

92 VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Alex Wood, 20 June 1942.
Sybil Morrison also felt that Murry "had a frightful attitude toward women. He thought they were O.K. in bed but that was all." Interview, 6 July 1979. Also VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Andrew Dakers, 9 November 1942. Brittain's Humiliation With Honour was published in England by Andrew Dakers.

PPU/ECM, 3 February 1942.

PPU/ECM, 3 February 1942. See also VBC, Brittain Lectures and Speeches, F76, "Food Relief in Europe", 24 January 1942 and VBC/D25, 24 January 1942.

PPU/ECM, 3 February 1942; Roy Walker, Famine (London: PPU, 1942).

PPU/ECM, 3 February 1942.

PPU/ECM, 3 February 1942; also VBC/D25, 3 February 1942.

PPU/ECM, 17 February 1942. It was, however, the season for black flags; on the previous day, 16 February 1942, Brittain recorded the fall of Singapore in her diary. VBC/D25, 16 February 1942. See also VBC/D25, 10 February, 12 February and 11 March 1942.

PPU/ECM, 17 February 1942.


PPU/ECM, 3 March 1942. Brittain's diary entry for that day included the comment, "Java now in peril from Japs." VBC/D25, 3 March 1942.


PPU/ECM, 3 March 1942.
105 PPU/ECM, 31 March 1942.

106 Edith Pye was a very influential and leading Friend.

107 Vera Brittain, who was also present at the gathering, commented in her diary: "Dingle Foot ... seemed I thought, a little embarrassed occasionally by his own position in the Ministry of Economic Warfare and the policy he had to apply." VBC/D25, 9 March 1942.

108 PPU/ECM, 14 April 1942.

109 VBC/D25, 6 May 1942. See also VBC/P79, "Famine Relief", Chairman's Address, Richmond and District European Food Relief Association, 22 April 1942. Other members of the PPU were also "on the circuit" in 1942; see: Nottingham Journal, 8 October 1942, Alex Wood at the Friends' Meeting House; Kentish Times, n.d. [autumn 1942], Alex Wood at a meeting in Bromley; Shields Advertiser, 23 November 1932, Corder Catchpool at Methodist Church Hall, North Shields; Finchley Press, 20 November 1942, Stuart Morris at North Finchley Congregational Hall; Macclesfield Courier, 18 December 1942, Rhys Davies MP. These, and other cuttings may be found in the Emile Cammaerts MSS, University of London, MS/II/2005/4a (i). Also, for a cross section of references from the national and provincial press on the subject of the food blockade and famine relief, see VBC/A11, Research Material, Food Blockade and Food-Relief, Press References, June-November 1941. From the spring of 1942 Vera Brittain threw herself into work for the Union's Food Relief Campaign. See VBC/E24 for extensive press cuttings of her activities and speeches.

110 PPU/ECM, 5 May 1942.

111 PPU/ECM, 19 May 1942. The Central Committee was to be composed of the Bishop of Chichester, the Bishop of Stepney, Bishop Meyer and other Roman Catholics, Dr. Paton, Henry Carter, Mr. Aubrey, the Master of Balliol, the Master of Selwyn, Sir Thomas Moore, Professor Gilbert Murray, Mrs. Crawshaw, Mrs. Bliss, Miss Pye, Professor Norman Bentwick.

112 PPU/NCM, 14 June 1942.

113 PPU/NCM, 14 June 1942.

114 VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Emile Cammaerts, 21 May 1943.
Interview with Roy Walker, Ipswich, 8 January 1980.

Interview with Roy Walker, 8 January 1980.

Walker's assessment of the Friends was that, collectively speaking, they would not make public nuisances of themselves, relying instead on a "Spenlow and Jorkins" technique. The Friends were, indeed, badly divided in 1939 over the peace testimony and what it involved. Interview, 8 January 1980.

PPU/ECM, 16 June 1942.

PPU/ECM, 30 June 1942.


PPU/ECM, 14 July 1942.

PPU/ECM, 14 July 1942.

Posters had also been accepted for display by the London Board of Transport. PPU/ECM, 14 July 1942.

PPU/ECM, 28 July 1942. See also VBC/D25, 25 July 1942. A collection had yielded only £39-12-0, however, against expenditures of £90 on publicity and posters. See Appendix VI for examples of PPU financing.

PPU/NCM, 23-24 January 1943. By this date the PPU's Food Relief Campaign had six shop displays in consistent use and forty-one committees throughout the country taking the PPU's lead and the Union's related publications.

VBC/D26, 3 November 1943.

PPU/ECM, 30 March 1943.

PPU/FRCCM, 28 April 1943.

VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Creech-Jones, 15 September 1943. Howard Whitten, of the Food Relief Campaign, supplied information to Richard Stokes for the
latter's speech in the House of Commons during the Economic Warfare Debate, 8 July 1943.

130 VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Howard Kershner, 11 January 1944.

131 Vera Brittain, One of These Little Ones (London: Andrew Dakers, 1943). See VBC/C, Rep., Brittain to Andrew Dakers, 9 February 1943 and Brittain to H. Whitten, 9 February 1943.

132 VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Dakers, 16 March 1943. The editor of the Evening News had, apparently, referred to Brittain as a "notorious pacifist".

133 Famine Relief Committee publication (London, November 1942). See also VBC/D26, 21 January 1943 and LPL, No/103, 11 February 1943.

134 VBC/D26, 4 February 1943.

135 VBC/D26, 19 February 1943.

136 Harold Nicolson, "Marginal Comment", the Spectator, 1 April 1943, 314.


138 VBC/D26, 15 May 1943.

139 PPU/NCM, 22-23 May 1943.

140 PPU/FRCCM, 30 June 1943.

141 Yet at the FRC Committee Meeting of 30 June 1943, it is noted that Brittain was to introduce Emile Cammaerts to Richard Stokes, MP.

142 VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Emile Cammaerts, 21 May 1943.

Edith Pye to Roy Walker, 19 July 1944.

Pye to Walker, 19 July 1944.

VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Edith Pye, 29 July 1944.

PPU/FRCCM, 30 November 1943.

PPU/FRCCM, 30 November 1943.

PPU/ECM, 21 December 1943.


VBC/D26, 30 October 1943. Moreover, an examination of Peace News for 1943 and 1944 reveals little devotion of space or attention to Food Relief, in marked contrast to its evident centrality in the Union's minutes for the same years. Middleton Murry clearly used his editorial powers with a dictatorial ruthlessness.

PPU/FRCCM, 11 January 1944.


PPU/FRCCM, 16 November 1944.

Vera Brittain, in Sunday Express, 27 August 1944. See VBC/D27, 30 August 1944.

VBC/C/Rec., Anonymous to Brittain, 29 August 1944.

See H of C Debates, cols. 358-9, 14 December 1944.

PPU/FRCCM, Reports, 18 January 1945.

In December 1944 Vera Brittain wrote to the Bishop of Chichester: "I write to you to express very deep regret that you saw fit to say, in reference to our work, that you knew the Minister 'had reason to attribute very considerable blame from time to time'." VBC/C/Rep., Brittain to Bishop of Chichester, 18 December 1944; see also Brittain to Lord Selbourne, 18 December 1944.
The Food Relief Campaign finally concluded with a farewell concert on Saturday, 20 June 1945 in the Concert Hall, Guildhall School of Music. The artists appearing included Peter Piers and Benjamin Britten. Speakers were Vera Brittain and Michael Tippett. A souvenir programme may be found in Housman's, Box marked Organisations--PPU 1936-1945 I; file marked PPU 1945.


Quoted by Major-General J. F. C. Fuller in "Barbarity of War without Rules", Evening Standard, 4 February 1944.

See VBC/C/Rec., Corder Catchpool to Vera Brittain, 28 July 1942.

Of the CANB the Evening Standard was to comment: "I should say this committee looks better as a corpse than ever in its short rickety life." Evening Standard, 21 July 1942.

David Irving, in The Destruction of Dresden (New York: 1965), incorrectly states: "Early in 1943 a Bombing Restriction Committee had made its appearance in London ...", Dresden, 41. He makes no mention of the CANB.

See H of C Debates, Vol. 373, cols. 1051-2. The CANB was also specifically mentioned in the Commons: Vol. 376, cols. 288-9, 19 November 1941 and Vol. 376, Col. 886, 27 November 1941.


Jevons's obituary notice in The Times, 27 June 1955, omits any mention of his chairmanship of the BRC, 1943-1945, or of his wartime activities.

See Lord Arthur Ponsonby to Thomas C. Foley, 5 October 1941, "Mr. Foley's Personal Correspondent, etc.", Box 3, Foley Papers, Friends' House, Euston Road, London.

Since these papers were only recently deposited they are entirely uncatalogued--the box number is therefore a provisional one.

Also James Maxton to Foley, 2 September 1941, unmarked file containing letters arranged alphabetically, Box 1, Foley Papers.

See also VBC/G596 and J. F. Quinlan, "Humanisation of War", Commonweal 26 (15 October 1937), 579.

See "Night Bombing Hun Plot", Empire News [Manchester], 9 November 1941; Midland Daily Telegraph [Coventry], 8 November 1941. The North Eastern Daily Gazette [Middlesbrough] entitled one article "Stop Night Bombing: Goebbels' New Move" and commented: "Most of the people concerned are in the defeatist- appeaser class. Their support of the campaign, though unwitting, is dangerous." North Eastern Daily Gazette, 7 November 1941.

See, for example, "Ships and Fighters - Not Tanks and Bombers. R. R. Stokes Appeal at Carnarvon", Catholic Herald, 19 June 1942.

It is also of interest to note that the controversy over area bombing--and, indeed, the question of food relief--stirred a very considerable degree of discussion in English and American Roman Catholic circles. Such journals and newspapers as *Blackfriars*, *Clergy Review*, *Commonweal*, *Ecclesiastical Review*, *Catholic Worker* and *Tablet* frequently published articles on these and related subjects during the period 1939-1945. It would seem that the development of Catholic radical thought on these questions merits closer study.

See also VBC/BRC, 1941-1943, R. R. Stokes to Vera Brittain, 16 March 1943 and 22 November 1943.


See VBC/BRC, 1941-1943, T. C. Foley to Vera Brittain, 25 November 1943.

In late March 1944 the BRC organised a public meeting on the bombing issue in Reading. This was addressed by two pacifist MP's, Reginald Sorensen and Rhys Davies. Corder Catchpool was concerned about the tenor of the latter's address which was reportedly "too political and merely anti-Churchill and Government". Catchpool informed Brittain that he would endeavour to encourage Davies to "strike a deeper note and treat the subject as a great moral issue."

VBC/BRC, 1944, Catchpool to Brittain, 8 April 1944.


Thus in the wake of the bombing of Lubeck and Rostock Rhys J. Davies asked: "whether the intensified
bombing operations over Germany including the attack on Lubeck, have involved a departure from the previously declared policy of His Majesty's Government that such operations would be confined to military objectives?"


In one notable exchange in December 1943, which occupies but one column of Hansard, Stokes succeeded in wringing from Sinclair three consecutive denials of any change in government bombing policy. H of C Debates, Vol. 395, col. 338, 1 December 1943.

Also information from Canon Edward Conway, ex-Pilot, RAF Bomber Command, interview, Reading, England, 15 December 1980.

169 In the Sunday Express the Bishop of Chelmsford commented: "I can never listen with patience to the superior prig who tells us we must remember our own faults and responsibility for the war." Sunday Express, 24 May 1940.

170 See PPU/ECM, 20 January 1942; 3 February 1942; 17 February 1942; 3 March 1942. Also PPU/NCM, 7-8 March 1942.

171 Foley Papers, "Mr. Foley's Personal Correspondence, etc.", Box 3, William Ebor [Temple] to T. C. Foley, 25 September 1940.

Angus Calder, in The People's War, makes the following comment about Temple: "While it would be gross to suggest that he was ever guilty of 'trimming' on moral questions, there was in the last analysis a trace of glibness in Temple's answers which is faintly disturbing." The People's War, 563.

172 See Geoffrey Fisher, Bishop of London--and later Archbishop of Canterbury--to T. Traherne, 11 June 1942 and Fisher's letter to The Times, 9 June 1942. Also Canon F. A. Cocklin--a Canon of St. Paul's--to T. C. Foley, 18 September 1941 and 1 October 1941; J. Hutchinson Cockburn, Moderator Church of Scotland to T. C. Foley, 31 October 1941 and 4 November 1941. T. C. Foley MSS.

173 Dean of Winchester, et al, The Church and the Atom (Winchester, 1948). William Douglas Home was to write about the Commission's conclusions to The Times:

Surely it is essential that the commission should explain why these views were not placed before the public during the war, when they might have been of practical--as opposed to academic interest. Otherwise,
one might conclude that, in war-time, its members deliberately kept silent and—like Peter—were content to stand and warm themselves at the fire.

The Times, 22 April 1948.

174 See, for example, PPU/NCM, 19-20 July 1941. Also VBC/D24, 14 and 15 July 1941; VBC/BRC, 1941-1943, Vera Brittain to Corder Catchpool, 7 May 1941.

175 See VBC/BRC, 1944, Corder Catchpool to Vera Brittain, 21 June 1944.


177 Foley Papers, loose papers and newspaper clippings, Box 2, Chichester to Foley, 1 February 1944.

178 Foley Papers, Chichester to Foley, 9 February 1944. In September 1943 Chichester had written: "I am most grateful for the ammunition which you sent me about bombing." Chichester to Foley, 23 September 1943.

179 The wealth of materials in the Brittain collection relating to the bombing issue and Brittain's own work for the CANB/BRC is very great. See especially the files marked "Bombing Restriction Committee", VBC/E34, "Bombing File", and VBC/E22 and E23. The Foley MSS is a similarly wealthy repository of correspondence relating to the subject and of newspaper references and clippings dealing with area bombing.

180 Vera Brittain, Seed of Chaos ([London?): New Vision Publishing Co., 1944]. See VBC/A13. The title Seed of Chaos was taken from the Dunciad Book IV by Alexander Pope. "Then rose the seed of Chaos, and of Night/To blot out order and extinguish light." See Testament of Experience, 327. See also Brittain, Stop Massacre Bombing. An Appeal to All Belligerants ([London?]: New Vision Publishing Co., n.d.). VBC/B20. After reading Seed of Chaos, Basil Liddell Hart wrote to Brittain to express his profound respect for your courage in upholding the claims for human decency in a time when war fever is raging. ... Since you are likely to have had abundant evidence of the resentment you create, you may like to have some evidence of the respect you inspire.
VBC/C/Rec., Basil Liddell Hart to Vera Brittain, 25 July 1944.


For an excellent discussion of the exchanges between Brittain and Orwell, and for an assessment of Brittain's research, argumentation and conclusions contained in *Seed of Chaos*, see Alan Bishop, "Vera Brittain, George Orwell, Mass Bombing and the English Language" (paper presented to McMaster English Association, McMaster University, February 1984). Also Brittain, *Testament of Experience*, 331; Brittain, "Massacre by Bombing", *Fellowship X* (March 1944), 332-6.

183 Solly Zuckerman, *From apes to warlords: the autobiography (1904-1946)* of Solly Zuckerman (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978), 148. See also N. Frankland and C. Webster, *The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945*, 4 vols. (London: 1961), III, 288 and 302 and Melden E. Smith, Jr., "The Strategic Bombing Debate: The Second World War and Vietnam", *Journal of Contemporary History* 12 (1977), 175-91; also C. P. Snow, *Science and Government* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961). The "intelligence service" of the BRC compared favourably with that of the Government. Corder Catchpool, through Quaker contacts, was able to obtain information about the German domestic situation. In one letter to Vera Brittain he attached part of a letter from a prominent German Quaker, marked by Catchpool as confidential and not for publication. The letter dealt with the reactions of ordinary German civilians to bombing by the Allies and stressed that resilience and fortitude was being strengthened by suffering. The collapse of German civilian morale from bombing, it concluded, was unlikely. VBC/BRC, Catchpool to Brittain, 26 February 1943.

EPILOGUE

And yet--who dreamed that Christ has died in vain? He walks again on the Seas of Blood, He comes in the terrible Rain!

Edith Sitwell, The Shadow of Cain

The Peace Pledge Union was not a wartime historical backwater but was instead part of the central river system that was the English Radical, Liberal and Dissenting tradition. Pacifism had its source in the springs of seventeenth-century religious protest and in the early nineteenth century helped to swell the banks of those later English traditions personified by Cobden. Yet, if at the confluence of the four streams, their values mingled, distinctive currents remained. But the Great War in large measure changed the nature of the riverbed: where Liberalism and Dissent, and to a lesser extent Radicalism, had formerly cut deep channels, an inhospitable bedrock caused them now to meander. The pacifist current, however, retained its vigour when revivified and rechannelled by Canon Sheppard. The resulting flow was sufficiently strong as to seep around the dam of near monolithic conventional patriotism which characterised wartime Britain. But the effort was considerable and the pacifist stream after victory in 1945 was all but lost to view for a number of years. The
regenerative strengths of British pacifism, fed by the currents of religious faith, humanitarian commitment and political conviction, were, however, to prove themselves once again.

The young supporters of the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament who marched from Aldermaston at Easter or the pacifists [led by the aged Earl Russell] who sat down in Trafalgar Square, were heirs of the Peace Pledge Union of the thirties. Their actions, however strange, suggested no spirit of indifference to the deepest spiritual problems of the age.²

The survival of the British peace movement, faithful to its inherited traditions of Liberalism, Radicalism and Dissent, is probably owed in some measure to the wartime work of the Peace Pledge Union as an institution and to individuals within the organisation such as Vera Brittain and Roy Walker.

Looking across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it is clear that pacifism carved a channel that did modify the topography of English political and intellectual history. It is equally clear that during the Second World War the Peace Pledge Union kept the nineteenth-century heritage of moral protest vigorous in an extraordinarily difficult time. And beyond this, the Peace Pledge Union continually reminded those who would listen of the threat posed by war to the very existence of Western Christian civilisation. This threat to Christian values was tragically symbolised by the destruction of the great Benedictine Abbey of Monte Cassino. As George Orwell, no friend of the Peace Pledge Union nor of Vera Brittain, was to write from Germany in April 1945:
The people of Britain have never felt easy about the bombing of civilians ... but what they still have not grasped ... is the frightful destructiveness of modern war and the long period of impoverishment that now lies ahead of the world as a whole. To walk through the ruined cities of Germany is to feel an actual doubt about the continuity of civilisation.
FOOTNOTES

EPILOGUE


2 David Thomson, quoted in A. Sked and C. Cook, Post-War Britain. A Political History (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979), 223. The Trafalgar Square demonstration had been banned by the police but protesters ignored the ban. The police cordoned off the Square to prevent others from joining those already sitting in. Vera Brittain was among the protesters who found their way blocked by the police and promptly sat down in the middle of the road, later to be gently carried away by police constables. Interview, Harry Mister, London, England, 22 December 1980.

3 George Orwell, in the Observer, 8 April 1945, quoted in Brittain, Testament of Experience, 359.
MAP A: PEACE PLEDGE UNION:
DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPORT,
1942

Degrees of support on scale of 0-10

Map compiled by author on basis of Barclay's Area Development Report.
At the end of 1942, according to the report of the Annual General Meeting of the PPU in 1943, 374 Groups were recognised as active. Barclay's report does not account, therefore, for some 57 Groups.
The above information is based on and reconstructed from John Barclay, "Report on Area Development Covering the Period 15th February - 31st May, 1942", PPU Minutes, March 1940 - June 1942.
MAP D

THE STATE OF DISSENT AT
THE END OF THE 18TH CENTURY

The influence and strength of Dissent

Increasing

Decreasing

50 mi.

Source: Gay, Geography of Religion, 287.
MAP E

DISTRIBUTION OF NONCONFORMITY - 1851

Index of Attendance

- Over 55.0
- 40.1-55.0
- 30.1-40.0
- 20.1-30.0
- 20.0 and under

Source: Gay, Geography of Religion, 288.
TOTAL DISTRIBUTION
OF METHODISTS
IN 1851.

Index of
Attendance

Over 35.0
26.1-35.0
21.1-26.0
15.1-21.0
10.0-15.0
Under 10.0

Source: Gay, Geography of Religion, 310.
Index of Attendance

- Over 46.0
- 40.1-46.0
- 33.1-40.0
- 25.1-33.0
- 25.0 and under

Source: Gay, Geography of Religion, 271.
MAP H: GREAT BRITAIN: AREAS INFLUENCED BY THE COMMUNISTS, WELSH NATIONALISTS AND PEACE PLEDGE UNION

Source: PRO INF 1/319, "Anti-War Movements", unsigned and undated report [probably February 1940.]
APPENDIX I

The occupations of the objectors at the various exchanges were as follows. Those the observer judged to be of working-class background at five of the Exchanges are starred (*).

CITY OF LONDON
Artiste (dancer)
County Court Dun
Local Government Clerical Worker
Warehouseman*
Accountant Clerk
GPO Maintenance engineer

STEPNEY
Tailor's presser* (Jewish)
GPO sorter*
Tailor's cutter (Jewish)
Customs and Excise Clerk

POPLAR
GPO Maintenance hand
Shipping clerk
General labourer*
General clerk
Clerk

WESTMINSTER
Civil servant (Treasury)
Civil servant (Exchequer)
Civil servant (Ministry of Food)
Assistant Principal, UAB (Senior Civil Servant)
Restaurant waiter
GPO sorter*
GPO counter clerk
Teacher
Medical student
Local Government Officer
Civil Servant Clerical Association clerk
Club plate man (dishwasher)
Secretary, Friends' House
Warehouse porter*
Carpenter and joiner
Dress designer
Journalist (Amalgamated press)

BATTERSEA
Mathematics student (London University)
Carpet planner
Diamond setter
Customs office clerk
Law Agency clerk
Clerk in Hampton's depository
Solicitor's clerk
Senior Wages clerk (Mullard Radio)
Printer's Assistant (Daily Mirror)
Ice-cream vendor* (Wall's)
Accountant clerk (Associated Newspapers)
Hosiery salesman
Draughtsman (LPTE)
Electrician
Bricklayer*
Road contractor's clerk
BBC staff
GPO sorter*
Local government clerk (Bethnal Green)
Meter inspector (council employee)

WALHAM GREEN
Artists (3 or 4)
Musicians (3 or 4)
Civil Servants (2 or 3)
Local Government Servants (2 or 3)
Insurance broker
Spiritualist medium
Brewer's assistant
Lorry driver
Electrical wireman
Lay preacher
Carpenter
Musical director of the BBC

CAMDEN TOWN

Radio engineer
Steel bender
Bench polisher
Assistant accountant
Insurance clerk
Briar-pipe maker
Student of music
Glove cutter
Artist
Sorter (GPO)
Builder's labourer
Journalist (Daily Herald)
Wireless Operator (Civil Air Line)
Plumber
Bricklayer's foreman
Salesman (Hoover)
Motor mechanic
Draughtsman
Typographer
Cabinet maker
Storekeeper
Cinema foreman
Clerk (foodstuffs)
Radio and electrical engineer
Shop assistant
Actuary
Commercial artist
Salesman (boots and shoes)

APPENDIX II

LIST OF COUNCILS THAT HAVE DISMISSED OR SUSPENDED CO'S

Note: this list has been compiled from press cuttings from 11 May to 7 July (1940) and is not complete.

Amersham UDC (Urban District Council)
Blackpool
Brighton (2.9% of staff affected)
Barnstaple
Brentford & Chiswick
Balham
Burnley
Bullingdon RDC (Rural DC)
Bebington (by 22 votes to 9)
Birmingham (140 CO's affected)
Barnoldswick UDC
Barnet UDC
Bury (4 nonconformist ministers protest)
Bermondsey (after petition by 3,500 rate-payers)
Bri worth [sic]
Carlisle (after previously deciding to wait)
Cardiff (teachers only)
Colne
Cheadle & Catley (but no CO's affected)
Cambridgeshire
Croydon (after previously deciding to wait)
Canterbury
Clacton
Devonshire
Darlington (amendment that instead of dismissing them outright they should be given leave for the duration failed)
Dudley  (Ald. Young said: "I warn members of the Conservative party that it is a very dangerous position to go against the constitution, you are saying in effect that you will not allow the Government to decide the matter. It is dangerously near Fascism.")

Durham City
Essex
Esher
Eastbourne
Finchley
East Ham
Ebbw Vale
Faversham
Hull  (Transport and General Worker's Union protest)
Heston & Isleworth
Kidderminster
Keighley  (moved by ex-servicemen councillors)
Luton
Leicester  (after petition of rate-payers)
Lytham St. Annes
Maidstone
Middlesex
Norwich  (by 38 votes to 15)
Nottingham  (by 38 votes to 8)
Newhaven
Paignton  (carried unanimously)
Poole
Rugby
Reading  (April decision re-endorsed)
Richmond
Stockport  (by 47 votes to 2)
Stoke on Trent
Salford  (two not affected because of tribunal ruling)
Southend
Shoreditch
Sevenoakes
Stoke Newington
Swinton
Southport (by 28 votes to 9)
Totnes
West Bromwich
Wanstead (one affected)
Wimbledon
Worcester
Wolverhampton (5% of staff affected)
Winchester
Torquay
Walsall
Wednesbury
York
Watford

COUNCILS STILL CONSIDERING THE MATTER

Bath (Labour proposes dismissal; question adjourned)
Manchester (after previously refusing to dismiss, Conservative councillors bring matter up again, Labour and Liberal considering it)
Newcastle
Caernarvon (considering pay cute [sic] for CO's)
Sheffield (NALGO and some Labour councillors bringing matter up again)
Bournemouth (undecided)
Cornwall (undecided)

COUNCILS REFUSING TO DISMISS

Crayford (decides to consider cases on merit)
Somerset (decides to consider cases on merit)
Coventry (decides to consider cases on merit)
Northampton (CO's to be re-engaged on Army pay plus £1 a week)
Fulham  (definitely refuse to dismiss in spite of local NALGO appeals)
Swindon  (motion ruled out of order)
Hastings  (refuse in spite of NALGO protests)
Swansea  (refuse in spite of employees' protests: Labour vote against dismissal)
Kettering  (refuse)
Liverpool  (refuse)
Edmonton  (refuse)
Ipswich  (refuse)
Gloucester  (refuse)
Welwyn
L.C.C.

APPENDIX III

CENTRES NAMED IN REPORT ON AREA DEVELOPMENT,
FEB. - MAY, 1942

1. NORTHERN IRELAND (1)
   Belfast

2. SCOTLAND (2)
   Edinburgh
   Glasgow

3. LAKELAND (7)
   Carlisle
   Kendal
   Sedburgh
   Windermere
   Workington
   Cockermouth
   Keswick

4. NORTH EASTERN [13]
   Newcastle

5. NORTH WESTERN [74]
   Manchester

6. YORKSHIRE (3)
   Hull
   Sheffield
   Doncaster

7. NORTH WALES [12]

8. WEST MIDLANDS (6)
   Birmingham
   Evesham
   Coventry
   Kidderminster
   Oswestry
   Shrewsbury
9. EAST MIDLANDS [32]

10. EAST ANGLIA (3)
    Cambridge
    Norwich
    Ipswich

11. SOUTH WALES (3)
    Newport
    Cardiff
    Swansea

12. WESTERN

13. BUCKS., BERKS., OXON. (3)
    Oxford
    Reading
    High Wycombe

14. LONDON [112*] See Appendix IV.

15. DEVON AND CORNWALL

16. SOUTHERN [25]

17. SOUTH EASTERN [21]


( ) denote incomplete number of groups in given area.

[ ] denote total number of groups in given area.
APPENDIX IV

14. LONDON--LIST OF LONDON REGIONS

Barclay's Report gives no indication of the location and distribution of London's 112 Groups. The minutes of the London Groups, London Area Annual General Meeting of 4 May 1941 are extant and do provide a list of London regions.

LONDON REGIONS

1. East End Pacifist Council
2. North London
3. Hornsey
4. Golders Green and North West
5. Wandsworth
6. Central London
7. West London
8. South East London
9. Croyden
10. Uxbridge
11. Barnet and District
12. North West Middlesex
13. Kingston
14. Ealing and District
15. Watford and West Herts.
16. Mid Herts.
17. Woodford Groups
18. Hounslow, Isleworth and Twickenham
19. Sutton, Epsom and Enfield

Source: Minutes of London Area Peace Pledge Union, dating from 7 May 1940.
APPENDIX V

COMPILATION OF PPU MEMBERSHIP FIGURES,
SEPTEMBER 1939 - JUNE 1945

KEY:

TM  Total membership
LF  Live file
TI  Total increase
TD  Total decrease
R   Resignations
D   Deaths
WO  Weeded Out (by PPU Headquarters)
G   Groups
A/  Active Groups
/IA Inactive Groups
C   Contact members
M   Men
W   Women
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<th>TM</th>
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<td>114366</td>
<td>gained total 560 - 291M ( '42)</td>
<td>25472</td>
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<td>141</td>
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<td>Jan. '43</td>
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<td>109420</td>
<td>108682</td>
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<td>270</td>
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<td>107685</td>
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<td>Apr. '43</td>
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<td>May '43</td>
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<td>105837</td>
<td>8529 ( '43)</td>
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<td>LF</td>
<td>TI</td>
<td>TD</td>
<td>R</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>WO</td>
<td>G: A/IA</td>
<td>C</td>
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<td>104955</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>364/</td>
<td>205</td>
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<td>Apr. '44</td>
<td>103871</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>348/</td>
<td>216</td>
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<td>Sept. '44</td>
<td>102757</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Jan. '45</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar. '45</td>
<td>99619</td>
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<td>Apr. '45</td>
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<td>June '45</td>
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<td></td>
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</table>

Source: All figures have been amassed from Annual Reports and minutes of PPU National and Executive Meetings. Not all figures are consistent—e.g., gains for 1942. These are, however, the only figures available.
APPENDIX VI

DIAGRAMMATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE
WEEKLY WORK OF A PPU GROUP MEMBER

APPENDIX VII

EXAMPLES OF PPU FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AT THE
GROUP AND NATIONAL LEVELS AND AT THE CAMPAIGN LEVEL

PEACE PLEDGE UNION, CAMBRIDGE BRANCH

RECEIPTS AND PAYMENTS, 1 JANUARY 1939 - 31 DECEMBER 1939

Receipts - subscriptions £ 21 - 18 - 6

Payments

PPU, HQ. £ 15 - 0 - 0
Hire of halls 3 - 14 - 6
Lit. and printing 4 - 7 - 9
Postage 2 - 4 - 6

Balance in hand £ 5 - 4 - 7

Source: Cambridge PPU Minute Book, 1938-1939, Cambridge Record Office

PEACE PLEDGE UNION BUDGET FOR 1944

Head Office Costs

Income tax on property £ 90 - 0 - 0
Light and heat 122 - 0 - 0
Rates 142 - 0 - 0
Lift Maintenance 11 - 0 - 0
Repairs 50 - 0 - 0
George's salary [?] 169 - 0 - 0
Cleaner's salary 52 - 0 - 0
Firewatching 60 - 0 - 0
Insurances (war-risk, etc.) 70 - 0 - 0

£ 766 - 0 - 0

Less rents receivable £ 360 - 0 - 0
£ 406 - 0 - 0
£ 406
### Administrative Expenses

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<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td>£3414</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stationery</td>
<td>180</td>
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<tr>
<td>Postages</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephones</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council, executive, area devel., youth, etc., meeting expenses</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affiliation Fees</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>CBCO</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRI</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPC</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCCL</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSU</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIA FREEDOM</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>£75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant to CBCO</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSB (Rest H. &amp; Petty cash)</td>
<td>175</td>
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<tr>
<td>Speakers Expenses</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Area Development</td>
<td>300</td>
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<tr>
<td>Area Dev. organ. expenses</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundry office expenses</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaigns</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiated Peace</td>
<td>250</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>£5594</td>
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### Income

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<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>1943 Amount</th>
<th>1943 Amount</th>
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<tr>
<td>Areas</td>
<td>£2000</td>
<td>£1638</td>
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<tr>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>1518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lit.</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christmas cards</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>305</td>
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<tr>
<td>PN</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Camp</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasurer's appeal</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>1511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>£6000</td>
<td>£5587</td>
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Source: Nat. Council Meeting, 22/23 January 1944
EXAMPLES OF THE PPU FOOD RELIEF CAMPAIGN
COMMITTEE'S FINANCING

Expenditures 1 January - 15 May 1944

Postage and sundries £ 9 - 15 - 7
Adverts. in Peace News 0 - 10 - 0
Harry Hilditch 8 - 0 - 0

£18 - 5 - 7

Excess receipts for period £53 - 13 - 11
Famine Relief Fund, balance of cash in hand as per last statement, March 31 £70 - 0 - 1
Additional receipts April 0 - 13 - 0
" " 1-15 May 2 - 0 - 0
2 - 13 - 0

Cash in fund 15 May 1944 £72 - 14 - 0

Source: PPU Minutes, 1944

Food Relief Campaign Committee Meeting, 8 May 1944

Collection and donations £41 - 9 - 11
Less: Hire hall 9 - 9 - 0
Leaflets 7 - 10 - 0
Posters 5 - 8 - 0
Bill Posting 6 - 15 - 0
Advertisements 1 - 15 - 0
Fares, publicity, etc. 7 - 9 - 11

£38 - 6 - 11

Meeting cleared £ 3 - 6 - 11

Source: Food Relief Campaign Committee Minutes, 13 June 1944
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