TRENDS IN POLICING
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A CASE STUDY OF THE HAMILTON POLICE 1900-1973

By

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Abstract

While there are numerous studies of the police, few have addressed the changes in policing that have occurred since the turn of century. Prior studies address issues such as police effectiveness, social control, the military model of police organization, police socialization, and the relationship between crime rates and the size of police forces. Although these studies have provided insight into different aspects of policing, they have not established a comprehensive understanding of the police as an institution. In other words, we have little understanding of what has caused the police to change. Further, we know little about the substance and consequences of change.

My goal is to conduct an exploratory study of changes in policing by examining the main trends in the Hamilton, Ontario, Police Department between 1900 and 1973. Trends in economics, organization and work are considered. The study provides significant findings, which can be understood in relation to the existing literature, and can provide new questions to serve as the basis for future research.

I explain trends in policing in relation to larger social and historical factors
including population growth, the changing distribution of crime, and the role of the
automobile. Change was pluralistic; different factors contributed to major changes in
policing. Often, change was the result of external circumstances - the larger social
context provided both the motivation for change and the possible range of alternatives that
could be implemented. In Hamilton, the twentieth century was a period of considerable
population growth. At the same time, the city was being transformed by the automobile, a
revolution that redefined urban space, patterns of social interaction and the mobility of
citizens. Over the course of the century, there was a substantial shift in the distribution of
criminal offences. It is within this context that significant changes to policing occurred.

The police responded to the changing times by changing themselves. The growth
of the Department paralleled that of the city. The police adopted cars and motorcycles for
patrols to cope with traffic problems and to provide a quick response to citizens in need.
The Department was completely reorganized and became more professional. At the same
time, the costs of policing were rising. Police chiefs continually struggled to find ways to
cope with rising wages and declining work weeks. Citizens would be hired, technology
employed, patrol strategies changed to cope with declining productivity.

The findings of my research suggest that changes to the Hamilton Police can be
understood in terms of diffusion theory. The larger social milieu provided not only the
motivation for change: it limited the range of possible solutions at any given point in time.
I argue that changes to the Police Department were a direct result of their ability to
adopt innovations. Ultimately, to understand the police we must view them as social and
historical products.
For my father, Aylmer Hay (1925-1988), who taught me to see a world full of wonder. For my mother, Lorraine Hay, who taught me to follow my dreams. And for my brother, Jimmy.
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Down and out - I wrote this dissertation sitting at my mom's dining room table. It took me almost two years to produce the final text - most of the time wondering if it would ever actually be finished. It was one of the most difficult times of my life, but also, one of the most rewarding. Thanks mom, for everything!

Steve Taylor, long time friend, who in his infinite wisdom, decided the only way to be inspired is to see Calgary in the darkest depths of winter. It worked.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Like many elements of our everyday experiences, the police appear as an inevitable feature of social life. Yet modern policing, as a government sanctioned form of social control, is a relatively recent phenomenon. For most of human history police forces, as we know them, did not exist. While all societies have forms of social control, the police represent a modern solution to social problems. The first ‘modern’ police force began in 1829 in London, England. It was a part of much larger legal reform instigated by Sir Robert Peel. The spread of police forces was very rapid, and by the twentieth century police forces had become a fixture of urban life. Since the turn of the century, police forces have undergone tremendous change. To understand the police we must understand the changes they have experienced and why these changes have occurred.

In the twentieth century, policing in Hamilton was revolutionized in many ways. At the beginning of the century, the police had a general social welfare orientation, running shelters for the homeless, operating ambulance services, counselling juveniles, and delivering relief to the poor. Most crimes were drinking offences which required a particular physical enthusiasm on the part of constables to resolve. Their modern counterparts are faced with a mobile population, enormous traffic problems and the
proliferation of property crime. The result has been a massive change to the distribution and amount of crime. Traffic issues such as safety have always been a police concern, but the widespread use of automobiles made police work very different in the 1970's than it was in 1900. It would be difficult to see the police as immune to change in the face of the massive changes occurring to the larger social context.

The twentieth-century was a period of unequalled technological change for the police. The biggest change was the transformation of police patrol from a physically demanding pedestrian activity to a technologically intensive, automobile-based operation. Other changes were also important. There was technological innovation in almost all areas of police work. In 1900, police communications were limited to call-boxes and telephones. Eventually mobile radios and computer-based systems revolutionized police communications. Technological innovations also advanced criminal investigation. New technologies from fingerprinting to blood-testing, from video cameras to breathalyzers all advanced the cause. Computers revolutionized the ability of the police to process information. It is difficult to conceive of the police without these technological innovations, yet at one time the police had to function without them.

Changes to police work reflected the changing times. While technological
innovation and the changing demands placed on the police both propelled changes to
police work, other factors were also significant. In the twentieth century, many police
forces became unionized (or formed union-like associations) which had a direct impact on
working conditions, benefits and wages. Unions also rearranged the power structure
within police departments by fragmenting the traditional power-based hierarchy. At the
same time, the police became more professional. Skills, training, and educational
attainment became more important. Eventually, skills would eclipse seniority as the
primary basis for promotion. Both the content and the social relations of work changed.

On an organizational level the changes were just as profound. The military model
of organization was replaced with a corporate style of administration. Ranks became
standardized and differentiated from organizational structure. Considerable specialization
occurred alongside the technological, professional and administrative revolutions. The
police force increased in size almost tenfold between 1900 and 1973. What had been a
small community organization was transformed into a medium size corporation in less than
75 years.

Over the twentieth century, economic factors motivated change. The cost of
policing increased dramatically, and the police consumed greater and greater portions of
the overall municipal budget. Increasing costs would be a factor in the rise of civilians in police work. Economic factors influenced many aspects of policing including: recruiting, resignations, the level of police services, the use of civilians, and technological innovation. Economic factors were critical in the relation between the police and municipal government. The economic organization of policing was filled with fiscal tensions among police administrators, the police association, and municipal politicians.

Social science studies of policing have been conducted examining a wide range of concerns, including socialization (Vincent 1990), social control (Ericson 1982, 1989, Harring 1983, Forcese 1992, Boritch and Hagan 1987), organization (Stinchcomb 1980, Steinman 1986, Reiser 1974, Sherman 1975, Simms and Peterson 1991, Van Maanen 1975), and police effectiveness (Clarke 1978, Clarke and Hough 1980, Bright 1965, Farmer 1978, Herbert and Rich 1980, Kelling et al. 1974). Few, however, have considered how the police have changed over time. Though some of these studies are valuable in their own way, taken as a whole, our knowledge of the police is ahistorical and fragmented. We see them as independent of the social and historical circumstances that have shaped them.
1.1 Aim of the Research

At this point two things are apparent: the police have undergone substantial change, and there is a shortage of research in this area. Accordingly, the primary aim of this study is to conduct an exploratory analysis of trends in policing in the twentieth century. Furthermore, the study attempts to portray the police\textsuperscript{1} in a more comprehensive manner to redress the fragmented nature of our present knowledge. Both the temporal and holistic nature of this study distinguish it from prior police research.

To achieve this objective, the study examines the major trends in the Hamilton Police Department between 1900 and 1973. Changes in policing do not represent a progress to some ideal or inevitable development; rather they are seen as the response to changing social, economic, technological, and demographic realities. Equally, changes do not appear to reflect some underlying unchanging essence or uniformity that is beyond external influence. The police are not seen as controllers or liberators, as oppressors or victims, as servants of the elite or working class heroes, but as an institution that has changed dramatically in a relatively short period of time. The central theme here is that the

\textsuperscript{1} Police or policing, as used here, refers to a composite of work, organization, technology, and finance.
police can only be understood in relation to their changes and their changes result from larger social and historical forces.

1.2 The Contribution of the Research to Scholarly Knowledge

The study fills a need for the long term analysis of policing. Additionally, it considers issues raised in the literature on the police.

The social control activities of the police (Ericson 1982, Boritch and Hagan 1987, Reiner 1991) have been prominent in prior research. An important issue is how the expression and extent of police control activities changed. If the police are "reproducers of order" as Ericson (1982) suggests, then we must consider the problem of order historically. Were the challenges to order uniform or does social disorder vary across historical periods? How effective are the police in this role? What have been the consequences of police control activities? The present study addresses social control issues by identifying the changes to police activity that have occurred in the twentieth century.

Another issue raised in the literature is the relationship between the size of police
forces and crime (Wellford 1974, Swimmer 1974, Loftin and McDowell 1981, Koenig 1996). This question has been a common one in criminology. In the present study the evidence from Hamilton will shed new light on this issue. Equally prominent and closely related in the literature are studies evaluating police effectiveness (Kelling et al. 1974, Clarke 1978, Felson 1994). Most of these challenge the traditional assumptions concerning the efficacy of police patrol as a deterrent to crime. The present study extends this literature by examining changes in police patrol in Hamilton and the assumptions that patrol was based on.

Another area of importance is the military model of police organization (Cain 1979, Fairchild 1984, Stinchcombe 1980, Auten 1981). In the past, researchers have been critical of the military model of police organization. The present study looks at police organization in a more comprehensive manner, from the perspective of overall organization change. While the military aspects of police organization were important, many other changes are worth considering such as organizational reform, standardization, specialization, and the increased emphasis on administrative skills and professionalization of police management.

Equally significant is the behaviour within police organizations. Vincent (1990)
looks at police socialization from the perspective of police culture. His work raises the question whether police culture is a significant factor in shaping police practises and attitudes, or is police culture a response to factors in the larger social milieu? The present study, although not concerned directly with police culture, can shed light on this question by examining the role of the larger social context in police culture. Additionally, the study complements Vincent’s work by addressing issues including recruiting, resignations and dismissals, the rise of a police association, police wages, and the changing distribution and content of work.

The study also considers the economics of policing, an area that has not received adequate attention in the past. Prior research has not adequately addressed the economic basis of policing. These issues provide a unique view of the police: how they allocate resources, especially in the face of public demands; the resources they require to function; and their unique status as a public institution. Economic factors provided many of the internal tensions and conflicts between constables and management. In many respects, these tensions define modern policing. Almost everything about policing has an economic dimension or economic consequences, and while it is not my intention to reduce the police to economic factors, it is impossible to ignore these factors.
In addition, the research makes important contributions to the literature on the history of policing. The historical contribution of the research builds upon earlier studies by Monkkonen, Marquis, and Weaver. Monkkonen’s (1981a) work on the development of urban policing is a unique contribution in the extent of its coverage and the substance of its findings. Many of Monkkonen’s observations are relevant to Hamilton. The police in Hamilton, like their American counterparts, acted as agents of moral order, they fulfilled a social welfare role, and they eventually shifted their orientation from social welfare towards problems of crime and traffic. Monkkonen’s work serves as a historical reference point for this study.

While there are few historical analyses of Canadian police forces, Marquis’s (1993) analysis of the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police is an important contribution. Key themes identified by Marquis, such as the importance of technological change (especially the role of the automobile and information processing), the relationship between local governments and law enforcement, and the rise of police professionalism, were all evident in Hamilton as well. Perhaps Marquis’s main contribution is the understanding that police issues transcended localities that different police forces faced similar problems and required similar solutions, and that the solutions that police chose were not always obvious or inevitable. My study reinforces Marquis’s findings by
providing a relevant case study at the local level.

In terms of local history Weaver (1990a, 1990b, 1991, 1995) has made a considerable contribution to our understanding of the history of crime, policing, and the courts in Hamilton. While the findings of our analyses tend to agree, we differ in perspective. In contrast to Weaver's narrative approach, I rely more on quantitative information. Also, Weaver tends to emphasize the police in relation to the criminal justice system where I am more concerned with the larger social context. While some changes to policing can be traced to the criminal justice system, many were rooted in other social factors. My intention is to build on Weaver's contribution by viewing the police in more detail.

1.3 Chapter Outline

The dissertation is organized into eight chapters. Chapter two covers methodological details and issues. It includes interdisciplinary issues in addition to delimiting sources used, problems encountered, and scope of the research. Chapter three examines theoretical issues. This includes a discussion of historical and sociological ideas,
and the implications they have for our understanding of change. Chapter four examines how the police have been shaped by the larger social context. It focusses on changes in population, the influence of the automobile, and the changing distribution of crime. Chapter five explores the economic basis of policing. Issues of police expenditures and wages are central concerns here. In chapter six, organizational change is examined. Of particular note is the departmental re-organization that occurred after World War II. In chapter seven, I consider issues of work and technology including professionalism and specialization, and the influence of technology on work. In chapter eight the results of the study are assessed in relation to substantive and theoretical concerns.
Chapter 2: Methodology

This chapter addresses the specific methodological concerns of the study including, selection of the subject, scope of the research, problems encountered, the research approach, and the limits of the study. The Hamilton police were chosen for pragmatic reasons. Both the availability of adequate historical records and a very limited research budget made alternatives unfeasible.

2.1 Scope of the Study

The primary goal of this study is to explain changes in a single police department, not to develop a universal or generic model of the police. The research is an exploratory analysis of social change within the Hamilton Police Department between 1900 and 1973. I combine social history with descriptive statistics in order to explain trends in policing.

The study covers the period from 1900 to the founding of the Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police in 1974. In Hamilton, the period between 1900 and 1973 was a formative period for modern policing. The turn of the century provides a convenient starting point because many of the nineteenth century practises were still in
place. In 1974, the Hamilton Police Department was reformed into The Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police. The transition from a city to a regional police force is a considerable topic in its own right, and deserves more attention than can be provided here. Therefore, 1973 serves as an appropriate end point for the study.

The research attempts to portray the Department in a comprehensive way to facilitate our understanding of changes to policing. The economics, organization, work, technology, and the historical context of policing are all considered. These areas are treated topically for the purpose of presentation. Obviously, they are interrelated on a fundamental level. Issues of work are related to issues of technology, organization, and economics. For example, we must look beyond the economics of policing to understand how the economics of policing have changed. We must look at social factors, changing technology and the changing demands placed on the police. The different aspects of the Department are seen in relation to each other and to the larger social environment.

2.2 Sources Used in the Study

The research in this dissertation is based on both primary and secondary sources. All primary sources used in the study are located in the archives of the Hamilton Public
Statistical information was used to establish trends in policing. The most important primary sources were the Hamilton Police Annual Reports (HPAR) and the more recent departmental statistical reports. These reports provided statistical summaries of police activity. The City of Hamilton Financial Records provided crucial fiscal data. The statistical information in these primary sources was supplemented by secondary sources including the Historical Statistics of the United States and the Historical Statistics of Canada. Weaver (1982) provided data for the numbers of automobile registrations in Hamilton.

Both primary and secondary sources were necessary for identifying the historical facts behind the trends in policing. Local newspapers played an important role in identifying key issues and events. Other police documents, such as the division defaulter’s book and personnel records, were also used. Unfortunately, during the research phase of this study, the Minutes of the Police Commission and Departmental photographs were not available. Where possible, primary sources were supplemented by secondary sources,

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2 The following years were missing: 1900-1904, 1906-1908, 1910, 1914, 1916, 1918, 1919, 1923, 1930, 1965.

2.3 Research Approach

Due to the interdisciplinary nature of the study, there is no research design in the traditional sense. The first step in the process was to obtain main trends from historical documents; most of these were contained in the Hamilton Police Annual Reports and the City of Hamilton Financial Records. The next phase of the research required the use of historical sources to explain trends. Where possible, primary sources were used. Due to the limitations of the records, secondary sources were required to augment archival materials.

Statistical summaries are useful for most aspects of policing. Trends have descriptive value as summaries of characteristics or activities, but taken alone they cannot explain anything. Even multivariate analyses cannot, in themselves, explain why a certain pattern or relationship occurs. Typically, sociologists rely on theory at this point to make the causal connections. For this study, explanation is more historical in character, i.e.,
explanation is rooted in events, not theory. However, in contrast to historians who develop narratives by using some events to explain other events, the approach taken here is to use events to explain trends. In this sense, the study represents a hybrid of sociological and historical methods, because it examines the role of specific events in relation to general trends.

2.4 Problems Encountered During the Research

Several problems were encountered during the research including missing data and incomplete records, the deteriorating condition of records, changes in content, records that were not equally accurate for all aspects of policing, changing categories or definitions in reports over time, and problems of comparison.

In contrast to the probability based samples used in the social sciences, samples in historical research requires evidence of some form, usually written documents, through which facts are established. Because explanations are based upon limited evidence, historical explanation can be controversial and subject to debate. In contrast to social scientists where theoretical issues can be divisive, historians typically argue about the facts (Elton 1967). For the historian, two kinds of situations are particularly problematic:
those where there is too much information and so the historian must be selective in choosing the evidence, and the opposite scenario, where too little information exists. In the latter case, historians must attempt to reconstruct the facts from evidence which may not be sufficient. For this study, missing and incomplete data were the most serious problem. Some police annual reports were missing, and even the most comprehensive reports left out many details of policing. The most problematic areas were Departmental organization and the specific details on police work and benefits. These areas were not covered adequately in the existing records.

In a few instances the physical condition of records was a problem. Some early records were illegible or had been defaced or altered. While the condition of reports was generally acceptable, some had deteriorated physically to the point where they were difficult to read.

Another problem was the continual change in the content of the annual reports, making it difficult to construct time series in some instances. There was also considerable variation in the accuracy of items contained in police records. Some items appear accurate, such as the police budget or the size of the force, some are less so. For example, the fact that police treat both criminal and traffic offences informally on many
occasions leads one to suspect the accuracy of official reports. When comparing different aspects of policing using statistical information alone we must remain sensitive to the fact that each of these items may vary in their overall accuracy.

Problems of accuracy were compounded by changing categories or definitions. Often direct interpretation was problematic due to changing definitions or categories. Categories in reports changed because of changes in federal, provincial, or municipal law. Changing categories also reflect changing times and changes in the demands on the police. Changing categories for criminal and traffic offences provided challenges to interpretation. When these problems were encountered, data were aggregated into a single category.

Even when records were relatively accurate, comparisons were difficult to make because police activity changed over time. Issues like productivity can be confounded by a myriad of factors including: length of the work week; technology used; specific details on the work performed; changing functions of the department; information processing required of officers; and the changing content of police work over time. We cannot talk of productivity as if it were a single thing. Without knowledge of significant events, such comparisons can be very misleading.
Some problems could be dealt with. For example, because we can take inflation into account, all dollar values used in the thesis (except where noted) were converted to constant 1971 dollars using the consumer price index in order to facilitate comparison. Fiscal comparisons can be quite meaningful. Also, the fact that considerable effort went into making financial statements accurate makes the evidence in this area unique.

Another type of comparative problem involves viewing past events and practises through current values or a sense of historical inevitability. There is no doubt that some aspects of the police exhibit cumulative or progressive features. Improvements in technology, training and knowledge can all accumulate over time. While I do not wish to deny that progressive aspects of policing exist, I do not view the police only in terms of them.

Alternatively, changes in policing can be viewed as responses to shifting social, economic, technological, and demographic realities - not uniform or inevitable progress. Certain characteristics may be more suitable in certain contexts than others; i.e., changes reflect the changing context, not movement towards an ideal. Since the context in which police exist does not change towards a pre-determined end, changes in policing cannot really be seen as being progressive - they are better understood in relation to specific
events. An example can illustrate this point. Early in the century, police work was defined by constables walking a beat. The intimate personal style of policing was eclipsed by technologically intensive cruiser-based patrol in an effort to ‘professionalize’ and ‘modernize’ the force. By the 1980’s, as the technological revolution continued, the public and police administrators seemed to value a more community-based style of policing as the shortcomings of the technological revolution became apparent. In a sense, the change in attitude represented a return to a more traditional model of police patrol. Thus, it is not simply a matter of progress, of one form displacing another. It is a matter of understanding changing demands made on the police and how they choose to respond to these challenges.

The distinctions made in this chapter and the rationale for interdisciplinary study should become clearer as we look more closely at the previous research on the police in the next chapter. Indeed, the police appear differently because they have been viewed from distinct vantage points. Some of these differences result from the inherent tension between sociology and history.
Chapter 3: Literature Review

The purpose of this chapter is to review prior studies on the police and situate the present research in relation to them. Prior studies in the areas of work, organization, social control, and police effectiveness are considered. Each of these areas raises questions that are relevant for the present study.

Previously, the police have been a subject of interest to both historians and social scientists. Both of these approaches have contributed to our knowledge. Historical studies have provided knowledge concerning the origins of modern policing. Social science research has contributed valuable knowledge of specific aspects of policing. Taken together, both historical and social science perspectives provide a foundation for the present study.

3.1 Work

Prior research on police work has focused on the areas of personality and attitude, isolation, use of force, and stress. In this section the findings of these studies are outlined.
3.1.1 Personality and Attitude

Research suggests that in contrast to stereotypical images of police there is no one police personality. Hadar and Snortum (1975: 37) found that there is little evidence of either a police personality or an "insidious enculturation process." The relationship between the individual and the culture of policing is reciprocal not unidirectional (Vincent 1990: 8). Still, emphasis on conformity and discipline are significant aspects of the socialization process for police officers (Van Maanen 1975: 220).

In general, attitudes towards work change over time. Van Maanen (1975:207) suggests that recruits enter highly motivated but this changes quickly. Around age twenty-six enthusiasm wears off and reaches a low point by age thirty; then morale improves until age fifty where it reaches a plateau (Ferdinand 1980: 47). Rafky (1975:191) found that individuals with more years of service were more cynical about the public. A number of factors may account for changing attitudes. In part, they may reflect the unfilled expectations of new recruits. Most work involves relatively minor problems - but most training has to do with fighting crime, creating role conflict and false expectations (Vincent 1990: 48-9). The isolation of the police from mainstream society may account for some attitudinal change. Policing is a very insular occupation (Johnston 1988: 56). The longer that individuals work in the police, and the higher their rank, the more likely they are to socialize only with other police (Vincent 1990: 100). Police
isolation is their own choice. They prefer shop talk and shared common interests with their peers (Vincent 1990:102). Also, they prefer to socialize among themselves because they grow tired of listening to people's complaints about police (Vincent 1990: 102-3).

Some differences in attitude are likely attributable to generational factors. Older officers are used to military style discipline - they are ready to fight if the situation calls for it (Vincent 1990: 44-50). Additionally, they oppose radical change and remain critical of educational requirements (Vincent 1990: 44-50, 124). In contrast, young officers reject military style discipline, avoid involvement where possible and are more educated (Vincent 1990: 44-50, 124). Conflict exists between the established police middle management and the newer, more educated, recruits. For older officers, some of the cynicism may result from their inability to conform to the changing public expectations of the police. Generational differences suggest more than different attitudes - they imply that police work has changed. This observation raises the questions, why has police work changed and what has brought about the changes?

3.1.2 Use of Force

There are few organizations that expect more discretion from entry-level personnel than the police (Stinchcombe 1980:50). The use of force is one area in which discretion is important. Force has served different functions for the police. Traditionally, force was
used in three situations: to punish wrong doers; to obtain confessions; to uphold the personal dignity of the police officer (Haller 1976: 318-20). Force was also used for self defense or to ensure compliance with the law. It is important to point out that the use of force is not guided solely by legal definitions. The use of force seems rooted in established police norms that individuals learn via socialization. The occupational subculture of police specifies when, why, and against whom, violence is justifiable (Waegal 1984:145).

The use of force has broader implications. It conflicts with both public expectations of the police and the professional image that police administrators want to establish. For example, Vincent (1990) found it difficult to get information on police brutality even though officers seemed to acknowledge it as an issue. Also, the use of force has been a rationalization for the male domination of police work. Vincent (1990:125-6) found that officers were opposed to women becoming constables because they felt it would weaken their solidarity as a group, and because women were judged to be of little use in violent situations. Over the years the attitudes towards women have changed somewhat, and they are now perceived as having the ability to work as effective officers (Vincent 1990:172). Although the need for force is only occasional, it has made the police resistant to change.
3.1.3 Stress

Stress is common in police work. Sources of stress include: court leniency, administrative policies and paperwork, inadequate equipment, community relations, the negative image of police, (Kroes et al. 1974: 146-54), boredom, and the lack of public consensus on both police and social issues (Vincent 1990, Vollmer 1971).

Often police work involves long periods of boredom interspersed with stressful encounters with the public (Vincent 1990: 77). Police officers perceive themselves as the “blue race” (Kroes et al. 1974:154). Officers come to expect abusive rather than friendly encounters with the public (Vincent 1990: 65-6). The police feel continually harassed by anti-police views held by many members of the public (Hadar and Snortum 1975: 53). “The persistence with which scorn is heaped upon them [the police] sometimes makes one wonder if many persons are left in this country who do not believe that every policeman is corrupt (Vollmer 1971:87).” Interestingly, this self-perception contradicts public opinion surveys which view the police favourably (Griffiths and Verdun-Jones 1994, Brillon et al. 1984). Perhaps these differences can be accounted for by the type of everyday encounters officers have with the public which may be quite stressful.

The lack of public consensus makes police work stressful. The police are scapegoats for the inability of the public to reach consensus (Vollmer 1971:86). Because
laws can vary markedly in terms their public support, it can be difficult to police a society that is divided on social issues. Some issues can be divided along age, class, religious, race, or gender lines, but others do not fit into categories well. For example, the enforcement of repressive laws (gambling, prostitution, and alcohol violations) alienates the police from large numbers of people “in all walks of life (Vollmer 1971:86).” If such laws are enforced, the police are seen as oppressors, and if they are not enforced then they are seen as corrupt or impotent. In reality, social problems cannot simply be solved by law enforcement. “There is no magic in law enforcement to produce the virtues of sobriety, morality, and decency (Vollmer 1971:100).” The police have an impossible task. Most social problems are beyond the means of the police to resolve, yet there is a public expectation that the police can deal with such matters (Griffiths and Verdun-Jones 1994:83).

Police deal with stress informally. Police develop strategies for establishing role distance during stressful situations (Moyer 1986:363). In other words, they find a way to detach themselves from situations that they find difficult to deal with. Officers overcome the day to day stress informally by joking, ignoring citizens, denying danger, and playful pranks (Moyer 1986:373). These informal approaches have questionable effectiveness. Vincent (1990:76) suggests that due to the amount of stressful situations the police face, officers should be taught both stress-awareness and how to deal with stressful situations as a part of their training. Indeed, training often focused on issues related to
professionalization and ignored the actual needs of constables on the streets. In part, police work was, and is, stressful because of its nature but also because constables were never given proper training for the realities of police work. Changes to work and training remain important considerations for the understanding of stress.

3.2 Organization

The police, as an organization, should be seen as one aspect of urban development (Monkkonen 1982: 576-7). In Canada, the origins of municipal police forces predated the Mounties by a generation (Marquis 1993: 5). Although crime was an issue, the adoption of police services was a part of the reforms to municipal government (Marquis 1993: 25). Initially, the police differed from their modern counterparts in the range of social services they provided. They provided shelter for the homeless, operated ambulances and were involved in a range of public service activities (Marquis 1993). Traditionally the police were “front-line social workers (Weaver 1990a: 82).”

Around the turn of century, national and international police associations were formed to deal with police concerns. The most important were the International Association of Police Chiefs (IACP) and the Chief Constables Association of Canada (CCAC). Reformers within the IACP wanted to professionalize police by making them more like the military, by centralizing power, and by eliminating the social-service/work
elements (Marquis 1993:59). The CCAC was formed in 1905 to address police concerns on a national level (Marquis 1993:5). Because police services were not centralized, formation of the CCAC was the beginning of a “national police consciousness (Marquis 1993:56).” Organizational reforms were important precursors of modern policing.

3.2.1 Military Organization

Initially, police organization was based on a quasi-military model. The military model of police organization was a hierarchical structure based on military rank and infused with a military style discipline. Military organization was used in American police forces to root out corruption early in the century (Franz and Jones 1987:153) and to provide combat readiness to fight the war against crime (Stinchcombe 1980:52). The military model may have been a response to local corruption in America, but in London the Metropolitan Police had a military character from its inception in 1829 (Gash 1961:497-98).

The military analogy should not be overdone. The degree of military emphasis varies from police force to police force (Fairchild 1984:189). Within police culture, military ideals conflicted with the realities of police work. The formal quasi-military bureaucracy espoused certain standards of conduct that were at odds with the culture of policing, which included “boozing, wenching and horseplay,” and at times, criminal
activity (Punch 1984: 3). Police work and military service were not inherently compatible. For the nineteenth-century London Metropolitan Police, those with prior military experience tended to resign prior to those with no military experience (Shpayer-Makov 1990: 12). Although Sir Robert Peel, the architect of modern policing, drew on military experience to establish the London Police, he envisioned its development as separate and distinct from the military (Gash 1961: 502). Auten (1981: 67) suggests that the police were organized along military lines because “there were no other models to emulate,” not because the military model represented the proto-typical police force. Even in the nineteenth century, there was no one military model that defined police organization (Emsley 1984).

Most observers are critical of the military tenure of police departments. They suggest that the military model has been ineffective because there are basic differences between military and police functions (Auten 1981: 67-75, Fairchild 1984: 192). Military discipline differs from police discipline because constables have much more discretion than low ranking military personnel (Fairchild 1984: 192, Punch 1984: 5). What traditional military organization produced was a machine (Auten 1981: 71) and this conflicts with the informed discretion that constables required to perform effectively. A basic goal of the police is to maintain the peace, not to eradicate an enemy or engage in military style exercises (Fairchild 1984: 197). Fairchild sees organizational specialization as the solution to the problems of the military model. She suggests that by separating the military and
peace keeping functions of the police, the need for complete organizational reform can be avoided (Fairchild 1984:198).

Some police reformers suggest that democratic alternatives to the military model exist. The motivation for such reforms is to redress the balance of power between the police and the community. On one hand, if the police are divorced from the community, they become an occupying military force; on the other, if they are controlled by the community conflict and partiality results (Stinchcombe 1980: 60). Johnston (1988:62) believes that, within limits, some democratic reform is necessary, but reforms need to be flexible. Cain goes further. She maintains that the police must be rendered vulnerable to community pressure or we end up with either paternalistic or authoritarian police - not a democratic institution (Cain 1979:154). Alternatively, Bayley (1976:196) maintains that police reform cannot simply be aimed at the police; the public must also change. It is not clear if the democratization of the police is a realizable goal. The "value conflicts of democratic society create conditions undermining the capacity of police to respond to the rule of law (Skolnick 1975:6)."

Democratic reformers seldom acknowledge the non-partisan ethos that was intrinsic to some nineteenth-century police forces. Initially, the police were, in theory, required to maintain a non-partisan position on many social issues. In contrast to many American police forces, which were influenced by local politics and interests, members of
the London Police were not allowed to have any connections with private business interests (Gash 1961:491). Before 1887, London Police could not vote in Parliamentary elections; they could not vote in local elections before 1893 (Skolnick 1975: 60). The need for reform is only marginally related to the quasi-military nature of police organization. A more important factor was the rise of powerful police organizations and unions, which created their own agendas. Marquis (1993:371) suggests that police reform is difficult because unions could make innovation impossible. Realistically, organizational reform has to address far more than the military component of police organization.

Technological advances and social change had altered many aspects of policing immeasurably since the turn of the century. Canada was a more urbanized, heterogeneous society where police managers had more in common with corporate managers than military commanders. Military experience and attachment to Imperial ideals, so important in the era of Sir Percy Sherwood, Henry Grasett and William Stark, were no longer the hallmarks of a police leader. The contemporary police executive operated in a milieu characterized by a more diverse and sophisticated public, powerful federal and provincial bureaucracies and social service infrastructures, institutionalized law reform, well-organized public interest groups, aggressive police unions, and an influential electronic news media. (Marquis 1993: 379)

To understand police organization, we must understand how its military origins were transformed into a corporate style of management. This is an issue that is seldom addressed in the literature on police organization.

A preoccupation with the military aspects of policing has resulted in a one-dimensional view of the police that ignores many aspects of organizational change. The problem with scholarly accounts of the military model is that they often confuse rank with
organization. Ranks are statuses assigned to individuals; they do not necessarily correspond with organizational structure. The 'Military' is a type of organization, not an organizational type. For example, the Hamilton Police still rely on a system of ranks to differentiate a hierarchy of social statuses within the department, as they did at the turn of century; however, during the same period there have been profound changes in organizational structure and administration including massive increases in size, considerable specialization, standardization, professionalization and technological innovation. While police forces maintain a system of social statuses differentiated by rank and a military style of discipline, the actual organizational structure of police work has changed considerably. This study looks at organizational reform in a more general sense than prior studies have done.

3.3 Social Control

The social control function of the police has received considerable attention from scholars. In the most general sense, police control activities are the response to violations of the law or disturbances of the peace. Historically, control activities include everything from enforcing traffic violations, arresting vagrants or the intoxicated, to enforcing local by-laws or resolving domestic disputes. Historians and social scientists tend to approach the control aspects of police work in different ways. Historians tend to take a broader view of control functions, pointing out the varied types of control activities that the police
were engaged in. They also view control in a more positive light than their social science counterparts, who usually focus on more oppressive forms of social control.

Monkkonen’s (1981a) *The Police in Urban America* has been the most influential work on the social control aspects of policing. He suggests that in the nineteenth century, police controlled the “dangerous class” by both arrest and by providing shelter for the homeless (Monkkonen 1981a:10,11). The dangerous class, i.e, the unemployed, criminals, vagrants and “social scum,” provided a constant source of criminal activity (Monkkonen 1981a:23). The “origins of policing are rooted in both class and crime control (Monkkonen 1981a:23).” Like Monkkonen, Haller (1976: 313), in a study of the Chicago police from 1890 to 1925, found that the control of tramps and drifters was a central police responsibility.

In Canada, a similar pattern of social control existed. Until the ascent of traffic offences, public drunkenness was the most common offence in Canada (Marquis 1993:246). In the 1850's, issues of “immigration, drunkenness, and rowdyism,” reinforced the need for police in Toronto (Rogers 1984:121). Similar to the United States, police saw moral reform as particularly important (Rogers 1984:132-3). Poor Irish Catholics had the worst relations with the police and were the targets of police activity (Rogers 1984:134). Other working class groups fared better, and overall there was “little
resistance from the working class” to the idea of the police (Rogers 1984:134-5).

According to Monkkonen, the eclipse of public order offenses was due to a rise in public order. Social welfare services became privatized and this facilitated police reform (Monkkonen 1981a:128). As the police shed their social welfare functions, they adopted a focus on crime and traffic control (Monkkonen 1981a:31, 108). Central to Monkkonen’s argument of a basic shift from class to crime control was an analysis of arrest rates. He provides evidence that arrest rates actually dropped during massive immigration, industrialization and urbanization (Monkkonen 1981a:75). To him, the decrease in arrest rates between 1860 and 1982 suggests a decrease in urban disorder (Monkkonen 1982:582).

The most controversial part of Monkkonen’s argument is that the decline in public order offences is best explained by the declining use of public space and the rise of urban order (Monkkonen 1981b:553). Automobiles increased the privatization of urban life by emptying the streets (Monkkonen 1981b:546). They changed how, and where, people socialized. Another important factor in the shift to urban order was Prohibition, which reduced alcohol consumption (Monkkonen 1981b:547). As social interaction changed due to automobiles, and alcohol became more scarce and expensive, police focused their control activities in different directions.
Conversely, Watts (1983: 342) suggests that it was not a rise of public order that reduced public order offences, but a shift in police orientation from pro-active to reactive. He rejects Monkkonen's assertion that society is more orderly now. He maintains that neither the public nor the police perceive the streets to be orderly (Watts 1983: 358). But Monkkonen only argued that public space had become more orderly. It may be more accurate to view disorder as shifting from public streets to private homes, due to changing patterns of social interaction. This shift takes problems out of public view, making it difficult for police to adopt a pro-active stance. Thus, Watts in one sense may be correct that disorder is still common. In another sense Monkkonen is correct because public spaces have become more orderly.

Another controversy concerns the effectiveness of police social control activities. Monkkonen asserts that, in contrast to crime control, order control has a long and successful record (Monkkonen 1983:117). Historians, however, do not all agree on this issue. Weaver contends (1990b:114) that the police reluctantly enforced moral order laws; they were not a "consistent or even forceful agency for social control." The police were not always willing to be agents of moral reform, and some people worried that the police were too close to the working class (Marquis 1993:52). Even police associations such as the CCAC were ambivalent about moral issues. Due to a lack of consensus, the CCAC did not pass a formal resolution on Prohibition (Marquis 1993:109). To the police, the most bothersome group were middle-class reformers with moral agendas (Marquis
In Hamilton from 1900 to 1914, the "heyday of moral crusades," the police only responded to interest groups for the short term (Weaver 1990b:114). The control of drinking offences may have been high on the police agenda, but the effectiveness with which they dealt with these problems is another matter.

Boritch and Hagan (1987) challenge Monkkonen's idea that policing went through a transformation from class control to crime control in the late nineteenth-century (Boritch and Hagan 1987:307). They maintain that the primary role of police is class control (Boritch and Hagan 1987:309). Their main assertion is that "the major change in the police role from the nineteenth to the twentieth-century was not a shift to a crime-control model, but rather a change in the form of class control (Boritch and Hagan 1987:309)." Essentially their case rests on the assumption that the enactment and enforcement of city by-laws reflected the attempt of the middle-class to control working-class morality, recreations, and economic activities (Boritch and Hagan 1987:325). By incorporating vice and bylaw offences in their analysis they found that the Toronto police exercised a strong class control focus from 1859 to 1955 (Boritch and Hagan 1987: 330). Since Boritch and Hagan excluded traffic violations (Boritch and Hagan 1987:315), they have ignored a large proportion of overall offences. In effect, they did not address Monkkonen's main assertion that social control changed from class to issues of crime and traffic control. While class control activities have continued, we have no idea of its
importance in relation to traffic and other forms of control.

Still, many social scientists find the social control as oppression perspective appealing. Reiner (1991:107) agrees that the bulk of police work involves maintaining order in public places and amounts to moral “street-sweeping.” Ericson (1982) suggests that the primary task of the police is the social control of those on the margins of society. He suggests (1982:10, 200) that the police are “agents of the status quo,” and that their basic goal is to “reproduce order” by controlling those on the margins of society.

In sum, even in their ‘crime work,’ patrol officers are most often ordering petty disturbances, regulating driving, and sorting out property relations. Whether such large resources should be poured into these areas is a matter of debate. If we argue strictly in terms of the harm done, it is doubtful whether the massive effort is worth it. (Ericson 1982:206)

Weaver agrees somewhat; he questions police effectiveness, but he views social control as only one aspect of police activities.

Moral order campaigns and strikes have secured prominent places in the writing of social history in Canada. However, to dwell on them as features of urban policing is to misunderstand policing as badly as to maintain that policing was largely concerned with apprehending criminals. To critics, police forces oppressed the workingman and “foreigners”; to its advocates it prevented crime and caught malefactors. These things they carried out, although they did them almost incidently and largely ineffectually. (Weaver 1990b: 115-16).

In contrast to Boritch and Hagan (1987), Ericson (1982), and Reiner (1991),
police reformers such as Vollmer (1971), and historians such as Monkkonen (1981a), Marquis (1993), and Weaver (1995) all emphasize the tremendous impact of automobiles on police control activities. They maintain that the implications of the widespread use of automobiles necessitated a re-distribution of police control activities.

Similar to Monkkonen, Marquis emphasizes the importance of traffic control. Traffic control expanded the need for police services. For example, in the 1920’s provincial governments were faced with the challenges of patrolling newly built highways, and at the same time, in the United States, “the automobile sparked the creation of state police or highway patrols in nineteen states between 1917 and 1929 (Marquis 1993:130).” Innovations in transportation required innovations in police work. The Ontario Provincial Police spent about three quarters of their time on traffic related duties, and they may have gone out of business without it (Marquis 1993:246). By the late 1950’s traffic offences constituted about 90% of summary convictions in Canada (Marquis 1993:246). Traffic duties were “analogous to arresting drunks in the nineteenth century”; they became “a measure of productivity” (Marquis 1993:246). As morality offences dominated the nineteenth-century, traffic offences came to dominate the twentieth-century.

Traffic control is necessary because few people can drive without violating traffic laws (Vollmer 1971:144). Because of the sheer number of violations, traffic regulation
became an overwhelming task for police (Vollmer 1971: 119). To place traffic police at major intersections of the business district is prohibitively expensive (Vollmer 1971:129). “So many police are assigned to perform traffic duties that regular patrol posts are almost entirely deserted (Vollmer 1971:130).” Vollmer’s observations suggest the extent of the problem. Such measures were needed because of the economic and social problems created by automobiles. Economic loss from traffic accidents in the USA in 1933 was four times the total loss from fire damage, approximately the cost of the entire public education system, and several times the cost of all police departments in the USA (Vollmer 1971:123).

In Hamilton the situation was similar. In Hamilton the automobile became the leading form of sudden death by 1921 (Weaver 1995:176). Drunk and careless drivers had a catastrophic impact on the city (Weaver 1995: 176).

As far as the police were concerned, the most important technological innovation was the automobile. It eventually took many constables off the beat and distanced them from the neighbourhoods they patrolled; it also vastly increased their workload. Starting in May 1910, the chief recognised the dangers posed to citizens by the ‘street burners.’ Interestingly, the three owners singled out as serious offenders who deserved substantial fines for speeding were members of the city elite... [The] trend changed as automobiles became more widespread... What is more, the powers conferred on police to deal with traffic represented the greatest increase in their power to lay charges since the creation of the force. (Weaver 1995:145-6)

Weaver’s comments are instructive. He not only emphasizes the extent of traffic problems,
he indicates that, at least initially, traffic control was directed at elites because only they could afford automobiles. Still traffic regulation provides an example of social control activity that was not rooted in class control. It is also interesting to note how traffic issues expanded the role of police control activities. This suggests that traffic control made police work very different in the twentieth century than it had been in the nineteenth.

Monkkonen, Weaver, Marquis and Vollmer tend view control activities as a response to a specific historical context. As the context changed so did police control activities. Boritch and Hagan, Ericson, Watts, and Reiner tend to emphasize the class or oppressive nature of social control activities as more uniform. These different perspectives raise a question of fundamental importance - to what degree were the police shaped by the changing social context? This question is central to the present study.

3.4 Police Effectiveness

This section examines the literature on police effectiveness. Two areas are of particular concern: the relationship between the size of police forces and crime rates, and the effectiveness of police patrol as a deterrent to crime. Both these areas are important because they challenge traditional assumptions about the effectiveness of police.

3.4.1 Crime and the Size of Police Forces
The literature on the police and crime attempts to evaluate the size of police forces in relation to crime rates. The answer to this question is significant because it provides a general idea of police effectiveness. It can at least potentially raise several issues. Traditionally, researchers have assumed that crimes rates could be compared to the size of police forces in order to establish a possible relation between them. If there is no relation between crime and the police then it implies that police are ineffective. If a positive relation is found then crime rates would appear as a function of police activity. Conversely, if the association is negative then the traditional assumptions about the deterrent value of police patrol would be reinforced.

Wellford (1974:199) used a regression analysis to analyse uniform-crime statistics (1960-1971) from twenty-one urban-centres in the United States. He found that the per-capita size and budgets of police forces contribute little to the “explained variation in crime rates (Wellford 1974:195),” and that crime was more related to socioeconomic factors than to characteristics of the police (Wellford 1974:208). His research does not lead to a causal interpretation (Wellford 1974:207) or concrete explanation. He suggests that more variables need to be studied to understand crime causation (Wellford 1974:210). Swimmer (1974) examines the same question using the same twenty-one urban-areas (as Wellford) between 1960 and 1971. He suggests, however, that the supply of crime and demand for police require separate equations, and for this reason he used a two-stage least-squares regression. Swimmer obtained very different results from
Wellford (1974). He found that greater police expenditure was associated with lower crime rates (Swimmer 1974:311). It is not clear whether it was different variables or different methods that produced the contradictory results.

More recently, Loftin and McDowell (1982) studied the relationship between numbers of police per 100,000 residents of Detroit between 1926 and 1977 and the level of reported crime. Part of the rationale for their research was that the results of previous research were ambiguous. “One can find support for almost any inference one wants (Loftin and McDowell 1982:394).” Their results did not suggest a relationship between the size of police forces and crime (Loftin and McDowell 1982:398). They conclude that “the economic model is too simple to account for the relationship between crime and police strength (Loftin and McDowell 1982:400).”

Koenig (1996) used Canada-wide time series data (1962-1988) to examine the relationship between police strength and crime. He found that police strength and crime “advanced broadly together over the 27 year period (Koenig 1996:83),” because increased police strength generated increased police activity, and this in turn is associated with increased rates of crime generally (Koenig 1996:84).

The problem with these studies is that they assume that increases in the per-capita size of police forces directly translates into increases in police activity. This may seem an
entirely reasonable assumption, but it is highly problematic because it confuses two
distinct aspects of policing: size and strength. Though they may correspond in some ways
and at some times, increases in per-capita size do not necessarily translate into increases
in police strength for the following reasons:

1. Changing work-weeks: reduced work-weeks or increased benefits may have required
increases in the per-capita size of police forces without translating into increased activity;
2. Changing distribution of work: Even if higher level of police activity could be
established it may mean more traffic enforcement, not crime enforcement;
3. Use of technology: technology can influence the degree of police activity. Increases in
activity may occur without any increase in size; and
4. Type of patrol used by police: police activity can be related to the particular allocation
of resources, not merely their total.

Because these factors have not been addressed, the research on the size of police forces
and crime has produced ambiguous findings.

3.4.2 Patrol and Police Effectiveness

A more direct approach is required to address the issue of police effectiveness.
Since over half of the resources of most police departments are committed to patrol

At one time, the myth of preventative patrol as a deterrent to crime was widely accepted (Kelling 1978: 200, Clarke and Hough 1984:5). With cars, radios and telephones, it appeared that an “omnipresent patrol force could be created (Moore and Kelling 1983: 55).” The belief was that technology combined with police presence would provide a remedy to the problem of crime. This has not occurred.

Bright (1965) was the first to study patrol effectiveness using the experimental method. He found that incidences of crime decreased if the number of officers per beat were increased from zero to one. Further increases from one up to four officers per beat had little impact on crime (in Kelling et al. 1974:9). Although the research was inconclusive due to methodological limitations, it appears that in some situations police presence can have an impact on crime (Kelling et al. 1974:9).

The Kansas City Patrol Experiment was a more elaborate evaluation of patrol effectiveness. Kelling suggests (1978:200) that prior to the Kansas City Study, the myth of preventative patrolling was pervasive in the research community and among police administrators. At the time, the study represented the most scientific analysis of the police patrol ever undertaken (1974:i). The study directly examined the relationship between
changes in the level of patrol activity and crime rates. Although the idea was simple, the experimental design was elaborate. The study divided patrol activity into three experimental groups as follows:

1. No preventative patrol, police responded to calls only.
2. Normal preventative patrol
3. Increased patrol, two or three times the normal level.

Over a one year period, differences between the three patrol variations were not statistically significant in terms of the amount of crime (reported or unreported), citizens feeling of security and their satisfaction with police overall (Kelling et al. 1974:iii). In the Kansas City study, citizens from randomly selected households could not distinguish changes in the quantity of patrol activity (Kelling et al. 1980:52).

The study represents the most accurate measurement of patrol activity under relatively controlled conditions, and as such it provides a basic challenge to assumptions of the effectiveness of police patrol in relation to crime. In part, the ineffectiveness of police patrol can be attributed to the lack of help from victims or witnesses (Moore and Kelling 1983: 50). Still, patrol is not completely ineffective. In instances where patrols have been removed, the consequences can be immediate. In 1968, during a sixteen hour police walkout, the city of Montreal experienced riots, vandalism, arson, burglaries, and ten
bank robberies (Marquis 1993:307). The value of police presence may be symbolic (Clarke and Heal 1978:69). Police patrol is important for reassuring the public, for increasing their feeling of security, and for alleviating the public’s fear of crime (Bahn 1974: 340, 344). While it is clear that a police presence is necessary, it remains controversial how these resources can be used most effectively (Farmer 1978:120).

The limits of police patrol as a deterrent to crime can be seen in relation to the opportunity for crime. Clarke and Hough (1984:7) estimate that a constable patrolling in London, England, could expect to pass within a hundred yards of a burglary in process on average about once every eight years, and even then may not realize that a crime was taking place. Felson (1994:11) estimates that on average, given existing police resources, each household in Los Angeles county can expect about 29 seconds of patrol coverage per day. That leaves 23 hours, 59 minutes and 31 seconds with no patrol coverage. This translates directly into opportunity for crime and reveals the obvious limits of patrol. There is little evidence that increasing foot patrols will reduce crime, and car patrols are no more effective (Clarke and Hough 1984: 6-7). Shover and Honaker (1996) suggest that a large percentage of property offenders they studied did not consider the possibility of arrest. Given the limits of traditional patrol activities, it is not surprising that patrols have little direct impact on the problem of crime in many situations. Even district police stations do not reduce crime much, since decreases in street crime are usually within
only several hundred feet of the station (Wilson and McLaren 1977:108). Given such conditions, the question becomes how could patrol be effective as a deterrent to crime?

The Kansas City study changed Kelling's perspective on police patrol. He maintains that terms like efficiency and productivity do not really apply to policing (Kelling 1978: 197). Further, he suggests that no attempt has been made to evaluate the productivity of police in non-crime related activities (Kelling 1978: 204). Despite their orientation towards crime, police spend most of their time on public service activity (Kelling 1978: 201, Clarke and Hough 1980:7, Clarke and Heal 1978:69). Because police provide a variety of services, it is difficult to estimate the appropriate size of police forces (Clarke and Hough 1984: 2-3). Ultimately, we need to take a broader view of police functions and effectiveness. The question of crime should be seen in relation to the realities and limits of police patrol.

3.5 The Present Research in Relation to Prior Studies

Prior research raises questions that need to be addressed. One issue that emerges is how policing was shaped by the larger social context. Monkkonen (1983:128) argues that to understand the police, we must understand the changing historical context. Similarly, Bayley (1976:195) maintains that police institutions reflect society. The question is to what degree do police reflect the larger society? This question applies to all aspects of the
police, from the work police do to the amount they are paid to do it. How can we account for the change from military to corporate organization? Similarly, how did the automobile influence policing? How have police control patterns changed? How did crime and traffic offence rates change, and what were the implications of these changes for the police? How important was patrol to policing in Hamilton? What factors motivated the change from foot patrol to cruiser patrol? What economic factors influenced policing, and how did the rise of police unions change police work?

All of these questions, in one way or another, relate to change. Do the police have a separate and distinct culture that is impermeable to external forces? Is policing simply a function of contemporaneous social processes and factors? To understand the police we are required to understand how they have changed and what has caused the changes. We must balance inherent characteristics and developmental tendencies against the demands of the moment. This is the primary task of this study.

In order to address questions raised by prior research, an exploratory study into the main trends in policing in Hamilton between 1900-1973 was conducted. Additionally, the study covers areas that previous research has not addressed - primarily how policing has been influenced by economic factors. The study examines the main trends in the areas of economics, organization, work and technology. It also examines the contextual factors from which the trends emerge. Ultimately the goal of the research is to present the police
in a more comprehensive manner.
Chapter 4: The Changing Context of Policing

The police are social products. This view is not unique, but it is seldom completely appreciated. Prior studies have viewed the attitudes and activities of the police as reflecting specific social or class interests. In this chapter we will take a broader view of this question. Changes to policing reflect more widespread changes than have generally been acknowledged by prior research. Demographic, technological, and social factors all produced significant changes to policing. In the twentieth-century, massive and relatively rapid changes transformed the police as they did society overall. The police were social products on two levels: first, specific circumstances compelled them to change, and second, the changes incorporated by the police reflect the range of (usually external) alternatives that exist at a given point in time. Change resulted from different aspects of the larger social context.

Among the different external factors that influenced policing, three are examined in this chapter. These factors were selected after a direct examination of the historical record based on the significance of their influence. They are population growth, the automobile, and the changing distribution of crime. Each of these has been responsible for tremendous changes to policing. Large increases in population transformed Hamilton
in a short time. The automobile represented a tremendous workload for the police, and simultaneously played a large role in the technological revolution that occurred in policing in the twentieth century. The changing distribution of crime played a fundamental role in changes to police activity and the public's expectations of the police. Activities that defined police work at the beginning of the century, dealing with drunks and vagrants, would become decriminalized by the 1970's. The primary goal of this chapter is to show how each of the aforementioned factors was essential to changes that occurred in the Hamilton Police.

4.1 Population

In Hamilton, population growth was not simply a quantitative phenomenon but a qualitative one as well, redefining social institutions and interaction. The city grew from a population of 52,665 in 1901 to 305,361 in 1973. Population increased, almost continually (Figure 4.1), tripling between the turn of the century and World War II, and doubling from World War II to 1973. Similar to Canada overall, increases in population can be attributed to declining infant and maternal mortality, longer life expectancies and massive immigration (Urquhart 1965). Immigration was an especially important factor in the growth of Hamilton. By 1961, over 31% of Hamilton residents were immigrants.

Data from the Hamilton Municipal notebook. This source was used because it is the most complete, and probably the most accurate. It should be pointed out that the values do not correspond identically with Census estimates.
Figure 4.1: City of Hamilton Population by Year

Population

Year
Immigrants arrived in waves, with large numbers arriving prior to World War I and after World War II. The period from the Great Depression to the end of World War II had very low immigration rates. Immigration cycles were quite pronounced. For example, in Canada the number of immigrants declined from 400,870 in 1913 to 36,665 in 1915 (Urquhart 1965). After World War II the opposite occurred. Nationally, immigration increased from 12,801 in 1944 to 71,719 in 1946 (Urquhart 1965). For Hamilton the period between 1930 and 1945 showed little or no population growth (Figure 4.1). This corresponds with low levels of immigration during this period.

In the twentieth century, the population of Hamilton increased about sixfold. The increases were propelled by waves of immigration.

### 4.1.1 Population and The Police

As population increased so did the police force. Figure 4.2 shows the number of police personnel per 1000 population. Between 1900 and 1940, increases in the size of the force were consistent with the ratio of one police employee per thousand population (Figure 4.2). In 1911, the ratio was 1.18:1000, and by 1940, the ratio stood at

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Prior to World War II, ratios tend to represent sworn staff. After the war, civilians tended to replace sworn staff, and ratios tend to be based on the number of employees. In order to remain consistent, I used the total numbers of employees for both periods. Data were obtained from HPARs 1900-1973, except that city financial records were used to estimate the civilian component of the force prior to their inclusion in the HPARs.
Figure 4.2: Size of the Police Force by Year

Size is expressed in the number of police employees per 1000 population
While the force had grown substantially during this period, from 87 to 168 employees, it had only kept pace with the growing population. As the city grew, the police force grew. Before 1946, transient deviations from the 1:1000 standard resulted from both world wars, inability to find recruits, settlement outside city boundaries, resignations, and lack of funding, but these temporary deviations were anomalies.

After World War II the situation changed dramatically; there was more change in the population standard used to estimate the size of the force between 1949-1953 than in the prior 50 years combined (Figure 4.2). The size of the force increased much faster than the population between 1949 and 1953, as the ratio increased from 1.0 to 1.8:1000. Between 1953 and 1973, the ratio remained close to 1.8:1000. In fact, in 1968 Chief Lawrence suggested that the ideal ratio was 1.8 police employees per thousand residents (HS August 22, 1968). In the post World War II period, changes in the size of the force appear more dependent on other factors. Technology, such as radio-equipped cruisers, increased the 'productivity' of the police, but these increases could not keep pace with

Massive immigration prior to World War I led to settlement outside the official city boundaries. These areas required police patrol. Settlement outside city boundaries meant the population patrolled by the police was greater than the estimated city population. It is likely that the large deviation from the 1:1000 standard prior to World War I resulted from the need to have officers patrolling areas that were not annexed by the city (see Weaver 1995:144). The pre-World War I peak does not represent an actual increase in the per-capita size of the force but more likely is the result of a demographic anomaly.
shrinking work-weeks and increasing benefits, and so, more police were required to provide the same level of service. These points will become more apparent as they are dealt with in greater detail in subsequent chapters.

Originally, the relationship between police size and population was rooted in police assumptions about social order. Police viewed crime and social problems as intrinsic parts of social life, and given their collective experiences, they had little reason to believe otherwise. The following quotation from a talk given by Deputy Chief Constable, Ernest Goodman, at a Rotary Club luncheon illustrates the point:

"Remove police surveillance from any of our so-called civilized countries for a period of twenty-four hours and what would be the result? I feel safe in saying that one-half the populace would be at the other's throat trying to force their property from them - and the outrages against our women folk would be too atrocious to even think of. To combat this police are amassed against any evil, even if we do peev you off once in a while by summoning you for speeding or improper parking with [sic] your automobile." (HS September 30, 1927)

Clearly, Goodman viewed police as a necessary part of the fabric of urban social life. To him, police kept a lid on crime and social problems by virtue of their presence on the streets. While he was aware of the obstacles they faced in controlling and preventing crime (HPAR 1936), he nonetheless saw their role as an essential one, one that could not be dispensed with without dire consequences. His views are more Hobbesian than class based, i.e., the role of police does not reinforce the status-quo, but prevents the war of some against some, if not all against all. For Goodman there was no dangerous class, in
the sense that Monkkonen (1981a) suggests, but rather crime was seen as an inherent aspect of social life.

Because crime or other social problems could emerge at any place or at any time, police relied on patrols as the basic remedy for social ills. Patrol work defined policing. Wilson and McLaren (1977:320) contend that policing should be considered a patrol service with specialized activities developed as aids. To this day, most, if not all, urban police forces maintain patrol activities as the basis of police operations. Hamilton was no different. Patrol activity formed the basis of police activity in the twentieth century.

Since patrol work involves covering a given population or area, it was common to estimate the numbers of constables required based on population. The link between patrol coverage and the demographic and spatial aspects of the city was direct. In contrast, the relation between patrol activity and crime was much less direct, making crime rates an inadequate basis for estimating police strength. Considerable changes in the distribution of crime and the overall crime rate had no influence on the ratio of one police employee per thousand population during the period between 1900 and 1945. If the size of the force was a function of crime, it would have changed dramatically in the first forty years of this century, but this never happened. Evidence suggests that crime rates were more important for determining the specific allocation of police resources rather than the total amount of resources.
There was nothing unusual about the reliance on population ratios to estimate the size of police forces. Population ratios were widely used in British, American, and Canadian police forces from the inception of modern policing in 1829. In Hamilton, the 1:1000 ratio was identical to the standard established by Sir Robert Peel for the London Metropolitan Police (derived from Gash 1961:501). In England, the standard was applied to rural areas as well. The Rural Constabulary Act set the maximum number of constables at one per thousand population; conversely, if the number of constables decreased below the 1:1000 standard, police forces risked losing government funding (Emsley 1984:71,81). The overall Canadian data reflect this trend. Prior to WWII the rates were close to 1:1000, while during the early 1950s, rates increased to about 1.6:1000 (Leacy 1983).

In Hamilton, no rationale was ever given in the Annual Reports for the use of population-based standards. These standards may be more related to available finances than an actual estimate of the police required to provide social order. Stone and DeLuca (1985:374) state that the main factor for determining the size of police forces is the available budget. Clearly, population standards had very different consequences depending on who was using them - chief constables could ask for increases in personnel if the rate declined below one police officer per thousand residents, and city officials could limit the growth of the force, suggesting that they could not justify increases beyond the

6 These Canadian data do not include civilians.
accepted standard (HS February 16, 1892, HPAR 1912). In Hamilton, the demographic standard balanced the requests made by chief constables for personnel against the attempts of city council to limit spending. Ultimately, population-based estimates of police strength were rooted in economic realities. As the city grew, so did tax revenues, and so did the police.

From the police perspective, standards based solely on population were advantageous because they resulted in stable, continuous funding from the city. In reality these estimates were only partially effective. First, in times of population expansion, the growth of the force lagged behind the growth of the city - resulting in continual understaffing. Second, demographic estimates may have sufficed for everyday needs, but they did not take into account the impact of unique events such as natural disasters, labour strikes, and special events during which the police often found themselves understaffed.

Implicit in police use of population standards and their direct expression in the police patrol was the reality of social problems that police faced. Single officer patrol was an adequate response because of the nature of most of the problems constables had to deal with. A single constable on patrol could realistically be expected to break up a domestic dispute, deal with traffic violations, discipline juveniles, write up a report for a theft, or deal with intoxicated citizens. Most police concerns did not involve group conflict, and in

7 This will become evident as we look at crime and traffic issues later in this chapter.
this sense patrol accommodated the public's demands. Size translated into patrol strength, and patrol strength was an attempt to address the individual nature of most social problems.

Because the size of the force was so closely tied to population, increases in population brought about tremendous change to the Department. If the population had not increased, then the changes to the Department would not have been so substantial. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, the growth from a small to a large police force was one of the most important aspects of change in Hamilton because it changed how the police interacted among themselves and with the public.

4.2 The Influence of the Automobile

As the automobile redefined the urban landscape, it revolutionized how people lived, worked, and socialized in the city, and consequently, the impact on policing was immense. Initially, the automobile replaced the horse-drawn carriage. The transition took time. In the 1920's, a police station (in Canada) was more likely to have a stable than a garage (Marquis 1993:168). By the end of the 1930's, horses had effectively disappeared as a form of road transport in the United Kingdom and the United States (Grubler 1990:127,139,141). The replacement of horse-drawn carriages was motivated by the advantages that automobiles had. They offered improved performance in terms of speed,
range, and ease of use, they did not require inventories of food and water, and initially, automobiles were considered environmentally benign (Grubler 1990:185). Also, the cost of automobiles had dropped substantially due to mass-production techniques and Henry Ford’s obsession with producing cars for the rank and file (Davis 1988:11). Consider that a Ford model T cost $850 in 1908, but by 1924 the price had dropped to $260 (Davis 1988:121-2). Just as the price of automobiles was falling, the real wages of workers were rising, creating an economic incentive to purchase automobiles. Ultimately, advantages over horse drawn carriages coupled with economic incentives created a momentum for the automobile revolution.

Trends in Hamilton clearly indicate the proliferation of automobiles. The number of passenger automobiles per thousand population increased from 44.93 in 1919 to 331.71 in 1968 (Figure 4.3). The rapid increase in the post WWII period is especially significant, and, similar to the overall Canadian trend, the number of vehicles increased much faster than the population (Figure 4.3). In 1941, 44.4% the households in Hamilton had an automobile; by 1971, the figure had reached 80.4% (Canada Census 1941,1971).

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8 Figures are in US dollars. It was not specified whether inflation was corrected for in these estimates.

After WWII the automobile was firmly established as the dominant transportation infrastructure in Canada generally as well as in Hamilton.

Eventually, as more and more individuals began using automobiles, the result was an increase in geographic mobility on an unprecedented scale. Felson (1994:47,63) suggests that the changes brought about by the automobile constitute a unique period in history, because the potential average mobility increased from a daily activity radius of about twelve miles to about fifty miles. This increase in mobility effectively resulted in the restructuring of urban space. The car changed the “very shape and function of our cities and towns,” and one chief estimated that the automobile created a tenfold increase in police work between 1911 and 1921 (Marquis 1993:169).

As the automobile changed the urban landscape through urban sprawl, the city required a new type of policing. Less densely populated suburbs meant that police patrolled ‘areas’ more than ‘people.’ For police, Weaver suggests, that “the very device that made urban sprawl possible provided the solution (Weaver 1995:165).” Consider the following: in 1901 the area of Hamilton was about 16 square kilometres, but

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10 The one exception to this trend was the widespread use of high rise housing, which provided police with unique problems because of their high densities (Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Annual Report 1978:101-02).
Figure 4.3: Passenger Vehicles Rates by Year
by 1979 the Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police would patrol an area of 690 square kilometres.\textsuperscript{11} The result was that between 1901 and 1979, the population density (of the area patrolled by police) decreased from 3267 to 591 persons per square kilometre. Another way of looking at the change is to look at the number of square kilometres per police employee, in 1901 it was 0.27, but by 1979 it increased to 0.84. As urban areas spread out police had to cover greater areas to patrol the same number of people. \textsuperscript{12}

Besides altering the landscape of the city and increasing mobility, automobiles created tremendous problems for the police. The police had always been responsible for traffic in the city, but the automobile took these problems to an entirely different level. Problems fell into two categories: congestion and accidents/traffic law enforcement. In Hamilton, by 1941 automobile-related problems became so severe that every constable on the force capable of operating an automobile was detailed to police car duty (HPAR 1941). The police began a system of rotation that consisted of two weeks walking a beat and one week in cruisers (HPAR 1942). Police records suggest that the transition from foot patrol to automobile patrol occurred primarily because of traffic problems in the city.

\textsuperscript{11} Data from 1901 Canada Census 1901, Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Statistical Report 1979.

\textsuperscript{12} With the formation of the Hamilton Regional Police in 1974 the city boundaries no longer directly corresponded with the police patrol boundaries. While this inflates the total area, it should be pointed out that effectively the region was becoming a single metropolitan area.
The automobile became a victim of its own success. The expansion of roadways
could not keep up with the massive numbers of automobiles using them. For example, in
1904 there were 4,550 metres of road for every car in the United States; by 1977 there
were only 41.3 metres of road for every car (Grubler 1990:129). Even though there were
many more roads in 1977 than in 1904, they were much more congested. This was even
more true in urban areas, which were plagued by very high car densities. In Hamilton,
congestion problems became acute, and by 1941 officers directed traffic at strategic points
in the city (HPAR 1941). In the crowded city core, congestion was an endemic problem.
Problems were exacerbated by the lack of arterial roadways to major employers, and by
the presence of the Niagara Escarpment which limited the possibilities for the expansion of
existing roadways. Large increases in the overall numbers of vehicles created problems
beginning in the late 1940's. By 1956, congestion had become so severe that a one way
street system was instituted (HPAR 1956). The problem could not be solved by
regulation and enforcement; it required rearranging the flow of traffic through the city
core more efficiently.

Parking posed its own problems. Five hundred parking meters were installed to
alleviate the parking problem in 1946 (HPAR 1946). The result was that bylaw offences,
of which parking offences typically constitute over 90%, almost doubled in 1946 alone.
Parking offences became so numerous that the police just could not keep up. Initially
parking offences were a police responsibility, but the extent of the problem led to the
creation of a separate parking authority. In 1953, Chief Lawrence suggested that “the parking problem is always with us (HPAR 1953).” Continual parking and congestion problems demonstrate the inability of enforcement alone to solve the problem. In American cities, the movement of shopping centres to suburbs was a basic solution to the problem of inner city congestion (Vollmer 1971:31). Hamilton shows the same pattern of sub-urbanization to accommodate the automobile.

When cars were moving, traffic enforcement and accidents made considerable demands on police. Many motorists had little regard for pedestrians, and automobile speeding was a problem as early as 1912 (HT October 14, 1912). By 1913, speeding had become so prevalent that Chief Smith mentioned the need to purchase a motorcycle to cope with the problem (HPAR 1913). Traffic enforcement, the bulk of which were parking violations and speeding offences, created a huge increase in the police workload (Figure 4.4). Between 1911 and 1970, the traffic offence rate increased over 78 fold, and the bylaw rate over 72 fold. During the same period, the crime rate increased only twofold (Figure 4.5). Marquis (1993:246) suggests that by the late 1950's traffic offences constituted 90% of summary convictions in Canada. In Hamilton, as a direct result of the overwhelming number of traffic violations, courts that traditionally dealt with morality offences, i.e., the lowest courts, were transformed into traffic courts (Weaver 1995:178). To get an idea of the extent of traffic enforcement, consider that in 1954, 71% of all offences were bylaw offences, of which, over 94% were parking tickets (HPAR 1954). Of
Figure 4.4: Distribution of Offences (%) by Year

- Traffic + Bylaw
- Bylaw
- Traffic
- Crime

Figure 4.5: Offence Rates per 1000 Residents by Year
the remaining 29%, 24% were traffic offences. Taken together, automobiles accounted for about 91% of all offences in 1954 (derived from HPAR 1954).

Traffic violations far exceeded the police resources to deal with them. Vollmer (1971:129,144) suggests that traffic laws are impossible to enforce completely because few individuals can drive without violating laws. Because of the large numbers of traffic violations, it is not practical, or even possible, to enforce traffic laws without massive increases in police personnel (Vollmer 1971:144). Consider that in Hamilton there were 10.36 passenger vehicles for every traffic offence in 1923, but by 1958 there were only 1.61 passenger vehicles per traffic offence (HPAR 1923,1958). Although it is obvious that enforcement efforts had risen tremendously, it is clear that enforcement capability did not come close to the extent of the problem.

Although many traffic offenders escaped the watchful eye of the police, traffic enforcement changed the public’s interaction with the police. Instead of devoted public servants, police became vilified as agents of a revenue-seeking, bureaucratic government. Vollmer (1971:132) notes that police detest parking tag duty because it results in destructive criticism and erodes public confidence in the police. Marquis (1993:247) maintains that traffic cops were often hated and feared by citizens even though it was their job to protect the public. It is easy to imagine how attitudes towards the police could

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13 Excludes parking tags.
systematically shift as traffic enforcement began to represent the basis of larger and larger numbers of public-police interactions.

In the following chapters, a recurring theme will be just how profoundly the automobile influenced policing. Stone and De Luca (1985:190) suggest that the major difference between nineteenth and twentieth-century policing was the direct impact of the automobile; the evidence in Hamilton supports this claim.

4.3 Changes in Crime

Police often view their role in crime prevention and law enforcement as their primary function. In Hamilton, the crime rates, as indicated by police records, more than doubled between 1911 and 1971 (Figure 4.5). Numbers can be misleading; it is not only a question of having more or less crime, but historically different eras can be distinguished by their particular distribution of criminal activity. These changes were so large that they were not simply a result of changes in police behaviour or agenda, but rather reflect basic changes in the city. The ability of police to influence the distribution of crime was quite limited, since the majority of crimes were reported to the police, not discovered by them (Weaver 1995).

14 For a discussion of the limitations of official crime statistics refer to Silverman et al. (1996). Actual numbers of crimes likely varied substantially from police records, however, crime statistics are more suitable as indicators of police activity.
Figure 4.6: Crime Rates by Year

Rate per 1000 Residents

Year
To demonstrate systematic changes in crime, we can classify crimes into three basic categories: morality, violent, and property. Morality crimes include drinking, gambling, prostitution and vagrancy offences. Violent crimes include all forms of bodily harm including assaults, sexual offences, and murder. Property crimes include all crimes against property including all types of theft and damage to property. Historically, drinking offences were the most common type of morality crime, assault was the most common form of violent crime, and theft was the most common form of property crime.

Figure 4.6 illustrates how the different categories of crime have changed in the twentieth century. Overall, there has been a dramatic transition resulting from declining morality offences and increasing property offences. The transition from high levels of morality offences to high levels of property offences reflects perhaps the most important trend in crime rates in the twentieth century. These trends were not arbitrary - they reflected the changing social character of the city. The changing distribution of crime indicates three distinct periods. In the pre-Prohibition era, between 1900 and 1917, most crime consisted of morality offences, primarily relating to public drunkenness. This era

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These categories do not include all types of criminal offences. They are meant to serve as summaries of overall trends. Other types of crime that occur at very low frequencies were not included.

Crime rates are per thousand population and are based on the following:
Property Crime: thefts reported
Violent Crime: aggregate of all assaults charges
Morality crime: drinking offences.
saw a continuation of trends that began in the nineteenth century and ended with Prohibition in 1917. The period between Prohibition and World War II represented a transitional phase from the domination of morality offences to the domination of property crime that occurred by the late 1950's. The post World War II era is noteworthy for the predominance of property crime. The rise in all types of crime makes this period unique in the twentieth century.

4.3.1 The Pre-Prohibition Era: 1900 to 1917

Between 1900 and 1917, morality crimes dominated police work. This pattern was widespread for many urban police forces, and in this sense Hamilton was typical. Monkkonen (1981a) has provided convincing evidence of the extent of morality crime in the United States in the late nineteenth century. Marquis (1993:109) notes that until the rise of traffic offences drunkenness was the most common offence in Police Annual Reports in Canada overall. Weaver (1995:78) provides evidence that the same pattern existed in Hamilton as well. For example, in 1892 most public complaints to the police involved drunkenness (HS February 16,1892). Arrests required direct physical intervention in many instances, and constables often had considerable difficulty due to the resistance put up by inebriated citizens (HS November 12,1921). Statistical evidence in police annual reports suggests that Prohibition was the end of an era when public disorder and drunkenness charges dominated crime. Even though drinking offences outnumbered
violent crime after Prohibition, they would never reach pre-Prohibition levels in the period that followed.

Excessive public drinking in the traditional era was accompanied by high rates of violent crime. Prior to Prohibition in 1917, morality and violent crime followed almost identical trends. High rates of both morality and violent offences gives this era its particular character. In contrast, property crime rates were lower than at any other time in the century. In 1911 there were 1.43 property crimes for every assault. This is quite remarkable when one considers that in 1961 there were 39.5 property crimes for every assault. There is no compelling evidence in police records that would make one suspect that thefts in the pre-Prohibition era were a major problem for the police. Vollmer (1971:36,38) suggests that prior to the widespread use of automobiles, that most theft was local, which made it harder for thieves to dispose of stolen property. This is consistent with the record in Hamilton; the ratio of solved to total property crimes was highest early in the century. In 1911, police prosecuted 73.86% of thefts - the highpoint for the century; the low point came in 1959, when only 13.79% of thefts were prosecuted (derived from HPAR 1905-73). Early in the century, there was more concern in the Annual Reports for morality crimes, which received more attention than either property or violent crime.

Anecdotal evidence from newspapers confirm these findings. Prior to Prohibition, the public called on the police to conduct morality campaigns of various sorts, including
attempts to reduce public drunkenness, vagrancy, gambling, prostitution, mischievous youth and underage smoking. Headlines in local newspapers tell the story: "Police on Warpath against Never Works (HT April 23, 1910)," and "Morality Campaign Has Been Pronounced a Success (HT September 21, 1911)." Not only did morality offences dominate the total number of criminal offences but they were issues of public concern.

Enforcement of morality offences reflected public concern, not simply a police agenda. Both Weaver (1995) and Marquis (1993:52) suggest that the police were not willing agents of moral reform due to their own working-class origins and sensibilities. Police were concerned with morality issues because they were high on the public agenda. Statistical evidence, sections from annual reports and anecdotal evidence from newspapers all suggest that morality issues dominated policing early in the century.

4.3.2 The Transitional Era: 1918 to 1945

Early in the century, moral issues were international in scope. In Ontario, World War I gave tremendous impetus to the Prohibition movement (Oliver 1975:22). After winning the provincial election in 1919, some of the Farm Party leaders felt that they had a responsibility to "cleanse the moral and social climate of Ontario (Oliver 1975:69)." Times were changing, however; a growing segment of the Ontario population felt that drinking should be legalized. Although the majority of voters in the 1924 election
supported Prohibition, the majority was slim and support for Prohibition declined by 90% in just five years (Schull 1978:276). The basic support for Prohibition came from rural areas and women, whereas most urban, male labourers were against it (Schull 1978:197). Increasing urbanization and factory work promoted a lifestyle that conflicted with traditional notions of sobriety that were cradled in a rural, agricultural lifestyle.

A return to the old ways was out of the question. Increases in mobility brought about by automobiles effectively made the local option in the Canada Temperance Act unenforceable (Schull 1978:276). Though greatly reduced after Prohibition, drinking offences still outnumbered most other types in Hamilton (HPAR 1920-27). In the 1926 Ontario Provincial election, 56% voted in favour of repeal of Prohibition if it was accompanied by strong governmental controls. After the repeal of Prohibition in 1927, the provincial government ended an eight year period of deficits with a $2,000,000 surplus (Schull 1978:277). For the government, there was a strong financial incentive to repeal Prohibition. The moral fervour declined in Ontario with increased urbanization and industrialization, the inability to enforce old options, and a sympathetic, cash-strapped, provincial government.

The era represented a transitional period between the dominance of morality offences that occurred prior to 1917, and the dominance of property crime which began in the 1950's. Morality offences plummeted and continued to decline, to reach a minimum
rate of 1.98 per thousand in 1933, which was also the worst year of the Depression in Hamilton (Evans 1970). Drinking offence rates began to increase after the Depression, and by 1950 the rate was quite high (13.38 per thousand).

In general, violent crime rates decreased during the transitional era (Figure 4.6). Overall there was a decrease in the assault rate from 1920 to 1960. Poverty and massive unemployment did not increase the assault rate in the 1930's. It is difficult to be specific, but it appears that the close relation between alcohol and violence was reduced after Prohibition. However, it is interesting to note that drunk and disorderly charges began to increase in the 1930's and continued to rise until 1952. During this period the assault rate was fairly constant. Prohibition did not eradicate violence, but it may have reduced it considerably.

In contrast to both morality and violent offences, property crime rates increased in the 1920's, before levelling off in the 1930's. Prior to World War II property crime seems relatively independent of both morality and violent crime. The amount of theft in the Depression in Hamilton was not unusual. "No compelling argument can be found for the notion that the rate of theft invariably increases with times of economic distress, because opportunity is a significant variable and scarcity a slippery concept (Weaver 1995:247).” Economic hardship did not produce a crime wave in the 1930's; in fact, the opposite was true. Crime was not a major problem during the Depression.
In the transitional era, declines in morality and violent crime rates were accompanied by increases in the property crime rate. During this era, property crime became more important, but not as important as the demand for traffic enforcement. Policing was redefined by the need for traffic enforcement. Other social service agencies emerged to take over many of the social welfare responsibilities that police had long performed. The days of police as the primary agents of public morality were over, because issues of public order were becoming more and more defined by traffic problems and property crime. The public would have been more likely to see an officer writing up a traffic violation than arresting an intoxicated citizen.

4.3.3 The Modern Era: 1946 to 1973

The modern era begins after WWII. It is characterized by the dominance of property crime and the eventual rise in all categories of crime. The most notable features of this period are the rising standard of living and increased mobility on an unprecedented scale. Along with the economic boom came massive immigration and the proliferation of a consumer driven economy, increases in alcohol consumption, and eventually, huge increases in property crime.

In the post war era, morality crimes would rise again. In Hamilton, as in Ontario generally, after 1950 alcohol consumption and the number of drinkers increased due to
changing attitudes, increasing affluence and decreasing alcohol prices (Single et al. 1981:129). Liberalism was at the heart of changing attitudes towards alcohol, as legislators tried to rid the criminal code of its “puritanical” roots (Single et al. 1981:140). More people in Ontario were drinking as wages increased and alcohol prices decreased and as public attitudes towards alcohol changed (Single et al. 1981:129,133).

By the 1960's, the old pattern of alcohol-related violence seemed to be making a comeback. A large increase in violent crime reversed a downward trend that had existed for about 40 years. In 1963, Chief Lawrence suggested that most assaults are between people who know each other, and liquor is often involved (HS Sept 4, 1963). Although violent crimes were still only a minority of overall crime, violence was a problem in the 1960's. Interestingly, while the overall crime rate (all criminal code offences) was 2.36 times higher in 1970 than in 1911, the assault rate was 27% lower. Increases in the overall crime rate between 1900 and 1961 resulted primarily from changes in the property crime rate, not the violent crime rate. After 1961, the violent crime rate increased, but it did not surpass the peak in the violent crime rate that occurred in 1913.

Although both morality and violent crime rates increased after World War II, the defining feature of the era was the large rise in property crime. The trend in property crime exhibits a continual increase over the twentieth century, with increases beginning to take off in the 1950s. There was an eleven fold increase in the theft rate between 1905 (3.67)
and 1973 (40.17). The post war period was a period when mass production of consumer items and relative economic affluence translated directly into high rates of property crime.

As the distribution of crime changed, so did the demands on the police. While it is typical to view the police as crime fighters, the notion is historically relative because the distribution of crime changed considerably between 1900 and 1973. In terms of crime the shift in workload meant that the police had changed from the guardians of public morality into the guardians of property, and along the way were themselves transformed.

4.4 Summary

Police could not control the numbers of cars on the streets, the amount of alcohol consumption, the social values of the times, the changes brought about by increases in population and urbanization, and the rise of post World War II affluence and consumption. The Department changed as much as the city around them did. Trends in policing were a direct function of larger social trends which necessitated economic, organizational, occupational and technological change. The police did not define the times; they responded to them. This will become clear as we look more closely at specific changes to policing in the following chapters.
Chapter 5: The Economic Basis of Policing

In the previous chapter we saw how external circumstances influenced the police. We observed that increases in population were dealt with by expanding the force. Similarly, police activity changed as the distribution of crime changed and as the city was invaded by automobiles. In contrast, economic factors play a more complex role in change because they can both motivate and inhibit change, and because they are both external and internal to the police. For example, a budget surplus may allow police to purchase new technology, but equally, it may promote the longevity of inefficient practices. Conversely, a budget shortfall may prohibit the addition of new technology, but at the same time may promote innovation in organization or the delivery of police services. Also, economic factors are more than a contextual influence: they are important elements of the Department’s social structure.

Almost every aspect of policing has an economic dimension, and consequently, no understanding of policing is possible without considering the role of economic factors. Over the years, economic factors influenced the size of the force, the amount of turnover and labour relations, how police work was carried out, the range of services provided by police, the composition of the force, and the use of technology. The changing economic climate in the twentieth century motivated considerable changes to the police. For police administrators the challenge was multiple: balancing the needs of the community against
the needs of the force, controlling rising costs, locating suitable recruits in a fluctuating labour market, providing adequate services with declining resources, negotiating with powerful labour associations, and attempting to increase productivity and efficiency. For most of the century, costs increased faster than the available resources. Economic circumstances provided powerful incentives for change, and, at times, equally powerful constraints against change.

The following topics will be considered in this chapter: annual police expenditure, police productivity, the formation and consequences of a police association in Hamilton, police wages, the Department’s attempt to cope with rising wages, and the significance of revenue generation. Taken together, these issues provide an understanding of the role that economic factors played in policing in the twentieth century.

5.1 Trends in the Annual Police Expenditure

Between 1900 and 1973 policing became much more expensive (Figure 5.1). The largest increases in expenditure occurred after 1951. Police expenditure increased much faster than the population. Between 1913 and 1972 the population of Hamilton

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17 All dollar values used in this chapter have been converted to 1971 dollars using the consumer price index (CPI) in Leacy (1983). This CPI was available for the years between 1913 and 1975. In order to convert dollar values after 1975, the CPI published by Statistics Canada was used.
Figure 5.1: Police Expenditure by Year
increased 3.72 times, but the police expenditure increased 21.2 times. In other words, we cannot account for most of the increase in police expenditure as a direct result of population growth. The most significant increases in expenditure occurred in the post-World War II period, and coincided with increases in pay and reductions in the work week, which created the need for more employees at a higher rate of pay.

In 1913, the annual police expenditure was $395,000 and by 1972 expenditure had increased to $8,400,000. Although there were more police officers per capita after the war, they were hired primarily to compensate for the reduced work week. Figure 5.2 shows the annual cost of policing per-capita in Hamilton between 1913 and 1973. In 1913, the force cost $4.81 for every citizen, and by 1973 the per-capita cost had increased to $27.43. The increase in the per-capita cost was nearly six fold between 1913 and 1973. The cost per capita shows the same trend as police expenditures, with the largest increases occurring after 1950. For most of the century, the cost of policing was relatively stable, but after World War II the costs accelerated so citizens had to pay more just to maintain the same level of services. What is interesting is that the post World War II period was also the period of escalating crime and traffic problems. Increases in police expenditure did not contain social problems to pre-World War II levels.

As police expenditures increased they gradually began to consume larger and larger portions of the municipal budget. Figure 5.3 shows the percentage of the
Figure 5.2: Police Expenditure per Capita by Year
Figure 5.3: % of Municipal Expenditure Spent on Police by Year
municipal budget allocated to the police between 1900 and 1973. \(^{18}\) Again, we observe the same basic trend, that massive increases occurred after World War II. From 1900 to 1924 the police expenditure ranged between two and four percent of the municipal budget, and then declined to between one-half and one percent between 1925 and 1949. The decrease between 1925 and 1940 cannot be explained as a function of decreasing police expenditures, since they were increasing during this period - it resulted from increased municipal expenditures in other areas. By 1972 police expenditures increased to almost 12 percent of the total municipal budget. The largest increases occurred in the 1960's; the change from 1959 (2.85%) to 1972 (11.72%) is dramatic. After 1960, the police began to consume a larger and larger share of the municipal budget.

5.2 Productivity and the Police

The reorganization of productive methods was at the heart of the changes that increased wages and reduced work weeks for industrial workers in the twentieth century. “Mass production made an incredible range of goods available at prices working people could afford (Morton 1980:7).” For public institutions, such as the police, the link between productivity and wages was not direct. While police wages were a function of the labour market, police productivity was limited by the highly labour intensive nature of

\(^{18}\) Some caution should be observed interpreting figure 5.3 since irregularities exist in the municipal expenditures series.
Figure 5.4: Ratio of Payroll to Expenditure in % by Year
police work. Most of the police budget went directly into wages. Figure 5.4 illustrates the ratio of police payroll to overall police expenditure, in percent, between 1900 and 1960.\textsuperscript{19} The results are quite astounding - between 80 and 90% of the overall police budget went to pay wages. Since most police expenditure went directly into wages, changes to working conditions or wages often had a major impact on police expenditure. This is even more amazing given the increased use of technology in the twentieth century. Consider that at the beginning of the century, police had no patrol cruisers or radios. Still, between 1900 and 1983 expenditures on technology remained small in comparison to wages.

Although “measures of productivity can be ambiguous (McLouglin and Clark 1994:246),” productivity can be defined as the ratio of output quantity to input quantity (Siegel 1986:4). Overall productivity does not only take into consideration the amount of output but also the cost of producing the output. Greater output for a given number of workers creates a potential for increased wages and benefits. These increases lower productivity since the cost of production increases. Productivity increases were the “chief source” of rising wages and increased standards of living in the twentieth century (Kendrick and Grossman 1980:4). Between 1948 and 1976 the US economy had an overall productivity increase of 2.3% per year (Kendrick and Grossman 1980:6).

\textsuperscript{19} Although no continuous data were available after 1960, data were available for 1975, which showed the ratio to be 87% (derived from HS March 14,1975) suggesting that the pattern did not change much.
There are no records that allow us to precisely establish changes to police productivity. To this day, most police organizations cannot demonstrate the amount of work officers do (Bayley 1994:20). Police annual reports hardly, if ever, give adequate accounts of police work. Attempts to establish a historically-uniform estimate of police productivity is confounded by the changing content of police work, variations in the means of dispute resolution, and the changing distribution of services provided by the police. We can, however, estimate changes that occurred to productivity as a result of the shift from foot to cruiser patrol. It is likely that cruiser patrol increased police productivity by a factor of two or three (Clarke 1980:5, Marquis 1993:212). There is no reason to assume that the Hamilton police varied from these estimates. Many occupations indicate similar increases. Between 1899 and 1954 many economic sectors (in the United States) had similar increases in output per person hour: pulp and paper, 3.68; steel mill products, 3.29; cotton goods, 3.4; and flour and meal, 2.16 (Kendrick 1961:476-82). Other sectors enjoyed larger increases in output per person hour during the same period: canning, 8.93; cigarettes, 22.6; motor vehicles, 14.4; and beet sugar, 9.0 (Kendrick 1961:476-82).

While police productivity increased about threefold, it lagged behind other sectors of the economy. Also, when one considers the overall productivity (the ratio of outputs to inputs) we can see that increases in output keep pace with the threefold increase in wages\textsuperscript{20} that occurred during in Hamilton between 1913 and 1973. Since the work-week decreased about 40 to 50\% between 1900 and 1973, it is very likely that the overall

\textsuperscript{20} Wages are discussed at length in section 5.4.
productivity of police patrol declined significantly in the twentieth century. These estimates are generous to the police since they do not involve increased benefits or paperwork performed by constables in recent years.

Police budgets were a function of trends in the labour market. The disjuncture between wages and productivity placed police administrators in an unenviable position because they continually had to ask city council for budget increases just to maintain the same level of services. Technology made policing more efficient, but it was unable to offset the increasing cost of wages in the twentieth century. In other words, as wages increased, increases in productivity could not keep pace, so policing became more expensive. It appears that police productivity lagged behind expenditures after World War II, as productivity gains were small in comparison to rising costs.

5.3 The Rise of Police Unions

Early in the century the social relations of work were changing. This was the era of the eight hour, five dollar work day originated by Henry Ford (Herndon 1969). Before 1920, attempts to form unions were becoming widespread in police forces (Stone and DeLuca 1985: 468). The attainment of improved economic benefits was a primary goal of police unions and associations (Burpo 1971:21). To improve wages, police unions used legal, quasi-legal, and “patently illegitimate” methods (Burpo 1971:34).
Strikes by police often resulted in public disorder. The most notable police strike early in the century occurred in Boston in 1919. The strike resulted from inadequate working conditions, long work weeks ranging from 73 to 90 hours, and low wages (Burpo 1971:4). It caused over a million dollars in property damage (Burpo 1971:4-5) and eight fatalities (Marquis 1993).

Unionization was the most significant problem police chiefs faced early in the century (Marquis 1993:116). By 1917 issues of promotion and benefits motivated several Canadian departments form police associations. (Marquis 1993:115-6). “By the summer of 1919 the American Federation of Labor had issued charters to more than three dozen municipal police unions (Marquis 1993:119).” The union movement was widespread by 1919.

During the same year, in Ontario, a provincial Royal Commission into police matters “refused to endorse police unions (Marquis 1993:119).” The union movement found little or no support from chief constables, although they could empathize with constables (Marquis 1993:119). As in the United States, the police-union movement in Canada went into decline after 1919. While some departments formed associations, they were not affiliated with organized labour (Marquis 1993:119). Police labour movements in Canada were closely associated with events south of the border.
In Hamilton, the move towards unionization corresponded with the changes occurring elsewhere. At the beginning of the century, wages were low and working conditions were poor. "The work was as physically demanding, as tedious and as vulnerable to ‘speed-up’ measures as industrial employment (Weaver 1995:127)." In the period between 1910 and 1920, police wages and working conditions began to fall behind changes in other occupations. Initially, police administrators resisted labour reform. In 1911, Chief Smith would not increase the time off for staff; to do so, in his opinion, would compromise the police presence on the streets, even though police officers had only one day off a month (HH January 12, 1911). Between 1910 and 1920 labour problems were endemic in the Department, and by 1918 rumours of a union began to circulate (HH July 19, 1918). The Toronto police force also experienced labour unrest during this period, and as a result, formed an association by 1918 (Marquis 1987:272). Down the road in Hamilton, the force was “deteriorating” because of inadequate wages. Chief Whatley maintained that “good wages bring good men (HS November 25, 1919).”

Constables were dissatisfied with pay, working conditions, lack of raincoats and the amount of time off (HH September 6, 1918). The response of the police board was to state that the force must not form a union, although demands for raincoats and more time off were granted (HH September 17, 1918). The hard stand that the Police Commission took on unions was very clear when Chief Whatley stated that no member of the force will be allowed to remain if he joins the AFL or any of its branches (HH September 19, 1918).
Chief Whatley, realizing the dilemma the force was in, recommended that, "the force should not be allowed to deteriorate because members are not adequately paid (HS November 25, 1919).” Although he desired increased pay and benefits for constables, Whatley remained firmly against the presence of a police union.

In 1921, three years after the formation of a police association in Toronto, a police association was formed in Hamilton. It was a compromise between the need for a labour union and the need for public control of such a vital municipal institution. Although the situation had improved considerably after the formation of a police association, demands for increased salaries continued in the 1920's. City controller Peebles responded by stating that he could not justify raising police salaries just because other cities pay police officers more (HS February 20, 1926). Still, what was paid to other occupations and other forces would eventually set the rate for the Hamilton force. The formation of a police association in Hamilton would eventually transform social relations in the Department.

In 1947, amendments to the Ontario Police Act allowed for collective bargaining and wage arbitration (Marquis 1993:217). In the United States, police chiefs still resisted unions. In 1958, the IACP published a report which stated that, according to existing law, membership in a police union was illegal. Police administrators opposed unions because they believed unions compromised professionalism and the neutrality of police officers, threatened the authority of the chief, and politicized the police (Burpo 1971:68).
1960's, after 40 years of dormancy, police unions became a force for improved wages and working conditions (Burpo 1971:6). The primary cause of police militancy was dissatisfaction with wages, which had only increased half as much as those of factory workers during the period between 1939 and 1964 in the United States (Burpo 1971:11).

Police also became more militant in Canada in the 1960's. In 1968, during the Montreal Police strike, strikers seized control of the police communications “when they found out that the arbitration award did not match Toronto remuneration levels (Marquis 1993:307).” Riots, vandalism, arson, bank robberies and burglaries ensued during the 16 hour walkout (Marquis 1993:307). Crime rates soared during the Montreal Police strike (Burpo 1971:14).

A familiar pattern emerges. Police, in general, have not to my knowledge, sought wage increases in relation to their productivity. Unrest over wages occurs when police feel they are lagging behind other occupations or other police forces. Despite the fact that police officers earn the salaries of professionals, the work ethos remains blue collar (Bayley 1994:68).

[P]olice officers are preoccupied with monetary rewards. Although they are salaried workers, they do not work to get a job done; they work in order to maximize returns in relation to hours worked. They never lose track of what the organization owes them for their effort in terms of days off, vacations, meal breaks, and sick leave. Police officers continually scheme to make the system work for them financially... Police officers hardly ever work for free. An extra hour of
duty must be compensated. Overtime payments have become a large portion of most police budgets, and officers regard them as an entitlement. (Bayley 1994:67)


Overall, labour unrest was episodic between 1900 and 1973. The period between 1910 and 1921 saw the formation of a considerable number of police associations throughout North America. After this initial period of unionization there was relative labour tranquillity until after World War II. After World War II, police associations became more militant, in search of improved benefits and wages to equal the surge of post-war affluence that transformed the economy.
5.4 Trends in Police Wages

Police wages in Hamilton increased considerably between 1913 and 1973. As previously noted, wages were directly related to changes occurring in other police forces and other occupations. In 1913, a first class constable earned $3972. By 1948, the amount was $4988, and in 1975, a first class constable was paid $11,851. Wages for constables increased threefold between 1913 and 1975; during the same period the work week decreased between 40 and 50%. Not including pensions or increased holidays and other benefits, a constable cost (in constant dollars) the public at least six times more in 1975 than in 1913. Most increases in wages occurred after 1950. By 1972 the Hamilton Police were the best paid force in Canada (HS March 19, 1972). Over the course of the twentieth century wages increased much faster than the cost of living. A dollar in 1913 would be worth about $4.83 in 1975. During the same period, the wage paid to a first class constable increased over 16 fold. The end result was that for the police, as for other occupations, their standard of living increased considerably.

While wages were increasing for all police employees, the ratio between a first class constable and the chief remained fairly constant. In 1905, the chief constable made 2.38 times the salary of a first class constable; in 1926 the figure was 2.65 times, and by 1977 the chief of police made about 2.29 times the salary of a first class constable (City of

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Hamilton Financial Records 1905, HS July 12,1926, HS December 8,1977). This contrasts with Weaver’s (1995:125-126) assessment of the relationship of the chief constable to a first class constable’s wages - while the chief’s wages increase more in terms of dollars, the ratio does not change much in the twentieth century.

Unfortunately, the Annual Police Reports do not provide a continuous time series for police wages. As a compromise, I created a derived series by dividing the payroll expenditures by the total number of employees to arrive at an average wage for the entire Department. The results (Figure 5.5) are quite informative. The derived average wage was very close to the actual wages of a first class constable (see table 5.1). Although data were available for only three years, the difference between wages for a first class constable and the derived average Departmental wage was less than 2% for the available data. Although the data are limited, it is likely that the derived Departmental average is an accurate representation of a first class constable’s wages. This result is not surprising, considering the large proportion of constables on the force.
Figure 5.5: Average Departmental Wage by Year

Year

1900 1908 1916 1924 1932 1940 1948 1956 1964 1972


1971 $
Table 5.1: Comparison of derived average Departmental wage and wages paid to first class constables (in 1971 dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>derived average wage</th>
<th>first class constables wage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>$4,043</td>
<td>$3,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>$4,988</td>
<td>$5,088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>$11,851</td>
<td>$11,673</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

actual wages obtained from HS July 12, 1926, HS March 11, 1948, HS July 10, 1975.

The average police wage increased considerably between 1920 to 1932, from $3067 to $5628 (Figure 5). After reaching a peak in 1932, the average remained fairly constant until 1950, after which it increased from $4629 to $6418 in 1959. Wages did not decline during times of economic distress in the 1930's, but tended to increase during relatively prosperous times. The trough in 1952 likely resulted from a large increase in recruits, which temporarily lowered the average wage.

The average wage for the Hamilton Police can be compared to overall Canadian averages for both production and supervisory/office workers (Figure 5.6). Several conclusions are possible from this comparison. First, results indicate that average wages have increased dramatically for all groups: production workers, 3.47 fold; supervisors, 2.76 fold; and Hamilton Police, 3.6 fold. Increases in police wages were slightly larger than for either supervisors or production workers. Second, police salaries were closer to
Figure 5.6: Average Wages by Year

- Average Wages
- Police
- Production Worker
- Supervisor/Office

Year

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970

1971 $
supervisor/office workers than to production workers. Third, police wages appear more
depression proof than wages for either production workers or supervisors. There were
few requests for increased wages in the 1930’s by the police association. In the 1930’s,
wages for police surpassed those of supervisors, and generally remained higher until after
World War II. Fourth, it is instructive to note that historic periods when supervisors’
wages were greater than the average police wages correspond with periods when police
had recruiting problems. This occurred prior to 1920, and especially in the 1950’s and
1960’s, when recruitment problems were common for the police even though wages were
at an all-time high. Comparing wages allows us to see how police wages follow similar
trends to those in other occupational categories. This is consistent with the historical
evidence, which suggests that police wages were primarily a function of the labour market.

Police were middle class. While police were paid much more in 1973 than in
1900, the increases were not out of line with those in other occupations. Police wages
never declined, but they levelled off in times of economic hardship. Policing as an
occupation was much more recession proof than other occupations, and this, provided a
major incentive for an interest in a law enforcement career. Indeed, many of Hamilton’s
law officers probably joined the force for job security.

5.5 Coping with Rising Wages
Initially, police administrators were unprepared for the changes that increased wages and reduced work weeks would have on police budgets. In order to deal with the problem of increasing expenses, police chiefs employed a variety of strategies to keep costs down, including cutting services, increasing the civilian component of the force, increasing the use of technology, altering patrol strategies, restructuring the organization to increase efficiency, and requesting more funds.

Cutting services was more common at some times than others. In the 1920's police budgets did not reflect the gains made in terms of reductions to the work-week that occurred between 1910 and 1920. In order to provide the same level of service, increases in personnel would have been required. Because the 1:1000 population standard did not change until after World War II, it is reasonable to suggest that the police were continually understaffed between 1920 and 1950. The ratio obscured the fact that fewer services were being provided due to the shrinking work week.

There were few options but to cut services. For example, in 1924 some areas of Hamilton went without patrol all night (HS December 15, 1924). In addition, special requests made by the public were often turned down. Services traditionally carried out by

It should be pointed out that the adoption of motorcycle patrols helped to cope with the problems in the 1920's. However, the fact that so few constables patrolled on motorcycles translated into marginal gains.
police, such as the police shelter and the ambulance service, would now be provided by other agencies. During the period when the per capita number of police was reduced (1920-1950), the actual demands on them were increasing due to traffic problems. Another example of service cutting involves the prioritization of police services. If the police became busy they would decrease the level of traffic and bylaw enforcement (HS June 1, 1966).

A more direct and long term response to rising costs was increasing the proportion of civilians on the force. The influx of civilians was a direct result of increasing labour costs, not liberalized hiring policies. Because civilians were paid less, increasing the civilian component of the force was a basic cost reduction strategy used by the police administration. Although police officials initially resisted using civilian labour, rising costs left them little choice. While civilians have always played a role in municipal policing, in the nineteenth century this role was confined to peripheral duties such as cleaning uniforms or janitorial services. In the twentieth century, civilians played a much more central role in police work, including clerical, communications and identification duties. Civilians were more efficient than sworn personnel in many instances, since they often had specialized skills. As the wages of sworn staff rose, the proportion of civilians steadily increased to offset the costs. The percentage of civilians increased from 2.6% in 1920, to 5.4% in 1940 and to 10.5% in 1960. Although the civilian component of the force had been increasing throughout the century (especially after 1920), in the 1950's there was
more pressure brought on the police to use civilians. In order to save money, Mayor Jackson advised Chief Chamberlain to keep the police on the street and use “girls” for office work (G+M March 3, 1951). In 1973, Chief Torrance suggested that it would be too expensive to have police officers continuing with all their traditional duties including identification, communications and paperwork (HS September 7, 1973). Economic factors motivated the changing composition of the police force and the attempt to save money took precedence over maintaining a homogenous force composed only of sworn officers.

Another primary cost reduction strategy involved the use of technology. Using cruiser patrol as opposed to foot patrol reduced costs by increasing patrol efficiency. The major transition from foot patrol to cruiser patrol occurred at the same time as wages were beginning to increase in the 1950s. Technology (especially the radio equipped cruiser) allowed for the 'mass production' of patrolling, an analog of production increases that resulted for industrial workers. Although no data exist for Hamilton, British data show the impact of auto patrols clearly. An average foot beat in a large British city covers about 200 acres, includes four to five miles of roads and a population of about 4000 by comparison, a mobile beat is three times the size (Hough and Clarke 1980:5). In this instance, the cruiser patrol allows one constable to replace three. If these approximations even remotely apply to Hamilton, it is clear that economic factors provided a major incentive for the transition from foot to cruiser based patrol.
Economics altered not only the method of patrol, but also how patrol was carried out. The best example of this occurred in 1959 when cruiser patrol by individual constables replaced the traditional two man crew (HS November 27, 1959). The radio made single constable cruiser patrols possible and costs made them inevitable. By the 1960's when wages began to increase rapidly, most patrolling was carried out in by single constables in cruisers, and the constable on the beat was quickly becoming an anachronism. It is unlikely that Hamilton could have afforded the number of constables required to patrol the entire city by foot, even if foot patrol was desired. In other words, fiscal limitations precluded a return to universal foot patrol. Single officer cruiser patrols were a lot cheaper and effectively doubled the amount of patrol coverage available from a fixed number of officers.

In order to maximize efficiency and control costs, the Hamilton Police underwent a major organizational restructuring in the 1960's (HS March 19, 1965). As the force increased in size and complexity, the efficiency of police operations became a factor. Increasing budgets made the effective use of policing resources a high priority. Reduced work weeks meant more employees were required, in addition to the increases that resulted from population growth. As the Department grew in size and complexity, a corporate form of organization was adopted. This represented a transformation from the nineteenth century quasi-military model to a corporate model\textsuperscript{23} that set professional

\textsuperscript{23} For a discussion of organizational change refer to chapter six.
standards and emphasized efficiency. The changes did not so much increase productivity as slow the rate at which productivity was being lost. Costs rose dramatically during the period of reorganization in Hamilton because wages were also increasing at the same time. It is likely that reorganization had little effect on costs because there is no suggestion that reorganization required fewer employees. Still, there is no mention of how reorganization influenced patrol strength or activity. Since wages make up most of the police budget, and since reorganization did not increase the size of the force, the impact of reorganization on the overall police expenditure was likely much less than increases in wages and other benefits. The adoption of corporate, bureaucratic organization was an attempt to control costs, not increase them.

Finally, the common strategy, used by police officials was to request more resources, but many of these requests were directly tied to population increases. Administrators’ requests for more personnel were predictable, although often ‘justified’ by reference to crime and traffic problems. Ericson (1982:195) suggests that most increases in police expenditures result from the motives of police manipulating the public’s fear of crime, but as I have shown increased budgets were the response to increased costs.

In the end, police administrators had little control over costs, which were a function of economic circumstances beyond their control. Increases in police ‘efficiency’ could not keep pace with increased costs. While workers in the industrial sector could
reap more benefits from the increased productive capacity of mass production, no such productivity increases were possible for police work. The labour intensive nature of police work motivated police administrators to implement a diverse strategy of cost control measures.

5.6 Revenue Generation

As costs mounted, the city council sought alternative sources of revenue. The police became revenue generators primarily through the enforcement of traffic and by-law offences. Although revenue generation was a not a specified goal of police activity, it became more important as the police budget increased.

The percentage of offences resulting in fines is shown in Figure 5.7. Between 1900 and 1960 there was a continual increase in the percentage of offences that was disposed of by fines. Most of the increase was directly related to the impact of the automobile, and the resultant traffic offences and parking violations. In 1905, police records indicate that there were 1106 fines issued, which represented 51.09% of all offences. Economic hardship in the 1930's corresponds with a temporary decrease in the percentage of offences that were dealt with by fines. By 1950, about 90% of all offences

\[24\] Includes criminal, traffic and bylaw offences.
Figure 5.7: % of Offences Resulting in Fines by Year
Figure 5.8: Police Receipts by Year

Year

$1971$
Figure 5.9: Ratio of Police Receipts to Expenditures in % by Year
resulted in fines. Increasing costs were accompanied by increasing revenue generation in the twentieth century - as an editorial in the Hamilton Spectator suggested, fines were like gifts to the city (HS June 3, 1961).

Police receipts between 1910 and 1959 are shown in Figure 5.8. Prior to 1944, annual police receipts were fairly constant, but after World War II receipts quadrupled. This corresponds with increased emphasis on traffic enforcement. One of the direct results of increasing traffic enforcement was a massive increase in the revenue generated. Large changes in revenue coincided with the installation of parking meters in 1946. Changes in revenue also corresponded with periods of rapidly rising costs. Municipal officials dealt with rising costs by finding alternative sources of revenue. The police became one vehicle by which this strategy was realized.

As important as revenue generation had become, it could not keep pace with police expenditures. Figure 5.9 shows the ratio of police receipts to police expenditure, in percent. One thing is clear, the police have never been able to generate more revenue than they spend. In 1915, before police revenues were audited, the ratio was 9%. By 1917,

\[ \text{25} \]

It is important to point out that irregularities exist within the police receipts series. The large peak that occurred in 1917 and 1918 was probably a direct result of changes in city financial policy. In 1915, city bylaw 1800 was passed, which stipulated that the city appoint an auditor for criminal justice accounts. In 1916 the Hamilton Board of Control Report, recommended that certain police court fines be retained by the city (Hamilton City Council Minutes 1916 page 576). It is likely that city officials were becoming more aware of the potential of revenue
the ratio had increased to 43% and then there was a dramatic decrease to 23% in 1920. In the 1940's, the ratio of receipts to expenditures was increasing, but the trend did not continue through the 1950's. This is interesting, because in the 1950's, revenue generation was the highest that it had ever been. Revenue generation could not keep pace with police expenditures as costs began to increase rapidly after 1950. To put it in perspective, in 1913 police generated $63,972 in revenue; by 1959 police revenue totalled $705,753, over a tenfold increase. Massive increases in the revenue generated by the police could not keep up with the even more massive increases in police expenditure.

5.7 Summary

An adequately staffed, well equipped, police force was never cheap - but it got more expensive as police expenditures increased at a rate much greater than increases in the population. Since policing was highly labour intensive and most of the police budget went to pay wages, and, since few increases in productivity were possible, real costs kept increasing to provide the same level of service. There was little that police administrators could do to stop the spiralling costs, since changes in police wages and working conditions were directly related to changes in the labour market, not to increases in police productivity. There is evidence to suggest that increases in wages coincided with generation and began to demand more accountability from the police. All this raises the question of how much revenue was generated, and where it all ended up, but the fact that city officials appointed an auditor implies that there were basic concerns with the existing system.
decreases in productivity. Police were continually using various strategies to cope with increasing costs. Aside from several specific instances where they cut services, police attempted to deal with rising costs by increasing productivity or hiring cheaper labour. Basic strategies included hiring civilians, using more technology, altering patrol strategies, and departmental re-organization. Some of the problems of increasing costs were offset by increasing revenue generation. Revenue generation, while not a specified goal of policing, became increasingly important in the twentieth century as costs mounted.

Policing can in many ways be reduced to economic factors. Communities do not get the level of services they need. They get the level they can afford. Police budgets were never based directly on crime or traffic problems. The cost of the police for many decades was a direct function of an ideal demographic ratio of constables to population and of the wages paid to each constable. In this sense, police wages were important determinants of the range and delivery of police services provided to the public.

Increased expenditure in most instances did not improve or extend police services, but were merely translated into increased wages, benefits, and shrinking work weeks. After all, in the post World War II era, large police budgets coincided with the highest levels of crime in the century. The question that arises is how much of the overall municipal budget should be dedicated to police services? In a situation in which expenditures continually increase and services remain the same or decrease, the economic
dimension of policing becomes increasingly controversial.

The productivity dilemma has become even more apparent in recent years.

The core strategy of policing is to provide a visible deterrent presence in public places. Police say again and again that the best way to prevent crime is to put officers in the street. Politicians and the public seem to agree. What police officers do not say, and the public does not know, is that this strategy is no longer affordable. If visible presence is the key to preventing crime, then crime is going to rise....In order to increase the street presence of one additional officer (24 hours a day, seven days a week), it is necessary to hire an extra ten officers... "Police officers are too expensive and too thin on the ground to deter crime by their sheer presence. (Bayley 1994:52, 55)

Bayley continues,

The problem with the budgets police are given is that they are not related to public safety needs. Police pretend to be producing public safety, when in fact, they are producing authoritative intervention and symbolic justice. Resources and outputs have not been connected. This sort of budgeting reduces police responsibility, undermining the search for programs that might enhance effectiveness with respect to crime prevention. (Bayley 1994:50)

The economic implications of policing remain controversial.
Chapter 6: Re-Organizing the Department for the Modern Era

At the end of the nineteenth century, the Hamilton police force was small, and relatively unspecialized. The Department was organized as a hierarchy of military ranks and infused with a military style of discipline. Most organizational changes occurred after World War II when the functioning of the department was complicated by large increases in size, the rapidly increasing need for information storage and retrieval, and greater specialization in functions. In the post-World War II era, the need for reorganization coincided with the evolution of police administrative practises.

Although most research on police organization has focussed on its military character (Franz and Jones 1987, Fairchild 1984, Punch 1984, Auten 1981) most changes to police organization in Hamilton cannot be understood in terms of the military model. Organizational change was not based on either military principles or ideals but on an emerging model of police administration. For Hamilton, organizational change is more accurately viewed as a transition from a quasi-military, rank-based hierarchy to an organization based on professional principles of police administration.

The IACP played an important role in the development of police administrative practises. Especially noteworthy was the IACP sanctioned organizational models for police departments of different sizes (Wilson and McLaren 1977: 109). The IACP based its organizational principles on aspects of public, commercial, industrial, and military organizations (Wilson and McLaren 1977:73). The principles of modern police organization were borrowed from a range of different organizational types and adapted to the needs of the police. Organizational reform was an important aspect of the professionalization of policing.

The act of organizing is indispensable to proper management, and without some form of organizational structure, most police operations could not be carried out. It the organizational structure is poor and if organizational concepts are poorly understood or applied, the efficiency of the entire department will be severely affected.

There is a distinction between the simple organizational structure of an agency and the application of principles of administrative organization. While the two are obviously related (a good structure usually depends on conscious applications of the principles), they are not one and the same. An agency can often operate adequately - quite well, in some cases - with a deficient structure, but an agency with a seemingly good structure can very seldom operate with efficiency if a basic principle of administrative organization, such as the need to adhere to
channels of communication, is consistently ignored. Further, the process of organizing ought to include thoughtful consideration of many of the other principles of administration. (Wilson and McLaren 1997:69)

In this chapter we will see what factors motivated the reorganization of the police in Hamilton. Further, we see how the content of the changes implemented corresponded with guidelines advocated by the IACP.

6.1 Factors That Led to Organizational Reform

In Hamilton, departmental reorganization can be understood in relation to three distinct factors: the need for change, the presence of an acceptable alternative, and an individual who could implement the changes. Reorganization in Hamilton was motivated by increases in the size of the police force and the need for information management. Change however, was not simply a function of need; the availability of IACP guidelines provided an alternative. At same time as police administrative practises were beginning to become consolidated within the IACP, the city of Hamilton appointed the youngest chief constable in the history of the force. He was a crucial factor in the modernization and reorganization of police services in the city.
6.1.1 Size and Reorganization

Between 1901 and 1973, the population of the city increased from 53,000 to 300,000. Population increases, combined with the shrinking work week, created the need to hire more staff. The force increased from a total 59 employees in 1900 to 572 in 1973. While the Department had increased almost ten fold in just 73 years, the most significant change occurred between 1949 and 1953, when the Department almost doubled in size, from 213 to 377 employees. In Figure 6.1 we can see that all employee groups increase in absolute terms over the entire period from 1900 to 1973, but there is also a large increase in the number of constables between 1949 and 1951, from 156 to 245. After 1951, both management and civilian components of the force increased (Figure 6.2). It is important to note that increases occurred at the lower level of the organizational hierarchy before corresponding changes took place in management and clerical areas. Growth was not driven by bureaucracy; bureaucracy resulted from growth.

Increases in the size of the force, especially in the period between 1949 and 1953, was a motivating factor for departmental reorganization. Growth rendered

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26 Civilians are defined as full time non-sworn staff and management is defined as full time sworn staff above the rank of constable. Data are from HPAR 1900-1973. Estimates for the numbers of full time civilians prior to 1928 were made from The City of Hamilton Financial Records.
traditional management practices ineffective. At the beginning of the century, organization was not an issue because of the small size of the Department. Many organizational forms could have worked equally well, since there was direct communication across different organizational levels. The chief knew everyone, he recruited and interviewed them, promoted them, and when necessary, he fired them. The Chief Constable was directly involved in every aspect of the force, from financing to specific enforcement strategies. Because of the chief's close ties to his officers and the community, the need for articulated lines of communication and defined organizational structure was not critical.

As the force grew, the old informal, personal management style reached its limits in terms of communications, need for specialized skills in finance, planning, crime and traffic enforcement, identification and records. The chief could no longer manage every aspect of the Department. The result was the need for more administrative specialization and co-ordination. In other words, growth eventually required specialization because it became impossible for any one individual to deal with all the details of running the force. Instead of direct involvement in the day to day operations of the force, the chief became an administrator, co-ordinating the overall activities of the organization while the details of day to day operations were relegated to middle management. This was certainly the case in Hamilton, where a major reorganization occurred after the largest increases in size in the history of the force.
Figure 6.1: Department Composition by Year

- Total Employees
- Constables
- Management
- Civilians

Year

1900 1916 1932 1948 1964

1908 1924 1940 1956 1972
Figure 6.2: Department Composition in % by Year

Year

%
6.1.2 The Automobile, Crime, and Information Management

While size was a crucial variable, another very important factor was the increased information production generated by traffic accidents and law enforcement. Police work became more information intensive in the twentieth century, and the direct result was the need for information management. These new demands forced organizational specialization and centralization, and because of this, they were an important precursor of modern police organization and administration.

Reorganization was paradoxically a function of one type of technology, the automobile and the absence of another, the computer. The ability to collect information grew much faster than the ability to process information. In other words, the police found an organizational solution to overcome the demands of one type of technology and the absence of another. The impact of the automobile cannot be overestimated because it created the need for organizational specialization due to the increased workload. Not only did the automobile create more work, but it was a different type of work than the police were used to, in that offences were dealt with by writing out tickets or accident reports. Ultimately, the need for increased information processing meant that the Department had to function differently.
According to Wilson and McLaren (1977:92), specialization first occurred in police departments as a result of the automobile and the problem of traffic control, followed by specialization in other areas. To put things in perspective, consider that in 1911 there was a grand total of 3978 offences in Hamilton. By 1959, the total had reached 136,487 offences. The number of offences had increased much faster than the number of police officers and the overall population. In 1959, automobiles were responsible for over 90% of all offences. The implication of the astronomical increase in the number of offences meant that information processing became a central police activity. Police not only had to patrol the city, they had to find a way to keep on top of the rapidly accumulating mountain of information.

The problem was exacerbated by the fact that crime enforcement was also becoming more information intensive. Prior to 1905, prisoners were not photographed (Torrance 1967:30), but, this became a common practise by 1915 (HPAR 1915). Fingerprints were also adopted early in the twentieth century, and by 1913 the “system” had proved to be a success (HPAR 1913). By 1923, the increase in information resulted in the Department copying Scotland Yard’s record system and abandoning the Bertillion system, which was based on physical description (HS December 15, 1923). In order to keep pace with the informational demands records systems were continually updated, but they seemed to always fall short of the increasing demands placed on them. By 1951, police had records for about 40,000 individuals on file, the longest record had 120 entries.
(HS October 25, 1951). To keep up with the mounting informational requirements, civilians were appointed for clerical duties in 1951 (HPAR 1951).

By 1952, it was suggested that the police department records be stored in one central location which would be staffed by civilians (HPAR 1952). Gradually, the increase in records required centralization in order to coordinate the information. In order to process information more efficiently, a key punch machine was installed in 1959 (Torrance 1967:48). In many police departments, organizational specialization was a direct by-product of the increasing amount of information, and specialization in records was a direct by-product of increasing size (Wilson and McLaren 1977:466).

The centralization of information changed how police interacted with each other and the public. Although the police have always relied on information, the source for that information was radically transformed in the twentieth century. Early in the twentieth century, information was obtained first hand by the constable on the beat, who had an intimate knowledge of the area he patrolled. Eventually 'stored' information became more essential to the activity of policing. In 1972, police forces in Canada were linked by computer in a centralized information system (Canadian Police Information Centre: CPIC) (Marquis 1993).

By the 1980's, constables patrolled in cruisers equipped with computers that could
access remote information. The difference was that information was provided through police sources as opposed to public sources. Once information was recorded it could be accessed as often as required and, because of this, police officers increasingly interacted among themselves. The organization became linked by virtue of a shared information base that excluded the public. Reorganization applied to more than Departmental structure it involved the reorganization and consolidation of information on different levels.

6.1.3 Chief Lawrence and Organizational Change

In retrospect, the organizational reforms that occurred in Hamilton were not unusual. What was unique about the Hamilton case was the presence of an highly capable individual who proved to be a catalyst for organizational change and professionalization of police services. While similar changes would have occurred in his absence, they would have likely come later, and in many respects, the Hamilton police force was ahead of its time in the 1950's.

In Hamilton, the modern era of policing began in 1952 when Leonard Lawrence was appointed Chief. Lawrence was the youngest person ever to be named Chief, and although he was outstanding in many respects, he had leapfrogged over other, more senior, officers who had exceptional service records. He was chosen, apparently, strictly
on the basis of ability. This was a major turning point, because it represented the transition from promotion based on seniority and service to promotion based primarily on ability. Lawrence was in every respect an outstanding police officer and administrator, perhaps the finest police official the Hamilton Police ever produced. By professionalizing and reorganizing the Hamilton Police, he left his mark on it as no one else ever had, and many of the changes that he implemented are still in practise today.

Lawrence represented the link between modern policing and the past, and while he professionalized the police in Hamilton, he was deeply rooted in the community and tradition. Similar to many historic personages who preside over an era of change, he seemed to embody contradictions. Although he thoroughly reorganized and professionalized the Department, he spent his entire career working out of a shabby office in the old police central station. He did not live long enough to see the new police headquarters, the physical embodiment of all the organizational changes he precipitated. He was highly respected by members of the community. At his funeral, attended by those on both sides of the law, one “ex-con” said it best, “he was quite a guy (HS September 6, 1973).” Lawrence was unusual because at the same time as he modernized the Department, he seemed to retain the respect that was given to former chiefs by virtue of their close ties to the community.

The Department had undergone a period of rapid expansion just prior to
Lawrence's promotion to Chief in order to provide increased traffic enforcement and cope with the introduction of the forty hour work week. Lawrence was the right person, in the right place, at the right time. He was the pivotal figure who came along when the Department had reached an administrative crossroad. He was 'progressive' in almost every way: in terms of organization and professionalization, hiring minorities and women, treatment of prisoners and the use of technology. In 1967, Lawrence was appointed as President of the IACP and was regarded as one of the finest law officers in the Western World (Torrance 1967). He completely reformed and professionalized the Hamilton Police Department, bringing it in line with international standards.

Lawrence had an awareness of organization like no other police official before him in Hamilton. In 1953, one year after he became Chief, the first organizational chart appeared in an annual report. From that point on, organization became an important aspect of police administration in Hamilton. According to Wilson and McLaren (1977:86), the first step in improving a police organization is to have an accurate chart of the department’s organization in order to assess its strengths and weaknesses. In Hamilton, prior to this, it was common for a incoming chief constable to create new positions or job titles to suit his personal management style. For example, in 1935 Chief Goodman replaced the deputy chief with two inspectors (HPAR 1935). This change was not permanent, for the rank of deputy chief was reinstated after Goodman's departure. Prior to the 1950's much organizational change was idiosyncratic and temporary; special
ranks were created when the need arose and dispensed with when no longer necessary. Lawrence was the first chief to make the distinction between rank and organization.

Although Lawrence began organizational reform in the 1950's, the big changes came in the 1960's. In March 1964, an organization and planning committee was appointed by Chief Lawrence to reorganize the Department into bureaus, divisions, sections, branches and units (Torrance 1967:51). A dozen ranks were reduced to eight in order to "clarify authority, reduce confusion, create a freer information flow and simplify the chain of authority (HS March 19, 1965)." The period after 1952 represented a watershed in terms of organizational change for the Hamilton police. Torrance (1967:44) suggests that the organizational change that occurred between 1952 and 1967 was greater than in the prior history of the Hamilton police force.

The organizational structure has remained basically the same since. After the formation of the Hamilton Regional Police in 1974, the organizational form has remained almost functionally identical with the organizational structure implemented by Lawrence. The reorganization he initiated was designed to accommodate change. This was the big advantage that reorganization provided over the traditional arrangement. By standardizing and rationalizing each aspect of police organization, procedure, and communication the Department could effectively respond more effectively to changes in size and function with minimal reorganization.
6.2 Organizational Reform: Understanding the Changes

While the need for organizational change remained beyond Lawrence’s tenure, the organizational reforms he initiated were a textbook example of police administration. The actual reorganization that occurred was based on widely accepted principles of police administration. Lawrence’s close association with the IACP would have exposed him to the innovations occurring in police management. As previously noted, one function of the IACP was to specify organizational structures for departments of various sizes (Wilson and McLaren 1977: 109). This in itself, implies that changes in size were basic motivating factors for reorganization. From the perspective of the IACP it is clear that police departments of different sizes need to function differently. What is interesting is that Hamilton’s organization may be more similar to American police departments than to other Canadian departments due to Lawrence’s involvement in the IACP.

The re-organization instituted by Lawrence can be illustrated by examining actual organizational charts for the Department. Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show the Department’s organization for the years 1953 and 1973 respectively. The differences between Figures 6.3 and 6.4 indicate the organizational changes that can be directly attributed to Lawrence.
Figure 6.3:  
Departmental Organization 1953
Figure 6.4:

Organizational Chart
Department of Police
Hamilton Ontario
1973

Chief of Police

Vice Intelligence

Operations Bureau

Deputy Chief

Traffic Division

Platoon Command

Criminal Investigation Division

Patrol Division Area 1
  - Station Branch
  - Mobile Patrol Branch
  - Canine
  - Foot Patrol Branch

Patrol Division Area 2
  - Station Branch
  - Mobile Patrol Branch

Patrol Division Area 3
  - Station Branch
  - Mobile Patrol Branch

Staff Superintendent

Staff Services

Youth Division

Staff Management

Juvenile Section

Personnel

Probation Officer/Supervisor

Planning, Research & Training

Driver Test & Training Aux. Branch

Communications, Prop. Transport

Records Identification

School Crossing Unit

Station Branch

Fails to Remain Unit

Office Dr. / Eyer Agree, Investigate

Station Duty Unit

Counter Desk

Crime Prevention Section

General Assignment Section

Fraud Unit

Auto Unit

Bicycles

Coroners Officer
The following observations can be made:

for 1953

1. Organizational structure was almost completely defined by ranks.
2. There was no separation between operations and administrative functions.
3. There was a very large span of control for the chief and the deputy chief.
4. The Department did not have a uniform organizational structure.
5. The Department had only one deputy chief.

for 1973

1. The organizational structure was differentiated from rank
2. The Department became more specialized. There was a separation of administrative and operations functions, with each having its own deputy chief.
3. There is a decreased span of control for upper management.
4. A uniform organizational structure was adopted. The Department was divided into Bureaus, Divisions, Sections and Branches.
5. Although not indicated by the diagrams, there was a simplification in the rank structure from twelve ranks to eight.

Having examined the actual changes that occurred, we can infer the actual organizational principles on which they were based. These, too, were standard
administrative principles internationally acknowledged by experts in policing. First, similar tasks should be grouped together. For example, the responsibilities of an administrative division should not include operations, and, thus, in many medium or large police organizations, the basic departmental divisions include both an operations and an administrative bureau. At the most basic level, one bureau generates information and the other organizes, processes and controls it. Second, responsibilities should be clearly demarcated. Specialization is an intrinsic aspect of organization which allows for the functional coordination of activities. Third, the span of control should not be too large or too small. There is an increased need for middle management in order to maintain a reasonable span of control for administrators. Fourth, there should be clear channels of communication and authority. (Summarized from Wilson and McLaren 1977:73-74)

The changes in Hamilton were almost identical to those recommended by the IACP for medium sized police departments (Wilson and McLaren 1977:71). The IACP recommends that the structure for medium to large police departments (200 to 1200 employees [Wilson and McLaren 1977:112]) be based on the following organizational subdivisions: Bureau, Division, Section and Unit. A Bureau is the largest organizational unit. Each Bureau is divided into a number of Divisions. A Division, as a subdivision of a Bureau embodies a department wide function. Divisions are broken down into Sections. A Section is a functional unit within a Division. In Hamilton the distinction between branches and sections was not always apparent. Finally, when further specialization is
required a Section can be broken down into Units. (Summarized from Wilson and McLaren 1977:71)

The structure for medium size police departments endorsed by the IACP is shown in Figure 6.5. If we compare Figures 6.4 and 6.5, we can see how Lawrence’s innovations paralleled IACP standards. Overall there is a considerable functional equivalency between the Hamilton Police and the IACP model. At the heart of both is the distinction between operations and administration. The IACP model has a technical bureau, which in Hamilton was included in the administrative bureau. At the divisional level there are many basic similarities, suggesting an overall functional correspondence between the Hamilton police and the IACP model. Still, there were important distinctions. In Hamilton, there was no fiscal division. Another distinction is the placement of the youth division within the administrative bureau as opposed to the operations bureau. By IACP standards the size of the Department in Hamilton by 1953 (377 employees) more than warranted organization reform. While Lawrence did not refer specifically to the IACP as the source of organizational reforms in annual reports, the similarity between the adopted organizational structure and the IACP model is too similar to be a coincidence.

27 The lack of a fiscal division in the 1973 organizational chart was likely an error. In the 1967 organizational chart for the Department, budget and fiscal matters are shown as a distinct group which reported directly to the chief.
Figure 6.5: The IACP Model for Mid-sized Police Departments

From Wilson and McLaren 1977:112
6.3 Consequences of Organizational Change

The ‘success’ of this reorganization is apparent from its longevity. The fact that the 1974 transition from city to regional police did not require functional reorganization attests to the foresight and soundness of the organizational decisions made by Lawrence. There is also little doubt that communications improved, and that overall the changes were an improvement over the previous system.

Reorganization did not increase the size of the force much, if at all, so it likely had little influence on cost. Reorganization was one response to increasing costs, not the reason for them. The force increased in size before it was reorganized, not after, and as we have seen in Chapter 5, increases in cost were directly related to size since most of the budget went directly into wages.

While reorganization improved communication and departmental functioning it is not clear to what degree it improved productivity. Wilson and McLaren suggest that:

[T]he professional- or institutional-style police department tends to stress the improvement of the indirect means for police effectiveness - such as the enhancement of superior personnel practises, improved supervision, better deployment of manpower, and organizational effectiveness - as opposed to improving actual operational efficiency and productivity. Nevertheless, it is not possible to discuss police improvement in a comprehensive way unless the *means* for improvement are stressed almost as much as the end product of improvement, i.e., operational effectiveness.
The reason that the progressive police department stresses improvements in personnel administration is not only to have better-selected officers and better-trained officers in themselves but, of course, also to achieve the results which more highly capable personnel can render in the field. As a consequence, if the gains which can be made from improvement of personnel are not actually translated into improvements in the field, the effort is wasted. (Wilson and McLaren 1977:245)

Such was the vision of professional police administration advanced by its advocates. In theory, there is little to argue with. In practise, too much emphasis on organization may be as problematic as too little. For instance, Bayley (1994:75) suggests that police organization has become an end in itself. The transformation of police organization changed how the police related to the public. Nowhere was this more evident than in the police annual reports. Early in the century, reports were much more comprehensive, including summaries of interesting cases, an overview of the year from the chief, a complete account of Departmental issues, including salaries, health problems, turnover, recruiting, and dismissals, in addition to statistical summaries of offences. By 1973, police annual reports had become little more than statistical summaries that catalogued the numbers of offences. Information is presented to the public almost as in a yearly statement that a stockholder would get from a corporation. Although, beyond the scope of this study, in some respects, the rise of community policing was a response to inadequacies in institutionalized professional policing, which dominated the post World War II era.
6.4 Summary

In contrast to prior studies of police organization, the military analogy is an ineffective means of understanding changes to police organization in Hamilton. Changes were inevitable given the problems of growth. The expression of organizational change was based on accepted principles of police administration which originated within the IACP. The need for change and the expression of that change were defined by the times. While reorganization was successful in solving the problem of growth and information management, the consequences of reorganization were not immediately apparent to police administrators. Public relations would become important, as both the rank and file constable and the general public became more distant and alienated from police administration. But the solution to that problem would have to wait for another generation of police administrators.
Chapter 7: Trends In Police Work

In the last chapter we saw how police organization was revolutionized by the changes in police administrative practises. Administrative reforms also influenced police work. As the management of police organizations was becoming more professional, i.e., more guided by administrative principles, the changes filtered down to the constable on the beat. Additionally, technology revolutionized police patrol work from its isolated, pedestrian roots. The radio-equipped cruiser completely changed patrol work, how it was done, who could do it, and the types of offences constables would encounter during patrol activities. The constable's world was changing; no longer was the lone constable walking a beat considered adequate to deal with the mayhem of urban life.

This chapter examines police work in relation to its historic roots, and how police work has been transformed by technology and professionalization. Two themes are important in this chapter. The first is the diversity of police work, both past and present. In spite of the technological and administrative changes to the execution of work, police officers face a wide range of challenges in their day to day activities. The second theme is the close relation between the visibility of offences and police control activity. As the
larger context changed, the social control activities of the police changed along with it.

7.1 Police Work in Historical Perspective

Historically, the absence of specialized agencies meant the police had to perform a wide range of duties. The police was the first municipal agency that was open 24 hours a day, 365 days a year (Marquis 1993). The police controlled crowds, supervised public events, helped injured or lost persons, provided an ambulance service and a shelter for the homeless in addition to their regular patrol activities. As diverse as police services were, patrolling was the basis of police work. For many American police forces early in the century, it was typical for over 80% of police personnel to be allocated for patrol activity (Fuld 1909:196-97). Patrolling meant walking a beat; police on patrol routinely checked locked doors, listened to citizens’ complaints, arrested offenders, enforced bylaw violations, were alert to public hazards, disposed of dangerous animals, investigated suspicious circumstances, assisted individuals in need, and intervened in disputes. Constables were responsible for reporting problems that they encountered on their beats. For example, in 1914, when Hamilton’s streets were first illuminated by electricity, the police were required to report lights that were out; boys throwing stones were the biggest problem (Torrance 1967:32). The most distinctive feature of police work was the range of problems they faced.
Walking a beat was not without its dangers; in the nineteenth century, the public often sided with the “ruffians.” Indeed, a constable had to be able to “lick” any man on his beat or risk getting beat up at regular intervals (HH August 1, 1929). Weaver (1995:90) suggests that policing “entailed extraordinary risks,” with anecdotal evidence of beatings, broken bones and teeth, and being shot at. In 1912, a constable was badly beaten, kicked into insensibility in what was apparently a case of mistaken identity (HH July 22, 1912).

Although officers were subject to physical abuse, relatively few were shot in the line of duty. Up to 1963, only seven police officers had been shot in Hamilton, two fatally (HS May 23, 1963). Early in the century, strength and endurance were the basic requirements for the job. Despite the physical demands and inherent risks of policing, it is clear that at least some enjoyed the occupation. “Today police work is a cinch.... but it’s not as much fun as it used to be. It’s just sissy stuff now,” reflected Sgt. Buttenham after his 31 years on the force (HS January 29, 1952).

While the police were tough on offenders, the courts could be even tougher. In one case, a prisoner accused the police of tormenting him, giving him the third degree for stealing a pair of socks and a safety razor. The courts had even less compassion; they sentenced him to six months in jail, after which he was deported to England (HT April 18, 1910).
The activities of the police did not depart from the standards set by the courts or the expectations of the public. An important change in police work over the course of the century was the reduction in discretionary force that a constable could use to resolve problems. Early in the century, a policeman could often remedy domestic problems or juvenile delinquency by direct physical intervention (Torrance 1967:66). Times changed, and in 1953 an officer was dismissed for assaulting a prisoner even though the prisoner had started the altercation. Chief Lawrence said that the officer should have charged the prisoner instead of retaliating; Lawrence’s actions were commended by the Police Board (HN October 2, 1953). A basic trend in police work was the reduction of physical discretion on the part of constables and a coincident rise in a more procedural disposition of offences.

Even though police work became much more specialized after World War II, the public still expected the police to be able to deal with everything from lost children to labour disputes. There were always unique demands being placed on the police. In the 1950's, Hamilton constables would act as city tour guides (HS June 18, 1952), and escorts for funerals; they would also be acquainted with the procedures involved with coping with a possible nuclear attack, enemy paratroopers or subversion (Marquis 1993:238). But the big difference in the post-war era was that most constables patrolled in cruisers. Later in this chapter we will see the extent of this transformation. Although the methods of patrol
were changing, police still provided a wide range of services to the public.

There are no records that provide a detailed account of police work. Examining the number of offences per constable can shed some light on this issue, however (Figure 7.1). At the beginning of the century, police work, at least in terms of offences, was dominated by crime. In 1911, the average number of offences per constable per year was 60.27, which can be broken down as follows: crime 52.73, bylaw \(^{28}\) 5.48, and traffic 2.06. There were about seven times more criminal offences than traffic and bylaw offences combined. By the 1920's, there were considerable changes to the distribution of offences. In 1925, there were on average 61.77 offences per constable per year (bylaw 24.73, crime 26.17, traffic 10.87). Although the total had not changed much since 1911, criminal offences were cut in half (due to declining drinking offences), while bylaw and traffic offences both increased about fivefold. Increases in the numbers of bylaw and traffic offences continued, and by 1959 traffic and bylaw offences far surpassed criminal offences (total 465.83, bylaw 307.28, crime 39.32, traffic 119.23). In the 1960's, criminal offences increased rapidly, primarily due to increases in property crime.

Overall, in 1971 the number of criminal offences per constable was almost double

\(^{28}\) Most bylaw offences in the twentieth century were directly related to the automobile. After World War II, about 90% of bylaw offences were parking tickets. Data for bylaw offences were not available after 1959. Presumably, at the time most parking tickets were issued by a separate parking authority.
Figure 7.1: Offences per Constable by Year

Number of Offences

Year

1900 1908 1916 1924 1932 1940 1948 1956 1964 1972

Traffic
Bylaw
Criminal
Total

1900 1908 1916 1924 1932 1940 1948 1956 1964 1972

Year
that of 1911, and traffic offences had increased over 50 fold. On average in 1911, there
was about one criminal offence per week, about one bylaw offence per month and a
traffic offence about every six months for each constable compared with two crimes and
about two traffic offences per constable per week in 1971. The increase in the numbers of
offences reflects, to some degree, greater emphasis on procedural disposition, and as such,
we should be careful not to interpret the changes as representative of the total amount of
work constables performed.

These changes took place alongside the declining work week. Before 1900,
constables worked an eight hour day (Weaver 1995:93). Although the workday was not
excessive by current standards, constables received far fewer days off. In 1910, they had
one day off every two months, and by 1913 they received a day off every two weeks
(Weaver 1995:144). In 1918, constables received one day off per week in Hamilton
(Torrance 1967:33). The length of the work week remained the same until after World
War II. The 44 hour week was introduced in 1951, and 40 hour work week was adopted
shortly thereafter in 1952 (Torrance 1967:43).

Although police were fitting more offences into a shorter work week, it is
necessary to consider that the total number of offences per week per constable seems
lower than one would expect; i.e., these statistics do not accurately reflect what police
spend time doing. Even in 1971, when rates are highest, the number of offences per
constable is only about one per day. Clearly, offences taken alone ignore a considerable amount of police work. Bayley (1994:17, 29) estimates that less than 10% of police work is related to crime; the majority of police work involves providing assistance and restoring order - activities for which no statistics exist. Most contacts that constables on patrol make with the public are brief. Ericson (1982:53) found that in 747 citizen contacts, 85% took less than 15 minutes, and 98% took less than a half hour (Ericson 1982:53). In Canada overall, there is an average of two or three dispatched calls per shift per patrol unit (Bayley 1994:41). There is no reason to believe that Hamilton deviates markedly from these estimates. This leaves a considerable amount of time that is unaccounted for, most of which presumably is spent on patrol activities.

7.2 The Impact of Technology on Patrol Work

In the twentieth century, the improvements in transportation and communication technology were eventually integrated to transform patrol work completely. As cruisers increased the mobility of constables on patrol, radios connected police through a centralized communication system. As these technological changes became more widespread, patrol work evolved from a physically demanding, pedestrian activity to one that depended on mobility, sophisticated communication networks, and instantaneous information processing. The police had come to rely on remote information and the technology that made it possible. Early in the century, patrol work was defined by
physical strength and endurance; late in the twentieth century policing was defined by technology. While the police experienced technological change in almost every area, transportation and communication technology had the most far reaching impact on patrol work.

For police administrators, technology served two purposes in law enforcement, efficiency and cost reduction, but in reality the effect was far more pervasive. Traditionally, because of limited budgets, police chiefs considered any alternative that might reduce the need for additional labour or improve police services. From the historical record it is clear that the need for efficiency and cost reduction were not limited to the twentieth century. In the nineteenth century, police officials proposed using mounted constables, instead of hiring more employees, in order to keep costs down (HS January 19/1889). Efficiency was also important, for example, to improve police response time in the year 1900 "fly cops" mounted on bicycles could be readily dispatched (Torrance 1967:34). By 1921, police could respond to a problem anywhere in the city within two minutes as a result of motorcycle use (HS January 29, 1921). Cost and efficiency were always important, but in the twentieth century these factors became paramount to police managers.
7.2.1 Transportation: The Adoption of Cruiser Based Patrol

The reliance of police on transportation technology is primarily a twentieth century phenomenon. In 1884, Chief Stewart introduced a patrol wagon; used for bringing in prisoners, it was the first of its kind in Canada (Torrance 1967:18). By 1889, the force obtained a noiseless patrol wagon - apparently offenders had grown so accustomed to the sound of the previous patrol wagon that it allowed them time to escape (Torrance 1967:22). Before the patrol wagon, offenders were transported by various means including coal wagons and delivery carts (Torrance 1967:20). Still, most of the day-to-day activities of constables were carried out on foot.

In the twentieth century everything changed. The Department’s first auto patrol car was built by Schact Company in 1911 (HPAR 1911). By the 1920’s, traffic accidents and violations had become so severe that a motorcycle squad was created to help control the problem. The Department had come to depend on motor vehicles so much that by 1925 it was suggested that a motor mechanic be hired to maintain Department vehicles (HPAR 1925). The need for motorized vehicles kept increasing, and by 1928 there were 14 motorcycle beats, with officers checking in every five to ten minutes (HPAR 1928).

The dramatic increase in the number of vehicles used by the Hamilton Police
Department is summarised in Table 7.1. As the table indicates both the quantity and the distribution of cruisers and motorcycles changed significantly over time.

Table 7.1: Number of Cars and Motorcycles used by the Hamilton Police force, 1926-1988.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Cars</th>
<th>Total Motorcycles</th>
<th>Constables/Car</th>
<th>Constables/Motorcycle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>66.00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>35.00</td>
<td>11.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.75</td>
<td>20.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8.45</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>24.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the number of police cars has increased dramatically from 1911 to 1988, most of the change occurred after 1951. The number of constables per car has decreased from 66 in 1911, to 8.45 in 1951, to 3.44 in 1988. Between 1947 and 1951, the number of police cars almost doubled from 16 to 29. Between 1951 and 1988, increases continued, indicating almost complete reliance on automobiles for patrol work. For motorcycles the scenario was reversed somewhat. Although there was an increase in the number of motorcycles from nine in 1926 to 19 in 1951, the number of constables per motorcycle increased during this period (except for 1951), indicating that motorcycle use overall was declining relative to the use of cruisers. Cruisers assumed more importance in patrol work as they replaced both motorcycles and foot patrol.

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29 It is important to note that there was more than one shift per day so the ratio of constables per car is about a half to a third of that indicated.
While motorcycles were much less expensive to operate from a maintenance perspective, they were and are much more dangerous, with an accident rate about eight times greater than for automobiles (Stone and DeLuca 1985:194-95). Wilson and McLaren (1977:333) suggest that motorcycle patrols involve “excessive costs” and “great hazards” because of increased risk of accidents and bodily harm. This lesson was learned early on in Hamilton, when in 1921, shortly after the formation of the motorcycle squad, Constable Pryor was killed after being thrown from his motorcycle (HPAR 1921). Second, the eclipse of motorcycles for patrol coincides with the installation of radios in police cruisers. The combination of the automobile and the radio gave cruisers a definite advantage over motorcycles for patrol. In about 1936, the cruiser began to eclipse the motorcycle for patrol work. This trend continued through the 1980’s, but was accelerated after 1950. The only advantage that motorcycles have over cars is that they can move through very congested traffic (Wilson and McLaren 1977:333).

Cruisers not only had advantages over motorcycles, but they had many advantages over traditional foot-based patrol. The advantages can be summarized as follows:

1. Cost effectiveness: considerable savings resulted from reduced manpower requirements;
2. Cruiser patrol allowed responses to more diverse needs including both criminal and traffic enforcement;
3. More rapid response: police could arrive in minutes;
4. Cruisers can be used in all types of weather because they provide protection from the elements; and
5. Patrol cars serve as mobile police stations since they can carry extra persons and supplies (items 2 through 5 from Wilson and McLaren 1977:332).

The displacement of both foot patrol and motorcycles by cruisers for patrol in Hamilton was consistent with generally accepted police practices. As the public became more mobile, so did the police. In this sense, the adoption of the automobile by police reflected a trend that was already pervasive in society. The need for traffic enforcement alone justified the technological transition to cruiser patrol. Police had to deal with the changing realities of urban life, and the automobile changed society to a degree that few other technological innovations have. As one Hamilton Mayor put it, "the day of the foot patrol has passed." Because the criminals have taken to cars, so must the police (HS April 5, 1929).

7.2.2 Communications: From Call-Boxes to Radio Communications

The use of communication technology for police applications began in the nineteenth century. In 1896, the call-box system was adopted. A call-box was a box with a telephone inside and a light on top (Torrance 1967:25). If the light was lit, the constable was required to telephone the station; if not, the constable would pull a lever, which would send a signal to the station, at which point, an attending officer would record the patrolman’s time and location (Torrance 1967:25). Call-boxes were placed at strategic locations in the city. In 1891, it was estimated that to install the system it would
cost $12,000 (1891 dollars) (HPAR 1891). This was an expenditure equal to about 25% of the total budget for the year (Torrance 1967:26). Although expensive, it was felt that call-boxes were needed to remedy problems in outlying areas of the city (HPAR 1891).

Call-boxes served two purposes, they improved communications, and they allowed headquarters to monitor constables on their beats. The drudgery of walking long hours alone on the beat often meant that constables were absent from patrol (Fuld 1909). The call-box was an attempt to provide more effective police services by monitoring the patrol activities of constables (Fuld 1909:118). By the 1960's, there were only a couple of call-boxes left in the city. Long out of service, constables walking a beat would come to use public telephones to contact the main station (Torrance 1967:26). Though no data exists, it is likely that the sheer proliferation of public telephones made the use of telephones within call-boxes less necessary. No statistics were published on the use or effectiveness of the call-box system in Hamilton. There may have been a change in patrol strategy which resulted in varying police beats. Still, it is not clear exactly how call boxes fit into the overall patrol strategy, especially how that strategy changed from the turn of the century.

The most important communication innovation was the police radio. By 1932, the detective department suggested that cars be equipped with radio receiving sets (HPAR 1932), and by 1934, the radio equipment was being installed (HPAR 1934). Initially the radio equipment eliminated two jobs (HPAR 1935) but, the benefit to policing was
considered enormous. Chief Constable Goodman noted that “radio is the greatest aid to police work ever devised,” and that radio ushered in a “new era of crime prevention (HPAR 1935).”

In 1936, radio sets were purchased for seven cars, representing about 70% of the fleet (HPAR 1936). The radio coverage was seven miles in any direction, and cars were assigned to zones under the direction of a radio dispatcher (HPAR 1936). The first radio call was on May 3, 1936. The initial radio system was one-way and averaged about 25 calls per day, but by 1944, the police had a three-way FM system that averaged about 80 calls per day (Torrance 1967:26). By January 1967 the Hamilton Police force had 79 radio equipped vehicles, with a total of about 450 calls per day and 12 dispatchers (Torrance 1967:27). In 1970, the police spent $330,000 on new radios that added more frequencies to the police band, allowing the police to divide the city into districts (HS September 29, 1970). Finally, by 1973, constables on foot patrol received two way radios (HS October 22, 1973). Although radios were necessary in emergencies, the occurrence of such incidents was not as common as one might think. Most radio calls were categorized as miscellaneous (Weaver 1995:165). Between 1936 and 1967 the number of radio calls per cruiser increased from about one to about two calls per shift.

Over the years, communication systems continually improved and found an
increasing role for police applications. Eventually, radios facilitated linking the region's police forces. By 1951, radio equipment connected the Hamilton Police with the OPP and the Dundas police (HPAR 1951). In 1965, a police teletype connected 140 police forces in Ontario (Torrance 1967:27). A further innovation was the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC), a national crime data bank operated by the RCMP, which was operational by 1972 (Marquis 1993:284). An important trend in police work was the implementation of more extensive communication networks that, with each iteration, linked more personnel within the organization. Eventually, separate police organizations would become nodes in an extensive information and communication network. Improvements in communication systems made police work much more information intensive.

7.2.3 The Consequences of Technological Change

Technology defines the modern era of policing. The police have come a long way from the days when constables carried inebriated citizens to the station on their backs. By the 1950's, technology influenced almost every aspect of police work and organization. On the more promising side, technology provided more mobility and quicker response; more diverse enforcement capabilities; reduced the isolation of constables on patrol; and greater support for constables on patrol. But these advantages came at a price, because cruiser based patrol completely changed how the public interacted with the police by
decreasing the range of services that the public were able to request directly from constables on patrol. Somewhat paradoxically, technology helped to maintain assumptions about the efficacy of patrol work. The most obvious expression of technological change was the direct influence on the content and execution of police work itself. Walking a beat required physical stamina and a direct relationship with the public. Cruiser based patrol was boring, isolated from the public, and dependent on technology to perform work. In many respects, cruiser based patrol was the antithesis of foot patrol.

A direct consequence of this technological transformation were the beginnings of a more diverse, representative police force. Physical stature was not nearly as important as it was at the turn of the century. Clearly, changing attitudes alone could never have changed the physical nature of traditional policing. At the turn of the century, police work was defined by physical strength and endurance, because of the large proportion of morality offences and the physical strain of foot patrol. Technological policing made diversity possible by requiring a more diverse array of skills and fewer physical demands. Although physical strength was still important, it was no longer all important. Technology changed what police work was, and in the process, it changed who could become a police officer.

As radio equipped cruisers were employed more extensively, they revolutionized police patrol. Either innovation taken alone would not have produced the dramatic change
that we have seen in policing. Cruisers without radios improved mobility, but they isolated constables by breaking down the traditional lines of communication between the public and the police. Traditionally, citizens had approached police directly with problems, but cruisers made this much more difficult. In short, increases in mobility provided by automobiles solved several problems, but simultaneously created a basic communication problem, to which the radio provided a direct and simple solution. Problems generated by the adoption of one type of technology were solved by adopting another, until patrol work was essentially changed beyond recognition from its pedestrian roots.

The radio was the link that made the whole system work, but in the process it completely changed how the Department functioned. Radio communication meant that citizens with complaints could call the Department directly, and the Department would contact the constable via radio. Radio equipped cruisers altered the information flow, from

[citizens constables organization]

to

[citizens organization constables].

This represented a crucial change because it fundamentally altered the relationship between the police and the public. The radio changed the basis for police-public interaction from direct contact with constables to communicating through the
organization. These changes in the interaction between the public and the police started with the advent of telephones and the use of call boxes in the late nineteenth century. Call boxes, however, did not substantially change police public interaction due to the limitations of the technology and the presence of constables on foot patrol.

The isolation of cruiser based patrol promoted the specialization of police services, since the public could not, in most instances, make direct requests to officers on patrol, and requests had to be funnelled through the organization's communication network. It also meant that the public dealt with the organization as opposed to an individual. The complainant, the dispatcher, and the constables became links in an information chain and this defined their relationship. Technology allowed the police and the public to communicate while effectively remaining strangers. Traditional lines of communication were severed as constables patrolled in their cruisers awaiting instructions from a police dispatcher. Requests for services were filtered and controlled externally by the growing police bureaucracy. The net consequence was that many of the informal activities that resulted from direct contact with the public were excluded, since they were not considered serious enough to call the police. Today, most police work is generated by radio dispatch, and “[i]f the public stopped calling the police, the police would have to reinvent their jobs (Bayley 1994:17).”

For much of the twentieth century, police managers embraced technological
change as if it were some absolute form of progress. To some degree, they were justified in making this assumption. While technology provided solutions to some problems, it created others for which other technological solutions were sought. While technology was openly embraced, there appears to have been little consideration of its consequences for both the police and the public. In a way, technology allowed the police to maintain a very old set of assumptions about social order and the role of police in society. Technology allowed the patrol mentality to prevail and to remain economically viable, to be grafted from its nineteenth century origins onto the age of mass production, mass consumption and mass mobility. The irony was that as police work and organization were completely transformed, the assumptions that the edifice of law enforcement was built on remained unchanged.

In contrast to police officials, many scholars question the effectiveness of police patrol as a deterrent to crime (Kelling 1971, Felson 1994, Bayley 1994, Ericson 1982). The assumed need for a more technologically-based police force prevented a dialogue on the causes and problems of social disorder because it allowed the assumptions of the nineteenth century to find an expression in the twentieth century. Technological change, although inevitable in some respects, became the means for maintaining the philosophical status quo. By viewing many problems in technological terms, for example, decreasing response time, increasing mobility, developing more extensive communication networks, police managers have often distracted attention from the historic, economic and
demographic realities of social problems for which improved technology was largely irrelevant.

7.3 Professionalism

The professional model - the image of the policeman as a highly trained law enforcement officer - came into its own in the post-World War II period. Professionalization occurred at the higher ranks first, facilitated by umbrella organizations such as the IACP and the CCAC, but it eventually filtered down to the constable on the beat. Professionalization was related to the growing consensus on police issues by police chiefs. The need for traffic and crime control delineated professional policing. Professionalization entailed a range of specific duties which could be applied to a general setting. Further, this consensus could be disseminated through police organizations such as the IACP and the CCAP. Work dispatched by radio meant that the organization had control of police work in a way that it never had before. Alongside technological change, increased training and increased educational requirements, increases in civil liberties, the introduction of Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR), and legal aid all provided an impetus for professionalization at the street level.

The adoption of professional standards did not occur all at once. Although most North American police forces were originally based on the London Metropolitan Police,
the considerable variability of police forces in the nineteenth century reflects the different contexts to which this model was applied (Ethington 1987, Harring 1983, Haller 1976, Watts 1973). Eventually, however, police forces became more alike, driven by the homogenization of urban space that occurred due to automobiles (Chapter 4). As police training became independent of a particular social context or community, police work became a range of skills which could be applied to any community.

Professionalization evolved slowly. Hiring based on physical characteristics had a long tradition in Hamilton, and the nature of police work early in the century provided ample justification in the minds of police officials. Hiring was based simply on age, sex, height and weight requirements. Some creative applicants tried to overcome these physical requirements by wearing lead filled or padded shoes (HH September 2, 1914). At the turn of the century, the force was very uniform physically, with most constables between 5'11" and 6'1" weighing between 170 and 190 pounds (Weaver 1995:121). The number of criteria on which candidates were evaluated increased over time. By 1935, suitable candidates were male, between 21 and 26 years of age, a British subject, have good character and at least two years of high-school to be considered for employment (HPAR 1935).

From the inception of policing in Hamilton until the 1930's, policing was a career that one learned by doing. Weaver (1995) maintains that police training has never been
adequate considering the range of services that they were expected to provide. In 1889, a police training manual was published, but it was primarily a guide to conduct (Weaver 1995:99-100). By 1935, the entire force had first aid training and revolver practice. Physical drill and parade formation were also a part of the curriculum (HPAR 1935). In 1937, a police training school opened at central police headquarters (HPAR 1937). One of the most important functions of the school was to help police officers write better reports (HS October 5, 1937). The emphasis on writing cannot be stressed enough; Wilson and McLaren (1977:468) suggest that police work can often be reduced to what an officer writes down. In 1962, the Hamilton school was absorbed into a provincial police school (HS March 12, 1962), as police training became uniform throughout the province of Ontario.

Another important aspect of standardization was the introduction of the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system in 1962. The main impact of UCR was to change police reports from a narrative format to a standardized, categorized form (Torrance 1967:50). Ultimately, the professionalization of police work involved not only the development of skills but their standardization and acceptance on a larger scale.

Police officers always required a rudimentary education. Joseph Crocker joined the Hamilton Police during Chief Smith’s “regime.” On May 15, 1913, Crocker had a “brief and courteous” interview with the chief, during which, the chief pointed to an article
of furniture and asked "What is it?" Crocker responded, "it's a cabinet." Chief Smith then asked Crocker to spell cabinet. After a lengthy career, Crocker became chief of the Hamilton Police in 1944. He wondered how his life would have been different if he had spelled cabinet incorrectly (HPAR 1949). By the 1970's, the police recruitment process had changed considerably. Many police departments used some or all of the following criteria: application forms, written examinations, fingerprints, physical tests, personal history statements, oral interviews, medical and psychological evaluations, probation (Wilson and McLaren 1977:272), and, most importantly, increased educational requirements.

National and international police organizations facilitated professionalization at the lower ranks. They created a forum for the discussion of issues, the dissemination of information and the standardization of procedures. After World War II, the field of police science expanded rapidly. At some American universities police studies were included in criminology programmes. After the war there was an incredible proliferation of texts on policing.

Perhaps the most important police reformer in the post war period was O.W. Wilson, a former student of Vollmer and a prolific writer on issues of police management and administration (Wilson 1958, 1963, Wilson and McLaren 1977). Wilson's works were influential in police circles, and important reformers in Hamilton were familiar with his
works. The IACP and other groups held courses - which were attended by members of the Hamilton Police force. Professionalization, similar to departmental reorganization, occurred in a period when knowledge and standards had evolved considerably and were being disseminated on an international scale.

The need for more educated recruits paralleled the development of police administration practices. As the upper echelons of the police became more professional, they became more selective in relation to potential recruits. Since most positions within police departments were filled by promotion, the need for more educated recruits was not only to provide a more competent officer at the street level, but to provide future administrative personnel who could be promoted from within the Department to fill the growing management needs of the organization. Despite all the changes occurring, there was still a sense that those who occupied the upper ranks of the organization should be police officers first.

Changes in the criminal justice system also provided an impetus for police professionalization. Increases in civil liberties required the police to maintain a more professional disposition. Police had to be able to document details of an offence and

30 Source, June 8, 1998 interview with Gordon Torrance.

31 In an June 8, 1998 interview, Gordon Torrance suggested that he had taken (about) 27 separate courses related to police work and administration in the late 1950's.
appear in court more often to provide testimony. "By the 1940's, every constable had to attend several weeks of classes, studying procedure, evidence, deportment, civility, criminal law, and by-laws (Weaver 1995:181)." These were important reforms since the evolution of case law placed restrictions on how police took statements and identified accused parties by witnesses (Weaver 1995:271). The introduction of legal aid meant that guilty pleas were more rare (HS April 27, 1973) and that police testimony would come under closer scrutiny. Changes to the criminal justice system increased the time that the police spent in court and the created the need for a more professional treatment of offenders.

The automobile was a major factor in police professionalization in several ways. First, the automobile forced police departments to become specialized because of the workload they created. Second, traffic offences were usually dealt with procedurally by writing up tickets or accident reports. On a small scale this is not important, but on a large scale it means that police spend a lot more time writing. As police were required to write more, they required more training and a higher level of education. Third, with the adoption of widespread cruiser patrol, constables required more extensive training. Fourth, traffic issues linked the police with other professional groups, such as city planners and engineers (Marquis 1993). Fifth, automobiles made urban space across North America more similar and, therefore, provided police with similar problems that required similar solutions.
The formation of the police association facilitated professionalization by helping to stabilize the workforce. A transitory work force would have made professional standards more difficult to implement. Although working conditions had improved considerably before the formation of the association in 1921 - as a response to the threat of unionization and the improved working conditions in other occupations - the association seems to have had a direct impact on turnover. Between 1910 and 1920, high dismissal and resignation rates coincided with a period of labour unrest in the Department. After 1921 annual turnover (dismissals plus resignations) decreased considerably and was typically below 7% (Figure 7.2).\textsuperscript{32} Turnover reached a high of 24 in 1920 and a low of one in 1936 (Figure 7.3). The police association benefited constables by improving wages and working conditions, but it may have also benefited management because it reduced the turnover of employees.

Still, at times it was difficult to recruit candidates with the desired level of educational attainment. After World War II, as the economy improved it was hard to secure recruits because the Department wanted high school completion (HS November 17, 1950). At the same time individuals were quitting due to low pay (HS December 22, 1950). In 1951, 400 people applied for 23 jobs but most did not meet the department's minimum requirements (HS October 1951\textsuperscript{33}). The post-World War II

\textsuperscript{32} Turnover data are not available after 1942.

\textsuperscript{33} The day was not specified.
recruiting difficulties continued, and in 1957 it was difficult to keep the force up to strength because they could not find suitable candidates (HS May 28, 1957). In other words, it was more important to Chief Lawrence to ensure a level of competence than simply to fill vacancies. An editorial in the Hamilton Spectator suggested that relative to trades, police were over qualified and underpaid (HS December 16/1967). Although the public was becoming more educated, the police could often not obtain the level of education desired. Only about 25% of the heads of all families in Hamilton in 1961 had a high school or greater level of education. This meant that a majority of the possible candidates were excluded from a career in policing on the basis of educational requirements alone.

Professionalization changed how individuals in the occupation related to one another. Prior to adopting professional standards, seniority was the main factor in promotion. This all changed as promotion became primarily based on ability. While there had always been less loyalty and more mobility among the rank and file, professionalization increased mobility at the higher ranks. By the 1980's mobility occurred at all levels of police forces. To advance their careers, individuals took jobs with other forces; this was especially true of police executives.

Police administrators believed that professionalization would have many benefits

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34 Source: Canada Census 1961.
Figure 7.2: Resignations and Dismissals (in %) by Year
Figure 7.3: Resignations and Dismissals by Year
including greater efficiency, more accountability, reduced discretion, and clarified
guidelines for behaviour. Professionalism likely accomplished these goals to some degree,
but it is difficult to assess its impact. The down side of professionalism was that it changed
the character of policing, which became more impersonal. It changed how the police
related to the public and to each other. It also changed how police were evaluated. The
fact that gifted individuals could leapfrog over their superiors creates animosity and
resentment at any time, but to institutionalize the changes disturbed the stable order based
on loyalty, seniority, and community service that had pervaded the Hamilton Department.

Professionalization, to a degree, over-specialized the police in the areas of crime
and traffic enforcement. The professional model did not take into account the potentially
wide range of demands that could be placed on police officers. The theory of professional
policing was at odds with the day-to-day realities of police work. Police training
emphasizes fighting crime, but most work involves minor problems (Vincent 1990:48-49).
Further, there are many aspects of police work for which the police have little or no
training. Training in areas such as stress management (Vincent 1990), dispute resolution,
and race and ethnic relations would all have benefited new recruits. The professional
model was too theoretical and rooted in the assumption of the effectiveness of the police
as crime fighters. It ignored the realities of police work and the communities that the
police had to serve. The community policing movement of the 1980's and 1990's was, in
part, a realignment of the professional model to address community needs.
7.4 Police Work and Social Control

Police work is essentially a government sanctioned form of social control. Marquis (1993:113) notes that police opposed “anything that disturbed the peace.” Traditionally, police saw their role as primarily preventing crime and preserving the peace (HT December 20, 1913). The public relied on the police to address almost any form of disorder. As such, control activities had both a negative and a positive dimension. Control activities could be negative insofar as they disproportionally focused on those on the margins of society. It is not difficult to find instances in which the police in Hamilton overstepped their authority in the execution of their responsibilities. Bayley (1994), Reiner (1991), and Ericson (1982) all suggest that the social control of marginals is still a common police activity. There is another side to the control activities of police, however. The social control activities of police were an important aspect of civic order.

Arguably, the modern city could not function without the imposition of order, order that we scarcely recognize as such because of its legitimacy and its necessity. Apart from benign critical grumbling, usually softened with humour, citizens in Hamilton have overwhelmingly and essentially uncritically supported the institutions of law and order. (Weaver 1995:22)

Dealing with traffic problems, arresting potentially dangerous offenders, intervening in domestic disputes, supervising labour strikes, helping those in need of assistance, were positive aspects of the social control functions of the police. The effectiveness with which they carried out these control activities remain controversial. “Their helpfulness and
usefulness have been undervalued by critics and their menacing traits underestimated by their champions (Weaver 1995:273).

Control activities varied over time. At the beginning of the century, most offences were related to public drinking. In an era when most drinking took place in public, the police were more likely to encounter intoxicated individuals on their beats than other types of offenders (Weaver 1995). Enforcement of morality offences, while motivated by public concerns, was made easier by their public visibility. In the post-World War II period, in contrast, property crimes dominated the overall number of offences. It was much more difficult for the police to control property offences because of their low visibility, the tremendous opportunity for the public to commit such crimes, and the diminished capacity for individuals to be caught after a crime has been committed.

The most visible offences in the post-World War II period were traffic offences. Ericson (1982) found that most pro-active actions undertaken by the police were traffic related. In the post-war period the combination of cruiser based patrol and the visibility of traffic violations resulted in an explosion of traffic offences.

In annual reports traffic problems always seem to surpass the ability of the police to deal with them. Even though police could be more effective because violations were more visible, the sheer extent of the problem makes one wonder how effective the police
could be overall, given their limited resources. Police could not eliminate drunk drivers, speeders or careless drivers, or prevent accidents and fatalities from occurring. While they made an essential contribution to public safety, the problem was just too big for the police to handle alone.

 Strikes, because they involve group conflict, and because they are episodic, present a unique example of police social control activity. Aside from a couple of serious strikes the demands that labour disputes made on the police were small compared with the allocation of police resources for traffic and crime problems. For example, 1990 was a fairly bad year for strikes in Hamilton. The police supervised 25 strikes involving 13,115 strikers, and made 55 arrests. The total property damage for all strikes combined in 1990 was only $44,500. Strikes required 1405 hours of overtime, which was incidental when one considers that the department had 904 employees in 1990. The additional labour requirements for the police to supervise strikes was less than two hours per year per employee. Strikes were so infrequent that police, for most of the century, had few if any full time staff to cover labour disputes exclusively.

 In comparison, traffic problems were of much greater magnitude. To begin, the

35 Data for labour strikes and traffic issues are from the Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police 1990 Statistical Report. The year 1990 was chosen because of the availability of comparative data.
human costs were much more substantial. In 1990, there were 6900 traffic accidents (about 132 per week), which resulted in 30 fatalities and 4045 injuries. The drunk driving program (R.I.D.E.) stopped over 56,985 vehicles and administered over 734 tests to possibly intoxicated drivers. Traffic problems required more attention because they represented a much greater threat to social order and public safety.

Often, the ability of police to participate in social control activities was related to their ability to take a pro-active stance in relation to social problems. But their ability to take such a stance varied considerably with the visibility of the offences. As far back as 1936, police officials were warning the public that there was little they could do to prevent theft (HPAR 1936). Weaver (1995:273) suggests that police have been less successful at social control than their critics claim. Even when police can adopt an effective pro-active stance to social problems the opportunity to violate laws often far surpasses the ability of the police to enforce the law.

An important trend in social control activities was the shift from the enforcement of morality laws early in the century to the enforcement of traffic laws in the post-World
Figure 7.4: % of Thefts Prosecuted by Year
War II period. In both situations, police adopted a pro-active stance. Although thefts dominated crime after World War II, so few of them were prosecuted that it is very hard to make a case that the police had a significant impact on property crimes. In Figure 7.4, we can see that the proportion of prosecuted to reported thefts had declined precipitously by 1930. In contrast to traffic offences, which were easily discovered by the police, most thefts were reported to the police by complainants (Weaver 1995:199,244). The theft rate increased almost tenfold from the turn of the century and while some police initiatives were relatively successful, the police could do little to address the increases overall.

The social control activities of the police seem closely related to the visibility of offences. Police could do little to stop thefts or assaults that occurred on private property. Out of public view, the police can have little impact on crime. Even when problems did occur in public, often the police were quite limited in their ability to control the problems. Traffic problems far surpassed the resources of police to deal with them. Similarly, drinking offences dropped after the passage of the Ontario Temperance Act in 1917, not because the police were able to implement an effective solution to the problem (HH April 4, 1918).

The visibility of offences directs the activity of police work, but it does not ensure adequate problem resolution. While police often suggest that crime rates are related to police strength, the reality is that the ability of the police to deal with these problems was
7.5 Summary

Changes in police work reflected the times. What police did, who could do it, and how it was done all suggest the particular historical nature of police work. It is clear that police work has always entailed unrealistic expectations. Many problems were beyond the ability of police to prevent or resolve. When police can mount a direct response to social problems, the resources they can muster are often inadequate to cope with the extent of the problems. The police in Hamilton were aware of this; annual reports often acknowledge the limitations of police resources or the extent of the problems they dealt with.

The professionalization of police work accompanied technological and organizational change. These changes define the modern era of police work. But it was also an era with sky-rocketing offence rates. Improvements in police organization and professionalization do not appear to have been an effective remedy to social problems. Social problems often require police intervention at some point, and in this respect police provide valuable services to the public, but it is inaccurate to view the police as a remedy to social problems. Police reformers such as Vollmer realized the limitations of the police

often quite limited.
to cope with social problems in the 1930's. Perhaps the most essential characteristic of police work is its diversity. The value of the police lies not in their ability to eradicate social problems, but in their ability to respond effectively (in the short term) to such a wide range of problems. This was, perhaps, the most significant aspect of the services they provided to the community.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

At the outset of this research, the police were like a ‘foreign’ culture to me. I therefore felt I had a responsibility to portray them with a sensitivity to their own views and history, and not to simply subsume them into a larger sociological paradigm. Similar to qualitative research, description and holism were important aspects of this study. Certainly, there are examples of quantitative studies that transcend established methodological paradigms and provide compelling results. Perhaps the most significant example of the use of quantitative data in a descriptive, holistic manner is Sorokin’s (1937) *Social and Cultural Dynamics*. Sorokin’s holistic and descriptive use of quantitative data to establish and understand systems of meaning set a precedent to which this study owes a great deal. Sorokin was able to develop a convincing argument on the basis of a content analysis of historical evidence.

The basic difference between Sorokin’s approach and my own was that he had a well developed hypothesis at the outset. At the beginning of this research I had few specific theoretical expectations. Initially, my interpretation of the historical record was much closer to Nisbet’s view of history than to any sociological paradigm. History, according to Nisbet (1969 241), “is diverse, multiple, and particular.” This view often conflicts with mainstream sociology, where, traditionally, social theorists have attempted
to understand change by rooting their analyzes in metaphors of timeless structural constants that govern social life (Nisbet 1969:274). Nisbet’s alternative is “to approach the problem of change historically... by trying to understand social change in terms of its particulars” (Nisbet 1969:275). By doing so, “we can see that change is bound up in events not an unfolding of immanent processes (Nisbet 1969:275).” Further, Nisbet sees external events as fundamental to social change, especially external events from “outside the domain of the form of social behaviour” (Nisbet 1969:275). Nisbet’s emphasis on historical particularism and the role of external factors in change in many ways represents the conceptual basis for this study, because I have described the changes to policing in relation to the events that shaped them; and these events, at least on the surface, appear relatively independent of one another.

For researchers examining the institution of the police, theoretical paradigms are not always self-evident. Previously, many of the best studies of the police were issue-centered than overtly theoretical in any substantial sense. Kelling’s et al. (1982) landmark study of police patrol comes immediately to mind; but there are others too. Clarke’s and Heal’s (1984) research is also a prime example of the non-theoretical issue-driven nature research on police forces. Similarly, it was important to me review the historical evidence in a convincing manner before entertaining conceptual and theoretical issues.

From this study, we can draw two sets of conclusions. First, we can address the
issue of social change directly: who were the police, what were the basic trends in policing, and how did these trends relate to the larger social context? These questions are important because changes to the police as an institution are inadequately understood at present. Second, we can look at social change more conceptually: why did these changes to policing occur, and what do they mean? Let us consider the empirical results of the study before dealing with the idea of social change on a conceptual level. Initially, after reviewing police records, I discovered that changes to the police were often linked directly to external events and circumstances. By examining factors such as population, the changing distribution of crime in police records, and the role of the automobile, I have shown how changes to the police as an institution were rooted in the need to adapt to changing circumstances.

Between 1901 and 1973 the population of Hamilton increased from 52,000 to 305,000. Population increases propelled the growth of the Department. Prior to World War II the size of the force remained very close to one police employee per thousand inhabitants. As the force grew, the character of policing changed. The police became a large institution in a large city. It was impossible to maintain the degree of intimacy that had once defined their relation with the public. Within the organization, the changes were also profound. The chief no longer had the direct contact with front-line officers or the public that he once had - he became separated from them by layers of middle management. The distinction between managers and workers became clearer as the organization
increased in size.

Prior research has often attempted to link the size of police forces with crime rates. In Hamilton the size of the force was not the product of crime rates (as they appear in police reports). During the first 45 years of the twentieth century, crime rates as specified in the Annual Reports fluctuated dramatically, while the per capita size of the force remained close to one employee per thousand residents. The opposite scenario is equally implausible: it would be difficult to explain changes in crime rates as a function of changes in the size of the force since the per capita size was effectively constant prior to World War II. I do not mean to suggest that larger variations in the size of the force would have had no effect, only that crime rates varied substantially during a period in which the size of the force remained constant. A direct examination of the historical evidence provides a far more compelling explanation of the relation between size and crime than prior studies which simply linked crimes rates and the size of police forces statistically. Indeed, after World War II: shrinking work weeks and increased benefits had a much more direct impact on the size of the police force than crime rates did.

Instead of looking for links between crime and the per capita size of police forces, it would seem to be more fruitful to address the question of size directly: that is, why were population estimates used? This question remains unanswered. To my knowledge, the police in Hamilton never provided a substantial answer for the use of population estimates;
they are simply treated as a self-evident basis for determining the size of the force. It is clear that after World War I the 1:1000 standard was altered by labour issues, especially declining work weeks - the effect is direct and unmistakable, yet we still do not know why a police force should have been set at a certain size. We do not know why police forces base their size on population, and so it is not clear whether a police force is too large or too small, because we have no way of knowing what the appropriate size is. To understand the link between population and size we need to know why the police used demographic standards to estimate their need for personnel. As I speculated earlier in the study, the size of police forces is much more closely related to fiscal policy than to any estimate of social problems but this remains to be demonstrated conclusively. It is clear that budgetary limits place direct limits on size. Yet police budgets were allocated by municipal government, and as the city grew so did the tax base. So even though the Department’s size was determined by its budget, its budget in turn was closely related to the expanding population of Hamilton.

While population growth was responsible for increases in the size of the force, the automobile redefined the content and execution of police work. To understand the police, one must take into account how the automobile transformed the social landscape in addition to its direct effects on the content and execution of police work. The automobile made suburban sprawl possible and greatly increased the mobility of individuals (Felson 1994, Schon 1971, Weaver 1995). “The technology of the city and most particularly the
central technologies of automotive transportation, engulf industrial nations. Consequently, a large Spanish city has less the character of a Spanish city than of a modern, industrial city anywhere (Schon 1971 25).” Similarly, in Hamilton automobiles transformed urban space in a way that no other technological innovation had.

Automobiles created a tremendous workload for the police, who attended accidents, directed traffic, enforced traffic laws, dealt with congested streets and irate motorists, and attempted to educate the public about the hazards of automobiles. Similar to Felson (1994), Weaver (1995), Monkkonen (1981a) and Marquis (1993), the present study underscores the impact of the automobile on policing. As Marquis (1993) suggests, the sheer volume of automobile offences made them analogous to the drinking offences that had dominated police work in the nineteenth century. Problems caused by automobiles demanded considerable police resources and attention, and as a result the need for specialized services developed.

Crime also had an important influence on the changes to policing. Crime control was, and is, an essential aspect of police work. It is important to recognize that the amount and distribution of crime, as recorded in police records, changed significantly in the twentieth century. As the distribution of crime changed so did the activities of the police. Early in the century, police intervention in daily life in Hamilton was dominated by drinking offences. This is a pattern that is widely acknowledged among historians.
(Monkkonen 1981a, Marquis 1993, Weaver 1995, and Rogers 1984). After World War II, morality, property, and violent crime all increased but the rise in property crime was especially noteworthy.

After World War II, in an era of unprecedented affluence, property crimes skyrocketed. The opportunity for theft increased substantially. The ratio of reported to prosecuted thefts was very low, suggesting that the police could do little to control the incidence of theft. Not only was there more crime in the post-war period, crime was more difficult to address owing to its particular nature. There is no evidence that police considered thefts of little consequence; rather, they had limited effectiveness dealing with such problems.

Different crimes have different degrees of public visibility. The ability of police to make arrests for theft was far more limited than their ability to deal with public drunkenness. Drinking offences were often highly visible, especially in an era in which most drinking took place in public taverns. It was not difficult to find drunks on the streets; thieves, however, were another matter altogether. To prevent theft, police checked to make sure that doors on businesses were locked. The police often made recommendations to the public to help them protect their property. Early on, the police recognized that there was little that they could do either to prevent many thefts from occurring or to apprehend offenders once a crime had been committed.
Different crimes were resolved in different ways. Dealing with intoxicated citizens on the streets usually required direct physical intervention on the part of constables. Early in the century, police work was dominated by the need for physical endurance to cope with the beat and the ability to resolve disputes physically when they occurred. In contrast, property crimes required writing up reports which were of a completely different nature. Thus changes in the relative distribution of types of crime had a direct role on the content of police activity.

Even when offences were visible, police often lacked the resources to deal with them. For example, declines in drinking offences in Hamilton followed the passage of the Ontario Temperance Act in 1917, which restricted the sale of alcohol. Prior attempts by the police were less effective. Similarly, increased emphasis on traffic enforcement produced large increases in the total numbers of offences - but it is not clear how much impact enforcement had on traffic offences due to the sheer extent of traffic violations. Traditionally, at least for visible offences, to catch more offenders you needed more police. The extent of traffic and crime problems often surpassed the ability of the police to cope. Thus it was very common in the historical record for the police to request more resources. While the continual requests for larger budgets may seem self-serving the reality was that police chiefs had few alternatives.

Prior studies have not adequately addressed the variability of police activities over
time. Ericson (1982) points out that control activities were directed towards those on the margins of society. In Hamilton, police also focused on these activities, but this emphasis was likely more a function of the visibility of these offences rather than their priority in the police scheme of things. Still, as we have seen, many researchers tend to see the police primarily as oppressors of marginal groups. In Hamilton, while the police did engage in 'oppressive' activities, such an interpretation taken alone would be inconsistent with the historical record. Social control activities were directly influenced by specific circumstances, including the extent and visibility of offences. The tremendous increase in traffic offences and the simultaneous decline in morality offences make it difficult to argue that the police maintained a uniform ideology of class control. How could such a uniform ideology produce such striking variation in the overall numbers and types of offences? The problems that police faced were not uniform across time: neither was their response.

Although the police, at times, and to varying degrees, reinforced the existing class divisions in the city, they were an institution that time and again was riddled with these very conflicts. Labour issues, though episodic in the historical record, played an important role in the Department's history. The formation of a police association shortly after World War I was one of the pivotal moments in the history of the force, permanently changing social relations within the Department. One is struck by the amount of coverage devoted to police labour issues in local newspapers. Aside from the formation of the police
association, police labour issues became increasingly important after World War II. By the 1960's the police association was a force to be reckoned with. The police force became more divided and management became more difficult, as the association aggressively lobbied for higher wages and better benefits. Within the police, labour issues intensified the conflict between managers and workers as the Department became more fragmented.

Labour issues were just the tip of the iceberg. They reflected the changing economics of policing. While the police provided a range of services to the public, they did so within definite budgetary constraints. The first requirement of any police force is the capital required to make it operational. Three findings of this study deserve particular attention: the increasing cost of policing, the increasing proportion of municipal expenditure allotted to the police, and the high proportion of the police budget that went directly to pay wages. The cost of policing increased much faster than population. Between 1913 and 1972, the per capita cost of policing increased 5.7 fold. Assuming that the level of services remained the same - a questionable assumption - these services required a much greater investment of tax dollars. As a result, between 1959 and 1972, police expenditures increased from 2.85% to 11.72% of the overall municipal budget.

In a typical year, between 80% and 90% of the overall police budget went directly into wages. Police wages were rooted in general labour market trends. Although the police were a public institution, they had to compete in the labour market to hire and keep
their personnel. Trends in the labour market (increasing wages for example) and at other police forces were powerful determinants of police wages in Hamilton. Thus, the wages paid to the Hamilton force were similar to those paid to other forces. At the time when wages were rising, police often had trouble recruiting because of alternative employment opportunities.

Police productivity declined over the century because increases in productivity were more than offset by increased wages and shorter work weeks. Similar to the national wage trends for workers and supervisors, wages for the police in Hamilton increased substantially between 1900 and 1973. Police administrators had to try to find ways to increase efficiency, and this produced many changes, such as the use of civilians, task specialization, organizational reform, technological change, and altered patrol strategies. Police administrators were put in an unenviable position: they often had to request larger budgets to provide the same level of services. Economic factors motivated widespread change to the Department. As in Vollmer (1971), Bayley (1994), and Felson (1994), the results of this study suggest that economic limitations alone preclude the police from being an effective remedy for many social problems.

As the institution grew, and costs mounted, there was a need for more effective use of resources. It was the combination of growth with the need for effective use of resources that culminated in a major Departmental reorganization in the 1960's. The
organization that emerged was very similar to the organizational structure for medium-sized police departments recommended by the IACP. The IACP model was based on a variety of institutional types, including industrial, commercial, public, and military organizations. In Hamilton, organizational change was not the elaboration or development of military ideals or practices. This is not to say that the police have completely transcended their military origins - one can still find elements of the military within the Department. For example, the use of rank, military style uniforms and the emphasis on discipline all suggest ties with a military tradition. The main point, however, is that the police are no longer a 'military organization'. Organizational change was closely related to the emerging professionalism that occurred after World War II.

Reorganization was consistent with widely acknowledged administrative principles, but these principles were applied to the specific needs of the police.

A contribution of the present study is the basic recognition that organizational change was not simply an elaboration of a 'military' model but the implementation of an organizational style that was consistent with the post World War II rise of professional police administration. Prior research (Weaver 1995, Marquis 1993) has pointed to the similarities between the police and contemporary corporations. My study adds substance to this argument by examining the particulars of organizational change. Change was not the result of inherent development or elaboration of the existing organization. Rather, an entirely new mode of organization displaced the traditional rank-based hierarchy.
Organization became a feature of policing that was clearly distinguishable from rank. The Department became an organization composed of functional elements that were coordinated on accepted administrative principles disseminated via police networks and organizations.

In contrast to the post World War II organizational revolution, changes to police work were more gradual. The most important trend in police work was the shift away from the physical rigors of the beat to a cruiser based patrol. The emergence of professionalism also represented a major change in police work. Professionalism was related to many factors including technology, the changing distribution of crime as evidenced in Annual Reports, the adoption of Uniform Crime Reporting, the introduction of legal aid, the rise of traffic issues and problems, the incorporation of more rigorous training and recruitment requirements, a higher base educational level, and the need to respond to changing public expectations. At the same time, police managers were becoming more professional via the administrative revolution. The constable on the beat was becoming more professional. Thus, professionalism occurred on different levels of the force almost simultaneously.

Despite the changes, there was an important element of continuity within police work. Police work remained diverse in the range of services provided by constables. But the most important element of continuity was the reliance on patrol work as the basis of
police services. Patrol work is as old as modern policing. Police seldom differentiate the function of police from its practical expression. Generations of police officers have maintained that patrol is necessary to preserve public order. While patrol activity formed the basis of police work throughout the century, the transformation of pedestrian to cruiser patrol allowed patrol activity to remain economically viable. Thus, technological change provided the opportunity for the police to maintain patrol as the basis of police services. Still, it has long been known that patrols have limited value (Bayley 1994, Felson 1994, Ericson 1982, Kelling et al. 1974, Bright 1965, Clarke and Hough 1980). One must wonder, given the continual need for efficiency, if alternatives to patrol were ever seriously considered by police officials. It is clear that the public placed a high value on police patrols. There has never been public pressure to consider alternatives to patrol; in fact, the public often requested increases in patrol services. While most citizens wanted a police presence in public, they often reservations about the costs of policing.

In the previous pages we have reviewed the basic changes to policing in Hamilton. It is now time to consider what these changes mean. Important changes took place in all the aspects of policing that I examined, but at the same time there was an important element of continuity within the institution. This is the essence of social change, that it occurs in the midst of a degree of continuity. To understand change we need to understand how change and continuity relate to one another. While change expressed itself most often in terms of variations in magnitude or composition there were also
changes in standards and the increasing specialization of the force. However, since most change seems to be either directly or indirectly related to external events and factors, it is the process of change through the adoption of innovations, or diffusion, to which I would now like to turn my attention. "Diffusion is the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a certain social system (Rogers 1983:5)." In the classic diffusion model, the ‘item to be diffused’ was thought to spread or fan out from a single source. More recently, it has been shown that often innovation does not precede the diffusion process - it evolves within that process (Schon 1971). Often it is unclear which alternative will provide the desired results and so it is important to see diffusion within a framework of “information and uncertainty (Rogers 1983:6).” For diffusionists social change is largely a process of ‘adaptation,’ i.e., incorporating things that originate elsewhere. A progressive institution is not simply one in which innovation occurs, but one in which external innovations can be readily implemented.

Diffusion theory has advantages. There is no need to postulate that change results from either social structure or an underlying nature, thereby relieving us from having to understand the transformation of a social system simply on the basis of its internal properties. For diffusionists change is often an end in itself. This allows us to escape from the metaphorical leanings of sociological paradigms from Marx to Sorokin, where social systems have an underlying essence, and change is simply an elaboration or development
of this underlying nature. A problem with social theory, as historians point out, is that such a position often cannot account for unique events. Conversely, diffusion theory can deal with the problem of unique events because it does not make deterministic assumptions about the nature of social structure.

Another advantage of diffusion theory is that most change, in one way or another, results from diffusion (Rogers 1983, Murdock 1956). The degree to which an institution is shaped by diffusion is often not self evident, because innovations, given enough time, are simply taken as part of the status quo. A basic feature of social institutions is their permeability, i.e., their ability to make what is extrinsic intrinsic. Indeed, it is difficult to recount a single innovation that originated within the ranks of the Hamilton Police. This not really a shortcoming because the purpose of the police was to provide a service, not serve as a source of innovation. Further, the sources of innovation transcend national boundaries as ideas and innovations are diffused via extensive communication and transportation networks.

For diffusion to occur two things are necessary: a real or perceived need, and available and feasible alternatives. Needs exist on different levels: economic, social (prestige), technological, and functional. Without a need of some form there is little incentive to adopt an innovation. Once a need is established, change becomes a process of selecting from the existing alternatives. If a particular alternative worked somewhere else,
that fact can provide strong motivation to adopt the innovation, because it reduces the risk of implementation. For the police, innovations had to be economically feasible as budgetary restraints often placed direct limits on the ability of force to adopt innovations, especially where new technology was concerned. Further, because so much of the budget went directly to pay wages economic constraints may have hampered the innovation process.

Diffusion had always been an important mechanism for changes to the police as an institution. Hamilton was no different. In the twentieth century the context of policing became more universal with the homogenization of urban space brought about by the automobile revolution. In other words, diffusion was made easier because many police forces sought solutions to similar problems - once a successful innovation was found it could fulfill a widespread need. More elaborate communication and transportation networks emerged in the twentieth century, facilitating the exchange of ideas. Police organizations such as the IACP and CCAC became more widespread and influential. Over the course of the century, there was a consolidation of police practices as numerous texts were published and police schools became integrated on local, provincial, national and finally international levels. Diffusion became more important because there were potentially more ‘things’ to diffuse and more opportunity to take advantage of recent innovations.
In Hamilton two distinct patterns of diffusion can be discerned. In the nineteenth century, the Department was heavily influenced by British police norms. American influences, though present, did not become dominant until the twentieth century. The Department's patrol philosophy, size, uniforms, and the system of rank all originated in Great Britain. This is what we would expect, given the fact that Canada was an emerging colony in the British empire. In addition, the force had a large contingent of British emigrants. All in all, the force was quite similar to other British police forces of the era. In the twentieth century, though a healthy cohort of British remained active and influential in the Department, the Department was far more influenced by its American counterparts. Eventually the Department adopted American style uniforms and ranks, used firearms, adopted cruisers for patrol, was reorganized along principles advocated by the IACP, formed a police association shortly after the police labour movement in the United States, and adopted numerous other American technological innovations. Americanization was never stated as an explicit Departmental policy; rather it was a byproduct of the proximity to major sources of innovation in the United States.

Diffusion theory not only allows us to understand change, it allows us to understand continuity. If 10 alternatives exist, or have no active agent to implement them, continuity usually results. A case in point is the continuation of the police patrol. Although patrol has been transformed from its pedestrian roots, it remains the essential aspect of police services. As we have seen, the increases in patrol productivity did not
keep pace with rising costs. Because of this, there has always been a strong case for finding alternatives to police patrol. Yet it is hard to find evidence that the police in Hamilton actively sought alternatives to patrol - they see patrol as a given, a fact of life, an essential service that could not be dispensed with without dire consequences. This view has come under scrutiny from academics who have seriously challenged the effectiveness of patrol. Still, no alternative to patrol is popularly known - there is no model for the police to follow. Further, there is no logical next step after patrol. To date there has been nothing for the patrol to evolve into; rather, innovation here has centered on varying the types and allocation of patrol activities themselves. It is not so much that police are simply resistant to change; there is no compelling alternative that would force them to change the nature of police services. In contrast, where there has been both a need and available alternatives, the police have responded by adopting innovations.

Continuity resulted, perhaps primarily, from the role that the police played in the city. The purpose of law enforcement has remained central to the police as an institution. There is a continuing need for law enforcement, and this in itself suggests that an active agent is required to fulfill his role. No other agency had an official sanction to perform this function. Thus, the police had a vital role with no competitors. To this day, no alternative to the police has gained popular support. While police receive criticism from academics, the public and from within their own ranks, most often criticism aims at renewal not abolition.
The police, however, do not always respond to the sentiments of the times. Continuity can and does result from an unwillingness to change. This is especially true for large-scale changes. Schon suggests that institutions are often assumed to have a stable nature (Schon 1971: 10-11). Social institutions resist change by their "dynamic conservatism," which is a tendency to fight to remain the same (Schon 1971: 33).

"Because of its dynamic conservatism, a social system is unlikely to undertake its own change of state (Schon 1971: 55)." Major change usually involves individuals with an extraordinary energy and commitment to the cause (Schon 1971: 56). Moreover, "social systems do not move smoothly from one state of its culture to another"... "something must come apart for something else to come together...." The problem is that "there is no clear grasp of the next stable state - only a picture of what is to be lost (Schon 1971: 51-52)." This is because systemic change results not so much from internal elaboration or development but from external factors, which are foreign to the stable state.

Schon's ideas apply to the Hamilton Police. As Schon suggests, major transformations seem to require agents of change. Two transformational changes - the formation of the police association and the post World War II reorganization - both met with resistance. The formation of the police association was at first vigorously opposed by the police chief. Because the police labour movement was widespread and gained acceptance in other cities, the chief eventually relented after several successful attempts to defuse the burgeoning labour movement within the Department. It would have been much
more difficult to form a police association in Hamilton if it had not happened elsewhere first. The fact that other police forces could still function despite the presence of police associations helped to legitimize the efforts to form a Police Association in Hamilton.

Another instance of systemic change was the post World War II reforms brought about by Leonard Lawrence. Lawrence's appointment as Chief Constable was actively opposed by some high ranking officers within the Department. Lawrence was an agent of change with no equals in the history of the force. He was the means through which major innovations were channeled. Once Lawrence was able to consolidate power, he promoted revolutionary change. But what is interesting here was that the opposition was not to the innovation, which would come later, but the to the violation of the long-standing tradition of promotion based on seniority and service. Thus, innovation was opposed not on its merits but on an unrelated characteristic of the agent who would bring it. There is no evidence to suggest that those opposed to Lawrence opposed organizational reform, except perhaps that they were from the old school and less likely to embrace the changes that the post World War II era would bring. Thus, the adoption of an innovation may depend on the characteristics of its agent, and acceptance or rejection may have nothing to do with the merit of the innovation itself.

Schon's ideas can be taken further. It is not simply a case of whether or not to adopt an innovation. Some innovations can serve to enhance the dynamic conservatism of
an institution. For example, in Hamilton one could argue that the implementation of technology to increase the productivity of police patrol reinforced existing ideas about patrol itself. Patrol could not have remained viable without productivity increases. In other words, revolutionary or systemic change can be avoided by innovation. Some changes can actively promote continuity because they can reduce the need for alternatives. Perhaps this is part of the reason that technological innovations were often actively pursued by the police. Relatively large scale technological change can take place alongside ideological continuity. Technological change also has a certain inevitability about it that police seemed willing to embrace in most instances.

Because systemic changes were motivated by external factors, and involved foreign and often revolutionary ideas, they met with resistance. Schon is correct to point out that change is often opposed. Yet overall we see an institution that was seldom subject to the systemic changes that Schon describes. From this perspective we would have to see the police force as effectively existing in a stable state punctuated by episodic transformations. Other changes, though very important, were often incremental and could be absorbed into the existing culture of policing, either by enhancing the institution’s dynamic conservatism or by having a negligible impact on the institution overall.

Stability is not inherently bad, any more than change is inherently good. In a sense, the goal or motivation of large scale change is to produce a new stable state. In
Hamilton, this is precisely what happened. Large scale changes tended to be spaced out between periods of relative stability. The formation of the police association fragmented and internalized conflict within the ranks, but we should remember that after the police association was formed, turnover in the Department was effectively cut in half. Further, the period leading up to the formation of the police association was one of the most problematic in the history of the force, with considerable employee discontent and turnover. A big problem required a big solution. Similarly, the organizational reforms introduced by Lawrence, though not as controversial, resulted in a transformation of the Department. Turbulent change resulted in a new stability. Certainly, stability is not ensured when large scale change occurs, but it seems clear that it is a goal. The goal of change is often stability, but a new stability based upon the demands of the moment. The future of the police, like the diffusion process itself, contains elements of uncertainty or possibility.

Police forces have become so much like one another that researchers often make references from the characteristics of one police force to ‘police’ in general. It is quite reasonable to do this: different police forces are alike in many ways. This suggests the power of change generally, and of diffusion in particular; i.e., the present day Hamilton Police are more similar to other contemporary urban police forces than to their historical antecedents. They use similar technology, rely on cruiser-based patrol, require similar training, face similar problems, exchange personnel, receive similar training, often have
similar organizational dynamics due to the presence of police unions and associations, and
exist within similar economic conditions and constraints. Each historical moment is
characterized by its own opportunities and constraints. The Hamilton Police were a
perfect example of this process. It would be a mistake to presume that who the police
have become is a simple function of who they once were. It would also be a mistake to
ignore stability and continuity. It is how change and continuity coincide at a particular
moment that makes the historical perspective so compelling.

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