

BABYLON ANATOMIZED

BABYLON ANATOMIZED:
BURTON'S USE OF AUGUSTINE

by

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Meditantur sua stercora scarabaei

Giordano Bruno

ABSTRACT

This dissertation argues that the works of Augustine, especially the *City of God* and the *Confessions*, serve as a major source and influence upon Burton's *The Anatomy of Melancholy*. Burton's attitudes towards the world, humanity, and his sources can be seen to derive in part from Augustine's attitudes on these subjects. Especially, Burton shares with Augustine a form of scepticism this dissertation defines as 'Augustinian Scepticism', which is qualitatively different from the dawning scientific-rationalist scepticism of, for example, Descartes. Though this form of scepticism could be defined as dogmatism, as its rigorous negativity never extends to the grounds of faith, it is still the source of much of Burton's attitude towards the world, his reader and his material throughout the *Anatomy*. Burton's *elenctic* rhetorical strategies especially, wherein he collapses all sides of an argument to create seeming chaos in the sublunary world, can in large part be traced to his reading of, and use of, Augustine and avowedly Augustinian thinkers such as Melancthon, Nicholas Cusanus and Agrippa.

Although critics such as Fish, Fox, Babb and Thompson deny an Augustinian influence in Burton's *Anatomy*, this dissertation argues against their positions. The argument presented employs a method of close, comparative readings, examining key passages of the *Anatomy* in the light of Augustine's *City of God*, the *Confessions*, and other works. Passages wherein Burton cuts closest to his submerged themes of redemption and salvation, abandoning the persona of Democritus Jr. in favour of his persona as Burton the Divine-Physician, (a symbolic persona drawn directly from Augustine), are especially examined. Through a focus on Burton's religious themes, a direct parallel with Augustine is discerned, and it is argued that Augustine has an influence on both style and substance in the *Anatomy*. Although Augustine is by no means the only, or even dominant influence on the *Anatomy*, Augustine would appear to play a much larger role in Burton's moral and spiritual thought, especially in Burton's scepticism towards the world, human knowledge and human endeavour, than has previously been acknowledged.

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*This volume is dedicated to my grandmother,
Lora Butler Paterson,
and to my parents, Lorne and Irene Gibson.*

*Learned Homer sometime sleepeth and the fastest
foote sometime slyppeth, the wysest tongue may catch a
tryp, and the wariest penne commit a fault, errour is as
naturall, as the correction thereof commendable.*

*Wherefore that which remaineth is, I commit my selfe
and my labour to thy good lyking, if thou lyke it, commend
it, and use it, if thou dyslike it, amend it, or refuse it.*

William Averell, 1590

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*Your supercilious critics, grammatical triflers, note-makers,
curious antiquaries, find out all the ruins of wit....
amongst the rubbish of old writers...*

Democritus Jr.

Incapable of Sober Discourse:

Burton and His Critics

Robert Burton's The Anatomy of Melancholy¹ is a complex work that appears to have drawn the greatest scholarly attention to its stylistic aspects. Though the Anatomy has many qualities to attract critical attention, part of the scholarly interest may be traced to the fact that most portions of the work rest upon literary foundations. Thousands of proofs, illustrations, arguments and evidences culled seemingly from all aspects of Western culture make of the Anatomy a treasury of aphorisms, quotations, allusions and anecdotes. As a result, a fascination with Burton's reading habits has arisen and become a source of contention amongst scholars, especially in the question of influences upon Burton's work.

It is the purpose of this thesis to examine the degree of influence generated by the works and ideas of Augustine upon Burton's Anatomy. Whether the influence is apparent through a direct reading of the works of Augustine on Burton's part, or whether Burton has inherited his Augustinianism through a filter of Renaissance sources, is not the central issue in this thesis. The central issue concerns whether or not there is an Augustinian element in Burton's Anatomy significant enough to deserve treatment. As we shall see below, a major school of thought on Burton denies that Augustinian elements are inherent in Burton's patterns of thought.

The question of influences is tied to context. It is a persistent tendency on the part of some scholars to examine Burton's Anatomy without due consideration of the cultural and historical contexts in which the work was written. Thus, there appear to be two basic critical approaches to the Anatomy. There are those critics who attempt to understand Burton on his own ground, by analyzing what Burton said and implied in

¹Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy. What it is. With all the kinds, causes, symptoms, prognostickes of severall cures of it. In three Partitions, with their severall Sections, members and subsections. Philosophically, Medicinally, Historically opened and cut-up by Democritus Jr., edited, with an introduction, by Holbrook Jackson, (London, 1932). All subsequent references to this volume will be carried in the text as (Anat., Partition number, Section number, Member number, Subsection number, page).

the Anatomy and placing that understanding in a necessary context, and there is a smaller group who castigate Burton either for what he said or for what he left unsaid¹. As we shall see below in the chapter on Burton, Augustine and rhetoric, Burton's Anatomy is a vast, complex and confusing (but not confused) edifice that deliberately works to defy definition and categorization.

The perception that it is Burton's conscious effort to confuse his readers has touched a chord in modern criticism and led to relatively sympathetic treatment of the Anatomy at the hands of critics such as Stanley Fish and Ruth Fox. These two critics especially examine the role of the reader in the Anatomy, taking their lead from the important and influential works of Rosalie Colie and Joan Webber on Burton's style and strategies. These critics argue that much of the meaning in the Anatomy is hidden beneath the satiric surface. In general, attempts to comprehend the Anatomy from this perspective are more perceptive than the efforts of critics who attempt to deal with the satiric surface of the Anatomy (especially the "Preface to the Reader"), without dealing with the more serious themes and sources that underpin the satire.

B.G. Lyons sees an underlying meaning in Burton's structures which, as we have seen above in the note on p. 2, some critics do not:

Where melancholy had already become an enormous catch-all for causes and symptoms of disease, Burton pushes matters a step further, and by calling it the condition of mortality (I, 144) changes the idea to a metaphysical one. The rigidly schematic pattern of the *Anatomy* is called into question by the extent to which it is over-elaborated, by the contradictory and doubtful ideas that are brought to play on it, and by

¹To illustrate the tendency to treat Burton harshly, one may speak for many. B. Chapin, in "Robert Burton and Renaissance Satire", (Columbia Ph.D., 1974), pp. 21-22, comments on Burton's 'method': "He often voices strong doubts about the utility and value of learning, but his scepticism is erratic and occasional. He neither lets scientific doubt restrict his field of inquiry to more productive dimensions nor does he draw any positive and consistent fideistic conclusions from the evident uncertainty of human knowledge...Instead he preserves what can only be called an obstinate faith in his own method (of which he is very proud) and continues to tackle every variety of knowledge...without producing any sort of synthesis."

the demonstration that is made throughout of the inadequacy of theory to the complications of life.¹

It is Burton's deliberate intent, Lyons feels, to undermine the structures and sense of order in his own work.

The aim is to show that life does not conform to precept and theory, and that the whole subject under consideration is far more complicated than might at first appear.²

That it is Burton's deliberate intent to undermine order and rationality in his own work becomes an important key to unlock the themes of the Anatomy. The question as to whether or not Burton *deliberately* seeks to undermine the sense of order in his own work has been a constant source of debate in Burton scholarship. Is Burton aware of what he is doing? Some critics, such as Chapin above, seem to argue that there is no serious theme or purpose in the Anatomy. Others debate whether the Anatomy is satire or sober discourse, while a perceptive few argue that it is both at the same time. The diversity of critical response to the Anatomy suggests that it is a more complex work than its harsher critics would seem to be willing to allow.

As this thesis is primarily concerned with the question of influences on Burton's deeper themes and rhetorical strategies, the focus in this critical survey will be on critics concerned with the same issue. However, perhaps it would be useful here to survey some of the various approaches taken to the Anatomy. One major aspect of Burton scholarship is concerned with Renaissance theories of melancholy, humoral psychology, and Burton's place in that tradition.³ Specialized studies analyze specific aspects of Burton's thought as filtered through modern critical perspectives, such as

¹G. B. Lyons, Voices of Melancholy: Studies in Literary Treatments of Melancholy in Renaissance England (London, 1971), pp. 147-148.

²Lyons, Voices, p. 131.

³For example, see Lyons, Voices; Laurence Babb, The Elizabethan Malady: A Study of Melancholia in English Literature from 1580 to 1642 (East Lansing, 1951); Laurence Babb, Sanity in Bedlam: A Study of Robert Burton's 'Anatomy of Melancholy' (East Lansing, 1959).

social criticism, psychological perspectives, and "utopianism".¹ A great deal of weight in Burton scholarship is given to the apparently vexing question of style and form in the Anatomy, and the relationship of style (especially the overtly satiric passages) and form to substance and theme. This sort of approach to the Anatomy is not only the most detailed and comprehensive, but usually is also the liveliest (although critics who tend to focus strictly upon the satire in the Anatomy necessarily ignore large portions of the work). We shall examine some of these critics below. A few critics examine, as this dissertation shall do in part, the perplexing question of the sources for and influences upon, the Anatomy. Conclusions concerning which writers may or may not have influenced the style, structure and substance of the Anatomy are as diverse as the various critics' perceptions. Let us turn then to examine selected aspects of the Anatomy's critical heritage in recent scholarship that are relevant to the scope and aims of this dissertation.

Douglas Bush, in a study that sets the standard for mainstream interpretation of Burton, describes the tone of most of the Anatomy as "one of interrogative, ironical, Lucianic scepticism,"² underpinned by Burton's "sanity of mind and largeness of heart, his capacity alike for robustious or bitter laughter and for sensitive exploration of the darker places of the soul."³ But

though Burton is here [the Preface] and everywhere a realistic satirist, a detached observer of the human comedy, he is much more than that ...

¹In order, W.R. Mueller, The Anatomy of Robert Burton's England, (Berkeley, 1952); Bergen Evans (in consultation with G.J. Mohr, M.D.), The Psychiatry of Robert Burton, (New York, 1944); Andrew Brink, "Depression and Loss: A Theme in Robert Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy (1621)", Canadian Journal of Psychiatry (Vol. 24, 1979), pp. 767-772; J. K. Gardiner, "Elizabethan Psychology and Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy," Journal of the History of Ideas (38, 1977), pp. 373-388; R. L. Nochimson, "Robert Burton: A Study of the Man, His Works and His Critics," (Columbia Ph. D., 1967); J. Max Patrick, "Robert Burton's Utopianism," Philological Quarterly, XXVII (1948), pp. 345-358.

²Douglas Bush, English Literature in the Earlier Seventeenth Century, 2nd ed. revised (Oxford, 1962), p. 295. See p. 295n for a short biography of Burton.

³Bush, English, p. 300.

His subject is the soul, body, and whole life of man, and he writes as both a divine and a physician.¹

The divine-physician, a symbol central to Augustine's Confessions and City of God, becomes a controlling metaphor in Burton's analysis of the causes and cure of melancholy (the relationship between Burton and Augustine will be discussed in more depth and detail in chapters 3, 4, and 5). Bush argues that the Anatomy follows traditional Christian dichotomies, by taking as its basic framework Creation before the Fall, and using this ideal as counterpoint to the subject-matter of the Anatomy, the world in time, or fallen creation.

That contrast is seldom absent from Burton's mind and, since he feels as well as thinks, it is tragic as well as comic. His fundamental postulate is 'that all the world is melancholy, or mad, dotes, and every member of it.'²

Many critics have come to the conclusion, as Bush does, that beneath the detached, ironic and seemingly objective surface of the Anatomy lies a compassionate and caring concern for humanity, a concern allied to a theme of salvation in a traditional Christian context.³ Where the members of this school of criticism disagree is on the extent and effectiveness of this theme, and how the theme of salvation is (or is not) achieved.

Turning first to what has been described as the satiric surface of the Anatomy, we find several critics with observations pertinent to this discussion. Northrop Frye describes Burton's Anatomy as "the greatest Menippean satire in English before Swift."⁴ A Menippean satire, or "anatomy", is a "fiction" that deals less with people

¹Bush, English, p. 297.

²Bush, English, p. 297.

³A minority position on Burton argues that Burton has lost control of his material, and thus critics pick up on the *apparent* gap between satiric invective and compassion in the Anatomy. Two samples may stand for all. Chapin argues that "unlike Donne Burton wants omniscience not in order to save his own soul, but to satirically damn the souls of others," in "Satire", pp. 143-144. James Roy King, in Studies in Six Seventeenth-Century Writers, (Athens, Ohio), p. 52, serves up even harsher criticism, arguing that "wrathful against those who write before seeing their subjects clearly ("out of an itching humour"- p. 7, Preface), [Burton] wrote or scribbled himself, charming many but convincing few that his was an adequate way to view man's plight."

⁴Northrop Frye, The Anatomy of Criticism, (Princeton, 1957), p. 311.

"than with mental attitudes," sees evil and folly "as diseases of the intellect, as a kind of maddened pedantry,"¹ and presents us with a vision of the world in terms of "a single intellectual pattern."² For Burton, this single organizing principle and intellectual pattern is melancholy, although it perhaps needs clarification that Burton never divorces his 'single intellectual pattern' of melancholy from its Christian sources in a context of grace and salvation.

There is a persistent school of Burton criticism which argues well about the Preface to the Anatomy, "Democritus Jr. to the Reader" (a section that represents approximately ten percent of the entire Anatomy), as if it were a separate and discrete work. Echoing Douglas Bush, R. Compean argues that Burton "found the Lucianic tradition congenial."³ "Whatever the source for the namesake in the Anatomy, its long satirical Preface is completely Lucianic and owes much especially to Lucian and Erasmus."⁴ Rosalie Colie, arguing in this vein, has established Erasmus, Rabelais and Montaigne as sources in order to make an argument for "a 'Lucianic' heritage for a tonal genre."⁵ Further, Burton's "understanding of Democritus as a satirical persona derives in part from Erasmus' use of Democritus in the Encomium."⁶ It is important here to re-emphasize that Colie's concern here is almost exclusively with "Democritus Jr. to the Reader," and not with the entire Anatomy. "Democritus Jr.', however, is not the *primary* persona of the Anatomy, a perception which many critics seem unwilling

¹Frye, Anatomy, p. 309.

²Frye, Anatomy, p. 310.

³R. Compean, "Swift and the Lucianic Tradition," (U. of California at Davis, Ph. D., 1976), p. 115.

⁴Compean, "Swift," p. 116. Compean does not consider the possibility of Augustine as an influence on Burton's satiric vision of the world. See below, Chapter 3, *passim*.

⁵R. Colie, "Some Notes on Burton's Erasmus," Renaissance Quarterly (20, 1967), p. 335.

⁶Colie, "Some Notes", p. 339. Colie's opinions in this article are based upon the discovery in the Beinecke library of a stray book from Burton's library, a heavily annotated volume containing "Seneca's De morte Claudij Caesaris; Synesius' De Laudibus Calvitij; and the Encomium Moriae by Erasmus, to which is added Erasmus' letter in defence of the Encomium." (p. 336) Whether William or Robert Burton or someone else, (there are, apparently, two distinguishable hands), judging by the annotations, someone "was much interested in the matter, genre and style of parody." (p. 337)

to acknowledge. This is a decision peculiar to critics who choose to examine Burton primarily as a paradoxical satirist. However, the persona who controls most of the Anatomy is not Democritus Jr., but rather Burton the divine-physician, a complex figure, who at times scoffs, usually 'dispassionately' observes, but always cares deeply about both his subject matter and his reader. Thus, perceptions concerning a "Lucianic" tradition operating in Burton's work through the persona of Democritus Jr., while undeniable in the Preface, ultimately have limited critical value in terms of the entire Anatomy.

Babb's comments on Erasmus help to clarify the point here. "If likeness were a certain indication of influence, one could declare confidently that Burton owes a great debt to Erasmus."¹

The similarities between the *Anatomy* and *The Praise of Folly* are striking. Erasmus and Burton strip the pretentious disguises from the same categories of fools with the same animated mockery. The parallels are especially close in those parts of the two books devoted to the subtle inconsequentialities of scholastic learning, to abuses in the Roman Catholic church, and to Christian worship which observes the letter but ignores the spirit.²

However, there are lengthy passages of the Anatomy, including most of Partitions I, II, and III, where there is no Lucianic-Erasmian flavour to the "subject matter, style and tone." Babb acknowledges the weakness of his tentative Erasmian thesis by withdrawing it after making his case.

Unfortunately for the source-hunter, [Burton] refers to *The Praise of Folly* no more than a dozen times, (comparatively not often), to *The Complaint of Peace* only twice, and to the *Enchiridion* not at all. There is no very good reason to believe that Burton took anything from Erasmus beyond his acknowledged borrowings. Although he has ideas in common with Erasmus, he could have found them elsewhere or could have evolved them independently.³

¹Babb, Sanity, p. 52.

²Babb, Sanity, p. 52.

³Babb, Sanity, p. 52. Babb's comments on sources and influences in Burton must be set in their context. Babb's thesis is that Burton, in borrowing from and being temporarily under the sway of so many, is not directly influenced by any to an appreciable degree.

In similar manner, Babb also dismisses Rabelais, but argues that Burton, like the writers mentioned by Colie, "seems to feel a kinship with Democritus and Lucian."¹ Despite this critical tendency to attempt to apply a "kinship" between Burton and classical, secular satirists to the structure and style of the Anatomy and its underlying thematic concerns, such sources are less important than many critics would have them. The influence is clear and undeniable in the Preface and in selected subsections, but over the entire Anatomy, the Democritean and Lucianic evidences fade. Vastly more detailed and important sources are found in the Christian tradition, especially in Augustinianism. Specific Christian sources such as Augustine, Melancthon², and Luther, and the Scriptures, especially the Pauline verses and selected books of the Old Testament, such as the five Wisdom books, are of central importance. (Chapters three, four and five below develop this perspective in more detail).

This dissertation argues for a greater Augustinian focus in Burton's Anatomy than critics such as Babb are willing to accept. For example, E. P. Vicari continues the strain of thought that sees Burton predominantly and consistently as a Lucianic satirist. Thus, discussing Burton's playful dismissal of scientific controversies, Vicari comments (concerning the ending to the 'Digression of Air'):

This is more than a playful flourish to draw the discussion to a close: it reflects Burton's most characteristic opinion of the value of learning, an opinion shared by Lucian: an opinion, in fact, central to the Humanist tradition.³

Thus, there appears to be a school of criticism that focuses only upon the satiric layers of the Anatomy, and sees Burton's themes as part of a process of *elenchus*, or negating of sophistry, and comments upon the Erasmian or Lucianic flavour of his prose.

¹Babb, Sanity, pp. 52-53, and p. 53, n8.

²I have followed Burton's spelling of Melancthon throughout this dissertation.

³E.P. Vicari, "Learning and Imagination in Robert Burton" (Toronto Ph. D., 1970), p. 44.

It is the argument of this dissertation that such distrust of learning by Burton in the Anatomy, though perhaps inspired in part by a Lucianic tradition, more probably devolves from Christian sources, not secular classical sources. Specific sources include Augustine and other Patristic writers, whose sceptical influence in the Renaissance extends to writers such as Nicholas Cusanus, Agrippa and Burton. For such writers, whose scepticism *never* extends to the grounds of belief, Augustine is the mentor and greatest influence.

Critics who are sympathetic to the persona of Burton the divine-physician, appear to be most concerned to resolve the seeming paradoxes in Burton's style, in particular the seeming paradox of a satiric attitude juxtaposed against homiletic intentions. Ruth Fox, in her excellent study, points to the central truth in Burton's Anatomy, which is that "rational system and illogical circumstance coexist as truth in the Anatomy."¹ Stanley Fish comes to a similar conclusion in his discussion of the Preface to the Anatomy, "Democritus Jr. to the Reader":

There is ... a 'double motion' in the preface- one rational and distinguishing, in the direction of making sense of things, and the other irrational and inclusive, leading to the discovery everywhere of nonsense... ²

It is important to remember that Fish's argument is concerned almost exclusively with the Preface, but given that limitation in his argument, Fish presents a persuasive vision of Burton's rhetorical style and themes. Fish argues that Burton's paradoxical and ironic presentation of material, wherein authorities are allowed to cancel one another out, wherein several sides of an argument are presented without any over-riding conclusion, is part of Burton's vision of life.

¹Ruth Fox, The Tangled Chain: The Structure of Disorder in 'The Anatomy of Melancholy' (Berkeley, 1976), p. 4.

²Stanley Fish, "Thou Thyself Art the Subject of my Discourse", in Self-Consuming Artifacts: The Experience of Seventeenth-Century Literature (Berkeley, 1972), p. 315.

The strategy of inclusion, which collapses speaker, reader, and a thousand or more 'authorities' into a single category of unreliability, extends also to every aspect of what we usually think of as 'objective reality'. If, as I have suggested, the base of irresponsibility is widened to include everyone, it also includes every *thing*, every structure, every institution, every profession, every nation, every concept. Burton says as much again and again; his assertion of universal madness is unqualified.¹

What Fish here delineates as Burton's vision of life is, as Rosalie Colie and others point out, the traditional Christian view of the nature of the fallen world. In the Christian view of history, after the expulsion of Adam and Eve from Eden, all of nature, including the perceiver, his faculties and understanding, have been made corrupt. The Scriptures, and all Christian commentators who are not overtly heretical, share this vision. The argument presented here in later chapters is that Burton, in his version of the Christian vision of history, follows in large part an Augustinian model, and this Augustinian influence accounts for many of the stylistic peculiarities which Fish examines. Thus, when Fish states that "sober discourse itself is an impossibility given the world the preface reflects and describes,"² Burton's style and strategies become a conscious reflection of the chaos of the fallen world. Fish feels that this is the extent of Burton's vision, and that Burton does not provide any redemptive solace to the reader. Thus, in Self-Consuming Artifacts, Fish ascribes a full pattern of Augustinian rhetoric and doctrine to the works of Donne, Bacon, Herbert, Bunyan and Milton, but not to Burton. The argument of later chapters in this thesis is against Fish's position here. (We shall return to Fish's argument in more detail later in this chapter).

¹Fish, Artifacts, p. 314. It should be noted here that Fish's assertion that Burton delineates a universal and unqualified madness is not entirely correct. Burton does not undermine the teachings and values of such traditional and orthodox Christian authors as Augustine and other Fathers, Paul and other Biblical writers. Democritus Jr. may see universal madness, but Burton the divine-physician does not. See below, chapters 3 to 5 for detailed analysis of Burton's religious values.

²Fish, Artifacts, p. 314.

Rosalie Colie claims that "the divine's business is to deal with the particular, unique tumble by which each man recapitulates the general Fall in Eden."¹ Thus Burton, mingling the divine and the physician, "was able to trace without ado all cases of melancholy back to the first Fall", as

Melancholy is the mark of living; all mortal men, by the Judeo-Christian dispensation, are marked for life by original sin, which in Burton's language is translated into melancholy.²

Having established the Christian context of the Anatomy, and having explicitly linked melancholy to the Fall, Colie then claims that Burton does not follow the traditional Christian cycle towards *Contemptus Mundi*:

He was certainly under no illusions about the pains of this world... but the solitary scholar, the spectator of other men's activities... nonetheless never gladly renounced the world into which he was born, never for one moment underestimated the values conferred by the painful, beautiful, various world... The world itself Burton could regard as a great box of simples from which to select the remedy proper to one's own kind of melancholy.³

Burton does not admire the world, however, or advocate worldly ways, Colie notes:

Albeit in some ways a moderate one, Burton was a product of the Protestant Reformation: the Augustine he selected as authority for his views is the Augustine of *Contra Pelagionos*, quite a different Augustine ... from the one Milton selected as his authority. For Burton men were less powerful than passions... [and] only God's grace could really bring men through, and even God's grace was no warranty for earthly happiness.⁴

Having touched upon the importance of Augustine in Burton's thought, it is unfortunate that Colie did not pursue the topic, or explain her rather enigmatic references to Augustine and Milton. The importance of Augustine in her perception is

¹Rosalie Colie, "Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy* and the Structure of Paradox", in *Paradoxia Epidemica: The Renaissance Tradition of Paradox* (Princeton, 1966), p. 434.

²Colie, *Paradoxia*, p. p. 434.

³Colie, *Paradoxia*, p. 439. It shall be argued in this thesis that Colie's position here describes an Augustinian vision of the world, in which the world is to be used and enjoyed for what it may have to offer, but never, as Colie seems to imply, used as a source of any meaningful cure for the ills of living.

⁴Colie, *Paradoxia*, p. 449.

undermined when she sees important influences on the Anatomy in More's Utopia, Nicholas Cusanus' De Docta Ignorantia, Montaigne, Agrippa, Erasmus, and Sebastian Brandt¹

(all quite probably accurate and perceptive claims, despite the counterclaims of Babb below), but *not*, apparently, in the works of Augustine, especially, for our purposes, the City of God. Colie concludes her excellent discussion with significant reference to Burton's hidden and largely ignored theme of salvation. The Anatomy

ends in an assertion of trust, amidst a dangerous and mutable world, in the flexible, tolerant, comprehensive grace of God. Melancholy is simply the condition of mortality, or of living; like life itself, it is the only medium in which anyone can become a man or hope for a life after death ... out of acknowledged folly grace has grown; melancholy proves to be a heavenly as well as an earthly muse.²

This "assertion of trust", drawn directly from Augustine, ends the Anatomy, and underlines, as shall be argued in subsequent chapters, Burton's use of Augustine in key passages of the Anatomy.

D. M. Donovan makes reference to Burton's use of Augustine in various editions of the Anatomy,³ but uses Augustine merely as an example to demonstrate how Burton proliferates references through the later editions. Nonetheless, Donovan's editorial research is of great interest here. With a close and exhaustive analysis of Partition III of the Anatomy, Donovan demonstrates Burton's conscious efforts to sharpen the language of the Anatomy, tighten its structures and make the style more effective. Of particular interest here are his comments concerning the nature of Burton's revisions and expansions in succeeding editions:

¹Colie, Paradoxia, p. 443 for More; for others, p. 458.

²Colie, Paradoxia, p. 460. What Colie neglects to point out is that the Anatomy ends with specific reference to Augustine, (filtered through Hemingius- see discussion below of Bamborough's article on Burton and Hemingius), and the last word of the Anatomy is "Austin" (Anat., 3.4.2.6., p. 432), thus connecting the "heavenly" physic directly to Augustine's teachings.

³D.M. Donovan, "Robert Burton's *The Anatomy of Melancholy*: 'Religious Melancholy', A Critical Edition" (University of Illinois Ph. D., 1965), p. xxxviii.

The only section which does not bear the mark of extensive revision is that devoted to the purely scientific study of melancholy. Burton's failure to revise this portion reflects his tendency to shift the *Anatomy* away from a purely scientific treatise to a study encompassing all human misery.¹

From the 1624 edition onward, then, the importance of humoral theory and the technically medicinal aspects of the *Anatomy* would seem to diminish, and the 'spiritual physic' of Burton's Christian medicine acquires greater emphasis. What is important in Donovan's analysis is Burton's increasing emphasis on the spiritual and emotional aspects of melancholy. Thus, especially in Partition III (a major section of the *Anatomy* much neglected by the Erasmian-Lucianic critics of Burton), Burton's essentially medieval medical knowledge gradually gives way to his Augustinian focus and his growing awareness of the psychology of melancholy. (Although such a study lies outside the scope of this thesis, there is a decided need for a major study of Burton's position in the history of the development of psychology). Donovan's analysis supports the claim made by many critics that Burton's primary focus is on human experience in the fallen world, especially on the emotional and spiritual aspects of melancholy.

Joan Webber's study of the *Anatomy* examines Burton's self-consciousness in his dual role as writer and persona, and comments on the importance of reading in the *Anatomy*, "not as the good substitute for experience that earlier writers had found it, but as experience itself, both dangerous and compelling."² In analyzing Burton's use of pseudonym and persona, Webber comments:

The shifting back and forth among his various selves and the commentary upon these selves constitute the most important and complex stylistic technique in the *Anatomy*.³

¹Donovan, "Edition", p. xvi, n29.

²Joan Webber, *The Eloquent I: Style and Self in Seventeenth-Century Prose* (Madison, 1968), p. 81.

³Webber, *Eloquent*. p. 81.

A danger in Webber's analysis is too great a reliance on the role in the Anatomy of the philosophy of the ancient Democritus. Thus, she comments:

The atoms of Democritus fell ceaselessly through space, combining and recombining by chance- and thus the world of men came into being.¹

Webber does not seem to acknowledge that for Burton, the world is God's deliberate creation, and circumstance must ultimately be traced to Providence - not to the accidental clash of atoms. Webber's unwillingness to engage the religious influences inherent in the Anatomy weakens what is otherwise an excellent analysis. Thus, for example, Webber comments on the microcosm-macrocosm aspects of melancholy, wherein each melancholiac is a symbol of the world,² and on how Burton's irony, whether directed at others or at self (persona), serves to undermine all human learning and pretension,³ but she does not connect either insight to Burton's undeniable Christian outlook. Most critics of Burton see him as a rather orthodox Anglican divine with fideist leanings, but none seem to accept an Augustinian influence in Burton's thought. In fact, three critics of Burton consciously dismiss Augustine as an important element in Burton's thought.

Stanley Fish, in Self-Consuming Artifacts, discusses in extensive detail the importance of Augustinian thought in several major English authors of the seventeenth century. Though Fish argues that Burton appears to have some Augustinian elements in his thought, he goes on to claim that Burton is, in the final analysis, not to be numbered among the Augustinians of the seventeenth century:

A better mind is exactly what Herbert, Milton, Donne, Bacon, Bunyan, Plato and Augustine labor to give us through the experience of their prose and poetry, for they are good physicians. I have included Burton

¹Webber, Eloquent, p. 82.

²Webber, Eloquent, p. 95.

³Webber, Eloquent, pp. 96-97.

in this volume partly because he has so much in common with these men and is, at the same time, so markedly different.¹

"Like all of these, Burton is continually calling attention to what his art is not doing; and what his art is not doing is making sense of things."² Fish's presentation of Burton's dialectic in secularized terms (affective stylistics), does not seem willing to acknowledge that Burton's vision of the world and human affairs shows the human sphere to be a part of fallen nature: disordered, corrupt and riddled with vice and folly. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, Burton's vision here coincides with Augustine's vision of the earthly city in the City of God. However, Fish's removal of Burton from the ranks of the Augustinians is firmly rooted in the redemptive vision of the heavenly city.

In the prose of Burton, Donne, Bacon and Milton, and in the poetry of Herbert, the undermining of discursive forms and the related devaluation of rational thought is but one half of a movement which is completed only when the availability of something better is affirmed. That affirmation is withheld in the *Anatomy*, and as a result the negativity of the work's rhetorical thrust is never redeemed ... In short, while the *Anatomy* ... undermines the reader's ability to make judgments and determine value, the only consolation it offers is the unhelpful assertion that we are all in the same boat.³

I do not believe that Fish is correct in arguing that Burton withholds the affirmative and saving power of grace from his ethic and dialectic. As we shall see in the chapter below on Burton, Augustine and rhetoric, Burton's rhetorical strategy is designed to open the eyes of the reader to the *possibilities* of redemption and salvation in existence. Burton appears to believe that the healing powers of God's grace lie hidden deep, beyond the powers of the *unaided* human mind to comprehend or grasp. This belief, which shall be examined in detail below, should not exclude Burton from the ranks of the Augustinians, but rather should grant him election to their ranks. Fish's contention

¹Fish, *Artifacts*, p. 349.

²Fish, *Artifacts*, p. 350.

³Fish, *Artifacts*, pp. 350-351. See the "Consolatory Digression", *Anat.*, Partition 2, pp. 131-201, for the "unhelpful assertion".

that Burton is not really an Augustinian seems to be based on the observation that Burton's rhetorical strategies differ somewhat from those of his contemporaries, and from those of the Augustine in On Christian Doctrine. As shall be explained in the chapter on Burton, Augustine and rhetoric, it can be plausibly argued that many of Burton's rhetorical principles and techniques are drawn from Augustine - if not from a careful analysis of the methods outlined in On Christian Doctrine, then from assimilation through example and imitation, of the City of God especially, the Confessions, and several other works. Fish's exclusion of Burton from the ranks of the Augustinians is addressed (along with the comments of Babb examined below), and hopefully adjusted in this dissertation to give a clearer picture of Burton's place in Fish's vision of seventeenth-century dialectics and their Augustinian roots.

Concerning Burton's thematic emphases, R.G Thompson observes:

His external argument conveying the wisdom of the skeptical approach in external pursuits of knowledge implicitly magnifies the importance of intuiting the innate moral truths of conscience. If the answers are not 'out there', it follows that they are inside us. The *Anatomy* is thus not designed to teach us anything new, but to discover what we ourselves already are.¹

The Anatomy's main concern then, would appear to be with the condition of mortality. As Thompson appears to be the only critic who considers Augustine seriously as an influence on Burton, it would be useful at this point to examine his thought on this subject. In discussing the relationship of conscience and will, Thompson discusses how the human will can choose to ally itself "with the city of God or the city of man"² but does not make any connection between Augustine's thought and Burton's at this point. Thompson stresses the concept of the two cities and two loves:

Augustine's chapter on the nature of the two cities, what he says and the particular passages he quotes from the Bible, is strikingly similar to the

¹R. G. Thompson, "The Wisdom of the Commonplace in Burton's *Anatomy*: A Study of the Rhetorical Intentions" (Michigan Ph. D., 1971), p. 84.

²Thompson, "Wisdom", p. 76.

spirit of the *Anatomy* ... Burton's repetitive stress on the impotence of self and the corollary idea that everything we know is from God is very like Augustine's stress on these matters.¹

Thompson adds that Burton's "scepticism of human reason and fideistic reliance on God"² is Augustinian. Further:

Burton's treatment of the will and his assumption of its two essential motions or habits in making 'a good or bad character' seems therefore to devolve from the Augustinian idea of the two loves in the soul for one or the other city.³

Curiously, Thompson does not pursue these observations any further, but rather retreats from this position, and weakens his argument concerning Burton's Augustinian focus. Thompson notes the aspects in Burton's thought of constant struggle and constant need for decision in life, but does not trace this to an Augustinian influence on Burton's part. Further, Thompson fails to note the importance of grace in salvation. Finally, Thompson effectively undercuts any feeling that Burton has been influenced by an Augustinian perspective by aligning himself with Babb's position that any such Augustinian focus, by the seventeenth century, was a cultural commonplace.⁴ As a result, Thompson makes no effort to determine how closely Burton might follow Augustine's ideas and themes. Thompson dismisses the ending of the *Anatomy*, wherein direct reference is twice made to Augustine in the last few lines: "All of that pedantry boils down to a redundant restatement of what has become the veriest of commonplaces."⁵ Thompson argues that "the 'Augustinian' features of [Burton's] thought ... seem to be common matters of concern to the Italian Humanists in general and Petrarch in particular."⁶ As a consequence, Thompson feels (and this perception

¹Thompson, "Wisdom", p. 121.

²Thompson, "Wisdom", p. 122.

³Thompson, "Wisdom", p. 122.

⁴Babb, *Sanity*, pp. 51-52.

⁵Thompson, "Wisdom", p. 121.

⁶Thompson, "Wisdom", p. 134.

appears to be unique to him) that Burton's Augustinian focus, as he describes it, descends to Burton from Petrarch, not Augustine.¹

Lawrence Babb is very cautious in discussing influences on Burton:

The positive conclusion that one reaches through a study of Burton's use of his sources is that he has been influenced by too many to have been *genuinely* influenced by any. His mind is diversely curious, receptive and retentive. There is nothing really distinctive about his philosophical, religious, or social opinions.² (emphasis mine)

Thus Babb delivers a serious warning about discussion of influences on Burton: "it is not possible to trace his views on more general and significant subjects to specific sources."³ Babb adds a perplexing conclusion, perplexing when one considers the richness and diversity of thought within the Anglican persuasion in this period: "He is simply a Jacobean Englishman, an Anglican, who believes what most of his cultivated countrymen believe, although he is a little on the conservative side."⁴ Given its historical context, when the Anglican church was torn by division and controversy that contributed significantly to the outbreak of the English Civil War, Babb's simplification of Burton's thought seems almost facile here. Many critics have followed Babb's lead, however, based on evidence which, in its historical context, appears to be lacking in depth and detail.

Babb's warnings about influences, however, seem to take on significance when one examines Democritus Jr.s' ideas on the subject:

No news here; that which I have is stolen from others (Anat., Pref., p. 22).

¹This conclusion is based upon Thompson's reading of Charles Trinkaus' In Our Image and Likeness (Chicago, 1970), especially pp. 3-50. Thompson comments: "I do not think that there is a single significant point advanced about Burton in this study that Trinkaus has not stressed in his evaluation of Petrarch ... Thus the connection assumed between the Italians and Burton relies heavily on Trinkaus and my reading of Twyne's translation of Petrarch's *De Remediis*" p. 135, n.2.

²Babb, Sanity, p. 53.

³Babb, Sanity, p. 53.

⁴Babb, Sanity, p. 53.

As apothecaries we make new mixtures every day, pour out of one vessel into another; ...we skim off the cream of other men's wits, pick the choice flowers of their tilled gardens to set out our own sterile plots (Anat., Pref., p. 23).

For my part I am one of the number, *nos numerus sumus*: I do not deny it, ... *Omne meum, nihil meum*, 'tis all mine, and none mine.' As a good housewife out of divers fleeces weaves one piece of cloth, ... I have laboriously collected this cento out of divers writers (Anat., Pref., pp. 24-25).

We can say nothing but what hath been said, the composition and method is ours only, and shows a scholar ... Our poets steal from Homer; he spews, saith Aelian, they lick it up. Divines use Austin's words verbatim still (Anat., Pref., p. 25).

But these are *Democritus Jr.'s* warnings, and must be viewed in the same light as most of his rhetoric (see Fish's comments above). Burton's sources and influences are more complex, and yet less, than Babb would allow. Consider the following list of sources and influences cited and defended by critics: Vesalius, Montaigne, More's Utopia, Nicholas Cusanus, Agrippa, Erasmus, Sebastian Brandt, Rabelais, Petrarch and the Italian Humanists, Aristotle, Lucian, Chaucer, Hooker, Luther, Aquinas, Jerome, Hemingius, Calvin, Puritanism, Anglicanism, Gnosticism, Emblem Books, Joseph Adams and the Puritan city preachers, and so on.¹ And then, of course, there are the references to Augustine noted above. For Burton to have been influenced by authors who appear to be so radically diverse in their styles, thoughts and beliefs is to say that Burton has been influenced by the traditions in the western cultural heritage, but such a conclusion would be of little value or interest.

The issue becomes more complex when one notes how the critics tend to cancel one another out (this becomes of interest when, in subsequent chapters, we examine

¹Vesalius, see Colie, Paradoxia, p. 431; Montaigne, see Colie, Paradoxia, pp. 435-436; Webber, Eloquent, pp. 278-279, n.13; More, see Colie, Paradoxia, p. 443; Nicholas Cusanus, see Colie, Paradoxia, p. 458; Agrippa, see Colie, Paradoxia, p. 458; Erasmus, see Colie, Paradoxia, p. 458; Compean, "Swift", p. 116; Sebastian Brandt, see Colie, Paradoxia, p. 458; Rabelais, see Colie, "Some Notes", p. 335; Petrarch, see Thompson, "Wisdom", pp. 133-134; Chaucer, see Frye, Anatomy, p. 311; Hemingius, see Bamborough, "Burton and Hemingius", Review of English Studies (Nov. 1983), pp. 441-445; Lucian, see Chapin, "Burton", passim; for the rest, see Vicari, passim.

how Burton uses authorities to cancel one another out in his rhetorical strategies). As noted above, Colie advocates Rabelais, an influence Babb denies. Or, of clearer interest for this dissertation, take Vicari and Babb on Burton's use of scripture: "Burton quotes the Fathers more often than the Bible, and Seneca more often than either."¹ Babb on the other hand, more perceptively argues that:

One of the most important categories in Burton's reading is his literature of religion. Few men have known the Bible better than he. He had Biblical texts ready for every conceivable occasion. His references to the Bible are incomparably more numerous than those to any other work ... He is well read in the works of the Church Fathers ... He refers to Augustine considerably more often than to any other theologian.²

Thus, given the apparent confusion in the area of influences on the Anatomy, the methods and opinions of the critics become of crucial importance to understand how they come to their insights. Lamentably, few critics of Burton provide detailed analysis and proof to justify their assertions about influences. Concerning this issue, an important point for this dissertation is raised in a recent exchange in *Neophilologus* with reference to Burton and Abernathy. Hogan argues:

One of the major sources of the subsections on despair (3,4,2-6) in Robert Burton's *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621) is John Abernathy's *A Christian and Heavenly Treatise: Containing Physicke for the Soul* (1615).³

Hogan claims that Burton freely plagiarizes from Abernathy's work in these five subsections:

Abernathy provided Burton with the titles for his subsections on despair, several quotations, some of which Burton inaccurately cites and others which he does not cite at all, and ideas about the nature of despair that Burton either borrows silently or miscredits.⁴

¹Vicari, "Learning", p. 160.

²Babb, Sanity, p. 46.

³Hogan, "Burton and Abernathy", *Neophilologus* (60, 1976), p. 140.

⁴Hogan, "Burton", p. 140.

Stachniewski, writing two years later, corrects Hogan's assertions, then adds a most pertinent warning to scholars of Burton. Stachniewski points out that Burton does not 'steal' Abernathy's ideas: "A difficulty arises from the existence of a shared phraseology."¹ Not only are phraseologies shared, so too are beliefs, dogmas, prejudices, sources, influences and libraries. Authors freely borrow, substitute, misinterpret and abuse other authors' writings, especially in works of religious controversy. And the central aspect of the Anatomy is its religious focus. Stachniewski then makes a crucial point about Burton, a point which is of central importance to the methods and aims of this dissertation, and one which ought to be crucial to any study of sources and influences in the Anatomy:

When dealing with an author as evasive about his own opinions as Burton notoriously is, *close comparison with an author from whom he borrows material is a useful guide.* ² (emphasis mine)

A method such as Stachniewski advocates has been followed in this dissertation with the works of Augustine and Burton's Anatomy. As shall be seen in subsequent chapters, there is a strong affinity between many of Augustine's ideas, especially from the City of God, and Burton's ideas on the same subjects in the Anatomy.

Bamborough's article on Burton and Hemingius underlines the importance of Stachniewski's method, and also indicates how an author like Burton acquires and uses sources. Bamborough agrees with Donovan's assertion (see above) that Burton revised the Anatomy in favour of his religious orientation and belief. Bamborough focusses on the "Cure of Despair" (Anat., 3,4,2,6) and examines Burton's additions and revisions to this very important section of the Anatomy.

The effect of this second enlargement of the text [in the second edition] was thus to align the *Anatomy* more clearly with the tradition of

¹J. Stachniewski, "Robert Burton's Use of John Abernathy's *A Christian and Heavenly Treatise*," Neophilologus (62, 1978), p. 634.

²Stachniewski, "Burton's Use", p. 636.

'consolation books', which aimed to assist and sustain the potential victim of religious despair.¹

Bamborough surveys some of the major sources used in this last section, and then argues that:

a considerable proportion of this new scriptural and patristic matter is second-hand, and was derived by Burton from a not very obvious source, the *Antidotum adversus pestem desperationis* (Rostock, 1599) of the Danish Lutheran Nicolas Hemingius (Niels Hemmingsen), of which his own copy is now in the Bodleian Library.²

Bamborough points out that three passages referring to Augustine were used by Burton in key places. In particular, the ending of the *Anatomy*, with its direct reference to Augustine, is borrowed from Hemingius, who uses it to end *his* book of consolation. Bamborough offers a few speculative comments as to why Burton may have used Hemingius to end the *Anatomy*, but unfortunately there is no attempt to discuss the use of Augustine in this context. Bamborough's article is valuable and useful nevertheless to outline how Augustine's ideas were filtered through the Renaissance and Reformation, and, for our purposes in this dissertation, to indicate the complexity of Burton's borrowings and use of sources. What is important here to remember is that, in borrowing from Hemingius, Burton leaves intact a consolatory ending that focusses the reader not upon Hemingius, but upon the ideas and beliefs of Augustine.

Burton has borrowed from and made use of many writers. Burton is influenced by (or perhaps, more accurately, borrows ideas from), quite a few of these writers (such as Abernathy, Adams and Percival) for a few pages, or even a subsection or two, as he unabashedly lifts, borrows, notes and alludes to whatever may be pertinent and cogent to illuminate his theme of melancholy. This diversity of apparent influences demonstrates Burton's extraordinary reading and, more important, his ability to weave diverse strands into his tapestry of melancholy in meaningful ways. As many critics

¹J. B. Bamborough, "Burton and Hemingius", *Review of English Studies* (November, 1983), p. 442.

²Bamborough, "Hemingius", p. 443.

have asserted, Burton seeks to establish melancholy as a universal affliction, and as his demesne is literature, all literature serves to develop and reinforce his themes.

There are very few writers, however, who have extended influence on Burton's thinking for more than specific short passages, and fewer still whose occasional or persistent influence is visible over the entire Anatomy. For example, a significant field of writing which influences Burton through many passages of the Anatomy is the field of scientific and medical inquiry. Writers of influence here include Lemnius, Bright, Galen, and Paracelsus, as well as Hermetic and humoral investigators, various ancient and medieval scientists and occultists, and a large array of medieval and Renaissance medical authorities. With the possible exception of Agrippa, these authors have little influence on the development of the themes examined in this dissertation. Thus, although the importance and significance of these various authorities and influences is not denied here, it is largely ignored. However, if one were to examine the 'scientific' influences on Burton, one could plausibly argue, following Donovan's discoveries concerning Burton's revisions, that Burton's interest in medieval humoral theory declined sharply, to be replaced by a rapidly increasing interest in psychology and mental disorders, and an increasing emphasis on the religious aspects of melancholy. As Bamborough notes, concerning revisions to the final section of the Anatomy in the second edition:

Constant preoccupation with one's own states of mind could easily become morbid introspection, and it was necessary to help the devout person- especially if he were, in Burton's phrase, 'precisely given' - to distinguish between proper religious seriousness and awareness of sin, and incipient melancholia....¹

Thus, Burton's revisions and expansions of subsequent editions are almost exclusively devoted to the development of his religious themes.

¹Bamborough, "Hemingius", p. 442.

Aside from these 'scientific' sources, the works which keep re-appearing throughout the entire Anatomy are those of Seneca, Virgil, Augustine and other Patristic writers, and the Scriptures. As Burton's use of Scripture is examined in more detail in subsequent chapters¹, at this point perhaps it is sufficient to allow Burton to comment upon his own use of the Scriptures:

Nay, what shall the Scripture itself? - which is like an apothecary's shop, wherein are all remedies for all infirmities of mind, purgatives, cordials, alteratives, corroboratives, lenitives, etc. "Every disease of the soul," saith Austin, "hath peculiar medicine in the Scripture; this only is required, that the sick man take the potion which God hath already tempered" (Anat., 2.2.4., pp. 94-95).

Significantly here, Augustine is brought forward to confirm the importance of the spiritually-healing Word of God, thus aligning Augustine clearly with the central religious themes of the Anatomy.

There is a Senecan counter-point of Stoic values, presented in opposition to the religious values of Burton's central themes, that runs through almost the entire Anatomy, although even this counter argument fades in the last sections on the cure of despair. As W. J. Bouwsma points out,² Stoicism and Augustinianism were two major world-views that came to the fore during the revival of ancient learning in the Renaissance. Burton is fully aware of Stoic values, and often *seems* to advocate them as a temporary surcease from the suffering inherent in the affliction of melancholy. But ultimately, true to his allegiance to a Christian and Augustinian worldview, Burton rejects Stoicism as inadequate in the face of the world's ills and humanity's many failings. Most especially, Stoicism is helpless to combat despair or to aid in the achievement of salvation. As shall be argued below, Burton's use of Augustine and other Patristic authors is qualitatively different from his use of Virgil, Seneca, and other

¹ See Babb, Sanity, p. 46, for an analysis of Burton's use of Scripture.

² W. J. Bouwsma, "The Two Faces of Humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance Thought", in Itinerarium Italicum: The Profile of the Italian Renaissance in the Mirror of its European Transformations, (Leiden, 1975), pp. 3-60.

Roman secular authors. Wherever Burton drops his satiric persona and gives serious utterance to his central theme of salvation, Augustine and the Scriptures usually assume the position of major influence, and Virgil, Seneca, and other secular sources fade to relative insignificance.

Thus, Babb's denial of a significant Augustinian influence in the Anatomy is argued against in this dissertation. Babb's argument is based upon two significant criticisms. In Sanity in Bedlam, Babb makes clear reference to Burton's debts to Augustine:

St. Augustine is the religious writer whom Burton knows best and is one of the dozen writers whose names appear most often in the *Anatomy*. "Austin" is quoted, cited or mentioned about one hundred and fifty times. Burton refers frequently to *The City of God*, the commentaries on the Psalms, and the *Confessions*, less often to about twenty other works.¹

Babb goes on to list many of the kinds of references which Burton makes to Augustine's works, but then concludes that Burton's use of Augustine "does not reveal a substantial Augustinianism."²

Many of the subjects on which Augustine is quoted or cited are miscellaneous and inconsequential. The ideas which I have called "ontological" and "theological" are commonplaces. *If they originated with Augustine, they had passed into common possession long before Burton's time.* There is no indication in the *Anatomy* that Burton was interested in the principal theme of the *City of God*. He seems to remember, rather, what the author has to say on the nature and power of devils. ³ (emphasis mine)

Babb's comments here deserve close analysis. That Burton should quote Augustine on a wide variety of topics will come as no surprise to anyone who has experienced the remarkable breadth of learning manifest in the City of God. As shall be discussed in subsequent chapters, it is central to the rhetorical strategies in both the Anatomy and the

¹Babb, Sanity, p. 51.

²Babb, Sanity, p. 51.

³Babb, Sanity, pp. 51-52.

City of God that the authors appear to survey all human action, thought and learning. However, to dismiss Augustine on the subject of demons and devils as "miscellaneous and inconsequential" is a surprising gesture on the part of a critic as informed as Babb usually is. This attitude demonstrates a fundamental lack of sympathy and understanding for the basic aims of religious writers such as Augustine and Burton, for whom demons possess not only symbolic value as manifestations of psychological and spiritual disorders (the examination of which disorders is the central ordering principle in the Anatomy), but also a serious and real potential for danger as agents, whether real or symbolic, of damnation. Thus, Burton's use of Augustine on the subject of demons and devils ought to be seen as significant.

What is also perplexing about Babb's criticism (see emphasized passage in above quotation) is his assertion that Augustine possesses *too* pervasive a presence in the Renaissance to serve as an important influence on Burton. It is true that 'Augustinian' thought had become pervasive and central to thought in the Renaissance and Reformation, but it is important to remember that writers such as Milton, Donne, Herbert, Burton, and numerous continental authors whose works Burton read, continued to read Augustine's works and adapt and employ Augustine's ideas, images, rhetorical techniques and strategies to their own efforts. The diversity in adaptations of Augustine can lead to observations such as Colie's, noted above, but worthy to be repeated here:

the Augustine [Burton] selected as authority for his views is the Augustine of the *Contra Pelagianos*, quite a different Augustine...from the one Milton selected as his authority.¹

As shall be argued in subsequent chapters, there is a discernable *direct* influence from Augustine to Burton, as well as an indirect Augustinian focus that comes to Burton through the filter of favorite writers such as Melancthon, Luther, Agrippa, and various

¹Colie, Paradoxia, p. 449.

Puritan authors. As well, another aspect of the use of Augustine to consider is the possibility that Burton, having to dwell in the midst of dangerous religious controversies, found in Augustine a writer who also lived in dangerous times, and yet, despite this, was able to chart a sure course towards salvation, and whose "influence" was so pervasive in Burton's time that his thought had become a "cultural commonplace", and therefore, in many ways, safe. Augustine is a sure and undeniable authority, an authority summoned to the defence of all sides in the religious controversies of the period, and thus, after the Scriptures, an authority most able to bolster Burton's theme of the universal spiritual affliction of melancholy. Further, Babb's assertion that Burton lacks interest in the major theme of the City of God remains unsubstantiated. There is a very close affinity between the central themes of the City of God and the Anatomy. As shall be demonstrated below, Burton's use of Augustine is far more than decorative and incidental, as Babb argues.

In conclusion, Babb makes the following claims concerning Burton and Augustine:

Burton's beliefs concerning Original Sin, Grace and predestination have points in common with Augustine, but the same points appear in the Articles of the Church of England. *He does not quote Augustine on predestination.* One gets the impression that, if Burton had never read Augustine, the *Anatomy* would have been a little shorter but not significantly different...Augustine appears usually in company with other authorities ... No one of them would be greatly missed. Burton uses Augustine ... just about as he uses Virgil and Seneca; when Augustine's opinion is convenient and pertinent, he inserts it.¹ (emphasis mine)

Babb's conclusions here are argued against in this dissertation. The argument in this dissertation is that there is a meaningful pattern to Burton's use of Augustine, and, keeping in mind Fish's criticisms of Burton as well, that an Augustinian perspective and worldview can be seen as making a major contribution to Burton. An aspect of this

¹Babb, Sanity, p. 52.

argument that is also important, given Babb's criticism, is that Burton's use of Augustine, other Patristic sources, and the Scriptures is qualitatively different from his use of Virgil, Seneca, and other secular classical sources.

Had Babb employed the method that Stachniewski advocates above, his conclusions concerning Burton's use of Augustine might have been different. Choosing Babb's comments on Burton and predestination as an illustration (see emphasized passage in note above), let us briefly discuss critical perceptions of Burton on predestination (Anat., 3.4.2.6., pp. 419-424). Babb argues that the lack of a reference to Augustine in this subsection, despite similarities to Augustine's thought in the argument, is significant. However, Burton's stance on predestination is so confusing, and deliberately confusing, that such a lack becomes meaningless. Vicari notes the religious background to the issue:

Belief in reason, however much Hooker may have maintained it, is not an article of the Anglican religion. This is apparent upon examining the words of the Prayer Book on predestination, which is. The cautious and paradoxical statements of Article XVII reflect the controversies of the time and the determination of the formulating bishops to be as inclusive as possible at the expense of logical consistency.¹

David Renaker, calling Burton a "profoundly unoriginal thinker,"² feels that Burton's handling of predestination is very complex. Renaker's focal point is Burton's use of rhetorical palinodes, or immediate denials of arguments just advanced. Burton's palinode on predestination is one of the most complex in the Anatomy, reflecting the dangers of shifting Church politics and the changing policies of various parties in the Anglican hierarchy of the 1620's and 1630's. With successive editions of the Anatomy, Burton's shifts in stance become more complex:

¹Vicari, "Learning", p. 117.

²Renaker, "Robert Burton's Palinodes", Studies in Philology (76, 1979), p. 163.

Here we see that as it becomes more dangerous to take any stand on predestination, Burton's palinode becomes both more elaborate and more extreme.¹

And, we may add to Renaker, the palinode on predestination becomes successively more *confusing* through successive editions, and ends with an appeal to Erasmus (Anat., 3.4.2.6., p. 424), a writer notorious even in his own lifetime for refusing to take definite sides on most religious issues. Consequently, Burton's lack of a reference to Augustine in this subsection does not appear significant.² Thus, Babb's useful study of Burton is hampered somewhat by his reluctance to pursue close comparative readings and to consider contexts. However, both of these methods are employed in this dissertation to consider the extent of Augustine's influence on Burton, and as a result it is argued that there is a clear and discernable Augustinian focus to Burton's thought in key passages of the Anatomy, passages wherein Burton seems to abandon his satiric persona and approach his central and serious theme of salvation.

Before proceeding to our discussion of Burton and Augustine, let us gather together a few loose ends. This dissertation presents Burton as a religious thinker, an Augustinian, and a spiritual physician. This is by no means the only critical perception of Burton. As noted previously, Burton fills an important niche in several fields, such as the histories of medicine, psychology and psychiatry. Sir William Osler indicates Burton's importance in medicine,³ Bergen Evans and Andrew Brink in the history of psychiatry. Brink argues:

¹Renaker, "Palinodes", p. 179. For a fuller discussion on this subject, see E. J. Bicknell, A Theological Introduction to the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England (New York, 1919), pp. 279-290. Amongst other concerns, Bicknell summarizes Augustine, Calvin and Arminius on predestination.

²Burton's use of Erasmus here may be a signpost to Burton's real feelings on this subject. In Erasmus' "A Diatribe or Sermon Concerning Free Will", Erasmus devotes an entire section to analysis of Augustine's views on free will and grace, and finds support for aspects of his argument in Augustine's views. As a reflection of the complexity of this issue, and reflecting the importance of Augustine in religious controversy of the time, it is worthy of note that Luther summons Augustine as an authority to refute Erasmus. For Erasmus' use of Augustine, see Erasmus-Luther, Discourse on Free Will (New York, 1961), pp. 27-28, 31 and 85. For Luther's use of Augustine, see *Ibid.*, pp. 120 and 122.

³Osler, "His Book", p. 175.

Burton was astute enough to see that reactive depressions are usually associated with some sort of loss, and he makes the first reasoned assertion of this fact in English medical literature.¹

Extolling Burton's "compelling example of an English psychiatrist's genius for common-sense empiricism, for learning about life as it is lived in order to improve it,"²

Brink concludes:

Robert Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621) can hardly be thought of as a modern study of psychiatry, but it contains more elements of modern theory than have been recognized ... Burton, more clearly than other seventeenth-century writers on melancholy, sees traumatic loss of attachment figures, status symbols and personal health as predisposing to mood disorders.³ (28)

It is valid to say that the Anatomy can be viewed as a primitive treatise on psychology, and as a Renaissance medical and psychiatric treatise. Burton's use of Galenic and Paracelsian knowledge, wherever it suits his strategies, such as in the passages on bodily disorders and cures, shows his awareness of medical and psychological writings. As well, sections such as the "Digression of Air" (Anat., 2.2.3., pp. 34-61) show Burton's familiarity with physical sciences, geometry, and mathematics. In many ways Burton appears to look forward to anticipate future developments in the history of ideas as eagerly as he embraces the learning of the past. However, it must be repeated here that editors and commentators such as Donovan and Bamborough have effectively demonstrated that in subsequent editions of the Anatomy, Burton neglected revision and expansion of the strictly medical and scientific passages in favour of the more spiritual and religious passages. A great deal of Burton's increasing perception and understanding of the human mind can be traced to his Augustinian focus. As we shall see, Augustine's ideas on memory, will, reason, the influences of childhood upon mature personality, depression and despair and their debilitating effects on the psyche,

¹Brink, "Loss", p. 767.

²Brink, "Loss", p. 771.

³Brink, "Loss", p. 771.

and potential 'cures' for psychological problems have significantly influenced Burton's thinking on these subjects.

Burton can with validity be seen as a modern thinker *in potentia*, moving towards the world-view of modern rational-scientific theories, if one so chooses, but it is the argument of this dissertation that such a view of Burton does not comprehend the entire, or even the central concerns of his thought. Burton is a religious thinker, a divine by profession and persuasion, a physician of the soul's sickness, and any analysis of his thought must comprehend his spiritual focus. Finally, although the following dissertation makes a claim for an Augustinian element in Burton's thought, the complexity and diversity of the sources in The Anatomy of Melancholy should be warning enough, even without Babb's cautions, to limit any claim concerning influences to something less than all-embracing. For example, the lack of concentration in this study on the humoral and medical-scientific sources must not be construed as a "silent dismissal" of their influence and importance in the Anatomy. To do a complete study of influences on Burton's Anatomy would be an exhaustive, perhaps even debilitating task, far beyond the scope of this dissertation. The material in hand is an attempt to discern a significant Augustinian strain of thought in the Anatomy, traceable in large part to direct contact with Augustine's works, a strain which has influenced, but not necessarily dictated, many of Burton's themes and much of his method. As with so many writers of the era, past, present and future mingle in his work in complex and sometimes confusing ways. It is important to recognize that Burton is a complex writer who ultimately defies categorization. Let us turn then, to a brief look at Augustinianism in the Renaissance, in order to establish a context for our examination of Burton and Augustine.

Most Soberly Mad:

Augustine and Augustinianism

Burton acknowledges the writings of Augustine throughout the Anatomy, in at least one hundred and fifty direct borrowings,¹ and other unacknowledged references. Burton has done much more than quarry the City of God, The Confessions, and other works for lively, interesting, or vaguely relevant quotations, as he does with so many of his sources. It would also seem that much of the spirit, many of the underlying themes and ideas, and in places, even the rhetorical style of Augustine's writings have had a stronger influence on Burton than has previously been acknowledged. For Burton, Augustine is a large influence, one of the largest influences outside the Scriptures. "As Austin saith" (or variations on that theme) is one of Burton's most used, and in places, most important phrases. From a modern perspective, it is arguable, as Lawrence Babb claims, that "many of the subjects on which Augustine is quoted or cited are miscellaneous and inconsequential".² But when we consider the religious significance of Burton's borrowings from Augustine, then it is also true, as we shall see below, that Burton uses Augustine most heavily and most effectively in significant passages to underline his own views and themes.

Augustine, since his own lifetime (A.D. 354-430), has been one of the most important and influential writers in the western Christian tradition.³ In the Renaissance and Reformation, Augustine's writings on subjects such as free will, predestination, the role of reason, and the path to salvation were of central importance. The following discussion attempts to assess the influence that Augustine, and Augustinian thought, may have had on Burton as a sceptic and fideist. The approach taken in this

¹Lawrence Babb, Sanity in Bedlam (Kalamazoo, 1958), p. 51.

²Babb, Sanity, pp. 51-52.

³Two excellent studies of Augustine's life and works are: Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo (Berkeley, 1967); and Eugene Teselle, Augustine the Theologian, (London, 1970). Studies which discuss Augustine's importance and influence include: Marcia Colish, The Mirror of Language (New Haven, 1968); F. E. Cranz, "Saint Augustine and Nicholas of Cusa in the Tradition of Western Thought", Speculum XXVII, 1953; P. O. Kristeller, Renaissance Philosophy and the Medieval Tradition (La Trobe, 1966); Charles Trinkaus, In Our Image and Likeness, in two volumes (Chicago, 1970).

dissertation is an attempt to understand how Burton read and used Augustine, for it is a central assumption about the Renaissance that, in the accelerating recovery of Classical, Hermetic and Patristic works, "elements were taken, transformed, misunderstood, *then* used."¹ In a writer such as Augustine, the recovery of whose texts by Renaissance philologists is of central significance for the development of Renaissance theology, influences, transformations, misunderstandings, and uses of his works are found throughout the literature of the era.² Like the Scriptures, Augustine is an often-used authority, an authority used both to sustain and undermine many religious and philosophical issues. Such pervasive influence as Augustine exerted in the Renaissance and Reformation has the potential of becoming vacuous and merely formal allegiance in some hands, but for Burton, Augustine's ideas and beliefs become an important influence on his thought.

In this dissertation, the term 'Augustinianism' refers generally to the Renaissance and Reformation understanding of Augustine, an understanding that influenced writers of the seventeenth century; thus, the term does not refer to the medieval Augustinianism. The recovery of the works of Augustine in the fourteenth century led to a new kind of Augustinianism that supplanted the medieval Augustinianism of the monasteries.³ Before turning to examine Burton's use of Augustine, perhaps it would be useful in this chapter to attempt a definition of 'Augustinianism' as a system of thought and belief, and a potential worldview, to serve

¹Amos Funkenstein, at the Hermeticism Conference, Washington, D.C., March, 1982.

²See, for example, Trinkaus, *Image, passim*, on Petrarch's use of Augustine, and how, through Petrarch, misunderstandings multiply.

³See Colish, *Mirror*, pp. 8-81, and Trinkaus, *Image*, pp. 3-50, for discussion of this historical development. The Renaissance Augustinianism that they describe becomes a cultural landmark. For example, both Plato and Aristotle are open to a wide variety of interpretations, but there is a 'Platonic', and an 'Aristotelean' pattern that is discernable in all the various contexts. The same sort of discernible pattern can be found in Renaissance Augustinianism. Donald Greene, in *The Age of Exuberance* (New York, 1970), pp. 92-100, argues that Augustinianism as a definable worldview survived well into the eighteenth century.

as a background to subsequent sections of this dissertation. In the following discussion, it should be emphasized, the 'understanding of Augustine' by writers such as Petrarch or Melancthon is not necessarily the same as the understanding achieved by Burton. Burton's understanding of Augustine will be examined in subsequent chapters. The following passages on Augustinianism are designed primarily to provide a significant context for discussion of Burton's use of Augustinian thought, belief, and methods, as too much discussion of Burton's influences seems to take place in the absence of such a context. This discussion does not presume to make general claims for an inviolable Augustinian worldview. There is too much controversy and disagreement among the sources involved for such universal claims to retain much validity. However, there is, arguably, a discernable strain of Augustinian thought which links Burton to an 'Augustinian' pattern, though Burton seems to shape this pattern to his own ends. Let us then, in a fairly minimal fashion, look at the progress of Augustine through the Renaissance and Reformation, examining especially authors who influenced Burton's thought, in order to establish a working context for the subsequent discussion of Burton and Augustine.

In his discussion of the Renaissance recovery of Augustine,¹ W. J. Bouwsma argues that two of the most significant strains of thought recovered from the Classical world were Stoicism and Augustinianism. Heiko Oberman comments on this claim.

Stoicism and Augustinianism confronted the humanist with life options by presenting alternative views of cosmos, man and history ... Stoicism could contribute the needed personal endurance; Augustinianism the essential public action. Both were valiant efforts to survive in a threatening or at least unpredictable world.²

¹W. J. Bouwsma, "The Two Faces of Humanism. Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance Thought," in Itinerarium Italicum: The Profile of the Italian Renaissance in the Mirror of its European Transformations (Leiden, 1975), pp. 3-60.

²H. Oberman, "Quosunque Tulit Foecunda Vetustas", in Itinerarium, p. xxi.

Every recovery of a Classical system of thought, such as Stoicism, inevitably must confront some aspect of Augustine's thought in his formidable commentaries on the learning and beliefs of the Classical world.¹

Many writers in the Renaissance and Reformation eras were aware of the considerable body of works and commentaries that had arisen to hedge in Augustine. This notion, that there were various Augustines whom one could draw upon through his commentators, can lead to critical problems in interpretation. Thus, the "recovery of the authentic Augustine"² is one of the most significant aspects of the Renaissance revival of the ancients. Augustine, for example, is renowned as the Church Father who had the greatest influence in introducing Platonism into Christian thought. A more pertinent example for the purposes of our subsequent discussion involves Augustine's influence on scepticism. There is a kind of scepticism in the Renaissance and Reformation periods which draws its impetus not from Cicero, nor from Sextus Empiricus or other classical models, but rather from Augustine's biting criticisms and commentaries on scepticism and other aspects of classical, secular learning.³ The assault on reason that is central to Reformation fideism, and Counter-Reformation pyrrhonism, usually stems from an Augustinian perspective, and often refers directly to Augustine's works.⁴

¹See, for example, Klibansky, Saxl and Panofsky, *Saturn and Melancholy* (New York, 1964), pp. 161-163, and p. 247, on Augustine's analysis of Aristotle's "Problem XXX".

²Oberman, *Itinerarium*, p. xxi.

³See, for example, Augustine, *City of God* (Harmondsworth, 1972), pp. 172, 190-194, 303-318; and Augustine, *Against the Academicians* (Milwaukee, 1957), *passim*, wherein Augustine criticizes the secular sceptics of the Classical world, such as Sextus Empiricus. In particular, Augustine questions their objectivity and logic.

⁴Fideism is "a term applied to a variety of doctrines which hold in common belief in the incapacity of the intellect to attain to knowledge of divine matters and correspondingly put an excessive emphasis on faith." *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church* (Oxford, 1977), p. 192. The editor, E. A. Livingstone, does not explain how this "emphasis" is to be considered "excessive". Pyrrhonism, in Burton's time, was a form of religious scepticism, most commonly Roman Catholic, in which the notion of authority (custom and consent) derived primarily from the submission of reason to faith in the 'mystery' of the Trinity, Incarnation, and Ceremony of the Eucharist.

Virtually every major aspect of Christian thought and belief in the Renaissance and Reformation periods was heavily shaped by an Augustinian focus. Issues such as the role of free will, predestination, the believer's relation to fallen nature, and the path to salvation drew heavily and primarily from Augustine and Augustinian sources (aside from the primary and most important source in the Scriptures). Thus, beginning with Petrarch and the early Humanists, and continuing through Burton's era, Augustinianism based upon the actual reading of the recovered works of Augustine becomes a major and significant form of thought. This underlines the need, when examining an avowedly Augustinian thinker, to make direct comparison between what Augustine said and what is claimed for Augustine by the writer in question. This is especially true of Burton, who uses sources deliberately to mislead and confuse the reader, as we shall see in our discussion on rhetorical strategies. Thus, the focus of this dissertation shall be not so much to assess Augustine's beliefs and opinions, as it shall be to determine how Burton understood, was influenced by, and used (and possibly mis-used) Augustine.

There is, within the narrowed scope of this chapter, a great danger of oversimplifying such a varied, complex and profound writer as Augustine, and reducing the variety of his influence to a formulaic pattern. Throughout this chapter on Augustinianism, then, it should always be kept in mind that Augustinianism represents more than one major religious belief or specific church, and thus should be seen as more of a worldview than necessarily as strict doctrine, or dogma. Let us turn, then, to examine a few of the major Renaissance and Reformation writers influenced by Augustine, in order to establish a framework for our examination of Burton and Augustine.

The original sin of pride and subsequent disobedience is affirmed strongly by Augustinians. The Fall defines humanity's essential flaw as the corruption of the will.¹ Augustine comments on the role of will in human life in the Confessions.

And I enquired what iniquity should be: but I found it not to be a substance, but a swerving merely of the will, crooked quite away from thee O God, (who art the supreme substance) towards these lower things; casting away its inward parts, and puffed up outwardly. (Confessions, I, p. 383)

This "swerving of the will" leads to confusion and spiritual sickness, the normal state of being for postlapsarian humanity.

I was for the time most soberly mad, and dying, to live: sensible enough what piece of misery for the present I now was...I fretted in the spirit...for that I went not into thy will and covenant, my God...For, not to go towards only, but to arrive fully at that place, required no more but the will to go to it, but yet to will it resolutely and thoroughly; not to stagger and tumble down an half wounded will. (Confessions, I, p. 445)

The "half wounded will" is taken up by Burton and made one of the central aspects of his examination of melancholy as primarily a spiritual sickness. (See below, "Structures of Mind" and "The Doors of Mortality".)

The Fall can be overcome and humanity potentially redeemed in the being of Christ. Humanity can approach a state of grace through submission of the individual's will to Christ's teachings. The evil within people can only be overcome by God's active love, leading to the preferred state of grace. The state of grace, it should be noted, would appear to be virtually impossible to achieve, in the Augustinian view, in this life.

But when the soul forsakes the body decayed with age, then is the other death felt, whereof God said in imposing man's future punishment:

¹In Chapter three of Book VII of the Confessions, vol. I (Cambridge, 1977), entitled "Free Will is the cause of Sin," Augustine writes: "I now knew as well that I had a will, as that I had a life: and when therefore I did either will or nill anything, I was most sure of it, that I and no other did will and nill: and there was the cause of my sin, as I perceived presently" (emphasis mine). All subsequent references to the Confessions will be carried in the text. For example, see also Melancthon on original sin and the will, in Loci Communes, (London, 1959), pp. 22-49.

'Earth thou art, and unto earth shalt thou return' [Genesis, iii, 9] : that by these two the first death, which is of the whole man, might be accomplished, which the second should follow, *if God's grace procure not man's freedom from it:* ¹(emphasis mine)

For the Augustinian, the believer's soul can only purify itself and its body and await with hope and fear the infusion of grace, for God's grace is something that humanity cannot achieve with its limited powers and corrupted faculties.

Augustinianism affirms humanity's inherent moral weakness. The need in the knowing sinner to come to grips with this inability to shed fallen nature completely becomes a central theme in Burton's Anatomy. Burton takes the spiritual aspects of melancholy, the universal affliction, and makes these a focal point of his examination of the disease. The apparent inevitability of divine justice and retribution (or perhaps fear of retribution) is demonstrated by Burton to be a major cause of melancholy. "God is angry, punisheth and threateneth, because of their obstinacy and stubbornness, they will not turn unto Him" (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 131). This punishment from God, however, is not inevitable, if the heart of the knowing and believing sinner opens to God. The Augustinian accepts his own fallen state, with all its inherent imperfections, but also attempts to accept the gift, freely given, of God's merciful and forgiving love. Pride in self is the major stumbling block for the sinner on his path to salvation. Burton explores this aspect of fallen nature in great detail, as we shall see in subsequent chapters.

For an Augustinian, it is not outward show of virtue, glibness of expression or even manifest actions of Christian virtue which point the path to salvation, but rather the affections of the heart. In criticizing Saul's outward show of faith, which merely hid his internal corruption, Melancthon, an avowed Augustinian, refers to Saul's lack

¹Saint Augustine, The City of God (De Civitate Dei), in two volumes, translated by John Healey, 1610 (revised 1620), (London, 1945), vol. 2, p.11.

of "an affection of the heart: he neither feared the wrath of God nor trusted in His goodwill."¹ In his works Augustine continually stresses the importance of the "affections", or the emotional aspects of faith and salvation, because the affections, like all else, come from God, and perhaps more importantly (for Burton as well), the affections are a guide back to God. God's love, made incarnate in Christ, is often abused or ignored by fallen humanity.

How hast thou loved us, O good Father, that hast not spared thine only son, but hast delivered him unto death for us wicked men? How hast thou loved us, for whom he that thought it no robbery to be equal with God, was made subject unto death, even the death of the cross?
(Confessions, II, p. 147)

The path to salvation, then, lies inward, and centres upon the affections and the will.

Too late came I to love thee, O thou Beauty both so ancient and so fresh, yea too late came I to love thee. And behold, thou wert within me, and I out of myself, where I made search for thee...Thou indeed wert with me, but I was not with thee...I tasted thee, and now do hunger and thirst after thee; thou didst touch me, and I even burn again to enjoy thy peace. (Confessions, II, p. 147)

The Augustinian's life becomes one of introspection, self-searching, and rigorous self-examination. (Burton, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, traces the melancholiac's disease to a root cause in a disordered will and consequent confusion in the affections, a position very similar to Augustine's tracing of the sources of "wretchedness" in human life). Augustinians tend not to be complacent, as they view life, both their inner and outer lives, as struggle. Thus, especially in Burton's time, Augustinians view with hostility alternatives to their own thought such as Stoicism and Pelagianism.¹ In general terms, then, Augustinianism is a rigorous system of spiritual discipline, involving a life of moral exertion and constant struggle against both the inner

¹Melancthon, Loci Communes, p. 90.

¹Pelagianism "is the heresy that man can take the initial steps towards salvation by his own efforts, apart from Divine grace." Dictionary, p. 370. See also, Bouwsma, Itinerarium, pp. 33-34, for an outline of the shortcomings of Stoicism from an Augustinian perspective.

and outer corruptions of postlapsarian existence. The focus of the Augustinian is on humanity and humanity's quest to recover the City of God.

In his examination of Augustinianism in the Renaissance, Bouwsma asserts that

with Augustinianism we must begin with man, and from here we reach a certain view of the cosmos. In Augustinian humanism the nature and experience of man himself limit what can be known about the larger universe to which man belongs and how he can accommodate to them.¹

As a consequence, Augustinians see humanity "as a mysterious and organic unity."²

Augustine, in his writings, tends to examine and consider the whole human, not any one particular aspect of mind or character or being. In an analysis of where God is to be found within the memory of humanity, Augustine demonstrates his conviction that the spirit of God informs the whole person.

Thou hast afforded this honour unto my memory, as to reside in it; but in what quarter of it? For I have already passed beyond such parts of it as are common to me with the beasts...and I proceeded to these parts of it, whither I had committed the affections of my mind: nor could I find thee there. Yea, I passed further into it, even to the very seat of my mind itself...neither wert thou there...No, nor yet art thou the mind itself...But why seek I now in what particular place of my memory thou dwellest, as if there were any places at all in it? Sure I am, that in it thou dwellest. (Confessions, II, pp. 143-145)

Thus, though arguing that the spirit of God is everywhere, Augustine focuses upon the will (arbitrium) as the central aspect of human personality, because all faculties make contributions (both positive and negative) to the power and action of the will (we will see in subsequent chapters that Burton shares this important view of human personality). Bouwsma takes an illustration from Calvin's Commentary on Genesis as a representative example of this tendency in Augustinianism.

'They childishly err,' [Calvin] wrote, against a hellenistic understanding of Christianity, 'who regard original sin as consisting only in lust and in the disorderly motion of the appetites, whereas it seizes upon the very

¹Bouwsma, Itinerarium, p. 36.

²Bouwsma, Itinerarium, p. 36.

seat of reason, and upon the whole heart.' *It follows, therefore, that the distinctive quality of man cannot be his reason.* ¹ (emphasis mine)

As a necessary corollary, knowledge gained through reason cannot lead by itself to knowledge of God or discovery of the path to salvation. Reason needs to be supplemented, and ultimately abandoned, in favour of a higher faculty. "He is thy best servant that looks not so much to hear that from thee, which himself desired; as to will that rather, which from thee he heareth." (Confessions, II, p. 145) To will is not merely to gain understanding, however. To will is to live.

Although many Renaissance writers found in the recovered works of Augustine a preferable alternative to the precise rationality of the Thomists and Schoolmen, an alternative which also seemed to provide protection from accusations of heresy, they were especially attracted to the possibilities in Augustine's ideas concerning reason and will. In Petrarch's discovery of, and fascination with Augustine's Confessions, a discovery which had a profound influence in disseminating Augustine's ideas through the Renaissance, it is Augustine's focus upon the self and the importance of will in salvation that attracted the first of many Renaissance humanists to an Augustinian world-view.

It was the failure of the university-trained professionals of his [Petrarch's] day, whether lawyers, physicians, or theologians, to be aware of the crying moral problems he sensed in his contemporaries or to be aware of the irrelevance of their studies for these problems which they sometimes sought too easily to solve. All of this had to mean an attempted return to the actuality of feelings and experience, in the first place to one's own.¹

Petrarch, in his Secret, engages in dialogue with Augustine, and acknowledges "that the beginning of my misery did arise from my own will."² Petrarch emphasizes his

¹Bouwsma, Itinerarium, p. 37.

¹Trinkaus, Image, p. 19.

²Petrarch, Secret, or the Soul's Conflict with Passion: Three Dialogues Between Himself and S. Augustine, trans. by W.H. Draper (London, 1911), p. 17.

agreement with Augustine on the primacy of will, by having Augustine state the following.

In the nature of man's actions two things are required, and if either be wanting, the action will come to nought. There must be will, and that will must be so strong and earnest that it can deserve the name of purpose.¹

"The essential point in this conception of the will was its separation from and its elevation above reason."²

The will, in this view, is seen to take its direction not from reason but from the affections, which are in turn not merely the disorderly impulses of the treacherous body but *expressions of the energy and quality of the heart, that mysterious organ which is the centre of the personality*, the source of its unity and its ultimate worth. The affections, therefore, are intrinsically neither good nor evil but the essential resources of the personality; and *since they make possible man's beatitude and glory as well as his depravity*, they are...treated with particular respect.³
(emphasis mine)

We shall see below, in the "Structures of Mind" chapter, how Burton places a great deal of emphasis on the affections and imagination, as they arise from their source in the heart's perturbations, (or, from the middle levels of the three major faculties), the levels where body and soul, lower and higher, mingle and often conflict with each other. It is important to add here, for the purposes of later discussion, that Bouwsma's assertion that the reason has no influence on the will is not entirely correct in Augustinian terms, either in the works of Augustine or in the works of Burton. As we shall see below, reason has a very strong role to play in Augustinian thought, although it is not the most important faculty of the soul.

The power and value of emotion and passion in human existence is very much an Augustinian concern. This value is not necessarily positive, however, as hundreds

¹Petrarch, *Secret*, p. 41.

²Bouwsma, *Itinerarium*, p. 37.

³Bouwsma, *Itinerarium*, p. 39.

of illustrative examples from the City of God and the Anatomy demonstrate. Time and again, passion is shown to be a destructive force, when it is not controlled by will.

[Thus] the sons of God were taken with the love of the daughters of men, and for their sakes fell into the society of the earthly, leaving the piety that the holy society practised. And thus was carnal beauty ...sinfully elected and loved before God, that eternal, inward, and sempiternal good. Just as the covetous man forsakes justice and loves gold, the gold being not in fault but the man, even so is it in all other created things. They are all good, and may be loved well, or badly; well, when our love is moderate; badly, when it is inordinate. (City of God, vol. II, pp. 88-89)

Augustinians, then, seek to unify personality in a higher synthesis, wherein reason and passion, through the power of will, are elevated above the mundane towards the spiritual. The approach is toward salvation through the healing powers of grace. This attitude led to a downgrading in the value and importance of reason.

Melancthon contrasts the reasoned searchings of "Sophists" into the mysteries of the Scriptures with the techniques of the faithful, who do not rely primarily on reason in their quest for truth.

Therefore, that faith of the Sophists which they call both 'incomplete' and 'acquired', by which godless men assent to the gospel history as we commonly give assent to the history of Livy or Sallust, is not really faith; it is opinion, that is, the uncertain, inconstant, and fluctuating deliberation of a mind on the Word of God. ¹

This degrading of rational modes of apprehension in favour of the intuitive assent of faith led, curiously, to a kind of scepticism. For Augustinians, absolute values and first principles are arrived at through faith and intuition, not reason and logic. Thus, Augustinians exercise a scepticism towards knowledge gained through rational modes of apprehension. The Anatomy is replete with hundreds of examples of this scepticism. It is important to remember that this scepticism does *not* extend to the grounds of belief. Because Augustinian scepticism is unquestioningly accepting of Christian metaphysics, it is very different from the thorough-going scepticism of

¹Melancthon, Loci Communes, p. 9

secular, rationalist perspectives. Though both the City of God and the Anatomy appear to be sceptical in perspective, neither work ever questions the being and workings of the Christian divinity.

Augustinianism does lead to scepticism concerning human achievement and human virtue in this world.

A deeper knowledge of the self revealed that, like his knowledge of God, man's virtue and happiness also comes entirely from God. To realize this was the goal of self-knowledge. ¹

Two examples from Augustine's City of God and one from On Christian Doctrine illustrate this belief.

At my first entrance upon this discourse of the city of God, I held it convenient, first of all, to stop their mouths, who, in their extreme desire of only temporal bliss and greediness after worldly vanities, hurl the blame upon Christianity (the true and only means of salvation) whensoever it pleases God in His mercy to correct and admonish them (rather than in His justice to punish or afflict them) with any temporal inconvenience. (City of God, I, p. 112)

Augustine argues, and Burton agrees, that the 'temporal inconvenience' of human misery stems from God's mercy, not from God's severity. The spiritual in the material shows us the eternal.

Thus in this mortal life, wandering from God, (2 Cor.: 5-6) if we wish to return to our native country where we can be blessed *we should use this world and not enjoy it*, so that the "invisible things" of God "being understood by the things that are made" (Rom. 1: 20) may be seen, that is, so that by means of corporeal and temporal things we may comprehend the eternal and spiritual. ² (emphasis mine)

This vision of the eternal through the temporal in no way increases the importance of the temporal. The world and fallen nature are to be distrusted, and a healthy scepticism toward the world and the works of humanity is to be cultivated. The Augustinian then, ought to

¹Bouwsma, Itinerarium, p. 44. See elsewhere on pp. 43-44 for an excellent criticism of the value of Stoic, or classical, virtue in the face of the world's and humanity's ills.

²Augustine, On Christian Doctrine (Indianapolis, 1958), p. 10. All subsequent references to this book will be carried in the text.

beware of those that dispute of the elements of this world only, and reach not up to God that made the elements. The apostle gives us good warning of this. 'Beware,' says he, 'lest any deceive you by philosophy and vain deceit,' [Col. 2: 8] according to the world's elements. (City of God, I, p. 233)

Thus the Augustinian becomes sceptical about, among other concerns, the efficacy of human achievement.

This sharp and clearly-defined division between the world's ways and salvation, between creation and the Creator, led to a division between earthly and heavenly concerns for the Augustinian, a division based upon Augustine's definition of the city of God and the earthly city. Calvin articulates the division between heavenly and earthly concerns for the Augustinian.

There is one understanding of earthly things, another of heavenly ones. I call those things earthly which do not pertain to God and his kingdom, to true justice, or to the blessedness of the future life, and are in some sense confined within the limits of it. Heavenly things are the pure knowledge of God, the nature of true righteousness, and the mysteries of the heavenly kingdom. The first class includes government, domestic economy, all the mechanical skills and the liberal arts. In the second are the knowledge of God and of his will, and the rule by which we conform our lives to it. ¹

Paradoxically, though the two cities are separate from each other, they exist side by side and within each other.

Augustine lays his greatest stress on the moral division between the two cities.

Two loves therefore have given origin to these two cities, self-love in contempt of God unto the earthly, love of God in contempt of one's self to the heavenly. The first seeks the glory of men, and the latter desires God only as the testimony of the conscience, the greatest glory. That glories in itself, and this in God. That exalts itself in self-glory: this says to God: 'My glory and the lifter up of my head.' [Ps. iii: 3] (City of God, II, p. 58-59)

The two cities exist within the same frame of space and time on earth, but for most people, the one, the heavenly, is invisible and unknowable. The two cities exist

¹Calvin, Institutes, II, ii, 13, quoted in Bouwsma, Itinerarium, p. 46.

spiritually in potentia within every person, and each person must choose between the two cities.

And the wise men of that [earthly city] follow either the good things of the body, or mind, or both: living according to the flesh... 'for professing themselves to be wise, that is, extolling themselves proudly in their wisdom, they became fools'[Rom. i: 22]... But in this other, this heavenly city, there is no wisdom of man, but only the piety that serves the true God and expects a reward in the society of the holy angels. (City of God, II, p. 59)

The wisdom that is foolishness in the eyes of the world becomes, as we shall see below, a central aspect of Burton's analysis of the root causes and cures of melancholy.

The two cities exist together in historical time, bound in by the Creation and the Last Judgement, but the Augustinian attempts to withdraw from the tangles of the earthly city as much as possible, to search for the Heavenly City within. Such a spiritual seeker necessarily becomes sceptical toward the earthly realm and all its concerns, values and beliefs. This helps to explain, for example, why the Augustinian places little value on the concepts of virtue or good works. Melancthon is adamant on this point.

Therefore we are justified when, put to death by the law, we are made alive again by the word of grace promised in Christ; the gospel forgives our sins and we cling to Christ in faith... In a word, we do not doubt at all that our sins have been forgiven and that God now favors us and wills our good. *Nothing, therefore, of our own works, however good they may seem to be, constitutes our righteousness.*¹

Such concepts as virtue and good works manifest themselves in the world, within the limitations of perception and understanding of the earthly city, and thus, are of little, but by no means no interest to the Augustinian attempting to enter into the City of God.² Augustinians do not deny the relative importance of worldly concerns, but these concerns have a lesser importance. The ultimate unimportance of worldly

¹Melancthon, Loci Communes, pp. 88-89.

² See City of God, XV, 1 and 2, vol. II, pp. 60-62, on historical time and the pilgrimage of the City of God through the world.

concerns is reflected, as we shall see below, both in Burton's analysis of melancholy, and in his rhetorical strategies.

In his rejection of the earthly city in favour of the heavenly, the Augustinian usually does not advocate a contemplative or ascetic withdrawal from life. On the contrary, the quest for the Heavenly City entails restlessness and struggle, for the most part because of the internal, spiritual struggles, yearnings, and doubts which the search for the true self uncovers. To the Augustinian, "fallen man seems to confront God in history rather than in nature."¹ Not spiritual withdrawal from the world, but spiritual action becomes the Augustinian ideal.

And the restlessness of human society was paralleled, in the vision of Augustinian humanism, by the inescapable restlessness of individual existence. The Augustinian conception of man as passion and will implied that he could only realize himself fully in activity, which inevitably meant that life must be fraught with conflict, an external struggle with other men, but also an inner struggle with destructive impulses in the self.²

The restlessness and struggle in individual human existence receives great play from Burton in his study of the melancholy mind. The Anatomy concerns itself in large part with the "destructive impulses in the self" which deflect the soul from salvation. As we shall see, Burton uses an Augustinian focus to examine humanity's "passion and will". It will be argued below that Burton's perspective on the human mind at work is Augustinian in the Anatomy, as is his central and most famous exhortation, "Be not solitary, be not idle" (Anat., 3.4.2.6., p. 432).

This Augustinian engagement with life is motivated by love.

This is the divinely instituted rule of love: 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,' He said, and 'Thou shalt love God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind.' [Lev. 19: 18; Deut. 6:5 ; Matt. 22:39,37] Thus all your thoughts and all your life and all your understanding should be turned toward Him from whom you receive these powers. For when He said, 'With thy whole heart, and

¹Bouwsma, Itinerarium, p. 50.

²Bouwsma, Itinerarium, p. 50.

with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind,' He did not leave any part of life which should be free and find itself room to desire the enjoyment of something else. (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, p. 19)

Burton, in his lengthy discussion of the various kinds of love and their diseased and melancholy aspects in Partition III, makes the following observation.

God is love itself, the fountain of love, the disciple of love, as Plato styles Him, the servant of peace, the God of love and peace; have peace with all men and God is with you. (Anat., 3.1.1.2., p. 16)

Love originates within the divinity, and extends towards humanity,

not that we are fair, nor for any merit or grace of ours, for we are most vile and base; but out of His incomparable love and goodness, out of His Divine Nature. (Anat., 3.1.1.2., p. 17)

Ultimately, this love informs all of existence, or at least ought to, as this love is shown by Burton (as we shall see in subsequent chapters) to be the most efficacious, indeed, the only cure, for melancholy. Both on the spiritual plane, and in the fallen world of human commerce and human intercourse, this divine love is the only love that can cure the wounded will and spirit. Also, as we shall see, a great deal of Burton's proposed cure for melancholy concerns itself with the attempted reconciliation, through love, of the afflicted individual to self and society. However, this 'cure' of melancholy is only one step on the path to salvation and involves a clear understanding that, to 'cure' melancholy, ultimately the seeker must reject the world and its ways. (or, reject the trappings of the earthly city). The most profound reason for this rejection concerns itself with levels of love. Augustinianism stresses (and Burton underlines) the essential helplessness of humanity to achieve salvation without the active and loving intervention of God. What humanity is perfectly capable of achieving, without any divine aid, Augustinians sadly note, is damnation.

In order to understand Burton's use of Augustine, one of the most important aspects of Augustine's thought, for our purposes here, is to be found in On Christian Doctrine, Book One, Section XIV. In this passage Augustine establishes two levels in

thought, perception, and being: the mundane level wherein worldly language and worldly knowledge and reason operate, and the spiritual level, where normal human expectations, desires and needs, drawn from experience, reason and habit, are overturned. To establish his argument, Augustine employs a symbol that becomes central to Burton's thesis on melancholy and its cure, the symbol of the physician,

who tends to wounds of the body, sometimes applies contraries, such as cold to hot, moist to dry, and so on; at other times he applies similar things, like a round bandage for a round wound...not using the same bandage for all members but fitting similar things to similar. Thus the Wisdom of God, setting out to cure men, applied Himself to cure them, being at once the Physician and the Medicine. *Because man fell through pride, he applied humility as a cure. We were trapped by the wisdom of the serpent; we are freed by the foolishness of God* (On Christian Doctrine, p. 15) (emphasis mine)

Echoing Paul's seminal strategies in, for example, First and Second Corinthians, Augustine reverses the reader's expectations here, employing contraries and paradoxes to build an argument. The movement from pride to humility, from wisdom to foolishness, through apparently ironic commentary, seeks to unbalance the reader, so that the reader can reassess his own assumptions and see the world as it really is - a place of sickness, desolation and despair. This realization, as Burton notes, can lead to yet another level of melancholy, spiritual melancholy, unless the melancholiac keeps firmly in mind the role of love in salvation. What is important here is that the seeking mind not be trapped in the shifting vagaries of reason to attempt to 'make sense' of such profound paradoxes as Augustine employs, especially his inversions of normal patterns.

Augustine explains his inversion of wisdom and foolishness.

Just as that which was called wisdom was foolishness in those who condemned God, thus this which is called foolishness is wisdom in those who conquer the Devil. We ill used our immortality, so that we deserved to die; Christ used his mortality well to restore us. (On Christian Doctrine, p. 15)

Employing the Christian historical pattern of innocence descending to corruption, then sin, followed by a final potential redemption through Christ, Augustine shows how the pattern is reflected in the ministering of Christian 'medicine'.

Our malady arose through the corrupted spirit of a woman; from the incorrupted flesh of a woman proceeded our salvation. *The same principle of contraries is illustrated in the fact that the example of His virtues cures our vices.* But the following things are like similar bandages applied to our wounds and members; that, born of a woman, He freed those deceived by a woman; that as a man He freed men; that as a mortal He freed mortals; that in death He freed the dead. Instruction will reveal many other examples of Christian medicine operating either by contraries or by similar things. (On Christian Doctrine, p. 15) (emphasis mine)

As we shall examine these concepts in greater detail in subsequent chapters, at this point it is not germane to analyze Augustine's paradoxes too closely, but it is pertinent to note here how the 'principle of contraries' operates as a rhetorical strategy and technique. Augustine counterpoises "corrupted spirit" to "incorrupted flesh", thus undermining the reader's expectation of 'corrupted flesh' and 'incorrupted spirit'. Augustine is attempting to teach the reader to see the world in a new light. Although the use of an argument that seems to transcend logic and reason, such as the statement "in death He freed the dead" is not peculiar to Augustine, the principle of contraries informs much of his writing, especially the City of God, as a rhetorical device to strengthen the main themes. "Christian medicine" is not the same as the medicine of human science; spiritual health is not the same as physical health. Further, the process of discovering where health lies is different, for it is only through 'foolishness' that the Augustinian discovers wisdom. Many of Burton's rhetorical strategies, as we shall see, are similar to Augustine's in this inversion of normal expectations. Burton also follows Augustine's lead in his use of the symbol of the Divine-Physician throughout the Anatomy.

Of Augustine's various works, the one which appears to have most heavily influenced Burton is the City of God. Let us examine a few of Augustine's themes and methods from the City of God in order to trace possible affinities with Burton's themes and methods.

Augustine outlines the great theme of the City of God in his opening.

That most glorious society and celestial city of God's faithful, which is partly seated in the course of these declining times...and partly in that solid estate of eternity... have I undertaken to defend in this work...against all those that prefer their own gods before this city's founder. (City of God, vol. I, p. 1)

In the beginning of Part II, Augustine reiterates his theme, "to dispute (as far as my poor talent allows) of the origin, progress and consummation of the two cities that in this world lie confusedly together". (City of God, vol. 1, p. 312) The intermingled earthly and heavenly cities exist in historical time,

from man's first offspring until he cease to beget any more. All the time included between these two points, wherein the livers ever succeed the diers, is the progression of these two cities. (City of God, vol. II, p. 60)

Although the two cities exist through all of Christian measured time, the span covered from Genesis to Revelations, only one society, and one city, is real.

Augustine juxtaposes the two kinds of wisdom which inspire the two cities, the Word of God as revealed in the Scriptures, and the wisdom of the Roman world, herein represented by Virgil's statement of the Roman political ideal (Aeneid, V, 853) which ends the following quotation.

For the King, the builder of this city, whereof we are now to discourse, hath revealed a maxim of the divine law to His people, thus: 'God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace to the humble.' [Jas. iv. 6; I Pet. v. 5.] Now this which is indeed only God's, the swelling pride of an ambitious mind affecteth also, and loves to hear this as parcel of His praise:

Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos.
To spare the lowly, and strike down the proud. (City of God, vol. I, p. 1)

Augustine comments bitterly and often on this perceived Roman 'arrogance', which claims God's prerogative as a rule of statecraft. As a consequence of this subversion of values in the Roman world, Augustine feels compelled to speak out.

Wherefore touching the temporal city (which longing after domination, though it hold all other nations under it, yet in itself is overruled by the one lust after sovereignty) we may not omit to speak whatsoever the quality of our proposed subject shall require or permit; for out of this arise the foes against whom God's city is to be guarded. (City of God, vol. I, p. 1)

Using the Roman 'lust' for dominion as his exemplum, Augustine argues that the earthly city, symbolized here by temporal power, becomes the dwelling-place of sin, evil and death.

Concerning the heavenly city, Augustine points out its lack of substance.

it is recorded of Cain that he built a city, but Abel was a pilgrim, and built none. For the city of the saints is above, though it have citizens here upon earth, wherein it lives as a pilgrim until the time of the kingdom come; (City of God, vol. II, p. 61)

The heavenly city exists, then, only in the person of its citizens. Thus, the pilgrims who are the denizens of the heavenly city live within the temporal and spatial boundaries of the earthly city, as long as they assume mortal garb. In an insight of great importance to Burton's analysis of melancholy, Augustine points out that these pilgrims also live within the *psychological* confines of the earthly city, or, as Augustine designates it, Babylon. Although the two cities are mingled together from the beginning to the end, of their temporal history, "in their confused progress",

the one of which, the Babylon of the earth, has made her false gods of mortal men, serving them and sacrificing to them as she thought good; but the other, the heavenly Jerusalem, has stuck to the only and true God, and is His true and pure sacrifice herself. *But both of these do feel one touch of good and evil fortune*, but not with one faith, nor one hope, nor one law: and at length, at the last judgment, they shall be severed for ever, and each shall receive the endless reward of their works. (City of God, vol. II, p. 230) (emphasis mine)

The two cities exist within each other, yet are completely unknown to each other, despite the fact that they are so intimately intermingled. For most of humanity, it is the heavenly city which is unknown.

Thus the two cities are described to be seated, the one in worldly possession, the other in heavenly hope, both coming out at the common gate of mortality, which was opened in Adam, out of whose condemned race, as out of a putrified lump, God elected some vessels of mercy and some of wrath; giving due pains unto the one, and undue grace unto the other. (City of God, vol. II, p. 88)

The great difficulty in knowing, and finding the heavenly city is a critical belief in Burton's Anatomy, wherein, as we shall see, the afflicted melancholiac is caught within a web of earthly concerns and psychological barriers which prevent access to the invisible realm.

Augustine reiterates again and again that the two cities exist *in time*. Through the 'common gate of mortality', both cities accept, however unknowingly or unwillingly, their deserved end. Although God may dispense the final judgement, and determine where the spirit shall have eternal rest, ultimately it is up to humanity to decide which city they choose to dwell in; paradoxically, by not choosing.

the citizens of God upon earth may take this lesson from those vessels of wrath, never to rely on their own freedom of will, and may hope to call upon the name of the Lord, because the natural will which God made (yet the Unchangeable made it not changeless) may both decline from Him that is good, and from all good to do evil, and that by freedom of will, and from evil also to do good, but that not without God's assistance. (City of God, vol. II, p. 88)

According to Augustine, "this freedom of will, increasing and partaking with iniquity, produced a confused mixture in both cities". (City of God, vol. II, p. 88) Humanity freely chooses its eternal fate, if the choice is to dwell in the earthly city, the corrupt, fallen world fashioned out of sin. The 'choice' to live in blessedness in the heavenly city is a little more complicated.

Augustine notes:

Two loves therefore have given origin to these two cities, self-love in contempt of God unto the earthly, love of God in contempt of one's self to the heavenly. The first seeks the glory of men, and the latter desires God only as the testimony of the conscience, the greatest glory. (City of God, vol. II, pp. 58-59)

Two kinds of love divide the cities, and the ramifications of this emotional division inform the activities in both realms. Burton would argue that the kind of love in the earthly city leads to melancholy as a spiritual disease, because the spirit longs for the other, the heavenly kind of love. A consequence of this confusion of emotion and love is Augustine's (and Paul's) inversion of wisdom and foolishness.

And the wise men of that [the earthly city] follow either the good things of the body, or mind, or both: living according to the flesh; and such as might know God, 'honoured Him not as God, nor were thankful, but became vain in their own imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened; for professing themselves to be wise, that is, extolling themselves proudly in their wisdom, they became fools' [Rom. I: 21-23]...But in this other, this heavenly city, there is no wisdom of man, but only the piety which serves the true God (City of God, vol. II, p. 59)

The wisdom of the world, and the knowledge derived from reason is, in fact, foolishness. In a sentiment which Burton echoes again and again in the Anatomy, Augustine argues that the knowledge and wisdom of the earthly city is not worth having, because it is rooted in spiritual error and degenerate emotions.

The symbol of the earthly city (which is the Roman world) becomes Babylon, "so fully and so fitly was their society suited to the name of Babylon, which...signifies confusion". (City of God, vol. II, p. 215) Drawing on the legend of the Tower of Babel, from Genesis 11: 1-10, Augustine, with a philological quirkiness Burton would have admired, links Babel and Babylon.

This city now which was called 'confusion' is that Babylon, whose wonderful building is admired even in profane histories: for Babylon is interpreted 'confusion'. Whence we gather that Nimrod the giant was...the builder of it; the scripture saying: 'The beginning of his kingdom was Babylon'. This was the metropolitan city of the realm, the king's residence, and the chief of all the rest, though it were never brought to that strange perfection that the wicked and the proud would

have it to be, for it was built too high, being, it was said, 'up to heaven.' (City of God, vol. II, pp. 103-104)

Augustine proceeds to draw the lesson from his symbolic twinning of Babel-Babylon (a symbol aimed at, and drawing its inspiration from, Rome).

But what intended man's vain presumption herein? Even if they could have exceeded all the mountains with their building's height, could they ever have gotten above the element of air? And what hurt can elevation either of body or of spirit do unto God? Humility is the true pathway unto heaven, lifting up the spirit unto God, but not against God. (City of God, vol. II, p. 104)

Concerning the destruction of the Tower and the scattering of the people through the confusion of tongues, Augustine notes with satisfaction: "thus pride was plagued" (City of God, vol. II, p. 104) No amount of human achievement or endeavour can serve to define the spiritual meaning of life if it is unaccompanied by the proper emotional and mental state. But the citizens of Babylon do not understand this (nor, indeed, do the many figures afflicted with melancholy whom Burton examines). Babylon, in time, becomes the devil's realm, as Augustine notes when he clearly divides the ultimate ends of the two cities: "the one whereof is God's and the other the devil's" (City of God, vol. II, p. 319). Where the devil rules, in the earthly Babylon, confusion, self-vaunting, self-exaltation and the very Roman (and, as Burton demonstrates, universal) lust for domination are the ruling spiritual qualities. As the earthly city is everywhere, Augustine does not hold out any hope for such notions as paradise on earth.

The heavenly city, on the other hand, is nowhere; at least, it is nowhere in this world. Rather, it is on pilgrimage in the hearts and minds of believers. As was noted above, because the faithful of physical necessity dwell in the earthly city, the two cities intermingle to a certain extent. As a corollary to this, then, Augustine has in mind the other great Biblical legend about Babylon - the captivity.

In a very real sense Augustinians believe themselves to be captives of Babylon as long as they dwell in the earthly city (which is all of their natural lives). Augustine, however, does not advocate any form of temporal activism for the spiritually enlightened. Accept the temporal limitations Babylon imposes, he seems to argue, but do not accept its beliefs.

And the prophet Jeremiah, foretelling the captivity of God's ancient people, commanding them (from the Lord) to go peaceably and patiently to Babylon, advised them also to pray, saying, 'For in her peace shall be your peace' [Jer. xxix. 7], meaning that temporal peace which is common both to good and bad. (City of God, vol. II, p. 265)

This rather curious passivity in the presence of Babylon and its evils helps to explain Burton's seeming indifference and inconclusiveness in the Anatomy towards much of his subject matter. The curious antics and miseries of the citizens of the earthly city are of no real consequence from an Augustinian perspective, and, as we shall see, much of Burton's rhetorical strategy is designed to undermine the concerns of Babylon. Being passive and indifferent towards Babylon, or the earthly city, does not imply acceptance of Babylon. For both Burton and Augustine, the fallen world is, and always will remain, a prison. Unlike other prisons, Babylon offers no escape in temporal, spatial, or, Burton especially would argue, as we shall see, in psychological terms. There is only one way to escape from the Babylonian captivity that is life in the fallen world.

Wretched then are they that are strangers to that God, and yet have those a kind of allowable peace, but that they shall not have for ever, because they used it not well when they had it. But that they should have it in this life is for our good also; because during our commixture with Babylon, we ourselves make use of her peace, and *though faith does free the people of God at length out of her, yet in the meantime we live as pilgrims in her.* (City of God, vol. II, p. 265) (emphasis mine)

Thus, spiritual pilgrims must live out their natural lives in Babylon, in the world of corrupt and fallen nature, but their interior, spiritual lives are, or at least ought to be, their central concern. As we shall see in more detail in subsequent chapters, for both

Burton and Augustine, faith is the key to unlock the prison and allow eventual escape from Babylon.

Babylon, the earthly city that encompasses all of fallen nature, presents a puzzling and disordered picture to the Augustinian observer. Babylon lives up to its somewhat spurious etymological roots as the city of Confusion, for the Augustinian observer knows that Babylon is, in a sense, God's creation, but also knows, as revealed in Scripture, that it does not live up to God's expectations. Augustine's apparent puzzlement with the failures of the world, in the City of God, is remarkably similar to Burton's, especially to the Democritus Jr. passages in the preface to the Anatomy. This *seeming* puzzlement in both writers deliberately points out problems not only with the observed, but with the observer.

We know not why God makes this bad man rich, and that good man poor; why he should have joy, whose deserts we hold worthier of pains, and he pains, whose good life we imagine to merit content; why the judge's corruption or the falseness of the witnesses should send the innocent away condemned ...why the wicked man should live sound, and the godly lie bedrid...why infants, of good use in the world, should be cut off by untimely death, while they that seem unworthy ever to have been born attain long and happy life; or why the guilty should be honoured, and the godly oppressed; and such contrasts as these- which who could collect or recount? (City of God, vol. II, p. 269) (emphasis mine)

Both Burton and Augustine spend a great deal of energy collecting and presenting as many such ironic contrasts and examples of Babylon's confusion of values as they can find. The seemingly puzzled attitude and faintly ironic tone of this passage, the deliberate selectivity of perception and the interrogative stance reveal Augustine's scepticism towards the earthly city and its values and achievements. Echoing Romans 11: 33, Augustine adds:

But now, seeing that not only the good are afflicted, and the bad exalted (which seems injustice), but the good also often enjoy good, and the wicked evil; this proves God's judgments more inscrutable, and His ways more unsearchable. (City of God, vol. II, p. 270)

Augustine seems sceptical as well here about the observer's ability to make sense of Babylon. Any attempt to engage, or understand the earthly city is doomed to confusion. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, this belief also underpins much of Burton's analysis of melancholy. Concerning Babylon, Augustine notes:

What shall we say but 'Get you out of the midst of Babylon'? This prophetic command wills us to ply our faith's feet as fast as we can, and be quit of this worldly city compact of a confused crew of sinners and evil angels, and hie us unto the living God. (City of God, vol. II, pp. 191-192)

To escape from Babylon's confusion as much as possible in this mortal life becomes the goal of the pilgrim seeking the heavenly city within.

As with Augustine, Burton sees the need to escape from Babylon. This escape is taken symbolically, as a psychological and spiritual process, for escape from the physical confines of Babylon is possible only in death. In one sense, as Burton notes, there is no escape.

Thus betwixt hope and fear, suspicions, angers...etc., we bangle away our best days, befool out our times, we lead a contentious, discontent, tumultuous, melancholy, miserable life; insomuch, that if we could foretell what was to come... we should rather refuse than accept this painful life. In a word, the world itself is a maze, a labyrinth of errors, a desert, a wilderness... an ocean of adversity, an heavy yoke, wherein infirmities and calamities overtake and follow one another, as the sea-waves. (Anat., 1.2.3.10., p. 274)

However, spiritually, escape from Babylon is the only plausible choice to avoid the misery, folly and confusion of existence. Augustine makes it very clear which realm he prefers.

The heavenly city is far above thine, where truth is the victory, holiness the dignity, happiness the peace, and eternity the continuance. (City of God, vol. I, p. 75)

The central symbol of the City of God is the division of the two cities, the earthly and the heavenly. Burton interprets the symbol of the two cities as follows:

St. Austin, lib. 15 de Civ. Dei, et sup. Ps. lxiv, hath delivered as much in effect: 'Every creature is good, and may be loved well or ill': and

'Two cities make two loves, Jerusalem and Babylon, the love of God the one, the love of the world the other; of these two cities we are all citizens, as by examination of ourselves we may soon find, and of which,' The one love is the root of all mischief, the other of all good. (Anat., 3.1.1.2., p. 14)

For Burton, Jerusalem and Babylon become symbols of the two worlds, the physical and the spiritual; the world of fallen, corrupt and mutable nature, and the eternal, timeless world achieved through salvation. Though the vast majority of the Anatomy is concerned with the ills of Babylon, and though his created personae, such as Democritus Jr., may seem overwhelmed by Babylon's confusion, it is arguable that Burton never loses sight of Jerusalem's promise in his exploration of Babylon's "labyrinth of errors".

One of the central themes, then, of both the City of God and the Anatomy of Melancholy is the need to escape from Babylon. Burton places the above-mentioned reference to the two cities near the beginning of the Third Partition of the Anatomy, wherein he deals with the spiritual aspects of melancholy, in their manifestations as love melancholy and religious melancholy. Thus, Burton provides insight into his spiritual physic through his reference to the two cities. For Augustine, the earthly city becomes associated with Rome, and Roman government and culture. On the symbolic level, the city is Babylon, with all the biblical connotations Augustine places upon it. Rome or Babylon, for Augustine and for Burton, the earthly city is the empire of the fallen world, an empire in time, filled with the miseries, vices and follies of fallen humanity. Burton especially makes it very clear to his readers just what the dangers of the fallen world are, and how they affect the mind. Thus, like Augustine in the City of God, he anatomizes the world of fallen nature, especially human nature, seeking to turn the careful reader against the world and towards God in pursuit of Jerusalem, or the heavenly city.

This sceptical stance towards the world and worldly values is not based on logical process, but stems from a presupposed set of first principles which determine Augustine's and Burton's attitudes, values and assumptions, reaching not only into the content and themes of their arguments, but also into method and style. Burton's underlying attitudes, his style, rhetorical methods and use of illustrative materials have been shaped extensively (but by no means entirely) by his understanding of Augustine. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, some of Burton's ideas which can be traced to Augustine and an Augustinian tradition are his views on scepticism and fideism, his assault on reason, the relation of humanity to the world on the one hand and salvation on the other, and, most importantly for Burton's psychology of melancholy, the consequences of the Fall in the corruption of human faculties, especially of reason and will.

The disparate roles that reason and the passions play in the mind in Burton's schemata follow Augustine's models, especially in the corollary beliefs that humanity's distinctive quality is not reason, but the intuitive and emotional faculties, and that knowledge is not as valuable as faith. Burton believes that humanity cannot overcome the numerous fatal flaws and weaknesses induced by the Fall, nor can humanity by itself, on its own powers, escape divine punishment. Pride and worldly 'vaunting' inhibit the spiritual love of God, and prevent the attainment of salvation, which is possible only through the infusion of grace from God to the supplicant sinner.

This inability to attain to salvation would seem, especially after reading the greater portions of the Anatomy, to forever bind most people to the abuses, weaknesses, vices, follies and failings of worldly pursuits and their own characters in the earthly city of fallen nature. Burton and Augustine share a certain attitude toward the world which posits the need for intense self-examination, a clear, somewhat detached view of all that is external to self, and, perhaps most important, a healthy

sense of irony. Underlying this attitude is a deep, emotional commitment to a system of belief which, predicated as it is upon faith, overturns all perception, values and knowledge inherent in human existence. As we shall see, in Burton's analysis, the major cause of the universal malady, melancholy, is the failure on the part of the foolish sinner to comprehend the importance and effectiveness of these underlying Augustinian values.

The Doors of Mortality:

Burton, Augustine and Salvation

In the Christian context, history is the chronicle of the fallen world. Historical time commences with the expulsion from Eden, and ends where Scripture ends, with the Last Judgment and the call for the Elect to enter Paradise.¹ For Augustine, and especially for Burton, history becomes the chronicle of human vice and folly. When "man, the most excellent and noble creature of the world, the principal and mighty work of God, wonder of Nature" (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 130), was created by God, humanity was

created to God's own image, to that immortal and incorporeal substance, with all the faculties and powers belonging unto it; [and] was at first pure, divine, perfect, happy. (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 130)

But humanity fell from such perfection and entered history.

The impulsive cause of these miseries in man, this privation and destruction of God's image, the cause of death and diseases, of all temporal and eternal punishments, was the sin of our first parent Adam...His disobedience, pride, ambition, intemperance, incredulity, curiosity; from whence proceeded original sin and that general corruption of mankind. (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 131)

Thus Joan Webber comments, concerning the Anatomy's subject matter:

The book imitates life under the aspect of melancholy. That is why it begins with the Fall, and that is why one thing that Burton almost never mentions or tries to describe is the eternal life. As many times as Burton describes himself as in a theatre beholding the world, or mounted on a high hill, or otherwise possessed of a timeless vantage point, it is always to behold *this* world and its follies.²

Burton's focus in the Anatomy, then, is upon humanity in its fallen state, in time.

However, this does not mean that Burton ignores salvation.

As outlined in the following passage, Burton follows Augustine's belief that historical time commences in a psychological moment, not in an event.

This then is the mischief: man liking himself as if he were his own light turned away from the true light This mischief, I say, was first in his soul, and thence was drawn on to the subsequent mischievous act, for the scripture is true that says: 'Pride goeth before destruction, and a

¹See Augustine, City of God, Book XI.

²Joan Webber, The Eloquent I (Madison, 1968), p. 113.

haughty mind before the fall.' [Prov. xvi. 18] The fall which was in secret foreruns the fall which was in public, the first being taken for no fall at all: for who takes exaltation to be ruin, though there is already a fall in the forsaking of the Highest? (City of God, vol. II, p. 45)

In that moment, measured with precision, when humanity uses self as the measure of creation, and explores the interior gifts and faculties of self for their own value, time begins. In this psychological 'falling away' from God, according to Augustine, humanity commences and continues in the sad (and, for Burton, often bizarre) tale of infamy that is human history, or the history of the earthly city. This is also a pattern that repeats itself in each person, in their own psychological re-creation of the Fall, a point that is important in Burton's examination of melancholy.

The nature of the fallen world is keyed to human nature. In their examinations of the will, reason and the passions, Burton and Augustine reveal their vision of human nature. They attack both reason and the passions in numerous passages, but, curiously, they come to defend reason and the passions as necessary to salvation. These contrasting and seemingly contradictory positions become clearer when one determines in what contexts both the attacks and defences are made.

Augustine places a great deal of emphasis upon what he calls the 'affections', or the emotional side of life in the fallen world. He interprets the pilgrimage of the Heavenly City through history in these terms:

We are on a road which is not a road from place to place but a road of the affections, which was blocked, as if by a thorny hedge, by the malice of our past sins. (On Christian Doctrine, p. 16)

Augustine seems to advocate, within limits, the value of reason as a guide on the "road of the affections" that is the spiritual pilgrimage.

A great thing is man, made in the image and likeness of God (Gen. 1, 26), not in that he is encased in a mortal body, but in that he excels the beasts in the dignity of a rational soul. (On Christian Doctrine, p. 18)

Augustine, in On the Free Choice of the Will¹ points out that eternal law, drawn from God's Will, is based upon the highest level of reason (summa ratio). From eternal law, through the application of right reason, we derive temporal law (Choice, pp. 14-15). It is reason, or intelligence, that enables humanity to rule over beasts. Hence, in chapter VIII, entitled "Reason should be master in human life", Augustine notes:

Again, there are the love of praise and glory and the desire for power. While beasts do not have these, nevertheless we are not to be judged better than beasts because of them. *For this craving, when not subject to reason, makes men wretched*, and no-one has ever thought himself superior to another because of his own wretchedness. When reason is master of these emotions (motus animae), a man may be said to be well-ordered (ordinatus). *Therefore, when reason, whether mind or spirit, rules the irrational emotions, then there exists in man the very mastery which the law that we know to be eternal prescribes.* (Choice, pp. 18-19) (English emphases mine)²

Augustine, then, stresses the importance of reason. What Augustine means by reason takes on added meaning through his reference to spirit. Reason becomes much more than an instrument of earthly scientific thought and its logical patterns. Reason is of great importance for Augustine because it appears to be the faculty which most clearly connects humanity with higher levels of being, and it is the faculty through which humanity controls base nature, both within and without.

Reason is important for Burton as well, although his constant attacks upon the pretensions of this human ability may seem to preclude this. In Partition 2, "Cure of Melancholy", Burton discusses the debilitating effects of imagination and passion upon the melancholiac, and then offers this advice:

Thou art discontent, thou art sad and heavy; but why?...thou art jealous, timorous, suspicious; for what cause? *examine it thoroughly*, thou shalt find none at all, or such as is to be contemned...*Rule thyself then with reason.* (Anat., 2.2.6.1., p. 106) (emphasis mine)

¹Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will (Indianapolis, 1964). All subsequent references to this work will be carried in the text as Choice, p. ___.

²See also Choice, p. 39.

The key to understanding both Burton's and Augustine's advocacy of reason in these passages is to see it in its proper context, for neither writer intends reason as a blanket term to cover all aspects of rational thought. Ultimately, as we shall see, both writers abandon reason as a significant aspect of salvation, but, paradoxically, reason is a major vehicle used to carry their thoughts to this point of abandonment. As well, both writers downplay the role of the passions in the fallen world, or in the earthly city, but as one approaches closer to their themes of salvation, the passions and affections take on greater importance. Augustine's symbol of the two cities helps to explain these paradoxes, for the very meaning of reason and passion, (indeed of language itself) changes, in the movement from the earthly city to the heavenly. As a consequence, it is important to keep in mind in the following discussion that both Burton and Augustine are dealing with two levels of comprehension, definition and meaning in their analyses of the human predicament.

Reason in the earthly city is like everything else: it has become a fallen and corrupt parody of its former perfection.

We are thus bad by nature, bad by kind, but far worse by art, every man the greatest enemy unto himself. We study many times to undo ourselves, abusing those good gifts which God hath bestowed upon us, health, wealth, strength, wit, learning, art, memory to our own destruction... We...use reason, art, judgment, all that should help us, as so many instruments to undo us. (Anat., 1.1.1.2., p. 136)

Burton reinforces his point that reason is often a detrimental faculty, with reference to Augustine's Confessions:

Those excellent means God hath bestowed on us, well-employed, cannot but much avail us; but if otherwise perverted, they ruin and confound us:...This St. Austin acknowledgeth of himself in his humble Confessions: 'Promptness of wit, memory, eloquence, they were God's good gifts, but he did not use them to His glory'. (Anat., 1.1.1.2., p. 136)

Burton quite possibly had in mind the following passage from Book IV, Chapter XVI of the Confessions:

What good did then my nimble wit, able to run over all these sciences, and all those most knotty volumes, made easy to me without help or light from any tutor: seeing that I erred so foully, and with so much sacrilegious shamefulness in the doctrine of piety? (Confessions, I, p. 201)

In these passages, reason is seen as an attractively misleading quality that undermines rather than enhances the quality of spirit. Both Burton and Augustine feel that reason *on its own* is potentially a dangerous faculty.

The basic dilemma in their view of reason is its paradoxical position as a middle faculty in the soul, operating as a necessary control upon baser faculties, such as sensitive perception and appetites, but itself needing to be controlled ultimately by faculties which transcend reason. Concerning reason as a controlling faculty, Augustine makes many comments in various works. For example, here is Augustine on "right reason":

Look at justice, which no-one uses wrongly. This is numbered among the highest goods of the mind and among all the virtues of the soul, upon which an upright and righteous life depends. No one uses wisdom, courage, or temperance for evil; for in these as in justice...right reason (recta ratio) prevails, and without it virtues cannot exist. No one can use right reason for evil. (Choice, p. 22)

Augustine argues that Christian virtues cannot prevail in human character without "right reason", a point Burton makes from a more pessimistic perspective:

so we, as long as we are ruled by reason, correct our inordinate appetites, and conform ourselves to God's word, are as so many saints: but if we give reins to lust, anger, ambition, pride, and follow our own ways, we degenerate into beasts, transform ourselves, overthrow our constitutions, provoke God to anger, and heap upon us this of melancholy...(Anat., 1.1.1.2., pp. 136-137)

Giving in to passions and appetites leads away from God, according to Burton. Within the fallen world, or the earthly city, reason helps to prevent just such a movement away from God. Thus, reason is an important faculty in the natural course of existence, in the long, trying struggle against evil that is the Augustinian vision of life.

Augustine illustrates this struggle with several aspects of human nature. Lust, for example, becomes a prime example of fallen values.

Lust dominates the mind, despoils it of the wealth of its virtues, and drags it, poor and needy, now this way and now that... now refusing assent and fearing clear reasoning; now despairing of fully discovering the truth and clinging to the deep obscurities of stupidity; now struggling into the light of understanding and falling back again from weariness. (Choice, p. 22)

Lust, in this passage standing for all of the passions, clouds the reasoning abilities and undermines humanity's struggle for salvation. As a consequence

the reign of lust rages tyrannically and distracts the life and whole spirit of man with many conflicting storms of terror, desire, anxiety, empty and false happiness, torture because of the loss of something that he used to love, eagerness to possess what he does not have, grievances for injuries received, and fires of vengeance. Wherever he turns, greed amasses, extravagance wastes, ambition entices, pride bloats, envy twists, sloth buries, obstinacy goads, submissiveness harasses, and all the other innumerable things that throng and busy themselves in the kingdom of lust. Can we think that this is not punishment which, as you see, all must endure who do not cling to wisdom?¹ (Choice, p. 22)

Lust, though only a natural weakness in humanity, has the power to control and dominate the very faculties that make humanity most like the divinity. Augustine appeals to reason in his war on lust:

the order [of the universe] would not be the most excellent possible if the weaker commanded the stronger. Therefore, it necessarily follows that the mind is more powerful than desire (cupiditas) because it is right and just that it should rule desire. (Choice, p. 20)

Though reason may temporarily rule lust, ultimately Augustine feels that neither can lead to salvation, as all human emotions and faculties in the fallen world are corrupt.

For Burton, lust becomes a major factor in his examination of melancholy, because of its insidious ability to unhinge and overturn the mind:

the very best of them, if once they be overtaken with this passion, the most staid, discreet, grave, generous and wise, otherwise able to govern

¹As we shall see in greater detail in a subsequent chapter on Burton, Augustine and rhetoric, passages such as this one from Augustine are very similar in structure and strategy to Burton's usual style in the Anatomy. See, for comparison, Anat., 1.1.1.2., p. 136, on lust and reason.

themselves, in this commit many absurdities, many indecorums, unbefitting their gravity and persons. (Anat., 1.3.2.3., p. 153)

The passion of lust can completely overpower the higher capacities in humanity, against the will of the sufferer: "and although they do perceive and acknowledge their own dotage, weakness, fury, yet they cannot withstand it" (Anat., 3.2.3., p. 153). Here then is a crucial criticism of reason. By itself, reason is not enough to withstand the frantic demands of runaway passions. It takes a great effort for reason to master passion, an effort which, Burton regretfully notes, most of humanity are unwilling to make.

The major part of lovers are carried headlong like so many brute beasts; reason counsels one way, thy friends, fortune, shame, disgrace, danger and an ocean of cares that will certainly follow; yet this furious lust precipitates, counterpoiseth, weighs down on the other; though it be to their utter undoing, perpetual infamy, loss, yet they will do it. (Anat., 3.2.3., p. 154)

Even though reason needs to control passion, because both these capacities in humanity exist in the fallen world, ultimately it is not enough for humanity merely to hold the lower tendencies in check. A movement through the higher faculties away from the world and its concerns becomes imperative. Yet control of the passions is constantly necessary. Burton makes this point in numerous instances.

Commenting on melancholy in Partition 2, "Cure of Melancholy," he notes:

"Whosoever he is that shall hope to cure this malady in himself, or any other, must first rectify these passions and perturbations of the mind." (Anat., 2.2.6.1., p. 102)

'The body's mischiefs,' as Plato proves, 'proceed from the soul: and if the mind be not first satisfied, the body can never be cured.' (Anat., 2.2.6.1., p. 103)

Thus Burton sees melancholy, and most illness, in psychosomatic terms, and believes that illness has its origin in the mind and spirit. In his "Cure of Melancholy", in the subsection entitled "Passions Rectified", the only 'cure' offered for disordered emotions (a disorder which often results in physical illness) in the melancholiac is

reason, as manifest especially in the reasonable concourse of friendship, and in self-control. The passions, when based on the concupiscible and irascible appetites, rather than on the higher 'affections' of the will (see Partition 1, pp. 160ff), must be kept under control of reason.

Given that reason is necessary to control the lower passions in human life, both Augustine and Burton are careful to point out that this is not enough. For merely to check the carnal appetites with the restraints of rational thought leaves one no better than a Stoic or an Epicurean, as Burton makes clear with pointed reference to Seneca in the "Passions Rectified" section (Anat., 2.2.6.1., pp. 102-109). Inasmuch as one can rise above the passions through strict self-control, and insofar as personal morality and philosophy can carry one through life in the earthly city through a reliance on reason as a guide to conduct, the result is still far from satisfactory. Returning to one of Augustine's favorite motifs, that of peace, we see that despite all rational efforts to control the passions, this effort of reason is not enough ultimately to save humanity from the universal affliction of melancholy.

But all the peace we have here, be it public or peculiar to ourselves, is rather a solace to our misery than any assurance of our felicity. And for our righteousness, although it be truly such, because the end is the true good whereunto it is referred; yet as long as we live here, it consists rather of sin's remission, than of virtue's perfection.
(City of God, vol. II, p. 266)

This passage, while seemingly describing the limitations of religious values, is a telling criticism of all philosophies, especially, for Augustine, Stoic philosophy. In the earthly city, true peace is not possible. The most that any system of thought predicated on reason can accomplish is to act as a 'solace for wretchedness', or, as a temporary surcease from the ills and evils of fallen nature. As we shall see, Burton picks up this belief in his sections on the cure of melancholy. Thus, even though reason as a method

and as a faculty in the mind is extremely important to both Augustine and Burton, both authors severely qualify the value and use of reason.

Humanity cannot rely on its own abilities because these abilities are fallen and corrupt. Augustine thus advocates a strong need for faith and prayer because

our reason, though it be subject unto God, yet as long as it is in the corruptible body, which burdens the soul, cannot have the affections under perfect obedience, therefore the justest man stands in need of this prayer. For though reason have the conquest, it is not without combat. And still one touch of infirmity or other creeps upon the best conqueror, even when he hopes that he holds all viciousness under, making him fall either by some vain word, or some inordinate thought, if it bring him not unto actual error. (City of God, II, p. 266)

Life, then, is always unsettled, and the Augustinian, just as is Burton's melancholiac, is involved in a constant struggle to gain control over his life, his character, and especially, over his emotions. An aspect of this struggle that becomes a major factor in Burton's analysis of melancholy is that the struggle is unceasing.

And therefore as long as we have to reign over sin, our peace is imperfect: because both the affections not yet conquered are subdued by dangerous conflict, and they that are under already do deny us all security, and keep us in continual anxiety. (City of God, vol. II, p. 266)

A great deal of Democritus Jr's. preface to the reader is an elaboration of these points stressed by Augustine: that life is a constant struggle against both external forces and humanity's own vicious, inward propensities; that reason and passion are locked in unending battle; and that there is no peace possible in any true sense of the word in the earthly city. Noting that "all the world is mad, that it is melancholy", Burton goes on to reinforce his assertion that melancholy is the condition of fallen humanity:

For indeed who is not a fool, melancholy, mad? Qui nil molitur inepte, who is not brain-sick? Folly, melancholy, madness are but one disease, delirium is a common name to all ... And who is not a fool, who is free from melancholy? (Anat., Preface, p. 39)

And:

who is not sick, or ill disposed? in whom doth not passion, anger, envy, discontent, fear, and sorrow reign? Who labours not of this disease? (Anat., Preface, p. 40)

And:

We cannot accuse or condemn one another, being faulty ourselves...for we are as mad our own selves, and it is hard to say which is the worst. Nay, 'tis universally so: (Anat., Preface, p. 46)

And:

'Tis not to be denied, the world alters every day; ... as Petrarch observes, we change language, habits, laws, customs, manners, but not vices, not diseases, not the symptoms of folly and madness, they are still the same...our times and persons alter, vices are the same, and ever will be. (Anat., Preface, p. 53)

Burton continues at great length in the Preface, as Stanley Fish and others have demonstrated, through detailed and exhaustive catalogues of stupidity, vice, folly, ignorance, delirium and madness - all human attributes in the fallen world. Moving from the sardonic persona of Democritus Jr. in the Preface to Burton's apparent own analysis as divine-physician in the three partitions of the Anatomy proper, the gloom lifts but a little. Burton offers page after page of advice on how to cope with the inevitable affliction of melancholy in the fallen world, but his advice consistently proves deficient, primarily due to his own undermining of his various and tentative cures (see Chapter Five on Burton, Augustine and rhetoric). Ultimately, Burton agrees with Augustine that there is no cure in the fallen world for the spiritual ills that beset humanity .

In Burton's lexicon of melancholy, reason is not really a solution in the human predicament, but, as with Augustine's views, the passions are definitely a problem. Paradoxically, the passions, or affections, are also a key to salvation. We have seen how passions such as lust, greed and desire (cupiditas) undermine the higher, controlling faculties. According to Burton, all such passions are rooted in the very fabric of human experience:

Angry, peevish, envious, ambitious...To insist in all particulars were an Herculean task to reckon up ... mad labours, mad books, endeavours, carriages, gross ignorance, ridiculous actions, absurd gestures ... hypocrisy, inconstancy, blindness, rashness, dementem temeritatem, fraud, cozenage, malice, anger, impudence, ingratitude, ambition, gross superstition, ... such base flattery, stupend, parasitical fauning and colloquing, etc., brawls, conflicts, desires, contentions, it would ask an expert Vesalius to anatomize every member. (Anat., Preface, pp. 116-117)

All of the above and very much more in human conduct are traced by Burton to corrupt and degenerate reasoning abilities, and an inability to control the lower passions. But for Burton, the passions are not all bad. In his complex attitude towards the value of passion, Burton follows Augustine.

Augustine sees passions as 'disturbances':

that state which the Greeks call $\pi\alpha\theta\omicron\zeta$,[pathos] whence our word passion is derived: $\pi\alpha\theta\omicron\zeta$, and passion, being a motion of the mind against reason...Why are these in these spirits that are not in beasts? For the appearance of such [passions] in beasts is no perturbation, because it is not against reason, which the beast lacks. And that it is a perturbation in men, their foolishness or their wretchedness is cause. For we cannot have that perfection of wisdom in this life that is promised us after our acquittal from mortality. (City of God, vol. I, p. 240)

In Augustine's vision, to be mortal is to be constantly beset by the disturbances and stupidities of the passions. Thus, life for the Augustinian would seem to be a constant struggle against base impulses. Augustine realizes, however, that the passions are not all base, and cannot be denied. Emotion and desire are an integral aspect of being, from the elements right up to the highest spiritual levels.

For if we were beasts, we should love a carnal, sensual life: and this good would suffice our nature without any further trouble; if we were trees, we should not indeed love anything by motion of sense, yet should we seem to desire fruitfulness and growth; if we were stones, water, wind, fire, or so, we should lack sense and life, yet should we have a natural appetite unto our due places; for the motions of weights are like their bodies' loves, go they upwards or downwards: for weight is to the body *as love is to the soul*. (City of God, Vol. I, p. 336) (emphasis mine)

Here then is the answer to the predicament of passions in the fallen world for the Augustinian, especially to the apparent domination of lust in human affairs. Love answers lust in Augustine's analysis.

Augustine sees the affections as possessing potentially positive value.

Augustine points to Paul, "Christ's athlete", as exemplum, because Paul felt very intense emotions, especially love, emotional pain, and mourning.

If these emotions, arising from the love of good, be vicious, then let true vices be called virtues: but seeing their use is levelled by the rule of reason, who dare call them frail or imperfect passions of the mind?
(City of God, vol. II, p. 37)

Augustine argues that there is, seemingly, nothing really wrong with human emotion. Emotion is a part of God's creation, and Christ incarnate felt intense emotions such as grief and joy. The key to an understanding of the affections, as it is with reason and 'right reason', is context. The passions, for the Augustinian, "are causes of the practice of virtue, not inducers unto vice" (City of God, vol. I, p. 257) under certain conditions:

[Scripture] subjects the whole mind to God's governance and assistance, and all the passions unto it, in such manner that they are all made to serve the increase of justice. Finally our doctrine inquires not so much whether one be angry, but wherefore; why he is sad, not whether he be sad; and so of fear. (City of God, vol. I, p. 257)

Augustine stresses the importance of compassion, probably the most important affection of all. "The Stoics indeed are wont to reprehend pity" (City of God, vol. I, p. 258), charges Augustine, arguing that their view of compassion as a weakness or vice demonstrates a lack of humanity on their part. Christians hold opposing beliefs, and thus find a Stoic stance unacceptable. Compassion is love for suffering humanity, an expression of that greater love, *Agape*, that fills all of Creation and makes it meaningful. It is the ability to love that redeems the passionate side of fallen humanity,

and offers a vital clue to the Augustinian in the quest to escape from Babylon, or the earthly city.

Augustine defines two kinds of love on the spiritual plane.

But since the divine substance is more excellent than ours and above us, the precept in accordance with which we are to love God is separate from that enjoining love for our neighbour. For He shows us mercy in accordance with His own goodness, while we show mercy for the sake of His goodness rather than for our own; that is, He has mercy on us that we may enjoy Him, and we have mercy on our neighbour so that we may enjoy Him. (On Christian Doctrine, p. 26)

Perhaps paradoxically, the degree of love is determined by its usefulness:

To enjoy something is to cling to it with love for its own sake. To use something, however, is to employ it in obtaining that which you love, provided that it is worthy of love. (On Christian Doctrine, p. 9)

Spiritual love in the earthly city is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Love is not self-satisfying, in this sense, but rather consists in denial of self. Those who love for the sake of the object of affection, or for the sake of the emotion, live in the "carnal shadows" of the temporal realm.

But he who sees the truth and flees has weakened the acuteness of his mind through the habit of carnal shadows. For men are driven back from their country by evil habits as by contrary breezes, seeking things farther back from and inferior to that which they confess to be better and more worthy. (On Christian Doctrine, p. 13)

Falling away from the greater truth of God's beneficence to the lesser truth and feeling of love in the earthly city is a major failing of humanity, a cause of the "sorrow" and "wretchedness" that infests the human condition and, Burton would argue, the major cause of melancholy. This 'turning away' from God to pursue a lesser love is, for Augustine and Burton, humanity's greatest failing. Thus Augustine offers this precept:

It is to be understood that the plenitude and the end of the Law and of all the sacred Scriptures is the love of a Being which is to be enjoyed and of a being that can share that enjoyment with us, since there is no need for a precept that anyone should love himself. That we might know this and have the means to implement it, the whole temporal dispensation was made by divine Providence for our salvation. We should use it, not with an abiding but with a transitory love and delight like that in a road

or in vehicles or in other instruments ... so that we love those things by which we are carried along for the sake of that toward which we are carried. (On Christian Doctrine, p. 30)

Augustine posits two kinds of love and two levels of passion to correspond to the various demands of the earthly city and the Heavenly. Confusion between these two levels and kinds of feeling is the major cause of 'sorrow' and 'wretchedness', or, as Burton would have it, melancholy. Burton often makes his case concerning melancholy with specific reference to Augustine, or 'Austin'.

In Burton's Anatomy, the overwhelming portion of the argument is devoted to an analysis of the emotional aspects of melancholy, to the complications and predicaments of passions and affections, and to their cure. Concerning the consolations of philosophy, Burton writes:

All philosophers impute the miseries of the body to the soul, that should have governed it better, by command of reason, and hath not done it. The Stoics are altogether of opinion...that a wise man should be...without all manner of passions and perturbations whatsoever, as Seneca reports of Cato. (Anat., 1.2.3.1., p. 251)

This 'philosophical indifference' is a position that Burton strongly disagrees with.¹

But let them dispute how they will, set down in thesi [in a thesis], give precepts to the contrary; we find that of Lemnius true by common experience: "No mortal man is free from these perturbations: or if he be so, sure he is either a god or a block." They are born and bred with us, we have them from our parents by inheritance ... 'tis propagated from Adam: Cain was melancholy, as Austin hath it, and who is not? (Anat., 1.2.3.1., p. 251)

" 'As the rain' (saith Austin) 'doth a stone, so do these perturbations penetrate the mind' " (Anat., 1.2.3.1., p. 252). Because the passions are so central to existence, Burton notes, in discussing the concupiscible and irascible passions: "All affections and perturbations arise out of these two fountains, which, although the Stoics make

¹Burton's adamant disagreement here would seem to contradict critical assertions that Burton has no position on any issue. Though this critical claim may be true of Democritus Jr., in the Preface, it is not true of Burton himself in key portions of the Anatomy. For claims that Burton avoids taking a stand on an issue, see, for example, Fish, Self-Consuming Artifacts (Berkeley, 1972), pp. 349-351.

light of, we hold natural, and not to be resisted" (Anat., 1.1.2.8., p. 161). As a consequence, again with Augustine as authority,

These concupiscible and irascible appetites are as the two twists of a rope, mutually mixed one with the other, and both twining about the heart: both good, as Austin hold, liv. 14, cap. 9, de Civ. Dei, "if they be moderate; both pernicious if they be exorbitant." (Anat., 2.1.3.11., p. 280) ¹

Burton notes that there are good and bad affections, and "out of these two arise those mixed affections and passions" (Anat., 1.1.2.8., p. 161) which constitute the emotions in the fallen world.

In the City of God, Augustine makes the same point about the mingling of good and bad emotions in the following manner:

So then both good and evil do will, desire, beware and rejoice; and to rehearse them in other terms, the good and bad do desire, fear, and are joyful: but the one does it well, and the other badly, according as their wills are. (City of God, vol. II, p. 35)

With the exception of those affections which may draw the Augustinian toward the Heavenly city, these mixed emotions, such as "pride, self-love, emulation, envy, shame, etc.," (Anat., 1.1.2.8., p. 161) reflect humanity's fallen condition, rooted as it is in fallen nature: "Perturbations and passions which trouble the phantasy, though they dwell between the confines of sense and reason, yet they rather follow sense than reason, because they are drowned in corporeal organs of sense" (Anat., 1.2.3.4., p. 259). As a consequence, Burton argues

Some few discreet men there are, that can govern themselves, and curb in these inordinate affections, by religion, philosophy, and such divine precepts, of meekness, patience, and the like; but most part, for want of government, out of indiscretion, ignorance, they suffer themselves to be led wholly by sense ... bad by nature, worse by art, discipline, custom, education, and a perverse will of their own, they follow on,

¹For the most part, it is from statements such as the one cited here from Augustine and other Patristic literature that Burton derives any notion he may have of a mean in human conduct, and not from Aristotle, as Chapin asserts in his doctoral thesis, "Robert Burton and Renaissance Satire" (Columbia, 1974), p. 205.

wheresoever their unbridled affections will transport them, and do more out of custom, self-will, than out of reason. (Anat., 1.2.3.4., p. 258)

"By giving way", Burton concludes, "to these violent passions of fear, grief, shame, revenge, hatred, malice, etc., they are torn in pieces, as Actaeon was with his dogs, and crucify their own souls." (Anat., 1.2.3.4., p. 259) One could multiply such eloquent illustrations from Burton, seemingly endlessly:

The tower of Babel never yielded such confusion of tongues, as the chaos of melancholy doth variety of symptoms. (Anat., 1.3.1.3., p. 397)

Burton makes his thematic point concerning the universal affliction, melancholy, over and over again: the world of fallen nature is a horrible place, made more horrible, not less, by humanity's presence and actions. To Burton, as for Augustine, the earthly city is a nightmarish prison for the soul: "if there be a hell upon earth, it is to be found in a melancholy man's heart" (Anat., 1.4.1., p. 433. See also 2.3.4., pp. 173-175).

If there is a cure for the universal afflictions of "melancholy" or "wretchedness", a needed spiritual light to guide the reader of the Anatomy or the City of God out of darkness, chaos and confusion, it is to be found within the individual, in the very faculties which both Burton and Augustine seemingly take great pains to discredit - reason and the passions. But even more important is the human will.

Both authors centre on the one faculty that is crucial to salvation, the will. In a faith that transcends reason, and in a mingling of the affections and reason in a higher synthesis involving the will, a synthesis that transcends 'perturbations and passions', Augustine offers a kind of solution to the 'wretchedness' of human existence, and Burton to the miseries of the universal affliction, melancholy. In a passage previously quoted from the City of God, we find a major clue to both authors' "physic":

our doctrine inquires not so much whether one be angry, but wherefore; why he is sad, not whether he be sad; and so of fear. (City of God, vol. I, p. 257)

Here Augustine argues that the emotions are not to be denied, but rather explored, understood, accepted, and reconciled to being.

In Book XIV, chapter IX of the City of God, entitled, "Of the perturbations of mind which the righteous moderate and rule aright", Augustine shows how the passions and affections may have positive spiritual values:

according to our religion and the scriptures, the citizens of God, as long as they are pilgrims, and in the way of God, do fear, desire, rejoice, and sorrow. But their love, being right, straightens all those emotions. (City of God, vol. II, p. 36)

These emotions, however, no matter how positive, cannot operate in isolation:

If these emotions, arising from the love of good, be vicious, then let true vices be called virtues: but seeing their use is levelled by the rule of reason, who dare call them frail or imperfect passions of the mind? (City of God, vol. II, p. 37)

Even Christ shared in human emotion, and "we may not think that having man's essential body and soul, He had but seeming affections" (City of God, vol. II, p. 37).

In order to establish the validity and importance of the emotions, Augustine adds:

we confess that those emotions, in their best kind, are but pertinent to this present life, not unto that which we hope for hereafter; and that we are often overpressed by them. A laudable desire or charity may move us: yet shall we weep whether we will or no. For we have them by our human infirmity ... *But as long as we live in this infirmity, we shall live worse if we lack those emotions.* (City of God, vol. II, pp. 37-38) (emphasis mine)

Thus, for the Augustinian, the emotions become not only an inevitable, but a necessary part of existence on the spiritual plane. In his "Cure of Melancholy" sections, Burton devotes considerable space to reconciling the reader to an acceptance of the emotional side of existence. As emotions in the fallen world tend, for the most part, to be negative, even frightening, Burton admonishes "We must not think the happiest of us all to escape here without some misfortune" (Anat., 2.3.1.1., p. 129). As even Christ felt grief and pain, who should then expect to avoid the pains of emotion in existence? "Whatsoever is under the moon is subject to corruption, alteration; and so long as thou

livest upon earth look not for other" (Anat., 2.3.1.1., p. 129). Burton's efforts to reconcile his reader to an inevitable emotional turmoil and sorrow in life follow an Augustinian pattern.

'No man,' saith our Saviour, 'can serve two masters, but he must love the one and hate the other,' etc., Bonos vel males mores, boni vel mali faciunt amores [a right or wrong love makes a good or bad character], Austin well infers: and this is that which all the Fathers inculcate. He cannot (Austin admonisheth) be God's friend, that is delighted with the pleasures of the world... (Anat., 3.4.1.1., p. 317)

Thus, Burton uses 'Austin' and Christ to underline the values and consolations of a spiritual turning away from the world's sorrows.

Burton's vision of humanity's fallen estate is shaped in large part by an Augustinian notion of struggle and conflict:

so we rise and fall in this world, ebb and flow, in and out, reared and dejected, lead a troublesome life, subject to many accidents and casualties of fortune, varieties of passions, infirmities as well from ourselves as others. (Anat., 2.3.1.1., p. 130)

Attempting to reconcile his readers to their lot does not imply for Burton that they should become reconciled to evil, or even to the fallen world in its myriad and mutable being. Rather, for Burton, to 'cure' melancholy means to look beyond melancholy, beyond its apparent cause in the nature of fallen creation, beyond its effects in the torments of being (effects dwelled upon at great length by Burton, and by his critics), to see the ultimate purpose and goal of humanity. There is no cure in this existence, Burton argues, that is anything more than a temporary surcease from affliction: but ultimately, the cure originates precisely in the deliberate struggle to overcome the affliction.

Our life is but short, a very dream, and while we look about, immortalitas adest, eternity is at hand: "Our life is a pilgrimage on earth, which wise men pass with great alacrity." If thou be in woe, sorrow, want, distress, in pain, or in sickness, think of that our apostle, "God chastiseth them whom he loveth." "They that sow in tears, shall reap in joy." [Ps. 6] "As the furnace proveth the potter's vessel, so doth temptation try men's thoughts." [Ecclus., xxvii, 5]; 'tis for thy

good..."as gold in the fire," so men are tried in adversity. (Anat., 2.3.1.1., p. 131)

If one feels unhappy with the miseries of existence, Burton then argues, one could reflect upon the meaning and consequence of damnation, when the soul is 'utterly undone', and sorrows are multiplied to infinity. Seconding Augustine, Burton argues in the above passage that humanity is on a pilgrimage through this fallen world, and thus should keep its collective eye fixed upon the ultimate goal of salvation, and avoid the distractions of the journey itself.

We are sent as so many soldiers into this world, to strive with it, the flesh, the devil; our life is a warfare, and who knows it not? Non est ad astra, nollis e terris via [not easy is the way from earth to heaven] (Anat., 2.3.2., p. 132)

Burton's ultimate consolation is that "there is a God above that can vindicate thy cause, that can relieve thee" (Anat., 2.3.2., p. 132), and thus he exhorts "Be of good courage, misery is virtue's whetstone". Burton constantly points the path to God as the beginning, but only the beginning, of the 'cure' of melancholy.

What's this life to eternity? The world hath forsaken thee, thy friends and fortune all are gone: yet know this, that the very hairs of thine head are numbered, that God is a spectator of all thy miseries, He sees thy wrongs, woes and wants. (Anat., 2.3.3., p. 165)

Burton multiplies such homiletic exhortations to their hundreds in Partition II:

And therefore God hath appointed this inequality of states, orders, and degrees, a subordination, as in all other things. The earth yields nourishment to vegetals, sensible creatures feed on vegetals, both are substitutes to reasonable souls, and men are subject among themselves, and all to higher powers, so God would have it... there is no such cause of so general discontent, *'tis not in the matter itself, but in our mind,* as we moderate our passions and esteem of things ... let thy fortune be what it will, *'tis thy mind alone that makes thee poor or rich, miserable or happy.* (Anat., 2.3.3., p. 170) (emphasis mine)

Concerning the possibilities of a 'cure' for melancholy, as a consequence of his focus upon melancholy as primarily a spiritual and mental disease, Burton stresses the importance of emotional and spiritual strength in his 'medicine'.

Against these other passions and affections, there is no better remedy than...to furnish ourselves with philosophical and divine precepts, other men's examples, ... to balance our hearts with love, charity, meekness, patience, and counterpoise those irregular motions of envy, livor, spleen, hatred, with their opposite virtues, as we bend a crooked staff another way; to oppose "sufferance to labour, patience to reproach," ... meekness to anger, humility to pride; to examine ourselves for what cause we are so much disquieted ... and then either to pacify ourselves by reason, to avert by some other object, contrary passion, or premeditation. (Anat., 2.3.6., p. 186)

Ultimately, though, such exhortations as these fall short of their intended effect, because of the weaknesses inherent in the sources of melancholy in the human spirit.

There is a predicament in using the human mind and affections to 'cure' the afflictions of existence which both Burton and Augustine note. In elevating the affections and passions from the physical to the spiritual level, from the mutable and mundane of the earthly city to the eternal of the heavenly, humanity does not rise above the struggles of existence. As the goal becomes eternal fulfillment, this new focus rather *intensifies* the struggles and wretchedness of existence, and in the case of melancholy, very often intensifies the nature and depth of the illness.

As a consequence, Burton writes with complete faith that the first, and most important cure comes from God. "We must first begin with prayer, and then use physic; *not one without the other, but both together*" (Anat., 2.1.2., p. 9) (emphasis mine). Thus Burton blends the spiritual and the medicinal, and as Divine-Physician, exhorts:

God works by means, as Christ cured the blind man with clay and spittle ... For all the physic we can use, art, excellent industry, is to no purpose without calling upon God ... it is in vain to seek for help, run, hide, except God bless us. (Anat., 2.1.2., p. 9)

Thus we see that Burton, like Augustine, distrusts both reason and passion, or the affections, in the fallen world, but, paradoxically, reason and emotion become necessary tools to salvation in the interior pilgrimage to the Heavenly City. Augustine comments:

the mind should be cleansed so that it is able to see that light and to cling to it once it is seen. Let us consider this cleansing to be as a journey or a voyage home. But we do not come to Him who is everywhere present by moving from place to place, but by good endeavour and good habits. (On Christian Doctrine, p. 13)

Augustine refers often to "the true God, with whom only and in whom only, and from whom only, every reasonable soul must expect and enjoy beatitude" (City of God, vol. I, p. 255). As Augustine lays so much stress on the reasonable soul, what he means by reason should be made clear.

Augustine distinguishes between reason and common sense.

Reason makes its judgment in one way, and common sense in another. Reason judges by the light of truth so that, by right judgment, it subordinates lesser things to the more important ones. Common sense, on the other hand, inclines towards the habits of convenience, so that it puts a higher value on those things that truth proves to be of lesser value. While reason places celestial bodies far over terrestrial ones, what carnal man would not prefer that the stars be missing from the sky, rather than a single bush from his field, or a cow from his herd. (On Free Choice, p. 100)

Common sense becomes the self-centred cunning of fallen humanity. What reasoning humanity does perform inevitably leads to rationalization and personal advantage, or, in the case of the melancholiac, to a self-absorbed focus, so that even in madness humanity 'makes sense' of its various predicaments.

Why melancholy men are witty, which Aristotle hath long since maintained in his Problems, and that all learned men, famous philosophers, and lawgivers, ad unum fere omnes melancholici, have still been melancholy, is a problem much controverted and so that old aphorism of Aristotle may be verified, Nullum magnum ingenium sine mixtura dementiae, no excellent wit without a mixture of madness (Anat., 1.3.3., p. 422)

Here Burton seems to argue that wit and intelligence lead to melancholy. Thus Burton, too, uses the process of reasoning through a difficult aspect of his subject matter, melancholy in the earthly realm, to undermine reason. Although Burton offers up hundreds of sensible aphorisms to aid the melancholiac, especially in the "Cure of Melancholy" Partition, these are rarely offered up as anything more than a temporary

surcease. In hundreds of instances, Burton offers up 'sensible' advice for ironic purposes, or else uses aphorisms in opposition to each other, leaving the reader to sort out the conflicting evidence in conventional wisdom. Thus, following Augustine's lead, Burton undermines reason as common sense. However, Burton does offer up traditional Christian solaces as guides out of the confusing swamps of conventional social wisdom:

What shall Austin, Cyprian, Gregory, Bernard's divine meditation afford us?Nay, what shall the Scripture itself?- which is like an apothecary's shop, wherein are all remedies for all infirmities of mind, ...etc. 'Every disease of the soul,' saith Austin, 'hath a peculiar medicine in the Scripture; this only is required, that the sick man take the potion which God hath already tempered.' (Anat., 2.2.4., p. 94)

Such homiletic medicinals in virtually every case are offered to the reader without the usual countervailing and undermining opposing views.

Augustine opposes the logic of philosophy to the true nature of knowledge:

the truth of valid inference was not instituted by men; rather it was observed by men and set down so that they might learn or teach it. For it is perpetually instituted by God in the reasonable order of things. Thus the person who narrates the order of events in time does not compose that order himself ... In the same way, he who says, "When a consequent is false, it is necessary that the antecedent upon which it is based be false also," speaks very truly; but he does not arrange matters so that they are this way. Rather, he simply points out an existing truth. (On Christian Doctrine, p. 68)

In relation to Augustine's rhetoric, concerning Augustine's theory of truth, J. A.

Mazzeo notes:

The nature and use of signs became strictly related to the realities to be sought (discovery) and to their formulation (statement), so that the use of the arts of language is utterly dependent on the structure of reality, a relationship with which no classical rhetorician other than Plato had been concerned.¹

For Augustine, reason at its best seeks to discover the structures of reality which underpin creation. As reasoning abilities in the fallen world are as corrupt and

¹J. A. Mazzeo, Renaissance and Seventeenth-Century Studies (New York, 1964), p. 3

degenerate as all else in nature and in the mind, humanity often mistakes the lesser illusions of corrupt nature for the greater truths of God's hidden world, or, to complete the Augustinian metaphor, confounds the rules of thought in the earthly city with the rules of thought in the Heavenly City. This confusion is between the merely logical manifestations of the illusory and the truly rational reality of God's creation. Augustine does not so much downplay reason, as he downplays the kinds of reasoning which are to be found in the earthly city. Thus, for example, in discussing exegesis, Augustine advocates the use of reason, but at the same time seriously qualifies that use.

When a meaning is elicited whose uncertainty cannot be resolved by the evidence of places in the Scriptures whose meaning is certain, it remains to make it more clear by recourse to reason, even if he whose words we seek to understand did not perhaps intend that meaning. *But this is a dangerous pursuit; we shall walk much more safely with the aid of the Scriptures themselves.* (On Free Choice, p. 102) (emphasis mine)

Burton's Anatomy is filled with examples of the misuse and abuse of reason by fallen humanity. As we shall see in the "Structures of Mind" chapter below, Burton examines the process of human reasoning in great detail, and traces the misuse of reason to the lower capacities, especially the appetites and imagination, and their irruption into the higher levels of thought (Anat., 1.2.3.2., pp. 253-287).

Like Augustine, Burton too criticizes logic and mundane reasoning for its own sake, but he is less concerned with criticizing the rational faculties than he is to prove his major contention that imagination, affections, perturbations and the passions corrupt what little reasoning ability humanity may possess. Thus his major criticism of reason is that it is a weakened faculty that needs constant bolstering. Discussing religious controversialists and sermonizers, Burton comments, echoing Augustine:

Blind fury, or error, or rashness, or what it is that eggs them, I know not; I am sure, many times, which Austin perceived long since, tempestate contentio nis. serenitas caritatis obrubilatus, with this tempest of contention the serenity of charity is overclouded, and there be too many spirits conjured up already in this kind in all sciences...which do so furiously rage. (Anat., Pref., pp. 35-36)

Thus, humanity, in the guise of reason, spends its days in the earthly city "in unprofitable questions and disputations" (Anat., Pref., p. 36) which undermine the spiritual side of existence. " 'Tis an inbred malady in every one of us, there is seminarium stultitiae, a seminary of folly" (Anat., Pref., p. 46):

altae radices stultitiae [deep are the roots of folly]... Some say there be two main defects of wit, error and ignorance, to which all others are reduced; by ignorance we know not things necessary, by error we know them falsely. Ignorance is a privation, error a positive act. (Anat., Pref., p. 47)

Under such circumstances, where ignorance and error hold sway, rational endeavour is, apparently, little more than "insana studia, insani labore, etc., mad endeavours, mad actions, mad, mad, mad" (Anat., Pref., p. 47). To underline the irrational nature of human rationality in the fallen world, Burton employs hundreds of illustrations throughout the Anatomy "to declare the world's vanity, full of ridiculous contrariety" (Anat., Pref., p. 49).

Despite Burton's criticism of reasoning processes, he does find reason useful, and even necessary, in human existence. But reason's usefulness is limited, and is of the order Augustine discusses above, when he says:

We should use it, not with an abiding but with a transitory love...so that we love those things by which we are carried along for the sake of that toward which we are carried. (On Christian Doctrine, p. 30)

For Burton, the major positive use of both reason and the affections, or emotions, is to contribute to the cure of melancholy, as we shall see below.

Augustine identifies a third level of reason which is, for our purposes, the most important level of reason. It is a level of reason which transcends reason and connects humanity with the divinity and divine ideas.

The human soul is naturally connected with divine ideas (divinae rationes), upon which it depends when it says, "This would be better than that." If the soul speaks with truth and understanding, it does so because of those divine ideas with which it is connected. The soul should believe that God made that which it knows by true reason ought

to have been made by Him, even if it does not see this in actuality. Even if a man could not see the heavens with his own eyes, still he could grasp, by true reason, that some such thing ought to have been created. The soul ought to believe that the heavens were made, even if it were unable to see them with its own eyes. For the soul would not have understood through thought that the heavens ought to have been made, if this conception were not among those ideas through which all things were made. *What does not participate in the divine ideas cannot be grasped by true understanding, since it is itself not true.* (On Free Choice, p. 97) (emphasis mine)

In this passage Augustine's use of the term 'reason' begins to depart from the levels of reasoning that operate in the earthly city and we approach the realms of the heavenly city and its perceptions. Here it is important to Burton's understanding of this aspect of the argument that reason involve divinae rationes.

Augustine promotes a kind of intuitive reasoning which encompasses and transcends all the lower human faculties, so that reason and the affections become linked, then merged:

But whether the love that we love them with is to be loved, that is to be declared. It is to be loved. We prove it, because it is loved in all things that are justly loved. For he is not worthily called a good man that knows good, but he that loves it. (City of God, vol. I, p. 337)

Reason and affection unite in love of God. This love is found on a higher plane of spirituality, a plane where intuitive reason becomes subordinate to, but a part of the realm of faith. Here reason combines with will (what Burton calls the "understanding" and the "will" of the rational soul - see "Structures of Mind", below) to achieve the only truth worth knowing.

When the rapier edge of the mind cuts through the many true and immutable things with its sure reason, it steers toward the very truth, by which all things are revealed; clinging to truth as if forgetful of all else, it enjoys everything at once in its enjoyment of truth. Whatever is delightful in other truths derives its delightfulness from truth itself. (On Free Choice, p. 68)

Augustine links the truth to the will:

No one can lose truth and wisdom against his will, for no one can be physically separated from them. That which is called separation from truth and wisdom is the perverse will which loves inferior things. No

one wills a thing unwillingly. We possess in the truth, therefore, what we all may enjoy, equally and in common; in it are no defects or limitations. For truth receives all its lovers without arousing their envy. (On Free Choice, p. 69)

As the truth and the will are linked, "our freedom then consists in submission to the truth" (On Free Choice, p. 69). As noted above, however, knowledge of the truth, and knowledge of the way to the truth, is not enough. One must live the truth. This imperative is a difficult one to follow, however, primarily because of humanity's corrupt faculties, especially the will.

But yet the mind itself, wherein reason and understanding are natural inwards, is weakened and darkened by the mist of inveterate error, and disabled to enjoy by inheritance, nay, even to endure that immutable light, until it be gradually purified, cured, and made fit for such an happiness. (City of God, vol. I, p. 313)

As mentioned above, Augustine sees life as a constant struggle for meaning and salvation, and here he comments that spiritual renewal and healing is a constant process. Augustine's spiritual 'cure' and Burton's ultimate cure of melancholy are dependent upon a crucial human faculty, the will.

Given the importance of the will to human spiritual health, Augustine appears ambivalent about the question of the freedom of the will. In a lengthy passage concerning two human flaws which are later adapted by Burton as central aspects of his examination of melancholy, Augustine makes the following observations concerning error and ignorance.

We should not be amazed that, because of his ignorance, man has not free choice of will to choose what he should rightly do. We should not wonder that a man may see what he ought to do and may will to do it, yet he cannot, through the resistance of carnal habit - which is, as it were, naturally increased by that violence which his mortality has bequeathed him... Thus the man who does not act rightly, although he knows what he ought to do, loses the power to know what is right; and whoever is unwilling to do right when he can, loses the power to do it when he wills to. *In fact, two penalties - ignorance and difficulty - beset every sinful soul.* Through ignorance, the soul is disgraced by error, through difficulty, it is tormented by pain. The approval of false things as true, so that man makes a wrong judgment against his will,

and the lack of power to abstain from lust because of the opposition and torments of the bondage of the flesh - *these two things are not in nature of man as he was made but are the penalties of man who has been condemned*. When we speak of the will that is free to do right, we speak of the will with which man was (first) made. (On Free Choice, p. 128) (emphasis mine)

The apparent lack of free will in humanity can be traced to its sinful state in the fallen world. Error and ignorance prevent the soul from achieving and living by the truth. But such bondage to carnality is *unnatural*, according to Augustine. Ultimately, Augustinian thought is aimed at cleansing the will of its postlapsarian corruptions through a policy of turning away from the fallen world of the earthly city towards the Heavenly city. This attitude of cleansing the will by turning away from corruption is the same belief that motivates Burton's cure of melancholy in the Anatomy.

The will affects all other lower faculties of the mind. Concerning the emotions, or affections, of desire and fear, joy and distress, Augustine notes,

But the quality of man's will is of some moment; for if it be bad so are all those motions of the soul; if good, they are both blameless and praiseworthy. For there is a will in them all. Nay, they are all direct wills. What is desire, and joy, but a will consenting to that which we affect? And what is fear, and sorrow, but a will contrary unto what we like? (City Of God, vol. II p. 32)

The will impinges upon and ultimately creates both emotion and understanding. Fallen humanity often confuses the lower powers with the higher, and, wittingly or unwittingly, willingly or unwillingly, allows the lower capacities, such as appetites, to subvert the creative faculties of the soul. This is also the major theme in Burton's focus upon spiritual melancholy as a disease of the will (see below, "Structures of Mind" chapter, for a detailed discussion). Augustine sees the affections, especially lust, as subverting the will. Desire and fear are two aspects of lust, and every act of evil, according to Augustine, stems from lust (On Free Choice, pp. 8-9).

Lust, rooted in pride, leads to all other evils, such as avarice and covetousness:

To wish to live without fear is not only the desire of good men, but the desire of all evil men as well. However the difference is this: that the

good seek it by turning their love away from those things which cannot be possessed without the risk of losing them. Evil men, however, try to remove obstacles so that they may safely rest in their enjoyment of these things, and so live a life full of evil and crime, which would be better named death. (On Free Choice, p. 10)

According to Augustine, the root problem with all evil choice lies not in the object of desire, or even in the "perturbations and passions" of human existence. Augustine argues that nature has a kind of neutrality in morality which is a form of goodness. The source of evil lies within humanity, precisely in the corrupt will that dictates to the rest of the faculties the choice of evil:

all things below [angels], even to the lowest earth, being natural, are also good, and have the goodness of form and kind in all order. How then can a good thing produce an evil will? How can good be cause of evil? For the will turning from the superior to the inferior, becomes bad, not because the thing whereunto it turns is bad, but because the turning is bad and perverse. No inferior thing then depraves the will, but the will depraves itself by following inferior things inordinately. (City of God, vol. I. p. 349)

The evil that humanity commits resides in the turning-away from God, in the silent and internal sin of the perverse will. Abuse of will is the major cause of melancholy, in Burton's lexicon. Burton finds that the will's tendency to allow the lesser appetites to overthrow its own powers is the major source of melancholy's power over the human personality:

For in this infirmity of human nature, as Melancthon declares, the understanding is tied to and captivated by his inferior senses, that without their help he cannot exercise his functions, and the will, being weakened, hath but a small power to restrain those outward parts, but suffers herself to be overruled by them. (Anat., 1.2.5.1., p. 375)

In a lengthy passage, Augustine links evil and the "wicked will" of humanity:

Avarice is desire, and desire is a *wicked will*. Therefore, a *wicked will* is the cause of all evil. If the will were in accord with its nature, it would surely maintain that nature, not harm it; and therefore, it would not be wicked. *From this we gather that the root of all evil is this: not being in accord with nature.* ... After all, what cause of the will could there be except the will itself? It is either the will itself, and it is not possible to go back to the root of the will; or else it is not the will, and there is no sin. *Either the will is the first cause of sin, or else there is no first cause.* Sin cannot rightly be imputed to anyone but the sinner, nor

can it rightly be imputed to him unless he wills it. I do not know why you ask anything else. (On Free Choice, pp. 125-126) (emphasis mine)

Burton notes that the lesser appetites, unless checked by the will, inevitably choose evil,

and thence come all those headstrong passions, violent perturbations of the mind; and many times vicious habits, customs, feral diseases; because we give so much way to our appetite, and follow our inclination, like so many beasts. (Anat., 1.1.3.1., pp. 168-169)

Because the will is weakened, humanity concedes to baser appetites, and melancholy arises.

Thus, free will becomes a somewhat unwanted faculty.

For God (the Creator of nature, and not of vice) made man upright: who, being willingly depraved and justly condemned, begot all his offspring under the same depravation and condemnation. For in him were we all, since we all were that one man, who through the woman who was made of himself before he sinned, fell into sin. ... And therefore this came from the bad using of free will. Thence arose all this train of calamity, drawing all men on into misery... (City of God, vol. II, p. 10)

Free will in humanity operates in only one way, in only one direction - away from God, and away from the Heavenly city,

wherein the soul leaves the life that is God (for it was not forsaken ere it forsook Him, but contrariwise, the one will being their first leader to evil, and the Creator's will being the first leader to good, both in the creation of it, before it had being, and the restoring of it when it had fallen) (City of God, vol. II, p. 11)

Augustine is emphatic upon this point that "this defect [of the will] is voluntary":

For if the will remained firm in the love of that higher and stronger Good which gave it light to see it, and zeal to love it, it would not have turned from that, to take delight in itself, and thereupon have become so blind of sight and so cold of zeal. (City of God, vol. II, p. 43)

Humanity willingly turns from God to itself.

But evil began within them secretly at first, to draw them into open disobedience afterwards. For there would have been no evil work, but there was an evil will before it: and what could begin this evil will but pride...? And what is pride but a perverse desire of height ... This is when it [the will] likes itself too well, or when it so loves itself that it

will abandon that unchangeable Good which ought to be more delightful to it than itself. (City of God, vol. II, p. 43)

As a consequence, according to Augustine, this "freedom of will, increasing and partaking with iniquity, produced a confused mixture of both cities" (City of God, vol. II, p. 88), and humanity, by its own decision, took up residence in the earthly city.

Free will exists then, insofar as one chooses to turn away from good; to choose good willingly one needs help. Augustine reinforces this claim in several works: humanity is free only to choose evil, to choose life in the earthly city.

If man is good, and cannot act rightly unless he will to do so, then he must have free will, without which he cannot act rightly. We must not believe that God gave us free will so that we might sin, just because sin is committed through free will. It is sufficient for our question, why free will should have been given to man, to know that without it man cannot live rightly. (On Free Choice, p. 36)

In reading Augustine's ideas about the will, the question of whether the will is absolutely free in essence, or only partially free in terms relative to context, or not free at all, is one that Augustine seems to refuse to answer clearly. He prefers to allow context to decide meaning. Despite this seeming ambivalence, however, free will is definitely a key part of Providence:

even so, man being in Paradise could not live well without God's help, but yet it was in his power to live badly, and to select a false beatitude, and a sure misery For who dare say or think that God could not have kept both men and angels from falling? But He would not take it out of their powers, but showed thereby the wickedness of their pride, and the goodness of His own grace. (City of God, vol. II, p. 58)

'As Austin saith' concerning the will, Burton echoes.

In Partition 1, Section 1, Member 2, Subsection 11, entitled "Of the Will", or, the affective side of the rational soul, Burton addresses himself to the question of free will, and what he has to say, filtered through the authority of Melancthon, could easily be borrowed from any one of dozens of passages in Augustine's works such as the ones quoted above:

The sensual appetite seeing an object, if it be a convenient good, cannot but desire it; if evil avoid it; *but this [the will] is free in his essence, "much now depraved, obscured, and fallen from his first perfection; yet in some of his operations still free"...* Otherwise, in vain were laws, deliberations, exhortations, counsel, precepts, rewards, promises, threats and punishments: and God should be the author of sin. But in spiritual things we will no good, prone to evil (except we be regenerate, and led by the spirit). (Anat., 1.1.2.11., p. 167) (emphasis mine)

Here Burton enunciates Augustine's position concerning the powers of the will. The will is free to turn away from good, but, as Augustine stresses, only God's Grace operating upon the will can lead the sinner to regeneration - if the sinning person is willing. Thus, Burton the Augustinian sceptic sadly notes that

we cannot resist, our concupiscence is originally bad, our heart evil, the seat of our affections captivates and enforceth our will; so that in voluntary things we are averse from God and goodness, bad by nature, by ignorance worse, by art, discipline, custom ... except our will be swayed and counterpoised again with some divine precepts and good motions of the spirit. (Anat., 1.1.2.11., p. 167)

As does Augustine, Burton, though advocating the notion of free will, also hedges his notion in:

we say that our will is free in respect of us, and things contingent, howsoever (in respect of God's determinate counsel) they are inevitable and necessary. (Anat., 1.1.2.11., p. 168)

Though both Augustine and Burton stress the importance of a strong and devout will, the will does not operate in the human personality in isolation.

A point which Augustine stresses, and Burton seconds, is the need to bring together reason and emotion in synthesis within the will, a relationship in disarray since the Fall. The will "was (as I said) once well agreeing with reason, and there was an excellent consent and harmony betwixt them, but that is now dissolved, they often jar, reason is overborne by passion" (Anat., 1.1.2.11., p. 168). Thus, Burton addresses all of humanity.

God hath given thee so divine and excellent a soul, so many good parts and profitable gifts, thou hast not only contemned and rejected, but hast corrupted them, polluted them ... thou art a traitor to God and nature, an enemy to thyself and the world. Perditis tua ex te: thou hast lost thyself

wilfully, cast away thyself, thou thyself art the efficient cause of thine own misery, by not resisting such vain cogitations, but giving way unto them. (Anat., 1.2.2.7., p. 249)

Such passages as these (and there are many of them in the Anatomy) lend significant meaning to Burton's underlying Augustinian focus on the interior struggle of the pilgrim to overcome his own degenerated powers, especially the powers of will. When one gets beyond the satire in the Preface, and considers the basic strategy of the entire Anatomy: "Thou thyself art the subject of my discourse", one begins to perceive that Burton's Augustinian focus on the struggle for meaning and salvation informs the entire work.

If humanity turns away from good and God through its own perverse will, (and inevitably people do), the return journey to Grace is somewhat more complicated. Here again, in what is arguably the most important aspect of the Anatomy, the ultimate and permanent cure of melancholy the spiritual disease, Burton follows close at the heels of Augustine.

We established that the mind could not become a slave of lust except through its own will ... We conclude, therefore, that the movement which, for the sake of pleasure, turns the will from the Creator to the creature belongs to the will itself. (On Free Choice, p. 87)

Augustine further argues that the will can be controlled.

All useful teaching on this point has its value in the fact that when this movement (of the will) is disapproved and controlled, we may turn our will away from the inclination toward temporal things, to the enjoyment of eternal good. (On Free Choice, pp. 87-88)

Humanity must exercise restraint and self-control, to turn appetites away from the carnal toward the spiritual. But this exercise of will, an aspect of Augustine's view that life is a constant struggle, is only the beginning. Humanity (and each and every individual, for this is a personal struggle), must acknowledge the limitations of being, and its own sinful state. Augustine argues that once this penitential attitude is inculcated, the pilgrim can lead a relatively good life in the earthly city, through denial,

examination and resolution. Burton's Anatomy contains hundreds of examples, aphorisms, precepts, exhortations and the like, to encourage suffering humanity to abandon its melancholy and lead a good life:

be thankful for that thou hast, that God hath done for thee, He hath not made thee a monster, a beast, a base creature, as He might, but a man, a Christian ... Thy lot is fallen, make the best of it. (Anat., 2.3.1.1., p. 131)

It is worth repeating here a passage examined earlier, wherein Burton underlines his central theme of melancholy with Augustinian exhortations:

Our life is but short, a very dream, and while we look about, immortalitas adest, eternity is at hand: "Our life is a pilgrimage on earth, which wise men pass with great alacrity." If thou be in woe, sorrow, want, distress, in pain, or in sickness, ... 'tis for thy good ... "as gold in the fire," so men are tried in adversity. (Anat., 2.3.1.1., p. 131)

Despite his constant urgings, his homiletic exhortations, Burton realizes that all this struggle to lead a good life is not enough. If it were, then Stoics would be the moral equivalent of Christians. To live a good life may prevent damnation, but only one path through the wilderness of the earthly city leads to salvation in the Heavenly city.

In Augustine's lexicon of salvation,

by His manhood is He mediator, and by man He is our way. For if the way lie between him that goes and the place to which he goes, there is hope to attain it. But if one have no way, nor know which way to go, what boots it to know whither to go? And the only sure, plain, infallible highway is this mediator, God and man: God, our journey's end, and man, our way unto it. (City of God, vol. I, p. 313)

The individual human will needs the divine assistance of Christ and the Holy Spirit to bolster what degenerated powers it may exercise on its own. Without this divine aid, the will is the major cause of sin in the human personality:

it is evident nonetheless that the souls of sinners suffer punishment at the hands of the most perfect ... Creator. These sins...must be attributed only to man's will. We need seek no further cause of sin. ... if a man refuses to strive for excellence, or wills to step back from where he set out, he justly and properly suffers punishment. (On Free Choice, pp. 137-138)

Augustine does not wish to imply that humanity is abandoned by the divinity.

However, humanity must make the effort and engage in the struggle that opens up the possibility of salvation:

the soul's ignorance of what it should be arises from the fact that it has not yet the power to know. *It will receive this power, however, if it uses well what it has received.* Moreover, it has received the power to search diligently and piously if it wills. And even when it knows what it must do, it lacks the power immediately to do so, since the soul has not yet received this power. (On Free Choice, p. 138) (emphasis mine)

Despite its own efforts, the human soul must receive divine assistance, and the form that it takes, the "power", is grace.

Since a man cannot rise of his own will as he fell by his own will, let us hold with firm faith the right hand of God, Jesus Christ our Lord, which is stretched out to us. Let us wait for Him with steadfast hope; let us love Him with burning love. (On Free Choice, p. 84)

God "made man upright, endowed with free will, earthly yet worthy of heaven, if he stuck fast to his Creator" (City of God, vol. II, p. 359). As a consequence, Augustine sees humanity's journey through the earthly city in terms of humanity's spiritual corruption and fall to the depths of physical being, and subsequent potential rise back to spiritual life - with the assistance of God's grace:

[Adam's seed] being corrupted by sin must needs produce man of that same nature, the slave to death, and the object of just condemnation. And therefore this came from the bad using of free will. Thence arose all this train of calamity, drawing all men on into misery (*excepting those that by God's free grace are delivered*) from their corrupt origin (City of God, vol. II, p. 10) (emphasis mine)

Augustine sees humanity as free to sin and err, but to escape this calamitous sequence, only dutiful submission to the power of the divinity, expressed through the mercy of Grace, can lead to salvation.

Burton, too, follows this sequence in his quest to cure the spiritual disease, melancholy. Calling upon Augustine, Burton indicates the safe path through the earthly city:

for us that are Christians, regenerate, that are His adopted sons, illuminated by His words, having the eyes of our hearts and understandings opened, how fairly doth He offer and expose himself! Ambit non Deus (Austin saith) donis et forma sua, He woos us by His beauty, gifts, promises, to come unto Him. (Anat., 3.4.1.1., p. 314)

Despite God's willingness to accept fallen sinners back into the fold, humanity does not seem to comprehend the magnitude and magnificence of the promise, and it is this failure to comprehend the meaning of grace that is a major cause of melancholy.

We are thus bad by nature, bad by kind, but far worse by art, every man the greatest enemy unto himself ... Those excellent means God hath bestowed upon us, well employed, cannot but much avail us, but if otherwise perverted, they ruin and confound us: ... This St. Austin acknowledgeth of himself in his humble Confessions: "Promptness of wit, memory, eloquence, they were God's good gifts, but he did not use them to His glory." (Anat., 1.1.1.2., p. 136)

As a consequence of this too human determination to ignore the gifts from God, Burton issues stern warnings to the reader in key passages in the Anatomy, warnings scattered here and there between the hundreds of pages of cataloguing of humanity's vices, follies, sorrows, lusts, angers and despairs. And many of these warnings are reinforced with specific reference to Augustine, as in the following passage with three references to Burton's favorite author (aside from the Scriptures) when he is indicating a path out of the quagmire that is melancholy.

"No man," saith our Saviour, "can serve two masters, but he must love the one and hate the other," etc.; Bonos vel malos mores, boni vel mali faciunt amores [a right or wrong love makes a good or bad character], Austin well infers; and this is that which all the Fathers inculcate. He cannot (Austin admonisheth) be God's friend, that is delighted with the pleasures of the world; "make clean thine heart, purify thine heart; if thou wilt see this beauty, prepare thyself for it." ... "Thou covetous wretch," as Austin expostulates, "why dost thou stand gaping on this dross, muck-hills, filthy excrements? behold a far fairer object, God Himself woos thee; behold Him, enjoy Him." (Anat., 3.4.1.1., p. 317)

The calamitous sequence that befalls humanity when a lust-dominated will controls the soul in the earthly city pales in comparison to the calamities which befall the soul that does not attain to the Heavenly city. Ironically, awareness of this is often a further cause of melancholy, as Burton explains in the section on "Religious Melancholy".

Burton reminds his readers of this future course beyond death many times (see, for example, Anat., 3.4.1.4., p. 347) and it is arguably the most important aspect of the entire work.

Burton goes on to offer clues to the reader for escaping the calamitous sequence of willing oneself away from God's mercies.

We are all brethren in Christ, servants of one Lord, members of one body, and therefore are or should be at least dearly beloved, inseparably allied in the greatest bond of love and familiarity, united partakers not only of the same cross, but coadjutors, comforters, helpers, at all times, upon all occasions: as they did in the primitive Church (Acts iv). (Anat., 3.4.1.3., p. 348)

However, both Burton and Augustine recognize the difficulties inherent in their chosen paths. Augustine finds one of the deadliest mental traps, even for those who desire and actively seek salvation, to be despair.

And whoever does not believe that his sins can be forgiven worsens in desperation, as if nothing better than evil remained to him since he has not faith in the fruits of his conversion. (On Christian Doctrine, p. 17)

Burton finds, in his "Religious Melancholy" section, that despair is a major aspect of melancholy, is in fact the highest spiritual level of the disease, and the most insidious:

But for as much as most men in this malady are spiritually sick, void of reason almost, overborne by their miseries and too deep an apprehension of their sins, they cannot apply themselves to good counsel, pray, believe, repent. (Anat., 3.4.2.6., p. 410)

The main problem is a too imaginative vision of divine justice, without a corollary vision of divine mercy and God's grace.

The main matter which terrifies and torments most ... is the enormity of their offences, the intolerable burthen of their sins, God's heavy wrath and displeasure so deeply apprehended, that they account themselves reprobates, quite forsaken of God, already damned, past all hope of grace ... slaves of sin. and their offences so great they cannot be forgiven. (Anat., 3.4.2.6., p. 410)

Such are the fruits of conscience in the fallen world, a too delicate perception of sin. The earthly city becomes a prison with no door when humanity trusts to its own fallen and corrupt perceptions, understanding, and imagination.

Burton points to the healing powers of God's grace as an antidote to the despair of the melancholiac.

But these men must know there is no sin so heinous which is pardonable in itself, no crime so great but by God's mercy it may be forgiven. "Where sin aboundeth, grace aboundeth much more." (Rom. v, 20) (Anat., 3.4.2.6., p. 410)

Here then, is the solution to the dilemma of free will in the fallen world. Despite humanity's predilection to choose evil, the infinite bounty of God's grace is available to all.

His promises are made indefinite to all believers, generally spoken to all, touching remissions of sins, that are truly penitent, grieved for their offences, and desire to be reconciled; Matt. ix, 12,13: "I came not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance," that is, such as are truly touched in conscience for their sins. (Anat., 3.4.2.6., pp. 410-411)

Over these six pages of exhortation and persuasion concerning the power and efficacy of grace, through 23 references to the Scriptures, 6 to Augustine, at least 16 to other Christian authors (especially Chrysostom), several unattributed quotations, and one reference to Seneca, Burton outlines the central tenet and cornerstone of his spiritual physic: "By this alone sinners are saved, God is provoked to mercy" (Anat., 3.4.2.6., p. 413). It is this section of the Anatomy that Stanley Fish objects to in his analysis of Burton¹. Fish's major objection to Burton's thought appears to be nothing more than that Burton refuses to guarantee salvation to the melancholiac, and thus would *seem* to perpetuate the disease he has set out to cure. However, Burton is too well-read in the Scriptures and in Augustine to attempt such a blasphemy as to guarantee what only God can guarantee. Burton does nothing more than hold out the possibility of salvation (for

¹Fish, Self-Consuming Artifacts, pp. 344-352.

which Fish condemns him), but, as we have seen from our examination of Burton and Augustine on free will, the *possibility* of salvation is all that humanity can hope for. As we shall see in our next chapter on rhetorical strategies, Burton does in fact offer a strategy to the reader for approaching salvation, but beyond that Burton can do no more than any other guide can do- point to the way and allow the melancholiac to exercise (or not) that freedom of choice and will which is so crucial in human experience. Thus, Burton advises his reader:

Be of good cheer; a child is rational in power, not in act; and so art thou penitent in affection, though not yet in action. 'Tis thy desire to please God, to be heartily sorry; comfort thyself, no time is overpast, 'tis never too late. *A desire to repent is repentance itself*, though not in nature, yet in God's acceptance; *a willing mind is sufficient*. (Anat., 3.4.2.6., p. 415) (emphasis mine)

Again, as spiritual guide indicating the source of the cure within the self, Burton points to the importance of the will:

A true desire of mercy in the want of mercy is mercy itself; a desire of grace in the want of grace, is grace itself; a constant and earnest desire to believe, repent, and to be reconciled with God, if it be in a touched heart, is an acceptance of God, a reconciliation, faith, and repentance itself. (Anat., 3.4.2.6., p. 415)

Just as the original sin is not the act of disobedience but the inner turning away of the will that led to the act, so too the way back to God does not originate in any potential recommendation for a specific action on the part of the melancholiac (which Fish seems to search the final sections for), but more importantly in *the will to act*. Thus, in accordance with Augustine's teachings in the City of God and elsewhere, Burton sees a change of heart in a willing mind, a mind willing to turn toward God and the Heavenly city and away from earthly desires and affections, as the central key to salvation. "As Satan labours to suggest, so must we strive not to give consent" (Anat., 3.4.2.6., p. 418). Here again, Burton's vision is Augustinian, reflecting the view that life is

constant, unceasing struggle, a constant battle of will, both a will to goodness and a will not to turn away from goodness.

We have seen a consistent movement in both Burton and Augustine from the physical to the spiritual, from the corrupt and fallen reason of humanity to the inscrutable reason of divine justice in Creation, from the perturbations and passions of humanity's fallen desires to the perfect affection of faith, from the imperfect and only partially free will of humanity to the perfect expression of God's Will in Providence, and from the love of humanity for God to the greater love of God's grace.

And as a mother doth handle her child sick and weak, not reject it, but with all tenderness observe and keep it, so doth God by us, not forsake us in our miseries, or relinquish us for our imperfections, but with all piety and compassion support and receive us. (Anat., 3.4.2.6., p. 426)

Concerning spiritual melancholy and despair, Burton is as helpful as he can be, given that each individual must find for himself or herself the path away from despair.

Faith, hope, repentance, are the sovereign cures and remedies, the sole comforts in this case; confess, humble thyself, repent, it is sufficient. (Anat., 3.4.2.6., p. 426)

Again echoing Augustine, Burton argues that grace comes ultimately despite humanity, from beyond any of humanity's powers to achieve to it.

Parcam huic homini, saith Austin, (ex persona Dei), quia sibi ipsi non pepercit; ignoscam quia peccatum agnovit: I will spare him because he hath not spared himself; I will pardon him because he doth acknowledge his offence: let it be never so enormous a sin, "His grace is sufficient." (2Cor. xii, 9) (Anat., 3.4.2.6., p. 427)

Finally, concerning grace itself, Burton addresses his readers:

For thy part then rest satisfied, "cast all thy care on him, thy burden on him, rely on him, trust on him, and he shall nourish thee, care for thee, give thee thine heart's desire"; say with David, "God is our hope and strength, in troubles ready to be found" (Ps. xlvii, 1). "For they that trust in the Lord shall be as Mount Zion, which cannot be removed. As the mountains are about Jerusalem, so is the Lord about his people, from henceforth and for ever." (Ps. cxxv, 1,2) (Anat., 2.3.2., p. 133)

This beneficence to humanity is made possible through the perfect expression of divine love: "God is love itself, the fountain of love, the disciple of love ... the servant of peace, the God of love and peace; have peace with all men and God is with you."

(Anat., 3.1.1.2., p. 16) Beyond this, Burton can go no further. The rest, the willing, is in his reader's hands. Significantly, as Burton acknowledges one of his major sources and certainly a major influence upon his underlying themes and beliefs, beliefs that are sometimes not as apparent as they should be to those who read the Anatomy primarily as a satire, the final word in the Anatomy is "Austin". In order to understand this influence of Augustine upon Burton in its most significant aspect, however, we must examine the influence Augustine has on Burton's methods, a method consistent with the rhetorical strategies inherent in what I have chosen to call 'Augustinian scepticism'. Let us turn, then, to an examination of methods and strategies in Burton and Augustine, to explore this further.

Babylon Anatomized:

Burton, Augustine and Rhetoric

Modern critics of Burton's Anatomy seem to be more concerned with his rhetorical strategies and techniques than with his religious and philosophical positions. Some of these critics, such as Fish, Fox and Webber, are able to combine technique with insight in order to gain greater understanding of the curious workings of Burton's arguments, especially in the Preface, "Democritus Jr. to the Reader". (See the opening chapter on critical perceptions of Burton for further details). None of them, apparently, point out Burton's debts to Augustine in terms of rhetoric, although the works of these scholars provide other clues and insights into the mind and work of this most jesting, complicated, devious and anonymous author, Robert Burton. I would like to supplement their insights here with a suggestion that one of the most probable sources for much, but by no means all, of Burton's raillery, irony and scepticism may be the works of Augustine, especially the City of God. Burton seems to adapt and transform Augustine's rhetorical methods and run with them to the very extremities of decorum, and then several giddy, vertiginous and sublunary leaps beyond. Let us turn then, to a close comparative analysis of Augustine's and Burton's 'anatomizing', to examine the nature of Augustine's influence upon Burton.

Augustine writes about the miseries of the flesh and miseries peculiar to the righteous (City of God, vol. II, pp. 387-395) (or, religious melancholy, to use Burton's term), in a passage which bears marked similarities to Burton's ideas on this subject. Augustine often employs catalogues of human and natural disasters which serve to unsettle the reader (City of God, vol. I, pp. 110-111), a technique Burton uses extensively and effectively throughout the Anatomy (see, for example, Anat., 1.2.1.1., p. 179). Augustine shows a fascination with the diverting and at times humorous anecdote (and often an anecdote with a sharp twist to the humour), usually listing such anecdotes and tales to lend accumulative weight to their credibility:

we see some men's natures far different from others; acting those things strangely in their bodies, which others can neither do nor hardly will believe. There are those who can move their ears, one or both, as they please: there are those that can move all their hair toward their forehead, and back again, and never move their heads. There are those that can swallow twenty things whole, and pressing their stomach lightly, give you every thing up as whole as if they had been put into a bag. ... There are those that can break wind backward so artificially, that you would think they sung. I have seen one sweat whenever he pleased, and it is sure that some can weep when they list (City of God, vol. II, p. 55)

Augustine goes on to describe "the case lately seen by some of the brethren" of Restitutus the presbyter, who, "when he pleased ... at the imitation of funeral wailing drew himself into such an ecstasy, that he lay as if dead, senseless of all pinching, pricking, nay even of burning..." (City of God, vol. II, p. 55) The techniques used here by Augustine, such as self-reference, personal knowledge, a vague and generalized 'well-known fact', humour, and specific detail to lend authenticity are techniques Burton uses constantly, and as we have seen in our critical introduction, according to some critics, unique to Burton's Anatomy. It should also be noted that in many instances wherein Burton or Democritus Jr. claim to have knowledge of a particular case, a literary reference follows. But even in this Burton can be seen as following Augustine's lead, for the City of God is filled with hundreds of anecdotes, stories and illustrations culled from literature.

Both writers delight to present lists and catalogues of the crimes, follies, superstitions, and brutalities of fallen humanity, mostly drawn from their reading. They both present their lists in anecdotal or aphoristic form, often and importantly with the authoritative backing of the very people they are railing against. To have an opponent confirm the veracity of an anecdote (though not necessarily the moral slant or theme) theoretically lends credence to the subsequent condemnation of that opponent's views. Burton's seconding of Augustine's technique in this is striking, although Burton is more subtle and less muscular than Augustine.

Burton most clearly echoes Augustine in passages where he cuts closest to his themes. Thus, on subjects such as the disorders of the mind, the miseries of childhood, the wretchedness of existence, and the corruption of the fallen world, Burton's affinities with Augustine are very strong. For example, see the City of God, vol. II, pp. 241-245, for lists of human follies and miseries such as the "disorders of love", the horrors of city life, and errors of justice, so that the ignorance of the judge is often a calamity for the innocent, and the miseries of war and divisions in society (see City of God, vol. II, pp. 247-249 for the debased love that is pride which leads to hate and violence, and a comparison in which humanity is seen to be lower than some of the carnivores); City of God, vol. II, pp. 249-250, on how disorders of the mind, or "misery" (melancholy) alienate the sufferer from "an orderly obedience unto His eternal law" (p. 249); City of God, vol. II, pp. 336-337, and the Confessions, I, pp. 19-31, on the miseries of childhood, nursing and education; and City of God, vol. II, pp. 322-324, for a list of wonders and marvels concerning the body's ability to withstand pain. All of the above, and many more which could be referred to in the City of God, are major subjects of study for Burton in the Anatomy, and in virtually every instance of his treatment of these subjects, reference is made to Augustine (see, for example, Anat., 1.2.4.2., p. 333, on education). Not only is Burton's underlying thematic attitude similar to Augustine's (see preceding chapter), but so too, often, is the tone. Burton does not merely borrow and share stylistic traits such as listing techniques, use of anecdotes and aphorisms culled from vast heaps of writings, ironic appeals to the authority of philosophical opponents, and loose, somewhat rambling sentence structures. Burton's affinities with Augustine's stylistic peculiarities cut deeper, to the level where rhetoric is used to enhance and strengthen the religious and thematic thrust of their several works. In this, Burton displays a good understanding and command of Augustine's rhetorical strategies, strategies borrowed, curiously, from classical secular

sources and adapted by Augustine to his own ends; a transformation of rhetorical technique which transforms the meaning of language itself in the earthly city, Babylon.

According to Joel Altman, rhetoric in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries "was considered to be not only an art of persuasion, but also an art of inquiry, in which the methods of logic were employed with greater amplitude than [those] permitted the dialectician."¹ As training in the use of language, rhetoric

is manifested in the use of specific rhetorical forms learned in school, in a predilection for debate, *in frequently disconcerting shifts of viewpoint*, and in an explicit preoccupation with the subject-matter of rhetoric. (Play, p. 3) (emphasis mine)

Further, literature of the period is typified by the rhetorical principle, learned in school from classical sources (and, though Altman does not mention it, possibly from Augustine, in City of God and Against the Academicians), and practised in maturity, of *in utramque partem* - to argue on both, or many sides of a question. Two significant results of this practise for our purposes were first "a great complexity of vision" (Play, p. 3) and "ambivalence and multiplicity of view" (Play, p. 4). There arose a tendency to avoid any attempt at reconciliation of opposing points of view. Altman makes a point concerning drama which is also significant for an understanding of the Anatomy.

The plays functioned as media of intellectual and emotional exploration for minds that were accustomed to examine the many sides of a given theme, to entertain opposing ideals, and *by so exercising the understanding, to move toward some fuller apprehension of the truth that could be discerned only through the total action*. (Play, p. 6) (emphasis mine)

Altman believes that this basic pattern of rhetorical training "can enhance our understanding of such fictions and enable us to see in their ethical ambiguities, intellectual ironies, and affective disjunctions a larger moral design" (Play, p. 8).

¹Joel Altman, The Tudor Play of Mind (London, 1978), p. 3. Subsequent references to this work will be carried at the end of the extract as Play, p. __ .

All of the above points from Altman's study have significant application to Burton's Anatomy, and to the works of Augustine, although Augustine (perhaps in hostility toward the classical precedents) practises *in utramque partem* less often than Burton. Given Augustine's extensive studies of classical rhetoric, especially the works of Cicero (see Confessions, vol. I, Book III, chapters 3 and 4, pp. 107-113), and his subsequent studies of the Scriptures, many of Augustine's rhetorical strategies, *but not his aims*, are based upon his own adaptations of classical precedents.¹ In light of Altman's theory, both Burton and Augustine are given to "intellectual and emotional exploration" of more than one side of an argument, often with an eye to confusing the reader. Altman's theory, in fact, is the most intelligible available explanation of Burton's 'Democritean' style, better and more pertinent than any theory advanced by a critic focussing specifically on the Anatomy. Altman's theory, it should be added, does not supplant but rather supplements the works of Colie, Fox, Fish, Webber and others, deepening our understanding of Burton's purpose when, as Fox says, "rational system and illogical circumstance coexist as truth in the Anatomy."

The theory and rhetorical practise of *in utramque partem* can help to explain Burton's habit of presenting several sides of an argument without offering the perplexed reader any resolution. For example, here is the sort of multiple argument that has some critics believing Burton's style borders on raving incoherence.

If any man take exceptions, let him turn the buckle of his girdle, I care not. I owe thee nothing (reader), I look for no favour at thy hands, I am independent, I fear not.

No, I recant, I will not, I care, I fear, I confess my fault, I acknowledge a great offence, ... I have overshot myself, I have spoken foolishly, rashly inadvisedly, absurdly, I have anatomized my own folly. (Anat., Pref., p. 122)

The deliberate contradiction of position appears to undermine the credibility of the narrator - or does it? As we shall see below, Burton seeks to undermine the reader, not

¹R. A. Markus, Encyclopedia of Philosophy, I & II, ed, P Edwards (New York, 1967), p. 198.

Democritus Jr. Another good example of this technique is Democritus Jr's discussion of his illusory Utopia, wherein every ideal he puts forward is shortly contradicted by another, then another, until he concludes:

If it were possible, I would have such priests as should imitate Christ, charitable lawyers should love their neighbours as themselves, temperate and moderate physicians, politicians condemn the world, philosophers should know themselves, noblemen live honestly, tradesmen leave lying and cozening, magistrates corruption, etc., but this is impossible, I must get such as I may. (Anat., Pref., p. 102) (emphasis mine)

Sometimes Burton's ironic raillery is implicit, as when he examines the case of

Socrates:

Theodoret, in his tract *de cur. Graec. Affect.*, manifestly evinces as much of Socrates, whom though that oracle of Apollo confirmed to be the wisest man then living, and saved him from the plague, whom 2000 years have admired, of whom some will as soon speak evil as of Christ, yet re vera, he was an illiterate idiot, as Aristophanes calls him, irrisor et ambitiosus [a scoffer and fond of praise] as his master Aristotle terms him, scurra Atticus [an Attic buffoon] (Anat., Pref., pp. 43-44)

One could list hundreds of such reversals of argument, some overt, some implicit, wherein Burton acknowledges (but does not necessarily agree with) at least two sides to an argument, and leaves the reader to make any resolutions required (or possible).

Augustine argues more than one side of an issue as well, though much less often than Burton, but perhaps more effectively. In Book XVIII of the City of God, he examines the various disagreements among philosophers. This is an excellent example of a style of argument which Burton would seem to share with Augustine, wherein the author employs the pointed comparison of contradictory ideas to ridicule the pretensions of *both* sides, and in this particular case, to call into question the entire process of secular reasoning.

Did not all of them [philosophers] defend their opinions in public...in schools, in gardens, and likewise in all private places? One held there was one world, another a thousand. Some hold that the world was created, some not created. Some hold it eternal, some not eternal. Some say it is ruled by the power of God, others by chance. Some say

the souls are immortal, others mortal. Some transfuse them into beasts, others do not. ... Some place the chiefest good in the body, some in the soul, some in both. ...Some say the senses are always true, some say but sometimes, some say never. These and millions more of dissensions do the philosophers bandy. (City of God, vol. II, p. 215)

If one were to add the illustrative quotations from the philosophers (especially their insults and raillery), and deform the grammar a bit, this could be a passage straight out of the Anatomy (see Anat., 2.2.3., for an extended example). Augustine goes on to conclude:

Has it [people, state, kingdom or city] not rather given nourishment to all confusion in its very bosom, and upheld the rabble of curious janglers, not about lands, or cases in law, but upon main points of misery and bliss? (City of God, vol. II, p. 215)

All such disagreement and intellectual brawling is not only typical, but inevitable, for "so fully and so fitly was their society suited to the name of Babylon, which (as we said) signifies confusion" (City of God, vol. II, p. 215).

If Babylon, or the earthly city, means confusion, then confusion it is that Burton deliberately creates *when he is examining the ways of the world and human psychology*. One of the most famous of his *in utramque partem* passages is the "Digression of Air," Part. 2.2.3., which has very strong affinities with Augustine's attacks on secular philosophers, part of which is quoted above. Such passages of cancellation of authority through the contradictory presentation of authorities proliferate throughout the Anatomy. As with Socrates (quoted above), here is Burton on Seneca:

"Twas Seneca's fate, that superintendent of wit, learning, judgment, ad stuporem doctus [amazingly learned], the best of Greek and Latin writers in Plutarch's opinion; "that renowned corrector of vice," as Fabius terms him, "and painful omniscious philosopher, that writ so excellently and so admirably well," could not please all parties, or escape censure. How is he vilified by Caligula, A. Gellius, Fabius, and Lipsius himself, his chief propugner! (Anat., Pref., p. 29)

Burton cites authorities both for and against Seneca, and leaves it to the reader to make any judgment required. The implication, though, is that authority itself, whether

Seneca's or another's is suspect. Many critics, most notably Fish and Fox, have pointed out this tendency in Burton to undermine seemingly impeccable authority.

At this point, however, it is very important to stress an aspect of his argumentation that is crucial to an understanding of the Anatomy, an aspect ignored by virtually every critic of the Anatomy. Both Burton and Augustine rarely, if ever, employ the technique of *in utramque partem* when discussing Christian 'folly' in the fallen world, except when discussing mis-guided or heretical fervours. And it is most decidedly the case that they do not use this undermining technique when enunciating and discussing their own themes of salvation. That there is such a clear division between the rhetoric of the earthly city and the rhetoric of salvation should not surprise a reader of Augustine, but one is surprised that so many readers of Burton have missed this crucial shift in rhetorical patterns in the Anatomy. Although Burton takes great delight in using classical, pagan sources such as Virgil and Seneca, or Renaissance controversialists, or the Schoolmen to contradict themselves and others on both sides of an argument, it would seem he never uses those whom he considers as major Christian sources and authorities, such as Augustine, the Scriptures, Paul, Chrysostom, Melancthon or Luther on any side of an argument but one. This is especially evident in his own serious thematic passages, such as many of those cited in the preceding chapter. Such allegiance, expressed in abandonment of a favored rhetorical technique, should demonstrate that there is much more to the themes and style of the Anatomy than a superficial raillery, more than mere 'confusion' as Fish suggests, and more of a visible pattern in the use of authority than Babb suggests (see critical introduction for detailed analysis of these critics' views of the Anatomy). Let us examine Burton's and Augustine's themes in the light of their rhetorical development, to see how the path through the earthly city toward salvation is revealed to the reader through technique as well as substance.

Burton commences the Preface to the Anatomy with direct reference to Seneca and Plutarch, two of the great Stoic thinkers of the Roman world (or Babylon), and begins to play on his theme, noted by Joan Webber, of the hidden true narrator and theme versus the apparent and superficial Democritus Jr. and his treatment of the fallen world in the Preface.

Gentle reader, I presume thou wilt be very inquisitive to know what antic or personate actor this is, that so insolently intrudes upon this common theatre to the world's view, arrogating another man's name ... Although as he [Seneca] said...I am a free man born, and may choose whether I will tell; who can compel me? If I be urged, I will as readily reply as that Egyptian in Plutarch, when a curious fellow would needs know what he had in his basket ... *It was therefore covered, because he should not know what was in it. Seek not after that which is hid.* (Anat., Pref., p. 15) (emphasis mine)

"That which is hid" in the Anatomy, it can be argued, is an Augustinian key to salvation. Burton plays upon the curiosity and need for rational order in human thought in the above extract, and in the process gives an important clue as to how to read the Anatomy. He accomplishes this with reference to two of his most-often used authorities from the earthly city of Babylon-Rome. Thus, Burton begins the entire Anatomy with playful and confusing references to self, narrator, and the rules of knowledge which pertain in the earthly city.

These rules are his parameters of discourse in the Preface and in much of the Anatomy proper, but, as many critics have noted (some ruefully), Burton undermines these rules almost immediately, and constantly. Although the tone is playful, confusing and ironic, Burton's intention is as serious as any Augustinian could hope to be:

Thou thyself art the subject of my discourse. (Anat., Pref., p. 16)

As we have seen in the two previous chapters, all of humanity dwells in the earthly city, and even those who have attained to a spiritual state wherein grace becomes plausible must still struggle with the exigencies of the world and, perhaps more importantly, their own natures and personalities. All of humanity is perpetually free...

to fall. Thus, with one playful sentence, Burton establishes the universality of his argument. Through the focus upon the reader (through this sentence and hundreds like it of personal address), Burton's often joking and ironic rhetorical style establishes the Anatomy as something other than a purely scientific-medical treatise on melancholy. Many critics have demonstrated that beneath Burton's ironic surfaces lie serious moral intentions and a thematic focus intensified, not lessened, by his unusual style. The intention of the rest of this chapter is not to repeat their insights, but to concentrate specifically upon Burton's affinities with Augustine's rhetorical principles and strategies, most especially in the City Of God.

Augustine's analysis of Babylon-Rome in the City of God, and Burton's analysis of melancholiacs in the Anatomy are both designed to show the reader how dangerous, and yet how foolish a place the world is, dangerous for the threat its allurements pose to the immortal soul, yet foolish for the pretensions, self-blindness and vaunting of humanity. Both writers use very similar methods to attack the vanities and pretensions of the earthly city. The City of God is, like the Anatomy, a massive and rambling work, a "disordered masterpiece."

Augustine, trained as a rhetor rather than as a writer of prose, has little sense of economy or proportion. All his works wander from their main topic, none more than the *City of God*, which is not so much a single work as a series of reflections on a large, central topic, God's design for the salvation of mankind, composed over a long stretch of years with many interruptions. In addition, he cannot resist an attractive side-road;¹

Burton, too, has "little sense of economy or proportion," the Anatomy is very much "a series of reflections on a large, central topic," the various Partitions, Sections, Members and Subsections "wander from their main topic," and Burton "cannot resist an attractive side-road." In places, Augustine's and Burton's styles are remarkably similar. In part, this is because Augustine is *not* a classical writer.

¹D. Knowles, in "Introduction", City of God (Harmondsworth, 1972), pp. xxxii-xxxiii.

Instead, his prose is liquid to fluidity, and rhetorical throughout, but it has an intimacy of disclosure and on occasion an iridescence that is new to Latin literature; Augustine can on occasion rise to sublimity, as he can also sink to flaccidity. In his construction of a work and its parts he is medieval rather than classical.¹

The deliberate lack of a polished structure is, as we shall see, a definite part of the overall theme and design of both the City of God and the Anatomy. Let us turn now to analysis of specific techniques in both writers.

In Book III, chapters 27 and 28 of the City of God, wherein Augustine discusses the civil wars fought in the Roman world between the tyrants Marius and Sulla, we see several major rhetorical techniques in use. Augustine cites the authority of Cicero and Lucan to establish the legitimacy of what follows. (It is commonplace in the City of God to find pagan sources cited to establish the veracity of the argument, but very rarely to support its conclusions). Augustine employs listing techniques, irony and biting sarcasm to reinforce his essential theme of the stupidity and viciousness of politics in the earthly city:

For in that war of Sulla and Marius (besides those that fell in the field) the whole city, streets, market-places, theatres, and temples were filled with dead bodies: so that it was a question whether the conquerors slaughtered so many to attain the conquest, or because they had already attained it. (City of God, vol. I, p. 106)

"And yet the wars only ended and not the grudges: for this victory [Sulla's] broke out into a far more cruel waste in the midst of all this peace." (City of God, vol. I, p. 107)

Then entered victorious Sulla into the city, and in the common street (war's cruelty now done, and peace's beginning) put seven thousand unarmed men to the sword, not in fight, but by an express command. And after that he put even whom he willed to death, throughout the whole city, insomuch that the slaughters grew so innumerable that one was glad to put Sulla in mind that he must either let some live, or else he should have none to be lord over. (City of God, vol. I, p. 107)

The intensity of the argument builds as Augustine catalogues the horrors of *peace* in the earthly city, where values are reversed and people run mad with lust of domination,

¹Knowles, "Introduction", p. xxxii.

pride, cruelty, and vain-glory. When a list of two thousand names slated for execution was published by the Sullans:

The number made all men sad, but the manner cheered them again: nor were they so sad that so many should perish, as they rejoiced that the rest should escape. (City of God, vol. I, p. 107)

In a superbly ironic tone, which purports to give the meaning of such cruelty,

Augustine gives specific instances of the tortures inflicted on the condemned:

...one of them was torn in pieces by men's hands without touch of iron, where the executioners showed far more cruelty in rending this living man thus, than they use ordinarily upon a dead beast. Another having first his eyes plucked out, and then all the parts of his body cut away joint by joint, was forced to live, or rather to die, thus long in such intolerable torment. Many also of the noblest cities and towns were put unto the sack: and as one guilty man is wont to be led out to death, so was one whole city then laid out and appointed for execution. These were the fruits of their peace after their wars... (City of God, vol. I, pp. 107-108)

In an ironic, almost sarcastic tone, which intensifies the force of the argument,

Augustine comments:

Thus this peace competed in blood with that war, and quite exceeded it; for that war killed but the armed, but this peace never spared the naked. In the war he that was stricken, if he could, might strike again: but in this peace he that escaped the war must not live, but took his death with patience performe. (City of God, vol. I, p. 108)

In the above extracts concerning the Marius-Sulla civil wars, we can see several rhetorical techniques which Augustine exploits with consummate skill.

The use of secular authority to bolster the argument, in this case introductory references to Cicero and Lucan, gives credence to Augustine's subsequent tone. A secular opponent cannot deny the argument as Augustine presents it, for secular authorities have seconded his criticisms. Thus Augustine uses his opponent to undermine his opponent. The tone of the passage is one of controlled, biting irony ("These were the fruits of their peace") that almost descends to sarcasm. But the truth of the argument and of the subject-matter serve to accent the tone, suggesting that the

savagery inherent in the earthly city is so brutal and all-encompassing that the caring Christian observer is forced to derisive laughter, not tears, as sorrow would never cease once allowed to commence. The parallels to Burton's raillery are striking (see, for example, *Anat.*, Pref., pp. 47-52 on Democritean laughter and Heraclitan weeping). Further, Augustine does not want to lend any moral credence to the affairs of the earthly Babylon, yet he wishes to demonstrate that he does care for the victims of worldly abuses, in this case, the victims of peace (in a similar way, Burton has sympathy for the individual melancholiac, but little sympathy for the world and its ways that generate melancholy). Ridicule and irony serve Augustine's purposes here much better than, to use a pagan model for example, the high-minded indifference of a Stoic. A Stoic attitude would stress the importance of rising above the horror in an independence of mind concerning the world, an attitude which, in its seeming lack of caring, Augustine actively seeks to undermine.

Consequently, a further refinement of Augustine's technique is the ironic reversal of expectations. It is a technique crucial to Burton's methods as well. We find Augustine using the ironic reversal of expectation (sometimes in the form of *in utramque partem*) again and again in the *City of God*, especially when he is attacking Babylon. Thus, for example, in the above illustration, Augustine reverses the reader's understanding of 'peace' and 'war'. This reversal of the (probably complacent) reader's expectations reflects the need to clear away the superficial overlay of human commerce, human experience, human rhetoric, and human viciousness and stupidity, to see the world as it really is, not as human pretension wishes it could be. It is a strategy designed to disconcert and unsettle the attentive reader, to shock the reader's mind out of narrowly-defined patterns of logic and reason, habit and custom, so that the alert reader may see clearly in new patterns of perception and understanding. The movement, as we shall see below, is from 'wisdom' to 'foolishness'. For example, in

reversing the expected roles of peace and war in the above extracts, Augustine redefines them, and in so doing alters the careful reader's understanding of these terms. Peace in Babylon, in the earthly city as symbolized by Rome, is not peace at all in any true sense, but an intensification of the continuous, unremitting brutality of fallen, corrupt and vainglorious creation. The careless, complacent reader will laugh *at* the Roman cruelties as unparalleled examples of folly. The careful reader, the 'fool', will laugh (sadly) *with* Augustine *at* himself, at all of fallen creation, for the Sullan massacres are, no matter how horrible, merely typical. The same pattern holds true in the Anatomy.

Burton, too, speaks out, through Democritus Jr., on war and peace:

What would he [Democritus] have said to see, hear, and read so many bloody battles, so many thousands slain at once, such streams of blood able to turn mills ... without any just cause, "for vain titles" (saith Austin), "precedency, some wench, or such-like toy, or out of desire for domineering, vainglory, malice, revenge, folly, madness," (goodly causes all ... (for plunging the world into an orgy of war and slaughter)) (Anat., Pref., pp. 55-56)

Following Augustine's lead here, Burton goes on to argue that war and peace become indistinguishable, for the fallen world cannot offer humanity any hope, solace, or surcease from pain:

Nay, what's the world itself? A vast chaos, a confusion of manners ... a madhouse, a turbulent troop full of impurities ... the theatre of hypocrisy, a shop of knavery, flattery, a nursery of villainy, the academy of vice ... a warfare ... (where you have to fight whether you will or no, and either conquer or go under), in which kill or be killed; wherein every man is for himself ... No charity, love, friendship, fear of God. (Anat., Pref., p. 64)

In this vision which draws fire from Augustine, the sublunary world becomes a foul, nightmarish realm where concepts such as 'peace' and 'war' have little distinguishable meaning or relevance. All of life in Babylon is a 'warfare'. Thus, Augustine, in discussing the possibilities of true peace, comments: "He that looks for this great good in this world is far wrong" (City of God, vol. II, p. 165). This is true because of the truth of human nature, human character, human weakness. And on the subject of

human frailty, both Burton and Augustine operate at their most profound and most ironic levels.

Augustine sees the impossibility of people being happy, either emotionally or spiritually, in the earthly city. In a chapter entitled "Of the true beatitude- that it is unattainable in this life" he comments:

But if we observe aright, none lives as he wishes but he is happy, and no-one is happy without being righteous; yet the just man lives not as he pleases, until he attain that sure, eternal, hurtless, undeceiving state. This he naturally desires, nor can he be perfect until he have his desire. But what man here upon earth can say he lives as he pleases, when his life is not in his own hand? (City of God, vol. II, p. 56)

To escape death, distress and deception, as we have seen in the previous chapter, is an unattainable goal in mundane life. A major cause of melancholy and despair, then, is the realization of the impossibility (or, seeming impossibility) of humanity attaining to spiritual goals in this life ... *unaided*. But the picture is not entirely bleak. Both Augustine and Burton believe that there is a great deal that humanity can do for itself as part of the journey through the earthly city, towards salvation, but - and this point is important to consider when examining some of the criticisms levelled against Burton - neither writer can do these things for the reader. The reader of their works must come to see the truth about life in the earthly city for himself or herself, and most important of all, the truth about his or her own role in life. The point they seek to make would be lost for either writer if they actually did the work for the reader. Thus, Augustine deplores most worldly wisdom, and the worldly-wise

who intend to make for themselves a beatitude extant even in the continual misfortunes of man's temporal mortality. And herein my purpose is to parallel their empty dreams with our assured hope ... that so confirming our assertions both with holy scriptures, and with such reasons as are fit to be produced among infidels, the difference of their grounds and ours may be the more fully apparent. (City of God, vol. II, p. 231)

The kind of reason Augustine employs pertains mostly to a rhetorical structure of argument, designed to convince and convert, and so is not qualitatively the same as the detached, objective logic of philosophy. Augustine's sense of reason is as intuitive and emotional as it is logical, and is designed primarily to persuade.

However, Augustine is careful to distinguish between mere eloquence and pure wisdom. Eloquence is yet another manifestation of the self-vaunting in the earthly city. As a consequence of this, as we shall shortly see, Augustine's rhetorical strategies employ reason to undermine reason, the arguments of his opponents to undermine his opponents, and 'proofs' from the earthly city to establish the legitimacy of the pilgrimage of the Heavenly city through the world.

An important clue concerning the rationale behind Augustine's rhetorical strategies is contained in his discussion of marvels in the earthly city which make manifest God's omnipotence and majesty (and, Burton might argue, His sense of humour) (City of God, vol. II, pp. 324-331). Within this list we find the following passage, which could also serve as Burton's *apologia* on method:

...it is thus by the will of Almighty God, who...having created so many things, which, were they not to be seen, and confirmed by sufficient testimony, would seem as impossible as the rest, whereas now we know them, partly all, and partly some of us. As for other things that are but reported without testimony, and concern not religion, and are not taught in scripture, they may be false, and a man may lawfully refuse to believe them. I do not believe all that I have set down so firmly that I do make no doubt of some of them; but as for those which I have tried ... these I have seen and believe without any doubt at all. (City of God, vol. II, pp. 327-328)

Despite his inability to affirm the validity of many of the wonders he discusses, Augustine proceeds to use these wonders and marvels to prove his point. A good anecdote is hard to resist. Further, he uncovers a major source for his sceptical attitudes towards the earthly city:

The rest I leave indifferent, to affirm or deny; yet I did set them down because they are recorded in our adversaries' own histories, to show

them how many things they believe in their own books, without any reason, that will not give credence to us, when we say God Almighty will do anything that exceeds their capacity to conceive.....He will do it, because He has said He will, even He that has made the incredulous heathens believe things which they held mere impossibilities. (City of God, vol. II, p. 328)

Paradoxically, Augustine freely uses the arguments and observations of pagans, heretics and so on, to undermine the positions of these people. Augustine occasionally quotes secular authors such as Cicero and Seneca to reinforce points proven out of Christian sources (this is a marked habit of Burton's as well). (See City of God, vol. II, p. 38, for an example of this technique using Stoic values). This does not mean that Augustine or Burton agrees with these sources. Often, the source's own credibility is undermined at the same time that it is used to bolster Augustine's argument. Augustine refuses to give any credence to any aspect of life in the earthly city save one - the struggle of the Christian pilgrim to attain salvation. All else in mundane existence is fraudulent, misguided and unworthy. Thus, Augustine is extremely sceptical towards the earthly city, and attempts constantly to discredit those whom he perceives as antagonists. To be sceptical towards Babylon-Rome means to adopt a sceptical attitude towards the world, all of fallen nature, and towards humanity, "the most miserable creatures of the world" (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 130).

To be sceptical, however, does not mean that Augustine is detached and clinically observant with the logical overview of a scientist. Rather, exactly the opposite is true. Augustine's scepticism makes him rail and denounce with at times bitter invective (see above, the Sullan massacres), but, he is at times bitter because he has a passionate love for all of fallen humanity, combined with an abiding concern for humanity's spiritual predicament in Babylon, and a fervent wish to aid and heal the spiritually afflicted (everybody). He seeks actively to undermine his readers' faith in the lesser things of the world, to turn each reader away from fallen creation, away from Babylon, to start the reader on a pilgrimage to the heavenly city. This is what Burton

would seem to be doing as well in the Anatomy. All of the above points, the scepticism of a particular kind, the use of a variety of authorities to support a central argument while undermining opponents' positions, the irony and raillery, and most of all, the underlying sense of compassion all inform the Anatomy and can be seen as being drawn from and influenced in part by direct contact with Augustine's works. However, the aspect of Augustine's thought which Burton would seem to employ in its most telling and profound manner is the reversal of values and expectations. Let us now turn to a detailed study of both authors' use of wisdom and foolishness to see how this influence operates.

The primary statement of the dichotomy between wisdom and foolishness in Christianity is found in the writings of Paul, especially in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, where Paul plays upon the idea of two kinds of wisdom and two kinds of foolishness:

19 For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent.

20 Where is the wise? where is the scribe? where is the disputer of this world? hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?¹

21 For after that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe.

22 For the Jews require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom:

23 But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block, and unto the Greeks foolishness;

24 But unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God.

25 Because the foolishness of God is wiser than men; and the weakness of God is stronger than men.

27 But God hath chosen the foolish things of the world to confound the wise... (I Corinthians 1: 19-27) (King James Version)

¹See also Job 5: 12, 13; Isaiah 29: 14; Jeremiah 8: 9.

Paul goes on to distinguish between two kinds of language, on the one hand the gospel, the revealed Word of God and the preaching based upon it, and on the other hand the "wisdom of words", which is essentially insubstantial and of no account:

1 And I, brethren, when I came to you, came not with excellency of speech or of wisdom, declaring unto you the testimony of God...

4 And my speech and my preaching was not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power;

5 That your faith should not stand in the wisdom of man, but in the power of God.

6 Howbeit we speak wisdom among them that are perfect: yet not the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world, that come to nought;

7 But we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, even the hidden wisdom, which God ordained before the world unto our glory...

9 But as it is written, Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of men, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him.¹

10 But God hath revealed them unto us by his Spirit...

13 Which things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth; comparing spiritual things with spiritual.

14 But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them because they are spiritually discerned. (I Corinthians 2: 1-14)

And finally, from chapter 3 of I Corinthians:

18 Let no man deceive himself. If any man among you seemeth to be wise in this world, let him become a fool, that he may be wise.

19 For the wisdom of the world is foolishness with God. For it is written, He taketh the wise in their own craftiness.²

20 And again, the Lord knoweth the thoughts of the wise, and they are vain.

¹See also Isaiah 64: 4.

²See also Job 5: 13.

21 Therefore, let no man glory in men. (I Corinthians 3: 18-21)

Paul traces the attainment of the higher, spiritual wisdom to the infusion of grace through the Holy Spirit, a process that comes from beyond humanity's powers. He traces the failure to achieve this wisdom to humanity's own fallen nature.

Thus Augustine, in commenting on Paul's words quoted above, has this to say concerning God's folly.

This now the wise and strong in their own conceit do account as foolish and weak. But this is the grace that cures the weak, and such as boast not proudly of their false happiness, but humbly confess their true misery. (City of God, vol. I, p. 303)

In moving from the foolishness of God to the wisdom of the world, Augustine employs reversals of values and expectations with virtually every aspect of human endeavour (or so it seems after reading through the City of God). He is not so concerned to catalogue each and every aspect of human life as he is to discover in various human activities the central threads of thought, feeling and experience which taken together make up his vision of humanity. Drawing heavily on Pauline precedents such as those given above, Augustine establishes two kinds of folly in Babylon - the foolishness of human vanity, pride, superstition and stupidity (City of God, *passim*) and the foolishness of Christ, which is, in fact, a profound wisdom (City of God, vol. I, pp. 265-266). Thus, between the two cities there lie two ways of seeing the world: through the stupidity, ignorance and folly of the fallen (all of humanity), and through the foolishness of Christ. Burton, in the Anatomy, takes great delight in cataloguing the former, as the bulk of the Anatomy is concerned with the foolishness and vice of the world. On rare, but significant occasions (some of which are discussed in the preceding chapter), Burton acknowledges and presents the other, truer wisdom that is the foolishness of faith. For the most part, though, Burton anatomizes the lesser folly, not because it is the more important (it is not), but rather because most people are hopelessly mired in the earthly Babylon, imprisoned by delusions, false authorities,

weakened perceptions, over-active imaginations and flawed reasoning abilities.

Burton's rhetorical strategies are designed to disillusion his readers, as Augustine attempts in the City of God, so that they can see the world stripped of the illusions of being and see it as it really is, rather than for what fallen human desire wishes it could be. This process of *disillusionment* is the most important aspect of both Augustine's and Burton's rhetorical strategies, for, without it, the first step on the path to salvation in a Christian context cannot be taken.

Burton, too, deals with the two kinds of wisdom and folly in the Anatomy.

Democritus Jr. plays with the notions of wisdom and folly, and inevitably (the malady is universal) discovers that nobody alone can escape the pitfalls of the world:

They are a company of giddy-heads, afternoon men, it is midsummer moon still, and the dog-days last all the year long, they are all mad. Whom shall I then except? Ulricus Huttenus' Nemo; nam, Nemo omnibus horis sapit, Nemo nascitur sine vitiis, Crimine Nemo caret, Nemo sorte sua vivit contentus, Nemo in amore sapit, Nemo bonus, Nemo sapiens, Nemo est ex omni parti beatus [Nobody; for Nobody is sensible at all times; Nobody is born without fault, Nobody is free from blame; Nobody is content with his own lot; Nobody is sane in love; Nobody is completely happy] etc., and therefore Nicholas Nemo, or Monsieur Nobody, shall go free. Quid valent Nemo, Nemo referre potest [Nobody can say what Nobody is capable of] (Anat., Pref, p. 117)

If all are fools, where then is wisdom? Burton pays particular attention to this question in the Preface, and in so doing unseats the meaning of language in the fallen world of Babylon.

Burton commences his detailed examination of folly with at least nineteen consecutive references to the Scriptures (Anat., Pref., pp. 40-41) to establish the folly of wisdom.¹ For example:

That men are so misaffected, melancholy, mad, giddy-headed, hear the testimony of Solomon (Eccles.ii, 12): "And turned to behold wisdom, madness, and folly," etc.; and v, 23: "All his days are sorrow, his

¹This would seem to contradict Babb's assertion that Burton uses his sources indiscriminately. See Babb, Sanity, pp. 50-52.

travail grief, and his heart taketh no rest in the night." So that, take melancholy in what sense you will, properly or improperly, in disposition or habit, for pleasure or for pain, dotage, discontent, fear, sorrow, madness, for part or all, truly or metaphorically, 'tis all one ... Wise men themselves are no better (Eccles. i, 18) "In the multitude of wisdom is much grief, and he that increaseth wisdom increaseth sorrow." ... all, as he concludes, is "sorrow, grief, vanity, vexation of spirit." (Anat., Pref., p. 40)

To this point in the Preface Burton presents a fairly straightforward homiletic lamentation on the vicissitudes of existence. But then he begins to play with the notions of wisdom and folly, running them together, turning their meanings inside-out and upside-down, and so on, until the reader begins to be more than a little perplexed.¹

For example, Burton establishes folly as a word of God:

I am more foolish than any man, and have not the understanding of a word in me (Prov. xxx, 2) ... David, a man after God's own heart, confesseth as much of himself (Ps. lxxiii, 21, 22): "So foolish was I and ignorant, I was even as a beast before thee"; and condemns all for fools (Ps. liii; xxxii, 9; xix, 20) The Apostle Paul accuseth himself in like sort (2Cor. xi, 21); "I would you would suffer a little my foolishness, I speak foolishly," ... Read Deut. xxxii, 6; Jer. iv; Amos iii, 1; Ephes. v, 6. "Be not mad, be not deceived; foolish Galatians, who hath bewitched you?" How often are they branded with this epithet of madness and folly! No word so frequent amongst the Fathers of the Church and divines; you may see what an opinion they had of the world, and how they valued man's actions. (Anat., Pref., pp. 40-41)

Burton would wish us to believe it plausible that the self-deprecation of the prophets and apostles of God concerning their own wisdom makes their criticisms of the folly of others that much more telling. As we shall see, their foolishness ultimately makes them wise.

But 'folly' is not confined to Scriptures. When Burton turns to the classical, pagan world of literature and belief, his comments take on new layers of meaning and irony:

I know that we think far otherwise [than the Church Fathers], and hold them most part wise men, they are wise men born, all politicians and statesmen must needs be so, for who dare speak against them? And on the other, so corrupt is our judgment, we esteem wise and honest men

¹See Joan Webber's The Eloquent I (Madison, 1968), p. 101, for analysis of this technique.

fools ... Shall I tell you the reason for it? Fortune and Virtue, Wisdom and Folly, their seconds, upon a time contended in the Olympics; every man thought that Fortune and Folly would have the worst, and pitied their cases; but it fell out otherwise. Fortune was blind and cared not where she stroke, or whom ... Folly, rash and inconsiderate, esteemed as little what she said or did. Virtue and Wisdom gave place, were hissed out and exploded by the common people, Folly and Fortune admired, and so are all their followers ever since; knaves and fools commonly fare and deserve best in worldling's eyes and opinions. (Anat., Pref., p. 41)

Note that Burton here is far more playful and ironic than when he uses Biblical or Patristic sources. This is a thematic and stylistic tendency throughout the Anatomy. In his parable of the Olympics, we see Burton playing on the arbitrary judgments that people pass, wherein worldly values of self-glorification and self-aggrandizement replace "wisdom and virtue". Further, the legions who worship Fortune and Folly actively spurn those who possess the true wisdom:

Achish (1 Sam, xxi, 14) held David for a madman. Elisha and the rest were no otherwise esteemed. David was derided of the common people (Ps. lxxi, 6) : "I am become a monster to many." And generally we are accounted fools for Christ (1 Cor. iv, 10) ... Christ and His Apostles were censured in like sort (John x; Mark iii; Acts xxvi). (Anat., Pref., p. 41)

Thus, we have the wise calling everyone foolish, fools calling the wise foolish, the wise calling themselves foolish, and the fools railing against the "fools for Christ". Burton then confuses the issue entirely.

'Tis an ordinary thing with us to account honest, devout, orthodox, divine, religious, plain-dealing men idiots, asses that cannot or will not lie and dissemble, ... that cannot temporize as other men do, ... but fear God, and make a conscience of their doings. But the Holy Ghost, that knows better how to judge, He calls them fools. (Anat., Pref., p. 42)

The levels of irony only multiply. Burton here plays on the double meanings of fools and asses. Fools point their fingers and bray "Fool", and, curiously, the Christian fool who is so called, *agrees* - but for entirely divergent reasons. The word 'fool' has totally different meanings depending on whether it is uttered in the earthly city or the heavenly. It is a deliberate part of Burton's rhetorical strategy here to spread confusion

(and there are more levels of confusion to explore yet), for the careless reader will miss the point, and, like the reader of the Sullan passages in the City of God, laugh with the fools of the earthly city. The careful reader, however, has an inkling as to who is truly foolish in the above passages, and while Democritus Jr. perhaps may be numbered amongst the fools (he places himself there many times), Burton certainly is not.

Burton proceeds to examine the wise men of pagan literature, and, predictably, finds they are all fools. He employs a favorite rhetorical trap. First he extols the philosophers, using sound authorities:

All those of whom we read such hyperbolic elogiums as of Aristotle, that he was wisdom itself in the abstract, a miracle of nature, breathing libraries, as Eunapius of Longinus. (Anat., Pref., p. 43)

Burton then argues the other side:

As Aelian writ of Protagoras and Gorgias, we may say of them ... They were children in respect, infants, not eagles, but kites; novices; illiterates ... and although they were the wisest and most admired in their age, ... there were myriads of men wiser in those days, and yet all short of what they ought to be. (Anat., Pref., p. 43)

Burton's secular authorities are often employed deliberately to cancel one another out, and after all the cancellations of authorities, what is left, often, is only a sceptical, derisive tone.¹ Burton does give reason for his harsh condemnation of classical, pagan authors, however:

(writers mostly rave in their books), their lives being opposite to their words, they commended poverty to others, and were most covetous themselves, extolled love and peace, and yet persecuted one another with virulent hate and malice ... They will measure ground by geometry, set down limits, divide and subdivide, but cannot yet prescribe quantum homini satis [how much is enough for a man] , or keep within compass of reason and discretion. They can square circles, but understand not the state of their own souls, describe right lines and crooked, etc., but know not what is right in this life. (Anat., Pref., p. 44)²

¹See Stanley Fish's excellent chapter on Burton in Self-Consuming Artifacts for detailed analysis of this point.

²Compare with City of God, II, p. 215, in part quoted above, pp. 133-134.

Hypocrisy, pride, wilful self-ignorance - in fact, all the vices of the fallen world - such are the sins of the wise. For all their intellectual and/or scientific-mathematical knowledge, the wise possess a crucial and telling ignorance in self-knowledge. As we have seen, self-knowledge is the crucial beginning on the journey to salvation.

Burton then turns his focus upon the "fools for Christ".¹ He first summarizes Christian attitudes toward heathens:

Yea, but you will infer, that is true of heathens, if they be conferred with Christians (1 Cor. iii, 19): "The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God," "Earthly and devilish," as James calls it (iii, 15) ... "When they professed themselves wise, became fools: (Rom. i, 22). Their witty works are admired here on earth, whilst their souls are tormented in hell-fire. (Anat., Pref., p. 45)

In a curious shift in tone, Burton *seems* to turn Democritus Jr. loose on the Christians:

In some sense, Christiani Crassiani, Christians are Crassians, and if compared to that wisdom, no better than fools. (Anat., Pref., p. 45) (English emphasis mine)

However, Burton's apparent attack on Christians is not qualitatively the same as his attack on the heathens²:

Quis est sapiens? Solus deus, Pythagoras replies. "God is only wise" (Rom. xvi), Paul determines, "only good," as Austin well contends, "and no man living can be justified in His sight" ... "None doth good, no, not one" (Rom iii, 12). Job aggravates this (iv, 18): "Behold, he found no steadfastness in his servants, and laid folly upon his angels"; (v, 10) "How much more on them that dwell in houses of clay!" *In this sense we are all fools, and the Scripture alone is arx Minervae [the citadel of Minerva], we and our writings are shallow and unperfect. But I do not so mean; even in our ordinary dealings we are no better than fools. (Anat., Pref., p. 45) (English emphasis mine)*

¹Chapin, in his thesis, "Robert Burton and Renaissance Satire," argues against my position here, decrying Burton's "lukewarm attitude toward the positive Christian corollary to the vanity of learning - the idea of the 'wise fool!'", p. 203. As well, "This is the same blend of Platonic mania and Pauline 'foolishness' that intoxicates Erasmus at the climax of The Praise of Folly, and Burton, the inveterate Aristotelean, is mistaken when he vis that is true wisdom. To accomplish this undermining of the reader, Burton employs many techniques borrowed from Augustine. Both authors use extensive lists of crimes, follies, wars, brutalities, superstitions and delusions in order to establish the universality of human misery, or melancholy. These lists are exhaustive, anecdotal, and supported by seemingly impeccable

² authority to establish their elenctic strategies. They both employ irony, sarcasm, ridicule and raillery to "laugh with Democritus" ratrmine the opponent's position.

Burton's "But I do not so mean" effectively serves to undercut his apparent, implied and illusory criticism of Christians. When Burton condemns the Christians, he is careful to include them with all of humanity in a condemnation, not of Christians, but of humanity's fallen estate. He then returns to his usual Democritean raillery against the "Two-legged asses" of the fallen world. For example, later in "Democritus Jr. to the Reader", Burton turns the definition of fool upon the reader:

I think you will believe me without an oath; say at a word, are they fools? I refer it to you, though you be likewise fools and madmen yourselves, and I as mad to ask the question. (*Anat.*, Pref., p. 72)

And, quoting Horace, again implicates the reader in universal folly: "*Nunc accipe quare desipiant omnes aequae ac tu* [now hear why all are as mad as you]" (*Anat.*, Pref., p. 72).

In the above passages on wisdom and foolishness, we get as clear as possible a glimpse of where Burton really stands. In order to maintain his stance of universal condemnation of the fallen world, Burton feels that Democritus Jr. must be seen to criticize even the 'fools for Christ'. However, what Democritus Jr. apparently attacks, Burton covertly defends. In his criticism of pagan philosophers, especially Socrates, Burton (through Democritus Jr. and the inevitable authorities) attacks their personal lives, their ambitions, conceits, passions, rivalries, sexual proclivities, actions, opinions, and even their drinking habits. These are all aspects and vices of the earthly city, and Augustine comments upon such tendencies as well. It is on the basis of the very large apparent gap between their writings, ideas and themes on the one hand and their characters on the other that Burton makes his most telling criticisms. "They can square circles, but understand not the state of their own souls." In turning upon the Christian fool, Burton takes a different approach, a different rhetorical strategy, and the difference in the quality of the raillery tells us a great deal about Burton's underlying Augustinian attitudes. "In some sense," Burton writes, Christians are like heathens,

"and if compared to that wisdom, no better than fools." *If* so compared, then true, but Burton's subsequent comparison shifts ground entirely, *away* from personal invective and attacks upon Christian conduct to a detached Olympian over-view of all of creation. Because "God is only wise," Christians, as part of fallen humanity, are, by definition, fools, for, as Democritus Jr. asserts again and again, "we are *ad unum omnes*, all mad" (Anat., Pref., p. 46). In this sense, even Christians are worldly fools, as this is an unavoidable condition of being in the fallen world. But the 'fools for Christ', in their two-fold folly, are the truly wise, and on this point Democritus Jr. is not ironic or sarcastic, but rather proceeds to undermine his own criticisms: "But I do not so mean."

Thus Burton quietly reverses the expectations raised by the raillery of Democritus Jr., in a situation where the shift away from irony reveals an underlying theme that runs through the entire Anatomy. But the reader must be alert to the constantly shifting tone, or the theme will be lost. As if to make up for such a slip in tone (a slip that reveals much to the careful reader, but only reinforces the foolishness of the careless reader), Burton proceeds to redouble the sarcastic efforts of Democritus Jr., through his negative, *elenctic* rhetorical strategies, especially in his attacks upon the reader. As a consequence, what this passage on wisdom and foolishness in the Anatomy reveals is that there are layers of meaning in the Anatomy which transcend the satiric surface and the medicinal passages, to reveal to the careful reader a more precise understanding of the themes. These insights tend to undermine the reader's expectations and hopes in the earthly city (such as a cure for melancholy), and open the reader's perceptions to the possibilities of salvation.

Burton is very explicit, as numerous critics have discussed, in pointing out the reader's active involvement in the process of anatomizing the world and self. "We have all our faults; *scimus, et hanc veniam*, etc., (we know and beg pardon), thou censurest me, so have I done to others, and may do thee" (Anat., Pref., p. 26). Comparing his

style to the surprises of a journey, Burton addresses the reader in an oft-quoted passage:

So that as a river runs sometimes, precipitate and swift, then dull and slow; now direct, then per ambages [winding]; now deep, then shallow; now muddy, then clear; now broad, then narrow; doth my style flow: now serious, then light; now comical, then satirical; now more elaborate, then remiss, as the present subject required, or as at that time I was affected. And if thou vouchsafe to read this treatise, it shall seem no otherwise to thee than the way to an ordinary traveller, sometimes fair, sometimes foul; here champaign, there enclosed; barren in one place, better soil in another: by woods, groves, hills, dales, plains, etc. I shall lead thee per ardua montium, et lubrica vallium, et roscida cespitum, et glebosa camporum [over steep mountains, slippery glades, wet grass, and sticky fields], through variety of objects, that which thou shalt like and surely dislike. (Anat., Pref., p. 32)

Burton does not merely misguide the reader out of the broad highways and into the swamps and tangles of his own thoughts, he creates (or at least, indicates) chaos in the sublunary world (and in the reader's expectations), to undermine the reader's perceptions and understanding. Both Burton and Augustine sympathize with the reader, but realize that ultimately it is up to the reader to see clearly, to abandon evil. All that either writer can do is indicate the way, because both writers realize the unimportance of worldly concerns in relation to the destined and eternal end of the soul's existence.

Thus, existence in the earthly city becomes a constant spiritual struggle:

there is another reason why the righteous should endure these temporal inflictions, and which was cause of holy Job's sufferance, namely that hereby the soul may be proved and fully known whether it hath so much godly virtue as to love God freely, and for Himself alone. (City of God, vol. I, p. 12)

A key part in Augustine's and Burton's anatomies of the fallen world in the City of God and in the Anatomy is to alert the reader to the all-pervasive spiritual malaise and sickness of society and self. Curiously, it is precisely within the sickness (for Burton, melancholy, for Augustine, "wretchedness") that the cure is to be found. Just as wisdom and foolishness operate on more than one level of meaning, so too the nature

of the sufferer is to be known on more than one level. Where "physic" cures the body, "Christian medicine" cures the far more important aspect, the suffering soul.

In a dignified passage from On Christian Doctrine, Augustine makes reference to "Christian medicine" and a kind of "spiritual physic" to cure the soul, through two principles that are very much aspects of his rhetorical principles as well:

The Wisdom of God, setting out to cure men, applied Himself to cure them, being at once the Physician and the Medicine. Because men fell through pride, He applied humility as a cure. We were trapped by the wisdom of the serpent; we are freed by the foolishness of God. Just as that which was called wisdom was foolishness in those who condemned God, thus this which is called foolishness is wisdom in those who conquer the Devil ... The same principle of contraries is illustrated in the fact that the example of His virtues cures our vices ... Instruction will reveal many other examples of Christian medicine operating either by contraries or by similar things to those who diligently consider. (On Christian Doctrine, pp. 14-15)

Augustine further connects, and renders meaningful, this notion of "Christian medicine" with the foolishness of Christ's preaching (On Christian Doctrine, pp. 13-14). Augustine clearly sees the value of reversal of expectations, the use of contrasting and similar arguments to first confuse, then enlighten in the resolution of the argument, and finally, the need for the reader to work hard, to "diligently consider" and search for the spiritual cure, in a process parallel to the pilgrimage of the heavenly city within, rather than having the reader receive a facile, and ultimately unhelpful explanation.

Burton, too, makes his reader "diligently consider" the processes of "Christian medicine". 'What matters is the nature of the sufferer, not the nature of the sufferings' is the central thematic tenet of the Anatomy. Although 'the nature of the sufferings' occupies a great deal of space in the Anatomy, it becomes ultimately a part of the process of *elenchus*, manifesting, and then negating, or cancelling out of the importance of the madness, vice, folly and pride of the fallen world. 'The nature of the sufferer' becomes a part of Burton's positive Augustinian denial of the fallen world. (Here, clearly, we can see the positive union of style and substance, in that the denial of

the world is effected through an *elenctic* rhetoric.) Thus, Burton outlines his own version of "Christian medicine":

A good divine either is or ought to be a good physician, a spiritual physician at least, as our Saviour calls Himself, and was indeed (Matt. iv, 23; Luke v, 18; Luke vii, 21) ... Now this [melancholy] being a common infirmity of body and soul, and such a one as hath as much need of a spiritual as a corporeal cure, I could not find a fitter task to busy myself about, a more apposite theme, ... and generally concerning all sorts of men ... A divine in this compound mixed malady can do little alone, a physician in some kinds of melancholy, much less, both make an absolute cure. (Anat., Pref., p. 37)

Here Burton promises to attempt a cure of both body and spirit. By establishing melancholy as a universal malady (see below, "Structures of Mind"), Burton feels inclined to include the reader, himself, and all of humanity in his condemnations of the earthly city: "if it be so that the earth is a moon, then we are also giddy, vertiginous and lunatic within this sublunary maze." (Anat., Pref., p. 78) Although he offers up hundreds of precepts and consolations to temporarily ease the affliction of natural melancholy, Burton's attempts to cure the more serious spiritual melancholy in the world of fallen nature, are doomed to failure by his own admission (through the persona of Democritus Jr.):

there is no remedy, it may not be redressed, desinent homines tum demum stultescere quando esse desinent [men will cease to be fools only when they cease to be men] , so long as they can wag their beards, they will play the knaves and fools ... Because, therefore, it [reform] is a thing so difficult, impossible, and far beyond Hercules' labour to be performed; let them be rude, stupid, ignorant ... let them be barbarous as they are, let them tyrannize, epicurize, oppress, luxuriate ... live in riot, poverty, want, misery ... stultos jubeo esse libenter [I give them full permission to be fools] (Anat., Pref., p. 97)

As we have seen above, Burton holds out little hope for humanity in the fallen world. A temporary cure of melancholy on the natural level is possible, but an effective and permanent cure on the spiritual level is impossible, without God's intercession in this "giddy, vertiginous and lunatic" world. Thus, paradoxically, a great deal of Burton's strategy in the Anatomy, like Augustine's in the City of God, is aimed at making the

reader realize that in the earthly city, in this life, there is no 'cure' for melancholy. This assertion is made despite the overwhelming evidence of seemingly hundreds of 'cures' offered up to the reader throughout the Anatomy, but especially in Partition 2. It is noteworthy, however, that the vast majority of these cures are aimed at specific instances of illness culled from Burton's prodigious literary experience. In any meaningful way, for the affliction of melancholy in the fallen world, Burton offers up only aphorisms and vapid (and often undermined) Stoic precepts to ease the afflicted melancholiac through the inevitable darker moments of existence. It is this aspect of Burton's thought which has drawn Stanley Fish's criticism (see "Critical Introduction" for more detailed analysis of Fish's points). However, there is only one true cure which Burton advocates, the application of "Christian medicine" and the preparation of the spirit for the hoped-for infusion of grace: "Faith, hope, repentance, are the sovereign cures and remedies, the sole comforts in this case" (Anat., 3.4.2.6., p. 426).

Burton, as we have seen, uses reason, authority and perception to undermine reason, authority and perception in the reader. He establishes the universality of melancholy (as we shall see below, "Structures of Mind") and implicates the reader in the disease, gradually drawing the reader into the weird, half-lit world of Democritus Jr. and his vision of the world's ills. It is difficult for the persistent reader to escape. The solace and hope that Burton offers undermine the bitterness and pessimism of Democritus Jr., but Burton does not actively offer up the comprehensive plan of salvation that Augustine offers the reader in the second half of the City of God. There is no need for this, and it would go against Burton's rhetorical strategies. The reader, if he has threaded the maze and has learned truly, knows where to look after reading and comprehending the themes in the Anatomy (the closing quotations from Augustine offer a very valuable clue). Burton rarely gets beyond the process of *elenchus*, except where noted and discussed above and in previous chapters, preferring to leave to the

reader the task of sorting truth from falsehood, wisdom from foolishness, Jerusalem from Babylon. This release of the reader to make a go of it on his own devices reflects a firm belief in the Augustinian notion of "struggle" in existence.

Burton is a great advocate of reason as a 'medicinal' aid for melancholy, to control passions and perturbations. Reason, or the pretence of rational argument, is a more than adequate tool to expose the vices and follies of humanity, especially in the areas of human knowledge and feeling. As an illustration, Augustine's reasoned, judicious and persuasive destruction of Roman virtues and gods in the first seven books of the City of God shows his reliance on rational method in argument. However, for both Burton and Augustine, this reliance on reason and a merciless logic is not a reflection of an objective world-view, just as their scepticism towards the world does not reflect a comprehensive philosophical doubt. Rather, their reliance on reason reflects a rhetorical strategy, wherein reason is a legitimate weapon in controversy, especially when anatomizing one's opponents. In such cases the logic and reason of both writers become vehicles for such varying tones as calm analysis, ridicule, vituperation, mocking satire and lament; at times their 'logic' reflects a kind of sleight-of-hand, at other times, seems merely petulant. Their scepticism is really dogmatism, according to Popkin's assessment.

The antithesis of scepticism ... is dogmatism, the view that evidence can be offered to establish that at least one non-empirical proposition cannot be false.¹

Dogmatists, as opposed to sceptics, apparently tend to be fideists or pyrrhonists, as they claim an unshakeable faith in at least one certain proposition, a position a true sceptic (a creature as mythical as the Unicorn) dare not demonstrate. Thus, Burton, because of his "dogmatism", cannot be nor does he want to be sceptical of basic Christian religious premises. He tends, as we have seen, to be an Augustinian in his

¹Popkin, R., The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley, 1979), p. xxi.

beliefs, albeit a somewhat submerged Augustinian. In his *apparent* scepticism, especially evident in the Preface, and its notion of an overturned world, Burton would be forced to prove his own beliefs as silly as everyone else's. This self-ridicule is something Burton *never* does in the fifteen hundred or so pages of the Anatomy - when it comes to basic beliefs and first principles. It is true that he attacks Christians in many places in the Anatomy, but he attacks the foolishness and vices of their living, and *never* does he attack, or even question, the basic tenets of Christianity. Burton's faith prevents his Democritean raillery from achieving universal proportion.

Thus, Augustinian sceptics such as Burton are possessed of deep faith, and where rational sceptics ultimately look upon the world with indifference or despair, the Augustinian turns away from the world. Both kinds of sceptics doubt all human knowledge through principles of uncertainty, but where the rationalist is left to dwell in self-proclaimed and false ignorance and doubt, the Augustinian, paradoxically, turns to ignorance. One passively confronts the indifferent world, the other waits for Grace to fall. Both use reason as a major tool to attain their ends, but the ends are so very different. However, it is important to stress that reason for both Burton and Augustine becomes less important as they approach the positive expression of their own basic themes and first principles, and faith informs the spirit of the pilgrim.

Burton employs many techniques which have a strong affinity with Augustine's writings, such as the reversal of expectations, the use of contrasting and similar arguments, *elenchus*, irony and raillery, the use of contrasting arguments from one's opponents to cancel each other, the use of the same authority on both sides of an issue, a surface scepticism that conveys a deeply-felt sense of care and concern, a delight in digression, listing and cataloguing techniques, a habit of pointing to wonders and marvels of "this sublunary maze", and, a playful, easily side-tracked, rambling, and for Burton, though for Augustine rarely, an occasional and deliberate incoherence towards

material. Both writers have as a part of their strategy the delight and diversion of the reader, a delight that is constantly undermined with carefully-planned rhetorical traps, logical pitfalls and ironic reversals. Although it is more true of Burton, both writers have an occasionally light, ironic surface that belies the profound seriousness of their themes. One laughs (as in the Marius-Sulla extracts above) despite one's better instincts, or perhaps, because of them.

Despite the delight in rhetorical play and the humour in many passages, both writers make their readers work to uncover their themes, but they reward the diligent reader who peels layers of meaning from the text to expose the basic underlying themes of salvation. Within the City of God and the Anatomy, both writers guide the reader towards salvation in a metaphorical pilgrimage, a pilgrimage of language through the fallen and corrupt world, a pilgrimage that moves from words to the Word of God, that moves from the dull, stupid and often vicious understanding in the earthly city to the clarity and wisdom of the "fools for Christ". In overturning the ant-heap of being, they uncover eternity.

Burton, by employing a network of direct addresses to the reader throughout the Anatomy, stresses the great importance of *participation* of the observer-reader in the unfolding argument of the book. This is particularly true in the unfolding process of the 'cure' offered, so that Burton advocates a movement from reading to participation in a life that could cure melancholy by leading ultimately to salvation. Thus the Anatomy itself becomes an analogue of the Christian path to salvation. Burton moves through Babylon in "Democritus Jr. to the Reader", exposing the vices and follies of the fallen world. In the conversion, the readers move *towards* a cure (if they are reading aright and have found the path) in the fallen realm in Partitions I and 2, the books of nature. In Partition 3, the book of God, melancholy is potentially cured with an increasingly spiritual physic, leading to the final sections, the "Cure of

Despair". Burton, then, very carefully and somewhat cagily guides his reader on a *literary pilgrimage* out of Babylon and towards salvation.

Thus the methods and techniques he uses, as outlined above, are designed to trick and tax the reader. Burton aligns himself with Augustine's sense of "struggle", so that, even if one has experienced the emotional conversion to Christ which lesser commentators have felt is the pinnacle of achievement, life still remains a constant struggle to break free of Babylon, and not to fall back into vice, folly and self-vaunting. A great deal of the repetition of argument in the Anatomy can be traced to this strategy. For Augustine and Burton, there is no such thing as a finally-defeated enemy, be it a habit, a heretic, or a philosopher- be it external evil or internal vice. The same human failings within and dangers without occur again and again to the struggling pilgrim, and often, because of the endless struggle, melancholy is the result.

Both Burton and Augustine constantly test the reasoning powers and the emotional commitment of their apparently Christian readers. Much of Burton's raillery can be traced to his doubt concerning the stability of faith, much of Augustine's to the imperial flavour of the new official Roman affection for Christianity. Both authors test the genuineness and depth of their readers' faith, and for those who do not measure up, offer assistance and guidance. For the earthly-wise, they offer much wit and humour in the form of satire and irony, just as life in the earthly city holds out many attractions, entertainments and pleasures for those who are the "self-pleasers". But the humour can turn savage, and the irony is a barbed arrow aimed at the laughing fool who holds the book. Both authors seek to subvert and undermine the reader's attitudes, to cure with "painful physic", to twist perception and understanding out of settled ways and into new avenues.

Thus, the form of the Anatomy draws life in part from the City of God. Burton's attitudes towards the world, humanity, and his sources seems to derive in part

from Augustine's attitudes on these subjects. Burton's scepticism is not that of Sextus Empiricus or the Academic philosophers, but is Augustinian, deriving from Augustine's criticism of classical, secular scepticism. Thus, Burton's "Augustinian" scepticism is qualitatively different from the dawning scientific-rational scepticism of, for example, Descartes.

Many critics, it would seem, read the Anatomy as a vaguely anti-humanist satire with a weak and conventional (and not very important) homiletic underpinning. Further, the accusation of confusion and insincerity is often levelled at Burton. The Anatomy in fact moves from a medical treatise on the surface, through an exploration of historical time in its examination of Babylon and the world of fools, to a metaphysical level, wherein Burton's Augustinian focus is aimed at turning the reader away from the world as goal or desire and towards a reconciliation with God and self.

Burton's idea of history is that all of the past is realizable in the present. Burton makes no distinctions in historical time, save that history begins in the garden, and ends in the bosom of God. All else in history, save for the intercession of Christ, is a chronicle of infamy in the fallen, corrupt world of Babylon. Thus, Burton's stylistic strategies, derived in large part from Augustine, are designed to awaken the reader to the true nature of the world, human knowledge and human experience. Because human will, reason and imagination, senses, emotions and affections all have suffered and been debased by the Fall, humanity cannot trust its own perceptions and reasoning abilities. Thus Burton, following Augustine's example in the City of God, takes his world apart to anatomize it, then reconstruct it on another plane.

Burton seeks to disabuse his readers of imprisoning perceptions through an active demolition of humanity's faith in knowledge and the tools of knowledge, especially reason and logic, authority, and the senses. Burton employs reason, authority and the evidence of observation to undermine this lesser faith of humanity's in

its own powers. His ultimate aim is to cleanse perception and understanding, in order to move beyond conventional wisdom to the foolishness that is true wisdom. To accomplish this undermining of the reader, Burton employs many techniques borrowed from Augustine. Both authors use extensive lists of crimes, follies, wars, brutalities, superstitions and delusions in order to establish the universality of human misery, or melancholy. These lists are exhaustive, anecdotal, and supported by seemingly impeccable authority to establish their *elenctic* strategies. They both employ irony, sarcasm, ridicule and raillery to "laugh with Democritus" rather than lament or weep with Heraclitus or Jeremiah. In their massive and seemingly anti-intellectual attack upon the world of Babylon, its learning, beliefs and aspirations, both Burton and Augustine contrast the stupidity, folly and ignorance of the world with the foolishness of Christ. In this, as we have seen, Burton drops his Democritean mask and follows Augustine's lead closely in outlining the path to salvation. Indeed, the closer Burton comes to his central purpose, the more numerous are the references to Augustine and the Scriptures, the two greatest sources for the ideas and themes which underpin the Anatomy.

Let us turn now to examine an issue in which the influence of Augustine is not as apparent, but in which Burton underlines the central importance of his theme of salvation. In his outline of the structures of the human mind, Burton establishes the links which make salvation a desirable possibility and set his Augustinian scepticism in a more meaningful context. Once we understand Burton's concept of the human mind, we see how it becomes possible to abandon the world of Babylon and turn instead to the Heavenly city within.

The Veyle of Vnderstandinge:

Burton and Structures of Mind

Burton's concepts of and definitions concerning the human mind, memory, understanding, the will, reason and emotions are all shaped and tempered by his religious beliefs. In his quest to define and 'cure' melancholy, Burton presents detailed and pertinent schemata of the human mind. The hierarchical structure of the human mind, in Burton's vision, is closely linked to the causes of melancholy, and to its potential cure. As we shall see below, Burton traces the human predicament of melancholy to the will, defining melancholy as a spiritual disease, and stressing the religious aspect of the cure, especially the importance of Grace. Thus, Burton's definition of melancholy begins with humanity before the Fall. "Man, the most excellent and noble creature of the world," (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 130) was

at first pure, divine, perfect, happy, "created after God in true holiness and righteousness"; Deo congruens [fitted for divinity], free from all manner of infirmities; and put in Paradise, to know God, to praise and glorify Him, to do His will. (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 130)

Humanity's chief purpose, then, in a prelapsarian state, was to know God and to do His Will. Human will, moved by pride (a pale reflection of Divine Will) led to the Fall, and all resultant human misery. Now, in the world Burton surveys, humanity is "miserable and accursed ... subject to death and all manner of infirmities, all kinds of calamities" (Anat., 1.1.1.1., pp. 130-131). None are exempt from Burton's analysis, "from he that sitteth in the glorious throne, to him that sitteth beneath in the earth and ashes; from him that is clothed in blue silk and weareth a crown, to him that is clothed in simple linen" (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 131). This quotation, taken by Burton from Ecclesiasticus, reinforces the universality of the Fall, a universality of misery and madness which the preface has indicated, and the Anatomy proper sets out to prove.

Burton's definition of melancholy begins with the nature of the Fall. It was "disobedience, pride, ambition, intemperance, incredulity, curiosity" which caused Adam

and Eve to sin, "from whence proceeded original sin and that general corruption of mankind" (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 131) and "all bad inclinations and actual transgressions" (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 131). Burton makes reference to the myth of Pandora and how her curiosity "filled the world full of all manner of diseases" (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 131), in an effort to link the beginnings of human misfortune with his contemporary readership, whose own curiosity has led them to open the Anatomy: "GENTLE READER, I presume thou wilt be very inquisitive to know what antic disposition or personate actor this is..." (Anat., Pref., p. 15). Thus, "it is not curiosity alone, but these other crying sins of ours, which pull these several plagues and miseries upon our heads" (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 131).

An important aspect of Burton's subsequent analysis is that human sin and concomitant emotions lead to an image of a God of justice rather than a God of mercy.

God is angry, punisheth and threateneth, because of their obstinacy and stubbornness, they will not turn unto Him. (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 132)

As we have seen in previous chapters, Burton follows an Augustinian pattern wherein the pilgrim leads a life of struggle in order to avoid the traps of Babylon and prepare for the hoped-for infusion of God's Grace. But for a return to occur there has to have been a previous turning away. Burton catalogues several instances of the intransigence and foolishness of humanity in turning away from God's Will towards sin, then comments:

To punish therefore this blindness and obstinacy of ours as a concomitant cause and a principal agent, is God's just judgment in bringing these calamities upon us, to chastise us, I say, for our sins, and to satisfy God's wrath. (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 132)

God punishes humanity for its transgressions with tribulations, diseases, and chastisements "inflicted upon us for our humiliation, to exercise and try our patience here in this life, to bring us home, to make us know God ourselves, to inform and teach wisdom" (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 132). The ultimate aim of physical existence is spiritual salvation, but between humanity and its apparent salvation lies a lifetime of suffering and affliction.

This "tribulation and anguish on the soul of every man that doth evil" (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 132) (that is, every person), is a universal infliction, taking ultimately the

metaphor of disease, or infirmity. Humanity's sin is the "impulsive cause " of the punishment inflicted by God, and the result is the fall of nature, and a universal, pervasive sickness of spirit.

Now the instrumental causes of these our infirmities are as diverse as the infirmities themselves; stars, heavens, elements, etc., and all those which God hath made, are armed against sinners. They were indeed once good in themselves, and that they are now many of them pernicious unto us, is not in their nature, but our corruption, which hath caused it. For, from the fall of the first parent Adam, they have been changed, the earth accursed, the influence of stars altered, the four elements, beasts, birds, plants, are now ready to offend us. (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 133)

Pernicious nature, especially in climate, the active violence of the elements, the hostility of predators, poisonous plants, serpents and insects, all testify to the corruption inflicted by sin, which now rebounds on humanity as a variety of miseries. However, Burton stresses,

the greatest enemy to man is man, who by the devil's instigation is still ready to do mischief, his own executioner, a wolf, a devil to himself and others. (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 135)

Burton points out that this "malice of men, and their pernicious endeavours, no emotion can divert, no vigilancy foresee, we have so many secret plots and devices to mischief one another" (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 135). Humanity's debasement and corruption since the Fall has earned for it the full measure of God's wrath, or so it might seem.

"We are all brethren in Christ, or at least should be," Burton points out, "members of one body, servants of one lord, and yet no fiend can so torment, insult over, tyrannize, vex, as one man doth another" (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 135). Through an all-pervasive malice, humanity's inhumanity perpetuates itself in a vision of society that at times seems nihilistic. As we have seen, however, Burton is outlining the quality of life in the earthly city.

Employing the insight that has made Burton seem a prophet of modern psychology, Burton argues that within the family, "our own parents by their offences, indiscretions, and intemperance, are our mortal enemies" (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 135). In every direction in the earthly realm, malice and evil thrive, but most of all they thrive internally, within each person.

We are thus bad by nature, bad by kind, but far worse by art, every man the greatest enemy unto himself. We study many times to undo ourselves, abusing those good gifts which God hath bestowed upon us, health, wealth, strength, wit, learning, art, memory to our own destruction. (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 136)

Burton's major tools in his destruction of the world and its reconstruction on a spiritual plane are Augustinian scepticism and a doctrine of learned ignorance. Burton is sceptical towards the world, and nature, and all things that exist in the fallen state. He is especially sceptical of any notion of progress, certainty or improvement in this world.. Thus, Burton's scepticism is qualitatively different from the dawning scientific-philosophical scepticism of his age. As we have seen in the previous chapter, wisdom and foolishness are reversed, and the language and knowledge of the fallen world become meaningless. Instead, Burton offers a spiritual guide to the diseased of this world- which is to say, everybody. The crucial statement here is Burton's parenthetical remark "by subtracting of His assisting grace God permits it" (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 136). Before the Fall, God's Grace was not required by humanity to achieve to a state of perfection, but in the bleak, almost nihilistic post-lapsarian world Burton portrays, grace is ultimately the only path to salvation. The Anatomy of Melancholy, then, becomes a handbook for the fallen, to turn the mind and spirit out of the depths of melancholy, towards God (or the City of God, as Augustine would have it), and the possibility of saving grace. Burton's examination of the workings of the human mind is based upon this vision of humanity's being and purpose. Thus, as we shall see, he presents the structures of the mind so as to illuminate the goal of being, which is salvation.

Burton's over-riding metaphor to describe the human condition is illness and disease. Disease, and its potential cure, becomes a metaphor of humanity's fallen spiritual state, and the possibility of salvation.

"Whoso is wise, then, will consider these things," as David did (Ps. cvii, verse last); and whatsoever fortune befall him, make use of it. If he be in sorrow, need, sickness, or any other adversity, seriously to recount with himself, why this or that malady, misery, this or that incurable disease is inflicted upon him; it may be for his good ... Bodily sickness is for his soul's health. (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 133)

Physical illness, then, is for the soul's health. This reversal of expectations (see previous chapter on Burton, Augustine, and rhetorical strategies) becomes a part of Burton's physic. Through sickness and disease, the suffering soul can, if guided aright, perceive a path out of sin towards salvation,

as Pliny well perceived; "In sickness the mind reflects upon itself, with judgment surveys itself, and abhors its former courses." (*Anat.*, 1.1.1.1., p. 133)¹

Diseases, through the suffering inflicted, open up avenues into the soul, and the disease that most clearly bridges the apparent gap between body and soul, between the physical and the spiritual, is melancholy.

Thus, as many critics have noted, The Anatomy of Melancholy becomes ultimately an anatomy of the world, sin, and human corruption, as disease and melancholy become the central metaphor of the fallen state:

so we as long as we are ruled by reason, correct our inordinate appetite, and conform ourselves to God's word, are as so many saints: but if we give reins to lust, anger, ambition, pride and follow our own ways, we degenerate into beasts, transform ourselves, overthrow our constitutions, provoke God to anger, and heap upon us this of melancholy... (*Anat.*, 1.1.1.1., pp. 136-137)

The punishment, then, for humanity's fallen state, degeneration and sins, is disease, in all its metaphorical implications, and most especially, melancholy.

Disease is universal. "No man amongst us so sound, of so good a constitution, that hath not some impediment of body or mind" (*Anat.*, 1.1.1.2., p. 137). All are ill in Burton's world. "We have all our infirmities, first or last, more or less" (*Anat.*, 1.1.1.2., p. 137). The universality of disease is linked directly and specifically to the consequences of the Fall.

Those excellent means God hath bestowed on us, well employed, cannot but much avail us; but if otherwise perverted, they ruin and confound us;

¹The use of Pliny here to bolster what is essentially the groundwork for a fideist vision of humanity is a good example of Burton's technique, learned from Augustine, of using an opponent's argument to undermine the opponent and bolster one's own argument. See previous chapter on Burton, Augustine and rhetoric for a more detailed analysis of this form of argument.

and so by reason of our indiscretion and weakness they commonly do, we have too many instances. (Anat., 1.1.1.1., p. 136)

Burton is careful to distinguish between diseases of the body and of the mind. The diseases of the body, those inflicted by nature, through climate, elements, plants, beasts, etc., are not very much his concern, and thus he refers the interested reader to the "voluminous tomes" of sixteen authorities, and an "etc." (Anat., 1.1.1.2., p. 138) "that have methodically and elaborately written of them all." On the other hand, and most important for Burton, "the diseases of the mind and head" (Anat., 1.1.1.2., p. 138) are of central concern. In fact, Burton enters into his outline of the structures and functions of the human mind through the motivating force of disease.

At first, Burton is very careful to make a distinction between madness and melancholy (a distinction that is later blurred). Out of the diseases of the head, he

will single such as properly belong to the phantasy, or imagination, or reason itself ... the diseases of the mind ... morbos imaginationis, aut rationis laesae [diseases of the imagination, or of injured reason], which are three or four in number, frenzy, madness, melancholy, dotage, and their kinds ... which I will briefly touch and point at, insisting especially in this of melancholy, as more eminent than the rest. (Anat., 1.1.1.3., p. 139)

Melancholy is the more eminent disease of the mind because, Burton will go on to argue, it more clearly stems from a spiritual source than any other disease, mental or physical.

Thus, melancholy provides Burton with the clearest hope of finding a cure for the spiritual malaise of postlapsarian being - the diseased matter of existence that burdens the soul.¹

There are various types of insanity in Burton's lexicon: dotage, madness, frenzy, hydrophobia, lycanthropia (wolf-madness), St. Vitus dance, and ecstasies, for example. All have an element of melancholy in them, but, at first, are made distinguishable from melancholy for various reasons. These initial distinctions are, arguably, as much or more a matter of method and rhetorical strategies as they are scientific discipline.² (See Anat.,

¹Although it is not the concern of this thesis, it should be noted that Burton's careful protean attempts to distinguish morbid and pathological disorders is of great importance to the history of psychiatry.

²As outlined above in the chapter on Burton, Augustine and rhetoric, Burton likes to lay rhetorical traps for his readers, and here, the seeming splicing of melancholy into varieties of madness could be seen as an engaging tactic, to draw the reader's curiosity into the centre of the rhetorical "trap", wherein the overturning of both language and the reader's perceptions and understanding of sanity and madness will take place.

1.1.1.3. and 4., pp. 138-140, for Burton's analysis of various types of madness). Some forms of insanity can be traced to specifically humoral causes which differ from melancholy's humoral origins in black bile,¹ but as a state of being, ultimately all forms of insanity become an aspect of melancholy. Unbalanced and overthrown, whether by physical or spiritual causes, the mind suffering from melancholy becomes all-inclusive of post-lapsarian humanity.

"Melancholy in this sense is the character of mortality" (Anat., 1.1.1.5., p. 144). It is found "either in disposition or in habit" (Anat., 1.1.1.5., p. 143) in everyone, in some sense:

In disposition, is that transitory melancholy which goes and comes upon every small occasion of sorrow, need, sickness, trouble, fear, grief, passion, or perturbation of the mind, any manner of care, discontent, or thought, which causeth anguish, dulness, heaviness, and vexation of spirit, any ways opposite to pleasure, mirth, joy, delight... (Anat., 1.1.1.5., p. 143)

Burton seems to divide the concept of melancholy into two discrete sections, melancholy of "disposition" and of "habit". He argues that the temporary "Melancholy in Disposition" is often a medical problem or a reflection of immediate emotional disorders, and a great deal of Burton's medicinal and psychiatric advice in the Anatomy is designed to aid the temporarily afflicted melancholiac. However, ultimately Burton does not feel that this kind of melancholy is important. "Exi a mundo, get thee gone hence, if thou canst not brook it; there is no way to avoid it" (Anat., 1.1.1.5., p. 145). This temporary melancholy is universal:

And from these melancholy dispositions, no man living is free, no Stoic, none so wise, none so happy, none so patient, so generous, so godly, so divine, that can vindicate himself; so well composed, but more or less, some time or other, he feels the smart of it. (Anat., 1.1.1.5., pp. 143-144)

Although "melancholy of disposition" ultimately is unimportant, Burton discusses it in order to establish the universality of melancholy. No-one can escape, at best, temporary

¹See Laurence Babb, Elizabethan Malady (East Lansing, 1951), passim, for detailed explanations of humoral theories and medical practices.

and recurring bouts of melancholy. Further, and more important, there is the constant danger that this condition could become a permanent disease of the mind. Of these recurring bouts of melancholy, "no man can cure himself" (Anat., 1.1.1.5., p. 144). Burton here means that even though specific cases may be treated once they occur, the tendency to lapse into melancholy cannot be cured, as it is part of the human condition in the fallen world.

It is in the very nature of existence to suffer, Burton points out:

"even in the midst of laughing there is sorrow" (as Solomon holds): even in the midst of all our feasting and jollity, as Austin infers in his Com. on the Forty-first Psalm, there is grief and discontent. (Anat., 1.1.1.5., p. 144)

Pleasure and pain are inextricably interwoven in life.

Nothing so prosperous and pleasant, but it hath some bitterness in it, ... it is all ... a mixed passion. (Anat., 1.1.1.5., p. 145)

The understanding that suffering is an inevitable disposition in life leads to an Augustinian vision of the nature of existence itself.

We are not here as those angels, celestial powers and bodies, sun and moon, to finish our course without all offence, with such constancy to continue for so many ages: but subject to infirmities, miseries, interrupt, tossed and tumbled up and down, carried about with every small blast, often molested and disquieted upon each slender occasion, uncertain, brittle, and so is all that we trust unto. (Anat., 1.1.1.5., p. 145)

The realization of the true nature of fallen existence should lead one to patient forbearance and courage in the face of inevitable pain and adversity. (See above chapter "The Doors of Mortality" for further discussion of attitudes towards the world). Burton advises:

arm thyself with patience, with magnanimity, to oppose thyself unto it, to suffer affliction as a good soldier of Christ, as Paul adviseth, constantly to bear it. (Anat., 1.1.1.5., p. 145)

Thus, "melancholy of disposition" becomes a part of our fallen human condition, a recurring dilemma which tests the emotions and spirit of the afflicted. In this sense it can be seen to be an aspect of the "struggle" that informs Augustine's vision of the earthly city.

Just as we *should* all be brethren in Christ, but are not, for the most part, so too the realization of inevitable pain that *should* lead to Christian magnanimity and patience often does not happen.

But forasmuch as so few can embrace this good counsel of his, or use it aright, but rather as so many brute beasts give a way to their passion, voluntarily subject and precipitate themselves into a labyrinth of cares, woes, miseries, and suffer their souls to be overcome by them, cannot arm themselves with that patience as they ought to do, it falleth out oftentimes that these dispositions become habits, and "many affects contemned" (as Seneca notes) "make a disease." (Anat., 1.1.1.5., p. 145)

Thus, when the recurring emotional and spiritual pain of the human condition, often a bittersweet pain, is not met with adequate mental and spiritual strength, the mind can be, and is, Burton would argue, overwhelmed. As a consequence, temporary disposition to melancholy can become a permanent habit, a deeply-ingrained state of being.

But all these melancholy fits, howsoever pleasing at first, or displeasing, violent and tyrannizing over those whom they seize on for the time; yet these fits I say, or men affected, are but improperly so called, because they continue not, but come and go ... This melancholy of which we are to treat, is a habit, morbis conticus or chronicus, a chronic or continue disease, a settled humour ... not errant, but fixed; and as it was long increasing, so not being (pleasant, or painful) grown to an habit, it will hardly be removed. (Anat., 1.1.1.6., p. 146)

This chronic melancholy is the more difficult to treat, and ultimately, as we learn in the subsequent portions of the Anatomy, requires spiritual physic. Burton demonstrates in many instances that melancholy of habit is very much a spiritual disease, and stems ultimately from the uncertainties, vanity, pride and folly that serves to alienate the sufferer from God in the fallen world. Though most may not be clearly and demonstrably mad from this disease, all of humanity at some level suffers from melancholy, especially in the very human weakness of mind which allows passion to overthrow reason. Thus, the Anatomy is addressed to everyone, in order to find a cure for the spiritual malaise that is the sickness of existence itself. And, as numerous critics have suggested, the first step in the cure would appear to be the acceptance of one's own diseased state, as Burton challenges the reader into acknowledgement of this condition.

Thou thyself art the subject of my discourse. (Anat., Pref., p. 16)

Self-knowledge is the crucial first step towards the cure of melancholy, just as it is, as we have seen in previous chapters, the crucial first step in the path to salvation. As well, the causes of melancholy are as extensive as the application, for every case has its own unique human cause. As a consequence, Burton seems able, with an apparent categorical clarity, to list and classify all or seemingly all, the major causes of melancholy available to him through his extensive readings, and even one or two available to him through experience.¹

Burton approaches his analysis of the structures of mind with a catalogue of causes, and commences with a typical rhetorical strategy, quoting authority to justify method.

"It is in vain to speak of cures, or think of remedies, until such time as we have considered of the causes," so Galen prescribes Glauco: and the common experience of others confirms that those cures must be imperfect, lame, and to no purpose, wherein the causes have not first been searched. (Anat., 1.2.1.1., p. 177)

In stressing the importance of causes before effects, Burton is also laying the groundwork for his spiritual physic. Burton proceeds to outline his method, luring the reader (who is, it must constantly be recalled, the ostensible subject of analysis in the entire treatise) with a promise of objectivity, reason and method.

It is a most difficult thing (I confess) to be able to discern these causes whence they are, and in such variety to say what the beginning was ... I will adventure to guess as near as I can, and rip them all up, from the first to the last, general and particular, to every species, that so they may the better be described. (Anat., 1.2.1.1., pp. 177-178)

Thus, the reader can (seemingly) sit back and await the ordered unfolding of the catalogue. It is a crucial part of Burton's underlying themes to understand why he commences the catalogue the way he does.

Burton begins with a discussion of general causes: "General causes are either supernatural or natural" (Anat., 1.2.1.1., p. 178). Natural causes are usually directly

¹See, for example, Anat., 1.2.3.15., "Love of Learning or Overmuch Study, With a Digression of the Miseries of Scholars, and why the Muses are Melancholy."

linked to melancholy of disposition, and thus, can, in a sense, be dealt with and/or 'cured', for the most part only temporarily, as hundreds of pages of the Anatomy attest.

Supernatural causes of melancholy are more complicated, as they involve a level of being where medicine is relatively useless. The primary supernatural cause of melancholy, then, proceeds "from God and His angels, or by God's permission from the devil and his ministers" (Anat., 1.2.1.1., p. 178). The statement is designed to startle and (hopefully) awaken the presumably complacent or slumbering reader. God a cause of melancholy? Not just a cause, but the primary, motivating cause?

O coelum! O terra! [O heaven! O earth!] unde hostis hic? what an enemy is this? (Anat., 1.2.1.1., p. 179)

Burton explains.

That God Himself is a cause for the punishment of sin, and satisfaction of His justice, many examples and testimonies of holy Scriptures make evident to us. (Anat., 1.2.1.1., p. 178)

As noted above, the fear of Divine Justice is a primary cause of melancholy, and, as any Augustinian observer of the human condition would (ruefully) admit, none can escape - all are fallen. As Burton's argument unfolds, melancholy moves further away from being a concept of a physical or a mental disease and more towards the notion of a spiritual disease.

Thus,

we find it true that ultor a tergo Deus, "He is God the avenger," as David styles Him; and that it is our crying sins that pull this and many other maladies on our own heads. (Anat., 1.2.1.1., p. 179)

The Fall and its consequences continue to haunt humanity, through the spiritual causes of melancholy in the human tendency to sin and err and then consider the consequences.

Burton *apparently* dismisses the primary supernatural cause of melancholy (God and God's Will) as being beyond the grasp and scope of the ordinary physician.

Paracelsus is of opinion that such spiritual diseases (for so he calls them) are spiritually to be cured, and not otherwise. Ordinary means in such cases will not avail: Non est reluctandum cum Deo [we must not struggle with God] ... No striving with supreme powers ... physicians and physic can do no good, "we must submit ourselves unto the mighty hand of God, acknowledge our offences, call to Him for mercy. If He strike us, una

eademque manus vul nus opemque feret [the same hand will inflict the wound and provide the remedy] ... He alone must help; otherwise our diseases are incurable, and we will not be relieved. (Anat., 1.2.1.1., pp. 179-180)

If the power to cause and to cure melancholy lies in God's divine hands, then what can the physician do? Perplexed, Burton seems to concede defeat on this point, turning almost in relief to the seemingly more comprehensible actions of devils and spirits. Burton seems to ignore the question of the helplessness of the physician in spiritual matters, but in the following two hundred and fifty pages of supernatural and natural causes of melancholy, the reader will be overwhelmed by the complexity and enormity of the problems facing the physician. The subsequent thousand or so pages of the Anatomy serve to reinforce the central theme, "He alone can help." Burton's rhetorical strategies of cancellation of authority and reversal of expectations (examined in the previous chapter) are used to demonstrate again and again the essential inability of the earthly physician to help. If God is the primary cause of melancholy, God is also the primary, and only, cure, and the Physician as Divine (an image Burton has learned from Augustine) offers a far clearer hope to the afflicted melancholiac.

All of humanity is mad, all fallen into corruption, all diseased in spirit, and thus all require extreme spiritual cure. Thus, Burton adopts the roles of both physician and divine.

A good divine either is or ought to be a good physician, a spiritual physician at least, as our Saviour calls Himself, and was indeed (Matt. iv, 23; Luke v, 18; Luke vii, 21) (Anat., Pref., p. 37)

In a role similar to Augustine's in the City of God and the Confessions, Burton feels his purpose is to bridge the gap between the physical and the spiritual, sickness and health, and to be the guide who points to the bridging power of Christ and God's grace.

Thus, the supernatural causes of melancholy work directly upon the spirit and soul of humanity. Natural causes work upon the soul through the agency of the body and its various organs, in a more indirect manner. Through either assault, as we shall see, melancholy occupies the middle ground between the lower and higher faculties, between body and soul, poisoning and corrupting the higher with the tendencies, miseries and lusts

of the lower. Just as the physician-divine bridges the physical and spiritual cures, and Christ bridges the fallen world of Babylon and the Heavenly City, so too, in a negative way, through its actions and effects in the mind and spirit, melancholy bridges the worlds humanity dwells in.

In Burton's analysis of the structures of mind, a key component, which goes a long way towards explicating Burton's attitudes towards humanity, is to be found in Augustine's City of God. This component is Augustine's vision of the relationship of body and soul. It "is not the body but the corruptibility of the body which is the soul's burden" (City of God, vol. II, p. 13). The corruptibility of fallen existence, "inflicted as sin's punishment upon the body, and not the body itself, is heavy to the soul" (City of God, vol. II, p. 13). Fallen humanity suffers from the imprisonment of the soul in a corrupt vessel, a vessel that makes its own demands upon the higher powers.

But whereas the pain of the flesh is not forerun by any fleshly fear, felt in the flesh before that pain; pleasure indeed is ushered in by certain appetites felt in the flesh, as the desires thereof, such as hunger and thirst and the carnal appetites usually called lust. Lust, however, is a general name to all desires. (City of God, vol. II, p. 46)

Lust, or the desires of existence, becomes an important notion for Augustine and for Burton. Augustine registers a significant point concerning pleasure and desire which helps to explain the nature of existence, and the attitudes of Burton and Augustine towards fallen humanity.

For this [lust] holds sway in the whole body, moving the whole man, without and within, with such a mixture of mental emotion and carnal appetite that hence is the highest bodily pleasure of all produced: so that in the very moment of consummation, it overwhelms almost all the light and power of cogitation. (City of God, vol. II, p. 47)

The overwhelming of the intellect by pleasure, the overthrowing of reason by passion, is seen as a danger of post-lapsarian existence. Lust mingles physical and mental levels of being, and even invades the spiritual levels. Lust, ironically, can become a mental disorder, preventing the pleasure it so cravenly seeks:

But the lovers of these carnal delights themselves cannot have this emotion at their will, either in nuptial conjunctions, or wicked impurities. The motion will be sometimes importunate against the will, and sometimes immovable when it is desired, and being fervent in the mind, yet it will be frozen in the body. Thus wondrously does this lust fail man, both in honest desire of generation, and in lascivious concupiscence; sometimes resisting the restraint of the whole mind, and sometimes opposing itself by being wholly in the mind and in no way in the body at the same time. (City of God, vol. II, p. 47) ¹

Lust, or desires, apparently can arouse the mind but leave the body cold. Here is a curious reversal of expectations, a reversal which goes a great deal of the way towards explicating Burton's vision of melancholy. Lust, or desire, can erupt, and too often *does* erupt into the higher levels of consciousness and intellect, and in so doing so disorders the mind's truer functions that lust renders itself (and all else) ineffective. This is not merely sexual desire, but all forms of yearning and want in the earthly city. Desire paralyzes itself ultimately. Thus, bodily pain

is only an offence given to the soul by the flesh, and a dislike of that passion that the flesh produces: as that which we call sadness is a distaste of things befalling us against our wills. (City of God, vol. II, p. 46)

Augustine here identifies the miseries and wretchedness of mental existence (what Burton calls melancholy), with a conflict of *will*, a point Burton makes central to his analysis of structures of mind. As a consequence of lust's ability to overthrow the higher levels of mind, Augustine notes,

all bodies are not impediments to beatitude, but only the corruptible, transitory, and mortal ones; not such as God made man at first, but such as his sin procured him afterwards. (City of God, vol. II, p. 14)

The suffering melancholiac (who is, Burton argues, everybody) can only with sadness note here that all bodies are corruptible, burdensome, oppressive, and in a dying state. It is the essential condition of existence in the earthly city. Thus, Augustine implies that the suffering, grief and anguish of existence is universal and unavoidable, but *not* necessarily permanent or incurable. Burton, too, as we shall see below, feels that the warring qualities

¹Concerning the relation of the physical to the spiritual, both Burton and Augustine could have in mind Paul's comments in I Corinthians 15: 42-46, concerning bodies.

of the various faculties and powers of humanity are universal and unavoidable, but ultimately are accessible to "Christian medicine" and therefore are not an incurable condition of being.

Burton, following Augustine's lead, argues that not only does the soul affect the body, but the body affects the soul:

For as the distraction of the mind, amongst other outward causes and perturbations, alters the temperature of the body, so the distraction and distemper of the body will cause a distemperature of the soul, and 'tis hard to decide which of these two do more harm to the other. (Anat., 1.2.5.1., p. 374)

Thus, the harm that melancholy can do moves in more than one direction, as a disordered mind can punish its own body (often in very strange ways, as Burton shows us in hundreds of examples), and the physical body can harm the spiritual levels of being. As we shall see below, the key here is the mediating role of the sensitive soul, which, when it comes to the damage and harm humanity does to itself, operates on all levels and in all directions. More generally, however, the relationship of body to soul is similar to that of vehicle to passenger.

The body is a domicilium animae (the dwelling of the soul), her house, abode and stay: and as a torch gives a better light, a sweeter smell, according to the matter it is made of, so doth our soul perform all her actions, better or worse, as her organs are disposed. (Anat., 1.2.5.1., p. 375)

"The soul receives a tincture from the body, through which it works" (Anat., 1.2.5.1., p. 375). In order for the soul to function in existence, it needs the body; indeed, draws sufficient material being from its 'prison-house' body to be actually affected by the body's existence, weaknesses and failings:

concupiscence and original sin, inclinations, and bad humours are radical in everyone of us, causing these perturbations, affections, and several distempers, offering many times violence to the soul. (Anat., 1.2.5.1., p. 374)

"Violence to the soul" here is a spiritual and moral violence which, following the pattern of the three levels of soul, (see below for detailed explication) sees the physical level of being invading and corrupting the imprisoned spiritual levels.

For in this infirmity of human nature, as Melancthon declares, the understanding is so tied to and captivated by his inferior senses, that without their help he cannot exercise his functions, and the will, being weakened, hath but a small power to restrain those outward parts, but suffers herself to be over-ruled by them. (Anat., 1.2.5.1., p. 375)

Reason and the will can be, and usually are, crippled by passion. More specifically, "spirits and humours" generated by disease and imagination "do most harm in troubling the soul" (Anat., 1.2.5.1., p. 375). Thus,

this body of ours is most part distempered by some precedent diseases, which molest his inward organs and instruments, and so per consequens [consequently] cause melancholy. (Anat., 1.2.5.1., p. 375)

Burton's primary concern appears to be the effects of the lower powers on the higher.

What Burton has to say here concerning the body is of little relevance or interest, except for the nobler seats in the middle and upper regions of the body, most especially the brain and the heart: "the brain itself ... is, as it were, a privy counsellor and chancellor to the heart." (Anat., 1.1.2.4., p. 150) The heart rules the middle regions of existence:

Of this region the principal part is the heart, which is the seat and fountain of life, of heat, of spirits, of pulse and respiration, the sun of our body, the king and sole commander of it, the seat and organ of all passions and affection. (Anat., 1.1.2.4., p. 153)

As the seat of passions and affections, the heart plays a large and dynamic role in melancholy, in the wars and conflicts of head and spirit. Although it is *not* the seat of melancholy, an unruly heart, as Burton demonstrates in Partition 3, whether in love or religious devotion, is a major cause of melancholy. The heart is

a part worthy of admiration, that can yield such varieties of affections, by whose motions it is dilated or contracted, to stir and command the humours in the body: as in sorrow, melancholy; in anger, choler; in joy, to send the blood outwardly; in sorrow, to call it in. (Anat., 1.1.2.4., p. 153)

The heart marshals and controls the body's functions through the distribution of "vital spirits" (Anat., 1.1.2.4., p. 153) in the blood. Thus the heart helps, or ought to help, to

mediate between body and spirit, and an unruly heart is a major cause of the disease of melancholy, whether of disposition or habit.

The brain, "chancellor to the heart," controls the upper regions of being:

the chief organ is the brain, which is a soft, marrowish, and white substance, engendered of the purest part of seed and spirits ... and it is the most noble organ under heaven, the dwelling house and seat of the soul, the habitation of wisdom, memory, judgment, reason, and in which man is most like unto God. (*Anat.*, 1.1.2.4., p. 153)

Within this 'noble realm,' Burton enters into analysis of what quality of being it is that makes humanity "most like unto God", and also finds the source of melancholy. In the following discussion of the levels of mind and spirit, it is important to keep in mind that Burton is not really conducting a 'scientific' or 'objective' analysis of the human mind. Burton is out to affirm humanity's spiritual links to the Divinity, and thus will 'prove' that melancholy is a spiritual, not a physical, disease.

The soul, which finds its somewhat disputed seat in the middle ventricle of the fore-brain (*Anat.*, 1.1.2.4., p. 154), is divided into three faculties: the vegetal, sensitive, and rational,¹ which parallel three distinct kinds of living creatures - vegetal plants, sensible beasts, and rational humanity (*Anat.*, 1.1.2.5., p. 155). Note that Burton here defines humanity as essentially "rational."

The sensible soul is a key component in Burton's analysis of melancholy. The sensible soul is divided into apprehensive and moving powers. Apprehensive powers are "outward, as the five senses, of touching, hearing, seeing, smelling, tasting, to which you may add Scaliger's sixth sense of titillation, if you please" (*Anat.*, 1.1.2.5., p. 157). The

¹Burton, as is usual when he explores controversial material, appears to be siding with impeccable authorities (Aristotle, Cicero, Plutarch, Pico della Mirandola) as he establishes these three faculties. He briefly notes the Hermetic claim for a 'spiritual soul' in humanity (pp. 154-155), but subsequently, *apparently*, ignores this fourth level, as all the qualities assigned to it by the Hermeticists are significantly located by him within the rational soul. As for the tripartite division: "the inferior may be alone, (plants, eg.) but the superior cannot subsist without the other; so sensible includes vegetal, rational both; which are contained within it (saith Aristotle) ... as a triangle in a quadrangle" (*Anat.*, 1.1.2.5., p. 155). [emphasis mine] Through the geometric analogy and the authority of Aristotle, Burton implies the existence of the disputed fourth level, leaving the reader, as usual, in a bit of a quandary. See previous chapter on rhetorical techniques for further discussion of Burton's methods.

outward senses do not enter into the discussion of melancholy very much, except that they become the unwitting vehicles of the delusions of deranged sensibility, tricked and manipulated, as it were, by the inner senses. "Inward are three- common sense, phantasy, and memory" (Anat., 1.1.2.6., p. 157). And it is here, in the inner senses of the sensible soul, where Burton locates a key cause, or source, of melancholy, a source which reaches all the way up through the hierarchy of faculties to corrupt and cripple the will itself.

Common sense marshals and judges sensory data, enabling us to "discern all differences of objects" (Anat., 1.1.2.7., p. 159). Memory

lays up all the species which the senses have brought in, and records them as a good register, that they may be forth coming when they are called for by phantasy and reason. (Anat., 1.1.2.7., p. 160)

Memory and common sense are relatively functional, selective faculties. It is the phantasy which is of greatest interest here.

Phantasy, or imagination, which some call estimative or cogitative ... is an inner sense which doth more fully examine the species perceived by common sense, of things present or absent, and keeps them longer, recalling them to mind again, or making new of his own. (Anat., 1.1.2.7., p. 159)

Phantasy, or imagination, is a potentially unruly faculty, and a major source of difficulties for melancholiacs.

In time of sleep this faculty is free, and many times conceive strange, stupend, absurd shapes, as in sick men we commonly observe. (Anat., 1.1.2.7., p. 159)

Phantasy also "feigns infinite other" sense-objects for itself, confusing and disturbing other faculties with its creations.

In melancholy men this faculty is most powerful and strong, and often hurts, producing many monstrous and prodigious things, especially if it be stirred up by some terrible object, presented to it from common sense or memory. (Anat., 1.1.2.7., p. 159)

Echoing a Renaissance commonplace,¹ Burton points out that in artists, "poets and painters," "imagination forcibly works, as appears by their several fictions, antics, images"

¹Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl, Saturn and Melancholy (New York, 1964), pp. 241 ff.

(Anat., 1.1.2.7., p. 159). Thus phantasy is an important and wide-ranging faculty, with a strong influence on the generation and maintenance of melancholy. Burton then makes a point about phantasy that is crucial to his argument.

In men it is subject and governed by reason, *or at least should be*; but in brutes it hath no superior, and is ratio brutorum, all the reason they have. (Anat., 1.1.2.7., p. 160) (English emphasis mine)

Ratio brutorum in humanity becomes one of the inhibiting aspects of fallen nature which seems to the limited human observer to offer so much, but usually takes away far more than it gives.

The phantasy, or imagination in the sensitive soul becomes the fulcrum to move the powers of the entire soul. Imagination links the soul to material reality, and mediates between the incorporeal mind and the sensitive world. Imagination is an important faculty for the melancholiac. The major function of the "sensible" or sensitive soul is to accommodate the external to the internal through the organs of sense, or rather, to make material reality accessible to the higher faculties of the soul. This faculty plays a pivotal role in Burton's argument that the lower faculties can, and do, affect the higher, and through their interference cause melancholy.

In tandem with these inner faculties of the sensitive soul is the moving faculty, "the other power of the sensitive soul, which causeth all those inward and outward animal motions in the body" (Anat., 1.1.2.8., p. 160). The moving faculty is concerned with the appetites, and thus has great importance in Burton's analysis of melancholy. "It is divided into two faculties, the power of appetite, and of moving from place to place" (Anat., 1.1.2.8., p. 160).

The power of appetite enjoys the same tripartite structure as the sensitive soul, of which appetite is such an important part: natural, voluntary and sensitive, or "intellective." Natural appetites "depend not on sense, but are vegetal as the appetite of meat and drink, hunger and thirst" (Anat., 1.1.2.8., p. 160). "Sensitive is common to men and brutes,"

(Anat., 1.1.2.8., p. 160) and includes appetites of instinct, pleasure and pain. The voluntary faculty is of greatest concern here, as it is the faculty of control.

Voluntary... or intellective ... commands the other two [appetites] in men, and is a curb unto them, *or at least should be*, but for the most part is captivated and overruled by them. (Anat., 1.1.2.8., p. 160) (emphasis mine)

The "several lusts" of humanity *should* be controlled by the intellective appetite, "for by this appetite the soul is led or inclined to follow that good which the senses shall approve, or avoid that which they hold evil." (Anat., 1.1.2.8., pp. 160-161) The appetites control the sensual level of being, so in this sense only do they have potential for control of the soul. As we shall see below, there is a higher level of being where humanity more clearly finds itself (or loses itself, depending upon one's perspective). For Burton's purposes, however, the voluntary, or intellective appetite is an important aspect of the psychology of melancholy, because of its usual inability to discharge its proper function.

Drawing on traditional Christian assumptions, and on Augustine, Aristotle and Nicholas Cusanus on movement, Burton begins to move his analysis of melancholy away from medical and towards moral and spiritual ends.

According to that aphorism, omnia appetunt bonum, all things seek their own good, or at least seeming good. This power is inseparable from sense, for where sense is, there is likewise pleasure and pain. (Anat., 1.1.2.8., p. 161)

Burton begins to separate the notion of good in a moral sense from good at the level of ratio brutorum. The intellective faculty is more precisely divided into concupiscible and irascible qualities: "concupiscible covets always pleasant and delightsome things, and abhors that which is distasteful, harsh and unpleasant...Irascible ... as avoiding it with anger and indignation" (Anat., 1.1.2.8., p. 161). To demonstrate the importance of this faculty, Burton notes:

All affections and perturbations arise out of these two fountains, which, although the Stoics make light of, *we hold natural, and not to be resisted*. (Anat., 1.1.2.8., p. 161) (emphasis mine)

As we have seen in previous chapters, Burton sides with the Augustinian view that the emotions and affections are natural and "not to be resisted", or suppressed, especially the feelings of spiritual love. At the same time Burton would argue that humanity ought not to give in to its own internal emotional demands, especially when these demands arise from the appetites rather than the higher levels of being. The moving faculty is, along with the heart, one of the major sources of emotional life, a life that usually goes awry in the melancholiac. Further, as we shall see below, in this discussion of emotions, Burton supplies a clue to the temporal and eventual spiritual cure for the universal disease of melancholy.

Thus, Burton reinforces his argument on the emotions (with an eye to his ultimate themes) by expanding on the importance of the intellective faculty of the sensitive soul and explicitly linking its powers to melancholy.

The good affections are caused by some object of the same nature; and if present, they procure joy, which dilates the heart and preserves the body: if absent, they cause hope, love, desire, concupiscence. The bad are simple or mixed: simple for some bad object present, as sorrow, which contracts the heart, macerates the soul, subverts the good estate of the body, hindering all the operations of it, *causing melancholy*, and many times death itself. (Anat., 1.1.2.8., p. 161) (emphasis mine)

Burton traces melancholy in large part to bad affections arising in the voluntary faculty of the sensitive soul. The cure of melancholy can be traced in large part to the voluntary faculty of the rational soul, as we shall see below.

The other quality found in the intellective faculty of the sensitive soul is "moving from place to place":

For in vain were it otherwise to desire and to abhor, if we had not likewise power to prosecute or eschew, by moving the body from place to place. (Anat., 1.1.2.8., p. 161)

The 'moving faculty' directs the body to achieve the soul's desires:

To the better performance of which, [moving the body from place to place] three things are requisite: that which moves; by what it moves; that which is moved. That which moves is either the efficient cause, or end. The end is the object which is desired or eschewed ... *The efficient cause in man is reason, or his subordinate phantasy*, which apprehends good or bad objects:

in brutes imagination alone, which moves the appetite, the appetite this faculty, which by an admirable league of nature, and by mediation of the spirit, commands the organ by which it moves. (*Anat.*, 1.1.2.8., pp. 161-162) (emphasis mine)

Burton argues here that appetite, in league with brutish nature, or *ratio brutorum*, can command and control the body, unless reason and the "mediation of the spirit" intercede on behalf of humanity's better nature. It is when the intercession of reason and the higher powers of will are not forthcoming, or go awry through the subversion of higher faculties by lesser ones, (a condition common to all humanity), that the conditions favorable to melancholy arise.

In Burton's analysis of the structure of mind, an analysis informed primarily by his religious beliefs, the voluntary intellectual faculty of the sensitive soul becomes an important mediating faculty - that which makes us most truly human. Humanity shares the vegetal soul, common sense and imagination (phantasy) with brutes and beasts. The rational soul, a higher faculty, is shared by humanity with the Divinity and aspects of divine creation (the angels, mostly). The voluntary faculty of the sensitive soul bridges both worlds, or, in Augustinian terms, bridges the earthly and the Heavenly City. Reason and passion clash here. The voluntary intellectual faculty is the human faculty where all the excuses, evasions, and failures of being have their origin, either directly or indirectly. The war between reason and the baser passions, which is a Renaissance commonplace, has as its battlefield this faculty of the sensitive soul. It is within this faculty that the crucial gap between imagination and will arises, where 'degenerate' forms of reason, appetite and will drag the 'regenerate' spirit, humanity's divine inner self, down to the realms of brute being. It is this gap between what the mind can imagine and what it is capable of willing that is the major cause of melancholy.

Burton is always careful to show how phantasy, links with every level of apprehension in the soul. He sees as central to his argument the dangers to the spirit of passions which erupt upon the understanding, through the basic corruption of human

nature. Burton describes these passions that arise from depraved appetite (phantasy centred on sense data), or the irascible and concupiscible, as follows.

Out of these two arise those mixed affections and passions of anger, which is a desire of revenge; hatred, which is inveterate anger; zeal, which is offended with him who hurts that he loves; and ... a compound affection of joy and hate, when we rejoice at other men's mischief, and are grieved at their prosperity; pride, self-love, emulation, envy, shame, etc. (Anat., 1.1.2.8., p. 161)

Burton insists "all affections and perturbations arise out of these two fountains" (Anat., 1.1.2.8., p. 161). Further, "this power is inseparable from sense" (Anat., 1.1.2.8., p. 161). Burton lays great stress on the ability of the phantasy to influence the other faculties of the soul. See, for example, Burton on the effects of imagination as made manifest in sorrow, fear, etc. (Anat., 1.2.3., pp. 258ff.). The "vehement imagination" forces changes and disturbances on the lower levels of the soul and of the body. Further, as we shall presently see, imagination and the affections have a power over the highest levels, where humanity is "most like unto God." Imagination, because of its powers to create, disturb and confuse, becomes the key faculty in Burton's analysis of melancholy.

The rational soul, humanity's highest faculty and the crest-jewel of being, proves difficult for Burton to locate. Burton confuses an already unclear picture with a plethora of learned citations, and allusions culled from a seemingly inexhaustible fount of learned, impeccable, and time-honoured authorities¹ to introduce the rational soul, "a pleasant, but a doubtful subject." (Anat., 1.1.2.9., p. 162) Significantly, Burton begins his *own* analysis of the rational soul with reference to Augustine, and unattributed "philosophers":

This reasonable soul, which Austin calls a spiritual substance moving itself, is defined by philosophers to be "the first substantial act of a natural human, organical body, by which a man lives, perceives and understands, freely doing all things, and with election." (Anat., 1.1.2.9., p. 164)

¹We find here a clue to the interpretation of a great number of these 'debates' in the Anatomy. Burton, after examining (apparently) both, or many sides of the issue, inconclusively abandons the debate about the existence and immortality of the soul, an issue he and his fellow Christians are sure on, and moves on to the real issue, the structure and function of the rational soul. Burton implies a scepticism and confusion not validated by his subsequent treatment of the rational soul. See previous chapter on rhetorical strategies in Burton and Augustine for detailed treatment of this strategy.

The rational soul contains within it and "performs the duties" of the vegetal and sensitive souls"¹ and all three faculties make one soul, which is inorganic of itself" (Anat., 1.1.2.9., p. 164). This soul is separate from the body, "although it be in all parts, and incorporeal, using their organs, and working by them." (Anat., 1.1.2.9., p. 165) Burton implies that body and soul work together, or at least ought to, in a symbiotic relationship that lends life and meaning. It is in the inevitable breakdown of this symbiotic relationship, wherein unruly lower faculties or weaker higher ones allow a confusion of powers, that the potential for melancholy arises, and is usually accomplished.

The rational soul is given a bipartite structure and division by Burton.

It is divided into two chief parts, differing in office only, not in essence: the understanding, which is the rational power apprehending; the will, which is the rational power moving: to which two all the other rational powers are subject and reduced. (Anat., 1.1.2.9., p. 165)

The rational soul would appear to have identical faculties and powers to the voluntary intellectual faculty of the sensitive soul. The key difference is the emphasis on reason in the understanding and the will in the higher faculty, and the lack of it in the lower. In setting up a seemingly identical structure, Burton can counterpoise qualities such as reason and passion, and thus seek a higher synthesis that confirms his religious beliefs.

Burton begins his discussion of the understanding with a quotation from Melancthon, an avowed Augustinian.

'Understanding is a power of the soul, by which we perceive, know, remember, and judge, as well singulars as universals, having certain innate notions or beginnings of arts, a reflecting action, by which it judgeth of his own doings and examines them.' (Anat., 1.1.2.10., p. 165)

As we shall see shortly, Burton, through Melancthon, here seconds Augustine's notion of *res*. For now, though, the important aspects of the faculty of understanding are the ability

¹It is this envelope of souls, wherein the sensitive soul is contained within the rational, that enables the voluntary, intellectual faculty of the sensitive soul to possess such wide-ranging and potentially destructive powers in human personality.

to discern universals and the ability to reflect upon and examine oneself, both key qualities of Augustine's 'pilgrim'.¹ Such abilities distinguish humanity from brutes.

Three differences appear betwixt a man and a beast. At first, the sense only comprehends singularities, the understanding universalities. Secondly, the sense hath no innate notions. Thirdly, brutes cannot reflect upon themselves. (Anat., 1.1.2.10, p. 165)

The understanding, that which separates humanity from the beasts, moves from sense perception to corporeal awareness to spiritual realization. This process is accomplished by as many as fourteen faculties, depending again upon the ubiquitous, but never-quite-agreed-upon authority. The objective of the movement of understanding is clear, however.

[The understanding's] object is God, Ens, all nature, and whatsoever is to be understood: which successively it apprehends. (Anat., 1.1.2.10., p. 165)

Thus, the movement is from perception of things to a realization of the being and essence of things (Augustine's *res*)², to an ultimate, hoped-for understanding of the Creator of all things. This movement quite clearly transcends the appetites and ratio brutorum of lower levels of being, and thus is the human faculty most kin to the divinity.

Augustine, in a lengthy passage from On Christian Doctrine, pinpoints the difference between sense and understanding.

Since men are moved by diverse goods, some by those which appeal to the bodily senses, some by those which pertain to the understanding of the mind, those who are given to the bodily senses think the God of gods to be either the sky, or the world itself. Or, if they seek to go beyond the world, they imagine something luminous or infinite, or with a vain notion, shape it in that form which seems best to them, perhaps thinking of the form of the human body if they place that above others. If they do not think of a God of gods but rather of innumerable gods of equal rank, they shape them in their minds according to that bodily shape which they think excellent. Those, however, who seek know what God is through the understanding place Him above all things mutable, either visible and corporeal or intelligible and spiritual. All men struggle emulously for the excellence of God, and no-one can be found who believes God to be something to which

¹See above chapter on Burton, Augustine and the path to salvation by the pilgrimage of the Heavenly City through the earthly city.

²J. A. Mazzeo, "St. Augustine's Rhetoric of Silence", in Renaissance and Seventeenth-Century Studies (New York, 1964), p. 3. "The nature and uses of signs became strictly related to the realities to be sought (discovery) and to their formulation (statement), so that the use of the arts of language is utterly dependent on the structures of reality..."

there is a superior. Thus all agree that God is that thing which they place above all other things. (On Christian Doctrine, p. 11)

Augustine shows here how an understanding of God that is not sense-oriented leads the mind away from the corporeal. Thought on the higher levels, then, involves a continual turning away from the world of nature towards the spiritual. It is a curiosity of Augustine's thought that the understanding must infer the spiritual in existence out of a perception of substance, for this process would seem at first to be virtually indistinguishable from what Burton calls phantasy. An inability (lamentably common in post-lapsarian humanity, and evident in the various perceptions of the divinity in the above quotation) to perceive the difference between the notions of phantasy and those of understanding is the central cause of the universal malady, melancholy. However, in Burton's analysis, the rational soul can escape from the affliction.

Phantasy "feigns" sense-objects for itself, and is moved by the baser appetites, but understanding performs a higher function, and again, an unattributed function:

His actions (some say) are apprehension, composition, division, discoursing, reasoning, memory, which some include in invention, and judgment. (Anat., 1.1.2.10., p. 165)

Burton elevates memory to the level of the rational soul, as memory partakes in the processes of selection in understanding. Thus, memory is an aspect of both affections and reason. Burton's authority for the importance of memory is Augustine.

But whereabouts in my memory is thy residence, O Lord ... For I have already passed beyond such parts of it as are common to me with the beasts, whilst I called thee to mind (for as much as I found not thee there amongst the images of corporeal things) and I proceeded to these parts of it, whither I had committed the affections of my mind: nor could I find thee there. Yea, I passed further into it, even to the very seat of my mind itself, (which is there in my memory, as appears by the mind's remembering of itself:) neither wert thou there: for that as thou art not either any corporeal image, no more art thou any affection of a living man ... No, nor yet art thou the mind itself; because thou art the Lord God of the mind. (Confessions, I, p. 143)

Memory connects humanity with the divinity, and with sensual nature. Augustine discusses the importance of memory in great detail in the Confessions, and for our purposes here, it is enough to say that Burton seems to follow his lead in attributing

memory to both lower and higher faculties. Memory becomes intertwined with the various levels of reason and imagination, as Burton establishes a series of vertically parallel constructs to establish the cause of the ascendancy of melancholy in the human condition.

The higher faculties and functions of mind depend upon ascending levels of reasoning powers. Imagination and reason operate in uneasy alliance as the functioning qualities of mind in the soul, an alliance that often degenerates, in a kind of Augustinian struggle, into a battle for control of perception and understanding. The imagination feigns experience, sensory data, and apparent knowledge, and reason struggles to perceive the *res* beneath the surface of existence. Thus reason marshals its various qualities. Reason gains control, or at least tries to, through the 'agent' of understanding and intelligence - wit.

The agent is that which is called the wit of man, acumen or subtlety, sharpness of invention ... *which abstracts those intelligible species from the phantasy*, and transfers them to the passive understanding, "because there is nothing in the understanding which was not first in the sense." (Anat., 1.1.2.10., p. 165) [emphasis mine]

Further, "that which the imagination hath taken from the sense, this agent [wit] judgeth of, whether it be true or false" (Anat., 1.1.2.10, p. 165). Thus, wit is the faculty whereby humanity sorts sensory perception and, hopefully for the fallen sinner, controls the imagination. A want of wit would seem to be one of humanity's greatest shortcomings. Lack of wit is certainly a major cause of melancholy, if one keeps in mind that wit is "acumen or subtlety".

Wit supervises the fourteen "species of the understanding":

Sense, experience, intelligence, faith, suspicion, error, opinion, science; to which are added art, prudence, wisdom; as also synteresis, dictamen rationis, [the dictates of reason], conscience. (Anat., 1.1.2.10., p. 166)

Some of these species are innate, some acquired through "doctrine, learning and use" (Anat., 1.1.2.10., p. 166). Burton, as is usual, does not appear to be intrigued with the philosophical arguments for the existence or acquisition of these species of understanding. He is far more concerned with the uses these levels of understanding are put to by a

beleaguered wit in its struggle to control the phantasy, especially the last three in the above list, *synteresis*, *dictamen rationis*, and conscience.

Synteresis, or the purer part of the conscience, is an innate habit, and doth signify "a conservation of the knowledge of the law of God and Nature, to know good or evil." And (as our divines hold) is rather in the understanding than in the will ... The *dictamen rationis* is that which doth admonish us to do good or evil ... The conscience is that which approves good or evil, justifying or condemning our actions. (*Anat.*, 1.1.2.10, p. 166)

Burton singles out these three powers of the understanding "as more necessary to my following discourse" (166), because his central concern in anatomizing the universal malady of melancholy is not so much mental health as it is spiritual salvation. These three powers of the understanding are most clearly positive contributors to the quality of morality in the mind (even if being moral may render one functionally "insane", in the sense that to be truly moral means to reject the world and its ways, and thus, perhaps, to be perceived as insane). Ultimately, there is no cure for melancholy as a mental illness, and thus no cure is possible through the application of medicinal powers. The powers of the mind, in analogue with fallen nature, are at war with one another, locked in an unceasing Augustinian struggle for control of the higher levels of the soul. This struggle renders "health" very difficult to attain, unless some sort of spiritual aid is sought, in the form of submission to God's Will. These three powers: conscience, the demands of the voice of reason, and the ability to discern knowledge of good and evil, are crucial elements of the mind, as they assist in strengthening and guiding the will.

In his discussion of the will, the final and most important element in Burton's structure of mind, Burton attempts to alter the reader's understanding of the meaning of, and the keeping of, health itself.

Will is the other power of the rational soul, 'which covets or avoids such things as have been before judged and apprehended by the understanding.' If good it approves, if evil it abhors it: so that his object is either good or evil. (*Anat.*, 1.1.2.11., p. 161)

Whether for good or evil, in either case the will acts, but in each case in a slightly different way, so that Burton can avoid the contentious issue of freedom of the will without deciding for or against it. There is a parallel between will and appetites, as lower and higher faculties again echo each other with a curious symmetry, concupiscible appetites echoing the will to the good, irascible the will to avoid bad.

Freedom of the will is one of the most profound, and most contentious of all the religious controversies in the Reformation and Counter-Reformation periods.¹ The key authority for both sides is, as usual, Augustine. Burton's careful piloting through the dangers inherent in a discussion of the will reflects his close reading and understanding of Augustine's subtle and profound quibbling on this issue.² Partition 1, Section 1, Member 2, Subsection 11, "Of the Will" is one of the most important passages in the Anatomy, for Burton here states some of his central themes in a clear manner, without Democritus Jr.'s raillery and rhetorical traps. Here Burton comes closest to revealing his hidden spiritual physic:³ melancholy is a spiritual disease which invades, infects and debilitates the *will* of humanity.

It is this spiritual melancholy, a disease of the will, for which there is no cure in any human sense. The analysis of this form of the disease forms a hidden sub-text in the Anatomy, wherein the reader must puzzle out the spiritual cure in a process very akin to the process of salvation as outlined by Augustine. Physical cures of physical melancholy and various related mental disorders occupy a large part of the Anatomy, and are valuable and interesting, but ultimately are of little spiritual significance. The true significance of melancholy lies not in its temporarily curable aspects, but in its incurable spiritual aspects. The ultimate reason there is no cure, even for the diligent reader, is that salvation is

¹ See, for example, Erasmus and Luther, Discourse on Free Will (New York, 1961).

² Babb, in Sanity in Bedlam (Kalamazoo, 1959), p. 52, argues 'the same points appear in the Articles of the Church of England.' My position here and Babb's are not incompatible.

³ Arguably, that which is hidden in the basket of 'that Egyptian in Plutarch', on the first page of Democritus Jr.'s introduction is Burton's hidden spiritual physic. See Anat., Pref., p. 15.

impossible in a world where spirit is anchored by sin, grief and suffering to the rock of corrupt and fallen being. There is a cure (Burton is not totally pessimistic), but the cure lies beyond any powers humanity may possess to obtain it, in the powers of the divine realm (see above chapter on Burton, Augustine and the paths to salvation). Even though it is the will which is afflicted with the disease of melancholy, it is also the will which mediates more clearly and more compellingly than any other human faculty between humanity and the divinity.

Concerning melancholy as a disease of the will, Burton's argument draws most heavily on Aristotle, Melancthon and Augustine. Burton draws on Aristotle to term the will "our rational appetite":

For as in the sensitive, we are moved to good or bad by our appetite, ruled and directed by sense; so in this we are carried by reason. (Anat., 1.1.2.11., p. 167)

'So in this we are ruled by reason' ... but rarely. Far more often, as Burton demonstrates in approximately fourteen hundred subsequent pages, in spiritual things the rational appetite is often overpowered by the lesser but more strident sensual appetite. These two appetites seem to differ only slightly, but in actuality differ profoundly.

the sensitive appetite hath a particular object good or bad; this [rational appetite] an universal, immaterial: that respects only things delectable and pleasant; this honest. Again, they differ in liberty. The sensual appetite seeing an object, if it be a convenient good, cannot but desire it; if evil, avoid it; *but this is free in his essence.* (Anat., 1.1.2.11., p. 167) (emphasis mine)

There are two important points to examine in this passage. The failure of understanding to move from the 'delectable and pleasant' corporeal perception to the immaterial and universal apprehension is a result of the control of unrealized rational appetite by sensitive appetite, leading to corruption of understanding and failure of will. Further, one appetite, the rational, is free; the other, lower one is not. Freedom and reason are then linked in the highest levels of mind and spirit. The rational appetite, however, is only nominally free: free in essence, free in design, but not free in practice.

Burton traces the predicament of will to the Fall. The rational appetite, though free in essence, is

much now depraved, obscured, and fallen from his first perfection; yet in some of his operations still free. (Anat., 1.1.2.11., p. 167)

Burton aligns himself with the fideistic side of Augustinian thought, but he also demonstrates a mastery of Augustine's subtle equivocations on will.

The actions of the will are velle and nolle, to will and nill: which two words comprehend all, and they are good or bad, *according as they are directed, and some of them freely performed by himself ...* we say that our will is free in respect of us, and things contingent, howsoever, (in respect of God's determinate counsel) they are inevitable and necessary. (Anat., 1.1.2.11., p. 168) (English emphasis mine)

Burton touches on a deterministic view, but avoids affirmation of it by insisting on an element of freedom in human activity.

Otherwise, in vain were laws, deliberations, exhortations, counsels, precepts, rewards, promises, threats and punishments: *and God should be the author of sin.* (Anat., 1.1.2.11., p. 167) (emphasis mine)

Burton sees clearly the dangers in a deterministic viewpoint, and manages to avoid controversy by following closely as Augustine pilots his way through the concept and definition of will.

Arguing that "Free will is the cause of sin", Augustine notes:

I now knew as well that I had a will, as that I had a life: and when therefore I did either will or nill anything, I was most sure of it, that I and no other did will and nill: *and there was the cause of my sin.* (Confessions, I, p. 343) (emphasis mine)

Further, and more precisely:

And I enquired what iniquity should be: but I found it not to be a substance, but a swerving merely of the will, crooked quite away from thee, O God, (who art the supreme substance) towards these lower things. (Confessions, I, p. 383)

Evil, then, is the choice to turn away from good. The basic difficulty here, as noted above, is that the will, like all the rest of creation, has been corrupted by the Fall. From its original

being as a magnificent and rational instrument of God's Will, human will has become a weakened and corrupt instrument of baser powers.

Some other actions of the will are performed by the inferior powers which obey him, as the sensitive and moving appetite ... but this appetite is many times rebellious in us, and will not be contained within the lists of sobriety and temperance (Anat., 1.1.2.11., p. 168)

The universal design of Providence has, in human postlapsarian perceptions, *apparently* been overturned, so that in the fallen world, appetites control will, sense clouds understanding, the "excellent consent and harmony" of the various faculties has been lost, and "reason is overborne by passion" (Anat., 1.1.2.11., p. 168). The resultant confusion in the human mind leads to melancholy.

The will is the highest and most tenuous link between humanity and the divine, the link that most clearly establishes the meaning and purpose of being. Burton sees melancholy as primarily a spiritual malaise, a disease of the will that effectively ruptures humanity's contact with the divinity. Seemingly, the will has little to do with humanity's lower nature.

Those natural and vegetal powers are not commanded by will at all; for "who can add one cubit to his stature?" (Anat., 1.1.2.11., p. 168)

Further, and more important, the second level, that of the sensitive soul, also seldom comes under the control of the will, and this is the central predicament of the melancholiac.

These others [sensitive powers] may, but are not: and thence come all those headstrong passions, violent perturbations of the mind; and many times vicious habits, customs, feral diseases; because we give so much way to our appetite, and follow our inclination, like so many beasts. (Anat., 1.1.2.11., pp. 168-169)

The crux of Burton's structure of mind, of his medicinal and spiritual examinations, of his exhaustive studies of the levels and kinds of melancholy comes down to conflict - conflict in the will of the rational soul between the lower powers inherent in appetite for the sensual, and the higher powers of reason inherent in spiritual appetites that would seem to deny the sensual.

In a passage which summarizes his thematic focus for the reader, and which is echoed in one form or another throughout the entire *Anatomy*, Burton analyzes the nature of human will.

But in spiritual things we will no good, prone to evil (*except we be regenerate, and led by the spirit*) we are egged on by our natural concupiscence, and there is ... a confusion in our powers, "our whole will is averse from God and His law," ... we cannot resist, our concupiscence is originally bad, our heart evil, *the seat of our affections captivates and enforceth our will*; so that in voluntary things we are averse from God and goodness, bad by nature, by ignorance worse, by art, discipline, custom, we get many bad habits, suffering them to domineer and tyrannize over us; and the devil is still ready at hand with his evil suggestions, to tempt our depraved will to some ill-disposed action, to precipitate us to our destruction, *except our will be swayed and counter-poised again with some divine precepts and good notions of the spirit.* (*Anat.*, 1.1.2.11., p. 167) (emphasis mine)

Drawing upon what many critics of Burton seem to dismiss as Christian commonplaces, Burton paints a picture of humanity sinking into a sea of evil through an inability to control appetites, lusts and "ill-disposed actions", due to a failure of will. It is Burton's hidden sub-text (that which is hidden in the Egyptian's basket), and an integral aspect of his rhetorical strategies, to attempt to energize the will of the reader towards good. This is a ticklish task considering that, in turning away from the world and towards God, the will is *not* free and voluntary. It is only voluntary in the direction of evil, by turning away from good.

How then to help the reader? The key appears to be not to activate the will by forcing false activity on the reader, which would only mislead the reader further. Rather than activate, Burton seeks to *heal*. He seeks to leave the reader's will and understanding in as healthy a state as possible in order to increase the potential to receive Grace. In Augustinian terms, the fact of Grace is beyond humanity's grasp in this fallen world, but the potential towards Grace reflects a state of spiritual health. The disease which prevents this, which most clearly debilitates the spirit and weakens the will, is the 'universal malady', melancholy. Thus, Burton leads his reader on a kind of pilgrimage through the earthly city, pointing out the various snares, pitfalls and illusions which debilitate and

weaken the will. The confusing rhetorical strategies, the anecdotal, familiar style, and the exhaustive lists are all designed to lead the reader to the realization and emotional acceptance of his own human frailty.

As Burton points out in the first pages of the Anatomy proper, it is humanity's own fallen nature, corrupted and weakened by the consequences of original sin, which causes melancholy. The lower invades, infects and corrupts the higher. Body infects mind, appetite overpowers reason, passion undermines understanding, and the end result is a diseased and ineffective will. Thus, because the will is not prepared to receive the healing power of Grace, the possibility of salvation is denied. And it is the possibility of salvation that Burton wishes to make available to his reader. It is Burton's ultimate thematic purpose, throughout the Anatomy, to strengthen and galvanize the will of the reader, to turn the reader away from appetite and fallen nature and towards the spiritual realms, where, on the highest levels, reason and will unite in a fervent love of God. And in all of this, as we have seen, Burton follows the lead of Augustine in leading his reader on a kind of pilgrimage through the fallen world, and through the corruption of human nature.

Throughout the Anatomy, Burton stresses the importance of belief. He emphasizes the weakness in human powers, powers that are out of control in the mind of the melancholiac. For Burton, faith is an emotional, seemingly illogical appeal to the powers of God which seeks to activate the will to turn towards God and the Heavenly City. In the corrupt wasteland of fallen nature, salvation is impossible without this divine intervention. Burton's structure of mind enables access to the divinity through the healing power of Grace granted to an unworthy and melancholy humanity by a beneficent and loving Providence.

As we have seen in previous chapters, Burton and Augustine place great stress on the healing powers of belief, but their Divine-Physician has super-celestial and spiritual healing powers, more specifically, the power of Grace. The "undoubted hope and love towards the physician" in Burton's scheme is faith in Providence (see, for one example

among many, Anat., 3.4.2.6., pp. 426-427, on the healing power of God's Grace). In the Anatomy, Burton deals primarily with the causes and effects of passions, perturbations, and various disruptive emotional states. For example, rather than analyze an emotion such as vaunting (a kind of peacock strut of the smug and self-righteous soul), Burton is most concerned with the causes, found in emotional frenzies such as hatred, anger or zeal, that lead to vaunting. Thus, in his analysis of the structures of mind, Burton is less concerned with definitions and processes of mind than he is concerned with the effects of human thought and passion on the possibility of salvation from corruption. 'Curing' the disease is more crucial than precisely explaining it, which is why, after the exhaustive effort of reading the entire Anatomy, a precise definition of melancholy remains elusive. It is a state of being, and inevitable, and Burton sees that his best course as a Physician-Divine is to guide the reader towards the possibility of a cure- a cure the reader can only hope for in this life.

Thus, for Burton, the intellective faculty of the voluntary level of the sensitive soul is a kind of transition zone, the level of being that his theories turn on. Humanity shares the vegetal soul, common sense and phantasy with brutes and beasts. Humanity shares the rational soul, the vessel of the highest faculties of reason and will, with divine being. The voluntary level of the sensitive soul shares in both worlds. Out of this faculty arise all of the "excuses and evasions" of being- degenerate and selfish forms of reason and self-centred appetites that enervate will and drag the imprisoned spirit down to the level of brute being. Ultimately, and inevitably, the corruption of will that comes from the irruption of the lower in to the higher leads to melancholy. As we have seen, Burton is very attuned to the failings of will that lead to sinful states of being, and he seems to take great delight in cataloguing these human 'follies'. A more accurate representation would be to say that Burton, through his Augustinian loyalties, sees any kind of salvation or cure in this life as a futile impossibility. Burton's oft-quoted dictum, borrowed from Hemingius, and deriving from an Augustinian insight, "Be not solitary, be not idle," is not a mere palliative. When

placed in the context of Burton's Christian faith and Augustinian loyalties, it becomes a call for courage, a plea for the reader to energize and render meaningful his life's pilgrimage.

Conclusion

We have seen that Augustine is a major source and influence on Burton, though by no means the only influence. For example, the form of the Anatomy draws life from Augustine's City of God, but only in part, as Burton is too widely read and eclectic in his thinking to be easily categorized as to influences. The argument presented here is that throughout Burton's complex and shifting vision an Augustinian element persists. Burton's attitudes towards the world, humanity and his sources can be seen to derive in some measure from Augustine's attitudes on these subjects. Burton's scepticism, for example, would appear to derive in large part not from Sextus Empiricus, or the recovery of Academic philosophers, but from Augustine, and Augustine's criticisms of classical, secular scepticism. Thus Burton's scepticism is qualitatively different from the dawning scientific-rationalist scepticism of, for example, Descartes or Hobbes.

Many critics seem to read the Anatomy as a vaguely anti-humanist satire with a weak and conventional (and often undervalued) homiletic underpinning. The pattern in the Anatomy examined here sees Burton's understanding moving away from a scientific-medical treatise on the surface. Through an exploration of historical time in its examination of Babylon and the world of fallen nature, with its levels of misunderstanding, failed perception, and evil, Burton moves to a metaphysical level, wherein his Augustinian focus is designed to turn the reader away from the world as goal or desire and towards a reconciliation with self and God. Burton's idea of history is that all of the past is realizable in the present, and serves to illuminate that present for the careful observer. He makes no distinctions in historical time, save that history begins in the Garden, and ends in the bosom of God. All else in history, save for the intercession of Christ, is primarily a chronicle of decaying infamy in the fallen, corrupt world that is Babylon. Thus, Burton's rhetorical strategies, derived in large part (though not completely) from Augustine, are designed to awaken the reader to the true nature of the world, and the limitations of human

knowledge and human experience. Human will, reason and imagination, senses, emotions and affections have all suffered and been debased by the Fall, and thus humanity cannot trust its own perceptions and reasoning abilities. Much of Burton's *elenchus*, then, is designed to undermine the reader's faith in the reader's own perceptions and understanding, in order to prepare the way for more spiritual and timeless concerns. Thus, following a pattern familiar in Christian literature, and expressed perhaps most clearly and profoundly in Augustine's City of God, Burton takes his world (or perhaps the world of Democritus Jr.) apart, only to reconstruct it on another plane.

Burton seeks to disabuse his readers of imprisoning perceptions through an active demolition of faith in knowledge and the tools of knowledge, especially reason and logic, authority, and the senses. Ironically, the tools Burton uses to undermine this lesser faith in reason, authority and the evidence of observation are reason, authority and the evidence of observation- underpinned, however, by faith, and reinforced with a relentless scepticism towards the world, and the self. His ultimate aim is to cleanse perception and understanding, to move beyond conventional wisdom to the foolishness that is true wisdom. In order to accomplish this undermining of the reader, Burton employs many techniques which have their direct parallel (both in style and substance) in Augustine. Both authors use extensive lists of crimes, follies, wars, brutalities, superstitions and delusions, lists that are exhaustive, anecdotal, and supported by (seemingly) impeccable authority to establish their validity. They both employ irony, sarcasm, ridicule and raillery to "laugh with Democritus" rather than weep with Heraclitus (or lament with Jeremiah). In their rhetorical and apparently anit-intellectual attack upon the world of Babylon, its learning, beliefs, and aspirations, both Burton and Augustine contrast the stupidity, folly and ignorance of the world with the foolishness of Christ.

For Burton and Augustine, God's divine, retributive justice is the primary cause of melancholy, or wretchedness. This punishment, carried out in the expulsion from Eden (an expulsion due to pride and disobedience, and perhaps curiosity), led to the corruption

of human faculties, especially to the corruption of the will. Due to this corruption, human pride and self-centredness inhibit the true spiritual love of God, and this inhibition leads inevitably to melancholy.

Though the disease manifests itself in as grotesque or banal a form as the human imagination may conceive, and though Burton may seem to be fascinated by the variety and vigor of the disease, in his examination both of specific causes and cures of melancholy, he focuses upon the human faculties as the key to unlock melancholy. Following Augustine's lead, Burton demonstrates that humanity's distinctive quality (aside from a lunatic disposition), is not found in reason but rather in the affections. More precisely, our humanity is found in the elevation of will above reason in a higher synthesis of human power. Though the intuitive and affective aspect of human being inherits the negative, disordering qualities of its fallen estate, it also has positive value on the spiritual plane, and serves as a potential (and passive) bridge to the divinity.

Because worldly knowledge is always inconstant, a matter of conjecture ultimately, the intuitive aspect of the mind takes on greater importance for Burton and Augustine, especially as they turn from their criticism of the world and approach their own underlying positive themes. Within the two cities, as we have seen, a series of contrasts are established. The spirit is torn between these two world-views, making life for the pilgrim in the earthly city a restless, never-ceasing struggle to avoid evil and attain to the truth. In this quest, as a consequence of the deep, inward searching for a sense of self and self-knowledge that is central to Augustine's moral themes, knowledge is necessarily abandoned in favour of faith. The most intense examination and questioning leads the restless mind of the Augustinian sceptic to this inescapable conclusion: humanity can never overcome its own fatal flaws and weaknesses - alone. Because of the apparent sharp division between world and God, humanity is seemingly incapable of achieving salvation. The only hope for the Augustinian is the purity of faith, a faith that passively awaits the infusion of Grace from a merciful, rather than a just, divinity.

In this, the affective, intuitive aspect reveals its ultimate importance, for the human quality which best prepares the pilgrim for the heavenly city is love, the highest expression of the affections and of the will - not the love that is generated by pride, but the love of God, of fellow humanity and of self that for Augustine Burton is rooted in humility and compassion - is rooted, in fact, in the symbol and being of Christ. The cure of melancholy, as symbolized by Christ, is not medical or temporal, but rather is spiritual and timeless.

It is in the recovery of Augustine's positive, underlying themes of salvation that Burton abandons his condemnation of the world, moving beyond a quirky, self-indulgent and somewhat cranky iconoclasm, best symbolized by Democritus Jr., towards a redemptive, compassionate and caring vision of humanity. Just as melancholy is the "universal malady", the disease that bridges body and soul, mind and spirit, so Christ is the cure who bridges body and soul, earth and heaven. "I can say no more, or give better advice to such as are always distressed in this kind, than what I have given and said" (Anat., 3.4.2.6., p. 432) concludes Burton, because ultimately, the key to his message is already in the hands of his readers.

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