NUMBER 9
WAR AND PEACE. II
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by

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Number 9
Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Australian National University
1983
ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND
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Pacifism, despite its limited revival through the nonviolent action
movement and as a respectable tradition within the Catholic church, continues
to have a bad philosophical press. It is commonly portrayed as incoherent in
one way or another, characteristically as inconsistent. Even philosophical
defences of pacifism are liable to be extremely defensive, conceding only that
pacifism is consistent, but insisting otherwise that it is as false as a moral
position can be, bizarre, and morally insensitive. What follows challenges the
prevailing wisdom put out in the philosophical press, but using its own analytic
methods.

§1. Slide arguments to inconsistency; and arguments from irresponsibility and
from rights. In an influential and widely disseminated set of articles
attacking pacifism, Narveson says that the pacifist's position is
not only that [T1] violence is evil but also that [T2] it is morally
wrong to use force [violence] to resist, punish, or prevent violence.
This further step makes pacifism a radical moral doctrine. What I
shall try to establish below is that it is, in fact, more than merely
radical - it is actually incoherent because self-contradictory ... (p.408, italics added).

Subsequently (p.414) he characterises pacifism by way of T2, though it would be
better characterised by the more sweeping

1. According to the US Catholic Bishops, pacifism is 'a valid Christian
position', with a long tradition going back to Christ and the early
Christians who were committed to a nonviolent lifestyle: see Origins 12

The revival in the nonviolent action (NVA) movement is a somewhat qualified
one (as will emerge), many in that movement wishing to distance themselves
from traditional pacifism.

2. In particular, T. Regan 'A defence of pacifism', Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 11 (1972) 73-86. Page references to this article are prefixed
by R.

Regan ends by saying 'To regard the pacifists' belief as "bizarre and
vaguely ludicrous" is, perhaps, to put it mildly'.
P2. It is morally wrong to use violence.

However T2 captures the cases that separate comprehensive pacifism from the orthodox opposition. The main form of pacifism under investigation is called 'comprehensive' to distinguish it from standard pacifism, in the usual narrower sense which is restricted to certain theses concerning (state) order, notably opposition to (violence in) war, which does not necessarily rule out violence elsewhere. But if violence is what is impermissible, then it should be so universally and not merely in war. Pacifism, as a moral position, should be comprehensive.

On its own showing, it is contended, pacifism is precluded from taking proper action to prevent, what it acclaimedly prohibits, violence; for preventative action would involve, sometimes, use of force. But genuine commitment to a moral position must allow action to back up commitment, action of a type logically excluded in the case of pacifism. Hence the initial incoherence Narveson and others find in pacifism: that it cannot underwrite its own claims or actively defend them, on pain of inconsistency. However Narveson's location of incoherence in pacifism depends, essentially, on several connected slides, all of which the pacifist should resist — without force. The initial slide is from the theme T2 italicised above to what results by deletion of the crucial phrase 'to use force', or as it should be 'to use violence', namely

R2. It is morally wrong to resist, punish, or prevent violence — and similarly from special and related cases of T2 to special and related cases of R2 (e.g. from T2S, it is forbidden to use force to resist violence, to R2S, it is forbidden to resist violence). The slide is illegitimate because commitment to T2 does not entail commitment to the rejected proposition R2; for one thing there are many ways of confronting, reducing and controlling violence, worked out by pacifists and others, which do not involve use of violence (or perhaps force).

The initial slide is however what Narveson exploits in his first main assault on pacifism (after clearing several confusions, which he takes to explain the popularity of pacifism, out of the way). This argument, from the irresponsibility of pacifism, does not actually lead to contradiction, but it does suggest that there is a serious tension between pacifism and any method of maintaining social order, so serious that pacifism is socially irresponsible:

... to hold the pacifist position as a genuine full-blooded moral principle is to hold nobody has a right to fight back when attacked ... It means that we are all mistaken in supposing that we have the right of self-protection ... It appears to mean, for instance, that we have no right to punish criminals, that all our machinery of criminal justice is, in fact, unjust.

Robbers, murderers, rapists, and miscellaneous delinquents ought, on this [irresponsible] theory, to be let loose (pp.415-6).

Since one can protect oneself and avoid and resist aggression without fighting back (with violence), pacifism does not mean what Narveson claims it means, unless a slide is made. Nor does comprehensive pacifism, characterised (tentatively) by theses T1 and T2, imply that we have no right to punish criminals, but simply that such punishment (or the imposition of penalties) will not apply violent methods. Nor therefore does it imply that all the conventional machinery of criminal justice is unjust, but only that some, or a good deal, of that machinery is. One hardly needs to be a comprehensive

4. Pacifism, as involving the active use of defensive methods, can be traced back as far as the Mohist philosophers of ancient China. On modern methods see especially G. Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston, 1971. As will emerge, there is a point in distinguishing (as Narveson does not in his earlier work) force from violence; they are not equivalent.
pacifist to coherently think the latter. This provides some confirmation for the key point which is that there is, so far at least, no inconsistency evident in maintaining that those who hold that violent methods are morally legitimate are mistaken.

The next slide is closely connected with, and really generalises upon, the initial slide. The stunt is to imbue a range of more neutral terms with the connotation of violence or at least of force which Narveson here proceeds to equate with violence. Thus such activities as resisting, punishing, preventing, and defending are taken to imply (use of) force or violence, and so to be excluded from among admissible pacifist methods. Hence the conflation of T2 and R2; use of force is taken to by implied in R2. Hence the assumption that a pacifist cannot resist (p.415). Hence also Narveson’s unwarranted "recharacterisation" of pacifism as the position that 'no one ought ever to be defended against attack' (pp.417-8). If the stunt were got away with, it would deprive pacifism of, for instance, the general methods of nonviolent action and resistance, and so render pacifism a much less defensible position. But positions can be defended, as in this paper or on the field, without violence. Things can be resited, even things like arrest, without violence (e.g. by sliding out of handcuffs and running away). Force can be applied, as in opening a jam jar or pulling a person out of danger, without violence. Violence implies force, but not vice versa; and it is violence, not all applications of force, that comprehensive pacifists are bound to exclude.

The attempt to castrate pacifism, by depriving it of the range of nonviolent practices, is not confined to those who (want to) think pacifism in any case indefensible. It enjoys some popularity even among those advocating development and expansion of nonviolent methods, who no doubt want to distance themselves from older pacifism, whose methods they see as confined to compromise, mediation, negotiation, and involving the granting of concessions. The newer (nonviolent) activists have justification; for pacifism has often been presented, by an unsympathetic opposition, as confined to passive methods (cf. even the Concise English Dictionary account, where it is erroneously said
of pacifism that 'positively, it holds that all disputes should be settled by negotiation', and, negatively, that it is 'the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-cooperation with any form of warfare': italics added). But nothing in the characterisation of pacifism, whether comprehensive or standard, need so limit its admissible methods: nothing excludes resistance, uncompromising methods, and imposition of sanctions which offer no concessions. It is simply that comprehensive pacifism has not yet developed its fuller potential, especially in conflict resolution.

Subsequent slides in the development of the argument against pacifism are just variations on those given, writing violence-involving in as an internal qualifier. Thus the measure of a person's opposition to something in terms of 'the amount of effort he is willing to put forth against it' is taken somewhat perversely - to be violence-involving effort or opposition in the case of the pacifist's 'opposition to violence'. If this slide were permissible any pacifist would be caught in an elementary inconsistency since in being opposed to violence, by definition, he is prepared to use violence and so is not opposed to violence. Even Narveson 'cannot make too much' of this inconsistency, though it is not so far removed from the alleged inconsistencies he does want to make much of in his main inconsistency argument.

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5. In the way Sharp, for example, has illicitly assumed in several works: see for instance the unduly narrow definition of pacifism given in his Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston, 1980, p.198.

Again, however, there is some historical basis for dissociating nonviolent action from pacifism; and given the difficulties comprehensive pacifism can lead to, there are philosophical reasons as well.

But even without much in the way of organised sanctions, worthwhile positive results can often be obtained, as the case of international law reveals: cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, 1961, p.212.
A similar slide, together with a further slide, is made in the argument to inconsistency based on the notion of rights, especially as it figures in the pacifism theme, transformed to the claim P2(R). No one has a right to indulge in violence (p.418).

For Narveson tries to incorporate the right to indulge in violence in the very notion of right. The initial move is to work in assumptions of defence from breaches of a right and of preventative action against infringement of it. Because 'a right just is a status justifying preventative action ... what does follow logically is that one has a right to whatever may be necessary to prevent infringements of his right' (p.419). That 'whatever may be necessary' turns out to include force, now very generously construed - here is the further slide - to incorporate such things as social pressure. Moreover 'it is a logical truth, not merely a contingent one, that what might be necessary is force' (p.421)! For these logical transformations to work, however, the notion of preventative action must have the notion of violence built into it. The argument accordingly begs the question against pacifism. To block the argument it is enough for preventative action associated with rights to be, or to be limited to, nonviolent action. In any case the 'whatever may be necessary' requirement is quite indefensibly strong. For example, D'Agostino's right to his umbrella does not entitle him to kill a person who is trying to steal the umbrella even if such action is necessary in the circumstances to prevent infringement of his right.

How the argument from rights leads to inconsistency is summed up thus (p.421):

SA1. 'If we have any rights at all then we have a right to use force to prevent the deprivation of the thing to which we are said to have a right'.

SA2. We have, according to the pacifist's 'the right not to have violence done to us', as a consequence of the objection to avoid violence.

But, therefore, we have the right to use violence, so the pacifist's position is self-contradictory, both granting and not granting the right to use violence. The argument fails because SA1 is readily rejected. Narveson is mistaken in claiming that 'our standard concept of rights' yields SA1 (cf. p.423). That a
right can be sustained by right-supporting or right-defending action does not require that that action is violent. Pacifists can provide an adequate analysis of rights - essentially the usual one - without letting themselves in for SAI, by simply rejecting the Narveson slide\(^6\). What appears in place of SAI is something like SAI\#. If we have any rights at all then we have a right to uphold them. But the right to uphold them, defend them, protect them, etc., does not, ipso facto, give an entitlement to the use of violence. Without the slide there is no dilemma for the pacifist. The "pacifist's dilemma" and Narveson's slide are two aspects of the one thing.

§2. The arguments from lesser violence and lesser evil. In outline the argument - which is independent of the notion of rights - is that pacifists must admit, in terms of their own principles, that there are cases where the use of violence would be morally permissible and morally justified. The cases are those where some use of violence would prevent much greater violence. Inconsistency is immediate by T2. More explicitly, and in (Narveson's) terms which also import the notion of evil, pacifists have to admit both that the lesser evil, some use of force, is admissible, in preventing greater evil, and that it is not admissible because it involves violence. An argument like this as gets summarized as follows:-

It seems to me logically true, in any moral theory whatever, that \([E2']\) the lesser evil must be preferred to the greater. If the use of force by me, now is necessary to avoid the use of more physical force (by others, perhaps) later, then to say that physical force is the

\(^6\) Narveson, in responding to a suggestion of Armour (pp.423-4), sees nothing between (1) forceful defence of rights, with the slide to violence in, and (0) nothing really answering to rights at all, where words like 'rights' occur without stuffing. This shows a serious blindspot. What lies in between are a range of notions which do not guarantee the slide to violence.

An account of rights which will serve is given in R. and V. Routley 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; see especially p.175ff.
supreme (kind of) evil is precisely to say that under these circumstances I am committed to the use of physical force. ¹

Now there are several somewhat different arguments snarled up in these sketches. It is important to get them unsnagged ², especially if a clearer view of the ethical place of pacifism is to result. The basic argument, from lesser violence, goes as follows:

C1. There are cases where use of violence would prevent greater violence.
C2. One ought to minimize violence.
Therefore
C3. There are cases where one ought to use violence, since in this way, in any arbitrary one of the cases indicated, violence is minimized. Therefore

~P2. It is not (always) morally wrong to use violence, contradicting the pacifist principle, P2, according to which it is morally wrong, always, to use violence.

All the ingredients of this argument, together with support for the premisses, can be pulled together from Narveson's work. He not only espouses C2, but suggests two distinct arguments for it, the first of which connects the argument with the lesser evil argument:

E1. (Use of) violence is an evil.
E2. Evil should be minimized. ³

The second argument to C2 is simply from the pacifist premiss, varying P2,
E3. One ought not to undertake violence — period; that is, the level of violence ought to be zero.

8. Without getting into the level of complication, not to say epicyclying, that Regan lands himself in: he is obliged to distinguish three mirage-like senses of 'lesser evil': quantitative, qualitative, and resultant (Rp.78).
9. See np.127 where it is asserted that violence as a source of evil should be minimized, and np.119, where the point is put in terms of absolute evil. That way of putting it already starts to give the game away, since Narveson is all too evidently interested in negotiable evil which can be traded off against other evils.
Neither argument is decisive; both in fact begin easing pacifists into a frame of reference that they should resist, where moral absolutes are warped into moral relatives, where obligations give way to obligations-other-things-being-equal, etc. In any event E3 only directs one not to get involved in violence at all, and says nothing about minimizing it when one has got into it. E3 is compatible with directives quite different from minimization where violence is involved, e.g. rooting it out, which may involve nonminimization strategies. Thus E3 does not entail E2, and commitment to E2 does not commit pacifists to C2—a principle nonviolent activists usually do not accept either, being prepared to accept violence perpetrated against them, for example, as a means to social justice.

Nor do E1 and E2 entail C2; so neither does commitment by pacifists to principles like E1 and E2 oblige them to accept C2. For in particular, violence is not the only evil, and (so) evil may sometimes be reduced by some increases in violence, e.g. such well-known hypothetical cases as the slaying of an evil-perpetrating but non-violent dictator. Regan’s reconstruction of Narveson’s argument fails for similar reasons. Regan argues from premises concerning the ranking of evil and a premiss like E2', specifically

3. The use of force is a substantive evil.

4. Therefore, a lesser quantity of force must be preferred to a great quantity of force (Rp.79).

The argument is invalid: an ordering of evils does not induce a similar ordering of force, even when force is an evil. It is enough to observe that increasing force may still reduce evil, and so, on Regan-Narveson assumptions, be preferrable.11

Resort to the theme that

E1†. Violence is an irredeemable evil

(proposed by Regan in his “defence” of pacifism, Rp.80, and subsequently considered by Narveson, Np.118) promises a way around the difficulty. An irredeemable evil is figuratively so black that no combination with grays (lesser evils) or whites (goods)

10. An argument like the argument from lesser violence itself would appear to undercut the argument from E1 and E2 to premiss C2 for the argument for lesser violence.
will lighten its hue; it always dominates. E1 together with E2 will yield C2, but now the problem with the argument shifts to E1. What are the grounds for that? As Narveson points out (Np.119), it is not widely acceptable, most people being prepared to countenance some small amount of violence in exchange for considerable goods. (But then, not so long ago, most people were tolerant of cruelty to animals providing it was not too gross.) Moreover, so Narveson implies, appeal to E1 does not get pacifists out of the argument from lesser violence; indeed it seems to get them in deeper, by underwriting C2. It does break the argument however; for it removes C1 and, more importantly, the corresponding premiss of the more difficult argument from lesser evil, which starts from D1. There are cases where the use of violence would avoid greater evil.

For given, by E1, that use of violence is irredeemably evil, there is no greater evil than that tainted with violence; and there are accordingly no cases such as D1 requires. This is the core of Regan’s defence of pacifism (see Rp.80ff.), which however converts pacifism into a ‘bizarre and vaguely ludicrous’ position (Rp.86), extreme pacifism, some of the (problematic) features of which Regan outlines.12

But the approach through violence as an irredeemable evil is a mistaken (utilitarian inspired) attempt to get at moral absolutes, which is what pacifism is, like other deontological positions, grounded upon. But such absolutes are adequately expressed in such commandments as, One ought not to commit violence, meaning thereby, as it says ought not, not just for the time being, or so long as reasons for acting otherwise don’t arise, or other things being equal, or prima facie, but ought not

11. That is by no means the only element in Regan’s torturous reformulation of Narveson’s argument that can be faulted. Consider, for example, premiss ‘5. If any given action, A, is necessary to bring about a lesser rather than a greater quantity of qualitatively equivalent evil, then one’s obligation is to do A.’ While the premiss has considerable appeal as a principle of supererogation, there is little reason to accept it as one supplying obligations.

12. Extreme pacifism can be seen as taking the rule that one ought never to use violence as having priority over all other moral rules – which is indeed an extreme position even if a consistent one. Such a priority rule is an unsatisfactory way to deal with moral dilemmas: see further below.
come what may, period. Such old-fashioned deontological, moral absolutist positions, such as pacifism is at bottom, collide head-on with more fashionable, highly malleable moral positions like utilitarianism, which both Narveson and Regan (at the time) were working from. The reason for collision is simply that 'utilitarianism ... is incompatible with pacifism': for the utility 'that will be brought out by doing some violence may be greater than that produced by any alternative' (Np.121). So one who acts according to the utilitarian-commandment to maximize utility may sometimes commit violence, contravening pacifist principles.

On its own inconsistency with a false doctrine such as utilitarianism shows little: every position suffers inconsistency with very many false doctrines. Narveson does have another (small) argument to the effect that pacifism is also at odds with the other ethical positions he presents, libertarianism and contractarianism. But this argument would only carry weight, were it otherwise correct, if the positions were suitably exhaustive; however they are not, including no deeper ecological position for instance. What has happened which is more insidious, however, is that utilitarian thinking has permeated much of the rest of ethical thought, thus helping to establish a climate unfavourable to incompatible ethical positions such as pacifism. There are two more specific damaging features. Firstly, as we have seen, utilitarianism, and consequentialist approaches more generally, have made it seem as if no deontic principle were firm, but all are provisional. This is entirely mistaken. The theory of *prima facie* principles is a theory-saving device, designed to get consequentialist positions out of difficulties such as moral dilemmas. Secondly, consequentialist positions tend to suggest that

13. To show what Narveson goes on to claim that people are sometimes justified in using force rather more is required, as Regan points out, R. 85, n.18. It has also to be shown that there are cases of these types (as in Cl) and that agents can know that use of force will increase utility, reduce evil, etc. A pacifist, rightly sceptical of utilitarian tracing of consequences, and fond of noting that violence begets violence, could, with a small dose of scepticism also, dig in at this point and claim that because no one can be sure that use of force will reduce evil, so no one is justified in using force. This is sceptically-based pacifism.
only consequentialist reasons carry argumentative weight, and so try to ease rival positions, such as pacifism, into offering sometimes incongruous consequential support for their themes.

Narveson takes such procedures a stage further, and foists utilitarian assumptions upon pacifists: thus he says that the pacifist's 'objection to violence is that it produces suffering, unwanted pain, in the recipients' (p.425). These incongruous utilitarian grounds are something of a travesty of pacifists' reasons for objecting to violence, which concern rather the type of action involved and what it does - though not only or always at all in the way of suffering - to the perpetrators as well as those on whom it is inflicted. Even more astonishing, such utilitarian-style considerations are supposed to commit the pacifist to the following three statements, one of which however he must deny (!):

[N]1. To will the end (as morally good) is to will the means to it (at least prima facie).

[N]2. Other things being equal, the lesser evil is to be preferred to the greater.

[N]3. There are no "privileged" moral persons ... (p.425)\textsuperscript{14}.

'These three principles' which feature in the summation of 'the pacifist's problem', among them imply, as far as I can see, both the commitment to force when it is necessary to prevent more violence and also the conception of a right as an entitlement to defense. And they therefore leave pacifism, as a moral doctrine, in a logically untenable position (p.425).

It would take not merely logic, but a good deal of magic, to coax such consequences out of the statements given. For implications to hold the substantive terms such as 'violence' and 'right' must also figure, in one way or another, in the implicans; otherwise the implications fail just on formal grounds. The intended argument to the "commitment to force" conclusion appears however to be some sort of variant on the lesser evil argument, with N2 replacing E2' (N3 and N1 have more oblique roles, N3 to stop exceptions being made for oneself and one's group, and N1 to ensure that

\textsuperscript{14} Narveson also wants to contend that 'all of these may be defended on purely logical or "meta-ethical" grounds'. This is likely false, especially the claim as to logical status, since some of the principles are rejected in substantive ethical theories.
violence adopted or even required as a means has its full import, e.g. as reflected in C1, in an ethical end. But, for one thing, principle N1, which is at least dubious unless 'prima facie' is unbracketed, begs the question against pacifism, which is bound morally to shun violent means. Under pacifist reformulation N1 will give way to something more like N1#. To choose an end as morally good is to choose (only) morally acceptable means to it.

For another, without much further construction work the suggested arguments need not worry pacifists since nothing damaging emerges; the three principles duly adjusted; they hardly leave pacifism as untenable.

More threatening is the argument from lesser evil itself, which has yet to be countered. This is the argument from D1 (cases of violence to avoid greater evil) and N2 or E2 (minimization of evil) to C3 (admissibility of violence) and inconsistency in comprehensive pacifism. What are these difficult cases? Narveson's stock examples concern murder, one of them being the situation where person N (Narveson in fact) must kill the (potential) mass-murderer B (Np.119). But what is the moral situation here? N ought to prevent mass murder, but also N ought not to kill B, because that is murder and involves violence. The situation is that of a moral dilemma. Indeed the example is very similar to that of a paradigmatic moral dilemma, that of Pedro and Jim, where Pedro volunteers to call off his firing squad about to shoot several captives if Jim shoots one of them. Now almost everything turns on what account is given of moral dilemmas. What a comprehensive pacifist does not do, unless he wants coherence trouble, is to take the inadequate utilitarian line of trying to explain moral dilemmas away, as if they didn't ever occur (at least at other than an initial intuitive level), as if all obligations were prima facie, negotiable, etc., etc. No, the conflicting obligations stand. What is to be done is however a very consequentialist thing, to try to determine the best

15. A surprising feature of Narveson's argument, also Regan's "reconstruction", is that these cases are usually nowhere in sight, as if again one got to conclusions logically out of the air, without any of the hard work the cases involve.

16. The example was first discussed in B. Williams, 'Conflict of values', reprinted in his Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, 1981, 71-82.
thing (or a sufficiently good thing) to do in the circumstances. In trying to
determine what is the appropriate course of action principles like N2 and its mate, 
N2M, that it is preferable to minimize evil, will presumably be satisfied. Suppose
that the best course in the circumstances is a violent one, e.g. N had better shoot 
B. No inconsistency in pacifism follows. Even granted that it is preferable to minimize evil, and that in this sense (not a deontic one) evil should be minimized, it does not follow that N ought to resort to violence. On the contrary the situation remains a fix. N ought not to shoot B, but in the appalling circumstances, he had better do so\textsuperscript{17}. There is the real-life complication of a moral dilemma, but no inconsistency through arguments like that from lesser evil.

Narveson's jackpot question, entangled in his discussion of the argument from 
rights, can now be met. The question presents a dilemma:

\textbf{If force is the only way to prevent violence in a given case, is its use 
justified in that case?} (p.420)

Narveson is thinking of cases where one is about to be murdered, Regan where one is
to be raped. Given that such force again presupposes violence, the pacifist answer
is a qualified No: No, it is not deontically justified\textsuperscript{18}. It is certainly not morally
obligatory, and it is not justified, in the sense of 'justified' which reflects its
deontic origin in 'making right'. But \textit{justification} is ambiguous, and may just
amount to making out a case. The response is qualified then because some force might
be consequentially justified, as a second-best solution, in a dilemma situation.
Narveson, proposes on the contrary, that enough violence for the given occasion is
morally justified it can go at least as far as killing another person - but he
presents no back-up argument, taking his proposals as evident. As it is not the
pacifist can simply dispute it - the jackpot question does not lead to a decisive
argument against pacifism (though Narveson gives the impression that it does, e.g.
p.423). What it can lead to is the argument from lesser evil over again.

\textsuperscript{17} This corresponds to the account of moral dilemma, given in much more technical
detail in R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic
notions' in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest and others) 1983, to appear;
also available in this Discussion Paper series.

\textsuperscript{18} An extreme pacifist would answer with an unqualified No.
§3. The accusation of fanaticism, and the charge of moral insensitivity. Through its adherence to unexceptionable principles such as P2, pacifism is a form of fanaticism, so Hare contends.\textsuperscript{19} Insofar as Hare manages to get his remarkable accusation off the ground, he does by conflating pacifism with extreme pacifism: the pacifist ... solves the conflict of principles, not by critical thought, but by elevating one principle quite irrationally, over all the others (p.174).

Comprehensive pacifism in not always resolving the conflict of principles, in letting moral dilemmas stand, does neither of these things, and so does not fit into Hare's deceptively neat two-level classification of moral thought, into intuitive and critical. But comprehensive pacifism is not, as standard pacifism is not, extreme pacifism. Nor is it the particular "critical thinking", anti-pacifist solution Hare helps himself to, without any of the requisite supporting argument, according to which pacifist principles are inappropriate in many places at the present time, e.g. violence is apparently fine for countries like Israel (cf. p.175).

Hare's accusation turns on an extravagant redefinition of fanaticism. A fanatic on Hare's redefinition, a \textit{Harey-fanatic}, is a person who adheres to ideals which diverge from what utilitarianism (in approved form) recommends (cf. p.170)! Since comprehensive pacifism is committed to principles and ideals of nonviolence which, as already observed, diverge from where utilitarianism (as massaged by Hare or Narveson) tends, namely towards the appropriateness of violence in many situations, such pacifists are Harey-fanatics. This does not of course make them fanatics, in the usual sense: whether they \textit{are} fanatics depends on the very different matter of whether their position comprises 'wild or extravagant opinions' (OED) or is 'bigoted'. The idea that pacifism consists of such opinions can be removed by an appeal to history:—A great many of the sages, especially Eastern thinkers, and the founders of some of the world's main religions, have been pacifists, committed to pacifist principles\textsuperscript{20}. But the relevant opinions of such thinkers are not, can hardly be, all of the condemned type. Whence the conclusion follows. By this simple syllogism, the accusation of fanaticism is rebutted.

\textsuperscript{19} R.M. Hare, \textit{Moral Thinking}, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981, p.173. All page references to Hare's work without further citation are to this text.
Nor do comprehensive pacifists come out at fanatics under Hare's earlier, more satisfactory, though seriously incomplete, account of fanaticism: there fanaticism is treating something that is not morally relevant, such as wearing blue beads or being Jewish, as morally relevant. For however the sensitive task matter of using violence as morally irrelevant. Naturally, given that using of characterising moral relevance is completed, it can hardly exclude the violence is a morally relevant matter, so are other procedures with similar damaging results to those of applying violence: this does lead to a residual problem for comprehensive pacifism (taken up at the end of §4).

Does it really matter then that pacifists, though not fanatics, are Hare-fanatics? Although it appears that it does not matter in the least, Hare has an argument that it does. Hare-fanatics are bigots, inasmuch as had they done their homework properly, had they performed their critical thinking adequately, they would abandon the principle they are fixated upon (and, guess what, go over to Hare's utilitarianism). As one might anticipate, Hare's argument, upon which he sets great store, 'from universal perscriptivism to utilitarianism ... based [entirely] on the logic of the concepts involved' (p.176), is unsound, and in fact fails at several

20. Thus, e.g. A. Naess, *Gandhi and Group Conflict*, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, p.15:

...among the generally acknowledged moral leaders from the time of ancient China and India down to present day, the principle of nonviolence has been the rule, and the condoning of violence, even in defence, the exception.

21. R.M. Hare, *Applications of Moral Philosophy*, Macmillan, London, 1972, p.78. Note that the elegant prototype argument Hare develops in this article on peace - from universalisation, directed against fanaticism and nationalism, there presented as the main causes of war - does not lead to utilitarianism (though the seeds of the later, more obscure, route are present, e.g. on p.79) and does not tell against pacifism. What has gone wrong in Hare's later argument to the much more sweeping conclusions just alluded to, can be seen by comparing the later argument with the clearer prototype argument developed against nationalism.
crucial points. Before getting to some of these details, there is a highly objectionable feature of Hare's procedure that deserves comment, namely the way in which the whole highly informal argument is set within the framework of Hare's own two-level theory. The procedure adopted is methodologically radically unsound because it takes for granted the adequacy of Hare's theory, a matter that is open, at the very least, to serious doubt, since it supposes a quite particular, and eminently rejectable (utilitarian) way of handling and resolving moral dilemmas, a way already rejected above.\textsuperscript{22} With that rejection goes a rejection of the standard deontic logic Hare presumes, which he assumes any serious opponent must adopt. But since that logic, which Hare assumes uniquely determined, rules out any approach what, go over to Hare's utilitarianism). As one might anticipate, Hare's the question against some important opponents of utilitarianism.

In his arguments Hare divides fanatics into pure and impure. Impure fanatics comprise moral intuitionists and pure deontologists, who stick to their deontic principles, who 'cling to their intuitions' (p.176), and do not advance to what Hare calls 'critical thinking'. Hare's dismissal of "impure fanatics", such as extreme pacifists, 'because of [their] refusal or inability to face facts or to think clearly' (p.170) involves a quite illicit shift in the notion of critical thinking, originally introduced to account for a particular (primarily utilitarian) fashion of accommodating cases where intuitive principles conflict, of moral dilemmas (p.28 ff.). But this bit of dirty-trick philosophy can be here set aside, since comprehensive pacifists are presumably "pure fanatics"; for they are 'able and willing to think critically, but somehow survived the ordeal still holding moral opinions different from those of the utilitarian' (p.171). They are in fact "pure fanatics of the first type", since they go on holding opinions which turn out to be inconsistent with utilitarianism, as we have seen. According to Hare there cannot be any fanatics of this type, if his argument is correct (p.171). Therefore, his argument is not correct.

\textsuperscript{22} See further, again, Routley and Plumwood, \textit{ibid.}
One sufficient reason for incorrectness we have already glimpsed, namely failure to consider the possibility that a Harey-fanatic operates with different logical assumptions and concepts from those of utilitarians (cf. p.176 ff.). There are other reasons. For one, Hare's argument (e.g. p.177 ff.) depends on preference substitution, which requires a base class of preference-havers, among whom preferences can be intersubstituted. Hare, in the course of his discussion chauvinistically contracts this base class to certain humans.\textsuperscript{23} Differently, the whole representation of moral matters by way of preferences of this type is open to familiar objection, even by utilitarians of a different cast.

As to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, this is less an argument than a damaging charge:

A person committed to an extreme pacifism, though he need make no logical mistake, yet lacks a fully developed moral sensitivity to the vagaries and complexities of human existence (Rp.86).

The smear is not without basis. Regan is envisaging situations where violence is applied to avert greater evil; and he points to what he takes to be the evident moral permissibility of a woman's using 'what physical power she has to free herself from an aspiring rapist' (Rp.86). Interestingly, Regan has not described the situation in a way which is incompatible with a pacifist stand: there is nothing in that to prevent a woman wriggling free (even in a way that involves some force) and fleeing. What is at issue is the permissibility of using violence, which implies the (perhaps wilful) infliction of non-negligible damage, including pain, injury or death, by forceful means\textsuperscript{24} (cf. Np.110); that is, which involves much more than mere use of physical force or power (or energy). And it is by no means so evident that the woman is entitled to inflict violence upon the aspiring rapist. Once violence is duly separated from force, a pacifist can hardly be accused, in a way that can be made to stick, of crass moral insensitivity.

\textsuperscript{23} On the defectiveness of such contractions of the base class, see R. and V. Routley, op. cit., especially the concluding section.
But disentangling violence as a subcase of force is by no means so straightforward a matter as may at first seem. Indeed the literature on nonviolent action abounds with defective characterisations of violence. Fortunately the arguments developed in this paper do not depend on a tight characterisation of violence. It is enough, for main purposes, that violent actions are a subclass of actions by forceful means, a subclass picked out both through the forcible means and through what is done, in the way of inflicting damage. However it is important to indicate some constraints on a satisfactory account of violence, which are presupposed. Firstly, violence is not adequately distinguished as illegitimate force: legalised force, applied on behalf of some "legitimate" authority, is violence, so long as it is physically similar to acts not so legitimated. Violence is not removed by the imprimatur of the law. Secondly, violence is not the threat of violence, where no force is applied. (This only needs emphasizing because it is so often mistakenly supposed that threats, intimidation and the like, involve violence.) Thirdly, violence can be perpetrated without intention to inflict damage.

24. Directed against other creatures and more generally against ecological systems such as ecosystems which can be hurt. There is a difference here between live (goal-directed) systems and property, and comprehensive pacifism does not necessarily exclude wilful damage to property. Thus eco-pacifists may destroy, or at least disable, bulldozers but not harm those who use bulldozers to destroy habitat. However sensitive eco-pacifists will not condone sabotage or "violent" destruction of property either: disabling of equipment may be different.

It follows from the account of violence sketched that intimidation, threats of violence, and "psychological violence" are not violence, because they do not involve forcible means: violence is physical violence. Naturally, intimidation and psychological violence are open to moral criticism and censure on grounds related to those that tell against violence proper. For similar reasons, "economic violence" and "structural violence" are also not violence: such procedures are generally open to criticism on other grounds and hardly need to be covered under the blanket charge of violence. Nor is poverty, e.g., violence or violence-involving, except figuratively, in the way that war is an obscenity. Even given the warranted restriction of violence to physical-force, many difficult cases remain; e.g. questions as to when usually approved surgical practices involve violence.
There can be unintentional violence, e.g. the women may have applied violent means, without intending to, in escaping the rapist. Fourthly, such matters as the distance at which force is applied and the indirectness of the means, as for instance in modern military operations, are irrelevant. The submarine operator who, by causally pressing a button, fires a missile at a distant Russian city instigates a violent act. By contrast, an adjacent blockade of a city, which results in hardship but not in direct damage, may be affected by nonviolent means. Finally, violence is not confined to action done against persons, but can be directed against other life-forms, as will soon emerge.

Pacifism, like most positions, has its weaknesses, and one of them derives from the fact that violence (like pain) is a partly quantitative matter, and that there is no sharp cut-off point at the bottom end of the scale with small amounts of violence greater than zero. Yet minute (non-foot-in-the-door) amounts do not seem to matter all that much morally, at least compared with the gross evils that confront us on most sides when we look. Morally sensitive pacifists will not focus or fixate on small quantities of violence to the undue exclusion of larger moral problems. They will certainly give it to be understood that by 'violence' in principles such as P2 they mean 'nontrivial violence'.

Arguments to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, on the basis of pacifists' not taking obvious steps to prevent evil occurrences, depend also upon a confusion of passivity and pacifity. Both Regan and Narveson (e.g. p.425) assume that pacifism

25. The point is explained in more detail in G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom, op.cit., p.288n. Note however that Sharp's account of 'political violence' is defective in various other respects. It is curious, but understandable, that in his major, and massive, texts on nonviolent action, Sharp never really gets to grips with the problem of characterising violence, and indeed appears tempted by such defective equations as that of violence with force and threat with use.

26. Another comes from the necessary circumscription of permissible nonviolent action, to ensure that it does not include actions worse than nontrivial violent action.
is a passive do-nothing position. This is far from true, as the variety of methods considered or adopted by nonviolent action groups has made plain. Neither Regan nor Narveson correctly comprehend the real scope or possibilities of nonviolent action. Otherwise, Narveson would hardly be able to assert, in the automatic (but carping) way he does, that the pacifist is standing by 'not doing anything about' violence (p.425). Narveson's later negative assessment of what he calls 'positive nonviolence' does not change the situation: for this positive approach is simply nonviolence practised in an exemplary way, as by Christ, in the hope that others will follow suit, and fails to recognise the potential of nonviolent training and the extent or effectiveness of nonviolent practices. Fuller details of these practices, when assembled, much reduce the impact of the argument from social irresponsibility, which is part of what lies behind the charge of insensitivity.

§4. The argument from radical political corollaries and from other awkward corollaries. The practice of pacifism would certainly tend to eliminate war. For war involves violence, typically on an extensive scale. Standard pacifism takes out war by definition. But the position of comprehensive pacifism is not so clear. Although normally war would be excluded, what of dilemma situations? War would always be counted morally impermissible, but in exceptional extenuating circumstances it might be the (second-) best thing to do. A strange pacifism! Comprehensive

27. The methods also include anticipatory action, for instance, the policemen going off to enact violence find their vehicles won't start, e.g. because components have been removed.

As to variety, Sharp has distinguished 197 methods falling into 3 broad types: protest, noncooperation and intervention; op. cit. pp.32-3. Of course pacifisms and nonviolent action positions need not coincide: the interrelations are those of overlap (see. e.g. Sharp, Politics, p.68).

pacificism thus does not include standard pacifism, in contrast to extreme pacifism. Comprehensive pacifism can of course be brought progressively closer, in practice, to extreme pacifism through principles emphasizing the evil of violence. If that evil is given a suitably large weighting then second-best choices will yield the same results as extreme pacifism does (deontically), and entirely exclude war.

Now it can hardly be cogently argued as telling against pacifism that it would eliminate wars, since wars are exchanges that should certainly be avoided at all reasonable costs; nor therefore can an argument be mounted against pacifism from the desirability of war as an institution, at least not without much further ado. However wars are by no means the only social arrangements or institutions which dispense or rely upon violence extensively: and a more general argument may be mounted from the desirability, or inevitability, of these violence-underpinned institutions. In particular, nation-states and many of their institutions, most obviously police and military forces but less directly state legal arrangements, typically depend on violent means. States are however desirable social institutions, and war is a by-product of nation-state arrangements (in the case of just wars, are no doubt further evils to prevent greater evils). A more telling objection, then, is that comprehensive pacifism implies the inadmissibility of actively coercive institutions, such as police forces and states typically are; such organisations may be ruled out either directly as violence-dispensing or else because they have individuals, delegates, who effect violence on their behalf. Pacifism does not however exclude the replacement of such recently evolved organisations as police forces, by nonviolent substitutes, which will maintain order by alternative nonviolent means. Law and authority can still operate then in the fully nonviolent state; but it is nonviolent methods that will be applied, where necessary, to back-up authority and "enforce" laws. The force of the objection should thus not be overestimated. Pacifism does not entail the elimination of prominent social institutions concerned with public order, and accordingly does not succumb to sweeping charges of social irresponsibility. Nor is it true that
pacifism ... would also entail anarchism, that is, the illegitimacy of government. For a purely voluntary "government" is not a government in the sense that defines a state at all (Np.127).

A government or administration can certainly operate by nonviolent, or (differently) noncoercive, political arrangements. Comprehensive pacifism only implies that arrangements not of this sort are morally impermissible. Accordingly, it does not imply the absence or illegitimacy of government, or therefore of a state, of a political community organised under a government. Nor does it even imply that a state with certain coercive institutions may not be a second-best solution to moral dilemmas of political organisation. Since it admits of states with frameworks of law and authority and not necessarily based on the free agreements of individuals, pacifism does not entail anarchism. Gandhi's practice affords a counterexample: his main objective, not attained, was a nonviolent Indian state; it was not the replacement of British India by a stateless or anarchist society. Granted there are genuine interconnections between pacifism and nonviolent anarchism\(^\text{29}\), they are not so simple as derivability. Nor is comprehensive pacifism as a moral ideal so easily brought down by its political corollaries.

Comprehensive pacifism upsets other widely accepted social practices than those concerning external and internal state relations, such as war, civil order and the like: it also tells against the received treatment of other species, animals for example. While it does not entail vegetarianism, while it does not prohibit eating of meat, it does morally forbid violence to animals. At least it does this so long

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29. Both hold that the coercive state which relies upon violent methods is without moral basis or legitimacy. Both involve pretty tall orders, the replacement of violence-dispensing political organisations by alternative arrangements (on replacement in the case of anarchism, see R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'The irreputability of anarchism', Social Alternatives, 2(3) (1982) 23-8). But they differ as to what justifies these arrangements and what means can be applied (see further Sharp, op. cit., under index headings to anarchism, especially Politics, p.67). Roughly, while pacifism pushes removal of violence to a limit, anarchism pushes removal of authority (especially state authority) and restrictions on liberty, to a limit.

Naturally the interconnections did not escape Gandhi: 'The ideally nonviolent state will be an ordered anarchy' (unreferenced citation at the end of the Ecophiolsophy Newsletter, #5, p.24).
as what normally counts as violence, to animals, continues to rank as violence, and is not removed from the category by restriction of the application of violence to humans (or persons). There is little good basis however for such a chauvinistic restriction. And, in any case, similar corollaries spread into several controversial moral areas concerning the killing of humans, e.g. suicide, euthanasia, capital punishment, indeed wherever violence plays a significant role. So long as these involve violence, pacifism excludes such practices. But must they involve violence? At the risk of opening a hornet's nest, consider what examples like euthanasia may suggest, the possibility of nonviolent killing. The killing of creatures does not have to take overtly violent forms. No force need be applied: in the new "abattoirs" or hospitals a creature simply eats a pill or is given an injection and dies painlessly and without a struggle. Then the proper objections to such practices, for example that consent may not have been obtained, that worthwhile life is extinguished, are not pacifist ones, which focus on violence? On the face of it, there are no purely pacifist objections to eating meat so obtained. New technical arrangements will solve, in principle at any rate, the disruption of practices threatened by vegetarian corollaries.

But suppose now that the new technology is extended much further by clever scientists, working in their accustomed military role: newly devised "weapons", such as the anti-neutron bomb, which selectively destroys property but not people, or devices which just "dissolve" people, enable "wars" to be fought without violence. Even a pacifist who goes as far as countenancing nonviolent killing can however avoid these reaches of technological fantasy. For "dissolving" people requires energy, which (since reflecting force) can stand in for force in an (upgraded) account of violence: that is, the new wars will still involve violence.

Was there however anything so wrong with eating meat obtained by more old-fashioned violent methods such as hunting or raising and killing one's own? Pacifism, like vegetarianism, runs counter to "natural" behaviour of creatures to

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10. See R. and V. Routley, 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', op. cit. Such a restriction to persons is however imposed by Sharp, op. cit. (e.g. Politics, p.608), and it does remove the problems of vegetarianism and predation.
which the principles are supposed to apply. Aggression is a fairly common feature of animal and human behaviour, and it sometimes (though by no means so often is as made out) erupts in violence. The force of the argument can however be mitigated in various ways, for example along these lines. Aggression is assumed to be an evolutionary adaption developed to enable creatures to be better fitted for survival (of themselves and their offspring) in their natural environment. But most humans now live in rather artificial environments substantially removed from situations for which evolution gradually adapted their features (there is no way they are going to adapt in time to absorb massive doses of radiation, for instance). Much as humans have adjusted their living environment in nonevolutionary ways, so along with it they should substantially adjust their social practices – including aggressive and violent practices, now ill-adapted to their situation and mostly counterproductive. So argues the pacifist.

There is a residual problem, like that confronting vegetarianism. Are the practices of creatures living in (relatively) natural conditions, such as predators and tribal people, to be condemned as morally wrong when these involve violence? Sometimes, yes, when the violence grossly exceeds what is required given the end to be attained: but always? Though a way can be beaten around the edge of this problem, it is a rather unsatisfactory way. What this suggests is that nonviolence is not an absolute, but at best a qualified ideal. The arguments for nonviolence – which are mostly practical arguments which do not exclude occasional uses of violence and do not strictly apply to creatures in natural surroundings suggest a similar sort of conclusion. But the suggestion is a dangerous one, practically at least, since it opens the door a chink to other options which nonviolent approaches would categorically exclude. The further suggestion that emerges upon granting that moral thinking and associated principles in this area are in a pretty primitive state, is that what is called for is much more investigation aimed, among other things, at sharper, more sensitive, and less blanket principles than P2. This is to concede an attenuated charge of moral insensitivity against comprehensive pacifism so long as P2 remains unqualified. The sheer moral power of such pacifism is one reason for

31. As Singer has in the analogous case of vegetarianism: see e.g., Animal Liberation, Jonathan Cape, London, 1975.
giving its adoption some pause. There is no reason however why a genuine pacifism (making for real peace) should not be built on a modified version of P2 which permits such natural phenomena as predation. Nothing logically rules out such a genuine and more sensitive pacifism.

There are other requirements the position to be worked out should meet as well. In particular, a rationality requirement implies that pacifists go on to oppose acts similar to those using violence: otherwise they could have a case made against them. This is a requirement of consistency in a different sense from the pure logical sense, namely that of keeping to the same story. Again there need be no deep problem for pacifism, so long, this time, as it is not erroneously supposed that there must be a single principle (e.g. just P2) - as distinct from a bundle of moral principles, others of which serve to oppose acts accounted similar to those involving violence. To meet the rationality requirement the position should, in particular, be integrated into a larger framework of nondestructive practices, which are of a piece with nonviolent practices. For, except metaphorically, practices destructive to the environment, for instance, do not involve violence, e.g. such things as strip mining in a fertile valley, damaging a wild river, dumping toxic wastes in streams and oceans. In an extended sense, which gets beyond the confines of the property picture, all these practices are environmental vandalism. But even metaphorically, vandalism does not cover violence against persons (and certainly not nonphysical violence such as "psychological violence"). What is sought then is an appropriate synthesis of these notions covering destructive practices; and also an accompanying synthetic term, better than the umbrella term 'vandolence'. Then P2 is superseded by an appropriately qualified P2#. It is morally wrong to use vandolence.

It remains to characterise the cluster of destructive practices that count as vandolence and to try to justify the principle - no easy tasks.

32. It is important that pacifism, like other deontological positions, reject assessments of similarity simply in terms of similar damaging consequences. Features of the means deployed, for example, also matter.

33. The position has been called 'pacifism.'
APPENDICES

5. The arguments from impracticality and social reality: the alleged impracticality of pacifism in the real world. Even if it is conceded that pacifism is a viable moral ideal, that it does not fall down as incoherent or ludicrous, still the feasibility of pacifism as a sensible practice to live by will be contested - despite, or perhaps because of, major examples such as Christ and Gandhi. And it has to be admitted that the real world, with all its horror and squalor, does put pacifism to severe tests. But in this regard pacifism is not an exception.

Nowhere is the practice of nonviolence usually thought less likely to succeed than in replacing war. Yet nonviolent social defence methods, to replace the usual violent methods, have been described in some detail, though they have never been properly prepared for or given a dress rehearsal. The prospects for success of nonviolent defence of a region can vary significantly, depending upon whether the war convention is observed or not. If the convention is observed then pacifism stands reasonable prospects of success.

The difficult cases are where the war convention is broken, and violence is unleashed, perhaps in massive ways, on noncombatants. According to Walzer, in his superficially sympathetic sketch and assessment of nonviolent defence and resistance, 'success ... is possible only if the invaders are committed to the war convention and they won't always be' (Wp.331). This is presumably false. Success may be attained - there is never any guarantee of it, without or with war - even if some conventions are flouted. The invaders may give up and depart for all sorts or reasons, some of them irrelevant, e.g. they needed a quick decisive victory, they got homesick. What Walzer no doubt means is something like this: that sufficiently ruthless invaders in sufficient numbers with sufficient time and sufficient support

34. The more sweeping replacement of the state (of the main source of war) is considered in Routley and Plumwood, in Social Alternatives, op.cit.

35. Again for example, in Sharp, Politics, op.cit. See also Martin, op.cit., and references given there.

lines, etc., can eventually succeed. But that sort of thing is also true even if the defending side resorts to violence. The difference lies in the pattern of events; if the defence "forces" are well-armed it is more difficult and costly for the invaders to start with and easier afterwards than with well-prepared civil resistance.

Walzer is thinking, however, like many who jump to the conclusion that nonviolent defence cannot succeed when the war convention is abandoned, in terms of inappropriate examples. He is thinking of an extreme totalitarian state, in total command, in the way the Nazis were in Germany, the Jews of Germany providing the model of the enslaved population, the "resistance". The picture is highly misleading. The Jews, by and large, did not resist extermination in an organised way. The Nazis, who never invaded Germany, were in control or all the infrastructure and had the cooperation (at least) of the bulk of the population. For Walzer's comparison to work, there would have to be an enormous occupying army which took over and managed all key infrastructure. With island territories such as Australia it is not even so clear that this is logistically feasible against a largely united and actively resisting population. Walzer's impression of the resistance fragmenting and the populace moving into dulled acquiescence (e.g. Wp.332) might have got things the wrong way around, with disbelieving and frustrated soldiers ready to leave. 38

Non violent resistance is however unlikely to be put to the test in any adequate way in present state-determined circumstances. No state would be prepared to risk

37. It has been argued, moreover, that when church leaders, Christian or Jewish, opposed the deportations, most of the Jews were saved (when country by country comparisons are made). See, for one of many treatments of this sensitive issue, R.L. Rubenstein, The Cunning of History: the Holocaust and the American Future, Harper, New York, 1978, chapter 5.

38. The argument suggested in Walzer (e.g. p.333) that nonviolent methods would increase evil, or at least its distribution, is weak. It is countered by Sharp's observation that the suffering likely to be induced is less than in comparable wars.
training its populace in full nonviolent action techniques (civil defence is different). It would then be all too easy for them to "rout" the police: civil obedience, for example, could no longer be ensured by the customary violent means.

§6. On the positive case for pacifism: initial sketchings. The argument thus far has been largely defensive, meeting a range of objections to comprehensive pacifism. That in itself is revealing. Pacifism is the rest position (inertial state) and deviations from it are what require explanation. The reason for this is simple enough: violence is, on most ethical systems, at least a prima facie evil, so use of it is what has to be justified.

Positive arguments for pacifism can take advantage of its privileged position and merely try to dispose of "exceptional cases" where violence is supposed to be justified. The favourite exception is self-defence against a violent opponent: the case is curious in that the defender (person or nation) is already in a morally-excluded situation, since the attacker has overstepped moral bounds. Still the defender is not morally committed to violence whatever he does - as in a dilemma situation. And since it is at least prima facie wrong, and he does not have to use it, he should not resort to it.

An elementary syllogistic argument, given by Narveson (Np.117), can be adapted to give a similar result:

Violence is (intrinsically) wrong
Violence in any excepted cases (e.g. self-defence) is still violence
Violence in any excepted cases is still (intrinsically) wrong.

Naturally those opposed to pacifism will challenge the first premiss, and a dialectic already glimpsed will begin.

None of the arguments for pacifism is conclusive, since even where arguments are deductively tight assumptions can be challenged (as above). Nor are all the arguments for pacifism particularly good ones. One of the poorer positive arguments for pacifism, for example, makes similar assumptions to those of the classic theory.
of war, namely that once war is embarked upon it cannot be limited, e.g. the hope that nuclear or chemical weapons will be used selectively and restrictively is an illusion, escalation is inevitable. The (moral) limits in war - whatever they are - are bound to be overstepped. Although the chances of escalation are real enough, the case is overstated. Limited exchanges and confrontation are possible. Wars are much more social arrangements and much more conventional than the classical theory allows. Wars can, for example, be started and stopped in midstream should more important things intervene (e.g. a pollution crisis affecting other neighbouring states).

The main reasons for pacifism are, inevitably, those for nonviolence. They include (as support for the first premise above) a mixture of means-ends consideration, a range of consequentialist and practical reasons, e.g. the cost in pain, suffering and anguish of violent methods, the injustice that violence characteristically works, the futility and counterproductiveness of violence within the setting of modern industrial societies, the broader popular support base obtained by avoidance of violence, the desirable social consequences of nonviolence such as a more open, less furtive, society. None of these well-known types of reason (giving the why of pacifism) are separately decisive, but their cumulative effect is considerable. These reasons can be put together, in various ways, to make a strong positive case for pacifism, as principled nonviolence. Mill's defence of liberty affords a model for one way of proceeding: it is enough (a nonelementary exercise) to adapt Mill's consequentialist arguments for liberty to arguments for nonviolence, as otherwise Mill's procedure works (at least it works as well as it works for liberty).

39. As was pointed out by F. D'Agostino in discussion.
A more decisive argument, but making use of similar practical and consequentialist data, takes a semantical route. The data is used to arrive at preference rankings on worlds, and these worlds are then applied in semantically modelling nonviolence principles. Again pacifism is derived as principled nonviolence. 40

R. Routley*

40. The details of such an esoteric defence of moral principles are outlined in R. and V. Routley, op.cit.: a fuller account may be found in their 'Semantical foundations for value theory', Nous (1983), to appear.

*With thanks to R. Beehler, F. D'Agostino, B. Martin, L. Mirlin, R. Goodin, and participants in the Philosophy Seminar, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University.

The main outlines of the paper were drafted while the author was a research associate at Simon Fraser University.
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