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IN MOZAMBIQUE AND RHODESIA

GUERRILLA STRUGGLE IN AFRICA: A TWO-CASE STUDY  
IN MOZAMBIQUE AND RHODESIA

BY

HARENDRA GULABH, B.A.

A Thesis

Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS: It is the intention of this study to explore the hypothesis that a revolutionary peasant consciousness forms a quintessential ingredient in the complex of forces that culminate in a successful guerilla struggle. Beyond this, it will be demonstrated that the success of the struggle in Mozambique is a product of the development of an ideological clarity during the course of a struggle where the ruling class was in decay and thus lacked the indigenous capacity to forge a sustained, cohesive defense against the revolutionary movement. In Rhodesia on the other hand, while many of the objective conditions have contributed to the development of guerilla struggle, as in Mozambique, nevertheless the presence of a well-entrenched, indigenous, white bourgeoisie with sole domination of state power has been a great barrier to the protracted struggle. Consequently, the greater difficulties inherent in this have minimized guerilla gains. This has resulted in sectarianism and a diminution of peasant consciousness with an overall deleterious impact on the Zimbabwe struggle as a whole.

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I will not add that all the responsibilities are mine for analyses must be a collective effort if they are to be of any use in the struggle.

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TO THE STRUGGLE  
OF THE  
PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE



## INTRODUCTION

Recently, much has been written about the participation of the peasantry<sup>1</sup> as an essential component in determining the success of a guerilla struggle. Utilising the practical example of the success of the guerilla wars against Portugese colonialism in Africa, revolutionists have only begun to analyse the significance of guerilla warfare in the setting of the Southern African socio-economic context. The singularly most important aspect of the manifestly racist politics of the Sub-continent lies in the presence of intransigent minority regimes, uncomfortably ensconced on the potentially volatile, yet latent response of indigenous peasantries. The mechanism of their apparent invincibility rests most immediately on their oppressive, yet highly effective military preponderance. However, this vast network of military and of late counter-insurgency preparedness is a direct function of its economic dependence on the western industrial capitalist nations. Vast internal resources have guaranteed their security as undynamic, repressive systems that produce tremendous wealth at the expense of a highly exploitable reservoir of cheap African labour. After the 1960's the inflow of private capital investment in Southern Africa, for instance, has been staggering compared with similar investment in other parts of Africa. The most dramatic aspect of this tremendous increase is almost wholly attributable to the promise of multifold profitable returns. In Southern Africa, the state sustains this guarantee through its steady series of the most repressive type of anti-labour legislation that is found anywhere in the

world<sup>2</sup>. Also, the apparatus of state machinery lends credibility to its legitimacy and the status quo, meanwhile rendering it a valuable trading and commercial ally of international capitalism<sup>3</sup>. However, this is not to digress from the main concern so much as to illustrate the international capitalist background against which these guerilla struggles must be viewed. The extent to which capitalist economic realities contribute to the development of a revolutionary consciousness, therefore, is made increasingly clear. Broadly then, this premises the main thrust of my argument which will include its relationship to an emerging ideology, that is anti-imperialist, and by definition anti-capitalist, as a result of the contradictions that produce the struggle.

Since colonial intransigence here has led to the foreclosure of all avenues of a social and economic transformation, most attempts by resisters to seek a redress of long-standing grievances and an amelioration of social and economic conditions have been thwarted. Inevitably, this accounts for the long history of indigenous resistance which has now culminated in guerilla struggles in parts of colonial Africa, with the potential of spreading. Yet, this racial minority's intransigence has roots that do explain its raison d'etre and the continued existence of the capitalist status quo. Although the classical Marxian economic basis to social change does not form the subject matter of this study, a predominantly economic perspective will contribute significantly to an understanding of revolutionary change that is predicated on socialist doctrine.

I shall focus on the hypothesis that a revolutionary consciousness in the peasantry is the most active and indispensable ingredient of a

successful guerilla struggle. All things considered, I shall argue that in the last analysis the logic of guerilla struggle, per se, will in time, forge this revolutionary consciousness through the total participation of the peasantry<sup>4</sup>. In the dialectic of struggle, capitalist contradictions per se given their irreconcilability will furnish the need for a national re-construction, based more or less on socialist principles. The crucial "emphasis on popular participation", writes Mark Selden, "that forms the fundamental postulate of people's war, meant that strength and legitimacy rested primarily on active peasant support".<sup>5</sup> What was sine qua non in the Chinese and Vietnamese struggles against the entrenched army of occupation, obtained equally so in the resistance to Portugese imperialism in the colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Guiné-Bissau. Writing about the peasant struggle in Mozambique, John Saul has similarly suggested that popular peasant participation in

"the struggle has become the key both to Frelimo's (Mozambique's resistance movement) military success and to its own internal clarity as a revolutionary movement"<sup>6</sup>

For, broadly based active peasant participation in the struggle allows for the emergence of a unity of the vanguard movement or party and the peasants. The relationship between the two components is consolidated by the immediate commitment to a common struggle against a common enemy. The logic of struggle, will, thus generate a consciousness of revolutionary praxis. Hence, in Vietnam, where peasant resistance to ubiquitous U.S. imperialism became the cause célèbre of revolutionaries everywhere, revolutionary consciousness functioned,

"to set up a strong struggling village...to defend the people's life and livelihood, to preserve the human,

material and financial strength for the revolution and realistically push forward the armed struggle."<sup>7</sup>

To understand the conditions which determined the state of preparedness in Vietnam is to realise the importance of that awareness that is derived from a long struggle involving the full commitment of the peasantry. But revolutionary consciousness hardly falls from the sky; it cannot exist in a vacuum of apolitical struggle. The daily lives of peasantries centre around narrow political issues of a personal nature. In short, as Basil Davidson has said,

"'big words' about freedom and independence can achieve nothing if the 'little words' about local oppression are not persuasive."<sup>8</sup>

Relationships within the village commune and the immediate environment form the primary issue of concern, rather than the apparently abstract and incomprehensible 'trivia' about international money markets or the latest 'newspaper' reports on investment returns of transnational corporations that ironically affect the modus vivendi of the village itself. At any rate, the close relationship of the peasantry to basic subsistence agriculture denies the prospect of any sudden response to farming and agricultural innovations. At heart, peasant society is indeed, steeped in the tradition of conservatism. True, "parochialism cuts deep in rural areas, the outlines of the broader exploitative environment, world-wide and territorial, which oppresses him are not easily perceived by the peasant."<sup>9</sup> However, if peasants are politicised about the causes of their meagre subsistence, as being the outcome of an economic system which, in a broader international context, is oppressive to other people as well, there is every possibility that this consciousness will demand new prior-

ities. These priorities will undoubtedly find expression in close peasant cooperation and ultimately peasant participation in the guerrilla struggle. However, this will only occur when a revolutionary consciousness displaces their narrowly parochial interests.

Yet, it is significant to note that the transformation of African societies through the 'inherent strength' of international capitalism is at the same time creating conditions that uproot old traditional values of village cooperation and thus alienate peasants from their total dependence on the land. The very system that forces cash-economy needs in peasants remote from the line of rail, also expects a newer dependence on finished products of the capitalist system. Moreover, the 'citizenisation' of the peasantry, as well as continuing the dependence on cheap goods from the urban industrialised centres, adds a new dimension in that it incorporates the rural areas into the expanding capitalist economy of the metropolises. The state perpetuates capitalist economic relations by legitimating a forced levy that is generally beyond the reach of the peasant, who as a consequence, is compelled to enter the cash economy as has been the case in Rhodesia. A clear manifestation of such a case is the 'hut-tax'<sup>10</sup> which guarantees a constant supply of cheap labour that is so attractive to private capitalist investments.

To return to the principal theme of this paper, then, revolutionary consciousness is created as a result of the participation of peasants in struggle. But, at the same time, peasant participation must be based on a correct analysis of the objective conditions that obtain in society. The spirit of the analysis is emphasised by Mao tse-Tung, writing on the Chinese experience;

6

"...when you do anything, unless you understand its actual circumstances, its nature and its relations to other things, you will not know the laws governing it, nor know how to do it, nor be able to do it well."<sup>11</sup>

He anticipates the direction of struggle once he has evaluated the factors that constitute the objective conditions. At the same time, mere theoretical considerations do not suffice as the birth of a revolutionary consciousness comes in the wake of engaging in struggle. Thus;

"History tells us that correct political and military lines do not emerge and develop spontaneously and tranquilly, but only in the course of struggle."<sup>12</sup>

The struggle then, is a product of political analysis made by a guiding organisation which has to lead and in the exchange between leaders and led, a dialectic is established. The resultant 'to and fro' of the two constituent elements in turn produces struggle, as a manifestation of resolving the contradiction. To paraphrase Trotsky, the piston moves as a result of the energy of the steam and vice versa, each representing the Party and the peasants, respectively<sup>13</sup>. The metaphor captures the fundamental dialectical relationship between the two components, as indeed, a piston engine works. Still, the essential feature that emerges, then, is characterised by an understanding of objective conditions that exploit the peasantry. Any understanding of objective conditions then must be based on an ideology, or as Mao Tse-Tung has suggested, a "correct line". The dialectic of a 'people's war', can only become meaningful by the marriage of an effective organisation, that has a high level of revolutionary consciousness, to an oppressed peasantry that perceives its own spontaneous force. The scenario of the relationship between the peasants and the guerilla organisation is better articulated by Selden

writing about the Vietnam situation but could easily depict Mozambique as well. The 'peasantness' of the two situations evokes a sense of mutual identification. A very similar experience, particularly with respect to the forging of new bonds, occurred during the early stages of the Mozambican revolution. Also, guerilla/peasant bonds were secured in the context of the traditional cooperative movement. Historically, of course, the Mozambican peasantry did not share the element of the dying remnants of feudal society, in as much as autocratic landlordism was more a feature in Vietnam than it was in Mozambique. However, a parallel did exist in the figure of the Portugese colonial official and the agent of the prazos, or land concessions. It is worth drawing a parallel then, between the two peasant struggles in the scenario of how revolutionary consciousness enters a peasant milieu. In Selden's words:

"In the course of a people's war, local communities defined in response to the imperatives of defence and social change may be effectively integrated in national movements. The very intensity of the wartime experience contributes to the rapid development of consciousness and organisation. In people's war, peasants cease to be the passive pawns of landlords and officials or to fatalistically accept the verdict of a harsh natural environment. Where the primary resource of insurgent movements is man and where active commitment is the sine qua non of success, the sharing of common hardships and hopes creates powerful bonds among peasant resisters and between leaders and led. In the new institutions which emerge locally in the course of the resistance, to an unprecedented degree peasants begin to secure active control of their economic and political destinies."<sup>14</sup>

And further on, Selden adds that the struggle

"...forges new bonds of unity in which the very definitions of leader and led are recast and the beginnings of a new social basis are created."<sup>15</sup>

It is important to note here that these 'beginnings of a new social basis',

is precisely the outgrowth of a vision that animates an inherent abhorrence of the status quo of capitalist class relations. The very intensity of struggle crystallizes irreconcilable capitalist contradictions that are resolved only in a synthesis of revolutionary praxis, that but reinforces the guerilla/peasant unity.

Conscious struggle on an ideological level, taking into account the weight of international capitalism as the oppressing antagonist, will demonstrate the overt class basis of colonial society. Once this hurdle of exposing the real enemy is overcome, a more thorough analysis of capitalist class relations can occur. Necessarily, the role of ideology has its constituent place in the understanding of objective conditions. Such an exploration will lead to new forms of development. It has been suggested that possibly the only real alternative to the uneven and inequitable capitalist developmental model is socialism. The need to integrate this new pattern underpins all revolutionary struggles. As Saul has recognised,

"most twentieth century revolutionaries aim at some kind of socialist transformation of the existing system, this being, ultimately, the only effective response to imperialism."<sup>16</sup>

The fact of the gradual transformation from capitalist to post-capitalist economic life based on mutual non-antagonistic cooperation is in large measure, due to the widespread praxis of socialist re-construct-  
ion. This is particularly true of areas that have undergone such revolutionary change as to transform their social and productive relations in areas that are literally described as 'liberated areas', which have, now become part of the guerilla lexicon. As a result of growing peasant



participation in the ongoing guerilla struggle, revolutionary consciousness is manifested in a greater egalitarianism that is all the more encouraging in view of its admission by such hostile a critic as Douglass Pike who claims that;

"Probably, it is safe to conclude that the group norm in the liberated area was characterised by a greater sense of equalitarianism, greater social mobility with individual merit counting for more and family for less, and a greater awareness of strata, class consciousness or social solidarity."<sup>17</sup>

It is a striking testimony to the degree of peasant participation coupled with the efforts of the vanguard party that is able to prepare politically for a revolutionary class consciousness, that is animated by the exigencies of guerilla struggle which can ultimately forge favourable conditions for socialist re-construction.

To recap the main points thus far, peasants have been active participants in both Vietnam and China and in both cases it has to be guided by the Party. The same is true of guerilla struggles elsewhere but the major concern is to show the indispensibility of revolutionary consciousness as a precondition to successful guerilla warfare. The two areas where I try to show this as a testable hypothesis is in Mozambique and Zimbabwe<sup>18</sup> (Rhodesia) in the context of minority regimes based on racial supremacy, yet wholly dependent on Western capitalist investment. Minority racialist regimes, by the coercive machinery of the army and police, help buttress their own privileges and allow for international capitalist investments that yield a vast surplus as a result of the 'citizenisation' (enslavement) of the peasantry. The continued intransigence of the regimes in power leave little choice but armed struggle.

In the process of preparing for struggle, a party or effective organisation must politicise the peasantry and raise its level of parochial consciousness to accommodate for revolutionary armed struggle that is linked to a radically new ideological anti-capitalist perspective that most closely resembles socialism.

In assessing a successful guerilla struggle then, one has to determine what success means in this context. Basil Davidson has outlined several conditions for arriving at its definition. At the outset, a fundamental prelude to a

"successful guerilla-type resistance can never stem from military adventure, however motivated, but only from the political exploitation of a general situation which is felt by a mass of people to be hatefully and obviously unjust to them."<sup>19</sup>

This condition is one which can easily be satisfied in the context of the Southern African situation. In the two areas that form the basis of this study, similar historical circumstances obtained, except for one crucial difference, that I will fully explore in its proper perspective. Here I shall merely point out the legislative sovereignty of Rhodesia since 1923<sup>20</sup> as opposed to the total 'colonial' status of Mozambique. Important differences, as a consequence, have affected the development of an African resistance to white settlerism there.

Again, these conditions that I introduce here will feature as integral aspects of my argument that a revolutionary consciousness which was the fundamental pre-condition of the guerilla success in Mozambique, developed and consolidated the struggle against Portuguese imperialism because it had the total support and active participation of the Mozambican peasantry. That the nature of the struggle was anti-

imperialist, forced a re-definition of a development pattern that has been in other African situations, based on the capitalist model. It is this fact of an anti-imperialist struggle that has engendered from the start, a radical socialist perspective. The guerilla war has been, from obviously strategic and military viewpoints fought with the idea of it being part of a much wider struggle against a world-wide system of international capitalism. The fact that bombs that fall on peasant villages are made in the U.S. and aircraft that strafe rural hamlets come from France and that guerilla arms from Czechoslovakia, Cuba and China is patently indicative of the world-wide implications of the war. Without delving too deeply on this single aspect, I want to emphasise the importance of the connection between a state of revolutionary consciousness and a re-definition of reality inevitably forced by the exigencies of guerilla war that anticipates success. This has been the case in Mozambique, where precisely as a result of active peasant revolutionary consciousness, success was surely inevitable. In contrast, the success of the guerilla struggle in Zimbabwe has been more doubtful due to a number of factors, but particularly the absence of the crucial element of a revolutionary consciousness. However, other factors will mitigate its political development that was predicated on the obfuscating issue of constitutional reformism that extended back to 1923. This significantly contributed to the hijacked revolutionary struggle in Zimbabwe, where African resistance focused on the vaguest of 'demands' for 'African majority rule', and a 'non-racial partnership'. That the 'demands' were mutually antagonistic was not recognised. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that African resistance ignored any call for fundamental

structural changes.

According to Davidson, to return again to his conditions,

"this political exploitation will still fail unless it can pass from the mobilisation of mass support to the mobilisation of mass participation."<sup>21</sup>

It is an imperative that must be satisfied if any mass support is to be retained in order to secure the base. Initially the peasantry will understand this need but its active involvement is itself the mechanism through which the struggle gains both in momentum and in strength. Political work that precedes any direct confrontation is the necessary function of political cadres, who by definition, are small in number, with a high level of revolutionary consciousness and motivated by dedication to the struggle. Since cadres are at a disadvantage in numbers, local peasants must therefore present 'a steady stream of new volunteers' whose political consciousness, in the context of the imminent struggle, develops fully enough to effect a constantly expanding base of operations. This type of peasant mobilisation will result in the widespread consolidation of support which leads to the establishment of agricultural co-operatives and to 'free base areas', where guerillas can move freely amongst the peasants. The dialectic of guerilla struggle then becomes fully operative in one small area.

But this process of peasant mobilisation involves not only an analysis of historical circumstances, but

"the most intimate knowledge of local habits, languages, hopes and fears...Peasants are not optimistic people"

advises Davidson,

"and they will not be persuaded by those who do not closely understand them and share their lives."<sup>22</sup>

This is probably the most fundamental level of communication between the leaders, (political cadres) and the peasants. In a real sense, it expresses the resolution of the dialectic since it is also a sharing of two perspectives; one that is local and whose reality is to all intents and purposes, untainted by the broader issues that the other represents, in terms of an understanding of central authority and Government that is so alien to peasant culture. Indeed, as Eric Wolf notes in writing of revolutionary leaders who, in 'going to the people' exhibit

"these behaviour patterns and cultural idioms they must first unlearn, if they are to enter into successful contact with the peasant rebels."<sup>23</sup>

It is worth quoting a little more of Wolf's observations with respect to the primary contacts between cadres and peasants. What occurs is:

"a complex dialogue with the villagers in which the outsider learns as much, if not more about local organisation and criteria of relevance, than the local inhabitants. Guerilla warfare both speeds and deepens this learning as cadre and peasant activists synchronise their behaviour and translate from one cultural idiom into the other."<sup>24</sup>

Thus, the initial trust is built on cadres' patient reckoning with peasant life from which, in most cases, they have long since become alienated since, as Amilcar Cabral has noted,

"the leaders of the liberation movement (are) drawn generally from the 'petty bourgeoisie' (intellectuals, clerks) or the urban working classes (workers, chauffeurs, wage-earners in general)..."<sup>25</sup>

Only in this way can cadres gain the necessary trust and confidence of the peasantry. But the dialogue is a function also of the foundations for an incipient socialism as

"the (guerilla) leaders realise the richness of spirit, the capacity for reasoned discussion and clear exposition of ideas, the facility for understanding and assimilating

concepts, by population groups who yesterday were forgotten if not despised, and who were considered helpless by the colonisers and even by some nationalists. The leaders thus enrich their culture. They develop personally. They free themselves from complexes. They reinforce their capacity to serve the movement in the service of the people."<sup>26</sup>

Thus do the cadres integrate and understand, but still more, actively identify with the village community by the praxis of living in peasant society, underpinned by a theoretical understanding of socialism, if indeed that is the case. But, no matter, since the vaguest of quasi-socialist, 'African humanist' principles will later reinforce and crystallize into a more coherent body of socialist practice.

Let me complete the dialectic, as it, in turn affects the peasantry who begin to understand the broader context of this primary stage of struggle. In the words of Amilcar Cabral, the articulate ideologue of another guerilla struggle against Portuguese imperialism in Guinea-Bissau;

"On their side, the working masses and in particular the peasants, who are usually illiterate and have never moved beyond the boundaries of their village or their region, come into contact with other groups and lose those complexes of their own that constricted them in their relationships with other ethnic and social groups. They realise their role in the struggle. They break the bonds of their village universe. They integrate progressively into their country and the world. They acquire an infinite amount of new knowledge that is useful for their immediate and future activity within the framework of the struggle. They strengthen their political understanding by assimilating the principles of national and social revolution postulated by the struggle. They thereby become more able to play the decisive role of providing the principle force behind the liberation movement...

...The armed liberation struggle implies, therefore, a veritable forced march along the road to cultural progress."<sup>27</sup>

The outline of the beginnings of a new social order akin to socialism, is thus, in the making. Indeed, the vision of the product of the struggle against international capitalism becomes clear the more so when one realises that the manifestations of the oppressive class nature of imperialism are everywhere evident. It is this realisation that introduces the compelling need to re-orient the struggle in the context of a radical and structural transformation of society. Of necessity, a revolutionary consciousness must obtain in order to sustain a high level of peasant participation.

But peasant participation is based on a correct understanding which only comes out of an analysis of the objective conditions that obtain in society. As I have indicated above, the revolutionary war in China, according to Mao Tse-Tung,

"proved that we need a correct...Marxist military line as well as a correct Marxist political line"<sup>28</sup>

which implies of course, a true understanding of the realities of capitalist society. But in Zimbabwe indeed, there has always been a broadly political understanding albeit in the context of constitutional reformism. This preponderance and affair with such a subterfuge has invariably accounted for an inability to have analysed the objective reality of Rhodesian society. Thus a false consciousness has been at the root of the vacillating and unclear political aims of the African leadership there. Hence, it is possible to engage in guerilla warfare without understanding the objective conditions that obtain in society, as has been the case in Rhodesia. Adventurist, armed confrontation against the incumbents will fail unless political work is done, prior to such an engagement. This

lesson has been learnt now, by the guerillas there as they realise their mistakes.

A fourth condition that contributes to a successful guerilla war, as Davidson has suggested is that,

"In step with the development of the resultant political and military struggle (the two becoming inseparable) the organisation of this type of modernising peasant movement must be such that the fact and influence of mass participation becomes, and remains, a dominant and manifest factor in the whole process. The peasants want to be sure they are fighting for themselves; only then will they become willing to fight for their neighbours as well."<sup>29</sup>

Often enough, not adequate leeway is given to the peasant in terms of allowing for peasant initiative as well as leadership potential, but at the same time,

"following from this, the growth of mass participation must never be allowed to rob the new vanguard of its leading role; otherwise their leaders will move in one direction while the peasants go off in another."<sup>30</sup>

The dialectic of struggle militates against the latter possibility inasmuch as the logic of a revolutionary war that is based on the active support of the peasantry, articulate in a revolutionary consciousness, holds within it the essential component of guerilla success.

The theoretical considerations have been outlined in the preceding overview of the dynamics of guerilla struggle, briefly alluding to the Vietnamese and Chinese experiences. In the frame of reference of Davidson's five conditions that are necessary for successful guerilla warfare, I want to analyse each of the two case studies I have chosen, but at the same time, cognisant of the basic assumption that I believe underpins all revolutionary success. My emphasis therefore is predicated on the hypothesis that a revolutionary consciousness in the peas-



antry is an integral component of successful guerilla struggle.

I shall demonstrate this in the two case studies I have chosen. The two cases have some basic similarities that I shall explore below. At the same time, as is now known, Mozambique differs in that PRELIMO has successfully concluded its guerilla struggle against the primary enemy, Portuguese colonialism. The campaign to transcend this initial guerilla phase and to enter the second and ongoing revolutionary struggle must be continued. For the purposes of this paper, I limit my discussion to the conclusion of guerilla warfare in Mozambique. Rhodesia, on the other hand, is a slightly more confusing issue. As I will explain, factors that were absent in Mozambique, have played an important role in thwarting an effectively, challenging guerilla movement there. Again, as we know, the chances of a guerilla victory in Rhodesia appears to be a trifle reduced. It is still possible, however, to assess the probable outcome of the guerilla war there in view of the comparative experience in Mozambique and its dynamic of struggle. Perhaps, the single most important aspect of the guerilla campaign in Rhodesia, is reflected in the failure of the African nationalists to effectively conduct political work prior to launching the offensive. Other factors will further clarify this cursory evaluation. One last point that will perhaps illuminate the discussion is the absence of any liberated areas from which an extensive political education of the peasantry could have been mounted. PRELIMO's strength grew even in the south, least affected by guerilla warfare, by the sheer weight of its success in the north. It became a viable alternative to the concentrated power of Portuguese rule. It actually proved the destructibility of Portuguese hegemony. In this respect, it

acted as a catalyst, insofar as it more or less guaranteed a steady flow of new recruits. This, then, is an important distinction between the two cases.

## FOOTNOTES

## CHAPTER I

1. The term peasantry, which will be used throughout this paper, will be interpreted to mean in the definition that John S. Saul and Roger Woods in "African Peasantries", have given:

"...those whose ultimate security and subsistence lies in their having certain rights in land and in the labour of family members on the land, but who are involved, through rights and obligations, in a wider economic system which includes the participation of non-peasants."

From Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, Essays on the Political Economy of Africa. (New York, 1973, P. 407).

2. For instance, the infamous Pass Laws, that rigidly control the influx of cheap African labour into the urban industrial centres of South Africa. It is a criminal offence to be without the Pass Book, an identification booklet that must be in possession of the owner, twenty four hours a day. Failure to produce this biographical document on demand is automatically punishable by imprisonment. It is compulsory only for Africans.
3. See Ruth First et al, The South African Connection. (Harmondsworth, 1972, Pp. 316-339).
4. I shall explain in the concrete example of the Mozambican struggle how this logic of guerilla struggle has been an important function of the revolutionising of peasant consciousness, e.g. see Pp. 42-43.
5. Mark Selden, "People's War in China and Vietnam", in Lawrence Kaplan, ed., Revolutions: A Comparative Study. (New York, 1973, P. 399).
6. John S. Saul, "African Peasants and Revolution", in Review of African Political Economy. (No. 1, August 1975, P. 55).
7. Selden, op. cit. Pp. 395.
8. Basil Davidson, "African Peasants and Revolution", in Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3, April 1974, P. 279.
9. Saul, op. cit., Pp. 42-43.
10. See below P. 61.

11. Mao Tse-Tung, "Revolutionary War in China" in Kaplan op. cit., p. 355.
12. Ibid., p. 362.
13. 'Without a guiding organisation the energy of the masses would dissipate like steam not enclosed in a piston box. But nonetheless what moves things is not the piston, or the box, but the steam.' Trotsky's dictum cited in Saul, "African Peasants and Revolution", op. cit., p. 42.
14. Selden, op. cit., pp. 374-375.
15. Ibid., p. 375.
16. Saul, op. cit., p. 43.
17. Quoted in Selden, op. cit., p. 399.
18. The African name for Rhodesia; named after an ancient civilisation whose ruins still stand in the southeastern part of the country.
19. Davidson, op. cit., p. 279.
20. See below in chapter on Rhodesia, p. 58.
21. Davidson, op. cit., p. 279.
22. Ibid.
23. Eric R. Wolf, "Peasant Problems and Revolutionary Warfare", cited in Selden, op. cit., pp. 384-385.
24. Ibid.
25. Amilcar Cabral, "National Liberation and Culture", cited in Davidson, op. cit., p. 280.
26. Ibid.
27. ibid.
28. Mao Tse-Tung, op. cit., p. 361.
29. Davidson, op. cit., p. 280.
30. Ibid.

## MOZAMBIQUE

- Sept. 25, 1964: the first military offensive - general administration and military posts in Cabo Delgado attacked;
- November, 1964: attacks extended to Niassa, Zambezia and Tete; Portuguese, unprepared, are unable to maintain defenses in four provinces at once. FRELIMO<sup>1</sup> consolidates position in Cabo Delgado and Niassa.
- 1965-mid-1966: no FRELIMO major offensives: mining of roads, ambushes, strengthening and consolidation of military and political position, and training of new recruits by FRELIMO.
- Mid-1966-mid-1967: over 30 Portuguese bases attacked.
- Late 1967: fighting extended in all regions; control in Cabo Delgado to the River Lurio, surrounding Porto Amelio (the capital); control in Niassa to the Marrupa-Maua line; to the south, the Catur zone; to the west, conditions for re-opening the struggle in Tete and Zambezia are created.
- March, 1968: military operations begin in Tete Province. (site of Cabora Bassa hydroelectric power dam; built largely by South African interests; multi million dollar project).
- May, 1974: FRELIMO fighters shot down 9 aircraft, destroyed 20 vehicles and 2 trains, five posts were attacked and numerous ambushes and sabotage operations were carried out. Altogether about 150 enemy soldiers were killed and many wounded."<sup>2</sup>

April 25, 1974: The Armed Forces Movement engineers a successful coup d'etat and topples the Caetano/Salazar dynasty in Portugal. This is a direct consequence of the combined efforts of the 3 guerilla wars in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. The initial stage of the revolution has been achieved. Now begins the long and arduous phase of consolidating revolutionary gains; national re-construction of the social and economic relations that already have been forged by the struggle must be matured.

FRELIMO accedes to power as a sovereign state in Mozambique, June 25, 1975.

To fathom how profoundly this revolution has altered social and economic relations in Mozambique is, as yet, too early to say. Any attempt to assess FRELIMO's success in radically transforming the productive relations in society therefore, is premature. However, a good indication of its political direction and the extent to which the Mozambican revolution has gone, can be derived not only from its trajectory starting with its early days of hit-and-run ambush tactics to its sophisticated military strategies but also the degree to which the peasantry has integrated the now evidently socialist ideology.<sup>3</sup> This guerilla victory must be seen in the light of the traditional exploitive machinery of Portuguese imperialism. In particular, the practice of enslaving the peasantry was at the root of the history of exploitation that characterised 450 years of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique. Colonial imperatives such as inter alia, unequal 'trade' with the 'indigenas', and the total submission of the peasantries, were reinforced by the divine autocracy of the Catholic Church, to produce 450 uninterrupted years of absolute

Portuguese hegemony that ended so abruptly, though hardly surprisingly, on April 25, 1974. What factors indeed, contributed to its downfall? The underlying cause, however, must be attributed to its inability to resolve the contradictions that were generated by the very nature of its imperialism. The presence of mutually antagonistic classes, based apparently on race, remained the fundamental contradiction in Mozambican society. There was at once a class of land-owners and a class of landless peasants<sup>4</sup>. The former enjoyed unchallenged privileges, while the latter was deprived of their basic inalienable right to the land. Indeed, they were enslaved to work on the farms of the large prazos (land concessions) that were distributed by the crown. The prazo system was introduced

"in an effort to strengthen their (Portuguese) tenuous hold on the interior and in the process replaced African chiefs with a class of large landowners who wielded absolute power and authority over their African subjects and who subsequently tended to operate independent of royal control."<sup>5</sup>

The excesses perpetrated against the landless peasantry by this large landowning class, gave rise to

"African protest in Mozambique (that) evolved from the early experience of Portuguese colonialism and imperialism".<sup>6</sup>

Ultimately, this Lusitanian character that Antonio Salazar, former Prime Minister of Portugal, claimed was 'colour blind' rested on the same racism that is a necessary instrument for the maintenance of an economic system based on the blind exploitation of a labour force rationalised as 'beasts of burden'. As it is now evident, this myth is clearly a useful mechanism to legitimate the inexhaustible supply of a racially distinct cheap labour force that is forced into an economically subservient position.

Peasant labour is owned and used to produce a surplus whose profit is then expropriated and, therefore, denied to the producers. Once this fundamentally economic relationship is understood, the subsequent history of exploitation and the African response expressed in continued resistance, will clearly explain why Portugal clung on to her profitable colonies. A colonial administrator, Antonio Enes of the 1890's stated precisely his views on forced labour; the sentiments, to all intents and purposes accurately reflect Portuguese colonialism;

"The state, not only as a sovereign of semi-barbaric populations but also as a depository of social authority should have no scruples in obliging and if necessary, forcing these rude Negroes in Africa, these ignorant Pariahs in Asia, those half-witted savages from Oceania, to work ...(sic)"<sup>7</sup>

Such an outburst of hatred for coloured races is still very much an expression of the constant need to legitimate the 'slave' empires of incalculable economic wealth, that have been built by such God-fearing Christian nations as the European imperialist powers. But it is misleading, I believe, to predicate the fantastic economic fortunes on the fact of racism. Rather, in a broader sense, the issue of racism is a convenient tool of imperialism, in any age, to divide the labour class and in this case, the peasants.

Eduardo Mondlane, (the first President of FRELIMO, who was assassinated in 1969) isolates the initial symptom of an imperialist economy, in discussing the Portuguese relationship to Africans,

"the background to the political relationship between the Portuguese and the African is one of conquest. The Portuguese sought to control the African either by influence, or failing this, through military conquest which directly destroyed the African political structure."<sup>8</sup>



His analysis of the legalisation of this conquest is important for two reasons; firstly, it clearly spells out the racial character of the labour legislation that was to emerge from this and secondly, it refutes the myth that Mozambique has always been a 'non-racial' society. Thus;

"It was not until the end of the nineteenth century, when conquest was completed and a comprehensive colonial administration set up, that the full legal basis of the relationship began to emerge. The significant point about the government established at the end of the nineteenth century, was the clear separation of two administrative codes, one for Africans and one for Europeans... The main legislative achievements of the early twentieth century were to define the legal basis for this distinction between two types of population."<sup>9</sup>

The full impact of this policy in economic terms can be understood in the fact of basic agricultural wages:

<u>"Race</u>	<u>Annual Wages in Escudos</u>	
(Whites) Europeans	47,723.00	
Africans	1,404.00	" <sup>10</sup>

This economic discrepancy lies at the heart of the capitalist nature of the private accumulation of resources that are socially produced. Portugal's intransigence in admitting to the fact of her colonies is, patently a direct function of her primarily economic importance.<sup>11</sup> An inexhaustible legal supply of cheap labour to produce goods that can realise competitively high profits is undoubtedly, the basis to its colonialism and that of capitalist Europe. However, any further analysis of this type of economic imperialism is outside the scope of this paper. It would require a whole new study to explore the economic aspects of Portuguese colonialism.

Yet, it is of signal importance to note that the official Portuguese rationalisation of her foreclosure to peasant demands, for Moz-

ambican self-determination is found in convoluted sophistry as expressed by Salzar; I will quote him fully in order to emphasise that the alternative of FRELIMO's revolutionary armed struggle was a direct function of the inflexibility of Portuguese imperialism; in addition note that the contradictions are again exposed;

"These contracts (in overseas territories) have never involved the slightest idea of superiority or racial discrimination...I think I can say that the distinguishing feature of Portuguese Africa - notwithstanding the concerted efforts made in many quarters to attack it by word as well as action - is the primacy we have always attached and will continue to attach to the enhancement of the value and dignity of man without distinction of colour or creed, in the light of the civilisation we carried to the populations who were in every way distant from ourselves!"<sup>12</sup>

The very basis of Portuguese intransigence to African self-expression then, is found in the apparently 'non-racial' character of Portugal's colonies. By the strange logic of incorporating these colonies into the Portuguese political structure as 'overseas provinces'<sup>13</sup>, the issue of independence for the colonies was duly avoided. Instead, the colonies were even invited to participate in the Portuguese political process by sending representatives equal to elected officials of any other province in Portugal itself. In order to lend credibility to this practice, the policy of 'assimilation' was inaugurated. Inherent in such a policy is the myth of racial equality. A primary prerequisite of an assimilated African was 'being baptized Christian'. Therefore,

"the question of equality could only arise at all in the cases of 'natives' who had made every effort to adopt Portuguese habits"<sup>14</sup>

Yet, those negligible few who had become 'Black Portuguese' continued to be denied the promise of equal treatment. The myth of equality ran counter

to any viable expression of a Mozambican identity. Portugal's historical denial of this indigeneous identity in fact, ironically, laid the basis for a coherent Mozambican self-expression that militated against any attempts at assimilation. This was precipitated by the early practice of slavery (forced labour) in the cotton and sugar plantations but was reinforced by the policy of 'non-racialism'.

In Mozambique, peasant consciousness developed at an early stage of the struggle and this underlying unity was partly generated by the prazo system that enslaved the peasantry which condition enforced this unity and also by Portugal's 'non-racial' assimilation policy which took little account of 'tribal' groupings and consequently destroyed African chiefdoms. As a result of the ensuing struggle and the necessity of political mobilisation a revolutionary consciousness began to crystallize. This 'non-racialism', therefore, united the various African 'tribes' insofar as Portuguese colonialism aimed rather for a political incorporation of its colonies into the metropolitan political structure, as 'overseas provinces' as opposed to permitting eventually a political sovereignty under Portuguese tutelage, by means of a 'Portuguese-ised' indigeneous African elite, as has been, traditionally the practice of other colonial experiences in Africa. Also, the fact that Portugal could not afford to de-colonise was by far the most important consideration in proposing various mechanisms to maintain her hold over her overseas colonies. They were a fantastic source of Portugal's wealth. It was this singular factor that accounted for the repressive Portuguese intransigence that led to armed confrontation as Hobson's choice. Therefore, a neo-colonial solution to the decolonisation of Mozambique was virtually

impossible given her almost total economic dependence on her colonies. These Portuguese excesses and her 'non-racial' colonialism were an imperative that she could not surrender. Yet one can argue that a neo-colonial solution might have worked had she actually practised her assimilation, in toto. However, as Mondlane has claimed, armed struggle, as a real alternative was already by 1961, a fait accompli in view of the repressive machinery of Portuguese inflexible colonialism in practice; therefore,

"By 1961 two conclusions were obvious. First, Portugal would not admit the principle of self-determination and independence, or allow for any extension of democracy under her own rule, although by then it was clear that her own 'Portuguese' solutions to our oppressed condition, such as assimilation by multi-racial colonatos, multi-racial schools, local elections etc., had proved a meaningless fraud. Secondly, moderate political action such as strikes, demonstrations and petitions, would result only in the destruction of those who took part in them. We were, therefore, left with these alternatives: to continue indefinitely living under a repressive imperial rule, or to find a means of using force against Portugal which would be effective enough to hurt Portugal without resulting in our own ruin.

This was why, to FRELIMO leaders, armed action appeared to be the only method."<sup>15</sup>

It is manifestly clear that the development of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique almost necessitated the inevitable course of action; all the more so, it can be argued, given the political intransigence of Portugal. It denied the Africans any outlet for voicing 'grievances' or to ameliorate its vicious economic conditions. But to understand this trend more fully, as a logical outcome of Portuguese capitalism in Mozambique and its relationship to the 'labour supply' that was radically transformed into a revolutionary force, whose strength can now be gauged by the events of April 25, 1974.

Mozambique today, is a long strip stretching 1,250 miles up the east African coast, about eight and a half times the size of Portugal, itself. To the south it is bordered by South Africa, to the north by Tanzania and to the west by Malawi, Zambia, and Rhodesia. At the beginning of 1970, the population was estimated at more than seven million, six million of whom were African, while the rest comprised mainly of European descent, as well as small Asian and Mulatto<sup>16</sup> minorities.

It is important to note at the outset, that during the early period of Portuguese colonisation in this area, to a large degree its "imperialism of extraction", as Chilcote has termed it, was sustained by Portugal's extensive trade links with England. The one net result of 'Portuguese continuity in Mozambique' was the

"establishment of charter companies...distinguished by a predominance of British capital in the nineteenth century ... , (that) partially explains the continued, if not still predominant, British interest in Mozambique."<sup>17</sup>

This pattern of Portuguese dependence on British capital is explained by an eighteenth century treaty whereby:

"free entry was granted to British cloth, and in exchange Portuguese wine was given preferential treatment entry into England. With the expansion of vineyards, cereal production declined; with the entry of British goods, a perennial trade deficit developed. And Portugal's textile industry stagnated. The result was disastrous, for Portugal itself became a satellite to the English metropolis"<sup>18</sup>

With the consolidation of Portuguese rule in Mozambique at the turn of the century, they

"were able to gain control of raw material sources and markets through treaty arrangements and...to maintain a certain hegemony through the use of sporadic colonisation schemes and Roman Catholic missionaries who penetrated and remained in, the interior."<sup>19</sup>

These colonisation schemes were facilitated by the granting of vast land concessions to private chartered companies as well as colonial administrators who,

"not unlike European feudal lords, ruled those Africans who had the misfortune to fall under their authority and control. The lot of these Africans was worse than that of slaves."<sup>20</sup>

Perhaps, the singularly most important aspect of this brutalising autocratic prazo rule was the imperceptible emergence of an incipient African unity, which sprang from the collective experience of prazo oppression. Conversely, this was to a large degree, responsible for the 'de-tribalisation' of African regionalisms. Further consolidation of this process occurred during the forced recruitment of labour that was exported to the mines in Rhodesia and South Africa. The economic advantages accruing to the Portuguese state in the form of gold payments for each labourer, obviously outweighed any considerations of a humanitarian nature.<sup>21</sup> As early as 1903, the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association of South Africa was accorded full rights to recruit cheap labour in Mozambique. This export of labour proved more profitable for Mozambique than any of her foreign investments could reap from exploiting the resources. A still significant proportion of Mozambicans work under this legally-sanctioned 'contract', in the mines of South Africa.

The traditional African response to the Prazo system was expressed in a pattern of resistance that culminated in the formation of FRELIMO, and its method of a concerted armed revolutionary struggle. The prazo system gave rise to even larger concessions that were freely granted to private capitalist companies operating on the same pattern as other colonial private companies that were sanctioned by the state. The three

most important of the large private companies were the Mozambique, the Niassa and the Zambezia. Their main concern was the maximization of profits by the exploitation of this vast reservoir of slave labour to procure minerals and a monopoly on the export of such goods. The three main cash crops that yielded a profitable return on investment were sugar, sisal and cotton. Mineral deposits had not then been discovered in Mozambique which diverted international capital into the mines of Rhodesia and South Africa. However, the fundamental premise of all investment was based on securing a profit for the companies by the total submission of the local population. The extent of these companies' power and control is gained from a description of their size of ownership and legally-sanctioned powers. Firstly, they were protected by a formal charter that stated their right to the land and all those peasants who happened to live on it. The Portuguese government guaranteed their right to

"explore and exploit mineral and agricultural resources (that included) the natural harbours of Beira, Lourenco Marques and Nampula; the five largest rivers of East Africa all of which have their estuaries in Mozambique; all kinds of hard wood, rubber plants, palm trees, wild animals for hides and skins, fisheries and above all, a large labour force... In the area assigned to it, each had a monopoly on commerce, mining, construction, postal services and the right to transfer land. It also had sole right to collect taxes: the foundation of its power over the local population and its means of collecting labour"<sup>22</sup>

Since many peasants were not yet introduced into the cash economy, the concept of payment of taxes was alien to them. Failure to meet this cash tax payment resulted automatically in reducing them to serfdom or full slavery. The Africans soon found their rights to land tenure did not count as private ownership which rights were accorded instead to the

large private companies, that were mostly foreign owned. On the prazo therefore, Africans' grievances were non-existent. Slavery became an easy outlet for suppressing such grievances. In such conditions, the intermingling of different tribes had the effect of gelling the common African experience of economic exploitation. The removal of 'tribal' authority diverted their frustration against these prazo and their extensive land holdings. But resistance to Portuguese rule came in the wake of the 'non-racial' assimilation policy as well. Though the 'assimilado' had achieved the standards required for integration into the political fabric of colonial Mozambique, he

"never achieved equal status with fellow white citizens, for he generally held an inferior economic position due to wage differentials and he was forced to carry an identity card."<sup>23</sup>

This produced a new small class of dissidents who generally would read, write and speak Portuguese fluently, but their denial of full citizenship proved the policy of 'non-racialism' a facade. This contradiction between apparent Portuguese benevolence and goodwill and the practice of extending a false citizenship to the Africans was a constant factor of Portuguese intransigence in Mozambique. As I have already stated, their unwillingness to perceive their colonies as such but rather as the absurd notion of 'overseas provinces' again betrayed any Portuguese benevolence. As a result of the historical conditions, then, Chilcote argues that

"African protest in Mozambique evolved from the early experience of Portuguese colonialism and imperialism. Mass forced labour, discrimination and exploitation and omnipresent foreign capital provided the common experience of fear and reaction and the basis for coherence among different ethnic groupings."<sup>24</sup>

Thus, it can be seen, then, the extent to which the policy of Portuguese



colonialism in Mozambique helped shape the struggle that was to emerge from the exploitation of African labour. One important point to note about the historical development of Mozambique society is the element of a commonality of struggle. One could argue, perhaps that a 'peasantisation' vis-a-vis the labour practices employed, was a direct function of the prazo land system and the so-called 'non-racial' assimilation policy of Portuguese imperialism. For, the process of 'peasantisation' was accelerated mainly because of the convergence of various 'tribes' on the prazo system. The 'assimilados' on the other hand, were invariably thwarted in any upward mobility. These two factors facilitated Mozambican unity.

Consequently, peasant revolutionary consciousness in Mozambique was directly related to the nature of Portuguese colonialism. I have stated above that Portugal's colonies were officially considered part of the mainland, notwithstanding their physical and geographical separation. Whereas other colonial empires overtly acknowledged the role of colonies as contributing to the economic aggrandizement of imperialism, in their market value, Portugal saw itself as a power that derived its raison d'etre purely and simply from its inexorable grip on its African colonies. The fact of their economic importance was constantly played down at the tune of an incessant moralising about its role of 'civilising' the 'indigenas' who, they were led to believe, with a few trappings of Portuguese culture could become assimilated as Black Portuguese into the 'non-racial' imperial structure. How far this myth differed from objective conditions that obtained in these 'overseas provinces' has been alluded to already. The colonies were, in the last analysis, the found-

ation on which Portuguese imperialism rested. Perry Anderson has suggested convincingly that

"the colonies function as the ultimate rationale of the regime; its only compensation for 35 years of nullity and stagnation."<sup>25</sup>

Writing in the early sixties, his perception and analysis of the Portuguese 'white elephant' was such that he could prognosticate the end of Portuguese fascism. Or, did the reality of Portuguese imperialism dictate its inevitable fall?

"The disintegration of the Portuguese empire would mean the end of Portuguese fascism. The present regime cannot survive the independence of its colonies."<sup>26</sup>

However, the political autopsy of Portuguese colonialism reveals its inherent sickness as stemming from the myth of empire to which the Portuguese state so steadfastly clung. Perry Anderson has captured the vital essence of empire;

"the Empire, for Portugal, has for centuries been a central determinant and fulcrum of change within the metropolitan area itself. Today Portugal is in a position of economic dependence on its colonies... It is the sole raison d'etre of an otherwise entirely stagnant regime, which has failed to effect almost any transformation whatever in Portugal itself. It is the justification, the compensation of 35 years of ignominy and neglect."<sup>27</sup>

But Marcelo Caetano was even more audacious when he expressed what Portugal represented:

"'Africa is more than a land to be exploited... Africa is for us a moral justification and a raison d'etre as a power. Without it we would be a small nation; with it, we are a great country.'"<sup>28</sup>

This raison d'etre then, was totally predicated on the idea of compensating for the wretched diminution of Portugal after her once glorious far flung empire. She was deprived of her former imperial authority that

flowed from her vast maritime nexus. The fact of England's empire, on the other hand, allowed her to wallow in her past glory. Much of her own economic 'investment' in the African colonies was underwritten by England. It could probably be argued that had it not been for English economic support, Portugal would have long since been an insignificant third rate nation. But the incredible deficit trading pattern with England in fact, reduced her to a colony herself.<sup>29</sup> However, this aspect is outside the scope of this analysis.

The character of Portugal's labour (slave) policy in its colonies played a crucial role in determining the scope and extent of the revolutionary struggle that emerged from it. That the excessive oppression of the 'indigenas' in Mozambique underpins the impetus to armed struggle has been attested to. What remains to be understood are the reasons for the Mozambican guerilla success which is all the more highlighted in view of other similar guerilla struggles elsewhere. In particular, what factors have contributed to Mozambique's success vis-a-vis Zimbabwe? Let us begin to consider some of the more integral aspects. All the conditions that were crucial in helping to bring down the Portuguese regime now existed in Mozambique; the denouement of African Nationalisms north of Mozambique; a free and contiguous border with one of Africa's more 'anti-imperialist' regimes; ideal guerilla country; ethnic unity across a 'free' border; colonial administration from Lisbon and an increasingly disciplined leadership. These were the material conditions that facilitated guerilla struggle; but merely the presence of these precipitating factors did not of themselves begin the transformation. Rather it was the responsiveness of radical elements (urban frustrated

petty-bourgeoisie) to these conditions that created a vanguard (FRELIMO) which was instrumental in leading the struggle. For the clarity of FRELIMO was a function of its dialectical relationship to the peasantry,

"For it is this relationship that has defined the forward momentum of the Mozambican revolution."<sup>30</sup>

That many of these peasants were exported to Southern African mines as cheap labour accounts for a similarly enforced unity that arose out of their collective oppression. Yet at the same time, many Mozambicans voluntarily emigrated in response to the desperate system there.

As Anderson puts it,

"The work regime imposed on the Mozambicans is so oppressive that a massive and continual exodus from the colonies is provoked."<sup>31</sup>

The convergence of the various 'tribes' in forced common bondage created powerful bonds which reinforced their perception of the enemy. It is as a by-product of this labour migration that a truly national response to Portuguese colonialism emerged. The fact of their incarceration in barbed-wired compounds proved a tremendous forum for consolidating these apparently disparate, yet potentially revolutionary forces. In addition, travelling to another country where a similar exploitative apparatus existed, all but furthered the process of labour solidarity. Having expanded their horizons, the peasants could now begin to see their own oppression in a far wider and comprehensive totality of international imperialism. Clearly, these peasants-as-proletariat had had their own oppressive reality re-affirmed by the 'apartheid' racial policy of South African oppression. However, this enforced southward migration of Mozambican peasants has seen a similar pattern in the reverse direction as

well. The fact of such fundamentally intolerable conditions of existence has been at the root of a steady flow of traffic north, into free Tanzania. The other factor stemming from this is the economic exploitation of the peasant cooperative movements in the northernmost provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa, both bordering on Tanzania. It was here that peasant based agricultural coops were first introduced. The development of political mobilization in this northern area, represented a microcosmic precursor to national revolutionary consciousness that was to involve the full and active participation of the peasantry in the guerilla struggle. As I have pointed out, the material objective conditions were ripe for the beginnings of the guerilla struggle.

A manifestly clear expression of the early resistance to Portuguese rule was found in the cooperative movement, that developed in the north in the 1950's. A number of local peasants organised agricultural cooperatives that would rationalise the production and sale of their produce.<sup>32</sup> However, the success of the scheme soon was disrupted by Portuguese authorities who placed monetary taxes on this production and later "banned our cooperative movement". It was at this point that these local economic associations began to assume a more widely political character.

"In 1962, after the formation of FRELIMO, people began giving active support. We had many contacts with Dar (es Salaam) through secret messengers...We started organizing people."<sup>33</sup>

That Tanzania was a contiguous free nation gave added impetus to the early resistance in the north. It was this factor that contributed significantly to the establishment of a political school of Mozambican

exiles there. This embryonic organization had the task not only of military training but also a basic level of education - diligently denied in 450 years of Portuguese 'civilisation' - that could be instrumental in creating an army of trained political cadres. In line with this preparation for imminent armed struggle,

"as a first step in the educational programme, a secondary school, the Mozambique Institute, was established in 1963 at Dar es Salaam to provide education for Mozambican children..."<sup>34</sup>

A later school was inaugurated that succeeded the Institute. Bagamoyo, served the needs of the struggle to a far greater degree in that it synthesised the political/formal aspects with a more

"Fundamentally work and military-oriented (Political training programme)... The Bagamoyo school is in any case merely the further extension of a progressive primary school system which is mushrooming in the liberated areas."<sup>35</sup>

This progression from the early local cooperative resistance to one that was now beginning to cohere into a disciplined movement, gave FRELIMO its initial thrust that led to a consolidation of a supportive peasant base. Obviously, the importance of a free Tanzania, itself in the throes of an anti-imperialist struggle, cannot be more underscored. Independence in Africa, north of the Zambesi, in turn became increasingly a focus of attention for the savagely exploited Mozambicans. The invincibility of Portuguese imperialism now was an unmasked myth, and the rejection of oppressive colonialism was expressed in the wake of this African de-colonisation. Despite false de-colonisation - the pattern in which a transfer of merely political independence to an indigenous bourgeoisie, retains intact the economic relations that obtained as before - the ideology of African independence and self-assertion increasingly character-

ised FRELIMO's own objectives. But, an important consideration must be mentioned in the context of this conventional pattern of de-colonisation. The very reality of FRELIMO's commitment to guerilla warfare imposed its own logic on the nature of de-colonizing Mozambique. As John Saul has found, despite the presence

"in the Mozambican context...(of)...all those features characteristic of the brand of nationalism which... facilitated false de-colonisation elsewhere on the continent"

the conditions under which the need for armed guerilla warfare became inevitable, precluded at the outset, any possibility of a neo-colonial solution, for a number of reasons. In the first place, the absence of an indigeneous elite that could assume political power militated against this possibility. Its neglect was a direct function of Portugal's colonialism by equating the colonies with 'overseas provinces'. Second, and flowing from the above, the character of Portuguese colonialism opposed any indigenous desire for self-expression or political autonomy. And, lastly, as a result of its mythologised 'non-racialism', and therefore the incorporation of all races into the Portuguese cultural fabric, Portugal duly denied the possibility of African, let alone settler, independence. P. Anderson articulates these expressions of an historical foreclosure, in the myth of a cultural but not racial distinction;

"The proof is the device of assimilation, by which the African, in passing certain purely cultural tests, is thereafter treated on an exactly equal footing with his white 'compatriot'...The reality brutally and publicly negates this mythology. In the realm of theory, the very definition of a 'native' is explicitly and unambiguously racialist: 'persons of Negro race or their descendants.' No white settler has to prove that he is of 'good character' or has employment, to qualify for

citizenship... If cultural indices were really to be invoked, the outcome would be embarrassing for the white population: a quarter of it is illiterate. Economically, the disparity between white and African wage-scales matches the most virulent patterns of apartheid... In Lourenco Marques, there is a permanent curfew for Africans after nine o'clock in the evening: the image of alien military occupation itself. In both Angola and Mozambique the 'cadernata' which must be held by all natives operates as a passbook; permission must be granted by the administration for the holder to move from one area to another. In principle and in practice, the system of control is thus almost exactly the same as in South Africa."<sup>36</sup>

Hence, this description aptly places in perspective the 'systematic falsification of reality' in Portugal's African Colonies. It forecasts the historical outcome of a long struggle between the oppressor and the oppressed. The role of the peasantry as a revolutionary vehicle for the radical transformation of economic and social relations begins to crystallize. Understandably, the components that contribute to 'false decolonisation' did exist but in the circumstances, it is clear that they were of secondary importance. For as Saul has argued:

"in the context of a genuine liberation struggle this kind of nationalism (conventional reactionary, petty-bourgeois - led that has characterised much of the African 'nationalisms' so endemic in neo-colonial capitalist structures still prevalent today) quite literally, does not work as it did for African leadership groups elsewhere on the continent. Portuguese intransigence meant that a stronger link with the people had to be forged in order to undertake effective guerilla warfare."<sup>37</sup>

Or to put it more poignantly, as FRELIMO's Chief of Operations, Sebastião Mabote claimed!

"the Portuguese had given Mozambique an opportunity other African states had missed - the opportunity to have a revolution."<sup>38</sup>

The colonial legacy bequeathed to Mozambique in terms of the Africans'



wretched labour conditions, their forced migrations both into the repressive Southern mining centres as well as into the safe haven of a progressively anti-imperialist Tanzania, their blocked channels for self-amelioration, their racial subordination all contributed significantly to the total oppression by an inflexible Portuguese imperialism. The response to this oppression set in motion a dynamic whose dialectic was irreversibly revolutionary, and whose logic in turn continued to reaffirm the dialectic of peasant struggle.

However, it would be not only unfair but inaccurate to give full credit to the base of this struggle without entering into an understanding of the role of

"an effective movement - FRELIMO - to bring the potential peasant base into meaningful and effective existence."<sup>39</sup>

For ultimately the efficacy of any mobilisation of the peasantry has to precede and follow from the political work of an organization that itself is able to offer an exemplary alternative that promises the end of capitalist tyranny. In the case of Mozambique, of course, FRELIMO, has served as that 'piston box' or revolutionary vanguard. As Mondlane has attested to, favourable conditions had long since existed.

"All FRELIMO had to provide was the practical understanding and the organisation."<sup>40</sup>

But, more than the mere movement of FRELIMO, it necessarily entailed a well-disciplined and politically conversant army of cadres with a high level of revolutionary consciousness to lay the political groundwork that preceded any actual military engagement. None of this, of course, is possible unless a correct analysis is made and flowing from that, an ideology that will both embrace and sustain the very principles for which

the war is being fought. In no uncertain terms, then, must the peasantry be made aware of the larger context of the struggle, viz. in terms of international imperialism, whose exploitative practices serve to sustain its economic hegemony at the manifest expense of human self-expression. FRELIMO has stressed that "mobilisation of the people (is) one of the fundamental tasks". It continues in a review of the year's struggle;

"Our people must be mobilised, must be constantly told about the nature, objectives and methods of struggle, and the manoeuvres of the enemy. It was the people's mobilisation which enabled us to reach where we are today."<sup>41</sup>

It is evident that a great deal of FRELIMO's efforts was mobilised through revolutionary cadres, to constantly allow for this peasant support to be transformed into active participation. As Amilcar Cabral has noted, the resolution of the contradiction between leaders and led, cadres and peasants emerges out of the dialectic of struggle; the dialectic of the cadres shedding their petty-bourgeois proclivities while the peasants, in turn, broadening their horizons through the process of the interaction. Or as Yoweri Museveni has asserted,

"that unless the bourgeois, petty bourgeois leadership commits suicide as a class and integrates itself with the masses, you are bound to end up with disaster. A people's war humbles the mighty and exalts the weak. This has taken place in Mozambique."<sup>42</sup>

This is the same dialectic that Cabral was addressing himself to when he articulated the essence of exchange between the revolutionary cadres and the peasantry.<sup>43</sup> For, ultimately it is this dialectic that will crystallize the unity between peasant and cadre. For

"the mobilisation style of leadership in the base areas required forging new relationships of solidarity between leaders and led, critical for waging a successful guerilla struggle."<sup>44</sup>

From the evidence of the struggle in Mozambique, it is precisely this unifying alliance that added revolutionary momentum to the war. The northern provinces — where the cooperative movement suffered the setback at Mueda in 1960<sup>45</sup> — instrumentalised the dialectic of leaders and led. That these provinces were contiguous with socialist Tanzania provided ample opportunity to establish a base of operations. Indeed, political groundwork had been laid two years prior to any armed confrontation with Portuguese troops. In 1961, after the massacre at Mueda, the FRELIMO leadership had resolved the question of the use of armed struggle to achieve any measure of political reckoning, when it was conceded that "Portugal would not admit the principle of self-determination..." The first Congress of FRELIMO that was held in 1962 ratified its early conviction to 'struggle for national liberation' and thus began war preparations. However,

"it took two years of hard work, planning and learning from our mistakes and failures before we were able to set out confidently on an active path towards liberation."<sup>46</sup>

"The armed struggle was launched on 25 September, 1964"<sup>47</sup>

The fact of two years of political education and active political work in the base areas significantly distinguishes the Mozambican struggle from other African false de-colonisations; the latter have obfuscated the issue of self-determination and independence by displacing not so much the structural foundations as the racial components of the functional equilibrium of capitalist class domination. Consequently, what emerges is not a people that can identify with a transformation of social and economic relations but a people whose elite merely, has changed. In contrast, a distinguishing feature, arising from this singularly

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striking example of Mozambican revolutionary praxis, is its peasant participation in the struggle itself. For as Saul has argued in the case of a conventional African de-colonisation that leaves untouched the capitalist economic relations,

"the mere Africanization of peripheral capitalism proceeded apace, (which) has had little, ultimately to offer the vast mass of the peasantry:"<sup>48</sup>

The point is well taken and further explained in the context of an exhortation by Nyerere to fight the perpetuation of neo-colonialist, imperialist tendencies that have plagued 'developing' peasant societies everywhere;

"...sooner or later, the people will lose their enthusiasm and will look upon the independent government as simply another new ruler which they should avoid as much as possible. Provided it has been possible to avoid any fundamental upset, they will then sink back into apathy— until the next time someone is able to convince them that their own efforts can lead to an improvement in their lives"<sup>49</sup>

But, in Mozambique, the consolidation of an effective supportive peasantry was a function of the political work carried out in the years of relative calm. It can be confidently asserted that this peasantry, though conditioned to oppressive practices, as yet did not possess a radical outlook in its initial attempts at forging links with FRELIMO cadres. Through the instrument of political education, through the subsequent discipline of organising their own affairs and through relating their experience of exploitation firstly, to support of the guerillas and then their active participation in the guerilla war, the dialectic of war forced the peasantry to adopt an increasingly revolutionary consciousness that, in turn, translated into a hallmark of successful guerilla warfare.

Indeed, the dialectic becomes operative, as it forces the element of political exploitation, in Basil Davidson's words, to "pass from the mobilisation of mass support to the mobilisation of mass participation"<sup>50</sup>.

The revolution, thus emanates from this logic of protracted struggle which will shape a consciousness in the peasantry's own image. The evidence that the seeds of FRELIMO's political work began to germinate mainly through the leadership of its cadres, is substantiated by these personal accounts of two FRELIMO recruits.

"In 1964, I joined FRELIMO because our people were exploited. I still did not know properly what to do about it. The people didn't know what to do. We had heard our neighbours in Malawi had been liberated and would come to liberate us, but we soon learnt that we would have to liberate ourselves. The party told us that we and no one else are responsible for ourselves.

Some comrades came to explain things to us and before, right at the beginning, the radio told us that FRELIMO, led by Comrade Mondlane, was fighting for the liberation of us all.'

'Previously I was in a state of servitude, but I didn't know it. I thought that was just how the world was. I didn't know that Mozambique was our country. The books said we were Portuguese. (sic). Then about 1961 I began to hear other things. The old men in their cooperatives were also beginning to agitate. In 1962 even the children saw the truth. FRELIMO began operating in our zone. Some comrades explained about it and wanted to join. By the end of 1962 even the government felt that the party was growing, and they started a great campaign of repression, arresting and torturing everyone they suspected. Many preferred to die rather than betray their comrades. The party gained strength. The leaders explained the truth to us, taught us our own strength, and we saw clearly how Mozambique, which belongs to us and not to Portugal, had been dominated.'<sup>51</sup>

The above revealing case histories are illustrative for a number of reasons. Primarily, they demonstrate the total lack of political, or for that matter, local realities. Also they tell the sad truth of the

colonial practice of mythologizing its legitimacy by propagandist political obscurantism, - "... just how the world was". It also depicts in a dramatic way the process of Portugal's 'assimilation' policy filtering down to the peasants. But significantly, both have unequivocally identified their colonial exploitation and their 'state of servitude'. The transformation of attitudes from apathy and helplessness in the face of this onslaught of pervasive oppression, to genuine determination to conquer the instrument of exploitation, in the final analysis, is a measure of the efficacy of FRELIMO and its leadership. Their sense of impending success is due to the nature of the historical development of Mozambican realities. But, at the same time, it is due, in no small measure, to the response of FRELIMO's efforts to counteract this behemoth of capitalist class relations. The basis of Portuguese involvement in colonial empire, notwithstanding arguments to the contrary, is still economic. The fact of South Africa's continued gold payment to Portugal, of about \$15.00 (1954) per recruit for the profitable recruitment of Mozambican labour,<sup>52</sup> is just one of a series of economic remunerations that accrued to Lisbon. In addition, her mere representation as agent of international capital in Mozambique - as well as in Angola and Guinea-Bissau — accentuates this role as policeman in areas of high labour-intensive capital investment, which, in itself, guarantees an extraordinary profitable return. The relationship between the foreign economic interests — American, British, German, French, Belgian, Swiss, Dutch, Japanese, etc. — and Portuguese colonialism is a healthy one for,

"The (Portuguese) state ensures the bureaucratic and military conditions of profitability, and is paid in return. The corporations provide the capital the administration lacks: the administration provides the order the corporations need."<sup>53</sup>

The importance of this international perspective cannot be undermined in the understanding of the struggles in Portugal's African colonies and their increasingly anti-imperialist, socialist-leaning proclivities. The fact of an actual guerilla struggle, therefore, somewhat attenuated the bourgeois, reactionary and elitist tendencies to subvert the primary objectives, given the total participation of the peasantry as an ongoing condition that both validates the struggle and checks any compromising leadership. In the case of Mozambique then, all the precipitating conditions that were satisfied, also accelerated the forward momentum of the struggle. As Saul has indicated,

"Once set in motion the reality of protracted struggle has increasingly imposed its own logic upon the Mozambican liberation movement."<sup>54</sup>

It is now clear that Portuguese colonial policies of 'contract' forced labour and mythologized 'non-racialism' actively precluded any possibility of the emergence of an indigenous national bourgeoisie as was the practice in a conventional de-colonising setting. This has had the effect of cementing the bonds that have linked the petty-bourgeois leadership to peasantry and thus consolidated the dialectical unity thereof. A no less significant factor that has contributed to the comparative success of FRELIMO in Mozambique has been the comparative ineptitude of Portuguese administration in the colony. For instance, Portuguese contacts with the remotest areas of peasant concentration have been minimal, and informers have not been as common as has been the case in Rhodesia. True, there have been cases of where the local regulo (appointed chief) would collaborate with the Portuguese expressly to protect his own personal interests; FRELIMO, however, invariably gained

wide support following its elimination of the regulos. The logic of a genuine revolutionary guerilla struggle soon becomes irreversible.

I have dealt with the variables that are considered essential in the context of the historical nature of Portuguese fascism. The dialectic of struggle in the colonies is inevitably proving itself. It is my hope that this modest analysis of Portuguese colonialism and its application to Mozambique, in the context of international capitalism, is merely a precursor to a more comprehensive study of this phenomenon. It has been my intention to demonstrate that revolutionary consciousness is a fundamental criterion in the interplay of forces that will consummate a successful guerilla struggle. However, this has evidently been the case in Mozambique. What of Zimbabwe? I shall again invoke this discussion with respect to the guerilla struggle there.



## FOOTNOTES

## CHAPTER II

1. FRELIMO, Frente De Liberacao De Mozambique, the guerilla resistance army that fought against Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique.
2. Building Freedom: Mozambique's FRELIMO, p. 10.
3. John Saul, "Portugal and The Mozambican Revolution", Monthly Review, September, 1974, p. 61.
4. The class of landowners often included people of mixed race, called mulattos.
5. Ronald H. Chilcote, "Mozambique: The African Nationalist Response to Portuguese Imperialism and Underdevelopment", in Christian P. Potholm and Richard Dale, eds., Southern Africa in Perspective. New York, 1972, p. 188.
6. Ibid.
7. Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle For Mozambique. Harmondsworth, 1969, p. 37.
8. Ibid., p. 39.
9. Ibid., p. 40.
10. Ibid., p. 43.
11. Perry Anderson, "Portugal and The End Of Ultra-Colonialism", New Left Review, November/December, 1962, p. 104.
12. Mondlane, op. cit., p. 36.
13. Anderson, op. cit., July/August, 1962, p. 108.
14. Mondlane, op. cit., p. 125.
15. Ibid.
16. Anderson, op. cit., May/June, 1962, p. 100.
17. Chilcote, op. cit., p. 185.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., p. 187.

20. Mondlane, op. cit., p. 25.
21. South Africa paid Portugal \$15.00 per worker in gold; one estimate put the figure at 400,000 workers per annum.
22. Mondlane, op. cit., pp. 29-30.
23. Chilcote, op. cit., p. 188.
24. Ibid.
25. Anderson, op. cit., p. 108.
26. Ibid.
27. Anderson, op. cit., May-June, 1962, pp. 115-116.
28. Anderson, op. cit., July-August, p. 116.
29. See Chilcote op. cit., p. 185.
30. John Saul, "African Peasants And Revolution", Review of African Political Economy, p. 52.
31. Anderson, op. cit., May-June, 1962, p. 99.
32. Mondlane, op. cit., p. 134.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid, p. 128.
35. John Saul, "FRELIMO And The Mozambique Revolution", in Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, Essays on The Political Economy Of Africa. P. 385.
36. Anderson, op. cit., May-June, 1962, p. 110.
37. John Saul, "African Peasants And Revolution", Review of African Political Economy, p. 55.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Mondlane, op. cit., p. 127.
41. Mozambique Revolution, July-September, 1973, p. 3.
42. Yoweri T. Museveni, "Fanon's Theory On Violence: Its Verification in Liberated Mozambique" in N. M. Shamuyariva ed., Essays On The Liberation Of Southern Africa, p. 21.

43. Cited in Basil Davidson "African Peasants And Revolution" in Journal Of Peasant Studies, Vol. 1., No. 1., April 1974, pp. 280-281.
44. Mark Selden, "People's War In China And Vietnam", in Lawrence Kaplan, ed., Revolutions: A Comparative Study, New York, 1973, P. 385.
45. See Mondlane, op. cit., p. 124.
46. Ibid, p. 122.
47. Ibid, p. 138. ◊
48. John Saul, "African Peasants And Revolution", op. cit., p. 50.
49. Quoted in Ibid.
50. Davidson, op. cit., p. 279.
51. Quoted in Mondlane, op. cit., pp. 126-127.
52. Anderson, op. cit., July - August, 1962, p. 104.
53. Anderson, op. cit., May - June, 1962, p. 122.
54. John Saul, "FRELIIMO..." op. cit., p. 382.

## RHODESIA

In trying to determine the extent to which a revolutionary consciousness, as a prerequisite, was important in the guerilla struggle in Rhodesia, it is essential to give a brief analysis of the historical development of the current situation there. Guerilla warfare has now become a feature of Rhodesian political realities; but how successful its activities will be, can be gauged only from an understanding of how much the peasantry had integrated revolutionary consciousness into daily application.

The dynamics of peasant oppression and its response to the class as well as the racial manifestations of Rhodesian society, must be seen in the light of infusion of vast amounts of international - mainly British - capital. For, to deny the argument of race as an instrument of class exploitation, though not invalid, is to misrepresent the deeply inherent socio-psychological myths that sustain white Rhodesian, as with South African 'apartheid', society.

In Rhodesia, U.D.I.<sup>1</sup> was clearly a symptom of the desperately narrowing choices that befell the white ruling class. Despite arguments to the contrary, the real power of political realities lies with the white labour aristocracy, as we shall see. Giovanni Arrighi<sup>2</sup> in his classical study of capitalist class relations in Rhodesia has accounted for the absence of 'poor - white-ism' as resulting from the careful selection of skilled-labour immigrants who settled in Rhodesia. He argues that capitalist development attracted needed skills entering Rhodesia

as a consequence of industrial development, and not prior to, as was the case in other colonies. In his words:

"It is important to notice that, unlike South Africa or Algeria, their settlement (white wage workers formed of artisans, semi-skilled workers, foremen, clerical workers, administrative employees etc.) was a consequence of, and did not precede, capitalist development in the country. Therefore, they had to be attracted by the offer of high wages, and with their skills they brought union organising abilities. This phasing of white settlement and capitalist development is at the root of the absence of 'poor - white-ism' in Southern Rhodesia."<sup>3</sup>

It is important to remember, then that this aspect of a class of white wage worker, was the bedrock upon which the system of white privilege was built. It has been the most gaping contradiction that exists in Rhodesia. The resultant emergence of racial attitudes have perpetuated this system, which in turn, has contributed to the consolidation of racial attitudes. In view of their political control, it has not been difficult to legitimate white superiority, notwithstanding the black/white ratio being 19:1 (population figures are estimated to be roughly 6,000,000 Africans and 225,000 whites). The fact that their economic welfare and standard of living is one of the highest in the world, reinforces their political intransigence, again based on these jealously guarded white privileges. Significantly, it must be added at this point, that

"This class of white wage worker, together with the white petty bourgeoisie, i.e., handicraftsmen, shopkeepers, and small employers in agriculture and mining, already in the prewar period constituted the bulk of the European population in Southern Rhodesia."<sup>4</sup>

It is this class that has come to be known as the 'jealous aristocracy' in Rhodesia. The fact that international capitalist interests were congruent with those of the white agricultural bourgeoisie and the 'labour aristocracy' strengthened its economic basis which, in turn, con-

solidated the myth of white racial superiority.

Since the 250,000 whites automatically qualify as the electorate their unilateral interests gain international legitimacy to absolute minority rule; at the same time, the exploitation of 6,000,000 indigenous Africans, to all intents and purposes, is expressed in a cohesive, readily identifiable class of peasant-workers who are compelled, by law, to sell their labour in order to facilitate the private accumulation of their labour surplus value by the whites. On the other hand, the resources of the land are efficiently exploited, for the full maximisation of profit, by international capitalism. This resource allocation is shared, obviously by the two principle agents of international capitalism, i.e. the national bourgeoisie and multinational corporations, primarily British and South African. Its proximity in economic terms as well, naturally invites the South African based Anglo-American Corporation to participate in this economic exploitation. Mwana Wevu (a pseudonym of a Zimbabwean graduate student) in Zimbabwe: Exploitation and Liberation<sup>5</sup> discusses the role of foreign capital in the economic dependence of Rhodesia on international capital investments. He argues that:

"As a direct colony of Britain, Rhodesia could only stand as an area of plunder and exploitation for British capital (by) direct British capital investment (that) amount(s) to well over \$300 million, by far the largest investment stake of any foreign country."<sup>6</sup>

and points out:

"of equal interest to the domination of the Rhodesian economy is the mutuality of interests, amounting to a collaborative partnership, of British and South African capital. The concrete expressions of this partnership is the octopus-like Anglo-American Corporation (AAC), whose mining and related interests extend from South Africa throughout Southern Africa to the Congo. This

AAC group...is heavily involved in Zambian copper mining."<sup>7</sup>

The nature of the capitalist formation of Rhodesian class relations precipitates the concomitant 'proletarianisation' of the African masses. At present any discussion of its role in the capitalist development of Rhodesia would be premature without an historical perspective, that will explain the labour flow of Africans into the industrial sector. Such a process highlights their exploitation - political, economic, social and human - that has in turn, forced a response expressed in African resistance, whose culmination has effectively come to recognise white intransigence, to the changing political realities in white-ruled Southern Africa. The fact of guerilla warfare attests to it. However, unlike Mozambique, the political and colonial realities in Rhodesia have so far precluded the possibility of a sudden guerilla victory. What factors have contributed to this current deadlock? For one thing, the Rhodesian Government has always had an independent, powerful and ruthlessly efficient military apparatus, that is backed by an extensive informer network, which has effectively stunted revolutionary potential. But perhaps more importantly, it has enjoyed a totally legal basis to its political authority that was ceded to the white minority electorate in 1923. This constitutional legitimacy granted by Britain in 1923 is one of the factors that has led to the current 'impasse' between African aspirations and white intransigence, both of which stand mutually opposed to each other.

The resolution of this contradiction can only come with the effective praxis of revolutionary warfare. But the mobilisation of the peasantry to a level of revolutionary consciousness that will necessitate

participation in the struggle has been seriously impeded, as a result of the coercive monopoly of the state. Its legitimacy in conducting indiscriminate, yet calculated massacres and continual repression is derived from the 1923 constitution, that gave white Rhodesians virtual carte blanche, in their relations with the Africans. Let us briefly trace the more salient characteristics that have produced this apparent political cul-de-sac, from the historical perspective.

As in other British colonies, so in Rhodesia there was a Chartered Company, headed by Cecil J. Rhodes - after whom the country was named "to impress the world with the permanent character of European settlement".<sup>8</sup> Between 1890, when the British flag was first hoisted in Salisbury in the name of the British Empire and Queen, and 1923, Southern Rhodesia was effectively ruled, controlled and exploited by the British South Africa Company. Arrighi, in assessing the relative economic and political preponderance of the company in determining the original settlement and subsequent historical development of class/race relations in Rhodesia, has argued that,

"The most important single element determining the nature of economic and political development in Southern Rhodesia was the British South Africa Company's overestimation at the end of the nineteenth century of its mineral resources, and the persistence of this overestimation for roughly fifteen years... The costs incurred in the meantime increased the stake of the company in the country and led to additional heavy development investment, particularly in railways...the Rhodesian gold fields failed to yield deposits comparable to those of South Africa. For example, even in 1910 against a profit of close to £7 million... from the Johannesburg gold mines, the...Rhodesian mines yielded a profit of only £614,000.

The desire to recover the original heavy outlays induced the chartered company to foster the formation of a white rural bourgeoisie which, by developing the country,



would raise the value of its assets in the area - viz., the railway system, the main claims, and especially land."<sup>9</sup>

The importance of the development of an agricultural base, therefore, is a direct result of the company's efforts to recover from its initial heavy losses. The character of Rhodesia, it will be seen, largely stems from the political entrenchment of this rural bourgeoisie, which 'was the foundation of the capitalist sector of the economy'. A striking feature of this settlement was the establishment of an early industrial base that continued to be relied upon in the event of especially the Second World War which generated increased productivity and whose importance was further enhanced in view of the stagnation of the 1930's.

For

"goods previously imported became practically unavailable, thus creating a demand for local industries; chrome and asbestos assumed strategic importance; world shortage of agriculture produce provided a rapidly growing outlet for farm output."<sup>10</sup>

A growing industrial base that went hand in hand with the concomitant expansion of agricultural production, had the effect of consolidating the white rural bourgeoisie, whose political hegemony was able to check the influx of African labour into the industrial urban centres. It was with this prospect in mind that a series of anti-African labour legislation was enacted. The cosy alliance between the national white bourgeoisie, based in agriculture, and international capitalism, represented by the British South Africa Company which controlled the railways and coal supply, proved valuable for capitalism by the increased development of the country. While the settler government, like the Portuguese colonial regime, regulated the supply of labour for the rapidly expanding industrial base through repressive labour legislation, the BSAC continued

to infuse additional capital investment which yielded vast profits mainly as a result of cheap African labour.

A significant feature of the granting of self governing status to Rhodesia's white bourgeoisie, in 1923 is the African response to the political vicissitudes of repressive legislation that soon ensued. This arrangement is unique in the history of British colonialism. Nowhere has there been a case of legitimating a racial minority's rule in a colony whose ratio to the indigenous population is 19:1. The explanation is perhaps found in an economic motive. With the profitable economic exploitation and development of Rhodesia's resources, it is more apparent as to what motivated its decision to replace the BSAC, with local white settler rule, whose interests as mentioned, coincided with those of international capitalism. The 1923 Constitution then bestowed virtual sovereignty on Rhodesia, though technically it remained still a British Colony. This constitutional aberration of Rhodesia's political development has significantly contributed to the present impasse for, on the one hand, as the white minority claims, it is in fact the de facto, if not the de jure government in power, alternatively, the Africans demand a major share in the political development of the country; yet the political structure of the country ensured that African majority rule would never be realised. It sufficiently established a solidly entrenched white minority as the sole legal authority in Rhodesia. In fact, since 1923, Britain effectively ceased to exert any influence in local Rhodesian affairs. In spite of her veto power that she explicitly retained in the event of any discriminatory or racial legislation, it was never used in the face of a series of anti-African laws. Britain also retained the

right to her defence as well as foreign policy. According to Martin Loney,

"The British Government retained control over foreign policy and ostensibly over policy affecting Africans. The Assembly was barred from changing certain aspects of African administration; legislation containing clauses which discriminated against Africans had to be reserved for British Government approval. Britain also retained the power to legislate directly for Rhodesia. These constitutional provisions provided the basis for the government of the colony until the Constitutional Review Conference of 1961."<sup>11</sup>

However, before any viable unified African opposition could be mustered, a battery of repressive labour and land enactments forced the submission of the African peasantry. The relationship between the failure of African resistance to cohere into a revolutionary force and the 1923 constitutional arrangements is important enough to outline. The perennial obfuscation of constitutional rule in Rhodesia always was suggestive to the Africans of a possible 'non-racial' sharing of political power. Since Britain had retained the veto power over discriminatory legislation, the traditional African response was expressed in the belief that Britain would 'grant' independence to the Africans and not to the white bourgeoisie, already in effective control. John Day has outlined the reasons for this constant appeal of the African nationalists to Britain to exercise its powers of veto.

"The strange relationship of the British Government with the Southern Rhodesian Government largely explains the energy expended by Southern Rhodesian nationalists in trying to move the British Government and also, paradoxically, their difficulties and failures in doing this... The refusal of the British Government to give Southern Rhodesia independence until the Africans had a secure place in the political system encouraged the nationalists to appeal to the British Government for help."<sup>12</sup>

On the other hand, as for the white ruling class, its primary concern

was to sever its constitutional links with Britain and establish a legally independent white racial dictatorship, albeit with the trappings and ritual of electoral democratic practice. It is thus a significant departure from conventional colonial practice. Accordingly, it is the emergent African bourgeoisie which should assume political power as has been the pattern of decolonisation elsewhere. But in view of the increasing racial polarisation in Rhodesia, compounded and reinforced by government legislation and the hardening of racial attitudes, this possibility soon faded. Moreover, the continued intransigence of the entire white population militated against such an eventuality. We will find that as a result of the blocked channels for the gradual integration of the African into the 'democratic process' and the deliberate suppression of any opportunity for such a move, the need for armed confrontation became a more feasible alternative.

To understand the polarisation of racial attitudes that finally led to the commitment to guerilla warfare, let us explore some of the conditions of this process. To further divide the races and alienate the Africans from the land, the government introduced the first of its major 'cornerstone' racial policies, in 1930; the Land Apportionment Act categorically divided the country into 'European areas' and 'Native Reserves'. More than the mere racial separation, the Act provided for a guaranteed supply of labour which led to the decreased productivity of African cultivation. Giovanni Arrighi has argued that this act forced

"the transformation of the traditional system of cultivation from shifting to continuous cultivation. The change was also encouraged by the government, which

'centralized' the African rural areas, i.e. divided them up into permanent arable and permanent grazing land. Given the techniques employed by the peasantry and the type of soil allocated to them, this move from shifting to continuous cultivation produced progressive soil erosion, thus decreasing the productivity of African land."<sup>13</sup>

The effect of this decrease in African productivity is expressed in a more or less steady flow of peasants into the cash economy labour force. Besides having had their traditional land expropriated for European use, the government ensured, as if this did not already prove effective, a constant labour supply by backing up the Land Apportionment Act with the hut tax, which forced every adult African male to spend a minimum of between one and three months a year in wage employment on white owned farms, in mines, factories and homes, in order to pay this hut tax. Again, failure to automatically resulted in imprisonment. Alternatively, the peasants could remain on their land but only as tenants, 'their rent being commuted for labour'. In this way a strict control of African movement was maintained, while preventing the rise of a class of independent African farmers. Yet, the flow of African labour into primarily urban settings militated against the act since Africans were not allowed to live in areas designated as 'European' unless there was an agreement with the European;

"Whereupon a native or his family shall be permitted to occupy a portion of such land under condition that he supply labour to such owner or occupier."<sup>14</sup>

It ought to be stressed that regardless of whether the African previously held 'title' to the land, or rather had traditionally occupied it, he became, under the new Act, a mere tenant. Such a situation would force the African peasant either into a labour 'contract' with the Euro-

pean farmer or to be forcibly removed from the land. The areas that were reserved for African settlement, (Native Purchase Areas), were later made available for African purchase, with the express purpose of creating an African elite. However, these areas were specifically allocated by the government and thus "the formation and growth of the African bourgeoisie could be indirectly controlled."<sup>15</sup> The areas set aside for 6,000,000 Africans, constituted (and still do) a mere 8% of the total land area of Rhodesia, while for practical purposes, the rest either was owned or controlled by the 250,000 whites. Land was an issue around which a possible resistance could be started. However, in view of the overwhelmingly onerous and contradictory legislation, African aspirations were constantly shattered. As Arrighi has found,

"In addition to rents and labour services, European landowners exacted various fees (grazing fees, dipping fees, etc.) which were so exorbitant that within a few years (they went) far toward paying the purchase price of the farm!"<sup>16</sup>

Another piece of legislation that prevented the rise of an African elite was the Land Husbandry Act which

"had provisions for reducing the size of African cattle herds, on the grounds that the Africans did not have enough land to support all their cattle."<sup>17</sup>

This was an absurd rationalisation yet one meant really to further restrict the social and economic mobility of Africans, given that cattle were a measure of wealth in African society. Instead of increasing the size of the 'reserves', cattle herds were legally and forcibly reduced. A powerful impetus for the rise of a national African consciousness was thus created, as this particular law, to a large extent, was responsible for cohering an as yet embryonic African nationalism. For as Van Velsen

has indicated with regard to cattle herd reduction;

"...this Government interference with the peasants' two main sources of wealth - land and cattle - provoked bitter resentment."<sup>18</sup>

That other such blatantly racist and economically harmful devices were important in generating support for an emerging African nationalism is implicit.

The historical and structural conditions of African exploitation are implicitly clear, in its relationship to the rapid capitalist development of Rhodesia. That the peasantry was forced into a condition of involuntary industrial servitude, is itself a powerful cause for the subsequent resistance of the African peasantry. A fundamental question that arises in the face of such continuous repression and in the absence of any concrete ongoing African opposition, is then, what factors have prevented the rise of an effective national resistance movement in Rhodesia? The Mozambican situation appeared similar in certain respects, though the virtual enslavement of its peasantry allowed for a comparatively worse repression. What conditions precipitated the emergence of a successful guerilla movement in Mozambique yet were not present in the Rhodesian context? The following discussion will focus on these questions that will lead into an analysis of the guerilla movement in Zimbabwe. Just as the prazo system of forced labour and the myth of 'non-racialism' in the 'assimilado' policy acted as unifying elements of an oppressive Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique, so in Rhodesia, there existed similar components of white settler authority whose exploitative practices were expressed in two equally oppressive 'cornerstone' laws. That became the target of African resistance. Both the Land Apportionment Act and

the Land Husbandry Act were positively unifying factors; the invariable invocation of the oppressive nature of these two laws found considerable support for the early resistance movements in Rhodesia. For ultimately,

"The overwhelming issue for most Africans was the question of land, an issue especially important for the Ndebele whose traditional homeland, being more fertile was (is) more rapidly occupied by white settlers."<sup>19</sup>

The ongoing response to white rule must be understood in the context of the two dominant 'tribal' divisions that have characterised the development of African opposition as divided and thus, ineffective to seriously challenge white hegemony. The traditional dichotomy between the Ndebele in the south and the Shona in the north has, apparently been carried over and continues to plague African resistance in Rhodesia. For instance the guerilla movement is still organised into two armed camps of ZAPU/ZANU,<sup>20</sup> struggling against the same enemy. It is obvious that much political work has to be done. It is true that this failure to unite in response to a commonly perceived enemy, has contributed to the continued ineffectiveness of the guerilla movement even today. Needless to say, the dual effort creates unnecessary waste in both human and material resources. Here, it is of significance to note however, that there has generally been a high level of political consciousness in Rhodesia. This is attributable to the early political-religious movements that sprang up as a result of seeking some forum for articulating economic and political grievances. In general, African protest movements took four forms.

"(1) There were the elite African associations, primarily concerned with improvements in the position of the emerging urbanised African intellectuals. (11) Among the Ndebele, organisations were created to work for the restoration of the old Ndebele nation, at least in modified form, by obtaining permission to restore the Kingship



and secure land for one Ndebele home. (111) The emergent working class provided a base for more modern kinds of organising, most notably by the Rhodesian Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union. (1V) Finally and most significant, in terms of mass support, were the millenarian independent African Christian Churches, particularly<sup>21</sup> the Watch Tower, the Zionists and the Vapostori Movement."

The presence of a number of cohesive organisations, therefore, per se, contributed to the early diversity of particular types of resistance, which though fundamentally aspiring to the same goals, inadvertently exposed itself to the proverbial divide-and-rule tactics of the white government. It is easy to understand the nature of its weakness; however, notwithstanding this early splintered African opposition, considerable efforts were made to coalesce the disparate groups to form a united front. The government very early crushed the millenarian movements as they became politically suspect, since the message of the missionary was overtly egalitarian and therefore a threat to the system of white privilege. For,

"He tells them (the Africans) of privileges and responsibilities in a Kingdom in which all men have equal opportunity; of a Heavenly Father who has no favourites in this world-wide family; of a brotherhood that knows nothing of race or colour. Such teaching is bound to be revolutionary; it cannot be otherwise."<sup>22</sup>

In addition and very significantly, the Watch Tower Movement was instrumental in organising the first really important African strike, in 1928. It is little wonder then, that such a 'revolutionary' movement would be proscribed. As for the early Ndebele movement; its aims were incompatible with the changing realities of an industrializing economy, so it soon dissipated, though not without,

"An expression of continuing hostility to white rule<sup>23</sup> and to the conquered Africans they offered self-respect and hope for the future."<sup>23</sup>

More significantly, however, the elite and trade union movements established a more permanent pattern laying the foundations of the more recent African Nationalist Organisations. Nevertheless, they were unable to resolve the basic contradiction between the urban worker and the rural peasant. In spite of this dichotomy, the factor of land expropriation assumed considerably greater importance than their immediate conditions as urban wage-workers. Since, in the first place, had it not been for the barrage of anti-land legislation that drove them off the land, they would still be in the rural areas, as peasants. At any rate, their role as vanguard political movements was a direct function of their urban milieu. Their forced entry into this milieu exposed them immediately to the more visible contradictions of a capitalist class and race system. The very fact of their low wages vis-a-vis those of their white 'workers' and their oppressively hard working conditions forced them to understand the nature of their exploitation. The absolute significance of this condition is underscored in terms of how, in 1952, Joshua Nkomo, who today heads one wing of the guerilla movement, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), articulated this understanding, as the then General Secretary of the Rhodesian Railways African Employees' Association;

"It will be found in the long run that the interests of workers, be they black or white, are inseparable."<sup>24</sup>

However, the reality of the Rhodesian situation vehemently militates against this possibility, particularly with the knowledge that white wage-workers continue to constitute the back-bone of the support that enables the fascist Rhodesian Front ruling class to sustain itself. As Arrighi has found, it is this group that constitutes what has been

called the 'labour aristocracy' in Rhodesia. But the disunity between the urban workers and rural peasants was in turn reflected in the alienation of the African elite, (of intellectuals etc.), from the mass peasant base. At no time did it ally with the other classes until it was forced to concede the need to

"come to terms with the reality that there could be no solution to the problems of the African elite without a solution to the problems of the African masses."<sup>25</sup>

But concomitant with the Post-War rapid industrialisation, came the growing need, as reflected in Government policy, to deliberately foster the rise of an African bourgeoisie; in the words of Arrighi, the government began to perceive

"the need (for) an African middle class and bourgeoisie as a requirement for industrialisation and as an 'insurance against the mass of Africans'...and in consequence by the Government."<sup>26</sup>

This, obviously is the traditional tactic of ruling classes anywhere; i.e. to create a middle class to act as a buffer against the masses as well as an agent of the continuance of economic class relations. It ought to be pointed out here that this is a favourite yet almost unfailingly oft-used instrument of monopoly capitalism in retaining economic power through neo-colonialism.

It is the creation of an African elite by inducing more inter-racial competition that has further obfuscated the true nature of the exploitive apparatus in Rhodesia. It is the long term preponderance on and flirtation with constitutional politics that has contributed to the erroneous and erratic development of African protest. In fact,

"the nationalists and their sympathisers had over looked the fact that Britain wielded little real power in South-

ern Rhodesia, unlike in the territories administered directly from the Colonial Office..."<sup>27</sup>

This dance with constitutionalism was based on dangerous premises. In an analysis of its miscalculation, this point is conceded.

"The liberation movement assumed that since all other British Colonies were in that period achieving independence through forcing the British Government to a constitutional table, settlement of the Rhodesian problem was most likely going to follow the same pattern. Hence the attempt at constitutional solutions...in 1961."<sup>28</sup>

Furthermore, I want to demonstrate that African unity was ~~near~~ impossible in terms of the unique conditions governing white Rhodesian politics. The failure of African opposition to crystallise in a well-disciplined unified front is a measure of the success of the white government in dispersing this resistance.

The reaction of the white Rhodesian settlers to African opposition has invariably been swift and decisive for a number of reasons. Primarily, the efficiency of the coercive branches of Rhodesia (army, police force, reservists), has the effect of thwarting African resistance at a very early stage. Secondly, this is executed through an extensive network of indigenous informers. Another reason is the state of military preparedness of the white settlers, especially in view of the success of the guerilla war in Mozambique. What, therefore, must be understood is the ubiquitous fear amongst the whites of a sudden mass African uprising. These fears have significantly generated an efficient administration. Also, the tradition of an efficient British colonial administration lingers on. For, throughout the history of its occupation and subsequent settlement in Rhodesia, it was run along extremely disciplined, regimented lines, similar to the efficient British administration

of Colonial India. It is this same legacy of an efficient government that was bequeathed to Rhodesia. There are several bases to this efficiency, whose manifestations are an expression of the enforcement of its highly racist laws. But the fundamental aspect to this political efficiency is grounded, in the maintenance of the economic status quo, which will ensure the continued investment of foreign large scale international capital.

Meanwhile, African nationalist agitation increased in the wake of the denouement of nationalisms in the rest of Africa during the early 1960's. The resultant reaction to this seemingly unbridled political sentiment, was increased repression. This is attested to by Arrighi,

"By means of mass arrests and restrictions the government was able to wipe the leadership of the African nationalist movement from the political scene. The relative ease with which the Rhodesian Front Government succeeded in disrupting (at least temporarily) the organization of the nationalist movement cannot be explained as is often done...in terms of some inherent shortcomings of the Rhodesian Africa Leadership."<sup>29</sup>

We have seen how this repression has been effective in crushing African opposition. This is executed only as a result of efficient police and army forces, that moreover have access to political information even before any action gets under way. It is what Anthony R. Wilkinson has described as 'pre-emptive administration'; as he further explains,

"Ever since the late 1950's African militants and their activities have been carefully controlled and suppressed by stringent security legislation and an efficient informer system. The geographical separation of residential areas for the different races, although not as advanced as in South Africa, facilitates security."<sup>30</sup>

A constant factor of white policy, it follows therefore, is the

need to maintain a high degree of military preparedness. With this in mind, its compulsory army recruitment forces the country to be in a state of perpetual mobilisation, notwithstanding the recent escalation of guerilla warfare in its northeastern areas. In turn, the political repression that is legitimated by the Emergency Powers Act, (1960), has been a terrific impediment to the organisational efforts of African resistance. It is this Act that enables an ordinary young white policeman to arrest without reason, any person he deems suspicious of intention to create a political disturbance. Under this draconian legislation, thousands have been arrested and/or detained without a formal charge being laid, let alone having been allowed access to a trial. Thus, the country continues to be under a state of seige. The degree to which the remotest parts of the country are integrated into the centralised authority structures, is understood in the evidence before an early Commission of Enquiry. It is also a reflection of the efficient system of administration; A former member of the police force is speaking:

"In Southern Rhodesia, you might say that every inch of the territory is policed, you have regular patrols... you are always among the natives, one might say you are in constant contact with their pulse, you can feel how they react to things..."<sup>31</sup>

Such has been the nature of the white reaction as to preclude virtually any possibility for the Africans to organize. Economic conditions have been long created to render a steady recruitment of a vast network of police informers. It has been estimated that at any given time during the repressive period of spontaneous resistance (peaking around 1962), one out of every four Africans was in the pay of the (C.I.D.) Criminal Investigation Department, under whose authority all

political arrests were made. It is under such formidable odds that African nationalist aspirations must be cohered and mobilised. Coupled with a ruthlessly efficient coercive state apparatus of the police and army, it is little wonder, then, that the Zimbabwe Africans have experienced such severe handicaps in co-ordinating and consolidating an effective ongoing national resistance.

The absence of a revolutionary consciousness is mitigated by the presence of a broadly political consciousness. One at any rate, that is externally imposed by the exigencies of the common exploitation and its concomitant brutal repression.

For, the distinction lies in the fact of, as Davidson's first condition of guerilla warfare, the

"Political exploitation of a general situation which is felt by a mass of people to be hatefully and obviously unjust to them."<sup>32</sup>

A revolutionary consciousness will necessarily follow a rigorous and thorough political mobilisation of an exploited people, articulate in a cogent revolutionary ideology that aims, 'in the last analysis to radically and in the shortest possible time, overthrow the status quo of capitalist class relations. The failure of the African nationalists to effectively present any thorough analysis of the objective conditions of such a repressive state is an indication of the inherent weakness in the leadership. As already alluded to, it was opportunistic in its constant attempts to dance to the tune of constitutional reformism. Its inability to perceive the true nature of Rhodesian Fascism is reflected in its perennial search for 'peaceful', 'non-racial', 'partnership' solutions, that ignored the fundamental premise of guerilla warfare. No analysis

of the objective conditions of Rhodesian society was made.

The historic schism in the Zimbabwean resistance to white capitalist exploitation again expresses itself in the current ZAPU/ZANU rift. The guerilla struggle has been effectively subverted by the deliberate exploitation of this fissure in the wall of African resistance. Old 'tried and tested' methods of exploiting such nascent divisiveness is a common policy of imperialist 'divide-and-rule' self-aggrandizement. The fact that ZAPU has been traditionally Southern Ndebele, while ZANU, Northern Shona is largely a function of the efficacy of the divide-and-rule, splintering tactics of the white regime. It was much easier to execute because of the prevalence of two major tribal groups that fell into the two major regions of Rhodesia. Yet some blame must be placed locally as well. The intra-group rivalries is reflected in a statement made by James Chikerema of ZAPU argued that:

"The army has been divided into tribal factions. The party has been divided into tribal factions and clannish empires. There are cadres that are more equal than others in both the party and the army. There are cadres that are given special treatment on tribal and class considerations in both the party and the army."<sup>33</sup>

Besides, this reflected the clan and 'tribal' sectarianism that characterised the initial basis of the split. During the national leadership under Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU), a rival organization under Ndabaningi Sithole, led a breakaway group in 1963 to form ZANU. This break was apparently precipitated by

"dissent party officials having become increasingly critical of Nkomo's style of leadership. Difficulties within Rhodesia had led Nkomo to concentrate his political energies on the infinitely more sympathetic and apparently more fruitful international environment.



His decision to establish - an - Executive - in - Exile resulted in an official split on 9 August, 1963."<sup>34</sup>

This initial split also characterised the growing concern with Nkomo's 'style of leadership', but as Wilkinson has suggested

"Later conflicts between and within the two organizations assumed ideological and tribal dimensions seriously inhibiting the advancement of the nationalists cause."<sup>35</sup>

The most fundamental of pre-conditions for successful guerilla warfare was being positively neglected. No political work that was generated by a coherent anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist ideology was being done. In spite of the fact that conducive circumstances did not prevail, which could otherwise predispose the situation to active political mobilisation, there was an urgent need to analyse the conditions under which the struggle ought to have been waged. It is out of an understanding of the dialectic that a correct ideology can be formulated while, at the same time political work continues to be done. This contradiction has been expressed by Nathan Shamuyarira, writing on the basic leadership differences;

"There was a fundamental difference of approach; Nkomo wanted to circumvent the situation at home and organize international support in hopes of bringing effective pressure to bear; Sithole and Mugabe saw as the great need more organisation at home to crystallize the situation there."<sup>36</sup>

However, the problematical aspects of any efforts to politically mobilize the people to anticipate armed confrontation still remained. For, this was attributable immediately to this leadership crisis. A further result of this leadership difference, already polarising the masses, was characterised by its inability to work out an effective, well-planned strategy of change. In fact, the bankruptcy of its ideol-

ogical basis (save for a vague vacillating 'multi-racialism' or an ambiguous 'African Nationalism') is witnessed in the initial unco-ordinated insurgency in Rhodesia. It smacked of sporadic acts of adventurist, putchist sabotage, that was so ill founded that it soon became apparent that these incursions came to represent the attempts of frustrated individuals, who had little knowledge of the basics of guerilla warfare. For any understanding would have been reflected in the five conditions that I have referred to, which, according to Basil Davidson feature as the prerequisite conditions for successful guerilla warfare. There was a serious lack of political preparation which fact has accounted for the traditional schism between the urban-based leadership and the rural peasantry. Another factor that is of significance is the absence of 'liberated areas' where guerillas might have found a source of new recruits and succour from the local population. The logic of struggle would have produced a clarity of purpose which would but force the emergence of a new consciousness. Thus, as the struggle comes more entrenched and the ideology that has generated it made more explicit, a positive move is made from simply nationalist to revolutionary politics. At the same time the dialectic of struggle becomes a more positive and practical reality to the peasants. Leaders from the petty-bourgeois urban milieux and peasants from the rural areas begin to resolve the contradiction. The much more complex relationship between the two elements will then emerge to unify and thus strengthen the struggle. It is through the integration of such a process that the peasantry gradually comes to adopt a revolutionary consciousness, vis-a-vis the Mozambican guerilla struggle, then, it is clear that the role of effect-

ively 'liberated areas' is very important. Yet, one can understand the failure in Zimbabwe to secure such areas. The stringent security system of 'pre-emptive administration' that so accurately characterised the political intransigence of the white settlers effectively counteracted any such anticipated guerilla strategy, by the forced removal and re-settlement of the peasantries, much like Vietnam's strategic hamlet programme. Hence, the early guerillas found themselves in an impossible situation from which to launch any effective political mobilisation of the rural peasantry. A series of 'control' legislation rendered such political work impracticable. It can be argued then, that despite the lack of success, the mere fact of these excesses allowed for the emergence of a certain as yet undefined consciousness of oppression. But the issue around which any African mobilisation could ever - indeed did - occur, was an increased African Parliamentary representation, i.e. a cautiously limited and very gradual process of Constitutional reformism. This preoccupation, on the part of certain elements of the tiny African elite (African businessmen, bus owners, some professionals, etc.) with 'constitutional reformism' created a smokescreen which confused as well as encouraged many Africans. For, according to the political machinations of the white ruling class, a limited African Parliamentary representation would divert attention and political work from the more radical elements of the exploited Africans. There invariably appeared to be a 'genuine' concern to extend political representation to the Africans. This offered some modicum of encouragement and hope of change to some Africans; to others it was seen for what it was - a sham, a subterfuge to throw into disarray any unified African opposition.

Through extremely high educational and property qualifications - which few Africans could satisfy - the franchise was restricted to the whites. In 1950, therefore,

"There were still less than 300 African registered voters out of a total electorate of 47,000."<sup>37</sup>

This figure is even more dramatic when one is reminded of the ratio of Africans to whites at 19:1.

Hence, it was this allowance for change in African conditions through 'peaceful means' that became a significant feature in the failure of African nationalist leaders to master and sustain any effective support. For, as long as there was an 'outlet' for African grievances, however futile and illusory African parliamentary representation, actually may have been, the white government could invariably invoke repressive legislation (e.g. Emergency Powers Act) to imprison all who utilised 'illegal' means. Such was the nature of 'constitutional' reformism. Significantly, it helped obfuscate the development of any unambiguous African resistance which otherwise might have exposed clearly the intentions of the white regime. Thus, armed resistance as a viable alternative to change and African liberation was delayed.

To summarise; the 1923 Constitution, by allowing for the 'protection' of the Africans, implicitly acknowledged the eventual evolution to increased African representation in Parliament, according to traditional British Colonial Practice. It was the belief of a British guarantee of African 'protection' that precipitated and channelled the course of reformist African politics. There were constant attempts to participate in white electoral politics, to be accepted as 'responsible' Africans who could satisfy the conditions of 'white civilisation' in Rhodesia and

only then become political partners. It was this tactic that completely disoriented and thus dispersed African opposition. Hence, African concern with acceptance into the 'white democratic electoral system' was a direct function of its failure to co-ordinate a genuine opposition to the capitalist nature of class society in Rhodesia.

"Instead of concentrating, in spite of the repression, on building a strong national base, and developing an appropriate strategy the nationalist leaders spent a great deal of effort in attempting to influence Britain and obtain support from other countries and the UN."<sup>38</sup>

Thus, it was deliberately misled in internationalising its struggle by flogging the (British) dead horse and appealing to the UN and OAU. Their failure is reflected in the fact that the nationalist movements have not gone beyond the stage of sending occasional commando squads into Rhodesia. In addition no 'liberated areas' are in their control, thereby making for a very difficult task to establish some sort of revolutionary rapport with the peasantry. This has meant that the guerillas must infiltrate from neighbouring Zambia where extremely tight security and counter-insurgency measures have been set up. Another factor that has militated against any guerilla success is the nature of the terrain. The north-eastern part of Rhodesia is sparsely vegetated with vast open areas of savannah country where detection by security air forces is much easier. However, the important aspects of their failure must still be found in the lack of political preparation and in engaging in revolutionary praxis which of necessity comes of a clear ideological commitment.

I have discussed the factors that have generated African resistance in Rhodesia that eventually culminated in armed guerilla struggle. Since 1967, when the first guerilla incursions into Rhodesia occurred,

there has been comparatively minimal success. Despite political rhetoric that often suggests winning political fortunes, it is evident that the guerilla struggle will intensify in the future in view, especially of the adamant, recalcitrant attitudes of white Rhodesians. The sudden collapse of Portugal and the victory of FRELIMO in Mozambique has led to an increased determination of the Zimbabwean guerillas. Yet, a similar determination has gripped the white Rhodesians whose livelihood has very dramatically become threatened. Their reaction has been expressed on the one hand, in a gradual political compromise; while on the other, there is a growing demand to 'close ranks'. It is clear that finally, a very real split has occurred in the white monolith of privilege. There are various implications that arise in the context of Southern African politics. But my concern is to see this historical development of white Rhodesian society precipitating favourable conditions for successful guerilla warfare. For the Africans, there is always the danger that failure to participate in the guerilla struggle, will produce a reformist alternative that in turn, will negate the basic commitment to armed struggle. Such a failure can only be reflected in the absence of a revolutionary consciousness that is expressed in revolutionary praxis.

## FOOTNOTES

## CHAPTER III

1. Unilateral Declaration of Independence was illegally declared November 11, 1965 by the white minority in response to growing pressure of African nationalism and white intransigence to maintain itself in power 'forever'. It is still not recognised by any country in the world, including South Africa. It was also a response to Britain's ostensible refusal to grant independence to a white minority government. For fuller details see Chapter 6 in Loney, op. cit.
2. Giovanni Arrighi, "The Political Economy of Rhodesia". New Left Review, No. 39, September/October, 1966.
3. Ibid., p. 37.
4. Ibid.
5. Mwana Wavu "Zimbabwe: Exploitation and Liberation", Monthly Review March, 1969.
6. Ibid., pp. 32-33.
7. Ibid., pp. 33-34.
8. Richard Morrock, "Rhodesia: Historical Background", Monthly Review January, 1960, p. 10.
9. Arrighi, op. cit., pp. 35-36.
10. Ibid., p. 44.
11. Loney, op. cit., p. 49.
12. John Day, International Nationalism, London, 1967, p. 26.
13. Arrighi, op. cit., p. 41.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., p. 42.
16. Ibid., p. 195.
17. Morrock, op. cit., p. 12.
18. Van Velsen, Trends in African Nationalism in Southern Rhodesia, Kroonik Van Afrika, Liden, 1964, p. 144.

19. Loney, op. cit., p. 92.
20. ZAPU - Zimbabwe African People's Union.  
ZANU - Zimbabwe African National Union.
21. Loney, op. cit., p. 92.
22. Terence Ranger, The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, Evanston, 1970, p. 224.
23. Loney, op. cit., p. 96.
24. Ibid., p. 98.
25. Ibid., p. 97.
26. Arrighi, op. cit., p. 53.
27. Anthony R. Wilkinson, Insurgency in Rhodesia, 1957-1973, Surrey, 1973, p. 5.
28. Ibid.
29. Arrighi, op. cit., p. 59.
30. Wilkinson, op. cit., p. 32.
31. Loney, op. cit., p. 92.
32. Davidson, op. cit., p. 279.
33. Wilkinson, op. cit., p. 31.
34. Ibid., p. 6.
35. Ibid.
36. Loney, op. cit., p. 104.
37. Loney, op. cit., p. 50.
38. Loney, op. cit., p. 102.



## CONCLUSION

The above two chapters have outlined the dimensions of the guerilla struggles in Mozambique and Rhodesia. In line with the hypothesis of a pre-requisite revolutionary consciousness in the peasantry, in the interplay of forces precipitating a successful struggle, I want to reiterate the elements that converge in and differentiate between the two situations. We have seen how the Mozambican struggle has culminated in revolutionary success. Yet, for at least 9 years, since the illegal seizure of white minority rule in Rhodesia, (U.D.I.) there still exists a relatively ineffective guerilla campaign to bring down the regime. To be sure, it has been beset by a series of upsets that have gained little measure of success vis-a-vis the Rhodesian military counter-balance.

In the light then, of the presentation of evidence of guerilla advances (as in the case of Mozambique), or setbacks (as has been characteristic, up until now, in Zimbabwe) it is essential to explore the circumstances that have distinguished the two cases. What indeed, have been the factors that have contributed to FRELIMO's success? Conversely, to what extent has the historical development of Rhodesia and its consequent interplay of conditions, been a factor in the relative failure of a revolutionary consciousness to take root in the Zimbabwean peasantry? An understanding of these and related questions will render some idea of what is to be expected in the next few years. It may illuminate the direction of the current movements in this area. I have indicated throughout the discussion the comparative merits and weaknesses of the two guerilla struggles, but it is now a matter of integrating this equation

into a more comprehensive and analytical perspective.

In the first place, the historical development of each colony has been characterised by two imperial policies purporting to enlighten the 'natives' by its own special brand of white hegemonic benevolence; yet this same colonising factor merely acted as a means to the more 'noble' desire to secure for the metropolitan power, a 'place in the sun'. What this meant, in crude economic terms, of course, is the blind economic plunder and exploitation of foreign resources, especially that of cheap indigenous labour. These in turn directly contributed to the rapid industrialisation and capitalist development of Europe. I have explored this aspect in Mozambique where the colonies became the chief source of economic wealth for Portugal; who stood to gain from her 'handling charges', as agent of international capitalism. This has been clearly documented, despite a dearth of such information, by Perry Anderson whose sources include, the "Economic Review of Portugal and her 'Provinces'" (sic); e.g.

"...(iii) Dondo Aluminium Plant (Angola) - Pechiney (France) to hold 40% of capital, provide technical knowledge, etc. cost is expected to be \$20 millions.

...(iv) Tagus Bridge Project - United States Steel corporation (U.S.A.), Morrison-Company Inc. (U.S.A.), D. B. Steinman (U.S.A.) The contract is worth 1,764 million escudos. Finances will come entirely from external credit to be provided, by Export-Import Bank (U.S.A.) and Saligman and Cie. of Paris.

...(x) The Instituto Pasteur (pharmaceuticals and retail chemists; formerly part of the CUF combine) has been brought up by the Wyeth concern (U.S.A.), which is linked to American Home Products; the price is approximately \$300,000...."

The argument becomes crushingly powerful in view of such 'stable'

- yet highly repressive - regimes as those of Brazil, South Africa, Greece and Chile. Recent evidence now confirms the pattern of international 'trading' between imperialism ("the highest form of capitalism") and the 'underdevelopment of development'<sup>2</sup>. Ostensibly, all sudden shifts in power relations to the right, through the classical coup d'etat, are interpreted as being primarily political. But evidence has invariably refuted this as simplistic and naive 'analysis'. The growing power of the multinationals becomes increasingly clearer. The entrenchment of international capital and its profitable returns, in both these colonies has already been alluded to. The economic priority of this relationship dictates a stable government, at any cost. Bearing this in mind, then, the extent of the political and economic exploitation of the colonial 'indigenas', is more clearly understood.

A characteristic feature in both colonies has been the extensive exploitation of the 'indigenas'. However, to merely document this oppression and ascribe to it a quantitative weight in the overall interplay of forces that created this consciousness of oppression, would be misleading. For, the peculiar political arrangements that gave form and direction to the African response are probably more crucial to comparatively assess this interplay of factors that have influenced the emergence and development of the two guerilla struggles.

The idea (and practice), that a colonial settler minority should govern itself with almost total sovereignty in international affairs militates against the classical notion of colonies. That this fact polarised power relations in Rhodesia along racial lines is no accident. 1923 was a rallying point for the white settler minority who argued,

quite rightly according to the precedent, that their autonomy was at stake. It was this single most important facet of the Rhodesian situation that continues to legitimate all previous relations between the two races. Accordingly, this white intransigence is at the root of the problem that culminated, for the settlers, in their elusive independence, (U.D.I.), declared during the height of white settler fear.

While Mozambique continued to be ruled from Lisbon, thousands of miles away and with absolutely no hope of 'independence', the Zimbabweans were controlled directly from Salisbury, and were thus mired in the illusion of an eventual peaceful transition to 'majority rule'. It was based on the assumption, quite correctly derived from the traditional colonial experience, that they too, would be 'granted' their 'independence'. The phase of de-colonialisation was rapidly proceeding apace in the rest of Africa, British or French, so it was supposed, why should the mother country not bestow the instruments of 'freedom' and 'independence' upon Zimbabwe? The 'winds of change' were swiftly blowing across Africa portending good omen, as a harbinger of good fortune. But it was still very premature to see through the obscurantism of neo-colonial economic relations. The effect of all this flurry of freedom was merely to consolidate the existing economic status quo, through neo-colonial economic relations.

Portugal had long denied her 'overseas provinces' any effective bargaining power to discuss, let alone anticipate, the decolonisation of her colonies. The Mozambicans, therefore, were denied any political expression except perhaps through the National Assembly in Lisbon, and only as representatives of these 'overseas provinces'. Their racial

exclusion promptly blocked even this political subterfuge. Hence, their objective and very intensive oppression very early forced them into a decision that had no turning back, i.e. armed revolutionary struggle. On the other hand, the Rhodesian constitution was such as to permit and even encourage the Africans to participate in the 'democracy' by extending to them the franchise, limited though it was.<sup>3</sup> The importance of this peripheral electoral 'privilege', coupled with the trust that Britain would not grant the whites independence, is an expression of the failure of Zimbabweans to accept the reality of their political wilderness and thenceforth begin to seek alternative means to political change. The fact that the defence and security of Rhodesia, through British indifference, became a Rhodesian concern, no less than a priority, significantly contributed to the political repression of the Africans. This of course, created an atmosphere not wholly conducive to African politicisation on any radical or 'meaningful' level. For instance, the only political expression that was subsequently permitted was artificially channelled into support for racist white, status-quo - oriented political parties. Any overt alliance with trade unionist or African nationalist politics was deemed illegal. Under the 1959 Law and Order (Maintenance) Act, any assembly of more than three persons, for the purposes of political discussion, was considered illegal. Reinforced by a barrage of repressive legislation, - invariably enforced - this led to an early demoralisation of the African population. The tactic of divide-and-rule was effective in dispelling and defusing collective African resistance, especially in view of the predominance of two main 'tribes'. To compound the problem of mobilising African resistance, an

efficient network of (African) informers was widely deployed by white Rhodesians. That economic privation was a condition of existence facilitated a steady inflow of new recruits. These factors, then, militated against African aspirations in Rhodesia, and prevented the emergence of favourable conditions that could lead to an early resolution to guerrilla warfare.

It can be argued that the political exigencies of this peculiar colonial situation, necessitated a political consciousness to develop in the Zimbabweans. For, the mere fact of the overt political repression, of inter alia, the Pass Laws, and the hut-tax, etc., engendered a sense of political and economic frustration that sought, as has been shown, expression in political reformist change. The fact that repression was so ubiquitous effectively acted as a restraint against any sophisticated revolutionary ideology. This is attested to in the later development of nationalist politics whose basic platforms called for 'majority rule' in a 'multi-racial' society, that had no relevance or meaning to the imperialist nature of their oppression. Often enough, it exploded as racial violence against the 'murungu' (whites). It is clear, even from the later nationalist phase that the lack of perspective vis-a-vis their ideological orientation, was a function of the political development of Rhodesia's racial classes. Finally, the display of the constant schism between the two rival organizations, is fully a failure of the African political movements to analyse and understand the objective conditions that have determined their stunted development. For, a clear understanding of these conditions would necessarily have yielded a concomitantly clear ideology of revolution. Hence, their failure per se, has accounted for

the continued lack of a clear ideological basis.

For, despite the claim of a socialist orientation, the Zimbabwean guerilla movement has displayed the singularly negative characteristic of divisive sectarianism while it remains a splintered movement.<sup>4</sup> It is not necessary to repeat the origins of this ZAPU/ZANU split save to mention that their dispute has reflected a fundamental difference of approach. Furthermore, as Wilkinson suggested, the two guerilla movements have both been susceptible to the

"divisive influence of the Sino-Soviet dispute; when ZANU commandos clashed with (Rhodesian) security forces near Sinoia in April 1966 ZAPU condemned them as 'pro-Chinese extremists'. ZAPU has traditionally relied upon Soviet support..."

Whereas the internal divisions in the various liberation movements of ... Rhodesia ... have given rise to policies which in essentials are reactions to external events and conditions - like the Sino-Soviet dispute and competition for OAU Liberation Committee funds - the greater political maturity of FRELIMO has enabled (it) to develop strategies more relevant to internal conditions ... in Mozambique and not simply responses to external stimuli."<sup>5</sup>

Yet more fundamental than this was the total failure of establishing links with the rural peasantry. In comparison to FRELIMO, the Zimbabwean guerillas did little political work in the countryside while FRELIMO was placed in a somewhat better position vis-a-vis its contiguity with a free 'socialist'-oriented Tanzania, Rhodesia's border with Zambia was regularly patrolled discouraging Zimbabwe guerilla incursions. In addition, re-settlement programmes effectively out off the guerillas from their base in the border areas. The inefficient Portuguese administration lacked the resources to despatch regular counter-insurgency patrols. Their failure, needless to say, encouraged and even actively

created conditions for the emergence and consolidation of effective FRELIMO guerilla bases. It was in these areas that the two years (1962-1964) of relative calm after the 1960 Mueda massacre, were concretely utilised in preparing the population inside Mozambique through a rigorous political education, that included military training. For, precisely because of the proximity of Tanzania, FRELIMO had a greater degree of achieving success than was true of the Zimbabwe guerillas. Yet, it is possible to argue that the eagerness with which the nationalists from Zimbabwe embarked upon the internationalisation of the Rhodesian situation, amply demonstrates their inability to secure a solid rural peasant base. Their occasional sorties into the halls of the Commonwealth offices, OAU, and the UN to presumably try to persuade international opinion to actually adopt Rhodesia as a top priority issue, have come to nought. Their failure to perceive the 'Rhodesian situation' as much more than mere local racial oppression has been a serious miscalculation that has literally thwarted the natural growth of a revolutionary situation there. For as John Day found;

"Attending these neutralist and Afro-Asian conferences the Southern Rhodesia nationalists met more powerful men than themselves with similar ideologies, from whom they received sympathy and encouragement. As at the Pan-African conferences, the United Nations and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conferences, they found many vociferous allies whose help proved more moral than practical."<sup>6</sup>

Such setbacks further alienated the African peasantry who came to identify with the national leadership even less. Yet, from a positive point of view, these sporadic peregrinations for international vocal support and recognition (with which it seemed overflooded), inadvertently



raised the level of political consciousness as these were reported in the media. A case certainly can be made for the avid response to mass media amongst Africans in Rhodesia. (A favourite pre-occupation is trying to assimilate media output, the very fact of which allows for a considerably politicised urban work-force; In turn, the political ripples are transmitted to the rural peasantry with whom the urban workers are (in regular contact, as they go back and forth, between the urban and rural (traditional) milieux).

At any rate the negation of active peasant participation in the struggle has been an important factor in the alienation of the peasantry in Rhodesia. In no small measure has this contributed to the ingratiating and ideologically bankrupt leadership. In the first place it continued, till the eleventh hour, to play constitutional reformist politics, forever seeking to participate in white 'democratic' politics, that offered no channel for a broadly-based mass democracy. The fact of their inactivity vis-a-vis guerilla warfare obviously left them unprepared and unsuited for the ideological orientation that complements a guerilla struggle. For it is out of the logic of revolutionary praxis that a correct ideology is forged, while the dialectic itself operates to strengthen the links between leaders and led, while the movement itself gathers revolutionary momentum.

As Amilcar Cabral has asserted,

"No-one could create the theory of the struggle for liberation without participating in the struggle."

The same point was made later by FRELIMO president Samora Machel, in articulating the dialectic of struggle;

"Your consciousness has been enriched through practice, and thus our task will be to synthesise this practice, free it from subjectivism and empiricism, raise it to the level of revolutionary theory, so that we can then enrich practice.

Through this course we shall acquire a critical spirit, a capacity to analyse and thus we will be able to understand the nature of the current war."<sup>8</sup>

Indeed, it is this revolutionary praxis that will advance the struggle. One cannot overemphasise the importance attached to the full participation of the peasantry. The struggle will therefore consolidate the unity between the vanguard leadership and the peasantry. But in the case of the Zimbabwean guerilla movements, disunity has been a major setback. Likewise, its failure to establish 'liberated areas' and therefore any peasant bases, will continue to delay any significant advances. Moreover, without this peasant base, the vanguard loses its dialectical relationship with the peasantry. For as Saul has argued in emphasising the indispensability of a peasant base;

"...the popular peasant base of the struggle has (been) the key both to FRELIMO's military success and to its own internal clarity as a revolutionary movement."<sup>9</sup>

It is evident, then, that while FRELIMO progressed as a revolutionary movement, due principally to the participation of the peasantry in the struggle, in Zimbabwe, the nature of the colonial administration impeded the development of a genuinely revolutionary movement. One such factor has been the ever present 'open' channels for African political advancement through limited electoral means, however illusory this appeared to be. In Mozambique, as FRELIMO's chief of operations quipped, in view of utter Portuguese intransigence;

"the Portuguese had given Mozambique an opportunity other

African states had missed - the opportunity to have a revolution." [10]

This may indeed be the case, but what must certainly be emphasised notwithstanding the historical circumstances, is the degree of FRELIMO's commitment to the struggle. That an early realisation of the absolute necessity for active peasant participation in the struggle, was the quintessential component, is now unequivocal. But, much more than this, it took the logic of struggle to produce a genuinely revolutionary consciousness in the peasantry. It was this factor that thrust the struggle into its victorious culmination. What of Zimbabwe? It is evident that as long as the vanguard there, fails to consolidate a peasant base and thus to clarify its own revolutionary consciousness through praxis, it will remain a frustrated leadership that is unable to advance the struggle.

We have seen that in Mozambique, notwithstanding similarly oppressive conditions, the African peasantry was an active element in the struggle. By moving from a state of support to participation of the vanguard guerilla movement, FRELIMO, in the intensity of the struggle itself, it gradually acquired a revolutionary consciousness. The common experience of sharing in the struggle invoked a new vision of man, unshackled by capitalist exploitation. This was the inherent understanding of the revolutionary consciousness that could emerge only out of the praxis of struggle. In Rhodesia, meanwhile, the peasantry did not fulfill the condition of actively participating in the guerilla struggle. It, thus, was deprived of any opportunity to acquire this revolutionary consciousness, which I argue is a necessary component of a successful guerilla war.

## FOOTNOTES

## CHAPTER IV

1. Anderson, op. cit., I, pp. 116-117.  
See also, Ruth First, Jonathan Steele and Christabel Gurney, "The South African connection: Western Investment in Apartheid", Harmondsworths, 1972, for an in-depth analysis of foreign investment in South(ern) Africa. The inter-linkages 'spill' over into the northern regions of Africa, affecting virtually every African country as a result of the giant 'umbrella' multinationals. Also, a good source for investments in Rhodesia, especially the huge Lonrho Company, with still extensive profitable land holdings in Rhodesia.
2. Term borrowed from Andre Gunter Frank, "Development of Underdevelopment", A. G. Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment of Revolution, New York, 1969.
3. In 1961, the decision to create an African elite prompted a limited extension of the franchise to Africans. However, by deliberate obfuscation and complicated clauses, that contained a complex system of blocked votes etc., it became the option of a few wealthy or educated Africans. By means of educational and property qualifications it effectively eliminated the majority of Africans. Only a fraction, therefore could vote. Of this, a fraction actually did. For details see, E. Mlambo Rhodesia: The Struggle for a Birthright, London, 1972, Appendix B., P. 319.
4. Cf. N. Sithole, We Are Our Own Liberators, Gwelo, (Rhodesia), 1974, p. 9.  
"We shall pursue our ideology of socialism best suited to Zimbabwe conditions," (ZANU position).  
M. Chengawose, ON ZAPU and the Struggle for National Liberation in Zimbabwe, Montreal, 1974, p. 13.  
"It is the main objective of our Party...to achieve our liberation and a socialist revolution through armed struggle". (ZAPU position).
5. Wilkinson, op. cit. pp. 31-32.
6. Day, op. cit., p. 60.
7. Amilcar Cabral, Our People are our Mountains, London, 1971, p. 21.
8. Samora Machel, "Further Advance on The Ideological Front", in Mozambique Revolution, January/March, 1974, p. 3.
9. John Saul, "Peasants and Revolution", Op. cit., p. 55.
10. Ibid.

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