CONTEMPORARY QUEBEC FEMINISM:
THE INTERRELATION OF POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
IN WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS, TRADE UNIONS, POLITICAL PARTIES

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ABSTRACT.

This study explores the development of francophone women’s movements in Quebec, 1960-1980, in the light of a theoretical framework derived from hegemony theory and feminist theory. In particular, it is concerned to discover how the ideologies of women and the politics of feminism are related to the consolidation of ruling and opposition blocs in three periods, which have been characterised as liberal-modernisation (1960-1976), a crisis of hegemony (1970-1976) and progressive nationalist (1976-1980). The thesis argues that women’s movements are not merely constituted by the social and political conditions in which they develop, but are also constitutive of more general alliances on a political field structured by class, national and gender struggles. Liberal, social Catholic, revolutionary, radical and trade union women’s movements are studied.

The study argues that the development of feminist politics was not, as has been thought, simply backward. Instead, liberal feminist political organizations developed in advance of similar organizations in the rest of Canada. They did so by appropriating elements of the legitimating liberal modernisation ideology and adapting them to support their programmes for improvement in women’s status and for the representation of women in the state, through an advisory Conseil du Statut de la femme. The study also argues that feminist and nationalist aspirations were not merely opposed to one another, as is commonly argued, but that in
the long run, the mobilised political field which grew out of national and trade union struggles, permitted rapid and innovative reform in state policy. Finally, the study points to the ways in which a feminist gender politics, particularly as influenced by trade union feminism, was central to the consolidation of the progressive-nationalist bloc, led by the Parti québécois.
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The responsibility for any remaining errors is mine.
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1.1. Setting the scene.

[T]he sociologist's investigation of our directly experienced world as a problem is a mode of discovering or rediscovering the society from within. She begins with her own original but tacit knowledge and from within the acts by which she brings it into her grasp in making it observable and in understanding how it works [Smith 1974: 11-12].

Because it was in the confrontation between a set of expectations based on "tacit knowledge" and a first hand encounter of actual Quebec politics in the early 1970s, that the questions which led to the present enquiry were generated, recalling one dramatic episode I witnessed may help to set the scene.

It was in early September 1973 in Montreal, a week after a coup had toppled the democratically elected, socialist president of Chile, Salvador Allende. Michel Chartrand, the president of the Montreal Conseil central of the Confédération des Syndicats nationaux (CSN), addressed a union-sponsored rally which half filled the Forum, home of the Montreal Canadiens [1]. In Quebec, he declared, the workers' defence of the revolution would be armed. This statement was greeted with tumultuous applause and thundering chants. Through the clouds of tobacco perfumed smoke typical of political meetings in Quebec, rows of yellow, green,
red and white hard hats sporting union logos were visible all around the arena, and everywhere right hands were raised in clenched fists and left hands were clutching large plastic cups of Cinquante [2].

To a socialist-feminist just off the train from Ontario, this looked like, if not the revolution, then at least a sign of a degree of popular radicalization scarcely matched anywhere else in North America, certainly within the white working class. Such widespread radicalism and militancy, moreover, might have led an observer to expect that the women's liberation movement, which had become an integral part of left-wing politics in the rest of Canada and in the USA, would be at least as well established here. Knowledge of its spectacular Quebec debut (in a 1969 civil disobedience action when 165 women, many wearing red head-scarves, were arrested) had earlier filtered along the faulty networks of communication that brought news of Quebec political events to anglophone radicals. But, despite the fact that several issues of Québécoises Deboutte!, a feminist journal whose revolutionary nationalist and socialist rhetoric easily equalled that of Chartrand, had been published by women working out of the Centre des femmes in the Saint-Denis student quarter, there did not seem to be much of a women's movement at all. The Centre was almost always closed, Québécoises Deboutte! did not appear regularly, and there was no large scale autonomous women's liberation group of the sort that met in Toronto, Vancouver, New
York, Chicago and too many other cities to mention. Only one of the several small revolutionary groups that published newspapers, ran bookstores and organized demonstrations and, they hoped, the working class advocated an autonomous women's liberation movement and even it, the Trotskyist Groupe Marxiste Révolutionnaire, did not believe that there was a social base for such a development in Quebec [Taupe Rouge 1:1 Sept. 1973; GMR 1974c].

However, by the end of the United Nations-declared International Women's Year, (1975) scarcely two years later, feminist politics seemed to have undergone a complete change. Several single and multi-issue groups had been established; Les Têtes de Ploche, a new newspaper with a radical feminist perspective, was publishing regularly; the Conseil du statut de la femme (CSF, a government advisory body) had organized large regional and province wide meetings to apprise itself of women's demands; and the union centrals had begun seriously considering how to incorporate a whole panoply of feminist demands into their policies and practices.

In trying to account for these developments two sets of sociological problems arise. First, why was the women's liberation movement so relatively weak among francophone women in Quebec in the early 1970s, and how could such "backwardness" be squared with the relatively high degree of general political mobilization? Second, why did francophone feminism develop so quickly after its late beginning, and why was the labour
movement, contrary to one current of sociological argument [Marchak 1973; Baker and Robeson 1981], so open to relatively radical versions of feminism once the issue was raised? The answers to these questions could not be sought in a sectoral internal history of the women's movement, but only in terms of understanding the interplay of gender, class and national politics at a macrosocial level. Pitching the analysis at the level of the political field as a whole, it became clear, also required an analysis of the ideological and legislative contributions of political parties in shaping these politics.

1.2. The development of the women's movement: the state of existing theory.

The normal process of sociological research is to begin with a review of the literature for existing theory and methodology. Several problems, not the least of which is the paucity of the literature itself, confront the sociologist interested in the contemporary [3] Quebec women's movements who would follow this well established path. A review of Yolande Cohen's [1983] survey of Quebec masters' and doctoral theses on women shows that research inspired by the revival of feminism has tended to be concentrated on issues like employment or domestic labour, rather than on the contemporary women's movement itself [4]. The work of Martine Lanctôt [1981] and Joan MacKenzie [1983] on women's movements in Montreal 1969-1979 and that of Diane Lamoureux
[1983], which investigates feminism and nationalism, are exceptions [5].


First, a great deal of the early published material is conceptually circumscribed by the activism which inspired it. Pioneering work was written with a dual aim: to situate a particular branch or branches of the movement, and at the same time to justify its claims and, indeed, its very existence. While they reported on early organizational developments of the new women's movement, the theoretical problem which preoccupied such authors as Shulamith Firestone [1969], Juliet Mitchell [1971], Marlene Dixon [1971/2] and Barbara Deckard [1975] was how to sort out the general historical and structural determinants of women's subordinated status. This approach, whether in refined or crude versions, implicitly conveyed a notion that the rise of the women's movement could be accounted for in terms of the "oppression" to which it responded. The strategic interests motivating such accounts were made starkly explicit in Gayle Rubin's statement [1975: 57-58]:

If innate male aggression and dominance are at the root of female oppression, then the feminist program would logically require the extermination of the offending sex, or else a eugenic project to modify its character. If sexism is a byproduct of capitalism's
relentless appetite for profit, the sexism would wither away in the advent of a successful socialist revolution. If the world historic defeat of women occurred at the hands of an armed patriarchal revolt, then it is time for amazon guerillas to start training in the Adirondacks.

More academically motivated [8] studies of the emergence of recent feminism have tended to focus on its consciousness, its internal dynamics, or its organizational history at the expense of its overall political context. Even though they are, without exception, American such studies provide rich detail on the movement's organizational structure and history and also insights into its social composition, symbolic forms and organizational life. Also, some of the explanatory frameworks adopted are quite fruitful for understanding particular aspects of feminist mobilization. For example, Maren Lockwood Carden [1974] shows that the socialization practice of consciousness raising tended to have a similar effect on participants in both women's liberation and women's rights organizations, despite the different personal motivations and prior ideological commitments that women brought to these groups. Joan Cassell [1977] accounts for some of the internal organizational forms of the women's liberation movement in terms of the social psychology of group formation on the one hand and the familial locus and public marginality of women on the other. Drawing on the collective action perspective advanced by Charles Tilly and his associates [1975; 1978], Sarah Evans [1980] points to the importance of understanding not only consciousness but the resources developed
In prior organizing.

In one of the most sociologically well-worked studies, Jo Freeman [1975: 7-10] suggests that the initial phases of feminism be analysed in terms of the inherited values and norms of the originators, internal group dynamics and environmental influences. In addition she argues that the concept of relative deprivation, is "complex" and adequate to analyse "psychological as well as objective conditions". Relative deprivation explains not only how individuals move from passive acceptance to action but also the class character of the movement, i.e. why "the first and second waves of the women's movement were largely led by and based in the white middle class, and in particular women in the professions" [Ibid. 17].

Freeman relies on the definition of relative deprivation advanced by Ted Robert Gurr [1970: 13], for whom it is

a perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people think they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining given the social means available to them.

Simply put, there is a gap between what people have and what they think they should have in terms of comparisons they make with a reference group [9]. But, while such an awareness is doubtless a necessary precondition for action, the concept's explanatory
power is limited by its psychologism and individualism. Relative deprivation does not, as Freeman claims, analyse objective and structural factors; it only references them as mediated by the perception of actors.

Leaving aside the fact that Freeman's account ignores the phenomenon of working class feminism [10], there are three other problems with her approach which means that it cannot analyse the combination of delayed and rapid development in the Quebec case. First, because the notion of environment is inadequately explained, it cannot direct sufficient attention to intervening variables. Like the movement writers, she moves from a description of the social characteristics of women, and women alone, to a description of consciousness and organization. This approach does not give sufficient weight to global structural or political conditions. Second, the reactive character of the psychological motivations it ascribes to individuals occludes a dimension of (rational) choice on the part of actors for, as we shall see, women participants in the student and left movements subscribed to a view that they were (likely to be) "relatively deprived" long before they acted politically on this notion. In understanding the delayed development of women's liberation groups it is necessary to understand why and under what conditions, women's issues become politically salient [11]. Finally, it cannot account for the normalization of feminist politics as part of the official discourse of the state which
occurred particularly after the election of the Parti québécois (PQ) in 1976 [12]. This process of state reform raises the question of "recuperation" (récupération), or the way in which the ideology of a radical movement, is as it were co-opted by, integrated into or made consistent with the needs of the (conservative) reproduction of the existing social order [13].

The underspecification of key factors like environment and resources for mobilization is corrected to some degree in the collective action approach developed by Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly and Richard Tilly. They argue that analysing social movements in terms of "the social base, the organizational form, the prior claims and grievances, the present mobilization of the actors provides a major part of the explanation of their actions" [Tilly, Tilly and Tilly 1975: 273-274]. In developing a typology of collective action, Charles Tilly [1978] refines this framework by stressing external factors which generate cleavage and internal factors which promote solidarity, including the resources available to a movement. He identifies five dimensions: interests, organization, mobilization, collective action and opportunity. However, the emphasis on form over content in this approach tends to minimize the role of ideological and cultural factors, a particular problem in relation to a feminist struggle that sought ideological and cultural change. In addition, the categories of political analysis they employed are also underdeveloped, particularly with
regard to the structures of power and integration in advanced capitalist states. Finally, they have not theorized a place for sexual or gender politics within the neo-marxist orientation they adopt.

However sociologically sophisticated, the common conceptual limitation of all these studies is that they implicitly or explicitly abstract the development of the women's movement from the overall constitution and development of the global political situation in which the movement emerged. Moreover, the women's movement is seen as determined, rather than also as a determining element within societal political dynamics. Where, for example, the impact of the women's movement on the state is considered, its effect is evaluated sectorally in terms of policy on women's issues, as if gender politics were not part of ideological legitimations and other overarching political processes including the economic class struggle and the mainstream of party politics [Freeman 1975: 170-229]. Thus, although they offer some promising leads—in terms of stressing the early phases of movement formation, taking group psychological dynamics into account and stressing the importance of resources for movement formation—in the end they fail to offer a theoretical framework adequate to explain the differentia specifica of the Quebec case.

In the Quebec case, the crucial relationship of feminism and nationalism has received a good deal of attention but a similar abstractness has prevailed. Adopting a perspective that opposes
these two ideologies and politics and, furthermore, sees nationalism as dominant, several historical and contemporary studies have argued that nationalist ideologies and politics have served simply to reproduce women's subordination or block the development of feminism [Trofimenkoff 1977; 1975: 81-82; Lanctôt 1981; Lamoureux 1983, 1987]. On an empirical plane, these studies do help account for the delay in the emergence of contemporary feminism but do not offer an adequate explanation of its explosiveness. They fail to consider the ways in which gender politics and women's movements are not merely constituted by other components in the political arena, but themselves help to constitute both sectoral (nationalist) politics and the political arena as a whole. Nationalism is not an essence and its ideological character is not fixed; for example, in the case of Finland, the movements for national independence and women's rights cooperated to develop a programme for and an ideology of an independent national state in which women would be citizens [Juusola-Halonen 1982: 454-5; Porter 1980: 78].

To grasp the specificities of the development of the women's movement we must reach for a theory of gender politics which sees that politics as both determined and determinant and which is able to situate the women's movement within the social, ideological and political structures and processes of modern Quebec society as a whole. The problem is that a conceptual framework for doing this can hardly be said to exist. For, those
forms of macrosociology most interested in developing an overall understanding of the conflictual political dynamic of advanced capitalist society (i.e., "western marxism" [Anderson 1976] and its contemporary offshoots) have stressed class as the main source of social cleavage and, while they may have taken notice of "the family" as a site of social integration, have not theorized gender [Barrett 1980: 188-226; Vogel 1983; Sargeant 1981].

Because the study uses the terms feminism and nationalism throughout and although these terms are continually (re)defined in context, it is perhaps useful to have some working definitions of these key categories at this point.

There is considerable debate about what feminism is. Most generally, this term can be taken to refer to a political ideology that promotes the advancement of women [Banks 1981: 3; Dubois et al. 1980; Delmar 1986: 9-14; Mitchell and Oakley 1986]. In this study, unless further specified, feminism refers to a perspective that understands that there is, in some sense, inequity in gender relations, and acts to make women more self-determining. More specific variants of feminism are identified by the use of a modifier; thus, liberal, social Catholic, revolutionary, radical, lesbian and trade union feminism are terms that appear and are more fully defined in Chapters 5-9 below [14]. Social Catholic feminism is a term that I use to identify the ideology of the Association féminine.
d'éducation et d'action sociale (AFEAS), which combines elements of liberal politics with organicist Catholic social philosophy. What is called "revolutionary feminism" in this study, combines elements of marxist-feminist analysis with a nationalist, anti-colonialist perspective [Dhavernas 1981; Lamoureux 1987]. Although lesbian feminism is extremely theoretically heterogenous, it tends to emphasize the oppressive character of heterosexism [Rich 1980; Myron and Bunch 1975; Wier 1987]. Finally, in order to draw attention to the distinction between feminist groups and groups of women organized in order to promote women's interests without reforming gender relations, the latter have been called "feminine" organizations.

Nationalism as an ideology emphasizes the importance of social collectivities with common cultural, geographical, linguistic, historical and sometimes economic and religious characteristics that develop social cohesion and are usually associated with particular nation states. Léon Dion [1975: 16] defines nationalist ideology as:

l'ensemble des représentations faites par référence à une collectivité spécifique particulière, appelée peuple ou nation, définie par un amalgame de traits incluant, entre autres mais sans qu'aucun d'entre eux en particulier ne soit suffisant ni nécessaire, une origine, une histoire, un territoire, une culture, des institutions et une langue communs aux membres de cette collectivité, témoignant du sens d'une solidarité d'appartenance et de destin souvent en face d'autres collectivités jugées étrangères ou ennemies ainsi que par des projects concernant l'organisation de la vie culturelle, économique et politique jugés convenir à
In cases where self-identified social groups exist but lack an independent state, the political project of nationalism is usually an autonomous state. This was the case in Quebec, whose ideological and political history has been marked by various forms of nationalism [15].

1.3. Aims of the study.

In the light of these considerations, the aims of this study are twofold. First, to provide an adequate sociological account of the development of the Quebec women's movement 1960-1980; that is, from the beginning of the period of political, cultural and social reform known as the Quiet Revolution [4.1. below] to the defeat of a referendum called by the PQ government on "sovereignty-association" in May 1980, with specific attention to that movement's distinguishing forms and rhythms of development [16]. Secondly, through the analysis of this particular example to make a contribution towards the development of more general theory concerning the constitution and, in turn, the constitutive role of gender politics in the complex social totalities of modern state societies.

With respect to these aims, I should make two preliminary remarks.

First, the empirical and conceptual aims of the study are linked and indeed seen as interdependent. It is neither
necessary nor possible to review here the whole history of the debate in sociology over the relation between empirical enquiry and the development of theory. Within historical sociology, the classic statements of position are to be found in the debates that raged within the German Geisteswissenschaf\(\text{ten}\) at the turn of the century, flowing from discussions between competing brands of neo-Kantianism concerning the status and methodology of science [17]. The writings of German cultural theorists, Hawthorne argues [ibid. 144], had posed the question of the relation between social and natural science in terms of a distinction between ideographic and nomothetic forms of theorising. Insofar as they concerned the actions and consciousness of human subjects, the social sciences came to be defined from this perspective as interpretive, not amenable to either a mechanical cause/effect type of analysis or to a logico-deductive form of theory construction. The methodological problem was, rather, the development of an empirically grounded framework of analysis adequate to make history, culture and human institutions intelligible. The explanatory aim of inquiry was to understand the unique configurations of intentions and actions traced through the historical life of actual societies.

However, within the cultural sciences, so defined as historical, interpretative and ideographic, there was also an attempt to introduce a formal and objectivist approach to social and historical causation and to integrate its categories back
into concrete socio-historical analysis. Thus, the work of Max Weber, as the most important exemplar of this synthetic approach in classical sociology, consisted, on the one hand, of extremely detailed historical reconstructions of law, religion, economic organization and bureaucracy and, on the other hand, of an almost encyclopedic attempt to fix the formal abstract meaning of the categories which those studies sought to employ [18]. Weber’s way out of the ideographic/nomothetic dichotomy has, however, proved more useful to middle range than fully macrosociological theory because of his anti-holistic insistence on the centrality and irreducibility of individual action [Weber 1947: 112-123].

If the dialectic of concrete and abstract in Weber tends to freeze into an uneasy dichotomy, the marxist tradition, because of its ties to Hegelianism and greater practical interest in deciphering social totalities, has more forthrightly conceived of ideographic and nomothetic theorizing as interdependent and mutually determined aspects of the same social scientific enterprise. For Marx, concrete analysis with its multiplicity of grasped determinations is the end point of theory and concepts, correspondingly, the necessary starting point for systematic social inquiry. Perhaps the clearest statement of Marx’s mature methodological position is to be found in the Grundrisse. There, within the field of political economy, Marx polemically contrasts what today might be called an empiricist approach to theory formation with his own.
It seems to be correct to begin with the real and the concrete, thus to begin, in economics, with e.g. the population, which is the foundation and the subject of the entire social act of production. However, on closer examination this proves false. The population is an abstraction if I leave out, for example, the classes of which it is composed. These classes in turn are an empty phrase if I am not familiar with the elements on which they rest....Thus, if I were to begin with the population, this would be a chaotic conception (Vorstellung) of the whole, and I would then, by means of further determination move analytically towards ever thinner abstractions until I had arrived at the simplest determinations. From there the journey would have to be retraced until I had finally arrived at the population again, but as a rich totality of many determinations and relations. The former is the path historically followed by economics at the time of its origins....The latter is obviously the scientifically correct method. The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse [Marx 1858: 100-101].

There is, it should be said, a certain ambiguity in this passage. For, if Marx extols as "scientific" the movement from the abstract to the concrete, he also implies that there could be no science without (inductivist) pre-science and that rigorous concepts are themselves the outcome of empirical inquiries into confusedly grasped totalities and problem areas. Indeed, once we adopt the less self-certain and more pragmatist perspective that twentieth century philosophy of science brings to bear on such issues [19], we cease conceiving of scientific truth in absolute terms and recognize that systematic understanding of the objective world in practice advances (if at all) through a process of successive approximation in which the two forms of inquiry Marx identifies mutually interact. Theory and empirical
analysis, in sum, should be seen as developing in tandem with one another [20]. Such at least is the perspective adopted here [21].

Thus, in order to develop an analysis of the concrete determinations at play in the development of women's movements and gender politics in Quebec it is necessary to reconstruct empirical evidence in terms of a general theory of gender politics. However, because there is no adequate theory of gender politics, the development of the categories requires reflection on actual historical instances. And, their further refinement depends also on further studies of the kind attempted here.

Of course, and this is the second methodological point, it is beyond the scope of this study to offer more than a preliminary and selective totalization. Even if current theory were more developed it would be a dauntingly mammoth task to detail all the concrete determinations of gender politics and women's movements as constituting and constituted by even so relatively small and (semi-)autonomous a social formation as modern Quebec [22]. The study focusses primarily on the interrelation of organized collective political actors, that is, parties, unions, caucuses, lobby groups, oppositional movements, state agencies as they ideologically and programmatically address gender relations and women's issues, with the overall aim of trying to grasp the place of gender politics in the construction, maintenance and contradictory exercise of social hegemony [23]. While the study is particularly concerned with the political and ideological, it
assumes that in order to understand these social developments it is necessary to situate them in relation to the social and material configurations of gender. Continuities and changes in the social position of women (and men) in education, the labour force, marriage, fertility, unionization and occupation of positions of power are taken to be important indices of such relations.

For the sake of defining an area that can be researched in the scope of a doctoral dissertation, however, without denying their importance to a complete analysis, several elements of gender and gender politics will be left out of account. The study will not deal with gender identity as a psychological base for gender ideology or with psychocultural dimensions more generally [24]. Neither will it consider the practices of Important secondary ideological institutions (schools [Fahmy-Eld and Dumont 1983], church [Danylewycz 1981; Dumont-Johnson 1978; Juteau Lee 1980] and mass media [Fahmy-Eld 1981; Fahmy-Eld and Dumont 1984]) or internal family dynamics. Moreover, the positions of collective political actors are generally taken to be represented in the official ideologies and programmes of organizations and the statements of their leadership; with some slight exception, I have not attempted to evaluate the impact of these positions on practices and attitudes on their members, whether in on-the-job relations, contracts or behaviour in meetings. Finally, the study limits its examination of the process of policy formation
at the level of the state ignoring, for example, the internal operations of state bureaucracy as an ongoing determinant of social policy formation and important issues like state funding of child care.

1.4. Methods of research and empirical sources.

Leaving a fuller discussion of the theoretical categories employed to Chapters 2 and 3, let us now turn to the methods and sources of empirical research. Overall, the research strategy adopted was inspired by Norman Denzin's [1970: 471-3] discussion of "triangulation" between methods, i.e., the use of more than one research method and data source. Combining research methods and sources of data, he argues, allows the investigator to draw on the special strengths of each and to run internal checks on data and interpretation [25].

The empirical data, then, was drawn from three separate kinds of sources: documentary research, interviews and direct observation. Let me take these in reverse order, moving from the least to the most formal.

1.4.1. Observation.

Drawing on an existing critical tradition, feminist social scientists have called into question the conventional empiricist division between the researcher, a non-subjective subject whose experience is denied, and those researched [26]. This
subject/object split, they argue, "objectifies" both its terms. And, as Dorothy Smith [1974; 1975] and Marla Mies [1983: 126] have contended, it also smacks of an elitism contradictory to feminist values. Instead, a more interactive research process has been called for, one which recognizes that the researcher is part of the research process and that knowledge is created and criticized in complex ways, including on the basis of the experience.

For example, Mary Parlee [1970: 130] finds that: "One hallmark of the feminist research in any field seems to be the investigator's continual testing of the plausibility of the work against her own experience". Examining the relationship between feminist method and the experiential analysis she had early called for [Reinharz 1979], Shulamith Reinharz [1983: 167] points out that new definitions of experience see it as "interesting (not arbitrary), effective (in the sense that our ideas shape our world and are not simply shaped by it), uniquely human and contextual" [27].

All this is preliminary to talking about what, from the perspective of the present, turns out to have been a prolonged "entry into the field" and a first, informal phase of "data collection" for this study [28]. Although to include this material is not conventional, it would be partial, and therefore false in terms of the precepts described above, to leave it out. As mentioned in 1.1. above, I arrived in Montreal in September
1973, with the intention of living in a city/province/culture that had fascinated me on earlier forays. In my conceptual baggage I brought not merely feminism but a sympathy to some aspects of Quebec nationalism, to community activism and to the trade union movement, all arising from encounters in which I both observed and participated [29].

My experience in Montreal was, of course, shaped by the people I knew and the activities I participated in. Among the francophones there was a variety of students, intellectual workers, public sector workers and the permanently unemployed. Among the anglophones, there was a similar mix, with the addition of women who were first of all feminists [30].

In this context, I was an "observing participant", who engaged in group discussions, took notes, wrote papers and set up committees, all with a view to convincing those I worked with that feminism was practically strategic. My activities are to be distinguished from the classic sociological method of "participant observation", with its formalized protocols and inert relation to the milieu [Whyte 1955: 379ff]. The goal here was to understand social relationships in order to change them. Still, the knowledge generated from this process, although interesting and needing to be confirmed, cannot simply be disqualified [31]. As Mies [1983: 125], following Marx and Freire, points out:
Participation in social actions and struggles, and the integration of research into these processes...implies that the change of the status quo becomes the starting point for a scientific quest. The motto for this approach could be: "if you want to know a thing, you must change it"[32].

These forms of engaged observation were supplemented by more formal participant observation undertaken, later on, as part of my research. In March 1979, I attended public and private events in Montreal celebrating International Women's Day (IWD, Journée Internationale de la femme) including a demonstration, workshops, theatrical performances, associated with a fair where groups engaged in women's issues -- from unions to a rape crisis centre, immigrant organizations to feminist publishers -- had booths. Here I collected documentation, took notes on group discussions of housework and abortion action, and spoke informally with participants [33]. In this period, I also read some of the work on field work, oral history and interviewing techniques and decided that semi-structured interviews with key informants were appropriate for the kind of work I was planning to do [Thompson 1975; Shaffir et al. 1980].

During the period of my research in Quebec from May 1980 to the end of December 1981, I continued this kind of participant observation. In May 1980, I participated in an IWD week-end conference held in the town of Ste-Anne-des-Monts in the Gaspe region [34]. Over 100 women attended, including members of a women's centre planning group from Matane, the L'Association
féminine d’éducation et d’action sociale [5.4. below], the
Fédération des femmes du Québec (FFQ) [5.3. below] and other
women’s groups [35] as well as individuals. As well as workshops
on special topics ranging from self-defense to crafts, informal
social activities including a "souper communautaire" were
organized. During this conference, I carried out "conversational
interviews" [36] with one member from each of the FFQ, AFEAS, Les
Fermières, Filles d’Isabelle and the Matane feminist group.
These discussions touched on social definitions of women’s role,
ownen’s attitudes towards feminism and nationalism and the
ideologies, activities and structures of women’s groups. I
rapidly discovered that the women I talked to wanted to know who
I was. When I described myself accurately as a feminist and a
student, currently preparing a thesis in sociology about women’s
movements in Quebec and with a long term comparative interest in
women’s movements, they willingly shared their knowledge and
views. At the same time they also expected any discussion to
operate with a feminist ethic of reciprocity and egalitarianism.

This insistence on refusing the "interviewee" role, which I
later found substantiated in the feminist literature on
interviewing [Oakley 1979; Roberts 1981; Mies 1983] had two
consequences for the work. First, I abandoned as futile the
"objectivity" and a manipulative "rapport" on the interviewer’s
part are combined [37]. Rather, feminist values coincided with an
Instrumental rationale to suggest that good information was more likely to be produced in a situation where I too would answer questions. Secondly, it confirmed my intuition that better information would arise if I allowed the interview to follow its own logic. Thus, for later semi-structured interviews, I prepared a list of questions that I wanted answered, but let the discussion unfold, probing for clarification and checking off the topics as they were covered. To assure completeness, first, I returned at the end of the interview to any questions on my list that had not been checked off and then, asked the person I was interviewing if there was anything else that she thought that I should know. Sometimes, this led to further talk lasting from 10 minutes to over an hour.

During this period, I also attended a number of feminist events including: a week-end 1980 conference organized by the Comité de lutte pour l'avortement et la contraception libres et gratuits (CL) [6.3. below], several readings and theatrical performances, 1980 and 1981 IWD activities in Montreal and informal group discussions. While some of these, for example the cultural activities, are outside the scope of this study, others like the abortion conference provided important insights on, for example, the issue of recuperation. All of these activities served both to introduce me to a wider range of individuals and as the kind of cultural immersion -- in Quebec society and its feminist subculture -- that anthropologists insist is necessary to
understand any society [38]).

1.4.2. Interviews.

In addition to the conversational interviews described above, semi-structured ones were also conducted with selected key informants [39]. These latter were organised in two stages. First, as I finished the documentary research on the major organizations, I spoke with at least one woman from that group. In some cases interviews were sought with another such informant during the writing up stage. Altogether there were 23 interviews of this type, each lasting from two to four hours.

In setting up the interviews, I phoned each woman, briefly identified myself and my project and asked for an appointment using French or English depending on how she answered the phone [40]. As a result, all of the interviews with francophone women were held in French, those with anglophone women in English, and one freewheeling session (with a bilingual francophone) that lasted close to four hours switched from one to the other, sometimes in the middle of a sentence. I strongly feel that the quality of the data was improved by this tactic, not only in the obvious case of unilingual francophones [e.g. Interview: Q] or untranslatable concepts, but also because many of the bilingual women were more at ease discussing their experiences in the language in which they had occurred, their mother tongue [e.g. Interview: F]. In addition, given the political tensions of
language in Quebec [Coleman 1980], my use of the interviewee’s language helped establish a basis of trust. Citations from interviews are in the original language.

We met in cafes, offices, and occasionally in the home of the person I contacted [41]. At the interview, I briefly explained my project again and asked if there was anything that she wanted to ask me at this stage. Often women did have questions, out of curiosity or out of a desire to vet me politically [42]. Most of the women agreed to allow the interview to be tape-recorded. I offered to keep the interviews anonymous, and several preferred to be unidentified. As a result, in Appendix B, I have listed all of the women I talked to pseudonymously, identified only by organization [43].

Finally, further conversational interviews which conform more closely to Kanter’s [1977: 296] model and of which 10 are listed in Appendix B were conducted with, for example, librarians (documentalistes) in unions and women’s organizations.

1.4.3. Documentary study.

As useful, though, as all the foregoing observation and interviewing proved to be, the most important evidential source for this study is documentary. Because it examines the ideology and bloc position of women’s organizations, political parties and labour and nationalist movements in relation to state practices, it was necessary to examine each of these elements individually
In order to understand the relationships among them. Historically, organizational ideology and policy are condensed and preserved in documents.

The procedure followed was to read, first, the published documents of women's organizations. I looked first at what I call, below, organizations of the ideological break [Chapters 5, 6 below], i.e., revolutionary and radical feminisms, including the *Front de libération des femmes* (FLF) the *Centre des femmes* and its offshoots, *Les Têtes de Ploche*, *Pluri-elles* and *Des luttes et des rires de femmes* [44]. At this stage, categories arising from the central issues discussed were established as a frame for further analysis. These included: labour force participation, domestic labour [45], sexuality and sexual orientation, the politics of biological reproduction (including contraception, abortion, pronatalism, birthing), the "family", definitions of gender, language, strategy (definitions of state, analysis of political parties, identification of allies and the role of women's movements), and the nation. Rather than follow organizational and Ideological developments in historical order, I began at the point of the widest elaboration of feminist ideology. This procedure allowed the development of a more complete framework within which to read the absences discernable in other currents' positions.

In turn, this schema was used for the analysis of the Ideology of other organizations, whether feminist or not. Where necessary
It was expanded. In the case of liberal feminist organizations, for example, it had to be expanded to include individual women's fulfillment or "épanouissement". Liberal feminist organizations surveyed included the FFQ, AFEAS and its predecessors and RAIF (Réseau d'action et d'information pour les femmes), which was included in this category because of its strong lobbying orientation, although its ideological starting points transcend early liberal formulations.

In order to situate gender politics as part of a wider political field, which includes class and nationalist politics, Le Devoir, a paper of record, was read for its presentation of gender ideologies, as well as for reports on class and national issues for the whole period, 1960-1980. In addition, Parti libéral du Québec (PLQ) and Parti québécois election platforms and statements reported and other documents concerning women for the period were examined [46]. Finally, other journals representing particular ideological tendencies—from the Catholic publications Relations and Maintenant, through the liberal reformist Cité Libre [47] to the nationalist or revolutionary Parti Pris, Socialisme Québécois, Mobilisation and La Taupe Rouge, journals of left wing currents, were analysed both for political and gender ideologies.

For the labour centrals, the study surveyed all the minutes and special reports prepared for conventions for the Confédération des syndicats nationaux (CSN), Centrale d'enseignement du Québec
(CEQ) and Fédération des travailleurs du Québec (FTQ). In addition, special documents on women, and other occasional publications were considered where appropriate [48]. Although the Centrale des syndicats démocratiques, whose founding is discussed below in Chapters 4 and 8 organised about 62,000 women in 1982 [Paré 1983: 138], it was not considered because it had not adopted or acted upon feminist positions.

Sources for the state sector were equally diverse. From 1964, the Débats de l'Assemblée nationale recorded parliamentary debate, with parliamentary committees added in 1970. For the early 1960s, reports of the Commission de révision du Code civil (CRCC) dealing with family law, were the best source. In addition, ministries published occasional research reports. From its founding in 1973, the CSF turned its attention to gender inequities in law and administrative practice; its documents were a useful source of information. It also produced occasional studies available as photocopies, published research documents and a series of informational pamphlets, as well as a newsletter [CSF Bulletin, which became in May 1979 La Gazette des Femmes] [49].

In sum, complementary information that permitted internal verification as well as different kinds of knowledge was derived from the three research methods. Observation, both more and less formal, provided basic (sub-)cultural access necessary to understanding the milieu to be analysed. Documentary analysis
provided access to an historical record, unaffected by the changing perceptions of participants. On the other hand, interviews made available background and other information that was excluded from the written record.

1.5. Order of presentation.

Overall, then, this study undertakes to examine the development of women's movements in Quebec between 1960 and 1980 both sectorally and as part of a total political field. Key to the way in which this field was constituted and changed were a state modernisation process associated with the Quiet Revolution, a process of class polarization, working class radicalization and a nationalist upsurge that came to a head in the 1970s, all of which affected the way the ruling political alliance in Quebec was structured and maintained. What, the study asks, was the impact of these developments on the formation and dynamic of women's movements? And what part, conversely, did the dramatic evolution of gender politics, betokened by the rise of the women's movement, itself play in them?

An answer is sought by tracing and comparing the gender ideologies and polices of women's organizations, trade unions, nationalist movements and political parties. From such an examination it will become clear both that gender politics in these different political sectors emerged in their own ways at different times and that the ideologies promoted by feminists of
various sorts eventually penetrated the general political
discourse of unions, nationalists and others over time. What
will also emerge is that feminist gender radicalization and other
politics existed in a relation of tension. If feminist policies
came to be integrated into the state this was both as a result of
feminist agitation and because—with some adaptation and
deflection of aim—these dovetailed with other policy objectives
of governing and opposition parties.

By looking at both sides of this process, in a way that takes
feminism's influence seriously but without exaggerating its
unity, autonomy and power, the question of the Quebec women's
movement's historical specificity, alluded to above [1.1.] can be
more systematically posed. As well, it is hoped, such
historically concrete examination might shed a more general light
on the place and dynamic of gender politics in contemporary
capitalist societies.

Chapters 2 and 3 try to establish the general categories of a
theory which can integrate gender politics into an analysis of
hegemony. Chapter 4 goes on to suggest a preliminary framework
for analysing, more specifically, the relation of gender and bloc
politics in Quebec, 1960-1980. Chapter 5 examines the way in
which gender politics was constituted in Quebec during the phase
of liberal hegemony and modernisation and the way in which
reformist feminist gender politics began to radicalize. Chapters
6 and 7 examine the forms and causes of the ideological break
represented by the emergence of a radical and autonomous feminism after 1968. Chapter 8 examines gender politics in the trade unions. Chapter 9 looks at the way gender political issues were expressed ideologically and legislatively at the level of the state. The study concludes by reconsidering the original, theoretical and historical problems posed concerning the relation of feminist gender politics and political hegemony, and suggests directions for further research and reflection.

2.1. Introduction.

To grasp the place of gender politics within an entire society requires, as I have already suggested, the development of better sociological theory than we have, particularly at the macrosocial level. Despite its foundational connection with a political project of ending women's subordination and despite the way in which its categories are saturated with notions of power and politics, feminist theory itself has not been able to adequately theorize the state or politics even for its own strategic purposes [Findlay 1981; Barrett 1980: 227-228]. In what Mary O'Brien [1981: 6] calls "malestream" theory, perhaps the most promising approach is offered by the "neo-Gramscian" [Hall 1977] school of Louis Althusser, Nicos Poulantzas, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, concerned as it is to develop a non-mechanistic and a non-class reductionist theory of ideology and politics in capitalist social formations.

As O'Brien [1974: 87] put it with reference to hegemony theory:

Thus, neo-marxism which marginalizes women but does not obliterate them, may hold heuristic and analytic possibilities which its current androcentrism conceals. For example, it may permit a deeper understanding of the relation of patriarchy and that complex abstraction which we call the state.

Beside the virtue of this school's attempt to steer marxism away
from the kind of class reductionism that negates the significance of gender, it provides a conception of politics that at once is focused on conflict and its dynamics and recognizes that a multiplicity of determinations are always at work. However, in their received form these theories are sadly underdeveloped with respect to the categories of gender structures and politics, an underdevelopment that feminism has not yet really addressed.

In this light, the main aim of this and the following chapter is to suggest how feminist theory and hegemony theory can be critically amalgamated so as to provide a framework for the analysis of gender politics in the public realm, both as a specific dimension of political practice and in relation to other, for example, class and national politics and ideology. To this end I first review relevant aspects of Marx's theory of ideology as an entry point for considering the Gramscian tradition. Chapter 3 then explores feminism's own attempts to develop political theory and suggests ways in which hegemony theory can be developed and appropriated so as to provide the basis for the political theory feminism seeks. I conclude by offering some general theses considering hegemony and gender politics and by indicating how the synthetic framework sketched out can be operationalised in terms of an enquiry into the development and place of the women's movement in the shifting bloc politics of Quebec between 1960 and 1980.
2.2. Marx on ideology and class rule.

While there is no mention or direct counterpart of the subsequently developed Gramscian term hegemony in Marx's own work, hegemony theory descends from his rich but unsystematized insights concerning the superstructure and the non-economic aspects of class domination. It should be said at once that his formative theoretical writings focus rather more on the thematic of ideology than on the state. In part, this bias reflects the fact that his primary theoretical objective -- to develop a theory of society starting from the material conditions and historical production of social life -- was conducted in the context of a running polemic against the consciousness-centered theories of history and society prevailing in German intellectual circles at the time [Marcuse 1954: 3-16]. It is for this reason too that Marx's reflections in this area, unfortunately, often combine sociological arguments about the material determinants and political function of various belief systems with epistemological arguments about their character and status as knowledge (or mystification) in a way that is problematic for sociological appropriation [2].

Marx's problematic can be summarized in the following points:

1. consciousness and social life cannot be understood apart from one another. "Thought and being are indeed distinct but they also form a unity" [Marx 1844: 138];

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2. Within this unity, the structure and conditions of social life are the determining element.

The sum total of these relations of production constitute the economic structure of society—the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness [Marx 1857: 11];

3. The ideas that predominate in a society are normally the (self-justifying) ideas of those who dominate economically and socially.

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class, which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class, which has the means of production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore the ideas of its dominance [Marx and Engels 1845/1846: 39];

4. Notwithstanding the primacy of the economic in the formation of consciousness, social relations of class domination and the
normal prevalence of ruling class ideas, ideas play a decisive role in class conflict and in the transition from one mode of production to another [3].

With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations the distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic -- in short ideological forms -- in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out [Marx 1859: 12];

5. the consciousness which arises spontaneously out of social life as a result of practico-social conditions or which reflects the interest and perspective of the dominant class (including its internalization by the dominated class or classes) is in some sense "false", partial and mystified. The young Marx posed this mystification or opacity in terms of a problematic of alienation.

Political economy conceives the social life of men ... under the form of exchange and trade....It is evident how political economy establishes an alienated form of social intercourse, as the true and original form, and that which corresponds to human nature" [Marx and Engels 1845/1846: 179]. In the later Marx of Capital, it becomes a contradiction between the phenomenal forms and real relations of a social formation. "It is however precisely this finished form of the world of commodities--the money form--which conceals the social character of private labour and the social relations between the individual workers by
making these relations appear as relations between material objects, instead of revealing them plainly [Marx 1867: 168-169].

Whether captured in the distinction between true and false consciousness or science and ideology, Marx insisted that what he regarded as the falseness of contemporary social science (in the first instance political economy) has social roots and that its falseness consists in the way in which it reproduces and naturalizes the partial vision of an historically circumscribed stage of social development. "The categories of bourgeois economics...are forms of thought which are socially valid and therefore objective for the relations of production belonging to this historically determined mode of social production, i.e., commodity production" [Ibid. 169];

6. the conditions under which a non-ideological science is possible are those in which the real source of the illusions crumble. Thus, the development of a real understanding of social conditions is dialectically related to the struggle of the dominated class (in capitalism the proletariat) to abolish its alienated conditions of existence. In this sense, the perspective of the proletariat is historically privileged in that its struggle against domination of private property brings economic exploitation out into the open and so practically reveals the social relation which the science of historical materialism theorizes. "The real, practical dissolution of these phrases, the elimination of these notions from the consciousness
of man will...be accomplished by altered circumstances, not by theoretic deductions" [Marx and Engels 1965: 55].

While Marx gave comparatively little attention to the superstructure, or "the legal, political, religious or philosophic—in short ideological—forms in which men become conscious of this (economic) conflict and fight it out" [Marx 1859: 12], questions of political practice and structure haunt his entire thought and are, indeed, central to it. If his theory of ideology was conditioned by the problematic of breaking from illusion, so too was his theory of politics conditioned by the practical project of achieving socialism, the centrality he accorded the theoretical constructs of capital and labour and by the limitations of contemporary class political struggles in such a way as to focus his interest almost entirely on the struggles of rising classes for state power. It is because of this that Marx's political theory tends to consist on the one hand of abstractions about politics in reference to a generic category of praxis and on the other hand of schematic representations of the state without much analysis of the concrete mediations which connect the play of repressive or transformative praxis with the actual forms and contradictions of governance.

The category of praxis is defined in the germinal theses on Feuerbach as purposive activity which works on an environment and rebounds back on the practitioner and is held to distinguish the human species from all others on this planet [Marx and Engels
1844/1846: 7]. In a theory which starts from a view of social
life as practical, "All the mysteries which urge theory into
mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in
the comprehension of this practice" [Ibid. 199, Thesis VIII]. For
him, the term resolved the antinomy between determined
circumstance and active transformative subjectivity [Ibid. Thesis
III]. In these terms, revolutionary practice was thought of as
both a special case and the pure form in which practice revealed
its essential character. There are two views of the state to be
found in Marx. The first views it rather narrowly as instrumental
and coercive [Ibid. 90]. The second stresses the role of the
state in mediating class conflict and as a factor of cohesion
[Marx 1852: 27-28].

Overall, what Marx gives us is less a systematic theory of
ideology and politics in relation to domination and its
contradictions than a specification of the field which such a
theory would have to occupy. Moreover, given the way in which
marxism became a possession of the Second and Third
Internationals before the WWII, and the specific political
evolution of these two organizations, his philosophical thematics
were suppressed, dogmatized or subordinated to economism, further
narrowing the theoretical focus. Because the Second
International adopted the economist view that capitalism would
inevitably develop toward a period of crisis and collapse as a
result of the development of the productive forces, ideology and
politics were considered to be epiphenomenal and wholly
determined [Coletti 1972: 52-56; Anderson 1976].

Analysing this position, Lenin [1964: 19-23, 65-74] suggested
that there were, in effect, two forms of economism: the
economistic passivity of the Second International’s theory of
economic collapse and the workerist economism of those who argued
that trade union struggles were adequate to produce revolutionary
consciousness. By instead emphasizing the primacy of political
struggles in revolutionary situations and arguing for an
interventionist politics of ideological transformation, he
rearticulated these themes as questions for self-conscious
reflection for activist socialism [Lukacs 1971] [4]. However, as
Soviet marxism dogmatized during the Stalinist period, concepts
about ideology and politics once more rigidified, dominated by a
sterile dichotomy between proletarian and bourgeois ideas while
sectarianism and Instrumentalism held sway over political
practice [Marcuse 1961: 63-76]. Thus, as Roger Simon [1982: 15]
has pointed out, the Stalinist codification of Lenin’s insights,
into what has become known as Marxism-Leninism, was able to break
only partially from mechanistic determinism:

Marxism-Leninism did not succeed in working out an
adequate theory of the link between class struggles
and...popular democratic conflicts in non-revolutionary
periods, when capitalism was relatively stable. Thus
the primacy of the political was reserved for
revolutionary situations; in periods of stability there
was a tendency to revert to an economistic approach.
2.3. Hegemony theory.

2.3.1. Gramsci and the neo-Gramscian revival.

The questions of politics, ideology and their relation were put back on the agenda of marxism in the 1920s, as a result of the complicated strategic questions which arose in response to the collapse of the Second International and the rise of fascism [Anderson 1976: 28-32]—just as they were a generation later in response to new movements for national liberation in the third world and among ethnic minorities, students, youth and women in the first. In general, we can say that in activist periods socialist movements sought theoretical formulations which would aid them in facing the more complicated state and class structures and ideological institutions of advanced capitalism. In breaking from the Second International’s scientism [Colletti 1972: 229-236] theorists like Karl Korsch [1970], Georg Lukacs [1971] and Antonio Gramsci [1977, 1979] sought in the 1920s to revivify Marxism by reading it in the light of Hegelian dialectics and by introducing more complex sociological categories which emphasized consciousness and the superstructure [Colletti 1972: 111-140].

One of the most sociologically fertile of these leads has proved to be the work of Gramsci. After a period of neglect his work came to the attention of academic and activist post-war marxisms in the context of a 1960s search for non-economist and
non-Stalinist forms of radical social theory. The relative absence of academically or politically institutionalized Marxist theory in the English speaking world, meant that the Gramscian analytic framework has been transmitted as much as anything else through its French structuralist appropriation largely via the *New Left Review* editorial board's project of introducing contemporary European developments in Marxist theory to Anglophones.

Thus the Gramscian reintroduced was already purged of his Hegelian "deformations", deformations which had, as in the cases of Korsch, Lukács and even Lenin, inspired an attack on mechanism [5]. This combination has produced in effect a doubly mediated translation: from Italian thought to French thought and from French thought to English thought [6]. As a result, it has become difficult to disentangle Gramsci himself from the modifications and reinterpretations his work underwent at the hands of Althusser and the neo-Gramscian school.

Indeed, there are problematic aspects deriving from Gramsci's ambivalent integration of Crocean historicism which can prove to be a stumbling block for contemporary sociological appropriation. Traces of a notion of a unitary totality can be found to influence his thinking about ideology at two levels: first, in a tendency to conceptualize society as a totality spiritually united in different epochs by different world views such that Marxism is seen as the successor to medieval
Christianity and bourgeois liberalism; and second, in his emphasis on (political and productive) praxis as an essential moment in the generation of as yet unknown forms of consciousness—primarily the ideology, strategy and mass psychology necessary for proletarian struggle [Gramsci 1977: 332]. However, as the first marxist to think systematically about the politics of ideology and culture and, more particularly, the formation, clash and intersection of ideologies in a political field [Gramsci 1971: 137] and, in making "concrete historically specific study" a priority [Hall et al. 1978: 45], he developed a conceptual structure that can be freed from pre-sociological philosophical abstractions.

Still, because the structuralist school has claimed to have gone beyond Gramsci, sorting out the relationship between their work and his is not just an exercise in intellectual history but raises vital questions about how the Gramscian framework might best be developed for the sociological analysis of the kind of complex sectoral and electoral politics which have come to predominate in advanced capitalist societies. In fact, as I shall argue, the neo-Gramscians can fairly be said to have advanced hegemony theory in certain respects, most particularly with regard to the coherence and rigor of conceptual definition and in the introduction of a problematic of social reproduction. But, on the other hand, their anti-Hegelian campaign led them more to focus on general problems of temporality and structure
than to question Gramsci's essentialist attachment to the absolutes of class determination and class conflict. Thus, the initial reformulations of Althusser and Poulantzas bypassed the problem of class reductionism, a perspective from which Gramsci himself had only partially broken.

Mouffe, in fact, [1981: 172] goes so far as to suggest that the work of Althusser represents, in this respect, an actual regression:

In fact it is precisely at the point where Althusser comes up against the obstacle which he never manages to surmount--class reductionism--that Gramsci emerges as the first Marxist to have established a non-reductionist problematic of ideology.

The rest of this section selectively reviews key elements of the Gramscian analytic framework, focussing on those most relevant to the analytic problems of this study as a whole. It then considers how the work of the French structuralist school has, despite its limitations, led to a clarification of hegemony theory; how, in doing so, the limitations of a class reductionist approach have been made explicit; and, how, in the work of Mouffe and Laclau, internal critics of the Althusser school, marxist political sociology has been brought to the edge of a radical reformulation in which class ceases to be regarded as a uniquely universal structuring principle, a transformation which opens up hegemony theory to the kind of feminist correction that O'Brien called for.
2.3.2. Gramsci's theory of hegemony.

Before turning to Gramsci's main categories three principles guiding his analysis should be noted. First, Gramsci takes seriously the notion of the primacy of the political, not just because he is an activist, but because he thinks politics occupies an expanded place in the life of liberal democratic capitalist societies in comparison with all previous social formations. Second, in such societies class rule is normally maintained through managing the political and ideological relation of forces, backed up by direct coercion only in moments of crisis. Third, to the extent that political domination must be continually renegotiated in a political field constantly destabilized by class contradictions, he conceives of the social totality as dynamic, passing through cycles of totalization, detotalization and retotalization as it moves from one unstable political equilibrium to another. Bearing these principles in mind, let us look more closely at Gramsci's notions of hegemony, the state and civil society, blocs and counter-blocs, ideology, culture and the intellectuals, and then consider the place of the family and women within his framework.

Hegemony.

The concept of hegemony is central to Gramsci's work as a whole. In its fully developed form it operates at two levels [8]. First, it has a specific meaning--the process whereby ruling
classes act so as to generate "spontaneous" consent on the part of subordinate classes to "the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group" [Gramsci 1971: 12]. At the same time, secondly, it serves as a paradigmatically orienting concept in terms of which all the other concepts of interest here find their specifically Gramscian denotation.

The root idea is that (class) dominance is normally maintained not merely by coercive power but also through generating the consent of subordinate classes and social groups to existing social relations. Hegemony, as this latter, is analytically and historically separable from the former, which centers on the military and judicial organs of the state. For Gramsci, the use or threatened use of force remained important, but in the maintenance of domination hegemony is at least as strategic since a class must be able to exercise moral and ideological authority before it could capture and continuously exercise state power at all.

A social group can, indeed must, already exercise 'leadership' before winning governmental power (this is indeed one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises such power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to 'lead' as well [Gramsci 1971: 57-58] [9].

For Gramsci, particularly under capitalism, the process of generating the consent necessary for the exercise of hegemony is highly complex, having both an ideological ("intellectual and
moral leadership" [Gramsci 1971: 57]) and an economic aspect. "Though hegemony is ethical-political," he writes, "it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity" [Gramsci 1971: 161]. Through the effective organisation of economic tasks, that is, members of ruling classes acquire a social prestige that can be translated into consent for other aspects of its social leadership. At the level of consciousness, to secure such "consent" means that the ideology of the dominant class comes to be shared by subordinate groups, and it is on that basis, in turn, that strategic political alliances can be forged [10].

In the narrow sense, then, hegemony simply refers to the forms and modes in which a dominant class's cultural and moral authority is achieved. So defined, the concept is useful for the kind of enquiry here conducted, and for two reasons. First, in an analysis which seeks to understand the interplay between dynamic conflicts (of gender, class, and nation) and the shifting formations of ideology, an approach centred on the concept of hegemony avoids the false dichotomy of "consensus vs conflict" models by recognizing that these dynamics deeply inter-relate. Unlike a narrow marxist functionalism, which sees subordinate classes as victims of manipulation or false consciousness, it insists that subordinated groups' adhesion to dominant values has an element of spontaneity and is mediated by actual experience of
the world. Secondly, hegemony theory's emphasis on ideology is appropriate for analysing gender relations, since these are importantly constructed and maintained through the adherence of both women and men to specific definitions of masculinity and femininity, that is, through the cultural and ideological dimensions of the power relations of gender.

State and civil society.

Gramsci pursues his analysis of hegemony with respect to two analytically distinct but interpenetrating superstructural levels: the state, or political, society and civil society. These concepts are unfortunately among the least clearly defined of his terms [Simon 1982: 68]. What is clear about Gramsci's definitions is that, as Christine Buci-Glucksmann [1980: 84-109] has pointed out, they amount to an "expansion of the state concept" beyond governmental apparatuses or its monopoly on organized violence. The state in this larger sense is coextensive with all the politics involved in the maintenance of social integration. Let me quote here at length a passage from the Prison Notebooks which reveals the problematic and which, as we shall see, has a particular relevance for Quebec.

It is true that the state is seen as the organ of one particular group, destined to create favourable conditions for the latter's maximum expansion. But the development and expansion of the particular group are conceived of, and presented, as being the motor force of universal expansion, of a development of all "national" energies. In other words, the dominant
group is coordinated concretely with the general interests of the subordinate groups, and the life of the state is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and superceding of unstable equilibria (on the juridical plane) between the interests of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate groups—equilibria in which the interests of the dominant group prevail, but only up to a certain point, i.e., stopping short of narrowly corporate economic interest [Gramsci 1971: 181-182].

Gramsci's use of the term civil society is similarly "elusive" in so far as it refers to both a level of the superstructure and of structure [Hall et al. 1978: 45]; but again a descriptive definition can be easily found. In the first instance, civil society comprises those aspects of social life which exclude relations of production and the repressive/coercive apparatuses of the state [11]. In the most often cited definition, he takes civil society to include all other institutions and social organizations: "the ensemble of organisms commonly called private", for example, political parties, trade unions, cultural organizations, the church and the family [Gramsci 1971: 12]. In relation to the analysis of feminism, two points emerge from this conception. First, civil society is seen as the locus of particular kinds of ideological struggle about values and legitimacy. Secondly, and as a result, political and ideological authority is seen as decentered, diffused through the institutions of civil society.

What makes all this confusing is that Gramsci not only distinguished between the state (as a legal and coercive apparatus) and civil society but reintroduces the term "State (in
Its integral meaning: dictatorship plus hegemony)" [Gramsci 1971: 239] to include both the "state" in the narrow sense and all the institutions which make up civil society. As he puts it: "one might say that the State=political society + civil society, in other words, hegemony protected by the armour of coercion" [Gramsci 1971: 263].

At first sight, this formulation is problematic in so far as it seems to collapse all social relations into the state. However, in "Hegemony and the integral state in Gramsci: towards a new conception of politics", Mouffe [1979c; 178] argues that "His project is not the 'statization' of society, but an indication of the profoundly political character of civil society as a terrain of the struggle for hegemony". Moreover, Gramsci's point is partly historical. Unlike pre-capitalist states, modern capitalist and post-revolutionary states, integral states operate so as to establish themselves as "the organizer of a real historical bloc through the creation of an intellectual and moral unity" [Ibid.]. In general it is at the level of the state in this expanded sense that the political balance of capitalist societies is established.

Historical blocs.

The maintenance of hegemony in the institutions of the state and civil society depends, for Gramsci, on the capacity of the ruling class to assemble a broad social alliance with other
classes and strata in a bloc. The bloc is a system of political and ideological alliances, dominated by a particular class but vehicling the interests of all of its components [12]. Blocs can be hegemonic (ruling) or counter-hegemonic (oppositional), but they are always composed of more than one class, layer, stratum or fraction and always unified at the levels of politics and ideology. The hegemonic bloc becomes hegemonic because the dominant class or class fraction it contains is capable of transcending its narrow corporate interests and convincing the members of its alliance that it has done so, while at the same time carrying out a programme which at least partially realizes those interests. Conversely, for the revolutionary politician (or the revolutionary feminist), the problem becomes one of organizing and consolidating social strata into a counter force capable of establishing its own dominance.

The mediating role of bloc politics also serves to provide a non-mechanistic account of the relation between the economic structure and the superstructure. "[T]he complex, contradictory, and discordant ensemble of superstructures," he notes, "is the reflection of the ensemble of the social relations of production" [Gramsci 1971: 366]. But this reflection is neither simple nor reductive since, although the superstructures of capitalism must be seen in terms of their historical relations to the development of capital, their effective development appears as a succession of spontaneous and uncontrollable moments, in all cases mediated
through "ideology" as expressed in attitudes and forms of social organization [13].

Ideology and the intellectuals.

For Gramsci [1971: 349], ideology is a sociological reality materialized in social institutions and relationships which cannot therefore be reduced to mere appearance either as an epiphenomenon of the economic structure or as "mere elucubrations" of particular individuals. He emphasized that "the thesis which asserts that men become conscious of fundamental conflicts on the level of ideology is not psychological or moralistic in character, but structural and epistemological" [Gramsci 1971: 164; cf: 365].

The structural character of ideology, "at the highest level as in art, economics and law", is that it "serves to cement and unify" an entire social bloc [Gramsci 1971: 349]. To be hegemonically effective such an integrating ideology must have two characteristics. First, it must have "moral authority" [Gramsci 1971: 60-81]. Secondly, like the bloc it both represents and unifies, a hegemonic ideology must be integrative; it is "a cultural-social unity through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single aim, as the basis of an equal and common conception of the world" [Gramsci 1971: 349]. Thus, a hegemonic ideology is not composed of the views of one class at a particular historic conjuncture,
but of enduring ideological elements that have arisen out of the unique history of each country over a long historical period and across class lines. Such ideologies have been called national popular ideologies [14].

Writing of the process whereby new critical ideologies are formed, Gramsci [1971: 195] argued that these typically preserve some existing elements but reinterpret their significance:

This criticism makes possible a process of differentiation and change in the relative weight that the elements of the old ideologies used to possess. What was previously secondary and subordinate, or even incidental, is now taken to be primary—becomes the complex of a new ideological and theoretical complex. The old collective will dissolve into its contradictory elements since the subordinate ones develop socially, etc.

The validity of an ideology is tested in terms of its relation to a structure: historically organic ideologies, necessary to a particular historical social structure, are a material force in that they have the capacity to "organize human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle etc." [Gramsci 1971: 376-377]. In this sense only, is ideology psychological for Gramsci. Mass consciousness (or the consciousness of the active man-in-the-mass) is also double or contradictory, with that level of consciousness that is "implicit in activity" actually or potentially in conflict with verbal consciousness acquired (inherited, absorbed) in the process of socialization, which may
retain the moral power to block radical transformative action [Gramsci 1971: 333]. For Gramsci, the political import of this view is similar to the methodological implication that it holds for sociological investigation, i.e., the need to look beyond the surface and to take a long view [15].

Given the importance to Gramsci of ideology in the cementing of blocs and unifying societies, the historical importance he attributed to the role of intellectuals is not surprising. He repeatedly expressed a fundamental anthropological stance that all individuals are intellectuals, in the widest sense of the term, in that intellectual activity is a dimension of all human activity and "man" is mind, the product not of nature but of history [Gramsci 1971: 403, 9, 323 et passim] [16]. However he also used the term in a more specialized sociological sense, defining intellectuals not simply by their engagement in the activity of thinking but by their specific place and function in the social ensemble: "All men are intellectuals...but not all men have the function of intellectuals" [Gramsci 1971: 8-9]. So defined, intellectuals include not merely writers (men of letters, philosophers and artists, i.e., those engaged in mental labour which manipulates symbol systems) but all those who serve as organizers of the social totality, whether in production (engineers, managers, technicians), culture (thinkers, writers, artists) or politics (state administrators, civil servants, party workers). In general, intellectuals are concerned with
reproducing or innovating material and ideal culture in both the political and civil spheres and in production, in areas ranging from science and technology, to bureaucratic administration, education (at all levels), religion, journalism, philosophy and the arts including the art of politics.

Among intellectuals so defined Gramsci drew a further distinction between "organic" and "traditional" intellectuals on the basis of their relation to class and bloc formation. Every social group creates organically, i.e., in the process of its formation and rise to power, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and self-awareness in the economic, political and social fields [Gramsci 1971: 5]. Such organic intellectuals can play a vanguard role for a whole class, group or bloc as did the Moderate Party for the capitalist class in the Risorgimento [Gramsci 1971: 59-60, 97] by expressing or integrating ideological elements in such a way as to promote the coalition of classes or class fractions into political blocs:

Given this organic condensation or concentration, the Moderates exercised a powerful attraction "spontaneously", on the whole mass of intellectuals of every degree who existed...in a diffused or molecular state....[T]hey thereby create a system of solidarity between all intellectuals, often with bonds of a psychological nature [Gramsci 1971: 60].

In Gramsci's view, such a "spontaneous" phenomenon is really progressive in that it causes the whole society to move forward and augment its cadres for economic activity. Political parties
can in some cases be the way some groups elaborate "their own category of organic intellectuals directly in the political and philosophical field" [Gramsci 1971: 15]. Indeed, Gramsci termed the revolutionary party the "collective intellectual".

In contrast, traditional intellectuals are those which a rising class meets already in existence and who seek to represent themselves as independent of the ruling class: clergy, rurally based educated professionals like doctors, lawyers, scholars and teachers and civil servants [Gramsci 1971: 7, 14] [17]. They function to preserve existing ideological elements and seem to represent an uninterrupted moral and value continuity. The system of mass education in capitalist society plays both a conservative and a progressive role in the formation of intellectuals and is significant for the reproduction of hegemony and its bases in the self through its tendency to standardize intellectual qualification and mass psychology.

The family and women.

In stressing the importance of ideological cohesion and the private institutions of civil society to the the maintenance of hegemony in the bloc structure, as we have seen, Gramsci explicitly included the institution of the family as a site of ideological and moral reproduction. However, while his theory formally incorporates and refers to this level of social structure, his treatment of the linked questions of the family,
women and sexuality remained sketchy and underdeveloped, thought in terms of sexual naturalism and economic determinism rather than hegemony.

In fact, in his reflections on these issues that are available in translation, much greater attention is given to sexuality than women or the family. At times, as in his essay on "Americanism and Fordism", Gramsci [1971: 277-318] seemed to suggest that sexuality is historically shaped. Despite this glimmer of a sociological position, his perspective is limited by a sexual naturalism (of "Instincts"), which in turn substructures androcentric and heterosexist assumptions. Although he comments rather scathingly on the sexual practices and thrill seeking of bourgeois women, it is male sexuality that is discussed as the norm and as the locus of instinctual evolution. This naturalism also means that, although he gave critical support to the project of women's emancipation, he is not particularly sensitive to intrafamilial dimensions of male/female power. When he speaks approvingly of the natural sexual practices in peasant families where the man, returning from the field, encounters a wife who does not require sentimentality or seduction he fails to entertain the possibility that the women's experience may differ from that of the man [18]. Here, and in a similar light, it is taken for granted that the working class, whose historically shaped sexuality Gramsci is concerned to explore, is male.

More importantly, Gramsci's insight that there is a necessary
correspondence between the organization of work and "a specific mode of living and of thinking and feeling life" [Gramsci 1971: 302] tends to be conceived in terms that reproduce the economism he more successfully avoided in the macropolitical sphere by reducing the effectivity of the family and sexuality. There is a unilinear determination of family and sexuality by the economy. He argues that the need of advanced capitalism to rationalize production means that the struggle for hegemony encroaches more and more directly upon family life and sexual practices and so expands the ground on which hegemony is established into the area of personality. Fordism (or Taylorism) [19], which we can take to mean advanced capitalism, with its requirements for high and sustained levels of output of labour power by skilled workers, requires workers to spend their wages rationally to reproduce that labour power, avoid the dissipation of alcohol and "womanising" and so rigorously discipline their "sexual instincts (at the level of the nervous system)". As a result, "the 'family' in the wide sense (rather than a particular form of the familial system)" is strengthened and sexual relations are regulated and stabilized [Gramsci 1971: 300].

Yet it is always changes in the productive process that "demand" changes in the sexual instinct, and never sexual discontents that give rise to demands for political changes.

The truth is that the new type of man demanded by the rationalization of production and work cannot be
developed until the sexual instinct has been suitably regulated and until it too has been suitably rationalized [Gramsci 1971: 297].

However, the positions that Gramsci takes on these issues are somewhat contradictory. While he gives a lot of credence to a notion that there is a natural, heterosexual sexuality at the level of instinct [Gramsci 1971: 304], sexual practices are thought to be historically shaped and in an evolutionary way. The advance in modes of production requires and produces a reshaping of sexual "instincts" so that they represent "a considerable advance on earlier, more primitive instincts" [Gramsci 1971: 298]. In this regard, Gramsci's historicism prevented him from becoming either an unmitigated sexual liberationist or a puritan. He saw both orientations not just as one-sided but as deriving from particular class locations in particular productive systems. On the other hand, while he oscillates between constructivist and naturalist perspectives on sexuality, he ultimately succumbs to economic reductionism.

However, while he never developed the point in detail with regard to gender, his consistent stress on the need for ideological and moral reconstruction in the widest possible terms as part of the revolutionary project led him to include sexuality, the family and everyday domestic life as areas which must be transformed prior to political changes:

The formation of a new feminine personality is the most important question of an ethical and civil order
connected with the sexual question. Until women can attain not only a genuine independence in relation to men but also a new way of conceiving themselves and their role in sexual relations, the sexual question will remain full of unhealthy characteristics and caution must be exercised in proposals for new legislation [Gramsci 1971: 296].

From the increasing importance he accords to the realm occupied by the family and sexual practice in the productive process of advanced capitalism, in contrast to its initial phase, and from his commitment to changing moral and ideological foundations of personality as part of the political struggle, we might push Gramsci's analysis one step further by suggesting that the family and gender relations become an increasingly salient, and even crucial, site for struggle as capitalism advances further. Thus, these aspects of the sex/gender system would need to be included in any analysis of how hegemony is constructed and maintained.

2.4. The neo-Gramscians: decentering the political field.

As I have suggested, the neo-Gramscian structuralist school both advances hegemony theory and retreats from some of its implications. Leaving aside the epistemological claims of their work at various stages, what we are most interested in here are the specific contributions that Althusser, Poulantzas, Laclau and Mouffe have made to the development of a sociological theory of politics and ideology in advanced capitalist social formations.

From Althusser, first, we can take a general model of the social structure as a "complex" totality: a complexity that
partly results from the way in which different social structural levels (ideological, political and economic) develop unevenly [Althusser and Balibar 1970: 97]. Poulantzas [1973] puts these notions to work with regard to the political instance and the state; while Laclau's and Mouffe's examinations of political movements, both in peripheral and advanced capitalist social formations, point the way to the integration of gender politics into the framework.

2.4.1. Althusser.

Althusser's most explicit treatment of Gramsci is to be found in the chapter "Marxism is not a historicism" in *Reading Capital* [Althusser and Balibar 1970: 119-144]. Here he argues that Gramsci's "enormously delicate and subtle work of genius" can be separated from French and Italian humanist and historicist schools of history that claim his patrimony [ibid. 126-127]. He argues that there is a contradiction between the framework implicit in Gramsci's historical studies of Italy and the theoretical categories to which Gramsci explicitly adheres and that Gramsci's claim that Marxism is "absolute historicism" is a polemical device to counter Bukharin's economism and mechanism. Thus Althusser sees Gramsci's framework as contaminated by an historicist teleology which he sets out to demolish and replace by a socio-historical approach fully sensitive to the specificity and determinate political openness of any given "conjuncture" [20]. As far as the problematic of hegemony is concerned,
Althusser's effort to reformulate and refine Gramscian thinking revolves around three points.

First, and most generally, Althusser insists that the marxist concept of social formation should not be confused with Hegel's notion of society as an expressive totality, i.e., a totality which is animated by a single principle and in which all the parts are symmetrical expressions of that principle. To this Althusser counterposes a notion of society as a complex totality. His most elaborate discussion of this distinction and its significance is to be found in the essay "The errors of classical economics" [Ibid. 1970: 91]. There he argues that social totalities are complex because and in the sense that what he calls the levels or instances of a social formation are relatively autonomous from one another and from the economic base, are mutually determining and have asymmetrical rhythms of development.

Thus, Althusser breaks even more completely than Gramsci from a dichotomy of base and superstructure in which the former determines the latter. What Althusser [1971a: 98-101] proposes instead is a model of the social formation of a "structure of structures" in which one structure, the mode of production, determines the relative effectivity and causal interrelationship of all the other structures, but not immediately and only "in the last instance". He calls this multiplicity of determinations in which the economy is determinate only "in the last instance",

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"overdetermination" [Althusser 1969: 101-102]. As Brewster puts it: "the overdetermination of a contradiction is the reflection of its conditions of existence in the complex whole, that is, of the other contradictions in the complex whole, in other words its uneven development [ibid. 253].

Correlatively, in terms of historical process, the development of the social formation as a whole is not seen as unilinear but as unfolding through these different structures in what he calls "complex time":

The fact that each of these times and each of these histories is relatively autonomous does not make them so many domains which are independent of the whole: the specificity of each of these times and each of these histories -- in other words, their relative autonomy and independence -- is based on a certain time of articulation in the whole, and therefore on a certain type of dependence with respect to the whole....It is not enough, therefore, to say, as modern historians do, that there are different periodizations for different times, that each time has its own rhythms, some short some long; we must also think these differences in rhythm and punctuation in their foundation in the type of articulation, displacement and torsion which harmonizes these different times with one another [Althusser 1969: 100].

In a similar vein, he rejects the notion that historical ruptures, i.e., revolutions, are caused by the explosion of a single contradiction, seeing them rather as the "condensation" of many levels of conflict. Indeed, rather than employing the Hegelian term contradiction to understand the unstable and conflictual character of social formations he prefers the
Freudian metaphor of overdetermination [21]

Althusser’s second refinement of the Gramscian model is to repose the relation of economic class structure and superstructural institutions and sites of the state and civil society in terms of a problematic of social reproduction [Althusser 1971a: 141 et passim]. This notion, already implicit in Marx’s comments from the Grundrisse cited above, not only rejects the mechanical reflection theory of vulgar marxism but also anchors Gramsci’s strategically oriented conception of hegemony and hegemony struggles in a perspective tacitly derived from French classical sociology [22].

Finally, and in line with a similar appropriative ambition, Althusser attempts to elaborate a general theory of ideology linked on the one side to a theory of the subject or self and of the relationship between the individual and society and on the other side to the theory of hegemony and social reproduction. In "On ideology and the state", Althusser [1971b] interprets socialization as the ideological constitution of the subject. "It is in the forms and under the forms of ideological subjection" he argues "that provision is made for the reproduction of the skills of labour power" [Ibid. 133], and this ideological subjection is mediated in turn through the ideological apparatuses of the state. These latter are taken to include not merely the institutions of law, politics and the education system, but trade unions, organized religions, the
media, the arts and even the family, which whether "public" or "private" are defined as such (i.e. as ideological state apparatuses or ISAs) by their "functioning massively and predominantly beneath the ruling ideology" [ibid. 146]. In relation to the individual subject, ideology through "interpellation" creates identity; in relation to the ruling class it creates consent. "The category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology in so far as all ideology has the defining function of constituting concrete individuals as subjects" [ibid. 171], i.e., as subjects amenable to the directing intelligence of the dominant class.

Althusser's position is a frustrating mixture of strengths and weaknesses as the international controversy it provoked testifies [23]. If its insistence on rigor stimulated a search for clarity and coherence within western marxism, its scientific pretensions promised more than any theory could deliver and masked a dogmatic attachment to a simplified and highly abstract conception of advanced capitalist social structure. His emphasis on the complex character of social determination remained wholly abstract and his occasional references to concrete social processes, most notoriously in the essay on "Ideology and the state", left him open to the charge of functionalism and reductionism. This is particularly evident in his essay "Ideology and the state" [Althusser 1971b] where, by presenting the ideological domain as a simple top down process of
inculcation in which ruling class dominated ideological state apparatuses stamp out subjected ideological subjects like cookies from a mold, Althusser effectively adopts a functionalist framework. Not only does Althusser seem here to be in contradiction with his polemic against those who would reductively represent social formations as expressive totalities; he also falls into a simplified form of hegemony theory that Gramsci in his later writings had clearly left behind. There is no room in this approach for the generation of anti-hegemonic consciousness or, indeed, ideology. Whereas for Gramsci ideology was a battle zone and the site for a most complicated politics, for Althusser ideology becomes simply the zone for subjection, while the place of resistance, rebellion and counterstrategizing is left vacant and untheorized.

2.4.2. Poulantzas.

Largely inspired by Althusser and his reading of Gramsci, Nicos Poulantzas focused on further developing the structural marxist problematic, particularly with respect to its theory of the state, politics and ideology. His work on the interrelation of class, class politics and the state avoids the functionalist closure that Althusser falls into, but his own efforts at elaboration ultimately suffer from the same kind of hyper-abstraction. His contributions to the theory of hegemony that are relevant here can be summarized under three points.
First, in *Political Power and Social Classes* [1973], *Fascism and Dictatorship* [1979] and in his celebrated exchanges with Milliband, largely in the pages of the *New Left Review*, Poulantzas takes Gramsci’s hints about the functions and forms of the state, both in general and in capitalist society, and builds them into a rigorous and elaborated categorical framework. He emphasized that while marxism correctly stressed the centrality of the state’s coercive apparatus (ultimately the police and army), the state is not a simple unity but a differentiated institution whose various administrative, legislative, executive, welfare and judicial components can conflict with one another or become the object of separate social struggles.

He was also concerned to build on Gramsci’s insights about the integrative role of the state ("the state has the particular function of constituting the factor of cohesion between the levels of a social formation" [Poulantzas 1973: 44]), and about the variability of its form according to the type and level of development of the mode of production and according to the conjunctural relation of forces.

In particular, with regard to the function of the state as the cohesive factor in a [social] formation’s unity, it is clear that it takes on different forms according to which mode of production and social formation is under consideration.... This function of the state... specifies the state as such in the formation dominated by the CMP, characterized by the specific autonomy of instances and by the particular place which is there allotted to the region of the state. This characteristic autonomy is the basis of
the specificity of the political: it determines the particular function of the state as the cohesive factor of the levels which have gained autonomy [ibid. 46, original emphasis].

Cutting through the jargon, we can see that Poulantzas is stressing that the function of the state is to integrate and not just repressively control class based social formations; that what he calls "the relative autonomy of the state" is specific to and circumscribed by this integrative role; and that because of the growth of secondary institutions in capitalist formations the state and the practices that relate to it are more autonomous from the immediate and coercive exercise of state power than in pre-capitalist formations.

Secondly, this view of class and state substructures a theory of politics in which he attempts to sort out the different dimensions of what he calls the political region. As a first step a distinction is drawn between "the political", or the politico-juridical structures of the state, and politics. The political, he argues, "must be located in the structure of a social formation, not only as a specific level, but also as a crucial level in which the contradictions of a social formation are reflected and condensed" [ibid. 41]. In the most general terms, politics or political practices take as their object the conjunctural "present moment" and "either transforms (or else maintains) the unity of a formation" [ibid. 41, 43]. This definition of practice is, however, considerably restricted by its identification of practice with class practice and of its
object with the state and state power.

Finally, and similarly underlining the specificity of the political region, he reintroduces Marx's notion of the political scene as "the space" that "contains the struggle between social forces organized in political parties" [ibid. 247]. Of course, it should be remembered that in Marx's own usage and in general in the nineteenth century "parties" were not formal political associations contending for parliamentary positions but more or less organized representatives of particular interest groups and social forces, or what I have called above, collective political actors operating in a political field.

[Political practice is the "motive force of history" in so far as its product finally constitutes the transformation of the unity of a social formation in its various stages and phases. This, however, must not be taken in an historicist sense. Political practice is the practice which transforms the unity, to the extent that its object constitutes the nodal point of condensation of contradictions of different levels with their own historicities and uneven development.) In this light, the political region is irreducible [ibid., original emphasis].

To the extent that Poulantzas renders previous marxist paradigms of the state more complex, one might argue that he renders them more adequate to the richness of determinations making up the real. Despite this, however, Poulantzas's work can be and has been criticized on two major grounds. First, his leap out of the frying pan of conceptual fuzziness lands him right in the fire of taxonomy. While he does seek in places to
instantiate his categories and use his framework heuristically to analyse such historical phenomena as fascism [Poulantzas 1979] and the class structure of advanced capitalism [Poulantzas 1975], he retains a rather unmarxist dichotomy between concept formation and concrete historical analysis which gives his work a schematic, abstract and to some critics "idealist" and formalist cast [Lefebvre 1971; Hall et al 1978: 68; Clarke et al. 1978: 115; Thompson 1978: 193 ff].

Secondly, this schematism allows him to smuggle a class reductionism into his substantive theory. Politics, for him, is always, as we have seen, class politics; social forces are always class forces; and ideology is always class ideology.

The way in which classes are related to the relations of production and to the economic structure has the determining role in the constitution of social classes: this role provides precise evidence of the constant determination in the last instance by the economic element in the structures, as reflected in social relations [Poulantzas 1973: 14].

Thus, determination by the economic determines not only class structure but its dominant place in social (i.e., economic, political and ideological) relations.

In relation to the problem of gender politics and hegemony posed by this study, Poulantzas's work is of contradictory value. On the one hand, it theorizes the political and ideological field as a space in which the contradictions of the
whole social formation are condensed and as the arena where social structures are maintained or transformed. This definition obviates an analysis of the superstructure as mechanically determined by and reflective of the forces of production without eliminating a role for class determinations. Thus, he potentially offers a vision of the political field as a space where class and cultural politics co-exist and which is open to the analysis of gender politics. On the other hand, he explicitly jettisons non-class -- and hence gender -- determinations from consideration in his model. Overall, his theory is so sex-blind (or androcentric in so far as it includes human individuals at all) that gender structures and contradictions are never even considered as part of the contradictions of a whole social formation.

2.4.3. Laclau and Mouffe.

It is precisely on these grounds, that is with an objection to its class reductionism, that Laclau and Mouffe open their attack on their structural marxist colleagues. The point of entry is a further reevaluation of Gramsci's concept of hegemony. Laclau attributed the germinal insight on hegemony theory which underlay his critique of Poulantzas to an unpublished paper by Mouffe; the particular idea that he extracted is that:

The notion of the specific autonomy of democratic interpellations is implicit in the concept of "hegemony", of democratic ideology as a domain of class
struggle and, consequently, it permits Marxist theory to overcome class reductionism. Gramsci's great originality did not lie so much in his insistence on the importance of superstructures in the determination of historical processes--other theoreticians, such as Lukacs, had already insisted on this point--but in his effort to overcome at the same time economism and class reductionism. Nonetheless, this never led Gramsci to forget that ideological articulations always occur within class discourses [Laclau 1979: 141n].

Against a class reductionist approach Laclau counterposes the thesis that: "(1) Class struggle is only that which constitutes classes as such; (2) Consequently, not every contradiction is a class contradiction, but every contradiction is overdetermined by the class struggle" [Ibid. 106]. Laclau and Mouffe's argument can be summarized in four points.

First, the distinction between "the class struggle" and "classes in struggle" is of paramount conceptual importance. "The class struggle" is intrinsic to the social opposition which is constituted directly by antagonism internal to a given set of production relations (in capitalism, the bourgeoisie versus the working class) [24]. Class in this sense is not just an objective economic category defined with relation to the place of a group within the mode of production but a simultaneously objective and subjective phenomenon, in Marx's terms class in itself and class for itself, self-constituted in and through the built-in opposition they embody [25]. "Classes in struggle" refers to a situation where classes or subgroups of classes that can be called class fractions, come into contingent conflict with one another for power or resources. Such, for example, defined the
relation among various peasant, petit-bourgeois and bourgeois
elements in setting up the French Second Empire [Marx 1852; Tilly
et al. 1975] or various populist agricultural movements’ demands
for a change in distribution and monetary policy in North America
[Lipset 1971; Canovan 1981: 98-135] [26]. In this sense,
confrontations between classes are not necessarily "confrontation
as classes, [In] that their nature--their insertion in the
production process--is relatively external to the confrontation
itself" [Laclau 1979: 106].

Secondly, to this distinction corresponds a further distinction
between the politics intrinsic to the mode of production,
abstractly considered, and the actual political process that
unfolds within a social formation as a whole.

If the first contradiction -- at the level of mode of production -- is expressed on the ideological level in
the interpellation of the agents as a class, this second contradiction is expressed through the
interpellation of the agents as the people. The first
contradiction is the sphere of class struggle; the
second, that of popular-democratic struggle [ibid.
107]) [27]

The people are defined by their exclusion from power; the power
bloc by its control of the state apparatus. Thus, the
contradiction arises in relation to the existence of the state
within a class based social formation.

In relation to the problem of determination/determining it is
important to note that "the people" are considered to "form an
objective determination of the system which is different from the class determination". "If class contradiction is the dominant contradiction at the abstract level of mode of production, the people/power bloc contradiction is dominant at the level of the social formation" [ibid. 108].

Thirdly, ideological elements do not have a necessary class belonging. If ideology is a cement, and blocs form themselves together by aggregating ideological elements, and interpelating subjects on that basis, in so doing they establish a particular denotation for particular elements given their place in the newly constituted ideological configuration. Thus, the class meaning of any particular ideological element (for example, national feeling or ethnic pride) depends on its place within an ensemble of ideological elements by which bloc and counter blocs are held together. For Laclau, then, the process of forming blocs is in part the reconfiguring of ideologies so that disparate and even potentially conflicting social forces or groups can be held together [ibid. 108-111].

Fourthly, while the political level and the bloc structures have their own specificity and cannot be reduced to "the class struggle", they are nevertheless overdetermined by it:

[If not every contradiction can be reduced to a class contradiction, every contradiction is overdetermined by class struggle. According to basic Marxist theory, the level of production relations assigns the role of determination in the last instance]
In any social formation. This in itself establishes the priority of the class struggle over the popular-democratic struggle, since the latter takes place only at the ideological and political levels (the 'people' do not, obviously, exist at the level of production relations) [Ibid. 108].

Here Laclau seems to be saying two things: first, the type and level of development of the mode of production determines what social forces are in play. Thus stated, he has not moved beyond the problematic of determination in the last instance which implies that the field of alliances is latently structured by the antagonism in the mode of production (so that is is hard, but not impossible to get workers and bosses on the same side of a struggle, as happens in the fight against regional inequality in Canada). Secondly, the lurking and most explosive issue that can come to the surface in political struggles between power and popular blocs is the question of production relations and, when it does so, the production relations can be changed.

Positively, this conception of determination, antagonism and articulation reserves a place within structural marxist theory for a non-reductionist conception of collective political forces and ideologies, or what we might call multiple subjects of history. Rather than rejecting nationally specific variations as mere cultural lags, false consciousness or remnants of the dominant classes or previous eras, such ideological forms and political issues are necessary to the constitution of a bloc struggling to gain (or keep) hegemony. In this light, to take the Quebec case, elements of the Ideological heritage, like
Catholic organicism and the myth of survival [5.1. below] are not merely survivals but indispensable ingredients in the formation of contemporary popular democratic ideology.

While Laclau's initial formulations were developed in relation to the analysis of peripheral capitalist social formations in Latin America, and as a critique of Poulantzas's analysis of European fascism, Mouffe later advanced the theory in relation to new social movements in the centres of advanced capitalism. Here she argues that the commodification of social life, its increasing bureaucratization by an interventionist state and the "'cultural massification' resulting from the all embracing influence of mass media" [Mouffe 1984: 140] have transformed the conditions in which hegemony is formed and contested:

Most of the existing social relations and collective identities have been destroyed or profoundly challenged by the effects of these three combined processes, and new forms of subordination have been created. It is as resistances against those new forms of subordination that "new social movements" should be interpreted [ibid.].

Here Mouffe retains and develops the view that while such new antagonisms and the movements that they generate are an outgrowth of the development of the capitalist mode of production, they are not class antagonisms in the strict sense because they do not affect "the social agent in so far as s/he occupies a place in the relations of production". They neither replace nor are subordinate to the working class as a privileged revolutionary
subject:

[N]o struggles, no demands, whatever they are, have a necessarily socialist character. There are no paradigmatic forms in which resistances against subordination are automatically expressed. It depends on the existing discourses and their capacity to articulate those demands through the construction of a given type of "subject". Those resistances can be perfectly articulated to right-wing discourses as well as to left ones. They can be neutralized by the dominant system or even used for its modernization [ibid. 141-142].

Despite Mouffe's fashionable "s/he" and the increasing number of politely deferential references by other neo-Gramsclans to the women's movement as exemplary of a politics which cannot be reduced to class, this theoretical tendency has not adequately come to grips with the theoretical challenge posed by feminist analyses of gender structures and politics. There are in fact two ways gender categories might be integrated into the model: first, as another interpellating element (among many) and, second, as the effect of another determining structure. Mouffe [ibid. 140], in effect, chooses the former solution:

[O]ne of the consequences of the development of capitalism...is a tendency to dissolve anterior social relations that were already relations of subordination as in the case of the patriarchal family. Women's subordination did exist before capitalism, and if feminism only begins with capitalism it is because its development has created the conditions for such a subordination to be put into question. The same could be argued concerning older forms of subordination such as those based on race.
However, there are two important problems with this solution. First, despite Laclau's and Mouffe's general argument against seeing ideologies and social relations as remnants of previous eras, women's subordination seems here to be accounted for solely in terms of "antior social relations" without allowing for its (re-)construction in a specifically capitalist form. Secondly, in order to situate this oppression a reference to "the patriarchal family" is smuggled in as an unexplained category which nevertheless seems to be granted determinative power.

The second solution would be to recognize that there is a further structure active in the constitution of social formations beyond the mode of production, narrowly defined, and the popular bloc/power bloc antagonism; and that this further structure is also active on the terrain on which hegemony is constructed. This latter tactic, adopted by most feminist theory, has the advantage that it avoids equating the sex/gender system with hierarchies based on ethnicity or race. However important race may be in the dynamic construction of a given political field, race is historically contingent in that the interaction of racial (or ethnic) groups depends historically upon the geographical encounter of social groups and is not a necessary constituent of human societies. Sex and the relations of biological reproduction which substructure gender have never been contingent in this fashion. Nor, despite the visions of some biological engineering, can sex and procreation be eliminated from societies
If they are to survive. However, as we shall see, this solution generates problem of its own.
Chapter 3. Towards a feminist appropriation of hegemony theory.

3.1. Feminist theories of gender politics.

3.1.1. Introduction.

If the sex-blind marxist heritage of neo-Gramscian hegemony theory has precluded the adequate integration of gender into its social and political categories, then feminist theory, passing through the necessary stages of recovery (of women hidden from history) and deconstructive critique of existing paradigms, has not yet itself been able to develop a full theory of politics and the state of its own which incorporates all the necessary levels of analysis [Maroney and Luxton 1987: 1-3]. As Michèle Barrett [1980: 226] pointed out, "The question of how feminists should approach the state is of utmost importance yet remains controversial". Disagreements in this debate are compounded not only by debates about the nature of the state within marxism, as Barrett suggests, but between marxist and non-marxist theory as well [Bell 1973, 1976; Jessop 1977]. However with its conception that male dominance is not natural [Sacks 1974; Lamphere 1974; Tanner and Zihlman 1975; Zihlman 1978], feminist theory has usefully expanded definitions of politics and the political so as to include previously excluded interactions and relations.

Perhaps one of the most important limitations of feminist
theory, at least as it has developed so far, is that despite its historical relation with an activist political movement founded on the insight of gender politics, it has theorised the social structures of gender more fully than the mode of insertion of gender politics into the political field [1]. This is not to deny that feminist theory has understood its tasks as political as well as intellectual or, in a post-Kuhnian way, grasped the political character of knowledge [Fox Keller 1984; Harding 1983; Hartsock 1979; 1983], but to stress that it has, with some notable exceptions, tended to slight the analysis of the region of politics in itself. The implication of the relatively one-sided development of feminist theory for this study is that an examination of its political categories must pass by way of its structural ones. And here, the main issue has been how to relate sex and gender as a dimension of social life to other social structures particularly, given the neo-marxist provenance of much of feminist theory, to class and economy [2].

Since the late 1960s, feminist theory has evolved three main approaches to this problem, each of which implies a different orientation to gender politics and the state. The first suggests that sexual structures and oppression are not only distinct but primary and that, as a result, sexual politics are primary; the second, that there are two mutually irreducible structures of domination, sex and class, each of which generates its own form and level of politics; and the third, that some existing
theoretical framework (for example, mainstream political science or structuralist marxism) must be expanded so as to provide a conceptual space for at least "women" and, at best, gender structures and politics.

Because several of these perspectives have drawn upon Friedrich Engels’s classic marxist formulations in *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* in various ways, it is useful to briefly review it here. Of prime importance is the now famous passage from the "Preface" to the first edition in which Engels [1972: 71-72] states:

> According to the materialist conception, the determining factor in history is, in the final instance, the production and reproduction of immediate life. This, again, is of a twofold character: on the one side, the production of the means of existence, of food, clothing, and shelter and the tools necessary for that production; on the other, the production of human beings themselves, the propagation of the species. The social organization under which people of a particular historical epoch live is determined by both kinds of production.

However, this dualist perception of structures is negated by his unilinear reduction of all politics in capitalist societies to class politics. While he argues that the world historic defeat of women as privatized domestic producer coincided with class differentiation, and that the process of state formation in Greece and Rome was paralleled by the constitution of propertied patriarchal families [ibid. 220, chapters 4-6], he does not, in fact, situate these developments with reference to one another in
Engels does not assert that the sex struggle antedates class conflict. Neither, however, does he clearly argue that it is rooted in the emergence of class society. He simply treats the two developments as parallel, skirting the difficult problems of historical origins and theoretical relationships [Vogel 1983: 84].

In addition, despite the recurrent assertion from the Manifesto of the Communist Party [Marx and Engels 1848: 494, 487] that women are to men as the proletariat is to the bourgeoisie, he subsumes their liberation to their entry into socialist social production. Thus, he leaves no autonomous realm for gender politics and sees the domestic violence of proletarian life as simply an excrescence of capitalist class domination [3].

3.1.2. Radical feminism: the discovery of sexual politics.

In contrast, the first, radical-feminist, approach places sex structures and gender politics front and centre. Kate Millett [1970: 24], an early exponent, widely redefined politics as "power-structured relationships, arrangements whereby one group of persons is controlled by another", which allowed her to redefine sexual politics as control of women by men. I have argued elsewhere that while this concept successfully illuminates power asymmetries in intimate interactions between men and women in the kitchen, bedroom and family, the underlying Weberianism of the notion of power adopted by Millett and others leads to
difficulty in developing a broad structural analysis of sexual politics [4]. For other radical feminists, like Shulamith Firestone [1970], Ti-Grace Atkinson [1974], Alix Kates Shulman [1980] and Susan Brownmiller [1975], the locus of male power and sexual politics retreats even further from social and state structures to the realm of reproductive biology or psychological drives.

Radical feminism also helped to popularize the term "patriarchy", picked up variously from Engels and Freud, to stand for "that which oppresses women" [5]. For Millett, Firestone and others, the mechanisms for maintaining women's oppression are ideological and cultural manifestations of a generic transhistorical patriarchy which is expressed in political parties and governments as it is in all other social relationships. It must be "clearly understood that the arena of sexual revolution is within human consciousness even more pre-eminently than it is within human institutions" [Millett 1970: 45] [6].

In support of this view, there is anthropological evidence that, as societies stratify, the control that older men exercise over women (as brides and as workers) contributes to the more general establishment of social hierarchy [O'Laughlin 1974; Meillassoux 1975; Lévi-Strauss 1969; Blumberg 1975] and that women's subordination was an aspect of primitive state formation [Reiter 1977; Rohrlich 1980]. In addition, O'Brien's [1981]
critique of "malestream" political philosophy from Aristotle to Mill convincingly demonstrates how patriarchally the state has been defined and how exclusively masculine the public realm has been.

More recently, such radical feminist theorists as Katherine Mackinnon [1982; 1983a; 1983b], Andrea Dworkin [1979] and Susan Brownmiller [1975] have expanded their analysis to include the operations of the state in capitalist society. They suggest that the state monitors gender relations to ensure male supremacy, and constructs an oppressed female sexuality. However, while they claim to go beyond marxism they fall into a parallel monocausality, substituting sex for production. And, as Alison Jaggar [1983: 102] has pointed out, radical feminism's belief that "the oppression of women has not changed significantly over time or place" leads them to "view women's original and contemporarary subordination as manifestations of the same phenomenon". This in turn leads to the conflation of historical and causal justifications for the claim that women's subordination is primary. Thus, given its abstract, astructural and ahistorical conception of the social totality, this perspective cannot precisely define relations of power and the play of gender and other politics in a concrete social formation in the way necessary for the kind of analysis proposed here.
3.1.3. Dual systems analysis.

For feminists attempting to integrate marxist and emergent feminist theory, the logical step seemed to be to theorize the second determinative structure: the mode of production of human beings themselves. This second approach, which Iris Young [1980] has called "dual systems analysis", criticises the first for reductionism. Rejecting any simple inversion of a monocausal economist determinism, this extension of the Engelsian problematic instead depicts social life as determined by two separate and mutually irreducible social structures which it tends to label production and reproduction.

Mitchell's [1971] groundbreaking structuralist complication of the Engelsian problematic suggested that, instead of lumping women into an undifferentiated totality of "the family", their position needed to be understood in terms of an interrelationship between the mode of production and a "mode of reproduction" which itself included sexuality, socialization (or childcare) and reproduction (or procreation). However, the fact that these latter not only interpenetrate but also effectively recompose the family has meant that they have remained undeveloped. Nor was she able to move in her analysis from the politics of experience to those of the state.

Emphasizing sexual experience and kinship structures Rubin [1975: 159] provided an expanded definition of a second such
structure: "a 'sex/gender system' is the set of arrangements by which a society transforms biological sexuality into products of human activity, and in which these transformed sexual needs are satisfied". She argues that all societies must have such a structure based on sex, but that such systems need not be hierarchical. Thus, by emphasizing the autonomy of the sex/gender system at the same time as stressing its analytic distinctness from "patriarchy", Rubin developed a notion that has been widely accepted by writers of all three approaches [cf. Sargent 1981; Harding 1983]. Her adaptation of a base/superstructure approach, where sexual differentiation in regard to procreative biology substructures gender including sexual object choice, has been particularly promising for the project of integrating marxism and feminism. However, by relying on Levi-Strauss’s structural anthropology to explain power inequalities rather than by exploring structural marxism’s theory of politics as the unifying moment of social formations, her theory tends in the end to ignore both politics as such and the state.

However, for some feminists working in this vein, not only are the structures of class and gender irreducible to one another, but they are equally important in the organization of social life. In a particularly stark version of such a dualist approach, Roberta Hamilton [1977: 104] went so far as to argue that, given the distinction between structures of women’s
oppression and those of class, it is methodologically appropriate to use feminist theory to analyse the ideology which reproduces the former and marxism for the latter [7]. More recent exponents of this view like Heidi Hartmann, [1975, 1979, 1981], Batya Weinbaum and Amy Bridges [1979] and Azizah Al-Hibri [1981] have taken as a main focus the operation of patriarchy in shaping women's relationship to men in paid employment and household, rather than the state itself.

In so far as the dual systems approach has theorized the relation of the structures of class and sex it has tended to do so in vague terms, as intertwined or dialectically interrelated. In this view, ideology, legal structures and economic dependence are the central mechanisms for reproducing women's subordinated condition and the state, when considered at all, balances the interests of capital with those of patriarchy, usually in favour of patriarchy, however defined [8].

Critics have also pointed out that dual systems theory ignores the historically unified place of the (pre-capitalist) household in production and, more importantly, that it fails to articulate a systematic theory of the relationship between the two structures [9]. Having a separate theory for the two systems retains complementary inadequacies in each. These cannot be overcome simply by putting back together two distorted theories, much as in another context Mary Daly [1975: 65] suggested that one did not arrive at androgyny by sticking together two
distorted halves -- "something like John Wayne and Brigitte Bardot scotch-taped together -- as if two distorted halves could make a whole". Thus, explicit calls for dual systems theory have fallen out of fashion in the face of their understandable inability to provide fully theorised specifications of the relations of gender and class, not only in the present mode of production but transhistorically.

However, a critical appropriation of the dual systems problematic largely by socialist-feminists has generated an important body of empirical studies concerning, for example, the relation of the liberal democratic [Findlay 1981], welfare [Wilson 1977; Kitchen 1980; Lewis 1983] or socialist [Heilbroner 1979; Lapidus 1978; Davin 1976] states to sex/gender systems. In addition, it has led to attempts to overcome the weaknesses of formulations which conceptualise gender and class as simply parallel structures, resulting in what one can call modified dual systems theory.

As a step in this direction, there have been several middle-range studies of the way in which legislation and the court system organize gender relations on the terrain of the household, sexuality and education. The educational system, for example, has been widely studied as a direct and anticipatory secondary socializer of gender for children and adolescents in training as workers [Russell 1987; Blackstone 1976]. While insisting that male control of the state apparatus arises from
their class position rather than simply from their sex, Mary McIntosh [1978] nevertheless sees an indirect role for the state in the reproduction of patriarchy. By the kind of legislation it adopts, it shapes both the family household system and women's economic dependence within the marriage relation. Thus, through family law and welfare legislation the state provides asymmetrical conditions for women's and men's labour force participation and rights to social assistance at the same time as it abdicates legislative and policing responsibility within the household, thereby leaving a space for the operation of patriarchal power.

It is this aspect of state action that Annika Snare and Tove Stang-Dahl [1978] identify as the "coercion of privacy", wherein direct state control is reinforced by the informal controls of culture and male power within the family [10]. However, as Shelly Gavigan [1982] has pointed out with respect to Canadian abortion legislation, the state can also directly invade the private realm, coercing reproductive decisions. This approach does demonstrate that the state acts to regulate gender politics, class politics and their interrelation in specific instance and so advances the problematic beyond that of radical feminism. At the same time, however, not only does it, like simpler forms of dual systems analysis, lack a theory of how these politics are balanced, but it tends to see gender politics as constituted by the state rather than also having their own political
3.1.4. Modified dual systems theory.

Perhaps the leading exponent of this approach, particularly in the field of state theory, is Zillah Eisenstein. Indeed, she has been the only writer to attempt a full scale construction of a theory of women and the state in advanced capitalist society within a modified dual systems framework, and so the strengths and weaknesses of her position are worth examining. For Eisenstein, the liberal capitalist state has a dual character. On the one hand, it exists to serve the interests of the capitalist class; on the other, it is the guarantor of the power relations between the sexes, and as such is patriarchal. In so far as liberal individualism is the ideology of capitalism, at least in the U.S.A., while that of patriarchy rests on an ideology of male privilege, "the capitalist patriarchal state" is not merely dual but contradictory. Sharpening this contradiction is the way in which the patriarchal character of the liberal capitalist state derives from its institutionalization of a division between the public and the private realms. Thus, the state faces a dilemma of conciliating its foundational commitment to privacy, where patriarchy rules, at the same time as it operationalizes its promise of equality for all citizens regardless of ascribed statuses [Eisenstein 1981: 204-206; 1984: 23].
From this position, Eisenstein draws two conclusions. First, because the capitalist patriarchal state is unable to guarantee women's rights, the liberal strategy of legal reform will lead to a radical reassessment of the nature of the state on the part of liberal feminists who dominate the American women's movement. Despite the fact that "the motive of the state, via liberal feminism, is to keep women in their place as secondary wage earners and as mothers", liberal feminism has a radical future "potentially subversive to [both] liberalism and the capitalist patriarchal state" [Eisenstein 1981: 232]. Secondly, this contradiction also helps to explain how a patriarchal reaction could set in at the level of the state, as it arguably has under the administrations of US Presidents Carter (1976-1980) and Reagan (1980-1984) [Eisenstein 1984: 19].

The strength of Eisenstein's analysis is that it seeks to explain gender politics in political terms rather than by shifting ground to transhistorical psycho-cultural factors [11], or to the direct effect of economic factors. However, there are several problems with her position. First, she makes an inadequately theorized and empirically unsubstantiated notion of "sex-class", taken from the nineteenth century American suffragist Elizabeth Cady Stanton, central to her analysis [Eisenstein 1981: 145-162] [12].

More importantly, however, she significantly over-simplifies the Poulantzian theory of the state to which she lays claim
[Eisenstein 1981: 226]. In her use of his concept that the state is "relatively autonomous", she means no more than that the state is motivated in its repressive and ideological activity by contradictory interests internal to the capitalist class and internal to the male sex-class, as well as between the interests of these two "classes" in such a way as to prevent its direct domination by either capitalism or patriarchy. While even this is more sophisticated than earlier dualist and radical feminist views of an instrumental state at the beck and call of a unified patriarchal class of all men, it loses sight of Poulantzas's more complex point that because the political field is the moment where unity is constituted a whole range of contradictory and complex forces come into play so that politics cannot be reduced to any one set of contradictory processes.

Third, Eisenstein's view that both patriarchy and capitalism contain at least some internal contradictions does not rescue her view of the totality from an underlying simple dualism. She fails to carry forward Poulantzas's conception of the political field as a complex totality, or to expand it so as to include the kind of intersubjective and sexual power relations that radical feminists insist are important. As a result, in her usage, if not as explicitly defined, the state is regarded as a unitary institution. In effect, in trying to introduce gender politics into a theory of the capitalist state she has simultaneously fallen into the trap of giving an essentialist content to a
Poulantzian (i.e. structuralist) concept.

This view of the state, as well as her teleological optimism about liberal feminism's radical future, also leads her to an implicit trust in the strategy of lobbying the state for reform. Such optimism about the ultimately benign potential of state reforms also avoids the problem that other feminist theorists, like the materialist feminist Christine Delphy [1980], the socialist feminist Michele Barrett [1980], the anarchist feminist Nicole Laurin Frenette [1982] or Mary O'Brien [1981: 185-210], have raised concerning the dangers of political and ideological recuperation. Aside from the theoretical issues involved here, we should signal that Eisenstein's analytic framework provides no way to think practically and strategically about this problem, while discussion about it was a feature of revolutionary and radical feminist political discourse in Quebec.

Finally, in taking over Poulantzian theory, Eisenstein fails to incorporate -- or perhaps even notice -- his Gramscian underpinnings. Thus, for example, she has no theory of how hegemonic ideology develops in relation to the construction of bloc unity in the political field. To a certain extent, this leaves her no choice but to reproduce some elements of the liberal theory of the separation between public and private which she is concerned from a feminist strategic perspective to contest.
3.1.5. An expanded framework.

The third approach is to expand an existing framework. There are at least two strategies for accomplishing this. The first, and the least conceptually radical, is to treat sex and gender difference as simply another variable in the social system which can be added into the empirical mix without disrupting the overall categorical framework from which explanations are being derived. Here, in effect, it is a matter of potentiating rather than transforming an existing framework. Sex differences that had previously been glossed over in conventionally sexist terms can be critically re-examined [McCormack 1975] [13].

In mainstream political science, for example, feminism has provoked a critical re-evaluation of studies of political participation. In such work, all the evidence points to the fact that women are not merely "apolitical" but excluded. Their under-representation among office holders in political parties, legislatures and positions of power in the state apparatus is assured by gatekeeping activities that deprive them of access to the financial, political and social resources that election to office or power brokerage requires [Flora and Lynn 1974; Bashevkin 1983; Brodie and Vickers 1981; Manley 1980]. There is also general agreement that participation rates and independence of choice in voting for women depend on the salience to them of political issues and their assessment of their capacity to be effective [Jacquette: 1974 9-13; Flora and Lynn 1974; Duverger
1955]. By itself though, all this remains descriptive and leaves open the question of why these barriers exist, and why there are sex differences with respect to the salience of political issues. Nor can gatekeeping be explained in the terms of motivation and politicization that are usually used to explain participation.

What seems to be revealed, rather, is the symptomatic presence of a structure of power with multi-dimensional implications. One might ask, for example: do women vote as their husbands do as a result of their full and free agreement with their spouses' political choices, or as a result of their location in two overlapping political systems and power structures, micronic family politics and macronic electoral politics, both structured by male female power differentials? The scope and limitations of the strategy of adding women on are evident in a recent study of the "gender gap" in voting behaviour [Klein 1984]. Here, gender asymmetries (along with changes in family size and women's work force participation) are introduced to explain voting behaviour. As well as providing a fuller data bank which is important in itself, this work builds up an informational nest egg from which more speculative theoretical ventures can be hatched. Indeed, the more attention paid to gender related phenomena, the more a thorough re-conceptualization is unavoidable.

In this light, a second strategy is to set about expanding an existing framework so as to provide a fuller totalization within
which the pre-existing categories are not merely stretched, but redefined and reconfigured so as to make conceptual room for what can be taken to be an irreducible and irreducibly complex dimension. This strategy has been pursued by marxists engaged in the examination of domestic labour who, in examining the full social underpinnings of the category of the reproduction of labour power, have called for corrections in the way in which the more general category of mode of production is theorized [Fox 1980; Seccombe 1980a 1980b; Luxton 1980]. More recent attempts to avoid theoretical eclecticism have led some marxist feminists to emphasize the historical and class implications of reproductive biology in determining gender structures and family organization [Armstrong and Armstrong 1983; Brenner and Ramas 1984]. In avoiding at all costs what they see as an incoherent dualism, such writers as Joanna Brenner and Marla Ramas have eliminated gender politics as a determining variable altogether. However, while not economist in the old-fashioned sense of reducing gender to class determinations, their bio-economic exclusion of a political dimension has the same reductive effect.

It is in this context that O'Brien has called for a feminist modification of hegemony theory. "Hegemonic analysis", she says, "unpacks such social processes" as the difference between women's and men's morality and the male supremacist character of dominant working class values "without falling into the crevasses of theology or economism" [O'Brien 1984: 86]. She has not herself,
however, provided more than the glimmerings of a picture of what such an expanded theory of hegemony would look like and, indeed, this task remains to be done [14].

3.2. Towards a synthesis.

Like Mary O'Brien, I believe that one fruitful way to approach the theoretical synthesis required for the analytic task at hand is through a revision of hegemony theory. More particularly, with suitable corrections, the structuralist interpretation of that tradition, with its move to understand the social formation as decentred and politics as the process whereby its unity is maintained or changed, the political region as irreducible and the meaning of ideological elements as constituted through their locus in an ideological complex, opens up a non-economist door which feminist theory can push through.

At the same time, the feminist framework chosen for the task must be theoretically capable of being integrated into such a synthesis. Here, obviously, neither radical feminism's emphasis on the universally invariant, and perhaps even pre-social, character of patriarchy nor strict dual systems analysis's static conception that the two structures of patriarchy and class must be given equal weight are congruent with the dynamic historical instability of social formations highlighted by hegemony theory. Thus, the modified dual systems analysis that can consider sex gender and class structures as co-determined is most
appropriate.

What would such a synthesis look like? In attempting an answer to this question, I make no claim to present a theoretically complete integration of feminist and hegemony theory. However, while I have argued above that, at this stage, theoretical work must proceed in conjunction with concrete historical study, I also recognize that the concepts and theories one starts with selectively structure what can be seen. In that light, then, the following theses are advanced as a provisional starting point for undertaking the double correction of feminist and hegemony theory I believe necessary to theorize the place and character of contemporay gender politics.

1. At stake in gender politics is the way in which females and males are constituted as gendered subjects (women and men) who are capable of interacting with one another in a hierarchical or egalitarian fashion. For this reason, explicit and implicit forms of gender politics pervade every dimension of social life. Without absolutizing the distinction, we can say that it is importantly situated in both micronic interactions of every day life and the macronic political field, that is, in both the private and public realms; and that while these realms evidently affect one another in complex ways gender politics thus takes place in two distinct zones. On its internal pole, it is constituted in relation to identity, emotionality, sexuality, procreation, domestic labour, kinship and the family. On the
external pole gender politics is constituted in relation to the entire place and relation of forces in the social formation (i.e. the play of class, ethnic, national and bloc forces) and in relation to the state as their ultimate regulator. What this means is that the family-household system as the key mediating structure between these levels is both a site of politics and an object of politics. It also means that the gender politics of a society are irreducibly complex and cannot be conceived as unitary or as unfolding in a well-defined and easily circumscribed sector.

2. Given the pervasiveness of gender and of class structures in class societies, hegemonic and counter-hegemonic blocs and the ideological cement that holds them together are always at least doubly constituted by class and gender politics. In other words, the political field where the politics of hegemony are played out, is as it were, also doubly constituted: that is, by the politics of the mode of production/class (as structures) and of social formation/bloc (as processes) on the one hand and by mode of production/class (as economic structures and politics) and the sex/gender system (as gender structures and politics) on the other.

3. As capitalism has developed, there has been a historical shift in the formal constitution of gender structures. Entrenched male power (with the "patriarch" as household head, legal representative, citizen and work team and religious leader)
has given way to modified male power, with women and men having full legal and citizenship rights and independent relations to production and religious affiliation [15]. This has had ramifications for the entire constitution of ideology, politics and the state in advanced capitalism.

a) With respect to ideology, the interpellated "we" of dominant ideology and public political discourse has moved from being explicitly and then implicitly masculine to become implicitly then explicitly both masculine and feminine. The relational triangles, of men-work-family and women-work-family, have also been ideologically reconstituted. This process has developed unevenly, with an increase in women's workforce participation rates occurring in advance of first, the modification of the ideological representation of women and later men and secondly, the modification of political discourses to accommodate women's interests as defined by an autonomous movement.

b) With respect to the political field, there has been a similar shift in that, first, sex/gender politics and political issues have become explicitly articulated as political. Secondly, the organizational strength and institutionalization of an autonomous women's movement and of women's interest groups in mixed sex organizations has meant that "women" have been able to constitute themselves as a political force on the political field. In effect, the ideological constitution of the feminine has moved to the stage where women have come to be constituted as
what Marx might have called a gender (and movement) for itself, that is, self-consciously self-defining in part through the development of organizational supports for autonomous political practice and ideological struggle.

c) With respect to the state, there has also been a shift in the character of the state as well as in the contents of its legal constitution of gender relations. Overall, the maintenance of male power and the state's role vis-a-vis capitalism have been decoupled, a process that has passed through a stage in which "patriarchy" was privatized by relegating the exercise of male power to the private realm, even while the state adopted and maintained an officially egalitarian posture in which women and men were legally constituted as citizens. Winning the bourgeois democratic right of citizenship as "equality in and under the law" has been, in the case of women, an uneven process still uncompleted in some countries. Increasingly, the state has had to intervene in production relations and privacy in order to fulfill the demands of "women" and maintain its moral authority in the shifting play of bloc politics. In addition, legal and administrative structures have changed, as a result of welfarism and political pressure on part of women's movements.

In sum, we can say that the importance of all of these shifts is not just that gender relations have themselves become an important and explicit axis of politics and ideology, but also that a new relationship between gender relations and the
politicco-ideological field as a whole has been established. In effect, the entry of the male/female axis as an explicit and conflictual element in the process of bloc formation and in the play of bloc politics has led to a further stage in the decentering of class and class relations with respect to the whole process of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic bloc formation in advanced capitalism.

4. Notwithstanding the generality of these tendencies in late capitalist development, they take historically specific forms, developing unevenly, in combination with other political relations, and in a context of bloc politics and formation. The actual relation of gender politics to other forms of politics and the processes of bloc formation must therefore be worked out in each case.

4.1. Introduction.

This chapter offers a preliminary background sketch of bloc and gender politics in Quebec, 1960-1980. The aim here is not so much to provide a general historical background, but to begin to operationalize the conceptual structure outlined above with respect to the specific social formation under investigation. This bloc structure, understood in terms of class alliances and cleavages, integrating ideologies and party leaderships, is laid out. There are, I argue, two major bloc structures: a liberal modernisation bloc headed by the PLQ (1960-1976) and a progressive nationalist bloc headed by the PQ (1976-1980). Finally, lines for investigating the specific relation of gender politics to this changing bloc context are sketched out.

Before proceeding, two qualifying notes may be in order. First, this analysis is not complete. More detailed discussion of the specific ideologies and constitutions of collective political actors (parties, unions and movements) are developed in relation to the analysis of each sector of feminism (Liberal, revolutionary, radical, trade union and state-sponsored) in the appropriate chapters. Secondly, there is no single historical work adequate to give readers an introduction to the period. However, readers are referred to Denis Monière's Le développement
des idéologies au Québec [1977], William Coleman's The
Independence Movement in Quebec, 1945-1975 [1984], Dale Postgate
and Kenneth McRoberts's Quebec: Social changes and Political
Crisis [1976], Henry Milner's Politics in the New Quebec [1978],
Louis-Marie Tremblay's classic study of the trade union movement
Le syndicalisme québécois: Idéologies de la CSN et de la FTQ,
1940-1970 [1972], Jacques Rouillard's Histoire de la CSN, 1921-81
[1981], and the Collectif Clio's L'histoire des femmes au Québec:
depuis quatre siècles [1982].

4.2. Class alliances and bloc formation.

4.2.1. Quebec class structure and hegemonic blocs.

As the Gramscian perspective suggests, shifting patterns of
class and gender alliances in Quebec were cemented and given
shape by ideological configurations that united the project of a
dominating class with the aspirations of other social groups,
aspirations that came out of particular enduring social
conditions. In the case of Quebec, these conditions were
affected most particularly by an unresolved national question
which went back to the British conquest of New France in 1759 and
the establishment of a federated Canadian state in 1867 [1]. The
problem of what form of social organization and political
relation to the Canadian state would be able to ensure not just
the survival (la survivance) but the developmental autonomy of
the French-speaking people of Quebec is extremely important for
the period of study. In addition, as the synthetic framework sketched out above suggests, during a period traversed by a deliberate state policy of modernisation and economic development, gender ideologies would both change and play an increasingly important role in the construction of hegemonic and opposition blocs as conditions of women's lives changed and as a developing women's movement built its organizational base, reformulated ideologies on the relation of "woman" to work, marriage and nation and increasingly engaged in politics.

The two decades between 1960-1980 can be subdivided into two major periods wherein hegemony was exercised by two historic blocs, first in the name of modernisation and then of nationalism, separated by an interregnum when high levels of social conflict and ideological contestation led, during October 1970, to a classic crisis of hegemony. How were ideology, class alliances and gender politics shaped in the blocs and counterblocs in Quebec that correspond to this periodisation?

To answer this question raises the issue of how hegemony can be empirically studied. Most generally this means finding out what class and gender forces are at play, measuring not merely governmental power but consent and moral authority, identifying unifying ideologies and analysing them for the meaning of their class and gender elements. However, in an historical study, we must also work from the data that is available.
Unsatisfactory as it may be, a rough index of consent is provided by voting patterns or opinion polls. Documentary evidence from collective and individual social actors also illustrates the ways in which they pick up and replicate or redefine particular thematics central to the major blocs in play, in this case those formed around the political projects of modernisation and nationalism. Counter-hegemonic opposition can be traced in ideological productions (from formally adopted platforms to pamphlets), as well as in a range of action (from the extraparliamentary tactics, like demonstrations and strikes, to actions circumscribed by the formal structures of the state, like electioneering, lobbying and litigation). The extent to which such actions can be contained by or are in rupture with existing hegemonic or oppositional ideologies can be determined by establishing whether or not central ideological elements (for example, the extent and origins of male/female conflict) are part of or break from a hegemonic ideological configuration, given the specific meanings they have both in the hegemonic bloc ideology and in the specific ideology of any (collective) political actor.

But before considering such overall questions, it is necessary to see how the succeeding blocs were composed, and for this it is necessary to identify the various class forces on the scene.

How to define the class forces at play in Quebec during this period and their relation to nationalism has, given the overtly
political character of this question, provoked considerable
debate [Niosi 1978b; Bourque 1978; Legaré 1977; Coleman 1984].
While it is beyond the scope of this study to enter into the
intricacies of the discussion, it is nevertheless necessary to
define class terms at least minimally in order to flesh out the
feminist/hegemony theoretical framework I have adopted. As Anne
Legaré [1977: 181] has concluded in the to date most complete
study of Les classes sociales au Québec, while classes exist only
in struggles their structural relation to one another can be seen
as a necessary objective support to these struggles.

There is in sociology a wide debate on the terms that are
appropriate for social classes. Among the available terms for
the non-dominant classes are industrial and service workers, the
proletariat or working class, agricultural classes, the new
middle class and the petty bourgeoisie. Because of the
theoretical importance that marxist and Gramscian analysis
accords to the wage relation to capital [Marx 1973: 508, 510;
Gramsci 1971: 366; 1977: 34-37], I adopt a wide definition of the
"working class" to include not only the traditional (and
traditionally male) industrial proletariat but also state sector
and tertiary private sector workers who do not fill management
functions [2]. We should note that the composition and location
of this class has changed, with more women in the labour market
and more workers, both male and female, in tertiary sectors of
public and private administration, finance, sales and service

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The ideologies and policies of trade union centrals are taken to represent the political interests of the working class. Two problems are signaled here. First, there is an unexplored question of the extent to which official trade union ideologies are (or are not) internalized by their memberships. In one sense, this is irrelevant to the construction of blocs and debate on the political field, for here organizations "act". In another sense, the importance of whether or not official ideologies interpellate their members cannot be denied, not just in the intersubjective aspects of gender politics in the home and at work, but for the way that the action of individual trade unionists (for example, in their civic actions of voting or their participation in strikes) can reinforce or undermine the positions taken by the larger organization.

Second, there is the problem of whether to consider all state sector workers as part of the working class, including, for example teachers, or whether some other term should be used. Two sets of terms have been proposed to describe those in the "middling" positions created by advanced capitalism. Hubert Guindon [1964; 1960] proposed the term "new middle class" to describe white collar workers, often with post-secondary education, in the administrative bureaucracies of the state, educational system, private enterprise and the church [3]. Grouping together civil servants, teachers, members of the
private sector communications industry and middle level
industrial managers is problematic because it is based on
consumption patterns, in the first instance of education, and on
ideological self-definitions constructed without reference to the
specific (and different) relation of these layers to the
relations of production. To use the term would thus introduce an
eclectic theoretical element into a neo-marxist discourse [4].

To avoid such inconsistency, some marxist sociologists, notably
close followers of Poulantzas like Legaré [1977: 44-72], have
proposed the retention of the category "petty bourgeoisie" for the
members of such occupations. But, almost entirely (except for
upper level managers), these occupational categories are part of
a new salariat who, despite their educational "capital", are
separated from the means of production and so forced to sell
their labour in the labour market for a sustenance wage [5].
Should they then be called, as André Gorz [1968] proposed, the
"new working class" or, with Legaré [1977: 104, 175-176] "la
petite bourgeoisie salariée"? My choice is to use terms which
emphasize the separation of such workers from the means of
production, their lack of decisional power, the character of
their work, their union membership and the self-definition they
had come to adopt by the 1970s: the new working class or,
sometimes, intellectual workers [CEQ 1973a: 13]. Insofar as this
occupational group has played an important role in forming and
cementing the political alliances of blocs in the 1960s and
1970s, it is certainly useful, despite the variety of sub-groups it includes, to see it as a distinguishable class layer [6].

Finally, there is the classically defined petty bourgeoisie of independent professionals and small business owners. Despite their absolutely and proportionally declining numbers, farmers should be noted here [7]. Reference to farmers and small business must be made not merely for completeness but rather because they were the social layer from which the membership of one of the most important women's organizations, AFEAS, drew its membership [AFEAS 1981a]. In addition, as Gramsci suggests, the ideologies and the parties which they have supported electorally have tended, as we shall see, to be the parliamentary voice of conservative gender politics.

Structurally opposed to the subordinate classes is the capitalist class, itself not monolithic but with internal divisions of size, sector and origins. Capital operating in Quebec can be divided into international capital, largely American but with some French and British representation, Anglo-Canadian capital, owned by non-francophones and local francophone capital [Raynalud 1961; Ministère de l'Industrie 1976; Parenteau 1976]. The history of class formation in Quebec had left this latter, the core of a national bourgeoisie, extremely underdeveloped and unable to resist the incursions of imperialist capital, on the one hand, or to defeat the politically dominant alliance of an ultramontanist clergy and a
petty bourgeoisie devoted to resisting the social and political effects of industrialization, on the other. As a result, in 1960 the francophone sector of the capitalist class was small, numerically under-represented and undercapitalized and so often restricted to labour intensive sectors [Legaré 1977: 85-87]. However, by 1980, as a result of a successful state supported process of consolidation of capital, it had grown in size, assets and power to the point where it had gained control over "a number of large companies formerly under anglophone control", including natural resource and industrial concerns, and had generally engaged in a process of capital consolidation [Niosi 1981: 64] [8]. In the course of the two decades, then, partly through state policy and partly through the normal processes of accumulation, not only did individual local capitalists increase the size of their operations, but this sector of the capitalist class itself grew as a whole [Ibid: Chapter 3].

Not just because of its multi-national composition nor because of its objection to the social reforms advocated by "social-democratic" or "socialist" nationalist currents, but also because of its need for access to a pan-Canadian if not international market, for federal subsidies and for favourable legislation, this capitalist class has not supported the full nationalist programme of independence [9]. In particular cases, some sectors supported some state intervention into the provincial economy, for example, in the nationalization of
hydro-electric power or the development of Quebec based industrial funds [10]. In 1969 large capital acquired a politico-ideological voice to counter a militant labour movement and co-ordinate with the state through the founding of the Consell du patronat du Québec (CPQ) [Fournier 1976: 63-64].

The foregoing discussion, while helpful, should be modified by two remarks, for not only are classes defined through class struggles, they shift historically. First, over the period of the study, the weight of internal constitutive elements in particular classes changed. Within the working class, widely defined, new layers gained numerical importance, most particularly blue and white collar, educated and manual state sector workers, whose numbers increased from 36,766 in 1960 to 42,645 in 1964 and [Quebec 1966/1967: 202] 78,896 in 1969 [Quebec 1969/1970: 99]. This change, a growth rate of 5.5% a year (1955-1963) [Quebec 1964/1965: 114] was, in large part, due to the massive transfer of workers from jobs in institutions controlled by the Catholic Church to those controlled by the state in health care, education and welfare work, as well as to the expansion of these sectors [Gow 1976]. In addition, as public sector administration and public enterprises (e.g. Hydro-Québec) expanded, so too did employment in this area. As we shall see, these changes particularly affected women workers [Chapter 8].

Within the middling classes, the traditional petty bourgeoisie decreased. Lawyers, for example, increasingly worked for
corporations and governments and many doctors were employed by the state health service [Niosi 1981: 6; Interview: K]. Also, as falling recruitment failed to replace the large numbers of women and men religious who left teaching, service and contemplative orders, many of them for secular employment in similar positions, the size of the clergy fell. The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that by the 1970s an important layer of non-management state sector workers and of a new bureaucratic administrative layer, both in the state and in state sponsored economic organizations, had also swollen the ranks of the middling classes [Legaré 1977: 103-105] [11]. In Gramsci's terms, we could say that traditional intellectuals were being replaced by intellectuals organic to late capitalism [12].

Overall then, the relative weight of classes on the political stage changed as did their relation to the state. All classes became more state dependent, which engendered new lines of conflict as different classes, class layers and political currents sought to influence its expanding administration. This reconfiguration of classes necessarily affected the process of establishing and maintaining hegemonic and counter-hegemonic ideologies and blocs. For, insofar as the formation and fragmentation of blocs also involved the formation and dissolution of specific class alliances, the basis for these alliances would shift not only on ideological grounds but in response to their changing economic features. For example, the
relation of the governing party to state sector unions became increasingly important in bloc formation and cleavage.

These, then are the class forces in play. How were bloc alliances among them formed?

4.2.2. Liberal modernisation.

The first bloc, which dominated the Quebec political scene from the election of June 1960 to October 1970, was constituted by a cross-class alliance led by the PLQ under Premier Jean Lesage. Intellectuals (including journalists, teachers, academics, students, some women's groups, and the progressive clergy), trade unionists, particularly in the CSN, some members of the middle classes and representatives of capital had joined together in opposition to the backwardness, corruption and authoritarianism of the previous UN government under the leadership of Premier Maurice Duplessis [13]. Buoyed by an optimism which rested on the prospects of growth in an expansionist phase of the business cycle, the PLQ promised the creation of employment through increasing francophone control in productive enterprises [Le Devoir April 30 1960] and accelerated economic development through state intervention [14]. Overall, the programme offered by the Liberals was one of modernization: of the state and its administrative apparatuses, of the political system and of the economy. Their 1960 platform, announced under the slogan, "C'est
"le temps que ça change!" [Le Devoir 30 April 1960] sketched the outline for an evolving series of reforms that came to be known as the Quiet Revolution [15].

The 1960 election was more significant than a simple transfer of power between rival parties in a liberal democracy usually is: in marking the ascendancy of a new hegemonic bloc, it held implications for wider alterations in cultural life, ideology, and political practices. It should also be said that the ascendancy of liberal modernisation as an ideology and project were to some extent independent of electoral success of the PLQ itself [16]. Although it was defeated in 1966, in part as a result of "disappointment with the rhythm of reform", when the UN returned to office with 55 seats in the Assemblée Nationale/National Assembly to the Liberals' 51, the restored governing party had "sa plus grande force dans les circonscriptions électorales peu populéuses" [Lemieux et al. 1970: 21, 38]. Thus, the UN returned to power with only 40% of the popular vote, seven percentage points less than the PLQ share [ibid: 21] [17]. In addition, while there were differences of policy, the UN continued the main lines of the modernization programme identified with the Liberals [Milner 1978: 120] [18].

At the level of the economy, the inadequacy of capital pools to transform local enterprises (particularly in the agricultural, energy and heavy industrial sectors), a lack of skilled labour and an absence of economic planning were seen as barriers to
development. Indeed, these blockages had begun to put "en péril la continuité de la croissance économique" [Bernier 1976: 49].

In response, the Liberals proposed state aid to rationalise the economic base (particularly in agriculture, hydro-electric power and steel), to revamp the educational system to produce technically skilled labour power and to create the material and social infrastructures perceived to be appropriate to an advanced capitalist society (hospitals, urban transportation, roads, and communications).

All this was to be supervised by a state planning organization, with membership from unions and business alike [19] and to be financed by a state run development bank, the Société générale de financement. The Caisse de dépôt et de placement du Québec, founded in 1965 and funded in part by the provincial state through its opting out of a federal pension scheme, provided an internal source of financing for state projects [Postgate and McRoberts 1976: 115]. Through such measures, the PLQ evidently placed a greater reliance on the state as an actor than is to be found in laissez-faire liberalism. Given the weakness of the Quebec bourgeoisie, the turn to the state was in part a pragmatic use of an instrument at hand [20]. But it also reflected a conception that an expanded state that intervened in economic and cultural life was appropriate to advanced capitalist societies.

While these reforms were promoted electorally on the basis of their ability to increase social wealth for the mass of the
people [Le Devoir 20 April 1980], they could and were to be carried out without altering capitalist relations of production. Thus, representatives of all branches of capital operating in Quebec, international as well as local, gave cautious support to the project. While local capital looked for direct economic benefits, international capital welcomed the modernisation programme’s promise of less labour strife and technically trained workers.

At the political level of its programme, the PLQ sought to revalorize the state and the political system by extending democratic citizenship participation, by ending patronage and corruption in the electoral process and the civil service and by greater state involvement in the provision of services to the citizenry, particularly in the areas of education, welfare, and health care [21]. Secularization—or more mildly laicization, through the establishment of a system of citizen’s advisory committees at the community level—of these institutions corresponded to the shift in power at the political centre. Altogether these reforms served to legitimate the state as an institution which came to aspire to replace the church as the central ideological institution in Quebec and as the guarantor of "French-Canadian" survival and aspirations.

In this connection it is worth noting that the rise of modernisation as an orientation coincided with and was amplified by independent developments within the Catholic church itself.
In 1960, its clergy were still powerful (re)producers of sometimes nationalist ideology through their control of educational, community, and communications as well as religious institutions [Lacoste 1973; Magnuson 1980: 73]. From 1960-1965 under the leadership of Pope John XXIII, the Catholic church was engaged internationally in a process of reforming its religious orders, liturgy and social policy to meet the requirements of the modern age [22]. In new Catholic social policy, state increased intervention was recognized as legitimate insofar as it favoured social co-operation and the common good [John XXIII 1961: 415-418; Charles 1982: 174]. This was only one of several coincidences of modernization ideology and new Catholic social philosophy, both of which adopted perspectives from the social sciences, particularly sociology and political science. As well as electoral support for the Liberals, by priests like the Abbés Gérard Dion and Louis O'Neill [Le Devoir 20 April 1960; Dion and O'Neill 1960], the Church educated its adherents to new conceptions of Catholic organizations as "groupes intermédiaires", intervening to help the state shape social policies [AFEAS 1:1 Jan 1987: 33; Charles 1982: 411]. Like the Liberals, then, the Church was engaged in a process of valorizing political activity in the public sphere and, if unintentionally, the state as such.

At the same time, some members of the clergy sharply opposed specific Liberal undertakings. The greatest conflict arose with
regard to the educational reform which was eventually to strip the church of much of its administrative and ideological power to define curriculum and hire teachers. Still, there was some support among Catholics even for these reforms [23]. Members of the laity, many of them women, actively campaigned for various degrees of increased state control of education through, for example, the pages of *Cité Libre* and in the *Mouvement laïque de la langue française* [Barrière 1963] [24]. Despite official church opposition to state control of education, two important clerical educators, Monsignor Alphonse-Marie Parent and Sister Marie-Laurent de Rome, served on and so lent their legitimacy to the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education whose report recommended sweeping changes [25]. As a result, a *Ministère d'Éducation* was established in 1964 against clerical opposition [26] as was also, in 1967, a new network of free, post-secondary institutions or CEGEPS, *Collèges d'enseignement général et professionnel*, oriented towards scientific and professional ends and designed to supercede the existing system of highly stratified, fee-paying church administered *collèges classiques* which privileged classical studies. In addition, confessional teachers' organizations had themselves been long pressing for reforms in administration, curriculum, qualifications and labour relations [8.4.3. below]. Finally, as these reforms began to take effect, they opened up occupational opportunities for lay university trained teachers and administrators and so began to create an institutionalized layer of support among state employed
educational workers [Milner 1978: 136].

For the PLQ's modernisation project to take hold there had, of course, to be consent. And here a combination of ideological management from above and cultural developments from below helped to generate the requisite cross-class acceptance so that the hegemony of this new articulation of bourgeois ideology with popular democratic ideological elements and national aspirations was ensured. Faith in elements of the survivalist discourse, which had praised and reinforced an involuted focus on land, language and church and had inveighed against industry as anglo-saxon materialism [Monière 1977: 181, 212-226], were to be replaced by commitment to a progressive ideology capable of integrating a faith in science, rational planning, and economic progress. Economic projects, like the centralization and development of energy resources, resonated through popular culture, witness the adoption of the punning "Manic" from the Manicouagan dam into non-state popular and commercial discourses in advertisements, songs, and so on [27].

However, given the political effects of the unresolved national question in Quebec, there was not a free field for ideological manipulations. Despite a modernist turning outward to technology, Harvard, and France for inspiration, and despite a close political association of the previous hegemonic bloc's with clerical-nationalism, the ideological element of national survival could not easily be discarded. The results of a private
pol I carried out by the Liberals in late 1959 and early 1960 made the new government conscious of the electoral importance not merely of preserving "French-Canadian identity" and turning it into something congruent with participation and even leadership in the modern world, a difficult enough task in itself, but also of increasing Quebec autonomy [28].

Thus, although one current of the reform movement initially promoted individualism over nationalism [Postgate and McRoberts 1976: 89], the national question was an issue that remained an enduring feature of the Quebec political field. In addition, attempts to develop Quebec society themselves gave rise to new nationalist aspirations as they confronted structural conflicts built into the division of powers between Ottawa and the provinces. Revelations of the Laurendeau-Dunton Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism about the economically and politically disadvantaged position of francophones and the experience of blocked career paths on the part of civil servants returning from Ottawa to Quebec all fed a dynamic which linked individual well-being with nationalism [Dion 1973b: 255-260]. Finally, nationalist rhetoric was sharpened by electoral rivalries between the "modernising" Liberals and the "nationalist" UN [29]. All of these contributed to the development of a new and "optimistic" concept of the nation, still defined by language, but newly geographically bounded and linked to the Quebec state in lieu of the previous definition of
a (dispersed) French-Canadianism defined by its religious mission [30].

The economic, political and ideological dimensions of the Quiet Revolution's programme of 'modernising' Quebec provide a context for understanding the development in this period of policy towards, and the actual social situation of, women. The line adopted vis-a-vis gender relations, on the part of both the ruling party and ideological definers, was a minimal modernisation which brought women closer to full citizenship rights, encouraged their political participation and educated them for paid employment. As will be shown in Chapter 5, women became active in the Quiet Revolution both as party workers and in pressure groups. And it was in relation to this hegemonic project that the first feminist organizations in Quebec were shaped.

4.2.3. The growth of a new opposition bloc: nationalism and socialism.

During the Liberal's second term (1962-1966) the modernisation alliance began to fragment along lines of ideological difference, both nationalist and socialist, and of class cleavage. Divisions over nationalism occurred both within the ruling party, with Liberal cabinet member, René Lévesque, leaving the PLQ to set up the Mouvement souveraineté-association (MSA) in October 1967, and
In the wider society [Le Devoir 16 Oct. 1967; Saywell 1977: 9-18]. These developments were expressed both politically and culturally. Indeed, behind the 1966 defeat of the PLQ was the success of the unilingualist Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance nationale (RIN) and the more conservative Ralllement national (RN) in gaining 5.6% and 2.3% of the popular vote respectively [31]. In extraparliamentary politics, Montreal militants from workers' and citizens' committees, student and nationalist groups, formed in 1970 FRAP (Front d'action politique), a socialist political action group, which decided to contest the 1970 municipal election [Milner 1978: 200]. As well, nationalist sentiment stimulated a cultural efflorescence in music, literature, film and theatre, a creative mix expressed in the revolutionary nationalist journal Parti Pris (1963-1968), which combined poetry and fiction with a critique of clerical, class and foreign domination, liberalism and social and sexual repression [Parti Pris 1:1 1963: 3-8; Monière 1977: 343-351]. Although gender issues were subordinated to those of nation, and those of sexuality thought through in androcentric terms [6.1.2. and 6.1.3. below], the key ideological elements of nation, state and progress were themselves transformed, as we shall see, in important ways that were to affect gender politics and ideologies.

Finally, the CSN, the CEQ and later the FTQ began to develop an ideology that tied nationalism to workers' liberation [CSN PV
1966: 8-16; 1971b; CEQ 1972b; FTQ 1972b, 1973a]. This ideology and struggles against the state as employer split them from the ruling parties, particularly during the restored UN government, 1966-1970, and the third PLQ administration 1970-1973 [9.3 below]. Working class unity and radicalization was also on balance strengthened by the Front commun developed to negotiate in the public sector in 1970 [Le Devoir 13 Jan., 3 March 1972] [32]. In April 1972, after a two-week strike following prolonged negotiations, public sector workers were legislated back to work under threat of heavy fines for non-compliance for both individuals and unions. After the presidents of the three centrals, Marcel Pépin (CSN), Louis Laberge (FTQ) and Yvon Charbonneau (CEQ), were sentenced to one year prison terms for defying a back-to-work injunction, a series of strikes, occupations and walkouts both by public sector workers and their private sector union supporters shook Quebec in early May [Le Devoir 15, 20 24 May 1972]. A second public sector common front, established in 1975, used rotating strikes effectively over the summer of 1976 to gain favourable settlements and not incidentally, help bring down the PLQ government [Le Devoir 26 May, 10 Nov 1976; Milner 1978: 184-185]. As we shall see, these strikes not only developed class consciousness in the labour movement but also were important for the overthrow of sexist working class gender politics [8.4.1.11. below].

The October crisis of 1970 [33] was sparked by actions of the
Front de Libération du Québec, a revolutionary nationalist organization, which had sporadically carried out bombings and armed robberies in 1963-64, 1966 and 1968 at several business and political targets including: the Montreal City Hall, the stock exchange, the anglo-Canadian retail chain Eaton's, the (Liberal) Reform Club and the National Revenue Building [Milner 1978: 197-198]. In 1970, FLQ "cells" kidnapped James Cross, a British trade official and PLQ Labour Minister Pierre Laporte, whom they offered to free in return for the public broadcasting of a manifesto and the release of "political prisoners", i.e. revolutionary nationalist activists jailed for the kinds of criminal acts listed above. The broadcast of their manifesto [FLQ 1970] generated considerable public support for their goals of political independence and workers' control of the economy, including endorsement by the leaders of FRAP of the goals, if not the tactics [Interview: P; Milner 1978: 200]. However, the federal government enacted the War Measures Act and ordered the army into Quebec to contain an "apprehended" insurrection. Civil rights were suspended and nationalists, students, leftists, community activists and unionists were arrested. The whole affair was muddled by the activities of undercover federal police. These events mark the beginning of the end of the Liberal phase of the modernization project. Although the PLQ retained governmental power for more than five years, increased levels of social strife, ideological contestation and class antagonisms fragmented the old alliance of unionists, local
capital and traditional intellectuals and resulted in the consolidation of a new opposition bloc [10.1.3. below].

4.2.4. Progressive nationalism.

The electoral victory of the PQ in 1976 marked the coming to power of a what I have called a progressive nationalist bloc. The alliance represented by this party coalesced around an ideology of national political and economic self-determination as the vehicle for economic and social justice. On the one hand this orientation renewed the modernization project and on the other inflected it to the left. In the process of constructing the moral and ideological authority necessary for this oppositional bloc to become hegemonic, revolutionary nationalists, committed to a socialism and extraparliamentarism, and "progressive nationalists", committed to stage theory and electoralism, fought for its ideological domination and political control [6.1.2. and 6.1.3. below].

The coalition of class forces in the progressive nationalist bloc directed by the PQ was from the outset narrower than that which originally supported the liberal modernization project, but still wide among francophones. While it brought together, at least electorally, an alliance of unionized workers, intellectuals, state administrators and the cooperative movement, it lacked the support of most sectors of capital, including private sector administrators and, as Niosi [1978b] has
effectively demonstrated, large and even medium francophone capital.

In 1976, the PQ won the vote of working class ridings and had the electoral allegiance of teachers [34]. But, it had limited support from the labour centrals as such with only the FTQ officially supporting its election. And the CSN's and CEQ's adoption of openly socialist rhetoric to express national and class aspirations also distanced them from the PQ although individuals in the CSN leadership and many teachers supported the party electorally. In addition, as gender politics moved to the centre of the political arena throughout the 1970s, revolutionary and radical feminisms as well as newly militant liberal feminism played an increasingly activist and autonomous role in bloc construction and fragmentation. Thus, the lines of cleavage which were apparent from the beginning in the progressive nationalist bloc were the same as those in the previous liberal modernization bloc (structural class divisions and ideological differences over nationalism) expanded by gender politics.

The complexity of these alliances in relation to the PQ has made it difficult to characterize the class character of that party with any precision. The lack of support from capital suggests that the PQ was not, like the PLQ a bourgeois party. Some, like Daniel Latouche [1976: 119] and René Lévesque himself in the exuberance of electoral victory (1976, cited in Niosi [1978b: 34]) have labelled the PQ a social democratic party, a
label that would suggest formal links with working class organizations. However, Jean-Marc Plotte [1977] has pointed out that the PQ does not have such formal links nor have its membership or electoral bases been homogenously working class [Latouche 1976; Pinard 1970, 1973, 1976]. Finally, Crête [1984: 206] has shown that after the 1976 election until 1984, the PQ had above average support from the households of unionized workers, indeed with unionization being enough to offset the usually low support in over 45 age groups.

In contrast, some commentators have suggested that the PQ is a bourgeois party on the grounds that its leadership includes members of the state bourgeoisie or that its policies favour the development of local capitalism [Bourque 1978]. But, just as the PQ has no formal links with any trade union central, neither is it linked to any employers' association. Indeed, its constitution prevents it from being significantly financed by big business, it has few bourgeois adherents and the party has often promoted policies opposed by entrepreneurs [Niosi 1978a, 1978b].

The final alternative is to see the PQ as a petty bourgeois party, a classification initially advanced by Bourque and Laurin-Frenette [1972]. Pinard and Hamilton have called it a party of intellectuals and have, in the face of electoral results, stressed its narrow base of support in terms of its leadership [1984]. Monière [1977: 338], Milner [1978: 155-156, 158] and Niosi [1978b] emphasize the "middle" class origins of
the majority of its leadership and the presence of a technocratic wing of state-based administrators and managers. At the same time, they agree that the party also has a democratic or participationist wing, which has promoted social democratic policies [Milner 1978: 155; Niosi 1978b]. Indeed, for Monière [1977: 340], it is the combination of the PQ's nationalism and social democratic elements in its programme that allows it to govern in the interests of capital.

In the PQ's first term, its policies balanced class and national interests, with nationalism expressed more "culturally" through language policy than "economically" through the nationalization of foreign owned corporations, and with delays in putting forward legislation demanded by the labour movement [35]. In the second term after the period of this study, it relied increasingly on the "business class" to animate economic development [Coleman 1984: 226] while still passing important legislation on workplace health and safety, control of strikebreaking and equal pay for work of equal value, which was designed to improve the lot of women workers.

There are two points to note here. First, in a capitalist democracy any party that is not striving for a revolutionary change in the relations of production will necessarily legislate in part in favour of capital, whatever its ideology, electoral base or leadership if it does not wish to be subject to pressures, at the extreme a capital strike or military
Intervention as in the case of Chile. Second, the "patinage" [36] that the PQ demonstrated between policies favouring the working class and the capitalist class is typical of Marx's [1852: 62 et passim] classic characterization of the politics of the petty bourgeoisie, wavering between the two structurally antagonistic classes of capitalism. Thus, although internally divided into technocratic and radical wings, there seems to be justification in identifying the PQ as a petty bourgeois party.

This pattern in which reformist parties emerge in Quebec as representatives of cross-class blocs cemented with a particular reading of the national question is not limited to the 1960s and 1970s. The Liberals and the UN had both been formed through a similar strategy and both had also split on class lines [37]. If Laclau is correct in arguing that ideological elements have no fixed or necessary class meaning, the precise definitions of nation, collectivity, the state and class would also potentially be redefined in the context of each of these hegemonic blocs, as indeed they were.

The synthetic framework suggested above would lead one to expect that the ideological meaning of woman, the relation of woman-nation and so on would be different for each of these blocs. In any case both bloc alliances were formed during a period when, throughout the Western world, "the woman question" became a visible political issue [Delmar 1986: 24-27]. Yet, before the late 1960s the definition of "woman" and
"woman-nation" in Quebec remained static and lagged in comparison with North America. Women did not gain the provincial franchise until 1940 and pre-modern ideologies continued to dominate [Gagnon 1973; Barry 1977: 50-52; Collectif Cillo 1982: 371-2]. In large part this configuration can be explained by the fact that the Catholic Church, which remained a central definer of social ideology, gave theological authority to an ideology of natural sexual difference. In part it is due to the way that gender politics could be obscured in a political field dominated by an unresolved national question. In the period under study, however, these conditions were to change.

4.3. Gender politics and bloc politics: lines of investigation.

In order to understand the role of gender politics in bloc formation in Quebec and the shaping of gender politics in that context, the synthetic framework and the schematic history of bloc formation laid out above suggest three central lines of investigation -- ideology, political field and the state. These in turn generate a series of questions to be answered concretely in the Quebec case. Answering these questions requires that the relation of the sex/gender system to the mode of production be specified, and that the emergence of movements be situated in relation to changes in both structural levels. As well, it is important to consider the particular conditions under which different women's organizations and currents emerged.
Ideology.

With regard to ideology three sets of questions arise about the salience of gender ideologies in global ideologies, the content of these ideologies and their social definers. First, how central or explicit a role do ideologies of gender play in other global ideologies of, for example, liberal modernization, the nation and nationalism or class? Second, how do gender ideologies construct femininity and masculinity as psychological, social and political roles? How do gender ideologies conceptualize male-female relations, as equal or unequal, hostile or cooperative, political or not, central to the nation or not? To what extent are gender ideologies capable of recognizing themselves as ideologies rather than as, for example, God-given (like clerical nationalism), natural (like liberal modernization) or (like forms of revolutionary nationalism and socialism) as invariant political requirements? Third, who are the social definers of gender ideologies and what is their relation to the definition of hegemonic ideology? Are women active in the definition; if so, are their actions mediated through autonomous women's organizations and movements or integrated into other social institutions like the church, the mass media and science? To what extent are these ideologies hegemonized, that is, articulated in already available political terms (of liberal modernization or nationalism); or to what extent do they, particularly in their feminist form, themselves help to construct
hegemonic ideologies, that is, force the reorganization or revision of pre-existing political or gender terms?

Politics

With regard to politics, we will want to know the role of gender politics in the construction of blocs. To what extent do particular gender ideologies and politics (those, for example, of liberal or radical feminism) cement or fragment political currents or alliances contending for bloc leadership? How are gender ideologies and politics related to other cementing or fragmenting forces internal to blocs? Is gender politics expressed through autonomous movements (like the women's liberation movement or the gay movement) or as an element of other political movements (like political parties, the trade unions or the church) organized to change or reproduce existing gender structures?

The State.

In combination, the Gramscian perspective on the state as the location where social unity is constructed and the feminist view that the state has historically established the legal ground on which gender politics can be fought out suggest that the state should be seen as both a maintainer of the sex/gender system and as a site of struggle for gender politics. Thus, we may ask: how does the state prescribe gender relations through its formal legal structures and enforce them through its administrative
practices? How does the state constitute females and males as citizens? How does the state integrate -- through the acceptance of reforms or the cooptation of elements of feminist ideology -- the politics of gender, particularly as developed by gender political movements? Secondly, how do political actors on the terrain of gender politics, both inside its governmental structures and in popular movements, see the state and act towards it [38]?

More concretely in Quebec, we should ask not only how definitions of woman constructed in (modified) patriarchal or feminist ideologies were shaped by ideologies that dominated globally or in narrower political currents or movements; but also how ideologies of gender, however defined, shaped these wider ideological configurations. I shall argue, first, that the definers of global gender ideologies moved from Church fathers and men and women in the media who translated modernisation ideology into the image of the working mother at the beginning of the period, to new activist intellectuals, organic to the women's movement. As a result of this change, "woman" moved from being incorporated in the family and a reproducer of culture in a "French-Canadian" nation to being an individual with rights who is collectively central to the project of national and working class liberation.

At the same time, I shall argue, gender politics became re-located on the political field. Three phases in this
development can be traced. First, there was the situation that prevailed at the opening of the period where ideologies of "woman" and family were central in traditional clerical-national discourse. Then came the relative marginalization of gender politics associated with the process of liberal modernization, where, despite some reforms, the political "we" interpellated only implicitly included women, gender relations were privatized, equality (at least of opportunity) was assumed to have been achieved and any enduring sex/gender dichotomies were thought to arise from "natural" invariant determinations. Finally came a new stage, from the mid-1970s on, when gender relations became recognised as a central and sometimes crucial aspect of the political field.

In this latter period, the actors in the state were increasingly forced to respond to the politicization of gender relations. Thus, there was a spate of legislation concerning "women's issues", political parties differentiated on gender ideologies and programmes, and gender politics entered more explicitly into state ideology and state action. I shall argue that this integration of gender politics into the official political field has had a dual character: on the one hand, incorporating feminist stances into global ideology in such a way as to legitimate them and, on the other, containing and managing them within the existing policy framework of the state.
Chapter 5. Opening the question: women's organizations and gender politics during the period of liberal modernisation.

5.1. Introduction: women and the Quiet Revolution.

Several commentators have noted the interrelation between the shift in political power associated with the Quiet Revolution and changes in the social situation of women. Usually this relationship is expressed as one in which "women" were the passive recipients of societal changes, whether in educational or legal reform, economic organization, occupational possibilities, or ideology [Brodeur et al 1981: 16; Carlisse and Dumazedier 1975: 13-17; Gagnon 1974b: 19]. However, while the overall structural changes associated with "rattrapage" (catch-up) certainly did have a direct impact on women's activities and in the long run facilitated the development of a women's movement, the relationship between the Quiet Revolution and "woman" was more complex than the conventional interpretation might suggest.

In the realms of education and religion, for example, women's circumstances were not changed merely by the (male) reformers of church and state. Women were themselves active in helping to define and promote the goals of modernization in the schools, and of new Catholic social philosophy from within the Church [Gouin-Decarle 1962; Stanton-Jean 1963]. In addition, a few women, for the most part isolated intellectuals or members of small organizations, appropriated some of the rhetoric of liberal
modernization to (re)pose the question of women's equality, thereby setting in motion a process that would eventually, as Eisenstein's theory predicts, help expose the limitations of the liberal state and its ideology. The contradictory implications for women of the retention, in contemporary discourse, of ideological elements drawn from traditional clerical nationalism on the one hand, and from technocratic rationality on the other, were to become increasingly clear.

At the same time it is important not to overcorrect previous assumptions about the direction of change. If women helped ensure the inscription of gender issues within the politics and ideology of modernization, the initial results were nevertheless strictly limited both by the whole politico-ideological history of gender relations in Quebec and by the prevailing gender divisions and relation of forces which that history had bequeathed. Also, it was not only or, in some cases, even mainly women who initiated important debates about gender issues or placed them on the agenda of political reform. Two of the significant events of Quebec gender politics in the early 1960s -- a remarkable dossier on "La femme canadienne-française" in Le Devoir [24 June 1961; see 5.2.2. below] and the passage of legislation revising the family law provisions in the Quebec Code civil [5.2.3. ; 9.2.1. below] -- were initiated by male-dominated organizations.

Moreover, the two organizations which emerged in this period to
express female group interest politics, the liberal feminist Fédération des femmes du Québec (FFQ) and the social Catholic L'Association féminine d'éducation et d'action sociale (AFEAS), accepted the ideology articulated by the male leaders of the modernization project, as expressed by the Liberals and the progressive clergy respectively. In short, if in the 1960s Quebec women began to make feminist history anew, the circumstances under which they did so were bounded and circumscribed by their incorporation in existing organizations, by their removal from mass action, and by the ideological and strategic confusions to which such circumstances understandably led.

It is with an eye, then, to both directions of determination that the question is posed in this chapter of the implications, during the Quiet Revolution, of the ideological dominance of modernising liberalism and Catholic reformism for the development of gender, and more particularly, of feminist politics. A useful focus and starting-point is provided by the way in which the central theme of equality that continued to preoccupy the developing women's movement throughout the period of this study were first articulated by liberal feminism. By examining this ideological development both in general and through the cases of the FFQ and AFEAS, light is shed on the way in which gender politics both responded to and helped shape changes in the whole social ensemble. Conversely, the development of feminism can
itself be shown to illuminate, first, tensions within liberal ideology with regard to women and, second, the role of liberal feminism in constructing the hegemonic bloc.

Finally, the measure of convergence exhibited between the perspectives of such differently located organisations as the FFQ, from the start secular, autonomous and feminist, and AFEAS, in its origins confessional, pro-family and supervised by priests (aumôniers) illuminates another important feature of the Quiet Revolution and the alliances that sustained it: the contemporary resonance of liberal reform within important sectors of the Church [Lacoste 1973]. Certainly, the concomitant evolution of secular and religious ideologies towards more liberal and modern orientations reinforced one another with regard to changes in gender relations and politics. As traditional Catholicism began to give up the ghost of holy sanction for a rigid sexual division of social labour it effectively entered, as the 1960’s history of AFEAS illustrates, the same contradictory space with regard to gender politics that obtained in secular reformist thinking about women and family. To draw on an analogy from contemporary sociological theory, family forms and gender relations took on a Parsonian cast: while retaining a high value on kin relations, women had begun to adopt the marital roles and prescribed in magazines from Châtealaine to Cité Libre [1], which stressed companionship in the couple, social involvement and greater skills at mothering and housewifery for women [Carisse and

But before actually considering the cases of the FFQ and AFEAS, it is necessary to provide some background concerning, first, the competing liberal and traditional ideologies of women already in place and, second, the policies and programmes of the governing Liberal party. For, it was these political and ideological orientations that emerging feminist currents were forced to confront, and in turn reshape, as they sought to express and achieve their goals.

5.2. Liberal perspectives on women.

5.2.1. Changing perspectives on women.

As I pointed out above [4.2.2.], the election victory of the Liberals in June 1960 placed them in control of the state apparatus and confirmed the ascendancy of a new political bloc united by a new ideology. Given the scope of the Quiet Revolution project, and as the feminist/hegemony perspective adopted in this study would suggest, the family and gender relations were other obvious targets for modernization. Changes at the level of these social institutions were required to manage both economic development on the one hand and to support the hegemony of the new political alliance on the other.
In common with a general tendency of capitalist development in other North American regional economies [Armstrong and Armstrong 1984: 64] the tertiary sector of the Quebec economy expanded rapidly, particularly in clerical and administrative jobs in the public sector [2]. Connelly [1978: 41-44] has argued that housewives formed a labour pool, an institutionalized reserve army of labour, available to fill these positions [3]. Since there were not enough men, unmarried women or first time entrants available on the labour market, married women, particularly those with children, had to be drawn (back) into the labour force. On the one hand, a reduction in fertility and changes in the relation of the (sub)urban household to production freed women to take outside employment [4]. On the other hand, while the costs of periodic inflation, rising aspirations for consumer goods, including houses, cars and vacations and the prolonged dependence of adolescents kept in school, pushed them onto the labour market, the process of preparing them ideologically and psychologically to do so must be considered as distinct [Le Devoir 30 Aug. 1962]. This task required modifying social representations of women so that a combination of all three ideological elements in the women:work:marriage triangle could become articulated as a possible lifestyle choice. At the same time, there was some resistance from the weight of traditional ideologies and some evidence that Quebecers of different classes placed a high value on family life [Taylor 1964; Garigue 1964,
Thus, new roles for women were initially perceived as threatening sanctified values.

The most coherent version of conservative gender politics had been that of clerical nationalism, or of what Rioux [1968] has called the "idéologie de survyance". This complex, which had been a dominant element of Quebec political discourse prior to the 1960s [Gagnon 1974b: 19], has been extensively analysed elsewhere [Dion 1957, 1975: 29-52; Gagnon 1973, 1974a; Monière 1977: 177-182; Lamoureux 1987]. Still, it will be useful to state its principal components here. Centred on the figure of "la femme au foyer", it opposed paid work for married women who were to remain tied to domestic tasks. It took the woman:nation relation as integral to the preservation of the French-Canadian race, for, as Bishop Laflèche wrote, the family and the nation were the same entity, writ small and large [cited in Monière 1977:181]. At its centre is a notion that national survival depends upon physical and cultural reproduction in family and faith:

*Toutefois, la famille canadienne-française revendique un appanage encore plus glorieux, résultat, lui aussi, de son esprit de foi, de la chasteté de nos moeurs. La famille canadienne-française enfants de l'avenir* [Groulx 1919: 295].

This family in turn requires moral and physical maintenance to be provided by women. Physical maintenance in this case included both high rates of biological reproduction, known as "la revanche
des berceaux", and large amounts of domestic labour of both a material and a moral-emotional type [5].

Woman's nature, according to this Catholic philosophy, is determined quasi-biologically by natural law and is distinct from that of men: "Il s'agit ici non de capacité et de dispositions naturelles, 'secondaires' -- comme l'aptitude aux lettres, aux arts ou aux sciences -- mais bien d'aptitudes qui sont 'essentielles' dans la vie de la famille" [Pie XII 1953: 47]. While this difference is not clearly specified its effects are elaborated at length: the wife, "soleil de la famille", bears the greater responsibility for its happiness and is to overcome complaints, reproach and irritation to ensure that her husband finds repose. Maternity, "la fin à laquelle le Créateur a voulu ordonner tout l'être de la femme" [ibid. 48-49] ensures not only her health, pride and glory but also the dignity and sanctity of the marriage bed. Neither sexuality nor female employment are validated unless they directly benefit the development of a maternal spirit or fulfill the duties of family life [ibid.]. Contraception is, of course, a sin. Despite the differentiation of roles and natures, women are assured equality in dignity, happiness and esteem [6]. In Quebec, a final fillip was added to the honorific aspects of the feminine maternal role because of its centrality to the ideology of national survival.

Although particularly well developed and articulated with nationalism in Quebec, a notion of "the family" as a repository
of moral values preserved by women outside the strife of market relations is not restricted to either Quebec or Catholicism. Rather, feminist historians have pointed to, first, its common connection with the development of Industrial capitalism and secondly its role in an ideology which justifies the oppression of women [Hamilton 1977; Ryan 1979; Ehrenreich and English 1979; Millett 1971]. Juliet Mitchell [1971: 154] has also suggested that the illusory privacy of the family serves among non-owning classes as a substitute for private property. Finally, the definition of women as preservers of the cultural basis of national identity is not only rooted in Catholicism but, as Eleanor Leacock [1986] has argued, is also a common response to colonization [7].

Such views can be contrasted with the contradictory, modified patriarchal, definitions of women as both companion and mother, and equal citizen and subordinated wife, to be encountered at the time in liberal gender ideology. In a real sense, the contradictoriness inherent in these definitions derives from liberalism itself. In her analysis of the foundations of liberal gender and family ideologies, Zillah Eisenstein [1981] argues that classical liberalism's conception of a public political universe of freedom and citizenship rests on an assumption that the family is a separate realm, sustained by a hierarchical division of labour and the work of women. Eisenstein [1981: 33] and Lorene Clark [1979: 36-38] stress the continuing presence of
patriarchal elements in Locke, for example, arguing that any moderation in these elements can be explained as resulting from his desire to discredit patriarchalism in the state, but not in the family. Thus, while Locke's *Two Treatises of Government* argued against a patriarchal justification of kingly power in the state [1968: 285], he distinguished paternal power and political power [ibid.: 308], and held that the subordination of wives had a basis in nature [ibid.: 192]. At the same time, however, he [1968: 364] defined marriage functionally in terms of child-raising and was therefore able to see divorce as permissible where there are no dependent children. This view of marriage as both an unequal partnership and a dissolvable legal contract is contradictory in that it both treats women as legal persons and subordinates them to a non-rational power in the family [Nicholson 1986: 152-164] [8]. A similar kind of inconsistency persisted among liberals in the 1960s, leading them on the one hand to treat women as participants in the re-valourised public realm and on the other hand to retain a naturalist ideology of gender difference and inequality not unlike the Catholic views described above.

Nor was the problem of reconfiguring gender and family ideologies restricted to Quebec, for the similar development of new labour market requirements and fertility patterns in other parts of North America required similar ideological revision [Friedan 1964; 1981]. The difference is that the still persistent
strength of Catholicism in maintaining a theologically justified problematic of sexual differentiation in Quebec's frozen [9] superstructure, and not just elements of classical liberal and industrial capitalist ideologies, shaped the terms in which the revision of gender and family ideologies could be posed. All in all, the political freight of these ideologies, as well as the differing psychological investments of individuals differently related to family structure, acted as a conservative brake on what could be done.

The ideological task for the Liberal regime both in its attempt to achieve consent for its project and, more narrowly, to maintain political power was, nevertheless, to bring family and gender ideologies into line with their global strategy. More practically they also needed to mobilize and capture the electoral support of women. The political forefathers of the PLQ had had some success in mobilizing women's support and had, as a result, a small political legacy of pro-feminist legislation to draw on. They had successfully, if under some pressure from their federal party organization, operated a tactic of promising provincial suffrage when out of office and so helped to consolidate support for their defeat of the Union Nationale led by Premier Maurice Duplessis in 1939 [Cleverdon 1975: 252 ff.]. They now had to find a similar formula that would work in the context of their modernizing drive. The strength of conservative rural and clerical elements both in the party and in the Quebec
electorate meant that a complete ideological reversal was not possible. Nor were they pushed to a more radical stance by the existence of well organized feminist pressure groups inside or outside the party. Indeed, as we shall see below, the number of these organizations was limited and, so too was their ideology.

For all these reasons, and despite the absence of an organized feminist movement, women's role, (le rôle et la place de la femme), began to emerge in the early 1960s as an issue for public discussion. Although it was primarily couched in terms of individual dilemmas and consciousness, commentators -- whether the Pope in Relations, women's columnists like Germaine Bernier in Le Devoir (in a series that ran between 5 March and 20 May 1960) politicians or women members of the Fédération des femmes libérales du Québec (FFLQ) [La Réforme 16-17 Oct. 1959: 10, April 1963: 12, Aug. 1963: 7-9] -- consistently saw that economic and social changes required rethinking women's role. Thus, although the woman question was not conceived in expressly political terms, the terms in which it was thought were amenable to politicization. The fact that modernization had already been politicized as the operative slogan of the Liberals and had been successfully identified with the state, ultimately facilitated the development of a politicized feminist current in Quebec. Similarly, the success of the transformation of Quebec society instilled a basis for the optimistic belief that people acting collectively and self-consciously could alter the social totality.
In their own interests [Dion 1973a: 36]. But, in the short run, the limited terms in which the question of women's status was posed also testify to its successful hegemonization by the modernization discourse and, behind this, the modernizing bloc. In effect, the absence of a self-conscious women's movement created a space where gender politics were defined "from the outside" by non-feminist intellectuals, much as the development of the Quebec economy had been directed from the outside. Before returning to examine Liberal policy in greater detail, then, it will be useful to look at the debate generated by the actions of two of these outside agencies, the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste (SSJB) and Le Devoir, in June 1961.

5.2.2. "Le rôle et la place de la femme" [10].

The question of "Le rôle et la place de la femme" was posed in several mass circulation and specialist publications throughout the 1960s. At issue was women's position in relation to the new possibilities -- or requirements -- that seemed to be opening up for them as a result of structural transformations in work and family life and against a background of a clash among feminist, traditional and modernizing ideologies. In some cases, in the women's columns of Le Devoir and Châtelaine, for example, the actual dilemmas of women were reflected [11]. In the absence of an autonomous women's movement and a feminist press and with few women in positions of power in the state and in communications, however, the issues selected for public debate and in the
formation of policy were almost entirely the result of the intervention of traditional male sources of authority in Quebec: intellectuals, politicians, clergy, and nationalists. Indeed the first concerted "public" debate on the issue of woman that escaped ghettoization in the women's pages in Le Devoir was, with some historical irony, provoked by an initiative of a traditional nationalist organization, the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste [12]. In continuity with its patriarchally inflected concern for national survival, the SSJB consecrated the 1961 fête nationale, St-Jean Baptiste day, to the theme of "la femme canadienne-française".

In response, Le Devoir, which was firmly in the progressive camp, invited women from a range of social locations and feminine organizations to speak to the situation and interests of "French-Canadian" women, not as totemized in some "mythic tradition" but in the concrete circumstances of "the present". Michel Roy's [Le Devoir 24 June 1961] unsigned introduction to the resulting dossier stated his intentions clearly:

Nous avons cru qu'il suffisait d'inviter la femme à nous exposer ses problèmes, de la même manière qu'on invite parfois les Noirs du Sud des États-Unis à nous confier leurs amertumes. Nous avons commodément réduit la femme à quelques symboles facilement identifiables: la femme-mère, la femme au foyer, la femme au travail, la femme compagne de l'homme. C'est rassurant, mais c'est largement incomplet. C'est faux. Quelques-unes de nos collaboratrices l'ont senti sans oser le dire tout à fait.

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Writing later in *Cité Libre*, Thérèse Gouin-Décarle [1961] identified the author of this unsigned piece as playing a catalytic role. His Invitation, and the parallel he drew between the excluded and subordinated status of Quebec women and American blacks, helped "explain", she said, vague feelings of humiliation and displeasure, not previously expressed by the dossier's contributors.

Regardless of its origin in a dispute between progressive and conservative male ideologues, the dossier's two sections, a roundtable discussion and several short essays, provide a unique window onto feminine and emergent feminist thought in the first phase of the Quiet Revolution. Preliminary in character, the responses in the roundtable are wideranging, often confused and sometimes internally contradictory; as well, the essays indicate disagreement among women from different social sectors. Despite these differences, they consistently identify issues central to the modernization debate: the nature of gender differences, work and marriage, education, "equality" and political organization.

The dossier's centrepiece was the roundtable chaired by journalist Jeanne Sauvé [13]. The other participants were soeur Marie-Laurent de Rome, philosophy professor at the Collège Basile-Moreau and member of the Parent Commission on educational reform, Mme Fernande Saint-Martin, editor-in-chief of *Châtelaine*, Mlle Denise Gauthier, president of the *Jeunesse ouvrière catholique féminine* (JOCF) [14], and Mme Paul Martel, founder of
the Montreal section of the *Société des femmes universitaires* (SFU), perhaps the most consistently visible "feminist" organization at the beginning of the decade. These organizational links help to identify both the social location and ideological formation of the participants. As one might expect, Laurent de Rome's and Gauthier's adherence to Catholic gender ideology was mediated by their experience in educational and workers' organizations, while Saint-Martin held a confusing amalgam of traditional family oriented and radically individualist views that can be accounted for in terms of her professional position as editor of a women's magazine, particularly one that promoted the new double standard of competence -- as housewife and public person -- for the "femme symbiote". Martel's capacity to present a consistent position supporting employment and job-training no doubt reflected her voluntary career as a SFU lobbyist.

Of the five issues listed above, the role of marriage in a woman's life and a woman's role in marriage was perhaps the most important. The changing economy was recognized as an exogenous agency transforming marital and family relations. Noting that "la société réclame des femmes travailleuses" [Laurent de Rome] and that consequently the number of women workers was constantly rising, the participants asked what the relationship between family life and work actually was, and what it should be. All the participants agreed that the displacement of economic
activity outside the household and the contemporary reorganization of work prevented women from playing a full social role from within a family setting as had been possible in the eighteenth century. New social conditions required new social roles for the father, the children, and women themselves. They were thus confronted not merely with comprehending the new social roles as given but with role-making: "La femme doit maintenant inventer un style nouveau pour une vie nouvelle" [Gauthier].

However, the possibilities of invention were limited, in the first instance, by the demands of biological and social reproduction. Most of the discussants accepted childbearing and childrearing as a "natural role" for women, doubly determined by young children's needs for a mother's care and women's particular psychological capacities to fulfill these needs. In contrast, it was suggested that women could not escape this responsibility in any case because "society" pushed them into it. These modernist commentators stressed the Catholic norm that children were necessary to complete sexual love, but abandoned its concomitant that the possibility of conception was necessary to render marital sex free from the sin of lust. Without mentioning the existence of birth control, the participants noted that the period women spent in child-raising was declining and would continue to do so. Women would need to find a place in the labour force after this period. Laurent de Rome's assessment that a woman would always have to accept a smaller professional
and social role than her husband's because her contribution to raising their children should be larger was not disputed. If their contradictory views of wife- and motherhood as natural and forced, moral and "humiliating" [ibid.], central and in decline are not fully critical, at least they problematized the conventionally naturalist view.

Similarly, marriage was seen as both problematic and of great, even inevitable, importance for individual women: "Vous n'enlèverez pas l'attrait de la femme pour le mariage" [Gauthier]. Motives and anticipatory socialization for marriage were often bad. Either the attitudes to love and sexuality learned in the family of origin were filled with particularly pernicious bitterness or peer groups and the mass media fostered inflated "romantic" notions. Like women in the past who had often married for economic reasons, young girls, the participants thought, still married in order to stop working: "le but du mariage, ce n'est pas même l'amour, c'est un désir de confort, de profiter de plus de liberté". As a result of a lack of preparation, "la femme aborde le mariage avec la crainte de l'enfant, la crainte de la maternité, la crainte de l'homme, la crainte de la cellule familiale" [Laurent de Rome]. Once married with children, women were totally unprepared for the work, responsibility, and isolation of contemporary (sub-)urban life [Moreux 1974]]. Conversely, many French-Canadian women sublimated too much of their sexual life in children and housekeeping, with
the result that the sexually routinized marriages of their families of origin were reproduced. Such women were criticized for thinking that their lives were sufficiently justified by the simple fact and sacred function of motherhood.

The acceptance of marriage as the main goal of women's lives posed problems for other aspects of the social ensemble, particularly the labour force and education. Defining a proper relationship between educational structures and the normative emphasis on marriage was one difficulty. Despite a consensus on the inadequacies of the existing situation, the participants disagreed about the proper extent, timing, institutional location and duration of education for motherhood: "Nous sommes devant un problème,...à un moment donné, il faut choisir. Désirez-vous un enseignement spécifiquement féminin...qu'on prépare à l'école la femme pour sa tâche maternelle?" While Saint-Martin argued for this route, others thought that such preparation should wait until a woman was expecting her first child. They agreed, however, that past educational practices and the ideological commitment of both students and parents lagged behind contemporary labour force needs. A feminine education, of the type still offered in the Ecoles ménagères in Quebec at that time, failed to prepare girls for work [15]. And despite teachers' urgings, girls, certain that they would marry, often shirked technical training. In other cases, daughters were denied higher education by parents similarly committed to the
nexus woman:marriage:home. Like their attitudes to job training, young women’s attitudes to work were also shaped by this ideology so as to make them poor unionists. Finally, all those in contact with the labour market shared a notion that "La jeune fille est une employée temporaire".

A rather more radical and contentious note appeared when the participants considered the more explicitly political issues of equality and independence for women. There was no consensus about how to define equality, or about how to achieve it. This aspect of the discussion clearly illustrates strategic and ideological differences along lines of class and religious commitment. Women, Martel argued, were not equal in Quebec, because of the subordinate legal status of married women and because they did not have the right to equal pay for equal work. For her, legislative reform was a logical step. Gauthier queried: "Si on veut sortir la femme du foyer, est-ce en vue de l'égalité avec l'homme ou si c'est pour lui faire apporter une contribution valable à la société?" For Sauvé the answer was straightforward: "C'est pour elle d'abord... pour qu'elle ne soit soumise à l'homme comme la législation sociale peut le laisser entendre". Responses to her question about the necessity of paid work for equality revealed further disagreements among the participants and contradictions in individual positions. For Sauvé, educated and professional, "Ce qui est important c'est que la femme se sente valorisée, qu'elle se sente indépendante."
materiellement", but paid employment was not necessary since some women would not think much of working in a store. In response, Martel stressed the need to open up a range of occupations so that women could find appropriate work. In contrast to her earlier support for sex-typed training for motherhood, Saint-Martin plumped for a categorical statement of liberal capitalist faith: "La base de développement de la personnalité, c'est l'indépendence économique", But she also gave it a feminist twist; without a trade, many women remained like children under their husbands' thumbs, dependent for food and shelter, unable develop their full potential ("s'épanouir")). In response to Laurent de Rome's intervention to cool the debate by asking if it was really necessary for women's work to be paid, the other participants divided evenly with Martel and Saint-Martin in the affirmative and Gauthier and Sauve in the negative.

Approaching the notion of equality directly instead of tangentially through the term Independence produced a shift in opinion. Saint-Martin, in particular, argued that there were limits to women's equality since, even in "socialist" countries where "la femme a reçu une promotion totale", they were still not equal and had a greater share of childcare. In a more limited sense, Sauvé thought that possibilities for equality in some professions could only be realized through struggle. Again, searching for the ends of equality, Laurent de Rome, the
philosophy professor, somewhat illogically equated equality with competition, asking: "L'important, est-il d'être l'égale de l'homme, de rivaliser l'homme? Est-ce si important que la femme soit à l'égal de l'homme sur le plan professionnel?" This time only Martel replied with an unqualified yes.

Thus, on closer examination, the meaning of the term equality dissolves into less than the full meaning of this term. Moreover, although the role of male opposition was noted, the obstacles to full equality were almost all seen as residing in woman's "nature", itself a psychological expression of an ahistorically and asocially conceived reproductive biology. In contrast to this naturalist argument, reviewing American historical data, Linda Gordon and Ellen Dubois [1983: n21] attribute "greater male sexual dominance" not to women's failures but to "peasant authoritarian backgrounds and women's extreme economic dependence", conditions which arguably obtained in Quebec.

Finally, the practical question of organizing generated a somewhat sharper critique of the role of masculine opposition. Men assigned women to trivial tasks in mixed organizations [Saint-Martin] or did not accept them at all in an organisational context [Martel]. In mixed groups, women were forced to take masculine psychology into account [Gauthier]. Two contrasting solutions to these difficulties were proposed. The first, which bridged traditional Catholic preferences for single-sex
organizations and a proto-feminist critique of masculine practice, was the promotion of groups for women only: "Jusqu'au présent les structures ont toujours été masculines. La femme a peine à s'immiscer dans des structures masculines. Il faudrait grouper les femmes car elles agiront plus facilement en groupe que sur un plan individuel". The second, proposed by Laurent de Rome, was to increase the number of mixed organizations in order to reinforce the integration of couples effectively giving this preference over measures that would foster the independence of women [16].

The roundtable's themes and perspectives capture perfectly the uneven consciousness generated from the contradictory structural situation of women. While the modernized version of the woman: work:marriage triangle was accepted, along with its requirement that women be available both for the labour market and for the tasks of biological, domestic, and cultural reproduction in the household-family system, this dual role was not seen as problematic, but thought to promote women's financial independence, sense of self-worth and escape from the stresses of isolation: in short, their self-development. Traditional notions of extra-social, natural determination of gender personality compete and blend with newer more sociological, relativist and feminist understandings that such differences are inculcated as a direct result of education and as an indirect result of social sanctions and structural pressures. While male resistance was
perceived as something of a problem for women's achievement of professional and political power, male power was not perceived to exist in any systematic way. And, if predominant ideological constructions of women as primarily wives created difficulties, marriage as an institution was in no way challenged. Finally, a tendency to substitute psychologistic analysis for other forms of reasoning -- whether theological, biological or economic -- which Ehrenreich and English [1979: 205, 211 ff] have analysed for the contemporary USA, represents a modernized view of the individual as occupying a social place that is ultimately compatible with a capitalist labour market and career structure.

While an inchoate sense of the specificity of women's interests in an untheorized situation of gender politics haunts the discussion like the ghost of struggles yet to come, it cannot be stressed enough that neither concepts, strategies, nor goals were made clear. As René Geoffroy [Le Devoir 24 June 1961] put it:

La femme d'aujourd'hui se cherche. Elle vit dans un état de malaise dont elle n'est pas toujours consciente, mais qui pénètre toute sa vie. Elle se pose des questions. Elle accepte de moins en moins vivre sur de l'aiguille et sent la nécessité de repenser certaines valeurs qui lui ont été léguées de génération en génération. A travers des structures sociales de plus en plus déshumanisantes la femme recherche un équilibre entre ses responsabilités de mère et d'épouse et un désir de se libérer de mythes dans lesquels elle ne se reconnaît plus et qui la laissent insatisfaite.

Three of the other contributors to Le Devoir's dossier laid out with varying degrees of clarity strategic responses to this
malaise of women in three typical social situations. Speaking for the Union catholique des femmes rurales (UCFR), its secretary Jeanne Larose [Le Devoir 24 June, 1961] remained committed to a traditional feminine role: "Le destin de la femme d'aujourd'hui rejoint celui de la femme d'hier, donner et entretenir la vie". For this kind of woman, improvements promised by modernisation (in education for her children, marriage preparation, and the standard of living) are desirable as long as they sustain and reinforce the family as an institution. This orientation sees political involvement as a way to extend the domain in which she can care for her family, just as was argued by the maternal feminists of the suffrage movement [17]. The role of organizations like the U CFR is "lui aider à prendre conscience de ses nouvelles responsabilités". Paid labour should be subordinated to "la triple vocation de la femme, l'épouse, la mère, la personne" [Asselin-Maillot, Le Devoir 24 June, 1961].

Madeleine Ryan, urban, a former journalist, married [18] and mother of three children, exemplified a newly emergent feminine role characterised by a two stage or interrupted career [Barry 1977: 23; Myrdal and Klein 1968: 192-3] and the companionate marriage. Ryan's prescription, to keep alert and involved in social action while caring for children full-time with a view to returning to work, is perhaps closest to the model legitimated in the 1960s. It shares essential elements of the modernising perspective, particularly the legitimation of political
Involvement and paid work in the labour force.

The most radical response of the three is provided by Gouin-Décarie, an occasional *Cité Libre* contributor on women's and educational issues. She urged the adoption of a model of non-differentiation in which women would be treated as citizens "à part entière", without special status. But because she had no analysis of structural barriers to the achievement of this desired gender equality, her prescriptions did not break the boundaries of either classical liberal theory or the Quebec Liberal project. Nevertheless insofar as gender equality implies gender neutrality, Gouin-Decarie’s statement holds the potential for a more thorough-going feminist radicalization than those of the other two contributors. At the point where it becomes conscious of the existence of structural barriers which derive from the assignment of women to domestic and childcare responsibilities and to male agency in maintaining masculine privilege, it also leads to a rejection of the ideology of "femme symblose" [Gagnon 1974b:20] that became dominant in the 1960s.

These strategies, family-centred, dual career, and non-differentiation, were offered to women in 1961 as they attempted to think through "*Le rôle et la place de la femme*" and acted to shape the structures of gender in changing Quebec society. In the rest of this chapter, we will see them exemplified and contested in feminist and feminine political organizations.
5.2.3. The Liberals and women's politics, 1960-1963.

The manner in which the new government in its early years handled the competing gender ideologies described above had a contradictory effect on the place of women in official political discourse. On the one hand, in breaking from the family and woman centered ideology associated with the UN and pessimistic nationalism, the Liberals effectively made possible a discussion of women's equality in terms of the watchwords of the Quiet Revolution reform. On the other hand, several factors to be discussed below meant that actual improvements in the status of women were limited. Indeed, the term "woman", which neither clung to old honours nor expressed new aspirations, was incompletely incorporated into modernising ideology and so marginalized in political discourse [19]. The fact that these manoeuvres were carried out in the absence of any mass women's politics, meant that the social question of women's place, while posed, did not develop into a fully fledged issue of gender politics. At the same time, they provided both ideological ammunition and a series of grievances for an emerging feminist current which established its political autonomy with the founding of the FFQ in 1964. This section looks first at the orientation of the Liberals themselves, and then at the positions developed, largely in response, by those few feminist actors who
actually were on the political field in the early 1960s.

Liberal policy, as initially expressed, was formed in response to two contradictory requirements. First, their aspirations to direct a total reform of Quebec society meant that they had to find a way to include the interests of women, like those of other subordinate social groups, in the would-be hegemonic project they were putting forward. But, at the same time, an electoral realpolitik made it necessary for them not to appear as enemies of the family nor, behind that, of the national survival that large families symbolized in the long dominant clerical nationalist ideology. Thus, although the PLQ, as early as 1956 [La Réforme Oct. 1959: 12], had promised to reform sections of the Code civil dealing with the legal status of married women to the ends of women's equality, this policy was not publicized during either of the elections of 1960 and 1962 [20]. Nor were women and equality linked by Liberal ideologues. Instead the large family of the revanche des berceaux, "la famille nombreuse du Québec", already fast becoming an anachronism, was the ideological object appealed to during these campaigns. Overall, then, Liberal spokesmen promoted the interests of "the family", still largely conceived in terms inherited from the survivalist discourse, at the expense of those of women themselves.

An early example of this orientation was the proposal of Liberal AN member (MNA) Emillion Lafrance, self-identified as one who had frequently raised these topics since 1952, for the
establishment of a Ministry of the Family empowered to carry out research and co-ordinate policy on all aspects of family problems [21]. His proposal reflects clerical concerns in that it reiterated a demand of the Quebec episcopate of November 18, 1958 for a study on the family and for a higher institute for family studies [Le Devoir 21 Dec. 1959][22]. Unlike traditional Catholic pronouncements that embedded "the family" in cultural survival and religious duty, his speech already effectively linked it with issues of economic development and political reform or, more precisely, with a dynamic policy for the management of natural resources by a noncorrupt planning council that would be the focus of the next Liberal election campaign. The development of economic policies and infrastructures should be undertaken without delay, he advised, "toujours dans l'intérêt de la famille québécoise", Indeed, "Une des premières caractéristiques dont cette politique devrait tenir compte est celle de la famille nombreuse du Québec. Chez nous, plus qu'ailleurs, notre législation devrait être centrée sur la famille".

The centrality of this renovated appeal to family was underlined by PLQ leader Lesage on the hustings. "La prochaine session, celle de la famille" [Le Devoir May 9 1960], would return the family to its rightful place in the province of Quebec. In the view of Lesage and Lafrance, the family was an all-embracing category which subsumed housing, welfare payments and social allocations, education, and financial affairs.
Including taxes and import duties. Like economic development, educational reform was promised not in the interests of individuals but of the family. Family policy was also pronatalist, with housing aid and family allowance payments to be biased in favour of those with more than three children [ibid. 1 Dec. 1959]. In one important respect, this active orientation to the family by politicians fitted into the modernisation perspective since it challenged the traditional prerogatives of the church on matters of family policy, placing it, rather, in the care of lay organs of the state. But, despite this modernizing shift, the "family" as an ideological term continued to be conceived, at least partly, in terms taken from the survivalist ideological discourse and political practice: hence pronatalism, the family's unitary predominance over individuals, and an appeal to its essential link with the fate of Quebec society as a whole.

The departure from classically liberal emphases on the rights of the individual in favour of those of the family is even more clearly illustrated by an earlier legislative debate on the "Déclaration des droits des citoyens" [23]. In the dying days of the session, the ruling UN proposed the adoption of a draft declaration in order to circumvent the overriding of provincial legislation by the federal (Diefenbaker) government's own proposal for a Charter of Rights. In that debate, Lafrance proposed amending the draft to protect "les droits et libertés..."
Accepting this as a friendly amendment, a UN MNA amplified it with the suggestion that the proposed charter "continuer à s'inspirer dans toute la législation des principes de la morale chrétienne", He agreed: "La famille selon cette philosophie constitue la cellule fondamentale de la nation. Nous devons faire tout ce qui est possible pour faire protéger la famille", At that point Liberal house leader Georges Lapalme intervened; while in accord with the emphasis on the family, he was forced to reject the term "continuer" since that would retroactively give blanket support to all past UN policies and actions. The legislation did not pass.

What is interesting here is the unquestioning allegiance to a Christian (read Catholic) view of family morality, the elevation of its rights over those of the individual members, and the complete failure of all parties to consider sex equality as a civil right. The liberal values of equality and democracy were mentioned with respect neither to gender nor the private domestic sphere. This displacement of women's interests was electorally opportunistic. At the same time, it ran counter to the fact that the Liberals, not to mention other components of the mass opposition [24], were committed to policies which would promote greater equality for women in the family, at work and in education.

The ease with which Liberals were able to evade the issue
testifies to the relative weakness of feminist politics in the period. Although there were several highly structured women's organizations in Quebec at this time, they were for the most part confessional, not autonomous, in that they were supervised by chaplain-priests, and they were engaged in promoting a feminine (rather than feminist) politics [25].

Two exceptions, the Société des femmes universitaires (SFU) and the Fédération des femmes libérales du Québec (FFLQ), bear some examination because they illustrate the character of what nascent feminist forces there were and the contradictory way in which the social category of women was inserted into the hegemonic bloc. While Quebec based, they had influential pan-Canadian counterparts, the SFU in the Canadian Federation of University Women, and the FFLQ in other women's auxiliaries to federal and provincial Liberal organizations [26]. Although both supported feminist positions on education, work and legal equality, they were important in different ways, the SFU as an unaffiliated lobby group and the FFLQ as the duly constituted "voice" of women inside the ruling party.

The SFU, a mainly Montreal-based organization, was open to women who had attended university. Given the class character of the Quebec educational system, it is safe to say that their families of origin and marriage were largely "middle class" although members came from both language groups. Along with members of the similar Société des femmes diplômées de
I'\textit{université} (SFDU) and some women lawyers, it occasionally petitioned for legal and educational reform, particularly with regard to the legal status of married women. An example of their activities was a meeting held at the \textit{Université de Montréal} in early December 1959 in response to the establishment, by UN Premier Paul Sauvé, of a commission under Judge Thibodeau to consider general revisions to the \textit{Code civil}. The prospect of updating the code opened up a new arena for activity by reformers who sought progress in relation to "\textit{le statut juridique de la femme}". A report of this meeting was published in \textit{Le Devoir} [12 Dec. 1959] under the telling headline "\textit{La femme mariée quand elle est malheureuse devrait être aidée et non handicapée par la loi}". Bernard Bissonnette, dean of the \textit{Université de Montréal} law faculty, was honorary chair and keynote speakers included Marie-Paule Laurin Maciver, Mignonne Legault-Tessier as well as Thérèse Casgrain. The meeting is important, not only because it is the only reported public lobbying action by women in response to the establishment of the Thibeaudeau commission, but because it reveals the political style of these reformers.

Participants were agreed that family law provisions [27] were a major obstacle to the achievement of full civil equality for women. A married woman was treated as a minor, subordinated to the authority of her husband, the legal "\textit{chef de famille}". She was forced to remain domiciled in any place he chose, unable to act as a legal guardian for her children and so incapable of
ordering medical treatment for herself or her children even in
emergencies, prevented from practising a profession separate from
his, belonging to a union or professional association and barred
from obtaining credit, even for the basic necessities of life, without
his written permission. Without a notarized marriage
contract, all family assets, including the matrimonial home and
any property that a wife brought to or inherited during the
marriage, was under the husband's control so that he could
mortgage, sell, give or will way from her all assets. The
marriage contract regime of "séparation des biens" allowed a
woman to retain her own property but gave her no right to assets
accumulated during the marriage and did not override the legal
provisions with regard to domicile, authority over children,
credit, work and testamentary power.

Casgrain, a veteran of the struggle for suffrage [28], whose
speech was deemed the highlight of the evening by the Le Devoir
reporter, linked the current reform with "Ces luttes
célèbres... si loin et si proches pourtant". Her approach was one
of reasoned reform of an unreasonable situation. "Il faut
promouvoir," she urged, "fièrement, sereinement, et même
audacieusement dans la perspective de la réforme." Not only was
Quebec law backward in comparison with those of the other nine
provinces, but, containing 175 exemptions, it was also unwieldy.
Thus, in Casgrain's view its retention simply played an
ideological role, confirming the conventional notion of married
women's general dependency and incapacity.

Moreover, a lawyer present continued, despite the myth that Quebecois husbands were "intelligent, bons", experience in her own legal practice showed that women in difficult circumstances of marriage breakup or discord found the "le bon père de famille, selon l'application même du Code--à qui souvent elles ne peuvent accorder un minimum d'estime et de confiance--se révèle tout banalement un incapable, un irresponsable". Her criticism of men was not universal: happy women walked hand in hand with "ce compagnon d'éternité, ce chevalier gentil-homme, bref le Prince Charming". Finally, another panelist appealed to Catholic teaching, citing, doubtless selectively, a 1931 Encyclical instruction that women should not be put into the ranks of inferiors.

The law, then, was criticized in terms of reason and rights, feminist humanitarianism and even the dominant theological norms. But, as in the case of the Le Devoir roundtable, neither marriage nor gender structures were challenged as institutions, and indeed, the idea that Prince Charming existed, later a favourite target of Quebecoises denunciations, was accepted without a blush.

In addition to the independent activists of the SFU, women inside the Liberal Party also acted as a limited pressure group on women's issues. However, despite the energy to be found in
the debates on the women's page of the Liberal journal, *La Réforme*, the FFLQ was politically hegemonized and organizationally circumscribed by the Quebec Liberal Party. Several models of power in political parties have been reviewed in relation to Quebec by Lemieux [1982]. Whichever of these models is adopted, the FFLQ cannot be said to have had much power. If, for example, power is seen to lie primarily in membership in the legislature, women were excluded because of their lack of representation.

Indeed, the AN got its first and only woman member only in 1981, when Claire Kirkland-Casgrain was elected to fill her deceased father's seat in Outremont [*Le Devoir* 6 May 1970] [29]. If, on the other hand, power is seen to reside in the apparatus of policy makers and riding presidents, women were not well represented here either because of their commitments to a separate, women's, organisation [30]. Even in terms of membership, there were fewer women than men, and these women were less able to raise funds because of their situationally determined lack of access to wealth, particularly in its corporate form [Lemieux 1982: 79-81].

However, two other bases of potential power not considered in Lemieux's review seem to be of greater importance in the case of the FFLQ: first, its semi-autonomous structure and second, its usefulness as a source of elections canvassers and workers [31]. Feminists have offered two quite contradictory assessments of the first. On the one hand, it has been argued that independent
women's caucuses whether in unions or political parties are indeed an effective base for the discussion and support of women's interests and concerns [Milkman 1982; Manley 1975]. On the other hand, such auxiliaries have been castigated as ghettos which keep women out of positions of power where strategy is adopted, thus ensuring their ongoing subordination [Bashevkin 1983; Jacquette 1974: 12-15]. Overall, one can conclude that the greater the degree of formal organizational autonomy, of feminist consciousness and of solidarity in the caucus, the more likely that such groupings will be able to act effectively on women's issues.

The FFLQ represented, in fact, a mix of these types. With annual province-wide conventions empowered to elect its own executive and adopt resolutions, local branches in riding associations and women's pages in La Réforme, it apparently meets the criteria of formal organizational autonomy. But it was ideologically circumscribed both by the parent party's goals and by its members' acceptance of dominant ideologies of women's role. Its pages in La Réforme presented a mixture of political concerns and traditional women's auxiliary activities. For example, pictures or statements of the wife of a past or current Liberal leader were just as likely to appear as those of the FFLQ president or prominent female federal members of parliament; and reports on women's employment vied with accounts of teas, dances, and fashion shows [32].
Three areas of feminist concern -- education, work, and the legal status of married women -- did however get mentioned. The mere presence of these issues does not permit us to see the FFLQ as an independent pressure group since these had already been made part of the Liberal project. Nevertheless, the fact that calls for equal pay for equal work and legal and educational reform appeared in articles by leaders or letters from members [La Réforme Aug. 1963: 15, Jan. 1962: 10, April 1964: 15] suggest that the FFLQ did see itself as an authentic representative of feminist reform, at least within the established party policy framework. At the same time, the criticism of Liberal plans to do away with the écoles ménagères as part of the educational reform indicates that there was both a conservative current in the membership committed to housewifery, and a certain degree of autonomy in discussing party policy [La Réforme May 1963: 15, 16].

Closer attention to work-related issues presents a rather different picture, however. During a short-term boom in the textile industry's business cycle, women workers were required to work night shifts. Under pressure from mostly the CSN unions who opposed such night work [33], the Liberals established a commission of inquiry, headed by long-time party activist and a Liberal nominee to the Commission de révision du code civil, lawyer Yvette Dussault-Mailloux [Le Devoir 8 Jan. 1966]. Her report, which recommended abrogating protective legislation

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preventing women's night work, was publicized in and supported by the FFLQ without any evidence of independent critical discussion. Nor did any of the articles link the legislation of gender-neutral conditions in the labour force to the issue of equal payment for labour. Here, insofar as a feminist demand for equal pay was completely eclipsed by more immediate party concerns, the effective autonomy of the FFLQ must be considered as weaker than its formal structure might indicate. Indeed, just as its actions were always tied to the exigencies of Liberal legislative policies and electoral campaigns, so were its statements, which always praised the party and supported its positions, a conduit for party policy and ideology rather than an independent "voice" of women.

As for the party, its reform policies with respect to the status of married women, equal pay and education that it had previously espoused when seeking to lead the opposition forces arrayed against the UN, were on the whole progressive in the sense that they caught up with and in some cases even surpassed similar legislation elsewhere in Canada. But the legislation actually passed was perhaps less than the policies promised. Even after the reform of the Code civil in 1964 [9.2.1.1. below], married women were still formally subordinate to their husband and the property provisions remained the same, effectively excluding women from the right to family property. In the same year the PLQ also adopted the first equal pay legislation in
Canada [34]. Weak and difficult to enforce, it was applicable only for the same, not merely similar work, gave no protection or assistance to the complainant and contained few penalties for the employer. Nevertheless, along with the objective needs of the labour force for workers and of households for income, this legislation, like the ideological modifications promoted in Le Devoir, served to legitimate the new dual role for women as mothers and workers.

In the long run, however, of all the Quiet revolution initiatives, it was perhaps the unintended consequences of educational reform that had the greatest impact on gender relations. Like the participants in the Le Devoir roundtable, the Parent Commission's [1964: 239-241] blueprint for educational reform suggested that job training was a necessary component for the new shape of women's adult lives as mother: worker: housewife. Again, neither the Report nor the government sought to end sex-typing in jobs, aiming rather to prepare women well for opportunities available in a sex-segregated labour force. But, as we shall see below [6.1.1], conditions in the new educational institutions created a milieu for the radicalization of women, first as students and nationalists, later as feminists. Eventually, as these students became teachers in schools and CEGEPs, and members of unions which were critical of gender hierarchy [8.4.3.1 below], these institutions themselves came to serve as an important locus for the reproduction of new feminist
Ideologies.

In a limited and ambiguous way, then, the Quiet Revolution phase of the Liberal modernisation drive can be seen to have created a political field which would facilitate the development of feminist movements. At the most general level, it did so by adopting a strategy which made the secular state and its capacities to direct economic development, not the family nor the church, the guarantor of national survival and "épanouissement". In addition, modernising reformers promoted a modification of patriarchal ideology and power, in line with a more egalitarian view of marriage. Increasingly, "woman" was removed from the centre of ideological debate and subsumed under the abstract category of citizen, albeit citizens with a special role as mothers and wives. This reconfiguration made it possible for groups like the SFU, SFDU and the FFLQ to construct a legitimated feminist politics within the limited terms of a liberal ideology of equality. And it was the contradictory situation created by the incompleteness of this ideological transformation and institutional reform that formed the basis, in turn, for the development of new autonomous women's organizations.

5.3. The Fédération des femmes du Québec.

5.3.1. Introduction: relaunching feminism.

The establishment of the Fédération des femmes du Québec between 1964 and 1966 represented the appropriation of central
elements of the newly hegemonic liberal modernisation ideology by 
women in their own interests. Adopting the tenets of 
secularization and undifferentiated citizenship, the FFQ broke 
even more profoundly than the Liberals and the FFLQ from the 
traditional nationalist problematic. For the FFQ, women were an 
interest group operating in a pluralistic political milieu, one 
whose gender based interests had been overlooked in the 
modernizing drive. Especially in the period before 1975, the FFQ 
operated from a Good King Richard perspective [Hobsbawm 1965], 
believing that once reasoned argument had brought injustices to 
the attention of those in power they would be corrected. In 
accepting the benevolence, or at least neutrality, of the state 
as well as in promoting specific policies, the FFQ not merely 
failed to transcend but, in fact, actually reinforced liberal 
hegemony, despite the dynamically radical potential which its 
commitment to gender based politics implied. However, as we 
shall see, this potential did not begin to be realized until 
national, class and gender politics had begun to discredit the 
notion of a neutral state.

Among recent feminist organisations in Canada, the FFQ is 
unique in its direct linkage to the earlier phase of struggle 
centred on suffrage [35]. Not only were the same women involved 
in both, but the FFQ initially viewed its task as completing 
reforms in working and legal conditions left unfinished by the 
suffrage struggle itself. Moreover, the FFQ's actual
organizational founding was sparked by a celebration to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of provincial suffrage launched by suffrage activist, Thérèse Casgrain. With Casgrain, Colette Beauchamp, a young journalist at Le Devoir, lawyer Réjeanne Colas and a few others organized a meeting which reintroduced feminism to the Quebec political field. As one of the organizers recalled: "It was fantastique. There had been nothing like it in Quebec up to that time. The hall was full of women who had never seen anything like it" [Interview: A].

At this meeting, the elation of mutual self-recognition, a process that feminists were later to identify as a fundamental dynamic of consciousness-raising, led women to decide that there were still a number of injustices to correct with regard to the labour force, the legal system, education and economic security. While the fête's sponsors had not set out to establish a new organization, the meeting approved a spontaneous suggestion for a province-wide organization to overcome the fragmentation of feminine and women's rights organizations and to become "le porte-parole OFFICIEL de la majorité des femmes du Québec" [Solange Chalvin, Le Devoir 16 April 1966]. A new committee, composed of a core of the original organizers, and later expanded to sixteen members including sociologist Monique Bégin, Colas and Simone Chartrand [36], undertook the preliminary work necessary to found such a federation.

As well as surveying the priorities for action in women's
interests of over 200 individuals and groups, this committee
drafted a statement of purpose that was approved at the meeting
officially launching the new organization [Interview: A]. It was
to group women without distinction of race, ethnicity, colour or
creed; to coordinate social action; to keep its membership
informed of one another’s goals, research, and immediate activity
in the field of social action; and to initiate, coordinate and
sustain action programmes of its own [Le Devoir 25 April 1966].
Despite some opposition, the meeting also made what turned out to
be a fortunate decision to permit individual as well as group
membership. Individual members, in fact, provided a vital core
of activists solidly committed to the FFQ’s liberal feminist
ideology and its course of independent action [37].

Although contemporary reports and my own interviews emphasized
that there were women of all social classes, marital statuses and
regions at the meeting, some groups were under-represented.
First, the two major Catholic women’s organizations, the Union
catholique des femmes rurales (UCFR) and the urban based Cercles
d’économie domestique (CED), frightened by the secular character
of the organization and preoccupied with internal debates on the
direction their own organizations should take [Interview: D], did
not attend [38].

Secondly, the audience was largely urban, educated, often with
experience in special interest groups -- from consumers’
associations to university women’s clubs and the VOW [Interview:
Q, A]. The participants, almost all francophone, were about evenly divided between "professionals" and "housewives". Almost no active trade unionists attended, although Claire Robillard, an employee of the FTQ and its representative to the new organization and Yvette Rousseau, a CSN official later (1970-1974) president of the FFQ, persistently put forward the concerns of women in working class jobs [Interview: Q]. There were also almost no students. In a photograph of the original board, Beauchamp was the only one in a minidress, a fashion sign that the leaders of the group were of a certain age [FFQB 6:4 March 1976: 11].

Contemporary commentators welcomed the FFQ as a new political and ideological force. Journalist Renaude Lapointe thought that the 1965 celebration manifested a new political spirit and women's self definition as undifferentiated equals with men:

Tout en admettant que l'évolution féminine a atteint au troisième stade, qui est pour ainsi dire celui de l'homogénéisation, de l'intégration non seulement théorique mais pratique des femmes dans la société avec droits et devoirs égaux à ceux des hommes, elles reconnaissent comme immédiate la nécessité de former d'abord un groupe de pression très puissant comme le National Committee of Women [La Presse 25 April 1965].

Invited to speak at the 1966 founding conference, René Lévesque, then Ministre de la Famille et du Bien-Être, praised its timeliness and utility: "Nous avons besoin des femmes productives dans tous les sens du mot" [Le Devoir 25 April 1966].
For him, the new organization was congruent with the PLQ’s modernisation ideology, although caution should be exercised not to incarnate men in general as the enemy.

L’opposition des hommes est de plus en plus faible à ce que peut représenter le statut de la femme, sa condition et le travail des femmes dans le Québec, sauf chez les fossiles véritables qui sont de moins en moins nombreux et chez les esprits distraits qui n’ont pas vu que les réalités ont changé, que les vieux murs de discrimination sont en train de s’écrouler [ibid].

There is evidence of this congruence in that the programme he proposed, based on resolutions adopted at party conventions, was almost identical to the one that the FFQ would adopt over the two next days.

Indeed, the FFQ’s most important ideological innovation was to apply a thoroughgoing liberal individualism to women to a degree unprecedented in Quebec gender and feminist politics: "La FFQ a toujours conçu que les femmes sont des individus" [Interview: Q]. Like Mill’s [1970] classical or Friedan’s [1963] contemporary liberal feminism, the FFQ proposed to strip away barriers to women’s individual achievement [39]. But, as I have argued, this individualism is only one component of liberal political philosophy, which also constructs the polity as separate from a private familial realm which it cedes to patriarchal rule. In stressing individualism the FFQ was logically faced with resolving the contradictory liberal problematic with regard to the family. In the Quebec case, this contradiction was
particularly important in that liberal modernisation ideology, as expressed in the PLQ's electoral platforms, had retained clerical nationalism's emphasis on the family, downplaying the importance of the individual. At the level of its ideological pronouncements, the FFQ ignored this contradiction, but, despite some early hesitation it opted to emphasize women as individuals and downplay the family.

Regional committees were set up in Montreal and Quebec City, followed by other regional centres [FFQB 1:2 April 1968: 3, 1:6 Feb. 1972: 22]. An initially sporadic newsletter, the FFQ Bulletin, [40] was published. The new organization set up permanent subcommittees including those on work, family law reform and social action [ibid. 3, 6]. These were supplemented by committees to work on annually adopted themes, for example, to prepare submissions to the federal Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada (RCSWC) in 1968 [ibid. 4] or to study pornography in 1977. Overall policy was set at annual conventions open to individual members and women belonging to member organizations.


The FFQ's programme was remarkably consistent over its first seven years. Work life was its top priority, and one of its first steps was to establish a permanent subcommittee on women in the labour force. It lobbied for a women's secretariat in the
department of labour and for equal pay for equal work, in part through the annual presentation of briefs to the *Ministre du Travail* beginning in 1968 and in part through joint action with unions and other groups [41]. One of their first actions was to join the FTQ, the CSN and the *Union générale des étudiants du Québec* (UGEQ) in protesting the replacement of 33 married women teachers in Alma with (unmarried) "*jeunes filles*" straight out of school; and from 1970 to 1973, they campaigned with unions and day care organizations for reforms that would let women workers deduct day care expenses from their taxes [FFQB 1:3 Dec. 1970: 8, 1:4 March 1971: 3].

The presence of women like Mme Martel, from the SFU, and of those like Rousseau and Chartrand, who were connected with the labour movement, served both to stress work as a theme and to remind the largely middle class organization of the condition of working class women. This awareness was still evident at the 1973 convention, when one workshop recommended that a special initiative be taken that year to persuade unions to bargain for equal pay in their contracts [FFQB 3:5 July 1973: 5]. The FFQ *Bulletin* [FFQB 4:1 March 1973: 7] also featured a report by FTQ staff researcher, Mona-Josée Gagnon [FFQB 4:2 May 1974: 7], on its path-breaking convention discussion of women's rights in unions and at work [8. 4. 1. 11]. Finally, the Chicoutimi region undertook to involve the wives of strikers in a campaign to raise public awareness about local strikes.

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In contrast to other previous and concurrent women's organizations and mixed voluntary groups like farmers' and religious organizations, the FFQ evinced little concern with the family as such. The topic took up little space in its publications and, rather than taking the lead in this area, the FFQ largely supported the initiatives of other (sometimes member) organizations, for example, with regard to consumer credit or controls on advertising directed at children [FFQB 1:2 April 1968: 7, 1:3 Dec. 1970: 4]. When in 1973 a number of organizations in Quebec focused on the family, which they saw as threatened, the concerns of its member organizations led the FFQ to do likewise. But rather than attempt to save a beleaguered family, the FFQ stressed an agenda of reforms in family and divorce law, reforms which would continue to make it more secular and less patriarchal [FFQB 1:2 April 1968: 7] [42]. And, on one of the central bug-bears of Quebec family policy and debate, the FFQ noted that "dénatalité" or a falling birth rate was not merely negative but actually had positive aspects [FFQB 3:1 1973: 1-3, 4:2 May 1974: 2-3].

When the FFQ addressed the question of family, it usually did so only obliquely in terms of the woman:work:family relation; and in doing so, it provided a distinct inflection to this ideological term. At the FFQ's founding conference, Bégin called for retraining to aid women re-entering the labour force. It is instructive to note that this demand and a focus on "recyclage"
was taken up by the subcommittee on the family, not that on work. Thus, from the start, the FFQ defined women’s "family" responsibilities to include paid work, even if the reality of interrupted work lives had also to be recognized.

This orientation to work was located in a broader concern for women’s rights. In 1968, International Human Rights Year, the FFQ called for a provincial human rights act and federal and provincial human rights commissions. It also urged a provincial investigation of women’s condition and supported demands by pan-Canadian women’s organizations like the VOW and the CFWU for a federal Royal Commission on the Status of Women. Once this commission, chaired by journalist Florence Bird (who wrote as Ann Francis), was established, the FFQ took advantage of its resources to present a brief on women’s education in Quebec and to sponsor a study on women’s political participation under its auspices [Depatie 1971; FFQB 1:2 April 1968: 5]. Later on, it also successfully sought funding from the federal Secretary of State to publish a study guide to the Commission’s recommendations [FFQB 6:4 May 1976: 11].

The new organization was officially nonpartisan. Nevertheless, its policy orientation, liberal, pluralist and committed to working within the existing political process, encouraged it to
form links with the PLQ. The focus on work and non-differentiation made the FFQ logical allies of the Liberal Party, especially in the latter's attempt to revise legal structures and remove protective barriers from labour legislation. The very fact of the FFQ's existence would seem to be evidence of the PLQ's desire to legitimize a reformed political life. But there are more concrete examples of organizational links. For example, the FFQ invited women from the FFLQ, but not from the UN, to speak at workshops and meetings [43]. Finally, activism in the FFQ also served as a route into the federal and provincial Liberal parties for women like Begin and Rousseau [44].

But if the FFQ was consistent in the first decade of its existence it was not politically static. The greatest change was not in its legislative programme nor ideological commitments but in its self presentation, what can be called its political tone. The first hand-duplicated issues of the Bulletin talked about work "dans l'optique de service" [FFQB 1:2 April 1968: 4] a traditional feminine orientation. There was also a faith in the inevitability of progress [FFQB 1:6 Feb. 1972: 6]. Government ministers were regularly congratulated simply for listening politely to FFQ representations [45]:

Une société qui favorise l'élection d'hommes politiques aussi valables que M. Castonguay est une société qui progresse. Il n'y a pas longtemps encore, quelle aurait été la réaction d'une Commission
The eulogizing of politicians reached an extreme at the 1973 convention, when Begin, then federal Minister of Health and Welfare, suggested eliminating the tax on cosmetics as, in effect, a popular democratic measure in the interests of all women. All women, she argued, no matter how rich or poor, have cosmetics -- lipstick, power, mascara -- in their purses, so eliminating the tax on these items would give housewives more money to spend on family needs! The Minister was warmly congratulated by FFQ presiding officers for her suggestion [FFQB 3:4 May 1973: 10]. As long as the FFQ maintained a polite and uncritical tone, the practise of giving ministers a platform, which it saw as getting the ear of the government, allowed them to shine and effectively favoured the party in power.

But, despite these actual links, the FFQ formally maintained a pluralistic, or what it called a non-political, stance that encouraged all forms of political participation [46]. As FFQ President Rousseau put it in her 1972 Rapport au congrès:

"S'engager politiquement, c'est exercer un pouvoir afin d'influencer des décisions politiques dans le sens de ses connections, que ce soit comme individu ou comme groupe. Une démocratie ne fonctionne qu'en autant que ceux qui en font partie exercent leur pouvoir. Même si tout ne fonctionne pas de façon satisfaisante" [FFQB 3:1 Oct. 1972: 8].

By 1973, however, a more militant tone started to appear in
some of the Bulletin articles. Criticizing the same provincial Charte des droits earlier welcomed uncritically by the FFQ [FFQB 3: 6 Dec. 1973: 18], FFQ member Aline Gobeil asked, "Une charte des droits pour qui?" Using a metaphor equating women with victims of crime transforms gender discrimination from a residuum of a previous society to a present crime. Without naming the criminal, she held the government responsible for allowing discrimination to continue. For, while victims of criminal acts are protected by law, "quand ont-ils montré la même diligence et le même acharnement à lutter contre les affronts et les multiples formes de discrimination dont les femmes sont victimes tous les jours?" [FFQB 4:2 May 1974: 2-3]. She cited a long list of discriminatory practices in both federal and provincial employment conditions and union contracts which result in salary gaps and criticized the lack of maternity leave provisions, warning: "Faut-il s'étonner que le Québec ait le taux de natalité le plus bas au Canada?" In a similar vein, the political action committee deplored the weakness of the Commission des droits de la personne established in 1975, with its imprecise legislation, underfunding, lack of power to initiate cases and absence of women members [Ibid. 10] [47].

Two quite different developments, one in the regional and one in the international political field, may help to explain the timing of this new militant tone. First, like all other popular and reformist organizations in Quebec, the FFQ felt the
contradictory effects of the 1970 October crisis. Although the most important short term effect of the federal Liberal government's declaration of the War Measures Act, which permitted the suspension of habeas corpus and the deployment of the Canadian army in Quebec, was to demobilize far left groups [6.1.1. below], it also raised questions for other political activists about the possibility of peaceful reform, and hence about the utility of reform strategies themselves [Interview: Q]. FFQ President Rousseau's statement of October 30 1970 indicated a firming of purpose, despite the FFQ's anxiety and its condemnation of violence [FFQB 1:3 Dec. 1970: 2-3]. Although the organization had not in the past pushed its members to carry out its social action programme, the FFQ would now intensify its struggle for reform: "Les femmes du Québec ont-elles compris qu'une réforme fondamentale de notre société est imminente et nécessaire, et qu'elles ne peuvent plus refuser d'y participer chacune selon ses capacités et dans son milieu?" [Ibid.].

Secondly, the FFQ was no longer the only "porte-parole" of feminism. English Canada, the USA and northern Europe had all seen the emergence of a militant women's liberation movement after 1968 [Discussion Group no. 6 1972; Mitchell 1971: 43-54]. Before 1977, however, the Bulletin was remarkably silent on this movement. Although francophone feminism was slow to develop in Quebec, FFQ members were aware of some of its more spectacular actions in Montreal and of the Canada-wide struggle for repeal of
the abortion laws covered by the Montreal press [Le Devoir 9 March 1970, 30 March 1973, 4 Oct. 1973; 7.3. below]. In addition, as Laurette Robillard put it on the occasion of the FFQ's tenth anniversary, hope for reform was turned to scepticism in the 1970s, by slow progress [FFQB 6:4 March 1976: 14].


As well as the factors mentioned above, a pluralist conception of the state, informal links with the Liberals and the effects of class and gender styles, the politeness of the FFQ can be partly explained by its lobbying strategy. In particular, its main objective, the establishment of a governmental body charged with acting in women's interests, required implementation by the party in power [FFQB 1:6 Feb. 1972: 1]. The initial conception of this body as a bureau in the Ministry of Labour had by 1972 expanded to an Office de la femme, independent of all government departments, with a wide range of powers to educate women and government from a reform perspective, and which would "viser une intégration dans tous les secteurs de la société, sinon, risquer de se perpetuer une discrimination qui enlève à la femme le
contrôlé de sa propre destinée" [Ibid.]. The brief the FFQ presented to the PLQ Prime Minister Bourassa on this office well illustrates the contradictions of liberal feminism. In demanding an expanded role for the Office, the FFQ stated, more fully than before, the radical implications of its non-differentiation ideology, though still without challenging the family [Ibid.]. Yet against this radicalism, and notwithstanding its earlier intention to rely on social action for change, this demand for an Office with far reaching powers also accorded an increased role in assuring women's equality for the state.

Persistent lobbying was rewarded by the establishment of a Conseil du statut de la femme by the Bourassa government in 1973. Although the parliamentary debate about, and actions of, the CSF are considered below [9.2.3., 9.3.3.], it is useful to note here some of the effects that its establishment had on the FFQ. First, both lobbying for its establishment and supporting its initial activities tied the FFQ firmly to government and reinforced its belief in the effectiveness of legislative change. This ideological and strategic orientation was in turn reinforced by more concrete links. Laurette Robillard, an FFQ board member active in the subcommittee on work, became its first president and other (former and active) FFQ members were named to its board of directors and research staff [49]. The FFQ also promised close co-operation with the CSF on anti-discrimination initiatives in the public service [FFQB 4:4 Oct. 1973: 3] and in planning the
International Women's Year (IWD) [FFQB 5:1 1975: 4]. In general, however, the FFQ's success left it without a central organizing focus, a repetition on a much smaller scale of the effects that gaining suffrage had had on a previous generation of feminists. Thus, close personnel ties and ideological parallels between the CSF and the FFQ allowed a state body to take over the latter's programme just at the point when a more radical feminist militancy was developing among younger women.

As a result, after 1973, the FFQ was faced with a crisis of direction arising from its incapacity to develop new programme initiatives or quickly revise its ideology to meet the new feminist insight concerning the structural, and not just consciousness-based, character of oppressive sex/gender systems. This loss of initiative was amplified by the FFQ's organizational structure. The difficulty of its task becomes clear when it is understood that contact with the base of a member organization like, for example, L'Association des veuves de Montréal [50] had for the most part to pass through the member organization's own leadership bodies; and that, not only did these organizations have their own priorities and ideological configurations but their base members usually had little time for additional political involvements [Interview: Q]. Although the FFQ's constitution gave such federated members the right to attend annual meetings, regional councils and special events, few did because of travel costs, and because they were already burdened
with domestic and paid labour, work in their own voluntary organizations and childcare. Attendance at annual conferences in the 1960s was about 100-150 [51]. Reaching these federated members was a constant difficulty for the FFQ. Thus, the structural compromise which allowed the FFQ to claim to represent a large number of women (130,000) while providing a means for committed individual members to act, also served to limit the extent of its ideological and political radicalization. Differences in orientation and action between individual and organizational members became more evident as the former turned more quickly to new forms of feminist radicalism. Overall, the central board found it hard to mobilize members to carry out its own programmes.

The explanations offered by the FFQ members tended to stress individual consciousness rather than organizational structure for this failure. The level of political consciousness, sophistication and interest of Quebecoises was said to be low and to require political education:

Nous savons que pendant cette première période où les femmes joueront un rôle sur la scène publique, il leur faudra s'unir et apprendre à délaisser les petites rivalités et mesquineries... elles apporterait une dimension qui existe encore si peu dans la vie publique: LE DESINTERESSEMENT ET L'OBJECTIVITE [52].

Four years later, women were seen to be still lagging, but better prepared for the help the FFQ was prepared to offer: "Nous
sayons pourtant que plusieurs sont prêtes à y prendre leur place" [FFQB 1:6 Feb. 1972: 1]. At an intensive internal education session, base members had their own ideas about why women didn't attend meetings: objectives were badly defined, themes imprecise and badly documented, personality conflicts erupted and individuals suffered from "la timidité" [FFQB 3:3 March 1973: 9]. Organisational disagreements simmered, with some members claiming that the FFQ had operated outside its charter from 1974 and that constitutional revision was long overdue [Le Devoir 21 April 1976] and others stressing problems of burn-out for central leaders [Interview: Q]. Thus, neither leaders nor base members directly examined structural constraints to consciousness raising.

Finally, as well as lobbying government and mobilizing its membership, the FFQ held that mobilizing all the women of Quebec to develop a politicized consciousness of women's rights issues was an important task. In this ambition, the FFQ was attempting to claim social leadership, contesting not only the traditional ideology and morality but also contemporary rivals for ideological hegemony in the mass media and the ruling parties. To this end, it sponsored education events, like a tenth anniversary colloquium on sexist stereotypes, which was attended by representatives of private and public industry, but not by unionists [Le Devoir 26 April 1976] [53]. Practically this meant that the FFQ had not only to be able to motivate a vast and
diverse membership that included not only the politically committed individual members but also the associated organizations, but also women who were not involved in its organizational networks. But neither its material, human nor ideological resources were adequate to the task. Nor is it possible precisely to evaluate the extent to which the FFQ can be credited for any ideological change in the period following 1973 as feminist actors multiplied on the political field and gender politics became more complex.

As liberal feminism's equal opportunity plank increasingly became part of hegemonic ideology on the one hand and feminist radicalism, a counter-hegemonic challenge on the other, the FFQ lost its ideological distinctiveness and leadership. Its policy development also lagged and sometimes even appeared to be muddled. It even waffled on the key issue of work, deciding that it was in favour of part time work in 1976 but reversing its position as a result of a report written by labour sociologist Hélène David in 1977 [FFQB 7:4 1977 March/Apr, special issue "Le travail à temps partiel, piège ou option?"]]. After 1975 it increasingly took up issues, like violence against women and pornography, problematized by radical feminism [FFQB 7:1 Jan/Feb 1977: 8, 8:5 Jan 1978: 4]. But in seeking areas for growth, the FFQ did not make an attempt to capture the layer of younger women radicalized after 1968, nor did it turn effectively to women from economically and socially disadvantaged milieux, as Simone
Chartrand urged [FFQB 7:1 Sept. 1976: 11] [54].

By 1973 and certainly by 1975, the organizational and ideological uniqueness of the FFQ's early period was seriously eroded. Politically outflanked by more radical women's liberation groups [Chapters 6, 7], coming to support one of the new current's main issues, the decriminalization of abortion, only in 1975 [FFQB Jan. 6:3 1976: 3-4] and no longer a main voice calling for improvement of women workers' conditions [Chapter 8], its strategic role was taken over by the very organization, the CSF, it had lobbied for and by the IWY activities that the FFQ membership pledged itself to support. In the next few years, the FFQ was to take its lead from campaigns organized by the new women's organizations that sprang up after IWY. Its own capacity to provide leadership and initiate strategy remained muted until it distanced itself from the CSF's plans for a politique d'ensemble, arguing that enough studies had been done and action was needed [FFQB 8:5 June 1978: 4]. Whether this was because a process of radicalization had made the organization more critical of all government or whether this was in part based on lingering FFQ/PLQ ties is not clear. But at the same convention, they did welcome federal Liberal cabinet member Bégin warmly and reproduced, in the Bulletin, Le Devoir women's columnist Renée Rowan's report of Bégin's speech urging a strategy suited to the actual social context [Ibid. 24]. Thus, with its 1978 Livre noir the FFQ demonstrated that it was less hegemonized by the actual
ruling bloc, but not that it had broken from liberal feminist ideologies.

Still, in the 1960s and 1970s, the FFQ played an important ideological and political leadership role, redefining women as a gender in terms of liberal individualism and inserting women's interest politics into a pluralist electoral political arena. As Rousseau summed up, "le plus souvent la FFQ a demandé l'appui des associations pour réaliser ses objectifs. Elle joue ainsi le rôle de leader tel que le voulaient les fédérations" [FFQB 6:4 March 76: 15]. In these actions and orientations it stretched the limitations of liberalism, both as an ideology and as a ruling political practice in Quebec, and began the long transformative process to allow women to begin to redefine gender politics in their own terms.

5.4. L'Association féminine d'éducation et d'action sociale: modernization from above.

5.4.1. Introduction.

If the FFQ articulated liberal modernization ideology for women from the perspective of secular individualism, the formation of AFEAS in 1966 expressed a similar process of modernization in the more organicist francophone Catholic women's organizations. Founded in 1966 as a result of the fusion of two confessional organizations, the larger rural L'Union catholique des femmes
rurales (UCFR) with 25,000 members in 345 "cercles" and 13 federations and the smaller urban Cercles d'économie domestiques (CED) with 10,000 members, 136 "cercles" and 7 federations, the new organization was the largest women's organisation in the province with about 35,000 adherents [55]. But, more than its size, its socially approved status among rural women made AFEAS important. Even in the 1960s, many husbands only permitted their wives to go out in the evening to attend AFEAS meetings or craft courses offered by the Ministère de l’Agriculture [Interview: D].

Its official slogan "pour la promotion de la famille et de la femme" [AFEAS 1:1 Jan. 1967: 1] echoed the clerical national tradition at the same time as it pointed to embryonic developments in both Catholic social philosophy and gender ideology among devout conservative rural and small town populations. Certainly, its initial reformist impulse derived more directly from the reforming elements within the Church than from any organic evolution of gender relations in rural Quebec. But over its first decade it experienced a feminist consciousness raising that altered the internal balance of power between clergy and its female membership and served to advance, not just a "modernised", i.e. modified patriarchal, vision of the family, but also the preconditions for a series of important developments in the whole politics of gender within this stratum of women.

Four factors influenced the political and ideological development of AFEAS. The first was its founding ideology in the
two reforming currents of religion and the state. The second was
its organizational structure. Third, was a set of changes in
gender relations and politics in the social layers of its
membership base and leadership which led to decreased fertility
and altered the woman:work:family triangle. Finally, these
sectoral social developments were themselves situated in a wider
context of gender politics, that is, a dynamic of feminist
radicalization and its co-optation by the state.

AFEAS’s ideological development had three phases, which can be
characterized as follows: baptism in modernization, 1966-1970;
growth of autonomy, 1971-1974; and the turn to feminism,
1975-1980. In each of these, gender ideologies, political
conceptions and relations with the clergy changed. After a word
about AFEAS’s roots, then, let us consider each of these phases
in turn, with particular attention to the developing relation
between AFEAS’s own development and the wider play of gender and
bloc politics.

Catholic women’s organizations developed under the close
supervision of the clergy. Indeed, the creation of the *Union
catholique des fermières* (UCF, which became the UCFR in 1957) and
the CDE was largely a result of conflicting claims of the church
and state to organize francophone Catholic women in Quebec [56].
At the instigation of two agronomists in the Ministry of
Agriculture a mass women’s organization, the *Cercles des
fermières* had first been founded in 1915 and formally organized

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on a provincial basis in 1919. With the goals of "charité, service social, mouvement d’action catholique" this had attracted large numbers of "les femmes des petites bourgeoisies locales" and farm wives, respectively its leadership and base, with state subsidized courses in craft and housewifery subjects [Collectif Clio 1982: 307-309]. After membership in the Fermières had grown to 49,000 in 1944, the clergy founded the rival UCF and ordered their female parisioners to join it in order "briser l’alliance entre le gouvernement provincial de l’époque et les femmes rurales" [Ibid: 417].

Although this directive was promoted spottily by the clergy and obeyed unevenly by their female parisioners, about 10,000 rural women joined the new organization. Despite successive membership losses in 1944, 1952, and 1957 the Fermières survived, however, and rejected yet another initiative of the bishops, this time for fusion of the two church based (CDE and UCFR) and the state sponsored women’s organizations, in 1963 [57]. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, it continued to offer courses and present briefs to the government on adult education and issues related to farm and family life, although it had been somewhat politically marginalized [Interview: CA, CC]. Over this same period, AFEAS (and before, 1966, its rural and urban predecessors) had larger memberships and a livelier politico-ideological development. Indeed, because of its size, its combined rural and urban membership, its relation to the Church and its ideological
evolution, it can well be argued that AFEAS was the most important locus for the development of new forms of gender politics among mainstream, practising Catholic women.

5.4.2. Ideology In Catholic women's organizations In 1960.

Articles from two issues of Femmes Rurales, La revue de l'Union catholique des femmes rurales (FR), in 1959 and 1960 provide a base point for examining the ideological and political distance that came to be travelled by contemporary Catholic feminism. Watched over by priests constitutionally required as chaplains at all levels of the organization, women in the UCFR consumed traditional clerico-nationalist ideology prepared by priests and its incorporated female leadership for dissemination in FR guidelines for the monthly study sessions that were its central activity [FR 10:10 June 1960: 12-13] [58]. All the Catholic organizations considered here followed a schedule of set study topics preceded by preparatory essays in the organizational monthlies. Attending clergy often controlled local membership and executive meetings, congresses and study sessions, interpreting not only scripture but procedural rules and generally influencing the decision making process [Interview: D, CA]. As well as putting a damper on the activities of the cercles their presence also meant that fewer women developed political leadership skills.

In the UFCR, the organizational slogan, "pour la terre et la
famille" was identical with the sentiments of the clerical nationalist ideologue Abbé Groulx, the image of women was timeless and the Pope was revered as an unquestionable moral authority. Even though femininity was defined so traditionally, an anxious note is hinted at in a voluntaristic suggestion by its propagandiste [59], Marthe Beaudry, in "Aux jeunes et à celles qui les aiment" that femininity must be reinforced by socialization and accepted by young girls if it is to endure properly [FR 10:3 March 1959: 7-8]. Despite contemporary adolescent anxieties about pimples and even longer school attendance, "cela ne change rien à leur préoccupation dominante: celle d'aimer et d'être aimée." In effect she recommended manipulative tactics, constructing interests around that

grande préoccupation: intérêt pour les enfants, pour les tâches féminines, désir de développer toutes ses aptitudes manuelles, tous ses talents, de cultiver son intelligence, de fortifier sa volonté tout en veillant à sa santé physique....Telle est une vie de jeune fille: elle sera une vie de femme [ibid.].

However healthy, dextrous or intelligent, girls are first of all mothers and the family their sphere.

June 1960, the month the Liberals came to power, found Paul-Emile Bolte, a San Sulipician priest who was the aumônier général [60] discussing the "Discours du Pape (10): Savoir garder l'équilibre" [FR 11:10 1960: 4-6]. He warned women against following the example of a fictional Mme Tourbillon who,
convinced of the value of UCFR, threw herself into its work full speed ahead, neglected her husband, children and home, and then justified her actions by the scriptural injunction against lukewarm convictions in, appropriately enough, the Book of Revelations. Elaborating Pius XII's pronouncements on inherent gender difference [5.2.1. above] as "Images de Dieu, selon leur mode propre", he explained that men are rational and logical thinkers who act according to plans and principles, while intuitive and emotional 'woman' "au contraire, distingue moins aisément les différents plans: intellectuel, sentimental, sexuel, moral, social". While female imagination and sensibility are precious social assets, they bring with them dangers of errors of judgement, excess zeal, and instability. To fulfill her God-given duty a woman must balance housecleaning, gardening, parsh work, family, and leisure; and she must always put her family before external activities, even in the UCFR [61].

Despite the strength of the progressive movement in the church associated with the pontificate of John XXIII that led internationally to Vatican II and found a Quebec voice in Cité Libre, the roles prescribed for Catholic women remained those of traditional clerico-nationalism with its idealization of the patriarchal family and only the slightest concessions to the realities of industrial capitalism [62]. The study session for that same month, was devoted to "épanouissement", a term that later became a watchword of popularized feminism. For the UCFR
fulfillment (épanouissement) had three dimensions, pregnancy, birth and a large family: all biological and with no leaven of individual development [FR 11:10 June 1960: 7-10]. In a more general sense as well, it remained conservatively oriented to status quo politics, free from the watchwords of modernization. In contrast to Vatican II and Abbés Dion's and O'Neill's validation of electoral politics for citizens, women were directed toward apolitical familial and parish activities at the expense of wider involvements.

Overall, then, gender ideologies in Catholic women's organizations in the early 1960s were congruent with those of traditional nationalism and served to cement the hegemonic bloc represented by the Duplessist UN. Unlike secular liberal feminists, Catholic women's organizations only took a turn to modernisation ideology after the election of the Liberals. But, while serving initially as barriers to the construction of the liberal modernisation bloc, their subsequent ideological radicalization remained within its orbit and so reinforced it.

5.4.3. Founding AFEAS.

The clerical initiative [63] to form AFEAS was not merely another move in a long-standing fight against the Fermières from an entrenched anti-statist perspective; it also resulted from an encounter with the reforming currents embodied in the Quiet Revolution's liberal modernization and Vatican II's liberalizing
humanism. The central leaderships of the UFCR and CDE, strongly supported by urban members, argued for organizational and ideological reform as necessary to catch up with rapid social change. The ground for this position had been partially prepared by the 1963 study sessions related to the fusion discussions with the Fermlères, where educational reform had been considered as a prime requirement of modernisation. They were also spurred on by the secular challenge presented by the creation of the FFQ in 1964-65. While state sponsored and secular women's organizations continued to be rejected, women's political involvement in public and church affairs was promoted and the new organizational structures were intended to increase lay women's participation and control [64].

The new organization's name itself, with its stress on education and social action and its concern with adult education, exemplified a progressivist faith that education was the route to collective social development [AFEAS 1:1 Jan. 1966: 11, 2:1 Sept 1967: 5-7, 3:2 Oct. 1968: 2]. Other elements of modernisation rhetoric were applied to gender relations for the first time in the first issues of the new organization's monthly publication. Most importantly, contemporary social change required thinking about the models that women would choose [AFEAS 2:1 1967: 10, 2:6 Feb. 1968: 4], in gender balances of power and in the division of labour in the household [2:1 Sept. 1967: 6-7]. Thus, the patriarchal family was gradually to become modified by more equal
cooperation between husband and wife.

While these changes were in line with the general ideological shifts which occurred in advanced capitalist social formations in the 1960s, they were radical, even shocking, to previously hegemonic clerico-nationalist ideology. Thus, despite a momentum of reform among executive and urban members, the degree of change perceived at the base combined with the fact that a top down change leaves existing ideologies at the base meant that there was serious resistance, principally from rural members and autonomiers. The fact that such a top down revolution also leaves power relations in place meant, however, that the leadership was in a position to undertake the internal education necessary to inculcate ideological change as well. Indeed the structure of the new organization, designed to facilitate both the diffusion of information from the centre out (or the top down) and the channeling of information from the periphery to the executive board (or the bottom up) was crucial to the combination of flexibility and stability that came to characterize AFEAS, and was one of its main strengths [AFEAS 1973a; 1980; Interview: D].

The constitution established three organizational levels: local parish cercles, regional directorates and conferences and a province-wide executive board and annual congress, each with clearly defined responsibilities and rights [AFEAS 1966]. The central executive planned the study sessions and priorities for action on a yearly basis and put programmes ratified by the
congress into effect. The regional bodies considered information flowing in both directions, reinforcing central directives and evaluating the concerns of the local groups before funnelling them back. In turn, these groups had to follow a monthly programme of study, prayer and arts ménagers [65] and action as well as send suggestions for these undertakings to the centre.

While this may seem a neutral structure, often found in political organizations, in this instance it proved to be flexible enough to accommodate a dialectic of increasing desire for autonomy and political sophistication generated at the base as a result of its programme of internal political and social education and external politico-ideological changes [AFEAS 3:2 Oct. 1968: 2, 3:4 Dec. 1968: 24-25; AFEAS 1973]. It was highly effective in integrating its members and in homogenizing their ideological stances. Its effectiveness is indicated by two quantitative measures. First, annual congresses were attended by about 1,000 [AFEAS 11:1 Jan. 1976: 24] women who participated in workshops and voted on policy and programme. This means that one out of 30 AFEAS members participated in congresses, which in turn functioned not merely on a rational political level but as ritual occasions for the strengthening of group solidarity [66]. Secondly, the only study of AFEAS membership shows a low turnover, and few left because of disagreements with organizational perspectives or activities [AFEAS 1981b]. Nor is there any evidence that members were dissatisfied with the basic organizational structure. Although the constitution was modified twice, in 1973 and 1979, this
structure was not altered at all. Instead, reforms gradually reduced, and ultimately removed, clerical control by placing greater power in the hands of the lay female leadership [67].

5.4.4. The Ideological evolution of AFEAS.

5.4.4.1. Baptism in modernisation.

The period from 1966 to 1970 was AFEAS's baptism in modernisation. This phase was explicitly defined as one of preparation: "étudier, unir le savoir et leur forces intellectuelles et morales pour être en mesure d'exercer leurs droits et réellement jouer leur rôle" [AFEAS 1:1 Jan. 1967:].

Its progressive quality is shown in the way that previously sacrosanct familial institutions and relations were questioned: what should be women's role? Is there anything in their nature that prevents them working? what should be the relation between spouses? On balance, however, it promoted "la famille" over "la femme", saw women as mothers first and advised submission to husbands [68].

Setting the tone for the new organization, its conseiller général, George-Etienne Phanneuf, welcomed technological progress with the dualist proviso that religious and scientific law must be kept separate: "Le progrès est la manifestation d'activités humaines. Celle-ci est voulu par Dieu comme vient de le rappeler le Concile Vatican II....Essayons aujourd'hui d'entrer dans cet esprit de sain optimisme" [AFEAS 1:1 Jan. 1967: 4]. However, it
was up to "femmes chrétiennes, de l'assumer de telle façon que les vues de Dieu soient mieux servies et sa gloire mieux recherchée dans nos foyers et notre société" [ibid. 5] [69]. In his view, the education AFEAS offered its members would enable them "à mieux remplir leur rôle de femme au sein de la société".

Thus like the ideology of "la femme symbiose", Phaneuf prescribed a "dual" role inside and outside the family. The notion of dualism adopted by the organization should however not be confused with Myrdal and Klein's [1968] sociological concept of dual roles for women as workers and wife-mothers because it selects social action or unpaid work with voluntary groups rather than paid employment as the preferred external activity. While recognising that many married women sought labour force jobs from economic need, Catholic gender ideology still judged such employment for women with small children as entailing unacceptably high costs in terms of child care, appliances and fatigue and to community and family solidarity. But, although women are and will remain "l'élément centrale de la cellule familiale", their needs and labour force participation must be recognised. It is past time to establish "une collaboration entre les époux et les enfants de permettre la femme d'avoir un peu de temps libre où elle pourra se cultiver et où, le moment venu, elle pourra, si elle le désire, s'intégrer au monde du travail" [AFEAS 2:6 March 1968: 3, 10].

The political strategy for the new organisation was described
by Céline Bédeau, propagandiste générale, in "Le rôle des corps intermédiaires" [70]. The organisation should adopt a strategy of making its views clear to government and its most important task would be first to educate its members to the new realities of life in industrial Quebec where lobbying was now part of the tasks of citizenship. Indeed, by having women run formal meetings at all three levels, AFEAS taught its members valuable political skills. In this context, she also introduced a tone, mildly critical of gender structures coupled with a challenge for women to do better, characteristic of the first two phases. Ideological prescriptions which relegate women to a domestic universe are also "un refuge servant à masquer la non-préparation et l'insécurité devant la tâche nouvelle" [AFEAS 1:1 Jan. 1967: 11]. Although she noted in passing that some women had too much work to get involved with community activities, the rest were exhorted to take an interest in the problems that particularly concern women. However, women needed collective action to ensure that they would get a hearing:

Seule, malgré sa bonne volonté, ses connaissances et sa compétence, elle ne peut faire valoir son point de vue et être prise au sérieux par l'Autorité qu'en s'associant à d'autres femmes dans un groupement autonome (libre, indépendant). À ces femmes, nous suggérons l'AFEAS, association démocratique, mouvement d'action sociale, qui vise à promouvoir les intérêts du foyer et à transformer la société [ibid: 12].

Her view logically subordinated women to the family: "Une vraie femme voit tous les problèmes de la vie humaine dans la
perspective de la famille... tous ses problèmes la touchent de près ou de loin, ou au moins quelques membres de la famille"
[ibid.]. Indeed, in "Les droits et devoirs réciproques de la famille et la société" this favoured institution, the fundamental social cell in which the woman remained the central element, was conceived as transcending not only women but the whole society. "[La famille n'est pas faite pour la société. c'est la société qui est faite pour la famille" with more rights ("fécondité", housing, economic and social security, health care and control over education) than duties (civic participation and the moral, physical, intellectual and religious upbringing of children) [AFEAS 1:2 Feb. 1966: 10].

5.4.4.11. Growing autonomy.

In the 1970s, inspired in part by the Bird report [AFEAS 5:6 Jan. 1971: 11], AFEAS entered a second phase of ideological revision. Despite the continuing programmatic centrality of the family, women were no longer seen exclusively as mothers but also as citizens and producers [71]. The social action perspective was increasingly politicised and the organization undertook to give its members a basic course in politics and economics to equip them for political activism [72]. Although it remained a confessional organization, based in parishes and rooted in a conservative social stratum, greater social power for women and greater autonomy for the organization, now defined as "libre" were sought [AFEAS 4:6 Feb. 1970: 3; 6:1 Sept 1971: 5, 8:9 May

Less often blamed for their incapacities, women were instead seen as "limitées par des préjugés tenant à une conception étroquée de son rôle" [AFEAS 4:6 Feb. 1970: 3]. Although AFEAS never blamed men for women's inequality, it began to note, descriptively to be sure, indices of male/female power differentials in men's greater personal wealth, their advantages in the Code civil and the available regimes of marriage contract and their more frequent occupation of formal positions of power and leadership [AFEAS 4:9 May 1970: 5-8]. Becoming increasingly less willing to subordinate women's activities to the claims of husbands or households and recognizing the costs of women's isolation [AFEAS 8:7 March 1974: 7-8], it more and more urgently called for male cooperation in the home. Even at its most developed, in president Azilda Marchand's [73] 1974 editorial "Assume ta condition de femme" [AFEAS 9:1 Sept. 1974: 2-3, Catholic feminist ideology, just like liberal feminism and the PLQ [9:2.1.1.] continued to explain women's powerlessness as a cultural lag. Why, she asked, in a society of abundance where energy, time, and competence are liberated, are women not? "La société traditionnelle avait 'parqué' les femmes dans leur foyer plus ou moins doré, les illusionnant sur leur sécurité 'bien au chaud' loin des soucis du monde, en oubliant leur état de dépendance, d'isolement et d'impuissance" [Ibid.].
Although she distinguished herself from the new feminist radicals [74] and reiterated a service orientation, Marchand nevertheless made the feminist claim that all economic injustice and social discrimination against women is "une entaille à la justice et à la paix". Her perspective constructs women as an interest group and whose political action in their own and wider social interests is legitimate. However, it retains a mellorist faith in the capacity of education to alter consciousness and social structures that was a permanent feature of AFEAS political strategy [AFEAS 4:9 May 1970: ]. For Marchand, then, the feminine condition did not mean passively accepting injustice, but seeking the social, economic and political conditions which would sustain women's human and spiritual development.

Such ideological reformulations met with opposition, in the first instance from many of the chaplains. While the conseiller général cautioned against abandoning spiritual faith for a diffuse humanism he did not actively oppose the movement towards ideological and organizational autonomy. However, reading between the lines of his text, which prescribed greater neutrality for aumônières, we can see that enough of them tried to retain their control over the cercles to warrant a public and official chastening, however mildly expressed [AFEAS 3:7 1968: 3-7. 3:8 1968: 10-13]. Although some left the women to their own devices, whether through confidence in their capacities or indifference, in other parishes priests not only wanted to retain
control over discussion, but even wanted AFEAS members to clean the church, launder surplices or arrange flowers [interview: D; AFEAS 3:7 1968: 14]. There were also differences over the fate of the arts ménagers side of the programme. Older rural women were often devoted to it, while younger rural and urban women wanted to pursue political action to a greater degree [interview: D]. After much discussion [AFEAS 2:4 Dec. 1967: 10, 3:1 Sept. 1968: 14-16], and some unauthorized experiments which removed it entirely, a compromise was reached that reduced time spent on crafts and household skills to less than half of the meeting time in the cercles and which encouraged groups to seek a new approach. In 1981, however, this section, supervised by a committee on "artisanat et culture", was made optional. At the same time, it had been rethought once again from a neo-feminist perspective which revalorized the work that women had traditionally done in quilting, weaving, sewing and so on in such a way as to make it ideologically acceptable to the younger women, even if they still found it tedious [interview: D; AFEAS 1981a: 6; Femmes d'ici 13:1 Oct. 1978: 15] [75].

The furthest extent of AFEAS's political autonomy can be seen in its actions with regard to abortion. In 1972, before the Quebec Conference of Bishops had taken a stand, the AFEAS [6:3 Nov. 1972: 4-10] executive made a statement supporting the existing law which permitted abortion under specific medical conditions. They neither advocated abortion, challenged the
doctrinal prohibition against it nor called for the repeal of the abortion law; but they did argue, in an extension of "Christian charity" and liberal Catholic and Quiet Revolution support for the state’s secularization, that given difficulties with contraception, spousal disagreements about contraception and economic and social stress, access to abortion was an unfortunate necessity for some women in difficult situations, which the current law, was right to safeguard in preference to unsafe illicit abortions [76]. As might be imagined, their independence of action on a matter which the hierarchy saw as lying wholly within its competence caused an enormous scandal [77]. As an immediate outcome of this conflict, AFEAS was asked to organize a study day for the bishops [78]. In addition, in order to respond to the debate generated within the organization by these actions [ibid. 12], it undertook a major internal education effort, providing information on family planning, including artificial birth control and abortion, but not advocating any particular method. The campaign was introduced by asking members to be sensitive to the dilemmas pregnant women sometimes, unfortunately, faced, and the point was brought home to a level of shared experience by asking "Were you overjoyed by your last pregnancy?"

5.4.4. III. The turn to feminism.

In a third phase beginning in 1975, AFEAS attempted to resolve the contradictions generated by its growing feminism by
developing a form of Catholic feminism that combined a sociological understanding of the family with a commitment to the multifaceted, religio-social development of the human individual. This development was both facilitated by the legitimacy given feminism by the IWY and catalyzed by the events organized across the province by the CSF and AFEAS itself in that year [Chapter 7; AFEAS 9:6 Feb. 1975: 12, 9:7, March 1975: 2]. In particular, a study of women working in family businesses begun the previous year as an IWD project revealed a shocking contrast between the extent of women's productive effort and the fragility of their economic security [AFEAS 1977]. This study also confirmed what women had known from their local experiences: the family, even in rural and small town Quebec, could no longer be assumed to be stable. The forces of modernization had reached the stage where divorce and widowhood left middle aged and older women bereft of support, in other words, had individuated them. Insofar as feminism tipped the family:woman (or the collective:individual) balance in the direction of the individual as against traditional and even recent reformed Catholic teaching, actual social and legal conditions and Vatican II's commitment to the human individual seemed to warrant adopting a new perspective which recognized the individuality of women [Charles 1982: 158-161]. Once again however, the social composition of the membership, which was still overwhelmingly married women with children, Catholic morality and liberal feminism's own limited critique of the family checked this
development, so that AFEAS never adopted the more radical individualism of the FFQ [79]. Still, the biological difference that had been seen as central to defining women's social roles, was beginning to be described by 1976 as "la petite différence" [AFEAS 10:5 Jan. 1976: 6].

In short, AFEAS developed a hybrid form of social Catholic feminism, which allowed the organization to resolve, at least to some extent, some of the contradictions that arose from the confrontation of its liberal and progressive moment with conservatizing ideological constraints arising from the social location of the largest part of its membership. Its IYW study of "la femme collaboratrice" [AFEAS 1977], which ultimately resulted in the foundation of a new pressure group, Les Femmes collaboratrices, in 1981, shows how some of these ideological and social determinations operated in relation to two ideological elements, Individual and work, that were important to liberal modernization. This project was a study of the situation of women who worked in family businesses, "femmes collaboratrices", particularly farm wives. Although it focussed on a traditional topic, rural women embedded in the family unit, AFEAS's growing feminism had led it to redefine "what women do" from a bio-psychological nature or a spiritual plane of duty to a material plane of valuable work. The study noted that, as workers in family businesses and households, women were unwaged, unprotected by labour or social legislation and often deprived of
a share of the capital accumulated, in part through their efforts, when such families and their businesses dissolved through death or divorce. To counter these problems, it recommended wide-ranging changes in legislation covering pensions, unemployment insurance and family property so that women would be protected as individuals. The principal recommendations were to make women working in family businesses eligible for unemployment insurance and government pensions schemes, to award women a portion of their husbands' pension contributions at divorce and to ensure that family assets, including a family home occupied by a wife, could not be willed away from her. Here AFEAS had learned what liberal feminism took as a starting point: in periods of crisis, men were likely to be revealed, not as Prince Charming, but as an added burden for women [Femmes d'ici 12:2 Oct. 1977: 4-5, 12:3 Nov. 1977: 9].

In other articles, AFEAS gradually endorsed what corresponded to the sociological definition of women's two roles, that is, cyclical or part time labour force participation for married women with children. It urged that such contributions to the family economy be supported by still greater contributions by husbands, and supported this demand by running biographies of AFEAS leaders that stressed that their husbands' willingness to share in child care and domestic labour was essential to their part time work or activism [AFEAS 10:3 Nov. 3-4, 1975: 10:5 Jan. 1976: 2-3, 6-8, Femmes d'ici 12:3 Nov. 1977: 11] [80]. Thus,
while the overall ideological manoeuvre of modernisation was to cast women in part as individuals in the labour force through a portmanteau image of the working mother, AFEAS sought to locate working women in an organic family context.

As AFEAS changed its view of the women:work:family triangle to increasingly feminist positions, it also altered its initial view that new feminist radicals received more attention from the mass media than they deserved [AFEAS 3:7 March 1968: 14] and of its own relation to the wider feminist movement. Again, this further ideological development revealed internal differences in the membership, particularly between older and younger women [Femmes d'Île 12:7 March 1978: 15-16, 13:7 March 1979: 17]. Provoked by one executive member's signing an article with her maiden name hyphenated with her married name, one member wrote to the editor denouncing feminism [AFEAS 11:1 Sept 1976: 14; Interview: D]. Indeed, in 1977, after devoting several study sessions and articles to feminism and over the continuing objections of some members [Femmes d'Île 12:7 March 1978: 13-14], AFEAS explicitly identified itself as such, completing a turn from the promotion of the family over women to the promotion of the self-defined interests of women, albeit as still ideologically incorporated within the family [AFEAS 11:8 April 1977: 2, Femmes d'Île 12:1 Sept. 1977: 3-5]. At the same time, in practical terms, its social action turned increasingly to women’s issues, sometimes following the lead of radical currents in a new women’s movement.
that had by this time emerged in Quebec with regard to, for example, pornography and violence against women. Here a feminist consciousness about the objectification of women and ideological justifications for her subordination combined easily with longstanding Catholic concerns about the need to shape and control ideological production according to moral values [81].

Overall, the development of AFEAS, like that of the FFQ, was shaped, as we have seen, by a play of political forces and relations hegemonized by liberalism. If in a different way from the FFQ, it also demonstrates limits to the liberal position on the family and women. However, the social location and political ideologies of its membership meant that its place in relation to the process of bloc formation differed from that of its more radical secular counterpart. As a liberal Catholic organization, rooted in a conservative social layer, it was not directly part of the modernisation alliance. Still, it served as an important transmission belt for liberal reformist ideas into a potentially resistant constituency and helped undermine the base for a feminine reaction to the new currents of gender politics that emerged in the 1970 [82]. Its development from 1966 to 1970 also shows the political and ideological dynamic generally associated with the rise of feminism. For, if AFEAS was initially "modernized from above" by a paternalist clergy and against some resistance, its self-conscious programme of education, its formally democratic organizational structure and the political
conditions generated by emerging feminism itself, combined to foster the development of a leadership identified with feminist goals. And in turn, this leadership was able to introduce radical ideas into the base, promote greater organizational autonomy, and undertake wider political intervention into the politics of the state.

5.5. Conclusions.

The project of modernisation of state and society undertaken by the Liberals in their attempt to construct a new hegemonic bloc had important effects on the development of feminism. Overall, it legitimated women’s political involvement, individualism, and paid labour force participation. These important ideological elements were adopted and furthered by the two women’s organizations that developed in this period, the purposively feminist FFQ and the (as it were) unintentionally feminist AFEAS. In doing so, each organization initially helped to confirm the pluralist liberal democratic ideology and participate in the support of the hegemonic structure. Although the FFQ never rejected parliamentarism and pluralism, its radical commitment to feminist individualism and insistence on rapid reform in the late 1970s, when it differentiated itself from the state-sponsored feminism of the CSF, provided a legitimating cover for more radical forms of feminism. As a result, it both helped to entrench liberal feminism within the hegemonic political ideology and bloc and later, with its increasing criticism of the failures
of the PLQ after 1975 and of the PQ after 1978, also helped to consolidate new oppositional currents. AFEAS, on the other hand, remained much more closely allied to status quo politics. Its most valuable role was introducing a reform gender ideology into rural Quebec, a potentially reactionary bastion, so helping to consolidate the modernisation bloc as a grand social alliance.

Both organizations trained leadership cadres who were to play key roles in the building of reformist state-sponsored feminism. The FFQ, the more radical of the two, had played a role as an ideological leadership in the first period of feminism, but neither really offered a strategic alternative after revolutionary and radical feminist currents emerged in 1968 and 1975 respectively. It is to these developments we now turn in order to examine more fully the play of feminist radicalization and integration (recuperation) in the development of the politics of hegemony and counter-hegemony. Suffice it to say here, that FFQ and AFEAS represented a first stage in the development of a process whereby women became constituted as a distinct interest group on the political field.
Chapter 6. The Ideological break (I): revolutionary feminism.

6.1.1. Introduction.

In the next two chapters, attention is turned to the development, between 1968 and 1980, of new feminist groups and ideologies in Quebec. Unlike the two organizations examined in the last chapter, the FFQ and AFEAS, whose ideology did not break the bounds of parliamentarism, these groups did break from the liberal framework. There were two phases to this development. The first, in the contexts of rising nationalism, student radicalization and class conflict (the late 1960's to early 1970's phase) was one of cadre building and the development of analytical and ideological resources in politically isolated feminist nuclei. The second, examined in the next chapter, was one of wider feminist mobilization in the context of a diffusion of feminist ideas during and after International Women's Year in 1975.

The overall result of the first phase of cadre building was that feminism ceased to be merely an opposition current within the liberal consensus, but also became relocated outside that consensus as an element of an opposition bloc in formation. For these new feminists, the over-riding ideological task,
correspondingly, was how to redefine the situation of women, and of the relocated women's movement, in terms compatible with the discourses which ideologically bound that opposition bloc together.

6.1.2. The break-up of the Quiet Revolution.

Despite its initial electoral and administrative successes, the alignments that made up the Quiet Revolution political bloc were unstable. Class tensions between the labour unions and the Liberals were exacerbated both by the latter's adoption of economic policies favoured by the business class [Coleman 1984: 94-99] and by the state's role as employer in a period of economic downturn [1]. In his 1966 Rapport moral, "Une société bâtie pour l'homme" [CSN PV 1966: 7-35], CSN President Marcel Pépin accused the government of failing to realize its democratic promises and of often being a harsher employer than the private sector, carrying out its negotiations in such a way as to ensure that the government is no more progressive [2]. Second, commitments to modernisation and nationalism within the governing political alliance pulled in different directions. Third, its electoral base was insecure; a largely rural conservative reaction gave rise to new alignments on the right which returned the Union nationale to power between 1966 and 1970 [Lemieux 1976]. Fourth, it was unable to deliver on its promise of economic improvement to all; some social groups, particularly the urban poor, were excluded from its benefits. Fifth, in the light
of a dramatic radicalization in the third world, new revolutionary ideologies arose which made the Quiet Revolution project look obsolete and pro-capitalist. Sixth, new social layers, including state employees [Milner 1978: 93-105], teachers and students, themselves generated by the structural reforms of the Quiet Revolution, increasingly developed political programmes in competition with that of the hegemonic bloc [3]. Finally, the speed and extent of the modernisation process exacerbated social tensions, which arose from its incapacity to fulfill its early promise, and fed movements of social protest which developed with reference to all these issues and structural contradictions.

While these changes in the political field of Quebec did not directly produce a women's movement they did provide the context in which, after 1969, a new, self-proclaimed revolutionary feminism began to emerge. As a whole, they marked a decisive break with the Quiet Revolution project for youth and students, for nationalists and for important segments of the trade unions and the "new middle class" [Guindon 1964: 151-152]. Out of these elements, a new bloc, which took on the mantle of a popular democratic opposition, began to be formed. Where were women and gender politics in relation to it?

The most important influence in this period both for the development of feminism and for Quebec politics in general was the growth of a new nationalist movement. Indeed, from the mid-1960s until the defeat of the referendum on independence in
1980, strategic debates on the national question were a central feature of all levels of political discourse [Coleman 1984; Le Borgne 1976], as a review of the 1970s public statements reported in *Le Devoir* of federal and provincial politicians, the labour unions, intellectuals and organizations representing the bourgeoisie (*Conseil de Patronat*) attests. Although equally central to global strategies of political integration and capitalist reproduction, these debates were sometimes marginalized by other political developments in Canada as a whole, but in Quebec the national question was not only structurally but also ideologically hard to avoid. Apart from its historical origins, Latouche [1979: 128] suggests that a search for national identity ("À résoudre les problèmes d'identité nationale") derived from the ways in which the modernisation process itself had undermined traditional forms of nationalist ideology.

The growth of the new nationalism in Quebec was part of a broader radicalization which was unfolding worldwide in this period [Levitt 1984: 39-51]. Reflecting on their experiences, several analysts who were also participants in Quebec social movements in the 1960s and 1970s, have pointed out the significance of some of the international influences on the development of new Quebec nationalist currents [Vallières 1971: 21-22; O'Leary and Toupin 1982: 23-27; *Collectif Clio* 1982: 473; Brodeur et al. 1981; Interviews: C, B, L]. Without rechanting
the whole litany, it is useful to recall that the period after
WWII was marked by a series of movements for national liberation
and socialism in colonies or neo-colonies including China (after
1949), Cuba (1959), Algeria (1958), Viet Nam (1954, 1960), and
southern Africa. Moreover, the civil rights struggle and the
subsequent development of revolutionary currents among American
blacks demystified the ideological, class, and racial peace of
the end of ideology theorists [Bell 1960] by, in the words of a
contemporary slogan, "bringing the war back home". Reflections
on these struggles, in the context of an ethnically and
linguistically stratified social situation, provided analytic,
ideological, and strategic precedents for the embryonic
nationalist movement.

Mobilizations in defense of these liberation movements served
to amplify radical youth and student movements in advanced
capitalist societies, particularly France, the USA, Britain, and
Canada. They also provided them with a rhetoric which could be
applied sectorally to an analysis of youth and student
"oppression" which penetrated both the politicized and hippie
wings of the youth movement [Farber 1970; Rowntree and Rowntree
1968]. This blended together a cultural critique of "bourgeois"
society, inspired in part by the Frankfurt school, in part by
anarchism and in part by a neo-Freudianism brought to bear on the
question of the relationship between sexual and social oppression
[4]. Finally, at the end of the 1960s, a new feminist radicalism
arose within particularly the American and Canadian new lefts whose theoretical and ideological developments were transmitted to Quebec both directly [Friedan 1975; Benston 1969; Firestone 1970] and indirectly through French journals [5]. Arising from the complex interaction of these movements, radical new questions were posed concerning colonialism and national liberation, marxism and revolution, youth and student alienation and, if somewhat more inchoately, sexuality, sexual repression and the family.

The new nationalist movement had two wings: a parliamentary wing which eventually formed the PQ and an extraparliamentary wing composed of student organisations, unions, community organizations, far left groupuscules (including, most dramatically, the FLQ), and a diffuse movement of youth, artists and intellectuals who migrated from cause to cause. Among the most important groups were several Comités d'action politique (CAPs) in working class neighbourhoods (St-Jacques, St-Henri) and FRAP (Front d'action politique, 1970), a left-wing coalition which contested the 1970 Montreal municipal elections [Milner 1978: 199-200]. Each wing offered strategies to assure both national survival and equitably shared economic improvement, aspects of a popular democratic programme that had been marginalized in the state's actual modernisation policies. Each also took critical distance from traditional nationalism, particularly in its previously dominant clerical form [Dion 1975:
85 ff]. But although gender had been central to the latter’s ideological construction of national survival in its construction of the family:woman:nation relation, these new currents skipped over the question of gender politics, which they continued to treat from a masculinist or a statist perspective. Let us look at how this happened in each wing in turn.

6.1.3. Revolutionary nationalism and sexual politics.

The revolutionary nationalist current, emerging as it did in part from youth and student movements generated by successive crises in the educational system, tended to be socially homogeneous [6]. In the 1960s, its leadership consisted largely of male francophone intellectuals [7], and its successive activities included publications, community organizing and the construction of revolutionary groups. It was not, however, politically homogeneous. As well as the differences that might exist at any one time, differences, even over nationalism itself, sharpened in the course of its evolution. By the mid-1970s, some groups had abandoned the strategy of national independence altogether, seeing it as an obstacle to the conduct of class struggle [C. Gagnon 1972].

While it is outside the scope of this study to analyse the ideology of all these groups, it is important to review their main tenets. The journal Parti Pris (PP) [1:1 1963: 2-4], was established with the theoretical task of integrating the national
question into a socialist strategy, with the ideological goal of demystification, particularly of clericalism and American mass culture, and with the practical aim of uniting vanguard intellectuals with the working class in order to overcome the alienation that, they held, affected all those with a colonized status [PP 3: 1/2 1965: 2-5]. Grouping together many of the key intellectuals of the movement, Parti Pris was both very dynamic and influential [Behleis 1984: 162] [8]. It is instructive, then, to see how it defined itself with respect to questions of gender. The later positions of the marxist-leninist groups are less interesting because they replay old stories; but where relevant they are touched on in section 6.2. below.

While the nationalists were influenced in varying degrees by marxist and socialist theory, they all argued that the question of national oppression and liberation constituted the dominant contradiction and privileged locus of struggle in Quebec. Since capital in Quebec was imperialist, largely anglo-Canadian or American, anti-colonial struggle entailed class struggle and was the pre-condition for socialism [PP 1:1 9/10/11 1964: 64]. As a left nationalism, this current sought to distinguish itself from what it defined as bourgeois and petit bourgeois ideology, whether nationalist or not; as one oriented to class struggle, it was greatly concerned with overcoming the divisions in the working class. Such concerns continued to influence the far left throughout the 1970s, with the result that feminism, when it
later appeared, was to be ruled out of court on grounds of its complicity in both these deviations [Interview: C, K, I]. While nationalists were divided on the extent of their explicit adherence to an "étapiste" (stage) strategy—first national independence and then socialism (or whatever)—it should also be remembered that a two stage project of social emancipation predominated, with national liberation seen as the pre-condition for other structural reforms [9]. From this perspective, much as from those of the Second and Third Internationals, the woman question and other such "cultural" issues could only be resolved after independence had been achieved [Thonnessen 1973; Heitlinger 1979].

Although Parti Pris rarely dealt explicitly with gender politics, two thematic concerns can be noted. First, in a familiar ideological manoeuvre, its writers reinterpreted existing concepts by inversion: the family, rather than being the national saviour, was redefined as a locus for reproducing repressive ideology. Thus, while the centrality of women to clerico-nationalist conservatism, and even a view of Quebec as a matriarchal society was accepted [PP 9/10/11 1964: 34], the effects of this were criticized rather than praised. Pierre Maheu's [1964: 5] call for a turn "De la révolte à la révolution" begins: "Les premiers lueus du mois, jadis ma mère me faisait faire—à haute voix—mon examen de conscience.... Selon la gravité de mes péchés du mois, elle pleurait plus ou moins sur ma
mauvaise nature." In this picture of the powerful moral mother, and in the casual misogyny that is to be found in several such social and physical descriptions of women in this journal, there is not even a hint of a critical perspective which could understand women themselves as oppressed [10].

At their most sympathetically regarded, women, like men, are seen to have been cheated by religion, their class situation or the organization of family life. But they are also thought to be more complaisant. Pierre Vallières [1971: 61, 85, 104, 139 et passim], for example, goes so far as to identify the family as the locus of production of labour power and his mother as cowed by years of economic insecurity; but she still appears as incapable of understanding or of loving her son, complaining about money and headaches, curtailing her husband’s political impulses, and giving lip service to religious values she did not hold. Not only did he prefer his father’s personal style to that of his mother, he also blamed her for serving as the principal relay for the imposition of clerical repression and petty bourgeois restrictions on the young.

through the church confessional was continued into scientific and social discourses; and if as a result sexuality is considered to be the element which reveals the "true" nature of individuals, then it is not surprising that Fanon's and Memmi's portraits of the colonized male as a psychological castrate found a ready audience in these (ex-)Catholic writers [12].

There are three points of importance to be noted about this discourse. First, if the writings of the Citélibristes on sexual morality discussed above had, within the optic of laïcisme, used progressive Catholic psychological science to legitimate (marital) sexuality in the interests of the modified patriarchal family, then those of the revolutionary nationalists set out to liberate male potency in the interests of mass anti-imperialist struggle. Correlatively, revolutionary struggle against imperialism would lead to the decolonization of individual subjectivity and was thus related to a project of sexual liberation. However, these transformations had been thought only from a male point of view and signally ignored women's experience of sexuality or psychosexual needs. In this sense at least, the thought of revolutionary nationalists was less complete and more phallocentric than that of earlier liberal critics [13].

6.1.4. Reformist nationalism and sexual politics.

The parliamentary wing of the nationalist movement, the Parti québécois, resulted from the fusion of the Ralliement national
(RN) and the Mouvement souveraineté-association (MSA) led by René Lévesque [Le Devoir 15 Oct. 1968], after he split from the PLQ when its 1967 convention rejected his resolution calling for an independent Quebec [14]. A third group was involved in the fusion discussion, the socialist Rassemblement pour l'Indépendence nationale (RIN). This was dissolved after its membership split, with many members joining the PQ as individuals but with others going on to found the radical Front de libération populaire [15]. With these origins, the PQ combined characteristics of both a social movement with goals to transform the society and of a political party, with the goal of winning power electorally. But still it is important to note here simply that as a reformist independentist formation self-consciously seeking hegemony within the confines of a liberal capitalist parliamentary system, the PQ's policies reflected both its ideological commitments and electoral exigencies [16].

Its policies, general reformist trajectory and elan made it in effect the inheritor of the Quiet Revolution project at the point where the PLQ became unable to conduct it any further [Bolly 1976: 121]. At the same time, its stage approach offered a practical way to combine the objectives of independence and social reform, and thus gave it a strong appeal to the newly radicalized youth: "Socialisme versus nationalisme. Ce fut le premier dilemme auquel plusieurs d'entre nous furent confrontés. Et il était de taille... Il fallut René Lévesque et la formation..."
du MSA-PQ pour que ce premier dilemme soit résolu" [Plotte 1979: 19].

The social base of the PQ was young, urban and well educated, a direct product of the educational renewal of the Quiet Revolution and the carrier of its optimistic nationalist values [17]. As a would-be hegemonic and majoritarian force, however, it also had to construct a broader social alliance. This it did not just by making a cross class appeal to francophones but also by targeting particular social layers—unionized workers, state employees, and the cooperative movement—likely to support the reformist and egalitarian thrust of its programme. At the same time, the PQ's electoralism forced it to seek a balance between the radicalism of its early members and the more conservative nationalists for whose support it had to compete with the UN and the Créditistes [18].

These constitutive features of the PQ had a contradictory effect on its approach to sexual politics. At the level of policy formation, its reformist inheritance clashed with its nationalism. With regard to women, on the one hand it took over the unfulfilled aspects of the Liberal Party's programme for democratic rights. On the other hand, from the nationalist tradition, it inherited a population policy based on the revanche des berceaux designed to ensure the survival of the francophone minority in Canada. There was, in consequence, a tension between a lingering attachment to policies and ideologies based on the
good Catholic "femme au foyer" and those oriented to the more modernized figure of the working mother. As late as 1978 the PQ [1978] policy stated that the family was "la cellule de base de la société".

This contradiction was exacerbated by a halving of the birth rate among Quebec women between 1958 and 1974 [Henripin 1973]. A series of research publications [1972, 1976] by demographers, including Jacques Henripin, who chaired the state advisory body, the Conseil de la Famille, on the effects of the falling birth rate emphasized the fragility of the nation as an ethnic entity, and hence provided scientific justification for the péquistes [19] insistence on protecting it [20]. At the same time these studies provoked fears among feminists of a revival of pronatalist policies [Interview: B]. In fact, the traditional pronatalist solution was not politically feasible because of the weight of feminist and proto-feminist sentiment against it within the PQ's own ranks. For the social base of the PQ shared the age, educational, occupational and residential characteristics of the wider women's movement in North America [21] and, while not organized autonomously, supported many of that wider movement's demands. Eventually, by 1974, women party activists set out to do their own party wide educational work on women's issues and to build women's caucuses [22]. In a perceived absence of francophone feminist expertise, they turned to the bilingual New Women's Center/Centre de la Femme Nouvelle [23] for technical
advice on issues [Interview: U].

In this period, the struggle for national survival was increasingly being played out in terms of linguistic issues, a change in orientation which was to give, as we shall see, the PQ space to resolve the contradiction between claims for women's rights and national survival, both militantly represented in its base. For, insofar as the nation was coming to be defined as a linguistic and cultural rather than "racial" entity, the burden of its reproduction no longer had to fall in the same way on women. The focus instead shifted to the role of the state, particularly the educational system, and regulatory control over such things as immigration and the language of work. Contradictions on gender issues did not, however, entirely disappear. In what was no doubt an attempt to cater to values thought to be held by a predominantly Catholic electorate, in 1977 Levesque urged the party not to include liberalization of access to abortion in its policies. When his advice was ignored and his proposals defeated, he announced that he would not abide by party policy. He was, though, roundly criticized by feminist party militants [Le Devoir 30, 31 May 1977, 14 Oct 1977]. Later, as I shall argue [9.3.2. below], the PQ ultimately resolved these contradictions in favour of women's demands.

As the major vehicle of popular democratic demands and national aspirations, the PQ was tremendously attractive to radicals, and this attraction was reinforced by its promise to legislate in
favour of workers and other subordinate strata. These positive policies combined with its relatively malleable positions on gender politics enabled the PQ to incorporate and obtain the loyalties of women activists. The accelerated pace of elections in 1970, 1973 and 1976 lent urgency to the péguliste project. This, in turn, drew politically active women to it, who might otherwise have been available for building an autonomous women’s movement in a period that was crucial for its development elsewhere [24]. Thus, like revolutionary nationalism, but for a different reason, reformist nationalism effectively restricted the development of a women’s movement per se.

6.1.5. Social struggle and the crisis of hegemony.

A growing instability in the bloc directed by the Liberals was expressed not just by the increase in extraparliamentary and parliamentary nationalism, but also by the sharpening of class and other social contradictions as the Quebec state took an increasingly reactionary political stance. The most important site of struggle was labour relations. The late 1960s pattern of high levels of unemployment [25], strikes and large scale solidarity demonstrations continued into the 1970s. The incapacity of the Bourassa government to act in the private sector against plant closures and layoffs and its hard line in the public sector produced explosive and prolonged strikes; which in turn accelerated the radicalization of trade unions and oppositionists, including students, revolutionaries, women and
community organizers [26]. Not without internal conflict, the major labour centrals more and more adopted nationalist and socialist positions [27].

The breadth and militancy of the social movements, their sheltering by the trade unions, the sharpness of confrontations between the state order and its opponents, and the latter's increasingly nationalist or independentist rhetoric combined to produce an apparent challenge to the hegemony, not just of one or another ruling political bloc headed by the Liberals, the UN, or even the PQ, but to the hegemony of the long term ruling parliamentary consensus as such. The nervousness of the ruling bloc and, conversely, the strengths of the opposition bloc were finally revealed in the October crisis of 1970 when, in a classic example of the breakdown of hegemony, the provincial and federal state apparatuses, led by two wings of the Liberal Party, agreed that military force and the temporary suspension of civil rights was necessary to prevent an "apprehended" insurrection (sparked by the FLQ kidnappings), and restore order [28].

This extreme reaction, and the subsequent hardening of a law and order current within the government led by labour minister Jérôme Choquette intensified divisions in the opposition between revolutionary and reformist political strategies and actors [9.3.4. below]. On the one hand, it delegitimized the Liberals as holders of state power in liberal terms and put wind into the sails of the PQ. On the other hand, revolutionaries were
confirmed in their sense that there was no place for reforms in the existing political structure and that "le grand soir" was about to arrive [Interview: P]. By the early 1970s the revolutionary movement and its fringes had grown to such an extent that it served as a self-enclosed reference group which was further legitimated by the accession of radicals to positions of authority in the leadership and staffs of the unions. Thus, the growth of a radical movement, its ideological domination by the national question, its heritage of an organicist ideology which became both populist and syndicalist, and a defeated challenge to the ruling order, all formed a context in which revolutionary feminism began to develop in Quebec.

6.2. "Pas de femmes libres sans Québec libre!": the ideological break of women's liberation.

6.2.1. Introduction.

The developmental dialectic of left nationalism, social protest, and repression was not merely a backdrop for the development of revolutionary feminism; it also had a specific impact in several ways. First, it created the occasion for the first women's action, a protest against repressive legislation banning demonstrations in Montreal [Le Devoir 10, 29 Nov. 1969]. Secondly, it structured an ideological field dominated by a hierarchy of (sometimes overlapping) class, national and gender preoccupations; it was in breaking from the various ideologies
that traversed that field that the new feminism initially sought
to define its identity. Thirdly, it operated to restrict the
scope and depth of the rupture; in the face of cross-cutting
political loyalties, few militants were prepared to devote
themselves primarily to women's politics. All these features of
the new feminism in Quebec meant that their isolation was a
recurrent theme in the period from 1969 to 1975.

In the same period, because of the lower salience of other
issues, the emergence of an ideology which defined women as
oppressed and supported their autonomous self-organization and
women's liberation organizations elsewhere in North America was
less constrained [29]. In fact, this ideology was first
introduced into the francophone milieu from the outside. In the
summer of 1969, inspired in part by American developments, a
group of women student radicals at McGill University, who later
went on to found the Montreal Women's Liberation Movement (MWL)
in the fall of 1969 [Le Devoir 5 Oct. 1969], initiated
discussions on the strategy of women's liberation with about a
dozen women militants from francophone groups [30].

Among francophones, however, these first discussions generated
two opposing assessments of the strategic importance of women's
liberation, a division that was to continue to reemerge for the
next six years. The majority adopted a "nationalist" position,
rejecting a strategy of separate women's groups on the grounds
that the national liberation struggle was difficult enough. In
contrast, a few women from both language groups, emphasizing their exploitation for trivial work and exclusion from decision-making in the left, adopted a "feminist" position, insisting on the need for an autonomous struggle for women's liberation [31]. Thus, the revolutionary feminism initially emerged from a narrow social layer and was closely tied to the "English" in ways that turned out to be problematic for its medium term development.

The issue that provided women's liberation ideology with a political point of entry was a struggle for control of reproduction. In 1967, the McGill Student Society had funded the publication of the Birth Control Handbook, written by two students, Donna Cherniak and Alan Gold, which helped to catalyze an incipient feminist critique of the version of liberated sexuality then current in the mixed student movement [Interview: K]. Following the publication of this handbook, its editors were inundated with requests for help from women seeking abortions. The extent of these requests strengthened the determination of women activists and inspired abortion rights activist Dr. Henry Morgentaler, who was already providing medically safe but illegal abortions to fund an abortion counselling service. Their campaigns grew into a vigorous and partially successful movement for free abortion on demand and in turn helped structure the subsequent development of feminism in Quebec [Interview: W].

The various feminist organizations that emerged from this
conjuncture all belonged to the far left of the social movement, and their members identified themselves as revolutionaries. Within these common boundaries, there was also both an organizational division of labour and some ideological evolution. The Front de Libération des femmes du Québec (FLF) (1969-1971) was above all manifested through its spectacularly contestative political actions, while the main external intervention of its successor, the Centre des femmes (CDF) (1972-1974) was through its publication, Québécoises Debouttes! Finally, a new stage was reached when several small groups, which emerged from the remnants of the CDF, devoted themselves to specialized activities or specific issues.

It is not the task of this study to reconstruct all the details of this organizational history of revolutionary feminism [32]. What is important is to understand how from 1969 to 1975 the evolution of revolutionary feminism, as expressed by the Front commun des québécoises, the Front de Libération des femmes du Québec (FLF), the Centre des femmes (CDF) and its successors which formed L'Intergroupe, was conditioned by, and in turn influenced the construction of, a popular democratic opposition bloc [33]. Thus we are interested here in this current's relation to the ideologies of liberal modernization, nationalism, socialism and sexism. If the stress here is on Montreal groups, this is justified for two reasons: first, it was only in Montreal, where the first of these groups emerged that there was
organizational continuity throughout the period; secondly, these groups were politically important both because of their pioneering character, and because their publications and their media-reported actions reached a wider Quebec audience.

6.2.2. The organizing of revolutionary feminism: the Front de libération des femmes du Québec.

The occasion for testing women's liberation ideas in practice and for initiating a theatrically new style of feminist politics was provided by the passage in November 1969 of a municipal by-law banning all demonstrations (except the Grey Cup parade) by the Montreal city administration headed by Mayor Jean Drapeau after a series of street strike support actions by students, nationalists and trade unionists. The first protest to defy this ruling was carried out by an ad hoc group of anglophone and francophone women--students, artists, office workers, trade unionists, and "mères de famille"--calling themselves the Front commun des femmes québécoises [Le Devoir 28, 29 Nov. 1969]. They did so in the absence of any active response on the part of unions or other groups, and with a sense of breaking through sexist stereotypes about women's passivity [Interview: K]. After a rally against repression at the Monument National, where those stereotypes and related norms of chivalry were satirized, they burst out onto the street surrounded by marshalls, linked by chains and wearing bright red scarves. Waiting police arrested 165 women some of whom were imprisoned overnight [34]. While "des femmes enchaînées, représentant l'esclavage, qui manifestent pour
les libertés publiques" were perceived as symbolically important [Solange Chalvin, Quartier Latin 28 Jan. 1970], this first autonomous action by francophone women did not confirm the strategy of women's liberation organizing for all of its participants. Many of these, believing "d'abord un changement social global pour obtenir un changement des rapports hommes-femmes", returned to work for socialist or nationalist goals in co-operation with men in community (CAPs), nationalist (RIN or PQ) or student organizing [35].

The action did, however, lay the basis for founding the FLF. For some, the experience of working with women confirmed their sense of marginalization in "les organisations d'hommes". According to one participant, Lise Trudel, their reflections on "la nouvelle condition féminine apportée par des choses comme la contraception", work and freedom led to the conclusion that under certain conditions women could become one of the many "groupes moteurs de revendication" and even "un groupe révolutionnaire" [Quartier Latin Jan. 1970]. By January 1970, after a second series of discussions on the strategy of building an autonomous women's liberation movement had again divided the women on their orientation to mixed and women's groups, the remaining women renamed themselves the Front de Libération des femmes du Québec and set out "crée une solidarité entre toutes les québécoises" in order to elaborate a project of liberation [FLF 1970 in O'Leary and Toupin 1982: 65]. Although some of the media coverage
these actions received was hostile [36], it all served to
publicize the strategy of autonomous women's organizing by this
new political force and to draw women to it, many of them with
high expectations [Interview: K].

During its two year existence the FLF drew perhaps a total of
200 women to its meetings. The number of militant adherents who
were actually involved in its activities varied from 20 to 60,
but at several points major actions were organized by a handful
of six or eight women [O'Leary and Toupin 1982: 22]. Young,
unmarried and without children [QD 1:1 1972: 6], most were from
relatively privileged backgrounds and in post-secondary
education. One participant recalled that those francophone women
who came to the organization from McGill had parents who had
taken charge of their daughters' education and wanted to assure
that they would be bilingual; only one was a scholarship student,
in French literature, from east end Montreal [Interview: K]. As
était toutes des petites filles modèles, issues de la révolution
tranquille, avec des hautes valeurs...féminines et humanistes".
Others worked in the administrative apparatuses of the labour
centrales. Almost all had been politically active in unions,
student organizations or citizen's committees where they had
"souffé de la discrimination" [Ibid. 329; Interview: M, K].

The organizational history of the FLF had four important
turning points. Although it had participated in the abortion
counselling service with Montreal Women's Liberation, it later underwent two divisions on national lines. First, in September 1970, anglophone women were excluded from the FLF. Second, in February 1971, the abortion counselling service was itself split when the FLF decided to do all its counselling in French. Thirdly, although always loosely organized, it eventually adopted a structure of cells for Action-choc, abortion, day care and propaganda. Finally, these cells' independence of action led to serious disagreements and internal debates over the nature of women's oppression, which eventually led to the FLF's demise at the end of 1971. The public actions of the new organization over its two year period were largely articulated around two axes: abortion rights and cultural guerilla warfare.

The long series of internal struggles about the presence of anglophones in the FLF and their eventual exclusion on the grounds of their "attitudes colonisatrices" and of their parachuting ideas from "tous les textes américains" without regard for Quebec reality, testified to the primacy of national identity over an ideology of sisterhood which transcended class, racial, ethnic and educational cleavages [QD 1:1 Nov 1972: 3-4]. To say this, however, does not adequately capture the intensity with which these issues were debated [37]. For, if a characteristic of the early days of the women's liberation movement was an emotional elation which derived equally from the awakening of individual capacities and from the discovery of
warmth and solidarity among women, so too was political and ideological dissension experienced as emotionally devastating. These debates about the national character of the FLF "went on for weeks in small groups at a high emotional level, never in the general assembly--and just as well. They were not always pushed by the radicals; sometimes by the unilinguals, sometimes by francophones from McGill" [Interview: K].

Later when the French-speaking women resolved to do counselling only in French a similar "horror show" exploded which ended, unresolved, only when the francophone women moved out of a shared house amidst tears and tantrums [Interview: K, W]. There were bitter recriminations on all sides. One of the founders of the abortion counselling service recalled:

I'm still completely torn about that period. I went to observe women being counselled in French. They probably got the gentlest care, done very visually all the time. The francophones were a lot more optimistic about peoples' capabilities, taking care of their kids and so on. I didn't think it was terrible, we should go with it, but that didn't go over when I went back to the group [Interview: K].

On the anglophone side there was guilt about being unilingual or anglophone and resentment about being tarred with a class brush simply because they were university students. They countered the francophones' attempt to introduce class in geographical terms using the names of Montreal neighbourhoods--"poor St-Henri versus rich Westmount"--with the response that not all anglophones were
from Westmount [Interview: W].

Although part of the general style of the FLF, cultural contestation was the specialty of Cellule X: Action-choc. Their first action in 1971 was undertaken at the request of Lise Balcer, a secretary at the CSN, who had been convicted of contempt of court when she refused to testify at the trial of FLQ member Paul Rose for the kidnapping and murder of Liberal cabinet member Pierre Laporte in October 1970 on the grounds that women were excluded from Quebec juries. During her pre-sentence appearance before Judge Marcel Nichols, Balcer stressed that she was defending her rights and asked why, if it took only two hours to pass the War Measures Act, it had taken "une éternité pour adopter une mesure qui touchait la moitié de la population du Québec" [La Presse 2 March 1971]. At this point seven FLF members stormed the empty jury box shouting "Discrimination!" and "Ta justice c'est de la marde (sic)" [QD 1:1 1972: 4]. Judge Nichols demanded their names and sentenced each of them to a month in prison also for contempt of court. As they continued to shout "On nous viole encore" while they were being removed from the court, he sentenced Marjolaine Pêloquin to a second month. In the corridors, they all demanded the same sentence. Claire Aubin actually received it for shouting "Ta justice, j'y crois pas, c'est de la merde" [Le Devoir 3 March 1971] [38]. To reporters, Cellule X promised more of the same.

This demonstration was in fact shortly followed by two more
public actions by Cellule X. In May, they attacked a commercial exhibition, Le Salon de la femme as a "vérifiable foire commerciale et ode à la femme-objet" [39]. After careful conspiratorial preparation to avoid being blocked by security forces, they stormed the entrance and marched around the hall with representations of oversize lipsticks, mops and kettles and of a man ejaculating while thinking of women, camping, and sport, and slogans like: "Votre culture de salon on en veut!" and "Vous avez pas fini de vous faire vous acheter!" [FLF 1971f in O'Leary and Toupin 1982: 101-102]. The second was in support of women who raided the male only taverns in the suburbs [40].

The short term results of these actions were contradictory. Dramatic actions got the kind of press coverage that drew in more members. But since the group operated with a decentralized structure, new members could and did form cells which rejected not only the actions but the tactic of cultural guerilla warfare [OD 1:1 1972: 5-6]. The secrecy with which the actions were carried out also disturbed members. Like most women's liberation movement groups, they wanted to avoid elitism and authoritarianism. But in rejecting formal structures in favour of spontaneity, they laid themselves open to problems of "structurelessness" [Freeman 1975: 119]. The other sub-groups felt that they were not informed and that actions carried on by a few women in Cellule X in the name of the FLF had not been approved. In April 1971, Cellule avortement charged that X's
propaganda was weak and its actions badly planned, with no support for arrested women and no links to other women directly affected by the issues. In short, they had become the private property of Cellule X [FLF 1971b.

As other cells took up the critique of Cellule X, these misgivings were extended to a general evaluation of the structure, functioning, and lack of strategic perspectives of the FLF as a whole. As a result, a period of self-evaluation was initiated in the summer and an internal newsletter to facilitate the exchange of information among the cells and to be "un premier pas pour mieux se connaître entre nous" was established [FLF 1971f In O'Leary and Toupin 1982: 101]. A meeting of about 20 women decided that in the interests of "formation et d'une orientation politique commune" each cell should produce from the written contributions of each member common texts dealing with three fundamental questions: "Pourquoi un FLF au Québec? Qui on veut reléendre? Comment?" In the ensuing debate, ideological differences were expressed between the newly recruited Cellules 1 and 2 and the longer established Cellule X which adopted slightly modified marxist and women's liberation positions respectively [41].

Relying on an analysis of women's oppression found in Engels' [1972] Origin, somewhat modernised by Margaret Benston's [1969] "The political economy of women", Cellule 2 sought to define women's "specific exploitation" in terms of a relation to the
economy which left them dependent upon their husbands; in their responsibility for the invisible and unpaid work of domestic labour; and in badly paid unstable work in low productivity sectors associated with household tasks. Because women’s liberation required cooperation with male workers in not only the transformation of the actual family but also the destruction of economic and political forces that gave rise to the family, private property and the state, "sex war" was ruled out. The FLF was justified in abstract terms: oppression was not individual and women, like all oppressed groups, needed to take responsibility and leadership for their own struggle. The first target groups to be mobilized should be working class housewives and women workers, whose material conditions were worst, in order to enable them to persuade their husbands to join in a struggle for their common liberation in cooperation with other allied groups whose political orientation involved national liberation [FLF 1971f in O’Leary and Toupin 1982: 107-113].

In contrast, Ex-cellule X with cellule Q comme dans vulve, the group responsible for the abortion referral and sexual education projects took a more experiential tack, directly addressing their history in left groups [Ibid. 119-121]. In mixed groups, they argued, women were silent, ignored or sure to lose in "le jeu de la compétition verbale (qui est très important dans les groupes mâles)" while men refused to discuss these low priority issues or to alter their personal or organizational functioning. Women had
a choice: to be accepted by becoming "asexué" and "hyper-capable intellectuellement", or to become "cheap labour pour les gars de la gauche" [42].

As well as in these defensive terms, autonomy was a positive advantage necessary to develop "une analyse autonome"; to discover a new language, identity and definition to redefine male-female relations; and to develop their creativity, strength, capacity to act, and solidarity. Although all women were exploited in the same way regardless of their husbands' social class, the FLF should try to reach and politicize women from popular milieux (workers, housewives, the unemployed, widows, and single mothers on welfare), who were not materially compensated for their exploitation, and secondary and CEGEP students who were not yet "poignées dans les rôles d'épouses et de mères" [Ibid. 120]. As well as using extreme tactics of cultural demystification that, however marginal in the short term, prepared for political change, the FLF should engage in building "les instruments de notre libération" including the means for controlling our bodies--contraception, sexual information, and abortion clinics--and childcare centres [Ibid. 121]. Later, Cellule X proposed a structure where the internal autonomy of the cells could be modified by cooperation for internal education, information exchange, and common recruitment [FLF 1971d].

This second position was both nationalist and feminist, closer to the general dimensions of women's liberation ideology
developed elsewhere [43]. In fact, Cellules 1 and 2 returned to work in mixed socialist groups shortly after the debate, while X and Q demonstrated a primary allegiance to the fledgling movement by staying with the FLF. Nevertheless, despite the maintenance of the abortion referral service, recruitment and attendance fell to the point where the group dissolved at the end of the year [QD 1:1 1972: 6].

In January 1972, however, revolutionary feminism experienced its second rebirth. Four women, two each from the FLF and the a community organizing group the Comité Ouvrière St-Henri (COSH) decided to establish a new Centre des femmes that would build on the base of the FLF while avoiding what they saw as its errors of organizational anarchy, inadequate analysis and a lack of clearly established political priorities [QD 1:1 Nov. 1972: 2]. Unlike the FLF whose ambition was to reach all Quebecoises, the CDF adopted the perspective articulated by the more "marxist" cells of the FLF, that working class housewives from popular milieux should be their target group. Similarly, rejecting the privileging of action, spontaneity and decentralization over analysis, structure and discipline, the handful of women at the CDF set out, not unambitiously, to become a politically homogeneous nucleus of revolutionary feminists capable of creating the conditions for the emergence of an autonomous women's movement directly tied to the struggle of the people of Quebec against all forms of oppression [Ibid.]. These priorities
at once rejected women's liberation American-style, and adopted the vanguardist self-definition and (officially) centralized decision making process of the socialist, now increasingly marxist-leninist (m-l), groupuscules that opposed women's autonomous organizing [44]. They saw themselves as at once a leadership for other groups [TP 2:2 April 1977: 3] and as without enough knowledge to answer the "embarrassing questions" put to them in discussions with mixed groups [TP 2:1 March 1977: 4].

Three sectors of work, which were fairly consistent over the CDF's two year history, were chosen: research, propaganda and sexual hygiene [45]. In practice, the exigencies of continuing the francophone abortion counselling service still funded by Dr. Morgentaler and putting out the journal Québecoises Debouttel, interspersed with a series of gruelling self-evaluation and perspectives discussions (bilans), consumed all the available energy. In their second year of operation they made some outside contacts, discussing the founding of a socialist-feminist organization, meeting with the militants of the Association pour la défense des droits sociaux (ADDS) [QD 1:6 June 1973: 8-19], a welfare rights self-help group, and even a PQ constituency organization [CDF 1974: In O'Leary and Toupin: 162-163] and speaking on numerous occasions in CEGEPs [TP 2:4 June 1977: 7-8]. With an average of about seven women--sometimes as few as two, on rare occasions with as many as 14--and extremely ambitious plans [TP 2:1 March 1977: 4; O'Leary and Toupin 1983: 360] women left
the group "épuisées et essoufflées". The CDF was, then, a classic locus for burn-out, or reaction of anxiety, fatigue and depression to extreme stress and competing demands [Freudenberger and Richelson 1980]. Surrounded by an aura of ideological purism [Interview: C, K; O'Leary and Toupin 1983: 354] and often attributing their problems to a lack of marxist analysis [TP 2:4 June 1977: 6], the CDF recruited few militants. Those who joined tended to come from post-secondary education and the left, although at least one older former textile worker came onto the scene at the end [Ibid.; O'Leary and Toupin 1983: 352].

Not surprisingly, given the gap between their goals and their resources, the CDF militants frequently felt that they had failed; the refrain of isolation was once more heard. Still, they had an important influence, particularly through Québecoises Deboutte!. There were nine issues, each with a real circulation of 1,500 to 2,000 copies [46]. It ran regular features on sexuality, the politics and techniques of reproduction control, the history of women in Quebec, working women, domestic labour, feminist theory and the strategic debates of the women's movement and a black humour page, mocking political and religious authorities. In addition, it was under the aegis of the militants of the CDF, with support from the teachers union, trotskyist organizations, and, later, other labour centrals, that a defense of Dr. Morgentaler was mounted after his 1974 arrest on abortion related charges. The same alliance established the
Comité de lutte pour l'avortement et contraception libres et gratuits as a key organizer in the abortion rights struggle [7:3 below]. In a real way, then, the CDF did play the organizing and motivating role for feminist radicalization that it envisaged for itself until its demise at the end of 1974, just as a new, wider phase of feminist radicalization in International Women's Year was about to begin.

6.2.3. Revolutionary feminist Ideological self-definition.

Against this organizational background, let us now consider how, largely in the pages of Québecoises Deboutte!, the new revolutionary feminism defined itself. Although theoretically incorrect, the notion of women's liberation as epiphany does capture a very important quality about first the experience of feminist radicalization in the late 1960s and second the ruptural character of the perspective it represented. Schematically, the new feminism formed in rupture with the actual ruling bloc in Quebec and with parliamentarism more generally; with dominant liberal notions of gender and family; with a subordinated but persistent clerico-national view of the nation:woman:family relation; with the male dominance and phallocentrism of the new nationalist movement; and with working class sexism.

Constructively, revolutionary feminists sought on the one hand to incorporate insights from their own experiences and on the other
to build on contributions from contemporary feminist theory. From this self-grounded approach were derived not only strategic imperatives as Rubin [1975] suggests, but a political self-definition. Central to this identity was an assertion that women, as a sex, were oppressed and a determination to insist on this in the teeth of prevailing ideologies.

Most importantly, this revolutionary feminism broke with the ideological construction of gender divisions as private and outside of politics that Eisenstein [1981] argues is central to liberal capitalism. The left had already rejected the ideologies of modernization and liberalism as theoretically inadequate, practically bankrupt and politically tainted by their association with a delegitimized ruling bloc. But the writers of Québecoisées Deboutte! went further by attacking the gender division as such together with the privatized family that reproduced it.

As their theoretical point of departure, revolutionary feminists took over, unqualified, Engels' notion of patriarchy, as "le premier système d'exploitation d'un groupe humain par un autre" and as an enduring system of interlocking economic, social and sexual oppression [QD 1:2 Dec. 1972: 11-13]. Although modified familial patriarchy had accommodated itself to a language of "equal rights", its fundamental structure as a system of domination was unchanged:

Tout au plus peut-il accepter des 'réformettes' style
The militants of the FLF and the CDF were cut off from liberal feminism both in its earlier incarnation by historical amnesia and in its contemporary form by political choice [Interview: K, W] [47]. The lobbying techniques of groups like FFQ and AFEAS were rejected as likely to bring only crumbs from the government and not the necessary radical change [FLF 1970f in O’Leary and Toupin 1982: 67]. Rather than patiently and politely petitioning politicians and officials, both the FLF, with its flamboyant contestations and the CDF, with its class conscious vanguardism, favoured demonstrations as a tactic for building a mass women’s movement. However, despite the clarity of their intentions, the relationship of revolutionary feminists to liberal feminism’s goal of full equality for women through legal reform, was necessarily ambiguous. In Quebec, equal pay for equal work, full family law reform, legislation against discrimination on the grounds of sex and full political rights (as jurors) had not been achieved by earlier feminist struggles. Thus, even if full liberation rather than equality was the goal, revolutionary feminism could hardly avoid taking on in some fashion the uncompleted equality project of liberal feminism itself [Mitchell 1976: 381-382; Rhode 1986: 151-152].

For the CDF and its militants, a rejection of liberalism,
liberal meliorative feminism and individualist or cultural strategies for liberation was intimately linked not only with their self-definition as revolutionaries but also with their sense of national identity. At the level of theory, this meant a consistent attempt to understand the specificity of women in Quebec. Strategically, it meant a conviction that women’s liberation had to be carried out "dans le cadre de la libération nationale, sociale, économique, politique et culturelle" and required "un changement global de la société québécoise" [QD 1:1 Nov. 1972: 1; 1: Dec. 1972: 1-2].

But, however central as an interpellative element in their self-definition, the newly radicalizing feminists’ relationship to nationalism in this conjuncture was complex. In the first place, their nationalism was lived. To understand the depth of feeling, it is necessary to look beyond political documents to autobiographical statements and symbolic choices. In common with the rest of the nationalist movement, the national situation of women was experienced as both oppression and as hope. A devaluation of the French language and culture had been internalized as a mark of inferiority [Interview: B, K; Dugas: 1981; de Vault 1982: 27]. Historical hostilities were played out in childhood games; *féline* Louise Lanctôt [1981: 16], one of the October 1970 Cross kidnappers, had not, as a child, played cowboys and Indians, but English and French. In both its positive and negative moments, the powerful appeal of nationalist ideology
for these revolutionary feminists was apparent: hence, the adoption of *l'equal* usage [48] in *Québécoises Deboutte!* [1:3 Feb. 1973: 16] and the various instances of refusal to work with anglophones or in English [49]. The emotions behind these decisions often transcended their political rationale. In debate, francophones often said, "We are to you what you are to men" [Interview: K, W].

Secondly, the model of national liberation, which contemporary radicals tended to transfer to sectoral struggles was itself extended to Quebec women. The woman:nation relation was theorized as having two codetermining dimensions, with "nation" (or national liberation) as dominant insofar as the object "woman" (or women's liberation) could only be conceived in the context of the former. Given the power of nationalist sentiment and ideology, both for the participants and for the left that was their reference group, the problem presented was how to open up a space for gender politics. The initial solution was to say that they were inextricably linked. The most striking example of this identification of women and Quebec is to be found in the main slogan of the FLF: *Pas de femmes libre sans Québec libre; pas de Québec libre sans femmes libres*. But like O'Leary [O'Leary and Toupin 1982: 32], a participant [Interview: K] recalled that the similarity of the name chosen for the Front de Libération des femmes du Québec with that of the revolutionary nationalist FLQ was not accidental, and even expressed a sense of daring.

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Nuanced by its increasingly socialist concerns, the CDF continued to make "woman" and "nation" parallel: the condition of women workers in marginal industry were identified with all Quebec workers long used as "cheap labour" [QD 1:1 Nov. 1972: 14]. Furthermore, the geographic and national boundaries in which strategy was thought were always emphasized: the subject of concern was "women in Quebec".

The problem of balancing women and nation as focuses for struggle did not remain at the level of theory. Given the existence of a large but strategically divided nationalist movement, radicalizing feminists faced difficult choices about which representatives of nationalism to support. Traditional nationalism's rigid sexual division of labour and pronatalism were rejected as were the remnants of these views in the policies of present political parties, whether PLQ, Créditiste or PQ [QD 1:1 Nov. 1972: 12-15, 16-35]. Not for them the turn from "mères chrétiennes aux mères nationalistes", the restoration of the family in the interests of an authoritarian state or the waged housewife, all of which they identified as a logical outcome of an attempt to recuperate raised feminist consciousness by the PQ, the "parti nationaliste de droit" [QD 1:5 1973: 3-11] [50].

But the case was not always so clear. Given the demands of different groups for women's allegiance, conflict was bound to occur. During the 1970 provincial election, the FLF faced a decision in which nationalism and feminism were counterposed.
While some proposed active support for the PQ, others wanted to harass all parties, including a "not really left" PQ, for their failures to respond to women's needs. In face of this practical need to decide "est-on premièrement femmes ou premièrement Québécoises" the fledgling movement split once more between nationalists and feminists, despite a proposed compromise that would allow FLF members to participate as individuals in the PQ campaign [O'Leary and Toupin 1982: 69-70; 1983: 327, 329-30]. Those who remained picketed election meetings with signs which demanded free abortion or equated married women with (unpaid) prostitutes and free countries with liberated women [Le Devoir 3 March 1970]. Similarly, during the October crisis, the FLF could not agree to endorse the FLQ manifesto because it failed to consider the oppression of women [Interview: K; O'Leary and Toupin 1982: 33].

With the CDF's turn to socialism and to the development of the analytic tools they felt they needed to build cadres, the problem of how to reconcile national and feminist political imperatives was not resolved but put to one side. The socialist-feminist theorizing that filled the pages of Québécoises Debouttel, while clearly a conceptual advance over the FLF scattergun approach, generated new sets of contradictions, this time between the economist marxism espoused by an increasingly marxist-leninist far left and a need to expand marxism so as to take account of women "à tout prix". The resulting ambivalence can be traced
through the CDF’s attempt to develop a theory of the specificity of women’s oppression. This they explored along two principal axes: sexuality and economy. While cognizant of both, the FLF had tended to combine these two dimensions of critique, as in their attack on commercialized objectification at the Salon des Femmes. The CDF related them rather differently, by subordinating the question of sexuality within an increasingly economistic perspective.

In the pages of Québecoises Debouttei this subordination is not, however, apparent at first glance. Indeed, a quantitative analysis shows that of all the major topics, sexual issues occupied the largest single proportion (about 20%) of the journal. But a more careful reading of these articles shows a different picture. About a third were educational, that is, conveying information about the female reproductive system, contraception and abortion. The rest sought to explain sexuality in terms of "l’articulation entre la répression sexuelle et la répression politico-économique", with the stated intention of mobilizing radicalization on sexual issues so as to challenge "tout le système" [QD 1:3 Feb. 1973: 22]. The social organization of all forms of sexuality, whether in the family, population policy, pornography, prostitution or repressive morality, was seen as deformed to serve the interests of the dominant classes: Anglo-Canadian or American capitalists supported by French-Canadian capitalists, sheltered by the church and state
Sexual pleasure, lesbianism or the sexual exploitation of women by men were not discussed [51].

Although they consistently supported one of North American feminism's main planks, free abortion on demand, CDF militants also sympathized with third world countries forced to submit to population control [QD 1:4 March 1973: 27-28; 1:7 July/Aug. 1973: 5]. From this perspective, they criticized the American slogan: "contrôlons nos corps, nous contrôlons nos vies" as incomplete: "Nous ne pouvons prétendre avoir le contrôle de nos vies lorsque nous sommes acculées par notre situation matérielle à éviter ou refuser une grossesse" [QD 1:3 April 1973: 29-30] [52].

With respect to the economic axis, women were considered to be exploited both as workers and as housewives. As well as rescuing the history of women workers, in, for example, an interview with long time textile union activist Madeleine Parent [QD 1:8 Sept. 1973: 18-24], QD regularly reported on strikes involving women--at Regent Knitting, Lumiray, Susan Van Heusen and Coleco (about 14% of the total pages published in all). It also supported unionization as a way to improve women's working conditions, although it did not hesitate to criticize unions for their past and present sexist practices [QD 1:6 June 1973: 51]. Somewhat suprisingly, however, more space (10%) was devoted to the analysis of domestic labour and to the explication of a particular demand, wages for housework, that they apparently did
not support, than to actual labour force conditions. Relying on
marxist theory and on the Bird commission report [Canada 1970],
QD argued that the economic base of women's oppression was the
private, invisible, unpaid production of use values and labour
power in the home, which left women dependent on husbands and
isolated from one another [QD 1:4 March 1973: 17-18]. In that
vein, a manifesto-like statement on revolutionary feminism
specified the first two elements in women's oppression as full
time childcare and unpaid domestic labour [53]. As an essential
step to real socialism, housework was to be socialized through
the "création des équipements et services collectives":
laundries, restaurants, and 24 hour childcare [QD 1: Dec. 1972:
11-14].

It is also noticeable that in their discussion of women's paid
labour, they chose formulations which privileged the status
"housewife" over that of worker. They defined two thirds of
Quebecoises as housewives, whether or not they also worked
outside the home [QD 1:3 Feb. 1973: 15]. In part, this reflected
a wider, international attempt to bring the occluded dimension of
domestic labour into marxist theory [Malos 1980: 5]. In part, the
interest of the FLF and CDF in housewives of the most oppressed
layers may contain echoes of clerical nationalism's la femme au
foyer, or even of Catholic and middle class injunctions to
charity. This slant was also reinforced by an interview with
"two marxist feminists", Marlarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James
[QD 1:6 June 1973: 26-39], the two major proponents of the wages for housework current. Although the interview was published with a disclaimer that it did not represent the position of the CDF, more recent reports suggest that some of the CDF militants changed their positions as a result of this encounter [O'Leary and Toupin 1983: 12]. Combined with the fact that three of the four groups which devolved from the CDF supported wages for housework, this suggests that there was an element of self-censorship at work. No doubt some of this silence can be attributed to the fact that not all of the CDF militants agreed with the new position, but some of it can also be attributed to a desire to present an orthodox marxist face to the world, including to the far left.

Despite the insistence on a sexual dimension to women's oppression, passing references to patriarchy and an objective concern with women's role in the family, the articles are surprisingly silent on the role of men. The capitalist class, not individual men, was deemed the beneficiary of women's subordination at work, in the household and sexually [QD 1:4 March 1973: 5-12]. Even in a late article on rape based on the work of radical feminist Susan Griffin, the tendency of "l'ouvrier" to play "le rôle d'exploiteur vis-à-vis toute femme" is explained as a secondary, compensatory effect of his exploitation in the abattoir of cheap labour, and criticized as dividing the working class [QD 1:7 July/Aug. 1973: 23-31, 29; n11
above]. The function as well as the immediate cause of rape was analyzed economically; its ultimate function was to protect property, including property rights in wives. This reluctance to identify men as women's oppressors, attributable to nationalism, marxism and vanguardist workerism, contrasts with stronger critiques of sexism in male dominated groups that were held privately or received more restricted circulation [54]. Thus like the support for a wages for housework position, the reluctance to identify men as women's oppressors was an unacknowledged element of discourse.

In context, these suppressions are not surprising. Given little evidence of the raised consciousness and self-organization of working class women, deemed necessary preconditions for a larger feminist movement, the increasingly "m-l" CAPs, linked by personal ties, remained the CDF militants' primary reference group. The groups active in the CAPS were more than a "model" to be copied by rote as Lanctot [1980: 125-126] suggests. As long as they remained to some extent open to "woman work" [Mobilization 3:4 Feb 1974: 10-13], they were both allies and competitors: targets for feminist propaganda efforts, allies to be consulted, a source of recruits and recruiters in turn of the CDF's own militants [55]. Convincing these larger groups would also be a rapid way of overcoming the CDF's own isolation, as manifested both in opposition from their "allies" and indifference from the working class housewives that they defined
as their main constituency.

Overall, then, the fragmentation of the liberal hegemony as its central elements flew apart in the turbulence of 1968-72 was reflected in the emergence of a fully oppositional feminist nucleus. But at the same time the strength of the nationalist and socialist lefts produced by that same conjuncture, and whose ideology this new feminism generally shared, also blocked its theoretical advance, its capacity to attract activists, and its degree of political autonomy. The next chapter continues the examination of the growth of oppositional feminism, but in a new period of rapid growth catalyzed by International Women’s Year. What was it, we may ask, which produced such radically changed gender politics?

7.1. Introduction.

We now turn to the second phase of feminist radicalization in Quebec, the growth of autonomous feminism, taking as our starting point 1975, International Women’s Year. The term autonomous feminism refers to both the organizational independence of groups and to a central political tenet, expressed by the La vie en rose, L'Equipe de l'éditorial [1981: 3] as: "L'autonomie, cela signifie que nous travaillons d'abord pour nous-même, à partir de notre réalité, sans avoir à justifier nos intérêts, nos priorités, nos choix". While a two phase development (with the organizing of radical nuclei of women’s liberationists followed by a diffusion of feminist ideas) is not unique to Quebec, the political situation gave it a particular character: restricting the number of participants and shaping ideological orientations in the first phase so that, in contrast, the expansion and transition to the second phase appeared to be both very large and very rapid.

Three main developments mark this shift. First, there was a process of growth and diversification that led to the creation of many independent women’s groups, not just in Montreal but across the province. Second, the state-sponsored Conseil du Statut de
la femme, established in 1973, began to play an activist and organizing role. Third, a process of feminist mobilisation, touched off by International Women's Year, led to conjunctural cooperation among liberal feminist organizations (FFQ and AFEAS), more radical groups and feminists in the trade unions. As a result of this growth and diversification, the women's movement was placed in a new relation to the political and ideological dynamic of bloc structures. On the one hand, feminism began to move from being either an incorporated element within the liberal alliance or an isolated sector of the far left of the opposition bloc towards being an integrated element of the progressive nationalist bloc led by the PQ. At the same time, its growth, commitment to autonomous organising and expanded ideological resources permitted the women's movement to become a reference group for itself, able to operate with greater independence as an actor on the political stage. In turn, this growing independence was to prefigure further tensions within the progressive nationalist coalition that came to power with the PQ.

7.2. International Women's Year and feminist politics.

The declaration of 1975 as International Women's Year (IWY) and the opening of a Decade for Women by the United Nations was the most important catalyst for this mobilization [Le Devoir 6 Sept 1974]. It provided the occasion for the feminist concerns that had been developing molecularly to surface and to be heard. The major media all ran special features on the status of women.
during the year [1]. This widespread attention helped normalize feminism so that Ghislaine Patry-Buisson, FFQ president 1974-1977, hoped the word "féminisme" could be "dédramatisé" [La Presse 18 Dec. 1975]. By generalizing feminist concerns and by presenting them in the language of journalism rather than of militants or theorists, it also may have helped to overcome the gap that Helene Wavroch, president of the Syndicat des infirmières et infirmiers saw between intellectuals and women workers [La Presse 12 March 1975].

On a province-wide basis, the most important player was the Conseil du statut de la femme. Urged on by representatives of the women's and labour movements, it organized a series of well attended regional meetings across the province culminating in a conference, Carrefour 75, at Laval University in Quebec City, attended by 500 women [Le Devoir 28 May, 2 June 1975]. The workshops and plenary sessions gave about 2,000 [Le Devoir 26 May 1975] women an opportunity not only to discuss issues but to make their demands clear to the CSF. Resolutions on day care, equal pay and equal work, maternity leave, decriminalizing abortion, an end to stereotyping in texts and courses and support for women in the home were debated and adopted [CSF 1975d]. The result was a basic programme for reform accepted by important sectors of the women's movement until the late 1970s [9.3.3. below].

Responses to International Women's Year, as well as to the fact of its government sponsorship, served to demarcate the political
positions of many activist groups towards feminism. There were two dominant responses. The first, which can be defined as reformist, welcomed the recognition it gave to women’s concerns. Liberal feminists, on the whole, saw it as providing a good opportunity for reflection and questioning [Le Devoir 20 Jan., 10 Feb. 1975; Le Devoir 2 Dec. 1974]. The second, which can be defined as radical, was fearful that feminism would be "recuperated" by the state. Although both were critical, they can be distinguished in terms of the kind of critique they put forward. Reformists criticized the government for its failure to live up to its promises but did not challenge its fundamental right or capacity to deliver programmes of benefit for women [Le Devoir 27 Jan. 1975; La Presse 11 Jan. 1975; FFQB 6:1 Sept. 1975: 6-8]. In contrast, the radical critique did challenge the interest, capacity and right of the capitalist state to act in women’s interests. The radical critique can be further divided into two variants. The first of these was pro-feminist and held by autonomous women’s groups [2] and the trotskyist Groupe Marxiste révolutionnaire (GMR) [Taupé Rouge, Jan. 1975: 7-9]. The second, most strongly held by marxist-leninist groups, was anti-feminist [Interview: K]. Whatever their official stance with regard to IWY or to feminism itself, all these players nevertheless indicated the importance of the year, by choosing International Women’s Day, March 8, as the occasion for important organizing efforts.
Since 1908, socialists had chosen this day, in accordance with their general ideological orientations, to celebrate current women's struggles [3]. In the early 1970s, in Quebec and elsewhere, feminists in the left began to revive it as a general day of celebration and protest. In 1974 in line with their populist and nationalist preoccupations, Montreal women from the union-funded Centre de formation populaire and women's committees in the CEQ and the CSN (with some participation from the Centre des femmes) had organized a "fête populaire" with entertainment and skits. After this event was roundly criticized for turning into an apolitical beer bash for men, there was determination to avoid a similar outcome in 1975 [Interview: C]. A provisional coordinating committee was established to organize a more focussed set of events in Montreal for the following year, centred on a day-long teach-in [4].

The trotskyist GMR played an important role in the immediate organizing efforts for IWD. As well as work on the coordinating committee, it organized mixed-sex Comités 8 mars at the Universities of Montreal and of Quebec in Montreal (UQAM) and eight CEGEPs [5]. These committees in cooperation with student councils organized preparatory "semaines de sensibilisation" (consciousness-raising), which drew several hundred participants in most locations. Groups of students from them went together to the teach-in and a woman CEGEP student was a co-leader of the workshop on education. While similar projects were organized
largely at the instigation of women teachers in some other CEGEPs, notably Maisonneuve [Pluri-elles 1:1 June 1977 np], the Comités benefited from their ability to share political, ideological and technical resources (for mixed media presentations and publications) [Interview: C]. While it is as important not to overvalue lost information as it is to resurrect it, it can be said that the Comités instigated the first systematic propagandizing for revolutionary women's liberation ideology in the CEGEPs, that several ongoing women's groups [6] evolved from them and that they provided a counterweight to the virulently anti-feminist and workerist ideology that the two larger m-l groupings by now propounded.

The teach-in, which was organized under the slogan "Travailleuses ménagères, même combat" [Le Devoir 4 March 1975], was a political success. Recommendations on abortion and contraception, day care, paid labour, domestic labour and education formed a left-wing feminist programme which counterbalanced both marxist-leninist anti-feminism and the CSF's reformism. A large attendance, of over 700 people, encouraged the organizers and established the event as a model to be repeated [7]. In the short run, links were established among organizing groups for continuing cooperation which had a direct outcome in demonstrations held later that spring on abortion rights and day care funding [Interview: B, C; Le Devoir 5 May 1975]. These connections also led to the first women's contingent
ever included in a Quebec May Day labour march, led by CSN vice-president Lucie Dagenais, who noted at the time that she felt this was her real place [8].

If these efforts were important in the development of revolutionary feminism from an isolated nucleus, left-wing opposition to feminism had not disappeared. The marxist-leninist groups that had come to dominate the far left (MREQ and En Lutte) organized their own IWD meetings events, attended by about 300 people each, in conflict both with one another and with the teach-in [Interview: L; Le Devoir 4 March 1975]. For the MREQ, equal pay was seen as the only legitimate women's issue, capitalism was the only cause of working class women's oppression and China the real example of women's liberation [Mobilisation 4:6 nd 1-27]. In a return to nineteenth century mechanism, contraception and abortion were viewed as a capitalist plot to reduce the size of the working class. Increasing tensions between the "m-l" groups and feminists meant that, however strong their support for socialism and however close their previous social ties to its "maolsant" wing, the latter increasingly asserted an autonomous stand and became ostracised from the "m-l" milieu.

International Women's Day events were also held in other locations in the province [Interview: J]. Perhaps the most important indication of the extent of the penetration of feminist ideology and the transformation of traditional perspectives is
the one in the Lac St-Jean region. With centres of mining and related industries employing mainly men, balanced with a rural population scattered on farms and small villages and with its Catholic dominance and low levels of female employment, this region does not seem at first glance to be the most fertile ground for feminism to develop [9]. Indeed, AFEAS was the largest women's organization. In preparing for IWD, AFEAS took the dispersal of population into account by organizing a series of smaller meetings in the surrounding small towns where the importance of International Women's Day was discussed. Combined with the large meetings in Lac St-Jean these brought out more than 1,000 people [Interview: D]. In a real sense, all these activities were a coming out party for the new feminism which, as noted above (5.4.4.iii.), had already begun to stir in AFEAS.

What then was the overall significance of IWy activities for the emerging Quebec women's movement? Findlay [1981; 1987] suggests that the Canadian federal government took IWD as an opportunity to capitalize on the "status of women issue" and to channel women's demands into a policy process that rarely paid them heed. In Quebec, any such ambitions were complicated, however, not only by anti-government stances on the part of women's groups themselves, but also by the relative independence that the CSF had as result of its structural location (reporting directly to parliament), its composition (including activist representatives of trade unions and women's organizations) and
Its own activism and willingness to take a critical stand [Le Devoir 13 Dec. 1975; 9.2.3. and 9.3.3. below]. IWY activities, in turn, not only lent legitimacy to the CSF vis-a-vis some sectors of the women's movement [Interview: D, U], but showed the government that the new women's movement, or at least its concerns for equality, economic security and cultural reforms, had wide support [Le Devoir 16 June 1975]. But, with a commitment to keeping the public service budget low, the Liberals were unable or unwilling to meet these demands. The PQ, in contrast, as an opposition party, was able to point out the latter's failure actually to develop policies to meet women's needs [Le Devoir 20 Dec. 1975; Le Jour 20 Dec. 1975]. Thus, as we shall see, while feminist radicalization was not, despite the energetic engagement of the government's advisory body, the CSF, actively integrated into the ideology of the ruling party (the PLQ), it did, voiced by the PQ, begin to make its way into the parliamentary arena.

In sum, the placement of the women's movement in the bloc structure remained ambiguous. On the one hand, International Women's Year and its attendant activities legitimated women's issues. Women's equality had become a matter of international concern. As such, it became a fashionable topic for mass media whose journalists were able to promote a definition of feminism in their own terms, if not those of the radicals responsible for the ideological break. All this had the effect of integrating at
least the acknowledgment that there were unresolved women's issues into the dominant "liberal" consensus. On the other hand, in Quebec, government inaction combined with the PQ's ability to capitalize on women's discontents left feminism in an oppositional stance. At the same time, the hostility of the dominant groups on the far left even towards revolutionary feminism cut the latter free from the far left. All in all, then, one can say that although semi-officially promoted, feminism became more politically autonomous. This combination of political autonomy and legitimation facilitated its growth and diversification, as we shall see in the next section.

7.2.1. New groups and new ideologies.

As well as the emergence of women's issues onto the public political stage, IWY both catalysed and coincided with the proliferation of *groupes autonomes* [10]. Some, like new student groups at the Université du Québec a Montréal and at several CEGEPs were the direct outcome of IWY organizing [Interview: L]. Others, like *Action travail des femmes/Womanpower* (1976), were established on the basis of a Canada-wide distribution of funds by the Women's Programme of the (federal) Secretary of State [11]. Some seemed to replicate, and even import, developments that had been pioneered elsewhere; a case in point is the journal *Les Têtes de Ploche* (1975-1979) which represented the first full articulation of radical feminism among francophones, seven years after it had originated in New York and six years after it had
spread to Canada [12].

In Montreal, several groups had been initiated by anglophone women in west end anglophone institutions, although some of them consciously attempted, with varying degrees of success, to serve a francophone clientele [Interview: J, U]. The YWCA had established a women's centre in 1973 at the main Dorchester branch which was succeeded by the New Women's Centre/Centre de la femme nouvelle opened in 1974 with the federal Health and Welfare funding [TP 2:2 April 1977: 4-5]. Organizing at McGill and Sir George Williams Universities had established women's centres, a women's health collective, a lesbian group and the Montreal Women's Liberation (1969) and Montreal Feminist Association (1973) [Interview: J]. On the cultural front, a feminist art gallery, Powerhouse, was established with federal job creation funding [13] and Androgyny, a bookstore, specialized in women's and gay books. Several internationally known feminists including Germaine Greer (1971), Kate Millett (1973), and James (1973, 1975) and Dalla Costa (1973) had come to propagandize in Montreal [14].

Before the late 1970s these remained, for the most part, confined to their own milieu [Interview: J]. For example, despite invitations from the 1975 IWD teach-in organizers, no anglophone groups were actively involved and few English-speaking women came to the day's activities [Interview: L]. Nor did many anglophone women participate in two earlier events organized by
francophones, a 1972 teach-in at the Université du Québec a Montréal or a 1973 summer course on women at the Université de Montréal [Interview: C; Teach-In 1972; QD 1:1 Nov. 1972: 9]. And women in Quebec had launched the Réseau d'information et d'action pour les femmes whose main activity was the publication of a newsletter, RAIF, which served as a a locus for republishing press clippings [RAIF 1 Dec. 1973: 7-8]. Using contestative language and skill in gaining press coverage [15], this group campaigned for the demands of the movement for abortion, day care, equal wages and jobs and maternity leave and was, perhaps the main actor in a campaign for the right of married women to use their birth names [10.2., 10.3. below].

Federal LIP funding had also permitted setting up several cooperative, or parent and staff controlled day care centres (garderies populaires) in the period 1971-1973. Operating in both French and English, these centres provided low cost child care to a clientele of students, political militants, female-headed, working class and progressive new working class families [Interview: B]. Most of them experienced financial crisis when their start-up grants were not renewed. A series of legislative and financial proposals of the PLQ government, known as la loi Bacon after Lise Bacon, Ministre des Coopératives, were opposed by parents and workers organized in the Regroupement des Garderies populaires as financially inadequate to meet real child care needs or even preserve existing structures. The leadership
of this largely francophone organization included several working
class women sympathisers of En Lutte! Although they eventually
rejected the strategy of autonomous women's organizing, in the
spring of 1975 they helped organize the IWD teach-in and the
series of demonstrations on feminist issues. However, through
the late 1970s this single issue movement was dominated by a
populist rather than feminist ideology [Interview: B].

On the cultural front, new feminist works appeared in
literature and theatre. In a review of Quebec feminist theatre,
Pol Pelletier [1980] singles out two productions, "Un jour mon
prince viendra" (1974) and "Nous aurons les enfants que nous
voulons" from the Théâtre des Cuisines (TC) as the first feminist
plays. Feminist theatre developed further with a new production
from TC, "Moman a travail pas, a trop d'ouvrage", the
establishment of the Théâtre Expérimental des Femmes where
several productions were produced from 1978-1981, and commercial
plays including the controversial, Les fées ont soif [16]. In
this period, writers like Nicole Brossard, France Théoret,
Madeleine Gagnon, Louky Bersianik and Jovette Marchessault
transformed the cultural concern with language fostered by
nationalism to experiment with developing a language that
expressed women's experience, including their relation to their
bodies [17]. In terms of the perspective adopted in this study,
these cultural productions were, while not directly political,
significant in reconfiguring social ideological space so that a
feminist vision could become part of the wider popular consciousness.

These proliferating developments testified both to a developing conviction among activists that the women's movement needed to assert its autonomy and, at the same time, to the diversification of ideology among feminist radicals. But until the combined effects of LWY and the PQ election victory in 1976 changed the relation of forces in the political arena, the influence of these activities was still largely behind the scenes, serving to promote women's radicalization in unions, in left groups, in community organizations and in the PQ. A striking example of the kind of delayed reaction that resulted from these developments was the opening of the Librairie des Femmes d'ici in October 1975 [PE 1:1 1975: np] by a woman who was inspired by the 1972 teach-in "to do something", but only began to act upon this desire three years later [TP 1:1 March 1976: 5] [18].

7.2.2. Radical feminism: Les Têtes de Pioche.

With respect to the ideological development of feminism after 1975, the journal Les Têtes de Pioche (TP) was perhaps the most important new voice. It was not the only new actor on the scene, but while other groupings tended to have a more specialized focus on providing services for particular groups of women (lesbians, single mothers, battered women and unionized or domestic workers), it was centrally concerned with the overall tasks of
developing an autonomous feminist movement in Quebec. Moreover, with its origins in a feminist intelligentsia, it approached the problem of the analysis and explication of ideology with a peculiarly self-conscious clarity. Although its subscription list was not large (500) [TP 1980: 9] and its style certainly not populist, its influence in its three years of publication, 1976-1979, was more profound and much more widespread than these numbers suggest [19]. Perhaps its appeal can be explained by its commitment, not to inserting feminism into marxist theory as was the case in Québecoises Debouttes, but to the feminist principle of building theory on the basis of reflected experience, to speak "(au je)" [TP 3:7 June 1979: 2]. Moreover, without attributing a causal relation, it can be said that the development of an increasingly large sector of the women's movement at least paralleled that proposed for it by TP. For these reasons, this journal is worth examining in some detail.

Founded as a publishing project in mid-October 1975, the first issue of TP appeared after five months of intense discussion designed to homogenize and clarify perspectives. Its initial editorial collective included Nicole Brossard, arguably Quebec's most important woman poet, historian and long-time activist Michèle Jean, who had published Québecoises du 20e siècle [1974], and writer France Théoret. It was soon expanded to include Elizette Rioux, a former factory worker and counter clerk; Agathe Martin and Martine Ross [TP 1:1 March 1976: 2]. The first half of
Its three years of publication was devoted primarily to political self-definition, while in the second half it concentrated more on events in the wider women’s movement.

The project was driven by a troubling set of questions about the progress of the women’s movement in Quebec. Why was it underdeveloped, "encore clandestine et marginalisée" [TP 1 March 1976: 8, 4]? Why were groups who worked on women’s issues "dans l'ombre", ignored in the mass media [TP 2 April 1976: 2] or trivialized by ridicule [TP 1 March 1976: 6]? Why was there an uneven development of feminism along linguistic lines with abortion services, day-care centres, women’s studies programmes, rape crisis and battered women’s centres operating first in English? Why did divorce law reform and family planning also lag [TP 3 May 1976: 6]? In the view of the editorial collective, the explanation lay in Quebec’s cultural heritage and such backwardness could only be corrected through the development of an autonomous women’s movement guided by a radical feminist perspective which could "faire reposer l'oppression de la femme avant tout sur l'organisation patriarcale de la société" [TP 2 April 1977: 2, 3; 7 June 1979: 2]. Thus, the tasks of analysing culture and diffusing radical feminist ideology were defined from the start as primary goals.

Analysing Quebec society as endemically patriarchal inevitably led to a clash with both traditional nationalism and the new brand espoused by the PQ, which in their view, similarly
glorified the linkage of woman as mother with the nation. Jean
and Théoret rejected the claim that Quebec society was
matriarchal as a "représentation phantasmique" and clerical
nationalism as "un méssianisme délirant d'assurer la conservation
de la langue, de la foi et des bonnes moeurs aussi bien que de
duire monter en flèche la population de la province catholique".
The vaunted changes of the Quiet Revolution had not altered the
view which collapsed woman and mother into one. Furthermore,
religion made female sexuality "suspect sinon maudit". "Depuis
Eve la femme est la tentatrice....La seule genitalité autorisée
est la réproduction, pour l'Eglise" [TP 3 June 1976: 34]. Quebec
had not experienced a real matriarchy but the superimposition of
an image of matriarchy on a patriarchal society, where women's
fate was to be isolated ("solitude"), caged in the household,
economically dependant, restricted by discriminatory laws and
powerless [TP 1 March 1976: 1, 3]. These ideologies made the
emergence of feminism more difficult [Ibid] and resulted in the
isolation of the movement as a whole [TP 3 June 1976: 3].

A critique of nationalism also emerges in the collective's
evaluation of the PQ. While welcoming the PQ to power in November
1976, they rejected its programme as merely an updated
pronatalism in support of the working mother: "Car, pour le PQ,
l'avenir du Québec repose sur une politique nataliste. Et la
natalité a toujours été le lot des femmes" [TP 8 Dec. 1976: 5].
Women might be in the majority in the society and in the PQ and
essential volunteers in elections, but their demands would be ignored as long as they remained divided and failed to put women first of all. Women in the PQ should use their power to ensure that women’s issues were not ignored [ibid. 8] Indeed, the PQ’s debates and legislative proposals on abortion, maternity leave and day care as well as Levesque’s refusal to accept the demands of the women’s movement were carefully monitored [TP 7 Nov. 1976: 8].

National oppression was not so much denied as identified as a structure parallel to women’s oppression. Indeed the revolutionary nationalist language of Parli Pris was echoed as women were identified as “colonisée” [TP 2:1 march 1977: 1, 2:7 Nov. 1977: 4-5]. For Jean, both “Québéctude” and “féminitude” demanded self-abnegating denial of one’s real interests [TP 9 Feb. 1977: 5, 7]. These structures of domination could sometimes interact; québécoises were doubly penalized in a world that “sous le couvert d’une idéologie dite libérale, a généré la domination du blanc, mâle anglo-saxon sur le reste du monde” [TP 3 May 1976: 4]. Although she recognized that becoming conscious of oppression was difficult, even the autonomous woman without a feminist consciousness was, according to Brossard, la négresse blanche [TP 1 March 1976: 4].

The writers of TP argued that leaving still powerful nationalist ideological inheritance unacknowledged create real difficulties for feminist movements in Quebec. It repressed
consciousness: "ce n'est que prudemment et lentement que la femme d'ici apprend à s'affirmer" [TP 3 May 1976: 6]. It channeled struggles into particular areas, like abortion and day care, prevented questions being raised with regard to sexuality (including lesbianism) and its expression in the arts, and limited gains on abortion or other issues [TP 1 March 1976: 8]. As well, contemporary commercial culture was sexist [TP 2 April 1976: 6–7, 2:4 June 1977: 4–5] and opposed feminism: "de la vie politique à la vie privée, la mode intacte tout" [TP 2:2 April 1977: 27]. Brossard decried what was a general trend of advertising to promote an image of individualized liberation at the expense of the women's movement [TP 2:9/3:1 Feb/March 1977: 2; Wernick 1984]. Finally, political parties attempted to coopt feminism by promoting token women [TP 3 1976: May: 4].

Against all of this, they argued that women's oppression was the first oppression and today "le front féministe-radical ou l'émersion du radicalisme féministe et lesbien dans certain cas met en veilleuse la lutte des classes et l'exploitation économique des femmes et des hommes comme travailleuses et travailleurs" [TP 7 Nov. 1977: 6]. While there were some differences of emphasis in the articles signed individually, the consensus was that feminism was a "lutte de sexe" which implied "une reconnaissance ouverte de l'homme en tant qu'ennemi" [TP 1:9 Feb. 1976: 7]. The enemy was also violent [TP 7 Nov. 1976, 2:8 Dec 1977]. But the response to this situation varied. One
article in TP's first special issue, "La colère des femmes", suggested violent revenge:

J'ai envie de te tuer, de te faire sauter, de t'embrasser. De te faire manger de la merde, une merde longue comme ça. Te tuer, tout faire sauter. Mettre une bombe... en finir pour une bonne fois [TP 4 June 1976: 2].

This article provoked criticism from readers [TP 5 Sept. 1976: 7]. And other collaborators distinguished between "l'homme" as representative of patriarchy and Individual men [TP 1:9 Feb. 1977: 7], or saw desires to reform the couple (heterosexual or spousal) as revolutionary [TP 2:9/3:1 Feb/March 1978: 4].

Other tenets of radical feminism were also put forward. Under the slogan "La vie privée est politique", [TP 2 April 1976: 1-2], TP examined housework and family life, fashion and the concrete experiences of Individual women. In contrast with Québécoises Deboutte!, however, their analysis of housework did not emphasize the structural determinants of the sexual division of labour or of the benefits of women’s unpaid domestic labour to capital, but rather the benefits to Individual men. The family was seen as a microcosm of patriarchal society with "rapports de pouvoir identiques (mais imperceptibles) à ceux qui s'exercent sur la place publique" [Ibid.].

TP also took up new themes that were emerging in the women’s movement internationally. These included women's health [TP 3:3
May 1978: 5] and violence, especially rape, wife battering and misogynist advertising [TP 2:1 March 1977: 8, 3:5/6 Sept./Oct 1978: 5]. The most controversial was an attack on the institutionalization of heterosexuality [Rich 1980]. From the first issue TP had deliberately mentioned lesbianism as a possible sexual choice, and as the balance of sexual orientation within the collective shifted it was increasingly referred to [20]. Ellette Rioux defended the right of lesbians to publicly identify themselves [TP 4 June 1976: 7, 3:2 Apr 1978: 7, 8]. Indeed, lesbianism as a sexual choice became so coupled with radical feminism that Madeleine Howard-Egré, a later recruit to the editorial collective, felt it necessary to write an article insisting that a heterosexual woman could hold also this position [TP 2:1 March 1977: 2, 6]. As well as the controversy generated among women readers, the problem of sexual orientation also provoked tensions within the editorial collective and reflected widespread tensions in the women's movement at that time [TP 2:9/3:1 Feb./March 1977: 8, 3:2 Apr 1978: 2; Interview: L, B].

Such positions, which denied the marxist canon, especially as economically interpreted by the "m-l" groups, embroiled the journal in a great deal of internal and external controversy. As the "m-l" groups expanded, they continually attacked not only radical feminism (as represented by TP) but also all those who insisted on the specificity and autonomy of women's struggles, (like the Comité de lutte), whether or not they supported the
wages for housework position (like Théâtre de Cuisine or Les Editions Remue-ménage). At the same time, women activists split from far left groups on feminist grounds [TP 2:7 Nov. 1978: 1; Interview: 1, C]. Indeed, much of the second half of the journal’s life was devoted to reporting on and refuting several “attaques acharnées” by m-l groups [TP 3 Dec. 1976: 8, 3:2 April 1978: 1, 2] [21].

However, such disagreements over the relation between class analysis, marxism and feminism were not only external and at one point, indeed, even threatened the existence of the journal. Shortly after several new members were recruited to expand the editorial collective, internal ideological tensions exploded. The printed record leaves only the perspective of the radical feminists who kept control of the journal. In an editorial, they reported that the new, later excluded, collaborators had polarized the group over whether women’s organizing was simply one of many appendices to class and political conflicts, or the fundamental struggle that women “doivent mener pour que cessent leur oppression et leur exploitation” [TP 8 Dec 1976: 2, 1:9 Feb 1977: 2]. Les Têtes de Ploche also criticised trade union involvement in planning activities, like IWD, which should be reserved for autonomous women’s organizing [TP 2 April 1976: 4]. Unlike revolutionary feminists who had kept their strongest criticism of their far left reference groups to Internal bulletins or private talk, TP responded with a public and
militant critique of sexism in the left and so politically
defended all of the autonomous feminist current. Overall, then,
the distancing from the nationalist project that was begun by the
FLF's and CF's critiques of reformism was completed by radical
feminist insistence on the primacy of gender struggles [22].

7.2.3. Diversification of issues.

As women's groups and services multiplied and as the autonomous
women's movement was increasingly legitimated in the eyes of
women by the failure of either opposition or ruling political
collisions to act on the full feminist programme, new issues and
coordinating forces arose within the women's milieu. For
example, Pluri-elles (PE) was established by socialist-feminist
activists in 1976 as a Information bulletin to coordinate the
work and knowledge of women working in the enlarged sector of
autonomous groups [PE 1:1 June 1977 np]. Its organizers also
sponsored a series of round-table discussions for feminists in
Montreal to further these aims [DLDR 1982: 152]. After mounting
difficulty in sustaining its rotating editorial and production
collective and political disagreements about its direction, the
journal was taken over by a new editorial group [23] who wanted
to use it to explore personal relations and interiority of being
a woman, a project which its new title, Des luttes et des rires
de femmes, is intended to connote [DLDR 2:1 Oct./Nov. 1978: 2-3].
At this point, its chief ideological impact was to provide a
voice for lesbians and a certain kind of spontaneism, opposing
all structure in language and organization [DLDR 2:5 nd: 2].
However, it introduced the topic of immigrant women and continued
to organize round tables and to report on feminist activities,
particularly those directed against perceived violence against
2-3].

Other groups focused on single issues. The Coordination
nationale pour l'Avoirtement libre et gratuit (CNALG) resulted
from long and patient organizing efforts while a coalition of
battered women's centres, arose as new feminist social services
sought to lobby the state for better funding and legal
enforcement and legislative reform [PE 1:3 nd: 5-8]. And, as
economic issues became increasingly important for socialist
feminism [Maroney 1983], several focused on issues related to
paid work [24].

After 1975, violence against women, defined as rape,
pornography and wife battering, emerged as an issues in several
campaigns in Montreal and elsewhere in the province [25]. A
campaign against sexist advertising, originated in Montreal by
feminist radicals, which attacked the publicity of the Dapper Dan
jeans stores chain, was rapidly picked up by women in Quebec City
and Hull as well as by the Liberal and Social Catholic feminist
organizations [TP 1:9 Feb 1977: 6, 2:1 March 1977: 8; Interview:
K, J]. Similarly, protests in 1978 against the failure of the
Canadian government to investigate the case of Dallila Maschino, a
landed immigrant studying at the Université de Montréal, who was allegedly [26] forced to return to her Muslim family in Algeria after her marriage to a fellow student in France were quickly supported by the FFQ [DLDR 2:1 Oct./Nov. 1978: DLDR 1981: 23].

The pattern of development of these campaigns was different in several ways from issues raised by feminist radicals before 1975. First, they were generally initiated by women operating in the francophone milieu and not the result of interventions by anglophone feminists linked into continental movements. Most of these women had their first experience in the women’s movement, not the left [27]. Second, even with these local origins they nevertheless emerged at the same time as and shared many of the ideological preoccupations of organizing nuclei elsewhere in Canada or internationally [28]. Third, they were supported by both feminist radicals and liberal feminists at about the same time. Sometimes, as in the Maschino defense campaign, liberal feminists moved more quickly to pick up on actions initiated by their more radical sisters than they had on issues like abortion. In other cases, the preoccupations of the more radical feminist agitators coincided with the long held concerns of reformist groups; for example, the campaign against sexist advertising, which was interpreted as violence against women and evolved into a wider concern with pornography, replicated two of AFEAS’s longstanding concerns.

Finally, in 1977 a new group, the Regroupement des Femmes
Québécoises (RFQ), was launched by a small core of activists who left the PQ to do so [Yannacopoulou 1981: 58-59]. Alienated by the party’s failure to operate from a full feminist perspective, they saw their brief as watching over the PQ to make sure that women’s issues were not lost in the referendum shuffle and called on other similarly disaffected péguliste women to join them [Le Devoir 16 May 1977]. A founding meeting of 200 women in June defined the movement as an autonomous, political, feminist mass movement dedicated to the struggle against women’s oppression [Le Devoir 21 Nov. 1977]. Hopes raised for a permanent left feminist organization that would play the role of a left-wing FFQ, were dashed as ideological differences over the attitude to take to the referendum and to the more general question of the relationship of socialism and feminism resulted in severe ideological differences that hampered the work of the organization [Interview: A; RFQ 1978a, 1978b]. Along with RAIF, some of whose members were active in the Quebec region of the PQ CCF, the RFQ kept up a left and feminist critique of the PQ in power.

Altogether, then, after 1975, Quebec feminism became more independent of anglophone intervention at the same time as its timing and themes became more like those of the North American movement. At the same time, it became more unified as a national movement in Quebec, with a greater degree of coordination between its liberal and radical wings [29]. As a result, for all its
Ideological and strategic diversity, the women's movement began to assume an independent place on the field of Quebec politics as a whole.

7.3. The abortion issue.

Through all the ideological and organizational complexities of the period following 1969 there was one issue which consistently provided a practical reference point for the developing women's movement. This was the struggle for free abortion on demand, which grew from a small handful of women to a Quebec-wide, or national, single issue movement with almost all feminist groupings, from liberal to revolutionary and lesbian, with the exception of social Catholic, feminism, coming to support it [30]. In Canada, abortion was governed by the federal criminal law, which in a 1969 reform had legalized abortion under particular conditions [31]. Women whose health or life was endangered by a pregnancy could obtain legal abortions in approved hospitals if a Therapeutic Abortion Committee (TAC) approved a written application submitted by a doctor. Hospitals were under no obligation to set up TACs nor were TACs, where they existed, obliged to grant abortions or even meet.

Four points should be noted at the outset. First, the initiative in this struggle did not always come from feminists. Dr. Henry Morgentaler, and the state, through its judicial,
repressive and political apparatuses, were often responsible for setting processes in motion to which feminists had to respond; and the fact of running a much needed counselling and referral service had its own external imperatives. Secondly, unlike similar struggles elsewhere in Canada, the Quebec movement can be said to have won a qualified victory after 1976. Shortly after his appointment as PQ justice minister in 1976, Marc-Andre Bedard announced that he would not prosecute qualified medical doctors practicing medically safe abortions outside the hospital setting prescribed in the law; i.e. "une certaine immunité aux médecins qui pratiquent les avortements dans les mêmes conditions que le Dr. Morgentaler" [Le Devoir 14 Dec. 1976]. As a result, some doctors became able to practice abortions privately, with the government turning a blind eye [Interview: K]. Thirdly, although the focus here is on the nationalist and class dimensions of the alliance that supported liberalized abortion, it should be stressed that the core organizers and their supporters argued for access to abortion partly in relation to a wider campaign for control over reproduction and the liberation of women's sexuality [PE 1:2 nd: 3 et passim]. Fourthly, a striking paradox of the abortion rights campaign is that while it was, like other oppositional movements in the period, indeed cast in nationalist and class, as well as feminist, terms, it was to some extent dependent upon the actions of a male immigrant liberal humanist doctor, Henry Morgentaler [32].
The glaring biases in the access system, as it developed after 1969, were interpreted as nationalist and class inequities. There were consistently differential rates of abortion in anglophone and francophone hospitals with only one abortion performed in a francophone hospital in 1971 in contrast to 180 in anglophone hospitals [Le Devoir 20 Feb. 1970]. A history of Catholic control of francophone hospitals, which apparently influenced their refusal to provide abortions, was seen as linked to national oppression [Interview: G]. By 1977, despite growing acceptance of abortion [La Presse 11 Nov. 1977], most francophone hospitals, most with a majority of (lay and religious) Catholics on their boards of directors, had not even set up the TACs required for abortions to be performed. According to Ministère des Affaires sociales statistics in the period 1972-1976, anglophone hospitals, largely in Montreal, still did 93% of all abortions in Quebec, Notre-Dame did 61% of abortions in francophone hospitals and, in 1974, only 2 hospitals outside of Montreal, in Sherbrooke, did any at all [La Presse 6 Aug. 1977]. As a result, Quebec women turned either to illegal abortions, between 10,000 and 25,000 a year [33], to an anglophone institutions where many francophone women felt ill at ease, or to expensive [34] trips to fee-paying New York clinics [CL 1975: 26-27]. Women who lived outside of Montreal, including all rural women, and those without the language and social skills to operate in a "middle class" bureaucratic and hospital environment, were particularly disadvantaged in access to
abortion [CL 1980; Le Devoir 10 Feb. 1977] [35].

Concern for such disparities was an important unifying element within the alliance promoting liberalisation, and it linked the issue to a wider anti-government opposition. Such alliance-building was, moreover, self-conscious. Class and linguistic (national) inequities were a main focus of the work carried out by revolutionary feminist activists who were the day-to-day leaders of the campaign. From the outset, they saw operating a referral service as an effective way to politicize women. An early leaflet given to clients pointed out that the only recognized social role for women, as the maternal gardienne du foyer, required the repression of sexuality in the interest of reproduction [FLF 1971c in O'Leary and Toupin 1982: 97-98]. It went on to denounce the class nature of the legal system and to counsel rebellion: laws were made by rich men who controlled factories and personal life; women should not have more babies to be unemployed. Later, Québécoises Deboutte! insisted that population policy was formed in the interests of the dominant capitalist classes, church and the state, all of whom wanted high fertility rates for cheap labour or for the survival of their mass base [QD 1:4 March 1973: 6; 1:3 Feb. 1973: 27]. Although the analysis became increasingly refined and the polemics directed towards women who sought abortions more subtle, these critiques of class and state control over abortion and linguistic/national inequities in access continued to be a central preoccupation of
the Comité de lutte pour l'abortion et la contraception libres et gratuits (CL) through the period of this study [CL 1975: 4 12, 1978: 20, 31-35]. Objections to sending women to expensive English-language American clinics were, for example, couched in precisely these terms [QD 1:7 July 1973: 9].

Concern for class and national issues also consistently affected political decisions by the reform coalition and its members. In the early period, as well as the split in the counselling service along language lines described above, the FLF refused, on Independentist lines, to participate in a 1970 cross-Canada Abortion Caravan to Ottawa, despite their sympathy with its objectives [FLF 1970a in O'Leary and Toupin 1982: 71]. Instead they held a Mother's Day demonstration in 1970 and launched a campaign for free abortion on demand on IWD the next year [Le Devoir 9 March 1971]. A similar position was taken by the Coordination nationale pour l'Avortement libre et gratuit (CNALG), founded in January 1978 to coordinate struggles for abortion rights across the province. Demands for reform, they decided, should be addressed to the provincial state because the application of the federal law was in its hands and it could give public or private clinics affiliated "hospital" status [CL 1978: 9; CNALG 1980: 90]. In all periods, the class dimensions of the issue were also stressed, and allies sought among those, like unions, concerned with economic inequality.

Until 1977 a large part of the political campaign was
necessarily connected with a defense campaign for Dr. Morgentaler. First charged with the indictable offense of procuring a miscarriage in June 1970, he was not brought to trial until Jan. 28, 1973, in part because of the time required to consider briefs submitted by his defense counsel [Le Devoir 4 Oct. 1973]. A speech given in Toronto in March 1973 by Morgentaler stating that he had performed over 5,000 abortions with almost no complications and demanding that the government decriminalize abortion no doubt provoked further legal proceedings [Le Devoir 30 March 1973]. These included his arrest on August 15 1973 along with those of sixteen workers and patients at his clinic [Le Devoir 16 Aug. 1973]. Police harassment spread to his associates; on February 21 1973, the CF was raided by police who claimed to be seeking abortificants but who harshly questioned both the women leading and attending an information session on contraception, demanding to know if they were pregnant. They also took documents and subscription lists for Québécolses Deboutte! [QD 1:4 March 1973: 22; CL 1976: 28-29].

The campaign originally faced difficulties arising from differences between the Front commun pour l’abrogation des lois sur l’avortement (FCALA), which held a public meeting of over 300 people in the fall of 1973 to organize the Morgentaler defense committee, and revolutionary feminists [Interview: B]. On the one hand, FCALA itself and its key organizers, the Young Socialist
Alliance/Ligue de jeunes socialistes, argued for a narrow strategy of defense and supported a tactic of formulating the ideology in liberal terms of freedom of choice [36]. On the other hand, revolutionary feminists, who were beginning to evolve a critique of professional monopolies on medical knowledge that would eventually lead them to call for government funding for "Les centres de santé des femmes" [37], wanted an open struggle for free abortion on demand:

Nous ne voulons pas concentrer la lutte uniquement autour de la défense des médecins. Il ne s'agit pas de défendre le droit des médecins à pratiquer des avortements, mais bien de s'assurer à nous les femmes, le droit d'avorter librement et gratuitement [CL 1978: 6].

These internal disputes alienated potential support with the result that demonstrations and pickets at the court were disappointingly small [38]. However, they also led to the consolidation of the revolutionary feminist current in the founding of the Comité de lutte by women from the Centre des femmes, the welfare rights group ADDS and the teachers' unions (CEQ) along with several other (unaffiliated) women in the spring of 1974 [TP 2:2 April 1977: 3] [39]; and that organization played a central role in the issue from its establishment until at least 1981, after the period of this study.

Why was this organization able to maintain itself while other revolutionary feminist and radical feminist initiatives were
relatively short lived? Certainly, throughout the early to mid 1970s it experienced itself as suffering the same political isolation as other groups [CL 1975: 41]. Indeed, the Comité de lutte was the subject of a particularly violent attack for its "bourgeois feminism" by the maoist far left in 1976 [ibid.]. Moreover, because it did not share the wages for housework perspective of the other groups that emerged from the Centre des femmes, it was also somewhat ideologically divided from other early feminists groups.

There were several factors, however, that, despite difficulties of funding and maintaining the service [Le Devoir 30 Jan. 1976], provided a certain measure of stability. First, combining the political struggle with the actual referral service in one organization was important. In the debates that preceded the dissolution of the FLF, Cellule avortement had argued that the work was valuable because it attracted new militants, had the capacity to raise consciousness and provoke action on a mass scale, touched all women and received wide press coverage [FLF 1971c in O'Leary and Toupin 1982]. Although continually plagued by the problem of transcending the role of a radical social service and by burn-out, this work had had from the beginning an ability to recruit new members to replace those it consumed. No matter how difficult it became at some points, women were reluctant to desert the referral service whose importance was demonstrated by a weekly average of 60 requests for help.
(1973-1974), or more (1974-1976) [CL 1975: 40; Interview: K]. There were moments of crisis, but new members seemed to become available [TP 2:4 1977: 6]. Second, the issues raised by the political campaigns were in part sustained by actions of the federal government itself. The latter's pursuit of a conviction of Morgentaler kept the issue alive during a period when the seeming guarantees of the 1969 "liberalization" of the abortion law made it difficult to mobilize support for either the radical demand of free abortion on demand or for the reformist choice position in elsewhere Canada.

The militants in this work were also less isolated than their own evaluation suggests. First, however estranged they might feel from it, there was an ongoing, if episodic, movement for repeal of the abortion law in the rest of Canada, as well as international mobilizations for abortion rights. Of these, the French Mouvement pour la libéralisation de l'avortement et de la contraception and Choisir were important reference points [CDF 1974 in O'Leary and Toupin: 168; CNALG 1981: 1-14]. More immediately the abortion struggle permitted the formation of alliances with other groupings of women. The first intervention into the family planning milieu, "Manifeste pour une politique de planification des naissances", was a joint effort with the women workers from the CLSC Hochelaga-Maisonneuve [QD 1:1 Nov 1972: 7-8; CDF 1972 reprinted in O'Leary and Toupin: 1982: 192-196]. The Comité itself was founded as a coalition of individuals and
groups. Following the initiatiative of their women's committees, all the labour centrals (CEQ, CSN, FTQ) eventually officially endorsed the movement's demands [Le Devoir 3 Dec. 1977]. As well, through the 1970s, other feminist groupings engaged in local struggles for abortion services in hospitals [40] and in 1977, 1978 and 1979, the CNALG was able to mobilize large numbers of women to demonstrate for their demands [CNALG 1980: 88].

While such organizational links were important, more important still, perhaps, is the place the abortion issue itself occupied on the political-ideological field. It was situated, in effect, at the intersection of radical and liberal perspectives. Radical and revolutionary feminists saw abortion rights as a necessary but not sufficient condition for women's liberation, linking it into a problematic of sexual liberation and reproductive self-definition inimical to familial patriarchalism. In addition, the way that inequities in access were read as a class issue with national overtones, placed it on the left. But, while core organizers of the abortion struggle analysed and promoted it in radical gender, class and national terms, the issue, at the same time, struck a liberal chord. Insofar as the question of abortion rights is one of choice, and of an individual's right to bodily integrity, it has, as Petchesky [1985: 3-8] has convincingly argued, a central place and a long history in a liberal individual rights perspective [41]. In this vein, civil liberties organisations like the Ligue des droits de l'Homme
supported the liberalization of abortion, as did, it will be recalled, liberal feminists in the FFQ [FFQB 6:3 Jan. 1976: 3-4], the Bird report [RCSWC 1970: 286] and the CSF [1975] [42]. In addition, the stance of AFEAS (centrally in 1974 and at its 1975 congress) in support of equal access under a wide interpretation of women's health [43] effectively meant wider access [Le Devoir 8 Aug. 1975]. Although he rejected Morgentaler's civil disobedience tactic, liberal Catholic Le Devoir editor, Claude Ryan, criticized serious failures in the way abortion access operated in Quebec, in part because these brought the law into disrepute Le Devoir 4 April 1973] [44]. All this created a climate in which the CL's and the CNALG's continuing critique could be heard.

The question was also one of great importance to women in the PQ. The official stand of the PQ was, as we have seen, ambiguous; but nationalism and feminism, long antagonistic, worked together to shape its position in relation to the Morgentaler case. Between 1973-1976, Morgentaler was acquitted at three successive jury trials held in Montreal [Le Devoir 21 April 1976]. Despite this, the crown prosecutor, under instructions from the federal justice department, appealed in the first of these to the non-jury Cour d'Appel which overturned the jury decision. Morgentaler was sentenced to 18 months in jail and three years' probation [Le Devoir 4. Oct. 1973]. With variations, this scenario of acquittals by Quebec juries and appeals or threats to
appeal by the federal government was repeated three times [Le Devoir 2 July 1974]. From a nationalist point of view, and other aspects of the case aside, this was a clear case of the "oppressor' federal state overriding the rights of Quebec juries [Interview: K]. In opposition, the PQ found this a convenient way to couch and respond to the whole affair [Le Devoir 8 May 1975]. However, when later pressed for further action by the CL, and its successor the CNALG, the PQ sheltered behind the fact that abortion was in the federal jurisdiction and outside their control [PE 1:5 1978]. But in 1975, federal Liberal Justice Minister Marc Lalonde, who was responsible for women's issues, had already deplored the failure of hospitals under provincial control to establish TACs, while supporting the superior court decision to overturn the jury ruling [Le Devoir 24, 27 March 1975]. It was, then, in the establishment of the "cliniques Lazare" [below] that the PQ was able to resolve its dilemma of balancing femininism, nationalism and electoralism with regard to abortion.

These moves to liberalization came in the context, it should be stressed, of continuing conservatism at the level of actual hospital practice. Despite the 1969 change in the law and ongoing pressure from women's groups, hospital user groups and, after 1978, even from the PQ government, francophone hospitals had resisted establishing effective TACs on religious or moral grounds, both because of the counter-pressure of doctors as
Individuals or as pressure groups and for fear of acquiring a public image as abortionists [CNALG 1981]. Quebec doctors, obstetricians and gynecologists in particular, have been shown to be less favourable towards abortion, except under a restrictive interpretation of danger to women's health, than both the population at large and doctors in the rest of Canada [Le Devoir 10 July 1975]. As a result, "Profitant de la marge de manoeuvre que leur laisse la loi... les provinces, les hôpitaux et les médecins y ont opposé une résistance passive ou active qui a très souvent rendu cette loi inopérante" [Le Devoir 10 Feb. 1977]. At the same time, anti-abortion "Pro-vie" forces began to organize in Quebec with wide support from the Catholic hierarchy and from conservatives, sometimes nationalist, doctors [Le Devoir 19 March 1973] [45].

The continuing power of doctors and administrators over hospitals points to a failure in the Quiet Revolution's own project of having state institutions (in health and education) democratically controlled through intermediary groups of citizens. The PQ eventually met this lag in the development of participatory organizational structures and its reflection in the resistance to abortion with an attempt to establish family planning clinics across the province. In an attempt to assure greater equality of access, the state health service controlled by the Ministre des Affaires Sociales (MAS), moved to establish 20 new regional specially funded "cliniques Lazures" which would
offer a complete service to assure all aspects of family planning (contraception, abortion, sexuality and fertility) officially in the legal framework of the criminal code. In essence, the policy compromises worked out by the PQ were another example of the "privilege of backwardness" [46], with "advanced" forms of social organization (no prosecution and an attempt at free-standing abortion clinics) replacing lagged and resistant institutions [47]. However, the CNALG soon criticized the operation of the clinic project as inefficient and inappropriate. First, several hospitals that had accepted funds did few abortions, and the government with no hold on the hospital milieux, had to wait on their good will. Second, the clinics rested on the "vieille formule" of TACs which, influenced by the personal morality of the practitioners and operating on the same strict criteria that they had used in the past, denied women the right to make their own decisions about reproduction [CNALG 1980: 88-89].

Overall, the abortion struggle, even more clearly than the other activities and politics of the women's movement during this period of feminist radicalization, had an ambiguous relationship to the shifting forces of hegemony and opposition. On the one hand, support for free abortion on demand placed feminism in a contradictory relation to liberalism: in line with its individualism and the separation of church and state, but in tension with its inherited refusal to challenge private patriarchy in the family. On the other hand, if the political
sympathies of the leaders of the abortion rights struggle, as well as their left-wing training in student, labour and nationalist movements, ideologically tied them to the opposition bloc, the feminist insistence on women's right to control their own fertility also placed the struggle at variance with the pronatalism, whether clerical or progressive nationalist, that was an important unifying element within that same bloc. At the same time, to the extent that any government would actually implement abortion reform there was a possibility that this particular feminist demand would be co-opted to the credit of a ruling party. However, the anti-state, anti-elitist positions of the Comité de lutte, CNALG, the labour movement and trade union and PQ woman's caucuses resisted easy incorporation. Indeed, after 1977, support of the women's movement and the labour centrals for the feminist demand for reproductive control signalled the beginnings of a left-wing opposition to the PQ arising from within the bloc it sought to hegemonise. It also signalled that the non-economic elements of women's oppression had begun to be incorporated into the politics of the working-class movement.

7.4. Conclusions.

Altogether, the two phases of feminist radicalization considered in this and the previous chapter altered the ideological and organizational terms in which gender relations were construed and gender politics fought out. Above all, the
women's movement became an autonomous, self-referential force, a wide-scale coalition that, whatever its particular internal ideological differences, was unified by its own set of (partially) shared beliefs. This development involved more than just a change in the way women's interest politics were organised. Rather, it marked a stage in the formation of feminism as a politically consolidated, self-conscious movement, a process similar to the way in which classes "for themselves" are formed through class struggle. At the level of feminist ideology, the extent of this autonomisation is a measure of the ideological break which that radicalization provoked. Overall, revolutionary and radical feminists broke with important integrating elements of both competing would-be hegemonic (whether liberal modernising or progressive nationalist) ideologies, including, modified familial patriarchalism, normative heterosexuality, pronatalism and parliamentarism.

As we have seen, a most important aspect of this transformation was the development of nuclei of feminist intellectuals in the FLF, the Centre des femmes, Les Têtes de Pioche and a wider artistic milieu. In every way organic to the women's movement, these engaged intellectuals generated, collected, revised and circulated radical new feminist ideas. With the deepening and diffusion of these ideologies and their partial and uneven adoption by secular (FFQ) and social Catholic (AFEAS) liberal feminism, as well as by feminist organizers in the PQ, the labour
movement and even in the state advisory body (CSF), these ideas began to acquire the political weight and moral authority of ideologies which, as Gramsci argues, must be taken into account in any attempt to construct the alliances required to consolidate a ruling or an opposition bloc.
Chapter 8. Gender politics and the trade unions.

8.1. Introduction: women and unions.

In the two decades from 1960 to 1980, gender politics in the three major Quebec labour centrals, as expressed by official ideologies and platforms, developed along feminist lines to a degree that was remarkable not merely in terms of the contrast with previous positions but also in comparison with labour movements in the rest of North America. Changes, which in some cases completely transformed previously held positions are interesting enough in themselves, especially in view of sociological and historical debates about the effects of male dominance and chauvinism in workers' organizations. However, the weight of trade unions and trade union politics in the whole process of bloc formation and fragmentation in the Quebec social ensemble also gave these developments added significance both for feminist movements and for the wider (re)constitution and (re)location of gender as a social and political category.

The explanation for this relatively advanced gender consciousness in the Quebec labour movement, I shall later suggest, is to be found on the one hand in a pronounced shift in the woman:work: marriage relation associated with the process of "rattrapage" and on the other hand in the whole set of political
circumstances that produced generally radicalized unions. But before examining the Quebec case in these terms, it may be worthwhile as a critical reference point to note first the general kinds of arguments, for the most part schematic and abstract, that feminist historians and sociologists have advanced about the relationship between feminism and trade unions in general [1].

Three issues especially have been important for both scholars and militants. First, do trade unions, and more particularly mixed sex trade unions, benefit women workers or do they merely reproduce gender hierarchies? Second, how do trade unions formulate women's issues? Third, what effect do women members have on advancing or retarding trade union militancy?

With regard to the first question, feminist sociologists and historians have sought to evaluate the effects of unionization and union gender politics on women in relation to two different periods, broadly before and after WWII. In the first period, that of union formation, some writers have highlighted the role of male-dominated unions in promoting rigid occupational sex-typing which effectively excluded women from skilled and highly paid employment, and was justified by a notion of a family wage (paid to adult men) and an ideology (of bourgeois origin) that women's place is in the home [2]. Others have seen the family wage as having benefitted the whole working class, including its women members, and stress the restrictive significance of reproductive
biology under nineteenth century conditions [3].

In assessing the extent and effects of male dominance in the more recent development of labor movements, three dimensions have been studied: policies, economic benefits and the persistence of patriarchal ideology. Some analysts of contemporary Canadian unions have concluded that their policies are of little benefit to women [Baker and Robson 1981]. But there is growing evidence to the contrary, with unions taking up such issues as sex-typing of jobs, equal pay for work of equal value, sexual harassment and maternity or parental leave [Penny 1983; Briskin and Yanz 1983; Maroney 1983; Fitzgerald et al. 1982: 153-180]. While the formal structures and democratic norms of unions have not always protected women workers [4], their recently demonstrated capacity to adopt non-sexist policies has encouraged a critical defense of unions by women trade unionists [Hartmann 1976; Fitzgerald et al. 1982: 175-180; Briskin and Yanz 1983; Cockburn 1983: 151-190; Genge 1986]. Indeed, that the right to unionize has become inflected as a feminist demand [Lepage et al. 1981] is demonstrated by its centrality in several recent Canadian strikes [5].

With regard to wages, the evidence clearly suggests that unions benefit women and do not simply increase male-female wage differentials. The wages of both male and female unionized workers are higher [6] than those of their nonunionized peers in the same occupational category and branch of industry in Canada.
as a whole [White 1980: 57; Gunderson 1975] and in Quebec [Marion et al. 1975; Femmes au travail 1978]. After examining earnings for Quebec women by occupation and size and branch of industry, Lysette Boucher [1980: 33] concluded that: "De l'ensemble des résultats obtenus...quelle que soit l'approche utilisée, un fait demeure: le syndicalisme a effectivement un impact positif sur les salaires."

While recognizing and criticizing manifestations of sexism in union policies, organisational work styles and informal practices, several analysts have suggested that despite leadership structures dominated by men, mixed-sex unions have been, and continue to be, important for the achievement of women's rights [Gray 1987; Warlan 1981; Hartman 1976]. In part, this is because women are protected as workers by contracts which establish work norms, seniority, procedures for promotion and wage norms for occupational categories [7]. For women office workers, such formal norms can eliminate practices which rest on and reinforce gender hierarchies and place them in what Rosabeth Moss Kanter [1977: 70-97] has termed a patrimonial relation to a (male) supervisor: status contingency or promotion through rug ranking rather than merit, absence of salary scale, being constrained to play an expressive role and lack of opportunities for Initiative [Lepage et al. 1981: 65-66].

If the first issue problematizes the utility of unions for women, the second questions the utility of women for unions.
Traditionally, male union leaders have argued that because of a lower commitment to work than to their interpersonal relations, romance and family, women workers are difficult to organize and when organized, politically unreliable [Gray 1987]. Feminists have countered such claims by shifting the focus from the supposed characteristics of "women" to the structural characteristics of the workplace. For example, Kanter [1977: 129-163] found that dead end jobs with little access to opportunity and power structures in organizations led to low job commitment for men and women alike. Moreover, she argued, it is the dependent fealty relation that women clerical workers frequently occupy that socializes them to become addicted to praise from their supervisors. Similarly, by pointing out that, in contrast to men, women workers frequently have a double day of paid and domestic labour, feminists have argued that social structural arrangements and not merely an abstracted ahistorical "female consciousness" are really at issue [Gagnon 1974b] [8]. Also, while the historical record contains examples of women as strike breakers, it also contains many examples of tactical ingenuity and heroic solidarity among women strikers [Luxton 1980: 215-222, 229-231; Tax 1980; Sangster 1978].

Indeed, two propositions about the kinds of factors which encourage radicalization in workers' movements, though not developed for gender relations, would, for the recent period, suggest a contrary hypothesis. Ernest Mandel [1977] argues that
certain categories of educated, unionized intellectual workers act as a transmission belt for radical ideology generated outside of the labour movement. Another thesis holds that because of their relation to the state, public sector unions are likely to move from narrow economic struggles to political action [Bolvin 1973]. Together, these would suggest that (numerically) female-dominated public sector unions organizing educated workers would play an important role in radicalizing gender ideologies and politics in the labour movement as a whole. In the case of feminism, while all public sector unions may be important, teachers' unions might be expected to play a particularly significant role in radicalizing gender politics.

In addition, political struggles for women's equality may have spin-off effects which either facilitate the introduction of equal rights policy into the internal and bargaining practices of unions or help to widen their vision of their social role [9]. Today, women's caucuses have supported gay and lesbian workers' claims for protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation both through direct actions and through their more general contributions to changing the ideological climate [Genge 1986; Briskin and Yanz 1983]. Overall, the structural location of women workers in relation to (narrowly defined) capitalist production and the family-household system means that their demands are likely to go beyond wages to raise the kinds of questions that are associated with social unionism [10]. Thus,
the question of the conservatizing or radicalizing effect of a female membership cannot be posed outside of the historical context.

The third set of questions has to do with the way in which trade unions appropriate feminist issues. While there is little written on this issue for recent feminism, the history of the women's movement both in Quebec and elsewhere has given rise to a number of disputes among feminists inside and outside the trade unions [11]. A hypothesis that might be advanced is that unions do not simply water down feminist demands put forward by activists in the autonomous women's movement but that gender issues undergo a process of class transformation as they are adopted by the labour movement. The focus on sexual objectification, for example, has been translated into a workplace struggle against verbal and physical sexual harassment [12]. In Laclau's terms, a non-class liberal democratic element (the (sexual) integrity of the person) may thus here combine with a class element (workers' control of conditions of work) in the construction of a feminist popular-democratic discourse (harassment free workplace equally for women and men).

While primarily engaged in collective bargaining, unions can be conceived as carrying out struggles on three levels: economic, ideological and political. Before turning to the orientation of Quebec trade unions toward women at each of these levels, let us look briefly at the background for this in women's labour force
participation and unionization and the politico-ideological character of the Quebec labour movement itself.


It is now commonplace to note that the most significant change in the composition of the labour force for all regions of the North American economy in the period of study was the massive entry of women [Cook 1976: 5, 27-44; Armstrong and Armstrong, 1984: 18-22; Smuts 1971]. In Quebec, their numbers increased in absolute and proportional terms and became closer to the Ontario and Canadian averages [13]. While they were only 24.0% of the labour force in 1951 they had increased to 29.5% in 1961, 35% in 1971 and 38.3% in 1980 [Statistics Canada 1971 cat. 94-702 table 1].

Employment has risen for married women. While married women were only 17.2% of women workers in 1951, they rose to 31.8% in 1961, 48.8% in 1971 [Statistics Canada 1971 cat 94-702 table 3], and to almost 51% in 1981, when almost half of married women were in the labour force [Statistics Canada 1981a cat. 94-702 table 3] [14]. At the same time, although women's age of first marriage has risen somewhat, as Messler [1980: 122-123] points out, the rate of marriage, which rose in the 1960s, has begun to fall, so that women and men both are less likely to marry [15].

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One way of understanding these changes is to look at changes in labour force participation rates for women of different age cohorts [Table 8:1]. In the 1960s and 1970s, the participation rate increased fastest for those who were in the prime childbearing groups [16]. For women 25-34, it more than doubled

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>72.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 &amp; +</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


for the whole period from 1951, when only 23.9% of women in this age group were in the labour force, to 58.8% in 1980. For women in the 20-24 groups a similar rise of 169% can be traced, from 46.3% in 1951 to 72.3% in 1980. For women between 45 and 54, participation mounted steadily at about between 126% and 141% a decade between 1951 (19.1%) and 1971 (33.8%), climbing to 46.5% in 1980. Finally for women 55 years of age up to 65, the normal
age of retirement, during the same period the participation rate just about tripled, from 10% in 1951, to 13.9% in 1961, 17.8% in 1971 and to become a stable 27.6% between 1977 [CSF 1978a: 211] and 1980. The relatively rapid rise in participation for these older groups in the 1970s indicates that women who entered or remained in the labour force were being retained. At the same time, because of increased attendance in secondary and post-secondary education in the 1960s and a relatively low rate of female youth unemployment towards the end of that decade, the participation rate for women below twenty fluctuated, decreasing by 4.1% from 39.7% between 1951 and 1977, but rising again to 43.1% in 1980 [17].

Overall then, the two previously dominant patterns, the single peak of work until marriage or the first child or the double peak which indicated a withdrawal of women in the years of child bearing and rearing, were replaced by a flattened curve with between 7 of 10 of younger and almost 5 out of 10 of older women working. Proportionally, the distribution of women in the labour force changed from being numerically dominated by single women to being dominated by married women. The flattening of the curve for the younger age groups and the indices of retention for the older age cohort together support the argument that the woman:work relation and the woman:work:marriage relation both changed. Participation in paid employment became a normal, life long expectation for women. We can draw an analogy with the
experience of Quebec male workers between 1930 and 1950. As changes in the economic structure dramatically reducing the proportion of the, particularly francophone, labour force in agriculture, and as clerical ideologues ceased preaching a return to the land, the male Quebec worker (travailleurs) underwent a process of proletarianization which resulted in a changed consciousness and a growth in militancy that led to important post-war strikes, for example, in mining at Asbestos in 1949 and Murdochville in 1953 [David 1980a]. In the 1960s and 1970s, a similar commitment to work in the capitalist economy for his female counterpart (travailleuse) has had, as we shall see, some similar consequences in altering consciousness and generating militancy.

If we draw a schematic sketch of the "typical woman worker" in 1961, she was young, unmarried or, if married, without children and unlikely to have completed secondary school. She worked in one of four sectors: clerical (bureau) (25%), services (21.1%), "professions libérales" (largely teaching and nursing, 19.3%) and manufacturing (16.2%) [Legaré 1977: 139]. By 1980, she was older, married, with at least one child, with some post-secondary training [18]. With a decline in manufacturing occupations to 13%, she was increasingly likely to be an office or service worker, or a teacher or nurse [19].

As in Canada as a whole, the expansion of clerical occupations accounts for many of the new jobs occupied by women [20]. While
the expansion of clerical jobs at the beginning of the period had the initial effect of reducing concentration in women's employment in manufacturing and services, the subsequent shrinking of the manufacturing sector has meant that women workers became highly concentrated in clerical occupations. While this expansion also occurred in the private sector, much of it was also a result of the public sector reform associated with the Quiet Revolution, with public sector employment expanded from 29,298 to 41,847 between 1960-1965 in its fastest growth period [Postgate and McRoberts 1976: 116; Gow 1976]. In 1975, 90% of all women in the Quebec civil service were concentrated in the category of office and support workers (personnel de bureau, techniciennes et assimilées) while the percentage of secretaries and stenographers who were women remained over 97% [Bhérer 1978: 3].

Continuing a trend begun in the 1950s, public sector jobs also expanded in nursing and teaching. Teachers in primary and secondary schools increased in number from 26,200 at the time of writing of the Parent report to 62,472 in state schools in 1978, of whom about two thirds were women [Québec, Commission royale d'Enquête 1963: 62; Ministère de l'Education 1978, table 41.1]. New areas opened up as well in the expanding CEGEP and university systems [21]. Nursing and health care jobs similarly expanded in hospitals and new health care institutions, like CLSCs [22]. As well as the increase in the numbers of jobs, there were changes
In sources of recruitment. At the opening of the period, 40% of public school, 90% of collège classique teachers, and about 20% of nurses, usually in administrative positions, were in religious orders [Magnusson 1980: 94] [23]. But during the 1960s and 1970s, as large numbers of women left religious orders or retired from employment and low levels of recruitment failed to replace them, these professions became secularized. According to Daigle [1983] nurses, in particular, abandoned an "ethic of service", inculcated in these "religieuses laïques" through training, occupational hierarchies and legal regulation for one based on professional independence and material reward [24].

Women workers, for all these changes, remained concentrated not just in certain occupations, but in their lower levels, with few occupying supervisory positions. Over the twenty years, however there was only slight improvement in their position in the supervisory hierarchy [25].

Legislative changes as well as the expansion of the state sector associated with the Quiet Revolution had a direct impact on the relationship of women workers to the unions. While women are unionized at a lower rate than men in both Canada as a whole and in Québec, the proportion of unionized women in the labour force in both these jurisdictions has increased steadily at a faster rate than men [White 1980: 22; Lepage et al. 1981: 61]. This increase was largely a result of waves of unionization following upon legislation that permitted public sector workers
to unionize in 1964 [SQ 1964, chapter 13; Cardin 1973]. As we shall see, this unionization affected not only the sex composition of union centrals but the play of gender politics within them [26].


8.3.1. Introduction.

In general, for the period of this study, the evolution of trade union politics was strongly marked by the fact of the labour movement's division into three distinct major centrals, the Confédération des syndicats nationaux, the Fédération des travailleurs du Québec and the Centrale de l'enseignement du Québec [27]. These centrals' stances toward both gender and global politics were strongly influenced by their historical origins. They were also shaped by their changing composition, their official and unofficial alliances with political parties and their relations with one another. In this section, these dimensions are laid out as a first step before moving to an analysis of their specific policies and politics with respect to women.

8.3.2. The labour centrals in 1960.

The origins of the modern Quebec labour movement lie in two distinct traditions: North American trade unionism and Catholic
social action [28]. If, as Louis-Marie Tremblay [1980: 219] has suggested, the American influence on Canadian labour movements seemed natural and inevitable, one must not forget that European traditions and local conditions have also shaped their development, particularly with regard to political action. In Quebec, ethnic national cleavages and the ideological and organizational influence of the Catholic church—whether in its initial fierce opposition to unionism, in its gradual accommodation to the promotion of workers’ organizations under its control or in a certain ideological patrimony retained by the unions of Catholic origin even after deconfessionalization—have been important [29]. Through the 1960s and 1970s, organizational, ideological and developmental differences persisted in the Quebec labour movement between the often bilingual "international" (American and pan-Canadian) unions that comprised the FTQ [30] and the almost entirely francophone national unions of the CSN and the CEQ and its forerunner, the Corporation des instituteurs et institutrices catholiques de la province de Québec (CIC).

Historically, American-based unions tended to import organizational stability along with a strongly business unionism characterized by a reticence to engage in ideological debate, reform projects, politics or anything beyond occupational and economic interests [Tremblay 1980: 216, 223–237]. Still, these formations carried a sometimes class conscious economic militancy that was, from its origins, profoundly distrusted by the Quebec
clergy [Monlère 1977: 210, 255]. Across Canada and in Quebec, American influences were mitigated by a more political British labourite tradition which encouraged Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) and FTQ affiliation with the social democratic New Democratic Party [31]. However, the FTQ's weak financial and organizational basis, with only voluntary membership of Quebec-based CLC affiliates, and its consequent lack of political clout, with support for policies adopted by its central instances left to the discretion of its affiliates, can be partially attributed to pulls to international and pan-Canadian unions. In addition, these orientations and ties left the FTQ and its predecessors less open to the appeals of nationalist ideology, particularly as long as it was largely dominated by conservative clergy. In one sense, these outward ties served to make the FTQ less intimately a part of Quebec cultural developments and shielded it from both their more reactionary and more radical potential. For example, it was only in 1973 that the FTQ adopted the kind of class conscious nationalism that had surfaced in the CSN and CEQ from the late 1960s [32].

In contrast, confessional unions, if a conservative element in the labour movement, were strongly rooted in Quebec society as a relatively left-wing (if subordinate) part of a wider, well-structured conservative Catholic social action movement:

Il s'agit de trouver en fait déjà inscrits dans une structure beaucoup plus vaste, à caractère fortement...
centralisée, vers laquelle ils se dirigeront très facilement au fur et à mesure qu’ils prendront conscience de leur identité collective, mais aussi de leur faiblesse en face des organisations rivales, et plus tard dans la mesure où ils épouseront l’effort de mobilisation de la collectivité québécoise vers la croissance [Dofny and Bernard 1980: 152].

Their social location shaped the organizational structure, leadership and ideology of the national unions in an enduring way. Supervised by a charismatic leadership of aumôniers, Catholic unionism took a wider, more organicist view of the importance of social and cultural issues, particularly the protection of religious values and the survival of a linguistically distinct nation, that was initially committed to corporatism and class peace [33].

With the 1960 transformation of the Confédération des travailleurs catholiques du Canada (CTCC) into a labour organization with autonomy of action vis-à-vis the Catholic hierarchy (CSN), the implications of these ideological elements also changed. Analysing the epochal Asbestos strike of 1949 from a perspective similar to the one adopted in this study, Hélène David [1980a: 182] has convincingly argued that in intervening to support the politically and economically subordinated, the workers, the church unintentionally also undermined its traditional opposition to materialist ideologies in favour of industrial rationality:

Par ailleurs, la conséquence principale de la grève a été la fin de l’hégémonie idéologique de l’Eglise, non
As clerical hegemony further disintegrated in the 1960s and 1970s under pressure from both secularizing liberalism and revolutionary nationalism, the organicism of Catholic social perspectives was retained even after specific pronouncements had been outmoded. Thus, in the course of ideological radicalization, its organicism and nationalism were transformed into at least a militant social unionism and at most a populist-syndicalist self-definition, increasingly couched in socialist terms, as a social movement that spoke for the people, was properly concerned with more than workplace issues and did not need to be aligned with a political party [34].

The origins of the CEQ, like those of the CSN, are national and Catholic but unlike the latter’s significantly feminist [35]. From the start, teachers’ unions in Quebec were torn between concerns for professional legitimacy and economic militancy. Early women teachers’ organizations often devoted themselves to programmes of self-education, cultural uplift and professional improvement. Nevertheless, organizations like the Fédération catholique des institutrices rurales (FCIR, founded 1936), particularly under the leadership of its instigator Laure Gaudreau, embarked on an attempt to win a living wage for women which required defending women’s right to work. Along with their urban sisters, women in the FCIR were forced to counter clerically inspired school board views of teaching as a vocation.
of service rather than a profession and as an invariably short-lived career for women, ideas which together justified their failure to provide female teachers with a living wage, job security after marriage or maternity leave.

In 1945, male and female, rural and urban teachers' organizations were amalgamated into the Corporation des Instituteurs et Institutrices catholiques de la province de Québec, with jurisdiction over teachers in state-sector Catholic schools where the majority of the teaching was in French. Women comprised about 85% of its 10,000 members [CSN-CEQ 1979a: 102]. Although it was officially constituted as a professional corporation under Quebec law the next year, so that "tous les enseignants devaient obligatoirement en faire partie pour exercer leur profession" [Bolvin and Guilbault 1982: 73], government opposition and a slow expansion in the educational sector meant that by 1960 it had grown to only 16,000 members and had been able to sign few collective agreements [Dionne 1969 cited Ibid. 73]. In addition, according to Gaudreault, women had to fight male control of the union apparatus and patriarchal ideologies in the new organization [L'Enseignement Oct. 1960: 19, Nov. 1960: 19, 22]. In short, the CEQ's 1960 ideological heritage was one of previously dominant (religious, clerical nationalist, corporatist and gender complementarist) ideological elements. But at the same time, the material conditions of women teachers working lives added into this contradictory if explicable mix an upwardly
mobile professionalism and an equal rights feminism.

If we return to Dofny and Bernard's distinction between pressure groups and social movements, we can conclude that at the beginning of the 1960s the FTQ was imbued with an ideology of business unionism that occasionally strayed over a line into short term pressure group action. The CEQ was mainly a professional-corporatist pressure group with limited independence from dominant ideologies. And the CSN was a politically oriented interest group that was a component on the left of the largest social movement in Quebec, Catholic social action.

8.3.2. Changes in union membership.

The rapid growth of Quebec unions after 1964 is attributable to Quiet Revolution labour law reforms [Dofny and Bernard 1980: 157; SQ 1964: chapters 13, 141].

Table 8.2. Quebec union membership, affiliated to centrals 1960-1980 (in thousands).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CLC*</th>
<th>FTQ</th>
<th>CSN</th>
<th>CSD</th>
<th>CIC-CEQ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>223</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The social composition of the labour movement also changed, adding large numbers of public sector, white collar and women members. The entry of these new categories of workers was a direct result of the legalization of civil service unions and of the right to strike for all public sector workers except police and firefighters [37]. Despite membership losses in private sector unions in the economic downturn of the mid to late 1970s, the rate of unionization continued to grow to 39.3% in 1979 [38].

The CSN, which had experienced little growth in the 1950s was the main beneficiary of the 1960s wave of unionization, doubling its numbers and changing the character of its membership between 1961 and 1966 [David 1980b: 252]. "Du syndicat presque exclusivement ouvrier jusqu'en 1960, la CSN se retrouve six ans plus tard composé à 50% de cols blancs" [Dofny and Bernard 1980: 158] [39]. Twenty-five thousand "fonctionnaires" (provincial civil servants) who unionized in 1963 joined the central the next year with the result that CSN public sector membership, which had been less than 15% of its total in 1960 climbed to 40% in 1966 [Dofny 1968: 167-168]. By 1970, service and professional workers, largely in the public sector, accounted for two-thirds of the membership before the 1972 split-offs. However, despite the departure of the Syndicat des fonctionnaires provinciaux and of many nurses, by 1981, the proportion of such workers had returned to 56% [Rouillard 1981: 236].
Changes in the composition of the FTQ were less dramatic although its total membership increased more than threefold 1960-1980 as more CLC unions joined the provincial federation [Table 8.2]. By 1968, the numerical domination of craft workers had given way to industrial unions. But the FTQ remained a blue collar organization, with only 10% of its members in the public sector rising to about a third in public and parapublic sectors in 1980 [Dofny and Bernard 1980: 162; Gagnon 1983]. However, Jean Bernier [1974] has pointed out that although only 11% of white collar workers in the private sector were covered by collective agreements, about one third of these were members of International AFL-CIO-CLC (American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organizations) unions, and so actual or potential affiliates of the FTQ. Female membership in the federation was concentrated first of all in traditional female trades in the garment and textile industries. Its largest public sector union, the Canadian Union of Public Employees/Syndicat canadien de la fonction publique (CUPE/SCFP), organized male blue collar workers as well as some female office workers, largely in federal and municipal employment.

The membership of the third large central considered here, the CIC-CEQ, also almost tripled to 86,000 members in 1980. In the 1960s because of its status as a professional corporation, this growth came not so much from the affiliation of previously unorganized teachers as from a dramatic expansion in the public
education system, one of the most highly unionized sectors in Quebec [Milner 1978: 177]. After 1973 as the union began to organize non-teaching educational and recreational and support staff [40], the percentage of women as members of the union fell slightly to about three quarters in 1970 and 70% in 1980 while remaining about 80% of primary and secondary teachers [CEQ CLG 1976b; 1980]. Although there was a dramatic increase in the number of women teaching in the CEGEPs (which themselves replaced the male and clerically dominated collèges classiques), women generally remained clustered at the lower levels.

In sum, as a study for the CSF by Lepage et al. [1981: 61-63] points out while the rate of unionization for all workers in the Quebec labour market increased 1963-1976, the rate for women more than doubled from 13.5% to 28.7% outstripping that of men, which increased from 20.9% 34.0%, and for the workforce as a whole, 20.2% to 31.8%. The striking feminization of the labour force in the period of this study finds its parallel in a similar feminization of the labour movement. The logical conclusion of the patterns of growth of unionization among women noted above is that the numbers and percentage of women in the centrals also rose too. By 1980, the percentage distribution of women in the three centrals was uneven: about three-quarters of the CEQ [CEQ CLG 1980b: 8], 44% of the CSN [CSN CCF 1982: 8] and 30% of the FTQ [FTQ CCF 1981]. Again, as the beneficiary of the most rapid growth rates, the CSN experience the most rapid increase among
Its female membership which doubled during the Quiet Revolution [41]. These changes were to provide a base for the development of working class feminism; but, as we shall see below there was not an automatic relationship between increases in membership and changes in gender ideology and politics. These politics were conditioned by the divergent ideological heritage of the centrals, by the general development of union politics in relation to the bloc structure, as well as by gender politics outside the unions.

8.3.3. Trade unions and bloc politics, 1960-1980.

While in marxist theory, capitalist social relations place the working class in structural antagonism to the capitalist class and more generally to the ruling social alliance, the trade unions, as organized representatives of working class economic interests, have historically had a more ambiguous political role. On the one hand, a characteristic of fully developed capitalist societies is the legalization, and hence institutionalization, of trade unions [42]. Indeed, one of the effects of labour law reform in Quebec from the Quiet Revolution on, was an involvement of the state in a collective bargaining process that it, at the same time, normalized [David 1980b: 252-253]. However, despite this institutionalization, trade unions can still become central to the constitution of an
opposition bloc in periods of social and economic crisis or of widespread radicalization. The place, then, of trade unions in bloc formation cannot be abstractly determined but depends on a host of concrete historical circumstances.

In general, one might hypothesise that the political relations among trade unions and between unions and political parties are subject to pressures for cohesion and fragmentation which can be identified schematically as follows. Within the labour movement itself, factors making for cohesion would include: common ideology, shared political alliances and common opposition to a single or many employers; whereas factors making for fragmentation would include: bases in different sectors and branches of industries, competition between unions to organize particular sectors or units of workers (interunion rivalry), ideological differences, and incongruities in alliances, whether of degree or kind, with political parties. Acute differences of these kinds within the labour movement prevent or mitigate the construction of an opposition bloc which includes the working class while low levels of difference promote its cohesion. The relations between trade unions and ruling parties are also affected by similar factors. Here, factors of cleavage include: divergent class interests, ideology, sectional alliances between particular trade unions and particular parties in a pluralistic political environment, and the role of the state as employer in late capitalist societies. And factors making for cohesion
include: alliances between a particular party and some or all of
the trade unions against other parties, shared ideology,
opportunism, shared political projects. Overall, low levels of
cleavage combined with high cohesiveness between the labour
movement and (ruling or oppositional) political parties would
make for stable bloc formation, and in the former case for stable
hegemony more generally.

In Quebec, all the factors just mentioned came into play in
different ways at different times so that the overall process of
bloc formation was complex and indeed, politically labile. Three
major periods can be distinguished, each characterized by a
different relation between unions and the major political
parties, and a different overall relation of social forces.
These are the Quiet Revolution honeymoon, which lasted for about
six years after 1960; a period of class polarization from 1966 to
1976; and a néguiste honeymoon following the 1976 election.

The first period was characterized by the institutionalization
of trade unions as "corps intermédiaires" in an apparently benign
labour reform against a background of a promise of political
renewal and economic growth. Overall, the labour movement was
fragmented by political differences and interunion rivalry. The
CSN, officially politically non-partisan, in fact operated in a
rather tight alliance with the PLQ who they saw as carrying out
measures they had lobbied for [David 1980b: 253-254; Le Borgne
1976: 11-16] [43]. On the other hand, the FTQ was allied with the
NDP. After the breakdown of unity talks between the CSN and the pan-Canadian CLC, raiding between the affiliates of the Quebec centrals in all sectors increased [David 1980b: 254-5], with the CSN generally the more aggressive and victorious [Tremblay 1964]. Nevertheless, interunion committees cooperated to develop common positions on labour legislation and wage policies (politique salariale). As well, inherited ideological differences played a role, as did differences in actual ideological evolution. And a highly fragmented structure of public sector bargaining did not promote intersyndical unity to a high degree, while generous settlements in this sector also promoted relatively peaceful relations with employers [Hébert 1974: 254-257].

By 1966, in a period of economic downturn, a new climate of labour relations set in, characterized by injunctions, continuing high rates of unionization, government success in imposing a wage policy, more meager settlements in the public sector, a less favourable attitude of the ruling parties, and back to work legislation [44]. After being outflanked by the government in 1966 public sector negotiations, CSN president Marcel Pépin proposed a common front for the next round of bargaining. Accepted by the FTQ in principle at its October congress [CSN PV 1969: 68-69, 84], the alliance was formalized in a joint CSN-FTQ-CEQ protocol in 1968 which recognized the right of workers to choose a union, promised education in union matters and outlawed raiding for the next two years [Le Devoir 13 Jan
In 1971-1972, this alliance gave rise to the first Front commun struggle in the public sector, which was focussed on the demand for a "salaire minimum décent" of $100.00 a week [Le Devoir 17, 18 August 1971]. In early March 1972, after the first round of negotiations broke down, the common front unions voted 68.5% in favour of a strike which began two weeks later [Le Devoir March 22 1972]. Forced back to work by draconian special legislation which included daily fines of $50.00-$250.00 for workers and $500.00-$50,000.00 for union leaders and unions themselves, the workers reacted with wildcat strikes, and the occupation of plants, government buildings and even, briefly, the town of Sept-Îles [Le Devoir 28 March 1972, 20, 21, 26 May 1972]. These measures inevitably politicized the strike without overcoming the traditional split between economic and political action [Moniere 1977: 361]. While there is disagreement about the extent to which the CSN-CEQ leadership's call to "casser le système" can be taken to reveal a real and not just rhetorical agenda [45], the strike certainly sharpened the division between the ruling bloc and the opposition bloc, revealing the decline of the moral authority of liberal modernisation ideology, as purveyed by the PLQ, as well as the latter's growing incapacity "to win the active consent over those whom it rules" [Gramsci 1973: 244] [46]. By 1974, despite opposition from his own party, the PLQ labour minister had agreed with union representatives on the Conseil consultatif
de travail et main-d’oeuvre that coercive measures to determine salary and essential services in public sector conflicts did not work [Hébert 1974: 764]. However, the by now widespread fiscal crisis that western capitalist states faced reduced his room to manoeuvre [O'Connnor 1973; Deaton 1972].

However spectacular the actions of this union based opposition, it is important not to exaggerate its cohesiveness. Factors working toward its fractioning were also in play. In the first place, ideological differences sharpened between the CSN and the CEQ on the one hand and the FTQ on the other as CSN congresses and leaders increasingly adopted analyses of Quebec society couched in the anti-imperialist language of revolutionary nationalism and called for some form of socialism as necessary for workers who had no future in capitalist society [CSN 1971b]. As increasing bureaucratization undermined professional autonomy in local school situations and the delegitimization of secondary school administrations promoted political action [Rainville 1972; Nault 1964], CEQ reports also came to adopt socialist language, denouncing the "école capitaliste" for serving the dominant class [CEQ 1972c]. Although the centrals had different positions on the PQ, they nevertheless decided to act to bring down the PLQ in the next election [Le Devoir 2 June 1975]. This was for the CSN and the CEQ a tactical move into the PQ's orbit in contrast to the FTQ's stronger third period electoral alliance with that party [below]. Despite these differences, the public sector alliance
survived as a tactical mechanism for bargaining in 1975-1976.

But the interunion alliance was faced with other problems besides growing ideological differences. Most important of these for the large centrals was the continuation of raiding in the private sector, particularly construction. In addition, the 1972 Front commun was, as I have noted, schismatic leading to the break-away of some unions and eventually to the formation of the conservative CSD. In the CSN, these splits exemplified a wider division between a left wing composed of the technocratically trained central leadership together with the radical Montreal Conseil central led by Michel Chartrand and the less politicized base of the movement [Harvey 1980: 35; Bolvin 1972; Interview: P].

For the third period, ideological differences sharpened. The CEQ and the CSN adopted a nationalism which would have moved them into the PQ orbit if it had not been qualified by their explicit socialism. Their stance toward the PQ government was therefore ambivalent. The FTQ, however, coming late to nationalism and adapted to working with a 'social democratic' party which it saw the PQ as representing, at least in part, developed an increasingly tight alliance with the PQ. "Le discours actuel de la FTQ se situe dans la même perspective que la social-démocratie vers laquelle tend le PQ, même si formellement aucun lien d'affiliation ne réunit ces deux organisations" [Bolvin and Gullbault 1982: 85-89]. Thus, for the FTQ, as M. Gagnon [1980:
187] was later to suggest, the PQ was the only viable provincial possibility. And indeed, the FTQ saw its decision to support the party directly in the election of 1976 and 1980 as vindicated by the PQ's vigorous programme of labour legislation in health and safety, maternity leave and other areas [ibid.; 9. 3.2. below].

After 1976, the leaderships of the CSN and the CEQ continued a unity policy vis-a-vis the labour movement and took a critical stance toward the PQ government, refusing to participate in tripartite economic summits. However, the ideological hegemony of the reformist nationalist project meant that their memberships were politically committed to and active in the party [Le Borgne 1976: 104-114], especially in the case of the CEQ [47]. Moreover, by offering a test of stagist strategy and one with an attractively reformist face, the election of the PQ both raised expectations of reform and also demobilized much of the activist left, both inside and outside the unions in the short term [Interview: P].

In looking back over these three periods, then, we can say that for both ruling blocs, first that of liberal modernisation and then its progressive nationalist successor, new ruling parties were able to secure the support of important sectors of the labour movement both politically and ideologically. This hold, combined with ongoing interunion rivalries of the kind that can be expected in a situation of overlapping jurisdictions, served to fragment the labour movement as a component of an opposition
bloc. However, the peculiar relation of provincially based labour movements to provincial governments in the latters' role as state employer, was a factor making for unity along class lines. Throughout the period of the Common Front, this potential for unity was most vigorously realized in situations of sharpened class conflict.

Given the minority status of women in the unions and their exclusion from power, it might be expected that cohesiveness in the labour movement would facilitate the work of feminists. And conversely, we might expect that cross union or cross central alliances among trade union feminists would be a factor for intersyndical unity. How in Quebec, then, did feminist and trade union politics actually interact?

8.4. Gender politics and ideologies in the labour movement.

The origins, social composition and political and gender ideologies institutionalized in the structures and practices of the labour centrals, as well as interunion rivalry and bloc alliances, all affected the development of gender politics by variously facilitating or blocking feminist radicalization within the unions. This overdetermination [Althusser 1969: 101-102] becomes apparent in contrasts between the way this process unfolded in the three centrals. But despite this, and the overall political and ideological differences within the labour movement, gender politics in the centrals became homogenized in
that women and gender issues were placed on the agenda of all three centrals and in that, in many cases, they adopted and lobbied for the same policies. All of this served to restructure the opposition bloc's self-definition as a force that must include women.

8.4.1. CSN gender ideologies and policies.

Inflected as it was with a Catholic complementarist gender ideology which stressed natural difference and the centrality of maternity, the early 1960s CSN ideological stance on family, gender and the woman:work:marriage triangulation is commonly thought to have been simply reactionary [Gagnon 1973: 44]. While there is substantial evidence to support the charge of conservatism, this view remains somewhat one-sided. Indeed, it is possible to argue that the CSN's heritage of organicism, corporative anti-capitalism, familialism and concern with non-economic values, when rethought in feminist terms, could be the basis for a radical critique of women's status that goes beyond a legalistic equal opportunity perspective, just as the same characteristics facilitated the more general development of the CSN towards radical syndicalist and socialist positions [48]. Just as, to use Laclau's terms, ideological elements take on a class meaning from their political context, so too are gender and family ideological elements contextually inflected. For example, the CSN's demand for day care was formulated by its women's committees either in terms of a biologist emphasis on women's
t~e

"natural" role as mothers, as was the case In

1950s, or In

terms of a sense that day care was a social requirement and right
for women, children and men, as It was In the 1970s. A uni lateral
Interpretation also Ignores, as we shal I see, early work by women
unionists on these Issues that,

If moderate and even conservative

from a contemporary standpoint, nevertheless, prepared the ground
for later agitation [49].
In I lght of these qual lflcatlons,

In fact, three phases In the

CSN orientations to the Interrelations among women work and

unionism can be Identified: first,

1960-1966, the definition of

the relation as the "problem of women's work"; second, 1966-1974,
the adherence to an abstract norm of gender equal lty; and third,
1976-1980, the emergence of marxlst Influenced trade union
feminism.

Let us look at each of these In turn.

8.4.1. I. "The problem of women's work" [50].
In the four conventions from 1960 to 1966,

larQely at the

Instigation of women , the CSN sought to resolve Its ambivalence
about the employment of married women by developing an
orientation appropriate to contemporary Industrial capital Ism
[Interview: Q]. On the whole, then,

Its pol Icy amd gender

Ideology In this period were somewhat lnconslstemt.

For the most

part, the CSN sought to remove obvious Inequities In pay and to
create the option of a working mother [51], a perspective
congruent with I lberal modernisation.

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However, other aspects of


its gender ideology, particularly about the nature of sexual difference and the family, consistently retained a strong flavour of Catholic complementarism across the period.

At its 1960 congress, following a report by vice-president Jeanne Duval [52], the CSN established a new [53] Comité féminin to study women's union and legislative problems with a view to elaborating "un programme d'éducation et de revendication susceptible d'aider les travailleuses à mieux remplir leur rôle dans la société" [CSN PV 1960: 276]. This committee's reports to successive congresses all sought to understand how to respond to structural changes in the economy which made women's paid labour an irreversible fact. Unlike natural and agricultural economies where an ideology of "femme au foyer" was appropriate, for women could and did earn their livelihoods in domestically based work as part of a complementary, harmonious and fulfilling sexual division of labour, modernization left women who were "contraintes par la dure nécessité" to support their families no alternative to paid employment in the labour market [CSN PV 1960: 191-192].

New economic realities did not, however, alter man's natural or god-given characteristics, including his need to "produire, se reproduire et assumer l'éducation de sa progéniture". Nor could they touch women's special characteristics: their maternal reproductive role and inherent psychology of natural reserve, instinctive recoil from conflict and generous selflessness, all
of which affected their social and union participation [ibid. 195]. Thus, the first three reports analysed gender differences as both natural and sociologically significant for the labour movement. However by 1966, while a personalist "psychologie féminine" still gave women a different outlook, male-female differences began to be attributed to socialization, particularly gender typed education [CSN PV 1966: 208-209]. This concept of gender difference as socialized was accompanied by a view that the Comité féminin itself helped to perpetuate. Thus, in search of abstract equality and on the grounds that women no longer needed the protection of a special committee, it successfully recommended its own dissolution [ibid. 209-210].

In this first phase, as through the whole period of this study, CSN policy consistently supported women's right to work and to work for equal wages. However, the supporting rationale changed. In 1960, the acceptance of women's labour force employment was couched as an accommodation to necessity; but only two years later, influenced by the positions of the larger International Labour Organisation, the CSN adopted a perspective that stressed the right to choose. While no woman should be forced to work for economic reasons, "elle devrait être libre de le faire si elle le désire....Cette liberté de choix doit être respectée et protégée" [CSN PV 1962: 11]. However, by emphasizing maternity while ignoring fatherhood and by insisting that women, and only women, be able to accomplish their family
responsibilities without harming their health or children [Ibid.], both the CSN and its women's committee confirmed actually existing gender divisions echoed in both modified patriarchal and Catholic ideologies.

Indeed, with the intention of reducing "schizophrenic" stress for married women with children as they attempted to alternate work and mothering, the committee and the congress called for a four hour work day, leave to care for sick children and payments to women who stay at home with small children [CSN PV 1960: 181, 304-305]. It is worth quoting an example of this dual nature argument [Ibid. 177-179] at length to show how, despite its psychological naturalism, it captures a sense of the costly contradictoriness of women's dual role:

En obligeant la femme à être tour à tour travailleuse et mère, on la place dans une situation contre-nature, qui a des implications psychologiques graves. Cette situation d'alternance fait de la femme une hésitation dont l'attitude oscille entre deux extrêmes: dans sa recherche frénétique pour concilier les besoins de sa nature profonde, tantôt elle réclame avec une agressivité disproportionnée, et tantôt elle se laisse balotter par les circonstances; tantôt elle se pense une concurrente de l'homme, tantôt elle s'installe à ses crochets [Ibid. 179].

Other policies, for day care in establishments that employed large numbers of women [CSN PV 1966: 213], for state supported and trained home help in time of sickness [54], and against the reintroduction of night work for women legalized by the PLQ, were also justified in terms of the quality of a mother-centred family
Such demands reproduced the protectionism of the 1930s and 1940s.

An extension of the central's earlier conservative critique of the way that social policy was formed on the basis of capitalist rationality, as well as patriarchal familism, underlay these demands. Anti-capitalism could occasionally subordinate gender difference and patriarchalist solidarity to men's and women's common class interests. In 1962, for example, Duval denounced capitalism's restless search for profit and production as contrary to human nature [CSN PV 1962: 180]. Also, prefiguring marxist feminist analysis, the committee began to argue that denying women the right to employment was not just morally wrong but also reproduced an important element of capitalist ideology: "Ce conservatisme se trouve pour une fois en accord profond avec la philosophie du capitalisme" [Ibid. 178]. More concretely, the CSN rejected Sunday work for men and hoped to abolish night work altogether in the interests of family life by extending protectionism across gender lines [CSN PV 1964: 141; Le Devoir 8 Jan. 1966].

Trade union consciousness and enlightened male self-interest combined to promote the equal pay plank as a strategy both for reducing exploitation of women workers and for strengthening unionism [CSN PV 1964: 207] [55]. Gender, age and wage differentials permitted under existing legislation allowed owners to treat women, especially young women as cheap labour.
Legislation which permitted wage differentials on the basis of age and sex encouraged owners to hire women and young women instead of men as cheap labour. As soon as they reached eighteen, when adult wages were prescribed, they were often laid off. To counter the gender conflict and competition created by this pattern, the CSN turned first to the state, urging that the school leaving age be raised to eighteen, a measure that was also justified as providing better opportunities for general education and occupational training than either its members or women workers in general had [CSN PV 1966: 213]. As well as petitioning the government to legislate "À travail égal, salaire égal," the CSN formally urged its affiliates to exclude unequal wages from their contracts. However, there is no evidence that this demand was vigorously acted upon and plenty, in the persistence of gender wage differentials, to indicate that if there were any actions, they were unsuccessful [56].

Finally, the committee and the congress asked why so few women participated in union activities. In 1960, when it was thought that women's higher morality reduced their militancy, Duval appealed to them to act so as to help protect others who were weak [CSN PV 1960: 197-198]. Four years later, following a pattern that also appeared in the FTQ and AFEAS, the perspective had shifted to blaming the victim: "Elle n'a pas le droit d'être indifférente et de ne pas soustraire à ses devoirs envers le monde du travail. Elle ne doit pas par son manque d'intérêt, sa
Although there was some recognition that the asymmetrical relation of women and men to the labour market, the household and union life affected union participation, the continuing view that motherhood and housewifery were components of a natural role prevented the development of a fully structural analysis of barriers to women's participation. However, the committee's educational presentations, even those given to the now outmoded wives' committees, stressed the need to increase women's union activities [57].

Sexism was, in fact, widespread in the central. While insisting that the male leadership was very accepting of her, one past CSN vice-president also acknowledged that women had to initiate ideological and policy reforms and that these often met with resistance in the locals [Interview: Q]. The extent of opposition was documented in a study for the Bird commission of male Quebec unionists which found that almost three quarters opposed women's paid employment [Geoffroy and Sainte-Marie 1971]. Little of this resistance to the accommodationist ideology being promoted appears in the congress minutes. But in 1962, the Rimouski Conseil central objected to women's employment on the grounds that "le premier rôle de la femme consiste surtout à être épouse et mère gardienne du foyer" and asked for a special committee of inquiry into the present and future implications of the fact that "l'emploi des femmes augmente alors que chez les
hommes. Il décroît de façon alarmante" [CSN PV 1962: 305]. In response to this kind of sentiment, CSN president Jean Marchand stressed class over patriarchal interests, reminding 1964 congress delegates that capitalism's failure to create jobs, not women's labour force participation, was responsible for unemployment and insisting that: "À l'atelier comme à la maison, les travailleurs doivent les [femmes] considérer comme des compagnes et les traiter sur un pied d'égalité" [CSN PV 1964: 8] [58].

What influences accounted for this troubled ideological evolution? Most important is the way that altered gender balances in the unionized and nonunionized labour force confronted the CSN with the political necessity of convincing these new workers to defend trade union interests. But exogenous ideological forces were also important. Ideological parallels between Le Devoir's roundtable and women's pages, the FFLQ and the CSN, particularly with regard to their views of the women:work:family relation, women's special psychology and education and their search to find historical and social explanations for women's status, all provide ample evidence that these issues were in the air as women sought to begin a process of gender political self-definition within the bounds of modified patriarchal liberal ideology. As well, there was programmatic congruence between the FFQ's and the CSN's calls for a provincial enquiry into women's work. More direct was the role of the

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Bureau International du travail. Not only were its policies adopted as the CSN's own, but trips to ILO conferences on women's work held in Europe exposed women in the CSN leadership to new ideas [Interview: Q]. Finally, when, with typical Quiet Revolution faith in social science, the central engaged labour sociologist Jacques Dofny to advise it on policy development, it was informed that other labour movements strongly supported full time work [ibid.].


By 1966, the perception that gender differences arose as a result of sex-specific socialization supported a view that a separate women's committee, animated as it was by a "mentalité ancienne", itself helped to perpetuate them and should be rejected in the name of modernisation [CSN PV 1966: 208–210]. Just at the time when new women's rights groups were beginning to form, then, the committee successfully recommended its own dissolution. While presenting an eclectic list of factors from psychology to childcare and economy to family which severally and together placed women in a particular relation to union life, it nevertheless decided that men and women should no longer be treated differently in relation to work and union life. Taking a stand for norms of abstract equality which did not recognize women's status as subordinated, the committee argued that its existence only confirmed women as "à part" [ibid. 209]. Instead, individual women were themselves charged with the responsibility
for overcoming any inequality in union participation; indeed, they argued, women's general acceptance by the labour movement depended on it. They further suggested, breaking with paternalism for the first time, that individual women had the right to decide how to balance their union and family lives without the former always giving way to the latter [ibid. 209].

In like vein, the liberal formula, equality of opportunity in the workplace reinforced by access to education, informed the committees's call at the congress for government, union locals and the labour movement's Collège des travailleurs to provide free, adult education programmes with special emphasis on women. Finally, it called for more articles on women workers written by women workers themselves in the CSN's journal, Le Travail [ibid. 210-213]. This latter had already begun to change its approach to women, by switching from an orientation to members' wives, replete with recipes and helpful household hints, to take up issues of greater concern to women union members [CSN CCF 1976: 60-61; Gagnon 1974b: 24].

There is some historical irony that as a result of the dissolution of the committee and the adoption of a more fully liberal view of gender issues as private, women in the CSN missed a political opportunity to build upon the increased human and material resources that their rising (absolute and proportional) numbers meant, choosing instead, for reasons that seemed progressive, to leave them to their own devices. With this
development, however, a preoccupation with women dropped from the CSN agenda until 1975 when a new Comité de la condition féminine (CCF) was established, largely at the instigation of women staff members (permanentes) in the central's administration [59]. Of course, the cessation of the committee was not the only factor. The intense ideological debates of the CSN in this period tended to focus on macrosocial issues of revolutionary nationalist and class struggle which generally subordinated gender issues to a sex-blind socialist orientation [60].

At the same time, various internal and external events during these eight years were very important for the germination of a new marxist feminist leadership among both the officials and the employees that emerged after 1975. Although with fewer formal and less intimate informal links with revolutionary feminism than the Montreal based CEQ members who helped to found the Comité de lutte, some permanentes and union members participated from the outset in revolutionary feminist politics, especially in the Front de libération des femmes. Indeed, one of the indirect outcomes of the FLF's jury protest was to raise feminist consciousness in the CSN. Nicole Thérèse, a permanente, returned to work after a month in jail for her part in the protest only to discover that on March 8, 1971 the CSN executive committee had docked her pay because she had been absent from work without permission. The statement she filed in a subsequent grievance against the CSN as employer is worth examining at some length for
It is at once an autobiographical account of the making of a militant and an indictment of the CSN for sexism in hiring, working conditions and the selective application of its official ideology [61].

Formerly an executive member of a union local at the Compagnie canadienne de l'Exposition universelle, Thérrien was hired as a library worker, bibliothécaire, for the CSN in the Centre de documentation in February 1966. Her work, she testified, gave her access to the true history of Quebec workers' unremitting struggle to win the most elementary rights in the face of threats of imprisonment. This deepened the radicalization she had already undergone in Parti Pris and Parti socialiste du Québec study groups, as did the attitude of her immediate supervisor, André l'Heureux, who "a toujours considéré le militantisme comme n'étant pas uniquement un travail de bureau, mais aussi une forme d'action qui pouvait dépasser ce cadre... un élément essentiel à la vie du mouvement syndical" [Ibid. 6]. With his support, she helped organize support and picket line education for striking workers [62], a militancy that meant that she was often not at her desk from ten to six. These activities, she argued, were in line with CSN principles articulated in Marcel Pépin's presidential reports to the 1966 and 1968 CSN congresses, particularly "Mais parler ne suffit pas. Il faut agir" [Ibid. 8-10] [63].

At the same time because these activities were only part of
consciousness raising in a multifaceted reality, she joined the FLF and learned about discrimination against women in Quebec. She had had to recognize, with regret, that despite a common situation in the class struggle the attitudes of the labour and political movements did not differ from that of the government. The CSN expected high levels of training and skill from its women office workers, but paid them much less than male fulltimers (permanents). At the same time, it gave these higher paid workers benefits like paid sick leave, educational courses and access to information sessions, expenses for congress attendance and dinner allowances even though job demands forced office workers too to eat in restaurants. Thus, they became "petits boss" using their secretaries for prestige. But, she argued, the origins of this need to dominate lay not merely in sexism but in shared (national) oppression: "Au fond, ce que nous percevons c'est leur aliénation qui leur fait croire qu'ils pourraient eux aussi dominer, accéder à un poste important" [ibid. 12].

However, this gender balance of power had begun and must continue to change:

Nous ne pouvons plus par notre silence être complices de ces hommes qui se servent de nous comme support moral, comme éducatrices, comme réceptionnistes, comme dactylos, comme colléuses de timbres, fausseuses de pancartes, comme hôtesses, comme sulieuses, comme cuisinières, jusqu'à faire de nous des belles catins 'ben' maquillées pour les distraire, pour leurs faire oublier leurs difficultés quotidiennes allant même jusqu'à leur laisser croire que le Pouvoir leur appartient. Mais... après la victoire?... Serons-nous
toujours des subalternes, desustensiles?

Finally, she argued that the disciplinary action against her was politically biased and discriminatory in a strict sense. The salaries of permanents employed by the central and its affiliates had been paid during jail terms of seven to ten days. When she had pointed this out to the CSN trésorier général, he had replied: "Ce n'est pas la même chose. Il a été arrêté injustement". How could the CSN think her arrest justified when not only had it already called for changes in the law but when subsequent reform testified to the justice of the FLF cause? Despite the militant note on which she ended, QUEBECOISES DEBOUTTE! (sic), the grievance was unsuccessful. However, its arguments and failure generated a great deal of discussion among women employees. How much worse, when the three union presidents, jailed in the 1972 public sector common front strike, were hailed as working class heroes [Interview: P].

Working class feminist radicalization also grew out of several early 1970s strikes involving women workers. Some of these, at small garment and electrical manufacturing plants, like Regent Knitting, Luminray, Susan Van Heusen and Coleco, were important in shaping the consciousness of both revolutionary feminists and women unionists and in building links between them [QD 1:3 Feb. 1971: 10-11, 1:3 April 1973: 18-31, 1:6 June 1973: 42-51]. One portrait of the radicalization process in the private sector is given by L.H.J. Groulx [1976] of a strike in a Montreal textile
factory by a young (in their twenties), mainly female, workforce [64]. In the first two phases of unionization and negotiating a contract, Groulx found that consciousness was radicalized, either in an anticapitalist (radical) or in a rejectionist (révolté) perspective [65]. It was only in the final phase of negotiations and after a return to work required adherence to contract provisions, that consciousness "deradicalized" to negotiative and utilitarian modes. Groulx's study supports the view that in the pre-contract strike stage, precisely when "outside militants", either revolutionary feminists or union employees (permanentes), were present, working women's definitions of the situation were most radical and their ideologies most open to radicalization. Contacts with women workers at such a time in turn helped sustain radical ideological commitments on the part of the external interventionists by suggesting that a radicalization of women workers, on class and gender lines, was not only possible but actual, and not merely separate but combined [66].

Other strikes, particularly the first common front public sector strike of 1970, galvanized large concentrations of women workers into militant action. Although the Front commun (FC) involved women from all three centrals, those at the CSN were most affected since the FTQ had few women workers in the public sector and those in the CEQ were above the minimum salary guidelines. Thus, while the FC marked a turning point in the activism of women workers in all the centrals, its effects were
asymmetrical. The main union demand was an end to salary differences on the basis of region or the worker's sex. Given explicit sex-based wage differentials and inequalities implicit in the sex-typing of jobs which meant that women were clustered in the lowest paid jobs, this demand affected women most [67]. Whatever the reason, whether because their interests were directly at stake or because of the radicalism common to newly unionized workers, women engaged in widespread militant action, for example, on pickets, hospital occupations and radio station take overs [68]. Nor was this militancy restricted to the strike situation: it also carried over into their interventions on gender politics and ideology elsewhere in the labour movement.

In 1972, for example, women's protests forced CSN president Marcel Pépin to change a description, in a key document of the socialist radicalization, "Pour vaincre", of women's awakening militancy from "pour courir au secours de leurs hommes" to "pour combattre à part entière en vue de la promotion des intérêts des travailleurs [CSN PV 1972: 120-137].


In the legitimating ideological climate of IWY, agitation, mostly by permanentes rather than women members of affiliates, had increased to the point where once again a committee, Comité de la condition féminine (CCF), was established and mandated to
write a report to the 1975 CSN congress. "*Lutte des femmes, lutte de tous les travailleurs*" [CSN CCF 1976], familiarly known as "*le rapport rose*", radically transformed the central's positions by placing women's issues back on the agenda of the labour movement and by defining women as historically and socially oppressed. Schematically, one can say that the issues of women's family:work relationship, occupational training and union participation that had been configured in a familialist perspective were reintroduced, newly illuminated by a marxist-feminist analysis which incorporated a critique of domestic labour and of class dimensions in the oppression of working class women.

If the first phase of gender ideological revision at the CSN drew on liberal reformist gender ideology, this time it was oriented to a more radical current. Because the analysis was so global and its acceptance only superficial, the next two reports did not take any new ideological initiatives but sought to consolidate the socialist-feminist perspective in more concrete and practical terms [Interview: S]. Thus, *le rapport rose* can be reviewed as typifying the ideological turn.

The report analysed the origins of women's oppression from a fully Engelsian perspective, insisting that "*la double oppression des femmes -- comme membres des classes laborieuses and comme femmes parce que le fardeau les a confinées au foyer*" -- had its origins in the development of private productive property or
class society. Patriarchy required monogamy to ensure that property could be passed on to biological heirs, made men "*chefs de famille*", privatized financial responsibility for supporting individuals in each family unit and relegated women to privatized work in the household [CSN CCF 1976: 7-11].

Stereotyped ideologies of sexual differentiation which situate women outside of all social context supported gender divisions by making women accept their own oppression:

...*les femmes comme personnes avant des qualités supposément propres à leur sexe:...sentimentales et rêveuses, douces et compréhensives et, il va sans dire FEMININES avec tout ce que cela implique....le don qu’elles ont de faire de leur foyer...un havre de paix et de consommation familiale....la vocation naturelle* [Ibid. 14-19, emphasis original].

Gender stereotypes and divisions produced political as well as direct economic benefits for capitalism. Women were cheap and flexible workers, drawn into production in times of crisis and superexploited in the labour market. While women were indispensable supports for the family institution, an essential unit for consumption, it was above all women’s unpaid domestic labour that was profitable for capitalism [Ibid. 14]. However, unlike earlier revolutionary feminists, CSN marxist-feminism did not find it necessary to deny that "*les hommes, quelle que soit la classe à laquelle ils appartiennent, se sont faits les Instruments de l’oppression des femmes*" [Ibid. 17]. By blaming male agency in oppressing women on their socialization to a role...
"à la fois protecteur et domiateur", the CCF was able to maintain a vision of individual change on the part of men and class solidarity between women and men in the struggle against capitalism.

Cette division si profonde entre les hommes et les femmes--au point qu'on la trouve NATURELLE--ne sert qu'à maintenir et à consolider le régime capitaliste et conséquemment le pouvoir de la bourgeoisie, d'une part en consolidant l'institution familiale telle qu'on la connaît dans les sociétés capitalistes et, d'autre part, en affaiblissant considérablement la force de la classe ouvrière [Ibid. 19].

The innovative programmatic elements derived from the domestic labour analysis and from a willingness to challenge men's petty privilege in the household. Because of their responsibility for domestic labour, women face many more material difficulties in participating in the labour force or in the labour movement than men [Ibid. 21]. While some of their burden could be lightened by services like child care, inexpensive cafeterias, collective responsibility for housework, recreational programmes and crisis support from an "auxiliaire familiale professionelle" and while maternity leave is necessary to make women's right to work real, they insisted that men change their attitudes and behaviour "EN PARTICULIER DANS LEUR PROPRE FAMILLE" [Ibid. 33, emphasis original]. Men must stop disguising their real resistance to women's right to work as a passive acceptance which leaves household and family tasks to women--"C'EST TON AFFAIRE"--to share them equally [Ibid. 33-34, emphasis original] [69]. Male
unionists still purveyed patriarchal ideologies that women only work for a secondary income (salaire d'appoint) or out of boredom [Ibid.] that the central had tried to lay to rest in the early 1960s. In this phase, they were challenged with regard not only to such workplace ideologies of women's role, but also in what radical feminists like Hartmann [1976] and Marxist feminists like McIntosh [1978] have identified as a centre of contemporary forms of patriarchal control: the family-household system.

Two of the programmatic demands repeated older labour movement themes: women's right to work (now cast as access to social labour) and equal pay and working conditions. The report also made a series of concrete proposals for changes in the labour legislation and employment practices: an end to piece work; fair hiring practices; an end to the sexist education in the schools, which trains women for sex-typed jobs; an end to occupational sex-typing itself; equal pay for work of equal value; no special hours for women's work; and rigorous application of the Loi du salaire minimum and equal benefits [Ibid. 21-23]. These embodied both the traditional CSN strategy of extending protective measures from women to men and the liberal notion of abstract equality. These were supplemented by demands for conditions that would give women the power to "disposer de notre personne" including freely chosen maternity and reform of the Code civil to remove the subordinated status of married women and to ensure a real right to divorce supported by effective collection of
ally and child support [ibid. 49-51].

Given an analysis that situated the origins and perpetuation of women's oppression in class relations, it is not surprising that CSN trade union feminists saw the labour movement as a privileged location for struggle against women's oppression. For them, conversely, if the bourgeoisie profits from women's oppression, members and organizations of the working class would profit from their liberation. For the labour movement to be able to support women's struggles, however, it would have to reform its own internal practices. Not only were its past positions discriminatory but women were underrepresented in its positions of power [ibid. 70]. To overcome these inequities, they urged the formation of women's caucuses, "le regroupement des travailleuses pour mieux comprendre et combattre toutes les formes d'oppression qui les écrasent et aussi pour initier les luttes que l'ensemble du mouvement ouvrier doit mener contre l'oppression des femmes" [ibid. 62]. Taken altogether these changes for equality held out the promise of healing of male female relations, not only by overcoming structural contradictions but by making new relationships possible. Sharing domestic and breadwinning tasks equally would transform family life by increasing autonomy and independence: "Ce seront là précisément, des conditions plus propices au développement de rapports authentiques et égaux" [ibid. 51].

With the acceptance of the report, a Comité de la condition
féminine was established as a committee of the congress.

The committee’s second report, "La lutte des femmes pour le droit au travail social", "le rapport bleu" [CSN CCF 1978], was more modest in its ideological innovations but more specific in its political analysis. After restating the marxist feminist historical account, it attacked federal (Liberal) and provincial (PQ) governments for attempting to blame unemployment on women, for failing to reform taxes to benefit two-earner families or to institutionalize maternity leave and childcare and for adhering to ideologies of the family as the basic social unit [ibid. 7-9]. About half of the report was devoted to appendices that contested sexist ideologies or explained previously adopted positions [ibid. 37-67]. The CCF’s own activities in forming regional Comités de la condition féminine, which in turn held education sessions, coordinating regional and sectoral committees and organizing celebrations of IWD were also reviewed [ibid. 23-29]. Under the influence of the abortion rights organization, CNALG, and following the lead of its women’s committee, this congress also adopted a resolution in support of free abortion on demand, laying the basis for overcoming differences with the autonomous groups that arose in 1976 and 1977 [70].

In 1980 the annual congress was postponed to allow a special congress on the national question to be held. When regular business was taken up again, the women’s committee report contained many of the same resolutions motivated by the same
explanations [CSN CCF 1981]. However, the convention voted to fund the committee more generously, including paying the salary of a full time staff member responsible for women's issues [Interview: F].

In sum, over the twenty year period of this study, the CSN underwent three major changes in gender ideologies. If the first two responded to liberal feminist accommodation to social change, the third was influenced by a much more radical current. Despite the ideological breaks which legitimated women's right to work and defined women as oppressed, there was continuing resistance to implementing a full programme for gender equality by breaking down sex roles among the membership [Interview: F]. However, with the support of the male leadership, women activists were able to use the financial, human and communications resources of the central to organize so that by the 1980s there were CCFs in almost all sectors and at all levels from the locals, to unions and federations, supported by a staff member at the central [Pare 1983: 140] [71].

An activist orientation on the part of the initiators of trade union feminism in the CSN as well as the central's policy of support for community groups helped establish some links with women in the autonomous groups. The CSN supported women's employment rights groups like Action travail des femmes and a coalition for maternity leave, worked with other unions and autonomous group) to organize large demonstrations and publicity
for International Women's Day and supported day care struggles.

8.4.2. Gender politics in the FTQ.

8.4.2.1. Formal equality in a period of inaction.

The development of trade union feminism in the FTQ began with ideological advantages and some structural disadvantages in comparison with the CSN. For example, the FTQ officially supported women's right to work and since 1945 had supported an equal wage demand at face value and not as a ruse to encourage hiring men, although this policy did not result in much real action until 1973 [Gagnon 1974b: 27-28]. On the other hand, aspects of both the formal structure and the composition of the FTQ membership were disadvantageous. The low level of centralization meant that member unions had a great deal of autonomy in deciding if and how to carry out centrally established policies. Combined with the FTQ's anti-ideological stance and its relatively late class and national radicalization in 1972-1973, this decentralization acted as a brake on the discussion of social questions at congresses. In contrast, the raising of women's issues in the 1970s was associated with both a social unionist perspective and an ideological critique not congenial to past practices: "Et pour que les syndicales jouent adéquatement leur rôle de solutionner, elles doivent le faire dans une perspective dépassant les strictes préoccupations
In addition, the actual social composition of the FTQ was such that it was pulled in two directions. The FTQ’s female membership has been reported at between 20% and 33%, a much lower percentage than at the CSN [72]. A large part of this membership was located in unions, like the International Ladies Garment Workers Union that, despite a predominantly female base, had little or no place in contemporary women’s struggles, in part because of difficulties in organizing an ethnically and linguistically mixed membership and in part because of a sclerotic leadership [73]. On the other hand, many of the FTQ’s women workers belonged to the Canadian Union of Public Employees/Syndicat canadien de la fonction publique (CUPE/SCFP), a new public sector union with a good record on women’s issues [74]. And, the results of a survey of affiliated locals taken prior to the 1981 congress which indicated that the number of women had risen to 100,000 for a proportion of 1:3, were welcomed as "bien davantage que ce que nous pensions" [FTQ CCF 1981: 2].

Throughout the 1960s, the FTQ congress minutes were, compared with those of the CSN, remarkably silent on women and family. A 1961 attack on unemployment, in a "Mémoire sur le chômage" presented to the Quebec government on February 26th 1962, contains no rhetoric on "the family" or its needs for survival [FTQ 1961a]. Moreover, where references were made to gender, they tended to be stereotyped and not thought through. The 1967
preparatory study for a joint FTQ-CSN-CIC brief to the provincial government commission on poverty (the Castonguay Commission) included both gender neutral references to "the rights of individuals to social security" and gendered assumptions that: "The worker today demands the certainty of being able not just to eat but to assure the subsistence of his family for the rest of its days" [FTQ 1967b emphasis added]. Indeed, the documents of the 1960s and early 1970s generally assume a male membership of "travailleurs" led by a male leadership [75]. Similar gender stereotypes surfaced in, for example, the union label campaign which included "Miss Trade Union Label" contests as late as 1969 [FTQ 1969a: 30] and in the "Rapport de la Commission des coûts blancs" which not only referred to workers in a female dominated sector as travailleuses but also, when it mentioned women clerical workers at all, disdainfully dismissed them as temporarily employed, husband-hunting young ladies driven by middle class ideals whose high turnover rates in the labour force made unionization difficult [Ibid. 69-85] [76]. Finally, the FTQ, like the PLQ, discussed human rights issues without any consideration of women [77]. Overall then, however much the FTQ may have distinguished itself politically from the PLQ and however different its ideological origins from the CSN, there is evidence that they all shared a common sexist element.

But, as early as 1964, there is also some indication that male and female members' gender ideologies diverged [78]. On the one
hand, two numerically male dominated United Steelworkers of America locals brought resolutions to the congress urging higher family allowances as an incentive to raising a family and the provision of a state grant of $1000.00 to permit newlyweds to establish a household without going into debt [FTQ 1967c: 12]. In a similar vein, chemical workers called for an allowance of $100.00 for mothers of newborn babies [FTQ 1969b: 10] and the carpenters rejected Sunday work on the grounds that it was anti-familial and anti-social [FTQ 1971c: 48]. In contrast to both these proposals and the central's interpretation of human rights, a female dominated CUPE [79] local used this rubric to introduce a demand for legislation providing "concrete measures" to ensure female workers equal pay and working conditions to those of their male counterparts [FTQ 1967c: 87].

While a surface sex-blindness and gender neutrality hid sexism, androcentrism and gender distinctions, in the policy area of labour legislation, strictly defined, the FTQ's trade union consciousness still led it to support rights for women workers. In 1964, for example, it urged that the labour code be revised to give domestic workers the right to unionize and to strike [FTQ 1964b: 78]. It also, unlike the CSN and eschewing the latter's protectionist stance, refused to participate in the 1966 government commission on women's night work on the grounds that its mandate was too narrow: a more general inquiry into women's work was necessary. Practically, the FTQ supported liberal
feminist moves to improve women's work life by making FTQ comptroller, Claire Robitaille, an official delegate to the FFQ [FTQ 1967a: 14]. This assignment was more than the personal voluntary work of one woman. For the most part she was part of a two woman delegation and when she left the FTQ she was replaced by another FTQ delegate. I have suggested earlier that women with connections to the trade unions in the leadership of the FFQ, like Robitaille, Rousseau and Chartrand, were instrumental in reminding the middle class FFQ of the needs of organized and unorganized working class women. Here we might note that their involvement in the FFQ also served as a conduit and helped legitimate a feminist concern with women as workers in the labour movement itself.

Prior to its new preoccupation with women in 1973, the FTQ's fullest statement on gender relations is to be found in the wide-ranging brief presented to the RCSW in 1968 [FTQ 1968c]. Equality in the labour force, supported by "education" and manpower (sic) policies to ensure retraining and the right to unionize and to prevent sex-typing of jobs, was seen as the chief precondition for women's social equality [ibid. 22]. However, despite increasing participation rates for women, they noted gender inequalities in hiring, salaries, and promotion in the labour force. For example, women's share of jobs in the high-paying secondary sector was decreasing [ibid. 14]. On the other hand, the feminization of an occupation, like teaching, led
to falling wages, prestige and status [ibid. 20]. Nevertheless, their optimistic assessment was that unionisation made a difference by giving women working conditions, if not wages, equal to men’s [ibid. 5-7]

The brief also identified gender ideologies as at least partly responsible for the persistence of such inequalities in the labour force and in political participation. They argued that "the hostility of the working man against women in a period of unemployment" showed the persistence of residual ideologies in which "woman’s equal right to work is not acknowledged" [ibid. 12]. Indeed, to be accepted, a working woman must be "first of all a perfect wife and mother", in short, a superwoman [ibid. 21]. Yet despite the constraints that these ideologies represent, women themselves could not be fully exculpated for they did not take full advantage of the opportunities to act to change these inequalities that the labour movement, construed as egalitarian, provided:

If there is an area in which artificial barriers haven’t been raised against them, or where they haven’t been entrusted with good works and the preparation of sandwiches and cookies; where, on the contrary, their participation in important tasks and functions has been solicited, it is surely the area of organized labour. And yet women workers are far from fulfilling the role that is their due....women must begin by helping themselves if they want to enhance their status and achieve the full social equality of the sexes [ibid.. 14-15].

For the writers of the brief, the central strategic necessity
was to find a way for women to "conciliate her roles" as wife and mother with her role as worker [ibid. 20]. Legislation to ensure maternity leave, to revise the income tax act to permit women to deduct job related expenses like child care was important; the provision of community service like public nurseries, community housekeeping services to free working women was suggested; and the traditional labour movement demand for the "gradual reduction of the work week for all" was cast in a feminist perspective [ibid. 22-34]. Warning that part-time work for women could create new problems, they asked the Commission to try to find out the consequences of its generalization [ibid. 33-34]. Finally, the brief's strategic attitude toward government sponsored advisory bodies like the RCSW itself was one of support and political trust. Not only was the latter seen to be capable of conveying information to the government, it was also entrusted with the important task of revising gender ideologies: "We therefore rely on your commission to find a formula acknowledging the economic function of the educator-mother in the home, but one which doesn't amount to a moral condemnation of the woman who decides to act otherwise" [ibid. 32].

Thus, while critical of the content of gender ideologies and structures, the brief effectively left the reform of gender relations up to the good will of the ruling bloc, defining the issue in terms compatible with the hegemonic liberal ideology and within the proper scope of the state. Nor were there any
Internal processes pushing the FTQ to break from its equal rights perspective. First, since the membership of the FTQ was not particularly aware of gender issues the report passed without notice in the FTQ [FTQ CCF 1973: 45]. Secondly, since the FTQ was similarly not radicalized on class questions, a class critique of women's condition could not arise. Thus, whatever problems or potentials for ideological radicalization the brief might have raised, its virtues or weaknesses were simply not discussed.

8.4.2.11. Towards a meaningful right to work.

Gender politics moved onto front stage with the presentation of the first report on the status of women in the Quebec labour movement at the 1973 FTQ congress. The result of collaboration between women staff and members of the central, it linked the position of women in the labour force, in unions and in the whole society [80]. In keeping with FTQ gradualism, the report, Travailleuses et syndiquées, gently educated its readers by criticising the implications and inaccuracies in common sense beliefs. Nevertheless, it radically rejected the traditional division of male and female roles and insisted that a critique of sexist ideology and practices, even among union members, was necessary for, "le sort que la société, c'est-à-dire, les gouvernements, les lois, et même nos structures syndicales, font aux femmes est étroitement relié à la conception que l'on se fait du rôle primordial des femmes dans la société" [Ibid. 9]. Moreover, it broke with customary practice by raising what it
recognized were painful personal questions, about gender hierarchies and uneven sharing of parental and family burdens in the workers’ own families, as necessary to ensure real, not merely superficial, support for women’s social equality [ibid. 49].

Without an explicitly marxist terminology, the rejection of sex roles and dominant gender ideologies was located in a wider class perspective. Because "les patrons sont les grands gagnants", discrimination against women was seen as tied to the economic system [ibid. 29]. Economically, masculine prejudices that women do not need salaries sufficient to support their families benefited management by permitting it to maintain low salaries in traditionally female occupations. Rejecting the typical forms of women’s employment as alienating meant questioning alienation for everyone [ibid. 27-28]. Politically, hierarchical gender relations in the family, where women are "subalternes" and men "chefs" and where children learn values of authority and submission important to capitalist society, was highly adaptive in a society with an undemocratic and inegalitarian political structure [ibid. 33]. Thus, struggles on class and gender issues were not only mutually reinforcing but, more strongly, mutually determining: "L’oppression des femmes et le régime économique-social dans lequel nous vivons sont donc étroitment liés...Une victoire remportée sur un front ne sera pas complète si l’autre front n’est pas conquis également" [ibid. 35].
With regard to the labour movement, the focus was shifted from women's culpability to material and political barriers to their participation. Even if employers and governments had been primarily responsible for discrimination in employment it is "impossible d'absoudre le mouvement syndical, qui ne l'a pas combattue ni même la dénoncée" [Ibid. 49]. One major barrier is the double day which leaves women to deal with "les tracas familiaux, les mauvais bulletins des enfants ou le menu du souper" [Ibid. 55]. But, a pattern of decreasing female participation in the labour movement's upper echelons, with women almost always a marked minority in executive positions and always a scant handful among staff members even in unions with a majority female membership [81], indicates that it shared wider social values.

However, just as the FTQ formally raised the question of women's rights, the issue was swamped in the attention of most of the congress participants and of the press by a precipitous rise of nationalist sentiment as the central debated leaving the Canadian Labour Congress [Le Devoir 7 Dec. 1978]. Thus, in the least nationalist of the centrals the historical relationship of nationalism and feminism in Quebec was reproduced. A review of the press coverage indicates that only two stories of eight in Le Devoir [7 8 Dec. 1973], a newspaper that had been historically favourable to liberal feminism, referred to the new focus on women's issues. As well, of several other papers [82] only the
CSN sponsored *Québec Presse* [9 Dec. 1973] which mentioned women's issues twice, ran more than one story. It was, however, treated seriously on the convention floor. In a two hour plenary discussion of the report, more of the small minority of women delegates participated than usual [*La Presse* 7 Dec. 1973]. And if, as Lysiane Gagnon of *La Presse* noted, the report was "un choc", nevertheless "la plupart des délégués masculins était encore là vers la fin de l'après midi" [*Ibid.*].

The report established an ideological framework based on equal rights which informed policy development from 1973 to 1979 where the demand for equal work and equal pay gave rise to proposals, in subsequent years, for more concrete measures to be taken by unions and government [*FTQ 1975b: 16-17, 1979b*]. Most important of these were demands for equal pay, maternity leave and decriminalization of abortion legislation [*83*]. By 1979, it was urging the government to adopt global measures to facilitate women's access to the labour market and to unionization including affirmative action programmes, ending unregulated outwork (*travail à domicile*) and concrete action on equal pay [*Ibid.* 9-10]. In addition, new ground was broken that year by including workplace health and safety conditions which particularly affected women, sexual harassment and the reintroduction, yet again, of a demand to reduce the work week [*Ibid. 9*] [*84*].

Unions were seen to be able to play several roles in the struggle for women's equality. First, they were urged to act as
watchdogs for women's equality and to press for women's rights in contracts by demanding: equal pay for work of equal value, an end to job ghettos, revised salary structures, maternity leave and the reduction of parental burdens for men and women (1973) [FTQ CCF 1973: 45-50]; an end to sex-typing of jobs, including equal rights in all hiring even for jobs where strength was required and supple job evaluation criteria to prevent women's under-payment, an end to sex-based wage differentials and double seniority lists and positive anti-discrimination clauses [FTQ CCF 1975: 24-31]. By 1979, locals were also asked to report the extent and success of their efforts to the central and its CCF which, deploiring the slowness of progress, kept watch over the watchdogs. Secondly, unions could act as pressure groups for the kind of legislative change outlined above. To this end, the FTQ itself participated fully in the national campaign for maternity leave and lobbied the government for the clarification of clauses dealing with women in human rights legislation, the (Code des droits de la personne) [9.3.1, 9.3.2 below].

Thirdly, unions were urged to abandon their past protectionist orientation to women in favour of a strictly egalitarian approach. To change union practices to an egalitarianism capable of integrating women, the 1973 report recommended "un travail de sensibilisation", efforts to change the paternalist attitudes of male staff and the establishment of non-decisional women's groups where they would feel less intimidated [FTQ CCF 1973: 56-61].
Later reports continued to ask the labour movement to survey its own actions, for example, with regard to hiring staff and electing officials. In a tougher tone, noting that only one of 21 permanent(e)s at the central was a woman and that women held only 6% of the total of such positions for the central and its affiliates while clerical support staff were largely women, in 1981 the CCF suggested that the struggle against job ghettos should begin in their own administrative structures [FTQ CCF 1981: 8].

In keeping with these developments in the late 1970s, there were also major revisions with regard to maternity, which became one of the FTQ's main areas of intervention. While rejecting the definition of children as a "ressource naturelle", as Quebec's cheap labour had all too long been called, the 1973 report argued that contract provisions for the "protection maximale de la grossesse et de la maternité" were necessary for individual equality [FTQ CCF 1973: 10]. By 1977, in the context of developing a politique familiale, children had come to be seen as "la ressource la plus précieuse du Québec" and maternity was identified as a social function which should have state support [FTQ 1977b: 44]. That year, the congress adopted resolutions calling for not just maternity leave but also 2 week paternity leaves and optional parental leaves of up to 2 years to be taken by either parent without loss of position or seniority [FTQ 1979b: 3-5] and the central later lobbied for health and safety
regulations to protect pregnant women workers [DAN 31L 3s 1979: B-8586-8620]. It also called for family allowances that met the real cost of children in the average family; a network of free, parent-controlled childcare and nursery centres; and extended lunch hour and after school supervision in elementary schools. In this context, the congress supported free abortion on demand, free contraception and sex education in the schools in the same terms as revolutionary feminists and CNALG: avortement libre et gratuit [FTQ 1977b: 43-46, 50, 1979b: 6]. The 1979 congress revived the classic socialist-feminist demand, stripped to be sure of marxist language, for the collective provision of household work mentioned earlier in the 1968 brief to the Bird commission [FTQ 1979b: 2].

Given the decentralization of the FTQ mentioned above, it is hard to evaluate the extent to which the central took to heart the advice it gave to its affiliates to take women's issues seriously, whether at the bargaining table or in everyday organizational practices. Despite a relatively poor performance on bringing women into the administrative structure, the FTQ committed some financial, technical, human and ideological resources to women's equality. For example, in the 1979 document "For a new society" [FTQ 1979d], women's rights were inscribed not just tangentially but as a central part of its overall programmatic orientation. Several support services for women's rights were also developed including an internal educational
course on maternity leave rights (in addition to its external intervention in the campaign), articles in its newspapers and International Women's Day activities.

Certainly a high point of energy and deepening radicalization was the non-decisional week-end conference held in Montreal in 1979 on the theme, "Double exploitation, une seule lutte" [FTQ 1979e]. All the policies adopted by the FTQ from 1973 were reviewed and new issues raised about on-going legislative changes, particularly the human rights code, maternity leave and affirmative action. In an "atmosphère chaleureux et militant", over 500 delegates (of whom 25% were men) were able to focus exclusively on the question of women's rights, exchange experiences and clarify issues [Gagnon 1983]. However, Gagnon [1983: 171] has argued that because two-thirds of those attending were from the public sector, the inverse of the public-private proportion in the central:

En conséquence, certaines recommandations adoptées par le collège, qui dépassaient les positions traditionelles de la FTQ, n'ont pas été retenues par les instances officielles de la FTQ, dont le congrès, où ses déséquilibres dans la représentation privé-public n'existaient pas.

Thus, tensions that we saw in the 1960s between unions where gender and sectoral differences overlapped, still existed in the FTQ despite a significant educational effort.

Finally, the CCF was formalized in 1981 after the period of
this study as a 15 member body nominated by the Conseil général to represent the sector [85]. Its role was defined as instigating the FTQ's affiliates to take steps to improve the situation of women workers and co-ordinating action on the status of women for the central as a whole by raising awareness, making contacts with women, carrying out the FTQ's orientations and developing new perspectives for its tasks as required. Although it was given no regular budget, it was able to draw on the Conseil général for money for special projects and, in September 1982, it appointed a full time staffer, the former CCF chair, Carole Larivière Gingras, to oversee its actions [Paré 1983: 22-24].

8.4.3. Feminism in the teachers' unions.

If the FTQ provides an example of the mode of trade union feminist radicalization in a male dominated, private sector international and largely blue collar central and the CSN the same in a national, male dominated, public and private sector central, then the Centrale de l'enseignement du Québec as a national, female dominated "professional" and "middle class" union offers yet another set of conditions for the development of trade union feminism. Even allowing for these differences and the different dynamics of feminist and class radicalisation they produced, however, the CEQ was affected by the same developments on the political field as the other centrals. Thus, its move from the equal rights feminism that guided official policy from 1960-1972 to a more radical stance from 1973-1980 has
similarities with the development of both other centrals. In examining the CEQ's specific development then, it is necessary to highlight both these parallels and differences.

8.4.3.1. Equal rights feminism.

In 1963, over the opposition of male teachers but with the support of the aumonier général [L'Enseignement 1963 Sept.: 16], women teachers succeeded in passing a resolution in favour of equal pay. Laure Gaudreault, an important founding figure of Catholic women teachers' unionism, had promoted this demand in her column, "La page de l'institutrice", in L'Enseignement, the Corporation des instituteurs et institutrices catholiques newspaper [86]. In a liberal feminist appropriation of modernisation ideology, she urged an end to discrimination against women who were excluded from stable employment by marriage and further penalized by pregnancy.

The demand for equal pay was a logical outgrowth of Quiet Revolution laicisation and its transformation of the educational system. For, if education was no longer to be dominated by an ideology of service and women and men religious were to lose their highly privileged access to supervisory positions, there would be an opportunity, even a necessity, to upgrade teaching staff and recruit new supervisory personnel from the ranks of a largely female profession. This need was sharpened by the rapid expansion of the state educational sector which demanded more and
more teachers at a time when women religious were starting to
leave their communities in unprecedentedly large numbers [Dumont
1983: 282-283] [87]. The absence of maternity leave meant that
women's teaching careers were often shorter than men's. It was
thus necessary to stabilize the female teaching staff in order to
provide them with incentives to upgrade their educational levels
with the university attendance deemed necessary to meet new
educational goals of technical (rather than moral) competence
[88].

However, institutional factors and gender politics themselves
blocked the full transformation of women's status in the
educational system which the dynamics of modernisation pointed
toward. First, negotiating contracts with individual school
boards made it difficult to introduce a coherent policy.
Secondly, despite 1966 decisions to promote both women's and
Quebec's rights and the "victories" (including equal pay for
equal qualifications, improved pensions, equal opportunity for
married women and access to promotion for qualified, usually
upgraded, women) noted by CIC president Raymond Laliberté [CIC
1967: 12; CEQ 1970b: 21, 1974a: 3], leadership positions in the
Corporation were numerically dominated by men some of whom were
reluctant to promote feminist positions. Still, activist women
teachers arrived at the moment of feminist ideological rupture in
the late 1960s fresh from a successful struggle for women's
economic rights. In addition, young women teachers had lived
through the generational social and political experiences events that radicalized Quebec students in general and the initial handful of revolutionary feminists in particular. Indeed, this radicalization had shown itself in the turn to the democratized, child-centred "école nouvelle" and support for deuxième front social activism of nationalist, anti-poverty and international struggles [CEQ 1970b].

8.4.3.11. Women’s liberation in the context of class and national liberation.

However, the rise of a powerful feminist current in the CEQ was framed not only by liberal and revolutionary feminism but by the emergence of a radical class ideology among teachers as well. Indeed, the two processes became intertwined. It is notable in that context, that the CEQ’s feminist politics was initiated from the base, by ordinary members of the central, rather than by staff members, as in the two other centrals. The Comité Laure-Gaudreault (CLG), formed in 1973 by a few young teachers based primarily in Montreal represented the first skirmish and rapidly developed to the point where it declared itself a provincial committee on the status of women [CEQ CLG 1974b: 80-83] [89]. An opening for feminism had been prepared by a debate on the role of the school system in reproducing class society, "L’école au service de la classe dominante" [CEQ 1972a: 40-41] at the CEQ’s twenty-second congress. Following the discussion, a resolution to denounce "énergétiquement les
programmes et les attitudes scolaires assurant l'aliénation de la femme" was passed, the first such resolution in any Quebec central [CEQ 1973a: 48-49].

At the next congress, the CLG presented a report which was studied in commission and led to the adoption of a long resolution tied to a programme of action to bring about women's liberation in the context of national and class liberation [ibid. 33-49] [90]. Motivating this concern was a sense that teachers had become proletarianized:

At one point in its evolution, capitalism reduced the craftsman to anonymity by setting up factories for mass production. Similarly, capitalism has reduced the teacher to anonymity by setting up factories for the mass production of ideology. They are now common labourers [CEQ 1975b: 10].

This transformation had affected women at least as much as men and, given the male domination of the supervisory hierarchy, perhaps more. Hence, the need for a feminist programme of corrective action.

In the course of a long discussion, the 1973 [CEQ 1973a: 33-49] congress confirmed feminist concerns by officially recognizing the CLG, elected seven members to it and providing it with a budget which included release time for a teacher to act as a permanente [91]. The committee was defined as a working group, which was to orient the development of a programme on women to the priorities of the CEQ. With the aid of the CLG, the union
voted to study the alienating image of women in school texts, the issue of wages for housework raised by revolutionary feminists and the unresolved issue of part-time work raised by the liberal and modified patriarchal notion of "the working mother". It also reaffirmed a position adopted a year earlier for state sponsorship of *garderîes populaires* controlled by the parents and workers. In part this reflected their interests as professionals and as workers faced with a falling birth rate that would eventually reduce their clientele [Ibid. 43]. The same congress also voted in favour of the liberalization of the abortion law [Ibid. 44-45]. As well as producing studies of these issues, the CLG was to ensure that they were raised in union locals, to support the development of other CCFs at local levels and to support the active participation of its members and their "conjoint" in the development of anti-discrimination policies [Ibid. 43].

Over the next six years, further resolutions indicated that teachers shared the developing feminist concerns of unionists in other centrals. Paid maternity leave (without loss of rank, position or benefits) was adopted in 1974 and reaffirmed in 1976 following a 1975 study which showed that many teachers were still penalized by maternity leave [CEQ 1976a: 18-19, 1976c; CEQ CLG 1976b]. This issue was partially resolved in 1976 when teachers, as part of the common front of public sector workers, won twenty weeks paid maternity leave and two years of unpaid parental
leave. The early resolution favouring liberalized abortion law was strengthened to support for free abortion on demand in 1976 [CEQ 1976a: 18]. This policy was translated into practical support for Morgentaler [Ligne Direct 5:1 Oct. 1976: 10-12], the CNALG manifesto in 1977 [CEQ CLG 1977b] and the Semaine nationale sur l'avortement in 1978 [CL 1978: 29-35; CEQ 1978b: 30]. As well as a continuing recommendation to remove stereotyped images from the curriculum [CEQ 1976a: 15-18], the CEQ supported a programme of sex education for the schools including information on contraception [CEQ 1980a: 26, 24]. Even if the proposal for contraception was situated in an optic of family planning, this was, of course, a direct challenge to the position of the Church, still dominant in local school board politics [Milner 1986]. Indeed, that year the central spoke voted for deconfessionalization in the school system [ibid. 14]. That year too, over some objections, the central rejected both wages for housework and part-time labour in favour of "le droit au travail social" (labour force work) with social supports as necessary for the liberation of all women [ibid. 59-65].

However, despite its influence in annual congresses the CLG remained somewhat marginalized. In part this was because it was centered in Montreal and not part of the main administration in Quebec, in part because of resistance to its ideas from both older women and men in the CEQ who were still loyal to liberal equality perspectives. Nevertheless, despite some organizational
changes and later a shrinking budget [Paré 1983: 90], the committee was active and productive. It produced several reports on educational, social and employment issues and participated in maternity, parental and abortion rights campaigns [CEQ CLG 1980b]. Moreover, from the outset, it saw itself as involved in a wider class conscious women’s movement [CEQ 1973a: 40] and from 1976 had a permanent mandate to work with other centrals on "la lutte des femmes" [CEQ 1976a: 21]. In addition, as well as the campaigns mentioned above, it had a continuing practical involvement in projects with extra-union feminist groups, most notably for the organization of IWD activities where the centrals and autonomous groups cooperated [92].

The representativeness of the CLG and of the CEQ’s stance is hard to gage. Despite the regular adoption of militant feminist resolutions at succeeding congresses, there is some indication that, during the 1970s attitudes within the central were somewhat divided. In 1973, a resolution to table CLG discussion was defeated only narrowly (179-172) and during the rejection of the wages for housework orientation in 1980 one man denounced the "sainte", "presque congénitale" "quasi-unanimité" that characterised status of women discussions, suggesting that disagreement and inattention lay underneath [CEQ 1973a: 46, 1980a: 60-61]. One liberal feminist former teacher suggested in an interview in 1981 that older women teachers had become, in the main, somewhat alienated from the socialist feminist ideology
that the CLG had promoted [Interview: Q]. Nevertheless, a major project of 1976, a survey of the members’ orientation to specific dimensions of women’s workplace equality by the CLG [CEQ 1978b: 24] found overwhelming support for a full programme of feminist demands: all agreed with women’s right to equality with men, 98% with the sharing of family responsibilities, 96% with the right to social labour, 90% supported day care and 88% believed that maternity was a social act [CEQ CLG 1976b, 1977d]. These findings agree with those of Margrit Eichler [1984: 67-86] for English Canadian women and men, where teachers ranked second in support of gender equality behind decision makers and ahead of white and blue collar workers [93]. Practice, however, as reported in both studies, lagged behind reported belief with only 40% of the husbands sharing domestic tasks and 57% participating in the education of their children in Quebec [CEQ CLG 1977d: 10] [94].

However, with regard to the question that had vexed all the centrals, namely women’s low rates of union participation, this commitment to equality did not necessarily mean a commitment to union activity by women. According to the 1976 survey, a large minority of women teachers believed that participation would undermine their relations with their superiors (44%), with colleagues (33%) or their own professionalism at work (33%); while 20% reported that their husbands were hostile to union activity [Ibid. 12-15]. Like trade union feminists in the other centrals, the CLG interpreted this data to mean that the primary
barriers to participation were political and ideological. "La condition même des femmes" induced a greater susceptibility to fear of reprisals, a lack of solidarity among women and difficulties arising from operating in a male environment. Secondly, they argued that the material aspects of women's lives, the double day of work in the labour force and childcare, as well as a priority on work, including upgrading and retraining (recyclage), were further barriers to union participation. All in all, as a result, there was a general "lack of interest" by women in union activity. In response, they decided that they had to enlarge the scope of their analysis in order to provoke reflection, while at the same time respecting "les rythmes différents de prise de conscience", in order to accomplish their first priority, politicizing their union sisters. At the same time, the CLG challenged the union to reflect on its own style of work at all levels and bring about changes to facilitate women's participation [CEQ CLG 1980a]. Delegates voted for the immediate goals of providing childcare for meetings and holding meetings during working hours with liberation from job requirements which should, in the long term, be supplemented with a change in the onerous requirements of unionism [CEQ 1980a: 64-65]. They also called upon their members to transform their everyday practices with respect to the intimate forms of gender politics and relations by changing male/female relations both in the union and in the "private" lives of members and their "conjoints" [95]. It was important, for example, to modify speaking styles and to
equalize the amount of time that each sex talked [Ibid. 66] [96].

At the organizational level, nevertheless, the CEQ, of all the centrals, made perhaps the greatest progress in getting women into its positions of power. New hiring of permanent(e)s was blocked by a freeze on positions in 1978 so that women were still only 15.5% by 1981 [Paré 1983: 89]. But for the first time that same year it elected a majority of women to its executive. Much of this progress was due to strong CCFs, especially in the teachers' locals [Interview: F]. Hélène Paré [1983: 97-104] reports that at the end of 1981 over half of the primary and secondary locals had CCFs with at least a part-time attached staff member (responsable) [97], and that other sectors had CCFs or responsables or were in the process of forming committees. While small locals with less than twenty members could not sustain such activity, there were also several workplace CCFs, particularly in CEGEPs where FNEQ-CSN also jointly organized on women's issues [Interview: F]. Finally, in the late 1970s and early 1980s the early informal contacts among feminist teachers developed into a slightly more formal but still activist province-wide network of about 60, mostly female, contacts in 50 CCFs. Meeting quarterly for one and a half or two days, and operating in the consensus style of contemporary feminist groups, it was a locus for raising and debating new or troublesome issues and a source of support for its members [Interview F; Paré 1983: 108].
Thus, its female membership base, the involvement of its members in intellectual work, its contacts with liberal and revolutionary feminism and its location in the public sector, all combined to move feminism among teachers in a radical direction and to make it a leading, if variously interpreted, ideological force in the CEQ.

8.4.4. Interunion cooperation, interunion rivalry.

Cooperation among trade union feminists occurred mainly at two levels: with respect to the work of the CCFs and in the public sector common fronts. In 1976 both the CSN and CEQ, followed by the FTQ, adopted a positive perspective on intercentral solidarity on women's struggles [Gagnon 1983: 172-173]. This orientation led to the formalization of the already existing informal intersyndical women's working committee that, together with autonomous feminist, revolutionary and popular day care groups, had animated the organisation of the 1975 Montreal IWD teach-in. In its new official guise, the intersyndical CCF organized IWD activities in 1976 and 1977 across the province. However, with an intensification of CSN-FTQ hostility in large part in construction, the FTQ's Consell général directed its CCF to withdraw from the committee [ibid.]. As a result, the latter organized independent IWD celebrations from 1978 on [Le Devoir 10 March 1978]. Despite this, effective co-operation among the CCFs continued, for example, in a national action committee on maternity leave and parental rights [9.3.2. below]. In fact, the
centrals shared many of the same policies on women's issues and continued to draw on each other's experience. For example, when the FTQ CCF recommended sexual education in the schools it drew on CEQ expertise and recommendations [FTQ 1978b]. More formal links were also maintained between the CSN and the CEQ who, together, organized two \textit{Etats généraux des travailleuses} in Montreal in 1979 and 1980 [CEQ-CSN 1979; \textit{Etats généraux} 1980] [98]. The first meeting adopted a minimal platform of 12 demands for improvements in maternity and sick leave, wages and working conditions for all workers and a programme to facilitate unionization. It was supported by groups for non-unionized workers (\textit{Au bas de l'échelle, Association du personnel domestique}), single parent and immigrant groups, the CCFs of the two sponsoring centrals [\textit{Etats généraux} 1980]. (The conditions faced by non-unionized workers are examined in Lepage and Gauthier [1980].) Indeed, despite sharp hostility among the male leaders of the centrals, their feminist activists retained a respect and cordiality among themselves which reflected their common experience and commitment to struggle as women [Interview: F, O, S].

Despite their political and jurisdictional differences discussed above [8.3.], the unions, as I have noted, maintained a formal alliance in the public sector. In part this was necessitated by the multi-panel bargaining conditions that obtained there, in part it was facilitated by a growing
disenchantment on the part of the FTQ with the PQ as state employer [99]. Here progress in overcoming occupational sex-typing and wage inequities was gained through concentration on women’s issues in bargaining between 1976 and 1980. For example, the explicit sex-based differences in payment for the same jobs that existed through the 1960s was attacked and for the most part formally eliminated in the 1976 contract [9.3. below]. As Dominique Gaucher [1980] points out, this programme did not eliminate gendered wage inequities entirely. These persisted in, for example, the hospital and service sectors, disguised as just payments for skill differentials. Nor, despite a flurry of high level appointments of women by the PQ in 1979 [Payette 1982: 69-70; 9.3. below], was there significant change in sex-typing in upper level administrative positions [Le Devoir 8 April 1980]. But the principles of equal pay and equal access were clearly established as policy for all three centrals and for the state. In addition, the inclusion in the 1976 settlement of maternity, paternity and parental leaves set an example, not only for Quebec private sector workers but for all workers in the rest of Canada [White 1980: 110-114]. Similarly, provisions for the protection of pregnant workers adopted in the revised Code de droits de la personne, and in health and safety legislation passed after the period of this study were, despite union criticism of the authority given to medical opinion and an insufficient concern with dangers or stress in female typed occupations, in advance of legislation anywhere in the rest of Canada [Heitlinger 1987:}
What emerges overall is that because trade union feminists (at least while acting for their unions, whatever their personal opinions) saw their activity as part of union struggles and were guided by the ideological and political orientations of the central to which they belonged, their capacity to act upon their solidarity as women could transcend inter-union differences. But it could also be disrupted as in the case of the FTQ’s withdrawal from joint union and women’s groups IWD activities. In effect, the integration of feminists into official union structures gave them access to centres of power at the expense of their own autonomy and independence of action [100]. Nevertheless, their gender political mobilization in women’s struggles in a common situation as (actually or potentially married) women workers (with children) served to homogenize the policies of all three centrals on specific issues, like child care and maternity leave. And, despite feuds, as a result the centrals were able to find common ground in defense of what were, after all, common positions on women’s issues, just as they had with labour legislation and wage policies in the 1960s when the CSN supported the Liberal government and the FTQ did not.

With respect to the processes of hegemony and bloc formation, two points can thus be made. First, in the labour as in the national movement, the development of autonomous, self-referential feminism, or of women as a gender-in-itself, was
complicated by the way in which women activists at the forefront of ideological and political development were doubly interpellated. On the one hand they had common interests arising from a common cultural definition and a material situation as women -- which, as organic feminist intellectuals, they sought to articulate for their sex as a whole. At the same time, they identified themselves as workers in particular trade unions, with loyalties to the stances, strategies and co-workers of these (at times conflicting) reference groups. That they were able to keep this contradiction in some kind of balance was in large part due to the fact that the gender ideologies and policies of the centrals themselves, with regard for example to the working mother, came in the main to coincide.

Secondly, on the level of bloc politics, while ties among women activists were not able to overcome schismatic tendencies in the labour movement with regard to the kind of political alliances that cement blocs, they were a significant force for cross-central cooperation. As such, especially in the second (1975-1976) public sector Common Front and even after the election of the PQ in 1976, trade union feminism, as an ideology and a political force in all the centrals, contributed to the possibility that unions might be able to sink their differences in a new opposition led by the organisations of the working-class. At root, perhaps, this was because women, whether activist or not, shared a common subordinated situation both in
political parties and in the labour movement itself.

8.5. Conclusion: trade union feminism, the women's movement and bloc politics.

As we have seen, during the period covered by this study gender politics in Quebec trade unions underwent a radical development. At the level of official ideology, despite differences of nuance relating to nationalism and socialism, the three major centrals all passed from a protectionist stance toward women through a demand for abstract equal rights to a concrete struggle against the specific conditions that made for the oppression of working women. While the labour movement's gender politics became more feminist in other jurisdictions in North America than they were in the 1970s [Maroney 1983; Briskin and Yanz 1983; District 65 1980;], what is remarkable about the Quebec development is the speed and extent to which official union policy moved from the second to the third of these stances. Overall, we can say that it was the high rate of unionization of women and the particular degree to which the Quebec trade union movement came to see itself as the leader of a global oppositional force that accounts for this development. However, there were differences in the mode of feminist ideological radicalization in the three centrals discussed and in the diffusion of feminist ideology within them was uneven.

Here, with respect to the centrals themselves, there are two
points to be noted. First, the rhythm of development of trade union feminism with regard to socialist and nationalist radicalization in the unions and feminist radicalization outside them varied. Feminist issues were first initiated in 1972 in the CEQ in the context of its first major statement on the way in which education served the dominant class, but they followed its adoption of a strong policy on language rights as an aspect of nationalism. In the FTQ, class (1973), feminist (1973) and nationalist (1973) radicalization were closely grouped. Both these centrals adopted strong feminist ideologies and policies in advance of the widespread social diffusion of such views in 1975, International Women's Year, but after the ideological break represented by the emergence of revolutionary feminism in 1969. In the CSN, class and national ideologies had radicalized by 1968, well in advance of those on gender, which became one of the central's official preoccupations only after changes in gender ideology had begun to become more widespread. Secondly, at the level of its own ideology, feminism developed more quickly and more thoroughly toward socialist positions in the CEQ and the CSN than it did in the FTQ.

To explain these differences requires a multifactoral approach which includes the effect of the social composition of the centrals, their past adherence to specific gender ideologies and their present global perspectives. In the CEQ, a predominantly female membership, a recent history of successful struggles to
promote workplace equality and a current preoccupation with the role of ideology in reproducing hierarchical relations of class all served to lay the foundations for its adoption of feminism. Of these factors, the CEQ's social composition and the character of education as work in ideological reproduction were the most important. In the FTQ, the lack of developed anti-feminist ideologies and some numerical feminization of its ranks, again particularly in the new sectors of unionization (IN CUPE/SCFP and other public sector unions) contributed to its openness to feminism. However, its anti-Ideological stance and the smaller percentage of its female membership left it without a history of formal commitment to elaborated gender positions. As a result, the initiation of the second and third stances in this central occurred almost simultaneously with demands for an end to sex roles still couched in a framework of equal rights. Finally, the CSN's heritage of activism on issues to do with family and women, its greater numerical feminization and its actual socialist development explain the comparative radicalism that marked its own feminist re-orientation.

In addition, feminist gender political consciousness did not develop homogeneously within any particular organized sector of the labour movement; and such developments as there were would hardly have been possible without the continuous intervention of a narrow layer of trade union feminists. Here, too, there were differences between the centrals in the way such initiating
nuclei were constituted and developed. In the CEQ, feminism developed at the base and away from the geographical and political power center of Quebec city headquarters. In the other two centrals, feminism developed with the aid of staff members in the centrals themselves.

Despite these differences, there were underlying commonalities among the three centrals. Let us look first at the role of permanentes. These tended to be ideologically self-selecting individuals, committed to trade unionism [Interview: O, P, Q]. Some like many of the revolutionary feminists of the FLF, were university trained; some had a history of activism in the trade unions. The character of their work, as was strikingly demonstrated in Nicole Thérien's [1972] grievance against the CSN, whether truly ideological workers or involved in the manual aspects of reproduction of trade union ideologies, exposed them to the ideological claims of the unions to representative democracy and worker's rights. As workers involved in ideological aspects of the reproduction of an institution, they were, whether trained in universities or in the labour movement's own educational endeavours, sensitized to ideological issues [Interview: Q]. At the same time, they experienced the sharp contradiction between the claims of the labour movement and its practice, particularly in terms of gender issues, much as the women of the revolutionary and student lefts had experienced a contradiction between a rhetoric of national and social
liberation and the sexist practices of these movements. Finally, their positions as \textit{permanentes} in the centrals gave them social links to other trade unionists and to Montreal based revolutionary and radical feminists, for example, in organizing for International Women's Day activities, links that women radicalizing individually in, for example, a textile union in Sherbrooke, did not have [Interview: Q]. In the CEQ, several of these factors were replicated. The initiators of feminist activity were also university trained ideological workers, with social links with one another through a common situation in Montreal as well as links with revolutionary feminist activism. Thus, despite their apparently different place in the labour movement, base members in the CEQ and staff members in the CSN and the FTQ, the feminist initiators had in common occupationally defined sensitization to ideological issues and a commitment to some form of radicalism, combined with links or access to new forms of feminist activism.

To some degree, it should be added, this layer of feminist \textit{permanentes} overlapped with the participants in the revolutionary feminist women's liberation movement. But that movement, as we have seen, as a result of the ideological dominance of nationalism and "m-l" socialism, was numerically and politically weak in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Thus, it was unable to play a major political role for trade union feminists even if it did elaborate ideologies which later appeared in trade union
position papers, particularly at the CEQ and CSN. Instead, with a class, social and, particularly for the CEQ and CSN, a national mission, the trade unions themselves became a radical oppositional pole. And, as such, the labour movement attracted to it not only progressives, nationalists and socialists, but feminist activists as well.

The integration of feminist demands into the official policies of the labour movement introduced a new element into the balance of forces both in the women's movement and within bloc politics as a whole. That male-dominated mixed organizations with a socialist perspective were able not only to make an ideological turn to women's issues but also to win advances in working conditions at the bargaining table legitimated the socialist and trade unionist option at the expense of radical and liberal feminisms. At the same time, the adoption of these demands by the powerful labour centrals legitimated feminism in the wider society. However, while both socialist and feminist ideologies were thus made a legitimate topic of political discourse, independent socialist feminist organizations did not develop (as was the case in Toronto and Vancouver) largely because of the success of the trade unions in integrating their feminist militants [Maroney 1983]. Thus trade union feminism both took advantage of the ideological break of revolutionary feminism and furthered the development of conditions for its organizational spread.
With respect to bloc politics, we can say that the relationship between feminism in the trade unions and the maintenance of hegemony went through two stages. First, in 1972-1976, growing co-operation facilitated the development of a progressive nationalist oppositional bloc against the PLQ liberal modernisation alliance; second, after 1976, that some juncture of trade unions and feminism in the progressive nationalist bloc’s undermined claim to satisfy feminist popular democratic demands when it came to power under the PQ. Most clearly, in the short term, public sector bargaining for women’s issues furthered political disagreements between workers’ organizations, on the one hand, and the successive PLQ and PQ ruling parties, on the other, in their role as public sector employer. In the longer term, insofar as fundamental aspirations for popular democratic feminist demands, such as universal day care, equal education and effective equal value and maternity and parental leave legislation were not met, such agitation served to strengthen the opposition alliance all the more as trade unions themselves not only carried these demands but also materially and politically supported other groups with the same political alignment.

If all these developments put trade union feminism in an oppositional position in relation to the ruling parties of both the liberal modernisation and progressive nationalist blocs, it is important to understand, at the same time, that they took place against a background of some shared gender political
assumptions. Most notably, these included an assumption that the nuclear family, however revised, was an institution that would and should endure. At the same time, there was a common view that the nuclear family should become more egalitarian and that legislative changes were an effective way to ensure this outcome. Considering that in addition, as we shall see in the next chapter, the PQ not only espoused a programme of women's issues articulated as by feminists, but also put many of them into practice, these shared ideological elements paved the way for a cross-cutting gender political dynamic: the renewed possibility of the women's movement's integration, via the state, into the ruling bloc.
Chapter 9: Gender politics and the state.

9.1. Introduction.

In tracing the development of liberal, social Catholic, revolutionary, radical and trade union feminisms in the previous four chapters, I have several times noted that the state played a key role in actively shaping or adjudicating, with apparent neutrality, specific issues of gender politics. In this chapter, the focus shifts from the actual formation of women's movements to the expression of that process in the political life and self-definition of the state itself. In effect, there are two substantive questions to be considered: first, how political parties exercising or struggling for power articulated gender politics in the official arena of legislative debates and party policies; and second, how the overall politics of the state, so defined, expressed, reflected and transformed the gender political issues posed by a growing and increasingly sophisticated women's movement.

However, before analysing the actual historical development in Quebec in these terms it may be useful, as theoretical background, to review briefly the three main propositions regarding the general relation between gender politics and (ongoing) state formation in advanced capitalist societies advanced in Chapters 2 and 3 above.
1. The politics of gender, like those of other social contradictions, are condensed in the actions and ideologies of the parties, agencies and institutions that make up the state. In general, in capitalist societies, such condensation means that gender conflicts are combined and inflected with those of class. In Quebec, they were also overdetermined by the politics of nationalism, that is, in relation to popular-democratic demands for national survival. During the 1960-80 period, more particularly, gender political issues had to be articulated against the background, on the one hand, of conflicting class interests engendered in the development of a "modernised" capitalist economy; and, on the other, of the transformation of survival strategies from a reliance on the church and women, as mothers of the nation, to one of locally controlled economic growth and the state defense of language and culture.

This context not only, as we have seen, conditioned the dynamic and ideological development of the Quebec women's movement itself; it also set the framework for the way in which gender issues could be politically represented. In effect, there were two main problem-areas which parties and governments had to find ways to confront: first, the woman-work-marriage relation (especially as expressed in the legitimated emergence of the working mother); and, second, the woman-nation relation (that is, women's status as citizens and social identity vis-a-vis the nation).
2. Under the impact of women's increasing participation in the public realms of work and politics, the modern capitalist state has had to shift its interpellative vocabulary from explicit or implicit patriarchalism to address a citizenry that has two sexes. Political ideology, party programmes and state policies have thus increasingly come to address women as legal individuals emancipated from patriarchal family control, as well, enduringly, as wives and mothers. In Quebec, the PLQ Quiet Revolution strategy of legitimating its regime, and the state itself, by promoting democratic participation favoured this kind of development. At the same time the shift was neither sudden nor completed. If the liberal heritage of individualism favoured it another aspect of the liberal heritage, the foundation of the state in a public/private split, militated against it by still leaving room for conservative gender definitions vis-à-vis the private sphere (in Quebec, of clerico-national origin) to influence the way women were politically addressed. In Quebec as elsewhere, then, the explicit inclusion of women in the category of citizens was contradictory and more generally problematised the relation of state structures to patriarchal relations.

3. The expansion and consolidation of state control over both economic and non-economic institutions in Quebec was an example of the tendency of the modern capitalist state to become "integral", i.e. to extend the construction of hegemony into the institutions of civil society so as increasingly to bring all the
politics of the social formation it governs within its realm of action. With respect to gender, the logic of this kind of development is twofold: on the one hand, the state seeks to extend its rule over gender relations; on the other, feminists develop gender political strategies that appeal to the state to regulate gender relations in the name of justice and equality, liberal democracy's governing norms. Because hegemony is not statically given but must be continually reproduced through ideological integration, one way for the integral state to respond to the emergence of a feminist movement is to attempt to appropriate both the issues and the moral authority of the feminist movement as its own, in part by putting its just self forward as adequately representing "what women want". However, its capacities to do so are limited by its own non-unitary character, the particular ideologies of the parties represented in the legislature, electorallist exigencies and its need to balance class contradictions, all concretely manifested in struggles by different interest groups over both policy formation and implementation [Gough 1975].

Still, in Quebec, as we shall see, the issue of gender equality did emerge at the level of the state, both within the ideologies of political parties and in official policy with respect to three distinct sets of issues: women's legal status (within marriage and as citizens); the revision of policy and ideology to accommodate the working mother; and the relation of women as
citizens and as ideological symbols to the changing forms of the nation. In what follows, let us consider the articulation of these issues by the major political forces active in each of the two blocs that exercised hegemony in the period under study.

9.2. Gender politics within the Liberal bloc.

9.2.1. The party political actors.

As I argued in Chapter 5, there were several points of congruence between liberal feminism as represented by the FFQ and AFEAS and modernizing Liberalism. They held similar perspectives on equality, the family, the state and strategy (reform rather than revolution). Both played down gender conflict, seeing changes in gender relations as a result of evolution and not "sex war". Moreover, the overlapping networks of members, career paths and speakers linking the FFQ and, to a lesser extent, AFEAS with the PLQ indicate that liberal feminism was initially oriented to the latter not just as the ruling party but also as a reference group. With a view to understanding the role of gender politics in the management of hegemony, this section examines the development of ideology and legislation in governing and opposition parties 1970-1976, tracing the movement from cooperation to estrangement between feminism and the modernising (PLQ and UN) governments in office.

While the general ideological stances of the PLQ and PQ have been examined above in Chapters 4 and 5, those of two other
political parties represented in the legislature during this period, the UN and the various Social Credit groupings, should be mentioned here. As we shall see, in both parties, but in different ways, a conservative ideology of sexual difference coexisted with one of women's equality. The UN was simply inconsistent. On the one hand, it advocated equality for women, while, on the other, even its main spokesman on women's rights retained ideas of essential gender difference. For the Créditistes, a consistently and unambiguously conservative, pro-family ideology of difference overrode equality claims. "Equality" was incorporated into "family" in order to support claims for, for example, wages for housework; and opposition to abortion was a continuing preoccupation.

In contrast with these two parties as well as with the PLQ itself, the PQ, during its period in opposition (1970-1976), adopted a more radical stance by taking on the task of representing feminism in the legislature [9.2.2.11 and 9.3 below]. It promoted the view that women and men should be equal, that to bring about such equality measures needed to be taken which compensated for the concrete differences in women's and men's social situations, and that gender politics were in the present historical situation genuinely contradictory and conflictual. With this development, lines of opposition on gender politics and party politics began to coincide. Entering the political arena as it did via the PQ's efforts to lead an
Increasingly widespread social opposition meant that, in the legislature just as in the actual social movements, the expression of feminist radicalism was overdetermined by class and national politics.

However, despite such important ideological differences, voting patterns of all the parties favoured reform. Thus, in order to evaluate party gender ideologies as they appeared in the legislature, we must look closely at telling details of language in legislative debates, at the reference groups among women that the various parties chose, at the relative speed with which they implemented legislation and even at the vigour with which they pursued women's issues while in opposition.

9.2.2. Equality.

Liberal political philosophy is classically based on a concept of an individual whose reason justifies rights and abhors barriers to individual fulfillment and opportunity [Mill 1970: 239-241; Jaggar 1983: 42-46]. Its preferred strategy is to deal with those barriers through legislation designed to remove obstacles; only later, under certain kinds of pressure, does it accept positive action to assure more concrete equality. In 1960, Quebec was an obvious candidate for this kind of endeavour with respect to gender since, as we have seen above, important legislation enshrined patriarchal control over the family (in the Code civil [5.2. above]) and inequality both in the work place
[5.2., 8.4. above] and with respect to citizenship rights [6.2. above].

9.2.2.1. Liberalising family law.

A series of reforms beginning with the PLQ’s Bill 16, *Loi sur la capacité juridique de la femme mariée* (1964), and the UN’s Bill 10 (1969), *Loi concernant les régimes matrimoniaux*, initiated the process of increasing women’s equality by purging patriarchal power from family law [1]. The actual process of reform, initiated by the UN in 1959 and continued by subsequent governments, was organised through a special office, the Commission de révision du Code civil (CRCC). At each stage, the jurists staffing this office, in consultation with the powerfully organised professional associations of notaries and lawyers, proposed draft legislation which was introduced into the legislative process at the behest of the ruling party [DAN 28L 2s 1969: 4517].

Ideologies of modernisation and gradualism guided the work of the office. Its supervising jurist, André Nadeau, argued that changes were necessary to respond to the increasingly active role and growing responsibilities of married women, occupational autonomy, education and changes in mores [CRCC 1963] [2]. These changes should bring a measure of equality:

*A la place d’un état de subordination conçu d’après un mode suranné, n’y a-t-il pas lieu de reconnaître à*
Bill 16, guided through the Assemblée nationale in 1964 by Claire Kirkland-Casgrain, its only woman member, modified "patriarchal power" over the wife in favour of a "conjugal" model of the family [DAN 27L 3s 1964: 891]. It removed the requirement that married women obey their husbands and gave them the status of full legal persons, including the right to practice an independent profession [RSQ 1964: Code civil, art. 181]. A wife's property rights were extended in all marriage regimes, with her consent required to dispose of community property in the basic regime of biens en commun and her capacities to manage her own property under the regimes of biens réservés and séparation des biens. Women were given the right to arrange medical care for their children in their husband's absence [3] and to contract debts for basic necessities to sustain life for themselves and their children. Although no longer formally chef de famille, the husband retained a greater degree of paternal power over children, continued to assure the material and moral direction of the family and established its domicile unless his residence presented moral or physical dangers [ibid. art. 175] [4]; the wife was to cooperate, to assist. While this reform was defended as egalitarian, women were still the junior partners, "l'épouse associée du mari" [ibid. 899].

Five years later (in 1969), as a "logical follow-up" [DAN 28L
4s 1969: 4516], Bill 10 addressed again the issue of marital property. It established a régime des acquets (a form of community property [5]) as the basic family property regime, without changing the distribution of property rights in already existing marriages. In fact, only a minority [6] of Quebec marriages had been carried out under the provisions of the previous basic regime of biens en commun. In part, this was because of limitations on women's legal capacity and in part because it made a woman liable for obligations incurred by her husband, the representative of the single legal person that constituted the community, as the result of business failure, bankruptcy or bad administration [ibid. 4519]. While protecting a woman from pursuit for her husband's debts, the regime of séparation des biens favoured in most marriage contracts radically limited her claim to what has come to be defined as "family" property: a farm, small business assets or even her house. Rising rates of family breakdown through separation and divorce, seen as a consequence of modernisation, left women in need [7]. Appealing both to a traditional notion that women needed to be protected and to a new idea that women's work in the home merited monetary recognition, all parties rejected this form of marital property rights [ibid. 3684]. Overall, in fact, the approach to family property adopted here was neither based exclusively on a feminist analysis in terms of women's rights nor on cleric-co-nationalist exaltation of the sacredness of the family. It balanced, rather, market measures of worth with
traditional protectionism.

The fact that, even with the passage of Bill 10, gender asymmetry was to some extent still maintained in the law was defended in the AN on economic, sociological and political grounds. First, it was argued that male and female roles were actually different, functionally as well as in terms of power. For the PLQ's Kirkland-Casgrain, conditions of industrial production which meant that a man had to leave home to meet his obligations to support his family materially, made it logical for him to retain his right to define its domicile [DAN 27L 3s 1964: 895]. For another Liberal, Bill 16 merely ratified the already existing fact of women's key role in charge of children [ibid. 899]. A second contention was that hierarchy was necessary in order to ensure "unity" in family decision-making [ibid. 895]. Finally, with Bill 10, members of the then governing UN argued that the proposed reforms reached the limits of social consensus [DAN 28L 4s B-2116, 3529] [8].

Throughout, for the Liberals, the task with regard to family law reform was to balance two roles that were potentially and actually in conflict. In a Quebec still divided between an increasingly secularized urban population and a rural one still devout, it had to present itself as both the historical champion of women's rights [DAN 27L 3s 1964: 922; 28L 3s 1968: 903-904], and as the beneficent defender of the family touted in its 1960 election propaganda. For the first, no other party could rival
its record. In fact, its proposals for Bill 16 went further than the recommendations of the Nadeau Commission wherein the French model of male headship was retained. Pointing to the fact that social norms evolved more rapidly in North America, the PLQ later argued that, with in Bill 16, Quebec had moved into the forefront of francophone legislation [DAN 28L 3s 894-895]. Nor in 1964, did any women’s groups themselves yet present any real ideological or strategic challenge [9].

In its second role, as champion of the family, it presented itself as the moderate face of a modernising evolution that was in any case historically inevitable [10]. Conjugal equality, the basis of a modern philosophy of marriage, it was claimed, was originally a Christian principle, recently given renewed expression by Pope John XXIII [ibid. 895-5]. In its own paper, La Réforme [March 1963; Sept 1964], the PLQ was able to recall that it had granted women the vote without any dire consequences for family unity, while neglecting to mention that this measure had been opposed in the name of national, religious and familial traditions by Catholic women’s organizations and clergy [Stoddart 1973]. Lingering fears about support for the family were addressed by establishing, during that same session, the Conseil supérieur de la famille to promote pro-family policies and provide a voice for pro-family movements [DAN 27L 3s 1964: 3524-3526]. UN leader, Jean-Jacques Bertrand, voiced the hope that this government advisory body would make the family "la
spokesman Emilion Lafrance explained the centrality of the family as an outgrowth of Quebec's "humanisme chrétien et français" [Ibid. 3529]. Also, in presenting the legislation, it made full use of Claire Kirkland-Casgrain, the first woman deputy and cabinet minister, herself highly visible as a mother and daughter embedded in family relations [11].

Unlike the earlier debate on Bill 16, the debate on Bill 10 was largely technical. However, Kirkland-Casgrain's contribution on third reading and the response it generated signaled that the management of gender relations by the state had become more complicated with the emergence of both liberal and revolutionary feminism as organised forces.

Aulourd'hui, alors que nous parlons de société juste, de société heureuse, que nous faisons face à des problèmes tels que les décrivent les expressions de "Student Power" et de "Black Power", d'aucuns prétendent que, d'ici quelques années il y aura sur notre terre d'Amérique; ce serait le "Woman Power" qui revendiquerait pour lui--et le vous sourire, messieurs--les droits et privilèges qu'on lui a systématiquement refusés pendant des siècles et ce pour aboutir à faire des femmes, des citoyennes à part entière, louissant dans tous les domaines de droits égaux à ceux des hommes [DAN 28L 3s 1969: 4516].

Four points are worth noting with reference to this remark. First, the use of English terms for these movements distances them from the Quebec political field by stressing their foreign origin, despite the fact that Indigenous student and national
liberation movements were active in Quebec. Second, agency (beyond historical accident) in refusing women's rights and privileges is implied, but not attributed to any particular institutions or individuals, for example, capitalism or men.

Third, at least some of her fellow legislators, all men, found the idea of "Woman Power" funny enough to make them smile [12]. A UN member of the parliamentary committee responsible for Bill 10, Rolland Théoret, suggested that his encounter with "Woman Power" began "le vendredi soir, quand le retourne chez moi" [DAN 25L 4S 1969: 4519]. Finally, although the women's liberation movement had already made more radical claims, the outcome that Kirkland-Casgrain predicted, and no doubt sought, was full citizenship. Thus, her comment was both disparaged and found threatening, while she herself both raised the possibility of a feminist challenge to power and distanced herself from its radicalism. Overall, the balancing act on family and feminism that the PLQ tried to maintain was becoming more difficult to maintain.

While there was some extraparliamentary criticism of the pace of legislative change, no party or pressure group challenged liberal evolutionist assumptions about how gender relations had and would change. For Bill 16, eight groups, including the CSN, the FTQ, the VOW, the SFDU, l'Association générale des Étudiants de l'Université de Montréal, le Comité ouvrier des Droits de l'Homme, le Conseil du travail de Montréal and the Jewish Labour
Committee, supported the Ligue des droits de l'Homme's view that
the reform of women's property rights contemplated in the Bill
was inadequate and that the formal retention of paternal power
undermined equality [La Presse 7 Feb. 1964, cited in DAN 27L 3s
1964: 396-397]. It was, feminists said, only crumbs [ibid.]. In
bringing these criticisms forward into the AN, the UN opposition
was in effect playing a feminist role, but without breaking from
the framework of the dominant liberal parliamentarist ideology.
In the case of Bill 10, a largely technical criticism of its
mechanisms by notaries and the Bar met with revisions. In
contrast, FFQ concerns with continuing failure to protect women's
right to the marital home, to change all regimes and complexity
in the legislation, raised by the PLQ, then in opposition, went
unheeded [DAN 29L 4s B-2113-2115; FFQ 1967].

Opposition party criticism on both Bills was limited in part
because of the role of the CRCC in preparing draft legislation.
Because the UN had initiated the reform of the Code civil, it, in
a sense, shared responsibility for sponsoring Bill 16. Similarly,
preliminary drafts of Bill 10, prepared before 1968, were only
proposed as legislation under the UN [13]. The absence of
criticism can also be explained by the fact that on this issue,
the PLQ and UN reformists and the conservative Créditistes had
found a middle ground, that the measure was seen as a pragmatic
catch-up and that, in the legislature, there was no more radical
voice [14].

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The legislative goals of equality within the family and protection for women in the case of family breakdown were only partially met by these reforms. Family law still enshrined asymmetrical gender roles and was vague on women's birth names. Women's groups found the legislation too complex and inadequate to protect women's right to the family home [DAN 28L 3s 1969: B-2115]. Still, feminist demands were met by increasing state intervention into a realm of "private" relations which had previously been under the moral supervision of the Church. There is, and was at the time, a debate about the adequacy of these reforms. If neither feminists nor traditionalists were fully satisfied [Interview: A, Q; Collectif Cillo 1982: 428], everyone thought they were practically necessary to bring the law into line with the actual practice of, for example, women who entered professions without their husbands' permission or chose marriage contracts to regulate property.

9.2.2.11. Formal equality as citizens.

A second set of reforms of women's legal status shifted the terrain from the private realm of patriarchal power in the family to the question of public equality rights as citizens. The first instance of this was in the aftermath of the revolutionary feminist FLF's 1971 courtroom contestation of women's exclusion from jury duty [6.2.2. above]. A few months later Bill 34, La
The issue was raised again with regard to gender human rights legislation three years later. Opening the legislature on March 14, 1974, the PLQ indicated its intention to overcome the negligence of the past by a Charte des droits de l'homme [16]. The stated purpose of such a code was to protect Quebecers by safeguarding "acquired values of democracy and individual rights and freedoms", by translating principles into concrete laws and by providing recourse for individuals through court awards of damages [DAN 30L 2s 1974: 2396]. Politically, it was intended to reassure nonfrancophone minorities that the PLQ could protect their interests in the face of nationalist language agitation and to provide a democratic gloss for a government increasingly portrayed as repressive and corrupt [Le Devoir 20 Jan 1971, 31]
Oct. 1973]. Although discrimination on the grounds of sex was proscribed in the Charter -- third in a list after race and colour but before marital status, religion, political convictions, ethnic or national origin and social status -- no further reference was made to this dimension in the rest of the opening speech. Later, in the debate on first reading, Liberal Justice Minister Jérôme Choquette pointed to women’s exclusion from taverns, the only example of sex discrimination offered by a member of that party. Rather, interventions by both the PLQ and the UN speakers centered on the right to education in the language of one’s choice [DAN 3OL 2s 1974: 2817-2820] [17].

Despite his party’s emphasis on working class rights (to unionization and economic democracy), it was the péquistte Jacques-Yvan Morin who stressed gender equality. He criticized the bill as sexist for marginalizing the question of women: "la place de la femme dans cette charte est tout à fait secondaire" [Ibid. 2754]. Responding to anticipated opposition ("Oh! je sais que le ministre va me répondre qu’au sens générique l’homme embrasse la femme"), he nevertheless insisted that the title of the proposed Charter be changed so as to reflect gender neutral feminist usage: "droits de la personne" rather than "droits de l’homme" [Ibid. 2753]. Specific rights were necessary to respond to the real problems women faced. These included the longstanding labour and feminist concern for maternity leave and the CSF concern with inequality in the public service. But he
went beyond workplace issues, to raise ones of autonomy. Here he mentioned the need for a married women to have access to education and work without her husband's consent and her need to have an autonomous identity confirmed through the life-long right to use her birth name, "un élément indispensable de sa personnalité" [Ibid. 2754] [18].

Morin's statement should not be seen as a personal idiosyncracy; rather it was a strategic response to bloc positioning and illustrated important points of PQ gender strategy. Overall, the PQ had a pedagogical orientation to law and the state. Beyond its legal implications, a charter, as a fundamental constitutional law, represented a "sorte de contrat social" where citizens' rights and duties were mutually recognized with a view to a greater dignity of persons and a better balanced social life. It could be used, in part by formal state instruction in schools, to change public attitudes, revising "la morale collective des Québécois" [Ibid. 2757] [19]. In short, through Morin the PQ announced its intention to include women equally in a legal social contract at the level of the state at the same time as it sought to consolidate a more radically egalitarian feminism as part of the opposition bloc it headed. In contrast, Morin's personal views may be more accurately represented in a report by the usually reliable Graham Fraser [1984: 221-222].

According to this source, Morin told Lise Payette in 1977, that he "had difficulty understanding the phrase 'equality of women'
and thought it would be better to talk of 'complementarity of women', a formulation associated not with recent feminist ideologies of non-differentiation but with traditional or maternal feminist acceptance of gender divisions [20].

The acceptance by the PLQ of gender neutral language for the Charter (personne instead of homme), showed that some recognition of the importance of the state's adopting language usage which could equally address women and men was beginning to be shared across party and bloc lines. However, this acknowledgement was not made part of all state practices. New identity cards to be issued on April 1 1976 by the state health insurance scheme, the Règle de l'Assurance maladie, required the use of her husband's name on a married woman's card. Several organizations, RAIF, SFDU, FFQ, the CSF, objected to what the CEQ's Comité Laure Gaudreault saw as a patriarchalist placement of women in "l'ombre de l'homme" [Le Devoir 24 March 1976]. In response, the Règle argued ease of transition and statistical research required family identification and proposed that women be allowed to apply to have a card issued in her birth name only, a formality not required of men [Le Devoir 5 Nov. 1976], a development that RAIF [27 été 1976: 13] claimed as a victory. On this issue, feminist criticism was framed in terms of the ideological elements of justice, identity and autonomy: watchwords, as we have seen, of Quebec feminism since the early 1960s. But we should note that it was only the practice of naming that was attacked by the feminist
and nationalist oppositions active on this issue, and not the institutional structure of the family itself or its central place in state ideology and administrative policy.

9.2.3. Women, work and marriage.

Throughout the 1960-1976 period, an increase in women’s labour force participation meant that there was pressure to reform the woman-work-marriage relation, not only ideologically but through the provision of infrastructural supports to aid working women. However, neither of the governing parties offered much in the way of legislative action, leaving change largely to market forces or to extra-governmental ideological apparatuses, for example in the media and the labour movement.

To be sure, the family legislation just discussed did have some implications for women’s position in the work force. Provisions on work in Bill 16 abolished legal barriers to individual access to the labour market. Also, as we have seen, in line with its equal opportunity ideology, the PLQ removed barriers to women’s night work in 1966 and, under pressure from the party, reformed the minimum salary law in 1964 to include a weak form of equal pay provisions [21]. During the UN government, although there was some discussion of the system of out-work, where mainly women worked at low piece work rates, no new regulations were put in place, on the grounds that, even if unions objected, "people"
wanted it [DAN 28L 3s 1967: 552-553, 2007]. The 1966 provisions were eventually strengthened, however, by the PLQ in the 1975 Charter of Rights [22]. In addition, Article 11 forbade the publication of discriminatory notices or symbols, a provision that the CSF used to urge the banning of employment advertisements specifying women or men [CSFB 2:5 1975: 12-14, 16-17].

There reforms were limited, however, by their formally egalitarian character and as such can be seen more as creating free market conditions for labour, and removing barriers to the expansion of the state, than as ensuring concrete equality in women’s access to and treatment in the labour force. For example, despite party policy and ministerial promises [23], maternity leave was not enacted, and plans announced for equality of opportunity measures [see 9.2.3.11. below] in the public sector gave rise to only a small experimental programme in the Justice ministry [24]. Nor, from the perspective of gender equalization, was the Liberals’ faith in the private sector confirmed by results. Salaries remained unequal [Tardy Bernard 1977] and an unpublished study for the CSF reported that even by the late 1970s private sector affirmative action programmes covered only a few women [Boucher and Langlois cited CSF 1978: 267]. What advances there were in equal pay and maternity leave in the private [Lepage and Lavigne 1981] or public sectors were won through contract negotiations, particularly the 1972 and 1976
strikes [25]. As we shall see, the attendant politicization of public sector negotiations meant that any political credit or moral authority to be gained from promoting these issues devolved, instead, onto the opposition.

On the other hand, despite its pro-family rhetoric and the desires of its membership, the PLQ did little to advance a positive family policy [26]. Despite occasional discussion about falling birth rates, the PLQ did not adopt strong pro-natalist measures [27]. Day care was left privatized and underfunded [28]; and a system of emergency family help was never established. The one programme initiated by the PLQ, a series of ten prenatal educational films, was attacked by the Le Devoir women's columnist, Renee Rowan [20 April 1975], as biased and unrealistic. Still, the theme of the family continued to be an ideological element in the PLQ's public self-presentation. It was, for example, a workshop topic at the 1974 and 1976 conventions and a main theme for the 1975 convention, where, in the context of a turn to law and order, women's rights issues were ignored [29]. In contrast, on the right, Creditiste pro-natalist, pro-family ideologies offered maternity leave and forgiveable marriage loans [Le Devoir 28 Nov. 1973]; while, on the left, the PQ struggled to balance nationalist pro-natalism and feminism.

The PLQ's relative lack of attention to enacting family policy is related to the kind of nationalism it espoused as well as to
its liberal predisposition to leave the family in the realm of the private. After its first electoral campaigns, the PLQ addressed popular-democratic concerns for national survival less by turning to traditional ideologies of the family or by making the defense of language a central preoccupation, as by engaging in a dynamic of conflict with the federal government over resource and institutional control. And, once the issue of the physical survival of the nation (dénatalité) had become identified with the nationalist and PQ camp, it was difficult for the PLQ centrally to address it without setting other aspects of its strategy, namely its federalism and its electoral support among non-francophone voters, at risk.

As well as the constraints on the development of PLQ family policy represented by nationalism, other groups were critical of the PLQ programme to manage the woman-work-family relation. For example, following the direction of nationalist demographer Henripin, the Conseil supérieur de la Famille and groups associated with the family movement criticized its lack of programmes to offset falling birth rates [30]. Although the kinds of criticisms they offered had changed over time, the labour centrals were also critical of PLQ policy, from the early CSN opposition to the abolition of protective legislation preventing night work for women to the new activist mid-1970s feminist programmes for workplace equality. And as we have seen, from their very different perspectives, both liberal and revolutionary
feminists argued that the lack of adequate social support for women was a cause of falling birth rates. Overall then, concrete measures to reform the conditions in which women balanced employment and domestic responsibilities remained of marginal importance in state policy until after 1976; and the whole issue of providing support for the working woman, and more especially the working mother, came to be claimed as its own by the opposition forces that coalesced under the leadership of the PQ.

9.2.4. Integration into the state.

9.2.4.1. Integration through state structures: the Conseil du statut de la femme.

The high point of gender political reform under the aegis of the liberal modernisation bloc was the establishment of the Conseil du statut de la femme in 1973. This marked a turn in the mode of integrating women into political discourse of the state: that is, from their location as members of a patriarchally structured family to their situation as individuals seeking fulfillment (épanouissement) as citizens and workers. Ideologically, this turn connoted that a feminist definition of women's rights had come to transcend natural or theological argument. As we shall see, however, this shift was by no means complete so that definitions of women as "individuals" and as "mothers" continued to co-exist in an uneasy ideological balance.

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Nevertheless. setting up the CSF was an Important step.

Its

very existence acknowledged that gender pol I tics were an actual
dimension of social contradictions and at the same time Its
establ lshment altered the relation of gender pol ltlcal forces by
creating a new branch of the state to off lclal ly represent
women.

At the same time.

It formally Integrated I lberal feminism

Itself Into the state apparatus.
member.

It was to be ".u.n carrefour offlclel ~ ~ POURRONS

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[DAN 29L 4s 1973: 2135, added

From the beginning. then. the CSF was placed In an

ambiguous and yet strategic relation to the women's movement. as
a body which was organizationally within the state and
pol ltlcal ly positioned to mediate the whole "woman"/state
relation.

Sections 9.2.4. I I and 9.2.4. I I I examine the party

gender Ideologies articulated In the AN debate on establ I sh Ing
the CSF and the development of Its actual practices and pol Icy
positions respectively.
9.2.4. I. Debate on the CSF (1).
Despite Its compression Into two days at the end of a crowded
session. the debate on the second and third readings of Bl I 1 63.
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femme. reveals the fullest

articulation of Ideologies of women. particularly by the PLQ and
the UN.

In a period notable for the absence of such open

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discussion in the legislature. Given the heterogeneous conceptions of women held by parliamentary spokesmen, discussions of gender equality necessarily involved the question of the family. Nor were their conceptions of equality very clear. Wanting to say that women were or ought to be "equal" in some undefined personalist sense, they resorted to asserting that they were equal in fact but somehow also faced special problems. Their weak definition of inequality as discrimination ignored the globally structured character of female subordinate gender relations.

Opening the debate, the PLQ's Gérard-D. Lévesque presented his party as rational modern social managers who were nevertheless democratic humanists sensitive to social concerns raised by women. Integrating rationalist and humanist logics gave him a functionalist justification for gender equality as part of a liberal modernising programme: a high level of civilization and humanist values required full citizen participation. Therefore,

Les efforts du gouvernement et des milieux concernés pour la promotion de la femme relègent cette même préoccupation de valorisation de nos ressources humaines en vue d'accroître la participation au sein de notre collectivité et d'éliminer les obstacles à cette participation" [Ibid. 2088].

For these reasons, he said, the PLQ had responded to the FFQ's request for a Consell [Ibid.] [31].

His arguments for gender equality were essentially evolutionist
and moral [32]. His exposition of the numerous problems facing women pointed to socialization as the origin of inequality. The inculcation of roles "selon le sexe" in the educational system engendered inequalities of opportunity: in athletics, in occupational and career choice ("l'orientation professionnelle et choix de la carrière"), in wages and promotion and even in pensions and life insurance [ibid. 2089].

For Lévesque, analysing the family posed problems because of difficulties in evaluating women's work in the home. Honouring "l'administratrice et l'éducatrice de la mère de famille" was rarely went beyond words and "les facilités d'épanouissement" for these women were perhaps more limited [ibid.]. But, as another Liberal member pointed out, the PLQ considered the family to be an essential social institution: "Quoi de plus digne de la femme que son rôle de mère... elle assure la survivance de la cellule essentielle à toute société..." [ibid. 2133]. Saving it, he continued, would require the full participation of men in partnership with women. Here, then, a traditional ideological attachment to "la cellule familiale" was used to ground a liberal view of gender relations as essentially non-conflictual.

Similar confusions are to be found in the UN's main speaker Tremblay. In a pro-feminist vein, his rather rambling attempt to reconstruct the origins of women's subordination connected it, on the one hand, to the pronatalism of totalitarian military regimes (from ancient Greece to Hitler) and, on the other, to misogynous
religious doctrine. Introducing a "personal note", he invited his (male) colleagues "à se faire un examen sérieux de sa conscience et à demander si tous et chacun, nous ne sommes pas responsables des préjugés qui existent encore dans la société québécoise à l'endroit de la femme" [Ibid. 2090]. The status of women in Quebec, he concluded, while not "déplorable, pitoyable, misérable", was also not equal. While his own political staff was largely female, in general women did not receive equitable treatment in the work force.

At the same time, in a more traditionally Catholic vein, he claimed that gender equality was not incompatible with functional differentiation between the sexes: "la femme est l'égale de l'homme, ses fonctions sont différentes" [Ibid.]. Eclectically mixing moral and market criteria, he identified the role of women in the home as perhaps the most socially useful and touching (émouvant) of all, while suggesting that the high costs of the sacrifices it demanded be compensated by a salary [Ibid. 2091].

The ambiguity of his position led to a major gaffe when he came to the thorny issue of who was to control the CSF. Questioning the class and regional representativeness of the proposed council, out of a concern for "les petites filles qui travaillent dans des restaurants.... des magasins, dans des confiseries....sur les fermes", he attacked wealthy dilettantes ("des pâteuses....avec des beaux manteaux, des diamants") as inappropriate for council membership. While he did not want the
PLQ government to exercise control over the CSF, he did want the latter's research to be directed to serve women on welfare, not to go off on tangents about ballet lessons [Ibid. 2093, B-3985-3987]. Behind these populist concerns, one can see a certain "joking" hostility to women's organizations as such [33], picturing their members as well-off consumers of "snob" culture with a contrasting protectionism toward "les petites filles" [34]. His unease about women's place in the political process was shared by other members. Tremblay's bachelorhood was the occasion for some merriment, while his pride in the prominent place of women on his staff just prompted sexual innuendo and charges that he discriminated against men [Ibid. 2089, 2091]. The hidden assumptions behind these reactions were that women do not gain positions on merit, that men are better than women and that interparty rivalries are more salient than agendas set by women themselves.

Although all the opposition parties questioned the representativeness of the proposed council and the PLQ's haste in presenting the legislation [35], the Créditistes went a step further, accusing the government of a panic stricken response to its sudden discovery that there were women in Quebec. Yvon Brochu accused the PLQ of engaging in political vaudeville, of being motivated by opportunism in proposing "un projet qui sent d'électoralisme à plein nez" and of creating a "comité fantôme" [Ibid. 2118, 2095]. Brochu and his colleagues denied the need for
any special legislation, let alone a council. Under a Créditiste government all legislation would have its feminine aspect [ibid. 2133]; nothing more was needed than simply to recognize equality in law [ibid. 2122]. His deeper concerns were revealed in his assessment that the family was endangered: widows could not survive on their pensions, welfare mothers received only a third of what foster parents would get for raising their children, teachers committed sex offenses, family enterprises were economically pressed. Women's rights as mothers were threatened by the availability of information on abortion in CEGEPs and actual abortions available from Morgentaler [ibid. 2120-2021]. The main task was thus to revalorize the role of la femme de famille with a salary and minimum guaranteed income [ibid. 2119].

In sum, without actually attacking feminism, the Créditistes used a liberal argument about equal legal treatment to deny the fact of gender conflict and to exalt family-centeredness in women.

The PQ also questioned the haste and representativeness of the process of formulating the legislation. But its perspective introduced the new feminist radicalism of the Ideological break into the discussion [36]. The party's main spokesman, psychiatrist Camille Laurin, who had already written a forward to one of the first of the new Quebec feminist books [37], was particularly well prepared [ibid. 2123-2126]. Like Tremblay, he sought to explain women's secondary status historically. But he also pointed to material factors, in the levels of economic and
technological development and in conditions of (uncontrolled) procreation, along with the gender political element of male preponderance in the public sphere and of cultural codes defining women as bearers of a dangerous, sinful sexuality. The effects of these latter, he noted, became "automatisés", even "Inconscients", as shapers of social development and motivators of individual actions [38]. Finally, privileged class interests were served by women's status and he castigated "des patrons" for "profitant d'une façon scandaleuse du travail féminin".

His feminism was activist, left-wing and even strong enough to mute his nationalist hostility to the involvement of the federal government, in this area. He credited historical and contemporary women's movements for changing the relations between the sexes and argued that feminist thinkers and the federal Royal Commission on the Status of Women (Bird Commission) [39] had already provided clear directions for a multidimensional improvement of women's condition. He hoped the perspective of the revolutionary feminist Centre des femmes would become generalized. Of particular interest to this study, Laurin viewed "women" as engaged in a process of self-definition [ibid. 2127]. Although, like épanouissement this process can be read as occurring at the level of the individual, it can also be seen as a collective process of gender formation; the latter possibility is strengthened by his reference to collective consciousness raising [ibid. 2125].
For Laurin, present social arrangements were culturally
alienating, created conflicts between employment and domestic
responsibilities and, echoing earlier citélibriste
preoccupations, had led to a crisis in the couple [5:1 above].
Women were divided, between those who were dissatisfied with the
status quo and those who were privileged or made passive by it;
but the real problem for proponents of reform was "l'hostilité,
parfois sournoise, parfois brutale de la gente masculine" [ibid.
2128]. Under the circumstances the state had an obligation to
correct injustices and to assure the achievement of real gender
equality [ibid. 2129]. As well as paying wages for housework, the
state should provide services to harmonize the two roles
(daycare, "auxiliares familiales", help for woman-headed
families, retraining) as well as assure workplace equality
through non-sexist schooling, the right to unionize and the
provision of maternity leave. On the cultural front, the state
should actively oppose the objectification of "la femme-louet"
(woman as plaything), particularly in broadcasting [ibid. 2129].
Perhaps its most important role, however, was to educate the
public on the basis of a general philosophy which would let it
integrate "la dimension féminine, une dimension égalitaire" into
all its activities [ibid.]. Here, by making such a call from a
perspective which understood the actuality of gender inequality,
Laurin gave a feminist meaning to almost the same words as those
of the Créditiste member Brochu.
Laurin had also done his homework on the political process leading up to the legislation. While the Liberals presented themselves as fulfilling the FFQ’s demand, he pointed out that the legislation proposed the weakest of three models put forward by the FFQ, who had merely settled for what they could get [Ibid. 2130]. His stance was indeed more radical than that of the FFQ itself, for it had, after a process of pressure and back room dealing, come to accept and identify with the legislation and even count it as a victory [Le Devoir 5 July 1973; FFQB 3:5 July 1973: 10], a view capitalized on by the PLQ [DAN 29L 4s 1973: 2099, 2140].

Despite united opposition support, the UN’s proposal to table the legislation for four months of further study was defeated by the PLQ majority. On July 22, enabling legislation for the CSF, Bill 63, was finally passed unanimously [Ibid. 2350].

9.2.4.iii. The CSF: mandate and activity under the Liberals.

Because the Conseil du statut de la femme was established by legislation rather than government mandate [40] and because it reported directly and annually to the legislature, it was placed in a relatively strong position [Le Devoir 6 Sept. 1974]. It was given the following powers and responsibilities [CSF 1973/1974: 5-6]:

- to advise the government on any matter submitted dealing with the equality, rights and status of women;
- to communicate its findings, conclusions and any problems it considered as requiring government study or action to the responsible minister and to ensure that its recommendations were carried out;

- to receive and hear petitions from individuals and groups;

- to inform the public;

- with prior ministerial approval, to set up special committees; and

- to report each year by June 30.

Although both parliamentarians and feminists expressed concerns about whether it had the necessary freedom to initiate research [41], it proved to be an activist and independent-minded body.

Voting members of the CSF sat for four year terms [42]. They included a president, vice-president, full time secretary and appointees from different social milieux: women’s associations (4), the university milieu (2), "socio-economic groups" (2), and organized labour (2). In addition, the deputy ministers (or their delegates) of eight ministries including social affairs, labour, justice, education, the civil service, culture, communications and finance, were ex-officio non-voting members. Within this generally facilitative organizational structure, the appointment of FFQ activists like Laurette Champigny Robillard, Caroline
Pestlau and Francine Depatie [43] to the first three posts respectively as well as strong feminist representations from the labour and women's movements gave the CSF, from the outset, an experienced leadership core [44].

According to its first Rapport annuel [CSF 1973/1974], in its first year the CSF was primarily concerned with setting up its own structures, making intra-governmental links and undertaking a study on equality of opportunity for women in the public service commissioned by public service minister Oswald Parent [45]. Its other priorities that year were day care; education (stereotypes, guidance and access); the economic situation of women in the home; family court; part-time work; and discrimination in human rights, credit access, marriage benefits and wages [46]. It set up study subcommittees on childcare, the upcoming International Women's Year and the public service, mandating the last to establish a programme and timetable for implementing equal opportunity. The IWY group was to consider projects submitted for funding and to establish a strategy and schedule for reaching women in 1975.

The high profile business of IWY, including a survey of the opinions of québécoises held by québécols [47], took up its second year [CSF 1974/1975]. In subsequent years, it added, according to its president Robillard, the "less spectacular but more important" [Le Devoir, 7 June 1976] projects of legal reform, intra-governmental communications, unemployment, divorce and
family legislation [CSF 1974/1975], the use of birth names [48] and violence [Leclerc ndb] to its list of priorities. Always concerned to maintain communication with the Quebec women it saw as its base, it began publishing a monthly Bulletin [49]; established Action-femmes, a province-wide free telephone information service [50]; and sponsored a series of regional consultations [CSFB 2:2 nd 7-8; 3:4 Summer 1976: 9-11]. The largest of these, the IWY Carrefour 1975, gave the CSF a public face, undertook consciousness raising, set up links with women's groups and resulted in a programme that could legitimately be claimed to have been defined and approved by les québécoises in light of their specific needs [51].

An indication of the CSF's sense of political autonomy from the government in Quebec City and its strong orientation to the women's movement is that it set up a permanent regional office in Montreal in order to give itself a presence close to the headquarters of women's organizations [CSFB 3:6 1976: 2-5]. Through this office, it hoped to coordinate the actions of diverse groups to maximum effect [52]. Although benevolently intended, the CSF's intervention posed political problems for the wider women's movement by making central a state body to coordinate a women's movement that was, as we have seen in Chapters 6 and 7, at that time unable to establish permanent structures to coordinate itself [Interview: J].

From the outset, the CSF skillfully used media publicity to
pressure the government. Early in the course of a struggle, which pitted daycare groups and their feminist and union supporters against the Minister of Cooperatives, Lise Bacon, the CSF issued a "cri d'urgence" insisting that the government provide funding to maintain the popular day care centres established by LIP/PIL funds [CSFB 1:4 Sept. 1974: 1-2; 2:4 n.d. 4-6]. After seven months of government footdragging on workplace equality legislation [CSF 1974b], which had already been vetted by labour and justice officials and approved in principle by the labour minister Jean Cournoyer [Le Devoir 13 April 1975], the CSF called a press conference to publicize a special issue of its Bulletin [Jan. 1975] on that legislation [53], asking individuals and organizations for support and stressing the urgency of government action. Without specifically accusing the government of sexism, the CSF's actions made it clear that delays had more to do with the political will of the ruling party than with technical problems [CSFB 3:3 nd: 6-7]. Similarly, it publically stated its support for decriminalizing abortion and for publically funded clinics where abortions would actually be performed [Le Devoir 10 July 1975; CSFB 3:6 Dec. 1976: 15-16] [54]. It also reviewed and criticized legislation, such as human rights legislation, urging its strengthening to benefit women, educating women on how to use its provisions and offering to put its own resources at the disposal of test cases that would benefit women [CSFB 2:5 1975: 16-17].
While retaining the liberal equal opportunity discourse built into its mandate, the CSF was also concerned with the effects of class inequalities on women. Stressing the economic dimensions of gender inequalities led it to see women and workers as natural allies [CSFB 2:1 nd: 5; GF 1:2 May 1979: 13-16]. As well, it adopted the socialist legend of International Women’s Day as originating in garment workers’ struggles for unionization, and stressed its centrality to a militant strategy of unity in struggle [CSFB 2:1 nd: 7].

In pursuit of the goal of individual equality, the CSF then, (unlike Liberal and UN politicians, but like the PQ), was led to think about women as a collectivity and to adopt a strategy of mass mobilization.

Given its definition as a state structure representing women, the CSF was an important mechanism for the integration of women and feminist movements into the ruling bloc. Nevertheless, its public visibility, the resources it commanded, its ideology and its activist willingness to openly criticize the government all served to stress and heighten the conflict element in gender political relations. Its situation in a state structure whose
Ideology, laws and practices reproduced both gender hierarchy as such and class differences in women's situations, was to some extent in conflict with its mandate to advance the cause of women. Even the liberal feminism it espoused placed it in an oppositional relation to the government. At the same time its mandate to serve a single interest group, women, meant that its priorities were not identical with those of either the labour or nationalist leaderships of the opposition bloc [55]. For feminist organizers too, its role was ambiguous. While it publicized and legitimated their demands, it did so in a form that accorded with established state practices and responded to the government’s timetable, not women’s movement priorities. As a result, liberal feminists were, as we shall see, particularly after 1977, impatient with its pace; while radical and revolutionary feminists were critical of its ideology and suspicious of its subordination to state and party ends.

9.2.5. Integration into the state: Intra-party politics.

The liberal modernization bloc attempted to incorporate women ideologically along two main dimensions. The first was through the articulation of an ideology of progress and evolution which denied that women’s subordination had a structural character and, hence, could ignore the reality of gender political conflict. The second was through a parliamentarist claim that women, like
men, were represented by the elected government and in the state. Except for Kirkland-Casgrain's brief mention of "Woman Power", gender conflict was not seriously acknowledged in speeches in the AN by PLQ members, despite a women's movement growing in size and militancy. Women were interpellated [56] as family members, as objects of protection or as individual citizens and never as a gender with collective interests of its own in opposition to those of men. These two dimensions fitted well with the overall tenets of modernisation ideology. All responsibility for discrimination could be laid at the hands of a "past", radically divided from the present by a quiet and progressing revolution, for which the ruling party, whether UN or PLQ, need only take selective responsibility, while the state political processes could be identified with progress.

All this played out not only at the level of the state in the way we have just seen, but also at the level of internal party politics. The rest of this section concentrates, then, on the PLQ itself as the main party governing during the liberal modernisation bloc and as the main promoter of its ideology.

In the internal operations of the PLQ as a party, two different modes of integration were offered. The first, a separate women's body [5.2. above] was rejected in favour of the second, a gender neutral assimilation of the FFLQ's 25,000 members into the party in 1970, under the presidency of Lise Bacon [57]. Bacon's (bilingual) inaugural presidential statement required women's
best efforts to transmit "la vérité libérale à nos concitoyennes" and promised electoral aid to the party leader [L'Électeur Jan. 1970: 8]. The FFLQ failed to get either the formal or actual parity on all governing bodies that it wanted, but PLQ members claimed that equal numbers of male and female convention delegates were elected [DAN 29L 3s 1974: 2132].

As I have mentioned [5.2.3. above], in the 1960s given the relative absence of women in positions of power in the PLQ, the leader's wife often appeared on the FFLQ pages of La Réforme as a symbol of Liberal women. Since she appeared only by virtue of her martial relation, we can say that the image presented was of a helpmeet. After 1970 the image of the leader's wife changed somewhat with the election of Bourassa to party leadership. Rarely visible on the political scene, Andrée Simard Bourassa, a member of the economically powerful Simard family [58], was presented as a modern combination of glamour and helpmeet: like many women pursuing further education yet ready to subordinate academic demands to her husband's political life, part of an ordinary couple [La Presse 6 Jan. 1970]. While the reasons for her absence from the political scene are not clear, they may well have included political expediency. Bourassa's administration met with charges of corruption and conflict of interest (in part because of its dealings with Simard family enterprises [59]) paralysing enough to lead Le Devoir [3 March 1975] editorialist Michel Roy to question, not just PLQ capabilities, but the
parliamentary system itself. Still, when the PLQ sought a speaker to represent its "feminist" side during IWY, Andréé Bourassa delivered a speech which argued not only that women were increasingly given a just value, but also, echoing Mill, that most women would, given a choice, opt for the role of mother and wife, because that is their nature. Such a vocation, she went on, freely chosen, would be a source of happiness. Thus, PLQ ideology still contained naturalist assumptions as well as validating women's turn to careers [L'Eлектeur Sept./Oct. 1975: 6-7].

In the PLQ's conduct in the legislature, two solutions to the problem of how to present itself as representing women were also tried: tokenism and representation. In the first phase, up to 1970 tokenism was combined with patronising rhetorical galantry [60]. Although there was only one woman in the house, she was given a cabinet post and often responsibilities for women's issues [61]. The visibility, symbolic significance and the assumption that tokens represent all members of the group to which they belong [Kanter 1977: 210-216] were clearly evident for Kirkland-Casgrain whose election was touted as a sign of a new dawn for women. This strategy was less available in the case of Bacon who was often at loggerheads with groups promoting women's issues. However, the founding of the CSF as a state body to represent women, took some of the pressure of representivity off the one elected member.
More important was the way in which the reported positions of women's organizations were used both before and after 1973 to legitimate policy. The AN record of both ruling and oppositional parties indicates that the optimistic prediction that the FFQ would become the official spokesperson for women was to some extent realized. The PQ's intention to incorporate feminist issues is indicated by its readiness to raise feminist questions in the legislature, by its ideologically critical approach and by its willingness to raise class conscious feminist concerns, as well as those of the FFQ. And, despite its ideological ambivalence, the UN too sought legitimation in and for the FFQ. Only the Créditistes put more conservative women's organizations ahead of it. However, the combination of the PLQ's claim to put forward FFQ views and its actual lack of action on issues like maternity and employment equity tells us not only about the particular relation of forces on the Quebec political field during the 1960s and early 1970s, but also points to the way in which liberal feminism was ideologically articulated within the capitalist state. For the ruling parties feminism started from a limited abstract equality of opportunity perspective (in the family and work force), which was formally expanded to recognize that women had special claims (with the founding of the CSF). For its supporters in autonomous women's organizations, however, liberal feminism gradually radicalized, developing a more subtle understanding of the cultural dimensions of sexism embedded in gendered role structures and a more concrete programme for
reform. As a result, liberal feminism occupied a somewhat contradictory position, both as part of the hegemonic liberal modernisation ideology articulated by state institutions and ruling parties, but also as a movement whose demands had not been met by the ruling parties of that bloc.

9.3. Gender politics within the PQ bloc.

9.3.1. A new party accedes to power.

As we have seen from the brief sketches of the parliamentary performance of PQ members above and in the discussions of its relationship to the nationalist, revolutionary and workers' movements in previous chapters, the PQ came to power with a quite different strategy vis-à-vis gender politics from that adopted by the Liberals. In government, as in opposition, its ideologies of women were more fully articulated and more feminist. An explicitly feminist gender politics appeared as part of the government's public face from the beginning, with warm support for International Women's Day being expressed in its "Discours inaugural" for the first full legislative session [62]. Its conception of gender equality was also more sophisticated: it was prepared to modify the Charte des droits de la personne to permit affirmative action (discrimination positive) if this proved necessary to ensure workplace equality catchup [DAN 31L 4s 1980: 5190-1] [63]. Flowing from this fuller definition of equality
were proposals to address the specific aspects of women's situation that needed to be corrected if they were actually to have the same opportunities and power as men [64]. Most importantly, it acted to legislate support for the working mother.

All of this meant that the woman it interpellated was not just an abstract individual citizen or a mother located in a family, but a worker, a Quebecer and a feminist as well [65]. Its reference groups included trade union feminists and feminist radicals as well as liberal feminist pressure groups like the FFQ and AFEAS [66]. Indeed, an argument can be made that its identification with feminism was strong enough to undermine some other aspects of its programme, as it found to its cost during the referendum campaign [10.1.4. below].

To note these points is not to award the feminist palm to the party nor to assume its homogeneity with respect to gender issues. For feminist policies had to be incorporated into a policy matrix where sexism endured, nationalism dominated ideologically and a rationalist planning process coexisted with a mood of almost millenarian euphoria -- "tous émus, fébriles mêmes" [Payette 1982: 1-2] [67]. For René Lévesque and other party members the November 15, 1976 election victory presented an opportunity that was on the one hand, because unexpected, fragile and on the other the beginning point of a long term process of social reconstruction and individual transformation [Fraser 1984:
Confident statements by the new prime minister, illustrate one pole of this situation: "A partir d'aujourd'hui, demain nous appartient" [DAN 31L 2s 1977: 3].

Overall, according to Lévesque [DAN 31L 2s 1977: 3-10], the PQ government was committed to a long term comprehensive programme that included: civil service reform; economic growth; workplace health and safety legislation and compensation for actual victims of asbestosis [68]; mechanisms to avoid future work stoppages during police contract negotiations; consumer protection; state automobile insurance; protection of agricultural land; accords with Indians and Inuit; and long term reform of the courts and labour code. As well, there were the nationalist centrepieces: language legislation ("la vitalité culturelle et linguistique...une priorité absolue"), and a mechanism, a referendum, for the self-determination of the people of Quebec. Women were promised an in depth study leading to a "politique d'ensemble sur la condition féminine" and an improvement in services. Similarly, in subsequent opening addresses economic development and political and economic autonomy prevailed, although maternity leave and "une accélération substantielle et une réorientation du développement des garderies" were promised even before the CSF's recommendations were presented [69].

Let us now trace, using the same issue categories as in 9.2. above, the actual development of gender politics at the level of the state during the PQ government's early years.
9.3.2. Equality.

Although equality was retained as a key ideological element in the PQ's legislative discourse, it took on a new meaning. Rather than calling simply for the removal of discriminatory clauses from Quebec laws, the PQ sought to make gender equality part of its policy of total social renewal, an approach which characterized its sense of social mission. Still, it did move to meet unsatisfied feminist demands for formal equality in family law.

The major reform of family law in Bill 89, Loi instituant un nouveau Code civil et portant réforme du droit de la famille, postdates this study, not taking effect until April 2, 1982 [70]. The reforms purged the remaining elements of patriarchalism and gender asymmetry in the rights and obligations of spouses in their relation to one another and as parents [71]. Protection of the family home (and household furnishings) required spousal consent to sell, rent, sublet, end a lease on or, in some cases, mortgage a residence. This provision overrode existing marriage contracts [72]. While contractual freedom was maintained, the société des acquets was extended to cover all non-contract marriages in Quebec. Property brought to the marriage, inheritance and gifts remained personal property; while all property acquired through work, including pension benefits and business activity, belonged in common and would be divided on
dissolution of the marriage. The legislation formalized a married woman's right to use her birth name and to pass it to her children, alone or in combination with that of her husband [73]. All distinctions between legitimate, adopted or natural children were extinguished. Although a married woman's children were still presumed to be fathered by her husband, she, like the father, was now allowed to disavow that paternity during the first year of a child's life.

These provisions for property division in the Quebec law were designed both to meet the requirements of formal equality and to address the problems faced by divorced or separated women [74]. Meeting a demand of the FFQ, RAIF and sole support or welfare groups like ADDS, the support payment (pension alimentaire) was made indexable to the cost of living and its payment assured by direct state backup and pursuit of defaulters [75].

9.3.3. Women, work and marriage.

Once in power, the PQ abandoned its policy of wages for housework in favour of reforms to protect, in labour minister Pierre-Marc Johnson's words, women's "choix d'exercer librement leur droit au travail ainsi que leur droit à la maternité" [DAN 31L 3s 1978: 1896] [76]. In ideological terms, the party's support for maternity leave crystallized in one and the same policy issue Its pronatalism, Its feminism and Its social democratic concerns with workers' rights. The party strongly
Identified itself with the policy by choosing to have it come into effect on Nov 15, 1978, two years to the day after the its electoral victory. The speed with which the PQ moved on this legislation contrasts with the PLQ's failure to legislate this same plank of its own programme.

The amendment made a woman covered by the *Loi du salaire minimum* and who had worked 20 weeks for the same employer in the last 12 months, eligible for 18 weeks maternity leave with a guaranteed return to her position [77]. Employers contravening the law could be fined up to $500.00 a day until the employee was reintegrated into her post [ibid. 2091]. Although no minimum income was guaranteed in the law, pregnant women could avail themselves of 15 weeks of benefits from the federal unemployment insurance scheme and the PQ budgeted $5.8 million to tide women over the two week UI waiting period [78].

During the AN debate, parliamentary opposition was largely technical. For the PLQ, the problems were that not all women were covered by the legislation [79] and that funding provisions were not clear [ibid: 2073]. PLQ critic, Thérèse Lavole-Roux attacked the inefficiency and Incompetence of Commission du salaire minimum inspectors, without acknowledging that these weaknesses must have predated the scant seven months of PQ government [ibid. 2085-86] [80]. For the UN parliamentary leader, Maurice Bellemare, what was necessary was a family policy that would protect the (unborn) child of the working mother [ibid.
2074] and increase the birth rate. Recalling national pride (notre fierté) in a burgeoning Quebec population during the high birth rate of the revanche des berceaux, he asked, "comment devrions-nous être fiers d'encourager nos mères et porter une attention particulière du côté financier pour aider la reproduction de nos Québécois" [Ibid. 2077] [81]. In statements by his party, the resurrected combination of motherhood, nationalism and pronatalism outweighed technical criticism. The law passed unanimously on third reading and was sanctioned July 3 1978 [Ibid. 2117]. In the period before it came into effect, the PLQ and the UN played a low profile opposition role by raising questions in the legislature about the date of implementation [Ibid. 1327–1328].

The real opposition was extraparliamentary, with heavy fire from unions and immigrant and women's groups who had already organized a common front for maternity leave. Forty groups [82], associated with an earlier common front for maternity leave immediately redirected their efforts to fight for improvements in the legislation and set up a Comité de surveillance to ensure that "le peu de droits que les femmes ont, soit respectés" [83]. They demanded universal coverage for all women workers, no matter what their sector or history of employment. Taking the more generous public sector contract as a model, they wanted a 20 week maternity leave (extendable indefinitely on medical grounds), 10 days paternity leave and a gender-neutral unpaid parental leave
with job security and accumulated seniority. In addition, they urged free dental care and prenatal classes for pregnant women. In order to get a hearing for their case, they attacked on the sensitive point of national survival. Much like the FFQ and the Centre des femmes, they argued that falling birth rates were exacerbated by a lack of support systems and even went so far as to suggest that rising abortion rates could be partially explained in the same terms.

The response to this opposition throws some light on the extent of the PQ's commitment to feminism in its first term. As a result of outside opposition, CSF pressure, Lise Payette, the Ministre de la Condition féminine, proposed and circulated a new set of revisions in 1980. [84]. The informal name of these proposals, La Loi 1, was the same as that given to the PQ's centerpiece language law, Bill 1 [85]. The name signaled urgency and strongly identified the measure with the party, just as the selected starting date of the actual maternity leave legislation also did. The willingness of Payette and her strongly feminist political staff (cabinet politique) to publicize these recommendations point to an identification with "women" over "party" [86]. It may be noted that in a parliamentary system that places high value on cabinet solidarity, this publishing initiative of Payette's was unusual. However, the fact that the reforms were not enacted that year indicates that the government, perhaps as a result of a post-referendum anti-feminist backlash
In the cabinet [Payette 1982: 127], was not in agreement that the legislatively institutionalization of the working mother deserved top priority. Thus, just as there had been divisions within the PQ over abortion in 1977, there were tensions, if not divisions, in the cabinet about how to proceed on this issue.

At the same time as providing social supports for maternity, the government supported women's right to control their reproduction, as evidenced by its actions on the Morgentaler case and with the establishment of the cliniques Lazure [7.3. above]. This policy, clearly radical in both the Canadian and Quebec contexts, met with sustained opposition from both the UN and the Créditistes, and occasionally from the PLQ [DAN 31L 3s 1979: 3310-12; DAN 31L 4s 1980 519-20; 1152-3] [87]. Still, government action was not always rapid or widespread enough for some of its own backbenchers; in fact they went so far as to probe away at government policy in parliament, just as PQ feminists played an internal oppositional role in party conventions [DAN 31L 4s 1980: 1152] [88]. Right wing opposition rested much more straightforwardly on Catholic dogma that "avorter c'est tuer" and on its causal effect in depopulation [Ibid. 519]. The Créditistes kept up a steady attack on baby murdering, insisting that Morgentaler was guilty of the charges he faced and that the multipurpose cliniques Lazure were only designed to perform illegal abortions [Ibid. 246; see also DAN 29L 4s 1980: 1518-19; 30L 1s 1976: 819-19; 30L 2s 1977: 604]. The rhetoric of these
attacks was not only reactionary with regard to women but implicitly antisemitic [interview: k] [89].

In both aspects of its dual role as government and employer, the PQ promised equality in public sector employment [DAN 31L 3s 1978: 6]. Here, it took up a programme planned by the CSF, initiated by the PLQ and urged by the common front unions as well as being part of its own programme. At the same time, its intention to keep public sector salaries in line with those in the private sector [90] acted as a limiting factor. After what she called undeniable evidence from a CSF study that 1979 public sector contracts still contained discriminatory clauses was presented in the Assemblée by Liberal critic Lavole-Roux, Payette was forced to retract an earlier statement (June 13 1980) that complete equity had been achieved, but hoped it was the last time she would be forced to do so [DAN 31L 4s 1980]. However, simply removing obvious cases of difference in rates of pay to male and female workers doing the same jobs, as Payette promised, would not overcome systemic discrimination. In a study of Quebec public sector contracts, Dominique Gaucher [1980] argues that the source of male-female wage inequities lay in deeply entrenched sexism in evaluations of the skill and difficulty required in particular jobs [91].

Over the whole period of its government, it can well be argued that the PQ produced the best legislative framework for working women in Canada, with the most generous maternity and parental
leave provisions and the strictest equal pay provisions [92].

Some of these reforms, like the further revision of the maternity leave law and the provisions of new health and safety legislation which protect pregnant women and nursing mothers from dangerous work situations, postdate this study. Still, the measures in place by 1980 -- maternity leave with provincial subsidies to supplement federal unemployment insurance and multi-service reproductive clinics, as well as a programme of public sector equality -- can be evaluated as important steps in developing a fully fledged legislative framework to acknowledge the working mother as the norm and to bring a measure of concrete equality to women workers.

9.3.4. Integration of women into state structures: the Conseil du statut de la femme (2).

The 1976 election brought a party to power which, sharing the critique of some feminists, mistrusted the CSF as too closely identified with the Liberals. Indeed, in her political memoirs Lise Payette [1982: 60-62], the minister given a watching brief on the status of women in the PQ government, recalls that one option was to scrap the Conseil altogether [93]. Instead, the CSF was strengthened in two ways. First, it was given the task of articulating the global policy review (politique d'ensemble) on the status of women promised by René Lévesque, that was to be the
centrepiece of péquiste gender politics. Second, as we shall see, in September 1979 the status of the minister responsible for that body, and hence for women's issues, was upgraded to sit on the inner cabinet.

While there is considerable agreement that Payette actually played a key role in this process [RAIF 44/45 May/June 1978: 12; Interview: G; *La Presse* 24 Oct. 1978], there were political conditions that allowed her to do so. A working class based feminist gender politics had been an important element in the cohesion of the opposition bloc, in particular in the protracted public sector negotiations that preceded the November 1976 election [Le Devoir 29 Jan. 1976]. Although nationalist and economic issues dominated in the PQ programmes up to 1976 [PQ 1970, 1973, 1976] a women's caucus and feminist positions had continued to develop in the party's base. Still, PQ policy juggled contradictory support for wages for housework, abortion rights and pronatalism. Also, despite their performance in opposition, key members of the new cabinet, like Morin, privately held ideologies that rested on sexual differentiation or chauvinist and "soft paternalist" assumptions [Payette 1982: 54, 128]. So it was clear that these issues were important, but not what was to be done. Despite newly elected women members, the government lacked expertise [94], and conferring the tasks of policy development on the CSF, set at arms length a policy process that was bound to be controversial in the cabinet, in the
party and in the province. At the same time, this tactic offered a solution congenial to both the technocratic and democratic wings of the party: centralized planning and democratic consultation. As well, by the promise of a participatory review of overall policy, it could satisfy its feminist members, for example Payette and Denise Leblanc-Bantey, who wanted women to speak for themselves [95].

Payette became publically identified with PQ feminism, in part because of her cabinet position, but also, importantly, because of her previous job moderating a very popular television magazine show for women, *Femme d'aujourd'hui*. In her memoirs, she describes herself as a social democrat, from a working class family, sensitized to sexism in the political process as a result of campaign experiences with feminist Thérèse Casgrain, who was perennially defeated as a federal candidate [96]. Her feminism, she promised, would make her "*plus tannante*" [*Le Devoir* 8 Feb. 1977]. Despite insecurity about her own lack of political experience [Payette 1982: 31-32], in her first term as *Ministre des Consommateurs, Coopératives et Institutions financières*, she successfully piloted the complex policies setting up Quebec's first consumer protection and state automobile insurance systems [97].

In that first term, she was also *Ministre responsable* for the CSF, a position which gave the status of women portfolio the same governmental status it had had under the PLQ. It also meant that
this issue was not represented on the high powered cabinet Comité des priorités. With growing confidence in her own ministerial capacities and increasing belief that participation in that committee was crucial to any real progress, she reports that she rejected Lévesque's September 1979 suggestion that she retain that status together with responsibility for the CSF. Instead, she asked that she be named Ministre d'État with oversight on all legislation and practices affecting women and a position on the inner cabinet priorities committee [Ibid. 64]. In this position, her expanded power, combined with the CSF's existing powers, created something much like the Office that the FFQ had lobbied for before 1973. But, because of the split of powers between cabinet and advisory body, they were more directly influenced by the political process than would have been the case in the model the FFQ put forward.

The CSF actively sought the development of an integrated policy on women, as it had from the PLQ, from Payette in February 1977 [CSF 1977/1978: 7]. Rejecting the form that its proposal took as outmoded by the programme of her party, Payette suggested a longer term project to "définir ce que nous allons être, nous les femmes, une fois que ces préalables que nous réclamons...seront obtenus" [Le Devoir 8 Feb. 1977]. On May 18 1977, after a presentation by Payette, the Conseil des ministres decided to authorise the minister responsible for the CSF and the Ministre d'État au développement social to entrust the CSF with a thorough
study for a (long or short term) *politique d'ensemble*, to plan and coordinate the activities of the ministries involved in proposed changes, and to identify the instruments that these ministries have or ought to have; to have the finance, municipal affaires, and immigration ministries represented at the CSF; and to furnish all necessary documentation [CSF 1978a: xvi–xviii].

Working with the interministerial committee (*comité interministériel*, CI) it established [ibid. xviii], and after several months of confusion of terms and "tergiversations" [Le Devoir 2 Sept. 1977], the CSF set out to study seven aspects of women's lives: culture, labour market participation, household, women's bodies, the couple and family and aggression [98]. Given the gaps in existing analysis and budgetary and personnel restrictions, the CSF experienced this as a challenge [CSF 1977/1978: 7].

A further, political, challenge was posed by the reaction of some women's organizations to the announcement of the study. Many of the autonomous groups and trade union feminists, accusing the government of failing to act on existing recommendations, refused to participate in yet another consultation process [RAIF 40/41: 12; La Presse 30 Oct. 1978]. Some, like the FFQ and AFEAS, were committed to the Carrefour 75 programme but not hostile to the report [La Presse 28 Oct. 1978]; others, like the union CCFs, argued that particular sectoral groups had already stated their demands: all that was needed was action [Le Devoir 23 Oct. 1978]
Nevertheless, 250 representatives of 116 organizations, many with more conservative gender politics, participated in the consultation process. 

The resulting report, *Pour les Québécoises: égalité et indépendance*, is impressive in scope and coherence. Ideologically, it broke new ground by rejecting an acceptance of differentiated gender roles and a naturalist maternalism sometimes left unexamined in the liberal feminist equality of opportunity strategy. For example, the RCSWC [1970: xii] report argued that women should be able to choose between labour force work and unpaid household activities. Because it failed to suggest a similar choice for men, but only urged their greater participation in childcare [ibid.], this recommendation carried a veiled assumption that women are naturally better at and therefore suited to child care.

The report broke with the liberal view that socialization was the cause of women’s oppression. Rather it placed the blame on a social structural division of labour, located initially in the family, supported to be sure by socialization and value systems [CSF 1978a: 26, 145]. Because this division led to women’s insecurity and dependence, it was necessary to “*amener les hommes et les femmes à partager le travail rémunéré comme le travail nonrémunéré*” [ibid. 145]. To this end, it recommended [102] a series of goals: full employment, a guaranteed annual income, affirmative action in both public and private sectors; a whole
host of changes in the operation of existing educational, employment and (re)training programmes and hiring practices; and reform of tax [103], family and labour law. Attacking naturalist myths of motherhood [Ibid. 94], it recommended both that birthing practices be improved and fertility control be promoted by government funded research on contraceptives, public education and the kind of multiservice medical facilities later provided by the cliniques Lazure [Ibid. 97-101]. Violence against women (defined as battery, rape and pornography), a concern of radical feminists, was introduced as a new theme. This issue, like that of medical practices (psychotropic drugs, anaesthesia, electroshock therapy and surgery [104]), was defined as an aspect of health. Finally, it saw gender relations as political, calling for equal representation of women in government and other power structures [105]. But if, like radical, revolutionary and trade union feminists, it problematised the family and women's exclusion from positions of power [Ibid. 313-328], it did not share their analysis of the centrality of class or male exploitation in maintaining their subordination [106].

Despite praise from editorial writers and feminists alike for its pertinence and balance [Le Devoir 26 Oct. 1978], high quality [Le Soleil 24 Oct. 1978] and clarity [RAIF 1978; Le Devoir 24, 26 Oct. 1978], the report was greeted with continuing objections from some groups. For example, RAIF president Marcelle Dölment maintained that it was a waste of time and that the PQ programme
would be a better guide because it had been created at the grass roots [Le Soleil 26 Oct 1978]. For some, like Françoise Stanton, the FFQ Quebec regional president, the report did not go far enough, conveying only justice and not, as René Lévesque claimed, revolutionary change [Ibid.; Le Devoir 24 Oct. 1974]. For her, much of the work of reform was to be done in the couple. While AFEAS's first impressions were more moderate, the Fermières president, Marielle Primeau, was opposed to its stress on the word independence, on the organicist grounds that total personal independence is in all cases impossible as well as in terms of its (pro-réquiste) implications in the pre-referendum Quebec political climate [107]. In contrast, Andrée Ferretti, former left wing RIN vice-president, insisted that to be equal to Quebec men was merely to share the effects of colonialist and capitalist exploitation [Le Devoir 2 Nov. 1978]. And En Lutte! [31 Oct. 1978] attacked it as a trap for women, arguing that class relations, not sex roles, were at the basis of women's subordination. Feminist critics all insisted that the time for study was over and that it was time to act [Interview: G, K].

CSF president Robillard shared some of these fears, seeing no will to act in the government. She counted on massive support from women, who, she argued, should use the immense political power they had through procreation, the referendum and elections to negotiate change [Le Devoir 2 July 1978]. She also defended the process of writing the report. This had permitted the
development of the kind of realistic, innovative and coordinated policy in an extremely complex area distributed, across several ministries, that the CSF's breakneck pace from its inception had made impossible [Le Devoir 25 July 1978].

Pressure would be necessary, for despite its performance in opposition, ministers were not necessarily informed of, or convinced by, feminist arguments. Indeed, some of the recommendations, particularly the abolition of tax exemptions for non-working spouses, were rejected outright [Le Soleil 25 Oct. 1978, 8 Feb. 1979] [108]. To overcome this opposition, with its underlying complementarist view of gender roles, Payette [1982: 8] and her political staff undertook a campaign to educate both deputy ministers and the cabinet. Meanwhile the national PQ CCF kept up pressure from within the party [Le Devoir 2 Feb. 1978; RAIF 38-39 Sept./Oct. 1977: 65, 40/41 nd: 9]. Whatever the efficacy of these efforts, in 1979 a "vague féministe" swept the cabinet and party [Payette 1982: 66].

From early suspicions, the relations of the party and the Conseil became more cordial, as steady budget increases indicate [109]. If legislation, on for example maternity leave, failed to meet CSF recommendations, the party did act. And if the CSF had continued to be a thorn in the side of government, it had produced a thoroughly creditable report that reflected well on the party. On Dec. 1 1978, Claire Bonenfant, who had impatiently left the FFQ to work with the smaller, more flexible,
quick-striking and ideologically more contestative RAIF, was appointed CSF president [GF Nov./Dec. 5:6 1978: 2-3] [110]. She was, she promised, "plus féministe que péquistes" [Le Devoir 4 Dec. 1978], a statement which seems justified by her work on the feisty national PQ CCF on maternity leave [111]. For Bonenfant, as, she averred, for many women, the jury was still out on the PQ; it had not met their high expectations but she waited confidently for improvements [Le Devoir 4 Dec. 1978]. In line with her view that the second five years of the CSF should be a period of work with the base, she continued the CSF's activist touring to talk with women's groups across the province [Le Devoir 6 March 1979]. Like her predecessor, the new CSF president regularly castigated the government for failing to implement promised policies, in this case the politique d'ensemble [Le Devoir 31 January 1978].

Overall, then, after the accession of a new bloc to power, led by the PQ, for which progressive gender politics was an important element of ideological cohesion, the relation between the CSF and the government passed through two stages. Following a short period of mistrust where the tensions that had marked the CSF's relation to the government under the PLQ continued and were intensified, that tension was eased as the PQ found a role for the advisory body in developing policy. However, underlying this apparent change, the same set of structural tensions between the three main actors on the gender political field, the women's
movement, the advisory body and the state, continued to operate. After 1976, the women's movement had continued to grow, to assert its political autonomy and to develop, particularly in its liberal feminist wing, a more radical ideology. Thus, between 1976 and 1980 the ideological centre of the gender political field shifted in a radical direction and the unstable adhesion of these actors to the PQ-led bloc was maintained. Despite a radicalization in the ideology of state sector actors (PQ and CSF), and consequent legislative reform (to do with motherhood, human rights and family law), there continued to be tension in the relations of the women's movement and the government. Since the CSF by its mandate was forced to consider both these latter as its reference groups; since, in practical terms, as an advisory body, it needed to remain on the kind of terms that would encourage the government to listen to its advice; and since politically it understood the dependance of its authority (accrued during IWY and as a result of its 1978 report) on the militancy of the autonomous women's movement, the CSF had to maintain a balancing act. It continued, then, to be caught in the contradictory dynamic that had marked it since its origins: on the one hand, serving as a centre for autonomous campaigning, on the other, as a means for integrating the women's movement into the activities of the state.
9.3.5. Integration of women into state structures: the PQ and the woman-nation relation.

Although an ideology of individual representation, part of the electorallist discourse of the liberal democratic state, continued in the period of governmental power of the progressive nationalist bloc it was not the only or even the most important axis of collective political membership offered women by the PQ. In order to succeed in its nationalist project, the PQ had to win the loyalty of women to the nation as an independent state. This meant rethinking both terms of the woman-nation relation with respect to traditional definitions where the nation was involuted, the woman confined and both devoted to procreation. Given the composition of the bloc the PQ led (particularly its reliance on trade unions) and its own internal feminist opposition, not to mention its renewed version of state-led modernisation, the nation had to be able to offer women more than their traditional role as its biological and cultural reproducers. Although, before 1978, the party programme had tended to ignored "women" in favour of the "family" [PQ 1973, 1976], PQ strategy was thus oriented toward the "new woman" of the 1960s and 1970s, centered particularly on the figure of the emancipated working mother. Like the nation, she would be equal and independent; and, for the nation to free itself, she had to adhere to the values of equality and independence both for herself and for it.

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The Lieutenant-Governor's opening remarks at the second session of the AN in 1977 offer an example of this reworking. Here, "woman" is associated not just with the nation's past survival but also with both "épanouissement", the 1960s watchword of mainstream feminist organizations like AFEAS and FFQ, and with the IWD, symbol of 1970s feminist militancy and its socialist and trade union associations. In turn, the emancipated woman, held out as a goal of PQ policy, would help make possible a new future for the nation:

"[La Journée internationale des femmes] nous permet de rendre un hommage particulier au rôle essentiel que les Québécoises ont joué dans la survie de notre nation et à celui, plus grand encore, qu'elles sont appelées à remplir dans son épanouissement" [DAN 31L 2s 1977: 1].

Bland as these words may seem at first glance, the theory of the ascription of ideological meaning in terms of bloc situation adopted in this study reminds us that no ideological term has a fixed meaning. The term "épanouissement" here serves as a pivot to allow an important but implicit ideological juncture to be made. Whereas for liberal feminism, fulfilment (épanouissement) was individual, for the PQ it was also collective and, in this sense, the term symbolized above all the independence without which the nation could not flourish (épanouir). It is thus implied in the cited extract that the épanouissement of women (as members of that nation) rests on the gaining of national independence. This condensation also relies for its
Interpellative power on the discourse of autonomy (Independence) developed by feminism itself. As the FLF had put it: "Pas des femmes libres sans Québec libre; pas de Québec libre sans femmes libres". Later, Payette advanced the position that feminist demands, just like nationalist ones, foreshadowed a new model of social relations with "un fort potentiel révolutionnaire" [112].

Women, like the nation as a whole, were encouraged to think of the collectivity in terms of the state. The global character of the PQ's promise of a "politique d'ensemble" symbolized the goal of integrating women equally into all aspects of social life organized by the state. Indeed, in a remark which recalls Lesage's statist tactic of nation-building, Robillard argued that women should use the state, because that was what they had [Le Devoir 24 Oct. 1978].

If the association of feminism and nationalism in 1978 was discussed in terms of symbols, by 1980, in the pre-referendum campaign, the matter was strategic: for it was crucial to win women's actual votes for the PQ's independentist project to carry. The fragility of the new entente between feminism and nationalism was, however, exposed in what came to be known as the "Yvette issue" [113]. Early in the referendum campaign, Payette gave a press conference to evaluate PQ progress on women's issues. While she praised her party's achievements, she argued that more needed to be done to remove lingering sexism from the state apparatus and the society as a whole. In support of this
contention, she read out an extract from an approved primary school text, which portrayed a girl, Yvette, as "joieuse", "gentille", "bien obligeante", a proper little housewife and mother's help; her brother, Robert, was athletic, competitive and ambitious. Shortly after that, she made a speech in the referendum campaign in which she argued that women who were afraid of independence were products of a sexist, sex-typed socialization, and went on to name the recently elected PLQ party leader Claude Ryan's wife as an "Yvette" [114].

These remarks were taken up by Le Devoir editorialist, Lise Bissonnette, who portrayed Payette as a prying journalist, Ryan as a socially involved Catholic and community activist and mother, and Payette's statement as insulting and anti-feminist [Le Devoir 11 March, 9 April 1980]. In a useful analysis of the construction of the "Yvette issue" in nine francophone and two anglophone newspapers, Renée Dandurand and Evelyne Tardy [1981] have argued convincingly that Bissonnette, here and in a later editorial [13 March 1980], defined the terms in which the press discussed Payette's gaffe. In particular, she introduced the notion of backlash, and transformed a personal insult (to Ryan) into a collective insult (to all stay-at-home mothers). This somewhat contradictory mix of charges made possible a polemical identification which was swiftly exploited by "nombreuses(eux) militantes(ants) du Parti Libéral: dire non à Lise Payette, c'est dire non au référendum; dire non au référendum, c'est dire non à
Shortly thereafter, the wife of a PLQ staff member, assisted by two full-time workers, organized a series of Sunday meetings, called "Yvette brunches", which started in Quebec City and culminated in a meeting of 14,000 to 15,000 women at the Montreal Forum [115]. The meetings were addressed by federalists, including professional politicians such as Lavole Roux, Claude Ryan, Jeanne Sauvé and (former or current) FFQ leaders such as Yvette Rousseau, Monique Bégin and Sheila Finestone [116].

There is considerable debate about the nature of the opposition to Payette's remarks. To be sure, the fact that an important part of its audience consisted of middle aged, middle class housewives supports an interpretation that it was motivated by a "pro-family/pro-housewife" anti-feminist backlash [Le Devoir 31 March 1980]. In contrast, some writers with feminist credentials, like Lysiane Gagnon [La Presse 10 April 1980; cf. Jean et al. 1986] point to a lack of anti-feminism in the Forum speeches. The first article, predicting a rapid demobilization of the so-called Yvette movement, emphasized the audience's party solidarity with the PLQ's federalism; the second stressed, perhaps too much given the role of PLQ organizational resources, that this was an independent mobilization of women and therefore, by implication, not anti-feminist. Whatever interpretation holds, it must be noted that the mobilization was made possible because of the way liberal feminism, as we have seen, defines
women's rights as the "right to choose", thus allowing a woman to "choose" to be a housewife and mother. At the same time, Payette's statement, in attacking a woman not in a public role, a policy through a woman, or a politician through his wife, trangressed a feminist principle of sisterhood. The blurring of feminist and anti-family positions in her statement was taken advantage of by the federalist forces, which acted swiftly and effectively to capitalize on Payette's gaffe. Only autonomous groups [117] rallied to support the yes vote in order to "frêner les ambitions de la droite" unleashed by the other side [Le Devoir 25 April 1980; Interview: S].

Although Payette apologized for the personal implications of her remarks in the AN, she did not retract the characterisation of anti-independentists as fearful Yvettes, reading the extract of the school text into the record [DAN 31L 4s 1980: 5191-2]. Instead, she defended herself in terms that exemplified the way in which the PQ was trying to recast the woman-nation relation: i.e. as someone who had contributed to the national survival and renewal both by having and caring for children and by contributing to independentist politics. Nevertheless, polls which consistently showed a lower percentage of women as supporting the yes vote, indicate the failure of that strategy and of deep cleavages along gender ideological lines in the progressive nationalist bloc [118].

If the PQ's relation to feminism differed from that of the PLQ,
it can also be said that, in turn, feminism had a different relation to the former than it had to the latter. For a number of historical reasons, women were more integrated into PQ party structures than in the case of the PLQ. For example, the PQ never had the kind of separate women's division that, like the FFLQ, played an auxiliary role. Rather, women activists developed riding and national women's caucuses whose raison d'être was explicitly feminist. As a result, these caucuses maintained a high degree of political independence, which was manifested not only during convention debates [6.1. above] but also in critical public statements between elections that went well beyond the limits that Liberal women set for themselves, or had set for them.

Despite the overriding importance of nationalism in its programme, the PQ also helped normalize the integration of women into state structures and ideology that moved beyond the isolated tokenism that had characterized such integration in the liberal modernization bloc. The 1976 election was not only a victory for the PQ, but the first time that more than one woman was elected to the AN [119]. The Assemblée nationale's speaker, Clément Richard, described his first use of "Mesdames et messieurs" in the AN, as marking an access to privilege that women had won through struggle [120]. At the same time, the slow process of feminizing the higher levels of government also picked up pace in 1979 with a number of high profile appointments of women to

Finally, the symbolic heritage of feminism became appropriated in state ideology through an annual ceremonial commemoration of IWD which was held to mark, not just women's progress, but their struggles to this end. Introduced by René Lévesque, the practice of saluting IWD was taken up by other parties. Their various modes of commenting on IWD indicated at the same the variety of their gender political ideologies. The Créditistes feted women as mothers, while the UN continue to combine ideologies of differentiation and maternity with support for equality [DAN 31L 2s 1977: 320-330]. The PLQ, on the other hand, used the occasion for partisanship. Liberal critic Lavole Roux, in 1978, used the day to state that she could be in greater solidarity with Quebec women than Payette, because the latter was bound by cabinet solidarity [Ibid. 327-8]. In opposition, PLQ strategy was generally to harass the government on, for example, its slowness in bringing maternity leave legislation or in implementing it once passed [DAN 31L 3s 1978: 1327]. Although Lavole Roux availed herself of the FFQ [1978b] Livre noir, she offered only technical criticism of PQ measures without advancing an alternate gender political programme.

Overall, the PQ strategy of relying on a feminist ideology: appeal, supported by a strong legislative record of reform, to refashion the woman-nation relation in support of its overriding nationalist commitment met with only limited success. Indeed,
the Yvette incident, which was the first check to its momentum that the yes vote campaign met, had a demobilizing effect on the nationalist forces, if only by turning one of its most popular and persuasive proponents, Payette, into a media liability. Given a continuing inconsistency with respect to the pro-family element in its own ideology, the PQ was unable to prevent that powerful ideological symbol from being seized by the anti-independentist forces. Beyond its immediate importance to the politics of the referendum, this whole incident was also an important ideological event: it marked the first time in Quebec that family and nation had become separated from one another as elements in a popular-democratic ideology of national survival.
Chapter 10. Conclusions.

10.1. Introduction.

This study has had two inter-connected aims. The first is historical: to understand the relation between the development of the women’s movement and that of the overall political field in Quebec between the onset of the Quiet Revolution and the defeated PQ referendum on sovereignty-association in 1980. The second is theoretical and concerns the development of a general framework for the analysis of gender politics in advanced capitalist societies. These aims have been interconnected because exploring the concrete historical questions raised depended on the application of a framework that only existed in a rudimentary state and which, I have argued, could only be developed through the kind of concrete analysis this study has tried to undertake. In this concluding chapter let us consider, then, what light has been thrown on each of these objectives.


10.2.1. Introduction.

In the study so far, two historical processes have been thrown into relief. First, I have traced the emergence, growth and
Ideological development of feminism, both as an autonomous movement, in Chapters 5 through 7, and in the labour movement in Chapter 8. As well, in Chapter 9, I have explored the growing, if ambiguous, integration of feminist politics into state policy and ideology. I have argued that through all of this process, as women's organizations became actors on the political field and women came to define their own gender ideologies, the issues of women and gender became more central to the political field as a whole. Second, I have shown how the development of particular women's organizations and feminist gender politics were affected by, but also affected, the relation of that politics to a wider process of bloc formation.

Let us now consider how these two levels of analysis can be brought together. How, in other words, did the concrete development of gender politics and the women's movement affect and respond to the formation and dissolution of the two hegemonic blocs that successively dominated Quebec politics from 1960 to 1980?

In order to answer this question, however, a preliminary distinction needs to be drawn between two forms in which groups, classes or genders can be integrated into blocs. A bloc component may be said to be hegemonically integrated into a bloc when it broadly shares that bloc's central ideological elements and where, conversely, the ruling party has legitimacy and moral authority for that particular bloc component. A bloc component
may be said, on the other hand, to be **conjuncturally integrated** into a bloc where a particular ideological element is shared, but where dissensus on other elements prevents a broader ideological agreement [1]. From this perspective, two polar types of blocs are theoretically possible: first, those that hegemonically integrate all their bloc components and, second, those where ideological integration is slight, lines of ideological cleavage already exist and a conjunctural form of integration predominates. In Quebec, in 1960-1980, the blocs were of a mixed type, with some components integrated hegemonically and others only conjuncturally.

Let us now consider the shifting place of gender politics on the Quebec political field and see what answers this provides to the questions originally posed about the timing and social location of the emergence of women's movements. Let us begin by reviewing in turn the gender political character of each of the main blocs that have been identified [2].

10.2.2. Gender politics in the liberal modernisation bloc.

The dominant gender ideology expressed by and within the liberal modernisation bloc combined five elements: a commitment to formal legal equality; the valorization of women's right to work; a conception of naturally differentiated gender roles; a view that changes in gender relations result from natural social evolution, not power struggles between women and men; and an
adherence to the view that the family, as an institution, was essentially and unproblematically separated from the sphere of politics. This combination of elements was held in different forms by the two political parties, the PLQ and the UN, that alternately governed from 1960 to 1976, with a traditional ideology of gender differentiation more clearly articulated by the UN.

In combination, these ideological elements were evidently contradictory. But if so, they also reflected the contradictoriness both of actual gender arrangements and of the relation of political parties to the gender politics this contradictoriness produced. As manager of class relations it was the state's role to assure the availability of a trained and reliable labour force [Poulantzas 1973: 53]. At the same time, the state presided over by the PLQ and the UN was faced with the task of doing this during a period in which there was an expansion of state sector workers, an end to church control of education and social services and a turn in the organization of teaching and nursing from one dominated by an ethic of service to one dominated by professionalism and contractual work relations. Modernisation at this level clearly affected women. For, while most adult women continued to be married, with children, and with prime responsibility for domestic labour, they were also becoming increasingly necessary members of the labour force, particularly in the sectors mentioned. However, while traditional clerical
national ideologies that privileged women's place in the home were no longer adequate, the watchwords of modernisation and catch-up were in themselves insufficiently elaborated by the ruling parties to encompass a new definition of women's identity and social role. Through the 1960s and early 1970s, then, the political parties in power continued to address women in terms of their traditional familial roles, while, at the same time, their legislative initiatives and policy statements began to apply equality norms to women in their roles as employees and citizens.

In addition to this ideological inconsistency, as I have noted, these parties' gender ideologies and policies came to be shaped by a context in which there was a growth of sectoral feminist politics, as well as a rise of class and national tensions. From 1960 to 1964, despite occasional agitation of individuals and university women's groups (Société des femmes diplômées de l'Université, Société des femmes universitaires), (autonomous) feminism was effectively absent from the political field. Still, the modernisation project, which encouraged an optimistic belief in change, in people's capacity to manage their own lives, and promoted the state as a source of justice for citizens, provided a political space and ideological resources for the emergence of liberal feminism, in its secular and social Catholic forms, in the Fédération des femmes du Québec (1964) and the Association féminine d'éducation et d'action sociale (1966). The activists of
the FFQ, some of whom had close political ties with the PLQ, turned the rhetoric of modernisation, democracy and equality to serve their own ends: formal legal equality in the family and the labour force and the normalization of women's place in the labour force. From 1966, support for the idea of democratic participation and, more generally, the sense that a new era had dawned also stimulated AFEAS to embark on a modernising course, at first expressed in a self-education programme designed to help members catch up to the new realities so that they could fulfill their obligations as citizens. Although the Fédération des femmes libérales du Québec urged gender equality resolutions on the party, this auxiliary organization was constrained at all times by the policy and ideological limits of its parent body. Thus, despite their pressure group politics, we can say that liberal feminism was hegemonized by the liberal modernisation project which promised, as PLQ cabinet minister Pierre Laporte put it, the dawn of a new life for women [DAN 27L 3s 1964: 903]. In this optic, the PLQ and the UN reformed family law (Bills 16, 1964, and 10, 1968) and the former party reformed labour law to include weak equal pay provisions (1964) and to limit protectionist legislation forbidding night work for women (1966), all measures designed to promote formal equality.

The furthest extension of the equality of opportunity ideology of liberal modernisation was the establishment of the Conseil du statut de la femme in 1973, in response to a campaign headed by
the FFQ. This, I have argued, represented the first step in changing the self-presentation of the liberal democratic state in Quebec from a language of abstract equality that shrouded the modified patriarchalism still enshrined in even reformed family law to one which integrated liberal feminist ideologies based on a more thoroughgoing principle of gender equality. However, because the CSF's establishment also represented an implicit acceptance of the feminist contention that gender relations were political, its very existence helped undermine liberal assumptions about the "naturalness" of lingering gender asymmetries and about the nonproblematic character of the family [3].

In the meantime, beginning in the late 1960s, the emergence of new actors on the gender political field, the revolutionary feminist Front de libération des femmes and the Centre des femmes, trade union feminists in the FTQ, CEQ and CSN, and the radical feminist Têtes de Ploché, had begun to alter the overall configuration of that field. As a result, feminism began to form a component of an opposition bloc in formation. This was the result of two separate developments. First, new groups and ideologies of revolutionary and radical feminism began to emerge in response to ideological and political developments among oppositionists (including the rise of nationalism and socialism in Quebec, and of women's liberation elsewhere) and to structural changes in the relation of women to education, work and
procreation. Second, as a result of charges of corruption, inaction on women's issues and repressive response to the self-organization of revolutionary nationalists, popular groups and the labour movement (particularly in the 1970 October crisis and a series of labour conflicts of which the most important was the 1972 public sector strike) the PLQ, and with it the current embodiment of the liberal modernisation project, increasingly lost the moral authority necessary for the maintenance of its politically and ideologically ruling position.

In that context, particularly following the October 1970 crisis of hegemony, liberal feminism, if not social Catholic feminism, began to feel itself estranged from the ruling coalition on both democratic and feminist grounds. FFQ president Rousseau's denunciation of the War Measures Act is one example. The holding of a clandestine press conference, where an unnamed FFQ representative supported the FLF demand for women's right to sit on juries as an aspect of women's equality in citizenship rights, is another. If the reaction of AFEAS was less strong, it, too, was nevertheless fundamentally concerned with democracy in the political process.

Despite these developments, the establishment of the CSF in 1973 was partially successful in rehegemonizing feminist politics and (re)integrating them into the governing bloc. Liberal feminism in the FFQ was partially demobilized, as it identified with the CSF and waited for it to initiate new reforms at the
state level. And, while a feminist radicalization in AFEAS began and deepened, it did not reject either parliamentarist strategy for reform, or that mixture of commitment to values of equality of opportunity and gender differentiation that was characteristic of liberal modernization gender ideology as a whole. On the other hand, the distinct ideological commitments of revolutionary and radical feminists, with their origins in the break of the late 1960s, prevented such an assimilation in this case; and, while women drawn from the labour movement sat on the CSF, the class polarization of the labour centrals from the ruling party meant that their integration could be only conjunctural at best.

The new militancy, gender ideologies and strategies generated by intellectuals organic to these currents served, in fact, to alter the configuration of the whole gender political field. The issues they problematized reshaped the policy agenda that liberal feminism sought to operate on and helped reenergize the FFQ and sustain the radicalization process already underway in AFEAS. Thus, while there was no direct political cooperation between the more radical currents and liberal feminism before 1975, the former themselves came to present an alternative pole of attraction for feminism. Moreover, because the PLQ's commitment to abstract equality (of opportunity) was unsupported by practical measures it failed to touch a central issue of concern to all feminist currents, the woman-work-marriage relation, and there was a tendency for feminism of all variants to find itself
In tension with the gender politics of the ruling parties of the liberal modernisation bloc and, as a result, with liberal modernisation rhetoric. Such tensions were not, however, important enough to overcome the high degree of loyalty to the PLQ of both Quebec women as a whole and those who supported greater government intervention to promote gender equality [Bashevkin 1983].

Reinforcing this trend after 1970, the PLQ changed its self-presentation from a liberal modernising party to one of law and order. From successfully presenting itself as the friend of women's equality, from suffrage to the reform of family law, the PLQ turned to a concern with preserving and strengthening the family at its 1974 and 1975 conventions, all without the balance of workshops on women's rights and with only one resolution on even the equal opportunity feminism it espoused. As for the UN, its mixed messages on women, which retained a strong element of gender differentiation, and its decline after 1970 to a protest or rural party, left it in a weak position to hegemonize organized feminist politics. Throughout the period, despite progressive elements in its AN performance, UN policy and campaigning stressed family issues without raising the question of women's equality [4].

From 1970-76, then, by their own internal marginalization of feminism, despite the success of the CSF, the PLQ and the UN failed to combine the new feminist ideologies of the break with
existing elements of liberal modernising ideology, all this
during a period when components of the feminist movement
experienced rapid growth, became more ideologically sophisticated
and radical, and succeeded in disseminating feminist views more
widely [5]. Instead, progressive women’s politics, including
conjuncturally its liberal feminist wing, were effectively pushed
into an anti-government stance, making the women’s movement
available for conjunctural alliances with other oppositional
actors.

However, the highly visible activities of the CSF in 1975,
International Women’s Year, just like its establishment in 1973,
helped prevent a full hegemonization of feminism by the
opposition bloc, by re-emphasising the link between liberal
feminism and the official ideological practice of the Quebec
state. As I have argued, however, the CSF’s relation to the
gender political field was ambiguous. On the one hand, because
of the effectiveness of its own activism at a time when feminist
issues were of comparatively low priority for the major political
parties, none of them [6] was in a position to fully capitalize
on the CSF’s mobilising efforts. On the other hand, precisely as
a state body, the CSF, the best funded, best known multi-issue
organization to speak on women’s behalf, lacked the kind of
autonomy that feminists argued was essential to ensuring freedom
of action, and success, in the fight for women’s liberation.
Thus, the CSF represented both a political advance for feminism,
Thus, in the early 1970s, there was little basis for the integration of feminism into either the nationalism or the socialism that were the leading ideologies of the opposition bloc in formation. In addition, women of similar age, educational and class background to women's liberation movement organizers elsewhere in Canada and the USA were interpellated as strongly as members of a national group that they perceived as threatened as they were as members of an oppressed sex. Some feminists, like Louise Harel [6.2.1. above], were nationalists first and foremost. Others, like members of the FLF and the Centre des femmes, attempted unsuccessfully to insert feminist ideology and politics into left nationalism. Despite their brave slogan "Pas de femmes sans Québec libre; pas de Québec libre sans femmes libres", the primacy of their commitment to the left-wing movement was evident in their first demonstration, on an anti-repression rather than a specifically feminist issue, just as their nationalism was evident in their refusal to work with anglophone women locally or across Canada on a central issue of the women's liberation movement, abortion rights. It was only with the writers of Les Têtes de Ploche, who remained convinced of the need for national liberation and socialist economic transformation, that these were inserted into a perspective where feminism dominated. And it was only writers of Des luttes et des rires des femmes who distanced themselves from the politics of both nation and class.
the integration of liberal feminism into the state, and a challenge to the political leadership that various feminist groups sought themselves to establish in gender politics.

10.2.3. The formation of an opposition bloc and the women's movement, 1968-1976.

To say that, in the early 1970s, despite the ideological and programmatic congruence of liberal modernisation strategy and liberal feminism, there was a tendency to exclude all forms of feminism from the hegemonic bloc does not, however, say anything about the degree or mode of their integration into the opposition bloc. Integration would largely depend upon the degree of congruence between feminist ideologies and other dominant components of opposition bloc ideology: nationalism and (on the part of one wing of the labour movement, the CSN and the CEQ, the far left and popular groups) socialism. For feminists, nationalism was historically suspect because a previously dominant clerico-nationalist ideology had promoted pronatalism and opposed women's rights. Contemporary nationalists gave first priority to a struggle for national liberation in a stage strategy for social transformation, while also retaining elements of pronatalism [PQ 1970a, 1973: 6; QD 1:5 April 1973: 3-7; Lamoureux 1987: 60-61]. As for socialism, most Quebec far left groups denounced as divisive any form of feminism not subordinated to a workerist economism that argued that all working class women needed were equal pay and day care.
The official involvement of liberal and social Catholic feminist organizations in political activity of any sort was limited by a constitutional requirement that they be politically neutral, not support parties or take a stand on other than women's issues. Nor were their politics or their leaders close to the socialist or nationalist ideologies which animated the anti-government opposition. Thus if the PLQ had lost its capacity to represent or hegemonize the feminism of the FFQ or AFEAS, neither was politically willing nor constitutionally able to swing into a réquisite orbit. Insofar, then, as these organisations were integrated into the opposition bloc, this integration was (to use the distinction drawn in 10.2.1. above) conjunctural rather than hegemonic, and centered on such popular-democratic feminist demands as the right to maternity leave or on such across-the-board issues as defense of civil liberties in the wake of the 1970 October crisis.

In the period of PLQ government following the October crisis, liberal feminism was left in something of a political vacuum. Without close political allies at the party level, its main reference groups became the state-sponsored CSF on the one hand, and an increasingly complex, self-referential women's movement on the other. Particularly after 1975, organizations and tendencies shared, worked for and amplified one another's issues. Divergences on feminist ideologies themselves (on, for example, the family), as well as differences over ideologies and alliances
outside of it (on, for example, socialism), as well as a lack of material resources, prevented the formation of new multi-issue feminist organizations. This did not, however, prevent the formation of highly effective single issue common fronts (on, for example, abortion and maternity leave). The development of such co-operation (on, for example, the importance of women's capacity to control their fertility or on pornography) indicated that women had become conscious of themselves as a collective interest group: the first stage, one might say, in the political construction of a gender-for-itself.

Overall, however, despite the increasing strength, radicalization and sophistication of the women's movement, gender and feminist politics were still marginalized in electoral politics. Feminist issues were swamped by debate on the national question in the elections of 1970 and 1973 [Le Devoir 4, 6 April 1970; 6, 9 October 1973]. Emerging trade union feminism was frequently overshadowed by debates on nationalism or socialism in the centrals and by the economic and political dimensions of class struggle in a period of inflation, high unemployment, factory closings and state fiscal crisis. If, supported by state-sponsored feminism, a new ideology normalizing women's equality and their right (as mothers) to work was gaining widespread acceptance, in political terms feminists continued to be an opposition either within the liberal modernisation or progressive nationalist blocs.
However, from 1973 to 1976 the situation once more began to change. Growing feminist strength in the trade unions and in the PQ, articulated around a policy of maternity leave and equal wages and backed up by newly established Comités de la condition féminine, began to provide leadership for the women's movement as a whole and, combined with the generalized feminist radicalization described above, served as a basis for the integration of feminist currents into the opposition bloc led by the PQ. The struggles of the public sector common front for maternity leave and equal pay prior to the November 1976 election advanced this process considerably. Gender issues were given a working class formulation at the same time as class issues were increasingly given a feminist inflection in protracted public sector negotiations that year. These centered on the issue of who should bear the costs of correcting historically unequal wages and of social reproduction through childbearing, and brought the women's movement into conflict with the state as legislator and employer. In this conflict the labour centrals, which officially (FTQ) or at the level of the base (CSN and CEQ) supported the PQ, vowed to bring down the government. Against this background, the 1976 election itself was unique in the period covered by this study because of the explicit way in which the contradictions of class, gender and nation were condensed in, and central to, the long summer of political debate that led up to the actual election campaign.
Programmatically, demands for equal pay and maternity leave, as concrete measures to promote women's equality, did not contradict the policy of the ruling PLQ. They were, however, in conflict with its practice, and went beyond its more abstract conception of equality and its view of the family as nonproblematic, outside politics and ultimately gender asymmetrical. On the other hand, feminist (whether liberal, social Catholic, radical or revolutionary), nationalist and socialist perspectives converged on the issue of maternity leave which they all supported, if sometimes for different reasons. Thus, feminists supported it in terms of women's rights, (some) nationalists as an aspect of pronatalist population policy, and socialists backed it as an equality measure within a materialist analysis of the intergenerational reproduction of labour power. Through these multiple channels, then, a feminist issue became linked organically to the working class component of the opposition bloc. The demand was also linked to the leading party in that bloc, the PQ, through its practice as the opposition party in the AN that consistently supported workers' demands in the 1976 common front, through its important section of its base among unionists, state workers and women [Crête 1984] and in the social democratic aspects of its programme. Thus, a popular-democratic feminist demand, which brought together central elements of liberal, revolutionary, radical and trade union feminist ideology, that is, a conception of women as persons who ought not to be confined to social roles determined by reproductive
biology, and who (as péquist(e) Pierre-Marc Johnson later summed it up in the debate on maternity leave) had the right both to work and be mothers, made possible the integration of feminism into the opposition bloc. Moreover, and as a result, this feminist ideological element became politically central to the integration of that bloc itself.

The centrality of the issues of the woman-work-marriage relation to the process of bloc formation, did not, however, automatically ensure the integration of feminism on the other key dimension of péquist(e) gender politics, realigning the woman-nation relation. Nor did it assure the integration of feminists with respect to other, non-gender issues, such as an orientation towards sovereignty-association or to state intervention in the economy.

At the same time, the estrangement of liberal feminism from the liberal modernisation bloc from 1970 to 1973 was in itself only conjunctural. Following the honeymoon of state sponsored feminism and liberal feminism with the founding of the CSF and IWY, liberal feminism became critical and impatient with the PLQ government's failure to act on employment issues for women workers (FFQ) or for "femmes collaboratrices" (AFEAS) in 1975-1976. Thus, any basis for the integration of liberal feminism into the opposition bloc was only conjunctural, on lines of feminist policy and to the extent that the PQ succeeded in downplaying the specifics of its programme and in presenting
Itself as the party of good government.


Once in power, the PQ promoted feminist ideologies and their integration into state practices as part of its strategy for achieving hegemony and retaining office. However, women's organizations, whether nationalist or not, kept a remarkable degree of political independence from the party [7]. The autonomy of groups like the FFQ and AFEAS, which had only ever, as I have suggested, been conjuncturally integrated into the progressive nationalist alliance, is not surprising. Radical and revolutionary feminists, while sharing the policy goals of independence or socialism, had long been sceptical about the PQ's feminist commitment as well as opposed to its étapiste strategy, and so also had a basis for keeping their critical distance. However, hegemonically integrated groups, like the PQ's own Comités sur la condition féminine, and trade union feminists, who shared nationalist or social democratic ideology, also retained their independence of action. All of these groups moved rapidly into openly critical postures with, for example, the publication of the FFQ's 1978[b] Livre noir, the PQ CCFs' criticism of maternity leave legislation, RAIF's continued sniping and the founding of the Regroupement des femmes québécoises by ex-PQ members in 1978 and of common fronts for maternity leave and abortion rights [8]. From the beginning of the PQ's term in
office, then, the adhesion of feminists to the bloc led by that party was fragile, and feminist issues themselves, if central to the bloc's cohesion, were also a potential source of its fragmentation [9].

Gender political opposition to the PQ was also mounted from the right. Although it has not been a task of this study to trace its growth, there is evidence of its existence in the Créditistes' and the UN's traditional gender ideologies, in the anti-abortion organization Pro-vie and in the letters column of Le Devoir at the height of the controversy surrounding Morgentaler's trials [10]. A preliminary analysis of conservative positions, as represented in newspaper reports and letters, shows that traditional Catholic views of gender differentiation and hostility to non-reproductive sexuality were common elements. The presence of conservative gender ideology in groups more central to the study has also been noted in the 1978 split in AFEAS and in the Fermières' opposition to the Égalité et Indépendance report.

On the other hand, parliamentary speakers from the PLQ, the largest opposition party, did not make feminist concerns central to their attacks on the government, offering only limited and technical criticism of legislation that centrally affected women. Indeed, in a major response to Lévesque's 1980 Inaugural speech by the PLQ women's critic, where one might expect to find a full articulation of PLQ gender ideologies, feminist issues
took second place to a denunciation of the PQ's nationalism. The latter was objected to as leading to economic errors and a falling population [DAN 30L 4s 1980: 506-507]. Continuing hostility between the unions, bearers of one brand of feminism, and the PLQ, and the failure of that party to relay the criticisms of any feminist tendency more radical than the FFQ served to distance it, then, from feminist critics of the government. This distancing, combined with general policy overlaps between the PQ and trade union feminists and the political allegiances of sectors of the labour movement to the PQ, meant that the PLQ was not in a position to hegemonize the activist feminist opposition.

In the course of the 1980 referendum campaign, as we have seen, the progressive nationalist bloc actually fractured along gender political lines. The perception that a feminist backlash, combined with the resistance of anglophones and immigrant groups (allophones), was responsible for the defeat of the nationalist project served to undermine the central importance that progressive nationalism had provisionally been prepared to accord feminism since 1976. As a result, Payette reports [1982: 108, 127], the sometimes inconsistent turn to feminism that had swept the PQ was halted for reasons of electoral opportunism. Moreover, if the bloc was divided on gender political lines, nationalism also divided feminism. Although, as we have seen, several of the Montreal autonomous groups eventually rallied to
the independentist side, they did so from a position of critical support. In contrast, liberal feminist leaders of the FFQ openly joined the federalist cause by participating in the *Yvettes* campaign. At the same time, despite the prominence of FFQ leaders in the federalist camp, my informants reported that the memberships of both the FFQ and the AFEAS were themselves divided in their orientation to independence [interviews: R, L, P]. Thus, the fact that large sectors of organized feminism had been integrated only conjuncturally into the bloc led in opposition and in government was made clear.

10.2.5. The Quebec women's movement: historical conclusions.

Taking the period as a whole the following points can now be made about the timing and social location of the women's movement as it emerged and developed in Quebec 1960-1980.

1. First, we can say that the initial perception that the emergence of feminism in Quebec was delayed has to be qualified, and is not true at all in the case of organized liberal feminism. In its secular form in the FFQ, the latter emerged in advance of both the English-Canadian liberal feminist ginger group which agitated for the establishment of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women [Morris 1982], and of the comparable pan-Canadian National Action Committee on the Status of Women, which was founded to lobby for the enactment of that Commission's 1970 report [Findlay 1981]. It was also organized
earlier, and had a larger -- proportionally and absolutely -- membership than, the American NOW (National Organization for Women, 1966), which only took off in 1970 [11]. There is no organization similar to AFEAS elsewhere in North America with which the timing of its emergence and turn to feminism can be compared. But, as in the case of the FFQ, we can say that liberal modernisation ideology and politics were significant in its formation, and that it formally adopted feminism before other rural-based women's groups in Canada [12]. In turn, the foundation of the CSF, made powerful because of its legislated position in relation to the legislature and a requirement that it choose its members from women's interest organizations, the labour movement, academia and disadvantaged groups, is attributable to the activism of liberal feminists, on the one hand, and to the Quiet Revolution tactic of building sectoral citizen participation into advisory boards, on the other. In sum, both variants of liberal feminism emerged relatively early in Quebec. This can be accounted for in terms of the hegemony of liberal modernisation ideology in the Quiet Revolution; and the strength of state-sponsored feminism rested, in turn, on the prior activism of those groups.

2. In contrast, the new kind of feminism represented by the women's liberation movement, if it was not precisely delayed [13], was certainly restricted in size and politically isolated. As I have shown, this restriction and isolation can similarly be
accounted for in terms of the bloc political context. As the liberal modernisation bloc fractured on class lines, in terms of ideologies of nationalism, in terms of its incapacity to meet the expectations that it had raised and in terms of new contradictions generated out of its attempt to re-structure higher education, the opposition bloc came to be dominated by ideologies of nationalism. Despite, moreover, a concern by some nationalist ideologues to understand the sexual dimension of the colonized experience (*le colonisé*), even this was largely thought through in male terms. At the same time, many women who would have been core participants in a women’s liberation movement were committed instead to progressive or revolutionary nationalism, and so unavailable for work in building an autonomous women’s movement.

However, gender politics from the late 1960s to 1974 was not just subordinated. The left-wing nationalist and labour activism characteristic of the period also created a highly mobilized context in which isolated groups of radicalised feminist intellectuals organic to the women’s movement developed the latter’s initial organizations, internal network connections and ideological resources, in, among others, *Québécoises Deboutte!*, *Les Têtes de Pioche*, and RAIF, in the FTQ and CEQ reports on the status of women, in the PQ’s CCFs and in the publications of the Comité de lutte pour l’avortement et la contraception libres et gratuits. These developments had a major impact, refining and
diffusing new feminist ideology. And the resulting combination of a high level of mobilization with accumulated ideological resources contained precisely the factors -- organisational networks, ideological resources, defined interests, claims and grievances, mobilization and opportunity -- that Tilly and his associates pointed to as important for the development of a movement.

At the same time, feminists in the trade unions used the ideological resources available to them from that context (an ideology of democracy and equality in the FTQ, and a collectivist social organism in the CSN and CEQ), to advance a form of feminism specific to the labour movement. As the ideologies of all these branches of the labour movement radicalized in socialist and nationalist terms, the tenets of this radicalization (the injustice of the employers' state, the second front (*le deuxième front*), the school as a reproducer of oppressive ideologies) created a radicalized climate whose central ideological elements too were turned to feminist ends. For trade union feminists, occasions for mobilization were provided by factors strictly exogenous to the women's movement, particularly public sector strikes, but turned by accident (in 1972) and by design (in 1976) to feminist ends: respectively, across-the-board minimum wage demands which disproportionately benefited the lowest wage earners, women, and equal wages and maternity leave. At the same time, the links that were made
between trade union, revolutionary and radical feminists in the autonomous groups in support of abortion rights, day care and the support of women strikers, laid the basis for large scale organizing of IWD after 1975.

3. The apparent explosiveness of the feminist mobilization that took place after 1975 is thus to be accounted for in terms partly exogenous to and partly internal to the women's movement. Among external factors the first, International Women's Year, which as a United Nations project adopted by the Quebec state, was properly outside of the autonomous women's movement, provided feminists with the occasion for mobilizations, access to material resources and ideological legitimation. In Quebec, the mobilizing effect of IWY was amplified by the activist role of the CSF, which provided a bridge between the state, feminist groups and women not previously mobilized. One result of IWY publicity was the attention directed by, for example, journalists towards women's equality and the effects of sexism. This in turn provided a stage on which to express the accumulated ideological and social resources of the movement which had had trouble finding an audience in a political context overshadowed by class and national mobilizations. Liberal feminist ideology radicalized, particularly in AFEAS's open declaration of its feminism, in the FFQ's acceptance of the trade union programme of work related demands (after a brief focus on part time work as the solution to women's problems) and in the liberal stands both
of these organizations took on the issue of abortion [14]. Support for old and new issues, like the liberalization of access to abortion and of an end to violence against women, generalized through the women's organizations and in the government sponsored CSF. Thus, there was, despite on-going strategic and ideological differences, a measure of the ideological convergence that Carden [1974] noted for the USA. A new breadth and maturity in the women's movement after 1976 was indicated by its capacity to sustain two major single issue common fronts on abortion and maternity leave supported by all sectors of feminism as well as by a range of other groups.

4. As we have noted the factor of bloc politics came into play not just in providing a context for political mobilization as the hegemony of liberal modernisation ideology declined, but also in creating a context in which some of the women's movement's programmatic goals could be achieved. A feminist programme, pushed by trade union feminists, the PQ's own internal feminist caucuses and membership, and autonomous groups, was central to the cohesion of the progressive nationalist bloc. As a result, a new series of legislative and administrative reforms were actually put in place: abortion rights, with the decision not to prosecute Morgentaler or others like practitioners and the establishment of the cliniques Lazure; maternity leave; family law reform; and the upgrading of the cabinet power of the minister charged with the status of women. In addition, these
reforms and the global policy review carried out for the government by the CSF continued, through the controversies they engendered, to provide occasions for feminist mobilization.

5. All this suggests, finally, that the conventional feminist view concerning the oppositional relation between nationalism and feminism needs to be revised, at least, in the Quebec case. In the short term the interests of these movements were indeed opposed to one another, with nationalist groups drawing off activists with feminist convictions, and two-stage strategies (first Independence, then social reform) placing feminism on the back burner. In a broader, longer term perspective, however, the rise of nationalism in Quebec had a positive relation to the women's movement. It created a highly mobilized context which sustained a high degree of ideological radicalization, oriented to the goals of autonomy, independence and liberation, and which created bridges between issue-oriented activists and a labour movement mobilising in defense of class and national interests. Also if revolutionary and radical feminist ideological practitioners were constrained in their efforts to address their nationalist and marxist peers, they were also provided with values (like self-determination) that they could reconfigure to interpellate, with a feminist meaning, those who already understood them in at least nationalist terms.

By 1976, as we have seen, the antagonism between the women's movement and nationalism had considerably softened; indeed, the
women's movement had become integrated into the progressive nationalist bloc that the PQ was leading to electoral power. For some sectors of the women's movement (liberal or radical feminists) this integration was conjunctural; for others (those in the PQ's CCF's, and some trade union feminists), integration was hegemonic; and the importance of these differences was revealed when the women's movement itself divided on nationalist lines during the defeated Referendum of 1980.

To say, however, that different sectors of the women's movement became conjuncturally or hegemonically integrated into the opposition bloc, is also to say that that bloc had, to maintain its cohesiveness, to address the feminist political actors who helped shape it. Conversely, the election of the political leadership of that bloc to power was the historically effective condition for the realization of important steps to ensure the concrete equality of women in the family and in the work force. Sustained by these general commitments, as well as by its own core of feminist activists and electoral supporters, the PQ further institutionalised this feminist policy shift in the state, by orchestrating, as we have seen, a public education campaign, designed not only to promote these reforms but to encourage a change in the social consciousness of gender. But this is not to suggest a counter-thesis. The Yvettes Incident and the subsequent fragmentation both of the women's movement and its relation with the PQ, shows that the feminist-nationalist
juncture was itself tenuous and unstable. Overall, it seems, the relation of feminism to nationalism has no fixity, and can only be understood against the background of the particular bloc forces and alliances in play.

10.3. Theoretical conclusions.

At the level of theory, this study was intended to explore the utility of neo-Gramscian hegemony theory with its analysis of the political process as structured by blocs for understanding the development of feminism. A number of subordinate arguments about the operation of contemporary gender politics were advanced.

The first argument, that women's movements must be seen not merely as determined by social structures or political forces, but as constitutive components of the political field and of the blocs which compete for hegemony on it, has been amply borne out by the way in which women as political actors affected politics in parties, trade unions and social movements. At crucial historical points (e.g., the family law reform of 1964, the public sector strike and election of 1976, and the referendum of 1980), as we have seen, gender politics were important in cementing and fragmenting ruling and opposition blocs. Given the dual process of determination of women's politics by the total political process, and of the total political process by women's politics, hegemony theory does indeed have a lot to offer feminist analysis.
Application of this approach has generally allowed us to see the complexity of women's insertion into the political process. I argued that gender politics will tend to become more central to the ideological constitution of blocs in advanced capitalist states as these are forced to manage a new form of the woman-work-marriage relation structured by an increasingly permanent attachment of women to the labour force. This argument, too, has been empirically born out by the study. In Quebec, we have seen a case where, indeed, making this turn became conjuncturally crucial to the ability of an opposition bloc to sustain its ideological unity and achieve electoral power.

I also argued that one might see the political processes in which women became involved as those of a gender-in-formation, on the model of a class-in-formation. Such a gender-in-formation would produce its own organic intellectuals, and political and ideological apparatuses. However, although such intellectuals and apparatuses were produced by contemporary feminist organizing in Quebec, the study has revealed problems with this concept. In addition to ideological differences which tend to fragment gender unity, there seem to be no overriding structural determinants which make for gender interest solidarity. Women do not have a unique relation to the mode of production in the way that a class does. In Quebec, urban/rural (FFQ/AFEAS), ethnic-national (anglophone/francophone), age, occupational (housewife/worker)
...and class divisions continually cut across potential gender solidarity. As against the model of an inter-class gender movement, we have also seen a striking instance of a different possibility, wherein a working class labour movement is able to make feminist issues its own, transforming them into class issues, yet without blunting their feminist edge. In Quebec, this occurred generally in the rise of trade union feminism, and more particularly in the 1976 struggle between the labour and women's movements and the governing party over equal pay and maternity leave. All this would seem to suggest that class structures might be dominant over those of gender on a political field typical of an advanced capitalist social formation, like Quebec. What this would mean, concretely, is that, although the women's movement may not be able to assume the same kind of political weight as class actors, like the labour movement, the latter, in a given gender political situation, may be able to adopt feminist politics. This suggestion must, however, remain provisional and historical, and requires testing in the light of other periods and situations.

Gramscian theory sees the process of class formation, to the extent that it is a process of political consolidation, as mediated by and mediating the political dynamics of mutually opposed blocs [15]. As an extension of this approach, I have argued that the process of (feminist) gender consolidation must similarly be seen as inserted into bloc structures and politics;
and also that, just as the popular democratic concept of nation can interpellate all members of a national social formation, whatever their class position, so too can feminist ideologies potentially interpellate all female members of a particular social formation [16]. However, as debates in the Assemblée nationale in 1964 and 1968 on family law, and among feminists over the relative priority to be given the abortion and maternity leave issues in 1976 have shown, in order to unify all women, such feminist ideologies must remain at a high level of abstraction. The process of specification opens up grounds for ideological difference. For Quebec feminism, ideological divergences developed over positions on the family, socialism, sexuality, the state and the nation.

Overall, then, the very fluidity of gender political determinations means that the concept of "gender-in-formation" has only the status of a useful metaphor. In addition, my contention that the dual systems perspective, which sees only two structures, class and patriarchy, and not the mediating importance of blocs, has serious flaws [3. above] is strongly confirmed by the way in which bloc politics has been shown to have affected the development of all the major feminist organizations in Quebec, particularly in their liberal, social Catholic, revolutionary and trade union forms.

The study has also helped concretize the loosely developed Gramscian concept of the integral state, at least insofar as it
has pointed to one of the modes of the growth of that state. Throughout the period studied, the development of the integral state in Quebec was advanced by feminist demands for legislation and administrative action on gender relations in the institutions of civil society. Asking for equality provisions in family legislation, for example, meant substituting the rule of the state for that of men as "patriarchs" in the family and the church. In asking the state to promote, through all educational and media apparatuses, particular (egalitarian) ideologies of women, they were also inviting the state to extend its rule into what Mitchell [1974] and Althusser [1971b] have identified as individual psycho-structural supports for ideology, that is the world of primary relations and identity.

Conceptualizing these developments in terms of the integral state complicates the whole issue of recuperation, that is how the women's movement while pressuring for reform could avoid being co-opted by the state. In this perspective, a feminist ideological element cannot be thought of as simply a possession of a women's movement that the state appropriates. Nor is there any simple opposition between "women" and the state: rather, women are continuously involved in the process of retotalization of the always fragile political configuration of blocs. With regard to this process, the state provides the legal administrative framework and is the site where that politics is expressed. Thus, in particular instances, for example
International Women's Year, state sponsored feminist bodies, like the CSF, can play important roles in structuring the field on which gender politics is played out. On a different issue, state sponsorship of the cliniques lazaire was a real feminist political gain, insofar as it permitted actualizing the ideology of women's right to control their own bodies, and despite the fact that the establishment of these clinics, still under the control of the medical profession, ignored the more radical demand, articulated by the feminists of the Comité de lutte and the Coordination nationale pour l'avortement libre et gratuit, for women's control of their own medical reproductive services. In these cases the state, whether through advisory bodies like the CSF, parties or legislation, played a role not just in the conservative maintenance but in the egalitarian transformation of gender politics.

Besides theoretical there are practical implications, here, for feminist organizing: that engagement with the state is inevitable; that a complex notion of recuperation is necessary to retain the flexibility needed to form strategy against a background of shifting political circumstances; and that feminist strategizing might usefully be oriented to influencing the politics of blocs.

Finally, the study indicates areas where further research would be helpful in understanding the development of feminism in such a way as to further refine the integration of feminist and hegemony
theory here advocated. In particular, it would be helpful to investigate the location and dynamic of conservative gender politics; the forms taken by gender politics and organizing at the base of trade unions, political parties and other core political institutions; the relative importance of state, media and sectoral (for example, labour) institutions in the process of value transmission; and the role of the state bureaucracy in shaping state gender policies. Also, an analysis of how the progressive nationalist bloc and the PQ regime fragmented in the years after 1980 would be necessary to complete the analysis of liberal modernising and progressive nationalist blocs in Quebec undertaken for the two decades covered in this study. Finally, given the perspective on theory development adopted in this study, the project of developing a fully integrated feminist/hegemony theory needs further work involving similar macrosocial studies of gender politics in other social formations and other periods. It would be on the basis of such comparative study that the thesis provisionally advanced above, for example, about the relative dominance of class over gender politics could be further explored.
Notes.

Notes for Chapter 1.

1. This professional hockey team had long been mythologized as the carrier of Quebecois masculine pride well before 1976. In one spectacular incident in 1967, after a goal was disallowed in a game at the Forum, rioting fans smashed store windows, including those of a Toronto based department store chain, on a major shopping street. Rick Salutin’s dramatization of these events in his play Les Canadiens was well received in Montreal [personal communication: Paul Thompson]. Sport teams and events not only carry national aspirations [Kidd and McFarlane 1971], but differentially code masculinity and femininity [Hall and Richardson 1982; Bouteller and San Giovani 1983; Kidd 1987]. Thus, sporting triumph can compensate for the sense of impotence that what Memmi [1972] calls “le colonisé” or the colonised experiences.

2. This is the brand name of a popular beer marketed by Labatts and favoured by unionized workers [Interview: P].

3. In this study, "contemporary" and "recent" indicate developments since 1960, and, for Quebec, from 1960-1980. The focus is on francophone women’s organizations, which, observers agree, have been practically isolated from anglophone feminism as a result of national conflict [Danylewycs and Fraser 1978].


5. For Canada as a whole, Cerise Morris [1982] has studied the establishment of the Royal Commission on Women in Canada and Angela Miles [1979] has investigated "The Politics of Feminist Radicalism: A Study in Integrative Feminism"; see also Maroney [1978].


7. This term is a useful shorthand to refer to developments which took place after 1960.

8. There is no disciplinary specialization in published book-length studies. Anthropology, history and political science have
been as well represented as sociology.

9. According to Freeman [1975: 15-16] a reference group is "something to which people relate their attitudes and judge their rewards". It can be a group, a single person, an abstract idea or an unrealized standard. It functions both normatively by establishing standards and comparatively, by allowing an individual to make judgements about particular situations or attitudes in terms of the reference group. For a different view of the dynamics of feminist consciousness, see Bartky [1978].

10. There is considerable evidence that working class women have mobilized on feminist issues both at earlier stages of industrialisation [Bacchi 1979; Dye 1975; Kessler Harris 1982; Manley 1980; Sangster 1978] and more recently [Maroney 1983; Briskin and Yanz 1983; Penny 1983].

11. For a discussion of the view that particular political issues (usually those touching on women's responsibilities in household and childcare work) have a greater salience for women, see Jacquette [1974] "Introduction", Flora [1974], Bourque and Grossholtz [1974] and Iglebzin [1974]. Andrews [1984a] has argued that feminism has emerged in the areas of consumption, but Feree [1980] and Nussbaum [1980] point to work place experiences as a basis for feminist radicalization. Brown [1973: 28] discusses the concept of salience with respect to ideologies (and hence politics), operationalising it in terms of the capacity to mobilize individuals to action.

12. At the empirical level, the prediction that feminism should be initiated by middle class women does not help to explain why unions played such an important role in Quebec.

13. The term récupération has been developed by Latouche [1979: part 3] and Yanacopoulo [1981: 65-66] to talk about the way in which radical critical ideas are weakened by being normalized and reintegrated into the process of social reproduction itself. "Récupération" can be distinguished from co-optation, which refers to integration into a group or institution. The former refers to ideological work put into "negating and diffusing challenges to the historically dominant meaning" of gender ideologies and relates to the process whereby the dominant ideology is reproduced [Barrett 1980: 111]. One might think of the case of mid-1970s Revlon ads for "revolutionary red" lipstick or 1980s media images of individual "superwomen". An earlier formulation of this problem can be found in debates about whether particular feminist demands were to be regarded as reformist or revolutionary. Such a concern distinguishes the orientation of, for example, liberal and radical or revolutionary feminists to state reform. The former are in general interested in the direct effects of reform, the latter with not only the direct benefits of reform but also with the extent to which these reforms serve
to legitimise the state and undermine the critical and transformative vision, or "total revolution" [O'Leary and Toupin 1982: 13-14] of feminists; that is, in the theoretical terms adopted here, to re-hegemonize feminism. I have found no instance of liberal feminists denouncing recuperation by the state, while radical and revolutionary do [QD 1:2 Dec. 1978]. In an narrower political and perhaps politically motivated sense, however, editoralist Lise Bissonnette denounced the report Egalité et Indépendance as an attempt to recuperate feminism to Parti québécois interests [Le Devoir 26 Oct. 1978], a tense relation she later exacerbated with regard to the "Yvettes" operation [see 9.3.4., 9.3.5. below; Dandurand and Tardy 1981]. While apparently of French origin, an anglicized version of the term has come to be used in both written and spoken language within the English-speaking Left.

14. For a thorough discussion of the background and key concepts of different feminist currents see Jaggar's brilliant study Feminist Politics and Human Nature. The following summary characterisations may be made:

Liberal feminism tends to define women as disadvantaged, to adopt an equal rights perspective, to ignore class differences, to see the source of women's disadvantaged position in ideas transmitted through socialization, to conceptualise change as part of a natural social evolution [Armstrong and Armstrong 1984: 127-149; Jaggar 1983: 173-203], which takes place primarily in the public world of work and to adopt a pressure groups strategy of lobbying. Especially before International Women's Year, 1975, it tended to see the family as a separate sphere, minimized the importance of reproductive rights and was resistant to the idea of state intervention at the economic level to ensure women's equality.

Radical feminists see women's oppression as the fundamental structure of inequity on which all other oppressions are built. As a result they prioritize feminist politics above those of class or nation and generally construe men as "the enemy" [Atkinson 1974; Koedt et al. 1973; Jaggar 1981: 114, 249-296]. In their organizing they have tended to emphasise issues linked to sexuality (objectification, pornography), violence (wife battering) or both (rape). Some have gone so far as to adopt a strategy of outright separatism (from men) [Daly 1978]. Alice Echols [1984] has identified a further evolution of this tendency, "cultural feminism", which "equates women's liberation with the nurturance of a female counter culture which it is hoped will supercede the dominant culture".

Socialist feminism and marxist feminism both draw on a marxist tradition exemplified by Engels [1972]. They argue that because social formations are determined by both class structures and a sex/gender system, women's oppression must also be seen as
15. For discussions of nationalist ideology and movements in Quebec see Russell [1966]; Dion [1957, 1971, 1975]; Milner and Milner [1973]; Denis [1979]; Coleman [1984]; Monière [1977]; Laurin-Frenette [1979]. Although these authors hold various theoretical positions, there is general agreement that after 1960 a conservative, involuted nationalism promoted by clerical authorities was replaced by a modernising and sometimes socialist or social democratic nationalism [Dion 1975] below. Hartz [1965] suggests that "fragment cultures" freeze and create distinct cultural wholes; Davis [1978] discusses marxist theories of nationalism.

16. The term "rhythms of development" refers to such dynamic features of an historical development of, for example, a party or a movement, as the timing of its initial appearance, its relative speed of growth, and its relative endurance with respect to the development of other similar or different phenomena in the same or another social formation. For a discussion of the difference between linear evolution and complex historical time, see Althusser and Balibar [1970: 119-145]. The term "sovereignty-association" was adopted by the PQ to describe its project of political independence for the Quebec state at its convention in June 1-3 1979 [Le Devoir, 3 June 1978]. Of the vast literature on this topic, useful introductions are to be found in Saywell [1977], Milner [1978] and Fraser [1984: part 3].

17. This discussion relies on Hawthorne [1976], especially Chapter 7.

18. However, his work is never systematized theory and so meanings shift. For his views on objectivity see Weber [1904; 1919a; 1919b], and for his historical work see Weber [1905; 1923]; on Weber's general framework see Bendix [1966], Mommesen [1965; 1974] and Giddens [1972].

19. For a defense of this position see Lakatos and Musgrave [1970].

20. For a different sociological response to this problem see Glazer and Strauss [1971].

21. A Goffmanian perspective [Goffman 1959] might also suggest that the successful performance of the doctoral candidate role in sociology requires publically convincing adhesion to the Durkheimian dictum, handed on through sociological folklore, of no theory without facts and no facts without theory. Thus, from the perspective of the sociology of presenting the study, its theoretical and empirical aims merge, methodological issues aside, in the ritual requirements for getting the union ticket.
22. The term social formation can be defined as "a social whole, in the widest sense at a given moment in its historical existence" [Poulantzas 1968: 15]. Quebec is structured by a combination of determinants that make it both a distinct society and a region of the North American regional economy, together constituting what I earlier called a "double insertion" into the North American social formation [Maroney 1979: 38]. The effects of this dual structuration have been noted in the labour movement [Dofny and Bernard 1980; 8.3. below] and in student politics [Roussopoulos 1974: 100-102].

23. This term, developed by Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci [1971: 57-58 et passim], refers to domination legitimated by consent; for a discussion see 2.3 and 2.4 below. For the purpose of this study, I have called this integration "feminist/hegemony" analysis.


26. For a fuller discussion of these issues with regard to the social sciences, see the anthology edited by Bowles and Duell Klein [1983], Smith [1974] and Fox Keller [1983]; Fox Keller and Grontowski [1983] and Benston [1969] also discuss these issues as they affect the "hard" sciences.

27. Liz Stanley and Sue Wise [1983] argue that the process of theory building is importantly shaped by experience, not just in everyday life, but professionally; in terms of how, for example, colleagues respond to the presentation of research in academic and other social settings. The method of presentation they advocate is to tell the tale of the research process and of the conceptual revisions it led to.

28. On "fieldwork in a semi-familiar setting" see Posner [1980]. She notes that a process analagous to going native in a foreign culture can result from the process of social integration even in a local institution. Despite an overlap of values with many participants in the field and despite the social ties that I developed, the technique of data triangulation mitigated against this danger in the final study. The preliminary period of informal study also corresponds to the "hanging around" that fieldworkers often, as contributors to Shaffir et al. [1980] point out, do.
29. More precisely, in the early 1960s I had pored over reports in Maclean's magazine about Jean Lesage, the Quiet Revolution, and growing nationalist aspirations in Quebec, and tried to defend them to my schoolmates. As a university student, I had hitch-hiked to Montreal to attend a conference on Quebec nationalism at the Université de Montréal and sat up over coffee, cigarettes and intense discussion with intense Quebecois(e)s. Later, in 1968-9, I had spent some time with community activists in what I remember as a whirl of discussions about art and revolution, community control and the state, Quebec and Canada that were conducted in spacious workshops whose white walls were broken with posters of Cuba, France and local struggles or in dingy apartments heated (illegally perhaps, and certainly inadequately) by paraffin stoves. These experiences, the discovery (in France) that there was more to French than the drunken, plucked, sweatered chickens that populated my French grammar text, and the filtering of information along the lines of the left, across the invisible frontier, all combined to make me want to live in Quebec and learn to speak French.

30. Several of these I met through the GMR, others in a variety of other far left groups, known locally by their critics as "les groupes m-ls", whose orientation was derived from the Maoism that swept the North American New Left. The definitive work on the North American New Left has yet to be written. In the meantime see Levitt [1984] and Kostash [1980] for Canada and Evans [1980] and Cluster [1979] for the US.

31. These activities also meant that the problem of entry into the field for the formal research was considerably reduced as I already had social network connections and an established bona fides, two factors which Hoffmann [1980] points out can be helpful in making contact and in assuring good quality information.

32. All emphases are in the original unless otherwise indicated.

33. Field notes were made during the workshops and after discussions with individuals.

34. The conference was deliberately scheduled two months after March 8, the official date of International Women's Day, in order to assure that women travelling from other locations, sometimes over 100 miles, would not be turned back by bad weather.

35. These included associations like the Fermières and the confessional Filles d'Isabelle which are not examined in this study because they are neither self-defined as feminist organizations [5.4 below] nor central to the development of feminist politics in the period.
36. In her corporate ethnography, *Women and Men of the Corporation*, Rosabeth Moss Kanter [1977: 296] points out that such interviews are on specific topics, occur in various locations and are mutually beneficial, allowing the informant to ask questions and the interviewer to "broaden [her] territory and view ... considerably".

37. For such counsel see Goode and Hatt [1952: 185, 191 et passim]; Benney and Hughes [1970: 194] suggest that equality is merely a convention, that interviewers encourage and accept affect as well as information [ibid. 196]. They portray the interview as an aggressive sexual game: "our flirtation with life, our eternal affair, played hard and to win, but played with that detachment and amusement that gives us, win, or lose, the spirit to rise up and interview again" [ibid. 191-2]. With a certain irony, Prus [1980] describes the process and "dynamics of acquiring information" as a hustle.

38. See, for example, Pettigrew [1981]; Smith [1974: 11] argues "The only way of knowing a socially constructed world is knowing it from within. We can never stand outside it".

39. A list of key informants, mainly women but including some men, was established on the bases of names appearing in the publications of women's organizations and of a snowball technique. Those women who occupied formal offices, wrote documents that I judged as influential in shaping organizational policy or ideology or belonged to several organizations, were placed on the list [see Appendix B]. These were sources rather than sponsors [Fine 1980: 128-129].

40. With individuals I already knew, or who had been recommended to me by mutual friends, a similar procedure was followed, although obviously the problem of identifying myself and my project was reduced.

41. With a concern to balance the feminist conviction that clothes should not make the woman [Carden 1974: 34, 54-55] and the advice of sociological precursors that one should take account of the prejudices of the interview subject, I dressed in a fashion that was respectable without resorting to costume. This meant that I wore either gray flannel pants and a blazer or less formal corduroy pants and a sweater.

42. I answered all questions except for naming individuals with whom I had previously spoken.

43. Were I to conduct a similar project again, I would ask those who refused permission once more at the end of the interview if I could use their names. Since this project has a strong historical dimension, this is information that would be
useful for other researchers.

44. Because Quebec has a deposit library system usually complete runs of the periodical publications of these organisations are all to be found in the Bibliothèque nationale. Since then a feminist publishing house, Editions du Remue-ménage, has published complete editions of Québécoises Debouttes, Les Têtes de Ploche and selections from Des luttes et des rires des femmes, an undertaking which provides a clue to the importance that feminists accord the printed word in general and these publications in particular.

45. Domestic labour is the term developed by marxist feminists for "housework" and childcare or "reproduction". For a discussion of the term see Barrett [1981: 19-22]; for what has come to be called the domestic labour debate see Benston [1969], Dalla Costa and James [1972], Seccombe [1974, 1975, 1980a, 1980b], Luxton [1981]. Fox [1980] and Malos [1980] are useful anthologies in this general area. For critical sociological accounts of house­wifery see Komarovsky [1964], Lopata [1971] and Oakley [1974a].

46. The PLQ published a newspaper, La Réforme from 1958; it became L'Électeur in 1967. Because the PQ published an internal newspaper only sporadically, Le Jour was consulted selectively. This daily mass circulation newspaper, "l'organe officieux du Parti québécois" [Dion 1975: 93], was partially funded by the party. It was organized in 1973 after Claude Ryan, editor of the influential paper Le Devoir, refused to stand as a PQ candidate [Fraser 1984: 163], and was published from 1974 to 1977.

47. On Cité libre, a liberal reform journal founded in 1951, see Monière [1977: 311-318], Dion [1975: 55-61] and Behlels [1984: 149-154].

48. Since labour movement movement ideologies were only part of the global study, it was not possible to read all of their journals. On Quebec trade union ideologies on women, see also Gagnon [1973, 1974b, 1974c, 1983] and Barry [1977].

49. Its resource centre in Montreal proved to have an almost complete collection of this material.

Notes for Chapter 2.

1. While neo-Gramscian founders do not consider gender, more recent work from this school includes at least ritual references to the women's movement [Simon 1984; Mouffe 1984; Sasson 1982]. The first use by feminists I have traced of hegemony and "hegemonic" [Himmelweit et al. 1976: 4] is not theorized. Some use has been made of the notion of hegemonic ideologies in
the sociology of culture and education [Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies 1979].

2. This conjunction has also been a source of great confusion for twentieth century marxology [Popper 1970; Althusser 1969, 1971].

3. For a strong statement of the contrasting thesis that the productive forces are primary, see Cohen [1978: 138-140].

4. For a discussion of Lukacs' position see McDonough [1978: 35-41].


6. The fully fledged "translation" problem would involve not only transposing one set of categories into another and also sorting out the relations between different national intellectual traditions but also a sense of what each has made of Gramsci.

7. In addition, conditions of prison life and censorship and his early death before editing the Prison Notebooks [Flore 1970] all combine to leave gaps and a lack of clarity in some of his concepts.

8. In the early Turin period, the term hegemony was used in a way which does not interest us here to mean domination in a classic marxist-leninist sense [Sassoon 1980: 51-54].

9. This view is in sharp contrast with the history of the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia.

10. According to Mouffe [1979c: 183], "expansive hegemony" can be defined as "the ability of one class to articulate the interest of other social groups to its own".

11. For both Hegel and the early Marx, civil society, as the site of consensual relations was distinguished only from the state and included the economy; for Marx and Engels, this concept was replaced by mode of production and production relations [Bobbio 1979: 21-30].

12. "Undoubtedly the fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed -- in other words, that the leading groups should make sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind" [Gramsci 1971: 161].
13. Gramsci [1971: 196-200] contrasts this view of spontaneous disturbances arising from actual social conditions with "spontaneism", or the belief that dominated social groups will create a revolution without the necessity of forming a political party. Thus, his theory of social formations as unstable totalities is distinct from his view of strategy. His concept of unstable totalities can be contrasted with Parsonian systems theory [1964] where politics and power are minimized, Durkheim's organicism [1965] where representations (or ideological elements) symbolize a (transcendent) social whole or Weber's view [1922: 180-188] where politics exists but interests are first of all individual. For a critique of Parsons, see Gouldner [1971: Part II].

14. "[T]he creation of an active direct consensus resulting from the genuine adoption of the interests of the popular classes by the hegemonic class...would give rise to the creation of a genuine 'national-popular will'" [Mouffe 1979: 182].

15. As the crowning point of an "entire movement of intellectual and moral reform", he held Marxism to presuppose the cultural past of the Renaissance, Reformation, German philosophy, the French Revolution, Calvinism, English classical economics and secular liberalism [Gramsci 1971: 395].

16. Among non-marxist foundational sociological thinkers, George Herbert Mead [1963] has articulated this position most systematically; for a modern discussion of a Mead-Marx synthesis, see Richard Ropers [1973].

17. Simon [1982: 94-96], following Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, editors of the Prison Notebooks, argues that traditional intellectuals are defined not by their supercession (as for example, feudal appendages) but by their self-definition.

18. Jessie Bernard [1973: 16-58] has suggested that there can be two marriages, "his" and "hers", corresponding to the differing situations of men and women and the perceptions that are thereby generated.


20. For Gramsci, conjunctures are analytically distinguishable from on-going structural problems.


22. The influence of Comte and Durkheim on Althusser is traced
in Wernick [1984]; for an Althusserian critique of Durkheim, see Hirst [1975].


24. For a strict reading which emphasizes production, see Cohen [1978: 134-173].

25. "[C]lasses do not exist as separate entities, look around, find a class enemy, and then start to struggle. On the contrary, people find themselves in a society structured in determined ways...they identify points of antagonistic interest, they commence to struggle around these issues and in the process of struggling discover themselves as classes, they come to know this discovery as class consciousness" [Thompson 1978: 149; cf, Kay 1975: 81-81].

26. See also the debate between Conway [1978, 1984] and Richards [1981].

27. The notion of "popular-democratic" bloc, ideology, struggle etc. developed from the Gramscian term "popular national" [Forgacs 1984].

Notes for Chapter 3.

1. The many studies of the women's movement have tended to be historical and descriptive. The recent perception of a "gender gap" in electoral politics has served to partially refocus analysis; for an example of this approach see Klein [1984].

2. It is not the task of this study to evaluate feminist structural categories as such but only in so far as they impinge upon the definition of the state and the political field. This includes being agnostic on the vexed question of the origin and universality of women's oppression, an issue debated, for example, in the volumes edited by Reiter [1975] and Rosaldo and Lamphere [1974]; see also Friedl [1975] and Leacock [1978].


4. The Weberian definition of power adopted by these writers is "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests" [Lamphere 1974: 99; Collier 1974: 91]. See Maroney [1978: 71-72];
5. On the development of "patriarchal theory" see Coward [1983]; for useful discussions of the meaning and utility of the term itself see Beechey [1979], Rubin [1975: 167-168] and Mcdonough and Harrison [1978].

6. Mary Daly [1978: 326] states the logical conclusion: "Patriarchy appears to be 'everywhere'. Even outer space and the future have been colonized". Although Millett [1970: 33, 362-365 et passim] relies on a lurking adherence to liberal strategies of education and Firestone [1970: 192] on technological revolution, for Daly education is not of course an adequate strategic; only the social elimination of males through separatism or perhaps androclide remains.

7. In this early work, there is no analysis of the state's ideological role and "the family" is seen as the reproducer of ideology [Hamilton 1977; Mitchell 1971: 119]

8. On the debate arising from Young's [1980] attack on this conceptual vagueness see Sargent [1981].

9. For the historical critique see Tilly and Scott [1978]; Middleton [1979] on Hamilton; Brenner and Ramas [1984] on Hartmann; and Lewis [1985] on Brenner and Ramas. For a radical feminist version of this critique see MacKinnon [1982; 1983a; 1983b]; for a socialist-feminist version see Vogel [1981].

10. For a useful review of this literature see Barrett [1980: 227-247 et passim].

11. As do some feminists influenced by the work of French psychoanalytic theorist Jacques Lacan; for different forms of Lacanian influence in feminism see Mitchell [1974] and Irigaray [1974].

12. This is only one example of a general stylistic tendency to think that concepts are established through repetition. Cady Stanton (1815-1902) was an American women's rights movement leader.

13. Following Smith [1977], Duelli Klein [1983: 90] calls this research "on" women rather than research "for" women. She criticizes it for retaining an androcentric perspective: "much of this research consists of duplicating traditional research: knowledge about women was added on to the knowledge about men".

14. In fact, her suggested correction is to put male female differences in what she calls reproductive consciousness into the model.
15. Some authors hold that women's social position, for example, production [Clark 1969] or religion [Hamilton 1977], declined with the development of capitalism. The concept of the patriarch as work-team leader is developed by Tilly and Scott [1978: 2 et passim]. With regard to Quebec, Gagnon [1974b] identifies three ideological types: the traditional (clerical/national) "femme au foyer", the "femme symbiose", which came to prevail in the 1960s, and nondifferentiation. "La femme-symbiose... elle ne travaille pas, est en mesure de le faire ou l'a déjà fait; elle est active dans diverse organisations (comités d'école, bénévolat, partis politiques...)". Because these activities are approved as long as they do not interfere with "ses responsabilités premières (famille et foyer)", this ideology prolongs the traditional framework.

Notes for Chapter 4.

1. The full historiographic and political debate on the Conquest and Confederation are beyond the scope of this study; see, for example, Ryerson [1968].

2. Thus, I reject Poulantzas's categorization of these latter as petty bourgeois. Gorz's [1982: 35-44] critique of androcentric definitions of "proletariat" as workers in heavy industry is particularly apt given the historical concentration of women in light industry [Cross 1977]; on drawing the line around management, see Wright [1978: 43-44].

3. Barzeau [1964] had earlier signaled the emergence of a middle class.

4. Nor are the categories narrow and congruent enough to suit Weber's [1922: 181-183] definition of social class as identical situation in the market.

5. For a brief review of the debate between Dahrendorf and Milliband see Giddens [1982: 37-39].


7. Quebec agriculture is almost entirely direct production for market. Agricultural sector workers were only 6% of the labour force in 1960, and about 4% in 1981 [Canada 1981 cat no 93-965 table 10]. Large scale cooperatives of farmers and credit unions operated by 1980 like any business attempting to rationalize its actions in a competitive market. Their actions lead Niosi [1981: 53-55] to call them a "petite bourgeoisie modernisée" and "grande large". As Postgate and McRoberts [1976: 47-48] point out, in
the two decades following 1951, rural population decreased by 8% and 7% of the total population respectively and "the farm/non-farm ratio in the rural population reversed itself" after 1961. A long term decline in rural population was reversed in the late 1970s, with a 13.9% "return to the land", mostly in the "urban fringe, particularly of medium sized cities" [Canada 1981 cat no 99-942 charts 2, 3].

8. Bourque and Legare [1979] argue that there is a state as well as a private sector bourgeoisie, a distinction that is not relevant to the argument of this study.

9. Indeed, Niosi [1981: 60-63] argues that the "new Quebec bourgeoisie" is not a national bourgeoisie, but a fragment of a pan-Canadian capitalist class.

10. Such a fund, the Société générale de financement was established in July 6 1962 to support Quebec's entrepreneurial development; see Niosi [1981: 108-111] and Coleman [1984: 101-106]. This experiment was of mixed success. It invested heavily in the Simard family [ch 9 n58, n59] holdings headed by Marine Industries as well as in several consumer industries (knitting, biscuits, metal goods) which were not very profitable, so that by 1966 its capital was exhausted.

11. While an exact figure for the "new middle class" is "inconceivable", Milner [1978: 94] estimated it in 1975 at between 200,000 and 250,000 or a tenth of the labour force with a total of 300,000 to 350,000 members including dependants, that is, lower proportion of the total population because it is young and likely to consist of small and two earner families.


13. On the UN in power and the growth of opposition, see Quinn [1963: 131-169]. Duplessis had in fact died in September, 1959. The short-lived government of his successor, Paul Sauvé ended with the unexpected death of the leader. The party was divided about Antonio Barrette who lead the 1960 campaign [Quinn 1963: 177-178].

14. The CSN [PV 1962: 15] welcomed this development. The nationalization of hydro-electric power, an issue of the 1962 election, was one example [Le Borgne 1976: 20].

15. Aspects of this programme were first politically articulated by the PLQ as early as their 1956 convention. On the reform of the Liberal Party, see Comeau [1982] and Bolly [1976, 1982]. Party programmes have been collected by Roy [1971].
16. Sociologist Marcel Rioux saw these elections as setting a new course for the whole society [cited Dion 1975: 61]. The penetration of this ideology into popular culture and everyday speech, is indicated in the adoption of "manic", abbreviated from Manicouagan (site of a massive Hydro Quebec project) as a term of praise; c.f. Postgate and McRoberts [1976: 98]. Analyses by Pinard [1970, 1973] suggest that Liberal electoral support was not tied to support for the modernisation programme [1969] and that working class voters were suspicious of the PLQ. However, a poll taken before the 1962 election by the Groupe de recherches sociales found the majority of francophones supported the PLQ: 58% in Montreal and 53% in the rest of the province [Lemieux 1973: 28-29]. For further discussion of the labour/Liberal split see 4.2.3. and 8.3.3. below.

17. Voting statistics show that farmers supported the UsN by 4.1% and 3% more than the provincial average vote in 1956 and 1960 respectively. In 1962 and 1966 they continued to be strongly unioniste compared with the provincial average of votes for each party. By 1970, they voted more strongly for the UN and the Ralliement Créditiste [Leveillé 1976; Lemieux et al., 1970].

18. But, as Denis Monière [1977] and Gilles Bourque and Anne Legaré [1979] have pointed out, this had already in a different form been on the agenda of the short-lived (1959-1960) government of UN Premier Paul Sauvé.

19. A Conseil d'orientation économique du Québec was established early in 1961 [Coleman 1984: 100].

20. Panitch [1977: 14] has pointed out that the Canadian state has never been laissez-faire, but played a crucial role in facilitating capital accumulation through guaranteeing financing for public works, through immigration policies designed to develop a working class and through the provision of a technical and social infrastructure for economic development. In this light, the Quebec state was becoming like the Canadian state.

21. Milner points out that from 1961 to 1970 Quebec expenditures quadrupled, while federal spending doubled. "Thus, a door was wide open for the new Quebec state institutions of the Quiet Revolution. It was not just a question of coordinating and in some cases shifting to the provincial level, activities already proceeding through the federal government. It was rather a question of making the Quebec state something no state had been to Quebecers before--the instrument of their apparent individual and collective needs" [Milner 1978: 73].

22. On the social and economic teachings of Vatican II, see Charles [1982]. The 1961 papal encyclical Mater et Magistra was widely commented on in Quebec, including in a special CSN convention [CSV PV 1981].
23. An important attack on francophone education was the anonymous *Les insolences du frère untel* [1960] (published in English as *The Impertinences of Brother Anonymous* [1962]), written by a Marist teaching brother, criticized the church and its schools for promoting conformity and blind obedience to authority at the expense of academic ends. A best-seller, this book helped crystallize criticism of the educational system [Magnusson 1980: 103].

24. Women, among the founders of the Mouvement laïque, instigated a 1961 petition demanding a Ministry of Education and non-confessional schools (Écoles libres). This participation was, according to Madeleine Dubuc [*La Presse* 18 June 1975], a training ground which gave women a taste for expressing their own opinions without hiding behind the excuse of first talking things over with their husbands. See also an interview with Simone Chartrand [*Ligne direct* 31 Sept. 1974: 35-39] in which she recalls that parents’ committees provided a tribune for women, put women in a position where they had to make decisions and had a “pedagogical effect” for husbands who learned to care for children during meetings. The goals of these organisations were not just child-centered, but sought to develop "une spiritualité de laïcs" that validated marital sexuality. The grass roots consultations and studies prompted by Parent Commission [n25] was, she says, a further impetus to women’s developing political awareness and skills throughout the province.

25. Established in May 1961 and chaired by Monsignor Alphonse-Marie Parent, a vice-rector of Laval University, this Commission royale d’Enquête sur l’enseignement produced a vast report on overall strategy for educational reform [1963, 1964a, 1964b, 1965]. Marie-Laurent de Rome, a philosophe, was the principal of a women’s classical college. While it supported occupational education for girls, it did not attack sex-typing of jobs, and assumed that women would be, in the main, family centered [1964b: 239-241]. Under its influence, however, the strongly sex-typed education of girls in Écoles ménagères was abolished. On the role of the state in shaping family relations, in part through education, see Fahmy-Eld and Laurin-Frenette [1980].

26. According to Magnuson [1980: 107-108] clerics were reconciled to the reform, in part with the confirmation of the right of private individuals and groups to establish schools; in part with a guarantee of 16 of 24 Catholic seats on the 24 member Conseil supérieur d’éducation. Dion [1967] argues that Vatican II meant that some clerics, particularly Bishops Roy and Leger, were open and relatively sympathetic to the reform. Falardeau [1964] persuasively demonstrates the lack of francophone participation in technical and scientific education. On the organisation of CEGEPs see, Donehower [1986].
27. For work which captures the flavour of this period, see Reid [1972], Sisto [1975]. I am grateful to Gall Scott for access to her unpublished study on Quebec culture in the 1960s and 1970s, Quebec: A Cultural Revolution [cited as Scott 1980]. A private poll carried out for the Liberals, before the 1962 election, showed that almost one half of the electorate supported the nationalization of electricity, the main election issue, while almost 25% opposed it and about one third were undecided [Benjamin 1975: 53]. Benjamin [ibid: 52] also notes that this programme was promoted in terms both of economic growth and social justice.

28. Tremblay [1959] argues that provincial autonomy was the only element of traditional nationalist ideology that was popularly accepted. Benjamin [1975: 35] stresses the Liberals use of nationalist symbols, particularly the official provincial “drapeau fleurdelyse”, in a party trying to “Quebecicise” itself. Indeed, nationalist appeals and symbols were strong features of the early Liberal campaigns [Le Devoir 20 April 1960]. For a similar view, see Balthasar [1980].

30. Dion [1976] distinguished the new nationalisms of the 1960s and after by an orientation to growth and development which replaces the traditional "nationalisme pessimiste" [1957]. He also suggests the terms "nationalisme social democrat" and "nationalisme socialiste" [1975: 85] for what I call progressive nationalism and revolutionary nationalism. I have chosen these terms to indicate the location of these groups on the political field in terms that relate to different feminist currents while avoiding the usage of right/left/centre.

31. The RIN received over 7% in Montreal [Saywell 1977: 8].

32. On the founding of the Front common, see Plotte [1977].


34. Yvon Charbonneau, CEQ president, personal communication 1981.

35. The use of the term "cultural" for language policy is, of course, an overstatement because legislation in this area defined French as the language of work [Coleman 1980: 96-103].

36. Literally "skating". This term evokes both slipperiness and the skill of a hockey player weaving through the opposition defense.

37. Indeed, Duplessis himself came to power initially on an anti-monopolist anti-imperialist platform. In this light, one might expect the next "new" party to emerge to be a labour, a
social democratic or a socialist party; and, indeed, initiatives have been taken in this direction by trade union leaders [Comité des cent 1982]. In 1987, support apparently grew for the federal social-democratic New Democratic Party.

38. We should signal here that administrators in the state bureaucracy play an important role in shaping gender politics, but that this is beyond the scope of this study.

Notes for Chapter 5.

1. See Parsons [1965a]; Parsons et al. 1955]. Châtelaine was a mass circulation, French-language women's magazine founded in 1960 under the editorship of Fernand St-Martin. In its first number, the editorial urged women to be beautiful, good housewives, knowledgeable about the fine arts, science, politics and social issues, which were no longer a male preserve [Châtelaine 1:1 Oct. 1960: 3]. On the ideological role of such magazines see Lefkowitz [1975] or for an earlier period in Quebec, Fahmy-Eld [1981] Fahmy-Eld and Dumont [1984]. From 1964-1967, Liberal cabinet minister Claire Kirkland-Casgrain wrote a column on public issues, but the magazine also carried articles on cooking, fashion, beauty and home decorating. On Cité Libre, see Monlère [1977: 311-318].

2. Armstrong and Armstrong [1975] indicate that the major expansion of women's jobs from 1951 was in the clerical sector, and that public sector jobs made a large proportion of these. In Quebec, jobs in this area expanded by 146% between 1945 and 1972 [Barry 1977: 8].

3. For a criticism of this concept, see Beechey [1978], West [1978] and Marchak [1987: 204-211].

4. The household ceased to be the site of production for many consumption goods previously produced there which were now bought in the market.

5. This ideology was promoted by both clerical and secular writers [Trofimenkoff 1977, 1978]. The "revenche des berceaux" refers to high rates of fertility among Quebec women, who were urged to fill the cradle to preserve their nation, thus revenging the British conquest of New France in 1760. The overall trend from 1851 is decline in fertility to below replacement levels in the 1970s [Henripin and Lapierre 1979]. Still, general fertility rates in Quebec remained above those of Canada as a whole until 1956, but dipped below the Canadian average thereafter [Henripin 1972: 21]. In comparison with the other provinces, Quebec fertility rates were lower than Ontario's, a similarly industrializing province, before 1881 and below Saskatchewan's
and Manitoba's from the beginning of record keeping until 1911.
In the economic depression of the 1930s, Quebec's fertility rate
like those of all the provinces declined, from 155 per 1000 to
102 per 1,000 in 1941. In the post war baby boom, Quebec rates
rose from 102 per 1,000 in 1941 only 14.7% to 117 in 1951 and
declined slightly by 6.8% to 109 in 1961, compared with an
increase from 73 per 1,000 of 31.5% to 100 in 1951 and a further
8% in 1961 to 108 per 1,000 respectively for Ontario [calculated
on the basis ofHenripin 1972: 21]. There is debate about whether
such high rates were maintained because of ideology [Henripin
1973] or of economic conditions [Laurin-Frenette 1979: 85;
Lavigne 1987; Lamoureux 1987; Caldwell 1976]. The notion of
"emotional labour" is developed in Luxton [1980: 43-118] and
Rosenberg [1987].

6. Writing in the conservative catholic journal Relations,
Marcel Marcotte s.j., similarly castigated what he saw as a fear
of maternity recommending British methods for birth without fear
[July 1961: 216-217]. In later numbers he attacked girls'
"depersonalization" of themselves in their desire to "be one of
the boys", wearing "football-style sweaters" and acting as
"imprudent, scandalous and ridiculous" majorettes [Oct. 1963:
300-301]. Later articles and issues continued the theme of worry
about changing female gender roles [March 1968: 85] and the
survival of the family [July 1966; June 1967: 101].

7. Black American women apparently took on such a role
willingly recreating and preserving community life during slavery
and though the first half of the twentieth century [Davis 1981:
5-29, et passim].

8. Even Mills [1970: 38-39, 67-68], the most liberal of
nineteenth century feminists, believed that women would choose to
be mothers (and wives) in the household even after the removal of
all barriers to their wider social participation. For a
discussion, see Eisenstein [1981: 113, 139].

québécois".

10. This was the title of a column by Germaine Bernier run in
the women's pages of Le Devoir, 21, 27, 28, 29 July 1962.

11. In Le Devoir, at the very least, the experiences of women
journalists who were precisely caught in the contradictions of
transforming gender roles backgrounted articles. A wider range
of women were also permitted to speak there: femmes
universitaires, femmes chef d'entreprises, trade union women, and
so on. There was a wide discussion of appropriate professions
for girls [Le Devoir 7 April 1961, 22 May, 30 Aug. 1962, 24 May
1963, 22 June 1963]. Finally, the question of women's obligations
to citizenship duties of political participation, including

12. The Fédération nationale Saint-Jean-Baptiste, the women's auxiliary of the SSJB founded in 1907, had promoted improvements in women's condition within traditional Catholic ideology [Lavigne et al. 1977]. The SSJB, founded in the nineteenth century, was devoted to preserving French-Canadian distinctiveness of faith and language.

13. According to a recent biography [Woods 1983], Jeanne Sauvé, an activist in Catholic youth organisations, worked as a journalist for Radio-Canada's programme Fémina. She was married to Paul Sauvé, a federal Liberal Minister of Forestry. She was elected to the federal parliament herself in 1972 and held the portfolios of science, technology and environment until she was appointed Speaker of the House (1980-1984). This was followed by an appointment as Governor-General in 1984.

14. This was a confessional organization for women workers and those concerned with working women. On the positions of the Jeunesse ouvrière catholique, see Barry [1977: 27, 32, 48, 49].

15. The question of continuing or dissolving these schools was practically posed in the educational reform programme [La Réforme May 1963: 14]. On the history of the Ecoles ménagères see Thivierge [1983].

16. On the consolidation and loss of power in women's organizational networks in the USA see Kraditor [1971].

17. Some suffragists, called maternal feminists, sought the vote for women in order to extend their housekeeping and maternal capacities into the public sphere. See Kealy [1979] and Bacchi [1983].

18. Her husband, Claude Ryan, became editor of Le Devoir and leader of the PLQ in 1977. She was later to become involved in political controversy about the national question [9.3.4. 10.1.4. below] and Jean et al. [1986] Dandurand and Tardy [1981].

19. If, as Chombart de Lowe and Chombart de Lowe [1964: 12] argue, ideologies of women are central to all global ideological systems, it is the peculiar marginalization of ideologies of women and of gender politics more generally that is of interest in Quebec in the first years of the new regime.

20. It did not appear in Le Devoir in April or May 1960 either in stories written or in Liberal election advertisements about PLQ policy.

22. John XXIII, in a call for world peace, argued that the "solidité de l'institution familiale" was the foundation for peace. He also criticized the romanticism of the mass media [Le Devoir 9 Dec. 1959].

23. This paragraph relies on a Le Devoir 5 March 1960 report.

24. In the labour movement, for example, the predecessors of the FTQ and the CSN had, authentically or opportunistically, supported equal pay and revisions of family law [Gagnon 1974b; FTQ nd].


26. The CFUW, established in 1919, was open to university educated women. In 1967, its committee on women's equality successfully petitioned the federal government for a Royal Commission on the Status of Women [Morris 1980]. Its President, Laura Sabia, described it as a very proper and academic group that worked on scholarship funds and "white-glove tea parties" and objected to her activities lobbying for the Royal Commission [Morris 1980: 11]. A pan-Canadian peace group, the Voice of Women (VOW), was founded in 1960. However, because of its scope and orientation to anti-nuclear politics, it is not examined here [Matheson 1976: 71-89]. Nor is the Communist Party of Canada sponsored Women's League, founded in 1959, examined because of its small size and lack of ideological impact [Interview: J, K]. On women's auxiliaries to Canadian political parties see Manley [1980] and Bashevkin [1985: 3]. In terms of educational level and urban location, members of the various university women's associations meet the criteria for the "cosmopolitan women", that Bashevkin [1983] identified as opinion leaders who promoted women's rights.

27. Inherited from the Code Napoléon, these had been little revised since 1866. After much agitation, women had been given the right to keep their own earnings. A 1954 revision had made simple adultery the grounds for divorce for either spouse, replacing the previous double standard that allowed women to divorce their husbands only when they bought their concubines into the matrimonial home [Johnson 1971: 45-47].

28. Casgrain, 1896-1981, from a wealthy Montreal family, was president of the Ligue des droits de la femme and of the Provincial Committee for Suffrage. Her husband, a stockbroker and a Liberal, was speaker of the House of Commons, 1936-1940. Before she joined the social democratic Co-operative Commonwealth
Federation she was Vice-president of the Canadian Liberal Women's Association; she was appointed to the Canadian Senate in 1970 [Casgrain 1972].

29. Kirkland-Casgrain, a lawyer, was made Minister without portfolio immediately after being elected. She remained the only woman in the legislature until she stepped down before the 1973 election [Kirkland-Casgrain 1984].

30. Bashevkin [1985: 53] sums up the pattern of women's participation as "the higher the fewer".

31. Premier Lesage praised their contribution. See for example La Réforme [May/June/July 1965: 8].

32. From 1960 to 1963 pictures or comments from leaders' wives were prominently displayed. See for example La Réforme [April 1963: 12, Feb. 1964: 12].

33. See 8.4.1.I. for the details of the CSN position [Le Devoir 3 Feb. 1966].

34. See the Loi sur la discrimination dans l'emploi [Statuts refondus du Québec 1964: ch 42].

35. Although women from both language groups were active in proto-suffrage groups in Montreal at the end of the nineteenth century [Bacchi 1983: 27], French speaking Catholic women complied with the instructions of the episcopate to withdraw from suffrage groups after 1902 [Pinard 1977: 81]. Quebec women were granted federal suffrage at the same time as other Canadian women, but only won provincial suffrage in 1940, after a struggle involving francophone activists like Thérèse Casgrain, Idola St-Jean and others [Cleverdon 1975: 214, 264].

36. Of middle-class background and a former JOC activist, she was a public relations staffer for a Montreal teachers' local and married to CSN leader Michel Chartrand [Chartrand 1981, personal communication].

37. Le Devoir [16 April 1966] promoted the organisation generously with hortatory headlines—"Femmes du Québec, unissez-vous"—and stories which distinguished it from existing "associations féminines" [Le Devoir 25 April 1966]. One informant credited Chalvin as the women's editor who initiated attitude changes at the paper leading to a recognizably feminist slant [Interview: A]. The accord between Le Devoir and liberal feminism was to continue even in the latter's most advanced form.

38. "Simply to be secular, not to have an aumônier was a great scandal" [Interview: A].

40. The Bulletin, originally mimeographed, was renumbered and redesigned beginning 1:1 Sept. 1973.


42. Both issues of work and of consumption were salient, but the former prevailed. One might say that they were more interested in women's rights than family stability insofar as the reforms they wanted facilitated divorce by making the process less complicated and by establishing a régime des acquets, or family property (excluding inheritance), that would be divided at divorce [FFQB 1:2 April 1968: 3, 4:1 March 1974: 8].

43. Some like Mme Guy Marchand belonged to both organizations and so played a dual leadership role in workshops [FFQB 1:2 April 1968: 6].

44. The former became a federal cabinet minister; the latter joined the Liberal Party upon her appointment to the Senate. This route into the (federal) House of Commons was also taken by Sheila Finestone, the first anglophone FFQ president (1977-80), who was elected as a Liberal MP in 1984. FFQ networks were also used to recruit its members for government jobs by Bégin, Sauvé, and Albane Morin, a PLQ MNA, who invited them to submit c.v.s [FFQB 3:3 March 1973: 9]. Although I have not found appointments of FFQ members to major posts other than in the CSF by the Liberals, Laurette Robillard and Francine Fournier were appointed by the PQ government to head provincial commissions on the disabled and human rights respectively.

45. The admiration was mutual. Sauvé praised middle class groups who spent so much money and activity on public duties [ibid.].

46. In an attempt to encourage women to run for office and support their candidacies, the Bulletin also published biographies of women candidates including Bégin, Morin and Sauvé, all Liberals [FFQB 3:1 octobre 1972]. In the 1970s, the FFQ began to survey candidates on women's issues [Interview: CJ].

47. The FFQ supplied a list of its members who it felt were well qualified for membership and urged that women be given seats on the Règle de la langue française after passage of Bill '22 [Le Devoir 3 Oct. 1974].

48. Neither the federal nor provincial civil services had
functionaries or structures with the necessary authority or expertise to carry out the work [Findlay 1987]. An ad hoc committee to ensure passage of the recommendations, founded in 1971, was formalized as the National Action Committee on the Status of Women in 1972 [Bashevin 1985: 24].

49. After 1976, she adopted the form Champlgny-Robillard for her surname. Council members associated with the FFQ included Francine Depatie, Yvette Rousseau, Pierrette Samson [Interview: Q].

50. Because this organization was based, not on a programme, but on self-help for women in crisis after the death of a spouse, it had to be able to incorporate a wide range of political stances.

51. The Bulletin did not regularly print the attendance numbers. However, 200 women attended the 1973 conference [Le Devoir 23 May 1973] and 40 went to a special session in 1976 [Le Devoir 21 April 1976; Interview: Q].

52. This statement is from president Rita Cadleux’s 1968 convention address, "Elles auront besoin d’appui, de confiance, d’élan" [FFQB 1:6 Feb. 1972: 1].

53. Le Devoir columnist Rowan goes on to list: Eaton’s, the supermarket chain Dominion Stores, the Chamber of Commerce, Air Canada, Hydro Quebec and others. The absence of union leaders supports my contention that liberal feminism was only partially integrated into the opposition bloc [10.1.2. below].

54. Women of the younger generation or with revolutionary or radical feminist ideology, that I spoke to, all saw the FFQ as moribund and directionless, but still a useful ally on paper because of its size [Interview: A, Q, J, O].

55. AFEAS [1:1 Jan. 1967: 10-11, 15]; membership rose to 38,635 in 1970 [AFEAS 4:3 Nov. 1970: 9]. In both organizations the local organizations, called "cercles", were parish based.

56. On the founding of AFEAS [8:11 Aug. 1974: 19-20] and the "quarrel" between the confessional and state organizations see Le Collectif Clío [1982: 307-309, 416-419, 376-378]. They suggest that a rapid expansion of these Cercles because of the Liberal government’s policies and war effort programmes had raised fears of laicization of education. The pressures exerted by the clergy were a mixture of old-fashioned threats—"votre fils ne pourra pas être ordonné", warnings that "étatisme" leads to communism and a critique of state patronage: "Depuis que les femmes ont été gratifiées du droit de vote, le fait qu’elles soient organisées en cercles dépendant de l’État comporte la possibilité qu’un gouvernement aux abois ou que les politiciens peu scrupuleux
solent rentes (sic) de profiter de la situation pour influencer
Induement leurs votes" [Ibid: 378]. Their reasons are then mixed:
traditional control over women, fear of the state, and a
validiation of women’s political rights. In all three
perspectives, however, the clergy’s concern is paternalistic.

57. Fusion talks were preceded by a year of common study on
the Parent report and separate conferences where fusion
resolutions voted [Interview: D].

58. According to the same source, there were 13,952 firm
subscriptions, as well as 4,924 "en marche" and 59 expired [FR
21: 10, 1960: 5].

59. In this organization and its successor AFEAS, the occupant
of this paid organizational position wrote and did editorial work
for the journal, carried out some internal communications and
acted as a public relations person [Interview: E].

60. The organizational chaplain attended all meetings at the
provincial level, both of the executive and of the membership.
As well as ritual functions, like opening and closing prayers and
grace at banquets, he had the constitutional right to participate
in all discussions.

61. In contrast to the high moral-ideological tone of these
articles, another practical concern was whether Cercles
should provide substitute care so women from backroads (rangs) farms,
who were responsible for small children or invalids, could attend
meetings [AFEAS 1:1 Jan 1967: 3]

62. For example, Catholic trade unions enthusiastically
supported a family wage for men while supporting equal pay for
women only as a tactic to make them unattractively expensive
employees [Gagnon 1974b: 22-23].

63. AFEAS [1:1 Jan 1966: 7] attributes the initiative to the
conseiller général. The title of the position was changed from
aumônier général to conseiller général with the founding of
AFEAS, but the occupant continued to sit ex-officio on the
provincial board and to participate in conventions. A discussion
of the need for a new organization occurred in 1965-1966 [FR 17:1
1966 passim]. A notice of motion to create AFEAS was made at the
congress of the UFCR and CED Sept. 21-22 1965 and adopted a year

64. Unlike the FFQ, AFEAS was not a recruiting ground for
federal or provincial parliamentarians. However, its members sat
on local health clinic (CLSC) and school boards and were elected
to local offices, including mayoralty [Interview: D, E].

65. The section of the programme and of the journal devoted to
crafts and household skills covered a wide range of activities, from tradition Quebecois crafts like weaving (on frame looms) and making ceintures flèchées (a kind of hand loom weaving with a distinct pointed pattern) to domestic science tips on cooking and menu planning. The first article dealt with how to plan a wine and cheese tasting [AFEAS 1:3 March 1967: 3] and recipes ceased to appear after Sept. 1973. Initially this section was supposed to take up half of the time available for each local group’s evening meeting. It was supervised by a Comité arts ménagers [AFEAS 2:1 Sept. 1967: 15].

66. One woman interviewed [CA] stressed this sense of integration and renewal in positively Durkheimian [1965: 401 et passim] terms as "émouvant", making her feel part of "un groupe sympathique", larger than herself or her cercle. Perhaps this was reinforced by the fact that, as well as a ritual banquet, the chaplain general held a mass, where symbolically totemic substances were ingested so that each participant contained inside her a material manifestation of their unity in Christian faith. The similar ratio for the FFQ was as low as 1:10,000.


68. This positive sentiment towards men endured; see "Accepte ton mari" [AFEAS 4:4 Dec. 1969: 5-9]. However, there was a continuing awareness of difficulties in marriage, with centres for consultation on marital problems recommended in AFEAS [1:6 June 1967: 9, 5:6 Feb. 1971: 12].

69. Typical of a "non-directive" rhetorical style in AFEAS, his view was actually posed as a question.

70. This was, of course, the strategy articulated earlier in Cité Libre and realized in the citizen's committees set up by the Liberals for health and educational institutions.

71. This view was expressed by the conseiller général in AFEAS [4:2 Oct. 1969: 3; see 4:8 April, 1970: 2-3]. A later editorial, AFEAS [5:10 June 1971: 20], refers ambiguously to "travailleurs" where, in context, the masculine form could indicate either members' husbands or be a formally generic usage applied to the women members themselves.

72. See the study session for the last issues of AFEAS volume 3 and all of volume 4. Topics included local and provincial government, production, consumption and trade unions. To compare with other Quebec organizations with Catholic roots, the CSN undertook this kind of political education in the early 1960s.

73. The second to hold the office, she presided over the
organization 1970 to 1975 during its turn to feminism. As an older woman from a small town and a long time activist, she was very popular, "sympathique", well respected and non-threatening. Her support for feminist ideas, strengthened during her appointment to the first term of the CSF, was important in ensuring acceptance of ideological change for less radical members of the organization [Interview: D, E, CA].

74. AFEAS members did not want to develop masculine personalities, "partir en guerre contre les hommes", reject love and children or abandon all family and social responsibility [AFEAS 9:1; 1974: 9-11].

75. An AFEAS [1981b] survey of non-renewing subscribers shows that 7% found the organization too feminist, 5% saw it as too serious and 4% found too much and 14% too little crafts; of the other non-renewals were with no disagreements (31%), because of cost (25%), pursuing courses (24%), preferred other organizations (23%), were not asked to renew (18%), personality conflicts (14%), too much work (12%) and found the other members too young (9%). (Total exceeds 100%, because more than one answer given.)

76. More radical groups advocated that the decision should be that of a woman or a woman and her doctor. The AFEAS executive took this decision in the context of a major debate on abortion in Quebec [7.3 below]. It maintained support for access to abortion in hospitals throughout the study [Le Devoir 2 Aug. 1975].

77. Because the decision was made at a provincial executive meeting, the conseiller général was aware of it and did not object [AFEAS 6:3 Nov. 1972: 11-12; Interview: D].

78. This study cannot judge the effect of the study day, but informants think that it helped to ensure a relatively moderate position for the bishops throughout the 1970s [Interview: D, J, O]. It also supported the idea that women should have the chance to represent themselves at Therapeutic Abortion Committees [AFEAS 9:2 Oct. 1974: 7].

79. In 1980, 1398 questionnaires were sent to a stratified random sample of AFEAS members [1981a]. Of the 932 returns: 86.4% were married, 7.6% widowed, 4.2% unmarried, 1.9% divorced or separated; 74.6% were between 31-60 years of ages, with 11.9% below and 13.5% above; most had at least one child. Most members had 8-12 years of schooling (54.2%, with 31.0% up to 7 yrs), were housewives (58.6%, with 15% working in family enterprises, 15.7% part-time and 9.5% full-time); came from families with annual incomes of $10-19,999.00 (39.2%), with about half of the respondents from lower income households living in rural areas). Although 31.1% of its members came from urban and 49.1% from rural areas, only 1.4% were from Montreal.
80. In 1977, the renamed bulletin, *Femmes d'ici* [12:1 Sept 1977: 3-5], discussed the Hélène David study on part-time work that had been crucial for reorienting the FFQ, pointing out that the conditions of work and benefits were almost always worse than those of full time work. Whatever attractions it might apparently hold, the fact that almost all part time workers were married women, made it necessary to question its organization.


82. In looking at the anti-feminist backlash among US women, Susan Harding [1981] suggests that they feel defensive of the family strategy, breadwinner/dependant wife, that they have chosen. Dworkin [1983] argues that right wing women cling to male protection in even patriarchally dominated families in defense against rampant male violence in the wider society, adopting a "better the devil you know" approach. Certainly the intervention of right wing agitators like Phyllis Shaffley of the Eagle Forum or fundamentalist preachers helped crystallise a right-wing opposition among women and men to the attempt to get an Equal Rights Amendment into the US constitution [Eisenstein 1984: 176-181]. Whatever the theory, AFEAS's successful recasting of family ideology to incorporate both feminist and traditional elements, undermines the basis of such reaction [Interview: D, CA]. On this point, see Le Collectif Cilo [1982: 455-456]. At the time of writing, we lacked studies of a similar Canadian group, self-proclaimed REAL Women (Realistic, Equal, Active, For Life) or the 1987 splinter group Victorious Women.

Notes for Chapter 6.


2. Here [Ibid.] and in subsequent reports [CSN PV 1970: 35], the president claimed that unionism was workers' democracy.

were in turn supported by the CSN [CSN PV 1970: 35].

4. The Frankfurt school was a group of intellectuals led by Max Horkheimer at the Institute for Social Research; see Jay [1976]. The work of two of its exiles, permanently based in the USA, Herbert Marcuse [1964; 1966] and Erich Fromm [1961] was particularly influential in this regard. There was a late 1960s vogue for the Russian anarchist Bakunin [Cohn-Bendit 1969]. The Canadian influence of Relmut Reiche's [1970], *Sexuality and the Class Struggle* predated its English publication, with his trip to Canada in the fall of 1969 [personal communication, Andrew Wernick]. The Montreal based journal, *Our Generation*, promoted peace and anarchism.

5. *Partisans. Féminisme année zéro* 1971 published a translation of Benston [1969]; see O'Leary and Toupin [1982: 40-41] for references to these texts. Several women interviewed remembered that they awaited new publications and translations of such books eagerly [Interview A, C, D, K].

6. For student movements of 1964-1968, see Latouche [1979: 18] "Du syndicalisme étudiant au nationalisme, le pas était vite franchi". He also suggests that students had known only the society of the Quiet Revolution with its *manle de grèves et épreuves de force* [ibid. 19]. But it was a society that also generated high levels of expectations. Thus it provided a political context in which attitudinal references or social and ideological practices available for emergent feminism combined both these dimensions: high expectations and militant tactics. For a detailed analysis of the far left, see Denis [1979: 221 ff] and Milner [1978: 196-211].

7. Almost all UGEEQ leaders on Latouche’s list were male; student strikes trained new layers of leaders some of whom, especially in CEGEPS were women [Interview: D]. Some women were in the artistic fringes of the FLQ [de Vault 1982: 37-46] and one, Louise Lanctôt [1981] was involved in the kidnapping which precipitated the October crisis. Two surveys indicated that young women had a strong feelings that Quebec society was "unjust". A 1966 survey of 153 Montrealers (90 men and 63 women) found that women had a stonger sense of injustice with regard to eight dimensions (inequality, the power of money, the condition of workers and the aged, unequal access to education, taxes and the obligation to speak English) while men outranked women on only two dimensions (the power of rural clergy and denominational schooling) [Roussopoulos 1974: 91-98]. These findings confirmed those of a 1964 study by Rioux and Sevigny [cited ibid. p. 94]. Thus, one might attribute women's participation in student and other movements to this sense, and their exclusion from their leaderships to sexism as was the case elsewhere in Canada [Discussion Collective no. 6 1972: 31-39]. We shall see below the ways in which Quebec women activists came to do so.
8. The team initially included Pierre Maheu, Jean-Marc Plotte, Paul Chamberland and André Brochu who founded the Mouvement de libération populaire (MLP) as an activist arm in 1965 [PP 3: 1/2 1965: 2-5].

9. According to Denis [1979: 475], Révolution Québécoise, founded in 1964 by Pierre Vaillières and Charles Gagnon before its 1965 fusion with PP [PP 2: 10/11 1965: 102-104], was the first to criticize "Independence first", but failed to offer an alternate strategy. This view was criticized in "Manifeste" [PP 3: 1/2 1965: 2-41], but resurfaced [PP 4:5/6 1976: 2-5]. See also CAPs de Maïsonneuve and St-Jacques [1972: 35, 29-30] "La nécessité d'une organisation politique des travailleurs" which argues that nationalism displaces class for ethnic interpretations, defines students as workers, and notes contradictions within the working class between workers with different qualifications or in different sectors but makes no mention of women or sexism.

10. Again in the first of Issue PP, women are identified as housewives [pp. 18, 63]; ill dressed old maids [38-39]; more interested in supper than sex [40]. Later they are "les filles de la faculté des lettres qui n'ont pas encore été balsées" [PP 5 1964: 37]. All calls to action in all issues of the journal are linguistically addressed to men as "les hommes, les travailleurs".

11. Memmi's study, first published in 1957, was revised for its 1972 Montreal publication by the left-wing house, L'Etoile, that also published early women's liberation material, for example, Manifeste des femmes québécoises [Groupe de femmes 1971] and a translation of US radical feminist Susan Griffin's Le Viol [1972; QD 1:7 July/Aug. 1973: 28].

12. Fanon [1961: 63-82 et passim] and Memmi [1971 part two] read the emasculation of "le colonisé" on at least three levels: political, economic, and sexual.

13. O'Brien's [1981: 52-52] writing on the "potency principle" as an fundamental aspect of political philosophy may be recalled here. For the USA, Barbara Ehrenreich [1983: 29-51] has also noted that the sexual liberation themes that fed into the politics of the black and white new lefts were tied to a general "anti-momist" and anti-family reaction among men that had its origins in the 1950s and was signalled by the appearance of Phillip Wylie's [1955] Generation of Vipers in 1942 and of Playboy in 1953. Angela Davis's [1981] qualified critique of sexism notes a similar concern with masculinity among "colonized" black revolutionaries in the 1960s.

14. With a public profile already established as a popular television interviewer and effective cabinet member, Lévesque had
been "one of the most respected personalities in the party" [Griffin 1984: 52]. On the PQ and its ideology, see Lévesque [1968], Saywell [1977], Griffin [1984: 49-60].

15. According to D'Allemagne [1974: 139-141] RIN members were young, with a high proportion of students, as well as artists, writers, intellectuals and civil servants; 56% of its 1966 election candidates were young, urban and in professional or semi-professional occupations typical of what some call the "new middle class" [Bolly, cited in Milner 1978: 152], but has been identified here as part of a working class union movement.

16. See its 1970 election appeal [Le Devoir 5 April 1970] which asked voters to say yes to normal liberty, security and responsibility and its 1970 La souveraineté et l'économie working document and the 1972 manifesto Quand nous serons vraiment chez nous [PQ 1973], both of which argued that independence was necessary to achieve economic growth and "social democracy". The leftism was moderated for the official programme, Un gouvernement du Parti québécois s'engage [Saywell 1977: 77]; by the 1975 executive and parliamentary stagist undertaking of a transition period and negotiations [Le Devoir 8 Oct. 1975]; and by the 1976 programme promise of a referendum [PQ 1976].

17. Of the delegates to the 1969 convention, 40% had university degrees and another 20% had completed CEGEP or collège classique [Bellavance 1973: 47-49]. He suggests that the delegates were male, in direct contrast to a survey which indicates that over half the membership were women [PQ nd]. Teachers were strongly represented [Ibid. 88].

18. On the right, the Ralliement créditiste was founded in 1957 to contest federal elections, emerged as a party of rural protest in the provincial elections of 1962 and 1966 and was to endure, with splits and changes of name through the period of this study [Bolly 1976; Milner 1978: 121-123].

19. An adjectival form referring to the PQ. Used as a noun, it means a PQ member.


21. While there is no quantitative data on the social characteristics of women's movement members, commentators agree that women's liberationists were overwhelmingly young, and university educated, while NOW members tended to be older, with post-secondary education and employed, often in professional positions. See Deckard [1975], and Freeman [1975]. After 1970
Carden [1974: 107] notes that many housewives joined NOW.

22. In contrast the NDP Waffle movement had women's caucuses in 1969 [personal communication, Varda Burstyn].

23. According to a former director, this was a service initially founded in 1972 by anglophone women working out of the Montreal YWCA and funded by a grant from the federal Secretary of State Women's Programme. It offered individual counselling and short term courses in both languages on legal problems (especially divorce), work and labour market re-entry, physical violence and reproductive control (birth control and abortion) [interview: J].

24. In Canada, the women's liberation current continued to be active through the first years of the 1970s and the liberal feminist National Action Committee on the Status of Women was founded in 1972. In the USA, women's liberation and liberal feminism were both strengthened over this period [Carden 1974: 63-81, 106-117].

25. Official unemployment rates moved from 5% 1965 to 10% in 1971; unofficial and sectoral rates were even higher [Armstrong 1980].

26. Milner [1978: 95] sees "an element of subtlety to these linkages", in part facilitated by better information published by unionized journalists who identified with strikers; see also CSN [PV 1970: 35]. The list is not exhaustive, but informants suggested that politically important strikes included those of the Montreal police and firefighters, 1969; the Mouvement de Libération du Taxi 1969-1970; Lapalme 1970; La Presse 1971 (and lockout); Tricoft 1974; Firestone 1974; United Aircraft 1974; the general strike of public sector workers in 1972; and widespread rotating strikes by these same unions in 1976; see also O'Leary and Toupin [1982: 30-31]. International demonstrations against American involvement in Vietnam lasted till 1972 and began for Chile, after the coup, in 1973.

27. Pépin's Lettre aux militants [CSN 1970] was a response to such conflict.

28. Public opinion polls show both the truth and the exaggeration in this "apprehension". At the height of the crisis more Quebecois felt themselves threatened by the police (21%) than by the FLQ (9%). Few supported the FLQ's militarist strategy, but there was a widespread show of support for the social aims expressed in its manifesto [Latouche 1979: 25-26; interview: L].

29. For example, many white women founders of the American movement were excluded from the civil rights movement and felt
excluded by men from the draft protests [Evans 1980]. Several women active in the emergence of feminism had come to Montreal as companions of Americans intent on evading the draft for the Vietnam war [Interview: M]. Canadian nationalism, with parliamentary wings in the New Democratic Party and, to some extent, in the Liberal Party, seems to have coexisted more easily with feminism. In English Canada, women's liberation groups often outlasted the new left organizations from which they sprang.

30. Unlike the FLF [1971c: 80], francophone analysts see Marlene Dixon as a crucial formative influence [Lanctôt 1980; Collectif Cillo 1982: 482]. Anglophones, McGill students at that time, insist that discussions predated her arrival [Interview: W, G, M], a perception confirmed by Rhoda Howard in an undated personal communication. There is historical irony in the persistence of differences of interpretation along linguistic lines.

31. See also, FLF [1970f] "Historique," [O'Leary and Toupin 1982: 65-67]. For the ease of readers, FLF documents will be identified by the original date but referenced to the page numbers in O'Leary and Toupin [1982]. O'Leary and Toupin [1982: 65] date this as summer 1970; Le Collectif Cillo, [1982: 482], following Lanctôt [1980], perhaps incorrectly, date it as January 1970.

32. My archival research confirms a detailed historiographic reconstruction to be found in Lanctôt [1980].

33. For the most part, this involves analysing ideology through published statements. However, in the case of the FLF, because of its spontaneity, cell structures and lack of publications, and because many of its most important discussions were carried on outside of even those few organizational structure it possessed, these developments must be traced through the public actions, internal splits and renewed initiatives that made up the life of the group.

34. Some were bailed out by friends, husbands or organizations; two, Suzanne Corliveau and Lise Landry, who refused to pay $20.00 fines after the law was struck down as unconstitutional and ultra-vires in the Cour du Bien-Être and Cour Supérieure du Québec, were later jailed [Devoir 12 Aug. 1970]. In an undated personal communication Rhoda Howard recalls that she was released without bail, but that the CSN paid her legal fees.

35. Louise Harel [Quartier Latin 28 Jan. 1970] here cited was one who left women's organizing to work, ultimately, in the PQ. A lawyer, she was elected PQ vice-president in 1979, and as a MNA in 1981. A strong party left-winger, she supported women's rights and abortion issues and, according to Fraser [1984: 183], was a thorn in Lévesque's side. O'Leary and Toupin [1983: 13] have
pointed out a recent union-sponsored history [Roul I lard 1981] has wiped out this action; feminists have credited it properly [Maroney, 1978; Lanctôt 1980).


37. "Mais... on veut vraiment faire l'histoire des femmes, il faudrait tenir compte davantage de l'émotion, du sentiment" [O'Leary and Toupin 1983: 331].

38. The account reconstructed by former FLF members [O'Leary and Toupin: 1983: 332] differs from reports published in newspapers reports and from all written histories.

39. For its organizer's very different assessment of this hodge-podge exhibition which rented booths to anyone from the FFQ to cosmetics manufacturers, see Le Devoir [19 April 1972]. Radical feminists from Les Têtes de Pioche also saw it as a "salade capitaliste" but at least one reader thought that participating would give access to women [TP 3 May 1976: 8].

40. The first Montreal tavern raid was carried out by members of the trotskylst Ligue de la jeunesse socialiste [Interview: W, C].

41. Their very names give a hint of different political styles and cultural allegiances!

42. Dorothy Smith's [1975] discussion of women's exclusion from academic structures suggests that the first two modes of integration are offered women more widely in mainstream social institutions as well.

43. It foreshadowed later critiques of the failure of Leninist groups to practice feminist principles they claimed to accept [Rowbotham et al. 1980].

44. The form "m-l" conventionally indicates a maolist influenced marxist-leninism; "maolsant" indicates a more widely socially adopted ideologically softer variant of these perspectives.

45. This term, echoing Wilhelm Reich's early sexual hygiene work with German youth and workers [cited QD 1:2 Dec. 1972: 20 n1], included research and abortion counselling and agitation. Its initial task was to "évaluer...les possibilités d'organiser la lutte autour de la répression sexuelle et plus globalement autour de la santé...une première prise de conscience des femmes à partir de la sexualité" [QD 1:3 Feb. 1973: 26].

46. "Everyone read it and passed it on" [Interview: W].
Raymonde Lorrain, a CDF militant, thinks that it had a good audience despite circulation problems that arose from a lack of experience and despite production problems that arose from the demands of running the abortion service [TP 2:4 June 1977: 7-8].

47. The term is Jacoby's [1976]. Toupin argues that women are hidden from history [Rowbotham 1973] not accidentally, but because they are assigned to "les oubliettes de l'histoire" [O'Leary and Toupin 1982: 4]. O'Leary recalls "au temps du Centre des femmes... on considérait les 35000 (sic) femmes de l'APEAS comme des réformistes, donc sans importance" [O'Leary and Toupin 1983: 376].

48. The traditional Quebec dialect was self-consciously adopted by nationalist writers as a mark of pride [Interview: L].

49. As well as the instances described above, the CDF refused to participate in the Montreal Feminist Association, arguing that it was too premature because women had not yet become conscious of their oppression and organized locally. Instead they elected to undertake a series of discussions with women from associations populaires [QD 1:4 March 1973: 2-4]. Ironically, they were pushed to action by the independent anglophone initiative, repeating the dynamic in the founding of the FLF.

50. The Créditiste offer of payments to encourage marriage and young married women to stay at home "pour sauver la race" was compared to Hitler's pronouncements that women's universe was husband, family and children [QD 1:5 April 1973: 5].

51. The consistent use of travailler.s et travailleuses, with men placed first, indicates an undeveloped concern with language as a dimension of women's subordination that is consistent with the rejection of culturalism.

52. If the main struggle for "reproductive rights" in Canada and the USA was focused on the right to abortion, still some, often of minority group or welfare supported women, claimed the right to bear children [Petchesky 1985]. At a meeting I attended in Toronto during the 1970 Canadian Abortion Caravan, for example, a woman receiving family benefits described her refusal to consent to sterilization in order to get an abortion in a public hospital. For example, the CDF denounced the PLQ's "politique de natalité" as effectively limiting, rather than planning births, because it lacked provisions for day care and maternity leave. Thus, it left the costs of biological reproduction of the "nation" to the private family, and more particularly women who bore the burden of interrupted earnings or careers. Here is an instance of the incorporation of a popular democratic goal from the liberal feminist agenda into the socialist-feminist perspective.
53. These were followed by superexploitation, the double day, economic dependence on husbands and sexual objectification [QD 1:3 Feb. 1973: 13].

54. Informants distinguished the greater frankness of kitchen talk from the formal decorum of meetings and public statements [Interview: B, K]. Similarly, "L'intolérance politique de la plupart des groupes de gauche face aux luttes de femmes nous plaçaient beaucoup trop souvent dans une position de défense. Pour la plupart de ces groupes être féministe c'est diviser et retarder la vraie lutte, celle de la classe ouvrière" [CDF [1974 in O'Leary and Toupin 1982: 158].

55. A total of seven women from the small CDF core went into m-1 groups [calculated from O'Leary and Toupin 1983: 348-370].

Notes for Chapter 7.

1. For example, La Presse [15 Jan., 12 Feb. 1975] interviewed one woman each week and ran a series of articles on women and work, later published as a book [Gagnon 1976a]; Le Jour also ran a series of articles on women and work [8-14 July, 1977]; Le Devoir [16 June 1975] sponsored a survey of male attitudes to women while its women's columnist, Renée Rowan, ran a weekly feature on the events and issues of IWY [21 Oct. 1974]; and both federal and provincial public broadcasting, Radio-Canada and Radio-Québec, aired special programmes [Le Devoir 10 June 1975]. The special features were too numerous to mention, but, for example, Réseau, a Université du Québec journal ran a special issue in April 1975 with articles on women's working conditions, reports of regional activities and interviews with Simone Chartrand, Marcelle Dolment, Rita Cadieux and unionist Matilda Blanchard.

2. For example, RAIF saw IWY as benefitting only an elite and as "une récupération des énergies contestataires des femmes au profit d'un verbalisme démobilisateur et d'un commercialisme vergogne" [Le Devoir 10 Dec. 1975]. IWY publicity was also seen to create "l'illusion que chacune isolément pourrait assurer sa promotion personnelle" [Le Devoir 10 March 1975].

3. Socialist mythology of IWD, widely circulated in Quebec [Le Devoir 10 March 1975], held that it commemorated the death of New York garment workers in a factory fire, an origin recently revealed as spurious [Kaplan 1984; Thonnessen 1973].

4. The first meetings of the provisional coordinating committee were complicated by external political differences. While some of the committee members from CEQ who were sympathisers of
Lutte! wanted to avoid an event that would compete with that organization's as yet unannounced plans, the autonomous groups, Théâtre de Cuisines and Comité de lutte, insisted on an autonomous event. In addition, there was some hostility to working with a member of the GMR leadership, who had been invited to join the committee by a member of CL as a result of her Morgentaler defense committee work [Interview: C]. Despite these difficulties, they organized an all day teach-in for the Saturday following IWD. In 1972, women had begun organizing for maternity leave on IWD [Le Devoir 16 March 1972].

5. For the organizing rationale see GMR [1975a]. Like the women's liberation movement as a whole, these committees were built on a base of student and international (Chile) solidarity organizing. In addition, several women students joined the GMR from this work, were trained by it and the left on largely feminist grounds thus fulfilling the GMR's hope of creating cadre for the women's movement in an unexpected way. As a result of sharing their informants' perceptions and collapsing the categories of far left and m-l, historians have ignored the role of the GMR [Lanctôt 1980: 158-160; O’Leary and Toupin 1982: 33-38]. Théoret [1978] points to the continuing role of student/staff cooperation in forming CEGEP committees on women in 1978.

6. For the views of two CEGEP groups, see Comité femme, Bois de Boulogne "Pour lutter contre le sexisme," and Maisonneuve comité-femme, "En rêvant de loin", [PE 1:1 June 1977: np].

7. As always estimates differ, but to participants Le Devoir's [March 10 1975] estimate of 150 at workshops seems low; in the evening, certainly, the auditorium of the polyvalente (secondary school) Jeanne-Mance was full.

8. The CDF had gone to a May Day parade in 1973 as a small group [Interview: C].

9. The area was opened up in the course of an anti-industrial, clerical colonization drive in the 1930s. It did have a recent history of labour militancy, however. During the common front strike of 1970 mostly male workers took over the airport and radio stations in Sept-îles but the feminist concerns of the unions were slow to be integrated [Interview: P].

10. For a list of these groups, see Appendix D.

11. On this funding, see Findlay [1987]

12. In 1968 New York groups included Redstockings and the New York Radical Feminists; starting in Toronto in 1969, the Canadian group was The New Feminists [Carden 1974: 87; Matheson 1976: 329-30]. The journal's title, literally pick-axe heads, refers to
a stubborn person.

13. Money came from the federal Local Initiatives Project/Projet d'initiatives locales grant programme (1971-1974) which paid low level salaries for workers for two years.

14. In the suffrage struggle, English-speaking women sponsored visits by British feminists, including Emmeline Pankhurst [Cleverdon 1950: 221-222].

15. This was despite differences between trade unions and autonomous groups which led to separate IWD activities in 1977. Representatives of the autonomous groups charged that the centrals had forgotten them and excluded them from decisions about organizing, but saw this a turning point which would allow consolidation of of the emergence of autonomous groups [PE 1:4 1977: 5, 2].

16. Conservative Catholics tried to have this play by Denise Boucher [1979] banned. It presented the three faces of woman: housewife/mother, prostitute and Virgin Mary, the last raped by the Holy Ghost in the shape of a giant bird puppet [Interview: L].

17. On Quebec women's writing, see Smart [1978]. A special issue of A Room of One's Own [4:1/2 1978] introduces several important Quebec women writers. Théoret, a CEGEP teacher and cultural critic published Bloody Mary (1977). Madeleine Gagnon a writer and critic, served on the executive of the Université du Québec à Montréal faculty association. Her 1982 "Mon corps dans l'écriture" raises themes of new feminist writing. Bersianik's first novel, L'Euqueillonne (1976) was more than 27 weeks on the best seller list, [ibid. 3] and her second, Pique-Nique Sur l'Acropole (1980), repeated her success. Under the editorship of Governor-General's Prize-winning poet Nicole Brossard, author of L'Amer ou le chapitre effrité (1977), who has since developed an international reputation as a feminist and lesbian writer, the literary journal, La Nouvelle Barre de Jour, sought out experimental writing from women [Interview: L]. On new French feminist theories of language, see Cixous [1976], Irigaray [1974]. Marchessault's 1975 Comme une enfant de la terre also attracted considerable notice. One informant suggested that these developments, unattended by all but a few feminists and literary specialists in English Canada served to maintain distance between francophone and anglophone feminists in Quebec [Interview: L].

18. It sold only "pro-feminist" French books by women, with the result that its stock, as well as its commercial success, were somewhat limited [TP 2:2 April 1977: 8]. It became the site of a cafe, where drop-in traffic and particularly anglophones, often felt uncomfortable and later of women's self-defense groups,
before it went out of business in 1981 [Interview: J, L].

19. Among my informants, it was read by anglophones as well as francophones and by women, from AFEAS to socialist feminists, often with disagreement but always with passionate engagement. "Malgré un faible tirage, [TP] exerce une influence considérable sur le mouvement des femmes" [Collectif Clio 1982: 494].

20. Coop femmes, the first francophone lesbian feminist group was established in 1977 [TP 2:9/3:1 Feb./March 1978: 7].

21. In the mid-1970s, autonomous women's groups, including TP, Comité de lutte and Intergroupe, were denounced as petty bourgeois and divisive of class struggle. It should be added that, whatever its impact on wider working class unity, feminism was an increasingly divisive force within the ranks of far left groups themselves. In the late 1970s, groups of women left the Trotskyist Parti Socialiste des Travailleurs and the GMR, charging that they had failed to integrate women's struggles into their programmes. Similarly in the dissolution of the "m-1" current in the early 1980s, women members led attacks on sexism and bureaucratic lack of democracy in organizational functioning [Interview: I, C; En Lutte! 1981].

22. In one review article, for example, they went so far as to identify sexism with radical fascism, because both saw sex differences as more fundamental than those of class and race [TP 5 Sept. 1976: 4].

23. These included: Action travail des femmes. Au bas de l'échelle.

24. One of the founders of Pluri-elles saw the new group as composed of younger women, without much or any experience in left or feminist groups, impatient with politics, many of whom had been mobilized by IWY and who wanted a place to write and publish. In her informed view, as a writer and critic, some had successfully used the journal to do so [Interview: L].

25. Rape crisis centres emerged until in 1978 there were five in the province, as did shelters for battered women. Quebec's first, the Centre d'aide aux victimes de viol was founded January 1975 as a bilingual 24 hour telephone service without funding [PE 1:1 June 1977: 7]. Pluri-elles [1:3 nd] was a special issue on rape. With high levels of demand placed on its volunteers and facing internal disputes, it closed its doors for four months in August 1978 [Centre d'aide 1979]. The Mouvement contre le viol was established in June 1979 [PE 4:2 Dec./Jan. 1980/1981]. This group saw rape as an expression of violence and the "everyday" outcome of gender inequality [DLDR 4:2 (1980): 12]. Campaigns were led by radical feminists against the rock group Battered Wives [PE 2:2 Dec./Jan. 1978/1979: 8]. Women's centres (maison
des femmes) were opened in Quebec, Montreal, Rimouski, and other centres [Interview: J]. At the other end of the justice system, a support group for women prisoners and prison leavers founded in 1978 (Comité femmes de Tanguay) sought to reveal how economic conditions lead to crimes like fraud (unemployment insurance, welfare, credit cards and so on) and agitated for better medical care for pregnant women and against the repression of lesbianism in prison [DLDR 2:5 nd. 30-33]. It has been argued that the "fragmentation" of the women's movement derives from a need to fight on all fronts at once [Hughes 1982: 303], a situation which seems to have arisen as a result of proliferating issues.

26. A Montreal support group formed in July 1978 alleged that she had been drugged before being kidnapped by her brother, had been forced aboard a plane and was being held incommunicado by her family. The Canadian government had an obligation to ensure that she was not being held again her will [TP 3: 5/6 Sept/Oct 1978:5]. While this struggle provided an impetus for short term action, its overall significance development was to turn attention to the situation of immigrant women [Interview: L].

27. For example, in the only quantitative information I have found, of the 39 collaborators who responded to a DLDR survey, 9 had no previous involvement, 24 had been in one or more women's groups and 6 in a mixed-sex group [DLDR 1981: 69].

28. On the themes of violence against women, see Lederer [1980].

29. This was despite differences on general strategy.

30. Carrefour 75 [CSF 1975d: 7] recommended removing abortion from the criminal code, abortion on demand before 20 weeks of pregnancy with all costs to be paid by medical insurance and TACs in all hospitals in the mean time. AFEAS, it will be recalled, supported access as defined by the 1969 law.


32. For the position of the Ligue des droits de l'Homme, of which Morgentaler was a member, see its La société québécoise face à l'avortement [1974] and Le Devoir [10 July 1975].

33. This estimate by the Université de Montréal Département de démographie, cited in La société québécoise face à l'avortement [168, n32], was widely repeated [CL 1978: 31].

34. CL [1978: 48] lists two hospitals which charged $460 and $395 (US) for the procedure. Travel costs were extra.
35. According to the report of the 1975 federal Committee on the Operation of the Abortion Law [Badgley et al. 1977: 160], "It is impossible for one hospital in any province to handle the total number of requests. A great number of women are forced to seek abortions in the United States. This is costly and excludes the women under a certain income".

36. Technically, they called for defense of Morgentaler and repeal of section 251, a measure that would leave the medical power of doctors and hospitals untouched. Revolutionary feminists wanted regional clinics to provide free contraception and abortion on demand as well as defense and repeal [CDF 1974 in O’Leary and Toupin 1982: 168].

37. Such clinics would be democratically controlled by volunteer boards of workers and users. Drawing on the French experience, where underground clinics were closed down after the liberalization of French law, only to find out that hospital services were inadequate, women from the CL and the Montreal Centre de santé des femmes du quartier plateau Mont-Royal strongly defended autonomous health care delivery systems at a Jan. 1981 conference on abortion I attended [CNALG 1981: 8-10]. Fearing the movement’s demobilization, they saw clinics as a means to keep nuclei of women activists together to continue to pressure the government for better service. Because of its social dimension, and because it is, as Barrett and Roberts [1978] point out, essentially based on "self-diagnosis", abortion is particularly likely to generate such challenges to medical authority.

38. Courthouse pickets that I attended consisted of about 10 participants. However, CDF [1974 in O’Leary and Toupin 1982: 169] says that two pickets of 100 to 200 women were held.

39. The original name, Comité de lutte pour la défense du Docteur Morgentaler et l'avortement et la contraception libres et gratuits, was soon modified. For its own evaluation of its work, see CDF [ibid. 165-170, 174]. The abortion movement was important to the early stages of the women’s liberation movement in general in Canada [Fitzgerald et al. 1982: 19, 32-41].

40. Hull was the most important local movement; but activists included PQ riding CCFs and a women’s centre in Rimouski. Twenty-two groups signed the manifesto "Nous aurons les enfants que nous voulons" which was presented to the PQ government after its inaugural session on March 8 (IWD) 1977 [CNALG 1980: 47-52, 88].

41. At the same time, the use of abortion as a technique of fertility control can be placed in more right wing problematics: of eugenicists, supporters of family rationalization (people
should be able to afford the children they have), attempts to reduce welfare rolls [McLaren and McLaren 1986: 30-31; Petchesky 1985: 67-96] or be part of a state solution allowing women to be both workers and mothers without having to provide child care [Discussion Collective no. 6: 1972: 121-124].

42. The RCSWC [1970: 286-287] recommended abortion on the "sole request" of any pregnant woman during the first trimester, as did the FFQ after 1975. The federal government has taken no action on this recommendation [CACSW 1979]. This view was publically supported by the CSF, which argued that the law was supported neither in spirit nor in fact [Le Devoir 10 July 1975]. McLaren and McLaren [1986: 176 n53] identify the first public call for abortion law reform as a 1959 article in the English language Chatelaine.

43. A broad interpretation, based on the World Health Organization's definition of health, includes social and mental as well as physical well-being [Pelrine 1972: 52].

44. He also argued that patient education, not criminal law was the proper approach to an issue that was widely regarded, even by 40% of Catholics in English Canada, as private [Le Devoir 3 April 1973]. Morgentaler was generally seen as sincere in his actions, but, as Judge Hugessen put it before pronouncing sentence, his "massive and public" defiance of the law left no alternative to punishment [Le Devoir 2 July 1974].

45. See, for example, the statement of the Quebec Conference of Bishops [Le Devoir 14 May, 1976], which called for part-time work for mothers, maternity leave, birth and childcare allowances, tax benefits for parents, and improvements in housing, prenatal care, healthy family planning education, good moral and sex education in schools, and support for Grosesse-secours. The last is a volunteer telephone hot-line designed to help pregnant women by finding work, accommodation, shelter and adoptive parents [Le Devoir 15 April 1974]. The Montreal service was founded in 1973 on the model of a similar Toronto service. In 1974 it took 892 calls of which 76% were from women under 26 (34% under 18); 20% students, 33% unemployed and 11% on social assistance; and 66% unmarried. Catholic dogma has taken different positions on the morality of abortion. Before 1896 it held that the soul entered the foetus at 40 days for a male and 80 days for a female so that abortion before that date was not considered to be murder [Pelrine 1972: 48-48]. In 1971 Catholic bishops in noric countries took a liberal Vatican II position stressing that a decision about abortion was personal, to be taken in the light of individual conscience [Le Devoir 10 July 1975]. The Front commun de respect pour la vie straightforwardly blamed Quebec's population decline on abortion and denounced politicians for permitting "Le génocide progressif du groupe francophone" [ibid.].
46. This term refers to the process by which social developments can apparently "skip stages" in with new "advanced" social forms replacing existing "backward" forms [Dofny and Bernard 1968: 154].

47. Some hospitals and doctors also practice menstrual extraction before pregnancy is confirmed, and so not covered by section 251.

Notes for Chapter 8.

1. In examining concrete instances of the relation of gender and class struggle, these studies and others of the history of socialism have also raised a more general question: the conceptual and historical relation of feminism and socialism as historical projects [Thonnessen 1973; Dofny 1974; Eisenstein 1979b, 1979c; Heltlinger 1979; Barrett 1981].

2. Among those who argue that sexism was a defining characteristic of the early period of unionization, the work of Heidi Hartmann [1976; 1980] represents perhaps the most fully articulated linkage of theory and history. She sees the protectionist legislation and the family wage fought for by unionists and granted by the middle and bourgeois classes as a manifestation of a cross class alliance of males as patriarchs seeking to control women's labour, sexual and reproductive capacities in the institutionalized marriage relation. Despite the preliminary character of these debates, the weight of the historiographic evidence confirms the finding that in this first period a strong current of sexism in union policies and ideologies was shared by many male union leaders [for the USA see Kessler-Harris 1982; Baxendale 1976; for Britain: Boston 1980; Cockburn 1983: 14-35]. However, the variations that these and similar studies have generated underline the necessity of looking at concrete situations before attempting to move theory onto a more global plane. On the origins of this ideology see Millett [1970: 61-108], George [1973], Oakley [1974b]. Ehrenreich and English 1978: 1-29, Elbert and Glastonbury [1978], Hamilton [1978: 50-75] and C. Hall [1980].

3. In contrast to Hartmann, Humphries [1977] has argued that in the conditions of late nineteenth century industrial capitalist society, the winning of the family wage was responsible for a rise in the living standards of the working class. Barrett and McIntosh [1980] argue that the family wage was an ideal rather than a reality whose ideological function was to reinforce women's dependence and weaken the working class by creating the conditions for conflict between women and men. Working within a marxist feminist perspective, Brenner and Ramas [1984] and Hugh
and Pat Armstrong [1983] for England and Canada respectively have
shifted the blame by emphasizing the importance of female
reproductive biology in shaping the division of labour in the
harsh conditions of capitalist industrialization. Lewis [1985]
has criticized this work on historiographic grounds. The
question of the motives of unions in struggling for the family
wage and accepting or promoting protectionism has also generated
a lively and still far from resolved debate.

4. Milkman [1982] suggests that even during the post WW II
period when women were forced out of highly paid industrial jobs,
national (American) UAW structures provided a means for women to
fight for employment rights against local male opposition.

5. In Canada these have included strikes in auto parts
manufacturing (Fleck), clerical work (Blue Cross), and different
branches of the banking system [Maroney 1983]. As well, it was
adopted as a central slogan for IWD organizing in Toronto (from
1978 to 1981) and by autonomous organizations of women workers in
Boston, New York, Vancouver and Chicago [District 65 1980].

6. In a study of white collar workers, Marchak [1974] argued
that unionization increased the male/female wage gap, a gap that
might be overcome by women's unions. However, historical and
contemporary evidence suggests that such feminist syndicalist
unions have not had the resources to win significant battles
against employers [Dye 1975; Fitzgerald et al. 1982: 132-140;
has more recently rejected her earlier position. Nussbaum [1980]
and Feree [1980] link feminism and trade unionism for white
collar workers.

7. For workers in unstable and seasonal industries like the
garment and food trades where, especially in Quebec, large
numbers of women are employed, unionization may mitigate the
effects of short time or unpaid overtime or the assignment of
work on the whims and preferences of supervisory personnel. For
the contemporary garment industry see Gannage [1985, 1987] and
Lipsig-Mumme [1987]; for the historical conditions of women
garment and textile workers in Quebec see Dumas [1975: 43-69];

8. Meisner et al. [1975] and Clark and Harvey [1976] show that
there is no evidence that husbands devote more time to housework
when their wives are in the work force. Luxton [1981; 1983]
shows that women's work days remain longer, despite some help
from husbands, who often choose the more pleasant jobs. More
generally, these sources along with Joann Vaneck [1974] shows
that time devoted to housework has not decreased, despite
technological change.

9. Milkman [1982] found that, in the long run, black workers
benefited from the equality of opportunity policies established in the UAW as a result of women’s struggles.

10. In contrast to a narrow focus on wages and contracts (business unionism), social unionism refers to union involvement in non-workplace reform issues. For a feminist discussion of social unionism see Briskin and Yanz [1983: 38].

11. For example, I observed sharp disagreements about the presence of men in union contingents for IWD marches in Toronto in 1978, 1979 and 1980. In Quebec, these differences came to a head in 1977, when women from the autonomous groups refused, as we have seen, to participate in IWD organizing with the unions.

12. MacKinnon [1979] develops a typology of harassment: quid pro quo (exchange of sexual access for job benefits or security), and harassment as a condition of work (sexist joking or comments on a woman’s appearance).


15. According to (previously unpublished) Quebec Ministry of Justice Statistics, it has moved from 22.78 years in 1960 to 23.53 years in 1970 and 23.79 years in 1979 [Messler 1980: 137].). The CSF [1978a: 213] concluded that "qu’ils s’agit surtout des femmes mariées, avec ou sans enfants, qui décident de rester dans la population active".


17. Because of different methods of calculation figures may vary slightly and this apparent rise may be slightly exaggerated.

18. As a result of Quiet Revolution educational reform, 31% had attended CEGEP or university by 1970 and 50% by 1980 [Messler 1980: 109].


20. Armstrong and Armstrong [1975, 1984: 34-41] have shown that women’s work is both segregated and concentrated. For Canada as
a whole, from 1941 to 1961, 10 occupational categories accounted for over half of women in the labour force, with greater concentration in clerical jobs in 1971 than in 1941; and these forms of concentration continue on into 1971 and 1981.

21. "College" enrollment jumped from 9,927 in 1964 to 20,914 in 1969 after CEGEPs were established and to 50,341 in 1974, an increase of 655.4% from 1965-1974 or of 49.1% from 1970-1974 [Statistics Canada 1975: table 2]. In 1979-1980, enrolments reached 133,676 students, just over half of whom were women [Statistics Canada 1981b: table 1].

22. According to figures cited by Daigle [1983: 119], from 1941 to 1971 the percentage increase for nurses was 842% compared to 190% for all women workers. The 1946 Loi des infirmières reserved the occupation for women, although in the face of a shortage of qualified staff the law was modified to include males [SQ 1969: chapter 70, para. 2] "Avec la professionnalisation... les rôles de femme et d'infirmière ont été institutionalisés jusqu'à se confondre complètement" [Daigle 1983: 117]. In this profession the concentration of women fell slightly from 96.2% in 1961 to 95.8% 1971 and 93.5% in 1978 [Descarrères-Bélanger 1983: 49]. While only 143 of 2,679 CEGEP nursing students were men in 1975, the balance shifted slightly to 277 out of 2047 in 1979-1980 [Statistics Canada 1975: table 4; 1981b: table 4].

23. A brief but thorough treatment of education is found in Magnuson [1980]. Teachers include both men and women, with the latter clustered at the lower levels: 99.7% of kindergarten, 89.1% of primary and 40.6% of secondary teachers according to Descarrères-Bélanger's calculations [1983: 79].

24. This ethic, arising in (francophone) Quebec from an occupation founded by nuns and introduced in England by Florence Nightingale's hospital reform, stressed that care giving was a service with moral rewards and reinforced a gendered hierarchy of command, from (male) doctor to nursing supervisor to nurse [Coburn 1974; Gamarniko 1978].

25. Despite official PLQ and PQ policies and campaigns by the CSF, women were still less than 2% of (upper) management in the civil service in 1978 after 5 years of affirmative action [Gauthier 1979]. Change was slow, with women still only 2% of upper management and 13.5% of middle management in 1979/80 [Annuaire 1979/1980].

26. Partly as a result of laicization, nurses' unions also took off after 1960 [Daigle 1983].

27. As noted in Chapter 4, after the 1972 Front commun strike leadership recommended defiance of back-to-work legislation, the CSN's executive committee divided in its response [Le Devoir 19,
30 May 1972]. In addition, Hydro-Québec employees and one of the civil service unions, the Syndicat des fonctionnaires provinciaux, dissatisfied themselves from the FC to bargain independently. Dissident CSN members led by "les trois D", vice-president Paul-Émile Da'lpé, treasurer Jacques Dion and director of services Amedée Daigle, took between 25,000 and 30,000 members into the new CSD central. Almost all of the leather, clothing, and textile workers joined along with some construction, mine and metal workers, concentrated in two rural regions, L'Estré and Bois-Francs [Gaudette 1977: 42-48, 51]. Despite the fact that about 35% of the membership were women, working in traditional areas like textiles, the needle trades, social services and sales, I found no evidence of the establishment of active women's commissions or feminist policy developed during the period of this study and so the CSD is not dealt with here. Paré [1983: 138-139] indicates that there are a few feminist militants in locals and that there is a "responsable du dossier" for women's issues for the central. The CSD is, overall, ideologically conservative [Rouillard 1981: 236-239; Ethier et al. 1975: 96, 105-7].


29. The origins of Catholic unionism lie in the Confédération des travailleurs catholiques du Canada (CTCC), founded in 1921 under clerical leadership aiming both to improve the lot of workers and to undermine the success of secular unionization drives. In 1960, it formally deconfessionalized, changing its "inspiration" from Catholic to Christian principals and its designation to CSN [CSN PV 1960: 131]. Tremblay [1980: 231] argues that nineteenth century utopian unionism, in the Knights of Labour, also influenced "national" or Catholic unionism: "Surtout au Québec, l'idéalisme et la volonté réformistes des Chevaliers du travail se retrouvent dans les unions nationales qui sont de la même ligne généalogique".

30. The FTQ resulted from the 1957 fusion of the AFL Federation des travailleurs de la province du Québec with the CIO Fédération des unions industrielles du Québec.

31. For a discussion of the political effect of fragment cultures [Hartz 1965], see Horowitz [1968].

32. On the CSN's nationalism see Le Borgne [1976].

33. "La conscience d'une responsabilité traditionnelle envers la préservation de l'héritage culturel canadien-français soutenait une attitude réactionnaire à l'égard des processus inexorables de la révolution industrielle" [Tremblay 1980: 225]. As ideological reproducers, the CIC/CEQ were by definition concerned with...
cultural, and hence linguistic and national issues. From the 1960s they supported the development of French [CEQ 1970b: 21] and in 1973 the congress supported not only self-determination but independence for Quebec, although they felt that this was too serious a question to commit the central to without a fuller survey of its members [CEQ 1973a: 138].

34. These views are developed in its 1968 report, "Le deuxième front" and in its working documents "Ne comptons que sur nos propres moyens" [CSN 1971a] and "Il n'y a pas d'avenir pour le Québec dans le système économique actuel: la CSN propose un changement" [1971b].

35. On the history of teachers' unions, see M. Thlverge [1981, 1983]. From seeing itself as a corps intermédiaire with a dual professional and union character, the CEQ gradually moved to adopt (deuxième front) social action policies against poverty in 1966 [CEQ 1970: 20-21] and to see itself as a union [CEQ 1971a: 11-12] and part of a working class movement [CEQ 1973a: 45-50, 52-53]. These developments were grounded in the educational philosophy of the école nouvelle promoted by the teachers' organization which stressed democracy and student-centered teaching, enabling them to understand social and cultural "reality" [Action pédagogique 1: 9-18, 3: 36-40]. This stress on revealing reality, increasingly defined as the exploitative reality of a capitalist society [CEQ 1972c], was maintained throughout the period and became, by 1980, a desire to teach students so that they would be capable of changing that reality in the interests of les travailleurs, democracy and equality [CEQ 1980a: 24].

36. Figures for the CSN were not reported in CALURA for 1980 or 1981; the 1972 CSD figures are an estimate from Bolvin and Guibault [1982: 97].

37. In 1961-1965, and particularly after 1964, the number of unionized workers grew at the rate of 10.2% a year and the rate of unionisation, including teachers, from 28% to 33% [Dofny and Bernard 1968: 167-168].

38. These figures from Rouillard [1981: 218] are calculated on a slightly different basis which gives 31.8% in 1961.

39. Craft and industrial workers were 72.8% while service and professionals were 27.2% in 1960 [Rouillard 1981: 219].

40. Except for university professors, where women were 12% in 1980, they comprised about 30-38% in these sectors [CEQ 1981]. Formed from the Syndicat professionnel des enseignants and the Syndicat des professeurs de l'État québécois, the Fédération nationale des enseignants québécois (FNEQ) was founded in 1969 with 3,800 members, and signed its first contract that same year.
By 1980, at 3,500, women were about 38% of CEGEP teachers. Feminists in FNEQ were active in union affairs and in women's movement activities [Interview: F].

41. Although initially enrolled in the CSN, several nurses' associations left in 1977. According to a study by the Ordre des Infirmières and Infirmiers du Québec [cited in Paré 1983: 114] with the exception of management most of the province's 46,000 nurses were unionized. Of these, 31,000 were in independent unions and the rest were in CSN or FTQ affiliates. Nurses' unions have fought for wages, working conditions and professional recognition [Daigle 1983].

42. Althusser [1971b] theorises this by including unions among what he calls "Ideological State Apparatuses", while Poulantzas [1973: 83-84] elaborates Lenin's point about the conservative implications of the tendency of workers' organizations to subordinate political to economic class struggle. On the whole, unions have a dual character: given a legal existence by the state in the context of regulated bargaining, but also serving as a locus for potentially oppositional class politics. For a discussion see Giddens [1982: 50-56].

43. Under its president Jean Marchand, who later entered federal Liberal politics, it also worked actively against the right wing Ralliement créditiste [David 1980b: 254].

44. On public sector negotiations see Boivin [1972, 1973].

45. Marxists are generally more skeptical than non-marxist analysts on this point. See Mlinar [1978: 192-193] and Postage and McRoberts [1976: 147].

46. The populist mobilisation was accurately expressed in the FC's sloganeering self-identification as "Nous, les 200.000". This expression played on a québécois linguistic habit of referring to themselves as "nous autres".

47. Le Borgne [1976: 183-185] discusses an in-house survey from the 1974 CSN Congress in which 78 of 100 respondents indicated that they had voted for the PQ in the October 1973 election. CEQ president Yvon Charbonneau told me that the base of the central's membership strongly supported the PQ. This supports reports that the membership of the PQ was composed of educated workers, often teachers [Bellavance 1973: 88].

48. It was always concerned with childcare, household help (auxiliaires familiales) and maternity leave as well as the moral atmosphere of the workplace [CSN PV 1964: 370; 1970: 104-105; CSN CCF 1976: 57].

49. They were precisely conservative in Gordon and Dubois's
[1984: 32] sense of accepting existing gender power relations while attempting to improve women's status, and in carrying over a complementarist naturalization of a gendered division of labour into the programme to improve women's status.

50. "Le PROBLÈME du travail féminin" was the title of CSN vice-president Jeanne Duval's 1961 convention report [CSN PV 1961: 175, emphasis added], discussed in this section.

51. "Mais la femme n'est pas seulement une travailleuse; elle est aussi une mère" [CSN PV 1960: 195].

52. Complementarism, the view that men and women are both different and complementary, reserved a vice-presidency for a woman, often, as in this case, a nurse. She served in this position 1953-1964 and chaired the women's committees after 1960.

53. A previous committee, established in 1952, had been as much directed to workers' wives as women workers [Gagnon 1974b: 24].

54. This demand was also recurrently supported by AFEAS.

55. This motivation is distinguished from earlier support for equal pay as a gambit to make women too expensive to be attractive to employers [Gagnon 1974b: 23]. Nineteenth century British compositors reasoned similarly [Cockburn 1983: 24].

56. Gender differences in wages persisted in the public and private sectors. I found no evidence that equal wages were negotiated before 1968. There were also changes in how the demand was presented, as salaire égal [CSN PV 1962: 108] and as, under the influence of the ILO, "valeur égal" [CSN PV 1964: 143-144]. In 1968, it demanded a well supervised, clear and specific policy for equal wages between men and women and for workers in the same occupations across the province [CSN PV 1968: 68; 103].

57. Wives' committees evidently continued in some areas as evidenced by the undated notes for a talk to one such in Yvette Rousseau's personal file in the CSN archives. The CSN held one such meeting to educate women about unions, contracts, bargaining and working conditions and to urge them to educate themselves about contemporary political realities beyond everyday domestic cares. The contradictory character of the meeting is captured in the fact that CSN regional education representative, (Mlle) Gabrielle Hotte, cast this project in terms of issues of family interest, while another speaker, (Mme) Mia Riddez felt that "Il est temps que les femmes fassent à leur tour des revendications envers leurs employeurs de plein temps; leur mari". She asked how many men understood the distress of women who had neither time nor money to go out to breathe, to exchange ideas with someone other than children. It was up to men to help women take their place in the sun, to educate themselves, to take some
responsibility for raising their children. The presidents of the **Syndicat du bâtiment et du bois** and of the CSN, Marcel Pépin, also spoke [Le Devoir 5 March 1966].

58. Although stating clearly that the CSN did not oppose women's work, his complementarism still wanted "leur nature" to be respected [CSN PV 1964: 8]. He also recommended tripartite, government worker and employer committees set up as a first set toward legislative reform. On the other had, he recommended the appointment of women to negotiation committees and other responsible posts [Ibid. 9-10; CSN PV 1966: 212-213].

59. An exception to this silence was the CSN brief to the RCSWC in 1968 [CSN 1968b]. It reviewed concerns about work and family life and pointed to laws on jury duty and marital status areas where legislative reform was needed.


61. This and the next two paragraphs are based on Thérien [1972].

62. She lists strikes at the public sector **Régie d'alcool du Québec** and at the private sector firms of Squibb, Domtar, Sunoco and Lapalme. These last, auxiliary postal workers, became folkheroes of the labour movement for defying federal Prime Minister Trudeau in a long strike [Interview: P].

63. The union, **Syndicat des permanents et employées de bureau**, that organized her workplace was not a formal member of its employer's organization, the CSN.

64. Because this study unfortunately ignores gender dimensions and takes place in 1974 at the end rather than the beginning of working class radicalization, its usefulness is limited.

65. In the first case, workers identified with the working class and saw their opposition to the capitalist class and the union as instruments of ideological radicalization. In the second, the respective identifications were "petits", "contremâitre" and "solidarité à la base".

66. This is confirmed by the importance given to reports of these strikes in QD [Chapter 5] and by some interview material.

68. I participated in an attempt to occupy a Montreal radio station. In the preparatory meeting at CSN headquarters, the main speakers were men, but women led several of the small groups. Participants recalled that there were some all-women groups and that women's militancy was particularly notable [Interview: L, P].

69. In her 1968 "The politics of housework", Pat Mainardi [1980] described men's use of passive-aggressive tactics to avoid housework, including delay, studied incompetence and scorn.

70. In March 1977, the CCF endorsed this demand as part of the CL manifesto, "Nous aurons les enfants que nous voulons" [CSN CCF 1978: 59].

71. Her data also indicate that about 100 locals had committees and that there were 100 "responsables"; they also suggest that the left-wing Montreal Conseil central, where public and private sector workers were involved, was particularly active.

72. Earlier estimates [FTQ CCF 1973: 3] were made on a narrow data base so that the number of women affiliated to the central may have been under-reported [Gagnon 1983: 163].

73. In 1980, women were between 45% and 69.9% of the members of Quebec unions in the needle trades (confection) [FTQ CCF 1981: 8]. Men were concentrated in skilled craft unions, like cutters and furriers. They were active in the pre-WWI period of union formation [Tax 1980] and in the 1930s [Dumas 1975: 43-75]. Gannage [1982, 1987] shows the complex relation of gender, class and ethnicity among garment workers in a Toronto establishment. One suspects that in many cases these workers also imported patriarchal ideologies which survived as part of emigrant ethnic identities. In August 1983, dressmakers in a Montreal local of the FTQ-affiliated ILGWU struck for the first time in forty years, inspired in part by a feminist rank and file current which developed after 1980 [Lipsig-Mumme 1987: 58].

74. According to the same survey, women were between 30% and 44.9% of Quebec federal public sector employees [FTQ CCF 1981: 9]. On what she considers the relatively good record of public sector Canadian unions, see White [1980: 61-67].

75. See, for example, FTQ 1969a; 1971a.

76. This document, then, partially confirms Marchak's [1973: 144] view that the failure to organize may be more due to organisers' prejudices than to women's reluctance; cf. FTQ CCF [1973: 64].

77. The central's main concern was with attacks on blacks in
the Montreal area. See the FTQ’s [nd: 43] review of its 1960-1967 positions on human rights/discrimination, which mention race, ethnicity, colour and religion, but not sex.

78. The following examples from the Cahier des Résolutions, proposed by affiliates but not adopted by the congress, provide a glimpse of ideology at the base.

79. Although this may be an effect of editing or error in the production of the FTQ booklet, the resolution is signed with the initials of only the English name of the union, CUPE.

80. It was largely written by Mona-Josée Gagnon, a feminist FTQ researcher, who was key in nurturing feminism in the FTQ. After completing an Industrial Relations MA study on women in the Quebec labour movement while on leave [Gagnon 1973], she edited a historical collection on Quebec Ideologies of women and writing widely on the labour movement [1974a]. From 1975, she devoted 20% of her work-time to women’s issues [FTQ 1975b: 60].

81. In 1973, there were two women, Robitaillé and Gagnon, working in responsible administrative positions at the FTQ with women only 2.8% of the total full time staff [FTQ CCF 1973: 4].

82. The FTQ archives contained clippings from La Presse, Le Journal de Montréal, Le Soleil, Montréal Matin, Le Droit, Le Devoir, Québec Presse and The (Montreal) Gazette.

83. Relying on a CSF study of inequities in contracts [Bérer and des Rivières 1974b], the 1975 report, "Le combat syndical et les femmes" [FTQ CCF 1975: 37-43], stressed the need to negotiate non-discriminatory contracts and include clauses on maternity leave and protection for pregnant women in dangerous jobs. It did not mention abortion. In 1975, the congress passed a resolution calling for repeal of the abortion laws, the release of Morgentaler and a Quebec government information campaign on contraception [FTQ 1975c: 32-33].

84. This latter demand was linked organically to the congress theme, full employment [FTQ 1979c].

85. By 1979, regional CCFs had been established in three regions (Montreal, Outaouais, and Quebec) and were in the process of being formed in another (Abitibi-Témiscamingue). Other regions had taken steps or saw the need for consciousness-raising as a preliminary step in forming CCFs [FTQ 1979a: 26, 34-52].


87. Sources of expansion were a "dizzy decline" in private francophone secondary school enrolments 1965-1968 and, more
Importantly, the baby boom bulge and higher retention rates for the more than half of Quebec children who left school before sixteen in 1959-1960 [Magnuson 1980: 110-116]. Dumont [1983] argues that the changes of the Quiet Revolution meant that religious communities no longer provided the only avenue of épanouissement or security for women who now had many alternatives to marriage. This flight from religious life peaked in 1972. At the same time from 1960 to 1979 there was a decline in recruitment of postulants, with novices joining only contemplative orders.

88. "Government figures for 1961-62 revealed that 90 per cent of Catholic public school teachers and 65 per cent of Protestant public school teachers had thirteen years or less of education... Increasingly the undergraduate degree became the minimum requirement for new teachers, elementary as well as secondary. By the end of the decade about half of Quebec teachers had fifteen or more years of schooling, which had the additional effect of stabilizing the profession" [Magnuson 1980: 113].

89. The committee chose this name to commemorate the feminist founder of the rural Catholic teachers' unions.

90. However, a motion stating that workers' liberation "englobed" women's liberation was defeated [CEQ 1973a: 39].

91. An additional employee of the central worked with the committee from 1974-1980.

92. The CLG initiated a provincial session on women with the CSN and the FTQ in March 1974 [Ligne direct 2:4 1974: 33] and worked on IWD activities [CEQ 1976b: 29].

93. The study measured attitudes to career/family conflict, married women's labour force participation and the normative distribution of six of household tasks (cooking, dishes, shopping, laundry, cleaning and childcare). Decision-makers were defined as women in positions of power in government, the public service, trade unions, political parties, private business and voluntary organizations [Eichler 1984: 338].

94. In the Canadian study, only 30% responded that husband and wife or the entire family participated in children's home, versus the 81% who thought this ought to be a joint or family activity. For sharing of other tasks, the distribution [Eichler 1984: 85] was:
task | normative equality | actual equality
---|-------------------|------------------
shopping for children's clothes: 46% | 18%;
decorating a room 68% | 39%;
major food shopping 46% | 30%
doing the dishes 66% | 31%.

This remarkably high rate does not measure actual male participation, which both women and men tend to over-report [Luxton 1981] as a proportion of total domestic labour.

95. Note the use of a term for a partner that does not presuppose the legal relation of marriage.

96. Patterns of speech in organisations frequently give men precedence [Smith 1975]. Rowbotham et al. [1980: 65-70, passim] suggest the same solutions for the same problems in left groups in Britain.

97. As a result of negotiations with school boards, such staff continued to be formally employed by the board but, in place of teaching duties, took up work on the status of women in union or joint union-board committees.

98. Tensions between the FTQ and the other centrals meant that the former did not participate. Several autonomous groups oriented to working women mentioned below signed the manifesto.

99. However, relations remained tense, and FTQ president Louis Laberge attacked teachers for being absent on too many professional days [Interview: P].

100. This is a tension between what Bashevkin [1985: 4] calls "independence" and "partisanship". She finds, as the title of her book suggest, that women "toe the line". Of course, one cannot extrapolate directly from parties to unions, but the similarities are striking.

Notes for Chapter 9.

1. It was completed with the PQ's Bill 89, see 9.3.1.1.

2. Nadeau became president of the Commission (later Office) in 1961 where he sat with Liberal lawyer Dussault-Mailloux [La Réforme April 1965: 15]. This document on the legal status of the married woman, the first half of a report on marriage

3. Responding to criticism, Kirkland-Casgrain said that a wife's "simple statement" of her husband's absence would be adequate [DAN 27L 3s 1964: 918].

4. Women were now allowed a separate residence without a legal separation.

5. Actually, the sharing of acquired property and the separation of property brought to the marriage gave women less than full rights to the marital home.

6. Estimates for contracts under the séparation des bléns vary with the UN MNA Rolland Théoret suggesting 65%; Kirkland-Casgrain suggesting 60% to 70%; and Gaston Binnette reporting 73% for 1962 [DAN 28L 4s 1969: 4519, 4523].

7. With an inflationary expansion of wealth in the post war period, conventional compensatory payments to be made to a wife -- usually $3,00.00 to $10,00.00 -- and testamentary benefits had also proved to be inadequate [Interview: E].

8. While some opposition from conservative groups, like the Créditistes and the Fermières, would seem to offer some tactical justification for this contention in 1964, such an argument in 1969 rationalized masculinist prejudice since, by that time, more egalitarian legislation could have been justified as responding to current Catholic teaching, with its new stress on conjugal equality [Charles 1982: 115-120], and, more importantly, the demands of the FFQ, the largest women's organisation in Quebec.

9. The SFDU urged the PLQ to enact its proposed law reform which It and the FFLQ warmly supported [La Réforme 3 Aug 1963: 15].

10. See Kirkland-Casgrain's and other PLQ speeches in the second reading debate [DAN 27L 3s 1964: 891-893 et passim].

11. "This legislation represents the family that has been in this House on the Liberal side longer than any other...If we take the combined terms of Dr. Kirkland and his daughter" [DAN 28L 3s 1964: 904]. While in the legislature, Kirkland-Casgrain stressed her husband's supportiveness [La Réforme Aug. 1964; Le Devoir 6 May 1970], but later wrote that her activism had been a source of strain in a marriage which ended in divorce only after she did not run in the 1970 election [1984: 99-100].
12. PLQ leader Lesage had joked that he expected the UN minister to begin his speech with "vive les femmes libres" [DAN 28L 3s 1969: 4510]. Similarly during debates on jury duty [DAN 29L 2s 1971: 2472-2473; n15 below] and the CSF [DAN 29L 4s 1973 2089; 9.2.4.1] joking broke out about male/female power relations and the bachelor status of the UN women’s issues spokesman. This kind of uneasiness was a characteristic first response to women’s claims for power.

13. In turn, reforms researched and proposed under the PLQ were carried out by the PQ.

14. UN and Créditiste spokesmen agreed that the legislation was in accord with sociological realities [DAN 27L 3s 1964: 918, 923], but the former wanted women’s property rights expanded in all regimes while the latter was concerned with widows’ benefits in particular [ibid. 920, 935]. Kirkland-Casgrain referred to the FFQ’s Robillard’s support for the Bill as "une éclaircise pour notre émancipation" [ibid. 926].

15. Although the law empowered women to sit on juries and removed the property qualification for all citizens, some women, notably wives of Quebec provincial police officers, continued to be excluded by virtue of their marital status [SQ 1971: ch 26 para 52]. Later, there was some concern that juries had too many women because men simply did not turn up for jury duty and that women imposed severe sentences [Le Devoir 9 Sept. 1974].


17. The CSF had presented criticism in committee, but even after passage it was dissatisfied with the lack of protection for complainants, absence of reference to age, low level of fines, the placement of the burden of proof on the complainant and the length of time that cases would take [CSFB 2:5 1975: 16].

18. This last, associated with RAIF [RAIF 1 1973: 1; 8 1974: 15-16], was also supported in principle by the ORCC [1975a], the FFQ, the CSF [CSFB 1:5 1974: 1-2; Leclerc nd], the YWCA, which ran workshops on "La femme et son nom" [Le Devoir 6 Jan. 1976]. As well, it was supported by letter writers to Le Devoir who suggested boycotting businesses who refused credit in a woman’s birth name [5 Oct. 1975] or criticised universities for insisting that students use a married name [7 Feb. 1975]. The Justice Minister wrote to the CSF stipulating that the use of a husband’s name was only customary and the use of a birth name could be considered legal under article 56a of the Code civil without addressing problems raised by articles 114 and 115 which specified the use of a husband’s name [CSFB 2:4 1975: 14].
19. Fraser [1984: 106] has noted a similar pedagogical orientation in Laurin's "hypnotic patience" explaining language legislation. Similarly, stressing the educational role of government, PQ member Clément Richard answered Marx's question about educating the educators by quoting Bertrand Russell: "Institutions mould character and character transforms institutions."

20. Payette [1982: 130] explains that she left politics because of fatigue, in part from dealing with the continuing sexism of her fellow cabinet members, including Morin.


22. See Bill 50, Loi de la Charte des droits de l'homme [DAN 30L 2s 1974: 2395-7; SQ especially articles 10-13, 16-20. Bill 27, Loi modifiant la loi des établissements industriels et commerciaux, which removed remaining restrictions on night work for women and removed the employers' obligation to provide transport for night workers, came into effect the same day as the Charter. Laws excluding women workers from mines remained in effect [CSF 1975b, 1975c; Bérér and des Rivières 1974c: 5].

23. Kirkland-Casgrain promised maternity leave legislation [Le Devoir 31 May 1966; 7 June 1966]. And, perhaps carried away on a wave of IWY sentiment or out of range of collegial supervision, so did the second PLQ woman cabinet member, a former FFLQ (1967) and PLQ president (1970), Lise Bacon, in an uncharacteristically feminist interview in Paris in 1975 [Le Devoir 12 Sept. 1975, 3 March 1975]. Bacon was the target of attacks by day care groups in 1974-1975, and was seen by feminists as "loin des femmes" [RAIF 12/13 Jan. Feb. 1975: 27].

24. By 1976 still only 1.6% of all management personnel (cadres supérieurs) were women, in comparison with 3.4% of all workers and 8.4% of men; over 90% of women were in the lower category of office workers (personnel du bureau) [Bérér 1974b]. And, according to the CSF, 1975 public sector wage offers from the PLQ government were likely to exacerbate, not reduce, the gender wage gap [Le Devoir 13 Dec. 1975]. According to CSN-CCF [1976: 49] differences of 7.3% and 11% existed in 1975 government offers for kitchen helpers and maintenance workers.

25. Although the minister responsible for the CSF had promised maternity leave for public sector workers during the 1976 Common Front negotiations [Le Devoir June 1976], achieving it became a
26. Resolutions calling for improved family support were routinely passed at PLQ conventions [PLQ 1971: 175-179].

27. See Adamcyck [1975]; the 1981 convention published a discussion document on population by nationalist demographer Henripin [PLQ 1981].

28. In 1964, the FFLQ asked for study on legislation regulating day care; in 1971, a resolution calling for private not government day care was passed while one asking school boards to open empty buildings for use as day care centres was tabled [PLQ 1971b: 13].

29. Payments to mothers were discussed in C’est tol. comme famille [PLQ 1974]. A law and order tendency in the party was led by Justice Minister Jérôme Choquette until he resigned later the following year [Le Devoir 3 March, 2 June, 1 Oct. 1975]. In 1976, Le Devoir editorialist Lise Bissonnette accused the PLQ of retreating from innovative family policy [26 April 1976].

30. In 1975, several organizations (family planning, single parent and family groups, AFEAS and Grossesse-Secours) called on the PLQ to pay particular attention to the family [Le Devoir 23 April 1975].

31. Later in the debate he listed 13 groups including: a Liberal women’s organization Club Wilfred-Laurier, Canadian Consumers’ Association, YWCA, Allied Jewish Services of Montreal, Ligue des femmes du Québec, Mouvement des femmes chrétiennes), childcare groups, university women and journalists; but he also stressed the FFQ, mentioning it twice [DAN 29L 4s 1973: 2139-2140].

32. It remained, then, a normative ideal, articulated in liberal terms, but not necessarily strategically connected to that ideology.

33. In committee, he denied press accounts that included the FFQ among the groups he caricatured [Ibid. B-3985].

34. As well as expressing class and regional resentments, these statements may echo the kind of fear of powerful women that was evidenced in revolutionary nationalist writings discussed above in 6.1. Chodorow [1978: 180-190] has suggested that this hostility is endemic to mother-raised males, particularly in the household-family forms of late capitalist societies.

35. For the PQ it was "unicement pour s’attirer encore le vote féminin" [DAN 29L 4s 1973: 2138].
36. The pedagogical and political importance accorded by the PQ to the debate is indicated by the fact that three of its six members made lengthy and well-prepared interventions. If the lengths of interventions on second reading are measured in terms of pages, Laurin spoke more than any other MNA. His speech comes out to 21 printed pages in the DAN in comparison with those of the PLQ's Lévesque (15), the UN's Tremblay (16) and the Créditiste Brochu (18). For a discussion of the educational and political background that shaped Laurin's thinking, see Fraser [1984: 91-107]. Note the similarity between Laurin's view that a "feeling of incompleteness" and a "flawed identity" in his francophone patients was "a collective inheritance that only collective psychotherapy could resolve" and the revolutionary nationalist orientation derived from Fanon [1975, 6.1.3. above].

37. La femme au Québec [1973], by Dolment, a founding member of RAIF, and her companion pequisté Barthe, was favourably reviewed, by Rowan, as practical and indispensable [Le Devoir 30 Jan. 1973].

38. Millett offers a similar view of patriarchy as a habit of mind [1970: 63].

39. He specifically mentioned the sociological, philosophical, and psychol analytic work of Simone de Beauvoir, Evelyne Sullerot, Mélanie Grégoire, Kate Millett, Betty Friedan and Germain Greer [DAN 29L 4S 1973: 2126]. While an appeal to a federal body was uncharacteristic in the speeches of PQ members I have read, the PQ opposition referred with approval to the RCSWC more than once, urging the PLQ to act on its recommendations [Ibid. 2095], and even volunteering to cooperate with Kirkland-Casgrain, then Ministre du Tourisme, chasse et pêche, in studying and following up on its recommendations on child care, maternity leave, work and woman-headed families [DAN 29L 1S 1970: 2047].

40. The federal Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, for example, was established by mandate [Findlay 1981].

41. The PLQ, responding to FFQ questions in committee, said that that ministerial approval was included for administrative reasons (coordinating research in ministries and councils) not to vet political issues; see DAN 28L 4S 1973: B-3985-92 for this discussion.

42. The first set of appointments was staggered. Appointments were renewable and included a per diem allowance.

43. A career administrator, Robillard had worked for the, Montreal Chamber of Commerce and run its women's programme. Pestlau, an economist, had belonged to the VOW as well [Pestlau 1976]. Depatie had written on women and politics for the Bird Commission [Fournier 1977].
44. This strength can be contrasted with the lack of feminist career public sector administrators to staff government committees in Quebec [Interview: J, L, O] or federally [Archibald 1975; Findlay 1987]. Premier Bourassa's attempts to capitalize on the CSF's independence backfired when Francine-C. Mackenzie resigned from the CSF, after he had cited her as an example of an "impartial" appointment because her husband, Toronto Star reporter Robert Mackenzie, often criticized the government. She was replaced by Laval historian Christine Piette Samson [Le Devoir 14 May 1974].

45. He received the report [CSF 1974a, 1974b] June 27, 1974 [CSFB 1:3 Aug. 1974: 2]. The programme "Égalité des chances" recommended the elimination of discrimination where it existed and affirmative action in recruitment, hiring, and job classification through the use of, for example, non-sexist terminology; an end to sex-typing of jobs, including secretarial functions; consideration of relevant volunteer activities in hiring; an evaluation of and promotion in secretarial jobs on the quality of work involved, not in terms of a boss's status and promotion; placing women on the oversight public service Commission; an end to unequal pay; and a programme of maternity leave [CSF 1974b].

46. It published a series of research reports on these issues [Bhérer 1974a; Longtin 1974; Monette 1974; des Rivières 1974a; Thibault 1974, 1973] and also conducted reviews of legislative provisions which affected women [Bhérer 1974c; Bhérer and des Rivières 1974c; Dussault 1974]. No family court system existed in Quebec, despite the urgings of, for example, the FFQ and AFEAS [CSF nd]. The CSF sub-committees and reports were organized in terms of the mandates of ministries that dealt with women's affairs, e.g. justice, education, social services and so on [CSF 1:1 May 1974: 2-4].

47. Co-sponsored with Radio Québec, the province's educational broadcasting system, and published in Le Devoir [14, 17 June 1975], it revealed that 88.8% thought that women were not inferior to men. About 46% saw women and men as equally intuitive, 60% as equally responsible, 36% equally independent, and 46% equally burdened with work in or outside the home. However, percentages of men who thought that a housewife had a better chance to be happy in marriage (56%), with her children (69%) or in herself (37%) or who rejected the role of househusband (75%) indicate underlying hesitations about the working mother. Church attendance, low education, (male) breadwinners, and occupations as "workers" were associated with more conservative views on the latter topics.

48. See des Rivières [1974a]; Monette [1974]; Leclerc "Comment je m'appelle" [nda]; CSFB [1:5 nd 1; 2:3 nd: 6-11]. At CSF urging,
Justice minister Jérôme Choquette wrote to Bourassa and government departments that women have "le droit strict d'exercer ses droits sous le nom patronymique qui lui est propre" [CSFB 2:4 nd: 14-15].

49. Published from 1:1 May 1974 to 6:3 March 1979 (sometimes with undated or unnumbered issues) it was replaced by the La Gazette des Femmes [1:1 April 1979].

50. In 1974, Lise Monette was hired to run the consultation service [CSFB 1:5 nd: 5]. It provided the CSF with insight into the concerns of unorganized women and testimony to its popularity in a rising number of calls. Its records are useful for the researcher because they show the topics Quebec women wanted information on. For example, in its first year, 33% of the questions were about the CSF itself, 32% dealt with legal issues, mostly divorce, 13% with work or employment and the rest with issues from guaranteed annual income to abortion [CSFB 1:5 nd: 5-6]. In later years, the percentage of calls about the CSF fell, to 9% in 1977 and 6.6% in 1978, while the percentage for justice fluctuated slightly, falling to 31.7% in 1977 and rising to 37.1% in 1978, with workplace issues climbing slightly to 18% for both years and a new category, human rights, taking up 15.2% and 10.9% respectively [CSF 1977/1978:16; 1978/1979: 39].

51. A first printing (1500 copies) of Carrefour 75 recommendations, sent to some unions, provincial and federal governmental offices, women's groups, all hospitals, credit unions (caisses populaires), Chambers of Commerce, Indian chiefs, professional associations, life insurance companies, feminist organizations and the media, was soon exhausted and two more printings were made for distribution [CSF 1975/1976: 11].

52. It also wanted to help women to run for elected office [Le Devoir 2 Aug. 1975].

53. It also called for maternity leave and tough equal pay laws for all workers.

54. It took the lead on asking all national and provincial status of women councils to support its position [CSFB 3:1 nd: 6].

55. Along with its sister status of women councils, it pushed for provincial-federal cooperation in, for example, divorce reform, urging an end to quarrels between the two levels of governments [ibid. 5].

56. Althusser [1971b] uses the term "interpellate" (Interpeller: hall, heckle) to refer to the way in which, through ideological practices, individuals are at once hailed, addressed and provided a social location with which to identify. Following
Althusser's translator Ben Brewster, this form has (re-)entered into English usage.

57. The last president of the FFLQ, she was also, in 1970, the first woman elected PLQ president.


59. Claude Simard, variously minister of institutions, finance and labour, allowed $700,00.00 worth of contracts to be awarded to Clairemont Enterprises, whose signing officers included Andree Bourassa [Le Devoir 9 April 1974].

60. Kirkland-Casgrain's charm in piloting Bill 16 was praised [DAN 27L 3s 1964: 899] and a rhetoric of gallantry, hat-tipping, and paternalistic praise of Kirkland-Cragrain's performance echo through the debate [ibid. 897, 920]. The point here is that this language went unchallenged and co-existed with joking hostility.

61. Kirkland-Casgrain's sponsorship of Bill 16 was added to her ministerial responsibility for roads; Bacon oversaw areas of day care and social services. Thus, in taking on areas associated with women and, in the former's case, an area symbolically associated with all women, they partially conformed to the role of token representatives [Kanter 1977].

62. The first session was devoted to cleaning up urgent questions remaining from the business of the previous administration [DAN 31 Ls 1976: 2-3].

63. This proposal was attacked by PLQ MNA Fontaine as "farfelu" [DAN 31L 4s 1980: 5190-1], and went unimplemented.

64. That there existed "Une volonté concrète" to fully and quickly realize women’s legitimate aspirations in legislation was claimed by Levesque [DAN 31L 4s 1980: 54].

65. The PQ was not only identified with this social individual, but this kind of individual had high expectations of the PQ. On the other hand, women who supported feminist positions did not have a high degree of identification with the party except among its core supporters, university educated persons, where 60% of women and 61.8% of men supported the PQ in 1979 [Bashevkin 1983].

66. The CSF 1975 survey would indicate that male breadwinner families, men with low education or those who were workers (ouvriers) held beliefs that would not be met in PQ policy.

67. The raison d'etre of the party was nationalism; up until
the election, women were absent from PQ policies or appeared as housewives and mothers or as potential recipients of wages for housework in welfare policy [PQ 1970, 1973].

68. This lung condition resulting from exposure to asbestos fibers was used in union pressure for the kind of health and safety legislation promised by the PQ [Le Devoir 10 May 1984].

69. For example, the third session promised economic development, action on unemployment, university and CEGEP reform [DAN 31L 3s 1979: 3-6].

70. First, second and third readings were on March 5, December 8 and 19 1980 respectively.

71. This included equal economic obligations, according to ability. Either spouse could contribute through "son activite au foyer" [SQ 1982 articles 400-659].

72. Either or both of the spouses could have residences (owned or rented by either or both) registered as a family home through different mechanisms for minimal or no cost; buildings with more than five units could be mortgaged without spousal consent. The court supervised the division of both residence and furnishings at breakup of marriage.

73. Surnames were limited to two hyphenated names with different surnames possible for each child; new surnames could be retroactively registered with both parents' consent.

74. At the same time, federal law reform placed a greater emphasis on marriage breakdown as a cause for divorce.

75. Again, this was a policy promised by Bacon [Le Devoir 3 March 1975].

76. Bill 45, Loi modifiant la Loi du salaire minimum, permitted the Commission du salaire minimum to publish a regulation according maternity leave to pregnant workers; see [DAN 31L 3s 1978; 1737; 1896-7; 2073-93; 2117]. This was reinforced by Loi de Sante et securite au travail which spelled out the right of pregnant and lactating women to refuse work they perceived as dangerous pending confirmation by an appropriate authority and to be reassigned or relieved of all work if reassignment was not possible without loss of pay, benefits or job security [SQ 1979: chapter 63]. Although the Conseil du patronat had supported maternity leave, specific employers associations were critical of the extent or worker’s rights as spelled out in the new health and safety legislation, while union representatives supported it [DAN 31L 3s 1979: 2536-4537, B-8133-8240 et passim].

77. Leave could be prolonged for medical reasons by four
weeks.

78. UIC participation criteria were slightly less rigorous: 20 weeks paid work in the last 52, 10 weeks of labour force participation (paid work or drawing unemployment benefits) between the 30th and the 52 week before the predicted date of birth, except for those who had already been drawing regular benefits for a 15 week period. For a discussion of Canadian maternity leave policies see Heitlinger [1987].

79. Domestic, farm, part-time workers and those who received tips were not covered by the law.

80. When it was charged that the onus was placed on women to prove discrimination in a case of dispute, Labour Minister Pierre-Marc Johnson immediately responded that the burden of proof would be on the employer [DAN 31L 2s 1978: 2087].

81. Charges of electoralism seem unwarranted given the centrality of the policy to the PQ.

82. These included the CSN (which gave important administrative support), the CEQ, Au bas de l'Échelle (itself already funded by the CSN) and the Centre de référence et d'information pour les femmes and organizations working with immigrant women (the Association des travailleurs grecs and the Service d'aide aux néo-québécois et immigrants).

83. See Front commun pour l'amélioration du congé de maternité leaflet, "Le congé de maternité, un droit fondamental".

84. This pamphlet looks like something produced by a not too well off women's group, with hand lettered headlines and cheap reproduction.

85. This law was withdrawn for revision and resubmitted and passed as Bill 101 [Fraser 1984: 109-112].

86. It recommended maternity leave, prenatal education and childcare again in 1977 [CSFB 3:5 1977: 8].

87. This was radical in relation to the existing legal structure, if not in terms of public opinion polls which had long indicated majority support--from 54% in 1970 to 73.9% in 1971--for abortion to be a doctor/patient decision [RCSWC 1970: 282; Châtelaine, March 1971, cited QD 1:5 April 1973: 39].

88. In opposition, péquist Claude Charron had argued strongly that hospitals should be forced to provide better access to abortion [DAN 29L S4 B-1002-5].

89. In the 1930s anti-semitism was explicit in Quebec
90. Stated by Lévesque in the *discours inaugural* [DAN 31L s4 10], this was specified by Belleval as including benefits and wages [DAN 31L s3 B-1981]. The next public sector contract which was negotiated (after the period of this study) in fact imposed cutbacks with the result that state sector workers who had supported the PQ were extremely disillusioned and angry [personal communication, E. Spry].

91. For example, male security guards who move between buildings were paid more than female security guards who remain indoors with disturbed and often violent inmates of group homes or hospitals.

92. Hetlinger [1987] argues that Quebec’s maternity leave legislation was the most advanced in Canada. Ontario passed equal work for equal value legislation only in 1987.

93. Early in her tenure, Payette saw the CSF as ill-functioning, created to calm women and put a brake on their demands [*Le Devoir* 8 Feb. 1977].

94. Four PQ women candidates were elected, including Jocelyne Ouellette, a Hull administrator, Denise Leblanc-Bantey, a journalist and student from the *Iles de la Madeleine*, and deputy-speaker Louise Ceurrier, as well as one PLQ woman candidate, Thérèse Lavoie Roux, an "administrator" and former Montreal School Board chair from Acadie.

95. On IWD 1979, the latter cited Mill to the effect that deplorably superficial knowledge about women will not improve until they do so [DAN 31L 4s 1979: 55].

96. Casgrain ran for the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, the forerunner of the New Democratic Party. On its founding see Lipset [1971]; on feminism in its ranks, see Manley [1980]. This link is further evidence of Casgrain’s role in the intimate connection between first and second wave feminism in Quebec.

97. Her predecessor in this job, Bacon, had failed to get these measures into legislation [Fraser 1984: 121-122].

98. The Cl, composed of existing and newly designated departmental representation, planned and coordinated working groups on each topic and evaluated and costed the practicability of recommendations. For a list of its members, see CSF 1978: Appendix H 2-11.

99. According to the *Le Devoir* report, the CSN CCF sent a telegram to the union stating that it felt that the central’s first obligation was to its members and that it was too busy to
disperse its energies. The CSN and the CEQ told La Presse that they were boycotting in the name of public sector battles to come.

100. In the CSF's assessment, 80 of 438 possible groups participated, 36 of which were ad hoc committees specially constituted for that purpose [CSF 1978: xix]. These included the Fermlères, university women's clubs, several FFQ regional councils, the LFQ, women's services (rape, pregnancy, labour force re-entry and abortion counselling), housing, YWCA, PQ CCFs, unmarried mothers', single-parent, widows' and other family associations, artists', nurses' and professional associations, a list of 118 organizations in all [ibid. Appendice H 11-14].

101. The government received the report, unanimously approved by the CSF, 20 Sept. 1978 [CSF 1978: ill]; a version without recommendations was published as a special issue [5:5 Oct. 1978.]. The time required to release the report can be ascribed to government hesitation or the summer recess; some recommendations were leaked to journalist Lysiane Gagnon who suggested that "l'emprèsement du gouvernement aura peut-être besoin d'être stimulé" [La Presse 26, 30 July 1978].

102. Its 306 recommendations can only be summarized here in general terms.

103. The married tax exemption was to be replaced by childcare allowances and exemptions for sole-support families.

104. Noting that rates for caesarian births and hysterectomies varied by region in Quebec, they urged educational programmes through CLSCs to make women more autonomous with regard to health care decisions [CSF 1978: 102-142].

105. See the discussion [ibid. 313-328]; recommendations on leisure and cultural policy were also made [ibid. 277-312].

106. In a "Libre opinion" column journalist Micheline Carrier, who had worked on a draft of the report, saw it as leaving out the working class and ignoring the extremely difficult conditions faced by women workers, despite recommendations on work [Le Devoir 4 Dec. 1978].

107. In a television interview, Robillard provided information to head off this kind of objection, mentioning that the phrase, égalité et indépendance was borrowed from UN leader Daniel Johnson, [Typescript of Interview, CSF Relais-Femmes "Egalité et Indépendance" file].

108. The cost of recommended tax changes was estimated, without this measure, at $200 million.

110. Robillard’s term was extended to launch the report; new CSF members had been named, Danielle Drolet and Henriette Thérrien from women’s groups and Jeanne d’Arc Vaillant from socio-economic groups, and Plête-Samson’s term was renewed [Le Devoir 2 Sept. 1977]. Bonenfant, from a well-known Le d’Orléans bourgeois family, had traversed the politics of the radicalization, working in the RIN and various popular, left and marginal groups in the Quebec region before turning to feminism [CSFB 5:6:2-3]. She saw her freedom, for example to criticize the CSF report as she had done, limited by the requirements of her new position. Still, she thought the report needed to be expanded in such areas as medical care and aging [Le Devoir 4 Dec. 1978].

111. Material from this body criticizing PQ policy was regularly fed to RAIF; the PLQ was also criticized including a stinging discussion of Lavoice Roux [RAIF nos 38-39, 40-41 42-43].

112. Her speech in Sherbrooke was cited by Carrière [Le Devoir 20 Nov. 1978].

113. For discussion of this issue, see Dandurand and Tardy [1981]; Yanacopoulo [1981]; Jean et al. [1986]; Lamoureux [1987].

114. It will be recalled that, in the 1960 Le Devoir round table [5.1], Madelaine Ryan had argued for women’s withdrawal from the workforce in order to accomplish maternal obligations, but stressed that these should be leavened with social involvement.

115. As well as conceiving of the idea and materially supporting the campaign, Liberals like former PLQ vice-president M.-J. Godbout quickly promoted the notion that there had been an insult [Le Devoir 17 March 1980].

116. The last was later elected as a federal liberal MP; see the summary of events in Dandurand and Tardy [1981: 45-54].

117. The Centre de documentation féministe, Comité de lutte, Editions de la Pleine Lune, Editions remue-ménage, Des luttes et des fires de femmes, Théâtre des cuisine, Les presses de la santé de Montréal/ Montreal Health Press and Théâtre expérimental des femmes. The RFQ promoted an abstention campaign, arguing that women should vote “woman” because nationalists were not to be trusted [Le Devoir 5 Feb. 1980; RFQ 1980c].

118. For a table which relates these polls to the Yvette events see Dandurand and Tardy [1981: 45-54].
119. As well as the deputy speaker, in July 1977 two were cabinet ministers: Payette and Ouellette (Ministre des Travaux publics et de l'Approvisionnement) [Fraser 1984: 396].

120. "La seule évocation de ce féminin plural nous rappelle le dur combat mené par plus de la moitié de la population québécoise pour obtenir en toute équité le droit de vote lui-même et conquérir par la suite l'ultime privilège d'être représentée à l'Assemblée nationale" [DAN 31L 1s 1976: 2].

Notes for Chapter 10.

1. This distinction, as I am formulating it, refers to ideological integration only. While it has implications for political alliances, the question of alliances, and their types, is a separate matter and is not specifically examined here. It should further be noted that neither Gramsci nor the neo-Gramscians discussed in Chapter 2 distinguish between modes of integration in this way, though such a distinction is consistent with their approach and seems to be a useful analytic addition.

2. Because what follows is a summary of points already discussed in the course of the study, references will only be given where new empirical material is introduced.

3. Here, Eisenstein's [1981: 204-206] contention that, carried to its furthest extent, liberal feminism's individualism tends to undermine the patriarchal roots of the public-private separation in the liberal democratic state, seems to have been borne out.

4. No profeminist election speeches by representatives of this party were reported in Le Devoir for the campaign periods preceding the 1960, 1962, 1966 and 1973 elections. Even when questioned by the FFQ in 1970, its representative responded in general terms about, for example, improving rural hospital services, without reference, even, to an equality framework [Le Devoir 4, 6 April 1970].

5. The different rhythms of development of feminist organisations traced confirms Black and McGlen's analysis that what they called "cosmopolitan women" (urban, educated) moved into feminist action in the mid-1960s and that "traditional women" (rural, less educated) only began to show evidence of changes in political orientation after 1974. What this study has done, has been to show the role of AFEAS in fostering such changes.

6. The PQ was distanced from these developments because of its own agenda and its distrust of activities sponsored by the
government's advisory body.

7. This distance was widely noted by everyone, both journalists and activists [Interview: A].

8. The apparent links between the FFQ and the FLQ were noted in RAIF, where the organization was called the "FFQ rouge", the tradition Liberal colour. At the same time, PQ CCFs were active in the coalition for improved maternity leave legislation, the CNALG and in party circles [Interview: A]. Differences between the FFQ and RAIF may in part arise from age and educational differences, but there is no data available to make rigorous comparisons. As well, the hegemonic ideological configurations and the degree of ideological radicalization prevailing at the time of their founding and the relative freedom of RAIF from the need to include member organizations had an effect.

9. Other actors on the left increasingly made gender equality a part of their platform or basis of unity [Comité de cent 1981].

10. Over 100 letters debating abortion were read for their approval or disapproval of abortion and the sex of the author. In 1973 and 1974, they were overwhelmingly written by men, sometimes clerics. Their letters opposed abortion on the grounds of a pronatalist argument for national survival, Catholic moral grounds, or on both combined. On Pro-vie see, Le Devoir 18, 19 Oct 1973, 8 Dec. 1973.

11. Carden [1974: 104-105] tells us that there were 28 charter members in NOW, 300 at its first annual meeting, and indicates that it had a growth spurt, from 5,800 members to over 20,000 members from 1972 to spring 1973. All NOW's members, it should be noted, are individual, not group.

12. This comparison relies on information from a former secretary to the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women [personal communication, Sue Findlay, June 1985].

13. The FLF was active in 1969 around the same time as similar groups emerged in Toronto, Vancouver [Discussion Collective no. 6 1972] and several major American cities [Carden 1974: 59 ff].

14. The former called for equal access under the law in 1974; the latter supported decriminalization in 1975.

15. For example, a hegemonically integrated bloc led by a bourgeoisie perceived as benevolently and effectively in charge of economic and social development can retard the development of a self-conscious working class for itself.

16. Feminist ideologies have also interpellated men, as the masculine supporters of suffrage [Cleverdon 1950: 57 et passim; Bacchi 1982: 5-7] and contemporary pro-feminists have shown [Kaufman 1987].
Appendix A: List of abbreviations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADDS</td>
<td><em>Association des droits démocratiques sociaux</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFEAS</td>
<td><em>Association féminine d'éducation et action sociale</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td><em>Assemblée nationale</em> (National Assembly)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANEQ</td>
<td><em>Association nationale des étudiants du Québec</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACSW</td>
<td><em>Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td><em>Comité d'action politique</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td><em>Comité de condition féminine</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td><em>Centre des femmes</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CED</td>
<td><em>Cercles d'économie domestique</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEGEP</td>
<td><em>Collège d'éducation générale et professionnelle</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| CEQ | *Corporation des enseignants du Québec*  
      *Centrale de l'enseignement du Québec* (formerly CIC) |
<p>| CFWU | <em>Canadian Federation of University Women</em> |
| CIC | <em>Corporation des instituteurs et institutrices catholiques de la province de Québec</em> |
| CL | <em>Comité de lutte pour l'avortement et la contraception libres et gratuits</em> |
| CLG | <em>Comité Laure-Gaudreau</em> |
| CLSC | <em>Clinique locale de santé communautaire</em> |
| CLC | <em>Canadian Labour Congress</em> |
| CNALG | <em>Coordination nationale pour l'avortement libre et gratuit</em> |
| CPQ | <em>Conseil du patronat du Québec</em> |
| CRCC | <em>Commission de révision du Code civil</em> |
| CSF | <em>Conseil du statut de la femme</em> |
| CSFB | <em>Bulletin du Conseil du statut de la femme</em> |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSN</td>
<td>Confédération des Syndicats nationaux</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTCC</td>
<td>Confédération des travailleurs catholiques du Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSD</td>
<td>Confédération des syndicats démocratiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUPE/SCFP</td>
<td>Canadian Union of Public Employees/Syndicat canadien de la fonction publique (FTQ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAN</td>
<td>Débats de l'Assemblée nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLDR</td>
<td>Des luttes et des rires de femmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC</td>
<td>Front commun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFQ</td>
<td>Fédération des femmes du Québec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFQB</td>
<td>Bulletin de la Fédération des femmes du Québec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFLQ</td>
<td>Fédération des femmes libérales du Québec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLF</td>
<td>Front de libération des femmes du Québec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLP</td>
<td>Front de libération politique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLQ</td>
<td>Front de libération du Québec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FNEQ</td>
<td>Fédération nationale des enseignants du Québec (CSN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>Femmes rurales, (bulletin of UCFR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAP</td>
<td>Front d'action politique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTQ</td>
<td>Fédération des travailleurs du Québec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMR</td>
<td>Groupe marxiste révolutionnaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWD</td>
<td>International Women's Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWY</td>
<td>International Women's Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOCF</td>
<td>Jeunesse catholique ouvrière féminine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIP</td>
<td>Local Initiatives Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNA</td>
<td>Member of the National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLP</td>
<td>Mouvement de libération populaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MREQ</td>
<td>Mouvement révolutionnaire des étudiants du Québec (became Ligue communiste du Canada (marxist-leninist))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSA</td>
<td>Mouvement souveraineté-association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>National Action Committee on the Status of Women/Comité national d'action sur la condition féminine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOW</td>
<td>National Organization for Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>New Democratic Party/Parti nouveau démocratique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORCC</td>
<td>Office de révision du Code civil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PE</td>
<td>Pluri-elles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLQ</td>
<td>Parti libéral du Québec/Fédération libérale du Québec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Parti-Pris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PQ</td>
<td>Parti québécois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QD</td>
<td>Québécoises Deboutte!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAIF</td>
<td>Réseau d'action et d'information pour les femmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCSWC</td>
<td>Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada (Bird Commission)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFQ</td>
<td>Regroupement des femmes québécoises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIN</td>
<td>Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance nationale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RN</td>
<td>Ralliement national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFDU</td>
<td>Société des femmes diplômées de l'Université</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFPQ</td>
<td>Syndicat des fonctionnaires de la Province de Québec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFU</td>
<td>Société des femmes universitaires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSJB</td>
<td>Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td>Théâtre de cuisine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TP</td>
<td>Les Têtes de Ploche</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCFR</td>
<td>Union catholique des femmes rurales (formerly Union catholique des fermières)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGEQ</td>
<td>Union générale des étudiants du Québec</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UN  Union nationale
VOW  Voice of Women (Voix des femmes)
YWCA  Young Women's Christian Association
Appendix B: Interviews with key informants.

In the following list, individuals are identified by language spoken and affiliations.

Interview A: francophone, member of the FFQ founding committee, later of PQ and RFQ.

Interview B: francophone, member of Morgentaler defense committees, C L.

Interview C: immigrant, francophone, member of 1972 teach-in organizing committee, C L, 1975 IWD union/movement teach-in organizing committee.

Interview D: francophone, member AFEAS central committee.

Interview E: francophone, staff member, AFEAS.

Interview F: francophone, member FNEQ CCF and PQ.

Interview G: francophone, member Morgentaler defense committee, C L and CNALG.

Interview H: anglophone, immigrant, March 8 committee.

Interview I: francophone, member m-i group.

Interview J: anglophone, staff member New Women’s Centre.

Interview K: bilingual anglophone, member FLF, editorial collective of McGill Birth Control Handbook, Health Press collective), FNEQ.

Interview L: bilingual anglophone, member UQAM women’s group (1975-77), founding committee Pluri-elles, staff member of a battered women’s shelter.

Interview M: member FLF.
Interview N: francophone, contributor DLDR.

Interview O: francophone, member FTQ, staff member CSF outreach service.

Interview P: francophone, left-wing activist, member CSN.

Interview Q: francophone, founding member FFQ, member CSN Bureau national.

Interview R: francophone, member autonomous feminist group.

Interview S: francophone, member FTQ.

Interview T: francophone, teacher, member of CEQ.

Interview U: bilingual anglophone, staff member of New Women's Centre, consultant on women's issues PQ government.

Interview V: bilingual anglophone, member gay rights groups.

Interview W: anglophone, American immigrant, McGill student, member abortion service, Trotskyist organization.

Conversational Interviews (selected).

Interview CA: member AFEAS.

Interview CB: member Filles d'Isabelle.

Interview CC: member, women's centre, outside of Montreal.

Interview CD: staff member, FTQ.

Interview CE: staff member, CSN.

Interview DF: staff member, CEQ.

Interview CG: activist, GMR, CSN.

Interview CH: anglophone journalist.

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Interview CI: staff member, FFQ.

Interview CJ: member Fermières.
Appendix C: Canadian Abortion Law.

Canada, Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970,
c. C-34, s. 251, ss. (1)--(5).

s. 251(1) Everyone who, with the intent to procure the miscarriage of a female person, whether or not she is pregnant, uses any means for the purpose of carrying out his intention is guilty of an indictable offense and is liable to punishment for life.

(2) Every female person, who being pregnant, with intent to procure her own miscarriage, uses any means or permits any means to be used for the purpose of carrying out her intention is guilty of an indictable offense and is liable to imprisonment for two years.

(3) In this section, "means" includes
(a) the administration of a drug or other noxious thing,
(b) the use of any instrument,
(c) manipulation of any kind.

(4) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to
(a) a qualified medical practitioner, other than a member of a therapeutic abortion committee for any hospital, who in good faith uses in an accredited or approved hospital any means for the purpose of carrying out his intention to procure the miscarriage of a female person, or
(b) a female person who, being pregnant, permits a qualified medical practitioner to use in an accredited or approved hospital facility described in paragraph (a) for the purpose of carrying out her intention to procure her own miscarriage, if, before those means, the therapeutic abortion committee for that hospital, by a majority of the members of the committee and at a meeting of the committee at which the case of such female person has been reviewed,
(c) has by certificate in writing stated that in its opinion the continuation of the pregnancy of such female person would or would be likely to endanger her life or health, and
(d) has caused a copy of such certificate to be given to the qualified medical practitioner.

(5) The Minister of Health of a province may by order
(a) require a therapeutic abortion committee for any hospital in that province, or any member thereof, to furnish for him a copy of any certificate described in paragraph (4)(c) issued by that committee, together with any other such information relating to the circumstances surrounding the
issues of that certificate as he may require, or
(b) require a medical practitioner who, in that
province, has procured the miscarriage of any female person
named in a certificate ... to furnish him with a copy of that
certificate, together with any such information relating to the
procuring of the miscarriage that he may require.
Appendix D:

Provincial and major Montreal based women's groups.

1959  *Ligue des femmes*/League of Women

1964  *Fédération des femmes du Québec*

1966  AFEAS

1969  Montreal Women's Liberation Movement
      *Front commun pour la libération des femmes du Québec*
      *Front de libération des femmes du Québec*
      abortion reference and counselling service

1972  *Centre des femmes*
      *Centre d'information et de référence pour les femmes*

1973  RAIF
      Comité Laure-Gaudreault/CEQ
      CCF-FTQ

1974  *Comité de lutte pour l'avortement et la contraception libres et gratuits*
      Théâtre de cuisines
      Centre de documentation féministe
      Centre de santé des femmes du quartier plateau Mont-Royal
      Comité inter-centrales de la Condition féminine

1975  New Women's Centre/ *Centre de la femme nouvelle*
      Centre d'aide aux victimes du viol
      *Editions de la pleine lune*
      CCF-CSN

1976  *Editions du Remue-ménage*
      *Les Têtes de Ploche*
      *La librairie des femmes d'ici*
      Coop femmes
      Action travail des femmes
      *Au bas de l'échelle*

1977  *Pluri-elles*
      Centre refuge, Assistance aux femmes, Auberge transition
      (battered women's shelters)
      *Maison des femmes de Montréal*

1978  *Coordination pour l'avortement libre et gratuit*
      *Femmes solidares* (parental leave)
      Comité femmes de Tanguay
Comité pour la libération de Dalia Z Maschino
Regroupement des maisons d'hébergement pour femmes en difficulté
Coalition des femmes de Montréal contre la violence faite aux femmes
Front commun contre les violences faites aux femmes
Regroupement des femmes québécoises

1979 Le mouvement contre le viol
Regroupement des féministes socialistes
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