MEDIATION AND SYSTEM
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TITLE: Mediation and System; Reinhold's 1789 Attempt
to Re-write the 'Critique of Pure Reason'

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ABSTRACT

In 1789 Karl Leonhard Reinhold published a book entitled Versuch einer Neuen Theorie des Menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögen. With it he intended to show that the position taken by Immanuel Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason was without a ground. That is to say, Kant's work lacked a principle which would enable it to be presented as a system. By focusing on representation and its preconditions, Reinhold intended to provide such a ground through an exhaustive yet unified description of the contents of consciousness. He will begin with a universal and self-evident first principle that will set Kant's results beyond doubt. In this way, Reinhold's Elementarphilosophie becomes the ground of the critical philosophy and together they constitute the only possible system of knowledge.

Through a detailed exposition of his book and its relation to Kant's, and by drawing on the reaction of Schulze, Maimon and Fichte to the aforementioned first principle, we want to suggest that Reinhold fails in his attempt to 're-write the Critique of Pure Reason'.
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Finally, and yet foremost, this thesis is lovingly dedicated to my parents, to my sister Judy, and to Mary; for the difference between reasons and causes.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

Chapter One --- Relation of Kant's Philosophy to Reinhold's

Chapter Two --- The Elementarphilosophie
   Section One; Ground
   Section Two; Consequent
      Theorie der Sinnlichkeit
      Theorie des Verstandes
      Theorie der Vernunft

Conclusion --- Mediation and System

Bibliography
Introduction

Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1758-1823) was temporarily one of the most famous of Kant's immediate contemporaries. The general intention of Reinhold's philosophy is mediation, i.e. to uncover what is common to spontaneity and receptivity alike, and thereby unite the so-called 'faculties' of sensibility, understanding and reason in another, more basic human capacity.

On the face of it, Reinhold's self-assigned task does not seem to be patently absurd or excessively violent from the standpoint of interpretation. After all, for Kant it is, presumably, one and the same active mind which both thinks with concepts and combines the manifold of intuitions in the unity of space and time. For Reinhold there apparently exists within Kant's philosophy the means for overcoming at least some of the dichotomies in his theory of knowledge. In other words, ignoring for the moment the fact that Kant himself does not seem to take up and make use of these means, consider the following.

Intuitions are immediate representations, i.e. epistemic events related directly to objects. Concepts, on the other hand, are mediate representations: the knowing and the known are separated by some third thing, namely intuitions, which are necessary but not sufficient in order to be able to think with concepts.
A *prima facie* investigation reveals that, for Kant, it is the difference between these two modes of knowledge that is all important. Hence the real distinction between understanding and sensibility, between knowing and thinking, and the formal division of the "Transcendental Doctrine of the Elements" into "Transcendental Aesthetic" and "Transcendental Logic". For Reinhold it is otherwise. It is precisely the similarity between the two modes of knowledge which attracts him, and that similarity is this: intuitions and concepts are both representations (Vorstellungen). This is the characteristic which is shared by spontaneity and receptivity, and further, it is the reason why sensibility and understanding can be subsumed under an all inclusive mental faculty which is common to them both, namely, the capacity of human beings for having representations (menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögen). Even our capacity of reason, the epistemic vehicles of which are ideas of the unconditioned, presupposes the Vorstellungsvermögen, for ideas, too, are representations. Regardless of their genetic differences, intuitions, concepts and ideas share a common ground: they are representations.

The nature of our capacity to represent is for Reinhold what the *cogito ergo sum* was for Descartes.¹

¹The comparison is suggested by Kuno Fischer, *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, 4th edition; VI, 24-25.
That is to say, it provides in the first place a principle which is indubitable, undeniable and self-supporting; it stands on its own as a self-evident fact that there are representations. Secondly, as a principle it is the platform from which Reinhold intends to complete the mediation which is the intent of his philosophy. Moreover, this mediation is to be systematic: the principle which is its ground provides a description of all of the facets of consciousness. Through an investigation of consciousness\(^2\) as such, Reinhold will arrive at the same results as those yielded by the critical philosophy, with the difference that, in the process, he will have given those results a single, firm foundation. Hence, there is a Cartesian aspect to Reinhold's philosophy. The "Aesthetic" and the "Logic" are unified by basing a theory of our capacity for knowledge (Erkenntnisvermögen) on the theory of Vorstellungsvermögen. Once more, on the face of it this corrigendum is not implausible. Kant himself may have recognized the need for a Cartesian point of departure when he discusses the original unity of consciousness, the 'I think' which must accompany all of my representations.

\(^2\)The ongoing synonymity of 'consciousness' and 'representation' is provisional; cf. below, p. 36.
Reinhold, then, intends neither to comment on nor refute Kant; the critical philosophy does not require a supplement. What it does need is a foundation.

Chapter Two of the present work is an exposition of Reinhold's Elementarphilosophie; it is based on the second and third books of the first (1789) edition of the Versuch einer Neuen Theorie des Menschlichen Vorstellungsvermögens, the book which Adickes says is Reinholds' most important contribution and "which for a time gave him an even more prominent place in the philosophical movement than Kant's". Chapter One of the thesis will deal with the relation of Kant's philosophy to Reinhold's and it is based in part on the first book of the Versuch, which explains the need for a new investigation of the capacity for having representations and is, in short, Reinhold's justification for writing a book which, as far as its content is concerned, is purportedly the same as Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft.


⁴This book will be cited directly in the text within parentheses, thus: (Versuch, ). Following the standard first and second editions, Kant's Kritik der Reinen Vernunft will be cited in the same manner, thus: (KRV, ). Further details regarding publication can be found in the Bibliography.

⁵Erich Adickes, German Kantian Bibliography, p, 50.
Chapter One: Relation of Kant’s Philosophy to Reinhold’s "Von dem Bedürfnisse einer neuen Untersuchung des Vorstellungsvermögens"

Kant attempted to show in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" (KRV, A39-41) that the principles of a priori knowledge lie within us, that such knowledge is synthetic and can be derived from the ideality of space and time. Only in this way can it be proven, for example, that the principles of mathematics are apodictic and necessary. These qualities are characteristic of such principles if and only if space and time are ideal.

Or again, Kant indicated in the "Transcendental Analytic" that things in themselves are unknowable. This is substantiated by proving that unified experience, i.e. lawfully ordered perceptions, is possible if and only if it is the case that things in themselves are unknowable.

Now Reinhold has no quarrel with these two results. However, he points out that Kant’s proof procedure has no hold on an individual who claims that mathematics has only hypothetical necessity or on one who denies the reality of 'experience' in the Kantian sense. In both cases, Kant’s transcendental method turns on the evidence of particular features about the nature of mathematics and of experience, features which are by no means self-evident and which can therefore be understood in a different way. The point is,
in being so understood, Kant's conclusions are rendered groundless.\footnote{Reinhold, \textit{Beitragen}... , I, 278-279. Cited in de Vleeschauwer, \textit{op. cit.}, III 499.}

Reinhold wants to preserve the results of Kant's procedure and at the same time avoid the contingency, which, in his estimate, makes that procedure dependent on external considerations, thereby robbing it of certainty. To do so, Reinhold begins with a principle which no one can deny because of its self-evidence, namely, the existence for us of representations. From this position, everything else can be deduced properly. Whereas Kant moves from the synthesis of creative, spontaneous thought and the given, to the conditions for the possibility of that synthesis, Reinhold on the contrary moves in the opposite way. One the basis of our capacity for representations, he concludes that, to remain with our examples, things in themselves cannot be represented and cannot, therefore, be known, and that in the representation and hence also in knowledge, there is an \textit{a priori} element.\footnote{de Vleeschauwer, \textit{op. cit.}, III, 500.}

The same results as those of Kant, but now founded upon something which cannot be questioned.

The activity which is common to all facets of consciousness is that of representing. Intuitions,
concepts, sensations, ideas and thoughts are all representations (Versuch, 209). "Das Wort Vorstellungsvermögen fasst in seiner engeren Bedeutung Sinnlichkeit, Verstand and Vernunft zusammen" (Versuch, 212). Thus, an analysis of any aspect of the faculty of knowledge presupposes an examination of our representative capacities. The 'philosophy of the elements' (Elementarphilosophie) will take up such an examination in order to reveal what is elemental i.e. essential and irreducible, to the activity of representing. Although it will thereby establish a foundation for the Kantian doctrine, its method of doing so is exactly the opposite of its predecessor. What is presented in the Critical philosophy as the ground is for the Elementarphilosophie the consequent. For example, in the "Paralogisms of Pure Reason", Kant had argued that the concepts of rational psychology (i.e. the substantiality, simplicity, personality and ideality of the self) do not give us knowledge of an unconditioned 'self-in-itself', and concludes that reason is unable to know such an entity even though it can think of one. Reinhold, on the contrary, having demonstrated this incapacity of reason insofar as it follows from his first principles, concludes that psychology cannot know the soul or self-in-itself. Reinhold's conclusion is Kant's starting point.

In this way the Elementarphilosophie becomes the ground of the critical philosophy and the latter, in turn can live up to its own standard of being a system of science, i.e. not a mere aggregate but rather a unified and organized body of knowledge held together and founded upon one grounding principle (KRV, A832B860). In order to fulfill the requirement of being a system, Reinhold claims that Kant's position must be prefaced by his own in the relationship of consequent to ground respectively. As a system, philosophy is the science of sciences, for it has to do with knowledge as such. It can limit, for example, the science of psychology, as we saw above. It is only by having a ground that philosophy can be a system and it is only as a system that philosophy can have a (one) ground, which means (among other things) that a unifying principle is necessary. As far as Reinhold is concerned, such unity is impossible so long as there remains two qualitatively distinct sources of knowledge as there apparently are in Kant. In other words, experience, which is the knowledge provided by the representation of perceptions that are connected in a lawful and necessary way, is ununified and disordered if there is no common root to its two components.

Kant attempts to reach a unifying ground in his discussion of the principles of pure understanding. The highest principle of all synthetic judgements is, "every
object stands under the necessary conditions of synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience" (KRV, A158). Any knowable object is, as such, subject to the conditions of a possible experience; these conditions for the possibility of the object are the same as those for the possibility of experience. Hence the critique of knowledge offered by Kant rests upon the notion of experience; as a critique it presupposes a prior agreement as to the nature of experience. But this is not good enough for Reinhold. The principle or ground which allows philosophy to be science must fulfill a particular requirement. That is to say, by virtue of being a true ground or foundation, it provides its own evidence. At the risk of petitio principii, it cannot fall within the scope of the science for which it is the ground i.e. it cannot be reached by the philosophical reasoning which presupposes it. At the same time, it cannot fall outside the scope of philosophy, for this is to be the science of sciences, the all inclusive propadeutic for any knowledge whatsoever. By virtue of its self-evidence, the grounding principle remains untouched by sceptical denial and does not depend upon dogmatic assertion. For Reinhold, Kant's concept of experience does not fulfill this requirement of self-evidence. The first line of the "Introduction" to the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft ("There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience") is an instance of capriciousness which is very much open to
sceptical attack. Reinhold calls the adequacy of Kant's notion of experience into question, not because he holds that it is false, but rather because it can be doubted. It is open to question, and this openness rules out self-evidence. In short, Kant begins with experience and proceeds to its preconditions. Reinhold is concerned with representation and its preconditions. After him will come Fichte, whose intent it is to explicate the conditions of self-consciousness.

We have briefly outlined two requirements which must be met if the Critical philosophy is to be the true philosophy; it must be a system, and it must be based on a self-evident first principle which circumscribes the entire content of the system. If these two conditions are met, the result will be not only free of misunderstanding, but free even of the possibility of misunderstanding. The previous philosophical positions are, then, just as much false as true (Versuch, 31). Instead of "intellectualizing appearances" (as in Locke) or "sensualizing concepts" (as in Leibnitz) Kant's method is infamously 'transcendental'; he intends to explore the concept of knowledge or knowability in general (KRV, A271B327). Instead of emphasizing sensibility at the expense of understanding or vice versa, Kant will write a critique of the capacity for knowledge and thereby determine its extent through itself, avoiding the alleged one-sidedness of his predecessors (Versuch, 46).
This is what Kant did, but not in such a way as to exclude or even avoid the possibility of misunderstanding. One of these is the confusion of two sorts of questions (Versuch, 179), the logical one, 'of what does the capacity for knowledge consist?', with the metaphysical one, 'with what is the capacity for knowledge concerned?'. A logical inquiry has to do with the laws which constitute such a capacity, and through which any and all knowledge is possible. A metaphysical inquiry is concerned with laws that make up and describe the nature of a knowing or known thing. To obfuscate this distinction when the issue at hand is, for instance, sensibility, is to move away from a discussion of the general conditions for intuitive knowledge, towards one which includes the notion of a knowing subject as corporeal organism equipped with senses and a particular, empirical object which is 'out there'. Neither of these is intrinsic to knowledge as such, and the transition from logic to metaphysics prevents the results of the investigation from being demonstrably universal.

Here we find again that Reinhold is making the same sort of argument as he did against Kant's notion of experience, but this time it concerns knowledge in general. There is by no means agreement as to the nature of it (Versuch, 188). Hence, anyone who does not give to

4 That is, knowledge 'as such' or 'in general' (überhaupt), what it is quite apart from any knowing or known thing.
knowledge the same characteristics as does Kant, will not find himself bound by the latter's "Deduction".

The sought after universal validity can, however, be had by beginning with something which it makes no sense to deny i.e. that which, unlike 'knowledge' or 'experience', does not allow disagreement. This is the concept of representation (Vorstellung). If there are representations, then there is an ability to have representations. If all knowledge relies on them (but not the reverse), then there is nothing which falls within the scope of the capacity for knowledge (Erkenntnissvermögen) i.e. is knowable, which also falls outside the scope of the capacity for representations (Vorstellungsvermögen) i.e. is representable. In other words, in order to account for our ability to know, one must understand the concept of Vorstellungsvermögen; so long as it and its consequences remain unclarified, it will be impossible to reach universal agreement with respect to the Erkenntnissvermögen and the scientific character of the Kantian position will be lost. The existence of representations and our concomitant capacity, in some sense, to 'have' representations, is for Reinhold the fact to which even the most sceptical philosopher must concede, and it must be the starting point held in common by all philosophers. If it has this
as its ground, the Critical Philosophy will be the
"philosophy without surnames".

Adickes, op. cit., p.50. What does Kant himself have to
say about this? The answer can be found in his corres-
pondence. There it is clear that Kant received the Versuch
in the year in which it was published, for he acknow-
ledges its receipt in a letter of May 12, 1789 (I, Kant,
Kant: Philosophical Correspondence, 1759-99, trans. and ed.
by A. Zweig, p.142). It is mentioned again in another
In it Kant tactfully suggests that it is "possible to
develop the consequences of the principles that I have
already laid down as basic ... without requiring the
friends of the Critique to struggle through such an
abstract work". However, Kant is much less tactful when
discussing Reinhold with J.S. Beck in a letter dated
only six days later (September 27, 1791. Ibid, p. 180).
In it, the Versuch is described as "incomprehensible".
Without examining the reasons for it, it can be seen that
Kant's reaction to Reinhold's attempt to provide a ground
for the Critical philosophy is predominantly negative.
Chapter Two: The Elementarphilosophie

Section One: Ground

The title of the second book of Reinhold's Versuch is "Theorie des Vorstellungsvermögens überhaupt". It is concerned to establish and expose the all-inclusive and self-evident first principle. Insofar as it is to be first, there can be no wider or more general principle. Insofar as it is to be self-evident, it must be the expression of a fact which is not further provable. And finally, insofar as it is to be all-inclusive, it must describe that which makes possible and accompanies each and every mental event. This 'fact' is consciousness, and the first principle of the Elementarphilosophie is arrived at through reflection on the nature of consciousness. Hence it is called the "Principle of Consciousness" (Satz des Bewusstseins)\(^1\) and is the foundation of all other principles. That is to say, the remaining principles which make up the content of the Elementarphilosophie, eg. one of sensible consciousness, one of knowledge etc., each describe a specific mode of consciousness, but the Satz des Bewusstseins determines them all and is true of consciousness.

\(^1\)There is no reference to a "Principle of Consciousness" in the Versuch; the Satz does not appear as such until a year later in the Beiträgen, even though Reinhold's description of consciousness is substantially the same in both works. Cf. below, p. 18 N.
in general. Moreover, because it holds of consciousness as such, this principle is that through which we can come to know all subordinate principles with certainty i.e. know them to have universal and necessary validity.

It is suggested by Reinhold that his doctrine of a principle of all principles and the need of the Critical Philosophy for it is already recognized by Kant in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, specifically in the "Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding"\(^2\). The purpose of this deduction is to clarify the relation of understanding to sensibility and, ultimately, to the objects of experience, by establishing the validity of the categories, i.e. by showing that they are applicable to phenomena as objects of possible experience (*KRV*, A128). The categories are concepts which, formally speaking, serve as rules for the synthesis of the manifold of intuition; the necessity of these rules as regards that synthesis, e.g. that the concept of body entails the representation of extension, can only be found in a condition which lies outside of that synthetic unity and outside of experience altogether. This condition or ground is apperception, and because it is concerned with the *a priori* manner in which we know objects rather than with the objects themselves, it is furthermore, transcendental apperception (*KRV*, A106).

In all probability, $117$ is the passage upon which Reinhold bases his claim that the concept of one, single, unifying principle is pre-figured in Kant's *Kritik*, for it is here that transcendental apperception is described as supplying "a principle of the synthetic unity of the manifold in all possible intuition".

The synthetic proposition, that all variety of empirical consciousness must be combined in one, single self-consciousness, is the absolutely first and synthetic principle of our thought in general.

As one might by now expect, Reinhold does not disagree with this as far as it goes. However, he questions the scope of Kant's 'manifold'; rather than having only to do with intuitions or "empirical consciousness" as the Kantian one apparently does, the manifold must include the whole class of representations e.g. ideas, concepts and intuitions alike, for as representations they are all aspects of consciousness and hence are equally subject to the "absolutely first" principle which governs the synthesis through which the manifold becomes a manifold for consciousness. Kant allows "our thought in general" or *Bewusstsein überhaupt* to remain indeterminate$^3$. In other words, sensibility is emphasized at the expense of understanding, for the former does not fall within the circle circumscribed by the principle which is the condition of the latter.

Consequently, the indeterminacy charge: if there is a principle which is common to all manifestations of our mental activity and not only to some, that principle has gone unnoticed.

This is important for Reinhold, since it precludes the possibility of accomplishing what he takes to be a central task of the Kantian enterprise as well as of his own Elementarphilosophie, namely, establishing the limits of knowledge (Versuch, 146). The criticism of reason which Kant undertakes does not seek to present the happenstance bounds (Schranken) of reason, i.e. what it does not know, but rather to demonstrate its necessary limits (Grenzen), i.e. what it cannot know (KRV, 761B789) and thus to avoid the situation in which reason makes unjustifiable epistemological claims and "comes into conflict with itself" (KRV, Axii). Insofar as he intended to indicate the parameters of metaphysics and the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements, Kant had asked the question, "What can I know?" (KRV, A805B833), a question which must remain unanswered as long as the concept of consciousness is indeterminate. As long as there is lacking a principle which describes reason as a unified whole, the limits of knowledge cannot be fixed.

For Reinhold, Kant's question "What can I know?" means 'What can be represented?' or 'What is the extent of our capacity for representations?'. In short, what can
to be present to consciousness? In order to describe mental activity and determine the limits of the Vorstellungsvermögen, Reinhold formulates his first principle: "The representation is, in consciousness, distinct from and related to both the represented and the representing". This description is universally valid. Consciousness or the activity of representing, distinguishes from itself both the representation and the represented. This

4 "Die Vorstellung wird in Bewusstsein vom Vorgestellten und Vorstellenden unterschieden und auf beide bezogen". This formulation appears first in the essay entitled "Über das Bedürfniss eines ersten Grunds", which is contained in the Beiträgen, of 1790 (Reinhold, Beiträgen..., I, 144. Quoted in Erdmann, op. cit., I, 442 and de Vleeschauwer, op. cit., III, 501). It is substantially the same as the following passage in the Versuch.

Man ist, durch das Bewusstsein genöthiget, darüber einig, dass zu jeder Vorstellung ein vorstellendes Subjekt, und ein vorgestelltes Objekt gehören, welche Beyde von der Vorstellung, zu der sie gehören, unterschieden werden müssen (Versuch, 200).

In both books there is, in the description of consciousness, a similar tension between the representing and the represented, i.e. a connection which is not a connection, a 'belonging to' yet a 'distinguished from'.

However, there is also in the Beiträgen an essay entitled "Neue Darstellung der Hauptmomente der Elementarphilosophie"; it is an abbreviated version of the Versuch. In it, as is noted by Erdmann, the formulation of the Satz des Bewusstseins is slightly but, we think, significantly different.


This is the version which reaches Schulze and Fichte (G.E. Schulze, Aenesidemus oder über die Fundamente der von dem Herrn Professor Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementarphilosophie, p. 58 J.G. Fichte, Werke, I, 5).

Here it is quite plain that it is the subject which does the relating and the distinguishing. For the significance of this, cf. below p. 98ff.
holds true even of fictional constructs, i.e. the unicorn and the representation of it are distinct. The extra-mental existence of objects is not in question at this point.

Reinhold's principle also makes a claim to being presuppositionless. It takes nothing for granted about subject or object; discussion about the manner of their existence is set aside. They are "representing" (Vorstellenden) and "represented" (Vorgestellten) respectively, and what they are and are not is described and determined by the principle of consciousness, not the reverse. Both the subject and the object are separate from the representation yet related to it. They are also distinct from each other. Finally, the representation is that which is both related to and distinct from subject and object. By adopting this principle as its starting point, the Elementarphilosophie can uncover the limits of knowledge by discovering what can be represented i.e. by describing the constitution of the representation as opposed to that of the representing subject or represented object.

Before continuing with the exposition of this all-important principle and an analysis of how representations, subjects and objects can be both distinct from yet related to one another, the nature of Reinhold's type of investigation must be made clear. We saw before
that he wishes to avoid the consequences of confusing two sorts of questions, the logical and the metaphysical. To do this, he distinguishes between "internal" and "external" conditions for representation (Versuch,202ff.). The latter are, for instance, the representing subject and the represented object. They are external because there is a sense in which, as subject and object, they exist outside of representation in general. Some of the conditions which determine them are not those of the Vorstellungsvermögen. This or that subject or object is sufficient condition for representation, but it is unnecessary and external because it is not included within the concept of mere representation. In other words, the latter is not explained in terms of itself. For this reason, subjects and objects are only circumstantial aspects of the capacity for representations.

Hence, the Elementarphilosophie is not concerned with them but rather intends to discover, through an examination of representation as such, the internal conditions or necessary ground without which having representations would not be possible. Reinhold proceeds logically rather than metaphysically, for he is dealing with the concept of representation, i.e. what representation is überhaupt. To accomplish this, it is necessary to 'suspend questions about the nature of the representing subject or soul and of the represented object or external thing' (Versuch,222).
Reinhold's investigation is 'transcendental' in the sense that it has to do with the *a priori* elements which are necessary for having representations, rather than with the representations themselves. In Book III it will yield results about the way in which we know objects or ourselves rather than knowledge of objects or selves as such: this feature of being propadeutic is shared by the Critical philosophy and the *Elementarphilosophie*.

What are the elements which allow the representation to be related and not related to the knower and the known? There are two, form and content. The first is that whereby the representation is connected with the subject and not connected with the object, and the second, the content (*Stoff*), is that whereby it is connected with the object and not with the subject. The represented object is the content moment of the representation, and the representing subject is the form moment of it. Both are logically essential to the existence of a representation; that which makes the content of a representation the

\[5\] As indicated by Schulze, there is no argument in the *Versuch* in support of the view that the content is object-contributed and the form subject-contributed rather than the other way around or something else altogether. Certainly Reinhold's view is plausible and is also that of Kant. However, if we assess Reinhold's philosophy according to its own standards, then this oversight is serious, for it leaves his system open to a sceptical attack such as Schulze's. In other words, another position is tenable, despite the claim claim that the *Elementarphilosophie* is to be the 'philosophy without surnames'. Schulze, *op.cit.*, p.207.
content of a representation is its form, and vice versa. "Beydes Stoff and Form machen zwar nur durch ihre Vereinigung die Vorselung aus" (Versuch, 235).

As elements of his description of consciousness, Reinhold makes a great deal of philosophical mileage with this pair of concepts. For instance, (1) he is quick to point out that the form of a representation is not to be confused with the form of a represented object (Versuch, 239). In this respect, the representation of an object is distinct from the object as it is in itself, and what belongs to the one does not belong to the other. It is only the content element which is common to both, for in the activity of representing, the form is contributed by the subject and is therefore distinct from that of the object.

6 Kroner goes so far as to call the opposition of form and content the Ausgangspunkt of Reinhold's theory. R. Kroner, Von Kant bis Hegel, 2nd edition, p. 317.

7 An overdue note on 'subject' and 'object'. These infamous terms are, for Reinhold, double-sided. Each side is determined by the presence or absence of representation. That is to say, the object is what 'is' represented, and the subject is what 'does' the representing. However, they are only external conditions of representation in general, for each of them exists in another sense: they are also what is not represented and therefore unknown, i.e. the thing- or self-in-itself.

8 The nature of this contribution is usually described by the term "produced" (hervorgebracht; cf. esp. Versuch 255ff.). It is also captured by the verbs "belonging to" (angehört... an; Versuch, 237) or, more generally, "related to" (bezieht sich auf; Versuch, 244). Cf. below, p. 27n.
Thus (2), it is false to say of representation in general that it functions like an image or picture (Bild) of an object (Versuch, 240). All items of consciousness, including images, are representations: the former are defined in terms of the latter and not vice versa. Only those representations which also happen to be images can picture an object.

If representations are not pictures, it is pointless to claim that there must be a "resemblance" (Ähnlichkeit) between a thing (as it is in itself) and its representation (Versuch, 241). If all knowledge is representation, then discovering the truth value of such a claim entails an infinite regress: it could not be assessed save through further representations and further assessments and so on. Hence one cannot decide whether or not there is a resemblance between a representation of a certain thing and that thing as it is in itself.

This is in sharp contrast to an image, which we know is a copy of, or at least bears a symbolic resemblance to, its original. The relation of the representation to its object cannot be explained in terms of the visual paradigm: sehen and vorstellen are not analogous. Consequently, any concept of truth which is putatively based upon the resemblance or pictorial correspondence of a representation with its object is ruled out.

(3) We have already seen that the formal moment
of an object is distinct from that of its representation and have noted that 'subject' and 'object' are two-sided terms. The object is the same as the representation insofar as the representation is a representation of that object, i.e. insofar as its content is the object, but it is also different. The same is true mutatis mutandis of the subject: it is the same as the representation because the form of the latter is subjectively produced, but it, too, is also different. This difference means that the subject and object exist, on the one hand, as represented and, on the other, as not represented i.e. as they are in themselves. In the first case, according to Reinhold's description of consciousness each is related to a complete representation consisting of form as well as of content: they exist as represented. As for the second, each is described as being 'in itself': the object, when it is content without form, and the subject, when it is form without content. We have seen, however, that form and content are necessary elements of representation. Hence, it is axiomatic for Reinhold that an 'object' without form is not representable.

Dasjenige, was sich nicht unter der Form der Vorstellung vorstellen lässt, ist schlechterdings nicht vorstellbar (Versuch, 250).

The presence of difference notwithstanding, there is also identity. It is clear that, for Reinhold, it is one and the same subject or object which exists both as represented and as in itself. On the necessity of the existence of things-in-themselves, cf. below p. 32.
It is also self-evident that a form-producing but contentless subject or self-in-itself is also for the same reason not representable.

Dasjenige, dem kein Stoff in einer Vorstellung entsprechen kann, ist schlechterdings nicht vorstellbar (Versuch, 235).

The content, which is essential to representation is given through the capacity of receptivity and is to this extent subjectively determined, but what is an sich is undetermined. The conclusion is that there can be no representation of a thing-in-itself or of a transcendent soul and ipso facto no knowledge of either. Reinhold is hereby at least on the way to establishing criteria by which to answer the aforementioned question concerning the limits of knowledge.

(4) It is a necessary condition for representation that the content be "given", as opposed to the form, which is produced. Givenness is not sufficient, however. Consciousness must also be open to the given.

10Reinhold makes a distinction between gegeben sein and gegeben werden (Versuch, 262-63). Only the former can be known to be true of representation überhaupt, for it is the essential element which distinguishes content from form. In other words, the sheer fact of 'being given' is one of the internal conditions for the possibility of there being representations; it is a constitutive element of the Vorstellungsvermögen. This is not true of gegeben werden; it refers to a condition which is external to the Vorstellungsvermögen, and we cannot, therefore, know what it means 'to become the given'. Whatever is gegeben werden is the ground or cause of representation, and does not belong to representation in general. By virtue of its externality, this condition is sufficient for representation but not essential to the Vorstellungsvermögen. Cf. J.S. Beck, Erlautender Auszug aus den kritischen Schriften des Herrn Professor Kant; III, 74-75.
It must contain a feature which enables it to be affected by the presented content. In Reinhold as in Kant, this feature is receptivity. Correlatively, consciousness must also be able to produce the form, and the characteristic by which it accomplishes this is spontaneity. Together, these two make up the *Vorstellungsvermögen* (Versuch, 264, 267).

This is another occasion on which we must be cautious not to attribute to Reinhold conclusions which he does not draw. That is to say, the discussion of receptivity has nothing to do with the corporeal senses, for these would provide empirical, physiological causes for particular representations rather than logical grounds for representation as such. Or, the discussion of spontaneity has nothing directly to do with that activity as the effect of a representing subject, for then it would be a psychological rather than a logical examination.

Rather, Reinhold is immediately concerned only with the "form" of receptivity (Versuch, 285) or spontaneity (Versuch, 288), for these forms are the elements of the *Vorstellungsvermögen*. By this sense of 'form' Reinhold apparently means, following classical tradition, the essence or nature of a thing, the genus or that which is common to the members of a class. It is in this sense that, e.g. the 'form' of spontaneity is the active manner (not the producing activity itself) in which the manifold is
synthesized by a subject: it is the ground for there being produced unity in representation. Insofar as it is this ground, it itself is not subjectively produced. Instead, the 'forms' of receptivity and spontaneity are both determined and given; as elements of the Vorstellung-vermögen, they are determined prior to all representation, but also, insofar as they obtain of representation in general, they are given on the occasion of each representation as receptivity and spontaneity proper (Versuch, 291-92).

Finally, (5) the produced form is that by which the subject is related to the representation, and the given content is that by which the object is related to it. At the same time, form and content serve as distinguishing factors. The subject is distinct from the object. The subject and object each contribute an ingredient to representation, which is to say, they are both related to it. We noted above, however (p.22n), that the nature of the relation between the subject and the representation is somewhat ambiguous. The same is true of that between the object and the representation, which relation is described only by the indeterminate 'given'. This is unlike the usually fastidious Reinhold, and for Schulze it indicates the presence of tension in Reinhold's thought. Despite the fact that the subject and the object are both related to the representation, it is not at all apparent that they must be related in the same way. Why not hold, as Schulze, in fact, does, that the subject is related to the representation as substance and accident, and that the object is related to the representation as "signified" (Bezeichneten) to "sign" (Zeichen)? In other words, it is not self-evident that the truth of a sentence such as 'form is related to subject' is a condition both necessary and sufficient for the truth of a sentence such as 'form is a product of subject'. Schulze, op.cit., pp. 283-287.
representation because of the presence of objective content, and the object is distinct from it because of the subjective form of the representation. What, however, are the elements which separate the given from the produced? Keeping in mind the distinction between inner and external conditions, we want to ask how the given is given and the product is produced.

Reinhold's answer is, in both cases, couched in familiar Kantian terms. In the first place, the content of a representation is always a manifold (Mannigfaltige): the given is always given in terms of a multiplicity. We saw above that receptivity is a precondition for there to be any impact whatsoever of the object on consciousness. It follows that the nature or 'form' of receptivity is not simply openness but openness to the manifold as such. Secondly, the form of a representation is always unified; it distinguishes itself in the representation by being a unity over and against the manifold given. The distinction between subject and object is made in terms of unity and manifold.

12 The content of a representation must be a manifold in order to account for the fact that we do distinguish between objects (Versuch, 284-85). That is to say, our capacity to do so is grounded in representation, and this is another claim with which Schulze takes issue. Being able to distinguish between objects presupposes that there are objects which are different in this or that respect. The ground for that distinction is not in consciousness: it is in the objects themselves. Schulze, op.cit., p.318.

13 In other words, the basis for the distinction is in representation, and that, Schulze again maintains, is simply not true. The ground for the presence of difference is not in something which the subject and object share,
It was previously indicated that the nature of spontaneity is productive. Conceptually considered, it is essentially synthesis. However, spontaneity is only logically distinct from receptivity. In esse, each is inextricably involved with the other and neither can be known as it is in itself.

So ist auch der blosse Stoff, das Mannigfaltige an sich und ohne Bezug auf Einheit, und die blosse Form, die Einheit an sich und ohne Bezug aufs Mannigfaltige, nicht vorstellbar (Versuch, 284).

The unifying activity of understanding is always the synthesis of a manifold, and the form of spontaneity consists of the synthesis of the manifold in general (Versuch, 288).

In conclusion, distinguishing between form and content in Book II of the Versuch is a very fertile move on Reinhold's part. It calls for the further distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself, which in turn leads to the denial that representations 'resemble' that which they are representations of, i.e. the denial that they serve a pictorial function. Finally, that the content is given and the form produced opens the way for further distinctions between the manifold embraced by the receptivity of consciousness and the unity generated by namely, the representation, but rather in the subject and object themselves. To be different means that each has at least one characteristic which the other does not. Schulze, op.cit., p.319fn.
its spontaneity. Before making the transition to Book III of the Versuch, there is yet another distinction to be dealt with, one concerned only with content and not form.

Representation is the highest genus and is synonymous with mental activity. However, Reinhold divides this genus such that each and every representation is one of two types: it is either pure or empirical. The ground for this division is to be found in the nature of the content of the representation in question (Versuch, 301-2). (a) If it is empirical or a posteriori content, then the representation which it is the content of is also empirical. The mode in which the content is given specifies the type of representation. In addition to this, a posteriori content can be subjective when it is internally determined by the activity of representation, or objective when it is determined by that which lies beyond mere Vorstellungsvermögen. For both the content is determined in and with the representation. (b) If the nature of the content is pure or a priori, then the corresponding representation is also pure. Again, because the content moment is essential to the representation, and because in this case that content is pure, it follows that the representation is also pure. But here, as opposed to (a), the content is determined previous to all representation, i.e. instead of specifying the nature of a representation, it is a logical prerequisite for there being representations. As such,
a priori content presents what is intrinsic to the mere Vorstellungsvermögen, and this can only mean that it is the previously mentioned 'forms' of receptivity and spontaneity.

As we saw above, these forms are determined prior to representation yet given in it, the former as elements of the Vorstellungsvermögen and the latter as universal and necessary characteristics of representation in general. So the sole content of an a priori representation is the forms of receptivity and spontaneity. Consequently, again unlike (a), there can be no, objective a priori content, but only the subjective type, for no object can determine in the representation that which is established prior to all representation and which is required for there to be represented objects in the first place i.e. these forms. Hence Reinhold's comment that "aller objektive Stoff ist Stoff a posteriori" (Versuch, 302).

A previous point, that there is a difference between pure and empirical content as regards their mode of determinancy, deserves further attention, for in one respect this difference does not hold true. It was indicated that the mode in which a posteriori content is determined is in and with the representation, and that its a priori counter-

\[
\text{At the same time these forms are themselves "in no way representations" (Versuch, 307). Only the pure content of a representation, and not the representation itself, is determined prior to all representation.}
\]
part is determined prior to representation by the forms of receptivity and spontaneity. This is true insofar as we are concerned with the inner conditions for representation in general, quite apart from considerations about subject or object. However, there is a sense in which a posteriori content is determined previous to all representation, that is, a sense in which its mode of determinancy (and not what it is determined by) is the same as that of pure content. In this case one is concerned with external conditions of representation, specifically, the description of empirical content as gegeben werden (Versuch, 303).

In other words, empirical content, whether subjective or objective, is determined by an affective ground which is independent of representation and which is itself indeterminate or an sich: this is the sense in which a posteriori content is determined prior to representation, i.e. only in the extent to which its ground stands outside of the synthetic activity of consciousness.

This constitutes an argument for the necessity of the existence of things-in-themselves. A posteriori representations require empirical content, and this sort of content entails the affection of things which are themselves not determined by the conditions of representation. If they were so determined, the content and the ensuing representation would be a priori, not a posteriori. Hence, the need for what is 'in-itself' or indeterminate;
its existence is called for, not by representation as such, but by empirical representation. It is, thereby independent of the principle of consciousness, which describes only what is required for representation in general. By virtue of this independence, that which is \textit{an sich} cannot be represented\textsuperscript{15}.

Before continuing to Book III of the \textit{Versuch}, some general comments are in order. Form and content, spontaneity and receptivity, unity and multiplicity, givenness and productivity: each member of these pairs is different from the other. Unity and multiplicity, as well as form and content, are even opposites. Yet, insofar as they are essential to representation in general, each is bound up with, or is the same as, its other. This is our thesis that the intention of Reinhold's philosophy is the mediation of difference. The latter must be overcome, for to remain with it is to render insoluble the problem of the unity of experience. Thus Reinhold wants to show that there is an identity which does

\textsuperscript{15}This does not solve, but only reinforces the classical formulation of the problem of the thing-in-itself, namely, how can it be both necessary for representation, at least as far as \textit{a posteriori} representation is concerned, and yet be independent of the conditions which would allow it to be represented in the same manner. Since Reinhold has indicated that it is necessary, we will concentrate on the other horn of this dilemma; how can the thing-in-itself be present to consciousness? Since the \textit{Elementarphilosophie} purportedly provides a principle which determines the entire content of consciousness, it must be able to account for the thing-in-itself.
not totally collapse each concept into its other, but rather preserves what is proper to each of them. For instance, form and content are separate elements of, and have distinct functions in, the Vorstellungsvermögen, yet they share the fact that they are essential to the existence of representations. Nowhere is this attempt at mediation more obvious than in Reinhold's description of consciousness. "The representation is, in consciousness, distinct from and related to both the represented and the representing". It is his notion of representation which allows Reinhold to say that it is simultaneously identical to and different from subject and object, but this notion also generates a problem.

How can he show that there is this 'identity within difference'? Where is there a place for similarity among the many differences that are related to the distinction between form and content? If there is no place, how is mediation possible? If it is not, then representation, at least as Reinhold conceives it, is out of the question. If the separation of form and content is logical only, then what compels the reader to accept it as true in esse? We saw at the outset that Reinhold demands a self-evident foundation for his Elementarphilosophie; on his own terms, then, is it self-evident that this is what representations are?
Chapter Two: The Elementarphilosophie

Section Two: Consequent

The third and final book of the Versuch is entitled "Theorie des Erkenntnisvermögens überhaupt" and is divided into four sections: an introduction, "Theorie der Sinnlichkeit", "Theorie des Verstandes" and "Theorie der Vernunft". How is this book connected to the previous one? How does the Erkenntnisvermögen interact with the Vorstellungsvermögen, or how is consciousness related to representation? Already we have seen that, for Reinhold, there is no knowledge without representation. The question now becomes, why is this true, and how is knowledge possible in terms of representation?

In the introduction to the third book, there is an attempt to explain what is meant by the term, "consciousness in general" (Bewusstsein überhaupt). As one might expect, in order to do this Reinhold re-introduces his description of consciousness: the inner condition for consciousness is the twofold relation

\[ \text{It is said to be twofold because there is (1) a relation to subject and to object, and (2) because it is a relation of identity and difference i.e. 'the representation is related to and distinct from the representing and the represented'}. \]
which obtains between the mere representation, the subject and the object. Now hitherto we have more or less equated consciousness and the representing activity, and this not without reason. "Es gibt keine Vorstellungen ohne Bewusstsein" (Versuch, 327). It makes no sense, as far as Reinhold is concerned, to speak of unconscious representations. However, this does not mean that consciousness in general and mere representation are unconditionally identical, for to the former belongs the same subject and object which are distinct from the latter. Hence, even though they are inseparable, 'consciousness in general' and 'representation as such' are not synonómous.

Since its internal condition is the relation which holds between the mere representation, the subject and the object, there are three corresponding moments of consciousness: (1) that of a mere representation, (2) that of the representing subject, i.e. self-consciousness, and (3) that of a represented object. Bewusstsein überhaupt is what is common to these three and they are related to it as species to genus (Versuch, 325-6). It will be seen below that knowledge (Erkenntniss) is possible only in terms of the third moment of consciousness, i.e. that of a represented object. In order to see why and at the same time further explicate the important concept of consciousness in general, we must examine Reinhold's analysis of the other two. In this regard he introduces the terms 'clarity' and
'distinctness'.

(1) Das Bewusstsein überhaupt ist klar in wieferne dasselbe Bewusstsein der Vorstellung ist (Versuch, 331)

Consciousness in general and therefore any particular accompanying moment of it is 'clear' only insofar as the representation becomes an object for consciousness, and the result is the representation of a representation i.e. the alteration of mind through the affection of one representation and the production of another.

The prerequisite for clarity is that a representation becomes an object for consciousness. This in turn presupposes the existence of such a representation. The simple (i.e. unrepresented) possession by consciousness of a representation is called by Reinhold "obscure consciousness" (dunkles Bewusstsein; Versuch,336). Even though there are no representations without consciousness, "es giebt Vorstellungen ohne klares Bewusstsein" (Versuch,331). Obscure consciousness is only aware that it has something; when this something becomes for it a representation, consciousness is clear.

(2) Das Bewusstsein überhaupt ist deutlich in wieferne es Bewusstsein des vorstellenden Subjektes, als des vorstellenden d.h. Selbstbewusstsein, ist (Versuch,333).

In this moment consciousness is not only aware of something as a representation, but of this representation as an object, its object, and therefore of itself. Consciousness in general as well as any specific moment of it is distinct
only insofar as it is self-consciousness. The object of self-consciousness is the representing subject, but only \textit{qua} representing, for whatever the subject may be in-itself, i.e. as non-representing, can never be a represented object. To objectify and represent the representing activity of a subject is to represent the essential characteristics of representing as such, namely the forms of receptivity and spontaneity. In other words, because it is only \textit{qua} representing and not \textit{qua} subject that consciousness is aware of itself, this awareness will consist of what is necessary for representing as such, namely, the forms. Thus, the possibility of self-consciousness and the possibility of a representation of the self\textsuperscript{17} depends on the possibility of there being representations of these forms.

There is here a logical progression.

Der Weg vom dunkeln Bewusstsein eines Gegenstandes, von welchem alles Bewusstsein ausgeht, zum deutlichen Selbstbewusstsein geht durch das klare Bewusstsein der Vorstellung (\textit{Versuch}, 336).

Distinct or self-consciousness requires the representations of the forms of receptivity and spontaneity. This means, in effect, that distinctness presupposes clarity, for the latter consists precisely in the representation of a representation or specifically, as far as self-consciousness is concerned, in the representation of the representation

\textsuperscript{17}Unter dem Ich wird das vorstellende Subjekt, in wieferne es Objekt des Bewusstseins ist, verstanden" (\textit{Versuch}, 336).
of the forms. Clarity, too, presupposes something further: it demands that there be a representation to be represented, the simple possession of which is obscure consciousness.

This is Reinhold's analysis of the first and second moments of consciousness, i.e. that of the mere representation and that of the represented object. The third moment, consciousness of the object, is knowledge (Erkenntniss), and here the Vorstellungsvermögen is Erkenntnissvermögen.

(j) What, more specifically, is the relation between knowledge and consciousness of an object?

Das Bewusstsein des Gegenstandes heisst Erkenntniss überhaupt, in wieferne bey demselben die Vorstellung auf den bestimmten Gegenstand bezogen wird (Versuch, 340).

This sentence can be explicated by means of a contrast between consciousness in general and consciousness of an object. In the former an object is distinguished from the mere representation, for the object is not the representation; it is what is represented. Or, to put it another way, for consciousness in general the representation is related to a represented object insofar as the latter is represented. On the other hand, consciousness of an object means that the object is not only, in fact, distinguished from the mere representation but, moreover, is now represented as distinguished. It is by virtue of the representation of its being distinguished that the object is said to be "determined" (bestimmten).
In order to be knowledge, generally speaking, consciousness of an object must be the representation which is related to the represented object, not merely insofar as the latter is represented, but also in the extent to which the objects being represented is represented.\(^{18}\)

Perhaps this initially difficult aspect of Reinhold's position can be clarified if we abandon the heuristic contrast of consciousness in general and consciousness of an object and, instead, begin with knowledge and move 'backwards'. Just as there are two essential elements of representation, namely form and content, there are two conditions of knowledge. First, there must be a represented object, and second, since the mere presence of the represented object is apparently insufficient for Reinhold, there must be cognition of that object. As we saw before, representation is logically prior to knowledge, much as Reinhold's *Versuch* is the ground of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. As far as knowledge is concerned, this priority entails two orders of representation. First order representation is that of the represented. Second order representation or knowledge in general is that of a first order representation; in other words, the represented is itself represented as an object.

\(^{18}\)This sentence cannot be concluded thus: '...which is related to the represented object, not merely insofar as the latter is represented, but also in the extent to which it is an object, i.e. is unrepresented.' This conclusion entails the contradiction that the (determined) object of knowledge is the (indeterminate) thing-in-itself.
knowledge one of which is logically prior to the other; if there is to be a (second order) representation of the represented object as object, then it presupposes that there is an original, unrepresented represented object, and this amounts to the statement that the conditions necessary for representation are ipso facto necessary for knowledge.

As with that between form and content in Book II, the distinction between what we have called first and second order representations in Book III is a very fruitful one, for it is, in effect, Kant's distinction between intuition (Anschauung) and concept (Begriff) respectively. We will first look at these separately.

An intuition is a species of representation in general, and it is true of representation in general that it is related to a represented object. The content moment of a representation and in particular the givenness of the content, makes this relation possible. There are two inter-related aspects of the nature of this relation, and they are the ground for distinguishing intuitions from other sorts of representations. First, the relatum of an intuition is the object presented by the raw given. Second, the relation between intuition and object is "immediate" (unmittelbar); the intuition springs directly from the way in which the content becomes affected by the manifold, for there is no third factor through which the intuited object is represented as, or known to be, distinct
from the representation. An intuition is a first order representation i.e. the representation of the represented object as represented. It is for consciousness the sheer presence of something, and if there is nothing other than intuition for consciousness, then the latter is said to be 'obscure' (Versuch, 345-46).

A concept is also a species of representation in general, and again we will use two correlative aspects of the nature of the relation between representation and represented object in order to explain the difference between concepts and other kinds of representations. First, the relatum of a concept is another, now objectified, representation, in particular, an intuition. Second, the relation between the concept and the intuited object is "mediate" (mittelbar); the concept arises if and only if it has first been supplied with a content provided by intuition, which in turn is contingent upon the given. In other words, the immediate content of a concept is not the raw given (as in intuition), but rather an already represented and synthesized given. Hence, the relation of the concept to the original object of intuition is mediate, for the concept is the synthesis, not of the given manifold, but of the represented manifold. A concept is a second order representation, i.e. the representation of a representation of a represented object, which object is said to be "thought" (Versuch, 347-48).
The connection between knowledge and representation, and the transition from Vorstellungsvermögen to Erkenntnissvermögen can now be exposed.

Knowledge in general is the representation of a determined object. From what has been said of concept and intuition, it follows that (1) intuitions alone do not constitute knowledge, for they are representations of the object but not of the object as determined. It is evident that there is an object, but what this object is must remain, at this point, undecided. (2) Concepts alone do not constitute knowledge and are not even representations, for without intuition they lack the element of content which is necessary for representation. Moreover, without the intuited object, there is nothing in consciousness which is at the same time related to that which is outside consciousness, to that which is not a representation. Consequently, the cooperation of intuitions and concepts is necessary for knowledge in general; they are its inner conditions.

The capacity of ours to have intuitions is sensibility (Sinnlichkeit), and the capacity to have concepts is understanding (Verstand). Because intuitions and concepts are the joint prerequisites of knowledge, the Erkenntnissvermögen consists of sensibility and understanding just as the Vorstellungsvermögen consists of
receptivity and spontaneity. Before focusing on, first, sensibility, and then on understanding, we want to make a further comment on the relation of Reinhold to Kant in the light of our exposition as it is hitherto.

It may have become obvious to the reader that Reinhold has made the transition from the Elementarphilosophie to the critical philosophy. This can be substantiated by an example. Kant claimed that "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind" (KRV, A51). As we have just seen, Reinhold certainly has no quarrel with this; a concept or second order representation, when devoid of a first order representation, is empty, and a consciousness for which there is only an unrepresented intuition, is obscure. The results are in both cases the same, namely the absence of knowledge.

Again, this time from a slightly different perspective, Reinhold and Kant agree, as against Leibnitz and Locke, that it is only the conjunction of sensibility and understanding which can solve the problem of "objective validity" in cognition, i.e. 'how subjective conditions of thought (the categories) can furnish conditions of the possibility of all knowledge of objects' (KRV, B122)\(^{19}\).

\(^{19}\)This is, of course, the problem of Kant's "Transcendental Deduction". It will be dealt with at greater length in the appropriate section below. Cf. "Theorie des Verstandes", pp. 60-81.
However, these agreements notwithstanding, there is also an all-important difference between Kant and Reinhold. Reinhold maintains that the symbiotic relation between sensibility and understanding appears, in Kant's thought, ex nihilo. Moreover, as was suggested in the introduction above, he believes that this procedure is illegitimate because it fails to make the critical philosophy systematic. A true system would have permitted Kant to derive, and not simply introduce, the point about empty thoughts and blind intuitions; it would have followed, as the only possible consequence, from something that was itself firmly established.

Reinhold's philosophy is an attempt to recast Kant's conclusions in the mold of a system where, to continue with our example, the inter-dependency of intuitions and concepts is entailed by certain facts about the nature of first and second order representations, which are themselves ultimately derived from the Satz des Bewusstseins. In short, the Elementarphilosophie is to be the ground of the critical philosophy. The second book of the Versuch, "Theorie des Vorstellungsvermögens überhaupt", is an exposition of this ground. The third book, "Theorie des Erkenntnissvermögens überhaupt", is an exposition of the consequent: it must show, in addition to being an exposition, that all the results of the critical philosophy can be systematically obtained from the theory of representation.
Theorie der Sinnlichkeit

What is called, in the Critique of Pure Reason, "Transcendental Aesthetic" is re-named by Reinhold "Theory of Sensibility". He begins this section with a polemic against the misguided intentions of previous philosophers. In particular, he criticizes those who confuse logic and metaphysics by failing to distinguish between the following two questions.

Wie muss die vorstellende Substanz beschaffen seyn, wenn sie sinnlicher Vorstellungen fähig sein soll? und. Wie muss das Vorstellungsvermögen beschaffen sein, wenn es sinnlicher Vorstellungen fähig sein soll? (Versuch,351).

The concept of sensibility must be understood before one can come to grips with problems about the constitution of a sensing substance. At the same time, in order to avoid some variant of the classical postions of materialism or dualism, this understanding cannot be reached through that same substance. What sensibility is cannot be determined by starting with a corporeal organism. This position is, of course, also that of Kant. The explicit intention of the "Transcendental Aesthetic" is the twofold isolation of sensibility from any other capacity of reason, specifically, understanding, and from the content of sensation (KRV,A22).

Reinhold demands a concept of sensibility, and to find it be begins with sensible representation. A representation is sensible if and only if it is the
immediate outcome of the way in which receptivity is affected, i.e. if and only if it springs directly from the given manifold. One of the elements necessary for representation in general is form, the characteristic of the Vorstellungsvermögen by which form is produced is spontaneity. Now the formal moment of sensible representation is the synthesis through spontaneity of the given manifold. We have seen that, for conceptual representation it is different: because this species of representation bears a mediate relation to the given, its formal moment requires the synthesis of the represented manifold. In order to distinguish these, Reinhold calls the former "first order spontaneity" and the activity which accompanies it "apprehension" (Versuch,357). The spontaneity associated with sensible representation is more passive than the other; it is, with respect to its content, 'disinterested'. Nevertheless, it is spontaneity; even though we have yet to determine the concept of sensiblility, we do know that it is a mode of knowledge and as such is based on representation, which is to say that it is not receptivity alone, but rather receptivity and spontaneity combined.

Whatever is true of representation in general is also true of sensible representation. Hence the sensible representation is, in consciousness, related to and dis-

20."Die bloße Vorstellung heisst sinnlich in wieferne sie durch die Art wie die Receptivitat afficiert wird, unmittelbar entstanden ist." (Versuch,356).
tinct from both subject and object. The relation to the subject is called "sensation" (Empfindung) and that to the object, "intuition" (Anschauung). Since intuition has already been discussed at some length, let us concentrate on the former. There can be no sensation without intuition and vice versa. They are different sides of the same epistemic event. Sensation is a mere "change of circumstance" (Veränderung des Zustandes: Versuch, 359); this change in the representing subject is a result of the latter's immediate relation to the given, i.e. it is what happens when receptivity is affected and the represented object is apprehended through first order spontaneity. There is, however, no consciousness of this alteration built into sensation. Only if there is a separate representation of the change itself, is such consciousness, which would be clear or self-consciousness, possible.

In conclusion, the quality of immediacy is common to intuition, sensation, and sensible representation in general, where 'immediacy' describes the way in which receptivity is affected. Hence Reinhold has a concept of sensibility: it is the vehicle which accompanies representations according to this way, i.e. as they arise directly from the given manifold (Versuch, 362). Sensibility is not completely but is for the most part receptivity, and it is to this extent passive rather than active. It is however, not identical to the mere receptivity of the
Vorstellungsvermögen. The latter has to do with the possibility of affection in general with respect to representation in general, and the former with the possibility of external and internal affection with respect to sensible representation.

Having determined the concept of sensibility, Reinhold proceeds to distinguish within it two and only two subordinate capacities, inner and outer sense.

Outer sense is "die bestimmte Fähigkeit der Receptivität von aussen afficiert zu werden" (Versuch, 365); 'von aussen' describes what is external to the Vorstellungsvermögen, i.e. that which is determined by conditions other than those of the Vorstellungsvermögen. Outer sense is the completely passive capacity which makes possible impressions of objects which are present outside of the representing subject; it is that aspect of sensibility which is susceptible to that sort of affection the ground of which is outside of the affecting. Insofar as this affection is related to the representing subject, it is called "outer sensation", and insofar as it is object related, "outer intuition". The description of outer sense can be expanded if we add to it two disclaimers.

First, outer sense is not to be equated with the function of the corporeal senses. Indeed, this receptive function does belong to the sensible Vorstellungsvermögen, but only as an empirical modification of it,
a modification that is given in and with the representation. The corporeal senses presuppose that consciousness is open to such modification in the first place, and this openness, which is determined prior to all sensible representation and which is itself not one modification among others, is outer sense. The corporeal organism determines only the content, and not the logical form, of sensible representation in general; that organism is therefore distinct from outer sense.

As for the second disclaimer, Reinhold makes it clear that 'von aussen' does not mean the way in which receptivity, through a posteriori, objective content, is affected by things-in-themselves (Versuch, 376-77). The reason for this is similar to that of the first disclaimer. Reinhold intends to uncover what is logically true of sensible representation in general. Whatever is true of mere representation, the ground, is ipso facto true of sensible representation, a consequent. In particular, it is true of all sensible representations that they contain as necessary prerequisites the elements of form and content. Now the manner of affection of things-in-themselves is a condition only for the content: that the representation in question is a mere sensible representation, i.e. its form, is left indeterminate. As a result, such affection is not true of sensible representation in general.

We turn now to inner sense; it is "die bestimmte
Fähigkeit der Receptivität von innen afficiert zu werden" (Versuch, 368). 'Von innen' describes the affection generated by the spontaneity of the Vorstellungsvermögen i.e. objects which are distinct from the mere Vorstellungsvermögen and yet are nothing but the results of its own activity. Hence, inner sense is that capacity of receptivity which allows there to be, in sensibility, impressions of objects, which objects arise through the subject’s own activity. As before, the mere sensible representation which results from such affection is, insofar as it is related to the representing subject, inner sensation, and, insofar as it is related to the represented object, inner intuition. Unlike before, however, where the content of outer sense is related to only one thing, namely, objects which are distinct from the representing subject, the content which is given to inner sense is related to two: the alteration within the representing subject which is produced through spontaneity, and, in a priori representation, the forms of receptivity and spontaneity.

One of the afore-mentioned ramifications of the distinction between form and content was that the latter is always given as a manifold: the receptivity of the Vorstellungsvermögen is determined a priori to accept only a manifold, which is said to be the form or nature of receptivity. We have just seen that, as far as sensibility is concerned, receptivity is made up of outer and inner sense. It follows, if sensible representation is to be possible, that what is
essential to both types of sense is the manner in which the manifold is given. But what is this manner? How is the manifold given von aussen and von innen?

The nature of outer sense is the Aussereinandersein of the manifold in representation, and the content moment of some sensible representations is described by this 'being outside one another'. Correspondingly, the element of form in such representations, which is determined a priori, consists of the unity of what is Aussereinander. In the extent to which this unity is related to the object, it is called the "form of outer intuition" (Versuch, 378-80).

The nature of inner sense is the Nacheinandersein of the manifold in representation, and the content moment of all sensible representation is described by this 'being one after another'. Correspondingly, the form of such representations is the unity of what is nacheinander. Insofar as this unity is object related, it is called the "form of inner intuition" (Versuch, 381-82).

There is a crucial difference between the forms of outer and inner intuition. Aussereinandersein is true of outer sense and nothing more; it describes the content of one species of representation, namely, that which is determined by an affection the conditions of which stand outside of the Vorstellungsvermögen. On the other hand, Nacheinandersein is true not only of its proper sphere, inner sense, but of outer sense as well, for the latter is passive through
and through, its content can become the content of a sensible representation if and only if the manifold is synthesized. That is to say, the representations of outer sense are possible if and only if externally affected receptivity itself becomes the content of inner sense, for inner sense is, partly, this synthetic activity of spontaneity. Hence the unity which brings together the form of inner sense is true of sensible representation in general, i.e. including outer sense (Versuch, 383-84).

Just as the forms of receptivity and spontaneity are the content of pure representations without at the same time being representations, Nacheinandersein and Aussereinandersein are the forms of inner and outer sense respectively. As forms, they are determined prior to all representation, and hence the representations which they are the content of are a priori representations. We will deal with each of them separately.

The representation which is determined by the form of outer sense is that of mere space, which is to say, mere space is the object of a representation the immediate content of which is the Aussereinandersein of the manifold. Because of its formal content, this representation is determined a priori. As a result, its object, mere space, is a

21"Mere space" (blosse Raum) is to be distinguished from "empty space" (leere Raum), for the fullness or emptiness of space is not essential to the concept of space as such. It is an empirically dependent and logically irrelevant contingency whether or not there is something 'in' space.
necessary object; it is the condition of all external affection and is itself the form of outer intuition. Mere space makes possible the representation of things outside of us and is independent of the empirical aspect of experience. Moreover, because the representation of mere space is the representation of the universal characteristic which all externally intuited objects must have, this representation itself is related to something external and is a predetermined, external intuition; in other words, the immediate representation of the form of outer intuition is also an outer intuition.

Since space is for us a necessary object and because the form of external sense is 'being outside one another', "extension" (Ausdehnung) is for us the universal characteristic of all externally intuited objects (Versuch, 389-402).

At the risk of being prolix, two things must be made clear. First, mere space is not simply the form of outer sense, for that form is, in fact, the Aussereinandersein of the manifold. Rather, mere space is the form of outer intuition; the representation of it, which is a priori intuition, is a result of the unity imposed on the Aussereinandersein by the productive activity of spontaneity. Secondly, not space itself, but the representation of it, is the form of outer intuition; we will comment on this point below.

We turn now to inner sense; the representation which is determined by its form is that of mere time. The content...
of this representation is the manifold in the form of Nach­
einandersein. When this manifold is synthesized there arises
a representation which, because of is immediately related to
its object, is an intuition. Since this object is mere time,
there is an intuition of mere time, and because the content
moment of any representation is necessary but not sufficient
for that representation, the Nach­einandersein of the manifold
is essential for but not identical to mere time. By virtue
of the fact that the content of the representation is the
form of inner sense, this representation is said to be deter-
mined a priori. It is, in short, an a priori intuition.
Hence, its object, mere time, is a necessary object; it is
the sole condition under which the internally given manifold
can be present in representation. Represented time is the
form of internal intuition. It is again worthy of note that
it is not time itself, but the representation of it, which
is the form of inner intuition.

It was indicated above that, depending upon the sort
of representation involved, the content given to inner sense
is one of two types. In a priori representation it is the
forms of receptivity and spontaneity, and in a posteriori

ished from empirically represented chronological time.
The conditions of the former are also those of the
Vorstellungsvermögen, for the content of the representation
of mere time is the nature of time as it is immediately
determined by the mind. On the other hand, the conditions
of chronological time, i.e. planetary movement, are foreign
to the Vorstellungsvermögen, and therefore have nothing
directly to do with internal sense.
representation, it is the alteration produced by the synthetic activity of the representing subject; the former is determined prior to representation and the latter simultaneously with representation, and together they constitute the entire possible content of inner sense. Now here we are concerned only with empirical content. The representation of the form of inner sense is a representation of the characteristic which invariably holds true of such content, a characteristic which anything, that can be intuited as being contained a posteriori within the representing subject, must have. This 'anything' can be so intuited only according to the form of inner intuition, i.e. only within mere time. The universal characteristic in question is the "alteration" (Veränderung) produced in us by the spontaneity required for that representation; it is the change which accompanies time and through which an empirically given manifold in us can become represented, for that manifold can always be described as 'being one after another' (Versuch, 402-10).

On two occasions we have emphasized the fact that, for Reinhold, it is explicit that space and time are not only forms of intuition, but are themselves represented objects. They are, more specifically, objects of the representations of the Aussereinandersein and Nacheinandersein of the manifold, i.e. of the forms of outer and inner sense. Kant certainly agrees with the first position: there can be little doubt that, for him, space and time are
the forms of intuition (KRV,A29,B56,B72,A162 etc.). The second position is less clear: certainly one does not want to think of space and time as intuited objects in the same sense in which other things are intuited objects, if only because the intuitions of the former are a priori. However, as Erdmann and Hegel have indicated, Kant seems to have held that, in geometry for instance, space can also be the object of a representation. "Space and time are represented a priori not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but as themselves intuitions..." (KRV,B160). This is possible by virtue of the a priori unity which space, and time as well, have. "Space is essentially one" (KRV,B39); its unity is the form of outer sense i.e. each item of the manifold of the intuition of space is Aussereinander and shares the characteristic of extension. "Time has only one dimension" (KRV,B47); its unity is the form of inner sense i.e. each item of the manifold of the intuition of time is Nacheinander and shares the characteristic of alteration. Time and space, then, are not only forms of intuition, but also formal intuitions.


24It is, of course, significant that the previous quotation is from Kant's "Transcendental Deduction". The ground for the unity in question is not in sensibility but rather in the transcendental synthesis of imagination, the function of which is to mediate between the forms of sensible intuition and the categories of understanding.
A brief recapitulation is in order. Sensibility is, for the most part, the receptive capacity of the Vorstellungsvermögen which allows it to be directly affected by the given manifold. Sensibility is divided into two subordinate capacities, outer and inner sense. Aussereinandersein describes the nature of the only manifold given to outer sense: when this nature is the content of representation, the represented object is mere space, which is, consequently, the form of outer intuition. Nacheinandersein is the manifold directly received by inner sense, and it is the content of the representation of mere time; insofar as it is represented, mere time is the form of inner intuition. There is a crucial difference between these two forms; the scope of the form of inner sense is wider than that of outer sense. As regards sensible representation, whatever is given to the manifold as Aussereinandersein is ipso facto given as Nacheinandersein, but not vice versa. In other words, all sensibly represented objects are in time but not necessarily in space: time is the form of intuition in general.

Before turning to the Theorie des Verstandes, Reinhold draws several conclusions about the Erkenntnissvermögen based on the Theorie der Sinnlichkeit. These conclusions are, of course, somewhat incomplete, for there are two elements required for knowledge and only one of them, intuitions, has been examined hitherto.
Only that which is distinct from the mere Vorstellungsvermögen, i.e. which is not one of its essential elements, can be the object of an empirical representation and hence give rise to empirical knowledge.

Empirisch heisst jede Vorstellung in wieferne ihr Stoff nicht im blossen Vorstellungsvermögen, sondern durch ein Afficiertsein im Gemüthe bestimmt ist (Versuch, 417).

If this condition obtains for the content of an intuition, then that intuition is empirical and its object is an "appearance" (Erscheinung). As the intuited object, appearance is determined by the form of intuition; all appearances are in time, and some of them, those the content of which are given through outer sense, are also in space.

Thus, one criterion for empirical representation is that the content be distinct from the Vorstellungsvermögen. Things as they are in themselves are distinct from the mere Vorstellungsvermögen, but they cannot be the object of an empirical representation because they are "essentially distinct" from all representation (Versuch, 419). Precisely because they are required as the ground for the content of a posteriori representation, they are by nature indeterminate and cannot be "durch ein Afficiertsein im Gemüthe bestimmt". Whatever is an sich is neither Aussereinander or Nacheinander and stands outside of space and time. Here again Reinhold has made a contribution to his project of determining the limits of knowledge. In the extent to which empirical intuition is a necessary part of
our knowledge, the representations of space and time are the limits of the Erkenntnisvermögen: we may know appearances, but not things as they are in themselves. We can know objects which are subject to the forms of inner and outer sense, i.e. which are 'one after another' or 'outside one another', but anything which stands outside of these conditions cannot be known.

Theorie des Verstandes

In our exposition of the introduction to Book III, we made a distinction between first and second order representation. The former is the representation of the represented object, and is called an intuition. The latter is the representation of a first order representation and is called a concept. Hence, second order representation or knowledge in general, requires first order representation. The ground for distinguishing intuitions and concepts is the presence or absence of mediation. The object of an intuition is immediately represented by virtue of the fact that the intuition springs directly from the affected content. On the other hand, knowledge is consciousness of an object that is always already represented; in short, the content of a concept is an intuition. Our capacity to perform the procedure through which an intuition becomes a concept, is "understanding" (Verstand), and that section of the Versuch which deals with it, is the Theorie des Verstandes. Its counterpart in the
Critique of Pure Reason is the "Transcendental Analytic."

The procedure through which an intuition becomes a concept is called "judgement" (Urteil). What are its general conditions? In order to answer this, we must fall back on the Elementarphilosophie: every representation requires a content and a synthesis through which the content given manifold is represented. Hence, as a second order representation, a concept must have a represented, not merely given, manifold, as well as a spontaneously produced formal unity. Because this unity is that of a represented manifold and is not that of a mere representation, it is called "objective" (Versuch,429). It is the general form according to which all intuited objects can be thought, i.e. according to which an object can be presented in a representation that is distinct from intuition. Objective unity is the a priori determined form of concept in general, in much the same way as the representation of the unity of Nacheinanderseins, i.e. time, is the form of intuition in general, and just as the representations of space and time...

Kant uses the first order/second order distinction in his description of judgement: "Judgement is, therefore, the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a representation of it" (KRV,B93).

The phrase "objective unity" is that of Kant; "... that unity through which all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object ... is entitled 'objective' (KRV,B139). Unlike Kant, however, Reinhold's 'objective unity' is not synonymous with the 'transcendental unity of apperception or self-consciousness', for there is no equivalent of the latter in Reinhold's system.
are \textit{a priori} intuitions, the representation of objective unity is an \textit{a priori} concept (\textit{Versuch}, 434).

Judgement is the procedure through which the intuited manifold is combined in objective unity. Having asked after its general conditions above, we now ask after the operative conditions of this procedure. In the terminology of formal logic, judgement is the combination of subject and predicate, and as such generates conceptual thought (\textit{Versuch}, 436). Since the subject cannot be thought 'through' a predicate before combination, for such combination is a condition for all thought, that subject must be intuited and is, in fact, an intuition. As a characteristic of the subject, the predicate must arise out of the intuited object; hence, the predicate is a concept. It originates from the intuition, not as the separation of one part from another, but rather through the combination of the represented manifold. Judgement is the activity of understanding which determines the relation of concept to intuition. As such an activity, it is both the combining of the intuited manifold in objective unity, and the separation of subject and predicate.

As a result of the dual nature of the judging activity, there are two kinds of judgement (\textit{Versuch}, 438-39). In the first, the objective unity of a concept is produced from an intuition; the predicate is drawn out of
the subject through the mere synthesis or combination of the intuited manifold. In the second, an already produced and therefore separated objective unity is re-combined with the intuition, as a predicate with its subject. Since it is for the most part a combining activity, the former is called a "synthetic judgement" and, because it requires the separation of subject and predicate, the latter is called an "analytic judgement".

Furthermore, because in analytic judgement the predicate is already other than the subject, that judgement must have as its logical antecedent the synthetic judgement in which that predicate, the concept, first arises out of the subject, an intuition. Analytic judgement demands the presence of objective unity, which can only be supplied by a synthetic judgement: in the more familiar Kantian phrase (KRV, B130), 'analysis presupposes synthesis'. The same characteristic which, in analytic judgement, is combined with an object in consciousness is, in synthetic judgement, produced prior to consciousness.

The form of judgement, or what is true of judgement in general, and the form of synthetic judgement, are the same. This form is the combination of the intuited manifold in objective unity, and it is essential to representation through concepts. This means that every judgement is first of all synthetic. The form of analytic judgement, on the other hand, is that of an activity through
which a produced concept is represented in consciousness: in this case the predicate already exists. There is still the combination which holds of judgement in general, but in analytic judgement it takes place in consciousness, not prior to it.

Even though judgement, generally speaking, has to do with combination, the represented manifold which is combined in objective unity is no longer combined according to the forms of outer and inner sense, i.e. the Ausser- and Nacheinandersein of the given manifold. Hence, the "Theorie des Verstandes" is not only concerned with the form of judgement in general; Reinhold also wants to uncover the particular ways in which the represented manifold is combined just as he did for the given manifold. These 'ways' or forms (plural) of judgement are the modifications of objective unity according to which objects can be thought. The particular forms which determine such objects belong to the nature of understanding, are themselves determined a priori and are called "categories" (Versuch, 440-41). They are, to use Kant's terminology²⁷, the "logical function" of our capacity for judgement.

Before focusing on the nature of such a function, a methodological observation is called for, one which will

point out a procedural difference between the two philosophers in question. Reinhold's *Versuch* is a re-formulation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and the "Theorie des Verstandes" is purportedly the equivalent of the "Transcendental Analytic". It is clear, then, that Reinhold is approaching that chapter which, in Kant's work, is entitled "The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding".

As Kant saw it, the task of this chapter is to demonstrate that certain concepts are 'objectively valid' because they are more than subjective and accidental conditions of thought. The "Deduction" will show that they not only accompany empirical knowledge, but are also necessary for it, and that the unity which is attributable to objects in general and which is required by understanding for thought is, in fact, possible. In other words, the overall intention of the "Deduction" is at least twofold. First, it is an attempt to explicate the condition of 'objective validity'; how can concepts, as regards their existence in consciousness, be determined *a priori*, and yet also be true of anything which does or ever could count as a sensibly intuited object (*KRV*, B122-3). Secondly, it will determine how to go about deciding which *a priori* concepts fulfill this condition, i.e. which of them are "primary concepts" (*KRV*, B107) or categories, without at the same time forcing Kant to provide a definition
How did Kant carry out this intention? Categories are the logical functions of judgement, and the table of categories is developed from the table of judgements: that there is a connection between these two is the "clue" which allows Kant to decide the number and nature of the categories and thus provide an exhaustive description of understanding (KRV, B105). Now it is important to note that the table of judgements is itself the result of "the labors of the logicians"²⁸: it is more or less adopted from the classical logic textbooks, and it is here where our procedural difference arises. In our discussion of the relation of Kant's position to Reinhold's, we saw that the most important feature of the Elementarphilosophie is its being systematic: it has as its ground a principle which is true of all possible knowledge, and which thereby provides the subsidiary principles of the sciences and of logic. Hence, forms of judgement, which are part of the system, cannot be introduced into the system from a discipline which is supposedly based upon the system, namely from logic. In opposition to Kant, Reinhold must derive the forms of judgement from what has already been established in the Versuch, for they cannot be borrowed from logic.

In order to begin to do so, Reinhold draws a distinction between the two elements of judgement, logical

²⁸I. Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, p. 71. cf. KRV, B96ff.
form and logical "content" (Materie:Versuch, 44). The latter is made up of two parts, namely, the two representations which have been called subject and predicate. The logical form of judgement, as we have seen, is the synthetically determined relation of them to objective unity; it is the way in which the represented manifold is combined in objective unity, i.e. the way in which the subject is related to the predicate. Thus, the formal element of judgement also consists of two parts. It is, first of all, the subject and object combined and, secondly, it is consciousness, i.e. the combining activity itself in which one becomes aware of the intuited object.

What the judgement is überhaupt, i.e. that it is a judgement, is determined by its form, which is to say that it is determined by the mere presence of the relation to objective unity. Moreover, that relation depends upon the possibility of combination in objective unity; the various forms of the subject/predicate relation are possible in judgement if and only if there are just as many forms of combination and this, in effect, means, if and only if there are just as many functions of understanding. Hence, the possibility of combination is determined by

29 One ought not to confuse the form of judgement with the forms of judgement. A particular judgement is also determined by a form. Unlike judgement überhaupt, however, it is not determined by mere relation, but rather by the sort of relation, which obtains between subject, predicate and objective unity.
the nature of understanding. Reinhold has forged a link, the importance of which will become evident below, between forms of judgement and concepts which are functions of Verstand.

At this point we are faced with several questions. The most obvious of these demands an enumerative response: what are the forms of judgement and their concomitant concepts? What is called for here is a list or table of forms and of categories. More important, however, is the following question: what decision procedure does Reinhold follow in order to determine such a list? In other words, how is an enumeration of the forms of judgement possible if Reinhold is not allowed to benefit from 'the labors of the logicians'? It was suggested above that the solution must be found in what has already been established in the Versuch. That is to say, it follows from the aforementioned 'link' between forms of judgement and functions of understanding, that the search for forms of judgement is, in fact, the search for the relations which can exist between judgement and objective unity, for such forms are manifest only in those relations. An enumeration of the various ways in which the intuited manifold can be combined provides us with a list of the forms of judgement. In addition, if the enumeration is complete, then the list is also; since judgement is nothing other than the combination of the intuited manifold, then to spell out the ways in which
this can be done is to exhaust the nature of judgement.

The decision procedure which allows Reinhold to specify all of the forms of judgement has as its ground the claim that there is diversity in the manner in which the subject and predicate are combined in objective unity. In short, judgement can be modified in various ways. How is this claim substantiated? Before turning to Reinhold’s answer, which is purportedly his version of Kant’s "Transcendental Deduction", two remarks must be made about the nature of concepts and of judgements.

The "Theorie des Vorstellungsvermögen überhaupt" indicated that the analysis of representation in terms of form and content has, as one of its results, the distinction between the manifold and its unity: the form of intuitions is the unity of the given manifold and the form of concepts is the objective unity of the represented manifold. Furthermore, second order representations, i.e. concepts, have, as their content, intuitions. Ultimately, this means that a concept has not two elements, but rather three; (a) the form or unity of an intuition, (b) the content of an intuition, the given manifold, and (c) the concept’s own form, the objective unity of the first two elements. Each of these is essential to an object insofar as that object can be thought, and together they constitute the objective unity of a concept. These elements will be referred to
respectively as "unity" (Einheit), "plurality" (Vielheit)\(^{30}\), and "unity and plurality together" (Einheit und Vielheit zugleich). The first two are the a priori representations uncovered in the "Theorie des Vorstellungsvermögen überhaupt", i.e. the forms of receptivity and spontaneity; they are not only representations but also the prerequisites for there being representations. The third, though not true of representation in general, is necessary for concepts.

The second remark has to do with the nature of judgement. We saw before that the content element of it consists, first, of a subject, and, secondly, of a predicate. The formal elements of a judgement consists, first, of the subject and predicate as combined and, second, of the combining of subject and predicate, i.e. consciousness. There are, then, four aspects of judgement: (1) subject, (2) predicate, (3) subject and predicate combined and (4) consciousness.

The content of these two remarks provides Reinhold with the equipment he needs to generate the forms of judgement by substantiating the claim that judgement in general can be modified in various ways; this, in turn, provides him with a procedure by which to decide what the forms of judgement are. Our exposition

\(^{30}"Vielheit soll hier nur so viel als Mannigfaltigkeit überhaupt bezeichnet, in wieferne sie der Einheit entgegengesetzt ist" (Versuch, 444n.). Plurality is not the given or intuited manifold, but manifold or multiplicity in general.
of the text in question (Versuch, 444-55) requires two stages.

(I) With respect to its logical content, (1) the characteristic of judgement which determines the relation of the subject of a judgement to objective unity, is quantity. (2) That which determines the relation of the predicate to objective unity, is quality. As regards its logical form, i.e., the combination of subject and predicate, (3) the characteristic which describes them as combined, is relation. (4) That which determines the combining activity itself, i.e., consciousness, is modality. Quantity, quality, relation and modality are the logical modifications of judgement in general; they are determined by the nature of understanding.

(II) Since judgement, through combination, gives rise to concepts, each of these modifications of judgement has three subordinate moments, namely, the elements which are necessary for thinking an object: unity, plurality, and unity and plurality together.

(1) In quantitative judgement, the subject is related to the objective unity of the predicate as unity, plurality, and unity and plurality together, i.e., the predicate is true of one subject, of several or of all. Specifically, the judgements in question are, respectively, singular, particular, or universal, and the corresponding categories are unity, plurality and totality (Allheit).
(2) In qualitative judgement, the predicate is related to the object unity of the subject as unity, plurality and unity and plurality together. In the first case, the predicate is posited in the subject. In the second, it is excluded from the subject. In the third, it is both posited and excluded, i.e. the exclusion of one predicate establishes all others as true of the subject. The concomitant judgements are affirmative, negative and infinite, and the categories which accompany them are reality, negation and limitation.

(3) In judgements of relation, subject and predicate combined is related to objective unity as unity, plurality and unity and plurality together. In the first case, subject and predicate are one; they are internally connected through categorical judgement and constitute an object as substance and accident. In the

Quantitative unity and quantitative plurality are to be distinguished from objective unity and manifold in general. The former are sufficient conditions for what can be thought, whereas the latter are both sufficient and necessary for concepts. Quantitative totality (Allheit) is also to be distinguished from totality (Totalität) in general, for reasons which will become apparent in the "Theorie der Vernunft" (Versuch, 451).

Kant observes that "the third category in each class always arises from the combination of the second category with the first" (KRV, B110). For example, allness or totality is just plurality considered as unity. Reinhold's procedure of subdividing the modifications of judgement in terms of the elements of conceptual representation, i.e. of unity, plurality and unity and plurality together, makes Kant's point abundantly clear.
second, subject and predicate are related to objective unity by being distinct; they are externally connected as ground and consequence in hypothetical judgement. In the third case, the combined subject and predicate make up an object which itself consists of several objects. Here the subject and predicate are both internally and externally connected as the parts of a whole which are at the same time themselves independent and exclude all others. By virtue of this exclusion, the judgement in question is disjunctive. The categories which correspond to these forms of judgement are substantiality, causality and concurrence.

(4) Finally, in modal judgements, the combining of subject and predicate, i.e. consciousness, is related to objective unity as unity, plurality and unity and plurality together. In the first case, judgement and consciousness are unified and internally connected, i.e. the actual combining of subject and predicate happens in consciousness. In the second, the two are externally connected and the combining is represented as something distinct from consciousness; here judgement is merely possible. In the third case, the combining of subject and predicate is both internally and externally connected.

Koncurrenz. Strictly speaking, the third category of relation is not Koncurrenz but rather Gemeinschaft. This is Reinhold's only terminological departure from Kant's table of categories.
with consciousness. The mere representation of combining, and the actual combining itself, are inseparable. Modal judgements, then, are assertoric, problematic and apodictic, and the categories which they give rise to are actuality, possibility and necessity.

The division of the forms of judgement into two classes is determined by the distinction between their logical content and their logical form. In the same manner, and following Kant, Reinhold divides the table of categories into two groups. The mathematical categories are concerned with the measure of the content of judgement and are determined primarily by intuition. The dynamic categories are concerned with the form of judgement, i.e. they describe the activity of mind, and are determined for the most part by mere concepts.

In conclusion, on the basis of the affinity which he discovered between the general form of judgement, i.e. the combination of the intuited manifold in objective unity, and the general form of concepts, i.e. objective unity itself, Reinhold has established that there is also such an affinity between the particular forms of judgement and the particular forms of concepts which are called 'categories'. This allows him to generate a list of the twelve forms of judgement and the categories which accompany them by enumerating the possible relations which can hold between judgement and objective unity.
The enumeration is intended to offer a complete list of the functions of understanding by exhausting the nature of judgement. It therefore supplies forms of judgement, and hence categories, which are "original", i.e. primitive or simple concepts which cannot be further derived.

The conclusion of our exposition of the "Theorie der Sinnlichkeit" suggested that, for Reinhold, and perhaps for Kant, space and time are not only forms of intuition in general, but are also themselves formal, a priori intuitions. In the "Theorie des Verstandes", it is clear that the same is true of categories.

Die Kategorien selbst sind keine Vorstellungen, und folglich auch keine Begriffe, aber sie sind Formen der Begriffe, und in wieferne sie vorstellbar sind, Gegenstände von Vorstellungen (Versuch, 460).

Hence, the categories can be viewed in two ways. (1) As the forms of concepts, they can be determined through sensibility in the extent to which they are related to intuitions. They are, then, characteristics of objects insofar as these objects can be known. Furthermore, just as time was the universal and necessary characteristic of the objects determined by sensibility, the categories are the universal and necessary characteristics of those determined by understanding. Only if it is accompanied by quantity, quality, relation and modality can an object be said to be determinate and hence knowable.
(2) As formal objects, the categories can be themselves represented. Such representations are concepts; moreover, because the categories have been developed from the elements of understanding, and have been shown to be determined prior to all representation in the Vorstellungsvermögen überhaupt, these concepts are both a priori and pure. In this way the categories describe objects which are merely thought. The pure representations of the categories are the "principle concepts" (Stammbegriffe) of pure understanding.

The double-sidedness of the categories presents a problem. As pure concepts or characteristics of objects that can be thought, the categories are not contingent upon the conditions of sensibility. This means that they are independent of the manner in which the given manifold becomes affected: they stand outside of the form of intuition, namely, mere time. If the categories are concerned with the formal activity of spontaneity rather than with the content of this activity, then they are eternal, logical essences. On the other hand, we have seen that objects which are represented through sensibility are intrinsically temporal. The form of intuition is mere time. Now if one adds to this the fact that knowledge demands a determinate object, one which is intuited as well as thought, then the problem becomes apparent: how can the categories be double-sided? That is to say, how can they
be related to the temporal nature of sensibility and yet be eternal?

This a version of the problem that was Kant's concern in the "Analytic of Principles" (KRV, A131). There, he argues that, because the categories are radically distinct from all sensible intuition, it is not at all clear how the two can interact, even though such interaction is required for the possibility of knowledge. By virtue of the fact that they are pure and formal, the concepts of understanding cannot, as such, be applied to the intuitions of sensibility. Kant is questioning the efficacy of judgement; in particular, its capacity to subsume intuitions under concepts. Where are the rules for this subsumption, and how are they built into judgement? What is called for, Kant concludes, is a mediating factor, and this he designates a "transcendental schema" (KRV, A138, B177). Schemata will supply him with a canon or set of rules for judgement and will allow him to distinguish between knowing and thinking; both activities involve the categories, but only the former is concerned with the sensible manifold.

Reinhold draws the same conclusion as Kant. The possibility of knowledge demands mediation and he, as did Kant, finds this middle ground in mere time. The reason why time is the only candidate as such a ground, is this. Unlike the representation of mere space, which is the form
only of outer intuition, the representation of mere time is the condition of all sensible representation, both inner and outer. It is also determined a priori and has, therefore, something in common with the pure categories as well as with the sensible manifold. The task, then, is to temporalize the categories.

Schemata are the representations of the determinate relations which the categories bear to mere time (Versuch, 446). For example, the relation of quantity to time is number, and that of quality is "degree" (Grad). These and the remaining schemata are the same as those listed in the Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, and the rest need not be repeated here. Suffice it to indicate that they are the afore-mentioned middle ground and, as such, are the forms of the Erkenntnissvermögen; they determine the possibility of knowledge. No object which contradicts the schemata can be known; knowledge of an object is possible if and only if that object can be accompanied by schemata as predicates (Versuch, 482). To speak of the schemata as predicates and of knowledge of a determinate object, however, requires the activity of judgement.

How, then, does the introduction of schemata solve the problem of the efficacy of judgement? The form of judgement is determined by the nature of the Erkenntnissvermögen. When the content of a judgement is a schema, which, since it is necessary for knowledge, is also
determined *a priori* in the *Erkenntnissvermögen*, then both elements of the judgement are determined *a priori* and that judgement is said to be necessary. In other words, because schemata consist solely of the categories and the form of intuition in general, both of which are determined *a priori*, the representations of schemata are also determined *a priori* and are necessary representations. Furthermore, because schemata are the predicates of all known objects in general, the judgements of which they are the content are universal as well as necessary. Such judgements are original; they cannot be derived from other judgements, for they consist of representations which have, as their objects, the forms of thought and of intuition, which are themselves non-derivative and basic elements that are determined prior to all judgement and representation. Hence, when the schemata are represented in judgements which are thereby characterized by universality and necessity, the result is the rules of understanding\(^3\) which describe the conditions that make possible empirical knowledge, otherwise known as "experience" (*Erfahrung; Versuch, 484*). These rules are also the standards by which intuitions are subsumed under concepts in judgement. The problem of the efficacy of judgement is solved by discovering that the

\(^3\) These rules, or universal and necessary judgements, are, for example, that all appearances are determined by number, i.e. possess extensive magnitude; that they are determined by degree, i.e. possess intensive magnitude, and so on (Cf. *Versuch*, 485-86).
rules of subsumption are built into the schematized categories.

There are two inner conditions or elements of experience, namely, its form and its content. The form of experience are the schemata which govern the possibility of a posteriori knowledge. The content of experience is "sensation" (Empfindung); in our exposition of the "Theorie der Sinnlichkeit"\textsuperscript{34}, sensation was defined as the relation of the sensible representation to the subject. It is necessary for experience, since it provides for the latter its content, but at the same time sensation is distinct from experience, for it is representation without knowledge. Out of this Reinhold establishes the concept of a known object in general and the principle which expresses it.

\begin{center}
Jeder erkennbare vom blossen Vorstellungsvermögen verschiedene Gegenstand steht unter den formalen und materialen Bedingungen der möglichen Erfahrung (\textit{Versuch}, 490).
\end{center}

The phrase "vom blossen Vorstellungsvermögen verschiedene" excludes the elements which can only be represented a priori, thus restricting the scope of the principle to a posteriori knowledge. That which is described by the principle is the objective unity which is represented in intuition, and thus subject to the material conditions of possible experience, and determined by schematized categories, and thus subject to the formal conditions:\textsuperscript{34} Cf. above, p. 48.
of possible experience. Since it is concerned with the most general concept of what can be known a posteriori, this principle is the highest principle of empirical knowledge.

Theorie der Vernunft

The third and final section of the third book of the Versuch is the "Theorie der Vernunft". It is the shortest of the three sections, even though its counterpart in the Critique of Pure Reason, namely, the "Transcendental Dialectic", is longer than the "Aesthetic" and the "Analytic" combined.

We have seen that each theory has its own species of representation. In the "Theorie der Sinnlichkeit", it was intuitions, and in the "Theorie des Verstandes", it was concepts, and they interact in the following ways. Intuitions are represented objects and concepts are represented intuitions. For intuitions the given manifold is represented and in concepts the represented manifold is thought. The representation which is proper to the

Since they do not stand under the form of intuition, which form is the middle ground between the content of sensibility and the pure categories of understanding, things in themselves are not determined by schematized categories. They meet neither the material nor the formal conditions of possible experience. Here again there is no solution to the problem of how the thing-in-itself can be present to consciousness. Indeed, that problem has been complicated; on the one hand, what is An sich cannot be categorized. On the other, insofar as it provides the content of a posteriori representation, it seems to be both efficacious and real, i.e. be described by the categories of causation and reality.
"Theorie der Vernunft" is "ideas" (Ideen) and our first concern must be to expose their relation to other kinds of representation.

As one might expect, Reinhold's analysis of ideas is based upon the distinction between form and content.

Der Stoff der Idee ist das gedachte, durch den Verstand verbundene, Mannigfaltige... (Versuch, 489).

In coming to grips with this, it is helpful to compare ideas to concepts and, in so doing, to distinguish between three orders of spontaneity. The content of a concept is the manifold which is combined by the form of sensibility, i.e. by the spontaneity which is peculiar to the production of intuitions and which is known as first order spontaneity. The content of an idea is the manifold which is represented through the concepts of understanding and combined according to the form of understanding, i.e. second order spontaneity. Every manifold presents a new task for spontaneity, and the manifold represented through concepts is no exception. A different sort of representation is called for, one which is related to concepts as form to content.

This new representation is an idea; its immediate content are the concepts of understanding. Before turning to the question of its form, we must make a distinction between two kinds of ideas (Versuch, 501-02). This distinction has as its ground the fact that
there are two kinds of concepts which make up the content of ideas, those which are determined a priori and those which are not. 'Idea', as such, refers to those representations which arise out of the combination of concepts. As far as the "narrower meaning" (engere Bedeutung) of 'idea' is concerned, each of these combined concepts are related through schematized categories to a content, namely, intuitions, which is the product of first order spontaneity and which is, thereby, determined a posteriori. The "narrowest meaning" (engster Bedeutung) of 'idea' is that of a representation which is produced by the combination of a priori concepts, i.e. concepts which are merely products of understanding and are related to a general manifold that is determined a priori. In other words, these a priori concepts are the categories represented as pure and formal functions of understanding. This sense of 'idea' is narrowest in scope because it is cut off from sensibility.

It is the ideas which are concerned with a priori concepts that determine the form of ideas in general. That is to say, even though it is in terms of the unschematized categories that the manifold in general is connected and represented in understanding by second order spontaneity, 

36 Strictly speaking, there are three senses of 'idea' in the Versuch. The third sense, which is mentioned quite early in the book, and which resembles that of Locke, is synonymous with representation überhaupt or mere representation; its scope is quite wide and denotes any item of the mind.
it is only through 'ideas' in the narrowest sense that the a priori concepts themselves are brought to a unity which is not that of understanding by a spontaneity that is not second order. That unity is the "unity of reason" (Vernunftseinheit). Because it pertains to the representations of concepts, which concepts have to do with the manifold überhaupt rather than a particular intuited manifold, the unity of reason is the form of ideas in general and is true of both the narrower and narrowest sense of 'idea'. Furthermore, it is produced by the spontaneity which is proper to reason, i.e. third order spontaneity.

Kant explicitly indicates that the unity of reason is "quite different in kind from any unity that can be accomplished by the understanding" (KRV, B359, cf.A307). Reinhold uses the contrast between sensibility and understanding to establish this qualitative difference (Versuch, 502-03). In sensibility, Ausser- and Nacheinandersein are the modifications of the mere manifold. In understanding, the various logical ways of combination are the modifications of mere unity. The form of intuitions is that of a manifold, and the form of concepts is that of a unity. On the basis of this contrast, it is clear that the manifold which is made up of the forms of judgement and the pure categories is independent of the forms of sensibility. Hence, in the extent to which reason
is concerned with concepts, i.e. concepts in their pure and formal mode, it combines an unconditioned manifold. The unity which arises from this combination i.e. the unity of reason, is, therefore, unconditioned or absolute. If the unity of a manifold is determined by judgement alone and not by the conditions of empirical content, then that unity is absolute and the manner of its representation is an idea in enger Bedeutung.

The idea of absolute unity is said to be the "highest and most general" idea (Versuch, 511). In order to determine why, we must further describe the nature of reason. The activity peculiar to it is mediate judgement or "syllogism" (Vernunftschluss: cf. KRV, A330), i.e. the relating of a characteristic to an object by means of a second characteristic. The form of mediate judgement, like that of judgement in general, is combination. However, unlike the activity which is proper to understanding, the combination produced by mediate judgement is unconditioned, i.e. independent of the conditions of sensibility.

What determines the content of mediate judgement? It has been shown that any judgement must have quantity, quality, relation and modality, and it was noted that the third category in each class is the combination of the first two. Hence, insofar as mediate judgement is judgement, i.e. is concerned with the combination of two concepts which are themselves conditioned by the
form of intuition, its content is determined by the third category of each class, because that category is a combination of two concepts. Specifically, these categories are totality (Allheit), limitation, concurrence and necessity; it is in this way that absolute unity is related through understanding to sensibility. At the same time, however, in the extent to which mediate judgement is mediate, i.e. is involved with unschematized categories as pure and formal concepts, then its content is determined by unconditioned totality (Totalität), unconditioned limitation or "limitlessness" (Grenzenlösigkeit), unconditioned concurrence (das Allbefassende) and absolute necessity. They are the essential characteristics of the combination of mere concepts that is generated by third order spontaneity and they describe the absolute unity of reason. As a result, the representation of absolute unity is the 'most general' idea because it is a representation of that which is necessary for reason, and it is the 'highest' idea because it is the form of all objects that can be represented through reason, i.e. of all intelligible objects.

Absolute unity goes beyond experience. It cannot be an object of experience nor can it be the characteristic of an object of experience insofar as such characteristics...

37 This does not mean, however, that absolute unity is no longer absolute; just how it can be related to the form of intuition, yet not be determined by it, will be explained below.
are combined in the objective unity produced by understanding. This presents an obvious problem. What, then, is the epistemic function of reason, if any? Kant dealt with this, especially in the appendix to the "Transcendental Dialectic" entitled "The Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason" (KRV, A642B671ff.). Reinhold's solution is the same as Kant's, and to see what it is, we can contrast the unity of reason with that of understanding. The latter is, together with intuition, an essential, constitutive ingredient of experience. That is to say, the objective unity of the intuited manifold, which has as a necessary condition the schematization of the categories, constitutes knowledge. On the other hand, the unity of reason consists of mere concepts and unschematized categories, and is not, therefore, required for the Erkenntnissvermögen as regards the constitution of known objects. Instead, it is a non-objective facet of knowledge, i.e. a law according to which objects of experience can be systematically ordered (Versuch, 515-16). This is the regulative use of reason in which it aids the understanding by means of ideas.

Since there is a difference in kind between its unity and that of sensibility or understanding, the epistemic function of reason is distinct from that of the other two capacities; in other words, it contributes to knowledge in a different way. It is, nevertheless,
necessary; just as there was a general principle for
the constitutive ingredients of experience\textsuperscript{38}, there is
also one for its regulative laws.

The unity of reason is the standard which must be met
by objects insofar as they are to be represented in terms
of experience as a whole, i.e. in terms of knowledge of
the systematic unity of the sensible world. This means
that all such objects must be described as unconditioned
by the four characteristics of absolute unity, namely,
totality (\textit{Totalität}), limitlessness, absolute concurrence
and absolute necessity. As such a standard, unconditioned
unity remains unconditioned while being related, in a
regulative way and by means of schematized categories, to
the form of intuition. In this way it can be related to
sensibility and yet not by determined by it.

Ideas do not constitute knowledge but rather
regulate it in accordance with the general principle of
reason mentioned above. This principle is the ground for

\textsuperscript{38}\textit{Cf.} above, p. 80.

\textsuperscript{39}This is not substantially different from the principle
which, in Kant's work, describes the logical employment
of reason in general, i.e. "to find for the conditioned
knowledge obtained through the understanding the uncondi-
tioned whereby its unity is brought to completion" (\textit{KRV}, B364).
several subordinate principles (Versuch, 521), all of which serve to allow reason to guide understanding in the investigation of nature. In Reinhold as in Kant (KRV, A657B685) there are three such principles, that of homogeneity or genera, i.e. that the plurality determined through understanding has as its form absolute unity, that of specification, i.e. that objective unity has an unconditioned manifold, and that of the continuity of logical forms. The last principle is a combination of the first two: the idea of a complete systematic connection demands an unbroken transition from the 'ascent' to higher genera to the 'descent' to lower species. Just as, in understanding, there are three elements of the objective unity of a concept, namely unity, plurality and unity and plurality together, the three principles are determined a priori in reason as unconditioned unity, unconditioned plurality and unconditioned unity and plurality together. All of these ingredients are necessary for the regulation of the knowledge of nature with which science is concerned.

Since the form of understanding is the synthesis of the manifold in a concept, i.e. judgement, Reinhold forged, in the "Theorie des Verstandes", a link between

40 That is to say, the species is a mere concept, and is more or less empty and indeterminate. As such, there will always be subordinate species between it and the individual; there can be no such thing as the lowest species. Since there will always be such a mediating factor, the objective unity of this concept demands an unconditioned manifold, i.e. one which is determined through the mediate judgement proper to reason.
the various forms of judgement and certain concepts of understanding, and this link allowed him to fix the number and nature of the categories. In the "Theorie der Vernunft", we have seen that the activity peculiar to reason is syllogism or mediate judgement, i.e. the process of relating a characteristic to an object by means of another characteristic. This activity, then, is bound by the three judgements of relation, namely, categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive. Just as the twelve forms of judgement determine objective unity and reveal just as many categories of understanding, the three forms of syllogism determine absolute unity and reveal just as many ideas of reason. In categorical judgement, subject and predicate are related as substance and accident, and the idea in question is that of absolute subject. In hypothetical judgement, they are related as ground and consequence, and the concomitant idea is that of absolute cause. Finally, in disjunctive judgement, the subject is related to the predicate as the "member" (Glied) of a "communal whole" (gemeinschaftliches Ganze), and the representation of this relation is the idea of absolute "community" (Gemeinschaft). Insofar as they are related a priori to the form of reason, the categories of substance, cause and community provide a thoroughgoing unity for.

41 The number of pure concepts of reason will be equal to the number of kinds of relation which the understanding represents to itself by means of the categories" (KRV, A 323).
empirical knowledge.

In the "Theorie der Sinnlichkeit", it was shown that, as regards sensibility, empirical knowledge requires two capacities, inner and outer sense. The latter is a condition for knowledge of appearances of external objects, and the former is a condition for knowledge of appearances produced by the activity of the representing subject. Hence, the three afore-mentioned ideas have two, essentially different applications; they must regulate the content of both inner and outer sense. In other words, the unity which reason provides for empirical knowledge must be both subjective and objective.

We will examine the objective and subjective aspects of the unity of reason separately.

Das absolute Subjekt, der absolute Grund and die absolute Gemeinschaft bestimmen die objektive Vernunftseinheit der Erfahrung, in wieferne sie auf die in der empirischen Erkenntniss a posteriori vorgestellten Dinge ausser uns mittelbar bezogen werden (Versuch, 526).

The three ideas which determine the objective unity of reason are ideas in engere Bedeutung; they are related, through schemata and hence mediately, to an objective content comprised of things which are represented a posteriori, i.e. to a manifold which can always be described as Aussereinandersein. As a result, because it is determined by the form of intuition, the content of such ideas can never be a thing-in-itself. Instead, these
ideas allow only knowable objects to be thought in a systematic unity, which is to say, the aspect of experience which is independent of the Vorstellungsvermögen is represented in a thoroughgoing connection.

Das absolute Subjekt, der absolute Grund und die absolute Gemeinschaft bestimmen die ... subjektive Vernunftseinheit der Erfahrung, in wieferne sie auf das in deutlichen Bewusstsein a priori vorgestellte vorstellende Subjekt unmittelbar bezogen werden (Versuch, ibid).

These are the ideas in engster Bedeutung; since they are concerned with the subject only insofar as it is represented through reason, their relation to that subject is immediate, i.e. without benefit of schemata. The content of such ideas cannot be objects of experience but rather mere representations which bring into systematic unity the activity of the representing subject. This subject is not the self-in-itself, but rather the subject of distinct consciousness, i.e. a subject which is represented qua representing and not qua subject.42

The twofold application of these ideas to external experience and internal mental events is the epistemic function of reason. By way of a conclusion to this exposition and commentary on the Versuch, we want to indicate briefly the manner in which Reinhold intends to

42On the notion of distinct consciousness, cf. above p. 37. Again it is clear that there is no room here for the thing-in-itself. Even though it is apparently necessary, Reinhold cannot account for its presence in consciousness.
shift from theoretical philosophy to practical through the introduction of freedom. Ideas arise from the unity of the manifold forms of understanding. In them is combined a content which is not contingent upon the forms of sensibility. This unity is produced by the third order spontaneity which is proper to reason, a spontaneity which is determined by nothing except itself and which is, therefore, an unconditioned, self-generating activity. Hence, insofar as the representing subject is a subject of reason, it is an absolute or self-determined cause: in a word, it is free.

Reinhold's version of the practical philosophy is sketched in a short appendix to the Versuch, entitled "Grundlinien der Theorie des Begehungsvermögens". It consists of a demonstration that our capacity for desire is determined a priori in the formal nature of reason which, as we have seen, is itself grounded in the Vorstellungsvermögen.
Conclusion: Mediation and System

In order to become the one and only ground of Kant's critical position and be the 'philosophy without surnames', the Elementarphilosophie rests on a principle the aim of which is twofold, namely, mediation and systemization. Mediation will allow the Elementarphilosophie to be that ground, and systemization will enable it to be that philosophy. The principle in question is the Satz des Bewusstseins; it is for Reinhold, a self-evident fact. It is, moreover, a fact which describes "consciousness in general" (Bewusstsein Überhaupt): there is, purportedly, no mental event of which it is not true. As we have seen at some length, this principle describes consciousness in terms of representation. In particular, it is described in terms of the relations which hold between the represented object, the representing subject and the representation itself. There are, then, two criteria to be fulfilled if the principle of consciousness is to realize its aim, and these are self-evidence and universality. Self-evidence is required so that the principle and its consequences are beyond reproach, and universality is necessary so that there can be a unified theory of all mental activity. In this, the conclusion, we want to decide whether or not the principle of consciousness fulfills these criteria.
We will consider the criterion of universality first; does the principle of consciousness capture every moment of mental activity, or is there some aspect of this activity which is left indeterminate? This question, among others, is examined in a series of letters between Reinhold and Solomon Maimon, which series is reprinted in the latter's *Gessamelte Werke*. There Maimon suggests that the principle is not true of consciousness in general. Even though it may be true of the *Vorstellungsvermögen*, there is more to mental activity than representation or, at least, 'representation' as Reinhold understands it. Whatever this 'more' is, it cannot be described by the structure presented by the principle of consciousness.

Maimon's objection centers around the notion of "perception" (*Wahrnehmung*). It is clear that, for Reinhold, perception is to be understood in terms of consciousness and representation; it is a species of both and consists of a perceiving subject and a perceived object\(^1\). This is the structure dictated by the principle of consciousness; as a species of representation, the perception must arise out of the synthesis of the manifold. For Maimon, however, a simple perception, of the colour red, for example, represents nothing outside of itself; it is related neither to subject nor object, for there is no synthetic activity and no manifold\(^2\). Of course, this does not prevent

\(^1\)Solomon Maimon, *Gessamelte Werke*; IV, 233.
such a perception from becoming a 'representation' in Reinhold's sense; if it becomes the ingredient of a synthesis, then it is related to the object as its characteristic. The point is, however, that it need not be so related. Some perceptions do not contain an object within themselves. They are not, therefore, described by the principle of consciousness.

The scope of this criticism can be widened if we consider the status of non-epistemic mental events such as pain or pleasure. Again, Reinhold insists that "feeling" (Gefuhl) must be thought of in terms of representation, i.e. as something related to both subject and object.

Das Objekt des Gefuhls ist freilich nur eine Veränderung in uns, aber darum nicht weniger Objekt, nicht weniger etwas als das Gefühlte vom Gefühl, als vom Fühlenden unterschieden.3

Certainly pain, for example, is the representation, and the person experiencing it is the subject, but what constitutes the represented object? What is this "etwas"? Reinhold suggests that it is the 'alteration in us' which is perceived by inner sense, but this seems to entail the absurd possibility that someone who is in constant pain can no longer represent it because there is no such alteration. Perhaps Reinhold means logical, rather than

2Maimon, Gessamelte Werke; IV, 226n. Cf. I. Kant, Kant; Philosophical Correspondence, 1759-99, p.176.

3Maimon, Gessamelte Werke; IV, 233-234.
physiological, alteration; that is to say, perhaps the object of my (second order) representation, through which representation I come to know that I am in pain, is a (first order) representation, i.e. the pain itself. This has not, however, solved the problem: what is the object of that first order representation? Reinhold's inability to account for it means that we must abandon the universality of the principle of consciousness, for it cannot account for certain facets of our mental life. Thus Reinhold falls prey to his own criticism of Kant: *Bewusstsein überhaupt* remains indeterminate.

The principle of consciousness fails to fulfill the criterion of universality; hence the *Elementarphilosophie* cannot be complete. This may not effect the truth value of the content which it does have, however. Even though the scope of the system is limited and the principle of consciousness restricted, it may still be a valid description of certain facets of our mental activity. With this in mind, we turn to the criterion of self-evidence.

Despite the claim that the principle of consciousness expresses a single, self-evident fact, it actually

4 Cf. above, p. 16.

5 This is not Kant's position. Especially in the *Prolegomena*, completeness and truth value are explicitly linked. I. Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, p.11.
expresses two things. First, that there are representations in consciousness, and secondly, that the subject, object and representation are related and distinguished. In order to be able to say that the principle of consciousness is the first and highest principle, and thus to provide a unified ground for his system, Reinhold must maintain that the two things expressed by it are bi-conditional. To fail to do so is to allow there to be two facts, thus requiring a still higher principle to account for the connection between them. Hence, the presence of representations in consciousness, and their being related and distinguished, are both essential elements of the principle: there are representations in consciousness if and only if they are related and distinguished from the subject and the object. In a word, the three components of the Satz, and their being related and distinguished, are equiprimordial. The presence of each is contingent upon its being related to and distinct from the others, for this, according to Reinhold, is what representation is. In this part of the conclusion, we want to suggest, with Fichte, that the two aspects in question are fatal to the principle. By placing too heavy a burden upon the subject, Reinhold robs the principle of self-evidence and renders it inherently unstable.

In Chapter One it was noted that, after the publication of the Versuch, there is a small but
significant change in the formulation of the Satz in Reinhold's later work\(^6\).

Im Bewusstsein wird die Vorstellung durch das Subjekt vom Subjekt und Objekt unterschieden und auf beyde bezogen.

With the phrase "durch das Subjekt", Reinhold makes it explicit, as he had not done earlier, that the relating and distinguishing referred to in the Satz are activities of the subject. No reason for this change is given, but Reinhold may have been aware that the principle of consciousness expresses two facts and not one, and perhaps attempted, with his notion of the subject and its activity, to bind the two together. However, even though it may be obvious as an empirical fact that there are representations in consciousness, it is far from self-evident that they are related and distinguished from the subject and object and that the activities of relating and distinguishing are subjective in origin. As a result, the self-evidence of the principle is severely undermined, but that is not all.

Since we cannot objectify and come to know this subject qua subject, i.e. as the self-in-itself or as an underlying substance, the subject which relates and distinguishes must be the representing subject, i.e. the same subject which is caught up in the framework described by the principle of consciousness and which is portrayed throughout the Versuch as being spontaneously synthetic.

\(^6\)Cf. above p. 18n.
This means that the everyday activity in which the subject combines the manifold is also the elementary activity in which it establishes itself as a subject over and against the object and the representation, and all of this is seemingly done in accordance with the principle of consciousness.

Even though Reinhold has obeyed his own stricture and avoided hypostasizing the subject or attempting to describe it as it is in-itself, he may have claimed more than the principle of consciousness permits. That is to say, it is clear that Reinhold believes that relating and distinguishing are done by the representing subject; they are not the manifestations of an impersonal, transcendental unity. At the same time, however, 'relating' and 'distinguishing' are substantive verbs. They signify not only activity but also that which is acted upon. This is, we believe, the point of Fichte's objection: "Wie ist Synthesis denkbar, ohne vorausgesetzte Thesis und Antithesis?"7. The subject must be more than synthetic, for relating and distinguishing presuppose that there are things to be related and to be distinguished; in other words, the subject, object and representation must be already there. In order to avoid the position which would allow there to be two elementary facts instead of one, the three components of the principle of consciousness must be equiprimordially

7J.G. Fichte, Werke; I,7.
present in consciousness as well as being equiprimordially related and distinguished. Suddenly, not only their being related and distinguished, but also their presence in consciousness, depends upon the subject. The subject is not only that which relates and distinguishes, but also the source of what is related and distinguished.

Such a subject is not the synthetic one portrayed in the Versuch and described by the principle of consciousness. The subject of the Versuch is essentially synthetic because it takes the manifold, which is ultimately given, and combines it in a unity. The subject presupposed by the principle of consciousness is essentially creative: it is called on to be the foundation of the object, of the representation and of itself. Hence, Fichte claims that the principle of consciousness contains an "inner opposition": the Satz is inherently unstable because it presupposes a subject other than the one determined by it. Far from being a principle which is self-evident, it necessarily involves an appeal to what is transcendent.
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