THE IDEAL OF IMPERIAL CITIZENSHIP

1895-1919

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Abstract

As all early twentieth century British schoolchildren knew, Great Britain presided over an Empire upon which the sun never set. Yet the Empire itself was not a unified state, the solid red on imperial maps belying the dizzying array of political identities which existed under the Union Jack. Some Britons believed this diversity spoke to the legitimacy of the nation's imperial rule, and saw Empire as a vehicle of peace and progress. Others feared the loss of an Anglo-European cultural identity, and sought to reassess British values at the expense of indigenous local identities. Adherents of each view saw in the idea and institution of citizenship the means through which to pursue their goals.

This dissertation examines efforts amongst British conservatives in the early twentieth century to develop a concept of imperial citizenship which would both unite the Crown's multitudinous subjects and cement Britain's political power on the world stage. Through a discussion of the ideas and careers of five select imperialists - Lionel Curtis, John Buchan, Richard Jebb, Arnold White, and Thomas Sedgwick - it is demonstrated that ideas of imperial citizenship were contested between conservatives who developed a gradually inclusive view of Empire and those who held to a more inclusive, Anglo-centric understanding of Empire. Specific attention is given to the issue of intra-imperial immigration as an arena where the debate concerning imperial citizenship was starkly and decisively apparent. The difficulties encountered by British conservatives in articulating a cohesive concept of imperial citizenship, the dissertation concludes, resulted from two main factors: their failure to effectively incorporate colonial nationalism into their prescriptions, and their inability to create practical means by which a truly pan-imperial citizenship could flourish.
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While popular opinion may assert that writing is a solitary pursuit, anyone who has actually done a good deal of it knows better. Many people were generous with their time, expertise, and company as this project came to fruition. Richard Rempel was an exemplary supervisor, providing ideas, criticism, direction, patience, and an appreciation that history and sports are two of the finer pursuits in life. David Barrett read the manuscript twice with exceptional care and has made me a much better writer. Stephen Heathorn also read multiple drafts and helped me make sense of my ideas. John Sainsbury provided help at both ends of the process. Librarians and archivists at the Public Record Office in Kew, the National Archives of Canada, the National Maritime Museum at Greenwich, the Bodleian Library, the Royal Commonwealth Society Library at Cambridge University, the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at the University of London, Queen’s University, and McMaster University were each helpful in their own way. George Henderson made my time at Queen’s especially enjoyable. My colleagues on the 4th floor also provided much support, some of it even to do with history. David Leeson, Rhonda Hinther, Greg Stott, Ken Macmillan, and many others breathed life into the austere halls of CNH. My parents were supportive of my career path from the beginning, and helped in innumerable ways. Finally, I could not have done this without Jo, who helped me through each stage of the process, even when she didn’t know it, by simply being her.
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Abbreviations Used in the Text

CAB    Cabinet Office
CO     Colonial Office
DORA   Defence of the Realm Act
EIO    Emigrants' Information Office
FO     Foreign Office
HO     Home Office
JICH   Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History
JRSA   Journal of the Royal Society of Arts
LCC    London County Council
LRCS   Library of the Royal Commonwealth Society
MHTD   Memory Hold The Door
MSS    Manuscript Series
NAC    National Archives of Canada
NMM    National Maritime Museum
OHBE   Oxford History of the British Empire
PMG    Pall Mall Gazette
PRCI   Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute
PRO    Public Record Office, Kew
QUA    Queen's University Archives, Kingston
RCI    Royal Colonial Institute
RG     Record Group

* Explanations for the abbreviated forms of archival records can be found in the first reference in each chapter.
Chapter I

Introduction:
The Conservative Case for Imperial Citizenship, 1895-1919

So the tribune came and said to him, ‘Tell me, are you a Roman citizen?’
And he said, ‘Yes.’ The tribune answered, ‘I bought this citizenship for a large sum.’
Paul said, ‘But I was born a citizen.’ So those who were about to examine him withdrew
from him instantly; and the tribune also was afraid, for he realized that Paul was a Roman
citizen and that he had bound him.
(Acts 22: 27-29)

The British Empire was a conservative endeavour. The Empire certainly had its Liberal
Imperialists, but as their historian has illustrated, they represented the conservative wing of the
Liberal party, and were rarely distinguishable from the Tory Unionists on matters of Empire.1
The Empire, and specifically the Empire of the late-Victorians and the Edwardians, represented a
conservative idea because it took as its central purpose the promotion and preservation of unity,
in all its forms and manifestations. The Empire had been built upon liberal ideas,2 and such ideas
had themselves become ingrained as “tradition” by the late nineteenth century. By the 1870’s,
Benjamin Disraeli had established imperial idealism and institutions as the preserve of the
Conservative party. The desire to preserve, to maintain, to solidify, and to perpetuate - these
were the stated goals of imperial actors of the late-Victorian and Edwardian period, and it is
precisely through an understanding of these impulses that the historian can come to grasp the
“imperial mind,” that particular set of individuals, assumptions, perceptions, prejudices, and


2 Components of this liberal framework include the abolition of slavery in 1833, the
grant of responsible government to Canada and the Australasian settlement colonies, and the
broad-based reforms of the English utilitarians in India (work which changed dramatically in
tenor after the Mutiny in 1857).
hopes which influenced the geopolitical shape of Empire.

Such an understanding is not focussed upon a study of the "official mind," that amorphous body of decision-makers which some historians have identified as being responsible for the shape and thrust of British imperialism in the long nineteenth century, especially in the era of the "new imperialism."3 Neither, though, is the present project one in the model of the Annales school, an attempt to capture in its totality the imperial "ethos" or "mentalité." The British Empire still awaits its Braudel, and given the immensity of the Empire, both physically and metaphysically, such a project may be, if not impossible, highly improbable. The Empire defies a "definitive" explanation, a truth demonstrated by the fact that so many "definitive" or general explanations have been offered from so many separate and mutually exclusive perspectives.4

What the present project will essay is an exegesis of one distinct strand of the imperial thought web - the idea of imperial citizenship in the late-Victorian and Edwardian period. The institution of citizenship, which was of course at the base of any discussion of imperial unity or cooperation, deserves closer scrutiny. The notion of imperial citizenship can provide historians with a partial map of the imperial mind of the pre-Great War period, offering insight into the political development of empire, as well as the vast discrepancies in the benefits and status of

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3 The conceptual notion of the "long nineteenth century" covers the period from 1789 (or 1793, depending on the predilection of the historian) to 1914 and the beginning of the Great War. The case for the "official mind" of Empire and the geopolitical impulses which gave it shape is set out most famously in Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians (London: 1961).

4 The historiography of "theories of imperialism" is immense in scope. For a more detailed essay on this topic, see Appendix I.
different classes of "citizens."

The purpose of this work is to examine the concept and development of ideals of a common imperial citizenship as derived and propagated by British conservatives between 1895 and 1919. Debates over imperial citizenship took place within the relatively small circle of Britons drawn from the educated and aristocratic elites who constituted what Stefan Collini has termed the "upper ten thousand." Many of these men, and most were men, were Oxbridge educated. As such, a small number of interconnected, and often interrelated, individuals wielded an inordinate degree of influence in both the political and intellectual world of late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain. These same individuals were in turn selected for key imperial positions abroad, and as such constituted a nexus of imperial influence binding the Empire to the metropole. Furthermore, it was mainly in conservative circles that issues of Empire and imperial citizenship resonated most strongly. Voices on the British Left concentrated on domestic issues; conservatives exhibited more concern over issues of "national interest" and "international prestige," and thus turned their gaze to Empire.

*The Varied Strains of Conservative Imperial Citizenship: An Explanation of the Subjects of Study and of Methodology*

Who were these "British conservative imperialists" advancing arguments of imperial citizenship? The British Right was never a collective body, united in pedigree and pronouncement. Indeed, the late-Victorian and Edwardian period bore witness to great cleavages

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5 David Cannadine portrays much of the intellectual and material form of this nexus in *Ornamentalism* (Oxford: 2001).
in the conservative camp. The tariff controversy split the party itself into contrary factions, a dispute which ultimately cost Arthur Balfour the party leadership in 1911. In terms of political philosophy, British conservatives since the Reform Act of 1867 had been caught between the Scylla of electoral reform and its attendant intensification of “mass” politics, and the Charybdis of maintaining their political base within “the upper ten thousand.” Their response, predictably, was to defend the status quo, a position pursued with great success by that most practical of Prime Ministers, Lord Salisbury: “[t]he perils of change are so great, the promise of the most hopeful theories is so often deceptive, that is it frequently the wiser part to uphold the existing state of things, if it can be done, even though, in point of argument, it should be utterly indefensible.” The “existing state of things” in terms of Empire was fortuitously favourable for conservatives for much of the pre-1920 generation. The Empire was at its apex, despite the claims of historians such as Max Beloff that it contained the seeds of its own imminent

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7 Biographical information for each individual mentioned by name in the text can be found in Appendix II: A Glossary of Names Referred to in the Text. Historians and historical figures who were deceased by the late-Victorian period are not included.


9 This is not to say that the Conservatives faced no imperial challenges. See for instance the 1913 Imperial Preference Crisis or the 1909-10 debate with the Dominions regarding the creation of an imperial navy. Nevertheless, such events did not prove immediately compromising to the unity of the Empire.
destruction. Historians have mistaken the triumphalism thus expressed by voices from the Right for unanimity. Opponents of Empire were few and far between in the late-Victorian and Edwardian era\(^{11}\), and in the main offered only qualified denunciations.\(^{12}\) However, the differences apparent in domestic conservative politics were also apparent tactically and ideologically in reference to Empire. Most significant for a study of imperial citizenship is the split between those advocating a parochial, nationalist imperial citizenship and those supporting a nascent, cosmopolitan imperial citizenship. This split is evident in the writings of innumerable conservative imperialists of the era.

E. H. H. Green has described the orthodox view of the Conservative party as, "if not the 'stupid party' then an institution lacking a deep interest in ideas."\(^{13}\) In contrast to the Edwardian Left, Wellspring of both British Socialism and the New Liberalism, the Tories have been identified with no emerging, or indeed coherent, ideas at all. Green disputes this notion by reference to conservatives' study of political economy, where he argues the Tory party was


\(^{11}\) Imperialism, indeed, was advanced also by voices on the British Left and Centre. See for instance *Fabianism and the Empire: A Manifesto by the Fabian Society* (London: 1900) and the Liberal Imperialist Manifesto.

\(^{12}\) Criticism of Empire in the pre-1920 era was, on the whole, reminiscent of the "Little Englandism" of Richard Cobden and the Manchester School, rather than a denunciation of Empire in and of itself. J. A. Hobson and E. D. Morel, for instance, criticized the economic exploitation they believed imperialism made possible; the pro-Boers opposed war (or perhaps more accurately, its excesses, in South Africa); and the Independent Labour Party (ILP) position on Empire was framed in pacifist, anti-militarist language. See Bernard Porter, *Critics of Empire* (London: 1968) and, more recently, Stephen Howe, *Anti-Colonialism in British Politics* (Oxford: 1993).

profitably engaged.\textsuperscript{14} Imperialism itself is a second area where conservatives were intellectually active.\textsuperscript{15} However, because many of their ideas concerning Empire proved ultimately unsuccessful, at least in their original form, conservative imperialism has usually been portrayed as reactionary, the dying embers of Victorian expansionism. Salisbury, Balfour, and Bonar Law, Unionist leaders from 1895-1923, were each practitioners of realpolitik, carefully balancing the concerns of policy, party unity, and the polls in search of political equilibrium. Beneath this search for stability was a concern for Empire as both political position and as idea. The two dominant conservative political ideas during this era, Tariff Reform and Home Rule, were not solely national issues. Domestic debates over “the Big Loaf” and Ulster were also debates about Empire, and it was the issue of Empire which the Unionists made their own, for better and worse, in the Edwardian era.\textsuperscript{16}

Three ideas characterized conservative imperialism in the Edwardian era. Most significant was the effort to combat a perceived national decline.\textsuperscript{17} Salisbury’s government\textsuperscript{18}

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\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., esp. 176-183.

\textsuperscript{15} Andrew S. Thompson, Imperial Britain: The Empire in British Politics, c. 1880-1932 (Harlow, Essex: 2000) details the salience of imperialism in extra-parliamentary politics.

\textsuperscript{16} See Hugh Cunningham, “The Language of Patriotism, 1750-1914,” History Workshop Journal, 12, 1981, pp. 8-33. Paul Reading argues that the Liberals also had purchase on imperial patriotism during the Edwardian era. While he does demonstrate that the Liberal party had a national consciousness and a national platform, this does not \textit{ex ante} make it “patriotic” - that is, the Liberals did not make “love of country” an electoral issue. Such a position would have antagonized the Liberals’ Irish Nationalist allies and, as indeed happened after 1910, compromise the Liberals’ majority in the House. Reading, “The Liberal Party and Patriotism in Early Twentieth Century Britain,” 20\textsuperscript{th} Century British History, 12, 3, 2001, pp. 269-302. On patriotism and the British Left, see Paul Ward, Red Flag and Union Jack: Englishness, Patriotism and the British Left, 1881-1924 (London: 1998).

feared national isolation, and looked to Empire as the means of maintaining Britain’s status as a
Great Power in the face of growing economic and political competition from Germany, the
United States, France, and Russia. The Boer War (1899-1902) was the most significant imperial
event of the period. Britain’s pyrrhic victory over Paul Kruger’s Boers had two important
consequences. One was to tarnish Alfred, Lord Milner as an illiberal expansionist, charges
which played a role in the Unionists’ disastrous defeat in the election of 1906. The other was to
initiate the “age of efficiency.” “National efficiency” 19 became a byword for reform - reform of
the army, of the navy, of public health, of education, and of imperial organization itself. It is in
the field of imperial organization where Curtis, Buchan, and Jebb made their contributions. Even
Tariff Reform, which split the party in the wake of Chamberlain’s inaugural speech in favour of
protection on 15 May, 1903, in Birmingham, can be seen as part of the broader “national
efficiency” debate.

Closely linked to the movement for imperial reform was the growing ceremonial
importance of Empire, the process of publicly casting the national identity in imperial hues. 20

18 The best work on Salisbury is the recent magisterial biography by Andrew Roberts,

19 The phrase was born with Lord Rosebery’s Chesterfield speech of 15 December 1901,
marking Rosebery’s definitive split with Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, then leader of the
Liberal party. On “national efficiency,” see G. R. Searle, The Quest for “National Efficiency”: A

20 Of the many works on Empire, national identity, and politics, see F. Coetze, For
Party or Country. Nationalism and the Dilemmas of Popular Conservatism in Edwardian
Queen Victoria's 1897 Diamond Jubilee, the imperial durbarsof Edward VII (1903) and George V (1911), both in Delhi, and the introduction in 1904 of an annual Empire Day all speak to the public nature of Empire.\textsuperscript{21} Conservatives were particularly emphatic in supporting these public celebrations of the imperium as means of generating and maintaining feelings of imperial unity.

Finally, conservatives also embarked upon a minor constitutional revolution in these years. Joseph Chamberlain indicated the growing political importance of Empire by choosing the Colonial Office in Salisbury's 1895 Cabinet\textsuperscript{22}, and the party interpreted its victory in the "Khaki election" of 1900 as a mandate for imperial change.\textsuperscript{23} The Colonial and Imperial Conferences, the 1907 decision to formally describe the self-governing colonies as "Dominions,"\textsuperscript{24} and the Union of South Africa Act and the Morley-Minto Reforms (both in 1909) each reflected conservative influences within Asquith's Liberal government.\textsuperscript{25} The conservative-dominated National government under Lloyd George created the Imperial War Cabinet in 1917 and passed the Government of India Act (1919). Each of these measures were

\textsuperscript{21} On the public celebration of Empire in this era, see the essays in \textit{The Invention of Tradition}, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds. (Oxford: 1983).

\textsuperscript{22} Peter Marsh, \textit{Joseph Chamberlain: Entrepreneur in Politics} (London and New Haven: 1994) is the best recent work on the Colonial Secretary.

\textsuperscript{23} While the 1900 election was fought on the issue of Empire, it is important to note that the Tories and Liberal Unionists actually won four fewer seats in 1900 (399) than they had in 1895 (403). See Elizabeth York Enstam, "The 'Khaki' Election of 1900 in the United Kingdom" Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University, 1967, pp. iii.

\textsuperscript{24} The term "dominion" was the legal term for any British territory. "Dominion" refers to the white settlement colonies' official designation after 1907.

\textsuperscript{25} Though the Liberals were in power from 1906 until 1916, many of the imperial initiatives realized during this period, such as South African Union, had been spearheaded by conservatives.
important constitutional markers in the evolution of a more decentralized Empire.²⁶

Domestic and imperial concerns and ideas were thus fused in the conservative mind in a manner which was less pronounced in the Liberal and nascent Labour camps. Out of this environment emerged a generation of men who became conservatives, rather than liberals or socialists, because they believed in organic stability, collective rather than individual action, the importance of imperial tradition, and the intellectual fallibility of man. In other words, they were sceptical of man's ability to govern himself through moral and rational self-awareness and self-improvement, and sought instead collective solutions to governance, both public and private. In Empire, they found an institution perfectly suited to these tasks. Empire also represented power in the early twentieth century, and thus conservatives supported it as a means of getting things done, of effecting change.

**Approach to the Problem**

 Intellectual history, like free jazz, is open to improvisation. If not performed capably, both can result in confusing noise rather than felicitous music. Thus, an articulated and sensible methodology is of paramount importance. The methodological framework of this work is prosopographical, a collective intellectual biography. Rather than presenting the conservative

²⁶ Lionel Curtis contributed directly to this process with the 1916 publication of *The Commonwealth of Nations*, where he outlined the principle of a Commonwealth which later imperial thinkers were to take up.
debate concerning imperial citizenship *in toto*, or examining imperial "pressure groups," is presented is a collection of individual intellectual portraits. These portraits should be envisioned as beads on a thread, part of a linked public discussion on imperial governance and the identity of the imperial citizen. Rather than treating ideas in a teleological manner - viewing Adam Smith as the founder of "the market" or August Comte in terms of the creation of sociology - this study will approach them in their historical context. This methodology follows the pattern of intellectual history advanced by historians such as Stefan Collini and John Burrow, who have positioned intellectual history as the historical recovery of "the thought of the past in its complexity." 

Individuals, not amorphous "social forces," it is argued here, are thus the kinetic elements of history. Intellectual biography provides an ideal method by which to measure and to reconstruct such thought and context. What is thus of significance for the intellectual historian are the ideas which contemporaries recorded, argued, and propagated. What is not of importance are the quotidian details of individual's lives, neither their private relationships nor their personalities, excepting when these impinged upon their thoughts and ideas. For these reasons, the intellectual historian must tread warily in attributing hidden or unconscious motives to his or her subjects.

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27 The historiography on imperial pressure groups is extensive and instructive. Amongst many examples, see Andrew S. Thompson, *Imperial Britain. The Empire in British Politics, c. 1880-1932* (Harlow: Longman, 2000).

28 *Economy, Polity, and Society. British Intellectual History 1750-1950*, Stefan Collini, Richard Whatmore, and Brian Young, eds. (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), pp. 2, 3. Intellectual history as practised in this manner consciously navigates between a "master narrative" account of ideas and their progression through time, and a post-structuralist intellectual history, which seeks to "[illuminate] the irrationalities which shadow reason, the unconscious desires which run through habits of rational calculation, alerting us to the illusory, impossible quality of a transcendent, hypostatized reason." (Schwarz, p. 11.)
her subjects. The written record rarely betrays clear evidence of such motives. What does emerge from the study of actions is intent or purpose, which may be differentiated from motive in that actions do not incorporate psychic reasoning. Thus, historians must interrogate their subjects, but should not, as has become fashionable amongst writers of “creative non-fiction,” “imagine their way into their subject’s experiences.”

This project provides intellectual portraits of five individuals, each a commentator upon or courtier of Empire. The ideas presented by the first three provide a capsule survey of conservative debate concerning imperial citizenship. Lionel Curtis propagated a federalist philosophy of Empire as one that promised the best guide to world peace. John Buchan put forth the case for an emerging moral cosmopolitanism. Richard Jebb’s work offers a particularly apposite example of an attempt to put the hybrid model of imperial citizenship into practice on an institutional level. The policies that he advocated regarding imperial naturalization and immigration are trenchant examples of the attempt to conceptualize imperial citizenship. In contrast, the ideas of Arnold White illustrate a parochial, nationalist view of Empire and citizenship. If Curtis, Buchan, Jebb, and, to a lesser extent, White, provide a partial portrait of the conservative imperialist as political theorist, Thomas Sedgwick was a member of the broader

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conservative constituency which sought to implement such theories in the public realm. His imperial emigration schemes will be examined as a demonstration of British conservatives’ ultimate failure to give the ideal of imperial citizenship a practical form.

The following collective intellectual biography thus presents the core arguments of the debate concerning imperial citizenship. There are a number of related issues of importance which cannot here be addressed. Specifically, the role played in the definition of imperial citizenship by gender dynamics, the perennial problem of Ireland, education, and psephology will be accorded little attention. There are also geopolitical limitations, though these reflect the concerns of contemporaries themselves. While bearing in mind the importance to Empire of the dependencies, especially India, the historical focus of the present argument is


32 See John Kendle, Ireland and the Federal Solution: The Debate over the United Kingdom Constitution, 1870-1922 (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press). The position of the present study is that Ireland should be studied as an extension of domestic political history, rather than as a component of imperial history.


34 The literature on the expansion of the franchise in Britain, and its impact upon imperial affairs, is voluminous. Richard Price argues in An Imperial War and the British Working Class (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972) that the masses were not overcome by jingoistic fervour, remaining largely uninterested in matters of Empire.

35 See Curzon’s famous indictment of Chamberlain’s imperial tariff scheme: “[w]hat would have become of him [Chamberlain] and us if he had ever visited India . . . The Colonies would have been dwarfed and forgotten, and the pivot of the Empire would have been Calcutta.” See Enoch Powell, “The Myth of Empire,” The Round Table, 60, 1970, p. 440.
Great Britain and its relationship with the white settlement colonies, known after 1907 as "the Dominions." Contemporary imperialists devoted most of their attention and energies to relations with the dominions. This devotion reflected the sense of community built through emigration, the shared experience of the Boer War, and economic investment. Though interest in the dependencies was of course not absent - Curtis and Jebb, for instance, spent considerable time on the future position of India within the Empire - Britons by and large did not feel for them the sense of shared identity they found with the dominions.

One further addendum is necessary. What of the allegedly racist nature of the British Empire, of which Benedict Anderson tells us that "no one in their right mind would deny."\textsuperscript{36} The issue of race will be dealt with throughout each chapter, as it manifested itself differently in the respective voices here studied. Race, however, is not taken in the present argument to be the defining notion of the Empire. Britons of this era used the term "race" in so many different ways as to render it useless as a categorical term. The Empire was without doubt constructed along "racial" lines, for there are countless displays of discrimination - notably, as examples, the prejudice evidenced by white settlers toward the Maori in New Zealand, Asians in Australia, and indigenous peoples in South Africa. Most Britons understood race as normative, as something permanent and unchangeable, and thus the term tells us little about why the Empire took the form it did and not another.\textsuperscript{37} While the influence of "racialist" thought must be consistently


\textsuperscript{37} Here imperial racial attitudes conform to the first two, but not the third, of Peter Firchow's three-tiered model of racial discrimination: (1) \textit{weak racism} - belief that races/ethnicities do exist and help cause social events/phenomenon; (2) \textit{medium racism} - adds the idea that some races are superior, others not; and (3) \textit{strong racism} - asserts that action should be taken on account of such superiority. See Firchow, \textit{Envisioning Africa: Racism and Imperialism}
examined, it is not satisfactory as an explanatory construct. After all, Britons of all political persuasions viewed the world through the prism of race in the late-Victorian period. The Victorian Charles Lamb explained the British view of “race” in a clear, if characteristically idiosyncratic, manner: “[t]he human species, according to the best theory I can form of it, is composed of two distinct race, the men who borrow, and the men who lend.”\(^{38}\) The liberal humanist Gilbert Murray, meanwhile, believed that,

there is in the world a hierarchy of races. The bounds of it are not, of course, absolute and rigid, but on the whole, it seems that those nations which eat more, claim more, and get higher wages, will direct and rule the others, and the lower work will . . . be done by the lower breeds of man.\(^{39}\)

*The Nature of the Field*

Imperial historians have not in the main concerned themselves with the study of citizenship. Several factors account for this lacuna; foremost is the fact that no individual has ever legally been a “citizen” of the Empire. Citizenship, after all, is technically a republican notion. In British law the unifying legal structure is the crown. All individuals living under the crown are subject to its sovereignty, and thus “subjects” rather than “citizens.” Historians’ attention has consequently been drawn to the construction of the sovereign state, and the


dissemination of this political model throughout the Empire.\textsuperscript{40}

Second, concerning the study of the citizen as individual, historians have been more interested in issues of race and class than in citizenship. The historiography, both post-colonial\textsuperscript{41} and otherwise\textsuperscript{42}, has thus stressed issues of discrimination, subjugation, and prejudice. These issues are of undoubted significance in understanding how the Empire functioned, particularly in the eyes of its subject people, but they tell us little of how British contemporaries perceived of their Empire. They are also all too often motivated by contemporary political concerns, such as the promotion of minority rights, rather than rigorous historical curiosity. When such a line is

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{40}] The Whig approach has been well served by Nicholas Mansergh. See above, n4.
\item[\textsuperscript{41}] If postcolonial work has any unifying principle, it is that, as in war, the first casualty of imperialism is “the truth”: “[c]onquest entailed not only mastery of peoples and ecologies, but also the conquest of truth itself.” To overcome the privileged version of the truth offered by the colonizer, postcolonialism seeks to provide a hermeneutic procedure aimed at dislodging and exposing the master narratives of race/class/gender which dominated European thought, and which underpinned imperialism. See Bill Schwarz, “Conquerors of Truth: Reflections on Postcolonial Theory,” *The Expansion of England: Race, Ethnicity and Cultural History*, Schwarz ed. (New York: Routledge, 1996), pp. 9-31. The main shortcoming of such work is that it conceives of the imperial power, and imperialism itself, as a *deus ex machina*, obscuring any nuanced understanding of dynamics at the metropole and conflating individuals and time periods that were varied and often contradictory. See, for varying perspectives on this approach, Said, *Orientalism* (though Said has subsequently retreated somewhat; see Said, “*Orientalism Reconsidered,*” *Race and Class*, 27, 2, 1985, pp. 1-15); *Colonial Discourse, Postcolonial Theory*, Francis Baker et al, eds. (Manchester: 1994); Antoinette Burton, *Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865-1915* (Chapel Hill, NC: 1994); and Mrinalini Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity: The “Manly” Englishman and the “Effeminate” Bengali in the Late Nineteenth Century* (Manchester: MUP, 1995).
\end{itemize}
crossed, polemic increases and historical argument suffers.\textsuperscript{43} The argument put forth here is that the intent of the actor should be given equal historical weight alongside the perception of those “acted upon.” This is not to condone or apologize for Empire, but to seek to understand and explain imperial ideas and policies in their specific eras. The historian is on dangerous ground engaging in value judgements, if for no other reason than the issues are perforce no longer directly relevant in and of themselves. Thus, it is essential to study not just the consequences of Empire. Attention must also be directed to Empire’s impetus, its core ideologies, which are not necessarily always to be divined in its consequences.

Third, and conversely, when historians have turned their gaze to domestic citizenship, it has largely been with the aim of explaining the integration, or lack thereof, of immigrants into British society, and of chronicling the general progression in British political life from an environment of privilege and deference to one of relative egalitarianism.\textsuperscript{44} Work in this field is


concentrated on the late and post-imperial era, when immigration from the Empire became a political issue in Britain.

Each of the three preceding historical themes - the status of Britons as “subjects” rather than “citizens,” issues of racial and class inequality, and domestic attitudes to immigration - is of importance in understanding the evolution of citizenship in British political culture. Yet each perpetuates a conceptual gap between the imperial metropole and the imperial periphery that has plagued imperial studies from their foundation as a sub-discipline in the early years of the twentieth century. 45 By defining “Britain” and “the Empire” in isolation, historians have implicitly suggested that the two entities were mutually exclusive. Such an approach obfuscates the interdependency of the relationship between Britain and her Empire. The roots of this division stretch back to the beginnings of decolonization itself.

In the main, two contrasting arguments have characterized imperial historiography since the retreat of the British Empire in the years after 1945. One view holds that the nature and development of Empire were shaped by events in Great Britain, the imperial metropole. Notions of British racial and cultural hegemony, the capitalist concerns of the City, and the dictates of Great Power diplomacy are here given explanatory weight. 46 In contrast, proponents of the


periphery argument hold that it was events in the extra-European world, not the home country, which largely propelled imperial activity. First given shape by Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher 47, and later developed by David Fieldhouse 48 and others, the periphery argument sees Empire as having evolved, if not quite in a fit of absence of mind, then certainly without a single guiding influence. Analogous to this debate over the development of Empire were national histories of the dominions, which read imperial events within the frame of the birth of a nation, and consequently underemphasize imperial connections. This theme is particularly notable in Canadian history. Even those national works which have treated the imperial theme seriously, notably Carl Berger’s Sense of Power 49, have usually cast colonial imperialism as a manifestation of English nationalism. More recent contributions to the field of Britain-dominion relations, including those whose subject is Canada 50, have extended empirical knowledge of the field, but have remained faithful to the idea of nationalism as the most significant theme governing dominion-Britain relations.

The present study is intended as a contribution to this discussion, adding a broader imperial perspective to these explanatory constructs. In concentrating on imperial citizenship,

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50 The best recent studies of British-Canadian relations covering the era from Confederation to the Second World War are Norman Hillmer and J. L. Granatstein, _Empire to Umpire: Canada and the World to the 1990s_ (Toronto: 1994) and R. F. Holland, _Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance, 1918-1939_ (London: 1981).
the intent is to contribute an “imperial” history, if only from the vantage point of Britain.

Citizenship, though, is a contested notion, both politically and historically, and one which is by nature contextual. Before discussing the nature of imperial citizenship in the late-Victorian and Edwardian era, then, a brief survey of historical and political models of citizenship will aid in the construction of a conceptual definition of citizenship upon which this project will be based.

A Definition of Terms and Discussion of Citizenship in Theory and in Imperial History

The roots of Western citizenship are to be found in the civilizations of ancient Greece and Rome. Students of citizenship often look to Athenian democracy as the ideal polity, a community where man’s highest function was the political, and where citizenship was a privilege that held both rights and responsibilities. In the words of Aristotle, a good citizen, “must possess the knowledge and the capacity requisite for ruling as well as for being ruled.”51 The Greek model, born of the city-state, stressed civic values and ethics, and bequeathed an exclusive and inward-looking citizenship.52 The Greek city-state model, however, was supported by a slave hinterland - citizenship thus applied to some but not to others. The Roman model, based not on the city but on the idea of a commonwealth, was outward-looking.53


52 Greek citizenship was particularly attractive to late-nineteenth century positivists, including T. H. Green’s coterie at Oxford. It advocated the creation of a “social solidarity” through the search for the good and a consequent valuation of ethical behaviour. See Frank Turner, The Greek Heritage in Victorian Britain (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 358-368.

The British Empire, as noted by commentators as varied as the civil servant C. P. Lucas and the diplomat and legal historian James Bryce\textsuperscript{54}, had a greater affinity to the Roman model. From the mid-Victorian period, the two Empires were consciously and consistently compared, epitomized by Disraeli’s 1876 initiative to name Victoria “Empress” of India, a title with no pedigree in post-Settlement Britain. The two exceptional characteristics which Britons believed their Empire shared with that of their Roman predecessors were liberty and peace. Imperium et Liberatas became a rallying cry amongst imperial voices in Britain. Liberty would be developed and maintained through the imperial endeavour because the institution valued peace over conflict by binding people together, rather than casting them apart. Central to this idea of Empire as a leavening institution was the principle of British citizenship. To be a subject of the British crown meant to share a common identity with all fellow subjects. Thus a favourite analogy of Victorian imperialists, made famous by Palmerston in the Don Pacifico affair of 1850, was of St. Paul’s invocation of Roman citizenship to protect himself from persecution by the authorities after his conversion to Christianity.\textsuperscript{55} Like the apostle, the “citizen” of Britain was perforce a free citizen

\textsuperscript{54} See C. P. Lucas, Greater Rome and Greater Britain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1912) and James Bryce, The Ancient Roman Empire and the British Empire in India; The Diffusion of Roman and English Law Throughout the World; Two Historical Studies (London: Oxford University Press, 1914). Bryce, one of the leading legal scholars of his era, also wrote copiously on citizenship. See for instance Bryce, The Hindrances to Good Citizenship (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1909).

\textsuperscript{55} Acts, 23: 25-29. In declaring the principle of Civis Romanus sum in the House as the climax of his defence of Britain’s intervention in the Don Pacifico affair, Palmerston spoke to the global currency of British citizenship. (He also earned the reprimand of Gladstone, whose command of Latin was far superior to that of the Prime Minister). Don Pacifico, a Portuguese Jew who was a British subject because he was born in Gibraltar, sought redress from the British government after his house in Athens had been sacked during an Easter riot. When the Greek government hesitated to act on the British government’s demand for restitution, Palmerston sent a British fleet to blockade the port of Athens. He then fended off Parliamentary opposition to
of the world.

Not all late-Victorian and Edwardian minds found such comparisons to the good. In *Patriotism and Empire* (1905), the liberal writer J. M. Robertson put forth the argument that it was Empire itself which corrupted, and that the true significance of the Roman Empire lay in its decline. Edward Gibbon Wakefield’s *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* also gained in popularity amongst British intellectuals at the *fin de siècle*.\(^{56}\) However, it was the sense of ecumenicalism and duty imbued in Roman imperial citizenship which remained most influential. Earlier Victorians admired the symbolism of Edward Poynter’s *Faithful unto Death* (1865), which portrayed a petrified Roman sentry at Pompeii still on guard.\(^{57}\) If an identification with the Roman model of citizenship held sway in the mid-Victorian period, the Greek model, a Platonic conception of citizenship whereby the citizen strives to attain the ideal, began to gain favour by the turn of the century, as concerns of national efficiency came to the fore.

The association of the classical and the current did not necessarily betray an ahistorical sensibility on the part of contemporaries. Ideas of citizenship had remained relatively unchanged from the classical period through to the eighteenth century. In medieval Europe, citizenship had largely been conceived of as a familial relationship between sovereign and citizen. Citizenship

\(^{56}\) See Raymond F. Betts, “The Allusion to Rome in British Imperialist Thought of the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,” *Victorian Studies*, XV, 2, December 1971, pp. 149-159.

\(^{57}\) Vance, p. 242.
in medieval England implied that the burgher and later residents of a city possessed a municipal and thus local identity. This identity was based upon the possession of property, thus establishing a link between citizenship and residency. Early modern European notions of citizenship, where they existed, were tied to the city-state. Leaders of Italian city-states and Renaissance writers such as the Frenchman Jean Bodin, in his *Six Books of the Commonwealth* (1576), held to the notion that such a relationship would provide a bulwark against internecine religious conflict. In post-1648 Europe, the Westphalian nation-state replaced the city-state as the polity of significance. Despite the subsequent century and a half era of Absolutism, the emergence of the nation-state signalled a transfer of sovereignty from God and his earthly delegates, whether cleric or crown, to, in Hobbes’ language, ‘the Commonweal’. It was the Enlightenment which ultimately sparked change. Aided by the growth of the nation-state, emerging Enlightenment notions of rational thought, materialism, individualism, and internationalism led directly to the political upheavals of the French Revolution. It was the seminal events of 1789-1793 which produced an alternative citizenship model to the classical one - a new, republican model which privileged the individual over the state and autonomous thought over “tradition” and “religion.”

The republican model has proved the framework for modern citizenship. As we will see, however, the imperial citizenship conceived of by British thinkers in the late-Victorian and Edwardian eras did not, and indeed, could not, adopt this republican model holus-bolus, but

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rather piecemeal, in the tradition of Britain’s historical reaction to the Revolution itself.\textsuperscript{60} Before progressing to the British hybrid citizenship model, though, it is necessary to provide first a picture of how historians have tracked the progress of this second, republican citizenship model since its birth, and to note its impact upon the study of British imperial citizenship.

Two works merit mention here: the abstract citizenship model of T. H. Marshall, and the socio-historical model of Charles Tilly. T. H. Marshall, the mid-twentieth century political sociologist, further developed the nineteenth century notion of dutiful citizenship by incorporating, in step with the extension of civil rights in European nations after the Second World War, the notion of individual rights. Marshall posited that post-Enlightenment British citizenship had developed in three distinct stages\textsuperscript{61}: (1) the nineteenth century model of civil citizenship, based upon civil rights fully realized in the 1832 Reform Act; (2) political citizenship, which emerged fully in the Reform Act of 1918, and was based upon political equality in theory, if not always in practice; and (3) social (or egalitarian) citizenship, wherein all citizens were assumed to enjoy certain social rights, an ideal which emerged in step with the intensification of capitalism and became possible once the Poor Law, which recognized the social rights of some (workers) but not others (paupers), was abolished through the reorganization of local government in 1928-9. Marshall’s definition of citizenship as an abstract concept stressed the developing moral basis upon which it is increasingly constructed:

\[\text{citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All}\]

\textsuperscript{60} Thus, Edmund Burke was an influential figure for conservative imperialists of the latter era.

who possess the status are equal with respect to the right and duties with which the status is endowed. There is no universal principle that determines what those rights and duties should be, but societies in which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspiration can be directed.\textsuperscript{62}

Political and social citizenship, T. H. Marshall contended, arose in tandem to replace the older, civil notion of citizenship.\textsuperscript{63} British conservative imperialists’ efforts to create an imperial citizenship existed, using Marshall’s theory, in the space between the nineteenth century civil citizenship ideal and the emerging notions of political and social citizenship. Their ideas conformed with Marshall’s argument that societies, in this case the supra-state of Empire, which lack a coherent notion of citizenship seek to create such a citizenship first as an abstract ideal, and only secondly, if at all, as a legal or political reality.\textsuperscript{64}

Charles Tilly has proffered a practical model of citizenship. Tilly’s premise is that citizenship is a relational phenomenon,

\begin{quote}
\textit{a continuing series of transactions between persons and agents of a given state in which each has enforceable rights and obligations uniquely by virtue of (1) the person’s membership in an exclusive category, the native-born plus the naturalized and (2) the agent’s relation to the state rather than any other authority the agent may enjoy.}\textsuperscript{65}
\end{quote}

Tilly’s definition of citizenship stresses the relationship between individual and state, employing

\textsuperscript{62} T. H. Marshall, p. 18.

\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 19.

\textsuperscript{64} The idea that political ideas and theories are “images,” creations of the “imagination,” has held the attention of numerous recent historians. See for instance Benedict Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities} (London: Verso, 1982) on the matrix of nationalism, imperialism, and abstract projection, or Dror Wahrman, \textit{Imagining the Middle Class: The Political Representation of Class in Britain, c. 1780-1840} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) on the intellectual “creation” of the middles class in late Georgian Britain.

the concrete term "transaction." This relationship can be *thin*, where it entails few rights or responsibilities, or *thick*, where it accounts for most of the activities individuals engage in. This model also acknowledges that much negotiation occurs within the boundaries of "citizenship," the most important being between notions of *jus sanguinis* (principle of descent) and *jus soli* (principle of residence), and between ties of gender, ethnicity, and military service.

Using Tilly’s model, British citizenship for much of the nineteenth century was generally *thin* until the final third of the century, when a new dynamic - nationalism - altered the status quo. Unlike class consciousness, which is a horizontal category, nationalism is a vertical category. Nationalism is an exclusive notion, and as such forces minority groups within the nationalist polity either to assimilate or to create a nationalism of their own. While the

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66 The use of this term is significant, as Tilly defines citizenship in conscious opposition to the postmodern sensibility which he sees as increasingly hegemonic in the social sciences. This sensibility encourages skepticism regarding the possibility of verifiable social knowledge, challenges claims of systematic social change, and asserts that only language represents “reality.” Tilly argues that each of these notions is inimical to the concept of citizenship, as the latter represents a collective will/purpose/action. See Tilly, pp. 2, 3.

67 Tilly, pp. 8, 9.


70 The classification of class consciousness as a horizontal category and nationalism as a vertical category is drawn from Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics* (Oxford: OUP, 1993), p. 125. This terminology has a long pedigree.

71 In Britain, under the pervasive influence of liberal ideals and values, minority groups usually opted for the assimilation. Britain, for instance, provided a home for countless exiles from nationalist continental conflagrations.
Enlightenment had created an alternate model of citizenship to the classical, one which gave space to "the informed citizen,"\(^{72}\) the development of this new ideal often led to the veneration of the nation-state in essentialist terms. Here the political influence of the Romantic reaction to the rationalism of the Enlightenment was of decisive significance. The language of essentialist nationalism was patriotic, militarist, pseudo-scientific racialist, and finally imperialist. Such an intense and often emotional construct accounted for the European rush to embrace the "New Imperialism" of the 1880's and 1890's.

Such popular imperial expressions were ironic. The proponents of Enlightenment citizenship, such as the political pamphleteer Thomas Paine, claimed that their new creed was international and humanist in its ambition. Yet this internationalist scope was itself a horizontal, rather than a vertical, category. It incorporated Europeans, but left little room for non-Europeans. This paradox between international pretensions pursued through national means was clearly evident in British imperial rule. While the British often claimed to be pursuing internationalist and liberal intentions, they nonetheless held firmly to the belief that such intentions were part of a national mission.

Indeed, nationalism has been viewed by some commentators as the very lifeblood of imperialism. The philosopher Hannah Arendt has gone so far as to argue that it was expansion itself which gave rise to the "flag of nationalism."\(^{73}\) For his part, Michael Ignatieff has described

\(^{72}\) For the argument that "the informed citizen" is central to the republican model of citizenship, see Michael Schudson, *The Good Citizen: A History of American Civil Life* (New York: The Free Press, 1998).

\(^{73}\) Expansion, Arendt has argued, was the result of the confluence of mob and capital, and gave a new life to nationalism. Only outside the body politic did national, rather than local, identity become important. See Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York:
ethnic nationalism as “autistic,” meaning that its proponents are unable to converse with those outside of their nationalist vacuum. Many late-Victorian and Edwardian imperialists would have agreed with this verdict if it was applied to nationalisms other than their own. Where the French Canadian, Maori, and Afrikaner communities of the Empire expressed views counter to those emanating from Whitehall, for example, Britons regularly denounced them as “nationalists”, an epithet implying regression.

In contrast to the nationalist model of citizenship stood the cosmopolitan ideal which conservatives such as John Buchan began to feel their way towards by the early twentieth century. Britons expressed an affinity for this model in part due to the nation’s close cultural and educational ties to Germany. It was the German philosopher Immanuel Kant who in the


As Ignatieff acknowledges, the term “autistic”, used as a political adjective, was coined by Hans Magnus Enzensberger. See Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honour, (Toronto: Penguin, 1999 [1998]), pp. 60-67.

The terms “London,” “imperial government,” and “Whitehall” are used interchangeably in this chapter to denote the British Parliament and its constituent decision-making bodies. This is to acknowledge that although the British Parliament was the nexus of imperial decision-making, different individuals and bodies were responsible for different measures.

See Richard Jebb’s denunciation of Henri Bourassa, below pp. 173. Imperial historians largely agreed with this verdict into the 1960’s. In A. L. Burt’s comprehensive and influential textbook The Evolution of the British Empire and Commonwealth (Boston: D. C. Heath & Company, 1956), for instance, “nationalism” is mainly reserved for descriptions of the Irish, Boers (Afrikaners), or Quebeçois. See Burt, pp. 133-134, 271, 549-550. The emergence of colonial nationalism (i.e. a nationalism whose core loyalty was directed to the emerging dominion-state, not the imperial-state) was of course remarked upon in the dominions long before it was taken into account by Britons. See for instance George Wrong, “Growth of Nationalism in the British Empire,” American Historical Review, 22, 1916-1917, pp. 45-57.

Stuart Wallace argues in War and the Image of Germany: British Academics 1914-1918 (Edinburgh: 1988) that British Germanophilia was in the decline from the 1880’s on. His
eighteenth century put forth the definitive statement of a cosmopolitan citizenship. Kant’s ideas, though not read in their original by many Britons, had been transmitted to British thinkers through the mediating influence of Hegel. Hegelianism had been a central influence for the school of idealism which emerged in Britain in the 1880’s, largely through the writing of T. H. Green at Oxford. British idealism itself constituted a “community of opinion,” rather than a system of thought. The writings of Hegel, and in turn Kant, had appeared as course readings for Oxford students by the 1870’s. German metaphysics occupied an important place in the intellectual firmament of late-Victorian Britain, though it never succeeded in supplanting empiricism as orthodoxy. As such, Kant himself was “often read as attempting to integrate experience into knowledge, as attempting to reconcile the a priori and the a posteriori.”

In the essays *Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitan Intent* (1784) and *Eternal* 

study is concerned with academics, however, and their concerns in the decades before the First World War were largely with German educational organization and practice, not necessarily German thought or culture per se. It was the war experience itself which caused the rejection of German ideas. Thus, “doubts were expressed before 1914 about the German model of university development, but it was the war which raised questions about the uses to which German scholarship were put.” Wallace, p. 5.


79 den Otter, p. 6-7.

80 *Ibid.*, p. 23. The influence of Kant upon British philosophers and Victorian thought in general has most often been located within liberal traditions, and furthermore is usually seen as indirect. Stefan Collini, for instance, notes the “unreflective Kantianism of Victorian moral commonplaces,” and argues that Victorians’ attention to the importance of “feeling in moral action” represents a divergence from Kantian thought. (*Public Moralists*, p. 63-64) In this sense, the moral cosmopolitanism expressed by Buchan and Curtis, two “liberal” or “progressive” conservatives, is consistent with a general late-Victorian affinity for a “broad” Kantianism, expressing the spirit if not the detail of Kant’s political ideas.
Peace (1795), Kant argued that only the creation of a moral and political cosmopolitanism, a “universal citizenship,” could prevent war. He disputed the very idea of ownership of state citizenship by which later nationalists asserted their patriotism, arguing that, “[a] state is not a possession (patrimonium) like the soil on which it has a seat.” He also disagreed with essentialist notions of citizenship, including those based upon race, arguing that “[t]he state of peace among men who live alongside each other is no state of nature (status naturalis).” Man’s purpose, according to Kant, is to produce an “internally perfect constitution,” a form of world government which binds men together with the express purpose of preventing them from gravitating apart and producing war. Such a government is preferable, Kant contends, because it allows for the full exercise of freedom, man’s highest goal, defined as “the authority (Befugnis) not to obey any external laws except those which [he has] consented to.” Kant then famously offered “Three Articles for Eternal Peace Among States”: the creation of a republican civil constitution, the construction of a federalist international system, and the consecration of

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83 Ibid., p. 436.

84 Kant, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent, translated by Carl J. Friedrich, in The Philosophy of Kant, p. 127.

85 Kant, Eternal Peace, p. 437, n4.
universal hospitality as the basis of cosmopolitan law.\textsuperscript{86} Despite the metaphysical basis of his argument, and despite the fact that Kant himself famously never left his own city, his third article of cosmopolitan governance and citizenship is predicated on a decidedly material and international fact - namely that for all man's differences with his fellow man, real or imagined, he is bound by circumstance to share the globe.\textsuperscript{87} This fact necessitates "society" and man's political engagement with his fellow men.

British theorists had addressed this global ideal through the hybrid citizenship model of "subjecthood." Even before Britons came to acquire the equality that T. H. Marshall argues as defining full citizenship, they had secured substantial civil liberties through a shared dependence upon a single common law, contained in the institution of the sovereign. As such, Britons were "subjects." They retained such a distinction even into Europe's republican era. Politicians' and theorists' negotiations between the identities of "subject" and "citizen" produced the hybrid model of citizenship which the British came to develop, and subsequently the hybrid model which conservative imperialists attempted to apply to the Empire.

"Subjects" or "Citizens"?

Kant's three articles were challenged implicitly by nationalist voices in the latter

\textsuperscript{86} See \textit{Eternal Peace}, pp. 437-448.

\textsuperscript{87} "But it is a right to visit [\textit{Besuchsrecht}] which belongs to all men - the right belonging to all men to offer their society on account of the common possession of the surface of the earth. Since it is a globe, they cannot disperse infinitely, but must tolerate each other. \textit{No man has a greater fundamental right to occupy a particular spot than any other} [Emphasis added]." \textit{Ibid.}, p 446.
nineteenth century and sacrificed on the battlefields of the two world wars. Yet they were of
great influence in shaping the thought of British imperialists, and not just the proponents of
imperial federation. British imperial thinkers, especially those on the Right, in fact
unconsciously adopted a hybrid of the earlier classical and the later Enlightenment or Kantian
model of citizenship, a hybrid that was allowed freer rein within the gossamer polity of Empire
than in the arid domain of domestic politics. The Empire proved more amenable to political
experimentation because it was, as Eric Hinderaker has observed, “a process rather than a
structure,” a “negotiated system” and the “site of inter-cultural relations.”\textsuperscript{88} What were the terms
of this hybrid model of citizenship developed by late-Victorian and Edwardian British
imperialists?

The delineation between “subject” and “citizen” was not lost on Britons of the pre-1920
generation, and is crucial for any discussion of imperial citizenship. The term “citizen” was an
ambiguous concept in the British Empire. All under the British flag, whether in London or
Lagos, were technically “subjects,” all owing allegiance to the crown. Indeed, it was this
personal relationship to the sovereign, with all that implied for both subject and monarch, which
provided the Empire with stability and cohesion. This doctrine was central to rhetorical notions
of imperial citizenship, as allegiance to the crown was reciprocated through the protection the
state provided its citizens, even while abroad: witness Lord Palmerston’s famous dictum of \textit{civis
Romanus sum} in relation to the Don Pacifico affair in 1850.\textsuperscript{89} The status of “citizen,” understood

\textsuperscript{88} As cited in Fred Anderson, \textit{Crucible of War: the Seven Years' War and the Fate of

\textsuperscript{89} See note 53 on the Don Pacifico affair.
as the political and practical relationship between constituent polities and individuals within a state structure, was not spelled out by statute, as indeed Britain had, and has, no official constitution *per se*. This unofficial, rhetorical, and localized nature of citizenship gave rise to great discrepancies amongst imperial subjects in rights, benefits, and duties.

The most stark divide in citizenship status was that between subjects of the United Kingdom and the white settlement colonies on the one hand, as compared to the dependent Empire on the other.⁹⁰ In Britain, the principle of *jus soli*, born of the soil, dictated that anyone born on British soil was a natural-born British subject, a right which extended to any children born to said British subject on foreign soil. Naturalized aliens were also classified as subjects, though they were denied the political right to vote or hold public office. The status of subjecthood was deemed to reside in the male, as attested by the fact that, following the 1870 Naturalization Act, and restated in the 1914 British Nationality and Status of Aliens (BNSA) Act, women’s nationality was tied directly to that of her husband.⁹¹ Thus, a woman who married an alien became an alien, while an alien woman who married a British subject became a subject. This pattern followed the general principle then adhered to in Europe and the United States, and

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⁹⁰ Britain had secured the settlement colonies, as their collective title indicates, largely through the emigration of Britons. She had secured the dependent Empire, meanwhile, through either force or indirect influence. As such, the ties between Britain and the settlement colonies, whether cultural, political, economic, and so on, where much stronger than those between Britain and her dependencies.

⁹¹ British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 17, s. 10 (1); Naturalization Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 14, s. 10 (1). The 1870 Naturalization Act marked a departure from previous common law precedent, which held that allegiance to the crown was indelible, by stating that “a woman shall be deemed to be the subject of the state of which her husband is for the time being a subject.” On the evolution of married women’s nationality status in Great Britain, see M. Page Baldwin, “Subject to Empire: Married Women and the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act,” *Journal of British Studies* 40 (October 2001): 522-556.
reflected the uneasiness legislators felt concerning large-scale immigration.\(^{92}\)

The principle of *jus soli* was also held in the settlement colonies, with the exception that the dominions dictated their own naturalization policies. In the dependencies, all under the crown were also subjects, but enjoyed fewer rights. Individuals born in British India, those territories under the direct administration of the Raj, were classified as non-European natural-born British subjects. Individuals born in non-British India, those territories controlled but not officially administered by Britain (the allied Indian principalities) were classified as British Protected Persons (B.P.P.s), enjoying no political rights but remaining under the protection of the crown, and were thus analogous to aliens in the United Kingdom. Individuals born throughout the remainder of the dependent Empire were either B.P.P.s or non-European British subjects, depending on the status of the territory (e.g. mandate, crown colony, protectorate, suzerainty).

The heterogeneous nature of imperial citizenship created several obstacles to imperial unity, most notably concerning immigration and naturalization.

The issue of imperial citizenship, and its attendant difficulties, exercised great debate within imperial circles in the late-Victorian and Edwardian era. One such discussion circle, the Royal Colonial Institute\(^{93}\), provides a representative portrait of the debate. In a speech


delivered to the Royal Colonial Institute in April 1912, E. B. Sargent, an Institute member\textsuperscript{94}, clearly spelled out what he believed to be the difference between the two terms: "citizens are to be regarded primarily in their political association with one another, subjects in their individual relation to a single person who is their ruler."\textsuperscript{95} Thus, citizenship denotes a complex web of interpersonal relations, while subjecthood implies the more straightforward exchange of duty for protection between subject and state, as mediated through the crown. Sargent concluded that neither "British citizenship" nor "imperial citizenship" existed except as rhetorical devices, designed to generate a feeling of equality amongst diverse and unequal people.\textsuperscript{96} The only true "citizen of Empire" was the monarch, in whom all allegiance was invested.\textsuperscript{97} Citizenship, he continued, was a local, municipal phenomenon, and elastic because it was constantly under negotiation. Thus, national citizenship could only exist through local negotiations. Such negotiations were impracticable and potentially destructive on a national scale, thus precluding the possibility of national citizenship until such a time as sufficient political commonalities emerged to preclude conflict. Premature adoption of a national citizenship, he warned, would lead to autocracy.\textsuperscript{98}

The key element in British political life was thus, in Sargent’s view, the monarchy.

\textsuperscript{94} Sargent was also a correspondent of both Lionel Curtis and Richard Jebb.


\textsuperscript{96} A separate rhetorical reason for the increased use of the term "citizen," especially to connote "subject," was the increasingly pejorative understanding of the latter term. For similar reasons, Britons began to refer to “Serbia” as opposed to “Servia.” See Walter Hely-Hutchinson, \textit{United Empire}, III, 1, January 1912, p. 68

\textsuperscript{97} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 368-369.

\textsuperscript{98} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 369-370.
Individual national allegiance and citizenship were both invested in the monarch, and this loyalty - subjection - provided the leavening factor of Empire. The colonies were tied to the crown through the institution of responsible government; the dependencies through the direct rule of the monarch. The demarcation between allegiance and citizenship, though, was constantly evolving, as opposed to the static fusion of both identities in the constitution of a republic. This evolution in regard to Empire, Sargent asserted, was usually in the direction of merger rather than separation. In order to protect liberty, the predominant goal of Empire, Sargent concluded that the key question was where to place responsibility for common imperial affairs, so as to create the "political commonalities" requisite for imperial citizenship. Sargent thus proffered an organic view of imperial citizenship, one emphasizing the centrality of the crown, responsible government as the model colonial political framework, and the encouragement of imperial political competence through tutelage.

Sargent here spoke for the majority view among conservative imperialists of the era. His arguments were received positively by his peers in the Royal Colonial Institute, the hearth of conservative imperialism. Other voices offered further clarification. Richard Jebb agreed that imperial citizenship at present was subservient to subjection, and further outlined four tenets of imperial subjection which combined "civil" and "political" functions: (1) the right to invoke the protection of the crown, especially overseas; (2) the right to be tried under British law where consular courts have been established under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act (1890); (3) the right to marry in foreign countries under the Foreign Marriages Act (1892); (4) and the right to have an


100 See the letters in *United Empire*, III, 7, 8, and 9, 1912.
owner’s interest in British shipping (in other words, extra-territorial trading rights). Subjecthood, in Jebb’s view, entailed no particular political rights *per se*. As the condition was passive, it provided protection in return for allegiance to the crown.\(^{101}\)

F. P. Walton, an Institute member and Dean of the Faculty of Law at McGill University, argued that the term “British citizen” had no definite meaning, except as a synonym for “British subject,” and that since British subjects could not transfer their franchise from one imperial jurisdiction to another, the term “imperial citizen” also had no bearing in practice.\(^{102}\) Newfoundland Governor Ralph Williams reiterated the Palmerstonian notion of subjecthood\(^ {103}\), while the Canadian H. E. Egerton argued that, “I think that we are forced to the conclusion that the absence of a system of common citizenship is a necessary consequence of the formless and chaotic character of the British Empire as a whole.”\(^{104}\) James Bryce reminded his peers of the Roman influence that distinguished public rights, such as voting and holding office, from private rights, such as the autonomy of family relations or commerce. British citizens enjoyed the former, he noted, while British subjects enjoyed the latter. The task of creating an imperial citizenship rested in ensuring that British subjects’ private rights were assured in each jurisdiction of Empire; that is, that they were mobile.\(^ {105}\) He was confident that British public rights were already the world’s broadest, observing for instance that Indians sat in the House of


The applicability to Empire of the emerging hybrid idea of British citizenship, incorporating both “republican” notions of citizenship and the continuing importance of subjecthood and the sovereignty of the crown, was also a matter of official interest. The Colonial Office deliberated extensively on this matter. It recognized the distinction between “subject,” “those born within the [lineage] of the King,” and “citizen,” a republican identity establishing and individual’s constitutional tie to the state.\textsuperscript{106} It further spelled out the central requirement of British subjecthood, namely the principle of \textit{jus soli} (matter of place).\textsuperscript{107} British subjecthood, the Colonial Office explained, implied certain benefits, most importantly equal protection under the common law both at home and abroad, but did not necessarily entail political rights. Before 1918, it will be recalled, the franchise was by no means universal in Britain. Hence, the fact that subjects of the Empire had limited, if any, political rights was normative, not aberrant. Indian “coolies,” for instance, though able to claim protection under British law if they were aggrieved, could be, and were, moved unilaterally about the Empire as indentured labour. The official view of imperial citizenship, then, was essentially an extension of its definition of British subjecthood, made to conform to Palmerston’s vision that, “[t]he true ideal is, and should be, a vast co-

\textsuperscript{106} “British Nationality and Citizenship,” \textit{Colonial Office Journal}, 6, 2, 1912, pp. 106, 107, 109. The \textit{Colonial Office Journal}, though not an official publication, was disseminated with the approval of the Secretary of State for the Colonies for the purpose of popularizing the Office’s work.

\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 107. Edward III expanded the definition of \textit{jus soli} to include also the principle of \textit{jus sanguinis} (matter of family), allowing children of British subjects born abroad to be subjects.
operative league of contented and emulous Anglo-Saxon States.\footnote{108}

Such a league, even in sentiment, proved difficult if not impossible to attain. The imperial triad - Britain, the white settlement colonies, and the dependencies - was resistant to union for two central reasons: the growth of nationalisms other than the English, and the practical difficulties presented by intra-imperial migration. Writing in McGill’s \textit{University Magazine}, Walton observed the difficulty which nationalism in particular presented for any implementation of imperial citizenship. This problem was especially evident in the field of naturalization, central to any state’s definition of belonging: “I do not see how the dominions, and Canada in particular, can have it both ways. Their people either belong to the Empire or not.”\footnote{109} Here we can see the republican model of citizenship implicitly advanced, for Walton finds fault not in the dominions’ continued allegiance to the crown, but in their insistence that they dictate certain “political” rights. Some commentators, including the Canadian imperialist W. Wilfred Campbell, feared that emergent nationalism in the dominions was atavistic, and lauded Empire as a progressive world force: “[p]resent-day imperialism is more than a mere self-satisfied jingoism . . . it is a vital force, a sort of necessary phase of human progressiveness; that instead of being the foe to the individual national life, it is the greatest means to that end.”\footnote{110}

While conservative imperialists were quick to diagnose the threat that colonial

\footnote{108} \textit{Ibid.}, p.111.


nationalism posed to the creation of imperial citizenship, their proffered preventative cures were vague, if consistent. Common themes were the need to improve “imperial sentiment” and emphasize “character” as a unifying tool. On his appointment to the chair of colonial history at Queen’s University\textsuperscript{111}, the Canadian academic W. L. Grant declaimed that,

\begin{quote}
[t]he study of colonial history in general, and of Canadian history in particular, can thus do something to advance the comity of nations, and in especial to advance that great spiritual drawing together of the Anglo-Celtic race, which, were it to come, would be strong enough to guard the peace of the world.\textsuperscript{112}
\end{quote}

The Canadian Reverend Father Bernard Vaughan, in turn, asserted that “character,” the tenets of a “life dominated by lofty and holy principles,” should form the basis of Empire.\textsuperscript{113} Even opponents of imperialism, such as the contrarian Goldwin Smith, drew a distinction between “extension without break of continuity or loss of moral unity,” and imperialism, which Smith defined as “extension where continuity was lost and moral unity was broken.”\textsuperscript{114} Smith thus had no difficulty criticizing Canadian nationalism where it impeded his favoured position, union with the United States. Grant, Vaughan, and even Smith thus favoured the principle of moral union as supportive of a collective (and in the case of Grant and Vaughan, an imperial) citizenship. In turn, they viewed colonial nationalism as inimical to collective citizenship because it betrayed poor character. If there were Canadian voices to champion these views, it is not surprising that

\textsuperscript{111} The second such chair in the Empire after the Beit at Oxford.

\textsuperscript{112} W. L. Grant, “Teaching of Colonial History,” \textit{Queen’s Quarterly}, 18, 1911, p. 186.


British conservative imperialists advanced these positions even more vigorously.

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Citizenship is a normative notion, a relationship between the individual and the state which is taken for granted, assumed to have always been such. Even when revolutionary citizenships are constructed, they draw upon "the way things are/were" as their basis. Thus the republican model of citizenship draws upon the Greek model in its prioritization of Platonic "truths." Citizenship has also traditionally been seen as fundamental, natural. It is what is. Thus citizenship is "remade," "restructured," and sometimes more ominously "purified," but never produced, constructed ex nihilo. It is rather reproduced. Even in the case of the United States, conscious of its own birth and self-consciously "the New World," a citizenship which was putatively new was not quite so. Indeed, while the core "truths" of the American Constitution are "held to be self-evident," they were not and are not held to be new. They are rather pre-existing ideals which the new polity chose to elevate as primary in its notion of citizenship, John Locke's notion of private property rights being perhaps the most significant such ideal. They are also a self-conscious rejection of some aspects of "British citizenship," rather than being a new creation in their own right. Citizenship, as a largely rhetorical concept, fosters differences. It dictates classification. One is either a citizen of one state or a citizen of another, regardless of the many similarities which otherwise may exist between the people of each state. In seeking to create an imperial citizenship, British conservatives faced the challenge of developing political and cultural bonds under the aegis of an empire which was not, in and of itself, a state.

The empire constituted part of the mental infrastructure of men and women in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, as unquestionably permanent and benign, if not indeed
benevolent, as were the Thames or the Lowlands of Scotland. Neither ardent imperialists such as Lionel Curtis and John Buchan, or critics of empire such as the liberal writer and economist J. A. Hobson, saw the British imperium as “wrong” in any absolute manner. Their differences were in degree, not in kind. Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to find in late-Victorian or Edwardian Britain any audible voice calling for the dismantling of empire. What existed instead were many competing commentaries on how it ought to be managed. Even that most famous of tracts on empire, Joseph Conrad’s *Heart of Darkness*, is not so much the work of an anti-imperialist, but rather a morality play which at its core asserts that we, the British, really are much more humane at this sort of thing than the debased Belgians.\(^{115}\) As such, the debate was not whether imperialism is “just,” or “fair,” or “right,” but rather how is it to be constituted? Who belonged? Did all under the British flag have equal rights and responsibilities, or did there here exist a scale of difference? If so, why? And how, finally, were such issues to be weighed? These are the questions with which this dissertation is concerned.

The subject of the present project is an explication of British conservative thought on imperial citizenship. The project is divided into two distinct sections: (1) an exegesis of the theoretical underpinnings of various conservative arguments for the creation of an imperial citizenship; and (2) an examination of the applicability of such abstract constructions in practice through case studies of the citizenship issues of imperial naturalization, immigration, and emigration.

\(^{115}\) Conrad’s many critics often miss this point. See for instance the Nigerian novelist Chinua Achebe’s claim that Conrad’s work is “racist” because, among other alleged flaws, it perpetuates that myth of the “lazy native.” While fair to a point, Achebe’s claim is overly polemical, and ignores the historical context and avowed aim of the work. See Chinua Achebe, “An Image of Africa,” *Massachusetts Review*, 18, 1977, pp. 782-794.
Though the idea of imperial citizenship will be discussed in greater detail throughout the breadth of the essay, it is profitable here to conclude with a preliminary definition of the concept, as understood in the context of late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain. Thus,

imperial citizenship was (the argument for/ideal of) a unified imperial polity in which the individual’s allegiance to the sovereign (subjecthood) was of principal importance, and concomitantly sought to maintain and/or develop such allegiance through the encouragement of political liberties, where deemed appropriate, based upon values of morality and character, for the purpose of creating a cosmopolitan political community.

As will be argued, conservative imperialists certainly did not adhere to all components of this definition, yet it existed as the template which many such voices attempted, in their varied manners, to apply to Empire.

The purpose of this project, then, is to provide a partial explanation of how the British Right’s view of Empire evolved from one of a limited, nationalist entity to a one of a more cosmopolitan and inclusive body. In other words, to plot the path conservative imperialists travelled from W. T. Stead’s grandiloquent response to the Jameson Raid -

I shall marvel greatly if the future historian, looking back on the month of January, 1896, does not regard it as marking one of those great and fateful moments in the history of a people, when a nation become conscious of its providential mission, and recognises in the revelation of great events the attesting seal of circumstance to its deep instinctive intuition of a Divine Call\textsuperscript{116}

- to Lionel Curtis’s assessment that the imperial vision of colonial “self-government was . . . less a liberal constitutional formula than a moral proposition,”\textsuperscript{117} one which presented the greatest chance for peace in a world torn apart by war.


Given the intellectual topography of late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain, the issue of imperial citizenship may be best approached through the prism of intellectual biography. As such, the imperial ideas of five British conservatives of the period will provide the framework for the discussion of imperial citizenship. The first three subjects were political theorizers. Lionel Curtis was co-founder of the imperial pressure group The Round Table and ubiquitous prophet of Empire in the first half of the twentieth century. John Buchan was a novelist, politician, bureaucrat, and eventual Governor-General of Canada from 1935-1940. Richard Jebb was a journalist and author of a series of influential books on colonial nationalism and imperial organization. Curtis, Buchan, and Jebb, though not leading politicians or intellectuals in their own right, were men of the first importance amongst the conservative elite of the era.

They shared three central traits which shaped their imperial ideas. First, each had travelled broadly within the Empire, developing a comparative knowledge of Her Majesties’s overseas realms rare amongst their contemporaries. South Africa made an especially important impression on all three, particularly the influence of Alfred, Lord Milner. Buchan and Curtis worked directly with the proconsul, and Jebb shared Milner’s certainty that a strengthened Empire offered Britain its best future. Second, all three collectively moved beyond Milner in their shared realization that the relationship between Britain and the white Dominions was changing due to the emergence of colonial nationalism. The future challenge for Empire, they argued, was to redefine this relationship to the common benefit of all. Third, Curtis, Buchan, and Jebb all wrote for an educated audience. Whether through the Round Table, Spectator, or Morning Post, each sought to influence the professional and the powerful. Each gave voice, with separate inflection, to an emerging conservative vision of Empire as organic, increasingly
inclusive, and progressive.

In contrast to this emerging vision was the view of Empire espoused by Arnold White. White was an imperial journalist, professional polemicist, and public advocate of the Royal Navy. He held to an older view of Empire as a British “possession,” a vested interest which must be protected and expanded as a point of principle. Unlike Curtis, Buchan, and Jebb, White had seen little of the Empire first-hand, conceived of the Empire as static rather than as evolving, and wrote for the tabloid press. His ideas will serve to set in relief those of the preceding three theorists. These competing conservative notions of Empire and imperial citizenship - one progressive, one parochial - were given shape through the work and ideas of those conservatives engaged in the work of empire. One such individual, an imperial “doer” rather than “thinker,” was Thomas Sedgwick, a proponent of imperial emigration. His endeavours will be examined in an effort to demonstrate the practical forms conservative Britons devised for imperial citizenship.

These five men present the historian with case studies of individuals who devoted their careers to British imperialism, and who conceptualized the Empire in terms of unity and preservation. The argument of this thesis is that while these individuals supported a vision of citizenship which purported to be inclusive, it proved impractical when given shape, particularly in reference to intra-imperial immigration. The ideal of a common imperial citizenship ultimately foundered on the shoals of colonial nationalism and the unwillingness of most Britons to concede decision-making influence to colonial voices.
Chapter II

The Imperial Prophet:
Lionel Curtis

The most persistent voice of Empire emanating from the British Right in the early decades of the twentieth century belonged not to a sitting politician, nor to a Tory grandee, but to a man who operated outside of official circles. Lionel Curtis, if one was forced to assign him a career, could best be described as an imperial spokesman. Through his writings, travels, and eclectic and exhaustive proselytizing, Curtis helped maintain imperialism as an issue of importance for the public and Whitehall alike. Imperial leaders from Rhodes and Milner to Jan Smuts and New Zealand prime minister Sir Joseph Ward, and later British Foreign Ministers from Austen Chamberlain through to Ernest Bevin in the 1950's consistently employed Curtis as a spokesman and consultant whenever the Empire-Commonwealth came to the fore as a political issue.¹

He was a figure of single-minded purpose, an outlook illustrated in a letter Curtis sent in 1911 to the Canadian Vincent Massey, then a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford:

[m]y deepest conviction is that in politics as in other matters there is a truth which can be discovered by earnest and dispassionate enquiry and that those who have the patience to reach it and abide in it will find that they meet on common ground which will give them the basis for concerted action. . ..²


² Lionel Curtis - Vincent Massey, 20 June 1911. The Round Table Papers of Lionel Curtis (hereafter RTPLC), MS English History 793/5, Bodleian Library, Oxford University. The bulk of Curtis’s papers for the period 1895-1919 were lost in a fire at Curtis’s house at Kidlington in 1933. All that remains are a small selection of letters from his early service in southern Africa, covering the years 1900-1902. Beyond this material, there exist miscellaneous letters from the following three decades, mostly copies secured from other sources, and material
The key words in this passage are “truth” and “common ground.” These terms provide a key to understanding the thought of Lionel Curtis on Empire. They also indicate the core traits of Curtis’s personality. Historians, especially political and intellectual historians, are often wary of giving too much weight to their subject’s personality, what might be called the human qualities. This task is left to biographers, who are deemed better at the art of portraiture. The over-determined and under-researched biographical work of many disciples of Freud and Lacan has made historians further leery of venturing into the realm of the personal. The historian is interested in the work, writing, or career - the public person. The private self is seen as tangential, or at best secondary, fodder for anecdotes but not important in and of itself.

Lionel Curtis’s historical significance resides in his role in the creation of the imperial pressure group, The Round Table, and in his tireless pursuit of the idea of imperial federation. He played a leading role in imperial affairs through the whole of the first half of the twentieth century. In this he differed little from the scores of other Oxbridge men who looked to Empire, rather than the bar, politics, or the City, for their professional niche. What set Curtis apart from his peers, indeed what characterized his career in its entirety, was an industry of almost monastic intensity³ and a proselytizing spirit which did not recognize defeat. He developed a reputation in

relating to his work with the Round Table. Consequently, much of Curtis’s thought on imperial citizenship, and indeed all other matters, for this period must be derived from his published output, and the opinions of his correspondents and friends.

³ Curtis’s industry was legendary, his peers remarking with a mixture of bemusement and wonder on both his tenacity (Kerr: “I know of no other man with so big a furnace in his belly”) and his work habits (while labouring on the “Egg” in 1911, Curtis wrote to Duncan that he had cut his work day back to 10 hours a day to avoid strain). Kerr’s quote enjoys the status of received wisdom in the literature on Curtis, appearing in almost every work of substance which concerns him. See for instance Norman Rose, The Cliveden Set, (London: 2000), p. 64 and Kathryn Seygal Patterson, The Decline of Dominance: India and the Careers of Lionel Curtis, Philip Kerr, and Reginald Coupland, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Bryn Mawr College,
imperial circles as a man above politics, a conciliator who could mediate between competing camps with fairness and equanimity. His biographer Deborah Lavin has written that he was in the business of public relations before that calling had crystallized into a profession.⁴

Curtis’s core imperial belief was that Empire was mankind’s best means of fostering and preserving peace. His message was imperial unity, a utopian idea he held as revealed faith. For this fervent devotion to his cause, and his unwavering belief in its efficacy and justness, Curtis’s friends referred to him as “the prophet.” A true believer, whether religious or secular, is marked above all by faith; faith that what one believes in is true, just, and paramount. This is especially true in matters of the mind. The British Empire was, in Benedict Anderson’s ubiquitous phrase, an “imagined community,” a community tended by a flock of supporters, some more devout than others.⁵ Of the many and varied individuals identified closely with Empire in the early twentieth century, Lionel Curtis can be counted among its most dedicated devotees. “The prophet” - no other description does justice to his career⁶ - carried the gospel of Empire far and wide.

*An Imperial Upbringing*

Curtis was raised in an evangelical environment, his father an Anglican Rector. Though

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1989, p. 53. On Curtis’s work habits, see Curtis - Duncan, 8 August 1911. MSS Curtis 2/82.

⁴ Lavin, p. x.


⁶ The *Dictionary of National Biography* can do no better than term Curtis a “civil servant,” a designation based upon his work as a peripatetic advisor to various governments between 1920 and his death in 1955. The titles “imperial prophet” or “imperial visionary” more accurately define his actual role. *DNB*, 1951-1960, p. 279.
he moved away from the Church of England while at Oxford, Curtis nonetheless derived from his upbringing a sense of divine mission, of service. As he recalled in 1935, "I myself was brought up as what in America they call a fundamentalist."\(^7\) He transferred the biblical literalism of his childhood to the study of imperial union, which he viewed as the “New Jerusalem.” Curtis believed that South African Union, a process in which he was a leading figure and which he hoped would be replicated on an imperial scale, he noted that “[i]t is indeed impossible not to feel it [union] is the Lord’s and that it is wondrous in our eyes.”\(^8\) In the course of a speech in Johannesburg in 1906, advocating Union, he invoked the parable of the talents, stating that “[h]e that is faithful in little is faithful in much.”\(^9\) Such references were not uncommon in pre-war British culture, despite the mounting secular assault on traditional religious life. In this Curtis merely showed a greater affinity for Gladstonian moral politics than for the realpolitik outlook then generally ascendent amongst British politicians such as Lord Salisbury and A. J. Balfour. But Curtis should not be mistaken for a religious imperial crusader in the vein of David Livingstone. The real significance of Curtis’s faith is that it shaped his conception of imperial governance, and the concomitant role of the individual in the imperium. Indeed, Curtis’s notion of imperial citizenship much resembles the parable of talents, with each individual tending to his given task in service to the whole. The Latin root of “religion,” respect for that which is sacred,

\(^7\) Curtis, (undelivered) address to the Rotary Club of Cape Town, 26 March 1935. Cited in Lavin, p. 18.

\(^8\) Curtis - Mrs G. J. Curtis [his mother], 1 June 1910. Curtis Papers, MSS Curtis 2/1, Bodleian Library, Oxford University.

can be taken to encompass Curtis’s idea of and devotion to the idea of Empire. Imperialism for Curtis was a secular religion.

Despite his fervent devotion to his creed, and the fact that he was a founding member of The Round Table, an imperial pressure group, Curtis was not seen as a *papabile* quantity in conservative circles. In an age of mass democracy, his aristocratic bearing left him unsuitable for the hustings. He was an Oxford graduate, though his degree was only a third, a record which he tried in later life to overcome through sheer industry: “I’m only a third in greats and I spend my life panting to keep up with firsts.”\(^{10}\) Not marrying until middle age, Curtis devoted his life to Empire, producing a prodigious, if not entirely original, corpus of work on his chosen subject. His intellect was better suited to synthesis than to originality. Nonetheless, as will be demonstrated, he had a major impact on imperial debate. He was much more comfortable in the smoking room, a milieu he made his own when he returned to Oxford as a tutor on imperial affairs. It was from this pulpit that he preached his imperial message, and from whence he secured a reputation as a mediator and man “above politics.” His reputation as an imperial expert was secured through his work as a leading figure in bringing about South African Union.

Curtis shared his contemporaries’ unshakeable belief in the supremacy of British political culture. His was not, however, a myopic view of imperial citizenship. The young Curtis was not unfavourably disposed towards the Boers, even during the war: “My little experience has been that the Boer like the Englishman is not a model of all the virtues but neither is he beyond other races a villain; and just because the stupidity of our rulers has set us to shoot each other should

we say that he is?" 11 Contact with Milner would temper Curtis’s disdain for his “rulers,” and indeed, he came to idolize the Proconsul, under whom he worked in South Africa. Curtis’s devotion to Milner was perhaps the strongest of all the members of the Kindergarten, the name which came to identify the small group of young Oxford men who came out to the Cape to aid in post-war reconstruction. 12 Like many of his fellow Milnerites, he was devoted not to the great Proconsul’s policies or imperialism per se, but rather to the determined manner in which Milner pursued his convictions. In response to public criticism of Milner’s anti-Germanism in the wake of the Naval Crisis of 1909, Curtis expressed his admiration for his mentor by recourse to his classical background: “Justum et tenacem propositi virum non civium ardor prava jubentium non voltus instantis tyranni mente quotat solida, neque Auster.” 13 Though Curtis was later to move away from Milner’s race-based notion of imperial citizenship, the two men maintained a close working and personal relationship until Milner’s death in 1925. It was Milner, more than any

11 Curtis - Leonard Courtney, 24 April 1900. MSS Curtis 1/208. Curtis worked as Courtney’s secretary with the London County Council (LCC) before the later recommended him for service with Milner.

12 Walter Nimocks’ Milner’s Young Men: The ‘Kindergarten’ in Edwardian Imperial Affairs (Durham, N.C.: 1968) is the most complete work on this topic. The sobriquet was bestowed on the group by their South African critics, led by the lawyer Sir William Marriot and the politician and Premier John X. Merriman, who found objectionable the aristocratic cocksureness of men they deemed carpetbaggers. Lavin suggests that Curtis himself (in With Milner in South Africa, p. 344) brought the phrase into common usage. See Lavin, p. 36 n.

13 Curtis, “Note on Milner Interview.” MSS Curtis 142/190 (Diaries).

Not the fury of hectoring citizens, not the tyrant’s lowering frown, not the tempers of the south can touch the unshakeable mind of one who is just and faithful to his proposal.

The translation is from the original. The Milner interview was published on 17 October, 1910, in the Evening Standard.
other person, who preached the importance of Empire, the mission to which Curtis would devote his career and indeed his life.

South Africa and the Foundations of Curtis's Thought on Imperial Citizenship

Curtis was born on March 7, 1872, and was raised in an intensely religious environment. He came to reject non-conformity, however, and embraced imperialism as his life's religion. His truly formative period is to be found in southern Africa. Curtis's views on imperial government and citizenship were formed in the crucible of post-war reconstruction in southern Africa. Following service as secretary to the Liberal Unionist MP Leonard Courtney, then as private secretary to Lord Welby, the Vice-Chairman of the London County Council (LCC), Curtis moved to southern Africa in 1900 to serve his country as a cyclist in the City Imperial Volunteers. He served only a few months in this capacity before returning to England on a personal matter. South Africa, however, had cast a hold on him, and he returned to the Cape on 2 October, 1900, quickly securing a post under Milner. The details of Curtis's work in pursuing Milner's goal of a "British" South Africa, and then in framing the "Egg," the document which became the core of the new federal Union of South Africa's constitution, have been well covered elsewhere. What is significant for an understanding of the evolution of

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15 The "Egg" was formally known as the Selborne Memorandum (1907), named after Lord Selborne, Milner's replacement after 1905 as High Commissioner in South Africa and Lord Salisbury's son-in-law.

16 See John Kendle, The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union (Toronto: 1975) and Lavin, pp. 63-80.
Curtis's thought on imperial citizenship is his conception of the role of the individual in such a federal structure.

Curtis developed three core ideas regarding imperial citizenship, none of which he would fully articulate until the end of the Edwardian period. Of primary importance was his growing conviction that imperial federation held the key to world peace, and provided the buttress of "Civilization." Curtis defined "Civilization" as a British-led European civilization drawn in equal parts from the Greco-Roman tradition and the legacy of liberty bequeathed by the twin revolutions of the late eighteenth century in America and France. Second, Curtis came to believe through his constitutional work in South Africa that imperial governance must be centralized. Such centralization implied that the imperial citizen must be intrinsically tied to the imperial state, not to any component state, though he had initially been intrigued by the journalist and imperial traveller Richard Jebb's ideas on colonial nationalism and the importance to Empire of allowing the (white) colonies a greater degree of autonomy. Third, in an age where the intellectual divide between the "elite" and the "masses" was widening on every front\(^\text{17}\), Curtis faced a dilemma. On the one hand he was convinced that those most able to rule should govern. On the other hand, he recognized the ever-emerging political reality that democracy necessitates a role for the elector. He tried to square this circle by arguing that while all citizens of Empire are entitled to its benefits, some citizens were more equal than others. Thus his adherence to the Victorian notion of tutelage, what Thomas Metcalfe has in a less euphemistic manner called

"authoritative liberalism."\(^{18}\) This term encapsulates Curtis’s idea of imperial citizenship - a paradox of equality in theory and inequality in practice.

These three convictions could be realized, in Curtis’s view, through the creation of a federal imperial union, a political structure uniting Britain and her English-speaking Dominions of settlement, encouraging them to act in concert in pursuit of their common goals. However, such an “Anglosphere,” to use the language of Owen Harries, the former editor of the conservative journal *The National Interest*, would prove to be stillborn.\(^{19}\) The idea of a federal imperial system was not new by the twentieth century. Indeed, imperial federalism had captured the attention of imperial actors in the 1880’s, when the Imperial Federation League brought the idea to the forefront of imperial debate.\(^{20}\) In the wake of Confederation in Canada, and increased inter-colonial cooperation in Australia, intellectuals and public figures such as the Canadian George R. Parkin had urged that London adopt the federal system for the Empire as a whole. The federalists failed the first time for a variety of reasons.\(^{21}\) Despite Joseph Chamberlain’s

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\(^{18}\) Thomas Metcalfe, *Ideologies of the Raj* (Cambridge: 1997; first edition 1995), p. 59. Metcalfe argues that authoritative liberalism was the ideological consequence of the Indian Mutiny of 1857, an event which shattered the certainties of an earlier imperial liberalism, voiced by India men such as the senior and junior Mill. They had asserted that Empire’s purpose was to spread British values far and wide through the bonds of culture. (Metcalfe, p. 44-45) He asserts that the second half of the nineteenth century was marked by a new British imperial emphasis on the bonds of race, and the consequent ordering of a typology of difference. While there is no doubt that the idea of “race” assumed an evermore important role in imperial affairs, certainly from the 1880’s, see below for the argument that the cleavage between notions of “culture” and “race” as the imperial *modus operandi* is perhaps overstated.


efforts at the Diamond Jubilee in 1897, the idea of federation lost momentum until the aftermath of the Boer War.

Historians’ work on the Edwardian concern over “national efficiency,” widespread after Britain’s pyrrhic victory in southern Africa, is most often focused on notions of physical and military reform. Yet, there also emerged from the cauldron of war a renewed debate over the federal idea. It was seen, not only by Milner and his Kindergarten but also more widely in imperial circles, as both a means to prevent future imperial conflicts and as a template for the long-conceived idea of a Union of South Africa, the prelude to imperial federation itself. It was as a participant in this public discussion that Curtis began to formulate his idea of imperial citizenship. The neo-liberal political philosopher Francis Fukuyama has recently set the tone of debate in the study of international relations with his provocative contention that in liberal democracy mankind has reached the pinnacle of its political evolution: “[a]t the end of history, there are no serious ideological competitors left to liberal democracy.” Fukuyama, and those who have built upon his ideas, see this development as a positive one. Arguing that man’s greatest desire is to gain the respect of his fellow man, Fukuyama contends that the most rewarding area for the satisfaction of this desire is community. Through the construction of community man sublimes his self-destructive urges to the pursuit of rational material desires and the acceptance of the language of rights as natural and self-evident. Irrespective of the strengths or weaknesses of Fukuyama’s thesis, what is of interest here in regard to Curtis’s idea of imperial citizenship is that it parallels the former’s contention that liberal democracy

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successfully sublimes the individual’s Hobbesian desire to maintain his position in society at the expense of others. In other words, war between liberal democratic states becomes impossible, or at least highly improbable.

Curtis arrived at the same conclusion much earlier from his contemplation of the merits of imperial federation. In a federal imperial union he saw a guarantor of world peace. Though he shied away from such language, Curtis’s notion of imperial citizenship came close to an argument for a “world state,” a shared sense of identity which would foster peace. He outlined these ideas in a speech at government house in Narm Tal, India, in July of 1917, a speech which can be taken to mark the position on imperial citizenship he would advance through much of the rest of his life.

Curtis began his address by stating that man’s highest order is the prevention of peace, an order best attained through individual freedom. The British Commonwealth was the bulwark of this order. To this relatively anodyne political message, Curtis added a moral imperative and a moral fervour: “we love what we fight for, because we know what we love.”

\[23\] Though his ideal was a true world state, he continued, given what he saw as the impossibility of such an institution, the British Commonwealth was the best practical alternative. He was careful to point out that such a Commonwealth must perforce be British, not out of a sense of racial superiority, but rather based upon a shared cultural tradition: “[i]t [the Commonwealth] is British only because from that holy soil the principle which inspires it has sprung.”

\[24\] Subjects in the dependencies could be forgiven for not seeing the difference. Curtis continued by arguing that


\[24\] Ibid., MSS Curtis 126/77.
the “nation” and the “state,” that is cultural identities and political identities, are not coterminous, and it is in fusing these two notions, these two identities, that the Commonwealth succeeds in fostering freedom. Freedom exists because imperial patriotism is due not just to England, but to the entity of the Commonwealth, the latter being an inclusive body that has incorporated the citizens of many nations. The Commonwealth was an “international state,” a “citadel of freedom” in which the responsibility of peace rests on the shoulders of all of its citizens. The entire system would collapse if individual imperial citizens refused to participate. The potential problem of dual loyalties would be solved, Curtis asserted, by dividing responsibility for various areas of governance between the imperial and the national government. As he argued elsewhere, such a scheme would be modelled on both Lord Durham’s nineteenth century directives concerning responsible government and Alexander Hamilton’s thoughts on a federal division of power. Curtis believed the federal imperial system he imagined would mark a return to the model democracy once attained in Pericles’ Athens.25 He concluded by moving back to his own era to applaud the service of the true imperial citizens who were serving the commonwealth in the trenches of Europe, and called for the continuation of this spirit in the post-war era.26

Curtis had tried out these ideas on a smaller scale through his role in drafting the “Egg.” Like the Empire in microcosm, southern Africa was a region of linked but competing regions. The pursuit of self-interest (“national interest” except that they were only colonies) by each of these regions made it inevitable that local conflicts would necessarily explode into larger ones,

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25 Consistent with his selective use of history in argumentation, Curtis neglected to note that Athenian democracy was built in part on the requisition of resources from the rest of Greece, and the use of slaves.

pulling all interested parties into war. This, according to Curtis, was precisely what had happened in the case of the South African War. Apart from neglecting his patron’s decisive role in precipitating the contest, Curtis here also ignored the decisive role of economics, especially competition over mineral resources. Cumbersome governmental machinery had not created war. Curtis’s frustration, much as Milner’s, was that the lack of unhindered British regional sovereignty, owing to the existence of autonomous or semi-autonomous regional entities such as the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, made it impossible for Britain to act as she wished. Thus, the government at the Cape was unsuccessful in securing what it deemed fair economic and political rights for the üitlander population (non-Boer prospectors) in the Transvaal. Curtis thus phrased his analysis of the conflict and its legacy in the language of peace. He argued that a federal union, formed in the likeness of the Westminster model, was not only the best, but the only guarantee of peace: “[there is] no half-way house between open conflict and union.”

Curtis drew a number of lessons from his time in municipal government, a vocation he found stimulating. Upon leaving the Johannesburg town council in 1906, where he had served as Town Clerk since 1901, Curtis outlined the views which he would later develop further though his work with the Round Table. Government, in Curtis’s mind, functioned most effectively when representative traditions were twinned with what he dubbed “study groups,” experts who


28 Curtis diary, 16 August 1910. MSS Curtis 142/101.
would reflect on problems and advise their elected counterparts.\textsuperscript{29} The absence of such groups led to "government of platitude and panacea."\textsuperscript{30} This reliance on experts was to become the operating principle of the Round Table.

\textit{The Round Table and the Idea of Imperial Federation}

The genesis of the Round Table is to be found in the debate over imperial defence which captured the attention of colonial and British officials alike in 1909. The immediate trigger of this debate was the alarming expansion of the German navy. Britain believed that the Dominions should contribute to the cost of their own defence. Sentiment on this issue was mixed in the Dominions themselves. The issue provoked the most discussion in Canada, where the naval debate dominated the Parliamentary sessions of 1910-1911. Curtis and his circle of intimates viewed with dismay the acrimony which characterized British-dominion negotiations over this issue. In informal meetings held in South Africa throughout the summer of 1909\textsuperscript{31}, the group agreed that a well defined imperial union, not dissimilar to that envisioned by Joseph Chamberlain during the tariff debate earlier in the decade, was the best method of preventing imperial cleavages. While the group acknowledged the fact that the Dominions cherished their

\begin{footnotesize}
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\textsuperscript{29} In holding to this view, Curtis shared much with his Fabian counterparts and their philosophy of achieving political change through the "permeation" of their ideas into official minds.

\textsuperscript{30} Curtis, "Copy of speech on leaving Johannesburg council," 27 November 1906. MSS Curtis 1/222.

\textsuperscript{31} Besides Curtis himself, the most active participants in these discussions were Phillip Kerr, R. H. Brand, and F. S. Oliver.
\end{footnotesize}
independence in matters of self-government, they argued that their dependency on Britain for
defence made formal union a necessity.

The imperial union envisioned by Curtis would be governed by an Imperial Parliament,
consisting of two houses, an elected lower house, and an upper house of peers. The Imperial
Parliament would deliberate on issues of imperial importance, most notably defence and foreign
policy. It would also have the authority to impose imperial taxes. In exchange for proportionate
representation in the Imperial Parliament, the Dominions would enjoy a broad-based autonomy
in domestic issues. The most important domestic jurisdiction would be local tariff autonomy. In
defending an essentially laissez-faire economic model in respect to tariffs, Curtis set himself
apart from those within the conservative fold who supported Joseph Chamberlain’s initiative for
tariff reform.

To bring about such a union, the group decided that cells should be developed in each
dominion, under the guidance of men “of character and capacity,” for the purpose of bringing the
issue of union before the public until such a time as a formal plan could be constructed. Curtis
later clarified the nature of such work in a letter to the Asian specialist and civil servant
Valentine Chirol. He explained that the Round Table would function like a royal commission,
gathering information but not advocating a position until it had completed its work. Finances
for this endeavour would be raised from the members themselves and from wealthy benefactors.

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32 See [Curtis], *Green Memorandum* (1910), 254. The *Green Memorandum* was also
known as “the annotated memorandum” and “Round Table Studies, First Series.”

33 “Memorandum of conversations which took place between a few English and South
African friends at intervals during the summer of 1909,” MSS Curtis, 156/1/1-8.

34 Curtis - Valentine Chirol, 22 March 1912. MS English History 823/19.
The Round Table was from the beginning an elitist enterprise, and never claimed otherwise. It held regular “moots,” where members would gather to discuss pertinent imperial issues. It also founded an eponymous journal, where unsigned articles pressed the cause for imperial union. The original impetus for publishing anonymously was that articles were to reflect a group consensus on issues, and minimize allegations of personal bias. The same principle was to be applied to the creation of the group’s plan for union, dubbed the “Green Memorandum.” Curtis, however, came to be the guiding force, writing the final copy and indeed almost the entirety of earlier drafts. When the document was finally offered to the public for perusal as *The Problem of the Commonwealth* (1916), Curtis felt compelled to state in the preface that “the writer himself has, of necessity, had to decide what to reject and what to accept. He has no authority for stating, therefore, that the report represents any opinion but his own.” This statement represents not the pro forma introductory apologia of writers, but rather the divisions which had sprung up between Curtis and his fellow Round Table members. These divisions concerned style, rather than substance, however, and produced no ideological rift amongst the group’s members.

Curtis argued that self-government, the goal toward which Britain’s colonies were progressing, was only effective when people assumed greater involvement in public affairs

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35 The journal is still published through the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at the University of London.

36 Curtis - Chirol, 27 March 1912. MS English History 823/32. Curtis - Seton, 4 September 1912. MS English History 823/82.


beyond simply exercising the vote. To anticipate the discussion of Richard Jebb’s ideas on Britannic Alliance found below in Chapter IV, it is necessary here to note that by “greater involvement” Curtis did not mean increased autonomy, or in Jebb’s language “colonial nationalism.” Indeed, Curtis viewed the drift towards colonial self-reliance with concern, believing that incipient nationalist thought in the Dominions served only to attenuate the common bond of Empire, not strengthen it. Curtis did not reject colonial nationalism, nor was he ignorant of it. The principle of colonial nationalism was in fact at the heart of his idea of Empire; it was the goal towards which the people of Empire were progressing. In The Problem of the Commonwealth he explained how this process had taken shape.

Each [Dominion] has asserted the right to decide for itself who shall inhabit its territories and how they shall live; and the people of each Dominion have constructed for themselves national governments competent to interpret public opinion on these matters, to formulate policies, and to raise from the particular public to which they are responsible the taxation required to make them effective. And in equipping themselves to think and act as nations the peoples of the Dominions, like those of the United States, have severally acquired a national consciousness of their own. Canadians, Australians, and South Africans each think of themselves as nations distinct from the people of the British Isles, just as the British think of themselves as a nation distinct from the citizens of the United States.39

Echoing Lord Durham’s conclusions on responsible government, Curtis noted “[t]hat in the last analysis the colonists were free to decide all things for themselves.” Such freedom, he continued, should be “accepted as articulus stantis aut cadentis Imperii, the cardinal principle of imperial policy.”40 Colonial self-definition became central to any working definition of imperial citizenship: [c]olony [sic] is not a territory, a code of laws and a scheme of institutions, but a society of people, and nothing which touches the manner in which those people are to live

39 The Problem of the Commonwealth, p. 68. Poor New Zealand is apparently to be understood as an appendage of Australia.

40 The Problem of the Commonwealth, p. 46. Emphasis in original.
can in the end affect them so profoundly as the ultimate and fundamental question as to people are themselves to be.\textsuperscript{41}

His concern lay in the fear that the Dominions might use such self-definition in a manner counter to the imperial "common good," by which he meant imperial unity. Specifically, he was concerned that colonial desires to conduct independent foreign relations would be counterproductive to the imperial enterprise, especially because the Dominions were not able to contribute adequately to their own defence.

Curtis's proffered solution to prevent imperial dissolution was an Imperial Parliament where the Dominions would be proportionately represented, and where they would thus have some say in the conduct of foreign policy relating to their territory. Each constituent of Empire would send representatives based upon its population, and according to its current distribution of the franchise. Such a structure would show respect for the colonies' broader conception of the franchise (women, for instance, could vote in New Zealand by 1893; indigenous peoples in South Africa could not\textsuperscript{42}). This conception, however, proved unacceptable both to dominion leaders

\textsuperscript{41} Lavin, p. 61.

\textsuperscript{42} Curtis was ambivalent about the issue of what was then called the "coloured vote" in South Africa, though this is not to imply that he was necessarily progressive on issues of race. He was, for instance, quick to reach agreement with Jan Christian Smuts, in conversation in South Africa in 1909, that the expansion of the franchise to black South Africans was not politically advisable at that time. See Curtis diary, 4 April 1909. MSS Curtis 142/14. While the discussion of Curtis's ideas on imperial citizenship and race in this chapter are confined to his notion of dyarchy and India, both Curtis and the Round Table had much to say on the issue of race. More strident critics have drawn a tenuous link between the Kindergarten's ambivalent position on race and the creation of apartheid in South Africa in 1948. See Magubane, p. 281. Such views conflate the role of the British and the Afrikaners in order to make an argument sympathetic to a post-colonial view of African history. Milder critics note the fundamental disagreements between the British and Afrikaner views of a future South Africa, and attribute the eventual cleavage between the two sides in part to the hauteur of Milner and his disciples. See for instance O. Geyser, "Jan Smuts and Alfred Milner," \textit{The Round Table}, 360, 2001, pp. 415-432.
and the British government. The Liberal H. H. Asquith, British Prime Minister, was not sympathetic to the idea of an Imperial Parliament when this idea was floated, apparently without the Round Table’s blessing, by New Zealand premier Sir Joseph Ward at the 1911 Imperial Conference: “that authority [here referring to foreign policy and defence] cannot be shared, and the co-existence side by side with the cabinet of the United Kingdom of this proposed body . . . would, in our judgement, be absolutely fatal to our present system of responsible government.”

*The Problem of “Creating” Citizens*

Asquith’s comments illustrate the broader problem Curtis faced in formulating his ideas on imperial citizenship, and explains why these ideas remained fissiparous. Namely, Curtis struggled to reconcile the existence of multiple loyalties within the Empire with the formation of a unified imperial state. This struggle manifested itself in his thought on the nettlesome question of race, in his misreading of the American federal example as articulated by its most vocal proponent, Alexander Hamilton, in his attempt to confront such divisions in the immediate future through the principle of tutelage, and finally over the question of who would serve in the role of “tutor.” Curtis’s difficulty in outlining how these multiple loyalties could be subordinated to a loyalty to the imperial state explain why he was unable to offer a coherent definition of imperial citizenship.

As we have seen, Curtis’s ideas drew heavily on the campaigns of the imperial

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federationists, and specifically the Imperial Federation League, of the 1880's and early 1890's. Curtis shared the earlier federationists’ conviction that union was a matter of politics, not a priori a matter of race. Here historians’ attention to the admittedly more dramatic writings of British racialists such as the eugenicist Francis Galton, the philosopher Karl Pearson, and the civil servant and writer Benjamin Kidd have clouded our understanding of late-Victorian imperialism. “Race” was indeed front and centre in discussions of imperial citizenship, but not necessarily in a consciously discriminatory manner.

When early twentieth century Britons spoke of “race,” what they invariably meant was “culture.” Such an understanding allowed men such as Curtis to hold two seemingly incongruent positions: one, that the British “race” was the world’s most advanced; and two, that non-Britons could become members of the British “race” if properly “educated.” In accepting this position Curtis was developing the ideas of federationists such as Joseph Chamberlain and the Canadian Archbishop McGoun. McGoun rejected an imperial union based upon the superiority of one race, writing that “the people of the Anglo-Saxon race have no more right to assume sovereignty over the other races of the world, than the Greeks did to class the rest of mankind as barbarians . . . .” Rather, imperial union was to be a political one: “[t]he political idea we desire to keep . . . is the extension of the reign of individual and local liberty . . . for the preservation of political rights, and for resisting injustice and oppression whether of individuals,

44 The delineation between “race” and “racialist” is set out in further detail on pages 15-16, and in chapter IV.

45 While there is not space here for a full discussion on the topic, such usage was relatively consistent throughout Europe in the late-nineteenth century. “Pedigree” and “lineage” are alternate meanings. “Race” did not take on its current pejorative meaning until the mid-twentieth century. See Andrew Wheatcroft, The Habsburgs, (London: 1995), 286-287.
provinces, nations or races.”⁴⁶ Even more strident voices at home, such as the outspoken Radical
Right Member of Parliament Henry Page Croft, argued for an imperial citizenship based on the
primacy of Empire over the local.⁴⁷

Curtis specifically used the notion of “race” in his interpretation of imperial citizenship in
much the manner the later British socialist literary critic Raymond Williams used the term
“culture.”⁴⁸ Williams, in drawing on Matthew Arnold’s explication of the term as denoting that
which unites a civilization, appropriated the term to denote an organic society where work was
creative and cooperative. While Curtis shared neither Arnold’s poetic impulses nor the later
Williams’s socialist convictions, he too held that culture conveyed the idea of union and affinity,
which served to improve the intellectual life of all members of society (hence Arnold’s
juxtaposition of Culture and Anarchy). Put simply, culture was that which held people together.
Hence the use of adjectives - high, popular, foreign - rather than nouns to distinguish between
types. Curtis’s conception of federation and its attendant imperial citizenship of local autonomy
subordinate to a shared loyalty to the imperial crown were predicated upon a view of political
culture as creative and cooperative.

While Curtis and the Kindergarten did not ignore issues of race, their concerns were
fundamentally with the white settlement colonies. The dependent or “coloured” Empire

⁴⁶ Archbishop McGoun, A Federal Parliament of the British People. (Toronto: 1890),
pp. 2, 3-4.

⁴⁷ Henry Page Croft, The Path of Empire. (London: 1912). Also see Larry L. Witherell,
Rebel on the Right: Henry Page Croft and the Crisis of British Conservatism, 1903-1914.
(Newark: 1997).

⁴⁸ See Raymond Williams, Culture and Society (New York: 1958). See also above note
29.
provided the paradox of citizenship which they were unable to resolve. This paradox was especially apparent in the case of India. India was immense, both geographically and demographically. Curtis’s own estimate of India’s population was 312,632,537, a figure which he had extrapolated from the 1911 census and published in *The Problem of the Commonwealth*. The total population of the British Empire at this time was 433,574,001.\(^{49}\) India thus made up almost three-quarters (72.1%) of the entire Empire. Any proposed imperial government must therefore address the question of Indian representation. Curtis understood this. However, the sheer size of the collected Indian provinces dictated that Indian representatives would overwhelm those from the rest of the Empire if given proportional representation. A young Curtis put this problem quite baldly to Kerr in 1907. Commenting on the “crisis” of Indian labour in the Transvaal\(^{50}\), Curtis wrote that the granting of equal rights for all imperial subjects was a dangerous proposition, for the result would be that “in the coming centuries the great reservoir of Indian races will be opened and allowed to deluge the whole of the Imperial Dominions and submerge the white community.”\(^{51}\) An imperial citizenship which recognized all imperial subjects as equal was thus not in Curtis’s immediate view, and indeed was impractical given the attitudes of early twentieth century Britons and the gross economic and social disjunction between white and non-white subjects.

\(^{49}\) [Curtis], *The Problem of the Commonwealth*, plate 2, “Population of the World divided according to States,” faces p. 69.

\(^{50}\) Milner had encouraged the import of Indian and Chinese “coolie” labourers, a measure designed both to develop the gold-mining industry and undercut the negotiating position of African labourers. The goal in both cases was to attract large numbers of white settlers to South Africa, a dream which went unfulfilled.

\(^{51}\) Kathryn Seygal Patterson, *The Decline of Dominance*, p. 60.
Like McGoun, Curtis’s believed that the common identity fostered by a shared British culture enabled the Empire to function as an institution of peace. The empire’s participation in the First World War confirmed Curtis’s belief. As he wrote in one of the draft versions of the “Green Memorandum,” “[t]o commonwealths war is a visitation to be faced, like famine or pestilence, only with the purpose of preventing its recurrence and protecting the liberty for which they stand.”

He contrasted the benevolent imperialism of the British ideal with what he saw as a malevolent German variant, that sought to spread “its own culture overall the world, blind to the truth that for each individual and race the only culture is their own.” Curtis was fully aware of the charge that the British Empire was really no different, attempting to achieve by legislation what he accused the Germans of seeking by the sword - namely imperium. The difference, he contended, which put the British in the right was their adherence to “freedom.” This principle he contrasted to Central European “autocracy,” a spectre which would reappear with even more frightening consequences later in the century.

It was not, however, authoritarian Germans who exercised Curtis’s imagination, but French dictators. Curtis invoked the memory of the Napoleonic Empire as the antithesis of the British Commonwealth. He also explained the Atlantic cleavage in Napoleonic terms, arguing that the United States had drifted from its rightful place within the commonwealth because it interpreted the principle of freedom in Napoleonic, rather than British, terms. This view of the causes of the American Revolution led Curtis, in concert with his fellow Kindergarten members, to sympathize with the views of Alexander Hamilton, the least insular of the Founding Fathers.

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53 Ibid., p. 683.
The connection between Hamilton's federalism and the British Empire had been brought to the fore in a biographical study of Hamilton penned by F. S. Oliver, a Round Table "fellow traveller."\(^{54}\) Hamilton was co-author of *The Federalist Papers* and leader of the Federalist Party. Hamilton's federalism encompassed a belief in union, a strong central authority, and government by the nation's "natural" leaders, by which he meant the educated elite of which he was a part. Hamilton opposed the platform of states' rights and the Rights of Man championed by Jeffersonian Democrats, though he acknowledged the existence of regional identities.\(^{55}\) The most nettlesome question regarding such identities was the southern states' desire to maintain slavery.\(^{56}\) Here Hamilton, alongside Madison, famously compromised by agreeing to count three-fifths of the slaves in each state when apportioning representation in Congress and direct taxes.\(^{57}\) Hamilton more than most of his Federalist peers was willing to sacrifice principle for a settlement. He also advocated a firmly national foreign policy, arguing that only through collective action could the new nation avoid becoming enmeshed in war. Oliver believed that Hamilton's federal platform presented an ideal template for the British empire: "[t]he final


\(^{55}\) Fair, pp. 6-7.

\(^{56}\) See Federalist Paper 42, General View of the Powers Conferred by the Constitution, Continued: *It Were Doubtless to be Wished That the Power of Prohibiting the Importation of Slaves Had Not Been Postponed* (Jan. 22, 1788), in which James Madison tries to make sense of the various terms "free citizen," "free individual," and "people" in the Constitution, and put a positive face on the exclusion of African Americans from full recognition as persons.

\(^{57}\) Federalist Paper 54, The Rule of Three-Fifths: *Let the Case of the Slaves be Considered* (Feb. 12, 1788)
question with us, as with Hamilton, is how we may convert a voluntary league of states, terminable upon a breath, into a firm union. . . . His aim was to make a nation: our aim is to make an empire.” Oliver also admired Hamilton’s methods as a lobbyist. The latter operated behind the scenes, preferring personal influence over public pronouncement.

Oliver’s biography of Hamilton quickly gained the attention of the Kindergarten, Curtis in particular. Curtis, however, was inconsistent in his interpretation of Hamilton’s position. On one hand, Curtis saw in Hamilton’s staunch Federalism the ideal template for a Commonwealth. On the other, he elsewhere pursued the argument that the United States, in adopting an isolationist stance in world affairs for almost the entirety of its history, had reneged on its rightful duty to further the parliamentary tradition around the world. In the latter position, Curtis was echoing Kipling’s famous “white man’s burden” line, delivered in verse to the United States during the latter’s war with Spain.59


59 Kipling’s poem ‘The White’s Man’s Burden’ appeared in McClure’s Magazine, February 12, 1899. The first stanza, usually cited (rightly) to indicate Kipling’s jingoism, reads as follows:

Take up the White Man’s burden-
    Send forth the best ye breed-
    Go bind your sons to exile
    To serve your captive’s need;
    To wait in heavy harness
    On fluttered folk and wild-
    Your new-caught, sullen peoples,
    Half devil and half child

“Burden” here should be read not as something necessarily unpleasant, a base means to an end (though many of course saw it as such), but rather as “responsibility.” It is patronizing in the precise sense that Kipling is extolling the role of the Anglo-American as patron of his wards. Indeed, in the third stanza Kipling urges Americans to “Fill full the mouth of Famine,/And bid the sickness cease.”
Curtis further misread Hamilton in failing to see the real compromises the latter accepted in pursuing the collective goal of a united nation, most notably that concerning slavery. Curtis also did not understand that Hamilton sometimes engaged in rhetoric to make his point. While Hamilton disagreed with the anti-Federalists over their view that the state government should be more powerful than the national government, he shared with his foes a firm belief in private property as political sacrament. It was this notion of property and ownership (Locke's legacy) which led to the awkward and somewhat disingenuous compromise over slavery. The founding fathers implicitly argued that non-white Americans would be excluded from full citizenship not because of their colour, but because they did not own property. Curtis, as we will see, shied away from any definition of imperial citizenship which recognized property as the determinant principle. Down this road lay a decreased role for Britain and the potential dominance of India if the sheer weight of the latter's demographic dominance was translated into property ownership. A Hamiltonian federation might have been a useful model for small scale union, as in South Africa, but it proved to be no more than rhetoric when applied to the Empire in toto.

Furthermore, Curtis maintained an elitist disregard for mass politics which Hamilton and his fellow Founding Fathers, though they shared in spirit, had been forced to come to terms with.

Here we move toward the paradox central to Curtis's notion of imperial citizenship. He advocated for the Empire what might be termed a humanist idea of citizenship. Commenting on

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60 See for example Hamilton writing in Federalist Paper 85, Concluding Remarks: *Whether the Constitution Has not Been Shown Worthy of the Public Approbation* (May 28, 1788): "It is not impossible that these circumstances may have occasionally betrayed me into intemperances of expression which I did not intend; it is certain that I have frequently felt a struggle between sensibility and moderation; and if the former has in some instances prevailed, it must be my excuse that it has been neither often nor much." *Selected Federalist Papers*, Dover edition (Mineola, NY: 2001), pp. 204-205.
the pacificist nature of true Empire, he stated that, "[t]he British Empire has held together in so far as Britain has discovered principles and evolved a system which are not British but human, and can only endure in so far as it grows more human still." The "principles" which Britain had "discovered" were those of liberty, the removal of authoritarian rule, and freedom, the ability to act as one wishes under such a condition of liberty. These were the closely linked goals towards which the entire development of Empire was moving. This is why Curtis employed the teleological title of "Project of a Commonwealth" as the working title of Round Table Studies. Second Series. The very endeavour of Empire was a process of spreading freedom:

[f]reedom, like the principle of life in the physical world, is inseparable from growth. Commonwealths are the corporeal frame in which it is incarnate, and they cease to flourish when they cease to extend the principle that inspires them in an increasing degree to an ever-widening circle of men. This was not to say, however, that all those under the British crown were entitled to play an equal role in this process, nor even that the British themselves had set out as their goal the political education of other peoples. Rather, by assuming the imperial mantle, Britain had contracted the moral responsibility to promote improvement, much as, according to Curtis, an industrialist has a moral responsibility to ensure the welfare of his workers. The act of political education was the telos of Empire: "[i]n truth, this world-wide state is not, as some historians have vainly taught, an outcome of blunders, accidents, and crimes, but of the deepest necessities of human life. It is the project of a system designed on the only scale which is capable of meeting those needs." If the Empire was the only means to achieve the needs of freedom and liberty, some

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61 Round Table Studies. Second Series. Installment E. p. 683.

62 Ibid. p. 688.

63 Ibid. p. 689.
imperial subjects enjoyed a greater role in this process. By 1915, Curtis increasingly used the term “the Commonwealth” to denote Empire. He argued that in order “[t]o endure... a commonwealth must contain a sufficient proportion of citizens competent to share in the tasks of government, and, in fact, sharing them.” Put clearly, Curtis argued that a commonwealth, his vision for Empire, “is a state in which government rests on the shoulders of all its citizens who are fit for government”\(^{64}\); its success rested in the ability to “realize its character as a commonwealth in time.”\(^{65}\) The ambiguity in this last passage is unintentionally revealing of Curtis’s Whiggish notion of imperial citizenship. If we parse this sentence to place the emphasis on the last three words, Curtis unintentionally reveals his conviction that it is important to understand Empire as a “commonwealth in time,” a living process where citizenship gradually widens to encompass all under the British sovereign. These humanistic ideas were tempered by Curtis’s separate and more conservative conviction that some men were more fit to govern than others. If the “project of the commonwealth” was to tutor subject peoples in imperial citizenship, the time when such citizenship would be fully realized across the Empire was a long time off.

Here lies the paradox at the core of Curtis’s thought on imperial citizenship. Writing to Lady Selborne in 1915, Curtis expressed his conviction that in Britain, and by extrapolation, in the Empire, some were more fit to govern than others: “I, belonging to the lower middle class, believe more and more firmly every day in aristocracy as understood by Aristotle. In plain words I believe in trusting political power to all who are fit to exercise it, plus as many more as

\(^{64}\) Emphasis added.

\(^{65}\) Ibid., pp. 695, 699, 700.
can be given the vote without endangering the state too much." From this view naturally followed the conviction that the franchise should be extended only where it could be "properly" employed. Curtis’s caveat that he came from humble origins - the "lower middle class" - is intended to convey the fact that his notion of citizenship was not one of noblesse oblige. Though he recoiled from such crude indications of social stratification, it should be noted that, like his contemporary Buchan, Curtis took a marked liking to the social and material benefits of clubland and the country manor. Indeed, in June 1909, shortly before his work in pursuit of union in South Africa bore fruit the following year, Curtis returned to the comforts of London and Oxford. In 1912, sponsored by his patron Milner, he obtained the position of Beit Lecturer of Colonial History at Oxford.

The assumptions and prejudices imbued in the idea of political tutelage will be discussed below in reference to Curtis’s activities in India. Curtis’s affinity for an aristocracy of political merit leads us to ask how such imperial tutors were to be chosen. Here his service with Milner was decisive. The issue of leadership dominated their conversations long after both men had taken leave of southern Africa. Milner was openly dismissive of party politics. Writing early in World War I, he argued that the quality of public men had declined since the nineteenth century, both because of the "machine" nature of parliamentary government and because imperial and domestic issues, which he held to be separate, were perforce dealt with by the same men.

Milner’s vision was a government composed of men with a common cause, each with his


67 [Anon], “Lionel Curtis: The Prophet of Organic Union,” The Round Table, 1955, 106. The Beit Chair in Colonial History was then held by the Canadian H. E. Egerton. The Beit Chair, under whose auspices Beit lecturers worked, was an endowment of Alfred Beit, the South African mining magnate, and a fervent imperialist.
separate task, working within the framework of an Imperial Constitution. It is no accident that Milner's only service as a Minister, indeed his only period of service in the House at all, was in Lloyd George's National Government. Curtis agreed with his mentor's tone, but complained in private to Milner that the latter offered no real alternative to the party system. The question of leadership continued to vex Curtis. Earlier he had looked with hope to Balfour, whom Lady Selborne described as a "hero above politics." The search for a man of common cause also briefly pointed to Lord Grey of Falloch and Bonar Law, though in the case of the latter, for reasons no grander than that he was by birth a colonial. Nowhere, however, did Curtis find a figure capable of propagating the "common cause."

Curtis thus came to favour a form of British "influence," rather than leadership, as the tool to best achieve a federal Empire. The history of the Round Table, the imperial pressure group spearheaded by Curtis and Philip Kerr, later Lord Lothian, is well known. Curtis's work at Oxford was also imbued with his ideas on imperial citizenship. In his Beit seminars, Curtis discussed a wide range of imperial issues, and introduced his students to leading imperial figures of the day, from Members of Parliament to Foreign Office and Admiralty mandarins.

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70 Lady Selborne - Curtis, 10 November 1911; 15 November 1911; 16 January 1913. MSS Curtis, 2/96, 98, 129. Andrew Bonar Law was born in rural New Brunswick in 1858. He moved to Scotland as a child.

71 John Kendle's The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union (Toronto: 1975) remains the best and most detailed historical account of the movement.

72 The Round Table Papers of Lionel Curtis, MS English History 793/82-84, 202.
Curtis also devoted some of his Oxford time to the Ralegh Club, a private discussion forum which he saw as the “Oxford vehicle” of the Round Table. The Ralegh Club was founded on 6 December, 1906, by the scholar J. G. Lockhart, and included among its first members Viscount Cranborne, the Oxford don Reginald Coupland, and the young Canadian Rhodes scholar Vincent Massey. The group’s purpose was to provide a neutral venue for the discussion of politics and the British Empire. Though not officially tied to any other imperial organ, the Ralegh Club was largely sympathetic to Curtis’s idea of a federal imperial union. The Club had a resident membership of twenty-five. It also accepted honorary members by nomination. Curtis, along with fellow Kindergarten alumnus Lionel Hichens, were the first such honourary members. They were followed in 1913 by Richard Jebb, E. D. Morel, the crusader against King Leopold’s Belgian Congo, R. H. Brand, the banker and fellow Round Table member, and George Wrong, the Canadian academic.

Members and invited guests addressed the group on issues of imperial affairs, including the nature of imperial citizenship. A prominent theme of discussion was that of colonial nationalism, and its relation to a potential federal Empire. Some members, such as Lord Compton, disparaged the existence of cleavages in the Dominions created by party politics, pointing to issues such as the then current naval debate in Canada as examples of dominion

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73 The club spelled its name “Ralegh” because that is how their namesake, the explorer Sir Walter Raleigh, spelled his own name.

Curtis also belonged to other imperial organizations during his tenure at Oxford. One such group was the Colonial Club, a largely academic forum which included many Rhodes scholars and other colonial figures then living in Britain. The Colonial Club, like the Ralegh Club, often invited public figures, such as Sir Edward Morris, the Prime Minister of Newfoundland, to give addresses.

74 Minutes of the Ralegh Club, 6 December, 1912, 2 February 1913. Rhodes House, Oxford. Milner joined the group in April of 1913.
leaders being unable to see the forest for the trees.\textsuperscript{75} A federal system, Compton continued, would rectify such difficulties by separating local and imperial affairs.\textsuperscript{76} Edward Grigg, journalist, civil servant, honourary Ralegh Club member, and, from 1913-1914, joint editor of \textit{The Round Table}, countered in a later gathering that colonial nationalism was not necessarily anathema to imperial union. Grigg argued that democracy, whose direction “was all towards the formation of large states,” would act as a check to the authoritarian potential of union.\textsuperscript{77} Lockhart argued that the strength of Empire lay not in its adherence to democracy, but rather in its moral basis. He distinguished between an older imperialism, based upon a laissez-faire detachment from colonial affairs and thus encouraging local autonomy, and the new imperialism\textsuperscript{78}, which was universal and thus demanded unity. Colonial nationalism, he stated, was important, but was clearly secondary to imperial loyalty.\textsuperscript{79} The Indian J. B. Raju, speaking to the club soon after Lockhart, also saw the Empire as a universal institution. In the “exposed fiction of a United India,” the Empire’s greatest merits were the unifying forces of the English language and culture. Raju contradicted Lockhart, however, in contending that Indians were

\textsuperscript{75} The 1911 election in Canada was dictated in part by the issue of Laurier’s support for a Canadian navy. Conservative leader Robert Borden attacked Laurier for not showing sufficient imperial patriotism, while Henri Bourassa castigated the Prime Minister for neglecting Quebec.

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Ibid.}, 25 May 1913.

\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Ibid.}, 8 June 1913.

\textsuperscript{78} Lockhart’s use of the adjective “new” is merely comparative. It is not to be confused with the “New Imperialism,” the term used loosely by historians to designate Britain’s shift to a more active or “forward” imperialism beginning in the 1880’s, usually in reference to the “Scramble for Africa.”

\textsuperscript{79} Minutes of the Ralegh Club, 19 October 1913.
attracted not to the Empire’s moral message, but rather its material richness.\textsuperscript{80}

It was this often myopic attention to ideology that led Ralegh Club members, and the circle of mostly conservative Britons from which it derived its support, to overestimate the potential of imperial citizenship and underestimate the strength and growth of colonial nationalism. Richard Jebb addressed the Club on just this issue in early 1913, arguing that a federal imperial government “would destroy the sense of responsibility in the Dominions.” He argued that an alliance or cooperative structure, based upon mutual interest rather than force, would better achieve the stated goal of imperial unity.\textsuperscript{81}

Curtis was particularly attentive to this question of dual loyalties. In correspondence with Keith Feiling, the New Zealand-born Oxford historian, Curtis argued that because the nature of states is organic, the state perforce claims unlimited authority over its citizens. This occasioned the problem of dual loyalties, as a citizen of a dominion would owe complete allegiance to both his or her homeland and to the Empire.\textsuperscript{82} The potential for conflict, he believed, was obvious. Though not quite as fearful of the negative consequences of such a conflict as was Hamilton\textsuperscript{83}, Curtis nonetheless advanced the federal idea as the solution to this quandary. Just as the American settlement had achieved a balance between the citizen’s loyalty to his local and state

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 26 October, 1913.

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 11 May, 1913. Jebb’s scheme for a Britannic Alliance is explored in greater detail in Chapter IV.

\textsuperscript{82} Curtis - Keith Feiling. 20 February, 1912. MSS English History 793/31.

\textsuperscript{83} “...in every political institution which is formed upon the principle of uniting in a common interest a number of lesser sovereignties, there will be found a kind of eccentric tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs, by the operation of which there will be a perpetual effort in each to fly off from the common centre.” Hamilton, Federalist Paper 15, 1 December, 1787. Selected Federalist Papers, p. 45.
government, so would a Commonwealth create a balance between the dominion citizen’s domestic and imperial loyalties. In advancing this belief in the catholic nature of Empire, Curtis expressed his conviction that imperial citizenship would necessarily encompass all under the crown, though he left the timetable for this evolution purposely vague.  

Curtis’s concept of imperial citizenship was thus one based upon the framework of a federal imperial system. All living within it were theoretically equal but some would exercise leadership until the majority were capable of exercising in full their citizenship, and the loyalty of Dominion residents would be first to the Empire, and second to their national or local community. Such a citizenship model would be both catholic and humanistic, working through English civilization to preserve and protect peace. Put in these words, Curtis appears every part the idealist. The remainder of this chapter will detail Curtis’s activities in propagating his imperial message, first in the colonies of settlement, and second in India.

The Prophet Spreads the Word

Curtis’s influence rested not just in the currency of his thoughts. Indeed, his prolix style sometimes obscured rather than illuminated his ideas when presented in the written form. He compensated for this deficiency by operating as a lobbyist for empire, attempting to influence by personal persuasion individuals in positions of importance. He organized discussion groups, formed interest groups, and travelled tirelessly throughout the empire. The historian Norman Rose has aptly described Curtis as “a doer,” a conclusion with which the latter’s peers would

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certainly have agreed. Curtis was never at a loss for an imperial cause, though many of these
causes were lost ones. He was not content to exert influence upon the debate concerning
imperial citizenship solely from the comfortable seat of Oxford. Soon after his return to England
in 1909, Curtis decided to travel to each of the Dominions to ascertain the respective degree of
imperial sentiment and present the case for a federal imperial union.

Curtis’s decision to travel to the Dominions was the direct result of the creation of the
Round Table. The group had formed in September, 1909, born out of a weekend “Moot,” or
discussion meeting, led by Milner at Plas Newydd, the country estate of Lord Anglesey. Most
of those present were Kindergarten members. Between cricket and golf, the group shared their
common conviction in the importance of Empire, and their belief that some form of federal union
was the best means for its perpetuation. One of the outcomes of the weekend meeting was the
decision to send to Canada Curtis and Phillip Kerr, the Castor and Pollux of the imperial
conservative firmament, along with William Marris, a London member of the Moot. Their task
was to assess the receptiveness in that Dominion to imperial federation. Kerr was circumspect
concerning the potential success of a federal union, attentive to the possibility that the Dominions
would not willingly stall their evolution toward national autonomy solely out of a sense of
imperial duty. By contrast, Curtis was optimistic. He came away from the group’s brief tour
convinced that imperial union could be achieved. He discounted the nationalist stance of
Laurier, and was so inspired by what he believed was Canada’s pan-imperial sentiment that he

85 Rose, p. 59.

86 [Curtis], Memorandum of Conversations which Took Place Between a Few English
and South African Friends at Intervals During the Summer of 1909, MSS English History c.
1007. See also Rose, p. 66, 54 and Kendle 46-72.
rushed to draft the first Round Table document, the so-called *Green Memorandum*. It was this document which set forth the Round Table’s vision of a federal commonwealth.

Curtis argued with his fellow Round Table members over the best means to propagate the message of federal union, and to create the necessary sense of citizenship. Here his force of personality carried his case. His Round Table peers were converted, some, like Kerr, more slowly than others, to the cause of union. On Curtis’s return from Canada, the group decided to make their campaign public, but publish anonymously. This suited Curtis, who had no ambitions to personal glory. His messianic nature, however, demanded a more active role. As he noted later in his trip, in a letter to his mother, “surely God’s will must work for Good not for evil.”

Imbued with this faith, Curtis set sail in the spring of 1910 for South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, returning to England via Canada in early 1911. His circumnavigation of the colonial globe brought Curtis into contact with politicians, business leaders, and “ordinary” subjects.

Curtis’s voyages to the Antipodean Dominions served to confirm his belief in the overriding importance of a common imperial citizenship. Curtis had left for the Dominions eager to test Milner’s argument that imperial citizenship should be built on a foundation of race/culture, a “strong and enduring British leaven” of white men. Curtis saw himself as a catalyst for such

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87 Curtis - his mother, 6 December 1910. MSS Curtis 2/37.

88 See Lady Selborne to Curtis, 17 November [undated, but 1910], MSS Curtis 2/25; Curtis - his mother, 7 July 1910, MSS Curtis 2/10; and Curtis to his mother, 20 September 1910, MSS Curtis 2/14. His travel itinerary is also pieced together from the remaining portions of his travel diary, found in MSS Curtis 142.

89 For details on Curtis’s voyage to Australasia, and the establishment of the Round Table moots in those colonies, see Leonie Foster, *High Hopes: The Men and Motives of the Australian Round Table* (Melbourne: 1986), pp. 17-36.

90 Milner - Curtis, 1 December 1908. MSS Curtis 1/231.
unity, and met initially with much success. Moots were formed in each of the Dominions, though none achieved anything near the influence of the British organization. He found much interest in federalism in New Zealand, where he landed at the end of June, 1910.91 Touring the Dominion in July, he was impressed with the “Britishness” of the people, and approved especially of what he saw as their strong “character.”92 He conversed with farmers who were eager to contribute their fair share to the defence of the Empire, as well as “ordinary” New Zealanders who expressed the Dominion’s reticence to accept “foreign” labour.93 Curtis found the most support for his ideas amongst the conservative establishment, his converts including the son of John Seddon, the Prime Minister, and Professor J. Hight, political scientist at Canterbury College.94 On the evening of 16 August, Curtis convened a group of his converts at the Wellington Royal Oak Hotel.95 The assembled agreed that the Empire needed change, that colonial independence was not as yet a realistic option, that the Dominions should contribute to their own defence, and that Dominion Parliaments were not yet receptive to arguments for union. Curtis pointed to the case of South Africa, where the individual colonies could not cooperate except in formal union. As would be the case in each of the Dominions where moots were formed, the group believed propaganda work must precede the release of the “green memorandum” to the general public. New Zealand was a “test tube” case for Curtis, a Dominion


92 He noted, for instance, the large number of New Zealand youths who made their way to Britain for their education. See Curtis’s travel diary, 7 July, 1910. MSS Curtis, 142/27.

93 Curtis diary, 29 July, 1910; 30 June 1910. MSS Curtis 142/73, 22.


95 Curtis diary, 16 August, 1910. MSS Curtis, 142/99.
both modern and small enough to conduct “experiments” which, if successful, could be replicated throughout the Empire. Buoyed by his perceived successes, he left Auckland for Sydney, Australia on 12 September, 1910.

Despite his optimism, Curtis also noted a parochial streak in the Dominions, an outlook which reinforced his argument against colonial autonomy. This nationalism he found most pronounced in Australia. Indeed, the topic dominated his discussion with Andrew Fischer, the Australian Prime Minister, where the latter impressed upon Curtis his Dominion’s wish for a “white Australia.”

Curtis also observed the reluctance of Australian education authorities to use non-Australian texts in schools. It was the strength of such nationalistic impulses which reinforced for Curtis the need to create strong federal powers to maintain imperial unity.

Curtis also found antipodean life less serious and more philistine in tone than that of Britain. He was particularly disgruntled by what he saw as the intently parochial nature of Dominion party politics. Australians, he complained in his diary, placed material gain above the cultivation of ethical and spiritual improvement: the “real criterion of national value is character and conscience, not wealth.”

A fervently industrious individual himself, Curtis found Australian culture lax and distracted. Australians reserved their greatest energy not for political

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96 Curtis diary, 23 September, 1910. MSS Curtis, 142/147.

97 Curtis diary, 25 September, 1910; 27 October, 1910. MSS Curtis 142/152, 190. One such federal power was taxation. In 1911, Curtis wrote to Duncan, who was still in South Africa, advising the latter to implement tax collection throughout the new union. Curtis believed that a strong, unified tax policy would engender equality of purpose between Boer and Briton, thereby strengthening a sense of shared citizenship. He held a similar conviction regarding the empire as a whole. See also Curtis - Duncan, 8 August 1911. Curtis MSS 2/82. The issue is also considered in The Problem of the Commonwealth, pp. 187-199.

98 Discussion with “a farmer, McGregor,” Curtis diary, 9 August, 1910. MSS Curtis, 142/86.
life, he lamented, but leisure:

[s]port was the curse of modern civilization and of Australia in particular. 43,000 [sic] people attended a football match in the last week. The playing fields of Eaton [sic] were all right as a national school so long as people played; but not when they looked on . . . . People who devoted all this time to sport had no time to think. It was just a revival of the phase under the Roman Empire when the population herded in the arenas.⁹⁹

"The root of the problem," he observed in a letter to his mother, "is that they [Australians] look upon work as a means to leisure instead of looking on leisure as an aid to work."¹⁰⁰ The base nature of Dominion politics, he noted elsewhere, was due directly to Dominion subjects' sense of estrangement from the imperial decision-making process: "[the] absence of responsibility in external affairs was really one of the factors contributing to the deterioration in the moral outlook of the Dominions."¹⁰¹ Curtis believed Australia's "convict" history accounted for the Dominion's nationalism,¹⁰² betraying sympathy with the common early twentieth century notion that behaviour was hereditary.

Such selective understanding was particularly apparent in his position on Dominion immigration policy, an issue of imperial contention in the Edwardian era.¹⁰³ While he accurately observed that immigration was one of the first issues upon which the Dominions, especially those south of the equator, had taken an autonomous position, he failed to understand fully the

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⁹⁹ Curtis diary, 26 September 1910. MSS Curtis 142/158.

¹⁰⁰ Curtis - his mother, 2 November, 1910. MSS Curtis 2/16.

¹⁰¹ Curtis diary, 9 August 1910. MSS Curtis, 142/87.

¹⁰² Curtis diary, 1 July 1910. MSS Curtis, 142/27. Curtis found New Zealand a more 'moral' Dominion, owing its religious-based settlement pattern.

¹⁰³ See below, Chapter V, for a more detailed discussion of imperial immigration policy and its implications for imperial citizenship.
implications of this fact upon the evolution of imperial citizenship. Writing in *The Problem of the Commonwealth*, Curtis stated that the Dominions did not comprehend the imperial ramifications of enacting racially based immigration measures because they felt no responsibility to or for the peoples of the dependencies. Specifically, "they [the Dominion governments] failed to realize the gravity of the offense offered to racial susceptibilities throughout the Indian Empire, and the hardships often inflicted unnecessarily - and even necessarily - on individuals or whole classes of immigrants."\textsuperscript{104} Dominion governments articulated racially-based immigration policies for purely domestic reasons. While it is accurate to argue that not all Dominion citizens sought to inflict offense, the policies were nonetheless discriminatory. Curtis recognized the racial component of colonial nationalism, but did not see it as central to the Dominions' identities. He instead interpreted such policies as a temporary stage in the development of responsible government, one which would be eclipsed when the Dominions achieved maturity. Problems of intra-imperial immigration, which should have concerned someone putatively interested in conceptions of imperial citizenship, were instead subsumed in his writing under the benign term "experience."\textsuperscript{105}

The position Curtis thus implicitly proffered was the encouragement of imperial homogeneity in word, but the acceptance of colonial autonomy in practice on issues where it was shown to be a *fait accompli*. Thus, "[a] colony consists not of a country represented by a certain area on the map but of the people who inhabit that area, and clearly they cannot control their own social development unless they can decide whom to admit to their community and whom to

\textsuperscript{104} *The Problem of the Commonwealth*, pp. 62, 63.

\textsuperscript{105} *Ibid.*, p. 64.
Curtis tried to square the circle by simply assigning jurisdiction over intra-imperial issues to whichever government - imperial or Dominion - expressed greater concern over them. Such a view of federalism might have worked well in the seminar room, but proved stillborn upon conception.

Curtis further argued, somewhat curiously, that the principle of free movement of imperial citizens within the Empire was only a narrowly conceived right. Noting the centrality of private property as recognized in English common law, he asserted that “the only part of England which is legally open to an Englishman [or citizen of the British Empire] is that portion of its surface covered by the public roads, the commons, and such landed property as he himself may chance to possess.” Such a proposition lends credence to the argument that citizenship, both English and imperial, was based upon qualifications other than “race,” or more specifically cultural origin. Thus, wealthy and or well-educated Indians such as the businessman, academic, and politician Dadabhai Naoroji (Salisbury’s “Black Man”), or indeed Mohandas K. Gandhi, could find a place in late-Victorian and Edwardian London, while uneducated and/or poor Indians were castigated as “backward.” This is not to say that neither England itself, nor the Dominions, were welcoming societies, but rather that where they discriminated, they did so indirectly through the pursuit of “responsible government” or “autonomy.” Curtis implicitly

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106 Ibid., p. 63.


108 On Naoroji, see Jonathan Schneer, London: 1900, (New Haven: 1999), Chapter 8. Schneer advances the counter-argument that British notions of Empire and citizenship were indeed racist and exclusionary in principle. David Cannadine, in Ornamentalism (2001), his riposte to Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978), lays out the argument that class, not race, was the central pillar of the imperial household.
recognized that imperial citizenship was not at its heart concerned with issues of race, though in practice it often manifested itself thus. What he failed to understand was that such a race-blind citizenship could not simply be imposed by changes in government structure or the lobbying of pressure groups. Thus an important flaw in his conception of imperial citizenship was that it did not adequately recognize the strength of colonial nationalism.

*Curtis, India, and the Disjoint between Theory and Practice*

If Curtis's understanding of nationalism was flawed in relation to the Dominions, it proved especially misguided when he turned his mind to India, the lynchpin of the Empire. The case of India proved especially troublesome for Curtis, as indeed it did for all of the Round Table. It occupied a half-way house between the settlement colonies, which enjoyed responsible government and the dependencies, governed by British fiat, and deemed by London unlikely to progress towards autonomy in the near or distant future. India was ancient. Unlike the other dependencies, whose cultures the British regarded as either "backward" or "childish," Indian culture had long established roots. In the early decades of the Raj, the British had conceived of India as an unchanging or feudal land, home to "Oriental Despotism." This view was undercut by the early nineteenth century as British scholars "discovered" Indian traditions of self-government and aristocracy. Corresponding with the Age of Reform at home, late-Georgian and early-Victorian British officials, most notably James Mill, promulgated a series of reforms in India consistent with the principles of utilitarian liberalism.

The Indian Mutiny of 1857 put an end to British efforts at fostering a shared identity
amongst British and Indians in India. The East India Company lost its right to govern in 1858, and was completely dissolved by 1874. The British government assumed direct control of the region, and increasingly the British came to view the societies of the subcontinent as ones defined by race and caste.\textsuperscript{109} The notion that India was marked above all by its difference from Britain reached its peak during Lord Curzon’s tenure as Viceroy (1898-1905). The architectural splendour of Government House in Calcutta and the summer retreat at Simla contrasted sharply with the squalor in which most Indians lived, and gave expression to the growing cultural divide.\textsuperscript{110} Curtis shared Curzon’s view of India as a land of difference and saw as his main task the integration of Indian society into the imperial citizenship his federal scheme dictated. This proved an insurmountable challenge.

Curtis’s attention to the question of Indian participation as imperial citizens set him apart from many conservatives who, like Joseph Chamberlain during his 1903 Tariff Reform campaign, conspicuously ignored India. Despite their preoccupation with the Dominions, the “Indian question” had also exercised the minds of the members of the Round Table since the group’s inception. The Round Table had convened a symposium on Indian issues on 30 June, 1912, the same month Kerr contributed anonymously an article on India to \textit{The Round Table}.\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{109} See Metcalfe, pp.6-11, 25-31.

\textsuperscript{110} On Simla and Government House, see David Gilmour, \textit{Curzon} (London: 1994), pp. 204-207.

\textsuperscript{111} Curtis - Graeme Patterson, 4 June 1912. MSS English History 823/61; Kerr - Curtis, 17 April 1912. MSS English History 823/36. See also [Phillip Kerr], “India and the Empire,” \textit{Round Table}, 2, 1912, 587-626.
The Indian scholar J. B. Raju by 1913 had attempted to form a Round Table moot in India.\textsuperscript{112} In 1915, in association with two of Lord Selborne’s sons then on military service in India, Raju succeeded in establishing a Round Table study group in Agra.\textsuperscript{113} The Agra group was to remain the only Round Table institution outside Britain and the Dominions. In the United Kingdom, the Round Table Moot, as the British core of the movement was unofficially known, convened a special “Indian Moot” in the fall of 1915 to discuss measures to bring India into the federal model. Curtis himself had studied the Indian situation as early as 1910 during his tour of Australia and New Zealand.\textsuperscript{114} In line with most conservatives who had staked out positions on India in the early twentieth century, he also cautiously supported India’s eventual evolution to responsible government, and advocated Britain’s role as trustee in helping to bring about this transition. During his tenure in South Africa, Curtis had been influenced by Milner’s notion of a British Empire founded on ties of blood - of race conceived of in narrow terms. The young Curtis argued that “[i]f the system [colonial integration] is to be a reality the place of birth must

\textsuperscript{112} See Hon. Louis Palmer - Lady Selborne, undated letter, MSS Curtis 2/170. A date of 1913 is probable as the letter is filed with other materials from that year. The Round Table also curtailed its proselytizing work during the war years, when Curtis was preoccupied with writing The Problem of the Commonwealth and Commonwealth of Nations. Finally, note 93 (see below) indicates that Raju had worked for some time on that project. Raju was an Oxford-educated Indian, and, as noted above, a participant in Ralegh Club functions.

\textsuperscript{113} See Dewitt Clinton Ellinwood, Jr., “The Round Table Movement and India,” Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, 9, 1971, p. 190.

\textsuperscript{114} Kerr - H. A. L. Fischer, 8 November 1910. MSS English History 823/5. Kerr records that he sent Curtis Sir W. Hunter’s The Indian Empire, which provided Curtis with much of his historical knowledge of India.
be treated as irrelevant and race and blood must be treated as the essential factor.”115 His labours in pursuit of South African unification had attuned him to the importance of fostering a sense of shared community, however. In confronting the “problem of India,” Curtis realized that Milner’s race-patriotism and idea of “maintenance” were no longer practical considerations. It was simply impossible for enough white settlers to emigrate to India to alter the demographic odds in Britain’s favour, and no longer an acceptable option to enforce subjugation by the sword.

Though undeniably brutal and a gross example of overreaction, General R. E. H. Dyer’s actions at Amritsar in 1919 proved the last gasp of autocratic rule in India, despite continual low-intensity conflicts and constitutional wrangling in the subsequent three decades leading to independence.

British rule in India had always been rule by the sword, though tempered by attempts at fostering acquiescence amongst the native population.116 By the end of the Edwardian era, however, reform was in the offing. The Morley-Minto reforms117 of 1909 increased the number of Indians eligible to serve on the Raj’s provincial and central legislative councils, and through the war years British officials debated the wisdom of agreeing to further constitutional concessions designed to increase Indian participation in self-government. Indeed, the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919 can be viewed as progressive in this respect, as after that date a full

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115 Lavin, p. 60.

116 Examples of attempts to foster acquiescence include the Municipal Council Act of 1882 (which gave local bodies jurisdiction over education, sanitation, and public health), and the Indian Councils Act of 1892 (which introduced limited elections for legislative councils). See Barbara Metcalf and Thomas Metcalf, *A Concise History of India* (Cambridge: 2002), p. 135.

117 The official title of the Act to extend the franchise in India was the Indian Councils Act (1909), the most significant of the Morley-Minto reforms.
one-tenth of India’s male population was enfranchised, a percentage numbering in real terms almost 16 million people. A less charitable view of British actions in India during the 1910's is that they were desperate measures designed to maintain the Raj in the face of an increasingly bellicose Congress and the satyagraha campaign of Gandhi and his sympathizers.

Curtis departed for India in 1916 by way of Canada and the Antipodean colonies. He arrived in the subcontinent in late September of that year, just as the debate over responsible government for the region turned hot. His work in propagating his notion of Commonwealth citizenship had an immediate and significant effect. Impressed by the performance of Indian troops in combat on the Western Front and in Mesopotamia, and conscious of the rise of nationalism throughout the subcontinent, Curtis became convinced that India must be brought into the federation tent. As he had earlier done for the Dominions, Curtis decided that he should

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120 Curtis diary, 25 September 1916. MSS Curtis 143/5. Curtis elsewhere records that he arrived in India in October of 1916. See Curtis, Letters to the People of India on Responsible Government. The date is here given as September, as that is consistent with his diary entry, though it is conceivable that either the diary date is incorrect, or that he met with the Bombay government official whom he refers to in the diary while still at sea.

121 Curtis began to use the phrase “commonwealth citizenship” in place of “imperial citizenship” after he began work on The Problem of the Commonwealth to better reflect his idea of Empire as a cooperative federation.

122 The Indian Army raised 1,440,437 volunteers in the First World War, 62,056 of whom died. See Denis Judd, Empire: The British Imperial Experience from 1765 to the Present (London: 1996), p. 245.
voyage to India to gather information and press the case for federation to those “on the ground.”

Upon arrival, Curtis was immediately struck by the divide in India over Indian self-rule. On the one hand, he met with British officials who, though often sympathetic to Indian ambitions for responsible government and equal citizenship, believed that Indian representation in any Imperial Parliament would not be feasible until Indians were prepared to govern themselves. In the words of Sir Reginald Craddock, whom Curtis interviewed in November of 1911, self-government for India was “like a distant peak with the light on it.”123 Britain’s official position was “responsible government in the future; trusteeship in the present.” On the other hand, Curtis conversed with Indian nationalists who asserted India’s alleged tradition of self-rule. At a conference of Indian princes in Delhi in October of 1911, Curtis himself was lectured on the divine nature of Indian princely rule.124

Curtis believed that imperial citizens, however defined, must also remain subjects of the British crown, the repository of imperial loyalty. As such, arguments for Indian self-government predicated on the separate sovereignty of Indian rulers obviously carried for him little weight. He did respect the upper tiers of Indian society as educated125, however, and envisioned a half-way house which he believed might be amenable to both sides. This house he termed dyarchy.126

123 Curtis diary, 11 November 1911. MSS Curtis 143/12.

124 Curtis diary, 31 October 1911. MSS Curtis 143/8.

125 See David Cannadine, Ornamentalism, for the argument that British imperial actors viewed the Empire in terms of class, and thus accorded respect to fellow elites in the colonies.

126 Curtis spelled out his thoughts on dyarchy and Indian citizenship in his three works on India, A Letter to the People of India (1917) [reprinted in Dyarchy pp. 38-95], Letters to the People of India on Responsible Government (1918) [reprinted in Dyarchy pp. 357-466], and especially Dyarchy: Papers Relating to the Principle of Dyarchy to the Government of India (1920).
Curtis envisioned dyarchy as a system of parallel jurisdictions designed to gradually incorporate Indians into the ruling class. Britain’s task was not to educate Indians for self-government in a formal manner, but rather to bring Indians into the current decision-making structure. “It is in the workshop of actual experience alone that electorates will acquire the art of self-government, however highly educated they may be.”\textsuperscript{127} In advancing this position in his conversations with Indian and British officials, Curtis was recommending a limited democracy for India. He explicitly differentiated this form of democracy from self-government, however: “while self-government involves election, election does not involve self-government.”\textsuperscript{128} Thus, while he believed that those Indians with education were capable of exercising responsibly the franchise and participating in local government, he did not believe that they were as yet capable of doing so without the watchful eye of the Raj.

Neither in Curtis’s view were Indians as yet ready to participate as equals in his proposed Imperial Parliament. Consistent with the philosophy of gradualism implicit in dyarchy, Curtis suggested that India’s current position in such a body should be an advisory one. Such a measure, he argued, would provide India a voice in the Imperial Legislature, while ensuring that quarrels between Hindu and Muslim voices would not cause trouble.\textsuperscript{129} In advancing this position Curtis was not without Indian support. Babu Surendranatti Banerjee, editor of the Indian newspaper \textit{Bengalie}, agreed with Curtis’s view on the need to educate Indians in governing before responsible government could be instituted. He urged Curtis to lobby British

\textsuperscript{127} Curtis, \textit{Letters to the People of India on Responsible Government}, p. 159.

\textsuperscript{128} Curtis diary, 26 November, 1916. MSS Curtis, 143/26.

\textsuperscript{129} Curtis diary, 13 October, 1916; 7 November, 1916. MSS Curtis, 143/17, 32.
officials to include property and education qualifications in any expansion of the Indian electorate, thereby ensuring highly qualified Indian elected representatives.\textsuperscript{130} Another Indian interlocutor believed Indians should maintain their caste traditions and let the British govern, as this was consistent with “tradition.” Despite the myopia betrayed by this argument, it serves to remind us that by the twentieth century the Raj was as much a part of “Indian tradition” as was the durbar or Hinduism.\textsuperscript{131} Other Indian correspondents were even benignly supportive of British rule, arguing that it had previously helped rid India of scourges natural and cultural, such as famine and sati.\textsuperscript{132}

Curtis’s adherence to principles of tutelage was accompanied by a conviction that force was still the ultimate basis of British authority: “to maintain order you must legislate against disorder.”\textsuperscript{133} Writing in his travel diary on Indian nationalism, he even accepts the use of military force in the event of uprisings.\textsuperscript{134} Still, he was hopeful a pan-imperial patriotism would result from the gradual inclusion of Indians in local, and later national, government. He was less

\textsuperscript{130} Curtis diary, 12 December, 1916. MSS Curtis, 143/ 38.

\textsuperscript{131} Indeed, Lord Curzon cemented this fusion of cultural traditions with his magnificent Imperial Durbar of 1903. Organized to proclaim Edward VII Emperor of India, Curzon modelled the occasion on Lord Lytton’s 1877 Durbar proclaiming Queen Victoria Empress of India. Curzon consciously adopted an Indo-Saracenic motif in order to make Indians feel more welcome, though there was no mistaking which was the dominant power. See Bernard Cohn, “Representing Authority in Victorian India,” in \textit{The Invention of Tradition}, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger editors, (London: 1995 [1983]), pp. 207-209.

\textsuperscript{132} Bhupendranattee Basu - Curtis, 8 December, 1916. MSS Curtis, 143/35. \textit{Sati} [also \textit{suttee}] is the now defunct Hindu practice of a widow immolating herself on her husband’s funeral pyre.

\textsuperscript{133} [Curtis], “Notes on India,” undated manuscript, MSS Curtis 143/116.

\textsuperscript{134} “England could wipe them [potential ‘rebels’] out with big guns.” Curtis diary, 14 December, 1916. MSS Curtis 143/41.
concerned with fostering in Indians a personal devotion to the monarch, as existed in the Dominions, but rather hoped to generate local patriotism, a self-pride in the institutions which the Empire had allowed to flourish. Curtis was not a jingo, a narrow-minded patriot whose patriotism amounted to little more than national self-centredness.¹³⁵ Rather, he shared the view of his fellow conservative G. K. Chesterton that to say “[m]y country right or wrong” is like saying “my mother drunk or sober.”¹³⁶ Patriotism, in Curtis’s view, was a higher allegiance to the ideals which made one’s country (or, in this case, Empire-commonwealth) worth preserving. He reached back to his earlier invocation of Hamilton’s federalism, noting that the local patriotism of the old Thirteen Colonies continued to flourish under the aegis of the new American Republic. From Hamilton, Curtis drew the conclusion that an imperial citizenship could be forged by allowing national patriotism to exist within the parameters of an imperial structure which united the different peoples of the Empire. This would allow for unity and diversity. And, like the early American republic, though for different reasons, some citizens would enjoy greater stature than others. Political experience, Curtis continued, must precede the necessary social reform through which true equality would emerge: “[the] creation of electorates involves an experience of responsibility.”¹³⁷

Curtis’s presence in India was not without controversy. Consistent with the Round Table modus operandi of anonymous publication and informal lobbying, Curtis attempted to work

¹³⁵ See below the relevant sections of Chapter III and Chapter V on jingoism and patriotism.

¹³⁶ G. K. Chesterton, The Defendant (1901). Chesterton converted to Roman Catholicism in 1922.

¹³⁷ ‘Notes on India’, MSS Curtis 143/174.
"behind the curtain" while informally "polling" the public on its potential receptivity to a federal imperial system. The perils of such an approach are two-fold. On the one hand one risks generating suspicion, especially in those outside of the chosen circle wary of a cabal. On the other hand, in attempting to "lead from the front" in marshalling public opinion to one's cause, one risks being led by those voices most vocal, rather than most representative. Curtis encountered both difficulties in December, 1916.

The "Indian Letter Controversy" erupted on 28 December, 1916, when a private letter Curtis had intended for Kerr was leaked and published in the Bombay Chronicle.138 The letter was marked "private" and was destined for circulation to Round Table members and subscribers. In it, Curtis summarized his early conversations with Indians, and elaborated on India's place in the proposed Imperial Parliament. The Chronicle recounted what in its view were the letter's most pernicious points: the nefarious working methods of the Round Table, Curtis's desultory and offensive linking of India with Central Africa as imperial societies not yet ready for the mantle of responsible government, and the Round Table's goal of responsible government as the purpose of Empire in India. The response to the letter in the Indian press was swift and severe. New India wrote that Curtis's views on India were "a tissue of misrepresentations and half-truths more diabolical than lies," and chided the Prophet for lecturing Indians on government "in the land where village self-government existed, when England was unborn."139 The Beharee

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138 Bombay Chronicle, 28 December, 1916. Patterson notes that Gandhi soon after took credit for the leak, and indeed Henry Polak, a Gandhi associate, reminded Congress the day after the letter appeared in the Chronicle that Curtis had supported anti-Asian legislation when he was in South Africa. See Patterson, p. 127. The "letter controversy" is briefly recounted in Lavin, pp. 140-141, though she does not mention Gandhi's involvement.

139 New India, 29 December, 1916. Round Table cuttings, MSS English history, 851/6.
lamented that the letter was just the sort of thing to be expected from Englishmen who know nothing of India. *Magh* feared there was a plan in motion to “bring our country [India] under the domination of the colonies.”

Curtis’s reputation as an honest broker in imperial affairs amongst the London establishment was preserved by the intervention of Sir James Meston, Governor of the United Provinces and an India delegate at the 1917 Imperial Conference, who spoke well of Curtis, calling him impetuous but loyal to the Empire. Affairs in India were more combustible. His position in jeopardy of being compromised, Curtis responded to the allegations of perfidy and authoritarianism not with direct rebuttals, but by offering to the public the full context of his views. In March of 1917 Curtis outlined his position in the Indian press, in which he made a virtue out of necessity by publicly endorsing the idea of responsible government as Britain’s vision for India. He published his response in full as *A Letter to the People of India on Responsible Government* in May, 1917. The Indian press now became more conciliatory, expressing hope that here was a voice which understood Indian nationalism. In extolling the virtue of gradualism as the path to responsible government, Curtis effectively sidestepped his private comparison of Indians and Africans as peoples as yet “beyond the pale,” too immature to partake equally in the imperial citizenship he envisioned for the Dominions.

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140 The *Beharee*, 4 January, 1917; *Magh*, January 1917. Round Table cuttings, MSS English history, 851/13-14, 8.

141 It must be stated that Meston, Governor of the United Provinces, also had a less altruistic motive for defending Curtis. Meston himself had been implicated in the Curtis letter by virtue of Curtis having added (disingenuously) Meston’s name as a co-writer to add weight to his impressions. Meston had also extended the invitation that brought Curtis to India in the first place, and thus saw himself partially responsible for the latter’s activities.

142 *Indian Social Reformer*, 7 January, 1917.
It is tempting to view Curtis’s response to the letter controversy as a partial *mea culpa*, a recognition on his part that India was in fact more like Britain than he had previously thought, and that it therefore should not be patronized with “tutelage” but instead brought into the imperial fold as a full partner.\(^{143}\) Such a view is to argue, however, that Curtis’s ideas on imperial citizenship were motivated by expediency. This jars with the evidence. The desire to foster a “wider patriotism” was part of his notion of imperial citizenship as early as the later years of his service in South Africa. To assert that it was not, as does Kathryn Patterson, is to accuse Curtis of being disingenuous.\(^{144}\) The notion of an imperial citizenship which incorporated Indians was not mere rhetoric. Had Curtis wanted to placate colonial subjects uncomfortable with any proposal to include “coloured” subjects within an imperial citizenship, he could simply have avoided speaking on India altogether, and indeed this was the course he followed in the main concerning Africa. Curtis certainly was not an enlightened voice on matters of race - no plan for equal citizenship ever passed his lips. That said, no one else of Curtis’s generation proffered such a plan either.

Curtis’s position on imperial citizenship evolved from one influenced heavily by Lord Milner’s idea of imperial maintenance and race-patriotism to one which argued for a shared sense of loyalty to the institution of Empire and a freedom derived from respect for local autonomy. In a speech he gave upon stepping down from the Johannesburg town council in

\(^{143}\) This is Patterson’s view. She rightly observes that Curtis served Montagu in an advisory position, but it is incorrect to assume that the 1917 reforms, while representing a change of opinion for Montagu, also represented a change in position for Curtis. This is to erroneously contend that Curtis held an inflexible position regarding India before 1917, which is at odds with his record both at Oxford and in South Africa. See Patterson pp. 128-130.

\(^{144}\) Patterson, pp. 168, 189.
1906, the young Curtis had voiced a muted acceptance of the autonomy and indeed vibrancy to be found in the colonies: “I found that they [South Africans] judge one not by where one comes from or by how he was brought up . . . . I always [found] that they judge by one’s purpose.”\textsuperscript{145} Curtis admired such goal-driven behaviour because he himself shared this view of life and the importance of having goals. At this stage in his career, though, Curtis still held to the Milnerian conviction that the strength of Empire was to be found in London, in the institutions both abstract and concrete which Britain (by which he truly meant England) herself had created. The Westminster system, Curtis noted, “has given her [England] the name and place that she holds today, the freest and strongest country in the world.” The early Curtis still held to conventional notions of an Empire centred in the metropole.

Curtis was more successful in propagating his model of imperial citizenship on the lectern than he was in practical political terms. Nowhere was this gap more evident than in India. The “Indian question” which confronted imperial thinkers in the 1910's was not one which demanded a simple choice between equality or servitude for His Majesty’s Indian subjects. The “Indian question” spoke directly to a sense of trepidation felt by many Britons, Curtis included, concerning their relationship with India. Many Britons felt uneasy engaging politically with peoples of “questionable” or at the least “immature” political competence, yet realized that the logical conclusion of the imperial enterprise was just such an engagement. This intellectual dilemma was addressed by Curtis and his fellow-travellers in a manner consistent with the Round Table’s philosophy of the efficacy of the study-group - an issue which demands

\textsuperscript{145} Report of Curtis’s speech at the Carlton Hotel, Johannesburg, 30 October, 1906. MSS Curtis 126/3.
further study. On this point it is revealing that Curtis left India in 1918 a frustrated man. The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, which in retrospect clearly laid the foundation for eventual Indian independence, did not at the time satisfy Curtis. He found them too cautious, and lamented that they did not enact in full the principle of dyarchy which he favoured. At the same time, Curtis was never able to grasp the sophistication and deep roots of Indian nationalism, and thus failed to understand why some nationalists viewed dyarchy as simply a perpetuation by alternate means of the status quo.

As was his pattern when confronted with political setback, instead of reevaluating his message or his political strategy, Curtis moved his campaign to a different imperial front - in the 1920's he plunged into the Irish conflict preaching the same message of shared authority which he had promoted for India, namely the creation of an Irish Dominion which would subsume internecine rivalries within a federal structure. He was to be no more successful in Ireland than he was in India.

Conclusion

Despite his difficulties in India, Lionel Curtis was particularly well-suited to his chosen role as imperial spokesman. His early experiences at Oxford and in South Africa impressed upon him the importance of Empire as an instrument of peace through unity. A strong work ethic, broad social connections, and an insatiable curiosity about his fellow imperial subjects spurred him to spread this message throughout the Empire. Drawing upon the Union he had helped bring
about in South Africa, as well as the ideas of the American founding father Alexander Hamilton. Curtis argued that the means by which the Empire could achieve unity was imperial federation. Curtis’s co-creation, the Round Table, set about raising support for such an institution in both Britain and the Dominions. Curtis believed that an imperial federation would encourage the political participation of all members of the Empire, eventually bringing about an egalitarian imperial citizenship. The midwife for this process was to be an “authoritarian liberalism,” whereby Britain instructed the Empire’s non-white members in British political culture.

Curtis’s imperial reach proved longer than his grasp. In advancing a broad and idealistic view of empire, he overlooked many of the elements which pointed instead to imperial devolution and growing nationalism. Most importantly, he failed to recognize the nascent feelings of national identity at play in both the settlement colonies and the dependent Empire, and overestimated the degree to which political tutelage could persuade colonial peoples to see the benefits of the British imperium. The concept of imperial citizenship which Curtis advocated could only be created once an imperial state itself had come into being. Because Curtis and his Round Table peers were unable to help bring about such a transition, the imperial citizenship he envisioned also failed to materialize.

Nonetheless, his ideas were influential in framing the political evolution of Empire in the mid-twentieth century. Perhaps of greatest significance was his concept of dyarchy, which epitomized the British style of informal Empire, and ironically, given Curtis’s support for imperial federation, proved an essential stepping-stone in India’s progress toward independence. If his work for imperial federation produced, then, mixed results, the “Prophet” himself does not merit the same historical judgement. Through his tireless advocacy of imperial union, he came
to embody the principle of progressive imperialism in the first half of the twentieth century.
Chapter III

“A Lodge in the Wilderness”:
John Buchan, the British Empire, and the Question of Who Belongs

Every subject’s duty is the king’s, but every subject’s soul is his own

*Henry V IV, i, 176-177*

In the course of inter-election campaigning for the constituency of Peebles and Selkirk in the immediate pre-war years, John Buchan’s Liberal opponent, Donald MacLean, once accused the Conservative Buchan of vacillating on the issue of tariffs. Buchan’s response, “consistency is not much of a virtue,” was indicative of his mental outlook and political temperament, and characterized his attitude to Empire. This is not to say that Buchan lacked a focused intellect, or was merely self-serving, desirous of the trappings and honours of political postings, but devoid of substance, as some critics have charged. John Buchan was a practical man, whether as

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1 Unidentified clipping, Scrapbook 1: Miscellanea 1904-1919, Buchan Papers, Queen’s University Archives (hereafter QUA), Kingston, p. 87. The campaign was aborted with the outbreak of war in August 1914.

novelist, barrister, civil servant, historian, or finally in 1935, as Lord Tweedsmuir of Elsfield, Governor-General of Canada. His personality was forged by the twin and often competing forces of a latent Calvinism, befitting the son of the manse that he was, and a strong Scottish romanticism, culled from, amongst other sources, a life-long devotion to Sir Walter Scott. Buchan’s public life was imbued with these influences. His attitude toward Empire demonstrates a good example of a progressive conservative with a cosmopolitan sympathy held back, but only just, by his respect for tradition and stability. As Buchan himself asserted, he was “a Conservative with a move on.”

Buchan devoted the greater part of his career to the propagation and preservation of his concept of Empire, a concept he came to form during the first decades of the twentieth century. His vision was of a broad-minded notion of Empire based upon morality, values, and an understated fatalism. From this understanding of imperialism Buchan formed a conception of imperial citizenship as cosmopolitan and cooperative, an organic citizenship which resembled, but did not mimic, that of Curtis.

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works about and by Buchan.

3 *Edinburgh Evening News*, undated clipping. Scrapbook 1, p. 69, Buchan Papers, QUA.
John Buchan’s Imperial Beginnings

Discussions of John Buchan’s imperialism unfailingly begin with his 1906 symposium *A Lodge in the Wilderness*. All too often, however, they do not move much beyond this work. Buchan wrote the book, his second full-length work of fiction, in the wake of his time in South Africa as a not yet thirty year old aide to Alfred, Lord Milner. The book is a thinly veiled treatise on the nature of Empire, and while critics have rightly noted *A Lodge*’s literary failings, they have been too quick to attribute to Buchan the main character’s views on Empire. Hence, the ubiquitous reference made by commentators to the claim of Francis Carey, the Cecil Rhodes character, that Empire is “a spirit, an attitude of mind, an unconquerable hope . . . It is the wider patriotism which conceives our people as a race and not as a chance community.” On this basis, even temperate critics such as Juanita Kruse have portrayed Buchan as paternalistic, while other less measured pens have termed him “racist,” “misogynous,” and a mouthpiece for “white supremacy.” Such misreadings of Buchan’s imperialism are the result of examining Buchan’s

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4 Following *The Half-Hearted* (1901).


fiction without considering his broader career. While his novels are certainly significant in understanding his views on Empire, it is important to note that before 1920 Buchan did not regard himself primarily as a novelist. Indeed, the novel upon which his fame continues to rest, *The Thirty-Nine Steps* (1915), was written as a diversion while Buchan endured a duodenal ulcer and was confined to bed in Broadstairs. In order to properly consider Buchan’s imperialism, and the light it can shed on the development of imperial citizenship in the pre-1920 era, it is necessary to examine the full scope of his undertakings.

Buchan’s fiction, though, is still an important key to his imperial outlook. Instead of considering his more well-known works such as *A Lodge, Prester John* (1910), or *Greenmantle* (1916), it is a largely overlooked 1910 short story in the *Atlantic Monthly* that brings Buchan’s views come most clearly to the fore. “God’s Providence” is an examination of the relationship between imperialism and domestic politics which characterized Buchan’s own career. Anticipating Buchan’s rejoinder to accusations of hypocrisy on the Scottish campaign trail, one character notes that “[w]hoever makes a fetish [sic] of consistency is a trumpery body, and little use to God or man.”7 The story is about the folly of slavish devotion to creeds. It gently mocks the impassioned calls of the imperial ideologues and displays a sympathy for a balance between tradition and change. Indeed, what most commentators on *A Lodge* have failed to recognize is that Buchan was trying to sort out what he saw as “true” imperialism from what he saw as the jingoistic position of men in the type of Joseph Chamberlain. Buchan mistrusted jingoism even at that early age. This distinction framed Buchan’s thinking on imperial citizenship. His beliefs were based upon firm moral convictions, but he realized that they could only be realized through practical means.

Alongside a fervent sense of morality, Buchan also maintained a life-long sense of

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fatalism. He recognized that life is full of failure and unfulfilled visions. From the time of the
death of his close friend Cuthbert Medd in 1902 through the upheaval of the war years, when he
lost his younger brother Alistair, and friends Tommy Nelson and Raymond Asquith, he endured
personal tragedy. However, while he dealt with personal failure by throwing himself into
another challenge - taking up journalism and the law when his position with Cromer fell through,
writing *The Thirty-Nine Steps* when he could not go to the front - he dealt with tragedy and
disappointments in the political sphere with perseverance. His fatalism and approach to failure
ironically made him a progressive Tory. Thus, he embodied an interesting paradox: he
envisioned imperial citizenship in idealized terms but sought to attain it through practical means.

Buchan was a moderate imperialist. His was not the idealism of the technocrat, nor
that of the jingo. He developed a notion of Empire as cooperation. From this evolved his
concomitant understanding of imperial citizenship. To Buchan, citizenship was a lived principle.
He approached the world with a Calvinist certainty rounded at the edges to account for what he
saw as man's inherent frailty. Citizenship in Buchan's mind was a relationship of common
community, of responsibility to the collective.

The central tenet of this view was a muted cosmopolitanism, grounded in firm
conviction, not emotion. He never left the broad church of Scottish Presbyterianism, and thus
his position on citizenship was guided by a firm morality. The responsibility and duty of
individual and state were reciprocal and paramount. Buchan also viewed imperial democracy as
a concept worthwhile but difficult to achieve. These rather sober characteristics, however, were
tempered by an ecumenical understanding of race and a Romantic conservatism, the latter most
familiar to the legions of Buchan's readers. From this palette, Buchan produced a

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8 He pays tribute to these and other fallen friends in *These for Remembrance* (1919), his
most personal book.
impressionistic vision of imperial citizenship which was more far-sighted than that of most of his contemporaries. Like many successful people, he was a man of paradox. He was a practical idealist, promoting an ecumenical view of imperial citizenship in an age praising cultural homogeneity and “national interest.” Unlike the parochial conservative view which held that Empire was a British possession to be developed and exploited as such, Buchan was interested in and concerned with issues which addressed the Empire as a whole, a totality. As Governor General of Canada from 1935 until his death in 1940, he brought these views to an imperial post of prominence, and became a strong advocate of the country he came to love.

The genesis of this position is to be found in Buchan’s upbringing. The Reverend John Buchan was a Free Church minister; his mother was an equally devout Calvinist. Hence the younger Buchan grew up in an atmosphere of moral sobriety. Buchan attended Hutchesons’ Boys Grammar School in Glasgow, after which, at the age of seventeen, he moved to Glasgow University. As such, he remained free of what the historian J. A. Mangan has called the public school ethos. Not for him the boyhood indoctrination of duty, cooperation, and Muscular Christianity coupled with a belief in the right to rule others. As Buchan wrote in his autobiography, *Memory Hold the Door*, school was “an incident, an inconsiderable incident; a period of enforced repression which ended daily at four in the afternoon.” Buchan was always most at home by himself, a state-of-mind he most often sought in nature. Following the example of his literary idol, Sir Walter Scott, Buchan found inspiration in the Scottish countryside, especially the Borders of his youth. He shared the temperament of that region’s inhabitants, “realism coloured by poetry, a stalwart independence sweetened by courtesy, a shrewd, kindly

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wisdom.”\textsuperscript{10}

When he moved to Brasenose College, Oxford, on scholarship, much of the principled character that marked his mature life had already been formed. His Glasgow mentor, the classicist Gilbert Murray, had impressed upon Buchan the virtues of independent study, especially of the Greco-Roman past. Though Murray was primarily a Greek scholar, Buchan gravitated to the Romans, in whom he discovered a “standard of values.”\textsuperscript{11} He rejected as tendentious the philosophical idealism of T. H. Green and his associates, then prevalent at Oxford. Though he was attracted to Platonism as a “climate of opinion,” he began to cultivate a suspicion of systems of thought, especially those based upon what he perceived to be generalities. Ideals were not created through perception - \textit{cogitavit, ergo fuit} - but rather were articulated from experience. They must have a distinguished pedigree, and be possessed of a benevolent or productive purpose. In imperialism Buchan found an ideal suited to his world view.

What Buchan developed at Oxford was an intellectual confidence in himself and a passionate respect for classical learning. He won numerous prizes, including the Stanhope and the Newdigate, though his disappointment at being denied a Fellowship at All Souls in 1898 lingered for many years.\textsuperscript{12} He also set a standard of industry, producing numerous books of

\textsuperscript{10} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 43.


\textsuperscript{12} A. J. Butler conveyed his sympathies with Buchan, noting in a letter in late 1899 that “it [Oxford] is an entangling place, and not favourable to the higher forms of mental or moral energy.” A. J. Butler - Buchan, 5 November, 1899. Correspondence General [CG], Buchan Papers, QUA (letters are filed in chronological order). Buchan garnered the Stanhope Prize for an essay on Raleigh, the Newdigate for his verse on the Pilgrim Fathers. See also Lownie, pp. 60-61. The Stanhope was awarded annually for the best undergraduate history essay, the Newdigate annually for the best undergraduate poem. Fellowships at All Souls, of which there
prose and poetry, debating in the Union, and cultivating relationships with a circle of peers that included Tommy Nelson, Raymond Asquith, and Arthur Steel (later Steel-Maitland), among others. Buchan’s talent and productivity were such that he appeared in the 1898 edition of *Who’s Who* at the slight age of twenty-two, the youngest entry in that edition. He left Oxford with a First in Greats.

Following Oxford, Buchan briefly pursued a career in law, being called to the bar by Middle Temple in 1901, and as a journalist, writing for St Loe Strachey’s *Spectator*. Much of his writing for the *Spectator* concerned matters of Empire, a focus which caught the eye of L.S. Amery, then with *The Times*. Amery had been invited by Alfred Milner to assist in the reconstruction of post-war South Africa. *The Times* would not release Amery, so he suggested Buchan as a replacement. Milner gladly acquiesced, being familiar with Buchan’s reputation.\(^{13}\) Buchan spent three years in South Africa, working first on the Refugee Relief Committee, then heading up the resettlement of Boers on the land. He also served as Milner’s Political Private Secretary. Buchan left South Africa in 1903, and so was not part of Milner’s Kindergarten, that group of devoted Oxonians who fell under the spell of “religio-milnerania” and helped generate support for federation, a process which culminated in the Union of 1910.\(^{14}\)

Buchan returned from South Africa deeply marked by his experience under Milner. Writing to his brother Walter in late 1901, he remarked,

> [h]e [Milner] is the most tragic figure in S. Africa, and one of the greatest anywhere. You have a man of superhumanly clear intellect, and an iron will - both of which control

was usually only one per year, were granted to recent graduates to serve as junior tutors.

\(^{13}\) See Adam Smith, pp. 106-7.

a highly sensitive temperament. He is a kind of fatalist, going on doggedly with his work, but not caring much except for doing reform joined to a close-textured intellect which reformers rarely possess.\textsuperscript{15}

Buchan admired Milner’s practical idealism, and came to model his own imperialism along similar lines. His view had changed but little nearly forty years on, noting in Memory Hold the Door that Milner “had the instincts of a radical.” Writing to Lady Murray in 1902, he noted “[I] feel that my experience here is a magnificent education. I have to see that things get done.” In a note to Gilbert Murray that same year, he confessed that “I detest official work, but I love this plain dealing with facts.”\textsuperscript{16}

Buchan had come to South Africa long on ambition but short on experience. He found there a country which marked him only a shade less than his own Scotland. South Africa was a contradiction for Buchan, a mix of modernity and backwardness, a combination of the sophisticated and the “heathen.”\textsuperscript{17} It was there that Buchan began to develop his cosmopolitan view of Empire. Though not a pro-Boer, he had a less hostile opinion of the conflict than most of his colleagues, noting that “it [the war] seemed to me a case of competing equities, and ours was rather the better.”\textsuperscript{18}

Most significantly, his time with Milner impressed upon Buchan the power of Empire as an idea. Buchan’s imperialism took the form of a “secular religion.” As he impressed upon

\textsuperscript{15} Buchan - Walter Buchan, 29 October, 1901. CG, Buchan Papers, QUA; Memory, p. 98.

\textsuperscript{16} Buchan - Lady Murray, 22 January, 1902, emphasis in the original; Buchan - Gilbert Murray, 16 November, 1902. C-G, Buchan Papers, QUA.

\textsuperscript{17} Buchan - Anna Buchan (whom he called “Nan”), 7 October, 1901. C-G, Buchan Papers, QUA.

\textsuperscript{18} Buchan - Lady Murray, 16 January, 1902. C-G, Buchan Papers, QUA.
Gilbert Murray, "I am no lover of the demagogue of Empire." This distrust of, and increasingly disdain for, chauvinistic imperialism is important in understanding the development of Buchan’s thought on imperial citizenship. His was not a proto-liberal conception of equality and rights-sharing, but rather a critical response to the emotional and intellectually thin “new imperialism” voiced by Chamberlainite new imperialists. He did, though, maintain a grudging respect for the major advocates of the “forward” policy. Indeed, Milner was Chamberlain’s hand-picked man-on-the-spot in South Africa. When Rhodes was close to death, Buchan’s remark, “I don’t like him, but he is undoubtedly a great man, one of the few Napoleonic people we have had since Marlborough,” illustrated his admiration for men of action, even if he found their creed, expansionism, lacking.

It was the spirit of Empire, a spirit he believed he saw in Milner, which Buchan believed most valuable. It was this spirit that he found missing in many exponents of the forward policy. Chamberlain, whom Buchan met when the former visited the Cape in late December, 1902, was “a man whom you want to make General Manager of the British Empire, but whom you know will forever remain a General Manager and not a creator.” Buchan returned to London in 1902. Milner had advised him to first pursue a career in finance - “you must have money if you are to do any constructive political work” - but Buchan had taken the imperial mission to heart, and hoped to enter the colonial service. He had, however, placed his money alongside his ideals,

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19 Buchan - Gilbert Murray, 30 January, 1902. CG, Buchan Papers, QUA.

20 Buchan - William Buchan, 20 March, 1902. CG, Buchan Papers, QUA.

21 Buchan - Stair Gillon, 10 January, 1903, quoted in Lownie, p. 78.

22 Buchan - Charles Dick, 16 May, 1903. Charles Dick Papers, Box 13 Correspondence, Copy A-Z, Buchan Papers, QUA. Janet Adam Smith, beyond decoding much of Buchan’s cryptic handwriting, also compiled copies of his correspondence with select figures, which she then placed with the rest of his papers at Queen’s University after finishing her biography.
holding shares in the Imperial Cold Storage Supply Company Ltd. The position he most coveted was an assistantship to Lord Cromer, then Pro-Consul in Egypt. Buchan contends in his memoir, and in letters from the time, that Cromer wanted him but that the Foreign Office overturned the decision. This is not corroborated by the historical record. What is clear is that Buchan did briefly correspond with Cromer. Cromer wrote a favourable letter concerning Buchan’s *The African Colony* (1903), a work on South African political reconstruction.

Such a posting would have suited his burgeoning interest in imperial matters. Cromer epitomized the pro-consular grandeur Buchan had found so attractive in Milner. Cromer also seemed to epitomize the practical idealism Buchan was coming to admire, an idealism which valued the first two of David Livingstone’s three “C”s - Christianity and civilization - while betraying suspicion of the third - commerce. In a 1908 essay for the *Edinburgh Review*, Cromer expressed his belief that the future of Empire rested “on the degree to which the moralising elements in the nation can, without injury to all that is sound and healthy in individual action, control those defects which may not improbably spring out of the egotism of the commercial spirit . . ..”

Buchan admired men such as Milner and Cromer for their devotion to public service. Much of his own career, like theirs, was fashioned within the public sphere, and even when he did not hold a public post he maintained the spirit of service. One of his most successful initiatives, for instance, was the Nelson Sevenpenny Library, which made available in reprint a wide variety of literature and non-fiction, both high and low, for a broader reading public. Apart

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23 Royal Bank of Scotland - Buchan, 14 March, 1904. CG, Buchan Papers, QUA.

24 Janet Adam Smith contends that no position was available in the first place, and that the conversations may have been only of a hypothetical nature. See Adam Smith, p. 148.

from being good business, Buchan saw this endeavour as a contribution to building a new, more literate community. Literature was a serious concern for a man who kept with him a copy of *Pilgrim's Progress* as one of his guides to life.

He maintained this devotion to the common weal during the First World War. Buchan was deeply affected by the conflict, an event which shocked him as much as any of his contemporaries. Though his duodenal ulcer prevented him from serving at the front, his work in non-combat roles was certainly impressive: *The Times* correspondent in France in 1915-1916, a stint at the Foreign Office, a commissioned officer in the Intelligence Corps, communications work for Reuters, and finally a post in the War Cabinet as Director of Information. In the last-named position he oversaw the government's propaganda efforts, organizing lecture series and picture displays, though he was continually frustrated by the domineering tendencies of Lloyd George and Lord Beaverbrook. Historians, however, can be thankful to Buchan for providing much of the extant photographic record of the British war effort, the legacy of these propaganda exhibitions. In addition to his official duties, Buchan penned in his spare time Nelson's *History of the War*, the sheer bulk of which attests to the fact that he was fueled by equal parts industry and duty. As he noted to Gilbert Murray, "it is good thing to be very busy at a time like this, when most of one's friends are dying. It prevents brooding."28

26 On Buchan's creation of a public war-photo gallery, especially as a place where families could trace their sons, see *The Times*, 10 October, 1918, p. 9b.

27 Reuters was operated as an arm of the British government during the war, and much of Britain's telegraphic propaganda was conducted through the agency. Buchan returned to Reuters from 1919-1923. See Donald Read, *The Power of News: The History of Reuters* (Oxford: 1999), pp. 130-32, 136, 159.

28 Buchan - Gilbert Murray, 15 July, 1915. CG, Buchan Papers, QUA. The *History* was well received, with figures from Rosebery to Balfour expressing their approval. See for instance Rosebery - Buchan, 31 January, 1915. CG, Buchan Papers, QUA. For more on Buchan as a military historian, see Keith Greaves, "Nelson's History of the War," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 28, 1993, pp. 533-551.
disappointment was that health prevented him from serving himself, a guilt driven home sharply by the death of many of his closest friends. Buchan acutely felt the void of the “lost generation.” He rejected, though, the turn to nihilism and decadence in the immediate post-war period as vacuous and disrespectful to those who had served, complaining that “the interpreting class plumed themselves wearily on being hollow men living in a wasteland.”

Unsurprisingly, Buchan was not popular amongst the Bloomsbury literati.

Emerging From Milner’s Shadow

In the aftermath of imperial reconstruction in southern Africa, Buchan came to see imperialism as an institution which could be put to the service of peace. He disavowed Milner’s faith in imperial federation, illustrating that he was not a mere acolyte. Nonetheless, he shared Milner’s conception of Empire as something that must be maintained, not expanded. He also shared with Lionel Curtis an organic view of Empire. In his memoir, Buchan recalled the imperial fervour he now felt in a passage which merits quotation in full:

I dreamed of a world-wide brotherhood in the background of a common race and creed, consecrated to the service of peace; Britain enriching the rest out of her culture and traditions, and the spirit of her Dominions like a strong wind freshening the stuffiness of the old lands. I saw in Empire a means of giving to the congested masses at home open country instead of blind alley. I saw hope for a new afflatus in art and literature and thought. Our creed was not based on antagonism to any other people. It was humanitarian and international; we believed that we were laying the basis of a federation of the world. As for the native races under our rule, we had a high consciousness; Milner and Rhodes had a far-sighted native policy. The ‘white man’s burden’ is now [1940] an almost meaningless phrase; then it involved a new philosophy of politics, and an ethical

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29 Memory Hold the Door, pp. 183-184.

30 It is instructive to note that Milner did not propose his line on “maintenance” until after the conclusion of the South African War, which he had played a major role in precipitating.
Beyond providing a wonderfully succinct template for the turn of the century progressive conservative's mind, these thoughts reveal the cosmopolitan nature of Buchan's imperialism. The religious metaphor used in the first sentence indicates the ecclesiastical notion of Empire, and the individual's role therein, to which Buchan held firmly. The latter passages betray the tone of apologia, the admittance of a retired soldier that the results of the war in which he once fought have been called into question, but that the battle had been joined with motives relatively free of caprice or malice. The most instructive statement, though, attests that imperialism was not a creed of conquest. Rather, in Buchan's view, it was one which carried a moral benevolence. What were the tenets of such a belief, and how honestly were they adhered to? It is to these questions that the argument now moves.

In this early stage of his career, Buchan held that imperialism should take the form of a creed. He set about sketching such a creed in *A Lodge in the Wilderness*. He later admitted that his conclusions were naive, framed by an idealist's mind little enlightened by experience. In the preface to the 1916 reprint of *A Lodge*, Buchan admits that the mood he had conveyed in 1904 had been proved passé. Buchan's imperialism was much more a state of mind.” Buchan came to argue that imperialism was an attitude, not an intellectual proposition. Buchan's conservatism meant for him a proper understanding of Empire could only be achieved through

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31 *Memoir*, pp. 124-125. Emphasis has been added.

32 *A Lodge in the Wilderness* (London: 1916), p .1a. The message of the importance of Empire as a mystic whole, though, he believed was still essential given the unrest generated by war.

33 Buchan advanced this “argument” in a speech to the Political Economy Club entitled “A Project of Empire,” delivered 6 April, 1910. Speeches (a) (filed by date), Buchan Papers, QUA.
the realization that contemporary problems were not new, but rather had deep historical roots. Although sentiment was necessary to fostering imperialism, it alone did not suffice. The only solid basis for imperialism lay in a sense of common history. As he wrote in his autobiography, “if your back cast is poor your forward cast will be a mess.” As such, one must honour the memory of one’s forefathers. In a speech to an audience of London teachers shortly after the conclusion of the Great War, Buchan summarized this position: “[i]t is when men forget their history, or have never known it, that they believe, like Mr Trotsky, that a new world can be created by a few . . . extractions, . . . that life can be forced into concreted [sic] canals.”

Stability and continuity were thus the most important virtues. Buchan, like conservatives of all hues, derived much of this line of thought from Edmund Burke, and was fond of noting that “Burke does not proselytize.” Indeed, Buchan’s Empire bore much resemblance to Burke’s doctrine of a liberal Empire. Empire was a serious proposition, and must be treated as such.

Buchan also expressed in his public pronouncements support for Burke’s vision of an organic society. By an organic Empire Buchan did not mean that Empire was a free-standing entity which would endure if its citizens simply believed in it. In a speech given in Edinburgh in 1904 on the topic of “The Empire of South Africa,” Buchan argued that imperial ideas “should be worked out in detail and given a practical form.” The colonies, he continued, should follow the example of the eponymous hero of Kipling’s imperial novel *Kim*, who learns to become a servant of a cause greater than himself.37 Writing in the *Scottish Review*, a journal of politics and

34 *Memory Hold the Door*, p. 143.

35 Buchan, untitled speech given to London teachers, 1 June, 1918. Speeches (a), Buchan Papers, QUA.

36 Buchan, “Literature and Life,” speech given in 1910 at an unidentified locale. Speeches (a), Buchan Papers, QUA.

37 Buchan, “The Empire of South Africa,” January 1904, Edinburgh. Speeches (a), Buchan Papers, QUA.
culture which he edited in 1907-1908, Buchan argued that ritual and pomp should be minimized, so as not to conflate imperialism and iconography and thus create divisions between imperialists. He also stressed the intangible gains of an organic Empire: “[w]e gain alliances, we gain a field for the energy of our sons, and we gain the satisfaction which comes from all creative work.”38 Speaking to the Personal Service Association in Edinburgh in 1913, he noted that “[s]ociety is an organic life like the human body, . . . if part is sick the other parts cannot be really well.”39 The Empire, too, was an organism, dependent on the mutual cooperation of its varied peoples for its survival.

**Jingoism and Buchan’s Imperialism**

In conceiving of Empire as an organic whole, Buchan was not out of step with most of his colleagues on the British right. Where he parted ways with many other conservatives of the period was in his rejection of jingoism. Jingoism characterized the imperialism of men as varied as Milner, W. T. Stead, the Poet Laureate Alfred Austin, and Buchan’s superior at the *Spectator*, the Liberal Unionist St. Loe Strachey. In order to understand why Buchan rejected jingoistic views on Empire, it is first necessary to outline the main precepts of jingoism itself.

Jingoism and imperialism are not synonymous. The term jingoism had its origin in the Russo-Turkish crisis of 1877-78, when the British hawks’ willingness to fight if necessary was aptly captured in G. W. Hunt’s famous music hall verse, and Disraeli sent the fleet to

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39 Buchan, “P. S. A,” 11 December, 1911. Speeches (a), Buchan Papers, QUA.
Constantinople in a show of force. Jingoism came to connote aggressive nationalism, usually in support of the Empire. It also came to include broader celebrations of imperial triumphs and causes. The Silver and Diamond Jubilees of Victoria, Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and Empress of India, in 1887 and 1897 respectively, were elaborately florid examples of the latter.

While jingoism was necessarily in favour of Empire, imperialists were not, _ipsa facta_, jingoism was as a tangential phenomenon. Rather than being the wellspring of imperial fervour, jingo sentiment was instead a response to the _fait accompli_. It functioned neither as a cause nor a motive, but instead was a consequence, a response, a reaction. The liberal critic of Empire, J. A. Hobson, described jingoism as that “. . . inverted patriotism whereby the love of one’s own nation is transformed into the hatred of another nation, and the fierce craving to destroy the individual members of that other nation.” What Hobson does not address is the fact that such sentiments usually manifested themselves only after another “nation” had committed some transgression. An understanding of jingoism as a reactionary impulse can be expanded to incorporate celebrations of martial activity, most often by those who did not directly take part. This is well illustrated by an event which left its shadow over South Africa throughout Buchan’s tenure there: the Jameson Raid of 1895.

The Jameson Raid was initiated by what is best termed a whim. There had been interest in the Cape community in fomenting a rebellion in the Transvaal to precipitate the formation of a

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40 See Robert Blake, _Disraeli_ (New York: 1967), p. 637. The refrain of G. W. Hunt’s “By Jingo” runs as follows: We don’t want to fight; But by Jingo, if we do,/We’ve got the men,/We’ve got the ships,/We’ve got the money too.” The song was performed during this period by G. H. Macdermott. See J. M. MacKenzie, “Empire and Metropolitan Cultures,” _The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. III_ (Oxford: 1999), p. 278.

South African Union. Leandar Starr Jameson, a Scottish doctor and close associate of Cecil Rhodes, was to lead a British contingent of border police across the Bechuanaland/Transvaal border when given the word by Rhodes. Instead, Jameson inexplicably cut telegraph lines, and decided to force the situation himself. The Raid turned into a fiasco, with Boer forces making short work of the poorly marshaled British. The gallant, if foolish, Jameson, upon hoisting the white flag, is said to have uttered, “there goes my life.”42 The Raid helped trigger the Boer war four years later, and Rhodes’ dream of a united South Africa had to wait until 1910.

Britons’ reaction to the Raid speaks directly to the relationship between jingoism and Empire. As with rumour and innuendo, jingoism operated best in an arena of stereotype and misinformation. Anti-Boer sentiment had flourished before the Raid, and Jameson’s imprudence only inflamed matters. The Daily Mail opined that “... every petty annoyance that a spiteful and jealous child could play on another is resorted to by the Dutch towards the English. I expect it will always be so until the Dutch have had a decisive lesson.”43 Such views were not restricted to self-identified imperialist papers, as the radical Reynold’s Newspaper asserted that the Boers were “... stern, harsh, narrow and ignorant.”44 Such prejudicial views were given free play in the aftermath of the Raid, for Britons, even among the political elite, had little concrete

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43 Daily Mail, 18 February, 1896, p. 2.

knowledge of the affair. The leaders of the Revolutionary Committee at the Cape had their death sentences commuted on the condition that they not speak of Transvaal politics for three years. By the time this expired, southern Africa had entered a new crisis that was to culminate in the Boer War.

The response to the Raid was twofold. Jameson’s critics castigated his actions as treasonous. Such voices were mostly liberal, supporters of Gladstone’s principle of moral trusteeship, or imperial skeptics reluctant to support any forward policy. By bringing shame upon the nation, Jameson had compromised the values of prudence and stability which supported the notion of Empire. In contrast, Jameson’s supporters, who were far more numerous, turned such logic on its head. They attempted to excuse his actions by claiming that Jameson was either dim-witted, unprepared, or both, neither of which was portrayed as particularly damning. Reaction in the City was largely favourable, as many brokers believed Jameson’s folly would relieve political tension in South Africa, and thus provide more investment opportunities. This conjecture was born out by the fact that the price of shares in the region’s major mining operations rebounded from a six-month decline shortly after the Raid.\(^\text{45}\)

Jameson received even greater support from the public. This can best be elucidated in the reception he received when he returned to London in February, 1896, to appear at his trial. One pundit wrote, “if he [Jameson] was our idol before the disaster, what is he now? Why a greater idol than before.”\(^\text{46}\) The boisterous greeting Jameson received can be compared, by appropriate historical coincidence, to the reception encountered by returning British troops from their triumph over the Ashanti. While the defeated Jameson waded through a throng of cheers at Paddington station, Tommy Atkins’ victorious return from west Africa was greeted by a

\(^{45}\) Hamilton, p. 304.

\(^{46}\) Rodney, p. 23.
thunderous indifference.47 This paradox can perhaps be explained by the consistent British taste for imperial amateurs, the more vainglorious the better. Indeed, the Pall Mall Gazette wrote lovingly of “our Quixote,” and “credit[ed] Dr. Jameson with the best possible motives.”48 Many of the heroes of the British Empire - Gordon at Omdurman, Livingstone in central Africa, Roger Casement in the Congo - were men who either succeeded in spite of very human flaws or failed in spectacular fashion. Their most important trait, though, was that they showed chivalry and flair. Conversely, men such as Major-General H. H. Kitchener, who attained notable success in a most methodical and bureaucratic manner, were often viewed with suspicion.49 As the Pall Mall Gazette aptly stated, in comparing Jameson to another quixotic hero of British history, Bonnie Prince Charlie, “personal bravery and contempt for money are the two qualities which most surely win the popular heart, for the simple reason that we admire most what we lack most.”50

The Jameson Raid reveals three elements of jingoism: 1) it was a transitory and event-driven phenomenon; 2) it functioned independently of the imperial ethic; and 3) it was driven by emotion, not ideology. Jingoism was a response, a reaction, and as such existed only temporarily. While much of the nation celebrated the virtue of the Raid’s quixotic hero, there was little call for retribution against the Boers. Though war broke out four years later, this was attributable more to damaged Afrikaner pride than to any British desire to “do Jameson one


49 Even before the controversy over concentration camps and the razed earth policy, the “methods of barbarism” in Liberal leader Henry Cambell-Bannerman’s famous phrase, Kitchener was never a favourite of the British public. Despite Kitchener’s avenging of Gordon in 1898, it was General Sir Garnet Wolseley (later Viscount), who was a national hero., even though he had been unsuccessful in advancing up the Nile to Khartoum.

better."

The most striking proof of the transitory nature of jingoism was that imperial achievement was not necessarily a significant element in its generation. Men such as Lugard, Kitchener, and even Milner, while attaining great success in the field of imperial expansion and leadership, ostensibly the core of the jingo spirit, were instead often ignored or even criticized for their methods. Other crises, such as the contemporaneous Venezuelan border dispute with the United States, or the Ashanti war, garnered comparatively minor public responses. The imperial ethic was grounded in notions of duty, service, character, and trusteeship. Jingo heroes such as Jameson were caricatures of these virtues, men who were otherwise deeply flawed, but whose appeal resonated on a separate plain of exaggerated emotion. Imperialism demanded something of the adherent. One must be an active participant. This was Buchan’s position. Jingoism, as a purely emotive phenomenon, demanded nothing at all of the participant. The jingo crowd were passive observers, members of what Hobson termed the “cult of the spectator,” no different than the Manchester United supporter who wears red and white face-paint to Old Trafford, but turns on the local side if it records an own goal. More importantly, the jingo participant bore no responsibility for the actions others took in the name of their common country.

Imperial actors such as Jameson and Gordon, who embodied moral equivocation in the actions, garnered the laurels. Buchan, however, denounced what he termed their “false imperialism,” finding it xenophobic, aggressively martial, and self-serving. In a speech in Glasgow in 1904, he dismissed jingoism as “mere land hunger,” and argued that “a desire to paint the map red from a vulgar ostentation is no Imperial idea.” Buchan instructively does not

51 Buchan, “The Problem of our African Possessions,” speech, Glasgow, 1904. Speeches (a), Buchan Papers, QUA. Buchan could also see the light side of the jingo screed. Lady Flora Brume, when given the task of writing some jingo verse, instructs that to write “comic imperial poetry . . . You simply get all the names of places you can think of, string them together, and
use the term “mafficking”\textsuperscript{52} in his letters of the period. His time with Milner had impressed him with the need for a new imperial creed, a renunciation of old doctrine and a consideration of new ideas. Francis Carey articulated this hope in \textit{A Lodge}, “a creed beyond parties, a consuming and passionate interest in the destiny of [one’s] people.”\textsuperscript{53} Consolidation, based on an understanding that the time for growth, even if it was still desired, was over, was the new goal. This step accorded with the position of Milner himself, as well as of his Kindergarten and later Round Table progeny. Buchan differed from Milner and the Round Table, though, in that he hoped this “new idea” would not take the form of federation, but rather would be a closer association of English-speaking peoples, including Americans. In this he shared much of Rhodes’ concept of Empire.\textsuperscript{54} Buchan lacked, though, the lust for territory and power which possessed Rhodes (and the “most superior” Curzon for that matter), instead envisioning the broader Empire as a plain upon which Britain could perform service and exert influence.\textsuperscript{55}

\textit{Towards a Cosmopolitan View of Imperial Citizenship}

Buchan envisioned such service and influence in cosmopolitan terms. This notion of

\textsuperscript{52} The relief of the siege of Mafeking in April 1900 touched of wild celebrations in the streets of London. The term “mafficking” briefly entered the English language after this event as a colloquial synonym for spontaneous public celebration.

\textsuperscript{53} \textit{A Lodge}, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{54} Despite his Cape-to-Cairo vision of British imperial expansionism, Rhodes also had a life-long affinity for the United States. He directed that Americans be eligible for Rhodes scholarships at Oxford, and worked closely with many expatriate Americans while in South Africa.

\textsuperscript{55} This view was consistent with two marks of Buchan’s upbringing: the Scot’s natural attraction to wanderlust, there being a disproportionate number of Scots in all facets of imperial activity; and his Calvinist distrust of excessive sentimentality. See “Imperial Fact and Sentiment,” \textit{Scottish Review}, 28 May, 1907, p. 94.
cosmopolitan imperialism combined an attachment to the local and the national with a sense of belonging to the Empire as a whole. As such, he disavowed excessive nationalism, understood as loyalty to one's nation-state. In a speech delivered in 1912 in opposition to Home Rule for Ireland, Buchan stated that "I do not believe in any sort of Nationalism, or any government based on it." This view held for the Empire as well. Imperial citizenship should encompass the principles of the hearth in combination with an imperial sensibility. He recorded in his memoir that:

I had regarded the Dominions patronizingly as distant settlements of our people who were making a creditable effort under difficulties to carry on the British tradition. Now I realized that Britain had at least as much to learn from them as they had from Britain....They [the Dominions] combined a passionate devotion to their own countries with the vision of a great brotherhood based on race and a common culture, a vision none the less real because they rarely tried to put it into words. I began to see that the Empire, which had hitherto been only a phrase to me, might be a potent and beneficent force in the world.  

In an address to the Galashiels branch of the Primrose League, Buchan noted this position as "local patriotism": "[n]o one of us will be a good citizen of the British Empire unless he is first a good Scotsman . . . and a devout lover of his own shire." Such a view spoke to the indelible Scottishness he maintained throughout his life, and the pleasure he found in the local everywhere he went. The South African veld was a constant character in his fiction his entire life. In Canada he became the first Governor-General to visit the Canadian Arctic, and was honoured by native tribes in Quebec and Carleton, Saskatchewan, with the title of Chief. He consciously applied this notion of the importance of locality in his politics, arguing for the application of

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56 "What the Home Rule Bill Means," speech, Innerleithen, 18 December, 1912. Press Clippings (e), Scrapbook 1, Buchan Papers, QUA; Memory Hold the Door, p. 112.

57 Buchan, address to Galashiels branch of Primrose League, undated clipping (probably 1911 or 12), Scrapbook 1: Miscellanea 1904-1919, p. 78, Buchan Papers, QUA.

58 See Janet Adam Smith, pp. 389-391.
local loyalties to international causes. The deleterious consequences of World War I cemented this outlook in his mind. At a ceremony in 1919 to honour Buchan and the recently knighted Sir Donald Maclean for their service to the community of Peebles, Buchan reflected that “the lesser patriotism does not exclude the greater; on the contrary, it is its surest foundation. But we have learned in the war, I hope and believe, another loyalty - a loyalty to civilization, to humanity.”

With these words Buchan echoed the ideas Curtis was also in the process of conceiving at this time. Such reasoning also led Buchan to support the nascent notion of a League of Nations, an idea spearheaded by his friend and former teacher Gilbert Murray.

Buchan propagated a cosmopolitan view of imperial citizenship as early as century’s first decade. In a set-piece discussion in A Lodge, various views are advanced as to the proper practice of imperialism. Mr. Wakefield, the practical minded colonial, asserts that what the colonies want is a business relationship, not some form of mysticism. Others argue over party politics and “liberal” and “conservative” imperialism. The Tory Lady Amysfort, distrustful of “the saint in politics,” expostulates on practical imperialism. Lord Appin, a composite of Arthur Balfour and Lord Rosebery, exclaims that what should be avoided at all costs is dogmatism. All the group really agrees upon is the rejection of any imperialism which rests on brute force, terming it “degenerate.”

It is Carey, ironically given Buchan’s reservations about Rhodes, who captures best the mood of broad-minded imperial citizenship, rather magnanimously stating that “the truth can only be known to the man on the hill-top.” This is not to say that Buchan’s idea was patriarchal. Rather, the view from the eyrie allows the imperialist greater vision,

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59 Buchan, “Citizenship of Peebles,” January 1919, p. 3. Box 14, Speeches (ii) ff # 3, Buchan Papers, QUA.

60 A Lodge, pp. 34-38, 50-54, 182, 60.

61 Ibid., p. 32.
acknowledging the full scope of Empire, not merely its localistic ruts and gullies. The Spectator’s review of A Lodge struck just this note, recording that, “[t]here is in the whole book a power of vision which makes one feel as though one looked down from a great height [and] . . . [saw] how the great game of our heritage should be played.”

Buchan took the idea of cosmopolitan imperialism beyond his writing. As a public figure in the period between the Boer War and World War I, he engaged in many imperial projects with an eye to propagating this position. The occasion of Canada’s tercentenary as a British colony well illustrates this. Buchan admired the evolution of responsible government in Canada, a view which contributed greatly to his subsequent success as Governor-General. Canada pointed to the efficacy of his cosmopolitan imperialism in its success in uniting two cultures without destroying local patriotism. For Buchan, as with many Edwardians, Laurier seemed a living example of this principle: a Quebeçois who had integrated the two solitudes. Buchan thus saw the tercentenary as a celebration of this cultural compromise. Public ceremony was an agent of cooperation. He noted in the Scottish Review that “the best security for peace and friendship will always be the pride which comes from co-operation in a general task.” As his contribution to the

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62 Spectator, 15 December, 1906, pp. 985-86. While at first it might seem unsurprising that Buchan might receive a favourable review from the journal he often wrote for and shared in the editing, Buchan initially published A Lodge anonymously. The book did not appear under his name until its second printing in 1907. Hence, this review was of the anonymous edition. F. S. Oliver, Scottish draper and author of Alexander Hamilton, a biography of the American founding father which was very influential among the men of Milner’s Kindergarten, had urged Buchan to write under his own name for the initial edition. Oliver passed on Buchan’s ideas to his friends in the Kindergarten, and even hinted at the early coalescing of the movement which would become in 1910 the Round Table. See Oliver - Buchan, 23 December, 1906. CG, Buchan Papers, QUA.

63 Samuel de Champlain founded a fortified trading post in 1608 at the narrows of the St. Lawrence, or “Quebec” in the French translation for the Algonquin word for “straight.” Though there were earlier settlements in what is now Canada, including Champlain’s at Port-Royal, the Quebec settlement proved permanent, and thus the date 1608 has been commonly used both in Buchan’s era and in modern Canadian historiography to signify the settlement of Canada. See for instance Margaret R. Conrad and James Hiller, Atlantic Canada: A Region in the Making (Oxford: 2001), pp. 48-60.
tercentenary, Buchan organized a committee to erect a memorial of Wolfe and Moncalm, and attempted to engage such luminaries as Lord Rosebery in the project. It did not meet with success, but an interesting postscript to this effort is to be found in June, 1917, when Buchan was serving as Director of Information, heading the government's propaganda efforts. One of his initiatives was to propose a monument to Abraham Lincoln in Edinburgh for the fourth of July, in order to strengthen the Anglo-American alliance. This proposal likewise proved abortive, but it expressed his continued belief in the Anglo-American relationship, and further testified to his reputation as an international citizen.

"The Last Victorian": Buchan and Late-Victorian Morality

Buchan's conception of imperial citizenship was infused with a well-defined morality. His Calvinist roots helped shape a vision of Empire balanced between a high-minded idealism and a recognition of man's fallibility and the harshness of life. Like many of his generation, he esteemed notions of duty and service. He rejected the political relativism voiced by the more strident imperialists of his generation, such as the American businessman J. H. Hammond, who believed "the morality of an action cannot, of course, be made to depend upon the effects which flow from it; but it is precisely from these effects that we properly estimate the wisdom or folly

64 Buchan, "The Quebec Tercentenary," The Scottish Review, 30 June, 1908 in Comments and Characters, p. 100; Rosebery - Buchan, 1908 (n.d), Rosebery papers, as filed in Box 13, Correspondence (d), Copy A-Z, Buchan papers, QUA.

65 Buchan - Rosebery, 21 June, 1917. Box 13, Correspondence (d), Copy A-Z, Buchan Papers, QUA. As Director of Information, Buchan also attempted to organize speaking tours of the United States, approaching speakers such as Gilbert Murray. Buchan's affinity for the United States came to the fore again in meetings with Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1936-37. Buchan's reputation as an internationalist was furthered through his service as Reuters' Foreign Office Director from 1916-1917. He had to resign when he became Director of Information. See Read.
of a political decision.” Buchan saw the essence of politics not as a contest of power, but as the performance “of a man’s duty, not only to himself, but to his fellows and to the state.” Morality was indeed the standard of both a man and his actions. The measure of this morality was what the historian John Gibbins, in a separate context, has termed “the good motive.”

This conviction is similar to the significance of “altruism” for the Victorians. Stefan Collini has argued that “altruism” was the most pervasive component of the Victorian intellectual climate, an ideal binding the dominant liberal directive of individualism to a broader notion of public service. Morality was conceived of as adherence to obligation. There existed a “correct” answer to problems, and failure to grapple with these was seen as base selfishness. The ultimate goal was harmony, both between individuals and for society. This struggle to imbue Lockean liberalism with a social conscience was influenced both by the decline of orthodox Christianity and a growing acknowledgment of social and economic cleavages in British society.

An important component of altruism was attention to proper character, both individual and collective. Abhorrence of apathy, respect for work as compared to Georgian leisure, self-restraint, and the domination of the will over baser motivations all marked the Victorians’

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66 J. H. Hammond, p. 47.

67 Buchan, “Literature and Life,” unidentified speech, 1910. Speeches (a), Buchan Papers, QUA.

68 See John Gibbins, “Liberalism, Nationalism, and the English Idealists,” History of European Ideas, 15, 1992, esp. p. 492. Though Gibbins does not refer directly to imperialism, the idea of ‘the good motive’ is clearly applicable here.

69 Stefan Collini, Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain, 1850-1930 (Oxford: 1991), Chapter 2, esp. p. 65. Collini argues that recognized intellectual movements (Ethical Socialism, New Liberalism, etc.) tend to be the final stage in the evolution of moral and cultural values into cultural consensus. In other words, the “process of becoming” is more important than the tenets of a movement, for the formation of a “movement” often signals the imminent decline of its values and mores.
mental terrain. This applied to the national character as well. “National character,” according to John Stuart Mill, was the force which bound together entities such as laws, customs, and wars.\textsuperscript{70} It is from debates concerning “national character” that notions of citizenship are by necessity drawn.

Buchan was sympathetic to many of these values and shared the assumptions upon which they were based. For these reasons Gertrude Himmelfarb metaphorically characterizes him as the “last Victorian.” She argues that Buchan epitomized Victorian ideals of service and respectability, and held a descriptive, not prescriptive, world-view. Buchan certainly went to great pains to be fair and true to principle. He exemplified the principle of altruism, as described by Collini, though he was sometimes dogmatic. As Hugh Summerville, the semi-autobiographical young writer in \textit{A Lodge}, notes: “[t]he people who go back to first principles, as a rule make the journey only to find some defence for a prejudice which nothing will induce them to forego.” Rather, he advocated “the religious value of free thought,” and applied the religious notion of “faith” to his position on Empire: “[r]eligion should be like a strong tree, blown upon by every wind, but able to stand up against them and derive health and strength from their buffeting. If we believe, then we know that all things work for good to him that believeth.”\textsuperscript{71} A system of thought, he believed, should be flexible and tolerant. Buchan’s tolerance and sense of morality were manifest in his early experiences in South Africa. He was

\textsuperscript{70} Mill, \textit{op. cit.} in Collini, p. 108.

\textsuperscript{71} Gertrude Himmelfarb, “John Buchan: The Last Victorian,” in \textit{Victorian Minds}, pp. 249-271; \textit{A Lodge}, p. 229; Buchan, “Thought and Faith,” speech to Selkirk Public Service Association (P.S.A), December 1915. Speeches (a), Buchan Papers, QUA. Buchan attempted to combat the appeal of socialism during his pre-war campaign by offering voters “the bribe of service, hope, and a wider horizon of fuller and richer citizenship.” See \textit{The Scotsman}, 19 April, 1911. The left-leaning \textit{Edinburgh Evening News} was unimpressed by this position, scoffing that it was “a grand, satisfying mouthful - of east wind.” See \textit{Edinburgh Evening News}, 20 April, 1911.
firmly convinced of the moral worth of reconstruction in South Africa, despite the criticism leveled at the Land Settlement Department for excessive bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{72} What was important was to reintegrate the whole of South Africa into the imperial community.

Buchan later applied this same criterion in appealing for a broad patriotism during the early stages of World War I, invoking Shakespeare's Henry V's call to arms at Agincourt, and in the aftermath of the war, urging in a speech in Peebles that "we must bring to the task that moral quality which puts the interests of the whole community before the interests of the individual."\textsuperscript{73} He believed this understanding of imperialism as moral purpose might be fulfilled through the creation of the League of Nations. Writing to Gilbert Murray, one of the League's leading advocates in late 1918, Buchan noted that "[a]ll the enthusiasm that I have always had for my own brand of Imperialism I feel now attaches to this creed [LoN]."\textsuperscript{74} Buchan, like many others, was soon disappointed by the League's inability to maintain peace, a failure which seemed to confirm his fatalistic view of the world.

Buchan's imperialism was one characterized by a moral cosmopolitanism. What was "moral cosmopolitanism," and what was the place of the individual within this cosmos? Buchan saw imperial citizenship as manifested in the moral relationship between individual and state, specifically the proper behaviour of each party. The state was conceived of first as the Empire, and only second as "British," "Canadian," and so on. Local allegiances, as we have seen, were

\textsuperscript{72} See The Times, 5 January, 1903. Despite expressing reservations concerning the qualifications of some of the officials chosen to oversee resettlement, the paper lauded Buchan for displaying "an aptitude for rapid decision and for taking responsibility."

\textsuperscript{73} Buchan, unidentified clipping (probably early 1915). Scrapbook 1: Miscellanea 1904-919, Buchan Papers, QUA. "For he this day who sheds his blood with me/Shall be my brother; be he ne'er so vile/This day shall gentle his condition," Henry V, IV, iii, 61-63. Buchan, "Citizenship of Peebles", p. 3.

\textsuperscript{74} Buchan - Gilbert Murray, 17 December, 1918. CG, Buchan Papers, QUA.
important, but they were important because they buttressed the broader entity of Empire. In other words, they were supported to a broader, more cosmopolitan, understanding of Empire. Buchan’s moral cosmopolitanism thus meant a desire to incorporate the various peoples of Empire within a common citizenship based upon a shared morality, or proper “character” in the language of the day. Such a citizenship would be free from national limitations and prejudices.

This was his message in an Edinburgh speech in 1904 in which he stated that the “important thing is to get this country [Britain] to make it [imperialism] part of their political outlook.” He recognized a great paradox here. When faced with failure or ennui, whether personally or as a people, “[t]he only thing to do is to draw a larger circle with a wider radius.” However, he also recognized that “those who do that often fail to complete it, and leave only a broken arc to show how vast their design was.” As the fervour of the “New Imperialism” began to cool in the aftermath of the Boer War, the challenge to imperial thinkers such as Buchan now seemed to be how to prevent the imperial arc from breaking. The forward policy now pursued was not territorial, as it had once been under men of the “Scramble” like Sir Bartle Frere and Sir George Goldie. Now it took the form of a political activism. The task was to consolidate, to solidify, with the ex post facto rationalization that the “civilizing task,” the mission, was complete. For Milner and his Round Table protégées, the solution was in federation. Others, such as the imperial journalist Richard Jebb, believed colonial nationalism held the key to future imperial strength. Buchan remained aloof from such structured initiatives, preferring instead an imperial solidarity built from the individual out. Central to this view was an expansion of political participation throughout the Empire. The path to such a catholic imperialism, according to Buchan, was thus through democracy. It is through an examination of

75 “The Empire of South Africa,” p. 29.

76 A Lodge, p. 69. The quotation comes from Summerville.
the conjunction of imperialism and democracy, and the contingent place of race in that relationship, that Buchan’s ideas on imperial citizenship become clear.

Imperialism and Democracy

Buchan’s catholic sense of imperialism can be seen as an attempt, largely political, to create a shared culture, a shared idiom, a support system outside of which the individual would be rudderless, and which was therefore a necessity. In short, it was to encourage assimilation and prevent conflict. The question in regard to Empire was whether this was a chimera or a real possibility. Buchan advocated a broad imperial citizenship based upon shared responsibilities, with the conviction that the creation of cultural homogeneity would decrease the potential for conflict.

Buchan believed that the franchise was paramount, for an individual could not fully realize his citizenship without voting. This was the covenant which tied him to the state. The state, in turn, was obligated to provide conscientious administration, and must therefore select the best possible civil servants in pursuit of this task. The twin charges of voting and administration, directed towards imperial ends, formed the core of Buchan’s articulation of imperial citizenship. He saw democracy as a neutral force: “democracy in itself, remember, is not a good thing; it is only good if it is well done . . ..”77 His cosmopolitanism meant that everyone was a potential equal, and he betrayed little of the patrician disdain for the “masses” which characterized conservatives such as Lord Salisbury. Writing on “Democracy and Representative Government” in the Fortnightly Review, Buchan asserted that, “Everyman is a

77 “Literature and Life,” p. 17.
pretty sagacious fellow. He is not the neurotic being, living in a whirl of elementary emotions, that some would have us picture." It is thus highly ironic that when Buchan was finally elected to Parliament, it was for the cloistered seat of the Scottish Universities.

Buchan did express a hope that democracy held the potential to bring people together. It was intuitive, something all could grasp at various levels. Furthermore, he advocated an organic democracy - here anticipating civil society - rather than party politics. He shared this view with many who were on the fringes of organized politics and felt the party system hindered good government. One of the few favourable aspects of the Great War, in Buchan’s mind, was that it showed the potential for consensus government. Thus, he sympathized with H. H. Asquith’s frustration at the political maneuvering which characterized much of the year 1916, sharing Asquith’s conviction that such behaviour at a time of “horror” was base, and hindered the proper functioning of the coalition government. In the intellectual tradition of Burke, security remained for Buchan the preeminent objective; thus his opinion that the Great War was analogous to the American Civil War, in that both were conflicts within a civilization.


79 Buchan - Stair Gillon, 12 February, 1916. CG, Buchan Papers, QUA. Buchan was at this point responsible for Russian deputations visiting London.

80 Asquith - Buchan, 14 May, 1916. CG, Buchan Papers, QUA. Buchan was on good terms with many of the so-called members of the “Monday Night Cabal,” including Milner and Amery, which eventually ousted Asquith. The “maneuvering” Asquith refers to in this letter concerns the debate over Home Rule in May of 1916, specifically the immediate political fallout from the Easter Rebellion and the execution of Casement and other Irish leaders. Ironically, Buchan quickly became frustrated with Lloyd George, the beneficiary of his comrades’ maneuvering, and Asquith’s replacement as Prime Minister. Lloyd George gave Buchan little freedom at the Ministry of Information and after the war refused to give him the knighthood he desired. Asquith was also the father of Buchan’s close friend Raymond Asquith, though father and son were not particularly close. Both Buchan and the senior Asquith were devastated by Raymond’s death at the Somme on September 19, 1916. See for instance Roy Jenkins, Asquith (New York: 1966), pp. 413-415.

81 Buchan, “Some Problems of Modern Democracy,” undated speech, most likely
He also advocated a broad democracy in the tradition of Benjamin Disraeli, and the Conservative party's great "leap in the dark" of 1867. Buchan had early in his career considered writing a biography of the former Tory leader\(^{82}\), but his view of democracy was less opportunistic than was Disraeli's. He outlined this view in a pamphlet on women's suffrage, a cause which he strongly supported. Buchan did not believe women should gain the vote because it was a "right." In fact, he opposed the language of "rights" as an Enlightenment abstraction, arguing that "in the last resort there is only one right - the right of every man and woman to do his or her duty."\(^{83}\) Women should be allowed to vote because citizenship, of which the exercise of the vote was the central component, is contingent upon the "bearing of certain civic burdens, and is no friend of 'irrelevant tests' such as gender."\(^{84}\) Character and intelligence were the true tests of citizenship, traits which women possessed in equal propensity to men. In advancing this position, Buchan set himself apart from not only most Conservatives of the period, but also most Liberals. As a practical rationalist, Buchan also had no time for critics of female suffrage who employed the "thin edge of the wedge" argument. Buchan saw this as "fear-mongering." Any initiative can be perverted, he argued, and one legislates against the future at his peril. The proper performance of citizenship, especially of the franchise, was a necessary prerequisite to

delivered early in the war, when Buchan gave public lectures and served as a war correspondent for The Times and the Daily News. F. Britten Austin - Buchan, 30 May, 1916. CG, Buchan Papers, QUA.

\(^{82}\) Buchan - Charles Dick, 6 January, 1900. Box 13, Correspondence d) copy A-Z, Buchan Papers, QUA.

\(^{83}\) See Buchan, 'Women's Suffrage: A Logical Outcome of the Conservative Faith," leaflet for Conservative and Unionist Women's Franchise Association", undated (probably 1911).

\(^{84}\) Ibid.
enjoying liberty.\textsuperscript{85}

This position is to be seen in Buchan’s view of imperial union as cooperative, rather than prescriptive. A relationship, whether between people or between political entities, is successful when its members participate of their own accord. Individuals are the best judge of their own interests, and should be free to act as they wish so long as they do not harm others. In regard to Empire, it laid the basis for the support of an imperial union based, not on the centralizing imperatives of Milner and the Round Table, but on the common-sense appeal of strength in numbers. Imperial union, or perhaps more specifically imperial unity, a looser concept not necessarily requiring constitutional bonds, offered the best environment for furthering the interests of all who existed under it.

Buchan argued that unless Britain was prepared to fully administer a colony, she should not interfere in the colony’s internal government. Imperial union should be an amalgam of states which were autonomous, regardless of size. This is the message he proselytized during his time at the \textit{Spectator}, arguing that “[w]e must learn to regard colonials as . . . our fellow citizens . . . as no more a foreign country than Wales or Ireland.”\textsuperscript{86} This would create an Empire of people, not territory. He advanced this argument in an anonymous piece in the \textit{Spectator} in 1904, supporting the jurist Sir Frederick Pollock’s proposition that colonial representatives be included in the Privy Council.\textsuperscript{87} In a series of letters to Violet Markham, a close friend and Liberal Milnerite, Buchan outlined his views on the franchise and Empire. He argued that the franchise

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\textsuperscript{85} \textit{Ibid.}
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\textsuperscript{86} “The Empire of South Africa,” p. 27.
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\textsuperscript{87} [Buchan], “Imperial Organization,” \textit{Spectator}, 22 October, 1904, pp. 586-87. He praised the Imperial Conference for furthering this spirit of imperial cooperation in “The New Doctrine of Empire,” \textit{Scottish Review}, 2 May, 1907.
\end{flushright}
in the colonies should be based on population, and grouped into “districts,” on the model of Britain’s electoral reforms of 1884-85. He had faith in expanding the franchise, citing the broad electorate in New Zealand as a positive example. He added, though, the belief that electoral districts should be redistributed each election, to ensure that voters’ input was balanced with the “public good.” By this, he meant the preservation of colonial unity and continued participation in the “imperial mandate.” Thus, in South Africa for instance, the Dutch vote must not be allowed to outnumber the British, for fear that the Dutch dominated colonies would cast their ballot for independence.

Buchan’s position on native citizenship was an extension of this argument regarding the settlement colonies. In regard to the native peoples of South Africa, he had argued in 1904 that the franchise should be withheld for the immediate future, lest social and economic disequilibrium ruin the prospects for union. However, he also warned that if natives, who outnumbered whites by a ratio of 6 to 1 in the territory south of the Zambezi river, were not brought into the imperial fold, disaster would also ensue. Thus, social prejudices must be overcome in light of practical need. This provided the impetus to search for a more cosmopolitan imperial citizenship.

_Buchan’s Conception of The Role of the State_

If imperial citizenship, then, entailed responsibility to the collective, from which liberty ensued, what role was the state to play in such a relationship? In short, the state’s role was to provide skilled administration. This was the lesson Buchan derived from serving under Milner.

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88 Buchan - Markham, 27 January, 1906; 29 January, 1906. CG, Buchan Papers, QUA.

The administrative task in South Africa of organizing the Refugee Relief Committee and
leavening the abuses of the concentration camps appealed to Buchan. He earned the Proconsul’s
admiration for this service, a compliment he repaid in his tribute to Milner in an Edinburgh
Review piece in 1903. Buchan also came to share Milner’s frustration with party politics, what
Milner called “the system,” governed by people “having no adequate appreciation of the
supreme value of trained knowledge, or of the difference in size of the questions submitted to
them, so that they are capable of the same levity with regard the biggest things as with regard to
trifles.” Buchan’s disappointment in not receiving the post under Cromer furthered his
disenchantment with political life, and helped mark him as a fatalist. He complained that “fatted
souls like Liberals can never be Imperialists,” and worried after the Unionists were swept from
office in January, 1906 that his party would have to “start at the beginning and do the work of
Disraeli all over again.” He was particularly incensed at the censure of Milner in the aftermath
of the Chinese flogging incident: “[i]t is the insufferable result to Lord M [sic] which makes me
furious.” Buchan admired Milner’s practical capabilities as well as his imperialism, and chafed
at what he perceived as an attack on the Proconsul’s integrity. Like many of Milner’s
supporters, most of whom were conservatives, Buchan believed that Milner, a man who had

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90 Buchan - Helen Buchan, 28 October, 1901; Buchan - Anna Buchan, 9 December,
1901, CG, Buchan Papers, QUA.


92 Buchan - Violet Markham, 23 March, 1906; 19 January, 1906. CG, Buchan Papers,
QUA.

93 Buchan - Violet Markham, 23 March, 1906. CG, Buchan Papers, QUA. The Chinese
labour controversy erupted during the 1906 election. Milner had encouraged the employment of
indentured Chinese labourers in the Rand mines, a measure denounced by the Radicals in the
Liberal Party. Allegations that Milner had authorized the “flogging” of some of these labourers
led to a motion of censure in the House on 21 March, 1906, where Milner was denounced by
innuendo.
devoted his career to public service, deserved more respect. He was particularly upset at the opportunistic bombast of Churchill.  

Nor did he always have an easy time of it in the Unionist party. This was largely due to his minority position as a Tory free-trader at a time when the party was pulling itself apart over the issue. Buchan had supped on St. Loë Strachey’s free-trade views while at the *Spectator*, and had come to believe that protection would be harmful to imperial unity, provoking internal disputes and stifling colonial initiatives. He opposed Joseph Chamberlain’s argument that the British workingman must accept higher bread prices in return for continued economic growth and job security. This was not because Buchan was opposed to what the historian Bernard Semmel has called social imperialism, the attempt to increase working-class patriotism through concessions such as old-age pensions and national insurance, but because he feared it would alienate the colonies by positioning them as economic clients of Britain. Buchan asserted that the colonies would trade with Britain regardless of tariff relief, and that free trade would allow them to pursue their own economic interests, a surer way to keep them within the imperial fold. In his adherence to Cobdenite free trade, Buchan differed little from the Liberal Imperialist position, and indeed Rosebery, the nominal founder of the school of “efficiency,” was a personal and intellectual confidant of his. However, after the Conservatives moved more definitively toward Tariff Reform as party policy in the aftermath of defeat in both the January and December general elections of 1910, Buchan paid the price for his adherence to free trade, as

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94 Buchan violently protested the censure motion, and Churchill’s speech in support of it, in anonymous leaders in the *Spectator* (24 March, 1906) and the *Quarterly Review* (April 1906). Buchan remained ambivalent about Churchill throughout his career. He had expressed reservations to his friend C. H. Dick concerning Churchill’s accession to the Colonial Office in 1905, and was livid over his role in the censure affair. He nonetheless admired the future Prime Minister’s adventurous streak, which appealed to Buchan’s romantic side, and told his youngest brother Alistair, who served with Churchill, that he was a man of stature despite his rash and unpredictable nature. See Buchan - C. H. Dick, 22 December, 1905. Box 13, Copies A-Z, Buchan Papers, QUA; Buchan - Alistair Buchan, 10 June, 1916, CG, Buchan Papers, QUA.
leading party figures such as Arthur Balfour and Austen Chamberlain could not find time to stump for him as he attempted to win support for the next election.⁹⁵

What Buchan found most troubling about Tariff Reform, for he was not given to long thought on economic policy, was that it undermined efforts to promote imperial unity. It ran counter to his conviction that one cannot legislate unity. Lord Launceston, the Milner character in *A Lodge*, states that “unity must precede union,” and that a legislated federation was a poor idea.⁹⁶ While, in the spirit of Burke, legislators should be given freedom to innovate, they must not impose their ideas on others, this running counter to the spirit of democracy. This, in Buchan’s eye, was Joseph Chamberlain’s failing, and the basis for his opposition to tariff reform.⁹⁷

Buchan’s arguments concerning proper state administration, democracy, and the role of the individual led him to conceive of citizenship as a right shared by all subjects of Empire. The best means of coming to terms with the frictions that resulted in being both a democrat and an imperialist - a dichotomy which the geographer Halford Mackinder argued was irreconcilable, the two convictions being mutually exclusive - was Buchan’s development of a cosmopolitan notion of imperial citizenship, where all under the flag of Empire were deemed equal, at least in capability. He did not advocate full legal equality, self-government, or some other method of formally recognizing this principle. What he did reject were essentialist notions of race and citizenship. Thus, there were no convincing arguments for denying equality, though there were cases when its realization would be gradual.

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⁹⁵ See Balfour - Buchan, 16 May, 1912; Austen Chamberlain - Buchan, 16 May, 1914. CG, Buchan Papers, QUA.

⁹⁶ *A Lodge*, pp. 74-75.

⁹⁷ Tariff reform, along with Home Rule, was the leading election issue in the years before World War I, and accounted for much of the debate as Buchan campaigned in the Borders. See accounts of the campaign in the *Peeblesshire Advertiser* and *Glasgow Herald*. 
Mackinder, in the post-war work *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (1919), asserted that both Cobdenite “idealists” and Tariff Reformers were the selfsame beast, in that both sought to organize the Empire in the name of “efficiency.” Both camps conceived of individuals as constituent parts of the state, and though both were legitimately concerned with the welfare of individuals, this concern was motivated by a concern for “national efficiency,” not individual efficiency. Thus both camps shied away from advocating assisted emigration schemes (see Chapter VI). Mackinder understood imperialism to be the desire to strengthen pan-imperial bonds between both the myriad subjects of the Empire, on the individual level, and between its territorial units, on the constitutional level. Imperialists, he argued, were “organizers,” concerned with improving “national efficiency” through imperial means. In this sense, he continued, imperialism proved inimical to democracy: “[w]hile ‘the democrat is thinking of the rights of man,’ the organizer is ‘thinking how to use men,’ and has idealized the disciplined state, the ‘camp state.’” The only reason the Empire did not break apart was that democracy and imperialism, understood in Mackinder’s sense as the spirit of using the Empire to improve “national efficiency,” had their respective separate quarters in the settlement and dependent Empires.

*An Ecumenical Conception of Imperial Citizenship*

The “two Empires” thesis, holding that Empire consisted of a “democratic” sphere which profited from an “imperial” sphere, is generally accepted by historians. The struggles of the decolonization era seem to support this view *ex post facto*. However, this is not to say that contemporaries were either ignorant or dismissive of this relationship. Indeed, Buchan went part

of the way toward bridging this gap, and, being somewhat ahead of orthodox thought on this issue, was inevitably disappointed. His cosmopolitan ideas, starting with his time as an outsider in the aristocratic world of Oxford, meant that he had difficulty adhering to the hierarchical notions of race which his generation embraced. From the frank discussions of race by Karl Pearson, Francis Galton, and Benjamin Kidd in the 1880’s, through to the milder paternalism of Frederick Lugard in the 1900’s and 1910’s, two generations of British thinkers, in working through the problem of the “two Empires,” inevitably invoked ideas of hierarchy. Either there were separate ‘races’, some superior, others inferior, an unbridgeable gap; or all people were fundamentally equal, but some were more advanced than others, and thus had a duty to help the “less developed” advance. While Buchan’s experiences led him toward an ecumenical conception of imperial citizenship, one which sought to overcome divisions of thought on the issue both in Britain and throughout the Empire, he was ultimately unable to transcend the question of difference, and thus failed to articulate in clear terms what such a citizenship would look like.

Buchan initially held to the belief that there were apparent and substantial differences amongst the “races” of Empire. He argued in The African Colony (1904) that the races were separated by a “radical mental dissimilarity,” and propagated the notion of the “lazy native,” stating that whites and blacks should not compete as labour because the black exhibits less “industry.” Buchan’s Prester John (1910), in which an enterprising nineteen-year old hero thwarts a native uprising in South Africa, portrays natives as intelligent, but impetuous and unsophisticated.99 This was his first attempt at a romance in the vein of Rider Haggard, and was

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99 Buchan, The African Colony (London: 1904). Edward Said has much to say about the myth of the “lazy native” in British literature, and, on less solid ground, in British culture. Buchan here assumes his usual place amongst the rogues’ gallery of imperial apologists, a place well deserved if based only upon the admittedly patronizing Prester John. Said, however, betrays a lack of knowledge of the rest of Buchan’s literary œuvre, which though certainly not high literature, is not “racist.” See Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: 1994), pp. 162-
written for boys. Though often denounced today as “racist,” the character of Laputa, the native chief, presents a clue to Buchan’s developing ideas on race and citizenship. He is at once noble and childlike, honourable and unpredictable. Bill Schwarz, in commenting on the influence of southern Africa on Buchan’s career, argues that Laputa is not a creole, but rather two distinct people, depending on whether he is conversing with a black man or a white man.\footnote{Bill Schwarz, “The Romance of the Veld,” in Bosco and May, eds. \textit{The Round Table: The Empire/Commonwealth and British Foreign Policy} (London: 1997), p. 113.} Laputa thus represents a transition in Buchan’s thought from a paternal conception of non-British peoples, where difference is rigid and unbridgeable, to an ecumenical one where all men, in potential if not in practice, are equals. (It must be emphasized that Buchan was certainly not a proponent of equal status for all, at least in the short-term.) By the 1910’s, Buchan’s idea of moral cosmopolitanism had taken form, making it impossible for him to hold to the “‘two Empire” thesis. A character in his 1925 novel \textit{The House of the Four Winds} sums up this new position: “human nature was much the same everywhere, and that one might dig out of the unlikeliest places surprising virtues.”\footnote{Buchan, \textit{The House of the Four Winds} (London: 1965 [1925]), p. 26} This development is best shown in contrasting Buchan’s reaction to the Chinese Labour controversy in the Transvaal in 1905-06 with the more ecumenical spirit he advocated for Empire by World War I.

The controversy over “Chinese slavery,” the importation into the Transvaal of 50,000 Chinese labourers after 1904 to revive the faltering Rand gold industry, sharply divided Edwardian politics. The human abuses suffered by Chinese “coolies,” combined with their low wages, led to criticism of the Unionists’ labour policy, and contributed to the Liberals’ triumph
at the polls in 1906, though the controversy’s role should not be overrated.\textsuperscript{102} The “coolie” question was the first true test of Buchan’s imperial faith, as it set his attachment to Milner and “the imperial mission” against the strong moral convictions which would later lead him towards ecumenicalism. Writing in \textit{The Times} in early 1904, Buchan expressed cautious support for the labour scheme.\textsuperscript{103} He argued that Chinese labour might be a necessary, though temporary step, in the Transvaal’s progress toward responsible government. The establishment of a strong economy would set the conditions for political reform. He put off criticism of the scheme as \textit{mala fide}, focused on admitted humanitarian problems when the real issue was the absorption of the Transvaal into the Empire. It should be noted that despite Buchan’s concerns, the most forceful critiques of indentured labour in general were not humanitarian, though they sometimes used such language, but rather economic. Indentured labourers, after all, worked more cheaply than white labourers. The Chinese Labour issue, in combination with debates concerning tariff reform and the Government’s Education and Licensing Acts, helped politicize working class Britons to vote against the Conservatives in 1906.

Buchan had become sensitive to the importance of colonial nationalism, the sense of place and history then developing at various rates in the colonies, and intuited the significance of this force in the future Empire. Thus, the Transvaal’s wishes were to be respected, even if it strained the loyalty of Asian subjects or the comfort of British Liberals. This was the message he offered in the \textit{Scottish Review} in 1908, urging the Liberal government not to veto colonial legislation banning further Indian immigration into the Transvaal. Campbell-Bannerman’s


\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Times}, 17 February, 1904, 4e.
government had granted the Transvaal autonomy by Letters Patent in 1906, and responsible government had led to the election in 1907 of the moderate Het Volk party, under the leadership of Louis Botha. This development helped Buchan reconcile his tentative support for "coolie" labour with his moral doubts, as he could assert once the crisis had passed that "liberty . . . is liberty to act foolishly as well as to act wisely."\(^{104}\)

In this definition of liberty in the context of Empire, Buchan anticipated the position proffered by Laurier at the 1911 Imperial Conference. The Canadian premier argued that "the power of disallowance now vested in us [the Imperial government, which Laurier technically, as a Colonial himself, did not speak for] was one which in the interests of the Colonies it was better should not be exercised. Even although the Act sought to be disallowed, were one taking my property from me and handing it over to my political opponents, it would still be better for us not to interfere."\(^{105}\) The freedom to make bad decisions was the bulwark of imperial unity. This was consistent with Buchan’s approval of Burke’s notion of representative government, where the elected representative is given free rein to exercise his good judgement, rather than being a mere conduit of public opinion (or of his constituency office).\(^{106}\)

There was a degree of willful naïveté here, as support for the principle of responsible government, and, in the dependent territories, trusteeship, also meant a silent condoning of the often brutal suppression of internal dissent by such governments. Buchan, for instance, was


\(^{105}\) *Peeblesshire Advertiser*, 1 April, 1911. The occasion was a speech to the Peeblesshire Unionist Organization. Besides Home Rule, the topic Buchan was directly addressing, questions of imperial organization were also at the fore in 1911 in light of debates over an imperial navy and Australia’s racial policies. See below, Chapter IV.

noticeably silent regarding the violent suppression of the Zula rebellion in 1906, when the Zula population forcibly resisted the imposition by the Natal government of a poll tax. This same paradox was later at the heart of the Amritsar crisis of 1919, where Brigadier-General Dyer was punished as an individual, but the principle of the Raj was not, immediately anyway, challenged.107 How much wrong is permissible in the service of right?

The “right” Buchan upheld was the “civilizing power” of Britain. He believed that Africa must become “a land of political telepathy,” where the various races created a common community. Thus, it was equally damaging to Empire when white Transvaal labourers held back their labour for unreasonable wages, as they intermittently did, as it was when Africans resisted British governance. Both situations worked counter to the principle of unity for the common good. Therefore, just as the British people must be further schooled in the necessity of a common imperial purpose, so natives, whether in Africa or elsewhere, must be taught civic duty. This was consistent with a notion of trusteeship, the position that the native’s lands are a protectorate, not a colony, and that “[w]e [the British] must fulfill our trust in the noble sense.”108 This appeal to nobility is instructive. Buchan, unlike many of his peers, especially on the Right, was aware of the danger that such language could devolve into mere cant, convenient show to mask economic and territorial aggrandizement.

Trust between ruler and ruled must be reciprocated, not taken advantage of; this remained a touchstone of Buchan’s imperial philosophy. In this view, Buchan owed much to his early connection with Gilbert Murray. Murray too was a “thinker” amongst “doers.” He also feared the potential for opportunism and opposed inequality, writing to Buchan that the


consciousness of belonging to a great nation entailed a sense of *noblesse oblige*, to which one was “bound in self-respect.” Abuses can creep in when self-criticism is lacking, or when this self-respect is perverted, as when ideals are mistaken for facts. Thus, an individual Englishman is virtuous, if that is the case, not because he is an Englishman, but because he is virtuous.

Murray was fearful that England, like the ancient Athens he knew as a scholar, had the potential to administer its Empire poorly if it came to believe that “the Higher, because it is higher, has a right to behave worse,” an eventuality which would lead to “fearfully underrating the intensity of the other people’s feelings.” Murray applied this lesson to Empire, arguing that the British, as imperial missionaries (in a secular sense), must learn the culture of the natives before their “improvement” along western lines was possible. After all, he contended, the natives’ “lands are a protectorate, not a colony.”

In the spirit of Victorian altruism, he concluded in a romantic manner, invoking the memory of Wellington, and asserting that it is better to be Icarus and risk failure, than to be a contented minor power.

If Buchan was not ahead of his time on issues of race, neither was he an advocate of a British supremacy based upon essentialist notions of racial hierarchy. While it is true that he was more concerned with political progress than racial platforms, his view of inequality in Empire is best termed as paternalistic. He accepted that the principles of imperialism dictated that all the peoples of Empire were deserving of self-government, but this did not mean it must occur immediately. Here he shared the contemporary conviction that subject peoples must be tutored in the ways of democracy, ideally of the Westminster variety. Commenting on India, he

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109 Gilbert Murray - Buchan, 25 April, 1903. CG, QUA, Buchan Papers. Murray, though a liberal in politics, believed Buchan’s Tory party was better equipped to address these issues, as it held more firmly to principles of Empire, whereas the Liberals were more “aimless.”

argued that “[i]f we give freedom, we are bound to guard against its abuse, or we shall fail in our duty to those whom we govern.” He thus supported the gradual reforms encompassed in the 1909 Morley-Minto legislation, and in general seconded Lord Cromer’s opinion that the premature grant of self-government would not be a liberal act, but rather merely a doctrinaire, and ultimately counter-productive, move.\(^{111}\)

Because of such equivocating, Buchan’s defence of the “civilizing mission” was notably hollow. His orthodox pronouncements on race became half-hearted by the 1910’s, as if he was as much concerned with convincing himself of the validity of such arguments as he was in propagating the message to others. Buchan was, as Juanita Kruse has observed, careless in his language concerning race. He sometimes employed the stereotyped euphemisms of the day when referring to matters of race.\(^{112}\) He also held tightly, especially early in his career, to the notion of “totem,” that men were of a “type” that determined their actions. A belief that individuals have an essence of some sort is perhaps an unsurprising position for a Calvinist to maintain, but Buchan began to move beyond this position by the early 1910’s to develop a cosmopolitan view of race, one which highlighted commonalities between people rather than differences. This progression in Buchan’s thought resulted in part from the emotional and mental struggles of the Great War, but also because of a growing conviction that borders, whether political or cultural, were porous and artificial, useful for practical matters, but not indicative of essential or even, necessarily, substantive differences between peoples.


\(^{112}\) Witness, for instance, his 1917 correspondence with Walter Hines Page, then American ambassador to Britain, where Buchan refers to the Japanese ambassador to Britain as “the Jap.” Buchan - Walter Hines Page, 17 January, 1917. Page letters, copy, Copies A-Z, Buchan Papers, QUA.
Furthermore, his sense of morality was centred on the individual, not on "cultures" or "peoples." Buchan thus sought to ameliorate divisions within his own hierarchical society as well as the racial divisions apparent within the Empire. This was apparent in his work as an historian, where he concentrated on biographies. He produced well received studies of Montrose and Lord Arwell in 1913, and later in life wrote on Lord Minto, Sir Walter Scott, Caesar, Charles Gordon, Cromwell, and Augustus. Buchan's notion of imperial citizenship, like his histories, was rooted in a sense of fairness. One admirer was his fellow historian G. M. Trevelyan. In a letter congratulating Buchan on the publication of Montrose, a biographical study of the seventeenth century Scottish royalist and Covenanter, Trevelyan noted "[t]hat is the way to write history, to be an advocate for your own view, but a judge in impartiality in stating the facts."\(^{113}\) Wakefield, the colonial nationalist character in A Lodge, sees the Empire in catholic terms, stating that "the boy who grows up in the backwoods and the boy who goes the conventional road of Eton and Oxford will become different men, though they may be sons of the same father." This spirit of inclusion applied as well to men of action, Wakefield declaring that, "[w]e must have our subalterns as well as our marshals, our Garibaldis as well as our Cavatars and Mazzinis."\(^{114}\) There was also much of Buchan's personal philosophy guiding him towards an ecumenical position. Oxford, he reflected late in life, had been "an excellent thing, for to mix with abler men than yourself is to learn humility."\(^{115}\)

It is evident that Buchan was struggling towards an ecumenical imperial citizenship as far back as his time in southern Africa. Despite his reservations about granting natives the

\(^{113}\) G. M. Trevelyan - Buchan, 21 September, 1913. CG, Buchan Papers, QUA. Emphasis in original.

\(^{114}\) A Lodge, pp. 77, 62.

\(^{115}\) Memory Hold the Door, p. 93.
franchise, or his faith in the paternalistic notion of tutelage, he nonetheless shied away from
Milner’s demographic plan to “swamp” the Boers through increased English settlement. He
instead argued more positively that the Boers could be brought back into the imperial fold, the
strength of Empire being “that wide tolerance which does not seek a dead level of uniformity,
but is content to give all creeds and sentiments free scope under its flag.” Buchan tempered
his support for war in South Africa, and he found much to respect in the Boers, a domestic
people who resembled the people of the Borders he knew so well. This respect was repaid in
1919 when Smuts asked Buchan to chronicle South Africa’s wartime service, a project which
resulted in *The History of the South African Forces in France* (1920).

His ecumenical outlook also bridged party divisions. Buchan always maintained that he
was “nine-tenths” a Liberal. His only issue with the party of Gladstone was a perceived moral
smugness on its part which he believed resulted in complacency: “Tories may think they are
better born, but Liberals know that they are born better.” Indeed, many of Buchan’s
pronouncements during the Great War were decidedly more liberal than those of the Liberal
party. He fumed at the deleterious effect on public morale (and on the quality of his despatches
from the front) of the government’s general censorship. He also expressed sympathy for those
Britons who refused to serve due to moral reservations, both before and after the introduction of
conscription in 1916. He signed a petition in December 1918 in favour of a general amnesty for

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116 [Buchan], “Mr. Kruger’s Funeral,” *Spectator*, 24 December, 1904, p. 1045. Kruger’s funeral was a lavish affair, with some 10-12,000 onlookers, though it was notably muted as much of the crowd were Boers. Robert Brand, an Oxford colleague of Buchan’s who also served under Milner in South Africa, observed that “[t]hey [the Boers] were a[n] . . . apathetic crowd, no signs of grief. It was a show, a variety from the monotony of the veld.” Brand - Buchan, 18 December, 1904. CG, QUA, Buchan Papers.

117 See the review of Buchan’s *The African Colony* in *Blackwood’s*, 176, July 1904, pp. 75-84; *MHTD*, p. 115.

118 *Memory Hold The Door*, pp. 145-146.
conscientious objectors. A central character in *Mr. Standfast*, the third Richard Hannay novel, written in 1917-1918, is a conscientious objector whose moral certainty marks him as a hero.\(^{119}\)

While Buchan did not experience combat itself, he was not naive as to the horrors of the war. He spent much time at the battlefield as an official observer, and came to know its features intently. The war made an indelible impression on him. His personal losses - his brother Alistair, his friend Raymond Asquith - have been noted above. Even apart from those tragedies, the war confirmed Buchan’s fatalism: “one acquiesced in tragedy, but it was an acquiescence without hope of philosophy. There was no uplift of the spirit, such as is traditionally associated with battle.”\(^{120}\) The tragedy led him to view a strong Empire as a bulwark against any future Armageddon. Buchan’s 1917 introduction to the revised edition of *A Lodge*, penned at the nadir of the war, expressed this sentiment thus: “[w]e understand, as we never understood before, that our Empire is a mystic whole which no enemy may part asunder, and our wisest minds are now given to the task of devising a mechanism of union adequate to this spiritual unity.”\(^{121}\) As Andrew Lownie has observed, though, Buchan much preferred the “spiritual unity” to the formal “mechanism of union.”\(^{122}\) Such a position was consistent with his ecumenicalism, which celebrated the diversity of Empire, emphasized a growing understanding that its variety was its strength, and argued that cooperation might better be achieved in spirit than in material practice.

\(^{119}\) Balfour - Buchan, 13 October, 1915. C-G, Buchan Papers, QUA; W. H. Hamilton - Buchan, 9 May 1919. C-G, Buchan Papers, QUA; John Buchan, *Mr. Standfast* (Oxford: 1993 [1919]). Mr. *Standfast* draws heavily on Bunyan’s *Pilgrim’s Progress*, and is the most overtly moralistic of Buchan’s “shockers,” as his adventure novels were termed by contemporaries.

\(^{120}\) *Memory Hold the Door*, p. 167.

\(^{121}\) Undated clipping, Scrapbook 1: Miscellanea 1904-1919, p. 172. Buchan Papers, QUA.

\(^{122}\) Lownie, “John Buchan, The Round Table and Empire,” in *The Round Table: The Empire/Commonwealth and British Foreign Policy*, pp. 58.
In advancing these views, Buchan was consistent with broader intellectual movements within the conservative tent which sought to provide collective responses to the problems of both imperial and domestic challenges.\(^\text{123}\)

**Conclusion**

The cause which John Buchan had nurtured since his service in Milner’s “creche” at the turn of the century was that of Empire. A cosmopolitan imperial citizenship, equal parts duty, responsibility, morality, and cooperation, was his expressed vision. Buchan shared with Lionel Curtis, and indeed with most conservatives of the early twentieth century, an organic notion of Empire. *Sick Heart River*, Buchan’s last novel and a work which literary critics and general readers alike recognize as his most autobiographical work, encapsulates succinctly his notion of Empire and citizenship. Edward Leithen, the novel’s protagonist, notes of his work with a group of French Canadians and the Hare people in Canada’s north that it was “finer than the duty of kinship. It was a brotherhood of men.” Later, when Leithen is close to death, Buchan reflects on the rewards of service: “[m]ost men had their lives taken from them. It was his [Leithen’s] privilege to give his, to offer it freely and joyfully in one last effort of manhood.”\(^\text{124}\) In the final judgement, Buchan’s imperialism, and his attendant notion of imperial citizenship, were largely spiritual. Ever the romantic conservative, connected to nature and place as much as to

\(^{123}\) On conservatives’ efforts to adapt to the new intellectual challenges of the twentieth century, and especially efforts to incorporate collectivist thought, see E. H. H. Green, *The Crisis of Conservatism* (London and New York: 1995), Chp. V.

individuals or nations, he conceived of Empire as a belief. As the British Empire, teetering under the pressures of nationalism and the anti-colonialism of Washington, rallied its remaining strength against German and Japanese aggression in the late 1930s, Buchan reflected on the vitality of the early twentieth century Empire in full bloom:

[i]ts dreams, once so bright, have been so pawed by unctuous hands that their glory has departed. But in those days things were different. It was an inspiration for youth to realize the magnitude of its material heritage, and to think how it might be turned to spiritual issues.\textsuperscript{125}

These words serve to illustrate just how far Buchan’s imperial thought had progressed from his early days in South Africa. His understanding of Empire evolved from one which, in the early years of the twentieth century, saw the differences amongst imperial subjects as paramount to one which came, by the 1910s, to stress the possibility of a shared imperial identity. Buchan was unable, however, to systematically outline how his understanding of Empire might take form as an imperial citizenship. There were three reasons for this failure. First, Buchan’s conception of imperial citizenship was compromised by the fact that the Empire was not a state per se. This made it difficult to define precisely what the individual’s relationship to the imperial state should be. The first priority was perforce to create such a state, and Buchan’s tentative thinking in regard to such a process was confined to the preliminary stage of engendering imperial unity. Second, the very broad-mindedness of Buchan’s thought meant that it lacked cohesion. If the central progression in Buchan’s imperial outlook was from a parochial to an ecumenical understanding of “race,” the constant was an inability to construct an imperial citizenship which reflected this evolution. Finally, Buchan’s Victorian attention to “character”, the basis of his moral cosmopolitanism, meant that his ideas concerning imperial citizenship concentrated on how individuals acted, the performance of their duties, rather than on

\textsuperscript{125} Memory Hold the Door, p. 124.
what rights such individuals might or should have. Buchan wrote widely on the value of bringing people together, and believed that the institution of Empire was the ideal means by which to realize this goal. He was less certain, however, about what form the Empire should assume once this ecumenical goal was attained.

Buchan's vision of imperial citizenship was thus one of unfulfilled potential. If, as William James asserted, "the one and the many" is the "most central of all philosophical problems," John Buchan can be seen to have responded to the question of his age by working to bring together the one and the many under the banner of Empire. It was to be left to others to place these ideas within a practical framework.

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CHAPTER IV

"The Great Anomaly": Richard Jebb, Intra-imperial Immigration, and the Practical Problems of Imperial Citizenship

The organic imperialism of Lionel Curtis and the nascent cosmopolitan imperialism of John Buchan demonstrate two strains of early twentieth century conservative thought on citizenship and the Empire. These men, however, travelled in the worlds of political philosophy and the civil service. They were, with only occasional exceptions, strangers to the world of policy implementation. The task of giving practical shape to ideas of imperial citizenship was left to others. One such figure was the imperial journalist and traveller Richard Jebb. Like Curtis and Buchan, Jebb was primarily a theorist. However, Jebb had a clearer conception than they of the emerging political importance of the Dominions. Unlike Curtis and Buchan, who despite the differences in their thought both remained convinced that Britain must remain the centre of the Empire, Jebb began to envision Empire less as a federation and more as a confederation.

His *Studies in Colonial Nationalism* (1905) established the young author as an authority on the Empire, and particularly the white settlement colonies. Jebb spent the next decade refining his argument that the settlement colonies, soon to be termed the Dominions, exhibited the traits of emerging nation-states. Any proposed schemes to maintain imperial unity must

\footnote{Curtis's dyarchy proposal was a guiding influence in the formation of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919. Curtis himself, however, never held elected office, though he made a successful and long career as an advisor to political leaders. Buchan was ill-suited to elected office.}
necessarily, he believed, take this new reality into account. Despite two subsequent books,
innumerable speeches in the lecture halls of Edwardian imperialism, and a platform at the
Morning Post, Jebb was unable to win broad support for his ideas. A devastating loss as a
Unionist candidate at the polls in the December 1910 election proved a decisive blow to his
confidence. With the outbreak of the First World War, Jebb largely retired from active life,
though he would live for another four decades.

Richard Jebb’s work and career present an instructive case study in the practical problems
of defining imperial citizenship. He articulated a vision of Empire that was at once inclusive and
exclusive, one that rested on a set of shared values which proved difficult, if not impossible, to
inculcate in the Empire’s peoples. Jebb’s vision betrays the fragility of pan-Empire ideals.
However, the currency his activities carried, the prescience of his views, and the very fact that
the contentious debate Jebb spent much of his career commenting upon, imbued as it was with
racial and political conflict, did not result in violent imperial cleavages speaks to the paradoxical
elasticity and durability of the imperial ideal. Ironically, the impossibility of ever creating a
commonly acceptable definition of imperial citizenship proved a stabilizing, rather than
debilitating, factor. Thus, in the failure of Richard Jebb’s vision of imperial citizenship, we can
gain a clearer understanding of the relative strengths of the Empire in the early twentieth century.

One arena in which this failure was particularly evident was that of intra-imperial
migration. The migration issue is a particularly appropriate topic of study for historians of
Empire because it reveals attitudes and conceptions of citizenship, and helps illustrate how

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2 The Imperial Conferences, a History and Study in Two Volumes (London: 1911); The
imperialism was constituted, on whom it had an impact, and how it was perpetuated. These were issues in which Jebb showed much interest. This chapter outlines Jebb’s thought on colonial nationalism, imperial unity, and intra-imperial immigration. Jebb was ultimately unsuccessful in convincing others of the virtues of his ideas. Ironically, his lack of success in this endeavour as well as his generation’s broader inability to create an ideal of imperial citizenship, can in retrospect be viewed as fortuitous. The lack of a concrete notion of imperial citizenship allowed an environment of multiple jurisdictions and ideological ambiguity to develop. This environment itself unexpectedly proved successful in maintaining imperial unity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Through the examination of select examples of intra-imperial immigration conflicts and citizenship laws to illustrate tensions between proponents of a “wider patriotism” and those of “colonial autonomy,” it is the argument of the following chapter that Britons’ inability to create a consensual notion of imperial citizenship resulted in a sense of equilibrium, where the centralist imperatives of imperial decision-makers in Britain were balanced by the often independent actions of colonials. This equilibrium in part helped maintain imperial unity.

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In the introduction to *Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire*, his recent foray into imperial history, the historian David Cannadine advances the claim that, “the British Empire was at least as much (perhaps more?) about the replication of sameness and similarities originating from home as it was about the insistence on difference and dissimilarities originating from overseas.”

Arguing that the Empire constituted “a complex social hierarchy . . . a social organism,” Cannadine seeks to explain Britain’s imperium through the nexus of class. His attention to the essentially Burkean nature of the Empire is well placed, and a valued corrective to a historiography whose attention to the tensions and conflicts of Empire can leave the reader curious as to how the institution actually survived for three centuries. However, Cannadine overestimates the putative bonds which held together Britain and the Dominions. It was not just the dependent colonies which constituted separate and distinct polities. The Dominions, too, despite cultural allegiances to Britain, and despite lack of control over their own foreign relations, were by the end of the nineteenth century largely autonomous nations. The Imperial Conferences of the early twentieth century were marked by nothing if not the Dominions’ stated desire not to stand alongside Britain in political federation, not to harmonize citizenship legislation.

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5 On the Imperial Conferences, see *The Colonial and Imperial Conferences from 1887 to 1937*, Vol. I and II. Maurice Olivier, ed. (Ottawa, 1954); and John Kendle, *The Colonial and*
Indeed, the absence of any notion of imperial citizenship poses a challenge to the claim that the Empire constituted a unified political or social whole. Ornamental ties were of undoubted significance in perpetuating British imperial ties. But they were also just that, ornaments. Colonial societies were not simply simulacra of Britain, nor, in Sir Charles Dilke’s oft-cited phrase, a “Greater Britain”\(^6\); their very antithesis to such conceptions explains the Empire’s lack of concrete political and social unity. One means of explaining why notions of imperial citizenship failed to resonate throughout the Empire is to examine the problems presented by intra-imperial immigration, a defining question of the imperial debate before World War I. The imperial publicist Richard Jebb provides an ideal guide for to this debate.

The perennial challenge of Empire was *imperium et libertas* - how to maintain both structure and unity while also preserving the cherished ideal of freedom. This paradigm was especially clear in contemporary debates concerning intra-imperial immigration, the various processes by which individuals were able to move from imperial territory to imperial territory, and the degree to which each benefited from being an imperial subject. Historians such as R. A. Huttenback have argued that immigration legislation throughout the white Empire was explicitly discriminatory and prejudicial, reflecting the racist attitudes of imperial societies.\(^7\) While there is no doubt that these policies were prohibitive, exclusionary, and discriminatory in an absolute sense, terming them “racist” is to mistake the effect for the cause. Such discriminatory acts were

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*Imperial Conferences* (London, 1967).


a means of pursuing consensus within colonial societies, seen by many imperial actors as the buttress of imperial unity. The situation was ironic. On the one hand imperialists in Britain envisioned an imperial citizenship built upon a "wider patriotism," a pan-imperial sentiment emphasizing imperial connections such as military service, and indeed the "ornamentalism" Cannadine details. On the other hand, imperialists in the colonies believed such a citizenship could best be achieved by building homogeneous, not inclusive, local societies. In consequence, non-whites (and sometimes simply non-Britons) were to be excluded in the colonies because they represented a challenge to cultural unity. In an age that viewed consensus and unity as virtues, inclusion and multi-culturalism were not yet achievable notions.

Indeed, issues of imperial citizenship and immigration vexed the Empire's political leaders, and were a persistent theme at the quadrennial Imperial Conferences held in London. Imperial immigration played a central role in debate during the 1911 Imperial Conference. The crisis of Chinese labour in South Africa, racial debates in British Columbia, and the articulation of a "White Australia policy" had pushed the issue to the forefront, and it became a focal point of any discussion of imperial citizenship. The debate was fractious, not only merely owing to the varied desires of the Dominions, but also because what was under discussion was really the cultural framework of Empire. Jebb argued that the "Chinese experiment," the importation of Chinese labourers to work in the gold and diamond mines of South Africa, had been a failure in light of his theory of colonial nationalism.\footnote{Richard Jebb - Sir Charles Bruce, 4 March, 1912. Jebb Papers, Institute of Commonwealth Studies (ICS), University of London. Jebb's correspondence is filed by date in (Jebb Papers File A).} He based this argument, which he also applied to Asian immigration throughout the rest of the Empire, not on racial distinctions, but rather on
what he saw as a challenge to the cultural homogeneity and consensus he saw as the bulwark of a strong Empire.

Richard Jebb was not the only Victorian to employ an at best ambiguous use of the terms “race” and “imperialism.” These two terms are often used in tandem when historians address the issue of imperial immigration, usually to argue that imperial immigration policies were defined by racist ideology and sentiment.9 Victorians and Edwardians, however, employed the terms “race” and “imperialism” with a noted lack of precision. Both terms took on new connotations in the middle of the nineteenth century. With the rise of social Darwinian thought, especially Gobineau’s *Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines*, linguistic differences became transposed into physical ones, and then conflated with ideas of “stock.” “Race” now took on a discriminatory meaning.10 The new discriminatory meaning polluted the older genealogical sense of the word, and contemporaries now used the same term to refer to both cultural and biological “differences.” It was also used increasingly in an imperial context. “Imperialist” in its modern context had been introduced in the 1870’s as an epithet to describe the nature of the Second French Republic under Louis Napoleon. In Britain, Disraeli appropriated the word from his critics, who had employed it against him, and cemented it as Conservative policy in a speech

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9 The most explicit example would be Robert Huttenback’s *Racism and Empire* (Ithaca: 1976).

10 Raymond Williams, *Keywords* (Oxford, 1983 [1976]), pp. 248-250, for the complete etymology of the term “racial.” The word was first introduced to English in the seventeenth century from the French “race” and the Italian “razza.” It had several early meanings: “(i) offspring in the sense of a line of descent,” “(ii) a kind of species or plant,” “(iii) general classification, as in ‘the human race,’” and “(iv) a group of human beings in extension and projection from sense (i).” Williams stresses the ambiguity that arose when the term began to be used to describe differences within a species, specifically *Homo sapiens*.
in 1872 at the Crystal Palace. Differing from the older *imperium*, Latin for “supreme power,” “imperialism” was now used in the context of military or economic expansion. In its core meaning of conflict, “imperialism” was thus a historically specific term, rather than an ideology. It referred to action, not policy. However, this meaning was soon confused with pan-Empire sentiment, varying across the British Empire, but generally signifying a desire to promote the unity, cohesion, and stability of Empire.11 Thus a citizenship built on a “wider patriotism” was thought to be best achieved by seeking homogeneity, not inclusion.

How did contemporaries come to hold such views in the imperial context? To answer this question, it is first necessary to briefly detail the career of Richard Jebb. This outline will be followed by an exegesis of Jebb’s views on colonial nationalism, and then a discussion of his vision of imperial citizenship. The focus will then broaden to detail the practical issue of immigration within the Empire, a case study of imperial citizenship put to the test. Finally, Jebb’s ideas concerning imperial citizenship, and the issue of imperial immigration itself, will be reassessed in terms of their contribution to maintaining imperial unity through ambiguity.

*Richard Jebb and Empire*

Richard Jebb, the publicist of Empire, spent the bulk of his career writing for *The

Morning Post, the press organ of the British officer class. The nephew of the great classicist Sir Richard Claverhouse Jebb, the younger Jebb struggled during the early part of his career to emerge from the shadow of his more famous uncle. Jebb did, however, become a prolific opinion-maker in his own right. Sharing his uncle’s appreciation of the classical world, Jebb studied the Roman Empire at Eton and later at New College, Oxford. His affinity for the Roman ideal of citizenship and imperial unity was to be the defining mission of his later life. Jebb’s public school education also marked him as significant in another way. He was schooled in what J. A. Mangan has termed the “games ethic,” that particular English public school view of the world which bestowed unwavering confidence in the student, and which generated the cult of the amateur, respect above all else for honour, virtue and fair play, and, not least of all, a great cultural elitism. Such attitudes are seen as disingenuous in the post-colonial era, but this was certainly not the case during the period in which Jebb was active. This mentalité, perhaps more so than guns, steamships, and capitalism, was the foundation of the Victorian and Edwardian Empire.

Emerging from this world, Jebb took it as his task to participate in Empire. In an age when spiritual certainties were being seriously questioned, the agnostic Jebb found his spiritual solace in imperialism. His tool would be the pen. He authored several books on Empire, the

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12 On the history of The Morning Post in this era, see Keith Wilson, A Study in the History and Politics of The Morning Post, 1905-1926 (Lewiston: 1990).

13 Even after the elder Jebb died in 1906, Richard had to write the Halifax Chronicle to inform that paper that a leader of his they had picked up from The Morning Post was not written by his uncle. Jebb - Halifax Chronicle, December, 14, 1906. Jebb Papers, A, ICS.

14 On Roman citizenship, see the relevant sections of Chapter I, as well as Norman Vance, The Victorians and Ancient Rome (Cambridge, Mass.: 1997).
most significant of which was his first work, *Studies in Colonial Nationalism* (1905). Inspired by his initial tour of the Empire, *Studies* presented a detailed exposition of Jebb’s nascent conception of colonial nationalism, and, as it presented the growth of the settlement colonies in a favourable manner, it was understandably well received in imperial circles.\(^{15}\) Jebb envisioned “Five Free Nations, who are peers among their peers,”\(^{16}\) pursuing their own goals under the common aegis of imperial patriotism, uniting when necessary, “separate limbs, trained to concerted action in emergency.”\(^{17}\) There was an obvious paradox at the heart of this argument — how to maintain the “purpose” of Empire while simultaneously respecting colonial autonomy.

Though widely influential, Jebb made little money from the publication of *Studies*. Only 513 of the 750 printed were sold, and Jebb made but £30/14/3 for his labour.\(^{18}\) Jebb followed the success of *Studies* by embarking on a three volume history of the Imperial Conferences up to 1911. Only the first two volumes of this endeavour, detailing the Conferences up to 1907, were published.\(^{19}\) *The Britannic Question*, published in 1913, can be seen in certain ways as a

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\(^{15}\) *The Times* (26 May, 1905), wrote that “Mr. Jebb’s book has no small originality”; *The Spectator* (94, 17 June 1905, p. 897) remarked that “[i]t [Studies] is essentially a work which will be welcomed, not derided in Canada and Australasia. And that is to say no small thing of its merits, and of the successes with which its author has achieved his object”; and *The Academy* (68, 29 April, 1905, p. 469) judged that the book “should be studied by all who wish to understand the trend of colonial aspirations, whether they agree with them or not.”

\(^{16}\) *Ibid*, p. 335.

\(^{17}\) Jebb - C. H. Cahan, 3 April, 1912. Jebb Papers.


\(^{19}\) Jebb, *The Imperial Conference, a History and Study, in Two Volumes* (London: 1911). A manuscript edition of the proposed third volume, detailing the conference of 1911, is located in the Jebb Papers.
continuation of Studies, as Jebb again outlined his belief in colonial nationalism, incorporating into his argument lessons drawn from the previous decade. Jebb also directly challenged the reinvigorated federationist school, with specific reference to the Round Table’s scheme of an Imperial Parliament, by advocating what he termed “alliance.” Though well received amongst fellow imperialists, the book also resembled Studies in its lack of commercial success.\(^{20}\) He was also hired to write under Fabian Ware at The Morning Post, providing commentary on the Empire, and writing many of the paper’s leaders. The Morning Post was a Unionist paper, vigorously supporting tariff reform.\(^{21}\) Jebb himself was a member of the Tariff Reform League. He continued to hold to this position after Bonar Law, faced with the alternative of splitting the party, was forced in 1913 to reject protection as Unionist policy.\(^{22}\) His staunch protectionism in part accounts for the fact that he faded from the political scene soon after this time.

Jebb lost his only bid at elected office. He stood as a radical Unionist in the January 1910 election for the seat of East Marylebone. His fervent support of tariff reform was not to the electorate’s liking, and Jebb was defeated by a landslide.\(^{23}\) Like Lord Alfred Milner and many

\(^{20}\) The Britannic Question sold only 369 copies, out of an initial press run of 600, in its first two months, and quickly went out of print. See Longman Green - Jebb, 23 June, 1913. Jebb Papers, A, ICS.


\(^{23}\) The defeat was particularly galling for Jebb because East Marylebone was a staunch Conservative constituency (Lord Robert Cecil was the MP before moving to Blackburn). In the general elections spanning the period 1885 to December, 1910, 63% of East Marylebone voters had supported a Conservative/Unionist candidate. In January 1910, Jebb ran as a representative of the Imperial Democratic League, a radical tariff reform branch of the Unionist Party sponsored
other contemporaries, he came to view party politics as an inadequate means of addressing
problems, though acquaintances such as Lady Selborne and Lionel Curtis, probably quite
accurately, believed Jebb had simply taken his defeat too personally. 24 Jebb’s influence, though,
remained more widespread than his electoral appeal. His importance was to remain as a
polemicist. Jebb’s ideas were central to debates over Empire in the pre-war period. In addition
to tariff reform, he championed separate dominion navies, imperial partnership, and the
establishment of the Imperial Conference as a governing body. The last-named project was
consistent with the programme advanced by Joseph Chamberlain. Jebb’s was a voice espousing
the commonalities within Empire. Like Curtis, he believed that the Empire’s potential for
creating peace was its great gift to the world.

Jebb was not, however, simply another parochial commentator, thrusting upon the world
ideas conceived while contemplating maps in the study of the Royal Colonial Institute. Like
Seeley and Dilke before him, he used the inheritance left him upon the death of his father to
begin an extensive tour of the Empire at the age of twenty-five “to study imperial questions at

in part by Fabian Ware, then editor of The Morning Post and Jebb’s boss. The group sought to
force Balfour’s hand regarding tariff reform by electing a number of its members. They failed.
In East Marylebone, Jebb took votes away from the other Unionist candidate, allowing a Liberal
to win the seat with a minority poll. See Henry Pelling, Social Geography of British Elections,
153-155; and The Evening Standard, 23 November, 1910.

24 “He [Jebb] is still as charming and friendly as ever, but five years of journalism has
perverted his judgement and the election fiasco [Jebb’s defeat] has poisoned his mind.” Lady
Selborne - Richard Feetham, 27 April, 1911. MSS Curtis Papers 1/68, Bodleian Library, Oxford
University.
first hand."  

From 1899-1901, Jebb visited Ceylon and all the settlement colonies save those in South Africa, where war had broken out. In 1906 he visited the South African colonies, now moving toward unification, and later toured the West Indies. Jebb set out with an orthodox belief in "Greater England," but returned an advocate of "alliance." He also returned from these two voyages with extensive diaries that provide an invaluable record of the Edwardian Empire.  

Jebb's principal concern during these tours was farming and colonial land use, interests shaped by his younger years at the family home at Ellesmere. However, after landing in Canada in 1899 he broadened his perspective to include the prevailing attitudes toward Empire of the various colonies he visited. Jebb also found time to indulge in more leisurely pursuits, including skating in Canada and fishing and cycling in Australia and New Zealand.  

Jebb's success as a writer granted him access to London's club society. He was a member of the Royal Colonial Institute and the Compatriots (fellow members included John Buchan and F. S. Oliver). His association with the Compatriots is especially illustrative of his position on Empire. Founded in 1904, the group had as its raison d'être imperial consolidation.


26 The diaries are especially valuable for studying the gestation of Studies in Colonial Nationalism. Jebb did not keep up a substantial correspondence until 1906, when the publication of Studies and his position at the Morning Post secured his status as an imperial commentator.

27 Diary, 2 March, 1899. Jebb Papers, B/2/1, ICS. His diaries are interestingly marked by the almost complete absence of personal matters. Even his wedding - to Margaret Ethel of Settle, Yorkshire, in Yokohama, Japan - receives little mention.

28 Schreuder, p. 79.
Its members believed that Britain had a responsibility to develop the Empire. As such, they supported tariff reform and assisted emigration, and believed that imperial affairs should be guided by imperial experts such as themselves. Just as significantly, the Companions viewed their contest with laissez-faire free traders as not just an economic crusade, but also a moral one. Jebb enthusiastically supported all of these views. Jebb also gave speeches to numerous other imperial groups, including Oxford’s Raleigh Club. Though opposed to the Round Table’s pro-federation stance, Jebb enjoyed mostly congenial relations with the group’s members, though he remained somewhat jealous of Curtis’ greater public standing. For his part, Curtis thought Jebb a writer of the second order, though he liked him.

After the publication of Britannic Alliance in 1913, Jebb largely retired from public life; “I feel that I must go out of the business, to which I have given nearly twenty years, for I have

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30 See Andrew S. Thompson, Imperial Britain: The Empire in British Politics, 1880-1932 (Harlow, Essex: 2000), p. 87. Thompson’s work is especially useful for the student of Ewardian conservative pressure groups, detailing the activities of the Tariff Reform League, the Navy League, and the Emigration Committee of the Royal Colonial Institute, in addition to the Companions.

31 Jebb was close with Richard Feetham, a copy of whose Witwatersand convocation speech from 31 March, 1951, is preserved in Jebb’s papers (Q/2/10), testament to a long acquaintance. Curtis invited Jebb to speak at the Raleigh Club, and often provided Jebb with copies of lecture series he gave while Beit Lecturer at Oxford (Curtis - Jebb, 14 April, 1913. Jebb Papers, A, ICS). Curtis could also be condescending to Jebb, though, indicative of the former’s elitist bent. Curtis admonished Jebb for accusing him of orthodoxy (Curtis - Jebb, 17 April, 1913. Jebb Papers, A, ICS), and complained both privately and directly to Jebb that Jebb misrepresented the Round Table’s scheme in public. He also termed Jebb’s work “primitive.” (MSS Curtis Papers, 142/101). Lady Selborne was less kind, terming Jebb “an extraordinarily pig-headed as well as puzzle-headed man.” (MSS Curtis Papers 1/68)
come rather abruptly to the end of my tether.”³² This had as much to do with the declining fortunes of the freelance intellectual, increasingly superceded by specialists and technocrats, as the lack of receptivity of Jebb’s ideas. Jebb withdrew from public life in 1914, contributing to the war effort as a musketry instructor in Britain, having been deemed unfit for active service. After a brief stint as a staff captain at G. H. Q. in France in 1919, Jebb retired to the family house at Ellesmere, where he remained until his death in 1953, contributing periodic works on imperial matters and becoming active in local politics.³³ What was distinctive about Jebb, then, and what makes his opinions all the more valuable to the historian, is that he had a most rare comparative knowledge of the Empire. It is to the fruits of this knowledge that we now turn.

Richard Jebb and Colonial Nationalism

Jebb was a colonial nationalist. What he observed while visiting the settlement colonies were societies British in nature, but pursuing widely different social and political agendas. They had “begun the road from the colonial to the national status.”³⁴ Rather than seeing this as cause for concern, Jebb believed this evolution could become the very buttress of imperial unity: “if diversified nationalism, within workable limits, is valued as a progressive element in human civilization, then the new policy [unity based upon colonial nationalism] is desirable as well as

³² Jebb - Lionel Curtis, April 15, 1913. Jebb Papers, A, ICS.


practicable.”

Perhaps Jebb’s key observation was that this process was inevitable. Just as it was nearly impossible to remove settlers once they had cultivated territory, Jebb saw colonial nationalism as a permanent development. Britain’s response, according to Jebb, should be to encourage, not reverse, such nationalism: “it is easier to quicken the followers than to turn back the leaders.”

He differentiated between colonialism, the despotic rule over dependencies which are marked by sentimental ties to the mother nation and the pursuit of selfish goals, on the one hand, and nationalism, the manhood of a state, characterized by self-respect, on the other. Each colony was at a separate stage of development, and should be treated accordingly. As did many of his generation, Jebb divided the Empire into two, “the Rulers, i.e. the autonomous partner nations, and the Ruled, i.e. the peoples of the Dependencies.” Jebb’s main critique of imperialism was that London treated all colonies the same, as if they were simply part of a “Greater England.” To correct this mistake, Jebb pointed to the Imperial Conferences as an alternative means of governing the Empire. The first Conference had been convened in 1887 in response to fears that the colonies might be dragged into international conflicts. The Conference was periodically reconvened by London over the subsequent two decades, and by 1911 included representatives of all the settlement colonies in addition to observers from India. The remaining Crown Colonies and dependencies were represented by the Colonial Office. Central to Jebb’s

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36 Ibid.


support of the Conference system was the notion of consensus. For Jebb, "the best Empire is that in which the average state government exhibits the highest sense of Imperial responsibility with the least measure of Imperial compulsion."\textsuperscript{39} The Conference was to be the \textit{via media} for expressing colonial nationalism, promoting civic spirit, but also a body flexible enough to adapt to changing imperial circumstances, as alliances are by definition fluid. Jebb favoured the creation of an "independent secretariat" - he is vague as to how this would be organized - to oversee the Conference process.\textsuperscript{40} However organized, the Conference would succeed as a consultative executive body because it would be binding by consensus, not dictate. Further detail on the structure of imperial government proposed by Jebb is to be found in Appendix III.

Jebb's ideas found support in various circles. The Unionist and jurist Sir Frederick Pollack would not go as far as "alliance," but did support the notion of 'partnership.' Pollack believed an imperial "partnership" would provide for security along the lines of Burke's view that the function of the state was the maintenance of security.\textsuperscript{41} Pollock also saw the Imperial Conferences as a better means of preserving unity than moving towards federation or preserving the status quo. Jebb's ideas were echoed in the immediate post-war years by Leopold Amery, future Colonial Secretary in Stanley Baldwin's first government, who wrote in \textit{The Morning Post} that "the idea of the Empire as a possession of the United Kingdom . . . is obsolete. We must conceive the Empire as a chain of British nations girding the world." Amery also predicted a

\textsuperscript{39} Richard Jebb, "Britannic Alliance," MSS, p. 1. Jebb Papers, G/7, ICS.

\textsuperscript{40} Jebb - Sir Bevan Edwards, 9 July, 1910. Jebb Papers, A, ICS.

\textsuperscript{41} See Sir Frederick Pollock - Royal Colonial Institute, 13 November, 1906. Jebb Papers, A, ICS.
British Empire at the beginning of the twenty-first century with 200 million white members.\textsuperscript{42}

Jebb had other, less abstract, reasons for favouring the Imperial Conference system over more centralist models. It would provide a more sympathetic forum for the other two planks of his imperial vision, tariff reform and co-operative defence. Jebb, as has been noted, was a protectionist, but one by necessity rather than conviction. With Britain facing growing economic competition from Germany and the United States, tariff reform was seen as necessary if the nation was to retain its economic dominance. The colonies, he argued, were especially vulnerable as they were too small to compete on their own. Jebb discussed this issue in a series of letters with Leopold Amery in 1912. Jebb suggested that delegates to the Imperial Conference should discuss measures “to the effect that the policy of the British Government would recognize the unity of the Empire in the event of any attempt by any foreign country to penalise any British state, individually, on account of Imperial Preference.” This would be the economic equivalent of Palmerston's \textit{civic Romanus sum}.\textsuperscript{43} Jebb found some support for this view in the colonies. Speaking for the Empire, \textit{The Brockville Times}, for example, printed the following protectionist rhyme:

\begin{quote}
We don’t want to Retaliate,
But, by jingo, if we do.
We’ve got the Pine
We’ve got the Spruce
And we’ve got the Nickel too!\textsuperscript{44}
\end{quote}

The Britannic Alliance would allow each colony to protect its own industries in raw and semi-

\begin{footnotes}
\item[42] \textit{The Morning Post}, 12 November, 1919.
\item[43] See Jebb-Amery, 20 May, 1912. Jebb Papers, A, ICS.
\item[44] Jebb Diaries, 13 March, 1899. Jebb Papers, B/2/1 81, ICS.
\end{footnotes}
produced goods while still enjoying access to the large imperial market. Alliance was also
Jebb’s answer to the vexing imperial question of defence. Jebb argued that alliance would allow
each colony to create its own navy if so desired, with the understanding that defence resources
would be pooled in wartime.

Richard Jebb and Imperial Citizenship

Much of Jebb’s writing is concerned with issues of imperial state formation. How did
these issues affect people on an individual level? What was Jebb’s notion of imperial
citizenship? How did he conceive of the individual’s relationship to the Empire? Jebb believed
a common citizenship was key to maintaining the Britannic Alliance. Arguing that competent
imperial governance beneficial to both governed and governor, Jebb wrote that,

most imperialists will agree in regarding British rule in those countries as a noble task, hitherto credibly performed upon the whole, and one in which it is desirable that the Britannic peoples should take an active interest and a common pride, because it would tend to elevate the type of citizenship in their own countries by fostering the sense of a high public responsibility. 45

As has been noted, the term “citizen,” used at the state level, is a republican term. All
those under the British flag were of course “subjects.” British subjecthood was buttressed by the
doctrine of personal allegiance to the crown, with subjects in turn entitled to protection under
British law, particularly in relation to foreign powers. Imperial citizenship, as an extra-legal
notion, rested in the main upon shared notions of loyalty, sentiment, and culture. Where the de
facto status of “citizen,” understood as one’s relation to one’s own state, became important

politically concerning the Empire was in regard to intra-imperial issues. On this level of imperial citizenship, unlike that of imperial subjecthood, all were most certainly not equal.

There were frequent difficulties with regard to determining the status of persons born in territories with an ambiguous administrative relation to Britain - such as the Transvaal before October 1899, or the many protectorates. The debates over imperial citizenship, especially in terms of attempts to cultivate and codify mutual interests, however, mainly concerned the interests of the Dominions (settlement colonies) as against those of Britain (which had constitutional hegemony over the non-Dominions, i.e. colonies without self-government). As such, issues of race were pushed to the periphery, and the definition of citizenship was contested in the main with reference to whites. As imperial idealists such as George Wrong argued, imperial unity was to be based not on race, which fostered isolationism, but rather on liberty, an internationalist virtue which encouraged temperance. British citizenship, Wrong suggested, made one a citizen of the world.46

Jebb agreed with this view, criticizing what he termed the ‘tribalism’ of an Henri Bourassa or a Paul Kruger, whose definitions of nationalism were based on ethnicity. He saw tribalism, “the tendency to hate your neighbour in trying to be different from him”47, as the greatest threat to the Empire. Hence his virulent denouncement of Ulster nationalism, which was not “true” nationalism because it pointed to independence rather than unity. Jebb’s antipathy toward Ireland was based upon the then common view of England’s Celtic cousins as


troublemakers: "I've no use for the Irish. All agitators and no work . . . all talk and nothing else." 48

Jebb believed there were two key elements in fostering a strong sense of imperial citizenship. The first was the cultivation of democracy - the "motor of imperialism." 49 Such cultivation took the form of imperial trusteeship - Britain's duty was one of tutelage, instructing other societies in self-government until they were ready to take that mantle for themselves. The principle of imperial trusteeship was based upon the conviction that while equality may be the professed goal, it was not achievable at the present. Speaking to the Royal Colonial Institute in 1906, Jebb stated that "the theory that all British subjects have equal political rights has long been denied by palpable facts which Imperial statesmanship cannot hope to alter, and could not alter . . . without first destroying the national principle as the basis of Imperial organization." 50 He looked with hope to a time when common values would create a truly integrated Empire: "[c]an you imagine Commissioners of the India Civil Service holding examinations in Melbourne and Cape Town to fill the Service of a ViceRoy born in Quebec?" Given this dream, he was dutifully impressed to find, upon visiting Ceylon, that its Supreme Court Judges were chosen in part by judges from other colonies. 51

Unlike Joseph Chamberlain, who neglected the subcontinent in his imperial pronouncements, India was key to Jebb's imperial vision, as it was to the Empire itself. As

48 Jebb Diary, 10 May, 1899. Jebb Papers, B/2/2, ICS.


51 Jebb, "Imperial Ideal," p. 34; Jebb Diaries, 27 November, 1900. Jebb Papers, B/2/28, ICS.
illustrated in Appendix III, India was to be treated like the other dependencies regarding constitutional authority. Jebb did not believe India was “ready” for self-government at the time, but he did recognize its special nature, and believed it should be granted equal status with the settlement colonies in the realm of tariff and immigration policy. This was a somewhat empty concession, though, as the volume of trade and immigration into India was dwarfed by the volume directed from India to the rest of the Empire.

Concomitant to the development of democracy in Jebb’s vision was stability. Imperial sentiment must be encouraged through education, improved knowledge of other parts of the Empire (here travel was important), and mutual support. Jebb was duly impressed with the aid quickly given by New Zealand and the Australian colonies in 1900 to famine-struck India, and to Ottawa, hit by fire.\textsuperscript{52} Imperial loyalty, finally, should be based in national self-respect. Jebb held these views earnestly. He was not unaware of the negative connotations trusteeship had even at that time. While visiting the Canadian Prairies, he acknowledged that others held the view that imperialism was parasitical when remarking that the real ‘white man’s burden’ was the mosquito.\textsuperscript{53}

Jebb’s vision of a Britannic Alliance, an organic Empire which respected the growing autonomy of the colonies while maintaining, at least for the moment, a preeminent position for the metropolitan government in London, did not come to pass. It conflicted both with the centralist position advanced by Curtis and other Round Table members, and with the very

\textsuperscript{52} Jebb Diaries, 6 May, 1900. Jebb Papers, B/2/20, ICS. Jebb termed this “Charitable Imperialism.”

\textsuperscript{53} Jebb Diaries, 9 June, 1899. Jebb Papers B/2/2, ICS.
colonial nationalism Jebb himself sought to accommodate. The tension between British and colonial interests confounded every imperial issue of the age. The most visible such issue was that of intra-imperial immigration, and it is to this topic that we now turn.

*Conflicts Concerning Intra-Imperial Immigration*

In a letter to J. S. Ewart, the Canadian nationalist, Jebb responded to Ewart’s contention that “organic community is too ambiguous” by arguing that “they [democratic communities] are held together, I think, not by the Reserve force of a central government but by the systems they have evolved, or are evolving, of mutual aid-in-living.” What Jebb meant by this term was a collection of communities which, while they recognized each other’s autonomy, also shared a common identity, a common spirit, and a responsibility to aid in the maintenance of the collective. As he argued in speech in 1913, “the best Empire is that in which the average state government exhibits the highest sense of Imperial responsibility with the least measure of Imperial compulsion.” A Britannic Alliance, Jebb continued, was “the exemplar of a new and higher order of international combination, based upon confidence instead of upon compulsion.” However, while “mutual-aid-in-living” was the ideal, the reality was rather less congenial, as conflicts over immigration proved imperial citizenship an impractical notion.

What were these realities? Imperial conflicts concerning immigration were at their heart

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54 Richard Jebb- J. S. Ewart, 6 February, 1913. Jebb Papers, A, ICS.

conflicts between the liberal outlook of London and the desire of various colonies to set their own policies. Victorian Britain, notwithstanding the arrival of Jewish and Irish immigrants in the second half of the century, was a largely homogeneous society. The dominance of laissez-faire ideology and the absence of the dislocation often concomitant with mass immigration, gave rise to liberal views in Britain concerning immigration and the movement of people. Temporary measures had been enacted to monitor the arrival of aliens during the Napoleonic Wars, but these had fell into disuse soon after Peterloo. The Naturalization Bill of 1870 gave the Home Secretary unfettered discretion over immigration in the name of the ‘public good’.

The most important qualification for naturalization in Britain itself was residency. This was because those resident outside of the Empire were more difficult to protect. The British Home Office, in refusing the application for naturalization of a missionary who planned to live outside the Empire, stressed that, “[n]aturalization implies an undertaking to defend at the cost of the British taxpayer and this should not be given with undue facility to people so much exposed as missionaries.” Britain thus enforced a five-year residency requirement on applicants for naturalization.

56 “Britain” will be used in preference to “England,” as there was no separate citizenship for inhabitants of Scotland or Wales. This is not to suggest, however, that a single identity was shared by all Britons, or Britain was free from racial animosities, as the anti-Irish attitudes of many Englishmen illustrated.

57 “Applicant desires to live abroad after naturalization.” PRO HO 144/413/B24725.

58 With residency the only stringently enforced requirement for naturalization, aliens arrived on Great Britain’s shores in great numbers, many of whom were paupers and political dissidents from Eastern Europe. The British government only paid serious attention to transmigrants, those stopping over at British ports on their way to other places, and who might be tempted to spend short periods in Britain before moving on. These individuals were required to provide their passports (or other identification if their country of citizenship did not use a
While its residency requirements were stronger in letter than in practice, the British government did concern itself with issues of "character." Criminals, for instance, were not deemed acceptable immigrants. Even before the 1905 Aliens Act codified this issue, character checks were carried out on prospective immigrants. These were usually conducted by the police and clerks of individual boroughs, as the Home Office did not have the staff to carry out inquiries. This procedure was necessary when the "applicant is not personally known to the S of S [Secretary of State] to be of good character"; that is when no references have been supplied. Despite the formally strict residency requirements and the attention to proper "character," Britain was certainly not inhospitable to new arrivals, with the partial exception of the sweated labour controversy of the 1880s and 1890s and the prevailing prejudice against Jewish and Irish immigrants.

Although the official Alien Act was passed in 1905, aliens in practice faced no substantial barriers to entering the United Kingdom until the outbreak of war in 1914. In fact, between 1823 and 1906, at which point the Home Office began extraditing Germans of "questionable" character, there was not one person removed by law from Britain. Victorian notions of passport system) and show their through-tickets. If they could not comply, they were deemed illegal immigrants and returned to their place of origin, a course of events which occurred with great frequency during wartime. See PRO HO 144/1396/271011.

59 "Refusal of naturalization on grounds of character." PRO HO 144/467/V31725. See also the expulsion orders for one Maurice Rosenthal, an alien expelled for keeping a brothel (PRO HO 144/794/131143), and one Paul Ga(o?jard for living off the proceeds of prostitution (PRO HO 144/1008/141734).

60 "Method for Obtaining information for application for naturalization, re: Ernest Bruno Gellet." PRO HO 144/466/B30159.

tolerance and inclusion were too strong to be swayed by occasional outbursts of xenophobia.\textsuperscript{62}

The Colonial Office believed similar liberal ideals should flourish throughout the Empire.

However, this did not mean that all people were to be treated equally.\textsuperscript{63} As stated, people of colour generally did not enjoy the same full citizenship rights as whites. Rather, it meant that all subjects should be given the opportunity to participate in Empire, whether as "bearers of civilization" or as pupils. Thus, policies of exclusion within the Empire were officially unacceptable to London.

This was the principle. The fact was that the various settlement colonies wished to exclude certain groups, whether fellow subjects such as Indians, or foreigners such as Chinese, for a variety of reasons. Usually these reasons were economic, though there were also cultural factors at work.\textsuperscript{64} White governments in the English-speaking world, including the United States, were often pressed by unions and newspapers to view Asian cultures as oppressive and despotic, promoting servility. Australians or British Columbians worried that Asian immigrants would steal jobs by undercutting wages, and complained that such immigrants saved money to send back to their home countries, rather than investing it where they worked. There were also

\textsuperscript{62} Exceptions to this general outlook include the ambivalent acceptance of Russian Jews in the 1880's and 1890's, and the growing suspicion of German immigrants in the two decades before the First World War.

\textsuperscript{63} On anti-alienism in Great Britain during the first decades of the twentieth century, see Matthew Hendley, "Anti-Alienism and the Primrose League: The Externalization of the Post-war Crisis in Great Britain 1918-32," \textit{Albion}, 33, 2, Summer 2001, pp. 243-269.

\textsuperscript{64} I draw here on the work of Laura Tabili, who argues that racial conflicts in interwar Britain were derived from material factors - colonial labour and struggles over political power (influenced by domestic social relations), and thus were not epiphenomenal, but historically contingent. Tabili, \textit{"We Ask for British Justice": Workers and Racial Difference in Late Imperial Britain} (Ithaca: 1994), p. 181.
fears of ‘cultural dilution’. As Lord Carrington, the Governor of New South Wales, noted in correspondence with the Colonial Secretary Lord Knutsford in 1888, “it is uniformly [sic] considered here that if these Colonies are to be an offshoot of Britain [italics added], they must be kept clear of Chinese immigration.” It was not so much that Asians would “dilute” the white population through intermarriage and miscegenation, though Jebb and others did voice concern over what was crudely termed “leakage.” The concern, especially in Australia, was of “The Yellow Peril.” Put simply, this was the fear that Asian peoples would ‘overrun’ the continent, pushing out the whites and terminating a British cultural presence in the Antipodes. This fear was accentuated by Japan’s 1905 victory in the Russo-Japanese War, though exclusionary policies pre-date that epochal event.

Yet, colonial decision-makers faced a paradox. On the one hand, British settlers generally desired a homogeneous state, as this was seen as the best guarantee of a consensual and united society. On the other hand, because these were societies built from the ground up, human capital was of the utmost importance. Given the abolition of slavery in the British Empire in 1833, immigration - in the form of indentured labour - provided an easily available replacement pool of workers. It had the added benefit of being cheap. Chinese labour thus proved indispensable, for example, in building the Canadian Pacific Railway. In Australia, Chinese labourers often worked land ahead of whites, thus expanding productive acreage, while Indian migrant labourers voyaged to Australia and southern Africa to work in agriculture and mining.

The conflict between economic need and discriminatory predilections was especially

65 *Correspondence relating to Chinese Immigration into the Australian Colonies, 1888*, #63, 19 April, 1888, p. 33. National Archives of Canada [NAC] RG 25 F4 vol. 1004.
stark concerning Asians from within the Empire. The 1842 Treaty of Nanking, which signalled the end of the first Opium War with Manchu China, guaranteed the British extraterritorial rights in the treaty ports in exchange for the promise of protection of person and property of Chinese migrants throughout all British Dominions. A complete ban on Chinese immigrants by any dominion would, therefore, have been impossible. Furthermore, for those Asians residing within the Empire, such as the Chinese of Hong Kong or the Straits Settlement or the Indians of the sub-continent, exclusionary legislation would have contravened implicit notions of imperial equality.

Exclusionary legislation had an established pedigree by the end of the nineteenth century. As the Victorian age came to a close, however, the white colonies became more explicit in their expressed anti-immigration sentiments. The most significant example was the so-called Natal Act. Passed by the Natal government in 1897 with the aim of preventing the importation of coolie labour from India, the Act reflected white settlers’ unease at the fact that there were by the turn of the century more Asians living in the colony than whites (See Appendix IV). The Act defined a “prohibited immigrant” as one who, “... when asked to do so by an officer shall fail to himself write out and sign, in the characters of any language of Europe, an application to the Colonial Secretary in the form set out in Schedule.” It was a transparent test designed to

66 The term “Asians” was the nineteenth and early-twentieth century forerunner to the current term “Asians,” and will be used here when referring to contemporary attitudes or legislation.

67 Ann Dummet and Andrew Nicol, Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and Others (London, 1990), p. 117. The term “dominion” was the legal term for any British territory.

68 P. E. Lewan, Appendix, Journal of the Royal Society of Arts (24 April, 1908). See also Memorandum respecting the Immigration of Persons into British Dominions, with special reference to Chinese Immigrants, March 1907. PRO FO 881/8893. This document provides a summary of relevant legislation for Consular Officers’ use in reviewing Chinese applications for
exclude Asians. A similar approach was taken in Australia and New Zealand, where legislation was passed linking the number of allowable Chinese immigrants per steamer to the tonnage it carried. New Zealand set the ratio at one immigrant to every 10 tons of tonnage.69 Australia and New Zealand also implemented diction tests. Canada opted for a poll tax system, which ultimately failed to stem migration, as employers paid the cost to maintain their labour supply. But the tax expressed anti-immigration sentiment in British Columbia nonetheless.70 As E. B. Robertson realized, “[a]t each increase of the head tax a falling-off in Chinese immigration occurred until such time as the Chinese were in a position to accommodate themselves to the new arrangement.”71 By 1914, in fact, the Canadian government proposed eliminating the poll tax and entering into a bilateral agreement with the Chinese government similar to the Lemieux agreement with Japan, which set immigrant quotas.

One means of resolving the conflict between Britain and the dependencies over the nature of immigration was to create a uniform imperial naturalization policy. This issue was brought to the fore at the 1911 Imperial Conference. To rectify the situation, the delegates at the Conference attempted to establish a unitary system of imperial naturalization, thereby creating a greater sense of common imperial citizenship. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the Canadian premier, proffered his conviction that, “a man who was a British subject anywhere, should be a British entry into the Empire.

69 Memorandum respecting the Immigration of Persons into British Dominions, with special preference to Chinese Immigrants, March 1907, p. 13. PRO FO 881/8893.

70 See Mackenzie King, Report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the methods by which Oriental labourers have been induced to come to Canada (Ottawa, 1908), pp. 69-71.

subject *everywhere.*”  

F. S. Malan, the South African Minister of Education, tentatively supported this view, but added the proviso that this should be “subject to the local laws as regards the rights of British subjects.”  

The stumbling point, which New Zealand’s premier Sir Joseph Ward clearly expressed, was the desire to keep the question of naturalization separate from a definition of British citizenship. In short, the colonies, with Laurier slightly out of step, wanted to maintain the right to diversity of policy, though they might support a uniform position on intent. Winston Churchill, then Home Secretary and speaking for Britain on this issue, sympathized with the colonies’ attitude, and supported the principle of colonial autonomy. However, he also appealed for a uniform policy, not the least because Britain wanted to maintain its own residency requirement, and thus wished the Dominions to harmonize their standards with her own.

Malan quite succinctly voiced the colonies’ reservations, expressing concern that under a uniform naturalization policy an individual might be able to circumvent local law by appealing to the imperial standard, thus challenging the principle of responsible government. This was a particular point of contention in southern Africa, as well as in other regions such as British East Africa, where large numbers of indentured labourers had come for term contracts. These labourers sometimes had the option at the end of their terms to be naturalized in their new country. In colonies such as the former Natal this was an issue of concern for white subjects, who feared becoming politically and economically marginalized unless they were permitted to

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determine the terms of naturalization.

The delegates to the Conference ratified a resolution calling for a uniform naturalization law.\textsuperscript{74} The compromise declared that Empire-wide naturalization should be granted to any alien, who, in addition to any other requirements, 1) has resided not less than five years within the Empire, or has served the Crown for five out of the last eight years; 2) is of good character and has an adequate knowledge of the English or other official language; and 3) intends to reside within the Empire or serve under the Crown. The applicant also had to live in the country of application for one year. By 1912, all the Dominions had agreed to the legislation except for Canada, which objected to a perceived violation of its autonomy regarding naturalization as dictated by Section 91 of the British North America Act.\textsuperscript{75} While the measure would have allowed for a degree of colonial autonomy in terms of procedure, it was not ratified immediately by Dominion legislatures, and once the First World War began, the opportunity for such an initiative had passed.

Jebb was of mixed opinion concerning the harmonizing of naturalization temporarily achieved in 1912. While it went some way to resolving the contentious issue of imperial citizenship, and promised easier intra-imperial travel, the resolution also signalled a shift in imperial affairs. Jebb, as noted, had long seen the Imperial Conference as the ideal means of incorporating colonial nationalism into imperial governance, providing a platform upon which the colonies could participate as equals. Policy harmonization, however, was a temporary

\textsuperscript{74} See Jebb, The Imperial Conference, Vol. II, pp. 304-306; and Jebb "Naturalisation," pp. 11-12, 18, 20-22.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid, pp. 20-22.
victory for the centralist school of thought. Though such harmonization might incorporate the Dominions’ concern with monitoring the “character” of immigrants, it standardized naturalization, and thus placed limits on the decision-making autonomy of the Dominions.

Furthermore, the defeat of Laurier’s “uniformity of effect, diversity of method” model, and Laurier’s subsequent retreat from this position, dealt a crippling blow to Jebb’s imperial vision. Centralism gained further adherents during the war years, beginning with the 1914 British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, which gave the British Home Secretary strong powers to restrict immigration. Fears of German spies and a palpable need for unity of action made Jebb’s decentralized position seem weak and potentially dangerous in a time of imperial need. Despite the move towards standardization, however, confusion as to imperial citizenship and its possibilities persisted. The war, and its attendant heightening of claims of national identity, made clear a potential division between a person’s legal and birth nationality. The Dominions’ participation in the war notwithstanding, imperial unanimity existed only in the abstract. In practical matters of consequence, local sentiment and colonial nationalism carried the day.

_Colonial Exclusion: A Local or an Imperial Phenomenon?

The shift toward more explicitly discriminatory legislation throughout the Empire was a manifestation of developing colonial nationalism. It is important not to thereby reason, however,
that the imperial government at Westminster advanced a uniform and liberal imperial immigration policy as a counter to this development. The liberal outlook evinced by Whitehall did not reflect a progressive position immigration per se. Rather, it reflected the fact that Britain herself faced no large influx of Asian immigrants, and thus could study the issue in terms of imperial unity, rather than national interest. Indeed, in a speech to the 1897 Imperial Conference, Joseph Chamberlain declared, "[w]hat I venture to think you [the colonies] have to deal with is the character of the immigration. It is not because a man is of a different colour to ourselves that he is necessarily an undesirable immigrant, but it is because he is dirty, or immoral, or he is a pauper, or he has some other objection."\textsuperscript{76}

Britain's laissez-faire attitude to Asian immigration was furthered by the fact that she could act unimpeded in this field in the dependent and protected territories of Empire. The example of India illustrates this fact. The Interpretation Act of 1899 set out the citizenship status of Indians, reasserting the separation between non-European British subjects and British Protected Persons (B.P.P.s).\textsuperscript{77} Those born in the Native States of India were aliens for the purpose of British law, even though they had claims to British protection under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act.\textsuperscript{78} Non-British individuals born in India, whether B.P.P.s or non-European British subjects, could become European British subjects upon application. The naturalization process in India was covered by the Indian Naturalization Act of 1852 and its subsequent


\textsuperscript{77} For definitions of the varieties of citizenship status in India, please refer to Chapter I.

\textsuperscript{78} "Nationality of K. S. Ranjitsinghi: Memo on nationality status of persons born in India, and on question of naturalisation of such." PRO HO 144/462/B32357.
amendments.\textsuperscript{79} The principles of the Indian Naturalization Act pertained to the other dependencies as well. However, neither “protected persons” nor non-European British subjects could become fully naturalized members of the Empire, thus precluding them from political equality with white subjects. This was of particular application to the case of India, where the difference between subject status and naturalization status allowed whites to rule as a caste unto themselves.\textsuperscript{80}

Britain exercised a similar freedom in regard to protectorates. With the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890, the British government assumed responsibility for the “safety and conduct” of all foreigners and British subjects living in those regions where Britain exercised influence but did not directly rule.\textsuperscript{81} This legislation was explicitly directed at protectorates

\textsuperscript{79} Indian Naturalization Act, XXX of 1852, 16 July 1852 (amended in 1876). Copy included in PRO HO 144/450/B30711. Their most significant sections were as follows: I) any person living under the government of the East India Company (or, after 1876 under the sovereignty of Queen Victoria, when she assumed the title of Empress of India) could apply for naturalization; II) applicants must supply vital statistics and time of residence; VII) once approved, the memorialist was accepted as if he or she had been natural-born, with all benefits therein (this differed from the Dominions, where naturalized subjects were precluded from voting or holding political office, and made it easier for the British to absorb people from the various principalities and territories they loosely controlled); XII) in India, “government” meant whoever was commissioned to head a territory, so it could be either the British themselves, or the local Indian ruler in the principalities allied to Britain. The memorialist would finally be required to pledge an Oath of Allegiance.

\textsuperscript{80} This separation of subject status also buttressed the case for maintaining the principle of the ‘two Empires’ in regard to responsible government and intra-imperial cooperation. Witness for example Lionel Curtis’s argument in The Problems of the Commonwealth (London, 1916) for excluding India from direct representation in any imperial parliament. Also note that while an Indian delegation was invited to the 1911 Imperial Conference in London, it was as an observer, not as a full delegate.

where the British operated at arm’s length, either through charter companies, such as certain
territories in southern Africa, or through alliances with native rulers, as in many Indian
provinces. While the Act did not survive the transfer of authority for such territories from the
Foreign Office to the Colonial Office under Chamberlain’s tenure as Colonial Secretary, the
principle underlying it was maintained. An 1894 Order in Council outlining Charter Company
rule in Matabeleland, for instance, decreed that native law would be maintained “so far as that
law is not repugnant to natural justice of morality, or to any Order made by Her Majesty in
Council, or to any Proclamation or Ordinance.” The principle of “jurisdiction without
territory” was subsequently invoked in Staples v. The Queen, an 1899 case in Matabeleland
concerning an accused thief’s appeal to be tried by jury rather than judge, in accordance with
Magna Carta. The Lords of the Judicial Committee upheld the Matabeleland Judge’s dismissal
of the appeal, on the grounds that Matabeleland was a “foreign state” for legal purposes, as it had
not been acquired by the “cession or conquest of territory.” Thus, while English law was not
automatically applicable to a protectorate, native law could be deemed repugnant “to a statute or
order applied in some special way to British subjects in the foreign country in question.”
Native law was certainly overridden in the case of white immigration, and subsequently whites
faced no barriers to travelling to any British protectorate. Thus the case with which men such as

82 Britain officially exercised limited jurisdiction over the allied Indian princes, but
unofficially exercised, through the office of the Resident, substantial control. The situation was
different in each principality, though after 1857 no Indian prince could maintain a standing army
or conduct independent foreign affairs.

83 “Matabeleland Order in Council, 1894.” PRO HO 144/462/B32357 65588.

84 Staples v. The Queen, 4, 3. PRO HO 144/462/B32357 655888.

85 Ibid.
the imperial philosopher Lionel Curtis travelled to and from British India.

When a territory became part of the British Empire, as in the case of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State at the conclusion of the second South African War in 1902, its residents could apply for naturalization. Those not deemed subjects need not obtain a certificate of naturalization, a time-consuming procedure which verified the proper character of the applicant, but need only take an Oath of Allegiance.86 This Oath could be taken outside the United Kingdom, in any Dominion, or in other imperial possessions in the case of officers in HM Service.87 British subjects could be naturalized in states where Britain had extraterritorial rights, but this was not encouraged, as there was usually no applicable legislation in the specific extra-British jurisdiction to provide for this, and the individual would reside outside the bounds of protection guaranteed to a British subject. The case of one J. W. Hendricks illustrates this situation. Hendricks worked in Siam in the early twentieth century, and sought to become a naturalized subject of that country. Though Siam was an independent state ruled by a monarch, then Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), it was regarded by the British as part of their “informal Empire.”88 The British judge to whom the case was referred assented to Hendricks’ request, but

86 See the case of Miss Elsa Marguerite Orbanowska, “Naturalization by virtue of annexation,” 3 February, 1908. PRO HO 144/686/103210.

87 “Re: Naturalization - C. Kristonson.” PRO HO 144/462/B20366.

88 Siam preserved its independence by negotiating a series of treaties with Western governments, beginning with Great Britain. In 1855, King Mongkut agreed to reduce tariffs on British imports, allowed British subjects to buy land and open businesses in Siam, and granted Britain extraterritorial jurisdiction over its subjects. Britain, in turn, refrained from absorbing Siam into its Empire. She wanted to preserve it as a buffer state between India and French Cochin China. British advisers also provided Mongkut and then Chulalongkorn with “guidance,” especially in financial affairs. The 1904 entente cordiale between Britain and France eliminated colonial tensions in the region, and in 1909, Britain signed a treaty with Siam,
cautioned that “in a barbarous country a mere present of oxen to a chief might be enough; but in a sovereign state we should surely ask that there should be some general law on the point before Great Britain can consent to the loss of one of her subjects.”

The Dominions themselves were resistant to a “general law” on imperial immigration, as we have seen. Dominion subjects, however, also evinced feelings of loyalty to Britain, and thus sought to avoid direct confrontation. To circumvent any obvious affront to imperial equality, colonial governments framed exclusionary legislation in the language of “control” and “expedience.” The preamble to Canada’s Act to Restrict and Regulate Chinese Immigration to Canada (1885), for instance, stated in part “…it is expedient to make provision for restricting the number of Chinese immigrants coming into the Dominion, and to regulate such immigration….” The exclusionary laws passed in most of the settlement colonies shared a common concern over the “character of the immigration.” Again, Canada provides an instructive example in the following memorandum its government sent to the British Foreign Office:

No person shall be permitted to land in Canada who is feeble-minded, an idiot, an epileptic, or who has had an attack of insanity during the past five years, or one who is deaf or dumb, or dumb, blind, or infirm, unless he belongs to a family either accompanying him or already in Canada, who give satisfactory security that he will not become a public charge.

No person shall be permitted to enter Canada suffering from a loathsome, infectious, or contagious disease, or one who is a pauper or destitute, or a professional beggar or vagrant, or a prostitute or person living off the prostitution of others, or one


Memorandum, Judge Skinner Turner, 9 March, 1906. PRO HO 144/823/140752.

Act (48-49 Victoria, c. 71), 20 July 1885. NAC, RG 25, F4, vol. 1004.
who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.\textsuperscript{91}

Canada's efforts to regulate Chinese immigration centred in part around the definition of imperial citizenship, specifically whether Chinese were or were not imperial citizens. Once again colonial nationalism was at the fore. Mackenzie King, befitting his growing stature as a Canadian nationalist, left no doubt as to his position on this matter: "that Canada should desire to restrict immigration from the Orient is regarded as natural, that Canada should remain a white man's country is believed to be not only desirable for economic and social reasons, but highly necessary on political and national grounds."\textsuperscript{92} In words which could easily have been Jebb's, King went on to argue that "...in matters which so vitally affect her own welfare, Canada is the best judge of the course to be adopted."\textsuperscript{93} However, King did acknowledge that Canada must keep in mind the obligations of common imperial citizenship in relation to Asian members of the Empire, and thus supported measures which maintained some degree of intra-imperial travel. In practice Canadian autonomy won out. Chinese were treated as a bloc, with no division recognized between those who were British citizens and those who were aliens: "under our Chinese Immigration Act all persons of Chinese origins are treated alike, irrespective of citizenship."

\textsuperscript{91} \textit{Memo}, pp. 6-7. PRO FO 881/8893.

\textsuperscript{92} King, \textit{Immigration to Canada from the Orient and Immigration from India in Particular}. NAC RG 25 F4 v. 1004, 7.

The emergence of colonial nationalism and the subsequent increase in stringent immigration legislation might indicate on the surface a hardening of attitudes towards non-Europeans, suggestive of social Darwinian thinking and racialism. Upon closer inspection, however, it seems that this interpretation, usually taken as the norm, needs to be modified. Intra-imperial conflicts over immigration can perhaps be better understood in terms of citizenship, specifically the dichotomy between the idea of a “wider patriotism” and the notion of state autonomy. This dichotomy accounts for the diversity of racial attitudes throughout the Empire.

Jebb had become particularly interested in immigration questions as his first tour progressed, for he saw it as a key element in the economic development of the colonies. What is immediately evident from Jebb’s diaries is that antipathy to immigrants, and Asians in particular, varied widely from region to region. For instance, while visiting Toowoomba, Victoria, in 1900, he makes mention of a prominent store sign “reassuring him” that “No Chinamen, Blacks, or Assyrians are among our Customers.” However, later in the month, while visiting Queensland, Jebb conversed with a sugar planter who supported Chinese immigration. The planter argued that his industry depended upon “coloured” labour, and that Chinese farmers were often pioneers, who bought land from sugar companies to plant bananas, and in turn prepared the soil for later sugar crops, at which time the company would repurchase the land. What Jebb perceived was

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95 Jebb Diaries, August 3, 1900. Jebb Papers B/2/25, ICS.

96 Jebb Diaries, August 22, 1900. Jebb Papers, B/2/26, ICS.
that the immigration “problem” was really one of attitude, and localized attitude at that, as Asian immigration was limited to specific territories, and was numerically quite limited.

Jebb was largely sympathetic to the exclusionary practices of the settlement colonies, as this was in congruence with his support of colonial nationalism. Jebb’s support for colonial nationalism led him to advocate restricting labour migration as necessary to colonial autonomy. He defined imperial citizenship with an eye to the practical, arguing that “the nature of Imperial citizenship must be deduced from the purpose for which the Empire is thought to exist.” 97 That purpose was the development of civilization based upon British culture, a development to be pursued along lines of union: “[u]nder alien skies their men, with ours, shall ‘drive the road and bridge the ford’.” 98

Jebb also shared the prejudices of his era. These prejudices were voiced primarily in cultural terms, not, as we might expect, in biological terms. Take, for instance, Jebb’s comments in a paper given to the Royal Society of Arts in 1908. He argued that Australian opposition to Asian immigration was based upon the belief that the two races could not coexist, Asians being difficult to assimilate because they came from a “mature civilization.” They would instead remain a “helot” class of poor labourers. 99 Jebb believed that national autonomy and sentiment were the strengths of Empire. In a letter to the journalist (and later politician) Leopold Amery, Jebb argued that “it is in the best interests of the Empire that there should be more uniformity


99 Jebb, “Problem of Asian Immigration,” JRSA, 56, 1908, pp. 587-588. The paper was given on April 7, 1908, with Alfred Lyttelton as chairman.
throughout its centres and dependencies in the law of alien immigration exclusion."\textsuperscript{100} While Jebb was by no means a racist, he did employ the stereotypes of the age when speaking of aliens. In Kuranda, Australia, while noting the racial animosity the locals exhibited toward Asian migrants, he unconsciously betrayed his own patronizing view of aliens in recording that he was unable to aid two Chinese puzzling over a train schedule: "their pidgeon English wasn't sufficient - me no save."\textsuperscript{101}

While Jebb believed that minority cultural differences, which ran against the majority desire for consensus and homogeneity, were the determining factor in generating immigration tensions, he did acknowledge that more deep-seated prejudice also existed. In fact, Jebb himself unconsciously illustrated just this in periodic diary entries. He recorded the following after witnessing a Chinese costermonger being abused by a customer: "The Chow lost his temper...I never saw such an absolutely demoniacal face in my life - the flat yellow features livid with passion and the little devilish eyes blinking and quivering with tears...Save us from the yellow devil if this fiend is an example."\textsuperscript{102} Jebb did go on to stress that his views on immigration were part of a broader imperial thesis, that of Britannic alliance, and that his strictures allowed for exceptions in certain cases. This was a necessary caveat, as Britain in 1902 entered into an alliance with Japan, a condition of which was a mutually acceptable immigration agreement

\textsuperscript{100} Jebb - Amery, 13 May, 1912. Jebb Papers, A, ICS.

\textsuperscript{101} Jebb Diaries, 24 August, 1900. Jebb Papers, B/2/26, ICS.

\textsuperscript{102} Jebb Diaries, August 24, 1900. Jebb Papers, B/2/26. It should be noted that Jebb was only twenty-six years old at the time, and his views matured as he gained more experience. Whether he genuinely moderated his view on racial differences or simply came to express himself in a more sophisticated manner is difficult to ascertain.
which exempted Japanese from any exclusionary policies.\textsuperscript{103}

Most of the comments in Jebb’s diaries relating to Asian immigration are framed in socio-economic, not racial, terms, and reflect a broad diversity of public opinion as to the nature of the “problem.” He notes that Chinese immigrants were often desired, whether as cheap labour, because they would perform tasks whites would not, or because they were pioneers in their willingness to improve infertile land.\textsuperscript{104} Prejudice occurred when colonial subjects perceived such immigrants as a threat to the colonial virtues of homogeneity and assimilation. Such a cultural fissure was anathema to a society, such as Canada, striving for unity. Canada was the nation, after all, which Jebb lauded for its harmonization of the twin cultures of French and English, however imperfectly he may have understood this phenomenon. As such, the potential for cultural division was seen as a threat, whether it came from Asians, or any other group. This view reveals the ambiguous attitudes held by British thinkers on the issues of race and imperialism in the early twentieth century.

There was an unbridgeable division between the imperial ideal of uniformity, expressed in the sentiment of “wider patriotism,” and the goals pursued by the autonomous colonies now

\textsuperscript{103} The 1902 Alliance had been preceded in 1894 by an Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty, which granted nationals of each country freedom of entry and movement in the other’s territory. In an often overlooked aspect of the agreement, Britain offered to negotiate a special exemption for any colony that had reservations about Asian immigration but still wished to adhere to the treaty. Queensland was the only colony which opted for this in 1894, and only did so in light of its need for labour. Canada joined the treaty in 1906 seeking to advance trade with Japan, provoking anti-Japanese riots in British Columbia. The Antipodean colonies (with the exception of Queensland) never became signatories, as they believed the “Yellow Peril” to be real.

\textsuperscript{104} Jebb gathered such opinions in places as remote as Thursday Island in the East Indies and as central as Vancouver. See for instance Jebb Diaries, 2 May, 1899. Jebb Papers B/2/1; Jebb Diaries, 10 September, 1900. Jebb Papers, B/2/27.
giving birth to their own nationalism. The Dominions were young nations which presumably
would have welcomed settlers and labour from any available source. But, as H. H. Stevens, a
British Columbia MP, put it in a speech in 1913, “I do not want any one to go away with the idea
that the Canadian has a very violent antipathy towards the Asian races, but . . . it was a question
that had to be dealt with if Canada was to remain a white man’s country and develop properly
[emphasis added].”¹⁰⁵ This is highly analogous to the “White Australia” policy vociferously
voiced by Henry Parkes, and later to become the central issue of the Australian conscription
debate of 1916-17.¹⁰⁶ Homogeneity, however, did not become entrenched in the national identity
of Canada, nor South Africa for that matter, because of the sizable presence of a non-British
white population, though it was certainly important in framing early twentieth century values.

Racial exclusion proved to be a localized phenomenon, not a systematic characteristic of
imperialism. Values of consensus and a concomitant belief in the virtue of homogeneity,
whether pronounced as in Australia or certain parts of the other colonies, or more muted, as in
Canada’s national policy, contribute to our understanding imperial citizenship. They signified
colonial priorities, and betrayed the ties, or lack thereof, between different parts of the Empire.
These values were undoubtedly linked to prejudice. However, an important qualification needs
to be made here, one that shifts the terms of debate concerning imperial citizenship away from a
racial divisions and towards a more multi-nuanced view. Such an expanded interpretation should
incorporate Jebb’s notion of colonial nationalism to recast white prejudice as an inward-looking,

¹⁰⁵ Vernon News, 9 October, 1913.

¹⁰⁶ Avner Offer, “‘Pacific Rim’ Societies: Asian Labour and White Nationalism,” The
rather than outward-looking, phenomenon. At its heart, the issue of non-white exclusion was a conflict between notions of liberalism (the freedom to enter into relationships, the primacy of the individual), and incipient nationalism (the desire to create a communal society, based on consensus and homogeneity). Other historians have of course noted this conflict, but have often framed it in terms of an expression of intrinsic antipathy toward the Other. With these competing ideals of citizenship at war with each other throughout the white Empire, however, it seems that non-whites were not actively discriminated against per se, but rather left out of a debate they were deemed unfit to participate in. The resulting discrimination was of course no different, but when examining citizenship issues, particularly the motives or interests of the dominant group, it is important to note whether prejudice was active rather than a passive. “Racial” discrimination, then, while it was readily evident, was a secondary, rather than primary, motive in producing exclusionist sentiment and legislation.

Intra-imperial immigration was problematic. Ostensibly, a British subject could move freely throughout the Empire. After all, the age of the passport had not yet come, and borders were more permeable than they proved to be later in the twentieth century. However, the variance in naturalization laws throughout the Empire challenged the principle of imperial unity and made it difficult to frame an official or unofficial notion of shared imperial citizenship.

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108 Passport Correspondence, 9 December, 1901. PRO Foreign Office [FO] 613/2. The National Registry and its initiation of the ID card during the First World War proves somewhat of an exception, though this measure applied only to the United Kingdom, and was confined to wartime. See Jon Agar, “Modern Horrors: British Identity and Identity Cards,” Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices Since the French Revolution, (Private Communication). My thanks to Jon Agar for providing me with an advance copy of this essay.
The central conflict defining efforts to create an imperial citizenship was whether to value centrally legislated inclusion or local responsible government as the highest imperial virtue. Exclusion, after all, was often a democratic notion, insofar as it expressed the popular will of a state’s people. This was especially the case in the colonies where the franchise, with the exception of South Africa, was on the whole much broader than in Britain. But democracy was also supposed to be the bearer of freedom and liberty, the buttress of trusteeship. What does one do when it instead breeds intolerance, an inclusive, rather than exclusive, communalism?

However, if one values state autonomy, as did most Britons of this era, it is difficult to place qualifiers on this ideal in the form of pan-imperial legislation, especially in an age which had not yet conceived of a theory of universal human rights. One thing was clear. Even if prejudice continued to be based on cultural and economic, rather than racial, terms, it was now more apparent than ever that it would be Ottawa and Cape Town, Auckland and Melbourne, not London, that dictated the composition and constitution of citizenship throughout the Empire.

*The Failure of Imperial Citizenship*

In advancing a definition of Empire and imperial citizenship that favoured unity, Richard Jebb was a man of his age. As we have seen, a unified Empire was the common goal of Curtis, Buchan, and White, as different as their conceptions of Empire might have been. Where Jebb differed from his conservative peers was in his notion of a Britannic Alliance. Jebb’s proposed Alliance incorporated the key idea of colonial nationalism. He was one of the first Britons to
recognize the new national identities that were at that time coming to the fore, and he accorded
these identities a central place in his idea of Empire. The Dominions would have their say
through the Imperial Conferences, an institution Jebb believed ideal for mediating the various
and sometimes conflicting desires of the Empire’s constituent politics. Even India, Jebb forecast,
might someday soon have an equal place at the Conference.

It was in regard to India, though, and more broadly in regard to the dependent Empire,
that Jebb’s notion of a common imperial citizenship codified in a Britannic Alliance ran aground.
Like many of his contemporaries, Jebb held at best ambivalent views on race, and the idea of a
common imperial citizenship ran afoul of the competing views on imperial naturalization and
intra-imperial immigration held by Britain and the Dominions. The failure to agree upon a
common imperial naturalization policy precluded the creation of the sense of “wider patriotism,”
built upon “mutual-aid-in-living,” that Jebb believed essential in producing imperial amity.

The failure to harmonize naturalization policies, and the failure to create a unified system
of citizenship in general, however, perhaps paradoxically worked to sustain the Empire, as it
allowed the settlement colonies the leeway to pursue their individual goals, while keeping alive
the desire for imperial unity. Thus the idea of Empire - imbued as it was with ambiguous and
sentimentalized notions of service, duty, and cooperation - could persist in an idealized state
without being compromised, at least fatally, by circumstance. The elites with whom David
Cannadine is concerned in Ornamentalism continued to attend royal tours and collect imperial
ribbons, while the continental drift of colonial nationalism continued unimpeded and inexorably.

Richard Jebb sounded this note in a letter to J. L. Gavin, editor of the Pall Mall Gazette,
in 1913:
I have... grown out of the notion that there is any possibility of winning the present generation of Englishmen to the conception of the Brittanic Commonwealth which I again put forward in the book [The Britannic Question] but I am still sanguine that the action of inaction of the Dominions may keep the door open to this ideal and eventually consummate it.\textsuperscript{109}

The conceptual fluidity of imperial citizenship ensured that imperial bonds between individual and crown, periphery and metropole, were largely self-defined, and perhaps in part explains why the transition from Empire to Commonwealth was relatively peaceful. The dependent colonies were to follow a similar path several decades later.

\textsuperscript{109} Jebb - J. L. Garvin, May 28, 1913. Jebb Papers, A, ICS.
Chapter V

The Imperial Garden: Arnold White and the Parochial View of Imperial Citizenship

Lionel Curtis, John Buchan, and Richard Jebb were representative of a breed of imperialist open to, though not necessarily always persuaded by, a broader interpretation of Empire and its underlying tenets. The polemical journalist Arnold White, by contrast, provides a stark example of a conservative who believed that Empire was just fine as it was, except for those instances when it could benefit from becoming more like it used to be. He epitomized imperialism at its most parochial. As “Vanoc,”¹ The Daily Express’s shrill critic-at-large, White voiced the concerns of the emerging clerk culture of Northcliffe’s Daily Mail, the suburbs, and Selfridge’s department store. Whether admonishing the Admiralty over its neglect of Britain’s navy, protesting the unfit nature of British soldiers after the South African War, or ferreting out imagined German influence in the British press, he was an untiring advocate of all things “English.”

White saw the Empire, which included the Celtic fringe of the British Isles, as not just a figurative, but also a literal, extension of “England.” As such, his desire to improve the nation’s health and efficiency - terms which frequently occur in White’s editorials - and to promote patriotism and loyalty applied equally to both England and her Empire. His notion of imperial citizenship was thus the same as his notion of domestic citizenship. He gave no thought to the multi-varied nature of the imperium, which is to say he advanced a parochial notion of imperialism. White’s ideas on Empire were founded on an emotional attachment to an imagined

¹ The pseudonym was drawn from Arthurian legend, where “Vanoc” was Merlin’s son. See White, The Views of Vanoc: An Englishman’s Outlook (London: 1910), p. v.
past of ethnocentric ascendancy. He advanced these positions in often exaggerated and voluble proposals on how to recapture imperial glory. While his tone was often strident, White published in both liberal and conservative organs. He was an ecumenical contrarian.

By contrasting the organic and tentatively cosmopolitan views of Empire fostered by Curtis, Buchan, and Jebb with the imperial parochialism of White, it is possible to develop the two main lines of contemporary conservative argument relating to imperial citizenship. These competing conceptual frameworks were not mutually exclusive, but rather were varying points on a spectrum which unquestionably placed Britain, or at the least England, at the constructive centre of the Empire. Expressed as general questions, the two core arguments can be outlined as follows: was the Empire a polity of individuals with England at its centre, the guiding but not necessarily determinate force?; or was it rather a “Greater England” in the most literal conception of Seeley’s famous phrase, a great estate upon which the English people were to leave their mark as was their self-assumed right? White, as will be made evident through an examination of his responses to some of the central issues of his era, notably immigration and the Great War, presented the case for the second view.

* * * * * *
"The Views of Vanoc"

The Royal Society of St. George issued a pamphlet in 1924, the year of Arnold White’s death, which accurately summarized the views of both the organization and the deceased. "Patriotism," the pamphlet began, "is more than a sentiment: it is a conviction based upon a comprehension of the duties of a citizen, and a determination loyally to perform such duties. Patriotism is love of country, born of familiarity with its history, reverence for its institutions, and faith in its possibilities, and is evidenced by obedience to its laws and respect for its flag."2

The Royal Society of St. George (RSSG), whose head was the Prince of Wales, was formed in 1894 to encourage and engender patriotism in those of English birth, celebrate days of national significance, such as St. George’s Day and Shakespeare’s birthday, and to promote the physical culture of England. The RSSG had branches throughout the colonies, with particularly strong groups in Western Canada. The Society was primarily interested in promoting an ideal of citizenship based firmly on English culture.3 Though his congenital distrust of organizations in which he did not have a leading hand kept him from being a member, White’s close association with the group is hardly surprising.4 It was to men such as White that the Society spoke most

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3 Pamphlet, Royal Society of St. George. WHI/57, NMM. The Society, founded in 1894, had three core objects: to encourage patriotism in Englishmen of birth or origin; to revive St. Georges’ Day and celebrate Shakespeare’s date of birth and death (April 23) as national holidays; and to promote the culture of England.

4 White was a member of the Navy League, and wrote many of its public missives. In naval matters, his primary interest, he acted as the confidant of and public agitator for Admiral Charles Beresford and later, upon changing his allegiances, the reformer Admiral Sir John Fisher. Beresford and Fisher were naval policy rivals in the Edwardian period, the former
clearly. White took the idea of citizenship as based on the principle of *jus sanguinis* quite seriously. Not for him the transfer of the franchise to Indians or Africans. White’s journalism reveals a man who was not entirely comfortable with the idea of Canadians or Australians holding political rights, let alone people who had no cultural reason to know the significance of the twenty-third of April.

To understand Arnold White, and what he has to tell us about conceptions of imperial citizenship, it is necessary to understand that he was both an eccentric and a self-styled man of the people. He was a self-made man, a son of the manse who had early on rejected religion and turned his ambition to the secular world. It comes as little surprise that Kipling’s “If” was a later favourite poem. His arguments had the predictability of a pendulum. The unifying theme in White’s pronouncements was an insular “Englishness” and the desire to maintain England’s international political position, especially by means of Empire. Hence his concern over naval matters and limits on immigration into England, two factors contributing to the security of the nation. His writing was often harsh and hyperbolic, yet he spoke to a number of concerns which resonated quite strongly in late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain. *The Atheneum* typified the response often accorded White in its review of his *Efficiency and Empire* (1901), applauding the spirit of this patriotic essay, but lamenting that White carried his criticisms too far, that he was opposing the latter’s reforms, specifically the introduction of the Dreadnought series of battleships and a home water fleet. White was also a largely inactive member of the Institute of Journalists, even though he spent most of his career on Fleet Street.

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5 “Miscellaneous Notes.” WHI/57, NMM.

6 In voicing these views, as well as in his advocacy of “efficiency,” White betrayed the influence of Lord Rosebery on his political thought. Rosebery had expounded on these same themes in his Chesterfield speech of 15 December, 1901. See Robert Rhodes James, *Rosebery* (London: 1963), pp. 429-433.
"perhaps a little too much of a Juvenal for the situation." Lord Rosebery expressed a similar opinion after reading a copy of the same book sent him by White: "the book lacks a sense of proportion and carries some of its views to an extreme which will repel many who would agree, as I do, with the spirit of it." The Times perhaps put it best in White's obituary, noting that White had tried to speak for the ordinary Englishman, "who delighted to see his own rather hazy ideas and prejudices presented in clear form and with compelling plausibility." Like W. T. Stead, a friend and fellow press maverick, White carved out a career as a polemical journalist with an interest in social affairs and the Empire. His first success was The Problems of a Great City (1886), in which he argued that alien immigration, especially Jews from Eastern Europe, had contributed to social problems in London. It was his most original work, as he was to draw upon the same theme of external threats leading to social dislocation and unrest in much of his subsequent writing.

It is as a Cassandra that White was best known to his contemporaries, the voice of efficiency and eugenics, inveterate critic of all governments and fervent English patriot. He pursued such criticism through his journalism, and he was particularly vociferous when he believed either the free flow of information or the privacy of the individual was jeopardized. White wrote mainly for the general public, hence his pseudonyms "Vanoc" and "Vox Populi." This was partly because his workmanlike prose was best suited to the concerns of the masses and the newspapers that catered to them - he wrote first for The Daily Express and later The Referee -

7 The Athenæum, 3829, 16 March, 1901, p. 335.
9 The Times, 6 February, 1925, p. 14n.
and partly because, apart from his life-long role as political agent of the Duke of Bedford and his
close relationships with Lord Charles Beresford and later Lord John Fisher, White had few
connections amongst the nation’s political elite. In fact, White was often contemptuous of
“authority,” assuming a quixotic role as defender of the people in the face of alleged elite
corruption and incompetence. However, his repeated attempts to enter Parliament\(^\text{10}\), his delight
in lobbying on behalf of the Navy League, and his pleasure at having \(HMS\) “Vanoc” named after
him for his role in improving sailor’s shipboard living conditions, all indicate that his anti-
establishment position may have been a reflection of his frustration at being unable to penetrate
that same world. His position on imperial citizenship reflected those of conservatives who
looked favourably upon Britain’s imperial past, and resented pressures to reform or reshape
imperial policies and philosophies.

Two influences marked White’s early career. The first was the New Journalism of the
1880’s and 1890’s, especially the work of his friend W. T. Stead at \(The Pall Mall Gazette\). From
Stead, White developed both his journalistic style and an approach to social affairs which saw
them as indicators of the nation’s political vitality.\(^\text{11}\) The second major influence on White, as it
was for many of his generation, was A. T. Mahan’s \textit{The Influence of Sea Power upon History},

\(^{10}\) White stood as a Liberal Unionist for the constituency of Mile End in 1886, 1892, and
1895 after rejecting Gladstone’s position on Home Rule, and as an Independent for Londonderry
in 1906. He was unsuccessful each time.

\(^{11}\) Series such as Stead’s “The Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon,” which appeared in
\textit{The Pall Mall Gazette} in July of 1885 and detailed the white slave trade in London, and the
revelations of London poverty by Charles Booth display both the social concerns and loose
treatment of “the facts” which characterize much of White’s journalism. White was never one to
let the facts get in the way of his moral fervour, never mind a good story. Judith Walkowitz’s
\textit{City of Dreadful Delight} (London: 1992) is particularly good on Stead’s “Maiden Tribute” and
its cavalier handling of “the facts.”
1660-1773 (1890). Mahan’s work legitimated White’s belief that the navy was key to international influence, the dominant theory of international relations in the pre-war era. Support for a strengthened navy was to be one of the distinguishing marks of White’s career.

What ideas did White seek to propagate? Primarily, White concerned himself with naval matters, being perhaps the most prominent Blue-Water\textsuperscript{12} man in the press in the two decades preceding the Great War. He also lobbied against immigration, arguing it contributed to problems of overcrowding and hygiene in urban England. Not surprisingly, then, he was a leading voice in the “national efficiency” debate which followed the Anglo-Boer War. The latter interest led White to eugenics, and he spent time in the immediate post-war years on the council of the Eugenics Education Society. The constant which linked these various interests was the Empire. Imperialism, in White’s mind, connoted not just the spread of British grandeur or the accumulation of wealth in far-away lands, but also, and more significantly, it was the embodiment and manifestation of the national culture. Empire was a monument to the grandeur and superiority of English culture, and he saw it as his duty, as an English citizen, to ensure that this culture should continue to flourish and prosper. However, the late-Victorian and Edwardian eras were years of change. The emergence of Germany and the United States as world powers, the rise of Japan, and a concomitant erosion of British economic supremacy combined with the intellectual angst brought about by Darwin, the second industrial revolution, and the new democracy to create an environment of uncertainty and flux. Given these tensions, many men of White’s generation turned to the Empire for reassurance. Renewed imperial vitality was to be

\textsuperscript{12} Proponents of the “blue-water” school of naval strategy argued that the key to the security of Britain and her Empire was a strong navy. Control of the world’s waterways also strengthened Britain’s economy by keeping trade routes open.
the means to arrest and reverse Britain’s relative decline.

White understood citizenship as an insular phenomenon, something one was born into. Both the citizen and the government subordinated their individual interests and activities to the “national interest.” Empire was part of this “interest,” and therefore, “imperial citizenship” was an extension of national citizenship. The English settlement colonies played a secondary, servile role, with the dependencies a mere appendage. Because White viewed the Empire as a resource to be used by England for its own ends, he was ignorant of the existence of local identities at the periphery, and thus did not see the need to formulate a broader “imperial” citizenship to encompass of such phenomena. Unlike Curtis, Buchan, and Jebb, White did not recognize the need for a broader imperial framework at either the government or individual level. The absence of an imperial “state” was not seen by White, as it was by the other conservatives dealt with in this project, as an obstacle to be overcome, but simply as the natural state of affairs.

_Efficiency and Degeneracy_

The one aspect of White’s thought on English citizenship that did incorporate the Empire was his concern over “national efficiency,” specifically a fear of moral and physical degeneracy. If England’s imperial hegemony was wavering, might this be due to deficiencies in the national character? Such fears were widespread in Britain in the aftermath of the pyrrhic victory in the Boer War, and marked a sense of urgency and crisis. The “national efficiency” movement, as the varied ideas which resulted from such fears came to be known, has been noted by historians
as a key shift in Edwardian thought. Most commentators, however, have chosen to focus on social policy or, more intently, on eugenics. In regard to the Empire, inquiries into the development and underlying rationalizations of citizenship have been unduly coloured by a preoccupation with the influence of pseudo-science. The little material that has been produced on White has not avoided this myopia. As astute an historian as Richard Soloway identifies White simply as "an early eugenicist." This is understandable, as White used this language, corresponded with many of those active in the eugenics movement, and above all, provides the historian with a dizzying array of pithy quotes on the subject. While White certainly voiced many of the eugenicist ideas of the period, and indeed was even a member of the Eugenics Society, his attraction to the cause derived mostly from his taste for the unorthodox, and less from any scientific conviction. As G. R. Searle has observed, what White found most attractive about eugenics was that it provided the vocabulary to better express his concern for a higher efficiency, which he expressed particularly in his naval advocacy.

The term "national efficiency" incorporated a variety of streams of thought which had as their goal improvement of the nation's human capital, and the improved operation of its institutional structure. The term "national efficiency" was used in such a variety of ways as to be almost empty of meaning. For present purposes Bernard Semmel's understanding of the term suits well. He argues that it was an imperial, nationalist creed with the goals of furthering the

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15 Searle, p. xviii.
'national interest', condemning laissez faire economics, and favouring "social amelioration." The means to achieve these goals was efficiency, through heightened industrial production, a united Empire, a vigorous population, and a state of military and naval preparedness. These aims could be achieved through administrative, military, and educational reform - witness the campaign for militia reform of White's patron, the Duke of Bedford, or the centralization of the school boards under the Education Act of 1902 - or through improvement of the population, either through better physical conditioning, or, more darkly, through the regulation of reproduction. White played a role in all of these debates, defying any easy categorization as to his position. He favoured military preparedness and a vigorous population, for instance. Yet he rejected the idea of social amelioration, convinced that this was simply socialism in sheep's clothing. He absorbed ideas from many different people who would never have come together at the same table - he was influenced by voices as diverse as Kipling and the Eugenics Education Society. As such, his synthetic arguments offer a panorama of the "national efficiency" movement, and its role in the formulation of imperial citizenship.

Consistent with his notion of citizenship as a relationship of reciprocal duties and rewards between individual and state, White understood efficiency as a literal measure of the

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16 Semmel, Chapter I, and p. 235.

17 White shared with Kipling both deep respect for the man in uniform and a frustration with establishment politics. On the eve of war in 1914, both suspected the Liberal government of being "crooked." Kipling gave a speech at Tunbridge Wells on 16 May, 1914, entitled "Rudyard Kipling's Indictment of the Government," a copy of which White included in his clippings for the period. Kipling denounced the "detoothing" of the House of Lords, the Marconi Scandals, and government plans to send troops to Ireland as signs of corrupt leadership. See the Daily Express, 18 May, 1914. Alleged institutional corruption had diminished Kipling's ardour for imperialism, a change of heart further exacerbated by the death of his son on the western front in 1915.
nations's success or failure. It was the nation's balance sheet. Morality was the currency in which such efficiency was measured, and formed the basis of White's convictions. Proper citizenship was proper morality put to the service of the nation. White mourned the death of Queen Victoria by pointing to the powerful legacy she had left, and the example of efficiency which her reign had been. In *Efficiency and Empire*, he wrote that "[e]fficiency is the basis, and possibly the reason, of all moral law; the Queen's great reign was efficient because obedient to the moral law."\(^{18}\) National efficiency had been weakened by a number of factors, most significantly the lack of hope in younger Britons engendered by poor, ill, and uneducated parents, the result of the breakdown of coherent family groups. The reason for this development, White believed, was the poor state of the English family. The family was the basic unit of any Great Nation, its health reflective of the health of the nation. It was important, then, for the family to display the physical ideals of efficiency, strength and beauty, because these were manifestations of the deeper virtues of temperance, discipline, and good temper, the marks of proper morality which White maintained had propelled England to a position of strength in the first place. He applied a similar logic to the governance of Empire, holding to a vision of the union of the settlement colonies, with India a subordinate. "What is Empire?," he asked, but, "[a] number of English speaking families." The Empire was founded on home life, freedom, and justice, he asserted, with the sea a "wide open common."\(^{19}\)

If family was the basis of the Empire, it followed, according to White's logic, that if parents were not fulfilling the duty to the nation, they should be segregated, either within Britain

\(^{18}\) White, *Efficiency and Empire*, p. 309.

\(^{19}\) White, lecture outline, "The Family and the Empire," nd. WHI/43, NMM.
or by being sent to the colonies - hence his support for assisted emigration - so as not to further harm the nation’s efficiency. Physical deficiency, according to White, was caused by moral failings. White would not have viewed events such as Black Week\textsuperscript{20} in the fall of 1899 as the cause of “national efficiency” fears, but rather as indicators of the true problem - a breakdown in citizenship. Citizenship was based in a strong morality; proper morality could be attained through physical efficiency and a strong family environment; therefore such efficiency had to be improved to strengthen the bonds of citizenship. It was a circular argument, but one which was quite persuasive in the pre-war era.

The citizenship bond was significant to White because he believed it united individuals and staved off anarchy. White saw man as atomistic and independent, requiring some organic means of maintaining order and stability. In taking this view, he intuited the spirit of the arguments regarding imperial citizenship proffered by Curtis and Buchan. White, however, also drew upon the atomistic theories advanced by proponents of a Spencerian view of society, where “to be a good animal is the first requisite to success in life, and to be a nation of good animals is the first condition to national prosperity.”\textsuperscript{21} Bernard Hollander, a British physician and phrenologist, argued in a lecture White attended that the collective, the nation, holds priority over the individual, and therefore, weak individuals should be placed under the care of the state. The mentally unfit, for instance, were only suitable for the most primitive form of citizenship.

\textsuperscript{20} “Black Week” was the term given to Britain’s defeats at Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso from 10-16 December, 1899. The disaster resulted in the appointment of Field Marshall Frederick, Lord Roberts’ appointment to succeed General Sir Redvers Buller as Commander-in-Chief of Britain’s war effort.

\textsuperscript{21} Robert Reid Rentoul, “Proposed Sterilization of certain Mental and Physical Degenerates,” Unpublished MSS. WHI/43, NMM.
That is, one where their personal security would be safeguarded by the state, but where they themselves would not be permitted to perform any role in choosing how the state itself should be constituted. Hollander concluded by suggesting that Britain institute a national health exam when an individual reached the age of twenty to better ascertain “national efficiency.” This final point is instructive, for Britain, unlike France or Germany, had no mandatory military service, and so had no institutional means to monitor the physical health of the nation. This suggests both a historical reticence to exert strong government control, and a less formal, more voluntary form of citizenship. The lack of information on physical efficiency, and the more fluid relationship between individual and state, also perhaps suggest why in times of national self-doubt, such as in the aftermath of the Boer War, public debate over matters of citizenship or “national efficiency” could be so charged with rhetoric and so empty of action.

White’s concern that England’s “national efficiency” was in decline was rooted in a firmly Malthusian conception of population dynamics. Believing that there was an “optimal” population level, above which, due to lack of resources, and, more significantly for the British Isles, a lack of physical space, any increases would be counterproductive and in fact detrimental, White argued for a variety of measures to regulate population with a view to maximizing the nation’s physical capital. When White’s neo-Lamarckian beliefs are added to this position, his

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23 Though he was not a member, White corresponded with members of the Malthusian League and read much of their literature. Copies of this literature can be found in White’s papers.

24 The French evolutionist and naturalist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829) argued that organisms adapted directly to their environment, and that offspring inherited characteristics from their parents. See Lamarck, *Recherches sur l’organisation des corps vivants* (1803). Neo-
attraction to the language of eugenics seems obvious. Indeed, an argument that appears continually in his writing is that traits such as indolence, infirmity, and especially criminality were hereditary. This was a dangerous situation for the nation to find itself in, White wrote, for the lower classes, who most often displayed these traits, tended to produce the most children.25

White is purported to have coined the phrase “the sterilization of the unfit.” White’s place in history is linked to this phrase, which is somewhat unfortunate as historians have usually misinterpreted what he meant. As spelt out in a public lecture in 1904, what he meant by sterilization was not the standard meaning employed by others of his time, but rather segregation. He believed this measure could serve as a corrective to social degeneracy. This is a difference in degree and not in kind, but nonetheless marks White as separate from Francis Galton and his lineage.

It is in this context that White’s concern with race must be placed. White used the term “race” as a synonym for the national culture which had “created” the Empire, namely English culture. His was therefore an inward-looking notion. He did not dwell, as did others of his generation, on racial differences per se. Not for White the pseudo-science of phrenology or the like. Even his eugenics, upon closer inspection, was not so much derived from biology as from culture. He was interested in the fitness of his fellow Englishman. In eugenics he found the language to express this concern. White’s arguments about eugenics were framed by a sense of common belonging and derived more from a shallow spirituality than from science. “Vanoc” Lamarckians such as White applied this theory to humans. They believed that individuals were directly shaped by their environment (for instance, slum dwellers were more likely to become criminals), and that these traits were passed on to their children.

believed that "[t]he irresistible inference forced upon us is that beyond and above there is a Source of energy and guidance" which "some call ... evolution, and others call ... God."  

Central to fostering this sense of common belonging, White argued, was encouraging amongst the public the Greek ideal of maintaining sound mind and body. His jeremiad in *Efficiency and Empire* concerning the unfit physical state of Britain's Boer War recruits is well known. Elsewhere, he observed that the height requirements for Britain's army recruits had declined from 5'6" in 1845 to 5'0" in 1900. White was equally concerned, though, with England's upper class, particularly the country's leaders.

Just as he had a strong belief that his journalism, the work of one individual, could have a significant impact in forming opinions, so too did he believe that in strong leadership lay the secret to "national efficiency." His years working as an anonymous publicist for Fisher and Bedford epitomized this conviction. White complained that decadence and materialism had drained the upper class of its leadership potential, leaving only ambitious men of the middle class to take up the task. Writing in *Black and White* in 1909, he declared that the only contemporary politicians of merit were the Tory Unionist Arthur Balfour and the Liberal Sir

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27 White reported that in 1898 the medical department of the Army rejected 23,287 out of 66,501 recruits because they were deemed physically unfit for service. Of the 11,000 men who volunteered for service in Manchester between October 1899, and July 1900, 8,000 were found to be physically unfit, while 1,200 of the remaining 3,000 were accepted despite the fact that they did not meet the military's standards for strength and chest diameter. See *Efficiency and Empire*, pp. 109, 102-103.

28 Public lecture, White, "The Physical Condition of the Nation," Douglas Hall, Hoxton, 8 June, 1904. WHI/43, NMM.
Edward Grey, neither of whom were typical members of the gentility.\footnote{White, “The Writing on the Wall,” \textit{Black and White}, 19 June, 1909. Grey was most comfortable at his country estate at Falloden, watching birds and walking with his wife Dorothy. Balfour, the centre of the “Souls” group at Oxford, was notable for his aloofness.}

White had been critical of the government’s organization and efficiency long before such calls became popular in the immediate years before war. He had outlined these concerns in 1900 in the \textit{Daily Chronicle}, then a Liberal Imperialist paper, in a series of articles entitled “Where We Fail.” The seven-part series proved immensely popular, and was reprinted as a pamphlet, entitled \textit{Society, Smart Society, and Bad Smart Society, Their Influence on Empire, Being Seven Letters Written to the Editor of the Daily Chronicle}. His argument was that England’s governing elite, which otherwise provided sound leadership, had been corrupted by the influence of “smart society,” and that “national efficiency” could only be improved if this influence was excised. By “smart society,” White referred to individuals, usually aristocrats but also scions of the new money, who owed their positions to their social standing or financial influence.\footnote{White, “Society and the Work of the Empire,” \textit{Daily Telegraph}, 30 January, 1900, p. 9f. This article, which was published anonymously, was not titled as part of the “Where We Fail” series. The two subsequent contributions of 5 February and 12 February were numbered as (I) and (II), but the February 19 contribution was numbered (IV), with the previous three submissions retroactively becoming numbers (I), (II), and (III). The numbering confusion accounts for the apparent lacuna of submission number (III).} He was not, as has been stated, against privilege as such, but instead attacked the “kakocrats” who often emerged from “smart society.” These individuals were superfluous to a well administered state, and in fact were often harmful as they acted in their own interest, not in service to the nation. Jews, marked with the additional “stigma” of being foreigners, occupied a prime place amongst White’s kakocrat class. In expressing concern over the influence of financial speculators, White paralleled the thought of J. A. Hobson. Indeed, Hobson himself tacitly admitted as much in an
anonymous review of White’s *Efficiency and Empire* for the *Spectator.*

White laid out five key areas for reform in the fourth installment of his *Daily Chronicle* series, advising that placement should be based on merit, officials should be properly trained, fair remuneration should be provided, duties should be thoroughly defined, and supervision should be carried out actively and regularly. These proposals, all of which were eventually implemented, reflected his concern that bureaucrats were not accountable to anyone, and therefore free to pursue their own agendas independently of the Minister, or to avoid censure if they proved incompetent. White also criticized the national honours system, believing it rewarded position, not talent, and expressed admiration for men such as the former Liberal Prime Minister William Gladstone and the early-nineteenth century prison reformer John Howard who turned down titles. Indeed, the main recommendations of *Efficiency and Empire* were to restore responsibility in government and to open careers to talent. He thought that efficiency in government should match the efficiency and sense of duty he observed in the military. He spoke on this topic at the International Eugenics Congress in 1912, observing that military training was the best way to build character. Other speakers at the conference presented

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31 Hobson published his ideas on financial speculation, as well as a broader indictment of imperialism, in *Imperialism: A Study* (1902). Hobson noted his agreement with the general thrust of White’s argument, specifically the need for greater vigour amongst the middle class, the crisis of physical deterioration, and the need for a reformed administration which limited the influence of finance. However, he chastised White for being merely declamatory, brandishing efficiency as a shibboleth, and lacking depth of understanding, while observing that in book form, White’s message betrays a “marked thinness of matter.” The *Spectator*, 29 June, 1901, p. 951.

32 White, “Where We Fail, IV” [see note 89 for numbering explanation], *Daily Telegraph*, 19 February, 1900, p. 7.

more ill-founded arguments, though, tarring White’s message by association.\textsuperscript{34}

White’s ideas on Empire and citizenship were not all pessimistic. He had no objection, in theory, to an expanded citizenship which encompassed most if not all members of the Empire, whether white or black, English or “colonial.” Like many of his contemporaries, though, he did not consider such a proposition possible at that point in time. An open-ended view of the future also framed his sense of democracy. Take, for example, his position of female suffrage. Though White himself never betrayed any distinct understanding of the opposite sex - his wife makes nary an appearance in his correspondence, and he was estranged from his sisters - he approved of women’s suffrage in principle, and attended many suffrage demonstrations as an observer. He feared, however, that such an initiative might upset the political status quo, not because women were politically naïve, but because such a precedent might give credibility to similar claims from other imperial groups, specifically India. Despite such broad-minded musings, however, White remained a convinced English patriot. His concern for “national efficiency” led him to conceive of Empire and citizenship as subordinate to the “national interest.” His interest in eugenics led him to understand citizenship in essentialist terms.

\textit{Patriotism and White’s English Nationalism}

One of the “Views of Vanoc” was that gardening, next to Empire-building the great English pastime, could provide a model for proper imperial statecraft. He lamented the current

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Times}, 30 July, 1912, p. 4d. White was followed by a speaker who argued that tall, fair-haired people succeed in life over short, dark-haired ones, and that the former were found predominantly in the south of England, accounting for the greater prosperity evident there.
situation, where “the head gardeners [of Empire] are addicted to the habit of allowing the winter season of international rest to slip away without making provision for the dog-days of war, when the earth is iron and the skies are brass, and it is too late to till the soil,” concluding that efficiency demanded the gardener’s primary skill, foresight.\textsuperscript{35} The health of the Empire reflected directly upon the health of England itself, White’s primary concern.

Arnold White was a patriot. He saw the Empire as a living monument to England’s past achievements and imperial citizenship as the fealty an individual owed to this tradition. Given this view, it is not surprising that White saw the Empire as an English possession, rather than an organic entity. Much like Joseph Chamberlain’s metaphor of the undeveloped estate, White’s Empire was an emanation of the English character. If he needed recourse to any justification for English supremacy, he found it in providence. In an essay published on Asquith’s proposed 1912 Home Rule Bill, “Vox Populi” referred to the American constitution as the ideal guide to proper citizenship and government. He concluded this piece by invoking the sanction of “Divine Providence” as the final arbiter of national success.\textsuperscript{36} The claim that successful nations, especially those conscious at their birth, were the natural result of their constituent peoples being “chosen” was common enough during this era - such language was ubiquitous in the United States or Germany. All nations, especially in an era of conscious nation-building, saw themselves as unique or special.\textsuperscript{37} What is of note about White’s

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\item \textsuperscript{35} \textit{The Views of Vanoc}, pp. 113, 116.
\item \textsuperscript{36} “Memo on British Constitution.” WHI/36, NMM.
\item \textsuperscript{37} Providentialism and nation-building in general has recently become a popular preoccupation of historians. Especially prevalent has been the idea of “imagined communities” (Benedict Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities}, 1982) and the definition of the self as normative in relation to some “Other.” Linda Colley’s \textit{Britons} (1992) is of importance here in the context of
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providentialism is how it illustrates the influence of American citizenship ideals upon Britain at this time.

Many of White’s ideas on imperial citizenship were derived from the American political experience. Writing in 1919, White argued that the American Revolution was the most “blessed” of all revolutions, carried out by loyal Englishmen rebelling against a “German” king and his corrupt ministers. Beyond his selective understanding of the Revolution, what he admired about the United States was its inherent sense of national mission, with individual liberty the reward for patriotism and the performance of national duty. White pointed favourably to the Declaration of Independence and its constant reference to “our seas . . . our coasts . . . our people.”

With the United States firmly established as a world power-broker after their decisive intervention in the First World War, White called for a version of Churchill’s later “special relationship,” with the elder nation absorbing its offspring’s energy and self-confidence, and in turn tutoring America in the merits of their common “racial” tradition.

His admiration of the America’s achievements was conditional, however, on England remaining the world’s imperial power. This conditional admiration was based on several interrelated certainties. The first was that England had an imperial duty to spread civilization to other nations and peoples. This was not a vulgarized notion of spiritual uplift, such as to be gained by

38 Vox Populi, “Memo on British Constitution.”

39 White, “Strangers Yet,” unpublished MSS, 1919. WHI/131, NMM. A similar spirit inspired Rhodes’ vision of cultural and racial unity, reflected for example in the bestowal of Rhodes Scholarships on Americans and Germans.
shouldering the "White Man’s Burden." In fact, White condemned such a view, arguing that the "emotional intention," especially when expressed by men in power, had historically been a great cause of trouble. White believed that England’s imperial duty was to foster a sense of national self-determination which would result in the "improvement" of the subject nation: "[t]he first effect of a sense of manhood and independence of thought is not to confer the right of unbridled insolence upon the emancipated soul, but to breathe into it the spirit of a gentleman." England was that gentleman, whose task it was to spread the gentlemanly spirit throughout the Empire. White looked to the writing of Ralph Waldo Emerson for support of his belief that civilization in turn bestowed its moral and intellectual advances upon those who were without them: "the good of one country must either spread to all countries or it is not Civilization." 41 As with Rhodes and the Canadian George Parkin, White considered the United States to be within the English imperium, if only unofficially, and thus it fell on her as well to participate in the task of spreading "civilization."

Given his view that the United States shared with England an obligation to inculcate the spirit of self-determination around the world, White’s appreciation of the renewed Monroe Doctrine of the McKinley-Roosevelt era is understandable. James Monroe’s 1823 pronouncement of hemispheric sovereignty had been revived during the 1895 Venezuela border dispute, and became explicit public policy during the subsequent conflict with Spain over Cuba

40 White, “Our Handbook: Civilization Forward or Backwards? The Embryo of Nationality,” unidentified cutting, 8 December, 1912. WHI/33, NMM.

41 Ibid. White selectively quotes from Emerson to build his case in this document. He misunderstood Emerson’s intent, namely, the advocacy of the spirit of self-reliance.
and the Philippines in 1898. Some commentators set out the case that the sort of aggressive imperialism the United States had entered into was predatory and inconsistent with the spread of "gentlemanly" civilization. In particular, they took exception to the American practice of forcibly collecting its citizens' debts in South American countries. For White, though, America's newfound interest in the international community was long overdue, and consistent with his belief that the "English" project of civilization could indeed take root overseas and produce a like-minded society.

As the frequent references to "England" attest, White left little doubt as to what culture he saw as paramount. White's patriotism was in the service of England. His Anglocentrism led him to mistrust those he saw as outsiders, especially Jews and those he termed "Celts." He maintained a long-standing suspicion of Jewish influences in England. Writing in the Daily Chronicle, White argued that what he termed "bad foreign Jews" - he admitted to the existence of well-meaning patriotic Jews - menaced the best forms of national life, as they were materialistic and worked counter to patriotic goals. He described such "bad" Jews as members of a "Jewish imperium," faulting them as cosmopolitans who chose to remain outside of the national family. His negative use of the term "imperial" as a close approximation for

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42 American President Grover Cleveland pressed Congress in 1895 to intervene on Venezuela's behalf in that country's border dispute with British Guiana. The issue offended British national pride, and aroused in the country mild anti-American sentiment, but was soon forgotten in the wake of the Jameson Raid in December, 1895.

The Spanish American war broke out in 1898, and marked the United States' first tentative and brief foray into global imperialism. A thorough study of this subject is David Traxel's 1898 (New York: 1998).


44 White, "Where We Fail, VI," Daily Chronicle, 7 March, 1900, p. 7a.
“cosmopolitan” paints his own imperialism in an interesting light. As argued above, White’s Empire was an extension of the English family, a “Greater England” in the most literal sense. He had no time for cosmopolitan initiatives, thus his opposition to multi-ethnic polities in Canada and the Cape Colony as threats to imperial unity. Jews, as stereotypical wanderers, were suspect in White’s view for the very fact that they had no state, no homeland. As he wrote in The Modern Jew (1899),

England, therefore, is in this dilemma: She is either compelled to abandon her secular practice of complacent acceptance of every human being choosing to settle on these shores, or to face the certainty of the Jews becoming stronger, richer, and vastly more numerous; with the corresponding certainty of the press being captured as it has been captured on the Continent, and the national life stifled by the substitution of material aims for those which, however faultily, have formed the unselfish and imperial objects of the Englishmen who have made the Empire.45

The Jewish “problem” was that they had no citizenship, in that they had no loyalty to place, and that they did not assimilate in the lands where they found themselves. The homeless was literally beyond the pale in a world where citizenship was tied to place. White’s prescribed solutions to this “problem,” similar to those proffered for other “degenerate” members of society, were severe:

[There are two methods...in which the evil results of a Jewish imperium inside the English Empire can be obviated. It can by destroyed and its members expelled...or the Jewish community...must revise their conduct and heartily work for instead of against the process of absorption.46

Writing in The Times in 1904, White suggested that Jews either face stricter monitoring upon

45 White, The Modern Jew (London: 1899), p. xiii. This work, like all of White’s monographs, was a compilation of smaller pieces, notably articles from The Nineteenth Century and The North American Review.

46 Ibid., p. xii.
entry to England, or that a tract of land in Uganda be granted to Jews for a homeland.\textsuperscript{47} His negative use of the term “imperial” also betrays a conviction that the buttress of imperial citizenship was race, not in a biological sense of inherent “superiority,” though he certainly did not reject this “possibility” out of hand, but rather in the sense that the moral character of “England” rested on history, tradition, and “inherited” traits which could not be learned. One was born an Englishman, one did not become one. Hence his fears of his Celtic neighbours, of Jews, who were doubly suspect, being not only “foreigners,” but also having no rooted home, and, in the years before WWI, of German fifth columns. White’s rhetoric got the best of him in his writing on Jewish topics, as evidenced by the following addendum the \textit{Daily Chronicle} felt compelled to include after his article on “bad Jewish influence”: “[i]t must be understood that while we willingly give Mr. Arnold White the publicity of our columns for his interesting series of letters, we do not endorse all the views he expresses.”\textsuperscript{48} White was cognizant of significant social problems - here the social dislocation and consequent problems created by the intermixing of cultures - but expressed himself in terms either too strident or too ambiguous to be convincing.

White also held a dismissive view of Britain’s Celtic peoples. Great Britain was for him a construct, a Celtic device to grasp a portion of England’s glory. He bristled at the perceived injustice that Great Britain was “governed almost entirely by Scots, Welsh and Hebrews - the latter intellectually our betters but devoid of those distinctive qualities which have made such a

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{The Times}, 24 December, 1904, p. 4f.

\textsuperscript{48} “Where We Fail,” VI.
South American phrase as ‘the word of an Englishman’ imply good faith.”

In a submission to *The Watchman*, White found fault with the English liberal tradition of sanctuary, especially as it had been applied to Jews, whom he complained did not join the “English family.” Like much of White’s writing, this passage is exaggerated to drive home a point. In this instance he doubted the loyalty of the Scot, Jew, or Welshman. Such opinions unsurprisingly found little favour amongst White’s Celtic correspondents, not the least of which was the Welsh Prime Minister, David Lloyd George. While vacationing at Balmoral in 1911, Lloyd George sent White the following mild chastisement after reading one of his articles:

> You are wrong in mistrusting the Celt. He is intensely loyal once his affections are engaged. He is tenacious of purpose beyond any other race in these islands. Most important of all he possesses the gift of imagination and when a country has gone deep into a rutted road, as England has, you need that power to lift it. At this juncture the peculiar qualities of the Celt are invaluable to these islands.

John Buchan could not have put it better.

White’s dismissive attitudes toward Celts and other “outsiders” shaped his imperialism. An English estate, the Empire was furthermore to be a pan-England, encompassing and propagating the traditions, qualities, and character that made England a world power both militarily and culturally. Because White believed that England had contributed solely to the construction of Empire, he begrudged “outsiders”’ claims on shared participation, especially

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50 “England for the British Empire,” Unpublished MSS. WHI/131, NMM.

51 Lloyd George - White, 15 September, 1911, “Ministerial Correspondence.” WHI/134, NMM. The ‘juncture’ to which Lloyd George was referring was Britain’s industrial unrest and the debate over the House of Lords, both political crises of 1911. White and Lloyd George corresponded occasionally during this period, mainly concerning White’s opposition to “Keir Hardieism” and what he perceived as Lloyd George’s socialist leanings.
when those groups did not pay tribute to England by fully assimilating. White forever saw England cheated of her just dues. The First World War provided only the most outrageous example of this. While at *The Referee* during the war, White corresponded sympathetically with many readers upset at the paper's use of the title "Britain" in its articles and editorials rather than "England," arguing that it was the English who had founded the Empire. One such correspondent wondered why there was no "English Brigade," as there was for the Scots.  

The Royal Society of St. George sent White much material in this vein, asserting that the English war effort was unappreciated. One Society pamphlet reported spuriously that England had suffered 75-82% of imperial casualties, and should therefore be accorded the bulk of patriotic respect, and most of the 900,000 Dominion troops had actually been born in England. The imperial values of White and those who were like-minded reveal the cracks in any emerging notion of Commonwealth or imperial unity, and explain in part why imperial federation and similar political schemes for imperial reorganization ultimately failed.

It is not only minorities who are nationalistic. As White shows, "majority" patriots can also hold aggressively national views. If proper respect for England's grand imperial tradition was the bulwark of White's imperial citizenship, how was such respect to be secured and perpetuated? To answer this question, we must look more closely at the relationship between citizen and state, and how White envisioned this relationship might work in terms of Empire. As will be made evident, White conceived of the imperial citizenship relationship as a replication of national citizenship.

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52 G. B. H. Burke - White, nd. WHI/52, NMM.

53 Royal Society of St George pamphlet, nd (probably early 1920s), addressed to White. WHI/52, NMM.
Reciprocal Citizenship

On 1 October, 1916, over 1,500 people met at Queen’s Hall for a rally to demand votes for men on service. Soldiers on active duty did not have the right to exercise their franchise, as it was assumed that such a partisan activity, even if performed by proxy and in confidence, would harm morale. Such a prohibition was anathema to men such as White, as it struck at the very heart of his conception of citizenship. The most important component of this was defence and security. Therefore, White counted the military in the front ranks of good imperial citizens, for they put their lives in jeopardy for the defence of the Empire. Any benefits the individual might derive from citizenship were dependent on the maintenance of the community’s security. Such a “duty-equals-reward” equation constituted for White the proper relationship between citizen and state. It comes as little surprise, then, that White spoke at the Queen’s Hall rally, commending the work of the military, particularly the navy, and urging that those serving England be allowed to participate in choosing its government. White suspected that Asquith’s Coalition was attempting to push through an election on a stale register. Other speakers at the rally included the suffragette Emily Pankhurst, the Radical Unionist Henry Page Croft, and National Review editor Leo Maxse, the latter going so far as to claim with characteristic bombast that the Government’s proposed Registration Bill sought to “enfranchise the conscientious objector and disenfranchise the Victorian Cross.”\(^{54}\)

For White, everyone had their place in the political order. The social contract which buttressed this order was between the state, which provided security and respected privacy, and

\(^{54}\) *The Times*, 2 October, 1916, p. 5c.
the individual, who contributed to that security through service, thereby deriving the benefit of privacy. This relationship defined national citizenship; a similar relationship existed in the Empire, were subjects, regardless of their legal citizenship, were expected in White’s view to work in the nation’s interest. This social contract was thus the basic tenet of White’s ideal of imperial citizenship. The monarch embodied this relationship, protecting the people while respecting the people’s will as expressed in Parliament. The government was reciprocally bound to act in good faith, lest the monarch be forced to intervene to restore order or legitimacy. White thus valued patriotism and honour in politicians, and could be acidic when these standards were not met. He discounted Winston Churchill on these lines, heading a review with the following epigram, “A merciful Providence fashioned him hollow/ The better that he might his principles swallow.” White was also critical of the replacement of Asquith by the Lloyd George Coalition in December, 1916.

Government should serve the people, not itself. Conversely, government should not function simply as the mouthpiece of the masses. White deeply mistrusted demagoguery, ironic in that much of his writing was just that. Nevertheless, he maintained an innate respect for aristocracy and the elite, so long as they used their position to the benefit of the state, rather than being self-seeking. White wanted an active and politicized citizenry, and deeply longed for a Carlyle-esque leader, capable of rousing the respect and loyalty of the people, while possessed of the best traits of traditional aristocratic rule, namely moral certainty and executive self-

55 White was a strong advocate of transparent government, and campaigned vigorously against perceived corruption. He attended meetings of The National League for Clean Government, though it is not clear whether or not he was a member. See WHI/134, NMM.

56 Unidentified clipping. WHI/134, NMM.
confidence.

White’s belief in the importance of both national leader and military service were reflected in his strong support for Trafalgar Day. He spearheaded the annual celebration at Nelson’s column of the admiral’s famous naval victory, in part to generate support for the navy and the Navy League’s activities, but more broadly as a means of developing national pride. When the writer Arthur Conan Doyle suggested that the holiday might be dropped in an effort to improve England’s relations with France, White retorted that this was just the sort of weakness of character the French had displayed at Waterloo, and that furthermore, the event “familiarizes the taxpayers and the electorate with the burdens of Imperial defence thrust upon them from without.”

The state, furthermore, should also employ business procedures, namely proper training and accountability. This was the theme of Efficiency and Empire (1901), White’s best known work. In this vein, he admired men such as Joseph Chamberlain, actors rather than speculators or rhetoricians. One of his correspondents voiced the view quite succinctly that the Empire should be run like a business, advocating an Empire run as a “limited liability company . . . John Bull & Co.” The Empire, in this vision, was an English estate, and should be viewed as such in clear, objective terms, not through platitudes such as “Britannia rules the waves” or “One

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57 The Times, 21 October, 1897, p. 10d. White was being somewhat unfair here, as Arthur Conan Doyle was no dissenter when it came to patriotism. The latter wrote a history of both the Anglo-Boer War and the Great War, for which he received a knighthood. In viewing Nelson’s victory as an “English” event, White neglected the contributions of other Britons who served on the Victory and her allied ships.

58 A. W. A. Pound - White, 28 July, 1914. WHI/83, NMM.
Englishman can beat two foreigners.”

In exchange for the governance provided by the state, the individual was required to help maintain the state’s well-being. This meant above all military service, a theme White advanced through his work with the Navy Service League, founded in 1904. White often bemoaned the ineffectual training of Britain’s military, and devoted considerable time lobbying for improvements in the living standard of servicemen, particularly sailors. He was the public voice of the Duke of Bedford’s scheme to improve England’s militia. He had little time for any individuals whom he believed did not perform their national duty. In a letter to The New Age in the fall of 1914, White castigated those of his fellow writers who refused to enlist because of family reasons, and argued they should be taxed, along with “independent ineligibles” such as himself, to support the men in uniform. He was deeply resentful that his age prevented him from serving.

After the introduction of conscription early in 1916, conscientious objectors, as to be expected, found in White no ally. It was inconceivable to him how someone could decide not to participate in the defence of the Empire, and he dispensed much vitriol denouncing such “traitors.” A representative example is the case of a conscientious objector named James Brightmore, whose officers had been disciplined for using excessive force in their efforts to

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61 [White], The New Age, 10 September, 1914, p. 460.

prevent him from deserting. White pestered the War Office with numerous missives in support of the officers, whom he believed where upholding a sacred principle of active citizenship.\textsuperscript{63} Any apparent tension in White’s respect for individual liberty and the duty of national service quickly melted away, revealing a conviction that citizenship entailed duties and responsibilities, above all loyalty and patriotism. The pacifism and neutrality expressed by men like Brightmore scandalized White.\textsuperscript{64} This was a dereliction of duty, rendering the objector no more a citizen than the alien. The most degraded person in White’s world was not the enemy, whose loyalties and passions were at least assured, but the neutral, whose rejection of the citizenship ideal placed him outside the pale. Citizenship was a required state-of-being, not an option from which an individual could be absolved of when desired.

Next to military service according to one’s capabilities, individual citizens were also expected to foster public discussion of the political issues of the day, thereby ensuring that the population at large was engaged in political life. Support for public discussion is to be expected

\textsuperscript{63} B. B. Cubitt, War Office - White, 23 July, 1917. WHI/35, NMM.

\textsuperscript{64} White was similarly upset by George Bernard Shaw’s 1917 article for the San Francisco Bulletin, in which Shaw wrote, “[j]in both armies the soldiers should shoot their officers and go home, the agriculturalist to his land and the townsman to his painting and glazing.” (San Francisco Bulletin, 2 November, 1914). Shaw, who had once worked under White at the Edison Electric Light Company, was engaging in satire, but nonetheless appeared to White as unpatriotic. White sent a memo to several of the dailies, in which he expressed his hope that “men of the stamp of Bernard Shaw would be wiped out as the swarms of butterflies disappear before the blast of the . . . monsoon,” and branded Shaw a “parasite.” What truly angered White was Shaw himself, whose sometimes patronizing assuredness and candour riled the patriotic and prosaic White to no end.

White chastised Shaw for ignoring the suffering of the soldiers and their families. Shaw, delighted to have found such a literal mind with which to spar, responded with characteristic wit: “[y]ou have let the war get on your nerves. The front will jolly you up [Shaw was suggesting a visit, not active service]: after an hour of big gun fire you simply won’t know that such a person as Shaw, the Terrible Traitor of the Hidden Hand, exists.” See Memorandum, White, 19 March 1917; Shaw - White, 17 March, 1917. WHI/178, NMM.
from a journalist, but White saw his role in this as paramount, and defended the rights and obligations of the press with unusual vigour. In exchange for participating in the political life of the nation/Empire, the individual secured a degree of personal autonomy. The state could not, in other words, make demands on the individual beyond those of military service. White believed the press had a duty to protect this autonomy by holding the state to account. White drew selectively from the tradition of Hobbes and Locke in formulating these ideas, and in the equilibrium between national security and individual autonomy lay his ideal vision of citizenship.

Though he did not use this language consciously, White’s notion of citizenship was in essence a political interpretation of Adam Smith’s theory of the “Invisible Hand.” Writing in the newly founded National Service Journal in 1904, White argued that the state should act as a trustee, while the individual-as-citizen should act as the businessman would, replacing “gain” with “duty” as the prime motivator. Individuals were thus, in a sense, raw material for the proper construction and maintenance of the state, and they were only paid - that is, they only derived their citizenship benefits - once their labour was completed. These were the virtues, White concluded, which the Germany of Bismarck, Moltke, and Wilhelm II had stressed in its rise to international prominence, virtues England would need to adopt in order to keep pace.65

Emigration and Citizenship

White’s “business” model was expressed in real terms through his long involvement in

65 National Service Journal, 1, 7, May 1904.
the issue of imperial emigration. His interest in this area was stimulated in the mid-1880's in the
course of his campaign against foreign immigration. He was convinced that urbanization,
combined with the arrival of Jews from Eastern Europe, had created social havoc. English cities
now suffered from urban crowding, increased rents, the growth of the sweating industry, and
other related problems which he blamed largely on the arrival of "non-English" immigrants. As
a solution, White began to advocate emigration to the Empire. He traveled annually to South
Africa from 1885-1890 in an attempt to convince local authorities to establish colonies of
English labourers there. He also voyaged to Russia on five separate occasions in the 1890's to
study the conditions from which Jews had been forced to flee. He published his
appraisal of the situation in *The Destitute Alien in Great Britain* (1892). The lesson White
derived from these travels was that social unrest occurs where there is a conflict of identity, and
therefore of loyalty. Assimilation, which was the proper state of affairs, became impossible. In
other words, White believed that identity must be tied to place. This, he believed, was the great
strength of the United States, where one was absorbed into the American polity immediately
upon disembarkation. Applied to the Empire, White adopted the view that Milner was soon to
develop in South Africa, namely, that the maintenance of Empire depended on the settlement of
greater numbers of Britons, both to increase the British presence and to aid in the assimilation of
indigenous groups.66 Empire, in short, could function as a safety valve to regulate domestic
pressures.

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66 In the case of both White and Milner, as well as many other imperial voices at the
turn of the century, "assimilate" was used in the sense of absorption into the imperium and its
system of governance, not full-scale cultural assimilation, though the latter would probably not
have been rejected had it been possible. Such an attitude was consistent with the growing favour
for "informal Empire," the most prominent example of which was of course Lugard in Nigeria.
When this was the case, citizens truly became a raw material, redistributed in accord with the desire for a balanced ledger. The role of the imperial accountant, the government, in such transactions was to facilitate the transfer of people and to ensure England always enjoyed a favourable balance. The preferred procedure was the organized emigration scheme. These numbered in the thousands during White’s lifetime, though many were unsuccessful. Thus, though individual liberty was a valued ideal, it was not as yet a “right” in the present understanding of this term. An appeal to “natural rights,” such as the individual’s right to movement, would have bewildered White. This does not mean that White approved of the wholesale uprooting of communities for imperial purposes. Rather, he saw emigration as the solution to social problems, and hence advocated the emigration of those Britons deemed “superfluous.” This was consistent with his notion that Empire existed for England, not, as with Buchan, of England.

While criminals were not appropriate emigrants, other disadvantaged groups certainly were. One such group were those engaged in “blind alley employment.” These were individuals, mainly young boys, who worked at jobs of limited duration, usually a few years. After that time the worker was often cast out and left with few if any useful skills, becoming a drain on society. Blind-alley employment included van-boys, golf caddies, messenger boys, and hotel workers. Richard Butler, White’s editor at The Referee, was also a supporter of assisted emigration. He encouraged “Vanoc” to stress how limited opportunities then were in Britain, and that emigres could serve the Empire by becoming “a useful asset as a food provider for the

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67 See Chapter VI, on Thomas Sedgwick and assisted emigration, for a detailed case study.

68 Malcolm Jones - White, 30 December, 1913. WHI/9, NMM.
Mother Country.”69 White echoed Butler’s position after World War I, reminding the readers of The Times “that if you settle outside the Empire you may be lost to it.”70

White argued that the state should take the lead concerning emigration. To that end, he worked with the Emigrant Information Office (EIO). Collaborators in this endeavour included Liberal Cabinet Minister Lewis Harcourt.71 The EIO operated out of the Colonial Office and provided prospective emigrants with quarterly literature on the white dominions, including information on employment, weather, passage, and culture. White also sat on the 1907 Parliamentary Committee on Emigration, whose members included the young civil servant William Beveridge. The Committee reviewed the EIO’s operations as part of its larger mandate to increase assisted emigration. In the previous year (1906), the EIO had received 14,646 queries from or on behalf of potential emigrants.72 Since 1895, between 2,220-3,300 applications to migrate were received yearly. Interest had increased in Australia and New Zealand, largely on account of the better climate, government assistance for passage, and ample employment opportunities. Australia had at the turn of the century the world’s highest standard of living. Canada, despite the efforts of the Minister of the Interior Clifford Sifton, saw a decline

69 R. D. Butler - White, 23 December, 1913. WHI/9, NMM.

70 The Times, 22 May, 1919, p. 13d.

71 White - H. Lambert, 23 March, 1907. WHI/80, NMM. The EIO was founded in 1886 as an arm’s length branch of the Colonial Office. The Royal Colonial Institute and C. P. Lucas in the Colonial Office had been instrumental in its establishment. The EIO had a minimal budget drawn from the public purse, and served mainly as an advisory body, with no designs on an active role in administering emigration. See also Chapter VI and Andrew Thompson, Imperial Britain, pp. 139,140.

72 The largest number of enquiries came from skilled mechanics (28.5%), followed by labourers (8.3%), female domestics (6.2%), and clerks (5.5%). See Report on the Emigrant Information Office for 1907, 1908, Cd. 3918.
in enquiries, as only labourers were to be admitted as part of tightened immigration legislation.

Though he continued to support assisted emigration until his death, White had eventually moved away from the emigration schemes he favoured in the late-nineteenth century to concentrate on promoting youth emigration. He lamented the graft and wastage state-operated plans often entailed. Moreover, he feared the emigration of society’s least productive members could lead to dominion resentment and cracks in imperial solidarity. Furthermore, he was disappointed that successive governments showed limited interest in administering mass emigration undertakings. The state had failed in its required role as imperial manager, leaving it to private individuals to take up the task of assisted emigration. Though he still worked to aid the broader emigration movement - including high-level engagements on the subject by figures such as the South African politician Louis Botha73 - by the early 1910's he had begun to favour youth emigration. White argued that youths were better suited to adapt to new surroundings. Hence, he saw an increased role for enterprising private operators such as Thomas Sedgwick and Dr. Thomas Barnardo, who between 1870 and 1914 sent 31,031 children overseas.74 Free from the stigma of pauperism, such schemes were conducive to the development of mental and physical character, White’s preeminent imperial efficiency concern. The concern White showed for a possible decrease in “imperial solidarity” can in part be attributed to the increases in non-British emigration to the dominions. For instance, in the 1907-08 fiscal year, the number of

73 Louis Botha - White, 13 August, 1904. WHI/47, NMM. Botha wrote to thank White for his part in a small scheme to resettle English widows in South Africa.

British immigrants to Canada was 59,832, while non-British immigrants numbered 94,007.75

Consistent with his citizenship model, White argued that assisted emigration should be suspended while Britain was at war, as the primary concern of both state and citizen was national security. He declined to attend EIO meetings during the war, arguing that the Office should be closed to conserve scarce human and economic resources.76 With the end of the conflict, White retreated into retirement at his cottage on Windmill Hill, Hampstead. Though his correspondence is silent on the issue, he was no doubt pleased with the passage of the 1918 Emigration Act. The legislation expressed many of his convictions concerning the state’s proper role as a facilitator and caretaker of the individual’s benefits for service rendered. In the case of the 1918 legislation, the state provided for both the Empire’s maintenance and the liberty of its citizens. Its role was “to improve the existing organization for affording information and assistance to those who wish to emigrate from the British Islands, and to provide for the establishment and powers of a Central Emigration Authority, and for the supervision and control of passage brokers and passage broker’s agents, and emigration societies, and for purposes in connection therewith.”77

Through most of his career, however, White had been disappointed with the failure of the state and its constituents to live up to their respective citizenship roles. This disappointment was especially clear during the First World War. The conflict heightened White’s Anglocentrism, and helps to illustrate how his English patriotism shaped his notion of imperial


76 White - EIO, 8 November, 1915. WHI/51, NMM.

77 30, 8 & 9 George V.
citizenship. An examination of White’s wartime controversies also brings to the fore the limitations to his understanding of Empire.

*White and the First World War*

The outbreak of the Great War confirmed White’s long-standing belief that Germany posed a mortal threat to the security of England and her Empire. Germanophobia was certainly not an uncommon trait in Edwardian Britain. White, however, held a particularly antagonistic position toward Germany and its citizens. He was one of the pre-war era’s leading “scaremongers.”78 His interest in the navy soon directed his gaze upon Germany. He saw Germany as a threat to England’s naval supremacy, especially in the North Sea. Britain’s imperial security rested upon the strength of the Royal Navy, and thus a threat to her naval superiority represented a threat to the Empire at large. With these thoughts in mind, White traveled to Germany in 1908 to conduct an investigation of the German navy for *The Daily Express*. Despite the reservations of Admiral Tirpitz, who viewed White with suspicion, the journalist was granted an audience with Kaiser Wilhelm II.79 The Kaiser, nephew of Edward VII, had cultivated a reputation as an Anglophile in the early years of the twentieth century, taking delight in his appointment as an Honourary Admiral of the Fleet, a title granted him by his maternal grandmother Queen Victoria. Nonetheless, he harboured many grievances against


79 See Teel, Part III, Chp. II. Due to White’s subsequent criticisms of Germany, his certification to visit Germany on later occasions was revoked by the German Embassy.
England. The Kaiser complained to White of the unfair treatment the English press had in recent years accorded Germany.\textsuperscript{80} White returned home impressed with German efficiency, but concerned about the mistrust of England expressed by the Kaiser, whom he depicted as unbalanced. As Anglo-German competition intensified in 1909 and 1910, White’s was one of the earliest voices predicting conflict and thus the need for national preparedness. He later summarized his position on Germany, and offered an amateur assessment of the Kaiser’s state of mind in his 1915 publication \textit{Is the Kaiser Insane? A Study of the Great Outlaw}.\textsuperscript{81} White had long feared “foreign” influences in the English press. Often this meant Jews, “an island of aliens in the sea of English life,”\textsuperscript{82} though elsewhere White expressed admiration for “good Jews” and the fortitude of the Jewish race.\textsuperscript{83} In the decade between his visit to the Kaiser and the start of war, “foreign” increasingly meant German. White argued that, despite the commendable aspects of German culture, “Germany wants that which England possesses,”\textsuperscript{84} namely an Empire which

\textsuperscript{80} See \textit{The Daily Telegraph}, 28 October, 1908. Britain’s reaction to the affair is conveyed in T. G. Otte, “‘An altogether unfortunate affair’: Britain and the Daily Telegraph Affair,” \textit{Diplomacy and Statecraft}, V, 1994, 296-333. Anglo-German relations were further soured by the intensification of the naval “scare” in 1909, when Germany intensified production of \\textit{Dreadnought} class battleships.

Wilhelm’s subsequent decision to grant an interview to a British paper, the so-called \textit{Daily Telegraph} affair, provoked a diplomatic incident and precipitated a nervous breakdown from which he never completely recovered.

\textsuperscript{81} The Kaiser’s political judgement and mental health were topics of much discussion in both Whitehall and Fleet Street. Recent evidence indicates that Wilhelm may have suffered from a brain defect now termed “minimal cerebral dysfunction (MCD).” See T. G. Otte, “‘The Winston of Germany’: The British Foreign Policy Elite and the Last German Emperor,” \textit{Canadian Journal of History}, XXXVI, December 2001, pp. 472.

\textsuperscript{82} White, \textit{Efficiency and Empire}, p. 80.

\textsuperscript{83} White, \textit{The Views of Vanoc}, 1910, pp. 83-85.

\textsuperscript{84} \textit{Ibid}, p. 180.
she might expand and exploit. This desire, given her increased naval strength, White thought understandable, as he observed melodramatically years before he traveled to Berlin: “[t]he longing for a slice of territory in a temperate colony can only be compared to the longing of a lover for his mistress or of an injured Spaniard for revenge.”

When war became a reality White saw Germans behind every tree. His attention was focused on the “Hidden Hand,” what he perceived as the undue German influence on the English press which threatened to compromise the war effort. One of White’s correspondents sent him a pamphlet entitled “Why the London Press Favours Alien Immigration and English Emigration,” which denounced the “Semitic” nature of _The Times_, a legacy of the paper’s former manager Moberley Bell, and claimed that _The Daily Mail_ was a “noted [product] of the Irish immigrant’s ‘noospoiper’ factory,” while _The Daily Chronicle_ “proprietors are some money-grubbing ingrates who bear the Welsh name of Lloyd,” and the _Pall Mall Gazette_ proprietor “is an American millionaire of German descent.” Though White did not share the stark xenophobia expressed in this pamphlet, the letter writer’s thoughts are perhaps indicative of the opinion his work courted, and explains why he was unable to capture mainstream support. White was also suspicious of advertisements in British papers the week war was declared, which he believed had been placed, through ostensible neutral groups, by the Germans. He was especially indignant about an entire page in the 5 August, 1914 edition of radical-liberal _Daily News_, which declared “Englishmen, Do Your Duty and Keep Your Country Out of a Wicked and Stupid War.”

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85 [White], _The Daily Mail_, 24 July, 1902, p. 4d.

86 Joseph Bannister - White, undated. Pamphlet dated 13 January, 1913. WHI/9, NMM.

87 _Daily News_, 5 August, 1914, p. 7. The advertisement was placed by the Neutrality League, an organization advocating peace. The League had temporary offices in Fleet Street and
1915 and again in 1917 he called for an investigation into German proprietorship of English
newspapers, bringing a motion to the Institute of Journalists to prohibit foreign-born individuals
from becoming members. A. G. Gardiner, the Institute’s president and editor of the Radical
*Daily News*, turned down White’s request (a not uncommon occurrence). He challenged White
to produce evidence of his claims, and dropped the issue when White would not comply. 88
White, despite the Institute’s refusal to hear his case, refused to resign, “because I never resign
from anything if I am in a better position to attack from inside in the interests of my country.” 89

White’s suspicions of the existence of a “Hidden Hand” illustrate his notion of
citizenship as based in national patriotism, a citizenship based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*,
something that one acquires by birth. On a more squalid note, it also shows his paranoia and
penchant for fear-mongering, while demonstrating his need to construct straw men for his
arguments. *The Times* summed up the popular response to White’s jeremiad, noting in its review
of *The Hidden Hand* (1917), in which White set out his fears of a German fifth column in
England, that “the hammering cocksureness of the style which may have all ephemeral
effectiveness does not carry conviction.” 90

White was concerned with the security of the Empire insofar as threats directed toward it
presented a danger to England’s own security. A similar concern prompted his criticisms of

88 Motion, White - Institute of Journalists, 16 October, 1915. For Gardiner’s response,
and a report of the Institute’s Annual Meeting for 1915, see *The Daily News*, 18 October, 1915,
p. 5c.

89 White, MSS, “Chapter - The Hidden Hand in Fleet Street,” p. 9. WHI/117, NMM.

90 *The Times*, supplement, 22 May, 1917, p. 479d. *The Hidden Hand*, like most of
White’s monographs, was a revised version of his previous journalism on the topic.
Britain's policy regarding immigrants. He argued that Britain's immigration law was inadequate, terming the 1914 British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act "a legal fiction" because it did nothing to address the issue of Germans resident in Britain.\(^91\) Part of this anxiety was occasioned by the passage of the Delbrück Law in Germany. In a speech to the Devonshire Club in August of 1917, White drew attention to the Act, spearheaded by the German Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Herr Delbrück.\(^92\) White had originally been made aware of this legislation through correspondence with an R. Feibelman of Amsterdam. Germany's previous naturalisation legislation, passed in 1870 with subsequent amendments, stated that a German would lose his German citizenship after ten years of domicile abroad, unless he had periodically registered at a German consulate. Since many emigres did not do this, most lost their citizenship when they went abroad, and their children were lost as prospective German citizens. The growth of a German Empire at the end of the nineteenth century necessitated a change in this legislation, as Germany now required laws to cover its new colonies, as well as maintain a military force outside of Europe. New legislation, of which the Delbrück Law was in 1917 only the then most recent manifestation, stated that German nationality would only be lost when the emigrant voluntarily revoked nationality. This contrasted with British law, which dictated that an emigre lost his British nationality if he acquired the nationality of another country. The Delbrück Act was an amendment to the German Bill on Naturalisation, and permitted denaturalized Germans to retain their German citizenship. Such individuals would have to formally apply to revoke

\(^91\) Evelyn Miller - White, 8 February, 1917; Miller- White, 22 February, 1917. WHI/117, NMM.

\(^92\) White, Lecture to Devonshire Club, notes, 29 August, 1917. WHI/42, NMM. See Memorandum on German Imperial and State Naturalization Law, 22 July, 1913, issued by the British Embassy in Berlin. Miscellaneous No. 3 (1914), Cd. 7277.
their German citizenship, and permission was rarely granted for those of military age.

White would have welcomed similar legislation in Britain, as it would have more firmly
defined British citizenship, particularly for Britons living beyond the United Kingdom. A
German model, however, was nothing except a threat. White feared the Delbrück Act,
predicated on the notion of a “Greater Germany,” would help facilitate German fifth column
activities in Britain, and not only amongst Britain’s lower classes. White alleged that there were
numerous German-Britons amongst Britain’s elite who held dual citizenship. He cited the City
bankers Baron Bruno von Schröder, Sir Ernest Cassel, and Sir Edgar Speyer, all Privy Council
members, as well as convicted German spy Lincoln Trebitsch, as examples of those he
suspected. The charges were by all appearances unfounded, Whitehall was not impressed, and
the Chancellor of the Exchequer decided White’s actions did not warrant action under the
Defence of the Realm Act.\textsuperscript{93} The irony in White’s vehement Germanophobia, and perhaps a key
to understanding its gestation, was that White’s great-great-grandfather was born \textit{Witt}, and only
changed the family’s surname to \textit{White} in the 1780's to avoid Germanophobe prejudice.\textsuperscript{94}

\textit{Conclusion}

The stream of imperialism represented by Arnold White was one based upon race-

\textsuperscript{93} White, speech to Institute of Journalists, nd. (early 1917 - for date see Evelyn Miller -
White, 8 February, 1917), p. 68. WHI/117, NMM. Von Schröder and Cassel had been
naturalized in Britain in 1878, Speyer in 1892. For White’s brush with DORA, see \textit{The Times},
14 March, 1917, p. 10d.

\textsuperscript{94} See Teel, p. 11. To add further irony, the publisher of \textit{The Views of Vanoc}, Kegan
Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. Ltd., had obvious German connections.
patriotism. It harkened back to an era of imperial consensus, when England acted rather than dithered, and when imperial loyalty was maintained by the very fact that it was rarely tested. How else to account for the seemingly heartfelt shock of the Indian “mutiny” in 1857 - could this have really happened to us?! White’s conservatism bore more resemblance to that of the mid-century Age of Equipoise than to that of the late-Victorian “New Imperialism.” Though he disavowed the liberal convictions expressed by many mid-Victorian imperialists, he expressed a Whiggish sympathy for aristocratic government, and shared Lord Palmerston’s Tory view of the “national interest.”

White’s concern for the “national interest” speaks to the importance of patriotism in pre-1914 Britain, specifically its impact on ideas of citizenship. White’s thought on citizenship developed firmly within the context of the “national efficiency” movement. He advanced an exclusive concept built around a reciprocal relationship between citizen and government, with commensurate duties and rewards, directed toward the national interest. Ultimately such a citizenship was parochial; outsiders were to be assimilated. The most important qualifications for such a citizenship were loyalty and an attachment to English tradition. Thus, the Crystal Palace of 1851 stood side-by-side Gordon’s travails in the Sudan in 1884 as great events in “English” history. White viewed the Empire within this framework. He never formulated any specific concept of imperial citizenship per se. Rather, he expressed the conviction that “English” citizenship, by extension, also encompassed Britons living in the Empire. This conviction was based in ideas of cultural exceptionalism, and while it often took on a racialist

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95 In defence of his foreign policy, Lord Palmerston delivered his famous definition of the “national interest” in the House on 1 March, 1848: “[w]e have not eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.” Hansard, 1 March, 1848.
form, it was not racist, because its genesis lay not in the differences between "races," but rather in national ego and parochialism. White ignored non-English imperial subjects in the simple, if arrogant, belief that their having been born outside of the English culture precluded them, on the principle of *jus sanguinis*, of ever becoming English citizens. Thus White betrayed a static, rather than progressive, notion of citizenship and Empire.

The responsibilities of imperial citizenship, namely service to the state in whatever manner necessary, came before rights or benefits. White’s conception of citizenship reveals that for patriots such as himself, citizenship was insular; his concern was for the nation and its people in and of themselves, not necessarily in contrast to others. Thus, the form of patriotic imperial citizenship which he voiced could and often did take a racialist shape, and sometimes could be overtly prejudicial. White was a patriot, and his views on imperial citizenship were in reality his views on England applied to a broader canvass. He had little direct knowledge of or concern for the Empire as a group of societies separate from England itself. It is telling that beyond his visits to South Africa to oversee a settlement scheme, his visits to "the Empire" were limited to brief voyages to visit English warships abroad. The breakdown of imperial loyalty in the Edwardian era and after can in part by attributed to subjects’ rejection of a citizenship model which showed them so little interest.
Chapter VI

"Practical Imperialism":
Thomas Sedgwick and Imperial [E]migration

The Colonies offer happy and prosperous homes to thousands who are unable to gain a livelihood within the narrow limits of these islands, owing to the pressure of overpopulation and consequent over-competition. In transplanting them to our own Colonies instead of to foreign lands, they retain their privileges as citizens of this great Empire, and live under the same flag and the same Sovereign.¹

Edward, Prince of Wales, 1889

So spoke the future King Edward VII, then the Prince of Wales, in a speech delivered in 1889 to the Royal Colonial Institute on the subject of imperial emigration. Edward expressed the conviction, shared by many of his fellow countrymen, that the Empire was, in Sir Charles Dilke’s famous phrase, a “Greater Britain.” Its people shared British culture and heritage, common bonds which provided the basis for imperial growth and success. The future growth of the Empire, then, should come through British emigration. This would have the added benefit of relieving domestic population pressures without contributing to the economic growth of Britain’s competitors on the global stage. The Prince also invokes the notion of citizenship, noting that it would be to the benefit of British emigrants to move to the Empire, as opposed to foreign nations. The idea of channelling emigration within the Empire was a common argument in the late-Victorian and Edwardian era. It also illustrates the intertwined notions of imperialism and citizenship. Imperial emigration provides an instructive case study in the principle of imperial

¹ Draft copy, Royal Colonial Institute - King George V. SP Volume II, 1/8, LRCS. The RCI presented Edward VII’s speech as part of its petition to George V to grant royal assent to Sedgwick’s New Zealand emigration scheme.
citizenship at work, what can be termed "Practical Imperialism." This chapter examines the relationship between citizenship and Empire through the prism of assisted emigration, with the emigration schemes of the imperial philanthropist Thomas Sedgwick as the central focus. It aims to show that conservatives' conceptions of imperial citizenship were by definition consensual. A consensual model of citizenship developed owing to the binary nature of relations between the metropole and the periphery, and was dependent upon the conviction, shared by both mother country and colony, that Empire was a structured relationship which offered greater benefits than did national autonomy or devolution.

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Sedgwick used the term "practical imperialism" as the title of his New Zealand scheme. See "Circular letter introducing Sedgwick’s pamphlet," 23 May, 1913. Volume 1, 4/20, Sedgwick Papers [hereafter SP], Library of the Royal Commonwealth Society [hereafter LRCS], Cambridge University, Cambridge.

* The Sedgwick Papers were scheduled to be reorganized in 2000/2001. The file numbers used in this chapter reflect the original (pre-2000) numbering scheme. They can be cross-indexed with the current filing system through the finding guide available at the Library of the Royal Commonwealth Society, Cambridge University.
Assisted Emigration

Thomas Sedgwick was convinced that emigration was central to the continued maintenance of Empire because it would consolidate a common identity. In his words, "Understanding means unity - unity means strength - strength and solidarity for the British Empire mean Security and Progress for Civilization." The view that emigration served to strengthen the sinews of Empire had long been part of the imperial landscape. What had not been decided was the nature of imperial emigration. State-assisted emigration plans were common during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when mercantilist concerns over limited world resources dictated that the government play a prominent role in directing the flow of emigrants. Edward Gibbon Wakefield’s emigration interests in South Australia during the 1830's are perhaps the best known of this period. The British government gradually divested itself of any direct role in emigration by the beginning of the Victorian era. This shift in policy occurred for two significant reasons. First, the colonies began to assert their independence, with the supervision of immigration one of the earliest concerns to fall under their assumed jurisdiction. Second, the Corn Law debates of 1841-1846 led to the primacy of the ideas of the Manchester School in political economy. Central to the thought of Cobden and his followers was a free exchange of labour, and the state consequently surrendered control of emigration to private operations. Market forces would henceforth dictate the flow of emigration.

\[3\] Cutting. SP Volume II, 1/1, LRCS.

Consistent with W. E. Gladstone’s ambivalence in regard to Empire, British governments maintained a *laissez-faire* approach to emigration for much of the Victorian period. The Tory governments of Lord Derby (1851-1852, 1858-1859, 1866-1868) and Benjamin Disraeli (1868, 1874-1880), though more active in imperial affairs, nonetheless adhered to their political rival’s policy on the matter of emigration. Britain eventually established the Emigrant Information Office (EIO) in 1886⁵, a government agency which provided prospective migrants with information concerning opportunities in the colonies.⁶ The state also maintained a minimal role in directing imperial emigration through three separate government branches. The Board of Trade collected statistics on passenger traffic on British ships. The Home Office engaged in a limited business in sending reformatory boys to the colonies. The Local Government Board also helped despatch a small number of poor children under the auspices of the Poor Relief Acts of 1848-9, and after the passage of the Unemployed Workmen’s Act of 1905, it had the authority to transport unemployed workers and their families.⁷ In general, though, the large-scale emigration of the nineteenth century, one of the largest mass movements of people in European history, unfolded without the direct involvement of the government. An astonishing total of 22.6 million

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⁵ *Memorandum on the History and Functions of the Emigrants Information Office*, British Parliamentary Papers, Cd. 3407, LXVIII, 1907.

⁶ The EIO’s most significant initiative was the publication of circulars which detailed the social and economic conditions which a prospective emigrant could expect to find in the colonies. See for instance Great Britain Emigrants’ Information Office, *Combined Circulars on Canada, Australasia, and the South African Colonies* (London: various years).

individuals left Britain between 1815 and 1914.\textsuperscript{8}

The individualized nature of imperial emigration continued unabated into the early years of the twentieth century. Emigration became more organized in the 1880's, when it emerged as one of the preferred solutions to the social problems identified by reformers such as Charles Booth of the Salvation Army.\textsuperscript{9} Thomas Barnardo's child emigration scheme and the East End Emigration Fund were the most successful, or at least visible, such endeavours. It was the rupture of the South African War, though, especially the controversy it engendered concerning the physical and moral unpreparedness of the British people, which led to the re-emergence of assisted emigration. Fears of declining "national efficiency" were manifest in the social imperialism expressed by individuals as varied as Joseph Chamberlain, Sir Alfred Milner\textsuperscript{10}, the "protectionist" economist William Cunningham, and others who advocated instilling imperial patriotism in the working classes through social welfare measures.\textsuperscript{11} Assisted emigration sponsors joined the ranks of tariff reformers, army reformers, and supporters of national insurance, in order to convince British workers that Empire, rather than socialism, was the system that offered them the greatest rewards. The majority of assisted emigration schemes of the pre-1919 era were privately organized. The British government still preferred to stay out of the emigration business. John Burns, the President of the Local Government Board, explained to


\textsuperscript{9} The Salvation Army was founded by Booth in 1878.

\textsuperscript{10} Milner worked closely with Booth and others at Toynbee Hall in the 1880's. Milner was a Liberal in that decade, and interested in issues of social reform.

the 1907 Imperial Conference that direct state involvement in emigration would necessitate choosing between colonies as preferred destinations, a measure counterproductive to imperial harmony. The government furthermore believed that charitable organizations could better administer such schemes. The rate of emigration remained satisfactory in London’s eyes.\textsuperscript{12} Indeed, the annual flow of outward passengers reached a historic apex in 1910-12, averaging 440,014 emigrants per year for this three-year period.\textsuperscript{13}

Yet there was growing concern among emigration advocates that the official neglect of imperial emigration could compromise the strength and efficiency of the British Empire. This was a particularly compelling argument in the heightened environment of pre-1914 international and imperial competition. Great Britain’s industrial and financial dominance on the world stage was being eroded by the burgeoning economies of Germany and the United States. One aspect of this comparative decline was that an increasing number of British emigrants were choosing the United States, rather than the British Empire, as their new home.

\textit{The Binary Nature of Imperial Emigration}

\textsuperscript{12} Williams, p. 29. John Burns addressed the Colonial Conference on 25 April, 1907. See the minutes of the 1907 Conference in \textit{The Colonial and Imperial Conferences from 1887 to 1937, Vol I.}, Maurice Ollivier ed. (Ottawa: 1954), pp. 257-258.

This environment of imperial concern led to differences of opinion between London and the Dominions regarding the role of assisted emigration. There were two paradoxes which characterized imperial emigration in the decades preceding the Great War, and at the centre of each was the nature of imperial citizenship as understood by the participating parties. These paradoxes were: a colonial desire for autonomy tempered by a lingering sense of imperial dependence; and colonial cultural allegiance to the United Kingdom challenged by burgeoning colonial nationalism. It was within this framework that Sedgwick and other advocates of assisted emigration operated.

Intra-imperial immigration was characterized by the tension between colonial desires to control the nature of immigration, and practical colonial needs dictated by economic and social conditions necessitating a continued dependence on the imperial government. This tension manifested itself in a different manner in the various settlement colonies, but was caused by similar factors. First was a colonial desire to dictate immigration policy, and specifically the type of acceptable immigrant. In the Antipodes, and to a lesser degree in Canada, the desire to attract the “proper” type of immigrant meant Anglo-Saxons while non-British immigrants, largely Asians, were to be rejected. The theme of colonial selectivity in immigration policy was

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14 The term “colonial” here denotes what after 1907 were referred to as the Dominions. There were emigration schemes which sought to colonize the dependencies, but these by and large came to little. See for instance the British East Africa Corporation’s unsuccessful scheme to settle British emigrants in Britain’s East African Protectorate. Major E. H. Leggett, “Colonization on the Equator” (British East African Corporation: undated [probably 1912/1913]). SP 2/53/353, LRCS.
a constant topic of analysis in both the metropolitan and colonial press.\textsuperscript{15} The colonies also demanded an active role in the screening of applicants and in the administration of the emigration schemes.\textsuperscript{16} Many colonial jurisdictions had moved aggressively into immigration issues, drafting policies on acceptable immigrants, and placing demands on agents such as Sedgwick who proposed to assist Britons to their shores. In South Australia, for example, the government passed the following regulations regarding prospective immigrants: the immigrants must be nominated by a current citizen; they must be rural or agricultural workers; they must not move to "congested" areas; the nominees must help contribute to the price of their passage; they must settle on the land; and they must be under fifty years of age.\textsuperscript{17} The government of Victoria was even more specific in its desires, advertising only for male artisans and female textile machinists, brush makers, tie and scarf makers, and shirt and pyjama makers. Victoria also offered assisted emigration for this limited pool of prospective emigrants, which is more than "closed" territories such as Queensland did.\textsuperscript{18}

While the settlement colonies demanded immigrants of an acceptable professional and social nature, they were hampered in their selectivity by practical needs and the sometimes countervailing interests of the imperial government. The most glaring practical need was, of course, demographic. The colonies may have preferred certain types of immigrants, but as

\textsuperscript{15} See for instance The Morning Post, 16 September, 1911 or The Dominion, 9 July, 1910.  

\textsuperscript{16} "Proceedings of Conference on Immigration," Royal Colonial Institute, 30-31 May, 1910. SP 1/40/108, LRCS.

\textsuperscript{17} "Assisted Immigration Regulations, South Australia." SP 1/42/123, LRCS.  

\textsuperscript{18} Government of Victoria Emigration Form of Application. SP 1/44/128, LRCS.
developing economies and democracies, what they needed above all was simply bodies. Only Canada had nearby, in the United States, a viable alternative to Britain from which to attract potential immigrants. Population density in the colonies was strikingly low, and natural growth did not come close to meeting the need for increased population. Thus, while public rhetoric and public policy might cause one to see the settlement colonies as restrictive and even closed, they were in fact out of necessity open to immigration, Asian immigration included. Representative of this dichotomy was the British Immigration League of Australia. Its Sydney branch advised its subscribers that while Australia was a prosperous nation, it was also a small nation among large ones, with a scant population of only 4.5 million people occupying 3 million square miles. In advocating increased emigration to Australia, the League employed the citizenship argument that “[t]erritories must belong to those who can fill them up.”19 The organization adhered to the notion of “Democratic Imperialism”, and framed its mission of attracting immigrants of British background in terms both patriotic (and thus national) and imperial (and thus extra-national):

> [t]he need for population in Australia is universally admitted, but the number of people who will personally exert themselves on behalf of the immigrant is, to put it mildly, insignificant. This is undoubtedly our greatest weakness, as compared to Canada and the United States, where it is hardly too much to say that every citizen recognizes a direct and personal duty in helping the newcomer to establish himself in his adopted country. This is a spirit of patriotism which it must be admitted we have not got, and any organization that endeavours to encourage it is well worth sympathy and support.20

Citizenship is here conceived of as a duty, a responsibility, to the collective, the nation. Though citizenship is imbued with patriotism, drawing upon sentiment and emotion, it is at its base a

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19 “Stop! Look! Listen!,” publication of the British Immigration League, Sydney, 1911. SP 1/45/134, LRCS.

20 *Sydney Morning Herald*, 16 November, 1911.
practical matter - here concerned with the growth of the nation through immigration. The colonies desired to organize their own immigration affairs, vigorously pursuing policies of autonomy, yet they remained dependent on Great Britain to supply the actual immigrants out of an expressed preference for immigrants of Anglo-Saxon "stock."

In Australia there were many colonial citizens sympathetic to this message, with innumerable organizations, formal and informal, engaged in attracting immigrants to that country. Some, such as MP Richard Arthur, endorsed Sedgwick’s ideas concerning emigration of urban youth from England.\textsuperscript{21} Other voices, such as the operators of the Dreadnaught fund, worked directly with agents in London to bring young settlers to Australia.\textsuperscript{22} Many of these groups, though, encountered the same problems which hampered Sedgwick, especially the inability of many boys to raise enough money to acquire even the documentation (such as a birth certificate) necessary to establish them as acceptable emigrants. The cost of assisted passage to the Antipodes, while decreasing rapidly, also posed a stumbling block for both the potential emigrant and the colonial government’s treasury. The rates for a third class passage from Britain to South Australia in 1911, for instance, were from £15 to £21 via the Suez Canal (a quicker but largely commercial route), and from £16 to £30 via the Cape of Good Hope (which remained in this period the preferred passenger route).\textsuperscript{23} Additionally, though the journey time from Britain

\footnote{21 Undated clipping of letter to the \textit{Daily Telegraph}. SP 2/41/131, LRCS. Arthur also solicited funds for the Millions Club, which raised passage fares for child emigrants.}

\footnote{22 \textit{Sydney Daily Telegraph}, 31 December, 1912. The Dreadnaught fund worked with the Central Unemployed Body in London to select and provide assisted passage to Australia to young unemployed boys.}

\footnote{23 "Assisted Immigration Regulations, South Australia."}
to southern Australia had declined from approximately three months in 1852 to just under one month by 1904, many emigrants were still daunted by the distance, both physical and mental.\textsuperscript{24}

Lower cost and shorter distance were the primary reasons that Canada remained a popular destination for emigrants in this era. In 1910, a third class fare from England to Toronto cost £7.8.9, while the same fare from England to Victoria was £14.5.3. The passage from England to eastern Canada took only about a week, the Empress of the Atlantic line advertising that its Liverpool to Quebec City run spent only four days on the open sea.\textsuperscript{25} Britain’s North American outpost was viewed in Britain as the most developed of the settlement colonies. Laurier’s boast that “I think we can claim that it is Canada that shall fill the twentieth century”\textsuperscript{26} epitomized the confidence and sense of opportunity invoked by the term “Canada.” At the same time, the colony’s reputation as a barren wasteland was in the process of being altered by Canadian Minister of the Interior Clifford Sifton’s vigorous expansion of the Western territories. Canada, like Australia and New Zealand, was also actively recruiting new citizens from the mother country. This combined sense of expansionist idealism and practical necessity was captured in a letter in 1912 to the Standard of Empire by Arthur Hawkes, a Canadian immigration advocate. Hawkes wrote that immigration was “the living epistle of the only political religion that can preserve British unity throughout the world.” Warming to his topic, he commented on the


\textsuperscript{25} “Work and Wages in Canada,” Canadian Pacific pamphlet, May, 1910. SP 1/47/143, LRCS.

\textsuperscript{26} Laurier speech, 18 January, 1904. On Laurier and the expansion of Canada, both economically and demographically, see O. D. Skelton, The Life and Letter of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Vol. II (Toronto: 1971 [1922]).
interconnectedness of imperial immigration: “Rachel said, ‘Give me children or I die.’ The Canadian state says, ‘Give me people so that I may meet my obligations.’ The British state says, ‘Give my people room, or they perish from overcrowding.”’

Thomas Sedgwick shared the sense of religious purpose voiced by Hawkes. Sedgwick’s ventures serve to illustrate both the hopes and, more significantly, the practical problems of the assisted emigration “solution.” It is to Sedgwick and his assisted emigration endeavours that the chapter now turns.

*Thomas Sedgwick’s Assisted Emigration Schemes*

Little is known about Thomas Sedgwick himself. Indeed, he is recorded by the preeminent historian of imperial migration, Stephen Constantine, as only a “minor philanthropist,” and indeed his role in imperial history is a small one. He is a significant figure, nonetheless, in that he is an example of those who attempted to give shape to the ideas of men such as Curtis and Buchan. Sedgwick was an active participant in Empire, representative of the sizable brigade of men and women who sought to give Empire practical form. He attempted to apply, intuitively, the principles, thoughts, and sentiments of imperialism voiced by writers and intellectuals such as Curtis and White, Buchan and Jebb. His chosen task was to construct an imperial citizenship in concrete terms, a task he pursued by involving himself in the emigration business.

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Sedgwick, born in 1874\textsuperscript{29}, was a social worker, one of the legions of progressive men and women who devoted themselves to alleviating, as best they could, the social and economic inequities of the period. He served briefly as an official of the Cape Colony in London, and this may be how his interest in imperial emigration began. Sedgwick lived and laboured for most of his life in the borough of Poplar, in the East End of London. The experience of working with the poor seems to have affected those involved in two distinct ways. Some became advocates of social reform, convinced that the route to a more just society lay through economic redistribution and the improvement of the physical and mental environment of the poor. The work of the Bosanquets and the Salvation Army, the Fabians, and later the New Liberals and the Labour Party, embodied the conviction that social engineering was both possible and desirable.\textsuperscript{30} Collective effort would produce collective gain. Others, notably the Charitable Organisation Society, continued to adhere to the mid-Victorian creed of self-help.\textsuperscript{31} The spirit of Samuel Smiles and Thomas Arnold had bequeathed a faith in character and self-reliance that still resonated. Self-improvement was best attained through inner improvement, which had the added benefit of discharging society of further relief responsibilities. The reduction of the Poor Law roles was of particular interest to advocates of the “national efficiency”. Sedgwick was an

\textsuperscript{29} See Sedgwick - Canon Gibson Smith, 31 January, 1911. SP 1/11/31, LRCS.


\textsuperscript{31} Asa Briggs’s \textit{Victorian People} (Oxford, 1954) remains a comprehensive study of the mid-Victorian period of “Equipoise,” despite the fact that the eponymous focus on individuals belies the influence of more abstract social forces, most notably religion. K. Theodore Hoppen, \textit{The Mid-Victorian Generation, 1846-1886} (London: 1997) has challenged the “equipoise” thesis.
advocate of the latter ideal, and he brought to his work in assisted emigration the mission of improving the nation’s moral and physical ardour.

Imigration advocates such as Sedgwick drew a distinction between imperial “emigration” and imperial “migration.” In a speech delivered at Hawkes Bay, New Zealand, Sedgwick told his audience that he considered himself a proponent of imperial “migration,” rather than imperial “emigration,” arguing that to move from Britain to New Zealand was no different than to move from Cornwall to Cumberland. Thus, Sedgwick argued that “migration” constituted movement within the Empire, while “emigration” denoted movement to regions outside of the Empire. While Sedgwick himself used the term “emigration” when referring to his plans, he understood this term to mean “migration.”

One category of immigrant especially sought by the colonies in the late-Victorian period was that of children and adolescents. Child emigrants were referred to by emigration advocates as “bricks of Empire building,” as they represented an investment in the imperial future. Sedgwick was one such advocate. Thomas Sedgwick saw in assisted child emigration the answer to three contemporary concerns. First, it would help relieve the socio-economic stresses

32 *Daily Telegraph* (Hawkes Bay), 8 March, 1911. Clipping in SP 1/20/54, LRCS.

33 Such movement has elsewhere in this dissertation been referred to as “imperial immigration.”


under which Britain herself was suffering, specifically over-crowding and poor national health.\footnote{Sedgwick, \textit{New Zealand Times}, 8 February, 1911.} Indeed, the city of London grew by an average of almost a million people per decade between 1861 and 1911. By the latter date, there were as many people resident in the imperial capital as lived in Canada.\footnote{London grew from a population of 3,222,270 in 1861 to a population of 7,251,358 in 1911. Canada’s population in 1911 was 7,205,000. See the \textit{Spectator}, 110, 31 May, 1913, pp. 912.}

Second, Sedgwick believed assisted emigration would invigorate the Empire, strengthening the cultural bonds which he believed were central to maintaining imperial unity, providing much needed labour to growing colonial economies, and simultaneously providing Britain with an ever larger market for her finished products.

Third, he assumed that those emigrating to the colonies were not currently contributors to the British economy, or else such emigration would not harm the British economy, or at best simply represent a redistribution of people.\footnote{This idea gained adherents in the 1900's, and was a perennial theme of discussion in the non-government institutions of Empire, such as the Royal Colonial Institute. See for instance William Pearson, “Canadian Colonisation: A Suggestion,” \textit{United Empire}, 1, 8 , August 1910, p. 561.} The idea that opportunity was to found in the colonies was especially attractive to those Britons who felt the class system ingrained in British society ordained a life bereft of social mobility. Such frustration was not confined to the poorest classes. Those at the bottom of the professional ladder, the newly emergent class of clerks, were particularly attracted by the idea of emigration. The protagonist in Shan F. Bullock's \textit{Robert Thorne: The Story of a London Clerk} (1907) articulates this dream. He emigrates to New
Zealand in the hope of creating a life where his children have "a chance of being something better than typists and clerks." \(^{39}\)

Sedgwick sought to provide such opportunity, especially to those with potential who faced a limited future in Britain. At the heart of Sedgwick’s scheme was the notion that emigration would aid those currently on relief who represented a cost to Britain’s economy. As such, he aimed to attract young boys engaged in the sort of "blind-alley" jobs which Arnold White bemoaned, such as van-boys and golf caddies, or those who in fact had no vocation at all. The opportunity of emigration to the colonies, where they would become gainfully employed, would transform these boys into productive members of the imperial community. Previous emigration schemes had confined themselves either to paupers and the unemployed or to individuals who had sufficient capital to pay their own expenses. The novelty of Sedgwick’s plan was that it would provide passage for a heretofore largely ignored stratum of society.

Sedgwick began preparations for his first emigration project in 1910. He drafted the Scheme for the Emigration of Town Lads to Colonial Farms, naming himself Honorary Secretary. The Committee worked out of Toynbee Hall in the East End of London. Sedgwick settled upon New Zealand as the destination of the Committee’s emigration efforts. He selected New Zealand because he believed it was progressive, had a mild climate, and most closely resembled Britain in the temperament of its people.\(^{40}\) There was also a shortage of youth labour in the colonies, a situation most acute in New Zealand. Sedgwick calculated that New Zealand would require up to 1,000 boys per year as labour. He pointed out that boys were experienced in


\(^{40}\) *Wanganui Herald*, 18 March, 1911. Clipping in SP 1/21/57, LRCS.
housework, and would become “centres of immigration for their friends and families,” as well as future producers and defenders of Empire.\textsuperscript{41} Sedgwick had voyaged to Wellington earlier in the year and secured a promise from the New Zealand government that it would supervise the boys once they arrived. He was also able to negotiate a £10 passage for each boy, though he had to raise the money for the fares himself. Sedgwick recruited fifty boys, twenty-five each from London and Liverpool, to participate in the inaugural project.\textsuperscript{42} The boys ranged in age from sixteen to nineteen. Each lad had to pass a physical exam, and provide two character and fitness references.\textsuperscript{43} The cost of the project would be £600, covering fifty steamer fares plus £4 per boy for expenses. Upon returning to London, Sedgwick, in association with the Central Emigration Board, secured most of the necessary funds through private donations. New Zealand farmers and friendly societies also contributed a small amount to the project. Sedgwick had no pecuniary interest in the scheme itself.

The New Zealand Labour Department selected fifty farms, out of the two hundred which showed interest, to take in the boys. The young immigrants were offered the choice of labouring on sheep, cattle, or fruit farms. New Zealand’s Secretary of Labour was to be the authorized guardian of the boys, and administered the plan once they arrived from Britain. Each boy would be apprenticed for three years, or until he turned twenty-one. Sedgwick had negotiated a 5s weekly wage, as well as room and board. Most farmers, though, paid their new charges from

\textsuperscript{41} Spectator, 105, 27 August, 1910, p. 310.

\textsuperscript{42} Evening Post, 14 January, 1911; New Zealand Times, 10 January, 1911. Clipping in SP 1/6/17, LRCS.

\textsuperscript{43} Sedgwick, manuscript copy of “Notes on New Zealand Expedition, prepared for the 1911 Imperial Conference,” 3 March, 1911. SP 1/19/48, LRCS.
8-10s/week, the higher wage indicative of the country’s desperate need for labour. Each youth kept a wage book, checked periodically by a Department of Labour inspector, and interest was paid on deposits. The first £10 the boys earned was garnished to reimburse the original sponsors. After the initial sponsorship had been paid, Sedgwick estimated that each boy would have between £70 and £90 after three years. The Secretary of Labour would hold this money in trust until each boy reached the age of nineteen. The Secretary could cancel the indenture within fourteen days if any boy was found “guilty of such misconduct as would entitle an employer to dismiss a servant.”

Sedgwick believed the key to success in youth emigration was preparation. He stressed to his recruits before they departed the importance of hard work, and impressed upon them the necessity of honouring their pledge. Sedgwick and the first group of fifty boys left Britain together aboard a Shaw Savill and Albion Ltd. steamer, travelling third class. After a brief stopover at Cape Colony, they arrived in Wellington on 24 January, 1911. The boys passed the time en route playing deck sports, and, it appears, eating. Sedgwick records that each boy gained an average of ten pounds. His message in letters to the boys’ parents read “All Splendid.” In an interview with the New Zealand Times soon after the group landed in Wellington, Sedgwick argued that the very act of emigration was liberating: “it is a unique opportunity for them [the youth emigrants] to steady, shake off old associations and habits and develop in anticipation of

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45 Sedgwick - “K” [his sister], 20 January, 1911. SP 1/8/20, LRCS.
the new life in the Britain of the South." The boys left for their respective farms immediately upon arrival, with twenty-two going to farms on the south island, twenty-eight to the north island. Only three of the fifty were deemed by doctors to be in poor health.

Sedgwick recorded the impressions of several boys from the original scheme in an effort to raise funds for follow-up ventures. Some of the boys appreciated the common bonds which made New Zealand feel like home:

I am in as good a situation as a fellow could wish for. We have good food, and the people are all good Britishers.

Some were simply thankful for change:

I would much rather be out here than in the Old Country.

Others expressed their appreciation for opportunities and material comforts which were denied them in Britain:

The last five months I have been out here has seemed to be no longer than a Saturday night in the butcher’s shop I used to work in in the Old Country. As to food, why a man that is worth one thousand pounds cannot have any better than I got.

The scheme seemed a success from the boys’ perspective, and, indeed, only one of the fifty youths fled his farm to strike out on his own in the first month of the scheme’s operation.

Most of the farmers who received the boys also had favourable reviews of the project.

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46 Sedgwick interview, *New Zealand Times*, undated clipping [either late January or early February]. SP 1/7/19, LRCS.

47 *New Zealand Labour Department Journal*, 7 February 1911. SP 1/6/17, LRCS.

48 “Opinions of Some of the Lads on their situations,” Sedgwick manuscript notes. SP 1/34/88, LRCS.


Sedgwick toured the various farms which participated in the project, and pronounced the scheme a success. One farmer told him that “[t]he boy is acquitting himself well . . . his manner and obligingness are a perfect eye-opener to us colonials.” Another explained that his boy “is very intelligent and in every way promises to make a good citizen.” 51 There were some criticisms of the scheme, largely concerning the effectiveness of city youth as farm labourers. One farmer complained, in a letter to the periodical *Truth*, that farm owners deserved better quality labour, given that they had contributed a portion of the project’s budget. 52

Some outside critics complained that “the boys were the failures of the large cities in the Old Land,” 53 and would perform no useful service in the new country. The New Zealand press, however, was largely supportive of the scheme. The *Graphic* chastised local critics as “parochial,” while the *New Zealand Mail* supported Sedgwick’s scheme as “scientific,” and concluded it would be successful because, “youth is plastic, and can mould itself to its environment.” 54 The *New Zealand Times* reported that the boys had settled in without incident. 55 Sedgwick also spoke with local leaders in an effort to generate support for follow-up ventures. Arguing that the “immigration business” benefited everyone, he hoped either to persuade the shipping lines to offer reduced passages to future emigrants, or gain a pledge from the New Zealand government to fund a portion of the passage. He delivered the same message to various

51 “Opinions of Farmers Employing the Boys,” Sedgwick Notes. SP 1/32/84, LRCS.

52 “A Farmer,” *Truth*, undated clipping. SP 1/10/27, LRCS.

53 *Evening Post*, 2 February, 1911.

54 *Graphic*, 1 February, 1911; *New Zealand Mail*, 1 February, 1911.

55 *New Zealand Times*, 17 March, 1911.
branches of the New Zealand Farmers’s Union. He put the money he received for these appearances back into the scheme.

After he had completed his travels in New Zealand, Sedgwick drew six conclusions for the future success of youth emigration:

1) the attractions of life abroad should be downplayed to avoid attracting lazy emigrants,
2) supervision of the boys is essential,
3) government officials should perform supervisory roles,
4) the apprenticeship system is the ideal labour arrangement,
5) youths of fifteen to sixteen are the ideal age, as older boys find it harder to adapt to a new environment and were more independent,
6) friends should be separated to avoid problems.

He had also become convinced of the need for female emigration, derived from practical rather than philosophical motives: “many jobs on the farms can be neglected, but house work has to be done.” Sedgwick also used the language of race in advancing the case for female emigration, fearing the Empire could face “race suicide” if more women were not brought to the Antipodes. In this regard he shared much of Arnold White’s view of Empire. The parochial nature of this view, though, was tempered by Sedgwick’s philanthropic outlook. He thought of attracting female orphans, widows, and poorly paid “respectable” workers as imperial emigrants, underemployed labour which might bloom in sunnier economic climates.

Sedgwick returned to England on the steamer “Ionic” in June of 1911 to begin

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56 Sedgwick, “Resume as to Progress of the Scheme,” 6 May, 1911. LRCS SP 1/36/96.
57 Ibid.
preparations for the next group of migrants. Despite the fact that he had failed to secure a promise of future funding from the New Zealand government,\textsuperscript{58} he was in high spirits, even promising to pay for the first triple wedding among Sedgwick settlers. In a farewell letter to the original group of boys, he imparted what he termed his personal creeds: "Live cleanly in thought, word and deed: purity and contentment are the sources of happiness," "Read all you can, especially the Bible, the handbook of life," and "Always buck-up - like the runner who dug pins into himself to keep up."\textsuperscript{59} His was a mind shaped by the mid-Victorian evangelical spirit of industry, doggedness, and honour - in short, "character."\textsuperscript{60} Such aphorisms also testified to a distinct lack of self-doubt on his part. Sedgwick was a conventional man of his age. His inability to distinguish between what was imaginable and what was practical contributed to the ultimate failure of his programme. The New Zealand scheme turned out to be the high-water mark of his work, as he was unable to later duplicate even the small-scale successes it enjoyed. Before sailing for England, Sedgwick stopped briefly in Australia to survey the state of emigration in that colony. He was similarly unable to secure any funding for assisted passage from Australian authorities.

Once back in Britain, Sedgwick set about canvassing for a follow-up group of boys to send to New Zealand. He also began to contemplate a Canadian scheme. Touring church halls

\textsuperscript{58} The New Zealand government wished to revisit the scheme after twelve months to assess its merit, and reserved judgement on assisted passage until that point.

\textsuperscript{59} Sedgwick - boys, 17 June, 1911. SP 1/41/111, LRCS.

in London’s East End, he propagated his arguments on the significance of assisted emigration for the future health of the Empire.\(^{61}\) He also travelled widely throughout England, spreading information about his schemes to prospective youths.\(^{62}\) He exhibited slides and lectured on living conditions in the colonies. One meeting, at Stepney Central Hall, attracted an estimated crowd of 1,500.\(^{63}\) This meeting carried additional emotional value due to the presence of several “Titanic orphans.” Sedgwick made much use of the “Titanic” metaphor to illustrate the tragic nature of life in London’s East End districts, as the disaster was still fresh in the public’s consciousness. Such meetings also conveyed a message to the colonies themselves. Sedgwick intended to illustrate the great reserve of available labour ready for export.

Sedgwick chose the Canadian province of Ontario as the destination for his second major emigration scheme. Unlike the New Zealand plan, though, the Ontario plan was a failure, and marked the effective end of Sedgwick’s influence in emigration circles. Canada had long been the favoured destination for British emigrants. It was the closest colony to Europe, and thus provided the cheapest passage. Land was readily available, and the country’s proximity to the United States offered markets and opportunities which were not present in Australasia. Canada’s role as the preeminent destination for British immigrants began to wane, however, towards the

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\(^{61}\) See for instance his Speech at the Socialist Hall, St. George St., 22 February, 1912. SP 1/72/256, LRCS.

\(^{62}\) The issue of providing emigrants with information on their prospective new homes held the attention of the press until the outbreak of war, with regular reports on initiatives such as that proposed by Sedgwick. See for example The Times, 30 December, 1912, the Daily Mirror, 6, January, 1913, and the Morning Post, 12 March, 1913.

\(^{63}\) Untitled notes. SP 1/9/51, LRCS. See also a report on the meeting in the Morning Post, 1 March, 1912.
turn of the century. The more hospitable climates of coastal Australia and New Zealand drew increasing numbers of immigrants, and shorter and more affordable steamship travel made longer journeys more attractive. Sedgwick thus believed Canada would have to adopt a more active role in emigration. He suggested the Canadian government harmonize federal and provincial immigration policies and methods, and introduce greater flexibility in regard to the types of immigrants granted entry.64 Sedgwick, though, like Richard Jebb before him, failed to understand the Canadian federal system. His Ontario scheme failed in part because he tried to negotiate the specifics of the scheme with local authorities, but lobbied the Canadian government for institutional aid.

His discussions with the Canadian government centred on the suitability of reformatory children as immigrants. The Emigration Branch of the Canadian Department of the Interior informed him that Canada only accepted such cases on an exceptional basis, usually refusing reformatory children on moral grounds.65 His solicitors in England had informed him that he could use boys for his scheme under two conditions: first, where there are no parents, and a guardian had not been appointed by the state; and second, where the parents were “no good,” and no longer retained custody under the custody of Children Act.66 Canadian farmers needed labourers, though, and Sedgwick found Ontario provincial authorities receptive to his idea.67

64 Sedgwick, “Notes for Conference on January 10, 1912.” SP 1/54/191, LRCS.

65 Department of the Interior, Emigration Branch - Sedgwick, 31 January, 1912. SP 1/73/263, LRCS. For more on Canadian immigration policy, and colonial immigration policy in general, see Chapter IV.

66 Hermann H. Myer & Co. - Sedgwick, 14 December, 1911. SP 1/72/256, LRCS.

67 H. A. MacDonnel - “Farmers of Ontario,” undated. SP 2/35/242, LRCS.
With the aid of a minor provincial official named Farrell, he organized his second major emigration endeavour. Sedgwick accompanied a group of fifty boys to Ontario, arriving in Canadian waters on Dominion Day, 1912. Upon arrival in Toronto, the boys separated to venture to their final destinations. The scheme was organized in a similar manner to the New Zealand plan. Funds had been raised during Sedgwick’s lecturing tour, with the Canadian Department of Colonisation to reimburse sponsors. The boys had to repay their first £10/10 for their passage. The average age of the Canadian group of boys was younger than the two New Zealand groups, and most came from London.

Sedgwick corresponded with officials in British Columbia, but was unable to attract any interest in an assisted emigration scheme to the Pacific coast. The Ontario scheme also encountered difficulties. Most problematic for Sedgwick was the fact that the Canadian Department of Colonisation had been slow to return his investment, citing ambivalent reports on the quality of the boys’ labour. This made it difficult to continue fund-raising efforts in England, and jeopardized the possibility of future schemes. He also adopted a somewhat harder stance with the boys. Whereas in New Zealand Sedgwick had been a fatherly figure, he assumed a more stern demeanour with his second group. In a letter he sent to the boys in October, 1912, he informed them that he would publish a list of all successes and failures as an inducement to hard work. The heavy-handed message probably reflected his concern over criticism that youths

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68 *United Empire*, Vol. III (second series), 8, August 1912, p. 683; Super Intendant of Immigration, Ottawa - Sedgwick, 1 October, 1912. SP 2/29/193, LRCS.

69 Sedgwick to an unidentified Canadian farmer who had one of the scheme’s boys [no name given, perhaps because the two had corresponded often, as was Sedgwick’s custom], 4 March, 1913. SP 2/33/223, LRCS.
made poor immigrants. Indeed, he had received in February, 1912, reports from the New Zealand Department of Labour that ten of the fifty boys had now left their original farms.70 Most of the boys who took flight were over nineteen, and Sedgwick began to consider sending younger boys, on the premise that they were more impressionable and easier to discipline. He was also sensitive to cries that child emigration was itself a bad idea on humanitarian grounds. Several cases of neglect of child emigrants had been reported in Canada in the year preceding Sedgwick's arrival71, and despite the relative success of Dr. Barnardo's houses, public opinion was not on Sedgwick's side.

At the same time that the Canadian scheme was running aground, Sedgwick received the news from New Zealand that the government would not help finance future schemes.72 In its report on the first year of Sedgwick's scheme, the Department of Labour cited an attrition rate of 20%, and concluded that this constituted evidence that the scheme was a failure.73 Sedgwick maintained that 80% was still an acceptable success rate. He was at a loss, though, to offer productive suggestions for future improvement, instead resorting to stereotype to explain the

70 Department of Labour, New Zealand - Sedgwick, 19 February, 1912. SP 2/47/318, LRCS.

71 See for instance Saskatchewan's Carlyle Herald, 31 August, 1911, or the Regina Morning Leader, 25 August, 1911, on the alleged abuse suffered by one Rose Violet King.

72 See Sedgwick - W. J. Massey (New Zealand MP), undated but likely April 1913. SP 2/50/340, LRCS. Also Department of Labour, New Zealand - Sedgwick, 19 February, 1913. See above, note 50.

73 One-year report on Emigration Scheme of Thomas Sedgwick, New Zealand Department of Labour. The report is included in Department of Labour, New Zealand - Sedgwick, 22 March, 1912. SP 2/48/322, LRCS.
absconds' actions. Most of them, he observed, were Irish Liverpudlians.\textsuperscript{74}

A lack of funds and the lukewarm reception of Canadian authorities resulted in the relative failure of the Ontario scheme by the spring of 1913. Sedgwick lost touch with most of the boys, and was unable to secure either federal or provincial government funding for a follow-up scheme. He returned to England and continued to agitate for the assisted youth emigration, but his opportunity had passed. Though he laboured diligently, giving speeches and contributing frequently to the periodical press on the merits of his schemes, Sedgwick was unable to secure adequate funding to launch a third initiative. Furthermore, there was a public perception that the Empire itself was losing its attraction for emigrants. Indeed, by May of 1913, the Colonial Office reported that almost 40% of British emigrants were now sailing for non-imperial ports.\textsuperscript{75}

This represented a precipitous decline from even 1911, when the \textit{New Zealand Times} estimated that only 20% of British emigrants voyaged to non-imperial nations.\textsuperscript{76} These statistics were in fact inflated. Stephen Constantine records that the number of emigrants bound for imperial destinations was actually rising, going from 43.2\% of all British national passengers in 1900-04 to 68.2\% in 1915-19. Thus, the perception that the Empire was falling into disfavour was in contradiction to reality, reflecting the heightened concern for imperial unity, especially in the face of economic and, in the case of Germany, military conflicts on the international stage.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{74} Sedgwick - Department of Labour, New Zealand, 3 May, 1912. SP 2/48/323, LRCS.

\textsuperscript{75} Colonial Office Journal, as noted in the \textit{Review of Reviews}, 47, May 1913, p. 482.

\textsuperscript{76} New Zealand Times, 15 June, 1911.

\textsuperscript{77} See Constantine, “Migrants and Settlers,” \textit{OHBE, IV}, pp. 167, Table 7.4. The discrepancy apparent in these numbers should not be overestimated. The compilation of destination statistics was notoriously difficult, not least because many emigrants were actually in transit, stopping over at one destination for a short time before leaving for another. Thus, for
When the guns of August signalled the beginning of the Great War, Sedgwick was forced to retreat to private life, the nation's concerns now redirected, as they had so often been before, to the Continent.

_Emigration or Migration?_

The clearest indication that late-Victorian and Edwardian imperialists understood immigration and citizenship to be largely separate issues, that they perceived no contradiction between supporting a national approach to immigration and advocating a broad imperial citizenship, is in their conception of assisted emigration as a domestic issue. Sedgwick is an appropriate example. In viewing intra-imperial immigration as imperial "migration," he conceived of British emigration to the colonies as a British issue. His concern was first and foremost to alleviate the problem of "excess population" in Britain herself. Hence, he conceived of the ideal migrants as those marginal to British society. In advocating the emigration of the poor and the destitute, Sedgwick revealed a vision of imperial citizenship which implicitly placed higher value on the interests of subjects resident in the mother country over those resident in the Empire. Sedgwick's arguments in support of child emigration have been noted. Sedgwick

example, Australia shows much higher numbers as an imperial destination than does New Zealand partially because many emigrants who eventually settled in New Zealand first stopped in Australia, often only to transfer to a different ship. The statistics do not capture such realities because they were in the main compiled in turn from port entry and departure statistics, and thus represent quite literally physical movements, not intended destinations.

78 See among other sources _Christchurch Press_, 23 March, 1911.
also encouraged the emigration of poor young women. In 1909, 43,546 more men emigrated to the colonies than did women. The difference increased to 67,619 in 1910. The gender discrepancy in emigration rates exacerbated the demographic imbalance in Britain, where there was a greater number of women to begin with. In 1913, the Committee for Junior Migration, a pro-emigration pressure group, recorded that there were 1,340,814 more women in Britain than men. This figure contrasted sharply with the dominions, where there were 759,624 more men than women. The Committee recommended that widows, waitresses, orphan girls, domestics, as well as young couples, should be encouraged to emigrate to the dominions. Sedgwick supported the emigration of “surplus” and “unattached” women, with the added condition that they should be urban women, a class of people whom he argued lived in conditions worse than those under which American slaves had suffered. He was largely unsuccessful in generating support for female emigration, not least because potential upper-class supporters did not favour the idea of recruiting as emigrants members of the “underclass.” Lady Selborne, for instance, did not support the Women’s Emigration Society as they did not attract “good” recruits. Such


81 “Female Migration,” anonymous pamphlet, Committee for Junior Migration. SP 2/17/107, LRCS.

82 “A Chance for the Girls,” p. 4. His rather naive assessment of American slaves was that they at least had “ample cottages, plenty of food and general kind treatment.”

83 Lady Selborne - Lionel Curtis, 13 October, 1916. Curtis Papers, MS 2/25207, Bodleian Library, Oxford University. The Women’s Emigration Society was one of the larger of a sizable community of female emigration bodies. Others included the Colonial Intelligence
differences illustrate the lack of a common ideal of imperial citizenship, and reinforce the notion that, understandably, imperial citizenship was largely conceived of by British imperial thinkers in terms of a domestic framework.

The efforts of imperial emigration advocates such as Sedgwick also suffered owing to the lack of cooperation between domestic aid groups. The British government’s Labour Exchanges, the Distress Committees, and the boards of Guardians offered little help to their charges. The Central Unemployment Body (CUB) for London, for instance, engaged in limited work ‘migrating’ unemployed young people to other regions of Britain. Their use of the term “migrate” is instructive here, implicitly challenging Sedgwick’s use of the term, and illustrating the philosophical divide within the aid society as to how best to address the issue of unemployment and emigration. The Central Body, in Sedgwick’s view, was unsuccessful because it could not attract charges of proper “character,” as evidenced by the fact that only £21,012 of the £126,924 spent on assisted passage schemes (both within and outside of Britain) was recovered from the emigrants and their sponsors for the year 1912-13. Furthermore, the CUB required each prospective boy migrant obtain a guarantor, which Sedgwick argued was a prohibitive obstacle for blind-alley youths. Finally, the CUB did not work with advocates, such as Sedgwick, who advocated emigration to the Empire. Other emigration agencies, such as the Boys’ Country Work Society and The Child Emigration Society, two of the larger child

League.


85 G. Bogue Smart, Report on British Immigrant Children and Receiving Homes, Canadian Department of the Interior, 1910, 1911. Kingsley Fairbridge, a Rhodes Scholar from
emigration bodies, also tended to operate as independents.

The lack of coordination between immigration organizations was in part due to Edwardian concerns over “national efficiency.” The aid agencies did not want to further contribute to the decline of Britain’s moral and physical capacity. Sedgwick offered another explanation for the charitable bodies’ disinterest in assisted emigration - they sought to perpetuate themselves. If the problem of overcrowding was solved, Sedgwick contended, then aid agencies such as the Boards of Guardians, which had the authority to remove some of their poorest charges, would be “improved” out of existence. He cited as evidence of this contention Earl Grey’s response to a question put to him the Dominions Royal Commission (a body which reported to the government on emigration to the dominions):

“Q 3,406 Chairman: ‘Why do they (the Guardians) exercise their powers so seldom?’

Earl Grey: ‘Well, I think it is more a question of ignorance. Sometimes improper motives came in. They do not like to get rid of the little patronage it gives them in keeping children within the area of their own jurisdiction.’”

It was not only private organizations that were ambivalent about aiding assisted emigration. Sedgwick was also unsuccessful in gaining for his “migration” schemes the assistance of the imperial government. “The Home Government,” Sedgwick wrote in a letter to the New Zealand boys in March 1913,

has never been Imperial, except in wartime, and the English people are Imperial mouthed and not Imperial minded. Consequently we have no Imperial Department of Migration, Trade, or Communication. If we do not get more Britishers in Canada and South Africa, they will no longer be British after the next few years, but will be American and Boer-

Australia, was the Honourary Secretary of the Child Emigration Society. The Society received small yearly donations from the Rhodes Trust before WWI.

86 Sedgwick, letter to the editor, Spectator, 111, 5 July, 1913, pp. 16-17.
While it is hard to imagine that the boys were particularly interested in their patron's perorations on imperial unity, Sedgwick was intoning here the mantra of emigration advocates of this era. He pushed unsuccessfully for the creation of an Imperial Migration Department which would oversee the movement of people throughout the Empire, but his lobbying came to nothing. He was also unable, as detailed previously, to secure further funding from either the New Zealand or Canadian governments to provide for future schemes. These failures were not, however, entirely deleterious to his endeavours. Though he actively sought the aid of government departments in his emigration endeavours, Sedgwick's personal efforts remained in the private sphere. He purposely avoided working directly under government control, as he believed bureaucratic emigration work would be dictated by short-term concerns. Independent work also offered other advantages: Sedgwick could write without the hand of a government superior on his shoulder.

The only organization which approximated Sedgwick's vision of an Empire united by sentiment and open to free migration was the Over-Seas Club, of which he became a subscriber. The Over-Seas Club was an ideal vehicle of imperial citizenship. Its creed was in effect a synthesis of the imperial citizenship ideas voiced by Curtis, Buchan, Sedgwick and others on the right: "[b]elieving the British Empire to stand for justice, freedom, order and good government,

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87 Sedgwick - New Zealand Boys, 28 March, 1913. SP 2/50/341, LRCS.

88 See Sedgwick - Reverend Canon Garland Brisbane, 2 February, 1911. SP 1/8/21, LRCS.

89 Fielding Star, 25 February, 1911. Clipping, SP 1/17/44, LRCS; undated clipping, Lyttleton Times. SP 1/31/80, LRCS.
we pledge ourselves, as citizens of the British Commonwealth of Nations, to maintain the heritage handed down to us by our fathers." The Club was founded by John Evelyn Wrench, who was inspired by Cecil Rhodes' privately disseminated idea to create a secret imperial society. Richard Jebb was the first Chairman of the Club's Central Committee. Wrench wanted to unite imperial interests, and bemoaned the multiplicity of imperial interest groups. This idea was first given shape during the 1909 Imperial Press Conference, a gathering of Empire press lords. In 1910 the Over-Seas Club came into being. It is a telling comment on the Club's raison d'être that one of the names rejected for it was "Citizens of Empire." The Club had 50,000 associates (members who wrote to express their support) in 1911, and its subscribers' list steadily increased throughout the 1910's. One difference stood out, though, marking Wrench's organization as separate from the Milnerian view of a centralized Empire - The Over-Seas Club disavowed federationism, and instead implicitly embraced Jebb's idea of association and alliance.

The Club sought to promote the "tremendous responsibilities incurred by citizenship of the British Commonwealth," and supported service and community work which had as their goal

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90 John Evelyn Wrench, *The Story of the Over-Seas League* (London: 1926), pp. 41, 43. The extended version of the creed sheds further light on the idea of imperial citizenship as the guardianship of a trust, with overtones of Freemasonry: "I believe in our glorious Empire of Free Peoples./ In the sacredness of our mission./ In the unselfishness of our aims./ In the ultimate triumph of our cause./ I believe in our great past./ And in a great future./ In the emptiness of riches./ And in the dignity of labour./ I believe in right thinking and pure living./ And in the inspirational power of women./ I believe in national re-birth./ In a new Empire and a new world./ I believe in the need of humbleness./ In the vision of the mountain-tops./ I believe in God's guidance in the days ahead./ I believe." *Ibid.*, p. 55.

the promotion of freedom. Members gave shape to these lofty goals by sharing information about their communities with fellow subjects around the Empire, and donating money to imperial causes. Common dedication to the shared participation in the latter activity led the Club on 31 March, 1918 to absorb the Patriotic League of Britons Overseas, a sister organization which also raised funds for the war effort. The new entity was known as the Over-Seas League. Ultimately, though, the Over-Seas League remained largely a cultural organization, exerting little influence on imperial policy. It was unable to coordinate its activities with government departments in either Britain or the colonies, and by the 1920's came to represent a form of imperial freemasonry, replete with lofty rhetoric but soft on concrete policy, including any involvement in imperial migration.

The failures of domestic aid agencies and the irrelevance of the Over-Seas Club as an agent of assisted emigration point to the absence of the sort of imperial sentiment Sedgwick hoped to foster, and furthermore the lack of a common citizenship ideal. Colonial nationalism, in its desire for an independent immigration policy, and the preference of the imperial government to maintain its laissez-faire approach to citizenship issues, conspired to doom Sedgwick’s vision of mass assisted “migration” within the imperial supra-state.

__Sentimental Citizenship__

92 Ibid., pp. 42, 45.

93 Ibid., p 39.
One of the ways Sedgwick sought to redress the contradictions between the colonies’ desire for autonomy in the field of immigration and their continued reliance on the mother country to actually supply immigrants was by developing the sentiments of a shared imperial citizenship. By “sentiments,” Sedgwick meant a shared knowledge of and concern for the other peoples of the Empire. Despite the omnipresence of immigration advocates in the British and colonial presses in the two decades preceding World War I, there were voices who opposed solving Britain’s social problems by contributing to the demographic growth of the colonies. Similarly, there were imperialists in the Dominions who were cautious as to the value of immigration in building their societies. In the words of Sedgwick’s Canadian contemporary, the humourist and imperialist Stephen Leacock, “[y]ou cannot make a nation by holding a basket at the hopper of an immigration chute.”94 Imperial citizens, in other words, were not merely units to be shifted about on a ledger. Sedgwick himself came to place greater stress upon mutually shared imperial sentiments in response to the lukewarm success of his two youth emigration ventures.

In a letter to Lord Strathcona in March, 1912, Sedgwick complained that the British schools which he had visited in the course of spreading information about his emigration schemes rarely displayed pictures or artifacts of the colonies. Most had only imported German rural landscapes.95 Many colonists maintained an affection for an England which had largely ceased to exist, remembering the favoured aspects of English life, often forgetting the less

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95 Sedgwick - Lord Strathcona, 13 March, 1912. SP 2/5/28, LRCS.
pleasant. Britons, mixing together contempt, paternal aloofness, and gentle regard, held a view of colonial life as rustic yet idyllic, déclassé yet imbued with opportunity - in short, a place to send one’s sons to, though perhaps not the first-born. The sentimental relationship between mother country and Dominion was an unequal one.

Sedgwick shared these concerns with Jebb, who, as we have seen in the previous chapter, believed that imperial sentiment was an integral component of a successful imperial relationship. Writing to the author of Studies in Colonial Nationalism, Sedgwick complained that not only were pictures of the colonies absent from British schools, but one could not find in the shops postcards or cheap books on the Empire’s history and lore. British adults, he continued, were ignorant of the Empire as well. His complaint was that there existed little reliable information on the colonies. There was certainly no lack of mass produced imperial ephemera at this time, though he found most of it lacking. Popular dramas on Empire were misleading. He was particularly exercised, for instance, by scenes of Indian scalpings. Popular lectures and exhibits on imperial topics were rare, there were few books by colonial authors in public libraries, and there was a general disregard for news from the colonies in the British press. Knowledge of the Empire was, he observed, much more plentiful in the Dominions. Sedgwick thus suggested that the colonies could send to Britain pictures, films, and lantern slides which showed attractive

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96 Colonial subjects did not hold only favourable opinions of Britain, of course. Many rejected the overt British class structure, and were particularly leery about accepting poor children for fear of replicating some of the social ills they had left behind. See for instance Sedgwick, “Evidence on the migration to colonial farms of boys from reformatories and industrial schools, to be tendered to the Department committee.” SP 1/73/261, LRCS.
aspects of colonial life and geography. His appeals produced a ready response, with offers of slides, pictures, and other visual material pouring in from almost every colony.

Sedgwick’s concerns were reflective of the concern amongst the intellectual and political elite that substantive matters of Empire were largely ignored by the British people. The wild celebration of the relief of the siege of Mafeking, or strong sales of Pears soap wrapped in packaging emblazoned with imperial motifs, might indicate that the Empire was not entirely a matter of neglect amongst the population. However, quiet desperation voiced by the social...

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97 Sedgwick - Jebb, 7 March, 1912. SP 2/6/33, LRCS. In commenting upon Britons’ knowledge of the Empire, Sedgwick was here anticipating one of the more popular lines of analysis in recent imperial historiography. For varying perspectives on this issue, see John MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire (Manchester: 1984), the essays in MacKenzie, ed. Imperialism and Popular Culture (Manchester: 1986), and Anne McClintock, Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Context (London: 1995).

98 London County Council - Sedgwick, 22 February, 1912. SP 2/7/34, LRCS.

99 It is a faulty syllogism, however, to conclude from the omnipresence of soap packages and matchboxes festooned with images of aboriginals or polar bears that Britons were, ergo, eager supporters of the imperial endeavour. Advertising and knick-knackery were not necessarily manifestations of public interest in Empire, but rather, manifestations of commercialism and the attribution by advertisers and businessmen of wants and beliefs to generate demand for a product. Jonathon Schneer argues that “[i]t was impossible, in turn-of-the-century London, to avoid the imperial subtext,” and points to the fact that Britons “elected” (emphasis in original) to partake of “museums, exhibitions, music halls, nigger minstrelsy, the Regent’s Park zoo, and the Sherlock Holmes stories” as evidence that they acquiesced in the imperial message.

Perhaps. It is equally plausible that such activities were popular for their artistic value, their price, or because they were the only available diversion. For instance, the consumer may have been interested in seeing a tiger at the zoo because it was a tiger (and thus foreign in the sense of being outside of the ordinary), not because it was a tiger brought from imperial India by peoples subject to the crown and culturally inferior to the British people. It is difficult to draw conclusions about the motivations of British consumers, as there exists a yawning lack of evidence concerning their thoughts and intents. What does seem clear is that it is a mistake to deduce, ex ante, the mentality of the consumer by studying the intent of the provider - this is to commit the mistake of taking advertising at its word. See Schneer, London 1900: The Imperial Metropolis (New Haven: 1999), pp. 93, 114, 113.
imperialists\textsuperscript{100} indicates that the task of fostering a sense of sentimental imperial solidarity must perforce confront a public that thought of the Empire as, to paraphrase Neville Chamberlain’s words before Munich, “a far-away place made up of people of whom we know nothing.”\textsuperscript{101} It is instructive that the concern for generating a sentimental attachment between Briton and colonial, in other words a sentimental citizenship, was held primarily by those imperial advocates who had travelled widely throughout the Empire.

The divide which existed between colonial and British views of the sentimental imperial relationship was complicated by ideas of race. In discussing sentimental citizenship, contemporary imperial thinkers largely ignored this issue, a lacuna certainly not present in later historians’ work on the issue. How to explain this omission? When contemporary thinkers did address the issue of race, it was from competing perspectives of insularity and cosmopolitanism. As has been argued in previous chapters, the language of race was employed inconsistently across the Empire. Sometimes racial language was employed to express colonial-national and imperial identities of culture and character; at other times it was employed to stigmatize and exclude groups viewed as threats, implicit or explicit, to an ordered and homogeneous society. The malleable usage of the term “race” was not confined to the white Empire. This may be seen in the response proffered by politically active subjects in the dependent Empire to ideals of imperial citizenship.

\textsuperscript{100} See above, p. 264.

\textsuperscript{101} In a broadcast to the country on 27 September, 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain described the Czechoslovakian crisis as “a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing.” See Keith Feiling, \textit{Neville Chamberlain} (London: 1946), p. 372.
A representative example of such a response is to be found in the periodical *The Indian Emigrant*, an Indian-published bimonthly newspaper which advocated equal citizenship rights throughout the Empire, and also lobbied for the interests of Indians living abroad. The paper implicitly endorsed the vision of Empire put forth by conservative thinkers such as Curtis, arguing that Empire was an institution of peace, where different people have proved capable of living together. It was “a half-way house between nationalism and cosmopolitanism.”

India’s inclusion in the 1917 Imperial Conference, though as an observer rather than a voting delegation, was seen by Indian imperialists as a positive step. Sir Satyendra Sinha, India’s spokesman at the Conference, proposed a three-pronged revision to imperial immigration regulations. He suggested that Indians domiciled in the Dominions be allowed to bring out their wives, that Indians at least be treated on equal grounds with other Asians, and that if exclusionary practices were to be exercised, India should be allowed to do the same.

Other colonial voices expressed their support for imperial citizenship as part of their campaign for greater equality. The *Jamaica Times*, for instance, registered its frustration with Canada’s policy of restricting West Indian immigration, and editorialized that an imperial community based upon insular attitudes and commercial concerns was doomed to failure: “[i]mperialism that confines itself to commerce and that is frigid in sentiment is one of those sordid bonds that wrecked the roseate hopes of the late

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102 *The Indian Emigrant*, 111, 12, July-August, 1917, p. 205.

103 “Memorandum on Indian Emigration,” as presented by Indian representatives at the Imperial War Conference, 27 April, 1917; reprinted in *The Indian Emigrant*, 111, 12, July-August, 1917, pp. 212-215. See also Singh’s contribution to debate at the Conference, 27 April, 1917, and Resolution IX, “Note on Emigration from India to the Self-Governing Colonies,” written by the India Office, 22 March, 1917. *Imperial War Conference, 1917, Extracts from Minutes of Proceedings and Papers Laid before the Conference*, Cd. 8566, pp. 117-120. For more detailed information of imperial immigration policy, see Chapter V.
Mr. Joseph Chamberlain.”

Not all dependent subjects, of course, voiced conditional support for Empire as long as it promised reform. Indian nationalists especially were uncomfortable with the imperial relationship as it then stood. Some argued that the solution to growing tensions between Indian nationalists and the white Empire was to grant the subcontinent self-rule and full British citizenship, so that India could negotiate divisive issues with the Dominions as an equal. After Amritsar (1919), many Indian spokesmen renounced Empire in toto, and agitated for independence.

Nor were all British observers innocent of invoking the issue of race. Many British opponents of assisted emigration used xenophobic language, betraying a world-view of which Arnold White would have approved. An anonymous letter writer sent Sedgwick the following missive, aptly summarizing this view:

Sir, before you arrange for Englishmen to leave England for the Colonies, please see that Jews return to Palestine and other foreigners to their own countries; after that Irishmen to Ireland, Welshmen to Wales and Scots to Scotland. Then when much ground is cleared of undesirables, we shall find that Englishmen will be able to obtain work and their sons can be recruited for England’s army and navy services.

Neither, though, should these attitudes be overemphasized, and indeed the above letter writer’s decision not to sign his letter to Sedgwick indicates that such views were by this point decidedly beyond the pale.

In the main, these debates on race went largely unnoticed by British emigration.

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104 Jamaica Times, 1 August, 1916.


106 ‘An Englishman’ - Sedgwick, undated letter. SP 3/7/41, LRCS.
advocates. Men such as Sedgwick were attentive to commonalities, not differences, and thus tended to ignore those factors which differentiated the colonies and dependencies from Britain. Even those imperial actors who were attentive to issues of colonial nationalism and imperial sentiment found it difficult to see how India, in particular, could be easily incorporated into an imperial citizenship which was based upon British ideas of politics and culture. Richard Jebb had observed this difficulty, arguing that India could not be accepted into the imperial family proper on equal terms. He hoped that through his proposed system of Britannic Alliance\textsuperscript{107} India would enjoy the autonomy to set her own immigration policy, thus attaining equality of purpose, if not treatment, throughout the Empire. Jebb advanced an essentialist position, writing that

with their [Indians'] own immemorial civilization, traditions, and indigenous ideals, all essentially non-European, and with their widely different standard of living, all of which differentiates the Indian peoples from the Britannic, a free exchange of population is not easy to contemplate.\textsuperscript{108}

Contemporaries thus saw imperial immigration and the suitability of subject peoples for imperial citizenship as two separate, if sometimes overlapping, issues.

\textit{Conclusion}

Thomas Sedgwick was a utopian, seeing in assisted emigration the solution to a wide variety of imperial problems. He had visions of eventually sending up to 50,000 boys to New Zealand, with their families following their paths.\textsuperscript{109} In the line of British utopians such as

\begin{itemize}
\item [\textsuperscript{107}] See Chapter IV.
\item [\textsuperscript{108}] Jebb, \textit{Britannic Alliance}, pp. 202-203.
\item [\textsuperscript{109}] \textit{East End News}, 13 December, 1911.
\end{itemize}
Robert Owen, Sedgwick, though not himself a socialist, saw assisted emigration as the panacean solution to Britain’s social-imperial problems. He even lobbied to attach the royal seal to his scheme. He informed George V by letter that “the first party of town lads for colonial farms beg to convey to Your Majesty the expression of our most dutiful and humble devotion to your Throne and person on our departure for the Dominion of New Zealand,” and later petitioned the monarch to grant the scheme official approval to increase its momentum and legitimacy. The monarch was the recipient of countless petitions on all sorts of issues, most of which never came before him. Sedgwick’s case was no exception. His request was denied.

Sedgwick’s ideas betray a shift away from earlier Victorian certainties of rational calculation - that problems can be overcome, and discontent understood by detached observation and scientific prescription. His solution to domestic problems of overcrowding and urban malaise was to extricate those individuals or groups deemed responsible for them. As a fellow assisted emigration advocate put it, “[w]hat is the Empire for, if not to be a contented prosperous community... Every citizen of Britain, man or woman, is entitled - from the very fact of being a British citizen - to a tangible share in the Imperial real estate.” Sedgwick’s argument that assisted emigration would improve imperial unity and construct a better imperial citizenship was a case of making a virtue out of what he perceived a necessity.

110 Bean and Melville, p. 79.
111 Sedgwick - Lord Stamfordham, 12 February, 1912. SP 2/1/3, LRCS.
112 Under Secretary of State, Colonial Office - Sedgwick, 5 June, 1912. SP 2/1/6, LRCS.
Chapter VII

An Unfulfilled Ideal

If there has been a theme characterizing Britain’s relationship with her overseas relations throughout the twentieth century, as pronounced in the 1900s and 1910s as in the 1990s, it has been ambivalence. The present project has evaluated the efforts of a select group of late-Victorian and Edwardian conservative imperialists to address the issue of Empire and citizenship. They sought to articulate a notion of citizenship which could unite Britons at home and in the Empire. Their efforts ended in frustration. The broader public was not convinced of the necessity of a clearly defined imperial citizenship. Perhaps conservative imperialists asked too much of their fellow putative imperial citizens. As one of Richard Jebb’s correspondents observed, “[t]he average man has only a certain amount of public spirit and disinterested idealism in his composition and if he exhausts it on ‘green hills far away’ like a federal parliament [or, for that matter, a ‘Britannic alliance’], he will have very little left for more necessary needs at home.”

In the historical case of the British Empire, and attempts to create a sense of imperial citizenship, Lionel Curtis, John Buchan, Richard Jebb, Arnold White, and Thomas Sedgwick, despite their varied arguments, all shared a desire for the transfer abroad of existing, though albeit sometimes unspoken, notions of British citizenship. Thus their stress on imperial loyalty, unity, education, “character,” and so on. A citizenship built upon liberalism and tolerance is at

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its heart consensual.

Citizenship is an authoritative idea, an authoritative concept. It can be malevolent, benevolent, or benign, it can be freely engaged in or enforced by dictate, but it always assumes the existence of unity and consensus, and of power. As such, it is an idea which conservatives have been quick to embrace. That said, it is not of course only conservative voices who hold to the idea of citizenship. Citizenship is also a social idea, a collective “coming to terms” with the fact, *pace* Kant, that individuals must perforce live with other individuals. This helps explain the often negative view held by Britons towards those of their peers who “went native.” Such behaviour was seen by domestic eyes to be unnatural, not only because it transgressed social conventions or because it offended domestic views of race, but because it was construed by those eyes as a rejection of the domestic notion of citizenship. If you have voluntarily left us, the argument went, either something is wrong with you or something is wrong with us. Since nothing is wrong with us, something must be wrong with you.²

At the level of the individual’s relationship to the supra-state of Empire, imperial citizenship, in practice, really meant how to maintain political ties with the Dominions.³ The dependencies, with India straddling the divide, were not included, not so much due to reasons of race, or their need for “tutelage,” but because they as yet did not “fit” with the central notion of Empire, namely cultural homogeneity. Thus, “racism” is not the correct description of British

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² See for example the case of that Victorian enigma, Sir Richard Burton.

³ One expression of such imperial loyalty was the erection of public monuments throughout the Dominions, celebrating themes such as the United Empire Loyalists or the Dominions’ contributions to the Boer War.
imperial ideas, but rather “racialism.” As Robinson and Gallagher note⁴, Britain’s “other”
Empire, the dependencies, was, if not acquired in a fit of absence of mind, certainly attained for
negative or contingent reasons - to protect trade routes, to make sure someone else did not gain
an advantage, and so on. The mission civilatrice was a French, not English, modus operandi.
Though British imperialism was undoubtedly characterized by the notion of service, the British
formulated an imperial raison d’être for the dependencies once they were there. This ex post
facto rationalization, in turn, perhaps explains why British decolonization was comparatively
easier than that of the other European powers. Territorial possessions obtained for practical
reasons could be, and were, just as easily let go for practical reasons.

Of the five imperialists whose ideas have provided the content of this study, Lionel
Curtis, the “imperial prophet,” devoted the greatest energies to the project of imperial citizenship.
Curtis’s concept imperialism evolved from one of race-patriotism, developed under Milner at the
century’s dawn, to one extolling Empire as a “citadel of freedom.” This citadel he termed a
“Commonwealth,” built around mutual loyalty to the sovereign. Curtis saw in Empire the
potential for a world-state, the means of bringing nations together within a single political
framework. The goal was world peace; the means of attaining this lofty ideal was imperial
federation. Drawing upon Alexander Hamilton’s conception of federalism, Curtis favoured a
federal Empire where Britain would be first among equals. His notion of imperial citizenship
can be described as one of “authoritarian liberalism.” Though the term appears to be an
oxymoron, it signifies an attempt to impose British liberal principles throughout the empire, as
opposed to allowing them to develop on their own. Curtis’s “authoritarian liberalism” can be

⁴ Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians.
contrasted to the "democratic authoritarianism" expressed in the colonies, where policies of
exclusion and homogeneity developed through democratic means. Curtis’s principles were
expressed most clearly in his support of political tutelage for the less "advanced" nations of
Empire. The idea of "dyarchy," specifically, was designed to create a "half-way house" for India
as she progressed toward equal standing in the imperial family. Curtis failed, however, to accord
sufficient standing to colonial nationalism within his proposed Anglosphere. He believed that
colonial nationalism was simply a parochial attitude, and thus failed to foresee the evolution of
the Dominions as independent polities. Nonetheless, Curtis was an honest broker whose
messianic force did much to advance the cause of the Empire-Commonwealth in the early
twentieth century.

In contrast to Curtis’s federalist notion of imperial citizenship, John Buchan offered a
more tempered understanding of Empire. Buchan, the Scottish romantic, shared Curtis’s sense of
Empire as a "secular religion," but envisioned a more organic imperium. Buchan’s sense of
imperial citizenship was cosmopolitan and ecumenical. In the early twentieth century, these
terms connoted an expanded understanding of Empire which sought to combine national and
imperial identities. Buchan’s inclusiveness entailed the expansion of pre-existing identities and
boundaries which he believed had stood the test of time, while also incorporating newer ideals
which promised productive change. One such ideal was democracy. Buchan favoured an
expanded democracy as the best means of fostering spiritual unity, a broad church consecrated by
its shared devotion to peace. He envisioned imperial citizenship as the lived principle of such an
Empire, one which required the active participation of all. Morality and "character" were the
most important requirements of such citizenship, and thus no one was ideologically precluded
from membership. The boundaries of Empire, based upon British culture, would continually expand as long as such expansion was practical. Empire, in Buchan’s view, was a union of people, not of possessions.

If, in their different ways, Curtis and Buchan were each struggling towards a less stratified Empire, Arnold White represented the imperial status quo. Curtis and Buchan believed that the Empire was rooted in British values; White believed that Empire existed for Britain, or more specifically, for England. White’s English nationalism, his insular prejudices (as seen in his antipathy to Germany), and his attention to maintaining stability each point to the pervasive impact the “national efficiency” movement had in Edwardian imperial politics. In an effort to counter fears of national decline, White articulated a notion of imperial citizenship which identified patriotism as loyalty to country. Such a citizenship was reciprocal, in its obligations, though the citizen was clearly in a subservient role. The citizen’s first priority was fealty to the state. The Empire, White argued, should be run as a business, with emphasis placed on principles of efficiency and a perpetual campaign waged against waste. In order to counter what he perceived as critical domestic socio-economic problems, he advocated the emigration of “surplus” population to the Empire and opposed foreign immigration to England. Finally, White betrayed a latent Whiggishness. His association with the Duke of Bedford, Lord Beresford, and Lord Fisher signalled the esteem in which he held aristocratic governance.

Curtis and Buchan represented movement within the conservative constituency toward a graduated imperial inclusiveness, while White’s exclusive definition of imperial citizenship marked out a separate conservative position to hold the line on Empire. This conflict between forward- and backward-looking conservatives was illustrated in the contrast between the careers
and ideas of Richard Jebb and Thomas Sedgwick. Jebb’s idea of a Britannic Alliance expressed elements of both Curtis’s constitution-building and Buchan’s sense of organic Empire. What set Jebb apart from Curtis and Buchan was his attention to colonial nationalism. He accorded the Dominions a greater place within his definition of imperial citizenship than did either Curtis or Buchan, arguing that imperial unity was only possible through the creation of a “wider patriotism.” Such a patriotism would evolve through the concept of “mutual-aid-in-living,” the harmonization of centrist and peripheral interests. Jebb’s putative Alliance was compromised by the practical difficulties of imperial cooperation. One example of such difficulties was the failure to harmonize imperial naturalization legislation. Intra-imperial immigration, perhaps the most significant channel through which Jebb’s envisioned “wider patriotism” might flow, was never opened. Though the goal of imperial citizenship was cultural consensus, local, national, and imperial identities proved at perpetual variance. The issue of immigration, and the attendant conflict between a liberal, though somewhat ambivalent, understanding of racial issues in Britain and the Dominions’ desire to dictate their own policies on race illustrated the practical failings of imperial citizenship.

Thomas Sedgwick also advanced a utopian view of imperial citizenship. He stayed closer to the shore, however, in conceiving of Empire and imperial citizenship in English nationalist terms. Like White, Sedgwick looked upon individual citizens as imperial capital. Sedgwick perceived imperial issues to be extensions of domestic issues, a perception borne out by the distinction he made between migration as movement within the Empire and emigration as movement outside the Empire. Drawing upon the ideas of social imperialism which developed within the “national efficiency” movement, he saw assisted emigration as a means of solving
domestic concerns of overcrowding, economic stagnation, and cultural decline. Sedgwick’s work also illustrates the divisions present within the Dominions themselves, which were increasingly nationalist and autonomous, yet still tied to Britain by economic, military, and, most significantly, cultural bonds. Finally, Sedgwick’s difficulties, especially in raising money for his operations, point to the lukewarm manner in which his fellow Britons viewed any such schemes of imperial citizenship.

Early twentieth century conservatives were thus divided into two camps: centralizing social imperialists, which included both progressives such as Curtis and traditionalists such as White, and cosmopolitan ‘associationists’ such as Buchan and Jebb. This divide is illustrated in the debates over the definition of citizenship, which placed the incorporation of individual identities in opposition to a compromise version of citizenship that included both imperial and national identities.

One historian has described the task of the Conservative Party in the early twentieth century as that of
discarding possible worlds, familiarising forgotten virtues, gathering in what has been scattered and selectively renewing worn-out initiatives. Coherence can be impaired by this reluctance to be programmatic, but it is on this diffidence that Conservative claims to integrity will rest and turn.\(^5\)

Some conservatives, such as Arnold White, did see their primary task as the preservation of the imperial tradition. Others, however, feared that such actions simply perpetuated a fossilized metaphor of Empire as the plinth upon which rested the nation’s prestige. Conservatives of a progressive nature, men such as Buchan and Curtis, instead drew upon the belief that liberty is a

society’s most important virtue, but that liberty of choice between competing and even contradictory objectives also entails the exercise of moral responsibility. Conservatives like John Buchan resisted becoming fully-fledged liberals only due to their lingering respect for the traditions of Empire.

Both the “centralists” and the “associationists”, however, experienced defeat. They were unable to create a “hybrid” citizenship, one which incorporated elements of both the classical and the republican model of citizenship, and took into cognizance the historically specific concerns of their age.\(^6\) Rejecting the explicit division between the terms centralist and associationist, each camp of conservative imperialists viewed imperial citizenship in terms of both *Gemeinschaft* (community), an ethnic conception of a nation including a common language and shared history and culture, and *Gesellschaft* (society), a mutual living arrangement interconnected by socio-political institutions. They proved unsuccessful in combining the two.

Despite their differences, the imperium conceived by Curtis, Buchan, White, Jebb, and Sedgwick was one of English culture girding the earth. Leopold Amery, a confidant of both Curtis and Buchan\(^7\), noted that it remained essential that imperial subjects’ allegiance remain to the crown, as Empire alone could keep international peace and “educate” Britain’s “subject races” in political competency. These goals were achieved, Amery concluded, through the

\(^6\) Conservatives also debated these points in the field of economics. A “Methodenstreit” ensued between classical economists of the Manchester school of free trade and proponents of the new historical economics, who attacked free trade as it was then constituted, instead favouring a deductive model of economics. See E. H. H. Green, *The Crisis of Conservatism*, Chp. V.

\(^7\) Amery, who wrote widely and sagely on imperial matters, could easily be included alongside the individuals studied in this project but for the fact that he attained high office, and thus moved from the realm of the dissemination of ideas to that of the formulation of policy.
stimulus of British culture.\textsuperscript{8} The Dominions served as overseas extensions of this culture, and imperial citizenship meant the expansion of British cultural traditions.

The Empire-Commonwealth as a political power did not long survive the Second World War, but a more tempered version of imperial citizenship has survived into the twenty-first century. The British Commonwealth is quite literally a cultural body, one in which member states share little more than a common imperial background. Nonetheless, the Commonwealth has functioned with relative harmony, regulating itself through the use of sanctions and moral suasion, and supporting unity through political, artistic, educational, and athletic endeavours. Indeed, while the Commonwealth, like Britain itself, has no formal Constitution as such, its “unwritten traditional procedures” betray a striking similarity to the ideals of imperial citizenship articulated by Curtis, Buchan, and Jebb. In the word of the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles, issued on 22 January 1971: “[t]he Commonwealth of Nations is a voluntary association of independent sovereign states, each responsible for its own policies, consulting and co-operating in the common interests of their peoples and in the promotion of international understanding and world peace.”\textsuperscript{9} Curtis’s voice in particular can be heard in the declaration that

\textsuperscript{8} Leopold Amery - Robert Brand, undated [25 May 1914], The Round Table Papers, Leopold Amery file, MS English History 805/38, 39, Bodleian Library, Oxford University.

\textsuperscript{9} \textit{The Declaration of Commonwealth Principles} [also known as the Singapore Declaration], issued at the Commonwealth summit, Singapore, 22 January 1971. The Commonwealth further defined its evolving principles in three subsequent documents: \textit{The Lusaka Declaration of the Commonwealth on Racism and Racial Prejudice} (Lusaka, Zambia, 7 August 1979), which pledged opposition to racism; the \textit{Harare Commonwealth Declaration} (Harare, Zimbabwe, 1991), a second general statement of beliefs, calling for strengthening human rights, democracy, and the rights of women; and the \textit{Millbrook Action Programme} (Millbrook, Queenstown, New Zealand, 12 November, 1995), which defined the Commonwealth’s role in global affairs, and set out an operating structure to attain its goals.
[w]e believe that international co-operation is essential to remove the causes of war, promote tolerance, combat injustice, and secure development among the peoples of the world; we are concerned that the Commonwealth is one of the most fruitful associations for these purposes.

Echoes of Buchan’s thought, furthermore, are evident in the Commonwealth’s principle of citizenship:

[w]e believe in the liberty of the individual, in equal rights for all citizens regardless of race, colour, creed or political belief, and in their inalienable right to participate by means of free and democratic political processes in framing the society in which they live. We therefore strive to promote in each of our countries those representative institutions and guarantees for personal freedom under the law that are our common heritage [emphasis added].

Elements of the imperial citizenship sketched out by early twentieth century conservatives have thus persevered, finding voice in a more progressive, if less powerful, international organization than the Empire within which it was conceived.

The notions of imperial citizenship expressed by conservative imperialists in the pre-1920 era, though not successful in their own time, garnered increased public currency as the twentieth century progressed. In particular, Curtis’s ideal of an imperial citizenship built upon “unity in diversity” gained support amongst subjects both in Britain and the Dominions during the Empire’s brilliant autumnal sunset of the 1930’s. An example of this attitude is to be found in a two volume encyclopaedia of the Empire published in 1931 by Fairgrieve & Young as part of their Human Geography series. In the collection’s penultimate paragraphs, the authors celebrate, in somewhat florid language, an imperial citizenship which they argue promotes a “living unity”:

[a] backward hill tribe, at the end of all things, away in the high Himalayas, was found to have an altar to an unknown god. Neither chief nor people could tell anything about this god except that he was far more powerful than any of their own or those of other peoples, for he had given them back their land that the Great Government of India had taken from
them; the name of the god was ‘The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.’

So, in diverse ways, the whole of the diverse parts of the Empire are unified; the more unity there is, the less is the chance of quarrelling; the fewer frontiers the less chance of war (emphasis added). But the ideal of Britain, the world over, is not a unity held together by force, not even the legal force that binds the separate units of the United States. British people are content with a freedom not incompatible with union and like to feel that their relationships are rather those of a family than of a legal partnership; just because the Empire possesses freedom of an abiding character it is not open to inhabitants of Britain to speak of it as ‘ours.’ The lands of which it is composed do not all belong to Britain; the peoples of which it is composed do none of them belong to Britain. The Empire may have begun with the ownership of possessions, but possession is no longer the dominant idea; it has become the Imperial Commonwealth.10

The use of the passive voice in the first sentence is instructive here, as it indicates the universality of the imperial presence assumed by the authors. Such triumphalism led early twentieth century Britons to ask questions which are now dated at best, forgotten at worst - questions of unity, of “civilization,” and of tutelage. And it accounts for the fact that they did not consider, or even conceive of, questions which later generations have come to see as of grave and central importance - questions of civil rights, or racial equality, and of national self-determination. Nonetheless, ideas of imperial citizenship have been taken up anew by post-imperial advocates of global ideas and institutions, a positive legacy of a now half-forgotten ideal.

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Appendix I

On the Historiography of Theories of Imperialism

Central to any study of the intellectual history of Empire is an understanding of the explanatory constructs historians have offered for its genesis and perpetuation. Two general points deserve mention here. One is the continued relevance of works from the first half of the twentieth century. Far from being superceded by more recent work, the theories on imperialism produced by historians and writers during the Empire’s last half-century of existence still demand to be read and grappled with. Second is the polemical rancour which has developed in the era following de-colonization. History, contemporary politics, and the addition or invasion of extra-historical methodologies from literature and cultural anthropology have combined to produce a stimulating, if at times excessively personal and accusatory, modern historiography. The following constitutes a selective list of some of the major theoretical texts on imperialism, covering the core methodological approaches and presented in chronological order.

J. R. Seeley, The Expansion of England, (London: 1883) is arguably the first self-consciously conceived theory of imperialism setting out the case for British imperial expansion as natural and justified, if conceived in a “fit of absence of mind”; John A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study, (London: 1902), written in the aftermath of the South African War (1899-1902) puts forth the critical but classic case that imperialism resulted from capitalism’s inherent and continual search for new markets; V. I. Lenin, The Highest Stage of Capitalism, (London: 1916) builds upon Hobson, but with the Marxist addition that imperialism constitutes the last stage of capitalism, the prelude to its inevitable collapse; Joseph A. Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social
*Classes*, (Cambridge, Mass.: 1951 [first published in German, 1919]) suggests that imperialism represented man's atavistic impulses, a desire to achieve through brute force a domination which was no longer possible at home.

William Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism*, 2 volumes, (New York: 1935) places imperialism firmly in the context of European power politics; Vincent T. Harlow, *The Founding of the Second British Empire, 1763-1793*, 2 volumes, (London: 1952-1964) presents the seminal "two Empires" argument, contending that the American Revolution constituted a dividing point between an older, mercantile Empire, and a second, expansionist Empire which developed out of the remains of the first; Nicholas Mansergh, *The Coming of the First World War: A Study in the European Balance, 1878-1914*, (London: 1949) and *The Commonwealth Experience* (London: 1969) explains Empire in sophisticated Whig terms, describing its history as the natural evolution from conquest to settlement to Commonwealth; Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, *Africa and the Victorians* (London: 1961), explain imperialism in geopolitical terms, arguing that indigenous nationalist impulses on the imperial periphery drew Britain into constructing a worldwide Empire to protect the strategic path to India, the imperial lodestone; D. K. Fieldhouse, *Economics and Empire 1830-1914*, (London: 1973) agrees that it is the periphery, not the metropole, in which we can find the causative factors of Empire, and while not a Marxist, asserts that Empire rested primarily on a nexus of economic relationships which shaped its form.

Edward Said, *Orientalism*, (New York: 1978) and *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: 1993) presents the most influential challenge to "traditional" interpretations of Empire; he depicts imperialism as an imagined entity, and argues that it came into being as a result of the western, Occidental creation of a stereotypical Oriental "other," an "other" deliberately suited to
the purpose of European domination; Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, eds. *Selected Subaltern Studies*, (New York: 1988) and Spivak, *In Other Words: Essays in Cultural Politics*, (New York: 1987) represent leading works from the subaltern school of historical study, the major claim of which is that imperialism is best understood from the perspective of the ruled, not the ruler, a project intimately linked to post-colonial studies; P. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914*, (London: 1993) also present a revisionist theory of Empire, arguing that economics, in the form of “gentlemanly capitalism” and the primacy of finance, was the creative force behind the British Empire; and David Cannadine, *Ornamentalism*, (Oxford: 2001) suggests that class, not race, was the determinent characteristic of imperial society.

To this list I would add recent work on environmental history, which seeks to place imperialism within the broader context of the natural world, but which also tends towards biological and geographical determinism. See in particular Alfred W. Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900*, (London: 1986) and Jared Diamond, *Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies*, (New York: 1997). Finally, of special note for a survey of theories of imperialism is the recent publication of the *Oxford History of the British Empire*, in five volumes. The fifth volume of the *OHBE, Historiography*, Robin W. Winks, ed., (Oxford: 1999), provides a well rounded if necessarily selective survey of the field. The above list represents only the most influential theoretical works on Empire, to which must be added a wealth of colonial and nationalist work, as well as countless more limited studies which nonetheless shed light on the genesis and perpetuation of Empire.
Appendix II

Glossary of Historical Names Referred to in the Text

Biographical entries detail the respective individuals’ careers during the scope of the dissertation (1895-1919). Thus, no details are given for the individuals’ careers after 1919-20, and any titles bestowed after 1919 are not noted. (eg Winston Churchill’s entry is limited to his imperial service up to the end of WWI, and neglects his later public activities and knighthood). Modern historians and historical figures pre-dating the period under study are not noted. Individuals are listed according to the name by which they were known during this period, and by which they are referred to in the text.

Amery, L(eopold) S(tennet) (1873-1955) British statesman. The Indian-born Amery was a long-standing Conservative MP, serving as Colonial Under-Secretary, First Lord of the Admiralty, and Colonial Secretary between 1919 and 1929.

Asquith, Herbert Henry Asquith (1852-1928) British statesman and Prime Minister (1908-1916). The Liberal Asquith also served as Home Secretary (1892-95) and Chancellor of the Exchequer (1905-08).

Balfour, Arthur James (1848-1930) British statesman and Prime Minister (1902-05). The Conservative Balfour presided over the end of the Boer War, passed the Education Act (1902), and later, as Foreign Secretary in 1917, was responsible for the Balfour Declaration, indicating the British government’s support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

Barnardo, Thomas John (1845-1905) Philanthropist and physician. He was the founder of Dr. Barnardo’s Homes for Destitute Children.

Bedford, Russell, H(erbrand) A(rthur), 11th Duke of (1858-1940) Military advocate, patron of zoological and scientific research, lord lieutenant of Middlesex (1898-1926)

Beresford, Charles, Baron (1846-1919) Naval Commander. Lord of the Admiralty (1886-88), Conservative MP, commander of the Mediterranean Fleet (1905-07) and Channel Fleet (1907-09). Beresford was closely associated with the ‘blue water’ school of naval policy.

Bosonquet, Bernard (1848-1923) Philosopher, member of the Charity Organization Society (COS) with his wife Helen, and leading neo-Hegelian scholar.

Botha, Louis (1862-1919) South African soldier, statesman, and Prime Minister. Attended the 1907 and 1911 Imperial Conferences in London.

Bourassa, Henri (1868-1952) Canadian politician and journalist. He opposed Canadian
participation in the Boer War and WWI, founded the newspaper *Le Devoir*, was a proponent of French Canadian nationalism and an opponent of imperialism.

**Brand, Phillip** (1878-1963) Banker and public servant, member of the Kindergarten.

**Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry** (1836-1908) British statesman and Prime Minister (1905-08). Campbell-Bannerman united the Liberals under his leadership, drawing together the party’s pro-Boer and Liberal Imperialist wings.

**Casement, Sir Roger** (1864-1916) British consular officer, Irish nationalist. He was instrumental in exposing Belgium’s exploitative rule in the Congo, and later executed for treason for playing a leading role in the Sinn Féin rebellion of 1916.

**Cecil, Robert (Arthur Talbot Gascoyne), 3rd Marquess of Salisbury** (1830-1903) British statesman and Prime Minister 1885-86, 1886-92, 1895-1902. Salisbury served as his own Foreign Secretary until 1900.

**Cecil (of Chelwood), Robert, 1st Viscount** (1864-1958) Lord Salisbury’s eldest son, member of the Ralegh Club, and elected Tory MP in 1903.

**Chamberlain, Joseph** (1836-1914) British statesman. Businessman, Mayor of Birmingham (1873-75), Liberal and Liberal Unionist MP, he became Colonial Secretary in 1895 in the Unionist Coalition Government. He was the leading political force in promoting the Boer War, and was an ardent advocate of imperial union. He resigned in 1903 to campaign for tariff reform. He suffered a stroke in 1906 and retired from public life.


**Chesterton, G(ilbert) K(eith)** (1874-1936) Critic and writer. He wrote literary criticism, poetry, and social criticism. He converted to Catholicism in 1922.

**Chirol, Sir (Ignatius) Valentine** (1852-1929) Journalist, author, civil servant.

**Churchill, Winston** (1874-1965) British statesman. Was a member of the Fourth Hussars from 1895-99, serving in Africa. His journalism on the Boer War made him famous. Was a Conservative MP (1900-1904), a Liberal MP (1904-15), an independent MP (1915-24). He held numerous cabinet positions during this era, including Colonial Under-Secretary (1905), President of the Board of Trade (1908-10), Home Secretary (1910-11), the Admiralty (1911-15), Minister of Munitions (1917), and Secretary of State for War (1919-21).

**Coupland, Reginald** (1884-1952) Historian of the British Empire and Commonwealth. An early admirer of Curtis, he was Beit Lecturer in Colonial History at Oxford in 1913, and Beit
Professor of Colonial History from 1920-48.

**Courtney, Leonard** (1832-1918) Journalist and statesman. Liberal Unionist Member of Parliament, a leading Pro-Boer, and forceful advocate of proportional representation.

**Croft, Sir Henry Page** (1881-1947) British politician. He supported imperial preference, and in 1917 helped found the ‘Nationalist Party’, which advocated a xenophobic imperialism.

**Cromer, Evelyn Baring, 1st Earl of** (1841-1917) Colonial Administrator and Consul-General in Egypt (1893-1907). Was responsible for the financial reform of Egypt.

**Cunningham, William** (1849-1919) Economic historian at the University of Birmingham, an advocate of tariff reform, and Archdeacon of Ely.

**Curzon (of Kedleston) George Nathaniel, Marquess** (1859-1925) British statesman and Viceroy of India (1898-1905). He introduced political and social reform to India, created the North West Frontier Province, and partitioned Bengal. Later served as Foreign Secretary (1919-1924).

**Dilke, Sir Charles Wentworth** (1843-1911) British politician, author, and advocate of Empire. A Liberal Radical, his career came to an end in 1885 over his alleged involvement with a fellow MP’s wife.

**Dyer, Reginald Brigadier General** (1864-1927) British brigadier general responsible for the Amritsar massacre in 1919.

**Ewart, J(ohn) S(kirving)** (1849-1933) Canadian lawyer and publicist. He was an advocate of Canadian constitutional independence.

**Feetham, Richard** (1874-1965) Judge. He was a member of the Kindergarten, an intellectual leader in drafting the Selborne Memorandum, an MLA in the South African Legislature, and a judge.

**Feiling, Keith** (1884-1977) Historian. He served in India during WWI as a commissioned officer.

**Fisher, Andrew** (1862-1928) Australian statesman and Prime Minister. Born in Scotland, he became leader of the Australian Labour party in 1907, served as Prime Minister on three occasions, supported Australia’s entry into WWI, and was Australia’s High Commissioner in London (1916-21).

**Fisher, (of Kilverstone), John A., Baron** (1841-1920) British naval commander. Lord of the Admiralty (1892-97), First Sea Lord (1904-15). In 1906 he introduced the *Dreadnought* series, and improved naval training and living conditions.
Frere, Sir Bartle (1815-1884) Governor and High Commissioner of the Cape Colony (1877-80). An advocate of British expansion in southern Africa.

Galton, Sir Francis (1822-1911) Scientist and explorer. Founder of the study of eugenics, drawing on the thought of his cousin, Charles Darwin.

Gandhi, Mohandas K. (1869-1948) Indian nationalist leader. He studied law in London, protested the discriminatory treatment of Indians in south Africa, especially Natal, and raised an ambulance corps of Indians during the Boer War. He returned to India in 1914, and though he supported the British war effort, became a leading figure in the Indian Congress Movement. He pioneered the use of satyagraha, and after protesting the Amritsar massacre, was jailed two years for treason.


Gladstone, W(illiam) E(wart) (1809-1898) British statesman and Prime Minister (1868-74, 1880-5, 1886, 1892-94). Though not a little Englisher, Gladstone was ambivalent toward Empire, though it should be noted that much of the Empire’s late-nineteenth century expansion occurred under Gladstone’s administrations. Gladstone himself was particularly supportive of national self-determination, particularly in the Balkans.


Gordon, Charles George (1833-85) British general. ‘Chinese Gordon’ helped suppress the Taiping Rebellion, was Governor of the Sudan (1877-80), and in 1884 was besieged at Khartoum by the Mahdi’s troops and killed before relief was sent. He became an imperial hero.

Grant, George (1835-1902) Principal of Queen’s University, Kingston. Canadian supporter of imperial federation.

Grey, (of Fallofon) Edward, Viscount (1862-1933) British statesman and Liberal Foreign Secretary (1905-1916). Grey was a Liberal Imperialist.

Grigg, Sir Edward (1879-1955) Civil servant and politician. He was The Times’ leading foreign correspondent for much of the 1900’s and 1910’s, and the first editor of The Round Table.

Harmsworth, Alfred, 1st Viscount Northcliffe (1865-1922) Journalist and newspaper proprietor. He revolutionized British journalism with his Daily Mail, launched in 1896, and was a leading advocate of the New Journalism. He became the proprietor of The Times in 1908.

Hichens, (William) Lionel (1875-1940) Businessman. A member of the Kindergarten, he was treasurer of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State (1903-07), and was a leading industrialist.
Hobson, J(ohn) A(tkinson) (1858-1940) British economist and publicist. He formulated the economic theory of under-consumption. In his most famous work, Imperialism, a Study (1902), he critiqued imperialism as a system driven by excess capital in the domestic market to seek new markets abroad.

Jameson, Sir Leander Starr (1853-1917) British colonial statesman. He led the infamous Jameson raid into the Transvaal in December 1895, and was subsequently sentenced to fifteen months in prison, of which he served six. He went on to become Prime Minister of the Cape Colony (1904-08) and supported South African Union.

Kerr, (of Lothan) Phillip, Marquess (1882-1940) Publicist and diplomat. Kerr was a member of Milner's Kindergarten, a founding member of the Round Table, an imperial journalist, and a member of Lloyd George's 'garden suburb' after 1916.


King, W(illiam) L(yon) Mackenzie (1874-1950) Canadian statesman and Prime Minister (1921-26, 1926-30, 1935-48). Liberal MP, Minister of Labour (1909-11), Liberal leader (1919). King was a colonial nationalist who strongly championed a greater role for the colonies within the Empire.

Kipling, Rudyard (1865-1936) Writer. His journalism, poetry, and prose made him the preeminent imperial writer of the era. He won the Nobel prize for Literature in 1907.

Kitchener, (of Khartoum and of Broome) Herbert (Horatio), 1st Earl (1850-1916) British Field Marshall. He won back the Sudan for Britain in 1898, led the war effort in south Africa (1900-1902), was Commander-in-Chief in India (1902-09), Consul-General in Egypt (1911), and Secretary of State for War (1914).

Kruger, Paul (1825-1904) President of the Transvaal (1883-1902). Led the Afrikaner side in the Boer War, opposing the integration of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal into the Empire.


Livingstone, David (1813-73) Missionary and African explorer.

Lloyd George, David (1863-1945) Statesman and Prime Minister (1916-1922). The Welsh Liberal served as President of the Bboard of Trade (1905-08) and Chancellor of the Exchequer (1908-15). He was a political supporter of home rule.

Lucas, Sir Charles P(restwood) (1853-1931) Civil servant and imperial historian. He was the
first head of the Dominions Department (1907), the forerunner of the Dominions Office.

**Lugard, Frederick** (1858-1945) British soldier and colonial administrator. He served the crown in Uganda and Nigeria, and became a leading proponent of the concept of indirect rule.

**Mackinder, Sir Halford** (1861-1947) Founder of modern geography, Liberal Imperialist, and, after a political conversion, advocate of protection and a neo-mercantile vision of Empire.

**Markham, Violet Rosa** (1872-1959) Public servant. The host of influential political and social discussions at her Gower Street home, she opposed female suffrage until 1918, the same year she lost her only contest for a seat in Parliament.

**Massey, (Charles) Vincent** (1887-1969) Rhodes scholar and Lecturer in modern history at the University of Toronto. An Anglophile Canadian and admirer of Curtis.

**Maxse, Leopold James** (1864-1932) Journalist and editor of the *National Review*. He was a strident Germanophobe.

**Milner, Alfred, 1st Viscount** (1854-1925) British statesman and High Commissioner for South Africa (1897-1905). Milner devoted his life to Empire, was a leading figure in precipitating and prosecuting the Boer War, presided over post-war reconstruction, and later served in the War Cabinet from 1916-1921, holding the post of Colonial Secretary from 1919-21. He was the spiritual head of the Round Table and a leading social imperialist.


**Murray, Gilbert** (1866-1957) Classical scholar. Professor of Greek at Glasgow (1889) and Oxford (1908), he was also a Liberal throughout his life, and was a supporter and eventual president of the League of Nations.

**Murray (née Mary Howard), Lady** (1865-1956) An accomplished classicist and collaborator in her husband’s public life.

**Naoroji, Dadabhai** (1825-1917) Indian politician. The first Indian elected to the House of Commons (1892 for Central Finsbury), despite Lord Salisbury’s belief that the voters would never elect a ‘black man’, and a founder of the Indian National Congress.

**Oliver, F(rederick) S(cott)** (1864-1934) Retailer and imperial publicist. His *Alexander Hamilton* (1906) was influential in shaping the thought of *Round Table* advocates of imperial federation.

**Pankhurst, Emmeline née Goulden** (1857-1928) Suffragette. Founded the Women’s Franchise
League (1899), and, with her daughter Christabel, the Women's Social and Political Union (1903). Her daughter Sylvia promoted pacifism and internationalism.

**Parkes, Sir Henry** (1815-96) Australian statesman. He was the premier of New South Wales five times, and helped draft the Australian constitution.

**Parkin, Sir George Robert**, (1846-1922). Canadian educator. The self-titled "wandering evangelist of Empire," he was the leader of the Imperial Federation Movement in the 1880's, and from 1902 until his death the secretary of the Rhodes Trust at Oxford. He was knighted in 1920.

**Pearson, Karl** (1857-1936) Scientist and Professor of Eugenics. A pioneer of the study of human evolution and heredity, he favoured a social-Darwinian view of Empire.

**Pollock, Sir Frederick** (1854-1937) British jurist and Liberal Unionist politician.

**Rhodes, Cecil** (1853-1902) British colonial statesman. Rhodes spearheaded British expansion south of the Zambezi, was behind the Jameson Raid, and promoted the Cape-to-Cairo line. His will provided for scholarships at Oxford for colonials, Americans, and Germans. The Rhodes Trust, another of his bequests, has been a guiding force in imperial studies since his death.

**Rosebery, Archibald Philip Primrose, 5th Earl of** (1847-1929) British statesman and Prime Minister (1894-5) He served as Gladstone’s Foreign Secretary (1886, 1892-4), was briefly Prime Minister, and was a leading Liberal Imperialist in the 1890's and early twentieth century.

**Selborne, Palmer, William Waldegrave, 2nd Earl of** (1859-1942) British statesman. High Commissioner for South Africa and Governor of Transvaal and the Orange Free State (1905-1909). He was the political force behind South African Union, and lent his name to the Selborne Memorandum, the Constitutional plan which the members of the Kindergarten were influential in framing.

**Selborne, Beatrix Maud Cecil, Lady** (1858-1950) A strong supporter of Empire, and early opponent of female suffrage, she was the daughter of the 3rd Marquess of Salisbury.

**Shaughnessy, Thomas, 1st Baron** (1853-1923) Canadian railway executive. He helped secure financing for the CPR, and served as its president from 1899-1918.

**Smuts, Jan Christian** (1870-1950) South African statesman. He fought in the Boer War, held several cabinet posts in the Cape House of Assembly, fought with Britain in WWI, and became Prime Minister of South Africa in 1919. He was an advocate of colonial nationalism, and favoured the League of Nations.

**Stead, W(illiam) T(homas)** (1849-1912) Journalist, editor of the *Pall Mall Gazette* and later of the *Review of Reviews*. He was a leading figure in the New Journalism and a strident opponent of the Boer War. He was lost on the *Titanic* when it sank in 1912.

Strachey, John St Loe (1860-1927) Journalist, editor of the Spectator (1898-1925), and Liberal Unionist advocate of Empire.

Trevelyan, G(orge) M(acaulay) (1876-1962) Historian. The son of the politician Sir George Trevelyan, he studied at Cambridge and served in WWI.

Walpole, Hugh (1884-1941) Novelist. Born in New Zealand, his earliest commercial success was The Secret City (1919).

Ward, Sir Joseph (1856-1930) New Zealand statesman and Prime Minister. The Labour politician was most noted for his social reform measures, including the world’s first Ministry of Public Health, and the provision of pensions for widows. He was knighted in 1901.

Ware, Sir Fabian (1869-1949) Journalist, editor of the Morning Post (1905-11), and director of the Imperial War Graves Commission.

Appendix III

**Fig. I.**
**Colonial Dependence:**
"Our Colonies."

**Fig. II.**
**Britannic Alliance:**
"Five Free Nations."

**Fig. III.**
**Imperial Federation:**
With Subject Dependencies.

**Fig. IV.**
**Imperial Federation:**
With Racial Equality.

- **Circles** represent countries
- **Parliament** (circled with a dot)
- **Imperial Conference** (circled with a cross)
- **Ministerial Representative in London** (circled with a cross and a dot)
- **Ministerial Responsibility** (dashed lines)

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### Appendix IV

**Population Table, showing relation of Asian immigrant population to white population throughout British Empire**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colony</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>British Indians</th>
<th>Other Asians</th>
<th>Total Asians</th>
<th>white population</th>
<th>relation %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australian Colonies</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>29,837</td>
<td>3571</td>
<td>9,184</td>
<td>2,886</td>
<td>45,478</td>
<td>3,731,428</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>2,836</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>3,029</td>
<td>769,690</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>171*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>100,727</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100,918</td>
<td>97,109</td>
<td>103.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Colony</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>1,346</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8,866</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>10,831</td>
<td>579,741</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transvaal</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>874</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8,928</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>10,348</td>
<td>298,167</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orange River Colony</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>142,679</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Br. SA</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>2,398</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>118,779</td>
<td>1,243</td>
<td>122,420</td>
<td>1,117,696</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>14,576</td>
<td>4,515</td>
<td>--†</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>159,566</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Canada</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>2467</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>--†</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Canada</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>17,045</td>
<td>4,674</td>
<td>--†</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>21,717</td>
<td>5,349,598</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**  
- indicates no recorded Asians living in these territories, or a lack of data  
* includes Japanese estimate  
† Canadian totals do not include British Indians

**Source:** P.E. Lewin, Appendix, *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts* LVI (24 April) 1908, p. 604. The dates given represent the closest available year for which data is available to 1901, a census year.
Bibliography

I have only included secondary sources which were of direct aid. References to other sources may be found in the appropriate footnote(s). Under primary monographs I have also included works written by my biographical subjects published after the study’s termination date of 1919 (e.g. Buchan’s Memory Hold the Door, 1940). The following abbreviations are used in the bibliography:

HO Home Office
FO Foreign Office
CO Colonial Office
RG Record Group

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Bodleian Library, Oxford University

British Conservative Party Papers
Lionel Curtis Papers
The Round Table Papers
Alfred, first Viscount Milner, Papers

Rhodes House, Oxford University

Ralegh Club Papers
Richard Feetham Papers
Cecil Rhodes Collection
W. T. Stead Correspondence

National Maritime Museum, Greenwich

Arnold White Papers

National Archives of Canada, Ottawa

Sir Robert Borden Papers
W. L. Mckenzie King Papers
Sir Wilfrid Laurier Papers

Queen’s University Archives, Kingston, Ontario

John Buchan Papers
Library of the Royal Commonwealth Society, Cambridge University

Colonial Office, *Census of the British Empire*, 1901 (1906)
Thomas Sedgwick, ‘Migration Scrapbooks, 1910-1914’

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- For individual document citations within these files, see the appropriate footnote in the text.


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Public Record Office, Kew

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CO 212, 214

National Archives of Canada, Ottawa

RG 13, 25, 74, 76

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*Atlantic Monthly*
Blackwood’s
Daily Express
Daily Mail
Daily Mirror
Daily News
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Dominion, The
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Journal of the Royal Society of Arts
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- *Society, Smart Society, and Bad Smart Society, Their Influence on Empire, Being Seven Letters Written to the Editor of the Daily Chronicle.* (London: Daily Chronicle, 1900).


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**VI. Monographs: Secondary**


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