

**FEAR, ANTAGONISM, AND CONTINUITY  
IN THE ÇATAPATHA BRÂHMAᅇA**

FEAR, ANTAGONISM, AND CONTINUITY

IN THE ÇATAPATHA BRĀHMAṆA

by

JONATHAN L. GEEN, B.Sc., M.Sc.

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AUTHOR: Jonathan L. Geen, B.Sc., M.Sc.  
(University of Toronto, Canada)

SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE:

Dr. Wayne Whillier (Supervisor)  
Dr. Graeme MacQueen  
Dr. Paul Younger

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## ABSTRACT

The specific issue which prompted this study is the current controversy over the relationship between two adjacent components of Vedic Literature, namely, the *brâhmaṇas* and the *upaniṣads*. Traditional Western Vedic scholarship, specifically that of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, vehemently insisted that the ideas found in the *upaniṣads* expressed a complete rejection of the Brâhmaṇic sacrificial system, which had been the dominant subject of Vedic Literature for centuries prior to the composition of the earliest *upaniṣads*. However, a recent study by Herman W. Tull on the Vedic origins of the Upaniṣadic karma doctrine has called this opinion of traditional Western Vedic scholarship into question, arguing for a large degree of continuity between the *brâhmaṇas* and the *upaniṣads*. By comparing a Brâhmaṇic discussion of a single Vedic sacrifice (i.e. the Darçapûrṇamâseṣṭî), with a single *upaniṣad* (i.e. the Bṛhadâraṇyaka Upaniṣad), this study provides evidence which furthers Tull's argument for continuity between the *brâhmaṇas* and the *upaniṣads*, specifically with respect to the related issues of "fear" and "antagonism".

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## Chapter One:

### INTRODUCTION

#### I -- GENERAL INTRODUCTION

One of the legacies of traditional Western Vedic scholarship has been the firm belief that the *upaniṣads* represent a radical shift in the development of Vedic thought, and, furthermore, that the ideas expressed in the *upaniṣads* represent a radical opposition to traditional Brāhmaṇic thought as expounded in the *brāhmaṇas*<sup>1</sup>. However, at least one recent study, that of Herman W. Tull on the Vedic origins of the Upaniṣadic karma doctrine<sup>2</sup>, has called this traditional Western view of the *upaniṣads* into question. It is the purpose of the present study to examine the degree of continuity which exists between a single Vedic *çrauta* ritual (as discussed in a *brāhmaṇa*) and a single *upaniṣad*. Specifically, I shall compare the discussion of the Darçapûrṇamâseṣṭi (DPM) or New and Full Moon sacrifice, as found in the Çatapatha Brāhmaṇa (ÇB), with the Bṛhadâraṇyaka Upaniṣad (BÂU), which is appended to the ÇB. More specifically, the related notions of "fear" and "antagonism", as presented in each of these two texts, will be compared. Through this comparison, the level of continuity between a Brāhmaṇic text and an Upaniṣadic text may be determined with respect to a narrow, yet vital, issue.

## II -- THE VEDIC PERIOD AND VEDIC ÇRAUTA RITUAL

The earliest indication of civilization in India comes from the limited archeological evidence of the so-called Harappa culture in the Indus valley (modern northwest India and Pakistan), which was discovered in the first half of the present century. However, the earliest period in India which can be considered as truly "historical" is that which is known as the "Vedic Period"<sup>3</sup>. This period takes its name from the principal literature which was composed throughout this time, viz. the four Vedas. The term Veda, literally translated as "knowledge", refers both to specific texts and the compilation of all texts bearing this stamp. While there is no unanimous agreement among scholars upon the date which marks the rise of the Vedic Period (i.e. the period when the earliest Vedic texts were composed), it is generally believed to have begun somewhere in the vicinity of 1500 B.C.E.<sup>4</sup>, which is a date roughly synchronous with the arrival of the migrating Aryan peoples into northwest India. Because Vedic culture, even to the present day, has never completely vanished in India, the official end of the Vedic Period is often defined by two factors<sup>5</sup>: the period of completion of the early upanişads, and the advent of Buddhism. Using these two factors as the criteria, the Vedic Period can be said to have lasted roughly 1000 years, from 1500 - 600 B.C.E., though the eventual decline of Vedic culture itself was no doubt more gradual than such rigid dating would suggest.

Information about this period in the history of India comes almost exclusively from the literature which was composed over this thousand year period and which has been passed down, generation after generation,

in a remarkably uncorrupted form. The primary component of this literature consists of the four Vedas: the Ṛgveda, the Sāmaveda, the Yajurveda, and the Atharvaveda. Each of these Vedas (as will be discussed in greater detail below), contains a verse portion (*saṃhitā*) consisting of a collection of hymns or specific liturgical adaptations of hymns (in whole or part), followed by a prose explanation portion (*brāhmaṇa*) explaining how the hymns or portions thereof are to be used in Vedic ritual, followed by a short appendage expressing the pinnacle of Vedic philosophical speculation (*upaniṣad*). Over this thousand year period, there were some distinctive shifts in the emphasis of the so-called "religious"<sup>6</sup> life of the Vedic peoples, changes which have been reflected in the evolving literature of the time. Though some sort of sacrificial element in the "religion" of the Vedic culture was no doubt present from the beginning, an element which many think to have been brought with the Aryans when they arrived in India<sup>7</sup>, there is a marked development in the sacrifice, which became increasingly formalized throughout this period until, during the mid to late Vedic Period, it became virtually the sole focus of attention.<sup>8</sup>

The two main bodies of texts which best represent this increasing emphasis upon ritual and sacrifice in the Vedic Period are the *brāhmaṇas* and the ritual *sūtras* (which are, along with the four Vedas, included under the rubric "Vedic Literature"). The *brāhmaṇas*, which officially comprise part of the Veda, are classified by the tradition as being *ṣruti*, literally "heard", denoting their origin in divine revelation. The ritual *sūtras*, on the other hand, rely upon the Veda as their authority, but are not considered to have been revealed. Thus, they fall under the category of *smṛti*, literally "remembered", denoting their

origin in Vedic tradition. While the ritual *sūtras* provide detailed descriptions of the rituals themselves, the *brāhmaṇas* provide the ritual theory necessary to justify and unify the many specific and often seemingly unconnected details of the sacrifices.

The major sacrifices which were performed during this time, as opposed to the more simplistic household sacrifices, are known as *çrauta* sacrifices, often translated as "solemn" or "public" sacrifices<sup>9</sup>. The predominant distinction between *çrauta* or *vaidik* rituals, as described in the *çrautasūtras*, and the so-called household offerings, as described in the *gṛhyasūtras*, was that the *çrauta* rituals, with the exception of the *agnihotra*, required the use of three sacred fires and the employment of several highly trained priests, whereas the household sacrifices were all offered to the home fire and were performed by the householder himself.

There were, by the time of the composition of the *brāhmaṇas* and ritual *sūtras*, three main categories of *çrauta* ritual: (1) *soma* sacrifices; (2) animal sacrifices; and (3) *haviryajñas*, or oblations of milk, butter, rice, barley, and similar materials<sup>10</sup>. These sacrifices ranged from short daily rituals, as was the case for the *agnihotra* (the morning and evening libations into the home fire), to semi-monthly and seasonal sacrifices based upon the lunar calendar, to the *agnicayana*, which was performed only once in a sacrificer's lifetime and which lasted for an entire year.

Not surprisingly, as the number of specific Vedic sacrifices increased, and as each sacrifice became more and more intricate, there eventually came a need for division of labour. Thus, the Vedic tradition, again by the time of composition of the *brāhmaṇas*, moved

beyond the use of a single generic priest who would perform all aspects of the sacrifice, to the division of priestly duties based upon specialized knowledge of a single Veda. That is, the duties of each sacrificial performance were divided such that there were separate tasks to be performed by different priests, and the duties which a given priest would perform depended upon the particular Veda in which he specialized. Corresponding to the four Vedas, there developed four main divisions of priests: (1) the *hotṛ*, who, specializing in the Ṛgveda, would recite certain and appropriate hymns from the Ṛgveda; (2) the *udgâtar*, who, specializing in the Sâmaveda, would chant particular songs from the Sâmaveda; (3) the *adhvaryu*, who, specializing in the Yajurveda, would perform the majority of the ritual "work", along with muttering the appropriate formulas from the Yajurveda; and (4) the *brahman*, who, having a sound knowledge of all four Vedas, would silently observe the on-going sacrifice, detect any errors in the performance, and expiate these errors by silently reciting formulas from the Atharvaveda<sup>11</sup>. Depending on the complexity of a given *çrauta* ritual, as well as the wealth of the patron (*yajamâna*) for whom the sacrifice was performed, additional priests may be added to the performance to function as assistants to one of the four main priests. For example, in the *agnicayana*, which is by far the longest and most intricate of the *çrauta* sacrifices, as many as 17 priests may be employed in the performance<sup>12</sup>.

There were at least two considerations deemed important for determining the eligibility of a Vedic male to perform a *çrauta* ritual<sup>13</sup>. (*Çrauta* sacrifices were not performed for or by females, though as the wife of a male, females often participated). The first

consideration was the class (*varṇa*) in which the individual was born. According to the *brāhmaṇas*, all (male) members of the upper three *varṇas*, i.e. Brahmins (priestly class), *kṣatriyas* (warriors, nobles, aristocrats), and *vaiçyas* (mercantile class), were eligible to have a *çrauta* sacrifice performed on their behalf. In general, this was true. However, certain sacrifices, by their very nature, tended to be specific for a single class. For example, the *râjasûya* and *açvamedha* sacrifices were reserved for kings (*kṣatriyas*), while the *agnicayana*, the *çrauta* ritual *extraordinaire*, was, for practical purposes, limited mainly to the Brahmin class<sup>14</sup>. The second consideration with respect to eligibility was related to the strict hierarchy which existed in the *çrauta* ritual system. That is, there was a hierarchy inherent in the sacrificial system such that an individual was considered eligible to perform a given sacrifice (or, more accurately, have a sacrifice performed on his behalf), only if all of the sacrifices which preceded the given sacrifice in the overall hierarchy had already been successfully performed<sup>15</sup>.

The purposes stated in the *brāhmaṇas* for performing these *çrauta* sacrifices are varied, ranging from relatively simple, mundane concerns, to a quest for residence in the world of the gods. Some of the desires thought to be fulfilled by the successful completion of a *çrauta* sacrifice included the gift of rain, the acquisition of progeny, cattle, and long-life (on earth), the satisfying of one's forefathers, and finally, residence in the world of the gods. On a more negative note, the *çrauta* sacrifices also provided the sacrificer with an opportunity to curse his enemies, effectively denying his foe any of the above mentioned desires. Another, more practical reason why these sacrificial

performances were carried out is that it was considered the social duty of all (male) members of the upper three classes to perform as many of the *çrauta* rituals as their economic status would allow, and to perform what sacrifices they could as often as possible.

There is a high degree of variability between the many Vedic *çrauta* rituals. This is especially true with respect to the detailed particulars of the ritual performance, which are recorded and discussed in the *brâhmaṇas* and *çrautasûtras* with astonishing thoroughness. It is, however, possible to describe the general Brâhmaṇic theory which explains how such ritual/sacrificial actions are able to produce the sort of remarkable results described above. Simply put, the sacrifice was thought to represent, in a microcosmic manner, the macrocosmic universe<sup>16</sup>. This microcosmic representation of the universe consisted of the sacrificial ground, which was demarcated for each sacrifice, and each element in the ritual, from the sacrificer himself, to the rice which was offered to the gods, to the mortar and pestle used to grind the rice. Not unlike the theory behind the use of a voodoo doll (whereby an actual person may be manipulated through manipulation of a correctly-prepared representation of the person in the form of a doll), the otherwise ferocious and untamed universe in which the Vedic peoples found themselves could be manipulated and controlled through the manipulation and control of the elements in the ritually constructed microcosmic sacrifice. The key to a successful sacrifice was to have a full understanding of which specific macrocosmic element was represented by which particular sacrificial element, and how to manipulate the sacrificial element in order to attain the desired result. Once this was understood, the macrocosmic universe could be harnessed through

relatively simple and efficient ritual acts. It was the learned Vedic priest, often described in the *brâhmaṇas* as "the one who knows", who was in possession of this knowledge of "equivalents". Naturally, this knowledge made the learned priest indispensable<sup>17</sup>.

### III -- THE ÇATAPATHA BRÂHMAṆA IN THE CONTEXT OF VEDIC LITERATURE

As mentioned briefly above, the primary component of Vedic literature is the four Vedas: the Ṛgveda, Sâmvêda, Yajurveda, and Atharvaveda. Each of these Vedas may be divided, on the basis of style and content, into three relatively distinct classes of writings. These are, listed in chronological order of composition: the *saṃhitâs* (verse/*mantra* portion); the *brâhmaṇas* (prose explanations of the liturgical uses of the *saṃhitâs*); and the *upaniṣads* (philosophical speculations). The *âranyakas*, which were appended to the *brâhmaṇas* and which often contained within them one or more *upaniṣads*, are a fourth and historically less well-defined class of writings and will be discussed in greater detail below.

On the whole, the Ṛgveda *Samhitâ* is considered to be of earliest origin, as it is clearly presupposed by the other three *saṃhitâs*<sup>18</sup>. The generally accepted chronology places the *saṃhitâ* of the Ṛgveda as the earliest, followed by those of the Sâmvêda and the Yajurveda, followed by the relatively later addition of the Atharvaveda<sup>19</sup>. While it appears that this relative chronology is sound, especially with respect to the earliest origin of each *saṃhitâ*, all of these texts were composed over many centuries, and in this respect, it is perhaps more appropriate to consider the Vedas as developing in a parallel as opposed to strict



chronological fashion<sup>20</sup>. Furthermore, different recensions of the same Veda often differ greatly in their dates, thus eliminating, to some extent, the impact of the relative chronology of the Vedas on the whole.

Originally, the small collections of hymns which, when eventually combined, would form the Ṛgveda Saṃhitā, were the possession of a few families, who traditionally traced their lineage back to one of the original Vedic ṛṣis<sup>21</sup> (i.e., seers: those men or women who received divine revelation and composed hymns as an expression of this revelation). These hymns were passed down from father to son (*sampradāna*), generation after generation, forming an (allegedly) unbroken transmission (*sampradāya*) from the families' founding ṛṣi up to the present. Otherwise, the hymns were jealously guarded. At some point in the tradition (which cannot at this point be dated with any accuracy<sup>22</sup>), these families combined their hymns into what might be considered the first or proto-Ṛgveda Saṃhitā. Over time, however, differences in specific contents, in emphasis, in external influences, and in geographical location necessarily resulted in different traditions with divergent (oral) texts. As these different traditions became formalized, various schools (known as *çākhās*, literally "branches"), began to arise<sup>23</sup>. Traditionally, the term *çākhā* was given to any school which was in possession of its own recension of the *saṃhitā*<sup>24</sup>. Appropriately, the name of a given recension eventually became synonymous with the name of its corresponding *çākhā*. Notwithstanding minor differences, the development of each of the other three vedic *saṃhitās*, i.e. the Sāma-, Yajur-, and Atharvaveda Saṃhitās, occurred in a similar fashion, each one overlapping, chronologically, with the development of the other three.

As Vedic sacrifice evolved into more and more highly formalized rituals, and took on greater prominence in Vedic society, the incidence of division of a given Veda into divergent schools increased, with the points of greatest divergence often related to certain particulars of ritual theory and performance. Unfortunately, the number of "recognized" schools that are made reference to within Vedic and immediately post-Vedic literature far outweigh the number of existing recensions<sup>25</sup>. Thus, the currently available recensions of each Veda represent, in all likelihood, only a fraction of the totality of the original corpus of Vedic literature, and may not even represent the historically most widely accepted and utilized versions.

Let us consider the *saṃhitās*. The Ṛgveda Saṃhitā contains 1028 laudatory hymns<sup>26</sup>, grouped into ten books (*maṇḍalas*)<sup>27</sup>, and addressed to many different gods or goddesses of the Vedic pantheon. Foremost among these gods, as determined by the number of hymns devoted to them, are Indra, Agni, and Soma. The Ṛgvedic hymns, which are of varying lengths, but contain, on the average, ten stanzas apiece<sup>28</sup>, were composed in a variety of different metres, the most prominent of which are the *anuṣṭubh*, *triṣṭubh*, and *jagatī* metres<sup>29</sup>. The Sāmaveda Saṃhitā, one of the two liturgical *saṃhitās*, also contains hymns/chants, however, these chants have been set to specific melodies (*sāmans*)<sup>30</sup>. Almost without exception, these hymns are taken from the Ṛgveda Saṃhitā, though most often rearranged in whole or in part in order that they might suitably correspond to a pre-determined melody<sup>31</sup>. The slight discrepancy between the contents of the existing Ṛgvedic and Sāmavedic *saṃhitās* may well be explained by the *sāmavedins'* use of a Ṛgvedic recension which is no longer available.

The second of the liturgical *saṃhitās*, the Yajurveda Saṃhitā, is comprised of roughly equal portions of isolated verses (*mantras*) and prose formulas<sup>32</sup>. While the vast majority of the *mantras* have been borrowed from the Ṛgveda Saṃhitā (though often found in slightly altered form), the prose formulas are entirely original to the Yajurveda Saṃhitā<sup>33</sup>. Whereas the other ritualistic texts, such as the Sāmaveda Saṃhitā, deal almost exclusively with the *soma* sacrifices, the Yajurveda contains virtually the entire apparatus of sacrificial formulas<sup>34</sup>. Because of its importance in Vedic sacrifice, the Yajurveda, along with its corresponding school of priests (the *adhvaryus*) increased in importance as the sacrifice took on greater prominence, and eventually the Yajurveda came to have the most schools of all the Vedas<sup>35</sup>. The Atharvaveda Saṃhitā, which is comprised of magical spells and formulas, is chronologically the youngest of the four *saṃhitās* and was the last to be included in the Vedic "canon", which was previously considered to be comprised of the three-fold science of the Ṛg, Sāma, and Yajurvedas<sup>36</sup>.

The *brāhmaṇas*, which chronologically follow the *saṃhitās*, are prose explanations of the *saṃhitā* verses, especially as they were used as liturgical devices in the *çrauta* rituals. While focusing entirely upon the various rituals and sacrifices, the authors of the *brāhmaṇas* were less concerned with describing the specific details of the sacrificial performance than with explaining,

"the origin, meaning, and *raison d'être* of the ritual acts to be performed and to prove their validity and the significance and suitability of the *mantras* and chants used as well as the mutual relations of the acts and their connections with the phenomenal reality"<sup>37</sup>.

These *brāhmaṇas*, literally "comments upon *brahman*", i.e. upon the *saṃhitās*, were originally isolated comments interspersed with the verse

or *saṃhitā* portion of the Veda. Over time, at least in most cases, these "comments upon *brahman*" were separated from the verse portions and collected together in a single work which was, appropriately, entitled a "*brâhmaṇa*"<sup>38</sup>. However, as will be discussed in greater detail below, especially with respect to the Yajurveda, certain schools allowed the *saṃhitā* portion of their Veda to remain a mixture of verse and prose explanation, later adding a *brâhmaṇa* (for the purpose of conformity) which was yet again a mixture of verse and prose explanation.

Each of the four Vedic *saṃhitās* has a corresponding *brâhmaṇa*; however, as with the *saṃhitās*, the various recensions of the *brâhmaṇas* within a given Veda vary to a greater or lesser degree depending on the school. The *brâhmaṇas* which, due to their survival to the present, have taken on primary importance in modern Vedic scholarship are the Aitareya- and Çâṅkhâya- (Kauṣîtaki-) *Brâhmaṇas* of the Ṛgveda, the Pañcaviṃça- (Tâṇḍyamahâ-) and Jaiminiya *Brâhmaṇas* of the Sâmaveda, the Taittirîya *Brâhmaṇa* of the Black Yajurveda, the Çatapatha *Brâhmaṇa* of the White Yajurveda, and the Gopatha *Brâhmaṇa* of the Atharvaveda<sup>39</sup>.

The third and final "primary" class of writing composed during the Vedic period is the *upaniṣad*. Though an adequate discussion of the *upaniṣads* is well beyond the scope of this particular study, several relevant facts may be reviewed. As mentioned above, the content of the *upaniṣads* on the whole is perhaps best described as philosophical speculation. An obvious question must be, "Philosophical speculation on what?" Though the question may be obvious, the answer is somewhat more complex, is a matter of continuing controversy<sup>40</sup>, and will be discussed in greater detail below. Suffice it to say that the speculation is, at least in part, on the nature, efficacy, and proper performance of Vedic

ritual. Contrary to the opinions expressed by many of the nineteenth and early twentieth century Vedic scholars (as discussed in greater detail in chapter four), the *upaniṣads* are not, in my opinion, an unbridled polemic against Vedic ritualism and sacerdotalism, but rather have their origins in Vedic ritual and are both closely connected to, as well as a natural philosophic growth out of, Vedic ritual. It must be always kept in mind that the distinction between the *brâhmaṇas* and *upaniṣads*, on the basis of ritualism as opposed to philosophical speculation, is a somewhat artificial one. Though more tightly bound to specific Vedic rituals, the speculation which abounds in the *brâhmaṇas* is, to a great extent, the admittedly less sophisticated precursor to the philosophical speculation of the *upaniṣads*. Furthermore, while there are over one hundred recognized *upaniṣads* in the present Indian tradition<sup>41</sup>, several of the oldest, longest, and most influential of the upanisads are those which are included within either the *saṃhitâ*, or more often, within the *brâhmaṇa*, of one of the four Vedas. For example, the Bṛhadâraṇyaka Upaniṣad and the Chândogya Upaniṣad, two of the oldest and longest of the *upaniṣads*, are appended, respectively, to the *brâhmaṇas* of the White Yajurveda and Sâmaaveda<sup>42</sup>.

The *âranyakas*, which constitute a fourth class of writings, are appended to the *brâhmaṇas*, and often contain one or more *upaniṣads*. Literally, *âranyaka* refers to doctrines which, on account of their esoteric and powerful nature, are not to be discussed in the village but rather are to be discussed in private, i.e. in the forest (*âranya*)<sup>43</sup>. Their contents include discussions of certain Vedic rituals which were not discussed otherwise in the *brâhmaṇa*, as well as providing further details or musings on rituals with which the *brâhmaṇa* has previous

dealt. In this connection, they can be considered, in general, as part of the *brāhmaṇa* proper. However, the *âranyakas* also include a certain amount of independent philosophical speculation, which often includes an *upaniṣad*. As the Vedic literary tradition evolved, and as the *upaniṣads* became the natural seat of the speculative tradition, the distinct category of "*âranyakas*" became somewhat obsolete<sup>44</sup>.

While different recensions of the same Veda often display marked differences in both style and content, the Yajurveda is unique with respect to its strict division into two traditions. These two traditions were so distinct that they formally adopted different names: the Black (*kṛṣṇa*) Yajurveda and the White (*çukla*) Yajurveda. While it is beyond doubt that they have their origins in the same body of material<sup>45</sup>, and while it is accepted that the Black Yajurveda represents the older of the two traditions<sup>46</sup>, there is not, in existence, an "original" Yajurveda Saṃhitâ. Gonda states, with respect to this point: "The considerable differences between the *çâkhâs* extant do not even allow us to attempt its reconstruction"<sup>47</sup>. The best that can be done by the inspired scholar is to gather, through close textual comparison, the material which is similar or identical in each tradition, and to assume that this common material represents, in whole or in part, the "original" Yajurvedic text. Despite an assumed common origin, the two traditions developed in such divergent paths that the formal division of the Yajurveda into two distinct traditions was appropriate.

There are three major recensions of the Black Yajurveda in existence, those being the recensions of the Taittirîyas, the Kaṭhas (Carakas), and the Maitrâyaṇîyas<sup>48</sup>, of which the first, at least

presently, is dominant. Stylistically speaking, the greatest difference between the Black and White Yajurvedas is in respect to a formal division of the verse (*mantra*) and prose explanation (*brâhmaṇa*) portions of the texts. In the Black Yajurveda, there is no separation between *mantra* and *brâhmaṇa* portions. While conformity to tradition did eventually result in the development of a separate "*brâhmaṇa*" corresponding to the Black Yajurveda Saṃhitâ, the distinction between the *saṃhitâ* and *brâhmaṇa* was somewhat artificial, as both contained a mixture of verse and corresponding prose explanation. The White Yajurveda, on the other hand, has a complete separation of verse (*mantra*) and prose explanation (*brâhmaṇa*) portions. The idea of a clear separation of *mantras* and *brâhmaṇas*, while new to the Yajurveda, may have been derived from the *hotṛs*, who already had their own separate *brâhmaṇa* corresponding to the Ṛgveda Saṃhitâ<sup>49</sup>. It was, supposedly, on account of the greater clarity which this division afforded that this younger Yajurvedic tradition claimed for itself the name "White", with the corresponding opposite label "Black" being given to the "less lucid" tradition<sup>50</sup>.

#### IV -- THE HISTORY OF THE ÇATAPATHA BRÂHMAṆA

Tradition ascribes the founding of this new, more lucid school of *adhvaryus* to Yâjñavalkya Vâjasaneyā<sup>51</sup>, and consequently the *saṃhitâ* of the White Yajurveda became known as the Vâjasaneyā Saṃhitâ (VS), while the corresponding *brâhmaṇa* of this school was entitled the Çatapatha Brâhmaṇa (ÇB). Of the ÇB, Jan Gonda states:

"It is not only the most extensive and best known of all the works of this class, but also one of the highest achievements in the whole range of Vedic literature. Being more elaborated than the other *brâhmaṇas* it is, also in passages of small compass, a mine of important information and richest in discussions and narratives, part of which are recounted in detail, though always fitted in the ritual framework"<sup>52</sup>.

Traditionally, there are said to have been fifteen or seventeen different schools of Vâjasaneyins<sup>53</sup>. Presently, there are only two existing recensions of the ÇB, those of the Mâdhyandinas and the Kâṇvas, however only that of the Mâdhyandina *çâkhâ* has survived in complete form (three of the seventeen books of the Kâṇva school are missing)<sup>54</sup>.

Literally, "Çatapatha" means 100 paths, and correspondingly, the ÇB is divided, at least in the Mâdhyandina recension, into fourteen books (*kâṇḍas*) consisting of 100 lectures (*adhyâyas*). Though the ÇB, in its present form, is considered to be the youngest of the major *brâhmaṇas*, there are, as Eggeling points out<sup>55</sup>, several different historical layers which can be discerned from close scrutiny of this text. For example, it has been convincingly suggested that the first nine of the fourteen books, containing the first 60 *adhyâyas*, existed for a time as an independent text. Patañjali mentions a text entitled *Ṣaṣṭipatha* (60 paths), which may well have referred to such an independent text. Furthermore, it is also likely that the last five books also existed together as an independent work, as the twelveth book of the ÇB is entitled *madhyama* (middle), and occupies the middle position of the last five books. However, the fact that the last five books may have been an addition to the first nine does not necessarily imply a later date of authorship for the former.

Further evidence<sup>56</sup> of the originally independent nature of the first nine books can be found when examining the relationship between



the VS and the ÇB. Of the 40 *adhyâyas* of the VS, the first 18 are thought to comprise the original text, the concluding 22 having been demonstrated to be later additions. Interestingly, it is the first nine books of the ÇB which correspond to the *mantras* and formulas in the first eighteen *adhyâyas* of the VS. Furthermore, as a rule, it is only those formulas which appear in the first eighteen *adhyâyas* of the VS which are found in the Taittirîya Saṃhitâ of the Black Yajurveda. The fact that the formulas found in the final 22 *adhyâyas* of the VS are, on the whole, located in the relatively younger Taittirîya Brâhmaṇa again suggests that they are later additions.

Even within the first nine books of the ÇB, there is a clearly discernable division<sup>57</sup>. Although "Yâjñavalkya", the supposed promulgator of the White Yajurveda, is made reference to more often than any other person in the ÇB, and is mentioned frequently in the first five books, he is not referred to a single time in books six to nine. Rather, the "authority of choice" in these four books is a person known as "Çânḍilya". Also, while the predominant geographical references in the first five books would suggest an origin in the area of the Ganges and Jumna rivers, books six to nine seem to have arisen in northwest India. (Using the above mentioned considerations, the tenth book of the ÇB must be grouped together with books six to nine, whereas books eleven to fourteen, which make frequent reference to both Yâjñavalkya and the region along the Ganges and Jumna, seem to belong with the first five).

Furthermore, the subject matter of the first five books tends to deal with the *haviryajñas* (oblations of rice, barley, and/or milk) and the *soma* sacrifices, whereas books six to nine deal, in the main, with the *agnicayana* (construction of the sacred fire altar). The relatively

clear distinctions between the first five and following four books of the ÇB tend to suggest different authorship (the ÇB itself is an anonymous production<sup>58</sup>), with the eventual combination of two schools revering, respectively, Yâjñavalkya and Çâṇḍilya as their authorities and ritual experts<sup>59</sup>. As for the relative chronology of the Yâjñavalkya books as compared to the Çâṇḍilya books, a comparison of the list of succession of teachers (*vaṃṣa*) at the end book ten (the last of the Çâṇḍilya books) with the list at the end of book fourteen (the last of the Yâjñavalkya books), leads to the conclusion that the Çâṇḍilya books were composed sometime later than those of Yâjñavalkya<sup>60</sup>.

Following the Mâdhyandina recension, the major topics covered in the fourteen books of the ÇB are as follows<sup>61</sup>: *kâṇḍas* I and II cover the Full and New Moon sacrifice (DPM), the establishment of the sacred fires, the seasonal sacrifices, and other miscellaneous *haviryajñas*; *kâṇḍas* III - IX cover the *soma* sacrifices and the *agnicayana*; *kâṇḍa* X contains, among other things, an esoteric doctrine on the mystery of the fire altar; *kâṇḍas* XI - XIV cover, along with some appendices to preceding books, discussion of the *açvamedha*, *puruṣamedha*, *sarvamedha*, the Bṛhadâraṇyaka Upaniṣad (in *kâṇḍa* XIV), and other miscellaneous topics such as initiation of Vedic students (*upanayana*), methods of study of the veda (*svâdhyâya*), and funeral ceremonies.

The relative chronology of the Mâdhyandina and Kâṇva recensions has not been conclusively determined, though it is fairly clear that they both presuppose a pre-existing text which is no longer extant<sup>62</sup>. In any case, the ÇB, in comparison to other existing *brâhmaṇas*, can be confidently assigned a relatively late date, and was perhaps the last of the major *brâhmaṇas* to be compiled. As it has been well established

that the White Yajurveda is of later date than the Black Yajurveda, Gonda is safe in asserting that, with respect to a relative date for the ÇB, "sometime between the texts of the Black Yajurveda and the beginning of the upaniṣadic period (600 B.C.E.) may be the best that can be suggested at this moment"<sup>63</sup>.

#### V -- THE TRANSLATION OF THE ÇATAPATHA BRÂHMAṆA



As the Mādhyandina recension is the only recension of the ÇB which is currently complete, it provided the obvious basis for what has become the only full English translation of the ÇB. This translation, which was completed over a twenty year period by Julius Eggeling, and which comprises volumes 12, 26, 41, 43, and 44 of the Sacred Books of the East collection (edited by F. Max Müller), is roughly 2000 pages long (including notes), and is a complete translation of the ÇB with the exception of the final six *adhyâyas* of the fourteenth book, which comprise the Brhadâraryaka Upanisad, and which had already been translated by Müller in volume XV of The Sacred Books of the East<sup>64</sup>. Unfortunately for purposes of consistency, Müller chose to translate the Brhadâraryaka Upanisad from the Kânva recension, as it was this recension of the *upanisad* upon which Çankara commented. Fortunately, however, the differences between the *upanisad* in the two recensions are minimal, especially with respect to the present study. Furthermore, as Eggeling notes in his translation of the ÇB, which includes a comparison with the Kânva text at several junctures, the two recensions are not, on the whole, greatly divergent.

While Müller's translation of the Bṛhadâraṇyaka Upaniṣad will provide the main source for the present study, other translations (also from the Kâṇva recension) will be consulted, including those of Hume<sup>65</sup>, Radhakrishnan<sup>66</sup>, and Mâdhavânanda<sup>67</sup>.

By way of justification of my unusually heavy reliance upon the English translations of the primary texts, I can only state that my knowledge of Sanskrit in general, not to mention Vedic Sanskrit in particular, has hardly developed to a point where I could confidently depart from either Eggeling or any of the various translators of the BÂU. Furthermore, it is my belief that this thesis is examining certain trends and ideas in the text which do not rest upon the wording of any single passage.

#### VI -- "FEAR" AND "ANTAGONISM" IN THE ÇB: A CLARIFICATION

Despite the fact that Vedic çrauta ritual provides the singular focus for the bulk of the ÇB, the ÇB is not itself a ritual, but a text. That is, in dealing with the ÇB, we are not dealing with the ritual actions described in the text, nor with the people performing the actions, but with the text itself. Thus, whenever "ritual" is referred to within this study (including references to the DPM), it refers to the theoretical ritual as described in the text, and more importantly with those accompanying commentarial remarks which explain the ritual but which are themselves not included in the ritual. This may, at first, seem self-evident. However, as one scholar has recently discussed<sup>68</sup>, there is, in some cases, a large discrepancy between an idealized

description of a ritual as traditionally found in a text and the actual performance of the ritual.

Thus, when we speak of "fear" and "antagonism", we speak of phenomena which appear to be expressed in the text of the ÇB, and it is on this level alone that the present analysis will be performed. For example, at many different junctures in the DPM, as discussed in the ÇB, there are concerns expressed about the fact that evil spirits may enter into the ritual during its performance, thus causing the ritual to be spoiled. On the level of the text itself, it may well be appropriate to speak of a continuing "fear" of evil spirits throughout the course of the sacrificial performance. However, whether or not this "fear" actually translates into a generalized, psychological fear on the part of the sacrificer and priests is quite unknowable. There is, unfortunately, no extensive ethnographic information on the Vedic peoples which might have allowed us to make such a judgement. The main point, however, is that although the psychological states of the sacrificer and the priests may be unknowable, for the purpose of this present study, they are irrelevant. For our purposes, it is sufficient that something which might best be described as "fear" or "antagonism" is expressed in the text.

## VII -- GRAPPLING WITH A LARGE TEXT

There are certain difficulties inherent in the analysis of a text such as the ÇB. First, it is roughly 2000 pages in translation. Second, it is a text which, historically, has been pieced together over many centuries, relying on the authority of several ritual experts who

were separated not only in time but also in space. Third, it assumes a high degree of knowledge on the part of its reader, not only with respect to particular ritual details, but with respect to legends, myths, and tradition which are not always clear even in the scope of Vedic literature in general, let alone in the ÇB. For these reasons, it is difficult to make any general statement concerning the ÇB without at least one small portion of the text providing a possible exception.

Thus, effort has been made in this thesis to make working with the text more manageable. For example, a single *çrauta* ritual, the Darçapûrnamâseṣṭî (DPM), will, as a representative of *çrauta* rituals in general, be compared with the *upaniṣad* which makes up the final portion of the ÇB, i.e. the Bṛhadâraṇyaka Upaniṣad.

The choice of the DPM as the representative of the ÇB's discussion of *çrauta* rituals may be justified in several ways. Comprising only 273 pages in translation, it is of a more manageable size than the ÇB as a whole. Also, because the DPM was to be performed once every fortnight, and had a usual duration of two days, it falls, in the hierarchy of ritual importance, somewhere between the *agnihotra* (performed twice daily by the householder himself), and the *agnicayana* (lasting one full year, requiring a battery of priests, and performed only once, if at all, in the lifetime of a sacrificer). And finally, a quick read of several other discussions of *çrauta* rituals in the ÇB has convinced me that the DPM is indeed, for the purposes of this present study, a worthy representative of the ÇB's treatment of *çrauta* rituals in general.

Chapter Two:

FEAR AND ANTAGONISM IN THE DARÇAPÛRÑAMÂSEṢṬÎ

I -- THE DARÇAPÛRÑAMÂSEṢṬÎ: A SUMMARY

The Darçapûrñamâseṣṭî (DPM), or the New and Full Moon Sacrifice, is the first of the *çrauta* rituals to be discussed in the ÇB. As with all discussions of *çrauta* rituals in the *brâhmaṇas*, the discussion of the DPM in the ÇB presupposes an extensive knowledge of the details of the sacrificial performance. These details are described in the *çrautasûtra* of the White Yajurveda, the Kâtyâyana Çrautasûtra, in which the DPM comprises the subject of books two and three<sup>1</sup>. Thus, while the author(s) of the ÇB singled out certain ritual details of the DPM and used them for the focus of relatively detailed discussions, many other details of the sacrifice are quickly brushed aside or ignored altogether. On this point, Eggeling states:

"The Brâhmaṇas presuppose a full knowledge of the course of sacrificial performance, and notice only such points as afford an opportunity for dogmatic and symbolic explanations, or seem to call for some authoritative decision to guard them against what were considered heretical practices"<sup>2</sup>.

The DPM is the subject of the entire first *kânḍa*, including the first 9 of 100 *adhyâyas*, of the ÇB. In Eggeling's lengthy translation, this *kânḍa* occupies the first 273 pages. Each of the 9 *adhyâyas* is divided into "*brâhmaṇas*" (ranging in number from 3 to 5), and each *brâhmaṇa* is further divided into sections (ranging in number from 9 to 44). Thus, when quoting from the DPM, the notation "I,1,1,1" represents "*kânḍa* I, *adhyâya* 1, *brâhmaṇa* 1, section 1".

Despite its premier position in the text, the DPM is not, according to the hierarchy of *çrauta* rituals, the first ritual which is to be performed. Rather, before a sacrificer could be considered eligible to have the DPM performed on his behalf, at least two *çrauta* rituals must first have been successfully completed: the *agnyâdhâna* (establishment of the home-fire), and the *agnihotra* (morning and evening libations)<sup>3</sup>. The discussions of these two "preceding" rituals are found immediately following the ÇB's discussion of the DPM, in *kâṇḍa* II.

According to Eggeling, the regular performance of the DPM "is enjoined on the Brâhmanical householder for a period of thirty years from the time of his performance of the ceremony of *agnyâdhâna*, ... , according to some authorities even for the rest of his life"<sup>4</sup>. How strictly this enjoiner was followed, in actuality, is uncertain. It is, however, unlikely that every Vedic householder of the upper three classes would have had the material resources to host such a regular sacrificial performance, which not only required four days per month of his undivided attention, but also required the supplying of the appropriate sacrificial ingredients as well as payment of the officiating priests.

As the title of the sacrifice implies, the DPM was to be performed twice monthly, once during the new moon, and once during the full moon. The usual duration of the sacrifice was two days; however, there was allowance made for the condensing of the full moon sacrifice into a single day if circumstances so dictated<sup>5</sup>. The exact days of the month which were to be reserved for the performance of the DPM were not unanimously agreed upon by the ritual authorities, some favouring the last two days of each half month, but with the majority favouring the



first and sixteenth days of each month as being the best for the main performance<sup>6</sup>.

While the sacrificial procedure is, on the whole, very similar for the full moon performance as it is for the new moon performance, there are certain details at particular junctures of the sacrifice which were modified to individualize each of the two performances for their particular time of the lunar cycle. The predominant difference between the two performances is in respect to the god "Soma" and his location during the sacrifice. As Soma was thought to be identical with the moon, Soma, in all his splendor, could be observed, during the full moon sacrifice, to be residing in the heavens. However, with respect to the new moon sacrifice, ÇB I,6,4,5 states:

"Now this king Soma, the food of the gods, is no other than the moon. When he is not seen that night [i.e. the night of the new moon] either in the east or in the west, then he visits this world".

The impact of Soma's location on the ritual is demonstrated by the choice of which gods receive a particular chief offering of a rice cake. During the Full moon sacrifice, there is a chief offering of a rice cake made to Agni-Soma, whereas at the New moon sacrifice, this rice cake is offered to Indra-Agni.

The performance of the DPM, as described in the ÇB, required the services of four priests: the *adhvaryu* and his assistant the *âgnidhra* (representing the Yajurveda), the *hotṛ* (representing the Ṛgveda), and the *brahman* priest (who required knowledge of all Vedas, and who specifically represented the Atharvaveda). As the Sâmaveda deals exclusively with *soma* sacrifices, no *udgâtar* was required for the performance of the DPM (or, for that matter, any other non-*soma* ritual).

In the normal course of the two day DPM, the first day was reserved for fasting, for the taking of the vow of abstinence by the sacrificer and his wife, and for the general preparatory rites. The main performance of the sacrifice was reserved for the second day, which would be followed by the sacrificer divesting himself of his vow.

The over-all framework of ritual acts performed in the DPM is typical of the *haviryajñas* in general<sup>7</sup>. The following is a general outline describing the performance of the DPM, part of which can be gleaned from the ÇB itself, and part of which needs to be supplied by the Kâtyâyana Çrautasûtra<sup>8</sup>.

On the first day of the two-day DPM, the sacrifice commences with the sacrificer taking a vow (*vrata*) that he will be true to the requirements of the sacrifice. At this point, the gods are invited to the sacrifice, and are thought to reside at the sacrifice until its completion. This is followed by certain preparatory rites, which include the sweeping and trimming of the fireplaces which will house the three sacred fires, the *âhavanîya*, the *dakṣina*, and the *gârhapatya* (the householder's fire). Once the fireplaces have been prepared, the *âhavanîya* and *dakṣina* fires are lit by utilizing the fire from the *gârhapatya*. Also during this first day, the sacrificer adheres to a predetermined fast, which prohibits the eating of any food which might be sacrificed to the gods, and in the specific case of the DPM, allows the sacrificer to eat only that which grows in the forest (ÇB I,1,1,10). When the sacrificer sleeps that first night in a specially made hut, which houses one of the fires, it is stated (ÇB I,1,1,11) that he shares his abode with the attending gods. The main performance of the sacrificial offerings is reserved for the following day.

The order of events on this second day, which precede the actual offerings, may be briefly outlined as follows<sup>9</sup>: (1) sacrificial grass (*barhis*) is strewn about the three fires, and the sacrificial utensils are fetched; (2) a portion of rice which will constitute the sacrificial food is removed from the rice-cart; (3) water which will be used for sprinkling (i.e. for purifying), is itself purified by being strained, and is sprinkled on both the rice which has been removed from the cart and on all of the sacrificial vessels; (4) the rice is then put into a mortar, and is threshed using the mortar and pestle; (5) this threshed rice is then placed into a winnowing basket and is winnowed, with the husks being thrown into the rubbish heap; (6) the husked rice is then washed three times; (7) the washed rice is then ground by mill-stones into rice flour; (8) the rice flour is then mixed with purified water and made into rice dough; (9) the rice dough is divided into two portions which will constitute the two rice cakes which are used during the sacrifice (one for Agni; one for Agni-Soma (Full moon), or for Indra-Agni (New moon)); (10) these two cakes are then basted in ghee and cooked on the fire; (11) when the cakes have been cooked, they are covered over with hot ashes until they are needed; (12) the altar (*vedi*) is then prepared, being constructed to particular specifications, and being purified by removal of evil (represented by a grass-bush which is flung away into the rubbish heap), and by being sprinkled with water; (13) the sacrificer's wife is then girded with a specially tied cord, which is said to represent Varuṇa's noose; (14) sacrificial grass (*barhis*) is then strewn over the freshly prepared altar; and finally (15) the *hotṛ* for the sacrifice is officially chosen, after which he recites kindling verses from the Ṛgveda, while the fires are stoked with

fresh kindling, in order to make the fires blaze and efficiently carry the sacrificial offerings to the gods.

There are several distinct series of offerings made during course of the sacrifice, which include the offering of ghee, butter, and cooked rice cakes. The first of these is the *âghârau*, which is comprised of two libations of ghee, one for "mind" and one for "speech" (ÇB I,4,4,1 ff). Next come the *prayâjas*, or fore-offerings, which are so named because they precede, and with the after-offerings frame, the chief offerings. The *prayâjas* are five in number, (said to represent the five seasons of spring, summer, rains, autumn, and winter (ÇB I,5,3,1 ff)), and are offerings of butter. It is said that by these fore-offerings, the sacrificer obtains the seasons, and thus the year, which is Prajâpati.

Immediately prior to the chief offerings, there is the *âjyabhâga*, or the two butter portions to Agni and Soma, which consist of two cuttings off a rice cake which has been basted in butter, and which have had further butter poured over them (ÇB I,6,1,21 ff). Through this offering, it is said that the sacrificer obtains Agni and Soma, which includes, among other things, the sun (Agni) and the moon (Soma).

The ÇB's discussion of the chief offerings is remarkably short, considering that the chief offerings constitute the main event of the sacrifice. The reason for this may be that these offerings were in need of less explanation and justification than some of the other "minor" offerings. These chief offerings include: (1) a rice-cake to Agni; (2) a low-voiced offering to Agni-Soma (consisting of butter alone); (3) a cake to Agni-Soma (at the full moon sacrifice) or a cake to Indra-Agni (at the new moon sacrifice)<sup>10</sup>; (4) an oblation to Agni-Sviṣṭakṛt

(consisting of one offering to Agni for each offering previously made); (5) the *brahman's* (i.e. *brahman* priest's) portion; and (6) the *Idā* offering (said to represent the domestic *pākayajñas*, and performed to bless the sacrificer with abundant offspring and cattle).

When offerings of rice-cakes are made, for example, to Agni or Agni-Soma, the whole cake is not used. Rather, there are four cuttings made from the appropriate cake which are then offered successively to the god(s) with the appropriate texts. Thus, when rice-cake offerings are made to Agni-Sviṣṭakṛt, to the *brahman* priest, and for the *Idā* offerings, they are not taken from specialized rice-cakes, but are taken from one or both of the two rice-cakes which were prepared initially for Agni and Agni-Soma/Indra-Agni.

Following these chief offerings are the after-offerings (*anuyājas*). Like the fore-offerings, they consist entirely of butter, and are said to represent not the seasons but the metres. Thus, ÇB I,3,2,6-7 states:

"To the gods belongs what sacrificial food [i.e. rice-cakes] there is, ... , and whatever oblations of butter are taken, they are taken for the seasons and the metres".

The after-offerings are succeeded by several other minor offerings, including the offerings of the remains, and the *patnīsaṃyājas*, which itself includes an offering to the wives of the gods. At this point, the sacrifice has effectively reached its end. All that remains is for the offering of the components of the rubbish heap to the *rakṣas* as their share of the sacrifice (which will be discussed in greater detail below), and the official end to the sacrifice, which occurs when the sacrificer divests himself of the vow which he took at the outset of the sacrifice.

## II -- FEAR AND ANTAGONISM IN THE DPM

### (i) Categories of Fear:

As mentioned above (in chapter one), the use of the terms "fear" and "antagonism" with respect to the ÇB must be understood in very specific terms. That is, when we speak of fear and antagonism in the ÇB, we refer to notions which seem to be expressed in the text itself. It will, I believe, be clear in the following discussion that the use of the term "antagonism" in this present study is fully justified, and is a term which has been used in related studies by other Vedic scholars, including Jan Gonda<sup>11</sup>. The term "fear", however, may be, in some instances, too strong; it may, in some instances, be replaced by the term "concern" (a less highly-charged term). This will become more clear in the following discussion. It should be noted that the choice of the terms "fear" and "antagonism" are mine, and do not, in the DPM, consistently represent direct translations of corresponding Sanskrit terms. The justification for the choice of these terms will be, I believe, self-evident.

The concepts of fear and antagonism are tightly bound to one another in the DPM. In fact, in many cases, it is the threat of antagonism which inspires what must be at least deemed concern, and in many cases, actual fear. That is, we are not merely speaking of "fear and antagonism", but of "fear of antagonism". Virtually all examples of the notion of "fear" found throughout the DPM are linked, to a greater or lesser degree, with fear of antagonism. However, I have categorized the many examples of "fear" in the DPM into three groups, which,

considering the above statement, must not be considered as mutually exclusive. These three groups are as follows: (1) fear of committing technical errors in the sacrificial performance, as well as the ensuing repercussions; (2) fear of antagonism between (i) the many gods who are invited to reside at the sacrifice, and (ii) the many ritual implements which come into contact during the performance of the sacrifice; and (3) fear of ritual impurity including (i) filth and "human-ness", as opposed to "divine-ness" (i.e. actual physical impurity), (ii) living human enemies, and (iii) evil spirits. The rationale for including human enemies and evil spirits as ritual impurity will be discussed below in chapter four.

(ii) Fear of Technical errors:

With respect to the ÇB's discussion of the DPM, and the possibility of committing technical errors during the actual performance of the DPM, it is indeed appropriate to speak of a "fear" of technical errors. Again, this is not to say that either the sacrificers or priests involved in such rituals lived in constant psychological fear during a sacrificial performance, but that such a fear is expressed in the text. This "fear" is demonstrated in five related ways. They are:

(a) **The *brahman* priest:** that is, the fact that the sole purpose of the highest officiating priest, the *brahman*, is to oversee the sacrificial performance, catch any technical errors which may have been made in the performance, and to atone for them through the silent muttering of formulas from the Atharvaveda; (b) **Atoning acts:** that is, the existence of certain ritual acts (not involving the *brahman*) which are stated to "make good" any technical errors, made wittingly or unwittingly, during

the performance; (c) **Warnings against Error:** that is, the warnings given regarding the hypothetical repercussions of the incorrect performance of specific ritual acts; (d) **Historical repercussions of errors:** that is, actual examples of what has happened in the past when certain ritual errors have been committed; and (e) **Committing human-like actions:** that is, the possible contamination of the "divine" ritual by acting in a typically human, i.e. non-divine, inauspicious manner. Needless to say, there was a great deal of concern on the part of the Vedic sacrificers and priests that the sacrifice be performed in as flawless a manner as possible.

(a) THE BRAHMAN PRIEST: As for the first of the five demonstrations of "fear" of technical errors, i.e. the role of the *brahman* priest, little need be said. The *brahman's* role in the DPM is common to all *çrauta* rituals, but was most likely the last of the priestly duties to be assigned on a permanent basis. Nevertheless, the very fact that such a "safe-guarding" priestly role existed at all is evidence of the Vedic concern for accurate ritual performances, or, conversely, their fear of ritual errors. On the role of this *brahman* priest, Hopkins states:

"The Brahman's job was that of an overseer or conductor who followed the details of the ritual performance and counteracted any mistakes made by the other priests. He himself had no active part in the ceremony, but sat in a special place near the main fire altar performing his functions of prevention and correction by meditation and by silent recitation of appropriate mantras"<sup>12</sup>.

Similarly, Gonda states:

"[The Brahman priest] oversees, accompanies (*anumantraṇa*) and corrects by means of expiatory formulas (*prayascitta*) possible accidents and blunders of the officiants"<sup>13</sup>.



(b) ATONING ACTS: In addition to the *brahman's* expiations, there are several specific acts performed during the DPM which the ÇB explains as acts which "make good" any errors which may be committed during the performance of the sacrifice. For example, ÇB I,1,1,12-15 states that the first act of the *adhvaryu* on the second day of the DPM is to go and fetch water. The reason for this act is explain in sections 14-15:

"The reason why he brings forward water is, that all this (universe) is pervaded by water; hence by this his first act he pervades (or gains) all this (universe). And whatever here in this (sacrifice) the Hotṛ, or the Adhvaryu, or the Brahman, or the Āgnīdhra, or the sacrificer himself, does not succeed in accomplishing, all that is thereby obtained (or made good)."

Similarly, during the closing ceremonies of the sacrifice, the *adhvaryu* is instructed to take a full vessel of water, walk around the fire to the south, and pour the water from the vessel onto the ground. The explanation given is as follows:

"And again why he pours out a vessel (of water) is: where anything is done wrongly at the sacrifice, there they tear or wound it; and - water being (a means of) lustration - he lustrates it by that (means of) lustration, water; he heals it with water" (ÇB I,9,3,4).

An example of an act performed to make amends for errors made during a specific part of the sacrifice can be found in ÇB I,5,1,20, where the *hotṛ*, at the time when he is officially chosen by the sacrificer, makes the last of a series of statements, addressed to Agni, so that,

" 'thou [Agni] make good for me [the *hotṛ*] whatever mistake may have been committed at my election' and it is accordingly made good for him".

Further examples of this sort of safe-guarding can be found in ÇB I,1,4,9 and ÇB I,5,3,23.

(c) WARNINGS AGAINST ERROR: Warnings concerning the hypothetical repercussions of incorrect acts made during the sacrifice abound in the ÇB's discussion of the DPM. Some of the many examples include: ÇB I,1,1,21, where it is stated, with reference to the fetching of the water by the *adhvaryu* on the beginning of the second day (see above),

"Let him set the water down without carrying it beyond (the north side of the fire, i.e. not on the eastern side); nor should he put it down before reaching (the north side, i.e. not on the western side). For, if he were to put the water down after carrying it beyond, -- there being, as it were, a great rivalry between fire and water, -- he would cause this rivalry to break forth on the part of the fire; and when they (the priests and the sacrificer) touch the water of this (vessel), he would, by carrying it and setting it down beyond (the northern side), cause the enemy to rise (spirt) in the fire. If, on the other hand, he were to put it down before gaining (the northern side), he would not gain by it the fulfilment of the wish for which it has been brought forward. Let him therefore put it down exactly north of the *Âhavaniya* fire.";

ÇB I,5,1,1-2 states, with reference to the choosing of the *hotṛ*,

"He (the *Adhvaryu*) now utters his call for the *Pravara* (choosing of the *Hotṛ*). The reason why he utters his call, is that the (*Adhvaryu*'s) call is the sacrifice: 'having bespoke the sacrifice, I will choose the *Hotṛ*', thus (he thinks, and) for this reason he utters his call for the *Pravara*. He utters his call after taking the fuel-band; for if the *Adhvaryu* were to utter his call without taking hold of the sacrifice, he would either be unsteady or meet with some other ailment.";

ÇB I,7,1,3 states, with respect to an improper addition to a formula used in the ritual,

"Some people add here the formula, 'Going near are ye!' but let him [the *adhvaryu*] not say this, because thereby another (an enemy) approaches (the sacrificer)".

(d) HISTORICAL REPERCUSSIONS OF ERRORS: Along with such hypothetical consequences of committing technical errors during the sacrificial performance, at least two examples are given of actual repercussions

which have occurred in the past. The first of these is found in ÇB I,2,5,24-26, where it is stated:

"Now those who made offerings in former times, touched (the altar and oblations) at this particular time, while they were sacrificing. They became more sinful. ... The gods thereupon said to Bṛhaspati Aṅgīrasa, 'Verily, unbelief has come upon men; ordain thou the sacrifice to them!' Bṛhaspati Aṅgīrasa then went and said 'How comes it that you do not sacrifice?' They replied, 'From a desire for what should we sacrifice, since those who sacrifice become more sinful, and those who sacrifice not become righteous?' Bṛhaspati Aṅgīrasa then said ' ... Sacrifice therefore without touching, for thus you will become righteous!'"

A more concrete repercussion is described in ÇB I,7,3,19, where it is stated, with reference to mixing verses of different metres,

"Now here Bhāllabeya made the invitatory formula (consist of) an anuṣṭubh verse, and the offering formula of a triṣṭubh verse, thinking, 'I thus obtain (the benefits of) both.' He fell from the cart, and in falling, broke his arm. He reflected: 'This has befallen because of something or other I have done.' He then bethought himself of this: '(It has befallen) because of some violation, on my part, of the proper course of the sacrifice.' Hence one must not violate the proper course (of sacrificial performance); but let both (formulas) be verses of the same metre, either both anuṣṭubh verses, or both triṣṭubh verses."

(e) COMMITTING HUMAN-LIKE ACTS: Finally, with respect to fear of technical errors, there are the warnings against performing particular acts in a "human" manner. For example, in ÇB I,4,1,34-35, it is said:

"'Agni we choose for messenger', because he was the messenger of the gods. -- 'As Hotṛ the all-knowing, him!' Here now some people recite, 'He who is the Hotṛ of the all-knowing'; lest (in saying 'for Hotṛ, the all-knowing, him') one should say to oneself 'enough (i.e. have done)!' This, however, he should not do; for by (doing) so they do at the sacrifice what is human; and what is human, is inauspicious at a sacrifice. Therefore, lest he should do what is inauspicious at the sacrifice, he should recite, just as it is recited by the Ṛg [veda]."

With respect to the cuttings made from the rice cakes during the chief offerings, ÇB I,7,3,9 states,

"Let him cut off only a moderate quantity; for were he to cut off a large quantity, he would make it human, and what is human is inauspicious at the sacrifice. Let him therefore cut off only a moderate quantity, lest he should do what is inauspicious at the sacrifice".

A similar reference is made in ÇB I,8,1,29, with respect to the Idâ ceremony.

If it was the case that the only repercussion of technical errors in the ritual performance was an unsuccessful sacrifice, meaning that the sacrificer did not obtain what he desired, then one might argue that the phrase "fear of technical errors" should be toned down to "concern about technical errors". However, this is not the case. Partaking in a Vedic *çrauta* ritual was not an "everything to gain, nothing to lose" proposition. Rather, incorrect performance of any *çrauta* ritual could result in severe repercussions, such as becoming more sinful, broken bones, and even empowering the sacrificer's own enemy to rise up and overcome the sacrificer. In this sense, the *çrauta* ritual was a gamble; there was much to gain, but also much to lose. And, when there is much to lose, there is fear.

(iii) Fear of Antagonism:

(a) Fear of Antagonism Between Gods

Within Vedic mythology in general, as well as within the ÇB in particular (see ÇB I,2,3,1; I,2,3,5; I,4,5,8-12; I,7,3,1-6; and I,7,4,1-4), there are many examples of incidents of antagonism between the different gods of the Vedic pantheon. This is to say nothing of the antagonism between the gods and *asuras* (anti-gods), which will be discussed in detail below. However, for the purposes of this present

section, we will limit ourselves to that fear of antagonism between the gods which may arise as a direct result of a performance of the DPM.

There appears to be one main cause for antagonism between the gods (i.e. those gods presumed to be present at the sacrifice), and this was related to the potential for jealousy arising over which of the many gods were to receive any particular offering. For this reason, each offering was to be vocally announced as an offering to one or more specific deities. For example, when the rice, which was to eventually become the rice-cake offering, is removed from the rice-cart, it is said:

"He now announces (the oblation) to the deity (for whom it is intended). For when the Adhvaryu is about to take the oblation, all the gods draw near to him, thinking, 'My name he will choose! my name he will choose!' and among them who are thus gathered together, he thereby establishes concord" (ÇB I,1,2,18).

Similarly, this specifying of the oblations for particular gods is emphasized during the cleaning (i.e. husking), of the rice:

"Here now some clean them with the formula: 'For the gods get clean! for the gods get clean!' But let him not do so: for this oblation is intended for some particular deity; and if he were to say, 'For the gods get clean!' he would make it one intended for all the deities, and would thereby raise a quarrel among the deities. Let him therefore do the cleaning silently!" (ÇB I,1,4,24).

(b) Fear of Antagonism Between Ritual Implements

During the performance of the DPM, and especially during the preparations of the rice-cakes, there is a great deal of concern that any two entities, sentient or insentient, may injure one another whenever they come into contact. If such contact is unavoidable, and is an integral part of the sacrificial performance, a *mantra*, (what most appropriately might be called an "appeasement *mantra*"), is spoken to one

or both of the entities such that "they will not injure each other". For example, this type of *mantra* is spoken when the black antelope skin, which is put onto the earth to support both the mortar and later the milling stones, is first laid upon the ground:

"He spreads it (on the ground with the hairy side upwards, and) with its neck part turned to the west, with the text (Vâj.S. I, 14c): 'The skin of Aditi art thou! May Aditi acknowledge thee!' For Aditi is this earth, and whatever is on her, that serves as a skin to her: for this reason he says, 'The skin of Aditi art thou!' And 'may Aditi acknowledge thee!' he says, because one who is related (to another) acknowledges (him). Thereby he establishes a mutual understanding between her and the black antelope skin, (thinking) 'they will not hurt [*hinasâte*] each other' (ÇB I,1,4,5)."

Another example is found at the placing of the mortar onto this black antelope skin:

"He adds: 'May Aditi's skin acknowledge (receive) thee!' whereby he establishes a mutual understanding between it (the mortar) and the black antelope skin, thinking: 'they will not injure [*hinasâte*] each other' (ÇB I,1,4,7)."

Further examples of "appeasement *mantras*" occur at the meetings of the threshed rice and the winnowing basket (ÇB I,1,4,20), the lower millstone and the black antelope skin (ÇB I,2,1,15), the upper millstone and the lower millstone (ÇB I,2,1,17), and, the fire and the outer "skin" of the rice-cake (ÇB I,2,2,12).

In certain instances, the two entities which meet (i.e. come into physical contact), include a priest. This is the case in ÇB I,1,2,10, where the yoke of the rice-cart is propitiated with a *mantra* so that it will not burn the *adhvaryu* when he comes to take the rice for the oblations. Also, a *mantra* is said by the *hotr* to avoid being scorched by the *âhavanîya* and *gârhapatya* fires when he takes his seat between them :

"At the same time he mutters, 'O All-maker, thou art the protector of lives! do not ye two (fires) scorch me away (from this), injure [hiñsiṣṭam] me not! this is your sphere'; with this he moves slightly northwards: by this (mantra, he indicates that) he sits midway between the Âhavanīya and the Gârhapatya, and thus he propitiates these two; and in accordance with what he says, 'do not scorch me away from this! injure [hiñsiṣṭam] me not!' they do not injure [hiñstah] him" (ÇB I,5,1,25).

There are also examples of warnings given to stave off the repercussions of two entities touching one another which are not, in the performance, supposed to come in contact. For example, it is warned that the wooden sword used by the priest to hack away the grass-bush from the altar, (an act which is said to expel evil from the altar), must not come in contact with either the priest himself or the earth (ÇB I,2,4,7), or with the water which is subsequently used to purify the altar (I,2,5,20). Also, the text warns that the different spoons which are used for ladling or pouring butter are never to come into contact (ÇB I,4,5,6).

(iv) Fear of Ritual Impurity<sup>14</sup>:

There is no doubt that many beneficial effects may result from the successful completion of the DPM, and that, consequently, it provided the Vedic sacrificer with a valuable tool. However, the conclusion to which one comes after reading the ÇB's discussion of the DPM is that the performance of this sacrifice is akin to a battle. The sacrificial performance, as described in the DPM, resembles a journey down a treacherous path, which is laden with pitfalls quite separate from repercussions of technical errors, or from antagonism between the gods or ritual implements, and which requires the assistance of "one who knows", i.e. a learned priest, if one is to safely traverse the path. For the sake of providing an over-all categorization of the of the sort

of problems or challenges with which one may be faced during the performance of the sacrifice, I have used the concept of "ritual impurity". Such an over-all categorization is not to be found directly in the text. Rather, all possible problems, including the ones which have just been discussed above, appear, in the text, to be treated equally, and without formal distinction.

All of the Vedic *çrauta* rituals are traditionally seen as being a re-enactment of a sacrifice which was successfully performed by the gods. The gods appear to have received these sacrifices through revelation, as opposed to actively developing them. For example, it is stated that:

"The gods were desirous as to how they might appropriate also the [waning half-moon] that had fallen to the asuras. They went on worshipping and toiling. They SAW this haviryajña, to wit, the new and full-moon sacrifices, and performed them; and by performing them they likewise appropriated the [waning half-moon] which belonged to the asuras." (ÇB I,7,2,23-24; emphasis mine).

The above text also refers to another important factor in the ÇB's discussion of the DPM, that is, the mythological battles between the gods (*devas*) and the anti-gods (*asuras*). In the *brâhmaṇas*, Prajâpati is considered to be the primary "creator" god. Two of his primary creations were the gods and *asuras*<sup>15</sup>. The mythological tales of the great battles between the gods and the *asuras* play a predominant role in the ÇB's discussions of *çrauta* rituals, though one cannot help but wonder how many of these so-called mythological tales were "invented" specifically to rationalize particular aspects in the performances of the rituals.



In such mythological accounts, the gods and the *asuras* were continuously contending for general cosmic superiority, and this often included battling for control of, or rights to, the sacrifice (see below). In each case, the gods eventually, if not immediately, overcame the *asuras*, and gained control over the particular item for which they were both contending. However, the gods, when performing a given sacrifice, even a sacrifice which they had specifically and successfully wrestled away from the *asuras* and established as their own, were in constant fear of being harrassed or disturbed by the *asuras*.

Thus, it is not surprising to find that the human sacrificers (the *yajamāna* and the officiating priests), as described in the ÇB, were faced with similar problems when attempting to re-enact one of these ritual performances. There is, in the ÇB's discussion of the DPM, constant weariness against possible disturbances, or what might be labelled as "problems from without". Thus, anything which may come "from without", and may interrupt or disturb an ideal sacrifice is, in this present section, considered to be a threat to the "purity" of the sacrifice, and is thus considered as "ritual impurity". Again, for the purposes of creating some semblance of order in what is a somewhat chaotic text, different types of ritual impurity will be categorized. However, it cannot be overemphasized that the distinctions which will be made between different types of ritual impurity are virtually non-existent in the text, and this phenomenon itself is of great interest.

However, before entering upon a discussion of the threat of "ritual impurity" faced by actual human sacrificers, it will prove constructive to briefly summarize the relationship between the gods and *asuras*, as described in the ÇB's discussion of the DPM.

While it would be an oversimplification to state that, in the ÇB, the gods represent "good" and the asuras represent "evil", this is essentially accurate in the context of their antagonism towards each other. After all, it is the sacrifices performed by the gods, not the asuras, which the Vedic sacrificers attempted to re-enact. Furthermore, as will be discussed below, the sacrificers had their own "version" of the asuras with which to battle during the sacrificial performance. These accounts of antagonism which are recorded in the DPM, while being mythological in origin, are not merely inserted as interesting stories. In all cases, allusions to the "antagonism" between the gods and asuras are intimately connected to the DPM itself, and each "episode" is used as a mythological explanation for why certain ritual acts are to be performed, and why they are performed at such and such point in the performance.

Mythologically, the gods and asuras, eternally at odds, were both created by Prajâpati. This is represented by the recurrent phrase, "The gods and asuras, both sprung from Prajâpati, ...", which is repeated at least seven times in the discussion of the DPM (ÇB I,2,4,8; I,2,5,1; I,4,1,34; I,5,3,3; I,5,4,6; I,7,2,22; and I,9,2,34). In four of these instances, the statement reads, "The gods and asuras, both sprung from Prajâpati, were once contending for superiority"; twice, the statement reads, "The gods and asuras, both sprung from Prajâpati, were contending for this sacrifice", (in which "this sacrifice" refers to the DPM), and once, the statement reads, "The gods and asuras, both sprung from Prajâpati, entered upon their father Prajâpati's inheritance, to wit, these two half moons", and as mentioned above, it was through performing the *haviryajñas* which the gods wrestled away the asuras' waning half

moon. While it is true that the text states that the gods and *asuras* "were contending", or were competing, such references do not in the least suggest any sort of "friendly competition", but rather always take the form of an extremely antagonistic battle.

There are many other instances of "antagonism" between the gods and *asuras*. For example, the gods were often concerned that, while performing a sacrifice, they would be disturbed by the *asuras* and *rakṣas*<sup>16</sup>. ÇB I,1,2,3 states, with reference to the heating of certain sacrificial vessels over the fire,

"For the gods, when they were performing the sacrifice, were AFRAID [*bibhayâmcakruh*] of a disturbance on the part of the *asuras* and *rakṣas*: hence by this means [i.e. the heating of the vessels], [the priest] expels from here, at the very opening of the sacrifice, the evil spirits, the *rakṣas*".

Later in the DPM, when the offering spoons are similarly heated over the fire, the same mythological rationale is given, virtually word for word (ÇB I,3,1,5); also, a very similar passage is given during the *âghârau*, that is, the two libations of ghee offered to mind and speech (ÇB I,4,4,8). Other examples of "fear" on the part of the gods with respect to disturbance of their sacrifice by the *asuras* and *rakṣas*, can be found in ÇB I,1,1,16-17; I,2,1,6; I,4,1,40; and I,5,3,21. While the "battles" between the gods and *asuras* are not generally given in any sort of graphic detail, ÇB I,2,5,18-19 does make reference to a "bloody battle", where "bloody deeds are done".

Most of the "antagonism" between the gods and *asuras* is generalized to seemingly include all members of both parties. There are, however, several examples of specific gods doing battle with specific *asuras*, such as the famous mythological battle between Indra and *Vṛtra* (e.g. ÇB I,1,3,4-5; I,2,4,1ff; I,6,3,9-17; and I,6,4,12-13),

and between Manu, the great progenitor of the Vedic race, and the *asuras* and *rakṣas* (e.g. ÇB I,8,1,16). A specific example of Manu's problems with the *asuras* is given in the text to explain why, between the threshing and the winnowing of the rice, the two millstones (used for grinding the rice into flour), are beaten with the wooden wedge (which fits between them during grinding), thus producing a "discordant noise":

"Manu was in possession of a bull. Into him had entered an asura-killing, foe-killing voice; and by his snorting and roaring the *asuras* and *rakṣas* were continually being crushed. Thereupon the *asuras* said to one another: 'Evil, alas! this bull inflicts upon us! how can we possibly destroy him?' Now Kilata and Akuli were the two priests (brahman) of the *asuras*. These two said, 'God-fearing, they say, is Manu: let us two then ascertain!' They went to him and said: 'Manu! we will sacrifice for thee!' He said: 'Wherewith?' They said: 'With this bull!' He said: 'So be it!' On his (the bull's) being killed the voice went from him. It entered into Manavî, the wife of Manu; and when they heard her speak, the *asuras* and *rakṣas* were continually being crushed. Thereupon the *asuras* said to one another: 'Hereby even greater evil is inflicted upon us, for the human voice speaks more!' Kilata and Akuli then said: 'Manu! we will sacrifice for thee!' He said 'Wherewith?' They said: 'With this thy wife!' He said: 'So be it!' And on her being killed that voice went from her. It entered into the sacrifice itself, into the sacrificial vessels; and thence those two (asura priests) were unable to expel it. This same asura-killing, foe-killing voice sounds forth (from the millstones when they are beaten by the wedge). And for whomsoever that knows this, they produce this discordant noise on the present occasion, his enemies are rendered very miserable." (ÇB I,1,4,14-17).

The actual human performance of the DPM is, as mentioned above, a re-enactment of the mythological act performed by the gods. Thus, it too involves the necessity of dealing with the impinging, harrassing evil spirits. However, with few exceptions (e.g. ÇB I,5,1,23), the so-called "evil spirits" are the *rakṣas* alone, and not the *asuras*, who are predominantly the foe of the gods. However, while one imagines, in the mythological accounts, the *asuras* and *rakṣas* as being the reasonably

well-defined "spirit-like" counterparts to the gods (though the gods themselves are, at times, not well-defined<sup>17</sup>), the *rakṣas* with which the sacrificer and priest must deal are not nearly so well-defined. In some cases, the name "*rakṣas*" is applied to what might be considered as mere physical impurity, such as dirt or stray grass. At other times, there seems to be a grouping, if not an equation, of the *rakṣas* with the sacrificers' human foes, either those who wish the sacrificer ill, or those to whom the sacrificer himself wishes ill. Still at other times, the references to the *rakṣas* seem to point towards their being active, antagonistic spirits, such as the *asuras* and *rakṣas* of the mythological accounts. Even more strikingly, these three relatively distinct "problems from without" with which the sacrificer and priests must deal are not at all clearly distinguished in the text. I shall return to this issue in my final chapter, but suffice it to say that what I have delineated as being three relatively distinct "problems from without" seem to be viewed by the authors of the ÇB as being merely three variations upon a single theme.

(a) PHYSICAL IMPURITY: There is an unquestionable concern on the part of the sacrificer and priests to maintain the ritual purity of the sacrifice on the physical level, albeit, in some instances, a ritualized concern. That is to say, while certain physical impurities are physically removed from the sacrifice, some are merely removed ritually.

The first concern with respect to the ritual purity of the sacrifice is the very fact that mere human-beings are partaking in a divine activity. Thus, right from the beginning, the "human" sacrificer is made "non-human". At the outset of the sacrifice, even before taking

the vow, the sacrificer purifies himself by touching water. The explanation for this is as follows:

"The reason why he touches water is, that man is (sacrificially) impure on account of his speaking untruth; and because by that act an internal purification (is effected), -- for water is indeed (sacrificially) pure. 'After becoming sacrificially pure, I will enter on the vow,' thus (he thinks); for water is indeed purifying." (ÇB I,1,1,1).

Next, the sacrificer takes one of two vows. One of the two possible vows is as follows: "'I now enter from untruth into truth', [thus] he [the sacrificer] passes from the men to the gods" (ÇB I,1,1,4). Despite this initial purification, further purification by water occurs throughout the sacrifice on account of human contact with such things as oblations (e.g. ÇB I,1,3,12) or the altar (e.g. ÇB I,2,5,23). There are many other examples of the purging of "human-ness" from the ritual. For example, two kinds of fire are expelled from the *gârhapatya* fire (which will then be used to cook the rice-cake oblations):

" 'O fire! cast off the fire that eateth raw flesh! drive away the corpse-eating one!' For the raw flesh-eating (fire) is the one with which men cook what they eat; and the corpse-eating one is that on what they burn (the dead) man: these two he thereby expels from it (the *Gârhapatya*)" (ÇB I,2,1,4).

Also, the girding of the sacrificer's wife is performed because "impure indeed is that part of woman which is below the navel" (ÇB I,3,1,13). Furthermore, after the sacrificer and priests have eaten *Idâ* portions (which are said to be akin to the domestic offerings, and thus considered somewhat impure at a *çrauta* ritual), they must purify themselves with water in order to be fit to finish the sacrifice (ÇB I,8,1,43).

Near the conclusion of the sacrifice, a priest (who is not specifically identified) is instructed to touch the earth:

"He then touches (the earth) thus with this (finger). Non-human, verily, he becomes at the time when he is chosen for the office of sacrificial priest: and, this earth being a safe standing-place, he thereby (viz. by touching the earth) stands on this safe standing place; and he thereby also again becomes human" (ÇB I,9,1,29).

Likewise, at the end of the sacrifice, the sacrificer divests himself of his vow by proclaiming: "Now am I he that I really am" (ÇB I,9,3,23), referring to the fact that he is returning from the gods back again to the human realm.

Many other acts of purification occur throughout the sacrifice. For example, there are two strainers which are used several times during the sacrificial performance to purify either water (e.g. ÇB I,1,3,11; I,2,2,2), or the butter used in the offerings (e.g. ÇB I,3,1,22-25).

Finally, with respect to physical impurity, there are instances where the physical impurities are either identified with the *rakṣas*, or the physical impurity is thought to be a representative of the *rakṣas*. For example, before the *adhvaryu* removes the rice from the rice-cart, he takes any grass which may have fallen on the rice and flings it away, reciting the formula: "Repelled is the *rakṣas*" (ÇB I,1,2,15).

Likewise, the black antelope skin, before being used, is shaken off with the formula, "Shaken off is the *rakṣas*, shaken off are the enemies" (ÇB I,1,4,4,; I,2,1,1). During the winnowing of the threshed rice, it is stated: "Cleared off is the *rakṣas*" (ÇB I,1,4,21). Further examples of the connection between physical impurities and the *rakṣas* are found during the flinging away of the grass-bush from the altar (ÇB I,2,4,12-15), and when the *hotṛ* removes some grass from his seat prior to sitting down (ÇB I,5,1,23). On two separate occasions, the priest is instructed to "cover over" the oblations between the time of their preparation and their use as offerings (ÇB I,2,2,16; I,7,1,20). It might be logical to

assume that this "covering up" of the oblations is designed to protect the offering materials from physical impurities, though the text explains it as protecting them from being spoiled by *rakṣas*. Lastly, in an act which we would equate with sterilization, the winnowing basket and *agnihotra* ladle (ÇB I,1,2,2), and the offering spoons (ÇB I,3,1,4) are, before being used, heated with fire, along with the formula, "Scorched is the *Rakṣas*, scorched are the enemies!".

(b) HUMAN FOES AS IMPURITY: As some of the above references suggest, there is a grouping, if not an equation, of the *rakṣas* and the enemy. While it is clear that the *rakṣas* are indeed an enemy to the sacrificer and priests, there are also other references which point to the existence and possible danger from human foes. Unfortunately, there are no passages which explicitly differentiate between different forms of "enemies"; though, if the *rakṣas* and the "enemy" were, at all times, considered to be synonymous, there would be no reason for including both terms in a single phrase, and for using one term here, the other term there, with no discretion. Furthermore, while there are references made to the *rakṣas* in certain passages which could not be interpreted as referring to any human being (see below), there are many passages which clearly seem to infer the existence of human foes which are relevant, and potentially dangerous, to the sacrifice. Such references can be divided into a few relatively distinct categories.

First, there are those references which allow for the exorcising, cursing, or otherwise causing trouble, for the enemy of the sacrificer. In these cases, the text specifically permits the sacrificer to identify this enemy by name. For example, when the priest places a potsherd (the



cooking surface for the rice-cakes) onto the fire, the text says that he does so "for the destruction of the enemy" (ÇB I,2,1,7). The text then immediately continues by stating: "whether or not he wishes to exorcise, let him say 'For the destruction of so and so'". Such specific identifications of the enemy by name implies that it refers to a human enemy, for it is doubtful that the sacrificer is being given a choice of which particular *asura* or *rakṣas* he wishes to destroy. Other examples, in which some ill may (optionally) be directed at a specifically named enemy occur at ÇB I,2,4,7; I,2,4,16; I,2,5,22; and I,3,5,7.

There is another group of references to the sacrificer's enemies which is more generic, i.e. no particular enemy is to be named. As mentioned above, many of the particular ritual acts performed during the sacrifice are given significance in the ÇB by relating them to a particular mythological event. Thus, if the sacrificer or priests perform a ritual action which the gods used to somehow overcome their enemies (i.e. the *asuras*), then the sacrificer likewise is able to overcome his enemies. However, there must be a "clear understanding" of the mythological significance of particular acts which are able to cause one's enemies grief. For example, he who understands why the millstones are beaten with the wedge to produce a discordant sound (see above for full reference), has his enemies made very miserable from the sound (ÇB I,1,4,17). Other instances where knowledge of the mythological significance of a ritual action is said to empower the sacrificer to make his enemies miserable, to defeat his enemies in battle, to stop his enemy from causing him harm, or to wrest the entire earth from his enemy, are found at ÇB I,2,5,7; I,4,1,35; I,4,1,40.

There are other, generic references to the sacrificer's enemy or enemies which lead to the conclusion that the term enemy refers to a human foe. For example, in ÇB I,1,4,18, during the beating of the millstones with the wedge, the following text is recited:

" 'What thou wert for the gods, that be thou for us!' He adds: 'Sap and strength do thou call hither! with thy help, may we conquer [the enemy] in every battle'".

ÇB I,2,4,14 states that the flinging of the grass-bush off of the altar holds off the evil spirits just as it did for the gods, but is also effective against "whoever has evil designs on the sacrificer and hates him". Later on in the ritual, the offering spoons are empowered through the use of a *mantra* into becoming a "destroyer of the enemies", such that they may "unceasingly destroy the enemies of the sacrificer" (ÇB I,3,1,6). And, furthermore, the sacrificer is warned against praying for too many blessings during the sacrifice:

"Let him not offer more [prayers] than these; for if he offered more, he would do what is in excess; and what is in excess at the sacrifice, that remains over for the benefit of his spiteful enemy" (ÇB I,9,1,18).

Lastly, with respect to the role, or fear, of human enemies during the sacrificial performance, there is one final interesting group of references. These references imply, at least to some extent, that there is actually a human foe present at the sacrifice (or, more likely for the security of the sacrifice, someone who ritually represents a human foe, i.e. a hired "reviler"). For example, there is mention made at various places in the text of the possibility of someone "cursing" the sacrificer or priests during the sacrificial performance, along with the appropriate measures which should be taken. This is seen at ÇB

I,4,3,11-22, where there are appropriate texts to be said by the *hotṛ* if someone was to curse him after his reciting of any one of the kindling verses. These texts, said by the *hotṛ* in the case where he has been cursed, have the general effect of returning the curse back onto the "curser". Another example of this is found at ÇB I,6,1,16, where it is stated that a disease of the face (i.e. blindness or deafness), will befall anyone who curses the sacrificer during the beginning, middle, or end of the sacrificial performance. Furthermore, there are at least five references (ÇB I,3,2,11; I,4,5,6; I,5,2,2; I,5,3,18; and I,8,3,5) to the sacrificer, during the libations of butter, standing behind the *juhû* (one of the offering spoons used to offer butter), while "he who means evil to [the sacrificer]" stands behind either the *upabhṛt* or *dhruvâ* (the other two offering spoons). By manipulating the various offering spoons in the proper manner, the sacrificer gains the upper hand on "he who means evil to him", while the opposite result is created by improper manipulations of these offering spoons. Whether or not we are to take this literally, that is, whether or not there is an actual, physical human being who means the sacrificer harm, and who stands behind the *upabhṛt* or *dhruvâ* offering spoons, is unclear; however, this is the most obvious conclusion.

(c) EVIL SPIRITS AS IMPURITY: There are several passages in the DPM which support the idea of the *rakṣas*' spirit-like quality. For example, when the *adhvaryu* walks over to the rice-cart to fetch the rice which will be used for the oblations, the text states:

"He now steps forward (to the cart), with the text (Vâj.S. I, 7c): 'I move along the wide aerial realm.' For the *rakṣas* roams about in the air, rootless and unfettered in both directions (below and

above); and in order that this man (the adhvaryu) may move about the air, rootless and unfettered in both directions, he by this very prayer renders the atmosphere free from danger and evil spirits" (ÇB I,1,2,4).

When returning from the cart with the rice, he again makes the exact same prayer (ÇB I,1,2,22). Another example, which is repeated at least three times throughout the sacrifice (ÇB I,1,4,6; I,2,1,9; and I,3,4,13), is the phenomenon of manipulating a given ritual implement with the left hand while seizing the next implement to be used with the right hand. The explanation given by the text for such "seamless" ritual action is that there is a fear "lest the evil spirits, the rakṣas, might rush in here in the meantime". Also, there is an instance (ÇB I,3,4,8) where the priest asks the sun to protect the fire, (which is already protected by enclosing sticks on the north, south and west sides), "lest the evil spirits, the rakṣas, should rush in from the east".

While it is certainly true that the text lacks any clear distinctions between the different sorts of "problems from without" with which the sacrificer and priests must deal, the evidence presented above points to the conclusion that there is a very broad definition for the terms "rakṣas" and "enemy", as witnessed by the variety of forms in which these enemies are encountered. The fact that the text makes no clear distinctions between physical impurity, human enemies, and evil spirits, tells us something interesting about how the author(s) of the ÇB viewed these "problems from without". We shall return to this topic in chapter four.

Chapter Three:

FEAR AND ANTAGONISM IN THE BRHADĀRANYAKA UPANIṢAD

I -- THE BRHADĀRANYAKA UPANIṢAD: A SUMMARY

The Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (BĀU) forms the final portion, i.e. the last six *adhyāyas*, of the ÇB. In the Mādhyandina recension, this *upaniṣad* forms the last six of nine *adhyāyas* of the fourteenth *kāṇḍa*, which, as a whole, is entitled the Āraṇyaka Kāṇḍa. In the Kāṇva recension, the six *adhyāyas* of the BĀU comprise the entire seventeenth and final *kāṇḍa*<sup>1</sup>. Though both recensions of the *upaniṣad* are in existence, only the Kāṇva version<sup>2</sup> has been translated into English. Unfortunately, in his translation of the Mādhyandina recension of the ÇB, Eggeling did not include a translation of the final six *adhyāyas*, i.e. the BĀU, as Müller had already (in the Sacred Books of the East collection), provided a translation of the Kāṇva version of the BĀU. The decision to translate the Kāṇva recension of this *upaniṣad* over that of the Mādhyandinas is justified by the fact that it was the Kāṇva recension upon which Çankara commented.

However, the fact that Eggeling did not choose to translate the Mādhyandina recension of the BĀU is itself evidence of how little the two recensions differ in substance. While the contents of the two recensions of this *upaniṣad* are very similar, the order in which the material is laid out varies. Fortunately, in Müller's translation of the Kāṇva recension (which will provide the predominant source material for this present study), he provides the location of each of the

*brâhmaṇas*, i.e. the divisions of the *adhyâyas*, in the corresponding Mâdhyandina version.

Though structurally the DPM and BÂU are treated similarly (i.e. division of the text into *adhyâyas*, *brâhmaṇas*, and sections), there is a marked difference in style between the ÇB's discussion of the DPM, which is part of the ÇB proper, and the BÂU, which functions as an appendage to the *brâhmaṇa*. While both the DPM and BÂU contain a great deal of philosophical speculation, the philosophical speculation in the BÂU is not, as in the DPM, perpetually and firmly rooted in a particular Vedic *çrauta* ritual. However, it would be quite incorrect to say that the philosophical speculation in the BÂU is not closely connected to *çrauta* ritual in general.

The six *adhyâyas* of the BÂU are, in structure, divided into three groups of two *adhyâyas*, with each group of two *adhyâyas* ending with a *vaṃçā* (a line of the succession of teachers). However, in content, the three groups of two *adhyâyas* overlap in many respects, and thus the division must be considered as being more structural than functional.

For the purposes of referencing quotations from the BÂU (following Müller, Hume, Mâdhavânanda, etc.), the six *adhyâyas* of the BÂU will be considered as a separate text, and the *adhyâyas* will be numbered one through six, as opposed to numbering them continuously with the rest of the ÇB. Thus, BÂU I,1,1 refers to *adhyâya* I, *brâhmaṇa* 1, section 1.

As one might expect, the predominant subject or issue dealt with in the BÂU is the identity of "Brahman", the origin and underlying "ground" of all, with the individual's true Self (*âtman*). Put another way, the bulk of the *upaniṣad* is concerned with philosophical speculations on the nature of "how things really are", and how different

aspects of the universe, such as the macrocosmic universe, the sacrifice, and the individual, are all connected (i.e. by the "equivalences"), and ultimately, all united in *Brahman*.

Much of the teaching in the *upaniṣad* comes in the form of dialogues, discussions, or debates between two or more people. As was mentioned above (chapter one), the fourteenth book of the Mādhyandina recension of the ÇB, including the BÂU, is historically considered to be one of the "Yājñavalkya" books (*kāṇḍas* 1-5, 11-14), as opposed to one of the "Çāṇḍilya" books (*kāṇḍas* 6-10). Thus, it is not surprising to find that Yājñavalkya figures prominently in many of these dialogues, always playing the role of the most knowledgeable teacher, and the one who is never bested in verbal debates.

It is reasonably clear that the "Yājñavalkya" of the BÂU is meant to be identical with the great authority and ritual expert found in the other "Yājñavalkya" books of the ÇB. Furthermore, whether or not this is true, the Yājñavalkya of the BÂU is clearly an expert on *çrauta* ritual. For example, at BÂU III,1,1-10, it is said that king Janaka Vaideha (a patron of, and regular character in discussions with, Yājñavalkya), had just performed the *açvamedha* (horse sacrifice), and wished to know which of the priests of the Kurus and Pāñcālas was the "best read" and the "wisest", (to whom he would give many cows and much gold). Yājñavalkya was the only priest to claim such a status; however, his claim did not go unchallenged by the other priests who were present. The first of nine priests to question, i.e. test, Yājñavalkya was named Açvala (the *hotṛ* priest of Janaka). All of Açvala's questions dealt specifically with Vedic sacrifice, and, easily answering all of the questions put to him, Yājñavalkya was able to demonstrate his perfect

knowledge of the sacrifice and how it provided freedom for the sacrificer.

Not only was Yājñavalkya himself a *çrauta* ritual expert, but the world in which he lived, and in which the BÂU was composed, was permeated with Vedic sacrifice. This is demonstrated not only in his debates with other priests regarding the sacrifice, but in the fact that "the sacrifice" itself is continuously referred to throughout the BÂU. The question of whether or not the *upaniṣad* takes a positive, neutral, or negative view of Vedic sacrifice will be reserved for the next and final chapter of this present study. Suffice it to say that, one way or the other, the BÂU is very much related to Vedic ritual in general, and is thus an appropriate appendage to the ÇB.

## II -- FEAR AND ANTAGONISM IN THE BRHADÂRANYAKA UPANIṢAD

### (i) Differences between the DPM and the BÂU:

With respect to the concepts of "fear" and "antagonism", the BÂU is quite different from the ÇB's discussion of the DPM. The major reason for this difference is that the BÂU is not, as is the DPM, a discussion of a particular *çrauta* sacrifice. Thus, much of the fear and antagonism resulting from the performance of an actual sacrifice, which, as was discussed above, resembles a battle, is absent. For example, there is, in the BÂU, no fear expressed with respect to the committing of technical errors, or with respect to the possible antagonism which exists between ritual implements which come into contact with one another. There is no fear of *asuras* or *raḁṣas* disturbing the sacrifice. In fact, there is very little discussion of antagonism at all in the



BÂU, whether mythological or actual. However, there is a great deal of discussion relating to fear. This "fear" with which the *upaniṣad* deals is a generalized "fear of antagonism", and is not merely limited to the fear of antagonism which is inherent in the performance of a given *çrauta* sacrifice.

In some very important respects, the BÂU shows evidence of being a direct post-script to the rest of the ÇB; one which, composed somewhat later (600 B.C.E)<sup>3</sup>, had digested much of the earlier material, and which intended to deal with the generalities of Vedic sacrifice rather than with the specifics of any particular one.

(ii) Antagonism in the BÂU:

While the "fear" which is expressed in the BÂU is what may best be described as "fear of antagonism" (which will be discussed in the next section), there are relatively few specific instances where an example of antagonism is actually described. For example, whereas the DPM is filled with the mythological battles between the gods and *asuras*, only one such battle appears in the BÂU. This passage (BÂU I,3,1-7), which is, nevertheless, reminiscent of the accounts given in the DPM, is as follows:

"There were two kinds of descendents of Prajâpati, the Devas and the Asuras. Now the Devas were indeed the younger, the Asuras the elder ones. The Devas, who were struggling in these worlds, said: 'Well, let us overcome the Asuras at the sacrifices (the *çrauta*) by means of the *udgîtha*'. [Then the devas went to speech, scent, the eye, the ear, and the mind, and asked each one to sing for them. On each occasion], the Asuras knew: 'Verily, through this singer they will overcome us.' They therefore rushed at [each of the singers] and pierced [them] with evil. ... Thus they overwhelmed these deities with evils, thus they pierced them with evil. Then [the Devas] said to the breath in the mouth: 'Do thou sing for us.' 'Yes,' said breath, and sang. The Asuras knew: 'Verily, through this singer they will overcome us.' They

therefore rushed at him with evil. Now as a ball of earth will be scattered when hitting a stone, thus they perished, scattered in all directions. Hence the Devas rose, the Asuras fell. He who knows this, rises by his self, and the enemy who hates him falls."

The only other significant mention of the gods and *asuras* is found in a passage (BÂU V,2,1-3) which describes the three descendents of Prajâpati, i.e. the *devas*, *asuras*, and men, all gathered together as Prajâpati's pupils. Interestingly, there is absolutely no overt antagonism in this instance.

There are, in the BÂU, several examples of passages which state that possession of a certain knowledge, i.e. "he who knows this", can overcome his enemies (e.g. BÂU V,4,1), or prevent his enemies from gaining their wish (e.g. BÂU V,14,7). On the whole, however, there is, in the BÂU, relatively little overt concern over actively antagonistic enemies.

As was mentioned above, the predominant reason for the BÂU's general lack of discussions involving antagonism is that it does not discuss the specific details of any particular Vedic sacrifice, thus bypassing the "sacrificial battles" which were prevalent in the DPM. There is, however, one exception. At BÂU VI,4,1-28, there is one clear discussion of a sacrifice in which antagonism plays a potentially serious role. This "sacrifice" is the act of procreation. BÂU VI,4,4 states:

"Many mortal men, Brahmans by descent, go forth from this world, impotent and devoid of merit, namely those who practise sexual intercourse without knowing this."

What is it that one (i.e. the male) must know? He must know the equivalences between the traditional Vedic sacrificial grounds and the female's body parts:

"Her lap is a sacrificial altar; her hairs, the sacrificial grass; her skin, the soma-press. The two labia of the vulva are the fire in the middle" (BĀU VI,4,3).

The reason why "knowing this" during sexual intercourse is considered so important is that,

"knowing this, he turns the good deeds of women to himself. But he who practises sexual intercourse without knowing this -- women turn his good deeds unto themselves" (BĀU VI,4,3).

According to the account given, there is no neutral position; one person or the other must end up with all of the "good deeds". Thus, procreation, which may be considered as a sacrificial re-enactment of the mythological event of creation, must, in this sense, be considered as a battle. And, in this respect, it is analogous to the *çrauta* rituals, including the DPM, which had been discussed in the earlier portions of the ÇB. What makes this account of the sacrificial nature of the act of procreation so stunning is that it implies that even the most intimate of human relationships is considered, by the *upaniṣad*, as a battle, and thus necessitates at least some degree of antagonism. A plausible explanation for this remarkable proposition will be provided in the following section.

(iii) Fear in the BĀU:

Despite the relatively few accounts of overt antagonism in the BĀU, the topic of "fear" is often discussed. Above all other passages in the BĀU which deal with fear, one (BĀU I,4,1-3), stands out above the rest as being the most revealing and the most interesting. It is as follows:

"[1] In the beginning this was Self alone, in the shape of a person (puruṣa). He looking round saw nothing but his Self. He first said, 'This is I;' therefore he became I by name. Therefore

even now, if a man is asked, he first says, 'This is I,' and then pronounces the other name which he may have. And because before (pūrva) all this, he (the Self) burnt down (ush) all evils, therefore he was a person (pur-usha). Verily he who knows this, burns down every one who tries to be before him.

"[2] He feared [*abibhet*], and therefore any one who is lonely fears [*bibheti*]. He thought, 'As there is nothing but myself, why should I fear [*bibhemi*]?' Thence his fear [*bhayam*] passed away. For what should he have feared [*abheṣyat*]? Verily fear [*bhayam*] arises from a second only.

"[3] But he felt no delight. Therefore a man who is lonely feels no delight. He wished for a second. He was so large as man and wife together. He then made this his Self to fall in two (pat), and thence arose husband (pati) and wife (patni)."

Çankara's commentary on the second section just quoted above, which clearly espouses the advaitic point of view, is as follows:

"Because this being with a human form [i.e. Virâj], possessing a body and organs, was afraid owing to a false notion about his extinction, therefore, being similarly situated, people to this day are afraid to be alone. And the means of removing this false notion that caused the fear, was, as in our case, the right knowledge of the Self, ... , From that right knowledge of the Self alone his, Virâj's fear was clean gone. That fear of Virâj, being due to sheer ignorance, was inconsistent with the knowledge of the Supreme Self"<sup>4</sup>.

The above passage, as well as Çankara's corresponding commentary, tells us much about the concept of fear as it is expounded in the BÂU. First, it provides the immediate origin of fear: "Verily fear arises from a second only". This is confirmed in a second passage, where it is stated that, "Verily a second is a rival" (BÂU I,5,12). That is, where there exists some "other", then fear, or at least the possibility of fear, also exists. Furthermore, this "fear of the other" is, no doubt, a "fear of antagonism". Çankara comments, on BÂU I,5,12: "What is a rival? A second being, appearing as an adversary, is called a rival"<sup>5</sup>. Such a generalized fear of the "other" would explain the passage discussed above in the previous section, in which the possibility of

antagonism exists even between two lovers. So long as there is an "other", there exists a "fear of antagonism".

Another manner of expressing this is to say that fear arises on account of duality. Thus, we must ask the question, "From whence did duality originate?" The above passage (i.e. BÂU I,4 1-3) is again clear on this issue. In the beginning, there was only "Self". And, despite his experiencing of some momentary fear, he realized that when there is only one, there is no need for fear. However, the "Self", being lonely, desired a second, and thus duality was born. The concept of duality developing out of unity on account of "desire" is a common idea through the BÂU. For example, at BÂU I,2,1-4, there is a similar account of the origin of duality:

"In the beginning there was nothing (to be perceived) here whatsoever. By death indeed all this was concealed, -- by hunger; for death is hunger. Death (the first being) thought, 'Let me have a body.' ... [Then] he desired, 'Let a second body be born of me'".

And again:

"In the beginning this was Self alone, one only. He desired, 'Let there be a wife for me that I may have offspring, and let there be wealth for me that I may offer sacrifices' (BÂU I,4,17).

In these expressions of "desire", the BÂU provides an explanation of the origin of duality out of unity, and thus, indirectly, the corresponding origin of fear.

Fortunately for its readers, the BÂU does not merely delineate the development of fear from duality, which itself arises from desire. It also points the way back from duality to unity, effectively eliminating fear.

The first step, however, is the recovery of unity from duality. As was mentioned above, the predominant message of the BÂU is the unity

of all things in *Brahman*. All things spring forth from *Brahman*, and all things return to *Brahman*. The goal suggested in the BÂU is to realize the truth of this unity through acquisition of knowledge. The unity of *Brahman*, as well as the goal of realizing this unity, are common topics throughout the BÂU:

"He cannot be seen, for, in part only, when breathing, he is breath by name; when speaking, speech by name; when seeing, eye by name; when hearing, ear by name; when thinking, mind by name. All these are but the names of his acts, ... , for in the Self all these are one. This Self is the footstep of everything, for through it one knows everything" (BÂU I,4,7);

"This Brahman-class, this Kshatra-class, these worlds, these Devas, these creatures, this everything, all is that Self" (BÂU II,4,6);

"There is nothing that is not covered by him, nothing that is not filled by him" (BÂU II,5,18);

"They who know the life of life, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the mind of the mind, they have comprehended the ancient, primeval Brahman. By the mind alone it is to be perceived, there is in it no diversity" (BÂU IV,4 18-19).

Furthermore, the unity of *Brahman* is demonstrated by Yâjñavalkya, who, when questioned by Vidagdha Sâkalya on the issue of how many "gods" really exist, starts out by stating "three and three hundred, three and three thousand", but eventually, when pushed by Vidagdha, states that there is only one god, and he is *Brahman* (BÂU III,9,1).

If indeed there is but one reality, i.e. that "all this" is really "one", then the realization of this unity should not only provide an end to duality, but also a corresponding end to fear. This is exactly what the BÂU tells us:

"For when there is as it were duality, then one sees the other, ... , but when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?" (BÂU II,4,13);

"If a man clearly beholds this Self as God, and as the lord of all that is and will be, then he is no more afraid [*na vijugupsate*]" (BÂU IV,4,15);

"This great, unborn Self, undecaying, undying, immortal, fearless [*abhayah*], is indeed Brahman. Fearless [*abhayam*] is Brahman, and he who knows this becomes verily the fearless [*abhayam*] Brahman" (BÂU IV,4,25);

"Verily, a second is a rival, [but] he who knows [Brahman] has no rival". (BÂU I,5,12)

In fact, as evidenced in the above passages, the nature of a unity is such that realizing unity is necessarily equivalent to becoming unity:

"Verily in the beginning this was Brahman, that Brahman knew (its) Self only, saying, 'I am Brahman.' From it all this sprang, ... , Therefore now also he who thus knows that he is Brahman, becomes all this" (BÂU I,4,10);

"He who knows this, becomes the Self of all beings, ... , Whatever grief these creatures suffer, that is all one (and therefore disappears)". (BÂU I,5,20)

However, there is still the problem of desire; it was, according to the BÂU, desire which impelled unity into duality in the first place. Thus, a realization of unity must logically and necessarily be accompanied by an end to desires (with the possible exception of the desire for realization of *Brahman*). This fact is also expressed often throughout the BÂU. For example, it is stated:

"But as to the man who does not desire, who, not desiring, freed from desires, is satisfied in his desires, or desires the Self only, his vital spirits do not depart elsewhere [as they do for a man who desires, but] being Brahman, he goes to Brahman. On this there is this verse: 'When all desires which once entered his heart are undone, then does the mortal become immortal, then he obtains Brahman'" (BÂU IV,4,6-7).

In order to further explain the experience of unity inherent in the realization of *Brahman*, Yājñavalkya, in a discussion with king

Janaka (BĀU IV,3,1-32), uses the analogy of the waking world and the dreaming world as being the world of duality, and deep, dreamless sleep as being the realization of unity. The following selected verses provide a synopsis of the rather lengthy discussion:

"[19] And as a falcon, or any other (swift) bird, after he has roamed about here in the air, becomes tired, and folding his wings is carried to his nest, so does that person hasten to that state where, when asleep, he desires no more desires, and dreams no more dreams;

[21] This indeed is his (true) form, free from desires, free from evil, free from fear [*abhayam*]. Now as a man, when embraced by a beloved wife, knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within, thus this person, when embraced by the intelligent (*prajña*) Self, knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within. This indeed is his (true) form, in which his wishes are fulfilled, in which the Self (only) is his wish, in which no wish is left, -- free from any sorrow;

[30] And when (it is said that) there [in deep sleep] he does not know, yet he is knowing, though he does not know. For knowing is inseparable from the knower, because it cannot perish. But there is then no second, nothing else different from him that he could know;

[31] When (in waking and dreaming) there is, as it were, another, then can one see the other, then can one smell the other, then can one speak to the other, then can one hear the other, then can one think the other, then can one touch the other, then can one know the other;

[32] 'An ocean is that one seer, without any duality; this is the Brahma-world, O King.' Thus did Yājñavalkya teach him. This is his highest goal, this is his highest success, this is his highest world, this is his highest bliss. All other creatures live on a small portion of that bliss."

In the following and final chapter of this present study, the similarities and differences between the DPM's and BĀU's view of "fear and antagonism" will be discussed, in an effort to determine the relationship, on both a practical and philosophical level, between the two texts.



Chapter Four:

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DPM'S AND THE BÂU'S

VIEW OF FEAR AND ANTAGONISM

A complete evaluation of the relationship between the *brâhmaṇas* and *upaniṣads* is a rather monumental endeavour. Thus, in order to evaluate this relationship in a limited and more manageable context, I have narrowed the topic to focus upon the relationship between Vedic ritual (as discussed in the ÇB, and as represented by the DPM) and the BÂU, on the specific and related issues of "fear" and "antagonism". The prominence of both "antagonism" and, especially, "fear" as topics of discussion in the DPM and the BÂU has been demonstrated above in chapters two and three. Based upon the information presented in these two chapters, it is the thesis of this present study that the view of "fear" and "antagonism" found in the BÂU represents a development and completion of the view presented in the DPM. In this sense, the thesis will provide an example of continuity, rather than opposition, between the *brâhmaṇas* and the *upaniṣads*. However, in an effort to locate the present argument in a historical context, the relationship between the *brâhmaṇas* and *upaniṣads* as it has been traditionally represented by Western Vedic scholarship will be briefly reviewed.

I -- THE TRADITIONAL WESTERN VIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE  
BRÂHMAṆAS AND THE UPANIṢADS

Herman W. Tull, in the first chapter of his book entitled, *The Vedic Origins of Karma*, provides a brief review of how Western Vedic

scholarship of the nineteenth and early twentieth century viewed the relationship between the *R̥gveda Saṃhitā*, the *brāhmaṇas*, and the *upaniṣads*<sup>1</sup>. To put it succinctly, it was the opinion of scholars that the *brāhmaṇas* represented a period of extreme degradation in Indian religious history, characterized by priestly domination and ridiculously intricate rituals which only served the priests' lust for power and their desire for high social status through religious "indispensability". As Tull points out, this conclusion was reached "even before the Vedic literature had been thoroughly investigated"<sup>2</sup>. There were specific historical forces behind the formation of this hasty opinion, and I shall, following Tull, briefly delineate them.

It was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that Western scholars began a serious, systematic review of the whole of Vedic literature. During the first half of that century, however, there was, in popular circulation, a Latin translation of the *upaniṣads* in Europe. Thus, the *upaniṣads* were introduced to Europe prior to the rest of Vedic literature through the work of Schopenhauer and Schelling, both of whom embraced what they interpreted as Upaniṣadic philosophy. Even without much knowledge of either the Vedic *saṃhitās* or *brāhmaṇas*, Schopenhauer expressed the opinion that the *upaniṣads* were the only portion of Vedic literature worth considering, dismissing the rest as mere "priestly rubbish"<sup>3</sup>.

Through the work of scholars such as W.D. Whitney, Rudolph von Roth, F. Max Müller, Maurice Bloomfield, Charles Lanman, Paul Deussen, A.B. Keith, and A.A. Macdonell, Schopenhauer's view of Vedic literature was eventually modified. Close examination of the earliest Vedic text, the *R̥gveda Saṃhitā*, seemed to prove Schopenhauer wrong. Certainly, the

Ṛgveda was not mere priestly rubbish. However, the opinion that the *brāhmaṇas* represented a period of degradation in Indian religious and cultural development still remained unaltered. Rather, the modified opinion went something like this: The Ṛgveda Saṃhitā represents a somewhat primitive golden age in Indian religious and cultural history; this golden age was followed by a period, represented in the *brāhmaṇas*, of increasing influence of a corrupt priestly class, which emphasized the practice of rituals so complex that they could not be performed without the guidance of several highly trained priests; and finally, the Vedic Period ends in a renaissance of the golden age, i.e. the *upaniṣads*, ushering in a new, less primitive and more philosophically sophisticated golden age<sup>4</sup>.

The following quotations reveal, in vivid detail, the contempt with which these scholars viewed the *brāhmaṇas*:

"[India] has, indeed, carefully treasured up and at all times regarded as sacred, the productions of its earliest period [i.e., the ṛgveda]; but it has attached the main importance to a worthless supplement [i.e., the *brāhmaṇas*], and lost from sight and from knowledge the truly valuable portion" (von Roth)<sup>5</sup>;

"The priests had lost the inspiration that came from action; they now made no new hymns; they only formulated new rules of sacrifice. They became intellectually debauched and altogether weakened in character" (Hopkins)<sup>6</sup>;

"The [brāhmaṇic] age is overcast, not only with a thick cloud of ritualism, but also with an unpleasant mask of phariseeism" (Hopkins)<sup>7</sup>;

"Both the performances and their explanations are treated in such a way, and spun out to such lengths, as to render these works [i.e. the *brāhmaṇas*] on the whole monuments of tediousness and intrinsic stupidity" (Bloomfield)<sup>8</sup>;

"Every page of the *Brāhmaṇas* contains the clearest proof that the spirit of the ancient Vedic poetry, and the purport of the original Vedic sacrifices, were both beyond the comprehension of the authors of the *Brāhmaṇas*" (Müller)<sup>9</sup>;

"The Brâhmaṇas ... are puerile, arid, and inane" (Lanman)<sup>10</sup>.

This was the opinion of these Vedic scholars on the *brâhmaṇas*. Once the Ṛgveda Saṃhitâ had been established by scholars as representing an early golden age, albeit a primitive one, there was a tendency to connect the Ṛgveda with the *upaniṣads*, "milieus they perceived to be in opposition to the intervening Brâhmaṇic period"<sup>11</sup>. The doctrine of karma, which, to the scholars of the day, seemed to appear out of nowhere in the *upaniṣads*, represented to them a shift in the Indian tradition towards a morality which was clearly lacking in the Brâhmaṇic period. Tull states:

"The shift to morality found in the Upaniṣadic karma doctrine, was interpreted as being 'anti-sacrificial', to oppose the 'corrupt' sacerdotalism systematically promoted in the Brâhmaṇas"<sup>12</sup>.

Simply taking for granted that an anti-sacrificial stance was upheld in the *upaniṣads*, Max Müller made the sweeping claim that the *raison d'être* of the *upaniṣads* was,

"to show the utter uselessness, nay the mischievousness of all ritual performances; to condemn every sacrificial act which has for its motive a desire or hope of reward"<sup>13</sup>.

Further, Paul Deussen opined that the emphasis placed upon knowledge in the *upaniṣads* is "radically opposed to the entire Vedic sacrificial cult"<sup>14</sup>. A somewhat softer position on this relationship between the *brâhmaṇas* and *upaniṣads* is taken by Heinrich Zimmer, in his book entitled *Philosophies of India*:

"The creative philosophers of the period of the *upaniṣads*, examining the problem of the âtman, were the pioneer intellectuals and free thinkers of their age. They stepped beyond the traditional priestly view of the cosmos. Yet, as we have seen, they went beyond it without dissolving or even criticizing it; for the sphere in which they delved was not the same as that which the

priests had monopolized, ... , The introverted Brâhmanic philosophers were therefore spared [a] head-on collision with the priests and with the past"<sup>15</sup>.

Such notions, held by those who have become the most influential Western Vedic scholars, and who have shaped the vision of the Vedic Period for all those who have followed, must be re-examined. To a great extent, this is what Herman Tull has attempted, most successfully, with regard to the development of the Upaniṣadic karma doctrine out of previously espoused traditional Brâhmanic ideas. Similarly, I shall now attempt to show that the connection between the *brâhmaṇas* and *upaniṣads*, as represented by a comparison of the DPM with the BÂU, is, with respect to the notions of "fear" and "antagonism", one of continuous development, and not of radical opposition.

## II -- THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DPM AND THE BÂU

While the focus of the present comparison of the DPM with the BÂU is on the issues of "fear" and "antagonism", there are several other related issues which are both prominent and relevant to this discussion. These include the issues of: (1) the development of the Vedic *çrauta* ritual prior to the sacrifice-related discussions recorded in the ÇB; (2) the general view of Vedic *çrauta* ritual as presented in the BÂU; and (3) the relationship between action and knowledge. In order to set the stage for an examination of the relationship between the DPM and BÂU on the topics of "fear" and "antagonism", these three issues listed above will be briefly discussed.

(i) The Development of Vedic *çrauta* Ritual Prior to Its Recording in the ÇB:

As is apparent from the quotations given above regarding the traditional Western view of the *brâhmaṇas*, it is obvious that Western Vedic scholars, in the past, have identified what they believed to be a radical change between the Vedic rituals, as discussed in the *brâhmaṇas*, and the *upaniṣads*. However, there seems to be an assumption (e.g. by Müller, Hopkins), that the Vedic rituals which were performed by the Aryan peoples when they first arrived in India underwent a continual development away from the golden age of the *Ṛgveda Saṃhitâ* into the dark, corrupt age of the *brâhmaṇas*, demonstrating a continual degradation of both religion and culture until a new golden age was ushered in with the renaissance of the *upaniṣads*. This assumption is, I believe, a faulty one, and there is evidence to suggest that the development of Vedic *çrauta* ritual throughout the Brâhmaṇic age, in fact, led to the philosophical speculations found in the *upaniṣads*. For example, as Gonda points out, the ÇB was not only, in all likelihood, the last of the great *brâhmaṇas* to be composed, but is also the source of the greatest amount of Brâhmaṇic philosophical speculation<sup>16</sup>. Furthermore, it was predominantly the ÇB which Tull used in his convincing argument for continuity between certain Brâhmaṇic speculations and the karma doctrine as found in the *upaniṣads*<sup>17</sup>. Rather than representing the period of greatest disjunction, the period represented in the ÇB, including the BÂU, seems to represent a period of gradual transition from the late Brâhmaṇic age to the early Upaniṣadic age. Thus, by choosing to compare the ÇB's discussion of the DPM with the BÂU, i.e. the ÇB's appending *upaniṣad*, I may have inadvertently

skewed the results of this present study towards greater continuity rather than towards the radical opposition proposed by many of the traditional Western Vedic scholars<sup>18</sup>.

Nonetheless, there were undoubtedly many changes which occurred throughout the Brâhmaṇic period with respect to both the theory and practice of Vedic rituals. As noted by Gonda<sup>19</sup>, one of the major driving forces behind the composition of the *brâhmaṇas* was the desire to justify and explain the rationale behind sacrificial performances in general, as well as many of the specific ritual acts included in these performances. Taking this a step further, Tull suggests that the purpose of the *brâhmaṇas* was to provide a metaphysical framework into which all of the diverse and seemingly independent sacrifices and rituals could be seen as representing a unified system<sup>20</sup>. It is unclear as to what concrete effect such attempts at unification might have had on the actual performances, but the development of the metaphysical, theoretical framework found throughout the ÇB no doubt represents the pinnacle of a "ritual theory" which continued its development throughout the entire early Vedic and Brâhmaṇic ages. In fact, the creation of a metaphysical framework with which to unite all Vedic rituals into a unified system represents, in all probability, the first step towards the sort of metaphysical philosophy encountered in the *upaniṣads*.

Thus, it might be argued that the differences in orientation which are to be found between the *brâhmaṇas* and the *upaniṣads*, and which traditional Western Vedic scholarship has identified as a "radical" change, may simply represent a final shift in emphasis, merely one more in a long series of orientation-shifts which occurred during the

development of Vedic ritual, and which tended to move towards, rather than away from, the type of speculation found in the *upaniṣads*.

Without the use of detailed linguistic analysis, or a detailed comparison with other recensions and other *brāhmaṇas*, it is difficult to discern any clear historical developments in the practice of Vedic sacrifice which are eluded to in the ÇB's discussion of the DPM. However, there is a passage which implies that the use of *haviryajñas* in general, such as the DPM, may have been a later development, and that they were utilized in order to avoid performing animal or human sacrifices (both of which, nevertheless, remained part of the Vedic *çrauta* ritual system). At ÇB I,2,3,5-7, there is an explanation of how and why the oblations consisting of rice or barley are just as effective as the fivefold animal sacrifice:

"Now it is as an animal sacrifice that this sacrificial cake is offered. At first, namely, the gods offered up a man as the victim. When he was offered up, the sacrificial essence went out of him. It entered into the horse. They offered up the horse. When it was offered up, the sacrificial essence went out of it. It entered into the ox. They offered up the ox. When it was offered up, the sacrificial essence went out of it. It entered into the sheep. They offered up the sheep. When it was offered up, the sacrificial essence went out of it. It entered into the goat. They offered up the goat. When it was offered up, the sacrificial essence went out of it. It entered into this earth. They searched for it, by digging. They found it (in the shape of) those two (substances), the rice and barley: therefore even now as they obtain those two by digging; and as much efficacy as all those sacrificed animal victims would have for him, so much efficacy has this oblation (of rice etc.) for him who knows this. And thus there is in this oblation also that completeness which they call 'the fivefold animal sacrifice'."

This passage seems to have been designed to justify what was most likely a historical development from the use of animal and human sacrifices to the use of oblations of rice and barley. In the opinion of at least some Vedic priests of the time, such a shift from animal sacrifices to



*haviryajñas* would, no doubt, be perceived as a "radical" shift in thought; perhaps even no less radical than the shift from Brāhmaṇic to Upaniṣadic philosophy.

(ii) The View of Vedic Sacrifice in the BĀU:

Considering the so-called "radical opposition" of the *upaniṣads* towards the *brāhmaṇas* which traditional Western Vedic scholars insisted upon, one would expect to find, in the BĀU, a vicious, unbridled polemic against ritual of any sort. This, however, is not at all the case. Rather, while there is an emphasis on "knowing *Brahman*", there is little or no corresponding disparaging of the sacrifice. The many instances where knowledge, or realization, of *Brahman* is emphasized have already been noted and discussed above (chapter three). However, one must search long and hard to find any statement which, even when taken out of context, can be conceived of as a blatant attack upon Vedic sacrifice as a whole. Most of the passages which mention or discuss Vedic sacrifice are either neutral or favourable towards it. For example, in a passage discussed above (BĀU III,1,1-10), where Yājñavalkya claims, before king Janaka and many other Brahmins of the Kurus and Pāñcālas, the status of the "best read" and the "wisest" of Brahmins, Yājñavalkya explains to his first "challenger", Aṣṭvala, how the sacrifice (in this case, the *aṣṭvamedha*) is able to free the sacrificer from death:

"Then Aṣṭvala, the Hotṛ priest, undertook to question him. 'Yājñavalkya', he said, 'everything here (connected with the sacrifice) is reached by death, everything is overcome by death. By what means then is the sacrificer freed beyond the reach of death?' Yājñavalkya said: 'By the Hotṛ priest, who is Agni (fire), who is speech. For speech is the Hotṛ of the sacrifice (or the sacrificer), and speech is Agni, and he is the Hotṛ. This constitutes freedom, and perfect freedom (from death).'"

This passage can hardly be interpreted as an unbridled attack against the *açvamedha* (the specific *çrauta* sacrifice which prompted the discussion). It may be argued that Yâjñavalkya, in an effort to get the king's reward of cattle and gold, was merely "spouting the party line", in an effort to demonstrate just how "well read" he was. However, there is nothing whatsoever in this passage or any other to suggest that this sort of blatant insincerity is intended.

There are many other examples where sacrifices or rituals are mentioned in the BÂU without any accompanying disapproval. For example, at BÂU IV,3,1, there is a passing reference to a "disputation" which Yâjñavalkya and king Janaka had previously held regarding the *agnihotra*. Also, "sacrifice" is one of several methods which Yâjñavalkya mentions as being the Brahmin's path to realizing *Brahman* (BÂU IV,4,22). At BÂU VI,3,1-13, a sacrifice is described in some detail for a man who "wishes to reach greatness (wealth for performing sacrifices)". And, of course, there is the discussion, mentioned above, regarding the sacrificial act of procreation, which involves, as do the *çrauta* rituals discussed earlier in the ÇB, a certain degree of fear and antagonism (BÂU VI,4,1-28).

One of the popular themes which is found in the *upanişads* in general, as well as the BÂU in particular, is the "internalization" of the sacrifice. Any detailed discussion of this topic is, unfortunately, well beyond the scope of the present study; however, there is one particular aspect which is most germane. As was discussed above (chapter one), the efficacy of a Vedic sacrifice, as described in the *brâhmaṇas*, relied upon a knowledge of a set of equivalences between the macrocosmic universe and the microcosmic sacrifice. Internalization of

the sacrifice, as is alluded to many times in the BÂU (e.g. BÂU I,4,22; V,13,1-4; V,14,1-8; VI,2,9-13), is merely the expression of a new set of equivalences, which link the body and senses of an individual to both the external sacrifice and the macrocosmic universe. Thus, the internalization of the sacrifice must, in this sense, be seen as a further development of Vedic *çrauta* ritual, rather than as a "radical opposition" towards it.

(iii) The Relationship Between Action and Knowledge:

There is no question that the BÂU, as compared with the DPM, emphasizes knowledge more than action, and especially knowledge of *Brahman*. However, the BÂU and the DPM both include discussions of knowledge and action. There are some obvious reasons why the BÂU may emphasize knowledge over action. For example, because the BÂU is not a detailed discussion of a specific *çrauta* ritual, as is the DPM, there are far fewer specific actions on which it might comment. That is, the philosophical speculation in the BÂU is not rooted in any particular sacrifice. Rather, it deals with Vedic sacrifice in general (as well as other issues). Furthermore, it may be speculated that either the author(s) of the BÂU felt enough had already been said on the topic of sacrificial actions in the previous thirteen *kânḍas* of the ÇB, (of which Yājñavalkya, the main protagonist of the BÂU, seems to have a solid knowledge, and which comprises roughly 2000 pages in translation), or that, previously, too much emphasis had been placed on action without the corresponding emphasis on knowledge.

In any case, the BÂU often stresses the importance of sacrificing with the proper knowledge of *Brahman*, which includes the realization

that, in reality, there are not many gods but only one. For example, it is stated at BÂU I,4,6:

"And when they say, 'Sacrifice to this or sacrifice to that god', each god is but [Brahman's] manifestation, for he is all gods."

Likewise, it is stated:

"These are all alike, all endless. And he who worships them as finite, obtains a finite world, but he who worships them as infinite, obtains an infinite world" (BÂU I,5,13);

"And he who worships (regards) [Brahman] as the one or the other, does not know him" (BÂU I,4,7).

There is at least one passage which implies that the path of sacrificing and the path of knowledge are equivalent but distinguishable:

"Brahman, who is knowledge and bliss, he is the principle, both to him who gives gifts, and also to him who stands firm, and knows" (BÂU III,9,28).

This passage is interpreted, by Çankara, to mean that *Brahman* is the principle for both performers of sacrifices and renunciates who perform no (external) sacrifice<sup>21</sup>.

There are several references which, while not disparaging the sacrifice, emphasize its limitations and inferiority to knowledge. For example, it is said (BÂU I,5,16) that there are three worlds, the world of men, the world of the fathers, and the world of the *devas*. Furthermore, it is said that these worlds are listed in terms of increasing desirability, and are obtained, respectively, through sons, sacrifice, and knowledge. However, though knowledge is placed above sacrifice, sacrifice itself is not explicitly denigrated. Similarly, there is a passage (BÂU VI,3,15-16) which states that those who go to the forest and worship the True *Brahman*, go to *Brahman* on their death, never to return, while those who practice sacrifice merely go to the world of the fathers, then to the moon (where the gods dwell), where

they can stay only so long as their good works (i.e. sacrifices) on earth would merit, after which they return to the human realm. Those who practice neither of these paths "become worms, birds, and creeping things". Once again, the sacrifice is not denigrated so much as it is made subordinate to knowledge. And furthermore, the BÂU is merely claiming for the sacrifice what the sacrifice (or, at least, the DPM) claims for itself:

"Thus the Adhvaryu and the Āgnīdhra lead the sacrificer to the world of the gods" (ÇB I,8,3,20);

"Now the spring, assuredly, comes into life again out of the winter, for out of the one the other is born again: therefore he who knows this, is indeed born again in this world" (ÇB I,5,3,14).

And lastly, there is a group of passages which implies that sacrifice is of no consequence for him who has finally come to realize *Brahman*. For example, at BÂU IV,4,22 it is stated:

"Him (who knows [Brahman]), these two do not overcome, whether he says that for some reason he has done evil, or for some reason he has done good -- he overcomes both, and neither what he has done, nor what he has omitted to do, burns (affects) him".

Considering the above, there can be no question that the BÂU emphasizes the merits of knowledge as well as, and in some cases over, the merits of action (i.e. sacrifice). However, there are similar notions expressed in the DPM, though they are perhaps not so predominant. For example, and as mentioned above in chapter two, there is a recurrent emphasis on performing the Vedic sacrifices with the correct corresponding knowledge. The knowledge which is generally considered important is the "mythological significance" of particular ritual acts, which are always re-enactments of deeds performed by the gods. The phrase "he who knows this", or similar phrases, occur many

times throughout the DPM, (e.g. ÇB I,1,4,17; I,2,3,7; I,2,5,7; I,4,1,36; and I,5,3,14), and is unquestionably emphasizing the importance of knowledge. Also, "mind" is glorified in the DPM, such as when Prajâpati declares mind's superiority over speech (ÇB I,4,5,8-12), and when it is stated (ÇB I,7,4,22) that,

"By the mind, assuredly, all this (universe) is obtained (or pervaded, âptam): hence he thereby obtains this All by the mind".

And, finally, there is a statement in the DPM (ÇB I,6,1,21) which suggests, similar to BÂU IV,4,22 quoted above, that possession of knowledge takes precedence over action:

"And he who knows this, even though he do much evil, is not shut out from the sacrifice".

The passages which have been dealt with above, not to mention the fine study by Herman Tull on the Vedic origins of karma, present, I believe, a strong case for the suggestion that the BÂU is not radically opposed to, but is rather an extension of, the rest of the ÇB, including the DPM. In the following and final section, the case for "continuity" between the DPM and BÂU will be further strengthened by considering the specific thesis of this present study, i.e. that the treatment of the topics of "fear" and "antagonism" in the BÂU are rooted in, and an extension of, the Brâhmanic notions as expressed in the ÇB's discussion of the DPM.

(iv) Fear and Antagonism in the DPM and the BÂU:

Fear, antagonism, and, most appropriately, "fear of antagonism", are subjects which are prominent in both the DPM and the BÂU. While there is much agreement which can be found between the two texts with

respect to discussion of these topics, there is no question the the BÂU has taken the discussion a significant step beyond anything found in the DPM. Not surprisingly, this is related to the "unity of all in *Brahman*", as it is espoused in the BÂU. I propose that the DPM identifies, or at least implies, the source of the fear and antagonism which exist in the performance of a sacrifice, and has devised many ways of dealing with, or even combatting, this fear and antagonism. Further, I propose that the BÂU has gone one step further and devised a method by which fear and antagonism may be eliminated completely. And finally, I propose that the ideas expressed in the BÂU are based upon, and merely an extension of, (though an impressive extension nonetheless), notions already prevalent in the DPM.

Let us begin with the DPM. First, we must ask ourselves exactly what it is that the sacrificer and priests are doing when they perform the DPM. Aside from the mundane obligations of performing a sacrifice to fulfill one's duty in society, the sacrifice is performed to gain certain desires which, as mentioned above, include the obtaining of progeny, cattle, rain, long life, victory over foes, and ultimately, the world of the gods. The manner in which the sacrificer obtains these things is by re-enactment of the sacrifices by which the gods obtained their own desires. This re-enactment also includes the manipulation of the macrocosmic world by manipulating the "equivalent" elements in the microcosmic sacrificial world.

However, for a sacrifice to be successful, that is, for a sacrifice to obtain for the sacrificer all relevant desires, not only must the "equivalents" be completely understood, but the manipulation of the sacrificial elements, and thus the sacrificial performance in

general, must be flawless. The reason why it must be flawless is that an unsuccessful sacrifice does not merely have a neutral effect, leaving the sacrificer in the same position as he was prior to the sacrificial performance, but rather can leave him in a much worse position. For example, an incorrectly performed ritual designed to weaken one's enemy may result in a strengthening of the enemy.

Thus, it is clear that the DPM must be performed as flawlessly as possible, and that there is clearly a justification for fear that the sacrifice may be ruined. In fact, it may be argued that, in the context of the sacrifice, all fear is generated from the concern that the sacrifice may be spoiled. That is, anything that may potentially spoil the sacrifice must be feared, and likewise, must be dealt with. In this sense, the sacrifice takes place against the background of a clear duality: that which could make the sacrifice successful, and that which might spoil it.

This duality is expressed in several ways throughout the DPM. For example, on the mythological level, there is the duality of the gods and the *asuras*. As discussed above, the gods were forever concerned that the *asuras* and *rakṣas* might disturb their sacrifice. Likewise, fear of technical errors is another way of saying "fear of spoiling the sacrifice". Thus, the DPM not only explains, in many cases, the proper manner in which a ritual act is to be performed, but it also describes the specific consequences of performing the act incorrectly. This is the specific duality of correct ritual action versus incorrect ritual action; there is clearly no intermediate ground between them<sup>22</sup>. This fear of technical errors also extends to the fear of antagonism between the various gods present at the sacrifice, as well as to the fear of



antagonism between "unappeased" ritual implements. These fears, which are fears of spoiling the sacrifice, are again related to the correct versus incorrect performance of the sacrifice. And finally, fear of ritual impurity provides yet another clear example of duality. There is that which is ritually pure, and that which will make the sacrifice impure.

As discussed in chapter two, ritual impurity, as I have defined it, may be caused by a wide variety of things, including physical impurity, human foes, and evil spirits. In chapter two, it was noted that in the discussion of the DPM itself, there was little or no attempt to clearly distinguish between the various types or causes of ritual impurity. I would now argue that the reason for this is the acknowledgement of the simple duality mentioned above, i.e. that which will make the sacrifice successful, and that which will spoil the sacrifice. Thus, it would seem as though the specific cause of ritual impurity is of no consequence to the Vedic sacrificer. Either some aspect of the sacrifice is pure or impure, and little else matters.

This would also explain why the definition of the *raṅṣas* is so elusive. I would propose that the *raṅṣas* are conceived of by the sacrificers to be physical impurity at one moment, evil spirits at the next, because physical impurity and evil spirits are merely two representatives of the same thing, namely, that which will spoil the sacrifice through impurity. Furthermore, I propose that they are labelled as *raṅṣas* on account of the fact that they represent the counterpart in the human context to the challengers and disrupters of the god's sacrifice, namely, the *asuras*.

This general duality of successful/unsuccessful sacrifice is even acknowledged at a successful performance of the DPM, whereby, at the end of the sacrifice, the *rakṣas* are allotted their share in the sacrifice (ÇB I,9,2,33) by being presented with the contents of the "rubbish heap" (with the text, "The Rakṣas' share art thou!"), which includes the husks from the rice which were previously winnowed away (with the text, "Cleared off is the rakṣas, cleared off are the evil doers" (ÇB I,1,4,21)).

Thus, at no time in the performance of the DPM is the above mentioned duality eliminated or overcome. And, because this is the case, the Vedic sacrificer, forced to work within this duality, attempted to maximize the positive or successful sacrificial aspects while minimizing the negative or unsuccessful sacrificial aspects. For this reason, the sacrifice takes on many of the qualities of a battle between foes. For example, in the mythology of the ÇB, virtually every sacrifice performed by the gods included some sort of battle with the *asuras*, which implies that any human re-enactment of such a sacrifice will also entail some sort of battle. Aside from the references already provided in chapter two which support this idea, there are several passages which explicitly make reference to the battle-like quality of the sacrifice. For instance, during the DPM's discussion of the fore-offerings, it is stated:

"A battle, it is true, is witnessed whenever any one performs the fore-offerings" (ÇB I,5,3,6).

Furthermore, it is stated (ÇB I,2,4,1-3) that the thunderbolt which Indra used to slay *Vṛtra* was divided into four parts: the chariot and arrow, used by the *kṣatriya* class, and the sacrificial post and wooden

sword, used by the Brahmin class. This implies that the power of Indra's thunderbolt for battle is imbued to the warrior in the form of his tools of battle, and likewise, is imbued to the priest in the form of his tools for battle. Thus, it is stated:

"Now when [the priest] takes up the wooden sword, he raises that thunderbolt against the wicked, spiteful enemy, even as Indra at that time raised the thunderbolt against Vṛtra".

By engaging the "enemy" in battle, the Vedic sacrificer has accepted the dualistic nature of the sacrifice and attempts to succeed in the sacrifice by conquering his enemy. And, as I have proposed, the enemy, in its simplest form, is that which would prevent a successful sacrifice.

The implied comparison between the battles of the *kṣatriya* class and those of the Brahmin class suggest that in some way, the sacrifice is mirroring the non-sacrificial, mundane world. Whether or not the similarity is to be explained, as does J.C. Heesterman<sup>23</sup>, by proposing that the Vedic sacrifices, as presented in the *brāhmaṇas*, are highly ritualized versions of what were originally actual battles, or agonistic contests, between competing groups of people (tribes?), must remain ultimately unanswered. Alternatively, it could be proposed that the battle-like quality of the sacrifice may be explained by suggesting that the Vedic authors projected onto the divine world the contemporary situation in their human world. The mythological battles of the gods and *asuras* would tend to support this proposal.

In any case, and for what ever reason, the experience of duality in the Vedic world, which included the dualities of friend and foe, eater and eaten, seems to have remained intact throughout the DPM and Vedic *çrauta* ritual in general. However, while the DPM does not espouse

an overcoming of duality, it certainly does imply that duality was not the "original" state of the universe. Though little space is devoted, in the DPM, to discussing the origin of this duality, and no space whatsoever is devoted to how such duality might be overcome, the origin of duality out of unity is expressed, at least in mythological terms, many times: "The gods and asuras, both sprung from Prajâpati".

It is the possibility of overcoming duality which takes the BÂU's discussions of fear and antagonism a step further than those of the DPM. As mentioned above (chapter three), duality is overcome, according to the BÂU, through the realization of *Brahman*, who permeates all, is the Self of each self, and in whom all things are unified. In fact, the shift from duality to unity which occurs with the realization of *Brahman* is described as a "returning" to unity; duality itself sprang, on account of desire, from an original state of unity. Furthermore, by identifying duality, i.e. the "other", as being the origin of fear, which is a fear of antagonism, the BÂU effectively eliminates the possibility of both fear and antagonism by eliminating duality and returning to unity. Thus, the main question with which we must deal is not whether or not the BÂU has progressed beyond the DPM, but rather, whether or not this new step which it has taken represents a further development of traditional Brâhmanic concepts, as represented by the ÇB's discussion of the DPM, or a radical rejection of them.

Even a cursory glance at the BÂU is sufficient to demonstrate its continuity, at least in a superficial manner, with the DPM. For example, the predominant figure in the BÂU is Yâjñavalkya, who is, no doubt, intended to be one and the same ritual authority who is often referred to in the DPM. And, as mentioned above, whether or not he is

intended to be the same character, the Yājñavalkya of the BÂU is without question an authority on Vedic *çrauta* ritual. Also, though there is, in the BÂU, only one example of antagonism between the gods and *asuras*, the gods, nevertheless, utilize the sacrifice to overcome the *asuras*, a method which perfectly parallels the instances found in the DPM.

However, there are other, less superficial passages in the BÂU which point towards a continuity with the DPM. For example, in the DPM, the origin of the gods and *asuras*, which may be seen as representing, in mythological terms, the origin of duality, is Prajâpati. Interestingly, Prajâpati, in the BÂU, is either equated with *Brahman* (e.g. BÂU V,3,1), or one step removed from *Brahman* (e.g. BÂU III,6,1; IV,3,33; V,5,1). That is, if Prajâpati is not equated with *Brahman*, then he is the first creation of *Brahman*, and as *Brahman* is not different from Prajâpati, then once again duality, at least in the above mentioned passages from the BÂU, has its origin in Prajâpati.

Thus, both the DPM and the BÂU agree upon the origin of duality from unity. And, furthermore, as is evident in the DPM, and as is explicitly stated in the BÂU, the origin of fear is duality. Therefore, the following ideas can be said to be shared by the DPM and the BÂU: the implication (DPM) or explicit statement (BÂU) of the "problem", which is fear; the origin of the "problem", which is duality; and, the origin of duality, which is unity. And, if these texts can be said to share these ideas, then it would, no doubt, be fair to propose that these ideas, when demonstrated in the BÂU, were borrowed from traditional Brâhmanic notions. Thus, I propose that (1) the explicit recognition of the origin of fear as duality, and (2) the overcoming of fear and antagonism through the overcoming of duality, represent the "new" ideas which are

proposed by the BĀU, and that they are not a radical rejection of, but a logical development out of, traditional Brāhmaṇic thought in general, and the sort of Brāhmaṇic speculations found in the ÇB's discussion of the DPM.

However, we must still consider the question of how the BĀU, once it had taken the traditional Brāhmaṇic notions a significant step further, viewed the old "Brāhmaṇic" sacrifice. As argued above, the BĀU does not reject Brāhmaṇic sacrifice, nor does it seriously denigrate it. Rather, it points out its limitations, which include the uselessness of action without knowledge, those desires for which the sacrifice is effective for obtaining, and that which it cannot achieve on its own, which is full realization of *Brahman*. In fact, there is one passage where the BĀU describes the sacrifice in much the same terms as I have described it above, i.e. as a method for trying to conquer the (dualistic) world while remaining in the dualistic world:

"Those who thus know this [set of equivalents] (even Gṛhasthas), and those who in the forest worship faith and the True (Brahman Hiraṇyagarbha), go to ... Brahman. In these worlds of brahman they dwell exalted for ages. There is no returning for them. But they who CONQUER the worlds (future states) by means of sacrifice [go to the world of the fathers, then to the moon, only to be born again as human]" (BĀU VI,2,15-16; emphasis mine).

The implication here is that, while sacrificing may allow one to obtain enough good merit to escape this human realm for some time (not to mention allowing one to obtain many other desires), specific knowledge is required for one to go to the world of *Brahman*. Furthermore, there is a very interesting statement made with regard to the "reality" of the dualistic world:

"As the spider comes out with its thread, or as small sparks come forth from fire, thus do all senses, all worlds, all Devas, all beings come forth from that Self [i.e. Brahman]. The Upaniṣad

(the true name and doctrine) of that Self is 'the True of the True'. Verily, the senses are the true, and he is the true of the true" (BÂU II,1,20).

This is stating, I believe, that while the world of duality is true, the world of unity is the true of the true. This is hardly an out-right rejection of duality, but merely a stating that duality is a lower truth than is unity.

Finally, due to the relatively close chronological proximity of the first thirteen *kāṇḍas* of the ÇB with the BÂU, it may be assumed that both the DPM and BÂU were written in a period where there was a transition taking place from traditional Brâhmaṇic thought to Upaniṣadic thought. Thus, it is not surprising that the BÂU offers an interesting mixture of Brâhmaṇic and Upaniṣadic ideas. For example, despite proclaiming the truth of the unity of all in *Brahman*, the BÂU still includes a mythological account of antagonism between the gods and *asuras* to discuss a particular topic. Furthermore, the fear and antagonism which is obviously implied in the sacrificial act of procreation (BÂU VI,4,1-11) demonstrates once again the presence of Brâhmaṇic notions interspersed with the newer Upaniṣadic ideas.

The fact that Vedic literature shows marked changes in emphasis over its thousand year history, such as the change in emphasis found between the *brâhmaṇas* and *upaniṣads*, is not surprising. After all, times change. When the Aryan peoples first arrived in northwest India, they were tribes of nomads, herding cattle from plain to plain. As Vedic society slowly settled into northern India, and slowly relinquished its nomadic lifestyle, it is hardly surprising that corresponding changes in their religious life should ensue. For example, as the Vedic peoples became more settled into one area, it is

not surprising that their religious rituals, i.e. the sacrifice, would become more intricate. Long and complex rituals hardly suit a nomadic lifestyle. Furthermore, contact with non-Aryan groups of people must have had, to a greater or lesser extent, an influence upon how the Aryan peoples developed. Anything which is currently considered as being a component of the so-called Vedic period is not necessarily to be assumed as having Aryan origins. Unfortunately, it is now quite impossible to categorize all components of Vedic literature into Aryan and non-Aryan.

However, the question is not whether or not changes continued to occur during the Vedic period's thousand year history. That much is clear. The question is whether the *upaniṣads* represent a continuation of this change and growth, or a rejection of it. The arguments presented above, I believe, support the proposition that the *upaniṣads* are continuous with that which preceded them, and are a further extension of ideas already expressed in the preceding literature. In any case, with respect to the notions of "fear" and "antagonism", it is clear that the BÂU is an extension and not a rejection of the ideas expressed in the DPM.





NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE:

1. The term "Brāhmaṇic" is used with various meanings by different scholars. For the purposes of this study, the term "Brāhmaṇic" refers to that which is found in the *brāhmaṇa* texts.
2. Herman W. Tull. *The Vedic Origins of Karma*. (Albany: State University of New York) 1989.
3. see, e.g., A.L. Basham. *The Wonder that was India (Third Revised Edition)*. (London: Sidgwick & Jackson) 1988, p. xix
4. see, e.g., A.L. Basham. *The Wonder that was India*. p. xix;  
Jan Gonda. *Vedic Literature: Saṃhitās and Brāhmaṇas*. (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz) 1975, p. 22
5. see, e.g., A.L. Basham. *The Wonder that was India*. p. xix
6. I have put the term "religious" into quotation marks in order to express some hesitation with equating the contents in the Vedic texts with the Western notion of "religion". However, despite my uneasiness with this term, there is not, at this time, a more suitable term.
7. see, e.g., Thomas Hopkins. *The Hindu Religious Tradition*. (Encino: Dickenson Pub. Co.) 1971, p. 14
8. Such assertions, however, come from textual evidence alone, and any assumption of a direct extrapolation from textual sources to societal beliefs and practices in general, must remain somewhat tenuous and unsubstantiated.
9. see, e.g., Jan Gonda. *Mantra Interpretation in the Çatapatha Brāhmaṇa*. (New York: E.J. Brill) 1988, p. 1;  
Brian K. Smith. "The Unity of Ritual". *Indo-Iranian Journal* 29 (1986), p. 79
10. Julius Eggeling (trans.). *The Çatapatha Brāhmaṇa According to the Text of the Mādhyandina School: Vol. 1*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 1882, p. xlvi
11. see, e.g., Thomas Hopkins. *The Hindu Religious Tradition*. p. 30
12. Frits Staal and C.V. Somayajipad. *Agni: The Vedic Ritual of the Fire Altar*. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass) 1986, pp. 51-52

13. Julius Eggeling (trans.). *The Çatapatha Brâhmaṇa: Vol. 1.* p. xlviii
14. Naama Drury. *The Sacrificial Ritual in the Çatapatha Brâhmaṇa.* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass) 1981, p. 12
15. see, e.g., Frits Staal and C.V. Somayajipad. *Agni.* p. 40;  
Julius Eggeling (trans.). *The Çatapatha Brâhmaṇa: Vol. 1.* p. xlviii
16. see, e.g., Jan Gonda. *Vedic Literature.* p. 340;  
Jan Gonda. *Mantra Interpretation.* p. 1: "[The purpose of the Brâhmaṇas is] to teach methods of controlling, or exerting influence upon, the powers operating in the world as far as man's interests are concerned".
17. Jan Gonda. *Vedic Literature.* p. 340
18. *Ibid.* p. 20
19. *Ibid.* p. 268
20. *Ibid.* p. 8
21. *Ibid.* p. 15
22. *Ibid.* p. 15
23. *Ibid.* p. 26ff
24. *Ibid.* p. 29
25. see, e.g., Julius Eggeling (trans.). *The Çatapatha Brâhmaṇa: Vol. 1.* p. xxviii;  
Jan Gonda. *Vedic Literature.* p. 313
26. Jan Gonda. *Vedic Literature.* p. 8
27. *Ibid.* p. 8
28. *Ibid.* p. 9

29. *Ibid.* p. 173
30. *Ibid.* p. 314
31. *Ibid.* p. 314
32. Julius Eggeling (trans.). *The Çatapatha Brâhmaṇa: Vol. 1.* p. xxii
33. *Ibid.* p. xxii
34. *Ibid.* p. xxv
35. *Ibid.* p. xxvi
36. Jan Gonda. *Vedic Literature.* p. 268
37. *Ibid.* p. 339
38. *Ibid.* p. 341
39. *Ibid.* p. 339
40. see, e.g., Herman W. Tull. *The Vedic Origins of Karma.*
41. Juan Mascaro (trans.). *The Upanishads.* (Markham: Penguin Books) 1965, p. 7
42. I have described certain *upanishads* as being both "contained within" and "appended to" a given *brâhmaṇa*. Both of these descriptions are correct. For example, while the ÇB on the whole (i.e. including all fourteen *kāṇḍas*), does contain within it the Bṛhadâraṇyaka Upaniṣad (which comprises the final portion of the fourteenth *kāṇḍa*), the Vedic tradition, by its method of distinguishing types of literature, does distinguish between *brâhmaṇas* and *upanishads*, and considers the latter to be appended to the former.
43. Jan Gonda. *Vedic Literature.* p. 423
44. *Ibid.* p. 423; Unfortunate for the sake of precision, the relationships between the *saṃhitās*, *brâhmaṇas*, *upanishads*, and

āraṇyakas are complex. That is, the divisions between these classes of literature are often blurred, and do not consistently follow strict and recognizable rules.

45. *Ibid.* p. 323
46. *Ibid.* p. 332
47. *Ibid.* p. 323
48. *Ibid.* p. 324
49. Julius Eggeling (trans.). *The Çatapatha Brâhmaṇa: Vol. 1.* p. xxvii
50. *Ibid.* p. xxvii
51. *Ibid.* p. xxvii
52. Jan Gonda. *Vedic Literature.* p. 352
53. Julius Eggeling (trans.). *The Çatapatha Brâhmaṇa: Vol. 1.* p. xxviii
54. *Ibid.* p. xxviii
55. *Ibid.* pp. xxix-xxx
56. *Ibid.* p. xxx
57. *Ibid.* pp. xxx-xxx1
58. Jan Gonda. *Vedic Literature.* p. 353
59. Julius Eggeling (trans.). *The Çatapatha Brâhmaṇa: Vol. 1.* p. xxxii
60. Jan Gonda. *Vedic Literature.* p. 353
61. *Ibid.* p. 354

62. *Ibid.* p. 354
63. *Ibid.* p. 354
64. F. Max Müller (trans.). *The Upaniṣads.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 1884.
65. Robert E. Hume (trans.). *The Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads (Second Edition, Revised).* (London: Oxford University Press) 1971.
66. S. Radhakrishnan (trans.). *The Principal Upaniṣads.* (New York: Humanities Press Inc.) 1969.
67. Madhavananda (trans.) *The Bṛhadâraṇyaka Upaniṣad with the Commentary of Śankarâcârya (Third Edition).* (Mayavati: Advaita Ashram) 1950.
68. Jonathan Z. Smith. *Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 1982, pp. 53-65: In an essay entitled "The Bare Facts of Ritual", Jonathan Z. Smith has provided a clear example of the large discrepancy which can exist between the way in which a ritual is traditionally described and the manner in which it is actually performed. The specific focus of Smith's study was the bear hunting rituals of the paleo-Siberian peoples. What Smith deduced from comparing records of the paleo-Siberian traditional descriptions of their bear hunt with ethnographic accounts of their actual bear hunts was that not only were the two accounts vastly different, but that the so-called primitive peoples involved were very much aware of the discrepancies. In his essay, Smith furthers his continuing arguments against classical anthropology and sociology which have insisted that such "discrepancies" between theory and practice could exist only in a people whose self-consciousness was so deficient that the label "primitive" was appropriate. While Smith's final conclusions are not strictly relevant to this present thesis, his point is well taken.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO:

1. Jan Gonda. *The Ritual Sūtras.* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz) 1977, p. 494
2. Julius Eggeling (trans.). *The Çatapatha Brâhmaṇa: Vol. 1.* p. xlvii

3. *Ibid.* p. xlviii
4. *Ibid.* p. 1
5. *Ibid.* pp. 1-2
6. *Ibid.* p. 1
7. *Ibid.* p. xlviii
8. However, all information from the Kâtyâyana Çrautasûtra was obtained from Eggeling's notes to his translation of the ÇB.
9. As the ÇB is written specifically for the *adhvaryu*, and discusses, on the whole, only his specific duties, the following outline is centered around the *adhvaryu*, and ignores altogether many of the duties of the other priests. Thus, unless explicitly stated, all of the following tasks are performed by the *adhvaryu* or *âgnîdhra*.
10. The cake offered to Indra-Agni at the New moon sacrifice may be optionally replaced with a libation of sweet and sour milk (*sannayya*) to Indra alone.
11. see, e.g., Jan Gonda. *Vedic Literature.* p. 386
12. Thomas Hopkins. *The Hindu Religious Tradition.* p. 30
13. Jan Gonda. *Vedic Literature.* p. 269
14. I have equated the term "impurity" with anything which might come from outside of the sacrifice and spoil the sacrifice. While the text does make use of the terms "pure" and "impure", it does not explicitly extend their meanings to the extent which I have done. However, I believe that my use of the term "impurity" is justified (as may become apparent below), and the text states nothing which might explicitly invalidate my usage. There is no doubt, however, that I am imposing distinct categories onto the text which do not explicitly exist.
15. In keeping with Eggeling's translation, the English equivalent of *devas*, i.e. gods, and the Sanskrit term for the anti-gods, i.e. the *asuras*, will be utilized.
16. *Asuras* and *rakşas* appear to represent two varieties of "evil spirits"; however, the text itself provides no clear basis for distinction between the two.

17. see, e.g., Jan Gonda. *Some Observations on the Relations Between "Gods" and "Powers" in the Veda, A Propos of the Phrase Sunuḥ Sahasaḥ.* ('S-Gravenhage: Mouton and Co.) 1957.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE:

1. F. Max Müller (trans.). *The Upaniṣads.* p. xxx
2. So far as I have been able to determine.
3. Jan Gonda. *Vedic Literature.* p. 354
4. Mādhavānanda (trans.). *The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad.* p. 96
5. *Ibid.* p. 222

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR:

1. Herman W. Tull. *The Vedic Origins of Karma.* pp. 14-21
2. *Ibid.* p. 15
3. *Ibid.* p. 15
4. It should also be mentioned that, in the opinions of these scholars, the golden age of India also ended with the *upaniṣads*. That is, not only the *brāhmaṇas*, but also everything which has succeeded the *upaniṣads*, was seen to represent, to a greater or lesser extent, a degradation of the golden age.
5. Herman W. Tull. *The Vedic Origins of Karma.* p. 16
6. *Ibid.* p. 17
7. *Ibid.* p. 17
8. *Ibid.* p. 18



9. *Ibid.* p. 19
10. *Ibid.* p. 19
11. *Ibid.* p. 16
12. *Ibid.* pp. 16-17
13. *Ibid.* p. 19
14. *Ibid.* p. 20
15. Heinrich Zimmer. *Philosophies of India.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 1969, pp. 355-356
16. Jan Gonda. *Vedic Literature.* pp. 351-352
17. Herman W. Tull. *The Vedic Origins of Karma.*
18. With respect to the comparison of the DPM with the BÂU, several considerations must be noted. The first of these is the fact that it is not entirely legitimate to extrapolate all Brâhmanic comment upon Vedic sacrifice from the ÇB's discussion of a single ritual, i.e. the DPM. However, as stated above, and with regard to the present topic of "fear and antagonism", I believe that the ÇB's discussion of the DPM is, on the whole, at least representative of the ÇB's approach to Vedic çrauta ritual. Likewise, the BÂU, while being one of the longest and most influential *upanisads*, cannot, without justification, be taken as the definitive representative of the *upanisads* in general. However, limitations of time and space hardly provide for a general comparison of all *brâhmanas* with all *upanisads*, and thus the limited comparison of a single çrauta ritual with a single *upanisad* is an unfortunate necessity.  
 However, it may be argued that, in several ways, this comparison of the DPM and BÂU may actually skew the data in favour of "continuity" as opposed to "radical opposition". First, because the BÂU is appended directly to the ÇB, one might expect to find more continuity between the DPM and the BÂU than with a *upanisad* taken from a different veda, e.g. the Chândogya Upanisad of the Sâmvêda. However, by using a çrauta ritual and a *upanisad* from the same tradition, it is possible to better isolate those differences between the *brâhmanas* and *upanisads* which are explained by any "radical" shift in thought, and eliminate the less relevant differences which would be inherent in any inter-tradition comparison. Finally, it may be logical to conclude that

the close chronological proximity of the first 94 *adhyāyas* of the ÇB with the final six, i.e. the BĀU, again skews the data towards "continuity". Obviously, this conclusion was not so logical as to be apparent to Müller, Hopkins, or the any of the other major Vedic scholars of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Furthermore, if the junction between the bulk of the ÇB and BĀU does indeed represent, chronologically speaking, the transitional period from Brāhmaṇic thought to Upaniṣadic thought, this is the best period to examine with respect to evaluating the claims made by the traditional Vedic scholars.

19. Jan Gonda. *Vedic Literature*. p. 339
20. Herman W. Tull. *The Vedic Origins of Karma*. p. 17
21. Mādhavānanda (trans.). *The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. p. 563
22. Though certain particular acts are mentioned as being optional.
23. J.C. Heesterman. *The Inner Conflict of Tradition*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 1985.



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