FINDING ANTIGONE’S VOICE
FINDING ANTIGONE’S VOICE:
WOMAN AND THE DIALECTIC

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A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree
Master of Arts

McMaster University
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MASTER OF ARTS (1997) (Philosophy) McMaster University Hamilton, Ontario

TITLE: Finding Antigone's Voice: Woman and the Dialectic

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NUMBER OF PAGES: 116
Abstract

In this thesis, I investigate Hegel's understanding of woman and the role she plays in the dialectical advance of identity. I claim that Hegel's discussion of woman in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* is problematic in that it fails to recognize the difference internal to the category of woman. Hegel treats woman as a homogenous category, which is incapable of internal differentiation. I then investigate the possibility that this inability to recognize woman's difference is indicative of a problem inherent in Hegel's dialectical method itself. I reject this claim by focussing on the necessity of unity for contradiction in Hegel's dialectic. Specifically, I defend a reading of Hegel, which emphasizes that the form of the logical requires both unity and difference, and that if the imminent necessity of a category is to develop properly, both of these elements must be present. Finally, I claim that one may be able to enrich Hegel's discussion of woman if one adopts Kristeva's perspective on the split mother/woman. If one recognizes woman as a heterogeneous category, one can have a conception of woman that sees her as more than merely an Other for male identity.
Acknowledgement

I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Sam Ajzenstat for agreeing to supervise this project. His comments on my work and suggestions for improvement proved helpful and insightful. I would also like to thank Dr. Jay Lampert for his help with this project. The vigilance with which he assessed earlier versions of this thesis was instrumental to the success of the project. In addition, his support and encouragement was imperative to its completion. I thank my husband Paul and my children: Cammi and Amos, for their love and support throughout my studies. Finally, I would like to thank McMaster University for providing the funding necessary to this thesis.
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Introduction

In order to understand the ways in which woman has been limited by male-stream philosophy, philosophy that deals with the questions posed by and pertaining to men, it will be helpful to read both contemporary and traditional philosophers with an eye toward their treatment of woman. One must inquire to what extent woman is included in philosophical discourse. It is my intention to conduct such an inquiry, focussing on the philosophical system of G.W.F. Hegel. Hegel's account of woman is problematic, in the sense that he does not grant woman the same possibilities for freedom that he grants man. Woman can only be free through man's activity in the state. This freedom is illusory, as it rests on man’s work, not the active self-determination of woman. Further, woman’s freedom is only represented by man; man, as the head of the family, speaks for woman. Woman is a male construct, in Hegel’s philosophy. He does not recognize the internal difference in the category of woman. On this reading, Hegel can only see woman in terms of the meaning she holds for male identity. Despite this problematic account of woman, I argue that Hegel's dialectical method can be defended, and may even be a useful approach for feminist thinkers to adopt.
I begin, in chapter one, by examining Hegel's general philosophical system. Hegel intended that philosophy be raised to the level of a Science (PhS, §5). Science alone holds the truth because only Science contains its opposition sublated within it (Hegel, PhS, §32). This has an important implication for Hegel's philosophical method. As a method seeking truth, it must be capable of sublating opposition. The remainder of chapter one looks at the character of Hegel's method as it develops in four themes, so as to reveal the internal movement of this sublation. These themes are: the rationality of the actual and the actuality of the rational, the dialectic, intersubjective self-consciousness, and the freedom of the will. All of these themes demonstrate the self-movement of Hegel's dialectical method.

Having obtained a general orientation to Hegel's work, I proceed to look closely at his discussion of woman. Because woman is discussed primarily in the context of the family, I start by looking at the constitution of the family and the function it performs in the attainment of freedom. I then turn to Hegel's views on woman and her role within the family. I argue that Hegel is unable to see woman as an active political agent. Further, his philosophy limits woman to a tragic existence, an existence where woman is not free, nor does she reflect on this lack of freedom.

In chapter three I investigate Hegel's claims more closely using the tools of feminist analysis. A survey of the feminist literature on Hegel reveals a discontent with his use of The Antigone. Hegel neglects those aspects of The
Antigone that reveal woman as empowering and affirmative. Feminists claim that Hegel ignores Antigone’s political action and instead focuses on her defense of familial duty. This inability to listen to the voice of Antigone and see the activism in her actions, they claim, is symptomatic of Hegel’s treatment of woman in general.

The implications of Hegel’s position on woman comprise the remainder of this chapter. I look at the argument put forth by Kristeva and others, that the creation of passive woman as man’s opposite, despite her active orientation, provides insight into the problems inherent in Hegel’s method itself. This group of feminists claims that Hegel’s discussion of woman is symptomatic of his construction of the Other as merely a logical negation throughout his philosophy. All otherness, they claim, is a construct of the self, and as such is an illusory otherness. On this reading, Hegel’s philosophy does not unite difference as such, but merely represses difference in order to impose unity.

In Chapter Four I defend Hegel against Kristeva’s claim that his entire philosophical system is focused on unity to the exclusion of difference. I look at three main areas of Hegel’s philosophy that are criticized by Kristeva. The first criticism concerns the notion of the Other that is put to use in Hegel’s writing on desire found in the “Lordship and Bondage” Chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Here lies the most obvious reduction of the Other to the same, claims Kristeva (1974, 135). I critically challenge this claim and defend an understanding of the interplay of self and Other that does not reduce both
categories to the same. I do so by referring to Hegel's writing on the Something/Other limit in the *Encyclopaedia Logic*.

Next, I look at Kristeva's discussion of Force. Here, she claims, is where idealism disposes with otherness in the form of negativity, in order to emphasize the positive, unifying ability of negation. Again, I defend a reading of Hegel that sees the relationship of two moments, negation and negativity, as a relationship of both unity and difference.

Finally, I conduct an examination of Kristeva's critique of the dialectic itself. This criticism lies at the heart of Kristeva's problems with Hegel, and for this reason is of the utmost importance. I argue that Kristeva emphasizes only one side of Hegel's dialectical method; focussing on unity, where Hegel discusses unity in difference.

This defense continues in chapter five, where I conduct an examination of the necessity of the "speculative moment", the unity that is invoked by the negation of the negation, in Hegel's method. Though I agree that Hegel does seem to emphasize the unity that he is seeking to explicate, I argue for a reading of Hegel that understands this unity as a unity in difference. If unity is at the same time difference, then the assertion that Hegel focuses on unity is also an assertion that Hegel focuses on difference. Hegel's account of unity can be seen as an account of difference.

The result of the examination in Chapters four and five is that Kristeva's claim, regarding the oppressiveness of the dialectic, is challenged. By
emphasizing Hegel’s writings on otherness, and his caution regarding the dialectical method, one can offer an alternate interpretation, whereby Hegel is concerned with difference as unity and unity as difference. He is concerned with Absolute knowledge that legitimately contains difference within it, not as a logical stepping stone to unity, but as a necessary part of the whole.

Kristeva’s critique of unity, and her insistence on the return to crisis of the subject is very important, for Hegel does seem to impose unity on the category of woman. One must recognize the subject as a process, as difference. This is especially important when examining woman. Through her focus on difference, Kristeva is able to develop an account of woman’s identity that reveals the unity and difference Hegel claims all identity must reveal. For Kristeva, woman is split, she is always double. Woman, and all subjects, embody difference. They are not subjects, but subjects-in-process.

In Chapter six I return to Hegel’s problematic account of woman. I offer an understanding of woman as difference that is influenced by Kristeva’s identity theory. This understanding, I argue, is similar to Hegel’s dialectical understanding of identity. In fact, it may be that Hegel himself would have had a similar understanding, had he allowed the internal development of the dialectic to complete itself in the category of woman. Using the notion of the “Maternal container” that is developed by Kristeva, I argue that woman’s identity must be understood as always double. If one does not understand woman in this way,
one will be forced to repress woman, and will see her as a threat to one's identity.

In conclusion, my thesis examines Hegel's account of woman and, finding it highly problematic, further examines Hegel's dialectical method and Kristeva's critique thereof. I defend a reading of Hegel's dialectical method that claims it does not focus on unity to the exclusion of difference; it does not treat all otherness as merely logical negation. However, I argue that Hegel does treat the concept of woman this way. One way of rectifying this treatment is to read Hegel's writing on woman through Kristeva's theory of the maternal container. On this account, woman can be seen as a double category. She can be seen as an instance of unity in difference, rather than a threat to identity that must be repressed, controlled and sentenced to a tragic existence.
Chapter One

Hegel's Project: an overview

Any introduction to Hegel's philosophical project is immediately faced with (at least) two difficulties. The first lies in the content of the introduction. How does one separate out "moments" of the whole for explication without reifying them as separate moments or, conversely, without being led to state the whole system? This is a very difficult task indeed, and it is further complicated by the second difficulty. An introduction cannot set out to demonstrate all of its assertions, for if it did, it would not be an introduction but the philosophical system itself. An introduction must assert what is to be proven within the body of the work. However, in making these bare assertions an introduction shows itself to be lacking in truth. In Hegel's words, "True thoughts and scientific insight are only to be won through the labor of the Notion" (PhS, §70).

This being said, even Hegel recognizes the difficulty of his work, and the need for some sort of orientation to it. What is essential is that the orientation not replace the work itself. One must labor at Hegel's philosophy if one is to find the truth. There is no "royal road to Science", only a long laborious journey (PhS, §70).

My intention, then, in this introduction to Hegel's system, is to provide a
number of key "assertions" which will both provide a context for the central discussion of this thesis, and (hopefully) an impetus for the reader to embark on his/her own journey through Hegel's texts. In reminding the reader of the bareness of assertion, I have taken care of the second problem stated above. I will deal with the first problem by making it clear that I do not intend to provide a complete and comprehensive account of Hegel's philosophy and that my discussion of various aspects of Hegel's thought will be pulled out from his system as a whole. To this extent, my discussion may at times seem to be concerned with independent aspects of the whole. However, on the contrary, the themes that I intend to discuss are all part of an inter-related system of truth, and I urge the reader to bear this point in mind.

My overview of Hegel will begin with some general comments on what it means for philosophy to be raised to the level of a Science. I will then discuss four central themes in Hegel's philosophical system: the unity of the rational and the actual, the dialectic, intersubjective self-consciousness, and the freedom of the will. These themes exemplify the self-sublation that I wish to emphasize in Hegel's dialectical method. My aim, again, is not to provide an in-depth explication of each of these themes, but a general understanding of them.

In the Preface to his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel informs us that the aim of his work is to raise philosophy to the level of a Science (PhS, §5). There are two things to note here. The first is that Hegel is not using Science as we
commonly understand it, nor is he referring to mathematical science or natural science. Hegel's notion of Science is distinctive, in that Science is the development of its own content. It is the unity of the form and its content. Or, more accurately, it is the content developed into its form so that the two, though distinguishable, are united. Hegel writes:

The true shape in which truth exists can only be the Scientific system of such a truth. To help bring philosophy closer to the Form of Science...That is what I have set myself to do

(PhS, §5).

Philosophy is a content that must develop into its proper form. This brings us to the second thing we need to note about Hegel's philosophy. He is highly critical of his predecessors who have seen philosophy as a series of refutations and counter assertions (Hegel, EL, §86). Science contains its own opposition within it. If philosophy is to become a Science it must go through a process of facing its "Other", of facing refutations and opposition (Hegel, PhS, §32). Philosophy must tarry with these oppositions. It must encounter its opposition and respond to those ideas or theories that refute its position. It cannot hide from this negativity, this demonstration of its own falsity, but it must grow forth out of it. To grow from its negativity, philosophy must reflect on it. Only when the negative is taken back into itself can philosophy be called a Science.

We may now have a sense of why it is that philosophy must be "raised" to the level of a Science. Science contains opposition and falsity within it. As such, it
is truth. Truth for Hegel is not mere correctness, but the inner adequacy of reality (Hegel, PR, §21). It is full reality; reality which has attained its proper form. Hegel's understanding of truth and reality will become clearer as we proceed. Suffice it to say that nothing stands outside the system of Science to oppose it. Further, Science develops out of itself, not relying on anything external for unification. As we will see when we look at Hegel's dialectical "method"\(^1\), philosophy must progress out of its own inner necessity. Philosophy must refute itself, and must incorporate that refutation. It must be a self-development and a self-movement if it is to be true. Philosophy must recognize its movement as a progression toward truth, not as a number of theories refuting each other.

Hegel believes that his philosophical system is a Science, a Speculative Science. We should not be surprised, then, that Hegel's philosophy is a system of rational thought which demonstrates the unity of philosophy's form and content. Or, put differently, Hegel's philosophy demonstrates the unity of reality and our perception of reality. Hegel wants to show that the Concept is real, it has an objective existence. Like Science, the Concept is not used by Hegel in the ordinary sense. It is not the concept as it is commonly understood; the thought of a thing as opposed to its reality (Hegel, EL, §9). Rather, Hegel's Concept is the unity of thought and reality and the awareness of that unity. The concept is "utterly concrete"; it has objective reality (Hegel, EL, §160). In the Concept, the appearance of reality and the consciousness of reality are the same movement in

\(^1\) Hegel uses the term "method" in a distinct way. See page 16 for a
two different designations: subjective (thought) and objective (reality). For this reason, the Concept has truth. In the concept, we realize that reality and thought are intricately united in such a way that thought is the mediated expression of reality.

With the aim of Hegel's philosophy in mind, I would like to turn to the first of our four Hegelian themes, the rationality of the actual and the actuality of the rational. In the Encyclopaedia Logic, and again in Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel writes:

> What is rational is actual,  
and what is actual is rational  
(Hegel, EL, §6; Hegel, PR, §29).

This dictum is not saying that the current state of affairs is as it should be. The copula "is" mediates the two sides of the dictum. What is rational "is" actual, not in the sense of being what is, but in the sense of being "necessary".² Hegel explains that a "contingent existence does not deserve to be called something actual" for it could just as well not be (Hegel, PR, §29). If it is actual, it must necessarily be. That is, it must be the result of an internal development of the rational itself.

The rational, which is often thought to reside in the human mind alone, has

²Necessity, for Hegel, is that which is essential to the thing. For instance, an acorn will become a tree out of necessity. It cannot grow into something else. The tree, then, expresses the inner necessity of the acorn. It is that which the acorn must become. Necessity stands in opposition to the contingent. Whether an acorn develops into a tree with 300 leaves or 301 leaves is a contingent matter and not one of inner necessity.
objectivity. The rational exists in the objects themselves. The rational is actual in
the sense of being objective. It is not a subjective ordering that is put on objects
from the outside; it is the order within the objects themselves. The rational belongs
to the object; it is actual in the world. It also belongs to the subject, and here we
see the importance of the second half of the dictum.

The actual is rational; the rationality that has objectivity in the world is also
part of the subject. The actual embodies laws that can be discovered by human
consciousness once it attains the absolute perspective. This is possible because
the form of human consciousness, as rational, is the same as the form of
objectivity, as rational.

It is important to emphasize again that Hegel is not saying that the existent,
the arbitrary unfolding of events, is rational. But that the actual, which is similar to
the existent but is understood more deeply as the laws which it exemplifies and
which in truth constitute it, is rational. That is, it is accessible to human reason and
human consciousness. The actual can be thought and known in its truth; it
exhibits a rational structure of laws and orderings which human consciousness can
dialectically discover.

What is inherent in Hegel's dictum of the rational and the actual is his desire
for philosophy to be the unity of the subjective and objective. Philosophy is not cut
off from the real, from the thing in itself. Human consciousness does not order and
impose laws on the existent. Rather, human consciousness discovers the
immanent totality of the thing itself. It does this in an active way -- through examining its own knowledge. Thus human consciousness comes to a true knowledge of things by examining its own way of knowing, and in doing so turns philosophy into a Science.

A brief look at the way philosophy becomes an inquiry into the process of knowing might be helpful. It is not my intention to examine this portion of Hegel's writing in detail but merely to give a general indication of how Hegel believes the subjective and objective to be united. Hegel's Phenomenology is an account of the experience of consciousness as it seeks to know and act in its world. It is meant to justify the claim that one can, in fact, lay out the truth of what is. Hegel wants to show that it is possible to know what is true of the world. All that is needed, and this is no small task, is for human consciousness to attain the perspective of absolute knowledge.

Hegel does not tell us why this perspective is necessary, but rather endeavors to show us that it is necessary. He begins with the most common sense knowledge, sense certainty. "Natural consciousness" which can be understood as the perspective of common sense, or everyday thinking, exists in a state of sense certainty (Hegel, PhS, §90). It believes that its encounters with objects are true if it is certain of them. There is no difference between truth and certainty, and so there is no reason to begin a quest for truth (Hegel, PhS, §91).

\[3\] For a more detailed analysis of the movement from an examination of the world as merely opposed to consciousness, to an examination of consciousness' way of knowing, see my response to Kristeva's criticism surrounding Force in
However, this claim is soon problematized. Once one has the experience of being certain, yet being wrong, the claims of sense-certainty become untrustworthy. There evolves a split between truth and certainty. Truth, it is claimed, cannot be found by relying on the sense-certainty, so one must instead rely on philosophical thought.

Throughout most of the Western philosophical tradition, the perspective of sense-certainty stands opposed to that of philosophy. Philosophers assert that one must give up what they believe to be true, at a common sense level, in order to attain a more philosophical standpoint. Thus one must change his or her way of thinking in order to suit the subject matter. The truth, then, seems to reside in the object. If one is to discover the truth, then one must adopt the correct perspective, which will grant unbiased access to the object. One must give up one's presuppositions and subjective biases, in order to discover truth.

But, as Hegel points out, this is impossible. Even if one can forget all that they know and are certain of, as Descartes attempted to do, they are still actively shaping the object under examination, for they are thinking about it (Hegel, PhS, chapter three of this thesis.

Sense-certainty begins by not wanting to examine the object and not seeing a problem with its association of truth and certainty. Here the philosopher has a very important role to play. He must prompt sense-certainty to question its own presuppositions, not by pondering over it, but by asking sense-certainty to state what it means (Hegel, PhS, §94). This is not to say that the philosopher must encourage sense-certainty to abandon its way of thinking in order to achieve a "philosophical standpoint". Rather, by prompting sense-certainty to conduct an examination of its knowledge and way of knowing, we start it on the path of self-development.
§100). Our thinking shapes the object and, consequently, shapes the truth of the object. When we posit the truth of the object as wholly subjective we run into the same problems we incurred when we believed that only the object was essential. When examining the subjective, the "I", we cannot say what it is without changing it, determining it (Hegel, PhS, §102).

We must realize that knowledge and truth require both. Hegel writes: "Thus we reach the stage where we have to posit the whole of sense-certainty itself as its essence, and no longer only one of its moments" (PhS, §103). The objective and subjective are not eternally separated, but are united in the act of knowledge. At this point, our inquiry into truth becomes, at the same time, an inquiry into knowing.

The "natural consciousness" of sense-certainty is not opposed to the philosophical perspective. Rather, the philosophical perspective develops out of the perspective of sense certainty; "nothing is Known that is not in experience, or, as it is also expressed, that is not felt to be true" (Hegel, PhS, §802). Once one begins the process of examination, one will necessarily be led, through an investigation of knowledge, to the philosophical standpoint proper, that of absolute knowledge. Each instance of questioning will lead to a new perspective, or a new state of consciousness, until one reaches the perspective that can demonstrate truth. In this abstract perspective, truth and certainty are again united, but this time in a conscious, determined way (Hegel, PhS, §86). Once one has this perspective, as Hegel asserts one does at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit,

5In absolute knowledge opposition and being are united. Here the
one has justified one's ability to state the truth, and what remains is the task of doing it.

At the heart of this discussion of the progression of consciousness, and indeed at the heart of Hegel's philosophy itself, is the dialectical method. Like the terms we have discussed above, "method" takes on a new meaning in Hegel's philosophy. A method is not a way of proceeding regardless of the content of one's actions. One does not apply the dialectical method as if it were something put on the content being studied; something that shaped it from outside the content itself. On the contrary, Hegel's method is the internal development of the dialectic, its self-movement. As we saw in our discussion of Science above, Hegel believes that the truth of philosophy must develop out of itself. It must develop in accordance with the inner necessity of philosophy. The dialectic is a logical account of this inner necessity. There has been much debate regarding the status of Hegel's dialectic and we will look at some of it in chapters three and four of this thesis. My purpose here is merely to give a general understanding of Hegel's method.

The dialectical method is a process of mediation that involves the unity of three terms. Though often referred to as thesis, antithesis and synthesis, this formulation is much too general to capture the intricacy of the dialectic (Harris, Lauer, Forester). Any attempt to explain the dialectic will meet the same fate of being overly simplistic, so I will use the example that is given by Hegel in the substance, the essence, is also known to be the subject.
Encyclopaedia Logic to demonstrate its general character. A demonstration is the most appropriate way to reveal any part of philosophy, "For the real issue is not exhausted by stating it... but by carrying it out," (Hegel, PhS, §3). Philosophy must not be explained, it must be performed.

Hegel begins his demonstration of the dialectic by pointing out that any thought will necessarily lead to its opposite. For instance, when we think the most pure, immediate thought of what Is, that of Being, we discover that this thought is impossible without being led to the opposite of Being, namely Nothing (Hegel, EL, §86). Being is a pure thought not because it is the sublation of all determinacy, but, on the contrary, because it is completely indeterminate (it can be represented by the equation $A = A$).\(^6\) When one attempts to investigate Being, one discovers that it has no determination; no qualities can be attributed to it. Being is a pure abstraction, and as such, it is Nothing (Hegel, EL, §87). Thus the attempt to think about Being results in our thinking about Nothing.

Nothing, then, is the negation of Being. Further, it is not just a negation, a denial of Being, but also a determination. This is a key point for Hegel. Negation is determination. In this instance we can see that Nothing is more determinate than Being, for Nothing can be identified as not-Being. It has a content, whereas Being remains empty.

\(^6\)There are a number of Hegelian thinkers who object to a "mathematical" interpretation of Hegel. I agree with their qualms. However, Hegel himself used equations as a heuristic construct, or representation, to aid the reader in understanding what he was trying to convey. I will follow Hegel's lead and use equations only to help explain the dialectic, not to replace it.
However, in examining Nothing, we discover that it only has its content in relation to Being. Its content is dependent on Being and has Being within it. Now, Being and Nothing are not the same. There is an intended difference between them (Hegel, EL, §88). When one thinks about what Is, one thinks about Being as the opposite of Nothing, Being as some-thing. However, because Being is not yet determinate, it turns out to be no-thing. Being and Nothing are opposites that are necessarily linked together; they are united. This unity takes the form of becoming (Hegel, EL, §88).

A becoming both Is and Is not; it contains an element of both Being and Nothing within it. These two opposing terms are united in becoming, which struggles to hold them together. This is not a true unity, but a perpetual movement from one to the other. So, Being takes Nothing back into itself, and we now have determinate Being (which can be represented as A=−A). The contradiction in this equation is obvious. It will propel the dialectic onward, for becoming has a result. The negation will be negated and we will have the new (first) category of Being-there (Hegel, EL, §89). Being-there is what has become. It is a Being which has become identical to Nothing (which can be represented as A=−−A).

The logical movement to Being-there is both a maintenance and a negation of the two earlier moments: Being and Nothing. Hegel uses the term Aufhebung to describe this movement (Hegel, EL, §96). Aufhebung, typically translated to sublate, has the connotations of negation, maintenance and transcendence. It is

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7 This transition will be further detailed in Chapter Four.
both "to cancel" in the sense of canceling a law, and "to preserve" (Hegel, EI, §96).

The unity of two moments does not cancel out their difference, but maintains them in a fusion, in a unity of difference.

Hegel's dialectical method is the key to making philosophy a Science. It will enable him to bring philosophy from "love of knowing to actual knowing" (Hegel, PhS, §5). True Science is the self-development of the Notion, or the self-determination of the Notion. This can only be attained by a method that shows that each category is self-contradictory and will develop necessarily into the next category. A proposition in philosophy that is true is also false. The falseness of the proposition does not prove it wrong, it does not require that we reject it. Rather, the result of a proposition's negation is that it becomes Other to itself, and in being Other to itself, it is related to itself. As such, the proposition incorporates its falsity (and its truth) in a new proposition. This movement will continue until we reach the Absolute Idea, the absolute unity where one's thought contains all opposition within it.

Up until this point we have been concerning ourselves with the more logical portion of Hegel's philosophy. However, Hegel also provides a rich account of the subject and its possibilities. Hegel's dialectic will ultimately lead him to an understanding of self-knowledge that is intersubjective. Self-knowledge depends on an Other, a negating, determining moment. In order to know oneself, one must take that self as an object. To do this one requires an Other who will act as a self-
reflection. The self, then, relies on an Other. The inquiry into truth that led to the unity of the objective and subjective elements discussed above, leads also to an understanding of the self as intersubjective.

When we turn our attention from objects in the world, to the process of knowing, which is the activity of consciousness, we become self-conscious (Hegel, PhS, §166). We are now conducting an investigation into the self's activity. This activity is desire (Hegel, PhS, §167). It is the desire for desired objects which moves self-consciousness. Desire is an interest in something Other, for if it were not Other it would already be possessed and thus could not be desired. In desiring, Self-consciousness sees the Other, or the object, as solely negative, as that which is only dependent. For this reason, self-consciousness seeks to negate the object by incorporating it entirely within itself. The perspective of desire will prove untenable, for the Other is not just dependent but is also independent. One both creates the object of desire, in the sense of desiring it (rather than, say, ignoring it), and one is dependent on the object of desire, for one seeks to possess it and thus have one's desire satisfied.

The object of self-consciousness' desire is not just the world, as it was for consciousness, but the world as it is for self-consciousness. That is, self-consciousness has its life as its object (Hegel, PhS, §168). Self-consciousness' orientation to this life is one of desire; it views life negatively, as dependent. However, it will learn through its experience with the Other that this is an untenable
position. In truth, Self-consciousness' desire and its life stand in a reciprocal relation of dependence and independence. Life is presupposed as the arena for desire, desire is presupposed as the making of life. As a presupposition for desire, life is in some way independent of desire; desire depends on life as the realm of possibilities for its desire.

Self-consciousness has a life (a process) that it is living (an activity). This life is in part determined by self-consciousness and is in part dependent on Life in general. That is, this particular life presupposes that there is a Universal Life, and does so necessarily, for if there were no Life in general, self-consciousness could not have this particular life. Life exists prior to this particular self-consciousness. But self-consciousness is not wholly dependent on Life. Life is dependent on it too. If there were no self-conscious beings, there would be no Universal Life. Life in general cannot exist without there being particular lives. So, we see that each must presuppose the other as its ground and possibility, yet each is the precondition for the other. This rather abstract account of the matter will become more clear as we proceed. The point I would like to emphasize is that self-consciousness will grow from a perspective of desire to one which recognizes the intersubjective nature of the self.

Self-consciousness seeks a reflection of itself in the external world; it desires another's desire. Here I am largely adopting Alexandre Kojeve's interpretation.
Because the object of desire is another's desire, or, put differently, because one needs to have the desire of another in the form of recognition so as to be certain of their "self", desire is intersubjective. A recognized self in isolation is impossible. One is dependent on Others for one's self; one requires an objective affirmation, a recognition, of one's self. Hegel opens his discussion of Lordship and Bondage with the following statement:

Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged

(Hegel, PhS, S178).

Self-consciousness is essential for-itself. However, it does not yet know itself as essential in-itself; this can only be achieved through recognition.

One can be subjectively certain that one is the center of one's world, of being essential, but one must also have an objective affirmation of this certainty in order for it to be true. If this were not the case, one could be anything just by thinking it. However, we know from experience that this is not possible. For

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8. Human desire requires another desire for its object because it requires an object which cannot be completely superseded, an independent object which is the genus of its own negation.

9Hegel gives an exposition of both the intersubjective aspect of the self and the intrasubjective aspect. His discussion of Lordship and Bondage has a double character; it is meant to examine our relationships with others, but it is also an examination of the moments of one self-consciousness. What we discover, then, is both the relationship of dependence and independence between the self and Others, and the unity of the dependent and independent aspects of self-consciousness. My discussion here will focus exclusively on the intersubjective nature of self-consciousness. For an interesting discussion of both aspects of self-consciousness, I would suggest one refer to Hegel's Dialectic of Desire and Recognition, edited by John O'Neill. New York: State University of New York, 1996.
instance, one cannot decide to be a philosophy instructor and simply walk into a classroom and assume this position. One is only an instructor if there are students, with whom one interacts, who treat one as an instructor. Without this objective confirmation of one's status as instructor, one is merely living a fantasy. In order for this recognition to have an element of objectivity, it must come from an Other who stands outside of the self. However, this Other is not just an externalization of the self, but a self in its own right. One is dependent on Others for a confirmation of one's self-understanding.

One is not wholly dependent on Others, however. If freedom is a possibility, if self-determination is a possibility, then one must in some sense be able to decide on one's self. One must be free to determine one's "self". Self-consciousness' activity is desire and one's life is the arena of one's desire (Hegel, PhS, §174). One's life can be separated out from other lives, and one's desire can be separated out from other desires. If there were no element of independence, there would be no difference. Hence there would be no self and Other to begin with. We must keep in mind that the Other is also a self-consciousness, and what is true for it, is also true for oneself. If one requires confirmation from an Other, who is independent, then one is also dependent on an Other (who requires confirmation from you as independent). The truth of self-consciousness is that it is both dependent and independent. The self stands in an intersubjective relation to Others. One cannot have a self without Others, yet one is not wholly reducible to
the Other.

To get a better understanding of the way one is both dependent and independent, let's look at Hegel's discussion of Lordship and Bondage, which I will refer to here as the dialectic of master and slave. To begin, self-consciousness, as simple being for itself, the immediate "I", encounters an Other. The Other appears as if it were an object, and likewise, self-consciousness appears to this Other as an object. Self-consciousness is certain of itself but not of the Other. Each sees the Other as an inessential object which has no truth. In order for self-consciousness to be both certain and true, it must be recognized by another self-consciousness. Hegel writes, "according to the Notion of recognition, this is possible only when each is for the other what the other is for it" (PhS, §186). One must be recognized by an equal.

In order to obtain recognition, self-consciousness tries to prove itself as "the pure negation of its objective mode" (PhS, §187). It tries to show that it is universal, and that as such it is not attached to any specific life. Thus it lays its specific life on the line. Self-consciousness is willing to risk life to prove itself universal; it puts its freedom above its natural existence.

The problem at this level of the interaction is that both self-consciousnesses are willing to risk their lives. The struggle to prove oneself essential leads to the death of one or both of the adversaries. In this sense, both selves lose, as neither receives recognition. This form of negating the Other proves impractical for self-

11This terminology is commonly used to replace Hegel's more formal "lord
consciousness. If it survives, it finds itself unrecognized at the end of the process. The Other has been "killed off", so it cannot recognize self-consciousness' essentiality.

Self-consciousness learns that there is no truth in its self-understanding. Self-consciousness, in assuming that its desire is wholly the center of all life, negates the Other's life. This move renders the affirmation of its desire, and thus the confirmation of this perspective, impossible. Self-consciousness learns from this experience that "life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness" (Hegel, PhS, §198). Previously, self-consciousness saw only its self-consciousness as essential. It saw only its universal aspect as essential. However, it now sees that the abstract immediate "I" is not the only essential thing. There are in fact two essential things: the abstract immediate "I", and the particular life of self-consciousness (Hegel, PhS, §189). However, as a self-consciousness that will become a master, it only recognizes life as essential to the Other. This self-consciousness is still willing to risk its life and this is precisely why it will become a master.¹²

If self-consciousness is to prove its desire essential, while not negating the life of the Other, it must find a new way to effect this negation. Self-consciousness and bondsman".

¹² Though I have been speaking of the master and slave interaction in progressive terms, in terms of the experience of consciousness as it learns and grows, we must keep in mind that Hegel is articulating parts of a whole. He is sorting out the elements of human interaction. It is for this reason that we can already know that the master will be willing to sacrifice his life and become a master.
negates the Other, not by negating its life, but by subjugating the Other (Hegel, PhS, §189). Hegel cautions that we must keep in mind that the actions of one self-consciousness are also the actions of the Other. The subjugation of the Other is not just an action taken on the part of the self-consciousness that will become master. The Other must also subjugate itself. It must render itself a slave by negating its own essentiality at the same time as it is negated by the master. The actions of one self-consciousness are always an interaction with the Other.

In the "life and death struggle" for recognition that will determine the two positions of master and slave, one of the self-consciousnesses values its life more than its recognition (Hegel, PhS, §187). It would rather have its desire assume the form given to it by the Other than lose that desire all together. Thus it surrenders to the Other and becomes the Other's slave.

As a dependent consciousness, the slave's "essential nature is simply to live or be for another" (Hegel, PhS, §189). The slave works on things to shape them in such a way as to satisfy the master's desire. The slave has a direct relationship to the objects on which it labors. The master, however, only consumes what the slave creates for it. The master is able to satisfy its desire without having to directly participate in the world of objects. The master, then, experiences the pleasure that comes with independence from the material world, at the same time as it experiences the pleasures of that world.

Though the Master receives recognition of the primacy of its desire, by
having that desire recognized as the essential desire, it soon realizes that it is dependent on the slave for this recognition. The master has not proven its desire to be essential after all, for its desire is dependent on the recognition of the slave. The slave is not an equal. It is, rather, one who has proven itself inessential "both by its working on the thing, and by its dependence on a specific existence" (Hegel, PhS, §191). The master's essentiality cannot be recognized by one who is inessential. Thus the outcome of this relationship is a "recognition that is one-sided and unequal" (Hegel, PhS, §191).

Although the master recognizes his dependence on the Other, he does not recognize that he is also dependent on all Others. That is, he does not realize that he must be, in part, dependent on life as the realm of possibility for his own desire. The master does not fear death. Only the slave has experienced the "absolute fear" which infected it with the negative (Hegel, PhS, §198). For the master, the negative still remains external; it has not penetrated his core being. The master believes that he is only dependent on the slave, the finite Other. The slave, on the other hand, recognizes both finite dependency and infinite dependency; he fears death, he depends on life, and his desire depends on that of the master. It is only through the slave, then, that the dichotomous relationship of unequal recognition can be overcome.

The slave, for his part, has been portrayed as wholly dependent on the Master. But this is not quite true. Just as the independence of the master turns
into its opposite, so too the dependence of the slave turns into an independence (Hegel, PhS, §194). The slave who emerges from the struggle for recognition as an inessential self will in fact prove essential to the progression of self-conscious knowledge.

The slave knows himself as dependent on the master and on life. But he also has an element of independence. He works on nature to change it. The work of the slave is the key to his independence because it has an element of permanence. Unlike desire, which negates in such a way as to remove the objectivity or independence of the object, work changes the object without destroying it. Hegel writes:

Desire has reserved to itself the pure negating of the object and thereby its unalloyed feeling of self. But that is the reason why this satisfaction is itself only a fleeting one, for it lacks the side of objectivity and permanence. Work, on the other hand, is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other words, work forms and shapes the thing

(PhS, §195).

The pleasure associated with desire is fleeting because it is based on consumption. Work, however, is a negation of the thing by changing it, not by consuming it. Thus in changing the world, the slave has his self-consciousness affirmed. The slave comes gradually to recognize his own subjectivity in a negative manner (Hegel, PhS, §196). When this occurs, the slave ceases to be a slave. The slave's growth effects a change in the master too. The master/slave
relationship changes, for if there is no slave over which to rule, one cannot be a master. The slave’s growth, then, results in the master no longer being a master. Both self-consciousnesses become equal and they recognize each other as both dependent on the Other, and independent from the Other. Though there are still problems with this scenario, its intersubjective element is visible.\footnote{The slave has not yet faced death in such a way as to overcome his fear of it. As a result, he has merely shown both himself and the Other to be enslaved to an Unchangeable master existing beyond both of them; they are both finite.} Both selves see themselves as equals engaging in a "mutual" recognition. This is intersubjectivity in the fullest sense. One recognizes one’s dependence on the Other and the Other’s dependence in turn. Both are reciprocally dependent on the Other, yet both maintain an element of independence from the Other.

The dialectical progression of self-consciousness reveals that a stable individual self-understanding must at the same time be a common social understanding; the self is a social self. It must be the symmetrical relation that Hegel calls mutual recognition. One requires an Other if one is to be a self. There can be no selves in isolation, only intersubjective selves.

In Hegel’s account of intersubjectivity, the dialectical method is central. A self meets another self who appears the same — it is another human self, who believes its desire is essential. Obviously, both desires cannot be the one essential desire. Consequently the relationship of immediate identity is driven out of itself. One engages in a struggle with the Other to see whose desire is truly essential. One self fears the loss of its life and in order to avoid this loss, affirms
the Other's desire as essential. One becomes a master and the other a slave. This unequal relation is also contradictory, as it does not satisfy the need for mutual recognition. Thus it, too, will negate itself. The slave will become a subject. We end up with a relation of both unity and difference. Self-consciousness discovers that it is both essential and inessential. It returns to the original position of seeing its desire as essential with one important difference. Now it can do so without contradiction, as it sees its desire united with the desire of the Other, which is also essential.

The self and Other are not only united in terms of self-knowledge and self-understanding, but also in the practical side of human consciousness, namely the will. Just as one came to realize that one's particular life is interconnected with universal Life, so too one must realize that one's particular will is interconnected with universal will. In Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel sets out to show the dialectical interconnection of the individual and the universal will. I would like to conclude this introduction to Hegel's work by looking briefly at this connection. I will not go into the details of the various moments of the will, instead I intend to focus on the more abstract account of the will that Hegel gives in his introduction to the Philosophy of Right. This account demonstrates more clearly both the relationship of the will to intersubjectivity, and the dialectical movement within it.

We cannot speak of the will as if it were something separate from thought. The distinction between the will and thought is just the distinction between two beings and as such they are enslaved to death, the absolute master.
differing attitudes: the practical and the theoretical (Hegel, PR, §4). These two attitudes are at the same time one. It is not that our will, as action, is separate from our thoughts. One cannot will without thinking, nor think without willing. One cannot will something without thinking of "something" as the end to which one's action is directed. Nor can one think without being active, for thinking itself is an activity. These two moments, thinking and willing, can be found in every activity. But they are also distinct; "the will is a particular way of thinking - thinking translating itself into existence [Dasein], thinking as the drive to give itself existence" (Hegel, PR, §4). The will, as a way of thinking, determines itself. For this reason, the will is freedom.

The will does not stand alone and cannot be accounted for without an account of freedom; "Will without freedom is an empty word, just as freedom is actual only as will or subject" (Hegel, PR, §4). Freedom is both the substance and the destiny of the will. Only when the will is free, only when it is in and for itself, is it actually a will. The activity of the will, as a free will, involves:

- canceling the contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity and translating its ends from their subjective determination into an objective one, while at the same time remaining with itself in this objectivity (Hegel, PR, §28).

In order to remain with itself in this objectivity, the will must take itself as an object. If the will has itself as an object, it is free. That is, the will is not limited by something external, but is limited by itself. In taking itself as an object the will is
able to determine itself. This determination can then be taken back into the will, as it recognizes it as its own. The will, in its truth, is this free will which has itself as its content. It wills itself; "freedom is willed by freedom" (Hegel, PR, §21).

Hegel's idea of freedom is very different from what is typically taken to be freedom, namely, the ability to do as one pleases. It is not opposed to this notion of freedom, though, for actual freedom develops out of the former freedom. Actual freedom has two moments: the abstract universal will, and the subjective particular will. The first moment, the abstract moment, is the will that thinks that it can will anything; it is pure possibility. This is the realm of "Abstract Right" (Hegel, PR, §34). The abstract universal will is certain that it is undetermined, unlimited. It can only prove this to itself by negating what is Other to it. But this is only negative freedom; "only in destroying something does this will have a feeling of its own existence" (Hegel, PR, §4).

The abstract universal will contains its own determination within it. This determination will issue forth from it. When this occurs, we have the second moment of the will, the subjective particular will. The particular will presents itself, at first, as being completely independent of the universal will. One decides to follow one's conscience, to decide for oneself what is the good. This is the realm of "Morality". The perspective of the particular will depends on seeing oneself as separate from others. If one is not independent of others, then one cannot have a will that is independent of Others. Just as one discovered, in the master and slave
relationship discussed above, that one is not wholly independent from Others, so too one discovers here that one's will is not wholly separate from that of Others.\textsuperscript{14}

The second moment appears opposed to the first, but in actuality it is only "a positing of what the first already is in itself" (Hegel, PR, §6). When we look closely at the claim of abstract universal will (that it can will anything, that it is unlimited) we discover that it turns into a will which is limited and subjective. If asked to say what it means when it claims to be able to will anything, the abstract universal will can only respond by saying that it could will this or that particular thing. The will wills \textit{something}, and that which it wills is a limitation (Ibid.).

The free will, or the will properly speaking, is the unity of both the abstract universal will and the particular will. Only when the particularity of the will is reflected back into universality is it free. Particularity, in order to be taken back, cannot be something external to the will itself. The free will must have what is internal to itself as its object. It must posit itself as the negative of itself. It must posit its own ideal as the subjective particular. Because this ideal is its own, the abstract universal will can return to itself from this ideal and be determined by it (Hegel, PR, §7).

Freedom, then, is "to will something determinate, yet to be with oneself in this determinacy and to return once more to the universal" (Hegel, PR, §9). The particular will reveals itself as both the same as the universal will and different from it. Gradually one comes to realize that the laws of reason, which are the self-

\textsuperscript{14} I do not intend to claim that the two movements are identical. I merely wish
expression of the particular will, are already contained in the laws and regulations of society. The particular will and the universal will exhibit the same rational structure. They are the same rational will. For one to seek the good outside of one's embodiment in social life, outside of the laws and regulations of society, does not make sense. One can be free only by obeying the law.

One has absolute freedom when one's actions are not caused externally but are chosen by the agent. If one has absolute freedom, then one is completely self-sufficient. That is not to say that one does not rely on Others. As we just stated, the Other is necessary for this self-determination. But, the dependence on the Other is only one moment of self-determination. The Other is overcome, not by fleeing from it, but by going through it.

True self-realization, the freedom of the will, returns to the starting point. The difference is that one is no longer subject to laws that come from outside oneself. One has made those laws one's own. One has come full circle to re-unite oneself with the universal in a way that is concrete and actual.

We have investigated, throughout the course of this chapter, a number of different themes that permeate Hegel's work. Each theme is a playing out of the dialectical method that forms the heart of Hegel's system of philosophy, not as a method that is applied from without, but as the self-development of the content itself. The subject and object, the self and other, the individual and the universal, all of these oppositions are interdependent and interconnected. There is a unity of to point out their similarity.
difference that forms their basis, not as a unity that unites difference, but as a unity that necessarily exists if difference is to be possible.

In the next chapter, I will direct my attention to Hegel's discussion of woman. This discussion is set in the first moment of freedom, the family. It is in the loving unity of the family that one first begins to realize one's freedom. One possesses the concrete concept of freedom first in the form of feeling, in love (Hegel, PR, §7). In love one limits oneself with reference to an Other even while knowing oneself in this limitation. One finds oneself in the Other; one returns to oneself from the Other. Now this is still a problematic stance as freedom here is "in the form of feeling" not thought (Hegel, PR, §7). But it is, in fact, the first moment of freedom and the beginning of ethical life. This discussion of the family, and woman's place within it, will constitute the focus of Chapter Two as we proceed with our orientation to Hegel's philosophy.
Chapter Two

Woman

As we saw in Chapter One, the will is free when its particularity has been taken back into the universal. The will is free when it is for-itself what it is in-itself. This freedom is attained in the state, the first moment of which is the family. Humans embody Spirit, and their laws are united with the laws of the divine. Only when we are aware of this embodiment will we be fully self-conscious. In the family, we are not yet aware of it. Nor can we become aware of it while remaining solely within the family, for the family is not a complete and self-subsistent unity.

The family is the most abstract moment of ethical life. What this means is that it is the simplest form of freedom, though not yet true freedom. The family offers only immediate freedom. Recall that freedom for Hegel is a matter of self-determination. In the family one has the experience of being certain of the freedom of self-determination, though this experience is a certainty, not a truth. One is united with oneself in the family, through the love of the Other (Hegel, PR, §158). One can have a relationship of mutual recognition within the family. The family is not only a love relationship, it also involves marriage, property and

¹ For Hegel, the family is a heterosexual, nuclear family.
children (Hegel, PR, §160). These complete the family. Husband and wife are united through the law, in a marriage which is recognized by the wider community. They share the family resources, and they are further united in their children. The union of two people attains objectivity in their child. The two subjects in a marriage see in their child "an existence which has being for itself, and an object which they love as their love" (Hegel, PR, §173). The child is the parents' love objectified. Hence the child is very important for familial unity.

The child is also important for the transition to the next moment of the state; namely, civil society. The ethical dissolution of the family occurs when the child becomes a person (Hegel, PR, §177). Of course, the family may also dissolve for reasons that are not ethical (say, for instance, natural reasons). It is important to understand what is entailed in the dissolution of the family. The family does not dissolve in the sense of breaking up into individual persons. It is the illusory independence of the family that dissolves. The family dissolves "into a plurality of families" (Hegel, PR, §181).

The family is only one individual family among others. In the beginning of ethical life, the family is (mis)taken as an independent, self-sufficient unity. It is as if the family were The unity which contained all within it. Of course this is not true, and we cannot deny the falsity of this claim, especially when the child leaves home. The child leaves its family of origin to create its own family. At this point, there must exist at least two families. Thus we move into civil society, which is a broader social context. It is also the moment of difference, where the
family itself behaves as an individual (Hegel, PR, §181). This individual family relates to other families as if they were individuals. In civil society, we have a number of different families interacting. Each seeks to meet its own needs and wants, and in doing so satisfies the needs and wants of the other (Hegel, PR, §182). It is not my purpose here to delve into the complexities of civil society, but merely to demonstrate the general character of the dialectical movement from the family to the state. When the order of civil society, which is first seen as haphazard and accidental, is recognized as the rational ordering of society by humans (and the ordering of humans by society) we have arrived at the Hegelian state.

The state contains both the family and civil society sublated within it. It unifies them while maintaining their opposition. The state alone is a self-sufficient unity. As such it is free Spirit. Hegel writes:

The absolute determination or, if one prefers, the absolute drive of the free spirit is to make its freedom into its object [Gegenstand]-- to make it objective both in the sense that it becomes the rational system of the spirit itself, and in the sense that this system becomes immediate actuality. This enables the spirit to be for itself, as Idea, what the will is in itself

(Hegel, PR, §27).

The state makes freedom possible. It is the arena of Spirit; it is Spirit's self-determination. The state is also the concrete Universal will, the particular will taken back into itself. As such, it is the locus of human freedom. However, when we look at the Hegelian state from the perspective of woman, its freedom
Hegel's discussion of the "Difference of the sexes" takes place in the "Family" section of his *Philosophy of Right*. Once the family is dissolved, and one recognizes that it is not a self-subsistent unity but is dependent on other families, the family behaves as if it were an individual (Hegel, PR, §181). At this point, the family is a unit and sexual differences are no longer essential. They are no longer differences that make a difference.\(^2\) The family, as a unity, is represented by one individual member -- the husband and father; "The family as a legal [rechtliche] person in relation to others must be represented by the husband as its head" (Hegel, PR, §171). In Hegel's patriarchal family, there must be one person who ultimately makes the decisions about the family. Family members might disagree about family matters, matters of contracts, financial matters, etc. For this reason, Hegel believes that there must be one person who is ultimately in control of the family resources, and ultimately in control of the family. When there is disagreement between family members as to any particular issue, this person would have the final say as to what is best for the family (Ibid.). Of course, this requires an ability to put the family before one's particular wants. It requires someone who can act on the basis of reason rather than their own desire or emotion. This person is the patriarchal father.

Hegel's reasons for giving the power and control of the family to the "reasonable" male will be evident once we see how he conceives woman's

\(^2\) At least, they no longer make a difference for man. Woman is still knee
nature. To ascertain Hegel's position on woman, let's examine more closely the point at which woman enters the dialectic of Right: the family. The family is the immediate or natural ethical Spirit; it is the "inner Notion" of the unity of Spirit (Hegel, PR, §450). It is not Spirit's actual self-conscious unity, but the immediate knowledge of its unity. The family is immediate because it has as its determination Spirit's own feeling of its unity, namely love (Hegel, PR, §158).

Love is defined by Hegel as:

> the consciousness of my unity with another so that I am not isolated on my own, but gain my self-consciousness only through the renunciation of my independent existence and through knowing myself as the unity of myself with another and of the other with me

(Hegel, PR, §158).

In love, one's self-understanding is that of being a part of a unity. One is united with the Other in such a way that both understand themselves to be a member of that unity, a member of the family, not one separate individual united with another. This self-understanding becomes one's identity; one is a member of the family. Love is the awareness of this unity with the Other.

The family has two different points of origin: subjective and objective. The subjective origin is one's particular inclination to give oneself up. This is also the first moment of the unity of love. One must feel oneself deficient as an independent person. The objective origin of the family lies in giving up one's individuality in order to constitute one unit, one person, one family. This is the
second moment of the unity of love; one gains recognition through an Other, whom one recognizes in turn.

The relinquishing of the self is necessary if one is to have that self recognized. In this respect, the union between two people is "a self-limitation, but since they attain their substantial self-consciousness within it, it is in fact their liberation" (Hegel, PR, §162). This appears contradictory; one must give oneself up in order to gain oneself. However, we know from our discussion of the will that freedom only appears as a limitation when one has not attained the correct perspective. Self-limitation is self-determination. As the first moment of ethical life, the family is the first moment of self-determination. Only in sacrificing one's individuality does one achieve one's self-consciousness; "Love is both the production and the resolution of this contradiction" (Hegel, PR, §158). Only in giving oneself up to the family, does one come to the self-knowledge that one is a part of a unity, rather than an individual person.³

The ethical part of the family is the part that is spiritual, as the ethical is intrinsically universal. The ethical connection in the family, then, is that of love. In love, one is subjectively certain of one's unity with the Other. For this reason, the ethical principle of the family is based on the "relation of the individual member of the Family to the whole Family as the Substance, so that the End and content of what he does and actually is, is solely the Family" (Hegel, PhS, §445).

³ This unity is not self-subsistent, and one will soon realize that there exists a social context broader than the family.
subject.

Woman, like man, is bound to the family as a part of a unity. However, woman does not reflect on her relationship to the family. Consequently, woman does not develop herself out of this immediate unity. She cannot "work and struggle with the external world" in order to discover the "self-sufficient unity" of the state, but instead remains in the realm of unreflected unity (Hegel, PR, §166). Woman's inability to struggle reveals her passivity. In an oft quoted passage, Hegel writes:

The difference between man and woman is the difference between animal and plant; the animal is closer in character to man, the plant to woman, for the latter is a more peaceful [process of] unfolding whose principle is the more indeterminate unity of feeling [empfindung] (Hegel, PR, §166).

Woman is not determinate in the sense that she is not mediated. She does not struggle to individuate and return to a self-conscious unity. Woman merely exists in an intuited, felt unity.

In fact, one is hard pressed to find any positive qualities in Hegel's characterization of woman. For Hegel, woman is passive, emotional, and apolitical. This is due to the fact that woman may have insights to offer, but she does not possess the ideal of Universality (Hegel, PR, §166). Woman does not recognize the Universal rights of all persons, she is limited to defending particular persons, particular family members. Woman is not able to recognize herself as a part of humanity, united with all others. She is immediate and does
not have the capacity for self-reflection which is necessary to unite the universal and the particular. Woman cannot be free.

Woman's knowledge comes through experience, it comes "imperceptibly, as if through the atmosphere of representational thought" (Hegel, PR, §166). It is akin to a peaceful intuition, not a hard won fight for enlightenment. Woman embodies the part of ethical Spirit that "maintains itself in unity as knowledge and volition of the substantial in the form of concrete individuality and feeling" (Hegel, PR, §166). For Hegel, this form is the lower form. Feeling is a content that is not true to the form of Spirit. Feeling is not yet thought because it has not been mediated. Feeling is immediate, and, like Being, will have to be made determinate through a thoughtful examination of it. Feeling has not yet been made conceptual. Woman exhibits this tendency to emotionality. This is in opposition to the male who takes on "the self-consciousness of conceptual thought" (Hegel, PR, §166). Woman feels, while man thinks.

Because she is subject to the non-reflective divine law of the family, woman is not capable of self-reflection. Her's is not an ethical self-consciousness, but merely an ethical intuition. Woman's ethical action is in accordance with the law of the family. Woman has her "substantial vocation in the family, and her ethical disposition consists in this [family] piety" (Hegel, PR, §166). A woman's highest achievement is to be pious and sacrificial. Woman is governed by a of law subjective substantiability, a law of "inwardness which has not yet been fully actualized...in opposition to the law of the state" (Hegel, PR,
§166). Woman does not feel the need to make the law of the family explicit, she does not "attain to consciousness of it, or to the objective existence of it, because the law of the family is inner essence" (Hegel, PhS, §457). Woman does not reflect on the law of the family, it is simply there for her to obey. Women's law is the "divine element that is exempt from the real world" (Hegel, PhS, §457). This law is not woman's creation, she has no part in its composition, it is merely given to her from outside.

Woman is limited to the family, for she is governed by divine law, by family law. If woman moved past the family into the community she might try to enact her familial ends on the state. To conceive of the state as a family would be a disaster. Hegel comments that:

> When women are in charge of government, the state is in danger, for their actions are based not on the demands of universality but on contingent inclination and opinion

(Hegel, PR, §166).

Woman could not run the state any differently than she runs the family and this would lead to a radical particularity in government.

It is now evident why woman is not in charge of the family property. Man must represent the family because woman is too emotional, driven by contingent concerns, and passive. In other words, woman is not rational enough to be able

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4It is also a disaster to conceive of the family as the state on a smaller scale. Both must be separate and opposed.
to put the needs of the family, as a unit, before her own wants and desires. Woman has her end in the family, and if she were to reflect on these ends, she would, of necessity, be driven out of the family to interact in the public sphere. This is impossible for Hegel, as to act in the public sphere is to Other oneself; to encounter oneself in difference. Woman is incapable of this process, as she does not contain the ideal within her. Woman has her end solely in the family.

Woman, it would seem, accepts the ends of the family as the end in terms of which her "self" is recognized. But herein lies the problem. The family is only the most immediate substantiality of spirit, not the venue for its fullest possible self-realization. One cannot be free, one cannot completely determine themselves in the context of the family, for there are still other social institutions which stand outside the family. Hence they stand outside of woman. If one is to be free, one must be able to see oneself in all otherness. For woman this is impossible.

At first glance, the claim that woman sacrifices her freedom in order to promote the ends of the family appears to be an irrational claim, and if this is the case, it would be an untrue claim. For the truth is never mere nature, but is rational self-determination; "Philosophy...has to do, not with unessential determinations, but with a determination in so far as it is essential" (Hegel, PhS, §47). What Hegel would find irrational is not the sacrifice of subjectivity, but any such sacrifice of self that does not have a higher end. This is not the case with
woman in Hegel's system of philosophy. Woman's assignment to the family, though it is in part determined by nature, is rational.

For woman, what is sacrificed is participation in the larger ethical community. This is a sacrifice that results in an ethical progression of mankind in general towards absolute knowledge. However, this is not a conscious sacrifice. Woman does not give up her possibility for freedom the way one would give up a treasured item. Woman is not even aware of the possibility of a higher freedom. Woman determines herself within the unity of the family, and according to Hegel, does not seek to go beyond it. She does not seek to represent the family unit in civil society. Woman is content to be a passive subject.

The image of the female that Hegel chooses to demonstrate the feminine side of the diremption of ethical substantiality is Antigone, a woman who boldly defies the laws of society for the sake of familial bonds. Hegel describes Sophocles' Antigone as "one of the most sublime presentations of piety" (Hegel, PR, §166). Hegel's discussion of the Antigone supports his view that woman cannot achieve full self-consciousness or self-knowledge because they only have the ethical life of the family as their end (Hegel, PhS, §457).

In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel cites the Antigone because he believes that it is exemplary of tragic Greek life. It demonstrates a level of Spirit  

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5 The fact that Antigone boldly defies the law should strike one as odd. Why would Hegel choose such an active woman to represent passivity? This seeming contradiction disappears when we realize that Hegel emphasizes Antigone's helplessness before divine law, and her sacrifice for it. Woman, for Hegel, is passive in the sense that she cannot actively reflect on the law that
that is embodied by the Greeks, but must ultimately be overcome. In the
Antigone, we are shown the tragic outcome of activity, any activity. In opposing
the law of the family and the law of the state, Sophocles had the insight to see
the necessary tragedy in action; any act will be in the service of one law and will
thereby break the other.

Though this opposition between the two laws will be overcome, woman
remains at the tragic, Greek level of Spirit. Woman remains at a lower level of
Spirit's self-realization. In Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel continues
to cite Antigone as the paradigm for woman; even in the modern state. Even in
contemporary times, woman has not moved past the oppositions exemplified in
Greek tragedy.

Antigone defies the human laws of the state in order to follow the divine
law which requires that she bury the body of her brother, Polyneices (who was
killed in combat against the State). Creon, the King of Thebes, decrees that no
person shall perform burial rites on Polyneices as he was an enemy of the state
and shall be treated as such despite his relationship to the King (Sophocles,
1949, 186). Any person who dares to touch the body of Polyneices faces the
penalty of "stoning to death in the public square" (Sophocles, 1949, 186).

Antigone, despite an awareness of the penalty involved, must bury her
brother. She attempts to enlist the help of her sister Ismene, but it is of no avail.
Ismene will not defy Creon, and refuses to help Antigone. Antigone, however,
claims that she must follow the laws of the Gods, the laws of the Netherworld which require the body of the deceased to be covered; "But I will bury him; and if I must die, I say that this crime is holy" (Sophocles, 1949, 188). Defying the royal decree, Antigone buries her brother and admits as much to the king. Outraged, Creon orders that Antigone be sent to a cave. However, the prophet Teiresias appears and tells Creon that he will be cursed for his actions. Realizing his error Creon rushes to the cave where Antigone is confined, only to find that he is too late; Antigone has taken her own life. In addition, Creon's son, Antigone's betroved, has killed himself out of grief, and lies at her feet. On hearing of her son's death, Creon's wife also commits suicide. Thus the prophecy is realized; Creon has been punished for his actions.

According to Hegel, the real insight of this Greek tragedy lies in the necessary violation of the law. In burying her brother, Antigone breaches the human laws of the state. In not burying her brother, she breaches the divine laws of the Netherworld. Hegel is careful to point out that Antigone has no choice as to which law she will act on, she is necessarily governed by divine law. The tragedy is that in acting one will be following only one law.

Human law is the known law and custom (Hegel, PhS, §446). Divine law stems from the immediate essence of the ethical (Hegel, PhS, §447). Hegel claims that man and woman are the mediating terms of divine law and human law (Hegel, PhS, §463). It is one's sex that determines which law one will follow (Hegel, PhS, §465). The opposition between the divine, eternal law and the law
of the state is a necessary and progressive opposition. It will lead spirit onward to its full self-realization. The opposition is "one of the highest order in ethics and therefore in tragedy and one which is individualized in femininity and masculinity" (Hegel, PR, §166). The opposition between the two laws is also an opposition between the sexes.

Woman is governed by divine law which is universal and is the law of the Family. Man is governed by human law which is the law that governs social life, or people in general, and is particular (Hegel, PhS, §453). The two orders require one another; human law has its roots in divine law, and divine law depends on human law (Hegel, PhS, §460). The opposition between the two laws will lead to conflict, as it does in the Antigone. Through this experience of conflict, self-consciousness will learn that it is governed by both laws. When it has achieved this perspective, the gender dichotomy of the Greek world will be sublated. The problem is that only the male consciousness will learn of the unity of divine and human law. Woman does not have the capacity to reflect on the law governing her, and as a result does not have the capacity to overcome the dichotomy between it and human law.

Antigone acts in accordance with familial law (she buries her brother) which puts her at odds with human law (punishment of the state's enemy). Any

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6 Hegel’s use of The Antigone is telling in this regard. Only Creon survives the conflict between the human and divine laws. At the end of Sophocles’ play, Creon realizes his error in obeying human law alone. Creon is the only person who gains insight from the tragedy. In Hegel’s philosophy, too, it is only the male-consciousness that will gain insight into the limited perspective
action will have the same tragic result. It will reveal the opposition of the two laws. This opposition will make evident, to those who reflect on it, that both laws require the other. Each law contains the other within it. Hegel proceeds to trace the progression out of tragic life. However, this progression is a male progression. Man becomes citizen and realizes his essence as Spirit's Other; man becomes free.

In the Phenomenology of Spirit, the Antigone is used as the exemplar of tragic Greek life. In Elements of the Philosophy of Right we discover that the Antigone is the "transhistorical paradigm of ethical family life and the role of woman" and as such it has lost its historical reference to the pagan Greek world (Mills, 1996, 81). Woman remains governed by the divine law of the family and she does not take the necessary step into the community in order to work towards a reconciliation of the two laws. Woman remains in the family, while man proceeds to realize the opposition of these laws and their necessary unification. Man proceeds to become fully self-conscious, while woman remains, like Antigone, a tragic figure.

Hegel's use of the Antigone as the paradigm for female consciousness has been heavily criticized by feminist thinkers. In the next chapter we will examine these criticisms. I will show that woman appears in Hegel's philosophy only as man's negation. Hegel is not able to see woman in her own right, as an active subjectivity. It is the male voice that speaks for female subjectivity in
Hegel's philosophy.
Feminist philosophers have pointed out a number of problems with Hegel's use of Sophocles’ *Antigone*. Many have claimed that Hegel's reading is not faithful to the text; he glosses over some of Sophocles' key points. Patricia Mills goes so far as to suggest that he actually changed the last line of the play (1996, 70). This opens up a number of hermeneutical questions regarding what can be defined as a reading that is "faithful" to the text. It is not my purpose here to investigate these questions. It will be more fruitful to look at those parts of the text that Hegel cites, and those parts that are excluded, in order to reveal Hegel's bias against woman. Hegel's analysis of the *Antigone* and the subsequent difficulties in his claims regarding woman leave feminists in a difficult position. Given Hegel's enormous influence in both philosophy and political theory, one cannot simply ignore him. The question remains, How does one reconcile Hegel's views with a contemporary view of woman as an integral part of the political realm.

There is some debate in the feminist literature with regard to Hegel's status. I would like to focus on three main feminist perspectives that critically
object to Hegel's discussion of woman. Each of these perspectives makes a claim about how feminists ought to respond to Hegelian philosophy. The first perspective takes issue with Hegel's treatment of woman, but sees some value in his having made explicit woman's familial, connected nature. The second perspective disagrees with Hegel's assertion that woman is necessarily familial and connected, but sees his dialectical method as useful for feminist analysis. The third perspective is slightly more radical in that it views Hegel's treatment of woman as indicative of the oppressiveness of his entire dialectical method. This perspective asserts that woman must find her own method, for to adhere to Hegel's dialectic is to mold oneself in the male image. All three perspectives offer insight into the feminist concerns with male-stream philosophy. However, I will argue in favor of the second perspective, which seeks to adopt Hegel's dialectical method for feminist purposes.

According to the first group of feminist objections to Hegel's work on woman, Hegel fails to see the ways that Antigone defies his description of woman. As a consequence, Hegel fails to grant woman an active, political role. Hegel is not willing to listen to the voice of Antigone, nor is he willing to look carefully at her actions. We have already seen how Hegel hopes to show, through his use of the Antigone, woman's allegiance to the family and her place as pious wife in the

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1 These perspectives are not mutually exclusive. Some arguments involve more than one perspective and will be referenced accordingly.
2 Recall that male-stream philosophy is philosophy that address questions
modern state. It is this conception of woman as passive and a-political that proves unacceptable to feminist theorists. Antigone's action, and woman's action, is political. Hegel's use of certain parts of the Antigone, and ignorance of other parts, demonstrates his inability to see woman's action as political action.

One of the key elements of the Antigone that is ignored by Hegel is the relationship between Antigone and Ismene (Mills, 1996; Diprose, 1991; Elshtain, 1989; Irigaray, 1996). Their relationship is one of solidarity and support. Though Ismene denies Antigone her help in burying their brother, when Antigone is found out Ismene is willing to share in the blame and support her sister's decision. When Antigone is questioned by Creon, Ismene appears and cries out "I am here to join you, to take my share of punishment" (Sophocles, 1949, 207). Despite their differences, Antigone and Ismene demonstrate a relationship of solidarity.

Mills claims that this relationship is disregarded by Hegel in his search for the ideal relationship as one of man and woman, identity-in-difference (1996, 76). Indeed, in Elements of the Philosophy of Right we find that the more different the two partners united in a relationship (usually of marriage) the stronger their unity (Hegel, PR, §168). Hegel's focus is on uniting radical opposites. The stronger the opposite, the better the unity. For this reason, he ignores the sister-sister relationship, for to do so would necessitate a discussion of the differences between Antigone and Ismene. On this reading, one would be hard pressed to posed by, and pertaining to, man.
see Antigone as passive, when it is she who takes an active stance and Ismene who will not defy Creon. Consequently, Hegel would have had a much harder time confining Antigone to the family as the paradigmatic woman (Eishtain, 1989, 228). Had he examined closely the relationship between Antigone and Ismene, Hegel would have been forced to recognize the difference within the category of woman itself. He would have had to recognize both activity and passivity in woman.

Hegel also overlooks Antigone's conscious decision to betray the law of the state; the decision to act (as men act) in the political arena. Antigone is seen as the opposite of political, reflective man. Hegel interprets Antigone's burying of her brother as an act of familial allegiance, not an act of political protest. As a woman, Antigone is governed by the law of the family, the law of the netherworld, and cannot choose to be governed by human law. Hegel claims that though Antigone is well aware of the human law of the state, she has no choice but to bury her brother and in doing so, obey divine law; "The sister remains or the wife becomes the guardian of divine law" (Hegel, PhS, §459) and as guardian of the divine law, "sees in the other side only the violence of human caprice" (Hegel, PhS, §467). Antigone cannot see that there exist two laws that are both in some sense just.³

Antigone's action is not properly political, claims Hegel, because she has an immediate intuition of what is right and what is wrong. Her intuition, not self-

³Nor, for that matter, can Creon. In fact, in reading the Antigone, one is struck by the extent to which Sophocles focuses on Creon's shortcomings. It is Creon, in the end, who is punished and left destitute because of his failure to
conscious reflection, lead her to obey familial law. Mills points out that this claim stands in opposition to the text. Sophocles sees Antigone's decision as a conscious one (1996, 71). He has the chorus cry out "You have made your choice. Your death is the doing of your conscious hand" (Sophocles, 1960, 220). Antigone claims allegiances to the dead, but she does not do so in an unreflective manner. It is not an unconscious intuition of her duty to her brother that causes Antigone to defy human law and bury him, but "it is a noble stance, consciously taken" (Mills, 1996, 71).

This may well be the case, but Hegel's point is not whether Antigone deliberated over her obedience to the divine law which governs her. She does deliberate thus, when Ismene is trying to talk her out of burying Polyneices. In this sense, then, her position is quite consciously taken. The point, for Hegel, is that Antigone is not led to question the validity of the familial law itself. Woman does not try to become conscious of family law in the sense that she does not question it. Woman takes her immediate certainty of what is right to be the truth. Woman cannot attain the freedom of recognizing herself in the state because she does not actively question familial law. Only man will unite the two laws as only man feels the need to make the family law conscious, to question his own certainty.

Antigone may not question familial law, but she does challenge Hegel's notion of female passivity. She reveals the experience of woman that is ignored recognize the justice of Antigone's position.
by Hegel. She takes action as a subjectivity in her own right. This active political orientation is ultimately revealed in the taking of her own life, an element of the play that is completely ignored by Hegel. Antigone will not be confined to a cave to die a slow death, as has been ordered by Creon. Through her suicide Antigone represents "the history of the revolt of women who act in the public sphere on behalf of the private sphere" (Mills, 1996, 77). Antigone boldly defies the law of the state, which she sees as unjust. She makes the personal political.

It is Hegel's insistence on an opposition between the personal and the political which is at the heart of this critique. Woman's action, which has its basis in the feeling of connectedness found in the family, is political action. What this amounts to is a claim that the family and the state cannot be kept separate. Hegel would agree, from his perspective of citizen, that this is true. However, Hegel also sees a difference between them. The family does not take precedence over the state, nor does the state take precedence over the family. This is the lesson we learn from the tragic ending of Sophocles' Antigone. The unity of family and state (civil society) as a mutual reciprocity is what allows for their difference. But, their unity alone is not sufficient. One acts differently in the family than one does in the state. One is connected with others in the family through one's love for them. However, in the state one must form laws that govern all of humanity, people one has never met, and never will meet. In the state we must behave both universally and particularly. What Hegel sees in Antigone's actions is her willingness to put
the family before the state, her emphasis on particularity, and her inability to act on universal principles. Hegel is not saying that universal rights take precedence over particular, familial relationships. Rather, he is arguing for the incorporation of both the universal and the particular element in the rational state. Both elements must be emphasized.

Hegel reads Antigone as the exemplar of intuition and immediate consciousness. Further, he sees an uncritical adherence to these attributes alone as a hindrance to political action; they lead to actions based on contingent inclination rather than actions based on the demands of universality (Hegel, PR, §166). But, as feminists point out, one can follow Hegel's emphasis on the importance of the Antigone for understanding female consciousness, while coming to a very different conclusion about what that consciousness entails and what the political state requires.

One could assert that intuition and connection are valuable political orientations. Antigone is a revolutionary woman, a feminist hero (Elshtain, 1989, 229; Mills, 1996, 77). She demonstrates the special capacity that woman has for acting on the basis of connections, familial or otherwise. This could lead to a "connection based alternative that poses a critical challenge to men who have become historically and socially bound to the creation and protection of abstract Rights" (Starret, 1996, 257). Woman sees that universal rights and laws are not necessarily needed for a just political state. A woman embodies a particularistic
orientation which does justice to different people and different circumstances. Antigone embodies this connected knowledge. Thus Antigone can be seen as a feminist Hero. Contemporary feminists can follow her lead and develop their own political and moral knowledge along with their own courage and defiance. They can continue to assert the value of the particular by acting on their connection based knowledge.

Though it is important to value particularity, it is difficult to see how this perspective could be effective at the level of the state. Instead of focussing on Hegel's claims about woman's nature, and according that nature a value that he does not, I believe it is more fruitful to adopt the second perspective. This perspective suggests that one ought to "actively forget" what Hegel says directly about woman (Markovosky, 1988; Rosenthal, 1973; Hayim, 1990). These patriarchal passages are eclipsed, so the claim goes, by a dialectical method that is very useful to feminist theory. Not to mention the importance that many feminists see in having an intersubjective approach to political issues. Hegel's philosophical system could be viewed as "the teaching of the good father" whose intentions are in keeping with the ideal feminists' seek, but who may be limited by his historicity (Benhabib, 1996, 26). As a part of the patriarchal world that was

4Carol Gilligan's study on moral decisions makes the claim that women make moral decisions based on an understanding of the self as inherently connected to others (Gilligan, 1987, 20). Further developments of this form of moral reasoning into a political theory have been performed by Dianne Meyers in Self Society and Personal Choice, 1989, and Subjection and Subjectivity:
widely accepted at his time, Hegel is reflecting his own historicity. His thought, in fact, is ahead of its time in terms of its claims regarding divorce and a woman's right to own private property. It may even be seen as advocating a theory of androgyny.\(^5\)

Rosenthal claims that Hegel's dialectical method can be used within feminist theory to resolve some of the contradictions that plague it. She writes:

> It is my contention that feminism is identical with self-knowledge in the Hegelian sense. As to the restrictions Hegel placed on that self-knowledge in the case of women, one has to ask: are these restrictions convincing to reason?


This suggests that we subject Hegel's writing on woman to the criteria which Hegel himself lays out. Further, Rosenthal sees a lot of value in Hegel's emphasis on the breaking of silences. The dialectic moves from the silent to the spoken; from the intuited to self-knowledge. This method can be very useful for feminist voices that have experienced the silencing effects of a patriarchal culture.

It is a version of this second perspective that I wish to defend. I agree with

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\(^5\)Dahlstrom points out that Hegel's analysis of Antigone is actually a lesson in gender inclusivity (1988, 203). It is their rigid gender roles that lead Creon and Antigone into conflict. Dahlstrom claims that part of what Hegel is relaying is that we need to have more flexibility in gender roles and in our sexual identifications. On this reading, Hegel is incredibly contemporary. Both sexes need to become a little more like the other. Unfortunately, Dahlstrom ignores the fact that woman cannot make herself more like man in Hegel's system. Women cannot be governed more by human law because they do not problematize family law. They must await man's progression to free citizen.
Rosenthal that Hegel's dialectical method could be useful for feminist theory and feminist politics. However, Hegel's account of woman is a misapplication of the dialectic. Or, more accurately, an application of the dialectic. I would like to emphasize that Hegel sees his method as a development of the content itself. It is vital that nothing be imposed from outside the dialectic. It must make its implicit principles explicit without intervention. The method, then, is not applied at all. It is the self-development of the thing in itself.

In Hegel's account of woman, however, he seems to be forcing the development. He fails to see the unity of opposition from both perspectives. Hegel allows for male freedom but does not allow for female freedom; woman does not reflect on the law of the family and hence does not progress past her tragic stance. All the while, Hegel asserts that male freedom and female freedom are not completely separate. This seems, and is, contradictory. While Hegel's account of the history of spirit is also meant to be an account of humanity's progression, woman is presented as being outside history. Woman does not progress, but remains stuck in a contemporary Greek mentality (Mills, 1996, 81).

One might object, and claim that it is not so much that woman is outside history as it is that she remains, primarily, an earlier part of it. Woman remains at the level of intuited knowledge and immediacy. This is one of the levels through which Spirit passes on its way to complete self-knowledge. So, woman is very much a part of history, but an earlier part. As such, she is both left behind and
brought along. The Greek world is *Aufgehoben*, and consequently it is both overcome and maintained in the further stages of Spirit's history.

This is of little comfort to woman however. For what one discovers is that woman is limited to participating in ethical life on an immediate level, while both man and Spirit are able to experience the rest of the dialectic. As Lonzi so eloquently puts it;

> Hegel regards woman as confined by nature to a stage that he considers to have great worth, but it is such that any man would prefer to not have been born rather than consider it for himself

(Lonzi, 1996, 280).

Feminists ought to pay close attention to Hegel's philosophy, especially his account of the necessary unity of opposites, but ignore his direct writings on woman, for here he makes a number of errors. In fact, this may not be the only area in which Hegel does not faithfully follow through on his dialectical method. For this reason, I advocate a cautious use of Hegel. One ought to read Hegel with one eye on the text and one eye on her own experience.

It has been objected, though, that this adaptation of Hegel's thought would only succeed in making woman more like the male model that is so often held out for her anyway (Oliver, 1996). The possibilities in Hegel's system of philosophy are male possibilities and to open these up to woman simply means allowing woman to mold herself in the male image. This is the third and final perspective that I will deal with. This approach sees Hegel's view of woman as symptomatic of
free. Yet, this contradicts Hegel's own dialectical logic where both selves must in some sense be equal. There must be a mutual reciprocity between man and woman if gender is truly Aufhebung within the family. The fact that woman cannot be free affects her status in the family. When one understands that woman does not know herself in the state, then one also understands that she does not have any identity in the family, save that of "not-man" (Oliver, 1996, 69). Thus, it is claimed that the dialectic in Hegel's system of philosophy implicitly represses otherness throughout. The Other is a logical stepping stone for self-knowledge and as such, it is reduced to the "principle of the Other" (Ibid.). The Other as an active, self-knowing Other is suppressed. As Kelly Oliver points out, woman is only maintained in a higher level of the dialectic in principle (Oliver, 1996, 71). In order to understand this claim we must understand the difference between woman and the "principle of woman". Woman has a positive existence, though the character of this existence is a matter of great debate within feminist philosophy. The "principle of woman" has only a negative significance. The "principle of woman" is, simply, not-man. Only the "principle of woman" is sublated and conceptualized in man's properly ethical behavior (Oliver, 1996, 72). Man requires an Other, and the body politic requires an Other. Both of these are found in woman (Diprose, 1991 167). It is claimed that this conception of the Other, as merely an opposite to be ends as familial ends, but she does not move beyond the feeling of that unity. Since the family is only the first most abstract moment of the state, woman cannot be completely free, even if she does unite universal and particular within
incorporated into one's self-understanding, is at play throughout Hegel's work.

Woman, as a positive, active, political subject cannot be a part of Hegel's system of philosophy. Hegel claims that both sides of an opposition contain the Other within them, and on close examination will necessarily yield this opposite (Hegel, EL, §82). However, woman cannot actively achieve freedom. She is forever a tragic heroine, passively awaiting man's action. Woman cannot initiate this action herself as she does not pertain to consciousness of the law by which she is governed. She does not question her own certainty of what is right. Woman does not negate herself. Nor can she be man's negation, except in the very limited sense of the male defined "not-man". To truly be man's negation, woman would have to be positively conceived; she too would have to possess self-knowledge. Man creates woman as an opposite, woman as the principle of woman, in order to negate himself and thereby have the capacity for a self-reflective ethical behavior. But woman as a positive subject remains outside the history of Spirit.

This third perspective asserts that woman is a negation that exists for the sake of a dialectal progression in which she is ultimately denied participation. Woman is not different, rather, she is man's own difference, his opposite. There is no feminine sex in Hegel's philosophy, apart from the one that man prepares for himself. Hegel's phenomenology is a "phenomenology of the patriarchal spirit" the family.
and "the image of woman here appears as a signifier in someone else's hypothesis" (Lonzi, 1996, 261).

That Hegel's understanding of woman as merely not-man problematizes his entire philosophy is a very strong claim. As we saw in Chapter one, it is imperative to Hegel's dialectic that both terms (categories) which are to be united in any dialectical movement negate themselves. Each must turn, of its own accord, into its opposite. However, Hegel refuses woman the possibility of self-negation; he claims that she does not attain self-reflection. Hence the movement of self-knowledge in Hegel's writing on woman is one-sided; it concerns male knowledge and it is built from male categories. Whether this failure of the dialectic is limited to the passages on woman, or indicative of a problem in Hegel's method in general, will be the topic of the next chapter. Using the critique provided by Kristeva, I would like to examine Hegel's dialectical method to discover if, in fact, Hegel is guilty of reducing otherness to a logical negation.

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In contrast, Irigaray claims that one must examine the questions of self-understanding and self-creation, which are posed by women themselves.
Chapter Four

Unity and Difference

If the problems in Hegel's discussion of woman in ethical life infect his entire
dialectic, then we must try and see the extent to which the dialectic itself imposes a
unity on its content. In this chapter I will conduct such an investigation, using
Kristeva as my guide, in order to discover the extent to which Hegel represses
difference in his philosophy.

Kristeva argues that Hegel overemphasizes unity to the point of
suppressing difference. She claims that the negation, or the Other, in Hegel's
philosophy is a logical category that is created by and for unity. It does not have
an existence outside this it function as a stepping stone for the dialectical
progression of Spirit. In order to show this lack of independence on the part of
negation, Kristeva focuses on the first two moments of any dialectical movement,
while ignoring the third. She does not do this unintentionally; Kristeva sees the
third moment in Hegel's philosophy as an imposed unity. If difference is truly to be
difference, for Kristeva, it cannot be unified. The kind of difference that throws the
subject into crisis cannot be united. This stands opposed to Hegel's account of the
unity of the dialectic. The dialectic is not imposed, but is the immanent
development of the difference itself; it is the implicit principle made explicit (Hegel,
EL, §81). Hegel believes that his examination of difference reveals unity as a
necessary presupposition. Though this seems outright opposed to Kristeva's account, I will argue that the difference between Hegel and Kristeva is, in part, a difference in emphasis.

Kristeva examines three key parts of Hegel's philosophical system in order to demonstrate his emphasis on unity. She begins with the erasure of heterogeneity and difference, which she claims occurs in Hegel's discussion of desire. Kristeva then traces the problem in desire back to its first manifestation, the play of Forces earlier in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Finally, to demonstrate the underlying problematic of difference in Hegel, Kristeva turns to the first moment of Hegel's logic, the doctrine of Being. In all three instances, Kristeva claims, Hegel performs the double move of opening Being up to difference and closing it off at the same time. He asserts the radical difference of opposites, but in the same move imposes a unity on them. To see how this is done, let's turn to the specificities of Kristeva's critique.

Kristeva begins her investigation into the exclusion of difference in Hegel's discussion of self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Recall that Hegel claims self-consciousness exists only when it is acknowledged by an Other (Hegel, PhS, §178). Hegel asserts the necessity of this recognition; self-identity is dependent on it. The self must come out of itself in the form of an Other. It must then be returned to itself from this otherness. Let's conduct a brief review of the structure of the interaction between self and Other, which we examined in chapter one.
To begin with, the self is conscious of itself only as "I"; it has immediate self-knowledge. In order for it to truly be a knowledge of self, the self must take itself as an object, which requires it be mediated by an Other. The self encounters a "~I", an Other. The self then negates the Other, and is reflected back into itself through the Other. It now knows itself to be a mediated self. It knows itself as "~I".

The specificities of Hegel's account were explored in chapter one and needn't be repeated here. What I would like to emphasize is that the two consciousnesses will eventually be united. They will realize their dependence on the Other, on the recognition of the Other; they will "recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another" (Hegel, PhS, §184, italics removed). The two selves will see their inherent connection to each Other made explicit.

Kristeva examines Hegel's account of desire and claims that it appears as "the most faithful representation of the collapsing of negativity into unity" (Kristeva, 1984, 135). For Hegel, desire is the desire to negate the otherness of the Other. It is the desire to incorporate the Other into one's self-understanding. Kristeva takes this to be the most obvious form of reduction to unity; the Other exists only as a part of one's self-definition. Thus the Other has no real independent existence.

Hegel posits an underlying "immediate" unity of the subject in order to have it encounter difference. The subject then returns to its position of unity, though this unity is a unity in difference, it is a mediated unity. However, Kristeva points out
that by assuming a unified subject, Hegel has reduced the Other to a mere logical negation. The Other is simply that against which one defines oneself. Though this is the case for both selves, at the level of experience, the Other exists only as a self negation. Hegel has erased heterogeneity. Difference becomes difference of the same. The Other loses any quality other than that which it contains for the self in question. In this respect, Kristeva claims, the Other only exists as a variation of the same (Kristeva, 1984, 135).

Kristeva is correct in pointing out that desire is a reduction to unity, however, as Hegel points out, it does not remain so. Hegel is quite clear that the initial position of self-consciousness is one of desire; it seeks to consume the Other which it perceives as an object. However, this orientation to the Other cannot yield the truth. For this reason, it is soon overcome. The master wants to appropriate the Other's desire. However, this orientation to the Other leaves the master unsatisfied, and eventually the category of mastery itself is overcome. The slave works and in doing so is reflected back into itself. It sees itself reflected in its products. The slave then ceases to be a slave and the oppositional categories of master and slave are sublated. Hegel's key point is that in examining itself, self-consciousness learns that its orientation to the Other, as that which is separate and opposed to the self, is inadequate. The Other is always already a part of the self. The self is intersubjective; it does not, and cannot, exist in isolation. This discovery propels self-consciousness forward, past the orientation of desire which proved itself inadequate.
In order to grasp the logical movement beneath Hegel's account of intersubjectivity, we might look at Hegel's discussion of the limit of the Something and the Other in his Encyclopaedia Logic. Hegel points out that it is necessary, if a thing is to be, that it incorporate the Other, as limit, into its existence. If a thing is to exist, it must have a limit. Hegel writes:

> Something only is what it is within its limit and by virtue of its limit. We cannot regard limit, therefore, as merely external to being-there; on the contrary, limit totally permeates everything that there is...Humans who want to be actual must be there, and to this end they must limit themselves

(Hegel, EL, §92).

In order to be, a thing must be limited. Only if Something and Other both exist as independent can they exist as a limit, an Other for the Other. Similarly, if both exist as an Other, they are not independent. They are a part of the thing for which they stand as otherness. Something is at once something else.

In intersubjective terms, there must exist a limit that is outside of the self, yet which is incorporated into the self insofar as it is a limit for that very self. This is not necessarily to say that the limit is only a limit for the self and has no moment of independent existence. It has to be independent if it is to exist. We only have Something if there is something else from which we can distinguish it.

Desire to incorporate the Other is a desire to make the Other into one's limit. The Other must survive one's destructive attempts in order to be one's limit. The slave must survive the master's attempts to negate its life and its desire. The original orientation of the master, which is the desire to incorporate the
desire of the Other, the desire to make its otherness one's own, does not collapse
difference into unity. Instead it demonstrates the paradoxical interconnection of
both.

We can see, then, Hegel would agree with Kristeva that desire is
problematic. This is the very reason why he sees the necessity of moving past an
orientation of desire. But, Hegel would disagree that the unity one discovers
through the dialectic of desire is imposed. The unity, in fact, is absolutely
necessary, for there would be no difference without it. If the self did not encounter
an Other, with whom it engaged in mutual recognition, then the self would have no
limit, it would be everything. As everything, the self would be nothing at all.

Seeking to further argue her position, Kristeva traces Hegel's discussion of
desire back to examine the place where negativity appears "most material and
independent...when it appears as Force" (Kristeva, 1984, 114). Kristeva points out
that Hegel's account of recognition is problematic on the same grounds as his
account of the play of Forces (Kristeva, 1984, 114). Indeed, when discussing the
double movement of the two self-consciousnesses, Hegel writes: "In this
movement, we see repeated the process which presented itself as the play of
Forces, but repeated now in consciousness" (Hegel, PhS, §184). We must go
back, then, to Hegel's account of the play of Forces to see if there is some basis to
Kristeva's critique that we have missed.

Hegel's writing on Force appears directly prior to his discussion of self-
consciousness. It marks the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness.
At this point, consciousness finds what appears to be a completely developed object, which presents itself as something that is (Hegel, PhS, §133). Consciousness looks to the object, in order to passively apprehend what the object is. It is convinced that the truth lies in the object itself. For this reason, it will try to find some force in the object. Ultimately, Hegel wants to show that the perspective embodied in this section of the Phenomenology of Spirit is inadequate. Consciousness does not yet realize that it "puts into" the object a conceptual unity; the object exists as a Concept for consciousness which has organized its sense perceptions to constitute this Concept. Thus the truth of the object cannot reside in the object alone.

In order for the notion that there is an objective force in the object that exists independent of consciousness to show itself false, one must posit this independence radically (Hegel, PhS, §139). Force must be thought to be completely independent of the understanding. Hence, the understanding believes that the object presents itself to be apprehended without any effort on the part of consciousness. However, when perceived this way Force will fold back on itself and show its reality to be in its Notion. Force will reveal itself as something that is actively grasped, not passively apprehended. It will show itself to be the work of the understanding.

Force is first believed to be the inner essence of an object, which produces that object's outer properties (Hegel, PhS, §136). For example, when encountering an object, say a chair, human consciousness immediately splits the
object into the particular chair that it sees, and the kind "chair" as the universal of which this particular chair is an instantiation. Any attempt to say what a particular chair is will fail unless one has recourse to "chair" as a kind. Similarly, when encountering an object, consciousness splits the object into its essence and its activity, and then realizes that any attempt to know the activity of force must refer to its inner essence. The activity of force doesn't make sense outside of the essence of force. It only makes sense as the expression of force's inner necessity.

One realizes, then, that force's activity, which one encounters as independent of oneself, and force's inner essence, which one has not experienced, but only posited, are interdependent. The thought determination that one "puts into" the object, the inner necessity that one posits behind the object's activity, is essential to any knowledge of the object. Thus, we realize that there is really only one Force, the unity of the being of force and its expression. We have no experience of this Force that lies behind the expressions of the object, yet we are certain it is there. Force, then, has reality only for consciousness. Its reality, its necessity, is as a Notion for consciousness.¹

The key problem that Kristeva identifies in Hegel's account of Force is his reduction of the reality of Force to the thought of it (Kristeva, 1984, 115). Hegel first claims that Force, in order to be, must be posited outside of thought.

¹ At this point, one is in the realm of self-consciousness where one believes that the truth of the object lays solely in one's comprehension of it. This is the orientation of desire, which we have already examined and which sees the object as existing for it alone.
Obviously, one can only posit from within thought itself.\textsuperscript{2} Hence force will double back on itself and supersede itself. Any attempt to think about Force will reveal that it is a Concept. The freedom from thought that Force reveals is only one of its moments. It is driven back into itself from this freedom, from this negation.

Kristeva credits Hegel with having pointed out Force's freedom and independence from thought. Her problem with Hegel is that as soon as this independence from thought is given, it is taken back. She writes:

\begin{quote}
In conceiving radical negativity as an \textit{expression}, the idealist dialectic deprives itself of negativity's powerful moment: the scission that exceeds and precedes the advent of thetic understanding.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
(Kristeva, 1984, 115).
\end{quote}

Force doubles back on itself and expresses itself from within the Notion. In doing so, it loses its power as an independent moment. Its dependence on consciousness is revealed, and this, claims Kristeva, supersedes its independence. Force becomes Force proper, the laws of Force which exist in and for the understanding. The independence of Force is reduced to its function as a negation, as one moment in the movement of Force.

Kristeva complains that Hegel has Force fold back into itself, into the one Force which expresses itself in a number of different ways only to devalue this expression. She writes:

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{2}For Hegel, Force is posited within thought, but as an externality. The result, then, is two-sided. It is both subjective and objective.
\end{quote}
Driving force back under the Notion leads Force to an inner world where it is depreciated for precisely that doubling, i.e., its persistence in "expressing" itself and in emptying this inner being, constituted by "Forces," of any possible knowledge

(Kristeva, 1984, 115).

Force is depreciated for continuing to express itself and in doing so emptying this expression of any knowledge. The truth of force is not in its diverse expression, but in its unified notion as the one Force. This again, according to Kristeva, reveals the emphasis on unity that is so problematic in Hegelian philosophy.

Though Kristeva is correct in her assertion that the independence of Force is posited only to be revoked, she does not seem to grasp the extent to which this infolding of Force is necessary. Force will necessarily fold back into itself. The independence of Force is only one of its moments, because it shows itself to be false. Force drives itself back into consciousness and shows that the reality of Force, which for Hegel means the actuality of the necessity of Force, is that it exists for consciousness. But, as Hegel goes on to demonstrate, this too will be proven false. Force is not wholly dependent on consciousness for its existence. This subjective understanding is just as one sided as the objective understanding that we began with.

Force and consciousness are mutually dependent and mutually independent. Kristeva's critique of Hegel stops short of this third moment. She seeks to emphasize the radical difference of Force and consciousness. However,
this has the effect of rendering Hegel’s views one-sided and inadequate. Hegel himself recognizes that it is incorrect to posit Force as wholly subjective. To do so is an orientation toward the object that seeks to make it completely dependent. To do so is the perspective of desire which is an inadequate orientation.

At the heart of this discussion, and the preceding discussion of desire, is Kristeva’s discontent with the dialectical progression in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Kristeva does not accept that in seeking self-knowledge, consciousness makes a number of errors which it learns from and which direct it. Kristeva focuses on these incomplete claims of consciousness, and reads them as if they were Hegel’s entire position.

Kristeva’s most lengthy critique of Hegel goes back to the dialectic as it is presented in the Encyclopaedia Logic. Kristeva attempts to show that the problem with both desire and force is that, ultimately, they demonstrate the reduction of difference to unity that is the very stuff of the Hegelian dialectic. Kristeva centers this critique around the powerful moment of negativity.

The term negativity comes from Hegel and may be thought of as "both the cause and the organizing principle of the process" (Kristeva, 1984, 109). Negativity functions as the movement of the dialectic; Kristeva labels it the dialectic’s fourth term (Kristeva, 1984, 109). It is the: “logical impetus beneath the thesis of negation and that of negation of the negation, but is identical to neither since it is, instead, the logical functioning of the movement that produces the theses” (Kristeva, 1984, 109). We must emphasize that for Hegel negativity is not
simply negation. It is not a negation because negation requires judgement, which in turn is dependent on a subject who judges. Negation, then, reinscribes the unified subject. Negativity concerns movement and the way in which the dialectic progresses.

Negativity is the "simple point of negative self-relations" (Kristeva, 1984, 109). Kristeva credits Hegel with having discovered the positive, reaffirming aspect of Negativity. Negativity makes self-knowledge possible by allowing an incorporation of the Other. However, Kristeva ultimately rejects his use of it.³ Hegel focuses too much on Negativity's affirming function and not enough on its independence. For Kristeva, this move results in a refusal of heterogeneity. It is the dialectic of Being and Nothing that first demonstrates this removal of heterogeneity in Hegel's philosophy (Kristeva, 1984, 112).

Hegel begins his account of the truth of the Concept with its most immediate, abstract instantiation, the doctrine of Being. He begins here because one must allow the truth to validate itself. This self-validation consists in the Concept showing itself to be what is mediated through and with itself (Hegel, EL, §83). So, we must begin with the most undetermined moment of the Concept, namely Being.

What we discover, when we examine Being, is that it is empty. Being is

³Kristeva will ultimately shape her own dialectic around the notion of crisis, not unity. She will emphasize the return to crisis that is effected by negativity, not the return to unity that is the result of its affirmative function.
pure thought, and as such, it is Nothing (Hegel, EL, §86). Being, then, turns out to be the same as its opposite, Nothing. When we look at Nothing, we find that it too, is the same as its opposite, Being. The difference between Being and Nothing is immediate. Because they are both indeterminate, the difference between them is "what is only meant" (Hegel, EL, §87).

The truth in this dialectic, as Hegel points out, is neither Being nor Nothing, but that Being, when thought, has passed over into Nothing (Hegel, EL, §88). It has shown itself, in reality, not to correspond to what we thought it was, its Concept. But, Kristeva points out, if the truth of Being and Nothing is this movement, this becoming where both are distinct but in virtue of a distinction that immediately dissolves itself, then this "supersession amounts to the erasing of heterogeneity within the Hegelian dialectic" (Kristeva, 1984, 112). If difference dissolves itself into a unity, then it was never really different to begin with. However, Hegel emphasizes that this unity is a unity in difference. Both the unity and the difference of Being and Nothing are equally emphasized. Though Being and Nothing may not be complex enough to capture the relations of sameness and difference, and so must develop into more complex categories, they are not simply a unity. Their unity sublates their difference, not by suppressing it, but by showing that each in its difference requires the Other.

Nothing, when posited as such or as something active in relation to negativity, can only be an abstract negation. It cannot be wholly separate and independent, which Kristeva claims it must be if it is to be the moving principle of
the dialectic. Kristeva asserts that it is in instances such as this, when negativity is considered a logical operation, not an active operation that is completely independent, that it becomes reified as a void (Kristeva, 1984, 112). Negativity becomes a logical category with no reality outside of its logical function. It becomes like zero, which serves a logical/mathematical purpose but does not really exist (Ibid.). It becomes the idea of something external that is not really outside. Hegel agrees that negativity is external. But he also asserts that it is internal. It is both the same yet different. The problem for Kristeva is that if negativity is not radically independent, then it is not independent at all. Hegel’s notion of Nothing, claims Kristeva, has no reality outside of its service as the logical connection between Being and Becoming. But, if it is to be the driving principle of the dialectic, it must exist outside of that dialectic.

Kristeva asserts that contrary to Hegel’s claim, what the dialectic represents as negativity, namely, Nothing, is precisely that which remains outside of logic (Kristeva, 1984, 112). It remains heterogeneous to logic even while producing it through a movement of separation or rejection. She tries to irrevocably separate negativity from the dialectic. Nothing has the necessary objectivity of a law and can be seen as the logic of matter (Ibid.). To see it as such is possible, writes Kristeva:

because of and in spite of Hegel because he maintains, in opposition to Spinoza, the inseparability, the interpenetration, indeed the contradiction of Being and Nothing even if only within the sphere of the Idea (Kristeva, 1984, 112).
It is the negativity that is inseparable from a Hegelian notion of Being that
splits and prevents the closing up of Being. It prevents the reification of Being as
an object, and allows for an understanding of the self as a process. Hegel's
demonstration of the negative moment in becoming, the moment of the
independence of Nothing, splits Being. It keeps Being from closing back on itself
as an undifferentiated unity. It propels Being into a constant movement, a
constant process. Kristeva asserts that the subject is always in process; Being is
always in a process of passing over, as is nothing. Of course, for Kristeva, the
unity of Being and Nothing in this process is highly problematic.

The Nothing that is contained alongside of, and within, Being opens it up to
experience which cannot be said. It allows that which is radically opposed to
Being to effect it. However, in doing so, it remains independent of Being. These
experiences are what Kristeva terms the unnamable. One cannot say what this
Nothingness is, for to do so is to posit that which is irreducibly different, and we
have no access to what is irreducibly different. Nothingness lets in all that cannot
be said and allows it to effect, and penetrate, Being. Negativity is not merely a
logical base. On the contrary, it asserts its unsayability as its strength.

Being is infused with Nothingness; it is always in a process of returning to
Nothingness. Nevertheless, one posits in Being an affirmative, unified existence.
However, this is a futile claim, for Being is driven back into negativity. According to
Kristeva, this ongoing process constitutes the character of human existence.
Contrary to Hegel's assertions regarding the return to unity enacted by negation, Kristeva emphasizes the split in Being, the process of Being as a constant return to crisis.

What Kristeva essentially takes issue with is the nature of the dialectical progression of identity as a unity in difference. Hegel writes:

It is of the highest importance to interpret the dialectical [movement] properly, and to [re]cognise it...The proper interpretation is that life as such bears the germ of death within itself, and that the finite sublates itself because it contradicts itself inwardly

(Hegel, EL, §81).

Being contains the germ of Nothingness within it. Hegel and Kristeva are in agreement on that matter. But, for Hegel, what must be emphasized is that Nothingness also contains the germ of Being within it. Further, it will be led on its own accord to render this implicit content explicit. It is not just a matter of one side containing the seed of its own destruction. Both sides are a part of the Other, insofar as they are Other to it. Hegel makes this quite clear when he comments that:

the dialectic... is concerned precisely with considering things [as they are] in and for themselves, so that the finitude of the one-sided determinations of the understand becomes evident

(Hegel, EL, §81).

The one-sided determinations of the understanding will necessarily "die off" and be replaced by a dialectical understanding. An understanding which can
grasp that unity is necessary for difference and difference is necessary for unity. In the next chapter I will look more closely at Hegel's dialectic to see if it is, in fact, capable of demonstrating the unity of opposites, while maintaining their difference.
Chapter Five

The Form of the Logical

In this chapter, I will examine the unity of contradiction in Hegel's dialectical method. I will begin by examining the "Form of the logical" in order to investigate the ability of the "negation of the negation" to unify. I will then turn to the importance of reflection for this move to unity. Finally, in order to directly answer Kristeva's criticism, I will examine this method as it is revealed in Hegel's exposition of Being and Nothing. I will argue for a reading of Hegel's dialectic as a method which does not reduce the second moment, the Other, to a logical negation, but recognizes both the separation and the interconnectedness of self and Other.

The unity in Hegel's system of philosophy is a unity in difference; a unity which retains the determinate and separate existence of all that it contains. Hegel's emphasis on unity is an emphasis on the necessity of defining a thing with reference to its limits or boundaries. A given determination has its limitation only in the face of what is Other; what exists for it as a limit. Thus in order for there to be identity, this self-constituted otherness must be taken as a limit for a subject. This negation of otherness does not abolish otherness but, on the contrary,

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1 I refer to Hegel's dialectical method which contains the three sides of the logical within it; not the dialectical side of the logical form alone.
incorporates it as a moment, along with the positive side of the determination (Hegel, PR §22). The result of this process is that one now has a relation of self-limitation. It is self-limitation that is the key, for as we saw in Chapter One, the freedom of the subject to determine itself is one of Hegel's main concerns. However, it is not just one person who must be free. All persons must be able to rationally determine themselves.

Self-determination takes place with the aid of an Other. This Other, however, is not a wholly separate, independent human being. Hegel's dialectic does not begin with two things that stand opposed to one another, for two separate and opposed moments can only be united from the outside. If this were the case, their unity would be an imposition, and Hegel is clear that the unity of the dialectic cannot be imposed. The dialectic must progress of its own accord. The finite determinations of the dialectic must be sublated on their own; they must "self-sublate" (Hegel, EL, §81). The Other (the negative) must originate out of the starting point (the positive). Further, the overcoming of these oppositions must be performed by the oppositions themselves.

But this seems problematic. If the negative develops out of the positive, then there is a sense in which the negative is a projection of the starting point. In intersubjective terms, this would mean that the Other is a projection of the self. If

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2 For a critical discussion of self-limitation see Duquette, "Kant, Hegel and the Possibility of a Speculative Logic".

3 Hegel has argued, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, that human beings are intersubjective. As such, they are dependent on each other. See chapter
this Other is merely the projection of the self, then Kristeva is correct and there is no Other in Hegelian philosophy. On the other hand, if the Other is both itself and an Other, then the possibility of a positive relation becomes more conceivable.

For Hegel, the Other isn't just a limit. As we saw in our discussion of something and Other in chapter four, the Other is itself something that is limited (EL, §92). The Other has a dual character. On the one hand, the Other is negation, nothingness, the situation of sheer instability. On the other hand, the object that Other signifies is also identical with itself; it has a moment of independence. It is something substantial that is determined by its lack of determinability. To be "other than" any determination one may posit in it is its determining factor (Hegel, EL, §87).

This dual character of the Other is what Hegel has in mind when he asserts that the negative becomes positive. He writes:

When the dialectic has the negative as its result, then, precisely as a result, the negative is at the same time the positive, for it contains what it resulted from sublated within it, and it cannot be without it

(Hegel, EL, §81).

The negative, opposition or contradiction, contains that which it is the negative of. In order to be an Other it must be related to that which is its Other. Therefore, to oppose is to relate, and, more strongly, contradiction requires unity. This is the insight that Hegel's dialectic provides, the insight that Kristeva refuses in her attempt to hold contraries apart. To be in contradiction is, at the same time,
to assert the unity of opposites.

In order to make this more clear, let's look closely at the negative's self-negation. As an important aspect of the dialectical method, the negative's self-negation can be found throughout Hegel's work. I will look specifically at Hegel's introduction to the "form of the logical" found in §79-§82 of the *Encyclopaedia Logic*. The logical, he tells us, has three sides which are not to be understood as three separate parts of the logic, but as the three "moments of everything logically real; i.e., of every concept or of everything true in general" (Hegel, EL, §79). The form of the logical is actual, it exists in the world. Any instance of truth will exhibit the tripartite structure of the logical. The three sides which comprise the logical are: the understanding, the dialectical or negatively rational, and the speculative or positively rational (Ibid.).

The first side, that of the understanding, is the most abstract side. The understanding distinguishes fixed determinacies from each other, and holds them apart. The main activity of the understanding is the "bestowing of the form of universality on its content" (Hegel, EL, §80). The understanding gives its objects the form of universality, and sees this abstraction as wholly opposed to the particular object to which it was assigned. The understanding is not just a subjective activity though. It is universal and hence objective at the same time. The universal is thought to be that which underlies the object, its cause or driving force. The universal posited by the understanding is not merely a collection of determinations (Ibid.). For instance, the understanding does not claim that
because a creature has brown hair and brown eyes, four paws, a tail, and dog breath, that it is a dog. Rather, the understanding posits the creature's kind as that of a dog. The Dogness of the creature is its universal element, which is more than the collection of its determinacies. It is the underlying principle of the thing.

The understanding, when pushed to extremes, will yield its opposite. Hegel cites the platonic dialogues as a good example of this overturning; Socrates had a talent for raising "all manner of questions, so that the people with whom he conversed were led on to say the opposite of what had appeared to them at the beginning to be correct" (Hegel, EL, §81). Similarly, any claim of the understanding, which seeks to keep the universal and the particular completely separate, can be pushed to reveal the indistinguishability of the two. This is the second side of the logical form, namely, the dialectical moment or the negatively rational side. The dialectic, Hegel writes, is the "immanent transcending, in which the one-sidedness and restrictedness of the determinations of the understanding displays itself as what it is, i.e., as their negation" (Ibid.). We might look again to our dog example in order to clarify the dialectical side of the logical. When one pushes the understanding, which seeks to keep the particular determinations of the dog separate from its universal Dogness, it will reveal that one cannot explain either side without reference to the other. One cannot explain Dog without recourse to its determinations, i.e., that it has four legs, a tail, etc. Nor can one say what that four legged creature is without recourse to its universal element, its Dogness. The negatively rational side shows the impossibility of knowing about
the particular dog or the universal Dog without being led to talk about both. The understanding, which sought to hold apart the dog and its Dogness, has turned into the dialectical, which cannot separate them at all.

My example of the dog is one of a concrete object. Hegel also provides a number of examples of the dialectical side with regards to politics, feeling, and ethics. He writes:

This dialectic is therefore recognized in many proverbs...if abstract justice is driven to the extreme, it overturns into injustice. Similarly, in politics, it is well known how prone the extremes of anarchy and despotism are to lead to one another. In the domain of individual ethics, we find the consciousness of dialectic in those universally familiar proverbs: "pride goes before a fall", "Too much wit outwits itself" etc. (Hegel, EL, §81).

These examples serve to further demonstrate the character of the negatively rational moment. However, one must not stop here. One must proceed from this negative moment to the positively rational moment; the speculative moment.

The speculative moment is the key to Hegel's dialectical method. The negatively rational moment is a result, and as a result it is positive, determined; it has a content. Hegel defines the speculative moment as the comprehension of "the unity of the determinations in their opposition, the affirmative that is contained in their dissolution and their transition" (Hegel, EL, §82). The speculative is not empty and abstract, but determinate. It is the "unity of distinct determinations" (Ibid.).
Both the understanding and the negatively rational can be found in this third, positive side of the logical. All one need do, to see the understanding, is remove the negatively rational, and all one need do to see the negatively rational is to remove the speculative, which sublates it. The speculative is the sublation of both earlier sides of the logical; it contains both within it as distinct. We might again refer to our dog example. First we saw that the dog and its Dogness were separate. Next we discovered that they could not be held apart or distinguished from each other at all. Now, in the speculative moment we realize that they are both separate and united; distinguishable and indistinguishable. The dog is different from Dogness as it has particular determinations that are not contained in Dogness. For instance, my dog has brown eyes and one crooked ear. These determinations are not necessary to Dogness, we can conceive of it without them. On the other hand, dog is not different from Dogness. My dog has the particular determinations referred to above, but he also has a tail and four legs and fur. I could not say what my dog is, without referring to his inner essentiality, his Dogness. My dog is not a brown eyed thing, or a fur bearing thing, but a Dog. His Dogness is his inner essential being. It is what is most important about him; it is what is true about him.

In the speculative moment, we realize that the indistinguishability of my dog and its Dogness has a positive result. It is precisely because it is a result that it is positive (Hegel, EL, §82). It has a content, a determination. I can now say what my dog is. He is both a Dog and he is this particular dog. He is both a dog, as
separate from Dogness, and a dog as united with Dogness.

This is the "core" of the dialectical process; the negative, which relates to the positive, is "forced" to overcome contradiction. The negation of the negative is a new positive, a new unity. This position contains the determinations of all that it has passed through. The negative rational moment folds in on itself. Through its definition as indeterminate, the negative reveals its determinacy and is no longer completely negative. It is now something that is. It is something that we can know a bit about, namely that it is "not the positive". The positive, for its part, is changed by this change in the negative. The positive moves to a new position of determinacy where our knowledge of it is increased. We know now that as the positive, it is not "not the positive". This dialectical method allows one to progress through a number of determinations, learning more and more about what Is, while always staying connected with the points through which one has passed. The dialectic incorporates all of its earlier determinations within it, as it is dependent on them.

One of the ways that one can further defend Hegel's dialectic is by emphasizing his use of reflection. There are (at least) two senses of reflection at work in Hegel's logic. The first is the thinking over of the object. It is a reflecting on the object which bestows it with a universal element. The result of this

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4 See Aboulafia, *The Self-Winding Circle: a study of Hegel's system*. St. Louis Green, 1982, for a discussion of the implications of the "forced" overcoming of contradiction, and the debates surrounding the sense in which the overcoming is a "forced" one.
reflection is the opposed determinations of the understanding. This initial position is problematized and a second position is taken; the dialectical. Both positions seem correct, but opposed. This is the negative sense of reflection (Hegel, EL, §81).

The reflection that I will examine is the positive sense of reflection; the "transcending of the isolated determinacy and a relating of it" (Ibid.). It is the positive reflection of the speculative moment. Though the dialectic continues on from this point, as reflection "links the two of them [moments] only in contiguity or succession, by means of an "also"; it does not bring these thoughts together" (Hegel, EL, §114), we can use this positive concept of reflection in order to defend Hegel's method. Reflection is important to speculative philosophy, as it mediates the actual (Hegel, EL, §22). One must reflect in order to know. In thinking, one raises oneself to the level of the universal. Thus thinking is freedom in which "there is no other for me that is not myself" (Hegel, EL, §24 add.2). We must not be surprised, then, that Hegel unites the first two oppositions in the Logic with a moment of thinking, namely reflection.

In reflecting, two different moments are united in a way that makes one indifferent to their difference. It is no longer a difference that makes a difference. In stepping back, thought changes. The one-sided determinations of the understanding are overcome in a dialectical method that incorporates difference as the very character of unity. In changing the perspective, the "object' of thought also changes. This is exactly what happens with the interplay of Being and
Nothing once one reflects on it.\footnote{And for this reason, one is led to the categories of identity and difference, ground, etc.}

We must begin our examination of Being and Nothing by pointing out that Hegel is careful to caution the reader against taking the positive element of the dialectic in isolation:

\textit{[C]orrect as it is to affirm the unity of being and nothing, it is equally correct to say that they are absolutely diverse too--that the one is not what the other is} 

(Hegel, 1991, §88).

This passage indicates that Hegel takes the diversity of the two moments very seriously, while recognizing that they are only possible as two different moments from the position of becoming.

Being and Nothing change in virtue of becoming determined; they become more concrete. The difference between Being and Nothing is unintelligible outside of becoming. Recall that each passed over into the other. Because Being has passed into Nothing, and Nothing has passed into Being, conceptual thought faces a dilemma whereby it must assert either the sameness of Being and Nothing (the dialectical side), or their difference (the side of the understanding) (Hegel, EL, §87). Thus conceptual thought is trapped in movement from asserting one as true to asserting the other as true. In order to be able to express the difference between them, one must move to becoming; one must move to a dialectical understanding (the speculative side)\footnote{Note that by defining the speculative as a dialectical understanding,}. It is in the movement to becoming that
Hegel introduces his dialectical method.

The dilemma can be resolved only when thought reflects on the movement itself, the constant oscillation of Being and Nothing, and recognizes that there is a moment of determinateness in this movement to and from. It is the very movement of thought that is the content of its thinking. The movement of thought is becoming. So, becoming is the first form of dialectical thought (Hegel, EL, §88). What distinguishes this moment as a dialectical moment is that what was previously inherent has become posited; the difference between the Being and Nothing that previously could only be implied, can now be spoken (Ibid.). The difference can only be discovered after the fact. It can only be reflected on.7

If we do not reflect, we are merely experiencing; we are merely passively apprehending as a consciousness. But, as we saw in chapter one, consciousness becomes self-consciousness, and self-consciousness does not passively apprehend but actively comprehends what Is (Hegel, PhS, §100). This comprehension is not imposed from outside reality, but is itself real. It is actual, as all knowledge must be reflected on in order to be knowledge, otherwise one could never say what he/she means. The reflection does not create the experience though. The reflection is a recollection of the experience of consciousness (Hegel, EL, §81). It is a positing of that which has taken place inherently. As such, it is a

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7The reflection, at this point, still comes from outside of the movement. It will not remain so, as reflection will turn onto itself.
mediation; it makes the inner essence real for consciousness.

The determinations of reflection demonstrate the internal linkage of ideas with each other. For Hegel, objective Concepts and Concepts of reflection are only different stages of the same development. The inner and the outer side of the object are one and the same thing, but they can still be distinguished.

What we learn from the process explicated in the first moment of the dialectical method is that unity is only a unity if it is unified in virtue of its difference. This is not to say that the negative disappears, or is appropriated by the positive. Rather, the unity of these two moments changes them in such a way that they are united and no longer merely opposed. That is not to say that they are not opposed at all. They are now seen in their true light, as both opposed and united. If Hegel emphasizes unity, as Kristeva claims, then he does so only by also emphasizing difference.

Perhaps Hegel would respond to Kristeva in the same way that he responds to the "one-sided" views of philosophy. He might emphasize, as I have tried to do here, the necessity of the unity of contradiction. Opposites cannot be isolated and held up as against the whole. They only make sense as opposites that are both united and opposed in the whole. Hegel makes this point at length when discussing philosophies that try to hold apart the infinite and the finite, the rational and the actual. He writes:

[T]he idealism of speculative philosophy involves the principle of totality and shows itself able to overgrasp the one-sidedness of the abstract determinations of the
understanding. Thus, idealism will say, "The soul is neither just finite nor just infinite, but is essentially both the one and the other, and hence neither the one nor the other." In other words, these determinations are not valid when they are isolated from one another but only when sublated

(Hegel, EL, §32).

This quote makes Hegel's position quite clear. The truth of the soul is that it is both finite and infinite, and yet it is neither. To trace this back to our discussion of the beginning of the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, what is essential about Being and Nothing is that they are the same yet different. They are both becoming, yet neither is becoming, for becoming is a new position, which contains the first two sublated within it. To see them one-sidedly, as an instance of Either-Or, is to lapse back into the "metaphysical understanding" that excludes mediation (Hegel, EL, §65).

Kristeva seems to be guilty of the very "one-sided" emphasis that Hegel finds problematic. She wants to emphasize the subject's return to crisis and difference. This, she claims, is in opposition to Hegel's focus on the subject's unity (Kristeva, 1974, 112). But, as we have seen, Hegel argues that his focus is on both unity and difference. A careful reading of Hegel's logic reveals the need to develop a dialectical understanding.

Kristeva's reading of Hegel emphasizes the subjective element of the dialectic. She speaks of his speculative philosophy as if "speculation" were to be defined as merely subjective. Hegel argues that, on the contrary, speculative philosophy is "neither provisionally, nor in the end, something merely subjective"
(Hegel, EL, §82). Rather, it is both subjective and objective. But, again, we must be careful that we do not interpret this as the unity of the subjective and objective. The subjective and objective are both identical and distinct. Their relation to each other is both a unity and a distinction (Hegel, EL, §82).

Hegel wants to see the Other as both identical to, yet distinct from, the self. If the Other, through whom the self is determined, must in some sense be identical with that self, we must inquire more carefully what that sense may be. It has been my argument throughout this thesis that the Other is identical with the self in the sense that both the self and the Other determine themselves through their connection with their Other. There is a mutual reciprocity in the dialectic of self and Other; a mutual dependence. The otherness of the Other is not dissolved in Hegel's philosophy, but equalized.

Otherness must be reconciled with that to which it stands opposed. The two are not the same in the sense of numerical identity, but are of qualitative similarity. Both freely restrict themselves with regard to the Other. So, genuine otherness is preserved; there are two different beings. Yet unity is preserved also, as the two only exist in each Other. Theirs is an otherness without estrangement, a dialectic of mutual recognition where both are equal yet different.8

If this is truly the sense in which otherness functions for Hegel, otherness as that which must be brought to the level of equality—though we do not know if this

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8Westphal discusses this "equality" at length in "Hegel's Radical Idealism: Family and State as Ethical Communities" from The State and Civil
means bringing it up, or lowering it—then we must look again at the particular problem that woman affords.
Chapter Six

Woman's Difference

As we have seen in the preceding chapter, Hegel's dialectical method does not treat otherness as merely a logical negation. Hegel's method is able to identify both the element of unity and the element of difference in the Other (the negation, in logical terms). However, as we discovered in chapter two, Hegel is not able to incorporate a positive notion of woman into his philosophical system.

Despite her problems with Hegel's dialectical method, Kristeva can shed some insight on Hegel's treatment of woman. This is largely due to the fact that Kristeva herself develops a dialectical understanding of identity, which is partially informed by her reading of Hegel. Kristeva's position on woman ends up being a position of unity and difference; a position that Hegel may have arrived at had he allowed the dialectic to develop properly. Though Kristeva may have a very different understanding of the impetus behind this position on woman, and though she may arrive at it using a very different theoretical orientation than Hegel, she nonetheless develops a dialectical understanding of woman and of one's relationship to woman.

In this chapter, I will use Kristeva's theory to show that at the heart of Hegel's inability to have a positive conception of woman lays his failure to fully articulate woman's difference. Hegel writes about woman as if she posed a threat
to male identity, and hence a threat to the state. However, if one understands woman as a category of difference, as a split category and as a category that splits itself in order to aid the Other in its quest for identity, then this perceived threat disappears. One can then conceive of woman as both Other and supportive. We need to make an excursion into Kristeva's identity theory, in order to understand the dual character of woman. My purpose in this excursion is not to fully grasp all the complexities and intricacies of Kristeva's theory. Rather, I want only to gain a general understanding of the way in which Kristeva opens up the possibility of seeing woman as a dual, yet non-threatening category.

Kristeva points out that one's identity begins with a separation from one's mother. This occurs most obviously on a material level; the child is expelled from the mother's body (Kristeva, 1987, 242). And it also occurs on a symbolic level; the child must see itself as separate from the mother.¹ Though it is traditionally believed in psychoanalysis that the separation of the child is facilitated by the Law of the Father (the stern father in the Oedipal drama, or the Word), Kristeva offers a different interpretation.² For Kristeva, in order to separate from the mother, the

¹Note that this symbolic separation need not occur with the biological mother. The child will need to individuate from she/he that it is dependent on for food and care (as all human infants are). At some point, the child will need to negotiate its own emerging identity with the fact that it is physically and psychically dependent on an Other. This Other will be referred to as the mother and/or the position of the mother.

²Despite any quarrels one might have with psychoanalytic theory on the whole, Kristeva's writing on child separation and identity formation will be helpful here in order to demonstrate the confusion in Hegel's philosophy regarding woman.
child must have the ability to split her. That is, the child must create two mothers as it were. One represents the container from which the child emerged, and the other represents both the mother's body as a body that "wants", and the mother's love as nuturant and affirmative (Kristeva, 1980, 238). The "maternal container" which is the mother from which the child emerged, must be, in a sense, killed off (it is the source which must dry up, perhaps?). The child must become independent of the maternal container in order to forge an identity of its own.

This independence is not the independence of castration, where the child is torn from the mother by an outside force. It is, rather, a pre-linguistic emerging independence. It is prior to the differentiation of dependence and independence, subject and object. The child is negotiating its own identity as part of the mother, yet as different from her.

The splitting of the mother, and the beginning of an emergent identity for the child, is only possible if the mother also actively splits herself (Kristeva, 1980, 240). She must Other herself. She must want something. There must be something through which she seeks satisfaction (Kristeva, 1980, 241). This wanting is different from desire, for desire requires objects. It requires a split between the subject and the object. For Kristeva, the process of identity formation begins before this split. It begins with not-yet subjects and not-yet objects (Kristeva, 1982, 5). In wanting, the mother creates a space of love that exists between the mother and what she wants. The mother's love is not love for the
child, but the space in-between the subject and object. It is the space of the abject (Kristeva, 1982, 12). By creating this space, the mother opens the possibility, for the child, of identifying with her love. That is, the child can want to become the mother's love. It can see itself as this love; as identical to this space. In doing so, the child can be both dependent and independent, yet neither because it is in between. The child can be both attached to the mother, as it is part of her wanting, yet detached from the mother, as it is part of the thing that she wants. Again, this occurs on a level prior to subjects and objects that stand opposed to one another. The ambiguous relationship of the subject and the object, and of the child to the mother, allows the child to “have” the mother and “have” an identity too.

This space of love, with which the child identifies, is a pleasurable space. Kristeva points out that if one’s identity involves only the castration of language, then it is difficult to explain why one gives up the security of unity with the mother. Why would any child seek loss and lack when they are in a position of secure unity? There must be something immanent in the mother-child relationship that causes the separation of the two. The mother must have a universal element, the germ of her own negation. There must exist the mother's “want”. If the child can identify with the mother's love, then it can be, in part, her fulfillment and satisfaction. It can be that which the mother depends on for the satisfaction of her desire. If this is possible, it not only explains the reason the child seeks out this position; it can have an identity and experience the pleasure of being mommy’s
satisfaction, but it also explains how the child can be both dependent on the mother and independent of her (Kristeva, 1980, 238). It creates the possibility of a reciprocal relationship of dependence between the mother and child. It is the reciprocity in this relationship that will allow the child to overcome its perception of the mother as threatening. The mother becomes both the unity from which the child separates, and, through her act of wanting, the support for this separation. She becomes the loving, "wanting" mother, who fosters the child's movement into language and identity.

If the child is not able to split the mother, or if the mother does not "want", the child must reject the mother entirely in order to have its own identity (Kristeva, 1987, 252). It will not be able to identify with the mother's love, which is a separate yet attached position. It will be faced with an either/or decision: either the child remains in an immediate unity with the mother, or it separates from her completely, repressing its element of dependence on her. In the first case, one will never develop one's own identity. In the latter, one will have an identity over and against the unity with the mother. The mother will then appear as that immediate unity which threatens one's identity. Rather than recognize its ambiguous relationship to the mother, the child will repress its dependence on her. It will render the mother threatening, as one who must be carefully controlled so that one can forget one's dependence on her and believe oneself wholly independent. This understanding is problematic for it assumes that the mother does not desire
separation from the child. It fails to see the mother's position as one of supporting identity, rather than trying to thwart it. The child mistakenly believes that the mother must dry up, disappear, before the child can have an identity.

I argue that Hegel's category of woman is analogous to this threatening mother that has not been split. Woman is the mother as a unity without difference. This is not to say that woman is simply a mother. I do not mean to claim that all women are essentially mothers, nor do I claim that the characteristics that define a woman are those of the mother. Woman is mother in the sense that she represents the immediate unity from which one must split in order to have an identity. The mother, recall, is not necessarily an actual mother. She is only the position of unity that acts as the foundation of identity. Hegel's woman fulfills the same function in his philosophical theory as the mother does in Kristeva's writing; she is the position of unity in relation to which one forges one's identity.

Hegel speaks of woman as threatening and devouring. Woman, given her place of importance in the family, exists for man as a unity from which he must break free. She threatens man, she tries to subvert his attempts at individuation, she does not want him to have any independence from her. She refuses him the separation he requires to join in the Conceptual world of men.

For Hegel, man must leave the secure confines of the family in order be united with his fellow statesmen. This creates some tension between the family run by woman, and civil society, the realm of man. Hegel writes:
Since the community only gets an existence through its interference with the happiness of the Family...it creates for itself in what it suppresses and what is at the same time essential to it an internal enemy—womankind in general

(Hegel, PhS, §475).

Woman resents the intrusion of the community. She is unwilling to give up man to the community, and as a result she comes to oppose and threaten that community. She becomes an enemy.

Woman finds her pleasure with the brave youth within the family. Her desire threatens to keep the young man in the family and not allow him to have his worth openly recognized by other men. At times it takes the action of war to pull the young man out of his family and into the service of the state. Hegel informs us that in war, the "brave youth in whom woman finds her pleasure, the suppressed principle of corruption, now has his day and his worth is openly acknowledged" (Hegel, 1977, §479). Woman attempts to keep man from this acknowledgement of worth.

Woman and man assert the truth of the unity and independence of the family. Man will be torn from this immediate truth to see that it is false. The family is not independent, but depends on the corporations of civil society and on the state. Man will learn that the stage of treating woman as enemy, of separating genders in the state, is also shown to be false as civil society advances. Though

3See Jo-ann Pilardi Fucho’s article "On the War Path and Beyond: Hegel, Freud and Feminist Theory" (1983) where she argues that Hegel's theory of the state and war can be read as a reflection of the psychosocial process of the
this may be the case, it is only man who recognizes it. Man will learn that woman is a citizen, just like him, and he will represent her and (possibly) even inform her of this fact. Hence it is only man who will proceed to speak for, and represent, woman. Woman, however, will not progress past the family. She will not recognize its falsity, but will remain in the tragic position of asserting the unity of the family. She will remain in ignorance, trying to convince the young man that the family is indeed true and independent.

The emergence from the family, then, is a struggle. It is a struggle against woman who has her substantial vocation in the family. Hegel recognizes that man is still dependent on the family, though. Male identity depends on the struggle with the family, and ultimately on the suppression of woman. Man must get the immediacy of feeling from the family, and he must get his particularity from the family. Hence man is both dependent on the family, yet independent of it. This is a great insight on Hegel's part. However, he continues to portray woman's role as one of thwarting the independence of the male through his dependence on her. Woman threatens the community, even while she is the foundation of it. The dependence on woman must be carefully controlled for she is threatening and this dependence is threatening.

Here it becomes evident that Hegel conceives of one's dependence on woman and the family as a threat to identity. This dependence is not a positive dependence, it is not a dependence on one whom man trusts and loves, but one separation from the mother that is necessary for masculine identity.
who threatens him. Woman threatens the community of man. She is a threat to male identity and must be separated from as much as possible. But, as we saw above, one cannot separate completely, for woman, as that against which man finds his identity, is a part of that identity. For this reason, the remaining dependence on woman must then be repressed, ignored, forgotten. It is not overcome, nor is it sublated. Rather, it is pushed from one's mind and denied existence. Woman's positive identity is repressed in Hegel's system of Philosophy.4

What Hegel fails to see is that woman does not wish to consume man, to keep him in the folds of immediacy, denying him participation in the state; denying him freedom. Woman is not solely the maternal container, and her desire is not that of male consumption. Hegel's position on woman is problematic in that it does not recognize woman's complex, dialectical nature. Man is both dependent on, and independent from, woman. Woman is both unified with man and separate from him, she is both mother's love and maternal container. Ironically, Kristeva, who criticizes Hegel for being overly subjective (one-sided) in general, and develops her own position partially in response to this understanding of Hegel, ends up with a dialectical account of woman that recognizes her complexity and difference.

Kristeva extends her "difference" oriented understanding of woman to include all relationships. One's dependence on the mother, if not recognized as a

4See chapter two where I make this argument in more detail.
partial dependence that fosters independence, becomes something threatening. Hence one must refuse their own dependence, what Kristeva calls their own otherness. This has the effect of rendering the self an illusory unity. It also leads to a difficulty in dealing with all instances of otherness.

However, by coming to terms with one's otherness, the self is able to foster relationships based on difference. This has the effect producing a better society, a more equalized and balanced society that balances itself by valuing difference.\textsuperscript{5} Hence Kristeva provides a way to change society for the better; something that is very important to those who have no voice in the state, aside from the voice of the patriarchal male who assumes he can speak for them. Kristeva does not just seek to know what is, she seeks to change it.

Kristeva's understanding of woman and her focus on social change can be used to enrich Hegel's philosophy in those instances where it fails to fully develop its own internal logic; in those cases, such as woman, where Hegel's thought is partially imposed on the content. This use is possible because of the dialectic understanding that Kristeva has of identity. Though she has asserted throughout her work that difference is radical and cannot be unified, she sees identity as this very difference. The subject is difference. The focus on the difference and otherness of the subject, the focus on a constant return to crisis of a subject-in-process, is a claim about the inherent instability of identity. It is a dialectical claim.

\textsuperscript{5} Kristeva makes this argument at length in her book \textit{Strangers To Ourselves}, 1991.
Kristeva's position regarding identity ends up being similar to that of Hegel. Throughout her work, Kristeva emphasizes the impossibility of a fixed identity, the impossibility of an identity without difference. Though Hegel often tends to speak in terms of the identity necessary for difference, whereas Kristeva speaks of the difference necessary for identity, the difference in theoretical orientation seems to be largely one of emphasis. By emphasizing difference one is able to posit the category of woman as a dual category. Kristeva's insight regarding the mother allows one to see that a dialectical understanding of woman is possible.

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6 She even admits to a dialectical understanding, though it is a materialist dialectic which has linked up to the body through Freud's notion of repetition (Kristeva, 1974, 178).
Conclusion

I have attempted, in this thesis, to defend Hegel’s dialectical method against some feminist critics, who view it as a tool of oppression. I have argued that Hegel’s discussion of woman is erroneous because he does not allow the inner development of the dialectical method to fulfill itself in the category of woman. Hegel has a “blind spot” when it comes to woman. He cannot envision her difference, her activity, or her desire to know herself.

I have also argued that this homogeneous perspective does not extend to Hegel’s dialectic. Hegel’s dialectical method does not oppress difference. Rather, it underscores the necessity of difference in any conception of unity. It also underscores the unity necessary for difference. Unity and difference stand in a reciprocal relationship to one another. Though it is at times difficult to recognize difference, and on this note Kristeva rightly argues it ought to be emphasized, unity cannot exist without it. Hegel’s emphasis on unity is an emphasis on the interconnectedness of unity and difference. This is demonstrated, as I argued in chapter five, in the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, where Hegel presents the three side of the “form of the logical” and reveals their unity in difference.

Having argued for an understanding of Hegel’s dialectical method that emphasizes its ability to account for both unity and difference, I returned to the
woman question. Here I claimed that despite her reading of Hegel's method as one that imposes unity on radically different categories, Kristeva can offer some insight into woman. Kristeva demonstrates the dual character of woman. For Kristeva, woman is both a category that is split, and a category that splits itself. She demonstrates the possibility of a conception of woman that is supportive rather than threatening.

Hegel is unable to have a positive conception of woman; he can see her only as a threatening dependency. I have also argued that the problem with this conception lay in Hegel's bias, not in his dialectical method. The difficulties in Hegel's writing on woman could possibly be rectified through Kristeva's notion of the split mother. One can use Kristeva's identity theory to develop a dialectical understanding of woman.

Despite Hegel's difficulties, I think that it is important for feminist thinkers, and feminist philosophers, to pay close attention to his philosophical theory. There are a number of feminist responses to Hegel's philosophy and I went through some of these responses in chapter two. I have defended the feminist perspective that one ought not to reject Hegel outright as seeing all otherness, all difference, as a logical negation for a self-relation. I have shown in Chapters three and four why that position is untenable once one understands the nature of Hegel's dialectical method.

I would like to again suggest that Hegel can be valuable to feminist theory if one engages in a program of actively forgetting his views on woman. Hegel was
wrong about woman. But, he does provide an interesting and comprehensive way
to deal with difference, something that feminists themselves see as a central
concern. Thus I advocate a reading of Hegel that is open to the possibilities of
emancipation for all "Beings" regardless of their sex/gender. While at the same
time an active forgetting of his position on woman. This entails knowing what Hegel
thought about woman, being wary and critical of his philosophy, yet engaging it
anyway.
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