

THE MOVABLE MOSAIC:
AN INQUIRY INTO THE THEORY OF
RECONSTRUCTION OF POLITICAL REALITY

By

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SCOPE AND CONTENTS:

The dissertation is devoted to the development of a systematic theory of political experience. While this project involves, at first, the synthesis of the pragmatist tradition in political philosophy into a theory of reconstructive empiricism, it also entails the elaboration of this revision of political epistemology into a paradigmatic theory of human action. Using this paradigmatic theory of human action as the basis of analysis, an examination then follows of three generalized modes of political experience, and of the relationships which hold between them.

Preface

The German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey noted in his monograph The Essence of Philosophy "that the method of the human studies involves a perpetual reciprocity between lived experience and concept." And, towards the end of his life, the American philosopher George Santayana, in his seminal writing Dominations and Powers, furthered this insight by the profound reflection that the peculiar responsibility of a political philosopher is to fuse self-consciously inquiry and experience into a vivid image of the human prospect, both in terms of its enduring problems and in terms of the possibilities present, at any given moment, for the creation of a more rational order of society.

This treatise is intended to discharge, at least partially, my responsibilities as a political philosopher. It does so in three related ways. First, this dissertation is a summary statement, to a large extent, of my intellectual development as a political philosopher during the second half of the twentieth century. Second, as a process of self-conscious reflection on the human circumstance, this treatise is aimed at a systematic synthesis of the major paradigms of human experience which historically have dominated the human imagination and which have monopolized the human will. Third, this synthesis of the human prospect, coordinating, as it does, reason and lived experience, is directed not only at a rigorous description of the human sensibilities, mentalities, activities, and value-qualities associated with the formative problems of salvation, security, and freedom, but also at an appraisal of the opportunities avail-

able in the modern age for the creation of a genuinely libertarian, and thereby substantively rational construction of political reality.

Like all political inquirers who have felt driven to a comprehensive and coherent understanding of their political situation, and of their place within it as social and historical beings, and who have not been satisfied to rest content with either an abstract and reductive empiricism or with an appeal to dogma, whether structuralist or idealistic, I have been forced to rely on an expansive theory of political knowledge: one which is simultaneously a philosophy of governing principles, an anthropology of the human mentality, a reconstructive sociology, and a radical mysticism. It is a philosophy of governing principles because it seeks to elucidate the fundamental human sentiments which regulate and anticipate the moral quality of the present political condition. It is an anthropology of the human mentality because it strives to penetrate, and thereby fully to comprehend, the inherent, and, indeed, immanent, processes of political thought which serve to rationalize collective order. It is a reconstructive sociology because it is devoted to an exhaustive appreciation of the patterns of political action which intermediate sensibilities, consciousness, and value-experience in the contemporary political situation. And, finally, this expansive theory of political knowledge is a radical mysticism because of its willingness to integrate into a unitary vision of human experience all the elements of lived existence, whether emotional, reflective, active, or moral, and to employ this provisional unification of human experience as the basis for prescribing new, and possibly more adequate, principles of political conduct.

This widening of the responsibilities and scope of political scholarship ultimately entails, of course, a broadening of the domain of political experience and a revision, albeit a moderate revision, of the vocabulary of political philosophy. From this perspective, political experience is not exhausted by its public aspect, but extends well beyond its conventional presentation to a mode of human experience which successively coordinates human sentiments, habits of political thought, and distinctive moral qualities. Thus, to comprehend the human political condition in its totality is to begin with political life as it is immediately experienced as a rhythm and tempo of moral impulses and qualitative dispositions, and thereon taking this felt sense of the adequacy or inadequacy of the public domain as our guide, to work back deeper and deeper into the more mediate aspect of the political condition until a coherent understanding has been achieved of the central images of political reality, dominant human aspirations, and patterns of political organization which inform, and even preform, the quality of the political circumstance, old and new. In addition, since this inspection of political experience deals less with a static phenomenon than with a dynamic human process, it has been necessary to employ such terms as "grounds" and "principles" in a manner strikingly different from their traditional usage. This modification of the philosophical vocabulary is intended to emphasize both the presence of a single, unitary process of human experience and to compensate for the absence in the contemporary idiom of suitable words to describe relationships of summation, intermediation, and transformation.

Intellectual journeys of this sort are rarely undertaken in solitude, nor do they usually end in finality. I have been assisted by the thoughtful reflections and encouragement of Marilouise and by the robust good humour of Alexis as well as by the creative criticism of my personal and intellectual friend Mr. T. J. Farrell. In addition, I am indebted to the chairman of my dissertation committee, Professor Derry Novak, and to the other committee members, Professors Howard Aster and Marshall Goldstein, not only for their help in revising the dissertation, but also for creating an environment conducive to rigorous and systematic thought. Finally, I am appreciative of the financial assistance given to me by the Canada Council. On this basis of solidarity, I have written a treatise which, hopefully, will prove to be a contribution to the discipline of political science and an aid to others in reasserting the importance of political philosophy in relieving, at least provisionally, the contemporary crisis of human civilization.

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Chapter 1. An Inquiry into the Theory of Reconstruction
of Political Reality

Political reality is not exhausted by the changing scene of public life. Contemporary political scholarship has, however, devoted itself almost exclusively to this publicly observable dimension of human politics. This concentration is at odds with longstanding traditions in the history of political thought. In the history of political thought, the study of public life has been consistently held relative to another, and perhaps more vital, dimension of political reality. This dimension of political reality devolves on the question of political being. The problem of political being may be summarized as the following query: What quality of political life emerges from the presence of different modes of political action across the public domain? The attempt to clarify the qualitative implications emergent from distinctive modes of political action has never, of course, been held separate from the more general query concerning which quality of social being develops from different modes of social action. The question of political being has been conceived as one aspect of the broader problem of social being and political action as one dimension of the broader process of social action. To comprehend the different modes of social action together with their emergent qualities is thus to master successfully the complementary questions of political being and political action.

This treatise will follow in the tradition of political thought. It will address the problem of political being by enveloping it within a broader treatment of social action. This treatment will be fundamentally reconstructive. It will seek to unify contemporary human experience into a new, and more satisfactory, mosaic of social reality. This mosaic of social reality is intended to provide a more lucid appreciation of the human circumstance through past actions, present realities, and future possibilities. The mosaic of social reality which will be introduced here has been developed as a paradigmatic theory of social action. The paradigmatic theory represents the most generalized image possible of social action. This image develops from the thesis that a significant portion of present human experience may be understood as a complex working-out of three competing paradigms of social action and of the relationships which hold between them. The three competing paradigms of social action will be identified as the cosmological, the corporate, and the organic. Each paradigm of social action may be visualized as a unique expression of the complete social process. The complete social process describes the characteristic movement of the history of social action itself. The history of social action is a process which unifies a general human problem, a broad phenomenology of the human circumstance, a pattern of human practices, and a consequent human condition into the experience of a total social reality. The complete social process thus contains four, relatively distinct, dimensions, all conjoined as related features in a single process of historical action. The latter, taken as a whole, represents a paradigm of social action. A paradigm of social action is thus a qualitatively distinct expression of the complete social process. This expression

begins with a formative human problem of urgent and general significance, continues with the elaboration of a broadly conceived image concerning what must be done for its resolution, advances into a pattern of concrete human activities, and culminates in the qualitative consequences of the actions taken. These consequences set the stage for the appearance of a new human problem of urgent and general significance and the process of paradigmatic action begins anew.¹

There is only one complete social process. It may, however, be given many different expressions. Each different representation of the complete social process represents a paradigm of social action. Thus, the cosmological paradigm is that expression of the complete social process which emerges from general concern with the problematic character of human salvation. The corporate paradigm is that mode of the complete social process which develops from preoccupation with the problematic character of human order. The organic paradigm is that expression of the complete social process which emerges from commitments to resolve the problematic character of human freedom. The formative problems of salvation, order, and freedom inculcate competing visions of social reality. These visions are expressed as root assumptions concerning what constitutes the basic nature of social action. The problem of salvation engenders an absolutist vision of social reality. The problem of order precipitates an entitative viewpoint on social action.² The problem of freedom leads to a reconstructive image of the human social reality. Each competing image of social reality, when taken as a whole, forms a phenomenology of the human circumstance. These phenomenological visions provide the root postulates out of which

distinctive social realities have, or may be, constructed. The absolutist vision results in a social reality characterized by the activities of mythification, conversion, transformation, and redemption. The entitative viewpoint leads to the activities of reification, mobilization, canalization, and commitment. The reconstructive perspective engenders a social reality characterized by the activities of actualization, reconstruction, consolidation, and creation. Finally, each construction of social reality culminates, or may culminate, in a distinctive human condition. The cosmological paradigm culminates in the condition of human chaos. The corporate paradigm results in the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. The organic paradigm may culminate in the condition of human uncertainty.

The competing paradigms of social action are linked together by means of their consequences. The cosmological paradigm culminates in chaos. The polarity of chaos is order - the formative problem out of which emerges the corporate paradigm. The latter results in the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. The polarity of reinforced meaninglessness is freedom. The problem of freedom inspires, for its solution, the creation of an organic paradigm. The latter tends towards the condition of human uncertainty. Human uncertainty is the breeding-ground out of which the cosmological paradigm has developed. The cosmological paradigm thus anticipates, and even requires, the development of a corporate world. The corporate paradigm sets the stage for the possible creation of the organic. And, in an ironic twist, the organic paradigm prepares the condition out of which the cosmological may once again develop. This is not, of course, a historical inevit-

ability. 'Human' conditions, even if found undesirable, do not have to be rectified. Formative human problems do not have to be solved. The paradigmatic theory of social action simply describes what has happened and what is likely to happen in a social reality characterized by the problems of salvation, order, and freedom. Insofar as each problem has resulted, or may result, in a distinctive paradigm of social action, then the history of social action is literally dead-locked. It is condemned to the rise and fall of the generalized human experiences associated with the struggles for salvation, order, and freedom.

The competing paradigms of social action do not exist in isolation from one another. Each is a distinctive expression of the same complete social process. These expressions may coexist in the same human situation. They may overlap one another and be experienced simultaneously as conflicting tendencies across the same human social reality. None is ever totally absent from human experience. Nor is any of the competing paradigms of social action ever completely absolute. Each paradigm achieves, or may achieve, only relative predominance over the other two. In terms of relative predominance, the three paradigms of social action may be spaced out over time. The corporate paradigm expresses the significant tendencies of twentieth century experience. The problem of order and the generalized human experience which it precipitates appear as the dominant social facts of contemporary human life. The cosmological paradigm exists, at the present moment, only in residual form. The salvation experience, while important, no longer captivates the social scene. The cosmological paradigm is, however, the

formative experience to which present social reality is a continuing response. Likewise, the organic paradigm exists now only as a possibility on the forward horizon of human experience. It has nowhere been fully realized as a major expression of the human social reality. It has, however, been partially realized whenever the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness has catalyzed the struggle for human liberation.

The themes of salvation, order, and freedom have thus shaped the contemporary human predicament. Each has yielded a distinctive paradigm of social action. The present social reality is, to a large extent, the locus for the intersection of these "competing paradigms of social action and of the relationships which hold between them. The three paradigms of social action have as their common ground the complete social process. Each exhausts a certain content which can be given to the complete social process. This exhaustion sets the stage for a movement, or a possible movement, out of one paradigm and into the next. The synthesis does not continue indeterminately but "comes full circle", metaphorically speaking, when the condition of human uncertainty makes possible, once again, the condition out of which the cosmological paradigm may develop. This is a fateful and significant contention. It will require for its verification a thorough presentation of the assumptions which have led to a vision of the complete social process and, thereby, to the paradigmatic theory of social action.

The present chapter will discuss the assumptions which have led to a process interpretation of human experience and will outline the general features of the paradigmatic theory of social action itself, while succeeding chapters will examine, in more detail, the competing

paradigms of social action and the relationships which hold between them. This chapter will proceed through the following six stages. First, the basic working assumptions which underly the present study will be presented in terms of a theory of reconstructive empiricism. Second, the argument will be made that the reconstructive empirical approach complements a process interpretation of human experience. A discussion will then ensue concerning the philosophical development of the process perspective. This discussion will concentrate on the remarkably thorough and profound theory of human process which has been elaborated by Michael A. Weinstein, a contemporary American political theorist. It is Weinstein's statement of process theory, together with the social action theory of Talcott Parsons, which informs the present study. Third, the four dimensions of the complete social process will be described. Fourth, a paradigm of social action will be presented as a unique interpretation of the complete social process. The general features of the paradigmatic theory of social action will then be outlined. Finally, some concluding comments will be made and the chapters which follow will be outlined.

Reconstructive Empiricism

The development of the paradigmatic theory of social action has been preceded by certain assumptions concerning the character of human knowledge and the relationship between inquiry and social experience. These assumptions constitute the working postulates which guide the present study. They have not been conceived a priori to an interpretation of social action but directly emerge from an investigation of concrete human experience and from a fundamental decision,

based on that investigation, concerning how the salient tendencies of social action may most fruitfully be disclosed and clarified. These working assumptions may be scrutinized, debated, and criticized in a principled fashion. They are not rigid dogmas but verifiable hypotheses concerning the constitution of human knowledge and the place of inquiry in social action. While they may be tested according to the usual canons of evidence and logic, their ultimate ground of verification lies in the degree to which they promote a genuinely moral interpretation of the process of human experience. A genuinely moral theory is distinguished by its readiness to expose to reconstructive thought every dimension of human life - whether sentiments, ideas, activities, or values - and by its eagerness to employ the results of such inquiries to hasten the appearance of human liberation. The working assumptions of this study are intended to advance a critical reappraisal of every feature of human life. They are also woven through by the present author's commitment to the fullest expansion possible of a substantively meaningful, and thereby libertarian, human situation. Rather than being value-free, the present study is thus value-full. As a fundamentally moral statement, this inquiry begins and ends with a commitment to lucid inquiry as the first step in the creation of a genuine human social experience. To the extent to which the present study succeeds in fostering a genuinely moral interpretation of human experience, to that extent it may be considered successful. Conversely, insofar as it fails to do so, then it may be considered less than an adequate political theory.

The present inquiry begins with the assumption of reconstructive

empiricism as its chief epistemological tool. Reconstructive empiricism may be viewed as a "movement" towards a genuinely empirical theory of human knowledge.³ A genuinely empirical epistemology is one which continuously unifies the more ideal aspect of human life with prescriptions for social conduct, human practices with reflections on their emergent qualities, and social inquiry with the intuitive apprehension of life out of which it has been bred. In a genuinely empirical mode of thought, there is no study of social life which is not simultaneously a moral commitment to a particular way of life, no moral commitment which does not engender activity as a response, and no social practice which is not grounded in a formative impression of the world and of one's fate, as a social and historical being, within it. Moreover, inasmuch as the unification, indeed the organic unification, of sentiments, practices, reflections, and ideals constitutes the touch stone of the process of human freedom, then in a genuinely empirical mode of inquiry the process of thought itself 'takes its place' in the struggle for a more libertarian world. Reconstructive empiricism advances the development of such a genuine mode of social study by presenting human inquiry as the activity of synthesizing human sentiment into substantive human meanings. A substantive human meaning is any representation of the social world which discloses how impressionistic experience may be harmonized with the conduct of personal life, and how social endeavour may be made reflective of genuine moral aspirations. A substantive human meaning is, in other words, a momentary, intuitive disclosure of the possibilities existent, at any given time, for binding together the actual with the possible, practice with

reflection, aspirations with realities, and apprehensions with conduct.

Three premises underly this conception of human inquiry. First, human reflection is conceived as implicitly a process of self-expression.⁴ Second, the content of self-expression is envisioned as any concretely apprehended aspect of human experience.⁵ Third, the process of self-expression - the creation of substantive human meanings - is understood as being advanced by the combination and recombination of concrete human experience into a more comprehensive synthesis of the human social process.⁶ This synthetic effort is always reconstructive. It continuously shatters the customary presentation of social reality in favour of a new and more satisfactory reworking of human experience. This reworking of concrete human experience is intended to portray a broader swath of the human social reality and to reveal more acutely the possibilities existent for the organic unification of the process of social action. And it is precisely the organic unification of social action - the binding together of affectivity, consciousness, practices, and moral aspirations into a unitary movement - which advances self-expression and, thereby, provokes the libertarian impulse.

The reconstructive viewpoint on human knowledge overcomes traditional conceptions of the place of social inquiry in human experience. Reconstructive empiricism does not conceive of human thought as a reality-in-itself, detached from the actual life-situation of concrete human beings, or as a neutral instrument capable of "discovering" a pre-existent subject matter. Moreover, the reconstructive empirical approach does not envision human reflection as a way of bridging an inevitably sundered universe:

a connective between the private realm of subjectivity and the more objective domain of public happenings. On the contrary, reconstructive empiricism simply presents human inquiry as the process of self-expression. And it views self-expression as the process of creating the world anew for oneself around the fountainhead of impressionistic experience. This proposal springs from a peculiar image of the human self. The human self is not maintained as a philosophical nicety or as a mechanical cog. It is envisioned neither as the embodiment of a hidden "spirit" nor as a discrete entity but, on the contrary, as an active, and potentially creative, social process. The human self is a social process which is concretely experienced, and in that experience, created. Rather than being the ultimate datum of human existence, the social self is developed through the process of merging the person, biologically conceived, into the broader forum of human experience. What is meant by the social self - the fact that people achieve an affective sense of being - is a complicated working-out of this merger. The scope of this merger cannot be reduced to a solitary person engaged in readily observable activities but extends well beyond the person, biologically conceived, to the complete social process out of which certain modes of social being have emerged as possibilities while others have not. To give full expression to the social self, therefore, is to comprehend the complete social process out of which it has developed. Self-expression is thus synonymous with the study of the broader process of social existence. And inquiry into any aspect of human experience is co-terminous, or may be co-terminous, with advances in self-expression.

The material out of which self-expression develops is any concretely apprehended aspect of social action. Concrete human knowledge is knowledge which may be gained independently.⁷ And human knowledge gained independently is knowledge which does not depend for its existence on "before the fact" assumptions concerning the character of human existence, dogmatic convictions, irreducible explanatory principles, primal acts of faith, or on intense "credos." All the latter may be considered, in fact, as the necessary presuppositions for dependent forms of human thought. There are two central varieties of dependent thinking - one metaphysical and the other more abstract.⁸ Neither metaphysical nor abstract modes of human thought yield concrete human knowledge. On the contrary, metaphysical thought is always an emergent of an intense human "credo." And knowledge which may be gained only abstractly is always dependent for its existence on an a priori willingness to 'reify' human existence. While metaphysical thought yields creeds and dogmas, abstract thought asserts a 'method of study' as the fullest representation possible of the human social reality. Thus, while theology is an example of metaphysical knowledge, the systems approach to human inquiry is an example of abstract knowledge. Although the contents of metaphysical and abstract thought may differ, their origins are exactly the same. Both emerge from a shared commitment to overcome the concrete social world in favour of that which may never be independently grasped. Dependent forms of social thought provide an "escape hatch" by which human beings may reach beyond the concrete social world to the nether world of abstractions and preformed realities. While such abstractions and preformed realities

may be transformed into the "lightning rods" of human creed, they have never been, and can never be, apprehended concretely. Their very appearance implies the loss of independent reflection.

Reconstructive empiricism dispenses with such "estape hatches" in favour of retaining an immediate and intuitive contact with the concrete social world. It encourages independent reflection. And such reflection is independent precisely because it is grounded in concrete human experience.⁹ Reconstructive thought is never, in this case, thought about nothing. It is always reflection on the actual life-situation of real men and women, on the history of social action of which their life-situation is but a working-out, and on the immediate possibilities for its improvement. Reconstructive thought, in short, is grounded in the entire historical panorama of human affectivities, modes of human consciousness, patterns of social organization, and dicta of moral life. It weighs the results of all knowledge independently gained against the concrete process of human experience itself. And it further demands that all such grounded inquiries prescribe how the actual life-process of concrete human beings may be advanced towards the condition of human liberation. Conversely, metaphysical and abstract modes of human knowledge are implicitly ungrounded.¹⁰ They do not designate anything in the concrete social world. Instead, they represent a negation of concrete social experience and an affirmation of that which may be only dependently experienced. Metaphysical and abstract modes of human thought, in short, are the leading agents in the flight beyond the empirical social world to the domains of anti-empiricisms and counterfeit empiricisms respectively.

So far, reconstructive empiricism has involved two basic assumptions. First, human thought has been described as implicitly a process of self-expression. Second, the content of self-expression has been defined as any concretely, or independently, apprehended aspect of human experience. As its final assumption, reconstructive empiricism maintains that self-expression may be achieved by synthesizing concrete human experience into substantive human meanings. A substantive human meaning is a fleeting vision of social reality which sums up human sentiments and which discloses the possibilities existent for organically unifying such sentiments with other dimensions of human existence - whether reflections, practices, or moral aspirations. This vision of social reality is like a movable mosaic. It unifies, for an instant, the central tendencies of human experience into a lucid image of the process of social reality. This mosaic of social reality relates the affective social self to the larger process of human experience within which the person is inextricably immersed. In doing so, the mosaic of social reality further clarifies the full web of social action out of which qualitatively distinct modes of social being have emerged and provides a tentative answer as to why other, perhaps more laudable, modes of social being have not developed. The social mosaic also reveals possibilities for concrete action and discloses how such activities may be related to the realization of libertarian ideals. The synthesis of the process of human experience thus plunges the social self, on the basis of sentiment, into the history of social action of which it is the focal point at the present moment. In a literal sense, the social self reconstructs its way to the creation of a sub-

stantively meaningful world. This implies, of course, that reconstructive thought emerges from reconstructive sentiments and anticipates the reconstruction of social life and aesthetic experience. It further implies that the process of reconstruction - the creation of substantive human meanings - is itself the process of human freedom.

This reconstructive activity is always relative, partial, provisional, and prospective. It is relative rather than absolute because broad portraits of social reality are grounded in particular human situations. The latter have referents in space and time and contain a unique constellation of experiences. There may be, at the minimum, as many images of the history of social process as there are different human situations, as many social reconstructions as there are libertarian sentiments to be expressed and possibilities for freedom to be disclosed. The creation of substantive human meanings must, therefore, be held relative to the human circumstance. It follows that no social reconstruction completely exhausts the entire process of human experience but that each image is a partial representation of a larger whole. The mosaic which is created encompasses only that narrow band of social reality which is relevant to particular human situations. Similarly, reconstructive activity is provisional rather than permanent because the changing scene of social life cannot be immobilized. Any change in independently apprehended experience alters the basis for the reconstruction of that experience. Human life is, or may be, temporarily 'thrown off balance.' And it is 'thrown off balance' by the prospective aspect of all substantive images of social action. The synthesis of human sentiments into substantive human meanings opens up opportunities for concrete social

action. Reconstructive thought 'stirs up' the necessity for reconstructive activity. And this reconstructive activity serves to add a moral dimension to every aspect of human existence. Human life of this sort is bound together by the realization and practice of genuine moral aspirations. It is such genuine moral aspirations which provide the well-spring for impressionistic experience and which ultimately inspire reconstructive thought.

Reconstructive thought succeeds, of course, only to the extent that the customary presentation of human history as a serial, chronological, and epochal affair is overcome.¹¹ Human history, in the most complete sense, is the history of social action. And the history of social action is the history of the concretely apprehended universe of human experience and of the emergent qualities which develop from its combination and recombination into new and more profound portraits of social reality. While that which is "in sight" across the social domain may be dated and, on the basis of chronology, arranged serially, that which is "out of sight but not out of experience" cannot be grasped so simply. And yet, it is precisely in the domain of affectivities, reflections, practices, and moral visions that the answer to which quality of social being is co-terminous with which mode of social action lies. The study of concrete human experience from the perspective of its emergent qualities leads to an unfamiliar historical process. In the study of independently apprehended experience, there are no customary land-marks, no simple divisions, and no tidy arrangements of periods into past, present, and future. The study of independently apprehended experience is, in fact, nothing less than the creation of the history of

that experience from the perspective of human sentiment and from the prospective urge to freedom. In short, the reconstructive empirical approach to human thought is a way of making history. And the history which is created is the history of the process of social action. The history of social process partially clarifies human experience and encourages a transformation, whether large or small, of the content of human life. This transformation is always preceded by the creation of a relative, partial, provisional, and prospective mosaic of social reality.

These remarks conclude the discussion of reconstructive empiricism. This study will now demonstrate how such basic working assumptions provide the ground for the development of a paradigmatic theory of social action, which is a broad mosaic of the history of social experience. This mosaic of social reality has been inspired by a desire for a substantively meaningful world, deals in concretely apprehended experience, and is implicitly reconstructive. It begins with the formative vision of the social process.

The Social Process

The history of social experience is the history of the process of social experience. And the history of the process of social experience is always the history of a unitary process of social action, its content and its qualitative modes of transformation.¹²

The unitary process of social action may be defined as a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation between human dispositions, queries, materializations, and qualitative consequences. This unitary social

process provides the single, dynamic point of reference around which every aspect of the history of concrete social experience may be organized. There has never been any occurrence in the concrete social world which does not maintain as its referent either a human disposition, a query concerning how that disposition may be alleviated or advanced,

a concrete process of materialization by which the products of human consciousness are transformed into social practices, or a qualitative consequence of the actions undertaken. Moreover, there has never been any fundamental transformation of human dispositions which does not preform and anticipate a corresponding alteration of human thought. There have been no queries which fail to summarize a past history of human affectivity, no transformation of human consciousness which does not set the stage for a further reconstruction of social life, no social reconstruction which does not sum up a prior process of human affectivity and consciousness, and, finally, no qualitative outcome of social action which does not simultaneously summarize a previous movement of human dispositions, queries, and materializations, and establish a new basis for the transformation, or possible transformation, of human affectivity. The domain of social experience is, in short, bound together by a dynamic process of social action. And this dynamic social process is always a movement out of human affectivity and into consciousness, beyond consciousness and into the more material aspect of social existence, beyond human materializations and into the domain of qualitative outcomes, and, finally, beyond qualitative consequences and into the possibility of a new reconstruction of the process of social action. This dynamic social process has never received a single

enduring interpretation throughout the history of concrete social experience. There has never been a single mode of human affectivity, a homogeneous state of human consciousness, a universal process of human materializations, or a unitary condition of qualitative consequences. Additionally, there has never been a universally identical process by which human dispositions, queries, materializations, and qualitative consequences are combined into a unitary movement. On the contrary, the process of social action has received many different expressions, each of which has yielded a distinctive mode of social experience. To comprehend the full range of social experience, it is thus necessary to clarify, at first, the history of transformations undergone by the unitary social process.

This clarification begins with the seminal insight that concrete social experience always contains four qualitatively distinct aspects, namely, a human disposition, a query, a materialization, and a qualitative consequence. Each is woven into a unitary social process by concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation. This insight does not originate with the present study. It is a product both of the substantively creative thought of Deepa and Michael Weinstein, contemporary American social and political theorists respectively, and of the formative reflections of Talcott Parsons.¹³ While the Weinstains have extended the critical notion of a four dimensional human process into a full examination of social process theory and, thereupon, into an admirable description of the different modes of human action present within the contemporary social world, Parsons has implicitly grounded the construction of a general theory

of social action in concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation.¹⁴ Working independently, the present author has achieved many of the same conclusions. Like the Weinstens, this author has been led to the conclusion that social experience may be best understood as a dynamic movement involving four qualitatively distinct dimensions, each of which provides the ground for a different content of human existence. Similarly, the mutual conclusion has been reached that there are three generalized modes of social experience, each of which represents a major reconstruction of the unitary process of social action. Like Parsons, the present author has concluded that the direction of particular reconstructions of social action may be best clarified through concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation. These shared conclusions are intended, of course, to serve the limited aims of the present study. This work is not primarily concerned with the elaboration of social process theory nor with the construction of a general theory of social action. On the contrary, the present study is devoted simply to the construction of a generalized mosaic of social reality. The definition of social action used here has, in fact, been derived directly from a concrete investigation of what constitutes the content and direction of the three generalized social experiences which compose this portrait of past, present, and possible social realities. This investigation has disclosed that the content of any given mode of social experience may be clarified by examining which dispositions, queries, materializations, and qualitative consequences have gained ascendancy at particular times and places. It has also revealed that the direction of

a given mode of social experience may be understood by studying how human dispositions, queries, materializations, and qualitative consequences have been combined into a unitary process of social action by means of concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation.

For example, the content of any given mode of social experience consists of human dispositions, queries, materializations, and qualitative consequences. A human disposition is a social process involving the summing-up of a formative impression of the concrete social world, and of one's fate as a social and historical being within it, into an active awareness concerning what is most problematic in human existence.¹⁵ An active awareness of what is most problematic in human existence may be described as a definition of the human situation. A definition of the human situation always has an affective human being, or a plurality of affective human beings, as its subject and some or all features of the concrete social world as its object. It is precisely the passing of the concrete social world through the well-spring of human affectivity which provides the ultimate ground for the development of definitions of human situation. And such definitions, once developed, unify a formative impression of the concrete social world with an understanding of what constitutes its most problematic feature. Similarly, a human query is a social process which involves the transformation of an active awareness of what is most problematic in human existence into an assumption about what must be done for its rectification. The movement from a human disposition to a human query is not simply a movement out of affectivity

into consciousness. It is also, in a profound sense, a movement beyond a more individualistic and definitional dimension of social experience into a more collective and intentional one.¹⁶ While a human disposition designates the social process by which an individual human being, or a plurality of individual human beings, may achieve a definition of the human situation, a human query denotes the social process by which an aspect of intentionality is added to social experience. And it is precisely this aspect of intentionality which provides the keynote for the appearance, or possible appearance, of a human collectivity. In this case, a human collectivity begins to emerge, or may begin to emerge, when a definition of the human situation leads to the intention of acting upon that definition. Human beings not only become aware of the human situation, but also organize themselves around the task of rectifying its problematic features. And this process of organization is a product of a human query. Similarly, a human materialization is a social process involving the translation of an assumption concerning what must be done for the rectification of a pressing human problem into a concrete social practice which specifies how this might be accomplished. A concrete social practice may be viewed as a realization of the products of human consciousness. This process of actualization is always more relational than definitional or intentional.¹⁷ A human materialization does not provide the basis for the process of arriving at a definition of the human situation or for the process of human intentionality. It does ground, however, the process of transforming the products of a human disposition and of a human query into a qualitative reconstruction of the conduct of

everyday social life. A human materialization is, in this case, concretely experienced as a qualitatively distinct way of being related to others. In a similar way, a qualitative consequence is a social process involving the summing-up of human dispositions, queries, and materializations into a transformation, whether partial or complete, of the human situation. This transformation of the human situation is concretely experienced as a quality of human life. And a quality of human life may be viewed as a lived valuation of a resultant human situation from the standpoint of a prior history of human dispositions, queries, and materializations.¹⁸ Social experience, in this case, contains a qualitative aspect. And this qualitative aspect is grounded in the process of weighing a transformed human situation against the human desires, intentions, and practices which have led to it.

The content of social experience thus includes, at the minimum, human dispositions, queries, materializations, and qualitative consequences. There is no social experience which does not contain a definition of the human situation, an intention to act upon that definition, a concrete social practice, and a quality of human life. However, social experience does not only contain a content. It also includes a direction. The direction of a given mode of social experience may be viewed, in its simplest expression, as an emergent of how a human disposition, a query, a materialization, and a qualitative consequence are combined into a social process by means of concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation. There are different modes of social process, each of

which represents a qualitatively unique working-out of the relationships which hold between the different aspects of social experience. Each mode of social process moves the domain of social experience in a particular direction. Thus, while all social experience is unified by means of the presence of a process of social action; not all social experiences are organized in precisely the same way. And it is the differences between the ways in which social dimensions are unified into a process of social action that account for the many possible directions of social experience. Such differences may be traced to the many possible variations of concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation.

For example, the different aspects of social experience are joined together, at first, by relations of performance.¹⁹ By performance is meant that the contents of a given mode of social experience mutually foreclose and circumscribe one another. A particular mode of human disposition gives rise to certain forms of human consciousness while foreclosing the possibility of others. A particular mode of human consciousness channels and directs the contents of human materializations. Only certain consequences, and not others, emerge from the materialization of human intentions, and these consequences circumscribe and foreclose, once again, the contents of human dispositions. Likewise, the different aspects of social experience are joined together by relations of anticipation.²⁰ By anticipation is meant that the contents of a given mode of social experience mutually necessitate each other. A human disposition requires for its fulfilment the appearance of a

human query. A human query demands for its fulfilment the presence of a human materialization. A human materialization "leads into" a qualitative consequence. And there is no qualitative consequence which does not demand, and even require, an adjustment, or a possible adjustment, of a human disposition. Similarly, the different aspects of social experience are joined together by relations of summation.²¹ By summation is meant that the contents of a given mode of social experience mutually "work-out" one another. A human disposition represents a working-out of a past history of social action. A human query may be viewed as a working-out of a formative human disposition. A human materialization represents a working-out of the products of human dispositions and human queries. A qualitative consequence may be viewed as a working-out of a process of dispositions, queries, and materializations. There is no aspect of social experience, in this case, which does not represent a summing-up of one dimension of social existence into another.

The different aspects of social experience are, therefore, always unified into a dynamic movement by means of concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation. Such relations are concretely experienced since they do not depend for their existence upon an external source of validation. They are not objects of human reification, products of human dogma, manifestations of a hidden 'purpose' in social existence, or empty connections between isolated phenomena. Relations of performance, anticipation, and summation are, on the contrary, independently knowable because it is possible to detect their presence across the concrete social world without resorting

to abstract thought or to a priori assumptions. And they are independently knowable as the internal dynamic of social experience because they constitute the very process by which the different aspects of social existence combine into a unitary movement. In this case, human dispositions, queries, materializations, and qualitative consequences are not externally related to one another as isolated phenomena. Nor are they joined by empty connections. They are, instead, internally related to one another as different aspects of a unitary social movement. And their internal relations consist of concretely experienced conjunctions of performance, anticipation, and summation. Accordingly, social experience contains its own dynamic. And the dynamic of social experience is grounded in the presence of relations of performance, anticipation, and summation between the central aspects of social existence. This dynamic of social experience does not, of course, always operate in exactly the same way. There are different modes of social action. And each mode of social action is different because it represents a qualitatively unique working-out of concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation between the major dimensions of social experience. This results in the possibility of social experience being unified by different modes of social process, each of which moves the social world, whether partially or completely, in a particular direction.

The history of social experience is thus the history of the different interpretations which may be given to a unitary process of social action. Whatever its interpretation, this social process

contains both a content and a direction. The content of social action consists, at the minimum, of a human disposition, a query, a materialization, and a qualitative consequence. The direction of social action consists, in its simplest expression, of a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation between a human disposition, a query, a materialization, and a qualitative consequence. Social action has, however, never consisted of a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation between a single human disposition, a single human query, a single materialization, or a single qualitative consequence. On the contrary, social action has always consisted of many dispositions, queries, materializations, and qualitative consequences, each of which perform, anticipate, and summarize each other. And interpretations of social action have always dealt with the process of social action in its fullest expression. In its fullest expression, the process of social action may be visualized as a complete social process. The complete process represents the most exhaustive statement possible of social action. It is the complete social process which provides the ground for the construction of a paradigmatic theory of social action.

The Complete Social Process²²

The domain of social experience is unified, in the fullest sense, by a complete process of social action.* The complete social process interrelates into a unitary human social experience a process of human dispositions, a process of human queries, a process of human materializations, and a process of qualitative consequences. The

* See Table 1 below, p. 332

complete social process is simply the process of social action brought to its fullest fruition. The process of social action consists of a movement between a human disposition, a query, a materialization, and a qualitative consequence. There has never been, of course, a single human disposition or a human disposition which has not transformed a formative impression of a specific aspect of the concrete social world into a particular definition of the human situation. In a similar way, there has never been a solitary human query or a human query which has not advanced a particular definition of the human situation into a unique assumption concerning what must be done for its rectification. Likewise, there has never been a single human materialization or a human materialization which has not organized a specific assumption concerning what must be done for the rectification of a particular definition of the human situation into a specific social practice which relates how this might be accomplished. And, finally, there has never been a solitary qualitative consequence or a qualitative consequence which has not combined a specific human disposition, a particular human query, and a specific human materialization into a unique alteration of the human situation.

On the contrary, social action has consisted, at first, of a process of human dispositions, each of which organizes a formative sensibility about a different aspect of the concrete social world into a partial definition of the human situation, and all of which preform, anticipate, and summarize each other.²³ Likewise, social action has been composed of a process of human queries, each of

which transforms a partial definition of the human situation into a specific assumption concerning what must be done for its rectification, and all of which preform, anticipate, and summarize each other.²⁴ Similarly, social action has consisted of a process of human materializations, each of which advances a specific assumption concerning what must be done for the rectification of a particular definition of the human situation into a unique social practice which relates how this might be accomplished.²⁵ Finally, social action has been composed of a process of qualitative consequences, each of which integrates a specific definition of the human situation, together with its related assumption and practice, into a partial revision of the human situation, and all of which preform, anticipate, and summarize each other.²⁶ In short, social action may be viewed, in its fullest expression, as a relentless development of relationships within processes of human dispositions, human queries, human materializations, and qualitative consequences, and between them.

Thus, the complete process of social action is grounded in a process of human dispositions. The process of human dispositions combines into a unitary human sensibility four root sentiments about the concrete social world, each of which provides the basis for a particular definition of the human situation. A human disposition has previously been described as a social process which channels a formative impression of a specific aspect of the concrete social world into a particular understanding of what is most problematic in human existence. There are four basic human dispositions, each of which advances a formative impression of a different feature of concrete

social reality into a particular, albeit partial, definition of the human situation. They may be described as subjective, collective, social, and aesthetic dispositions. A subjective disposition is a social process which organizes sentiments about the more personal aspect of the concrete social world into an appreciation of what is most problematic in the human survival situation. A collective disposition provides the basis for the transformation of feelings about the more postulational aspect of human existence into an understanding of what is most problematic in the human political situation. A social disposition advances a formative impression of the more material aspect of the concrete social world into an appreciation of what is most problematic in the human social situation. And an aesthetic disposition is a social process which transforms sensibilities about the more qualitative aspect of social life into an understanding of what is most problematic in the human value situation.

The concrete social world is, in this case, always apprehended impressionistically. It is not, however, always apprehended impressionistically in the same way. On the contrary, four affective responses to the concrete social world are possible, each of which furnishes a particular understanding of what is most problematic in human existence. For example, human affectivity may have, as its object, the more personal and introspective aspect of the concrete social world. An affective human being, or a plurality of affective human beings, may organize an impression of the concrete social world on the basis of its subjective adequacy.²⁷ By subjective adequacy is meant an intuitive

appreciation of the quality of social being emergent from a given transformation of the human survival situation. The submission of social experience to the standard of subjective adequacy affords an understanding of what is most problematic in a given process of human survival. Since any given process of human survival results, or may result, in the creation of a particular mode of social being, then there is no affective response to the quality of a particular mode of social being which does not produce, or may not produce, an active awareness of what is most problematic in the human survival situation. It is the unification of an impression of the concrete social world on the basis of its subjective adequacy with a definition of the human survival situation which comprises a subjective disposition. Likewise, human affectivity may be directed towards the more postulational and collaborative aspect of the concrete social world. Human beings may develop an impression of a given mode of social experience on the basis of its collective adequacy. By collective adequacy is meant an intuitive appreciation of the quality of social consciousness emergent from a given transformation of the human political situation. An impression of the collective adequacy of the concrete social world provides for an understanding of what is most problematic in a given process^d of human politics. Processes of human politics culminate, or may culminate, in the development of particular modes of social consciousness. Consequently, an affective response to the quality of a particular mode of social consciousness produces, or may produce, an active appreciation of what is most problematic in the human political situation. The synthesis of an impression of the collective adequacy of human experience with a

definition of the human political situation represents a collective disposition. In a similar way, an impression of the concrete social world may be organized on the basis of its social adequacy. By social adequacy is meant an intuitive appreciation of the quality of social activity emergent from a given transformation of the human social situation. An appreciation of what is most problematic in the process of human materializations may be gained from a sense of the social adequacy of human existence. Insofar as any given process of human materializations results, or may result, in a particular mode of social practice, then an affective response to the quality of a particular mode of social practice yields, or may yield, an active awareness of what is most problematic in the human social situation. It is the unification of an impression of the concrete social world on the basis of its social adequacy with a definition of the human social situation which comprises a social disposition. Finally, human affectivity may be oriented towards the more qualitative and consequential dimension of the concrete social world. The aesthetic adequacy of the concrete social world may context the development of human sensibilities. By aesthetic adequacy is meant an intuitive appreciation of the quality of social morality emergent from a given transformation of the human value situation. An appreciation of the aesthetic adequacy of human experience furnishes an understanding of what is most problematic in the process of human valuations. Since processes of human valuation always result in the creation of particular modes of social morality, then an affective response to the quality of a particular mode of social morality engenders, or may engender, an active awareness of what is most problematic in the

human value situation. The interrelation of an impression of the concrete social world on the basis of its aesthetic adequacy with a definition of the human value situation comprises an aesthetic disposition.

There are, therefore, four basic human dispositions, each of which transforms a formative impression of the adequacy of a specific aspect of the concrete social world into a particular definition of the human situation. The four basic human dispositions may be viewed as interrelated aspects of a broader movement of human sensibilities. Impressions of the more subjective aspect of human existence preform and anticipate sentiments about the more collaborative dimension of social experience. Collective sensibilities sum up personal feelings, and provide the basis for a further appreciation of human social life. The process of social affectivity summarizes subjective and collective sensibilities, and sets the stage for a more aesthetic impression of the human circumstance. And aesthetic sentiments sum up a prior history of subjective, collective, and social dispositions, and anticipate, once more, an appreciation of the quality of a given mode of social being. Moreover, a definition of the human survival situation preforms and anticipates an awareness of what is most problematic in the human political situation. Political problems summarize survival concerns, and point to particular social problems. Definitions of the human social situation sum up specific survival and political problems, and anticipate specific images of the human aesthetic situation. And aesthetic problems summarize a past history of survival, political, and social problems, and lead back into

redefinitions of the human survival situation.

Although the complete social process originates in a process of human dispositions, it also includes a process of human queries. While the process of human dispositions provides the basis for a complete awareness of what is most problematic in human existence, the process of human queries provides the basis for a complete understanding of what must be done for its rectification.

The process of human queries may be defined as a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation between four fundamental human assumptions, each of which specifies what must be done for the rectification of a specific human disposition. A human query has previously been described as a social process which transforms a specific human disposition into an assumption concerning what must be done for its resolution. There are four fundamental human queries, each of which responds to a specific human disposition. They may be described as ontological, epistemological, axiological, and aesthetic queries.²⁸

An ontological query is a social process which organizes a subjective human disposition into an assumption concerning what might constitute a more desirable mode of social being. An epistemological query transforms a collective human disposition into a postulate concerning what might comprise a more desirable mode of social consciousness.

An axiological query is a social process which channels a social disposition into an assumption concerning what might constitute a more desirable mode of social activity. And an aesthetic query advances an aesthetic human disposition into a postulate concerning

what might comprise a more desirable mode of social morality.

Human dispositions thus give rise to postulations concerning how they might be resolved most satisfactorily. However, human dispositions do not always yield the same postulations. On the contrary, there are four basic human dispositions, each of which integrates a formative appreciation of a specific aspect of the concrete social world into a particular awareness of what is most problematic in the human situation. And each particular appreciation of what is most problematic in the human situation yields a specific postulate concerning what must be done for its rectification. For example, a subjective definition of the human situation anticipates, and even requires, for its solution an ontological query concerning the nature of a more satisfactory mode of social being. An impression of the more subjective aspect of human experience calls into question the quality of social being engendered by a given process of human survival. And an ontological query draws this impression of human experience into a postulate which details the salient features of a more adequate mode of social being. An ontological query represents, in this case, the first step in the revision, or possible revision, of the human survival situation. In a similar way, collective human sensibilities require for their prosecution a reformation of the human epistemology. This reformation of the human epistemology originates in an aversive reaction to the mentality of a given political process. And it concludes with a prophetic query which spells out the ingredients of a more efficacious mode of political consciousness. An epistemological query may thus be visualized as

the lead-point in the reconstruction, or possible reconstruction, of the human political situation. Likewise, an axiological query emerges in response to human social sentiments: Such sentiments have, as their object, the quality of social activity emergent from a given process of human sociability. As the vanguard of an alteration, or a possible alteration, of the human social situation, an axiological query organizes social sensibilities into an image of human experience which describes what might constitute a more desirable mode of social activity. And, finally, an aesthetic definition of the human situation anticipates for its solution an aesthetic query concerning the character of a more adequate mode of social morality. An impression of the more valuational aspect of human experience calls into question the quality of the human moral condition. And an aesthetic query responds to this qualitative assessment of the human moral condition by providing a vision of the human prospect which outlines the broad strokes of a more satisfactory mode of value experience. An aesthetic query thus serves as the first step in the transformation, or possible transformation, of the human value situation.

There are, therefore, four fundamental human queries, each of which organizes a specific human disposition into a particular postulate concerning what must be done for its rectification. The four fundamental queries may be viewed as complementary features of a broader movement of human consciousness. Assumptions concerning the nature of social being preform and anticipate postulates concerning the nature of human knowledge. An epistemological query represents simultaneously a working-out of an ontology of social reality and a movement towards

a particular axiological assumption. Axiological postulates summarize a past history of ontological and epistemological queries and engender a particular human aesthetic. And an aesthetic query constitutes a working-out of a past history of ontological, epistemological, and axiological assumptions, and anticipates, once again, a new human ontology.

The complete process of social action is thus grounded in a process of human queries. While the process of human dispositions provides the basis for a complete impression of what is most problematic in human existence, the process of human queries provides the basis for a complete understanding of what must be done for the rectification of the human situation. The complete social process does not cease, however, with a unitary movement of human postulations. On the contrary, it also includes a process of human materializations. This process of human materializations provides the basis for a complete actualization of the assumptions necessary for the resolution of each basic human disposition.

The process of human materializations consists of an active playing-out of concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation between four rudimentary human activities, each of which specifies how a particular human query might be actualized. A human materialization has previously been depicted as a social process which transforms a specific postulate concerning what must be done for the rectification of a particular human disposition into a unique social practice. There are four rudimentary human materializations, each of which connects with a specific human query. They may be

described as survival, political, social, and aesthetic materializations. A survival materialization is a social process which channels an ontological query into an activity which represents a concrete working-out of a more desirable mode of social being. A political materialization organizes an epistemological query into an activity which constitutes a concrete development of a more adequate mode of social consciousness. A social materialization incorporates an axiological query into an activity which represents a concrete working-out of a more satisfactory mode of social organization. And an aesthetic materialization is a social process which transforms an aesthetic query into an activity which concretely symbolizes a more efficacious mode of social morality.

Human queries are thus structured out into the domain of concrete social experience by means of particular human practices. And such human practices are particular precisely because they constitute an actualization of specific human postulates and of their related sensibilities. For example, the process of survival activity may be viewed as a materialization of the ontological realm. The realm of ontology transforms subjective human sensibilities into an image of a more adequate mode of social being. This image of social being is objectified, or may be objectified, by a fundamental reconstruction of the human productive order. In a similar way, the process of human politics may be visualized as an expression of the epistemological domain. The domain of epistemology organizes collective human sensibilities into a vision of a more satisfactory mode of human consciousness. This vision of human consciousness is advanced, or may be advanced, into a "social fact" by a root revision of the structure of associative activity.

Likewise, the process of social activity may be envisioned as a concrete actualization of the realm of axiology. The realm of axiology incorporates human social sensibilities into a vision of a more desirable mode of human relationships. This vision of human relationships is materialized, or may be materialized, by a radical revision of the structure of human sociability. Finally, the process of aesthetic activity may be understood as a realization of the domain of moral postulates. The domain of moral postulates advances human aesthetic sensibilities into an image of a more adequate value experience. This image of value experience is transformed, or may be transformed, into concrete human experience by a fundamental alteration of human moral practices.

There are, therefore, four rudimentary human materializations, each of which serves as a concrete expression of a specific human query. The four rudimentary human materializations interrelate as partial aspects of a more comprehensive movement of human activity. The process of survival activity anticipates the content of political experience. The structure of political action, while summarizing the salient features of the human productive process, also sets the stage for a certain mode of human sociability. The process of social activity intermediates political and aesthetic activity. And the process of human aesthetics incorporates a past movement of social activity into a new description of the human survival experience.

The complete process of social action is thus rooted in a process of human dispositions, continues with a process of human queries, and advances into a process of human materializations. The

process of human dispositions provides the context for a complete impression of what is most problematic in human existence. The process of human queries affords the basis for a complete appreciation of what must be done for the rectification of the human situation. And the process of human materializations furnishes the ground for a complete actualization of the postulates necessary for the rectification of human experience. Ultimately, the complete social process culminates in a process of qualitative consequences. This process of qualitative consequences provides the basis for a complete transformation of the human situation.

The process of qualitative consequences may be visualized as a movement, indeed a dynamic movement, between four central qualities of human life, each of which sums up a specific human disposition, a particular human query, and a unique human materialization into a partial transformation of the human situation. A qualitative consequence has previously been described as a social process which transforms a specific dimension of social experience into a particular reconstruction of the human situation. There are four central qualitative consequences, each of which articulates with a particular aspect of social experience. They may be described as the quality of survival experience, the quality of political experience, the quality of social experience, and the quality of aesthetic experience.²⁹ The quality of survival experience is a social process which involves the integration of a subjective human disposition, an ontological query, and a survival materialization into a particular transformation of the human survival situation. The quality of political experience is a social process which entails the

organization of a collective human disposition, an epistemological query, and a political materialization into a particular reconstruction of the human political situation. The quality of social experience is a social process which involves the summing up of a human social disposition, an axiological query, and a social materialization into a particular alteration of the human social situation. And the quality of aesthetic experience is a social process which entails the incorporation of an aesthetic human disposition, an aesthetic query, and an evaluative materialization into a particular revision of the human aesthetic situation.

The process of human materializations thus engenders a qualitative transformation of the human situation. And this qualitative revision of the human situation consists of a playing-out of the relationships which obtain between four key processes of human experience, each of which represents a lived summation of human sentiments, postulates, and activities. For example, the process of survival activity results, or may result, in a radical transformation of the quality of social being. This transformation of social being is concretely experienced as a summation of a subjective human disposition, an ontological postulate, and a survival practice into a qualitative alteration of the human survival situation. A quality of survival experience represents, in this case, a lived synthesis of the more subjective aspect of social experience. In a similar way, the process of political activity culminates, or may culminate, in a root reconstruction of the quality of human consciousness. Such a reconstruction of human consciousness is directly apprehended as a summation of collective sensibilities, queries, and practices into a

qualitative transfiguration of the human political situation. A quality of political experience may thus be viewed as a totalization of the more postulational dimension of social experience. Likewise, the process of social activity leads, or may lead, to a modification of the quality of human sociability. This modification of human sociability is directly experienced as a summation of a human social sentiment, an axiological query, and a social practice into a qualitative revision of the human social situation. A quality of social experience may thus be visualized as a lived unification of the more material aspect of the concrete social world. Finally, the process of aesthetic activity produces, or may produce, an abrupt change in the quality of social morality. This abrupt change in social morality is concretely apprehended as a summation of aesthetic sensibilities, postulates, and practices into a qualitative revolution of the human value situation. A quality of aesthetic experience constitutes, in this case, a dynamic synthesis of the more valuational aspect of social experience.

There are, therefore, four central qualities of human life, each of which provides the context for a partial transfiguration of the human situation. These four central qualities of human life may be understood as interrelated features of a unitary process of human experience. The quality of social being backs up the quality of human consciousness. The quality of political experience intermediates the processes of survival experience and social experience. Changes in the human social situation anticipate the modification of the human aesthetic experience. And the quality of human aesthetics channels the process

of human sociability into a new revision of the human survival situation.

The complete process of social action thus integrates into a single, comprehensive human experience a process of human dispositions, a process of human queries, a process of human materializations, and a process of qualitative consequences. The process of human dispositions provides the ground for the development of a complete human sensibility. The process of human queries furnishes the basis for the appearance of a new human mentality. The process of human materializations affords the context for the creation of a complete pattern of human sociability. And the process of qualitative consequences provides the basis for the ascendancy of a new human condition.

The domain of human experience is unified, in the broadest sense, by the complete process of social action. It is not, however, always unified in exactly the same way. On the contrary, the complete social process may receive many different interpretations, each of which yields a qualitatively unique mode of human experience. To comprehend the history of social experience, it is thus necessary to clarify the history of transformations undergone by the complete process of social action. This clarification begins with the seminal observation that each transformation of the complete social process results in the development of a distinctive paradigm of social action. It is precisely a description of the major paradigms of social action and of the relationships which hold between them which provides the basis for the construction of a generalized mosaic of the human social

experience.

A Paradigm of Social Action³⁰

As the moving frame of the human social experience, the complete process of social action is not a neutral phenomenon, emptied of all content and direction. On the contrary, the complete process of social action incorporates as many contents as there are different expressions of the human social reality, and as many directions as there are significant tendencies in the human social experience. However, rarely, if ever, have the many different contents and directions of human social existence been organized eclectically into the complete process of social action. The more usual case has been for the human social reality to be unified, at any given moment and in any given place, around particular, and indeed dominant, expressions of the processes of human dispositions, human queries, human practices, and human value-qualities. While these different unifications of the human social reality are commonly grounded in a reconstruction of the content of each dimension of the complete process of social action and of the relationships which obtain between them, they are divided according to the uniqueness of the expression which they lend to the complete human social process. And they are divided according to the uniqueness of their expressions of the complete human social process precisely because each unification of the human social reality may be viewed as a paradigm of social action in its own right.

A paradigm of social action may be defined as a qualitatively unique reconstruction of the complete process of social action. As such, a paradigm of social action integrates into a unitary reconstruction

of the human social reality a generalized human problem, a phenomenology of the human circumstance, a pattern of social organization, and a human condition. Each of these four phases of a paradigm of social action is grounded in a fundamental transformation of a specific dimension of the complete human social process. A generalized human problem arises out of a root reconstruction of the process of human dispositions. A phenomenology of the human circumstance may be viewed as an emergent of a core alteration of the process of human queries. A pattern of social organization is grounded in a fundamental transformation of the process of human materializations. And a human condition is rooted in a radical alteration of the process of qualitative human consequences. These four dimensions of a paradigm of social action may be seen as interrelated, albeit partial, aspects of a single, unitary reconstruction of the complete human social process. A generalized human problem anticipates, for its solution, the emergence of a specific phenomenology of the human circumstance. A specific phenomenology of the human circumstance demands, for its prosecution, the ascendancy of a particular pattern of social organization. And a particular pattern of social organization culminates in the creation of a distinctive human condition. Thus, when combined, the different dimensions of a paradigm of social action coalesce as complementary features of a single unification of the human social reality. And this single unification of the human social reality is grounded in a fundamental transformation of the different phases of the complete process of social action and of the relationships which hold between them.

Human life is always enveloped in a dynamic working-out of the relationships which exist between competing paradigms of social action. However, this process of envelopment is never concretely experienced as a simple linear movement or as one in which the elements involved are clearly delineated from one another.³¹ It is possible, and, indeed, empirically justifiable, to visualize a single paradigm of social action as progressing from a generalized human problem to a phenomenology of social reality, from a phenomenology of social reality to a pattern of social organization, and ultimately from a pattern of social organization to the creation of a new human condition. Moreover, it is empirically justifiable to stretch out over space and time the relationships existing between contending paradigms of social action in order to discern more accurately their implications for one another. While such momentary totalizations of the process of paradigmatic action provide the basis for a substantive discussion of the interrelationships existing within and between the different reconstructions of the complete human social process, they are inevitably distortions of the fluid and dynamic qualities of concrete social experience. In the domain of concrete social experience, paradigms of social action have no point of first inception or of final completion. Generalized human problems merge indissolubly into phenomenologies of social reality; phenomenologies of social reality are incorporated as implicit, albeit intangible, aspects of different processes of social action; and human conditions, as manifestations of the dominant value-qualities emergent from different reconstructions of the complete human social process, are immanent in each element of their respec-

tive processes of paradigmatic action. Moreover, nowhere in the domain of concrete social experience are there to be found any clear and lucid delineations between competing paradigms of social action. Generalized human problems emerge even though the human conditions, of which such problems are but a consequence, have not yet been given full expression. Contending phenomenologies of social reality co-exist in the same human situation. Processes of social action rise and fall in response to the saliency of different modes of human consciousness. And contradictory value-qualities often infect the human social reality at one and the same time. The domain of concrete social experience is, in short, relative, partial, provisional, and prospective. In such a world, the process of paradigmatic action is ever more fluid than linear, and always more indeterminate than delineated. While it is possible, and even imperative, for purposes of clarification to isolate momentarily the relationships which hold within and between the different paradigms of social action, the generalized mosaic of social reality which results is fated to remain but an inadequate vision of the indeterminate and dynamic domain of concrete social experience. With this admonitory note, a brief description will now be given of each of the four major dimensions contained within a paradigm of social action.

The Generalized Human Problem

A paradigm of social action is grounded, most fundamentally, in the development of a generalized human problem. A generalized human problem may be visualized as any central and formative question which arises out of a fundamental transformation of the process of

human dispositions, and which requires for its solution a radical reconstruction of the entire process of social reality.

Most human problems are inherently particularistic and of limited consequence. They emerge out of specific human situations and anticipate, for their settlement, a limited alteration of a given social order. While this limited alteration of a given social order involves a playing-out of the relationships which obtain between human sentiment, reflection, practice, and morality, it does not call into question the dominant arrangement of societal institutions. On the other hand, human problems of paradigmatic stature are inherently general and of revolutionary consequence. They raise a question which cannot be satisfactorily answered within a given construction of social reality.³² Accordingly, they anticipate, for their settlement, not only a root reconstruction of human sensibilities, but also a radical transformation of the dominant processes of human consciousness, social organization, and social morality. The ascendancy of a generalized human problem may thus be visualized as the precise point at which a new human social reality arises, or may begin to arise, in direct response to insoluble contradictions within an old one.

A generalized human problem emerges out of a sweeping transformation of the process of human dispositions. The process of human dispositions has previously been portrayed* as a dynamic working-out of the relationships which obtain between four formative impressions of the concrete social world, each of which contributes

* See above, pp. 29-30

to an understanding of what is most problematic in the human situation. The four directions in human affectivity have been identified as the subjective, collective, social, and aesthetic. These different directions in human affectivity fully represent the social process by which an intuitive appreciation of the adequacy of a given human situation is summed-up into an understanding of its most problematic feature. This social process is both retrospective and prospective. It is retrospective because each dimension of human affectivity provides the basis for an evaluation, albeit an intensely impressionistic evaluation, of the adequacy of a different aspect of a past history of social experience. And it is prospective because each dimension of human affectivity provides the basis for the transcendence, or possible transcendence, of a past history of social experience by elucidating its most problematic feature. It is precisely when the retrospective and prospective qualities of the four major directions in human affectivity fuse into a unitary appreciation of an insoluble contradiction within a past history of social experience that a generalized human problem begins to develop. A generalized human problem emerges, in this case, whenever and wherever the subjective, collective, social, and aesthetic dimensions of the process of human dispositions interrelate as complementary features of a single, urgent comprehension of the crisis of human civilization which has been brought on by a given human condition. Although this intuitive awareness of a general crisis of human civilization is motivated by an aversive response to a past history of social experience, it results in a question, indeed, a central and critical social question, which

cannot be resolved within a past construction of social reality.

The Phenomenology of Social Reality

While a paradigm of social action is grounded in a generalized human problem, it is advanced by means of a phenomenology of social reality. A phenomenology of social reality may be envisioned as any comprehensive image of the human situation which emerges out of a root reconstruction of the process of human queries, and which entails, for its prosecution, the transformation of a generalized human problem into a radical reconstruction of the process of social action.³³

Most processes of human consciousness are truly intra-paradigmatic. Being embedded in particular human problems, they concentrate upon a clarification of the obstacles to be overcome for the solution to such problems within the framework provided by a given realm of social possibilities. Accordingly, such modes of human reflection are more concerned with the elucidation of immediate strategies for social action than with an appraisal of the mediating principles of social action. On the other hand, phenomenologies of social reality are genuinely extra-paradigmatic. They emerge in response to generalized human problems and anticipate, for their settlement, a radical alteration of prevailing patterns of social organization and social morality. Being motivated by a key question which cannot be answered within a given construction of social action, phenomenologies of social reality are neither apologetic nor reformist. They are, on the contrary, fundamentally revolutionary. And they are fundamentally revolutionary because the emergence of a new phenomenology of social reality constitutes the exact social process by which the principles of an

alternative, and more adequate, human social reality may be worked out. Phenomenologies of social reality thus function to transform a prior reconstruction of human sensibilities into a coherent vision of the possibilities of breaking beyond contradictions contained within an old paradigm of social action to the creation of a new human social reality.

The development of a comprehensive image of the human situation in response to a generalized human problem is not a narrowly intellectual exercise or one which is limited to competing schools of philosophy. It is, instead, a phenomenological process. And it is a phenomenological process because the working-out of a fundamentally revolutionary vision of the human condition is the product of an emergent awareness on the part of many human beings, at any given moment and place, of new, and more satisfactory, modes of being, thought, action, and valuation. This emergent awareness of a new human prospect is grounded in a fundamental reconstruction of the process of human queries. The process of human queries has previously been described* as a dynamic working-out of the relationships which hold between four fundamental human assumptions, each of which specifies what must be done for the rectification of a specific human disposition. The four fundamental human assumptions have been described as ontological, epistemological, axiological, and aesthetic. These different directions in human consciousness represent completely the social process by which a prior revolution of human sensibilities may be transformed into a comprehensive vision of a new, and more adequate, human condition. This social process is both expressionistic and projective. It is expressionistic because it

* See above, pp. 34-37.

elevates the subjective domain of human affectivity into a more objective transformation of human consciousness. And it is projective because it sets the stage for a further transformation of the more objective domain of human consciousness into a root reconstruction of the process of social organization. It is precisely when the expressionistic and projective qualities of each dimension of the process of human queries integrate into a unitary, comprehensive image of the human situation that a phenomenology of social reality results. A phenomenology of social reality develops, in this case, whenever and wherever a fundamental transformation of the process of human sensibilities gives rise to an emergent human awareness concerning what must be done for the actualization of a new social reality.

The Process of Social Organization

Although a paradigm of social action originates in a generalized human problem and is advanced by means of a phenomenology of social reality, it also contains a process of social organization. A process of social organization may be viewed as any pattern of human activity which emerges out of a core alteration of the process of human materializations, and which involves, for its prosecution, the transformation of a generalized human problem and of a phenomenology of social reality into the creation of a new value-quality of human experience.³⁴

Most processes of human activity are highly routinized and have a limited scope. They are highly routinized because they represent a working-out, indeed an often unselfconscious working-out, of a particular human problem and of a specific mode of human

reflection within a given network of social conventions. And most processes of human activity have but a limited scope because, rather than challenging this given network of social conventions, they implicitly affirm it by serving as a lived and concrete celebration of the status quo. On the other hand, processes of social organization which attain paradigmatic stature are both reconstructive and indeterminate. They are reconstructive because they represent a systematic and voluntaristic working-out in the domain of concrete social experience of a new generalized human problem and of its emergent phenomenology of social reality. This process of social actualization entails the abolition of the prevailing pattern of social organization and the inception of a new one. And such processes of social organization are indeterminate because they lead, or may lead, to the creation of a new human value-quality, the character of which is often an unintended consequence of a given reconstruction of the human social reality.

Processes of social organization of paradigmatic stature develop out of radical transformation of the process of human materializations. The process of human materializations has previously been envisioned as a dynamic working-out of the relationships which obtain between four rudimentary human activities, each of which serves to actualize a specific assumption concerning what must be done for the construction of a more adequate human situation. The four rudimentary human activities have been described as human survival practices, human political practices, human social practices, and human aesthetic practices*.

* See above, pp. 37-39

These four directions in human activity fully represent the social process by which a prior reconstruction of human sensibilities and human consciousness may be objectified as a unique pattern of social organization. This social process is simultaneously a point of summation and a point, or a possible point, of a new transformation of human existence. It is a point of summation because the development of a unique pattern of social organization remakes each aspect of concrete social experience into an active working-out of a generalized human problem and of its emergent vision of the human condition. And it is prospective because the creation of a new pattern of social organization anticipates, and even requires, a fundamental revision of the quality of human life. Thus, it is precisely when the retrospective and projective qualities of each dimension of the process of human materializations fuse into a single, unitary working-out of a new human social reality that a process of social organization develops. This process of social organization represents a point of mediation between a past history of human sentiment and human reflection, and a future human value-quality.

The Human Condition

Although a paradigm of social action interrelates a generalized human problem and a phenomenology of social reality with a process of social organization, it is not exhausted by them. On the contrary, a paradigm of social action also contains a human condition. A human condition may be visualized as the value-quality of human experience which arises out of a radical reconstruction of the process of qualitative human consequences.

There is no process of social action which does not culminate, or may not culminate, in a qualitative transformation of the human situation. Most qualitative transformations of the human situation are, however, partial and of limited significance. Their partiality derives from the fact that most processes of social action result in an alteration, albeit a modest alteration, of a specific dimension of human experience. And their limited significance is based in the fact that even such modest alterations of human experience are typically more complementary of, than antithetical to, the dominant value-quality of a given social order. On the other hand, the process of paradigmatic action ever culminates in the ascendancy of a new human condition. And the ascendancy of a new human condition implicitly entails a complete and irrevocable transformation of the quality of human life. This transformation of the quality of human life is complete since a human condition interrelates all dimensions of the process of human experience around a single, unitary value-quality. And it is irrevocable since the emergence of a new human condition symbolizes a qualitative transformation of the very process of social reality itself, and thus anticipates the development of competing definitions of the human situation.

A human condition is not an elusive and unprincipled social phenomenon. On the contrary, it may be viewed as a direct result of a fundamental transformation of the process of qualitative human consequences. The process of qualitative human consequences has previously been portrayed* as a dynamic working-out of the relation-

* See above, pp. 40-43

ships which hold between four core qualities of human experience, each of which sums up a particular dimension of the process of human materializations into a partial reconstruction of the human situation. The four core qualities of human experience have been described as the quality of survival experience, the quality of political life, the quality of social experience, and the quality of aesthetic life. These four directions in the more qualitative aspect of human experience exhaust the social process by which a past reconstruction of human sensibilities, human consciousness, and human activities may be fused together into a fundamental transfiguration of the human situation. This social process is both retrospective and anticipatory. It is retrospective because each quality of human life, whether productive, political, social, or moral, represents a lived summation of a particular transformation undergone by human affectivity, reflection, and practice. And it is anticipatory because each dimension of the process of qualitative human consequences sets the stage for the appearance, or possible appearance, of a new impression of what is most problematic in human existence. It is precisely when the retrospective and anticipatory qualities of each aspect of the process of human consequences combine into a single, unitary transformation of the human situation that a human condition develops. A human condition results, in this case, whenever and wherever the process of social reality is imbued with a new, and more dominant, value-quality.

In conclusion, a paradigm of social action may be regarded as a qualitatively unique transformation of the complete process of

social action. As such, a paradigm of social action contains four interrelated dimensions, each of which is grounded in a radical reconstruction of a particular phase of the complete social process. These four interrelated dimensions may be referred to as a generalized human problem, a phenomenology of social reality, a process of social organization, and a human condition. A generalized human problem arises out of a fundamental transformation of the process of human dispositions. A phenomenology of social reality develops from a core alteration of the process of human queries. A process of social organization is grounded in a root reconstruction of the process of human materializations. And a human condition derives from a radical transfiguration of the process of qualitative human consequences. A paradigm of social action results when these four particular reconstructions of the complete social process fuse together into a single, unitary construction of social reality. While this single, unitary construction of social reality may always be viewed as a product of a fundamental revision of the complete process of social action, it may receive many qualitatively unique expressions.

A Paradigmatic Theory of Social Action

The complete process of social action lineaments the development of the process of paradigmatic action. And the process of paradigmatic action gives rise to three competing constructions of social reality, each of which intermediates a generalized human problem, a phenomenology of social reality, a process of social organization, and an emergent human condition. These three competing paradigms of social action have been introduced previously as the processes of cosmological

experience, corporate experience, and organic experience. The process of cosmological experience* is an emergent of the formative problem of human salvation. The process of corporate experience* is a derivative of the generalized problem of human security. And the process of organic experience* is a product of the enduring aspiration for human freedom. These three contrasting human problems require, and even demand, for their solution the development of distinctive phenomenologies of social reality. The quest for human salvation engenders an absolutist image of the social universe. The aspiration for human security anticipates the creation of an entitative vision of the human social experience. And the struggle for human freedom requires, for its settlement, the emergence of an organic conception of social reality. These three contending images of the human situation are structured out into the domain of public life by means of unique processes of social action. The phenomenology of human salvation is actualized by means of a process of cosmological action. The phenomenology of human security is materialized by means of a process of corporate action. And the phenomenology of human freedom is realized by means of a process of organic action. Finally, these three competing processes of social action give rise to qualitatively unique transformations of the human situation. The process of cosmological action culminates in the condition of human chaos. The process of corporate action results in the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. And the process of organic action concludes, or may conclude, in the condition of human uncertainty.

* See Table 2 below, p. 333

* See Table 3 below, p. 334

* See Table 4 below, p. 335

As qualitatively unique reconstructions of the same complete social process, the three principal paradigms of social action are interrelated by means of their consequences. The uncertainty of concrete social experience motivates the development of the problem of human salvation, the first phase of the process of cosmological experience. The cosmological paradigm culminates in the condition of human chaos. Chaos makes salient the problem of human security, the basis of the process of corporate experience. The corporate paradigm results in the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. Reinforced meaninglessness provides the basis for the inception of the problem of human freedom, the nucleus of the process of organic experience. And the organic paradigm, being imbued with the value-quality of human uncertainty, dissolves, or may dissolve, once more into the process of cosmological experience.

The interrelation of these three competing paradigms of social action intimates that the history of the process of social experience may be understood, to a large extent, as a dynamic working-out of the relationships which obtain between qualitatively different constructions of social reality. In this sense, each paradigm of social action exhausts a certain content and direction which may be given to the process of social experience, and thus sets the stage for a movement, or a possible movement, beyond one construction of social reality to another. For example, the cosmological paradigm is formative to the human scene insofar as it emerges directly from an aversive response to the indeterminacy of concrete social experience. This aversion to human indeterminacy gives rise to an essentially

metaphysical expression of social reality. Likewise, the corporate paradigm, while not formative to the human scene, develops directly from contradictions contained within the social reality of human salvation. The corporate paradigm simultaneously negates the indeterminacy of concrete social experience and transcends the contradictions of the metaphysical by enveloping human existence within a fundamentally abstract construction of social reality.

And, finally, the organic paradigm emerges from an aversive response to both the social realities of human salvation and human security. This aversion to human metaphysics and to human abstraction engenders a genuinely reconstructive, and thereby concrete, interpretation of social experience. The history of the process of social experience may thus be visualized as a chronicle of the rise and fall in importance of metaphysical, abstract, and concrete constructions of social reality. While the metaphysical construction has monopolized the human past, and the abstract has typified the human present, the concrete remains, and will likely continue to remain, an active social possibility on the human horizon. The following discussion will briefly sketch the relationships which exist between the different dimensions of these qualitatively unique expressions of the human social experience.

Competing Generalized Human Problems: Salvation, Security, and Freedom

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There is only one process of human dispositions, but it may be the basis of competing definitions of the human situations. While all competing definitions of the human situation commonly emerge out of a temporal unification of subjective, collective, social, and

aesthetic human sensibilities, each grounds this unification in an aversive response to a different human condition.

For example, the problem of human salvation unifies the process of human dispositions around an aversive response to the condition of human uncertainty. The condition of human uncertainty may be viewed as a product of the relative, partial, provisional, and prospective character of the directly apprehended domain of social experience. Accordingly, the problem of human salvation becomes salient whenever and wherever the direct experience of human uncertainty engenders a generalized human desire for the construction of a social reality imbued with absolute certitude. Since human uncertainty comprises the elemental value-quality of the empirical process of social experience, the quest for absolute certitude is fated to remain a metaphysical venture. The generalized human desire for the stillness of absolute certitude can be assuaged, in this case, only by breaking beyond the domain of concrete social experience to a fundamentalist interpretation of social reality.

Likewise, the problem of human security organizes the process of human sensibilities around an aversive response to the condition of human chaos. The condition of human chaos may be regarded as a derivative of the absurd, apathetic, anomalous, and amoral qualities of a metaphysical process of social experience. The problem of human security gains the ascendancy wherever an aversion to human chaos sparks a generalized human aspiration for the creation of a more orderly social world. While the quest for an orderly social reality represents the antithesis of human chaos, it also counter-points the

indeterminacy of concrete social experience. The aspiration for human security is thus neither metaphysical nor concrete, but fundamentally abstract. And it is fundamentally abstract because the generalized human desire for the security of social order can be satisfied only by enveloping the process of human existence within a social apparatus which, while providing the means to social order, is devoid of any principled human content.

Similarly, the problem of human freedom interrelates the process of human dispositions around an aversive response to the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. The human condition of reinforced meaninglessness may be visualized as the emergent value-quality of an abstract process of social experience. Human freedom becomes problematic at whatever moment and place the direct apprehension of the value-quality of reinforced meaninglessness leads to a generalized human desire for the construction of a substantively meaningful social world. The creation of a substantively meaningful social world is neither a matter of human metaphysics, nor a product of human abstraction. It is, instead, a genuinely concrete endeavour. And it is genuinely concrete because the desire for substantive human meaning can be fulfilled only by working through the indeterminacy of the empirical social world to the organic unification of human experience.

The single process of human dispositions may thus be expressed in different ways. Each full expression of the process of human dispositions provides the basis for the development of a generalized human problem. There are three major generalized human problems, each of which grounds a particular paradigm of social action. The problem

of human salvation motivates the development of the cosmological paradigm of social action. The problem of human security precipitates the construction of the corporate paradigm of social action. And the problem of human freedom leads, or may lead, to the creation of the organic paradigm of social action. However, the three major paradigms of social action do not include only competing definitions of the human situation. On the contrary, they also contain contrasting phenomenologies of social reality.

Contrasting Phenomenologies of Social Reality ³⁷

Although there is only one process of human queries, it may be interpreted in different ways. Each different interpretation of the process of human queries gives rise to a contrasting image of the human situation. While all contrasting images of the human situation commonly interrelate ontological, epistemological, axiological, and aesthetic human postulates, each grounds this process of interrelation in the solution to a particular generalized human problem.

Thus, the phenomenology of human salvation unifies the process of human queries around the solution to the quest for social certitude. In its fullest expression, the quest for social certitude is grounded in the generalized human desire for the stillness of an absolute, complete, predetermined, and consistent process of social reality. While the social reality of human salvation originates in a fundamental transformation of human sensibilities, it requires for its prosecution a corresponding alteration of human consciousness. It is precisely such a radical revision of human consciousness which is symbolized by the phenomenology of human salvation. The phenomenology

of human salvation develops, in this case, whenever and wherever the desire for human salvation gives rise to an emergent human awareness concerning what must be done for its realization. This emergent human awareness is neither empirical nor abstract. It is, instead, metaphysical. And it is metaphysical because the phenomenology of human salvation interrelates into a single, unitary world-view four equally unprincipled human postulates: an absolutist ontology, a tautological epistemology, a teleological axiology, and a consistency aesthetic.

Similarly, the phenomenology of human security organizes the process of human queries around the solution to the aspiration for social order. In its fullest expression, the aspiration for social order entails the creation of an inert, patterned, homogenous, and redundant process of social reality. While the construction of an orderly social world grounds in a fundamental transformation of human emotions, it continues with a root reconstruction of human consciousness. It is precisely such a root reconstruction of human consciousness which is represented by the phenomenology of human security. The phenomenology of human security denotes, in this case, an emergent human understanding concerning what must be done for the realization of a more orderly process of social reality. This emergent human understanding is neither a product of human dogma nor a derivative of direct experience. It is, instead, a matter of abstraction. And it is a matter of abstraction because the phenomenology of human security unifies into a single, idealistic world-view four pseudo-empirical human postulates: an entitative

ontology, an analytical epistemology, an instrumental axiology, and a redundant aesthetic.

Likewise, the phenomenology of human freedom interrelates the process of human queries around the solution to the quest for substantive human meaning. The quest for substantive human meaning requires, for its settlement, the development of a holistic, reconstructive, substantive, and critical process of social reality. While the construction of a libertarian process of social reality is grounded in a radical revision of human sensibilities, it proceeds by means of a further alteration of human consciousness. It is precisely such a core alteration of human consciousness which is afforded by the phenomenology of human freedom. The phenomenology of human freedom gains the ascendancy, in this case, at whatever moment and place the desire for substantive human meaning leads to the creation of a comprehensive image of the human situation which specifies, albeit in an emergent sense, what must be done for the actualization of human freedom. This comprehensive image of the human situation is neither anti-empirical nor pseudo-empirical. It is, instead, genuinely empirical. And it is genuinely empirical because the phenomenology of human freedom unifies into a single, dynamic vision of the human condition four directly apprehended human postulates: an organic ontology, a reconstructive epistemology, an intrinsic axiology, and a transformational aesthetic.

The unitary process of human queries may thus be interpreted in different ways. Each different interpretation of the process of human queries principles the development of a distinctive phenomenology

of social reality. There are three major phenomenologies of social reality, each of which responds to a particular generalized human problem. The phenomenology of human salvation emerges from the generalized human aspiration for absolute certitude. The phenomenology of human security develops from the generalized human desire for social order. And the phenomenology of human freedom responds to the generalized human aspiration for substantive human meaning. The three major phenomenologies of social reality, however, do not articulate only with competing generalized human problems. On the contrary, they also anticipate the development of contending processes of social organization.

Contending Processes of Social Organization 38

There is only one process of human queries, but it may lineament the development of contending patterns of human activity. While all contending patterns of human activity commonly represent a complex synthesis of productive, political, social, and aesthetic human practices, each grounds this synthesis in the working-out of a different phenomenology of social reality.

For example, the process of cosmological action unifies the domain of human activity around the actualization of the phenomenology of human salvation. The phenomenology of human salvation has been described as that comprehensive image of the human situation which specifies what must be done for the resolution of the quest for absolute certitude. While this image of the human situation generalizes the

quest for absolute certitude beyond its basis in human affectivity into the realm of human consciousness, it does not provide an answer concerning how it might be possible to materialize the social reality of human salvation. Such an answer is provided, however, by the process of cosmological action. In this vein, the process of cosmological action may be visualized as transforming each aspect of human experience into a dynamic working-out of the problem of human salvation, and of its emergent mode of human consciousness. It accomplishes this task by patterning the domain of human activity around a single, metaphysical process of social organization. This single, metaphysical process of social organization consists of four complementary, and consequently equally ungrounded, human practices, each of which actively embodies a particular dimension of the struggle for human salvation. The four interrelated constituents of the process of cosmological action may be described as the activities of mythification, conversion, transformation, and redemption.

Similarly, the process of corporate action organizes the realm of human activity around the materialization of the phenomenology of human security. The phenomenology of human security denotes that emergent vision of the human condition which discloses what must be done for the realization of a more orderly process of social reality. While this emergent vision of the human condition advances the quest for social order beyond its basis in human sensibilities into the more reflective dimension of human experience, it does not reveal how social order might be instatiated as the dynamic nucleus of human social life. Such a revelation awaits the development of the

process of corporate action. In this case, the process of corporate action may be understood as transfiguring every aspect of human social life into a complex working-out of the problem of human security, and of its related phenomenology of social reality. This transfiguration of human social life is accomplished by the patterning of human activity around a single, distinctive process of social organization. This process of social organization is neither a product of human metaphysics nor an emergent of concrete social experience. It is, instead, a lived embodiment of human abstraction. And it is a lived embodiment of human abstraction because the process of corporate action interrelates into a unitary pattern of social organization four reciprocal, and thereby equally idealistic, human practices, each of which serves to negate a specific content of concrete social experience and to affirm a particular form of social order. The four complementary dimensions of the process of corporate action may be described as the activities of reification, mobilization, canalization, and commitment.

Likewise, the process of organic action unifies the domain of human activity around the actualization of the phenomenology of human freedom. The phenomenology of human freedom refers to that emergent image of the human situation which reveals what must be done for the materialization of a substantively meaningful social world. While this emergent image of the human situation transforms the struggle for human freedom from its basis in human dispositions into the realm of human consciousness, it does not respond to the pressing question concerning how might it be possible to concretely

realize a libertarian construction of social reality. Such a response is provided, however, by the process of organic action. The process of organic action may be viewed as transforming every aspect of the human social experience into a dynamic working-out of the problem of human freedom, and of its emergent image of the human situation. This transformation of the human social experience is neither an object of human dogma nor an embodiment of human abstraction. It is, instead, an expression of the empirical, and thereby concrete, possibilities of human life. And it is an expression of the empirical possibilities of human life because the process of organic action unifies human activity around a single, directly apprehended pattern of social organization. This pattern of social organization consists of four principled human practices, each of which transforms a particular dimension of the quest for substantive human meaning into a specific unification, indeed, organic unification, of human experience. The four interrelated constituents of the process of organic action may be depicted as the activities of actualization, reconstruction, consolidation, and creation.

The single, unitary process of human materializations may receive, therefore, many different expressions. Each different expression of the process of human materializations principles the development of a qualitatively unique process of social organization. There are three major processes of social organization, each of which actualizes a different phenomenology of social reality. The process of cosmological action represents a dynamic working-out of the phenomenology of human salvation. The process of corporate action

constitutes a complex working-out of the phenomenology of human security. And the process of organic action represents an active working-out of the phenomenology of human freedom. However, the development of these three major processes of social organization does not exhaust the process of paradigmatic action. On the contrary, the process of paradigmatic action also includes a plurality of clashing human conditions.

Clashing Human Conditions 39

There is only one process of qualitative human consequences, but it may principle the development of clashing transformations of the human situation. While all clashing transformations of the human situation commonly represent a dynamic unification of the value-qualities emergent from productive, political, social, and aesthetic processes of human experience, each grounds this dynamic unification in a different process of social organization.

For example, the condition of human chaos may be envisioned as the emergent value-quality of the process of cosmological action. The process of cosmological action denotes that pattern of social organization which specifies how it might be possible to concretely materialize the social reality of human salvation. While this pattern of social organization advances the quest for absolute certitude beyond its basis in human consciousness into the domain of human activity, it does not sum up the quality of human life which is engendered by the process of cosmological experience. This quality of human life is summed up, however, by the condition of human chaos. The condition of human chaos combines in a single, unitary transformation of the human

situation the four major value-qualities emergent from the process of cosmological experience. The four modes of human chaos may be described as absurdity, apathy, anomaly, and amorality. These four modes of human chaos fully represent the value-quality of a process of social reality which is distinguished by the presence of many routes to absolute certitude, and by the absence of any principled way of choosing between them.

Similarly, the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness may be visualized as the emergent value-quality of the process of corporate action. The process of corporate action has been described as that pattern of social organization which provides for the actualization of the social reality of human security. While this process of social organization generalizes the problem of human security beyond its basis in human consciousness into the realm of human practice, it does not represent the quality of human life which is emergent from the process of corporate experience. Such a representation is provided, however, by the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. The human condition of reinforced meaninglessness interrelates into a single, qualitative revision of the human situation the four dominant value-qualities which are engendered by the process of corporate experience. This process of corporate value-qualities may be understood as a synthesis of four interrelated modes of human meaninglessness, each of which is backed up by a specific process of social reinforcement. The four

interrelated modes of human meaninglessness may be described as irrationality, reactiveness, accidentality, and immorality. And their relevant processes of social reinforcement may be visualized as the domination of human necessity, obligation, self-interest, and duty respectively. These four dimensions of the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness fully sum up the value-quality of a process of social reality which is characterized by the presence of many means of ordering the social universe, and by the absence of any substantive reason as to why this should be done.

Likewise, the condition of human uncertainty may be envisioned as the resultant value-quality of the process of organic action. The process of organic action describes that pattern of human activity which provides for the materialization of the social reality of human freedom. While this pattern of human activity transforms the quest for substantive human meaning beyond its basis in human consciousness into the domain of human practice, it does not sum up the quality of human life which is immanent in the process of organic experience. However, this immanent quality of human life is summed up by the condition of human uncertainty. The condition of human uncertainty unifies into a single, holistic transformation of the human situation the four central value-qualities emergent from the process of organic experience. The four modes of human uncertainty may be described as relativity, partiality, provisionality, and prospectiveness. These four modes of human uncertainty fully describe the value-quality of a process of social reality which is distinguished by the presence of many libertarian human possibilities,

and by the absence of any way of realizing human freedom with any degree of finality.

The single, unitary process of qualitative human consequences may receive, therefore, many different interpretations. Each different interpretation of the process of qualitative human consequences contours the development of a distinctive human condition. There are three central human conditions, each of which sums up the value-quality emergent from a particular paradigm of social action. The condition of human chaos denotes the quality of human life emergent from the process of cosmological experience. The human condition of reinforced meaninglessness describes the quality of human life emergent from the process of corporate experience. And the condition of human uncertainty sums up the quality of human life derivative from the process of organic experience. The three dominant human conditions are not, of course, isolated from one another. On the contrary, they are linked together as points of intermediation, albeit as clashing points of intermediation, between the different paradigms of social action. The condition of human chaos interrelates the decline of the process of cosmological experience and the ascendancy of the process of corporate experience. The human condition of reinforced meaninglessness unifies the corporate and organic paradigms of social action. And the condition of human uncertainty represents the precise point at which the organic paradigm of social action dissolves, or may dissolve, into the process of cosmological experience. Each human condition thus symbolizes the fall, or possible fall, of an old paradigm of social action and the emergence of a new human prospect.

Conclusion

This chapter has elucidated the principles of human inquiry which guide the creation of a generalized mosaic of the human social reality. This task has been accomplished by unifying an epistemological theory of reconstructive empiricism with a libertarian revision of the theory of social action. This libertarian revision of the theory of social action has led to the vision of the complete social process. And, the vision of the complete social process has ultimately principled the development of a paradigmatic theory of social action. This paradigmatic theory of social action has been presented as the nucleus of a generalized mosaic of the human social experience. While the salient features of the three competing paradigms of social action have been introduced, they have not been exhaustively explored. Consequently, the remainder of this treatise will be devoted to a rigorous investigation of the three competing paradigms of social action and of the relationships which obtain between them. This rigorous investigation will begin with a consideration of the process of cosmological experience, will continue with an examination of the process of corporate experience, and it will conclude with a discussion of the process of organic experience.

Chapter 2. The Cosmological Experience

The preceding chapter has introduced the broad features of a reconstructive theory of the history of social experience. This reconstructive theory has begun with the thesis that contemporary social experience may be understood, to a large extent, as a complex working-out of three paradigms of social action, and of the relationships which hold between them.

The present chapter will elaborate this thesis by describing, in more detail, one of the major expressions of the complete process of social action--the cosmological paradigm. The argument will be developed here that the cosmological paradigm represents the social reality which emerges from the struggle to resolve, on a mass scale, the formative problem of human salvation. With reference to the complete social process, the problem of human salvation sums up the urgent desire to overcome the uncertainty of concrete social experience in favour of a metaphysical quest for absolute certitude. The quest for absolute certitude always requires, for its resolution, the creation of a distinctive phenomenology of salvation, one which transforms the yearning for absolute certainty into a process of social assumptions concerning how the problematic character of human salvation might be rectified. The phenomenology of salvation is materialized by means of a unique process of cosmological action. And the process of cosmological action always culminates in a consequent condition of human chaos.

The condition of human chaos will be treated in the following chapter. This chapter will describe the problem of human salvation, the phenomenology of human salvation, and the process of cosmological action.

No attempt will be made here, other than by way of example, to fence the cosmological paradigm within specific historical periods. Instead, the argument will be presented that a general concern with the problematic character of human salvation has been a recurrent theme throughout the history of social experience. At times, this concern has erupted into the creation of a unified social reality which has represented, on a continuing basis, a widespread effort to resolve satisfactorily the metaphysical quest for absolute certitude. For example, it has become commonplace in contemporary scholarship to identify the beginnings of "modernity"--the corporate paradigm--in terms of a radical breakthrough during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries from scholastic philosophizing to an empirical scientific viewpoint, from teleological to instrumental relations, from monistic moralities to more pluralistic ones, and from belief in "souls" to acquiescence in roles. The present study is in agreement with this reconstruction of the history of social action with the exception of two important reservations. First, there has never been an exclusively cosmological historical situation. The problem of human salvation and its emergent social reality have always been coexistent, to some extent, with the competing problems of order and freedom and with the qualitatively distinct modes of social experience which emerge from each. Second, although the cosmological paradigm is no longer dominant

across the contemporary human scene, it is not altogether absent. A significant portion of contemporary inquiry is distinctly scholastic rather than scientific, many people continue to hedge their participation in the corporate life-order with faith in various certainty principles, cosmological polities in the guise of modern totalitarianisms are yet operative, and the search for an aesthetic of consistency continues despite the predominance of corporate morality. These reservations suggest the futility of either attempting to enclose the cosmological paradigm within specific historical situations or of treating the social reality emergent from the problem of human salvation as something which has disappeared from the social scene. In this case, it seems more fruitful to concentrate on the general structure of cosmological experience rather than on the particular histories of cosmologies old and new. This concentration, if successfully prosecuted, is intended to provide a more coherent way of grouping particular cosmologies as well as a more lucid way of clarifying elusive but critically important relationships between the cosmological and corporate paradigms. The following discussion of the cosmological paradigm is, therefore, an attempt to clarify the central tendencies of the generalized social experience which has preformed and anticipated the quality of contemporary social existence.

The present chapter will discuss the first three phases of the cosmological paradigm. Their description will proceed as follows. First, the problem of human salvation will be described as a product of a fundamental transformation of the process of human dispositions in the direction of absolute certitude. Second, the phenomenology

of social reality emergent from concern with the problematic character of human salvation will be identified and examined. Third, the process by which the phenomenology of human salvation has been materialized will be clarified. Finally, a summary will be presented of the above three phases of the cosmological paradigm. The following chapter will then describe the final phase of cosmological reality--the condition of human chaos.

The Problem of Human Salvation

The problem of human salvation may be summed up, in its most general expression, as the following concern: How might it be possible to break beyond the uncertainty of concrete social experience to the creation of a mode of social life invested with absolute certitude? This general query does not, of course, suddenly appear out of nowhere. On the contrary, the problem of human salvation, in its fullest expression, is grounded in a fundamental transformation of the process of human dispositions. The process of human dispositions has been defined previously as a directly experienced synthesis of the relationships which obtain between four formative impressions of the concrete social world, each of which provides the basis for a particular definition of the human situation. There are four basic human dispositions, each of which transforms a formative impression of a different aspect of the concrete social world into a particular understanding of what is most problematic in human existence. There are, in this case, subjective, collective, social, and aesthetic human dispositions. The problem of human salvation, in its most general statement, is grounded in a qualitative transformation of each of the

above basic human dispositions. And each qualitative transformation of a basic human disposition provides a particular statement of the general problem of human salvation. There are, therefore, four particular problems of human salvation, each of which represents a fundamental transformation of a specific human disposition. There is, in this case, a subjective problem of salvation, a collective problem of salvation, a social problem of salvation, and an aesthetic problem of salvation. The four particular problems of salvation are not unrelated to one another. Rather, each particular expression of the problem of human salvation may be viewed as a partial aspect of a broader query concerning how it might be possible to break beyond the uncertainty of concrete social experience to a human situation qualified by absolute certitude.

For example, the subjective problem of human salvation may be summed up as the following query: How might it be possible to reach beyond the relativity of concrete social experience to the creation of an absolute human survival situation? The relative, and thereby uncertain, character of the concrete social world is grounded in the fact that human subjectivity is conditioned by a past history of social experience. There is no impression of the concrete social world, and consequently no affective sense of the human circumstance and of one's fate as a social and historical being within it, which does not ground in a particular human situation. And there is no particular human situation which does not represent a qualitatively unique working-out of a past movement of human dispositions, queries, materializations, and qualitative consequences. It is precisely

this working-out of a past history of social experience which provides the content for the development of a subjective sense of social being. However, there has never been a single past history of social experience. There are, on the contrary, many past movements of social experience, each of which sums up the many variations possible of human dispositions, queries, materializations, and qualitative consequences. And each past history of social experience provides, or may provide, the basis for the development of a unique mode of human subjectivity. There are, therefore, many possible modes of human subjectivity, each of which is relative to a particular human situation. It is precisely an aversive response to the uncertainty of a relative social world which serves as the fountainhead of the subjective problem of human salvation. The subjective problem of human salvation emerges, in this case, whenever and wherever the uncertainty of human relativity fosters a desire to break beyond the concrete social world to the creation of an absolute human survival situation. An absolute human survival situation is one in which human subjectivity is not conditioned by a past history of social experience, but is enclosed within a single, affective vision of the social world, and of one's position within it. In an absolute human survival situation, the uncertainty of human subjectivity is overcome by the certitude of being enveloped within a mode of social being which remains constant across the many past histories of social experience. It is the quest for a process of human survival which provides absolute certitude of social being, which yields the subjective problem of human salvation.

The concrete social world is not, however, only relative. It is also partial. While the subjective problem of human salvation responds to the uncertainty of human relativity, the partial character of concrete social experience provides the basis for the development of a more collective problem of human salvation. The collective problem of human salvation may be summed up as the following concern: How might it be possible to move beyond the partial, and thereby uncertain, character of concrete social experience to the creation of a complete human political situation? The partial, and thereby uncertain, character of concrete social experience derives from the fact that human consciousness is an emergent of particular impressions of the concrete social world. There is no process of human consciousness which does not respond to a specific mode of human affectivity. And there is no process of human affectivity which does not anticipate, and even require, for its resolution a particular mode of human consciousness. However, there has never been, and will probably never be, a single impression of the concrete social world. There are, on the contrary, many impressions of the concrete social world, each of which is relative to a particular human situation. And each impression of the concrete social world provides the basis for the development, or possible development, of a particular mode of human consciousness. There is, therefore, no single, complete process of human consciousness. There are, instead, many partial processes of human reflection, each of which provides an understanding of human existence from the standpoint of a particular mode of human affectivity. It is an aversive response to the absence of a single, complete process of human consciousness which inspires the development of the collective

problem of human salvation. The collective problem of human salvation appears whenever and wherever the uncertainty contingent upon the partial character of social experience leads to the desire to break beyond the concrete social world to the creation of a complete human political situation. A complete human political situation is one in which a particular process of human consciousness is presented as the single, full expression of an absolute mode of social being.³ In a complete human political situation, human consciousness is not contexted by the many possible modes of human subjectivity. On the contrary, the many possible modes of human subjectivity are first reduced to a single, absolute mode of social being, and then a particular process of human consciousness is presented as the full embodiment of this absolute mode of social being. Thus, in a complete political situation, the uncertainty of a partial universe is overcome by the certainty of being enveloped within a mode of human consciousness which remains the full expression of an absolute mode of human subjectivity. And it is precisely the quest for a process of human politics which provides absolute certitude of human consciousness which yields the collective problem of human salvation.

Concrete social experience is not, however, only relative and partial. It is also provisional. The provisional character of the concrete social world provides the basis for the development of a more social problem of human salvation. The social problem of human salvation may be summed up as the following query: How might it be possible to break beyond the provisional, the thereby uncertain, character of the concrete social world to the creation of a predetermined human social situation? The provisional, and thereby uncertain, character

of concrete social experience is grounded in the fact that the more social aspect of human existence is always a materialization of human consciousness. There is no social practice which does not actualize a particular process of human consciousness. And there is no process of human consciousness which does not anticipate, and even require, for its solution a specific mode of social activity. However, there has never been a single process of human consciousness. There are, on the contrary, many processes of human consciousness, each of which is based in a particular impression of the concrete social world. And each particular process of human consciousness leads into, or may lead into, a specific alteration of the human social situation. There is, therefore, no single way of actualizing the products of human consciousness. Rather, there are many processes of human materialization, each of which responds to a particular mode of human consciousness. It is an aversive response to the provisional character of concrete social life which motivates the development of the social problem of human salvation. The social problem of human salvation emerges whenever and wherever the uncertainty contingent upon the provisional nature of social experience grounds the desire to break beyond the concrete social world to the creation of a predetermined human social situation. A predetermined human social situation is one in which a single mode of social activity is presented as a way of actualizing a complete process of human consciousness. In a predetermined human social social situation, social practice is not conditioned by the many possible modes of human consciousness. On the contrary, the many possible modes of human consciousness are first reduced to a single complete mode of human thought, and then a particular process of

social activity is described as a way of materializing this complete mode of human consciousness. Thus, in a predetermined human social situation, the uncertainty of a provisional social world is overcome by the certitude of being enveloped within a mode of human materialization which remains the single means of actualizing a complete process of human consciousness. It is precisely the quest for a predetermined mode of social life which yields the social problem of human salvation.

The concrete social world is not, however, only relative, partial, and provisional. It is also prospective. The prospective character of the concrete social world provides the basis for the development of the more aesthetic problem of human salvation. The aesthetic problem of human salvation may be summed up as the following concern: How might it be possible to go beyond the prospective, and thereby uncertain, character of the concrete social world to the creation of a consistent human value situation? The prospective, and thereby uncertain, character of concrete social experience is based in the fact that the more moral aspect of social existence anticipates the transformation, or possible transformation, of the human survival situation. There is no process of social experience which does not culminate in a qualitative transformation of the human situation. And there is no valuation of this emergent human situation which does not provide the possibility of a new reconstruction of the process of social being. The domain of concrete social experience is thus always prospective. And it is an aversive response to the prospective character of concrete social experience which inspires the development of the more aesthetic problem of human salvation. The aesthetic problem

of human salvation develops whenever the uncertainty of a provisional social experience engenders the desire to break beyond the concrete social world to the creation of a consistent human value situation. A consistent human value situation is one in which the process of social morality reinforces, rather than reconstructs, an absolute mode of social being.⁵ In a consistent human value situation, the process of social morality does not lead to an alteration of the human survival situation. On the contrary, the process of social morality leads to the certitude of consistency itself. And it is exactly the quest for the certitude of moral consistency which yields the aesthetic problem of human salvation.

There are, therefore, four particular problems of human salvation, each of which is grounded in the transformation of a basic human disposition. The four particular problems of human salvation are linked together by concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation. The subjective problem of human salvation performs and anticipates the collective problem of human salvation. The quest for a complete mode of human consciousness summarizes the search for an absolute mode of social being, and sets the stage for the social problem of human salvation. The quest for a predetermined mode of social practice intermediates the desire for absoluteness and completeness, and anticipates the aesthetic problem of human salvation. Finally, the quest for moral certitude summarizes and reinforces the yearning for absoluteness, completeness, and predetermination. Taken together, the four particular problems of human salvation represent partial aspects of the general human query concerning how

it might be possible to break beyond the uncertainty of the concrete social world to a mode of social life characterized by absolute certitude. While this general human query provides a full statement of the problem of human salvation, it does not provide an answer as to what must be done if the yearning for absolute certitude is to be satisfied. Such an answer is provided by the phenomenology of human salvation.

The Phenomenology of Human Salvation

The problem of human salvation begins to develop whenever the immediate experience of the concrete social world fosters an aversive response to the absence of absolute certitude. The attempt to render absolute that which is experienced as uncertain requires, for its prosecution, the creation of formative postulates concerning what qualitatively more desirable modes of social being, social consciousness, social activity, and social morality might comprise. These formative postulates, when taken together, constitute the central features of the phenomenology of human salvation. The phenomenology of human salvation details, in lucid terms, how the concrete social world must be reconstructed if the quest for absolute certitude is to achieve a satisfactory solution. This vision of what must be done for the rectification of the problem of human salvation is grounded in a fundamental transformation of the process of human queries. The process of human queries has previously been defined as a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation between four fundamental human assumptions, each of which specifies what must be done for the resolution of a specific human

disposition. There are, therefore, four fundamental human queries, each of which responds to a particular understanding of what is most problematic in human existence. There are, in this case, ontological, epistemological, axiological, and aesthetic human queries. The phenomenology of human salvation, in its fullest expression, is grounded in a qualitative revision of each of the above fundamental human queries. And each qualitative revision of a fundamental human query provides a particular understanding of what must be done for the resolution of a specific problem of human salvation. The phenomenology of human salvation thus consists of four fundamental postulates, each of which responds to a particular expression of the general problem of human salvation. There is, in this case, an ontology of human salvation, an epistemology of human salvation, an axiology of human salvation, and an aesthetic of human salvation. The ontology of human salvation specifies what must be done to obtain subjective certitude. The epistemology of human salvation describes what must be done to obtain collective certitude. The axiology of human salvation specifies what must be done to obtain social certitude. And the aesthetic of human salvation describes what must be done to obtain moral certitude. These four postulates of human salvation are not, of course, unrelated to one another. On the contrary, each postulate of human salvation may be viewed as a partial aspect of a general human awareness concerning what must be done to attain a mode of social life invested with absolute certitude. For example, the ontology of human salvation is grounded in a vision of an absolutist universe. The assumption of an absolutist universe preforms and anticipates the appearance of an epistemology

of human salvation. The epistemology of human salvation is based in a vision of tautological human consciousness. The reduction of human consciousness to tautology serves as the postulate by that which is absolute may be recognized, and thereby admitted, into the more collective aspect of social experience. The presentation of a tautological structure of human knowledge sets the stage, in turn, for the appearance of the axiology of human salvation. The axiology of human salvation postulates teleology as the basis of the more material aspect of social existence. The assumption of teleology as the basis of social practice sums up the vision of tautological human consciousness and sets the stage, in turn, for the appearance of the aesthetic of human salvation. The aesthetic of human salvation presents the process of social morality as the experience of consistency itself. The struggle to achieve a more perfect consistency between the operative principle of absolute certitude and the concrete social world turns the phenomenology of human salvation inward upon itself in a complete circle of self-confirmation and self-justification. The following section will review briefly each of the four assumptions composing the phenomenology of human salvation, and will describe the relationships which hold between them.

The Absolutist Universe

The phenomenology of human salvation begins by grounding human subjectivity in a principle of absoluteness. The principle of absoluteness has been envisioned, at different times and in different places, as the primal origin of social experience, the first

cause of human life, as the rudimentary life force, or as an inexorable historical process. ⁶ Regardless of its particular presentation, this principle of absoluteness has been intended to lend, by its very presence, cohesiveness, consistency, and purpose to the social drama. It is the penultimate fundamentalism to which the entire spread of concrete social experience constantly reduces itself.

The assumption that the concrete social world is populated, in its essential features, by absolutes, essences, or immutabilities is a necessary prelude to the successful resolution of the formative problem of human salvation. The problem of human salvation emerges, at first, from an aversive response to the uncertainty of human relativity, and from an unwillingness to accept concrete experience as the fullest extension possible of social reality. Given the problem of human salvation in these terms, the single alternative remaining has to do with challenging human relativity by widening the limits of social reality to include that which has never been concretely experienced. The vision of an absolutist universe thus begins with the denial that concrete experience exhausts the full limits of human reality, and with the corresponding assertion that a widening of the experiential frame discloses an alternative and more laudatory reality--one which links human beings into a special relationship with an irreducible principle of absolute certitude. The concrete social world is thus reinterpreted as being held together by the unifying capacity of a dominant, and metaphysically experienced, principle of certainty.

The investiture of social experience with an absolutism is intended to throw off balance the customary presentation of the more subjective aspect of human existence. In this case, human subjectivity is no longer what it seems to be--a relative process of working through particular human situations to an adequate vision of the social world, and of one's position within it. Instead, human subjectivity becomes a manifestation of a larger principle which, lurking beneath the surface of social existence, binds together in a unitary design all dimensions of social experience. This ontology of social reality implies that the subjective problem of human salvation--the quest for a world filled with absolute meaning--will be unsatisfactorily resolved if limited to concrete social experience. Within the vision of an absolutist universe, the relativity of concrete human subjectivity must be transformed into the certitude of cosmological being. This transformation occurs by means of an intense conviction that the process of social experience is backed up by and ultimately is grounded in a subterranean reality, the presence of which may be only metaphysically grasped. To enter into the certainty of cosmological being, therefore, is to ally oneself actively with an absolutism by means of a formative credo. This leap beyond the empirical social world into the certitude of faith is the first necessary condition for the successful resolution of the formative problem of human salvation. By itself, however, the ontological assumption of an absolutist universe, and the consequent realignment of human subjectivity into cosmological being, is not sufficient for the realization of absolute certitude. It is further necessary that the absolutism be generalized across social existence. In this case, a

procedure must be found for calling forth that which is absolute onto the social scene. This procedure must allow for consciousness, in the most primary sense, concerning the full limits of the primal vision of certainty, and must establish how the primal vision of certainty may be further disclosed across social experience.

The requirements are met by the epistemological postulate that the certainty principle reveals itself in terms of knowledge tautologically conceived.

Tautological Consciousness

The phenomenology of human salvation has begun with the ontological assumption of an absolutist universe. The vision of a social universe bound together by a certainty principle represents the first step in resolving the problematic character of human salvation. The desire for certitude may be assuaged only if the limits of social existence have been expanded to include an absolutism, even though this absolutism has never been concretely apprehended. The phenomenology of human salvation does not end, however, with the declaration of an absolutist universe. On the contrary, the phenomenology of human salvation continues with an epistemological assumption concerning the tautological character of human consciousness. While the ontology of human salvation relates what must be done to obtain subjective certitude, the epistemological vision of human consciousness as a tautological process relates what must be done to obtain collective certitude. In this case, the absolutism must not only exist. It must also reveal itself in social experience. And the process of disclosing the absolutism must lead to a mode of human consciousness which is complete in itself

rather than partial. It is precisely the quest for a complete process of human consciousness which defines, in the first instance, the collective problem of human salvation.

The epistemology of human salvation thus responds to the collective problem of human salvation by reducing human consciousness to a tautological process. The reduction of human consciousness to a tautological process is an emergent of the ontology of human salvation. This point is elusive but important. It may be clarified by recalling that the ontology of human salvation has no justification whatever in terms of an empirical investigation of the concretely apprehended domain of social experience. The ontology of human salvation presumes that empirical knowledge, which relies on concrete experience, may be downgraded in favour of a metaphysical appeal beyond the concrete social world to the existence of an absolutism. This appeal is metaphysical since it relies on an intense credo—a blind conviction in the existence of something which appears nowhere in concrete social experience. The ontological assumption of an absolutist universe is thus the product of an anti-empirical appeal to the existence of that which may be known only metaphysically. Such a metaphysical appeal presupposes that the postulated principle of certainty is independent of concrete social experience. In this case, while the whole of social experience may be reduced to an absolutism, variously conceived, the reverse is definitely not the case. That which is absolute is such precisely because it is a self-contained, self-verifying, and self-acting thing. If this were not the case, then the certainty principle would be subjected to the empirical plight of human relativity.

This would be, or course, a straight-forward contradiction. Thus, the absolutism, if it is to provide the key to human salvation, must be conceived as something which moves under its own power. In a literal sense, the absolutism must reveal itself in social existence as a complete circular tautology. AS a self-contained tautology, the absolutism remains independent of concrete experience, and appears in social existence as that which maintains its own principle of locomotion. For this reason, the absolutism cannot be grasped directly by means of an empirical investigation of concrete social experience. It may only be appreciated metaphysically by recourse to knowledge tautologically conceived. Insight into the tautology is provided, not by empirical inquiry, but by a prior act of faith or belief. Once a metaphysical commitment to the existence of an absolutism has been obtained, then the full disclosure of the absolutism may take place. Having repudiated the empirical basis of human consciousness, there are no grounds remaining outside the tautology for testing its accuracy. One either believes in the tautology, and accepts the consequences of that belief, or one does not. Given a prior act of belief, the absolutism becomes that which it is revealed to be; and that which the absolutism is revealed to be, is what it is. The absolutism is thus disclosed as that which the activity of disclosing it reveals it to be. The activity of disclosing absolutism is, therefore, a process of tautological thought. It is consciousness which continuously moves inward upon itself in a complete-circle of self-confirmation. And tautological consciousness, of this sort, is consciousness which has been imbued with absolute certitude.

The epistemology of human salvation thus grounds the quest for collective certitude in the reduction of human consciousness to a tautological process. This epistemological reduction is intended as a challenge to the partial character of concrete human thought. Within the vision of tautological consciousness, human thought is no longer what it seems to be--an incomplete process dependent upon the changing character of particular human situations. Instead, human thought is transformed into a complete process--a means of providing the fullest expression possible of an unchanging absolutism. The epistemology of human salvation implies, therefore, that the collective problem of human salvation--the quest for a world filled with absolute purpose--will be inadequately resolved if limited to the domain of concrete human thought. The partial character of concrete human thought must be transformed into the certitude of tautological consciousness. This transformation takes place by means of a metaphysical appeal beyond empirical social inquiry to the existence of a process of human consciousness which remains complete in itself. It is precisely this tautological process of human consciousness which is postulated as the single means by which that which is absolute may be revealed, and thereby generalized, across the social world. However, it remains insufficient for a certainty principle to be proposed, and for a method to be postulated by which that which is absolute may be disclosed. A procedure must also be found for actualizing that which the absolutism is revealed to be. And this process of actualization must reduce the uncertainty contingent upon the provisional character of social activity to the certitude of predetermination. These requirements

are met by an axiological assumption concerning the teleological character of social activity.

Teleological Activity

So far, the phenomenology of human salvation has involved two formative assumptions: an ontological postulate concerning the absolutist character of the social universe; and an epistemological postulate concerning the tautological character of human consciousness. While the ontology of human salvation has responded to the request for subjective certitude, the epistemology of human salvation has described what must be done to obtain collective certitude. The phenomenology of human salvation does not cease, however, with the epistemological reduction of human consciousness to a tautological process. On the contrary, the phenomenology of human salvation continues with an axiological assumption concerning what might comprise a more desirable mode of social activity. The axiology of human salvation responds to the quest for social certitude. The quest for social certitude requires, in the most rudimentary sense, a means of breaking beyond the provisional character of concrete social activity to the certitude of predetermination. The axiology of human salvation provides a way of bursting beyond the provisionality of concrete social activity by grounding the more material aspect of social existence in a larger telos or direction. This larger telos or direction is envisioned as the ultimate source of a predetermined mode of social life. And it is precisely the attainment of a predetermined mode of social life which provides the collective problem of human salvation with a social expression.

The vision of a universe principled in teleology implicitly assumes, of course, that the domain of concrete social activity is not what it is experienced as--a provisional process by which the products of human consciousness may be actualized. Instead, the assumption of teleology overrides the provisionality of concrete social activity in favour of the certitude of a predetermined direction in social experience: a direction which may be actively appreciated, and whose appreciation leads to the insight that the telos manifest itself in terms of a certain range of social activity. The telos is thus released through a particular range of social practices, and this range of social practices represents the process by which the concrete social world may be actively wrenched into a closer and closer alignment with that which is necessary for the experience of absolute certitude. In this sense, the reduction of social activity to teleology thrusts the quest for absolute certitude beyond questions of being and consciousness and into the domain of social practice. Not only is there a particular vision of the social universe which provides subjective certitude, and a particular vision of human knowledge which provides collective certitude, but there is also a particular vision of social life, which if accepted, provides social certitude. The process of social activity, teleologically conceived, thus serves to actualize the products of tautological consciousness. However, it remains insufficient for a method to be found by which the products of tautological consciousness may be realized in social activity. It is also necessary that the social realization of that which is held to be absolute lead to the experience of moral consistency. This requirement is met by the aesthetic of human salvation.

Consistency Values

The aesthetic of human salvation grounds the moral dimension of social experience in the quest for consistency itself. The quest for moral consistency represents the root value experience of the phenomenology of human salvation. This value experience involves the resolution of any contradiction between concrete social experience and the assumptions necessary for the solution of the problem of human salvation in favour of a greater faith in the postulated absolutism. The quest for moral consistency thus involves an evaluative reordering of the concrete social world until it "fits" without contradiction into the image of social reality inspired out of concern with the problematic character of human salvation. The aesthetic of human salvation--the reduction of moral life to a quest for consistency--is thus the exact process by which the concrete social world is "forced" into conformity with the metaphysical desire for absolute certitude. The assumption that the concrete social world may be made consistent with an ungrounded vision of that world turns the phenomenology of human salvation inward upon itself as a complete circle of self-confirmation and self-justification. In this case, the reduction of human subjectivity to faith in a certainty principle is advanced by morally reinterpreting the concrete social world until it harmonizes with a prior conviction concerning the essentialist nature of the social universe. This process of harmonization strengthens, in turn, the belief that an absolutism may be known tautologically, and may be actualized teleologically. And the grounding of social activity in teleology reaffirms, once more, the struggle for moral consistency. It is the experience of moral

consistency which represents, in the most fundamental sense, the final solution to the problematic character of human salvation.

The phenomenology of human salvation thus provides the key to resolving the desire for absolute certitude. This key is expressed as a lucid image of social reality which details in ontological, epistemological, axiological, and aesthetic terms what must be done if the flight from the uncertainty of the concrete social world is to be successfully achieved. This image of a more desirable social reality represents a necessary but not sufficient condition for the ultimate settlement of the problem of human salvation. It is also necessary that the phenomenology of human salvation be actualized. While the phenomenology of human salvation provides the basis for a complete understanding of what must be done for the rectification of the uncertain human situation, it does not provide an answer as to how this might be accomplished. This answer is provided, however, by the process of cosmological action.

The Process of Cosmological Action

The phenomenology of human salvation contains the formative assumptions necessary for the resolution of the problematic character of human salvation. These formative assumptions require, for their realization, the creation of a distinctive pattern of social organization. This distinctive pattern of social organization reveals, in exact detail, how it might be possible to actualize the assumptions contained within the phenomenology of human salvation. This pattern of social organization may be viewed, in its essential features, as the process of cosmological action itself.

The process of cosmological action is grounded in a fundamental transformation of the more material aspect of human existence. The more material aspect of human existence has previously been described as a process involving a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation between four rudimentary human activities, each of which specifies how a particular human query might be actualized. There are four rudimentary human activities, each of which transforms a specific assumption concerning what must be done for the rectification of a particular human situation into a unique social practice. There are, in this case, survival, political, social, and aesthetic human practices. The process of cosmological action, in its most complete expression, is based in a qualitative transformation of each of the above rudimentary human practices. And each qualitative transformation of a rudimentary human activity provides a particular answer as to how a specific aspect of the phenomenology of human salvation might be materialized. The process of cosmological action thus consists of four rudimentary human activities, each of which serves to materialize a particular understanding of what must be done for the rectification of the problematic character of human salvation. These four cosmological activities may be described as mythification, conversion, transformation, and redemption.

The activity of mythification refers to the process by which the ontology of human salvation is actualized as a distinctive mode of human survival practice. The activity of conversion refers to the process by which the epistemology of human salvation is materialized as a distinctive mode of human political practice. The activity of

transformation refers to the process by which the axiology of human salvation is actualized as a distinctive mode of human social practice. And the activity of redemption refers to the process by which the aesthetic of human salvation is materialized as a distinctive mode of human moral practice. These four cosmological activities are not isolated from one another. On the contrary, each activity represents a partial aspect of a broader process of cosmological action. This broader process of cosmological action begins with the activity of mythification, continues with the activity of conversion, advances into the activity of transformation, and culminates with the activity of redemption. The following section will review briefly the four rudimentary human activities composing the process of cosmological action, and the relationships which obtain between them.

Mythification

The process of cosmological action begins with the activity of mythification. The activity of mythification refers to the process by which the ontological assumption of an absolutist universe is transformed into a distinctive mode of human survival practice. This process centres around the presentation of a primal salvation myth. A primal salvation myth is any vision of the process of social experience which reduces it to interpretation through one of its dimensions, specially conceived. This vision simultaneously contains the prophecy that the process of bringing this dimension of social experience, specially conceived, into the ascendancy is coterminous with the experience of human salvation. The activity of mythification may be understood, therefore, as the process by which a compelling and

and inspiring image concerning the fundamentalistic character of social existence is presented. This fundamentalistic interpretation of social experience casts the concrete social world into a qualitatively different light. It portrays the concrete social world as but a confusing manifestation of a single principle of absoluteness which has not yet been made fully apparent as the ultimate determinant of social existence. In the case, the primal salvation myth reinterprets the uncertainty of human relativity as being simply a sign that the ascendancy of that which is the determinant of social existence has not yet been fully achieved. The first step in its achievement lies in the crucial decision to link one's destiny as a social being with the prophetic vision contained in the primal salvation myth. This crucial decision requires an act of faith in the adequacy of the primal salvation myth. The primal salvation myth, while providing a reinterpretation of the concrete social world, does so from the standpoint of that which has never appeared anywhere in concrete experience--a principle of absolute certitude. Thus, one either believes, or does not believe, in the adequacy of the primal salvation myth. The myth is not subject to empirical verification since it begins as a denial of the concrete in favour of that which is distinctly metaphysical. To commit oneself by faith to the adequacy of a primal salvation myth is, therefore, to release oneself from the necessity of working out one's location within a particular human situation into an adequate vision concerning what it means to survive as a social being in a given place and at a given time. The answer to the formative question concerning what constitutes a desirable process of survival

as a social being is ready-made. This ready-made answer may be obtained by merging one's subjective sense of self with that which is ascendent in the social drama--the postulated principle of absolute certitude. An act of faith in the primal salvation myth is thus coterminous with the experience of being overwhelmed, and, in a profound sense, reborn with the awareness that a larger principle conditions and binds together the concrete social world, and that this larger principle can be immediately appreciated by faith as the basis for social being. Moreover, the appreciation of a primal salvation myth fosters the conviction that human beings are not condemned to the particular concrete situations within which they find themselves lodged, but can alter and eventually master their condition by regarding themselves as participants within a broader and more prophetic salvation drama. Human beings can, in other words, escape the uncertainty of human relativity by taking on as their own a mode of cosmological being. This mode of cosmological being has, of course, no basis in concrete social experience. Its timelessness and spacelessness may be obtained only metaphysically by means of an initial and intense credo in the primal salvation myth.

The process by which human beings take on as their own a mode of cosmological being represents the first, tentative step in the resolution of the formative problem of human salvation. In this case, the activity of mythification distinguishes the frontier of the process of cosmological action in its movement across the landscape of concrete social experience. Through mythification, human beings enter the cosmological paradigm and, thereby, take their place as active participants within the working-out of a broader salvation drama. This decision

releases human beings from having to confront their empirical social situation on its own terms by providing a fundamentalistic doctrine which, even though it fails or may fail to alter their concrete circumstance, succeeds in reducing its uncertainty to the certitude of absoluteness.

The activity of mythification resolves the quest for absolute certitude at the level of human subjectivity. Through the promulgation of a primal salvation myth, the ontological assumption of an absolutist universe is structured into social existence. By making an act of faith in the adequacy of a primal salvation myth, human beings leap beyond the relativity of concrete social experience into the absoluteness of cosmological being. In a profound sense, human selfhood dissolves into unity with that which is held absolute. There are, however, four qualitatively different absolutes to which the process of social experience may be reduced, and thus four basic salvation myths by which entry may be gained into the cosmological experience. Each certainty principle corresponds to a different dimension of social experience, specially conceived. For example, the whole of social existence may be grounded in the emergence of a special mode of historical being.¹¹ A primal salvation myth may be presented which reduces

the concrete social world to the working-out of a history of economic struggle, and which makes human salvation synonymous with the recognition of one's position as an historical actor within this broader salvation drama. Likewise, the domain of concrete social experience may be viewed as but a manifestation of an absolute conceived as thought itself.¹²

A primal salvation myth may be advanced which grounds the concrete social world in a determinant philosophical principle. Similarly, the more

material aspect of social experience may be considered the repositer of a certainty principle. A primal salvation myth may be presented which reduces social existence to clarification by means of a special type of social practice--whether the quest for happiness, the pursuit of self-interest, or the expansion of altruism. ¹³ Finally, the whole of social existence may be reduced for its interpretation to a religious principle. A primal salvation myth may be advanced which grounds the concrete social world in the working-out of an aesthetic creation--a god.

There are, therefore, four qualitatively different gateways by which admittance into the cosmological experience may be gained. Each gateway reduces the process of social experience to interpretation by means of one of its dimensions, specially conceived--whether historical, philosophical, social, or religious. Regardless of which primal salvation myth is accepted as the receptacle of human faith, the empirical consequence is the same. Human beings surrender the struggle for an adequate and concrete vision of the social world, and of their position within it, in favour of allegiance to that which is distinctly metaphysical--a principle of absolute certitude. This momentary identification with a metaphysical principle of certitude will not endure, however, unless the object of human faith--the primal salvation myth--is transformed into the very basis of a given process of social existence. The primal salvation myth must, in other words, be embodied in a conversionary polity, and this conversionary polity must provide for the organization of human beings around obedience to the guardians of a given tautology.

Conversion

The process of cosmological action has begun with the activity of mythification. The activity of mythification has provided for the actualization of the ontology of human salvation. Through mythification, the quest for subjective certitude has been broken down into four qualitatively distinct principles of absoluteness, each of which has grounded the quest for salvation in a different dimension of social experience. Each prophetic vision of salvation has described a different aspect of the process of social experience as the reposer of the fundamentalism to which the whole of social existence may be reduced. The certainty principle has thus been envisioned, at different times and places, as either historical, philosophical, social, or religious. Admission into the cosmological experience occurs by taking on as one's own a particular salvation myth. Since no primal salvation myth has ever been concretely experienced, identification with any of them presupposes a willingness to lose oneself, by means of faith, within a metaphysical experience. The willingness to plunge beyond concrete social experience represents the first step in the struggle for absolute certitude. This initial step will not be sustained, however, unless the formative credo has been further transformed into a process of political action. In this case, private faith, taken by itself, is like an island in the midst of the uncertainty of concrete social experience. While private faith produces subjective certitude, it does not produce collective certitude. It is the attainment of collective certitude which solidifies private faith, and which provides an additional barrier against the uncertainty of the concrete social world. The

primal salvation myth must, therefore, be structured out into a salvation polity. And the salvation polity must provide a mode of collaborative action which has, as its dominant motif, the experience of collective certitude.

The reduction of political life to certitude occurs through the activity of conversion. The activity of conversion refers to the process by which the epistemological assumption concerning the tautological character of human thought is transformed into a distinctive human political practice. This process centres around the creation of a conversionary polity. A conversionary polity is any collectivity which maintains itself as the concrete embodiment of a primal salvation myth, and which organizes faith in the adequacy of a primal salvation myth into the politics of absolute obedience. A conversionary polity thus serves as the keeper or guardian of a primal salvation myth. It defines what must be done if the prophetic vision contained in the primal salvation myth is to be brought into ascendancy across social existence, and rules explicitly as to who does, and who does not, belong to the particular cosmology. A conversionary polity thus publically certifies faith in a primal salvation myth, and transforms this faith into absolute obedience to a collective body which is presented as the interpreter of that myth. This transformation reduces the uncertainty associated with collective life to the experience of complete certitude. Political life is reduced to unquestioning obedience to the collectivity into which one has been converted. In this case, the activity of conversion "cashes in" faith for a higher and more secure order of certitude, one which invests collective life

itself with the possibility of completeness. A conversionary polity may range in size and extensiveness from a monolithic totalitarianism to a small bible-reading group. Regardless of its size or extensiveness, the political process involved is the same. A formative act of faith is generalized into obedience to a metaphysical collectivity. The process of generalization occurs through conversionary activity. Conversionary activity is implicitly based on the assumption of knowledge, tautologically conceived, and a conversionary polity is, in a literal sense, a concrete tautology.

It should be recalled that in the phenomenology of human salvation, the ontological assumption of an absolutist universe was followed by an epistemological postulate concerning the tautological character of human thought. While the ontology of human salvation has been actualized by the activity of mythification, the epistemology of human salvation is materialized by the activity of conversion. Through conversion, certitude of political life is obtained, and this mode of certitude complements and strengthens the leap into cosmological being--the product of mythification. The conversionary process is implicitly tautological. It involves taking on as one's own a metaphysical collectivity which maintains itself as the medium for the disclosure, and thereby the ascendancy, of a particular primal salvation myth. The epistemology of human salvation has involved the assumption that the proposed principle of absoluteness proceeds into experience as a thing moving under its own power. The movement of the absolutism may be disclosed, therefore, but not empirically verified. The primal salvation myth is, in fact, what the activity of disclosing it reveals it to be;

and what the primal salvation myth is revealed as, then that is what it is. Generalized into a mode of political action, the vision of an absolutism tautologically conceived, results in the creation of a collective body--a conversionary polity--which presents itself as the concrete embodiment of the primal salvation myth in social existence. The conversionary polity mediates between the primal salvation myth and its adherents. In order to testify concretely to one's faith in the primal salvation myth, therefore, one must give absolute and unquestioning obedience to the conversionary polity which concretely embodies the working-out of the myth. The conversionary polity, like the primal salvation myth which it represents, may thus be envisioned as a thing turning on its own head. Although the conversionary polity discloses the implications of the primal salvation myth for everyday life, the accuracy of this disclosure cannot be verified by an appeal to concrete social experience. Thus, what the primal salvation myth means in practical terms is synonymous with what the conversionary polity reveals it to mean. The conversionary polity thus acts as a concrete tautology. It binds together in a collective form a common allegiance to a particular certainty principle, the basis of which is to be found nowhere in concrete social experience. As such, the conversionary polity constitutes the concrete embodiment of a metaphysical experience. As the embodiment of a metaphysical experience, the conversionary polity cannot claim legitimacy as the rightful interpreter of a primal salvation myth by means of an appeal to concrete social experience. There is nothing in concrete experience which would lead to the conviction that one conversionary

polity, rather than another, is more legitimate as the concrete embodiment of a particular fundamentalism. Legitimacy thus comes to rest on the belief that a particular primal salvation myth is revealed by means of a particular conversionary polity. This belief is the act of conversion itself. The act of conversion has, as its basis, the conviction, albeit ungrounded, that a particular conversionary polity concretely represents the working-out of a given primal salvation myth. This conviction involves the complementary assumption that the expansion of the salvation polity into which one has been converted is coterminous with the advance of a particular certainty principle across social existence. That is, the prophetic vision contained in all salvation myths concerning the inevitable ascendancy of one dimension of social experience, specially conceived, over all the others is viewed as being collectively represented by the conversionary polity to which legitimacy, and thereby absolute obedience, has been rendered. However, the primal salvation myth must not only be interpreted as to its concrete implications. These concrete implications must also be employed as guiding principles in the transformation of the social universe. Obedience to the guardians or keepers of the primal salvation myth must be solidified by the diligent exercise of a prescribed set of right actions or correct conduct. This prescribed set of right actions functions to narrow the domain of social activity to that which is necessary for the experience of absolute certitude. The quest for human salvation is thus not only a matter of faith and obedience, but also of diligence in the conduct of everyday relations.

Transformation

The process of cosmological action has involved, thus far, the complementary activities of mythification and conversion. Both activities have been viewed as necessary but not sufficient conditions for the successful resolution of the formative problem of human salvation. While the activity of mythification has provided for the actualization of the ontology of human salvation, the activity of conversion has provided for the materialization of the epistemology of human salvation. Through mythification, a transcendent meaning--whether historical, philosophical, social, or religious--has been injected into the domain of social experience. And admittance into the cosmological experience has been made synonymous with the acceptance of this transcendent meaning as one's own. The activity of mythification has thus lodged the quest for human salvation in the private conviction that a primal salvation myth, however conceived, is both efficacious and correct, and that the attainment of absolute certitude entails the linking of one's destiny to the playing out of this larger meaning in social experience. Belief in the adequacy of a primal salvation myth has been generalized into a mode of political action by means of the activity of conversion. Through conversion, faith in a primal salvation myth has been directly translated into absolute obedience to the guardians or keepers of the myth. The emergent conversionary polity serves as the vehicle for the playing out of the certainty principle upon the social scene. The conversionary polity may thus be viewed as a metaphysical collectivity which moves in a circle of self-justification and self-confirmation. It appeals for its legitimacy to a fundamentalism of its own making,

a mythification, of which it claims to be the concrete embodiment and loyal guardian. In this sense, while serving as the interpreter of its own creation, the conversionary polity denies its own power of creation, and presents itself as merely the passive vehicle by which a given certainty principle may be exercised onto the social scene. An ungrounded mode of social being carries through, therefore, into an equally ungrounded mode of human politics.

The politics of absolute obedience prepares for the investiture of the more social aspect of human existence with the stillness of absolute certitude. The reduction of the domain of social practice to the certitude of predetermination occurs through the activity of transformation. The activity of transformation refers to the process by which the axiological assumption concerning the teleological character of the social universe is materialized as a distinctive human social practice. This process centres around the creation of a code of approved social conduct. A code of approved social conduct may be viewed as any predetermined description concerning what does, and does not, constitute an adequate range of social practices vis-a-vis the ascendancy of a given certainty principle. In this case, the conversionary polity discloses what must be done if the more social aspect of human existence is to be reduced to a predetermined working-out of a transcendent principle. Diligence in practicing this code of approved social conduct provides a concrete sign that the members of a given cosmology are themselves advancing towards salvation, and that this advance is coterminous with the transformation of broader and broader sections of concrete experience in the direction of the primal

salvation myth. The activity of transformation thus narrows the domain of social practices to those actions which reduce the distance between the concrete social world as it is empirically experienced, and as it should be experienced if the ascendancy of a primal salvation was firmly established. The social universe is, thereby, remade in the image of the transcendent principle. This implies, of course, that the whole of social existence may be invested with a predetermined purpose. The recognition of this predetermined purpose, and diligence in exposing it more fully, imbues the routine of social life, however trivial, with cosmological significance. Every social act becomes, in a profound sense, a way of giving witness to the conviction that all social existence may be viewed as a manifestation of an irreducible principle of absolute certitude. What social acts are performed required of course, a prior description of a code of approved social conduct. This code of approved social conduct, as dictated by the conversionary polity, specifies how participants in a given cosmology must act if a particular primal salvation myth is to be fully realized.

The reduction of the domain of social activity to the exposure of a larger telos provides for the experience of social certitude. It is the unrelieved certitude of having to make "no choices" in the everyday conduct of social life. The creation of a mode of social life requiring "no choices"--only diligence in practicing that which has been prescribed--elevates the quest for absolute certitude to the level of social practice and, thereby secures the basis for salvation not only in faith and obedience, but in diligence or propriety as well. The activity of transformation thus brings the

process of cosmological action to the threshold of a social reality which maintains, as its dominant quality, the experience of absolute certitude. The quest for human salvation requires, however, one final step. The reduction of social life to transformational activity must be solidified in a dogmatic moral experience. The dogmatic moral experience must resolve any inconsistencies between the 'way things actually are' in the concrete social world and the prophetic vision contained in the primal salvation myth. The creation of a dogmatic moral experience thus represents the last step in the struggle for human salvation. To attain consistency, even though only momentarily, is to experience the act of redemption itself.

Redemption

The process of cosmological action has consisted, so far, of the related activities of mythification, conversion, and transformation. Through mythification, human subjectivity has been absolutized. Through conversion, political life has been made complete. And through transformation, the provisional character of concrete social activity has been reduced to the certitude of having to make "no choices."

The quest for human salvation would be incomplete, however, if it were to cease at this point. One final measure is necessary. This measure devolves on the reduction of the moral dimension of social existence to the certitude of consistency. Moral consistency is obtained by the activity of redemption. The activity of redemption refers to the process by which the aesthetic of human salvation is actualized. This process centres around the creation of a dogmatic moral

experience. A dogmatic moral experience may be viewed as any human value situation which allows the consequences of actions taken to be evaluated in such a way, that regardless of their empirical description, these consequences are forced into congruity with the activities necessary for the resolution of the problem of human salvation. A dogmatic moral experience thus redefines the concrete social world until it "fits" the prophetic explanation of the social universe contained in the primal salvation myth. In this case, a dogmatic moral process allows for the experience of living "without contradictions." And the experience of living "without contradictions" represents, in a profound sense, the act of redemption itself.

The moral process by which the concrete social world is reduced to its certainty principle is coterminous with the entire process of cosmological action itself. Every aspect of the process of cosmological action may be viewed as a way of reducing the incongruity between the primal salvation myth and concrete social experience. For example, faith in the primal salvation myth represents the dogmatic moral process by which human subjectivity is absolutized. Unquestioning obedience is the dogmatic moral process by which political life is narrowed to that which is necessary for the experience of collective certitude. Diligence in the exercise of right actions represents the dogmatic moral process by which the domain of social activity is made consistent with the primal salvation myth, and with its process of disclosure. Finally, the quest to make consequences consistent with the objects of human faith, obedience, and diligence represents the dogmatic moral process by which the human value experience is reduced

to an exercise in self-confirmation and self-justification. The entire process of cosmological action itself is thus the moral process by which a world without inconsistencies and contradictions may be obtained. In such a world, human beings are redeemed or saved. The struggle for absolute certitude is momentarily realized. The activity of redemption is the process, therefore, by which the activities composing the process of cosmological action are unified in a dogmatic moral experience. The moral activity involved in reducing concrete social experience to dogma finally succeeds in turning the process of cosmological action back upon itself as a complete circle of absolute certitude.

While the dogmatic values composing redemptive activity describe what must be done if the circle of absolute certitude is to remain unbroken, they do not, by themselves, control this continuity. Instead, each dogmatic value must be further backed up by a sanction or control. There are four cosmological sanctions, each of which defines the permissible, outer limits of a given salvation experience. Participants in a given cosmology may reach beyond these limits only at the risk of doing violence to the experience of absolute certitude itself. For example, the value of absolute faith is backed up by the threat of psychic terror. To lose faith in a primal salvation myth is, in a profound sense, to lose oneself, and to be set adrift once again in the uncertainty of human relativity. Likewise, obedience to the guardians or keepers of the primal salvation myth is backed up by the threat of censure. By censure is meant that the person is threatened with the loss of a political life which provides the only legitimate insight into an operant tautology. Similarly, to

be careless in the exercise of approved social conduct is to be subjected to social opprobrium. Social opprobrium involves the bringing into play of such controls as criticism, ridicule, and rebuff. If a participant in a given cosmology has lost the faith, disobeyed the guardians of the myth, and become slothful in his social duties, then the danger of moral inconsistency becomes acute. The single remaining sanction which can prevent dissidence of this sort is that of excommunication or expulsion. The threat of excommunication is the ultimate control possible, other than physical extinction, within the cosmological experience. Once it has been exercised, then the dissenter is purposely expelled from the experience of absolute certitude, and is allowed to fend for himself in the condition of human uncertainty. The dogmatic values of faith, obedience, diligence, and consistency are, therefore, backed up by the sanctions of psychic terror, censure, opprobrium, and excommunication.

The activity of redemption constitutes the final phase of the process of cosmological action. The process of cosmological action has been depicted as the pattern of social organization necessary for the actualization of the phenomenology of human salvation. In this case, the ontological postulate of an absolutist universe has been described as being materialized by the activity of mythification. The epistemological postulate of tautological knowledge has been portrayed as being actualized by the activity of conversion. The axiological assumption of teleological relations has been conceived as moving into experience by the activity of transformation. And the aesthetic postulate of consistency values has been described as being ushered into actuality by the activity

of redemption. The process of cosmological action has thus been envisioned as the pattern of social organization emergent from concern with the problematic character of human salvation. Only in a figurative sense do the problem of human salvation and the phenomenology of human salvation remain separate from the process of cosmological action. In a concrete sense, the cosmological experience unifies the problem of human salvation, the phenomenology of human salvation, and the process of cosmological action into a complex Gestalt which is experienced as a single process of social reality. In this sense, every aspect of the process of cosmological action represents a concrete, albeit partial, working-out of the formative problem of human salvation and of the root assumptions necessary for its resolution.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the following three phases of the cosmological paradigm of social action: the problem of human salvation, the phenomenology of human salvation, and the process of cosmological action. There remains now one last phase of the cosmological experience to be discussed--the condition of human chaos. The following chapter will be devoted to a description of the condition of human chaos. It will be viewed as the quality of social existence which emerges from a general concern with the problematic character of human salvation.

Chapter 3. The Condition of Human Chaos

So far, the thesis has been developed that the problem of human salvation, while arising out of a fundamental reconstruction of the process of human sensibilities, anticipates for its prosecution a further alteration of the human mentality and of the pattern of social organization. It will be contended now that the process of cosmological action engenders a qualitative transformation of the human situation. This qualitative transformation of the human situation may be viewed as the human condition which emerges from a full playing-out of the cosmological experience.

This chapter will propose chaos as the central value-quality--the human condition--which always follows upon the attempt to create a social reality which has, as its dominant motif, a general pre-occupation with the problematic character of human salvation. The condition of human chaos may be defined as that quality of human life which is characterized by the presence of many competing cosmologies, and by the absence of any principled means of choosing between them. In a chaotic human situation, human beings are confronted by the necessity of choosing between mutually exclusive perspectives concerning what constitutes the correct route to human salvation. Each perspective or cosmology maintains itself as the single most adequate expression of the salvation drama. Human beings desiring absolute certitude are compelled to select between such opposing representations. This choice remains fundamentally unprincipled. It is always a matter of

faith and blind commitment, never a matter of genuine empirical knowledge. There is nothing in concrete social experience--the domain of empirical human knowledge--which would provide a clue as to which cosmology represents the most adequate response to the human desire for salvation. All cosmologies are, by definition, unique exponents of that which is anti-empirical--a metaphysical principle of absolute certitude. The choice between competing cosmologies is, therefore, incapable of being resolved by means of an appeal to the concrete social world. The choice must remain ungrounded. This permits, of course, the presence of many competing cosmologies, each of which may legitimately assert itself as the embodiment of the salvation drama. The degree to which a particular cosmology succeeds in having itself recognized as the most satisfactory expression of the desire for human salvation is a product not of its empirical adequacy, but, rather, of the extent to which the cosmology manages to "win out" over other perspectives by methods ranging from intellectual clashes to warfare. This struggle has, as its ultimate court of settlement, the extinction of all other competing perspectives. The annihilation of all other cosmologies allows one particular perspective to proclaim itself as the most worthy receptacle of human faith. The supremacy of one cosmology over all others has rarely, if ever, succeeded anywhere in the history of social experience. The more common occurrence has been that of protracted struggles between opposing cosmologies. In the course of such struggles, particular cosmologies have emerged, declined, and sometimes have appeared once more. For example, religious cosmologies have vied, and continue to vie, with one another as to which may lay the most legitimate claim

to being the representative of a god, albeit variously conceived, on earth. Historical cosmologies have engaged, and continue to engage, in intense rivalries as to which embodies most adequately an absolute mode of human subjectivity.¹ Philosophical cosmologies have continually been caught up within bitter disputes as to which expresses most lucidly the ideational fundamentalism to which the domain of social experience may be reduced for its explanation.² And, finally, social cosmologies have contended, and continue to contend, with one another as to which expresses most adequately that which is primal in the more material aspect of social existence.³ In addition, the history of social experience has been littered with bitter struggles between cosmologies advancing fundamentally different absolutisms. For example, religious cosmologies have competed, and continue to compete, against historical determinisms.⁴ Historical cosmologies have repudiated the claims to superiority made by philosophical perspectives. Philosophical determinisms have continuously been held superior to social absolutisms. And social cosmologies have, in turn, asserted themselves as superior to either historical, religious, or philosophical determinisms.

The cosmological experience thus culminates in a human situation characterized by the presence of many competing cosmologies, and by the absence of any principled means of selecting between them. Such a human situation may be described as the condition of human chaos. This chapter will examine the development and content of the condition of human chaos. This examination will proceed through the following four stages. First, the thesis will be advanced that chaos represents less an accidental outcome of the cosmological experience than a necessary

consequence, the origins of which are to be located in the very way in which the problem of human salvation has always had to be posed. The proposal will be made that the problem of human salvation is implicitly imbued with a fatal flaw. This fatal flaw is simply that there has never been, and can never be, a single interpretation of the problem of human salvation. The problem of human salvation may always receive, at the minimum, four qualitatively different expressions which are mutually exclusive. It will then be demonstrated that this fatal flaw has been magnified into four competing phenomenologies of human salvation, and ultimately into four opposing processes of cosmological action. The disintegration of the cosmological experience into four competing presentations has, as its ultimate result, the appearance of the condition of human chaos. Four central modes of human chaos will be described. They will be identified as absurdity, apathy, anomaly, and amorality. Absurdity will be viewed as the quality of the cosmological survival experience. Apathy will be described as the quality of the cosmological political experience. Anomaly will be viewed as the quality of the cosmological social experience. And amorality will be described as the quality of the cosmological aesthetic experience. After a discussion of each of the above modes of human chaos, some concluding comments will be made.

Before proceeding to a discussion of the origins of human chaos, a cautionary note must be sounded. This chapter will be intentionally limited to a clarification of the central tendencies of the concluding phase of the cosmological experience. Its major interest will not lie in an exegetical and narrowly historical interpre-

tation of the many particular expressions which the cosmological experience has received. The justification for this approach is straightforward. This inquiry began with the assumption that paradigms of social action reflect generalized social experiences. These generalized social experiences do not necessarily conform to an epochal and lineal vision of human history. While it is possible to identify which paradigm of social action seems to be in the ascendancy across a particular civilization, it would be impossible, if not fruitless, to describe the many concrete reasons why a particular paradigmatic experience has declined at a specific point in space and time. Thus, rather than concentrate on an exegesis of the particular historical expressions received by a specific paradigm of social action, it would appear more productive to dwell on the broader tendencies of social experience of which such particular histories are but transient manifestations. This cautionary note should be borne in mind throughout the following discussion of the condition of human chaos. Chaos is a specific quality of the human social experience. As such, it remains a possibility whenever and wherever human beings assume salvation to be problematic, and strive to realize a social reality invested with absolute certitude.

The Fatal Flaw

The cosmological experience contains a fatal flaw which ever limits its range and duration, and which prevents it from casting the domain of social experience into a permanent unification. This fatal flaw is simply that the cosmological experience, in its fullest expression, culminates in a human situation which has chaos rather

than absolute certitude as its central quality. This tendency to chaos effectively prevents social existence from being unified, on a mass scale and over a long duration, around the resolution of the problem of human salvation. The presence of the condition of human chaos signifies that the quest for absolute certitude has been doomed to failure once again.

The origins of human chaos can be seen in the very statement of the problem of human salvation itself. The problem of human salvation, in its most general expression, has previously been portrayed as a flight beyond the uncertainty of concrete social experience to the certitude of absoluteness. This portrayal was immediately qualified by the comment that there are four particular statements of the problem of human salvation, each of which responds to a specific aspect of human uncertainty. There is, in this case, a subjective problem of human salvation, a collective problem of human salvation, a social problem of human salvation, and an aesthetic problem of human salvation. The subjective problem of human salvation responds to the query concerning how it might be possible to break beyond human relativity to the certitude of absoluteness. The collective problem of human salvation queries how it might be possible to break beyond the partiality of concrete social experience to the certitude of completeness. The social problem of human salvation queries how it might be possible to burst beyond the provisional character of the concrete social world to the certitude of predetermination. And the aesthetic problem of human salvation queries how it might be possible to burst beyond the prospectiveness of the human value experience to the certitude of

consistency. There are, therefore, four particular problems of human salvation, each of which connects with a specific dimension of human uncertainty.

There has never been, however, a single interpretation given to each of the four particular problems of human salvation. On the contrary, each particular problem of human salvation has been capable of receiving at least four opposing interpretations. Four clashing contents may always be read into each aspect of the general problem of human salvation. And it is precisely the disintegration of each particular problem of human salvation into four competing interpretations which provides the well-spring out of which develops the condition of human chaos. The reason for this is as follows. The quest for certitude demands, above all, an absolutism to which the whole of social existence may be reduced for its clarification. An absolutism is, however, the product of a metaphysical experience. Nowhere in the empirically knowable domain of social experience has a principle of absolute certitude ever been concretely apprehended. An absolutism must, therefore, be invented, and then imposed upon the concrete social world. The framework within which the invention of an absolutism occurs is provided by the process of social experience itself. The process of social experience has previously been defined, in its simplest expression, as a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation between human dispositions, queries, materializations, and qualitative consequences. These four dimensions of social experience, and the relationships which hold between them, provide the boundary around the content of all

social existence. Nothing happens in social existence which does not ultimately have, as its referent, either an affective social self, an element of consciousness, a social practice, or an aesthetic meaning. If an absolutism is to be imported into social action, it must be envisioned as one of the basic dimensions of the process of social experience, albeit specially conceived. The conferral of primacy upon one dimension of social experience succeeds, in a single stroke, in imposing an absolutism upon the concrete social world, and in providing a bridgehead against the relative character of concrete social experience.

There are, however, four dimensions composing the process of social experience, each of which may serve as the reposer of a metaphysical experience. Each particular problem of human salvation may thus be stated in four qualitatively different ways, according to which dimension of social experience has been specially conceived as the vehicle for the entry of a principle of absolute certitude onto the social scene. For example, there is only one subjective problem of human salvation. It may, however, receive four conflicting interpretations, depending upon which dimension of social experience has, at first, been absolutized. The quest for subjective certitude may be reduced, in this case, to either a religious principle, a social determinism, a mode of human consciousness, or a historical process. Likewise, there is only one collective problem of human salvation. It may, however, be interpreted in four fundamentally different ways, according to which absolutism the quest for collective certitude has been dependent. The quest for collective certitude may be reduced,

in this case, to either a religious organization, a closed social grouping, a political party, or an economic unit. Similarly, there is only one social problem of human salvation. It may, however, receive four contradictory interpretations, according to which complete collectivity social practice has been made dependent. The quest for social certitude may be reduced, in this case, to four different sources of predetermination, whether religious, material, philosophical, or historical. Finally, there is only one aesthetic problem of human salvation. It may, however, be interpreted in four opposing ways, according to which social predetermination has been made the ground for moral consistency. The quest for aesthetic certitude may be reduced, in this case, to four qualitatively different dogmas, whether religious, social, philosophical, or historical.

Each particular problem of human salvation may receive, therefore, four conflicting contents at the minimum. These four conflicting contents are, by definition, mutually exclusive. Each competing content grants primacy to a different dimension of social experience, and makes this dimension the determinant of all other aspects of social existence. Or, stated in another way, each different interpretation of the quest for absolute certitude grants primacy to a particular aspect of the problem of human salvation, and makes this particular statement of the problem of human salvation the determinant of its other three phases. For example, religious approaches to human salvation grant primacy to the quest for aesthetic certitude, and make subordinate the quests for subjective, collective, and social certitude. Likewise, social expressions of the problem of human salvation grant

primacy to the quest for relational certitude, and reduce the subjective, collective, and aesthetic aspects of the salvation problem to explanation in its terms. Similarly, philosophical interpretations of human salvation grant primacy to the quest for collective certitude, and make subordinate the quests for subjective, social, and aesthetic certitude. Finally, historical expressions of human salvation grant primacy to the quest for subjective certitude, and reduce the collective, social, and aesthetic aspects of the salvation problem to explanation in its terms. These four competing interpretations of the problem of human salvation cannot exist in parity. The assertion of superiority on the part of one dimension of social experience, and, thereby, on the part of one particular statement of the problem of human salvation directly contradicts the primacy of any other dimension of social experience and thus of any other aspect of the salvation problem. Absolutisms, of course, brook no relativity. Either a particular dimension of social existence, and thereby, a specific statement of the problem of human salvation can be considered the determinant of all the others, or it must be considered as their subordinate. There is no middle ground! The four competing interpretations of the problem of human salvation must, therefore, vie with one another as to which expresses most lucidly the human desire for certitude. Religious deities must pit themselves against historical determinisms. Historical determinisms must compete against philosophical absolutisms. And philosophical absolutisms must struggle against social fundamentalisms. The stage is thus set for a chaotic human situation.

There are, therefore, four competing interpretations of the human desire for certitude, each of which grants primacy to a different statement of the problem of human salvation. Each opposing perspective points to a different route by which the flight from the uncertainty of concrete social experience may be prosecuted. The different contents which may be given to the desire for human salvation thus originate mutually exclusive cosmologies. Since each cosmology, or grouping of cosmologies, is ultimately grounded in a metaphysical experience, there is no principled method available for testing the adequacy of one cosmology against another. There is nothing in concrete social experience which would lead to the conclusion that one dimension of social existence rather than another may be considered the repository of absoluteness. How, then, is the adequacy of one metaphysical experience against another to be evaluated? How might the four conflicting interpretations of the problem of human salvation be evaluated in light of their simultaneous claims to being the correct route to human certitude? Since no evaluation grounded in concrete social experience is possible, then the answer must be that the competing contents which may be read into the problem of human salvation can be evaluated only in an unprincipled manner. The ultimate criterion for accepting a particular interpretation of the problem of human salvation to the exclusion of all others is thus the formative credo. The human situation, at this level, is thereby one of chaos. There are many competing interpretations of the problem of human salvation, but no principle available which would guide choice between them. The fatal flaw-- the tendency to human chaos--thus emerges directly from the very statement

of the problem of human salvation itself. This fatal flaw has been further magnified by means of the phenomenology of human salvation, and has been structured into social existence by means of the process of cosmological action itself.

The Flaw Magnified

The problem of human salvation is capable of disintegrating, at any given instant, into four opposing interpretations, whether historical, philosophical, social, or religious. Each competing expression of the problem of human salvation represents the starting point for the development, or possible development, of a qualitatively different grouping of cosmologies. And each grouping of cosmologies, whether historical, philosophical, social, or religious, commonly reduces social existence to clarification through one of its dimensions, albeit specially conceived. For example, historical cosmologies commonly reduce the problem of human salvation to the quest for subjective certitude. This reduction results in the dissolution of the social self into a deterministic process of human history.

The content of the historical determinism may be variously represented as class, nation, or race. In each case, the formative query concerning "Who am I?" is locked into a prearranged historical absolutism.

Likewise, philosophical cosmologies commonly grant primacy to the quest for a complete mode of human consciousness. The philosophical reduction results in the dissolution of the social self, by means of thought itself, into a larger idealism. This premises the quest for absolute certitude on the ability of human beings to reach beyond the partiality of concrete human thought to the completeness of

metaphysical consciousness itself. Similarly, social cosmologies commonly reduce the problem of human salvation to the quest for a source of social predetermination. This reduction results in the dissolution of the social self into a particular mode of social practice. The content of the social determinism may be variously represented as the maximization of self-interest, the hedonistic pursuit of pleasure, or the instinctual urge to altruism. In each case, a source of social predetermination is presented, and human existence is reduced to explanation in its terms. Finally, religious cosmologies commonly give primacy to the quest for aesthetic certitude. The religious reduction results in the dissolution of the social self into a larger transcendental principle. What ultimately constitutes the religious design for human salvation varies, therefore, according to the transcendental principle which has been invented. Regardless of which transcendental absolutism has been invented, religious cosmologies commonly reduce social existence to explanation by means of an aesthetic experience, albeit specially conceived.

There are, therefore, four competing interpretations of the problem of human salvation, each of which provides the basis for the development of a unique grouping of cosmologies. These competing interpretations of the problem of human salvation further magnify into qualitatively distinct expressions of the phenomenology of human salvation. In this case, the formative postulates composing the phenomenology of human salvation may be interpreted in four mutually exclusive ways according to which representation of the problem of human salvation is taken as a point of reference. For example, historical cosmologies commonly

treat human salvation as primarily an ontological problem. Historical representations of the salvation drama absolutize social being, whether through a priori assumptions concerning the deterministic character of class, nation, or race, and make derivative postulates concerning knowing, acting, and valuing. Philosophical cosmologies absolutize consciousness, and make derivative assumptions concerning being, acting, and valuing. The problem of human salvation is considered, in this sense, as fundamentally epistemological. Consciousness is thus held to be the determinant of social being, social practice, and social morality. On the other hand, social cosmologies define human salvation as primarily an axiological problem. Social cosmologies thus absolutize a mode of social practice, and make derivative assumptions concerning being, consciousness, and valuing. Finally, religious cosmologies treat human salvation as fundamentally an aesthetic problem. They thus absolutize a mode of moral experience, and make derivative assumptions concerning being, consciousness, and practice.

The phenomenology of human salvation alters significantly according to whether the quest for absolute certitude has been conceived as fundamentally ontological, epistemological, axiological, or aesthetic in character. In this vein, the possibility always exists for the phenomenology of human salvation to be composed of four competing perspectives concerning what constitutes an absolutist social universe, four contrasting images concerning what constitutes the tautological character of human knowledge, four opposing social teleologies, and four mutually exclusive descriptions concerning what is meant by a

consistency value. Moreover, given the fact that there has never been one but many historical cosmologies, an indeterminate number of philosophical cosmologies, many social fundamentalisms, and a multitude of religions, the emergent human situation becomes exceedingly complex. Further, given that all absolutisms, tautologies, teleologies, and consistency values are ultimately grounded in a metaphysical experience, and are thereby unprincipled, the emergent human situation becomes exceedingly chaotic. While there are many competing interpretations of the phenomenology of human salvation, no principle is available for selecting between them. Human beings, enclosed within the cosmological experience, are thus beset by an array of contradictory assumptions concerning what must be done for the successful resolution of the problem of human salvation. The tendency to human chaos, which originates in the very statement of the problem of human salvation, spreads, therefore into the phenomenology of human salvation itself.

It follows that there has never been, and will likely never be, a single content which may be read into the process of cosmological action. On the contrary, the process of cosmological action has received, and will likely continue to receive, four clashing interpretations. Each competing interpretation of the process of cosmological action has, as its framework, a qualitatively different grouping of cosmologies, whether historical, philosophical, social, or religious. These four groupings of cosmologies bring to bear on the same process of cosmological action opposing interpretations of the problem of human salvation, and competing images of the phenomenology

of human salvation. For example, historical cosmologies originate primal salvation myths which are grounded in the ascendancy of an absolute process of social being. Philosophical cosmologies contain primal salvation myths which trace the origins of social existence to the presence of an ideational fundamentalism. Social cosmologies espouse primal salvation myths which reduce the social world to the working-out of a relational absolutism. And, finally, religious cosmologies contain primal salvation myths which ground in a transcendental principle of certitude. There are, therefore, at least four competing primal salvation myths, each of which provides a different gateway by which human beings may enter the cosmological experience. Since competition exists not only between the four major groupings of cosmologies, but also within each cosmological grouping, the alternative possibilities available for entering the cosmological experience may be viewed as indeterminate. Each possibility, as manifested by faith in a particular primal salvation myth, is, by definition, mutually exclusive of all other possibilities. And since all primal salvation myths are ultimately grounded in a metaphysical act of faith, no principled decision is possible concerning which primal salvation myth embodies most adequately the source of absolute certitude. The tendency to human chaos is thus reinforced once again. While there are many competing primal salvation myths, no concrete principle exists for choosing between them. The adequacy of a given primal salvation myth is solely dependent, therefore, on the extent to which all other competing mythologies are extinguished.

The assertion of one primal salvation myth as the determinant of all others begins with the embodiment of the myth in a metaphysical

collectivity--a conversionary polity. (Each primal salvation myth is capable, by definition, of being generalized into a broader political collectivity. And each conversionary polity contains guardians or keepers of the primal salvation myth who exact obedience to their directives in return for the public bestowal of membership within a given cosmology. Once again, there are many opposing metaphysical collectivities, but no principled means of choosing between them. Each metaphysical collectivity succeeds only to the extent that it manages to attract complete obedience from larger and larger groupings of human beings. However, each conversionary polity asserts itself as the single, most legitimate embodiment of the single, most adequate primal salvation myth. The presence of any other metaphysical collectivity casts doubt on this claim. This doubt must be removed. There cannot be opposing collective embodiments of the same primal salvation myth, or competing collective embodiments of different primal salvation myths. A conversionary polity is either complete, or it is nothing. The question of political completeness cannot be settled by means of an appeal to concrete social experience since all conversionary collectivities are ultimately the products of an anti-empirical experience. The question of political completeness can be resolved, therefore, only by the acid test of protracted struggle between all metaphysical collectivities. In the last resort, survival itself represents the single criterion, albeit ungrounded, of the adequacy of a given conversionary polity.

It has been demonstrated so far that the activities of mythification and conversion, the first and second phases respectively of

the process of cosmological action, may receive opposing interpretations, and that no principled method is available for evaluating the adequacy of one interpretation as opposed to another. Accordingly, the conclusion has been drawn that the tendency to human chaos permeates both aspects of the process of cosmological action. This conclusion applies equally well to the activity of transformation, the third phase of the process of cosmological action. The activity of transformation denotes the entire process by which faith in a particular primal salvation myth, and obedience to the leaders of a metaphysical collectivity, are generalized into the diligent practice of a code of approved social conduct. The code of approved social conduct represents the social process by which the social and non-social universe may be gradually transformed in the direction of a given design for human salvation. And diligence in the exercise of this social code represents a means of giving testimony in daily life to the adequacy of a particular primal salvation myth, and to the legitimacy of a given conversionary polity. There are, however, as many codes of approved social conduct as there are conversionary polities to prescribe them. There may be, in this case, qualitatively different processes of social transformation relative to each of the four major groupings of cosmologies, whether historical, philosophical, social, or religious. In addition, there may be distinctive codes of approved social conduct relative to all of the different cosmologies which combine into each of the four general cosmological groupings. Each process of transformation activity is ultimately based, once more, on a non-experience, that is, on a telos which has never been concretely apprehended anywhere

in the domain of social experience. There is, therefore, no ground available for evaluating the competing claims on the part of each process of transformational activity to be the embodiment of the human desire for social certitude. Once again, there are many possible interpretations of the process of transformational activity but no principled means of choosing between them with any degree of certitude. The human situation, at the level of transformational activity, is thereby one of chaos.

The tendency to human chaos culminates in the activity of redemption, the final phase of the process of cosmological action. The activity of redemption refers to the entire social process by which faith in a particular primal salvation myth, obedience to the guardians of the myth, and diligence in the exercise of "right conduct" are generalized into the experience of moral consistency itself. It is the quest for moral consistency which establishes congruence between the "way things actually are" in concrete social experience and the "way they should be" if absolute certitude is to be realized. Redemptive activity, in this case, reduces the domain of social experience to a dogmatic vision about that experience. And it is this dogmatic vision which engenders aesthetic certitude, the closest approximation possible of the desire for human salvation. There are, however, as many dogmatic moral processes as there are cosmologies to advance them. Each moral dogma proceeds through the closed value process of faith, obedience, diligence, and consistency. In this vein, there are as many articles of faith as there are primal salvation myths to be believed in. Each conversionary polity is backed up by the dogmatic

value of obedience. The value of diligence permeates each process of transformational activity. And, finally, there are as many ways of establishing congruency between the concrete social world and the values of faith, obedience, and consistency as there are cosmologies present. All dogmatic moral processes are ultimately grounded, however, in a metaphysical experience. Nowhere in the domain of social experience has a consistent human value situation been concretely experienced. Redemption is a product of metaphysics, never of an empirical process of social morality. The choice between moral dogmas is, therefore, fated to remain ungrounded. While there are many competing routes to human redemption, there is no principled criterion for deciding between them with any degree of certitude. The process of redemptive activity, like the activities of mythification, conversion, and transformation, is tainted with the possibility of human chaos.

The penetration of human chaos into the redemptive aspect of the process of cosmological action represents its final point of magnification. While the origins of human chaos have been located in the very statement of the problem of human salvation itself, the development of human chaos has been demonstrated to be an axiomatic feature of both the phenomenology of human salvation and the process of cosmological action. The proposal will now be made that the tendency to human chaos ultimately results in a qualitative transformation of the human situation. This qualitative transformation of the human situation may be described as the condition of human chaos. The following section will be devoted to an examination of four central modes of human chaos--absurdity, apathy, anomaly, and amorality.

Modes of Human Chaos

There are four central modes of human chaos, each of which summarizes a specific aspect of the cosmological experience into a particular qualitative transformation of human situation. The four central modes of human chaos may be identified as absurdity, apathy, anomaly, and amorality.¹⁰ Each of the above modes of human chaos represents a specific quality of human life emergent from a particular statement of the problem of human salvation, a specific postulate of human salvation, and a particular phase of the process of cosmological action. Taken together, these four qualities of human life, and the relationships which obtain between them, constitute the central features of the condition of human chaos. For example, absurdity represents the central quality of the cosmological survival experience. As such, absurdity denotes the quality of social being emergent from a desire for subjective certitude, the transformation of this desire into an ontological postulate concerning the absolutist character of the social universe, and the actualization of the ontology of human salvation by means of the activity of mythification. Likewise, apathy represents the central quality of the cosmological political experience. As such, apathy reflects the quality of human consciousness emergent from a desire for collective certitude, the transformation of this desire into an assumption concerning the tautological character of human knowledge, and the materialization of the epistemology of human salvation by means of the activity of conversion. Similarly, anomaly represents the central quality of the cosmological social experience. Anomaly reflects, in this case, the quality of social relations emergent

from a desire for social certitude, the organization of this desire into a postulate concerning the teleological character of social practice, and the actualization of the axiology of human salvation by means of the activity of transformation. Finally, amorality represents the central quality of the cosmological value experience. As such, amorality denotes the quality of the human value experience emergent from a desire for aesthetic certitude, the transformation of this desire into a postulate concerning the consistency function of human valuing, and the materialization of the aesthetic of human salvation by means of the activity of redemption. The four central dimensions of human chaos are not, of course, isolated from one another. On the contrary, absurdity preforms and anticipates political apathy, apathy summarizes absurdity and sets the stage for an anomalous social experience, anomaly leads into amorality, and amorality reinforces absurdity once again. The cosmological experience thus culminates in the condition of human chaos. And the condition of human chaos may be described as a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations of preformance, anticipation, and summation between absurdity, apathy, anomaly, and amorality.

The appearance of a chaotic human situation militates directly, of course, against the continuation of the cosmological experience. Inasmuch as the cosmological experience is an emergent of the human desire for absolute certitude, the four modes of human chaos represent the antithesis of human salvation. A chaotic human situation thus signifies the decline, or possible decline, of the social reality of human salvation. However, a cautionary note is necessary. It is

conceivable, and even probable, that human beings may commit themselves to membership within particular cosmologies without experiencing the strains of human chaos. The condition of human chaos reflects the quality of human life emergent from the cosmological experience taken as a whole. Within a particular cosmology, the appearance of human chaos is neither inevitable nor even likely. On the contrary, as long as human beings retain absolute faith in a particular primal salvation myth, obey the guardians of the myth, diligently exercise "right conduct," and strive for moral consistency, then absolute certitude rather than human chaos is likely to be the central quality of their experience. Human chaos becomes salient only when attention is turned to the cosmological experience in its entirety. The cosmological experience, as a reconstruction of the complete process of social action, always contains many cosmologies. And it is the inevitable opposition of such cosmologies which provides the seedbed for the development of the condition of human chaos. To the degree that participants within particular cosmologies are drawn into these larger rivalries, their experience will be chaotic. The condition of human chaos thus represents a qualitative social strain which appears whenever an attempt is made to transform the desire for human salvation into a generalized social experience. When a given mode of social life is grounded in the salvation drama, then absurdity is likely to counterpoint absolute faith, apathy to undercut complete obedience, social anomalies to weaken diligence, and amorality to replace moral consistency. With this in mind, an examination may now be made of each of the four central dimensions of the condition of human chaos.

Absurdity

The cosmological experience culminates in the creation of an absurd human survival situation. The human situation denotes the entire social process involved in the transformation of an affective vision concerning what is most problematic in the more subjective aspect of social existence into a more adequate mode of social being. The human survival process entails, in its fullest expression, a dynamic movement between a subjective human disposition, an ontological query, a survival practice, and an emergent quality of social being. This emergent quality of social being represents the qualitative human consequence of a given transformation of the human survival situation. Accordingly, the cosmological survival situation refers to the entire social process involved in the resolution of the formative quest for subjective certitude. The formative quest for subjective certitude may be viewed, in its most complete expression, as a dynamic working-out of the relationships which hold between the subjective problem of human salvation, the ontology of human salvation, the practice of mythification, and an emergent quality of cosmological being. The emergent quality of cosmological being represents the qualitative human outcome of the cosmological reconstruction of the human survival situation. As such, the emergent quality of cosmological being may be described as one of absurdity. Absurdity denotes the quality of human life emergent from a human survival situation characterized by the presence of many opposing absolute modes of social being, and by the absence of any principled means of deciding between them. In the condition of human absurdity, human beings are overwhelmed

by a diversity of routes to subjective human certitude, and by the inexistence of any concrete ground upon which to base a choice between them. Ironically, the condition of human absurdity may have as its ultimate result a generalized inability to accept a given route to subjective human salvation with any degree of certitude.

Human absurdity represents, in this case, the negation, or possible negation, of a human survival situation grounded in faith, and aimed at absoluteness.

The condition of human absurdity is not, of course, an accidental outcome of the cosmological experience. On the contrary, it is only a short step from the desire for subjective human certitude to the qualitative experience of human absurdity. The pursuit of subjective human certitude involves a commitment to a mode of social life rent by a fatal strain. In this vein, the subjective problem of human salvation may be viewed as the product of an implicitly metaphysical venture. It represents an elusive quest for that which has never been concretely apprehended--an enduring principle of absoluteness. A principle of absoluteness, however conceived, is always an anti-experience. Accordingly, the ontology of human salvation and the practice of mythification directly reflect the advance of an anti-experience into the concrete social world. The quest for an absolute mode of human subjectivity thus involves the immersion of the social self within a non-event. Social existence dissolves into a metaphysical charade. The element of absurdity present within such a social process is heightened when mutually contradictory cosmologies begin to vie with one another concerning which provides the single most adequate route to subjective human

certitude. Suddenly, there is not one but many absolute modes of social being, each of which enjoys complete parity. Nowhere in the concrete social world is there to be found any clue which would assist human beings in weighing the merits of competing interpretations of the subjective problem of human salvation, opposing visions of an absolutist universe, and clashing primal salvation myths. This has, as its qualitative human consequence, the condition of human absurdity. To survive as a cosmological being is, thereby, to be lost within a maze of subjective absolutisms without the guidance of a principle of clarification. While human absurdity represents the central quality of the cosmological survival experience, it does not exhaust the condition of human chaos. On the contrary, human absurdity anticipates the development of political apathy, the more collective aspect of the condition of human chaos.

Apathy

The cosmological experience does not only culminate in the creation of an absurd human survival situation. It also results in an apathetic human political situation. The human political situation refers to the entire social process involved in the transformation of an impressionistic vision concerning what is most problematic in the more collective aspect of social existence into the creation of a more adequate mode of human consciousness. The human political process involves, in its most general expression, a dynamic working-out of the relationships which exist between a collective human disposition, an epistemological query, a political practice, and an emergent quality of human consciousness. This emergent quality of human consciousness

represents the qualitative human experience engendered by a given transformation of the human political situation. It follows, therefore, that the cosmological survival situation represents the entire social process involved in the rectification of the collective problem of human salvation. This social process entails, in its fullest expression, a dynamic movement between the desire for collective certitude, the epistemology of human salvation, the practice of conversion, and an emergent quality of cosmological consciousness. The emergent quality of cosmological consciousness may be viewed as a summation of the entire enterprise involved in the reduction of the more collective aspect of social experience to completeness. As such, the emergent quality of cosmological consciousness may be described as one of apathy. Apathy represents the quality of human life emergent from a human political situation which is characterized by the presence of many complete processes of human consciousness, and by the absence of any principled standard for choosing between them. In the condition of human apathy, human beings are bombarded by a multiplicity of possibilities for collective certitude, none of which contains an internal standard for its own verification. This has, or may have, as its conclusion a human political situation distinguished by a generalized inability, and thereupon a possible unwillingness, to recognize any metaphysical collectivity as the most legitimate embodiment of the human desire for salvation. Human apathy, of this genre, represents the antithesis, or possible antithesis, of a human political situation grounded in obedience, and aimed at completeness.

The condition of human apathy does not, of course, suddenly appear out of nowhere. On the contrary, the qualitative experience of human apathy represents a direct outcome of the desire for collective human certitude. The quest for collective human salvation requires a commitment to a mode of political life imbued with a fatal flaw. The fatal flaw is simply that collective human salvation always requires the presence of that which has never been concretely apprehended-- a complete process of human consciousness. A complete process of human consciousness is not an empirical datum but an anti-experience. Accordingly, the collective problem of human salvation, the epistemology of human salvation, and the practice of conversion directly represent the advance of a process of non-consciousness into social existence. Political life, conceived as the process of organizing human consciousness, thus degenerates into a non-event. The tendency to apathy present within such a political experience is made more apparent when competing cosmologies begin to engage in protracted struggles over which provides the single most adequate path to collective human certitude. Suddenly, there is not one but many metaphysical collectivities, all of which are totally equivalent to one another. Nowhere in concrete social experience is there to be found anything which would aid human beings in deciding between competing interpretations of the collective problem of human salvation, opposing images of the tautological basis of human knowledge, and clashing conversionary politics. If generalized, political indecision of this kind will culminate in the condition of human apathy. In an apathetic political condition, human beings are entrapped within a thicket of "complete" processes without the

assistance of a principle of selection. Thus, loss of faith expands, or may expand, into a degeneration of the will to political obedience.

Anomaly

Subjective absurdity and political apathy may be viewed as residual qualities which are ever present within the cosmological experience. These residual qualities become more pronounced whenever an attempt is made, on a mass scale and over a long duration, to organize social existence around the resolution of the problematic character of human salvation. However, the cosmological experience does not only culminate in an absurd human survival situation and an apathetic human political situation. It also results in an anomalous human social situation. The human social situation refers to the entire social process involved in the transformation of an affective vision concerning what is most problematic in the more material aspect of social existence into the creation of a more adequate mode of human sociability. This social process involves, in its broadest expression, a dynamic working-out of the relationships which obtain between a human social disposition, an axiological query, a social practice, and an emergent quality of human sociability. The emergent quality of human sociability represents the qualitative human experience spawned by a given reconstruction of the human social situation. Accordingly, the cosmological social situation denotes the entire social process involved in the resolution of the formative quest for social certitude. The formative quest for social certitude entails, in its most general expression, a dynamic movement between the

social problem of human salvation, the axiology of human salvation, the practice of transformation, and an emergent quality of cosmological sociability. The emergent quality of cosmological sociability represents a summation of the entire social process involved in the reduction of the more material aspect of human existence to the certitude of predetermination. As such, the emergent quality of cosmological sociability may be portrayed as one of anomaly. An anomalous social experience may be defined as one distinguished by the presence of many competing modes of social predetermination, and by the absence of any principled means of choosing between them. In an anomalous social experience, human beings are confronted by many opposing routes to social certitude, none of which may be empirically verified. This results, or may result, in a human social situation characterized by a generalized incapacity, and thereupon by a possible resistance, to reduce the quest for social salvation to any given code of approved social conduct. An anomalous social experience thus represents the negation, or possible negation, of a human social situation grounded in diligence, and aimed at
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predetermination.

The condition of human anomaly emerges directly from the desire for human social certitude. The quest for social salvation anticipates a process of human sociability fractured by a fatal strain. This fatal strain is simply that the desire for social certitude requires, for its satisfaction, the existence of that which has never been concretely apprehended--a predetermined process of human sociability. A predetermined process of human sociability is, however, less a product of empirical social existence than an object of metaphysical reflection.

Accordingly, the social problem of human salvation, the axiology of human salvation, and the practice of transformation directly reflect the advance of an unprincipled process of human sociability into the concrete social world. The material aspect of social existence is thus grounded in a non-event. The tendency to anomaly present with such a social experience is heightened when competing metaphysical collectivities begin to assert mutually contradictory routes to social certitude. Suddenly, there is not one but many predetermined processes of human sociability, each of which enjoys complete parity. There is nothing in concrete social experience which would guide choice between opposing interpretations of the social problem of human salvation, competing images of the teleological character of human relations, and clashing codes of approved social conduct. If generalized, social chaos, of this sort, culminates in an anomalous social experience. In the condition of human anomaly, human beings are condemned to participation within a domain of mutually contradictory "right actions", and cut off from any ground upon which to base a choice between them. The loss of faith and the degeneration of obedience may thus expand into the erosion of social diligence.

Amorality

The cosmological experience does not culminate only in the creation of an absurd human survival situation, an apathetic human political situation, and an anomalous social experience, but it also results in an amoral human aesthetic situation. The human aesthetic situation refers to the entire social process involved in the transformation of an impressionistic sense of what is most problematic in the

more evaluative aspect of social experience into the creation of a more adequate mode of social morality. The human value process entails, in its fullest expression, a dynamic working-out of the relationships which hold between an aesthetic human disposition, an aesthetic query, a value practice, and an emergent quality of social morality. The emergent quality of social morality represents the qualitative human experience emergent from a given transformation of the human aesthetic situation. Accordingly, the cosmological aesthetic situation denotes the entire social process involved in the resolution of the quest for moral consistency, the aesthetic problem of human salvation. This social process involves, in its most general expression, a dynamic movement the aesthetic problem of human salvation, the aesthetic of human salvation, the practice of redemption, and an emergent quality of cosmological morality. The emergent quality of cosmological morality represents a summation of the entire social process involved in reducing the more evaluative aspect of social experience to consistency. As such, the quality of the cosmological value experience may be described as one of amorality. Amorality represents the quality of human life emergent from a human aesthetic situation characterized by the presence of many consistent processes of social morality, and by the absence of any principled means of deciding between them. In the condition of human amorality, human beings are confronted by a diversity of routes to aesthetic certitude, none of which is susceptible to empirical verification. This has, or may have, as its consequence a generalized inability, and thus a possible unwillingness, to recognize any metaphysical moral

dogma as the most legitimate expression of the desire for human salvation. Human amorality may represent, therefore, the antithesis, or possible antithesis, of a human aesthetic situation grounded in dogma, and aimed at consistency.

The condition of human amorality develops directly out of the desire for aesthetic human certitude. The quest for aesthetic salvation anticipates the construction of a process of social morality imbued with a fatal flaw. This fatal flaw is simply that the search for aesthetic salvation requires, for its resolution, the appearance of that which has never been concretely experienced--a closed process of social morality. A closed process of social morality is not, however, an empirical phenomenon but an anti-experience. Accordingly, the aesthetic problem of human salvation, the aesthetic of human salvation, and the practice of redemption reflect the advance of an anti-experience onto the social scene. The human aesthetic experience thus degenerates into a non-event. The tendency to amorality implicit to such an aesthetic experience is brought to the surface when opposing cosmologies engage in bitter rivalries over which provides the single most adequate route to moral certitude. There is not one but many closed processes of social morality, each of which shares complete parity. And nowhere in the concrete social world is there to be found any principle which would guide choice between competing interpretations of the aesthetic problem of human salvation, opposing visions of the aesthetic of human salvation, and contending moral dogmas. Aesthetic chaos, of this kind, engenders the condition of human amorality. In an amoral aesthetic condition, human beings are enfolded within an unprincipled domain of moral dogmas without the benefit of any ground

upon which to base a decision between them. Accordingly, the loss of faith, the degeneration of obedience, and the erosion of diligence may culminate in the dilution of moral consistency itself.

A chaotic human situation thus contains four central dimensions, each of which is grounded in the qualitative transformation of a specific aspect of social existence. The four major modes of human chaos may be described as absurdity, apathy, anomaly, and amorality. Absurdity represents the quality of human life emergent from the cosmological survival experience. Apathy describes the central quality of the cosmological political experience. Anomaly represents the quality of human life emergent from the cosmological social experience. And amorality describes the central quality of the cosmological aesthetic experience. When combined, the four central dimensions of human chaos constitute the salient features of the human condition emergent from the cosmological reconstruction of social reality.

Conclusion

The above discussion of human chaos concludes the present investigation of the cosmological experience. This investigation has disclosed that the quest for absolute certitude requires for its prosecution the dynamic intermediation of a distinctive process of human sensibilities, a unique mode of human consciousness, and of a novel pattern of social organization. It has also disclosed that the cosmological experience contains the seeds of its own destruction-- the tendency to human chaos. While the tendency to human chaos accounts for the decline in historical significance of the cosmological experience, it also anticipates the ascendancy of the corporate

experience--the governing world-paradigm of the twentieth century.

Chapter 4. The Corporate Experience

For those fated to possess the twentieth century as their social history, reinforced meaninglessness rather than chaos has been the central quality of human life. The contemporary human survival experience has been distinguished more by irrationality than by absurdity. Political life has been qualified more by reactiveness than by apathy. The domain of social relations has become more accidental than anomalous. And the present human value experience has been characterized more by immorality than by amorality. In twentieth century life, the whole social existence has been made to service the continuation of the existent mode of social reality. The salient problem is no longer that human beings are condemned to a chaotic human situation, but rather that human beings have now become enveloped within a process of social experience which has, as its central value, the desirability of human security itself.

What has occurred to move social existence so dramatically from the condition of human chaos to one of reinforced meaninglessness? How has the crisis of human civilization precipitated by the appearance of human chaos been averted? And what implications has the conquest of human chaos had in terms of the emergent reconstruction of social reality? This chapter will investigate the above questions. The proposal will be made that the condition of human chaos always requires for its resolution a fundamental transformation of the complete process

of social action. Human chaos represents the culminating phase of one unique reconstruction of the complete social process, the cosmological experience. A chaotic human situation cannot be rectified, however, within the framework of the cosmological experience. The reason for this is as follows. The four central dimensions of human chaos--absurdity, apathy, anomaly, and amorality--emerge directly from the social reality of human salvation. The creation of a mode of social life grounded in the quest for absolute certitude always sets the stage for the appearance of a chaotic human situation. Accordingly, human chaos is not an accidental but a necessary outcome of the cosmological experience. As long as the desire for human salvation exists as a central human motivation, human chaos will likely remain a recurrent possibility. The resolution of human chaos thus requires that the cycle of social life out of which it has been bred be broken.

The annihilation of the cycle of social life out of which the condition of human chaos emerges is synonymous with a movement beyond the cosmological experience towards the construction of a more corporate mode of social existence. This movement begins with the supersession of the problem of human security over the quest for human salvation as the central object of human dispositions. It continues with the ascendancy of the phenomenology of human security, as opposed to the phenomenology of human salvation, as the prevailing image of social reality. It is materialized by the decline of the process of cosmological action in favour of the process of corporate action. And, ultimately, the movement beyond the cosmological experience towards a more corporate world culminates in a qualitative human situation

characterized more by reinforced meaninglessness than by chaos. In short, the condition of human chaos requires, for its resolution, the development of the corporate paradigm of social action. The corporate paradigm of social action begins with the problem of human security, continues with the creation of a phenomenology of human security, is materialized by means of the process of corporate action, and culminates in the condition of reinforced meaninglessness.

This chapter will examine the first three phases of the corporate paradigm of social action. This examination will proceed through four steps. First, the thesis will be advanced that the corporate experience begins, at the very instant, that an aversive response to the condition of human chaos originates a general human desire for a more orderly social world. The desire for a more orderly social world will be depicted as the central feature of the problem of human security itself. The problem of human security will be described, in its most general expression, as a qualitatively unique reconstruction of the process of human dispositions. Four particular statements of the problem of human security will then be presented, each of which will be portrayed as addressing a specific mode of human chaos. Second, the phenomenology of human security emergent from the quest for a more orderly social world will be investigated. This investigation will reveal that the phenomenology of human security may be understood as a qualitatively unique reinterpretation of the process of human queries. The four fundamental human assumptions composing the phenomenology of human security will then be introduced, each of which will be defined as a response to a particular expression of the problem of human security.

Third, the process of corporate action necessary for the actualization of the phenomenology of human security will be examined. This examination will propose the process of corporate action as a qualitatively unique reconstruction of the process of human materializations. The four social practices composing the process of corporate action will then be presented, each of which will be viewed as a materialization of a specific aspect of the phenomenology of human security. Finally, the above three phases of the corporate paradigm will be summarized, and some concluding comments made. The chapter which follows will then be devoted to a description of the final phase of corporate reality--the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness.

Before undertaking an examination of the problem of human security, some preliminary comments are necessary concerning the relationship which holds between the cosmological and corporate experiences. It should be noted, above all, that the cosmological and corporate experiences are not fundamentally dissimilar. On the contrary, both modes of social existence may be viewed, in their fullest expressions, as paradigms of social action. As such, the cosmological and corporate experiences commonly represent qualitatively unique reconstructions of the same complete process of social action. The complete process of social action has previously been defined as a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations of preformance, anticipation, and performance between a process of human dispositions, a process of human materializations, and a process of qualitative human consequences. The cosmological experience begins with the unification of the process of human dispositions around the problematic character of human salvation, continues with the transformation of the process of human queries into the assumptions necessary for the attainment of

absolute certitude, actualizes these assumptions by means of a fundamental transformation of the process of human dispositions, and culminates in a chaotic human situation. Likewise, the corporate experience originates in the unification of the process of human dispositions around the problem of human security, continues with the revision of the process of human queries into the postulates necessary for human order, actualizes these postulates by means of a reconstruction of the process of human materializations, and culminates in the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. The cosmological and corporate experiences thus commonly represent reconstructions, albeit qualitatively different reconstructions, of the same complete process of social action. Moreover, these two reconstructions of the complete social process are linked together by means of the condition of human chaos. The condition of human chaos, the final phase of the cosmological experience, sets the stage, in this case, for the development of the problem of human security, the first phase of the corporate experience. Human chaos represents a point of transition, or a possible point of transition, between the decline of cosmological reality, and the emergence, or possible emergence, of a more corporate mode of social existence. In addition, the cosmological and corporate experiences are linked together by a shared aversion to the relative, partial, provisional, and prospective qualities of concrete social experience. While the cosmological experience, as a metaphysical venture, militates directly against the development of a concrete social world, the corporate experience, as a more abstract enterprise, indirectly counterpoints the emergence of a concrete process of social experience.

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Whether directly or indirectly, both modes of social existence provide escape-routes beyond the uncertainty of concrete social experience. The cosmological experience provides for a flight beyond human uncertainty to the certitude of an object of human faith. And the corporate experience provides for an escape beyond the concrete social world to the security of a product of human reification. Accordingly, the formative problems of human salvation and human security are not altogether dissimilar. On the contrary, the problem of human security may be viewed, most aptly, as a "fall-out" from the failure of the cosmological experience to successfully prosecute the problem of human salvation. The problem of human security represents, in this case, but a more limited and banal version of the enduring human aspiration for a social world filled with absolute certitude. The quest for a more orderly social world represents a second chance, albeit in different form, at forestalling the appearance of a concrete process of social experience distinguished, at each and every instant, by relativity, partiality, provisionality, and prospectiveness.

The commonalities existent between the cosmological and corporate experiences are muted by fundamental differences. The problem of human salvation is not the same as the problem of human security. And thus, the social reality emergent from the quest for human salvation is not the same as the one which develops from the pursuit of human security. For example, while the problem of human salvation grounds in the quest for an absolute process of social experience, the problem of human security represents the quest for a restrictive mode of social existence. While an absolute social

experience is implicitly fundamentalistic, complete, predetermined, and consistent, a restrictive social experience is inherently inert, patterned, homogeneous, and redundant. Likewise, while the phenomenology of human salvation contains an absolutist ontology, a tautological epistemology, a teleological axiology, and a consistency aesthetic, the phenomenology of human security includes an entitative ontology, an analytic epistemology, an instrumental axiology, and a redundant aesthetic. Similarly, while the process of cosmological action organizes the domain of social practices around the activities of mythication, conversion, transformation, and redemption, the process of corporate action refers to that pattern of social organization characterized by the activities of reification, mobilization, canalization, and commitment. And finally, while the cosmological experience culminates in a chaotic human situation, the corporate experience culminates in the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. While human chaos anticipates the problem of human security, reinforced meaninglessness anticipates the problem of human freedom.

In terms of relative dominance, the corporate experience represents the operative paradigm of social action across contemporary human existence. The cosmological experience is no longer in the ascendancy. The social reality of human salvation is not, however, altogether absent from the social scene. Its presence is felt whenever and wherever human beings seek to overcome the uncertainty of concrete social experience in favour of absolute certitude. The central theme of contemporary human life appears to be, however, the quest for human security rather than the struggle for human salvation. The

quest for human security is not, of course, alienated as a distant goal from contemporary human experience but represents instead the central quality of every aspect of the present process of social existence. Thus, to live in the twentieth century is to contribute, albeit unintentionally, to the development of a mode of social experience which represents, to a large extent, a working-out of the problem of human security. If an understanding of the cosmological experience is indispensable for an appreciation of modern life, then a comprehension of the corporate experience is imperative. This does not mean that the corporate experience is unique to human existence during the twentieth century. On the contrary, the corporate experience, as a generalized reconstruction of social reality, has appeared in the past, occurs in the present, and will undoubtedly remain as an active human possibility in the future. However, what lends special significance to the corporate experience at the present moment is that rarely, if ever, in the history of social experience has the quest for human security achieved such extensiveness and duration as during human existence in the twentieth century. With this in mind, the problem of human security will now be examined.

The Problem of Human Security

The problem of human security originates in an aversive reaction to the condition of human chaos. The condition of human chaos has previously been described as that qualitative human situation which is characterized by the presence of many competing cosmologies, and by the absence of any principled means of choosing

between them. In a chaotic social experience, the human survival situation is reduced to absurdity, political life to apathy, human sociability to anomaly, and the human value experience to amorality. This has, as its ultimate consequence, the very real possibility that the quest for human salvation, if sustained, may precipitate the complete disintegration of social existence itself. It is the possible disintegration of social life which lends prominence to the problem of human security. The problem of human security represents, in this case, a direct emergent of the social ravages of human chaos. As such, the recognition of human security as the most problematic feature of human life signifies a fundamental shift in human dispositions away from the yearning for absolute certitude to the more banal desire for an orderly social world. And this fundamental shift in human dispositions represents, in turn, the precise point at which the cosmological experience concludes, and the corporate experience begins.

The problem of human security, in its most general expression, may be summed up as the following query: How might it be possible to break beyond the condition of human chaos to the creation of a more orderly social world? Like the problem of human salvation, the quest for human security is grounded in a fundamental transformation of the process of human dispositions. The process of human dispositions has previously been described as a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation between four formative impressions of

social existence, each of which furnishes a particular definition of the human situation. There are four basic human dispositions, each of which sums up a formative impression of a different aspect of social existence into a particular understanding of a problematic situation. There are, in this case, subjective, collective, social, and aesthetic human dispositions. The problem of human security, in its most general expression, is grounded in a qualitative transformation of each of the above basic human dispositions. Thus, the problem of human security may be expressed in four qualitatively different ways, each of which represents a fundamental transformation of a specific human disposition. There is, in this case, a subjective problem of human security, a collective problem of human security, a social problem of human security, and an aesthetic problem of human security. These four particular expressions of the problem of human security are not unrelated. On the contrary, each particular statement of the problem of human security may be viewed as a complementary aspect of a broader human query concerning how it might be possible to construct a more orderly social world out of the condition of human chaos.¹

For example, the subjective problem of human security may be summed up as the following concern: How might it be possible to burst beyond the condition of human absurdity to the creation of an inert human survival situation? The condition of human absurdity has previously been described as that qualitative process of human survival which is characterized by the presence of many competing expressions of absoluteness, and by the absence of any principled

means of choosing between them. In the condition of human absurdity, the quest for the certitude of absoluteness is thereby reduced to a protracted struggle between opposing objects of human faith. Such a survival condition is inherently disorderly. It is distinguished less by the certitude of human faith than by a fatal tension existent between different receptacles of human faith. This tension, if generalized, makes problematic the very continuance of an orderly process of social life. In this case, a world filled with many absolute processes of human survival, none of which contains an internal standard for its own verification, is also a world devoid of any single most adequate process of human survival. The presence of many absolute processes of human survival thus ultimately culminates in the absence, or possible absence, of a single process of human survival capable of binding together the whole of social existence. The divisiveness existent between different objects of human faith must be generalized, however, since the cosmological experience nowhere provides a grounded standard for the orderly resolution of competing claims to absoluteness. The quest for the certitude of absolute faith thus breeds the chaos of human absurdity.

It is the inherent disorderliness of the cosmological survival experience, together with the absence of any possibility for its internal resolution, which provides the basis for the development of the subjective problem of human security. The subjective problem of human security arises, in this case, whenever and wherever an aversive response to human absurdity sparks a desire for the creation of an inert,

and thereby orderly, process of human survival. An inert human survival situation is one in which human expectations concerning the nature and limits of social reality are organized in such a way as to promote the continuance of a given process of social existence. In an inert social world, human beings are motivated less by the promise of absoluteness than by the possibility of being integrated into a given social reality as agents of human order in their own right.² The appearance of inertness as a central human motivation presupposes, of course, a fundamental movement of human dispositions away from the yearning for absolute certitude to the more banal desire for order. It is such a transformation of human sentiments which is represented by the subjective problem of human security.

The general problem of human security does not have only a subjective dimension. It also has a collective aspect. The collective problem of human security may be defined as the following query: How might it be possible to break beyond the condition of human apathy to the creation of a patterned human political situation? The condition of human apathy has previously been depicted as that human political situation which is characterized by the presence of many clashing conversionary polities, and by the absence of any principled means of choosing between them. Human apathy brings the more collective aspect of social existence to the point of collapse. In an apathetic political world, there are many "complete" processes of human consciousness but no way of selecting between them with any degree of certitude. This has, or may have, as its ultimate consequence a process of political life marked by the absence, on a large scale, of any common associative

bonds between human beings. This breakdown of the binding ties of associative existence makes problematic the very continuance of an orderly process of political life.

It is the collapse, or possible collapse, of political life which engenders the collective problem of human security. The collective problem of human security achieves prominence, in this event, whenever and wherever a negative reaction to the possible loss of associative life fosters a yearning for the development of a patterned human political situation. A patterned human political situation is one in which a process of orderly human expectations is linked to goals which must be fulfilled for the survival of a given process of social existence.³ In a patterned human political situation, the quest for the certitude of completeness is thereby forsaken in favour of the security of being enveloped with a mode of associative life which functions to maintain order. The patterning of human consciousness presupposes, of course, a turnabout in human sentiments away from an understanding of collective life as a source of salvation to the expectation that associative existence will provide order. It is exactly such a turnabout in human dispositions which lies at the heart of the collective problem of human security.

The problem of human security, in its fullest expression, does not possess only subjective and collective expressions. It also contains a social dimension. The social problem of human security may be summed up as the following query: How might it be possible to burst beyond the condition of human anomaly to the creation of a homogeneous human social situation? The condition of human anomaly

has previously been described as that human social situation characterized by the presence of many absolute processes of social transformation, and by the absence of any principled means of deciding between them. The condition of human anomaly brings the more material aspect of social existence to the point of disintegration. In an anomalous social experience, there are many competing "approved" codes of social conduct, but no method of selecting between them with any degree of certitude. This results, or may result, in a process of social life distinguished more by a diversity of fundamentally contradictory human relations than by a uniformity of shared social bonds. The absence of a network of shared social ties casts into jeopardy the very existence of an orderly process of human relations.

It is exactly the disintegration, or possible disintegration, of an orderly process of social life which grounds the development of the social problem of human security. The social problem of human security originates, in this case, in an aversive response to the absence of a homogeneous social order. A homogeneous social order is one in which the entire domain of human relations has been reduced to that portion necessary for the actualization of the expectations and goals of an orderly human world. In a homogeneous social experience, each and every aspect of social intercourse is made to service the continuation of a given social reality. The creation of a homogeneous social experience requires, of course, a prior shift in human emotions away from the yearning for the certitude of predetermination to the more banal desire for the security of uniformity. It is precisely such a sudden shift in human emotions which is signified by the appearance of the social problem of human security.

While the general problem of human security includes subjective, collective, and social expressions, it is not exhausted by them. On the contrary, the general problem of human security also contains an aesthetic dimension. The aesthetic problem of human security may be summed up as the following query: How might it be possible to break beyond the condition of human immorality to the creation of a redundant human value experience? The condition of human immorality has previously been portrayed as that human value situation which is distinguished by the presence of many clashing moral dogmas, and by the absence of any grounded way of differentiating between them. The condition of human immorality threatens the very survival of the more evaluative aspect of social existence. In an amoral value experience, human existence is strained by the presence of a diversity of mutually exclusive dogmas, and by the absence of any hope for their internal resolution. This culminates, or may culminate, in the annihilation of all possibilities for an orderly process of moral life.

Once again, it is an aversive reaction to the possible annihilation of a uniform, and thereby orderly, process of moral life which motivates the development of the aesthetic problem of human security. The aesthetic problem of human security develops, in this event, whenever and wherever the impossibility of a uniform moral experience fosters a desire for the orderliness of a redundant human value situation. A redundant human value situation is one in which the quest for moral consistency has been subordinated to the necessity of constructing a process of value experience which unifies human existence.

by summarizing the principles requisite for an orderly social world. A redundant human value experience is thus one in which the entire range of moral possibilities has been reduced to that narrow sector necessary for the reaffirmation of a secure mode of social existence. In a redundant human value experience, the persistence of a given mode of social reality is granted priority over either the evaluation of the consequences of past actions, or the creation of new human possibilities. There is the maximization of present actualities, but no substantive change. Social existence is thereby frozen into a stationary pattern. The emergence of redundancy as a central human motivation presupposes, of course, a fundamental transformation in human sentiments away from the urge to moral consistency to the more melancholic desire for moral order. It is exactly such a downgrading of human aspirations which is summed up by the aesthetic problem of human security.

There are, therefore, four particular statements of the problem of human security, each of which is connected with a specific aspect of the condition of human chaos. These four partial expressions of the problem of human security are not, of course, unrelated to one another but are linked together by means of concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation. In this vein, the subjective problem of human security sets the stage for the development of the aspiration for collective order. The quest for collective order sums up the desire for an inert process of human survival, and anticipates the appearance of the social problem of human security. The desire for a homogeneous social experience summarizes the subjective

and collective expressions of the problem of human security, and sets the stage, in turn, for the development of the urge to moral redundancy. Finally, the aesthetic problem of human security sums up the aspiration for an inert, patterned, and homogeneous process of social life, and reinforces, once again, the quest for subjective security. Taken together, these four partial expressions of the general problem of human security combine into a single human query concerning how it might be possible to construct an orderly social world out of a chaotic human condition. This single human query represents, in its fullest expression, an outcome of a root reconstruction of the process of human dispositions. While this transformation of human sentiments provides for the inception of the general problem of human security, it does not yield an answer as to how an orderly social world might be concretely realized. Such an answer awaits the development of the phenomenology of human security.

The Phenomenology of Human Security

The problem of human security originates in an aversive response to the condition of human chaos. The creation of an inert, patterned, homogeneous, and redundant social world requires, however, the development of a coherent image of social existence which includes assumptions concerning what might comprise more desirable modes of social being, social consciousness, social practice, and social morality. This coherent image of social existence may be viewed as the phenomenology of human security. The phenomenology of human security represents the emergent vision of social reality necessary for the successful prosecution of the quest for a mode of social

life invested with human order. As such, the phenomenology of human security grounds in a qualitative transformation of the process of human queries. The process of human queries has previously been defined as a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation between four basic human assumptions, each of which relates what must be done for the resolution of a particular problematic human situation. There are, in this event, four basic human assumptions, each of which transforms a specific impression of what is most problematic in human existence into a particular query concerning what must be done for its rectification. The process of human queries thus consists of the relationships which hold between ontological, epistemological, axiological, and aesthetic human queries. The phenomenology of human security, in its most general expression, originates in a qualitative transformation of each of the above fundamental human queries. And each qualitative transformation of a fundamental human query provides a particular awareness of what must be done for the resolution of a specific expression of the problem of human security. The phenomenology of human security is thus composed of four fundamental human assumptions, each of which responds to particular problem of human security. There is, therefore, an ontology of human security, an epistemology of human security, an axiology of human security, and an aesthetic of human security. The ontology of human security specifies what must be done to attain subjective order. The epistemology of human security relates what must be done to attain collective order. The axiology of human security specifies what must be done to obtain social order. And the aesthetic of human security

relates what must be done to attain moral order. Moreover, the four postulates of human security are not independent of one another. On the ~~contrary~~, each postulate of human security may be viewed as a complementary feature of a general human understanding concerning what must be done to ensure the survival of a given process of social existence. For example, the ontology of human security is based in a vision of an entitative universe. The assertion that the social universe is, in its first appearance, entitative or "thing-like" represents the central assumption necessary for the reduction of human subjectivity to inertness. This key human assumption sets the stage for the appearance of the epistemology of human security. The epistemology of human security injects an analytic level of human consciousness into social existence. The separation of human consciousness into two levels, one concrete and the other analytic, and the consequent assertion of superiority on behalf of the analytic, represents the crucial assumption necessary for the patterning of an entitative, and thereby inert, social universe. This crucial epistemological postulate anticipates, in turn, the development of the axiology of human security. The axiology of human security defines as "real" only that narrow portion of human relations which may be treated as instrumentalities. The reduction of the more material aspect of social existence to the homogeneity of instrumentalism reinforces prior assumptions concerning the entitative and analytic character of the human social reality, and anticipates the appearance of the aesthetic of human security. The aesthetic of human security reduces the human value experience to an exercise in redundancy.

The creation of a process of social morality which exemplifies the principles necessary for the maintenance of an orderly social world sums up the axiological assumption concerning the instrumental character of human sociability, and reinforces, once again, the ontological vision of an entitative universe. The phenomenology of human security thus ultimately turns inward upon itself as a descending spiral of mutually reinforcing assumptions concerning the nature of social existence. The following section will briefly examine the descending spiral of human assumptions necessary for the realization of a more secure social world.

The Entitative Universe

The phenomenology of human security begins with an ontological vision of an entitative or "thing-like" universe.⁵ The entitative viewpoint simply maintains that the social universe is neither held together by a transcendental principle nor unified by a concrete social process but is, in its first appearance, shattered into a plurality of solitary constituents separated from one another at a distance. In the entitative universe, social being is neither the product of a metaphysical appeal to the presence of an absolutism nor the developmental outcome of a process of working-out human relativity into an adequate vision of the social world and of one's position within it, but is, instead, a given datum by the simple fact of existence. As a given datum, social being becomes less an object of human faith or a creative possibility than a vacuum into which may be read the cross-pressures present within a universe populated by solitary objects distanced from one another. The diremption of

the social universe into a plurality of discrete single entities thus represents the central assumption necessary for the reduction of human subjectivity to inertness. And the reduction of human subjectivity to inertness comprises the first tentative step towards the creation of a more orderly mode of social existence.

The ontological vision of an entitative universe may be viewed as a direct outcome of the subjective problem of human security. The subjective problem of human security originates in the human desire to create order out of the condition of human absurdity. The condition of human absurdity is ultimately principled, however, in the attempt to realize an absolutist universe. The quest for subjective human order begins, therefore, with the abandonment of the quest for absoluteness, and with the consequent recognition that the social universe is composed, in its most elementary features, of a plurality of autonomous parts in desperate need of some principle of unification. This need is accentuated by the complementary observation that the entitative universe is imbued with a natural tendency to human chaos, and that this natural tendency to human chaos represents a residual property of the isolated components of the entitative universe. In this vein, the problematic character of order is squarely lodged in the tendency of discrete single entities, if left to their own devices, to rapidly dissipate towards the condition of human chaos. ⁶ In its most contemporary expression, the natural tendency to human chaos has been described in terms of the first and second laws of thermodynamics which poignantly detail the bio-physical universe tilting towards mass instability. Similarly, the

laws of thermodynamics when presented as a model of social action, and when combined with a hedonistic metaphysics of "human nature," have grounded a parallel vision of impending crisis across the human domain. In either case, the problematic character of order has been envisioned as the given condition of an entitatively constituted universe, implicitly ensconced either within the "laws of nature" or within a universal "human nature." The impulse to disorder across the social and non-social domains has, as its mode of public expression, the observable behaviour of social and natural entities. The domain of public behaviour is filtered through inter-actions which serve as the mode of connection between the isolated constituents of the entitative universe. It is the possibility of analytically liberating inter-actions from their dependency on specific concrete entities which forms the next step in the flight from human chaos. This step requires, of course, the epistemological assumption that the domain of social experience contains two qualitatively different "levels" of social action, one concrete and the other analytic. While the concrete level of social action is grounded in the solitary entities composing the publically observable universe, the analytic level of social action describes the total pattern of inter-actions through which things-at-a-distance are related to one another. It is the epistemological vision of an analytic level of social action which provides the key to the successful prosecution of the quest for human security.

Analytical Consciousness

The entitative ontology dirempts the social universe into a plurality of autonomous parts, and introduces the possibility of human chaos as its central quality. While providing the condition necessary for the inception of the problem of human security, the entitative ontology does not, by itself, clarify how a more orderly social world might be attained. The ontology of human security must be complemented by the further epistemological assumption that the social universe does not consist only of discrete single entities but also of a web of inter-actions or activities between such entities. The inter-actional viewpoint situates discrete entities into relations which extend from the surface to the surface of the things connected. It is through an inter-actional field that the impulse to disorder on the part of isolated entities is released into the more public aspect of social experience. In this case, whether the impulse to disorder originates in an occult quality such as a "human nature" or in laws of motion between natural phenomena, it is always expressed through an inter-actional field.

The expression of the tendency to human chaos in terms of activities-between-things provides the key to the resolution of the problem of human security. The reason for this, while somewhat difficult to grasp, is crucial to an understanding of the phenomenology of human security. First, social inter-actions are not the property of the things which they connect but constitute a level of social action in their own right. There is a significant difference between the solitary entities which compose the publically observable universe

and the sum total of inter-actions which relate things-at-a-distance. While whole human beings and, by extension, the intuitable domain of nature constitutes concrete social action, the total patterning of their inter-actions forms a more analytic level of social action. There are, therefore, two levels of social action--the concrete and the analytic--which, while existing simultaneously, are fundamentally dissimilar. While the "concrete" level of social action is based in the solitary entity, the "analytic" level of social action is grounded in the total sum of activities-between-entities. The concrete and the analytic represent, of course, alternative viewpoints on the same entitative universe. The efficacy of the analytical, however, derives from the fact that unlike concrete social action it is not rooted in specific entities but represents a detachable, and hence manipulative, level of social action in its own right. This implies the possibility of circumventing the impulse to social disorder by deliberately patterning the analytic level of social action around the requirements for human order. In this case, the analytic viewpoint, by liberating activity-between-things from the things connected, permits that narrow sector of inter-actions to be identified which services human security rather than human chaos. Since concrete entities receive social character through a constant process of pushing and pulling across the public domain, and since the activity of pushing and pulling may be visualized analytically as a pattern of inter-actions which is detachable from, and hence independent of, the things connected, then the entitative universe may be effectively controlled by freezing it within an analytic pattern of social organization. The concrete

domain may, therefore, be subordinated to the analytic. The publicly observable universe of intuitable things may be made subservient to an abstract process of social organization.⁸ The imprisonment of the concrete within the analytic, of the publicly observable within a general abstraction, continues with the further axiological assumption that the domain of social relations across the entitative universe is exhausted by instrumentality. In this event, it is not sufficient that social existence be reduced to the inertness of an entitative universe or that the more conscious, and hence intentional, aspect of social experience be reduced to an analytical pattern. If the quest for human security is to succeed, then the domain of social relations must be reduced to the homogeneity of instrumentalism.

Instrumental Relations

The phenomenology of human security has involved, so far, two formative postulates, each of which responds to a particular aspect of the general problem of human security. First, the subjective problem of human security has elicited, for its solution, an ontological vision of an entitative universe. The image of the entitative universe has set the stage for the reduction, or possible reduction, to inertness of human expectations concerning the nature and limits of social reality. Second, the collective problem of human security has yielded, for its satisfaction, an epistemological assumption concerning the priority of analytical human consciousness over the immediate experience of the concrete social world. The epistemology of human security has provided the key to the patterning of an entitative universe. In this case, the epistemology of human security has proposed a dualistic

universe, composed of an intuitable domain of concrete social entities on the one hand, and of an analytic domain of patterned inter-actions between such entities on the other. While the natural impulse to human chaos has been assigned to the intuitable world of concrete "things," the task of preventing human chaos has been grounded in the analytic world of abstract relationships. And it is the analytic domain which has been envisioned as capable of being penetrated, and hence manipulated, by human thought alone. The quest for human security thus anticipates the subordination of the concrete social world to a general abstraction. But how is the analytic world of abstract relationships to be successfully superimposed on the intuitable domain of concrete social entities?

The subordination of the intuitable universe of concrete social entities to an analytical pattern of social organization requires a further axiological assumption concerning the instrumental character of social relations. The axiology of human security proposes that the domain of social relations may be divided pluralistically into four major groupings of social inter-actions, each of which serves to suppress a different aspect of concrete social existence. From this viewpoint, the domain of human sociability is exhausted, or may be exhausted, by that narrow band of social inter-actions instrumental to the realization of a more orderly social world. And this narrow band of social inter-actions may be "broken down" into four distinctive groupings, each of which responds to a different aspect of the general problem of human security. There is, in this case, a problem of ordering social inter-actions around the control of the social and

non-social "environments" of concrete social experience, of transforming control over the "environment" of concrete social existence into an orderly process of political life, of generalizing the requirements for political order into a network of compliant social relations, and of linking such compliant social relations with commitments to those valued futures necessary for the fullest realization possible of a more secure process of social existence.

The axiology of human security thus restricts the possible range of social relations across the entitative universe to those instrumental in resolving the problematic character of human order. Taking the single inter-action considered, the task is to order it instrumentally into the different levels of analytic action. Taking the different levels of analytic action, the task is to order them instrumentally around the resolution of the different dimensions of the general problem of human security. The expansion of the analytic universe of patterned social inter-actions across the concrete domain of intuitable "things" is thus solidified through the reduction of human sociability to instrumentalism. By reducing the human social experience to the homogeneity of instrumentalism, the distance between the publically observable and the general abstraction becomes annihilated. The quest for human security is actively inserted into the very process of human sociability itself. The inception of analytic action and its qualitative expression through instrumental relations brings the phenomenology of human security to the brink of successfully prosecuting the flight from human chaos. The single requirement remaining is that the exercise of instrumental relations be made

coterminous with the fullest expression possible of human order.

This requirement is fulfilled by postulating human values as agents of redundancy, and by making their attainment synonymous with the resolution of the problem of human security itself.

Redundancy Values

The axiology of human security has posited instrumentalism as the basis for the creation of a homogeneous social experience. While the reduction of the process of human sociability to instrumentalism advances the quest for human order beyond the subjective and collective dimensions of human existence and into the social domain, it does not conclude the phenomenology of human security. On the contrary, the persistence of an orderly social world would remain problematic and without focus if it were lodged exclusively in the conduct of human social relations. Sudden disruptions in the human social situation could threaten the pursuit of particular goals, instrumental to the maintenance of a secure process of social existence, thereby regressing the basis for human order towards the "environment" of concrete social action. Thus, the flight from human chaos must be liberated from its basis in human sociability, and lodged in commitments to the attainment of a particular human value experience. The homogeneity of social instrumentalism must, in this event, be generalized into the redundancy of moral order. Social order must be made anticipatory of the security of a redundant human aesthetic.

The creation of an orderly process of social morality is grounded in an aesthetic reduction of the human value experience to

an exercise in redundancy. The reduction of the human value experience to redundancy represents a direct outcome of the aesthetic problem of human security. The aesthetic problem of human security originates in an aversive response to the amorality of a chaotic human value experience. Since the chaos of human amorality is a product of the human desire for moral consistency, then the rectification of human amorality requires a repudiation of the quest for the certitude of moral consistency in favour of the security of moral order. The abandonment of the search for moral consistency, and the consequent human aspiration for moral order, ultimately result in a human aesthetic which postulates human values as agents of redundancy. Redundancy values are neither sources of moral consistency nor active social processes by which provisional social relations may be totalized, and thereby made the basis for the creation of a more meaningful social universe. Instead, redundancy values represent inert points of closure which sum up into an image of a more desirable mode of social existence the human commitments necessary for the development of an inert, patterned, and homogeneous social world. In short, a redundant human value experience is neither absolutist nor prospective, but is a source of those social reinforcements necessary for binding together a social universe composed, in its most elementary features, of a conglomerate of autonomous, competitive units.

The reduction of the human value experience to an exercise in redundancy concludes the phenomenology of human security. The phenomenology of human security has bound together into a coherent vision of social existence four central human assumptions, each of

which responds to a different aspect of the general human problem concerning how it might be possible to create order out of a chaotic human condition. This coherent vision of social existence has begun with an ontological vision of an entitative universe imbued with a natural impulse to human chaos. It has continued with an epistemology of human security which advances the possibility of nullifying the natural impulse to human chaos by the establishment of an analytical pattern of social inter-actions across the entitative universe. This epistemological possibility has been materialized by an axiological postulate concerning the feasibility of "breaking down" the domain of analytic social action into four distinctive groupings of social inter-actions, each of which serves to control a different aspect of the concrete social world. Finally, the domain of instrumental human relations has been bound together by a process of orderly human values, conceived as agents of human redundancy in their own right. In this case, a redundant human value experience reinforces the homogeneity of social instrumentalism, and solidifies the quest for human order at a high level of abstraction and generality.

The phenomenology of human security provides the image of social existence necessary for a satisfactory settlement of the quest for a more orderly social world. It does not reveal, however, how its solution of the general problem of human security might be materialized. The materialization of the phenomenology of human security takes place by means of the development of a distinctive pattern of social organization. This unique pattern of social organization may be described as the process of corporate action.

The process of corporate action represents the operative model of social action necessary for the actualization of an inert, patterned, homogeneous, and redundant mode of social existence. The following section will be devoted to a brief examination of each of the basic human practices associated with the process of corporate action, and of the relationships which hold between them.

The Process of Corporate Action

The thesis has been advanced, so far, that corporate existence begins at the precise instant that an aversive response to the condition of human chaos fosters a compelling human desire for the security of a more orderly social reality. The desire for human security has been portrayed, in its fullest expression, as marking a turnabout in human dispositions away from the metaphysical aspiration for absolute certitude to the more secular aspiration for an inert, patterned, homogeneous, and redundant social world. This turnabout in human dispositions has anticipated the development of a compelling vision of the human circumstance, one which sums up the desire for human security into a systematic understanding concerning what must be done for its prosecution. This compelling vision of the human circumstance has been described, in its most complete expression, as the phenomenology of human security. The phenomenology of human security has linked together into a single image of social existence the ontological, epistemological, axiological, and aesthetic assumptions necessary for the creation of a life-process invested with human order. The assumptions constituting the phenomenology of human security would be condemned to remain idle speculation if a means did not exist for

their actualization. However, a means has existed for the actualization of the vision of social existence emergent from the general problem of human security. This means may be described as the process of corporate action.

The process of corporate action refers to the entire pattern of social organization involved in the actualization of the general problem of human security, and the assumptions necessary for its solution. This pattern of social organization binds together into an interrelated process of human activities that which must be done if the quest for human security is to be generalized beyond its basis in human affectivity and human consciousness into the very structure of social existence itself. The process of corporate action thus provides for the transformation of every aspect of human social existence into a working-out, on a continuing basis, of the desire for human security, and its associated phenomenology of the human circumstance. This transformation of the human social reality develops from a fundamental reconstruction of the process of human materializations. The process of human materializations has previously been portrayed as a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation between four rudimentary human practices, each of which serves to actualize a particular understanding of what is most problematic in human existence, and a specific assumption concerning what must be done for its rectification. The four rudimentary human practices may be identified as human survival activity, human political activity, human social activity, and human aesthetic activity. The

process of corporate action is grounded in the qualitative transformation of each of the above rudimentary human activities in the direction of human order. Thus, the process of corporate action begins with the reduction of human survival activity to a process of reification. The activity of reification represents the qualitative process of human survival necessary for the actualization of the subjective aspiration for human inertness and its emergent ontology of human security. Similarly, the process of corporate action continues with the reconstruction of human political activity into a process of mobilization. The activity of mobilization represents the qualitative process of human politics necessary for the materialization of the collective problem of human security and its emergent epistemology of analytical human consciousness. Likewise, the process of corporate action results in the reduction of human social activity to a process of canalization. The activity of canalization represents the qualitative process of human sociability necessary for the actualization of a homogeneous social experience bound together by instrumentality. Finally, the process of corporate action culminates in the reduction of human aesthetic activity to a process of commitment. The activity of commitment represents the qualitative process of social morality necessary for the materialization of a redundant human value experience.

The pattern of social organization emergent from the desire for human security thus consists of a dynamic movement between the activities of reification, mobilization, canalization, and commitment.

These four phases of the process of corporate action represent complementary features of a unitary process of social action. For example, the activity of reification marks the rough forward edge of the advance of corporate experience across the environment of concrete social action, whether that "environment" consist of concrete human beings or of the intuitable domain of nature. Through reification, the constituents of the concrete social universe are funnelled into inert corporate roles. The activity of mobilization links the domain of inert corporate roles with the pursuit of tasks within vast organizations. Through mobilization, the inertness of corporate roles is transformed into a patterned human political experience. The activity of canalization directs the fulfilment of corporate goals through a process of social relations which maintains instrumentality as its dominant quality. Through canalization, a patterned human political experience is solidified by means of a homogenous network of social relations which ground in the active pursuit of self-interest, albeit narrowly conceived. The activity of commitment makes the maximization of self-interest coterminous with the expansion of the process of corporate morality across wider and wider reaches of the concrete social universe. The accumulation of commitments to the expansion of the process of corporate morality lodges the basis for human security at a high level of abstraction and generality, and sets the stage, once more, for new incorporations to enter the corporate experience. In this case, the process of corporate action ramifies across the concrete social universe as a spiralling process, which at every instant incorporates, mobilizes, consolidates, and

commits wider and wider section of human social existence around the creation of an inert, patterned, homogeneous, and redundant social reality. The following discussion will briefly treat each of the four central dimensions of the process of corporate action.

Reification

The process of corporate action begins with the activity of reification.¹⁰ The activity of reification denotes the entire social process involved in the expansion of an abstract, conceptual framework--an analytic pattern of social action--across the concrete social universe, and in the consequent assertion of this abstract, conceptual framework as the single empirical expression of social reality. Before reification, the fundamental constituents of concrete social existence may be considered (from the corporate perspective) as humanity per se and nature per se. After reification, the fundamental constituents of the human social reality are the corporate self and corporate nature. The reifying process thus encompasses all the activity involved in moving "beyond the human" and "out of the natural" into corporate existence.

The activity of reification may be viewed as a direct response to the ontological vision of an entitative universe, and thereby, as an emergent of the subjective aspiration for human inertness. The ontology of human security has posited a social universe which is, in its first appearance, composed of a plurality of autonomous parts, each of which serves as the locus of a natural impulse to human chaos. It is social and non-social behaviour

across such an entitatively constituted universe which must be controlled in the interests of human inertness. In this event, the behaviour of natural phenomena must be adapted to the requirements of human survival, and human behaviour adapted to the requirements of corporate survival. The quest, in both cases, is for the liberation of the basis of human order from environmental problems--for the preemption of the potentially problematic character of concrete social action. This dual process of mastery is effected through the activity of reification.

The leading agent in reifying activity is the role. From this perspective, a role is not simply an abstract concept which defines general sets of rights and obligations for the performance of certain human activities but represents the exact conceptual tool by which the concrete social universe is shattered apart and funnelled into corporate experience. The role is the gateway between corporate reality and its concrete environment. It is the leading wedge in the diffusion of an analytic pattern of social action across concrete social experience. Once enclosed within roles, the concrete human being succumbs to the image of the corporate self, and concrete nature to its corporate counterpart. This process continues with the intentional annihilation of distance between the role as an abstract concept and as an aspect of concrete social experience--between participation-in-a-role and being-a-role. The reification of roles as empirical expressions of concrete social reality serves to preempt the domain of concrete social action, and, consequently, to subordinate social and non-social behaviour to the creation of an orderly process of human existence.

The annihilation of role-distance establishes the basis for human order by making corporate existence less dependent on the shifting currents of concrete social action. Once the analytic has been transformed into the concrete and vice versa, then the object of mastery--social and non-social behaviour--has already been partially controlled. Their preemption through reification shifts the focus of control away from nature per se and humanity per se to human and natural action analytically conceived. The envelopment of the social and non-social domains within an analytic pattern of social action presupposes their prior alienation from the universe of concrete social action and, thereby, their capability of being fully mobilized into corporate reality. In this vein, the activity of reification pacifies broad sections of the "environment" of concrete social action, creating the condition necessary for orderly, albeit analytic, exchanges across the social and non-social domains. Once concrete phenomena have been hurled through roles into an analytic pattern of social organization, then the stage is set for their full mobilization into corporate existence. The creation of an inert process of social being anticipates, in this event, the development of a patterned human political situation.

Mobilization

The activity of reification advances the basis for human security "beyond the human" and "out of the natural" into an analytic network of social and non-social roles. This advance represents the exact process by which corporate reality confronts and overcomes its concrete environment--the behaviour of social and non-social phenomena.

While the activity of reification provides for the reduction of human subjectivity to the inertness of corporate roles, it must be supplemented by another process of corporate activity which directs reified phenomena towards the attainment of corporate goals. The objects of reification must be mobilized into a patterned human political situation. Through mobilization, the mastery of the "environment" of concrete social action is reinforced by the political control of action analytically conceived. The role is linked with a goal. The allocation of goals is implicitly political activity. The thrust of this political activity is towards the patterning of corporate roles with massive organizations which function to fulfil certain tasks. From the corporate standpoint, these tasks are indispensable to the survival of an orderly process of social existence.

The domain of concrete social action is not incorporated at random into corporate experience but is systematically mobilized into different collectivities, each of which organizes the objects of reification around the performance of particular tasks. The patterning of corporate roles involves, in this event, a dual process of differentiation and stratification. Differentiation refers to the social process by which the network of corporate roles is divided into a plurality of collectivities, whether productive, political, social, or aesthetic. Productive collectivities, the keynote of reification, organize corporate roles around the control of the "environment" of social and non-social behaviour. Political collectivities lodge the basis for human order in the active quest to gain compliance,

on a mass scale, for those futures deemed desirable from the corporate standpoint. Social collectivities fuse political compliance with the instrumental pursuit of self-interest. And aesthetic collectivities link the instrumental pursuit of self-interest with the expansion of the process of corporate morality. Each dimension of political differentiation thus advances the survival of corporate existence through the performance of a particular task.

The differentiation of corporate roles is, by itself, a political act of mobilization. There are different types of futures attached to different types of roles. For example, the role of the worker differs from that of the voter, the role of the voter is distinct from that of a student, and the role of the student is distinct from that of a client of a particular organ of propaganda. Thus, the activity of patterning corporate roles around the different levels of corporate action is run through and through with political consequences. The process of mobilization does not cease with the division of roles into the four levels of corporate action. It continues within each of the four central corporate collectivities as well. In this case, each corporate collectivity is further stratified according to political position. Since corporate politics, from this standpoint, involves the activity of assigning goals to roles, a system of political stratification exists which is divided according to who envisions goals, who administers them, who implements administrative decisions, and who is without a goal, and thereby without a relevant role. This internal process of stratification completes the political activity involved in differentiation.

The process of mobilization, which began with the division of roles into four levels of corporate action, terminates with the creation of hierarchies of political control which direct specific roles towards the performance of particular tasks. To assume a corporate role, therefore, is to be instantly enclosed within a pervasive process of political control. The fact that the extensiveness of corporate politics has often been overlooked does not indicate its non-existence. It may simply imply that its existence, and hence its importance in patterning human futures, may depend on its being overlooked. Just as reification succeeds because of the uncritical annihilation of role distance, mobilization succeeds because of a restricted vision of human politics. The patterning of human consciousness is grounded, in this event, in the concealing quality of corporate politics. The concealing character of corporate politics is indispensable to the successful prosecution of the activity of mobilization, and thereby prepares the way for political order to be canalized into the security of a homogeneous social experience.

Canalization

So far, the creation of an orderly pattern of social organization has involved the complementary activities of reification and mobilization. The activity of reification has qualified the movement of corporate reality across the environment of concrete social action. This movement is synonymous with the development of the corporate self and corporate nature out of the concrete human being and the intuited natural domain. The process of reification has been reinforced by casting participation within any dimension of corporate experience

as part of a broad political process in which human activity is patterned around the pursuit of corporate goals. To enter the corporate experience is, therefore, to suffer reification and to be the victim of a general process of political mobilization.

The activity of canalization advances the basis for human order beyond political mobilization into a homogeneous social experience. Canalizing activity refers to the social process by which compliance in the quest of corporate goals is transformed into a restricted range of social relations which are grounded in the instrumental pursuit of self-interest.¹¹ In this way, the continuance of corporate reality is liberated from its dependency on political mobilization, and lodged directly in the conduct of everyday social life. For the corporate self, the persistence of an orderly public situation becomes a matter of direct personal interest.

The pursuit of self-interest transforms political compliance into a homogeneous network of social relationships. Just as there are four dimensions of political compliance, there are four objects of self-interest which integrate relationships across the social domain. The four objects of self-interest are money, power, prestige, and the enhancement of favourable self-images.¹² In terms of corporate reality as a whole, participation in the ends of productive activity is rewarded with money. Compliance in the shaping of human futures has its interest base in power. Participation in sanctioned social relationships is reinforced by gains in status and prestige. Finally, acceptance of the process of corporate morality has, as its interest stake, the reinforcement of a positive self-image. In this vein,

to be employed, to obey political directives, to be socially responsible, and to acquiesce in corporate values is implicitly to possess a vested interest in the survival of corporate existence.

Just as there are four central levels of political stratification, there are four major levels of social stratification as well. It is the complex interplay between these four major levels of social stratification which binds together each dimension of corporate experience. Thus, the productive aspect of corporate reality, which has money as its object of self-interest, may be socially stratified into four interest levels. Each interest level corresponds to its relevant dimension of political stratification--whether of initiators, administrators, workers, or of the impoverished. Monetary rewards are distributed unequally from the top of the hierarchy to the bottom. Initiators, the commanders of economic conglomerates, reap astronomical salaries while the impoverished receive nothing (except at the largesse of the political conglomerate). Initiators may translate, however, their gains in the interest basis of money into positive self-images (the wizard financier, the patron of the arts, the educational "angel"). Administrators "buy" status with their money stake (the expert consultant, the brilliant engineer, the astute city planner). Workers use money to increase their consuming power (earning money to buy the dream cottage or to purchase another travel trailer). Finally, the impoverished, possessing little if any money, have nothing to offer in trade, and consequently have an interest in gaining money itself.

The same situation holds across the other dimensions of corporate existence--whether political, social, or aesthetic. Each dimension of corporate reality is grounded in the pursuit of a particular object of self-interest, and involves trade-offs between that object of self-interest and the remaining dimensions of social gain. Everybody, therefore, whether rich or poor, powerful or defenceless, influential or without status, possessing a morally laudatory self-image or other, has some stake in engaging in social relations which augment self-interest narrowly conceived. Since these relationships advance the homogeneity of social order, the survival of a corporate mode of social reality becomes synonymous with the conduct of everyday social life. In this way, the basis for human security is liberated beyond political mobilization, and rooted squarely in lived experience. The final step necessary in actualizing the desire for human security lies in the establishment of a connection between the pursuit of self-interest and the maximization of the process of corporate morality. This final step is fulfilled by the activity of commitment.

Commitment

The activities of reification, mobilization, and canalization have secured the basis for human order on a very high level of abstraction and generality. While the reifying process hurls the concrete into the corporate, and thereby reduces to inertness the "environment" of social and non-social behaviour, mobilization links the experience of being assimilated into corporate existence with the conditions necessary for the patterning of human political existence, and canalization makes

the continuation of a homogeneous social experience a matter of concrete self-interest. Thus, challenges against the persistence of corporate reality face the formidable task of not only unmasking the reifying process but also of weakening the vast process of political mobilization, and of questioning, on a mass level, concrete self-interest. These corporate defences are further supplemented by the advance of human order into the process of value experience itself. This advance to value experience liberates the basis for human security beyond the pursuit of self-interest, rooting it directly in commitments to a process of corporate morality. Such commitments cloak corporate reality in the trappings of moral righteousness. In this vein, appeals to the "moral worthiness" of corporate experience supercede and complement demonstrations concerning its usefulness in advancing concrete self-interest. The corporate experience is transformed into a laudable moral venture. The activities of reification, mobilization, and canalization become not only necessary phases in the quest for human security, but morally desirable ones as well.

Corporate values have previously been portrayed as agents of human redundancy. As such, corporate values sum up into images of more desirable human futures whatever is necessary for the maximization of an orderly process of social existence. It is precisely commitments to the realization of such images of more desirable futures which assures the corporate enterprise of moral legitimacy, and thereby sets it in motion as a self-justifying and self-perpetuating process of orderly human experience. But what constitutes the process of corporate morality? What valued futures are necessary for the maximization of the process of corporate action? .

An answer to the above questions may be gleaned from an examination of each of the four central human activities composing the process of corporate action. The four dimensions of the process of corporate action have been set in motion as responses to the different phases of the general problem of human security. Reification, which represents the corporate transformation of human survival activity, creates inertness out of a potentially chaotic concrete social universe. The "currency of exchange" across the corporate survival experience is money.¹³ Mobilization, which is associated with political activity, obtains compliance, on a mass scale, to corporate directives. The coinage across the corporate political experience is power. Canalization, which is connected with social activity solidifies political compliance into a homogeneous social experience. The currency of exchange across the corporate social experience is influence. Commitment, which represents the corporate transformation of human aesthetics, provides for moral allegiance to the legitimacy of the corporate enterprise. The coinage across the corporate value experience is value-commitments. Each currency of exchange generates a sanction which backs up the relevant dimension¹⁴ of the process of corporate action. Inducement looms behind reification, compulsion behind mobilization, persuasion behind canalization, and appeals to moral duty behind the activity of commitment. The four currencies of exchange and their relevant sanctions mediate and enforce the expansion of each dimension of the process of corporate action. In fact, the currencies of exchange and their associated sanctions represent the principal inspiration behind the very persistence of

corporate reality. The persistence of corporate reality appears to be grounded, in this case, in the desire to expand the major currencies of exchange to the limits that human existence can bear.¹⁵ Reification appears to be set in motion by the urge to maximize monetary profits; mobilization by the desire to expand political power; canalization by the urge to maximize influence; and commitment by the quest to solidify laudatory self-images. The expansion of each of the four major currencies of exchange thus binds together corporate existence, and thereby services the maximization of a social reality generated out of the desire for human security. In other words, the maximization of profits, power, influence, and value-commitments represents the content of the process of corporate morality. And this process of corporate morality spurs onward the steady expansion of corporate reality across human existence. The quest for profits sets the stage for new incorporations into corporate experience; the desire for power advances the mobilization of the objects of corporate reification; the lust for influence anticipates the canalization of social life; and the propagation of value-commitments provides moral legitimacy for the entire corporate enterprise. To be committed to the corporate value experience is, therefore, to be enveloped within the redundancy of an inert, patterned, and homogeneous process of social existence.

The process of corporate action thus consists of four rudimentary human practices, each of which contributes to the development of a more orderly social world. The activity of reification represents the dynamic of human survival necessary for the actualization of the subjective aspiration for human inertness. The activity of mobilization represents the key feature of a patterned human political situation.

The activity of canalization represents the pattern of social relations necessary for the materialization of a human social experience linked together by the homogeneity of instrumentalism. And, finally, the activity of commitment represents the moral dynamic necessary for the materialization of a redundant human value experience. Taken together, the activities of reification, mobilization, canalization, and commitment constitute complementary features of a pattern of social organization which, at every instant, organizes human existence around the settlement of the general problem of human security and the postulates necessary for its solution.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined three important dimensions of the corporate paradigm of social action--the general problem of human security, the phenomenology of human security, and the process of corporate action. While these three dimensions of corporate existence ground the inception, development, and actualization of the general human aspiration for the security of an inert, patterned, homogeneous, and redundant social world, they do not exhaust the corporate life-order. On the contrary, the corporate life-order contains one other dimension. This final dimension of corporate relativity is grounded in the quality of human life engendered by the appearance of the process of corporate action. The quality of human life emergent from the corporate life-order may be described as the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness.

Chapter 5. The Human Condition of Reinforced Meaninglessness

While not the unique property of human life during the twentieth century, the corporate experience has served as its dynamic nucleus. A large portion of the contemporary process of social experience may be understood as a working-out of the general problem of human security. The phenomenology of human security has provided the compelling vision of social reality which has dominated human consciousness during twentieth century existence. And the prevailing pattern of social organization across the existent social world has been the process of corporate action. The present moment has thus been enveloped within the driving momentum of the corporate reconstruction of the complete process of social action. This driving momentum has not ceased, however, with the transformation of the general problem of human security into a coherent process of human assumptions concerning what must be done for the realization of a more orderly social world. Nor has it ceased with the full development of the process of corporate action. On the contrary, the process of corporate action has anticipated the appearance of the culminating phase of corporate existence. This final phase of corporate reality may be described as the qualitative transformation of the human situation--the human condition--emergent from the resolution, on a vast historical scale, of the general problem of human security. This human condition both sums up corporate existence into a distinctive quality of human

life and sets the stage, in turn, for any attempt at breaking beyond the corporate world to the creation of an alternative mode of social existence. The human condition spawned by corporate reality thus serves simultaneously as a point of summation as well as a point, or a possible point, of new beginnings.

This chapter will investigate the central features of the quality of human life emergent from the corporate paradigm of social action. This quality of human life will be described as the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. The human condition of reinforced meaninglessness may be defined as that quality of human life which is characterized by the presence of many means of ordering the social universe, and by the absence of any substantive reason as to why this should be done. There are four modes of human meaninglessness, each of which is backed up by a specific process of social reinforcement. These four modes of human meaninglessness may be identified as irrationality, reactiveness, accidentality, and immorality. Irrationality represents the central quality of the corporate survival experience. Reactiveness comprises the dominant quality of the corporate political experience. Accidentality represents the dynamic quality of the corporate social experience. And immorality comprises the central quality of the corporate value experience. Each of these qualitative transformations of the human situation is grounded in a particular process of social reinforcement. There are four particular processes of social reinforcement, each of which is connected with a specific dimension of human meaninglessness. They may be envisioned as necessity, obligation, self-interest, and duty. An irrational process of human survival is bound together by the systematic

manipulation of access to the gratification of basic human necessities. A reactive political experience is linked together by the control of human obligations, whether through the actual use of coercion or through the constant threat of coercion. An accidental process of human sociability is bound together by the distortion, on a mass scale, of the content of human self-interest. And an immoral value experience is perpetuated by the systematic manipulation of appeals to moral duty.

The four modes of human meaninglessness and their associated processes of social reinforcement are not estranged from one another. On the contrary, each dimension of the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness comprises a partial aspect of a unitary process of qualitative human consequences. In this sense, the emergence of an irrational process of human survival, backed up by the domination of human necessity, anticipates the creation of a reactive human political situation. The reduction of political life to the meaninglessness of reactivity, through the domination of human obligation, sets the stage for the development of an accidental process of social relations. The creation of an accidental human social experience, backed up by the distortion of human need-dispositions, anticipates the appearance of social immorality. And the emergence of a process of social immorality simultaneously summarizes and reinforces the tendency to irrationality, reactivity, and accidentality. The human condition of reinforced meaninglessness thus consists of four interrelated dimensions, each of which represents a specific qualitative outcome of a paradigm of social reality characterized by the presence of many

techniques for ordering the social universe, and by the absence of any principled justification for the urgency or usefulness of such order.

The process of corporate existence is condemned to culminate in the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. The tendency to reinforced meaninglessness represents, in this case, less a fortuitous outcome of corporate reality than a necessary consequence, the origins of which are to be found in a fatal flaw which cross-cuts the process of corporate existence as a whole. This fatal flaw originates in the fact that the corporate life-order is neither an expression of human metaphysics nor an emergent of concrete social experience, but a spurious product of human abstraction. As a spurious product of human abstraction, the corporate life-order represents, in its essential features, a vast conceptual design, albeit an orderly conceptual design, devoid of any principled human content. It is a form stripped of all substance--an idealism barren of any genuine empirical ground. Consequently, the corporate life-order consists of a network of functions of human order, alienated from any substantive reason for the existence of that order. It is a process of means to order, rather than a process of creating substantive human meanings. This ultimately results in a qualitative human situation which, while containing the mechanisms for the maintenance of human order, does not, and indeed cannot, principle that order in any substantive human content. Mass instincts and pathological whims, rather than the creation of genuine human aspirations, thereby provide the guiding impulse of the corporate survival experience. . Reaction to irrational

impulses, rather than reconstructive social inquiry, monopolizes the content of the corporate political experience. The materialization of the products of political reaction, rather than the deepening and broadening of human relationships, characterizes the corporate process of human sociability. And, finally, the transformation of socially actualized impulses into objects of moral duty, rather than the creation of new substantive human meanings, constitutes the core dynamic of the corporate value experience. In addition, to the degree that corporate reality results in a qualitative process of human meaninglessness, to that degree the corporate life-order requires, for its continuation, the presence of a process of social reinforcements. Human irrationality begets the domination of human necessity. Political life becomes more obligatory as it becomes more reactive. The more accidental the social experience, the more the distortions of human self-interest. And, ultimately, the more immoral the human value experience becomes, the more prominent becomes the systematic manipulation of human conscience. The abstract, and thereby unprincipled, character of corporate existence thus anticipates the development of a human situation qualified by meaninglessness, and held together by a process of social reinforcements.

The discussion which follows will examine, in more detail, the origins and development of the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. This examination will proceed through the following five steps. First, the thesis will be advanced that the origins of the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness are to be found in the very statement of the problem of human security itself. The quest

for human security will be portrayed, in this case, as a spurious human problem, one which neither originates nor terminates anywhere in the domain of concrete social experience. The spurious character of the problem of human security will be traced to the fact that the aspiration for a more orderly social world represents a more abstract than concrete response to the condition of human chaos. And it is precisely the abstract, and thereby unprincipled, character of the problem of human security which will be considered as the fatal flaw which anticipates the development of the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. Second, it will be demonstrated that this fatal flaw has not remained the exclusive property of the problem of human security but has been magnified as the core feature of the process of human-consciousness by means of the phenomenology of human security. The phenomenology of human security will be depicted, in this event, as binding together a unitary process of assumptions, each of which specifies what must be done for the realization of human order, but none of which provides any substantive justification for the necessity of such order. The phenomenology of human security will thus be portrayed as an abstract image of social existence, one which is logically consistent but experientially false. Third, it will be shown that this tendency to abstraction has been transformed into the core dynamic of a pattern of social organization by means of the process of corporate action. The process of corporate action will be viewed, in this case, as providing means for the realization of human order, but no substantive reason for the urgency or potential uses of such order.

The process of corporate action will thus be depicted as an abstract pattern of social organization, one which yields the appearances of human order but not any principled human content. Fourth, it will be contended that a process of social existence driven by the affirmation of the form of human order and by the negation of content ever culminates in the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. The tendency to reinforced meaninglessness will be portrayed as an inevitable product of a mode of social reality grounded in a spurious human problem, and advanced by abstraction. The four dimensions of human meaninglessness, and their associated processes of social reinforcement, will then be examined. Each mode of reinforced meaninglessness will be described as the specific quality of human life emergent from a particular phase of the process of corporate existence. Finally, after examining the different dimensions of the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness and the relationships which exist between them, some concluding comments will be made.

The Fatal Flaw

The corporate life-order is imbued with a fatal flaw. This fatal flaw has, as its ultimate consequence, the dissolution of the quest for human security into a human situation experienced as qualitatively meaningless, and bound together by a process of social reinforcements. And this fatal flaw has, as its point of origin, the abstract, and thereby unprincipled, character of the problem of human security itself.

There are two related ways of demonstrating the spurious character of the problem of human security. First, it can be shown that the aspiration for a more orderly social world represents less a principled reaction to the condition of human chaos than a pseudo-response. Second, it may then be demonstrated that the quest for human security necessarily precludes the presence of any substantive human content. The problem of human security can be shown, in this case, to be a matter of appearances and not a matter of reason.

To begin, there is nothing in the condition of human chaos which would point, in any principled fashion, to the urgency of the problem of human security. The condition of human chaos has previously been portrayed as a qualitative outcome of the attempt to actualize the metaphysical desire for absolute certitude. As such, the condition of human chaos simply represents the unprincipled end of an unprincipled process of social experience. Human chaos emerges whenever human beings strive to overcome the relative, partial, provisional, and prospective qualities of concrete social experience in favour of the salvation of absolute certitude. A chaotic human condition is thus the symptom of a prior problem--the unprincipled character of the quest for human salvation--and not the problem itself. Accordingly, a principled response to human chaos would entail a root critique of the aspiration for human salvation, and a corresponding willingness to draw out, as fully as possible, the relative, partial, provisional, and prospective qualities of concrete social experience. On the other hand, an unprincipled response would treat human chaos as a problem in its own right, and thus simultaneously avoid both a root critique of

the quest for absolute certitude and a commitment to the uncertainty of concrete social experience.

It is such an unprincipled response to the condition of human chaos which is represented by the problem of human security. The problem of human security may be visualized, in this case, as a means; indeed as the only means known to human beings, of compensating for the loss of absolute certitude while forestalling the appearance of a relative, partial, provisional, and prospective social world. The problem of human security transforms the absurd, apathetic, anomalous, and amoral qualities of human chaos into a systematic justification for the creation of an inert, patterned, homogeneous, and redundant social world. Such a world does not represent a principled repudiation of the quest for absolute certitude, but its continuation, albeit under a different guise. In this vein, the aspiration for an inert process of social existence is but a derivative of the enduring human desire for the certitude of absoluteness. The patterning of human consciousness is but a more banal version of the human aspiration for a source of social predetermination. And the quest for moral redundancy is but a second chance, albeit in different form, at realizing the certitude of aesthetic consistency. In short, the problem of human security represents a sustained exercise in using the threat of human chaos as a justification for the development of a process of social existence which systematically compensates for the loss of absolute certitude.

Likewise, to the extent that the aspiration for human security compensates for the loss of absolute certitude, it also precludes the

appearance of a concrete process of social experience. In this sense, the reduction of social existence to inertness militates against the creation of a relative human situation. The patterning of human consciousness negates the partiality of concrete human thought. The creation of a homogeneous social experience precludes the development of a provisional process of human relations. And the aspiration for moral redundancy negates the prospective character of a concrete process of value experience. Thus, at each and every instant, the aspiration for human security stands mutually exclusive of those qualitative features which, when taken together, constitute the core dynamic of a concrete process of social experience. Moreover, inasmuch as the actualization of these qualitative features--that is, the fuller and fuller exposure of the relative, partial, provisional, and prospective character of the concrete social world--provides content for any empirically grounded process of social existence, the problem of human security is implicitly devoid of any principled human ground. Nowhere in the concrete social world is there to be found any principled basis for the reduction of social existence to inertness, for the patterning of human consciousness, for the creation of social homogeneity, or for the aspiration to moral redundancy. On the contrary, everywhere in the concrete social world there is to be found a principled basis for the repudiation of human inertness in favour of human relativity, for the transformation of patterned human consciousness into the partiality of concrete human thought, for the dissolution of social homogeneity into provisional social relations, and for the annihilation of moral redundancy in favour of moral prospectiveness.

The problem of human security is, therefore, neither an expression of human metaphysics nor a derivative of concrete social experience, but a product of an unprincipled human abstraction. Neither human faith nor critical human thought but the loss of faith and the suspension of critical human thought lead to belief in the problematic character of human security. This belief is grounded in the empirically false notion that the condition of human chaos requires for its resolution the emergence of an orderly social world rather than a confrontation with the uncertainties of concrete social experience. It is such a confrontation which is postponed by the aspiration for human security. The aspiration for human security serves, in this case, as a buffer between the loss of absolute certitude and the emergence, or possible emergence of a process of social existence qualified by relativity, partiality, provisionality, and prospectiveness. As a mid-point between the metaphysical and the genuinely empirical, the problem of human security is condemned to remain an unprincipled abstraction--a human desideratum which is both independent of human faith and alienated from any ground in the concrete social world. Accordingly, while the problem of human security expresses the means by which a more orderly social world might be created, it does not and, in fact, cannot provide any substantive justification for the necessity of such a world. It is a method stripped of all substance--a form devoid of any principled human content. The tendency to human meaninglessness, and the contingent necessity of appealing to the binding capacities of a process of social reinforcements, are, therefore, generic to the very statement of the problem of human security itself.

The Flaw Magnified

The spurious character of corporate reality is not the exclusive property of the problem of human security. On the contrary, the tendency to reinforced meaninglessness has been further magnified by the emergence of the phenomenology of human security. The phenomenology of human security may be viewed, in this case, as an unprincipled image of social existence: one which links together into a coherent world-view the abstract, and thereby ungrounded, assumptions necessary for the realization of human order. The phenomenology of human security has previously been described as a dynamic working-out of the relationships which exist between four fundamental human assumptions, each of which relates what must be done for the actualization of a specific dimension of the general problem of human security. This dynamic process of ordering assumptions consists of an entitative ontology, an analytical epistemology, an instrumental axiology, and a redundant human aesthetic. The ontological vision of an entitative universe sets the stage for the creation of an inert process of social being. The epistemology of human security provides the key for the patterning of human consciousness. The axiological vision of instrumentality as the keynote of human relations is the necessary prerequisite for the creation of a homogeneous social experience. And the aesthetic of human security provides the necessary condition for the creation of a redundant human value experience.

The four assumptions which constitute the phenomenology of human security are not independent of one another but represent,

instead, interrelated aspects of a unitary vision of social existence. For example, a redundant human aesthetic simultaneously reinforces and is backed up by an instrumental axiology. The axiology of human security simultaneously sums up and is grounded in an analytical epistemology. The epistemology of human security simultaneously reinforces and is backed up by an entitative ontology. And the ontological vision of an entitative universe establishes the necessary condition for the development of all the above phases of the phenomenology of human security. But what, however, provides the basis for the development of the ontology of human security? The answer appears to be that nothing--nothing, that is, in the concrete social world--principles the ontological assumption of an entitative universe. Nowhere in the domain of concrete social experience is there to be found any substantive justification for either the assertion of an entitative universe, or for the correlative assumption of a natural impulse to human chaos. In the relative, and thereby concrete, social world, there are no discrete single entities or classes of discrete single entities, only active processes of social being enmeshed in a web of moral aspirations, human sensibilities, and political ideals. And in the contextual world of human relativity there is no natural impulse to human chaos, only the concretely apprehended possibility of enriching social existence with substantive human meanings. The ontology of human security is not, therefore, a derivative of concrete social experience, but a product of human abstraction. It is a logically consistent but experientially false image of social reality.

Since the ontological assumption of an entitative universe ultimately grounds the development of the phenomenology of human security, it follows that each of its dimensions may be viewed as lacking any principled basis in the concrete process of social experience. In this vein, nowhere in the domain of concrete social experience is there to be found any principled justification for an epistemological vision of a dualistic universe: a universe shattered into a concrete domain of intuited things and into an analytic domain of activities-between-things. Nor can any substantive ground be discovered for an axiology of social reality which maintains that human sociability is exhausted by instrumentality. And, finally, the prospective character of the concrete process of value experience militates against an aesthetic vision of moral redundancy. Thus, at each and every instant, a spurious ontology gives rise to an unprincipled epistemology; an unprincipled epistemology anticipates an abstract axiology; and an abstract axiology preforms a pseudo-aesthetic. The phenomenology of human security may thus be viewed as an unprincipled image of social existence. As an unprincipled image of social existence, it provides the assumptions necessary for the realization of human order, but it does not yield any substantive reasons as to why such a world should be created. Like the problem of human security, the phenomenology of human security represents a conglomerate of functions of human order rather than a process of principles of human order.

The tendency to reinforced meaninglessness has thus been extended by means of the phenomenology of human security into the pervasive social assumptions which lineament the process of corporate

existence. The abstract, and thereby ungrounded, character of the phenomenology of human security does not, however, culminate the tendency to a world qualified by meaninglessness, and held together by a process of social reinforcements. Instead, this tendency has been actualized as the core feature of a pattern of social organization by means of the process of corporate action. The process of corporate action represents the vehicle by which the tendency to reinforced meaninglessness has been magnified beyond human affectivity and human consciousness into the central dynamic of human social existence. Accordingly, the process of corporate action may be envisioned as comprising the salient features of a fundamentally unprincipled pattern of social organization, one which specifies the exact social processes by which an orderly process of social existence may be maintained, but which nowhere specifies how such a world may be filled with any substantive human content.

The process of corporate action has previously been portrayed as a dynamic working-out of the relationships which hold between four rudimentary social practices, each of which materializes a different dimension of the phenomenology of human security. These four rudimentary social practices have been described as the activities of reification, mobilization, canalization, and commitment. The activity of reification represents the specific process of human survival necessary for the control of an entitatively constituted universe. The activity of mobilization represents the central feature of a patterned process of human politics. The activity of canalization transforms instrumentalism into the basis of a homogeneous social

experience. And, finally, the activity of commitment represents the core dynamic of a redundant process of social morality.

These four corporate practices have been further described as partial, although related, aspects of a unitary process of social organization. In this vein, commitments to the process of corporate morality reinforce the persistence of a homogenous social order based on the maximization of self-interest. This homogenous social order both controls the content of the process of corporate morality and reinforces, in turn, the persistence of a political order based on the activity of mobilization. The mobilization of human beings into orderly political patterns both preforms the content of the corporate process of human sociability and strengthens the persistence of a productive order based on the activity of reification. The activity of reification provides content for the patterning of human politics, and thereby provides the basis for the development of the entire process of corporate action. However, what principles the content of the activity of reification? What basis exists for deciding the time and pace of the expansion of corporate existence across the "environment" of social and non-social behaviour? Once again, the answer seems to be that nowhere in the domain of concrete social experience is there to be found any principled basis for the incorporation of human beings into corporate reality by means of the activity of reification. In the concrete social world, there is the materialization of possibilities for creating a holistic social universe rather than the reification of a given actuality. And in a world distinguished by the actualization of human possibilities as opposed to the reification of human actualities

there is the distancing of human beings from the roles which they happen to occupy rather than the annihilation of role-distance.³ The activity of reification may be viewed, therefore, as a tool of abstraction rather than a process of concretization. It is the social process necessary for the affirmation of form, and for the negation of content. Accordingly, the activity of reification represents the central dynamic of a fundamentally unprincipled process of human survival, one which elicits means to human order but not any substantive reasons for such order.

Since the activity of reification provides the ground for the development of the entire process of corporate action, it follows that the practices of mobilization, canalization, and commitment may also be envisioned as fundamentally unprincipled processes of social action. In this case, there is nothing in the domain of concrete political experience which would lead to the development of a politics of human mobilization. While the activity of mobilization is based on the organization of reified parts into patterned wholes, a concrete process of political experience is based upon the reconstruction of social existence in the direction of substantive human meaning. While the activity of reconstruction has, as its content, the actualization of human possibilities, the activity of mobilization has no content other than reaction to the products of human reification. Similarly, there is no principled justification to be found anywhere in the domain of concrete social experience for the canalization of human relations around the maximization of self-interest. While the activity of canalization is based on the generalization of political order into homogeneous

social groupings, a concrete process of social experience is based on the consolidation of political reconstructions into substantive human solidarities. While the activity of consolidation has, as its content, the materialization of political reconstructions, the activity of canalization has no content other than the accidentality of self-interest. And, finally, there is nothing in the domain of concrete value experience which would principle the development of a morality of human commitment. While the activity of commitment is based on the legitimization of social order, a concrete process of moral experience is based on the transformation of a provisional social experience into new, and more satisfactory, totalizations. While the activity of transformation has, as its content, the critical evaluation of substantive human solidarities, the activity of commitment has no content other than the affirmation of that which has gone before.

The process of corporate action thus consists of four fundamentally unprincipled social activities, each of which transforms the tendency to reinforced meaninglessness into a central, albeit particular, dynamic of social existence. The activity of reification transforms the spurious desire for human inertness, together with its emergent ontology of human security, into an unprincipled process of human survival. The activity of mobilization transforms the ungrounded aspiration for a patterned process of human consciousness, together with its emergent epistemology of human security, into a spurious process of human politics. The activity of canalization transforms the unprincipled desire for social homogeneity, together with its emergent axiology of human security, into a spurious process of human sociability. And the activity of commitment transforms the

abstract aspiration for moral redundancy, together with its emergent aesthetic of human security, into an equally abstract human value experience. A spurious human problem thus anticipates the development of an abstract phenomenology of the human circumstance. And an abstract phenomenology of the human circumstance preforms the appearance of an ungrounded pattern of social organization.

The envelopment of human existence within the pseudo-reality of order does not, however, have the process of corporate action as its final point of magnification. On the contrary, the reduction of every aspect of the human social reality to a function of human order ultimately culminates in a qualitative transformation of the human situation. This qualitative transformation of the human situation may be described as the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. The human condition of reinforced meaninglessness represents the quality of human life emergent from a social reality which is typified by the presence of many means of securing an orderly social universe, and by the absence of any substantive reason as to why this should be done. The following discussion will be devoted to an examination of the central dimensions of human meaninglessness, and their associated processes of social reinforcement.

Modes of Reinforced Meaninglessness

The human condition of reinforced meaninglessness represents the quality of human life emergent from the corporate life-order. This quality of human life is grounded, in its fullest expression, in a fundamental reconstruction of the process of qualitative human consequences.

The process of qualitative human consequences has previously been portrayed as a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation between four core qualities of human life, each of which sums up a particular dimension of a process of social experience into a specific transformation of the human situation. These four core qualities of human life may be described as the quality of survival experience, the quality of political experience, the quality of social experience, and the quality of aesthetic experience. The quality of survival experience refers to the mode of social being emergent from the actualization of a given subjective definition of the human situation by means of a particular ontological query and a specific human survival practice. The quality of political experience refers to the mode of human consciousness emergent from the materialization of a given collective definition of the human situation by means of a particular epistemological query and a specific human political practice. The quality of social experience refers to the mode of human sociability emergent from the actualization of a given definition of the human social situation by means of a particular axiological query and a specific process of social activity. And the quality of aesthetic experience refers to the mode of human morality emergent from the materialization of a given aesthetic definition of the human situation by means of a particular value theory and a specific process of evaluative activity.

As a reconstruction of the process of qualitative human consequences, the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness also consists of four core qualities of human life, each of which represents

a specific alteration of the human situation. For example, the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness begins with the reduction of survival experience to a process of irrationality, continues with a reactive political experience, advances into an accidental social experience, and culminates in an immoral aesthetic experience. The reduction of the human survival situation to a process of irrationality is sustained by the domination of human necessity. The qualitative transformation of the human political situation in the direction of reactivity is maintained by the domination of human obligation. An accidental social experience is held together by the domination of human self-interest. And an immoral human aesthetic situation is backed up by the repressive domination of the human conscience.

The four modes of human meaninglessness, and their associated processes of social reinforcement, may be viewed as products of the different dimensions of the process of corporate experience. For example, irrationality represents the central dynamic of social being in a world characterized by the presence of many means of securing subjective human order, and by the absence of any substantive justification for the necessity of such order. Reactiveness constitutes the core quality of human consciousness in a world transfixed by the desire for political order. Accidentality represents the central quality of human sociability in a world motivated by the quest for social homogeneity. And a world driven by the desire for the security of aesthetic redundancy is qualified by immorality. Moreover, an irrational process of social existence, lacking any internal principle of consolidation, must ultimately be held together by the use of physical extortion.

Political order, albeit a reactive political order, can be sustained only by the monopolization of human obligations, whether through the use of violence or through the more seductive lure of grants of political power. An accidental process of human sociability, lacking any internal principle of cohesion, must ultimately be reinforced by a network of external rewards and punishments. And the process of social immorality can be maintained only by the systematic distortion, on a mass scale, of human value aspirations. The corporate life-order thus culminates in a human situation which is qualified by irrationality, reactiveness, accidentality, and immorality, and which is linked together by methods ranging from the domination of human necessity to the manipulation of moral consciousness. The following discussion will be devoted to a brief examination of each of the four major dimensions of the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness.

Irrationality

The corporate life-order culminates, at first, in the creation of an irrational human survival situation. The human survival situation has previously been portrayed as the entire social process involved in the transformation of an impression concerning what is most problematic in the more subjective aspect of social existence into a qualitatively more desirable mode of social being. The human survival situation represents, in its fullest expression, a dynamic working-out of the relationships which hold between a subjective human disposition, an ontological query, a human survival practice, and an emergent quality of social being. This emergent quality of social being may be envisioned

as the summed-up consequence of a given reconstruction of the human survival situation. Accordingly, the corporate survival experience denotes the entire social process involved in the quest for subjective human order. The quest for subjective human order entails, in its most complete expression, a dynamic movement between the subjective problem of human security, the ontological vision of an entitative universe, the activity of reification, and an emergent quality of corporate being. This emergent quality of corporate being designates what an inert social world is actually experienced as. It is a lived consequence of the human aspiration for an orderly and thereby inert, process of human subjectivity.

The process of corporate being possesses irrationality as its emergent quality. Irrationality represents the central quality of social being in a world characterized by the presence of many means of securing subjective human order, and by the absence of any substantive reason for the existence of such order. In an irrational social universe, the very process of human survival is reduced to a social apparatus for the processing of concrete human beings into their corporate functions. While this social apparatus has, as its structure, the incorporation of human beings into an orderly network of corporate role-positions, it maintains, as its dynamic, a dual process of externalization and estrangement. Through a social process of externalization, human beings are wrenched beyond reflection on their concrete social situations and dismembered into a plurality of corporate functions, each of which serves as the locus for the development of a subjective sense of social identity. The individual human being becomes a corporate

being, and the corporate being becomes a cog within a mechanical apparatus aimed at the fullest realization possible of subjective human order. And an orderly process of human subjectivity, once realized, results in the subordination of the internal to the external, of existence as a process of self-expression to existence as a function of one's position within the corporate life-order. Through a social process of estrangement, the various modalities of corporate being are ripped apart, and situated into relations of mutual competition. Considered individually, the solitary corporate being, in his various public roles, is alienated even from himself. The role of the worker is performed at a different time and in a different place from the role of the political partisan; political life is cleaved from the domain of human sociability; and the social functions remain separate from the activity of moralizing. Considered collectively, all corporate beings are thrust apart into positions of mutual antagonism and distrust. In the corporate economy, success is a matter of trampling underfoot the aspirations of as many other human beings as possible. Political order rests on a division of spoils between those who are most adept at dealing in the pathological politics of power. The process of corporate sociability is grounded in a tension between the manipulators of the organs of social consciousness, whether the mass media or educational institutions, and the objects of manipulation--humanity at large. And the process of corporate aesthetics has, as its moving spirit, the division of the human race into those who, by seizing the moment, manage to translate private affect into moral injunctions and those who serve merely as the pawns of such propaganda.

In a world torn asunder by a dual process of externalization and estrangement, no basis remains for the unification of social existence other than the commonality of membership within the corporate life-order. And this basis of unification is fundamentally irrational. It is grounded neither in the satisfaction of basic human needs nor in the creation of possibilities for substantive human development. On the contrary, the process of corporate existence makes the maximization of a social apparatus--one which is structured by roles and driven by the social processes of externalization and estrangement--the basis for the development of an orderly process of human subjectivity. It is the maximization of this social apparatus--the dissolution of human beings, on a mass scale, into their corporate functions--rather than the grounding of social existence in a substantive human content which represents the key feature of the corporate survival experience. In the presence of order and in the absence of purpose, the direction assumed by the corporate process of human survival comes to be whichever mass instinct, pathological whim, capricious desire, or popular fantasy happens to be in the ascendent at any given moment. The romanticism of space flights, the stock-piling of military weaponry, the creation of spurious human wants, and the development of new technological toys provide momentary contents for an otherwise purposeless, and thereby irrational, survival experience. And insofar as human beings have been dissolved into their corporate functions, their estimation of their own social significance rises and falls in direct proportion to how their position within the corporate life-order is related to whichever project happens to monopolize the public imagination at any given time.

The process of corporate existence thus reduces the more subjective aspect of social existence to irrationality. An irrational mode of social existence, lacking any internal principle of consolidation, must be held together by the domination of human necessity. The domination of human necessity ranges from threats of starvation, in its negative extreme, to the amassing of enormous monetary profits on its positive side. Whether through physical deprivation or through a continuous upgrading of what constitutes an elementary necessity of human life, human beings are condemned to participation within an irrational human survival experience. And as the irrationality of corporate existence becomes more prominent, the use of necessity itself as a social reinforcement becomes more blatant. The poor are locked into corporate existence by the bureaucracies of hunger, the workers by consumerism, the professionals by the need of maintaining a certain "style of life," and the corporate bosses by the arrogance of wealth. Resistance against irrationality is met by the systematic starvation of the poor, the firing of workers, the making of factory hands out of the professionals, and the demotion of corporate leaders. In short, an irrational social world demands, for its perpetuation, a tacit monopolization of the means of human survival. And this monopolization of the means of human survival solidifies the expansion of a process of social being which is a matter of externalities and not a product of substantive human meaning.

Reactiveness

The process of corporate existence does not only culminate in the creation of an irrational human survival experience. It also

results in the development of a reactive human political situation. The human political situation has previously been depicted as the entire social process involved in the transformation of an impression concerning what is most problematic in the more collective aspect of social existence into a more adequate mode of human consciousness. The human political process constitutes, in its most general expression, a dynamic movement between a collective definition of the human situation, an epistemological query, a human political practice, and an emergent quality of political consciousness. This emergent quality of political consciousness may be envisioned as the end result of a given reconstruction of the more collective aspect of social existence. It follows, therefore, that the corporate political experience envelops whatever is necessary for the resolution of the quest for collective human order. The quest for collective human order involves, in its fullest expression, a relentless working-out of the relationships which exist between the collective problem of human security, the epistemological vision of analytical social action, the activity of mobilization, and a resultant quality of political consciousness. This resultant quality of political consciousness may be conceived as a lived summation of the human aspiration for the patterning of collective experience.

The corporate political experience has a reactive mode of human consciousness as its emergent quality. Reactiveness constitutes the core quality of human consciousness in a world typified by the presence of many means of obtaining collective human order, and by the absence of any substantive justification for the necessity of such order.

A reactive political experience is grounded neither in the expression of substantive human sentiments nor in the creation of genuinely valuable human goals. And a reactive process of human politics does not transform possibilities for the unification of social experience into a critical reconstruction of the human social reality. On the contrary, a reactive political experience reduces the more collective aspect of human existence to an orderly set of techniques for the mobilization of corporate beings around the prosecution of irrational projects. In a reactive political world, the occupants of corporate role positions are organized into massive conglomerates. While such massive conglomerates have, as their structure, a set of institutional techniques for the maintenance of political order, they possess, as their dynamic, whichever mass whim, pathological desire, or capricious fantasy has gained currency across the corporate domain. A reactive political experience is, therefore, neither creative nor reconstructive but simply a collective apparatus for the actualization of irrational sentiments.

A process of political order which is more reactive than creative necessarily lacks any internal principle of consolidation. What intrinsic ground can be found which would justify obedience to the leaders of massive conglomerates? Political obedience of this sort must be based upon the domination of human obligation. The domination of human obligation takes place by methods ranging from overt coercion to the conferring of the "powers of dominion" upon the corporate directors. While the "powers of dominion" may allow, and even oblige, the corporate bosses to displace private affect

upon the public domain, it does not liberate those occupying the command positions of the corporate world from the politics of reaction. On the contrary, the corporate directors, like the true victims of corporate existence--the poor, the prisoners, and those in mental institutions, are condemned to participation in a political universe which has, as its driving spirit, the meaninglessness of action and reaction. The difference is, of course, that while the politics of reaction may entail mental strain or hysterical rage on the part of the corporate bosses, reaction to such cerebral piques may involve matters of life and death for the disinherited. In other words, corporate leaders are obliged cerebrally to participation within the politics of reaction; professionals are obligated by gains and losses of prestige; workers are obliged economically; and the the disinherited are obligated by the problematic character of survival itself. Whether the source of political obligation be mental or physical, the principle remains constant that all who suffer such a process of social reinforcement are the puppets of a political experience which is aimed at collective human order, and which results in the distortion of human consciousness into a state of enfeebled reactivity.

Accidentality

While irrationality and reactivity constitute important dimensions of the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness, they do not exhaust the qualitative human experience engendered by the corporate life-order. On the contrary, corporate reality also culminates in the creation of an accidental human social situation.

The human social situation has previously been portrayed as the entire social process involved in the transformation of an impression concerning what is most problematic in the more relational aspect of social existence into a more adequate mode of human sociability. The process of social experience involves, in its most general statement, a dynamic movement between a definition of the human social situation, an axiological query, a human social activity, and an emergent quality of human sociability. The emergent quality of human sociability may be viewed as a lived summation of a given transformation of the human social situation. Accordingly, the corporate social experience represents the entire network of activities involved in the quest for a homogeneous, and thereby orderly, process of human relationships. This network of activities involves, in its fullest expression, a dynamic working-out of the connections which exist between the social problem of human security, the axiology of social instrumentalism, the activity of canalization, and an emergent quality of human sociability. This emergent quality of human sociability sums up what a homogeneous social order is actually appreciated as.

The corporate social experience has accidentality as its emergent quality. Accidentality represents the dominant quality of human sociability in a world which is characterized by the presence of many means of securing a homogeneous social order, and by the absence of any substantive reason for the existence of such order. In an accidental social world, the process of human sociability does not have, as its content, either the enhancement of genuine human solidarities or the materialization of an active process of political

reconstruction. Neither the development of substantive human friendships nor the appreciation of heterogeneous life histories provide the binding web for human sociability across the corporate world. On the contrary, an accidental process of human sociability is typified by the presence of many competing pseudo-groupings, each of which strives to actualize a particular product of the politics of reaction. Such pseudo-groupings represent the leading edge in the advance of irrational human sentiments across the social world. And the relationships which exist between such pseudo-groupings constitute the battle ground for the ascendancy or defeat of whichever pathological whims, mass instincts, or capricious fantasies have managed to infect a reactionary political process at any given time. For example, urban ecological groupings, guided by young professionals, challenge the concrete interests of blue collar construction workers. And resistance by construction workers to the anti-growth dogma of ecologists directly advances the economic interests of developers. Native protest organizations, goaded on and financed by liberal bureaucrats, are used as a strike force against increases in public appropriations to other social groupings, whether scientific, militaristic, or educational. And consumer groupings, nurtured into existence by governmental agencies, are employed to counter-point the growth of other bureaucratic empires, such as agriculture and defence. In each of the above cases, the general principle remains constant that the corporate life-order reduces social existence to membership within a variety of pseudo-groupings, each of which acts as a point-of-reference for the materialization of a particular element of

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corporate irrationality. The process of corporate sociability may thus be envisioned as a matter of rivalries between equally unprincipled groupings, whether the basis for the division of human social life be age, sex, economic status, educational attainment, ethnic background, citizenship, or geography. Regardless of which criteria are employed to split the human race into a plurality of contending social rivalries, such pseudo-groupings, once formed, are always more accidental than substantive. Rather than being grounded in the deepening and broadening of genuine human relationships, they are based on the transformation of whims and fantasies into orderly social homogeneities. Appropriation rather than appreciation thus comprises the guiding spirit of the corporate social domain.

In a world which has been shattered into a conglomerate of accidental social groupings, no basis remains for the unification of social life other than the domination of human self-interest. In this vein, no internal source of cohesion can be found for an accidental social experience. There is nothing intrinsically appealing about a social order which is based on the division of humanity into competing pseudo-groupings, by standards ranging from age to economic status. And in the absence of any internal source of social cohesion, the maintenance of a homogeneous social order is dependent upon the systematic imposition of an external network of rewards and punishments. For example, the mass media and educational institutions tacitly function to create a sense of envy, and even inferiority, on the part of the disinherited for the social life-styles of the workers, professionals, and corporate

bosses. Workers are inculcated with a "feeling of belongingness" within the corporate social order. This feeling of belongingness blossoms forth as a contempt for the poor, loathing of the administrators, and as admiration for the corporate bosses. Professionals are locked into the process of corporate sociability by positive rewards in the form of gains in status and prestige. Professionals sympathize, albeit at a distance, with the lot of the disinherited, despise workers, and fear their corporate superiors. And the corporate bosses, motivated by possessive pride in the organizations under their care, are baffled by the disinherited, contemptuous of the administrators, and patronizing towards their workers. Thus, whether through envy, belongingness, prestige, or possessive pride, human beings are persuaded to occupy quietly their social niches within the corporate life-order. This process of social persuasion ultimately provides the basis for the maximization of a homogeneous social order, qualified by accidentality.

Immorality

The transformation of the human social experience into a process of accidentality anticipates a further reduction of the human aesthetic experience to a process of immorality. The human aesthetic experience has previously been described as the entire social process involved in the transformation of an impression concerning what is most problematic in the more evaluative aspect of social existence into a more adequate process of social morality. This social process involves, in its fullest expression, a dynamic

working-out of the relationships which hold between a definition of the human value situation, an aesthetic query, a process of evaluative activity, and an emergent quality of value experience. The emergent quality of value experience sums up a given transformation of the human aesthetic situation into a distinctive moral condition.

Accordingly, the corporate value experience includes all the activities involved in the quest for aesthetic human order. The quest for aesthetic human order involves, in its most general statement, a dynamic movement between an aesthetic problem of human security, an image of the human moral experience as a process of redundancy, an activity of commitment, and an emergent quality of aesthetic experience. This emergent quality of aesthetic experience represents the human value condition which results from the actualization of moral order.

The corporate aesthetic experience possesses immorality as its emergent quality. Immorality represents the central quality of value experience in a human situation which is characterized by the presence of many means of securing aesthetic human order, and by the absence of any substantive reason for the existence of such order. In an immoral social universe, the very process of value experience is reduced to an empty technique for obtaining loyalty to the products of an irrational, reactive, and accidental mode of social existence. As a process of technique, an immoral value experience has, as its content, whatever pettifoggery, propaganda, seductive appeal, or method of proselytization promises to help maximize allegiance to the corporate life-order. And it is the maximization of loyalty, on a mass scale, to the process of corporate

existence rather than its critical evaluation which distinguishes an aesthetic experience that serves more as a means to order than as a reason for it.

The process of corporate aesthetics is not grounded, in this event, either in the exploration of genuine moral possibilities or in the submission of social experience to the standards of a ruthlessly honest human ethic. The corporate aesthetic experience is neither evaluative nor creative, but simply apologetic. And its capacity as a source of justification for that which has gone before, the process of corporate aesthetics is driven by the transformation of private affect into objects of moral duty. For example, corporate directors, moved by possessive pride in the social organizations which serve to actualize their irrational caprices, manufacture seductive appeals linking such organizations with the advancement of the human condition. Toothpaste becomes a moral imperative, and organized sports a value currency. Administrators present themselves not as fat parasites living off the sweat of the workers and the blood of the dispossessed, but as neglected, and even victimized, servants of an unappreciative public. Workers protect their economic interests by appealing to the sanctity of the very "rites of capitalism" which enslave them. And even the disinherited attempt to win sympathy for their lot by resorting to the emptiness of "natural" rights. In each of the above instances, an accidental social grouping maneuvers to generate support for its particular object of self-interest by cloaking itself in the garb of moral propaganda. Such maneuvering is continually counteracted by other corporate groupings,

each of which peddles its own claim to human loyalty with a greater clamour. This eventually results in a human aesthetic experience which is typified by the presence of many seductive moral appeals, all of which are equally unprincipled.

In the absence of any intrinsic merit, the process of corporate aesthetics is condemned to be held together by the domination of human value aspirations. While the domination of human value aspirations has the maintenance of loyalty to the corporate life-order as its product, it possesses as its dynamic the envelopment of human existence within a process of moral repression. This process of moral repression contains four qualitatively unique dimensions. In its negative extreme, moral repression may involve labelling as mentally insane those who actively dissent against the corporate life-order. While this tactic has typically been employed against political revolutionaries, it has also been used, and, in fact, continues to be used, as an ultimate negative reinforcement against all forms of popular dissent, whether economic, social, or cultural. The labelling of opponents of the corporate life-order as mentally unstable takes place, however, only when the three other modes of moral repression have failed to induce loyalty to the corporate world. First and foremost among these is the systematic nurturing into existence of a state of "happy tranquillity" among large masses of human beings. This state of happy tranquillity is characterized by the dulling of all human value ideals and by the widespread conviction that the corporate world represents the inevitable order of social reality. There is no agency in the corporate life-order which does not participate in

feeding this state of happy tranquillity with a steady diet of bombast and propaganda. Such bombast and propaganda are intended not only to inculcate a positive, albeit passive, acceptance of the corporate world, but also to deflect all criticism of the crisis of human civilization brought on by the corporate life-order into the cynical belief that this general human crisis is the product of ineptness and corruption on the part of those occupying the command positions of the corporate world rather than a derivative of the structure of corporate experience itself. ¹⁰ Second, the process of moral repression, also involves the transformation of a sense of "professional superiority" into commitments to the perpetuation of corporate existence. This dimension of moral repression is primarily associated with administrative or professional groupings. It is grounded in the belief that loyalty to the corporate life-order is justified by the fact that a social order, of this sort, provides considerable opportunity for the playing-out of professional interests, and for the choice of professional careers. Thus, the key to the repressive domination of administrators is neither the inculcation of a state of happy tranquillity nor the fear of being defined mentally unstable, but the systematic manipulation of a distorted sense of self-esteem. ¹¹

Third, human repression is totalized when human beings actively merge their destinies as social and historical actors with the fate of the corporate life-order. This mode of moral repression is peculiar to corporate directors. In this vein, corporate directors may be envisioned as being completely immersed in the pathological morality of order. They suffer total moral repression since no distance exists

between their commitment to their own personal aspirations and their sense of loyalty to the corporate world. By and large, the whims and fantasies of corporate directors provide the content of the process of moral order. In being loyal to this content, corporate directors are, in effect, being loyal to themselves." Since it is the private affect of corporate directors themselves which is generalized into an unprincipled moral order, their loyalty to this moral order is less a matter of fear, tranquillity, or self-esteem than a product of a complete and highly personalized identification with the fate of the corporate life-order.

There are, therefore, four different modes of moral repression, each of which functions, albeit in a different way, to ensure human commitments to the continuance of a fundamentally immoral process of value experience. This immoral process of value experience represents the culminating phase of the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. In its fullest expression, the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness may thus be viewed as containing an irrational human survival experience, a reactive human political experience, an accidental human social experience, and an immoral human value experience. Moreover, each of the above qualities of corporate experience may be described as being grounded in a specific process of social reinforcement. An irrational human survival experience is backed up by the domination of human necessity. A reactive political process is sustained by the domination of human obligation. An accidental human social experience is backed up by the domination of human self-interest. And, finally,

an immoral process of value experience is sustained by the repressive domination of human value aspirations. Taken together, these four dimensions of human meaninglessness, and their associated processes of social reinforcement, represent the quality of human life emergent from the corporate life-order.

Conclusion

The twentieth century has witnessed the ascendancy of the corporate life-order. Its ascendancy has been accompanied by a historic transformation of human sensibility, consciousness, action, and morality. The process of human sensibilities has been monopolized by the problem of human security. The process of human consciousness has been enveloped within the phenomenology of human security. The prevailing pattern of social organization has been structured out of the process of corporate action. And, finally, the human condition has been implanted with the value-quality of reinforced meaninglessness. While the development of the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness testifies to the ascendancy of the corporate life-order, it also anticipates its possible decline. The polarity of reinforced meaninglessness is human freedom. While reinforced meaninglessness denotes the human condition emergent from the corporate life-order, the quest for human freedom gives rise to the development, or possible development, of a new human condition--one which is bred out of an organic process of social experience.

Chapter 6. The Organic Experience

The corporate life-order does not have to be overcome. Nowhere in the history of social experience is there to be found any guarantee that the human race will rise to the task of mastering a process of social existence which is aimed at the maximization of an apparatus of social order, and which is sustained by a network of social reinforcements. Since inevitability has never been a property of the history of social experience, humanity may content itself in the future, as it has in the past, with quiet acquiescence in a structure of social reality which always culminates in the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. However, in the event, albeit the unlikely event, of generalized human resistance against the continuance of the corporate life-order, and in the equally improbable event that such opposition to the corporate world has, as its collateral, a generalized human determination to master, at whatever the cost, the process of corporate domination, human existence may be qualitatively transformed in a certain direction.

It has previously been demonstrated that the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness represents a direct emergent of the process of corporate experience. The reduction of the human situation to the vacuity of irrationality, reactivity, accidentality, and immorality, and the creation of a life-order distinguished by the

domination of necessity, obligation, self-interest, and duty, constitute, in this event, less accidental than necessary consequences of the development of corporate reality. Whenever and wherever the quest for human security results in the creation of a generalized social experience distinguished by the assumptions and activities necessary for the maintenance of human order, that process of social experience will culminate in a human situation qualified by reinforced meaninglessness. Since the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness represents a necessary derivative of the generalized social experience associated with the aspiration for human security, the rectification of this human condition cannot take place within the paradigmatic limits of corporate reality. Instead, the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness requires, for its resolution, a movement going beyond the corporate life-order to the creation of an alternative process of social experience. This movement begins when participation in the corporate world engenders a widespread human conviction that, in a universe dominated by the presence of many techniques for maximizing social order, human freedom rather than human security represents the most problematic feature of social existence. It continues with the transformation of belief in the problematic character of human freedom into a series of assumptions concerning what must be done for the realization of a more libertarian social world. And this movement beyond the corporate life-order is actualized by a further transformation of a libertarian process of human consciousness into an organic pattern of social organization. In short, the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness demands, for its rectification, the

dissipation of corporate reality and the ascendancy of an organic process of social experience. An organic social world instatiates human freedom as the basis of human dispositions, provides a libertarian description of the nature and limits of the human social reality, unifies the process of social organization around the creation of a substantively meaningful social universe, and ultimately culminates, or may culminate, in the condition of human uncertainty.

Before proceeding to an examination of the problem of human freedom, some prefatory comments are necessary. To begin with, a discussion of the central features of an organic social world must necessarily be more prophetic than either historical or descriptive. Such a discussion cannot be historical since nowhere in the human past has an organic process of social experience ever been completely actualized. And it cannot be descriptive, since everywhere in the human present the process of corporate experience inveighs against the possibility of human freedom. Thus in the absence of either a complete historical model or a contemporary source of inspiration, a consideration of an organic social reality is condemned to prophecy. It is, however, condemned to a peculiar sort of prophecy. Although an organic process of social experience has never been fully materialized anywhere in human history, the desire for human freedom has rarely been absent from the social scene. And to the extent that the desire for human freedom has often motivated a transformation, albeit a partial transformation, of social consciousness and social practice, to that extent an organic social experience has begun to make its

presence felt across the human drama. It is this enduring struggle for human freedom which provides a basis of solidarity for the present examination of the organic process of social experience. Moreover, while the domain of corporate experience does not provide any positive inspiration for the development of a libertarian social universe, it does preform, albeit in a negative fashion, the content and direction of such a universe. The conviction that the continuance of human freedom constitutes the most problematic concern of contemporary human life does not originate in a social vacuum. On the contrary, human freedom is made problematic by the envelopment of larger and larger portions of human existence within the corporate life-order. And it is precisely an aversive response to the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness which provides an enduring ground for the development of the problem of human liberation. The issue of human freedom is not, in this event, an eclectic human concern. It is, instead, a general human problem which systematically derives from the will to break beyond a world which has been reduced to the dominion of corporate order.¹ In sum, a description of an organic social world may be condemned to prophecy, but such prophecy is both tempered by active solidarity with the longstanding tradition of libertarian human struggles, and guided by a negation of the dominant social fact of twentieth century life - the process of corporate experience.

The fact that the development of an organic process of social experience is conditioned by the corporate life-order does not preclude the existence of a direct relationship between the cosmological and

the organic. On the contrary, this work has emphasized the presence of direct connections between each of the three generalized social experiences, whether the cosmological, corporate or organic. While the corporate experience provides the immediate impetus for the emergence, or possible emergence, of an organic social world, the relationship which holds between the corporate and the organic must be held relative to a prior relationship existent between the cosmological and the corporate. For it is precisely this prior relationship between the social realities of salvation and security which unifies the corporate and the cosmological as twin opponents of the organic. In this vein, the process of corporate experience has previously been portrayed as a generalized method of compensation for the loss of absolute certitude. The corporate life-order functions to "soften" the impact of the decline of cosmological experience by reducing human existence to the security of an inert, patterned homogeneous, and redundant mode of social reality. While the quest for human security is the product of human reification, the desire for human salvation is always an emergent of human metaphysics. An abstract social reality is not, of course, the same as a life-order which responds to the metaphysical urge. However, an abstract social reality is like a metaphysical one insofar as each process of social existence commonly militates against the appearance of a concrete social universe. While a metaphysical process of social experience negates the development, or possible development, of a concrete social world in favour of the anti-empirical, an abstract social reality postpones the appearance of the genuinely empirical in favour

of that which is simply pseudo-empirical. Thus, the metaphysical and the abstract unify as twin opponents, albeit in different ways, of the relative, partial, provisional, and prospective features of a concrete process of social experience. And inasmuch as the fullest actualization possible of a concrete process of social experience provides the keynote of an organic, and thereby libertarian, social reality, the cosmological and corporate experiences, as the repositers of human metaphysics and human abstraction respectively, commonly counterpoint the emergence, or possible emergence, of an organic social world. Only in a relative sense, therefore, is it possible to consider an organic social reality as directly derived from the corporate life-order. In terms of the full history of social experience, human freedom has always been problematic, and the actualization of an organic process of social experience has been a human possibility. What lends special significance to the problem of human freedom at the present time is that rarely, if ever, in the history of social experience have libertarian human sentiments been so systematically threatened as during the corporate age. While the project of human liberation - the abandonment of social metaphysics in favour of a direct confrontation with the empirical process of social reality - has in the past been "put off" by the development of corporate existence out of the ruins of cosmological experience, the issue must now be squarely met. No point of intercession remains between a further expansion of corporate reality and the task of creating a libertarian social world. The corporate life-order has wrenched human existence into a fateful moment of choice: a choice between a process of social

experience which thrives on the maximization of human domination, and a mode of social reality which is nothing less than a process of human freedom in its own right.

The creation of an organic social world is complicated, however by the very character of human freedom itself. The realization of a libertarian social universe is not simply a matter of removing the yoke of corporate reinforcements from the human situation. While the annihilation of all modes of corporate domination represents a necessary precondition for the development of a libertarian world, it does not exhaust the full process of human freedom. On the contrary, the full process of human freedom involves not only the negation of corporate reinforcements but also the creation of a substantively meaningful social universe. A substantively meaningful social universe is one which is distinguished by the unification, indeed the organic unification, of every aspect of human experience. The organic unification of human experience refers to the entire social process involved in establishing balance and harmony between the natural and the social, the affective and the conscious, the conscious and the practical, and between the more practical aspect of human life and the process of social morality. It is precisely the organic unification of human experience which constitutes the social process by which a substantively meaningful social universe may be created. And it is the process of creating a substantively meaningful social universe which represents, in the fullest sense, the enterprise of human freedom itself. Since human freedom may be visualized as the

active social process involved in the organic unification of human experience, it follows that the libertarian future cannot be reduced to an ideal end-state. There is no final point of culmination, no utopian mode of social existence, which stands external to the process of human freedom. Instead, human freedom manifests itself in the very process of achieving freedom. And the process of achieving human freedom - the entire enterprise involved in the creation of an organic mode of social experience - is condemned to be more contextual than inevitable, more incomplete than completed, more transitive than enduring and more projective than retrospective. Thus, an organic social world represents less an end of the struggle for human freedom than a contextual, incomplete, transitive, and projective means to human freedom. As such, an organic process of social experience is fated to remain a provisional expression of the possibilities existent for creating a substantively meaningful social universe, and thereby of the opportunities present for the fullest maximization possible of human freedom.

The Problem of Human Freedom

The creation of an organic social world begins with a fundamental transformation of human sensibility. This transformation of human sensibility is distinguished by the emergence of the problem of human freedom as the central object of human concern. The problem of human freedom arises in direct response to the envelopment of the process of social existence within the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. The human condition of reinforced meaninglessness has

previously been portrayed as the quality of human life which issues from the actualization of the process of corporate experience. The quality of corporate experience is characterized, in the most general sense, by the presence of many means of securing human order, and by the absence of any substantive reason for the existence of such order. An orderly social world, lacking any basis in the concrete process of social experience, results in irrationality, reactivity, accidentality, and immorality. And an irrational, reactive, accidental, and immoral social world, lacking any intrinsic appeal, must always be held together by a process of social reinforcements which include the domination of human necessity, obligation, self-interest, and duty. It is precisely an aversive response to such a human condition which provides the basis for the development of the problem of human freedom. The problem of human freedom arises, in this case, whenever and wherever an intense aversion to the process of corporate order engenders the following human concern: How might it be possible to break beyond the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness to the creation of a substantively meaningful social universe? This general human query does not originate, of course, in a social vacuum. It is grounded in a root reconstruction of the process of human dispositions. The process of human dispositions has previously been described as a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation between four dimensions of human sensibility, each of which yields a particular understanding of what is most problematic in the human situation. There are four

basic human dispositions, each of which sums up an impression of a different aspect of the human situation into a particular mode of human sensibility. There are, in this event, subjective, collective, social, and aesthetic human dispositions. The problem of human freedom, in its fullest expression, is based in a fundamental transformation of each of the above basic human dispositions. The problem of human freedom may be expressed, therefore, in four qualitatively unique ways, each of which represents a root alteration of a particular dimension of human sensibility. There is, in other words, a subjective problem of human freedom, a collective problem of human freedom, a social problem of human freedom, and an aesthetic problem of human freedom. Each particular statement of the problem of human freedom may then be viewed as a complementary, albeit partial, aspect of a single human query concerning how it might be possible to construct a substantively meaningful social world out of the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness.

Thus, the subjective problem of human freedom may be summed up as the following query: How might it be possible to break beyond the condition of human irrationality, and thereby beyond the domination of human necessity, to the creation of a holistic human survival situation? The condition of human irrationality has previously been described as that qualitative process of human survival which is characterized by the presence of many means of securing subjective human order, and by the absence of any substantive justification for the necessity of such order. In the condition of human irrationality, the human self is systematically dissolved into its

corporate function. And the emergent corporate functions have, as their content, pathological whims, mass desires, and capricious fantasies. Nowhere in an irrational social world is there to be discovered any basis for either the fulfilment of genuine human needs or for the actualization of opportunities for creative human development. Instead, an irrational social world - a world motivated by spurious human wants and by unprincipled human whims - is held together by the transformation of necessity into a process of social reinforcement. Human irrationality begets the domination of human necessity; and the domination of human necessity sustains the maximization of human irrationality. The more apparent it becomes that the process of corporate survival is flawed by irrationality, the more mandatory it becomes to induce participation within the corporate life-order by controlling access to the basic necessities of human existence. The irrationality of the corporate survival experience must become more apparent, however, since nowhere within the process of corporate reality is there to be found any principled possibility for its internal resolution. The condition of human irrationality represents, in this event, a direct emergent of the quest for an inert process of human subjectivity, the transformation of this quest into an entitative ontology of social reality, and of the actualization of an entitative ontology by means of the activity of reification. The aspiration for subjective human order thus results in the meaninglessness of human irrationality, and the meaninglessness of human irrationality anticipates, and even demands, the domination of human necessity.

It is the inherent oppressiveness of the corporate survival

experience, together with the absence of any possibility for its internal resolution, which grounds the development of the subjective problem of human freedom. The subjective problem of human freedom arises, in this case, whenever and wherever an aversive response to the condition of human irrationality sparks a desire for the creation of a holistic, and thereby more meaningful, human survival situation. A holistic social world is distinguished, at each and every instant, by the transformation of the very process of human survival into a means of realizing the organic unification of human experience. In a holistic social world, human necessity does not counterpoint human freedom. Instead, a holistic process of human survival is one in which the generalization of the means of human livelihood is made to complement the harmonization of all dimensions of human experience, whether of the affective with the conscious, of thought with action, of practice with morality, or of aesthetics with sentiment. And it is precisely the creation of an organic balance between the quest for human sustenance and the harmonization of human experience which forms the nucleus of the process of subjective human freedom. In this vein, a libertarian process of human subjectivity is neither a product of human faith nor an object of human abstraction, but an emergent of the human determination to create a world which is typified by a dynamic reciprocity between the provision of basic human necessities and the creation of genuine human possibilities. In a libertarian world, social being becomes substantively meaningful in direct proportion to how successful a reconciliation has been effected between the necessary and the desirable, and between the

contingent and the possible. How such a substantively meaningful process of social being might be constructed out of the irrationality of corporate existence represents the cornerstone of the subjective problem of human freedom.

The general problem of human freedom does not, however, have only a subjective dimension: it also contains a collective aspect. The collective problem of human freedom may be defined as the following concern: How might it be possible to move beyond a reactive political experience, and thereby beyond the domination of human obligation, to the creation of a reconstructive process of human consciousness? The condition of human reactivity has previously been portrayed as that qualitative process of associative existence which is characterized by the presence of many means of obtaining collective human order, and by the absence of any substantive reason for the necessity of such order. In a reactive political experience, the process of social consciousness is patterned around the actualization of the products of human irrationality. Nowhere in such a world is there to be found any substantive human purpose which would add meaning to the more associative aspect of human life. And in the absence of any substantive human purpose, a reactive political experience must be sustained by the coercive, or potentially coercive, monopolization of human obligations. Political order is thus qualified by reactivity; and a reactive political experience is always more obligatory than intrinsically appealing. In addition, the more reactive the political experience, the more necessary it becomes to reinforce political order by resorting to the domination of human obligation.

The process of corporate politics is condemned, however, to the maximization of the quality of human reactivity since nowhere in the corporate life-order does there exist any substantive human goal which would lend a prospective edge to a mode of associative life which has irrational human sentiments as its content and the aggrandizement of collective human order as its dynamic. Given this inherent tendency to human reactivity, the corporate life-order is also fated to compensate, or to attempt to compensate, for its absence of intrinsic appeal by resorting more and more overtly to the coercive manipulation of human loyalties.

It is the mandatory vacuity of the corporate political experience, together with the absence of any possibility for its internal rectification, which provides the ground for the development of the collective problem of human freedom. The collective problem of human freedom emerges, in this event, whenever and wherever an aversive response to a reactive political situation inspires a generalized human aspiration for the creation of a reconstructive, and consequently more meaningful, process of associative activity.³ A reconstructive process of associative activity is characterized by the transformation of political life into a means of clarifying opportunities for the realization of a more holistic social world. In a reconstructive political reality, human collectivities are neither the handmaidens of metaphysical dogmas nor instruments for the mobilization of human loyalties, but represent vehicles for the liberation of human consciousness. While the liberation of human consciousness has, as its content, the transformation of political

life into a cooperative venture aimed at clarifying possibilities for the organic unification of human experience, it has, as its dynamic, the development of a reconstructive human mentality. A reconstructive human mentality is one which continually breaks beyond the bonds of blind obedience and political obligation to the criticism and revision of all aspects of human life. It is when the human mentality becomes more reconstructive than either dogmatic or apologetic that the process of human consciousness becomes one with the project of creating a substantively meaningful social universe. And it is the creation of a genuinely meaningful social world which provides the guiding impulse of the collective problem of human freedom. The problem of collective human liberation thus responds to the reactiveness of corporate politics by proposing, as a more desirable human future, a mode of associative life which is based on the development of a reconstructive process of human consciousness, and which is aimed at the discovery of concrete opportunities for the actualization of a holistic, and thereby more meaningful, social universe.

The problem of human freedom does not, however, possess only subjective and collective expressions. It also contains a more social dimension. The social problem of human freedom may be summed up as the following query: How might it be possible to break beyond an accidental social experience, and thereby beyond the domination of human self-interest, to the creation of a more substantive process of human sociability? An accidental social experience has previously been depicted as one which is characterized by the presence of many means of securing an orderly network of human relations, and by the

absence of any genuine reason for the necessity of such order. In an accidental social world, the process of human sociability is organized around the materialization of the objects of political reaction. Accidental social relationships serve to canalize politically sanctioned whims into an apparatus of spurious social groupings, each of which advertises the actualization of a particular product of corporate politics as a matter of direct self-interest. In such a world, the process of social intercourse is ever more instrumentally motivated than intrinsically worthwhile. Social persuasion rather than social appreciation represents the keynote of an accidental process of social order. And in the absence of any internal source of appeal, an accidental social experience must be backed up by the monopolization of means for the gratification of human self-interest. Social order is thus distinguished by accidentality; and an accidental social experience is always more a product of suppression than an object of genuine human interest. Moreover, the more accidental the social experience, the more mandatory it becomes to reinforce social order by invoking techniques of social persuasion. The process of corporate sociability is condemned, of course, to the maximization of accidentality, since nowhere in the corporate world is there to be found any genuine basis of human solidarity which would add meaning to a mode of social life which has rewards and punishments as its content and the materialization of collectively approved whims as its dynamic. Accordingly, the corporate life-order is also condemned to sustain, or to attempt to sustain, its social apparatus by invoking,

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on an ever increasing scale, the suppressive techniques of social persuasion.

It is the inherent suppressiveness of the corporate social experience, together with the absence of any hope for its internal resolution, which catalyzes the development of the social problem of human freedom. The problem of human social liberation thus arises at whatever time and place an aversive response to an accidental social experience sparks a desire for the creation of a more substantive process of human sociability. A substantive social world is typified by the formation of genuine human solidarities around the appreciation of the products of reconstructive human thought.⁴ In a substantive social world, self-interest and human freedom are not mutually exclusive. A substantive process of human sociability is always distinguished by a broadening of the content of human self-interest to include such genuine human aspirations as the desire for social solidarities. Genuine human solidarities cannot, of course, either be predetermined or be nurtured out of instrumentalism. They develop within provisional social groupings which emerge and decline in response to the possibilities present for the organic unification of human experience. Such provisional social groupings have no basis of justification other than their own intrinsic appeal. They are neither sources of social certitude nor conglomerates of rewards and punishments but simply active social processes which promote the deepening and broadening of substantive human friendships. It is the creation of a dynamic union between human self-interest and the development of solidary social groupings which constitute the nucleus of the

problem of human social liberation. In this vein, human sociability is made substantive in direct proportion to the convergence established between social interests and social solidarities. The creation of a direct relationship between the maximization of human self-interest and the development of genuine human solidarities marks, in turn, the precise point at which an accidental social experience, based upon the systematic distortion of human social aspirations, begins to decline.

While the general problem of human freedom includes subjective, collective, and social expressions, it is not exhausted by them. On the contrary, the issue of human freedom contains one final dimension - the aesthetic problem of human liberation. The aesthetic problem of human freedom may be defined as the following concern: How might it be possible to move beyond the condition of human immorality, and thereby beyond the repressive manipulation of human moral sentiments, to the creation of a more critical human value situation? The condition of human immorality has previously been portrayed as that human value situation which is characterized by the presence of many means of securing moral order, and by the absence of any substantive reason for the necessity of such order. In the condition of human immorality, the process of value experience dissolves into a technique, albeit an empty technique, for garnering commitments to the continuance of corporate existence. The emergent network of human commitments has, as its content, whichever mode of mental seduction or propagandistic appeal appears most efficacious in fostering human loyalties to the perpetuation of an irrational, reactive, and accidental life-order.

Nowhere in an immoral social world - a world linked together by seduction and propaganda - is there to be found any genuine human value which would principle either the criticism of a past history of social experience or the creation of a more desirable human future. In the absence of any genuine value principle, the corporate world is condemned to be held together by the repressive manipulation of moral consciousness. And the more apparent it becomes that the corporate world is fundamentally immoral, the more necessary it becomes to compensate for the absence of any genuine human value principle by resorting to psychic repression. Moral order thus depends upon psychic repression; and the repressive manipulation of moral consciousness serves to reinforce a process of value experience which has propaganda as its basis, and the maximization of commitments to the corporate world as its dynamic.

It is the inherent repressiveness of the corporate value experience, together with the absence of any possibility for its internal-rectification, which provides the basis for the development of the aesthetic problem of human freedom. The problem of aesthetic human liberation emerges, in this event, whenever and wherever an aversive reaction to moral repression breeds an intense yearning for the creation of a more critical human value situation. A critical human value situation is distinguished, at every instant, by the transformation of the very process of social morality into a means, albeit a prospective means, of synthesizing genuine human solidarities into new, and more satisfactory, totalizations of human experience. A totalization of human experience refers to any broadly conceived

image of the human situation which both discloses human progress towards the creation of an organic social univers, and which reveals new opportunities for the development of a more holistic social world. A totalization of human experience thus combines in a single vision of the human condition an evaluation of a past history of social experience, and the creation of new possibilities for establishing balance and reciprocity between all aspects of the human social reality.⁵ As a process of totalization, a critical human value experience represents neither a source of moral consistency nor an apology for a given actuality. Rather, a critical process of value experience constitutes a point of active social transformation in its own right. It is the social process by which human beings may reflect upon their experience, and attempt to break beyond it. This dual process of reflection and creation has no external basis of justification. It is neither a matter of human belief nor a product of human commitment, but simply a process of human liberation in and of itself. As a process of human liberation, a critical human value experience invests each aspect of the human social reality with a moral dimension. This moral dimension - the synthesis of a past history of social experience into new, and more adequate, totalizations of the human condition - remains an internal feature of a libertarian social reality. In a libertarian social world, there is no process of human survival, no human political practice, and no act of human sociability which does not ultimately culminate, or may not ultimately culminate, in a better understanding of what has already been accomplished, and what remains to be accomplished, in terms of the organic unification

of human experience. And insofar as each aspect of a libertarian social world contributes to a better understanding of possibilities yet unrealized for the organic unification of human experience, each phase of a free human world may be viewed as fundamentally moral. A critical process of social morality is thus a process of human liberation in its own right; and this process of human liberation streams through each of the activities involved in the creation of an organic social world. How such a critical process of social morality might be wrested out of the repressiveness of corporate existence represents, of course, the nucleus of the aesthetic aspect of the general problem of human freedom.

The creation of an organic social reality thus begins with a root reconstruction of the process of human sensibility. This transformation of human sensibility is distinguished by the generalized human conviction that the problematic character of human freedom constitutes the most pressing issue of human life. In its fullest expression, the problem of human freedom contains four interrelated dimensions, each of which is grounded in a radical alteration of a particular aspect of the process of human sensibility. These four particular expressions of the general problem of human freedom are not isolated from one another, but are linked together by means of concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation. The quest for a more holistic, and thereby libertarian, process of human subjectivity preforms and anticipates the yearning for collective human freedom. The desire for a more reconstructive mode of human consciousness summarizes the quest for subjective

human freedom, and sets the stage for the development of the social problem of human liberation. The quest for a more substantive process of human sociability sums up the subjective and collective dimensions of the problem of human freedom and anticipates the desire for aesthetic human liberation. And, finally, the yearning for a more critical process of value experience develops out of a prior history of libertarian human sentiments, and grounds, once more, the development of the subjective problem of human freedom. Taken together, these four particular problems of human freedom represent complementary features of a unitary process of human sensibility. While this unitary process of human sensibility provides the basis for a complete impression concerning what is most problematic in the corporate life-order, it does not provide an answer to what must be done for the creation of a more organic process of social experience. Such an answer awaits the development of the phenomenology of human freedom.

The Phenomenology of Human Freedom

In the complete process of social experience, human sensibility preforms and anticipates both the content and the direction of human consciousness. Thus, while the problem of human freedom is grounded in an aversive response to the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness, this core alteration of human sensibility further anticipates the development of a libertarian process of human consciousness. In its fullest expression, this libertarian process of human consciousness may be described as the phenomenology of human freedom. The phenomenology of human freedom sums up in a single unitary vision of

the human social reality key postulates concerning what must be done for the realization of a more holistic, reconstructive, substantive, and critical social world. These key social postulates establish, albeit in the sense of an emergent human awareness, the modes of being, knowledge, practice, and morality which lineament a libertarian human situation. An emergent human awareness concerning what must be done for the actualization of human freedom does not, of course, suddenly spring out of nowhere. On the contrary, the phenomenology of human freedom is based in a radical transformation of the process of human queries. The process of human queries has previously been described as a dynamic working-out of concretely experienced relations of performance, anticipation, and summation between ontological, epistemological, axiological, and aesthetic human assumptions, each of which responds to a particular dimension of human sensibility. The phenomenology of human freedom emerges directly from a qualitative reconstruction of each of the above basic human assumptions and of the relationships which hold between them. Considered individually, each qualitative reconstruction of a basic human assumption, whether ontological, epistemological, axiological, or aesthetic, provides the basis for a specific understanding of what must be done for the resolution of a particular expression of the general problem of human freedom. Taken together, these four qualitative reconstructions of the different dimensions of the process of human queries provide the basis for a complete understanding of how it might be possible fully to materialize the desire for human liberation. The phenomenology

of human freedom thus interrelates into a unitary process of human consciousness all the critical social assumptions necessary for the development of a libertarian social world. This unitary process of human consciousness contains, in its fullest expression, an ontology of human freedom, an epistemology of human freedom, an axiology of human freedom, and an aesthetic of human freedom. The ontology of human freedom specifies what must be done for the realization of a more holistic social world. The epistemology of human freedom provides the assumptions which precondition the development of a reconstructive process of human thought. The axiology of human freedom specifies what must be done for the actualization of a more substantive process of human sociability. And the aesthetic of human freedom provides the basis for an active appreciation of what might constitute a more critical value experience. When combined, these four libertarian human postulates may be viewed as complementary aspects of a single, unitary world-view which responds fully to the desire for human freedom. For example, the ontology of human freedom transforms the yearning for a more holistic process of human subjectivity into an organic definition of social reality. The organic viewpoint provides the context for the development of social holisms, and sets the stage for the appearance of the epistemology of human freedom. The epistemology of human freedom transforms the desire for a more reconstructive process of human consciousness into the nucleus of a genuinely empirical theory of human knowledge. This genuinely empirical theory of human knowledge represents a complete answer to the formative

human query concerning what might constitute a more adequate mode of human thought vis-à-vis the problem of human freedom, and anticipates, in turn, the development of the axiology of human freedom. The axiology of human freedom transforms the aspiration for a more substantive process of human sociability into a radical reconstruction of the fundamental human assumptions which "context" the more material aspect of social existence. This radical reconstruction of the critical social assumptions surrounding the process of human sociability sets the stage for the creation of genuine human solidarities, and furnishes the ground for the development of the aesthetic of human freedom. The aesthetic of human freedom transforms the desire for a more critical value experience into a transformational description of the process of social morality. This transformational description of the human value experience preconditions the development of a more genuine process of moral activity, and summarizes, in turn, assumptions concerning the organic, reconstructive, and intrinsic character of the human social reality. The phenomenology of human freedom thus consists of an ascending spiral of interrelated assumptions, each of which represents a response, albeit a partial response, to the general human query concerning what must be done for the realization of a more libertarian world. The following section will briefly examine the fundamental human assumptions necessary for the actualization of human freedom.

The Organic Universe

The phenomenology of human freedom is grounded in the vision of an organic social universe. The organic viewpoint holds that social reality is neither apprehended pluralistically nor held together by a metaphysical principle of absoluteness, but is concretely unified by means of the process of social action itself. From the organic standpoint, nothing transpires in human existence which is not concretely apprehended; and nothing is concretely apprehended which may not be viewed as one aspect or dimension of a broader process of social action. This broader process of social action provides the ultimate ground for all social experience, and represents the furthest extension possible of empirical social reality.⁶

Ontologically, therefore, the phenomenology of human freedom maintains that concrete social reality is exhausted by the different dimensions of the unitary process of social action, and by the relationships which exist between them. In such a universe, no definitive separations, irredeemable dualisms, or deterministic reductions are possible between the bio-physical and the intuitive, the intuitive and the conscious, the conscious and the active, the active and the moral, or between the moral and the more environmental aspect of social experience. In an organic social universe there is simply a unitary, dynamic process of social action which principles the entire spread of social experience. This unitary human social process provides for the interrelation of all dimensions of social experience, whether of the bio-physical, affective, reflective, active, or aesthetic, in a solitary human movement mediated by concretely experienced relations

of complementarity and reciprocity. In an organic social world, human sentiment serves as a dynamic connective between a past history of social experience and a present bio-physical condition; human thought transforms an intuitive appreciation concerning what is most problematic in the human situation into an exploration of possibilities for its rectification; human practise provides for the concrete actualization of the products of human reflection; and human morality organizes the process of social activity around the consideration of new opportunities for the development of a more holistic, reconstructive, substantive, and critical social world.

While limiting concrete social reality to the history of the relationships existent between the different dimensions of social action, the organic viewpoint does not assume that the internal unity of social experience has ever been fully appreciated. On the contrary, the organic viewpoint holds that the presence of a complementary and reciprocal human social process as the ultimate ground of concrete social reality has never been fully realized anywhere in the history of human experience, and, even if realized, can never be fully actualized. The human imperative in an organic social universe is not to submit passively to the vision of a finished world but actively to accept the responsibility of drawing out more and more fully the unitary character of the human social experience. An organic process of social experience is, in other words, less a finished fact than an active human possibility.

It is the possibility of establishing complementarity and reciprocity between all dimensions of the process of social action,

and thereby materializing the concrete and organic character of the human social experience, which principles the solution to the subjective problem of human freedom. The subjective problem of human freedom originates, in its most elementary expression, in an aversive response to the condition of human irrationality. Human irrationality derives, above all, from the general human belief that the social universe is populated, in its essential features, by a plurality of discrete entities in need of some principle of external unification. The mastery of human irrationality thus requires, at first, the ontological observation that concrete social reality, organically conceived, contains its own internal principle of unification - the dynamic process of social action itself. Accordingly, the human task in an organic social universe is not to order parts into some whole, but to synthesize a whole into some substantive human meaning. And insofar as the creation of substantive human meanings provides content for the problem of human freedom, the human project in an organic social universe is less the attainment of social order than the fullest realization possible of human liberation. Human freedom is thus, at root, an ontological problem. And as an ontological problem, the quest for human liberation requires for its solution an abandonment of the entitative world-view in favour of an organic definition of social reality. While the vision of an organic social universe preconditions the development, or possible development, of a more holistic process of human subjectivity, it does not provide an answer as to how the internal unity of social experience might be more fully exposed. The creation of a holistic social world awaits, in this case, a further

epistemological assumption concerning the reconstructive character of human thought.

Reconstructive Consciousness

While the phenomenology of human freedom originates in the vision of an organic social universe, it always continues with an epistemological assumption concerning the reconstructive character of human thought. The reconstructive viewpoint holds that human thought, empirically conceived, is neither tautological nor analytical but a concretely apprehended process of human liberation in its own right. From the reconstructive standpoint, the adequacy of any given mode of human thought depends, above all, upon its empirical character; and its empirical character depends upon the degree to which it manages to evade both the metaphysical and the abstract in favour of a direct confrontation with the concrete social world. While such a direct confrontation with the concrete social world is distinguished by the absence of either the certitude of human dogma or the security of human reification, it is guided by the dual impulses of all empiricisms - the desire to limit social inquiry to that portion of the human social experience which may be examined without the benefit of a priori assumptions, primal credos, or excessive formalisms, and the consequent willingness to employ the results of such inquiry to advertise rigorously the possibilities existent, at any given time and place, for the creation of complementarity and reciprocity between all dimensions of the process of social action. Reconstructive human thought is thus always

genuinely empirical; and a genuinely empirical process of social inquiry is always fundamentally libertarian.⁷

The reconstructive viewpoint of human thought may be viewed as a direct response to the ontology of human freedom. The ontology of human freedom is grounded in the dual observation that concrete social reality has, as its outer limit, the relationships which obtain between the different aspects of the unitary process of social action, and that the project of human liberation devolves on the organic interrelation of the constituents of concrete social experience into a process of complementarity and reciprocity. The ontological assumption of an organic social universe is, moreover, fundamentally a product of human sentiment insofar as it derives, in large part, from the subjective human aspiration for a more holistic social world. While human sentiment serves as the nucleus of the vision of an organic social universe, such sensibility requires, for its satisfaction, a concrete means of expression. The reconstructive viewpoint of human thought acts as such a concrete means of expression. In this event, the epistemological assumption concerning the reconstructive character of human thought functions to generalize a libertarian process of human sensibility into an equally libertarian process of human consciousness, and thus transforms the desire for a more holistic social world into an active process of social inquiry which seeks out opportunities, albeit within the limits of concrete social reality, for the organic unification of human experience. Reconstructive consciousness thus serves as an avenue of expression for an organic process of human sensibility; and the epistemology of human freedom sums up the

human ontology into a radical alteration of the place of thought in social existence.

The epistemological vision of reconstructive human consciousness does not, however, only advance the ontology of human liberation. It also responds directly to the formative human query concerning what must be done for the realization of collective human freedom. The problem of collective human freedom derives from an aversive response to the condition of political reactivity. While a reactive political experience originates, in its most fundamental expression, in the human conviction that the process of social consciousness is inevitably dualistic, it is actualized by the transformation of this human conviction into the activity of mobilization. The rectification of a reactive political experience thus requires, at first, a root reconstruction of the epistemological theory which ultimately provides the basis for the process of political mobilization. This root reconstruction of the epistemology of human order begins with the assumption that social inquiry, empirically considered, is never dualistic, but unitary; and that the project of empirical social inquiry is never the subjugation of concrete human beings to a process of reification, but the actualization of opportunities for becoming genuinely human. Such a fundamental revision of the place of thought in human affairs is provided, of course, by the epistemology of human freedom. The epistemology of human freedom proposes a more substantive empiricism, indeed, a reconstructive empiricism, as the basis for the development of a more adequate mode of human knowledge, and regards reconstructive empiricism as a point of release for the creation of an

organic social universe. While reconstructive empiricism counterpoints a reactive political experience, it does not explain how the products of libertarian human thought might be actively transformed into the basis of a more substantive process of human sociability. An understanding concerning how empirical social inquiry might be generalized into a libertarian process of social activity awaits the development of the axiology of human freedom.

Intrinsic Activity


So far, the phenomenology of human freedom has involved two formative postulates: an ontological assumption concerning the organic character of the social universe, and an epistemological assumption concerning the reconstructive character of empirical human consciousness. While the ontology of human freedom has responded to the subjective human aspiration for a more holistic social world, the epistemology of human freedom has depicted what must be done for the realization of a more principled process of social inquiry. The phenomenology of human freedom does not conclude, however, with the epistemological observation that human consciousness, empirically conceived, is fundamentally reconstructive. Rather, the phenomenology of human freedom continues with a further axiological assumption concerning the intrinsic character of a libertarian process of human sociability. The axiology of human freedom proposes, in this event, that a genuinely meaningful process of human sociability is neither a product of teleology nor a matter of instrumentalism, but an object of intrinsic human worth.⁸ As an object of intrinsic human worth, a genuinely meaningful

process of human sociability contains no principle of justification other than that it constitutes the exact social process by which human freedom may be generalized beyond the reflective and into the more material aspect of social experience. Thus, while teleologically motivated relations may possess as their source of validation a metaphysical principle of some sort, and instrumental relations may be grounded in a network of rewards and punishments, intrinsically appealing human relations, being neither anti-empirical nor spurious, may claim only an internal validation as processes, albeit partial processes, of human liberation in their own right. Human freedom, in other words, is the practice of human freedom; and the practice of human freedom is self-validating and self-rewarding.

The intrinsic viewpoint arises in direct response to the problem of human social freedom. The problem of human social freedom is the product of an aversive response to the condition of human accidentality. An accidental social experience derives, most fundamentally, from the widespread human conviction that the process of human sociability is exhausted by instrumentality, and from the consequent transformation of this general human belief into a pattern of social organization which is distinguished by the activity of canalization. The rectification of an accidental social experience thus requires, above all, the diminution of the instrumentalist perspective, and the ascendency of a human axiology which holds that the substantiveness of a given process of human sociability varies in direct proportion to its intrinsic appeal. What lends intrinsic value, and thereby substantiveness, to a given process of human sociability is not, of

course, a matter of human eclecticism.

Human relationships gain intrinsic appeal to the extent that they constitute, or strive to constitute, social processes by which the products of reconstructive human thought might be actualized. Intrinsically appealing human relationships are thus always principled human relationships; and principled human relationships always represent a dynamic working-out of the fruits of libertarian human thought in the domain of social practice. It is the transformation of the products of reconstructive human consciousness into a dynamic process of intrinsic human relationships which provides the basis for the development of a substantive social experience, and thereby of human social freedom. The project of human social freedom, therefore, demands for its materialization the creation of a more substantive process of human sociability. And the development of a more substantive social experience requires, for its inception, an abandonment of both the teleological and the instrumental in favour of a mode of social practice which bases its claim to internal validation upon the social fact that it represents an active working-out of the opportunities present, at any given moment, for the organic unification of human experience. While the intrinsic viewpoint provides the key to the solution of the problem of human social freedom, it does not respond to the human aspiration for a more critical value experience. Such a response is provided, however, by the aesthetic of human freedom.



Transformational Values

The aesthetic of human freedom responds to the desire for a more critical value experience by providing the central principles of a new human understanding of what might constitute a more adequate definition of the process of social morality. The aesthetic of human freedom proposes that the adequacy of a given process of social morality is less a matter of its ability to yield either a consistent or redundant world-view than of its capacity to serve as an active process of social transformation in its own right. From the libertarian viewpoint, the human value experience, concretely conceived, cannot, and, indeed, should not, function as either a repositon of human dogma or an object of human commitment, but should, instead, serve as the social process by which libertarian human sensibilities, reconstructive human consciousness, and intrinsic human relationships are solidified as complementary and reciprocal aspects of a general human movement towards the creation of an organic social world. A libertarian human value experience is, in other words, an active process of social transformation; and this active process of transformation is nothing less than the very process of achieving the organic unification of social experience.⁹ There is, therefore, no inherent separation between the human value experience, when considered as an active process of social transformation, and the other constituents of an organic social world. In an organic social world, the process of social morality is not irretrievably cut adrift from either human affectivity, consciousness, or activity. On the contrary, an organic social world is distinguished by the investiture of every aspect of the human social

experience with a moral dimension. And this moral dimension serves as a concrete point of expression for the progress made, at any given moment, towards the dynamic unification of the process of social experience. The realization of the moral possibilities of every aspect of the human social experience is simultaneous, therefore, with the fullest actualization possible of the opportunities existent for the development of an organic social world.

The vision of the human value experience as a process of social transformation responds directly to the aesthetic problem of human freedom. The aesthetic problem of human freedom has previously been portrayed as originating in an aversive response to the condition of human immorality. An immoral value experience is based, most fundamentally, in the generalized human belief that human values are agents of social redundancy, and in the consequent transformation of this root human belief into a process of value experience which is characterized, at every instant, by the activity of commitment. The rectification of an immoral value experience thus requires, at first, an abandonment of the redundancy viewpoint, and the assertion of a human aesthetic which holds that the genuineness of a given process of social morality is a derivative of its ability to function as a dynamic process of social transformation. What adds genuineness, and thereby a transformational character, to a given process of social morality is not, of course, a product of human chance. A human value experience becomes genuine to the extent that it constitutes, or strives to constitute, a social process by which a given history of holistic human sentiments, reconstructive social inquiries, and intrinsic

human solidarities might be summarized, criticized, and, thereupon, generalized into new opportunities for the creation of an organic social world. A genuinely moral value experience is thus one which is grounded in a past history of social experience; and a grounded value experience always represents a means for the dynamic transformation of a past history of social experience into the creation of new libertarian human possibilities. Ultimately, it is the development of such a genuine process of social morality which counterpoints the redundancy of human immorality, and thus provides the key to the successful solution of the aesthetic problem of human freedom.

The emergence of a new, and more genuine, human aesthetic represents the point of culmination of the phenomenology of human freedom. The phenomenology of human freedom thus consists, in its fullest expression, of four interrelated human assumptions, each of which contributes to a general human understanding concerning what must be done for the realization of a more substantively meaningful social universe. The ontology of human freedom has proposed the image of an organic social universe as a necessary prelude to the development of a more holistic process of human subjectivity. The epistemology of human freedom has presented empirical social inquiry, reconstructively conceived, as the basis for a more creative political experience. The axiology of human freedom has grounded the quest for a more substantive process of human sensibility in the vision of intrinsic human solidarities. And finally, the aesthetic of human freedom has proposed the image of transformational human values as

a necessary precondition for the appearance of a critical moral experience. While these fundamental human postulates clarify the central principles of a libertarian social world, they do not explain how human freedom might be concretely actualized. Such an explanation awaits the development of the process of organic action.

The Process of Organic Action

The phenomenology of human freedom has elucidated the basic assumptions necessary for the creation of a libertarian social world. These basic assumptions are structured out into the domain of concrete social action by means of a unique pattern of social organization. This pattern of social organization represents the social process by which the quest for human liberation may be generalized beyond its basis in human affectivity and human consciousness into the realm of concrete social practice. This social process of human liberation may be viewed, in its essential features, as the process of organic action itself.

The process of organic action is grounded in a root reconstruction of the more active dimension of the complete process of social experience. The more active dimension of the complete human social process has previously been described as a dynamic working-out of relationships between four rudimentary human activities, each of which serves to materialize a specific human query. These four rudimentary human activities have been identified as human survival practices, human political practices, human social practices, and human aesthetic practices. In its fullest expression, the process of organic action derives from a core alteration of each of the above

rudimentary human practices. And each core alteration of a rudimentary human practice yields a specific explanation concerning how a particular libertarian human postulate might be materialized. The process of organic action thus consists of four rudimentary human activities, each of which transforms a particular aspect of the phenomenology of human freedom into a specific pattern of social organization. These four constituents of the process of organic action may be described as the activities of actualization, reconstruction, consolidation, and creation. Each of these four libertarian activities may be viewed as complementary aspects of a single, unitary process of organic action, which is grounded in the activity of actualization, continues with the activity of reconstruction, spreads out into the activity of consolidation, and culminates with the activity of creation.

Actualization

The activity of actualization denotes the entire social process involved in the transformation of the human survival experience into a concrete working-out of the ontology of human freedom. In responding to the desire for a more holistic process of social being, the ontology of human freedom has advanced the vision of an organic social universe as the basis of a more adequate understanding of the nature and limits of the human social reality. Basically, the organic viewpoint has held the resolution of the problem of subjective human freedom to be a matter of establishing relationships of complementarity and reciprocity between all dimensions of the human social experience. Indeed, the very process of achieving such a dynamic

unification of the human social experience has been viewed as the ultimate ground for the development of a genuinely libertarian, and thereby substantively meaningful, process of social being. Thus, according to the ontology of human freedom, the more organic the social experience, the more libertarian the process of social being; and the more libertarian the process of social being, the more substantively meaningful the social world.

The materialization of the ontological assumption of an organic social universe grounds in the seminal insight that in a libertarian social world the human survival experience is neither concerned with the reification of a given actuality nor with the mythification of metaphysical dogma, but is, instead, driven by the actualization of genuine human possibilities. The term "genuine human possibilities" refers to those prospective directions in human action which, if actualized, would result not only in the widest distribution possible of the means to human livelihood but, more importantly, in the up-grading of human sustenance in such a way as actively to engender the organic unification of social experience. Thus, while genuine human possibilities always have the maximization of the physical requirements of human life as their content, they possess as their dynamic the transformation of the quest itself for human necessity into a means of achieving an organic social world. It is the actualization of such genuine human possibilities which forms the nucleus of a libertarian human survival experience. In this vein, a libertarian human survival experience may be understood as providing for the fullest disclosure possible of the opportunities

present in any given human situation for the creation of relationships of complementarity and reciprocity between the demands of human necessity and the ideals of human freedom. In a libertarian process of human survival, the positive synthesis of human necessity and human freedom is concretely evidenced by the struggle to actualize only those human futures which would prove conducive to greater balance and harmony between the bio-physical, intellectual, social, and moral dimensions of human experience. Such a dynamic synthesis of the human social experience represents, of course, nothing less than a concrete working-out of the ontology of human freedom.

The transformation of the human survival experience into a process of actualization cannot occur without a prior revolution of human sensibilities. This prior revolution of human sensibilities is given witness by human beings striving to break beyond the chains of human mythification and the bonds of human abstraction to a social universe which is actively embraced as both a product of human will and an object of human responsibility. From the vantage point of libertarian human sensibilities, the core social fact of human existence is that the process of concrete social experience is neither predetermined nor inherently meaningful but developmental and only potentially meaningful. Substantive human meaning can neither be found outside of concrete social experience nor imposed upon it, but has to be actively created. The human conviction that meaning is created rather than given requires, at first, a rejection of human dogma and the intention to distance oneself from the apparatus of

corporate roles. While human dogma subordinates the social self to a preformed meaning, the apparatus of corporate roles isolates the social self from the question of meaning altogether. However, demythification and role-distance only set the stage for the addition of substantive human meaning to concrete social experience. What ultimately adds meaning to human life is the profound human sensibility that the liberation of social being involves the same process as the actualization of genuine human possibilities. From this viewpoint, a substantively meaningful social world is always distinguished by the actualization of genuine human possibilities; and the actualization of genuine human possibilities is always concurrent with the fullest development possible of a libertarian process of social being. Meaning is added to human life, in other words, by the human determination to consider being itself as an emergent of the reconciliation which has been achieved, or may be achieved, between the different dimensions of the human social experience.¹⁰ While the activity of actualization constitutes the exact social process by which a genuinely libertarian, and thereby substantively meaningful, mode of social being may be developed, it does not provide a political expression for the quest for human freedom. A political expression for human freedom is provided, however, by the activity of reconstruction.

Reconstruction

The activity of reconstruction refers to the entire social process involved in the transformation of the human political experience into a concrete working-out of the epistemology of human freedom.

In addressing the desire for a less reactive mode of human consciousness, the epistemology of human freedom has proposed a theory of reconstructive empiricism as the basis of a more adequate understanding of the place of thought in human experience. In its essential features, the theory of reconstructive empiricism has held the solution to the problem of collective human freedom to be a matter of transforming human thought, concretely conceived, into a means, albeit a partial means, of providing expression for the opportunities existent, at any given moment, for the organic unification of social experience. Rather than isolating human thought from human sensibility, reconstructive empiricism has viewed inquiry and sentiment as interrelated aspects of a unitary process of human freedom. While libertarian human sentiment provides the ground for the development of genuine human possibilities, concrete human thought transforms such possibilities into the vanguard of a root reconstruction of the human social experience. Thus, according to the epistemology of human freedom, the more concrete the process of human inquiry, the more libertarian the social experience; and the more libertarian the social experience, the greater the degree of coalescence between human feeling and human reflection.

The materialization of the epistemology of human freedom is grounded in the formative insight that in a libertarian social world the human political experience is neither a conversionary process nor a technique of mass mobilization, but rather a means by which genuine human possibilities may be developed into substantive human meanings. The term "substantive human meanings" refers to those fleeting images

of the human social reality which capture, at least for an instant, an intense human awareness of the impediments which confront the concrete realization of libertarian human possibilities. Thus, while substantive human meanings always have genuine human possibilities as their content, they possess as their dynamic the transformation of such possibilities into a rigorous investigation of the obstacles to human freedom present within any given human situation. This rigorous investigation of the human social reality is neither a product of human apology nor an object of human obedience. It is, rather, a process, indeed, an active and critical process, of social reconstruction. As a reconstructive social process, the creation of substantive human meanings has, as its core, the severance and revision of all dimensions of concrete social experience. This dual process of disavowance and revision is intended to expose fully all impediments to human freedom and to provide the basis for a new, and more satisfactory, realignment of human experience. It is the development of a more adequate realignment of human experience which forms the nucleus of a libertarian human political experience. A libertarian human political experience may be envisioned as a process which moves by negation and creation towards a better understanding of how human experience must be reconstructed if the remaining impediments to human freedom are to be surpassed. While this proposed reconstruction of human experience is primarily a product of human reflection, it is fueled by libertarian human sensibilities. Libertarian human sensibilities impel reconstructions of the human condition; and such reconstructions of the human

condition elevate human sentiment into qualitatively more profound modes of human reflection. The politics of reconstruction thus provides for a dynamic synthesis of human thought and human affectivity. Such a dynamic synthesis of feeling and reflection constitutes nothing less than a concrete working-out of the epistemology of human freedom.

The emergence of reconstructive activity presupposes a radical alteration of human beliefs about the nature of political life.

From the libertarian viewpoint, the human political experience has nothing to do with either obedience or obligation. Having rejected salvation as a central human problem, the libertarian perspective cannot find any principled reason for human beings to seek certitude within metaphysical collectivities. And having repudiated order as a spurious human problem, the libertarian viewpoint cannot discover any genuine human need for mobilizing human beings into mass collectivities. In the absence of either obedience or obligation, the libertarian approach considers political life as nothing more than a celebration of the human capacity to reflect critically upon its concrete social condition and to break beyond it. Political life, of this sort, has no necessary collective form. It is concerned neither with the formation of metaphysical communities nor with the creation of enduring conglomerates. Rather, it is devoted to the subordination of all collective forms, whether communal or organizational, to the process of critical human reflection. In its essential features, the process of critical human reflection is a product of individual human scholarship. While individual human scholarship may, at times, be broadened out into a

cooperative venture, such cooperation must be held relative to the reconstructive propensities of libertarian human thought. And at the exact instant that cooperative intellectual relations threaten to fossilize into collective ones, even scholarly cooperation must be subordinated to the rigorous demands of constructive and reconstructive human inquiry. ¹¹ Reconstructive political inquiry is fated, of course, to remain highly negative. The politics of reconstruction does not spring out of a void, but develops out of a social world in which many human beings are doubly constrained by mobilization and conversion. In such a world, the task of reconstructive political inquiry is to demonstrate continuously the deficiencies of both political order and political certitude, and to synthesize its findings into substantive human meanings. While the creation of substantive human meanings ultimately provides content for political freedom, this content needs to be socially materialized. The transformation of the content of political freedom into social practice takes place by means of the activity of consolidation.

Consolidation

The activity of consolidation denotes the entire social process involved in the transformation of the human social experience into a concrete working out of the axiology of human freedom. In responding to the human aspiration for a substantive social experience, the axiology of human freedom has advanced the image of intrinsic human relationships as the basis of a more adequate process of human sociability. Fundamentally, the intrinsic viewpoint has held the solution to the problem of human

social freedom to be a matter of principling the process of human relationships in the appreciation of the products of reconstructive thought. Thus, rather than alienating human sociability from reflection and sensibility, the intrinsic viewpoint has postulated human sentiment, social inquiry, and social communication as complementary dimensions of a unitary human social process. While libertarian sensibilities ground the creation of genuine human possibilities and reconstructive thought transforms such possibilities into substantive human meanings, the process of human sociability, intrinsically conceived, provides for the lived appreciation of such substantive human meanings. Thus, according to the axiology of human freedom, the more intrinsic the process of social relationships, the more libertarian the human experience; and the more libertarian the human experience, the greater the interrelatedness of human sentiment, thought and practice.

The materialization of the axiology of human freedom begins with the formative observation that in a libertarian world the human social experience represents neither a working-out of teleology nor a process of canalization. It represents a means by which the fruits of reconstructive inquiry may be consolidated into genuine human solidarities. The term "genuine human solidarities" refers to those enduring bonds of social interrelationship which emerge out of the human struggle to realize concretely the results of reconstructive inquiry. While genuine human solidarities are principled in a shared appreciation of the obstacles to human freedom present within the human situation, they are fueled by the transformation of this common appraisal of the human scene into a concrete living-out of the

possibilities existent, at any given moment, for the organic unification of human experience. This concrete living-out of libertarian human possibilities is neither inspired by rewards and punishments nor is it a matter of "right social conduct." It is motivated by the consolidation of every aspect of human social life around the implementation of a dynamic unity between all dimensions of human experience. Although this process of consolidation is not backed up by gains in social prestige or by the maximization of social certitude, it is, nonetheless, intrinsically rewarding. And it is intrinsically rewarding because the transformation of human social life into a living-out of the project of human freedom constitutes the social process by which human relationships may be made substantive. Human relationships obtain substantiveness, in this case, in direct proportion to their providing a social expression for the struggle to realize an organic social world. Or, stated in another way, substantive human relationships are directly principled in the process of establishing reciprocity and complementarity between all dimensions of the human social experience. As principled social processes, substantive human relationships do not culminate in the development of either closed social groupings or the pseudo-groupings of the corporate world. They do culminate in the formation of genuine human solidarities. And it is the formation of such genuine human solidarities which represents the nucleus of a libertarian human social experience. A libertarian human social experience may be thus viewed as a means to the formation of enduring bonds of social interrelationship between human beings who are inspired by the ideals of human freedom. While these enduring

bonds of social interrelationship are based upon an identity of interests, they are concretely experienced as a living-out of the possibilities present for the organic unification of activity, thought, and sentiment. This dynamic unification of human sensibility, inquiry, and sociability, of course, constitutes nothing less than a concrete working-out of the axiology of human freedom.

Creation

The process of social consolidation has summed up the activities of actualization and reconstruction into a libertarian revision of the human social experience. While this libertarian revision of the human social experience has provided for the development of a substantive process of human relationships, it has not responded to the problem of human aesthetic freedom. Such a response is provided by the activity of creation.

The activity of creation refers to the entire social process involved in the transformation of the human value experience into a concrete working-out of the aesthetic of human freedom. As an emergent of the human desire for a critical moral experience, the aesthetic of human freedom has advanced the image of human values as active processes of social transformation in their own right. Basically, the transformational viewpoint has held the solution to the problem of human aesthetic freedom to be a matter of grounding the process of value experience in the totalization of the different constituents of organic social action. Thus, rather than abstracting the process of value experience from human relationships, inquiry, and sensibility, the transformational

viewpoint has envisioned the human value experience as a means by which sentiment, thought, and sociability may be organized into new, and more adequate, understandings concerning what remains to be accomplished for the creation of an organic social world. Therefore, according to the aesthetic of human freedom, the more transformational the process of social morality, the more prospective the human experience; and the more prospective the human experience, the greater the possibility of a dynamic unity between human sensibility, reflection, activity, and morality.

The materialization of the aesthetic of human freedom is grounded in the seminal observation that in a libertarian social world the human value experience is neither a source of human consistency nor an object of human loyalty. Rather it is concerned with the transformation of an appreciative process of social activity into a critical moral synthesis. The term "critical moral synthesis" refers to that concrete, albeit prospective, realization of libertarian human possibilities which emerges out of a rigorous evaluation of a past history of social experience. While the development of a critical moral synthesis is grounded in an appraisal of a past history of social experience, it is neither a product of human ideology nor a derivative of human repression. On the contrary, the creation of a critical moral synthesis is motivated by the human struggle to achieve an organic social world, and, having achieved it, to break beyond it to the development of new libertarian human prospects. This dual process of criticism and creation is not removed, of course, from the other constituents of a libertarian social world. Indeed, the development

of a critical moral synthesis may be viewed as coexistent with the process of organic action itself.

Thus, the realization of libertarian human possibilities ultimately begins with the activity of actualization, continues with the practice of reconstruction, advances into the activity of consolidation, and culminates in the practice of creation. The creation of a critical moral synthesis may thus be viewed as binding together genuine human possibilities, substantive human meanings, and genuine human solidarities into a unitary process of value experience. And this unitary process of value experience may be envisioned, in its core features, as a concrete working-out of the aesthetic of human freedom.

The activity of creation represents the last point of culmination of the process of organic action. The process of organic action thus consists of four interrelated processes of social activity, each of which represents a concrete working-out of a specific dimension of the phenomenology of human freedom. The activity of actualization represents the social process by which possibilities for the development of a more holistic social world may be disclosed. The activity of reconstruction constitutes the social process by which a libertarian epistemology may be generalized into a process of political freedom. The activity of consolidation represents the social process by which a more substantive mode of human sociability may be materialized. And, finally, the activity of creation constitutes the social process by which the transformational viewpoint may be made the basis of the human value experience. Taken together, these four interrelated

processes of social activity may be envisioned as providing a complete answer concerning what must be done for the creation of a libertarian social world.

Conclusion

While not a historical inevitability, an organic paradigm of social action has always been a human possibility. This human possibility has required, for its prosecution, a fundamental reconstruction of the complete process of social action. This revision of the complete human social process begins with a core alteration of the process of human dispositions, continues with a transformation of the process of human queries, and is concretely materialized by means of a root reconstruction of the process of human activities. Or, stated in another way, an organic paradigm of social action commences with the ascendancy of the problem of human freedom, blossoms out into human consciousness by means of the phenomenology of human freedom, and is realized in concrete social experience by means of the process of organic action. While the activities of actualization, reconstruction, consolidation, and creation concretely materialize the quest for human liberation, they do not exhaust the full contours of an organic process of social reality. An organic process of social reality also manifests itself in a unique transformation of the quality of human life. This reconstruction of the quality of human life may be described as the condition of human uncertainty.

Chapter 7. The Condition of Human Uncertainty

Generalized processes of social experience are often associated with a dominant value-quality. In terms of the history of social action, this dominant value-quality is simultaneously retrospective and prospective. Retrospectively, it constitutes the nucleus of the human condition emergent from the resolution of a particular paradigmatic problem. And prospectively, it symbolizes a qualitative transformation of the human situation and thus sets the stage for the development, or possible development, of a new human problem of paradigmatic proportions. For example, the cosmological experience culminates in the condition of human chaos. Chaos represents a lived summation of the quest for human salvation and anticipates, in turn, the ascendancy of the problem of human order. Likewise, the corporate experience always tends towards the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness. Reinforced meaninglessness represents the value-quality associated with the desire for an orderly social world. The antithesis of the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness is, of course, the will to human freedom. The will to human freedom motivates, and will likely continue to motivate, the development of a more organic process of social experience. And the organic experience, like its competitors - the corporate and the cosmological experiences, culminates, or may culminate, in a distinctive quality of human life.

This chapter will investigate the value-quality associated with the struggle for human freedom. This value-quality will be described as the condition of human uncertainty. The condition of human uncertainty may be defined as that quality of human life which is distinguished by the presence of many libertarian human possibilities, and by the absence of any way of achieving finality for the process of human freedom. There are four modes of human uncertainty, each of which is grounded directly in a particular dimension of the process of organic experience. These four modes of human uncertainty may be described as relativity, partiality, provisionality, and prospectiveness. Relativity represents the type of human uncertainty emergent from a human survival experience which is devoted to the fullest actualization possible of the opportunities present for the development of a more holistic social world. Partiality symbolizes the uncertainty of a reconstructive political experience. Provisionality refers to the mode of human uncertainty which is associated with a substantive process of human sociability. And, finally, prospectiveness denotes the uncertainty of a creative aesthetic experience. These four modes of human uncertainty are not independent of one another. On the contrary, each mode of human uncertainty may be viewed as a partial, albeit related aspect of a single, unitary process of qualitative human consequences. For example, the relativity of a libertarian process of social being anticipates, and even necessitates, the reduction of reconstructive human thought to the uncertainty of partiality. Similarly, the partial character of a libertarian process of human consciousness backs up, and even requires, the reduction of a consolidating social experience

to the uncertainty of provisionality. Further, the provisionality of a libertarian process of human sociability anticipates, and even demands, the reduction of a creative aesthetic experience to the uncertainty of prospectiveness. Finally, the prospective character of a libertarian process of social morality anticipates, once more, the transformation of a wider and wider expanse of human experience into the uncertainty of relativity, partiality, and provisionality. The condition of human uncertainty thus contains four interrelated dimensions, each of which sums up a particular aspect of the process of organic experience into a specific, qualitative transformation of the human social reality.

The inception of a relative, partial, provisional, and prospective human situation proceeds directly out of the process of organic experience. The process of organic experience is imbued with a critical strain, one which restricts its range and duration, and which sets the stage for a regression, or a possible regression, of social existence to the quest for human salvation. This critical strain simply signifies that the process of organic experience, while providing the means to human freedom, does not, and, indeed, cannot, serve as the end of human freedom. The process of organic experience cannot, in other words, enclose the struggle for human liberation within the certitude of finality. It simply provides concrete social processes which, if prosecuted, will result in the fullest actualization possible, at any given moment, of libertarian human possibilities. These social processes of human freedom are never, of course, absolute, complete, predetermined, or consistent. On the contrary, they are fated

to remain contextual, incomplete, transitive, and transformational. Furthermore, they are fated to remain more indeterminate than final because the struggle for human freedom does not originate in a social void, but arises out of the human determination to remain faithful to the concrete qualities of the process of social experience. The social processes involved in the libertarian struggle are, in this event, neither a product of human metaphysics nor an object of human abstraction. They are an emergent of the human will to principle the realization of human freedom in the organic unification of concrete social experience. Nowhere in the domain of concrete social experience are there to be found any ultimate ends, complete processes of social thought, enduring modes of social experience, or inevitably consistent processes of value experience. Instead, the domain of concrete social experience is exhausted by a dynamic working-out of the relationships which exist between human sentiments, queries, activities, and lived evaluations. Human sentiments are embedded in particular socio-historical contexts. Human queries are partial to the specific human sensibilities which they serve to express. Human practices act as provisional points-of-release for particular processes of social consciousness. And the more evaluative aspect of concrete social experience sums up what has gone before into new, and more prospective, totalizations of human existence. Thus, in the domain of concrete social experience, there is no finality but only the uncertainty of the contextual, indeterminate, transitive, and prospective process of human life itself. Being principled in this process of concrete

social experience, the project of human freedom is not to eradicate the uncertainty of human existence but to work actively through it to the organic unification of human experience. Indeed, the task of human liberation is to promote actively the fullest disclosure possible of the uncertainties of concrete social experience. For it is exactly the direct apprehension of human uncertainty which reveals that the human enterprise has shifted away from both the certitude of human salvation and the orderliness of human security to an immediate confrontation with the exigencies of the concrete social world.² Human uncertainty represents, in this case, less the antithesis of social liberation than the very life-blood of the process of human freedom itself. Human freedom is thus synonymous with the organic unification of the process of social experience; and the organic unification of the process of social experience has, as its working material, the relativity, partiality, provisionality, and prospectiveness of the concrete social world.

The absence of any finality on the part of the process of human freedom is not without consequence. On the contrary, the fact that freedom begets uncertainty provides a preliminary insight into the fate, or likely fate, of the organic experience and into the curious relationship which exists between the contradictory quests for human salvation and human liberation. In this vein, the ascendancy of uncertainty as the dominant value-quality of the human social reality circumscribes the development of the process of organic experience and condemns the struggle for human freedom to a position of permanent opposition against the social reality of human salvation, and thereby against the process of corporate experience. Seldom in the history of human existence have libertarian social movements demonstrated an

ability to deal continuously with the indeterminate character of concrete social experience. And rarely, if ever, in the chronicle of human history have libertarian struggles principled themselves in the firm conviction that the indeterminacy of the process of concrete social experience constitutes the nucleus, indeed, the positive and fundamental nucleus, of an organic social world. The obverse has, however, all too often held true. Repeatedly, libertarian social movements, having seized the dynamic of their historical situations, have managed to actualize, however fleetingly, particular dimensions of the process of human freedom, whether productive, political, social or aesthetic. And just as often such libertarian struggles have regressed at the last instant, when confronted by the uncertainty of existence which their efforts have reaped, towards the absolutization of their gains. Freedom has dissolved into "salvation." The concrete experience of human indeterminacy has spawned the desire for absolute certitude. And the very process of libertarian action itself has been reduced to a cosmology. In short, the inability of libertarian social movements to instatiate human uncertainty as the life-blood of the process of human freedom has given rise to a peculiar historical momentum. This peculiar historical momentum has had as its content the passage of the process of organic experience into the cosmological, and thereby the passage of the quest for a substantively meaningful social world into the desire for the stillness of absolute certitude.³ While this process of social transformation appears to be the product of an enduring fear of human indeterminacy, it is not a historical inevitability. On the contrary, it is possible that human beings,

at any given moment, may begin to back up their commitments to libertarian social ideals with an active, and even fervent, acceptance of the uncertainty which the process of human freedom ever entails. Such a genuine commitment to the indeterminacy of a libertarian social world requires, of course, an intensive appreciation of the origins, development, and content of the condition of human uncertainty.

The ensuing discussion will provide the basis for an active appreciation of the condition of human uncertainty. It will do so by examining, in more detail, the inception, growth, and content of an indeterminate process of human experience. This examination will proceed through four steps. First, the thesis will be presented that the condition of human uncertainty represents less a fortuitous consequence of the process of organic experience than a direct emergent of it. This thesis will be explored by tracing the origins of human uncertainty to the very statement of the problem of human freedom itself. The problem of human freedom will be viewed, in this event, as the ultimate ground of the fatal flaw which cross-cuts the process of organic experience - the tendency of a libertarian social reality to dissolve into indeterminacy. Second, the argument will be made that the tendency to human uncertainty has not been limited to the level of libertarian human sensibilities, but has been magnified by means of the phenomenology of human freedom into the dominant value-quality of an organic world-view. It will then be demonstrated that the value-quality of human uncertainty has been structured out, albeit implicitly, by means of the process of organic action into the key

dynamic of a distinctive pattern of social organization. Third, following this discussion of the genesis of an indeterminate human experience, an examination will be made of the four major dimensions of the condition of human uncertainty - relativity, partiality, provisionality, and prospectiveness. Each of the above modes of human uncertainty will be investigated both for its content and for the transformation, or possible transformation, of the direction of human experience which it anticipates. Finally, after a consideration of the four central modes of human uncertainty, some concluding comments will be made.

The Fatal Flaw

The process of organic experience is imbued with a fatal flaw. This fatal flaw may be visualized as the tendency of an organic social reality to dissolve into a human condition which is typified by the presence of many means to human freedom, and by the absence of any end to the libertarian struggle. While the ascendancy of this fatal flaw in human experience signifies that the libertarian enterprise stands on the very edge of a fundamental and unparalleled transformation of the process of social reality, it also intimates the dissolution, or possible dissolution, of the libertarian urge into the desire for the certitude of human salvation. An indeterminate human condition thus exists simultaneously as the apex of human freedom and as the point, or possible point, of its disintegration.

The tendency to human uncertainty has its genesis in the very statement of the problem of human freedom itself. The problem

of human freedom, while elucidating the principles of a substantively meaningful social world, does not, and, indeed, cannot, provide an answer concerning how these principles might be actualized with any degree of finality. Rather, the problem of human freedom suggests, by its very statement, that the struggle for substantive human meaning can never be fully and irrevocably concluded. It intimates that the libertarian enterprise is fated to remain a contextual, partial, transitive, and prospective process of means rather than a network of ultimate ends. And it further intimates that whenever and wherever the libertarian struggle is invested with finality, then human freedom concludes and human salvation begins.

The reasons for the indeterminate character of the problem of human freedom are as follows. It has previously been contended that the libertarian venture is grounded, at first, in a fundamental transformation of the process of human dispositions. This fundamental transformation of human sensibilities has given rise to four particular expressions of the problem of human freedom, each of which responds, albeit in a different way, to the general human query concerning how it might be possible to break beyond the human condition of reinforced meaninglessness to the creation of a substantively meaningful social world. There is, in this case, a subjective problem of human freedom, a collective problem of human freedom, a social problem of human freedom, and an aesthetic problem of human freedom. The subjective problem of human freedom originates in the human desire to burst beyond corporate irrationality to the development of a holistic survival experience.

The collective problem of human freedom queries how it might be possible to reach beyond the reactivity of the corporate political experience to the meaningfulness of a reconstructive inquiry. The social problem of human freedom is motivated by the human determination to escape the accidentality of corporate sociability in favour of a more substantive process of social experience. And the aesthetic problem of human freedom queries how it might be possible to break beyond the apologetic quality of an immoral process of value experience to the critical spirit of a genuine human morality. There are, therefore, four particular problems of human freedom, each of which represents a complementary, although partial, aspect of a unitary process of libertarian human sensibilities. This unitary process of libertarian human sensibilities has never received, however, a single content. On the contrary, each particular problem of human freedom has been capable of being expressed in four different, although complementary, ways. Each of these four major contents may be visualized as a distinctive way of basing the quest for human freedom in the domain of concrete social experience. Taken together, the four major dimensions of the problem of human freedom - whether subjective, collective, social, or aesthetic - and their relevant contents form the essential ingredients of a process of human sensibilities which, while disclosing many libertarian possibilities, does not reveal any final solution to the quest for substantive human meaning. Or, stated slightly differently, the tendency to human uncertainty originates not only in the interrelated and transcendent character of the central dimensions of the problem of human freedom, but also in the striking fact that each libertarian

sensibility constitutes a complicated working-out of diverse social contexts, pluralities of social thought, indeterminate social relationships, and congeries of moral visions.

Thus, there is only one problem of subjective human freedom, but it may receive many different expressions according to which concrete social context motivates the human desire for a holistic process of social being. While the aspiration for a holistic human survival situation is primarily a product of an aversive response to the irrationality of corporate existence, such irrationality may manifest itself in productive, political, social or aesthetic forms. Depending on which form of corporate irrationality inspires the yearning for social holisms, a fundamentally different starting-point is gained for the project of human freedom. Some human beings may suffer a primacy of productive irrationality, and thus be driven to define the problem of human freedom as fundamentally a matter of economic exploitation. Other human beings may suffer, above all, the consequences of political irrationality, and thereby be driven to visualize the problem of human freedom as involving resistance to coercive collective obligations. Yet others may experience a primacy of social irrationality, and thus be prone to accept the reconstruction of human relationships as the fundamental datum of human liberation. Finally, some human beings may experience most acutely the irrationality of the corporate value experience, and consequently be compelled to define human freedom as essentially a moral problem. There are, therefore, four different contexts out of which may develop the yearning for a more principled process of social being. These major human contexts are not,

of course, antithetical to one another but complementary. Each represents a particular, and thereby relative, interpretation of the single problem of human subjective freedom. The problem of human subjective freedom is thus condemned to be embedded in the indeterminacy of a diversity of shifting human contexts.

Likewise, there is only one problem of human collective freedom, but it may obtain many different contents depending upon which element of corporate reactivity provides the basis for the project of social reconstruction. While the desire for a more reconstructive process of social inquiry is essentially a derivation of an aversive response to the reactivity of corporate existence, such reactivity represents, in turn, an expression of a particular form of corporate irrationality, whether economic, collective, relational, or aesthetic. Thus, depending upon which expression of corporate irrationality, and thereby of corporate reactivity, motivates the reconstructive urge, a fundamentally different mode of libertarian thought ensues. The process of reconstructive thought may take, as its object, an exploration of the possibilities present for the rectification of economic domination, political coercion, social manipulation; or moral repression. These different objects of reconstructive human thought are not, of course, mutually exclusive of one another. On the contrary, they may be viewed as relative, albeit partial, aspects of the single problem of collective human freedom. While the relativity of the different objects of reconstructive inquiry is based in the fact that each of them constitutes a concrete working-out of libertarian opportunities present within a

particular context of human experience, their partiality originates in the fact that none of them scans, or can scan, the entire human context. The problem of collective human freedom is thus fated to be anchored in the uncertainty of a plurality of contextual and incomplete processes of human thought.

Similarly, there is only one problem of human social freedom, but it may receive many different expressions according to which dimension of social oppression preforms the desire for a more substantive process of human sociability. While the yearning for a more substantive social experience is primarily a product of an aversive response to the oppressiveness of corporate existence, such oppressiveness may be experienced in a number of different ways. Some human beings may suffer, most acutely, the unsubstantiality of social relationships emergent from the productive sector of corporate existence. Other human beings may experience a primacy of political oppression. Yet others may suffer, most severely, the pathological character of everyday relationships across the corporate world. Finally, some human beings may experience a primacy of moral oppression. There are, therefore, four qualitatively different modes of corporate oppression, each of which grounds the development of a fundamentally different interpretation of the problem of human social freedom. These different interpretations of the problem of human social freedom are neither unrelated to one another nor estranged from the other dimensions of the libertarian human struggle. Indeed, each expression of the problem of human social freedom may be viewed as a partial, albeit complementary, aspect of a larger unitary whole. And each element within this larger, unitary

whole may be both visualized as an emergent of a specific desire for subjective human liberation, and as a manifestation, although a fleeting manifestation, of a particular process of reconstructive human thought. In short, the problem of human social freedom is condemned to the indeterminacy of a congerie of contextual, partial, and provisional processes of libertarian relationships.

Finally, although there is only one problem of human aesthetic freedom, it may be expressed in many different ways depending upon which mode of corporate repressiveness motivates the human aspiration for a critical process of social morality. While the yearning for a critical value experience is essentially an emergent of resistance against the repressiveness of corporate existence, such repressiveness may manifest itself in different ways. Corporate repression may involve the popularization of a distorted network of economic values, the aggrandizement of the pathological politics of power, the reduction of human social life to the externalities of status and prestige, or the ascendancy of loyalty itself as the dominant standard of the process of social morality. There are, therefore, four qualitatively unique modes of corporate repression, each of which provides a fundamentally different starting-point for assigning content to the problem of human aesthetic freedom. These different expressions of the problem of human aesthetic freedom are not isolated from one another nor are they independent of the other dimensions of the process of libertarian human sensibilities. On the contrary, each expression of the desire for a critical value experience is ever relative, partial, provisional, and prospective. It is relative because it

grounds in a particular human context; partial because it embodies only incompletely a specific process of libertarian struggle; provisional because it represents but a transient manifestation of this struggle; and prospective because it sums up a unitary, albeit particular, content of the process of libertarian human sensibilities into new, and more adequate, totalizations of human experience. In sum, there may be only one problem of human aesthetic freedom, but this single problem of aesthetic liberation is embedded in a content which is both transformational and vitalistic.⁵

The process of libertarian human sensibilities, whether considered subjectively, collectively, socially, or aesthetically, is thus distinguished by the indeterminacy of many different contents. While these different interpretations of the content of each dimension of the problem of human freedom elucidate libertarian possibilities across the domain of concrete social experience, they do not provide a way of actualizing human freedom with any degree of finality. On the contrary, the presence of many possible contents for the problem of human freedom intimates that the libertarian struggle is fated to remain a process of working through these contents to the organic unification of human experience. Accordingly, the project of human freedom - the organic unification of human experience - remains, and will likely continue to remain, more contextual than absolute, more incomplete than determinate, more transitive than predetermined, and ultimately more prospective than static. The tendency to human uncertainty is thus firmly grounded in the very statement of the problem of human

freedom itself. Human freedom anticipates, and even requires, uncertainty; and human uncertainty provides content for the process of social liberation. However, the tendency to human indeterminacy is not peculiar to the statement of the problem of human freedom. On the contrary, it has been magnified into the dominant value-quality of the organic experience by means of the phenomenology of human freedom and the process of organic action.

The Flaw Magnified

So far, it has been demonstrated that the emergence of the problem of human freedom as an object of general social concern is accompanied by the transformation of human sensibilities into a process of indeterminacy. It will now be argued that this tendency to indeterminacy - the fatal flaw which is immanent in the organic experience - has been generalized into the structure of libertarian consciousness itself by means of the phenomenology of human freedom, and has been further extended into the dynamics of libertarian practice by means of the process of organic action.

In this vein, it has been asserted previously that the libertarian struggle requires, for its solution, a fundamental transformation of the process of human consciousness. This root alteration of human consciousness has been described, in its entirety, as the phenomenology of human freedom. The phenomenology of human freedom interrelates into a unitary world-view four key assumptions concerning the nature of social existence, each of which responds to a particular dimension of the general problem of human freedom. There is, in this event, an

ontology of human freedom, an epistemology of human freedom, an axiology of human freedom, and an aesthetic of human freedom. The ontology of human freedom sums up the aspiration for subjective liberation into the vision of an organic, and thereby holistic, social universe. The epistemology of human freedom bases the quest for collective liberation in the development of a reconstructive, and thereby genuinely empirical, process of human inquiry. The axiology of human freedom transforms the desire for social liberation into the image of an intrinsic, and thereby substantive, process of human sociability. And the aesthetic of human freedom generalizes the yearning for moral liberation into the vision of a transformational, and thereby critical, process of value experience. The phenomenology of human freedom thus contains four interrelated postulates, each of which represents a concrete, albeit partial, response to the process of libertarian sensibilities. However, this unitary process of libertarian human consciousness has never received a single expression. On the contrary, it has always been receptive, and will likely continue to be receptive, to many different expressions, each of which discloses the libertarian possibilities present within a specific interpretation of a particular dimension of the problem of human freedom. Taken together, these different interpretations of each dimension of the phenomenology of human freedom - whether ontological, epistemological, axiological, and aesthetic - provide the single process of libertarian human consciousness with an element of indeterminacy. This element of indeterminacy inheres in the fact that the phenomenology of human freedom,

rather than manifesting a principle of finality, unifies into a single process of libertarian consciousness ~~four~~ key postulates, each of which serves as a means, albeit a complementary, incomplete, provisional and transcendent means, to social liberation.

For example, there is only one ontology of human freedom, but it may be interpreted in many different ways according to which content of the problem of human subjective freedom preforms the vision of an organic social universe. While the ontological assumption of an organic social universe is primarily a response to the desire for social holisms, this human desire may originate in four different social contexts, whether productive, political, social, or aesthetic. Depending upon which of these four major social contexts provides the basis for the development of the problem of human subjective freedom, a fundamentally different viewpoint ensues concerning what constitutes an organic social world. The nucleus of an organic social world may be variously conceived as the development of a dynamic synthesis between necessity and nature, the creation of new political unities, the harmonization of the process of social experience, or as the enactment of a new moral synthesis.⁶ These different images of an organic social universe are fundamentally complementary because each vision of an organic social world represents a relative, albeit partial, working-out of a specific dimension of the single problem of human subjective freedom. The ontology of human freedom is thus fated to be embedded in the indeterminacy of a variety of principled human viewpoints.

Likewise, although there is only one epistemology of human freedom, it may receive many different expressions according to which

interpretation of the problem of human collective freedom provides the basis for the development of a reconstructive, and thereby genuinely empirical, process of human inquiry. While the epistemological theory of reconstructive empiricism responds primarily to the quest for collective liberation, this quest is grounded, in turn, in a specific interpretation of the nature and content of an organic social world. Thus, depending upon which image of the organic social universe contexts the desire for collective liberation, a specific interpretation emerges concerning the content of reconstructive empiricism. In this sense, reconstructive empiricism may be visualized, albeit at different moments and places, as a means of expression for the organic possibilities immanent within human necessity, political life, social relationships, or within the process of value experience itself. In addition, these different interpretations of the content of reconstructive empiricism are more mutually inclusive than alienated from one another. Their reciprocity originates in the fact that each understanding of reconstructive empiricism constitutes but a partial response to the single problem of collective freedom.⁷ The epistemology of human freedom is thus condemned to be principled in the incompleteness which is the hallmark of all genuine empiricisms.

Similarly, there is only one axiology of human freedom, but it may receive many different interpretations according to which expression of the problem of human social freedom principles the image of an intrinsic process of human sociability. While the vision of an intrinsic social experience derives, above all, from the struggle

for social liberation, this struggle may manifest itself in different forms, whether in substantive human relationships founded on a commonality of survival interests, political ideals, social aspirations, or moral prophecies. Depending upon which type of human social freedom provides the basis for the vision of an intrinsic social experience, a strikingly different viewpoint ensues concerning the content of a libertarian process of human relationships. Thus, an intrinsic social experience may be variously conceived as having as its internal principle of validation its expression, indeed its concrete expression, of the opportunities present for the reconstruction of political life, productive experience, associative existence, or of the moral domain itself. These different bases for the development of an intrinsic social experience are not, of course, estranged from one another. On the contrary, they are unequivocally complementary. And they are complementary precisely because each content of an intrinsic social experience represents but a provisional, and thereby relative and partial, working-out of the unitary problem of human social freedom. The axiology of human freedom is thus ever fated to be embedded in the indeterminacy of a plurality of possible bases for the creation of genuine human solidarities.

Finally, although there is only one aesthetic of human freedom, it may receive as many different interpretations as there are possible expressions of the human desire for a more critical process of value experience. While the vision of a critical value experience derives, most fundamentally, from the quest for moral

liberation, the quest may move in different directions. The direction taken by the struggle for moral liberation is dependent upon which dimension of the human social experience - whether productive, collective, social, or aesthetic - has been visualized as the primary object of value renewal. According to which dimension of the human social experience has been accepted as the principal object of moral liberation, a distinctive perspective emerges concerning the range and content of a critical value experience. A critical value experience may be grounded, albeit at different times and in different places, in the totalization of productive relations, in the appreciation of genuine political solidarities, in the rigorous evaluation of human social bonds, or in the transformation of the more symbolic aspect of human existence. These different processes of moral liberation are, of course, more harmonious than competitive. Their harmony is grounded in the striking social fact that each content which may be given to a critical moral experience comprises but a prospective, and thereby contextual, incomplete, and transitive, working-out of the single problem of human aesthetic freedom. The aesthetic of human freedom is thus condemned to be principled in the uncertainty of a congerie of possible modes of human social transformation.

The process of libertarian human consciousness, whether visualized ontologically, epistemologically, axiologically, or aesthetically, is thus characterized by the uncertainty of many different interpretations. While these different interpretations of the phenomenology of human freedom designate what must be done for

the actualization of a holistic, reconstructive, substantive, and critical social world, they do not disclose any way of achieving closure for the libertarian struggle. On the contrary, the presence of many contents, albeit reciprocal and harmonious contents, for the phenomenology of human freedom suggests that the single process of libertarian consciousness, like the process of libertarian sensibilities itself, represents, and is likely to continue to represent, a contextual, partial, transitive, and prospective means of working through these contents to the organic unification of human experience. In short, the tendency to human uncertainty ramifies beyond its basis in human sentiment, and it squarely lodged in the very structure of libertarian consciousness itself. This momentum towards indeterminacy does not cease, however, at the frontiers of the libertarian construction of social reality. Rather, the tendency to human uncertainty has been further magnified into the realm of social activity by means of the process of organic action.

In this event, it has been contended previously that the libertarian enterprise demands, for its progression, not only a fundamental transformation of the processes of human sensibilities and human consciousness, but also a root reconstruction of the pattern of human social organization. This root reconstruction of the pattern of human social organization has been visualized as being principled in the ascendancy of the process of organic action. The process of organic action unifies into a libertarian pattern of social organization four central processes of social activity, each

of which serves to actualize a particular dimension of the phenomenology of human freedom. These four central processes of social activity may be described as the practices of actualization, reconstruction, consolidation, and creation. The activity of actualization transforms the ontological vision of an organic social universe into the nucleus of a libertarian mode of human survival practice. The activity of reconstruction represents a concrete working-out of the epistemology of human freedom. The activity of consolidation generalizes the image of an intrinsic social experience into the core dynamic of a more substantive process of human sociability. And the activity of creation represents a concrete working-out of the aesthetic of human freedom. The process of organic action thus consists of four interrelated activities, each of which constitutes a concrete expression of a particular phase of the phenomenology of human freedom. However, this unitary process of libertarian human activities has never received a single content. On the contrary, it has always attracted, and will likely continue to attract, many different contents, each of which serves to materialize a specific interpretation of a particular phase of the process of libertarian consciousness. When combined, these many different contents imbue the process of organic action with an element of uncertainty. This element of uncertainty is grounded in the root social fact that the process of organic action, rather than demonstrating a final solution to the problem of human freedom, integrates into a unitary human social process four central activities, each of which serves as a means for the creation of reciprocity and harmony

between the different approaches to social liberation.

In this way, there is only one process of actualizing activity, but it may receive as many different interpretations as there are contrasting visions of an organic social world. The activity of actualization may be variously conceived as having, as its object, the disclosure of the opportunities present for the organic unification of work experience, political life, social experience, or moral action. While these different human possibilities are commonly unified as means, albeit alternative means, to the creation of the same organic social world, they are divided according to the concrete social context in which they originate. Different human situations thus preform, and even anticipate, the emergence of unique libertarian opportunities; and different libertarian opportunities require, for their solution, unique expressions of the single process of actualization. In short, there may be only one process of actualizing activity, but this unitary human social process is distinguished by the indeterminacy of a thoroughly relative content.

Moreover, although there is only one process of reconstructive activity, it may be expressed in many different ways, according to which interpretation of the epistemology of human freedom preforms the project of political liberation. While the process of reconstructive activity responds primarily to the quest for a genuinely empirical mode of human inquiry, this quest is grounded in turn, in the actualization of libertarian human possibilities. Thus, depending upon which human possibility principles the libertarian struggle, a fundamentally different viewpoint ensues concerning the content and direction

of the process of reconstructive activity. The nucleus of the process of reconstructive activity may be considered, albeit at different moments and places, as the conferring of substantive human meaning upon the quest for human necessity, the struggle for a more adequate mode of associative existence, the pursuit of genuine human relationships, or upon the task of moral liberation. These different images of the process of reconstructive activity are linked together by bonds of reciprocity and complementarity. And they are linked together by bonds of complementarity and reciprocity because each expression of the politics of reconstruction represents but an incomplete and contextual working-out of the possibilities immanent in human experience for the unification, indeed, the organic unification, of human sensibilities and human consciousness. In other words, the single process of reconstructive activity is capable of dissolving into the uncertainty of a relative and partial content.

Similarly, there is only one process of consolidating activity, but it may be interpreted in as many different ways as there are contending visions of an intrinsic social experience. In this case, the activity of consolidation may be variously conceived as having, as its content, the development of genuine human solidarities around the reconstruction of economic experience, political action, social life, or of the ~~human moral~~ experience itself. While these different manifestations of human solidarity commonly contribute to the creation of a single, substantive social experience, they also possess an element of autonomy. This element of autonomy inheres in the striking social fact

that each process of social consolidation represents a qualitatively unique working-out of a different human possibility, and thereby, of a different process of political reconstruction. Unique human possibilities thus preform, and even require, distinctive political expressions; and distinctive processes of political reconstruction anticipate unique manifestations of human solidarity. In sum, there may be only one process of social consolidation, but this single human social process is ever principled in the indeterminacy of a contextual, partial, and provisional content.

Finally, although there is only one process of creative activity, it may be interpreted in many different ways depending upon which expression of the aesthetic of human freedom guides the task of moral transformation. While the process of creative activity grounds, most fundamentally, in the struggle for a genuinely transformational, and thereby critical, human value experience, this struggle responds, in turn, to the totalization of libertarian human solidarities. Thus, depending upon which genuine human solidarity provides content for the project of moral freedom, a strikingly different perspective ensues concerning the nature of the process of creative activity. In this case, the process of creative activity may be principled in the totalization of a diversity of genuine human solidarities, whether economic, political, social, or cultural. Rather than being mutually exclusive of one another, these different bases for the process of creative activity are fundamentally reciprocal. And they are reciprocal because each expression of the creative enterprise represents but a contextual, partial, transitive,

and prospective working-out of the opportunities available in human experience for the organic unification of human sensibilities, consciousness, practice, and values. In short, the process of creative activity is distinguished by the uncertainty of a transcendent and transformational content.

The process of organic action is, therefore, imbued with the indeterminacy of many different contents. While these different contents specify the exact social processes by which an organic, reconstructive, intrinsic, and transformational social world may be materialized, they do not provide the process of human freedom with any degree of finality. Indeed, the indeterminacy of the process of organic action intimates that the libertarian social struggle is fated to remain a means, albeit a highly uncertain means, of synthesizing many different perspectives into the dynamic integration of human experience. Accordingly, the tendency to human uncertainty - the fatal flaw which originates in the very statement of the problem of human freedom and which is magnified by means of the phenomenology of human freedom - is structured out into concrete social existence by means of the process of organic action. The ascendancy of the process of organic action thus discloses that the dominant value-quality of a libertarian social reality is fully expressed by the different modes of human uncertainty, and by the relationships that hold between them.

Modes of Human Uncertainty

While the tendency to human indeterminacy originates in the very expression of the problem of human freedom and is extended into human existence by means of both the phenomenology of human freedom and the process of organic action, it ultimately blossoms forth as the nucleus of a distinctive, and indeed qualitative, transformation of the human situation. In its fullest expression, this qualitative transformation of the human situation may be visualized as the condition of human uncertainty. The condition of human uncertainty interrelates in a unitary transformation of the human situation four central value-qualities, each of which represents a specific mode of human experience, whether productive, political, social, or aesthetic, emergent from a libertarian social reality. These four central value-qualities have previously been introduced as relativity, partiality, provisionality, and prospectiveness. Thus, all that remains to be done is a consideration of the specific transformations of human experience brought about by the ascendancy of each mode of human uncertainty, and an investigation of the consequences, or likely consequences, of this transformation of the human situation for the libertarian prospect.

Relativity

Relativity is the key-note of the process of human freedom. There can be no libertarian endeavour which is not based in an active appreciation of the contextual character of the process of concrete social experience; and there can be no awareness of the relativity

of human experience which does not lead, or may not lead, to a strengthening of the libertarian urge. Human freedom begets uncertainty; and human uncertainty is directly apprehended, first and foremost, in terms of the relativity of the process of social liberation.¹⁰

While the tendency to human relativity manifests itself, and is, indeed, made more and more apparent as the dominant value-quality of human existence, at each instant in the process of social liberation, the tendency to human relativity extends well beyond the frontiers of human freedom to the domain of concrete social experience. In this vein, relativity is a value-quality of human freedom because the overriding task of all libertarian enterprises devolves on the fuller and fuller disclosure of the concrete qualities of human experience. And one of the principal qualities of the process of concrete human experience is that it is divided into four interrelated dimensions, and that each of these major dimensions of human experience provides the context, or may provide the context, for the development of libertarian human sensibilities. The longing for human freedom may originate, in other words, in an aversive response to either the domination of human necessity, political coercion, social control, or moral repression. These different modes of human freedom are not, of course, independent of one another. On the contrary, they are fundamentally complementary. And they are complementary because each mode of human freedom is based in the transformation, or possible transformation, of a different dimension of the unitary process of concrete social experience and is, therefore, but a relative manifestation of a single human social process.

The relativity of concrete social experience thus breeds a contextual process of human freedom; and the contextual character of human freedom contains three important implications for the future of the process of organic experience. First, there has never been, and can never be, a single direction in the libertarian social struggle. The libertarian enterprise is capable of moving simultaneously in four qualitatively different directions, each of which principles the struggle for human freedom in the reconstruction of a different dimension of the process of concrete social experience. While the different directions which may be taken by the libertarian social struggle are dissimilar to the extent that each of them grants primacy to the transformation of a different phase of human experience, whether productive, political, social, or cultural, they are like one another insofar as each of them represents but a partial, and indeed reciprocal, manifestation of the single process of human freedom. In this case, there is no struggle to relieve economic exploitation which is not simultaneously a process of political, social and aesthetic transformation; no process of political freedom which is not based in a prior transformation of economic life, and which does not anticipate the reconstruction of human sociability and human morality; no campaign for social freedom which does not direct a past history of productive and political liberties into the project of moral renewal; and, finally, there is no process of aesthetic freedom which does not sum up a prior reconstruction of the productive, political, and social phases of the human situation, and which does not disclose new possibilities for the liberation of the human condition.

In short, the diversity and interconnectedness of the different directions assumed by the libertarian social struggle stands as the primary implication of relativity for the future of the organic social experience. In addition, the value-quality of human relativity also entails a temporal and spatial progression in the struggle for human freedom. While human freedom always has, as its basis, the liberation of human beings from the constraints of physical necessity, it enjoys, as its apex, the expansion across the human social domain of a creative process of value experience. Human freedom is grounded, in other words, in the realm of survival, advances into the domain of the political, progresses by means of the social, and culminates in the moral. This rough ordering of the progressive stages involved in the libertarian social struggle is not, of course, an absolute sequence. On the contrary, it is only indicative of a relative movement. And it is only expressive of a relative movement because the human project in a libertarian social world is not to work towards a final solution to the problem of human freedom, but to strive for a gradual redirection of the libertarian effort. While this gradual transformation of the content of human freedom is grounded in a movement beyond the physical to the political, beyond the political to the social, and ultimately beyond social freedom to moral liberation, it must, of necessity, be conducted with the expectation that human freedom will never be a fully moral enterprise, but will always involve a dynamic working-out of the libertarian possibilities present within the physical, collective, and social dimensions of human experience.

In short, the task of those committed to human freedom is not to work towards the extinction of human relativity, but to strive actively to employ the opportunities inherent in a relative human condition for the liberation of humanity. While an active acceptance of the value-quality of relativity constitutes the cornerstone of the process of human freedom, its rejection entails the dissolution of the organic social experience and the ascendancy, or possible ascendancy, of a generalized human preoccupation with the quest for absolute certitude. The quest for absolute certitude signals, of course, the appearance, once more, of the problem of human salvation - the antithesis of human freedom. Thus, the final implication which relativity holds for the libertarian prospect is simply that a denial of the affirmative qualities of a contextual human situation leads, or may lead, to the termination of human freedom and to the reemergence of the social reality of human salvation.

Partiality

While the process of human freedom is principled in relativity, it is also imbued with partiality. The partiality of the process of human freedom derives, most fundamentally, from the special position occupied by reconstructive empiricism in the task of achieving the organic unification of human experience. In this case, the process of human freedom is not exhausted by the struggle against the different manifestations of human domination, but also contains another, more positive, element. This more positive aspect of human freedom may be visualized as the root social fact that the libertarian struggle is

also concerned with the injection of substantive human meanings into the human social domain. Indeed, the creation of substantive human meanings represents the exact point at which the libertarian enterprise rises above reactivity towards a past history of social dominations to a consideration of the concrete social processes which may be deployed for the organic unification of human experience. The development of such substantive human meanings is, of course, the special function of reconstructive empiricism. As a process of libertarian social thought, reconstructive empiricism serves to generalize the domain of human possibilities into images of the human situation which reveal, indeed which concretely reveal, how it might be possible to create a dynamic synthesis between all dimensions of the process of concrete social experience. Reconstructive empiricism thus operates to create temporal unities between human sentiment, reflection, activity, and morality. However, such temporal unities are an expression of particular libertarian human possibilities; and the domain of human possibility is always imbued with relativity. Accordingly, there never has been, and can never be, a single, complete process of libertarian social thought. Rather, reconstructive empiricism is embedded in specific libertarian opportunities, and is, by that reason, fated to remain but a partial expression of the possibilities existent, at any given moment and place, for the organic unification of human experience.

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The partial character of reconstructive empirical inquiry intimates that no complete and final expression can be given to the libertarian urge. Substantive human meanings are principled in

particular concrete social contexts and must, therefore, be held relative to the specific modes of human freedom which they serve to generalize. Moreover, while all expressions of reconstructive empirical thought complement one another as partial aspects of a unitary human social process, such inquiries, when combined, do not constitute a finished whole. Human freedom is genuinely indeterminate. And the indeterminacy of human freedom has, as one of its products, the rise and fall of particular processes of libertarian reflection in response to the materialization of unique human possibilities. While the rise and fall of particular expressions of reconstructive empiricism provides for the shattering and reconstitution of existent social orders, it does not, and indeed, cannot, culminate in a final libertarian synthesis. To achieve a final libertarian synthesis, reconstructive empiricism would have to be reduced to an apology for a particular human possibility. And this reduction would entail an abandonment of the central role played by reconstructive empiricism as a creative agency in the indeterminate process of human freedom. In other words, the creation of a finished whole - a final libertarian synthesis - would mean that the directly apprehended process of human reflection would cease to be either reconstructive or empirical. The indeterminacy of creativity thus militates against the finality of apology. Moreover, given a genuine human commitment to the indeterminacy of reconstructive empiricism, there can be no expectation that the libertarian process of human reflection will ever manifest itself in an enduring collective form. Libertarian politics are but relative expressions of particular processes of reconstructive empirical thought;

and such modes of human inquiry are but partial manifestations of the diverse and active realm of human possibilities. Thus, just as particular processes of reconstructive empirical thought, having completed their function, are doomed to dissolve, so, too, libertarian politics, having provided an adequate collective basis for the formation of genuine human solidarities, are condemned to disintegration. Libertarian politics are, therefore, but temporal arcs between human possibility and human sociability. The temporality of libertarian politics represents a necessary condition for the development of human freedom. The process of human freedom depends, for its prosecution, upon the transformation of every aspect of concrete social experience into a means for the organic unification of human life. While this transformation of human life is grounded, at first, in the relativity of libertarian human sensibilities, it also requires that libertarian politics be imbued with the value-qualities of partiality and temporality. Libertarian politics thus represent a means to the organic unification of human experience only to the extent that they are self-consciously visualized as incomplete, and thereby dispensable, aids to the actualization of substantive human meanings. At the exact instant that such politics are elevated into substantive human meanings in their own right, and consequently envisioned as final embodiments of the libertarian aspiration, the struggle for human freedom ends, and the quest for the certitude of completeness begins. The quest for the certitude of completeness, whether in reflection or in politics, represents, of course, a dynamic nucleus of the process of cosmological experience.

Provisionality

Although the process of human freedom is qualified by relativity and partiality, it also contains the value-quality of provisionality. The provisionality of the process of human freedom may be viewed as a special attribute of the genuine human solidarities emergent from the playing-out of reconstructive empirical thought. Reconstructive empiricism provides for the creation of substantive human meanings; and substantive human meanings, once developed, serve as the nucleus of genuine human solidarities. As the embodiment of a substantive process of human sociability, genuine human solidarities are not, of course, absolute, complete, or static. On the contrary, they are contextual, partial, and transitive. They are contextual because principled human relationships are but concrete manifestations of particular human possibilities and of specific processes of libertarian human reflection. They are partial because genuine human solidarities, rather than encompassing the full range of libertarian social action, fuse a particular process of reconstructive empirical inquiry into a specific process of libertarian practice. And, finally, genuine human solidarities are provisional because they provide but a fleeting expression of the possibilities immanent in the human social experience for the materialization of libertarian ideals. The provisionality of substantive human relationships does not contradict the libertarian social struggle. Indeed, the element of provisionality, like the value-qualities of relativity and partiality, constitutes the very life-blood of the process of human freedom.

And provisionality constitutes the life-force of social liberation because the process of human relationships attains substantiveness, and thereby facilitates the growth of human freedom, in direct proportion to the extent to which it provides a momentary, concrete, and solidary bond between the products of libertarian human reflection and the realization of genuine moral ideals. Endurance is thus not the acid-test of human freedom. The process of human freedom is condemned to frailty. And the frailty of the libertarian social struggle manifests itself, above all, in the striking social fact that genuine human solidarities are fated not only to remain transient expressions of the heterogeneous and shifting domain of human sentiment and human reflection, but also to dissolve once the moral ideals which they concretely embody have been realized.

The provisionality of genuine human solidarities suggests the prophetic insight that the principle of indeterminacy is, in the most critical sense, the key-note of a substantive process of human sociability. There can be no substantive process of human sociability which is not thoroughly imbued with the qualities of transiency and heterogeneity; and there can be no element of provisionality which does not contribute, or may not contribute, to the creation of a truly indeterminate, and thereby libertarian, human social experience. The uncertainty bred by provisionality is thus the fountainhead of a substantive process of human sociability. Accordingly, an aversive response to the uncertainty of genuine human solidarities represents a direct challenge to the libertarian prospect. And if this challenge

is accompanied by a generalized human desire for the certitude of predetermination, then the prospects for human social freedom dissolve into the stillness of the social reality of human salvation.

Prospectiveness

While the process of human freedom is principled in relativity, partiality, and provisionality, it also contains an element of prospectiveness. The prospectiveness of the process of human freedom derives, most fundamentally, from the special position assigned to the human value experience in the project of achieving dynamic reciprocity and complementarity between all aspects of concrete social experience. When considered from the libertarian viewpoint, the process of human value experience is neither a source of social dogma nor a receptacle of human loyalties. It is a concrete social process by means of which libertarian human possibilities, substantive human meanings, and genuine human solidarities may be totalized into a critical moral synthesis. Since this critical moral synthesis sums up a past history of libertarian social struggles into a rigorous, and, indeed, creative, appraisal of what remains to be accomplished, it is never unprincipled, complete, predetermined, or regressive. A critical moral synthesis is never unprincipled because, by definition, it is based in an active appreciation of the human condition. It is never complete nor predetermined since it provides but a provisional evaluation of a particular process of social liberation. And a critical moral synthesis is never regressive because it serves as the point at which the libertarian venture breaks beyond the chains of its own

history to the consideration of new possibilities for the organic unification of human experience. The creation of a critical moral synthesis, as the nucleus of a libertarian human value experience, thus adds a final note of indeterminacy to the process of human freedom. This final note of indeterminacy intimates that the struggle for human freedom is fated to remain a process without end. Libertarian sentiments generalize into substantive human meanings; the products of empirical human reflection ground the development of genuine social solidarities; substantive human relationships dissolve into a critical moral synthesis; and this critical moral synthesis, in disclosing that libertarian ideals have not yet been fully realized, prepares for the transformation, or possible transformation, of the human social reality. The prospectiveness of the process of human freedom harmonizes, however, with the nature of concrete social experience. In the domain of concrete social experience, there is simply a unitary human social process which, while interrelating into a complementary whole human sentiments, reflections, practices, and ideals, has no ultimate point of inception or completion. As a qualitative emergent of the process of concrete social experience, the libertarian endeavour is thus condemned to the prospectiveness of a contextual, indeterminate, and transitive human social reality. Indeed, any challenge to the uncertainty of a prospective human value experience is, at one and the same time, a repudiation of the empirical, and thereby genuinely concrete, basis of human freedom. And any repudiation of the basis of human freedom in the domain of concrete social experience is but

another step towards the certitude of moral consistency, the hallmark of the cosmological experience.

The condition of human uncertainty thus integrates into a single human social process four central value-qualities, each of which symbolizes a specific transformation of the human situation brought about by the ascendancy of the organic experience. Relativity denotes the value-quality of human sensibilities in an organic social world. Partiality describes the quality of human life emergent from a libertarian process of human politics. Provisionality denotes the central value-quality of the human social experience in an organic social universe. And prospectiveness describes the quality of value experience emergent from a libertarian process of social morality. Taken together, these four dominant value-qualities form the final point of magnification of the fatal flaw which is implicit in the process of organic experience - the fact that the process of organic experience, while providing for the presence of many libertarian human possibilities, does not, and indeed cannot, provide any way of securing finality for the libertarian prospect.

Conclusion

This investigation of the condition of human uncertainty, the final phase of the process of organic experience, has revealed that human freedom, while an active social possibility, is not a historical inevitability. Human freedom does not have to be realized; and even if actualized, no assurance can be gained from anywhere in the history of social experience that human beings will finally

demonstrate themselves capable of dealing continuously with the indeterminacy of relativity, partiality, provisionality, and prospectiveness. It is more likely that the libertarian prospect, whenever actualized, will dissolve rapidly into the process of cosmological experience, and that those committed to libertarian ideals will remain opponents of their historical situations rather than creators of a new human social reality.

Table 1. The Complete Process of Social Action





Table 2. The Cosmological Paradigm of Social Action



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Table 3. The Corporate Paradigm of Social Action





Table 4. The Organic Paradigm of Social Action



NOTES

CHAPTER 1. AN INQUIRY INTO THE THEORY OF RECONSTRUCTION OF
POLITICAL REALITY

1. For some formative treatises on the contents of the process of paradigmatic action, see particularly John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1925)., and Arthur F. Bentley, Knowing and the Known (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949)., William James, A Pluralistic Universe (New York: Longmans, Green and Co.,)., Karl Jaspers, Man in the Modern Age (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1957)., Talcott Parsons, Politics and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1969)., Deena and Michael Weinstein, Living Sociology (New York: David McKay Company, Inc. 1974)., Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).
2. Michael A. Weinstein, "New Ways and Old to Talk about Politics", a paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association meetings, 1971.
3. For some excellent descriptions of the impediments confronting the development of a genuinely empirical mode of human knowledge, see especially John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948)., William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912)., and Deena and Michael Weinstein, Living Sociology, op. cit.
4. Professor Howard Aster, conversations, October 1973.
5. An excellent discussion of concretely apprehended experience as the context of all empirical inquiry is provided in William James' Essays in Radical Empiricism, pp. 42-43.
6. John Dewey, How We Think (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1910), pp. 79-80.
7. Ibid., p. 118.
8. Arthur Kroker, "Epistemologies, Visions, And Political Inquiry", an unpublished paper, 1973.
9. Many contemporary social philosophers have contended that the concrete process of social experience itself provides the ultimate ground for the verification of libertarian inquiry. For two interesting proposals of this sort, see Selected

Readings from the Works of Mao TseTung (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1971), p. 503., and John Dewey, Theory of Valuation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1943), p. 57.

10. Professor Michael Weinstein, conversations, November, 1971.
11. The indeterminacy of human history does not disallow the possibility of temporal and spatial relationships between the different paradigms of social action. Indeed, the history of social action may be understood as moving in two directions simultaneously. In the most primitive sense, human history is concretely experienced as the space and time of now: a space and time in which the tendencies to human salvation, security, and freedom rise and fall with no apparent connection and with no significant regularity. In a more mediate sense, the history of social action may be visualized as a vast and dynamic progression from one construction of social reality to another: a progression which is typified by a movement beyond the cosmological experience to the social reality of human security, and, by a leap, or a possible leap, beyond the corporate experience to an organic social reality. These two directions in the history of social action are more complementary than disconnected. Their complementariness originates in the salient social fact that the history of social experience is always more a matter of relative dominance than of absolute domination. For a similar viewpoint on the reconstructive quality of the historical experience see Gordon Leff, History and Social Theory (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1971).
12. The conception of a "unitary human social process" has been explicitly elucidated by many thinkers, including, among others, Henri Bergson, Arthur F. Benley, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, John Dewey, William James, Hannah Arendt, George Herbert Mead, Radhakamal Mukerjee, and Deena and Michael Weinstein. It has also been an implicit and, indeed, highly important feature of the writings of Karl Marx, Talcott Parsonse, and Max Weber.
13. The Weinsteins have transformed an ontological and aesthetic criticism of the corporate life-order into a profound synthesis of the human social process. Although working independently, I am intellectually indebted to them. This debt includes not only the Weinsteins' introduction of the present author to social process theory, but also their demonstration that militant activity is best tempered by militant philosophical reflection. For an appreciation of their writings, see particularly Michael A. Weinstien, "Politics and Moral Consciousness", Midwest Jorunal of Political Science, XIV, 2(May, 1970), pp. 183-215., Systematic Political Theory (Columbus: Charles

E. Merrill, 1971)., Philosophy, Theory and Method in Contemporary Political Thought (Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1971)., The Political Experience: Readings in Political Science (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972)., and Deena Weinstein, Living Sociology, op. cit.

14. This interpretation of Parsons' contribution to the theory of paradigmatic action has developed from a reappraisal of his seminal writings on the basis and direction of social change. See Talcott Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966)., Politics and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press, 1969)., and The Social System (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951).
15. For an interesting discussion of the place of impulse in human politics see John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: The Modern Library, 1930), pp. 100-103.
16. Jean-Paul Sartre has commented that "all consciousness is positional in that it transcends itself in order to reach an object". See Justus Stellar, To Freedom Condemned (New York: Philosophical Library, 1960), p. 25.
17. The Weinsteins have described a complete human action as "a group of people in relation to one another, using a set of objects for the realization of purposes". Implicit to this interpretation of human activity is the insight that human relationships are not individual properties, but active social processes. See Deena and Michael Weinstein, Living Sociology, p. 129.
18. Radhakamal Mukerjee has described the more qualitative aspect of human existence as follows: "The basic impulsion which shapes and works out human destiny and the process of civilization is the full flowering of human intuition and imagination - comprehension of total meanings and values, anticipation and appreciation of fresh transcendent situations and possibilities and consecration to new universal goals and purposes". See Radhakamal Mukerjee, The Sickness of Civilization (Bombay: Allied Publishers Private Ltd., 1964), p. 107.
19. For a historical application of the principle of "preformance," see my "Competing Visions of Nature: Cosmological, Anthropomorphic, and Ecological", an unpublished paper, 1972.
20. For a concrete interpretation of the principle of "anticipation," see my "Cosmologies of Nature", an unpublished paper, 1972.

21. The term "working-out" is not intended to imply that the process of social action is imbued with a teleological principle. On the contrary, the different dimensions of the process of social action represent a "working-out" of another because human existence is not bound together by a fundamentalism, but by directly apprehended relations of reciprocity, complementarity, and intermediation.
22. For other presentations of the complete social process, see particularly Hannah Arendt's treatise on "Action," in The Human Condition, pp. 155-223, John Dewey's writings on "The Analysis of a Complete Act of Thought" in How We Think, pp. 68-78, Talcott Parsons' description of the constituents of social action in The Social System; the Weinstein essay on "Human Action" in Living Sociology, pp. 118-141, and Max Weber's commentary on "The Fundamental Concepts of Sociology," in The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, pp. 87-157.
23. For an admirable discussion of the place of dispositions in human conduct, see George Herbert Mead's treatise on "The Self and the Process of Reflection" in his Mind, Self, and Society, volume 1, pp. 354-378.
24. Karl Manheim has eloquently described the contextual and summational qualities of the process of human consciousness in his Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1936).
25. In his Social System, Talcott Parsons has described the social processes of adaptation, differentiation, integration, and pattern-maintenance as the dominant principles of organizational activity in the modern age. For a revision of this aspect of Parsonian theory, see my "The Corporate Experience: Ontology and Contradictions," an unpublished paper, May 1973. And for an excellent interpretation of the social process of human freedom, see Michael Weinstein's discussion of the activities of creation, aesthetic appreciation, participation, and inquiry in his essay entitled "Socialism and Humanism." Jeffrey R. Orenstein and Louis Patsouras, The Politics of Community: New Aspects of Socialist Theory and Practice (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1973), pp. 13-37.
26. For a persuasive image of the different directions in the process of human experience, see Deena and Michael Weinstein, Living Sociology, pp. 123-126.
27. Or, as Josiah Royce has argued, "...the whole universe, precisely insofar as it is, is the expression of a meaning, is the conscious fulfillment of significance in life..." Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual, (London: The Macmillan Company, 1920), p. 443.

28. Michael Weinstein, conversations, April 1972.
29. Ibid., Living Sociology.
30. For an epistemologically derived image of "paradigms," see Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962).
31. Paradigms of social action, as concretely experienced constructions of social reality, transcend the "normal" dimensions of past, present, and future. It is only when their central features have been "distanced" from immediate existence-by means of critical reflection that it becomes possible to discuss relationships of emergence and summation between generalized human problems, phenomenologies of social reality, processes of social organization, and human conditions.
32. For an evocative description of the sensibilities involved when possessed by such a "question," see Arthur Koestler, Darkness at Noon (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1973).
33. For a comprehensive description of the phenomenological dimension of the process of social experience, see Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (New York: Macmillan Co., 1931).
34. For a comparable vision of the process of social organization, see Karl Jaspers' eloquent portrayal of the "technical mass-order" in his Man in the Modern Age, pp. 33-88.
35. For some penetrating discussions of the value-quality of the process of human experience, see Simone De Beauvoir, The Woman Destroyed (London: Wm. Collins Sons and Co. Ltd., 1969), and Andre Malraux, Man's Fate (New York: Vintage Books, 1961).
36. The three generalized human problems have inspired a diversity of intellectual commentaries. For a cross-section of writings on the problem of human salvation, see particularly Saint Augustin, Les Confessions (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1964), H. Richard Niebuhr, The Social Sources of Denominationalism (New York: Meridian, 1970), and Michael Oakeshott, Experience and its Modes (Cambridge: University Press, 1966). Among others, Gabriel Almond, David Apter, David Easton, Samuel P. Huntington, and Talcott Parsons are modern representatives of the intellectual tradition motivated by the problem of human security. For a sampling of the writings on human freedom, see particularly John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, L. T. Hobhouse, Liberalism (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), Herbert Marcuse, Negations (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955), George Santayana, Dominations and Powers (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), and Deena and Michael Weinstein, Living Sociology.

37. Karl R. Popper has developed a similar image of human epistemologies in his Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).
38. See Talcott Parsons, The Social System, and Deena and Michael Weinstein, Living Sociology, and my "The Corporate Experience: Ontology and Contradictions," Op. Cit.
39. For an excellent discussion of the relationship between chaos and order, see George Santayana, Dominations and Powers, pp. 33-35.

CHAPTER 2. THE COSMOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE

1. For some excellent descriptions of the ontological and epistemological development of the corporate experience, see P. W. Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics (New York: Macmillan, 1961), Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science (New York: Collier Books, 1962), Leszek Kolakowski, The Alienation of Reason: A History of Positivist Thought (New York: Anchor Books, 1969), and Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (New York: Harper and Row, 1965).
2. The philosopher Nicolas Berdyaev has described the absolutization of subjectivity as emanating from "ontological philosophy...from the philosophy of the all-in-one." See his treatise The Beginning and the End (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1952), p. 142.
3. An example of a philosophical work which commits itself to the value of completeness is Michael J. Oakeshott's Experience and its Modes (Cambridge: The University Press, 1966).
4. For example, Plato seems to identify "justice" with acquiescence in an antecedent moral design and, on this basis, prescribes the social and political relationships necessary for its actualization. See especially Books 1 and 4 of the Republic in The Dialogues of Plato (New York: Random House, 1937), volume 1.
5. A classic example of the consistency of moral absoluteness is Immanuel Kant's "categorical imperative." See his monograph Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 33.
6. For an admirable discussion of the principles of an absolutist universe, see Josiah Royce's The World and the Individual, pp. 141-182.
7. John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley have described the central features of tautological consciousness (under the category of "self-actional" epistemologies) in their book Knowing and the Known (Boston: Beacon Press, 1940).
8. A representative example of this mode of philosophy is Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's Christianity and Evolution (New York: Harcourt and Brace Jovanovich, 1971).

9. For a lucid exposition of this position, see Sterling P. Lamprecht's The Metaphysics of Naturalism (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967).
10. For some insightful historical descriptions of the process of mythification, see particularly James G. Frazer, The Golden Bough, A Study in Magic and Religion, abridged edition (London: Macmillan, 1971), and Edward B. Tylor, Primitive Culture (Boston: Estes and Lauriat, 1874). A contemporary appraisal of the place of myth in the history of social action has been developed by Talcott Parsons in The Social System, pp. 516-517.
11. A philosophical illustration of this is Karl Marx's and Frederick Engels' The Communist Manifesto (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1954).
12. For example, see George Hegel's The Phenomenology of Mind (New York: Macmillan, 1961).
13. A representative writing in this tradition is Wilhelm Reich's The Function of the Orgasm (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1973).
14. Note the resemblance of this process of objectifying faith to the "cybernetics" of corporate existence. The collectivization of faith seems to be one way that cosmologies strive to enhance their "adaptive capacity," thus anticipating the structural-functional ideal of survival.
15. An example of this is the "Ten Commandments."

CHAPTER 3. THE CONDITION OF HUMAN CHAOS

1. A contemporary example of this is the Soviet-Chinese rivalry over rights of succession to the Marxist-Leninist cosmology.
2. The Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno has opined that this interior tension of the philosophical tradition originates in an intense opposition between reason and imagination. Having described reason as a "dissolving force" and imagination as "integrative and totalizing," he was led to the conclusion "that the vital longing for human immortality finds no consolation in reason and that reason leaves us without incentive or consolation in life and life itself without real finality." Miguel de Unamuno, The Tragic Sense of Life (New York: Dover Publications, 1954), p. 106.
3. For an excellent account of the decline of religious cosmologies into sectional social movements, see H. Richard Niebuhr's The Social Sources of Denominationalism (New York: Meridian Books, 1970). And for an exhaustive description of important social "monisms," see Deena and Michael Weinstein's Living Sociology, pp. 40-46.
4. The decline of the Christian cosmology, however, may be perhaps attributed more to an internal source of chaos (Protestantism) than to chaos from without.
5. However, while committing itself to the primacy of a particular dimension of human experience, each cosmology also includes elements of the other phases of human existence. In this sense, there is no cosmology which is bereft of experience, reason, will, or imagination.
6. For a representative writing in this tradition, see Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co., 1910).
7. For some insightful expositions on national and racial determinisms, see particularly Leo Snyder, The Idea of Racialism: Its Meaning and History (New York: Van Nostrand, 1962), Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Meridian Books, 1966), Morris Ginsberg, Nationalism: A Reappraisal (Leeds: University Press, 1963), and Aurobindo Ghose, The Human Cycle: The Ideal of Human Unity (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1962). And for an unambiguous demonstration of the racist mentality, see Adolph Hitler's Mein Kampf (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1943).

8. For a philosophical understanding of the "social dissolution," see Georges Gurvitch's Determinismes Sociaux et Liberté Humaine (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955). A contemporary example of social determinism is Robert Ardrey's The Territorial Imperative (New York: Atheneum, 1966).
9. For example, there does not appear to be any empirical basis upon which a decision of "veracity" may be made between Maritain's and Strauss' opposing perspectives on the origins and development of natural rights and natural law. See Jacques Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1947), and Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).
10. I am indebted to Mr. T. J. Farrell for his stimulating commentary on the relationship of chaos to reason and imagination.
11. The sense of "absurdity" described here is less the absurdity of "nothingness" than that of an irreconcilably contradictory plenitude.
12. It will become apparent in the following two chapters that while "apathy"--the paralysis of will--represents the negation of cosmological experience, it is a necessary condition for the persistence of the corporate experience. Thus, the corporate experience transforms the seeds of destruction of the cosmological into a means for its own survival.
13. In a related way, Nicolas Berdyaev has pointed out the opposition between the development of a philosophy of life and any attempt at suppressing social anomalies: "Philosophical knowledge depends on the range of experience, and it also supposes an essentially tragic experience of all the contradictions of human existence. Philosophy is therefore based upon the maximum experience of human existence." See his Solitude and Society (London: The Centenary Press, 1947), p. 13.
14. For a philosophical "fall-out" of this immobility of morality, see Friedrich Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals (New York: Vintage Books, 1969).

CHAPTER 4. THE CORPORATE EXPERIENCE

1. For some important political and social theorists who have embraced the problematic character of order, see particularly Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1951), Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses (London: Routledge and Paul, 1950), Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1974), and David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965).
2. Or, stated more technically, "the problem of order, and thus of the nature of the integration of stable systems of social interaction, that is, of social structure, ... focuses on the integration of the motivation of actors with the normative cultural standards which integrate the action system, in our context interpersonally." Talcott Parsons, The Social System, pp. 36-37.
3. David Easton has described this political process as involving the "authoritative allocation of values." The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science (New York: A. Knopf, 1963), pp. 129-134.
4. For an excellent critique of the process of moral repression, see Herbert Marcuse, Negations (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).
5. For some admirable descriptions of the place of the "entitative" ontology in the theory of human action, see especially John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open Court Publishing House, 1925), chapter 2, William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1971), pp. 23-48, and Michael A. Weinstein, "New Ways and Old to Talk about Politics," Review of Politics, 35 (January, 1973), pp. 41-60.
6. This radical shift of the tendency to entropy from a patterned flow to a personal failing is intended, of course, to make the problem of human chaos "ontologically," and thereby concretely, manageable.
7. Weinstein, "New Ways and Old to Talk About Politics," Op. Cit.
8. For a treatment of the same process from a sociology of knowledge perspective, see William Leiss, The Domination of Nature (New York: George Braziller, 1972).

9. Parsons has described "process regression" of this sort as the ultimate negation of corporate experience. Talcott Parsons, Politics and Social Structure (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1969).
10. I am indebted to Professor John Burke, a Canadian political theorist, for his insightful observations on the problem of reification.
11. While the corporate experience entails a privatization of concern with salvation and of value-experience, it does not, of course, eliminate them.
12. Parsons, Politics and Social Structure, p. 397.
13. The four "currencies of exchange"--money, power, influence, and value-commitments--have been taken directly from Parsons' description of the "symbolic media" which regulate movement within and across the different systems of human action. Parsons has described the maximization of the four "symbolic media" as the central feature of the "public morality of instrumental activism," the governing value-experience of modern institutional existence. Talcott Parsons, Politics and Social Structure, p. 397.
14. The regulatory sanctions which coordinate the expansion of the different currencies of exchange have been developed by Talcott Parsons in his Politics and Social Structure, p. 363.
15. For a lucid description of the "maximizing" qualities of the corporate process of value-experience, see Michael A. Weinstein, "The Sociology of Public Morality: Talcott Parsons and Phenomenology," private communication with "Michael A. Weinstein."

CHAPTER 5. THE HUMAN CONDITION OF REINFORCED MEANINGLESSNESS

1. For a penetrating discussion of the abstract instrumentalism of corporate experience, see Karl Jaspers' Man in the Modern Age (New York: Anchor Books, 1957), pp. 41-64.
2. Laswell has traced the development of the psychopathology of power politics to the "displacement of private affect upon public objects." Harold Laswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1951), Chapter X, "The Politics of Prevention," pp. 173-203.
3. For an excellent account of the forms of political, social, and economic stratification which develop from the annihilation of role-distance, see Pitrim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Mobility (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959).
4. Deena and Michael Weinstein, Living Sociology, pp. 156-162.
5. The survival referred to here is, of course, that of the massive organizations and pervasive institutions that are supposed to ensure the survival of humanity. Thus, corporate experience is not simply abstract, but it is doubly abstract! This insight was offered to the present author in a letter from Michael A. Weinstein, April, 1975.
6. Compare this description of the necessary irrationality of corporate political activity with proposals for a "rational" political policy process put forth by Anthony Downs in his An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957), and by David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindbloom in their A Strategy of Decision (New York: The Free Press, 1970).
7. Radhakamal Mukerjee, an Indian social theorist, has associated Toennies' vision of pseudo-grouping with the perversion and distortion of moral experience. In discussing the genealogy of "disvalues," Mukerjee has commented: "...man's social regression is associated with the pursuit of low and spurious needs and values, infantilism, social inadequacy and neurotic state of personality and disintegration of the social order--different facets of the pathology of life, mind and civilization." Radhakamal Mukerjee, The Sickness of Civilization (New York: Paragon Book Gallery, 1964), p. 64.
8. Op. Cit., Living Sociology, pp. 19-20.

9. In sum, the corporate actively perverts moral experience by making values the cutting-edge of individual and organizational interests. Thus, in the corporate experience, interests regulate moralities, and pathological desires govern interests. For an excellent critique of the inadequacy of the corporate value experience, see Michael A. Weinstein's article "A Fourth Branch of Government: For Whom?" in his book The Political Experience (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1972).
10. The Canadian critic, Northrop Frye, has summed up the repressive consciousness of happy tranquility into the poetic phrase-- "the alienation of progress." For an admirable description of the social and intellectual consequences of corporate propaganda, see his book The Modern Century (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1967).
11. In describing the desire for glory or reputation as a principal cause of civil strife, Thomas Hobbes was a prophet of the corporate. See his Leviathan, Op. Cit., p. 185.

CHAPTER 6. THE ORGANIC EXPERIENCE

1. The fountainhead of human liberation is, in this event, less noetic or aesthetic than the decisiveness of intentionality. The human will, steeped in passion and driven by moral conviction, leads, or may lead, humanity beyond the corporate experience.
2. Radhakamal Mukerjee has described a holistic universe as a "bio-social-ideal situation." See his insightful treatise The Dimensions of Human Evolution: A Bio-Philosophical Interpretation (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1967).
3. For an insightful description of the obstacles confronting the development of a reconstructive mode of political activity, see John Dewey's The Public and Its Problems (Chicago: Gateway Books, 1946).
4. For example, the social psychologist George Herbert Mead has traced empirically the development of genuine human solidarities from a shared appreciation of the value of cooperation. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, pp. 317-336.
5. For an illuminating discussion of the method of "totalization," see Jean-Paul Sartre's book Search For a Method (New York: Random House, 1968).
6. William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, Op. Cit., p. 42.
7. For a similar fusion of epistemology and axiology, see John Stuart Mill's Philosophy of Scientific Method (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1950).
8. Michael A. Weinstein has identified "creative freedom, aesthetic appreciation, participation, and inquiry" as the principal intrinsic values of a more rational human order. See his essay, "Socialism and Humanism," in Jeffrey R. Orenstein's and Louis Patsouras' The Politics of Community: New Aspects of Socialist Theory and Practice (Dubuque; Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 1973), pp. 33-37.
9. Contrast this description of the ideals and functions of an empirical process of value experience with Kant's proposal for a "pure moral philosophy." Refer especially to Kant's Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1959).
10. The present author is indebted to Mr. T. J. Farrell for his insightful comments on the relationship of meaning and freedom.

11. The point is, of course, that in a libertarian world the existence of a political apparatus signifies a failure of both reason and morals.
12. Weinstein, "Socialism and Humanism," Op. Cit., pp. 33-35.

CHAPTER 7. THE CONDITION OF HUMAN UNCERTAINTY

1. For some excellent philosophical discussions of the principle of human indeterminacy, see Wilhelm Dilthey, The Essence of Philosophy (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1954) and Stephen C. Pepper, World Hypotheses (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).
2. Taken to its logical conclusion, the direct experience of human indeterminacy also discloses that, while the cosmological and corporate experiences are intelligible and comprehensible, they can never be synthesized by the process of organic experience.
3. Noting this inner tension of the will to human freedom, the philosopher Albert Camus has essayed that "a revolutionary action wishes to be coherent in terms of its origins should be embodied in an active consent to the relative. It should express fidelity to the human condition." Albert Camus, The Rebel (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1953), p. 257.
4. Or, stated negatively, the four freedom "situations" may be suppressed by the development of particular "statist" theories, whether moral, social, political, or economic. For example, Marcuse's plea for cultural liberation is counterpointed by Mao Tse-tung's proposal for the domination of value experience. The normative libertarianism of the philosophical anarchists Kropotkin and Proudhon is offset by the Leninist theory of social control. Stalinism negates the political rebelliousness of Fanon and Julius Nyerere. And Pitrim Sorokin's challenge to the desirability of "experts" is met by the dogma of socialist economic planning. See particularly Herbert Marcuse's An Essay on Liberation, Mao Tse-tung's Four Essays on Philosophy, Kropotkin's Mutual Aid, Stalin's "Socialism in One Country," Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth, Lenin's "Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder, Julius K. Nyerere's Ujamaa-Essays on Socialism, and Pitrim Sorokin's Who Shall Guard the Guardians?
5. Vitalistic, that is, in the sense that the process of human experience, being internally coordinated, contains its own principles of determination and evolution. Or, as the pragmatic tradition in philosophy has maintained; change itself is an object of immediate experience.

6. Or, described in another way, the source of libertarian solidarities may be either ecological, philosophical, existential, or aesthetic.
7. As the American philosopher Stephen Pepper has pointed out, there are as many theories of truth as there are world hypotheses, and as many world hypotheses as there are "root metaphors" to support them. See his World Hypotheses, Op. Cit., pp. 328-332.
8. And, following Nietzsche, each dimension of this critical value experience represents a moral critique in its own right--a valuing of all values. See particularly Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), p. 6.
9. For an excellent description of the different bases of social consolidation, see John Stuart Mill's essay on "Civilization," Essays on Politics and Culture (New York: Anchor Books, 1963), pp. 45-76.
10. For a penetrating defence of human relativity, see Hannah Arendt's chapter on "Ideology and Terror: A Novel of Government," in her book The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1966), pp. 460-479.
11. The American philosopher, George Santayana, has referred to social and moral liberation as the domain of "vital freedom." Santayana, Dominations and Powers, Op. Cit., pp. 57-60.
12. John Dewey has commented that "the meanings which are termed ideal as truly as those which are termed sensuous are generated by existence; that as far as they continue in being they are sustained by events; that they are indications of the possibilities of existences, and are, therefore, to be used as well as enjoyed; used to inspire action to procure and buttress their causal condition." Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 416.
13. Of course, that dimension of sentiment and reflection which is founded on either teleological or instrumental principles can never be integrated into genuine human solidarities.

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